Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah

Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah Law of the Sea, En...

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Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah

Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah

Edited by

Tafsir Malick Ndiaye Rüdiger Wolfrum

Chie Kojima Assistant Editor

LEIDEN/BOSTON 2007

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978 90 04 16156 6 Copyright 2007 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishers, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher. Authorisation to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill Academic Publishers provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Judge Thomas A. Mensah

CONTENTS

Foreword

xiii

Judge Thomas A. Mensah: Biographical Note

xv

Judge Thomas A. Mensah: Select Bibliography

xvii

List of Contributors

xxi

List of Abbreviations

xxxi

Part I International Law: Rules and Principles Towards A New Universal International Law: An Asian Perspective R.P. Anand

3

Precaution in International Law: Reflection on its Composite Nature Laurence Boisson de Chazournes

21

International Law and Collective Concerns: Reflections on the Responsibility to Protect Jutta Brunnée The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Human Right to a Clean Environment: The English Perspective Malgosia Fitzmaurice Some Thoughts on the Treatment of Inter-Governmental Organisations and their Personnel M.C.W. Pinto

35

53

97

vii

Contents

Part II International Dispute Settlement: Functions, Rules and Procedures Reflections on the Judicial Function in International Law C.F. Amerasinghe

121

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: A Proliferation Problem? Anthony Aust

131

Provisional Measures, or the Dangers of Being Too Exceptional Julio Barboza

143

Entre l’arbre et l’écorce (Between a Rock and a Hard Place): Can International Commercial Arbitration Deliver on Environmental Disputes? L. Yves Fortier

159

Environmental Damage and the United Nations Claims Commission: New Directions for Future International Environmental Cases? Philippe Gautier

177

Considerations actuelles sur l’inexécution des decisions de la Cour internationale de Justice Maurice Kamto

215

The Interplay between Negotiation and Litigation in International Dispute Settlement Vaughan Lowe

235

La recevabilité devant les juridictions internationales Tafsir Malick Ndiaye

249

New Issues in the Settlement of Disputes of International Investments: The Global Reach of the Role of Dispute Settlement Francisco Orrego Vicuña

297

Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the Progressive Development of International Environmental Law Philippe Sands

313

Preparation for International Litigation Sir Arthur Watts

viii

327

Contents

Taking and Assessing Evidence in International Adjudication Rüdiger Wolfrum The Selection of Candidates for International Judicial Office: Recent Practice Michael Wood

341

357

Part III The Law of the Sea 1. In General UNCLOS III and the Process of International Law-Making Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin

371

The Law of the Sea and the Margin of Appreciation Jean-Pierre Cot

389

Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident: New International Guidelines Edgar Gold

405

Uniform Application of the International Regime on Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Måns Jacobsson

421

Peaceful Uses of the Seas in the Light of New Challenges and Threats A.L. Kolodkin, Y.V. Bobrova and G.G. Shinkaretskaia

437

La Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique Djamchid Momtaz

443

The Penal Law of Ship-Source Marine Pollution: Selected Issues in Perspective Proshanto K. Mukherjee

463

International Law Governing Places of Refuge for Tankers Threatening Pollution of Coastal Environments 497 Myron H. Nordquist Public Trusteeship for the Oceans Peter H. Sand

521

ix

Contents

La Charte africaine des transports maritimes: Principes, règles et techniques Louis Savadogo Sea Boundary Delimitation and Internal Waters Budislav Vukas

545

553

2. Zonal Approach The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Military Activities and the Need for Compromise? Sam Bateman Categories of International Straits Excluded from the Transit Passage Regime under Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Hugo Caminos

569

583

The Outer Continental Shelf: Background and Current Developments Andree Kirchner

593

Offshore Bunkering in the Exclusive Economic Zone Rainer Lagoni

613

Some Reflections on the Effect of Artisanal Fishing on Maritime Boundary Delimitation W. Michael Reisman and Mahnoush H. Arsanjani

629

3. Operation and Implementation through Institutions States Parties and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Betsy Baker The Rise and Rise of IMO’s Liability and Compensation Regimes Rosalie Balkin

669

687

Suppressing Unlawful Acts: IMO Incursion in the Field of Criminal Law 713 Agustín Blanco-Bazán Article XIV of the FAO Constitution, International Legal Personality and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission William Edeson

x

735

Contents

Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Non-Members Moritaka Hayashi The EU Directive on Ship-Source Pollution and on the Introduction of Penalties for Infringements: Development or Breach of International Law? Doris König

751

767

The Regulation of Navigation under International Law: A Tool for Protecting Sensitive Marine Environments Julian Roberts and Martin Tsamenyi

787

Some International Law Aspects of the Use of Vessel Monitoring Systems for Preventing Illegal Unreported Unregulated Fishing Tullio Treves

811

Allocating Fish Across Jurisdictions Jon M. Van Dyke

821

4. Settlement of Disputes Article 283 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea David Anderson The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case and Dispute Settlement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Japanese Perspective Nisuke Ando

847

867

Delimitation Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Settlement Procedures P. Chandrasekhara Rao

877

From Port State to Court State? International Litigation as a Possible Weapon to Combat Sub-Standard Ships Robin Churchill

899

The 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Delimitation (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award Barbara Kwiatkowska

917

xi

Contents

The Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Some Observations 967 L.D.M. Nelson Arbitrations under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Shabtai Rosenne The Contribution of ITLOS to Oceans Governance through Marine Environmental Dispute Resolution Donald R. Rothwell Prompt Release Cases in ITLOS Michael White

989

1007

1025

Part IV Environmental Law International Approaches to Global Environmental Challenges Charles E. Di Leva

1055

The Iron Rhine Arbitration and the Emergence of a Principle of General International Law Christian Dominicé

1067

The Establishment, Role and Evolution of the Global Environment Facility: Operationalising Common but Differentiated Responsibility? David Freestone

1077

The UNCC Follow-up Programme for Environmental Awards Mojtaba Kazazi

1109

Strict Liability in International Environmental Law Alexandre Kiss† and Dinah Shelton

1131

The Interest of Caribbean States in the Nuclear Age: with Specific Reference to Trinidad and Tobago Anthony Amos Lucky Reflections on Developing Countries’ Role in Negotiating the Pre-Rio Conference Environment-Related Treaties: A Proposal of Action for Enhancing their Role and Effectiveness W. Paatii Ofosu-Amaah

xii

1153

1163

FOREWORD

T

he editors and contributors dedicate this Festschrift to their teacher, colleague and friend, Judge Thomas A. Mensah. This Festschrift includes essays that reflect Thomas Mensah’s lifetime contributions to international law that centre around the law of the sea, the protection of environment, and the settlement of disputes. Thomas Mensah has established his distinguished career in both practical and academic fields of international law across the three continents – Africa, America and Europe. Having completed his education at the University of Ghana (BA), the University of London (LLB) and Yale Law School (LLM, JSD), he embarked on his professional career as a lecturer back at his alma mater, the University of Ghana. His approach to international law soon attracted some of the United Nations institutions and Thomas Mensah became an indispensable talent for the United Nations in most of his professional life. Thomas Mensah’s JSD dissertation at Yale Law School, Self-Determination under United Nations’ Auspices: the Role of the United Nations in the Application of the Principle of Self-Determination for Nations and Peoples, showed his early dedication to foster implementation of principles of international law through international institutions, be they judicial, quasi-judicial or non-judicial. Later Thomas Mensah switched to the law of the sea. Highlights in his professional career are the position as legal advisor of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the professorship at the World Maritime University of Malmö and his position at the Law of the Sea Institute of the University of Hawaii. As legal advisor of IMO, Thomas Mensah was involved in the negotiations of several crucial international instruments and it was his responsibility to strengthen the legal services of IMO. Thomas Mensah’s contribution to international law as a Judge and the first President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is another highlight of his career. His firm conviction that international judicial institutions ensure that “international disputes are resolved peacefully, for the benefit of the parties and the international community as a whole” was brought in action during his term (Mensah, International Judicial Institutions and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 1999).

xiii

Foreword

Thomas Mensah has dedicated his enthusiasm for international law also as an individual. He has played a pivotal role in mediating conversations in the Sudan Projects at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, Germany, since 2002. His common law background from Ghana, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, combined with his knowledge of African realities and culture, made him the ideal person to bridge the gap between common law and civil law systems and differences in perspective between German scholars and Sudanese practitioners. Thomas Mensah has enlightened us not only by his professional activities but also by communicating with peoples with a good sense of humour. He taught us the importance of human interactions and communications in shaping a better common understanding of international law in a divided world. The editors would like to thank Peter Buschman of Martinus Nijhoff Publishers for his cooperation to make this project possible. We hope that this Festschrift, dedicated with our deepest respect to Thomas Mensah, will inspire its readers to reflect on his significant contributions to the development of international law. Tafsir Malick Ndiaye Dakar

Rüdiger Wolfrum Heidelberg June 2007

xiv

JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH: BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

T

homas A. Mensah was a Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, from 1996 to 2005. He was the first President of the Tribunal from 1996 to 1999. He was born in Kumasi, Ghana on 12 May 1932, and had his secondary school education at Achimota School Accra from 1948 to 1951. He entered the University of Ghana in 1952 and graduated with a BA (first class) degree in June 1956. Between 1956 and 1959 he studied law with the University of London, obtaining the LLB (honours) degree in June 1959. He subsequently undertook post-graduate studies at the Yale Law School where he was awarded a master’s degree (LLM) in 1962 and a doctorate degree (JSD) in 1964. The positions he has held include Lecturer in Law, University of Ghana (1963-1968), Dean of the Faculty (1967-1968); Associate Legal Officer, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (1965-1966); Special Advisor on Environmental Law and Institutions, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi (1991-1992); and Visiting Professor, World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden (1981-1990). Thomas Mensah spent most of his professional career with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in London. He joined the secretariat of IMO (then IMCO) in September 1968 as the first Head of the Organization’s Legal Division. He was promoted to the position of Director of Legal Affairs and External Relations in 1976, and he was designated Assistant Secretary General in 1981. He took early retirement from IMO in September 1990, after 22 years of service. Between 1993 and 1995 Thomas Mensah served as the Cleveringa Professor (visiting) at the University of Leiden and Professor of Law and Director of the Law of the Sea Institute at the William S Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawaii, in Honolulu. Thomas Mensah was nominated to be the first High Commissioner (Ambassador) of Ghana to the Republic of South Africa in 1995. He held this position until he was elected as a Judge of the newly created International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. In October 1996, he was elected the first President of the Tribunal. On the expiry of his term as President in September 1999, he continued xv

Judge Thomas A. Mensah: Biographical Note

as a Judge of the Tribunal until the end of his term as Judge on 30 September 2005. In 1999, Thomas Mensah was appointed Chairman of the “F4” (Environmental) Panel of Commissioners of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) to consider claims submitted by a number of governments for compensation for environmental damage resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990. The Panel completed its work in March 2005. In 2003, Thomas Mensah was invited by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic of Ireland to act as President of the five-man Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate on the dispute between the two governments concerning the environmental effects of the operation of the British nuclear facility at Sellafield (the Mox Plant case). Thomas Mensah was inducted into the Maritime Hall of Fame in New York in May 1998. The presentation on that occasion was made by the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, Mr Kofi Annan. In 2007, Thomas Mensah was honoured by the Government of Germany with the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. Thomas Mensah is a Member of the Institut de Droit international (since 1989), Titular Member Comité Maritime International (CMI), a Member of the Advisory Council of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, a Member of the Standing Committee on Maritime Arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris and a Member of the Commission on Environmental Law of the World Conservation Union (IUCN). He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Laws (honoris causa) by the University of Burgas in Bulgaria in 2005. He is joint winner of the 2006 Elizabeth Haub Prize for Environmental Law. Thomas Mensah is the author of articles, monographs and papers in the field of public international law, law of the sea, maritime law and international environmental law.

xvi

JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. “Legal Problems Relating to Marine Pollution”, in Peter Hepple (ed.), Water Pollution By Oil (The Institute of Petroleum, London, 1971), pp. 293-306. 2. “The IMCO Experience”, in John Lawrence Hargrove (ed.), Law, Institutions, and the Global Environment, (Oceana Publications, NY, A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1972), pp. 237-252. 3. “L’Activite Reglementaire de l’OMCI” (with Christopher H. Zimmerli), in L’elaboration de droit international publique, Societe Francaise pour le Droit International (Colloque de Toulouse, Edition Pedone, Paris, 1974), pp. 31-47. 4. “The Law Relating to Pollution of the Seas”, in Allan D. McKnight, Pauline Marstrand and T. Craig Sinclair (eds), Environmental Pollution Control: Technical, Economic and Legal Aspects (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1974), pp. 174-208. 5. “International Conventions Concerning Oil Pollution at Sea”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1976, pp. 110-130. 6. “Universalism and Regionalism in the Law of Carriage by Sea: The IMCO Experience”, in Clive M. Schmitthoff and Kenneth R. Simmonds (eds), International Economic and Trade Law – Universal and Regional Integration (A.W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1976), pp. 155-168. 7. “The Practice of International Law in International Organisations”, in Bin Cheng (ed.), International Law – Teaching and Practice (Stevens and Sons, London, 1982), pp. 146-163. 8. “Environmental Protection: International Approaches”, Marine Policy, Vol. 8, No. 2, April 1984, pp. 95-105. 9. The Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Document issued by the Secretariat of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), London, 1988.

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10. “The International Regulation of Maritime Traffic: IMO Approaches”, in E.D. Brown and Robin R. Churchill (eds), The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Impact and Implementation (Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, 1988), pp. 483-489. 11. The Group System in International Negotiations: An Appraisal, Inaugural Lecture for the Cleveringa Chair, Leiden University, 1993. 12. “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Its Role for the Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes”, in Abdulqawi A. Yusuf (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 5 (Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 227-242. 13. “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 1998, pp. 527-546. 14. “International and Governmental Structures and their Relation to Democracy: Common Report on Africa, Latin America and Asia”, in Hans F. Zacher (ed.), Democracy: Some Acute Questions, Proceedings of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, 22-25 April 1998 (Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Vatican City, 1999), pp. 327-363. 15. International Judicial Institutions and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Walter Schücking Institute, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn, 1999). 16. “The International Legal Regime for the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment from Land-based Sources of Pollution”, in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 297-324. 17. “The Jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea”, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Vol. 63, Issue 2, 1999, pp. 330-341. 18. “Environmental Damages under the Law of the Sea Convention”, in Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds), The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 226-249. 19. “Civil Liability and Compensation for Vessel-Source Pollution of the Marine Environment and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)”, in Nisuke Ando, Edward McWhinney and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda, Vol. 2 (Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 1391-1434. 20. “Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment and the Dispute Settlement Regime in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, in Andrew Kirchner (ed.), International Marine Environmental Law – Institutions, Implementation and Innovations (Kluwer Law International, 2003). xviii


21. “The Place of the ISPS Code in the Legal International Legal Regime – For the Security of International Shipping”, WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2004, pp. 17-30. 22. “Seafarers’ Rights: Reform” (with Michael Anderson and Deirdre Fitzpatrick), in Deirdre Fitzpatrick and Michael Anderson (eds), Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 539-559. 23. “The ISPS Code and the International Regime to Protect Maritime Security” (Keynote Address) in Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security – Workshop Symposium on the Practical Implementation of the ISPS Code (World Maritime University Publications, 2005). 24. Articles 44 to 53 (Contribution, Part III, Section A), in P. Chandrasekhara Rao and Philippe Gautier (eds), The Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), pp. 129-159. 25. “Book Review: Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2005)”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 75, 2006, pp. 343-351. 26. “Compliance Control in International Conventions on the Protection of the Marine Environment against Oil Pollution”, in Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), pp. 133-149. 27. “Joint Developments Zones as an Alternative Dispute Settlement Approach in Maritime Boundary Limitation”, in Rainer Lagoni and Daniel Vignes (eds), Maritime Delimitation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006). 28. “Seafarers in the Modern Maritime Industry: the Need for Reform”, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, Issue 2, May 2006, pp. 172-180.

Other articles on the Law of the Sea, Maritime Law, International Environmental Law and Public International Law.

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

C.F. Amerasinghe BA, LLB, Ph.D., LLD (Cambridge), LLM (Harvard), Ph.D. (Ceylon); Member, Institut de Droit international; Former Judge, United Nations Administrative Tribunal, NY; Judge, Commonwealth Secretariat Tribunal, London; Registrar, World Bank Tribunal, Washington, DC; Professor of Law, University of Ceylon; Honorary Professor of Law, University of Colombo; Adjunct Professor of International Law, American University Law School, Washington DC. R.P. Anand Professor Emeritus of International Law, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. David Anderson Former Judge, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Nisuke Ando Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University, Japan; Director, Kyoto Human Rights Research Institute; Member, Permanent Court of Arbitration; Membre, Institut de Droit international; Former Member and Chairperson, Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani Director, Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations. Anthony Aust He retired in 2002 as Deputy Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London. He is the author of Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge, 2000 (Chinese edition, 2005; 2nd English edn, 2007), and Handbook of International Law, Cambridge, 2005. Since 2002, he has been a consultant to governments and international organisations on international law; practises also with Kendall

xxi


Freeman, solicitors, London; and is a Visiting Professor of Law at the London School of Economics and University College London. Betsy Baker Lecturer on Law and Assistant Dean, Harvard Law School; Visiting Assistant Professor, Vermont Law School. Rosalie Balkin Director, Legal Affairs and External Relations Division, International Maritime Organization (IMO) (since 1998). Prior to that she was Assistant Secretary in the Office of International Law, Federal Attorney-General’s Department, Canberra, ACT, Australia. Prior to joining IMO, she headed the Australian delegation to IMO’s Legal Committee and served as Vice-Chairman of the Committee from 1993 to 1998. Julio Barboza Former Member and President of the United Nations International Law Commission; Member and former President of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal; Professor of international law at the Catholic University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Sam Bateman Ph.D.; Professorial Research Fellow at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong, Australia; Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; former Commodore (one star) in the Royal Australian Navy; former member of the EEZ Group 21. Agustín Blanco-Bazán Senior Deputy Director and Head of the Legal Office at the International Maritime Organization (IMO). He completed his law studies at the University of Buenos Aires, worked at Federal Courts and the Supreme Court in Argentina from 1969 to 1975, and further completed post-degree studies at the University of Vienna in philosophy in international law and political sciences (1975-1979). Previously he, as representative of the Argentine Reinsurance Group and the Argentine Institute of Reinsurance (1979-1984), led negotiations regarding implementation of reinsurance contracts during and after the South Atlantic conflict. He joined IMO in 1984 as interregional consultant in maritime legislation in charge of supervising legal aspects of implementation of IMO conventions in developing countries.

xxii


Y.V. Bobrova Ph.D. candidate and lecturer of international law at the Institute of the Moscow State Academy of Water Transport; specialist at the Ministry of Transport of Russian Federation (Legal Department). Laurence Boisson de Chazournes Professor and Head of the Department of International Law and International Organization, Faculty of Law, University of Geneva, Switzerland; Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. Alan Boyle Professor of Public International Law, University of Edinburgh; barrister, Essex Court Chambers, London. Jutta Brunnée Professor of Law and Metcalf Chair in Environmental Law, University of Toronto; Member, Board of Editors, American Journal of International Law; Co-editor, Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (2007). Hugo Caminos Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; Membre de l’Institut de Droit international. P. Chandrasekhara Rao Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Christine Chinkin Professor of International Law, London School of Economics; barrister, Matrix Chambers, London. Robin Churchill Professor of International Law at the University of Dundee, United Kingdom. Previously he had worked for many years at Cardiff University. His main teaching and research interests are the International Law of the Sea, International Environmental Law and Human Rights, on the first two of which he has written widely. He is the co-author (with Professor Vaughan Lowe) of The Law of the Sea. Jean-Pierre Cot Professor Emeritus, Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, France; Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

xxiii


Charles E. Di Leva Chief Counsel, Environmental and International Law Practice Group, Legal Department, The World Bank. Christian Dominicé Professor Emeritus of the University of Geneva and the Graduate Institute of International Studies (GIIS), Switzerland; Member, Institut de Droit international. William Edeson Professor, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong, Australia. From 1988 until 2003, he was a member of the Legal Office, FAO, Rome. Prior to that he worked in universities in Australia and United Kingdom, teaching Law of the Sea, International Law and Public Law. He has worked on maritime issues in several different regions, especially the Caribbean, the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean and southern Africa. Malgosia Fitzmaurice Professor of Law, Queen Mary College, University of London, UK. The main research interests of Professor Fitzmaurice are international environmental law, the law of treaties, international water law and indigenous peoples. L. Yves Fortier, CC, QC Chairman and senior partner, Ogilvy Renault LLP, Montreal, Canada; Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations (1988-1992); Former President (1998-2001), London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA). David Freestone LLD, Deputy General Counsel (Advisory Services) at the World Bank. He was previously Professor of International Law (University of Hull, England), has written widely on law of the sea and international environmental law, and is the Editor in Chief of the International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. Philippe Gautier Registrar, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; Professor, Catholic University of Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve), Belgium. Edgar Gold AM, CM, QC, Ph.D., FNI, Master Mariner (FG). Marine & Shipping Law Unit, T.C. Beirne School of Law, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.

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Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada and World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden. Member, Governing Board, IMOInternational Maritime Law Institute, Malta. Past President, Canadian Maritime Law Association. Titulary Member, Comité Maritime International. Moritaka Hayashi Professor, Waseda University School of Law; Former Assistant Director-General of FAO, in charge of Fisheries Department. Måns Jacobsson He studied law at Lund University in Sweden. He served as a judge in Sweden at district court and appellate court level and was Head of the Department for International Affairs of the Swedish Ministry of Justice. He held the post of President of Division of the Stockholm Court of Appeal. He was Director of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds in London 1985-2006. He is Visiting Professor at the World Maritime University in Malmö (Sweden) and at the Maritime Universities in Dalian and Shanghai (People’s Republic of China). In 2007 he was awarded the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws at Southampton University. Maurice Kamto Professeur à l’Université de Yaoundé II; Membre de la Commission du droit international des Nations Unies; Membre associé de l’Institut de Droit international. Mojtaba Kazazi Secretary of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC). He studied law in the University of Tehran (LLM, LLB, and doctorate course) and obtained Docteur en Droit (Grande Distinction), International Law, at the Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium). He has also studied international law in London and at The Hague Academy of International Law. He has worked as a judge of the High Court of Tehran; a law lecturer; on the arbitration and out-of-court settlement of a large volume of cases before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal at The Hague; and on setting up rules, policy and procedures for mass claims processing and on review of corporate and governmental claims in UNCC. He is the author of Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A Study on Evidence Before International Tribunals (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1995). Andree Kirchner Dr., LLM (Stockholm); Proferssor for International Law at the University of Applied Sciences Bremerhaven; Member on the ILA International Committee on Outer Continental Shelf. xxv


Alexandre Kiss† He was a director emeritus of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and president of the European Council on Environmental Law. He was one of the pioneers of international environmental law, having written more that a dozen books and several hundred articles on the topic during his distinguished career. He was decorated by the governments of France and Austria for his work, elected to the Hungarian Academy of Science, and was the recipient of the Elisabeth Haub Prize for Environmental Law. He passed away on 22 March 2007, shortly after completing his contribution to this volume. A.L. Kolodkin Ph.D., Professor of Law, the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Doris König Professor of Law, Bucerius Law School – Hochschule für Rechtswissenschaft, Hamburg, Germany. Barbara Kwiatkowska She holds a special chair of International Law of the Sea and is the Deputy Director of the Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea (NILOS) at the Utrecht University Faculty of Law, The Netherlands. She is the author of Decisions of the World Court Relevant to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (2002) and numerous other publications, and serves as a board member of leading journals on the international law of the sea and many other professional societies. Rainer Lagoni Professor of International Law and Director of the Law of the Sea and Maritime Law Institute, University of Hamburg, Germany. Vaughan Lowe Chichele Professor of Public International Law and Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford, United Kingdom. He is an Associate of the Institut de Droit international and a barrister practising from Essex Court Chambers, London. Anthony Amos Lucky Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Member of the Tribunal since 2 September 2003: President of the Chamber for Marine Environmental Disputes since 4 October 2005); Former Judge of the Supreme Court of Trinidad and Tobago and Justice of Appeal in the Court of Appeal in Trinidad and Tobago.

xxvi


He has a Masters degree in International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, the University of the West Indies. Tafsir Malick Ndiaye Juge au Tribunal international du droit de la mer. L.D.M. Nelson Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; President of the Tribunal 2002-2005. Myron H. Nordquist Professor of Law, Center for Oceans Law and Policy, Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia School of Law, USA. Djamchid Momtaz Professeur à l’Université de Téhéran; Associé de l’Institut du Droit international; Membre du Groupe d’experts gouvernementaux chargé d’élaborer le projet de la Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique. Proshanto K. Mukherjee ITF Professor of Maritime Safety and Environmental Protection, and Director of Doctoral Programmes of the World Maritime University (WMU) in Malmö, Sweden. He is Honourary Research Fellow of the University of Wales Swansea (UWS) and Academic Coordinator of the joint WMU-UWS Ph.D. Programme in Maritime and Commercial Law. After sixteen years at sea including command time, he read law at Dalhousie University, obtained his Ph.D. from UWS and practised as a barrister and solicitor in Ontario. He was Senior Deputy Director and Professor of Maritime Law of the IMO International Maritime Law Institute in Malta. He is author of Maritime Legislation (WMU Publications, 2002) and has written widely in public and private maritime law. He served on the Advisory Board of Editors of the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce and is on the Editorial Boards of the WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs and the Journal of International Maritime Law. He is a Fellow of the Nautical Institute and an Associate Fellow of the Royal Institute of Navigation. W. Paatii Ofosu-Amaah Vice-President and Corporate Secretary, The World Bank Group. Prior to this position, he was Acting General Counsel, Deputy General Counsel, Chief Counsel, Africa Division, respectively, and the first Legal Adviser, Environmental Affairs, in the Legal Vice-Presidency of the Bank.

xxvii


Francisco Orrego Vicuña Professor of International Law at the University of Chile; Président de l’Institut de Droit international. M.C.W. Pinto Secretary-General, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal; Attorney of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, and of the Inner Temple, barrister. W. Michael Reisman Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School, USA. Julian Roberts Ph.D.; Fellow, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia. Shabtai Rosenne Honorary Member, Institute of International Law. Donald R. Rothwell Professor of International Law, ANU College of Law, Australian National University, Australia. Peter H. Sand Lecturer in International Environmental Law, Institute of International Law, University of Munich, Germany; formerly Legal Adviser for Environmental Affairs, The World Bank, Washington, DC. Philippe Sands, QC Professor of Law and Director, Centre for International Courts and Tribunals, University College London; Barrister, Matrix Chambers, UK. Louis Savadogo Juriste au Greffe du Tribunal international du droit de la mer; Maître de conférences à l’Université de Cergy-Pontoise, France. Dinah Shelton Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School, USA. She is a member of the Board of Editors of the American Journal of International Law and Counselor to the American Society of International Law. She has lectured extensively and acted as consultant to numerous international organisations. She is the author of three prize-winning

xxviii


books as well as many articles on international law, international human rights law and international environmental law. G.G. Shinkaretskaia Ph.D. candidate and leading scientific worker at the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Tullio Treves Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; Professor at the University of Milano, Italy. Martin Tsamenyi Ph.D., Professor of Law and Director, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia. Jon M. Van Dyke Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa (since 1976). He previously taught at the Hastings College of Law, University of California, and at the Catholic University Law School, Washington, DC. He has written or edited ten books, including Who Owns the Crown Lands of Hawaii? (forthcoming), Updating International Nuclear Law (co-editor 2007), Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea (co-author 1997), International Law and Litigation in the U.S. (co-author 2000; 2nd edn, 2005), Consensus and Confrontation: The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention (1985), International Navigation: Rocks and Shoals Ahead? (1988) and Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century (1993), which was awarded the Harold and Margaret Sprout Award for 1994 by the International Studies Association. He earned his JD from Harvard in 1967, and his BA from Yale in 1964, both cum laude. Budislav Vukas Professor of International Law at the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law, Croatia; Membre de l’Institut de Droit international; Former Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Sir Arthur Watts, KCMG, QC Former Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom; Bencher of Gray’s Inn and a member of 20 Essex Street Chambers (London); Member of the Institut de Droit international. He has written extensively on matters of international law, and has appeared as Counsel in a number of cases in the ICJ and in international arbitrations, and has served as President or Member of several international arbitral tribunals.

xxix


Michael White, QC He had an early career in the Australian Navy in which he served in various establishments, ships and submarines in various parts of the world. He resigned as a Lieutentant-Commander and enrolled at university where he graduated B.Com and LLB from the University of Queensland (UQ), Australia, and later was awarded a Ph.D. in law from Bond University for a thesis on the conventions and laws on marine pollution from ships. From 1974 he practised at the Queensland Bar, being made a QC in 1988. He became a full time academic in 1999 as the founding Director of the Centre for Maritime Law, later the Marine & Shipping Law Unit, TC Beirne School of Law, UQ. He retired from the full time staff in 2004 and is now an Adjunct Professor in both the Marine & Shipping Law Unit and the Centre for Marine Studies, UQ. Rüdiger Wolfrum Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; Director, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg; Professor of Law, University of Heidelberg, Germany. Sir Michael Wood, KCMG Senior Fellow, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge; barrister, 20 Essex Street Chambers, London, UK.

xxx

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS A.C.

Appeal Cases (UK)

ACS

Association of Caribbean States

AFDI

Annuaire français de droit international

AFS Convention

International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships

AIDI

Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international

AJIL

American Journal of International Law

A.L.J.

Australian Law Journal

All ER

All England Law Reports

A.L.R.

Australian Law Reports

Alta. L. Rev.

Alberta Law Review

Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y

The American University Journal of International Law and Policy

Am. U. L. Rev.

The American University Law Review

An. Dr. Mer

Annuaire du droit de la mer

ANPR

advanced notice of proposed rulemaking

AOSIS

Alliance of Small Island States

APM

associated protective measure

Arb. Int’l

Arbitration International

Arch. de Philos. du Droit

Archives de philosophie du droit

ASDI

Annuaire suisse de droit international/Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht

ASEAN

Association of South East Asian Nations

Asia Pacific J. Envtl. L.

Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law

Asia Pacific L. Rev.

Asia Pacific Law Review

ASIL

American Society of International Law

AUD

Australian dollar

xxxi


AUSREP

Australian ship reporting system

Austl. T.S.

Australian Treaty Series

Austrian J. Publ. & Int’l L.

Austrian Journal of Public and International Law

Austr. Yb. Int’l L.

Australian Yearbook of International Law

B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev.

Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review

B. C. Int’l & Comp. L. R.

Boston College International and Comparative Law Review

BCSC

British Columbia Supreme Court (Canada)

Berkeley J. Int’l L.

Berkeley Journal of International Law

BIMCO

The Baltic and International Maritime Council

BIOT

British Indian Ocean Territory

B.L.R.

Building Law Reports

B. U. L. Rev.

Boston University Law Review

Buff. L. Rev.

Buffalo Law Review

BWM Convention

International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Waster and Sediment

BYIL

British Yearbook of International Law

Cal.

California Reports

Cal. W. Int’l L. J.

California Western International Law Journal

Cambridge L. J.

The Cambridge Law Journal

Can. Crim. Cas.

Canadian Criminal Cases

CARICOM

Caribbean Community

Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law CBD

Convention on Biological Diversity

CCAMLR

Commission for the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources

CCD

Convention to Combat Desertification

CCLM

Committee on Constitutional and Legal Matters (FAO)

CCSBT

Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna

CDEAW

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

xxxii


CDEM

construction, design, equipment and manning

CEA

Commission économique pour l’Afrique

CERCLA

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (US)

cf.

confer

CITES

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

CLC

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage

CLCS

Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

C.L.P.

Current Legal Problems

C.L.R.

Commonwealth Law Reports

CMI

Comité Maritime International

COFI

Committee on Fisheries (FAO)

Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y

Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy

COLREGS

Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea

Colum. J. Envtl. L.

Columbia Journal of Environmental Law

Colum. J. Transnat’l L.

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law

Colum. L. Rev.

Columbia Law Review

COMESA

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

Cong. Rec.

Congressional Record (US)

COP

Conference of the Parties

Cornell Int’l L. J.

Cornell International Law Journal

Cornell J.L. & Publ. Pol’y

Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy

CS

continental shelf

CSP

Country Support Program (GEF)

CTS

Consolidated Treaty Series

CW

Committee of the Whole (ICC Rome Conference)

CYIL

Canadian Yearbook of International Law

Dalhousie L. J.

Dalhousie Law Journal

DCD

Dissostichus Catch Document

xxxiii


Den. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y Denver Journal of International Law and Policy DMF

Le droit maritime français

DOALOS

Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UN)

D.R.

European Commission of Human Rights Decisions & Reports

DSR

Dispute Settlement Reports

Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F.

Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum

Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L.

Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law

Duke L. J.

Duke Law Journal

DWFN

distant water fishing nation

DWT

deadweight tons

EA

Europa - Archiv

Earth L. J.

Earth Law Journal

EC

European Communities

ECHR

European Convention on Human Rights

ECJ

European Court of Justice

ECLAC

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

Ecology L. Q.

Ecology Law Quarterly

ECOSOC

Economic and Social Council (UN)

ECR

European Court Reports

ECtHR

European Court of Human Rights

ed.

editor

edn

edition

eds

editors

EEZ

exclusive economic zone

EFP

Experimental Fishing Program

e.g.

exempli gratia

EIA

environmetal impact assessment

EIR

Extractive Industries Review

EJIL

European Journal of International Law

xxxiv


Eng. Rep.

English Reports

Envtl. L.

Environmental Law

Envtl. L. Rep.

Environmental Law Reporter

Envtl. L. Rev.

Environmental Law Review

Envtl. Liability

Environmental Liability

Envtl. & Plan. L. J.

Environmental and Planning Law Journal

Envtl. Pol’y & L.

Environmental Policy and Law

Envtl. Pol.

Environmental Politics

et al.

et alii

et seq.

et sequentes

etc.

et cetera

Ethics & Int’l Aff.

Ethics and International Affairs

ETS

European Treaty Series

EU

European Union

Eur. H. Rts. L. Rev.

European Human Rights Law Review

Eur. H. Rts. Rep.

European Human Rights Reports

Eur. L. Rev.

European Law Review

EWCA Civ.

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

EWHC

England and Wales High Court

F.

Federal Reporter (US)

FAO

Food and Agriculture Organization

FCA

Federal Court of Australia

F.C.A.

Federal Court of Appeal (Canada)

F.C.J.

Federal Court Judgments (Canada)

FCO

Foreign and Commenwealth Office (UK)

Fed. Reg.

Federal Register (US)

FFA

Forum Fisheries Agency

FFR

French franc

F. Supp.

Federal Supplement (US)

FTC

Free Trade Commission (NAFTA)

FUL

Supreme Court of Western Australia (Full Court)

GAOR

General Assembly Official Records

GATT

General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade

xxxv


GBI

GEF Benefits Index

GBP

Great Britain pound

GDP

gross domestic product

GEF

Global Environment Facility

Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev.

Georgetown International Environmental Law Review

Geo. L. J.

Georgetown Law Journal

Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.

George Washington International Law Review

Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ.

George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics

GET

Global Environmental Trust

Global Community YB Int’l L. & Jurisprudence

The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence

Global Envtl. Pol.

Global Environmental Politics

GMO

genetically modified organism

Golden Gate U. L. Rev.

Golden Gate University Law Review

GPI

GEF Performance Index

GPO

Government Printing Office (US)

GPSR

General Provisions on Ships Routeing (IMO)

Green Globe YB Int’l Coop. Env’t & Dev.

Green Globe Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development

GRULAC

Group of Latin American and Caribbean States

GYIL

German Yearbook of International Law

Hague Yb. Int’l L.

Hague Yearbook of International Law

Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.

Harvard Environmental Law Review

Harv. Int’l L. J.

Harvard International Law Journal

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

Hastings International and Comparative Law Review

HEA

habitat equivalency analysis

HELCOM

Helsinki Commission for the Protection of the Baltic Sea Environment

Hertslet’s

Hertslet’s Commercial Treaties

xxxvi


HNS Convention

International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea

HRA

Human Rights Act (UK)

HRLJ

Human Rights Law Journal

IACS

International Association of Classification Societies

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IAT

international administrative tribunal

IATTC

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission

ibid.

ibidem; in the same place

IBRD

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

ICC

International Criminal Court

ICCA

International Council for Commercial Arbitration

ICCAT

International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas

ICCPR

International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICFTU

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

ICISS

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

ICJ/CIJ

International Court of Justice/Cour internationale de Justice

ICLQ

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

ICMA

International Christian Maritime Association

ICNT

Informal Composite Negotiating Text

ICOMOS

International Council on Monuments and Sites

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

ICS

International Chamber of Shipping

ICSID

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

ICSU

International Council of Scientific Unions

ICTR

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

xxxvii


ICTY

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

id.

idem; the same

IDA

International Development Association

i.e.

id est; that is to say

IEA

International Energy Agency

IEF

International Environmental Facility

IFAD

International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFC

International Finance Cooperation

IFSMA

International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations

IGO

inter-governmental organization

IJIL

Indian Journal of International Law

ILA

International Law Association

ILC/CDI

International Law Commission/Commission de droit international

ILCYB

Yearbook of the International Law Commission

ILIB

International Law in Brief (ASIL website)

ILM

International Legal Materials

ILN

International Law News

ILO

International Labour Organization

ILR

International Law Reports

IMCO

Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization

IMO

International Maritime Organization

INC

Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (UNFCCC)

Indian J. Int’l L.

The Indian Journal of International Law

Indian YB Int’l Aff.

Indian Year Book of International Affairs

Ind. J. Global Legal Stud.

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

INTERCARGO

International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners

INTERTANKO

International Association of Independent Tanker Owners

xxxviii


Int’l Hydrographic Rev.

International Hydrographic Review

Int’l J.

International Journal

Int’l J. Estuarine & Coastal L.Int’l J.

International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law

Int’l Org.

International Organization

Int’l Rel.

International Relations

IOPC Fund

International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund

IOTC

Indian Ocean Tuna Commission

IPCC

Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change

IPOA-IUU

International Plan for the Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unauthorized Fishing

Iran-US CTR

Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports

ISA

International Seabed Authority

ISF

International Shipping Federation

ISM Code

International Safety Management Code

ISNT

Informal Single Negotiating Text

ISPS Code

International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

ITLOS/TIDM

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea/Tribunal international du droit de la mer

IUCN

World Conservation Union

IUU

illegal, unregulated and unreported

IWC

International Whaling Commission

IWCO

Independent World Commission on the Oceans

JAC

Judicial Appointments Commission

Jap. Ann. Int’l L.

Japanese Annual of International Law

J.D.I.

Journal du droit international (Clunet)

J. Envtl. L.

Journal of Environmental Law

J. Envtl. L. & Litig.

Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation

J. Hist. Int’l L.

Journal of the History of International Law

JIEL

Journal of International Economic Law

J. Int’l Aff.

Journal of International Affairs

xxxix


J. Int’l L. & Int’l Relations

Journal of International Law and International Relations

J. Int’l Maritime L.

Journal of International Maritime Law

J. Land Use & Envtl. L.

Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law

J. L. & Soc.

Journal of Law and Society

J. marine marchande Journal de la marine marchande J. Mar. L. & Com.

Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce

J. Marshall L. Rev.

John Marshall Law Review

J.O.

Journal officiel de la République française

J. Transnat’l Law & Policy

Journal of Transnational Law & Policy

J. World Investment

Journal of World Investment

Law & Contemp. Probs.

Law and Contemporary Problems

Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus.

Law and Policy in International Business

Law & Prac. Int’l Cts. The Law and Practice of International Courts and & Tribunals Tribunals Law Libr. J.

Law Library Journal

Law Quarterly Rev.

The Law Quarterly Review

LCIA

The London Court of International Arbitration

LDC

least developed country

LDCF

Least Developed Countries Fund

LJIL

Leiden Journal of International Law

Lloyd’s List

Lloyd’s List

Lloyd’s Rep.

Lloyd’s Law Reports

LNTS

League of Nations Treaty Series

LOS Convention/ LOSC

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

LPICT

The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals

LRIT

long range identification and tracking

Marine & Coastal L.

International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law

xl


Marine Pollution Bull.

Marine Pollution Bulletin

Maritime L. Ass’n Austl. & N.Z. J.

The Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal

MARPOL

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships

Max Planck UNYB

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

McGeorge L. Rev.

McGeorge Law Review

McGill L. J.

McGill Law Journal

MCS

monitoring, control and surveillence

Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade Melb. J. Int’l L.

Melbourne Journal of International Law

Melb. U. L. Rev.

Melbourne University Law Review

MERCOSUR

Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)

MFI

multilateral financial institution

Mich. L. Rev.

Michigan Law Review

MIGA

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

Minn. J. Global Trade Minnesota Journal of Global Trade Mod. L. Rev.

Modern Law Review

MOP

Meeting of the Parties

MoU

memorandum of understanding

MOX

mixed oxide

MSC

Maritime Safety Committee (IMO)

MSR

marine scientific research

NAAEC

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation

NAFO

North Atlantic Fisheries Organization

NAFTA

North American Free Trade Area

NAPA

National Adaption Programme of Action

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Nat. Resources J.

Natural Resources Journal

NAV

(IMO Sub-committee) Safety of Navigation

xli


N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. North Carolina Journal of International Law and Reg. Commercial Regulation N.C. L. Rev.

North Carolina Law Review

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD)

NEAFC

North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission

NGO

non-governmental organization

NILR

Netherlands International Law Review

NILOS

Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea

NJW

Neue Juristische Wochenschrift

Nord. J. Int’l L.

Nordic Journal of International Law

Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus.

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

NYIL

Netherlands Yearbook of International Law

N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol.

New York University Journal of International Law and Politics

N.Y.U. L. Rev.

New York University Law Review

OAS

Organization of American States

OAU/OUA

Organization of African Unity/Organisation de l’unité africaine

Ocean & Coastal L. J.

Ocean and Coastal Law Journal

Ocean & Coastal Mgmt.

Ocean and Coastal Management

Ocean Dev. & Int’l L.

Ocean Development and International Law

OCSLAA

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments

ODMACS

oil discharge monitoring and control system

ODS

ozone depleting substance

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OHCHR

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

O.J.

Official Journal

OJEC

Official Journal of the European Communities

OJEU

Official Journal of the European Union

OP

Operational Programme (GEF)

OPA

Oil Pollution Act (US)

xlii


op. cit.

opus citatum; in the work previously cited

OPRC

International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation

OPS

Overall Performance Study (GEF)

O.R.

Ontario Reports

Or. L. Rev.

Oregon Law Review

OSPAR

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic

Oxford J. Legal Stud.

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

PACE

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

PCA/CPA

Permanent Court of Arbitration/Cour permanente d’arbitrage

PCIJ/CPJI

Permanent Court of International Justice/Cour permanente de Justice internationale

PDF

Project Preparation Grants (GEF)

POP

persistant organic pollutant

p.p.m.

parts per million

PSSA

particularly sensitive sea area

PTBT

Partial Test Ban Treaty

Queen’s L. J.

Queen’s Law Journal

RAF

Resource Allocation Framework

RBDI

Revue belge de droit international

RCDIP

Revue critique de droit international privé

RdC

Recueil des cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye

R.D.I.

Revue de droit international, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques

RECIEL

Review of European Community and International Environmental Law

REEFREP

Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef (Inner Route) ship reporting system

RERAG

Regional Environmental Remediation Advisory Group

Res.

resolution

RFMO/RFO

regional fisheries management organization

xliii


RGDIP

Revue générale de droit international public

RIAA/RSA

Reports of International Arbitral Awards/Recueil des sentences arbitrales (UN)

Riv. Dir. Int.

Rivista di Diritto Internazionale

RJE

Revue juridique de l’environnement

R.S.A.

Revised Statutes of Alberta

RSNT

Revised Single Negotiating Text

R.S.O.

Revised Statutes of Ontario

RTDH

Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme

RUDH

Revue universelle des droits de l’homme

Rutgers L. Rev.

Rutgers Law Review

San Diego L. Rev.

San Diego Law Review

Sea Grant L. J.

Sea Grant Law Journal

Se. Envtl. L. J.

Southeastern Environmental Law Journal

SBC

Sea-Bed Committee

SBT

southern bluefin tuna

S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J.

Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal

SCC

Supreme Court Cases (India)

S.C.C.

Supreme Court of Canada

S.C.C.A.

Supreme Court Rulings on Applications for Leave to Appeal and Other Motions (Canada)

SCCF

Special Climate Change Fund

S.C.J.

Supreme Court Judgments (Canada)

SCOR

Security Council Official Records

SDN

Société des Nations

SDR

Special Drawing Rights

SFDI

Société française pour le droit international

SFRY

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SI

Statutory Instruments (UK)

SIDS

small islands developing States

SLT

Scots Law Times

SOLAS

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

SPLOS

Meeting of the State Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

xliv


SPS Agreement

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

SRS

ship reporting system

Stanford J. Int’l L.

Stanford Journal of International Law

STAP

Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel

STCW

International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers

STOPIA

Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement

SUA Convention

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

Sustainable Dev. L. & Sustainable Development Law and Policy Pol’y SZIER/RSDIE

Schweizerische Zeitschrift für internationales und europäisches Recht/Revue suisse de droit international et de droit européen

TAC

total allowable catch

Taiwan Int’l L. Q.

Taiwan International Law Quarterly

TEC

Treaty Establishing the European Community

TOPIA

Tanker Oil Pollution Agreement

TOVALOP

Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution

TSS

traffic separation scheme

Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L.

Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law

Tul. Envtl. L. J.

Tulane Environmental Law Journal

UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y

University of California Los Angeles Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

UCOMAR

Continental Unit for Maritime Transport (OAU)

UEMOA

Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine

UKHL

United Kingdom House of Lords

UKTS

United Kingdom Treaty Series

UNAT

United Nations Administrative Tribunal

UNCC

United Nations Compensation Commission

xlv


UNCED

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNCHR

United Nations Commission on Human Rights

UNCIO

United Nations Conference on International Organization

UNCITRAL

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

UNCLOS

United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea

UNCTAD

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNEP

United Nations Environmental Programme

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNFSA

United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNIDO

United Nations Industrial Development Organization

UNO/ONU

United Nations Organization/Organisation des Nations Unies

UN Rev.

United Nations Review

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

UNSG

United Nations Secretary General

UNTS

United Nations Treaty Series

U.S.

United States Supreme Court Reports

U.S.C.

United States Code

USD

US dollar

USDC

United States District Court

USDOE

United States Department of Energy

UST

United States Treaties and Other International Agreements

Utah L. Rev.

Utah Law Review

Va. J. Int’l L.

Virginia Journal of International Law

U. Haw. L. Rev.

University of Hawaii Law Review

xlvi


U. Queensland L. J.

University of Queensland Law Journal

U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev.

University of Toronto Faculty Law Review

U. Toronto L. J.

University of Toronto Law Journal

VCLT

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Vol.

volume

VMS

vessel monitoring system

VTS

vessel traffic service

Wake Forest L. Rev.

Wake Forest Law Review

WASCA

Supreme Court of Western Australia (Court of Appeal)

Wash. L. Rev.

Washington Law Review

WBGU

Wissenschaftliche Beiträge für Globale Umweltveränderungen

WG

working group

WHC

Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention)

WHO

World Health Organization

WLR

Weekly Law Reports

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev.

William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

WMO

World Meterological Organization

WMU J. Mar. Aff.

WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs (World Maritime University, Sweden)

WRI

World Resources Institute

WTO/OMC

World Trade Organization/Organisation mondiale du commerce

Yale L. J.

Yale Law Journal

YB Int’l Envtl. L.

Yearbook of International Environmental Law

YB Eur. Envtl. L.

Yearbook of European Environmental Law

ZaöRV

Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht

ZfU

Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht

xlvii

PART I INTERNATIONAL LAW: RULES AND PRINCIPLES

TOWARDS A NEW UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE R.P. Anand

I. Universality of International Law: A Recent Phenomenon

T

here is a widespread assumption today that international law is equally applicable to all States. It is expected to make no distinction between States, east or west, north or south, rich or poor, developed or underdeveloped. It is defined in Oppenheim’s International Law as “the body of rules which are legally binding on states in their intercourse with each other”.1 As the celebrated author, L.F.L. Oppenheim, declares: “[i]nternational law does not recognize any distinctions in the membership of the international community based on religious, geographical or cultural differences”.2 Therefore, while contemporary law makes no distinction between States, and all new entities, as soon as they emerge as independent States, are accepted as members of the ever-expanding international society and are bound by its rules and seek its protection, this is only a recent phenomenon and is not older than the United Nations itself. Before that, modern international law was supposed to be merely a product of the Western European Christian States, or States of European origin, and applicable only between them. As Oppenheim points out: “The old Christian states of Western Europe constituted the original international community within which international law grew up gradually through custom and treaty. Whenever a new Christian state made its appearance in Europe, it was received into the existing European community of states. But, during its formative period, this international law was confined to those states. In former times European states had only very limited intercourse with states outside Europe, and even that was

1

Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. I, Peace (9th edn, Sir R. Jennings and Sir A. Watts eds, London, 1992), p. 4.

2

Oppenheim, ibid. p. 87.

Ndiaye and Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes, 3–20 ©2007 Koninklijke Brill NV. ISBN 978 90 04 16156 6. Printed in the Netherlands.

I. International Law: Rules and Principles

not always regarded as being governed by the same rules of international conduct as prevailed between European states.”3 Gradually, as Oppenheim goes on to explain, the international community expanded with the inclusion of Christian States outside Europe, such as the United States, which became independent in 1776, and later by inclusion of non-Christian States, like Turkey, which was admitted as a member of the international community by the Peace Treaty of Paris in 1856. But “there were numerous states outside the international community” and “international law was not as such regarded as containing rules concerning relations with such states, although it was accepted that those relations should be regulated by the principles of morality”.4 As late as the First World War, we are told, “the position of such states as Persia, Siam, China, Abyssinia, and the like was to some extent anomalous”. Although there was considerable international intercourse between these States and States of Western civilisation – treaties had been concluded, full diplomatic relations had been established, and China, Japan, Persia and Siam had even taken part in the Hague Peace Conferences – since they belonged to “ancient but different civilizations there was a question how far relations with their governments could usefully be based upon the rules of international society”.5

II. International Law in Historical Perspective As we approach international law from an historical perspective, especially in the context of the role of Asian and even African countries in its origin and development, there are several questions that have been raised but not satisfactorily answered. From the 15th century onwards, the Europeans went to Asian countries for their own needs and developed not only active trade and commercial relations, but also intimate political relations with these independent Asian communities, especially in India and the East Indies. What rules of inter-State conduct applied between these European countries and Asian States? Without some common rules of international law, Europeans could not have survived in Asian countries. And if some rules of international law and comity did apply between them and their relations, did these rules have no influence whatsoever on the emerging international law among European countries during this period? It is all too well-known that after a few centuries of their relations with the Asians, the Europeans, especially Britain in the first instance, became the

3

Oppenheim, ibid. pp. 87-88.

4


5


4

Towards A New Universal International Law: An Asian Perspective

dominant power, defeated all the other powers in India, and made it a part of the British Empire in the middle of the 19th century. But this took, it is important to note, not a few years, a few decades or even a few generations. It took more than three centuries for Britain to defeat and subdue the Indian rulers. But once India was under their control, Britain extended its empire even further in other Asian and later African countries. After the British victory, other European countries started acquiring colonies in Asia. New relations now developed among European countries and Asian States, most of which had become colonies of European powers. What happened to the international law that earlier applied between Asian countries and Europe, or that had emerged and was developing among the European countries? Most European international lawyers talk about the development of international law during this period and later without any reference to Asian States or their role in the development of what is called modern international law. They insist that it is a product exclusively of European Christian civilisation with no reference to Asia or Africa. There is little doubt that the present system of international law largely developed in the context of European countries’ needs and demands, and struggle to have trade and commercial relations with India and other Asian countries. International law clearly and surely applied in their relations in the beginning. But once British and other Europeans defeated Indian rulers and other Asian countries, they ignored their own international law principles under one pretext or another, and there was no-one to question this “victor’s justice” until Europe’s authority came to be challenged by extra-European countries.

III. Commercial and Industrial Revolutions in Europe The economic growth and enrichment that resulted from the commercial expansion of Europe was so pronounced and spectacular that it is generally referred to as the Commercial Revolution. The Far East, the Americas and later Africa were large enough to be exploited by everybody. It is important to note that, although the Dutch, French and British were often at war with each other in Europe, nationalism did not enter into their relations in the East. As Toussaint points out, “the Europeans were far less busy killing one another in the Indian Ocean during the eighteenth century than they had been in the seventeenth, and they should be seen rather as a large international association, in which business came before everything else” (emphasis added).6 Under the general overall control of the British Empire in India and protection of its strong navy in the Indian Ocean, all Europe profited and all Europeans supported it.7

6

A. Toussaint, History of the Indian Ocean (J. Guicharnaud trans., London, 1966), p. 170.

7

Ibid. p. 175. 5


For Britain and France in particular, the 18th century was an age of phenomenal growth. The main feature of the Commercial Revolution was the increased volume of trade, which increased in the case of Britain by 500 to 600 per cent, and even more in the case of France.8 There is little doubt that the riches of Asian and American trade flowing to Europe enabled the great Industrial Revolution to take place in Europe. By the end of the 18th century, Britain had conquered a huge colonial empire not only in Asia, but in America as well. The Industrial Revolution, which started in England, gradually spread across the continent of Europe. But Britain faced no competition until 1870, and had a virtual monopoly in textiles and machine tools. British capitalists were accumulating surplus capital and were on the lookout for investment opportunities. London became the world’s clearing house and financial centre. The needs and demands of the Industrial Revolution were largely responsible for the creation of huge European colonial empires in Asia and later Africa. Several European countries had developed substantial industries. The close relationship between the new imperialism and the Industrial Revolution may be seen in the growing need and desire to obtain colonies which might serve as markets for the rising volume of manufactured goods. Several Europeanised countries outside Europe, such as the United States, Canada and Australia, had also developed tremendous industries and begun to compete with European countries for new markets. They raised tariffs to keep out each other’s products. The only alternative was to provide “sheltered markets” for each industrialised country. The Industrial Revolution also created a demand for raw materials to feed the machines. Many of these materials – cotton, jute, rubber, petroleum and various metals – could be obtained from Asia and Africa. In most cases, heavy capital outlay was required to secure adequate production of these commodities, and this was available in Europe. These factors were largely responsible for the spread of imperialism, which can be defined as “the government of one people by another”.9

IV. Development of Modern International Law International law, which had started developing among the numerous European States that had emerged after the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, began to be consolidated only after the Industrial Revolution in Europe. Although Hugo Grotius and his contemporary scholars,

8

See for more details R.P. Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea (The Hague, 1983), pp. 124-127.

9

See R.R. Palmer and J. Colton, A History of Modern World (3rd edn, New York, 1965), p. 614.

6


like the Spanish theologians and other classical jurists, are said to have been the initiators and founders of international law, they were “largely speculative thinkers and rationalizers” of the natural law principles and had hardly any influence on the conduct of States.10 Amidst terrible internal dissention in Europe and bitter rivalries in Asia, Africa and America during the 17th and 18th centuries, there was little scope for the growth of international law. After the Congress of Vienna, which met in May 1814 after the downfall of Napolean, the procedure was arranged so that all important matters were decided by the triumphant powers – Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia. For about fifty years, the political affairs of Europe remained almost completely in the hands of the Great Powers, which was extended to France in 1818 when she was admitted to the dominant group, turning a “tetrarchy” into a “pentarchy”. Called the “European Concert of Great Powers”, or the “European system”, and acting mainly through congresses, they decided the fate of smaller countries, intervened in their affairs, defined boundaries, exercised all manner of guardianship over States weaker than themselves, formulated rules, rendered judgments in controversies, and enforced their decisions. In the name of maintaining peace in Europe, the Great Powers enforced open dictatorship over other States without giving them any right to participate.11 They formed an exclusive club and established themselves as the founder group of modern international society and assumed authority to admit new member States or readmit old members who did not participate in the foundation of the closed group. They claimed a right “to issue, or deny, a certificate of birth to states and governments irrespective of their existence”. The result was, in the words of C.H. Alexandrowicz, that: “Asian states who for centuries had been considered members of the family of nations found themselves in an ad hoc created legal vacuum which reduced them from the status of international personality to the status of candidates competing for such personality.”12 The absurdity of such a situation was even recognised by a few European writers.13 But it was glossed over or ignored by the powers that be. As Antony Anghie says,

10

See G. Schwarzenberger, “Historical Models of International Law: Toward a Comparative History of International Law” in W.E. Butler (ed.), International Law in Comparative Perspective (Leiden, 1980), p. 228.

11

See K. Wolfke, Great and Small Powers in International Law from 1814 to 1920 (Wroclaw, 1961), Chapter I, pp. 9-32; see also J. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (Cambridge, 1894), pp. 92-101.

12

C.H. Alexandrowicz, “Mogul Sovereignty and the Law of Nations”, Indian YB Int’l Aff., Vol. IV (1955), p. 318.

13

See Hubrich as quoted in Alexandrowicz, “Doctrinal Aspects of the Universality of the Law of Nations”, BYIL, Vol. 37 (1961), p. 514. 7


“legal niceties were hardly a concern of European states driven by ambitions of imperial expansion”.14 It may be noted that there was no theory of recognition in international law before the 19th century. De facto sovereignty of a State automatically meant de jure sovereignty. As Alexandrowicz points out: “no constitutive theory of recognition ever made its appearance in any of the classics of the law of nations up to the end of the 18th century. It did not exist in the works of the Spanish writers; nor did Bodin, Gentili, Grotius (and the Grotians) or even Moser and Martens ever conceive such a theory … However, the positivists of the early 19th century destroyed this co-existence and started combining their un-universal positivism with constitutivism.”15 Henry Wheaton was one of the first prominent writers of this period to split sovereignty into internal and external elements, and maintained that a State might acquire internal sovereignty but that its external sovereignty would be dependent on recognition by States of an existing family of nations. Thus was introduced the “new international ‘caste’ system”, according to which the old Christian powers of Europe formed “the nucleus of the family of nations”. They admitted the extensions of this family to North and South America; and some of them argued that Haiti and Liberia were the first sovereign non-European countries with a Christian but non-European population. As we have mentioned earlier, the Ottoman Empire was the first non-Christian candidate State. Other States east of Turkey found themselves in the same situation. This applied not only to States that survived the collapse of the Asian State system, such as Siam or Persia: “but also to those countries which in the 19th century disappeared from the political map of the world such as Burma, Ceylon, Marattas, the Mogul Empire and independent Kingdoms of Indonesia. Those which vanished into oblivion had to wait until the end of the second world war.”16 Without passing judgment on the past, Alexandrowicz reasonably questions the validity of the “positivist view on the development of the family of nations and the law of nations”. Because, “if the Asian states which existed prior to the 19th century were generally acknowledged as capable of concluding treaties, maintaining diplomatic relations, waging war, making peace and participating in a spectacularly expanding world trade, limitations imposed on their legal capacity by ideological change (without their participation in such change) could 14

See A. Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law”, Harv. Int’l L. J., Vol. 40 (1999), p. 38.

15

C.H. Alexandrowicz, “Some Problems of the History of the Law of Nations in Asia”, Indian YB Int’l Aff., Vol. XII (1963), p. 8.

16

Alexandrowicz, ibid.

8


not produce such far reaching results as their reduction to a sort of extraneity – a status which implied a serious restriction of their position in international law” (emphasis in original).17 There is little doubt, says Alexandrowicz, that “replacement by a European Club of States endowed with power of constitutive recognition of non-members of the club outside Europe, provided a new legal pressure mechanism in the hands of the great powers”. Since the International Court of Justice held a treaty concluded in 1779 by a Maratha ruler with the Portuguese as valid in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory case,18 Alexanrdowicz goes on to say: “the Maratha Empire must have been in the sphere of international existence (as expressly stated by the judges) and thus the same must be said about other Asian entities in the 18th century such as Ceylon, Burma, the Mogul Empire, the States of the Deccan and Mysore, not to mention Persia, Siam or the Ottoman Empire.19 Those which survived in the 19th century, could not have been reduced to the status of candidates for admission to the family of nations and for recognition. If in fact they were re-admitted or recognized (always with emphasis on the problem of capitulations as raised by the European powers) these acts of readmission or recognition were in so far meaningless that they were simply inter-temporal adjustments cause by ideological changes.” Devoid of any legal or juridical significance, these acts of recognition and readmission might “have been rather acts of political pressure under the cloak of law”.20 Analysing the relationship between law and politics in positivist international law during this period, Antony Anghie remarks: “State behavior was the basis of positivist jurisprudence; but it was difficult to detect any consistent and principled behavior in the flux, confusion, and self-interest of the colonial encounter. Consequently, there was a danger that law would degenerate into expediency.”21 In fact, “coercion and military superiority combined to create ostensibly legal instruments”.22

17

Alexandrowicz, ibid. p. 9.

18

Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian (Portugal v. India), ICJ Reports 1960, p. 6.

19

This did not apply to China and Japan since “they did not (with a few exceptions) maintain intercourse with European powers prior to the 19th century”. Alexandrowicz, note 15, p. 15 footnote.

20

Alexandrowicz, ibid. p. 15.

21

Anghie, note 14, p. 38.

22

Anghie, ibid. p. 40. 9


V. Phenomenal Growth of Modern International Law As the diplomatic and commercial relations between nations multiplied and intensified between 1814 and 1914, the period is marked by a phenomenal growth of international law. Not only freedom of the seas and other norms of maritime law, but most of the important rules of modern international law came to be formulated and developed in the second half of the 19th century and later, according to the needs of European business and political interests. These rules originated and developed in treaties and customs amongst European countries, or countries of European origin in North America. Thousands of treaties, many of them multipartite or “law-making”, came to be concluded after the Congress of Vienna and they assumed a more businesslike and technical character. International conferences proved to be efficacious in the establishment of international cooperation and agreements.23 It is important to note, however, that while the classical jurists – Spanish theologians, Gentilis, Grotius and others – had, in their teachings, laid stress on the religious and moral precepts of the so-called “natural law” as the authority for the conduct of international relations, with the rise of nationalism in Europe and influence of Enlightenment, the adherence to natural law gradually declined. It was replaced by positivism or positivist philosophy, relying more on the practice of States and conduct of international relations as evidenced by customs and treaties, as against derivation of norms from basic metaphysical principles. This also led to the publication of numerous collections of treaties concluded by a certain country or a group of countries. Several such collections had already started appearing from the late 18th century.24 One important consequence of the positivist philosophy was the development of Eurocentrism in legal and political thinking and regionalisation of international Law. The classical jurists, like Gentili, Grotius and Freitas had emphasised the universal law of the family of nations rooted in the natural law doctrine and the principle of non-discrimination law. But with the new emphasis on the practice of States, several writers started arguing that international law was confined only to the European countries. Thus, in one of the most important treaty collections in the 18th century, G.F. Martens, in his Recueil des Traites (1791), while including several treaties between Asian rulers and the European countries, denied the existence of a universal positive law of nations which he believed was confined to European countries. Though he admitted “that there are nations outside Europe which cannot be denied the character of civilized

23

See A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York, 1954), pp. 196203.

24

See Nussbaum, ibid. pp. 164-185; see also L. Ehrlich, “The Development of International Law as a Science”, RdC, Vol. 105 (1962-I), p. 238.

10


nations”, he was reluctant to call the law applicable to European-Asian relations the law of civilised nations.25

VI. Family of “Civilised” States By the end of the 18th century, under the current of positivism, there had developed a “provincial outlook” in Europe.26 In the 19th century, these views came to be strengthened and under a new constitutive theory of recognition, all non-European nations and peoples, as we have mentioned earlier, were reduced to mere objects of international law with no legal status and no voice.27 Several Asian States on the subcontinent of India and in Southeast Asia, having been defeated and colonised, had already been eliminated from the family of nations. But even those that survived, such as Turkey, Persia, Siam, China and Japan, came under cloud and began to be treated as outside the family of “civilised” nations. “Civilisation”, undefined and as understood by the European powers, provided the legal title and determined the circle within which the law of nations applied.28 International law was said by Wheaton, in 1866, to be “limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or those of European origin”.29 It was declared to be: “a product of the special civilization of modern Europe … a highly artificial system of which the principles cannot be supposed to be understood or recognized by countries differently civilized.”30 For the first time in history it came to be openly said that “states outside European civilization must formally enter into the circle of law-governed countries”.31 To be received within the area of international law, which was said to coincide with the area of civilisation, was “to obtain a kind of international testimonial of good

25

See quoted in Alexandrowicz, note 15, p. 514. G.F. Martens called his book A Summary of the Law of Nations, Founded on the Treaties and Customs of the Modern Nations of Europe (W. Cobbett trans., London, 1802). He preferred to call it the “Law of Nations in Europe” as opposed to “Law of Civilized Nations, which is too vague” (p. 5).

26

P.C. Jessup, The Use of International Law (Ann Arbor, 1959), p. 20.

27

See Alexandrowicz, note 15, p. 8.

28

See, for an excellent analysis of the law of this period, Anghie, note 14, pp. 22 et seq.

29

C. Phillipson (ed.), Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (5th edn, New York, 1916), p. 14.

30

W.E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Oxford, 1880), p. 34.

31

Ibid. pp.34-35. 11


conduct and respectability; and when a state hitherto accounted barbarous desires admission, the powers immediately concerned apply their own tests”.32 The world came to be divided into three zones or spheres: “civilised”, “uncivilised” or “barbarous”, and “savage”. The first zone included the existing States of Europe with their colonial dependencies in so far as they were controlled and peopled by persons of European birth or descent, and the States of North and South America. The civilised States were the only ones that possessed sovereignty.33 The second zone consisted of States that were partially recognised, and included States like Turkey in Europe and the old historical States of Asia which had not become European dependencies, like Persia, China, Siam and Japan. All the rest came under the last zone who were entitled to mere “human recognition”.34 The law of nations no longer applied to semi-civilised or uncivilised peoples. They were at best to be treated according to “principles of Christian morality”. “It is discretion”, said Oppenheim in his famous treatise in 1905, “and not international law, according to which the member of the Family of Nations deal with such states as still remain outside that family”.35 W.E. Hall, noting that there was a tendency on the part of the non-European, “semi-civilised” States, like China, to expect that European countries would behave with them “in conformity with the standard which they themselves have set up”, said that treaties concluded by them created obligations of “honour” on the part of the European States, and not reasonable expectation of “reciprocal obedience”.36 The result of the non-recognition of Asian and African States was that practically any conduct toward their peoples, or aggression of their territories, could not be questioned according to the European law of nations. As John Stuart Mill, the great British empire builder, said in 1867: “To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another and between civilized nations and barbarians is grave error, and one which no statesman can fall into …. To characterize any conduct

32

T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (7th edn by P.H. Winfield, Boston, 1925), p. 50.

33

See Anghie, note 14, pp. 25-34.

34

J. Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, Vol. I (London, 1883), pp. 101-102.

35

L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I, Peace (1st edn, London, 1905), p. 34; see also Westlake, note 11, p. 29.

36

W.E. Hall, A Treatise, 3rd edn, pp. 43-44; quoted in G.W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (Oxford, 1984), p. 61.

12


whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the law of nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject.”37 Thus, it was pointed out that “the conquest of Algeria by France was not … a violation of international law. It was an act of discipline which the bystander was entitled to exercise in the absence of police”.38 Indeed, it was reiterated that it was for their own benefit that barbarous nations “should be conquered and held in subjection” by Europeans.39 Referring to “colonial law” between “uncivilised areas” and the “civilised nations”, a modern writer points out that there was no “common or mutual law” between them: “There was, instead, an extremely one-sided and precedence oriented law brought over by the European powers and the USA. The worst effects these legal double standards were felt in Africa. Africa’s inhabitants were seen as unfit to rule themselves and in this respect ‘powerless’ i.e. without recognised legal rulers, enabling Europeans to directly establish rule, nonetheless without making these areas part of the territory or its inhabitants citizens of the colonising state. This model mirrors the preceding epoch and the procedure applied by Europeans in America. Thus the concept of ‘civilised nations’ led to a factual and legal division of the world in two.”40

VII. Standard of “Civilisation” in International Law It was basically due to the superiority of European civilisation over other civilisations, it was assumed, that Europeans had international law. With the rapid progress in European economic and military power in the 19th century, this sense of superiority became more and more pronounced. International law, earlier characterised as the law of Christian European nations, or Christian European nations and nations of European origin in America, or public law of Europe, now came to be defined as the law of civilised nations with the assumption that European civilisation was the only civilisation worth acceptance and projection in international law. If ignorant, “uncivilised” countries were unable to under-

37

See quoted in B.V.A. Röling, International Law in an Expanded World (Amsterdam, 1960), p. 29.

38

Lorimer, note 34, p. 161; See also Vol. II, p. 28, for defence of a war against China and Japan to compel them to open their ports for European trade.

39

See Westlake, note 11, p. 139.

40

H. Steiger, “From the International Law of Christianity to the International Law of the World Citizen – Reflections on the Formation of the Epochs of the History of International Law”, J. Hist. Int’l L., Vol. 3 (2001), p. 189. 13


stand the intricacies of European system and law, and were not able to provide internal or municipal law to protect the Europeans in their countries according to European standard, they could not be accepted as members of the “civilised” family of nations and must sign capitulation treaties with the European States giving up their right to have jurisdiction over Europeans. The main purpose of this policy, adopted by the European countries and the United States, was, of course, to provide protection to their citizens in this period of active international trade and investment in the late 19th century. Instead of Christianity, it came to be insisted by most European writers in the 19th century that in order to be accepted as a “civilised” State, a country must have the capacity to protect the life, freedom and property of aliens. Considered as “an elastic but, nevertheless, objective standard for the treatment of foreign nationals”, the standard of civilisation demanded that foreigners receive treatment consistent “with the rule of law as understood in Western countries”.41 This meant, according to G. Schwarzenberger: “a modicum of respect for the life, liberty, dignity, and property of foreign nationals, such as may be expected in a civilized community, freedom of the judiciary from the direction of the executive, unhindered access to the courts and reasonable means of redress in the case of manifest denial, delay, or abuse of justice.”42 This “standard of ‘civilization’ became an integral factor in the changing domain and rules of international law”.43 As G.W. Gong goes on to tell us, non-European countries had to learn the hard way. Because: “until they fulfilled the standard’s requirements, these non-European counties remained outside the law’s pale and protection. Until granted ‘civilized’ legal status, they seemed vulnerable to the power and caprice of those countries to which the material benefits of industrial ‘civilization’ had come first.”44 For the European States, the local systems of justice were completely inadequate, and there was no question of submitting one of their citizens to these systems. Europeans “insisted that ‘unequal treaty’, ‘capitulation’, and ‘protectorate’ systems, all with extraterritorial provisions, be maintained until the non-European countries of Africa and Asia conformed to ‘civilized’ standards. European extraterritoriality thus became a badge of inferiority for many of the non-European

41

See G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (6th edn, Oxon, 1976), p. 84.

42

Schwarzenberger, ibid.

43

Gong, note 36, p. 5.

44

Gong, ibid. p. 6.

14


counties, a sign of their ‘uncivilized’ legal status”.45 A number of such treaties were concluded with Asian countries, including Turkey and Japan, although the former had interacted with European countries for hundreds of years and had long-standing relations with them. But Turkey was admitted into the European family of “civilised” States only in 1856, and then only provisionally. In Asia, it was only Japan that “Europeanised” itself, learnt European ways, adopted European laws, strengthened itself militarily, learnt the art of domination and colonisation from the Western “civilised” States, and was admitted into the family of nations in its own right as a “civilised State” after it defeated China in 1894 and Russia in 1904.46

VIII. Capitulations in India and the East Indies It is important to mention, as we have noted earlier, that there was a widely recognised custom in India and other parts of Asia, especially in the coastal areas, according to which settlements of foreign merchants were granted substantial concessions.47 As Alexandrowicz also pointed out in his pioneering work: “Foreign settlements, duly admitted by the receiving Sovereign, were allowed to govern themselves by their personal laws and habits, and they constituted a sort of miniature society within the larger community whose hospitality they enjoyed.”48 Foreign traders generally had their separate quarters and “they were under the jurisdiction of their own heads of settlements who exercise quasi-consular functions”. They were allowed to live according to their own law and habits, and enjoyed freedom of religion and internal autonomy in their settlements in which the local authorities did not interfere unless their actions affected the peace and order of the State.49 This custom was also extended to the European traders who found it possible therefore to set foot in the territories of one local ruler or another and to open new trade relations. But says Alexandrowicz, “[t]he privileges granted by the particular ruler to European traders were in course of

45

Gong, ibid. p. 8.

46

See R.P. Anand, “Family of ‘Civilized’ States and Japan: A Story of Humiliation, Assimilation, Defiance and Confrontation”, J. Hist. Int’l L., Vol. 5 (2003), pp. 1-75. See especially pp. 34 et seq.

47

See K.A.N. Sastri, “Inter-State Relations in Asia”, Indian YB Int’l Aff., Vol. II (1953), pp. 133 et seq.

48

C.H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies: 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries (Oxford, 1967), p. 98.

49

See Alexandrowicz, ibid.; see also R.P. Anand, note 8, p. 33. 15


time converted into ‘capitulations’ which became ultimately derogatory to his sovereignty”. But even when the Europeans converted the “capitulations” into instruments of exploitation and managed to make their concessions irrevocable, according to Alexandrowicz, “this legal development can hardly testify to the inferiority of civilization within the countries whose hospitality the Europeans enjoyed”.50 Surveying the state of international society and law at the turn of the 20th century, acute observers even in Europe found the situation rather gloomy. There was increasing use of force in the determination of the fate of the peoples. No real international society had come into existence beyond Europe, and Europeans acted from a position of superiority towards others. Capitulation regimes, consular jurisdiction, and brutal colonial wars were the order of the day. Advancing “civilisation” oppressed and impoverished indigenous populations in Asia and later Africa. In 1885, the dark continent was divided by the “civilised” States between themselves without the presence or participation of any African representative. Even in Europe, powerful States had set up a permanent reign of control over the continent and the smaller States enjoyed less autonomy then ever. International law was developing “in accordance with the law of the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest”.51 Some European publicists did regard the “contemporary language of civilization as pure hypocrisy that sought only the advancement of commerce”, and admitted that countless crimes had been committed in the name of civilisation, but thought that “it was inevitable that the weaker races should, in the end, succumb”.52

IX. Clash of Aspirations Leads to Conflicts and Wars As the clash of aspirations increased amongst European countries, peace came more and more to depend on the so-called balance of power and an uneasy equilibrium of forces. The scramble for colonies as protected overseas markets not only led to repeated clashes in Asian and African regions, but contributed to the forging of conflicting alliance systems. Such a situation could not last for ever. Change is beyond any law and is the law of life. The intense rivalry between European States for extension of their rule and colonisation in extra-European areas led to terrible tensions and an arms race supported by military-industrial complexes in Europe. Two Hague

50

Alexandrowicz, note 15, p. 11.

51

See M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 98-99.

52

See Koskenniemi, ibid. pp. 106-107, quoting several European writers, such as Solomon, Jeze and Engelhardt.

16


Peace Conferences, organised under the auspices of the Czar of Russia, to call a halt to the arms race did not help much. As the clash of aspirations increased among European countries, a European “civil war” started in Europe in 1914 that engulfed the whole world and was called the First World War. With all the terrible destruction and loss of life, which left Europe in ruins, it was felt that an international organisation must be established to avert war in future. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, US President Woodrow Wilson was at the forefront of statesmen who suggested the establishment of a League of Nations to avoid war in future. Unable to control the avarice and jealousies of European States and Europeanised Japan, and hampered by the absence of the United States, the League failed miserably and Europe drifted towards the Second World War in 1939, which was even more ferocious and destabilising.

X. Independence Movements in Asia If quarrelling and fighting Asians could not withstand the pressure of aggressive European States in the 18th and 19th centuries, Europe could not remain unaffected by these continued bickering and wars amongst the European States. Asian peoples were also not expected to be subdued when they came to know and understand Europeans and their weaknesses from close quarters. Several Asians had gone to Europe and had been educated in their universities. They realised the injustices that had been committed on Asians and that were being continued. Under the leadership of European-educated dynamic leaders, strong freedom movements started in Asia. It is important to note that, before the entry of the United States in the Second World War, the British colonial empire “cracked up with amazing rapidity”. The Asians sometimes wondered if this outwardly proud structure “was just a house of cards with no foundations or inner strength”. As Jawaharlal Nehru in his famous Discovery of India said: “there was a feeling of satisfaction at the collapse of old-established European colonial powers before the armed strength of an Asian power. The racial, Oriental Asiatic feeling was evident on the British side also. Defeat and disaster were bitter enough, but the fact that an Oriental and Asiatic power had triumphed over them added to the bitterness and humiliation. An Englishman occupying a high position said that he would have preferred it if the Prince of Wales and Repulse had been sunk by the Germans instead of by the yellow Japanese.”53

53

J. Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York, 1946), p. 457. 17


XI. Post-World War Society: A New World Although the Allies won the Second World War, the world that emerged from the holocaust was a new and different world. The European powers, which had dominated the world scene for nearly three hundred years, had been pushed aside and were no longer at the centre of the world stage. Out of the ruins of the world holocaust of 1939-1945, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged to dominate the international scene and seriously challenge each other. Since then the world, divided into two groups, plunged into a “cold war” and a most dangerous armaments race. There was another significant change. With the weakening of Europe, colonialism collapsed and, as we shall see, there emerged numerous independent countries in Asia and later in Africa that for a long time had no status and no role in the formulation of international law and, as we have seen, were considered as no more than its objects. For one thing, the erstwhile “backward” and “uncivilised” China emerged as a Great Power under the patronage of the United States. Although in 1945, of the 51 members of the United Nations, only 13 were from Asia and Africa, their number was bound to, and did, increase in a phenomenal manner, especially after 1955. Under a strong current of self-determination, in which India played not a mean role as we shall see, aided by the unusual conditions of the cold war, most of the Asian-African and Pacific countries acquired independence and became members of the “civilised” international society. So it was not long before Europe formed a small minority of this group, and a vast majority of the UN membership consisted of the thus-far neglected and dominated countries of Asia, Africa and other parts of the world. Needless to say, the criterion of “civilised nation” as a basis for participation in the community of nations has come to be abandoned. After the eras of “European nations”, “Christian nations”, and “civilised nations”, as B.V.A. Röling has acutely remarked, we have entered the “era of peace-loving nations”.54 The family of nations in the form of the United Nations has become practically universal, open to every “peace-loving” State, “able and willing” to carry out the obligations under Article 4 of the UN Charter. The democratisation of international society has become almost complete. Asian nations are now determined to stand on their own and cooperate with each other. As India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, said at the first Asian Relations Conference, which was organised on the eve of India’s independence in 1947, the “imperialism” of Europe was over and “as that domination goes, the walls that surrounded us fall down and we look at one another again and meet as old friends long parted”.55 He asserted:

54

B.V.A. Röling, note 37, pp. 50-51.

55

J. Nehru, “Asia Finds Herself Again”, Inaugural Speech at Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March 23, 1947, Vol. I, p. 300.

18


“For too long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. The story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to co-operate with all others who are prepared to co-operate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of the others … The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs.”56

XII. Asian States Accept International Law Despite the clear bias of numerous international law rules, because it was largely a “ruler’s law” during its formative years, Asian States are all in favour of accepting its tenets. In fact none of the newly independent countries rejected international law on the ground that it was European in its origin and bias. India and other newly independent countries mostly accepted the treaties concluded by the European countries on their behalf and before their independence. All they wanted and demanded was that international law, like all law, must change with changing circumstances. For one thing, what has been called the “geography” of international law has changed. International law is “no longer the almost exclusive preserve of the peoples of European blood”57 by whose consent, it used to be said, “it exists and for the settlement of whose differences it is applied or at least invoked”.58 As it must now be assumed to embrace other peoples, it clearly requires their consent. The creation of international law is no more “the prerogative of countries bearing the cultural heritage of the West but the common task of all members of the international community”.59 The new majority has naturally new needs and new demands, and they want international law to serve their needs and heed to their demands. The alteration in the sociological structure of international society, it is stressed, must be accompanied by an alteration in law. “International law, if it is to be effective”, said Nehru, “has to be related to the realities of international life; otherwise it becomes merely an academic exercise of some professor or pundit sitting in a university”.60 Since the Second World War, international law has been changing fast due to the tremendous developments in international society. Law always changes,

56

Nehru, ibid. p. 301.

57

R.B. Pal, ILCYB (1957), Vol. 1, p. 158.

58

J. Westlake, “The Native States of India”, Law Quarterly Rev., Vol. XXVI, No. CIV (October 1910), p. 313, quoted in Pal, ibid.

59

R.B. Pal, “Future Role of the International Law Commission in the Changing World”, UN Rev., Vol. 9 (September 1962), p. 31.

60

J. Nehru, “Inaugural Address at the Indian Society of International Law”, IJIL, Vol. 1 (1960), p. 6. 19


as we have repeatedly said, with changes in the society. With the accession to the entirely new “Family of Nations” and the active participation of the newly independent, but ancient, States of Asia and Africa in international relations, the exclusive club of Western Christian powers forming the active community of States has broken open. But despite the horizontal expansion of international society, our new world has become one world and a very small world at that. The ever-accelerating means of travel and communications have obliterated the distance between the farthest lands. Moreover, economic life has become extremely complex and more than ever involves a degree of worldwide interdependence. In a sense, we are for the first time living in a “global village”. Law cannot remain immune to all these changes. It is not possible to imprison this process of change in legal traditions that have lost the breath of life. No wonder law has been changing so fast. There is no doubt a new law is emerging that is based on European international law but is changing with the participation of the worldwide community of States. In an insightful and thought-provoking recent article, Y. Onuma remarks that “[i]nternational law must constantly reorganize and conceptualize itself to rectify past wrongs and to respond to the new realities of the world. Only with such constant efforts can international law become global international law which is voluntarily accepted by peoples all over the world”. He advises that only with “an intercivilizational approach” can the people of the entire globe “talk of our international law not only in the geographical sense but also in the civilizational sense”.61 We wholeheartedly agree.

61

20

Y. Onuma, “When was the Law of International Society Born? – An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective”, J. Hist. Int’l L., Vol. 2 (2000), p. 66.

PRECAUTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: REFLECTION ON ITS COMPOSITE NATURE Laurence Boisson de Chazournes

R

ecent decisions rendered by international courts and tribunals have prompted new interest in the legal profile of the precautionary principle. Among these decisions is the order on provisional measures rendered by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the MOX Plant case and in particular the Separate Opinion of Judge Tom Mensah.1 It thus appears interesting to shed light on some of the legal contours of this principle. Its complex and composite nature still raises difficulties. Even if there are terminological variations – references are made to the notion of a norm, rule, approach, standard, principle and even philosophy – precaution has become a principle endowed with a certain legal quality. An essential question is that of its relationship to the international legal order and its constitutive norms. Though it has found an initial anchor in international environmental law, the precautionary principle has started to permeate other fields of international law. The analysis of the place of the precautionary principle in the international legal order reveals that it is resistant to any premature attempts at rationalisation or definitive characterisation. The principle simultaneously shows a trend for legalisation through different instruments, favouring the determination of certain criteria (I), a multifaceted nature (II), an integrative nature (III) and it triggers new reflections on the notion of “social contract” (IV).

I. The Legalisation of Precaution Precaution in substance invokes a number of criteria, which justify ratione materiae its application in given situations. These criteria endow it with a particular structure, an original basis compared to other principles or approaches of international law and, more especially, in international environmental law.

1

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Case No. 10, 9 November 2001, available at <www.itlos.org>.



One can identify four fundamental criteria. Bringing them together compels precaution prima facie. Attempts to fit them in a hierarchy show that three of these (risk, damage and scientific uncertainty) justify the application of precaution a priori, whereas the last criterion (capacities) intervenes a posteriori to objectively determine its applicability, permitting the passage from “application” to “applicability”, from “desirability” to “feasibility”. Indeed, the act of defining the criteria to which precaution refers clears the way for the difficult objectivation, and hence materialisation, of the aforementioned criteria. 1. The “Risk” Criterion This is the fundamental nature of precaution. Precaution’s raison d’être originates in law’s aspiration to assess and manage risk in our societies. Risk is a more or less conceivable and contingent danger which can cause damage. It is therefore arbitrary in its essence. Volatility is its nature; its occurrence can be unforeseen, even unexpected. As long as there is any trace of doubt as to the occurrence of an event, there is risk.2 In an attempt to legally and precisely qualify the risks targeted by precaution, it is useful to recall the typology of risks compiled by Nicholas de Sadeleer, who was inspired by lessons drawn from German thought.3 According to him, there are three main categories of risks: (a) “unacceptable” or “definite” risks, those for which the causal link between the event and the damage is scientifically proven, even if doubt remains as to the time it will take for damage to occur. These risks should be eliminated by the principle of prevention; (b) “residual” risks, which human activity normally implies, and which must be tolerated (e.g., the risk implicit in driving a car or taking a plane). These risks do not need to be taken into account in the decision-making process. In order to avoid situations that would be absurd for human activity, residual risks, meaning “hypothetical risks resting on purely speculative considerations without any scientific foundation”,4 would have to be excluded from the precautionary principle’s range of application; and

2

See G.-J. Martin, “Le concept de risque et la protection de l’environnement: évolution parallèle ou fertilisation croisée?”, in M. Prieur, Les Hommes et l’environnement, en hommage à Alexandre Kiss, Paris, Frison-Roche, 1998, pp. 451-460. See also A. Kiss, “Droit et risque”, in Arch. de Philos. du Droit, Vol. 36, 1991, pp. 49-53.

3

N. de Sadeleer, Les principes du pollueur-payeur, de prévention et de précaution (Essai sur la genèse et la portée juridique de quelques principes du droit de l’environnement), Brussels, Bruylant, 1999, pp. 175 et seq. See also N. de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles – From Political Slogans to Legal Rules, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 91-226.

4

N. de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles – From Political Slogans to Legal Rules, ibid. p. 158.

22

Precaution in International Law: Reflection on its Composite Nature

(c) “uncertain” risks, whose existence has not been established by science but which are not unthinkable. These must be handled by the precautionary principle. The legal terminology used in international instruments to evoke the idea of risk varies according to the instrument examined. In some instruments, references are made to “threat”. Sometimes reference is simply made to the idea of “potential” nuisance or danger. The main difficulty with the risk criterion lies in its evolution. In other words, the matter of evaluating risk arises, including quantifying the probability of occurrence of risk, but also its qualification. International law does not provide any clear answers here, but international practice provides for indications of what is, in objective terms, the evaluation of risk.5 2. The “Damage” Criterion Once the decision-maker has an idea of the likelihood of occurrence of the suspected risk, he will naturally reflect on the possibilities of shielding himself from it. Must this risk be reduced or even eliminated, no matter what the importance or severity of damage it could provoke? Or, on the contrary, is intervention required only if what is at stake is worth the effort? His attitude is obviously subject to variations according to the probability of occurrence and especially to the importance of damage. The terminology used to denote damage in international instruments varies. Reference can be made directly to the concept of damage.6 Some instruments refer to the concept of “impact”.7 In spite of these terminological variations, the 5

As an example, it is interesting to point out that the WTO Appellate Body in EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) noted that the risk mentioned in article 5, paragraph 1, of the SPS Agreement was not only a “risk ascertainable in a science laboratory”, but also a “risk in human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and work and die”. The Appellate Body thus affirmed that the scientific evidence which the Communities referred to did not concern the type of hormone at stake; for this reason, risk assessment was been deemed insufficient. See the Report of the Appellate Body, paras 187 and 199-200, available at <www.wto.org>.

6

See Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on environment and development: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage”, available at <www.unep.org>; see also the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures”, available at <www.unfccc.int>.

7

See the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes: “The precautionary principle, by virtue of which action to avoid the potential transboundary impact of the release of hazardous substances shall not be postponed”, available at <www.unece.org>. 23


formulation of precaution in international instruments embodies an original, if not special, concept of damage. It is usually bound to a threshold of severity, which limits the application of the precautionary principle. This threshold usually invokes concepts such as “severity” and “irreversibility”. 3. The “Scientific Uncertainty” Criterion Whenever precaution is formulated in an international instrument, the criterion of scientific uncertainty is bound to it. The element of uncertainty is a sine qua non condition to the application and even to the legitimacy of the precautionary principle.8 Indeed, the precautionary principle differs from the principle of prevention precisely in its reference to the aforementioned element. The “preventive model” is forced to depend constantly on science and its expertise, the only way to allow for a certain objectivisation of the risks taken. Yet if precaution’s strength is found in its reference to scientific knowledge; this also reveals its limitations. If risk is known, preventive measures can be taken in full knowledge of the situation, exhibiting a certain effectiveness. Prevention is only possible for known phenomena. It is difficult to prevent what is unfamiliar, and even more difficult to do so with the unknown.9 To denote scientific uncertainty, international instruments evoke “the absence of complete scientific certainty”,10 “the absence of absolute scientific certainty”,11 or even “uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate data” and “the lack of adequate scientific data”.12 However, a precautionary measure must be anchored to a minimum level of knowledge, a basis of scientific data presenting a certain consistency.13

8

M. Remond-Gouilloud, “Le risque de l’incertain: la responsabilité face aux avancées de la science”, in La vie des sciences, Vol. X, 1993, No. 4, p. 355.

9

E. Rehbinder, “The Precautionary Principle in an International Perspective”, in E.M. Basse (ed.), Miljorettens grundsporgsmaal, Copenhagen, 1994, p. 95.

10

See the Declaration on Sustainable Development of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Bergen, 16 May 1990, available at <www.unece.org/leginstr/cover. htm>.

11

See the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean, available at <www.unep.ch/regionalseas>; see also the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, available at <www.unep.org>.

12

See the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, available at <www.un.org/Depts/los>.

13

See for instance the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (op. cit.), according to which the precautionary principle should be applied when there are “reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced into the marine environment” may cause hazards.

24


4. The “Different Capacities” Criterion The three above mentioned criteria would a priori justify the application of the precautionary principle. But a certain number of international instruments stipulate that measures of precaution apply a posteriori according to the capacity of the States concerned to deal with the problem. Acknowledging capacity permits one to relate the precautionary principle to a proportional approach in light of a State’s economical, social and technological means. Precautionary measures do not aim to paralyse human activity. A measure of rationality and reason must guide the application of precaution. It is obvious that States at different stages of development cannot be submitted to the same requirements of the implementation of a technique. A fortiori, precautionary measures can therefore be expected to vary from one State to another.

II. A Principle with Varied Facets It can seem surprising to question this principle’s legal status when it is inscribed in a large number of international conventions and instruments. This questioning can be justified by two reasons. First of all, the principle does not always occupy the same place. At times it will figure in the preamble,14 at others in operational clauses, among general obligations or principles.15 It is rarely precisely formulated. Many of these conventions and instruments only mention it vaguely, without worrying about the details of the implications derived from it. The analysis of the expressions that introduce the principle is particularly revealing of political compromises. The principle can be merely intended to “guide

14

1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, available at <www.biodiv.org>; 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants, available at <www.unece.org>; 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.

15

1991 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import Into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa (art. 4), available at <www.africa-union.org>; 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (art. 2) (op. cit.); Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean, amended in 1995 (art. 4) (op. cit.); 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (art. 2, “General provisions”) (op. cit.); 1992 Convention on the Baltic Sea (art. 3, “Fundamental principles and obligations”); 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (art. 3, “Principles”) (op. cit.); 1995 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (art. 5, “General Principles”) (op. cit.); 1998 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, available at <www.pic.int>. 25


Parties”, and comes off as an inspirational principle.16 Other conventions evoke the precautionary principle in specific terms. Conventions relating to the protection of the marine environment have integrated the precautionary principle with specific formulations and plan clear mechanisms of implementation, namely that of the reversal of the burden of proof.17 The 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety18 and the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants have for their part operationalised the precautionary principle.19 An interesting feature to note is that the place occupied by the precautionary principle in international conventions does not prejudice its legal value. Indeed, that it is stated in the operational clauses of a convention has not necessarily made it a principle of positive law as such, although it produces legal effects. One must recall that no international court or tribunal has yet pronounced on its status. The International Court of Justice has been confronted with the precautionary principle. First, in the second Nuclear Tests case, in which New Zealand affirmed that France was compelled, in applying this principle, to abstain from any underground tests until their innocuity was proven.20 In the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros case, Hungary invoked the precautionary principle to justify the impossibility of respecting a treaty by which it was bound to Czechoslovakia. The Parties had agreed on the need to adopt a precautionary approach, but they disagreed on whether it was necessary to know if the conditions for the implementation of the concept were present in that specific situation. The Court evoked the appearance of new norms which must be taken into account in the field of environmental protection, without however resorting to the qualification of the precautionary principle as a legal principle.21 Recently in the case of the Pulp Mills on the River

16

Bamako Convention (op. cit.), art. 4: “Each Party shall strive to adopt and implement the preventive, precautionary approach”.

17

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (op. cit.); Convention on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (op. cit.); Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (op. cit.).

18

The text of the Protocol is available at <www.biodiv.org>.

19

The text of the Convention is available at <www.pops.int>.

20

International Court of Justice, Nuclear tests case, Judgment of 20 December 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 253. The Court did not examine this question. See the separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry, who stated that in that case the precautionary principle should have been applied, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 338.

21

International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 78, para. 140: “The Court is mindful that, in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.”

26


Uruguay, the parties both agreed on its relevance to the case, but the Court did not mention it in its order on provisional measures.22 In the same way, the precautionary principle was invoked in the case European Communities – Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) at the World Trade Organization (WTO).23 At the time, the Appellate Body noted that the principle’s status was the subject of controversy among academics and law practitioners, and felt that “whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international law appears less than clear”. According to the Appellate Body, “it is unnecessary, and probably imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important, but abstract, question”.24 A recent Panel Report on European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, restated again that the status of the precautionary principle was unclear in international law in saying that: “the legal debate over whether the precautionary principle constitutes a recognized principle of general or customary international law is still ongoing. Notably, there has, to date, been no authoritative decision by an international court or tribunal which recognizes the precautionary principle as a principle of general or customary international law. It is correct that provisions explicitly or implicitly applying the precautionary principle have been incorporated into numerous international conventions and declarations, although, for the most part, they are environmental conventions and declarations. Also, the principle has been referred to and applied by States at the domestic level, again mostly in domestic environmental law. On the other hand, there remain questions regarding the precise definition and content of the precautionary principle. Finally, regarding doctrine, we note that many authors have expressed the view that the precautionary principle exists as a general principle in international law. At the same time … others have expressed scepticism and consider that the precautionary principle has not yet attained the status of a general principle in international law. Since the legal status of the precautionary principle remains unsettled, like the Appellate Body before us, we consider that prudence suggests that we not attempt to resolve this complex issue”.25

22

International Court of Justice, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Order of 13 July 2006, request for the indication of provisional measures, available at <www.icj-cij.org>.

23

European Communities – Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS/26/AB/R and WT/DS/48/AB/R, 16 January 1998.

24

See the Report of the Appellate Body, op. cit. See also H. Ruiz Fabri, “La prise en compte du principe de précaution par l’OMC”, RJE, 2000, p. 55.

25

European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 27


The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has also had to consider the precautionary principle in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases when it was asked to order provisional measures, but did not touch on the principle’s status.26 In the MOX Plant case the tribunal was also faced with the precautionary principle, but when asked to order provisional measures it made no mention of it.27 The reluctant attitude of international judges in dealing with the precautionary principle is proof of the difficulty faced in trying to raise it in explicit terms to the rank of a principle of international customary law. However, its insertion into various domestic law instruments, its acknowledgement by the Court of Justice of the European Communities,28 by national tribunals,29 and

Reports of the Panel, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R and WT/DS293/R, 29 September 2006, at para. 7.88-7.89. 26

The Tribunal justified the adoption of provisional measures, inter alia, by the following considerations: “Considering that the conservation of the living resources of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine environment … Considering that, in the view of the Tribunal, the parties should in the circumstances act with prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of southern bluefish tuna. Considering that there is scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be taken to conserve the stock of southern bluefin tuna and there is no agreement among the parties as to whether the conservation measures taken so far have led to improvement in the stock of southern bluefin tuna. Considering that although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the scientific evidence presented by the parties and to avert further deterioration of the southern bluefin tuna stock” (Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Requests for Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, available at <www.un.org/depts/los/index.htm>. See L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Unilateralism and Environmental Protection: Issues of Perception and Reality of Issues”, EJIL (2000), Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 315-338.

27

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), op. cit.

28

See the Decision of 5 May 1998 in the case of the export prohibition of British beef: “Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, the institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent. That approach is borne out by article 130r(l) of the EC Treaty according to which Community policy on the environment it to pursue the objective inter alia, of protecting human health”. See also, Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council of the European Union, Court of First Instance, Judgment of 11 September 2002; Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc. v. Council of the European Union, Court of First Instance, Judgment of 11 September 2002.

29

See for instance, CE, 28 juillet 2000, Association Force Ouvrière Consommateurs et autres, No. 212115, in Droit de l’environnement, No. 86, 2001/2, pp. 46-48. See also Tribunal de Grande Instance d’Orléans, Jugement correctionnel sur les faucheurs d’O.G.M., 9 décembre 2005, in Dossier documentaire: Justice, environnement, développement durable, risques industriels, Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature, Paris, 2006, p. 55; Supreme Court of India, Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India, 2002 (10 SCC 606). The European Communities referred to this judgment of the Supreme Court of India in European Communities – Measures

28


its reiteration in numerous international instruments30 tip the balance in this direction.31 As can be seen, the precautionary principle’s varied facets spring up. This variety is also mirrored in the obligations deriving from this principle as will be emphasised below. In order to get a better understanding of the precautionary principle, one must note that it is part of the development of a new body of law which does not necessarily comply with the paradigm of legal positivism. It mixes “hard law” and “soft law”. Therefore it is difficult to formally and specifically determine what the precautionary principle signifies in international law when evoked in international instruments. In other words, this situation opens the debate on the normative role played by precaution in the international legal order. Precaution is most often seen as a principle, without its meaning and the legal content of the expression “principle” being precisely determined. A principle is a juridical rule established by a text in terms sufficiently general to inspire all possible applications and that prevails over norms and standards.32 Even when in the form of a maxim, a principle is legally compulsory, though it may be unwritten.33 The expression “principle” also refers to generality, as opposed to exceptionality. Therefore, the precautionary principle is a permanent principle of Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, op. cit. para. 7.79: “the European Communities noted that the precautionary principle is one of the ‘salutary principles which govern the law of the environment’ in India and has been applied by the Indian Supreme Court”. 30

In this regard see the Nice European Council Resolution of 7-9 December 2000 on the precautionary principle. The Council notes that “the precautionary principle is gradually asserting itself as a principle of international law in the fields of environmental and health protection”, available at <www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Nice%20 European%20Council-Presidency%20conclusions.pdf>.

31

Some scholars consider the precautionary principle as a customary international law principle: J. Cameron and J. Abouchar, “The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law”, in D. Freestone and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle and International Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp. 29-53. Ph. Sands affirms that “there is certainly sufficient evidence of state practice to support the conclusion that the principle, as elaborated in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and various international conventions, has now received sufficiently broad support to allow a strong argument to be made that it reflects a principle of customary international law, and that within the context of the European Union it has now achieved customary status, without prejudice to the precise consequences of its application in any given case. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that international courts and tribunals have been reluctant to accept explicitly that the principle has a customary international law status, notwithstanding the preponderance of support in favour of that view, and diminishing opposition to it”. See Ph. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 279.

32

G. Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique, Paris, PUF, 2002, p. 653.

33

Ibid. p. 653. 29


action. The exception would be the non-application of precaution in a decisionmaking process. And as for all exceptions, this non-application will be subject to strict conditions and interpretation. Since one cannot describe precaution as a rule, the legal notion of principle seems adequate. The essence of the matter is to specify the contours and implementation mechanisms of precaution while using other legal rules. In sum, the precautionary principle is part of a new development of law. The aim is not strict international regulation, but the establishment of a process accompanied by a body of occasionally explicit, but usually implicit, rules guiding the behaviour of the various agents in the international arena.34 The precautionary principle does not refer uniquely to legal norms but also to technical norms, as well as economic, social, scientific, political and even cultural norms. It is in the context of this inter-normative process that precaution can be implemented effectively and efficiently, and can enjoy all necessary legitimacy. This characteristic aids in better understanding why the precautionary principle is resistant to legal systematisation. Lawyers must strive to look beyond traditional legal categories in order to admit the legal character of the precautionary principle.

III. A Principle with Integrative Power The precautionary principle has symbiotic effects. Due to its flexible structure and content, it constitutes a meeting point for certain principles and legal techniques. It is composed of a mix of obligations of means and of result, and is a basis for other principles in international law. The precautionary principle must be analysed as a symbiosis of legal obligations of means and obligations of result. One refers to obligations of means when reference is made to a State’s capacity to take measures but also when the “cost-effect ratio” of the envisaged precautionary measures is mentioned. In this case, the means implemented in order to respect the precautionary principle will 34

30

Birnie and Boyle, after having stressed the uncertainties in the application of the precautionary principle (and even in its meaning), affirm that “the proposition that [the precautionary principle] is, or … is not, customary international law is too simplistic. Use by national and international courts, by international organizations, and in treaties, shows that the precautionary principle does have a legally important core on which there is international consensus – that in performing their obligations of environmental protection and sustainable use of natural resources states cannot rely on scientific uncertainty to justify inaction when there is enough evidence to establish the possibility of a risk of serious harm, even if there is as yet no proof of harm. In this sense the precautionary principle is a principle of international law on which decision makers and courts may rely in the same way that they may be influenced by the principle of sustainable development.” P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 120.


vary according to their cost and to their effectiveness in preventing environmental degradation. This understanding of the precautionary principle first appeared in the 1992 Convention on Climate Change which requires that precautionary measures “(should) be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost”.35 Other instruments also require the need to take into account the costs of prevention in relation to their effectiveness.36 The obligation of means, in the sense of a simple behavioural order, is likely to make the principle more attractive to States. As an obligation of result, the precautionary principle imposes the obligation of preventing possible negative effects on the environment. In extreme circumstances, the principle can lead to the establishment of a preventive prohibition of certain activities and the suggested activity would be thus forbidden until its innocuity is proven.37 It is in this context that certain conventions provide for the reversal of the burden of proof. In truth one needs to go beyond the dichotomy (strictly, and classically, speaking) between obligations of means and obligations of result. The precautionary principle, due to the complexity of objectivising the criteria necessary for its implementation, rather calls upon “obligations of intermediary means” and “obligations of intermediary result”. This is to say that regardless of the type of obligation prevailing according to the dictates of a conventional disposition, there will always be a minimum dose of the other obligation to take into account. Therefore, though precaution in one instrument may refer essentially to an obligation of means, a minimal result is nevertheless to be expected of the application of precaution. Conversely, an obligation of result will necessarily be subject to conditions, i.e. the means to which the State wishing to apply precautionary measures has access. One may also say that the precautionary principle induces a new category of obligations, named “necessary obligations”. International agents are compelled to act in conformity with precaution as it becomes a sine qua non condition for human survival.38 Necessity becomes a potential source of the legal legitimisa-

35

Article 3, para. 3 (op. cit.).

36

See the 1994 Oslo Protocol (op. cit.): “precautionary measures … should be cost-effective” (para. 4 of the preamble). See also article 4, para. 3a), of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean, as amended in 1995 (op. cit.).

37

P. Martin-Bidou, “Le principe de precaution en droit international de l’environnement”, RGDIP, 1999, p. 655.

38

In the same way Judge Weeramantry in his separate opinion in the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros case, without mentioning any necessary obligation, stressed the necessity of taking into account erga omnes obligations in international judicial proceedings. The precautionary principle would belong to this category of obligations. As Judge Weeramantry said: “We have entered an era of international law in which international law subserves not only the 31


tion of precaution at the international level. It finds support in the emergence of a new global ethic, i.e. the preservation of humanity and the environment.39 Ethics becomes an essential source of law and legal obligation. Precaution would consist of an “obligation of legal ethics”.40 To recall the conceptualisation used by the French Constitutional Court (Conseil Constitutionnel), the precautionary principle could be described as a “principe particulièrement nécessaire à notre temps”.41 Due to its power of integration, the precautionary principle succeeds in reconciling ethics and law. This feature of the precautionary principle can also be exemplified in its intermingling with other fundamental principles. It lends these other principles strength, and calls for a redefinition of their role in the international normative system. Two of these principles enjoy a privileged relationship with the precautionary principle: “the principle of intergenerational equity”, and “the principle of public participation”. The principle of intergenerational equity is a constitutive element of the concept of sustainable development. As stated by Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, “the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations”.42 Considering the precautionary principle as a right geared towards the future permits the acknowledgement of the rights of future generations and of their interests in decision-making processes. By

interests of individual States, but looks beyond them and their parochial concerns to the greater interests of humanity and planetary welfare. In addressing such problems, which transcend the individual rights and obligations of the litigating States, international law will need to look beyond procedural rules fashioned for purely inter partes litigation. When we enter the arena of obligations which operate erga omnes rather than inter partes, rules based on individual fairness and procedural compliance may be inadequate. The great ecological questions now surfacing will call for thought upon this matter. International environmental law will need to proceed beyond weighing the rights and obligations of parties within a closed compartment of individual State self-interest, unrelated to the global concerns of humanity as a whole” (ICJ Reports 1997, pp. 118-119). 39

On the interplay between ethics and environment, see L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Ethique environnementale et droit international”, in N. Boschiero (ed.), Ordine internazionale e valori etici, Naples, Editoriale Scientifica, 2004, pp. 269 et seq.

40

C. Perelman, Ethique et droit, Brussels, Ed. de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1990.

41

See the Decision of the French Constitutional Court of 28 April 2005 (Décision 2005-514 DC, J.O., 4 May 2005, p. 7702). See also the “Charte de l’environnement” as part of the norms having a constitutional value in French law (the “Loi Constitutionnelle relative à la Charte de l’environnement” was thus adopted on 28 February 2005 and entered into force on 2 March 2005). The text of the “Loi constitutionnelle relative à la Charte de l’environnement” is available in L. Boisson de Chazournes, R. Desgagné, M.M. Mbengue and C. Romano, Protection internationale de l’environnement, Paris, Pedone, 2005, p. 19.

42

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, op. cit.

32


regulating uncertainty, the precautionary principle is sensitive to the future consequences of human activity on the environment, to health, and to human survival. A satisfactory implementation of the precautionary principle guarantees a fortiori the protection of the interests of future generations. The principle of public participation also benefits from the dynamism implicit in the precautionary principle.43 The management of the uncertainty linked to human activity is not the public decision-makers’ monopoly. The precautionary principle upsets traditional decision-making processes by requiring increased transparency. Precaution considered as the symbiosis of technical, scientific, social, economic, cultural, political and legal norms involves a plurality of agents. To do so, the implementation of the precautionary principle must give rise to an effective and efficient application of the principle of public participation. The State cannot be the only agent responsible for the evaluation of whether precaution should be applied in a particular situation. Scientific communities, the private sector, NGOs, local populations and other concerned actors must be involved in decision-making processes. In addition, access to adequate information as a corollary to public participation is a guarantee for meaningful decision-making processes.

IV. Conclusion: Understanding Precaution through its Societal Dimension “To be or not to be”: as with any new regulative legal concepts, precaution is confronted with this existential query. The precautionary principle’s viability in the international legal order depends on its intrinsic and extrinsic aptitude to play its role. Intrinsically, it must play its role as an original and singular legal technique, and not be overtaken by other legal techniques. Extrinsically, the precautionary principle must be able to live up to its societal dimension. If not, it risks being stripped of all normative legitimacy. The precautionary principle triggers new reflections on the “social contract”. It proves that all attempts of social constructivism (that is, of management of society according to a final and pre-ordained plan) is destined to failure, or at least

43

In accordance to Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, “Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided” (op. cit.). 33


to serious questioning. Precaution brings with it a new trend: that of complexity, and therefore the questioning of all absolute assumptions which have long been the foundations of modern society. It takes place within a post-modern context, and is the bearer of several “disturbances” in the legal order. The first is the remodeling of the interaction between law and science. The relativity of the Cartesian dogma due to the appearance of new problems and challenges for the whole of humanity leads to a new mode of handling scientific expertise by law. Indirectly, it also leads to a rebalancing of the interaction between legal politics and science. Precaution speaks of a bond profoundly upset: science would be sought for the suspicions and doubts it raises rather than for the knowledge it offers.44 This is not a dilution of the role of science, but a repositioning of it. Indeed, the precautionary principle creates another mode of interaction between normative processes and scientific expertise. The latter favours a new approach to law tending towards normative processes that are consolidated and renewed by the results obtained through scientific expertise on an ongoing basis. This expertise calls for a constant adaptation of decision-making processes. The second is the remodeling of the interaction between law and economics, linked to the cost that precaution could entail for a particular society. Precautionary measures could initiate a social psychosis which would kill initiative and innovation. Societies cannot allow such vagaries. To rebalance the interaction between law and economy, the precautionary principle must be considered as a substantive element of “sustainable development”. In this perspective its objective is not to ruin economic activity but to emphasise the necessity of convening today’s requirements in terms of environmental protection. As an element of sustainable development, the precautionary principle must strive for a “durable better-being of humanity”,45 in all its interpretations, not just its economic interpretation. The precautionary principle also requires one to rethink the interaction between law and effectiveness. In other words, one must redefine effective mechanisms to implement and underwrite this new body of law, whose essence is “soft”. The aim is to avoid veering into the arbitrary or excessive use of discretionary power in the application of the principle. Courts and tribunals are therefore asked to play a role in shaping the contours of the precautionary principle. There is a need to arbitrate between contradictory interests, and a third party such as a court or a tribunal, through the objectivisation of the content of the precautionary principle, can contribute to this important task.

44

N. de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles – From Political Slogans to Legal Rules, see note 3, pp. 174 et seq.

45

See the terms used by the World Commission on Dams in Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making, Report of the World Commission on Dams, Earthscan, London, 2000, p. 27.

34

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLLECTIVE CONCERNS: REFLECTIONS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT Jutta Brunnée*

I. Introduction

H

ow best to articulate and promote collective concerns of the global community in a decentralized legal order that has grown around the rights and obligations of sovereign States? States’ sovereign equality and autonomy must be preserved, but sometimes sovereignty must be limited if collective concerns are to be addressed. Yet, how to ensure that such concerns are genuinely collective, and that they are not abused by powerful States precisely to undermine the sovereign equality and autonomy of weaker States? International law continues to struggle with these fundamental questions. Perhaps by professional disposition, international lawyers have tended to be optimistic about law’s potential to mediate effectively between sovereign and collective concerns. In the 1960s, Wolfgang Friedmann famously observed that an emerging international law of cooperation had begun to significantly modify the classical law of co-existence of States.1 Three decades later, Bruno Simma traced the shifts in international law from bilateralism to community interest.2 More recently, Ellen Hey posited the emergence of an “international public law”, through which “common-interest

*

This chapter draws on J. Brunnée, “International Legal Accountability through the Lens of the Law of State Responsibility”, (2005) 36 NYIL 3-38; and on J. Brunnée & S.J. Toope, “Norms, Institutions and UN Reform: The Responsibility to Protect”, (2005) 2 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Relations 121.

1

W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964).

2

See B. Simma, “From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law”, (1994 VI) 250 RdC 217.



normative patterns” are woven across the traditional “inter-state normative patterns”.3 This chapter explores the remarkable rise of the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations from grave human rights abuses. In brief, while States are first and foremost responsible for the protection of their own populations, an international responsibility to step in arises when individual States are unwilling or unable to meet their protective duties. The idea that animates the norm is that extreme human rights abuses are no longer within the sovereign domain, but are matters of international concern. Therefore, the concept implicates an array of crucial, but also highly sensitive matters: the fundamental rights of human beings, State sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, and the rules on international use of force. Perhaps surprisingly, given that the responsibility to protect norm has the potential to reshape foundational elements of the international legal order,4 it was unanimously adopted in the United Nation’s 2005 World Summit Outcome document.5 It is too early to predict whether or not the responsibility to protect norm will live up to its transformative potential.6 But it is timely to reflect on its rise to prominence and to assess its legal characteristics. Because the norm is so intimately linked to the controversy surrounding humanitarian intervention, it has been embroiled in the debates about the legality of individual or collective recourse to military force. Its potentially significant impact in that particular context has rightly attracted close attention in governmental and scholarly circles. This chapter, however, places the responsibility to protect in a wider legal context. The discussion begins with a brief review of the concepts of jus cogens and norms erga omnes, and of the law of State responsibility as it pertains to these collective interest categories. Against this backdrop, it then traces the emergence of the responsibility to protect and examines its key features. It suggests that, when the elements of the norm are mapped onto the general structure of international law, its trajectory can be understood as part of a broader, albeit still fragile, normative evolution towards a better balance between sovereignty and collective concerns.

3

E. Hey, Teaching International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), at 7.

4

See A.-M. Slaughter, “Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform”, (2005) 99 AJIL 619.

5

UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Outcome].

6

For a sober perspective see N.J. Wheeler, “A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit”, (2005) 2 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Relations 95.

36

International Law and Collective Concerns: Reflections on the Responsibility to Protect

II. Collective Concerns and the General Structure of International Law One of the ways in which the collective concerns of States, or of the global community, have come to be embedded in the general structure of international law is through the concepts of jus cogens and norms erga omnes. Yet, if the interests protected by these norms are not merely those of individual States but are collective interests of all States, what are the legal implications? Most notably, under what circumstances, and through what means should States be able to demand compliance with collective interest norms or hold violators responsible for breaches? 1. Jus Cogens and Norms Erga Omnes There is general agreement on the existence of a category of peremptory norms, also referred to as jus cogens, from which no derogation is permissible. Individual States cannot exempt themselves from these norms or make contradictory treaty arrangements. The modification of such norms, like their initial creation, is a matter for “the international community of States as a whole”.7 However, notwithstanding the acceptance of the existence of a category of peremptory norms, it is difficult to say which norms are encompassed.8 To date, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been exceedingly cautious in its approach to peremptory norms and has confirmed the jus cogens status of only one norm, the prohibition of genocide.9 The categories of jus cogens and of erga omnes norms overlap to a significant extent, but whereas the former focuses “on the scope and priority to be given to a certain number of fundamental obligations”, the latter is concerned with “the

7

See articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 UNTS 331 (stipulating that treaties that purport to derogate from a peremptory norm are invalid).

8

See e.g. M. Shaw, International Law, 5th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 118.

9

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, Judgment of 3 February 2006, para. 64; at <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icrw/icrwframe.htm> [hereinafter Armed Activities case]. In affirming that the genocide prohibition has jus cogens character, the Court departed from its long-standing avoidance of such findings. Given that the finding was not necessary to decide the jurisdictional question before the Court, its statements have been controversial, notwithstanding the foundational nature of the prohibition. See e.g., remarks of G. Guillaume and T. Treves, respectively, Roundtable on the occasion of the “Lancement du Commentaire des Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traités”, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 20 October 2006 (notes on file with author). 37


legal interest of all States in compliance”.10 Since the obiter dictum of the ICJ in the 1970 Barcelona Traction case it is has come to be accepted that States owe certain obligations to “the international community as a whole”. These obligations, “by their very nature … are the concern of all States” and “all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection”.11 Over the years, the ICJ has deemed the prohibition of genocide,12 the “principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person”,13 and the right of peoples to self-determination to have erga omnes effect.14 Generally, as with jus cogens, it remains difficult to identify erga omnes norms with certainty.15 2. The Law of State Responsibility The most authoritative and comprehensive articulation of the law of State responsibility is found in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles), completed by the International Law Commission (ILC) after decades of work on the topic.16 The work of the ILC was complicated not least by the search for an appropriate approach to collective interest norms. In this area, given the continuing debates on which norms have jus cogens character or erga omnes effects, and given the scarcity of relevant State practice, the Draft Articles had to tread carefully between codification of international law and progressive development. Whether the relevant obligation is owed to an individual State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole, the Draft Articles make clear that the legal consequences of a breach for the responsible State are the

10

See ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001), Commentary to article 42, at 281 [hereinafter ILC Commentary].

11

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, 3, at 32, para. 33.

12

Most recently in Armed Activities case, supra, note 9.

13

Barcelona Traction case, supra, note 11, at 32, para. 34.

14

East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, 90, at 102, para. 29; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 139, at 172, para. 88, and at 199 para. 155 (concluding also that “certain of its obligations under international humanitarian law” have erga omnes effect) [hereinafter Wall case].

15

For detailed assessments, see e.g. M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); C.J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Ch. 4.

16

Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles].

38


same.17 It must cease the violation,18 must offer necessary assurances of nonrepetition,19 and must make full reparation for the injury caused.20 However, for all other matters – the invocation of responsibility by other States, the remedies available, and the countermeasures they may take to induce the responsible State’s compliance – the collective interest question looms large. The distinction between injured and non-injured States is at the core of the ILC’s effort to strike a delicate balance between the need to anchor the Draft Articles in the bilateralist practice of States and the desire to allow for a maturing of international law’s collective interest traits.21 The ILC also sought to mediate between concerns that a wider conception of injury might expose States to excessive claims for violations of collective interests, and the desire to ensure that violations of norms that protect important collective interests are accorded appropriate significance in the responsibility regime.22 In the resulting regime, a State has standing to invoke another’s responsibility as an “injured” State for the breach of an obligation that was owed to it individually.23 Injury can also result from the breach of an obligation owed to a group of States of which it is part (obligations erga omnes partes), or owed to the international community (obligations erga omnes), but only when a State is specially affected by the breach or the breach radically changes the position of the States to which the obligation is owed.24 By contrast, when a violation affects only a State’s legal interest in the upholding of collective concern obligations, it must invoke another’s responsibility as a non-injured State, with attendant limitations upon what it can claim from the responsible State and what measures it can take to ensure compliance.25 Non-injured States may only claim cessation of the breach and assurances of non-repetition.26 In addition, they may claim reparation “in the interest of

17

Ibid. article 33(1).

18

Ibid. article 30(a).

19

Ibid. article 30(b).

20

Ibid. article 31. Reparation encompasses restitution (the re-establishment of the situation that existed prior to the act), compensation for damage, and satisfaction. See ibid. articles 34-37.

21

See I. Scobbie, “The Invocation of Responsibility for the Breach of ‘Obligations under Peremptory Norms of General International Law’”, (2002) 13 EJIL 1202, at 1204, 1218.

22

See M. Koskenniemi, “Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New International Order?”, (2001) 72 BYIL 337, at 348-349.

23

ILC Draft Articles, supra, note 16, article 42(a).

24

Ibid. article 42(b).

25

Ibid. articles 48, 54.

26

Ibid. article 48(2)(a). 39


the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached”.27 The latter option is noteworthy insofar as it is intended to “provide a means of protecting the community or collective interest at stake”.28 The separate reference to “beneficiaries of the obligation” implies the possibility of claims for reparation on behalf of non-nationals, for example for violations of their human rights. However, the ILC acknowledges that these collective interest remedies involve “a measure of progressive development”.29 The uncertainty regarding such claims underscores the importance of the fact that the responsible State is under an independent duty to cease the violation and to make reparation for damage, including damage suffered by non-State actors whose rights were violated.30 The ILC’s efforts to strengthen the collective interest elements of the State responsibility regime are also visible in the Draft Articles’ treatment of “serious breaches” of peremptory norms of international law.31 Absent State practice on punitive or otherwise elevated legal consequences of a jus cogens violation for the responsible State, the Draft Articles confine themselves to declaring the ordinary consequences of a breach of international law to be applicable.32 However, the Articles do sketch out special obligations for other States in the face of such violations. Third States must cooperate to end a serious breach through lawful means, and they may not recognize a situation created by a serious breach or assist in maintaining that situation.33 As noted earlier, it is difficult to identify State practice that explicitly relies upon the peremptory character of legal norms and the ICJ, while it has on several occasions invoked the erga omnes effect of certain norms, has until very recently avoided pronouncing itself on peremptory norms.34 Interestingly, in

27

Ibid. article 48(2)(b).

28

ILC Commentary, supra, note 10, at 323.

29

Ibid.

30

In other words, these secondary obligations are not contingent upon invocation of a State’s responsibility by another. For example, in its Advisory Opinion in the Wall case, the ICJ concluded that Israel had violated the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. It held that Israel not only had an obligation to end the violation but also to make reparation for the damage caused, either by “returning the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, or by compensating “all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the wall’s construction”. See the Wall case, supra, note 14, paras 122, 150-153.

31

ILC Draft Articles, supra, note 16, articles 40 & 41. A serious violation “involves a gross or systematic” breach. See ibid. article 40(2).

32


33

Ibid. article 41(1) & (2).

34

The 2006 decision on its jurisdiction over the Armed Activities case, supra, note 9, marked the first time that the Court as a whole affirmed the jus cogens character of a norm.

40


its Advisory Opinion in the case on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court concluded that “all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation”, “not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created” by the construction of the wall, and “to see to it that any impediment, resulting from the construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to an end”.35 These third State obligations echo the legal consequences that the Draft Articles attach to breaches of peremptory norms. However, the ICJ instead tied these consequences to the erga omnes nature of the right to self-determination,36 an approach for which it was criticized by some of its members.37 As for the Draft Articles, the ILC acknowledged that the stipulation of a duty to cooperate to counteract serious violations of peremptory norms may reach beyond what “general international law at present prescribes”.38 The Commission’s goal was “to strengthen existing mechanisms of cooperation, on the basis that all States are called upon to make an appropriate response” to serious breaches of peremptory norms.39 The reactions from government and scholarly circles have been mixed.40 The Draft Articles’ approach to countermeasures also builds on the distinction between injured and non-injured States, and only the former may take such measures.41 According to the ILC, countermeasures violate the obligations owed by the injured State to the responsible State; their wrongfulness is precluded only by the fact that they respond to a prior violation by the responsible State.42 Of course, countermeasures may not involve the violation of the prohibition on the threat or use of force, fundamental human rights obligations, or other obligations of peremptory character.43 Under the Draft Articles, the purpose of countermeasures is not to punish violations of international law but to induce

35

Wall case, supra, note 14, para. 159.

36

Ibid. paras 154-160.

37

See Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Wall case, ibid. para. 37 (noting that she did not “think that the specified consequence [sic] of the identified violations of international law have anything to do with the concept of erga omnes”); Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, Wall case, ibid. para. 40 (admitting “considerable difficulty in understanding why a violation of an obligation erga omnes by one State should necessarily lead to an obligation for third States”).

38


39

Ibid.

40

See D. Shelton, “Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility”, (2002) 96 AJIL 833, at 842.

41

ILC Draft Articles, supra, note 16, article 49.

42

Ibid. article 22; see also ILC Commentary, supra, note 10, at 324.

43

ILC Draft Articles, supra, note 16, article 50(1). 41


the responsible State to comply with the secondary obligations (i.e. cessation, non-repetition, and reparation) that flow from its internationally wrongful act.44 When the responsible State fails to comply, countermeasures bring an element of enforcement into the State responsibility regime.45 The countermeasures regime operates against the background of a largely decentralized legal system, where self-help may be the only available means of enforcement.46 Yet, their purpose to induce compliance with secondary obligations also entails limitations on the self-help options available to an injured State. Most notably, once the responsible State has complied with its obligations, countermeasures must be terminated.47 Thus, countermeasures must by definition be temporary and reversible,48 and they must be “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question”.49 These features of the countermeasures regime are part of the Draft Articles’ effort to balance the need for self-help against the risk of abuse and escalation of countermeasures.50 Along with the unsettled practice of States, concerns about abuse also help explain the Draft Articles’ even more cautious approach to self-help in the face of violations of collective or community obligations. Rather than a rule that purports to govern response action by non-injured States, the Draft Articles provide merely a savings clause. Article 54 stipulates that the provisions on countermeasures do “not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under Article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State” and “to take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached”.51 Article 54, then, builds on the tentative attempt in article 48 to provide a remedy for violations of collective or community obligations. But just as the existence in international law of a non-injured State’s right to seek a remedy on behalf of another State or the beneficiaries of the obligation is uncertain, so is the existence of a right of non-injured States to take countermeasures.52 The 44


45

Note that resort to countermeasures must be preceded not only by a prior appeal to the responsible State for compliance, but also its prior notification of pending countermeasures and an offer to negotiate. See ibid. article 52(1).

46


47


48

Ibid. articles 49 (2) & (3), 53.

49

Ibid. article 51.

50

See generally, ILC Commentary, supra, note 10, at 324-328.

51


52

See ILC Commentary, supra, note 10, at 355 (observing that “there appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States referred to in article 48 to take countermeasures in the

42


opinions of States and academic observers alike remain divided. For some the very importance of the collective interests at issue demands that States be able to induce compliance through countermeasures.53 For others, the fact that it is individual States that would decide whether or not to take countermeasures, combined with the inequalities among States, raise the specter of abuse and even “vigilantism” by powerful States.54 The ILC concluded that it was premature to permit non-injured States to take countermeasures in response to violations of collective interests. Since “practice is sparse and involves a limited number of States”, it opted for a provision that “reserves the position and leaves the resolution of the matter to the further development international law”.55

III. The Responsibility to Protect 1. Evolution of the Concept The surprisingly rapid evolution of the concept of responsibility to protect over the last fifteen years or so was driven in large part by grave human rights crises within certain countries, and by the failure of the world community to intervene to prevent further atrocities from being perpetrated upon civilian populations. The Rwandan genocide encapsulates this failure,56 but it is not a unique case, as the horrors of Cambodia, Zaire/Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and, most recently, Darfur attest. The immediate impetus for concerted efforts to elaborate the concept of responsibility to protect was provided by the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Kosovo raised again the fundamental questions whether or not a norm of humanitarian intervention existed and, if so, who could invoke it, only the Security Council or individual States?57 In justifying the intervention, most of the NATO States (with the exception of Belgium) side-stepped these thorny issues and refused to posit any general norm of humanitarian intervention. Instead, the NATO partners argued a “moral duty” to act, or a “necessity” to act.58

collective interest”). 53

See M. Kaplan, “Using Collective Interests to Ensure Human Rights: An Analysis of the Articles on State Responsibility”, (2004) 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1902, at 1913.

54

See e.g., Koskenniemi, supra, note 22, at 348.

55


56

See e.g., M. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

57

Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report - Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

58

See e.g., J. Solana, Secretary-General of NATO, Press Statement, NATO Press Release 040 (1990), reprinted in J.L. Dunoff, S.R. Ratner and D. Wippman, International Law – Norms, 43


Shortly after Kosovo, Canada, one of the participants in the NATO intervention, promoted the creation of an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).59 In its articulation of the responsibility to protect,60 the ICISS sought to transcend the intractable debates surrounding rights to humanitarian intervention.61 The responsibility to protect was not about rights at all, but about duties. The primary duty holder was the sovereign State, which should offer security and protection to its own citizens. The report emphasized the overriding importance of a wide spectrum of proactive measures and assistance to local governments in discharging their responsibility to protect, as well as the importance of non-military forms of pressure.62 But it also offered a set of carefully crafted threshold criteria for recourse to collective military action where there was “serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur”. The triggering events were “large scale loss of life … with genocidal intent or not, which [was] the product either of deliberate State action, or State neglect, or inability to act, or a failed State situation”, or “large scale ethnic cleansing”.63 In cases where a State failed in its protective obligation, or where it was the perpetrator of massive human rights violations, collective military action could be authorized internationally to protect victims within a sovereign State.64 To guide decisions on military action, the ICISS outlined

Actors, Process (New York: Aspen, 2002), at 892. 59

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001; at <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report-en.asp>.

60

Of course, the idea of a responsibility to protect can be traced further back. See e.g., O. Corten and P. Klein, Droit d’ingérence ou obligation de réaction? Les possibilités d’action visant à assurer le respect des droits de la personne face au principe de non-intervention (Brussels: Bruylant, 1992). Then UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar asserted already in 1991 that sovereignty could not be a shield behind which human rights could be systematically violated. He argued that there was a “collective obligation of States to bring relief and redress in human rights emergencies”. He added that any international protective action had to be taken in accordance with the UN Charter and could not be unilateral. United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 1; UN Doc. A/46/1 (6 September 1991).

61

See e.g., J.L. Holzgrefe & R.O. Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

62

ICISS, supra, note 59, at 19-31.

63

Ibid. at XII, and 32.

64

ICISS envisaged that this authorization should be sought first through the Security Council, and in case of an inability or refusal to act, through a revitalization of the “Uniting for Peace” resolution of the General Assembly or through a reference to a regional organization. See ICISS, ibid. at XII-XIII, and 47-51.

44


a “just cause threshold”, a set of “precautionary principles”, and criteria for “right authority”.65 The ICISS report was released shortly after the attacks of September 11th, 2001. The sensitivity of its recommendations was further increased by the intervention in Iraq, led by the United States and Britain without authorization by the Security Council. By November 2003, the worry over the “lack of agreement amongst Member States on the proper role of the United Nations in providing collective security” prompted the UN Secretary-General to create the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.66 The panel’s report was published in December 2004.67 With respect to the use of force for the protection of people, the report drew extensively on the ICISS recommendations. The panel specifically endorsed “the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort”.68 The High-level Panel’s invocation of triggering events for collective military action was similar to that of ICISS: “genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violation of international humanitarian law”.69 In addition, the panel emphasized that guidelines on the use of force could “maximize the possibility of achieving Security Council consensus” and “minimize the possibility of individual Member States bypassing the Security Council”.70 In his response to the High-level Panel report, the Secretary-General highlighted the question whether States have the right, or even obligation, to use force protectively to rescue citizens from genocide or comparable crimes against humanity.71 This move from a list of grave human rights violations to the concept of international crime as the trigger for action represented a crucial shift in emphasis. Another shift was equally important. Whereas both ICISS and the High-level Panel had left open the possibility for unilateral action in a case where

65

Ibid. at XII. For a detailed discussion, see J. Brunnée & S.J. Toope, “Slouching Towards New ‘Just’ Wars: International Law and the Use of Force after September 11”, (2004) 51 NILR 363.

66

In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/2005 (21 March 2005), at para. 76 [hereinafter In Larger Freedom].

67

See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565 (29 November 2004); at <www. un.org/secureworld> [hereinafter HLP Report].

68

HLP Report, ibid. at para. 203.

69

Ibid. arguably the reference to “serious violations of international humanitarian law” widened the scope of triggering events for intervention that ICISS had envisaged.

70

Ibid. at para. 206.

71

In Larger Freedom, supra, note 66, at paras 122 and 125. 45


the Security Council could not act, the Secretary-General’s response stressed that: “The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better”.72 To this end, the Secretary-General endorsed ICISS’ and the High-level Panel’s call for criteria for intervention, emphasizing that the formulation and application of such criteria was essential to achieve legitimacy amongst States and global public opinion for any Council action.73 The concept of the responsibility to protect survived the difficult negotiations that preceded the adoption of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, but a number of further shifts in emphasis occurred. The document describes the responsibility to protect as primarily a responsibility of individual States to protect their own populations. In addition, the link to international crimes is solidified. States are only called upon to protect their populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.74 A role is posited for international society, but this role is first to “encourage and help States” to exercise their responsibility to protect their own people, and secondly to “use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means…to help protect populations”.75 The Security Council is authorized to take collective protection action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on a “case by case basis” and “should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations” from the listed international crimes.76 The member States did not take up the earlier recommendations to develop more specific criteria for military intervention.77 The document contains only a charge to the General Assembly to “continue consideration of the responsibility to protect … and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law”.78 Nonetheless, given the history of debates around humanitarian intervention and the potential implications of the concept of responsibility to protect for State sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, its inclusion in the summit’s Outcome document is remarkable. The norm, which has now been at least formally endorsed, represents fundamental challenges to the conceptual structures that have long underpinned international law and politics. Granted, these challenges are not entirely unprecedented. Since the creation of the United Nations, steady 72

Ibid. at para. 126.

73

Ibid.

74

2005 Outcome, supra, note 5, at para. 138.

75

Ibid. at paras 138 and 139.

76

Ibid. at para. 139.

77

Some commentators argue that these criteria are already part of the existing international law on the use of force. See e.g. M.E. O’Connell, “The Counter-Reformation of the Security Council”, (2005) 2 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Relations 107.

78

2005 Outcome, supra, note 5, para. 139.

46


efforts have been made to shrink the sovereign domain and to recognize the imperatives of collective action. But the responsibility to protect could well be of a different order. It posits a generalized set of interlocking obligations owed to States and to persons. It represents not simply a carving out of specialized regimes through treaty commitments, but could prompt what Anne-Marie Slaughter has called a “tectonic shift” in the very definition of sovereignty.79 To illustrate, if the idea of the responsibility to protect is taken seriously, Sudan owes obligations of protection to its own people. But Sudan is also accountable to other States if it fails to protect its people. Importantly, third parties are not merely entitled to invoke Sudan’s responsibility; they also have a responsibility of their own to intervene, whether collectively or unilaterally remains uncertain. Given the potential impact on sovereignty, it is not surprising that, in agreeing to its inclusion in the Outcome document, many States sought to limit the potential impact of the responsibility to protect, especially in comparison to the way it had been cast by ICISS. As noted, for ICISS, the responsibility to protect encompassed a broad spectrum of measures focused upon the prevention of humanitarian crises. It created a clear “responsibility continuum” that comprised action to prevent, to react, and to rebuild.80 The use of force was a final step, taken only in extremis. Although the Outcome document retains some flavour of prevention, its language in this respect is extremely cautious. There are only general statements that the “international community should … encourage and help States to exercise [their] responsibility”, “support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability”, “use … peaceful means … under Chapters VI and VIII … to help protect populations”, and to help “States build capacity to protect their populations”.81 Presumably, the move away from early warning and prevention was designed to assuage the concerns of many developing countries that the responsibility to protect could lead to an overly active and interventionist United Nations or even to interventions by individual States without Security Council approval.82 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter limits any intervention in the internal affairs of member States to “enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. Certain States likely recognized that there was no turning back from the idea of intervention as set out in Chapter VII, but they wanted to contain further possibilities for outside intervention.

79

Slaughter, supra, note 4, at 627.

80

See J. Tanguy, “Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention”, (2003) 17 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 141, at 144.

81

2005 Outcome, supra, note 5, paras 138-139.

82

See generally M.V. Naidu, “Security, Sovereignty, and Intervention: Concepts and Case Studies”, (2002) 34 Peace Research 33; S.D. Muni, “Human Rights, State Sovereignty and Military Intervention: Reflections on a Critical Discourse”, (2005) 1 International Relations in a Globalising World 99. 47


Many of the same States seem to have negotiated other limitations on the concept of the responsibility to protect as well. As indicated above, the key limitation is that all responsibilities are triggered only in relation to international crimes.83 This limitation has at least three significant implications. First, while great emphasis is placed upon the primary responsibility of individual States to protect their populations, this responsibility applies only to the limited class of international crimes, though it must be added that here “protection” includes prevention.84 Second, the possibility for collective intervention also exists only in the relatively narrow circumstances of international crime. This effect was probably intended, at least from the perspective of developing States, to prevent a resurrection of the “civilizing mission” of 19th century international law.85 Third, if the duty of potential intervenors to act is limited to cases of “international crime”, it is left open whether there is any duty to act collectively in situations where massive human rights violations do not reach that threshold. It is worth remembering that the ICISS proposal had described the triggering events for military intervention to be “serious and irreparable harm” involving “large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not”, or “large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended”. Not only does the Outcome document limit the trigger to international crimes, but it also requires the actual commission of the crimes, not the threat.86 2. The Responsibility to Protect and the Law of State Responsibility The concept of the responsibility to protect attempts to strike a delicate balance between two potentially competing collective concerns: maintaining strict limits on the use of military force and protecting human rights against grave of

83

In the Outcome document responsibility is linked to “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. Although “ethnic cleansing” is not established as a distinct international crime, it is arguably included in the concepts of “genocide”, “extermination”, “deportation or forcible transfer of population” and “enforced disappearance” as set out inter alia in articles 6 and 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998). Depending upon factual circumstances, it might also be a “war crime”.

84

Of course, States are also subject to other human rights obligations derived from custom and treaty, but these obligations do not explicitly give rise to a potential collective obligation to protect.

85

See generally, M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

86

See 2005 Outcome, supra, note 5, at para. 139 (providing that collective action under Chapter VII can follow only after “national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations” from the listed crimes). This shift from the possibility of preventive military intervention to reactive intervention had already taken place in the Report of the High-level Panel. See HLP Report, supra, note 67, at para. 203.

48


abuses. In turn, both of these concerns must be balanced against the protection of State sovereignty from undue external intervention, military or otherwise. As noted at the outset, the potential impact of the responsibility to protect on the rules governing the international use of force has garnered significant attention, and rightly so. But, to fully appreciate the balance struck by the concept, an analysis against the backdrop of the categories of jus cogens and norms erga omnes and of the attendant rules of State responsibility is equally important. It reveals the extent to which the responsibility to protect, at least as articulated in the 2005 Outcome document, maps onto these general legal structures. This fact is important for at least two reasons. First, and leaving aside the use of force dimension for a moment, to the extent that the responsibility to protect focuses on firmly entrenched collective concerns, its encroachment on State sovereignty is revealed to be not novel but actually solidly grounded in international law. It is significant, therefore, that in limiting the responsibility to protect to “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, the Outcome document tied it not only to international crimes, but also to norms that, arguably, have both erga omnes effect and jus cogens status. Second, to the extent that the responsibility to protect tracks the consequences that the law of State responsibility attaches to breaches of erga omnes norms or jus cogens, it should be strengthened by the fact that it is merely a specific articulation of general precepts of international law. Specifically, by virtue of their erga omnes effect, States already owe the human rights obligations underlying the responsibility to protect not only to persons under their jurisdiction, but also to all States. By the same token, all States already have a legal interest in the protection of individual States’ populations against these grave human rights abuses. In the face of such abuses, all States could invoke the responsibility of the perpetrating State, could demand that the abuses stop, and, possibly, could demand that victims be compensated. If the State perpetrating the abuses refuses to comply, all States are further entitled to take “lawful measures” to compel compliance. General international law underscores, then, that third States’ preoccupation with extreme human rights abuses within an individual State are not unwarranted interventions in that State’s affairs, but legitimate pursuit of established collective legal interests. The responsibility to protect merely builds upon the balance already struck by international law through the concept of erga omnes effect. In turn, in doing so, it reinforces the foundation of primary norms with erga omnes effect upon which the operation of the attendant State responsibility rules depends. Further, to the extent that third States pursue the responsibility to protect by seeking the remedies that the Draft Articles make available to non-injured States or by taking “lawful measures” to induce compliance, those secondary rules that are not currently based upon clear State practice might be solidified.

49


What, then, of the seemingly greatest innovation of the responsibility to protect, the idea that third States not only have legal interests but legal responsibilities as well? A closer look reveals that here too the responsibility to protect against “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” rests on the foundations of the law of State responsibility. In the case of jus cogens violations, the Draft Articles insist that States are not merely entitled to demand that they stop but are under an obligation to cooperate to bring them to an end. The responsibility to protect concept makes explicit what international law, arguably, already requires. That said, given the ambiguities surrounding the legal consequences of jus cogens and norms erga omnes, this articulation is still an important development. Taken together, the law of State responsibility and the concept of the responsibility to protect send a clear message: no State may stand idly by when genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity are being perpetrated. The law of State responsibility underscores that third States are not merely under a moral responsibility to protect; each State has a legal obligation to participate in protective efforts. To the extent that the responsibility to protect can mobilize State practice, a side-effect would once again be to strengthen the secondary rules set out in the Draft Articles on the basis of so far scant precedent. As we have seen, the Draft Articles are careful in sketching out the measures that individual States can take in the name of collective concern, especially as far as the use of force is concerned. Here, the concept of responsibility to protect clarifies that, in cases of extreme crisis, the duty to cooperate to bring an end to grave human rights abuses does extend to military measures. All indications are that these measures must be taken collectively and under the authority of the Security Council. This result would be in keeping both with the overarching importance of limits on international use of force and with the more general effort of the Draft Articles to contain the legal space for individual State’s enforcement of community interest. With respect to the authorization of the use of force by the Security Council, it remains to be seen whether the responsibility to protect as articulated in the Outcome document marks progress or not.87 It might be argued, on the one hand, that the responsibility to protect brings progress in so far as it suggests that the States members of the Council have an obligation to cooperate to enable necessary collective measures. On the other hand, the State responsibility lens necessarily implies a reactive stance. Thus, to the extent that the articulation of the responsibility to protect in the Outcome document purports to limit the protective intervention option to situations in which international crimes have been committed, the impact on the Council’s scope for interventions to prevent extreme humanitarian crisis under Chapter VII is unclear. One might say that this limitation was the price for a

87

50

See the questions raised by Wheeler, supra, note 6.


measure of clarity that reliance on a fixed category of relatively well established international crimes would introduce. But definitional debates may simply be displaced to the next level. The requirement that an international crime has already taken place necessitates a legal assessment, which is likely to generate a heated and protracted debate that could actually delay response. In the case of genocide, one of the triggering crimes, we already know that disagreements over the question whether the facts fit the definition have stymied action on a number of occasions. If the ongoing crisis in Darfur and the lack of effective international response are any indication, so far neither perpetrating States nor the often invoked international community are living up to the responsibility that they so solemnly acknowledged in the Outcome document.

IV. Conclusion The inclusion of the responsibility to protect in the Outcome document of the 2005 UN Summit has been heralded as a major breakthrough. Indeed, given the fundamental challenge to sovereignty contained in the notion of a responsibility to protect, it is difficult to dismiss the Summit’s endorsement of the concept as mere “cheap talk”.88 The stakes were too high. The efforts to modify and limit the concept through its various iterations suggest that many States believe that the responsibility to protect actually means something – or at least that it could mean something if they are not careful to limit the concept now. Perhaps ironically, by focusing the concept on a narrow category of international crimes and casting it largely as a matter of responses to breaches of international law, the drafters of the Outcome document may have given the responsibility to protect more potential meaning than they imagined. Arguably, the narrowing of the concept’s ambit to violations of jus cogens, and thus to firmly entrenched and non-derogable norms, should strengthen the concept, making it harder for States, whether perpetrators or bystanders, to evade their responsibilities. But that is not all. If the concept does shift debate and mobilize action, it might also help fill the categories of jus cogens and norms erga omnes, as well as the attendant State responsibility rules, with meaning. The flipside of all this positive potential, however, is considerable normative risk. For if it fails to affect State conduct, we must ask ourselves not only what the noble idea of the responsibility to protect is worth, but also how far international law has really come in the wider struggle to give legal weight to collective concerns.

88

See Th. Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’ Communicative Action in World Politics”, (2000) 54 Int’l Org. 1, at 8. 51

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT: THE ENGLISH PERSPECTIVE Malgosia Fitzmaurice

I. Introduction to the Chapter

T

his chapter will focus on the human right to a clean environment and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), seen from the perspective of the jurisprudence of the English Courts. The chapter will consist of the following main parts: an introduction to the human right to a clean environment; the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights; a brief introduction to the 1998 Human Rights Act (HRA); and the relevant jurisprudence of English Courts.

II. Introduction to the Issues Concerning the Human Right to a Clean Environment The issue of the human right to a clean environment has, for many years, been a subject of vigorous discussion.1 The focus of the discussion has been shifting, 1

To mention a few of the numerous publications on this subject: R. Desgagné, “Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights”, 89 AJIL (1995), pp. 263-294; M. Thorme, “Establishing Environment as Human Right”, 19 Den. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y (1991), pp. 301-342; A. Boyle and M. Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, 1996; D. Shelton, “What Happened in Rio to Human Rights?”, 3 YB Int’l Envtl. L. (1992), pp. 75-93; idem, “Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to the Environment”, 28 Stanford J. Int’l L., (1991), pp. 103-138; A. Kiss and D. Shelton, International Environmental Law, 2004, pp. 661-731; G. Handl, “Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly ‘Revisionist’ View”, in: A.A. Cançado Trinidade



however, from the very issue of the existence of such a right to the more practical problems of the distinction between substantive and procedural human rights to a clean environment (i.e. right to environmental information, the participation in environmental decision-making and access to environmental justice). The early, general debate relating to the existence of such a right was mainly characterised by its vagueness and lack of focus. For example, much of the discussion was devoted to the name of such a (possible) right, such as a “right to an environment”, right to a “decent”, “healthy”, or “safe” environment.2 The issues which were initially widely analysed concerned the possible link between human rights in general and the environment and the classification of such a right. However, no persuasive theories were offered. Certain writers rejected the existence of such a possibility. G. Handl, for example, expressed doubts as to whether the human right to a clean environment may be derived at all from a general discourse of human rights.3 Their views stated that such a right belonged to the category of so-called solidarity rights (or the third generation of human rights). This category of human rights is in itself rather controversial.4 K. Vasak is assumed to have originated the concept of this category of human rights. He defined them in the following manner: “[t]hey are new to infuse the aspirations they express, are new from the point of view of human rights in that they seek to infuse the dimension into areas where it has all too often been missing, having been left to the State, or States … [t]hey are new in that they both are involved against the State and demanded of it; but above all (and herein lies their essential characteristic) they can be realised only through the concerned efforts of all actors of the social scene: the individual, the State, public and private bodies and the international community.”5

2 3

4

5

54

(ed.), Human Rights and Environmental Protection, 1992, p. 117; idem, “Human Rights and Protection of the Environment”, in: A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2001, pp. 303-328; M. Fitzmaurice, “Some Reflections on public participation in environmental matters as a human right in international law”, 2 Non-State Actors and International Law (2002), pp. 1-22. Desgagné, ibid. pp. 263-264. Handl in Eide, note 1, p. 306. He referred in particular to an unresolved issue of the concept of human rights as either inherent to human beings by the very virtue of their humanity; or granted by a State. This debate affects, in his view, not just the understanding of the burden of proof, but also goes to the very core of the debate between the proponents of natural law and positive law. See R.S. Pathak, “The Human Rights System as a Conceptual Framework for Environmental Law”, in: E. Brown-Weiss (ed.), Environmental Change and International Law, 1992, pp. 199-204. It was thought that this category included the right to development; and co-ownership of the common heritage of mankind. K. Vasak, “For the Third Generation of Human Rights: the Right of Solidarity”, Inaugural

The ECHR and Fundamental Freedoms and the Human Right to a Clean Environment

However, this category of rights was in general subject to a certain degree of criticism, from the point of view of the usefulness of these rights in relation to the environmental human right.6 Due to the inherent character of these rights, their application in relation to the environmental human right would make the main beneficiaries developing States. This, however, would not conform with the classical approach to human rights.7 The view, which was frequently expressed, draws on the environmental human right from the catalogue of already existing human rights, i.e. rights enshrined in two 1966 United Nations Covenants of Civil and Political Rights and Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. The most frequently referred to is the right to life (which belongs to the first generation of human rights) or the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being (which belongs to the so-called second generation of human rights). It is assumed that the vague and ill-defined content of the proposed right to a clean environment would acquire certain normativity, if it were drawn from already established human rights.8 Such an approach is not without problems, in particular in respect to the second generation of human rights, as “[d]espite their advantages, the existing system for implementing and monitoring second generation rights construes these rights rather narrowly, and continues to approach environmental questions only indirectly”.9 Finally, there are some views that define such a right as a mixture of civil and political and social, economic and cultural rights. The proponents of this view, however, point out that the second generation of human rights are vague in nature, and, therefore, the implementation in practice of an environmental right, in part derived from this category of rights, would encounter inherent difficulties.10 Moreover, such a right would represent a very wide spectrum of economic, political and social issues, therefore making the implementation of

6

7 8

9

10

Lecture for the 10th Study Session of the International Institute of Human Rights, July 1979; see also, P. Alston, “A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development of Obfuscation of International Human Rights?”, 29 NILR (1982), pp. 307, 309; S. Marks, “Emerging Human Rights: A Generation for the 1980s?”, 33 Rutgers L. Rev. (1980-1981), p. 441; and P. Kooijmans, “Human Rights-Universal Panacea? Some Reflections on So-called Human Rights of the Third Generation”, 37 NILR (1982), p. 317. They were thought to be so general as to encompass everything and everybody, see A. Boyle, “The Role of Human Rights in the Protection of the Environment”, in Boyle and Anderson, note 1, p. 46. Ibid. p. 49. J.G. Merrills, “Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual Aspects”, in Boyle and Anderson, note 1, p. 25. M. Anderson, “Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview”, in Boyle and Anderson, note 1, p. 6. Handl in Eide, note 1, p. 133. 55


and compliance with such a right very problematic.11 The same author observes that the changing structure of environmental measures, which are subject to socio-legal re-ordering (such as saving jobs), adds to definitional and practical difficulties of the problem of the human right to a clean environment. In intervening years, the discourse relating to environmental human rights has shifted from definitional issues to the more practical approach, based on a division of this right into a substantive environmental human right and a procedural environmental human right. The latter type of this right has particularly gained in importance after the elaboration and the entry into force of the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.12 This Convention is an emanation of certain principles contained in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Development and Environment, such as Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, which grants a procedural right to a clean environment. It is generally thought that the procedural environmental right is a more effective and a flexible tool in achieving environmental justice than a substantive right, which frequently does not grant any procedural rights to information, participation or judicial justice, therefore is to a large extent only a policy statement.13 This is often the case concerning the constitutional right to a clean environment (see below). At the international plane, T. Hayward observes in relation to the Aarhus Convention: “rights of information are clearly a prerequisite to effective democratic citizenship; and democracy is enhanced be increasing government and industry transparency and accountability on environmental issues.”14 This Convention is devoted in its entirety to the procedural environmental human right: an individual must be granted the right to receive information, be entitled to participate in the decision-making process concerning environmental matters and have an access to environmental justice. Failure to comply with these obligations implies a breach of a treaty by a State. The main pillar on which the Aarhus Convention is broadly conceived is public participation. Public participation under this Convention covers four types of decision-making procedures: specific activities; plans; programmes and policies; executive regulations and generally

11 12 13

14

56

Handl in Cançado, note 1, pp. 120-121. This Convention entered into force in 2001. See in depth discussion on this subject matter in: T. Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights, 2005, pp. 84-92. Ibid. p. 143.


applicable rules.15 It is based on two fundamental principles: the “early” public participation and the “effective” public participation (article 6(4) of the Aarhus Convention). Article 9(1) of the Convention defines the grounds on which access to environmental justice is based.16 At present, however, the implementation of the Convention is the most advanced in relation to the access to information. Public participation is still in its initial stages and the access to environmental justice is the least developed area of the implementation of the Convention. It is not often remembered that there are international environmental conventions that grant a right to information and public participation, although they are not human right-based. The 1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact in a Transboundary Context is an example of such a convention.17 The basic principle of the Espoo Convention is the same as the one enshrined in the Aarhus Convention, i.e. the establishment of a reasonable time-frame allowing sufficient time for each of the different stages of public participation in the environmental impact assessment (EIA). The extent of public participation is even broader in the new Protocol to the Espoo Convention (the 2003 Kiev Protocol on the Strategic Impact Assessment),18 which encompasses public consultations at the stage of plans and programmes (article 2(6)), in contrast to the Espoo Convention, which envisages it at the stage of projects. At the international level, there are two instruments that grant a direct right to a clean environment: the 1981 African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples Rights (article 24)19 and the 1988 San Salvador Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (article 15

16

17

18 19

J. Ebbesson, Background paper No. 5, Joint UNEP OHCHR, Expert Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment, 14-16 January 2002, Geneva, “Information, Participation and Access to Justice: the Model of the Aarhus Convention”, at <www.ohchr.org/english/ issues/environment/environ/bp5.htm>. The denial of environmental information gives the right to a review procedure before the court or another independent, or impartial body (article 9(1)); any member of public having a sufficient interest or maintaining impairment of a right has recourse to a review procedure before the court or another independent or impartial body in order to challenge the substantive or procedural legality of any decision, act or omission concerning the specific activities, which may affect the environment (article 9(2)); and finally, members of public, if they met required criteria laid down in the national law, shall have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities, which contravene the provisions of its national environmental law (article 9(3)). The Convention provides for “… an opportunity to the public in areas likely to be affected to participate in relevant impact assessment procedures regarding proposed activities and shall insure that the opportunity provided to the public of the affected area is equivalent to that provided to the public of the State of origin” (article 2(6)). Not yet in force. Article 24: “All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.” 57


11).20 In 2002, for the first time, article 24 of the African Charter was a basis for the petition filed by two non-governmental organisations before the Commission on behalf of the Ogoni people, against the Nigerian Government and the Shell Oil Company. The claim was also filed on the grounds of other human rights, such as the right to life and the right to health. The environmental human right was interpreted by the Commission broadly as not only providing a clean environment and unimpaired access to resources, but also conducting environmental impact assessment studies prior to any activity that may impact adversely on the environment. It also emphasised the right to information and the right to be heard (such a right is also part and parcel of the proofs of the environment impact assessment). It may then be stated that the EIA undoubtedly constitutes a procedural human right to a clean environment. This is often overlooked. The above-mentioned case is, however, exceptional, as it was brought, inter alia, on the basis of the right to a clean environment, as enshrined in the African Charter. However, as the international practice indicates, the insignificant number of international agreements granting direct environmental right results in selecting other human rights as the basis for alleged violations linked to environmental degradation, such as the right to life, right to health, right to adequate standard of living and minority rights.21 There are also international agreements that grant what may be called an indirect right to a clean environment. An example of such an agreement is the 1989 International Labour Organisation Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. This Convention requires its Parties to adopt special measures to safeguard the environment for indigenous peoples. The landmark declarations in the development of international environmental law, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Development and Environment, contain language that,

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Article 11: “1. Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have an access to basic public services. 2. The State parties shall promote the protection, preservation and improvement of the environment.” For example, the right to life: Human Rights Committee, case of EHP v. Canada; InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights: Yanomani v. Brasil; right to health: was featured in the practice of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in reports of the Parties and its general Comment No. 14 in which it said “the right to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to underlying determinates of health such as a healthy environment” and “[a]ny person or group victim of a violation of the right to health should have an access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both national and international levels”; right to adequate standard of living: the ECOSOC referred to environmental issues in its General Comment on the Right to Adequate Food and its Comment to the Right to Adequate Housing (“housing should not be built on polluted sites nor in proximity to pollution sources that threaten the right to health of the inhabitants”).


although relating to human rights, is couched in general terms and is too vague in relation to the environment itself to be viewed as granting a direct human right to a clean environment. Principle 1 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration introduces language that links environment to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It pledges that a person has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being. It also states that a person has the duty to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations; “[i] n this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and must be eliminated”. It may be said that the element that connects the human environment and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is human dignity. The 1992 Rio Declaration is, in its entirety, the expression of the concept of sustainable development but does not grant a direct right to a clean environment. It states: “[h]uman beings are in the centre for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy life in harmony with nature”. This statement is couched in the language of “entitlement” rather than a right. It may be observed (similarly to the Stockholm Declaration) that this principle is formulated in very general terms, and it is doubtful whether it may constitute the basis of a future formation of a human right to a clean environment. There are, however, different views expressed arguing that one possible way of avoiding the dilemma of the definitional nature (as well the problem of categorisation of human rights), is to leave the discourse of human rights and rely entirely on the concept of sustainable development, “where it advances or realises the right to a healthy environment”.22 The same author asserts that the 1992 Rio Declaration is the expression of the evolution of the right to a clean environment, which is translated into the principle of sustainable development, including the rights of future generations. In the view of the present author, this interesting approach is not without flaws. The concept of sustainable development in itself is very vague and its normative content is ill-defined.23 Equally elusive is the concept of intergenerational equity. It appears that drawing an uncertain human right from the concept of sustainable development, which in itself is vague and without the firm normative content, neither leads to definitive results nor clarifies the issue. Furthermore, the character of the Rio Declaration (and also the Stockholm Declaration) is that of a soft law instrument and both of these Declarations

22

23

S. Giorgetta, “The Right to a Healthy Environment, Human Rights and Sustainable Development”, in: 2 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2002), p. 182. See e.g., V. Lowe, “Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Argument”, in: A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development, 1999, pp. 19-38. 59


contain very few principles that have a binding force on the basis of international customary law.24 In general, however, it may be said that there is still a great degree of uncertainty concerning the existence of a global, uniform and universally accepted substantive human right to a clean environment. It appears that a so called procedural right (see above) gained certain recognition as a less controversial right and that both the environmental impact assessment procedure and the Aarhus Convention contributed to the acceptance and development of this right on international and national levels.

III. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Jurisprudence of the European Grand Chamber of Human Rights 1. General Introduction The European Convention of Human Rights forms a part of the European regional nexus of human rights instruments.25 The jurisprudence of the Court concerning the interpretation of the catalogue of human rights included in the Convention as to give effect to environmental concerns has been the subject of ongoing debate and much controversy. In general, the interpretation of the Convention by the Court is one of the most disputed issues in the practice of the Court, which resulted in stimulating and extensive jurisprudential debate. The general problems underlying the interpretative principles of the Convention, such as the margin of appreciation (as well

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The principle on the prohibition of transboundary environmental harm to other States and in the areas outside the States’ jurisdiction (Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration) is one such an acknowledged norm. It was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the 1996 Prohibition of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1996), para. 29. The European Court of Human Rights is one of the European regional institutions. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights was adopted by the Council of Europe, which was established in 1949 by the Treaty of London, signed by nine States: Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. At present there are 46 States Parties to the Convention. The Court is composed of a “number equal to that of High Contracting Parties” to the ECHR (article 20). The Judges are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly for renewable period of six years. Protocol 11 to the Convention made the jurisdiction of the Court compulsory and abolished the Commission. The catalogue of civil and political rights has been vastly enhanced by the adoption of Protocol 13 to the Convention, <www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/ The+Court/The+Court/History+of+the+Court/>.


the implication of this concept to universality versus relativism),26 autonomous concepts27 and the tests of balancing of interests between an individual and the community as a whole and of proportionality still remain largely unresolved. These general principles also have a bearing on the interpretation by the Court of the so-called “environmental human right”. Of paramount importance for the environment and human rights is undoubtedly the doctrine of margin of appreciation and the balancing of interests test (the interests of an individual versus the interests of the community). Since its introduction, the margin of appreciation has become one of the most taxing problems concerning the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. This doctrine is derived purely from the practice of the Court, and is not provided for in the Convention itself. It was initially introduced by the Court in the 1961 Lawless v. Ireland case28 and further developed in 1976 in Handyside v. United Kingdom.29 Although several writers attempted to define the character of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, it still remained elusive. S. McInerney describes this doctrine in a following manner: “One of the most complex features of international human rights law is the challenge of balancing of international human rights norms and the particularity of the contexts in which their application arises. Aligned to this is the delicate task of mediating the tensions between effective international supervision and the upholding of established human rights norms on one hand, and primary domestic responsibilities and socio-cultural choices on the other. The poles in the context may be seen as involving the vertical or horizontal distribution of power, as well as (absolute or relative) nature of the rights at issue. The balancing involved in any discernible standards as well as recognition of the subjectivity of the context and fact. Beyond this, the balancing needed in relation 26

27

28 29

There is a vast amount of literature on this subject, such as R.St.J. MacDonald, “The Margin of Appreciation”, in: R.St.J. MacDonald, F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 1993, pp. 83-124; H. Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of the European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence, 1996; D. Shelton, “The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe”, 13 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. (2003), p. 96; J. Sweeny, “Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights and the Post-Cold War Era”, 54 ICLQ (2005), p. 459; E. Benvenisti “Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards”, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l Law & Pol. (1999), p. 843; P. Mahoney, “Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the Court: Two Sides of the Same Coin”, 11 HRLJ (1990), 57; idem, “Speculating on the Future of Reformed European Court of Human Rights”, 20 HRLJ (1999), p. 1. See in depth: G. Letsas, “The Truth of Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR”, 15 EJIL (2004), p. 279. Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), (1961) 1 Eur. H. Rts. Rep. 15. Handyside v. United Kingdom, (1976) 1 Eur. H. Rts. Rep. 737. 61


to all human rights would appear to be heightened in the context of international human rights supervision, even in a relatively cohesive system such as the European Convention on Human Rights. These competing considerations form a symbiosis which a supervisory body such as the European Court of Human Rights must continually define in its interpretative and supervisory role. The margin of appreciation may be the single most distinguished interpretative feature of the ECHR jurisprudence: it has defined not only interpretative methodology of Strasbourg jurisprudence but also the substantive import of Convention rights. It remains pivotal to the operation of a critical symbiosis between national upholding of the Convention and the supervision of the ECHR mechanism: it lies at heart of the ineluctable and perennial mediation of consensus and relativity, supremacy and national autonomy as well uniformity and diversity.”30 The ECtHR further defined its role in relation to the national system in safeguarding human rights as subsidiary. According to the Court, national authorities are better equipped to assess local conditions and give effect to “pressing social needs”, which are implied by the notion of “necessity” in this context.31 The Court was always adamant in observing that the foremost responsibility for safeguarding human rights rests with national authorities and courts. They are also best qualified to assess the notions of “necessity” (within the context of social needs), and the “restrictions” and “penalty”, due to their deep knowledge of the conditions prevalent in their countries.32 The Court also made it quite clear that the application of the margin of appreciation has its limitations. The ECtHR exercises a supervisory function that “concerns both the aim and measure challenged” and its “necessity”.33 The doctrine of the margin of appreciation was applied by the Court in many cases, including the application of articles 8 (the right to respect for family and private life), article 10 (freedom of expression) and Protocol I (the right to property), which played a very important role in relation to the so-called environmental human right. Briefly speaking, the margin of appreciation and the issue of universality are two sides of the same coin. The Court explained in the Handyside case that certain concepts (in this case morals) could not be confined to one uniform definition that would fit all circumstances, and that “[t]he view taken by their respective laws of the requirement of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching 30

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S. McInerney, the review of the book by H.C. Yourow, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of the European Court of Human Rights”, in: 9 EJIL (1998), p. 763. Shelton, note 26, p. 130. Handyside, note 29, para. 48. Ibid. para. 49.


evolution of opinions on the subject…”.34 The Court’s permissive attitude to cultural relativity caused a long-lasting debate that engaged practitioners and theorists alike without achieving definite results. The main criticism has been based on a premise that such a relaxed approach mocks and undermines universal human rights standards and instead encourages States to depart from them and to rely on local traditions.35 The practical implementation of this doctrine is also subject to certain doubts, in particular as to the role this theory fulfils in the judicial function of ECtHR. D. Shelton observes that the lack of common standards is a drawback, as well as the insufficient specification of its comparative methods, standards of evidence or the extent of its enquiry. The Court’s application of the margin of appreciation is characterised by the lack of transparency, depth and the rigorous standard in comparative approach to this doctrine.36 2. Selected Case Law This section of the chapter will present a survey of cases that gave rise to views that the ECtHR recognised (to a certain extent) the existence of a human right to a clean environment. However, it must be emphasised that there is no direct human right to clean environment included in the catalogue of human rights in the ECHR. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has definitely undergone a fundamental (if not dramatic) change in so far as environmental issues are concerned since the first cases with environmental elements were brought before the Court. It is generally accepted that the first case with environmental element was brought before the Court in 1976.37 In this case, X and Y v. Federal Republic of Germany, the applicants were members of an environmental organisation, owners of a plot of land used for nature observation. The complaint regarded the use of the adjacent land for military purposes. The legal grounds on which the claim was

34 35

36 37

Ibid. para. 48. See e.g., Benvenisti, note 26, p. 844. See also less critical views on the Court’s practice in relation to the margin of appreciation, M. Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, 1994. Shelton, note 26, pp. 131, 134. See e.g., P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2003, p. 299. 63


brought were articles 2,38 3,39 and 540 of the ECHR. However, the application was not admitted by the Commission (further abolished), on jurisdictional grounds, as incompatible rationae materiae with the ECHR, and that the application was manifestly ill-founded as the ECHR does not include a right to nature preservation in its catalogue of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. In the intervening years, the practice of the ECtHR has undergone a fundamental and far-reaching change and it has become legally possible to bring a claim with an environmental component. The most commonly used article of the Convention to lodge such a claim has been article 8.41 The other articles also invoked included:

38

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40

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Article 2: Right to Life: “1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence; b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” Article 3: Prohibition of Torture: “No one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment.” Article 5: Right to Liberty and Security: “1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security as a person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court in order to secure fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.” Article 8: Right to Respect for Private and Familiy Life: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”


3, 6,42 10,43 1344 and the First Protocol.45 It may be observed that article 8 of the ECHR guarantees rights that are not absolute, but qualified. The permissible limits of article 8 are set by paragraph 2. The infringement of this article requires a two-step procedure: (1) the determination of whether or not there has been an interference with the right contained in this article; and (2) the determination whether it was justified under article 8 paragraph 2. Interference with the right may be justified if it is (i) in accordance with law; (ii) necessary in a democratic 42

43

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Article 6: Right to a Fair Trial: “1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has insufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.” Article 10: Freedom of Expression: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority or impartiality of the judiciary.” Article 13: Right to Effective Remedy: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before the national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by person acting in an official capacity.” First Protocol: Article 1: Protection of Property: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 65


society; and (iii) in furtherance of a legitimate aim identified in article 8(2). In many cases before it,46 the ECtHR has explained that the test for necessity in “democratic society” requires that “the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and … is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”. The reasons given to justify the interference must be “relevant” and “sufficient”.47 This is the so-called “test of proportionality”. The tests of proportionality and the balancing of interests (see below) are at the heart of the jurisprudence of the ECHR in cases that deal with human rights and the environment, i.e. involve to larger extent the interpretation of article 8 of the ECHR. The majority of earlier cases concerned noise pollution from London airports and were brought before the Court on the basis of article 8 and of the First Protocol. The most important of these early cases was the Raynor and Powell v. United Kingdom, as in this case the Court made certain observations that had a bearing on its future jurisprudence.48 This case concerned the noise generated by day flights to and from Heathrow Airport. It was brought by the applicants living under the flight path. The case was lodged against the Government of the United Kingdom for the breach of articles 8 and 13 of the ECHR for allowing the operation of the Heathrow Airport that resulted in excessive noise by aircrafts flying in accordance with the UK law and that the applicants did not have an effective remedy against it. The Court rejected the application on merits. Having applied the test of balancing the competing interests between the individuals and the community, it came to the conclusion that although the quality of life of the applicants has been disturbed, nevertheless, the economic importance of Heathrow Airport (for the development of trade and communication, and being a vast employer) is necessary for the well-being of the community. The Court observed that the UK Government took all possible measures to alleviate the noise pollution by adhering to international standards and compensated affected residents. From 1949 onwards, the UK Government addressed the issues of noise pollution by taking special regulatory measures.49 The Court finally decided that in areas such as the regulation of the noise pollution, the Court can only fulfil a subsidiary role and that the State authorities are best equipped to deal with such a complicated and difficult social and technical problem. Therefore “this

46 47 48

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66

Olsson v. Sweden, (1988) 11 Eur. H. Rts. Rep. 259. Ibid. There was a cluster of cases that were settled outside the Court but have certain importance because they were admitted before the Court and paved the way for similar cases. For example, Arrondelle v. United Kingdom, in which the legal grounds for bringing the claim were the same as in Raynor and Powell. The claim was also related to the alleged noise pollution nuisance due to the development of the airport and the construction of the motorway (Application No. 7889/77) (1980) 19 D.R. 186; Raynor and Powell v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1990, ECtHR, Ser. A, No. 172. Until 1949, the issue of noise pollution was regulated by the common law of nuisance.


is an area Contracting States are to be recognised as enjoying a wide margin of appreciation”.50 The judgment in this case was a disappointment for many lawyers. However, in 1994, the ECtHR passed a judgment in the Lopez-Ostra case,51 which at the time appeared to be of a groundbreaking character (which in light of the further practice of the Court was perhaps a premature and hasty assessment). The applicant in this case, was a resident of the city of Lorca in Spain. In 1988, a company called SACURSA erected a treatment plant for liquid and solid waste twelve meters from the home of the applicant (Mrs Lopez-Ostra). The plant was built with the assistance of municipal subsidies. However SACURSA failed to obtain the required licence for activities classified as causing a nuisance. In July 1988, fumes from the plant polluted the atmosphere in the city of Lorca. The applicant claimed unlawful interference with her abode and impairment of her and her family’s physical and mental health and safety.52 Courts of all instances in Spain, including the Constitutional Court, found the applicant’s claim manifestly ill-founded and dismissed it. Having exhausted all local remedies, the applicant bought her claim before the ECtHR, on the basis of article 3 and article 8, paragraph 1, of the ECHR.53 The Strasbourg Commission considered the claim admissible under article 8 of the ECHR, but not under article 3. The Commission found a causal link between the emissions from the plant and the illness of the applicant’s daughter. Subsequently, the judgment of the Court was rendered on the basis with article 8. The Court stated that environmental pollution, even without causing serious damage to health, could affect the well-being of individuals and impede enjoyment of their private and family life.54 The Court made some very important pronouncements in this case in connection with human rights and the environment. It applied again the balancing of competing interests test (community as a whole versus the individual). The Court stated that the payment of the rent for the substitute apartment did not completely compensate for the nuisance suffered by the family for three years and that the State did not strike the proper balance between the individual and public interests, i.e. between private well-being and general economic concern.55 The Court also found that although the plant was privately owned, the nuisance was attributable to the State since the plant was built on public grounds without obtaining the required licence, and was subsidised by the municipality. Furthermore, the public authorities were aware of the harm caused by the plant. The Court also

50 51 52 53 54 55

Raynor and Powell, note 48, para. 44. Lopez-Ostra, (1994) 20 Eur. H. Rts. Rep. 277. Ibid. p. 280. Ibid. p. 286. Ibid. p. 295. Ibid. pp. 295-299. 67


observed that States have a supervisory duty over the actions carried out on their territory, in order to protect private and family life and homes.56 The Court’s findings may be summarised as follows: pollution does not have to cause serious damage to human health, but rather must be “severe” in order to give rise to a cause of action, and that a privately owned facility’s nuisance may be attributable to the State. Most importantly, it was the first case in which the Court recognised clearly environmental issues within the human rights structure and that, even in the absence of an explicit environmental right in the ECHR, it found that article 8 constitutes a proper and sufficient link to connect the two: human rights and the environment. It also should be emphasised that it was the first time that the Court had given a green “slant” to its decisions while weighing the interests of public and economic nature against the environmental complaint of the individual. Anna Maria Guerra and 39 Others v. Italy was another important case.57 This case concerned the pollution relating to the operation of the chemical factory ENCHEM Agricoltura, in Italy. The case was brought before the Court on the basis of article 10 of the ECHR. The applicants complained about the government’s failure to inform the public concerning the risks and measures adopted in the implementation of the so-called 1982 EC “Seveso” Directive, relating to major hazards of certain industrial activities. There had been accidents in the factory in the city of Manfredonia in Italy, which resulted in 150 people being taken to hospital. The Commission admitted the case on the basis of article 10, however, it interpreted the obligation included therein narrowly as not involving the positive duty to collect and disseminate information of its own volition. It held that article 10 generally only prohibits the government from interfering with a person’s freedom to receive information that others are willing to impart.58 During oral pleadings, the applicants expanded the legal basis of the case to include article 8 of the ECHR, which was accepted by the Court. On this legal ground, the Court based its judgment in this case. The interpretation of article 8 in this case followed the Court’s findings in the Lopez-Ostra case. The Court confirmed that environmental pollution, without being severe, might affect individuals’ well-being, private and family life.59 It explained that rights guaranteed by this article were breached, as the long waiting period for essential information, necessary for the evaluation of risks involved to which the applicants and their families were exposed, affected family life. The Court stated that “[t]he direct 56 57

58

59

68

Ibid. p. 296. Case 1467/89, Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998-ECHR, judgment of 18 February 1998; (1998) 26 Eur. H. Rts. Rep. 357. It must noted, however, that eight out of twenty Judges expressed the view in their separate opinions that a positive duty to collect and disseminate information might exist under certain circumstances. Guerra and Others, note 57, para. 60.


effect of toxic emissions on the applicants’ right for their private and family life means that Article 8 is applicable”.60 Of great importance for the further development of the Court’s jurisprudence in matters of human rights and the environment were the two Hatton (2001 and 2003) cases.61 These cases concerned the night flights over Heathrow Airport, which, as it was argued by the applicants, disturbed their sleep. The United Kingdom Government conduced several research studies and in 1993 issued the Consultation Paper, which stated that the number of disturbances caused by aircraft noise was so small that “it had a negligible effect on overall normal disturbances and that disturbances rates from all causes were not at the level likely to affect people’s health and well-being”.62 The 1994 Scheme introduced a noise quota scheme for the night period. Under the quota scheme, each aircraft type was assigned a “quota count” between 0.5 QC and 16 QC. Heathrow Airport was then allotted a certain number of quota points and the aircraft movements had to be kept to within the permitted total point number.63 Aircraft operators could then select whether to operate a greater number of quieter aircraft, or fewer noisier ones. Night flights of noisier aircrafts were prohibited and night flights were based on the “night quota period” (differentiated between the summer and winter periods). The new Scheme of 1999 did not introduce any major changes as regards the situation of night flights at Heathrow Airport. The applicants argued the violation of articles 8 and 13 of the ECHR. The UK Government argued that night flights were necessary for the country’s well-being since they constituted an integral part of the global network of air services, inexorably linked with day-time flights. The Government sought the justification

60 61

62 63

Ibid. para. 75. Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom – 36022/97ECHR [2001] 565, judgment of the Chamber of 2 October 2001 <worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2001/565.html> (hereinafter the “first Hatton case”); Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom – 36022/97[2003]/338, judgment by the Grand Chamber of 8 July 2003 <worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2003/338.html> (hereinafter the “second Hatton case”). See on the first Hatton case, H. Post, “Hatton and Others: Further Clarification of the ‘Indirect’ Individual Right to a Healthy Environment”, 2 Non-State Actors and International Law (2002), pp. 259-277; R. Smith, “Hatton v. United Kingdom”, 96 AJIL (2002), pp. 692-699; A. Layard, “Night Flights: A Surprising Victory”, 4 Envtl. L. Rev. (2002), pp. 51-61; on the second Hatton cases, see: H. Post, “Judgement of the Grand Chamber in the Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom, or What is Left of the Indirect Right to a Healthy Environment?”, 4 Non-State Actors and International Law (2004), pp. 135-157; C. Miller, “Environmental Rights in a Welfare State? A Comment on DeMerieux”, 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. (2003), pp. 111-125. The second Hatton case, note 61, para. 40. Ibid. para. 44. The 1993 Scheme defined the “night” as a period between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. and the “night quota period” between 11:30 p.m. and 6 a.m. 69


for such flights under article 8, paragraph 2, of the ECHR.64 It also argued that the night flights scheme for all major London Airports (Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted) was more restrictive than in any other main European hub airport, such as Amsterdam Schiphol, Paris Charles de Gaulle and Frankfurt, and the imposition of even more restrictions would adversely affect the competitiveness of Heathrow Airport. The applicants, however, challenged this assertion, and observed that other leading world business centres such as Berlin, Zurich and Tokyo, introduced a total ban at their airports on passenger night flights.65 On 2 October 2001, the Chamber of the ECtHR observed that Heathrow Airport and the aircraft that are used were not owned, controlled or operated by the UK Government or its agents. The Chamber considered that, accordingly, the United Kingdom cannot be said to have “interfered” with the applicants’ private or family life. Rather, the applicants’ complaints fall to be analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicants’ rights under article 8 §1 of the Convention.66 The Chamber referred to the “fair balance” which must be struck between the competing interests of the individual and the community as a whole. In both contexts, the Chamber admitted, the State enjoyed a certain margin of appreciation in determining steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention.67 The Chamber explained that in striking the required balance, States must consider the whole range of material considerations. Further, in the particularly sensitive field of environmental protection, mere reference to the economic well-being of the country was not sufficient to outweigh the rights of others. The Chamber considered that States were required to minimise, as far as possible, interference with rights under article 8, by trying to find alternative solutions and by generally seeking to achieve their aims in the least onerous manner as regards human rights. To achieve that, a proper and complete study, with the aim of finding the best possible solution that would in reality strike the right balance, should precede the relevant project.68 The Chamber found that despite the margin of appreciation left to States, the UK Government, in the implementation of the 1993 Scheme, failed to strike a fair balance between the country’s economic

64

65 66 67 68

70

British Airways PLC (BA) in its written comments stated that the ban on some of the night flights at Heathrow Airport would have a disastrous and disproportionate effect on its competitiveness, due to the damage to the network and to the scheduling problems, especially for the long-haul arrivals. However, the applicants submitted a report by the Berkeley Hanover Consulting disputing these allegations. First Hatton case, note 61, para. 114. Ibid. para. 95. Ibid. para. 96. Ibid. para. 97.


well-being and the applicants’ effective enjoyment of their right to respect for their homes and family lives, therefore failed article 8 of the ECHR.69 As to article 13, the applicants argued the lack of private law rights in relation to excessive night noise as a consequence of the statutory exclusion of liability in section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. According to them the limits inherent in an application for judicial review meant that it was not an effective remedy, in particular the fact that the issues arising under article 8 could not be addressed in a process of judicial review, and that the arguments which had been raised by the local authorities concerning the substance of article 8 in the four applications for judicial review were rejected on the grounds that they fell outside the scope of the Grand Chamber’s power of review. They also mentioned the high cost of lodging an application for judicial review.70 The UK Government denied any arguable claim by the applicants of a violation of article 8 and that, accordingly, no issue of entitlement to a remedy under article 13 arose. Alternatively, they submitted that as the requirements of article 13 are less strict than and are subsumed by those of article 6, and as article 6 would have applied had it not been for the exclusion of liability in section 76 of the 1982 Act, no separate issue arose under article 13. They contended that the remedy of judicial review was available to the applicants. They also noted the wide margin of discretion enjoyed by national authorities in relation to the decision to implement the 1993 scheme. They also claimed that judicial review was an effective remedy and that courts had the power to set aside schemes on a variety of administrative law grounds (for example, irrationality, unlawfulness or patent unreasonableness).71 The Chamber held that article 13 has been interpreted by the Court as requiring a remedy in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as “arguable” in terms of the Convention. In the present case, there has been a finding of a violation of article 8, and the complaint under article 13 must therefore be considered. Section 76 of the 1982 Act prevents actions in nuisance in respect of excessive noise caused by aircraft at night. The Chamber addressed the question of whether the applicants had a remedy at national level to enforce the substance of the Convention rights to be secured in the domestic legal order. It was on this basis that judicial review was held to comply with the requirements of article 13. In one of the cases, the Chamber concluded that judicial review was not an effective remedy on the grounds that the domestic courts defined policy issues so broadly that it was not possible for the applicants to make their Convention points regarding their rights under article 8 of the Convention in the domestic courts. The Chamber observed:

69 70 71

Ibid. para. 107. Ibid. para. 110. Ibid. paras 111-112. 71


“it is clear that the scope of review by the domestic courts was limited to the classic English public law concepts, such as irrationality, unlawfulness and patent unreasonableness, and did not allow consideration of whether the increase in night flights under the 1993 scheme represented a justifiable limitation on their right to respect for the private and family lives or the homes of those who live in the vicinity of Heathrow airport. In these circumstances, the Grand Chamber considers that the scope of review by the domestic courts in the present case was not sufficient to comply with Article 13.”72 The Chamber therefore found that there had been a violation of article 13 of the Convention. Judge Greve, in her partly dissenting opinion (as to article 8 but not article 13), expressed the view that in light of wide margin of appreciation in such cases, it was sufficient to rely only on the limited scope of facts submitted by the Government, i.e. that the UK Government conducted sufficient inquiry into the noise generated by night flights and that the relevant decision-making process was correct. Sir Brian Kerr dissented on the judgment in relation to both articles 8 and 13. His dissenting opinion may be summarised as follows: the significant interference with the applicants’ private lives had not been established (they retained freedom to move elsewhere and house prices were not affected); the UK Government conducted a sufficient inquiry into the noise effects of night flights and introduced several protective measures and therefore complied with the right of non-undue interference in private life; that night flights undoubtedly contribute to the country’s economic well-being; and finally that the requirement of more detailed research would place a very heavy burden on the Government. He also opposed the findings of the majority as regards the test of minimum interference in this case as difficult to reconcile with the principle of the margin of appreciation. The applicants presented very few arguments to substantiate their claim and the macro-economic issue outbalanced these. Therefore such cases should have been dealt with more properly within the political rather than the judicial sphere. As regards article 13, he claimed that it is limited to cases in which grievances are arguable under the Convention, whilst in the Hatton case, article 8 was not arguable, as claims under it “must so clearly be decided in the Government’s favour”. The UK Government requested the referral of the case to the Grand Chamber. It strongly objected in its written and oral submissions against the “minimum interference” approach as outlined in paragraph 97 of the judgment in the first Hatton case. The Government argued that this test, in the context of the Hatton case, was at variance with the jurisprudence of the Grand Chamber and was, in principle, unwarranted. It claimed that the test “reduced to vanishing-point 72

72

Ibid. paras 114-115.


the margin of appreciation” accorded to States in an “area involving difficult and complex balancing of a variety of competing interests and factors”.73 The Government stressed that the number of very sensitive issues that were involved in that case were better resolved by national authorities, as they were better placed than a Grand Chamber to evaluate local conditions.74 Furthermore, it was observed that in this context the Grand Chamber played a supervisory role.75 On the other hand, the applicants argued that the aircraft noise was capable of infringing on the rights protected by article 8 and that the States had a positive duty to ensure adequate protection of these rights and that in this case the States struck a wrong balance between competing interests76 and that in the case of sleep depravation, the margin of appreciation should be narrow, since it was the matter that could only be judged by similar standards in similar Contracting Parties.77 The applicants also argued that the doctrine of the margin of appreciation does not play role in this case, since an international judge was placed to evaluate the adequacy of the procedural safeguard applied by the State. The Grand Chamber stated in no uncertain terms that “there is no explicit right under the Convention to a clean and quiet environment” and that only when the individual is directly and seriously affected by noise or other pollution, an issue may arise under Article 8”.78 The Grand Chamber reiterated the fundamentally subsidiary role of the Grand Chamber in such cases. National authorities have direct democratic legitimacy and are, as was stressed by the Grand Chamber several times, better placed, than an international tribunal to assess local needs and conditions. In the matters of general policy, which may involve different opinions contained within democratic society, the role of domestic policy-makers should be given special weight; in particular in matters relating to the implementation of social and economic policies, where the margin of appreciation should be wide.79 Further, the ECtHR made a very important comment that in cases like Hatton, involving State decisions on environmental issues, there are two aspects to be analysed by the Grand Chamber. First, the Grand Chamber may evaluate the substantive merits of the Government’s decision, to ensure compatibility with article 8; secondly, it may assess the decision-making process to ensure that the interests of an individual have been granted due weight.80 The Grand Chamber also noted the importance of striking the required balance between

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Second Hatton case, note 61, para. 87. Ibid. para. 88. Ibid. para. 89. Ibid. para. 90. Ibid. para. 91. Ibid. para. 96. Ibid. para. 98. Ibid. para. 99. 73


the interests of the individual and the community, a task that enjoys a certain margin of appreciation on the part of the Government in the determination of the steps to be taken to ensure the compliance with the Convention and the implementation of a positive duty deriving from article 8, paragraph 1, of the ECHR. In striking the required balance, the aims mentioned in paragraph 2 may be of certain relevance.81 The Grand Chamber once again expressed its staunch support for the wide margin of appreciation in cases such as Hatton. It explained, as it did in many earlier cases, that it is a task for national authorities to make an initial assessment of the “necessity” for interference, as regards both the legislative framework and the particular measures of implementation. The Grand Chamber’s task is to review such a national measure. The margin of appreciation is not identical in each case but will vary depending on the context, involving the nature of the conventional rights at issue, its importance and the nature of activities concerned.82 In cases such as Hatton, the Grand Chamber also acknowledged the importance of taking into account, while balancing the interests of the community and the individual and evaluating the margin of appreciation, the applicant’s right in respect of “home”, a right that is pertinent to the applicant and children’s personal security and well-being. Furthermore, since it concerns procedural safeguards, while article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process resulting in interference “must be fair and such as to afford due respect for interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8”.83 In the second Hatton case, one of the main tasks before the Grand Chamber was to adjudge the issues of the scope of the applicable margin of appreciation. The Government and the applicants represented very conflicting views. The Government advocated a wide margin of appreciation on the ground that the case concerned a matter of general policy. The applicants argued that where the ability to sleep is affected, the scope of the margin of appreciation is narrow because of the “intimate” nature of the rights safeguarded. The ECtHR made a very important statement that the conflict of views on the scope of the margin of appreciation can only be resolved by reference to the context of a particular case.84 The Grand Chamber observed that in the Hatton case the noise disturbances complained of were not caused by the State or by State organs, but that they originated from the activities of private operators and that:

81 82

83

84

74

Ibid. para. 97. See e.g., Buckley v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 September 1996, (1996) 23 Eur. H. Rts. Rep. 101, pp. 1291-1293. Second Hatton case, note 61, para. 101, citing paras 74 and 75 of the Buckley judgment. Second Hatton case, note 61, para. 103.


“[i]t may be argued that the changes brought about by the 1993 Scheme are to be seen as a direct interference by the State with the Article 8 rights of the persons concerned. On the other hand, the State’s responsibility in environmental cases may also arise from a failure to regulate private industry in a manner securing proper respect for the rights enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention. As noted above …, broadly similar principles apply whether a case is analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State or in terms of an interference by a public authority with Article 8 rights to be justified in accordance with paragraph 2 of this provision. The Grand Chamber is not therefore required to decide whether the present case falls into the one category or the other. The question is whether, in the implementation of the 1993 policy on night flights at Heathrow Airport, a fair balance was struck between the competing interests of the individuals affected by the night noise and the community as a whole.”85 The Grand Chamber further stated that: “[t]he Grand Chamber must consider whether the State can be said to have struck a fair balance between those interests and the conflicting interests of the persons affected by noise disturbances, including the applicants. Environmental protection should be taken into consideration by States in acting within their margin of appreciation and by the Grand Chamber in its review of that margin, but it would not be appropriate for the Grand Chamber to adopt a special approach in this respect by reference to a special status of environmental human rights. In this context the Grand Chamber must revert to the question of the scope of the margin of appreciation available to the State when taking policy decisions of the kind at issue… .”86 The ECtHR also emphasised that in this case, in contrast to other similar cases before it, national authorities did not fail to comply with some aspect of domestic regime.87 The Grand Chamber then proceeded to analyse all factors that have to be considered while striking a fair balance: economic interests (the Grand Chamber assumed that night flights contributed at least to a certain extent to the general economy); the availability of measures adopted by the Government to mitigate the effects of aircraft noise generally, including night noise (the Grand Chamber assessed these measures as reasonable); that the cost of houses in this area had not depreciated and people living there, if they so chose, could move

85 86 87

Ibid. para. 119. Ibid. para. 122. Ibid. para. 120. 75


elsewhere without financial loss and that this factor must be significant to the overall reasonableness of the general measure; and finally that it was “difficult if not impossible to draw a clear line between the interests of the aviation industry and the economic interests of the country as a whole”.88 As to procedural aspects, the Grand Chamber stated as follows: “… the Grand Chamber notes that a governmental decision-making process concerning complex issues of environmental and economic policy such as in the present case must necessarily involve appropriate investigations and studies in order to allow them to strike a fair balance between the various conflicting interests at stake. However, this does not mean that decisions can only be taken if comprehensive and measurable data are available in relation to each and every aspect of the matter to be decided. In this respect it is relevant that the authorities have consistently monitored the situation, and that the 1993 Scheme was the latest in a series of restrictions on night flights which stretched back to 1962. The position concerning research into sleep disturbance and night flights is far from static, and it was the government’s policy to announce restrictions on night flights for a maximum of five years at a time, each new scheme taking into account the research and other developments of the previous period. The 1993 Scheme had thus been preceded by a series of investigations and studies carried out over a long period of time. The particular new measures introduced by that scheme were announced to the public by way of a Consultation Paper which referred to the results of a study carried out for the Department of Transport, and which included a study of aircraft noise and sleep disturbance. It stated that the quota was to be set so as not to allow a worsening of noise at night, and ideally to improve the situation. This paper was published in January 1993 and sent to bodies representing the aviation industry and people living near airports. The applicants and persons in a similar situation thus had access to the Consultation Paper, and it would have been open to them to make any representations they felt appropriate. Had any representations not been taken into account, they could have challenged subsequent decisions, or the scheme itself, in the Grand Chambers. Moreover, the applicants are, or have been, members of HACAN (see paragraph 1 above), and were thus particularly well-placed to make representations.”89 Having taken all the above into consideration the Grand Chamber stated as follows:

88 89

76

Ibid. para. 126. Ibid. para. 128.


“[i]n these circumstances the Grand Chamber does not find that, in substance, the authorities overstepped their margin of appreciation by failing to strike a fair balance between the right of the individuals affected by those regulations to respect for their private life and home and the conflicting interests of others and of the community as a whole, nor does it find that there have been fundamental procedural flaws in the preparation of the 1993 regulations on limitations for night flights.”90 The Grand Chamber agreed with the findings of the Chamber that there were violations of article 13, as the scope of the review was limited to the classic English public law concepts, such as rationality, unlawfulness and patent unreasonableness. Prior to the entry into force of the Human Rights Act, the consideration of whether the increase in night flights under the 1993 Scheme represented a justifiable limitation on the right to respect for private and family life of persons living in the vicinity of the Heathrow Airport did not fall under the remit of judicial review. Therefore the Grand Chamber found that the scope of the review by domestic Grand Chambers was not sufficient to comply with the requirements of article 13. It may be noted that a minority of Judges appended a powerful joint dissenting opinion.91 The dissenting Judges argued that the application of the “evolutive” interpretation of the Convention leads to the construction of the human right to a clean environment based on article 8 of the Convention, “[i]n the field of environmental human rights, which was practically unknown in 1950, the Commission and the Court have increasingly taken the view that Article 8 embraces the right to a healthy environment, and therefore to protection against nuisance caused by harmful chemicals, offensive smells, agents which precipitate respiratory ailments, noise and so on.”92 They further claimed that the Court has confirmed on several occasions, prior to the second Hatton case, such as the Lopez-Ostra case, that article 8 guarantees the right to a healthy environment and that unfortunately the judgment in the second Hatton case appears to deviate from these developments and “even takes [a] step backwards”93 and that the UK Government did not substantiate sufficiently the economic importance of Heathrow Airport for the country. Commentators of the second Hatton case observed that the Court favoured the less protective approach towards rights aiming at minimising States’ interference

90 91 92 93

Ibid. para. 129. Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Ress, Türmen, Zupancˇicˇ and Steiner. Ibid. para. 2. Ibid. para. 5. 77


with article 8 rights, by seeking alternative solutions and by trying to fulfil their aims in the manner that was least damaging to human rights.94 The Court in the second case reiterated its finding in the Raynor and Powell case. The present author agrees with this assessment of the judgment. The following conclusions may be drawn from the judgment in the second Hatton case: (a) there is no “environmental” human right in the catalogue of human rights protected by the Convention and article 8 may only be invoked when the individual is directly and seriously affected by noise or other pollution; (b) environmental considerations are only one of the elements taken into account while balancing of the interests of the individual versus community in order to strike a fair balance – there is no special status of environmental human rights; (c) democratically elected national authorities are best placed to balance a variety of competing interests and factors that may arise in relation to article 8; (d) the State enjoys a wide margin of application in such cases; (e) the ECHR has, in principle, a subsidiary role; (f) the Court only plays a supervisory subsidiary role; (g) proof of interference by a State is not necessary as the State has a “positive duty” to safeguard the rights under article 8; (h) State responsibility in environmental cases may arise from a failure to regulate private industry; and (i) compliance with national laws by a State is one of the important elements taken into account when applying a balancing of interests test. The jurisprudence of the Court in environmental matters was further developed in the 2005 case of Fadeyeva v. Russia.95 This case related to air pollution from a Severstal steel plan built in Soviet times, currently privately owned. The plant was responsible for more than 95 percent of industrial emissions into the town’s air. The applicant lived with her family within the security zone and sought resettlement outside this zone. The applicant obtained the Court’s order to do so.

94

95

78

A. Layard, “Human Rights in the Balance – Hatton and Marcic”, 6 Envtl. L. Rev. (2004), p. 201. Case of Fadeyeva v. Russia text on the website: <worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2005/376. html>. See P. Leach, “Stay Inside When the Wind Blows Your Way – Engaging Environmental Rights with Human Rights: Fadeyeva v Russia judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 9 June 2005”, 4 Envtl. Liability (2005), pp. 91-97.


However, there was no priority waiting list and she was 6820th on the general waiting list. Her case was dismissed in local, regional and national courts. She relied on article 8 of the ECHR. There was no dispute as to the fact that the applicant’s place of residence was affected by industrial pollution, nor was it disputed that the main cause of pollution was the Severstal steel plant operating near the applicant’s home. The degree of disturbance caused by Severstal and the effects of pollution on the applicant was disputed by the parties. On one hand, the applicant asserted that the pollution seriously affected her private life and health, on the other hand, the respondent Government argued that the degree of harm suffered by the applicant was not such as to raise an issue under article 8 of the Convention. Therefore, the Court had first to establish whether the situation complained of by the applicant should be examined under article 8 of the Convention.96 The Court observed that article 8 has formed a ground in several cases involving environmental concern. However, is not breached every time that environmental deterioration occurs. The Court again noted that no right to natural preservation as such is included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. Thus, in order to raise an issue under article 8, specific conditions must be fulfilled: (a) the interference must directly affect the applicant’s home, family or private life; and (b) the adverse effects of environmental pollution must attain a certain minimum level if they are to fall within the scope of article 8. The Court further clarified that the assessment of that minimum level is not general but relative, i.e. it depends on all the circumstances of the case (such as the intensity and duration of the nuisance, and its physical or mental effects). The general environmental context should as also be taken into account (for example, there would be no claim under article 8 if the harm complained of was negligible in comparison to the environmental hazards inherent in life in every modern city). Therefore, in conclusion, the Court said that “in order to fall under Article 8, complaints relating to environmental nuisances have to show, first, that there was an actual interference with the applicant’s private sphere, and, second, that a level of severity was attained”.97 The Court noted that the State recognised many times that the environmental situation in the town of Cherepovets caused an increase in the morbidity rate for the city’s residents.98 The Court stressed that the domestic courts recognised the applicant’s right to be resettled and that the domestic legislation itself defined the zone in which the applicant’s house was situated as unfit for habitation. “Therefore, it can be said that the existence of interference with the applicant’s

96 97 98

Fadeyeva, note 95, paras 67 and 68. Ibid. para. 70. Ibid. para. 85. 79


private sphere was taken for granted at the domestic level”.99 The Court accepted that the actual detriment to the applicant’s health and well-being reached a level sufficient to bring it within the scope of article 8 of the Convention.100 Further, the Court reiterated statements made in the second Hatton case. The Court noted that, at the relevant time, the Severstal steel plant was not owned, controlled or operated by the State. Consequently, the Russian Federation had not directly interfered with the applicant’s private life or home. However, the Court observed that the State’s responsibility in environmental cases may arise from a failure to regulate private industry. Therefore, the applicant’s complaints fall to be analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s rights under article 8, paragraph 1, of the Convention. The Court first assessed “whether the State could reasonably be expected to act so as to prevent or put an end to the alleged infringement of the applicant’s rights”.101 The Severstal steel plant was built by and initially belonged to the State and from the beginning had contaminated and caused health problems and nuisance to many people in Cherepovets. In 1993, the plant was privatised. However, the State exercised control over the plant through the imposition of operating conditions and supervision as to their implementation. The plant was subjected to inspections by the State environmental agency and administrative penalties were imposed on the plant’s owner and management. The municipal authorities knew of the environmental situation and imposed certain sanctions.102 In this case, the Court gave further guidance on the application of article 8, paragraph 2, of the ECHR, drawing on its previous jurisprudence, i.e. it interpreted the doctrine of proportionality. The Court discussed the general principles, “the legitimate aim”, and “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court confirmed that in the event of the breach of a positive duty or direct interference by the State, the applicable principles regarding justification under article 8, paragraph 2, in order to balance the rights of an individual and the interests of the community as a whole are similar. To be compatible with paragraph 2, direct interference by the State with the exercise of article 8 rights must be in accordance with the law. The breach of domestic law in these cases would result in a violation of the Convention. However, the choice of means, where there is a duty for the State to take positive measures is, in principle, a matter of the States’ margin of appreciation. There are various means to ensure “respect for private life”, and a State that has failed to apply one particular measure provided by domestic law may find an alternative way

99 100 101 102

80

Ibid. para. 86. Ibid. para. 88. Ibid. para. 89. Ibid. para. 90.


to fulfil its positive duty. “Therefore, in those cases the criterion ‘in accordance with the law’ of the justification test cannot be applied in the same way as in cases of direct interference by the State”.103 The Court further observed that in all previous cases with environmental breaches, a failure by the national authorities to comply with some aspect of the domestic legal regime played a pivotal role. Therefore, in cases where the applicant complains about the State’s failure to protect Convention rights, domestic legality should be assessed “not as a separate and conclusive test, but rather as one of many aspects which should be taken into account in assessing whether the State has struck a ‘fair balance’ in accordance with Article 8 §2”.104 In relation to “legitimate aim”, the Court made following statements: “[w]here the State is required to take positive measures in order to strike a fair balance between the interests of the applicant and the community as a whole, the aims mentioned in the second paragraph of article 8 may be of a certain relevance, although this provision refers only to ‘interferences’ with the right protected by the first paragraph – in other words, it is concerned with the negative obligations flowing therefrom.”105 The essential justification offered by the Government for the refusal to resettle the applicant was the protection of the interests of other residents of Cherepovets who, just like the applicant were entitled to free housing under the domestic legislation. The municipality had only limited resources at its disposal to offer housing, and the applicant’s immediate resettlement would breach the rights of others on the waiting lists. The respondent Government argued the importance of the plant for economic well-being of the country. The Court was of the view that the operation of the steel plant in question contributed to the economic system of the Vologda region and therefore served a legitimate aim within the meaning of article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention. However, the issue to be determined is “whether, in pursuing this aim, the authorities have struck a fair balance between the interests of the applicant and those of the community as a whole”.106 The Court then analysed the meaning of “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court confirmed that a margin of appreciation is best left to the national authorities, who are in principle better placed than an international court to assess local needs and conditions. The Court, however, reviews whether the justification given by the State is relevant and sufficient, leaving it to the national

103 104 105 106

Ibid. para. 96. See also paras 94-95. Ibid. para. 98. Ibid. para. 99. Ibid. para. 100. 81


authorities to make the initial assessment of “necessity”.107 The Court also chose to refrain from revising domestic environmental policies (e.g. in the Hatton case the Court held that “it would not be appropriate for the Court to adopt a special approach in this respect by reference to a special status of environmental human rights”, paragraph 122 of the judgment). The Court explained that: “the complexity of the issues involved with regard to environmental protection renders the Court’s role primarily a subsidiary one. The Court must first examine whether the decision-making process was fair and whether it afforded due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8 and only in exceptional circumstances may it go beyond this line and revise the material conclusions of the domestic authorities.”108 The Court, having interpreted and analysed the implementation of article 8 of the ECHR, found that the Russian Federation “despite the wide margin of appreciation left to the respondent State”, “failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of the community and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her home and her private life. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8”.109 Although in this case the applicant won, it may be said that the Court had confirmed the main principles elaborated in relation to the interpretation of article 8 (as laid down in the second Hatton case) in adjudicating the cases with the alleged breach of “environmental rights”. The Court adhered to a wide margin of appreciation and the strict application of this article to environmental breaches. Most importantly, the Court emphasised that the catalogue of rights contained in the ECHR does not include a human right to a clean environment, and environmental issues, in so far as they relate to human rights, are relevant only in the context of their effect on home, private and family life, i.e. within the legal framework of article 8, not as an independent human right to a clean environment.

107

108 109

82

Ibid. paras 102-103. For example, in 1991, Fredin v. Sweden, the Court recognised that “in today’s society the protection of the environment is an increasingly important consideration”, and held that the interference with a private property right (revoking the applicant’s licence to extract gravel from his property on the grounds of nature conservation) was not inappropriate or disproportionate in the context of article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Ibid. para. 105. Ibid. para. 134.


IV. Brief Introduction to the 1998 Human Rights Act110 The Human Rights Act (HRA) incorporated the ECHR into the UK legal system, although it did not include all of its provisions. The following were incorporated: articles 2-12, 14, of the ECHR, articles 1-3 of the First Protocol, and articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 6 as read with articles 16-18 of the ECHR. These articles are “Convention Rights” according to the HRA. However, two important articles of the ECHR were excluded from the HRA, i.e. articles 1 and 13. The main feature of the Act is that the supremacy of Parliament is retained and it remains sovereign. In means that United Kingdom legislation has primacy over Convention rights, even in cases where it is incompatible with the Convention; and that the Parliament is free to enact legislation that is incompatible with the EHRC. As R. Lee explains, “[s]uch incompatibility would gain higher profile than before and the rights of an individual to pursue a remedy in Strasbourg would remain. Nonetheless, a future Parliament could repeal the Act in its entirety, and no attempt has been made to entrench the legislation”.111 According to the section 10 of the HRA, the higher courts can make a Declaration of Incompatibility, which can result in (necessitate) remedial action where there is a compelling case for a minister of the Crown to use the foreshortened legislative process to amend the offending primary legislation.112 However, the incompatible subordinate legislation will be quashed (section 3(2)(c)).113 Under section 9 of the HRA, all courts and tribunals have a duty to interpret the HRA and are bound by its provisions, as well as other public authorities. Human rights are complimentary to ordinary rights and are made effective through the remedies already in place.114 Further, the HRA, provides that “in so far as it is possible to do so” all legislation (primary and subordinate) must read in such a manner as to give effect to

110

111 112

113

114

See e.g., D. McGoldrick, “The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 in Theory and Practice”, 50 ICLQ (2001), pp. 901-953; R. Lee, “Resources, Rights, and Environmental Regulation”, 32 J. L. & Soc. (2005), pp. 111-130; J. Wright, Tort Law & Human Rights, 2001, pp. 15-47; D. Harris, M. O’Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1995; J. McEldowney, “Human Rights, the Courts and the Environment – The Decision of the House of Lords in Marcic v. Thames Water Utilities Ltd.”, 5 YB Eur. Envtl. L. (2005), pp. 93-111. Lee, ibid. p. 114. According to the Schedule 2 of the HRA the authorised Courts are: the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, the High Court of Justiciary, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal. The unauthorised Courts are: Magistrates Courts, Crown Courts and County Courts. It will not be so in cases when the subordinate legislation would deprive the parent Act of effect; or when the defect in subordinate legislation is an inevitable consequence of the parent Act. McGoldrick, note 110, p. 905. 83


the ECHR in a way that is compatible, subject to any “designated derogation” or “designated reservation”.115 It has been observed that this could prove to be problematic for courts, as broadly defined principles of the ECHR often do not conform well with the precise language of the UK statutes.116 Section 2(2) of the Act states that in interpreting legislation, the courts must take evidence of the jurisprudence of the ECHR, as laid down by the ECtHR, the opinions of the Commission and the decisions of the Council of Ministers whenever relevant. The enactment of the HRA marks a shift in relation to the freedoms of individuals from a common law approach to a right-based system. Lee observes that the rights included in the ECHR sit well alongside English constitutional law, “but the rights protected by the Convention may not map onto these recognised by common law”,117 an early case being on telephone tapping, where it was stated that, in the absence of a tort breach of privacy, there were no common law rules against tapping. The situation was remedied by the enactment of the Interception of Communications Act.118 The same author analyses the relationship between common law approaches to freedom of individuals and rights included in the HRA. He states that, considering the nature of rights under the ECHR, the approach should not change dramatically, due to the fact that not all rights under the ECHR have the same legal character.119 There are rights that are absolute, i.e. from which derogation is not permitted (such as articles 3 and 4) and rights that permit some degree of interference (articles 6 and 8, article 1 of Protocol 1) and which may be subject to the balancing of interests between 115

116 117

118 119

84

The phrase “to give effect” prompted some authors to express the view that “incorporation” is probably not the correct term. McGoldrick cites the Lord Chancellor, who explained that the ECHR under the HRA was not made the part of the English law and that the Act did not make the Convention directly justiciable, which by incorporation would have been the case, and also these rights would have been enforced by the courts. Furthermore, incorporation was not the aim of the HRA and that EHCR rights will not in themselves become part of English substantive domestic law (ibid. p. 907). Lee, note 110, p. 116. Ibid. p.117. As McEldowney observes, section 11 of the HRA makes it clear that Convention rights are in addition to existing rights available under the law (McEldowney, note 110, p. 95). The same author cites Lord Lester who said as follows: “The Act weaves Convention into the warp and woof of the common law and statute law. Convention rights have effect not as free standing rights; they are given effect through and not around UK statute law and common law, by interpreting, declaring and giving effect to written and unwritten law compatibly with Convention rights” (ibid.). Lee, ibid. See e.g., Wright, note 110, pp. 21-27. This author writes as follows: “[t]he fact the courts are bound by section 6 (3) to act in a manner that is compatible with Convention rights suggests that the Act will be of indirect horizontal effect, so that in the development of the common law (in the broadest sense, including the doctrines of equity) the courts will be obliged to accommodate Convention principles, regardless of the identity of the defendant” (p. 23).


an individual and the community (these rights are so-called “qualified rights”). Interference is subject to a strict regulation: it has to be authorised by law, if it is lawful, and the purpose of restriction must be legitimate and established on the basis of wider interests in areas such as public safety, national security, and the economic health of the country. Lee explains that the ECHR imposes two further criteria that must be met to justify restrictions: it must be necessary in a democratic society and must be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion. The first criterion, moreover, requires a test of proportionality, i.e. balancing of rights. In such cases States enjoy certain margin of appreciation within the structure of the ECHR.120 The position of a margin of appreciation within the domestic courts in unclear.121 The third type of rights under ECHR with different legal character is limited rights, such as the right to liberty (article 5). Finally, the question arises as to whether the HRA has a “horizontal” effect, i.e. it is also operative between individuals or non-public authorities. In principle, the HRA follows the structure of the ECHR and rights can only be effective against public authorities. However, there are few possibilities where individual rights can be addressed. According to ECtHR jurisprudence, the State has a positive duty to ensure that the legal regime regulates private relationships in such a manner that rights of individuals are respected. On this basis, the court as a public authority may have to give a horizontal effect to the Convention rights to ensure that such a positive duty is fulfilled. Another case is the failure of a public authority to act in order to exercise its powers to protect individual rights. There is also a view put forward by McGoldrick that the interpretative obligation in section 3(1) is a general one, and applies to all legislation and therefore is not expressly directed at any particular body or person, and does not distinguish whether the particular dispute is between private individuals. Sections 3 and 6 of the HRA can work in conjunction. The courts themselves, as public authorities (and therefore prohibited to act to in a fashion incompatible with the Convention), are bound by the obligation contained in section 6. “[I]f this analysis is correct, then the HRA may achieve a substantial degree of horizontal effect even in the absence of a direct cause of action for a private individual against another private individual”.122 Section 2 of the 1998 Act stipulates that UK courts must “take account” of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, but they there are no bound by it. As a matter of practice, UK courts follow the decisions of the Court “but where the reasoning is not persuasive they depart[ed] from the decision”.123

120 121 122 123

Ibid. p.118. McGoldrick, note 110, pp. 938-943. Ibid. p. 937. See also p. 936. McEldowney, note 110, p. 96. 85


A complicated question in the HRA is the notion of a public authority. Section 6(3)(b) provides that a public authority includes “any person certain of whose functions are of a public nature”. Section 6(5) explains further that those bodies that are public authorities for the purposes of the section 6 of the HRA because certain of their functions are of a public nature will not retain their public character if the nature of the act complained of is private. Such a distinction can be subject to many interpretations and was the subject of many of the court’s judgments.

V. The Environmental Issues before the English Courts (Selected Case Law) The jurisprudence of the English courts in respect of broadly understood environmental matters is the most interesting after the entry into force of the HRC, since judges are under an obligation to take account of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR (see section II, above). There are a great number of such cases and we will focus on a few representative ones in order to give an overview of the issues at hand. Therefore, some limited analysis of the relevant case law of the ECtHR will be presented, in so far as it relates to the English courts’ jurisprudence.124 It must be stated from the outset that the jurisprudence of the English courts in relation to cases with an environmental human right element is very complicated as it represents the mixture of common law, statutes and the case law of the ECtHR.125 The following cases will be discussed: Marcic v. Thames

124

125

86

The most often relied on cases of the ECtHR in the jurisprudence of the English courts are the following: Lopez Ostra v. Spain; Guerra v. Italy; S v. France (1990) 65 D.R. 250; Powell and Raynor v. United Kingdom; Hatton v. United Kingdom (2001); Hatton v. United Kingdom (2003). On the ECHR and the English courts’ jurisprudence, see e.g., Wright, note 110; R. Mullender, “Tort, Human Rights and Common Law Culture”, 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud., (2003), pp. 301-318; J. Thornton and S. Tromans, “Human Rights and Environmental Wrongs, Incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights: Some Thoughts on the Consequences for UK Environmental Law”, 11 J. Envtl. L., (1999), p. 36; Lee, note 110; M. Stallworthy, “Whither environmental human rights”, 7 Envtl. L. Rev. (2005), pp. 12-33; C. Miller, note 51, pp. 111-125; K. Cook, “Environmental Rights as Human Rights”, 7 Eur. H. Rts. L. Rev. (2002), pp. 196-215; M. Wilde, “Locus Standi in Environmental Torts and the Potential Influence of Human Rights Jurisprudence”, 12 RECIEL (2003), pp. 284-294; M. Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts, 1997.


Water,126 Alconbury v. DETR (House of Lords)127 and Dennis v. Ministry of Defence. 1. Marcic v. Thames Water The claim in this case was brought on the basis of the common law of nuisance, the 1991 Water Industry Act, article 8(1) of the ECHR and article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR. Mr Marcic was the owner of a house that was a subject of a regular overflow from public sewers. The House of Lords specified that between 1992 and 2000 it happened up to 17 times. The issue in this case was the statutory responsibility of a water company (Thames Water Utilities Ltd.) under section 94(1) of the 1991 Water Industry Act to maintain and ensure the effective drainage of sewers. The primary enforcement responsibility rested on the Director of the General of Water Services through the enforcement order. The claimant’s rights according to the Statue constituted a complaint to the Director who has discretion to decide on what action to take. The Statue does not contain the possibility of seeking damages for breach of statutory duty. The question therefore arose as to whether this also precluded the application of common law of nuisance. The claimant, without any participation by the defendant, remedied the flooding at considerable expense. The lack of willingness from the sewage undertaker to carry out the flood alleviation works resulted in the claimant not making a compliant to the Director and instead seeking redress on the basis of private nuisance. The sewers were adequate at the time of construction, however, they could not prevent the recent flooding of Mr Marcic’s property. Additionally, it was alleged that the undertakers were liable under the HRA as of October 2000 (the date of the entry into force of the Act). The alleged rights infringed were those guaranteed by article 8 and article 1 of the First Protocol: “[t]he application of this body of case law to the situation of Mr Marcic allowed the inference that he was a human rights ‘victim’ and, therefore, a proper claimant against the sewerage undertaker as a ‘public authority’. The sewerage undertaker was guilty of an ‘act’ incompatible with a Convention right, because the 1998 Act provides that an ‘act’ includes ‘a failure to act’, and this was construed to encompass a

126

127

[2003] All ER 135; see on this case, Layard, note 94; J. O’Sullivan, “Nuisance, Human Rights and Sewage – Closing the Floodgates”, 63 Cambridge L. J. (2004), pp. 552-554; See also J. Razzaque, “Access to Justice in Environmental Matters at the EU Member State Level – an Update on the UK”, 5 YB Eur. Envtl. L. (2005), pp. 68-91. Alconbury v. DETR 2 WLR 1389, see on this case, A. Layard, “Case Law Analysis”, 13 J. Envtl. L. (2001), pp. 378-389; see case analysis on the Marcic case in W. Howarth, “Environmental Human Rights and Parliamentary Democracy”, 14 J. Envtl. L. (2002), pp. 377-389; J. O’Sullivan, note 126. 87


failure to put an end to an infringement where it was found that the defendant could reasonably have done so”.128 Mr Marcic was successful at the Queen’s Bench Division (on the basis of the HRA) and in the Court of Appeal (on the basis of common law claim and the HRA),129 but failed in the House of Lords. According the 1991 Water Industry Act, a general duty that is not absolute, but a question of degree, is placed on companies to provide, improve and extend the public sewer and ensure effective drainage, therefore Lord Nicholls accepted a prima facie contravention of the statue.130 The Marcic case failed before the House of Lords on both grounds: the common law of nuisance and the HRA, due to the same error, i.e. by-passing the remedy under the statutory regulation (Lord Nicholls).131 Judge Havery, QC, in this first instance found that the continuing nuisance gave rise to the cause of action for infringement of Mr Marcic’s right under article 8 of the Convention, and the “act” was rendered unlawful by section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act, i.e. failure to prevent or put an end of the infringement, which made the action of the claimant reasonable (Guerra v. Italy). The Judge also relied on other ECtHR cases: Lopez-Ostra and Powell and Raynor and S v. France (positive duty of a State to secure the applicant’s rights under article 8(1) and interference of the authority under article 8(2) and article 1 of the First Protocol). The Judge observed that the rights embodied in article 8 and the First Protocol are qualified rights and that interference by the State is in some circumstances justified (para. 68 of the judgment), and requires the balancing of interests test (para. 102 of the judgment). It was also stated that Convention rights were subject to the need to strike a proportional balance between the interests of an individual and of the community as a whole. The court analysed the wide margin of discretion that was allowed in relation to the justification of the infringement of the claimant’s rights. The

128 129

130 131

88

Howarth, ibid. p. 383. It may be noted that the Court of Appeal, (Lord Phillips) decided that Thames Water’s liability at common law made it unnecessary to consider the substance of the claim under the HRA, but that repeated flooding constituted an interference with his private rights and interfered with enjoyment of his property since it did not strike a proper balance between competing interests of Marcic and other customers. Lord Phillips was of the view that Thames Water did not manage to convince him that Harvey J was wrong to hold that it had infringed the claimant’s rights under the HRA. J. Cassels, “What a Nuisance: Marcic in the Court of Appeal”, 12 [2001/2002] 3 Utilities Law Review, EWCA Civ. 64, p. 55. Marcic v. Thames Water Utilities Ltd., [2003] UKHL, paras 19-20 (Lord Nicholls). Lord Nicholls in part dismissed the case on the basis of a wrong remedy sought by Marcic. In his view, Marcic should have sought the judicial review remedy rather than damages. However, as Layard observes, it would have had the same effect, as the same balancing of interests test would have been applied – the court would have to determine whether Thames Water acted irrationally, unlawfully or patently unreasonably.


Court decided that such an infringement was not justified and that apparent faults in the fairness of the system for the determination of priorities in the sewerage improvements lead the Court to believe that the undertaker “had not surmounted the burden of proving fairness”.132 The Court of Appeal also admitted the breach of human rights but on different grounds. It was of the view that the statutory scheme of enforcement mechanisms was inadequate to address the situation where human rights issues were involved. The Court addressed the question of compensation (claimed by Mr Marcic), which was excluded from statutory regulation, therefore, it claimed, human rights were contravened. In light of this, the claimant would be entitled an adequate remedy due to the breach of his human rights. In the 2003 judgment, the Law Lords, in relation to human rights issues, relied on the second Hatton case (which overturned the judgment of the Chamber and decided the inadmissibility of the claim on the grounds of article 8(1)). The House of Lords overruled the judgment of the Court of Appeal on all grounds, including the HRA. As the claim was based on nuisance, it was rejected on the basis of detailed statutory regulation, which voided the claim based on common law and because Parliament did not intend the fairness of priorities to be decided by the judge. Generally, in relation to the human rights claim, the Law Lords were of the view that it is primarily for Parliament to balance the interests of the individual and the community as a whole (following the Hatton case, see below). In particular, the Law Lords took into consideration the ECtHR statement concerning the problem of the margin of appreciation and the balancing of interests. In paragraph 97 of the second Hatton case judgment, the ECtHR said as follows: “[a]t the same time, the Court re-iterates the fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention. The national authorities have direct democratic legitimation and are, as the Court held on many occasions, in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions… .” In paragraph 98, the Court stated: “[a]rticle 8 may apply in environmental cases whether the pollution is directly caused by a State or whether State responsibility arises from a failure properly to regulate private industry. Whether the case is analysed in terms of a positive duty on a State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure applicants’ rights under Paragraph 1 of Article 8 or in terms of an interference by a public authority to be justified in accordance with paragraph 2, the applicable principles are

132

Howarth, note 127, p. 383. 89


broadly similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention. Furthermore, even in relation to the positive obligations flowing from the first paragraph of Article 8, in striking the required balance the aims mentioned in the second paragraph may be of a certain relevance …” In relation to the margin of appreciation in cases, such as the Hatton case, the Court was of the view that it is not comparable to intrusion in private life in criminal matters, and that: “[w]hilst the State is required to give due consideration to the particular interest the respect for which is obliged to secure by virtue of Article 8, it must in principle be left a choice between different ways and means of meeting this obligation. The Court’s supervisory function being of a subsidiary nature, it is limited to reviewing whether or not the particular solution adopted can be regarded as striking a fair balance.” The decision of the House of Lords rests on the same legal basis as the Hatton case. Lord Nicholls was of the view that: “[t]he need to adopt some system of priorities for building more sewers is self-evident. So is the need for the system to be fair. A fair system of priorities necessarily involves balancing of many intangible factors. Whether the system adopted by a sewerage undertaker is fair is a matter suited better for decision by industry regulator than by court. And the statutory scheme so provides. Moreover, the statutory scheme provides a remedy where a system of priorities is not fair. …The Director is charged with deciding whether to make an enforcement order in respect of a sewage undertaker’s failure to drain properly. Parliament entrusted this decision to the Director, not the courts” (paragraph 38). Lord Nicholls reiterates the ECtHR view of the “fundamentally subsidiary” nature of the Convention in relation to democratic legitimation of national authorities, which are better placed to evaluate local needs (paragraph 41). In his view, the statutory scheme struck the right balance and the “malfunctioning of (the) statutory scheme on this occasion does not cast doubt on its overall fairness as a scheme” (paragraph 43). Lord Hoffman said as follows: “[t]he Convention does not accord absolute protection to property or even to residential premises. It requires a fair balance to be struck between the interests of persons whose homes and property are affected and the interests of other people, such as customers and the general public. 90


National institutions, and particularly the national legislature, are accorded a broad discretion in choosing the solution appropriate to their own society or creating the machinery for doing so. There is no reason why a Parliament should not entrust such decisions to an independent regulator such as the Director. He is a public authority within the meaning of the 1998 Act and has a duty to act in accordance with Convention rights” (paragraph 71). One scholar observed that: “[l]ike Hatton, then House of Lords on Marcic denied a susceptible individual remedy because the regulator had to be allowed to exercise his discretion as he saw fit. It was the Director’s role to balance the different interests of the majority (Thames Water and sewerage customers in general) against the effects on susceptible individuals”.133 Finally, in the Marcic case, the Law Lords satisfied themselves that: “Convention compliance was assured by the availability of a statutory scheme…. It was incumbent on the claimant to have pursued a remedy under a statutory scheme. However, the courts’ role in the human rights context in the face of executive discretion demands a true balancing exercise, and the nature and essential features of any statutory scheme surely require the scrutiny by reference to the rights already infringed. After all, almost all governmental activity is pursuant to powers … derived ultimately from statute.”134 Finally, we may say that the House of Lords interpreted the relevant provisions of the ECHR in light of the existing statutory law and reached the conclusions that the conditions attached to article 8(1) of the ECHR, as elaborated by the ECtHR, are fulfilled by the statute. We must agree with the statement that the “Marcic approach is different from the approach taken in Dennis and this has far reaching consequences. It shows a marked reluctance to allow rights to develop beyond existing case law of the ECtHR or to allow a rights-based approach to extend to common law of nuisance or negligence.”135 2. The 2001 Alconbury v. DETR Case This case was described as representing and example of “one arm of the Executive calling in, at first possible stage, a planning application from which another arm stood to gain significant sums of money”.136

133 134 135 136

Layard, note 94, p. 199. Stallworthy, note 125, p. 19. McEldowney, note 110, p. 108. Lee, note 110, p. 126. 91


It concerned planning permission for a disused airfield owned by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) sought by a national freight distribution centre. The facts of this case are very complicated. In brief they are as follows. The MoD concluded an agreement with Alconbury Developments to develop the site. In exchange, Alconbury agreed to make financial payment to the Department. The application for the planning permission was refused by the local authority and later “recovered” under section 78, paragraph 3, of Schedule 6 of the Town and Country Planning (TCPA) by the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (when Cambridgeshire County Council failed to decide on the application for a waste recycling depot within the prescribed period of time). Local residents protested as they anticipated the deterioration of a local amenity. They lodged a claim on the basis of article 6, paragraph 1, of the ECHR (the right to fair hearing), arguing that the final decision adopted in relation to the permission by the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions would be in contravention of this article, as he is not an “independent and impartial tribunal” in the meaning of this article, but fulfils the role of an executive (there were several factors that they pointed out, that prejudged such a decision: first of all the minister would decide on government-owned land and secondly, after the inspector’s analysis, the final decision would be made privately, by the Secretary of State upon the recommendation of the Department). In 2001, the Divisional Court agreed with the claim submitted by the residents. One of the judges observed that there was a common law bias and that the minister should not be a judge in his own case (he could not at the same time be a policy maker and a decision-maker), therefore the Secretary of State could not give an impartial and fair hearing. This judgment was appealed by the Government to the House of Lords. The House of Lords came to the conclusion that there was no breach of article 6(1), since the Secretary of State is subject to judicial review of the courts, which themselves fulfil the requirements of article 6(1).137 The reasoning of the Law Lords who arrived at this conclusion, however, differed. The most interesting were the views of Lords Slynn and Hoffman. The House of Lords analysed the judgments of the ECtHR in Albert and le Compte v. Belgium (1983) and Bryan v. United Kingdom (1995), in which the Court confirmed the fulfilment of article 6(1) in planning by the possibility of judicial review. Lord Slynn was of the view that the most important question was to enquire whether there was a sufficient judicial control by an independent and impartial tribunal after the decision of an inspector or the Secretary of State was made and that ECtHR jurisprudence did not indicate that it should be the “full jurisdiction” of the Court, therefore the judicial review process was sufficient 137

92

K. Davies, “Alconbury: administrative law and human rights”, <www.dspace.dial.pipex. com/rwlr/s10/s10-1-33.htm>.


(paras 49 and 50 of the judgment) and in compliance with the case law of the ECtHR. Lord Hoffman relied on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and adopted a two-level argument: “[h]e distinguished between two reasons for review after an unfavourable decision by an inspector or Secretary of State. The first on factual matters, the second on policy. This distinction is crucial to Lord Hoffman’s analysis and underpins his argument that safeguards inherent in inspector’s hearings are unnecessary when a decision is taken by the Secretary of State on issues of planning judgement rather than fact.”138 Lord Hoffman relied on the 1993 Zumtobel v. Austria case in order to develop the argument as to what it meant by full jurisdiction of the court in matters of judicial review. According to him “full jurisdiction” did not mean “full decisionmaking powers” but “full jurisdiction to deal with the case as the nature of decision requires” (para. 87 of the judgment). Furthermore, according to Lord Hoffman, the question of the impartiality of the inspector arises when it comes to findings or evaluation of fact in relation to the question of the breach of planning control, that “the safeguards are essential for the acceptance of a limited review by an appellate tribunal” (para. 117 of the judgment).139 Planning is a very special area, as regulated by English law. As was explained by Layard: “[t]he role of an inspector and of the Secretary of State is contentious when it explicitly acknowledged by all sides that they are never meant to act impartially or independently (in matters of planning judgment at least). Their role is to carry out policy and practice of the day, as government implements planning policy guidance notes and circulars and enacts the legislation. And yet what this means, when coupled with an extremely narrow remit for review, is that objectors to a proposed plan are virtually powerless to object. This is a crucial point and explains why the question of what constitutes ‘full jurisdiction’ as required by Le Compte and what the scope of review by the courts should be is so important. For planning is unlike many other areas of law where judicial review applies…. How these individual issues are weighted is, as the courts have consistently confirmed, a matter for planning judgment made by inspectors, local authorities, and government officials, not the courts.” For these reasons however, as Layard states: “… even the most controversial and unpopular of planning decisions are virtually impossible to challenge. When judicial review has been successful, this has been in the most extreme circumstances”.140

138 139 140

Layard, note 127, pp. 381-382. See in depth Layard, ibid. Layard, ibid. pp. 384 and 385. 93


3. The 2003 Dennis v. Ministry of Defence Case This case concerned the effect of noise from Harrier jet fighters on the claimant’s estate. The case was brought on the basis of the common law of nuisance and the HRA, article 8(1) and article 1 of the First Protocol. Therefore, Judge Buckley had to consider first, whether a claim under the law of nuisance was well founded or this claim was overridden by the public interest involved in the activity (Harrier training of pilots). The Judge ruled that nuisance was established “but that the public interest clearly demands that RAF Wittering should continue to train pilots” (para. 48 of the judgment). As to the human rights claim, of interest were arguments presented by the legal representatives of both parties. The counsel for the claimant argued that the Harrier flights clearly constituted interference and noted their impact on the value of the estate (paras 56 and 57 of the judgment). The counsel for the defendant submitted that flights were lawful and did not contravene any statutes or planning regulations (if flights, however, constituted a common law of nuisance, then article 8 added nothing), and that training pilots was a legitimate aim and that the balancing of interests test indicates that public interest should prevail (para. 58 of the judgment). Judge Buckley took into consideration the second Hatton case and S v. France (in relation to enjoyment of property). Following the Hatton case, the Judge relied on the principle of the balancing of competing interests between the individual and the community as a whole. He observed that States are required to limit as far as possible interference with rights by attempting to find alternative solutions and seeking to achieve their aims by the least burdensome manner with respect to human rights. There has to be proper research to find the best solution. The Judge concluded that there has been a considerable increase in night noise since 1993 when the Government modified its restrictions on night noise without, as found out by court, proper investigation (para. 62 of the judgment). Interestingly, the Judge relied in part on the S v. France case, to decide that a fair balance would not be struck if compensation had not been awarded. The Judge said as follows: “I would hold, as I believe is implicit in the decision in S v. France, that the public interest is greater than the individual private interests of Mr and Mrs Dennis but it is not proportionate to pursue or give effect to the public interest without compensation to Mr and Mrs Dennis … In my view, common fairness demands that where the interests of a minority, let alone an individual, are seriously interfered with because of an overriding public interest, the minority should be compensated” (para. 63 of the judgment). Paragraphs 92 and 93 of the judgment are interesting from a point of view of the interplay between the common law of nuisance and the HRA in relation to compensation and how these two independent sources on which the case was lodged were interpreted by the Judge. It was stated as follows: “[a]s in Marcic, since I have awarded damages for common law nuisance and I regard them as just satisfaction, the Human Right Act claims add nothing … Finally, if contrary to my view, the common law of 94


nuisance does not provide a remedy in a case such as this because, for example, the public interest prevents a nuisance arising in law, then the claim under the Human Rights Act would be relevant. I have given my view that the claim would succeed under both articles mentioned and I would have adopted the approach implicit in S v. France, and awarded compensation in the same sum”.141

VI. Conclusions There have been numerous human right cases with an environmental slant before the English courts. The pronouncements by the ECtHR in the second Hatton case appear to be of the utmost importance for the recent jurisprudence of the English courts, although in the eyes of many, this case heralds a more cautious approach by the ECtHR to environmental human rights cases (in the view of the present author, this is confirmed by the Fadeyeva case). The rights protected by the HRA, constitute legal grounds for cases concerning pollution, noise pollution, planning permission, and so on. However, in contrast to the cases before the ECtHR, the human right approach constitutes only a partial legal basis of cases before English courts together with common law and statutory grounds. Therefore, English courts are faced with the Gordian knot of human rights law (as embodied in the Human Rights Act and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR) and English law as contained in common law and statutes. As evidenced by the above-discussed case law, it is frequently very difficult to reconcile these systems (see, e.g. Alconbury and Marcic).142 Judges are faced with the daunting task of interpreting statutes, common law, HRA provisions and the relevant jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The jurisprudence of the English courts is therefore far from clear. There are also inherent problems with certain concepts in English common law such as private nuisance, which may be in conflict with ECtHR jurisprudence concerning article 8.143 Under this article, there is no condition of property interest (a necessary element in the common law of nuisance) in order to assert a right in respect to family and home life.144 If the public authority is responsible, a claim can be

141

142 143

144

It is interesting to note that against the spirit of the “growing compensation culture”, Judge Buckley awarded £950,000 compensation, although damages sought were £10,000,000. However, he admitted that noise nuisance is “testing the limits of tolerance” (para. 85 of the judgment) and the awarded amount reflects this. See, however, on this aspect, the view of Mullender, note 125. The common law of nuisance is a part of the law English law of tort. After the entry into force of the HRA, the relationship between tort and the HRA (the ECHR) became subject to many analytical studies, such as Wright (note 110) and the critical assessment of the book by Mullender (note 125). Wright, note 110, p. 189. 95


made under the HRA without the condition of the property interest, “because the issue of standing is determined by the question of whether the claimant is the victim of a violation of a Convention right”.145 “[E]ssentially, the outcome of litigation will be assessed by balancing the community and individual interests, and applying the proportionality test.”146 However, it has been suggested that the influence of human rights on property tort in environmental matters may change the rigidity of law regarding property rights, with property rights as the dominant type of rights, and close the gap between private (property) and public (environmental) interests. Cases concerning impairment of the enjoyment of the family home in English law (property tort, private rights) are centred upon the rights of the householder and the impairment of rights pertaining to title of the realty. The rights of other family members are assessed as being vague and in the realm of environmental interests assigned to the human rights field (public law area). In order to strengthen relevant human rights, they could be elevated to “something akin to a property right” by, for example, widening the notion of standing in environmental matters.147 The Environmental Justice Project reviewed the public’s access to and experience of the legal system in environmental matters.148 The report gathered the views of over 50 respondents, including 20 barristers, 17 solicitors and five non-governmental organisations. The report identified serious problems in relation to access to environmental justice. Ninety-seven percent of respondents were of the view that the civil law system failed to provide environmental justice; 82 percent of respondents were “not happy” with rules on costs; 66 percent of respondents thought that the courts did not have a good understanding of environmental matters; 44 percent of respondents recommended environmental training for the judiciary; and 26 percent of respondents considered the limited scope of judicial review as being a barrier to environmental justice.149

145 146 147 148 149

96

Ibid. p. 193. Ibid. p. 193. Wilde, note 125, p. 294. Leigh, Day & Co. Solicitors, <www.leighday.co.uk/doc.asp?doc=428&cat=934>. Ibid. pp. 3-4.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE TREATMENT OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR PERSONNEL M.C.W. Pinto

A

mong the many outstanding contributions that Tom Mensah has made to international law is his staunch support, in his days as Legal Adviser, for the claim of the inter-governmental organisation and its staff to treatment that would ensure impartiality and independence in the discharge of their responsibilities.

I. Introduction This brief chapter is not intended to deal with the many issues that arise in relations between States, in particular “host” States, and international organisations. It will invite attention to some issues arising out of the treatment of such organisations and their personnel by host States, and suggest that attempts to resolve them by applying the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations by analogy could lead to results that are unfair to organisations and their personnel, results that were certainly never contemplated, much less intended, by the framers of those provisions. The international organisations about which the following observations are made, are “intergovernmental organisations” possessing international legal personality, irrespective of whether they are of an “universal character” or were created for some limited purpose; of the number of States that are their members; of whether they are of specified or indefinite duration; and of whether their aims and purposes are global or regional in scope. The kind of international organisation contemplated here fits well within the description proposed by Manuel Rama-Montaldo in his article on international legal personality: “International organizations possess international personality when they fulfil certain objective preconditions: an international agreement creating an association of States endowed with at least one organ which expresses a will detached from that of the member States and possessNdiaye and Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes, 97–118 ©2007 Koninklijke Brill NV. ISBN 978 90 04 16156 6. Printed in the Netherlands.


ing defined aims and purposes to be attained through the fulfilment of functions or powers.”1

II. Early International Administrations The origins of the concept of the modern intergovernmental organisation and the professional qualities and behaviour characteristic of the international official are thought to lie in the great congresses or conferences held during the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century. Convened almost exclusively in Europe at the invitation of the great powers of the time – Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia, jointly or individually – they were concerned initially with political issues, the maintenance of boundaries, spheres of influence and the balance of power among the States of Europe, and thus worldwide. Later conferences would attempt to establish principles of State conduct to facilitate collective action in such fields as the promotion of commerce, including regulation of navigation and use of international watercourses, e.g. straits, rivers, and canals. International agreements concluded on such subjects led to the establishment of permanent offices to oversee their orderly implementation. The 19th and early 20th centuries saw the conclusion of several treaties dealing with inter-State cooperation in the scientific and technical fields, including the use of the telegraph, railways, sanitation and health, intellectual property and agriculture, each of them establishing a permanent administrative organ.2 In the character of these “secretariats” we may find the root of the qualities now associated with the vocation of the international civil servant. Appointed by a government, and conscious of a degree of loyalty owed to it, there was also, for the international civil servant, a loyalty higher, and possibly more complex, owing to the international collective organ for which the individual worked. As Pierre Gerbet observes: “The international character of these permanent administrative bodies was more or less pronounced. The majority was under the supervision of one Member State. Others were responsible to an international commission, in this respect resembling the river commissions system, with multi-national secretariats. These offices gave rise to many contacts between national administrative bodies and established the habit of

1

Rama Montaldo, M., “International legal personality and implied powers of international organizations” in 1970 BYIL, p. 111, pp. 154-155.

2

For a survey of the development of international administration see Eagleton, C., International Government, 3rd edn 1957, pp. 157-182; and for an outline of progress in the field, see Gerbet, P., “Rise and development of international organization: a synthesis”, in Abi-Saab, G. (ed.), The Concept of International Organization, 1981, pp. 29 et seq.

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Some Thoughts on the Treatment of Inter-Governmental Organisations and their Personnel

co-operation at the technical level, thereby laying the foundations of international civil services.”3 At the close of the 19th century and the dawn of the 20th, two great Peace Conferences were convened at The Hague at the initiative of Czar Nicholas II. Invited participants included, in addition to the States of Europe, the United States of America and several others from that continent. Four States from Asia were invited, but none from Africa. The agreements concluded at the Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 aimed at making war more humane, and established procedures for the orderly settlement of disputes between States with a view to preventing their recourse to war. For the latter purpose they established the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, and an International Bureau that “serves as registry for the Court … is the channel for communications relative to the meetings of the Court … has charge of the archives and conducts all the administrative business”. A Permanent Administrative Council composed of the diplomatic representatives of the States Parties to the Conventions, and taking decisions by majority vote, was charged with the appointment, direction and control of the International Bureau, and decided all questions of administration, including the organisation’s budget and financing.4 The next significant advance in the evolution of the international organisation and the character of its officials occurred at the end of World War I with the creation of the League of Nations. The last-quoted author links the character of the League’s secretariat with that of the staff of the numerous councils and commissions that had functioned under the authority of the Allies’ Supreme War Council to facilitate efficient cooperation in the conduct of military operations. As he observes, the international secretariat of the Council “covered every sphere of inter-Allied activity and constituted a true organ of government”.5 The League of Nations was, however, a conception that would extend far beyond the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Although the latter were entitled to permanent seats on the Council of the League and thus continued to exercise preponderant influence on the organisation, the League’s Assembly consisted of representatives of every Member State exercising their right to vote. The League’s secretariat had to reflect the complexity of that broad membership. To quote Gerbet again: “An international secretariat, directly based upon the experience of the inter-Allied bodies which had existed in wartime, was entrusted with

3

Ibid. p. 36.

4

E.g. Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, concluded at The Hague, 18 October 1907, articles 41 (Permanent Court of Arbitration), 43 (International Bureau), 49 (Permanent Administrative Council).

5

Gerbet, P., op. cit. above note 2, pp. 38-41. 99


the administrative tasks, and played a very important role on account of its permanent character, the qualifications of its members and the fact that they were independent of governments. The international civil service was to develop considerably.”6 Parts of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant of the League lay a foundation for the autonomy of the organisation and the independence of its officials. Thus, paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 6 provide that: “1. The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as may be required. … 3. The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council.” Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of article 7 provide: “3. All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women. 4. Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. 5. The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.” While the status of League officials was not among the subjects assigned for study by the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law established by the Council of the League on 11 December 1924, the Committee did observe that: “it is not certain that an absolute identity of privileges and immunities should be established between diplomats proper and the categories [of League officials] just mentioned. It seems possible that the difference of circumstances ought to lead to some difference in the measures to be adopted.”7

6

Ibid. p. 41.

7

Hill, M., Immunities and Privileges of International Officials: The Experience of the League of Nations, 1947, p. 12, note 20.

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III. Allegiance to a Sending State as the Foundation of the Rules Governing Inter-State Diplomatic Relations Diplomatic relations among States may well have been the earliest activity around which international law developed. Given the formidable body of customary law that already regulated diplomacy, it was to be expected that its rules should seem applicable, despite cautionary observations by the experts, to the personnel of intergovernmental organisations who formed a new category of “foreign” employees entitled to special treatment by a receiving State. It was not fully recognised however, that the rules that should apply to international civil servants had a different foundation from those applied to diplomatic agents, and that an attempt to apply the latter to personnel of international organisations could have consequences that were inappropriate and unfair. On 18 April 1961, the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities adopted the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations on the basis of draft articles essentially codifying customary law on the topic, prepared by the International Law Commission. It consisted of 53 articles covering most major aspects of permanent diplomatic relations between States, and included an Optional Protocol concerning Acquisition of Nationality and an Optional Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. While a resolution by the Conference recommended that the General Assembly invite the International Law Commission to study the privileges and immunities of “special missions”, there is no indication that the Conference considered that the result of its work could be applied, or even be adapted for application, to international organisations and international officials. Nevertheless, it might have been the entry into force of that Convention on 24 April 1964 that invited a renewed tendency to assimilate international officials to “diplomats proper” in subsequent agreements and to obviate the need for more analytical and function-oriented thinking about issues arising in connection with the needs and interests of international organisations, and the issues associated with the comparatively new vocation of the international civil servant. The 1961 Vienna Convention was drafted, negotiated and concluded by nationally accredited diplomatic agents very properly bearing in mind the particular requirements of their own calling, not those of international officials. As the Preamble to the 1961 Vienna Convention clearly and emphatically declares: “Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States; …” (emphasis added).8

8

Preamble, fourth paragraph. 101


The functions of a diplomatic mission representing a State are different in character and scope from the functions of an international organisation, which must take account of the interests of not one State, but of the entire membership, in addition to safeguarding its own integrity and independence. Thus, the criteria for determining the parameters of treatment to be accorded to an international organisation and its officials differ substantially from those applied in relation to nationally accredited diplomatic missions.9 The unique allegiance of bilaterally accredited diplomats to their sending States, and their factual and legal connection with those States may be thought of as the fons et origo of features of their treatment by receiving States.10 Those features are reliably safeguarded by remedies based on the crude but effective principle of reciprocity that promises retaliation in the event of exigent behaviour by a receiving State, as well as by bilateral agreements and multilateral conventions like the 1961 Vienna Convention, which provide procedures for the settlement of

9

C. Wilfred Jenks, whose outstanding contributions to the literature on international organisations remain as relevant today as when they were published, notes three major differences between diplomatic and what he terms “international immunities”. Jenks wrote: “Three major differences between diplomatic and international immunities stand out in special relief. One of the recognized limitations of diplomatic immunity is that members of the diplomatic staff of a mission may be appointed from amongst the nationals of the receiving State only with the express consent of that State; apart from inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of their functions, nationals enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may be granted by the receiving State. International immunities may be specially important in relation to the State of which the official is a national. While, as will appear when we proceed to examine current practice, this principle is not always fully accepted, the considerations of principle involved differ profoundly from those applicable to diplomatic immunity. Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State; in the case of international immunities there is no sending State and an equivalent for the jurisdiction of the sending State therefore has to be found either in waiver of immunity or in some international disciplinary or judicial procedure. Thirdly, the effective sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are the principle of reciprocity and the danger of retaliation by the aggrieved State; international immunities enjoy no similar protection; for this reason, matters satisfactorily covered by recognized practice in respect of diplomatic immunities may need to be formulated in unequivocal international obligations in the case of international immunities. In view of such factors as these the functional requirements of international organizations need to be considered on their own merits and not on the basis of automatic assimilation to the functional requirements of diplomatic intercourse.” Jenks, C.W., International Immunities, 1961, p. xxxvii.

10

The International Court of Justice in The Reparations case observed: “It is not possible, by the strained use of the concept of allegiance to assimilate the legal bond which exists, under Article 100 of the Charter, between the organization, on the one hand, and the Secretary-General and the staff on the other hand, to the bond of nationality existing between a State and its nationals”, 1949 ICJ Reports, p. 182.

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disputes. The origin of features of treatment accorded by States to international officials was, by contrast, their very independence from support or control by any State including the States of their nationalities, and that they are required to accept a unique allegiance to an entity that was itself independent of the control of any single State: the intergovernmental organisation. That independence was to preclude not only State interference with an official in the performance of his functions for the organisation employing him, but also State protection of an international official who is its national in the event of impeachment, making of the usually reliable device of “reciprocity”, a brutum fulmen in such cases. Notwithstanding the substantial difference between the functions, objectives, ideals and career patterns of bilaterally accredited diplomats on the one hand, and those of international officials on the other, the tendency of “host” States and “duty station” States to treat the latter as “diplomats” of a kind, and to look for equivalences of rank and function between the two types of officials, persists. This may have been the result of bureaucratic inertia or carelessness on the part of national administrations and equally on the part of international organisations. The conclusion of the 1961 Vienna Convention seemed to offer a carefully negotiated set of texts to which reference could be made in determining the treatment to be accorded both to diplomats, and equally to international civil servants. However, assimilation of international officials to “diplomats proper” was never correct, and continuation of the practice that treats international officials as “diplomats” (but not quite) and forces them into a mould that will enable the Vienna Convention to be applied to them will continue to unsettle relations between “host” States and organisations through perceptions of unfairness, causing needless inconvenience and possibly hardship to the officials concerned.

IV. Functional Independence as the Foundation of the Rules Governing the International Organisation and its Staff The Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State, in emphasising the need for the independence of international officials, comments on the basic principles involved and notes differences between the treatment to be accorded to them and the treatment accorded to bilaterally accredited diplomats: “The United Nations, being an organisation of all of the Member States, is clearly not subject to the jurisdiction of any one of them and the same will be true for the officials of the Organisation. The problem will be particularly important in connection with the relationship between the United Nations and the country in which it has its seat. The problem will also exist, however, in any country in which officials of the United

103


Nations are called upon from time to time to perform official duties. The United States shares the interest of all Members in seeing that no State hampers the work of the Organisation through the imposition of unnecessary local burdens. It would have been possible to make the simple statement that all of these officials and representatives would have diplomatic privileges and immunities, but it is not necessarily true that these international officials will need precisely the same privileges and immunities as are needed by the diplomatic representatives of individual States. It accordingly seemed better to lay down as a test the necessity of the independent exercise of the functions of the individuals in connection with the Organisation. … The enactment of (the necessary) legislation would not be for the purpose of conferring a favor upon any individuals. It would rather be for the purpose of assuring to the Organisation the possibility that its work could be carried on without interference or interruption. The according of such privileges and immunities is merely one aspect of co-operating with the Organisation itself ” (emphasis added).11 That functional independence was to be the foundation of the treatment to be accorded to international officials is evident from the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter: “Article 100 1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization. 2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. Article 101 1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly. … 3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in

11

Quoted in Jenks, op. cit. note 9 above, at p. 18.

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the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Article 105 1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. 2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization. 3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.” The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (UN Convention), and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations (Specialized Agencies Convention) were adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 and 1947 respectively when customary international law seemed to offer little guidance as to the treatment of international officials. Both are self-contained in their provisions on the subject (articles 17 and 18 of the UN Convention; articles 18 and 19 in the Specialized Agencies Convention), it being left to the administrative head of each organisation to designate the categories of officials entitled to the exemptions and immunities specified, that, according to the Charter, are to be “necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization”. Only as to two facilities accorded to international officials do they make reference to comparable treatment of diplomats, viz. exchange facilities, and repatriation in times of international crisis, neither of which is necessarily functionally connected with the organisation. As to the scope of all other immunities and exemptions provided for, i.e. immunity from legal process, exemption from taxation, immunity from national service obligations, from immigration restriction and alien registration, and the duty-free import of goods upon first taking up at a duty station, the applicable criteria are those of functional necessity. The UN Convention (article 19) and the Specialized Agencies Convention (article 21) both provide that the spouses and minor children of high officials are to have “in addition” the “privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law”. There is no indication of what such “additional” privileges and immunities might be, but what those provisions do accomplish is the extension to prescribed family 105


members of such high officials, the privileges, immunities and so on, accorded to “diplomatic envoys”. Having recognised that functional independence is the foundation of the rules that apply to intergovernmental organisations and the conduct of international officials, international law equips them with the means to maintain and defend the proper application of those rules. The International Court of Justice in the Reparations case, when discussing the nature of the United Nations (“the supreme type of international organization”), observed that its Member States had, inter alia, given it “legal capacity and privileges and immunities in the territory of each of its Members; and [provided for] the conclusion of agreements between the Organization and its Members”. Continuing, the Court said: “Practice – in particular the conclusion of conventions to which the Organization is a party – has confirmed this character of the Organization, which occupies a position in certain respects in detachment from its Members, and which is under a duty to remind them, if need be, of certain obligations. … In the opinion of the Court, the Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon the international plane … It must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged. Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international person … [and] that it is a subject of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.”12 Independence, then, is the foundation of principles that govern the intergovernmental organisation and its staff. For the organisation, this means the independence of its actions from the policy of any one Member State, and the faithful pursuit of the policies, aims and objectives laid down in its constituent instruments, or determined by the organ or organs empowered by them. Its actions must also be independent of the State in which it is located, that is to say, its “host” State, when that State is not a member of the organisation.

12

1949 ICJ Reports, p. 179

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The independence of the organisation is also to be reflected in the independence of its staff. The independence of the staff has a three-fold character: an international official is to be independent of the State of his nationality, independent of any Member State of the organisation he serves, and independent of the State in the territory of which he performs his duties, that is, the State that acts as “host” to the organisation, or the State of an official’s duty station. Accordingly, international officials, in the performance of their duties, must not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any authority external to the organisation they serve, and are required to refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to that organisation. Every Member State of the organisation, and any “host” State if it is not a Member State of the organisation, has the corresponding duty to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the staff of an organisation, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of those responsibilities. It is with a view to ensuring the independence of the international organisation that its Member States and the organisation’s “host” State (if it is not a Member State) treat the intergovernmental organisation as a subject of international law, with the capacity to possess rights and undertake obligations under international law, and accord to such an organisation and its staff the status, jurisdictional immunities and fiscal exemptions (perhaps less-than-felicitously termed “immunities and privileges”) that are necessary for the optimal performance of its functions and the achievement of its aims and purposes.13 What has been said in that sense about the staff of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies, applies equally to the staff of other intergovernmental organisations: “The independence of the international civil service, together with the principles of impartiality and loyalty to the Organization, constitutes

13

Jenks recounts in three basic propositions, the formulation by the International Labour Organization of the principles regarded as the foundation of international immunities (ILO Official Bulletin, 10 December 1945, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, p. 199): “(1) that international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; (2) that no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and (3) that the International Labour Organization (for which we may substitute any other international organization the position of which we may be considering) should, as a collective of States Members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States”, op. cit. note 9 above, p. 17. These, he declares are elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. 107


a fundamental basis for the proper functioning of international administrations. It has become a codified norm of modern international law. The principle of independence is guaranteed by the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities conferred upon staff members of the Organizations of the United Nations systems by virtue of the Charter of the United Nations, the constitutive instruments of the Specialized Agencies, the General Conventions of 1946 and 1947, Headquarters Agreements as well as by a wide range of other relevant international legal instruments. Independence is functional and therefore not unlimited. Staff members enjoy it during the performance of their official functions. Privileges, immunities and exemptions are not provided outside of the exercise of official duties. … To secure the independence, safety, well-being and protection of international civil servants is a responsibility both of Member States and the Organizations concerned. This can be achieved only when the international status, privileges and immunities of officials are fully respected and the staff themselves strictly comply with the obligations resulting from their Staff Regulations and Rules”.14 The Report of the Sub-Committee on Privileges and Immunities of International Organisations and Persons Connected with Them of the European Committee on Legal Cooperation published in 1970, stressing the need to protect the independence of the organisation declares: “Since an international organisation is brought into being by sovereign and independent states and is an association of states, it must be given a special status in relation to the exercise of jurisdictional and administrative authority by individual states. Its independence which is an essential element of this status must be ensured by the grant of such privileges and immunities as may be necessary to enable it to achieve, without being subjected to undue interference, the aims for which it has been set up.”15

14

Tarassenko, S. and Zacklin, R., “Independence of International Civil Servants (Privileges and Immunities)”, in De Cooker, C. (ed.), International Administration, 1990, p. III.1.13.

15

Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations, Resolution (69) 29 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 26 September 1970 and Explanatory Report, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1970, p. 12.

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A memorandum submitted to that Sub-Committee by the United Kingdom, encapsulates and re-affirms the rationale of immunities to be accorded to international officials: “10. Immunities and privileges have traditionally been justified on three grounds: (i) that they are necessary to ensure the independence of international organisations from control or interference by any state; (ii) that one government should not profit financially from the funds put at the disposal of an organisation by other governments; and (iii) that international organisations, and persons connected with them, should in general enjoy the status which their component states and persons representing them, traditionally enjoy.”16 That Report found that while the staff members of an organisation would, in general, be entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of a Member State in respect of official acts, to fiscal exemptions, to immunity from legal process, exemption from customs duties, restrictions and alien registration, and to repatriation facilities in times of crisis, certain “high officers” specified by the organisation would be entitled to “additional privileges” based on their assimilation to “diplomatic agents”. The Report does acknowledge that assimilation of “high officers” to diplomatic agents: “gave rise to certain problems in that there was no ‘sending state’ and the question arose whether states other than the state where the high officer normally performed his functions should be regarded as ‘receiving state’ for this purpose and whether the limitations in the Vienna Convention concerning nationals and permanent residents should apply”.17 However, having recognised the existence of such problems, the Report does not, regrettably, elaborate further on the issues which could arise as a result. Absence of the “sending State/receiving State” context would seem to leave the organisation and its officials, for all the emphasis accorded to the governing principles of “independence” and “equality”, vulnerable to unilateral attenuating

16

“Memorandum by the Government of the United Kingdom on the privileges and immunities of international organizations and persons connected with them”, ibid. pp. 73, 76

17

Ibid. p. 39. Elsewhere in the Report, the Sub-Committee observes that: “too close a parallel should not be drawn between the immunity from jurisdiction of states and that of international organizations because the reasons for immunity were not the same in the two cases. It had not been established that the degree of immunity required by states and by international organizations was the same”, ibid. p. 23. 109


or even discriminatory action by States, in particular by a State acting as host to the “seat” or headquarters of the organisation. It seems imperative that the status and facilities, as well as the fiscal and other immunities of an international organisation should be set out clearly, and in as much detail as possible in a contract or agreement between it and the State in which its headquarters or branch office will be located. The Report is critical of a practice best described in its own words: “states wishing to have the headquarters established in their territory should not bid against each other in the offer of privileges and immunities. This general principle should also be applied when headquarters agreements were being prepared. In general, the sub-committee considered that the competent representative organ of the organization should be consulted at appropriate stages in the negotiations for the drawing up of the headquarters agreement.”18 This principle is of particular importance in view of the now frequent practice of naming the seat of an organisation in its constituent instrument prior to negotiation of the terms offered by the host, as a virtual guarantee of permanent acceptance, and the fact that the State representatives who negotiate the constituent instrument may not be those who will be partners of the “host State” when negotiating a headquarters agreement (the “competent representative organ”); nor could they wield the influence of the former, who would have been able to withhold support for a candidate “host”, if the terms offered were to seem inadequate. It seems unlikely, however that the principle against “bidding” will ever be respected. The Report emphasises the need for the international organisation to enter into contractual relationships that would protect itself as well as third parties. Among such “third parties” must be counted its own personnel. The most important of these agreements is undoubtedly that concerning the organisation’s relationship with the “host” State which will provide inter alia for the status, facilities and fiscal and other immunities of the organisation and its personnel. It is of the first importance for the protection of the organisation’s independence that its status, facilities and immunities be set forth in the agreement clearly and in detail, as early in the relationship as possible, so as to explore, clarify and evaluate the

18

Ibid. pp. 16-17. The Report urges, in relation to United Nations organisations and its Member States that the organisations should enjoy the same status in all Member States “as far as privileges and immunities are concerned … and that the headquarters agreement should not extend the privileges and immunities set out in the general agreement unless there are special reasons of a local character to justify doing so …”. By the same reasoning it would seem contrary to this principle for a host State to restrict those privileges and immunity without justification.

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scope and content of the host State’s undertakings in their pristine form. Those undertakings would be established from that moment on for an indefinite period, since they would form a substantial portion of the terms of employment that the organisation will offer to recruits from around the world. Since these recruits are “third parties” in relation to the agreement between the host State and the organisation, it is only to the latter that employees may look to make good on the terms of employment promised to them. While periodic re-negotiation of the undertakings given by the host State may be provided for, unilateral action by the host State to change the relationship established under the host State agreement so as to affect adversely the status or rights of the organisation and its employees, e.g. under some purported application by analogy of the 1961 Vienna Convention, would constitute a breach of those undertakings. Early conclusion of a relationship agreement that records the undertakings of a host State would also enable both parties to appreciate clearly what terms the host State is offering by way of actual legal commitment. Such undertakings may then be distinguished from exemptions and immunities that the host State believes it is granting ex gratia and beyond which it considers to be its legal obligation, and which it may therefore claim the right to withdraw at any time without the consent of, or even consultation with, the organisation. The agreement with the host State should also provide in some detail for procedures to be followed in the event of allegations that there has been “abuse of privilege” by the organisation or its personnel. In the absence of a relationship similar to that between a sending State and a receiving State, remedies such as those provided in articles 9 (declaration that an official is persona non grata) and 11 (reduction of the size of the mission of a sending State) of the 1961 Vienna Convention cannot be applied, and it would seem inappropriate for a host State to apply restrictions on agreed exemptions and immunities, and without demonstrated justification. Article VII, section 24 of the Specialized Agencies Convention provides a procedure which could serve as a model, modified, if necessary, as to the agreed form of binding resolution of the dispute: “Article VII: Abuses of Privilege Section 24 If any State party to this Convention considers that there has been an abuse of a privilege or immunity conferred by this Convention, consultations shall be held between that State and the specialized agency concerned to determine whether any such abuse has occurred and, if so, to attempt to ensure that no repetition occurs. If such consultations fail to achieve a result satisfactory to the State and the specialized agency concerned, the question whether an abuse of a privilege or immunity has occurred shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice in accordance with section 32. If the International Court of Justice finds that such an abuse has occurred, the State party to this Convention affected by such 111


abuse shall have the right, after notification to the specialized agency in question to withhold from the specialized agency concerned the benefits of the privilege or immunity so abused.” Another area of the relationship between an international organisation and a host State that needs thoughtful regulation in the agreement between them is the social security regime applicable to the organisation’s personnel. In the absence of the sending State/receiving State relationship, article 33 of the 1961 Vienna Convention offers little guidance, except that it incorporates the basic principle that the personnel of an international organisation and their families are entitled to continuous social security coverage while employed by the organisation.19 The solution most frequently adopted is for the organisation itself to provide its personnel with adequate social security through contracts with private insurers. Where appropriate, the social security coverage available in the host State may be used as standard. However, a blanket exemption of the organisation’s personnel from the social security provisions in force in the host State may affect the social security rights of personnel who are nationals of the host State, in particular where the host State legislation actually prohibits their participation in the national scheme.20 Other situations prejudicial to the international organisation could result from application to it, by analogy, of the 1961 Vienna Convention. For example, a host State, having unilaterally imposed restrictions on fiscal exemptions previously accorded to nationally accredited diplomatic agents in its territory may purport to extend those restrictions to international organisations and their staff, arguing that the new restrictions are in accordance with its interpretation of the Vienna Convention, declaring in support that no sending State has objected. In so doing the host State would be (a) implying that State-accredited diplomats are entitled to the “highest” level of treatment that, if lowered, automatically lowers the standard of treatment to which international officials may aspire; and (b) subjecting the organisation and its personnel to a moving standard of treatment over which the organisation – although operating on the same international plane as the host State – has no control. It would allow a host State to assume the sole authority to interpret the provisions of the Convention in relation to international officials on its territory. Secondly, because the international organisation could never be in the position of a “sending State”, it would be 19

The three basic principles contained article 33 have been correctly summarised as follows: “exemption for those who should be covered by the law of the sending State, no exemption for the others coupled with a duty on diplomatic agents to carry our employer’s responsibilities in regard to non-exempt private servants, and optional participation where permitted by the law of the receiving State.” Denza, E., Diplomatic Law, 2nd edn, 1998, p. 291.

20

Op. cit. note 15 above, pp. 67-69.

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deprived of remedies available to the latter. Remedies based on the principle of reciprocity are outside the organisation’s reach, and, not being a State, it does not have the capacity itself to become a party to the 1961 Vienna Convention, nor to the Convention’s Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which, if it had been ratified by the host State, might have afforded the prospect of compulsory arbitration of the issue. Nor could the organisation have access to the International Court of Justice, being excluded by the provisions of the Statute of the Court. International organisations of an universal character, even if they had not provided in their agreements with their host States for compulsory dispute settlement, may yet be granted access by the UN General Assembly to the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, but most other categories of international organisations are unlikely to secure such access. It is therefore imperative that a host State include in the seat agreement with the organisation, or in some supplementary exchange of notes, provision for the impartial and binding settlement of disputes that might arise between them. To be deprived of access to impartial dispute settlement places an international organisation in a subordinate position in relation to a host State, and would seem to be both inequitable and inconsistent with the International Court’s contemplated capacity of an international organisation “to maintain its rights by bringing international claims”. Although the bringing of an international claim, absent prior agreement, is still dependent on the prior mutual consent of the parties to a dispute, a State that unilaterally imposes restrictions on an organisation or its personnel, claiming that right under the Vienna Convention or general international law, and refuses the request of the international organisation to subject that action to impartial third party review, might well be considered to be skirting legality. Within the United Nations framework it has become a matter of common form for immunities agreements to contain provision for international judicial settlement or arbitration in the event of any disagreement concerning their interpretation or application arising between a government and an international organisation. The inclusion of a clause providing for international judicial settlement or arbitration is also a normal feature of headquarters and host State agreements.21

21

Jenks explains the need for reference of disputes regarding an organisation’s immunities to international resolution: “The essence of the matter is that the rule of law is placed in an international setting in which an equilibrium of all the factors in play can be reached rather than in a purely national setting in which purely local influences may determine and distort the outcome … Whether any particular immunity is desirable and necessary … in order to guarantee … freedom and independence from unilateral interference or control by particular governments … is a question of judgement rather than of principle”, op. cit. note 9 above, p. 26. 113


Most international organisations are likely to have included compulsory dispute settlement procedures in their agreements with host States, and may invoke them in appropriate circumstances. However, even where prudence has prompted the inclusion of such a clause, its application may be effectively discouraged by political pressures indicating that the host State would consider recourse to those procedures to be an unfriendly act, portending retaliation, which might be better avoided.22

V. The International Law Commission and the Topic “Relations between States and International Organizations” It was during the General Assembly’s Thirteenth Session in 1958 that the Representative of France in the Sixth Committee, when discussing the International Law Commission’s final report on diplomatic intercourse and immunities, proposed that the Commission be requested to study the subject of relations between States and international organisations. He pointed out that the development of international organisations had increased the number and scope of the legal problems arising out of relations between the organisations and States, and that these problems had only partially been solved by special conventions governing their privileges and immunities. It was necessary, he stressed, not only to codify generally recognised provisions of those special conventions but also to work out general principles which would serve as a basis for the progressive development of international law in the field. In 1962, the Commission placed “Relations between States and International Organizations” on its agenda, and appointed Mr Abdullah El-Erian as Special Rapporteur on the subject. Having considered the scope and method of treatment of the subject proposed by him, the Commission decided to take up for immediate study that part of the subject that dealt with the status, privileges and immunities of representatives of States to international organisations. Left for later consideration was what came to be known as the “second part of the topic”, dealing with the status, privileges and immunities of international organisations, their officials, experts and other persons engaged in their activities, not being representatives of States.

22

Assistance to international organisations in the matter of dispute settlement may soon be available from another quarter: the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations. Concluded in 1986 on the basis of draft articles elaborated by the International Law Commission, the Convention is not yet in force, but will come into force upon the deposit of instruments of accession by some five more States.

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It is possible that the first part of the topic was selected because it was less likely to give rise to controversy as it most nearly resembled the successfully completed work on diplomatic relations between States. It called for the elaboration of rules concerning the facilities, privileges and immunities of the permanent representation of Member States and of observers to an organisation located within the territory of a “host” State, as well as with Member State or observer delegations to conferences, the essentials of which would remain on the familiar ground of inter-State relations, and could be settled essentially through negotiation among peers. The final set of draft articles elaborated by the Commission dealt with State representation to international organisations having a universal character, to organs of such organisations in which States were parties, and to conferences convened under the auspices of those organisations. It was submitted to the United Nations Conference which met in Vienna from 4 February to 14 March 1975, and on 13 March 1975 adopted the Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character. Thirty years on, the Convention is not yet in force, lacking some five ratifications to make the 35 needed to achieve that result. The “second part of the topic” presented a more delicate set of issues, the complexities of which, though undoubtedly sensed, were not immediately focused upon: the facilities, privileges and immunities, not of States, but of entities that, although created by States, were to be subject to operation on a collective basis. The outcome of collective decisions determining the policy and activities of an organisation could not be predicted, depending as they would on a variety of factors, from constitutional provisions to the political influence of individual States or coalitions, and even the directives of international officials acting within the scope of their authority. The extent to which the organisation was accorded autonomy could be seen as a dimunition of the sovereign authority of its Member States. While such a perception could, in particular, concern a State volunteering to be “host” to an international organisation, that concern would be likely to be shared by the Member States as a whole, beset by common preoccupations concerning maintenance of control, each one being a potential “host” State. The International Law Commission commenced work on the “second part of the topic” at its 28th session in 1976, Mr Abdullah El-Erian continuing as Special Rapporteur. An initial series of reports listed issues to be taken up for study in stages. These included the status, privileges and immunities of the international organisations themselves; the relationship of the privileges and immunities of international organisations to their responsibilities; the responsibility of States to ensure respect by their nationals of their obligations as international officials; the legal capacity of international organisations in both national and international law; the proceedings of committees on host country relations, such as that functioning at the Headquarters of the United Nations; the relationship

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between the scope of privileges and immunities of international organisations and their particular functions and objectives; and the special position and regulatory functions of international organisations established for operational and commercial activities, and the difficulty of applying to such organisations the general rules on privileges and immunities. Upon the resignation of Mr Abdullah El-Erian as Special Rapporteur for the topic, the Commission appointed Mr Leonardo Diaz-Gonzalez to succeed him, and, with the approval of the General Assembly, continued work on the second part of the topic. The Special Rapporteur presented six reports, the fourth, fifth and sixth of which contained a total of some 22 draft articles. The draft articles in the fourth and fifth reports dealt with the legal personality of an international organisation, its property, funds and assets, archives, publications and communications facilities. In the sixth report the Special Rapporteur reached the thorny subject of the fiscal immunities of international organisations and their exemption from customs duties. But the project had run its course, and as the reports reached areas that required States to grant immunities to international organisations and their personnel and touched upon restraints of a State’s right to levy duties and taxes on an organisation and its personnel, support in the General Assembly for continuation of the work seemed to fail. The Commission itself remarked the slow pace of ratification of the 1975 Convention which had dealt with the “first part of the topic”, and noted that the passage of time had failed to bring any sign of increased acceptance of that Convention. Accordingly, the Commission decided at its session in 1991 not to pursue the “second part of the topic” for the time being,23 and the General Assembly at its 47th Session in 1992 endorsed that decision.24

VI. Conclusion The current practice of some States in according treatment to international organisations and their personnel by applying to them, by analogy, the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which deals exclusively with diplomatic missions exchanged between States, and the staff of such missions, calls for strained interpretation of that Convention’s text, and produces results that are unfair to the former. Although the diplomatic mission of a sending State and its staff may bear a superficial resemblance to an international organisation

23

The work of the International Law Commission on the “first” and “second” parts of the topic Relations between States and International Organizations is contained in successive volumes of the ILCYB, Vol. II (Part 1) from the years 1971-1991.

24

UNGA Res. 47/33 of 25 November 1992.

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and its staff, unfairness results from failure to take account of fundamental differences between the aims and purposes of the institutions concerned, and the nature of the functions and motivations of their personnel. Such differences result, for example, in differences in the duration of stay of the staff concerned: a member of the diplomatic staff of a foreign diplomatic mission would only in exceptional circumstances be expected to remain in a receiving State for more than four or five years, whereas a member of an international organisation may stay much longer, possibly for the duration of an entire career of say 20-30 years. The status, as well as the fiscal and other immunities accorded to the staff of organisations would be expected to continue at least as long as their employment in that capacity should last, even if restrictions were to be placed on “diplomats proper”. Unilateral limitation of the duration of the status, facilities or immunities of organisation staff merely as a reflection of similar limitations imposed on the staff of diplomatic missions would not be in accordance with principle, or the legitimate expectations of the organisation. That dispute settlement procedures should be open to international organisations is also mandatory, since they cannot have access to the dispute resolution mechanism of the 1961 Vienna Convention, which a host State may assume the right to interpret unilaterally. To deprive an organisation of access to independent and impartial resolution of disputes would be deliberately to place it in a subordinate position, and one that would be inconsistent with its possession of the competence required to enable its functions to be effectively discharged, as well as its recognised capacity to defend its rights through the presentation of claims. A possible course of action would be to have the UN General Assembly invite the International Law Commission to complete its work on “the second part of the topic” earlier named Relations between States and International Organisations. On the other hand, it is unlikely that States represented in the Sixth Committee (all of whom are actual or potential “host States”, and thus might be disinclined to support measures that might appear to restrict the scope of the control exercised by States over their constructs) would alter the Committee’s 1992 conclusion that the importance of the “second part of the topic” had declined to the extent that consideration of it could be postponed indefinitely. In order to persuade State representatives that application of the 1961 Vienna Convention by analogy to international organisations and their personnel could produce unwarranted consequences unfair to the latter, besides placing them in a subordinate position without assured recourse to impartial dispute settlement mechanisms, it may be useful for a lead organisation, such as the United Nations, to undertake a comprehensive study of the needs and interests of intergovernmental organisations and their staff as distinct from those of States and their bilaterally accredited diplomatic missions and their personnel, with a view to determining the quality of treatment including a range of immunities

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and fiscal exemptions, to which the former ought to be entitled. The study could be based on terms of reference prepared by an expert group drawn from intergovernmental organisations of a range of types,25 and would clearly set forth the rationale for according such organisations and their staff a special status, as well as fiscal and other immunities. It should demonstrate as far as possible that such treatment does not comprise “privileges” to be “enjoyed”, but rather measures intended to ensure to the organisation and its staff the independence necessary for the proper performance of their functions, measures that are to be solemnly accepted and scrupulously observed.26 The study could demonstrate that those measures take into account the costs, both material and social, to foreign staff from having to live, work and perhaps raise a family away from a familiar home environment; and equally, that those costs are known and presumably accommodated, by a “host” State, whose restraint, exemplified by fiscal exemptions and immunities accorded to the internationally recruited staff of an organisation, must reflect to some degree the calculation of economic advantages to it from the influx of a substantial amount of foreign capital, as well as the surge in domestic commercial activity generated by the establishment of an international organisation on its territory. The study could make clear that a host State’s undertaking to provide facilities as well as fiscal exemptions and other immunities involves a legal commitment that is not to be cancelled or changed, except after consultation and the mutual consent of the parties to it; that the interpretation of that commitment cannot be the prerogative of one party, but must be the responsibility of an agreed mechanism for the impartial resolution of disputes; and finally, that recourse to that mechanism for the orderly and amicable resolution of disputes cannot, rationally and in good faith, be characterised as an “unfriendly act”.

25

Virally, M., “Definition and classification of international organizations: a legal approach”, in Abi-Saab, G., op. cit. note 2 above, at pp. 50-66.

26

As far back as 1961 (the year of the Vienna Conference that produced the Convention on Diplomatic Relations) Jenks, op. cit. note 9, observed: “The contemporary tendency to curtail immunities which savour of personal privilege and can be regarded as no longer necessary under modern conditions has been reflected in a certain dislike and distrust of the immunities of international officials” (p. 111). Conceding that criticism of the grant of immunities is both natural and healthy, he notes that: “in order to command respect, such criticism should be well-informed: it should be fair, and it has an obligation to provide answers to the problems of institutional growth, vital to the creation of effective international institutions” (p. 169).

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PART II INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: FUNCTIONS, RULES AND PROCEDURES

REFLECTIONS ON THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW C.F. Amerasinghe

I. Introduction

M

y contribution to this collection of essays in honour of Thomas Mensah concerns the settlement of disputes in public international law. More specifically it is an exploratory chapter on the nature and essence of the judicial function in the modern international legal system. It is in a way an attempt to sail in seas that were uncharted until very recently. There has been a plethora of writings on the actual judicial settlement of disputes earlier by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), now by other tribunals such as the International Administrative Tribunals (IATs), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and also by arbitral tribunals, whether long standing, such as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, or more ad hoc or instantaneous. However, the idea that all such tribunals constitute a much needed exercise of a generic judicial function in the settlement of international disputes has not been obviously and commonly acknowledged. In my treatise, Jurisdiction of International Tribunals, published in 2003, I took a look at the development in modern times of international adjudicatory dispute settlement.1 Tracing the development of such dispute settlement beginning with arbitration under the 1794 Jay Treaty to, among others, the ICJ, IATs and the ITLOS, which are standing courts, I concluded that: “The observations to be made are that adjudicatory settlement of international disputes has become a common feature of international relations, has taken effective shape and has developed into one of the

1

C.F. Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction of International Tribunals (2003), chapter 1 [hereafter referred to as Jurisdiction].


II. International Dispute Settlement: Functions, Rules and Procedures

most viable means of international dispute settlement, even though it may not be the only one to which resort is had; and now manifests itself in two forms – the arbitration and the standing court – both forms consisting of a diverse content.”2 I also observed that: “On the arbitral side, developments resulted for the first time in the creation of institutionalized arbitration systems, such as the ICSID, which became popular and much used in the areas in which they were intended to operate, unlike the PCA which is still little used. The institutionalized arbitral system under the UNCLOS has also been used, though much less. Moreover, long-term arbitral bodies of an ad hoc nature, such as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal have functioned successfully, though they are not permanent bodies. This form of arbitration perhaps had its origin in the Claims Commissions of the nineteenth century but the modern phenomenon is of a more structured and sophisticated nature, almost comparable to a one-time institution, functions for a longer period and is of a broader nature in terms of jurisdiction. At the same time it is clear that the essentially ad hoc, one-time arbitration continues to survive and be resorted to on a frequent basis. Established or standing courts have become a common feature, whether they are permanent or ad hoc. Since the formal establishment of the PCIJ in 1920 there has been a permanently established or standing World Court, now the ICJ. But in addition there are other courts of a permanent and standing nature, such as the ITLOS and the regional courts … which may or may not be called courts, that have been functioning effectively. The ITLOS has a jurisdiction which clearly overlaps with that of the ICJ but this does not appear to be a problem of any dimension.”3 That having been said, the time has come to examine certain aspects of the judicial function in international law. My concern is with the essence of the judicial function, because it is only since the early part of the 20th century that international law has in a commanding and consistent way accepted judicial settlement as perhaps one of the most important methods of dispute settlement, even though negotiation and other non-judicial means of settlement still remain viable and important. In pursuit of a clearer definition of the judicial function, as now conceived, I propose to suggest here some areas to which attention should seriously be

2

Ibid. p. 34.

3

Ibid. pp. 33-34.

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Reflections on the Judicial Function in International Law

given. I do not intend to make an exhaustive study of the issues. That would be inappropriate in a book of this kind. There are four matters to which particularly I should like to draw attention: (i) the preservation of independence and impartiality of judicial organs; (ii) what may be termed the “separation” of the judicial function; (iii) the issue of inherent powers of judicial organs; and (iv) the issue of subordination and subsidiarity of judicial organs.

II. Independence The importance of independence and impartiality as of the essence of the judicial function was first noted by me in regard to international administrative tribunals in 1988 in Volume 1 of my Law of the International Civil Service.4 I further discussed it later in relation to judicial organs created by international organizations by reference to certain specific areas.5 Preservation of the independence and impartiality of judicial, including arbitral, organs is now a fundamental norm in the international legal system. The essence of the judicial power or function requires independence of every judicial organ in every sense. As I have stated in Institutional Law: “The essence of the judicial power and function requires independence of the judicial organ in every sense. The requirement of impartiality, for instance, as a quality is in reality only a corollary of the requirement of independence. It is unnecessary and unreal to regard impartiality as an unrelated concept distinct from independence in this context. Rather, impartiality should be regarded as an aspect, an important one at that, of independence in considering the judicial function or power, because the two qualities are inextricably involved in that context, whatever their abstract content may be and even if they may be considered separate for other purposes. Further, independence is of the essence because it is basically and in principle a guarantee of justice and, conversely, a safeguard against injustice. The feature of essentialness of independence cannot be over-emphasized. While impartiality alone as a corollary has been referred to above, the concept of independence includes any less general quality, apart from

4

C.F. Amerasinghe, Law of the International Civil Service, Vol. 1 (1988), at pp. 68 et seq. The treatise is in its second edition (1994).

5

C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2005), pp. 224 et seq. [hereafter referred to as Institutional Law]. 123


impartiality, which is relevant to it. Such qualities include, for example, competence, absence of conflict of interest, and integrity.”6 The concept of independence would require a proliferation of norms to be applicable to judicial organs as the concept is developed and contextually applied. In Institutional Law, I considered some norms applicable to judicial organs created by international organizations in order to preserve independence. Of late it has come to be accepted in one way or another that the independence of the international judiciary is important and must be protected. For example, the International Law Association had a Study Group examine the “principles on the independence of the international judiciary” and produced the Burgh House Principles.7 In the preamble to the document produced it was stated: “Recognising the need for guidelines of general application to contribute to the independence and impartiality of the international judiciary with a view to ensuring the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international judicial process; Having regard to the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985) and other international rules and standards relating to judicial independence and the right to a fair trial; Mindful of the special challenges facing the international judiciary in view of the non-national context in which they operate; Noting in particular that each court or tribunal has its own characteristics and functions and that in certain instances judges serve on a part-time basis or as ad hoc or ad litem judges; Considering the following principles of international law to be of general application: – to ensure the independence of the judiciary, judges must enjoy independence from the parties to cases before them, their own states of nationality or residence, the host countries in which they serve, and the international organizations under the auspices of which the court or tribunal is established; – judges must be free from undue influence from any source; – judges shall decide cases impartially, on the basis of the facts of the case and the applicable law;

6

Ibid. at p. 224 (footnotes omitted).

7

See the ILA internet website, <www.ila-hq.org/>.

124


– judges shall avoid any conflict of interest, as well as being placed in a situation which might reasonably be perceived as giving rise to any conflict of interests; – judges shall refrain from impropriety in their judicial and related activities; Proposes the following Principles which apply primarily to standing international courts and tribunals (hereafter “courts”) and full-time judges. The Principles should also be applied as appropriate to judges ad hoc, judges ad litem and part-time judges, to international arbitral proceedings and to other exercises of international judicial power.” The Institut de Droit international has also established a commission to study the status of judges. On the one hand, it is important to realize that it is not only standing courts which must be considered but also ad hoc courts and arbitral tribunals. On the other hand, it is possible that the detailed rules relevant to various tribunals may be different or qualified. The rules evolved will undoubtedly cover not only the tribunals or courts, their judges and the parties to litigation but also related third parties such as the creating bodies or organs, States and other individuals. A thorough study of the subject will require a wide canvass. The work which has already been done or begun is only a starting point. It would seem that the recognition that the independence of international courts and tribunals must be protected and secured has come to be established. What is required is in-depth study of how the protection of independence and of the qualities which flow from independence may be ensured.

III. Separation and Definition of the Judicial Function Not only must the independence of judicial organs in the international legal system be protected but the character of judicial organs as judicial organs requires be recognized and affirmed. The ICJ has frequently pointed out that in relation to its jurisdiction to give advisory opinions it cannot give opinions which would involve compromising its judicial character.8 This approach reflects the application of a broader principle, namely that judicial organs may not perform functions which are not in keeping with their judicial character. The principle limits the jurisdiction of tribunals but goes further so as to cover the total scope of their activities in settling disputes. The reverse side of the same coin is that

8

See Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction, note 1, pp. 527 et seq. 125


the functions of a tribunal may not be so limited that it is unable successfully or fully to perform its judicial functions. These two areas concerned with the essence of judicial character have not hitherto been examined in any detail, though the importance of the judicial character of a judicial organ, such as the ICJ, in the discharge of its functions has to be recognized by the Court itself. I have tried to show that in the context of consent as the basis for the jurisdiction of an international tribunal, the two limiting principles do apply. In Jurisdiction, I wrote: “There is a third principle which is relevant and which will be demonstrated to the extent that it is applicable in some of the chapters that follow. In certain situations, though the parties may have consented, at least ostensibly, to the exercise of contentious jurisdiction by the tribunal to adjudicate on the dispute, there are circumstances flowing from general norms of international law relating to jurisdiction which may render this consent ineffective, if the norms are successfully applied. This is the principle that applies, for instance, when the rule of non-exhaustion of local remedies may be invoked as a bar to recevabilité in cases where the rule is applicable … or when the rule in the Monetary Gold Case is applied to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction to settle a dispute between parties that have consented to the tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction, because on account of the interests of third parties there is a lack of compétence in the tribunal … The source of these principles is the general principles of law relating to the judicial function. There is a fourth point to be made. On the one hand, while consent is generally the basis of the jurisdiction of international tribunals, subject to certain inherent powers that they have, conversely, a principle is to be recognized that there are certain limitations on the contentious jurisdictional authority of such tribunals which cannot be waived even by consent, whether express or implied, between or among the parties to the dispute. Proof of consent to confer jurisdiction on the tribunal even though certain requirements are absent could not give the tribunal jurisdiction. There have been no specific decisions of tribunals, as far as is known, on the question of whether consent can cure the absence of these requirements, but it is clear that there are certain fundamental requirements that are so inextricably involved with the judicial function of international tribunals that their absence would be an absolute bar to the assumption of jurisdiction by such tribunals. Examples of such requirements are the existence of a dispute9 and the need for the claim to have an object 9

In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Preliminary Objection) (1924), PCIJ Series A No. 11, the question whether a “dispute” had been presented to the PCIJ was discussed

126


and not be moot.10 Further, the legal nature of the dispute may also be a fundamental requirement, irrespective of whether settlement ex aequo et bono is requested or not. Again, the source of this principle is to be found in a general principle of law applicable to the judicial function in international law. The last two principles flow from general principles of law pertinent to the international judicial function and are extremely important in the context of the general consensual basis of contentious jurisdiction. One of them limits the scope of consent in that it does not permit consent to enlarge a jurisdiction which intrinsically an international tribunal does not have on account of the nature of its judicial function. The other does not permit consent to derogate from certain elements of jurisdiction which an international tribunal intrinsically has based on the character of its judicial function.”11 Both the principles referred to above are equally important. They are in effect ius cogens. They are susceptible of further substantiation and exploration.

IV. Inherent Powers In Jurisdiction, I discussed certain inherent powers of international tribunals.12 That there are such powers has to be acknowledged, first of all. For example, there is an inherent power to grant remedies, to review judgments or decisions or to establish rules of procedure. Some powers may not be taken away by agreement of the parties or in statutes of tribunals, for instance, because they are conferred by ius cogens. Then there is an overlap with the powers referred to in the previous section, which derive from the essential judicial character of courts and tribunals. Nevertheless, there are examples of inherent powers which may be qualified by the agreement of the parties or express provisions in the statutes of tribunals, subject to the above.

in the judgment where it was found that there was a dispute. Had the Court found that there was no dispute as defined by it, the consent of the parties to adjudication would not have cured that defect. 10

The Nuclear Test cases, 1974 ICJ Reports at pp. 253 and 457, were dismissed on this ground as was the Northern Cameroons case, 1963 ICJ Reports at p. 38. These limitations inherent in the judicial function are discussed further in Jurisdiction, note 1, chapter 7.

11

Amerasinghe, ibid. pp. 99-100. The “separation” of the judicial function in certain national systems was discussed by me in: The Doctrines of Sovereignty and Separation of Powers in the Law of Ceylon (1970) pp. 185 et seq.

12

Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction, note 1, passim. 127


As an example of inherent powers may be taken the granting of remedies. In Jurisdiction, after an examination of the cases, I concluded: “that there is inherent jurisdiction of some kind, deriving from the judicial function, is evidenced in part by the conduct of tribunals in interpreting the express terms of constitutive and jurisdictional instruments by reference to inherent jurisdiction, whether explicitly or impliedly, to cover what is not expressly mentioned. But more importantly the ICJ has explicitly made statements supporting the view that there is some inherent jurisdiction in regard to remedies deriving from a grant of jurisdiction to settle a dispute on the merits. … It would appear that both in arbitral jurisprudence and in the jurisprudence of the PCIJ and ICJ there is no indication that any of the forms of remedy … is, as such, outside the jurisdiction of tribunals. In principle all of these remedies are within their jurisdiction, in the absence of provision in the jurisdictional instruments to the contrary. That jurisdiction is inherent to the extent that such forms of remedy are not provided for expressly in the jurisdictional instruments. This applies both to arbitration and to standing courts. … Basically tribunals have as wide an inherent jurisdiction in regard to remedies as is appropriate to their judicial functions as international tribunals. Clearly this inherent jurisdiction may in certain circumstances depend on the kind of tribunal in question but by and large a starting point for the consideration of the remedial jurisdiction of a tribunal is the wide scope of jurisdiction … This amounts to saying that inherent remedial jurisdiction exists, unless it is shown to be otherwise, whether because of the provisions of the constitutive instruments of the tribunal or the circumstances of the case. In this connection the statement made by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case (Merits) that ‘In general jurisdiction to determine the merits of a dispute entails jurisdiction to determine reparation’ holds good for all international tribunals. ‘Reparation’ here clearly means ‘modalities to repair the wrong’. There is no reason to restrict it to the award of damages.”13 The theory and concept of inherent powers are susceptible of further exploration.

13

Amerasinghe, ibid. pp. 397, 421 and 422.

128


V. Subordination and Subsidiarity An important question which needs to be asked is whether judicial organs, established directly by agreement among States or by organs of international organizations, can be subsidiary or subordinate organs. The ICJ addressed the issue in relation to the UN Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) in the Effect of Awards case.14 The Court was of the view that, while the UNAT was not a subsidiary organ, that, in a sense the UNAT was a “subordinate” body, insofar as it could be abolished by the General Assembly (GA) of the UN which created it. I submitted after discussion of the issue in Institutional Law that administrative tribunals are not subsidiary organs of their creating body nor should be described as subordinate.15 They are simply organs of a judicial nature created by the organizations to perform judicial functions. In the same way such judicial bodies as the ICTY and ICTR which were created by the Security Council (SC) of the UN are neither subsidiary nor subordinate. In effect judicial organs intended to perform judicial functions, whether created by organs of international organizations or directly by the agreement of States or in any other conceivable way, should not be described as subsidiary or subordinate, as this leaves the wrong impression of these judicial organs. While the issue may still be sub iudice, because perhaps the last word on it has not been said, there is a strong case for the above view based on the nature of the judicial function. In Institutional Law, I offered the following conclusions on this aspect, after considering the status of the UNAT as a judicial organ created by the GA of the UN: “The above discussion of the status of the UNAT as a judicial organ of the UN which addresses issues of subsidiary and subordinate nature has been confined to the UNAT as a judicial organ of the UN which had been created by the GA pursuant to implied powers under the UN Charter. However, the specific conclusions reached in that connection are mutatis mutandis of general validity insofar as they may be extended so as to cover judicial organs created by organs, not only of the UN, but of international organizations in general. This is not purely a matter of analogy. There is necessarily implied in those conclusions the broader general proposition that such judicial organs cannot be subsidiary (or subordinate) organs of an organ of an international organization (or of an international organization itself in circumstances, if any, in which there could be subsidiary(or subordinate) organs of an international organization itself). The latter proposition in turn flows from a general

14

1954 ICJ Reports, at pp. 61 et seq.

15

Amerasinghe, Institutional Law, note 5, pp. 261 et seq. 129


principle of law which is implicitly recognized in all legal systems, including the international legal system, i.e., that a judicial body (or organ) cannot be subsidiary or subordinate to another body or organ. The general principle of law, on the one hand, not evidently discussed or explicitly enunciated in the context of any legal system, perhaps because it is obvious, is not, on the other hand, denied or contested. Rather, it is implicitly recognized and applied in practice, which basically concerns the fundamental nature of organs or bodies which are truly judicial; and in essence requires them to be independent. The latter broad principle is, as has been seen, the basis of many of the conclusions reached earlier relating to qualities of the judicial organs being considered flowing from the fundamental or essential nature of the judicial power in any legal system. It is clear that no judicial organs, whether created by an organ or organs of an international organization or established directly or indirectly under an international agreement can in any way be a ‘subordinate’ or ‘subsidiary’ organ, i.e., even in relation to other organs or international organizations or to international organizations themselves. If the contrary were possible, the organ would cease to be judicial. Such is the nature of organs which are judicial. Thus, the characterization of such judicial organs as are the subject of this chapter as ‘subsidiary’ or ‘subordinate’ is not only totally inaccurate but equally irrational. They are, and are intended to be, simply independent judicial organs exercising judicial functions, as they should be.”16

VI. Conclusions The above four areas may be subject to further examination. It must be recognized that for the definition and success of the judicial function in the international legal system the issues raised need to be discussed and the problems created need to be solved. In short there is room for more work on the essential nature of the judicial function in international law.17

16

Ibid. pp. 269-270 (footnotes omitted).

17

I am planning to write a book on the subject in the future but this should not deter others.

130

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: A PROLIFERATION PROBLEM? Anthony Aust

I

t is an honour to contribute to a book celebrating the career of Tom Mensah, a man with long experience of solving the myriad problems of international law which States and international organisations have constantly to grapple with. In some quarters, it has been fashionable to say that the existence of today’s many permanent international courts and tribunals adversely affects the development of international law by encouraging its fragmentation. In short, their proliferation is detrimental to the integrity of international law. I do not agree. Our international legal system is quite unlike the supply of weapons. The weapons trade is totally different to that of dispensing international justice. Words should be used with more care. But, first, we should assess whether since 1945 all the new permanent international courts and tribunals in fact meet a need. Before then, there was only one court which could truly be called international. After the First World War, a Protocol established the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).1 The PCIJ began work at The Hague in 1922 and existed until 1946. Although (or perhaps because) it was the first permanent international court open to all States, many treaties provided for the option of disputes under them being referred to the PCIJ. In its 24 years, it decided 29 contentious cases and gave 27 advisory opinions. They clarified important areas of international law, as well as contributing to its development. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) replaced the PCIJ in 1946,2 though in many respects it built upon PCIJ procedures and jurisprudence. But, unlike its predecessor, which was not part of the League of Nations, the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.3 However, given its role, other UN organs

1

6 LNTS 380; UKTS (1923) 23.

2

See <www.icj-cij.org>.

3

See the UN Charter, Art. 7, and the Statute of the ICJ annexed to the Charter.



leave the ICJ to get on with the job. With its seat at The Hague, it is sometimes even thought not to be a UN body. Generally, the ICJ has worked well. So far, it has decided over 60 cases and given two dozen advisory opinions.4 This may not seem a lot for such an important court. Although in the 1960s and 1970s, the ICJ decided on average less than one case a year, with the end of the Cold War, the number of cases has increased markedly. This was helped by the ICJ modernising its procedure and practice, so making it more effective. There are presently about a dozen pending cases. Most come to the ICJ under compromissory clauses in treaties, optional protocols and, sometimes, matching declarations under Article 36 of its Statute. Most are between developing countries. The Court has dealt with some very important issues of international law. On the other hand, in recent years its advisory jurisdiction has been sought (and given) in some matters which were essentially political, such as the legality of the use of nuclear weapons5 and of the Wall being built by Israel.6 These were matters on which the ICJ should perhaps have declined to advise. The way in which it dealt in the Wall case with the vital issue of self-defence, shows how advisory opinions can be of dubious value, both legally and politically. If we did not have an ICJ, we would be the poorer. Subject to its being given jurisdiction by the States in dispute, it has competence to decide any international legal dispute. Other permanent international courts have more limited jurisdiction, being restricted to particular areas of international law or having jurisdiction over a more limited number of States. In the late 1980s there was a Scandinavian proposal that there should be a permanent international tribunal to decide environmental disputes between States.7 Fortunately, it came to nothing. I say, fortunately, because there is nothing which can be truly called an environmental dispute. Such disputes inevitably raise many other issues of international law, not just those relating to environmental treaties. They involve also legal issues of economic or commercial importance. This is amply demonstrated by Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros8 where, in the context of a bilateral treaty, 4

The parallel cases on Nuclear Tests, Fisheries Jurisdiction and the Legality of the Use of Force (begun in 1999) are, for present purposes, each treated as one case.

5

ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226; 110 ILR 163.

6

ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136; 43 ILM (2004) 1009.

7

At the time, Austria suggested in all seriousness that there should be a UN environmental peacekeeping force. Immediately they were given the name “Green Helmets”, and, in English, “green” also has another meaning. At that time, many members of the Austrian Mission to the UN were called Helmut, and so the proposed force soon came to be known as the Green Helmuts. Returning to the UN after some years, I was pleased to hear from present members of that mission that the nickname was still remembered with much affection.

8

Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997, p. 3; 116 ILR 1; 37 ILM (1998) 162.

132

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: A Proliferation Problem?

the ICJ had to consider legal issues involving both environmental and economic matters. It is also well illustrated by the dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom about the Sellafield nuclear waste reprocessing plant in northwest England.9 Although the case has done the rounds (the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, an arbitral tribunal, and now the European Court of Justice),10 it is not only about the possible adverse environmental impact on Ireland and its waters from the Sellafield plant, but British concern to protect a valuable industrial asset. Such cases are better decided by a permanent court with universal interests, jurisdiction and long experience. Since 1945, certain other permanent or semi-permanent international courts or tribunals have been established. They have either universal or regional jurisdiction, and are usually limited to specific areas of international law, usually by reference to a particular treaty or treaties on a certain subject. Some are criminal courts or tribunals. Some are temporary. Following the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982,11 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was established in 1996 at Hamburg. It has 21 judges and generally follows the procedure of the ICJ. Its jurisdiction is restricted to legal disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention and Annex VI, the Implementation Agreement 199412 and any dispute under a treaty related to the purposes of the Convention submitted to it in accordance with that treaty. For example, the Fish Stocks Agreement 1995 allows the parties to it to submit disputes under it to ITLOS.13 ITLOS began work 10 years ago. Despite being relatively unknown, and with a jurisdiction that competes with the ICJ and other established means of settlement, it has so far had 13 cases. All but four were concerned with fisheries, two being about provisional measures in connection with maritime environmental disputes, the other two on issues relating to bunkering of vessels at sea, nationality of ships, hot pursuit, use of force at sea and claims for reparation. The tribunal has delivered seven judgments and made 26 orders. 17 States Parties were involved. The fact that many cases which could have gone to arbitration have instead been referred to ITLOS may well be because a permanent court is not slower than an arbitral tribunal, or indeed more expensive. It is sometimes argued that

9

See R. Churchill and J. Scott, “The MOX Plant Litigation: The First Half-Life” (2004) ICLQ 643-676.

10

European Court of Justice, Case No. C-459/03 Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, [2006] ECR I-4635.

11

1833 UNTS 397 (No. 31363); 21 ILM (1982) 1261.

12

1836 UNTS 42 (No. 31364); 33 ILM (1994) 1313.

13

2167 UNTS 3 (No. 37924); 34 ILM (1995) 1542. See art. 30. 133


because the parties are better able to control the arbitral process, if they want a quick decision they can more easily direct the tribunal to finish by a specific date. But, any such advantage has to be weighed against the fact that, unlike the ICJ and most other permanent international courts and tribunals, all the costs of the arbitrators, the registrar, other staff and accommodation have to be borne by the parties (normally 50/50 whatever the outcome), in addition to their own legal costs. And, since an arbitral tribunal has to be constituted for each case and its rules of procedure have to be agreed, the mere setting up of the tribunal can a long time. In 1998 in The M/V Saiga (No. 2), the parties Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Guinea, after beginning arbitration proceedings, then agreed to take their dispute to ITLOS.14 The European Court of Human Rights is overwhelmingly limited to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950 between one of the States Parties to it (currently 44) and a person within the jurisdiction of that party. Perhaps the greatest single factor that makes the ECHR so effective is the right of individual application (petition) to the Court, especially now that applications no longer need the consent of the State concerned. There are of course other regional human rights courts. The American Convention on Human Rights 1969 established a Commission and a Court of Human Rights, based in San José, Costa Rica, that was inaugurated in 1979, and has been busy.15 The 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights established an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights,16 but the Protocol entered into force only in 2004, and so far has few parties. The Arab Charter on Human Rights 1994 is not yet in force, and it will have no human rights court.17 The European Court of Justice is the essential guardian of the supranational law of the European Community (EC, though more often referred to as the European Union). Each EC Member State has one judge, and usually cases are heard by chambers of three or five judges. The jurisdiction of the Court is basically (a) over claims by the EC Commission that a Member State is in breach of a Community obligation; (b) over claims that a Community institution has acted invalidly; and (c) rulings on points of EC law referred by national courts.18

14

120 ILR 143.

15

D.J. Harris and S. Livingstone (eds), The Inter-American System of Human Rights, Oxford, 1998; <www.corteidh.or.cr>.

16

See <www.africa-union.org>.

17

See <www.al-bab.com/arab/human.htm>.

18

For a short account, see A. Aust, Handbook of International Law, 2005, Cambridge, pp. 475-478.

134


Although one purpose of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is to negotiate the removal of restrictions to trade in goods and services, it also has the vital complementary purpose of settling trade disputes between its Member States.19 The WTO Agreement 1994 contains, in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, a sophisticated mechanism for dealing with disputes between Member States. Despite its misleading name, the Understanding is an integral part of the WTO Agreement and thus legally binding on all Members. The method of settlement is by panels. Since they are more concerned with the detailed facts of each case, their members are mainly experts in trade and economics. There is an appeal to the Appellate Body, which hears only legal issues and thus consists of international lawyers, who sit in threes. In its first 10 years, the Appellate Body has already dealt with some 50 appeals, and they are rising in number.20 Although not a permanent court as such, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT)21 has had a long shelf life. Between 1979 and 1981, Iran held 52 US nationals hostage22 and expropriated US property. The United States responded by freezing Iranian assets. Iran also had claims against the United States. To deal with the many and complex claims, the Tribunal was established by the so-called Algiers Accords 1981.23 The Tribunal’s nine judges, three appointed each by Iran and the United States and three by those six, usually sit in chambers of three. They apply public international law and private international law, as appropriate. By April 2006 there had been 600 final awards, totalling over USD 2,000,000,000 for US claimants, and over USD 1,000,000,000 for Iranian claimants. In addition to these civil bodies, a number of international criminal courts and tribunals have been established. At first, the United Kingdom was sceptical at the practicality of the proposal for an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It remembered all the advantages which the Nuremburg Tribunal had had, especially physical custody by the Allied Powers of most of

19

33 ILM (1994) 1144. For a concise account, see Aust, ibid. pp. 382-387. For the Agreement, and all other agreements making up the WTO and all other relevant documents, access: <www.wto.org>. See also, M. Matsushita, T. Schoenbaum and P. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organisation: Law, Practice and Policy, Oxford, 2003.

20

See the WTO’s own A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, Cambridge, 2004; D. Palmeter and P. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organisation, 2nd edn, Cambridge, 2004, and The WTO Dispute Settlement Reports, Cambridge, 1996.

21

See <www.iusct.org>. See G. Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Oxford, 1996; and the over 33 Volumes of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports (Iran-US CTR), from 1981 onwards.

22

See the US Consular and Diplomatic Staff in Tehran, ICJ Reports 1980, p. 3; 61 ILR 502.

23

See <www.iusct.org>, 1 Iran-US CTR 3 or 20 ILM (1981) 223. 135


the alleged offenders and the crucial documentary evidence. It also could easily call witnesses. The ICTY, established in 1993 at The Hague, would have none of these advantages. But, for once, the United Kingdom was quite wrong. The ICTY has proved to be a success, and was followed in 1994 by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), located at Kigali. As international criminal tribunals, they have had to rule on difficult and important points of international law. Although the Trial Chambers have to decide on the law initially, there is an appeal from both Tribunals to the ICTY Appeals Chamber. There is also the Sierra Leone Special Court set up in 2002, located in Freetown, which is joint venture in criminal justice by Sierra Leone and the United Nations.24 Although the Court is essentially a national body and sits, usually, at Freetown, the UN’s involvement, and the fact that the Court’s jurisdiction is over offences contrary to common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 1949, Additional Protocol II of 1977, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, means that it enjoys certain aspects of an international criminal court. More potentially important is the International Criminal Court (ICC).25 Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC was created by treaty, the Rome Statute, adopted at a UN conference in 1998, and which entered into force in 2002.26 It now has some 100 parties. It is the first permanent and universal international criminal court, with its seat at The Hague. It has 18 judges, who must have practical experience of either criminal law and procedure or international humanitarian law or human rights law. For the moment, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction only with respect to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. So far no trials have been held, and it must not be thought that in future all major crimes of international concern will be prosecuted at the ICC. Because of the so-called “complementarity” rule the vast majority of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC will still be dealt with by domestic criminal courts. The chief value of the ICC is that when a domestic legal system cannot or will not deal with an international crime, the ICC may be available to deal with it. These international courts and tribunals, permanent or semi-permanent, have been described in some detail to demonstrate the real need for such new bodies. Neither the ICJ nor any other existing international body, would have been able to undertake their tasks. This was particularly so for the ICTY and the ICTR, although the advent of the ICC may have made the need for them unnecessary. We shall see. The ICJ could not have been given criminal jurisdiction without,

24

See the treaty at 2178 UNTS 138 (No. 38342) and <www.sc-sl.org>.

25

See <www.un.org/law/icc>. R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results, The Hague, 1999; W. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 2nd edn, Cambridge, 2004.

26

2187 UNTS 91 (No. 38544); 37 ILM (1998) 999; UKTS (2002) 35.

136


first, amending the UN Charter and, second, ensuring that their judges and the Court’s procedures were able to deal effectively with criminal trials. The need for the new civil international courts and tribunals has been amply demonstrated. It is clear that the ICJ would not have been a suitable body to decide WTO disputes or the Iran-US claims. WTO disputes require the highly specialised mechanism involving expert non-lawyer panels. Although the work of the Appellate Body might at first sight have been done by the ICJ, the appeals need to be heard by a body which is more attuned to the WTO system. There is also the time-factor. The ICJ is now a busy court with complex cases. It would just not be possible for it to handle also the work done by the Appellate Body. The same goes for the Iran-US claims. However, it must be admitted that sometimes a new international court or tribunal is unnecessary. The prime example is the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration set up in 1995 by the OSCE Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration 1992, which now has 33 parties.27 Curiously, it provides for compulsory conciliation, though the outcome is not binding, and voluntary arbitration leading to a binding award. The Convention was the brainchild of Robert Badinter. It is never easy to oppose motherhood, and so the United Kingdom took a very active part in the negotiations. Yet, the United Kingdom was never convinced that such a new body was needed, and so it is not even a signatory of the Convention. So far, the Court has not been used. Rather unkindly, it has even been suggested that ITLOS was not necessary. For many reasons it has not been as busy as one would have hoped. But as its particular strengths become better known, it will surely prove its value as a specialised tribunal. As the current President of the ICJ said on 29 September 2006 in her speech at the formal ceremony marking the 10th anniversary of ITLOS, the Tribunal has “built a reputation for its efficient and speedy management of cases and shown innovative use of information technology … the tribunal is already making its mark”.28 The main concern about the increasing number of permanent international courts and tribunals seems to be that they may decide questions of international law in different ways, so weakening its uniform application. There is not enough space to do a full comparative study of all the decisions involving international law. The present response to this concern will mainly give some telling examples of how the new bodies – especially regional courts – work in practice. No wise judge (international or national) wants to reinvent the wheel. He (or, increasingly, she) will seek to find out how a particular legal issue has been dealt with previously. An international judge – whether of a permanent court or sitting on an ad hoc arbitral tribunal – will naturally try to follow what has

27

1842 UNTS 151 (No. 31413); 32 ILM (1993) 557; <www.osce.org/cca/>.

28

See statements of the President of the Court at <www.icj-cij.org/>. 137


been done before, unless that seems to be wrong or has not done justice. He may even wish to advance the law. There are, of course, restraints on a judge, especially his fellow judges. International judges usually sit in threes, fives or fifteens. Compromise is therefore necessary. This can sometimes act as a useful restraint on undue judicial activism. The international law community is small, and its members constantly talk to each other and read each other’s judgments, books and articles. All professionals value the esteem of their colleagues as much as that of their spouses (sometimes even more), and try not to do things for which they might be heavily criticised by their peers. Although this may come as a surprise to law students, judges are human beings. International judges talk not only with to their own immediate judicial colleagues, but as much as possible with the judges of other international courts, as well as with jurists who sit on arbitral tribunals.29 If we look at the record of those least “international” of international courts, by which I mean the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, it becomes clear that, although their judges are mostly not experts in international law, they take that specialised area seriously. The judges of the Court of Justice are helped considerably by the scholarship of the advocates-general. When a question concerns the interpretation of their constituent instruments, such courts naturally take a more teleological approach, which requires consideration of the object and purpose of the constituent instruments. Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 expressly allows a court to take into account any relevant rules of the international organisation. The European Court of Human Rights has had to adjust to changes in society, while at the same time recognising that in certain areas, Member States have a “margin of appreciation” as to how to translate certain human rights principles into their domestic law. Given the special purpose of the European Community, its Court of Justice has had to develop Community law over its 50 years of existence. Yet, in other matters which call for the application of the normal rules of the law of treaties, the Court of Justice has shown itself keen to respect international law and international judgments, especially of the ICJ.30 In the well-known cases

29

See R. Higgins’s keynote speech to the annual meeting of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, “A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench” (2006) ICLQ 791-804. It is also worth reading for her realistic comments on the perceived problem of the fragmentation of international law.

30

See generally, P. Kuiper, “The Court and the Tribunal of the EC and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969” (1998) Legal Issues of European Integration, Vol. 25, 1-23.

138


of Paulson,31 Racke32 and Yusuf,33 the Court relied on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, and other multilateral treaties and judgments of the ICJ. In Racke, the Court held that the rules in the 1969 Convention apply to the EC to the extent that they reflect rules of customary international law.34 In Anheuser-Busch¸35 the Court applied the provisions of the WTO TRIPs Agreement. In its Opinion on the EEA Treaty, the Court, in considering the exceptional character of the EC legal order, relied on the normal rules on treaty interpretation in article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.36 In France v. Commission,37 the Court considered the definition of treaty in article 2(1)(a)(i) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations 1986, although the EC had not “ratified” that Convention, and the provision is the same in substance as the (same numbered) article of the 1969 Vienna Convention. But, the Court relied on the 1969 Convention (arts 60 and 62 respectively) in Portugal v. Council 38 and Racke.39 In France v. Commission,40 the Court had also interpreted article 228 of the Treaty of Rome by considering the authentic English, Danish, Dutch, French and German texts, as required by article 33 of the 1969 Convention. The judgment in France v. Commission is yet again instructive. The Court held that the European Community had concluded a treaty with the United States in contravention of internal EC rules governing the competence of various EC organs to conclude treaties. However, the Court did not claim that the treaty was not binding on the EC in international law. Given the complexity of EC internal rules, if the EC enters into a treaty in breach of those rules any internal irregularity is most unlikely to be manifest. It is therefore unlikely that the EC

31

Case No. C-286/90, para. 10 (United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea and various ICJ judgments; [1992] ECR I-6048).

32

Case No. C-162/96, paras 24, 49 and 50 (arts 26 and 62); [1998] ECR I-3688; 117 ILR 399; 37 ILM (1998) 1128; Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland), ICJ Reports 1973, para. 36; Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros, see note 8.

33

Case No. T-306/01; para. 233 (arts 25 and 103 of the UN Charter, art. 30 of the Vienna Convention, and the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgement (ICJ Reports 1984, para. 107) and Lockerbie (ICJ Reports (1992), paras 39 and 42).

34

Case No. C-162/96; [1998] ECR I-3688; 117 ILR 399; 37 ILM (1998) 1128; 93 AJIL (1999) 205-209.

35

Case No. C-245/02, paras 49 and 67; [2004] ECR I-10989.

36

See, Opinion 1/91; [1991] ECR, I-6079, point 14.

37

Case No. C-327/91; [1994] ECR I-3641; 101 ILR 30.

38

Case No. C-268/94; [1996] ECR I-6177; paras 26-27.

39

Case No. C-162/96; [1998] ECR I-3688; 117 ILR 399; 37 ILM (1998) 1128.

40

Case No. C-327/91; [1994] ECR I-3641; 101 ILR 30. 139


could invoke any rule of customary international law which might be reflected in article 46, whether of the 1969 or the 1986 Vienna Conventions. In 2006 the Court held that the EC had no sufficient internal legal base to conclude the EC-US Agreement on Processing and Transfer of PNR Data by Air Carriers to the US Homeland Security Department 2004.41 But, in paragraph 90, the Court recognised that the EC could not rely on its own internal law to justify not fulfilling a treaty obligation. It noted, however, that the EC could terminate the Agreement by giving 90 days notice, and so wisely gave the Commission time to renegotiate the Agreement so that it would comply with EC law. This has now been done. It is also unlikely that if an EC Member State enters into a treaty in breach of EC law this would entitle that Member State to invoke article 46. Earlier, in Commission v. United Kingdom, the Court of Justice held that a Member State could not enter into a treaty (in this case a new air services agreement with the United States) in 1977 which infringed existing obligations under EC law.42 But since a non-member State cannot be expected to know all the intricacies of EC law, the violation would not seem to be manifest for the purposes of article 46 of the Vienna Convention. When dealing with human rights issues, the Court of Justice has had close regard to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.43 In its more recent decisions, for example, Al-Adsani,44 that latter Court has shown the need for it to respect basic principles and rules of international law, in that case on the difficult question of State immunity in proceedings alleging torture. International law is still developing. Different courts may come to different decisions on the direction it should take. It is a mistake to think that every international court has to decide a legal question in the same way any more that the court of different States will decide the same issue in the same way. Even an important principle, such as the defence of superior orders, varies depending on the treaty being applied. Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter45 provided that acting pursuant to superior orders does not free an accused from responsibility, but “may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires”. Following on from that, article 7(4) of the ICTY Statute provides that a superior order does not relieve the accused from responsibility, but may mitigate the punishment. Yet, article 33 of the ICC Statute46 confirms 41

European Parliament v. Council, (Cases Nos C-317/04 and C318/04): see judgment of 30 May 2006. For the Agreement, see OJEU 2004 L 183, p. 83.

42

Case No. C-466/98; [2002] ECR I-9427.

43

See Roquette-Frères, Case No. C-94/00, para. 29; ECR I-9011.

44

App. 35763/97; 123 ILR 24.

45

82 UNTS 279 (No. 251).

46

2187 UNTS 91 (No. 38544); 37 ILM (1998) 999.

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that an accused cannot plead in his defence that he was carrying out the orders of his superior, but, as the result of a compromise in the negotiations on the Statute, it provides for a limited defence in the case of, in effect, war crimes: if the accused had been under a legal obligation to obey the order and did not know it was unlawful and the order was not “manifestly” unlawful. A final point. It is odd that permanent international courts should now be criticised for possibly harming the integrity of international law. It is sometimes forgotten how international customary law was developed, and continues to develop. For many centuries, international law was developed by national courts; as it still is, though not always very expertly.47 And, for the last two centuries, international law has also been fashioned by ad hoc arbitral tribunals.48 Despite the advent, less than 100 years ago of the PCIJ, and later other permanent international courts, many cases are still decided by ad hoc arbitral tribunals and domestic courts. Unlike a domestic legal system, international law has no formal hierarchy of courts. Although development of international law by such means may seem unfortunate, law (including the interpretation of a treaty) is best done when a court or tribunal is faced by a set of facts. The monitoring committees of human rights treaties have great value, but their ex cathedra statements on international law can sometimes be ill-advised. Only by seeing a legal issue against its direct factual background can any legal body come to a sensible and just determination.

47

See, for example, Pinochet (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147; 119 ILR 135.

48

For the numerous decisions on international law by national courts and ad hoc arbitral tribunals, see the cumulative indexes to ILR. 141

PROVISIONAL MEASURES, OR THE DANGERS OF BEING TOO EXCEPTIONAL Julio Barboza

I. Introduction

I

n the practice of international courts and tribunals, including that of the International Court of Justice, there is a certain reluctance to indicate interim measures of protection, notwithstanding the very large discretion usually granted by the Statutes or arbitral compromises constituting those courts and tribunals. They consider such measures an exceptional remedy – which is correct – but sometimes they seem to utilise that exceptional character to justify their abstention from indicating any at all. We believe that, contrary to that tendency, the Order of 3 December 2001 of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the MOX Plant case reveals a wholesome lack of prejudice against provisional measures and a commendable example of respect for the environment of the Irish Sea and for the procedural rights of the Party requesting the measures. The present chapter will presuppose that prima facie jurisdiction of the court or tribunal in question has been already established.

II. The “Exceptional Character” of Provisional Measures “Interim measures always constitute an exceptional remedy” concludes E. Dumbauld in his classic work of 1932. Then he explains why it is so: “They derogate from the usual rule that a plaintiff cannot obtain relief until he has thoroughly proved his case, and all defenses and objections of his adversary have been heard and considered”.1 Dumbauld, however, mentions two counter-balancing considerations in the subsequent paragraph: 1

E. Dumbauld, Interim Measures of Protection in International Controversies, 1932, p. 184.



“Nevertheless realization of the fact that under certain circumstances delay is equivalent to denial of justice, and that a remedy not available until expiration of the time required to obtain a final judgment in the normal course of proceedings is no remedy at all, has moved legislators universally to institute remedies pendente lite. Administration of justice according to law thereby extends its empire and the scope of self-help is accordingly diminished.”2 It would seem that preventing a denial of justice and diminishing the scope of self-help are important objectives in litigation, and not altogether compatible with the sometimes extreme judicial reluctance to indicate interim measures of protection. Their being exceptional means no more than that they are based on different principles and have a different nature than other judicial decisions, for instance that they are not res judicata and therefore may be reversed at any moment pendente lite. It is true that special caution should be employed to avoid anticipation of the final judgment through a provisional measure, but it should also be borne in mind that abstaining from indicating one may have at times the same anticipatory though opposite effect. In the MOX Plant Order of 3 December 2001, one further motive has intervened besides that of preserving certain rights of Ireland, namely, that of preventing pollution of the Irish Sea environment, which is high in the scale of values of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) and of the international community. Similar considerations may be valid in other multilateral and even bilateral instruments: regional agreements include prohibitions such as the causing of “serious damage” of article 290 of the LOS Convention, revealing public order concerns of that particular community.3

III. Preservation of the Rights of the Parties – The “Irreparable” Prejudice Judge Taslim Elias thus summarised the objects and scope of interim measures: “(a) to maintain the status quo ante in order to prevent an aggravation or extension of the situation – such measures shall have the effect of

2

Id.

3

For instance, the multilateral instruments on the River Plate Basin (Cuenca del Plata), concerning all the coastal States of that great basin, fix a lower threshold of pollution than the LOS Convention: that of “significant” damage. The Statute of the river Uruguay, appended to the frontier treaty between Argentina and Uruguay, prohibits significant damage to the waters of the Uruguay River, a river which separates the two countries.

144

Provisional Measures, or the Dangers of Being Too Exceptional

protecting the rights forming the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court (PCIJ, Series A, No. 8, p. 6); (b) to preserve the respective rights of the parties pending the decision of the court (PICJ, Series A/B, No. 58, p. 177); (c) the measures should not be granted to cover anything beyond what is absolutely essential to ensure the effectiveness of the ultimate decision, in other words, nothing is to be done in the interim period which might render the decisions nugatory and (d) of course, the Court may go beyond the proposal of any Party and indicate what it deems most appropriate. In the South-East Greenland case (PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 48, pp. 287/289), after deciding to dismiss the Norwegian request for an indication, the Court considered whether it should make an indication proprio motu. Only rights in issue are to be protected by an indication, and there can be no indication in advance of the institution of proceedings: Polish Agrarian Reform case (PCIJ, Series C, No. 71, pp. 136/137).”4 These objects and scope, as expressed by Judge Elias, are closely connected with each other and altogether tend to prevent something being done in the interim period which might render the Court’s decision nugatory; to accomplish that purpose, the rights of the Parties must be preserved. Jiménez de Aréchaga, in his Separate Opinion in the ICJ’s Order of 11 September 1976 in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, states that: “The essential justification for the impatience of a tribunal in granting relief before a final decision on its competence and on the merits is that the action of one party ‘pendente lite’ causes or threatens a damage to the rights of the other, of such a nature that it would not be possible fully to restore those rights, or remedy the infringement thereof, simply by a judgment in its favour”.5 Nowhere in the Statute or the Rules of the Court, however, is there a mention to the “irreparable prejudice” implied in the reference to the full restoration of the Parties’ rights and explicit in numerous pronouncements by the ICJ. Article 41 gives the Court a very wide discretion; the Court has “the power to indicate … any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party” simply if it “considers that circumstances so require”.6

4

“The International Court of Justice and the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection”, in Gilberto Amado Memorial Lectures, Brasilia, 1998, p. 133.

5

ICJ Reports 1976, pp. 15-16.

6

E. Dumbauld: “Indication of interim measures is to be made if the Court considers (“estime”) that circumstances so require. It thus appears that a prima facie showing of probable right and probable injury is all that is required”, Interim Measures of Protection in International Controversies, pp. 60-61, para. 9. 145


The notion of the preservation of a right of the Parties, however, has been restricted, as decided in the Chinese-Belge case,7 not to any breach of a right in dispute, but only to a breach occasioning “irreparable prejudice” to the injured State.8 As a consequence, then, of the expression “irreparable prejudice”, which remained undefined, uncertainty and vagueness were introduced in the field of provisional measures, the expression in question being interpreted as meaning that only grave prejudice could justify an indication, as will be seen presently. This would also mean that the Party that is denied the provisional measure purported to prevent the breach of its right is obliged to accept a substitute for its original right, if the Court upholds its case and there is no possibility of restitution. Compensation may not make reparation to the satisfaction of the claimant, because strictly speaking, nothing can replace the return to the status quo ante. That is why restitutio has priority in the International Law Commission (ILC) articles on State responsibility and can be partially or totally replaced by compensation only if it is impossible or too onerous.9 The notion of “irreparable”, then, seems to be logical if taken in the meaning of the law of State responsibility, i.e. referring to a damage which does not permit restitution, the return to the status quo ante: thus, interim measures of protection would not be reduced only to cases of grave or important damage. However, those which are de minimis could be discarded by the courts. In the case of the Aegean Sea Shelf (Order of 11 September 1976), the Court had found that, only if irreparable prejudice was inflicted to the rights of Greece, was it justified in utilising its “exceptional power” to indicate provisional measures and that in this instance the reparation of the prejudice could be

7

Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 between China and Belgium, PCIJ Series A, Vol. I, No. 8.

8

Id. p. 7. In the French version it was: “ne saurait etre reparé moyennant le versement d´une simple indemnité ou par une autre prestation materielle”.

9

Article 35: Restitution A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution: (a) Is not materially impossible; (b) Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation. Article 36: Compensation 1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. 2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.

146


achieved by “appropriate means”, even considering that the expeditions under the auspices of Turkey would have affected the exclusive rights of Greece if the Court had upheld them.10 The Court did not mention what those “appropriate means” were, but, according to the ILC Articles, forms of reparation short of restitution are compensation, satisfaction, and securities and guarantees of non-repetition. Restitution being impossible and none of the last three measures named granting a proper reparation, namely the return to the status quo ante, the following opinion of Judge Elias may be found justified. He was in opposition to the idea that: “even if the Applicant has the rights claimed by it, they could be compensated for in cash or kind if the other side should ultimately be found to be in the wrong.” And considered that “This is not a satisfactory state of affairs. … It means that the State which has the ability to pay can under this principle commit wrongs against another State with impunity, since it discounts the fact that the injury by itself might be sufficient to cause irreparable harm to the national susceptibilities of the offended State. The rightness or wrongness of the action itself does not seem to matter. This is a principle upon which contemporary international law should frown; might should no longer be right in today’s inter-State relations”.11 A somewhat similar set of facts to those of Aegean Continental Shelf presented itself in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, United Kingdom v. Iceland (Order of 17 August 1972) where the Court took a decision contrary to that in Aegean Shelf and indicated a provisional measure to prevent “the immediate implementation by Iceland of its Regulations”, as it would, “by anticipating the Court’s judgment, prejudice the rights claimed by the United Kingdom and affect the possibility of their full restoration in the event of a judgment in its favour”.12 In the Nuclear Tests case (Order of 22 June 1973) the Court found that “the radio-active fall-out which reaches New Zealand as a result of French nuclear tests is inherently harmful, and that there is no compensating benefit to justify New Zealand’s exposure to such harm; that the uncertain physical and genetic

10

Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v. Turkey), Order of 11 September 1976, ICJ Reports 1976, paras 32-33, at p. 11.

11

Separate Opinion of Judge Elias, p. 29.

12

Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Order of 17 August 1972, ICJ Reports 1972, para. 22, at p. 16. Except for the fact that in the Aegen Shelf case the Security Council had issued a recommendation to the Parties in the general sense of not producing acts tending to aggravate the dispute, the situation regarding certain rights of Greece and certain rights the UK being affected by the doings of other States were somewhat similar and might not perhaps have authorised opposite decisions by the Court. 147


effects in which contamination exposes the people of New Zealand causes them acute apprehension, anxiety and concern, that there could be no possibility that the rights eroded by the holding of further tests could be fully restored in the event of a judgment in New Zealand’s favour in these proceedings” (emphasis added).13 The “irreparable harm” referred to here is related to the life or health, acute apprehension, anxiety and concern, of the New Zealander people. But if the Court accepted that the rights of New Zealand were eroded by the French violations, it is not easy to see why the violations by Turkey to the rights of Greece – if the Court upheld those rights in its judgment – were not perceived to have the same effect by the Court in the Aegean Continental Shelf order. On the other hand, a right may also be lost even if there is no “irreparable prejudice” of a material order to the injured State, and it may well be that the purpose of the State to start litigation was to restore its right, and not to receive a sum of money instead.

IV. Prevention and Precaution There could be no doubt that interim measures of protection are closely linked to the concept of prevention: they are indicated in order to preserve the respective rights of the Parties until the moment that judgment is delivered, that is, until a future moment. In general terms, prevention has essentially to do with the future and is exercised in order to avoid certain incidents of adverse effect or to preserve a situation or the status quo. The principle of prevention prompts action in order to avoid foreseeable damage, whether certain or probable. In environmental matters, as well as in other matters, the preventive principle “requires action to be taken at an early stage and, if possible, before damage has actually occurred … Broadly stated, it requires an activity which does or will cause damage to the environment in violation of the standards established under the rules of international law to be prohibited … It is no longer primarily a question of repairing damage after it has occurred. The preventive principle is supported by an extensive body of domestic environmental protection legislation which establishes authorization procedures, as well as the adoption of international and national commitments on environmental standards, access to environmental information, and the need to carry out environmental impact

13

Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Order of 22 June 1973, ICJ Reports 1973, para. 28, at pp. 140-141.

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assessments in relation to the conduct of certain proposed activities” (emphasis added).14 Obviously, the precautionary principle is itself very close to the principle of prevention, but is different from it. Certainly, there is a doctrine of precaution in environmental law, but it is uncertain whether or not the precautionary principle is part of the international customary law of today, or even exactly what its precise formulation would be if such a principle really were a part of the international legal order. The reasoning behind the precautionary approach is a reaction against a reasoning that inspired action in law, as Philippe Sands points out: “The principle finds its roots in the more traditional environmental agreements which calls on parties to such agreements, and the institutions they create, to act and to adopt decisions which are based upon ‘scientific findings or methods’ or in the light of knowledge available at the time. These standards suggest that action shall only be taken where there is scientific evidence that significant environmental damage is occurring, and that in the absence of such evidence no action would be required”.15 In any case, the precautionary principle or approach is based on uncertainty, in most cases scientific uncertainty, as to the causes of some environmental hazards, even though some strong indications pointing to certain causes may exist. “Uncertainty” and “well-founded suspicion” seem to be key concepts in the precautionary approach. International courts and tribunals would surely hesitate before invoking the precautionary principle as the only reason for their decision. Judicial wisdom may find it convenient, however, to adopt a preventive or even a precautionary attitude – whatever one may call it – by indicating an interim measure of protection when the possibility exists of the loss of a right of the Party requesting it, or in the case of the LOS Convention, also of serious damage to the marine environment.16 The Law of the Sea Tribunal had, in our opinion, a commendable preventive attitude by indicating certain measures in the Order of 3 December 2001. We do not hesitate in qualifying the Order of 3 December 2001 as a “highly preventive” attitude bearing in mind the foreseeably short period of time until the constitution of the Annex VII Tribunal and the relatively high threshold fixed by article 290 of the LOS Convention, namely “serious” damage. Although

14

P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 1995, p. 209.

15

Id. p. 195.

16

Or to the waters of a river, whether or not protected by a treaty. 149


not easy to quantify, “serious” damage is generally considered higher than, for instance, “significant” damage.17 In other words, in order to reach the threshold established by the LOS Convention, sizable amounts of pollution would have to be spilled in a short time into the Irish Sea – itself a huge amount of water, notwithstanding its condition of semi-enclosed sea. The Tribunal did well in adopting that cautious approach, particularly when it could have taken refuge in the lack of urgency and the “exceptional” character of interim measures of protection.18 The Tribunal indicated the following measures, pending a decision by the Annex VII arbitral tribunal: “1. Unanimously, Prescribes, pending a decision by the Annex VII arbitral tribunal, he following provisional measures under article 22290, paragraph 5, of the Convention: Ireland and the United Kingdom shall cooperate and shall, for this purpose, enter into consultations forthwith in order to:

17

In the Pulp Mills case, the Statute of the Uruguay River established the level of “sensible” (in Spanish), i.e. “significant” damage. In the Convention on international water courses originated in the International Law Commission, the word “significant” in the English version is translated into Spanish as “sensible”.

18

Whether or not it would have been wiser to indicate the measures requested by Ireland instead of those of the Tribunal is of no interest to the present analysis. The Tribunal, of course, was empowered to indicate provisional measures other than those requested by the Parties, according to art. 89, paragraph 5 of the Rules of the Tribunal. Other judicial bodies have arrived at the same result through their own decisions, like the ICJ. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Interim Protection, Order of 5 July 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, pp. 93-94; Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Interim Protection, Order of 17 August 1972, ICJ Reports 1972, pp. 17-18; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Interim Protection, Order of 17 August 1972, ICJ Reports 1972, pp. 35-36; Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, ICJ Reports 1973, p. 106; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, ICJ Reports 1973, p. 142; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 1979, ICJ Reports 1979, p. 21; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 10 May 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 187; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Provisional Measures, Order of 10 January 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, pp. 12-13; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, ICJ Reports 1993, p. 24.

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(a) exchange further information with regard to possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the commissioning of the MOX plant; (b) monitor risks or the effects of the operation of the MOX plant for the Irish Sea; (c) devise, as appropriate, measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment which might result from the operation of the MOX plant. 2. Unanimously, Decides that Ireland and the UK shall each submit the initial report referred to in article 95, paragraph 1, of the Rules not later than 17 December 2001, and authorizes the President of the Tribunal to request such further reports and information as he may consider appropriate after that date.”19

V. An Individual Right derived from a Collective Obligation: Possibility versus Probability of the Existence of a Right to be Protected Point 82 of the Tribunal’s Opinion deserves literal transcription: “Considering, however, that the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the marine environment under Part XII of the Convention and general international law and that rights arise therefrom which the Tribunal may consider appropriate to preserve under article 290 of the Convention”. The Tribunal, then, considered that certain rights of Ireland derived from the duty of cooperation among concerned Parties to the LOS Convention – stated in its Part XII and in general international law – to prevent the pollution of the marine environment, in this case the environment of the Irish Sea. The UK had not fulfilled its duty of cooperation and consequently one important procedural right of Ireland had been violated. Had the Court left the UK go ahead at its own risk, Ireland would have lost that right “irreparably”.

19

The MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS Reports 2001, Vol. 5, p. 111. 151


The question could be asked20 as to whether a subjective right of Ireland corresponds to that collective obligation imposed by the LOS Convention in its Part XII, particularly in view of the recent articles of the ILC, adopted as an annex to UNGA Resolution 56/83. We believe that the obligation in question is of the type of those of article 48 of the ILC text, and that it confers a collective right to a group, or to the international community as a whole, protecting a collective interest. By the mere fact of belonging to that group, or to the international community,21 all Member States have certain rights, namely, to invoke the responsibility of the State committing the wrongful act, to request (a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition; and (b) reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. Naturally, article 48 is no more than a proposition of the General Assembly to the international community within the framework of codification of the law of State responsibility, but is compatible with the logic of present day international law. “Article 48 attributes a collective right to a group, which has no legal personality and cannot act as a centralised group in international law. There is no other way, in order for that legal protection of the collective interest to work, than to invest each member of the group with a subjective right of identical content as the one protecting the collective interest. That grants each member of the group a procedural right of action so that the collective right may be enforced by each one of them

20

As did Judge Wolfrum in his Separate Opinion.

21

Article 48: Invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured State 1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) The obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. 2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from the responsible State: (a) Cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in accordance with article 30; and (b) Performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. 3. The requirements for the invocation of responsibility by an injured State under articles 43, 44 and 45 apply to an invocation of responsibility by a State entitled to do so under paragraph 1.

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acting uti singuli. These are mechanisms typical of international law, a decentralized legal order”.22 The provisional measure ordered by the Tribunal protected what the Tribunal considered were the real rights of Ireland. That protective intention is easily deduced from the above-transcribed point 82 of the Tribunal’s opinion, particularly from its last phrase, where article 290 of the Convention is mentioned. We consider that the Tribunal took a wise decision: the omission of the duties derived from cooperation could have lead to the possibility of continuation of activities illegally polluting the marine environment. The continuation of an illegal situation is a scandal that should be avoided, particularly once a judicial instance has been seized of the case. The existence of Ireland’s rights, moreover, did not need to be demonstrated through complete evidence. Speaking of interim measures of protection, the word “possibility” should be used in relation with the existence of a right to be protected instead of “probability”. The latter word may be quantified by adjectives like “high” or “low”. “Possibility” is more reluctant to quantification; it refers to something that simply may happen. Judge Shahabudeen, in his Separate Opinion in the Great Belt case, stated that: “Also, in measuring the danger of prejudgment, it has to be borne in mind that what the Court is considering is not whether the right sought to be preserved definitively exists, but whether the requesting State has shown any possibility of its existence. As general judicial experience shows, that distinction is not artificial, it is real. Certainly, a finding that such a possibility exists clearly falls short of constituting an interim judgment. … What is important is that enough material should be presented to demonstrate the possibility of existence of the right sought to be protected” (emphasis added).23 The Separate Opinion of Judge Bennouna in the case of Pulp Mills on the Uruguay River points in the same direction: “La Cour ne devait-elle pas saisir cette occasion et se demander si, dans certaines circonstances, elle n’est pas tenue d’examiner prima facie l’existence du droit en cause; d’autant plus que cette question a divisé jusqu’à présent les juges et la doctrine?”24 To Judge Mensah, it is sufficient that “the rights

22

Id. pp. 14-21 for a more complete development of this subject.

23

Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabudeen, Case Concerning Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991, ICJ Reports 1991, pp. 12 et seq., at p. 30.

24

Separate Opinion of Judge Bennouna, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iau/iauframe.htm>, at para. 5. Judge Bennouna himself directs our attention to the Opinion just quoted of Judge Shahabudeen by saying: “Voir 153


of one or other of the parties might be prejudiced without the prescription of these measures, i.e. if there is a credible possibility that such prejudice of rights might occur” (emphasis added).25 Later on, he mentions “a reasonable possibility”.26

VI. The Nature of the Right Violated The nature of the allegedly violated right is also to be considered. The breach of a procedural right sometimes has an irrevocable character: the Party alleging such a breach may never have the opportunity of exercising it. Besides, unless the court provides for a correction through a provisional measure, the Party accused of violating the procedure has an advantage over the other Party. In the MOX Plant case, the Tribunal, by indicating a provisional measure, put the Parties in a situation of equality: they were directed to consultations according to the procedure imposed by the LOS Convention. By indicating an interim measure of protection, the court or tribunal makes the risk of loss fall on the Party allegedly breaching its obligation. It is true that in the end, that Party may not be found responsible for the breach, but abstaining from indicating the measure makes the same risk fall on the other Party, if its right were really breached. Why favour the Party who is prima facie responsible? It is perhaps the alleged exceptional character of those measures that has contributed to throwing weight on the wrong side, thus conspiring against the equality of the Parties. Had the Tribunal denied the indication of a provisional measure, and the other Party continued at its own risk with its alleged wrongful conduct, one of two things would have occurred: either the Irish Sea would have suffered serious damage through pollution, or the threat to its environment would have come to nothing. In both cases, judicial inaction would have betrayed the object and purpose of the LOS Convention, which established the procedural obligations of Part XII, Section 1 with a preventive intention. The Court would have substituted a procedure of its own choice, one following the logic of reparation, for that which the Parties had chosen of their own free will, namely one of prevention. Finally, the difference between prevention and reparation is not a minor one: as we have recalled above, that is why restitution was given priority over compensation in the law of responsibility. Moreover, the message that the Court is sending by its inaction may be interpreted, not in the sense that the Party acting at its own risk has to bear the consequences of its boldness, but rather as a clin d’oeil of

l’opinion individuelle du juge Shahabuddeen jointe à l’ordonnance précitée de la Cour du 29 juillet 1991 dans l’affaire du Passage par le Grand-Belt, notamment p. 29 et suiv.” 25

Separate Opinion of Judge Mensah, the MOX Plant case, op. cit. note 19, at p. 1.

26

Id. p. 2.

154


the Court encouraging that Party to go ahead, because at the end the judgment will favour its position. Moreover, the absence of an interim measure of protection would encourage the Convention members to try their luck and bypass the preventive procedure established in Part XII. Interim measures of protection, then, may have the effect of re-establishing the equality of the Parties by making the reluctant one comply with the procedural steps that the preventive character of the procedure requires. In cases such as MOX Plant, when a procedural right has the importance and nature of that invoked by Ireland, the Court or Tribunal must consider first whether such right really exists and, if prima facie evidence so suggests, whether a provisional measure would be in order to permit the injured Party the exercise of a right of which, otherwise, it would for ever be deprived.

VII. The Nature of the Prohibition In circumstances like those of the MOX Plant case, the Court had prima facie evidence that the United Kingdom had failed to perform some of the procedural steps required by the LOS Convention as previous to the authorisation, commissioning and functioning of the plant in question. The plant was to be the seat and, in part, the operator of an activity claimed to be the cause of serious damage to the marine environment of the Irish Sea. We believe that it is important at this moment to consider the nature of the activity or activities that were to be developed through and around the MOX plant, and according to the nature of those activities, also the nature of the consequent prohibition contained in Part XII of the LOS Convention. According to the claims of Ireland, two different types of damages may be distinguished. Some damages would be contingent, like those due to the accidental spills of radioactive material in the sea; other damages would instead be produced in the course of the normal operation of the plant or of other activities related to it. The former are caused by hazardous activities and may be licit if subject to an appropriate legal system, the latter originate in activities of noxious effects: they may be illegal in general international law27 and they are certainly illegal in

27

That such type of activities are forbidden in general international law follows from the fact that a general obligation of prevention of transboundary damage seem to emerge from decisions like those falling on the Island of Palmas case (“This right [that of sovereignty] has as a corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other States”, RIAA, Vol. II, p. 839, and a fortiori to protect the territorial rights of other States from activities developed within a State’s territory); the Corfu Channel case (“every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 22); the Trail Smelter case (“under the principles of 155


some multilateral28 or bilateral treaties. In our opinion, if damage to the marine environment produced by an activity trespasses the threshold of “serious” defined by article 290 of the LOS Convention, the activity causing such damage in the normal course of its development is forbidden by the LOS Convention. The notion of “cumulative” damage may intervene here; if by accumulation it reaches the level of “serious”, the source activity should be prohibited by the LOS Convention. In other cases, multilateral or bilateral treaties may fix a lower threshold, like “significant” damage in some South American instruments. Therefore, the expression “serious harm to the marine environment” in article 290 (and similar ones in other conventions) should only be compatible with a system whereby activities of harmful effects, i.e. causing harm referred to as “serious” in the normal course of its functioning, are prohibited.29 It should not be compatible with a system which exclusively established responsibility for reparation of the damage caused by each particular incident, thus simply setting up a tariff table for polluting the sea. Moreover, the fact that violation through noxious activities of the obligations prohibiting the level of damage established by a treaty could be interpreted as a

international law … no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence”, RRIA, Vol. III, p. 1963). It also follows from Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and from bilateral and multilateral treaties. See the course of J. Barboza in the Academie de droit international, “International Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law and Protection of the Environment”, RdC, Vol. 247 (1944-III), pp. 315-330. Günther Handl seems to agree as regards the existence of these two different types of activities. He poses the question as to whether certain types of transboundary pollution may be wrongful: “Instead, a conclusion to this effect may be suggested by the nature of the transboundary pollution. If it is of the continuous kind, the source State is likely to know or might be presumed to know of the transborder flow of pollutants, such knowledge will be increasingly presumable as States begin to establish environmental quality standards for the protection of human health and welfare and of natural resources … Thus, where States intentionally discharge pollutants in the knowledge that such discharge is bound to cause, or will cause, with substantial certainty, significant harmful effects transnationally, the source State will clearly be held liable for the resulting damage. The causal conduct will be deemed internationally wrong. Most cases of injurious transboundary environmental effects involve transboundary pollution” (see G. Handl, “Liability as an Obligation Established as a Primary Rule”, NYIL, Vol. XVI, 1985, pp. 58-59). 28

For instance, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, often abbreviated as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT).

29

An “activity” of harmful effects may be transformed by introducing some new device or procedure into an innocuous one. In fact, in the Trail Smelter case the activity of the smelter was rendered harmless by virtue of the new regime imposed to its functioning by the Arbitral Tribunal.

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material breach of the treaty, as long as it goes against its objective and purpose, points to the gravity of developing an activity of harmful effects within the framework of the LOS Convention.30

VIII. Conclusions 1. The interim measures of protection indicated by the Law of the Sea Tribunal in the MOX Plant case seems to have conciliated the exceptional character of such measures with the imperative of preserving the procedural rights of Ireland and the marine environment of the Irish Sea from serious harm. 2. The exceptional nature of those provisional measures is due to the fact that they are indicated only in prima facie evidence, a feature which is counterbalanced by their being merely provisional and necessary to preserve the rights of the Parties in dispute until final judgment. This objective is one of the highest in litigation. 3. The concept of “irreparable prejudice” as a necessary requisite for the indication of an interim measure of protection should be extended to cover situations where, without this indication, restitution (a return to the status quo ante) in favour of the prima facie injured State would become impossible or too onerous. 4. If there is prima facie evidence that one of the Parties to the litigation has omitted important steps in a procedure of a preventive character, thus violating the procedural right of the other Party, a provisional measure of protection should not normally be denied if requested by the latter Party in order to preserve its right. Thus, the equality of the Parties in litigation may be preserved and equivocal messages to the presumably responsible State avoided. 5. We find that the Law of the Sea Tribunal, by giving the interim measure of protection that has been commented upon above, has contributed to a better understanding of the nature of such measures.

30

Besides, of course, all the corresponding indemnities. 157

ENTRE L’ARBRE ET L’ÉCORCE (BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE): CAN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION DELIVER ON ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES? L. Yves Fortier*

T

homas Mensah’s illustrious career has been marked by his unswerving commitment to the advancement and promotion of an institutional, rules-based framework for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. His contributions in the areas of oceans development and environmental justice have resonated throughout the international system and left an indelible imprint on the law and practice of international resource management. As an architect of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and more recently the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes relating to Natural Resources and/or Environment, Judge Mensah has championed a greater consideration of the full spectrum of rights and interests at stake in international disputes concerning natural resources and the environment. His approach has fostered deeper reflection on both the limits presented by traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, such as arbitration, and their tremendous potential. A few years ago, Thomas Mensah warned that adjudicators should beware of exceeding the limits of their powers when seized of environmental disputes. In his Separate Opinion to the Mox Plant Provisional Measures Order, issued by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in December 2001, Judge Mensah opined on the challenges faced by arbitral tribunals in discharging their obligations within the jurisdictional limits imposed on them. He wrote: “[A] court or tribunal considering a request for provisional measures under paragraph 5 of article 290 has power only to prescribe measures

*

The author wishes to thank Alison FitzGerald and Renée Thériault, associates at Ogilvy Renault LLP, for their invaluable contribution in researching and writing this chapter.



pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal to which the dispute is being submitted. … … [T]he Tribunal should exercise considerable self-discipline to ensure that it does not deal with, or even appear to be dealing with, matters that fall outside its competence. This applies especially to the way in which it reacts to the evidence that may be submitted by the parties regarding the possibility or otherwise of prejudice of rights or harm to the marine environment, especially where, as in the majority of cases, there are wide differences between the estimations of the parties and their experts.”1 This statement, self-evident some may say, is nevertheless an important reminder to all adjudicators that there are limits to their capacity to shape the outcome of any dispute settlement process. The present chapter takes as its point of departure this tension between the jurisdictional boundaries of arbitration and the public’s perception of the legitimacy of the arbitral model in the particular context of international commercial disputes involving environmental issues. Notwithstanding the long history of arbitration in the peaceful resolution of environmental disputes, the suitability of the arbitral model in the specific context of commercial disputes where environmental regulation and policy-making are at issue is increasingly being questioned on the grounds that privacy and confidentiality – two of the hallmarks of international commercial arbitration – are ill-suited to a process intended to resolve inherently public disputes. The “public interest” critique has been raised in various fora, from mainstream media to national courts,2 and is neatly captured in the following excerpt from a 2002 New York Times article: “Their meetings are secret. Their members are generally unknown. The decision they reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a group of international tribunals handles disputes between investors and foreign governments can lead to national laws being revoked and environmental regulations changed. And it is all in the name of protecting foreign investors under NAFTA.”3

1

Separate Opinion of Judge Mensah, The MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, 3 December 2001, at 2.

2

The Council of Canadians, a Canadian non-governmental organisation, brought a constitutional challenge to the investor-State provisions in Chapter 11 of NAFTA on the ground they vested authority in arbitrators to adjudicate and determine claims involving the laws of governments in Canada. See Council of Canadians v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] O.J. No. 3422 (S.C.J.).

3

See Y. Fortier and S. Drymer, “Third-Party Intervention and Document Discovery”, (2003) 4(3) J. World Investment 473 at 474, citing an excerpt from a 11 March 2002 article published in the New York Times.

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Entre l’arbre et l’écorce (Between a Rock and a Hard Place)

This perspective, of course, is contrasted by an equally robust constituency of scholars and practitioners who posit that disputes involving natural resources or environmental issues are frequently purely business disputes that have been recast with an environmental gloss.4 One of the most vivid examples of the interplay between private dispute settlement involving natural resources and the public interest is Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Chapter 11 prohibits governments from implementing protectionist or discriminatory measures at the expense of NAFTA Party investors. Chapter 11’s provisions have been interpreted by arbitral tribunals to cover claims encompassing a broad range of State regulatory activity, including environmental regulation.5 The repeated use of Chapter 11’s dispute settlement mechanism by nationals of all three Contracting Parties stands in stark contrast to the absence of claims under the corollary mechanism provided by the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which was designed specifically to ensure that the environmental laws of each Member State are enforced. As the NAAEC’s arbitration clause has never been invoked, the increasing number of Chapter 11 cases in which environmental measures are scrutinised has led to growing public concern that these so-called “private” investor-State disputes will strip away the ability of States to legislate and enforce domestic environmental regulations and policies. Such concerns will surely not abate so long as investor-State or other forms of “private” arbitration remain the favoured method of resolving disputes between commercial and governmental interests. Nigel Blackaby wrote recently: “Arbitrators’ awards, even if unable to declare state measures invalid, may have a direct and significant impact on the state’s future conduct and the national budget. Taxpayers in states which are the subject of an adverse award may legitimately demand to know why their money is being paid out to disgruntled foreign investors. [These] criticisms should not simply be dismissed as the ranting of anti-globalizationists. There is some legitimacy behind the hyperbole and the legitimate complaints need to be identified so that they can be addressed.”6

4

See e.g., J. de Pencier, “Investment, Environment and Dispute Settlement: Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter Eleven”, (2000) 23 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 409.

5

Article 1110 of the NAFTA on expropriation of an investment is an excellent example. This provision has been interpreted as prohibiting not only the direct expropriation of an investor’s property, but the indirect expropriation of an investment through a State’s regulatory intervention. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Y. Fortier and S. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I know it When I see It, or Caveat Investor”, (2005) 13(1) Asia Pacific L. Rev. 79.

6

N. Blackaby, “Public Interest and Investment Treaty”, paper delivered at the Swiss Arbitra161


The debate invites sober reflection on whether arbitration is the proper forum in which to balance public and private interests, and (taking Judge Mensah’s warning to heart) whether arbitrators’ reluctance to act beyond a purely adjudicative role so as to perform such a function is likely to jeopardise the public perception of arbitration as a legitimate dispute resolution process in matters involving natural resources or the environment.

I. An Arbitrator’s Perspective on Commercial Arbitrations Involving Environmental Issues The starting point for my observations is that lawyers and arbitrators typically involved in the international commercial arbitral process are fully capable of arguing and adjudicating cases involving public law issues, such as environmental or resource disputes.7 I would temper this assertion, however, by a degree of caution in view of the expanding use of international commercial arbitration to resolve claims of a mixed public/private nature. A few years ago, Donald Donovan succinctly identified the potential implications of our increasing reliance on commercial arbitration to redress private disputes that turn on the consideration and interpretation of public law: “I continue to believe … that if international commercial arbitration is to play the critical role in the international economy of which it is capable, arbitrators cannot shy away from, and courts must be prepared to refer to arbitration, both private and public law claims encompassed by a valid agreement to arbitrate. … However, we must recognize that increasing reliance on international commercial arbitration to resolve disputes that might have both a commercial and public-law dimension will mean that a species of anational tribunal will be playing an increasingly significant role in the development and execution of both municipal and transnational legal norms.”8

tion Association Conference on Investment Treaties and Arbitration, Zurich, January 25, 2002, at 2. 7

See Y. Fortier, “The Principle and Practice of Arbitrability: Do We have the Ability to Deal with the Consequences?”, International Economic Dispute: A Wider Perspective, paper delivered at the LCIA Colloquium, Cambridge, UK (2004) at 12.

8

D.F. Donovan, “International Commercial Arbitration and Public Policy”, (1995) 27 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 645 at 657.

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This concern is reinforced by recent suggestions that a “global administrative law” is emerging from the complex layers of governance and decision-making on public law matters at the local, regional and international levels.9 For this reason, among others, it is essential that arbitrators and practitioners remain keenly aware of the changing landscape against which “private” or “commercial” disputes arise. They must also be attuned to the need for flexibility if the process of which they are the guardians is to continue to provide a forum for the resolution of disputes that are characterised by a clear public dimension. Instances of disputes concerning natural resources or the environment in which arbitration proceedings have been opened to the public, at least in some measure, are now numerous. The roots of this openness may be traced to early arbitration proceedings involving transboundary environmental disputes, such as the Trail Smelter dispute between the United States and Canada in the 1930s and 1940s. In that case, Canada and the United States agreed to arbitrate a dispute concerning damage allegedly caused to residents of Washington State by pollution emitted from a smelter located in Trail, British Columbia. The arbitration treaty concluded by the parties included a provision directing the tribunal to render a decision “just to all parties concerned” and permitting the tribunal to accept and consider evidentiary submissions from “interested parties”.10 The Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute between Australia, New Zealand and Japan (1999), and the MOX Plant dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom (2003), in which the pleadings and final awards were published and the hearings opened to the public, are more recent manifestations of the acceptance that in certain contexts the arbitration process must be transparent and inclusive if it is to be at all effective.11 In both cases, the parties themselves agreed to open the proceedings to the public. Increased focus worldwide on transparency in government decision-making and public access to information is leading to greater scrutiny of and challenges to the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings affecting governmental – and hence public – interests. I suggest that this is only natural. It has been suggested that a “public interest exception” to the principles of privacy and confidentiality should apply to all arbitral proceedings in which matters of public interest are raised.12 Such a uniform approach would likely be troublesome from a definitional perspective (e.g. how to distinguish “private” from “public” interests?),

9

See G. Van Harten, “Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law”, (2006) 17 EJIL 121.

10

See Convention for the Settlement of Difficulties Arising from the Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C., Ottawa, 15 April 1935, LNTS, Vol. 162, at 73-81.

11

See A. Tweeddale, “Confidentiality in Arbitration and the Public Interest Exception”, 2005 21(1) Arb. Int’l 59 at 61.

12

Ibid. 59 et seq. 163


as well as incongruous with the individualised solution that arbitration offers its participants. However, the idea comprises yet another manifestation of the natural and entirely appropriate yearning for greater openness of process within the arbitral model. The appropriateness of greater openness of process is considered by tribunals on a case-by-case basis. It is here that Judge Mensah’s warning in respect of jurisdictional boundaries is critical to ensure that the mere fact that the subject matter of a dispute touches on natural resources or environmental matters does not fuel public expectations that ultimately undermine the consensual nature of arbitration. The Methanex arbitration, a NAFTA Chapter 11 case has significantly influenced the manner in which commercial disputes raising public law issues are conducted. Spanning roughly six years, from the date the Notice of Arbitration was submitted in 1999 to the date of the Final Award in mid-2005, the case involved a ban imposed by the State of California on the sale and use of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), a gasoline additive produced by Methanex. Methanex complained that the United States had breached articles 1102 (national treatment), 1105 (fair and equitable treatment) and 1110 (expropriation) of NAFTA. The arbitration was conducted in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (the UNCITRAL Rules). All three claims were eventually dismissed by the tribunal.13 Several public interest advocacy groups petitioned the tribunal, seeking status as amici curiae and observers before the tribunal. Methanex and Mexico, which itself was an intervener, opposed the petitions. Canada and the United States contended that the tribunal had a limited power to receive written amicus submissions, but that it was inappropriate to accept such submissions in this case. In its decision on the amici curiae petitions, rendered in January 2001, the tribunal determined that article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Rules in fact precluded it from granting the petitioners access to the hearings absent the consent of the parties; nor did the tribunal consider that it had the power to order the parties to disclose to non-parties documents related to the arbitration.14 The tribunal subsequently decided that article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules, which permits a

13

See Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) Final Award, 7 August 2002.

14

Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae”, 15 January 2001 (Methanex Amici Curiae Decision). UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule 25(4) states: “[h] earings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise. The arbitral tribunal may require the retirement of any witness or witnesses during the testimony of other witnesses. The arbitral tribunal is free to determine the manner in which witnesses are examined.” UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), General Assembly Resolution 31/98, adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1976.

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tribunal to “conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate”, conferred a limited power on the tribunal to accept written amicus submissions.15 From a practical perspective, this ruling can be seen as striking a reasonable balance in the context of a dispute raising public law or public policy issues. It is also founded on a principled legal analysis of the jurisdictional constraints imposed on the tribunal. The issue of amicus participation was again raised in the Chapter 11 dispute between United Parcel Service of America Inc. (UPS) and Canada. UPS claimed, inter alia, that the use by Canada Post (a Crown corporation subsidised by the Canadian government with delegated authority to run the postal monopoly in Canada) of its vast infrastructure in aid of its non-postal courier services offered to the public (in competition with similar services offered by UPS) constitutes a breach of Canada’s NAFTA article 1102 national treatment obligations and its article 1105 minimum standard of treatment obligations, among others. The Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians petitioned the tribunal for standing as parties to the proceedings or, alternatively, for the right to intervene as amici curiae. The petitioners also requested disclosure of the pleadings and the right to make submissions concerning the place of arbitration and the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The tribunal determined that it had no authority to add parties to the dispute within the legal framework under which it had been constituted. The tribunal found: “In its own terms, article 15(1) [of the UNCITRAL Rules] … is about procedure. … It does two critical things. First, it gives the arbitral tribunal power to conduct the arbitration in an appropriate manner. That power is essential to the very process of dispute settlement by way of arbitration and might be thought to be inherent even if not expressly stated. Secondly, in its two sets of limits it recognises both the fundamental procedural rights of the parties to a fair proceeding, natural justice or due process, and the other particular requirements of the rules. … While the provision is plainly important, it is about the procedure to be followed by an arbitral tribunal in exercising the jurisdiction which the parties have conferred on it. It does not itself confer power to adjust that jurisdiction to widen the matter before it by adding as parties persons additional to those which have mutually agree to its jurisdiction or by

15

See Methanex Amici Curiae Decision, ibid. at paras 31 and 47. Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) states: “[s]ubject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case”. 165


including subject matter in its arbitration additional to what which [sic] the parties have agreed to confer.”16 The tribunal clarified that although it lacked the power to add a party to the arbitration, article 15(1) conferred upon it the power to receive submissions from petitioners for the purpose of facilitating the tribunal’s “process of inquiry into, understanding of, and resolving, that very dispute which has been submitted to it in accordance with the consent of the disputing parties”.17 The tribunal was of the view that, in doing so, the rights of the disputing parties would not be affected nor would the legal nature of the arbitration be changed. The tribunal noted that the proceedings should not to be equated with the “standard run of international commercial arbitration between private parties”, on the basis of which a limited privilege of participation, subject to the petitioners’ ability to provide assistance beyond that provided by the disputing parties, was granted. The final award dismissing UPS’ claims in their entirety was rendered in June 2007. Subsequent to the Methanex and UPS decisions, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) issued a statement on the participation of non-disputing parties in NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral proceedings.18 The FTC confirmed that NAFTA does not limit a tribunal’s discretion to accept written submissions from non-disputing parties.19 However, it recommended specific procedures to be adopted by tribunals in respect of amicus submissions. A three-tiered threshold must now be met by a petitioner: (1) amicus submissions may only address matters within the scope of the existing dispute; (2) the petitioner must have a “significant interest” in the arbitration; and (3) there must be a “public interest” in the subject matter of the arbitration.20 The FTC elected not to define “significant interest” or “public interest”, two concepts that are obviously critical to the determination

16

UPS v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) Decision of the Tribunal on Petitioners for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001, at paras 38-39.

17

Ibid. at para. 62.

18

Canada, the United States and Mexico have since issued general statements consenting to open arbitral proceedings under Chapter 11, limited only to the extent necessary to “ensure the protection of confidential information, including business confidential information”. See Statement of Canada on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, available online at <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/open-hearing-en.asp>; United States Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations (7 October 2003), available online at <www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/ asset_upload_file143_3602.pdf>.

19

NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing Party Participation, October 7, 2004, available online at <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/naftaalena/Nondisputing-en.pdf>.

20

Ibid. B(3)(d), B(6)(b), B(6)(c), and B(6)(d).

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of whether to grant amicus rights to a petitioner. As will be seen in the following discussion concerning natural justice in the context of commercial arbitration, the exercise of the arbitrator’s discretion in interpreting and applying the FTC’s recommended procedure regarding amicus petitions is precisely the context in which arbitral discretion rubs up against the limits imposed by the jurisdictional framework governing the arbitration. The Methanex arbitration has not only influenced the conduct of NAFTA proceedings vis-à-vis amicus interventions, it is resonating throughout the international commercial arbitration community. The Secretariat of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which has seen a significant rise in its docket of international investment disputes over the past decade, recently amended its Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) to bring them in line with the Methanex tribunal’s reasoning. Rule 48, which formerly prohibited publication of an arbitral award without the consent of the parties, now requires that the Secretariat promptly publish relevant excerpts of the tribunal’s legal conclusions, irrespective of party agreement. Rules 32 and 37 have also been amended to confer greater discretion on a tribunal constituted under the Washington Convention21 to allow non-parties to attend and observe hearings, and to file written submissions with the tribunal. The tribunal must consult with the parties “as far as possible” in respect of these decisions.22 Rule 37 also imposes constraints similar to those recommended by the FTC, such as confining submissions to the scope defined by the parties and requiring petitioners to meet a “significant interest” test.23 Shortly after the ICSID Secretariat issued its proposed changes, but before they were adopted, an ICSID tribunal constituted to consider a dispute regarding a water and wastewater concession in Buenos Aires issued an Order permitting the limited participation as amici of five non-governmental organisations.24 The tribunal denied the petitioners’ request to attend the hearing, citing the language of former Rule 32 according to which the consent of the parties was required. However, the tribunal determined – on the basis of both article 44 of the ICSID

21

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, done at Washington, 18 March 1965 (Washington Convention).

22

ICSID, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, available online at <www. worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf>, at 10 and 11.

23

Ibid. Draft Rule 37(2), (b) and (c).

24

Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. The Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005 (Aguas Argentinas Transparency Order). 167


Convention,25 which provides that the tribunal has discretion to decide any question that is not covered by the Arbitration Rules, and the Methanex decision – that it had the authority to accept amicus briefs. The tribunal articulated the following factors to be considered in a decision regarding the acceptance of submissions: (1) the appropriateness of the subject matter of the case; (2) the suitability of a non-party to act as amicus curiae in that case; and (3) the procedure by which the amicus submission is to made and considered.26 The tribunal noted that: “Courts have traditionally accepted the intervention of amicus curiae in ostensibly private litigation because those cases have involved issues of public interest and because decisions in those cases have the potential, directly or indirectly, to affect persons beyond those immediately involved as parties in the case. … The factor that gives this case particular public interest is that the investment dispute centers around the water distribution and sewage systems of a large metropolitan area, the city of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities. Those systems provide basic public services to millions of people and as a result may raise a variety of complex public and international law questions, including human rights considerations. Any decision rendered in this case … has the potential to affect the operation of those systems and thereby the public they serve.”27 The tribunal approached the amicus request from a rules-based perspective, referring repeatedly to the jurisdictional and legal framework underpinning its mandate. Interestingly, it also relied upon the award in Methanex, highlighting a growing tendency among arbitrators and tribunals to look for precedents outside the scope of the arbitration agreement or governing treaty in order to address issues of transparency and access. It is evident from the foregoing that progress is being made both on an ad hoc basis and at an institutional level to render arbitration a more transparent process. Lessons are being drawn by the arbitration community from various disputes in which advocacy groups have rallied to raise awareness of transparency issues. Concern remains, however, among arbitrators and parties alike that the core values of arbitration not be eroded by an environmentalist or public

25

“Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.” Washington Convention, art. 44.

26

Aguas Argentinas Transparency Order, supra, note 24, at 8.

27

Ibid. at 8-9.

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interest agenda that would replace party autonomy – which is of the essence of arbitration as an alternative to civil litigation – with loosely defined notions of either “public” or “interest”. In bringing these two perspectives together then, and giving space to each within an ongoing dialogue, it may be helpful to recall Judge Mensah’s central theme that respect for the jurisdictional boundaries of a body’s powers is integral to the global pursuit of justice. The observations that follow are intended to offer some insight, from an arbitrator’s point of view, into the role of international commercial arbitrators in balancing private rights and public interest in the arbitral process, and their capacity to do so. It is the view of this arbitrator that inherent in the arbitral model is a system of checks and balances that easily enable arbitrators to respond – to a degree – to demands for greater transparency and openness without sacrificing the primary consensual nature of this dispute resolution process.

II. Observations on Safeguards of Natural Justice in Commercial Arbitrations Involving Environmental Issues 1. Jurisdictional Boundaries of the Arbitrator’s Discretionary Powers The autonomy of the parties to select the rules that will govern the arbitration of their dispute is central to the arbitral model of dispute resolution. Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage have referred to the “extreme autonomy” necessary to enable parties to create an appropriate substantive and procedural legal framework within which their dispute may be resolved.28 In a purely private dispute, this is not problematic. However, international commercial arbitrators and arbitration practitioners are often called upon to deal with both public and private law issues. They are increasingly called upon to frame and resolve disputes that go beyond narrow commercial issues. This invites some reflection on the appropriate balance between the rights of private parties to a just resolution of the dispute between them, and the interests of persons or constituencies outside of the arbitral proceeding which are impacted by the public law issues bound up in the dispute. What is the role of the arbitrator in such a situation? The “balance of power” in an arbitral proceeding shifts from the parties to the arbitrator during the course of the arbitration.29 The parties initially confer powers on the arbitrator directly or indirectly, but the ultimate decision on the

28

E. Gaillard and J. Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, (The Hague/Boston/London: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 152.

29

See A. Redfern, M. Hunter, N. Blackaby and C. Partasides (eds), Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 4th edn, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2004) ch. 5 §5-03. 169


propriety and manner of exercising those powers rests with the arbitrator. This is an onerous burden.30 Arbitrators are guided in the exercise of their discretionary powers by procedural rules that define the scope of their authority. Specifically, an arbitrator’s powers: “are tempered by the parties’ rights of due process and the arbitrator’s duty to ensure that those rights are respected and enforced. As a result, the discretion accorded to the arbitrator to conduct proceedings … can be viewed as the source of what one authority has described as the ‘never-ending battle between the interests of justice and fairness on the one hand, and finality and efficiency on the other.’”31 Natural justice, or respect for the jurisdictional boundaries of the arbitrator’s mandate, further tempers the arbitrator’s exercise of his or her powers. Thus, notwithstanding that external pressures may be brought to bear on the arbitral model and, more specifically, on arbitrators in cases where public law issues are in play, a similar dialectic takes place in virtually all arbitral proceedings. Arbitrators are routinely called upon to engage in a balancing of these issues in order to achieve a just and final result.32 In the particular case of disputes concerning natural resources or the environment, arbitrators are called upon to exercise their discretionary powers not only with a view to the will of the parties, but also in a manner that takes into account the inherently public subject matter of the dispute. Indeed, in certain early disputes that may be characterised in equal measure as commercial and environmental, such as the Trail Smelter and Bering Sea Fur Seals arbitrations, a quasi-legislative or regulatory power was expressly conferred on the tribunal to design a regime that would permanently regulate the parties’ future conduct with respect to the resource at issue. This required the tribunals, as a facet of their respective mandates, to go beyond a determination of rights and obligations; it effectively shifted to the tribunal the burden of managing the parties’ ongoing relationships both with each other and with the resource in question.

30

Y. Fortier, “The Minimum Requirements of Due Process in Taking Measures Against Dilatory Tactics: Arbitral Discretion in International Commercial Arbitration – ‘A few Plain Rules and a Few Strong Instincts’”, in A.J. van den Berg (ed.), Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the New York Convention, ICCA Congress Series No. 9 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 396 at 397.

31

Ibid. citing E.D.D. Tavender, “Considerations of Fairness in the Context of International Commercial Arbitration” (1996), 34(3) Alta. L. Rev. 509.

32

For an in-depth discussion of this particular point, see G. Herrman, “Power of Arbitrators to Determine Procedures under the UNCITRAL Model Law”, in A.J. van den Berg (ed.), Planning Efficient Arbitration Proceedings – The Law Applicable in International Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series No. 7 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 39.

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In the case of Bering Sea Fur Seals, the United States had attempted to enforce protective legislation covering fur seals beyond its customary three-mile territorial sea so as to prevent British Columbia sealers from, in the US view, destroying the herd. After years of diplomatic negotiation, in 1892 the US and Great Britain executed a Treaty of Arbitration by which they agreed to arbitrate the dispute.33 In 1893, the arbitral tribunal rendered an award in favour of Great Britain. In accordance with the mandate conferred upon it under the Treaty, the tribunal then proceeded to design a binding regulatory regime for the protection of the fur seal stock. Unfortunately, the regime ultimately proved insufficient to avoid the decimation of the fur seal population in question, and the arbitrators attempted unsuccessfully to persuade both parties to impose prohibitions on fur seal hunting to allow the herd to recover.34 The Lac Lanoux arbitration also required an arbitral tribunal in effect to regulate the parties’ conduct with respect to the subject resource, though without the benefit of an express mandate. Lac Lanoux involved a 40-year dispute between Spain and France over the use of a transboundary watercourse. In 1956, the parties referred the dispute to arbitration and conferred a narrow mandate on the tribunal to determine the parties’ respective rights and obligations to use the resource under certain treaties between them. The tribunal rendered an award in favour of France. In its reasoning, the tribunal stated that, as the question before it related exclusively to the treaties between the parties, where those treaties were clear they would be applied. The tribunal went on to state that, where interpretation was required, it would be guided by international law, taking into account the Pyrenées treaties and the rules of customary international law as applicable to natural resources, such as watercourses.35 Thus, notwithstanding the absence of an express invitation to be guided in its deliberations by the particular resource in issue, the tribunal was able to anchor its reasoning in the arbitration treaty. It is important to reiterate that, in both of these cases, the tribunals focused on the resource at stake, rather than strictly on the rights and obligations of the parties as between themselves, because the agreement of the parties to do so was manifest or discernible in their agreement to arbitrate. This requirement 33

See Treaty between the United States of American and Great Britain, concluded at Washington, 29 February 1892, for the determination of questions between the two Governments concerning the jurisdictional rights of the United States in the waters of Bering Sea (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983).

34

The fur seal stock continued to drop to precipitously low levels, until Great Britain agreed to join the US, Japan and Russia in concluding the Convention on the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals on 7 July 1911. C. Romano, The Peaceful Settlement of International Environmental Disputes, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) at 146-147.

35

See Sentence du tribunal arbitral Franco-Espagnol en date du 16 novembre 1957 dans l’affaire de l’utilisation des eaux du Lac Lanoux, (1958) 62 RGDIP 79 at 99-100. 171


that the tribunal operate within the confines of the parties’ agreement is basic but it cannot be overstated. Its implications are obvious. Within the dialectic described above, it means that the parties have an unencumbered licence to define the scope of the issues in dispute between them as narrowly or as broadly as they see fit, and to empower a tribunal to address those issues – but only those issues. It is understandable in this light that where the nature of the dispute has the potential of affecting the broader public, and the parties invoke their right to define the issues in such a way as to avoid a public debate (and refer the dispute to arbitration precisely to avoid publicity), the public affected may well have forfeited reservations about the arbitration process. Does it necessarily follow, however, that the parties in such instances should be required to act in a manner that takes into account the full spectrum of “public” interests? Should the response to this question depend on whether a party is a State as opposed to a corporation? The Trail Smelter dispute offers an illustration of the practical issues associated with these concerns. In Trail Smelter, Canada effectively accepted liability for the conduct of its national; the issue before the tribunal was thus quantum. This strategic decision allowed Canada to hold its ground in what it perceived to be a coming war over potential environmental and health hazards caused by industrialisation along the US-Canada border.36 Canada also purportedly agreed on the application of US law rather than Canadian law because it was perceived to be friendlier to industry.37 In other words, Canada accepted that it was liable for environmental damage caused by the Trail smelter but deliberately narrowed the issues before the panel and even conceded the application of a foreign law in order to reduce the amount of the fine to be paid. NAFTA Chapter 11 offers another fertile source of material for consideration. It has been argued that one effect of NAFTA Chapter 11 is to facilitate regulatory change, through private adjudication, for the sole benefit of private entities.38 This is the spectre brought to the feast by the Ethyl case in the early stages of Chapter 11’s history and popularised in the portrayal of arbitrators and arbitration practitioners as a kind of cabal, as noted at the outset of this chapter.39 The Ethyl arbitration was the first Chapter 11 dispute in which an investor challenged a NAFTA party’s environmental measures. Ethyl Canada imported concentrated methylcyclo-pentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT) from its

36

Romano, The Peaceful Settlement of International Environmental Disputes, supra, note 34, at 268.

37

Ibid. at 268.

38

See J. Kirton, NAFTA Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: An Overview”, paper prepared for Experts Workshops on “NAFTA and its Implications for ASEAN’s Free Trade Area”, Asian Institute, Munk Centre for International Studies (Toronto, 27 May 2004) at 5.

39

See Fortier and Drymer, “Third-Party Intervention and Document Discovery”, supra, note 3, at 474.

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US parent company to be processed and distributed across Canada to gasoline refineries. Canadian car manufacturers complained that MMT was damaging emission control monitoring systems in their new model cars. As a result, in 1997, Canada passed the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act prohibiting the importation of MMT into Canada as well as the inter-provincial trade of MMT. Ethyl Corporation challenged the legislation before a NAFTA tribunal, claiming that it constituted a breach of national treatment, a breach of performance requirements, and an expropriation. The parties settled their dispute before consideration of the merits by the tribunal. The case has been criticised as an example of corporate interests trumping a State’s ability to legislate in the public interest, as well as an example of a State, having relied upon surrogate public interest arguments to protect a domestic industry, cutting its losses rather than facing an adverse arbitral award. The Ethyl case is mixed. It is often invoked as a means of impugning the NAFTA arbitral mechanism as applied to disputes involving environmental issues. However, it could be said that the case has also sparked a healthy debate on what responsibility, if any, parties to investor-State arbitrations have to consider the public interests that may be affected by their disputes. The parties in Trail Smelter were public entities vested with the power to regulate in the public interest, and, as such, were and continue to be accountable to domestic democratic processes. Canada, the State Party that concluded the settlement in Ethyl, was in a similar position. Greater concern may arise where private parties are seen to selectively address issues and choose the applicable law as a means of circumventing the application of undesirable public law controls on private activity, such as environmental regulations or public disclosure rules. This does not mean that there are no controls in place to discipline such conduct. Domestic courts do, in fact, exercise such control. In sum, arbitrators are required to exercise their discretionary powers within the jurisdictional framework of the arbitration and consistently with the will of the parties. Within this framework, the arbitrator’s discretionary powers constitute an important check on the arbitral process and are the locus of the dialectic on due process and natural justice. While it may be desirable in certain contexts for investors to conduct their affairs with an eye towards public concerns, as parties to an arbitration proceeding they are part of a structure that is inherently driven by fairness and justice. Where this is insufficient to satisfy the demands of those who continue to question the integrity of the arbitral process, the judiciary ensures that disputes that should not be resolved by way of arbitration are resolved through a mechanism appropriate to those disputes. 2. Judicial Checks and Balances The judiciary of a State safeguards the legitimacy of arbitration by, among other things, ensuring that a dispute submitted to arbitration is capable of 173


settlement by arbitration, and that an award for which enforcement is sought has been rendered in respect of a matter capable of settlement by arbitration. The arbitrability of a dispute therefore operates as a check on party autonomy at both the front and back ends of the arbitral process. At the front end of a dispute, courts provide a safety valve by making a prima facie determination as to whether the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable according to the terms of the parties’ agreement and according to the law applicable in the court’s jurisdiction. As explained by Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel: “arbitrability and its limitations are strongly influenced by the extent of control of arbitral awards by courts. If legislators or courts feel that certain factual or legal aspects of commercial contractual relationships involve a public interest and should, therefore, not be left entirely to the disposal of private parties and their arbitration, in order to achieve the necessary influence of the state, they can either exclude arbitrability or provide for control of awards by state courts. From the legal policy consideration at stake, both methods, furthermore, are not necessarily alternatives, but are in a relationship to each other to the effect that a more liberal approach to arbitrability may induce a less liberal approach to control of awards.”40 At the back end of the process, article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards41 provides that recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused by a court of the country in which recognition is sought, if the court finds the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration in that country. Thus, although there is no appeal process as such,42 courts must and do exercise a minimum degree of substantive control over disputes subject to arbitration and over arbitral awards. It has been posited by Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage

40

K.-H. Böckstiegel, “Public Policy and Arbitrability”, in P. Sanders (ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series No. 3 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1987), 177 at 181 et seq. See also Redfern, Hunter, Blackaby and Partasides, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, supra, note 29, at 3-13.

41

Done at New York, 10 June 1958.

42

The development of an arbitral appeal mechanism was considered by the ICSID Administrative Council in its discussions on possible improvements for the ICSID arbitration framework. The ICSID Secretariat committed to continue to study such a possibility. ICSID, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, supra, note 3, at 4. A recent issue of Transnational Dispute Management was devoted entirely to the debate over the issue of an appellate process for international commercial arbitral awards. See Vol. 2, issue 2 (April 2005).

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that it is precisely the existence of this control that frees arbitrators to rule on public policy issues that arise in otherwise private disputes.43 The NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute in Metalclad provides a useful example of how this judicial safeguard may apply to a commercial arbitration. In 1997, Metalclad Corporation initiated arbitral proceedings against the Mexican Government as a result of regulatory actions taken in respect of Metalclad’s hazardous waste landfill site in the Guadalajara Valley. The company alleged violations of Mexico’s NAFTA obligations with respect to fair and equitable treatment under article 1105 and expropriation under article 1110. The tribunal rendered its Final Award in 2000, finding that Mexico had violated article 1105 by failing to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and investment. The tribunal further concluded that Mexico had indirectly expropriated the company’s investment without providing compensation. Mexico challenged the award by way of judicial review before the Supreme Court of British Columbia, where the seat of arbitration was located. The Court determined that the tribunal had made decisions on matters outside of the scope of its jurisdiction. Specifically, it determined that the tribunal’s finding that article 1105 required a minimum standard of transparency consistent with international law was not based on any authority or evidence that would support the proposition that transparency had become a part of customary international law.44 In so doing, the Court effectively reined in an excess of jurisdiction by the tribunal.45 In another Chapter 11 dispute involving Canada’s breach of treaty obligations concerning a hazardous waste disposal operation maintained by S.D. Myers, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Trial Division’s decision to refuse leave for several environmental advocacy groups to intervene in the judicial review application of a Partial Award of the arbitral tribunal. The Court of Appeal, citing the trial judge’s reasoning, stated as follows: “I am not satisfied that the moving parties can bring to the Court a point of view with respect to these issues which will, in any material way, be different from that of the parties. The essence of the judicial review application is the correct interpretation of the NAFTA. The proposed intervenors do not have any particular or unique expertise in interpreting international treaty obligations that would assist the Court beyond that which is offered by counsel for Canada, the United States, Mexico, the respondent and the members of the Arbitral Tribunal itself. The social policy concerns of the moving parties, including Canada’s trade policy,

43

Gaillard and Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman, supra, note 28, at 415.

44

The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, 2001 BCSC 664 (2 May 2001), at para. 68.

45

Ibid. at para. 136. 175


would not assist in the determination of the legal issues which arise under the Government’s application for judicial review.”46 The Court of Appeal’s decision both reinforced the propriety of placing limits on participation in otherwise private proceedings and exemplified the control that national judiciaries may properly exercise over arbitration proceedings to ensure that fairness of process is achieved. These decisions are but a few examples of national courts exercising control to rein in arbitral decisions where they find that arbitrators have exceeded their jurisdiction, consistent with the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion I commenced this chapter by asking whether bona fide concerns in respect of the impact of private rule-making on the management of natural resources and State regulation of the environment risk being ignored if a narrow approach is taken to commercial arbitrations involving such matters. My starting and ending point is that commercial arbitration is bound by certain inherent limitations that make it a distinct form of dispute settlement. Judge Mensah’s wisdom is once again apropos in understanding the importance of this point. Upon the conclusion of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Judge Mensah said in respect of the so-called “purists” who argued that the dispute settlement regime under the Convention did not have “enough teeth” that, while this proposition may be true, it is “equally true that anything more radical would probably not have been acceptable to many of the States that have now accepted the 1982 Convention and its dispute settlement regime.”47 In my humble opinion, the goals of commercial arbitration are not inherently opposed to those of achieving environmental justice, even though at certain junctures they may appear to diverge. Our shared goal must throughout remain focused on how best to deal with these divergences when they occur, with the tools that we have at our disposal, in order to secure a just resolution and an enforceable award.

46

Canada (Attorney General) v. S.D. Myers Inc., [2002] F.C.J. No. 125 (F.C.A.), at para. 4, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 149 (S.C.C.).

47

T.A. Mensah, “The Dispute Settlement Regime of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, (1998) Max Planck UNYB 307.

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ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND THE UNITED NATIONS CLAIMS COMMISSION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CASES? Philippe Gautier

Introduction

O

n 30 June 2005, the panel of commissioners appointed by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) to review the claims for environmental damage and depletion of natural resources resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait (the “F4” Panel, or the Panel)1 completed its work with the submission of its fifth and final report to the Governing Council of the UNCC.2 The fact that the “F4” Panel was chaired by Thomas Mensah could already be a reason for paying attention to the work of the Panel. But this is not the only justification for the present chapter. Given the nature and number of claims concerned, the amounts of compensation involved and the important legal

1

The members of the Panel were Thomas A. Mensah (Chairman), José R. Allen and Peter H. Sand.

2

In total, the “F4” Panel produced five reports: Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the First Instalment of “F4” Claims (S/ AC.26/2001/16), 22 June 2001; Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Second Instalment of “F4” Claims (S/AC.26/2002/26), 3 October 2002; Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Third Instalment of “F4” Claims (S/AC.26/2003/31), 18 December 2003; Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fourth Instalment of “F4” Claims, part one, (S/AC.26/2004/16), 9 December 2004; Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fourth Instalment of “F4” Claims, part two, (S/AC.26/2004/17), 9 December 2004; and Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fifth Instalment of “F4” Claims, (S/AC.26/2005/10), 30 June 2005.



issues addressed, the reports of the Panel serve as a “precedent” – the expression being used without the connotation normally associated with it in common law systems – that will be referred to, and quoted by, claimants and judges in future cases involving reparation for environmental damages. From the outset, it must be pointed out that the reports and recommendations of the “F4” Panel were prepared in response to a specific mandate formulated by the United Nations Security Council and the UNCC Governing Council in the aftermath of an armed conflict. Hence, they are not, stricto sensu, international judicial decisions or awards. The panels instituted by the UNCC were not intended to constitute international tribunals. Rather they were international administrative organs set up by the United Nations to make recommendations regarding compensation for damage resulting from an act of aggression (Iraq’s unlawful invasion of Kuwait). Nevertheless, the task entrusted to the UNCC panels required them to carry out quasi-judicial functions when assessing the admissibility of claims, the existence of damage and the reparation relating thereto.3 Given the small number of international decisions on the issue of reparation for environmental damage, it may reasonably be expected that the reports of the “F4” Panel will be invoked in cases that may not have much in common with the legal and factual circumstances relating to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. A similar development occurred as a result of the decisions in the Trail Smelter and Lake Lanoux cases. In making their awards in those cases, the arbitrators could hardly have foreseen that selected parts of the awards would later gain autonomy and would become recognised principles of international environmental law.4

3

“The Commission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before which the parties appear; it is a political organ that performs an essentially fact-finding function of examining claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing payments and resolving disputed claims. It is only in this last respect that a quasi-judicial function may be involved. Given the nature of the Commission, it is all the more important that some element of due process be built into the procedure. It will be the function of the commissioners to provide this element”, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 2 May 1991, S/22559, para. 20.

4

In the Trail Smelter case, the arbitral tribunal concluded its response to the second question submitted to it by stating that “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence” (award of 11 March 1941, RIAA, Vol. III, p. 1965). When this statement was made, its meaning was probably more limited than what was later read in it. It was based not only on “the principles of international law” but also on the “law of the United States” (pursuant to the applicable law clause in article IV of the special agreement signed on 15 April 1935 between United States and Canada, see id. p. 1908). In addition, the liability of Canada for damages by pollution caused by a private operator under its control was not an issue in this case. In its report of

178

Environmental Damage and the United Nations Claims Commission

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the relevance that the reports of the Panel may have for future cases concerning reparation for environmental damage. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the Panel did not operate in a legal vacuum. While environmental damage is a relatively new concept, it has already acquired legal recognition. It is therefore useful, before undertaking an examination of the work of the “F4” Panel, to give an overview of the notion of environmental damage at the municipal and international levels.

I. Legal Approaches to Environmental Damage per se 1. Municipal and European Levels When reference is made to environmental damage, the first issue is one of terminology, i.e. the definition of environmental damage per se as opposed to other forms of damage. Usually, under municipal law, a distinction is made between injury to persons, damage to property and loss of profit. These categories do not provide much help in the case of environmental damages since they only envisage reparation for damages that may be assessed in monetary terms, on the basis of market values or actuarial estimates. However, they do not contemplate compensation for the loss of common resources (air, water, land) that are not owned by any specific persons. In addition, reimbursement of public services (e.g., clean-up, removal of wrecks or preventive measures) may be denied by a municipal court for the reason that these expenses are incurred by the State in fulfilling its tasks as a public authority and therefore do not directly result from the polluter’s act.5 The Amoco Cadiz case is a good illustration of the problems related to claims for environmental damage. Following the oil spill off the coast of Brittany in 1978, the case was brought before US courts6 where proceedings took 14 years. The

28 February 1931, the international Joint Commission constituted by the two States had already fixed an amount (USD 350,000) for damages caused until 1 January 1932 (see id. pp. 1908 and 1918). Likewise, as regards the Lake Lanoux case, the arbitral tribunal, in stating that France, while exercising its right to build a dam in an area close to the border with Spain, was under the obligation to take due account of the interests of Spain (see RIAA, Vol. XII, pp. 314-316), was simply applying a provision to this effect contained in a treaty between the two countries (see article 11 of the additional act to the Treaty of 1866). 5

See e.g., Ph. Gautier, “Quelques réflexions sur les Etats, le droit des gens et le dommage à l’environnement”, RBDI, 1992/2, pp. 448-484.

6

See Judgments of 18 April 1984 and 11 January 1988, US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, In re Oil Spill by the “Amoco Cadiz” Off the Coast of France on March 11, 1978; Judgment of 24 January 1992, US Court of Appeals (7th 179


claims were made not only in relation to damage to property or loss of profit (e.g., as regards oyster farmers, owners of hotels and restaurants and fishermen) but also in respect of various expenditures arising out of clean-up operations, repair and restoration measures, damage to the quality of life and public services, lost of reputation and public image, and ecological damage. As regards the public employee’s time devoted to clean-up measures, the District Court in its decision of 11 January 1988 decided that the “principle of free public services which … bars a … sovereign from charging the beneficiary of services which the sovereign has an obligation to generally provide” did not apply to the case on the basis of the relevant French law.7 On this basis, it awarded compensation for the time that public employees took from their regular duties to devote their efforts to the clean-up activity as well as for their overtime. As regards the equipment used for clean-up, the Court only granted the incremental operating cost and declined to award expenses that would have been borne had the equipment been operated in a normal way.8 Reimbursement for coastline and harbour restoration (harbour works, docks, access ways and beaches) was accepted by the District Court while compensation for lost enjoyment was rejected for the reason that such a claim was not contemplated under French law. The loss of image claims were not admitted since they were based on financial losses (resulting from the decrease in the number of tourists and visitors), which were already the subject of other individual claims. As far as ecological damage is concerned, the claim, which was based on the value determination of species killed in the intertidal zone by the oil spill, was rejected by the District Court on the ground that the damage was “subject to the principle of res nullius” and that under French law “neither the state not the communes has standing to assert

Cir.). See also, A. Kiss and D. Shelton, International Environmental Law, 3rd edn, 2003, pp. 283-285. 7

As regards the reasons for which the French claimants (including public authorities) decided to bring the case before American courts, reference may be made inter alia to the fact that the main respondent, Standard Oil, was a company registered in United States where its assets were located. In addition, the ceiling of liability provided for under the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) was applicable to France (it entered into force for France in 1975) while the United States was not a party to it (see e.g., M. Ndende, “Le règlement de l’affaire de l’Amoco-Cadiz”, in Espaces et ressources maritimes, 1992, pp. 227-250). This did not prevent the District Court, however, after having settled the issue of responsibility in 1984, from applying the law of France to the issue of damage, which, in its view, was “substantially identical to the law of the United States”.

8

It is interesting to note that, in its decision of 24 January 1992, the Court of Appeal found it inconsistent for the District Court to have granted compensation for the whole time devoted to clean-up activities while, in the case of equipment, having decided to provide reimbursement only with respect to incremental costs. It then added the regular costs of using the equipment during the clean-up to the award granted by the District Court.

180


claims for damage to the ecosystem in the maritime public domain”. The Court also considered that the estimated costs of a planned restoration programme were unreasonable because, in its view, the programme was designed to “bring about improvements in an ecosystem which was deteriorating as the result of causes unconnected to the oil spill” rather than to “restore the ecosystem to pre-spill conditions”. It also noted that, since 1978, the progamme had not yet been implemented and therefore its necessity had largely disappeared due to natural restoration of the ecosystem. The court accepted, however, to grant compensation for the reasonable costs for early studies regarding proposed implantation programmes as well as experimental programmes that were actually conducted. The legal framework existing at the time of the Amoco Cadiz oil spill has changed. Since then, several States have adopted specific legislation that enables their courts to grant reparation for damage to the environment per se. For example, after the Exxon Valdez oil pollution disaster in 1989, the United States adopted the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990, which expressly provides that compensable damage includes “natural resource damage” and “costs of public services”.9 Under the OPA, reparation may be obtained for the costs of returning the damaged natural resources to their baseline condition (primary restoration) and for the loss of use of natural resources and services (e.g. access to beaches, fishing, hiking) from the time of the injury until full recovery (compensatory restoration). Determination of the appropriate compensatory restoration is made through the use of a scaling method in order to “ensure that the gains provided by this action equal the interim loss in service due to the incident”.10 Different scaling methods are used in this respect. Service-to-service scaling (like habitat equivalency analogy, or HEA) measures the value of lost services – without having recourse to economic terms11 – and identifies the replacement projects that will provide natural resources and services of the same type and quality

9

“Natural resource damage” is defined as “damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources [land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water]” and “a United States trustee, a state trustee, an Indian tribe trustee, or a foreign trustee” is entitled to claim compensation for the damage. Under the Act, the level of compensation for natural resource damage is based on the following criteria: “(a) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged natural resources, (b) the diminution of value of those resources pending restoration; plus (c) the reasonable costs of assessing those damages” (§2706(d)). See L. de La Fayette, “New Approaches for Addressing Damage to the Marine Environment”, Intl. J. Marine & Coastal L., Vol. 20, 2005, pp. 172-174.

10

E. Brans, Liability for Damage to Public Natural Resources, 2001, p. 132.

11

For example the value may be measured in acre-year of habitat services, i.e., “the level of ecological services produced by one acre of wetland (or other habitat) during a single year”: Brans, id. p. 134. 181


to those lost. Valuation approaches may also be used to calculate the value in monetary terms of the damaged natural resources and services.12 It is, however, understood that these methods are not used to award monetary compensation; rather, the amounts awarded are to be used for restoration purposes.13 More recently, an approach, exclusively centred on pure environmental damage, has been adopted in the European Directive of 21 April 2004 “on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage”.14 Pursuant to the Directive, in case of environmental damage, the operator of the harmful activity has the duty to take all practicable steps to limit or prevent further damage and to take the necessary remedial measures (article 6). In addition, the competent authority may itself take the necessary remedial measures (and then recover the costs incurred from the operator) or it may request the operator to take those measures. In the Directive, a distinction is made15 between (a) primary remediation (“any remedial measure which returns the damaged natural resources and/or impaired services to, or towards, baseline condition”); (b) complementary restoration (additional remedial measure taken in order to “compensate for the fact that primary remediation does not result in fully restoring the damaged natural resources and/or services”); and (c) compensatory remediation (“action taken to compensate for interim losses of natural resources … that occur from the date of damage … until primary remediation has achieved its full effect”). Pursuant to Annex II (I), “Where primary remediation does not result in the restoration of the environment to its baseline condition, then complementary remediation will be undertaken. In addition, compensatory remediation will be undertaken to compensate for interim losses.” The regime set up by the European Directive – which is modelled on the US Act of 1990 – gives indications regarding the entity that is entrusted to take measures and/or claim compensation (competent authority designated by the Member State concerned), and the type of compensation contemplated (remediation measures). The directive also avoids the risk of large claims for

12

See E. Brans, id. pp. 131-141. See also N. Hanley, “The Economic Value of Environmental Damage”, in M. Bowman and A. Boyle, Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law, 2002, pp. 27 et seq.

13

L. de La Fayette, op. cit. note 9, p. 174: “[t]he usual procedure is for the person(s) liable for the damage to repair it themselves or to fund the restoration … Where restoration of the original site is not possible immediately or at all, the liable person(s) will pay for the creation of a comparable site nearby to provide the same or similar environmental services as those lost due to the oil spill. According to the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, most restoration projects are for alternative sites to compensate for ‘interim losses’ while the original site regenerates itself, with or without assistance”.

14

OJEU, L 143/59, 30.04.2004, pp. 56 et seq.

15

See Annex II (I) (a), (b) and (c).

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monetary compensation. It expressly states16 that compensation for the interim loss of natural resources (compensatory remediation) “consists of additional improvements to protected natural habitats and species or water at either the damaged site or at an alternative site” and adds that it “does not consist of financial compensation to members of the public”. 2. International Law In principle, in international law we should not encounter the difficulties that were mentioned regarding environmental damage in municipal law. A State that has suffered environmental damage as a result of a wrongful act is entitled to full reparation for injuries done.17 Nothing prevents the State, which has sovereign rights over its territory, from lodging an international claim for damage caused to properties located therein as well as for damage caused to its environment, including the cost of preventive and remediation measures. The same principle should apply whenever a State is legally bound, under international customary law or a treaty, to make good any loss resulting from an act attributable to it. For example, article XII of the 1972 Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects provides that “compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay for damage … shall be determined … in order to provide such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or international organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to the condition which would have existed if the damage had not occurred”. This provision espouses a broad definition of damage and there is no reason to believe that it would not apply to pure environmental damage. In the case of the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954, Canada referred inter alia to this provision and claimed compensation for the expenses incurred in “locating, recovering, removing and testing the [radioactive] debris and cleaning up the affected areas”.18 The fact that the matter was settled diplomatically and that half of the amount claimed was paid by USSR does not mean that the claim was not legally founded. The 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC Convention) initially adopted a similar approach by retaining liability of the shipowner for “any pollution damage”,19 which was defined as “loss or

16

See Annex II, 1.1.3.

17

See article 31 (Reparation) of the ILC’s articles on State responsibility: 1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State.

18

ILM, Vol. 18, 1979, p.904.

19

Art. III(1). 183


damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship … [including] the costs of preventive measures”20. In order to ensure payments of amounts exceeding the ceiling provided by the CLC Convention, the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (IOPC Fund) set up an international Fund, financed by the oil industry in the territories of the contracting parties. The main purpose of the IOPC Fund, which has legal personality in the laws of each contracting State, is to provide compensation for pollution damage within the scope of the protection offered by the CLC Convention, to the extent that full compensation for the damage cannot be obtained under the CLC Convention. The regime set up by these Conventions is not fully international in the sense that, by virtue of article IX of the CLC Convention, claims for compensation against the shipowner are submitted to the competent court of the countries whose territories have been affected by the pollution. Likewise, decisions of the IOPC Fund on compensation issues may be challenged before the competent municipal courts. The judgments of these courts against the IOPC Fund, when final, are enforceable in each contracting State.21 The IOPC Fund is equally bound by final decisions of municipal courts regarding claims for compensation.22 It is useful to note that the regime is currently governed by a revised version of these two Conventions: the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund Conventions. In addition, a Supplementary Fund was established in 2005 to supplement the compensation available under the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions.23 The broad definition of damage included in the 1969 CLC Convention generated a number of claims for environmental damage, as illustrated by the following three examples. The first is the claim arising from the incident in 1979 and involving the USSR flagged ship Antonio Gramsci. In this case, the damage was assessed by a court in Riga on the basis of an abstract valuation method.24 The claim was, however, rejected by the IOPC Fund for the reason that compensation

20

Art. I(6). Under the 1969 CLC Convention, preventive measures only refer to measures taken after the occurrence of an oil spill and do not include measures taken in order to prevent the oil spill itself. The 1992 Convention now covers both forms of prevention.

21

See art. 8.

22

See art. 7, para. 6.

23

While three separate legal funds are established by the Conventions (1971, 1992 and 2005), for the purpose of the present chapter, reference is made to the “IOPC Fund”.

24

The method was based on the following: “(a) estimate the quantity of oil spilled; (b) assume it disperses into the marine environment to 50 parts per million; (c) estimate the quantity of water affected by dividing (a) by (b); (d) multiply (c) by an amount per cubic meter read from the tables giving expenses per cubic meter for restoration”, D. Abecassis, Oil Pollution from Ships, 1985, p. 209.

184


under the CLC Convention could only be granted with respect to “quantifiable economic loss”.25 The question of environmental damage surfaced again in the Patmos case, where, notwithstanding the opposite decision of the IOPC Fund, the Court of Appeal of Messina decided in 1989 that the definition of damage in the 1969 CLC Convention included loss of use of natural resources, “and of other values that these resources have for the community (health, food, tourism, research, biological studies”).26 In 1996, a similar position was taken by the court of first instance in Genoa with respect to the oil pollution damage caused by the tanker Haven. The court awarded an amount, assessed as a portion of the clean-up costs, to compensate for the damage to the marine natural resources that could not be repaired. While the decision was appealed by the Fund, the issue was eventually the subject of an out-of-court settlement. On the occasion of the revision of the CLC Convention in 1992, the definition of damage was amended27 in order to clarify that “compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken”. Thus, the new definition envisages compensation for environmental damage in terms of reimbursement of actual costs of restoration measures rather than in the form of monetary compensation. Some problems remain unsolved, however, in particular as regards damage that cannot be repaired and temporary loss of ecological services pending the restoration of the environment. Pursuant to criteria developed by the IOPC Fund, to be eligible for compensation, restoration measures should be reasonable, not “disproportionate to the results achieved or the results which can reasonably be expected” and should be “appropriate and offer a reasonable prospect of success”.28 When restoration measures are not feasible or only at disproportionate cost, no appropriate remedy is therefore available. Regarding interim loss of ecological services (e.g. access to beaches), the policy of the IOPC Fund is to exclude “damage in respect of which the quantum of the damage cannot be assessed according to market price”. By the same token, it rejects the use of valuation methods based on “theoretical” models.29 Only

25

E. Brans, op. cit. note 10, p. 325.

26

E. Brans, op. cit. note 10, p. 328; see also M. Maffei, “The compensation for ecological damage in the ‘Patmos’ case”, in F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi (eds), International Responsibility for Environmental Harm, 1991, pp. 397-390.

27

The same amendment was already contained in the 1984 Protocol. The Protocol, however, never entered into force.

28

Fund/WGR.7/21 (1994) as quoted by E. Brans, op. cit. note 10, p. 351.

29

For example, in the 1997 Issos Amorgos incident, the IOPC Fund rejected a claim by Venezuela for loss of use and enjoyment of a beach, “assessed on the basis of the number of days the beach was closed, the length of the closure period, the number of people who visited the affected beach each year and the price tourists are willing to pay for a day on 185


claims presented in the form of reinstatement measures (for example in the form of more expensive restoration measures with a view to accelerating the natural recovery)30 might be considered under this type of damage.31 The approach developed by the IOPC Fund seems to have been followed by international conventions recently concluded in the field of environmental damages. For example, the 1996 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS Convention)32 and the 1999 Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal to the 1989 Basel Convention provide for the reimbursement of costs of reasonable measures of prevention33 and reinstatement actually taken or undertaken. Similarly, they do not contemplate monetary compensation. That said, under these regimes based on the civil liability of the operator of a potentially harmful activity, the scope of admissible restoration or prevention measures will eventually depend on the decisions of the competent municipal courts to which claims are submitted. This applies, for example, to the issues of temporary losses pending the restoration of the damaged area, the compensatory reparation in case of damage that cannot be repaired as well as other questions such as compensation for pure economic losses.34 In this respect, it is unlikely

the beach. The latter was calculated on the amount they spent on transport, food and beverages”, E. Brans, op. cit. note 10, p. 339. 30

Id. pp. 350-351.

31

Recently, the Fund has accepted that restoration measures be taken at an alternative site. This could be seen as a first step in the direction of compensatory measures for interim losses. The Claims Manual published by the Fund makes it clear, however, that “[r] einstatement measures taken at some distance from, but still within the general vicinity of, the damaged area may be acceptable, so long as it can be demonstrated that they would actually enhance the recovery of the damaged components of the environment”, IOPC Claims Manual (April 2005), p. 31, available at <www.iopcfund.org/npdf/claimsman-en. pdf>.

32

The HNS Convention does not, however, provide for compensation with respect to injury to person and damage to property.

33

Under the Protocol to the Basel Convention, preventive measures mean “any reasonable measures taken by any person in response to an incident, to prevent, minimise, or mitigate loss or damage, or to effect environmental clean-up” (see art. 2(c) and (e)).

34

The notion of pure economic loss reflects a common law approach where admissible economic loss is limited to loss resulting from a physical injury to property. “One example … is a fisherman’s loss of income as a result of his nets becoming oiled, which prevents him from fishing until his nets are either cleaned or replaced” (Claims Manual, op. cit. note 31, p. 10). Several exceptions are made to this rule with respect to those who depend for their income on the affected environment; for example fishermen or owners of an hotel located close to a contaminated public beach, (see Claims Manual, ibid.; see also E. Brans, op. cit.

186


that municipal courts will lightly accept being bound by interpretations of the CLC Convention adopted by a non-judicial body such as the IOPC Fund. A more acceptable solution would probably be to confer to an international judicial body the task of settling issues of interpretation through contentious or referral proceedings.

II. The “F4” Panel and Environmental Damage 1. The Reports of the “F4” Panel 35 Pursuant to paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 687(1991), Iraq “is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait”. The resolution also set up a Commission to settle claims arising out of the Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The claims were allocated to six different categories (designated by the letters “A” to “F” according to the legal status of the claimants or the nature of the claims). Category “F” relates to claims of governments and international organisations. Claims dealt with by the “F4” Panel are claims for environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources. The “F4” Panel was constituted in 1998 and completed its activities in 2005. Claims submitted to the Panel were divided in five different “instalments”, which were the subject of separate reports: (1) The report on the First Instalment36 concerned 107 claims totaling USD 1,007,412,574 submitted by Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey for monitoring and assessment activities. In practice, approximately one third of the claims were rejected,37 in most of the cases for lack of documentary evidence. Claims accepted were, however,

note 10, pp. 75 and 321-322). This approach, which is adopted by the IOPC Fund is not shared by civil law countries, which base their reasoning on the “direct” or “proximate” causal link between a damage and the act that caused it. 35

See P. Sand, “Compensation for Environmental Damage from the 1991 Gulf War”, Envtl. Pol’y & L., Vol. 35, 2005, pp. 244-249; C. Langenfeld and P. Minnerop, “Environmental Liability Provisions in International Law”, in R. Wolfrum, C. Langenfeld and P. Minnerop, Environmental Liability in International Law: Towards a Coherent Conception, 2005, pp. 143-156; M. Kazazi, “Environmental Damage in the Practice of the UN Compensation Commission”, in M. Bowman and A. Boyle (eds), Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law – Problems of Definition and Valuation, 2002, pp. 111-131.

36

First Instalment of 22 June 2001, op. cit. note 2.

37

Out of 107 cases, 38 were rejected and 2 were transferred to another instalment. 187


reviewed and the estimates often reduced. The amount recommended by the Panel was USD 243,234,967. (2) The report on the Second Instalment38 related to 31 claims totaling USD 872,760,534 submitted by Australia, Canada, Germany, Iran, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. It dealt mainly with measures that had to be taken to prevent (the risk of) further environmental damage (e.g., removal of mines and recovery of oil), as well as response actions (e.g., cleaning of buildings, airport facilities, or desalinisation plants) and expenses incurred by non-regional States in providing assistance to abate and prevent environmental damage (essentially regarding oil spills and oil fires). Claims were well documented and were accepted to a large extent. The amount recommended by the Panel was USD 711,087,737. (3) The report on the Third Instalment39 consisted of three claims totaling USD 10,004,219,582, submitted by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for remediation measures to clean and restore damaged environment.40 The claims regarding restoration measures were all accepted, with the exception of cleaning measures.41 The amount was, however, substantially reduced by the Panel, which recommended USD 1,148,701,011. (4) The reports (parts one and two) on Fourth Instalment42 addressed eight claims for remediation measures amounting to USD 16,305,459,098 submitted by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, Syria and Turkey (part one) and one claim of USD 6,799,491,526 submitted by Kuwait (part two). In part one, a large proportion of the claims or claims units were rejected,43 mainly for lack of evidence. Claims that were partially accepted were reviewed and their amounts reduced. Part two, devoted to a single claim from Kuwait (for expenses resulting from remediation and revegetation measures with respect to areas damaged by oil contamination and reimbursement of expenditures incurred in removing oil released by oil wells) was accepted but substantially reduced. The amounts recommended

38

Second Instalment of 3 October 2002, op. cit. note 2.

39

Third Instalment of 18 December 2003, op. cit. note 2.

40

See id. para. 5.

41

See id. paras 153-156 and 190-192.

42

Fourth Instalment (parts one and two) of 9 December 2004, op. cit. note 2.

43

The claims from Jordan, Syria and Turkey were rejected. The claims from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were accepted. In the case of Iran (claim No. 500456) only one claim unit (the claim consisting of three claim units) was accepted, partially.

188


by the Panel were USD 629,487,878 (part one) and USD 2,277,206,389 (part two). (5) The report on the Fifth Instalment44 consisted of 19 claims submitted by Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey for a total of USD 49,936,562,997, for “compensation for damage to or depletion of natural resources, including cultural heritage resources; measures to clean and restore damaged environment; and damage to public health”.45 A large majority of the claims were rejected, essentially for lack of evidence. The amount recommended by the Panel was USD 252,028,468. The results of the recommendations of the “F4” Panel may be summarised as follows: Requested

Recommended

% (rounded)

USD 1,007,412,574

USD 243,234,967

24.14

USD 872,760,534

USD 711,087,737

81.47

Third Instalment Remediation (cleaning and restoration)

USD 10,004,219,582

USD 1,148,701,011

11.48

Fourth Instalment (part one) Remediation (cleaning and restoration)

USD 16,305,459,098

USD 629,487,878

3.86

Fourth Instalment (part two) Remediation (cleaning and restoration)

USD 6,799,491,526

USD 2,277,206,389

33.49

Fifth Instalment Damage to natural resources

USD 49,936,562,997

USD 252,028,468

0.5

Total

USD 84,925,906,311

USD 5,261,746,450

6.19

First Instalment Monitoring and assessment Second Instalment Response action and cleaning

44

Fifth Instalment of 30 June 2005, op. cit. note 2.

45

Id. para. 4. 189


It may be immediately observed that the final amounts recommended constitute only small percentages of the total amounts of the claims, and that the percentages vary significantly in the different instalments. It would be misleading, however, to consider that the fluctuation in percentages reflects the position of the Panel regarding the categories of claims allocated to specific instalments. Indeed, many claims were rejected not because of the inadmissibility of the alleged damage but for lack of evidence. Furthermore, with the exception of the first instalment, the instalments had a composite nature and contained claims appertaining to different categories: monitoring and assessment measures, cleaning costs, costs of medical treatment, monetary compensation for natural resources (reduced crop yields or decrease in fisheries catches) or loss of ecological values, and remediation measures (e.g., natural reserves and captive-breeding programmes). It is therefore necessary to further consider the position of the “F4” Panel on the issue of environmental damage. Before doing so, it is appropriate to examine issues relating to the law applicable to the settlement of claims submitted to the Panel. 2. Applicable Law a. The Mandate of the Panel and the “Relevant Rules of International Law” By virtue of its mandate, the Panel, was required to apply Security Council Resolution 687(1991), relevant decisions of the UNCC Governing Council, and “[i]n addition, where necessary … other relevant rules of international law”.46 Prima facie, the expression “other relevant rules of international law” may be understood as referring to the sources of law provided for under article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (with the addition of unilateral acts). In its conclusions, the working group of experts established in 1994 by UNEP to examine certain issues in connection with environmental claims submitted to the UNCC47 mentioned, for example, the rules on State responsibility regarding reparation. In addition, it considered that, where no rule applicable by virtue of law provides a clear result, guidance could be found in the application of

46

Article 31 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, S/AC.26/1992/10, 26 June 1992, reads as follows: “[i]n considering the claims, Commissioners will apply Security Council resolution 687(1991) and other relevant Security Council resolutions, the criteria established by the Governing Council for particular categories of claims, and any pertinent decisions of the Governing Council. In addition, where necessary, Commissioners shall apply other relevant rules of international law”.

47

See the conclusions by the working group of experts on liability and compensation for environmental damage arising from military activities, Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage: Compilation of Documents, United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, 1998, pp. 119 et seq.

190


other rules by analogy or as a source of inspiration. As an example of treaties or customary rules concluded in another, but related, field, it referred to treaties concluded “in the field of state responsibility for damage and civil liability, and on the global and regional protection of the marine environment”48 and, as an example of international acts of relevant organisations, to the International Oil Pollution Convention Fund. It also referred to norms that would not usually qualify as “rules of international law”; for example soft law (the 1972 Stockholm and 1992 Rio Declarations) or rules of national law, “particularly where a general approach could be discerned”.49 Compared to the conclusions of the UNEP working group, the Panel used a more sober and prudent approach. In general, it considered that the primary sources identified in its mandate were sufficient to settle issues submitted to it and, therefore, that there was no need to have recourse to “other relevant rules of international law”.50 It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the Panel did not make use of other rules of international law. It did so whenever this was required and was consistent with the terms of its mandate. An example in this respect is the “duty to mitigate environmental damage to the extent possible and reasonable in the circumstances”. In the Panel’s view, “that duty … entails obligations towards the international community and future generations. The duty to mitigate damage encompasses both a positive obligation to take appropriate measures to respond to a situation that poses a clear threat of environmental damage as well as the duty to ensure that any measures taken do not aggravate the damage already caused or increase the risk of future damage. Thus, if a claimant fails to take reasonable action to respond to a situation that poses a clear threat of environmental damage, the failure to act may constitute a breach of the duty to mitigate and could provide justification for denying compensation in whole or in part”.51 It is true that this statement exceeds what is contemplated in the draft articles on State responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2001. According to the ILC, the mitigation

48

Id. p. 120.

49

Ibid.

50

This was, for example, the case with respect to the Iraq’s argument according to which damages were only compensable it they reached “the “threshold” that is generally accepted in international law for compensation in cases of State responsibility for transboundary environmental damage (Third Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 33). The Panel rejected this view on the basis of the wording of resolution 687(1991) and paragraph 35 of Governing Council decision 7. In the Fifth Instalment, the Panel considered on the basis of its mandate that there was no reason to restrict the expression “environmental damage” to damage to natural resources which have commercial value (see op. cit. note 2, para. 55).

51

Third Instalment, id. para. 42; see also e.g., Fourth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, paras 206-216. 191


of damage is “not a legal obligation which itself gives rise to responsibility”; it is only relevant when it comes to the issue of reparation and in this respect “a failure to mitigate by the injured party may preclude recovery to that extent”.52 Nevertheless, the position of the Panel appears here more convincing. Indeed, it seems difficult to understand why legal consequences – even if limited to the issue of reparation – could flow from the failure to take mitigating action if this would not correspond to a legal duty. b. Law of State Responsibility (i) Responsibility of Iraq The Panel had no competence to address the central issue that triggers the whole reparation mechanism, i.e. the responsibility of Iraq, since this question was already settled in resolution 687(1991). The responsibility of Iraq originates from its violation of ius ad bellum, i.e, the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Its responsibility is therefore for the whole damage caused and is not restricted to the violations of international rules regulating the conduct of war (ius in bello).53 Likewise, as aggressor, Iraq was not entitled to invoke any of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness (consent, self-defence, countermeasures, force majeure, distress or necessity). In the same vein, the argument that some types of damages were not admissible for the reason that they had been caused by allied military activities54 could not be accepted by the Panel since paragraph 34(a) of Governing Council decision 7 provided expressly that direct loss and damage, under resolution 687(1991),

52

GAOR, 56th Sess., Suppl. No. 10, pp. 228, 229, commentary to article 31, para. 11. The commentary refers to the decision of the ICJ in the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project case (ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7, p. 55), as a clear illustration of this point. However, in this instance the ICJ was addressing the possibility for Slovakia to take a wrongful act (countermeasure) in order to mitigate the damage, which seems to constitute another issue. In any event, the ICJ did not pronounce itself in this case on the legal nature of the “duty to mitigate”.

53

On this issue, see S. Boelart-Suominen, “Iraqi War Reparations and the Laws of War: a Discussion of the Current Work of the United Nations Compensation Commission with Specific Reference to Environmental Damage During Warfare”, Austrian J. Publ. & Int’l L., Vol. 50, 1996, pp. 225-316.

54

Iraq invoked in this respect decision 19 of UNCC Governing Council according to which “the costs of the Allied Coalition Forces, including those of military operations against Iraq, are not eligible for compensation”. For the Panel, the specific exemption from liability that was contained in decision 19 related to the “economic costs incurred by the Allied Coalition in undertaking or supporting military operations against Iraq” and not to the compensation claims for damage resulting from military operations, as specified in paragraph 34(a) of decision 7.

192


included any loss suffered as a result of military operations by either side.55 Iraq argued that paragraph 34(a) of decision 7 was inconsistent with the rules and principles of international law governing State responsibility and Security Council resolution 687(1991). In response to this argument, the Panel considered that it was not “within the scope of its mandate” to address this contention.56 Some explanation could have helped to understand the position of the Panel. We might consider that resolution 687(1991) relates to the settlement of an armed conflict and constitutes therefore lex specialis vis-à-vis rules of international law on State responsibility. More intriguing is the Panel’s view that it had no competence to verify the consistency between resolution 687(1991) and paragraph 34(a) of Governing Council decision 7. Clearly these two instruments were within the scope of its mandate. We have to recognise, however, that the Panel is not a judicial body and, therefore, that its functioning is not stricto sensu, governed by the principle of “compétence de la compétence”. For this reason, the Panel might have been reluctant to affirm its competence regarding the legality of an act that was part of its mandate. With respect to this argument, Iraq had maintained that, in retaining its responsibility for damage resulting from military operations by either side, decision 7 had not fulfilled the requirement of resolution 687(1991) that damages be a direct result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. In Iraq’s view, damage caused by allied forces could not “under any known standard of international law” be considered a direct result of Iraq’s unlawful act. It seems indeed questionable, on the basis of the liability of Iraq for any direct damage resulting from its unlawful act (resolution 687(1991)) to affirm, without further explanation, that this would cover damage resulting from military operations by allied forces (paragraph 34 of decision 7). In briefly addressing this issue, the Panel considered that decision 7 provided “guidance on the types of losses that are encompassed in Iraq’s overall liability established by the Resolution and that the two instruments had to be read together”. In other words, decision 7 would seem to constitute an authoritative interpretation of resolution 687(1991). In any event, it appears that the position of the Panel was here dictated by the terms of its mandate and is limited to the specific circumstances of this conflict. (ii) Direct Causal Link In accordance with paragraph 16 of resolution 687(1991), the liability of Iraq is limited to “direct” damage resulting from its invasion and occupation of

55

See Fourth Instalment (Part I), op. cit. note 2, paras 253-268; Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 600.

56

Fourth Instalment, id. para. 265. 193


Kuwait. This was further elaborated by the Governing Council57 in its decision 1 (paragraph 18), where it stated that direct losses “include any loss suffered as a result of: (a) military operations or threat of military action by either side during the period 2 August 1990 to 2 March 1991; (b) departure from or inability to leave Iraq or Kuwait (or a decision not to return) during that period; (c) actions by officials, employees or agents of the Government of Iraq or its controlled entities during that period in connection with the invasion or occupation; (d) the breakdown of civil order in Kuwait or Iraq during that period; or (e) hostage-taking or other illegal detention”. In addition, paragraph 35 of decision 7 provides that “direct environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources” includes losses or expenses resulting from: “(a) Abatement and prevention of environmental damage, including expenses directly relating to fighting oil well fires and stemming the flow of oil in coastal and international waters; (b) Reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment or future measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to clean and restore the environment; (c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage for the purposes of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the environment; (d) Reasonable monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings for the purposes of investigation and combating increased health risks as a result of the environmental damage; and (e) Depletion of or damage to natural resources.” While these two decisions provide some guidance to the Panels, they do not, however, address precisely the issue of the “direct link”. They rather define, in a non-exhaustive way, a list of acts or events that may be considered as an accepted cause of damage (decision 1) and a list of admissible damage (decision 7). The requirement that the damage should be “direct” is known in international practice although its usefulness is often criticised for the reason that it does not lead to consistency in decisions rendered by international tribunals.58 What seems to be accepted is that the causal link needs to be qualified in order to exclude damage that is “too remote”, i.e. damage that is not “proximately caused” by the illegal act or is not “foreseeable”.59 Several tests are proposed in order to assess the directness of the causal link; for example the requirement of “a clear and

57

See N. Wühler, “Causation and Directness of Loss as Elements of Compensability before the United Nations Compensation Commission”, in R. Lillich (ed.), The United Nations Compensation Commission, pp. 207-234; A. Rovine and G. Hanessian, “Toward a Foreseeability Approach to Causation Questions at the United Nations Compensation Commission”, in Lillich, id. pp. 235-255.

58

See N. Wühler, id. p. 231; see also B. Stern, Le préjudice dans la théorie de la responsabilité internationale, 1973, pp. 204-205.

59

See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, as adopted by the ILC in 2001, commentary to article 31, para. 10.

194


unbroken causal link between the unlawful act and the injury”60 or the foreseeability of the damage under the natural course of events. In its draft articles on State responsibility, the ILC did not consider that this issue could be solved by “a single verbal formula”61 and simply stated that the “notion of a sufficient causal link which is not too remote is embodied in the general requirement in article 31 that the injury should be in consequence of the wrongful act, but without the addition of any particular qualifying phrase”.62 Issues relating to the existence of a direct causal link were dealt with by several panels. Given the specific directions given to the panels by the Governing Council’s decisions 1 and 7, it is not likely that the solutions adopted could be easily transposed to other cases.63 This issue was also considered to a limited extent64 in the reports of the “F4” Panel. On the occasion of its consideration of claims resulting from the presence of refugees, the Panel, while expressing its appreciation for “the humanitarian actions of a number of claimant Governments in opening their borders to large numbers of refugees”, stated that in each claim submitted to it “the evidence … must be sufficient to demonstrate that the alleged losses … resulted directly from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait and that there were no intervening or supervening acts or decisions that broke the chain of causation”.65 Therefore, the question could be asked as

60

See the second Report on State Responsibility by G. Arangio-Ruiz, Special Rapporteur, ILCYB, 1989, Vol. 2, Part One, para. 37.

61

See the expressions collected by B. Stern, op. cit. note 58, pp. 182-183: causalité “adéquate”, “directe”, “immédiate”, “nécessaire et certaine”, “proximate”, “rapport tangible de cause à effet”, “lien nécessaire et inévitable”, “connexité étroite”, “rapport évident de cause à effet”, “natural and normal sequence”, “relation causale suffisamment directe”.

62

Op. cit. note 59.

63

See, for example, the decision to consider as an admissible damage injuries resulting from a road accident caused to persons departing from Iraq and Kuwait (see N. Wühler, op. cit. note 57, p. 223). It may be questioned, however, whether, under general international law, the requirement of direct damage would be satisfied in this case. This solution is probably the consequence of decision 1, which lists departure from Iraq or Kuwait among the events which cause direct loss.

64

In the Second Instalment, the Panel took the view that “[n]o compensation is recommended for the costs of telephone calls made on a card that was reported stolen because these expenses are not a direct result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait” (op. cit. note 2, para. 307). For the same reason it rejected a claim by Germany for expenses incurred with respect to a serious injury caused by accident and sustained by a member of the crew of a vessel engaged in activities undertaken in response to oil spills (id. para. 245).

65

See Fourt Instalment (part I), op. cit. note 2, para. 48. The Panel endorsed the position adopted by the “F2” Panel of Commissioners according to which “intervening acts or decisions [of a Government or a third party], as a general rule, break the chain of causation and losses resulting therefrom are not compensable”, id. para. 47. 195


to whether the opening of borders could be considered as intervening acts that would break the chain of causation. This does not seem to be the case according to the Panel. Indeed, it rejected claims only on the basis of insufficient evidence (regarding the number of refugees, the period of time concerned and the causal link between the alleged damage and the presence of refugees).66 In this respect, suffice to add that there seem to be no reasons for considering that the opening of borders to refugees (e.g. after an ecological disaster) would necessarily break the causal link. On the contrary, this measure could be seen as normal under the circumstances or as a measure to prevent a higher level of damage being caused to the population concerned. (iii) Parallel or Concurrent Causes of Environmental Damage A recurrent issue faced by the Panel concerns damage resulting from combining factors. The terminology in this field is uncertain and the expressions “parallel”, “concurrent” or “concomitant” causes are used. If the damage is not exclusively caused by a wrongful act but also by concomitant causes, the solution proposed by Arrangio Ruiz in his second report to the ILC was “the payment of partial damages, in proportion to the amount of injury presumably to be attributed to the wrongful act”.67 On the basis of the more recent proposal from the Rapporteur Special, J. Crawford, the ILC considered that the reduction of reparation for concurrent causes was not consistent with international judicial practice68 and took the view that the wrongdoer should be held fully responsible for the whole damage. The ILC admits, however, that “cases can occur where an identifiable element of injury can properly be allocated to one of several concurrently operating causes alone. But unless some part of the injury can be shown to

66

See e.g., id. paras 76(a), 80, 116, 126, 137, 145, 153, and 354.

67

Arangio-Ruiz, op. cit. note 60, para. 44. This approach seems to be valid even when it is not possible to clearly attribute a portion of the damage to a distinct cause. On this issue, the Rapporteur refers inter alia to G. Salvioli (“La responsabilité des Etats et la fixation des dommages et intérêts par les tribunaux internationaux”, RdC, 1929-III, pp. 245-246): “it will always be possible to transform the ideal part of the damage into an actual share of the compensation payable by the guilty party. The difficulty in determining the part of the damage to be attributed to the unlawful act cannot allow the judge purely and simply to reject the injured party’s claim.”

68

The ILC refers to the Diplomatic and Consular Staff case where Iran was held responsible for the detention of the hostages while initially the seizure “was attributable to the combination of the student’s own independent action and the failure of the Iranian authorities to take the necessary steps to protect the embassy”, and to the Corfu Channel case where Albania was held liable for the whole damage caused to the British ships notwithstanding the fact that the damage “was caused both by the action of a third State in laying the mines and the action of Albania in failing to warn of their presence”, GAOR, 56th Sess., Suppl. No. 10, p. 229, commentary to article 31, para. 12.

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be severable in causal terms from that attributed to the responsible State, the latter is held responsible for all the consequences, not being too remote, of its wrongful conduct.”69 Before the “F4” Panel, the issue of concurrent causes was raised by Iraq, which claimed that some environmental damages were not related to the Gulf War but resulted from other causes.70 Initially, the position of the Panel reflected the principle proposed by the Rapporteur Special of the ILC, Arrangio Ruiz, in 1989: “[w]here the evidence shows that damage resulted directly from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait but that other factors have contributed to the damage for which compensation is claimed, due account is taken of the contribution from such other factors in order to determine the level of compensation that is appropriate for the portion of the damage which is directly attributable to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”71 In the Fourth and Fifth Instalments, however, the Panel further clarified its position by stating that “where the information available does not provide a basis for determining what proportion of the damage, if any, can reasonably be attributable directly to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, no compensation is recommended for the alleged damage”. As a result of this decision, which departs from the rules proposed within the ILC, an important number of claims were rejected whenever the data submitted by the claimant could not provide a basis for determining what proportion of the loss could reasonably be attributed to the effects of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. A justification of the strict approach adopted by the Panel might perhaps be found in its rules of procedure according to which “[e]ach claimant is responsible for submitting documents and other evidence which demonstrate satisfactorily that a particular claim or group of claims is eligible for compensation pursuant to Security Council resolution 687(1991)” (Governing Council decision 7, article 35, paragraph 1), and “category “F” claims “must be supported by documentary and other appropriate evidence sufficient to demonstrate the circumstances and amount of the claimed loss” (article 35, paragraph (3)). On this basis, compensation would be denied whenever the claimant could not demonstrate the amount of the claimed loss that is directly attributable to Iraq. Compensation is granted, however, whenever it is found that the predominant

69

Id. para. 13. See also B. Stern, op. cit. note 58, pp. 270 et seq.; P. d’Argent, Les réparations de guerre en droit international public, 2002, pp. 636-641.

70

E.g. “Iraq asserts that the damage existed before [the] war, since [it] resulted from digging wells in search [of] oil and gas, the existence of many refineries and petrochemical factories as well as a large number of oil tankers in the Gulf waters, Second Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 24; see also Third Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 37.

71

Third Instalment, id. para. 39. See also, Fourth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 40 197


cause of the damage is attributable to Iraq.72 Given the specific rules of evidence applied by the Panel, it is unlikely that its decisions regarding concurrent causes could serve as a guide in other environmental claims.73 c. Environmental Damage In its conclusions, the UNEP working group defined environmental damage as “impairment of the environment”, i.e., “a change which has measurable adverse impact on the quality of a particular environment74 or any of its components including its use and non-use values and its ability to support and sustain an acceptable quality of life and a viable ecological balance”.75 Adopting a definition of environmental damage stricto sensu, the working group excluded damage to persons or to the economic value of property, even though such damage “may result from environmental damage and may be compensable under other heads of damage”.76 Regarding the expressions “environmental damage” and “depletion of natural resources” contained in resolution 687(1991), the working group considered that these two terms established a true distinction; the expression “depletion of natural resources” would cover “the destruction of natural resource assets which occur in their natural state … and which have a primarily commercial use or commercial value”,77 while environmental damage would refer to natural resources, which have a non-commercial value.78

72

See Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, paras 326-327 and 629.

73

See e.g. Trail Smelter case, award of 16 April 1938, op. cit. note 4, pp. 1930-1931 where the arbitral tribunal, while stating that the lack of reproduction of some species of tree was “certainly due to some extent to fumigations” admitted that it was “impossible to ascertain to what extent this … is due to fumigations or other causes such as fires … or destruction by logging”. It nevertheless took “lack of reproduction into account to some extent in awarding indemnity”.

74

The term environment being understood as including “abiotic and biotic components, including air, water, soil, flora, fauna and the ecosystem formed by their interaction” as well as, if a broad interpretation is adopted, “cultural heritage, features of the landscape and environmental amenity”, Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage:Compilation of Documents, op. cit. note 47, para. 31.

75

Id. para. 34; as examples of environmental damage, the working group referred inter alia to the deposit of oil, oil droplets and soot on land and into the marine environments; increased exposure to wind erosion caused by military activities (see para. 35).

76

Id. para. 32.

77

Id. para. 39; as examples of such damage, it referred inter alia to the diminution of the value of oil due to its contamination by mixing with water; loss of oil and gas; loss in relation of commercial value of fish stocks, soil, vegetation and trees, groundwater aquifers (see para. 41).

78

Therefore, “reference to ‘environmental damage’ alone would tend to exclude, for example, claims in respect of the exhaustion of oil reserves, whereas reference only to ‘depletion

198


On this matter the Panel took a more pragmatic approach and dealt with claims of different natures without adopting a precise definition of the expressions “environmental damage” or “depletion of natural resources”. The hybrid nature of the claims dealt with by the Panel may be illustrated by the table below, which lists the limited number of the claims, or claim units, which were accepted by the Panel in its Fifth Instalment:

Country

Claim

Amount requested (USD)

Amount recommended (USD)

Iran

Reduced crop yields

217,247,112

24,034,892

Decrease in production and market price of the crop concerned

Iran

(Temporary) loss of rangeland resources resulting from the presence of refugees

1,541,408

46,596

Size of the area and price of fodder

Iran

Medical treatment and public health facilities for refugees

5,639,273

3,366,964

(Reduced) annual official tariffs, unit cost per dosage of vaccines, cost of contraceptive services, cost of safe drinking water and sanitary facilities, overtime of staff

Iran

Monitoring of incidences of cancers

332,300

332,300

Information on expenses provided by Iran

Jordan

Salinisation and depletion of ground water resulting from the presence of refugees

1,465,565,462

1,344,661

Average unit costs of water conservation projects in Jordan

Basis for estimates

of natural resources’ would tend to exclude, for example, claims relating to pollution of the marine environment”, id. para. 38. 199


Amount requested (USD)

Amount recommended (USD)

Country

Claim

Basis for estimates

Jordan

Losses to terrestrial resources due to the influx of refugees and their livestocks (remediation of its rangelands, loss of forage production, damage to wildlife habitats, and disruption of a captive breeding programme)

2,474,391,198

160,582,073

Revised estimates for a cooperative rangeland management programme and captive breeding programmes

Kuwait

Marine and coastal resources

613,814,608

7,943,030 (shoreline resources)

Adjusted expenses for a compensatory restoration project

Kuwait

Treatment of injuries from mines and ordnance

2,385,617

2,354,903

Reimbursement for treatment of 143 persons (surgery costs were revised on the basis of actual cost at the hospital where the surgery was performed)

Kuwait

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) cases

1,181,450,810

5,909,343

Estimate of number of cases (41,700), time for treatment, number of visits (29,615) and average cost of visit

Saudi Arabia

Damage to intertidal shoreline habitats (losses in ecological services)

5,369,894,855

46,113,706

Estimates for two shoreline preserves operated for a 30-year period

As may be observed, the claims cover various types of damage: monetary compensation for loss of resources having commercial value (reduced crop yields,79 loss of rangeland resources, or depletion of water resources), expenses

79

According to the UNEP working group, this would not qualify as depletion of natural resources since the term refers to natural resources “which occur in their natural state (i.e. excluding for example an aquaculture project)”, id. para. 39.

200


for medical treatment or health monitoring programmes, or compensatory remediation measures for loss of ecological (non-commercial) values. This approach does not seem to be based on a rigid distinction between environmental damage per se and damage to persons and property, or between environmental damage and depletion of natural resources.80 In the same direction, it may be noted that “in some cases the claimants have used the terms environmental damage and depletion of natural resources interchangeably”.81 Instead of taking a narrow definition of damage to the environment, which would have excluded a number of claims as admissible, the Panel adopted a comprehensive approach, which enabled it to deal with the various claims submitted to it. In a sense, this is perfectly normal. Major environmental accidents not only generate environmental damage stricto sensu, but also damage to persons and property, as is demonstrated by the claims made in relation to the Prestige and Erika 82 disasters. In line with its comprehensive approach, the Panel did not feel that the scope of admissible claims was limited by the categories of damage listed in paragraph 35 of Governing Council decision 7. On several occasions, it affirmed that paragraph 35 did “not purport to give an exhaustive list of the activities and events that can give rise to compensable losses or expenses; rather

80

For example, in addressing the problem of valuation methodologies for assessing the value of “loss or depletion of natural resources” (Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 72), the Panel referred to “Habitat Equivalency Analysis” (“HEA”) (see also supra para. 8). This technique is used “to determine the nature and extent of compensatory restoration that is necessary to compensate for the loss of ecological services” (id. para. 73), i.e., as regards non-commercial value of the environment, and therefore does not correspond to the notion of depletion of natural resources as defined by the UNEP working group.

81

M. Kazazi, op. cit. note 35, p. 116.

82

In the case of the Erika, see, for example, the table of claims reproduced from IOPC Fund (1992) document 92FUND/EXC.33/5 of 4 May 2006, para. 6.3: Situation as at 30 April 2006 Category Mariculture & oyster farming Shellfish gathering Fishing boats Fish & shellfish processors Tourism Property damage Clean-up operations Miscellaneous Total

Claims submitted 1 007 530 319 51 3 692 711 148 532 6 990

Claims assessed 1 002 527 318 50 3 671 685 143 485 6 881

Claims rejected 89 109 29 6 440 342 12 30 1057

Number of claims 844 370 282 50 3 202 330 122 452 5645

Amounts (EUR) 7 758 232 889 189 1 099 551 43 976 832 76 404 591 2 059 060 21 605 370 6 716 440 117 509 265

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it should be considered as providing guidance regarding the types of activities and events that can result in compensable losses or expenses”.83 The main types of damage submitted to the Panel under the general category of environmental damage and depletion of natural resources may be summarised as follows: (i) Monitoring and Management Costs Claims for reimbursement of costs incurred for studies to assess and monitor damage to the environment were examined as a matter of priority by the Panel in its report on the First Instalment.84 The difficulty here arose from having to reach a decision on those claims before having established that damage had actually occurred.85 The practice of the IOPC Fund could not assist the Panel since the Fund only reimburses the cost of studies to the extent that they contribute to the submission of admissible claims.86 Accordingly, the Panel could not have taken any decision – with the exception of provisional payments – before a thorough examination of the merits of the claims. As we may realise, it would have been difficult to justify such an approach in light of paragraph 35, (c) and (d), of Governing Council decision 7,87 which lists certain monitoring and assessment measures as admissible claims. The Panel followed a liberal approach in this matter. It observed that “it would be both illogical and inequitable to reject a claim for reasonable monitoring and assessment on the sole ground that the claimant did not establish beforehand that environmental damage occurred”.88 Therefore, it did not consider “that conclusive proof of environmental damage is a prerequisite for a monitoring 83

Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, paras 28 and 67. See also e.g., Second Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 23.

84

In response to a request by the claimants, the Governing Council decided in 1998 that “appropriate priority should be given to the processing of such claims, so that the claims could be resolved quickly and separately from the resolution of the related claims for environmental damage”, First Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 17. See also Press Release for the Closing of the 29th Session of the Governing Council, 30 September 1998.

85

First Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 29.

86

If, for example, the studies “show no evidence of an environmental impact, or show an effect that cannot be repaired for financial or technical reasons”, the claim would not be admissible (E. Brans, op. cit. note 10, p. 354). See, for example, the IOPC Claims Manual which states that the “Fund may contribute to the cost of such studies provided that they concern damage that falls within the definition of pollution damage in the Conventions, including reasonable measures to reinstate a damaged environment. In order to qualify for compensation it is essential that any such post-spill studies are likely to provide reliable and usable information” (op. cit. note 34, p. 32).

87

See infra, para. 24.

88

Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 29.

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and assessment activity to be compensable in accordance with paragraph 35 of Governing Council decision 7”.89 Since the admissibility of monitoring and assessment activity did not depend on the evidence of damage, the Panel had to elaborate its own criteria for determining whether a particular claim would be accepted. The main criteria retained in this respect are “sufficient nexus” between the activity and the alleged damage on the basis of the consideration of the likelihood that a damage occurred and was attributable to Iraq, the link between the proposed activity and the damage, and the usefulness of the activity in assisting the Panel and in producing “information that might be helpful in identifying environmental damage and depletion of natural resources, or that could offer a useful basis for taking preventive or remedial measures”.90 It would probably not be possible to extend the approach adopted by the Panel regarding monitoring and assessment measures – and which was largely the result of decision 7 – to other cases. Before an international court, both the applicant and respondent have equal rights and it would be difficult to justify a decision requesting the respondent to support the cost of monitoring studies alone before any conclusion had been reached on the existence of damage and on the liability of the respondent for such damage. That said, some comments of the Panel may still be relevant in other cases. We may, for example, share the view of the Panel when it stated that “a monitoring and assessment activity could be of benefit even if the results generated by the activity establish that no damage has been caused. The same may be the case where the results indicate that damage has occurred but that it is not feasible or advisable to undertake measures of remediation or restoration.” This “could assist the Panel in reviewing related substantive claims. It could also be beneficial in alleviating the concerns of Claimants regarding potential risks of damage, and help to avoid unnecessary and wasteful measures to deal with non-existent or negligible risks.”91 On that basis, a court could order studies or an expert opinion, if this may assist it in its work and is permissible under its rules, and it could decide to allocate the costs involved to both parties. In addition, the respondent could still be considered liable for the reimbursement of these costs in the situation where it is concluded that the damage caused by its act is not reparable. It might, however, not be appropriate to hold the respondent responsible for the costs if the damage was not a result of its act or omission. Finally, it is useful to refer to another test to which the Panel attached great interest. This is based on the cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of the proposed monitoring and assessment activity “by reference to generally accepted scientific

89

Id. para. 30.

90

Id. para. 35.

91

Id. para. 32. 203


criteria and methodologies”92 as well as the risks that it could generate for the environment. This may certainly serve as a guide in future cases. For example, with respect to a study proposed by Iran on the release of genetically modified bacteria into the environment to combat oil pollution, the Panel expressed concerns about the risks that the release of such organisms could pose to the environment and human health,93 “particularly so in view of the low probability that the experiment would have any practical utility”.94 It also took the same precautionary approach regarding a study on the introduction of non-native tree species into damaged forest areas.95 (ii) Damage to Health Consistent with its decision to adopt a broad definition of environmental damage, the Panel considered injury to health as admissible damage. This departs from the jurisprudence of the IOPC Fund, according to which “claims relating to the health risks, anxiety and loss of environment amenities [are] considered not to fall within the definition of pollution damage”.96 It would be possible to maintain that the Panel acted in this matter on the basis of Governing Council’s decision 7 providing for the reimbursement of expenses resulting from “monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings”.97 However, decision 7 addresses only monitoring measures and not, strictly speaking, damage to health. Claims regarding damage to public health (“expenses of medical treatment for specific diseases and mental conditions as well as general claims for loss of life or reduced quality of life of the population”98) were more specifically addressed in the Fifth Instalment. The main contention of Iraq was that, under the scheme established by Security Council resolution 687(1991), governments were not entitled to bring claims for diplomatic protection, and injuries to nationals are to be compensated on the basis of other categories of claims to be submitted by individuals. In its response, the Panel made a distinction between the substance of the right and procedural aspects. It kept intact the right of a State under general international law to bring international claims for damage to its nationals. This right is not affected by “the fact that an injured national can bring an individual claim for

92

Id. para. 35.

93

See id. paras 169-171.

94

Id. para. 171.

95

See id. paras 238-240.

96

E. Brans, op. cit. note 10, p. 321.

97

Para. 35(d) of Governing Council decision 7.

98

Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 59.

204


a specific injury or damage”99 as long as there is no duplication.100 However, the Panel could not ignore Governing Council decision 3, which specifically regulates individual claims for personal injury and mental pain and anguish. It then observed that the procedure established by decision 3 had restricted the right to bring claims for mental pain and anguish to individuals who satisfy the criteria set out in the said decision.101 Subject to this exception, claims for public health expenses (e.g. medical treatment and public health facilities for refugees (vaccinations, family planning, water and sanitary facilities), monitoring of incidence of cancers, treatment of injuries from mines and ordnances, treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder cases (PTSC)) were considered as valid claims submitted by governments. In this respect, it is interesting to note the claim submitted by Kuwait for loss of well-being (estimated at one quarter of a life year based on a value of USD 50,000 per life year) for each person suffering from PTSC. The Panel rejected the claim, not because it considered it as non-admissible (as was contended by Iraq), but for the reason that there was no valid justification provided by Kuwait for the valuation of the damage.102 This confirms that, in the Panel’s view, Kuwait was entitled to claim compensation for damages caused to its nationals. In relation thereto, it may be maintained that injury to persons and damage to property resulting from an international unlawful act causing environmental disaster are part of, or ancillary to, the direct prejudice caused to the right of the State concerned. The State then has the right to claim reparation for the damage caused to its territory, including damages caused to its nationals or persons under its jurisdiction.103

99

Id. para. 70.

100

See e.g., id. para. 398 regarding the claim of Jordan for medical treatment costs for low birth-weight infants and malnourished children.

101

See id. para. 404.

102

Id. para. 515. The Panel did not find it appropriate to apply figures based on valuation methods used in the United States, particularly given the fact that they are used to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of alternative medical interventions in the United States and not to compensate individuals.

103

There would therefore be no reason for the rule on the exhaustion of local remedies to apply since the violation would not relate to “an international obligation concerning the treatment to be accorded to aliens” (see article 22 of the draft articles on State Responsibility adopted on first reading by the ILC in 1977, ILCYB, Vol. 2, Part Two, p. 30). In this respect, article 14, para. 3, of the new draft articles on diplomatic protection adopted by the ILC in 2006 is less clear: “[l]ocal remedies shall be exhausted where an international claim … is brought preponderantly on the basis of an injury to a national”, GAOR, 61st Sess., Suppl. No. 10, p. 20. 205


(iii) Salaries and Other Personnel Expenses, Cost of Equipment Regarding claims for salaries and other personnel expenses or cost of equipment incurred as a result of measures undertaken to respond to environmental damage,104 the position of the Panel was defined in its report on the Second Instalment: “a claimant may be entitled to compensation if it incurs additional expenses to make up for the loss of the services of its regular personnel who have been assigned other duties or required to undertake additional tasks”.105 This excludes “expenses which would have been incurred regardless of invasion and occupation of Kuwait”. Although this position seems to correspond to the practice of the IOPC Fund,106 it does not represent the only view on the subject. For example, in the Amoco Cadiz case, it was finally decided that France would be entitled to claim compensation for the time (not only overtime) devoted to clean-up measures as well as the operating expenses (not only the incremental costs) of the equipment used during the clean-up. In support of its decision, the court of appeals stated rather convincingly: “[t]here can be no doubt that if France had hired the British Navy to clean up the coast, it could recover from Amoco the payments to the United Kingdom – even though the United Kingdom would have maintained its ships and paid its sailors anyway. So too Britain could recover if in the future it should hire the French Navy to aid in spills on the British side of the English Channel. Any victim of a tort must decide whether to deal with the injury by hiring assistance in the market or by devoting its own resources (including the time of its employees) to the subject.” (iv) Pure Environmental Damage and Damage to Natural Resources The Panel handled first claims for remediation measures before addressing the issue of depletion of natural resources. Accordingly, most of the claims for environmental damage were handled in the Third and Fourth Instalments,

104

This also includes expenses resulting from measures undertaken by military personnel “if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the predominant purpose of the activities was to respond to environmental damage”: Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 29.

105

See e.g. Second Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 30. Regarding the claim of Germany for the operating expenses of a vessel including salaries of the crew, the costs of the oil pollution control equipment, and payments for the repair and replacement of the equipment, the Panel found that these expenses qualified for compensation (see Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 242). It considered, however, that no compensation should be granted “for the salaries of the crew of the oil pollution control vessel because Germany has not provided evidence to demonstrate that the salaries were of an extraordinary nature” (id. para. 245). Likewise, the Panel made an adjustment “to certain operating expenses of the vessel to take account of maintenance and depreciation costs that would have been incurred in any event” (id. para. 246).

106

Cf. E. Brans, op. cit. note 10, p. 324.

206


the consideration of the issue of possible compensation for loss or depletion of natural resources being expressly allocated to the Fifth Instalment.107 The main issues dealt with by the Panel in the Third and Fourth Instalments concerned the scope and objective of the remediation measures. In line with the principle established by the PCIJ in the Factory at Chorzów case,108 the Panel stated that “the appropriate objective of remediation is to restore the damaged environment or resource to the condition in which it would have been if Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait had not occurred”.109 The emphasis was however placed on “restoring the environment to preinvasion conditions, in terms of its overall ecological functioning, rather than on the removal of specific contaminants or restoration of the environment to a particular physical condition”.110 In this respect, it was noted that, “in some circumstances, measures to recreate pre-existing physical conditions might not produce environmental benefits and could indeed pose unacceptable risks of ecological harm”.111 The Panel paid great attention to this principle in reviewing the details of proposed remediation action. While considering the possibility of natural recovery of damaged areas,112 it expressed its preference for well-established and cost-effective measures rather than more sophisticated and expensive methods.113 It consistently adopted the view that it would not be appropriate to recommend measures that could pose a risk to the environment.114 In this context, the Panel played

107

See Fourth Instalment, Part I, op. cit. note 2, para. 51.

108

Factory at Chorzów, Merits, 13 September 1928, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, p. 47: “reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed”.

109

Third Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 47.

110

Id. para. 48.

111

Fourth Instalment, Part I, op. cit. note 2, para. 50.

112

“The Panel does not consider that any revegetation measures are warranted in the areas damaged by tarcrete. After fragmentation of the tarcrete, natural recovery can be accelerated by the application of organic amendments to provide additional nutrients” (Third Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 129).

113

The Panel considered that the treatment proposed by Kuwait (of excavated contaminated soil by high temperature thermal desorption to remove the petroleum contamination) was “not warranted in the circumstances of this claim. Other remediation alternatives, such as landfilling, have proven to be equally effective, and they involve significantly less expense” (id. para. 114); see also id. paras 128 and 129.

114

In order to remediate damages to its coastal resources, Saudi Arabia planned an ambitious programme concerning 20 areas, totaling approximately 73 square kilometers, along its coastline. It proposed “to excavate and remove visibly contaminated material. During the excavation, salt marsh and tidal flat areas would be isolated from the sea by the construction of sea walls and dikes; these would be progressively removed as work is completed in 207


an active role in supervising, reviewing and redrafting the measures proposed. Although such a proactive role could considered as unusual for a judicial body, it seems however appropriate in the context of complex environmental cases involving the adoption of restoration measures. Turning now to the claims for depletion of natural resources, it may be observed that several claims made under this heading related to quantifiable losses (e.g., reduced yields of several varieties of agricultural crops,115 decrease in fisheries catches,116 salinisation and depletion of groundwater resources117). In some instances, however, the distinction based on the (non-) commercial value of the resources reaches its limits. For example, Iran claimed compensation (of USD 1,541,408) for damage to 6,644 hectares of rangelands caused by refugees on the basis of an “ecological service value” for rangelands of USD 232 per hectare.118 The loss was evaluated by the Panel at USD 46,596 by reference, inter alia, to the prices of fodder during the relevant period and a reduced damaged area of 220 hectares. In this case, the valuation of a loss of ecological services was calculated on the basis of the market price of a natural resource. That said, claims relating to natural resources with a market value did not raise specific problems and compensation was based on the market price of the resource concerned (crop, water), to the extent that satisfactory evidence was provided by the claimants. The issue of pure ecological damage or damage to resources that “are not traded in the market” is probably the most controversial issue addressed by the Panel. With particular reference to the practice of the IOPC Fund, Iraq argued that “awarding compensation for any such claim … would constitute a

each area. … The excavated material would be treated using high temperature thermal desorption at a number of facilities to be constructed for that purpose. Treated sediments would be blended with dredged subtidal sediments and replaced in excavated areas. The salt marshes would be revegetated after bio-remediation treatment” (id. para. 179). According to the Panel, “[t]he extensive excavation proposed by Saudi Arabia poses a risk of causing substantial environmental harm to areas that are already experiencing natural recovery, as well as to other sensitive areas where excavation may cause more harm than good. Furthermore, the extensive infrastructural work related to this excavation, such as construction and deconstruction of numerous seawalls, dikes and access roads for the transport of excavated material could have considerable adverse impacts on the coastal and marine environment” (id. para. 181). 115

See Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 103.

116

See id. para. 135.

117

See id. para. 319.

118

Iran used in this respect estimates published in R. Costanza et al., “The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital”, Nature, Vol. 387, No. 6630, 1997, p. 253 (see Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, footnote 35).

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revolutionary change in international law”.119 The Panel, however, did not find anything “in the language or context of Security Council resolution 687(1991) or Governing Council decision 7 that mandates or suggests an interpretation that would restrict the term ‘environmental damage’ to damage to natural resources which have commercial value.” What makes the report particularly interesting on this question is that this issue was settled not only on the basis of the Panel’s mandate120 but also with reference to general international law: “[i]n the view of the Panel, there is no justification for the contention that general international law precludes compensation for pure environmental damage. In particular, the Panel does not consider that the exclusion of compensation for pure environmental damage in some international conventions on civil liability and compensation is a valid basis for asserting that international law, in general, prohibits compensation for such damage in all cases, even where the damage results from an internationally wrongful act”.121 That said, the actual amount of reparation granted in the Fifth Instalment seems to fall short of the expectations raised by the general view taken by the Panel in favour of compensation for pure environmental damage. Most of the claims were indeed rejected. Certainly, they were not dismissed for inadmissibility but for lack of evidence. But the question could be asked as to whether the level of evidence required by the Panel does not make it illusory for pure environmental claims to succeed. There are several reasons, however, that may explain the low rate of successful claims for damage to natural resources or, in general, for environmental damage. One decisive factor has already been mentioned; it concerns the strict interpretation of the rules on evidence that place a heavy burden on the claimant, particularly with respect to damages resulting from concurrent causes. Another element is that claims for depletion of natural resources contained in the Fifth Instalment were submitted in addition to claims for primary restoration measures addressed in the Third and Fourth Instalments. Therefore, in each case of compensatory restoration, “the Panel has considered whether the claimant has sufficiently established that primary restoration has not or will not fully compensate for the losses. Compensation is recommended only where the evidence available shows that, even after primary restoration measures have been undertaken, there are, or there are likely to be, uncompensated losses”.122 In practice, several claims were indeed rejected on the ground that the damage was adequately repaired

119

Fifth Instalment, id. para. 47.

120

Id. para. 55.

121

Id. para. 58.

122

Id. para. 82. 209


through the restoration measures already awarded in the reports on the Third and Fourth Instalments.123 Valuation methodologies used in claims with respect to resources “not traded in the market” have also played an important role in the determination of the Panel. In their claims, the claimants used different valuation methodologies (e.g., the habitat equivalency analysis) to determine the nature and extent of the loss of ecological services and the “compensatory restoration projects that are intended to offset the ecological services that have been lost between the time of initial damage to the resources and the time of their full recovery”.124 This was opposed by Iraq, which argued that these methodologies were “shot through with uncertainty” and constituted “abstract and theoretical methodologies” of the kind that international bodies, for example, the IOPC Fund had rejected.125 This argument did not convince the Panel, which took the view that, “in the absence of precise rules or prescriptions on the methods for evaluating damage, courts and tribunals are entitled and required to evaluate damage and determine appropriate compensation, relying on general principles for guidance, particularly the principle that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act”.126 The Panel also referred to the Trail Smelter award, which had considered that “[w]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty … while the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate.”127 For these reasons, although it recognised the difficulties relating to the use of valuation methodology relating to non commercial natural resources, it did not consider it a valid reason to reject these methodologies. At the same time, the Panel declared that claims presented on the basis of these methodologies “should be accepted only after the Panel has satisfied itself that the extent of damage and the quantification of compensation claimed are appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances of each claim”.128 In practice, the Panel examined carefully the valuation methodologies used by claimants and rejected them whenever it came to the conclusion that these methods were applied in an artificial way.

123

For examples where the panel concluded that there are no compensable losses beyond those addressed in the remediation measures, see id. paras 427 and 607. For examples of admissible compensatory damages, see id. paras 446 and 630.

124

Id. para. 73.

125

Id. para. 74.

126

Id. para. 80.

127

The Trail Smelter case, op. cit. note 4, p. 1920, quoted in Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 80.

128

Fifth Instalment, id. para. 82.

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As an illustration, reference may be made to the claim from Saudi Arabia for loss of marine and coastal wildlife caused by oil spills.129 Saudi Arabia sought “compensation based on the numbers of birds and marine mammals which were killed” on the basis of a unit cost for restocking. While the Panel accepted as a reasonable approximation a certain number of birds lost (22,500 deaths of pelagic birds and less than 1,000 wading birds) and took the view that “a restocking programme is conceptually a reasonable approach to compensate for the lost birds”, it eventually rejected the claim because Saudi Arabia had “not provided a sufficient basis for costing it”.130 It is true that, in this case, the unit cost for restocking was “based entirely on information obtained from published scientific literature”.131 Likewise, Kuwait valued its claim for loss of recreational activities at beaches by reference to a survey-based valuation technique. While the Panel admitted that some damage had occurred, it expressed doubts regarding the valuation technique, in particular regarding the accuracy of information provided by persons questioned in a survey conducted after more than ten years. It therefore rejected the claim for lack of evidentiary requirements.132 The use of the HEA also proved to be inconclusive, mainly for the reason that the data used by the claimants regarding intensity of damage, loss of services or recovery periods were inappropriate or overestimated in the view of the Panel.133 Finally, a further problem – linked to the valuation methodologies – relates to the issue of monetary compensation for loss of ecological services. According to general international law, when restoration or restitution in kind is not possible, monetary compensation constitutes a valid form of reparation. Applied to pure environmental damage, this would require that a price for ecological services be fixed and monetary compensation be paid accordingly. Conceptually, this is feasible and it is commonly done with respect to the costing of human life for insurance purposes. It is however important to appreciate the reasons why monetary compensation for pure environmental damage (or damage to natural resources without market value) does not seem appropriate. As observed by the Panel, the emphasis in environmental cases is placed on primary restoration. The objective is to restore the ecological functions of a damaged ecosystem.

129

See id. paras 650 et seq.

130

Id. para. 660.

131

Id. para. 658. The data were obtained from the “Primary Restoration Guidance Document for Natural Resource Damage Assessment Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990” issued by the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, (id. para. 653).

132

Id. paras 457-465. See also para. 439 regarding claims for loss of aquatic biota or para. 672 concerning a claim for ecological and economic losses of fisheries resources, which was simply based on estimated lost catch without taking into account other relevant criteria such as “reduced fishing activity during and soon after the invasion”.

133

See id. paras 424 and 606. 211


Therefore valuation methods are not tools used to determine an amount of damages that the claimant will dispose of as it sees fit. Valuation methods will be used to determine the extent of restoration projects that will assist the environment in recovering its ecological functions. The claim of Jordan for damage caused to its rangeland may serve as an illustration. In addition to an amount of USD 24,835,400 for the creation of 185,000 hectares of rangeland reserves, Jordan claimed compensation for resource losses that could not be fully compensated by the proposed reserves. By using HEA, Jordan “determined that approximately 25 million hectares of additional reserves [were] needed for this purpose”. The compensation requested (USD 2,449,308,925) was “based on the costs of establishing and maintaining the additional reserves”.134 Observing that, because of the limited size of its territory, Jordan could not implement the proposed compensatory remediation measure, the Panel did not “consider that the amount requested on the basis of such a programme would constitute the appropriate compensation for the loss”.135 Accordingly, it limited the compensation to the cost of a less ambitious alternative management programme. It is also important to point out in this context that, on the basis of the recommendations of the “F4” Panel, the UNCC will continue to monitor the use of funds allocated for monitoring and assessment or remediation purposes.136 The Governing Council adopted guidelines to this effect requesting governments “to submit to the secretariat every six months progress reports concerning the status of the funds received and the environmental remediation projects and monitoring and assessment activity”.137

Conclusion Undoubtedly, the reports of the “F4” Panel represent a corpus of decisions that will be used as precedents in future complex environmental cases. This is so not only because of the number of claims and the amounts involved but also because of the pronouncements made by the Panel on legal issues relating to environmental claims. While relying on the practice of bodies performing similar functions, in particular the IOPC Fund, the Panel did not hesitate to develop other approaches and to have recourse to general international law. We may in particular refer to the duty to mitigate damages or the criteria used to assess the reasonableness

134

Id. para. 356.

135

Id. para. 362.

136

See id. paras 780 to 782.

137

Guidelines for the follow-up programme for environmental awards, appendix to decision 258 of 8 December 2005 (S/AC.26/Dec.258 (2005)); see also para. 5 in the following decisions of the Governing Council: 212, 234, 235 and 248.

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of monitoring and restoration measures. In addition, the Panel established a pattern that could be followed in other international environmental cases. First, it adopted a comprehensive approach to environmental damage, which not only includes pure ecological claims but also injuries to persons and damage to property. Secondly, primary restoration measures represent the objective of the reparation regime in case of environmental damage. Thirdly, when restoration is not feasible or when restoration measures do not cover adequately the temporary loss of ecological services, compensatory remediation measures are allowed, for example in situ or in equivalent areas. Fourthly, restoration measures adopted by the Panel are monitored and the claimant States are required to submit regular reports on the use of the funds allocated to them. The Panel did not, however, solve all problems relating to the valuation of ecological services or natural resources not traded in the market. While the Panel seems to have accepted in principle the use of recent valuation methodologies, in practice it did not endorse their results. We must recognise, however, that in dealing with valuation of environmental damage, the objective of the Panel was not to fix an amount of monetary compensation (which could then have been calculated in a more approximate way)138 but to determine the level and extent of ecological losses that should be repaired by restoration measures. Ordering unreasonable or useless restoration measures would serve neither the cause of the environment nor the work of the Panel. Another reason for the strict approach of the Panel may also be found in the lack of sufficient evidence submitted by the claimants. With a team of experts assisting it,139 the Panel was well equipped to assess the serious character of the evidence supporting the claims. And it dismissed the results of valuation methodologies that were used artificially without paying due regard to the particular circumstances of the claims concerned. Litigants in future cases would be well advised to ensure that valuation methodologies are properly adjusted to the specifics of the claims. On several points, the solutions adopted by the Panel are closely linked to the specifics of its mandate and should not be considered as applicable to other

138

See section II2C(iv) above and note 127.

139

The panel was assisted by a multi-disciplinary team of independent experts “inter alia, in the fields of desert ecology and botany, biology, agriculture, forestry, plant pathology, soil fauna, landscape ecology, terrestrial and marine remediation techniques, marine biology, coastal ecology and geomorphology, geology, hydrogeology, water quality, chemistry, water treatment engineering, coastal and civil engineering, veterinary toxicology, natural resource and economic damage assessment, cultural heritage, ecological and health risk assessment, economics, statistics, remote sensing, modelling of the transport of airborne pollutants, epidemiology, toxicology, demography, internal medicine, cardiovascular and pulmonary medicine, endocrinology, vascular medicine and haematology, reproductive health, mental health, orthopaedic surgery, psychiatry, prosthetic devices, infant and child health, oncology and health care economics”, Fifth Instalment, op. cit. note 2, para. 88. 213


cases. This concerns in particular the decisions of the Panel to reject claims for damages resulting from concurrent causes whenever it is not possible for the claimant to determine the extent of the damage attributable to Iraq. Finally, it is remarkable that an international body was able to develop a coherent set of decisions in handling a large number of complex claims within a reasonable period of time. This underlines the useful role that international judicial bodies may play, especially when compared to the complexities and length of proceedings relating to large international claims brought before municipal courts.

214

CONSIDERATIONS ACTUELLES SUR L’INEXÉCUTION DES DECISIONS DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE Maurice Kamto

Introduction

T

out refus d’exécuter une décision du juge constitue une atteinte sévère au crédit de la justice ; et tout discrédit de la justice est ruine du droit. Que notre regard se porte sur l’inexécution de la res judicata dans l’ordre international pour chercher matière à hommage au dédicataire des lignes qui suivent ne surprendra guère. Car, si le Président Thomas Mensah a mis autant d’ardeur à servir la justice internationale, singulièrement au sein du Tribunal international du droit de la mer, c’est assurément parce qu’il a foi que la justice peut contribuer à régler durablement les différends internationaux, en particulier dans un monde plus que jamais en proie à des affrontements d’intérêts les plus variés. La réflexion sur la question de l’inexécution des décisions des juridictions internationales n’est pas nouvelle. La littérature en la matière abonde.1 Les cas d’inexécution des sentences arbitrales avaient alerté les rédacteurs du Pacte de la Société des Nations, puis la Charte des Nations Unies a voulu prémunir les arrêts de la Cour internationale de Justice (CIJ ou Cour) de ce risque en instituant une procédure porteuse ab initio des germes de son inefficacité. L’article 94 §2 de la Charte y relative dispose :

1

Voir notamment : Sh. Rosenne, «L’exécution et la mise en vigueur des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice », RGDIP, 1953, pp. 532-583 ; O. Schachter, « The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions », AJIL, Vol. 54, 1960, p. 2 ; A. El Ouali, Effets juridiques de la sentence internationale. Contribution à l’étude des normes internationales, Paris, LGDJ, 1966 ; W.M. Reisman, «The Enforcement of International Judgments », AJIL, 1969, Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 1-27 ; G. Guillaume, « De l’exécution des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice », RSDIE, 1997, No. 4, pp. 431-447.



« Si une partie à un litige ne satisfait pas aux obligations qui lui incombent en vertu d’un arrêt rendu par la Cour, l’autre partie peut recourir au Conseil de sécurité et celui-ci, s’il le juge nécessaire, peut faire des recommandations ou décider des mesures à prendre pour faire exécuter l’arrêt ». Le problème de l’inexécution des décisions de la CIJ ne doit pas être confondu avec la question de l’autorité de la chose jugée par la Cour mondiale. Si l’on fait abstraction de la question de la qualité des décisions de la Cour dont dépend, diton, l’autorité de la chose jugée,2 la maxime selon laquelle res judicata pro veritate habetur s’applique sans conteste à ces décisions. Au demeurant, le caractère obligatoire des décisions de la CIJ est affirmé, comme on le sait, en des termes sans équivoques dans le Statut de ladite Cour, notamment dans ses articles 59 et 60 ainsi que dans l’article 94 §2 de la Charte des Nations. Nul n’a, du reste, jamais nié la règle résultant de ces dispositions. L’inexécution ne consiste généralement pas en une remise en cause de cette règle ; elle est liée aux difficultés rencontrées par une ou toutes les parties dans la mise en œuvre d’une décision du juge international. Ces difficultés sont généralement d’ordre politique ou pratique, rarement de nature juridique. Une vraie difficulté d’ordre juridique s’apparentera en général à une question d’interprétation et pourra dès lors être soumise à l’appréciation de la Cour. D’une manière générale, la négociation permet de venir à bout de la plupart de ces difficultés. Cela implique une entente entre les parties, laquelle n’est possible que s’il existe de part et d’autre une volonté d’exécuter. Or, il se peut qu’une telle volonté n’existe pas toujours. C’est pour faire face à cette hypothèse que la Charte a prévu le dispositif de l’article 94 §2 suscité, qui s’apparente à une procédure d’exécution forcée. L’inexécution est un acte de rébellion post-judiciaire tendant à annihiler les effets d’une décision de la Cour. Face à un pareil acte, le paragraphe 2 de l’article 94 précité est une arme peu dissuasive, dans la mesure où il n’y a aucune garantie qu’elle tonnera en cas de besoin ; elle peut n’être qu’un pétard mouillé. Or, à quoi sert-elle une menace qui ne peut être mise à exécution de façon contraignante ? Seule la certitude qu’une sanction s’abattra en cas de manquement à une obligation juridique est de nature à dissuader un possible délinquant. Le potentiel d’inefficacité contenu dans l’article 94 §2 exige donc la plus grande attention. La juridictio par une instance tierce réputée impartiale, en l’occurrence la CIJ, est une des conditions de possibilité de l’ordre juridique

2

Voir G. Guillaume, « Avant-propos » à l’ouvrage de A. Azar, L’exécution des décisions de la Cour internationale de justice, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2003, p. XX.

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Considerations actuelles sur l’inexécution des decisions de la Cour internationale de Justice

international.3 Et dans la mesure où l’obligation d’exécuter est une conséquence essentielle de la res judicata, l’inexécution constituerait assurément une menace à la construction d’un état de droit dans l’ordre international (I), l’état de droit étant le signe même de l’ordre juridique organisé. Certes, la doctrine ne semble pas avoir été alertée du risque que l’inexécution fait ainsi courir à l’édification de l’état de droit au niveau international ; elle a néanmoins alimenté un débat juridique nourri sur l’article 94 §2 en pointant ses faiblesses, sans toutefois sortir, il est vrai, d’une logique de technique juridique pour y remédier. Mais on n’a guère avancé. Sans doute convient-il alors de rechercher ailleurs une solution permettant d’assurer l’efficience de l’article 94 §2 sans passer par une modification de la « philosophie » qui sous-tend cette disposition. En cette matière comme en bien d’autres l’expérience est bonne conseillère. Et de fait, une expérience novatrice récente de mise en œuvre d’un arrêt de la CIJ inspire une approche réaliste (II), alliant l’efficacité pratique du mécanisme et l’acceptabilité de celui-ci par les Etats et l’instance onusienne chargée à titre principal de veiller à l’exécution des décisions de la Cour mondiale.

I. Une menace à la construction d’un Etat de droit au niveau international La question de l’état de droit au niveau international fait désormais l’objet d’une attention particulière de la communauté internationale. Déjà, le Document final du Sommet mondial organisé en 2005 par les Nations Unies, à New York, le considérait comme un principe fondamental et les Etats ont apporté un ferme soutien à cette idée en reconnaissant « la nécessité de voir l’état de droit consacré et respecté par tous aux niveau national et international » ; et ils ont complété cette déclaration par un certain nombre d’engagements concrets visant à la renforcer.4

3

Voir C. Leben, « La juridiction internationale », Droits, 1989, p. 146 ; H. Thierry, « Le suivi des décisions juridictionnelles », in L’effectivité des organisations internationales : mécanismes de suivi et de contrôle, Paris, Pedone, 2000, p. 175 ; A. Azar, op. cit., p. 1.

4

Voir Nations Unies, résolution 60/1 de l’Assemblée générale. La notion d’état de droit est omniprésente dans le Document final en question qui la considère comme un élément indispensable de la réalisation d’un certain nombre d’objectifs tels que une croissance économique soutenue, un développement durable, et l’élimination de la pauvreté et de la faim. (Voir aussi : Demande d’inscription d’une question à l’ordre du jour provisoire de la soixante et unième session. L’état de droit aux niveaux national et international, Annexe à la lettre datée du 11 mai 2006 adressée au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies par les Représentants permanents du Liechtenstein et du Mexique auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies. Doc. A/61/142). 217


L’état de droit s’entend, au niveau international, d’un ordre juridique fondé sur la prévisibilité et la sécurité juridiques et dans lequel tous les sujets de droit sont soumis sans discrimination aucune aux règles de droit, la violation de la règle de droit étant sanctionnée, soit de manière transactionnelle par les sujets concernés, soit par un tiers impartial de nature juridictionnel ou non. L’état de droit ainsi entendu est un progrès de la civilisation commune internationale et son renforcement ne peut qu’aider à maintenir la paix entre les nations.5 L’entreprise de codification du droit international, notamment par une instance comme la Commission de droit international (CDI), tout comme l’œuvre de la Cour internationale de Justice, en tant qu’«organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies », constituent des piliers de l’état de droit au niveau international dans la mesure où elles concourent toutes deux à son enracinement et sa promotion. Pour les « petits Etats », cet état de droit est parfois une question de survie. En tant que pierre angulaire du règlement des conflits internationaux, l’état de droit postule le respect scrupuleux des décisions prises par les instances internationales compétentes. Il ne pourrait prospérer dans un système juridique dans lequel les décisions judiciaires pourraient facilement être tournées ou rejetées, de surcroît sans conséquence fâcheuse pour le délinquant. Un tel contexte installerait les sujets de droit dans une totale insécurité juridique, voire dans l’anarchie des rapports de puissance où le droit de la force triomphe si aisément de la force du droit. 1. L’inexécution, source d’insécurité juridique L’article 94 §2 de la Charte des Nations Unies cherche sans doute à éviter pareille situation. La rédaction de cette disposition montre à quel point les rédacteurs de la Charte eurent à cœur d’instituer une procédure extrêmement souple qui laisse toute latitude d’action aussi bien à l’Etat lésé qu’au Conseil de sécurité. L’Etat « victime » d’une inexécution a la faculté de recourir au Conseil de sécurité : il « peut » porter la question devant celui-ci, il n’est pas tenu de le faire. Cette formulation est logique dans la mesure où l’on ne peut pas contraindre un sujet de droit à jouir d’un droit établi à son profit ; il a toujours la faculté d’en jouir ou d’y renoncer. Est de portée différente, en revanche, la faculté laissée au Conseil de sécurité de décider ou de ne pas agir lorsqu’une partie lésée fait recours à lui. Cette liberté est énoncée de façon inutilement emphatique par la juxtaposition de deux expressions traduisant toutes deux une faculté : le Conseil « peut, s’il le juge nécessaire … ». Il ne s’agit donc pas pour lui d’un pouvoir lié, c’est-à-dire d’une

5

Voir entre autres, la déclaration du délégué du Liechtenstein (M. Stefan Barrica) à la VIe Commission le 17 octobre 2006.

218


obligation s’imposant à lui, mais d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire ; il dispose en la matière d’une souveraineté d’appréciation des actions à entreprendre. Il suffisait pour exprimer cette faculté d’utiliser l’un ou l’autre des deux termes : « peut » ou « s’il le juge nécessaire ». Et de fait, cette dernière expression qui n’apparaissait pas dans le projet du Comité IV/I chargé à la Conférence de San Francisco de rédiger les dispositions relatives à la CIJ aurait été ajoutée lors de la 22e séance du Comité après que la Conférence eut écarté une proposition de Cuba tendant à rendre obligatoire les mesures à prendre par le Conseil de sécurité pour assurer l’exécution des arrêts de la Cour.6 Par sa nature discrétionnaire, le pouvoir accordé au Conseil de sécurité en la matière constitue un premier élément de faiblesse de la procédure instaurée par l’article 94 §2. Cette faiblesse ne consiste pas en ce qu’un tel pouvoir pourrait remettre en cause le caractère obligatoire de l’arrêt de la Cour, car ce caractère découle du consentement des Etats parties au procès, lequel consentement confère aux décisions de la Cour l’autorité de la res judicata ; cette faiblesse tient au risque d’ineffectivité des décisions de la Cour dont l’exécution forcée se trouve subordonnée à l’appréciation souveraine du Conseil de sécurité, qui peut se contenter de « recommander » des mesures, ou même choisir de s’abstenir de toute recommandation ou action : l’option est laissée au Conseil, soit de « faire des recommandations », soit de « décider des mesures à prendre » pour assurer l’exécution de l’arrêt. Autrement dit, il a le choix entre l’exécution suggérée (recommandation) – sans doute fortement – et l’exécution forcée (décision). Si le Conseil opte pour des recommandations, il laisse l’exécution au bon vouloir de l’Etat qui a refusé d’exécuter par lui-même, de bonne foi, l’arrêt de la Cour, car après tout les recommandations, fussent-elles celles du Conseil de sécurité, ne sont pas juridiquement contraignantes. Elles peuvent constituer tout au plus un moyen de pression politique sur l’Etat « rebelle ». Ces faiblesses cumulées du mécanisme prévu par l’article 94 §2 constituent une fêlure dans la construction d’un état de droit au niveau international. Certes, l’on convient que les mesures recommandées ou décidées par le Conseil de sécurité ne doivent tendre qu’à rendre effectif l’arrêt de la Cour, et ne sauraient avoir pour effet de modifier ou d’affaiblir son autorité : le Conseil ne saurait en effet s’ériger en une instance d’appel ou de cassation devant qui une partie ayant perdu un procès peut contester l’arrêt de la Cour – comme le fit l’Iran à propos de l’ordonnance du 5 juillet 1951 dans l’affaire Anglo-Iranian Oil Company7

6

Voir les travaux préparatoires de l’article 94 de la Charte des Nations Unies dans UNCIO, Vol. 13, pp. 302-352 ; et sur l’historique de cet article, voir A. Pillepich, Commentaire de l’article 94 dans J.-P. COT, A. Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies commentaire article par article, Paris, Economica / Bruylant, 1985, pp. 1272-1274 ; A. Azar, op. cit., p. 148.

7

L’Iran contestait devant le Conseil de sécurité cette ordonnance en arguant de l’incompétence de la Cour pour connaître de l’affaire en vertu des articles 1 §2 et 2 §7 de la Charte 219


– et s’octroyer un pouvoir de réformation de la décision en cause.8 L’article 60 du Statut de la Cour est sans appel : « l’arrêt [de la Cour] est définitif et sans recours ». Tout arrangement tendant à le modifier ou à l’adapter au contexte (politique, économique, sociologique, militaire, etc.) de son application pour en faciliter l’exécution ne peut se faire que sur la base d’un accord entre les parties au procès tranché par la Cour.9 Mais l’inertie du Conseil de sécurité serait perçue comme une caution à l’inexécution et donc au bafouement de l’autorité juridique des arrêts de la Cour qu’elle contribuerait de la sorte à fragiliser. Elle ouvrirait certainement la voie à un retour en force du règne des plus forts dans les relations entre les Etats. Les principes cardinaux du règlement pacifique des différends internationaux et de l’égalité devant la justice auraient-ils alors un sens si les décisions de la haute juridiction mondiale devaient rester lettre morte, ou de simples pétitions de principe sur des questions affectant parfois l’existence même de certains Etats qui, croyant en la force du droit et l’autorité de la justice, choisissent de porter leur différend devant elle plutôt que de se lancer dans l’aventure incertaine d’une confrontation violente avec l’autre Etat en cause ? Et comment un Etat peut-il croire en la règle de droit s’il est persuadé d’avance que les arrêts de l’organe judiciaire principal de l’Organisation mondiale peuvent être foulés au pied sans pour autant que l’Etat récalcitrant soit automatiquement contraint de s’exécuter ?

(UNSCOR, 6e année, 560e séance §§ 28-39, 43-67). 8

Voir E. Tuncel, « L’exécution des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice selon la Charte des Nations Unies », Neuchâtel, 1960, p. 70 ; Sh. Rosenne, « L’exécution et la mise en vigueur des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice », RGDIP, 1953, p. 571 ; A. Pillepich, Commentaire de l’article 94 in J.-P. Cot et A. Pellet, op. cit., 2e éd., 1991, p. 1282. Contra : C. Vulcan, « Exécution des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice d’après la Charte des Nations Unies », RGDIP, 1974, p. 197. La position de cet auteur selon laquelle le Conseil de sécurité peut s’ériger en une sorte de cour de cassation et se prononcer sur l’existence ou la non-existence de la nullité d’un arrêt soulevée devant lui par une des parties à un procès suscite des réserves dans la mesure où elle ne peut trouver dans l’article 94 § 2, ni dans quelqu’autre disposition de la Charte, une base juridique convaincante. S’agissant des positions plus nuancées ou moins claires mais tout aussi contestables, voir O. Schachter, op. cit. note 1, p. 20 ; E. Kerly, « Ensuring Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice » in L. Gross (ed.), The Future of the International Court of Justice, New York, 1976, p. 278; A. Tanzi, « Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations », EJIL, 1995, p. 547.

9

Sur ce point voir par ex., M. Kamto, « Le contentieux de la frontière maritime entre la Guinée Bissau et le Sénégal », RGDIP, 1997/3.

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2. L’inexécution et le risque de désaffection à l’égard de la Cour Les effets de l’inexécution des arrêts de la Cour seraient donc dévastateurs sur le système de l’état de droit en construction dans l’ordre international. On comprend alors l’intérêt soutenu de la Cour et des Etats membres de l’ONU pour le sort ultime d’un arrêt contesté par une des Parties au procès, comme on a pu le constater à propos de l’arrêt du 10 octobre 2002 dans l’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria. La Cour d’abord. Il est sans intérêt de se demander s’il convient à cet égard de parler de la Cour en tant qu’institution ou bien de ses membres, la distinction étant, dans ce cas, d’un intérêt purement théorique. Certes, il ne revient pas à la Cour d’assurer le suivi de l’exécution de ses décisions, sauf, le cas échéant, si les parties lui en font expressément la demande. Sa fonction de juger s’arrête au prononcé de sa décision. Mais le juge ne peut être – et, de fait, il n’est pas – totalement indifférent au sort de son jugement, même s’il revient en définitive aux parties de trouver les moyens de donner suite au verdict de la Cour. A cet égard, on a noté combien attentive a été la Cour à l’application de son arrêt du 10 octobre 2002 après la déclaration de rejet faite par le Nigeria, le 23 octobre 2002. Et c’est avec un soulagement à peine dissimulé que des membres de la Cour ont accueilli la conclusion de l’Accord de Greentree du 12 juin 2006 entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria relatif au retrait des forces nigérianes de la péninsule de Bakassi, et plus encore la mise en œuvre effective dudit Accord sanctionnée par la cérémonie de retrait et de transfert d’autorité du 14 août 2006, à Akwa, dans ladite péninsule. Les Etats membres des Nations Unies ensuite. Le choc provoqué par la remise en cause de l’arrêt du 10 octobre 2002 par le Nigeria avait crée une manière de scepticisme chez un certain nombre d’Etats, en particulier en Afrique, sur le bien fondé du choix du recours devant la CIJ pour le règlement de leurs différends internationaux. Tout en maintenant leur adhésion au principe du règlement pacifique des différends entre Etats, certains ont commencé à exprimer leur préférence pour d’autres mécanismes que la procédure judiciaire, en particulier les négociations directes, les bons d’offices ou la médiation. Ainsi, dans le différend qui oppose depuis plusieurs années la Guinée équatoriale au Gabon à propos de la souveraineté sur l’îlot de Mabnié (30 ha environ) situé dans les eaux territoriales gabonaises, les Présidents Bongo Odimba du Gabon et Obiang Nguema Mbazogo de Guinée équatoriale avaient écarté, en 2003, l’idée de porter ce litige devant la CIJ parce qu’ils voulaient éviter l’impasse dans lequel se trouvaient les Parties à l’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria, suite au rejet par ce dernier de l’arrêt rendu par la Cour dans cette affaire. Lors de leur rencontre en mai 2003, à Libreville, ils évoquèrent même une solution à l’amiable susceptible de faire l’économie d’une bataille juridico-historique : l’exploitation conjointe des ressources pétrolières potentielles des eaux de cet îlot. Une commission ad hoc chargée de travailler sur 221


la définition d’une zone d’exploitation conjointe (ZEC) fut créée et se réunit du 26 au 29 mai à Malabo, sans cependant parvenir à un consensus. Le dossier fut alors confié à un avocat canadien, Yves Fortier, dont la médiation s’est avérée infructueuse. Or, entre temps, l’exécution de l’arrêt du 10 octobre 2002 par le Cameroun et le Nigeria a connu des progrès significatifs et a pris un tournant décisif avec la conclusion de l’Accord de Greentree précité suivie de sa mise en œuvre effective. Cette tournure des choses – sans doute inattendue pour certains dirigeants africains – a renversé les perspectives et modifié l’attitude vis-à-vis de la Cour : l’effectivité de l’arrêt de la haute juridiction mondiale semble avoir balayé les réticences d’hier. Ainsi, interrogé en octobre 2006 sur ce qu’il ferait si la médiation dans l’affaire de l’îlot de Mabnié échoue, le Chef de l’Etat équato-guinéen a répondu avec aplomb : « Alors nous irons devant la Cour internationale de justice de La Haye. Tout comme le Cameroun l’a fait à propos de Bakassi ».10 On ne peut avoir meilleure illustration de l’impact de l’exécution des arrêts de la Cour sur la confiance des Etats en la pertinence de celle-ci comme instrument privilégié de règlement pacifique des différends internationaux et garante de l’état de droit au niveau international.

II. Une perspective de solution réaliste La réponse traditionnelle à la question de l’inexécution des arrêts de la CIJ propose une voie étroite qui s’est avérée jusqu’à présent impraticable. Les présentes observations suggèrent une approche nouvelle de la difficulté, inspirée par une expérience récente. 1. La solution traditionnelle et ses limites On s’accorde généralement à dire que pour garantir l’exécution des arrêts de la CIJ au cas où les Etats parties au procès n’y procèderaient pas spontanément, il faudrait éliminer les faiblesses intrinsèques des dispositions de l’article 94 §2 relevées précédemment. Cela passe nécessairement par une révision desdites dispositions de manière, d’une part, à rendre obligatoire l’action du Conseil de sécurité lorsque celui-ci est saisi par une partie pour cause de refus d’exécution de l’arrêt de la Cour par l’autre partie, d’autre part, à imposer au Conseil de sécurité de prendre dans ce cas des décisions, donc des mesures contraignantes, et non pas à faire de simples recommandations. Cette option avait été préconisée au moment même de l’élaboration de la Charte des Nations Unies. On rappellera en effet qu’au début de la Conférence 10

Voir son interview dans le magazine Jeune Afrique, No. 2387, 10. 8 au 14 octobre 2006, p. 54.

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de San Francisco, Cuba fit une proposition dans ce sens.11 A un demi siècle de distance, on retrouve une proposition similaire.12 Cette solution est techniquement irréprochable mais politiquement difficile à mettre en œuvre. Lier le Conseil de sécurité dans ce cas reviendrait à lui refuser toute marge de manœuvre dans un domaine où il voudrait pouvoir apprécier la situation, soupeser les enjeux de l’exécution de l’arrêt de la Cour au regard de la paix et de la sécurité internationales mais aussi des intérêts de certains Etats. En particulier, les Membres permanents pourraient difficilement s’accommoder d’une formule rigide ne leur laissant pas d’autre choix que de prendre des mesures contraignantes. Non seulement parce qu’elle leur enlèverait la souplesse qu’offre une disposition facultative leur permettant de ménager l’obligation d’exécuter les décisions de la Cour et les intérêts de tel « allié » d’une puissance Membre du Conseil de sécurité, mais aussi parce que les Membres permanents du Conseil étant eux-mêmes justiciables devant la Cour, n’aimeraient pas se retrouver dans une situation où l’un d’entre eux seraient contraints par ledit Conseil d’exécuter un arrêt qu’il juge contraire à ses intérêts nationaux (essentiels). Une telle situation serait embarrassante aussi bien pour le Membre en cause que pour les autres Membres permanents du Conseil. Par exemple, il eût été difficile pour le Nicaragua d’obtenir du Conseil de sécurité qu’il prît des mesures obligatoires pour contraindre les Etats-Unis à exécuter l’arrêt rendu le 27 juin 1986 dans l’affaire des Activités militaires,13 même s’il avait été saisi sur la base d’un article 94 §2 révisé dans une sens juridiquement contraignant pour le Conseil. Suivant une même logique, plusieurs Membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité ont dissuadé le Cameroun de saisir le Conseil en vertu de l’article 94 §214 afin qu’il

11

La proposition cubaine pour l’article 94 était la suivante : « 1. Les Membres de l’Organisation et les Etats qui sont parties au présent Statut s’engagent à se conformer strictement et de bonne foi aux sentences ou décisions rendues par la Cour. 2. En cas d’inobservation totale ou partielle d’une sentence ou décision rendue par la Cour, la partie intéressée pourra recourir au Conseil de sécurité et celui-ci devra adopter les mesures nécessaires pour assurer l’exécution de ladite sentence ou décision » (UNCIO, Vol. 4, p. 695). Nos italiques.

12

M. Ajibola, alors Juge à la CIJ, proposait la rédaction suivante de l’art. 94§2, dans un ouvrage à l’occasion du 50e anniversaire de la Cour : « If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under any decision given by the Court, the other party may rescourse to the Security Council which shall decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to such decision » (B.A. Ajibola, « Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice » in M.K. Bulterman, M. Kuijer, Compliance with Judgments of International Courts, Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 34.

13

Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci, (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis) (fond), CIJ Recueil 1986, p. 14.

14

Les intérêts économiques, en particulier pétroliers, de la plupart des Membres du Conseil de sécurité sont si importants au Nigeria, par rapport au Cameroun, qu’il aurait été difficile pour ce dernier d’obtenir une décision – peut-être même une recommandation – du Conseil contre le Nigeria. Toute analyse bien faite, le Cameroun aurait pu compter dans 223


contraigne le Nigeria à exécuter l’arrêt de la CIJ du 10 octobre 2002 que ce pays avait, comme on l’a vu, rejeté dans un premier temps et fit de son mieux pour compliquer sa mise en œuvre. Si, à la faveur d’un amendement de l’article 94 §2, les Membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité – qui forment, quoi qu’ils en disent, un directoire international – devaient se retrouver en situation de devoir agir contre l’un d’entre eux, ou de sévir contre un « allié » ou un « protégé » de l’un ou l’autre d’entre eux, il est probable que le Membre concerné ou intéressé serait amené à user de son « veto ». Il s’agirait assurément d’une décision aux conséquences désastreuses pour la justice internationale et l’état de droit au niveau international : « Selon que vous êtes puissant ou misérable, des jugements de Cour s’imposeront à vous ou non », pourrait-on dire alors en s’inspirant de la leçon du fabuliste. 2. Une approche nouvelle tirée de l’expérience Une solution plus réaliste pourrait s’appuyer sur deux remarquables acquis récents : d’une part, une contribution jurisprudentielle, d’autre part, une expérience dont on s’accorde à dire qu’elle est exemplaire. En premier lieu, il y aurait lieu de procéder à une relecture dynamique des dispositions de l’article 94 §2 de la Charte afin de prendre en compte l’évolution récente de la jurisprudence de la CIJ à propos de la force juridique des ordonnances en indication des mesures conservatoires. En effet, depuis son arrêt du 27 juin 2001 dans l’affaire LaGrand, la Cour considère que lesdites ordonnances ont une force juridique contraignante au même titre que les arrêts. S’exprimant à ce propos dans son ordonnance en indication des mesures conservatoires, rendue le 3 mars 1999, dans cette affaire, la Cour déclare : « l’ordonnance du 3 mars […] ne constituait pas une simple exhortation. Elle avait été adoptée en vertu de l’article 41 du Statut. Ladite ordonnance avait par suite un caractère obligatoire et mettait une obligation à la charge des Etats-Unis » .15 Ne conviendrait-il pas dès lors d’interpréter à l’avenir les dispositions de l’article 94§2 comme s’étendant également à toutes les décisions rendues par la Cour en matière contentieuse, hormis les ordonnances interlocutoires ? Certes, l’article 94 §2 ne se réfère expressément qu’au cas d’inexécution d’un arrêt de la Cour, et dans ses ordonnances récentes en indication des mesures

le meilleur des cas sur un ou deux vote(s) favorable(s) et l’abstention des autres Membres permanents du Conseil, bien que tous les cinq Membres permanents fussent convaincus du bon droit de ce pays. 15

Voir affaire relative à l’Application de la Convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaire (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis) dite affaire LaGrand, CIJ Recueil 2001, § 110.

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conservatoires – celle du 2 mars 1999 dans l’affaire LaGrand comme celles rendues postérieurement – la Cour ne se prononce pas sur l’applicabilité de l’article 94 de la Charte à ces ordonnances.16 Or, une interprétation stricte ou restrictive du terme « arrêt » exclue les autres prononcés de la Cour, en l’occurrence les avis consultatifs, mais aussi les ordonnances et les décisions interlocutoires du champ d’application de l’article 94 §2. Ainsi, estime-t-on qu’une ordonnance n’est ni un arrêt, ni une décision dans un litige, que « [m]ême si elle indique des mesures conservatoires, ce n’est qu’« à titre provisoire (…) en attendant l’arrêt définitif » », et que si les rédacteurs de la Charte « avaient voulu englober toutes les ordonnances ou certaines d’entre elles dans l’article 94, ils se seraient exprimés différemment ».17 La remarque n’est sans doute pas inexacte. Toutefois, l’interprétation de l’article 94 devrait évoluer à la lumière de la jurisprudence sus-évoquée de la CIJ sur la force juridique des ordonnances en indication des mesures conservatoires. L’interprétation restrictive était défendable à l’époque où l’incertitude prévalait encore sur la force obligatoire desdites ordonnances et où l’on trouvait au sein de la Cour même et chez une bonne partie des auteurs une inclination en faveur du caractère juridiquement non contraignant des ordonnances en question. L’équivoque en la matière est désormais levée ; il convient dès lors de ne pas persister dans des solutions qui n’en sont guère. En effet, si l’on convient que les dispositions de l’article 94 §2 sont à la fois « limitées, facultatives et imprécises », à quoi sert-il de renvoyer, comme il a été suggéré,18 l’Etat plaignant de l’inexécution d’un arrêt ou de toute autre décision de la Cour en matière contentieuse à la faculté de recourir à l’article 2 §2 de la Charte ou aux possibilités offertes par les chapitres VI et VII de la Charte ? Les actions au titre des dispositions visées ne relèvent-elles pas du Conseil de sécurité au même titre que celles qui peuvent être prises en vertu de l’article 94 §2 ? La solution radicale et juridiquement la plus pratique serait de réviser l’article 94 §2 pour substituer au terme « arrêt » celui de « décision ». Mais on sait la difficulté de réviser la Charte en quelque disposition que ce soit. La CIJ a déclaré la force obligatoire des ordonnances en indication des mesures conservatoires pour des raisons objectives : ces ordonnances sont rendues au terme d’une véritable procédure contentieuse, avec application du principe du contradictoire comme dans la procédure au fond, même si la compétence de la Cour est, à ce stade, une compétence prima facie. Les efforts déployés par les parties pour plaider leur cause dans cette phase, le travail judiciaire de la Cour et les nécessités qui dictent la prescription des mesures conservatoires exigeaient qu’il leur soient attachés

16

Voir P. Dailler, A. Pellet, Droit international public (Nguyen Quoc Dihn), 7e éd. Paris, LGDJ, p. 904.

17

Voir A. Pillepich, Commentaire de l’article 94 in J.-P. Cot et A. Pellet, op. cit., p. 1276.

18

Ibid. p. 1278. 225


des effets de droit de même nature que celle des arrêts.19 C’est donc désormais le cas. Dès lors, il ne semble pas qu’une interprétation large de l’article 94 §2 étendant son champ d’application aux autres prononcés non interlocutoires de la Cour – y compris donc aux ordonnances en indication des mesures conservatoires – puisse être considérée comme abusive. En second lieu, l’expérience de la mise en œuvre de l’arrêt rendu le 10 octobre 2002 dans l’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria mérite de retenir l’attention. Son caractère exemplaire fait l’unanimité tant en ce qui concerne la faiblesse de son coût au regard des mécanismes onusiens traditionnels de maintien de la paix que pour son efficacité dans la résolution pacifique d’un conflit entre deux Etats. De quoi s’agit-il ? Le 10 octobre 2002, la CIJ a prononcé son verdict dans cette affaire qui a opposé devant elle le Cameroun au Nigeria en huit ans et demi de procédure dans laquelle ont été exploitées toutes les ressources du droit processuel de la Cour. Le Nigeria rejeta cet arrêt dans une déclaration rendue public le 23 octobre 2002 par son Ministre des Transports, aux motifs tenant, d’une part, à la qualité juridique de l’arrêt qu’il trouvait contestable, et, d’autre part, à la nationalité de certains juges de la Cour qu’il considérait comme récusables dans le cadre de cette affaire.20 Cette réaction nigériane était inattendue, car peu avant le prononcé du verdict de la Cour dans ce différend, le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, M. Kofi A. Annan, avait réuni les Présidents Paul Biya du Cameroun et Olusegun Obasanjo du Nigeria à Saint-Cloud près de Paris, afin qu’ils examinent ensemble les moyens de désamorcer la tension que pouvait susciter le futur arrêt de la Cour. Aux termes de la déclaration adoptée à la fin de cette rencontre, le 05 septembre 2002, les deux Chefs d’Etat se sont engagés à : « – respecter et mettre en œuvre la décision de la Cour Internationale de Justice (CIJ) sur la Péninsule de Bakassi ; – créer un mécanisme de mise en œuvre avec l’appui des Nations Unies ; – reprendre à Abuja le 30 septembre 2002 les réunions de haut niveau de la Commission Mixte ». Les deux Chefs d’Etat ont également reconnu la nécessité de prendre des mesures de renforcement de la confiance, y compris la démilitarisation éventuelle de la péninsule de Bakassi, avec la possibilité de dépêcher des observateurs

19

Ce sont sans doute ces bonnes raisons qui ont amené les rédacteurs du statut du Tribunal international du droit de la mer à conférer une telle force contraignante aux ordonnances en « prescription » des mesures conservatoires rendues par ledit Tribunal.

20

Pour plus des détails sur ce rejet, voir M. Kamto, « La volonté de l’Etat en droit international », RdC, Vol. 310, spéc. le Chapitre V, Volonté de l’Etat et Justice internationale.

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internationaux pour surveiller le retrait de toutes les troupes ; l’exclusion de déclarations ou de communiqués provocateurs sur la question de Bakassi par l’une ou l’autre Partie ; la nécessité d’envisager cette question dans le contexte élargi des relations d’ensemble entre le Nigeria et le Cameroun qui offrent des possibilités de coopération dans divers secteurs. Il convient du reste d’indiquer que bien avant les plaidoiries orales devant la Cour sur le fond, le Nigeria avait pris clairement l’engagement, par le moyen diplomatique le plus solennel, de respecter le verdict de la Cour, quelqu’il soit, dans l’affaire qui l’opposait au Cameroun. C’est ainsi que dans une note verbale No. R. 36/2001 du 23 août 2001, le Haut Commissaire du Nigeria au Cameroun écrivait : « Le Nigeria demeure engagé à promouvoir des relations pacifiques et de bon voisinage avec la République sœur du Cameroun, y compris la résolution pacifique de la situation de Bakassi. Ceci vous informe de notre décision d’accepter le règlement judiciaire de cette affaire par la CIJ ». La déclaration nigériane de rejet de l’arrêt du 10 octobre 2002 fut donc d’autant plus surprenante qu’elle intervenait seulement moins de deux mois après la rencontre de Saint-Cloud et les engagements qui y furent pris par les plus hauts dirigeants des deux Etats, avec comme témoin le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies en personne. L’exécution dudit arrêt paraissait alors sérieusement compromise. C’est alors que la diplomatie vint au secours du droit et réussit à enclencher un processus vertueux que la rencontre de Saint-Cloud avait essayé d’anticiper sans y parvenir. En effet, à l’invitation du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies et en sa présence, les Chefs d’Etat camerounais et nigérian se sont retrouvés à nouveau, cette fois au siège des Nations Unies à Genève, le 15 novembre 2002. Cette rencontre a été sanctionnée par un communiqué, dit de Genève, du 15 novembre 2002, d’où il ressort que les deux Chefs d’Etat ont convenu d’un certain nombre de mesures à prendre pour la mise en œuvre de l’arrêt de la Cour. La plus importante de ces mesures est leur décision commune de demander au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de : « mettre en place une commission mixte bilatérale qui sera présidée par son représentant spécial, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, et chargée de réfléchir aux moyens de donner suite à l’arrêt de la CIJ et de faire avancer le processus ».

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Le Communiqué de Genève définit de façon précise le mandat de la Commission Mixte ainsi créée.21 Les deux Présidents ont également convenu d’examiner l’assistance supplémentaire dont les deux pays pourraient avoir besoin de la part des Nations Unies et de se rencontrer à nouveau le moment venu, sous les auspices du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, pour faire le point sur les progrès accomplis. Ils ont convenu par ailleurs que la Commission Mixte se réunira alternativement à Abuja et à Yaoundé, et que sa première réunion se tiendra à Yaoundé le 1 décembre 2002. Aussitôt après sa mise en place, la Commission Mixte s’est dotée de structures consacrées à des activités spécifiques, afin d’assurer l’efficacité de son action et de tenir son calendrier de travail. Ainsi, a-t-elle créé : – une Sous-Commission de la Démarcation ; – une Sous-Commission des Populations concernées ; – un Groupe de travail sur le retrait et le transfert d’autorité dans la zone du Lac Tchad ; – un Groupe de travail sur le retrait et le transfert d’autorité à la frontière terrestre ; – un Groupe de travail sur le retrait et le transfert d’autorité dans la péninsule de Bakassi ; – un Groupe de travail sur la frontière maritime. Depuis sa création, la Commission Mixte a tenu, à date (mai 2007), dix-huit sessions ordinaires et quatre sessions extraordinaires, alternativement à Yaoundé et Abuja, la première session ordinaire ayant eu lieu le 2 décembre 2002 dans la capitale camerounaise. Pour évaluer le chemin parcouru, les deux Chefs d’Etat se sont rencontrés le 31 janvier 2004 à Genève, à l’invitation du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies. A l’occasion de cette rencontre, dite de « Genève II », les deux Présidents ainsi

21

Ce mandat est le suivant : « La Commission Mixte se penchera sur toutes les incidences de la décision, notamment la nécessité de protéger les droits des populations concernées des deux pays. La Commission aura entre autres, pour tâche de procéder à la démarcation de la frontière terrestre entre les deux pays. Elle formulera également des recommandations sur des mesures de confiance supplémentaires telle que : la tenue, sur une base régulière, de réunions entre les autorités locales, des fonctionnaires gouvernementaux et les Chefs d’Etat ; la formulations de projets destinés à promouvoir des co-entreprises économiques de la coopération transfrontalière ; la renonciation par les deux parties à tout propos ou déclaration incendiaires au sujet de Bakassi ; le retrait des troupes des zones pertinentes le long de la frontière terrestre ; la démilitarisation ultérieure de la péninsule de Bakassi avec la possibilité de déployer un personnel international chargé d’observer le retrait ; la réactivation de la Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad ».

228


que le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies ont marqué leur satisfaction pour les progrès significatifs réalisés par la Commission Mixte dans la mise en œuvre de l’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice du 10 octobre 2002. Pour la démarcation de la frontière terrestre, le budget nécessaire à l’exécution de l’ensemble des travaux y afférents a été arrêté à la somme de 11.640.000 dollars US en juin 2003 à Abuja. Cette somme fournie par le Cameroun et le Nigeria avec l’appui de certains partenaires au développement22 a été déposée dans un Fonds d’Affectation Spécial (Special Trust Fund) auprès des Nations Unies à New York. La Division des Achats des Nations Unies a été chargée de la publication des appels d’offres et de la passation des marchés pour l’exécution des travaux. En ce qui concerne le retrait et le transfert d’autorité dans la zone du Lac Tchad, le Groupe de Travail mis sur pied à cet effet, le 28 octobre 2003 lors de la première Réunion extraordinaire de la Commission Mixte à Abuja, a mené à bien les opérations dont il était chargé, du 8 au 17 décembre 2003. Ces opérations ont été sanctionnées par la signature – par les chefs des délégations camerounaise, nigériane et onusienne à la Commission Mixte – des documents constatant le retrait et le transfert d’autorité d’un pays à l’autre de chacune des localités concernées. Pareillement, le processus de retrait et de transfert d’autorité sur la frontière terrestre a eu lieu du 15 juin 2004 au 15 juillet 2004. Afin de suivre une démarche continue du Lac Tchad à la mer, la Commission Mixte a décidé que les cérémonies de retrait et de transfert d’autorité sur la frontière terrestre auront lieu sur la base d’une démarcation provisoire. Comme dans la zone du Lac Tchad, ces cérémonies se sont déroulées sans incident, et ont été sanctionnées par la signature, par les responsables précités, des documents constatant le retrait et le transfert d’autorité d’un pays à l’autre. S’agissant de la question des populations concernées, la Sous-Commission qui en avait la charge a été créée à la 2ème session de la Commission Mixte à Abuja en février 2003. Elle a effectué plusieurs visites de terrain, dans la zone du Lac Tchad, sur la frontière terrestre et dans la péninsule de Bakassi pour identifier lesdites populations, évaluer leurs droits et proposer à la Commission Mixte les moyens susceptibles de garantir ces droits. Au cours de ces rencontres, ces populations ont été informées qu’elles pouvaient choisir entre les trois options suivantes : – conserver leur nationalité et résider dans le nouveau pays d’accueil dans le respect de ses lois et règlements ; – prendre la nationalité du pays d’accueil, conformément à sa législation ; – demander à être réinstallés sur le territoire de leur pays d’origine.

22

Le Cameroun et le Nigeria ont contribué pour 3 millions de dollars US chacun ; la Grande Bretagne a donné une contribution exceptionnelle d’1 million de livres, l’Union européenne a contribué pour 400,000 euros et permis au Cameroun et au Nigeria de bénéficier de 4 millions d’euros au titre du IIIe FED. 229


Partout, ces populations ont exprimé clairement leur désir de continuer à vivre en paix. Afin d’assurer le suivi des problèmes des populations concernées après le retrait et le transfert d’autorité dans les zones attribuées respectivement à l’un ou l’autre pays, la Commission Mixte a institué un Personnel d’Observation mixte (Cameroun-Nigeria-ONU) qui devait effectuer une visite sur le terrain un mois après le retrait et le transfert d’autorité dans la zone du Lac Tchad et un mois après le retrait et le transfert d’autorité le long de la frontière terrestre, puis une visite trimestrielle dans chacune des deux zones. Ces visites de terrain, qui ont eu lieu au cours des années 2004 et 2005,23 ont permis au Personnel d’Observation de constater que les populations nigérianes et camerounaises des zones passées sous l’autorité de l’un ou l’autre pays vivent en bonne intelligence, en sécurité et dans la paix. Chacune de ces visites de terrain a fait l’objet d’un rapport à la Commission Mixte. Le retrait des forces armées nigérianes de Bakassi et le transfert d’autorité au Cameroun dans cette péninsule est sans conteste l’aspect du processus de mise en œuvre de l’arrêt du 10 octobre 2002 qui a suscité la plus grande difficulté. Aux termes du dispositif de l’arrêt, cette opération devait se faire «dans les plus brefs délais et sans condition ».24 Le calendrier de travail de la Commission Mixte, adopté au cours de sa 5ème session tenue le 6 août 2003 à Yaoundé, étalait le retrait de l’administration civile, des forces militaires et de police nigérianes de Bakassi d’avril à mai 2004. Lors de la 10ème session de la Commission Mixte, qui s’est tenue le 2 juin 2004 à Abuja, le calendrier de travail pour le retrait et le transfert d’autorité à Bakassi a été révisé à la demande de la délégation nigériane et établi du 15 juillet au 15 septembre 2004, date de la cérémonie officielle marquant l’évènement, suivi, le 16 septembre 2004, par le déploiement du Personnel d’Observation de la Commission Mixte. Mais ce nouveau calendrier ne sera pas respecté. Après la réunion inaugurale du Groupe de Travail sur le retrait et le transfert d’autorité à Bakassi qui eut lieu, comme prévu, les 15 et 16 juillet 2004 à Abuja, le 2 août 2004, contre toute attente, le Chef de la Délégation nigériane saisit le Président de la Commission Mixte d’une lettre datée du 31 juillet 2004 pour suspendre la visite sur le terrain qui devait servir de base à l’élaboration du concept d’opérations de retrait de Bakassi. Le motif avancé était que le calendrier des activités pour Bakassi était désormais soumis à l’approbation des deux Chefs d’Etat.

23

Le Personnel d’Observation a effectué ces visites successivement sous la conduite d’un Colonel canadien, puis d’un Général ghanéen et ensuite d’un Général éthiopien, tous recruté par les Nations Unies.

24

CIJ Recueil 2002, para. 325, p. 457.

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Ce fut le début d’une période d’enlisement des travaux de la Commission Mixte et de blocage d’un mécanisme qui avait fonctionné jusque-là sans véritable accroc. Chaque tentative de relance du processus révélait l’ampleur du malentendu entre les deux Etats et la profondeur de l’impasse. Un troisième Sommet de Genève entre les Chefs d’Etat des deux pays sous les auspices du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies ne permit pas de venir à bout de la difficulté, mais offrit une voie de sortie bien trop étroite en prescrivant à la Commission d’élaborer un nouveau calendrier à soumettre à l’approbation des Chefs d’Etat. C’était une formule de circonstance pour sauver le Sommet qui était infructueux parce que les parties discutaient sur des non-dits. Car le véritable problème était ailleurs et la solution se trouvait au niveau des Chefs d’Etat et d’eux seuls. La Commission Mixte était désormais hors jeu sur cette question de retrait de Bakassi. C’est dans ce contexte que le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies soumit aux deux Parties un projet d’Accord concernant les modalités de retrait et de transfert d’autorité dans la presqu’île de Bakassi et, après consultations, invita les deux Chefs d’Etat à Greentree, près de New York, pour son examen et sa signature. L’Accord est signé le 12 juin 2006 par les Présidents du Cameroun et du Nigeria, et par des représentants des Etats « Témoins », en l’occurrence le Secrétaire général, M. Kofi Annan, pour les Nations Unies, et les représentants de l’Allemagne, des Etats-Unis, de la France et de la Grande Bretagne. Le Nigeria y reconnaît la souveraineté camerounaise sur la presqu’île de Bakassi (art. 1) et s’engage à retirer l’ensemble de ses forces armées de la péninsule dans les soixante jours à compter de la date de la signature de l’Accord, avec une possibilité exceptionnelle pour le Secrétaire général de proroger ce délai de trente jours (art. 2). Le Cameroun pour sa part s’engage à garantir aux ressortissants nigérians vivant à Bakassi l’exercice des libertés et droits fondamentaux consacrés par le droit international des droits de l’homme et les autres règles pertinentes du droit international (art. 3). Afin de bien circonscrire la portée de l’Accord, les Parties soulignent qu’il « ne peut en aucune manière être entendu comme une interprétation ou une modification de l’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice du 10 octobre 2002, dont il est une simple modalité d’application » (art. 7). L’Accord institue une Commission de Suivi composée des représentants du Cameroun, du Nigeria, des Nations Unies et des Etats témoins. Deux annexes sont jointes à l’Accord dont elles font partie intégrante : la première fixe les règles applicables dans une Zone de la péninsule devant rester sous administration civile et l’autorité d’une force de police nigériane nécessaire au maintien de l’ordre pendant une durée deux ans à compter de la fin du retrait des forces nigérianes ; la seconde consiste en une carte précisant les limites de ladite Zone, attestées par les signatures des deux Chefs d’Etat et du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies. Un Procès-verbal sur les modalités d’application de l’Accord a été signé le même jour par les trois personnalités.

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Le jour même de la signature de l’Accord de Greentree, le Chef de l’Etat camerounais formulait le souhait suivant : « Mon vœu le plus ardent est que les engagements pris soient scrupuleusement respectés. Il en va de notre crédibilité et de celle des Nations Unies ».25 Deux jours plus tard, le 14 juin 2006, le Chef de l’Etat nigérian déclarait, comme en écho, dans un discours à la Nation nigériane : « Fellow Nigerians, we have seriously and, over a long period of almost four years, worked on this Agreement. We accept it whole-heartedly and will scrupulously impliment it ».26 Cette présentation succincte du mécanisme de mise en oeuvre de l’arrêt du 10 octobre 2002 n’a point laissée de place aux nombreuses difficultés, impasses et obstacles réels ou artificiellement crées qui ont jalonné le processus. Des travaux techniques et des négociations complexes ayant des enjeux aussi importants que ceux en cause dans l’exécution dudit arrêt ne pouvaient en être épargnés, sinon ils n’auraient pas nécessité quatre années pour que soient créées enfin les conditions de leur aboutissement. Il nous a suffit d’exposer ici les mécanismes de cette expérience dont tous les observateurs saluent l’originalité. Dans cet ordre d’idées, on notera que les travaux du Groupe de Travail sur la frontière maritime ont connu une accélération depuis la signature de l’Accord de Greentree et sa mise en œuvre effective : les deux Etats s’étant accordés sur les paramètres techniques nécessaires à la finalisation du tracé de cette frontière telle que définie par l’arrêt de la Cour et transposée d’accord parties sur la carte 3334 de l’Amirauté britannique, édition 1994, une carte géoréférencée dans le système WGS84 comportant ledit tracé a été approuvée solennellement par les deux Parties, le 12 mai 2007, au terme de la Ve session extraordinaire de la Commission Mixte qui a eu lieu les 11 et 12 mai 2007 à Abuja. L’exemplarité du processus de mise en œuvre de l’arrêt du 10 octobre 2002 tient au moins à deux éléments essentiels : d’une part, l’originalité de son mécanisme dont l’articulation inédite explique sans doute son efficience ; d’autre part, son caractère particulièrement économique au regard du rapport entre sont coût et les résultats obtenus. Le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, M. Kofi Ata Annan, a félicité, le jour de la signature de l’Accord de Greentree, « the Heads of State of Cameroon and Nigeria for devising a new approach in the area of conflict resolution and emphasized that the United Nations has played an important role in the process through an extremely cost-effective mechanism ».27 Dans la même veine, le Président du Nigeria a déclaré : « Our agreement today is a great achievement in conflict prevention management which pratically reflects its cost effectiveness

25

Allocution du Président Paul BIYA publiée dans Cameroon Tribune du 15 juin 2006, p. 3.

26

Document de source diplomatique.

27

Voir Joint Communique after the Greentree Accord, New York, 12 June 2006, in Cameroon Tribune, 14 June 2006, p. 5.

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when compared to the alternative of conflicts resolution. It is significance therefore goes beyond Nigeria and Cameroon. It should represent a model for the resolution of similar conflicts in the rest of Africa, and I dare say in the world at large ».28 A la lumière de cette expérience, il y a lieu de suggérer la création d’un Mécanisme de suivi de l’exécution (ou de la mise en œuvre) des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice. Un tel Mécanisme pourrait être soutenu par un Fonds de contribution volontaire à l’instar du Fonds spécial du Secrétaire général pour l’appui aux pays pauvres qui portent leur différend devant la Cour sur la base d’un compromis. Ce Mécanisme serait rattaché au Secrétariat général des Nations Unies qui se trouverait de la sorte en position de pouvoir informer à la fois l’Assemblée générale et le Conseil de sécurité sur l’évolution de l’exécution d’une décision de la Cour. En cas de blocage, le Secrétaire général ferait un rapport informé au Conseil de sécurité, permettant ainsi à l’Etat « victime » de l’inexécution de saisir, sur une base solide, le Conseil en vertu de l’article 94 §2 ; le Conseil de sécurité pourrait alors prendre des mesures conséquentes sur la foi, et du rapport du Secrétaire général qui aura suivi les efforts d’exécution infructueux, et de la plainte de l’Etat « victime ». *** La Cour internationale de Justice n’a jamais eu autant de succès qu’au cours des années récentes. Les Etats Membres des Nations Unies ont lieu de se réjouir d’un tel succès au moment où la question de l’Etat de droit au niveau national et international apparaît comme une des préoccupations majeures des années à venir. Cette admirable vitalité de la Cour tient aussi bien à la qualité juridique de ses décisions qu’à la célérité de plus en plus grande avec laquelle elle connaît des affaires dont elle est saisie. Elle témoigne aussi du rôle essentiel que la Cour, organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies, joue dans le système juridique international contemporain par sa contribution remarquable tant au développement du droit international qu’au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. L’exécution de ses décisions ne saurait en conséquence être abandonnée au bon vouloir d’Etats exerçant une volonté tyrannique, à l’aune de leurs seuls intérêts nationaux et au gré de puissances anarchiques.

28

Voir Speech by President Olusegun OBASANJO of Nigeria at the signing Ceremony of the Greentree Agreement, in Cameroon Tribune, 15 June 2006, p. 3. 233

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NEGOTIATION AND LITIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT Vaughan Lowe

J

udge Mensah has spent his professional life in the service of the practical application of international law. In the International Maritime Organization, as Ghana’s High Commissioner in South Africa, and in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), whose first President he became, his concern has always been with what international law can actually achieve in the real world, rather than with theoretical speculations on what it might have achieved or should achieve. That is, I think, the right perspective from which to view the law; and in particular it is the right perspective from which to appraise the ITLOS and Part XV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). The perspective is important because it is undeniable that on one view the ITLOS has not been a success; and in consequence the dispute settlement system at the heart of the LOS Convention might also be thought to have failed. But it would be a mistake to take that view. It is true that between November 1994, when the LOS Convention entered into force, and the time of writing, in June 2006, only thirteen cases had been filed with ITLOS. That is the same as the number of cases currently pending before the International Court of Justice, long regarded as an under-utilized tribunal. Indeed, the ICJ has had more than three times as many cases put before it during the period since 1994. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), admittedly an unusually active international body, currently has more than one hundred cases pending before its tribunals. ITLOS has in its current docket only one: the apparently moribund Swordfish case between Chile and the European Community that was filed in December 2001 but now appears to have been side-stepped by developments elsewhere. The record of the ITLOS may seem even weaker when the nature of the proceedings before it is considered. Of the thirteen cases, seven are “prompt



release” cases brought under LOS Convention article 292: those are the Saiga, Camouco, Monte Confurco, Grand Prince, Chaisiri Reefer 2, Volga, and Juno Trader cases. Four other cases – the two Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, MOX Plant, and Land Reclamation – went to the ITLOS only for the purposes of provisional measures applications under article 290(5), the merits phases being assigned to Annex VII arbitral tribunals. With the Swordfish case lying dormant, only one case – Saiga (No. 2) – has actually proceeded to a hearing on the merits in ITLOS. In the meantime, LOS Convention Annex VII tribunals have been constituted for the Southern Bluefin Tuna, MOX, Land Reclamation, Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago maritime delimitation, and Guyana v. Suriname maritime delimitation cases; and other Law of the Sea cases, including Eritrea/Yemen, Romania v. Ukraine, Cameroon v. Nigeria, Nicaragua v. Honduras, Nicaragua v. Colombia, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France, 1995), were referred to other tribunals. The reasons for the relative unpopularity of the ITLOS are not wholly clear and must be a cause of some concern to the ITLOS and its hosts in Hamburg. Some factors appear to weigh against recourse to the ITLOS, when a choice of tribunals is possible. Members of an Annex VII tribunal can be hand-picked; and arbitral tribunals have a rather stronger record of rendering unanimous awards than does the ITLOS, whose decisions are regularly accompanied by an array of separate and dissenting judgments which some litigants may fear could harbour unhelpful dicta that might compromise the clarity or authority of the majority judgment – incisive as the individual analyses might be, and fruitful as they might be as seeds from which the law might develop. The splendid Hamburg home of the ITLOS is a delight to plead in; but its location is not as well served as are arbitration facilities in some other cities by flights and local transport, by local hotels and the local commercial equipment and administrative infrastructure on which delegations engaged in litigation like to be able to depend for their immediate needs. But against those factors must be weighed the advantages possessed by ITLOS: a truly expert tribunal, whose members have enormous experience in Law of the Sea matters; an efficient, and not over-burdened, Secretariat; and above all, an exemplary record for the swift and efficient disposition of cases brought before it. One may hope that the ITLOS will succeed in attracting more cases on the merits in future, and that the parties to Annex VII proceedings might seek to locate their tribunals in the ITLOS building. Nonetheless, it would be focussing on the wrong indicator to judge the success of the ITLOS by reference to the number of its decisions on the merits. The argument that I wish to put forward in this chapter is that the utility and effectiveness of a dispute settlement procedure cannot be measured in terms of the number of decided cases. A judgment in a case is only one element in the

236

The Interplay between Negotiation and Litigation in International Dispute Settlement

process of dispute settlement; and it is not necessarily either the final or the most important element. Judgments do not necessarily end disputes. Their lack of finality is a possible result of two primary sets of circumstances in which the judgment might be rejected. First, a losing party may choose to avail itself of an opportunity to challenge a judgment. The best illustration of this phenomenon is the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes – ICSID. The ICSID Convention provides, in articles 51 and 52, for the revision and the annulment of awards rendered by tribunals sitting under the auspices of ICSID. The disputes handled by ICSID tribunals typically involve claims of several hundred million dollars. An award against a State of, say, USD 200,000,000 is a serious matter. If there is only a 2 per cent chance of a challenge to the award succeeding, it is still a rational decision to spend a million dollars challenging the award – particularly as the most expensive part of the litigation, which includes the marshalling, and often the translation, and compilation of the (frequently massive) evidential database and the preparation of memorials that deal both with questions of law and with factual matters, will by then be complete. The additional cost to the State of mounting a purely legal challenge to the award is relatively small. Challenges may demand a good deal of ingenuity, and some serious digging into law libraries, but they do not generally involve anything like the time and effort that must be spent on the initial presentation of a case. It is, therefore, not surprising that it is often thought worthwhile mounting a challenge rather than simply accepting an adverse award. This is reflected in the practice under ICSID. In June 2006, seven cases pending before ICSID tribunals involved annulment proceedings.1 This is a significant proportion of ICSID cases, and should make those who advocate the creation of a standing appellate body to review the awards of ad hoc arbitral tribunals pause for thought. Even in the realm of maritime affairs challenges to judicial decisions are by no means unknown. The International Court of Justice has entertained a challenge to the arbitral award in the Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal case, a request for revision of the decision in the El Salvador v. Honduras case, and a request for the interpretation of the judgment in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, for example. It might be said that these cases illustrate only the proposition that the initial judgment on the merits of a case is not necessarily the definitive judgment, and that they do not bear upon the question of the efficacy of what is truly the definitive judgment on the merits. A second set of circumstances in which a judgment is not final is not open to that objection. This category presents clear

1

The Vivendi, Mithcell, MTD, CMS v. Argentina, Repsol, Soufraki, and Lucchetti cases. Another case, Noble Ventures v. Romania is the subject of rectification proceedings under article 49. 237


instances of the refusal by a losing party2 to accept the finality of an award as a resolution of the dispute, here by the simple expedient of a refusal to accept and implement the decision. Again, instances are not hard to find. In the International Court the record of compliance with judgments in contentious cases was feeble for many years. Non-compliance in cases such as Corfu Channel, South-West Africa, Diplomatic Hostages, Nicaragua, and the like was a major cause of critical comment upon the utility – indeed, upon the credibility – of international law. While that record is now changing,3 non-compliance remains an option for a disappointed litigant before the International Court. The same is broadly true of litigants before other tribunals: the award in the Argentina-Chile Beagle Channel dispute is a classic example. The 1977 award in that case was declared a “nullity” by the Government of Argentina, which said that it did not consider itself bound to implement the award.4 The award was plainly a fact to be taken into account: but it was equally plainly not a final settlement of the dispute. The Beagle Channel dispute was eventually resolved after mediation by the Holy See, which led to the framing of a proposal for settlement that formed the basis for a Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded by the two States in 1984. That episode illustrates a basic truth covering litigation. A party whose claim is upheld by a tribunal is not the winner of the dispute: he is simply a claimant with a piece of paper that says that the lawyers think that he ought to be the winner of the dispute. The point is obvious in the context of monetary awards. A tribunal may award damages of, say USD 500 million against the Respondent; but if the Respondent does not pay, and does not have property worth USD 500 million that can be attached to satisfy the judgment debt, what is to be done? In such circumstances the award marks the beginning of what is likely to be some hard and imaginative bargaining in the search for a satisfactory solution. That solution may involve no money payments at all. Perhaps the Respondent, if it is a State, may give the Claimant a new concession, on particularly advantageous terms, or release the Claimant from debts in relation to, for example, tax liabilities or environmental remediation obligations. In any event, the award is no more than the end of one phase in the search for a settlement in which a variety of dispute settlement procedures, such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, may be deployed at different stages and in different configurations.

2

In practice it has been the losing party that has rejected judgments; but one may imagine cases in which a party is given a “victory” on grounds that the party finds unacceptable, with the consequence that a winning party might refuse to accept the judgment.

3

See the study by C. Schultze, Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of Justice (2004).

4

The award is published at 52 ILR 92-230 (1979). The “Declaration of Nullity” by Argentina is published at 52 ILR 269-277 (1979).

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One further point should be made here. The reasons for engaging in litigation are by no means always the same. Sometimes litigants seek an order, for compensation or an injunction or whatever, and the Respondents seek simply to avert the making of any such order. Each seeks to “win” the case, in the common and simplest sense of winning. In other cases the claimant is, one might say, playing for the rules rather than playing for a decision. That is to say, the primary importance of the case is to elicit a clear and favourable statement of the law on a particular point, which can serve as a guideline for future conduct, rather than to win a technical victory on what may be unsatisfactory grounds. Indeed, in some cases a claimant may prefer to lose under a court judgment that gives reasons for its decision that serve the broader interests of the claimant, rather than win with a judgment whose reasoning runs counter to the claimant’s broader interests. The winning of the particular case is incidental – a consequence of the fact that courts generally will not decide abstract questions of law and must therefore be presented with a concrete dispute before they will give a judgment. In such cases the judgment will again often be primarily useful not as a decision on – a resolution of – the particular case in which it was rendered, but rather as a legal instrument which can be used to strengthen negotiations in subsequent cases. For example, State Y may claim that State X had no right to exclude a particular fishing vessel from a particular port on a particular occasion. It may argue its case on the basis of, say, a duty of cooperation under the LOS Convention. The court might decide that State X indeed has the right to bar fishing vessels of State Y from its ports in certain circumstances. For States X and Y the primary significance of the judgment might be that it sets one of the parameters within which a dispute between States X and Y over fisheries regulation must be conducted in future: State X will know that it has among the measures at its disposal to bring pressure on State Y the possibility of denying access to its ports. State Y, too, will know what it faces in the negotiations. And if State Y is faced with problems such as the entry of unsafe ships into its ports, it may actually prefer to lose the case on the ground that all States may prevent the entry of foreign ships into their ports, absent a treaty obligation to the contrary, rather than to win the case on the ground that all ships have a right to enter any foreign port. One particular instance of “playing for rules” occurs in the context of mass claims, such as the claims before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, and UN Compensation Commission, and the claims against Argentina arising from the devaluation of the peso. Where there are many claims to be resolved which all turn upon the same point of law, the first cases decided have a particular importance as indications of the way that many similar cases would be likely to be decided. Paradoxically, in cases like this where the actual dispositif in the case is far less significant than the reasoning of the tribunal and its precedential effect, it is generally much more difficult to obtain an agreed settlement than it is in cases

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where the actual disposition of the particular case is the main concern. But once a court has rendered a judgment setting out the precise rights and duties of the parties in a test case, it is very much easier to negotiate settlements in similar cases on the basis of the court’s judgment. The point is, then, that the reasons for going to tribunals, and the roles played by their decisions, are manifold. That being so, it is sensible to look beyond compliance with their rulings on the merits of a case in order to evaluate their utility. Indeed – and this is the main argument in this short chapter – tribunals can play an extremely valuable role before they even reach the stage of a decision on the merits of a case. There are various ways in which proceedings before tribunals may contribute to the resolution of a dispute prior to a ruling on the merits. Here I shall mention four.5 Two arise prior to any ruling by a tribunal; and two arise at a later stage. The first arises from the written phase of proceedings. Anyone who has prepared a case for trial will know the mixed emotions that are aroused during the drafting of pleadings. Arguments which pressed themselves forward in discussions with the client with the unstoppable crushing power of a steamroller can seem to turn quickly into a thick fog. Points of law have less authority than was thought; cases that seem to have sprung up in the law reports since the last time one opened them have thrown aside whole lines of authority; the late-discovered letter for the evidence bundle does not say quite what the client said it would. And perhaps most importantly, the act of writing clear and precise pleadings strips bare faulty logic and weak arguments. On the other hand, some arguments are so strongly supported by the factual evidence and by the law that is it plain that the other side stands little chance of making out a successful defence on that point. In these ways, the discipline of preparing well-drafted pleadings shapes both the case and the Parties’ appreciations of the strengths and weaknesses of their position. That process continues in the run-up to the trial. When the other side’s reply comes in, counsel will read it, again with mixed emotions: irritation that the other side has not responded at all to certain points, coupled with the fear that they may pull an unforeseen argument out of the hat later on; satisfaction that they have been unable to raise any credible defence against other arguments; and the familiar chill with which one reads the passages in which the other side seems to kick the legs from under central parts of one’s case. Good lawyers are constantly alive to the possibility of a mutually advantageous out of court settlement, sparing the clients the uncertainty, some of the cost, and the stress that are inseparable from the judicial settlement of disputes.

5

I have been professionally involved in some of the cases that are referred to, but nothing should be read into that. The account given here is based solely upon publicly-available materials.

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Exchanges of written pleadings are one of the most effective ways of disclosing the strengths and weaknesses in a case, and revealing the cases in which a settlement might be a prudent step. These results flow largely from the simple fact of drafting the pleadings, regardless of the court or tribunal before which they are to be lodged. Tribunals have little influence at this stage; but they do have some. The tribunal may direct that the hearing should proceed in phases. Jurisdiction might be tried first and, if jurisdiction is found to exist, liability might then be tried, with quantum left for determination in a third stage. Separate pleadings might be ordered for each stage. The tribunal might order a joint report from the two parties on certain questions of fact, where there should be no room for differing views. The parties themselves may adopt this approach, asking for the separation of jurisdiction, liability, and quantum, for example. Or they may frame the question put to the tribunal so as to achieve a similar result. Thus, the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases was not asked to delimit the continental shelf, but only to decide “what rules and principles of international law are applicable to the delimitation”. The Parties were thus left free to negotiate delimitations between themselves after the Court had given its judgment. By doing so they were able to make adjustments to the delimitation line on grounds that the Court might not have taken into account had it drawn the line. When the International Court of Justice is cast in this role, its function is not radically different from that of the conciliation commission that was asked to report in the Jan Mayen case,6 and whose report the parties were free to accept or reject as they chose – but in fact became the basis of an agreed settlement between Iceland and Norway. In these cases the tribunal is in effect acting in support of a negotiated solution to the dispute. Whether by their own choice or by a decision by the tribunal on the procedure that it will adopt, the parties have the opportunity to withdraw the case from the tribunal at certain critical junctures when they might be expected to review the strength of their position. That is not to say that they will withdraw the case, or even consider doing so: the aim of the litigation might be such that it is essential to proceed to a determination of the merits of the case, regardless of its strength. (This is said to be the case in some boundary disputes, where neither State may wish to give away in negotiations even a tiny part of what has been claimed as national territory, but both States may be content to allow a tribunal to award part of its claimed territory to the other Party. In this way both States (or, more accurately, both governments) can tell their parliaments and their electorates that they fought the case with uncompromising and unflinching vigour but that they must, as good international citizens, accept the decision of the tribunal. It is often convenient to blame everything on the lawyers.) But,

6

20 ILM 797 (1981). 241


whether the parties wish to seize the opportunity of a negotiated settlement or not, proceeding with a case in stages gives them valuable openings to do so. The second example is the role of the tribunal during the oral phase of proceedings. Many advocates will have experienced the unwelcome sensation that comes from the realisation, often as one stands before the tribunal, that certain arguments in the case that have survived the test of translation from thought to writing nonetheless appear feeble when one has to explain them face-to-face with a panel of sceptical judges. If the realisation does not come unaided to the advocate, it may be helped by a single question from the bench, or even, in tribunals possessed of particular gravitas, a raised eyebrow. It is not wholly clear why a careful reading of the papers should not disclose everything that one needs to know in order to calculate the chances of success in a case; but the plain fact is that in many cases things seem to become much clearer after the initial opening speeches have been made. One reason is that there is still a tendency to draft pleadings so as to include every possible ground on which the party might wish to rely at the hearing; but some arguments invariably achieve much greater prominence than others, and it is only at the hearing itself that each Party can see how forcefully the other will press each aspect of its case. Here again there is an opportunity to reconsider the case. That opportunity can be used creatively. In the ITLOS proceedings in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, a Japanese experimental fishing programme was central to the case put forward by Australia and New Zealand. On the third day of the hearing, the Japanese agent made a statement including a “clear commitment that the 1999 experimental fishing programme will end by 31 August”. The ITLOS seized upon this statement and recorded it the preamble to its Order in that case.7 By doing so it effectively accepted the statement as a binding commitment, which relieved the need for the Tribunal to deal with that specific point in the Order itself. Similar developments occurred during the MOX Plant8 and Land Reclamation9 cases. The unilateral statements themselves may be seen as a form of negotiation in foro. One party in effect offers to do something which, it hopes, will meet some part of the demands made by the other side. The other party may respond by “accepting” the offer, or at least by refraining from rejecting it. But it is the tribunal that must take the decisive step. It is when the tribunal adopts the statement and includes it in the reasoning in its Order that the statement achieves its particular salience in the context of the dispute.10 The tribunal offers at least a

7

Order of 27 August 1999, para. 83; <www.itlos.org/>.

8

Order of 3 December 2001, paras 78-80; <www.itlos.org/>.

9

Order of 8 October 2003, paras 84-88; <www.itlos.org/>.

10

Which is not to say that unilateral statements made to international tribunals by agents of States may not create binding obligations even if no reference is made to them by the tribunal. See Alfred P. Rubin, “The International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations”,

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forum in which this kind of negotiation can take place; and when the case is one concerning a provisional measures application the tribunal has the opportunity to go rather further, perhaps giving some sign of issues and commitments that it regards as particularly significant, and thereby offering some pointers towards areas where the parties may be able to reach at least a partial agreement. This last point, however, is spilling over to the third category of examples that I wish to mention, that of interim judgments of tribunals. Interim judgments and awards decide what they decide. If they are given in provisional measures cases, they decide only on provisional measures, and the merits phase may take a quite different turn – as it did in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, where, after the ITLOS had made a provisional measures Order, the Annex VII Tribunal decided that the dispute fell outside the scope of its jurisdiction. But regardless of what they decide, decisions in interim proceedings can have an enormous effect upon the way in which a dispute unfolds. In the Land Reclamation case the ITLOS ordered the Parties to consult and to establish a group of international experts to report on factual and technical aspects of the case. The Straits Times reported the eventual outcome: “Singapore and Malaysia yesterday formally ended a three-year dispute over reclamation in the Johor Straits. … It represents a full and final resolution to the dispute, a joint statement said. They also agreed the settlement was ‘fair and balanced’. … Malaysia will drop its legal suit against Singapore, instead of heading for international arbitration as planned. As for Singapore, it can continue reclaiming as planned but will take steps to minimise the environmental impact. The basis for yesterday’s agreement were the findings of a group of independent experts. After 13 months of studying the straits, they found that Singapore’s reclamation caused no major impact to the environment. This is contrary to Malaysia’s claims that the works caused ‘serious and irreversible damage to the marine environment and serious prejudice’ to its rights. The experts detected a minor or moderate impact in a few areas and recommended measures to minimise these changes. In line with their suggestions, Singapore will modify the shape of its works at Pulau Tekong. The two countries will share the cost of works to make two jetties in Johor more stable. Singapore will also pay a sum of about $ 160,000 to compensate Johor fishermen for their losses. The signing, at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, brings to a happy end a saga that began in January 2002 ….”11 71 AJIL 1 (1977), and the work of the International Law Commission on the topic of Unilateral Acts of States, which began in 1998. 11

. The report appears in the Straits Times on 27 April 2005, in an article by L. Lim. 243


The expert group whose establishment the Tribunal had ordered proved to be the vehicle for an amicable settlement of the dispute. The fourth and final example is also drawn from the practice of ITLOS. It is the requirement imposed by the ITLOS under article 95 of its Rules that the Parties report on the implementation of the provisional measures that it had ordered. Here, the Tribunal performs an essentially passive role as the recipient of the reports. But the requirement creates yet another occasion on which each party must consider the position in relation to the provisional measures ordered and give a fair report on the position to the Tribunal. The continuing engagement of the ITLOS, pending the assumption of control by the tribunal that will hear the merits of the case, is undoubtedly useful. Like the regular reappraisals of progress that are an essential component of project management, they focus attention on what is going well and what is going badly, and on where the responsibility lies and where the opportunities for improvements in the situation might be found. If each Party submits an independent report, it must bear in mind that the other party will do so too; and this surely constrains both parties to adopt a fair and realistic approach to their reports. Fairness and realism must rank among the most important desiderata for States engaging in the search for a negotiated solution to a dispute between them. In this way, too, the ITLOS, and other international tribunals in a similar position, can make very significant contributions to the settlement of international disputes which remain largely invisible to the outside world. My argument is that any evaluation of the work of the ITLOS, or of any other international tribunal, must take account of all of these “hidden” contributions made by the tribunal to the settlement of international disputes. It may seem that the ITLOS has been sidelined, and that its prompt release and provisional measures jurisdiction is used only because there is no practical alternative to the enviably expeditious proceedings before the ITLOS. But in its handling of the cases before it, the ITLOS has been a sensitive and creative tribunal, making a very significant contribution to the settlement of the disputes; and this has come about not so much because of its decisions in cases brought before it but rather because of the role that it has fulfilled in facilitating the resolution of disputes by the Parties themselves. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the International Court quoted a passage from the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex,12 where it said that “the judicial settlement of international disputes “is simply an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the parties”.13 It might have added that the judicial management of

12

PCIJ, Series A, No. 22, at p. 13.

13

ICJ Reports 1969, p. 47, para. 87.

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disputes can also be a most harmonious complement to the direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the parties. The final question that I wish to raise in this chapter is whether this role is one that might consciously be developed in the ITLOS or in other international tribunals. This question is difficult, because it touches on the delicate balance between the role of a tribunal as an impartial arbiter between the parties to a dispute, and its role as one among many elements in a broader system of dispute settlement, in which the parties may concurrently be engaged in litigation, negotiation, and perhaps conciliation. Certainly, conciliation and adjudication are closer than is often supposed. If one looks, for example, at maritime boundary delimitation, the closeness becomes apparent. The International Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases14 was not asked to draw a maritime boundary line but only to decide “what principles and rules of international law are applicable to the delimitation” of Germany’s continental shelf boundaries with Denmark and the Netherlands. Having determined what those rules and principles were, the parties were then left to negotiate the actual boundary themselves – which they duly did. There is not a great deal of difference between that and conciliation, because the Court considered the special factors at play in the case against the background of the existing rules of international law on delimitation. In its judgment it made clear, for example, that mechanical application of the equidistance line was not what the law required in the circumstances of the German delimitation; and in doing to it gave clear pointers towards the kind of delimitation that it regarded as appropriate. Compare that with the terms of reference of the Conciliation Commission established by Iceland and Norway to report on the dispute on delimitation around Jan Mayen. The bilateral treaty between them, made in 1980, stipulated that: “Article 9 The question of the dividing line for the shelf in the area between Iceland and Jan Mayen shall be the subject of continued negotiations. For this purpose the Parties agree to appoint at the earliest opportunity a Conciliation Commission composed of three members, of which each Party appoints one national member. The chairman of the Commission shall be appointed by the Parties jointly. The Commission shall have as its mandate the submission of recommendations with regard to the dividing line for the shelf area between Iceland and Jan Mayen. In preparing such recommendations, the Commission shall take into account Iceland’s strong economic interests in these sea areas, the existing geographical and geological factors and other special circumstances. The Commission

14

ICJ Reports 1969, p. 4. 245


shall adopt its own rules of procedure. The unanimous recommendations of the Commission shall be submitted to the two Governments at the earliest opportunity. The Parties envisage the presentation of the recommendations within five months of the appointment of the Commission. These recommendations are not binding on the Parties: but during their further negotiations the Parties will pay reasonable regard to them.” Both the North Sea Continental Shelf judgments and the Jan Mayen report left the parties free to negotiate a reasonable and practical compromise solution to the dispute. They facilitated that agreement by making plain what, in broad terms, was the kind of delimitation the parties could expect from an adjudication on the merits of the case. But, crucially, they left the parties room to shape the final form of the settlement themselves. The terms of the compromis in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, and the very nature of a conciliation effort, in effect required the tribunals to stop short of rendering a final and definitive adjudication of the dispute. The tribunal acted as an aid to negotiation, not as a replacement for it. The question is whether tribunals could and should emulate this role by the way in which they handle contentious cases before them – whether tribunals should try to facilitate an agreed settlement even while the litigation rages, in case the parties should wish to seize the opportunity to craft a solution to the dispute themselves. There is no consensus on this question.15 Some will answer, no. It must surely be admitted that it would be wrong for parties that have agreed to submit a dispute to a judicial tribunal to find themselves plunged unwittingly and unwillingly into a conciliation process. Some States, after all, consciously choose adjudication in order to shift the responsibility for compromising on national territorial claims away from the Government and on to an international tribunal. Furthermore, every tribunal must be acutely sensitive to the risk that any initiative it might take to facilitate a dispute may be seen as an attempt to lead the parties down a road towards a settlement that the tribunal has prejudged. On the other hand, even the most determined litigators are likely to concede that they would prefer to concentrate their time and effort upon those parts of the case that are likely to be of primary concern to the tribunal, to avoid dwelling upon aspects that are uncontroversial or adequately covered in the written pleadings or (whatever the State might think) are patently hopeless, and to be able to explain to the tribunal why points that the tribunal appears to think peripheral are regarded by the litigator as important to the case. A gentle steer

15

See paragraph 47 of the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, <www. uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes-e.pdf>. And see the study in C. Bühring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business: Designing Procedures for Effective Conflict Management (1996).

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from the tribunal as to the matters upon which it would particularly welcome further argument, and a clarification of what appear to be the central issues in the case, is likely to benefit all, as long as it does not cast any doubt upon the right of each party to present its case as it chooses – a right which is fundamental to judicial settlement. This possibility is provided for in article 76 of the ITLOS Rules of Procedure, which states that “[t]he Tribunal may at any time prior to or during the hearing indicate any points or issues which it would like the parties specially to address, or on which it considers that there has been sufficient argument”. Judicious use of this power could do much to promote economy in pleading and to assist the tribunal in getting to grips with truly difficult questions on which the outcome of the case may depend. By coupling such guidance with an awareness that the presence of the parties before the tribunal does not mean that all hope of a negotiated settlement is gone, the tribunal may be able to set the dispute in a context that maximises the chances of the parties being able to move towards an agreed settlement themselves and to withdraw the case from the tribunal. A list of withdrawn cases, or cases that did not go past the provisional measures stage, may be a sign of a vigorous and creative tribunal finding an optimal role in the complex business of settling international disputes.

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LA RECEVABILITÉ DEVANT LES JURIDICTIONS INTERNATIONALES Tafsir Malick Ndiaye

Introduction

D

ans les différents ordres juridiques internes, l’action en justice et son exercice sont assujettis à des conditions particulières dites conditions de recevabilité,1 dont le défaut affecte la reconnaissance juridictionnelle de la prétention ; que celle-ci soit un droit ou une obligation. Ces systèmes juridiques consacrent la distinction entre la recevabilité et le fond en raison de la nécessité de statuer sur la première avant d’aborder le second.2 1

Ch. De Visscher, Aspects récents du droit procédural de la CIJ, Paris, Pédone, 1966, 219 p. ; R.J. Dupuy, « La réforme du règlement de la CJI », AFDI, 1972, pp. 265-283 ; G. Guyomar, Commentaire du règlement de la CIJ, Paris, Pédone, 1983, 760 p. ; G. Abi-Saab, Les exceptions préliminaires dans la procédure de la Cour internationale, Paris, Pédone, 1967, 281 p. ; M. Dubisson, La Cour Internationale de Justice, Paris, LGDJ, 1964, 471 p. ; J. C. Witenberg, « La recevabilité des réclamations devant les juridictions internationales », RdC, Vol. 41, 1932 (III), pp. 5-135. M. Mabrouk, Les exceptions de procédure devant les juridictions internationales, Paris, LGDJ, Bibliothèque de droit international, Vol. XXXV, 1966, 351 p. ; J. Lang, « La jonction au fond des exceptions préliminaires devant la C.P.J.I. et la C.I.J. », J.D.I., 1968, pp. 5-45 ; G. Sperduti, « La recevabilité des exceptions préliminaires de fond dans le procès international », Riv. Dir. Int., Vol. LIII, 1970, pp. 461-490 ; M. Virally, « Le champ opératoire du règlement judiciaire international », RGDIP, 1983, pp. 281-314 ; SFDI, La juridiction internationale permanente (Colloque de Lyon), Paris, Pédone, 1987 ; Sh. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, 3rd edn, Vol. II, Jurisdiction, The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999, pp. 517-603 ; J. Combacau, S. Sur, Droit international public, 4e edition, Paris, Montchrestien, 1997 ; P.M. Dupuy, Droit international public, 4e edition, Paris, Dalloz, 1998 ; P. Daillier, A. Pellet, Droit international public, 7e edition, Paris, LGDJ, 2002 ; Ch. Rousseau, Droit international public, Vol. V, Les rapports conflictuels, Paris, Sirey, 1983.

2

Dans l’ordre interne, la recevabilité englobe des exceptions dont l’effet simplement dilatoire est de suspendre l’instance : nullités de procédure, exceptions d’incompétence ; des fins de non-recevoir dont l’effet, si elles sont accueillies, sera de faire rejeter la demande en justice d’une façon définitive : a) moyens tirés de l’expiration d’un délai comme la péremption



En droit international, la recevabilité désigne la « qualité que doit présenter une demande, une pièce de procédure ou une preuve pour qu’elle soit examinée par l’autorité à laquelle elle est soumise ».3 Sa récurrence dans l’ordre international est symptomatique de la nature profonde de la juridiction internationale laquelle ne peut fonctionner sans le consentement préalable des Etats. Il y a là une différence qui la sépare de la juridiction interne. Qui plus est, l’opposition d’une exception de cette nature par le défendeur a pour conséquence automatique la suspension de l’instance relative au fond. La recevabilité joue un rôle considérable dans l’hypothèse où la juridiction, parce qu’elle est constituée antérieurement à l’introduction de l’instance, peut être saisie par voie de requête. Lorsqu’un demandeur fait valoir un mécanisme de juridiction obligatoire, il est rare que le défendeur ne tente de s’y soustraire et c’est pourquoi les procès relatifs aux conditions d’exercice de la juridiction sont prolifiques dans l’ordre international.4 On entend par irrecevabilité le caractère d’une demande ou d’une réclamation qui, en raison d’un défaut de qualité du requérant ou de l’absence en elle d’une condition requise, autorise ou oblige l’autorité à laquelle elle est soumise à en refuser l’examen. L’exception d’irrecevabilité englobe, quant à elle, les exceptions dites extinctives et celles dites interruptives.5 C’est le moyen de procédure tendant à obtenir que le juge compétent pour connaître d’une affaire ne procède pas à l’examen au fond motif pris de ce qu’une condition préalable à cet examen fait défaut. L’exception peut être soulevée par l’une des parties à l’instance et par

dans l’instance ou le retard dans l’appel ; b) moyens liés au fond tels que le défaut d’intérêt, le défaut de qualité, la nouveauté de la demande en appel ou du moyen en cassation, la prescription, le délai préfix, la chose jugée ; voir le nouveau Code de procédure civile français, institué par le décret No. 75-1123 du 5 décembre 1975. 3

Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international, Paris, Sirey, 1960, 750 p., p. 504.

4

Comme l’écrit le Juge M. Bedjaoui « dans le cas d’une introduction d’instance par voie de requête, le défendeur commence presque toujours par contester la compétence de la Cour, exception souvent assortie d’une mise en cause de la recevabilité de la requête », in Le droit international au service de la paix, de la justice et du développement, Mélanges Michel Virally, Paris, Pédone, 1991, pp. 87-107, spéc. p. 89. De plus, une exception d’irrecevabilité peut être soulevée proprio motu par la juridiction elle-même qui doit se demander à titre préliminaire si elle tire, de son statut ou de l’interprétation qu’elle en adopte, le pouvoir de connaître de l’affaire et de statuer sur la prétention.

5

Exceptions extinctives : exception de forclusion, exception tirée de la prescription, exception tirée de la transaction, exception de désistement, exception d’acquiescement, exception de chose jugée, exception de litispendance, exception tirée de la nationalité, exception de défaut de « mains propres », exception de nullité, exception de connexité, estoppel ; Exceptions interruptives : exception tirée de l’absence de différend, exception du défaut d’épuisement des voies de recours internes, l’absence de négociations diplomatiques, exceptions dirigées contre les voies de recours.

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La recevabilité devant les juridictions internationales

le juge proprio motu. Elle est présentée au début de la procédure et la décision rendue à son sujet est définitive. La pratique internationale retient habituellement cette expression d’« exception d’irrecevabilité ». Il faut dire que la Cour permanente ne s’était guère montrée enthousiaste à l’idée de s’engager dans la typification des exceptions allant même jusqu’à mettre en doute son intérêt procédural. Elle craignait d’introduire, sans expérience suffisante, dans la jurisprudence internationale, des notions et des terminologies empruntées aux procédures internes. C’est progressivement qu’elle le fera. Elle dit : « La Cour n’a pas à tenir compte, pour apprécier la conclusion par laquelle on lui demande de surseoir à statuer, des divers systèmes de procédure et des diverses terminologies juridiques en usage dans les différents pays. Que cette conclusion se qualifie d’ « exception » ou qu’elle prenne le nom de « fin de non-recevoir », rien n’empêche la Cour de s’en occuper, préalablement à tout débat sur le fond, puisque c’est de sa non-admission que dépendra la possibilité d’un tel débat ».6 La question de l’irrecevabilité se révèle complexe. La doctrine et la jurisprudence tendent à la définir par son but et ses effets par rapport à la procédure sur le fond. Elle est alors entendue comme l’ensemble des moyens par lesquels le défendeur dénie au demandeur le droit d’action ou se prévaut de l’inobservation de prescriptions formelles et autres exigences de procédure pouvant s’imposer à cette action. Le débat tourne autour de deux éléments ou deux traits communs auxdits moyens : la « pertinence » et la « non-incidence au fond ». La pertinence signifie que l’exception est à même de mettre fin à l’instance sur le fond. C’est dire que lorsqu’elle est accueillie, l’exception est, par exemple, de nature à soustraire le défendeur à toute condamnation. La non-incidence au fond traduit le fait que le résultat peut être atteint sans avoir à examiner ni à préjuger le fond. L’irrecevabilité peut être déclarée par le juge alors même que l’obligation alléguée existerait et a contrario, cette irrecevabilité peut être rejetée sans que ce rejet permette de présumer l’existence de l’obligation invoquée.7

6

CPJI, Affaire relative à certains intérêts allemands en Haute Silésie polonaise, arrêt du 25 août 1925, Série A, No. 6, p. 19.

7

Voir J.C. Witenberg, op. cit. (note 1), p. 17. L’auteur écrit, p. 16 : « En notre matière, la jurisprudence est même de beaucoup la source la plus riche. Saisis des réclamations sur la base de traités parfois laconiques et qui, surtout lorsqu’il s’agissait d’un nombre important d’affaires, n’ont pu prévoir les conjonctures spéciales à chacune, les tribunaux internationaux, maîtres de leurs méthodes, le plus souvent, maîtres aussi de leur procédure, se sont accoutumés à discriminer, parmi les questions posées par les cas concrets soumis à eux, celles communes à tous et desquelles, en chaque cas, un examen préalable s’imposait. C’est ainsi que la notion de recevabilité a passé du droit interne au droit international ». 251


La jurisprudence de la Cour permanente fournit des exemples qui corroborent cette façon de voir.8 L’autre débat sur la recevabilité est plus proprement juridictionnel. Il présente deux caractères qui infèrent la séparabilité de l’objet de l’exception du fond de l’affaire. D’une part, la préliminarité qui signifie que la question de la recevabilité fait toujours l’objet d’un débat préalable à celui relatif au fond. La pratique internationale a soumis à une procédure préliminaire l’examen des moyens qui participent de la notion de recevabilité en ce qu’il est de nature à entraîner le rejet de la demande sans parvenir à l’instance au fond. D’autre part, la spécialité qui traduit le fait que le moyen de recevabilité est sans incidence sur le fond et qu’il est examiné au cours d’une procédure spéciale.9 Ce caractère de spécialité résulte d’une longue pratique et apparaît comme inséparable de la préliminarité. La recevabilité est parfois regardée par le caractère préalable de son objet, sa relation logique et prioritaire, c’est-à-dire de priorité logique, par rapport au fond et donc la possibilité de l’examiner dans un débat préalable à l’instance au fond. Comme on l’a fait remarquer, « ce n’est qu’après avoir admis implicitement ou explicitement, d’une part que le demandeur jouit du droit d’action, d’autre part qu’il a exercé ce droit conformément aux règles prescrites, que le juge peut se prononcer au fond, c’est-à-dire sur l’obligation elle-même, objet fondamental du débat ».10 Nous traiterons de la recevabilité de l’action, laquelle est subordonnée à la satisfaction des conditions posées par les actes institutifs (Statut/Règlement de procédure) de la juridiction (I), avant d’en arriver à la recevabilité de la requête ou demande en justice laquelle exprime le droit d’action et qui consiste en l’exercice de celui-ci (II).

8

Voir Affaire du Chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis, CPJI, Série A/B, No. 76, p. 22 « La seconde exception … étant présentée afin d’exclure l’examen par la Cour du fond de l’affaire, et la Cour pouvant statuer sur ladite exception sans se prononcer en aucune façon sur le fond de l’affaire, l’exception doit être retenue comme préliminaire dans le sens de l’article 62 du Règlement » ; voir aussi l’Opinion dissidente du Juge Anzilotti dans l’affaire de la Compagnie d’Electricité de Sofia et de Bulgarie, CPJI, Série A/B, No. 77, p. 95 où il parle de l’« exception dont le but et l’effet sont d’empêcher le procès devant la Cour, sans préjuger la question de savoir si le droit réclamé par le demandeur existe ou non ».

9

Ce second aspect est tempéré par la question du « factual background ». Ce, parce qu’il n’est pas de point de recevabilité qui puisse être apprécié sans un certain examen des faits. En parlant de la documentation se limitant aux textes essentiels, le Juge Bedjaoui fait observer que « cette remarque ne garde cependant pas toute sa valeur si la question de la compétence est compliquée par une contestation de la recevabilité de la requête, car pour débattre de celle-ci, il faut souvent aborder des questions de fond », in Mélanges Virally, op. cit., p. 89 ; l’autre atténuation de la spécialité procède des jonctions éventuelles de l’exception et du fond.

10

Witenberg, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 8-9 ; Sur la séparabilité des exceptions préliminaires du fond, voir G. Abi-Saab, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 179-204.

252


I. Recevabilité de l’action contentieuse Selon le nouveau Code de Procédure civile, « l’action est le droit, pour l’auteur d’une prétention, d’être entendu sur le fond de celle-ci afin que le juge la dise bien ou mal fondée. Pour l’adversaire, l’action est le droit de discuter le bien-fondé de cette prétention ».11 Il apparaît ainsi que l’action doit être envisagée, tant du point de vue du demandeur que de celui du défendeur. Elle traduit le pouvoir légal, le droit conféré au demandeur de saisir la juridiction à l’effet de se prononcer sur le fond de sa demande. L’action s’analyse également en une prérogative permettant au défendeur de discuter le bien-fondé de cette demande. Il convient de distinguer le droit d’action du droit invoqué au fond (ou droit substantiel), parce que l’existence du droit d’action n’engendre pas forcément celle du droit invoqué au fond et qui justifie l’instance. C’est le cas lorsque la demande est déclarée recevable mais non fondée. Il faut rappeler que c’est la demande qui concrétise le droit d’action du demandeur tandis que la défense concrétise celui du défendeur. Le droit d’action est également distinct de la demande qui l’exprime. La demande en justice ou requête consiste dans l’exercice du droit d’action et ne doit pas être confondue avec ce droit lui-même. Le droit d’action peut exister sans qu’aucun acte procédural ne vienne le concrétiser parce que précisément l’action a un caractère facultatif. La juridiction internationale compétemment saisie sur le fondement de sa compétence d’attribution doit s’assurer que l’action introduite devant elle est recevable, c’est-à-dire qu’il entre dans sa fonction juridictionnelle d’entendre les prétentions et contestations des parties et de statuer à leur sujet. Elle doit par conséquent vérifier si les conditions d’ouverture de l’action sont remplies, faute de quoi la procédure serait irrégulière et la demande déclarée irrecevable. Les conditions de recevabilité de l’action apparaissent multiples. Elles tiennent pour l’essentiel à la fonction juridictionnelle et à la validité de l’instance. 1. Conditions tenant à la nature de la fonction juridictionnelle contentieuse La fonction juridictionnelle contentieuse des tribunaux les conduit à connaître de différends, lesquels doivent être réglés sur la base du droit. C’est dire que le différend doit exister et être justiciable. a. L’existence du différend L’exercice de toute juridiction contentieuse est assujetti à l’existence d’un différend lequel doit être constaté ab initio par la juridiction saisie ; faute de quoi, celle-ci doit déclarer la demande irrecevable. 11

Article 30 du nouveau Code de Procédure civile français, institué par le décret No. 75-1123 du 5 décembre 1975, entré en vigueur pour l’essentiel le 1er janvier 1976. 253


Par différend judiciaire international, on entend « un désaccord sur un point de droit ou de fait, une contradiction, une opposition de thèses juridiques ou d’intérêts entre deux personnes ».12 La divergence d’opinions ne doit cependant pas être abstraite. Comme on a pu l’observer,13 le différend, au sens technique que lui assigne la procédure internationale, procède des positions ou attitudes antithétiques suffisamment précises que des Etats adoptent délibérément l’un vis-à-vis de l’autre relativement au règlement par le juge international de certains intérêts. Il y a différend, au sens judiciaire du terme, quand un Etat énonce une prétention qui se heurte sur le terrain du droit à une contestation de la part d’un autre Etat. C’est le schéma classique : le différend se dégage de l’opposition ouverte de deux volontés expressément et successivement déclarées.14 Dans l’affaire relative à certains intérêts allemands en Haute Silésie polonaise,15 la Cour permanente indique qu’ « une divergence d’opinions se manifeste dès qu’un des gouvernements en cause constate que l’attitude observée par l’autre est contraire à la manière de voir du premier ». Il ressort de la jurisprudence internationale16 que l’existence d’un différend international demande à être

12

CPJI, arrêt du 30 août 1924 dans l’affaire Mavrommatis, Publications de la Cour, Série A, No. 2, p. 11. Cette définition a été reprise par la Cour de La Haye dans plusieurs de ses rendus : Affaire des Emprunts serbes, CPJI, Série A, No. 20, (1929), pp. 16-18 ; Affaire de l’Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie (première phase) ; CIJ Recueil 1950, p. 74 ; Affaire du Droit de passage sur territoire indien (exception préliminaires), CIJ Recueil 1957, pp. 148-149 ; Affaire du Droit de passage sur territoire indien (fond), CIJ Recueil 1960, p. 34 ; Affaires du Sud-Ouest africain (exceptions préliminaires), CIJ Recueil 1969, p. 319.

13

Charles de Visscher, op. cit., p. 32.

14

Voir Affaires du Sud-Ouest africain précitées, CIJ, arrêt du 21 décembre 1962, p. 328 : « Il n’est pas suffisant non plus que les intérêts des deux parties à une telle affaire sont en conflit. Il faut démontrer que la réclamation de l’une des Parties se heurte à l’opposition manifeste de l’autre ».

15

Arrêt du 25 août 1925, CPJI, Série A, No. 6, p. 14.

16

Voir Rapport de la Commission de Conciliation franco-siamoise en date du 27 juin 1947 ; Avis consultatif de la Cour Internationale de Justice du 30 mars 1950 dans l’affaire de l’interprétation des traités de paix, CIJ Recueil 1950, p. 74 où il est dit : « Il s’est donc produit une situation dans laquelle les points de vue des deux Parties, quant à l’exécution ou à la non-exécution de certaines obligations découlant des traités, sont nettement opposés. En présence d’une telle situation, la Cour doit en conclure que des différends internationaux se sont produits ». En outre, « l’existence d’un différend international demande à être établie objectivement. Le simple fait que l’existence d’un différend est contestée ne prouve pas que ce différend n’existe pas ». Ibid. La Cour reconnaît l’opinion contraire dans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain lorsqu’elle dit que « la simple affirmation ne suffit pas pour prouver l’existence d’un différend, tout comme le simple fait que l’existence d’un différend est contestée ne prouve pas que ce différend n’existe pas », CIJ Recueil 1962, op. cit., p. 328.

254


établie objectivement, tout différend se définissant par ses caractères intrinsèques et non par la qualification subjective que lui donnent les parties. La question de la recevabilité prend un relief particulier lorsque la juridiction peut être saisie par voie de requête comme c’est le cas pour les Cours et tribunaux permanents constitués antérieurement à l’introduction de l’instance. Si l’existence d’un différend est une condition préalable à l’exercice de la juridiction contentieuse, il faut en outre qu’il soit un différend réel. (i) Réalité du différend Au sens juridique du terme, le différend réel s’entend d’un différend qui se fonde sur des motifs juridiques de sorte que la sanction judiciaire de la situation litigieuse puisse engendrer un effet sur les positions juridiques des parties. Un lien intime doit s’établir entre le différend et l’exercice de la fonction judiciaire. Pour veiller à l’« intégrité de la fonction judiciaire », la Cour internationale de justice a eu l’occasion de refuser de faire droit à une demande de jugement déclaratoire, dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional.17 Dans son arrêt, la Cour rappelle que le Cameroun est l’une des possessions sur lesquelles l’Allemagne a renoncé à ses droits en vertu du Traité de Versailles et qui ont été placées sous le système des mandats de la Société des Nations. Il a été divisé en deux mandats, l’un administré par la France et l’autre par le Royaume-Uni. Ce dernier a lui-même divisé son territoire en Cameroun septentrional, administré comme faisant partie du Nigeria, et en Cameroun méridional, administré comme une province distincte dans le cadre du Nigeria. Après la création de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, les mandats sur le Cameroun ont été placés sous le régime international de tutelle, aux termes d’accords de tutelle approuvés par l’Assemblée générale le 13 décembre 1946. Le territoire sous administration française a accédé à l’indépendance, sous le nom de République du Cameroun, le 1er janvier 1960 et est devenu Membre des Nations Unies le 20 septembre 1960. En ce qui concerne le territoire sous administration britannique, l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies a recommandé que l’autorité administrante y organise des plébiscites afin de déterminer les aspirations des habitants. A la suite de ces plébiscites, le Cameroun méridional s’est uni le 1er octobre 1961 à la République du Cameroun et le Cameroun septentrional le 1er janvier 1961 à la Fédération du Nigeria (elle-même indépendante depuis le 1er octobre 1960). Le 21 avril 1961, l’Assemblée générale avait pris acte des résultats des plébiscites et décidé que l’accord de tutelle pour le Cameroun sous administration britannique prendrait fin au moment où les deux parties de ce territoire s’uniraient l’une à la République du Cameroun, l’autre au Nigeria [Résolution 1608 (XV)]. 17

Affaire du Cameroun septentrional, exceptions préliminaires, arrêt du 2 décembre 1963, CIJ Recueil 1963, p. 15. 255


La République du Cameroun a voté contre cette dernière résolution, après avoir critiqué la manière dont le Royaume-Uni avait administré le Cameroun septentrional et organisé le plébiscite, manière qui aurait modifié l’évolution politique du territoire et le déroulement normal de la consultation. Ces critiques ont notamment été développées dans un livre blanc auquel les représentants du Royaume-Uni et du Nigeria ont répondu. Après l’adoption de la résolution, la République du Cameroun a adressé le 1er mai 1961 au Royaume-Uni une note où elle faisait état d’un différend relatif à l’application de l’accord de tutelle et proposait de conclure un compromis à l’effet de saisir la Cour. Le Royaume Uni a répondu négativement le 26 mai 1961. Quatre jours plus tard, la République du Cameroun a déposé une requête devant la Cour.18 La requête faisait valoir l’injustice qu’aurait constitué le rattachement du Cameroun septentrional à un autre Etat. Le Cameroun reconnaissait cependant que la Résolution 1608 (XV) de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies avait eu un effet juridique définitif qu’il n’était au pouvoir de la Cour ni de réviser, ni d’infirmer. En revanche, le requérant demandait à la Cour de dire et juger que, dans l’application de l’Accord de tutelle, le Royaume-Uni n’a pas respecté certaines obligations qui découlent dudit accord. Le Royaume-Uni souleva une exception au motif de l’inexistence d’un différend réel. L’arrêt n’a pas retenu l’exception. La Cour s’est plutôt référée aux différentes définitions du différend découlant de celle donnée par la Cour permanente dans l’affaire Mavrommatis.19 Si elle a admis l’existence d’un différend « à la date de la requête »,20 en revanche elle n’était pas tenue d’y statuer « au moment du jugement ».21 La Cour invoquera l’absence d’intérêt juridique de l’objet de la demande pour rejeter la requête du Cameroun. Sa volonté de ne pas sortir de sa fonction contentieuse l’emmènera à énoncer une position de principe : « La fonction de la Cour est de dire le droit, mais elle ne peut rendre des arrêts qu’à l’occasion de cas concrets dans lesquels il existe, au moment du jugement, un litige réel impliquant un conflit d’intérêts juridiques entre les Parties. L’arrêt de la Cour doit avoir des conséquences pratiques en ce sens qu’il doit pouvoir affecter les droits ou obligations juridiques existants des Parties, dissipant ainsi toute incertitude dans leurs relations juridiques. En l’espèce, aucun arrêt rendu au fond ne pourrait répondre à ces conditions essentielles de la fonction judiciaire ».22 La réalité du différend s’apprécie également aux fins de l’instance à l’aune des relations directes entre les parties. Le requérant a la charge de la preuve 18

Voir <www.icj-cij.org> pour les décisions.

19

Affaire précitée, supra note 12.

20

Affaire du Cameroun septentrional, op. cit., p. 27.

21

Ibid. p. 34.

22

Ibid. pp. 33-34.

256


relativement à la cristallisation du différend dans ses rapports directs avec le défendeur avant le dépôt de l’acte introductif d’instance. Cet aspect du différend peut, le cas échéant, avoir des conséquences sur son existence même. Dans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain, la CIJ a eu à relever qu’ « il convient d’observer que cette question préliminaire [l’existence d’un différend] porte en réalité sur le problème de l’existence d’un différend entre les demandeurs et le défendeur, quels que soient la nature et l’objet du différend soumis à la Cour dans la présente instance ».23 La difficulté dans cette affaire avait trait à la nature de la relation entre les demandeurs et le défendeur. La contradiction s’est établie entre l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU et l’Union sud-africaine. C’est donc en leur qualité de membres des Nations Unies que les demandeurs avaient fait connaître leur point de vue. C’est pourquoi, les troisième et quatrième exceptions soulevées par l’Union sud-africaine posent le problème des conditions d’existence du différend international et de la recevabilité de la demande en justice. La troisième exception contestait l’existence d’un différend entre les demandeurs et l’Union au motif que le différend doit être établi antérieurement au dépôt de la requête.24 Pour l’Union, un différend au sens de la clause de juridiction obligatoire de l’article 7 du mandat n’existe que lorsqu’il met en jeu un intérêt « concret » c’est-à-dire personnel et direct de l’Etat demandeur ou de ses ressortissants. Or, la requête avait en vue, non des intérêts de cette nature, mais l’inexécution par le Gouvernement sud africain de ses obligations générales comme mandataire tant à l’égard des habitants du territoire sous mandat qu’à l’égard des autres Etats ex-membres de la SDN, ainsi que de celles concernant la surveillance et le contrôle de la Société. Selon le défendeur, de telles obligations ne conféraient aux membres de la Société aucun droit ou intérêt juridique autorisant un recours individuel à la clause juridictionnelle de l’article 7 du mandat. La Cour a rejeté cette troisième exception. Selon elle, ladite exception consiste essentiellement dans la proposition selon laquelle le différend soumis à la Cour n’est pas un différend comme il est prévu à l’article 7 du mandat. La Cour rappelle que l’article 7 mentionne « tout différend quel qu’il soit » qui viendrait à s’élever entre le mandataire et un autre Membre de la Société des Nations. Ces termes sont larges, clairs et précis et visent tout différend relatif à l’ensemble ou à l’une quelconque des dispositions du mandat, qu’elles aient trait aux obligations de fond du mandataire à l’égard des habitants ou à l’égard des autres Membres de la Société des Nations, ou encore à l’obligation de se soumettre à la surveillance de la Société des Nations, ou à la protection prévue par l’article 7. La portée et l’objet de ces dispositions indiquent en effet qu’on entendait que les Membres de la Société eussent un droit ou un intérêt

23

Affaires du Sud-Ouest africain, op. cit. (note 12), p. 328.

24

CPJI, Affaire de la Compagnie d’électricité de Sofia et de Bulgarie, Série A/B, No. 77, p. 83. 257


juridique à ce que le mandataire observât ces obligations à l’égard à la fois des habitants et de la Société des nations et de ses Membres. Tandis que l’article 6 du mandat contient des dispositions visant la surveillance administrative par la Société, l’article 7 instaure en fait, avec l’accord exprès du mandataire, la protection judiciaire de la Cour permanente. Il va de soi que la protection des intérêts concrets des membres est comprise dans ce cadre, mais le bien-être et le développement des habitants ne sont pas moins importants.25 La Cour conclut que le présent différend est un différend prévu à l’article 7 et que la troisième exception préliminaire doit être rejetée. Une interprétation littérale de l’article 7 du mandat, « tout différend quel qu’il soit », a permis à la Cour de disposer de cette exception. On se rappellera que l’arrêt reconnaît aux demandeurs un intérêt juridique à obtenir de la Cour qu’elle se prononce sur les violations du mandat alléguées par eux. C’est un fait que le droit international reconnaît lui-même, dans les domaines relevant des intérêts généraux de l’humanité, un intérêt à la protection de ce que l’on pourrait qualifier de « légalité internationale ». L’article 7 a été interprété dans ce sens qui reconnaît le droit individuel d’action de tout membre de la Société des Nations sur la base de dispositions que le mandataire avait expressément fait siennes. La Cour qualifiera d’ailleurs le mandat d’« engagement international d’intérêt général ».26 Le rejet de cette exception préliminaire a été vivement critiqué.27 La quatrième exception sudafricaine posait quant à elle le problème important de l’actualité du différend. 25

Voir supra note 18.

26

Affaire du Sud-Ouest africain, op. cit., p. 332 ; Dans l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co, la Cour dit dans un obiter dictum : « une distinction essentielle doit en particulier être établie entre les obligations des Etats envers la communauté internationale dans son ensemble et celles qui naissent vis-à-vis d’un autre Etat dans le cadre de la protection diplomatique. Par leur nature même, les premières concernent tous les Etats. Vu l’importance des droits en cause, tous les Etats peuvent être considérés comme ayant un intérêt juridique à ce que ces droits soient protégés : les obligations dont il s’agit sont des obligations « erga omnes ». CIJ Recueil 1970, p. 32. Par ces mots, la Cour admet la notion d’actio popularis dans le droit international ; notion dont elle constatait pourtant l’inexistence dans la deuxième phase des affaires du Sud-Ouest africain lorsqu’elle dit : « Au surplus, si on l’envisage sous un autre angle, cet argument revient à dire que la Cour devrait admettre une sorte d’actio popularis, ou un droit pour chaque membre d’une collectivité d’intenter une action pour la défense d’un intérêt public. Or, s’il se peut que certains systèmes de droit interne connaissent cette notion, le droit international tel qu’il existe actuellement ne la reconnaît pas et la Cour ne saurait y voir l’un des principes généraux de droit mentionnés à l’article 38, § 1 c) de son statut ». Affaires du Sud-Ouest africain, Seconde phase, 18 juillet 1966, CIJ Recueil 1966, p. 47.

27

Voir l’opinion dissidente commune des juges Spender et Fitzmaurice et celle du Juge Morelli ; voir aussi Ch. de Visscher, op. cit. (note 1), p. 22, où l’auteur dit : « Là où l’arrêt nous paraît s’écarter des règles de la procédure, c’est quand d’un droit général à l’action il conclut à l’existence actuelle d’un différend justiciable et à la recevabilité de la demande en justice. Le

258


(ii) L’actualité du différend L’actualité du différend s’entend des démarches diplomatiques du demandeur auprès du défendeur préalables au dépôt de l’acte introductif d’instance. Ce fut une condition de recevabilité qui s’attache à la situation litigieuse dont le but est d’assurer que le litige est mûr pour être tranché. Les négociations diplomatiques préalables étaient au cœur de l’organisation de la procédure arbitrale internationale. Leur rôle s’est atténué avec les juridictions permanentes où elles se présentent souvent comme une condition expresse de juridiction. La règle est posée par certaines conventions internationales qui évoquent un préalable diplomatique. Sa consécration coutumière est cependant douteuse au regard de la jurisprudence internationale. La quatrième exception sud-africaine posait un problème important de recevabilité en ce qu’elle remettait en cause l’actualité du différend. Elle énonçait que « le prétendu conflit ou désaccord n’est pas, eu égard à son état d’avancement, un différend qui ne soit pas susceptible d’être réglé par des négociations au sens de l’article 7 du mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain ».28 Pour les demandeurs, des négociations répétées avaient eu lieu pendant une période de plus de dix ans au sein de l’Assemblée des Nations Unies et de divers organes, entre eux et les autres Etats anciens membres de la Société des Nations partageant leur manière de voir d’une part et le défendeur de l’autre, et que ces négociations avaient abouti chaque fois à une impasse en raison de l’attitude du défendeur. Celui-ci rétorquera que « des négociations collectives au sein des Nations Unies sont une chose, que des négociations directes entre les demandeurs et lui-même en sont une autre et qu’aucune négociation directe n’avait jamais été engagée entre eux ».29 La Cour examinera cette quatrième et dernière exception pour la rejeter. Selon elle, le fait que, dans le passé, les négociations collectives aient abouti à une impasse et le fait que les écritures et les plaidoiries des parties aient clairement confirmé que cette impasse demeure oblige à conclure qu’il n’est pas raisonnablement permis d’espérer que de nouvelles négociations puissent aboutir à un règlement. En ce qui concerne l’argument du défendeur selon lequel des négociations directes entre les demandeurs et lui-même n’ont jamais été engagées, la Cour déclare que « lorsqu’il s’agit d’une question affectant les intérêts mutuels

droit à l’action n’est en soi qu’un pouvoir légal lequel demeure à l’état de simple virtualité tant que son titulaire n’a pas rempli les conditions procédurales auxquelles est subordonnée la demande en justice. Parmi ces conditions figure au premier chef la manifestation des attitudes antithétiques des Parties à l’instance, attitudes qui ne peuvent se déduire que de la prise à partie directe caractérisée par l’opposition classique de la prétention et de la contestation ». 28

Affaire précitée, note 12.

29

Ibid. 259


de nombreux Etats, qu’ils fassent ou non partie d’un corps organisé, il n’y a aucune raison pour que chacun d’eux se conforme au formalisme et au fauxsemblants d’une négociation directe avec l’Etat auquel ils s’opposent s’ils ont déjà pleinement participé aux négociations collectives avec cet Etat adverse ».30 Ce qui importe donc en la matière, ce n’est pas tant la forme des négociations que l’attitude et les thèses des parties sur les aspects fondamentaux de la question en litige. Pour la Cour, au vu de la nature des circonstances de l’espèce, la diplomatie parlementaire ou diplomatie par conférence s’est souvent avérée la voie de négociation la plus pratique.31 Cette nouvelle approche de la Cour rompt avec l’interprétation classique de la condition des négociations diplomatiques préalables et elle se soustrait au régime des rapports directs des Parties dans la détermination de la situation litigieuse. Elle peut brouiller les repères en ce qui concerne les contours du différend judiciaire dans la mesure où la diplomatie par conférence dans les assemblées plénières peut embrasser des questions juridiques et politiques. On ne peut exiger des délégués représentant leur Etat respectif qu’ils soient tous des juristes.32

30

Ibid.

31

Sur la notion de « diplomatie parlementaire » ou « diplomatie par conférence », voir l’Opinion individuelle du Juge Philip C. Jessup sous le même arrêt précité (CIJ Recueil 1962, pp. 433-436) qui explique qu’aujourd’hui une clause relative au recours préalable aux négociations diplomatiques doit être interprétée « comme comprenant ce que l’on a appelé la diplomatie parlementaire, c’est-à-dire la négociation des solutions aux problèmes internationaux dans le cadre et par les voies d’une institution organisée agissant selon des règles établies, comme l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. L’Assemblée générale et même l’ensemble du système des Nations Unies, avec ses missions permanentes et ses comités spéciaux, font aujourd’hui partie des moyens normaux de la diplomatie, c’est-àdire de la négociation ». Pour une opinion contraire, voir l’opinion dissidente conjointe des Juges Sir Percy Spender et Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (ibid. p. 562). Selon ces juges « Ces discussions sont nécessairement d’un caractère trop général et trop vague pour constituer des négociations entre les parties mêmes qui se présentent ensuite devant la Cour au sujet d’un différend déterminé les séparant en tant qu’Etats ».

32

La conclusion de l’opinion dissidente conjointe de Sir Percy Spender et Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (ibid. p. 563) est à méditer. Elle se lit : « Nous conclurons en faisant observer que les prescriptions touchant les « différends » et les « négociations » ne constituent pas de simples questions d’ordre technique. Elles apparaissent sous une forme ou sous une autre dans presque toutes les clauses du règlement judiciaire qui aient jamais été rédigées, et pour une excellente raison. Elles y sont insérées à dessein pour protéger les Parties, dans toute la mesure du possible, contre des litiges internationaux inutiles, prématurés, insuffisamment motivés ou simplement spécieux. Faute de cette mesure de protection, les Etats n’accepteraient pas de signer des clauses de règlement judiciaire obligatoire. C’est là un aspect de la question auquel il ne nous semble pas qu’on ait accordé assez d’attention ».

260


Le problème de l’actualité du différend s’est également posé dans l’affaire relative aux travaux de poldérisation par Singapour à l’intérieur et à proximité du détroit de JOHOR devant le Tribunal International du Droit de la Mer.33 Dans cette affaire, Singapour [le défendeur] prétend que la Malaisie [le demandeur] n’a pas rempli les obligations lui incombant au titre du paragraphe 1 de l’article 283 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le Droit de la Mer du 10 décembre 1982. Il dit « les négociations entre les parties, dont l’article 283 de la Convention fait un préalable au déclenchement des procédures obligatoires de règlement des différends définies à la partie XV de la Convention n’ont pas eu lieu ».34 Le défendeur fait valoir que la saisine du tribunal arbitral (prévu à l’annexe VII de la Convention) par le demandeur était prématurée puisqu’aucun échange de vues n’avait eu lieu contrairement à ce qu’exige l’article 283 de la Convention. Le paragraphe 1 de celui-ci se lit : « Lorsqu’un différend surgit entre des Etats Parties à propos de l’interprétation ou de l’application de la Convention, les parties en litige procèdent promptement à un échange de vues concernant le règlement du différend par la négociation ou par d’autres moyens pacifiques ». Le demandeur indique, pour sa part, qu’il a demandé à plusieurs reprises la tenue de réunions destinées à examiner les préoccupations de chaque partie en vue de régler le différend à l’amiable. Il fait valoir que le défendeur a refusé à maintes reprises de procéder à des consultations, exigeant de la partie adverse qu’elle prouve, au préalable le bien-fondé de sa cause. Il y aurait donc un principe d’épuisement préalable des négociations ; d’où l’exception in limine litis. Ce qui pose le problème de l’actualité du différend. Il apparaît qu’il y a divergence d’opinions entre les parties sur l’échange de vues concernant le règlement du différend par la négociation ou par d’autres moyens pacifiques. Dans son exposé des conclusions, la Malaisie dit : « Il ressort clairement de cette correspondance qu’un différend existe entre la Malaisie et Singapour à propos de la délimitation des eaux territoriales au-delà du détroit de Johor et de l’impact des travaux de poldérisation (à Tuas Reach, Pulau Ubin et Pulau Tekong) sur les eaux, bandes côtières et installations malaisiennes et sur le milieu marin. Il est également clair que l’échange de vues exprimé dans cette correspondance n’a pas abouti et ne saurait aboutir à un règlement négocié. En fait, Singapour 33

Affaire des Travaux de poldérisation à l’intérieur et à proximité du détroit de Johor (Malaisie c/ Singapour), ordonnance du 10 septembre 2003, TIDM Recueil 2003, p. 4 ; pp. 18-21 ; voir également les opinions individuelles des Juges Ndiaye, pp. 48 et suivantes et Chandrasekhara Rao, p. 36 et suivantes ; voir en outre le contre mémoire de Singapour, Chapitre 3 [Compétence et Recevabilité], p. 23 et suivantes ainsi que la Plaidoirie du Professeur Riesman, ITLOS/PV. 03/02, 25 septembre 2003 p.m., disponible sur le site web du Tribunal : <www.itlos.org> ou < www.tidm.org>, affaire No. 12.

34

Voir Réponse, paragraphe 6. 261


refuse même de débattre des points en question. Dans ces conditions, il n’y pas lieu de prolonger l’échange de vues entre les deux Etats ».35 La Malaisie déclare que Singapour a rejeté ses demandes maintes fois réitérées en vue de la tenue d’urgence d’une réunion de hauts fonctionnaires des deux pays pour examiner ses préoccupations de façon à résoudre le problème à l’amiable en indiquant qu’une réunion « ne serait utile que si le Gouvernement malaisien pouvait avancer des faits ou des arguments nouveaux à l’appui de sa thèse », que Singapour s’érigeait ainsi en juge des griefs de la Malaisie et qu’elle ne se montrait pas disposée à coopérer ni à négocier.36 Pour sa part, Singapour fait valoir qu’il n’y a pas eu de négociations sur le fond entre les parties. Elle soutient que la Malaisie a subitement soumis son exposé des conclusions, sans lui avoir d’abord donné la possibilité de prendre la mesure de ses préoccupations particulières et d’y répondre, qu’elle a demandé des précisions sur les griefs de la Malaisie et que celle-ci a fait savoir à maintes reprises qu’elle lui fournirait des indications détaillées sur lesdits griefs. Elle fait observer en outre que ce n’est que le 4 juillet 2003 que la Malaisie lui a fourni des précisions sur ses préoccupations quant aux effets néfastes allégués des travaux de poldérisation de Singapour qui a répondu le 17 juillet 2003 aux préoccupations de la Malaisie en lui communiquant toute une série de documents s’y rapportant qui dressait un tableau complet et des bilans de travaux qu’elle projetait, et en se déclarant prête à engager des négociations avec la Malaisie au sujet de toute question non encore résolue. Singapour ajoute que c’est à la réunion de Singapour que les deux parties ont eu pour la première fois la possibilité d’examiner aussi bien les préoccupations de la Malaisie que la position de Singapour, que cette réunion a aidé à la fois Singapour et la Malaisie à déterminer les questions qui les divisaient et celles sur lesquelles leurs point de vue convergeaient, préparant ainsi les parties

35

Voir exposé des conclusions en date du 4 juillet 2003, paragraphe 20.

36

Suite à la soumission des exposés des conclusions le 4 juillet 2003, il y a eu un nouvel échange de correspondances entre les parties [reproduit à l’annexe B à la demande de mesures conservatoires de la Malaisie]. Il y a eu également un nouvel échange de vues lors de la réunion de Singapour, tenue les 13 et 14 août 2003 à l’issue de laquelle, la Malaisie a informé Singapour dans une note datée du 22 août 2003 de ce qui suit : « A la fin de la réunion tenue les 13 et 14 août, la délégation malaisienne s’est réservée le droit de demander au Tribunal International du Droit de la mer (TIDM) de prescrire des mesures conservatoires et après ladite réunion, le Gouvernement malaisien ne voit d’autre solution que d’en appeler immédiatement au TIDM. La Malaisie est néanmoins disposée à tenter une nouvelle fois de régler les questions considérées par voie de consultation. Pour ce faire, il est cependant indispensable que Singapour accepte de reporter la poursuite et l’achèvement des travaux de poldérisation, en particulier à proximité de Pulau Tekong. Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères est fermement d’avis qu’il ne saurait y avoir de véritables négociations sur ce point si, dans le même temps, Singapour achève en toute hâte les travaux de poldérisation, quels que soient leurs impacts sur la Malaisie ».

262


à la phase de fond des négociations, et que les préoccupations de la Malaisie pourraient être prises en compte grâce au processus de négociation.37 C’est dans ce contexte que le Tribunal International du Droit de la mer a eu à examiner la question des négociations diplomatiques préalables. Le Tribunal rappelle que l’article 283 de la Convention s’applique « lorsqu’un différend surgit » et qu’il n’y a pas de divergence entre les parties quant à l’existence d’un différend et que cet article exige seulement un prompt échange de vues concernant le règlement du différend « par la négociation ou par d’autres moyens pacifiques ». Il indique que l’obligation de procéder « promptement à un échange de vues » vaut également pour les deux parties au différend. Après avoir passé en revue les moyens soulevés par les deux parties, le Tribunal constate qu’elles n’ont pas pu régler le différend ou s’entendre sur un moyen de le faire. Il a estimé – rappelant sa jurisprudence – qu’« un Etat Partie n’a pas l’obligation de poursuivre les procédures prévues à la section 1 de la partie XV de la Convention lorsqu’il conclut que les possibilités de règlement du différend ont été épuisées »38 et qu’ « un Etat partie n’a pas obligation de poursuivre un échange de vues, lorsqu’il arrive à la conclusion que les possibilités de parvenir à un accord ont été épuisées ».39 Selon le Tribunal, la Malaisie n’était pas tenue, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, de poursuivre un échange de vues lorsqu’elle a conclu que cet échange ne pouvait pas aboutir à un résultat positif. Il rappellera à ce propos le mot de la Cour Internationale de Justice selon lequel « il n’existe ni dans la Charte (des Nations Unies), ni ailleurs en droit international, de règle générale selon laquelle l’épuisement des négociations diplomatiques serait un préalable à la saisine de la Cour ».40 C’est sur la base de ce qui précède que le Tribunal a rejeté l’exception soulevée par Singapour. 37

Singapour a en outre rappelé l’assurance donnée à la Malaisie dans sa note diplomatique du 2 septembre 2003 : « Si ces éléments de preuve étaient concluants, Singapour réexaminerait sérieusement les travaux qu’elle mène et envisagerait de prendre toutes mesures nécessaires et adéquates, y compris une suspension, pour remédier à l’effet dommageable en question ».

38

Affaires du thon à nageoire bleue (Australie c/ Japon ; Nouvelle Zélande c/ Japon), Ordonnance du 27 août 1999, paragraphe 60 ; voir site web du Tribunal : <www.tidm. org>.

39

Affaire de l’usine Mox (Royaume-Uni c/ Irlande), Ordonnance du 3 décembre 2001, paragraphe 60 ; <www.tidm.org>.

40

Affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria (Cameroun c/ Nigeria), Exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, CIJ Recueil 1998, p. 303. En effet, si la règle de l’épuisement préalable des négociations se retrouve dans certains traités, elle ne s’impose guère en droit international général. La Cour Internationale de Justice a refusé de l’admettre à plusieurs reprises. Elle a même jugé, s’appuyant sur la pratique des Etats, que la requête pouvait lui être soumise alors que les négociations se poursuivaient. Dans l’affaire du plateau continental de la mer Egée, la Cour a dit : « L’attitude du Gouvernement 263


Au nombre des conditions assimilables à l’actualité du différend, en ce qu’elles se destinent à assurer que le litige est mûr pour être tranché par la juridiction internationale, il faut ajouter l’absence de litispendance et de connexité. Elle est d’application très rare en droit international vu la structure de celui-ci et, qui plus est, la nature juridique de cette condition fait l’objet de controverses dans la mesure où elle s’apparente à la compétence par certains de ses aspects et à la recevabilité par d’autres.41 Dans l’affaire de Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise,42 le Gouvernement polonais faisant état d’une instance engagée devant le Tribunal arbitral mixte germano-polonais en vue de la restitution à une société privée d’une usine qu’il croyait avoir injustement perdue, demandait à la Cour la suspension de son arrêt jusqu’au rendu de la sentence du Tribunal arbitral. La Cour a observé que ce n’est que dans les plaidoiries qu’il a été employé et, semble-t-il, surtout pour la commodité du langage. Si, cependant, on voulait apprécier ce moyen d’après les principes ordinairement admis en matière de de la Turquie pourrait donc s’interpréter comme sous-entendant que la Cour ne devrait pas connaître de l’affaire tant que les parties continuent à négocier et que l’existence de négociations activement menées empêche la Cour d’exercer sa compétence en l’espèce. La Cour ne saurait partager cette manière de voir. La négociation et le règlement judiciaire sont l’une et l’autre cités comme moyens de règlement pacifique des différends à l’article 33 de la Charte des Nations Unies. La jurisprudence de la Cour fournit divers exemples d’affaires dans lesquelles négociations et règlement judiciaire se sont poursuivis en même temps. Plusieurs affaires, dont la plus récente est celle du Procès de prisonniers de guerre pakistanais (CIJ Recueil 1973, p. 347), attestent qu’il peut être mis fin à une instance judiciaire lorsque de telles négociations aboutissent à un règlement. Par conséquent, le fait que des négociations se poursuivent activement pendant la procédure actuelle ne constitue pas, en droit, un obstacle à l’exercice par la Cour de sa fonction judiciaire » (arrêt, CIJ Recueil 1978, p. 12, paragraphe 29) ; voir en outre Affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci ; compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, CIJ Recueil 1984, p. 440, paragraphes 106 et 108. 41

Comme le remarque le Pr. Abi-Saab, op. cit., p. 116 : « La litispendance s’apparente à la compétence dans la mesure où elle trouve son origine dans l’organisation judiciaire, en présumant une compétence concurrente de deux ou plusieurs instances judiciaires. En droit judiciaire français, la litispendance et la connexité appartiennent au même genre (déclinatoires) mais non à la même espèce que les exceptions d’incompétence, en raison du fait qu’elles ont toutes trait à l’organisation judiciaire. Cela a conduit certains auteurs à considérer l’exception de litispendance comme une exception d’incompétence. D’autre part, la litispendance s’apparente à la recevabilité, notamment en droit international, vue l’absence d’une organisation judiciaire en ce domaine, car elle ne se présente pas comme une limite au champ d’application de l’activité judiciaire en général ou dans un cas d’espèce, mais plutôt comme une condition de l’exercice de cette activité judiciaire ». Voir également, G. Ténékides, « l’exception de litispendance devant les organismes internationaux », RGDIP, Vol. 36 (1929), pp. 505-527.

42

Affaire relative à certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise (compétence), arrêt du 25 août 1925, CPIJ, Série A, No. 6, pp. 19-20.

264


litispendance, la Cour devrait arriver à la conclusion qu’il n’est pas fondé. C’est une question vivement controversée dans la doctrine des auteurs et dans la jurisprudence des principaux Etats, que celle de savoir si la litispendance, qui a pour objet de prévenir un conflit de choses jugées, peut être invoquée dans les rapports internationaux, en ce sens que les juges d’un Etat devraient refuser de connaître, en l’absence d’un traité, de toute affaire pendante devant un tribunal étranger, exactement comme ils auraient le devoir de le faire si un tribunal national avait été, à une époque antérieure, régulièrement saisi de la même affaire. Selon la Cour, cette discussion ne saurait retenir son attention dans le présent litige, car il est évident que les éléments essentiels qui constituent la litispendance ne se rencontrent pas ici. Il ne s’agit pas de deux demandes identiques ; la requête encore pendante devant le Tribunal arbitral mixte germano-polonais de Paris poursuit la restitution à une société privée de l’usine dont celle-ci prétend avoir été indûment dépouillée ; ce qui, d’autre part, est demandé à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, c’est l’interprétation de certaines clauses de la Convention de Genève. Les plaideurs ne sont pas les mêmes. Enfin, les tribunaux arbitraux mixtes et la Cour permanente de Justice internationale ne sont pas des juridictions du même ordre ; et cela serait vrai, à plus forte raison, de la Cour et du Tribunal civil polonais de Kattowice. L’exception de litispendance a également été soulevée par le Gouvernement français dans l’affaire Camouco devant le Tribunal International du Droit de la mer.43 Le Représentant de la France, M. Dobelle, s’exprime ainsi : « il y a une seconde question que je souhaiterais évoquer à propos de l’examen de la recevabilité de la requête et elle porte sur l’épuisement des recours internes. La règle de l’épuisement des recours internes énoncée à l’article 295 de la Convention est généralement considérée comme ne constituant pas un préalable nécessaire à l’introduction d’une action au titre de l’article 292. Certes. Mais on peut néanmoins faire remarquer qu’une instance judiciaire interne est actuellement pendante devant la Cour d’Appel de Saint-Denis de la Réunion et que cette instance judiciaire tend à obtenir exactement le même résultat que celui qui est recherché à travers la présente procédure ». Le Tribunal observe que l’argument revient à soutenir que le requérant n’est pas qualifié pour invoquer la procédure prévue à l’article 292 en tant que « deuxième voie d’appel » à l’encontre d’une décision rendue par une juridiction interne et pour avancer que la demande fait clairement ressortir l’existence d’une « situation de litispendance qui jette un doute sur la recevabilité » de ladite demande. Le défendeur attitre l’attention à ce sujet sur l’article 295 de la Convention qui traite de l’épuisement des recours internes, tout en observant

43

Affaire du « Camouco » (Panama c/ France), prompte mainlevée, arrêt du 7 février 2000, TIDM Recueil 2000, Vol. 4, pp. 10-76, voir en outre ITLOS/PV.002 du 27 janvier 2000, lignes 1-8. 265


en même temps que « la règle de l’épuisement des recours internes, énoncées à l’article 295 de la Convention, [ne devrait pas être] considérée comme étant une condition nécessaire à l’introduction d’une action au titre de l’article 292 ». Le Tribunal note que le requérant rejette l’argument du défendeur et soutient que l’appel interjeté devant les juridictions internes ne porte nullement préjudice à son droit d’invoquer la compétence du Tribunal en vertu de l’article 292 de la Convention. De l’avis du Tribunal, il ne serait pas logique de lire dans l’article 292 l’applicabilité de la condition de l’épuisement des recours internes ou de toute autre règle analogue. L’article 292 de la Convention vise à obtenir la mainlevée de l’immobilisation d’un navire et la mise en liberté de son équipage après une immobilisation et une arrestation prolongées dues à l’imposition de cautions déraisonnables par des juridictions internes, qui infligent des pertes – pouvant être évitées – au propriétaire du navire ou à d’autres personnes affectées par cette immobilisation et cette arrestation. Parallèlement, l’article préserve les intérêts de l’Etat côtier en prévoyant que la mainlevée ne pourrait intervenir que contre le dépôt d’une caution raisonnable ou d’une autre garantie financière, à déterminer par la Cour ou le Tribunal visés à l’article 292, sans préjudice de la suite qui sera donnée à toute action dont le navire, son propriétaire ou son équipage peuvent être l’objet devant la juridiction nationale appropriée. Le Tribunal conclut que l’article 292 prévoit une procédure indépendante mais non un recours en appel contre une décision rendue par une juridiction interne. Aucune limitation ne doit être lue dans l’article 292, qui irait à l’encontre de son objet et de son but. De fait, il autorise la soumission d’une demande de mainlevée après une courte période à compter du moment de l’immobilisation et, dans la pratique, les recours internes ne peuvent normalement pas être épuisés dans un délai aussi court.44 Cependant, avec la prolifération des juridictions internationales, « des cas de litispendance pourraient se concevoir entre tribunaux internationaux du même ordre comme le seraient des tribunaux institués par une même convention ou par des conventions parallèles. On y retrouverait les raisons qui justifient l’exception de litispendance : d’une part, le souci d’éviter l’inutile concurrence des activités juridictionnelles, d’autre part la nécessité de prévenir le conflit de choses jugées. Le défendeur doit établir l’identité du litige en démontrant la triple identité de personnes, d’objet et de cause et demander son renvoi devant le juge qui a été en premier lieu saisi ».45

44

Ibid. pp. 28-29.

45

Ch. de Visscher, op. cit., p. 175.

266


b. Justiciabilité du différend La justiciabilité désigne l’aptitude d’un différend à être réglé sur la base des principes du droit46. Il s’agit de différends dans lesquels les parties sont en désaccord sur l’application ou l’interprétation du droit existant. Cette aptitude du différend à être tranché sur cette base est une condition de recevabilité de l’action contentieuse. L’article 38 du Statut de la CIJ énonce que « la mission de la Cour est de régler conformément au droit international les différends qui lui sont soumis », et l’article 40 indique que les affaires sont portées devant la Cour, selon le cas, soit par notification du compromis, soit par une requête adressée au Greffier ; dans les deux cas, l’objet du différend et les Parties doivent être indiquées ». Comme la Cour l’a indiqué, « l’existence d’un différend est donc la condition première de l’exercice de sa fonction judiciaire ».47 C’est dire l’importance de la qualification du différend qui apparaît comme un prérequis, quelles que soient les motivations qui ont mu les Parties à engager une procédure devant la juridiction saisie. Dans l’affaire relative à des actions armées frontalières et transfrontalières,48 la Cour fait remarquer qu’aux termes de la première exception d’irrecevabilité du Honduras, la requête du Nicaragua est une requête « artificielle, d’inspiration politique, dont la Cour ne saurait connaître sans se départir de son caractère judiciaire ». Le Honduras prétend que le Nicaragua cherche à utiliser la Cour ou la menace d’une procédure devant la Cour comme moyen d’exercer des pressions politiques sur les autres Etats d’Amérique Centrale. Selon la Cour, en ce qui concerne le premier aspect de cette exception, la Cour n’ignore pas que tout différend juridique porté devant elle peut présenter des aspects politiques. Mais, en tant qu’organe judiciaire, elle doit seulement s’attacher à déterminer d’une part si le différend qui lui est soumis est d’ordre juridique, c’est-à-dire s’il est susceptible d’être résolu par application des principes et des règles du droit international, et d’autre part si elle a compétence pour en connaître et si l’exercice de cette compétence n’est pas entravé par des circonstances qui

46

L’arbitrabilité s’entend, quant à elle, de la conformité d’un différend à un engagement d’arbitrage obligatoire. Max Huber qualifie de différend arbitrable un différend « susceptible de faire l’objet d’une décision sur la base du droit international » ; Rapport arbitral du Pr. Max Huber en date du 27 avril 1924 dans l’affaire des réclamations pour dommages causés aux sujets britanniques dans la zone espagnole du Maroc, RSA, Vol. II, p. 632.

47

Voir Affaires des Essais nucléaires, arrêt du 20 décembre 1974 (Australie c/ France), CIJ Recueil 1974, p. 271, paragraphe 55.

48

Affaire relative à des actions armées frontalières et transfrontalières (Nicaragua c/ Honduras), Compétence de la Cour et recevabilité de la requête, arrêt du 20 décembre 1988, CIJ Recueil 1988, p. 91, paragraphes 51-52. 267


rendent la requête irrecevable. L’objet de la saisine de la Cour est le règlement pacifique de tels différends. La Cour se prononce en droit et n’a pas à s’interroger sur les motivations d’ordre politique qui peuvent amener un Etat, à un moment donné ou dans des circonstances déterminées, à choisir le règlement judiciaire. L’exception du Honduras, dans la mesure où elle est fondée sur la prétendue inspiration politique de l’instance, ne peut donc être retenue. La détermination de l’existence du différend d’ordre juridique résulte de l’examen, par la Cour, des positions des Parties. Ce, à travers leurs pourparlers diplomatiques au plan bi ou multilatéral, leurs plaidoiries respectives, l’interprétation du titre de compétence ou d’un acte juridictionnel antérieur ou encore les circonstances pertinentes de l’espèce, étant entendu que la juridiction cherche toujours à établir de façon objective l’existence ou non du différend pour pouvoir exercer ou non sa fonction judiciaire. C’est dans l’affaire des activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci49 que la CIJ a envisagé le plus frontalement la question de la justiciabilité d’un différend. La Cour indique qu’elle croit utile de s’arrêter sur une question préliminaire, liée à ce qu’on pourrait appeler la justiciabilité du différend dont le Nicaragua l’a saisie. Dans leur contre-mémoire sur la compétence et la recevabilité, les Etats-Unis ont avancé plusieurs raisons pour lesquelles la demande devait être jugée irrecevable : d’après eux, notamment, un grief relatif à l’usage illicite de la force armée relève de la compétence exclusive d’autres organes, et plus particulièrement du Conseil de Sécurité, en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies et de la pratique ; et la Cour ne saurait connaître efficacement d’un « d’un conflit armé en cours » comportant l’emploi de la force armée en violation de la Charte sans sortir des limites d’une activité judiciaire normale. Dans son arrêt du 26 novembre 1984 la Cour a examiné et rejeté ces arguments, et les Etats-Unis, qui n’ont pas participé à la suite de la procédure, n’en ont pas présenté à la Cour de nouveaux qui iraient dans le même sens. Il apparaît toutefois, au terme de l’examen du fond auquel la Cour s’est à présent livrée, que des circonstances existent qui, pourrait-on soutenir, rendraient non justiciables le litige lui-même ou les questions d’emploi de la force et de légitime défense collective qui en font partie. En premier lieu, il a été soutenu que le présent différend devrait être déclaré non justiciable parce qu’il n’entre pas dans la catégorie des « différends d’ordre juridique » au sens de l’article 36 paragraphe 2, du Statut. Il est vrai qu’en vertu de cette disposition, la compétence de la Cour est limitée aux « différends d’ordre

49

Affaire des activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c/ Etats-Unis d’Amérique), Fond, arrêt du 27 juin 1986, p. 14, pp. 26-28, paragraphes 32-35.

268


juridique » ayant pour objet l’une quelconque des matières énumérées. La question de savoir si un différend entre deux Etats est ou n’est pas un « différend d’ordre juridique » aux fins de cette disposition peut être elle-même en litige entre ces deux Etats ; dans ce cas, il appartient à la Cour de décider, comme le prévoit le paragraphe 6 de l’article 36. En la présente espèce, cependant, ce point particulier ne semble pas être en litige entre les Parties. Durant la procédure consacrée aux questions de compétence et de recevabilité, les Etats-Unis ont avancé diverses raisons pour que la Cour conclue qu’elle n’était pas compétente ou que la demande n’était pas recevable. Ils se sont appuyés notamment sur la réserve c) de leur propre déclaration d’acceptation de la juridiction en vertu de l’article 36, paragraphe 2, sans jamais avancer l’argument plus radical qui voudrait que la déclaration soit en totalité inapplicable pour la raison que le différend dont le Nicaragua a saisi la Cour n’est pas un « différend d’ordre juridique » au sens de ce paragraphe. Pour ce qui est de la recevabilité, les Etats-Unis ont élevé une objection contre l’application de l’article 36, paragraphe 2, au motif, non pas que le différend n’est pas « juridique », mais que les questions sur lesquelles portent les demandes du Nicaragua relèvent expressément d’organes politiques en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies, et c’est là un argument que la Cour a rejeté dans son arrêt du 26 novembre 1984.50 De même, si les Etats-Unis ont soutenu que la nature de la fonction judiciaire empêche d’examiner au fond les allégations du Nicaragua en l’espèce – argument que la Cour n’a pas non plus été en mesure d’accepter –,51 ils ont néanmoins tenu à souligner qu’ils ne considéraient pas pour autant le droit international comme dénué de pertinence ou inapplicable à un différend de cette nature. Bref, la Cour ne voit aucune raison de penser que, du point de vue des Etats-Unis euxmêmes, le présent différend échapperait à la catégorie des « différends d’ordre juridique » auxquels s’applique l’article 36 paragraphe 2, du Statut. Elle doit donc aborder l’examen des demandes concrètes du Nicaragua sous l’angle du droit international applicable. Il est hors de doute que les problèmes d’emploi de la force et de légitime défense collective soulevés dans la présente instance sont réglementés à la fois par le droit international coutumier et par les traités, en particulier la Charte des Nations Unies. Il a cependant été affirmé que, pour une autre raison, les questions de cette nature qui se posent en la présente espèce ne sont pas justiciables et ne font pas partie des matières dont un tribunal puisse connaître. L’invocation de la légitime défense collective par laquelle les Etats-Unis cherchent à justifier leurs actions vis-à-vis du Nicaragua obligerait la Cour à déterminer si, leur sécurité se trouvant en jeu, les Etats-Unis étaient en droit de se proclamer eux-mêmes dans

50

CIJ Recueil 1984, pp. 431-436.

51

Ibid. pp. 436-438. 269


la nécessité d’employer la force afin de riposter à une intervention étrangère au Salvador. Pour y parvenir, assure-t-on, la Cour devrait se prononcer sur des aspects politiques et militaires et non sur une question qui soit par nature de celles auxquelles un tribunal peut utilement s’efforcer de répondre. Comme la Cour l’exposera plus loin, dans les circonstances de la présente espèce, c’est l’exercice, allégué par les Etats-Unis, d’un droit de légitime défense collective en riposte à une agression armée contre un autre Etat qui se trouve en cause. La question de la licéité d’une réaction à la menace d’une agression armée qui ne s’est pas encore concrétisée n’a pas été soulevée. La Cour doit donc déterminer d’abord si cette agression s’est effectivement produite et si, dans l’affirmative, les mesures présentées comme ayant été prises sous le couvert de la légitime défense constituaient en droit une réaction justifiée par la légitime défense collective. Pour répondre à la première question, la Cour n’a pas à déterminer si les Etats-Unis, ou l’Etat qui aurait été agressé, étaient acculés à la riposte. Si elle décide qu’il y a eu agression armée en l’espèce, et afin de se prononcer dans cette hypothèse sur les questions afférentes au caractère collectif de la légitime défense et au type de réaction, elle n’aura pas non plus à se lancer nécessairement dans des appréciations d’ordre militaire. La Cour peut, en conséquence, se borner ici à conclure que, dans les circonstances de la présente espèce, les problèmes de légitime défense qui ont été soulevés font partie de ceux qui relèvent de sa compétence et qu’elle est en mesure de régler. Il apparaît donc que la Cour se reconnaîtra une compétence pour connaître des aspects juridiques d’un différend susceptible de présenter des facettes multiples et elle se soustraira à l’examen et à l’appréciation de tout ce qui n’est pas d’ordre juridique. 2. Conditions tenant à la validité de l’instance Ces conditions de recevabilité ont trait à l’organisation judiciaire. Les règles de compétence, de forme et délais ou encore celles relatives à la réclamation sont parfois sanctionnées par des irrecevabilités qui affectent l’instance ou la procédure du fait de l’inobservation des principes régissant l’instance ou des règles de procédure. Il s’agit des conditions formelles de recevabilité et des conditions de recevabilité des réclamations internationales pour actes illicites.

270


a. Conditions formelles générales : formes et délais (i) Formes Les conditions formelles de recevabilité sont propres à chaque juridiction.52 Elles s’attachent à l’instance qui s’analyse comme la procédure engagée devant un organe juridictionnel dans l’exercice du droit d’action et dont l’objet est de faire valoir un droit contesté. Il s’agit d’actes successifs de procédure allant du dépôt de la requête au prononcé du jugement ou de l’ordonnance de radiation du rôle en cas de désistement d’instance. La validité de l’instance s’apprécie en fonction de l’observation des formes et délais relativement à l’acte introductif d’instance. Il faut noter que la procédure juridictionnelle internationale est très peu formaliste. Il s’ensuit que les conditions de recevabilité formelle ne sont pas d’une importance décisive. En effet, « la Cour, exerçant une juridiction internationale, n’est pas tenue d’attacher à des considérations de forme la même importance qu’elles pourraient avoir dans le droit interne ».53 Aux termes de l’article 40 paragraphe 1 du Statut de la CIJ, les affaires sont portées devant la Cour, selon le cas, soit par notification du compromis, soit par une requête, adressées au Greffier, dans les deux cas, l’objet du différend et les parties doivent être indiqués. Les dispositions de forme concernent plutôt la saisine par voie de requête. L’article 38 du Règlement de la CIJ indique en effet que : « 1. Lorsqu’une instance est introduite devant la Cour par une requête adressée conformément à l’article 40 paragraphe 1, du Statut, la requête indique la partie requérante, l’Etat contre lequel la demande est formée et l’objet du différend. 2. La requête indique autant que possible les moyens de droit sur lesquels le demandeur prétend fonder la compétence de la Cour, elle indique en outre la nature précise de la demande et contient un exposé succinct des faits et moyens sur lesquels cette demande repose ».54 Il faut rappeler que la Cour ne s’est pas encore refusée à procéder à l’examen d’un différend au fond pour des raisons de forme. Elle n’a pas non plus accueilli à ce jour une exception relative à une pièce de procédure imparfaite. Dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional, elle dit : « La Cour ne saurait être indifférente à l’inob-

52

Voir par ex. Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme : art. 2 ; Règlement Commission des Droits de l’Homme : art. 47 paragraphe 1 ; commission du Droit international, projet d’articles sur la responsabilité internationale (Version 2001) : art. 45.

53

Affaire des Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, op. cit., p. 34.

54

Voir également le Statut du TIDM, article 24 paragraphe 1 et les articles 54 et suivants de son Règlement. 271


servation, par le demandeur ou par le défendeur, des dispositions du Règlement élaboré conformément à l’article 30 du Statut. La Cour permanente de Justice internationale a cru devoir rechercher à plusieurs reprises si les prescriptions de forme de son Règlement avaient été respectées. Dans ces questions de forme, elle avait tendance à « adopter une interprétation large » (affaire de la Société commerciale de Belgique, CPJI, Série A/B, No. 78, p. 173) … si aucune autre raison ne l’empêchait, à son avis, d’examiner l’affaire au fond, elle ne refuserait pas de le faire en prenant comme motif l’absence de ce que la Cour permanente a appelé dans l’affaire de l’Interprétation du statut du territoire de Memel « la méthode opportune et appropriée pour soumettre la divergence d’opinions à la Cour » (CPJI, Série A/B, No. 49, p. 311).55 Qui plus est, la Cour peut faire abstraction des imperfections de forme des pièces qui lui sont soumises comme elle a eu à l’indiquer dans des arrêts antérieurs.56 (ii) Les délais En ce qui concerne la question des délais, elle regarde pour l’essentiel les pièces de procédure intervenant en cours d’instance. La procédure des juridictions permanentes n’impose pas de délai pour le dépôt de l’acte introductif d’instance.57 Cependant, leurs actes institutifs et autres documents de base fixent des délais pour toute une série de pièces ou actes et pour les procédures incidentes. Ces textes prévoient en outre que les Cours et Tribunaux fixent les délais pour l’introduction de certaines pièces de procédure ; en particulier celles ayant trait à la procédure écrite. Ceci résulte du fait que ces juridictions déterminent par un règlement le mode suivant lequel elles exercent leurs fonctions. Elles règlent notamment leur procédure comme le leur reconnaît leur statut respectif.58

55

Aff. du Cameroun septentrional, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

56

Affaire des Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, op. cit., p. 34 ; Affaire de Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaire, op. cit., p. 14 ; Affaire de l’Interprétation des arrêts Nos 7 et 8, CPJI, Série A No. 13 (1927), p. 16.

57

L’Affaire des Appels contre certains jugements du Tribunal arbitral mixte hungarotchécoslovaque est l’unique affaire portée devant la CPJI où une exception préliminaire d’irrecevabilité s’est fondée sur l’inobservation du délai prescrit par le titre de compétence pour l’introduction d’un recours. En raison du désistement du demandeur, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Cour n’a pu se prononcer sur cette exception. Voir, CPJI, Série A/B, No. 56 (ordonnance du 12 mai 1933), p. 162.

58

Voir en ce qui concerne le TIDM, la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer : art. 290 (mesures conservatoires) ; art. 292 (prompte mainlevée) ; Statut : art. 16 ; art. 27 ; Règlement adopté le 28 octobre 1997 : art. 46 ; art. 54 ; art. 59 ; art. 61 ; art. 69 ; art. 89 ; art. 90 ; art. 96 ; art. 97 ; art. 98 ; art. 99 ; art. 103 ; art. 110 ; art. 111 ; art. 112.

272


Dans ce domaine des délais également, la procédure juridictionnelle internationale est très peu formaliste. Les juridictions veillent essentiellement à l’égalité des parties sans pointillisme inutile. Dans l’affaire Losinger & Cie, S.A., le demandeur, la Suisse, a invoqué « l’invalidité en la forme de l’acte introductif de l’exception du Gouvernement yougoslave ». La demande formulée à ce titre par le Gouvernement suisse dans ses conclusions apparaît comme fondée sur les deux motifs suivants : « 1. L’acte introductif n’a été présenté dans le délai fixé par la Cour qu’en un seul exemplaire ; le dépôt en cinquante exemplaires imprimés n’a pas été effectué avant l’expiration du délai ; ainsi, les dispositions de l’article 40 alinéas 1 et 4, du Règlement en vigueur n’auraient pas été observées par le Gouvernement yougoslave ; 2. L’exception du Gouvernement yougoslave n’a pas été présentée dans le délai imparti en premier lieu pour le dépôt du Contre-Mémoire, mais seulement dans le délai fixé après deux prolongations accordées par la Cour sur demande dudit Gouvernement ; celui-ci serait ainsi allé à l’encontre de l’esprit de l’article 38 du Règlement en vigueur avant le 11 mars 1936 et de l’article 62, alinéa 1, du Règlement actuel, lesquels, en définissant le délai pour la présentation d’une exception préliminaire, ne viseraient que le premier délai fixé par la Cour pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire et n’y feraient pas rentrer « les prorogations ultérieurement accordées par la Cour à une partie ».59 La Cour, considérant, en fait, qu’elle a accepté l’acte introductif de l’exception, lequel a été l’objet d’une ordonnance du Président suivie d’une procédure écrite et orale ; que la question soulevée par le Gouvernement suisse concerne moins les droits des parties que l’organisation des travaux de la Cour et son administration interne ; qu’en tout cas, la Cour aurait le pouvoir, conformément à l’article 37, alinéa 4, du Règlement, de décider dans certaines conditions « qu’un acte de procédure fait après l’expiration du délai fixé est considéré comme valable ». En ce qui concerne en particulier le premier des motifs allégués par le Gouvernement suisse, que, tant selon la pratique constante de la Cour que d’après la genèse de l’article 40 du Règlement, cet article ne vise, en employant l’expression « pièce de la procédure écrite », que les mémoire, contre-mémoire, réplique et duplique (art. 43 du Statut ; art. 41 du Règlement), à l’exclusion des actes introductifs d’instance, requêtes ou compromis ; que cette interprétation résulte également du contexte (art. 39 al. 4, du Règlement) ainsi que de la place de l’article 40 dans le Règlement ; que, d’après la pratique de la Cour et les principes régissant la tenue du rôle général (art. 20 du Règlement), les actes 59

Affaire Losinger & Cie, S.A., exception préliminaire, ordonnance du 27 juin 1936, CPJI, Série A/B, No. 67 (1936), p. 22. 273


introductifs d’exceptions préliminaires sont, au présent point de vue, assimilés aux actes introductifs d’instance. La Cour ajoutera relativement au second motif allégué par le Gouvernement suisse, qu’en principe un délai prolongé est à toutes fins le même délai que le délai primitivement fixé. Elle a pu sur ces bases disposer des deux exceptions du demandeur. b. Conditions de recevabilité des réclamations internationales pour actes illicites (i) La nationalité du réclamant La protection diplomatique peut s’étendre à toutes les personnes, physiques ou morales, qui peuvent se prévaloir de la nationalité de l’Etat réclamant. C’est donc normalement de la nationalité que résulte le lien qui unit le particulier lésé et l’Etat réclamant. C’est ce qu’énonce la Cour permanente dans l’affaire du chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis : « En prenant fait et cause pour l’un de ses ressortissants, en mettant en mouvement en sa faveur l’action diplomatique ou l’action judiciaire internationale, l’Etat fait valoir son droit propre, le droit qu’il a de faire respecter en la personne de ses ressortissants le droit international. Ce droit ne peut être nécessairement exercé qu’en faveur de son national, parce que, en l’absence d’accords particuliers, c’est le lien de nationalité entre l’Etat et l’individu qui seul donne à l’Etat le droit de protection diplomatique ».60 Il revient à chaque Etat de déterminer de manière souveraine les conditions d’acquisitions et de perte de la nationalité des sujets de droit soumis à son autorité. Il s’agit d’une compétence exclusive. Comme l’a indiqué la Cour permanente, « dans l’état actuel du droit international, les questions de nationalité sont en principe, de l’avis de la Cour, comprises dans le domaine réservé à la compétence exclusive de l’Etat ».61 Cette opinion fut confirmée par la Cour Internationale de Justice dans l’affaire Nottebohm dans les termes les plus clairs : « le droit international laisse à chaque Etat le soin de régler l’attribution de sa propre nationalité »62. Le principe de la compétence exclusive connaît cependant quelques exceptions. 60

Affaire du Chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis, arrêt du 28 février 1938 (Estonie c/ Lithuanie), CPJI, Série A/B, No. 74, p. 28.

61

Avis consultatif du 7 février 1923 relatif à l’affaire franco-britannique des décrets de nationalité en Tunisie et au Maroc, CPJI, Série B., No. 4, p. 24.

62

Affaire Nottebohm, deuxième phase, arrêt du 6 avril 1955, CIJ Recueil 1955, p. 23 ; le Tribunal arbitral chargé de trancher le différend relatif au filetage à l’intérieur du Golfe du Saint-Laurent a rappelé « que le droit, pour un Etat de déterminer par sa législation les conditions d’immatriculation des navires en général, et des bateaux de pêche en particulier, relève de la compétence exclusive de cet Etat », Sentence du 17 juillet 1986, paragraphe 27 ; voir également l’affaire du Navire « SAIGA » (No. 2) (Saint-Vincent-et-les-Grenadines c/ Guinée), arrêt du 1er juillet 1999, TIDM Recueil 1999, pp. 47-48, paragraphes 103-

274


D’abord, le contrôle du juge tendant à vérifier si le particulier lésé possède effectivement la nationalité par lui revendiquée. La Cour Internationale de Justice a eu à se prononcer sur cet aspect. Dans l’affaire Nottebohm, elle dit : « Pour se prononcer sur la recevabilité de la requête, la Cour doit rechercher si la nationalité que le Liechtenstein a conféré à Nottebohm par une naturalisation intervenue dans les circonstances qui ont été rappelées peut être valablement invoquée à l’égard du Guatemala, si elle donne au Liechtenstein un titre suffisant pour exercer la protection de Nottebohm vis-à-vis du Guatemala et en conséquence saisir la Cour d’une réclamation concernant cette personne. La Cour n’entend pas sortir du cadre limité de la question qu’il lui faut résoudre, à savoir si la nationalité conférée à Nottebohm peut être invoquée vis-à-vis du Guatemala pour justifier la présente procédure. Elle doit la résoudre sur la base du droit international, ce qui est conforme à la nature de la question posée et à celle de sa propre mission ».63 Ensuite, la compétence exclusive de l’Etat relative à l’attribution de la nationalité a une autre exception dans le fait qu’un Etat n’est guère tenu de reconnaître une nationalité conférée en violation de la coutume internationale, des conventions particulières ou encore des principes reconnus en la matière.64 Enfin, il y a l’exception d’inopposabilité des naturalisations fictives telle qu’elle est dégagée par la Cour Internationale de Justice dans l’affaire Nottebohm. Selon la Cour : « Plutôt que demandée pour obtenir la consécration en droit de l’appartenance en fait de Nottebohm à la population du Liechtenstein, cette naturalisation a été recherchée par lui pour lui permettre de substituer à sa qualité de sujet d’un Etat belligérant la qualité de sujet d’un Etat neutre, dans le but unique de passer ainsi sous la protection du Liechtenstein et non d’en épouser les traditions, les intérêts, le genre de vie, d’assumer 109 ; voir en outre l’Opinion dissidente du Juge Tafsir Malick Ndiaye en la même affaire, pp. 234-257. 63

Affaire Nottebohm précitée, CIJ Recueil 1955, pp. 16-17.

64

Dans l’avis relatif à l’acquisition de la nationalité polonaise, la Cour permanente a indiqué que le principe « n’est applicable que sous réserve des engagements conventionnels » souscrits par l’Etat : voir CPJI, avis du 15 septembre 1923, Série B, No. 7, p. 16 ; La même règle est énoncée à l’article 1er de la Convention de La Haye du 12 avril 1930 relative à certaines questions portant sur les conflits de lois sur la nationalité : « Il appartient à chaque Etat de déterminer par sa législation quels sont ses nationaux. Cette législation doit être admise par les autres Etats, pourvu qu’elle soit en accord avec les conventions internationales, la coutume internationale et les principes de droit généralement reconnus en matière de nationalité ». 275


les obligations – autres que fiscales – et d’exercer les droits attachés à la qualité ainsi acquise. Le Guatemala n’est pas tenu de reconnaître une nationalité ainsi octroyée. En conséquence, le Liechtenstein n’est pas fondé à étendre sa protection à Nottebohm à l’égard du Guatemala et il doit être pour ce motif déclaré irrecevable en sa demande ».65 En ce qui concerne le moment auquel doit être appréciée la nationalité du particulier lésé pour que la réclamation soit considérée comme recevable, la demande doit être nationale à l’origine, c’est-à-dire que le réclamant doit posséder la nationalité de l’Etat demandeur à la date de survenance du fait illicite.66 Pour ce qui est de la continuité de la nationalité, s’il paraît suffisant au plan procédural de lier la recevabilité de la réclamation au moment de son endossement par l’Etat réclamant devant la juridiction internationale, la règle de la possession ininterrompue de la nationalité depuis l’acte illicite jusqu’à la décision finale ou à la clôture des débats est aussi avancée.67 (ii) L’épuisement des voies de recours internes La règle a pour objet de réaliser l’équilibre entre la souveraineté des Etats et les exigences du droit international. La protection diplomatique est une voie exceptionnelle qui ne peut ouvrir une procédure internationale qu’après l’épuisement des voies de recours internes. La règle se présente ainsi comme une exception d’irrecevabilité à la disposition de l’Etat défendeur lequel peut l’invoquer in limine litis au début de l’instance en réparation. C’est dire que le particulier lésé ne peut tenter d’obtenir la protection de son Etat que s’il a, au préalable, épuisé les voies de recours internes qui lui sont offertes par le système juridique de l’Etat dont il demande réparation. Dans l’affaire ELSI, la Cour Internationale de Justice dégage les caractères intrinsèques de la règle. Elle dit : « … la règle relative aux recours internes n’exige pas et ne saurait exiger qu’une demande soit présentée aux juridictions internes

65

Affaire Nottebohm, op. cit., p. 26.

66

Affaire du Chemin de fer précitée.

67

Dans l’affaire des réclamations britanniques pour dommages survenus dans la zone espagnole du Maroc, sentence arbitrale rendue le 1er mai 1925 par le Pr. Max Huber, on peut lire : « C’est un principe bien établi de la jurisprudence internationale qu’une réclamation doit être nationale du point de vue de l’Etat demandeur dès l’origine jusqu’à sa présentation comme réclamation de droit international. Par présentation, il faut comprendre non seulement la première présentation par la voie diplomatique, mais la totalité des actes par lesquels la réclamation est soutenue sur la base du droit international. Il en résulte que le caractère national de la demande doit exister jusqu’au moment du jugement ou tout au moins jusqu’à la clôture des débats », RSA, Vol. II p. 706. En ce qui concerne le changement de nationalité, et la question des personnes morales, voir Ch. Rousseau, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 121-151.

276


sous une forme et avec des arguments convenant à un tribunal international, celui-ci appliquant un autre droit à d’autres parties ; pour qu’une demande internationale soit recevable, il suffit qu’on ait soumis la substance de la demande aux juridictions compétentes et qu’on ait persévéré aussi loin que le permettent les lois et les procédures locales, et ce sans succès ».68 L’épuisement préalable des recours internes apparaît ainsi comme une condition de recevabilité de la demande. (iii) La conduite du réclamant dans l’ordre interne L’étranger a droit à la légalité interne de son pays de résidence. En revanche, il a l’obligation de se conformer aux lois et règlements dudit pays. Leur violation par l’étranger serait une cause d’irrecevabilité de la réclamation formée en sa faveur. Sa conduite ne doit donc pas contribuer à la réalisation du dommage qu’il a subi et pour lequel on tente d’obtenir réparation : ignorance de la législation interne ; négligence ; immixtion dans les affaires de l’Etat d’accueil ; agitation politique ; acceptation d’une fonction publique à l’étranger, etc.69 Telles sont les conditions essentielles de recevabilité de l’action contentieuse laquelle est un pouvoir légal, conféré au sujet de droit, de saisir le juge. Son titulaire doit cependant remplir les conditions procédurales auxquelles est subordonnée la requête.

68

Affaire de Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI), (Etats-Unis d’Amérique c. Italie), arrêt du 20 juillet 1989, CIJ Recueil 1989, p. 46, paragraphe 59 ; voir également l’affaire du navire « SAIGA » (No. 2) devant le TIDM, op. cit., pp. 43-47, paragraphes 89 à 102. Voir en outre, le Deuxième rapport du Rapporteur spécial de la CDI, J. Dugard, sur la protection diplomatique, Doc. A/CN, 4/514, 53eme session (avril-août 2002).

69

Il existe d’autres facteurs qui affectent la recevabilité des réclamations dans la mise en jeu de la responsabilité internationale en faveur des particuliers lésés. D’abord, la renonciation qui désigne la volonté d’abandonner une réclamation. Elle doit émaner de l’Etat seul détenteur du droit d’action Le désistement apparaît comme une variante de la renonciation en ce qu’il met un terme à l’instance par la volonté du demandeur ou à l’action exercée par lui. Ensuite, il y a la transaction, souvent conventionnelle dont l’objet est de régler à l’amiable le litige et qui éteint la réclamation rendant ainsi l’action du demandeur irrecevable. La transaction peut intervenir avant l’ouverture ou durant le cours de la procédure. Après, il y a l’autorité de la chose jugée entre les parties au différend tranché et qui s’impose aux nationaux des Etats en cause et qui rendrait par conséquent irrecevable une action en protection diplomatique pour l’affaire dans laquelle la règle est applicable et sur les points tranchés par la décision juridictionnelle définitive. Il y a enfin la prescription extinctive ou libératoire qui se pose lorsqu’un temps long s’écoule entre le moment de la survenance du dommage et celui de la présentation de la réclamation. Le point de savoir si la prescription extinctive ou libératoire de l’action internationale en réparation doit s’appliquer ou non relève de la liberté d’appréciation du juge. C’est pourquoi, le principe a donné naissance à des solutions jurisprudentielles nombreuses et variées mais également à des controverses doctrinales très savantes. 277


II. Recevabilité de la requête La requête ou demande en justice est l’acte de procédure par lequel un Etat saisit la juridiction internationale pour obtenir d’elle la sanction d’un droit dont il prétend être le titulaire. Cet acte introductif d’instance a deux aspects intimement liés, mais qu’il faut aussi distinguer. Il est d’une part un acte instrumentum, document écrit obéissant et donnant effet à des prescriptions de forme prédéterminées : désignation des parties à la procédure ; partie requérante / partie défenderesse ; objet du différend ; signature de l’original de la requête par l’agent ou le représentant diplomatique dans le pays du siège de la juridiction ; condition d’inscription de la requête au rôle des affaires, etc. Il recueille la trace de l’accord de volonté issu du compromis ou de la manifestation de volonté de l’Etat demandeur dans le cas de la saisine unilaterale, par voie de requête. D’autre part, la requête est aussi un acte negotium. Le negotium constitue la substance même de l’acte. C’est l’accord de volonté entre les parties à l’instance dans un compromis ou la manifestation de volonté de l’Etat auteur de l’acte introductif d’instance dans le cas de la saisine unilatérale. C’est l’acte negotium qui contient les « demandes » ou prétentions [petita] que les parties ou le requérant soumettent à la décision du juge. Ces prétentions de droit des parties dont la sanction est demandée au juge sont consignées dans leurs conclusions respectives qui énoncent les positions des litigants et sur la base desquelles la juridiction statue sur le différend. La distinction entre l’instrumentum et le negotium revêt une importance particulière pour l’interprétation de l’acte juridictionnel.70

70

Voir Brierly, Rapport sur le droit des traités, Doc. A/CN4/32, ILCYB, 1950, Vol. II, p. 298, paragraphe 30 où l’auteur commente la distinction. Il dit : « A certain linguistic difficulty must, therefore, inevitably pervade the framing of rules for conclusion of treaties. This is specially the case when the term “treaty” is used primarily to connote the instrument or document emboying a binding agreement than the agreement itself… It is innocuous provided that it does not obscure the real nature of treaty which is a legal act or transaction rather than a document”. Dans le même sens, voir Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Rapport sur le droit des traits, Doc. A/CN4/101, ILCYB, 1956, Vol. II, art. 14, commentaire No. 24 : « Considéré comme texte, le traité est un document plutôt qu’un acte ou une opération juridique. Cette ambiguïté apparaît chaque fois qu’on parle de traités parce qu’un traité est à la fois un document qui constate un accord et cet accord lui-même. Dans la première acception, il peut y avoir traité, même si le traité n’est pas en vigueur ou a cessé de l’être (c’est-à-dire bien qu’il ne subsiste pas d’accord en tant qu’accord juridique). Néanmoins, pour assurer en fin de compte la validité de l’accord, il est essentiel que celui-ci doit être rédigé, établi et authentifié par les moyens et dans les formes convenables. En effet, si, en droit, le texte ne constitue pas lui-même l’accord, il est du moins la preuve indispensable et généralement unique de la teneur de l’accord. La valeur primordiale du texte d’un traité uniquement en soi, est donc sa valeur de preuve. Il faut donc par conséquent que le texte fasse foi et, pour cela qu’il remplisse certaines conditions en matière de forme et de méthode ».

278


Dans une procédure ouverte par voie de requête, ce sont les conclusions des parties qui offrent au juge les termes de référence pour statuer. En revanche, dans le cas de la saisine de la juridiction par notification d’un compromis, « c’est dans les termes de ce compromis plutôt que dans les conclusions des Parties qu’elle doit rechercher quels sont les points précis sur lesquels il lui appartient de se prononcer ».71 Pour être recevable, la requête est assujettie aux conditions d’existence du droit d’agir en justice et à l’exercice de celui-ci. 1. Les conditions d’existence du droit d’action Les conditions générales du droit d’action sont l’intérêt, la qualité et le préalable diplomatique selon une présentation traditionnelle. a. L’intérêt à agir La nécessité d’un intérêt est une exigence traditionnelle dans l’ordre interne. On y relève les maximes célèbres : « l’intérêt est la mesure de l’action » ou encore « pas d’intérêt, pas d’action ». C’est que dans ce système juridique, la recevabilité de l’action en justice est assujettie à l’existence d’un intérêt en cause. Pour autant, la nature de l’intérêt requis à l’appui de la demande en particulier lorsque celle-ci est introduite par voie de requête a fait l’objet de controverses dans l’ordre international.72 L’intérêt y a été parfois perçu comme ayant un caractère purement procédural, c’est-à-dire celui d’obtenir de la juridiction saisie une décision au fond. Si l’intérêt joue un rôle particulier dans l’ordre interne où il constitue une condition de l’action, c’est que les systèmes juridiques internes n’utilisent pas la notion de différend qui est fondamental dans la procédure juridictionnelle internationale.73 Selon le Juge Morelli, la Cour Internationale de Justice : « ne peut exercer sa fonction en matière contentieuse si un différend n’existe pas entre les Parties … Or, pour ce qui est du différend international, si un tel différend existe – et l’on a déjà dit que l’existence d’un différend constitue, par elle-même, une condition à laquelle est subordonnée la possibilité d’une décision sur le fond – il est clair qu’il y a en tout cas l’intérêt de l’une ou l’autre Partie à ce que le différend soit réglé. L’intérêt à obtenir une décision sur le fond est « in re ipsa » parce qu’il est une conséquence nécessaire de l’existence même du différend. On voit que

71

Affaire du « LOTUS », arrêt du 7 septembre 1927, CPJI, Série A, No. 10, p. 12.

72

Voir G. Abi-Saab, op. cit., pp. 130-145.

73

Voir l’Opinion individuelle du Juge Morelli en l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional, op. cit., pp. 131-132. 279


la notion d’intérêt à agir n’a pas une place autonome dans le domaine de la procédure internationale ».74 Il n’y a guère de doute que l’existence d’un différend est une condition préalable à l’exercice de toute juridiction contentieuse dans la procédure internationale. En revanche, la conception de l’intérêt de l’éminent juge révèle une légère confusion entre l’action et sa condition d’existence. On doit admettre que l’intérêt est une condition première de la recevabilité de la requête devant les juridictions internationales comme devant les tribunaux internes. Le demandeur doit, par conséquent, établir l’existence de l’intérêt qui est pour lui à protéger afin que la juridiction puisse prendre sa décision au fond. En cela l’intérêt est une condition importante de recevabilité de l’action dans la procédure internationale. Il se trouve que ni le Statut, ni le Règlement de la CIJ ne mentionne l’intérêt à agir comme une condition de recevabilité de la requête. C’est la jurisprudence de la Cour qui en établit le régime. Dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional (exceptions préliminaires), le Royaume-Uni faisait valoir qu’un Membre des Nations Unies non partie à l’accord de tutelle sur le Cameroun n’a aucun « intérêt juridique » à introduire une action contre la manière dont le Royaume-Uni s’est acquitté de ses obligations autres que celles spécialement prévues par l’accord de tutelle en faveur des Etats tiers et de leurs ressortissants.75 Le Cameroun soutenait pour sa part, qu’il avait non seulement un intérêt juridique suffisant à agir devant la Cour en sa qualité de Membre des Nations Unies mais également « un intérêt plus personnel, plus direct et infiniment plus précis que ne l’aurait n’importe quel autre Etat d’Europe, d’Afrique, d’Asie ou d’Amérique ».76 La Cour a admis la recevabilité de la requête camerounaise après avoir reconnu son intérêt individuel en particulier « le fait incontestable que si le plébiscite du Cameroun septentrional n’avait pas été favorable à l’union avec la Fédération du Nigeria, il aurait été favorable à l’union avec la République du Cameroun … ».77 En revanche, la Cour s’est refusée à statuer au fond sur la demande du Cameroun. Elle n’a pas accueilli l’argument suivant lequel l’intérêt invoqué par le requérant était un intérêt judiciaire susceptible de donner lieu à une décision juridictionnelle. Dans l’affaire du Sud-Ouest africain (exceptions préliminaires), l’Union sud-africaine a invoqué l’absence d’intérêt à agir pour s’opposer à la recevabilité des requêtes contre elle introduites par l’Ethiopie et le Liberia. Sa

74

Ibid.

75

CIJ, Recueil des mémoires, 1963, p. 56 et suivantes.

76

Ibid. p. 346.

77

Affaire du Cameroun septentrional, op. cit., arrêt, p. 28.

280


troisième exception faisait valoir que le conflit soumis à la Cour « n’est pas, eu égard à sa nature et à sa teneur, un « différend », comme il est prévu à l’article 7 du Mandat pour le Sud-ouest africain et cela particulièrement en tant qu’aucun intérêt concret des Gouvernements d’Ethiopie et/ou du Liberia ou de leurs ressortissants n’est affecté en l’espèce ».78 La Cour répondra que le différend est un différend comme il est prévu à l’article 7 du Mandat et que l’exception doit être rejetée.79 Dans sa décision au fond sur la même affaire, la cour dit : « … Les Etats ne peuvent se présenter devant la Cour à titre individuel qu’en tant que parties à un différend avec un autre Etat, même s’ils ne cherchent qu’à obtenir un jugement déclaratoire. Au moment où ils se présentent devant la Cour, ils doivent, ne poursuivraient-ils qu’un objectif aussi limité, établir qu’ils ont, vis-à-vis du défendeur en l’espèce, un droit ou un intérêt juridique au regard de l’objet de la demande leur permettant d’obtenir les déclarations qu’ils sollicitent, ou, en d’autres termes, qu’ils sont des parties devant lesquelles l’Etat défendeur est responsable en vertu de l’instrument ou de la règle de droit pertinente ».80 La Cour refusera ainsi de donner suite aux demandes de l’Ethiopie et du Liberia. Elle précisera en outre que l’existence d’un différend ne dispense pas le demandeur de la justification d’un droit ou intérêt juridique à l’égard de l’objet de la demande, même si ce différend entre, comme en l’espèce, dans la catégorie de ceux pour lesquels une clause juridictionnelle lui donne compétence. L’existence d’un différend, selon la Cour, établit simplement, dans ce cas, qu’elle est compétente. Elle ne prouve pas nécessairement que le demandeur a un intérêt suffisant à ce qu’elle se prononce sur le fond.81 La manière dont la Cour a tranché cette affaire du Sud-Ouest africain révèle une contradiction de sa part. Par son arrêt du 21 décembre 1962, elle avait rejeté la troisième exception à la suite d’un examen sommaire de la question de fond à laquelle cette exception avait trait et qui concernait l’existence des droits substantiels que les demandeurs prétendaient avoir en leur qualité d’anciens membres de la Société des Nations, par rapport à l’objet de leurs demandes. En effet, se référant à l’article 7 du Mandat de la Société des Nations pour le Sud-Ouest africain, la Cour affirmait en 1962 que : « la portée et l’objet manifestes des dispositions de cet article indiquent en effet qu’on entendait par là que les Membres de la Société des Nations eussent 78

Affaire du Sud-Ouest africain, op. cit., Recueil 1962, p. 327.

79

Ibid. p. 343. Voir supra, première partie, paragraphe 1 sur l’existence du différend et le raisonnement de la Cour.

80

Arrêt du 18 juillet 1966 (fond), CIJ Recueil 1966, p. 34.

81

Ibid. pp. 37-42. 281


un droit ou un intérêt juridique à ce que le Mandataire observât ses obligations à la fois à l’égard des habitants du territoire sous Mandat et à l’égard de la Société des Nations et de ses Membres ».82 Avec l’arrêt du 18 juillet 1966 (fond), la Cour conclut : « Se fondant sur les considérations qui précèdent, la Cour constate que les demandeurs ne sauraient être considérés comme ayant établi l’existence à leur profit d’un droit ou intérêt juridique au regard de l’objet des présentes demandes ; en conséquence la Cour doit refuser d’y donner suite ».83 Pour justifier son attitude, la Cour a considéré que dans son arrêt de 1962, elle s’était simplement prononcée sur sa compétence à statuer sur le fond et qu’elle n’avait pas tranché la question relative à la recevabilité de la demande.84 Elle distinguera la qualité des demandeurs de leur aptitude à se présenter devant la Cour. Examinant la question de la qualité, elle dira qu’ « il restait aux demandeurs à établir au fond qu’ils avaient un droit ou intérêt juridique quant à l’exécution des dispositions par eux invoqués et qu’ils étaient fondés à obtenir de la Cour des déclarations par eux sollicitées ».85 La Cour a pu ainsi juger que le système des mandats ne fonde le droit d’action des Etats Membres de la SDN que sur leurs intérêts directs et personnels et non sur l’intérêt général au respect des obligations imposées au mandataire. L’on peut comprendre pourquoi le prétoire de cette juridiction a été déserté pendant de longues années à la suite de cet arrêt.

82

CIJ Recueil 1962, p. 343.

83

CIJ Recueil 1966, p. 51.

84

Ibid. pp. 42-43.

85

Ibid. p. 38. Lorsque l’on a soutenu que les Etats peuvent demander qu’un principe général soit observé et qu’ils peuvent avoir un intérêt juridique à réclamer devant la Cour le respect d’un principe de droit international en l’absence de tout préjudice matériel, la Cour rétorquera que « sans chercher à discuter jusqu’à quel point et dans quelles circonstances particulières cela peut être vrai, il suffira de signaler que si la Cour juge en l’espèce que les demandeurs n’auraient pu avoir de droits ou intérêts juridiques à l’égard des dispositions du Mandat relatives aux intérêts particuliers, ce n’est nullement pour le seul motif que leur objet est concret et tangible. De même si la Cour estime que les demandeurs n’ont pas individuellement comme Etats de droits ou intérêts juridiques à l’égard des dispositions relatives à la gestion, ce n’est pas parce que de tels droits ou intérêts juridiques n’auraient pas d’objet concret et tangible. La Cour juge simplement que ces droits et intérêts juridiques ne sauraient exister que s’ils ont été clairement conférés à ceux qui les revendiquent par un texte, un instrument ou une règle de droit et qu’en l’espèce on n’en a jamais conféré aux Membres de la SDN à titre individuel, que ce soit par l’un des instruments pertinents ou dans le cadre général du système des mandats ou d’une autre manière », voir CIJ Recueil 1966, pp. 32-33.

282


L’appréciation de l’intérêt du demandeur en intervention86 est quant à elle très différente. « Sous quelque forme que l’intervention se présente, l’intérêt dont elle se réclame est soumis au contrôle de la Cour. C’est que l’intervention, par sa nature, est un incident de procédure qui implique l’immixtion d’un tiers dans une instance en cours, immixtion qui ne peut se justifier que par l’existence d’un rapport de connexité entre l’objet de l’instance principale et les intérêts du requérant en intervention ».87 Les articles 62 et 63 du Statut et les articles 81 et 82 du règlement de la CIJ admettent la procédure d’intervention devant la Cour et envisagent deux cas distincts d’intervention. Dans le premier cas, le demandeur « estime que, dans un différend, un intérêt d’ordre juridique est pour lui en cause ». Dans le second cas de figure, la procédure d’intervention est ouverte à tous les Etats qui ont participé avec les Etats Parties au litige à une convention dont l’interprétation est mise en cause dans l’instance. Cette intervention est de droit. Dans l’affaire du Vapeur Wimbledon, l’Allemagne ayant contesté aux requérants le droit d’intenter une action contre elle, ceux-ci ont répliqué que « les quatre puissances de qui émane la requête sont intéressées au respect du principe du libre passage dans le canal de Kiel et à l’exacte exécution des clauses du Traité de Versailles ». Sur la recevabilité de la demande dans les termes où elle est soumise à la Cour – le défendeur s’en est remis sur ce point à son appréciation – la Cour permanente l’accueille sans hésitation. Elle dit : « La Cour estime que la recevabilité de la demande, telle qu’elle a été formulée dans la requête introductive d’instance, ne peut faire doute. Il suffit d’observer en l’espèce que chacune des Puissances demanderesses a un intérêt évident à l’exécution des stipulations qui concernent le canal de Kiel, puisqu’elles ont toutes des flottes et des navires marchands battant leur pavillon ; elles rentrent donc, sans qu’il soit besoin pour elles de justifier d’un intérêt pécuniaire lésé, dans les prévisions de l’article 386, dont l’alinéa 1er est ainsi conçu : « Au cas de violation d’une des dispositions des articles 380 à 386, ou en cas de désaccord sur l’interprétation de ces articles, toute Puissance intéressée pourra faire appel à la juridiction instituée dans ce but par la Société des Nations. »88

86

Comme l’indique la Cour permanente, « elle a pour fondement l’intérêt d’ordre juridique allégué par l’intervenant ; et il appartient à la Cour de ne l’accueillir que si l’existence de cet intérêt lui paraît suffisamment justifiée ». Affaire du Vapeur « Wimbledon » (arrêt du 28 juin 1923), CPJI, Série A, No. 1, p. 12.

87

Ch. de Visscher, op. cit. (note 1), p. 66.

88

CPJI, Série A, No. 1 (17 août 1923), p. 20. 283


La Cour Internationale de Justice a quant à elle rejeté la plupart des demandes d’intervention de droit pour défaut d’intérêt juridique pour les Etats en cause.89 Cependant, dans l’affaire Haya de la Torre où elle fut saisie par le Gouvernement cubain d’une requête à fin d’intervention laquelle fut très contestée au motif qu’il s’agit d’une tentative de recours contre l’arrêt de la Cour, relatif à l’affaire du droit d’Asile, en date du 20 novembre 1950, la demande a été accueillie. Le Gouvernement cubain justifiait sa requête par la nécessité où se trouvait la Cour d’interpréter un nouvel aspect de la Convention de La Havane, aspect que n’avait eu à retenir l’arrêt du 20 novembre 1950. La Cour jugea que l’intervention ainsi délimitée répondait aux conditions de l’article 63 et pouvait être admise par application de l’article 66, paragraphe 2, du Règlement de la Cour.90 b. La qualité pour agir Dans la procédure internationale, la qualité s’entend du titre juridique qui permet à un sujet de droit international d’invoquer en justice le droit dont il demande la sanction. C’est le Jus standi in Judicio ou encore le Locus standi. L’article 34 paragraphe premier du Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice stipule que « seuls les Etats ont qualité pour se présenter devant la Cour ». L’article 20 du Statut du Tribunal International du Droit de la Mer dispose quant à lui : « Article 20 : Accés au Tribunal 1. Le tribunal est ouvert aux Etats Parties. 2. Le Tribunal est ouvert à des entités autres que les Etats Parties dans tous les cas expressément prévus à la partie XI (de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer) ou pour tout différend soumis en vertu de tout autre accord conférant au Tribunal une compétence acceptée par toutes les parties au différend ». De plus le paragraphe 2 de l’article 292 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, qui traite de la procédure de « Prompte mainlevée de l’immobilisation du navire ou prompte libération de son équipage », dispose que « la demande de mainlevée ou de mise en liberté ne peut être faite que par l’Etat du pavillon ou en son nom ».

89

C’est le cas de Malte dans l’affaire du Plateau continental Tunisie-Libye, arrêt du 14 avril 1981, CIJ Recueil 1981, p. 19 ; de l’Italie dans l’affaire du Plateau continental LibyeMalte, arrêt du 21 mars 1984, CIJ Recueil 1984, pp. 1-28 ; de El Salvador dans l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci : demande jugée irrecevable à ce stade, ordonnance du 4 octobre 1984, CIJ Recueil 1984, p. 215 ; c’est enfin le cas des Philippines dans l’affaire de la Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan, arrêt du 23 octobre 2001, pp. 3-33, paragraphes 1-95.

90

Affaire Haya de la Torre (arrêt du 13 juin 1951), CIJ Recueil 1951, pp. 76-77.

284


Il faut relever que ces différentes dispositions relatives à la qualité et la conception qui les sous-tend traitent plutôt de la compétence générale ratione personae de ces deux juridictions internationales. Il s’agit des conditions posées par les parties qui se rapportent à la compétence, c’est-à-dire à l’exercice du pouvoir juridictionnel de ces organes : accès des Etats ou ouverture à d’autres entités,91 ces dispositions n’envisagent pas la question de la recevabilité de la requête. Les conditions de recevabilité relatives à la qualité sont celles ayant pour but d’assurer l’appartenance de la prétention en cause à la Partie qui la réclame directement ou en représentation. Il s’agit d’éviter, en effet, qu’un sujet de droit agisse alors que ce sont les intérêts d’un autre sujet qui sont en cause ; à l’exception de l’hypothèse de la représentation en justice dont la mutabilité dans l’ordre international va plutôt – de nos jours – dans le sens de la désuétude. Dans ce cas, la qualité a un fondement conventionnel. Elle apparaît comme une condition de recevabilité de la requête qui la distingue de l’intérêt direct et personnel.92 Le droit international général reconnaît quant à lui la qualité à faire valoir des réclamations internationales pour actes illicites. Il s’agit des conditions de la nationalité dans l’exercice de la protection diplomatique.93 La qualité, regardée comme condition de recevabilité de la requête, est difficile à cerner. Elle ne peut être mise en lumière que dans des hypothèses très rares ou en voie de disparition. Elle n’est que très rarement une condition autonome du droit d’action. C’est l’intérêt qui se présente comme la véritable condition du droit d’action. c. Les négociations diplomatiques préalables Cette condition se rattache à celle de l’existence d’un différend.94 Elle révèle que le litige est arrivé à maturité pour être tranché par la juridiction internationale saisie. La condition des négociations diplomatiques préalables est une survivance du droit arbitral antérieur à l’institution des juridictions permanentes que nous connaissons aujourd’hui où elle était en général requise parce qu’étant le procédé le plus naturel entre Etats souverains pour aboutir au compromis ou à la clause compromissoire. Lorsque cette condition a été soulevée devant la Cour parce que

91

Voir Affaire du « Grand Prince » (Belize c/ France), Demande de prompte mainlevée, arrêt du 20 avril 2001, TIDM Recueil 2001, paragraphes 62 à 94 ; voir en outre l’opinion individuelle du Juge Anderson dans cette même affaire et celle du Juge Wolfrum.

92

Voir Affaire des Ressortissants des Etats-Unis au Maroc, CIJ Recueil 1951, p. 109 et suivantes. La question de l’intérêt direct et personnel ou de la qualité a été développée par la CIJ dans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain. Voir le commentaire de G. Abi-Saab, op. cit., pp. 136-145.

93

Voir supra, section I, 2, b.

94

Voir supra, section I, 1, a, (ii). 285


prévue par le titre de compétence, elle lui a donné effet en soulignant, toutefois, son caractère relatif.95 La Cour permanente a eu l’occasion d’indiquer l’importance des négociations diplomatiques préalables comme moyen de détermination de l’objet du différend. Elle dit : « La Cour se rend bien compte de toute l’importance de la règle suivant laquelle ne doivent être portées devant elle que des affaires qui ne sont pas susceptibles d’être réglées par négociations ; elle reconnaît en effet, qu’avant qu’un différend fasse l’objet d’un recours en justice, il importe que son objet ait été nettement défini au moyen de pourparlers diplomatiques ».96 Toutefois, la Cour a eu à indiquer qu’elle aurait examiné le fond d’une affaire en cas de défaut de la condition des négociations diplomatiques regardée comme une condition de forme même si elle était prévue par le titre de compétence.97 C’est qu’on a voulu voir dans les négociations diplomatiques préalables une condition d’épuisement des recours internationaux par analogie avec l’ordre interne. Ce qui soumettrait le requérant à l’obligation de mettre en demeure le défendeur éventuel avant l’ouverture d’une procédure internationale. Si cette règle se retrouve dans certaines conventions internationales évoquant un préalable diplomatique, sa consécration coutumière est pour le moins douteuse.98 Dans l’affaire du droit de passage en territoire indien,99 le Gouvernement de ce pays avait soulevé une exception préliminaire tendant à faire admettre que l’action n’était pas recevable parce que le Portugal ne s’était pas « conformé à la règle de droit coutumier international » lui faisant obligation avant le dépôt

95

Affaire des Concessions Mavrommatis, op. cit., où la Cour dit « … l’appréciation de l’importance et des chances de réussites d’une négociation diplomatique est essentiellement relative », p. 13 ; de plus « … pour l’application de cette règle, la Cour ne peut pas se dispenser de tenir compte, entre autres circonstances, de l’appréciation des Etats intéressés eux-mêmes, qui sont le mieux placés pour juger des motifs d’ordre politique pouvant rendre impossible la solution diplomatique d’une contestation déterminée », p. 15.

96

Ibid. p. 15. La Cour était saisie de cette affaire par voie de compromis.

97

Affaire de Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise, op. cit., p. 14. La Cour indique en outre : « l’absence de négociations diplomatiques permettant de constater la divergence d’opinions exigée par l’article 23 de la Convention… n’aurait aucune portée pratique, car si la requête était, par ce motif, déclarée prématurée, le Gouvernement allemand serait libre de la renouveler le lendemain », p. 22.

98

Convention de La Haye relative au règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux du 29 juillet 1899 : article 16 ; Convention I de La Haye relative au règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux du 18 octobre 1907 : article 14 ; Pacte de la Société des Nations du 28 juin 1919 : article 13 paragraphe 1, Acte général d’arbitrage [Accord de Genève, règlement pacifique des différends internationaux] du 26 septembre 1928 : article 39 paragraphe 2.

99

Affaire du droit de passage sur territoire indien (exceptions préliminaires), arrêt du 26 novembre 1957, CIJ Recueil 1957 ; voir également les Mémoires et Plaidoiries, Vol. 1, p. 117.

286


de sa requête, « à entreprendre des négociations diplomatiques et à poursuivre jusqu’au moment où il eût été inutile de les poursuivre plus longtemps ».100 Ainsi, la règle serait obligatoire en vertu du droit international général et elle exigerait non seulement le recours au préalable diplomatique mais encore la poursuite de ce processus jusqu’à son terme. Comme on a pu le faire observer : « l’épuisement des négociations diplomatiques est une notion essentiellement relative, qu’on ne peut enfermer a priori dans des limites précises. Tout autre est, par exemple, la notion de l’épuisement des recours internes, qui joue, on le sait, un rôle considérable dans le domaine de la responsabilité internationale en raison de dommages causés à des personnes privées … La situation est toute différente quand il s’agit de cette procédure beaucoup plus souple et beaucoup plus empirique qu’on désigne sous le nom de « négociations diplomatiques » … La Cour admet que le préalable diplomatique, là où il est expressément prévu par le droit conventionnel, est loin de comporter des exigences précises et que l’attitude négative d’une des Parties peut suffire pour autoriser l’autre à porter l’affaire devant la Cour, même si l’échange de vues n’a été que de très courte durée ».101 Il apparaît par conséquent que le recours à la procédure judiciaire n’est pas assujetti à des négociations diplomatiques préalables et que les juridictions internationales peuvent être valablement saisies sans que les Parties n’aient épuisé le cours de ce processus. La détermination des conditions d’existence du droit d’action permet l’exercice de celui-ci. 2. L’exercice du droit d’action L’exercice du droit d’action se traduit par des demandes et des moyens de défense. a. Les demandes La demande en justice est l’acte juridique par lequel un sujet de droit soumet à la juridiction une prétention de droit. L’on distingue habituellement la demande principale ou initiale et les demandes incidentes. La première aussi appelée demande introductive d’instance, est celle par laquelle un sujet de droit prend

100

Ibid.

101

Voir M. Bourquin, « Dans quelle mesure le recours à des négociations diplomatiques est-il nécessaire avant qu’un différend puisse être soumis à la juridiction internationale ? », in Hommage d’une génération de Juristes au Président Basdevant, Paris, Editions A. Pédone, 1960, pp. 43-55, spéc. pp. 47-48 ; voir en outre la note No. 40 supra. 287


l’initiative de l’ouverture d’une procédure internationale en soumettant au juge ses prétentions de droit et qui donc introduit l’instance. Les secondes sont celles qui interviennent alors que l’instance est déjà engagée. Elles doivent remplir certaines conditions en se greffant sur le procès en cours. Leur recevabilité est assujettie à leur rattachement à la demande initiale par un lien suffisant, un lien de connexité ou un intérêt juridique en cause. Il s’agit de la demande reconventionnelle, de la demande additionnelle et de l’intervention. Les affaires sont portées devant la Cour, selon le cas, soit par notification du compromis, soit par une requête, adressées au Greffier, dans les deux cas, l’objet du différend et les parties doivent être indiqués.102 Dans le cas de la saisine par voie de requête, celle-ci « 1) … indique la partie requérante, l’Etat contre lequel la demande est formée et l’objet du différend. 2) La requête indique autant que possible les moyens de droits sur lesquels le demandeur prétend fonder la compétence de la Cour, elle indique en outre la nature précise de la demande et contient un exposé succinct des faits et moyens sur lesquels cette demande repose ».103 Dans l’affaire des Phosphates du Maroc, le Gouvernement français avait soulevé une exception déduite de l’obscurité de la demande motif pris de ce que le Gouvernement royal d’Italie « n’avait pas fait connaître l’objet de sa demande dans des conditions de précision et de clarté correspondant aux exigences d’une bonne administration de la justice, et aux prescriptions de l’article 32, alinéa 2 de l’article 42 du Règlement de la Cour ».104 En réponse, la Cour se montrant plutôt libérale, a estimé que « les précisions qui ont été apportées au cours de la procédure écrite et de la procédure orale lui permettent de se former une idée suffisamment claire de l’objet de la demande contenue dans la requête du Gouvernement italien ».105

102

Article 40 paragraphe premier du Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice ; voir également l’article 24 paragraphe 1er du Statut du Tribunal International du Droit de la Mer.

103

Article 38 paragraphes 1 et 2 du Règlement de la CIJ ; voir aussi l’article 54 paragraphes 1 et 2 du règlement du TIDM.

104

Affaire des Phosphates du Maroc, CPJI, Série A/B, No. 74, p. 16.

105

Ibid. p. 21 ; Dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional, la Cour a eu à examiner une exception préliminaire du Royaume-Uni fondée sur la prétendue inobservation de l’article 32 paragraphe 2 [article 38 paragraphe 2 actuel], du Règlement selon lequel, lorsqu’une affaire est portée devant la Cour, la requête doit contenir autant que possible l’indication précise de l’objet de la demande et un exposé des motifs par lesquels cette demande est prétendue justifiée. Faisant sienne l’opinion de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, la Cour estime que, exerçant une juridiction internationale, elle n’est pas tenue d’attacher à des considérations de forme la même importance qu’elles pourraient avoir dans le droit interne. Elle constate que la requête était suffisamment conforme à l’article 32, paragraphe 2, du Règlement et que cette exception préliminaire est par suite sans fondement ; Affaire du Cameroun septentrional, op. cit., CIJ Recueil 1963, pp. 27-28.

288


La demande en justice permet à la juridiction de statuer. Dans l’exercice de sa fonction juridictionnelle, elle peut rendre une décision d’incompétence ou considérer que la procédure est irrégulière, ce qui est de nature à la conduire à déclarer la demande irrecevable, ou encore trancher le fond de l’affaire. Pour ce faire, c’est la demande qui fixe le cadre de sa décision dans la mesure où la juridiction ne doit se prononcer que sur ce dont elle est saisie et pas au-delà. Il faut rappeler que le juge doit à ce propos tenir compte de la demande initiale et éventuellement des demandes incidentes formées après l’ouverture du procès. De plus, le juge doit se placer au moment de la demande pour apprécier celle-ci. Cette règle peut connaître des exceptions en matière de réclamations d’origine privée pour tenir compte du lucrum cessans ou du damnum emergens. Dans l’affaire du Droit d’asile, à la question : faut-il comprendre l’arrêt du 20 novembre 1950 dans le sens qu’il convient de reconnaître des effets juridiques à la qualification faite par l’Ambassadeur de Colombie à Lima du délit imputé à Haya de la Torre ? La Cour constate qu’il s’agit d’un point que les parties ne lui avaient pas soumis : la Cour n’avait été appelée à se prononcer que sur une conclusion formulée par la Colombie en termes abstraits et généraux. Ceci permit à la Cour de déclarer : « Il y a lieu de rappeler le principe que la Cour a le devoir de répondre aux demandes des Parties telles qu’elles s’expriment dans leurs conclusions finales, mais aussi celui de s’abstenir de statuer sur des points non compris dans lesdites demandes ainsi exprimées ».106 En revanche, elle n’est guère tenue de répondre aux motifs de fait ou de droit que les Parties sont censées évoquer pour étayer leur thèse respective. Elle a eu à opérer une distinction nette entre les motifs ou moyens invoqués à leur appui et les demandes estimant toutefois pouvoir fonder sa décision « sur telles raisons jugées par elle pertinentes et appropriées ».107 Cette décision est rendue sur la base des conclusions finales des Parties qui peuvent faire l’objet de modifications au cours de la procédure. Toutefois, le principe d’immutabilité de l’instance s’oppose à la modification des conclusions dans des conditions qui modifieraient l’objet du différend – et non de la demande

106

Arrêt du 27 novembre 1950 interprétatif de l’arrêt du 20 novembre 1950 (affaire du Droit d’asile), CIJ Recueil 1950, p. 402 ; voir également l’affaire du droit de passage sur territoire indien précitée et les vues du Président Klaestad sur la question du moment de la demande pour l’appréciation de celle-ci, Recueil 1960, p. 47 ; Dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional, si la Cour a admis l’existence d’un différend « à la date de la requête », en revanche elle a estimé qu’elle n’était pas tenue d’y statuer « au moment du jugement », op. cit., pp. 27 et 34.

107

Affaire Nottebohm, op. cit., p. 16 ; Examinant les conclusions du Royaume-Uni dans l’affaire des Pêcheries, la Cour a fait également une distinction entre les conclusions et un « ensemble de propositions qui, sous la forme de définitions, de principes ou de règles, tendent à justifier certaines prétentions et ne sont pas l’énoncé précis et direct d’une demande ». Affaire des Pêcheries, arrêt du 18 décembre 1951, CIJ Recueil 1951, p. 126. 289


– tel qu’il a été établi dans l’acte introductif d’instance. La juridiction statue par conséquent dans le cadre des conclusions finales des Parties lorsqu’elle estime recevables les amendements qu’elles y auraient apportés au cours de la procédure écrite ou orale. b. Les moyens de défense Il s’agit d’examiner ici la défense au fond et les exceptions préliminaires. (i) La défense au fond On entend par défense au fond la contestation directe du bien-fondé de la prétention du requérant par le défendeur. Son objet est de faire rejeter comme non justifiée une prétention après examen au fond du droit. La défense au fond peut être invoquée en tout état de cause jusqu’à la clôture des débats. Le problème de procédure soulevé par ce moyen de défense a trait au lien de connexité qui peut exister entre les arguments en défense au fond et ceux invoqués à l’appui d’une exception préliminaire. La Cour permanente a ainsi eu à rencontrer cette difficulté. Elle devait juger que, bien qu’une exception qui tend à contester le caractère national d’une réclamation d’origine privée soit à considérer, en principe, comme exception préliminaire, elle ne pouvait, en l’espèce, être traitée comme telle par la raison que la base de l’exception soulevée par le défendeur se confondait avec la position de droit qu’il défendait au fond et que, dans ces conditions, il était impossible de se prononcer sur elle sans toucher le fond.108 C’est ce qui amène quelquefois le juge109 à joindre une exception au fond pour tenir compte de cette connexité, laquelle peut être envisagée de deux manières. « Il peut tout d’abord s’agir d’une connexité au niveau des données. Les éléments, les « matériaux », dont croit devoir se servir la Cour sont, semble-t-il, communs à l’exception et au fond … L’exigence de jonction peut provenir aussi d’une connexité au niveau des solutions. La réponse à la question de procédure risque d’impliquer directement ou indirectement la réponse à certaines questions concernant le fond : cela peut précisément

108

CPJI, Affaire du Chemin de fer, op. cit., p. 17.

109

La Cour permanente l’a décidée, par exemple, dans les affaires : Pajzscsaky, Esterhazy, 23 mai 1936, CPJI, Série A/B, No. 66 ; Losinger et Cie, SA, 27 juin 1936, Série A/B, No. 75. La Cour Internationale de Justice a eu recours à la jonction au fond dans l’affaire relative à certains emprunts norvégiens, 6 juillet 1957, CIJ Recueil 1957, p. 9 ; dans l’affaire du droit de passage sur territoire indien, 26 novembre 1957, CIJ Recueil 1957, p. 125 ; et dans l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited, 24 juillet 1964, CIJ Recueil 1964, p. 6.

290


provenir du fait même que le débat sur la procédure et le débat sur le fond puisent leurs arguments à la même source et sont alimentés par des informations identiques. En statuant sur l’exception, le juge risque alors de préjuger le fond à un moment où la seule compétence de la Cour a été discutée. Ces deux exigences, tout à la fois « positive » (un besoin, celui de mieux connaître le fond, d’une part) et « négative » (une crainte, celle de préjuger le fond, d’autre part) sont en vérité étroitement liées ».110 (ii) Les exceptions préliminaires L’exception préliminaire désigne le « moyen invoqué au cours de la première phase d’une instance et tendant à obtenir que le tribunal saisi tranche une question préalable avant d’aborder l’examen du fond de l’affaire, le but de l’exception étant le plus souvent d’obtenir qu’il ne soit pas passé à l’examen du fond ».111 Ce moyen peut tendre à faire déclarer la procédure irrégulière ou éteinte. Et cette contestation portant sur la procédure a une conséquence sur le cours de celle-ci. C’est ainsi que le paragraphe 3 de l’article 79 du Règlement de la CIJ indique que dès réception de l’acte introductif de l’exception, la procédure sur le fond est suspendue et la Cour fixe le délai dans lequel la partie contre laquelle l’exception est introduite peut présenter un exposé écrit contenant ses observations et conclusions. L’exception préliminaire donne ainsi lieu à une procédure incidente et la Cour, après avoir entendu les parties, statue dans un arrêt par lequel elle retient l’exception, la rejette ou déclare que cette exception n’a pas dans les circonstances de l’espèce un caractère exclusivement préliminaire. Si la Cour rejette l’exception ou remet en cause le caractère exclusivement préliminaire, elle fixe les délais pour la suite de la procédure.112 Ces exceptions doivent, à peine d’irrecevabilité, être soulevées avant tout autre moyen de défense. L’adjectif « préliminaire » attaché à l’exception s’avère polysémique. Il désigne la hauteur de la procédure – le moment – à laquelle l’exception est soulevée mais aussi la substance de celle-ci dans sa relation logique et préalable au fond de l’affaire, et à l’aune de laquelle on détermine le caractère exclusivement préliminaire ou non de l’exception. La CPJI comme la CIJ ont été saisies de nombre d’exceptions préliminaires.113 Elles les ont traitées avec une grande souplesse mues par le souci de ne pas

110

J. Lang, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 5-45, spéc. p. 10.

111

Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international, Paris, Sirey, 1960, 750, p. 273.

112

Voir article 79 paragraphe 7 du Règlement de la CIJ ; voir également outre Abi-Saab précité, G. Guyomar, Commentaire du Règlement de la CIJ, Paris, Pédone, 1983, 760, pp. 496-518.

113

Ibid. p. 501 : 13 affaires pour la CPJI et 19 affaires pour la CIJ en 1983. 291


introduire dans la jurisprudence internationale des conceptions empruntées aux procédures internes. C’est ainsi qu’au sujet d’une exception préliminaire relative à l’irrecevabilité de la requête, dans l’affaire relative à Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise,114 la Cour permanente s’est posée la question de savoir s’il s’agissait : « d’un de ces moyens de défense tirés du fond de la cause et tendant à en faire écarter l’examen par le juge, auxquels on donne généralement, ainsi que l’a fait le droit français, le nom de fins de non recevoir ? Ou bien n’est-on pas plutôt en présence d’une véritable exception s’opposant … non pas à l’action elle-même et au droit sur lequel elle repose, mais à l’examen de cette action en justice ? ». La Cour répondra qu’elle n’avait pas à tenir compte des divers systèmes de procédure et des diverses terminologies juridiques en usage dans les différents pays. Selon elle, « que cette conclusion se qualifie « d’exception » ou qu’elle prenne le nom de « fin de non recevoir », il est certain que rien, ni dans le Statut et dans le Règlement qui la régissent, ni dans les principes généraux du droit, n’empêche la Cour de s’en occuper dès à présent et préalablement à tout débat sur le fond, puisque c’est de sa non-admission que dépendra la possibilité d’un tel débat ».115 C’est progressivement que la Cour entreprendra une typification des exceptions préliminaires,116 lesquelles ont été examinées avec un soin particulier.

114

CPJI, Série A, No. 6, p. 19.

115

Ibid. ; voir également Witenberg, op. cit. (note 1), p. 12 qui établit une ratio legis des exceptions préliminaires dans l’intérêt d’une bonne administration de la justice arguant « qu’avant d’aborder l’examen des prétentions du demandeur, l’on s’attache à contrôler s’il a le droit d’agir en justice, s’il a respecté les formes prescrites et si aucun obstacle légal ne vient paralyser son action ».

116

Affaire du Chemin de fer, op. cit., p. 16 ; Affaire Ambatielos, où la Cour distingue entre « l’exception juridictionnelle » et deux « moyens visant la recevabilité de la réclamation », CIJ Recueil 1953, pp. 22-23 ; Affaire Nottebohm, où la Cour se dit compétente pour « examiner tous les aspects, qu’ils touchent à la compétence, à la recevabilité ou au fond » ; CIJ Recueil 1953, p. 122 ; Affaire Interhandel où la Cour dit « étant donné que la quatrième exception préliminaire des Etats-Unis se rapporte à la compétence, en l’espèce la Cour l’examinera avant la troisième exception qui est une exception d’irrecevabilité, CIJ Recueil 1959, pp. 23-24 ; Affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c/ Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt du 26 novembre 1984 portant « Compétence de la Cour et Recevabilité de la Requête », où la Cour dit au paragraphe 84 : « la Cour en vient maintenant à la question de la recevabilité de la requête du Nicaragua. Les Etats-Unis d’Amérique ont soutenu dans leur contre-mémoire que la requête du Nicaragua est irrecevable pour cinq motifs distincts dont chacun, disent-ils, suffit à établir l’irrecevabilité, que ce soit à tire d’empêchement à statuer ou en raison de la « nécessité de se montrer prudent pour protéger l’intégrité de la fonction judiciaire ». Certains de ces motifs étaient en fait exposés en des termes donnant à penser qu’il s’agissait plus de questions de compétence ou de juridiction que de recevabilité ; toutefois leur classement à cet égard ne paraît pas être d’une importance décisive. La Cour va examiner ses motifs » ;

292


En ce qui concerne « un de ces moyens de défense tirés du fond de la cause » dont parle la Cour, on a pu y voir des exceptions préliminaires de fond.117 La recevabilité se présente comme une notion rebelle à la systématisation et quelquefois incertaine dans l’application. C’est une affaire d’espèce – même si les instruments juridiques permettent d’en identifier le genre – parce que les conditions et effets qui s’y rattachent sont prolifiques et malaisés à dégager. C’est en fonction des circonstances propres à chaque espèce qu’elle peut être déterminée. En revanche, ce qui est constant, c’est qu’avant d’aborder l’examen des prétentions du demandeur, le juge doit s’attacher à contrôler s’il a le droit d’action en justice,si la procédure est bien engagée, s’il a respecté les formes prescrites et si aucun obstacle légal ne vient paralyser son action.

Conclusion La question de la recevabilité révèle le pointillisme de l’Etat souverain qui veut toujours être maître de ses initiatives et juge en sa propre cause. L’introduction d’instance par voie de requête engendre presque toujours la mise en cause de

CIJ Recueil 1984, p. 429 ; voir en outre pp. 429-441, paragraphes 84-108, pour l’examen des motifs. 117

Voir G. Sperduti « la recevabilité des exceptions préliminaires de fond dans le procès international », Riv. Dir. Int., Vol. LIII (1970), pp. 461-490. L’auteur écrit : « Il nous semble tout à faire normal qu’un Etat ait la possibilité d’avoir recours au moyen radical de défense lorsque cet Etat, appelé à répondre en justice de certaines actions ou omissions prétendument illicites, estime ne pas devoir répondre de tels comportements pour le motif qu’il considère la norme de droit, qui est invoquée contre lui, comme n’étant pas susceptible d’être enfreinte par ces comportements en raison même des limites de l’applicabilité de la norme. Le moyen en question se qualifie du point de vue la théorie générale du procès, d’exception préliminaire de fond. Or, d’après l’interprétation courante de l’article 62 du Règlement de la Cour, portant sur les « exceptions préliminaires », cet article n’est applicable qu’aux seules exceptions formelles, dites aussi exceptions de procédure, à savoir aux seules exceptions dont le but et l’effet sont, d’empêcher le procès devant la Cour, sans préjuger la question de savoir si le droit réclamé par le demandeur existe ou non », pp. 463-464. L’exception préliminaire de fond ainsi dégagée est très proche d’une « fin de non-recevoir », c’est-à-dire de tout moyen tendant à faire déclarer le demandeur irrecevable en sa demande, sans examen au fond, pour défaut de droit d’agir, tel le défaut de qualité, le défaut d’intérêt, la prescription ou la chose jugée. Il est classique de souligner la nature mixte de la fin de non-recevoir. Elle est proche de l’exception de procédure en ce sens que lorsqu’elle est opposée, son examen par la juridiction ne suppose pas d’examiner le fond de l’affaire. En revanche, lorsqu’elle est accueillie, ses effets la rapprochent de la défense au fond qui engendre l’irrecevabilité. En un mot, le défendeur qui oppose une fin de non-recevoir au demandeur conteste le droit d’action de celui-ci. Ce qui est contesté, ce n’est plus la recevabilité de la demande en justice au regard de la procédure, mais le droit qui sert de fondement à cette demande. 293


la recevabilité de celle-ci. Et les moyens invoqués, on l’a vu, sont prolifiques : inexitence du différend ; différend sans objet ; différend portant sur un droit inexistant ; ou n’est pas d’ordre juridique au sens du Statut ; que la décision serait dépourvue d’effet pratique ou affecterait la fonction judiciaire de la juridiction ; que le requérant n’a pas qualité pour agir ; ou qu’il n’a pas d’intérêt juridique en l’espèce ; que le différend n’est pas actuel parce que le demandeur n’a pas épuisé les négociations ; que l’individu lésé que le demandeur protège n’a pas sa nationalité ; ou qu’il n’a pas épuisé les voies de recours internes de son pays de résidence ; ou qu’il n’a pas les « mains propres » ; ou enfin que des dispositions essentielles du Statut ou du Règlement ont été violées. On a même pu dire que la multiplicité des exceptions de procédure est à l’origine de la « désertion du prétoire international » et elle a contribué par-là à affaiblir la justice internationale.118 A cette époque – et c’est toujours d’actualité – où l’on cherchait à pallier la désaffection des juridictions internationales, la doctrine s’est posée la question de savoir s’il ne fallait pas soumettre au règlement judiciaire tous les différends entre Etats qui n’ont pu être résolus par d’autres moyens. La position du Pr. Virally à ce propos est édifiante : « La réponse à la question ainsi posée ne peut être que négative. Il n’en résulte nullement que l’on doive considérer comme inepte l’institution de la justice internationale ou que l’on puisse se désintéresser de son avenir. Tout au contraire. Comme on l’a dit déjà plus haut, la justice internationale a fait ses preuves et elles sont tout à fait convaincantes. Il s’agit donc bien, aujourd’hui comme hier, de multiplier les efforts pour favoriser son développement et lui permettre de prendre une place grandissante dans le règlement des différends internationaux. Mais il faut se rendre à l’évidence et accepter le fait qu’elle n’est pas destinée à acquérir la situation de monopole dont bénéficie la justice étatique dans son ordre, même à l’égard des seuls différends portant sur « un point de droit international ». En se refusant à l’admettre, on court un risque, dont l’expérience a montré qu’il n’était pas illusoire : de proposer aux Etats des engagements de se soumettre à la justice internationale allant très au-delà de ce qu’ils peuvent politiquement admettre. Le résultat est bien connu : Les Etats se refusent effectivement à prendre ces engagements, ou les assortissent de réserves qui les annulent, ou s’en dégagent dès qu’ils craignent d’avoir à y faire face. Cependant qu’on a négligé de leur soumettre des engagements plus modestes et limités, mais acceptables, et dont l’acceptation effective aurait consacré un progrès véritable ».119 118

V.M. Mabrouk, Les exceptions de procédure, op. cit. (note 1), p. 309.

119

M. Virally, « Préface », p. 5, in G. Malinverni, Le règlement des différends dans les organisations internationales économiques, Genève-Leiden, IUHEI-Sijhoff, 1974, p. 251.

294


Dans cet ordre d’idées, le mécanisme de règlement des différends, qui a vu des centaines de différends interétatiques portés devant l’Organisation Mondiale du commerce (OMC), est frappant. Cet apport important de l’« Uruguay Round » est à méditer même s’il ne s’agit guère d’une véritable juridiction commerciale internationale. Il faut, en effet, que les Etats se rassurent et qu’ils se rendent le plus naturellement justiciables des juridictions internationales qu’ils ont eux-mêmes créées et dont la crédibilité dépend en grande partie de ce qu’ils en feront. Par leur souci constant de dire le droit dans l’intérêt de la justice et de la paix ; par la nature du droit qu’elles appliquent et par la représentation des principaux systèmes juridiques du monde, ces juridictions sont tout à fait prêtes à remplir les missions à elles dévolues.

295

NEW ISSUES IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS: THE GLOBAL REACH OF THE ROLE OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT Francisco Orrego Vicuña

I. A Global Context

W

hoever drafted the text of the first bilateral investment treaty could not have imagined how popular his or her work would become. It has been copied by the thousand and found its way into over 2000 treaties in force today, in addition to it being reflected in various multilateral treaties dealing also wholly or in part with investments.1 It has been interpreted and reinterpreted by numerous international tribunals and domestic courts. During this process, which has not been long-term, a number of issues have been clarified, either in terms of the development of new approaches or understandings, or of the placing of limits. The aggregate of developments has meant that the settlement of disputes relating to foreign investments has become truly global in the past decade, both in the meaning of substantive law and also in respect of important jurisdictional questions. It is also opening the way for new developments concerning other important international activities, such as trade. It might well happen that in the long term these unfolding arrangements will also apply to a variety of aspects that today appear exclusively related to domestic law and jurisdictions. This contribution in honour of Judge Mensah aims to examine the main issues characterising this evolution, with particular reference to those decisions of the International Centre for Settlement of Disputes (ICSID) tribunals that have to a significant extent influenced a change in perspective, not only in respect of the extent of bilateral investments treaties and related instruments but also of the 1

E. Obadia, “ICSID, Investment Treaties and Arbitration: Current and Emerging Issues”, in G. Kaufmann-Kohler and B. Stucki, Investment Treaties and Arbitration, 2002, 67-79.



very meaning of international law in some aspects. In spite of critical perceptions that are not entirely wrong in some matters,2 the end result of such a process has helped thus far to reach a balance between the right of host States to undertake regulatory functions in the public interest and the right of foreign investors to carry on their business without arbitrary or unlawful interference.

II. The Expression of Consent and its Limits On a number of occasions, a State Party to the ICSID Convention that is brought to court by an investor raises the question that it has not expressly consented to the submission of that particular dispute to arbitration. In that point of view, commitment to arbitration under a bilateral investment treaty requires a specific “compromis” in which both parties will agree to that submission and its modalities. True enough, this was the traditional modality of inter-State arbitration in the early part of the 20th century. States agreed to the arbitration of disputes under a treaty, but this was normally regarded only as a “pactum de contrahendo”, the implementation of which required an additional and specific “compromis”. This is, however, a question that has fundamentally changed in the context of the settlement of investment disputes. Interestingly enough this is not the result of the ICSID Convention, which only requires the Parties to consent in writing to the submission of the dispute to the Centre.3 It is rather the result of the network of bilateral investment treaties that have provided for the overall expression of consent by States Parties in respect of disputes that might arise with foreign investors. This same result can be obtained by a general offer of submission to ICSID arbitration in domestic law. As these investors are not a party to the treaty but are the beneficiaries of rights bestowed directly upon them under international law, or under domestic law, their own expression of consent might come later in time or under separate instruments. This happens typically when consent by the investor is given in a direct agreement with the State concerned or simply by resorting to such a choice in writing, or even by instituting proceedings in the Centre. ICSID tribunals have had no difficulty in finding that the offer by the State to submit to arbitration, followed by acceptance, is a definite binding legal obligation without further steps needed to establish jurisdiction.4 This is not just the result

2

See generally, M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes, 2000.

3

ICSID Convention, art. 25.

4

F. Orrego Vicuña and C. Pinto, “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Prospects for the 21st Century”, Report Prepared for the Centennial of the First International Peace Conference, in F. Kalshoven, The Centennial of the First International Peace Conference, Reports and Conclusions, 2000, 261-418, at 286.

298

New Issues in the Settlement of Disputes of International Investments

of the operation of the bilateral investment treaty in respect of ICSID but also in so far other choices are available to the investor, particularly arbitration under UNCITRAL rules. But ICSID tribunals have also controlled exaggeration in this matter by not accepting modalities that are far remote from a proper consent. In Cable TV v. St. Kitts and Nevis, for example, the tribunal ruled that references to an ICSID clause in domestic proceedings did not amount to consent to arbitration.5 On the other hand, however, tribunals have also been strict in not allowing a State that has expressed its consent to elude its obligations in respect of the foreign investor. This happened in CSOB v. Slovakia, where the tribunal found that an ICSID clause included in a bilateral investment treaty not yet in force had been embodied by the parties in a direct agreement and upheld jurisdiction on this basis.6 In this same case, although the pertinent treaty provided that, upon the agreement of both parties, the dispute would be submitted to the Centre, it was held that this did not mean, as alleged, that submission had to be made jointly, as this would imply the need for an additional agreement to put into practice the consent expressed by the State in the treaty.7 The pactum de contrahendo approach was thus expressly ruled out. “Arbitration without privity” is here to stay, as evidenced not only by a variety of bilateral investment treaties but also by multilateral arrangements.8 The NAFTA, in the context of the operation of the ICSID Additional Facility, like the Energy Charter Treaty, contains forms of unconditional consent to ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration. A rather disquieting view was recently held by a Respondent State in the context of a dispute submitted to ICSID under a bilateral investment treaty. Because there had been diplomatic demarches by the State of the investor’s nationality in support of the investor’s right to take the dispute to arbitration, the Respondent State made the argument that there was a State-to-State dispute that had to be settled first through the operation of the ad-hoc arbitration that investment treaties normally provide for disputes between States Parties. It should be noted that diplomatic exchanges directed to facilitate the settlement of the dispute are not considered a form of diplomatic protection under article 27(2) of the Convention. That argument would have meant that recourse to ICSID arbitration by a private investor and the Centre’s jurisdiction would be paralysed until a different arbitration was finalised. As diplomatic exchanges not amounting to diplomatic protection regularly take place when there is an investment dispute, it would 5

Cable TV v. St. Kitts and Nevis, ICSID Award of 13 January 1997.

6

CSOB v. Slovakia, ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction of 24 May 1999.

7

Ibid.

8

J. Paulsson, “Arbitration without Privity”, ICSID Review, Vol. 10, 1995, 232. 299


be easy for any Respondent State to elude its obligations toward the investor by claiming the existence of an inter-State dispute. This situation would entangle ICSID’s jurisdiction for long periods of time to the disadvantage of the investor. Moreover, it is quite evident that the kind of disputes between States Parties to which the inter-State procedures could apply are very different from those affecting the investor’s rights under a bilateral treaty, a situation somewhat paralleled by article 64 of the Convention and its negotiation history. The tribunal rejected the request for staying of the proceedings before ICSID.

III. An Expanding Dispute Settlement System One noticeable aspect of the globalisation of foreign investment dispute settlement is that it is not exclusively related to a relationship between developed and developing countries as was to an extent originally conceived. It is much broader than that. In fact, developing countries have followed among themselves the same approach of bilateral investment treaties and signed such instruments by the hundreds, with little or no modification. And the same is true of multilateral investment treaties made among developing countries, such as the MERCOSUR Protocols9 or Free Trade Agreements.10 There are two other aspects important to note in this process of globalisation. The first is that under the ICSID Convention, not only can an investor bring a State to court but a host State can also initiate proceedings against an investor provided a written consent has been given, as happens often under direct investment agreements. States has seldom used this alternative and it seems that awareness about its existence is not widespread.11 There is also, of course, the possibility of counterclaims in a proceeding initiated by an investor. The second aspect is still more significant. For many years, developed countries appeared to believe that bilateral investment treaties were a one-way street allowing for claims against developing host States. Much to the surprise of a few OECD countries, investors from developing countries have recently initiated proceedings against them, thus evidencing that bilateral treaties mean a two-way street. At least one of these claims has been successful.12

9

MERCOSUR, 1994 Colonia and Buenos Aires Investment Protocols.

10

See, for example, the 1994 Free Trade Agreement between Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.

11

Gabon v. Societé Serete S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/76/1, and discussion in I.F. Shihata and A.R. Parra, “The Experience of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes”, ICSID Review, Vol. 14, 1999, 299-361, at 316.

12

Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Award of 13 November 2000.

300


IV. The Critical Date Time, of course, plays a most important role in affirming or dismissing jurisdiction in a given case. In Tradex v. Albania, for example, the tribunal admitted an objection to jurisdiction on the basis of an investment treaty that had not yet entered into force.13 In Holiday Inns v. Morocco, however, the tribunal faced a more complex situation. At the time of the investment agreement containing the consent to arbitration, the pertinent States had not yet ratified the ICSID Convention, but these requirements were satisfied before proceedings were actually instituted. The tribunal concluded that it was the date when conditions were satisfied that should be deemed to constitute the date of consent and, accordingly, affirmed jurisdiction as the request for arbitration was made after this date.14 Time is also of the essence for most bilateral investment treaties in that disputes that can be submitted to arbitration are normally only those that arise after the treaty has entered into force. The investment in most cases might have been made earlier. Given the fact that discussions and disagreements between investors and host States might extend for a long period of time, tribunals occasionally have to decide on the critical date on which the dispute arose and whether it is under its jurisdiction. The test was explained in Maffezini where it was held that disagreements and difference of views might extend for a period of time, even before the entry into force of the treaty, but what matters is the moment at which there is a claim with a legal meaning in respect of rights and obligations of the parties concerning the investment.15 This jurisprudential line was, however, interrupted in Lucchetti where an ICSID tribunal, contrary to Maffezini, declined to admit jurisdiction in respect of a dispute concerning measures amounting to expropriation that originated after the treaty was in force, because it believed that an earlier dispute was one and the same even though it dealt with a construction permit.16 This decision, of course, opens the door for a State to claim that any dispute with an investor before the coming into force of the treaty, even if different, means that there is a continuing dispute excluding jurisdiction.

13

Tradex v. Albania, ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction of 24 December 1996.

14

Holiday Inns v. Morocco, unpublished, reported in P. Lalive, “The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration”, BYIL, Vol. 51, 1980, at 123.

15

Supra note 12.

16

Empresas Lucchetti S.A. v. Peru, ICSID Award on Jurisdiction of 7 February 2005. 301


V. Resort to Safeguards There are a number of safeguards available to the parties of bilateral investment treaties that are not always resorted to, and the very existence of which many times appear not to be particularly noted until it is too late. States, for example, can exclude from investment treaties given classes of disputes. Most treaties, however, include broad expressions of consent. On occasions, more limited expressions of consent are made in national legislation or in investment agreements, but these may not then be quite relevant if the dispute arises under the terms of a broadly defined treaty. A second safeguard concerns the exhaustion of local remedies, a rather basic feature of traditional international claims that found its way into article 26 of the ICSID Convention. As noted in the Annulment Decision in Amco v. Indonesia, this safeguard must be resorted to in an express manner and certainly before consent is perfected.17 Also, as noted in Maffezini, other procedural provisions, such as a submission to local courts for a certain period of time, are not equivalent to a requirement to exhaust local remedies. One additional aspect concerning the expression of consent and safeguards needs to be examined in the light of this evolution. All bilateral investment treaties provide for a period in which amicable settlement must be attempted, most often a six-month period. It also happens that, occasionally, the investor will not follow this requirement or do so rather casually, and it happens more frequently that the government will ignore all the communications from the investor to this effect. The view has recently arisen that this is just a procedural step and not a jurisdictional requirement, and that what matters is to afford the government an opportunity to engage in such settlement, which, if not taken, might open the way to arbitration even before the period in question has lapsed.18 Two aspects appear relevant to find an answer to this question. The first is that, as noted in Tradex v. Albania, when the investor repeatedly requests the government to enter into discussions and this is ignored over a period of time, then, on completion of the six-month period, the request for arbitration may be introduced and such efforts will be considered enough to satisfy the amicable settlement requirement. The second aspect is whether ICSID’s Secretary-General could register a request that has not complied with the six-month amicable settlement requirement. The answer to this is that probably it cannot. The conclusion is then that the issue is not merely procedural but concerns a crucial question of jurisdiction. Just as the investor cannot pretend registration and ultimately jurisdiction if amicable

17

Amco v. Indonesia, ICSID Annulment Committee, ICSID Reports, Vol. 1, at 526.

18

Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final UNCITRAL Award of September 2001, paras 181-191; Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction of 24 June 1998, paras 74-88.

302


settlement has not been attempted, so too the State cannot object to registration and ultimately to jurisdiction if it has not reacted to the pertinent invitations to this effect during the established period of time.

VI. Rightful Claimants Some of the most difficult issues that ICSID tribunals have had to deal with in examining jurisdiction of the Centre and their own competence concern the question of who may be a party to proceedings before the Centre. This is in part connected with the interpretation of article 25 of the Convention, but it is also connected with the extent of investment agreements and investment treaties. A first issue that has given place to growing confusion relates to the status of a constituent division or agency of a State as party to an ICSID proceeding. Under the Convention, the participation of such division or agency requires the approval of the State or else that the State notifies that no such approval is necessary. Seldom has this been done. But when proceedings are instituted against the State because of acts or omissions of such divisions or agencies then the argument is often made that no approval has been given to the effect of their participation. However, the participation of a division or agency in its own right is one thing, and the responsibility of the State for the conduct of its organs, whether they are a part of the central government or entirely decentralised, including provinces, municipalities and other entities that exercise public functions, is quite another. The designation envisaged in the Convention relates to the first aspect only, that is, when an investment agreement has been entered into with a given subdivision or agency and then such entity is authorised by the State to participate in an ICSID proceeding in order to make effective the consent of the entity and the investor to submit their disputes to arbitration. It was thus held in Cable Television v. St. Kitts and Nevis that an investment agreement made with a constituent subdivision of that State that included an ICSID clause could not determine the jurisdiction of the Centre, as that entity had not been designated by the State in accordance with article 25.19 But if the dispute arises under a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty to which the State is a party and concerns an investment agreed to with a given subdivision or agency, even if such entity has not been designated to participate in ICSID proceedings, the State is still accountable for responsibility under international law. Article 4 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which

19

Supra note 5. 303


on this point unequivocally reflect customary international law, is very precise in establishing the responsibility of the State for acts or omissions of its organs.20 This question was discussed and decided in the case of Compagnie Générale des Eaux (or Vivendi) v. Argentina, where the existence of a concession contract with an Argentine province and the fact that that province had not been designated to participate in ICSID proceedings, did not prevent the Centre’s jurisdiction under a bilateral investment treaty between Argentina and France whose provisions governed the rights and obligations of the Republic of Argentina and foreign investors in its territory.21 The participation of natural persons as claimants in ICSID cases has not given rise to particular difficulties as on this point the applicable rules of international law are generally well established, including the test of effectiveness in case of disputed facts as decided by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case.22 Yet, the evolution of jurisdictional requirements in respect of natural persons has been notably less intense than with regard to corporate entities.

VII. Corporate Claims Very different, however, is the situation concerning juridical persons. The very complexity of corporate structures and investment consortia offers fertile ground for divergent views about who can or cannot claim before ICSID or other arbitration mechanisms. The private or public nature of the functions of a corporate entity has recently given way to important clarifications. The Convention envisaged allowing for claims by private entities against a State, but not by public entities against another State, although this alternative was not entirely ruled out in the negotiations. In CSOB v. Slovakia the claimant was a State agency of the Czech Republic that initiated proceedings against Slovakia, which prompted an objection to jurisdiction on this basis. Interestingly enough, the tribunal found that jurisdiction could be upheld as that particular entity, although owned by the State, was engaged in banking activities that had been privatised and were essentially commercial by nature.23 The test thus became not government control but the essence of the activities performed. The same test was later applied in Maffezini to establish

20

Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/Res/56/83, 28 January 2002; J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, 2002, Comments on art. 4, at 94-99.

21

Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Award of 21 November 2000, and Vivendi, ICSID Annulment Decision of 3 July 2002.

22

Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Second Phase), ICJ Reports 1955, 4 et seq.

23

Supra note 6.

304


whether some activities of an agency of the Spanish State were of a public or private nature and hence engaged the responsibility of the State or not. Agreement of the parties on the question of corporate nationality will, of course, be the most influential on a finding of jurisdiction by a tribunal. So happened, for example, in MINE v. Guinea where an agreement of the parties establishing that a corporation had Swiss nationality prevailed over the fact that technically the nationality was different.24 Issues relating to the real interest behind the investment and control of a corporation are relevant to this effect. The ICSID Convention facilitates this more flexible approach. In particular, article 25(2)(b) refers to the situation of a corporate entity that has the nationality of the Defendant State, but, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed it should be treated as a national of the other relevant State Party, and thus can claim against the Defendant State. It is not unusual that bilateral investment treaties and investment agreements will contain clauses to this effect. ICSID tribunals have occasionally found that certain arbitration clauses and other provisions might result in an implied agreement to treat a locally incorporated company as a foreign investor, as evidenced in Amco v. Indonesia25 and Klöckner v. Cameroon.26 It should be noted that this same result can be achieved by means of the definition of investment, which, if broad enough, as is usually the case, might not need an agreement on nationality or control. Questions about who actually controls a corporation have also been discussed by ICSID tribunals. In SOABI v. Senegal, an ICSID tribunal went quite far in searching for the controlling entity of a locally incorporated company.27 The immediate controller was a Panamanian company, but Panama was not a State Party to the Convention; beyond that company, Belgian nationals were in control and Belgium was a State Party. The tribunal ultimately accepted this last control. In Amco v. Indonesia,28 however, the tribunal refused to go beyond the control exercised by the immediate parent company of a locally incorporated company. Whether joint control of a company by foreign investors of different nationality and protected under different bilateral investment treaties qualifies to the effect of admitting jurisdiction was also raised in the recent parallel ICSID cases of Sempra-Camuzzi.29 The tribunal held that such control, arising out of a shareholders’ agreement that was public and approved by the host State, did

24

MINE v. Guinea, ICSID Award of 6 January 1988.

25

Amco v. Indonesia, ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction of 25 September 1983.

26

Klöckner v. Cameroon, ICSID Award of 21 October 1983.

27

SOABI v. Senegal, ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction of 1 August 1984.

28

Supra note 25.

29

Sempra v. Argentina/Camuzzi v. Argentina, ICSID Decisions on Jurisdiction, 11 May 2005. 305


qualify for protection under the treaty as the investment had been conceived as an integrated operation before the claim arose. A second related issue that arises in this context is whether a foreign investor is allowed to claim for damages affecting a corporate entity only when such investor has a controlling interest, or it can do so even if it is a minority shareholder. The claims by minority shareholders and related interests have also been admitted in the context of jurisdiction, particularly when the investor has been required by law or regulation to participate in a different company, usually a local company.30 Limits to this development have also been placed by ICSID decisions when the claim is not covered by the expression of consent to arbitration because of being too remote.31

VIII. Defining Investment Many aspects discussed above are closely related to the definition of investment. It is well known that the Convention did not define “investment” as there was no agreement on this point.32 Many examples of investment were given during the negotiation of the Convention. The precise definition of investment was therefore left to the consent of the parties on jurisdiction, normally embodied in the bilateral investment treaties. This is not to say that these treaties are entirely free to define jurisdiction as the parties may please. The definition has to be compatible with the meaning of the Convention and not go beyond what can be reasonably regarded as investment. In most cases, the dispute will relate to an investment on which there can be no doubt. In a few instances doubt has arisen and the Secretary-General has refused registration because the case is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre. So too an ICSID tribunal can refuse to accept jurisdiction on this ground. As ICSID jurisprudence develops, a number of cases have clarified whether a particular activity is an investment under the relevant treaty or not. Taxation inconsistent with mining contracts,33 the development of a timber concession,34 construction contracts35 and other activities have been identified as a pertinent investment under the relevant treaties. On the other hand, for example, in Mihaly

30

CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic of Argentina, 42 ILM (2003), 788.

31

Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction of 14 January 2004.

32

See Fedax v. Venezuela, ICSID Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 July 1997, paras 21-26, with citations to the relevant cases and literature.

33

LETCO v. Liberia, ICSID Award of 31 March 1986.

34

SOABI v. Senegal, ICSID Award of 25 February 1988.

35

Salini v. Morocco, ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction of 23 July 2001.

306


v. Sri Lanka, negotiations on a construction project that had not materialised in a contract were held not to constitute an investment.36 A dispute about whether a bank guarantee constitutes investment was decided in Joy Mining v. Egypt, the tribunal deciding that this was an ordinary commercial contingent liability and, therefore, it had no jurisdiction.37 Two new situations have recently emerged. In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Canada argued that the dispute did not concern investment but trade, and hence the tribunal lacked jurisdiction; the tribunal, however, found that the two questions were not “wholly divorced from each other”.38 The tribunal in S.D. Myres, Inc. v. Canada faced similar arguments and decided that the questioned measures concerning goods “can relate to those who are involved in the trade of those goods and who have made investments concerning them”.39 The connection between trade and investment is thus becoming a strong one.

IX. Disputes Concerning Financial Markets The second new development relates to financial instruments. Although not typically an investment of the traditional kind, financial instruments have become a crucial source for government financing and heavy investments are made in them worldwide. In Fedax v. Venezuela the tribunal had to deal with promissory notes issued by the government that had been circulated internationally, and Fedax, a foreign financial institution, had invested in them. The tribunal decided that the promissory notes were a means by which loans and credit benefiting the State had been made available and their purchase qualified as an investment under the investment treaty.40 Also in CSOB v. Slovakia, the tribunal held that loans in the circumstance of a large banking operation qualified as an investment.41 In both cases it was held that the resources made available to the State did not need to be physically transferred across borders to qualify as an investment. Financial developments cannot, of course, extend indefinitely as a covered dispute and the circumstances will provide clear limits to this end. In a recent case, a Belgian investor who had bought a participation in an international asset fund claimed against Malaysia on the ground that general economic measures

36

Mihaly International Corporation v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Award of 15 March 2002.

37

Joy Mining v. Egypt, ICSID Award on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2004.

38

Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA Award on Motion to Dismiss of 26 January 2000.

39

S.D. Myres, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL First Partial Award of 13 November 2000.

40

Supra note 32.

41

Supra note 6. 307


adopted by this country had diminished the value of his portfolio. Although this claim was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, there was little hope for it to succeed on its merits.

X. Strict Connection with an Investment The Convention also requires the dispute to be a legal dispute and to arise directly from the investment. In Amco v. Indonesia, a dispute concerning general tax obligations under domestic law invoked in a counterclaim was held not to qualify as an investment as it did not arise directly from the investment made.42 Occasionally, however, there is some confusion between a dispute arising directly from an investment and the question of the investment being a direct and not an indirect one. The point was also discussed in Fedax v. Venezuela, where the tribunal held: “However, the text of Article 25 (1) establishes that the ‘jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment’. It is apparent that the term ‘directly’ relates in this Article to the ‘dispute’ and not the ‘investment’. It follows that jurisdiction can exist even in respect of investments that are not direct, so long as the dispute arises directly from such transaction. This interpretation is also consistent with the broad reach that the term ‘investment’ must be given in light of the negotiating history of the Convention”.43 As noted above, the definition of investment agreed to in treaties is usually very broad and encompasses movable and immovable property, shares and other forms of participation in a company, claims to money and other contracts of financial value, intellectual property, business concessions and other matters. This broad definition is at the very heart of the interpretation of treaties made by ICSID and other tribunals. Although under article 24(4) of the Convention, a Contracting State can notify the Centre of classes of disputes it would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction, this is seldom done, and in any event such a notification does not constitute consent under the Convention nor does it change any consent given in other instruments. It might be important for governments and investors to be as precise as possible on the investments they intend to protect as this may avoid many disputes and misunderstandings and might also avoid ancillary claims and counterclaims that further complicate disputes submitted to arbitration.

42

Amco v. Indonesia, Resubmitted Case, ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction of 10 May 1988.

43

Supra note 32.

308


XI. Substantive Treatment Approaching Uniformity The definition of investment is not merely a jurisdictional question. It also touches heavily upon the merits of a claim as the action or omission of State organs and agencies will be measured against the type of investment concerned. The substantive treatment embodied in bilateral and other investment treaties is virtually the same. Fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, non-discrimination, most-favoured-nation treatment, fund transfers and requirements and guarantees concerning expropriation are almost identical across the spectrum. It is interesting to note that the discussion on the merits in most cases relates to the balancing of the rights of the State with those of the investor. The protection of property and acquired rights is no longer a fundamental issue in international law. For a long time the right to protection could not be easily reconciled with the supremacy of national sovereignty. Only after difficult confrontations an understanding was reached about the limits of the respective contentions, and conditions were set to diplomatic protection and the right to expropriate, including the right to compensation. International adjudication was instrumental in reaching such understandings. The success of this approach, together with inescapable economic realities, has been so evident that outright direct expropriation is today rather exceptional and has a number of well-set requirements to be accepted as valid under international law. If one examines the list of ICSID and other relevant cases of the past few years, one realises that this type of expropriation is quite exceptional.44 Some degree of accommodation has also been taking place in respect of indirect or regulatory expropriation, but this is thus far insufficient, scant and on occasions contradictory. The State holds its right to adopt measures in pursuance of public policies. Investors hold their right to be compensated if such measures amount to a taking. Neither of these views can be questioned in and of themselves. The problem lies in how and where the respective limits and conditions should be established, that is in identifying the point of common interest and reconciliation. Yet, when we might have thought that the legal framework was rightly evolving in the direction of attaining such a balance, principally under the case law of ICSID, all of a sudden the confrontation flares up again. Is there a NAFTA/bilateral investment treaty treatment or just a minimum customary

44

Direct Expropriation was involved for example in the case Compañía de Desarrollo de Santa Elena S. A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Award of 17 February 2000. In other prominent cases only regulatory measures alleged to have amounted to expropriation were involved, as was the case for example in Metalclad v. Mexico, 40 ILM 55 (2001) and Waste Management Inc v. Mexico, 40 ILM 56 (2001). 309


law standard? Are such standards those of the 21st century or still those of the 19th century?45 International legal thinking has had great difficulty in focusing on the right approach to the issue of regulatory authority, particularly if it entails indirect expropriation, as opposed to formal expropriation. This again is evidenced by examining the list of ICSID and NAFTA cases where the vast majority concern such questions as the right of the State to adopt certain types of regulations, the distribution of powers within the State and its various provincial or local governments, the effects of those measures and their connection with the treatment embodied in treaties. Two issues on which this discussion is based must be disposed of at the outset. There can be no doubt about the first such issue, namely the right of the State to adopt regulatory measures in implementation of legislation and other expressions of sovereignty. The second issue is that regulatory authority cannot be validly exercised if it violates the framework of legal rights and obligations in which it operates. This will be subject to scrutiny by constitutional bodies, judicial entities or international mechanisms.

XII. Limits of Regulatory Powers The problem lies in establishing the limit of such powers or functions under international law. First, it appears that it is a well-established principle that States may not act in a manner contrary to treaties and contracts, at least those contracts that are under some form of protection of international law itself.46 Secondly, as noted, it is quite evident that under the principle of attribution, States are responsible under international law for acts not only of central government authorities but also of any other public agency exercising regulatory functions of some sort. In the light of recent ICSID and NAFTA case law, as well as under many other international precedents,47 it has also become evident that most of the problems with a regulatory authority entailing some form of expropriation occur not with central government authorities that are conscious of international obligations

45

A. Sedigh, “What Level of Host State Interference Amounts to a Taking under Contemporary International Law?”, J. World Investment, Vol. 2, 2001, 631. See also the discussion in connection with environmental regulations in T. Waelde and A. Kolo, “Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law”, ICLQ, Vol. 50, 2001, 811-848.

46

R. Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law”, RdC, Vol. 176, 1982-III, 263.

47

Sedigh, op. cit., 666-671.

310


but with lesser governmental units, local states, municipalities and the like. This has gone so far that in a recent treaty it was necessary to expressly provide for the obligation to adopt measures to ensure the compliance with the treaty provisions by national, provincial and regional authorities and a mechanism of supervision was established to this effect.48 Domestic and international judicial control over administrative decisions of a State and its various agencies has helped to pave the way for finding the right balance in this respect. More recently, again in the light of both domestic and international experiences, the doctrine of legitimate expectation appears to be gaining momentum as a standard that has to be respected in terms of citizens’ rights, or for that matter, investors’ rights.

XIII. In Search of Legitimate Expectation In Preston, a leading English case, the House of Lords ruled that unfairness amounting to an abuse of power could arise from conduct equivalent to breach of contract or representation.49 Still more directly, in R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p. Coughlan,50 the Court of Appeal in England sought to redress the inequality of power between the citizen and the State.51 In this case it was held that: “Where the Court considers that a lawful promise or practice has induced a legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantive, not simply procedural, authority now establishes that here too the court will in a proper case decide whether to frustrate the expectation is so unfair that to take a new and different course will amount to an abuse of power. Here, once the legitimacy of the expectation is established, the court will have the task of weighing the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied upon for the change of policy” (emphasis in original).52 The Court, having examined prior cases, then added: “The court’s task in all these cases is not to impede executive activity but to reconcile its continuing need to initiate or respond to change

48

Protocol to the Argentina-Chile Treaty on Mining Integration and Cooperation, 20 August 1999, art. 5.

49

Preston v. IRC, (1985) 2 All ER 327, (1985) A.C. 835.

50

R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex Parte Coughlan, (2000) 3 All ER 850.

51

M. Elliott, “Case and Comment, House of Lords Decisions”, Cambridge L. J., Vol. 59, 2000, 421.

52

R. v. North and East Devon, op. cit., para. 57. 311


with the legitimate interests or expectations of citizens or strangers who have relied, and have been justified in relying, on a current policy or extant promise.”53 The situation is not altogether different under international law. Governments and international organisations may undertake changes of policy in their continuing need to search for the best choices in the discharge of their functions. However, to the extent that policies earlier in force might have created legitimate expectations, both of a procedural and substantive nature for citizens, investors, traders or other persons, these may not be abandoned if the result would be so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power. This also assumes the international protection of the rights concerned. Herein lies the limit of discretion and the role of judicial review as a means of redress. Because this approach is rooted in fairness it would not be unthinkable that, from citizens’ rights and foreign investors’ rights it might gradually expand into other areas of concern for the international community, most notably trade, the international civil service and other matters. Global society is approaching, quite rightly, global protection.

53

R. v. North and East Devon, op. cit., para. 65.

312

LITIGATING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: COURTS, TRIBUNALS AND THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW Philippe Sands

O

ver the past fifteen years environmental issues have been addressed by a growing number of international courts and tribunals, adding to the jurisprudence of the historically significant arbitral awards in the Bering Fur Seals case (1893), the Trail Smelter case (1941) and the Lac Lanoux case (1957). For the most part the recent decisions have played an important role in enhancing the legitimacy of international environmental concerns and confirming that global rules can play a significant role in contributing to the protection of shared environmental resources. International courts and tribunals have also acted to clarify the meaning and effect of treaty norms, to identify the existence of customary norms of general application, and to establish a more central role for environmental considerations in the international legal order. Nevertheless, there remain certain areas of international law in which international environmental norms are yet to be recognized as having a material role to play. This is the case, for example, in the field of foreign investment laws, the rules of international law that seek to promote investment flows by establishing norms prohibiting expropriation or unfair or inequitable treatment. As in the field of trade, where progress has been made, the key issue is the relationship between two different subject matter areas in international law. As issues become more inter-related it will be incumbent upon those involved in arbitrating disputes with an environmental element to strive for balance, balance between potentially competing objectives of environmental protection on one hand, and the protection of rights of foreign investors on the other hand. Neither of these important societal interests should trump the other, they should be treated in an integrated manner.



I. Historical Context and the Rise of Environmental Concerns It is appropriate to begin with some history. Environmental disputes have an impressive history. The subject is not a new one. As far back as 1893, a distinguished international arbitration tribunal gave an Award in the Pacific Fur Seal Arbitration.1 This concerned a dispute between the United Kingdom and the United States as to the circumstances in which the United States – a coastal State – could interfere with British fishing activities on the high seas. This pitted interests of conservation against interests of economic exploitation. Half a century later, an Arbitral Tribunal gave its final award in the famous Trail Smelter arbitration, between the United States and Canada.2 This concerned the transboundary pollution by sulphur deposits originating from Canada onto United States territory. A decade and a half later another distinguished tribunal gave its award in the Lac Lanoux arbitration, between France and Spain concerning the circumstances in which one State made lawfully use of shared international waters.3 What makes these cases noteworthy is that each raises the potential for conflict between economic interest and ecological interest. This is significant because it identifies issues concerning the need to balance competing interests: in the field of foreign investment rules, for example, of the need to balance the legitimate interests of a community to protect its environmental resources and the legitimate interests of a private investor to protect his or her property rights. More recently, as most will know, the environment as a discrete subject matter has gone up the political agenda, both at national and international levels. There is a greater awareness of the need to protect the environment and environmental resources. This awareness has been accompanied by the adoption of a large number of environmental laws, again both at the national level and, in the form of treaties, at the international level.4 This recent environmental understanding and these new environmental laws coalesce around a number of features that distinguish environmental matters from other areas, and which pose particular challenges to international courts and tribunals faced with resolving disputes having an environmental component. A first feature of the environmental field is that international courts and tribunals are faced with a particular, but by no means unique, difficulty: the development of international environmental law is often reflected in international treaties that involve a high degree of compromise, or “fudge”. In other words, the legislative body has presented the international judiciary with a set

1

Moore’s International Arbitration, 755 (1893).

2

3 RIAA (1941), 1907.

3

Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France), 24 ILR (1957), 101.

4

See P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd edn, 2003, Cambridge University Press.

314

Litigating Environmental Disputes

of rules and principles that can be rather vague. Called upon to interpret vague norms, an international court faces a situation of real difficulty when asked to apply the law to the particular facts of a case. This is not an easy task, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized in the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros case, and one can understand the Court’s reluctance to descend into detail if to do so is to adjudicate upon a dispute that has a broader context and that might lead to changes that the court is legislating. A second feature is that environmental issues invariably raise competing scientific claims.5 A court will often be called upon to adjudicate on two sharply differing views, in which mountains of scientific arguments – several thousand pages in the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros case – may be presented in an equally compelling manner. Unlike many national systems that provide for environmental or scientific assessors to join panels and assist in deciphering technical information, the international judge likely will often find herself in a difficult position when seeking to decide on the relative merits of a scientific claim. Again, this problem is not unique to the environmental field, but it calls for a specialized approach. A third distinguishing feature of environmental law – and this is a legal rather than factual characteristic – is that environmental claims are rarely, if ever, raised in isolation of other international legal arguments. In other words, the environmental law arguments will almost always involve arguments about other substantive areas of the law. Such other areas include trade agreements in the WTO context, human rights norms before human rights courts, and issues of general international law, such as the relationships between treaty and custom, or the law of the environment and the law of State responsibility. This combination suggests most strongly that an international tribunal composed solely of experts in international environmental law might not fare well in attracting cases. Therefore, what is needed is a body of judges with a mix of general and specialized expertise. This also explains why no cases thus far have been presented to the ICJ’s Environment Chamber, and in my view, why none may ever do so: no two States will agree that a given dispute is essentially “environmental”. A fourth distinguishing feature, relating more to issues raised before global bodies than regional bodies, is that the international community does not yet have a common appreciation of where environmental objectives stand in the general legal and political hierarchy. There are understandable differences of view between developed and developing countries as to what the priorities should

5

See, e.g., Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 ICJ Reports 7 et seq., 27, 29-31 (September 25), reprinted in 37 ILM (1998), 162 et seq., 181-183 (referencing the conflicting and inconclusive scientific arguments in the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros litigation); see also EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Appellate Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998, WTO Dispute Settlements. 315


be, and it seems clear that those differences will also extend to the bench.6 There are equally sharp differences of opinion between different regions, and even between developed countries. For example, the current debate over genetically modified organisms indicates that a German judge may be more likely to be risk averse and “precautionary” than an American judge.7 There is a fifth factor that must be mentioned: States remain hesitant about referring international environmental disputes to international adjudication. To the extent that States want international adjudicatory mechanisms, they do not seem to want those that apply a contentious and conflictual procedure to environmental matters. So, for example, in the field of ozone depletion, and soon also in other areas such as climate change and sulphur pollution States have put in place non-contentious procedures that are characterized by having more of an administrative function. This system exists as a sort of international alternative dispute resolution. The noncompliance procedure of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer has established an implementation committee that requires States alleged to be in noncompliance to explain why they have reached that situation and what they intend to do about it. The committee has the power to impose sanctions, as well as the task of bringing the State into compliance.8 For those who have watched the evolution of the early GATT panel systems into the quasi-judicial function of the Appellate Body of the WTO, the picture will be a familiar one.

6

Examples include the rather weak efforts at addressing the protection of forests, where differences in priorities between developed and developing countries meant that no binding global agreement could be adopted at Rio, or at any time subsequently: see the 1992 Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forest, in P. Sands and P. Galizzi, Documents in International Environmental Law (2nd edn, Cambridge, 2004, p. 751). The main international instrument concerned with tropical forests is aimed primarily at exploitation rather than conservation. The collision of interests was eloquently illustrated in the negotiation of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention. See Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1997, 31 ILM (1992), 818. The dispute over issues such as the fair distribution of the benefits from genetic resources (favored by developing countries) versus the uncompromised protection of intellectual property rights (advanced by the developed States) or means of provision of financial resources eventually led to the United States not signing the Biodiversity Convention. See M. Chandler, “The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International Lawyer”, 4 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y (1993), 141.

7

The precautionary principle evolved out of the German socio-legal concept of the Vorsorgeprinzip in the early 1930s. This concept, which is broader than the modern formulations of the precautionary principle requiring careful planning and responsibility, has been relied on widely in (West) German social and economic legislative activity and judicial practice; see generally Sands, supra note 4, at 266-278.

8

See Sands, supra note 4, at 205-210.

316


II. New International Fora The rise of environmental consciousness in international law has been accompanied by another phenomenon: the growing number of international fora within which environmentally related disputes can now be addressed.9 It used to be the case that the ICJ was just about the only permanent international tribunal around. Since it was established in 1946 it has been joined by a large number of other international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. I am thinking in particular of: – the dispute settlement mechanisms established under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and Annex VII arbitral tribunals; – the Dispute Settlement Understanding established under the Agreement of the World Trade Organization, which sets up a panel and appellate body structure with competence to deal with environmental issues in their international trade context; – the various international human rights courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the American Court of Human Rights, which frequently deal with environmental issues in their human rights context; and, more recently; and – the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which is now beginning to faced with environmental issues in a foreign investment context. There are also numerous other bodies which merit mention. It is appropriate to mention the World Bank Inspection Panel, which now has a distinguished jurisprudence considering environmental and other issues in so far as they relate to the activities of the World Bank, as well as the non-compliance mechanisms established under various multilateral environmental agreements.10 The proliferation of international fora has been accompanied by the growth and willingness of international actors – States, corporations and individuals – to engage in international litigation (even if States remain hesitant to refer environmental disputes to contentious international adjudication). Each of the bodies mentioned above has been faced with a growing caseload. Amongst that caseload are many cases dealing with, or touching upon, environmental issues. In that regard, a number of decisions in the past decade are noteworthy for having contributed to the development of international environmental law, by identifying and then applying various rules, and also by clarifying their meaning 9

See generally the web site of the Project on International Courts and Tribunals for a list of the various bodies which are now active: <www.pict-pcti.org>.

10

Ibid. 317


and effect and relationship with other rules of international law arising outside the environmental domain. These cases include: – the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons,11 its judgment in the Case concerning the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros dispute (Hungary/Slovakia) concerning the construction of barrages on the Danube (September 1997),12 and its provisional measures order in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, brought by Argentina against Uruguay (July 2006);13 – the WTO Appellate Body’s decision in the Shrimp Turtle case, concerning the circumstances in which the United States was able to impose conservation measures under its laws on shrimping activities taking place in four Asian countries (October 1998),14 and the WTO Panel decision in the EC-Biotech case brought by Argentina, Canada and the United States challenging the European Community’s import regime for genetically modified organisms (February 2006);15 – the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s provisional measures orders in the Southern Blue-Fin Tuna cases brought by Australia and New Zealand against Japan, addressing Japan’s unilateral scientific experimental fishing (August 1999),16 in the MOX Plant case brought by Ireland challenging the United Kingdom’s authorization of a new nuclear facility at Sellafield (December 2001),17 and in the Land Reclamation case brought by Malaysia against certain land reclamation activities of Singapore (October 2003);18 and – the award of the arbitral tribunal (Permanent Court of Arbitration) in the case concerning the Iron Rhine (Ijzeren Rijn) Railway (Belgium v. Netherlands, May 2005).19

11

ICJ Reports 1996, 226.

12

Supra note 5.

13

ICJ, Provisional Measures Order, 13 July 2006.

14

Shrimp Turtles case, AB-1998-4, 12 October 1998; 38 ILM (1999), 118.

15

The Panel’s conclusions are available at: <www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refid= 78475>.

16

38 ILM (1999), 1624.

17

Order of 3 December 2001, <www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=10&lang= en>.

18

Order of 8 October 2003, <www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=12&lang= en>.

19

Available at: <www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/BENL/BE-NL%20Award%20corrected %20200905.pdf>.

318


By contrast, to date the limited number of arbitral awards in the field of foreign investment that have been presented with arguments in international environmental law have been restrained in taking into account rules of international environmental law in interpreting and applying the requirements of a Bilateral Investment Treaty. Particularly noteworthy in this regard are the Award of the ICSID Arbitration Tribunal in the Santa Elena v. Costa Rica (April 2000) and the Award of a NAFTA/ICSID Arbitral Tribunal in Metalclad v. Mexico (August 2000). Before turning to the central issue for this chapter – the arbitration of disputes relating to foreign investment protection and the environment – I would like to touch briefly on a related issue, namely how one identifies and characterizes an “environmental dispute”. In my view it is more appropriate to talk about disputes which have an environmental or natural resources component or which relate to the environmental or natural resources than to characterize a dispute as an environmental dispute. The reason for this is simple. In my experience it is most unlikely that both (or all) the parties to a dispute would readily agree on characterizing it as an environmental dispute. In the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros case at the ICJ, for example, concerning the construction of barrages on the Danube river, Hungary treated the case as primarily an environmental case, whereas for Slovakia the case was about economic development and the law of treaties. For this reason the Environmental Chamber of the ICJ, which was created in 1993 and was never invoked, seems recently to have been dispensed with.20 The mere characterization of a dispute as an environmental dispute will have implications for a case. For this reason it is most unlikely that there will be established in the foreseeable future the International Environmental Court for which some observers have called. It would be preferable to follow the effort, for example, of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to develop model rules on arbitration of disputes relating the environment and natural resources, which rules take into account the particular characteristics of environmental disputes.21

III. Foreign Investment Protection and the Environment With that by way of background I turn now to address the issue of principle concern for this chapter: the arbitration of disputes relating to foreign investment protection and the environment. The subject arises because of the convergence of

20

See ICJ Press Release of 16 February 2006 (the Judges of the ICJ elect the members of the Chamber of Summary Procedure and of various Committees of the Court), in which no mention is made of the Environment Chamber.

21

See the optional rules on arbitration and conciliation at: <www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/ EDR/>. 319


two recent developments: the rapid growth in direct foreign investment (flows of which now dwarf public sector development assistance), and the sharp increase in environmental consciousness, resulting in new norms of environmental law adopted at the national and international levels. At first glance it might seem surprising that foreign investment and the environment could be related in law, and that disputes might arise as a result of conflicting tendencies between the norms which underpin both areas. However, a number of recent developments indicate that this is now a real subject in international law, and that it is set to be a permanent and expanding feature of the international agenda, which may also challenge national and international courts and tribunals. How are the two subjects connected? In different ways. One way is the manner in which international environmental conventions are seeking to encourage foreign direct investment as a way of achieving their environmental protection objectives. A leading example is the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC).22 This might be seen as the non-contentious (or less contentious) side of the relationship between foreign investment and environmental protection, where the two are mutually supportive. But more recently there has emerged a more contentious side to the relationship, where there may be a conflict between, on the one hand, norms of international law which seek to encourage foreign direct investment by providing full and effective protection to them (for example, limiting the circumstances under which expropriation or “creeping” expropriation may take place) and, on the other hand, norms of international law which seek to protect the environment. A potential tension exists where a State adopts laws or regulations which in some way interfere with the foreign investment: it could be anything from a law which nationalizes or expropriates an investment, for example land, to turn it into a protected national park, or regulations which increase the restrictions on an investment to the point that it becomes less profitable, or even worthless. This issue is one with which human rights lawyers will be familiar, where the potential conflict is between the protection of individual property rights, on the one hand, and environmental requirements of a community character on the other hand. This issue has arisen often in the case law under the First Protocol to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.23 Article 1 (1) of the Protocol provides: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the

22

37 ILM (1998), 22.

23

Done 20 March 1952, ETS No. 9, 213 UNTS 221.

320


public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.” How is that to be squared with measures genuinely intended to protect the objective environmental requirements? In discussing the lawfulness of a measure interfering with private property, the European Court of Human Rights has recognized that “in today’s society the protection of the environment is an increasingly important consideration”.24 Additionally, the Court has held that the right to compensation implied in Article 1 does not guarantee full compensation in all circumstances.25 In the Court’s words: “Legitimate objectives of ‘public interest,’ such as pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.”26 Similar considerations apply in relation to interference’s which are justified on environmental grounds. In cases such as these, in determining whether the level of compensation provided by the interfering State is consistent with article 1 of the First Protocol, the Court takes into account the nature of the property taken and the circumstances of the taking in order to strike a fair balance between the public interest and the private interests involved.27 In doing so, the Court will generally accord to the State a wide margin of appreciation in laying down the terms and conditions, including the compensation standard, on which property is to be taken where it is genuinely intended to achieve a legitimate objective of public interest.28 This is confirmed in the case of Pine Valley Development Limited and Others v. Ireland, where the European Court recognised that an interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property which was in conformity with planning legislation and was designed to protect the environment was “clearly a legitimate aim in accordance with the general interest” for the purposes of the second paragraph of article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR.29 That deals with the standard of treatment by a State of the investments (or property rights) its own nationals or those subject to its jurisdiction under human rights law. What about non-nationals? The ECHR leaves that question

24

Fredin v. Sweden, ECHR (Ser. A) No. 192 § 48 (Judgment of 18 February 1991) (withdrawal of a license to exploit a gravel pit for reasons of nature protection).

25

James v. United Kingdom, 98 ECHR (Ser. A) No. 36, §54 (Judgment of 21 February 1986); Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 102 ECHR (Ser. A) No. 50, §121 (Judgment of 8 July 1986).

26

Id.

27

Lithgow, supra note 25.

28

Id. at §122.

29

Pine Valley Development Limited and Others v. Ireland, ECHR (Ser. A) No. 222, paras 54 and 57 (Judgment of 29 November 1991). 321


to be determined by the rules of international law. The question has arisen as certain States adopt national environmental laws in such a way which may interfere with the property rights of foreign investors. This line of argument has been promoted in particular in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Chapter 11 of which provides for protection of foreign investments from inter alia measures “tantamount to nationalization or expropriation”, and provides for investor-State arbitration under ICSID or UNCITRAL rules.30 In the Ethyl case Canada banned all inter-provincial trade in and commercial imports of MMT, a manganese based compound which enhances the octane value of unleaded gasoline. The Ethyl Corporation – a US company – sued under NAFTA Chapter 11 on the grounds inter alia that violated national treatment requirements and represented an act “tantamount to an expropriation” without compensation. Ethyl Corp claimed damages of USD 251 million. After the arbitrators found that the NAFTA/UNCITRAL tribunal had jurisdiction,31 and after a Canadian procedure had found that the ban violated Canada’s Agreement on Internal Trade, the parties settled the dispute, with Canada paying Ethyl USD 13 million. Another case is now pending, this time involving a Canadian investor against the United States, in relation to Californian legislation relating to another fuel additive, MTBE. One sees in these two cases the rich prospect for conflicts between rules of law governing the protection of foreign investment and rules of laws seeking to protect the environment. In many ways this mirrors the tension which has emerged between the rules of free trade and the rules for the protection of the environment. In the Ethyl case the Canadian environmental protection legislation was not based on international law. What if it had been? What if the conflict pitted against each other rules of international law arising in two different contexts and aiming at two different societal objectives? In this scenario there may be a clear conflict between two competing rules of international law: which is to prevail? In the recent Award of an Arbitral Tribunal in Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v. Republic of Costa Rica this issue arose, not so much in terms of determining the legality of an act of expropriation, but rather in terms of determining the methodology for valuing the environmental resource – in this case an area of rain forest which is rich in biological diversity – which the host State was seeking to protect for the creation of a national park.32 The arbitral tribunal ruled that environmental protection objectives, even if an application of international environmental norm, did not have any bearing on the matter, including in relation to the methodology of traditional valuation based on full

30

32 ILM (1993), 605 at 641.

31

Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, Jurisdiction phase, 38 ILM (1999), 708.

32

17 February 2000. The Award is available on the ICSID web site.

322


and fair market value.33 In other words, for this arbitral tribunal, comprising a most distinguished group of individuals, the international rules for the protection of foreign investment appear to take precedence over any rules of environmental protection however national or international. This poses a particular dilemma. Can it be right that one set of rules of international law ought necessarily prevail over another? Does international law recognise an a priori hierarchy? If the tribunal is right then the practical consequence may be to prevent States, in particular developing country States, from taking effective measures to give effect to their international obligations to protect their environmental patrimony, since they will often not be in a position to finance an interference. On the other hand, there is a need to be vigilant against the possibility of abusing the right to protect the environment at the cost of foreign (or indeed domestic) property rights. What is needed is balance, rather as between the rights and interests of upstream and downstream riparian States.34 To my mind one can not start from the assumption that there exists an a priori hierarchy in the norms of international law. General principles of international law call for a balanced approach, in which the societal objective of encouraging foreign investment (as reflected in numerous international instruments) is treated in a balanced manner with the societal objective of protecting the environment (as also reflected in numerous international instruments), and vice versa. This need to treat developmental needs with environmental needs is now often referred to as the principle of “sustainable development”, as reflected in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and as invoked by the ICJ in the Case concerning the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project35 and more recently the arbitral tribunal in the Iron Rhine case.36 And observers will recognise this a lively issue in the trade and environment debate, and in which the WTO Appellate Body is moving towards seeking to reconcile the competing societal demands of free trade and environmental protection in the context of an integrated, holistic international legal order.37

33

The Tribunal said (at para. 71): “While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property was taken for this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation must be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the environment makes no difference.”

34

Supra note 3, at 140.

35

Supra note 5, at para. 140.

36

Supra note 19.

37

See WTO Appellate Body, Shrimp Turtles case, AB-1998-4, 12 October 1998; 33 ILM (1999), 118 et seq. 323


It is against this background that the recent Award of a NAFTA/ICSID Arbitration Tribunal in Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States is of considerable interest.38 The Tribunal ruled that Mexico had violated inter alia article 1110 of the NAFTA, which provides that “[n]o party shall directly or indirectly … expropriate an investment … or take a measure tantamount to … expropriation” except under certain conditions. In so ruling, it interpreted article 1110 to mean that “expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host state, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which as the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the sue or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state.”39 This definition significantly expands the concept of “expropriation” beyond its traditional meaning in classical public international law, to expressly include “regulatory takings” in the US constitutional law sense. The Tribunal did not cite a great deal of authority or precedent for the interpretation, and it is not clear that the parties to NAFTA intended so broad an approach. In the Metalclad case the Tribunal relied on the broad definition to rule, in effect, that the failure of Mexico to provide for a clear system of permitting (specifically concerning whether or not a local municipality was or was not entitled to grant a construction permit) constituted “a measure tantamount to expropriation” in violation of article 1110.40 The effect of the Award is to open the door to “tantamount to expropriation claim” on many environmental regulations (or other national regulations intended to protect human health), including some adopted pursuant to international treaty obligations (such as the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity or the 1971 Wetlands Convention). The decisions in Santa Elena and Metalclad are not premised on an approach which treats the protection of private property rights and the protection of the environment in an integrated manner. The combined effect of both cases may have the unfortunate consequence of exposing ICSID as an institution to the kind of scrutiny to which the GATT was subjected, after the infamous panel decisions in the Tuna/Dolphin cases in 1991 and 1994,41 when the institution

38

25 August 2000, unpublished.

39

Ibid. at para. 103.

40

The case raises important issues relating to inter alia federalism which the Tribunal appeared to gloss over, and the distinction between construction permits and operating permits on which the Tribunal did not appear to demonstrate a keen awareness.

41

See Sands, note 4, at pp. 955 et seq.

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was criticized for failing to ensure the adequate integration of environmental considerations into the interpretation and application of free trade rules.

IV. Conclusions The decisions in Santa Elena and Metalclad buck the trend of other cases which seek to strike a balance between environmental and other objectives. They do not indicate any particular sensitivity of the arbitrators to environmental considerations. It may be that the cases reflect a “generational issue”: that environmental issues remain novel with the consequence that it will take time to fully integrate environmental concerns into the better established norms of foreign investment protection. Yet developments in other areas – international trade stands as an example – indicates that understanding of the need for a balanced approach can emerge even where economic concerns are paramount. And the approach adopted by the arbitral tribunal in Iron Rhine points the way to the integration of apparently competing norms of international law, some of which may have emerged later in time.

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PREPARATION FOR INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION Sir Arthur Watts

I

nternational litigation is not a course embarked upon at the drop of a hat. Before a State institutes legal proceedings against another State there are many matters which have to be considered – not least of which is whether to begin that process at all. The judgment of an international tribunal, together with the formal initiation of the proceedings and the written and oral pleadings of the parties which underpin the eventual judgment, constitute the visible or evident components of the settlement process. What is much less visible or evident is the lengthy and often complex process of preparation which precedes the parties’ pleadings and even the institution of the legal proceedings.

I. The Decision Whether or Not to Institute International Legal Proceedings Perhaps the first decision which has to be taken by one of the States involved in a dispute is whether the time has come to refer the dispute to binding third party settlement by an international tribunal. Even if the final formal decision is an agreed reference of the dispute to an international tribunal, one or other of the States concerned (or perhaps both of them, acting independently) has to decide whether that is the most appropriate course for it to take. At this very early stage the prospective applicant State will almost certainly be keeping to itself its consideration of the matters on which it needs to take decisions, lest by alerting the prospective respondent State to what is afoot it raises the diplomatic temperature or prompts that State to take whatever pre-emptive action is open to it to thwart the possibility of it being “taken to court” (for example by withdrawing or amending its existing acceptance of the jurisdiction of a possibly relevant tribunal). So in most cases at these very early stages the prospective respondent State will usually be unaware of what the prospective applicant State is doing by way of readying itself to initiate, or to propose the joint initiation of, litigation before an international tribunal. Even if the two States are each separately considering the possibility of initiating Ndiaye and Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes, 327–340 ©2007 Koninklijke Brill NV. ISBN 978 90 04 16156 6. Printed in the Netherlands.


litigation, each will still in principle be keeping its consideration of this issue as confidential as it can. The first question which a State contemplating the initiation of litigation against another State has to address is the critical question whether to initiate such litigation at all. To a large extent this is a question to be decided by the authorities within the State which are concerned with matters of policy, although in reaching their decision they will be heavily influenced by various legal and other considerations. But essentially the decision is a political one, in which many non-legal factors play their part, such as the impact of a decision to litigate on the other State concerned and even perhaps on other regional States who might have an interest in the way States in their region choose to settle their differences; the State will also need to weigh the domestic impact of any decision to litigate against another State, and the economic consequences which might flow from the decision. It will also be as well for those who take the decision to institute legal proceedings to be clear in their own minds as to the purpose of the prospective litigation. Often this will involve a combination of political, economic and legal factors.1 The view that the objective of litigating is “to win” the case may be too simplistic, although most States will indeed hope that by referring some outstanding dispute to an international judicial tribunal the outcome will be in their favour. But settling the dispute on, hopefully, favourable terms is not the only reason which might motivate a State to initiate international litigation. The settlement of a long-standing dispute, for example, may be politically welcome just because it will be settled and will no longer be a cause of friction between the States concerned, almost irrespective of the outcome; again, reference of a dispute to an international judicial tribunal may be seen, irrespective of the eventual outcome, as a valuable step in the management of an inter-State difference; yet again, it may be easier for a State to accept an impartial judicial decision against it than to agree to arrive at the very same outcome by making diplomatic concessions on its own authority. Whatever the political calculations may be, it is only when (and if) the decision to litigate is agreed at the political level that the more strictly legal considerations in the preparation of the case come to the fore. Even though the State’s own legal advisers will have contributed extensively to the discussions leading up to the eventual political decision to institute legal proceedings, it is only once that decision has been taken that the legal aspects of the case become dominant. The principal legal considerations which the State’s lawyers have to address at an early stage can be summarised as “the three Cs” – Case, Counsel, and Court.

1

See generally, I. Brownlie, “Why Do States Take Disputes to the International Court?” in N. Ando, E. McWhinney and R. Wolfrum (eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda (2002), Vol. 2, pp. 829-834.

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Preparation for International Litigation

II. The Case The State’s legal advisers will need to make a careful evaluation of the legal merits of the State’s case. To a large extent, this evaluation will have taken place even at quite an early stage in the domestic preparations, since unless the case was thought to be, at least on a prima facie basis, strong enough to justify recourse to international litigation the whole process of embarking on the taking of a political decision to institute international litigation would have been somewhat futile. Just occasionally the decision to take matters to an international tribunal will be taken on almost entirely political grounds with little regard for the legal strength of the prospective case (as where, for example, the State’s main interest lies less in winning the case than in simply settling a dispute and getting it off the political agenda), but more often than not the legal strengths and weaknesses of the State’s legal position will play a major part in reaching the political decision to institute legal proceedings. Even so, with that initial political decision taken, the evaluation of the legal merits of the State’s case moves into a different gear. However carefully the State’s own lawyers, often those in the Foreign Ministry or Ministry of Justice, have thought about the State’s prospective case, there is a world of difference between that and the actual presentation of the necessary legal and factual arguments to a tribunal in the State’s opening written pleading (usually its Memorial). Just as an idea when initially conceived tends to look somewhat different when set down on paper in all its detail and its full implications made apparent, it is really only when beginning to prepare the State’s Memorial that the real strengths and weaknesses of the State’s case become apparent. Arguments which stated generally appear convincing may be less so (or may even be more so) when stated with the particularity which is necessary in presenting detailed argument to a tribunal; and similarly, facts which can be set out persuasively in papers prepared as a basis for political decisions may look different when one has to assess how they are actually to be proved. Since, typically, the process of considering whether or not to institute international legal proceedings will have been going on for some time, the State’s lawyers will have lived and breathed the case for many weeks if not months. That makes it not always easy for them to view the merits of their State’s case dispassionately, especially if (as is the case with most States) they have little or no direct experience of the ways of international tribunals. Fresh and more experienced minds can therefore be helpful.

III. Counsel This leads on to the second of the three Cs – Counsel. The need for fresh minds to be brought to bear coincides with the need for the State, once the decision 329


has been taken to institute international legal proceedings against another State, to begin to assemble a legal team to conduct the case. At the outset two preliminary points should be made. First, although it is convenient to touch on the question of engaging external Counsel as part of the process which follows the taking of the political decision to institute international legal proceedings, it will often be the case that external Counsel will have been brought in before that decision has been taken and as part of the evaluation which forms part of the political decision-making process. Thus a State may be in the habit of consulting a particular external international lawyer on its normal range of international legal problems, in which case it will naturally turn also to that person when it is considering the possibility of instituting legal proceedings against another State. The second preliminary point is that the term “Counsel” is one which is used with considerable flexibility in international legal proceedings. Whereas in domestic legal proceedings it is normally to be expected that lawyers representing the parties in dispute will have formal rights of audience in the court in question, typically by having been called to the appropriate Bar, there is no such formality in international legal proceedings. The International Court of Justice adopts what has become the standard practice in international courts and tribunals in providing for States to be represented by Agents and then continuing, in Article 42.2 of the Statute of the Court, that the parties “may have the assistance of counsel or advocates before the Court”. There has been little discernible attempt to attribute precise meanings to, or to differentiate precisely between, “counsel” and “advocates”. It may be that “counsel” covers those who are professionally qualified in their various domestic legal systems to exercise a right of audience in superior courts, and that “advocates” covers all those others who, while not being so professionally qualified, have nevertheless been selected by the State in question to address the Court on its behalf. But it may also be that little more can be said than that “[t]here is thus no more than a general expectation that States will appoint properly qualified persons to perform this function; by ‘properly qualified’ may be understood in this context (though not necessarily in any exclusive sense) members of the legal profession qualified to plead before the higher courts of their own country, and professors and other teachers of international law at recognized institutions of higher education”.2 Even persons with no legal background have addressed the Court in certain cases, although there is always the danger in doing so that the line between advocate and expert witness will become too blurred to be acceptable.

2

Sir F. Berman, in A. Zimmermann, C. Tomuschat and K. Oellers-Frahm (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2006), at p. 973. See also Sir A. Watts, “Enhancing the Effectiveness of Procedures of International Dispute Settlement”, Max Planck UNYB 5 (2001), pp. 21, 24-30.

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Understanding “Counsel” in that somewhat flexible sense, the need for a State to apply fresh minds to the evaluation of the merits of its legal case will, for most States, involve engaging Counsel from outside the State’s internal bureaucracy. These may be members of the State’s own legal profession or Counsel from other States – truly “external” Counsel. The importance of having such outside members of the legal team is that they can bring to the evaluation of the State’s case independent professional judgment based on long experience of international law and tribunals, and also that they can put their international forensic experience at the State’s disposal in preparing its case as effectively as possible within the framework of how international tribunals operate. No States (with very few, and limited, exceptions)3 engage in so much international litigation that their internal bureaucracies have real general and practical expertise in the ways of international tribunals, whereas there is a body of international lawyers who do possess such expertise and are willing to place it at the disposal of States who may be in need of it. It would be wrong to overemphasise the value which international external Counsel can bring to a State’s legal team, but at the same time it would be just as wrong to underplay the differences between international litigation and domestic litigation, and the assistance which practical experience of the former can bring to the presentation of the State’s case – or put the other way, it would be wrong to underestimate the degree of damage which Counsel inexperienced in the ways of international tribunals can do to the effective presentation of the State’s case. The essence of the matter is that external Counsel should bring their professionally independent and expert judgment to bear on the assessment of the merits of the State’s legal case, and on the best ways of presenting that case. Legal merits, factual and documentary evidence, and forensic tactics go hand in hand: on all of them the State’s legal team will expect to rely heavily on the external Counsel whom it engages. But establishing its legal team is not just a matter of the State engaging external Counsel. While the external Counsel may be at the sharp end of the State’s preparation and presentation of its case, they are only a part of the much larger team which the State will need to assemble for the purposes of the litigation. The team taken as a whole will comprise representatives of all the disciplines which are relevant to the particular case, and may include the State’s own nationals or persons from other States: the essential requirement is that the State should have at its disposal the best possible

3

In particular some States which are regularly involved in international legal proceedings in particular areas of activity find it appropriate to set up within the relevant Government Departments teams of lawyers and others devoted to the conduct of litigation in those areas. This is the case, for example, in some countries which have numerous cases before the European Court of Human Rights, or under regional investment protection treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement. 331


expertise, from wherever it might come. Thus a legal team will often include those with historical and geographic expertise, economists, those with knowledge of relevant resources (such as hydrocarbons, or fisheries), and so on, depending on what the case is about. Associated with the choice of Counsel is the question whether the State should engage the services of a law firm to help with the general running and conduct of the case. States which do not have any significant recent experience of international litigation may well find it helpful to engage an experienced law firm to help with the preparation of the case, especially if the State does not have a large internal civil service from which competent people can be allocated to perform the necessary functions. Although the use of a law firm will add to the costs of litigation, the value of a law firm which is experienced in the conduct of litigation before international tribunals can be immense and a positive contribution to the outcome of the legal proceedings.

IV. The Court The third C which calls for consideration is the Court or tribunal before which the legal proceedings are to be instituted (the term “tribunal” will be used here to cover both categories of institution). Again, as with the appointment of external Counsel, the fact that it is convenient to deal with this matter at this stage does not mean that it will not have been considered at earlier stages as well: in fact, it will probably have been considered earlier since there is little purpose to be served in seeking political decisions to institute legal proceedings against another State unless there is, at least prima facie, a suitable tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case. But however much thought has been given to this question in the stages leading up to the taking of the political decision to institute legal proceedings, it is a question which, like the merits of the prospective case, will come in for much more searching scrutiny once the prospect of legal proceedings has become a reality. It is also a matter on which external Counsel may be expected to have a substantial contribution to make. The choice of tribunal before which to institute proceedings involves considerations at two overlapping levels – the potentially possible tribunals, and the extent to which any of them has jurisdiction over the particular dispute to be put before them. Identifying potentially possible tribunals is relatively straightforward. The choice is in practice quite limited. For cases which may be considered to be general international law cases the essential choice is between a standing tribunal and an ad hoc tribunal. The leading standing tribunal with a general competence for disputes involving international law is, of course, the International Court of Justice, with the further possibility of having the dispute heard, if the parties so

332


request, by a Chamber of the Court4 rather than by the full Court; if the dispute falls within certain fields of activity it might be that there is already a standing tribunal with competence for that sector: examples are the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the dispute settlement provisions of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Deciding to have recourse to an ad hoc tribunal means going to some kind of ad hoc arbitration, although there may be a choice between an ad hoc arbitration commenced de novo and an ad hoc arbitration taking place within a standing institutional framework (such as an arbitration tribunal established under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). The principal factors which need to be weighed in making a choice between the various available options include, in addition to the overriding consideration whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute (as to which see below), the size and composition of the tribunal, the tribunal’s procedural requirements for the conduct of the case, the time which recourse to a chosen tribunal is likely to take before handing down its decision, and the probable costs involved in resorting to one tribunal rather than another. The size and composition of standing tribunals is known in advance. Thus the International Court of Justice consists of 15 Judges, plus a possible two ad hoc Judges5 if neither party already has a Judge of its nationality on the Court and if each wishes to make use of the opportunity to make an ad hoc appointment. The identity of the 15 regular Judges is thus a “given”, and there is no room for a State initiating proceedings in the International Court to exclude certain Judges or to add others which are more to its liking. There are, however, two exceptions to this: as already noted it is possible for a case to be referred not to the full Court but rather to a Chamber of the Court which for that purpose will comprise a number of Judges determined by the Court with the approval of the parties; the other exception, as also already noted, is afforded by the possibility of a party appointing an ad hoc Judge. If a State is not comfortable with the arrangements for the composition of what might otherwise be an appropriate standing tribunal, the State has the alternative of having recourse to an ad hoc tribunal, usually designated as an arbitration tribunal.6 With such a tribunal the arrangements for the establishment, number of arbitrators, and composition of the tribunal are in the hands of the States concerned. This means that it depends on their agreement, and that cannot be assumed to be readily forthcoming. In many ways the choice may thus turn out to be between a standing tribunal whose size and composition is fixed

4

ICJ Statute, Art. 26.

5


6

Other forms of designation are possible, such as “Commission”, but whatever title is adopted the essence of the tribunal’s functions will be that of arbitration of the dispute. 333


in advance but which (apart from the question of jurisdiction) may be utilised without having to get the agreement of the other State concerned in the dispute, and an ad hoc tribunal where those matters can be determined as the parties see fit but where that determination itself has to be agreed between the States concerned. Experience suggests that reaching agreement upon the number and identity of arbitrators can be a long drawn out process. Since this can frustrate the chosen recourse to arbitration, some arbitration treaty provisions give the parties only a limited time in which to appoint arbitrators and then provide that if they are not appointed within that time they will be appointed by some other designated authority. As important as the tribunal’s size and composition is the question of its procedural rules, since these will directly affect the way the case is conducted and ultimately its likely duration. With a standing tribunal the applicable procedural rules will be known in advance; thus with the International Court of Justice the Court’s modus operandi is governed by its Statute, its Rules of Court, and various Practice Directions.7 Particularly important procedural elements affecting the prospective conduct and duration of the case are what is said about the number, order and timing of written pleadings, whether the possibility of requesting provisional measures of protection is allowed, and whether provision is made for the making of preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the tribunal or the admissibility of all or part of the case sought to be brought before it. This last possibility can be a major source of delay, since the proceedings on the merits may be suspended while the tribunal considers the preliminary objections which have been raised. This issue is only likely to arise where a State has recourse to a standing tribunal in respect of a case for which the necessary consent has been given in advance, since where the case is submitted to a tribunal on the basis of a special ad hoc agreement it is likely that issues of jurisdiction and admissibility will have been dealt with satisfactorily in the course of the negotiation of the agreement.8 But where there is no special agreement, and a case is referred to a tribunal on the basis of a consent allegedly given in advance, it will often be the case that the respondent State will seek to argue that it never gave the consent alleged, or that if it did give consent the scope of its consent did not cover the particular case now being brought against it. That a respondent State should have the opportunity to make such objections is entirely reasonable, and is indeed inevitable with a judicial settlement system which is almost wholly

7

See Acts and Documents Concerning the Organization of the Court (No. 6), Charter of the United Nations, Statute and Rules of Court, and Other Documents (2007).

8

Even so, it may be that when the respondent State sees the details of the case against it as set out in the applicant State’s Memorial it will consider that it goes beyond the scope of the special agreement which had been reached for the judicial settlement of the parties’ dispute.

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dependent on the existence of consent; but it has sometimes been the case that a respondent State has abused that opportunity by making objections which have little if anything to be said in their favour. The prospective applicant State must therefore be aware, when considering the likely course of the legal proceedings which it is thinking of starting, that the expected smooth running of the case may be run off the rails by the introduction by its opponent of preliminary objections of varying degrees of merit. Whereas with a standing tribunal the applicable procedural rules are known in advance and the States which are to be parties to a case before such a tribunal will have to take those rules as they stand, with an ad hoc arbitration the parties will usually start with a clean sheet and (subject to the need for agreement) can tailor the applicable procedural rules to their special requirements. Even where an arbitration is held within a standing institutional framework the parties still usually have a degree of freedom to establish procedural rules tailored to their specific needs. A typical provision in this respect is to be found in Article 5 of Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states that “[u]nless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own procedure, assuring to each party a full opportunity to be heard and to present its case”. While the flexibility this gives to the parties will help them to secure procedures which fit their needs in areas to which they attach particular importance, it is unlikely that the parties will have serious problems over accepting most of the procedural provisions which are habitually adopted in arbitrations. There are now virtually standard procedural provisions, and there is a large degree of “borrowing” of such provisions adopted in earlier arbitrations by new tribunals when they are set up. Models for such procedural provisions have been drawn up and are often relied upon by States as affording at least a starting point for their negotiations: an example is afforded by the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States. However important the various foregoing considerations may be, the overriding consideration has to be whether or not the preferred tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the case which the State wishes to refer to it for decision. The international judicial process is still essentially consensual, and however attractive a particular tribunal may be for the prospective applicant State, that will be of no avail if the prospective respondent State has not consented to the dispute in question being submitted for decision to that tribunal. Questions of jurisdiction are complex, and cannot be fully explored within the compass of this present contribution. It may, however, be sufficient for immediate purposes to distinguish between standing tribunals (including ad hoc tribunals operating within a standing institutional framework) and completely ad hoc tribunals. While a tribunal in the latter category will be set up by a special agreement whereby the States concerned agree that their dispute will be referred to arbitration, so that the consent of both parties is apparent on the face of the agreement, standing

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tribunals typically allow for disputes to be referred to them either by virtue of a special agreement to that effect or by virtue of an expression of consent given in advance (e.g. by treaty or by unilateral declaration) and without reference to any particular dispute. The Statute of the International Court of Justice makes provision to that effect,9 allowing for the Court’s jurisdiction to comprise, first, all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the United Nations Charter or in treaties and conventions in force, and second, all cases in which both the States in dispute have made declarations recognising the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to other States accepting the same obligation – so-called “optional clause” declarations. A State wishing to institute proceedings before the International Court must therefore consider whether there exists a sufficient basis for the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the particular dispute which has arisen. This is not a matter on which the prospective applicant State can reach a definitive conclusion, since it is quite possible – and may even be probable – that the prospective respondent State will challenge the existence of jurisdiction by way of a preliminary objection, in which event it will be for the Court to rule upon the matter definitively. It is probably enough if the prospective applicant State’s legal advisers (including its external Counsel) come to the conclusion that a sufficiently arguable basis for jurisdiction exists to make it worthwhile pursuing the idea of referring the dispute to the Court, always in the knowledge that the other State may well question the existence of jurisdiction. Such questioning of the Court’s jurisdiction will essentially relate to the scope of the consent to jurisdiction which the prospective respondent State has given: thus it may, for example, question whether the treaty providing for disputes to be referred to the Court covers a dispute of the particular kind which has arisen, or whether the terms on which it has given consent by way of an “optional clause” declaration are adequate to include consent to the Court’s jurisdiction in the particular circumstances which have arisen.

V. Remedies to be Sought Having decided upon a tribunal which, at least arguably, has the necessary jurisdiction to decide the dispute which the State wishes to refer to it, an associated question which the State must consider concerns the remedies to be sought from the tribunal.10 The possible remedies are various, and may include a declaration that the conduct of the other State has been in breach of its international obligations, the payment of compensation for damage resulting from such breach, an

9


10

See generally, C.D. Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law (1990).

336


apology for the wrong done, the restoration of the physical status quo ante, the determination of a territorial or maritime boundary, and the performance of some particular acts (such as the return of property wrongfully seized). It is a question, of course, whether it is within the competence of the preferred tribunal to order the particular remedies which the State may wish to seek. This applies particularly to one remedy which is often sought, namely the ordering of provisional (or interim) measures of protection. From a practical point of view such a remedy can be immensely valuable, since the circumstances giving rise to the dispute may be such that the injured State, which will be the applicant State in the main proceedings, is presently suffering considerable damage from the conduct of the other (prospective respondent) State which cannot be adequately remedied by a decision given by the tribunal in what may prove to be many years’ time. Where the possibility of the tribunal ordering provisional measures is provided for, the circumstances in which such an order may be made are usually tightly circumscribed. The International Court of Justice has “the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party”.11 Other tribunals may possess an equivalent power12 but it cannot be assumed that all do so, and whether or not they do so is a matter for enquiry in each case. In particular, if a dispute is to be referred to ad hoc arbitration it will be a matter for agreement between the parties whether the tribunal is to have the power to order provisional measures, and the possible difficulty in reaching agreement on such a power may be a factor which a State will have to weigh in deciding whether to choose ad hoc arbitration or a standing tribunal (or an arbitration established within a standing framework).

VI. Time A factor which is of great concern to most litigating States is the length of time they will have to wait before getting a decision from the chosen tribunal. Except in those relatively few cases where the uppermost consideration in the minds of the litigating States is simply to get their dispute settled and off the agenda of their bilateral relations, States which are contemplating the initiation of litigation against another State13 will usually want as expeditious a judicial procedure as possible. It is difficult in modern times to get a decision in much

11

ICJ Statute, Art. 41; see also ICJ Rules, arts 73-76.

12

E.g. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 290, and Annex VI, art. 25.

13

The prospective respondent State, however, may well not share that sense of urgency, preferring instead to prolong the proceedings for as long as possible. 337


under two years,14 something in the region of three to five years is probably about normal, and in some cases it may take a year or two longer still especially if the respondent State has raised preliminary objections to the tribunal’s jurisdiction or to the admissibility of the case put before the tribunal. But the factors which come into play in this context make forecasting the likely length of time which a tribunal will take particularly difficult. As a general proposition it is probable that ad hoc arbitration will be quicker than recourse to a standing tribunal such as the International Court of Justice. The parties can, in agreeing to arbitration, decide upon whatever procedural arrangements they prefer, and in particular can establish quite short periods for the delivery of the various written pleadings, for the holding of an oral hearing, and for the maximum time allowed thereafter for the tribunal to hand down its decision; whereas in the International Court, while there is room for the Court to give the parties relatively short periods of time for their various pleadings, at the end of that process the speed with which the Court can deal with the particular case is heavily dependent upon all the other cases which are before the Court and the various stages which they have reached on their way to a final judgment. And while ad hoc arbitration might be quicker, the whole procedure requires agreement between the parties, and that agreement may itself take a long time to reach.

VII. Cost A State’s legal advisers will also need to consider the likely cost of initiating legal proceedings, if only to be sure they have made sufficient budgetary provision to cover the inevitable expenses. Again, no hard and fast figures can be given, although it is safe to say that pursuing a case to international litigation is likely to cost in the region of 5-10 million US dollars. So much, however, depends on the course which the case takes, and in particular whether the respondent State raises any preliminary objections to the tribunal’s jurisdiction or to the admissibility of the case brought against it, and whether any request is made for an indication of provisional measures. Both of those procedural possibilities introduce what is in effect an extra stage in the proceedings, and that in turn inevitably adds to the costs. Apart from such easily identifiable “extra” contributions to the costs of international litigation, the major elements in the total financial bill will usu14

Although in the Algiers Peace Agreement of 12 December 2000 Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to the arbitration of their boundary dispute by a Boundary Commission and provided, in article 4.12, that the Commission “shall endeavour to make its decision concerning delimitation of the border within six months of its first meeting”, this proved too optimistic. In the event the Commission’s Delimitation Decision was handed down on 13 April 2002, just 16 months after the conclusion of the Algiers Agreement.

338


ally consist of the costs of the tribunal and its registry (principally the fees and expenses of the persons concerned, and the tribunal’s accommodation and support costs), the fees of Counsel and of any specialist advisers who may be needed, the charges of a law firm if it is decided to engage one to assist with the preparation and conduct of the case, and the general overheads involved in the running of what is a substantial bureaucratic enterprise over a number of years. Most of these costs will have to be incurred irrespective of which tribunal the case is referred to, although clearly the shorter the overall duration of the case the less time, in total, will have to be devoted to it, with consequent implications for the costs involved. One noteworthy exception, however, concerns the costs of the tribunal and its registry. With a standing tribunal those costs will be likely to be borne as part of the budget of the institution within the framework of which the tribunal operates rather than by the litigating States: thus the costs of the International Court of Justice are carried as part of the United Nations’ budget, and not by the parties to cases brought before it.15 In sharp contrast, the costs of the tribunal and registry of an ad hoc arbitration will have to be borne by the parties: with a complex and long-running arbitration these costs can be considerable, even though they are only a part – and by no means the major part – of the overall costs of the case. Although it is open to States to request that the tribunal should order the other party to pay the costs of the case, such orders are seldom made and the States parties are left to bear their own costs and (where the tribunal’s costs are not carried on the budget of a relevant institution) an equal share of the costs of the tribunal and registry. Certainly, in preparing for international litigation the State should not assume that at the end of the day the other party will be ordered to contribute to its costs.

VIII. Other Preparatory Steps With decisions on the three Cs – Case, Counsel, and Court – duly taken, the State’s legal advisers are in a position to address other matters which have to be dealt with before the State’s case can be put before the chosen tribunal. Principal among the topics to be covered (although not necessarily in this order) are: – such steps as are necessary for the constitution of the tribunal, such as the choice of an ad hoc Judge if the case is to go to the International Court of Justice,16 or of arbitrators and registrar if the case is to go to some form of ad hoc arbitration;

15


16

While a State’s legal advisers will do well to give early consideration to the appointment of an ad hoc Judge, and while the Rules require that a party proposing to choose a Judge 339


– the drafting of a unilateral application submitting the dispute to the chosen tribunal or the negotiation of a special agreement with the prospective respondent State setting out the terms on which the two parties consent to refer their dispute to that tribunal; – establishing the State’s team for the case, including the choice of Agent to represent the State in the proceedings,17 the selection of the Government team to assist with the preparation of the case, including representatives of the appropriate Government legal office, experts (such as hydrographers, surveyors, economists, historians), researchers and advisers; – the initial preparation of the Memorial in which the State’s argument is to be put to the tribunal; – the gathering of any necessary evidence; – the preparation of eventual technical aids, particularly those for use with the opening written pleading; and – the actual institution of proceedings by whatever is the appropriate formal procedure for the chosen tribunal, such as the filing with the International Court of Justice of a notification of a special agreement or by a written application, or the giving of a notice of arbitration in accordance with whatever is the relevant agreed procedure. It is apparent that once the decision has been taken to institute international legal proceedings against another State, there is much for the State’s legal advisers to do before that decision becomes public knowledge and the legal proceedings are actually commenced. In this respect the State which is about to initiate legal proceedings has one inestimable advantage. It has, in a real sense, a head start; it knows what it intends to do and can begin its preparations well before the prospective respondent State becomes aware of what is being contemplated. Indeed, the prospective applicant State will usually be well-advised to keep its preparations as confidential as it can, precisely in order to maximise whatever tactical advantage which surprise may give it.

ad hoc must notify the Court of its intention as soon as possible (Art. 35.1), the deadline for informing the Court of the name and nationality of the person selected is two months before the time limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial (ibid.). 17

ICJ Statute, Art. 42.1.

340

TAKING AND ASSESSING EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION Rüdiger Wolfrum*

I. Introduction

I

n his Declaration1 to the Judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS, or the Tribunal) of 18 December 2000 in the Monte Confurco case,2 Judge Mensah criticised the way in which the Tribunal dealt with a factual assumption of the French municipal court of Saint Paul.3 This criticism touches upon three different issues, namely: the appropriateness for the Tribunal to assess a factual situation, the concrete assessment of facts by the Tribunal, and the Tribunal’s relationship in that respect to national courts. Only the first two aspects will be dealt with in this chapter, taking into consideration the law and practice of other international courts and tribunals. Evidence in international adjudication embraces information submitted to an international court or tribunal by parties to a case or from other sources, or collected by the court itself, with a view to establishing or disproving alleged facts.4 The production, collection and evaluation of evidence are processes

*

My sincere thanks go to M. Benzing, research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, whose assistance and advice was instrumental in the preparation of this contribution.

1

Declaration of Judge Mensah, ITLOS Reports 2000, Vol. 4, 118.

2

The Monte Confurco case (Seychelles v. France), ITLOS Reports 2000, Vol. 4, 86 et seq.

3

See para. 86 of the judgment: “The Tribunal does not, however, consider the assumption of the court of first instance of Saint-Paul as being entirely consistent with the information before this Tribunal”.

4

C.F. Amerasinghe, Evidence in International Litigation, 2005, 31; Sh. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice, 1920-2005, 2006, 1039, who describes the function of the ICJ as follows: “to establish on whom the burden of proof falls and to ascertain, and certainly to assess the relevance and the weight of the evidence produced insofar as it is necessary for the determination of the issues which it finds it essential to



which serve a particular purpose: they are meant to enable the adjudicative body in question to decide a legal dispute or to deliver an advisory legal opinion in accordance with all relevant facts. The production, collection and assessment of evidence are thus essential elements of the judicial function of international courts or tribunals. As far as the appropriateness of the assessment of evidence by the Tribunal is concerned, it is a particularity of the prompt release cases, such as Monte Confurco, that the Tribunal’s judgment is without prejudice to the merits of the case before the appropriate domestic forum.5 Does that mean that the Tribunal has to refrain from assessing the factual situation as Judge Mensah seems to indicate? This would be problematic if it excluded in general the possibility for the Tribunal to take and assess evidence. The procedure under article 292 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) applies only to particular factual situations identified as such in the LOS Convention, namely that a ship has been arrested in an exclusive economic zone for having allegedly violated the law of the coastal State concerned in respect of the management of living resources or the protection of the environment. A decision as to whether this situation existed requires an assessment of the factual situation prevailing at the moment of the arrest. Also, the main function of the Tribunal under this procedure, namely to examine whether to order the release of the vessel and the crew upon posting a reasonable bond or security as defined by the Tribunal, requires an assessment of the factual situation since the decision on the reasonableness of the bond or financial security has to reflect, inter alia, the value of the ship and the nature of the alleged offences. In this respect the assessment of the Tribunal may clearly differ from that of the coastal State concerned. As far as the assessment of evidence by international courts or tribunals is concerned, international judges have, in general, a wide discretion (principle of free assessment of evidence).6 The principle of free assessment of evidence does not absolve international courts and tribunals, though, from indicating in the final judgment how they reached their conclusions. However, international courts and tribunals are, in general, reluctant to deal in depth with questions of evidence when rendering their judgments or opinions. In particular, they do

resolve”; M. Lachs, “Evidence in the Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Role of the Court”, in: E.G. Bello/B.A. Ajibola (eds), Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias, 1992, 265 et seq.; A.A. Mawdsley, “Evidence before the International Court of Justice”, in: R.St.J. Macdonald (ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, 1994, 533 et seq. 5

See the wording of art. 292, para. 3, of the LOS Convention.

6

In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (Merits) (Nicaragua case), the ICJ stated that within the limits of its Statute and Rules “[it] has freedom in estimating the value of the various elements of evidence” ICJ Reports 1986, 14 et seq., at para. 60; see also K. Highet, “Evidence, the Court, and the Nicaragua Case”, AJIL 81 (1987), 1 et seq.

342

Taking and Assessing Evidence in International Adjudication

not consider themselves obliged to explain which standard of proof they have used and how they reached conclusions on disputed facts.7 This deficit is more and more acknowledged not only in legal commentary, but also by international courts themselves. Recent case law of international courts and tribunals indicates a more thorough and systematic approach to evidentiary issues.8 Evidentiary rules of international courts or tribunals adjudicating on interState claims, as laid down in their respective statutes or rules of procedure, are not enlightening in this respect. The rules mostly deal with formalities concerning the production by the parties and the taking of evidence by the international court or tribunal in question, such as the time of submission and requirements for specific means of proof. The value of such formalities should not be underestimated; they are the means through which international courts or tribunals control the production of evidence which is de facto mostly entrusted to the parties.

II. Principles Governing the Production, Taking and Assessment of Evidence By its very nature, litigation between two or more States or between States and international organisations may be compared, in general, with civil litigation under national law. In civil proceedings, both parties are, in principle, on an equal footing, as opposed to criminal or administrative cases, where the State has a considerable advantage due to its resources and means of collecting evidence. This makes the equality of parties the leading principle governing inter-State litigation. The collection of evidence by international courts and tribunals in disputes among States should be organised so as to enable the court or tribunal in question to deliver its decision impartially and on the basis of all factual information necessary correctly to decide the case. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has emphasised this point in the Nicaragua case.9 In the application of the more technical rules in question, the court should, however, bear in mind that a 7

Critical of the ICJ, see Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) (Merits), ICJ Reports 2003, 161 et seq. (Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, at 233 et seq., paras 30 et seq.).

8

See the recent judgment of the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007, at paras 202 et seq.

9

“[T]he provisions of the Statute and the Rules of the Court concerning the presentation of pleadings and evidence are designed to secure a proper administration of justice, and a fair and equal opportunity for each party to comment on its opponent’s contention” (The Nicaragua case, see note 6, at 26, para. 31). 343


decision on purely procedural grounds does not always serve the objective of international dispute settlement, i.e. putting an end to a dispute and thereby furthering international peace. What is decisive is the underlying substance of the dispute, as the Permanent Court of International Justice emphasised.10 The principle as formulated in the Nicaragua case contains two interrelated aspects, namely, the proper administration of justice and the fair opportunity for each party to comment on the opponent’s legal and factual contentions. Whereas the proper administration of justice refers to the judicial task of the court, i.e. to reach a decision based on sound procedural principles, the second limb refers to the parties to the case. It implies the equality of the parties and the audiatur et altera pars principle. The procedures before international courts and tribunals are influenced by different procedural models developed in national law. They proceed from the basis that it is mainly the responsibility of the parties to provide the court with the relevant factual material. In this respect, the procedure can be characterised as adversarial predominantly or principally, even though the procedure of international courts and tribunals also contains elements providing for a more active role for the court. Qualifying the procedure for international courts or tribunals in inter-State litigation as predominantly adversarial does not mean that the responsibility for the production of evidence rests solely on the parties to a dispute. This is most apparent in cases where one of the parties does not appear or fails to defend its case; here, the other party may request the court or tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make its decision. In such a case, the court or tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute, but also that the claim is well-founded in fact and law.11 The power of international courts and tribunals to call upon the parties to produce evidence or to supply any other factual explanations is detailed by their respective rules.12 On this basis and on the basis of existing jurisprudence of the ICJ and ITLOS, it is safe to say that under particular circumstances, these international courts and tribunals may take a more active role, including recourse to more inquisitorial mechanisms concerning the collection of evidence. This does not, however, alter the adversarial system of adjudication as described above in proceedings among States or between them and international organisations in principle. One of the principles resulting from or corresponding to the adversarial nature of inter-State litigation is actori incumbit probatio (the party that alleges a fact

10

Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex case (France v. Switzerland), PCIJ Reports Series A/B No. 46, 155 et seq.

11

See art. 53, para. 2, ICJ Statute; art. 28 ITLOS Statute.

12

See art. 49 ICJ Statute; art. 62 ICJ Rules; art. 77 ITLOS Rules.

344


bears the burden of proof).13 The applicability of this principle is not absolute, though. A distinction should be made between the phase of the production of evidence and the assessment phase. As far as the first phase is concerned, even though it will generally be incumbent on the party bearing the burden of proof to submit relevant evidence capable of sustaining its allegations, the parties to a dispute are obliged to cooperate with the international court or tribunal in question and to supply it with evidence on all matters of fact or law.14 Only in the second phase does the actori incumbit probatio principle become relevant, namely, when the adjudicative body holds that the party was not able to prove a fact upon which its submission relied. It will then dismiss this particular claim for lack of proof. The adversarial nature of inter-State litigation is of lesser relevance as far as the jurisdiction of the international court or tribunal is concerned. It is for an international court or tribunal to establish its jurisdiction; jurisdiction belongs to the issues that an international court or tribunal must examine proprio motu. This does not necessarily mean that the court or tribunal in question is under an obligation to take an active role by seeking relevant evidence.15 Nevertheless, it has to address the question of jurisdiction, even where the parties fail to make any submissions on that issue, on the basis of all evidence submitted by the parties. When considering the production and assessment of evidence, the adjudicative body has to bear in mind that the parties are States which have consensually submitted to the jurisdiction of that adjudicative body, which has to respect the sovereignty of the former. Parties are to be given adequate opportunity to express themselves on the relevant facts, as well as on all evidence submitted by the opponent; the accuracy of facts within the knowledge of the State concerned and submitted by it should not be questioned without good reason. An example to that extent was the decision of the Tribunal to accept the uncontested statement of the government of Belize that the Grand Prince was removed from the ships’

13

Amerasinghe, see note 4, 61 et seq.; Rosenne, see note 4, 1040; M. Kazazi, Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A Study on Evidence before International Tribunals, 1996; J.C. Witenberg “Onus Probandi devant les juridictions internationales”, RGDIP 55 (1951), 321 et seq.

14

J.F. Lalive “Quelques remarques sur la preuve devant la Cour permanente et la Cour internationale de justice”, ASDI 7 (1950), 77 et seq., at 85.

15

For example, in para. 92 of the judgment on the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Rwanda), judgment of 3 February 2006, at para. 91, the ICJ stated that the evidence has not satisfied the Court that the Democratic Republic of the Congo in fact sought to commence negotiations with Rwanda as provided for by article 29 of the Convention on the Discrimination against Women as a precondition to initiate proceedings. The Court further noted that the Democratic Republic of the Congo has failed to prove any attempts on its part to initiate arbitration proceedings. 345


register of Belize without seeking for evidence supporting or opposing the fact of such removal.16 As already indicated, evidence is meant to prove or to disprove facts. Questions of law, in contrast, need not be proved by the parties. This reflects the established jura novit curia principle frequently referred to in international litigation.17 This principle has several procedural implications. Moreover, there are some particularities for the Tribunal which have not been sufficiently elaborated upon. Questions of law, whether relating to jurisdiction or to the merits, need not be raised by the parties. The international court or tribunal must examine them proprio motu.18 It is for the international court or tribunal to establish within the frame of its constituent instrument which law is applicable to the subject matter of the dispute, which, in turn, is defined by the parties. In doing so, it is not limited by the legal arguments put forward by the parties.19 Even if the parties agree on the applicable law, their agreement would not be binding upon the court or tribunal in question unless provision for such agreement was enshrined in the constituent instrument of the judicial body, delimiting its jurisdiction. This differs from an agreement on the facts. The parties can always agree on the

16

The Grand Prince case (Belize v. France), judgment of 20 April 2001, ITLOS Reports 2001, Vol. 5, 17 et seq., at paras 76 et seq., in particular para. 92; however, see the dissent of nine judges, 66 et seq., at para. 12.

17

Case Concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (France v. Brazil), PCIJ Reports Series A No. 21, 124; Fisheries Jurisdiction case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland) (Merits), ICJ Reports 1974, 3 et seq.; Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland) (Merits), ICJ Reports 1974, 175 et seq.; Nicaragua case, see note 6, at 24; Amerasinghe, see note 4 at 50-58.

18

In the Case relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (River Oder case) (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, et al. v. Poland), (PCIJ Reports Series A No. 23, p. 1 et seq.), the Permanent Court of International Justice dismissed the objection of the parties to the dispute that Poland invoked belatedly that it had not ratified the Barcelona Convention. The Court pointed out that this was a matter of law to be examined by the Court ex officio (at 18-19). A somewhat different position is advanced by R. Kolb, in: A. Zimmermann/C. Tomuschat/K. Oellers-Frahm, The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, 2006, at 821-822, who distinguishes between general international law, which international courts or tribunals must know, in contrast to bilateral conventions and regional customary international law. For the situation before in the WTO Dispute Settlement System compare Appellate Body Report, EC – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/ AB/R, 7 April 2004, para. 105.

19

See Free Zones of Upper Savoy and Gex case, see note 10, at 138; Asylum case (Colombia v. Peru), ICJ Reports 1950, 266 et seq. at 278; Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, see note 17, at 9 and 181 respectively; Nicaragua case, see note 6, at 24.

346


facts either explicitly or by not objecting to facts as presented by one side.20 In addition, they can determine the question of which party bears the burden of proof for specific facts.21 The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals is not totally coherent as far as requesting evidence on the existence of customary international law is concerned.22 The separation of fact and law may not always be as clear-cut as theory may suggest. The Tribunal may be increasingly faced with this problem, for example in cases where the nationality of ships becomes decisive, as in prompt release cases. Whether a ship has a particular nationality is a fact. Whether a ship has been removed from a national register is, as far as national law is concerned, equally a fact. Whether such removal conforms to international law is a matter of law on which the Tribunal will have to decide. Generally speaking, the separation of facts and law is part of the exercise of the judicial function by international courts or tribunals. The jura novit curia principle applies to public international law only, not to national law. According to a dictum of the Permanent Court of International Justice, municipal laws are merely facts.23 Judges of international courts or tribunals are not obliged to be cognisant of national law. Therefore, the parties are responsible for proving their internal rules, and the court may request further evidence in this respect. The same is true for all other non-international law, including, for example, the regulations and directives issued by the European

20

D.W. Bowett, “Estoppel before international tribunals and its relation to acquiescence”, BYIL 33 (1957), 176 et seq., at 182.

21

Sir A. Watts, “Burden of Proof, and Evidence before the ICJ”, in: F. Weiss (ed.), Improving WTO Disupte Settlement Procedures, 2000, 289 et seq., at 293.

22

Although it has been emphasised that customary international law does not need to be proved (Fisheries Jurisdiction case, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland, see note 17, Separate Opinion of Judge De Castro, at 79), international courts and tribunals have stated, on several occasions, that custom had to be proved by the party relying on it. See Asylum case, see note 19, at 276 et seq.; United States Nationals in Morocco case (France v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 1952, 176 et seq., at 200; the case of the SS Lotus (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Reports Series A No. 10, at 18. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission has stated in two of its Partial Awards that the party alleging that individual provisions of the Geneva Conventions I-IV of 1949 or the Hague Regulations were not part of customary international law at the time of the conflict had the burden of proof regarding this status (Prisoners of War, Eritrea’s Claim 17 (Partial Award), 1 July 2003, at para. 41, available at <www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/EECC/ER17.pdf> (last visited 7 March 2007); Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim 2 (Partial Award), 28 April 2004, para. 16, available at <www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/EECC/ET%20Partial%20 Award.pdf> (last visited 7 March 2007).

23

Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland) (Merits), PCIJ Reports Series A No. 7, at 19. 347


Union, which do not qualify as public international law (in contrast to the agreements constituting the European Union). The separation of international public law and national law is, however, also not as clear-cut as it may seem. Both have become increasingly interlinked, in particular, when the adjudicating body is called upon to decide whether national law has implemented international obligations. This is a function the Tribunal is called upon to perform more frequently than other international courts or tribunals except perhaps human rights courts. In particular, Section 6 of Part XII of the LOS Convention as well as the rules on the management of fish resources in the exclusive economic zone and on the high seas provide that States Parties enforce international environmental standards or fishing standards through national law. Such enforcement measures are only legitimate if they keep within the limits set by international law. For example, article 73, paragraph 3, of the LOS Convention excludes imprisonment as a means of enforcing laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning fishing. The production of evidence is governed by articles 48 et seq. of the ICJ Statute and by the rules adopted by the Court, in particular articles 61 et seq. The relevant rules of the Tribunal (articles 76 et seq.) adhere closely to those of the ICJ. The procedural law of international courts and tribunals traditionally does not include any strict rules concerning the admissibility of evidence, and thus leaves the parties with considerable freedom to submit what they consider to be relevant. In international adjudication there is, however, a tendency by international courts or tribunals to seek a juridical solution based upon undisputed facts.24 This is legitimate. However, recent jurisprudence, in particular that of the ICJ, indicates that courts do not shy away from assessing highly disputed facts.25 According to article 43, paragraph 1, of the ICJ Statute and article 44, paragraph 1, of the ITLOS Rules, the proceedings before these two courts consist of two parts: written and oral. Accordingly, one distinguishes between evidence submitted in the course of the written proceedings, namely, documentary evidence, and the evidence produced during the oral proceedings. This primarily includes statements of witnesses and experts as well as, to a limited extent, documentary evidence. Documentary evidence before international courts and tribunals comprises all information submitted by the parties in support of the contentions contained

24

Rosenne, see note 4 at 1039.

25

Compare the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), judgment of 19 December 2005, paras 57 et seq. in respect of the use of force in respect of Kitona; concerning the military actions in the East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, paras 78 et seq.; concerning self-defence of Uganda, paras 106 et seq.; concerning violation of international human rights, paras 208 et seq. and the Genocide case, see note 8.

348


in the pleadings other than expert and witness testimony. According to article 49 of the ICJ Rules and article 62 of the ITLOS Rules, a memorial shall contain three parts: a statement of the relevant facts, a statement of law and the submissions. The counter-memorial shall include an admission or denial of the facts stated in the memorial and, if necessary, any additional facts, observations concerning the statement of law in the memorial and the submissions. In order to ensure the effectiveness of proceedings before the Tribunal, it is necessary that a reply and a rejoinder do “not merely repeat the parties’ contentions” but “be directed to bringing out the issues that still divide them”. In complicated cases, it is only at that stage that the parties will be in a position to determine whether they will need to bring witnesses and experts in the oral proceedings. The Guidelines of ITLOS or the Practice Directions of the ICJ include additional instructions as to the contents of the pleadings. For example, paragraph 8 of the ITLOS Guidelines requires that a party in its pleadings should deal specifically with each allegation of fact in the pleadings of the other party of which it does not admit the truth; it will not be sufficient for it to deny generally the facts alleged by the other party. The term document has been interpreted broadly in the practice of the ICJ and of the Tribunal. It includes the text of treaties (although the jura novit curia principle applies), national legislation, judgments of national courts, diplomatic correspondence, commentaries, maps, charts, photographs, video presentations, written opinions of experts and declarations. Also, press statements and statements by third parties have been submitted. In the Gulf of Maine case, the presentation of a video film was a matter of dispute. Canada had informed the Court that it was considering the presentation of a film during the hearing, to which the United States objected. The Registrar, in a letter addressed to the Government of Canada, stated that “in the few cases in the past in which films have been presented before the Court such films have had the character of a form of evidence comparable to a document”.26 The Tribunal follows the same practice.27 In general, documentary evidence is to be submitted during the written proceedings within the time limits prescribed for the filing of pleadings (memorial,

26

Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/ United States of America), 7 ICJ Pleadings 334; this practice was confirmed in the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria case (Cameroon v. Nigeria), in which the President of the ICJ stated that it had been the practice of the ICJ that if videos were to be shown during the hearing, they must be communicated to the Registry and the other party in advance (see also, ICJ Yearbook 1996-1997 at 210 on the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros case (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Yearbook 1999-2000, at 273, on the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Question between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain)).

27

See the Camouco case (Panama v. France), judgment of 7 February 2000, ITLOS Reports 2000, Vol. 4, 10 et seq., at 15 (para. 17). 349


counter-memorial and, optionally, reply and rejoinder). There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. A party may submit additional documents during the oral proceedings, if the other party consents thereto or the international court or tribunal authorise the party to do so.28 In practice, parties have used the opportunity to submit additional documents not only after the closure of the written proceedings and during the oral proceedings, but also after the closure of the oral proceedings.29 The Court may even order such late production itself. If evidence is submitted after the closure of the oral proceedings, it is communicated to the other party by the Court. The party then has the opportunity of commenting upon it. If necessary, the Court may even reopen the oral proceedings (articles 72 ICJ Rules, 87 ITLOS Rules). The submission of documentary evidence has to meet some formal requirements. Article 50, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the ICJ Rules and article 63, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the ITLOS Rules provide that the originals or certified copies of documents in support be filed with the Registry and that only the necessary extracts of such documents be submitted. Documents which do not meet the formal requirements have to be returned to the party for rectification. The said provisions require, in principle, that certified copies of any relevant documents submitted in support of the contentions contained in the pleading be annexed to the original of the pleading. The ultimate sanction for non-compliance with the formal requirements on the time and the form of submission of evidence set out in the Rules is in fact substantive rather than procedural. If an assertion made in a pleading is unsupported by evidence meeting the formal requirements, and challenged by the other party, the international court or tribunal in question may consider the assertion as unproven. Apart from the formal requirements for the production of documentary evidence (and relevance of the evidence), there are no general rules on the non-admissibility of documents for the ICJ or Tribunal comparable to those in some national legal systems. The situation is different for international criminal courts. In respect of the oral proceedings, the ICJ and the ITLOS are guided by their Rules30 to be read in the light of, and interpreted consistently with, the relevant Statute, as well as other procedural instruments such as the ICJ Practice Direc28

See art. 56, paras 1 and 2, ICJ Rules; art. 71 paras 1 to 5, ITLOS Rules.

29

In February 2002, the ICJ issued Practice Direction IX to the effect that parties should refrain from submitting new documents after the closure of the written proceedings, that reasons for any such request should be given, and that authorisation would be granted only in exceptional circumstances (ICJ Yearbook 2001-2002, at 5). The Rules for Arbitration of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (see arts 67-68, Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1907) are more flexible as far as the late submission of documents is concerned.

30

See arts 54 to 72, ICJ Rules, and arts 69 to 84, ITLOS Rules, which concern the presentation of arguments and evidence, and the making of enquiries.

350


tions and the ITLOS Guidelines concerning the Preparation and Presentation of Cases. Witnesses report facts within their personal knowledge. Such reports are made, in general, during the oral proceedings. The parties are required to submit a list of witnesses and experts within a sufficient time before the opening of the oral proceedings. This is meant to prevent one party from surprising the other or the international court or tribunal. In principle, a party may call any person whose name has been communicated to the international court or tribunal. The international court or tribunal retains its general power to control the conduct of proceedings. However, only under exceptional circumstances may a witness on the list not be called to give evidence.31 This is mainly the case when the witness cannot testify to facts relevant for the decision of the case. A witness not on the list may be called, with the consent of the other party or when the international court or tribunal so decides. It is also possible to hear a witness by means of a two-way video link.32 International courts or tribunals, in general, have no power to ensure the presence of witnesses by way of coercive measures such as subpoenas or contempt of court proceedings. Given that they are not of a supranational character, but are international, they have to rely in this respect on the powers of the parties to implement and enforce their decisions. The hearing is public unless it is decided otherwise or unless the parties demand that the public is not to be admitted. Accordingly, the questioning of witnesses takes place in public. With respect to the examination of witnesses, international courts or tribunals follow the system of examination-in-chief (examination by the party calling the witness), cross-examination (examination by the opponent), and re-examination (examination by the party calling the witness). After re-examination, no further cross-examination is permitted except where new matters have been introduced in re-examination. These examinations take place under the control of the president who, like the judges, may also question the witness, usually after re-examination. Parties may object to the questioning of a witness on the followings grounds: the witness is asked a “leading question”; the answer of the witness is not responsive to the question which is put; the witness is asked to report about hearsay or reports about hearsay; or the witness responds as an expert without qualifying as such. Particularly difficult situations arise when an expert witness is called upon to report facts as well as to give an opinion. In such situations, the expert witness should clearly distinguish whether he or she is reporting facts or opinions. The nomination and the examination of experts by the parties follow, in general, the same procedure as that concerning witnesses. Expert witnesses are

31

See, for example, the decision of the Tribunal in the M/V Saiga case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (Minutes), at 103, when the ITLOS decided that the testimony of the witness was of no possible relevance and declined to call the latter.

32

See art. 63, para. 2, ICJ Rules; art. 78, para. 2, ITLOS Rules. 351


not disqualified by the mere fact that they are government officials of the party which called them. However, the international court or tribunal may take this position into consideration when evaluating the evidence and deciding upon the probative value of the testimony. According to article 49 of the ICJ Statute, article 62 of the ICJ Rules, and article 77 of the ITLOS Rules, the ICJ and the ITLOS may call upon the parties to produce additional evidence as considered necessary. Such power may be exercised not only prior to and during the hearing, but also after the closure of the oral proceedings. It may be considered akin to the procedure in certain national courts known as discovery of documents, although this is conducted at the initiative of, and usually by, the parties, whereas the procedure before the ICJ or the ITLOS is mainly court-driven. Also, the possibility exists of seeking to acquire information necessary for the elucidation of a matter at issue, a power supplemented by the possibility of visiting the scene of a case. Finally, the ICJ and the ITLOS are empowered to arrange for the attendance of witnesses and experts of their own choosing to give evidence. According to article 34, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the ICJ Statute and article 69 of the ICJ Rules, the ICJ may request information from international organisations. Article 84 of the ITLOS Rules follows the same approach. For many years, it appeared that these provisions would remain dead letters. Since 1978, however, the provision has been invoked several times before the ICJ.

III. Assessment of Evidence It is for the relevant adjudicative body to decide whether facts are evident and whether it thus may take judicial notice of them. Facts that are evident, that are not disputed, or that are agreed upon among the parties, do not require to be proved.33 The procedure for admitting or objecting to facts is not formalistic in practice. The facts submitted by the applicant in its memorial must be objected to, otherwise they are considered admitted. The opponent is under an obligation to specify its objection; a general objection phrased such as “all that is not admitted

33

In the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United States of America v. Iran) (Merits) ICJ Reports 1980, 3 et seq. (at para. 12), the ICJ stated that the essential facts of the case were a matter of public knowledge, having received extensive coverage in the world press. It further stated that since the Iranian Government, to which all the information had been communicated, had not questioned such information; the Court was satisfied that the allegations of facts on which the United States based its claims were well-founded. For example, while assessing the claim of Uganda (Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, see note 25, at para. 129) that it acted in self-defence, the ICJ not only considered reports submitted by the parties but also referred to documents distributed by NGOs, which it considered as being in the public domain.

352


is objected to” is not sufficient. The refusal of a party to produce evidence that had been requested may be of relevance. The ICJ, like other international adjudicative bodies, may draw conclusions from a party’s refusal to produce a document or to give an explanation necessary to disprove a fact submitted by the other party. Such refusal may be considered as amounting to an admission. The absence of facts (negative facts) raises problems concerning the burden of proof and also the standard of proof. International jurisprudence of international adjudicative bodies seems to indicate that the negativa non sunt probanda rule of Roman law does not apply.34 The ICJ has, however, acknowledged the difficulties that arise from the necessity to prove the absence of a fact.35 The provisions on evidence of the ICJ and of the Tribunal do not refer to the use of presumptions as evidence. Nevertheless, international adjudicative bodies make use of reasoning based on presumption.36 It is common to distinguish between presumptions of fact (judicial presumptions or inferences) and presumptions prescribed by law (legal presumptions). Presumptions of fact are established tools of reasoning. Based upon general experience, judges may draw conclusions from certain established facts to the existence of other facts. Legal presumptions may have their basis either in international treaties or other texts. For example, the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation provides that under certain conditions, a warship may board a foreign vessel on the high seas if the request to the flag State for permission to board the ship was not responded to within four hours. In this case, the failure to respond is presumed to constitute permission. In spite of the investigative powers that international courts and tribunals enjoy to various degrees, the actori incumbit probatio principle becomes relevant in the phase of assessing the evidence. If the relevant facts sustaining the claimant’s contention cannot be regarded as proven after all the evidence before it has been evaluated by the court, such claim will be dismissed. The same applies to the defences of the other party if the facts sustaining such defences cannot be proven. The actori incumbit probatio principle has been modified for several reasons.

34

Kolb, in: Zimmermann et al., see note 18, 824 et seq.

35

In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ stated that “ [t]he evidence or material offered by Nicaragua in connection with the allegation of arms supply has to be assessed bearing in mind the fact that, in responding to the allegation, Nicaragua has to prove a negative”, see note 6, 14 et seq., at 80 (para. 147). This indicates that threshold of the standard of proof may be lowered in such cases.

36

C.F. Amerasinghe, “Presumptions and Inferences in Evidence in International Litigation”, LPICT 3 (2004), 395 et seq.; Y. Chang, “Legal Presumptions and Admissibility of Evidence in International Adjudication”, Annals of the Chinese Society of International Law 3 (1966), 1 et seq.; T.M. Franck/P. Prows, “The Role of Presumptions in International Tribunals”, LPICT 4 (2005), 197 et seq. 353


The distinction between the applicant and the respondent is not always clear in international adjudication. This is particularly true when the case has been brought by special agreement. As opposed to contentious litigation, there are no parties in advisory proceedings. Accordingly, there can be no burden of proof. Nevertheless, advisory proceedings naturally raise questions of fact. Whether the international court or tribunal has enough facts to decide the question put to it is a factor which it has to take into account when discussing the propriety of giving the opinion. There is no hierarchy among the different kinds of evidence. Documentary evidence or expert testimony does not have a higher probative value than witness testimony or vice versa. It is for the adjudicative body to decide in each case on the probative value of each piece of evidence presented and considered of relevance. In the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo and the Application of the Genocide Convention cases, the ICJ gave some indication on the method of evaluating evidence.37 Neither the ICJ nor other international courts or tribunals have discussed in detail the matter of the standard of proof to be applied or indicated the standard they used to reach their decision. A positive exception is the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. Two standards of proof are most frequently referred to in international adjudication, namely, “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and “preponderance of evidence”. The parties to a dispute may agree on a particular standard to be applied. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires a high degree of cogency. It means that the evidence weighs heavily in one direction. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one party on the basis of reasonable probability weighs heavier than the evidence produced by the other side. The difference between these two standards may, in fact, be small. The standard of proof in international litigation among States, in general, is the preponderance of evidence. There are exceptions to this rule, though. International courts and tribunals have to establish their jurisdiction beyond reasonable doubt. This is due to the fact that the jurisdiction of adjudicative bodies is based upon the consent of the States concerned. There must be no reasonable doubt that such consent existed. Apart from that, a tendency has developed that allegations against a State which imply a negative ethical judgment (violation of human rights or of international humanitarian law) have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. For example, the ICJ applied a high standard of proof (without referring to the standard “beyond reasonable doubt”) in respect of the allegation by the United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel case (Merits) that the minefields

37

Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, see note 25, at paras 59 et seq. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, see note 8, at paras 211 et seq.

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in question had been laid with the connivance of the Albanian Government.38 This rule has recently been reaffirmed in the Application of the Genocide case.39 In international criminal law it is established that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In some instances, the standard of prima facie evidence is used. This standard means that the adjudicative body decides provisionally on the basis of evidence submitted by one party, mostly the applicant. In fact, the assessment establishes whether the application meets a plausibility test on the basis of the evidence submitted in its support. Prima facie evidence shifts the burden of proof from the proponent of the burden of proof to the other party. By providing prima facie evidence, the claimant discharges its burden of proof. The respondent has to rebut such evidence whereupon the burden of proof shifts back to the proponent. If the respondent does not respond, it is for the adjudicative body to decide whether the evidence submitted is strong enough to sustain the claim. This shows that prima facie evidence is not to be confused with the principle of actori incumbit probatio. It is often argued that international courts or tribunals should more clearly identify which standard of proof they have used or that such standard should be enshrined in the respective rules. The effect of such approach is limited as far as the objectivity of the decision is concerned. Even if the standard of proof is identified in a particular judgment, this says little about how each judge decided on the factual situation. The decision of each judge to be convinced, or not to be convinced, by the evidence submitted embraces a subjective element. This decision is influenced by past experience and, probably, the professional or other background of each judge. Therefore, identifying the standard of proof does not necessarily render the judgment less subjective. However, identifying the standard of proof and explaining why a particular conclusion was reached provides for more transparency and forces the adjudicating body to deal with this point intensively in its deliberations.

IV. Conclusions The legitimacy of judgments of international courts and tribunals has been questioned recently. In particular it has been said that international adjudicative bodies lack accountability compared to national judges. This is not the place to deal with this issue in depth, but such sentiments should not be discarded lightly,

38

The Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania) (Merits), ICJ Reports 1949, 4 et seq., at 15-16.

39

Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, see note 8, at paras 209-210. 355


all the more so if they become commonplace, since they touch upon the roots of the international adjudicative system. There is, actually, little room to improve upon the legitimacy but there are possibilities for enhancing the transparency of international adjudicative decisions. One of them is to clearly explain to the parties to a conflict how the international court or tribunal in question assessed the evidence presented or at its disposal and what was decisive in reaching a conclusion on the factual situation. This would include clearly identifying the standard of proof. Furthermore, it would be helpful if the court in question also explained why it considered certain facts to be relevant and others not. Finally, it would increase the transparency of their decisions if the courts and tribunals established a relationship with the parties to the conflict ensuring that the decision rendered does not come as a complete surprise. This would require a more active role for international courts and tribunals vis-à-vis the parties than they are mostly willing to undertake at present.

356

THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL OFFICE: RECENT PRACTICE Michael Wood

I

t seems fitting to offer some thoughts on elections to international courts and tribunals to Tom Mensah, who was himself nominated as a candidate by the Government of Ghana for election to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and who was duly elected in 1996. He was chosen by his fellow judges as the first President of the Tribunal, in which office he served with great distinction from 1996 to 1999. Moreover, Tom Mensah was chosen by Ireland and United Kingdom to preside over the MOX Plant Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (having previously been a member of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea when it heard the Provisional Measures phase of the case). Elections to international judicial bodies1 have doubtless always been highly political, though campaigning seems to become ever tougher and longer (an early start can be vital), with an increasing role being played by “deals” within and external to a particular election. Many States, including the United Kingdom, continue to attach paramount importance to the qualities of the candidates in deciding for whom to vote, and by extension in deciding in respect of whom they are prepared to enter into deals. But this is not necessarily the case with all of the electorate. The focus of this chapter is on one aspect of the matter, the domestic nomination stage, and in particular recent British practice in relation to certain courts and tribunals. The importance of the national selection stage for international judicial appointments and elections is obvious. If good candidates are not put forward, or do

1

The present chapter only deals with permanent international courts and tribunals. The choice of the members of ad hoc arbitral tribunals, established to deal with particular cases, is equally interesting but a quite separate matter. Nor does the article consider the selection of “international” (that is, foreign) judges for what are often termed “internationalized” or “mixed” courts, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone.



not come forward, the election procedure cannot lead to good results. Conversely, the better the candidates the more chance there is of a good outcome. And in so far as the electorate does in practice have regard to the qualities of candidates, it is very much in a State’s interest to put forward as its candidate the best qualified from among those willing and able to assume the office in question. There are three main stages to be considered in the election of international judges: the qualifications; the national selection procedures; and the election or appointment procedures. The qualifications set out in the instruments establishing the courts and tribunals are generally pretty basic. The constituent instruments are, with a few exceptions, silent on the national selection procedures. Only as regards the election or appointment procedures do we find much detail. These matters have been little studied outside Foreign Ministries, and not a great deal of information is publicly available. They are matters about which relatively little has been written, in part no doubt because of the sensitivity and secrecy surrounding them.2 The Centre for International Courts and Tribunals at the Faculty of Laws of University College, London is currently undertaking a three-year Arts and Humanities Research Council-funded study entitled “Process and Legitimacy in the Nomination, Election and Appointment of International Judges”. It is understood that this will focus on the nomination and election processes of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, assessing the manner in which the processes work in practice and making any appropriate recommendations.

I. The Election or Appointment Procedures Before turning to the national selection procedures it is worth looking briefly at the election (or appointment) procedures for the various international courts and tribunals, since these (together with the qualifications required) are liable to have a considerable bearing on the nomination procedures. They vary considerably. The procedures for electing the judges of the International Court of Justice are unique, the vote taking place simultaneously in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Apart from the European Court of Human Rights, it is the only procedure about which much has been written.3

2

A study prepared by a group of European jurists was published in May 2003 by the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (Interrights), Judicial Independence: Law and Practice of Appointments to the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter Interrights Report), see especially Annex 1 (Comparative Appointments Procedure); see also P. Sands, “Global Governance and the International Judiciary. Choosing Our Judges”, 56 C.L.P. 481 (2003), and the references at footnotes 3, 8 and 20 below.

3

Sh. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005, Vol. I (2006), 358-390; P. Georget, V. Golitsyn and R. Zacklin, Commentaries on Articles 4 to 6, in: The

358

The Selection of Candidates for International Judicial Office: Recent Practice

For elections to the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, the Security Council submits a list of candidates to the General Assembly.4 To be elected, a candidate must obtain an absolute majority in the General Assembly.5 As with the International Court, this can lead to the strange position in a particular ballot when too many candidates receive the necessary votes, in which case the election is rerun for all remaining vacancies. Elections to the International Criminal Court are very complex. The first election in February 2003 required no less than 33 ballots, lasting four full days.6 Elections to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea are relatively straightforward. There is an allocation of seats among the regional groups. To be elected a candidate has to obtain a two-thirds majority of those present and voting at a Meeting of States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The two-thirds requirement has the potential to lead to a deadlock, as nearly happened at the first election in 1996. Where elections are contested (which in practice means most elections where there are less seats than States Parties), deals are now routine, whereby pairs of States mutually agree to support each other’s candidate or candidacy in the same or different elections.7 Missions to the United Nations in New York, where many elections take place, have one or more elections officers, whose task it is to construct such deals and organise all that goes into a modern election campaign within the United Nations system: introducing the candidate to a large number of Permanent Representatives (by calling on them at their missions or meeting at United Nations Headquarters, often in the Indonesian Lounge); arranging Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (A. Zimmermann, C. Tomuschat and K. Oellers-Frahm eds, 2006), 225-260; R.R. Baxter, “The Procedures employed in connection with the United States Nominations for the International Court in 1960”, 55 AJIL 445 (1961); M. Whiteman, 12 Digest of International Law, 1198-1203 (1971); Sh. Rosenne, “The Composition of the Court”, in: The Future of the International Court of Justice (L. Gross ed., 1976), 377-441; G. Abi-Saab, L. Damrosch, “Ensuring the Best Bench: Ways of Selecting Judges”, in: Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice: Proceedings of the ICJ/UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Court (C. Peck and R. Lee eds, 1997), 165-206. 4

In the case of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the Security Council now establishes a list of between 28 and 42 candidates (for 14 seats); in the case of the Rwanda Tribunal, the Council nominates between 12 and 18 candidates (for six seats).

5

For the purpose of these elections, the Assembly includes non-Member States maintaining permanent observer missions at UN Headquarters.

6

See ICC-ASP/1/Res.3, and ICC-ASP/1/5. The second election (of six judges) in January 2006 was completed in a single ballot.

7

These deals are usually confirmed in writing, but nevertheless experience suggests that around 25 per cent may not be honoured. In any event, deals are rarely considered binding beyond the first round; if the election goes beyond the first round, some States must change their vote if a result is to be attained. 359


lunches at which the candidate is expected to perform; organising receptions for the candidate; and taking advantage of the receptions organised for his or her rivals.

II. National Selection of Candidates In the case of most regional courts, each State Party is entitled to nominate a judge. The European Court of Human Rights is unusual in this respect, since each State is required to put forward three candidates.8 States have generally indicated their order of preference, and the Assembly was expected to respect this in making its choice, but this has proved controversial of late. Nowadays the lists are considered by the Council of Europe’s Rapporteur Group on Human Rights, which after an exchange of views transmits them to the Committee of Ministers. The Committee of Ministers then submits the names to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which makes the choice among the three candidates. In 1996, PACE resolved to invite the candidates for interviews by a Sub-Committee of its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights.9 In early 2003, a group of European jurists considered the law and procedure of judicial appointments to the European Court of Human Rights, and recommended that the Council of Europe should devise and distribute a template for national nomination procedures. This would have required States to advertise for candidates in the specialist press – where it exists – or in the national press; and

8

There was a flurry of writings on elections to the European Court of Human Rights in the mid-1990s, when the new Court was being developed: see N. Valticos, “Quels juges pour la prochaine Cour européenne des droits de l’homme?”, in: Liber Amicorum Marc-André Eissen (G. Cohen-Jonathan ed., 1995), 415; J.A. Carrillo-Salcedo, “Quels juges pour la nouvelle Cour européenne des droits de l’homme?”, 9 RUDH 1 (1997); H.C. Krüger, “Selecting judges for the new European Court of Human Rights”, 17 HRLJ 401 (1996); H.G. Schermers, “Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights”, 23 Eur. L. Rev. 568 (1998). See also the series of articles by J.F. Flauss: “Radioscopie de l’élection de la nouvelle Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme”, 35 RTDH 435 (1998); “Le renouvellement de la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme”, 47 RTDH 693 (2001); “Retour sur l’élection des juges à la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme, à propos du juge espanol sortant”, 55 RTDH (2003); “Brèves observations sur le second renouvellement triennal de la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme”, 61 RTDH 5 (2005); and J. Hedigan, “The Election of Judges of the European Court of Human Rights”, in: Liber Amicorum Lucius Caflisch (M.G. Kohen ed., 2007), 235.

9

Resolution 1082 (1996). The first interviews took place in December 1998/April 1999: for details, see Hedigan at note 8 above. According to the Interrights Report, the Sub-Committee – after “a superficial assessment of the curricula vitae and a 15-minute interview” – reports (very briefly) on the qualities of a State’s candidates and ranks them. The Sub-Committee being a political body, there is a risk of politicisation.

360


to establish an independent body, consisting of independent persons including judges and individuals with academic and other experience of international law and human rights, to devise the State’s list. The independent body would consult with interested civil society. It would then shortlist and interview candidates. Where, as a result of a thorough procedure, three candidates emerged but there was a hierarchy between them, the independent body should be free to rank the candidates. As a general rule, the Government should follow the recommendations of the independent body. In addition, the group made recommendations to ensure fair and effective interviewing, including agreement in advance on the areas to be covered in the questions; ensuring that the questions are relevant to the agreed criteria and do not carry built-in advantages for some candidates; and covering the same areas with each candidates.10 In 2004, PACE recommended that, in addition to the moral qualities and experience expected of candidates, the Committee of Ministers should invite Governments to meet the following criteria: i. that a call for candidatures has been issued through the specialised press; ii. that candidates have experience in the field of human rights; iii. that every list contains candidates of both sexes; iv. that the candidates have a sufficient knowledge of at least one of the two official languages; v. that the names of the candidates are placed in alphabetical order; and vi. that as far as possible no candidate should be submitted whose election might result in the necessity to appoint an ad hoc judge.11 The Committee of Ministers’ reply took note of the criteria, and invited Governments to make every attempt to meet them when preparing lists of candidates, but raised some important points on criteria iii and v and invited PACE to consider modifications.

10

Interrights Report, 27-28.

11

PACE Recommendation 1649 (2004). See also PACE Resolution 1366 (2004), as amended by Resolution 1426 (2005); the Committee of Ministers Reply of 22 April 2005; and the Motion for a Resolution in Document 11028 of 21 September 2006 (National Selection Procedures for Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights). In October 2006, the Bureau of PACE proposed that the proposed Motion be referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights for report. A further amendment to Recommendation 1649 (2004) was proposed by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in March 2007 (Doc. 11208 of 19 March 2007). On 17 April 2007, following a short debate, PACE rejected the amendment. For background, see Hedigan at note 8 above. 361


The statutory requirements for the qualifications and nomination12 of candidates for international judicial office are for the most part rudimentary, rarely going beyond some very general qualities that the judges must possess. This is the case, for example with Article 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.13 In the case of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea the sole legal requirement for membership is that the judges have “recognized competence in the law of the sea.” Given the importance of general international law in the work of the Tribunal, it has been suggested that this formal requirement may be to narrow.14 One exception is the International Criminal Court. Article 36 of the Rome Statute sets out quite detailed requirements for the judges. As is pretty standard, they must be of high moral character, impartiality and integrity, and possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial office in their respective States. In addition, every candidate must have either (i) established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant experience in criminal proceedings (List A candidates), or (ii) established competence in relevant areas of international law, such as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court (List B candidates). At least two thirds of those elected must come from List A. The emphasis on experience in criminal proceedings, and on relevant professional experience, reflects the particular role of this international court, and has ensured that it has a sufficient number of judges with the necessary experience to conduct criminal trials. For the first election in 2003, the United Kingdom decided to nominate a List A candidate, given the importance of experience in criminal law and procedure for judges appointed to international criminal tribunals. There are obvious problems (in terms of ensuring a fair trial) if elections to an international criminal tribunal, in particular, are politicised, and for this reason the Statute of the ICC includes fairly detailed requirements governing nominations. States Parties are given the option of proceeding through essentially the same arms-length process as for nominations to the ICJ (discussed below) or utilising “the procedure for the nomination of candidates for appointment

12

According to the Interrights Report (at page 9), “States have absolute discretion with respect to the nomination system they adopt … even in the most established democracies, nomination often rewards political loyalty more than merit”.

13

Article 2 of the ICJ Statute requires that the judges be elected “from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law”.

14

M.C. Wood, “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and General International Law”, 22 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. (2007).

362


to the highest judicial offices in the State in question”. The Statute goes further and expressly requires a nominating State not merely to say whether a candidate is put forward for List A or List B but to specify in the necessary detail how the candidate meets the qualifications laid down. The intention was evidently to encourage nominating States to take account of the need for properly qualified judges, and to offer the States Parties some objective basis for casting their votes when it came to the election. The Rome Statute also provides that “[t]he Assembly of States Parties may decide to establish, if appropriate, an Advisory Committee on nominations”, in which case the Assembly must also establish its composition and mandate.15 The idea of a screening mechanism proved controversial, and the provision is optional. The Assembly did not establish a Committee for either the first or the second election (in 2003 and 2006). The procedure for nominating candidates for election to the International Court of Justice is unique,16 and goes back to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, drawn up in 1920.17 Nominations are not by States, but by “national groups”. The national group consists of the members (normally four) of the Permanent Court of Arbitration belonging to the State concerned or, where the State is not a party to either of the Hague Conventions for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, by a group specially appointed (under the same conditions as those prescribed in the 1907 Hague Convention) for the purpose of making nominations. In the United Kingdom, the national group in the Permanent Court of Arbitration decides on its nominations independently of government.18 The four members of the national group are formally appointed by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, who may be expected to consult other interested Ministers (in particular the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General). The appointments are for six years, as prescribed in the Hague Conventions, and the members are in practice reappointed if they wish to continue. The categories of persons composing the United Kingdom national group are nowhere laid down, and are no doubt subject to change over time, depending on who is available. The current members are Dame Rosalyn Higgins, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, and Sir Arthur Watts: that is to say, the judge of British nationality on the International Court of Justice, who was an eminent academic and practitioner in the field of international law, including

15

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 36(4)(c).

16

Though now replicated (with additions) for the ICC.

17

O. Spiermann, “‘Who Attempts Too Much Does Nothing Well’: The 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice”, 73 BYIL 187 (2002), esp. at 219-227.

18

For a view of an earlier period, see Sands, note 2 above, 486-499. 363


before the International Court of Justice; a senior international law academic, who is also a practitioner with extensive experience of the International Court of Justice and other international courts and tribunals; a very senior judge (who is also the Chairman of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law); and a former Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, now an international law practitioner with extensive experience of appearing before the International Court and as counsel and arbitrator with other tribunals. This membership largely reflects the bodies mentioned in Article 6 of the Statute,19 and has a range of experience, that of international law practitioners and academics, of the domestic judiciary, and of international law work within government. It is important that between them the members of the group know the field, both in the United Kingdom (when it comes to the choice of a British candidate) and world-wide (since at each regular election the group may, and regularly does, nominate up to four candidates; it may also nominate candidates at by-elections). While they keep in close contact with the Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, not least to ensure that they are up-to-date with developments concerning upcoming elections, the members of the national group operate free from government control. This ensures an independent, apolitical, and professionally knowledgeable nominating process. As already mentioned, it is essential that, in addition to a full understanding of the Court, the election process and the qualities needed on the Bench, the members of the group know the field of international lawyers, around the world, from whom the choice normally comes and are fully up-to-date with developments. They make their selection based on the qualifications and qualities of the candidates, and with a view to an appropriate distribution of the fifteen seats. The recently established European Union Civil Service Tribunal,20 a seven-member tribunal appointed by the Council of Ministers of the then twenty-five (now twenty-seven) member European Union, is innovative, and elements thereof could perhaps provide useful precedents.21 It is innovative in two respects: there is a direct applications system, and there is an independent system for assessing

19

Under Article 6 of the ICJ Statute, each national group is “recommended to consult its highest court of justice, its legal faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national sections of international academies devoted to the study of law”.

20

For a description of the procedure, and the first election in 2005, see H. Cameron, “Establishment of the European Civil Service Tribunal”, 5 Law & Prac. Int’l Cts. & Tribunals 273 (2006).

21

It was noted, however, during the negotiations that the Tribunal would deal with “highly specialized litigation”, and that, in these circumstances, the arrangements were “entirely without prejudice to those that may be envisaged for other judicial panels”: see Cameron, note 20 above, 280.

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the candidates’ qualifications. Any person who is a Union citizen22 may put themselves forward in response to an advertisement – there is no nomination procedure. An independent selection committee (appointed by the Council of Ministers on a recommendation from the President of the Court of Justice of the European Communities) then assesses each candidate’s suitability to perform the duties of a judge at the Tribunal. The Selection Committee draws up an opinion and a shortlist of at least twice as many candidates as there are judges to be appointed. The Council of Ministers then appoints the judges from among these candidates, ensuring “a balanced composition of the Tribunal on as broad as geographical basis as possible from among nationals of the Member States and with respect to the national legal systems represented”.23 On the occasion of the first election to the Tribunal, in 2005, there were 243 applications. The Selection Committee interviewed 26 candidates, and then drew up an opinion and a shortlist of 14. The Council of Ministers then appointed the first seven judges listed, ensuring the required balanced composition in the Tribunal.24 The Caribbean Court of Justice likewise has an interesting process for the appointment of judges, designed to ensure independence from Governments. The President of the Court is appointed by a three-fourths vote of the Contracting Parties on the recommendation of a Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission. The other judges are appointed by a majority vote of all the members of the Commission. The Commission itself is appointed in a manner that is designed to ensure its independence.25 For these two new courts (the European Union Civil Service Tribunal and the Caribbean Court of Justice), and in the much early case of the World Court, the nomination of candidates for international judicial office is not exclusively a matter for governments. It may, therefore, be less susceptible to political favour or influence. But in other cases the nomination process is left, under the constituent instruments, entirely at the discretion of governments, and in these cases it is essential, if confidence in the courts and tribunals is to be maintained, and enhanced, that the method adopted for selecting candidates produces the best available people. Recent British practice is of interest in this regard.

22

Article 3(2), Annex 1, Statute of the Court of Justice, inserted by Council Decision 2004/752.

23

Article 3(1), Annex 1, Statute of the Court of Justice, inserted by Council Decision 2004/752.

24

See Cameron, note 20 above, 281.

25

Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, articles IV and V. See D.E. Pollard, The Caribbean Court of Justice (2004), 9-13, 37-38. 365


III. Current Selection Procedures in the United Kingdom Unlike domestic judicial appointments,26 the process for the selection of candidates for international judicial office is not laid down by law in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, starting about ten years ago, a new type of procedure has been used for selecting candidates for those courts and tribunals whose constituent instruments leave the matter in the hands of governments. This includes such diverse courts and tribunals as the European Court of Human Rights; the European Courts in Luxembourg (judge on the Court of Justice of the European Communities, judge on the Court of First Instance, and Advocate-General); the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; the International Criminal Court; and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.27 The process is not uniform, since it depends in some measure on the nature of the court or tribunal, on any provisions concerning the nomination of judges in the constituent instrument, on the election or appointment process, and on any particular circumstances (for example, where there is urgency, as was the case with the vacancy caused by the resignation, through ill-health, of Richard May, the British judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia). But, broadly speak-

26

In April 2001, the Commissioner for Judicial Appointments was established as an independent body to consider complaints by applicants for judicial appointment to courts in England and Wales. As part of the constitutional reforms that came into force in April 2006, the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) was established as a new independent body to select candidates for judicial appointments in England and Wales. In addition, a new Ombudsman was established to hear complaints from candidates. In October 2006, the JAC set out the procedure for selecting High Court judges, and indicated that the qualities required were: intellectual capacity, decisiveness, fairness, good communication, and efficiency. In Scotland, a Judicial Appointments Board, which began is work in June 2002, provides the First Minister with a list of candidates recommended for appointment to judicial office. The Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission was established in June 2005. There was a Northern Ireland Commissioner for Judicial Appointments from 2001 to 2006. The Office of the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Ombudsman was established on 22 September 2006.

27

A similar procedure is used for the choice of candidate for the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The procedure is not necessarily applied to a (first) re-election; as the Interrights Report pointed out, “judicial independence may require that, so far as judges have renewable terms of office, sitting judges should be automatically re-nominated” (p. 24). Nor has the procedure been used for the large number of relatively minor or occasional appointments, which are often in practice essentially nominal. These are unpaid, sometimes even when there is a case. Examples include the numerous lists of arbitrators under various multilateral treaties. However, in the case of the nominations of an ad litem judge of the Rwanda Tribunal and to the lists of arbitrators and conciliators maintained by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, a modified form of the procedure (albeit without interviews) was used.

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ing, the procedure currently used by the United Kingdom Government for the selection of candidates for international judicial office, in those cases where the nomination is a matter for government, is along following lines. First, an advertisement is placed in the legal pages of the national press and/ or the specialist legal press, as well as on appropriate websites, inviting candidates with the necessary qualifications to apply and setting out the nature of the position and the basic terms and conditions. In addition, there may be informal approaches to those who might be expected to be interested, for example within the judiciary (including through the various judicial email systems) or with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s academic international law contacts. Applicants are generally sent an information pack (which may be prepared with the assistance of the incumbent), including a detailed description of the post and giving the detailed terms and conditions. Applicants are requested to provide a curriculum vitae, together with a self-assessment of their suitability and qualifications for the post and the names of referees. A selection panel is formed, which will usually comprise judicial, legal, civil service and lay members. A typical panel might be composed of five persons: the Permanent Secretary or other senior official of the Ministry of Justice (formerly the Lord Chancellor’s Department); the Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or one of the Deputy Legal Advisers; two senior members of the judiciary of England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland; and an independent lay member (a non-lawyer). Thus, for example, in the case of the selection of a candidate for election to the International Criminal Court in 2002/2003, the panel comprised Sir Hayden Phillips, Permanent Secretary at the Lord Chancellor’s Department, as Chair; the present author (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Legal Adviser); Lord Justice Simon Brown (Court of Appeal of England and Wales); Lord Cullen (Lord President, President of the Court of Session in Scotland); and Ms Joanna Foster (Chair, Lloyds TSB Foundation, and Chair, Equal Opportunities Commission). The panel first meets to sift the candidates in order to choose those to be called for interview, and to discuss the selection criteria and the format of the interview. Among the criteria, aside from the appropriate legal requirements, is the ability to have influence within the court (which may be a large collegial body, quite different from most national courts) and, depending on the court, electability. For example, in the case of the European Court of Human Rights, the selection criteria might be as follows: eligibility; legal knowledge; skills and abilities; and high moral character. The selection panel would also be instructed to select the candidates considered to be best qualified for the position, regardless of ethnic origin, gender or other factors. In the case of the selection, in 2005, of a candidate for Advocate General in Luxembourg, the job description included among the selection criteria a good understanding of Community law and the ability to produce opinions of a high quality; an understanding of how decisions

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of the European Court of Justice impact upon the legal systems of Member States; some experience of legal practice; interpersonal skills; and good organisational skills. Knowledge of French was also considered important. Interviews last about one hour. Candidates are asked to make a short presentation outlining their reasons for applying for the post and what they consider to be its challenges. They will be questioned at some length to determine their suitability as against the selection criteria. For example, in the case of the European Court of Human Rights, there might be a range of questions on United Kingdom and European human rights law; on the relationship between Strasbourg and domestic human rights law; and to assess the candidates’ interpersonal skills, motivation and suitability for the job. Similar questions are asked of each candidate to ensure consistency. Following the interviews, the panel makes its recommendation to Ministers, who (having agreed in advance to the procedure) can be expected to approve the recommendation, absent some highly exceptional consideration.

IV. Conclusions Some recent innovations, both international (the procedures for establishing candidates for the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, developments in connection with the European Court of Human Rights, and the procedures for the Caribbean Court of Justice) and national (recent British practice in the selection of candidates for a number of courts and tribunals, which may well be mirrored elsewhere), suggest various ways of improving the procedures in cases where, under the constituent instruments, governments are solely responsible for the selection of candidates for international judicial office. Where nothing is laid down, it is for each State to decide the method for selecting candidates for international judicial office, within the applicable treaty provisions, taking into account its own circumstances and the peculiarities of the election in question. Whether the developments described above lead to better results is not something that can be established by empirical evidence, though it would seem probable that the wider the net is cast the more likely it is that good candidates will be found. But much depends on the nature of the court or tribunal in question. To find candidates for an international criminal tribunal, or a human rights organ, where there is potentially a wide field, is a different matter from selecting candidates for a court of general jurisdiction in the field of international law. Each court or tribunal is different. What matters, at the end of the day, is that the best available candidates (in terms of qualifications and abilities) are nominated, and that in making the choice political considerations, and the possibility of personal bias, are limited so far as possible. In short, what is needed are national selection procedures that produce candidates of the quality of Tom Mensah. 368

PART III

THE LAW OF THE SEA 1. IN GENERAL

UNCLOS III AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin

I. Introduction

S

ince 1945 international law-making has increasingly taken place through inter-governmental organisations and commissions, conferences or meetings of the parties to multilateral treaties (COPs/MOPs).1 Nevertheless, ad hoc diplomatic conferences remain an important feature of contemporary international law-making. The third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and the 1998 Rome Conference to adopt the Statute of the International Criminal Court are the leading examples in modern times. Their influence on the process of international law-making is particularly important, and forms the subject of this chapter. Diplomatic law-making processes have certain common features. They are all primarily political in character; they mainly operate through “quasiparliamentary procedures”,2 usually affording a significant degree of deliberation and transparency, and in most cases their voting membership is dominated by and generally open only to States or quasi State entities.3 This does not preclude the involvement of legal and technical experts, whether on an ad hoc basis, or through permanent bodies such as the International Law Commission (ILC) or the UN specialised agencies. Nor does it mean that other entities do not participate, albeit without a vote. On the contrary, one of the most striking features of modern international law-making is the interaction of States, inter-governmental 1

See J. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford, 2005); R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, 94 AJIL (2000) 623.

2

O. Schachter, “The UN Legal Order: An Overview”, in C. Joyner (ed.), The United Nations and International Law (Cambridge, 1997) 24. The significant exception is the UN Security Council.

3

The significant exception is the International Labour Organisation, created in 1919, with a tripartite membership of governments, trade unions and employers.


III. The Law of the Sea: In General

organisations (IGOs), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in what have been variously described as “epistemic communities” or “transnational networks” of officials, experts and interest groups whose quasi-autonomous character allows them to constitute a broader international community than the States that nominally make the decisions.4 Participation goes directly to a central question: who makes international law? Is it only a community of national governments, or a transnational epistemic community of experts and diplomats, or a broader community including NGOs or other representatives of civil society and operating beyond or across national borders? Most international law-making processes are also deliberative and transparent to some degree. Deliberation is an essential lubricant of any law-making process because it facilitates discussion, negotiation, compromise, persuasion, influence and participation. It is what allows participants a voice, whether or not they also have a vote. Just as importantly, contemporary international law-making has also become generally more transparent than in earlier times. This is partly a consequence of wider participation, but it also reflects a significant change in the way governments and international organisations view their role as international law-makers. In that sense the system as whole has come a good deal closer to Woodrow Wilson’s classic prescription of “open covenants openly arrived at”,5 although there remain significant exceptions, most notably the Security Council. An important question posed by any examination of international lawmaking structures is the extent to which we can make judgments about their legitimacy and in what terms. In this context legitimacy becomes a critical issue once international institutions acquire power to take decisions binding on States without their specific consent, and more especially so when those decisions amount in effect to legislating for all States.6 Nevertheless, the consent of States is increasingly attenuated by the scale and scope of law-making by multilateral institutions, and by some of the methods they employ. As Franck observes: “It is only by reference to a community’s evolving standards of what constitutes right process that it is possible to assert meaningfully that a law … is legitimate”.7 J. Brunnée and S. Toope argue that periodic meetings of the parties to multilateral treaties – and by extension the argument must also apply 4

P.M. Haas, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control”, 43 Int’l Org. (1989) 377; P. Szasz, “General Law-making Processes”, in Joyner, see note 2, 34-35; A.M. Slaughter, “The Real New World Order”, 76 Foreign Affairs (1997) 183.

5

Not all treaty negotiations are transparent however: compare A. Aust, “Limping Treaties: Lessons from Multilateral Treaty-making”, 50 NILR (2003) 243, 245.

6

The arguments reviewed in D. Bodansky, “The Legitimacy of International Governance”, 93 AJIL (1999) 596 have general relevance.

7

T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford, 1995) 26.

372

UNCLOS III and the Process of International Law-Making

to IGOs and law-making conferences such as UNCLOS III – constitute “ongoing, interactional processes”, and that “It is this broader process and not the formal act of consent that infuses the legal norms generated within [a multilateral agreement] with the ability to influence state conduct”.8 From that perspective legitimacy is essentially a sociological question about the process of law-making – the way law is created – rather than the outcome of the process.

II. Law-Making by International Conferences The negotiation of treaties in multilateral conferences dates back at least to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, but was relatively rare until the 20th century. The first truly law-making conferences were those convened at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. With forty-five States represented, the latter was the largest treaty negotiation then held.9 A reassessment on the 100th anniversary concludes that “The mixture of lofty rhetoric, prophetic international legal vision, and narrow political interest of the Hague Conferences became a characteristic, even an unexpected feature, of collective international law-making efforts in this century”.10 In practice, the more important global treaties and declarations continue to be negotiated and adopted using ad hoc conference procedures, although in many cases the preliminary negotiations are now conducted at the UN or in some other international organisation.11 Major examples include the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), the 1994 Agreement Establishing the WTO, the 1998 International Criminal Court Statute, and the various instruments, binding and non-binding, adopted at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development. Other non-binding instruments have also been adopted at global conferences of this kind, including declarations on human rights, population and development, and women.12

8

J. Brunnée, “COPing with Consent: Law-making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, 15 LJIL (2002) 1, 6. For a fuller account see also J. Brunnée and S. Toope, “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law”, 39 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. (2000) 19.

9

On the early history of international conferences see N. Hill, The Public International Conference (Stanford, 1929).

10

G. Aldrich and C. Chinkin, “The Hague Peace Conferences: A Century of Achievement and Unfinished Work”, 94 AJIL (2000) 90.

11

See generally, J. Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy (3rd edn, Basingstoke, 1996).

12

UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 25 June 1993; International Conference on Population and 373


The process has evolved significantly since its 19th and early 20th century antecedents. Decisions at The Hague Peace Conferences had to be adopted unanimously, but they were not open to IGOs, NGOs or observers, and their proceedings were held in private.13 Modern UN-convened global conferences are in principle open to all States, and do not necessarily exclude non-members of the UN. For example, Switzerland participated in UNCLOS III although not a UN member at the time. Other participants included relevant IGOs and NGOs with observer status. Participation by NGOs is nowadays the norm unless specifically excluded. UN conferences are thus very much more open to public scrutiny than in 1899. Multilateral conferences remain strange law-making phenomena: they have “no regular sessions, no permanent venue and no constitutional infrastructure”.14 Nevertheless, prominent among the modern examples of conference diplomacy, two negotiating models can broadly be distinguished: the one codified by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969 (and followed by the inter-State negotiating conference which adopted that convention), and the other based on the procedures followed by UNCLOS III from 1973 to its conclusion in 1982.

III. The Vienna Convention Model Early international conferences favoured unanimity or near unanimity as the voting requirement for adoption of multilateral treaties or individual treaty provisions. As the international community of States expanded, later practice tended towards majority voting, and it was this practice which the ILC preferred. 15 Article 9(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties thus provides that “adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes place by the vote of two-thirds of the States present and voting, unless by the same majority they shall decide to apply a different rule”. The ILC rejected the option of a simple majority in order to protect the interests of large but unwilling

Development, Cairo, 1994, UN Doc. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1; 4th UN World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995, UN Doc. A/CONF. 177/20. 13

Aldrich and Chinkin, see note 10, 97-98.

14

M.C.W. Pinto, “Modern Conference Techniques: Insights from Social Psychology and Anthropology”, in R.St.J. Macdonald & D.M. Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (Dordrecht, 1986) 305, 308.

15

Commentary to draft article 8, in A.D. Watts, The ILC 1949-1998 (Oxford, 1999), Vol. II, 634. See C.W. Jenks, “Some Constitutional Problems of International Organisations”, 22 BYIL (1945) 34; L.B. Sohn, “Voting Procedures in United Nations Conferences for the Codification of International Law”, 69 AJIL (1975) 310; R. Sabel, Procedure at International Conferences (Cambridge, 1997) 281-286.

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minorities. L.B. Sohn notes that in addition to a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, “there is great merit in adding to it the requirement of at least majority, and preferably two-thirds majority, of the states participating in the Conference”.16 UNCLOS III rules of procedure for all votes accordingly required both a two-thirds majority of States voting and a simple majority of States participating. One proposed amendment failed solely on that basis. Nevertheless, the principle advantage of majority voting is that it makes treaty adoption easier but does not preclude a dissenting State from subsequently ratifying. Minority interests are further protected by the right to make reservations to particular provisions, provided they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, or prohibited by the treaty itself.17 Many ILC treaties have been adopted on this basis, including the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea and the Vienna Convention on Treaties itself. However, the problems posed by majority voting are obvious. There is no necessity to negotiate a text capable of accommodating all participants, and the result may be that a significant minority of States vote against specific provisions, or the whole text, and they may then refuse to ratify the adopted convention. While reservations may to some degree alleviate opposition,18 they will not save a treaty that in the view of dissenting States is fundamentally flawed. As an exercise in global law-making such a procedure is quite likely to fail. It will neither ensure enough support for a treaty to function effectively, nor provide a potential basis for State practice and new customary law. The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas provides a good example. Adopted by the necessary majority, but against the opposition of major coastal fishing States, it limped into force without their participation and signally failed to establish the stable relationship between distant water and coastal fishing States that was needed. Further disputes ensued,19 and the whole issue ultimately had to be reconsidered by UNCLOS III. It is true that majority voting may enable a stronger text to be adopted, since it will sideline the recalcitrant few, but as the fisheries example shows, this may be a hollow victory. The compulsory dispute settlement provisions of the above-mentioned 1958 Convention are admirable but have remained unused because the States that objected to these and other provisions are not bound.

16

Sohn, see note 15, 353.

17

1969 VCLT, articles 19-23. See also Reservations to the Genocide Convention, Advisory Opinion, (1951) ICJ Reports 15.

18

For example the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf became widely ratified and generally indicative of customary law despite reservations to article 6: see North Sea Continental Shelf case, (1969) ICJ Reports 3.

19

See the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, (1974) ICJ Reports 3 & 175. 375


The Vienna Convention model is residual, so it is open to States to opt for a different approach. There are still situations where majority voting is favoured – it remains the norm for UN human rights treaties and ILC codification conventions for example – but in other fields such as the environment and law of the sea it has increasingly been abandoned in favour of a model based on the procedure used at UNCLOS III.

IV. Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) UNCLOS III had its genesis in a Maltese proposal in the General Assembly to designate deep seabed resources as the common heritage of mankind. The UNGA first established an ad hoc Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction to consider this proposal.20 Then, when it became apparent that there was pressure for more comprehensive reform, especially from developing States, the Seabed Committee’s mandate was broadened and UNCLOS III was convened by the General Assembly.21 UNCLOS III remains something of a milestone in international law-making for several reasons. Above all, it succeeded where its predecessors had failed. Whatever the position may have been when it was adopted, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea has become accepted, in most respects, as a statement of contemporary international law on nearly all matters related to the oceans. Most of its provisions, including those that were new or emerging law in 1982, are not only treaty law for the large number of States parties, but customary law for all or nearly all States. Even the United States, which originally voted against adoption of the text in 1982, and had not yet become a party in 2006, by then took the view that almost all of the Convention’s provisions were or had become customary law. Given the differences among States that prevailed before negotiations began, and which still had to be reconciled after the negotiations concluded, this is a remarkable achievement. To a significant degree, success can be attributed to the innovative and largely unprecedented negotiating methods and procedures employed at UNCLOS III, and to certain consequential features of the Convention itself.22 Those elements have in turn become a model for subsequent law-making conferences. It is for this reason that they continue to merit attention.

20

See UNGA Res. 2467(XXIII), 21 December 1968.

21

See UNGA Res. 2750(XXV), 17 December 1970; 2881(XXVI), 21 December 1971; 3067(XXVIII), 16 November 1973.

22

See A.W. Koers, “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, in W.P. Heere (ed.), International Law and Its Sources (Deventer, 1989) 23, 35.

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Unlike the first two UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea held in 1958 and 1960, the ILC was not asked to produce preliminary draft articles for UNCLOS III.23 The negotiation of what became the 1982 Convention was therefore not an exercise in codification by legal experts; rather it was understood from the outset that a political process “emanating directly from the General Assembly” and involving governmental representatives would be necessary in order to secure the appropriate compromises and produce a consensus treaty that could be universally supported.24 Involving the ILC would take too long and above all would not guarantee a text that reflected the vital and very diverse interests of the large number of States concerned. Preparatory work was therefore undertaken initially by an ad hoc committee of States which, however, proved unable to agree on a draft. Thereafter, a treaty text slowly evolved within the Conference itself. Proposals were made by individual States or more often by groups of States. These included various regional groups, the “Group of 77” representing developing States, and other overlapping interest groups of coastal States, maritime States, landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, archipelagic States and so on. There was also a considerable NGO presence, both in State delegations and as observers. Among other activities such bodies (including those representing mining industries from industrialised countries) provided States with technical and expert help. Gamble and Ku argue that “the duration of the conference, the complexity of the issues, including the need for technical expertise, created a rare opportunity for NGO influence because States needed information often available only from NGOs”.25 Consolidated negotiating drafts eventually emerged from committees with influential chairs, co-ordinated by the Conference President, actively seeking consensus and providing “the crucial source of momentum the negotiations had lacked up to 1975”.26 They were assisted by a series of informal meetings and negotiating groups, which in the words of one insider “became a general characteristic of the working methods of the Conference”.27 Legal experts participated in their personal capacities, and lawyers had particular influence in the negotiations on the dispute settlement provisions of the Convention. Perhaps 23

For the fullest account of the UNCLOS III process and how radically it differed from previous UN conferences see T. Koh and S. Jayakumar in M. Nordquist (ed.), UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary, Vol. I (Dordrecht, 1985) 29 et seq.

24

J. Evensen, “Working Methods and Procedures in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, 199 RdC (1986-IV) 425, 435-438, 450-453.

25

J.K. Gamble and C. Ku, “International Law-New Actors and New Technologies: Center Stage for NGOs?”, 31 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. (2000) 221.

26

B. Buzan, “Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea”, 75 AJIL (1981) 324, 334-335. He identifies the process of active consensus as the key procedural innovation that saved UNCLOS III.

27

Evensen, see note 24, 465; B. Buzan, “United We Stand: Informal Negotiating Groups at UNCLOS III”, 4 Marine Policy (1980) 183. 377


the least useful elements of the whole process were the plenary meetings of the Conference.28 Although the negotiations took ten years to complete, the final outcome was a comprehensive treaty consisting of 320 articles and eight annexes that made extensive changes to existing law, while creating new law on previously unregulated matters such as deep seabed mining, the marine environment and marine scientific research. How was such a difficult task made possible? Two closely related features of the process stand out and differentiate it from the Vienna Convention model used before. Firstly, the negotiations proceeded on the basis that “the Conference should make every effort to reach agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus, and there should be no voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus have been exhausted”.29 The reason for avoiding votes if at all possible was simple. As J. Evensen points out, “it would be an exercise in futility to work on the assumption that one or more major groups of the Conference should be occasionally or consistently outvoted …”.30 The reason for retaining the option of voting was equally simple – to ensure that the negotiations did not become deadlocked.31 This compromise formula worked successfully, and the only votes taken throughout the Conference came at the end, on whether to amend the final text, and whether to adopt the Convention.32 Throughout the negotiations up to that point consensus had prevailed, and with the exception of Part XI on the deep seabed, had helped produce a text that almost all participants could live with. This was an outcome very different from UNCLOS I at Geneva in 1958. Secondly, consensus was only possible because of the many compromises reached on different elements of the emerging draft. The General Assembly had stressed that “the problems of ocean space are closely inter-related and need to be considered as a whole …”.33 This gave rise to the so-called “package deal” approach aptly summarised by Evensen: “The essence of the procedural system

28

Nordquist, see note 23, 95.

29

UNGA Res. 2750 (XXV), 17 December 1970; UNGA Res. 3067 (XXVIII), 16 November 1973. The Conference Rules of Procedure in fact provided for adoption of articles by two-thirds majority vote, but a “Gentleman’s Agreement” incorporated consensus decision-making into the working procedure of the conference. See Sohn, see note 15, 310; Buzan, see note 26, 324; P. Allott, “Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea”, 77 AJIL (1983) 1; Koers, see note 22, 23.

30

Evensen, see note 24, 483; Buzan, see note 26, 326.

31

J. Evensen, “The Effect of the Law of the Sea Conferenve upon the Process of the Formation of International Law: Rapprochement Between Competing Points of View”, in R.B. Krueger and S. Riesenfeld (eds), The Developing Order of the Oceans (LOSI, Honolulu, 1984) 23, 28.

32

The final vote was demanded by the United States. The Convention was adopted by 130 to 4, with 17 abstentions.

33

UNGA 3067 (XXVII), 16 November 1973.

378


adopted for the Conference was that compromises arrived at in one part had to be weighed against compromises arrived at in other parts as a ‘quid pro quo’”.34 To take one well-known example – maritime States agreed to the extension of the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles and the creation of an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles provided their rights of maritime navigation were strengthened and safeguarded. As the negotiations proceeded it thus became increasingly difficult to amend certain draft articles without unpicking other elements of the package deal. Consensus was sometimes reached simply on that basis, with delegations reluctantly withdrawing potentially divisive proposals rather than pressing for a vote. By the time the final Conference session convened in 1982, further changes could in practice be made only if the Conference President was satisfied that they had substantial support and that no State objected. Three amendments proposed by Turkey and Spain were voted on in the final session: all were rejected. At the final conference session, however, the consensus negotiating process collapsed. US President Reagan (who had been elected in the last stages of the negotiations) sought major changes to the deep seabed regime in Part XI of the Convention and he made it clear that the Convention would be unacceptable to the US unless Part XI was renegotiated. Other industrialised States also had reservations about Part XI. But Part XI was a major part of the package deal: it reflected the ambitions of developing States for a new international economic order and for protection of land-based mineral producers. These States were understandably reluctant to forego the benefits of the package deal as negotiated. In their view they had already made significant concessions in order to secure consensus on Part XI and they rejected last minute attempts to make the extensive changes sought by the United States. The Convention was adopted overwhelmingly, with only 4 votes against, including the US. But many of the industrialised States abstained on the final vote and it soon became clear that, without further change, the Convention would enter into force mainly on the strength of participation by developing States. Eventually, the need to facilitate universal participation in the Convention regime, the reality that the economic advantages of the seabed-mining regime had not been and were not likely to be realised, and the global shift towards a market-oriented economy, combined to create the environment for renegotiation prior to entry into force. Achieving this outcome required another innovative approach to international law-making. The UN Secretary-General took the initiative by convening informal consultations. Through 15 meetings between 1990 and 1994 the issues of concern were identified and solutions were sought on some very detailed points. Various possible approaches were canvassed.

34

Evensen, see note 24, 485. See also H. Caminos and M. Molitor, “Progressive Development of International Law and the Package Deal”, 79 AJIL (1985) 871; Koers, see note 22, 23. 379


Imminent entry into force of the Convention created a strong sense of urgency and the General Assembly then invited all States to participate in the consultations. A draft resolution and a draft Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 1982 LOS Convention were agreed by consensus, including the US and other western States. The Resolution was adopted by the General Assembly and the Agreement was opened for signature on 28 July 1994.35 The use of an “Implementation Agreement” was deliberately intended to avoid formal amendment of the Convention, a process in which only the parties could have participated, and which in any case could not have taken place ahead of entry into force. Nevertheless, the Agreement disapplies certain provisions of Part XI and revises others. It also prevails over inconsistent provisions of the Convention. This looks very like amendment in practice. To encourage participation in the Agreement there are complex and innovative arrangements for States to become bound. Not all States that were parties to LOS Convention in 1994 have in fact done so, but as they continue to participate in the meetings of the International Seabed Authority without protest it must be assumed that these States have acquiesced in the changes made to the Convention. By 2005 there were 149 States parties, including nearly all the industrialised States which had abstained in 1982, and the amended Convention has now been in operation without protest since 1994. Many of its provisions are generally regarded as customary law by almost all States and by the UN. This is a very significant success in law-making terms. The UNCLOS III procedure is in some respects a reversion to the older ways of negotiating treaties.36 In practice much of the text was adopted by unanimity and there was little or no preparatory work by legal experts before the Conference convened; the participants themselves undertook the essential work. But the advantage of the package deal approach is clear. It sustained the necessary compromises through ten years of negotiations and enabled the parties to conclude a comprehensive treaty text, even if it did fall at the final hurdle. The Convention was thus negotiated as an integral inter-locking whole and reflected a complex balance of interests. Moreover, its package deal character is protected in various ways, including compulsory settlement of disputes.37 It can be ratified only in full, without reservations, or not at all.38 Unlike the 1958 Geneva Conventions, States

35

See D. Anderson, “Further Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, 43 ICLQ (1994) 886; J. Charney, “Entry into Force of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea”, 35 Va. J. Int’l L. (1995) 381.

36

Sohn, note 15, 352.

37

See articles 279-299.

38

See article 309. But States can make “declarations and statements” in accordance with article 310. See L.D.M. Nelson, “Declarations, Statements and Disguised Reservations with Respect to the Convention on the Law of the Sea”, 50 ICLQ (2001) 767.

380


cannot pick and chose the provisions they are willing to accept, unless like the US they treat them as customary law.39 Article 311 further limits the possibility of derogating from the package deal via inter se agreements, while amendments must be adopted by consensus, although voting is permitted once all efforts at consensus are exhausted.40 However, every negotiation has its own dynamics, and the process is only part of the story. The most that can be concluded is that the UNCLOS III procedures worked eventually and that subsequent experience has shown their continuing value in other contexts,41 including the International Criminal Court Conference, whose significance we consider below.

V. The International Criminal Court Conference In contrast to UNCLOS III the Rome Conference on the establishment of an International Criminal Court was a speedier process. It was held from 15 June – 17 July 1998 and even including the work of ad hoc and preparatory committees (prepcoms) the process lasted only from 1994 to 1998.42 However, the intergovernmental negotiating process did not start with a blank sheet of paper. The ILC had already undertaken significant preparatory work on a draft statute, starting in 1991. Work undertaken by the UN in drafting statutes for the two ad hoc tribunals established by the UNSC helped the ILC react with uncharacteristic speed. Extensive comments on the ILC draft were made by States in the 6th Committee and in writing and by 1994 the Commission had delivered a substantial draft statute to the General Assembly.43 Thereafter it was possible to convene a preparatory committee of all interested States to finalise a “widely acceptable consolidated text” for a diplomatic conference.44 The prepcom based its text on the ILC draft and the work of the ad hoc committee. It also looked at the evolving experience of the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and exchanged views with the members of the ICTY Office of the 39

However not all parties would necessarily accept that a non-party is entitled to benefit in this selective way from every new element of the Convention.

40

Articles 312-313.

41

See especially R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (London, 1998); I. Mintzer and J. Leonard (eds) Negotiating Climate Change (Cambridge, 1994); S. Oberthür and H. Ott (eds) The Kyoto Protocol (Berlin, 1999), and FAO, Structure and Process of the 1993-1995 UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks (Rome, 1995). Buzan, see note 26, 347, was much more cautious about the possible importance of UNCLOS as a model for later negotiations.

42

For a full account see R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: the Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (The Hague, 1999).

43

For an account of the ILC process see J. Crawford, “The ILC’s Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court”, 88 AJIL (1994) 140.

44

UNGA Res. 50/46, 11 December 1995. 381


Prosecutor. Unlike the ILC, the prepcom was open to NGO participation which, over the continuing sessions, became more co-ordinated and effective through the submission of commentaries and recommendations.45 The number of NGOs represented was larger than the number of participating States (160) and larger than any single State delegation. NGOs formed a global coalition to pool their political strengths, expertise and resources, enabling them to be involved throughout the entire negotiating process. Developing States were slower to participate in the prepcom process but by the sixth session more had begun to contribute. The prepcom divided the issues requiring consideration into sections and allocated them to Working Groups which reported to the plenary meeting. From this process a draft statute emerged that was significantly different from the text prepared by the ILC. Delegates at Rome were faced with some 1400 square brackets – the device used to indicate disagreement on the text – and numerous alternative texts for disputed provisions. The working process to move from this highly divisive text to a statute that could be adopted by the Conference was thus all-important. The work was again divided between 13 working groups responsible to the Committee of the Whole (CW). The overall process has been well described by the Chair of the Bureau of the CW and another member of the Canadian delegation: “The plenary dealt with the organization of work, the delivery of policy statements … and the formal adoption of the Statute at the end of the conference. The CW was responsible for the development of the statute and the Drafting Committee was responsible for ensuring proper and consistent drafting throughout the statute in all languages. … issues once debated in the CW were referred to working groups or coordinators. The latter then reported the results of their work to the CW, and texts accepted by the CW were referred to the Drafting Committee. Texts refined by the committee had again to be approved by the CW. The final report was sent from the CW to the plenary, with a complete text on the final day of the conference.”46 This account does not reflect the many informal and formal exchanges and consultations that took place throughout the conference, including meetings 45

C. Hall, “The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court”, 91 AJIL (1997) 177; id., “The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court”, 92 AJIL (1998) 124; id., “The Fifth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court”, 92 AJIL (1998) 331; id., “The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court”, 92 AJIL (1998) 548.

46

P. Kirsch and J. Holmes, “The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court”, 93 AJIL (1999) 2, 3 (note 5).

382


between various political and regional State groupings such as the non-aligned movement, the Arab Group, the Latin-American Group and the Caribbean Group.47 Other alliances formed around particular issues, some of which were especially forceful, for example between the Holy See and some Catholic and Arab States with respect to the crime of forced pregnancy.48 Most important in the acceptance of the Statute by the Conference was the proactive role taken by the bureau of the CW, the body with the responsibility for managing the conference. The bureau required coordinators to take the initiative in drafting texts and to refer only unbracketed texts to the CW. Towards the end of the Conference, when success had begun to seem out of reach, it prepared discussion papers that contained proposals and narrowed options so as to move the negotiations forward. Through the CW chairs also held bilateral talks with particular delegations to try to reach compromise. Finally, when there was still no agreement on a number of important points and growing concern that if this conference failed the prospects of agreeing an international criminal court would recede, the bureau pulled together a package deal text that it presented to the conference in the early hours of the final day. The plenary had to accept or reject this package. The text included a provision that no reservations were allowed. As at UNCLOS III, attempts at the final session to propose further amendments (including from the US) were rejected and the Statute was put to the vote. It was adopted by a 120 votes in favour, 7 against (including the US) and 21 abstentions. This process has been criticised. For example David Scheffer, Head of the US delegation, has remarked on the lack of time to consider “extraordinary” changes that delegates were “confronted” with on the last day and the rejection of any further proposals for amendment.49 Consensus package-deal negotiations come in several forms, and the negotiating techniques employed at the Rome Conference differ in detail from those used in the more leisurely atmosphere of UNCLOS III. Nevertheless there remain fundamental similarities. Firstly, the process was designed to secure the widest possible consensus, and in both cases that was largely though not completely achieved. The active role of the chairman at UNCLOS III and of the Bureau at the ICC Conference was in both cases essential to securing agreement on the draft text. It is obvious that a consensus process will not necessarily keep all States happy or completely eliminate opposition, and later in this chapter we will have to consider the nature of consensus as revealed by these and other international negotiations. At the same time it is not obvious that the Vienna

47

M. Arsanjani, “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, 93 AJIL (1999) 22, 23.

48

C. Steains, “Gender Issues”, in Lee, see note 42, 357, 366-369.

49

David J. Scheffer, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, 23 July 1998. 383


Convention model of negotiation based on majority voting would have delivered a better outcome; it remains the case that more States are likely to be dissatisfied when adoption by voting is the norm. Secondly, the involvement of the ILC in preparing an initial draft for the ICC negotiations indicates an important role for the Commission when legal expertise is central to the subject matter of a diplomatic conference. This is not quite different from UNCLOS III as it might seem, since the negotiators there also had the benefit of the preparatory work undertaken by the ILC for the 1958 UNCLOS I Conference and incorporated in the Geneva Conventions. Both sets of negotiations also show, however, that diplomats operating through a political process will inevitably refashion the work of legal experts into a compromise text that is more likely to secure agreement. In its own work there is no point the ILC trying to second-guess the compromises that may emerge from such negotiations, nor should its failure to do so be a cause for criticism or concern. The final ICC Statute is not the work of the ILC, but it is unlikely that a Statute would have emerged at all without the ILC’s initial preparatory work.

VI. The Nature of Consensus Law-Making Treaty conferences, commissions and conferences of the parties (COPs) are increasingly required to take decisions by consensus. Many IGOs also in practice take some of their decisions by consensus, including the UNGA, IMO, WHO and WTO, even if they are not required to do so.50 What do we mean by consensus in such cases? Unlike a unanimous decision, consensus is arrived at without a vote. It does not follow that all participants are necessarily in favour of such a decision: for example, article 161 of LOS Convention defines “consensus” simply as “the absence of any formal objection”.51 There may be various explanations for the absence of such objections, and one of the more subtle advantages of a consensus procedure is that some States might indeed have voted against if offered the option. Indeed they sometimes indicate their reservations, or even their opposition, in subsequent statements. One formula used by certain delegates in the UN runs as follows: “My government does not agree with the proposal but it will not obstruct the consensus.” But this is not so different from unanimity in some cases. A decision is unanimous even if some States abstain, and abstention may similarly conceal unexpressed opposition.52 50

On the evolution of consensus decision-making in the UN see M. Peterson, The General Assembly in World Politics (Boston, 1986) 81-90; H. Schermers and N. Blokker, International Institutional Law (The Hague, 1995) 506-515.

51

So does the WTO Agreement. See generally Sabel, see note 15, Ch. 16.

52

Kaufmann, see note 11, 27-32. But contra A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford, 1986) 196, who regards unanimity as “full agreement”.

384


Consensus in UNCLOS III and in other law-making conferences is also generally arrived at in circumstances where a vote is possible, and “The vote is then a threat, an inducement to achieve consensus”.53 This kind of consensus can be a very double-edged sword. A State that is reluctant to disturb the consensus may nevertheless have little incentive to ratify a treaty or implement a decision arrived at in this way. The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement was negotiated as a package deal between coastal and distant water fishing States, and adopted by consensus in which all the important fishing States participated,54 but a number of these have subsequently expressed opposition to the Agreement or have failed to become parties. Despite following closely the UNCLOS III model, it thus risks sharing the same fate as the 1958 Fisheries Convention. Of course, as the UNCLOS III conference shows, consensus on one item in a negotiation to which a State might otherwise be opposed may be the product of consensus on another of which it very much approves. As Buzan points out: “It is hard to overstress the importance of the integral link between consensus procedures and a package deal outcome …”.55 Where there is no such package deal, the potential law-making impact of a consensus text may be much less predictable. On the other hand, even if consensus cannot always be interpreted as approval, it is still different from the outright opposition expressed by a negative vote. Again, the subtle point is that States with less of an interest in the outcome may be willing to go along with a decision reached by consensus, whereas voting requires them to take a position for or against, or to abstain. Before establishing that there is no opposition, however, it is also important to ensure that there is positive support. Securing consensus thus places greater demands on chairs to evaluate the sense of a meeting and to take an active role in promoting consensus through informal negotiations or soundings.

VII. When is Consensus Law-Making Appropriate? A consensus procedure has benefits and drawbacks.56 As we saw above, the UNCLOS III precedent shows that it can work in favour of a complex, compre53

D. Vignes, “Will the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea Work According to the Consensus Rule?”, 69 AJIL (1975) 119. Compare consensus decision-making where no vote is allowed: in effect this requires unanimity and will allow any state to block a decision.

54

See FAO, Structure and Process of the 1993-1995 UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks (Rome, 1995); J. de Yturriaga, The International Regime of Fisheries (Leiden, 1997) 187201.

55

Buzan, see note 26, 339.

56

See generally, K. Zamenek, “Majority Rule and Consensus Technique In Law-Making Diplomacy”, in R.St.J. Macdonald and D.M. Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of 385


hensive and inclusive agreement that will stand the test of time and generate widely acceptable new law for parties and non-parties alike. The success of the procedure, still uncertain in 1982, can also be gauged inter alia from its use in negotiating the 1992 Climate Change and Biological Diversity Conventions, the 1994 Uruguay Round agreements establishing the WTO, and many other subsequent agreements. At the same time, as the stalemate in WTO negotiations in 2005-6 illustrates, consensus requires compromises that may be unobtainable, or may result in a text that is weaker or more ambiguous than might be thought desirable by some States or NGOs. Moreover, certain topics may be inherently unsuited to a consensus negotiating process. Human rights and humanitarian treaties fall into this category mainly because they do not readily lend themselves to the package deal approach we observed in UNCLOS III and WTO negotiations. Thus the negotiating practices of the ICRC and the UNCHR remain firmly based on the majority voting plus reservations model favoured by the ILC. While some countries will use reservations to emasculate the human rights treaties to which they become party,57 other participants will have the satisfaction of adopting a text that can nevertheless represent an aspirational ideal even if not accepted by everyone. Rather obviously, such an approach would not advance the “politics of interdependence” that characterises regulation of world trade, the oceans, or the global environment.58 Put simply, while consensus negotiations aim to produce a set menu for everyone, human rights negotiators prefer to offer an à la carte selection from a gourmet menu. And as we all know, those who dine à la carte often eat very different meals.

VIII. The Significance of Consensus Procedures The significance of consensus negotiating procedures can be evaluated in several ways. Firstly, they inevitably generate a greater need to engage in diplomacy, to listen, to bargain than would be the case when decisions can be taken by majority vote. The negotiation of the 1982 LOS Convention and the Climate Change Convention both show how a consensus process tends to democratise decision-making by diminishing disparities in power among States.59 This works in two ways. The G77 developing States had a strong influence on the UNCLOS III negotiations, and in strictly numerical terms (in reality a much larger group) could easily have commanded a two-thirds majority on many issues. Had they

International Law (Dordrecht, 1986) 857-887; Buzan, see note 26, 324; Sabel, see note 15, Ch. 16. 57

See e.g. the US reservations to the 1966 ICCPR or the Saudi reservations to CEDAW.

58

Buzan, see note 26, 329.

59

Ibid. 326-328.

386


wanted to do so they could have driven through a treaty that suited their interests alone. Of course, the United States, Europe and Japan would never have supported or ratified such a text. The consensus procedure made such an outcome unlikely, but it did not empower developing States alone; rather, it empowered all States. No participating State could be ignored, every State had to compromise. Thus the United States, Europe and Japan had to be accommodated throughout the negotiations. At the same time, none of these powerful States or groups of States could dictate what should be in the treaty without risking ultimate disagreement on a text. They too had to compromise, since the possibility of voting when efforts at consensus have failed ensures that no one State or group of States can block final agreement unreasonably. Much the same can be said of the climate change negotiations concluded by consensus in 2005 despite prolonged US hostility and a theatrical but pointless walkout. Even for so-called hyper powers, consensus procedures will ensure that minority interests are respected only if opposition is not pressed too far.60 Secondly, as the 1982 LOS Convention clearly demonstrates, the adoption of a consensus package-deal treaty can have a powerful law-making effect, even before the treaty enters into force. Although the outcome very much depends on the circumstances in which consensus is achieved and the nature of what has been agreed, securing widespread support for such a text not only legitimises and promotes consistent State practice, but makes it less likely that other States will object to immediate implementation. New customary law may come into being very quickly by this method. In this broader sense a consensus process becomes not merely a more effective way of negotiating universally acceptable treaties, decisions or soft law instruments but, in effect, a specific form of law-making process. The point is a simple one: once there is international consensus on the basic rule, it is highly unlikely that any State will object if it is then implemented, however rarely, in State practice. From this perspective, the practice of a few States and the acquiescence of many may be enough to satisfy even the ICJ that a new norm now exists in “customary” law. If so, we can see why it is worthwhile to negotiate a law-making treaty by consensus, but this does not as such show that consensus alone is sufficient to create new customary rules. Some measure of implementation and acquiescence appears essential, if only to test the reality of what has been agreed. Given the sometimes ambiguous nature of consensus already described, any other conclusion would be problematic for States which subsequently decide not to ratify the treaty.61

60

Koers, see note 22, 36.

61

The points made here are more fully developed in A.E. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford, 2007), Ch. 5. 387


IX. Conclusions We have not argued that UNCLOS III constitutes a body formally endowed with the power to legislate – or in that sense a legislature. Rather, as J. Charney has explained, “the products of multilateral forums substantially advance and formalize the international law-making process”.62 This is a subtle but important distinction. Can we go further, however, to argue that this “evolution in the law-making process” no longer requires us to have recourse to customary law and the evidence of State practice? The articulation of general principles by States constitutes one development which does not depend on implementation in State practice, and which is very different from traditional general principles borrowed from national law.63 B. Cheng’s conception of instant custom is another example,64 questionable perhaps in the context of UNGA resolutions, but rather more persuasive when applied to the consensus adoption of treaties such as the 1982 LOS Convention. Here we can observe a marked tendency to legitimise implementation in practice without waiting for widespread ratification or entry into force. Examples of this kind may suggest that the notion of custom emerging through practice over time diminishes to vanishing point when new norms are clearly articulated and unambiguously supported by a strong consensus.65 Questions of legitimacy, participation, and transparency are also relevant here; from that perspective modern law-making represents a marked advance over classical customary international law.66 It is more inclusive and more authoritative. It relies less on the uncertain practices of relatively few States and more on texts negotiated and agreed multilaterally. The agreement of States to the rules and principles is more obvious, and at an earlier stage. What this shows is that in modern international society both the processes and the legal instruments which could constitute a legislative system already exist. Nevertheless, even when States join in the adoption of negotiated texts, consensus may mask opposition, or be subject to reservation, or become the object of subsequent objection or non-participation. What happens after adoption and how States subsequently react plainly remain important when assessing legal effects. For that reason it remains premature to conclude that international conferences such as UNCLOS III or the Rome Conference have crossed the boundary between promoting law-making and making instant law, but they have undoubtedly come closer to doing so than many of their predecessors.

62

J. Charney, “Universal International Law”, 87 AJIL (1993) 529, 547.

63

E.g. the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

64

B. Cheng, “United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: ‘Instant’ Customary Law?” 5 Indian J. Int’l L. (1965) 23.

65

Charney, see note 62, 546.

66

Ibid. 538-547.

388

THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION Jean-Pierre Cot

T

he International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has occasionally had the opportunity of looking into the issue of the so-called margin of appreciation doctrine.1 Contrary to the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation, it has not directly addressed the problem to this day. The issue has been examined in individual opinions in the Camouco case by Judges Rüdiger Wolfrum and David Anderson2 and by myself in the Volga case.3 It would certainly have attracted the eye of Judge Thomas Mensah, had he chosen to stay on the bench, as it is bound to come up again, given the nature and texture of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). *** 1

On the margin of appreciation and the law of the sea, there is currently no relevant publication to my knowledge. More generally, there is quite a bulk of literature. I have mainly relied on the following: Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002; E. Benvenisti. “Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards”, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 843 (1999); E. Brems “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, 56 ZaöRV 240 (1996); O. Corten, L’ utilisation du “raisonnable” par le juge international, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1997; M. Delmas-Marty and M.-L. Izorche, “Marge nationale d’appréciation et internationalisation du droit: réflexions sur la validité formelle d’un droit commun pluraliste”, 46 McGill L. J. 923 (2000-2001); C.-D. Ehlermann and N. Lockhart, “Standard of Review in WTO Law”, 7 JIEL 491 (2004); R. St.J. MacDonald, “The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, International Law at the Time of its Codification: Essays in the Honour of Roberto Ago, Giuffre, Milano (1987), Vol. 3, p. 187; Y. Shany, “Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?” 16 EJIL 907 (2005); F. Teson, “International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism”, 25 Va. J. Int’l. L. 869 (1984-1985).

2

“Camouco” (Panama v. France), ITLOS Reports 2000, pp. 69-71 and pp. 50-51 respectively.

3

“Volga” (Russian Federation v. Australia), ITLOS Reports 2003, pp. 52-56.



The margin of appreciation introduces a degree of flexibility into the operation of the law. It is woven into the fabric of international society. Decentralisation in the elaboration and application of norms calls for a certain deference towards the principle actors of society, the Nation States. As the Permanent Court stated in the Lotus, international law leaves States “a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules” (PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, pp. 18-19). But the margin of appreciation is never unlimited. It is subject to the general obligation of good faith. Article 300 of the LOS Convention, stressing the obligation of good faith and prohibiting any abuse of right, clearly points in that direction. The margin of appreciation thus does not preclude review of a State’s actions by a third party, but does limit the scope of the review. The notion is related to other similar flexible notions such as reasonableness, abuse of rights, discretion, deference, comity or good faith. It touches upon the issue of balance of power within international society. Far from constituting a “doctrine”, i.e. a set of principles, as is sometimes alleged, it is a methodological approach, a standard of review. * The concept of margin of appreciation is well known in domestic law. It has been developed in particular in the field of administrative law in France and in Germany. These domestic systems distinguish between a full review of administrative decisions and a limited review of decisions taken in the exercise of a discretion allowed by the law. Though the context is very different, there are good reasons for applying the concept in international law.4 The Permanent Court and International Court accepted, early on, a limited review of the discretionary powers exercised by States and international organisations in implementing certain norms of international law. Thus, in the Admissions advisory opinion, the Court noted, “Article 4 does not forbid the taking into account of any factor which it is possible reasonably and in good faith to connect with the conditions laid down in that article”.5 The main development in the matter was that of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In the 1976 Handyside case,6 the European Court of Human Rights considered that the Convention leaves to the Contracting States a margin of appreciation, but nevertheless does not give them an unlimited

4

S. Jovanovic, Restriction des compétences discrétionnaires des Etats en droit international, Pedone, Paris, 1988; G. Cahin, “La notion de pouvoir discrétionnaire et les organisations internationales”, 107 RGDIP 535 (2003).

5

Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1947-1948, p. 63.

6

Handyside v. United Kingdom, Series A, No. 24, 1 Eur. H. Rts. Rep. 737 (1979).

390

The Law of the Sea and the Margin of Appreciation

margin. The ECtHR developed a considerable jurisprudence on the matter over the years. The European Court of Justice followed suit. For instance, in the Sirdar case,7 the Court, dealing with the application of gender equality regulations to elite military units, considered that “the competent authorities were entitled, in the exercise of their discretion as to whether to maintain the exclusion in question in the light of social developments, and without abusing the principle of proportionality, to come to the view that the specific conditions for deployment … justified their composition remaining exclusively male” (para. 27). Economic international law is another field where the concept has been applied. GATT panels, the dispute settlement bodies and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have resorted to the principle. A NAFTA arbitral tribunal has likewise examined the principle in D. Myers inc.8 The International Court of Justice has applied the method in the consular assistance cases. In the Lagrand case, the Court noted, referring to consular notification, that “[t]his obligation can be carried out in various ways. The choice of the means must be left to the United States”.9 It added, in Avena, that “[i]t should be underlined, however, that this freedom in the choice of means for such review and reconsideration is not without qualification”.10 But in Oil Platforms, the Court considered that, in the present case, international law left no room for any measure of discretion.11 It has been said that the Court showed some inconsistency in its jurisprudence. But this is not a question of “one size fits all” approach. The flexibility of the margin of appreciation has to be tailored to each case. In certain instances, there should be no room for discretion, while in others, the approach introduces a necessary element of flexibility. * The margin of appreciation is obviously the standard of review when it is explicitly called for. A prominent example is the definition of European Community directives by article 249.3 of the EC Treaty: “A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and method”. Judicial review, provided for by the Treaty, must then respect the margin of appreciation.

7

Angela Maria Sirdar v. The Army Board, Secretary of State for Defence, Case C-273/97 of the European Court of Justice.

8

S.D. Myers, inc. v. Government of Canada, 40 ILM 1408 (2001), p. 1438.

9

Lagrand (Germany v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 2001, para. 125.

10

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 2004, para. 131.

11

Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 2003, para. 73. 391


But international tribunals have felt free to apply the method without any explicit authorisation, as part of the inherent procedural powers of the judiciary or as implied by standards of evidence. Considerations of comity play a role, but also a rational division of work between national and international authorities. The former have a better appreciation of the facts and of the local context. It has been pointed out the division of labour also has the advantage of facilitating norm-internalisation by domestic actors and, ultimately, compliance with the norm. On the other hand, interpretation of international norms calls for a degree of centralisation. The problem is to strike the right balance. The degree of uncertainty of the norm is a more difficult problem. The uncertainty may well have been intentionally built into the text of the obligation by the parties. The question is then one of interpretation of the intention of the parties. As to peremptory norms or jus cogens, it has been argued that, by their very nature, they call for a stricter interpretation and preclude any margin of appreciation. But some of the most imperative international norms are also among the most uncertain. The distinction between “inward-looking” and “outward-looking” norms has been proposed as a possible criterion. Inward-looking norms (e.g. human rights) allow for a degree of deference to national authorities in application of the norm. The situation of outward-looking norms (e.g. resort to force) is quite different, as the role of the Court is to protect one State or society against another. In such a situation, deference to one State as opposed to the other cannot be upheld. But the opposition is not all that clear. E. Benvenisti12 makes the case that the argument also goes for inward-looking norms in human right treaties if provisions protect minority rights against the majority. * The main fields of application of the methodology have been human rights, trade and the use of force. A brief survey of these fields may be helpful before examining the specific issues related to the law of the sea. The ECtHR addressed the issue of the margin of appreciation early on. Its major pronouncement was in the Handyside case (7 December 1976).13 The ECtHR then decided: “… it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective law varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continual contact

12

Benvenisti, see note 1, p. 847.

13

Handyside v. United Kingdom, see note 6.

392


with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them … Nevertheless, it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of ‘necessity’ in this context. Consequently, Article 10 §2 leaves to the contracting States a margin of appreciation. This margin is given both to the domestic legislator (‘prescribed by law’) and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and apply the laws in force” (para. 48). In Handyside, the ECtHR analysed the margin of appreciation with respect to the standard “necessary in a democratic society”, striking the balance between the right of the individual and the interests of society. The balance is applicable to all Convention rights, with the exception of the four non-derogable rights: right to life; prohibition of torture; prohibition of slavery and forced labour; and prohibition of retroactivity in criminal law. Among the main factors taken into account by the ECtHR are: the comparative advantage of the national authorities in assessing the facts as well as the social requirements; the indeterminacy of the applicable standard; and the nature of the contested interests. The Convention itself calls for a degree of discretion by the Contracting States, in particular when it envisages certain regulations by the national authorities on subjects such as broadcasting, conditions of marriage or use of private property. An important contribution of the ECtHR to the subject has been evolutive interpretation. The notion has been affirmed by the International Court of Justice. In Namibia,14 the Court held that “an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation” (para. 53). The ECtHR addressed the issue in Tyrer v. UK,15 a case involving birching inflicted on a teenager. The Court stated that “… the Convention is a living instrument which … must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. In the case now before it, the Court cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of member States of the Council of Europe in this field” (para. 31). The “diachronic variability”16 of the margin of appreciation allows the Court to turn the screw as the social context changes and to apply a stricter standard

14

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16.

15

Tyrer v. UK, Series A, No. 26, Eur. H. Rts. Rep. 5856/72 (1978).

16

Delmas-Marty and Izorche, see note 1. 393


of review as commonly accepted standards change among the Contracting States. * The WTO Panels and Appellate Body do not use the terminology “margin of appreciation”. But the “standard of review” amounts to the same.17 The problem is always how much deference should be granted to national decision-makers. It is explicitly linked to the issue of separation and balance of power. In EC – Hormones,18 the Appellate Body considered that “[t]he standard of review … must reflect the balance established … between the jurisdictional competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional competences retained by the members for themselves” (para. 115). It added that the standard of review “… goes to the very core of the integrity of the WTO dispute settlement process itself ”. In the words of the Appellate Body, the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor “total deference” (para. 117). The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) requires Panels and Appellate Body to follow the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. This entails de novo review of legal determinations by national authorities. That does not solve all the problems related to interpretation or “clarification” of the law, given the open context of the provisions. But it does call for a degree of review. On the other hand, the Appellate Body considers it must establish an “objective assessment” of the facts. In US – Lamb,19 the Appellate Body considered it should not embark upon a new investigation without affording any measure of deference to the first, national investigation. The stipulations of the different WTO agreements lead to different standards of review. The anti-dumping agreement confers a broad discretion to a national authority for assessment of the facts. The Panel must limit its review if the national authority’s establishment of the facts is “proper”, a qualification somewhat reminiscent of the “minimal” monitoring in domestic law. WTO guarantees here are basically procedural. But in other instances, e.g. trade remedy measures, panels must require substantive, rather than purely formal compliance. In EC – Hormones,20 the Appellate Body, considering implementation of the SPS Agreement, rejected the Panel’s findings based on the “minimal procedural

17

Ehlermann and Lockhart, see note 1.

18

Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted on 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135.

19

Appellate Body Report, US Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted on 1 May 2001, DSR 2001:IX, 4051.

20

EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), see note 18.

394


requirements” approach and insisted on the “substantive requirements” of the Agreement. * Use of force strongly opposes two considerations in the delicate balance involved by the margin of appreciation. On the one hand, the norms of international law may be undetermined to quite a degree in specific cases involving the use of force and self-defence. The consideration is enhanced by the political sensitivity of the issues. On the other hand, the norm prohibiting use of force is among the most fundamental of norms and is certainly peremptory in nature. The issue of the margin of appreciation loomed in Nicaragua,21 but was not directly addressed by the Court as such. In that case, the Court nevertheless considered that “… whether a given measure is necessary to protect the essential security interests is not … purely a question for the subjective judgment of the party”.22 Based on the reading of the Treaty in force between Nicaragua and the United States, it did, at the time, adopt to a certain extent a margin of appreciation approach. The issue was put squarely to the Court by the United States in the Oil Platforms case.23 The United States argued that “discretion is an established judicial principle”, quoting the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as well as Nicaragua. They did not ask the Court to abstain from reviewing the case, but requested that the Court recognise an appropriate measure of discretion on the part of the United States in the course of its review. The Court rejected the argument, stating that “… the requirement of international law that measures taken avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving no room for any ‘measure of discretion’”.24 Judge Kooijmans, in his separate opinion, noted that the United States opted for means, the use of which must be subject to strict legal norms, since the prohibition of force is considered to have a peremptory character. He added, “The measure of discretion to which the United States is entitled is therefore considerably more limited than if it had chosen, for instance, the use of economic measures”.25 ***

21

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14.

22

Ibid. para. 282.

23

Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 2003, p. 162.

24

Ibid. para. 73.

25

Ibid. Sep. Op. Kooijmans, para. 46. 395


Application of the margin of appreciation to law of the sea issues must take into account the specificities of the field. The constitutional balance provided by the LOS Convention sets the framework. An important consideration is the texture of the Convention. The nature of the arbitral or judicial review obviously is a factor in deciding to resort to the margin of appreciation, or not. * The 1982 Convention on the law of the sea expands the role and responsibilities of Member States in the implementation of its rules and principles. One can picture the constitutional set-up as following. Full State sovereignty extends, as before, to internal waters, ports, the territorial sea out to 12 nautical miles beyond baselines and archipelagic waters included within baselines drawn according to the Convention. Sovereign rights are generously allowed to coastal States in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) up to 200 nautical miles offshore and on the continental shelf, eventually beyond the 200 nautical mile limit. The concept of sovereign rights is central to our discussion. Stopping short of full sovereignty, it implies an unfettered power of the coastal State to manage resources and establish rules and regulations accordingly. Member States do accept important obligations in that respect, but they have a free hand in deciding how to discharge these obligations. According to article 89 of the Convention, no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. The margin of appreciation obviously varies according to the nature of the rights exercised by the coastal State or flag State. Full sovereignty implies a large degree of margin of appreciation, even when discharging international obligations. But that margin may well be reduced or disappear, depending on the nature of the said obligation. Sovereign rights carry a degree of deference to the State in its exercise of those rights. * The texture of the Convention does not allow for any sweeping generalisations. But certain qualifications distinctly point to a margin of appreciation conceded to Member States. Discretion is an obvious example. In domestic law, discretionary powers go hand in hand with the margin of appreciation and a limited standard of review. The Convention uses the notion in certain circumstances. According to article 246.5, coastal States may, at their discretion, withhold their consent to the conduct of a marine scientific research project in some cases. But they may not exercise their discretion to withhold consent in respect of marine research projects on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.

396


Article 61.1 calls for the coastal State to “determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone.” Article 297.3(a) qualifies as “discretionary” the powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions established in its conservation and management laws and regulations. The Convention sets the standard of review with the consideration of discretion in mind. The Seabed Disputes Chamber “shall have no jurisdiction with regard to the exercise by the Authority of its discretionary powers” and “in no case shall it substitute its discretion for that of the Authority” (article 189). According to article 297.2(a)(i), the “exercise by the coastal State of a right or discretion in accordance with article 246” shall not be subject to settlement of dispute by Part IV, section 2 procedures if the coastal State does not agree. Article 297.3(c) provides that “[i]n no case shall the conciliation commission substitute its discretion for that of the coastal State”. * The rule of reasonableness is a more complicated issue. The qualification allows for a margin of appreciation by the Member State. But that does not settle the issue of the standard of review of such an appreciation, the deference to the judgment of the Member State. A classical application of the rule of reasonableness is to time limits. The ECtHR has developed over the years quite a body of jurisprudence on the issue. The 1982 Convention resorts to the notion of a “reasonable period of time” in quite a few instances. Article 74 suspends resort to Part XV procedures to search of an agreement on delimitation of the EEZ between States “within a reasonable period of time”. Article 83 stipulates likewise for delimitation of the continental shelf. Article 246.3 calls for consent to marine research not to be “delayed or denied unreasonably”. Article 246.6 calls for designation of areas “within a reasonable period of time”. Article 253.3 asks for rectification of research activities “within a reasonable period of time”. Article 294 calls for “a reasonable time-limit” in fixing judicial delays. Annexes to the Convention resort to the same standard. For instance, Annex IX, article 5.5, calls for an international organisation to provide information on distribution of competences between the organisation and its Member States on a specific question “within a reasonable time”. The concept of reasonableness also applies to substantive matters. Article 60.4 allows the coastal State to, “where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones” around artificial islands, installations and structures. Article 79 prohibits the coastal State from impeding the laying or maintenance of cables or pipelines, subject to “its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf ”. Article 147.1 states that “[a]ctivities in the Area shall be carried out with reasonable regard for other activities in the marine environment”. Article 221.1 authorises coastal States to take measures to protect their coastline or related

397


interests from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty “which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences”. Article 225 calls for States exercising their power of enforcement against foreign vessels not to “expose the marine environment to an unreasonable risk”. Article 260 mentioned safety zones “of a reasonable breadth”. Certain enforcement powers are subject to “reasonable grounds of believing” an illicit activity is being carried out. Such is the case for illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances (article 108), for the exercise of right of visit in case of piracy, slave trade, and so on. (article 110.1). Hot pursuit is allowed if the competent authorities of the coastal State “have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State” (article 111). States must assess potential effects of planned activities if they “have reasonable grounds for believing” the said activities may cause substantial pollution (article 206). Election of members of the Council of the Authority calls for representation of land-locked and geographically disadvantages States “to a degree which is reasonably proportionate to their representation in the Assembly” (article 161.2(a)). The same criteria are applicable to the representation of coastal States (article 161.2(b)). Article 161 is reminiscent of the International Court of Justice dictum in the Admissions advisory opinion.26 The very substantial reference to the rule of reasonableness in many of the provisions of the Convention indicates an important margin of appreciation conceded to the Member States in their implementation of the rights and obligations provided for by the Convention. * Article 300 of the Convention points in the same direction. It provides that “States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognised in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right”. Rosenne and Sohn note “the presence of highly subjective elements”.27 They add that “[i]t is rare, however, for a provision of this kind to be included in an international treaty, and it would be idle to speculate on the possible interpretation and application of this article”.

26

Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, see note 5.

27

Compensated, they add, by the fact that the article comes within the scope of the provisions of Part XV for the settlement of disputes. But article 300 opens Part XVI (General Provisions) of the Convention. The authors do not explain the nature of their remark. Cf. M.H. Nordquist, Sh. Rosenne and L.B. Sohn, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. V, Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 162, para. 300.6.

398


The editors of the Virginia Commentary recognise that the provision “may lead to some measure of third-party control over the invocation of the article, although certain exceptions in article 297 go a long way towards protecting the discretion of coastal States from third-party adjudication”.28 These principles certainly are quite general. But they must be taken into account when considering the object and purpose of the Convention. In particular, the reference to abuse of rights sheds some light on the standard of review contemplated in relation to exercise by Member States of the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognised in the Convention. In most domestic systems, the reference to abuse of rights entails a minimal form of judicial review, in relation to the purpose with which the right was recognised. It implies deference to the discretionary power conceded. * The issue was addressed by certain judges of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in prompt release cases. Article 292.1 provides: “Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying the flag of another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security, the question of the release from detention may be submitted to any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties … or to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, unless the parties otherwise agree.” Article 73 provides: “1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention. 2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other security. 3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment.

28

Ibid. 399


4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.” The Tribunal, in Monteconfurco, insisted that it “is not an appellate forum against a decision of a national court”.29 It added that “[w]hen determining whether the assessment made by the detaining State in fixing the bond or other security is reasonable, the Tribunal will treat laws of the detaining State and the decisions of its courts as relevant facts”.30 As Judge Wolfrum pointed out in the Camouco case,31 the margin of appreciation comes to play at two different levels: the discretionary power of the coastal State to establish its system on the release of ships and crew upon bonding; and the discretionary powers of the authorities of the coastal State in the implementation of the national system. I shall examine these two related, but separate levels. * The coastal States “enjoy considerable discretion in laying down the content of laws concerning the conservation and management of marine living resources in their exclusive economic zone and of the corresponding laws on enforcement”.32 Judge Wolfrum noted: “The Judgment has made no reference to these discretionary powers of the coastal States. They do not seem to play a role in the Judgment as a factor determining the power of the Tribunal vis-à-vis a coastal State. These discretionary powers or margin of appreciation on the side of the coastal State limit the powers of the Tribunal in deciding whether a bond set by the national authorities was reasonable or not. It is not for the Tribunal to establish a system of its own which does not take into account the enforcement policy by the coastal State in question.”33 Article 73.1 allows for sovereign rights of the coastal States for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the EEZ. The coastal State may take enforcement measures necessary to ensure compliance by foreign vessels of its laws and regulations. This broad authority is nevertheless limited to actions needed by the coastal State in the exercise of its sovereign rights. Coastal States may in particular specify monetary penalties 29

“Monteconfurco” (Seychelles v. France), Prompt Release, Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2000, p. 108, para. 72.

30

Ibid.

31

Diss. Op. Wolfrum in “Camouco”, see note 2, para. 12.

32

Ibid. p. 69, para. 11.

33

Ibid.

400


they consider appropriate. The Convention does not put a limit upon the amount of fines against violators a coastal State may consider appropriate. The discretion extends to the procedural guarantees. Certain States ensure due process through judiciary proceedings. Others rely upon administrative proceedings.34 States have discretion to choose the procedure, as long as they respect elementary rules of the due process of law.35 Discretionary powers are explicitly reserved and respected by Convention provisions, whether powers of coastal States or powers of the International Seabed Authority. Article 297.2(a) excludes from Part XV disputes arising out of the exercise by the coastal State of a right or discretion in accordance with article 246. Fishery discretionary powers of coastal States likewise can be excluded from Part XV procedures and an eventual conciliation commission can in no case substitute its discretion for that of the coastal State. Article 189 declares that the Seabed Disputes Chamber shall have no jurisdiction with regard to the exercise by the Authority of its discretionary powers. In no case shall it substitute its discretion for that of the Authority. In Camouco, Judge Wolfrum noted: “The attempt by France to safeguard its enforcement rights, including its right to fine violators of its laws on the conservation and management of marine living resources in its exclusive economic zone is, as already said, part and parcel of the sovereign rights of France in this respect. Unless the Tribunal has considered this approach ab initio to be a violation of article 73, paragraph 2, of the Convention it should have made this approach the basis for its calculation of the bond.”36 The important discretion accorded to Member States and, in particular, to coastal States, in implementing the provisions of the Convention calls, so it seems, for a degree of deference. Sovereign rights accorded to coastal States hardly fit in with the notion of “relevant facts”, to use the Tribunal’s expression in Camouco. This does not bar third-party review – quite to the contrary. But a simplistic “all or nothing” approach does not quite fit in with the delicate balance established by the Convention between the rights of coastal States and the rights of flag States. * Discretion on the part of national authorities, whether judicial, administrative or political, in appreciation of the facts and law applicable to the case and of 34

P. Cacaud, M. Kuruc, and M. Sprej, Administrative Sanctions in Fisheries Law, FAO, Rome, 2003, p. 61.

35

“Juno Trader” (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea-Bissau), Prompt Release, Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2004, pp. 38-39, para. 77.

36

See note 31, para. 13. 401


implementation of national policies raises different questions. The Tribunal has argued in Camouco that its judgment is not an appeal against a national court, but an independent remedy, hence the decision to consider national judiciary proceedings as “facts”. Judge Anderson challenged the view in his Camouco dissenting opinion. He noted: “It should be recognised that the local courts are better placed to appreciate all the relevant considerations of fact and law in the State concerned. In a matter such as this, concerning as it does procedure in a current criminal case, the local court should be accorded a wide discretion in fixing the amount of the security pending trial. In other words, national courts should be accorded a large ‘margin of appreciation’, a concept applied by the European Court of Human Rights, e.g. in the Handyside Case.”37 The remark is all the more to the point in urgent procedures such as article 292 prompt release proceedings. The Tribunal does not have the time to delve into considerations of local law or ask for an independent expertise. Evidence depends entirely on parties’ statements and possible cross-examination. Local tribunals may be under the same pressure. But they are at least familiar with the local legislation and factual considerations. Considerations of comity point in the same direction. Collaboration between tribunals is all the more called for in such cases. Hamburg is far removed from most local scenes. The bulk of implementation of the LOS Convention rests with national authorities. Mutual consideration, information, collaboration are certainly assets when seeking common views as to the interpretation and application of the Convention. In this respect, comity is not only a gesture of courtesy, but a useful tool. The parallel with the European Court of Human Rights is interesting. The Court had to deal with widely different views on the very touchy issue of sovereignty. The margin of appreciation principle offered the necessary tool to adapt these views within an overall framework and, moreover, to take into account the changing technological, political and social context. Coupled with a dynamic and diachronic principle of interpretation, the margin of interpretation allowed for a healthy development of the principles embodied in the Rome Convention of 1950 over the years, while showing due consideration to national authorities. An important aspect of the methodology of the margin of appreciation is that it does not preclude a judicial tightening of the screw – quite to the contrary. Over the years, as a close look into the Strasburg decisions demonstrates, judicial review of national authorities has become more effective, largely thanks to the margin of appreciation principle. Evolving social demands call for a gentle turn 37

Diss. Op. Anderson in “Camouco”, see note 2, p. 50.

402


from time to time in order to further the rule of law. But that is all the more feasible with the collaboration of national authorities and, in particular, of national courts. Juno Trader was an important decision in that respect.38 The Tribunal recalled that it cannot take into account the circumstances of the seizure of the Juno Trader in assessing the reasonableness of the bond (para. 93). But beforehand it had considered that it must apply the provisions of the Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with the Convention (para. 77). Without taking position on the margin of appreciation issue, the Tribunal stated quite emphatically: “The obligation of prompt release of vessel and crew includes elementary consideration of humanity and due process of law. The requirement that the bond or financial security must be reasonable indicates that a concern for fairness is one of the purposes of this provision.”39 The observation of the Tribunal is in no way contrary to the notion of a margin of appreciation of the coastal State in deciding upon the “reasonable bond”. On the contrary, it is reminiscent of the notion of non-derogable rights developed by the European Court of Human Rights in relation with the notion. The minimum standard of review does include “elementary considerations of humanity and due process of law”, even if such considerations are not written into the Convention in so many words. Judge Thomas Mensah was a man to develop these ideas within the Tribunal over the years. He has chosen another path, much to the loss of his friends in the Hamburg judiciary. But I am confident he will find other channels to explore new lanes such as these in the law of the sea.

38

See note 35, p. 17.

39

Ibid. para. 77; cf. Sep. Op. Treves, pp. 71 et seq. 403

FAIR TREATMENT OF SEAFARERS IN THE EVENT OF A MARITIME ACCIDENT: NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES Edgar Gold

Preface

I

t is an honour and a privilege to make a contribution to this Liber Amicorum for Thomas A. Mensah who has made so many important contributions to maritime law as well as numerous other sectors during a remarkable career as a lawyer, scholar, law professor, senior international civil servant, diplomat and distinguished judge. My association with Tom Mensah goes back well over four decades to when he was still based in Ghana. At the time I was on secondment as a chief officer on a vessel of the Black Star Line – Ghana’s national shipping enterprise. Whilst in Ghana I attended a maritime law seminar at the Ghana Maritime College in Accra. One of the principal lecturers was the Dean of the University of Ghana’s Law School in Legon, Ghana. It was Professor Thomas Mensah – already a well-respected lawyer and highly qualified academic. His lectures combined extraordinary academic knowledge with practical applicability, a no-nonsense approach, and a dry sense of humour – a combination for which Tom Mensah would become known throughout his career. Although I did not realize it at the time, it is quite likely that these early lectures influenced my later decision to leave the sea, study law and eventually become a maritime law specialist! We did not meet again until quite a few years later when Tom was already well established at the IMO. Since then we have met frequently in many parts of the world and have become good friends. This friendship also extended to our wives and it has been a joy to also know Tom’s wonderful wife and life-partner Akosua for many years. This chapter examines recent problems related to the fair treatment of seafarers. During his long career Tom Mensah has always paid special attention to the human aspects of the maritime sector. It seems, therefore, fitting to honour him with a discussion in this area. Ndiaye and Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes, 405–420 ©2007 Koninklijke Brill NV. ISBN 978 90 04 16156 6. Printed in the Netherlands.


I. Introduction In recent years all sectors of the maritime industry and many governments have become concerned about the criminal action taken against seafarers in the aftermath of maritime accidents, especially those that involve marine pollution. Examples such as those involving the masters of vessels such as Nissos Amorgas, Erika, Tasman Spirit, Virgo, and Prestige immediately come to mind. However, there are many other cases, both reported and unreported, that illustrate this increasing trend where seafarers appear to have become the “scapegoats” for maritime accidents, regardless of whether they are directly or indirectly involved or responsible. In some cases masters and other sea-going personnel, have been arrested, imprisoned or otherwise detained, under a variety of criminal law and other proceedings for extensive periods. Often the most basic rights of such persons are not observed and access to legal advice is frequently neither provided nor even permitted. Furthermore, such persons are often not charged nor provided with information why they are being held. In many instances, such seafarers appear to be held as “material witnesses” or for other “administrative and technical” reasons. In other instances seafarers may be actually “charged” with causing the relevant marine accident and/or with marine pollution. This occurs despite the fact that there is rarely any directly attributable responsibility for such accidents that may result from circumstances quite beyond the operational responsibility or competence of those so charged. It should be noted that these cases often occur in States that otherwise have an excellent reputation in terms of their criminal justice system and observance of the rights of individuals.

II. Case Examples It will be helpful to focus on two high profile cases, as well as one lesser-known case, in order to illustrate the problem: 1. Erika: this was a well-publicized tanker accident that occurred off the French coast in December 1999. It involved a 24-year old 37,000 DWT, Italian-owned, Maltese-flag product tanker that foundered and subsequently caused heavy oil pollution. The vessel was fully classed by RINA.1 The Indian master was arrested and imprisoned for some time by French authorities. The RINA report removed all responsibility from class and placed the blame for the accident on master and crew.2

1

The Italian classification society.

2

See, N.B. Mortensen, “The Erika Incident”, BIMCO Rev. 2001, at 44. See also, E. Gold, Gard Handbook on Protection of the Marine Environment, 3rd edn (Arendal: Gard AS, 2006)

406

Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident

2. Virgo: this is a case that has received very little publicity even though it should have! It involved a modern 28,000 DWT, Russian-owned, Cyprusflag product tanker, built in 1995, that was allegedly in a collision in international waters in August 2001 with a US-flag fishing vessel that involved loss of life on the fishing vessel.3 The vessel was arrested and held in a Canadian port subsequent to a request by the US government. The Russian master, the ship’s Second Officer and the seaman, who had been on lookout duty when the accident apparently occurred, were arrested and imprisoned by Canadian authorities. The arrest was based on a criminal law extradition request by the US authorities. The master and the two crew members were eventually released from jail but not permitted to leave Canada. The vessel was released after a surety amounting to USD 13.5 million was deposited. The master and the other two crew members had to remain in Canada for over 18 months before they were permitted to return to Russia after a USD 100,000 bond was posted to ensure their return for further legal action in Canada. This case is still pending and if Canada agrees to extradition, the seafarers involved could still face manslaughter charges in the United States. 3. Prestige: this is the most recent, high-profile case with repercussions that are also still ongoing at this time.4 The Prestige was a 26-year old Greek-owned, Bahamas-flag Aframax tanker that sank in heavy weather off the coast of Spain, causing serious oil pollution. The vessel sank after being refused access to a place of refuge in order to undertake salvage operations, and after the vessel was effectively taken over by Spanish maritime authorities. The master, who had remained on board after evacuating most of the crew, was forcibly removed by the Spanish military and subsequently jailed for over three months. Although a grossly excessive bail amount of EUR 3 million was initially demanded, the master was eventually released, but on a significantly lower bail payment. It is not appropriate to discuss the actual technical aspects of any of these cases. However, there are a number of common links between all of them: – All three vessels were operating on legitimate international voyages. In other words, they were fully classed with reputable classifications societies, had been appropriately inspected, and held all required certificates. It should be noted that whether we like or dislike flags of registry such as Malta, Bahamas or Cyprus, they are legitimate flag States at this time.

at 143. 3

See, T. Gray, “Virgo Arrests breaks Sea Convention”, Lloyd’s List, 20 August 2001.

4

See, Gold, note 2 above, at 145. 407


– All three vessels were under the command of experienced, certificated masters with command experience ranging from five to thirty-two years. Certificates were issued by major maritime States that have implemented STCW 5 requirements. – The difficulties experienced by all three vessels occurred off the coasts of major developed States with significant maritime traditions and experience, and well-established maritime administrations. Nevertheless, the response and actions taken by the coastal or port States involved were in breach of accepted international maritime law.

III. International Law Aspects It may be helpful to firstly provide a brief overview of what aspects of existing international law, that may protect shipmasters (and other crew members) from unfair treatment, are actually in place today. At the highest global level the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (LOS Convention),6 provides some specific guidance. The LOS Convention codifies the long-established rule on of who has penal jurisdiction over seafarers involved in an accident at sea.7 The convention states quite specifically that:8 “1. In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas, involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or of any other person in the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against such person except before the judicial or administrative authorities either of the flag State or the State of which such person is a national. 2. In disciplinary matters, the State which has issued a master’s certificate or certificate of competence or licence shall alone be competent, after due legal process, to pronounce the withdrawal of such certificates, even if the holder is not a national of the State which issued them.

5

International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW 1978) as amended.

6

In force since 1994. See Institute of Maritime Law, Ratification of Maritime Conventions (London: Informa, 1991-2006), Vol. I.1.170.

7

This principle was first established in 1927 by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the famous Lotus case (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Ser. A. No. 10 (1927). The principle was the set out in the Convention on the High Seas 1958, art. 11, Ratification of Maritime Conventions note 6 above, Vol. I.1.100.

8

Article 97.

408


3. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of the flag state.” This means that in the Erika case only Malta and India, in the Virgo case only Cyprus and Russia, and in the Prestige case only the Bahamas and Greece had jurisdiction over the respective seafarers. In other words France, Canada/United States, and Spain, not only treated the affected seafarers unfairly, but also acted in breach of applicable international law by jailing and/or confining them. Furthermore, the United States has no legal right in their extradition demand in the Virgo case.9 The problem in these three cases was that the States that had jurisdiction either chose not to act at all or simply protested without taking any further action. That appeared to permit the coastal States to act as they did. In these cases India, Malta, Russia, Cyprus, Greece and the Bahamas respectively could and, probably, should have instituted international legal proceedings through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) requesting the immediate release of the masters involved and, in the Virgo case, also the release of the ship. In a number of recent cases, involving detained vessels ITLOS has been able to act very quickly. However, in the cases described above nothing was done. In fact, there was probably relatively little incentive for “open registry” flag States, such as Malta, Cyprus or the Bahamas to do anything. This is despite the fact that under the LOS Convention, flag States do have certain legal responsibilities.10 For example, flag States are required to hold an inquiry into every marine casualty or incident of navigation on the high seas that involving a vessel under its flag that has caused serious damage or loss of life and personal injury.11 However, there is no legal requirement to do anything else. Although there was more incentive for States such as India, Russia and Greece to protect their nationals, it was probably considered insufficient to act.12 This appears to indicate that masters and other seafarers who serve on “open registry” vessels, and who get into difficulties, are on their own, unless the shipowner is willing to protect them. This will be difficult when a single-ship company and an unidentifiable owner are involved – something that is often the norm today.

9

Although the US has not yet accepted the LOS Convention, it is party to the High Seas Convention, which, as indicated, contains the same provisions.

10

LOS Convention, art. 94, “Duties of the Flag State”.

11

LOS Convention, art. 94(7).

12

In the Virgo case Russia and Cyprus both sent diplomatic notes of protest to Canada and the US, but there was no further follow-up. In the Prestige case Greece made a number of official protests to Spain and the European Union, but there was no additional follow-up. It is not known if the Bahamas lodged any type of protest. 409


In the Erika and Prestige cases France and Spain stated that they were taking action under areas of the LOS Convention related to the protection of the marine environment, and claimed that the actions taken were, therefore, covered under international law. For example, the Spanish Government stated that its intervention actions were based on the authority given under LOS Convention articles 56 and 73. Although the coastal State is given jurisdiction in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for the protection of the marine environment,13 it can only do so in conformity with other parts of the convention and with respect to the rights and duties of other States. This provision does not provide a blanket authority to do anything the coastal State wishes. Article 73 relates to the right to board vessels, but is referring to the management of living resources and has, therefore, very little to do with boarding a tanker in distress. In other words these legal assertions had a very dubious base. On the other hand, the LOS Convention does provide coastal States with specific powers to take action when a major maritime accident threatens their coastlines and waters with serious pollution.14 Such powers include boarding, inspection, legal proceedings and detention of the vessel. However, even these powers are strictly limited by a number of specific and general enforcement safeguards in the LOS Convention including: – The duty not to endanger the safety of navigation or creating other hazards to a vessel, or bringing it to an unsafe port or anchorage.15 Although coastal States are also given specific rights to intervene when a ship on the high seas is involved in an accident that is likely to cause serious pollution damage to the coastal area, any action taken is strictly limited;16 – The requirement to only impose monetary penalties for pollution offences outside the territorial sea. Only monetary penalties may be imposed within the territorial sea unless the pollution resulted from a wilful act;17 – That the rights of the accused should be considered in all aspects of any legal proceedings;18

13

LOS Convention, art. 56(1)(b)(iii).

14

LOS Convention, arts 220 & 221.

15

LOS Convention, art. 225.

16

International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969 (INTERVENTION 1969). Spain and France are both parties to the Convention.

17

LOS Convention, art. 230(1) & (2).

18


410


– That arrested vessels and their crews should be promptly released on the posting of a reasonable bond or other security;19 and – The requirement that violations of coastal State regulations in the Exclusive Economic Zone may not include imprisonment.20 Although the LOS Convention provides coastal States with very wide powers to take action, it also lays down specific safeguards designed to ensure that the rights of the flag State, shipowner as well as master and crew are protected.21 Without going into further details, it should be apparent that in the Erika, Prestige and Virgo cases one or more of these international law provisions were not followed. In all three cases the rights of the seafarers were, certainly, not considered.

IV. Legal and Practical Issues The difficulties faced by seafarers that may lead to unfair treatment subsequent to a maritime accident can be confined to three general areas: – Criminal action is today frequently taken against seafarers involved in maritime accidents that have been beyond their control. – In many States, seafarers, who have been involved in a maritime accident, whether at fault or not, are treated as criminals. – Even in cases where the relevant seafarers have not been found at fault, they are, nevertheless, held under criminal law provisions as “material witnesses”. Some difficulties in the initial IMO/ILO deliberations in this area relate to defining the meaning of “maritime accident”. Some interests had argued that the expression should instead be “maritime incident”. This is the type of discussion that might make lawyers happy but does not provide a solution to the practical issues that need to be resolved. Although a number of good arguments can be made that “maritime incident” might cover almost all areas where seafarers might be disadvantaged,22 it was suggested that if widely implemented fair treatment guidelines were to be achieved, it would only occur if the somewhat

19


20


21

INTERVENTION 1969, arts III and V. See note 16 above.

22

There are frequent cases that do not involve “maritime accidents” where costal/port States treat seafarers unfairly. In a recent case Venezuelan authorities imprisoned a Turkish master for 36 days for reporting suspicious drug activities around the hull of his vessel to the authorities! Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 13 July 2006. 411


narrower “maritime accident” expression were utilized. Fortunately this was also accepted in subsequent IMO/ILO discussions.23 Nevertheless, it is quite clear that a wide variety of “maritime accidents” may occur. It is also accepted that in most cases direct or indirect damage will result. This will give rise to damage claims by those who have been affected. In other words, the word “accident” always implies an unforeseen, fortuitous, or unexpected event.24 Administrative or criminal action for damage resulting from a maritime accident against those considered to have been at fault or otherwise negligent is resorted to more frequently today. This is also the area where most difficulties for seafarers that may lead to unfair treatment may occur.25 This is due to the fact that in many maritime accident cases some type of direct or indirect human error or omission is likely to be present. This error or omission may not necessarily involve only those operating the vessel. In some cases a vessel may have been improperly constructed, repaired or even loaded without the direct involvement of those in charge of the vessel. In other cases, weather conditions, totally beyond the control of the seafarers involved, may have resulted in a major grounding with commensurate damage from pollutants. In other cases, cargo operations undertaken by stevedores, again generally beyond the control of the seafarers involved, may result in personal injury and death. Yet even in such cases administrative and criminal action is often taken against the seafarers on the subject vessel. Flag States have specific jurisdiction to take administrative and/or criminal action against seafarers operating vessels under their flag who have been proven to be reckless or incompetent or who have been under the influence of alcohol or narcotics when an accident has occurred.26 Coastal and port States also have certain, strictly limited, rights to take action especially if damage has occurred.27 It has long been accepted under established international human rights provisions that anyone accused of a crime should always be treated fairly and be provided with all available legal rights. This is also spelt out specifically under the LOS Convention regime.28

23

See, IMO Doc. LEG 90/15, paras 379-383.

24

The new Guidelines define “maritime accident” as: “any unforeseen occurrence or physical event connected to the navigation, operations, manoeuvring or handling of ships, or the machinery, equipment, material, or cargo on board such ships which may result in the detention of seafarers”.

25

See, for example: Edgar Gold, “From Privilege to Peril – The Shipmaster’s Current Legal Rights and Responsibilities”, 3 WMU J. Mar. Aff. 51 (2004).

26

LOS Convention, arts 94, 97 & 217.

27

LOS Convention, arts 21, 25, 27, 218, 220, 225, 226, 228, 231 & 232.

28


412


Given this very brief initial assessment of State responsibilities, the question arises of why the fair treatment problem has arisen in the first place? Some of this difficulty appears to have arisen from the concern about the “criminalisation of maritime accidents”.29 This may well be the wrong starting point. States possess the jurisdiction to utilize their criminal law system when maritime accidents and commensurate damage, injury and death occur. Furthermore, there is no question that sovereign States have every right to criminally prosecute individuals and other entities for maritime accidents, occurring in their jurisdiction, that are in breach of national law. The problem is not the use of criminal law but its administration that has appeared to lead to unfair treatment of seafarers, especially in cases where there is evidence that such seafarers had no direct responsibility for the accident. For example, if a vessel laden with a pollutant cargo experiences an engine breakdown and subsequently grounds and causes serious pollution, although the master has done everything possible to prevent the grounding, he can hardly be held criminally responsible for the damage that occurs? Although the coastal State is likely to have national law provisions that make pollution a criminal offence it can only be applied if there was clear evidence that the accident that caused the pollution was due to a deliberate or negligent act.30 Frequent cases involving oily water separators that have been poorly maintained or otherwise tampered with are good examples. However, if the negligent act could be attributed to the shipowner, cargo owner, or other entity, but not to those in charge of the ship, criminal sanctions against the seafarers involved should be limited. At best the coastal State could ensure that those in charge of the vessel would supply whatever material evidence might be required to impose criminal or civil law sanctions on those entities that were considered to have ultimate responsibility for the accident and the damage. Nevertheless, it is at this stage that the “unfair treatment” problem often arises. There may be several causes for this. Firstly, the damaged State may be frustrated in receiving insufficient cooperation from the relevant shipowner or other entity. In some cases, the shipowner may be difficult to locate, especially in cases of single-ship companies. This may result in the relevant seafarers being held longer than necessary – almost as an inducement for those responsible to come forward. Secondly, there may be differences of opinion between the damaged State and those in charge of the vessel on technical matters that led to the 29

See, O.G. Anthony, “Criminalization of Seafarers for Accidental Discharge of Oil: Is there Justification in International Law for Criminal Sanction for Negligent or Accidental Pollution of the Sea?”, 37 J. Mar. L. & Com. 219 (2006).

30

There is also a problem in this area with recent European Union (EU) legislation that “criminalises” maritime accidents. EU Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 and Directive 2005/35/EC of 7 September 2005. It should be noted that a broad coalition of the shipping industry has commenced legal proceedings against the EU to test this Directive. See also, Gold, note 2 above, at 543, and Anthony, note 29 above. 413


accident. The master may have a certain loyalty to the shipowner, in order to protect the owner’s interests, which may be interpreted as a lack of cooperation with the damaged State. In other cases, a master, who may have experienced the trauma of losing his ship, perhaps involving loss of life and pollution damage, may be reluctant or even physically unable to cooperate as fully as may be expected by the coastal State. In other cases, the coastal State may itself be partially to blame for what eventually occurred and is then anxious to ensure that those in charge of the vessel become the principal “scapegoats”. There are numerous other permutations that may all lead to the misadministration of otherwise acceptable criminal law provisions and the commensurate lengthy detention and unfair treatment of seafarers. In other words, the principal problem in this area is administrative rather than legal.

V. IMO/ILO Responses and Action As a result of these problems, a number of States, international organizations and professional groups expressed their concerns to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), as well as the International Labour Organization (ILO). In response a “Joint IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on the Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident” was formed in September 2004 and finalized later that year.31 This Working Group, drawn from China, Egypt, Greece, Nigeria, Panama, Philippines, Turkey and the USA, as well as four shipowner and four seafarer members, was requested to provide recommendations to the IMO Legal Committee and the ILO Governing Body, including draft guidelines on the fair treatment of seafarers in the event of a maritime accident. The Working Group’s terms of reference required that account should be taken of the relevant international instruments. The Working Group held its initial meeting at the IMO in January 2005 and finalized its terms of reference also at that stage.32 In addition, it was decided that a “correspondence group” composed of other maritime interests, including interested States, would be formed. This group was requested to assist the Working Group in its deliberations through specific, expert input. The correspondence group included a number of nongovernmental maritime organizations such as: – Comité Maritime International (CMI) – International Shipping Federation (ISF) – International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)

31

See, ILO Doc. GB.291/STM/4 of November 2004 and IMO Doc. IMO/ILO/WGFTS1/WP.6 of 19 January 2005.

32

IMO Doc. IMO/ILO IWGFTS 1/111 of 3 February 2005.

414


– International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) – International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) – Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) – International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA) – International Group of P&I Associations – International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) – International Christian Maritime Association (ICMA) During 2005 the IMO/ILO Correspondence Group received input and submissions from a number of these interests. At the 24th Assembly of the IMO a “Resolution on Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident” was adopted.33 This Resolution was also adopted by the ILO Governing Body at its 292nd Session in March 2005. At the same time, the IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Working Group also decided that its second session would be held in London in March 2006 and issued an invitation to IMO member States, UN and other specialized agencies, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations to attend.34 At this stage a number of specific responses to the developing draft “Guidelines” were submitted to the IMO/ILO Working Group by interested members of the correspondence group. This included a joint ISF, ICS, and ICFTU submission,35 as well as working documents from the CMI36 and IFSMA, that were appended to a “Progress Report from the Correspondence Group” tabled in January 2006.37 The CMI’s International Working Group had sent a “Questionnaire on Fair Treatment of Seafarers” to 52 member States in December 2004. Responses were received from 27 States representing a variety of legal and maritime administrative systems.38 The common theme in the responses was that although most States

33

IMO Res. A.987(24). See, IMO Doc: A 24/5(b)/1.

34

IMO Doc. A1/A/4.ILO. Circular Letter No. 2679 of 19 November 2005.

35

IMO Doc. IMO/ILO/WGFTS 3 of 3 January 2006.

36

The CMI had been specifically requested to assist in this work. In response, the “CMI International Working Group on the Fair Treatment of Seafarers” (CMI-IWG) was formed in October 2004 to provide an initial response to this request. This working group was chaired by the author of this article.

37

IMO Doc. IMO/ILO/WGFTS 2 of January 2006.

38

Argentina; Australia; Bulgaria; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; Chile; China; Croatia; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong; Italy; Japan; Korea (Republic of); Nigeria; Norway; Slovenia; South Africa; United Kingdom; Uruguay; USA. This included an incomplete response from Indonesia. 415


have the right to exercise investigative, administrative powers when a maritime accident occurs, such powers are always designed to protect the rights of the individuals who are involved. Furthermore, the responses also indicated that criminal action is only applicable in cases where there has been a clear breach of national law by the individual who is being charged. In other words, according to the responses, seafarers subject to criminal action must be presented with clear evidence of a breach of criminal law that led to the accident. From the responses it also appeared that if no such evidence is present, the coastal, port or flag State can only mount an administrative enquiry that may result in monetary penalties for the individuals involved or the ship that was the source of the accidental damage. The CMI Questionnaire responses also indicated that a majority of States have the legislative powers to detain seafarers who have been involved in maritime accidents so that administrative and criminal investigations can proceed. However, these States also indicated that such detention would always be for a reasonable period. The responses indicated that seafarers held as “material witnesses” must be treated properly and that no discrimination between nationals and foreigners is permitted. Although there are some administrative differences between States that apply “common law” principles and those subject to civil law, in general, the responses indicated that the rights of individuals are paramount in cases where the criminal law is applicable.39 A progress report on the IMO/ILO Joint Working Group’s first and second sessions was submitted to the 91st session of the IMO Legal Committee in April 2006. During this session a set of agreed guidelines was also tabled. This was extensively discussed and resulted in a number of changes and a Resolution that contained a final set of approved guidelines.40 This documentation was then submitted to the ILO Governing Body and approved in mid-June 2006.41 As a result, the “Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident” entered into force on 1 July 2006, but are, of course, subject to voluntary acceptance by States.

39

The subject was also extensively discussed at the CMI Colloquium in Cape Town, in February 2006.

40

Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of its 91st Session, Annex 2, IMO Doc. LEG 91/12 of 9 May 2006. See also, “IMO adopts guidelines on fair treatment of seafarers”, IMO News, Issue 2, at 5 (2006).

41

See, R. MacDonald, “Fair Treatment Success”, Seaways, June 2006, at 10.

416


VI. The New Guidelines The Guidelines recognize seafarers as a special category of worker. Given the global nature of the shipping industry and the many different jurisdictions with which they may be in contact, seafarers need special protection, especially in relation with public authorities. As a result, the principal objective of the Guidelines is to ensure that seafarers are treated fairly following a maritime accident and during any subsequent investigation and detention by public authorities, and that any detention is for no longer than necessary. The Guidelines provide advice on the necessary steps to be taken by the various interests that may be involved following a maritime accident: the port or coastal State, the flag State, the seafarers’ State, the shipowner, and the seafarers themselves. The overall emphasis is on cooperation and communication between the various parties involved and to ensure that no discriminatory or retaliatory measures are taken against seafarers because of their involvement or participation in investigations. For example, the Guidelines set out some 22 steps that port and coastal States are required to consider in order to ensure that investigations are conducted with speed, civility and full regard to seafarers’ legal and human rights and their special position in the jurisdiction in which they find themselves. In this connection references are made to the rights of individuals and duties of governments under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, MARPOL 73/78,42 and the “IMO Code for the Investigations of Marine Casualties and Incidents”. The Guidelines also enumerate 12 considerations to be taken into account by flag States in relation to the fair treatment of seafarers. The main requirement for flag States, when not conducting their own investigations, is to assist other investigating States and to facilitate the fair treatment of seafarers serving on the flag State’s vessels. Similarly, the Guidelines also provide the seafarer’s State with 8 aspects to consider when investigations involving their citizens take place. Although such a State may not have a specific legal obligation to assist, the Guidelines suggest that there is a moral obligation. In many cases, where seafarers are employed under other flags, the seafarer’s State has frequently not bothered to become involved. The Guidelines attempt to rectify this problem. The negotiations that produced the new Guidelines experienced particular difficulties in framing provisions that would be applicable to shipowners and the seafarers themselves. Shipowners were concerned about protecting their legal position as owners of property, obligations under carriage and insurance contracts, as well as exposure to costs of maintenance and welfare for seafarers detained in foreign ports. The Guidelines attempt to address these concerns in

42

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78). 417


seven specific provisions for shipowners. On the other hand, those representing the interests of seafarers during the discussions were principally concerned that seafarers be protected from exposing themselves to criminal justice processes by making statements without legal advice and their lack of familiarity with the rights to silence and self-incrimination. This was addressed in four specific provisions for Seafarers in the Guidelines. A number of States also expressed concerns about the effectiveness of the new Guidelines at the final IMO Legal Committee meeting on the subject in April 2006. Some States43 expressed the wish for a review of the Guidelines during the year.44 The concerns expressed included: – The lack of clarity that the Guidelines were not intended to apply to incidents committed with criminal intent; – The definition of “maritime accident” lacked reference to actual or potential damage or injury; – The lack of a clear indication that the Guidelines should be interpreted and applied in conformity with domestic law; – The right to avoid self-incrimination needs to be more clearly addressed; – The lack of a clear statement that the ultimate obligation to pay wages for detained seafarers rests upon the shipowner and not on States; and – Although warships are excluded from the Guidelines, no reference is made to State vessels operated for non-commercial purposes. International organizations representing seafarers, such as IFSMA and the ICFTU, felt that voluntary guidelines still provided insufficient protection for seafarers. It was argued very forcefully that such protection could only occur if the guidelines became mandatory. This may indeed be true although much more difficult to achieve. In any case, the IMO Legal Committee decided that an ad hoc working group should be convened at its next meeting. Such a group could recommend any changes to the new Guidelines that may be necessary although it was hoped that most concerns could be addressed with only minor adjustments to the Guidelines. However, during the 92nd Session of the IMO Legal Committee, held in October 2006, it became apparent that consensus in the ad hoc Working Group in accommodating the various wishes could not be achieved at that stage. As a result, the Legal Committee decided that the new Guidelines should stand as originally concluded, but that the subject should 43

Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States.

44

IMO Doc. LEG 92/6/X of 11 August 2006.

418


be retained on its agenda for further attention during forthcoming sessions in 2007 and 2008.

Conclusion The conclusion of the Guidelines represents a positive step forward in this complex area. The responses to the CMI questionnaire revealed that although States have effective legislation that is designed to protect the legal rights of seafarers, such laws are frequently and regularly disregarded. There may even be difficulties with the way states implement existing laws, especially in cases where criminal prosecution is involved. This has been illustrated in the recent case involving the master of the container vessel Zim Mexico III, who was charged with manslaughter, held in jail pending trial for several months, and then convicted in the US port of Mobile.45 The master spent four months in prison, whilst awaiting trial as he was considered a “flight risk”. Although he had actually faced imprisonment for up to 15 years, the master was subsequently sentenced to time already served and then deported. Submissions on behalf of the master made to the court by many maritime organizations may have contributed to the “lenient” sentence.46 The charge and subsequent conviction resulted from the vessel striking a container crane whilst manoeuvring under the direction of a compulsory pilot. Regrettably, the accident resulted in the death of a technician who was working on the crane without permission. Nevertheless, the master was charged under an archaic US federal “Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute”47 dating back to 183848 that required a higher standard of care from seafarers than from others. There has been widespread and unanimous condemnation from the marine industry of the case, the way it has been handled and, of course, the unfairness of the ‘double-standard’ law. There is no question that under most other national justice systems the likelihood of criminal charges against the master would be minimal. Efforts are now underway to persuade the US Government to repeal this unfair legislation.

45

US v. Wolfgang Schröder, USDC (Southern District of Alabama) No. 06-0088-CG. Not yet reported.

46

See, for example, the submission by the Honourable of Company of Master Mariners, as reported in the Company’s Journal, Winter 2007, at 426. See also, P. Wake, “Master freed”, Seaways, March 2007, at 23.

47

18 U.S.C. §1115.

48

Although the law was passed in 1838, it originated in 1833, when the US President and Congress became concerned about increasing deaths and injuries involving early steamboats. 419


It appears that even full US compliance with the Guidelines might not have assisted the Zim Mexico III master in this case. The fact is that regardless of whether the US seaman’s manslaughter legislation is unfair, or even discriminatory, it is, nevertheless, a valid national law. On the other hand, it can be argued that prosecuting a master for an accident that arose from a mechanical failure whilst the vessel was under an experienced pilot’s direction, as well as denying him bail and detaining him in a very unpleasant jail for several months, is treatment that cannot be classified as “fair”. A further question is whether States that apply outdated, discriminatory legislation, or even disregard their own laws, will implement guidelines that are voluntary? This remains to be tested, although there are a number of good precedents for the wide acceptance of “soft law” provisions in the maritime sector.49 One of the principal reasons why there was such excellent cooperation between the various sectors of the maritime industry in reaching these Guidelines so quickly, was the awareness of the fact that this problem has a direct and very negative effect on attracting new personnel into the seagoing industry. This is exacerbated by the additional consideration that there is already a shortage of skilled senior engineer and navigating officers at present and looming shortage in other areas in the near future. It is too early to assess how effective this new initiative will be. Yet it is clearly in the interest of all sectors of the shipping industry, as well as coastal and port States, to ensure that every effort is made to implement these measures. Detaining and imprisoning seafarers, who may have little or no direct responsibility for maritime accidents, will neither prevent nor reduce maritime accidents. Even if criminal charges are indicated in cases of serious negligence, the seafarers held responsible must be treated fairly and without discrimination. Using seafarers as “scapegoats” for the failures of others or for political expediency is not only inappropriate and unfair, but is also unlikely to assist the IMO’s aim of achieving “safer shipping on cleaner seas”.

49

Good examples are the numerous maritime safety codes developed under IMO auspices. Many of these commenced their lives as “guidelines” but were slowly transposed into binding provisions. See, Gold, note 2 above, at 176.

420

UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME ON LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE Måns Jacobsson

I. Introduction

O

ne of the purposes of international treaties is to contribute to the uniformity of international law. The question is whether this objective is really achieved. In this chapter, this issue is examined in the light of the experience gained from the implementation and application of the international Conventions relating to liability and compensation for oil pollution damage caused by oil spills from tankers, which have been in force for 28 years. Dr Thomas Mensah, in his capacity as Director of Legal Affairs and External Relations of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), was involved in the creation of this regime and contributed greatly to the elaboration of the relevant Conventions.

II. The International Compensation Regime The international regime for the compensation of pollution damage caused by oil spills from tankers is based on two treaties adopted under the auspices of IMO, the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1992 Civil Liability Convention) and the 1992 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1992 Fund Convention). These Conventions replace two corresponding Conventions adopted in 1969 and 1971 respectively. The 1992 Civil Liability Convention governs the liability of shipowners for oil pollution damage. The Convention lays down the principle of strict liability for shipowners and creates a system of compulsory liability insurance. Shipowners are normally entitled to limit their liability to an amount which is linked to the tonnage of their ships.



The 1992 Fund Convention, which is supplementary to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, established an intergovernmental organisation, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (1992 Fund), which provides additional compensation to victims when the compensation under the Civil Liability Convention is insufficient. The 1992 Fund was set up in 1996 when the 1992 Fund Convention entered into force. By becoming party to the 1992 Fund Convention, a State becomes a member of the 1992 Fund. It succeeds a previous organisation, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1971 (1971 Fund) established in 1978, which is at present being wound up. The total amount of compensation available under the 1992 Conventions for any one incident is 203 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund (USD 300 million),1 including the amount payable by the shipowner under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention.2 On 1 November 2006, 115 States were parties to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, and 98 States were parties to the 1992 Fund Convention. Over the years, the 1971 Fund and the 1992 Fund have been involved in 136 incidents in some 25 countries and paid compensation totalling approximately GBP 550 million (USD 1,000 million) to tens of thousands of victims of oil pollution. Most compensation claims have been settled out of court. In fact court actions have been taken against the respective Fund in only a very small number of cases. A third tier of compensation in the form of a Supplementary Fund was established on 3 March 2005 by means of a Protocol to the 1992 Fund Convention adopted in 2003. To date 20 States have ratified the Protocol. The Supplementary Fund Protocol brings the total amount available for compensation of pollution damage in States that have ratified the Protocol for any one incident to 750 million SDR (USD 1,100 million). The 1992 Fund, the 1971 Fund and the Supplementary Fund are normally referred to together as the IOPC Funds. The three Funds, which have their headquarters in London, are administered by a joint Secretariat, headed by a Director.

III. Obstacles to Uniformity In the preamble to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (and its predecessor the 1969 Civil Liability Convention), the Contracting States indicate a desire “to

1

In this chapter the SDR has been converted into United States dollars at the rate of exchange applicable on 1 November 2006 (i.e., 1 SDR = USD 1.485280).

2

The amounts available under the 1969 and 1971 Conventions were considerably lower. As for the 1992 Conventions the amount available for incidents occurring before 1 November 2003 was 135 million SDR (USD 200 million).

422

Uniform Application of the International Regime on Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage

adopt uniform international rules and procedures for determining questions of liability and providing adequate compensation in such cases”. A major difficulty in achieving this end is due to the fact that cases brought under these treaties are to be heard by national courts. Under the Conventions and the Supplementary Fund Protocol, the courts in the State or States where pollution damage was caused have the final say as regards the interpretation and application of the treaties and the Funds are bound by the decisions of these courts. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that States, in accordance with their constitutional requirements and their legal traditions, use different methods for implementing treaties into national law. In many States (in particular those of the continental legal tradition), treaties that have been ratified by the State concerned and published in the Official Gazette apply directly as national law (the monistic system). This is the case in respect of, for example, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, most States in Latin America and the majority of States in North Africa. In many of the States following this approach, Conventions ratified by the State have a higher constitutional rank than and prevail over normal national statutes. In many other States, in order for an international treaty to become part of national law, it has to be implemented by means of a national statute which reflects the contents of the provisions of the Convention (the dualistic system). This method is normally used by those States whose legal systems are based on English common law, for example Australia, Canada, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom and a number of States in Africa, as well as Japan and the Republic of Korea. In this latter group of States, the courts apply the statutes rather than the Conventions. Since the implementing statutes are drafted in accordance with the national legislative tradition of the country concerned, there may be substantive differences between the text of the Conventions and the national statute. In some States belonging to this group the courts are reluctant to look at the provisions of the Conventions for the purpose of interpreting the national statute, and even more reluctant to use as a source of interpretation the preparatory works (travaux préparatoires) which led to the adoption of the Conventions.

IV. Position Taken by the IOPC Funds’ Governing Bodies The issue of uniformity of application has been raised frequently in respect of the Conventions creating the international oil pollution compensation regime both in the governing bodies of the 1971 Fund and the 1992 Fund3 and in court

3

The 1992 Fund is governed by an Assembly composed of all Member States or by an 423


cases in which the Funds have become involved. Although the issue of uniform application of the treaties is important for all aspects of the international regime, it has in practice arisen mainly in respect of the interpretation of the definitions of “pollution damage”, “preventive measures” (i.e. reasonable measures to prevent or minimise pollution damage) and “ship”, and the provisions on time bar and channelling of liability. In 1994, the Assembly of the 1971 Fund set up a Working Group to examine inter alia the criteria for the admissibility of claims for compensation. When considering the Working Group’s report, the Assembly endorsed the Group’s view that a uniform interpretation of the definition of “pollution damage” was essential for the functioning of the system of compensation established by the Civil Liability Convention and the Fund Convention. The Assembly also took the view that national courts should, when making decisions on the interpretation of the definitions of “pollution damage” and “preventive measures”, take into account the fact that these definitions were laid down in international treaties.4 The positions taken by the governing bodies have formed the basis of a Claims Manual, the latest version of which was adopted by the 1992 Fund Assembly in October 2004. The purpose of this Manual is not only to assist claimants with the presentation of their claims, but also to promote a uniform application of the Conventions forming the basis of the international regime. It should be noted that during the discussions in the Working Group, it was argued by some delegations that the decisions taken by the 1971 Fund Assembly and Executive Committee should be considered as constituting agreements between the Parties to the 1971 Fund Convention on the interpretation of these definitions in accordance with article 31, paragraph 3(a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. This issue was again considered by 1992 Fund Member States in May 2003 in the light of experience. The 1992 Fund Administrative Council (acting on behalf of the Assembly) adopted a Resolution on the need for uniformity of interpretation and application of the 1992 Conventions. In this Resolution, the Administrative Council made reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, which provides in article 31, paragraph 3, that for the purpose of the interpretation of treaties there should be taken into account inter alia any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions and any subsequent practice in the

Administrative Council acting on behalf of the Assembly. The 1992 Fund also has an Executive Committee composed of 15 Member States elected by the Assembly for dealing with compensation claims. The Supplementary Fund has an Assembly composed of all Member States. During the winding up period, the 1971 Fund, which previously also had an Assembly and an Executive Committee, is governed by an Administrative Council. 4

Doc. FUND/A.17/35, paragraphs 26.5-26.7.

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application of the treaty that establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. In the Resolution, attention was drawn to the importance for the proper and equitable functioning of the regime established by the 1992 Conventions that these Conventions were applied uniformly in all States Parties and that claimants for oil pollution damage were given equal treatment as regards compensation in all States Parties. The Resolution emphasised the importance of national courts in States Parties giving due consideration to the decisions by the governing bodies of the Funds on such matters. The IOPC Funds have dealt with tens of thousands of compensation claims. Decisions on most of them have been taken by the IOPC Funds’ Director. A large number of claims giving rise to questions of principle have, however, been considered by representatives of governments of Member States within the governing bodies of the 1971 and 1992 Funds.5 In their decisions, the governing bodies, whilst taking into account the particular circumstances of the case under consideration, have tried to ensure uniformity in their decisions and have, in general, succeeded. Over 28 years, the governing bodies have never taken a vote on the admissibility of claims, and their decisions have been taken by consensus. It has happened in a few cases, however, that a particular delegation, without asking for a vote, has requested that the Record of Decisions reflect that it did not agree with the decision. In this context, attention should be drawn to article 235 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Under that article, with the objective of assuring prompt and adequate compensation in respect of all damage caused by pollution of the marine environment, States shall cooperate in the implementation of existing international law and the further development of international law relating to responsibility and liability for the assessment of and compensation for damage and the settlement of related disputes, as well as, where appropriate, development of criteria and procedures for payment of adequate compensation, such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds. The Fund Member States do in fact, in their governing bodies, cooperate to achieve the objectives laid down in that article, i.e. prompt and adequate compensation to victims of oil pollution and development of compensation criteria and procedures.

V. Implementation of the Conventions into National Law In 2005 and 2006 the Fund Director requested States to inform the 1992 Fund whether they had implemented fully the 1992 Conventions into their legislations. A number of States admitted in their replies that the Conventions had not been so

5

The Supplementary Fund has so far not had to consider any compensation claims. 425


implemented. It is obvious that this could create considerable difficulties for the courts in these countries if legal actions were taken under the Conventions. It has further been established that, in some Contracting States, the provisions in the statutes implementing the Conventions differ from the corresponding provisions of the Conventions. In some countries, although the Conventions have been properly implemented, the courts apply national jurisprudence or other national statutes that are at variance with the Conventions. As is the case in respect of other conventions in the field of maritime law, the Conventions on liability and compensation for oil pollution damage were drafted in accordance with common law legislative techniques and traditions. This makes the text sometimes difficult to understand by national legislators and courts in countries with civil law tradition. Complications can also arise due to inaccurate translations of the authentic English and French texts of the Conventions into the national language of countries which have neither English nor French as their official language. The implementation of the provisions relating to time bar (article VIII of the Civil Liability Conventions and article 6 of the Fund Conventions) can be mentioned as an example. Claims for compensation under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions are time-barred (extinguished) unless legal action is brought against the shipowner and his insurer and against the 1971 Fund or 1992 Fund within three years of the date when the damage occurred, and in any event within six years of the date of the incident. A claim made against the 1992 Fund in respect of pollution damage in a Supplementary Fund Member State is regarded as a claim made also against the Supplementary Fund. Rights to compensation against the Supplementary Fund are therefore time-barred only if they are time-barred against the 1992 Fund. Experience has shown that some Fund Member States have not implemented in their national law the exact texts of the time bar provisions in the Conventions but have reworded the provisions in their national statutes, thereby changing their substantive content. In addition, the courts in some States have tended to interpret the time bar provisions in conjunction with provisions and principles on time bar in their national law. From the English and French texts of the Conventions (which were the only authentic texts of the original 1969 and 1971 Conventions) it is clear that it is not a question of normal prescription but of extinction of rights (“shall be extinguished”, “s’éteignent”) unless the measures set out above are taken before the expiry of the three- and six-year periods prescribed in the Conventions. Since the Conventions in their authentic texts are categorical on this point these periods cannot be interrupted or extended. This interpretation is also supported by the preparatory works. In some States, these periods are, however, considered as relating to normal prescription which can be interrupted or suspended in accordance with general

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domestic legislation or jurisprudence. A complication arises due to the way in which the provisions on time bar in the Conventions have been reproduced in Spanish translations published by IMO which, although official translations, are not authentic texts of the Conventions. The translation of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention uses the word “prescribirán” which in, for example, Spanish law refers to time bar periods that can be interrupted or suspended, whereas in the translation of the 1971 Fund Convention the word “caducarán” is used, which refers to time-bar periods that cannot be suspended or interrupted. The fact that an expression, which in the authentic English and French texts is identical in the 1969 and the 1971 Conventions, has been translated differently into Spanish in respect of the two Conventions can obviously lead to confusion in a Spanish-speaking country. However, as regards both the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention the word “prescribirán” is used in the Spanish translation published by IMO. It seems possible that, when considering whether a compensation claim is time-barred under the 1992 Conventions, a court in a Spanish-speaking country will base its decision only on the Spanish text published by IMO, although that text is not authentic, which may be the text published in the Official Gazette of that country, without taking into account the English and French authentic texts. Such an approach would, however, be incorrect from a legal point of view since the content of a treaty is to be determined by the authentic texts. In Spain the publication in the Official Gazette refers on this point to the translations of the 1969 and 1971 Conventions containing the words “prescribirán” and “caducarán” respectively, which is an indication that the original IMO translation was used in the implementation of the Conventions into Spanish law. This issue is of particular importance in States where claims for compensation may be brought in both civil and criminal actions. In some Member States, once a criminal action has been brought in respect of a particular event, the running of time-bar periods is suspended until the criminal action has been brought to an end by a final judgment. Another example relates to the enforcement of judgments against the Funds. Subject to any decision by the Assembly or Executive Committee referred to below, any judgment given against the Fund by a court having jurisdiction under the Fund Convention shall, when it has become enforceable in the State of origin and is in that State no longer subject to ordinary forms of review, be recognised and enforceable in each Contracting State under certain conditions. However, if the aggregate amount of the accepted claims exceeds the amount available for compensation under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, this amount shall be distributed between the claimants in proportion to their respective admissible amounts (i.e. payments shall be pro-rated). Decisions on pro-rating shall be taken

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by the Assembly or, by delegation, by the Executive Committee.6 It has become apparent that in some countries, the national system for the enforcement of judgments has not been adapted so as to take into account the provisions of the 1971 and 1992 Fund Conventions and the Supplementary Fund Protocol as regards the distribution of the amount available for compensation. The national laws do not contain any specific provision to the effect that the courts should take into account decisions by the competent Fund body as to pro-rating of payments. It has been argued in the States concerned that the decisions by the national courts in respect of individual claims should always be enforceable in full against the respective Fund, notwithstanding decisions by the Fund body that payments should be pro-rated because the total amount available for compensation was insufficient to pay all claimants in full, or there was a risk that this would be the case. This problem would also arise in other States, in particular in States where claims for compensation arising out of the same incident may be pursued in several courts, for example in both civil and criminal courts. Additional complications may arise if an incident were to affect two or more Fund Member States.

VI. Court Decisions relating to the Application and Interpretation of the Conventions As mentioned above, the IOPC Funds have over the years been involved in 136 incidents, but only a very small number of these incidents have given rise to legal actions against the Funds. These actions have, to a large extent, related to claims for pure economic loss. 1. Pure Economic Loss Compensation is payable under the Conventions for loss of earnings suffered by the owners of property contaminated by oil as a result of a spill (consequential loss). One example of consequential loss is a fisherman’s loss of income as a result of his nets becoming oiled, which prevents him from fishing until his nets are either cleaned or replaced. Most legal systems recognise the admissibility of claims for consequential economic loss. An oil spill may also result in loss of earnings by persons whose property has not been polluted; in common law this type of loss is referred to as pure economic loss. For example, a fisherman whose nets have not been contaminated may nevertheless be prevented from fishing because the sea area in the vicinity

6

Articles 4.5, 8 and 18.7 of the 1971 and 1992 Fund Conventions. The same applies under the Supplementary Fund Protocol.

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of his fishing grounds is polluted and he cannot fish elsewhere. Similarly, an owner of a hotel or a restaurant located close to a contaminated amenity beach may suffer losses because the number of guests falls during the period of the pollution. In common law jurisdictions, the courts have been very reluctant to accept claims for pure economic loss.7 In most civil law countries, pure economic loss is not considered as a separate category of damage. It is therefore treated as any other loss that qualifies for compensation, provided that the usual test in the law of torts is met, in particular that there is a sufficiently close causal link and, in some countries, that the damage is caused to an interest protected by the law in question.8 Aware of the position in common law countries, the 1971 Fund governing bodies decided shortly after the entry into force of the 1971 Fund Convention that claims for pure economic loss were admissible under the 1969 and 1971 Conventions, subject to certain conditions. This was considered appropriate in order to enable the Fund to treat claimants equally, independent of the country where the damage was caused. The 1971 and 1992 Funds’ governing bodies have over the years accepted as admissible thousands of compensation claims for pure economic loss, mainly in the fishing, mariculture and tourism sectors. Under the Conventions, claims are admissible for compensation only if they are for loss or damage caused by contamination. A claim is not admissible on the sole criterion that the loss or damage would not have occurred but for the oil spill in question. The starting point is the pollution, not the incident itself. In order to qualify for compensation, the basic criterion applied by the Funds is that a sufficiently close link of causation exists between the contamination and the loss or damage sustained by the claimant. The governing bodies of the Funds have decided that, when considering whether the criterion of a sufficiently close link of causation is fulfilled, the Funds should take the following elements into account: – the geographic proximity between the claimant’s activity and the contamination; – the degree to which a claimant is economically dependent on an affected resource;

7

As for the United Kingdom see Dynamco v. Holland, 1972 SLT 38; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v. Hall Russel & Co Ltd (1988) 1 All ER 37; Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 A.C. 398; Payne v. John Setchell Ltd [2002] B.L.R. 489. With respect to the United States see Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).

8

Pure economic loss is recognised in German law and in the laws of the Nordic countries as a separate category of damage.

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– the extent to which a claimant has alternative sources of supply or business opportunities; and – the extent to which a claimant’s business forms an integral part of the economic activity within the area affected by the spill. The admissibility of such claims for pure economic loss was considered in the context of the international compensation regime by the Scottish and English courts in respect of the Braer incident (Shetland Islands, 1993) and the Sea Empress incident (Wales, 1996). The 1971 Fund had accepted a large number of pure economic loss claims arising from these incidents. The courts were aware of the position taken by the Fund that claims for pure economic loss were admissible on certain conditions. In several cases arising out of the Braer incident the Scottish courts rejected claims for pure economic loss on the grounds that the alleged losses were not directly caused by contamination, even though the Fund had not rejected the claims on these grounds. A claim that had been rejected by the Fund was pursued by a company which supplied young salmon (smolt) to salmon farmers on Shetland from its facility on mainland Scotland some 500 kilometres from Shetland. The Fund had rejected this claim mainly on the grounds that the criterion of geographic proximity between the supplier’s activity and the contamination was not fulfilled. The Scottish Court of Appeal held in the so-called Landcatch case that the United Kingdom statutes implementing the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention, the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 and the Merchant Shipping Act 1974, did not cover secondary or relational claims. The Court of Appeal did not consider it proper to treat the criteria and decisions of the Fund as an aid to interpreting United Kingdom legislation.9 Also in the case of the Sea Empress incident, the 1971 Fund had accepted a large number of pure economic loss claims. The English Court of Appeal was called upon to consider a claim for pure economic loss by a whelk processor in Devon that had been rejected by the Fund, also on the grounds of lack of geographic proximity between the processor’s activity and the contamination. In its judgment, the Court held that the loss suffered did not fall within the ambit of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. The Court considered that this was a form of secondary economic loss, which was outside the intended scope of a statute that was closely focused on physical contamination and its consequences. The Court thought it reasonable to assume that the intention of the Contracting States who were parties to the 1971 Fund Convention was that those who established a causal link between their loss and the contamination should be compensated

9

Landcatch Ltd v. Braer Corpn, Assuranceforeningen Skuld and International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (1999) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 216.

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in full (so far as that were possible within the 1971 Fund’s limit). The Court considered that it was consistent with that intention for the Fund to operate so as to enable those whose loss was more proximate to recover in full by excluding from participation in the common fund those whose loss was less proximate. In the Court’s view, there was no doubt as to the need to draw a line to include some claims and exclude others and this claim fell on the wrong side of that line. However, the Court of Appeal did not think it appropriate to offer guidelines as to the causative test to be applied by the Fund when making decisions in the future and considered that the precise extent of the Fund’s obligations under the statute was best left for determination on a case-by-case basis.10 The reasoning in the judgments by the Scottish and English courts indicate that the 1971 Fund had, in out-of-court settlements, accepted a number of pure economic loss claims which might have been rejected by the courts had they been the subject of litigation. However, in the interest of equal treatment of claimants the Funds could not base their decisions on the jurisprudence in the country taking the most restrictive view in respect of such claims, since decisions by the Funds to reject pure economic loss claims as a matter of principle would not be upheld by the courts in countries where the jurisprudence is less restrictive. The question of admissibility of claims that, from the IOPC Funds’ point of view, are considered relating to pure economic loss has also been addressed in a number of cases by the French courts in the context of the Erika incident (France, 1999). As is the case in most civil law countries, under French law pure economic loss is not treated as a separate type of damage. Also the French courts had been made aware of the Funds’ position in this regard. So far, nearly 90 judgments have been rendered by the French courts. The judgments have for the most part gone in the 1992 Fund’s favour. Some courts have applied the Fund’s admissibility criteria, some have made the point that the criteria were not binding on the courts but provided a useful reference, and others have ignored the criteria but generally have reached the same conclusions that would have been reached on the basis of the criteria. In several cases in which the judgments in the Court of first instance had gone against the Fund, the Court of Appeal overturned these judgments. It is worth noting that in the cases where the courts had not taken the Fund’s criteria into account, the courts agreed with the Fund that the claims should be rejected since they did not fulfil the criterion of causal link.

10

Alegrete Shipping Co. Inc. v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld, International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1971 & Ors and R J Tilbury & Sons (Devon) Ltd (2003) 2 All ER (Comm) 1. 431


2. Pain and Suffering An interesting judgment dealing with the interpretation of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention in respect of a claim for pain and suffering arising out of the Keumdong No. 5 incident (Republic of Korea, 1993) was rendered by an Appellate Court in the Republic of Korea.11 After having considered the definition of “pollution damage” in the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and in the Korean Statute implementing the Convention, and having examined the legislation in various other States in consideration of whether claims for pain and suffering were admissible, the Appellate Court took the view that there should not be a difference in the application of the Conventions among Contracting States. The Court thus held that claims for pain and suffering were not admissible. The Korean Court therefore took into account that the definition was laid down in international treaties. 3. Environmental Damage National courts have also been called upon to consider claims for damage to the marine environment. The 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention defined “pollution damage” (article I.6) as loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur. In the Antonio Gramsci case (USSR, 1979), which polluted the coasts of the USSR (Latvia), Sweden and Finland, a claim of an abstract nature for ecological damage was made by the USSR against the shipowner. Although compensation could not be sought from the 1971 Fund, the USSR being Party only to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention at that time, the claim was of considerable interest to the Fund since it competed with the claim submitted by the Swedish Government for the amount payable by the shipowner. The USSR Court accepted the claim for an amount which had been calculated on the basis of a mathematical formula laid down in USSR domestic legislation. In the light of the position taken by the USSR Court, the 1971 Fund Assembly unanimously adopted in 1980 a Resolution stating that “the assessment of compensation [for environmental damage] to be paid by the Fund is not to be made on the basis of an abstract quantification of damage calculated in accordance with theoretical models”. Following the adoption of this Resolution, the 1971 Fund Assembly decided that compensation for environmental damage could be granted only if a claimant had a legal right to claim under national law and had suffered “quantifiable economic loss”. When the 1992 Conventions were adopted, a new definition of pollution damage was incorporated, which codified the principle set out in the Resolution adopted by the 1971 Fund Assembly in 1980. The new definition provides “that

11

IOPC Funds’ Annual Report 2001, pp. 60-61.

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compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken”. This more precise definition was intended to avoid in the future the difficulties encountered by the 1971 Fund. The Patmos and Haven incidents (Italy, 1985 and 1990 respectively), to which the 1969 and 1971 Conventions applied, resulted in claims by the Italian Government for environmental damage that were based on abstract quantification of the losses. The 1971 Fund rejected both claims, which subsequently became the subject of legal proceedings. In the case of the Patmos incident, the Court of Appeal in Messina accepted the claim, but since the total amount of the approved claims arising from the incident did not reach the limitation amount applicable to the ship, the 1971 Fund was not called upon to make any compensation payments and was therefore not entitled to pursue the issue to the Supreme Court of Cassation. As regards the Haven incident, although the Court of First Instance had assessed the loss based on a theoretical calculation, an agreement on a global solution of all outstanding issues was concluded between the Italian State, the shipowner/insurer and the 1971 Fund. Under this agreement, the parties undertook to withdraw all legal actions in the Italian courts. The courts were therefore not called upon to make a final decision on the admissibility of the claims for environmental damage. The amount subsequently paid by the 1971 Fund in compensation did not relate to environmental damage. In the Nissos Amorgos case (Venezuela, 1997), which also fell under the 1969 and 1971 Conventions, the Venezuelan authorities included in their legal actions against the shipowner/his insurer and the 1971 Fund claims for environmental damage based on an abstract quantification. The 1971 Fund has made it clear that these claims are not admissible under the Conventions. The Venezuelan Courts have not rendered any decisions in respect of these claims. 4. Definition of Ship The definition of ship in article I.1 of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention reads:12 “‘Ship’ means any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship capable of carrying oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as a ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard.”

12

This definition is by reference included in the 1992 Fund Convention. 433


In a recent case in Greece, the question arose as to whether the 1992 Conventions applied to a craft (the Slops) that had been originally designed and constructed for the carriage of oil in bulk at sea. In 1995, the Slops underwent a major conversion; the propeller was removed and its engine was deactivated and sealed for the purpose of converting the craft to a floating oil waste receiving and processing facility. The 1992 Fund Executive Committee considered that since the Slops was not engaged in the carriage of oil but purely served as a storage facility, it did not fall with the definition of “ship” in the 1992 Conventions. The Greek Court of First Instance considered, however, that any type of floating unit originally constructed as a sea-going vessel for the purpose of carrying oil was and remained a ship, although it might subsequently be changed to another type of floating unit, such as a floating waste receiving and processing facility and notwithstanding that it might be stationary or the engine might have been temporarily sealed or the propeller removed. The Greek Court of Appeal overturned the judgment and held that the Slops did not meet the criteria required by the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention and rejected the claims. The Court interpreted the word “ship” as defined in article I.1 of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention as a seaborne unit which carries oil from place A to place B. The Court of Appeal considered that, although originally built as a tanker, the Slops did not at the time of the incident operate as a seagoing vessel or a floating unit for the purpose of transporting persistent oil in its tanks. The Greek Supreme Court considered the interpretation of the definition of “ship” in a plenary session.13 In a judgment rendered in September 2006, a majority of the 22 judges (17:5) considered that, at the time of the incident, the Slops should be regarded a “ship” as defined in the 1992 Conventions as it had the character of a seaborne craft that, following its modification into a floating separating unit, stored oil products in bulk and, furthermore, it had the ability to move by towing with a consequent pollution risk without it being necessary for the incident to take place during the carriage of the oil in bulk.14 The minority of five Supreme Court judges were of the opinion that in order to be regarded a “ship” as defined in the 1992 Conventions, the craft must have been constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo with an additional condition that if it was a floating storage unit, it must actually be carrying oil in bulk as cargo during the voyage in question or during a voyage immediately following the discharge of that oil, unless it was proven that, following such unloading, there were no oil residues in the vessel’s tanks. The dissenting judges

13

The 1992 Fund’s position that the Slops did not fall within the definition of ship was supported by a legal opinion by Dr Thomas Mensah.

14

Supreme Court (in Plenary Session) judgment No. 23/2006 (not yet published).

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also stated that this interpretation resulted from the aim of the International Conventions, which referred to the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo. 5. Channelling of Liability The issue of channelling of liability is governed by article III.4 of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Civil Liability Convention. Claims for pollution damage under the Civil Liability Conventions can be made only against the registered owner of the ship concerned. This does not preclude victims from claiming compensation outside the Conventions from persons other than the shipowner. However, the 1969 Civil Liability Convention prohibits claims against the servants or agents of the shipowner. The 1992 Civil Liability Convention prohibits not only claims against the servants or agents of the shipowner, but also claims against the members of the crew, the pilot, the charterer (including a bareboat charterer), manager or operator of the ship, or any person carrying out salvage operations or taking preventive measures. This prohibition does not apply if the pollution damage resulted from a personal act or omission of the person concerned, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result. In spite of the provisions in the 1969 Civil Liability Convention prohibiting claims against the servants or agents of the shipowner, national courts in two States Parties to the Convention have held the masters of the vessels personally liable for pollution damage. The courts arrived at this result because the compensation claims based on the Conventions were filed in criminal proceedings and because a person held criminally liable for a given event is automatically civilly liable for the same event. In one of these cases, the master, the shipowner’s insurer and the 1971 Fund were held primarily liable whereas the registered owner was held subsidiarily liable, although it is clear from article III.1 of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention that the registered shipowner is the person primarily liable.

VII. Conclusions Although it has not been possible to achieve a total uniformity in the application of the Conventions relating to the liability and compensation regime, mainly due to the fact that the national courts of the Contracting States have the final say in respect of their implementation, the Conventions have, nevertheless, contributed to a large degree of uniformity as regards compensation for oil pollution damage. This is mainly because the decisions concerning the vast majority of all compensation claims have been taken by the governing bodies of the Funds which have sought to apply the Conventions in a consistent manner, irrespective of where the incident took place or the pollution damage was caused, thereby ensuring uniform application of the Conventions as far as decisions taken by

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these bodies are concerned. The same applies to decisions taken by the Director of the Funds. The national courts have only been called upon to take decisions on the application and interpretation of the Conventions forming the basis of the international compensation regime in relatively few cases. However, there are clear divergences between Contracting States both as regards the implementing legislation and the court jurisprudence. This is not surprising since the Conventions are, as regards the concept of “pollution damage”, not very detailed and on many other issues leave considerable scope for interpretation of the provisions. National legislators and courts are, for obvious reasons, influenced by the legislative traditions and the laws and jurisprudence of their country in other fields of law. It is a matter of concern that the lack of uniformity in the implementation and application of the Conventions between Member States results in unequal treatment of claimants. It is submitted that the only way of ensuring a high degree of uniformity in the application and interpretation of Conventions establishing the international compensation regime – it is not realistic to hope for total uniformity – would be to confer jurisdiction on matters of principle on an international tribunal. Such matters could be referred to the international tribunal by the national courts on their own initiative or at the request of a Member State or by the Fund governing bodies. The United Nations Tribunal on the Law of the Sea could be a suitable forum. The question is whether there is a political will to go down this road.

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PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEAS IN THE LIGHT OF NEW CHALLENGES AND THREATS A.L. Kolodkin, Y.V. Bobrova and G.G. Shinkaretskaia

N

avigation is an historic State activity taking place in the world’s oceans that has now become the main activity, especially in the light of the globalisation process. The principle of freedom of navigation was born due to the development of economic relations between States, the developing needs of people, the geographic discoveries and expanding connections within the world community. The principle was gradually recognised by all States and became a customary norm of international law. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958 established the freedom of navigation among other freedoms of the high seas (art. 2), and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOS Convention) confirmed the right of navigation for all States, both coastal and land-locked. As of 1 March 2007, there are 153 participants of the LOS Convention. Nowadays the principle of freedom of navigation in the high seas is an inseparable part of a broader principle, the principle of freedom of the high seas together with other freedoms: overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, construction of artificial islands and platforms, fishing and scientific research (art. 87 of the LOS Convention). This list is not exhaustive. Nowadays, the freedom of navigation has become somewhat restricted. A number of new international legal problems have appeared, the negative consequences of which bear upon interests of both the whole world community as well as individual States. It would be useful at this point to turn to the speech by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the General Assembly in September 2003, where he declared the intention to constitute high-level groups that would provide a common, comprehensive opinion concerning the prospects of deciding contemporary, critically important issues. Consequently, the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, with the theme “A more secure world: our common responsibility” was submitted to the General Assembly 59th Session on the 2 December 2004. Ndiaye and Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes, 437–442 ©2007 Koninklijke Brill NV. ISBN 978 90 04 16156 6. Printed in the Netherlands.


The High-level Panel appraised contemporary threats to international peace and security after having analysed new and old threats and taken into account concerns of all States – “rich and poor, weak and strong”1 – about security. The Panel submitted recommendations on strengthening the United Nations Organisation (UNO) with the goal of guaranteeing collective security for all States in the 21st century. Especially important was the Panel’s urgent request for everyone to understand the comprehensive character of contemporary threats to our security and the fact that strategies to deal with the threats must be comprehensive. The Secretary-General appealed to Member States to constructively analyse the Panel’s recommendations concerning possible ways of strengthening such instruments as sanctions and mediation, paying primary attention to combatting of threats. It is important to note that some recommendations are aimed at specialising institutions and intergovernmental organs of the UNO as well as intergovernmental organs outside the UNO. The Report demonstrates an urgent necessity for the international community to arrive at a new consensus about a future collective security and necessary changes to the UNO. Returning to the international legal problems of navigation in the world’s oceans, attention should be paid to point 175 of the Report, which says that trade in people – including trafficking of people, by sea among other ways – is the most abominable form of contemporary crime. We should emphasise here that this is a contemporary form of slavery. Slavery, and the trade and transportation of slaves, are prohibited by international law. Article 99 of the LOS Convention prohibits the transportation of slaves at sea. Moreover, suspicion that a vessel is involved in slavery on the high seas is a basis for intercepting the vessel (art. 110 of the LOS Convention). The international community has conventionally agreed upon the right of a military vessel or an airplane or other properly empowered ship or airplane, bearing clear identifying signs that verify them as performing States’ duties, to intercept foreign merchant vessels on the high seas (art. 110 (4 and 5) of the LOS Convention) under certain conditions. Article 110 of the LOS Convention lists the following conditions: (a) piracy; (b) slave trade; (c) unlawful transmission (under the condition of observance of art. 109 provisions as to the jurisdiction of the flag State of a military ship);

1

See: Letter of the General Secretary to the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change “A more secure world: our common responsibility”, UNGA 59th Session. 2 December 2004. UN Doc. A/59/565.

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Peaceful Uses of the Seas in the Light of New Challenges and Threats

(d) that the ship possesses no nationality; or (e) though the ship flies a foreign flag or flies no flag at all, there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that the ship is of the same nationality as the military ship. It is important to note that these generally recognised exceptions to the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas are aimed at increasing the security of navigation and preservation of the life of those at sea. But recently, new challenges and threats have appeared that are connected, primarily, with terrorist acts at sea, and the illegal traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which are not covered by the LOS Convention. The problem of international terrorism, the struggle against it, and the prevention of terrorist acts at sea and elsewhere, as well as preservation of peace and security in the light of evermore frequent terrorist attacks, is the primary task of the world community in general and every State in particular. Specialists emphasise the extraordinary danger of terrorist acts at sea. There are several lacunae in the international legal basis for the struggle against acts of terror at sea, notably: (a) a universal multilateral convention must be accepted which would serve as a basic instrument for the exercise of antiterrorist activity by an individual State, by competent international institutions and by the States’ special services; (b) such a convention would lay down a legal framework for measures taken in the struggle against acts of terror at sea in all its forms and manifestations, according to the 12 existing international conventions concerning the struggle against terrorism (and a 13th being the International Convention on the Struggle against Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted on 13 April 2005 and open for signature) as well as respective resolutions of the UN Security Council and so forth; and (c) especially important in the above convention would be the inclusion of a single – consensual – definition of terrorism. This work was begun by the draft proposed by India in 1996 at the 51st meeting of the UN General Assembly on a comprehensive convention on the struggle against terrorism. With the goal of preventing terrorist acts, the United States put forward the Initiative in the Sphere of Proliferation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Declaration on the Principles of Interception.2 This document constitutes an international response to the growing challenge of the proliferation of weapons of

2

The Russian Federation joined the founding group on interception on 31 May 2004. 439


mass destruction, systems for their delivery and respective materials throughout the world to stop the transportation of such weapons by sea. Members of the founding group creating a coordinated basis for the hindrance and prevention of the transportation of weapons of mass destruction and respective materials note in their Declaration that these measures are within international legal framework including the UN Security Council.3 The NATO operation “Active Endeavour” was created in the framework of the struggle against terrorism at sea in the Mediterranean Sea. The operation is aimed at the interception by NATO forces of foreign merchant ships suspected of the transportation of weapons of mass destruction and other kinds of prohibited weapons. In the framework of the operation, every three months two military convoys patrol the Mediterranean Sea. Since the operation began, some 42,000 merchant ships have been placed under surveillance. The operation was supported by Russian Federation according to the Agreement signed at the Russia-NATO meeting in Brussels on 9 December 2004. The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988 (Rome Convention 1988) and the Protocol On Struggle Against the Illegal Acts against the Stationary Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf of 1988 are now the most important international treaties against terrorism at sea. However, the necessity for improving their provisions has become apparent in the light of recent events.4 In 2005, the Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organization adopted the Protocol amending the Rome Convention 1988 and the Protocol thereof with the aim of toughening them up. In particular, the 2005 Protocol to the Rome Convention 1988 became the legal basis for the enforcement actions by military ships towards foreign merchant ships on the high seas, including those in the framework of the Proliferation Security Initiative. This included: (a) action to stop and board a foreign vessel on the high seas suspected of illegal activity; (b) determination of offences connected with illegal transportation by sea of people and goods resulting in the stopping of the vessel and the subsequent disembarkation; and

3

The Security Council Res. 1540(2004) of 28 April 2004 confirmed that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as means of delivery thereof is a threat to international peace and security, and emphasised the necessity for improving the coordination of efforts at national, subregional, regional and international levels.

4

See, J.L. Jesus, “Protection of Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects”, Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L., Vol. 18, No. 3, 2003, p. 363 at pp. 380-381.

440

Peaceful Uses of the Seas in the Light of New Challenges and Threats

(c) regulation of issues connected with liability for damage caused by unfounded disembarkation and so forth. Among current measures adopted by the international community for the prevention of terrorist acts, particularly at sea, it is important to mention the International Safety Code for Vessels and Port Constructions (enforced in 2004) and other amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 74/78), as well as suggestions by Russia, and unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004, which call upon States to cooperate in the struggle against terrorists and to sue them on the basis of the principle aut dedere aut judicare. The above operations in the areas of the world’s oceans involving different legal regimes with the goal of preventing terrorist activities promote the legal doctrine of so-called preemptive strikes. This tough problem has precipitated heated debate and a broad analysis of article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provides for the right to self-defence. The role of the Security Council and its resolutions are also being revised in the light of the doctrine of preemptive strikes, as well as necessity to reform the structure of the Security Council. From the point of view of the preservation of the various interests of States, including in the waters of the world’s oceans, and the secure navigation of ships, their crews and people on board, we concede that it is necessary to retain and confirm the authorisation order regarding the use of force by States in cases of real and substantive threats to their security. In this connection, the reform of the UN Security Council is a cornerstone of the problem, in the solution of which it is important to define and elaborate criteria concerning the use of “preventive” force, and the powers of the permanent members of the Security Council, with their veto right, in the appraisal of a situation and in the taking of a necessary decision. The current scale of illegal traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, primarily by sea, has become overwhelming and is one of new challenges facing the world community. In the above Report by the High-level Panel, the problem is characterised as a type of transnational crime. The LOS Convention, at the time of its creation, was unable to foresee all the nuances of the struggle against illegal traffic by sea. The provisions of the Convention provide for the possibility for the cooperation of States in this area (art. 108 (1) and (2)). The LOS Convention limits itself by providing that all States cooperate in the suppression of the illegal traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances by ships on the high seas in violation of international conventions (art. 108(1), whereas art. 108(2) provides for the possibility for every State to turn to other States with a request to cooperate in suppression of illegal traffic). The struggle against the illegal trafficking of drugs by sea is envisaged by the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 441


Substances of 1988 (UN Drugs Convention). Article 17, concerning “illegal traffic at sea”, contains important provisions, such as, for example, allowing military ships and aircraft of States Parties to act against vessels taking part in the illegal traffic on the high seas, even with the consent of the flag States. Taking into account the universal character of the provisions of the LOS Convention on the one hand, and the acuteness of this international legal problem on the other, it is necessary to add to the LOS Convention the definition of the illegal traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances as grounds for the interception of foreign vessels (art. 110). Moreover, article 108 of the LOS Convention, in treating the problem, declares the trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances by vessels on the high seas to be illegal. According to article 1 (“Definitions”) of the UN Drugs Convention, “illegal traffic” means offences provided for in article 3 (1) and (2) of the UN Drugs Convention, which describe a wide range of actions connected with narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including transportation. National legislation by Member States defines the actions provided for in article 3 as a crime. Thus the traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and the compulsory cooperation of competent State organs in the suppression of illegal traffic at sea should be included in the LOS Convention, as well as the compulsory punishment for the crime, expressed in the principle aut dedere aut judicare, and obligatory control by respective State organs over shipment of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Notwithstanding the peremptory character of the norms of the LOS Convention, there is an urgent need to follow current demands, and the international law of the sea must develop and react adequately to emerging new challenges and threats. The whole process of the historic development of the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas, and its recognition by all States of the world, even by those that have not ratified the LOS Convention, demonstrate that rejecting the legal order of the world’s oceans established by the LOS Convention is not an option. As to the current need to legalise the interception of foreign merchant ships, or other forms of limitation on the freedom of navigation, such measures must be exercised exclusively on collective grounds by taking joint decisions and be guided by the generally recognised principles and norms of contemporary international law.

442

LA CONVENTION SUR LA PROTECTION DU PATRIMOINE CULTUREL SUBAQUATIQUE Djamchid Momtaz

L

e 2 novembre 2001, la Conférence générale de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’Education, la Science et la Culture, l’UNESCO, adoptait la « Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique » (ci-après Convention).1 Le choix de cette Organisation comme cadre de négociation s’imposait de toute évidence, l’un des objectifs que lui assigne son acte constitutif étant l’élaboration de conventions internationales destinées à assurer la conservation du patrimoine universel. L’intérêt porté par l’Organisation à la question de la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique remonte à 1956, date à laquelle la Conférence générale adoptait une recommandation définissant les principes internationaux à appliquer en matière de fouilles archéologiques, dont celles menées sur le littoral ou le sous-sol des eaux intérieures ou territoriales.2 Depuis, le développement des techniques d’exploitation sous-marine, symbolisé par les interventions sur l’épave du « Titanic » à quelque 4000 mètres de fond, a rendu possible l’accès aux fonds marins situés à de plus grandes profondeurs, attisant d’autant la convoitise des chasseurs de trésors. A la recherche d’objets plus prisés sur le marché occulte des antiquités, ils ont entrepris, au cours de ces dernières années, la fouille sauvage d’un grand nombre d’épaves, au risque d’entraîner la perte de biens représentant autant d’éléments irremplaçables pour l’étude de l’histoire des civilisations. C’est ainsi que la question de la protection des objets de caractère archéologique et historique découverts en mer a été soulevée à la troisième Conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. La Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, adoptée à l’issue des travaux de cette Conférence, a le grand mérite d’énoncer l’obligation générale des Etats parties de protéger ces objets,

1

Doc. 31 C/64 – 31 octobre 2001.

2

Adoptée le 5 décembre 1956 lors de la session de la Conférence générale tenue à New Delhi, Doc. UNESCO IV.B.1.



quel que soit l’espace marin dans lequel ils se trouvent.3 Dans la zone contiguë, cette Convention reconnaît implicitement à l’Etat côtier une compétence exclusive.4 En revanche, aucune de ses dispositions ne traite des objets de caractère archéologique et historique susceptibles de se trouver sur la zone économique exclusive et le plateau continental, qui, par conséquent, continuent d’être soumis au principe de la liberté de la haute mer. Vide juridique d’autant plus regrettable que l’intense activité d’exploration menée en vue de la mise en valeur des ressources naturelles de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau continental a permis d’identifier de nombreuses épaves livrées désormais à la convoitise des chasseurs de trésors. Pour ce qui est des objets de caractère archéologique et historique gisant sur les fonds marins et leur sous-sol situés au-delà des limites de la juridiction nationale, pourtant mieux protégés parce que moins accessibles en raison de la plus grande profondeur des eaux, la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer énonce quelques règles lapidaires. Il est prévu que ces objets seront conservés ou cédés dans l’intérêt de l’humanité tout entière, compte tenu en particulier des droits préférentiels d’Etats pouvant se prévaloir d’un lien particulier avec ces objets.5 Cette disposition de la Convention manque malheureusement de précision et sa mise en œuvre est laissée à la discrétion des Etats.6 Elle omet par ailleurs de reconnaître une quelconque responsabilité à l’Autorité internationale du fond des mers pourtant chargée par la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer d’organiser et de contrôler les activités menées dans cette partie du fond des mers. Dès 1988, le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, dans son rapport annuel à l’Assemblée générale sur « les océans et le droit de la mer », mettait en exergue la nécessité de combler, par le biais d’un nouvel instrument international, le vide normatif existant quant aux épaves qui gisent dans la zone économique exclusive et sur le plateau continental.7 L’idée fut reprise par le Directeur général de l’UNESCO en 1991 dans le cadre d’un rapport sur le renforcement de l’action de cette Organisation dans la protection du patrimoine culturel, préparé à la demande de la Conférence générale.8 C’est suite à ce rapport qu’il fut invité, en 1993, par le Conseil exécutif de l’UNESCO, à entreprendre une étude de faisabilité

3

Article 303 al. 1.

4

Article 303 al. 2.

5

Article 149. Pour une analyse des dispositions pertinentes de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, Cf. M. Hayashi « Archeological and Historical Objects under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea », Marine Policy, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1996, pp. 291-296.

6

T. Scovazzi « The Evolution of International Law of the Sea: New Issues, New Challenges », RdC, Vol. 286, 2000, p. 209.

7

Rapport du Secrétaire général Doc. A/43/718, 1988 § 42-44.

8

Doc. 26 C Res. 3.9.

444

La Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique

sur la rédaction d’un nouvel instrument pour la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique.9 Cette étude sera remise en 1995.10 Entre temps, le Conseil de l’Europe11 et l’International Law Association12 adoptaient, respectivement en 1985 et 1994, des projets de convention sur le sujet. En 1996, ces textes serviront de base de discussions au Groupe d’experts et de représentants de la Division des affaires maritimes et du droit de la mer de l’ONU et de l’Organisation maritime internationale.13 Ce Groupe, réuni par le Directeur général à la demande de la Conférence générale,14 recommandait en 1997 la mise en place d’un Groupe d’experts gouvernementaux pour élaborer un projet de convention sur le patrimoine culturel subaquatique.15 C’est ainsi que la Conférence générale fut amenée, au cours de cette même année, à demander au Directeur général de convoquer la réunion d’un tel Groupe.16 De 1998 à 2001, le Groupe s’est réuni en sessions annuelles.17 Les profondes divergences divisant les experts, tant sur les mesures à prendre pour renforcer la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique que sur la compatibilité de telles mesures avec les droits que les Etats détiennent en vertu de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, empêchèrent la 4ème session du Groupe de parvenir à un consensus. C’est en vain que les négociations ont été poursuivies lors de la reprise de cette session. Le Groupe se résigna finalement à recourir au vote pour approuver le texte du projet de Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique. La plupart des experts qui représentaient les Etats qui estiment avoir un lien culturel, historique ou archéologique avec le patrimoine culturel subaquatique s’abstiendront ou s’opposeront au texte lors du vote. Le 9

Doc. 141 EX/5.5.1 § 15.

10

Doc. 146 EX/27.

11

Projet adopté en 1985 par le Conseil de l’Europe. U. Leanza « Le régime juridique international de la mer Méditerranée », RdC, Vol. 236, 1992, pp. 257-262.

12

P.J. O’Keefe « The Buenos-Aires Draft Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage Prepared by the International Law Association: Its Relevance Seven Years on », in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Legal Aspects, G. Camarda, T. Scovazzi (eds), Giuffre Editore Milano, 2002, pp. 93-104.

13

Rapport CLT-96/Conf 605/6.

14

Doc. 28 C/Res. 3.13.

15

Doc. 151 EX/3.3.2.

16

Doc. 29 C/Res. 21.

17

Première réunion du 29 juin au 2 juillet 1998 ; seconde réunion du 19 au 24 avril 1999 ; troisième réunion du 3 au 7 juillet 2000 et quatrième réunion en deux parties : du 26 mars au 3 avril et du 2 au 7 juillet 2001. Toutes ces réunions se sont tenues au siège de l’UNESCO à Paris avec la participation en moyenne de quelque 80 experts gouvernementaux ainsi que les représentants de plusieurs organisations internationales, dont les Nations Unies et l’Organisation Maritime Internationale, participant aux réunions à titre d’observateurs. 445


résultat du scrutin,18 tant au sein de la Commission de la culture de la Conférence générale, qui recommandait l’adoption du texte, qu’à la Conférence elle-même, reflète ces divergences. Elles sont généralement fondées sur une prétendue incompatibilité des dispositions de la Convention avec le droit international, plus précisément la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer.

I. La Convention vise à assurer et renforcer la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique L’alinéa 1 de l’article 2 de la Convention, intitulé « objectifs et principes généraux », précise que « la Convention vise à assurer et renforcer la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique ». C’est à cette fin que ses rédacteurs se sont appliqués à définir ce qu’on entend par un tel patrimoine et combler ainsi la lacune de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. Conformément à cette disposition de la Convention, consacrée aux définitions, « on entend par patrimoine culturel subaquatique toutes les traces d’existence humaine présentant un caractère culturel, historique ou archéologique qui sont immergées partiellement ou totalement, périodiquement ou en permanence, depuis 100 ans au moins ». Cette limite temporelle, à défaut d’être parfaite, a le grand avantage d’être objective tout en présentant l’inconvénient d’exclure du champ d’application de la Convention certains objets d’âge inférieur n’en présentant pas moins une importance artistique ou historique non négligeable. Ainsi en va-t-il des épaves de navires de guerre ayant sombré au cours des deux conflits mondiaux, du reste qualifiées de biens culturels par certaines législations nationales.19 C’est pourquoi il a été suggéré d’appliquer le critère temporel avec une certaine flexibilité,20 ce qui ne manquera pas, il faut le reconnaître, de susciter des difficultés d’ordre juridique. Quoi qu’il en soit, l’inclusion de cette limite présente l’avantage de permettre de faire la distinction entre l’épave historique et l’épave moderne,21

18

La Convention fut adoptée par la Conférence générale avec 87 voix pour, 4 contre et 15 abstentions. Cf. entre autres les votes négatifs de la Fédération de la Russie, de la Norvège et du Royaume-Uni, la France et la Suède s’étant abstenues.

19

G. Le Gurun « Le droit français de l’archéologie sous-marine », in Le patrimoine culturel et la mer, aspects juridiques et institutionnels, Vol. I, M. Cornu et J. Fromageau (sous la direction de), L’Harmattan, 2002, p. 106. L’auteur donne, entre autres, l’exemple de Malte.

20

U. Leanza « Le patrimoine culturel sous-marin de la Méditerranée », in La Méditerranée et le droit de la mer à l’aube du 21ème siècle, G. Cataldi (sous la direction de), Bruylant, 2002, p. 154.

21

J.P. Beurier « pour un droit international de l’archéologie sous-marine », RGDIP, Vol. XCIII, 1989, p. 48.

446


cette dernière pouvant continuer d’être exploitée à des fins, entre autres, de récupération de ses métaux. La définition du patrimoine culturel subaquatique se distingue par ailleurs par le fait qu’elle ne retient aucun élément géographique. Ainsi, le champ d’application géographique de la Convention, plus précisément l’obligation des Etats parties de protéger le patrimoine culturel subaquatique, s’étend, à l’instar de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, à toute l’étendue des mers et des océans, y compris les zones relevant de leur souveraineté nationale. Enfin, la définition du patrimoine culturel subaquatique telle qu’elle figure dans la Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique est extrêmement large.22 Cette Convention établit en effet une liste non limitative de biens devant être inclus dans la définition. Il s’agit tout d’abord des « navires, aéronefs, autres véhicules ou toute partie de ceux-ci avec leur cargaison ou autre contenu ainsi que leur contexte archéologique ». Il est intéressant de noter qu’en ce qui concerne les navires ayant sombré la Convention évite d’utiliser le mot « épave ». La raison en est qu’à ce jour il n’existe pas, en droit international, de définition généralement acceptée de l’épave. La définition du patrimoine culturel subaquatique englobe aussi « les sites, structures, bâtiments, objets et restes humains ainsi que leur contexte archéologique et naturel ». On peut citer, à titre d’exemple, les vestiges du phare d’Alexandrie précipités dans la mer par une série de séismes au cours du XIVème siècle. La liste se réfère enfin aux « objets de caractère préhistorique », à savoir ceux ayant fait partie de la cargaison d’un navire et tombés en mer. Il va sans dire, ainsi que la Convention ne manque d’ailleurs pas de le préciser, que les pipe-lines et les câbles posés sur les fonds marins, de même que toutes autres installations reposant sur ces fonds et encore en usage, sont exclus du patrimoine culturel subaquatique. En vue de protéger le patrimoine culturel subaquatique ainsi circonscrit, les rédacteurs de la Convention, soucieux de préserver les droits de juridiction des Etats dans tous les espaces marins, ont opté pour une approche zonale. C’est ainsi que, dans les espaces marins proches des côtes, les dispositions pertinentes de la Convention consacrent le droit exclusif des Etats côtiers en matière de protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique qui s’y trouve, alors que, dans les espaces marins plus éloignés des côtes, la responsabilité de protéger ce patrimoine incombe à l’ensemble des Etats.

22

G. Carducci « The Expanding Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: The New UNESCO Convention versus Existing International Law », in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, op. cit., p. 150. 447


1. Le droit exclusif de l’Etat côtier de protéger le patrimoine culturel subaquatique Il convient de distinguer entre les dispositions de la Convention relatives à la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique situé dans les espaces marins relevant de la souveraineté de l’Etat côtier et celles consacrées à la protection du patrimoine se trouvant dans la zone contiguë. a. La protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique dans les espaces marins relevant de la souveraineté de l’Etat côtier C’est évidemment dans « l’exercice de leur souveraineté » dans les eaux intérieures, les eaux archipélagiques et la mer territoriale que la Convention reconnaît aux Etats côtiers le droit exclusif de protéger le patrimoine culturel subaquatique gisant dans ces espaces marins. Conformément à cette disposition de la Convention, les Etats côtiers ont le droit exclusif de « réglementer et autoriser les interventions »23 sur ce patrimoine. Dans les deux cas et sans préjudice des autres accords et règles du droit international applicable en la matière, les Etats côtiers s’engagent à respecter les « règles relatives aux interventions sur le patrimoine culturel subaquatique » annexées à la Convention et qui font partie intégrante de celle-ci. Il s’agit de 36 règles empruntées à celles figurant dans la Charte internationale sur la protection et la gestion du patrimoine culturel subaquatique, adoptée par le Conseil international des monuments et des sites24 le 9 octobre 1996 à Sofia. L’Annexe à la Convention constitue, à l’instar de la Charte, un guide d’éthique et de pratique de l’archéologie subaquatique et énonce un certain nombre de principes : la préservation du patrimoine in situ comme première option, le recours à des méthodes d’investigation non destructives, l’encouragement de l’ouverture du site au public ainsi que la publication du résultat des recherches entreprises.25 Ces règles ont recueilli l’assentiment général et un certain nombre

23

Article 7 al. 1 de la Convention. D’après l’article 1 al. 6 de la Convention, on entend par intervention sur le patrimoine culturel subaquatique « une activité ayant principalement pour objet le patrimoine culturel subaquatique qui est susceptible de porter matériellement atteinte à ce patrimoine ou lui causer tout autre dommage directement ou indirectement ».

24

Plus connu sous son sigle anglais ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites). La Charte a été préparée par le Comité international du Conseil qui a pour mission d’assister l’ICOMOS et l’UNESCO à promouvoir la protection de ce patrimoine.

25

J.P. Beurier « Commentaire de la Déclaration de Syracuse sur le patrimoine culturel sousmarin de la mer Méditerranée », in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, op. cit., pp. 282-283. Sur les caractéristiques de ces principes, cf. H. Cassan « Le patrimoine culturel subaquatique ou la dialectique de l’objet et du lieu », in La mer et son droit, Mélanges offerts à L. Lucchini et J.P. Quéneudec, A. Pedone, 2003, pp. 139 et seq.

448


d’Etats qui avaient pourtant exprimé leur désaccord avec les dispositions de la Convention se sont d’ores et déjà engagés à les respecter.26 La Convention impose une seconde limite au droit exclusif de l’Etat côtier de réglementer et d’autoriser les interventions sur le patrimoine culturel subaquatique présent dans les eaux relevant de sa souveraineté. Elle concerne les navires et aéronefs d’Etat. D’après la Convention,27 en cas de découverte de tels navires ou aéronefs dans ses eaux, l’Etat côtier devrait informer l’Etat du pavillon, et, s’il y a lieu, tout autre Etat ayant un lien vérifiable avec ces derniers, en particulier un lien culturel historique ou archéologique. La Convention omet de préciser si, comme pour l’Etat du pavillon, tout Etat se targuant d’un tel lien doit être partie à la Convention. Dans la mesure où cette dernière se réfère à « la pratique généralement observée entre Etats » pour justifier l’inclusion de cette disposition, il faudrait en conclure que les rédacteurs de la Convention considèrent qu’elle n’est que l’expression d’une coutume internationale bien établie. Dans ces conditions, il ne semble pas qu’il soit nécessaire d’exiger que les Etats qui devraient être informés de la découverte des navires et aéronefs leur appartenant soient parties à la Convention. Quoi qu’il en soit, cette disposition est destinée uniquement à permettre à ces Etats de coopérer avec l’Etat côtier en vue d’adopter les meilleures méthodes de protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique gisant dans les espaces marins relevant de la souveraineté de ce dernier. b. La protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique dans la zone contiguë Pour permettre à l’Etat côtier d’assurer la protection des objets de caractère archéologique et historique se trouvant dans sa zone contiguë, la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer a eu recours à une présomption.28 En effet, l’Etat côtier peut présumer que l’enlèvement de tels objets de cette zone sans son autorisation constituerait une infraction à ses lois et règlements douaniers. Une telle présomption lui permettrait ainsi d’exercer, conformément à l’article 33 de cette même Convention consacré à la zone contiguë, le contrôle nécessaire en vue de prévenir une telle infraction. Il faut reconnaître qu’il n’est guère possible de prétendre que, dans tous les cas, les archéologues ou les chasseurs de trésors qui procèdent à l’enlèvement de tels objets dans une zone contiguë sont résolus à l’introduire dans le territoire de l’Etat côtier. On ne peut en effet exclure l’éventualité où les chasseurs de trésors opérant dans la zone contiguë

26

Cf. Intervention des représentants de la Fédération de la Russie, de Norvège et du RoyaumeUni au cours des débats de la Commission de la culture de la Conférence générale le 31 octobre 2001.

27

Article 7 al. 3.

28

Article 303 al. 2 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. 449


d’un Etat feraient, pour échapper à son contrôle, débarquer leur butin dans le port d’un autre Etat. Dans la mesure où la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de mer ne prévoit pas une telle éventualité, il faudrait en conclure que la présomption sur laquelle repose cette disposition est irréfragable.29 Ainsi, « la vérité de la présomption va nettement au-delà de la réalité »30 et il serait dès lors plus judicieux de dire que la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer a eu recours à une fiction juridique.31 En fait, si les rédacteurs de cette Convention ont eu recours à l’artifice juridique précité c’était pour venir à bout de l’opposition de certaines puissances maritimes à la reconnaissance des droits de juridiction de l’Etat côtier sur les objets archéologiques et historiques se trouvant dans les limites de 200 milles marins, une telle démarche ayant été proposée par les Etats dont les fonds adjacents recèlent de tels objets en grand nombre.32 En réalité, bien que l’alinéa 2 de l’article 303 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer ne reconnaisse pas explicitement de tels droits à l’Etat côtier dans sa zone économique exclusive, on se doit de reconnaître que cette disposition lui attribue en fait le droit exclusif de réglementer et autoriser l’enlèvement de ces objets dans ladite zone. En effet, dans la mesure où la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer qualifie l’enlèvement de tels objets de la zone contiguë d’infraction aux lois et règlements de l’Etat côtier, il faudrait en conclure que seul ce dernier sera en mesure de le faire. Cette disposition de la Convention étant destinée à « contrôler le commerce de ces objets », le droit exclusif ainsi reconnu à l’Etat côtier n’inclurait évidemment pas la recherche archéologique dans la zone, laquelle continuera de relever du principe de la liberté des mers. Le droit que la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer confère ainsi à l’Etat côtier dans sa zone contiguë en la matière dépasse largement la compétence de contrôle et de répression que le droit international lui reconnaît dans cette même zone. Il s’agit en fait d’une importante innovation aboutissant en fait à la création d’une zone de souveraineté que la doctrine qualifie de zone

29

L. Caflisch « Submarine Antiquities and the International Law of the Sea », NYIL, Vol. XIII, 1982, p. 20; A. Strati « The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: an Emerging Objective of the Contemporary Law of the Sea », Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, pp. 166-167 ; C. Economidès « La zone contiguë, institution revalorisée par le nouveau droit de la mer », in Propos sur le nouveau droit de la mer, Pedone, 1985, p. 84.

30

S. Karagianis « Une nouvelle zone de juridiction : la zone archéologique maritime », Espaces et ressources maritimes, 1990, No. 4, p. 10.

31

G. Carducci, op. cit., p. 190.

32

M.C. Giorgi « Underwater Archeological and Historical Objects » in A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, R.J. Dupuy, D. Vignes (eds), Martinus Nijhoff publishers Dordrecht 1991, pp. 568-569.

450


archéologique.33 Ainsi, les dispositions de l’alinéa 2 de l’article 303 procèdent plutôt du développement progressif du droit et doivent de ce fait être considérées comme demeurant « res inter alios acta ».34 D’ores et déjà, plusieurs Etats se fondant sur ces dispositions ont procédé à la mise en place de zones archéologiques.35 La Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique, tout en faisant siennes ces dispositions, n’en apporte pas moins certaines limites au droit exclusif que la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer reconnaît à l’Etat côtier dans sa zone contiguë. En effet, la nouvelle Convention lui impose l’obligation de respecter les règles figurant à l’Annexe de la Convention lorsqu’il réglemente et autorise les interventions sur le patrimoine culturel subaquatique situé dans sa zone contiguë. On ne peut que s’en féliciter dans la mesure où cette obligation contribue à renforcer la protection de ce patrimoine.36 2. La responsabilité commune des Etats de protéger le patrimoine culturel subaquatique L’article 9 de la Convention, consacré à la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique dans la zone économique exclusive et sur le plateau continental, ainsi que l’article 11 relatif à la protection de ce même patrimoine situé sur les fonds marins et leur sous-sol situés au-delà des limites de la juridiction nationale, plus communément appelés la zone, déclarent qu’ « il incombe à tous les Etats parties de protéger le patrimoine culturel subaquatique conformément à cette Convention ». La responsabilité principale de cette protection sera confiée à un Etat qualifié de « coordonnateur », qui agira, dans le premier cas, « au nom des Etats parties dans leur ensemble et non dans son propre intérêt »,37 alors que, dans le second cas, il interviendra « au bénéfice de l’ensemble de l’humanité au nom de tous les Etats parties ».38 L’Etat partie coordonnateur verra ainsi sa fonction dédoublée.

33

L. Caflisch, op. cit., p. 20 ; A. Strati, op. cit., p. 167 ; U. Leanza, op. cit., p. 146.

34

S. Karagianis, op. cit., p. 23.

35

Cf. entre autres la France : Loi No. 89-874 du 1er décembre 1989 relative aux biens culturels maritimes et le Danemark : Act No. 530 du 10 octobre 1984.

36

Article 8.

37

Article 10 al. 6.

38

Article 12 al. 6. 451


a. La responsabilité de l’Etat coordonnateur dans la zone économique exclusive et sur le plateau continental Conformément à la Convention,39 la qualité d’Etat coordonnateur échoit, en raison de sa position géographique privilégiée, à l’Etat côtier. Celui-ci peut néanmoins renoncer expressément à cette fonction. Dans ce cas, ce sont les Etats qui bénéficient d’un lien vérifiable, en particulier un lien culturel, historique ou archéologique, avec le patrimoine nécessitant une protection, qui seront appelés à désigner parmi eux un Etat coordonnateur.40 Afin de réduire les risques de pillage du patrimoine culturel subaquatique, la Convention mise sur la transparence des activités y relatives. Conformément à ses dispositions, toute personne ou navire qui fait une découverte41 ou envisage une intervention sur le patrimoine situé dans la zone économique exclusive ou sur le plateau continental42 devra non seulement le déclarer à l’Etat dont il a la nationalité mais aussi à l’Etat côtier. Des consultations seront alors tenues, sous l’égide de l’Etat coordonnateur, avec tous les Etats qui ont un lien vérifiable avec ce patrimoine afin de prendre les mesures qui s’imposent pour la protection des biens immergés.43 Il appartiendra à l’Etat coordonnateur de les appliquer et de délivrer toutes les autorisations nécessaires conformément aux règles annexées à la Convention. Les Etats participant à la consultation pourront néanmoins confier cette tâche à un autre Etat partie, à condition que l’Etat coordonnateur en convienne. Au cas où, de l’avis de ces Etats, des recherches préliminaires sur le patrimoine s’avèreraient nécessaires, l’Etat coordonnateur sera appelé à les conduire et à délivrer le cas échéant les autorisations qui s’imposent. Il transmettra sans retard les résultats obtenus au Directeur général de l’UNESCO qui les mettra à la disposition des autres Etats parties. Toutefois, en cas de nécessité, l’Etat coordonnateur sera exceptionnellement autorisé, avant toute consultation, à prendre d’urgence, conformément à la Convention44 les mesures qui s’imposeraient en vue de protéger le patrimoine culturel subaquatique. Celles-ci viseraient à prévenir tout danger immédiat, notamment le pillage ou toute autre activité humaine préjudiciable. Lors de l’adoption de telles mesures, l’assistance d’autres Etats parties pourrait évidemment être sollicitée.

39

Article 10 al. 3.

40

Article 9 al. 5.

41

Article 9 al. 1.

42

Article 9 al. 3 et 4.

43

Article 10 al. 5.

44

Article 10 al. 4.

452


b. La responsabilité de l’Etat coordonnateur dans la zone Le régime de protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique gisant sur les fonds des mers au-delà des limites de la juridiction nationale prévu par la Convention comporte, à l’instar de celui mis en place pour la zone économique exclusive et le plateau continental, deux volets : la circulation de l’information concernant le patrimoine sur une large échelle, la transparence étant garante de la protection, et la protection elle-même. Pour ce qui est du premier volet, les personnes et les navires qui font une découverte ou ont l’intention de procéder à une intervention sur le patrimoine culturel subaquatique situé dans la zone ont l’obligation de le déclarer à l’Etat dont ils ont la nationalité.45 Cet Etat est à son tour tenu de notifier les renseignements qui lui sont ainsi communiqués au Directeur général de l’UNESCO et au Secrétaire général de l’Autorité internationale des fonds marins, les Etats parties à la Convention étant à leur tour avisés de ces informations par le Directeur général.46 Le Directeur général invite alors tous les Etats qui ont exprimé, par une déclaration, leur souhait d’être consultés sur la manière d’assurer la protection effective de ce patrimoine. Dans la mesure où une telle déclaration doit être fondée sur un lien vérifiable avec le patrimoine, il ne peut s’agir, ainsi que la Convention ne manque pas de le préciser, que d’Etats de même origine culturelle, historique ou archéologique que les biens immergés.47 Ceux-ci seront appelés à désigner l’un des Etats parties comme Etat coordonnateur.48 Tout en précisant que l’obligation de protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique situé dans la zone est fondée sur l’article 149 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, la nouvelle Convention ne reprend pas la formule figurant à cet article. En effet, l’article 149 se réfère aussi à l’expression « de l’Etat ou du pays d’origine » de l’objet de caractère archéologique ou historique, qu’on ne retrouve pas dans la Convention de l’UNESCO. Cette suppression se justifie dans la mesure où l’expression « pays d’origine » prête à confusion49 et est dépourvue de représentation propre sur le plan international. A l’exemple des dispositions pertinentes de la Convention relative à la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique dans la zone économique exclusive et sur le plateau continental, l’Etat coordonnateur sera chargé de mettre en œuvre les mesures de protection convenues par les Etats participant à la consultation. Il lui appartiendra aussi de délivrer les autorisations nécessaires découlant des

45

Article 11 al. 1.

46

Article 11 al. 3 et 4.

47

Article 11 al. 4.

48

Article 12 al. 2.

49

R. Goy « L’épave du Titanic et le droit des épaves en haute mer », AFDI, 1989, p. 759. 453


mesures ainsi convenues. Dans les deux cas, si ces Etats en conviennent, un autre Etat partie pourra se substituer à l’Etat coordonnateur,50 tandis que seul ce dernier, à l’exclusion de tout autre Etat, sera en mesure de mener les recherches préliminaires sur le patrimoine et délivrer les autorisations nécessaires à cet effet. Les données ainsi recueillies seront transmis par ses soins au Directeur général de l’UNESCO qui, à son tour, les mettra à la disposition de tous les Etats parties.51 Si un danger immédiat menace le patrimoine culturel subaquatique, tous les Etats parties seront autorisés à prendre d’urgence, avant même toute consultation, les mesures qui s’imposeront pour l’écarter.52

II. La compatibilité de la Convention avec le droit international L’article 3 de la Convention précise qu’aucune de ses dispositions « ne porte atteinte aux droits, à la juridiction et aux devoirs des Etats en vertu du droit international, y compris la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer ». La plupart des Etats qui ont voté contre la Convention ou se sont abstenus ont invoqué l’incompatibilité de certaines de ses dispositions avec la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. Il s’agit plus précisément de celles relatives à la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique dans la zone économique exclusive et sur le plateau continental, qui accordent des droits de juridiction plus étendus à l’Etat côtier, et celles traitant des épaves des navires d’Etat.53 1. La compatibilité des droits de juridiction reconnus à l’Etat côtier La question de la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique dans la zone économique exclusive et sur le plateau continental a été incontestablement la plus controversée lors des négociations au sein du Groupe d’experts gouvernementaux. En effet, le clivage qui, lors des travaux de la troisième Conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, opposa les Etats partisans de la reconnaissance de la compétence de l’Etat côtier et ceux qui s’y opposaient de crainte de favoriser la territorialisation rampante de ces espaces marins, fit une nouvelle fois surface. La formule de compromis à laquelle le Groupe est parvenu ne semble pas avoir mis un terme à cette controverse qui aura été le principal obstacle à l’adoption de la Convention par consensus.

50

Article 12 al. 4.

51

Article 12 al. 5.

52

Article 12 al. 3.

53

Cf. Déclarations de la Norvège, de la Fédération d Russie et de la France au cours des débats de la Commission de la culture de la Conférence générale le 31 octobre 2001.

454


Il a été en effet soutenu que les dispositions pertinentes de la Convention mettent en cause l’équilibre difficilement élaboré par la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer entre les droits et les obligations de l’Etat côtier dans la zone économique exclusive et le plateau continental. Les dispositions de la nouvelle Convention ayant rompu l’équilibre en faveur des droits de l’Etat côtier, elles ne peuvent dès lors être considérées comme étant basées sur la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. Tel est le cas de la disposition qui accorde à l’Etat côtier le droit d’interdire ou d’autoriser toute intervention sur le patrimoine culturel subaquatique dans la zone économique exclusive et le plateau continental.54 Ce droit lui a été attribué pour lui permettre d’empêcher qu’il ne soit porté atteinte aux droits souverains que le droit international et la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer lui reconnaissent aux fins d’exploration et d’exploitation des ressources naturelles de ces espaces marins.55 La raison d’être de cette innovation se justifie difficilement.56 De nature fonctionnelle, cette nouvelle attribution reconnue à l’Etat côtier viserait à régler en faveur de ce dernier un éventuel conflit entre les intérêts des Etats qui voudraient procéder à l’enlèvement du patrimoine situé dans ces espaces et ceux de l’Etat côtier décidé d’entreprendre l’exploitation de ses ressources. Ceci dit, il est indéniable que de telles éventualités ont peu de chance de se réaliser. En effet, bien que, dans certains cas, l’enlèvement du patrimoine ou le renflouage des épaves nécessitent une emprise plus ou moins prolongée du fond des mers, obstruant ainsi les opérations d’exploitation, ils ne portent pas pour autant atteinte de manière irréversible aux droits souverains de l’Etat côtier. En revanche, le risque est grand que l’excavation du sous-sol des fonds marins entreprise aux fins d’exploitation de ses ressources entraîne la destruction du patrimoine culturel subaquatique, éventualité que la Convention n’entrevoit pas. Cette disposition de la Convention n’a malheureusement pas été rédigée dans un souci de préservation du patrimoine culturel subaquatique et semble par ailleurs être superflue. En effet, les rédacteurs de la Convention auraient pu se contenter d’y inclure une disposition renvoyant à l’article 59 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. Cette disposition relative à la question des droits résiduels dans la zone économique exclusive détermine la base de règlement des conflits dans les cas où cette Convention n’attribue ni droits ni juridiction à l’intérieur de la zone économique exclusive, ce qui semble être le cas de la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique dans la zone économique exclusive. Afin de régler le différend qui pourrait ainsi surgir entre les intérêts

54

Article 10 al. 2.

55

Article 56 al. 1a) et article 77 al. 1 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer.

56

G. Carducci, op. cit., p. 198. 455


de l’Etat côtier et ceux d’un ou plusieurs autres Etats, l’article 59 prévoit en effet qu’il « devrait être résolu sur la base de l’équité et eu regard à toutes les circonstances pertinentes, compte tenu de l’importance que les intérêts en cause présentent pour les différentes parties et pour la communauté internationale dans son ensemble ». Il reste que le recours à ces principes ne donnerait pas dans tous les cas la priorité à l’exercice des droits souverains de l’Etat côtier sur ses ressources naturelles, solution que la Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique impose pourtant. En effet, dans certains cas, l’importance exceptionnelle du patrimoine mériterait sans doute que les intérêts de la communauté internationale prévalent sur ceux de l’Etat côtier. D’une manière générale et indépendamment des difficultés que l’application de certaines dispositions de la Convention suscitent, il faut admettre que, dans un domaine comme celui de la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique dans la zone économique exclusive et sur le plateau continental, où la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer est silencieuse et le droit international inadapté, la question de la compatibilité de la Convention devrait être abordée avec une certaine flexibilité. En effet, une approche différente et par trop stricte aurait des conséquences absurdes57 et annihilerait les effets d’une convention pourtant destinée à assurer le développement progressif du droit international et combler un vide juridique. On ne peut dès lors refuser d’appliquer le régime de la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique situé dans ces espaces marins élaboré par la Convention au motif que la responsabilité effective que la Convention reconnaît à l’Etat côtier est incompatible avec les dispositions de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. Il est vrai que cette dernière Convention n’attribue aucune juridiction fonctionnelle à ce dernier sur ce patrimoine,58 mais il est aussi vrai qu’aucune de ses dispositions n’interdit à l’Etat côtier de prendre des mesures pour la sauvegarde de ce patrimoine. Bien au contraire, puisque la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer lui impose explicitement l’obligation de le protéger.59 Il est par ailleurs incontestable, de l’avis même des experts, que l’Etat côtier est le mieux placé, compte tenu de sa position géographique, pour mener à bien une telle tâche.60 Le régime de protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique dans la zone économique exclusive et sur le plateau continental mis en place par la Convention a le grand mérite de mettre un terme au régime de liberté tel qu’il résultait du

57

Ibid. p. 143 : T. Scovazzi « The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage », in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, op. cit., p. 122.

58

U. Leanza, op. cit., p. 156.

59

Article 303 al. 1 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer.

60

L.V. Prott « Les négociations au sein de l’UNESCO pour une Convention sur la protection du patrimoine subaquatique », in Le patrimoine culturel de la mer, op. cit., p. 228.

456


droit international, lequel ne pouvait qu’encourager et protéger les pilleurs de trésors.61 2. La compatibilité du statut des épaves des navires d’Etat L’article 32 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer énonce le principe de l’immunité des navires de guerre et autres navires d’Etat utilisés à des fins non commerciales. Ce principe n’est nullement contesté. La nouvelle Convention se fonde d’ailleurs sur cet article pour exempter ces bâtiments de l’obligation de notification et de déclaration mise à la charge des autres navires.62 La question qui se pose néanmoins est de savoir si cette immunité peut s’étendre aux épaves de ces navires. La Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer n’apporte pas de réponse à cette question pourtant soulevée, lors des travaux préparatoires de la Convention, par l’URSS. Cette initiative avait été provoquée par les opérations entreprises par les Etats-Unis en 1974 pour renflouer l’épave d’un sous-marin soviétique qui avait sombré dans l’Océan Pacifique en 1968.63 Diverses propositions, soumises par l’URSS et appuyées par les Etats socialistes, reconnaissaient aux navires et aéronefs d’Etat coulés au-delà de la mer territoriale une immunité complète de juridiction.64 Toutes furent rejetées par la Conférence. L’idée sous-jacente de ces propositions allait être reprise par la Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique qui interdit toute intervention sur de telles épaves situées dans la zone économique exclusive, sur le plateau continental ou sur les fonds situés au-delà, sans l’autorisation de l’Etat du pavillon.65 En revanche, dans les espaces marins relevant de la souveraineté de l’Etat côtier, ce dernier dispose du droit exclusif de réglementer et autoriser les interventions sur ces épaves. Cependant, dans un souci de coopération pour l’adoption des mesures de protection, la Convention prévoit que les Etats côtiers « devraient informer », en cas de découverte de telles épaves, l’Etat du pavillon et les autres Etats ayant un lien vérifiable avec l’épave.66 Cette disposition de la Convention devait susciter l’opposition des grandes puissances maritimes67

61

T. Scovazzi, op. cit., p. 117.

62

Conformément à l’article 13 de la Convention, les Etats parties « veillent à ce que ces navires se conforment dans la mesure du raisonnable et du possible aux dispositions des articles 9, 10, 11, 12 de la Convention ».

63

J.P. Quéneudec « Chronique du droit de la mer », AFDI, 1977, p. 734.

64

J.P. Quéneudec « Chronique du droit de la mer », AFDI, 1981, pp. 680-681.

65

Articles 11 al. 7 et 12 al. 7.

66

Article 7 al. 3.

67

Cf. Déclarations de la Fédération de Russie, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d’Amérique au cours des débats de la Commission de la culture de la Conférence générale le 31 octobre 457


qui estiment que le renflouement des navires et aéronefs d’Etat dans la mer territoriale ne peut se faire sans l’assentiment de l’Etat du pavillon. La pratique étatique semble confirmer cette opinion. On en veut pour preuve la note diplomatique adressée le 31 octobre 1980 par l’URSS au Japon exigeant l’arrêt immédiat des opérations de renflouage de l’épave du croiseur russe Amiral Nakhilov échoué dans sa mer territoriale.68 Les opérations furent suspendues alors que le croiseur avait, avant de sombrer, été capturé par la marine de guerre japonaise lors du conflit russo-nippon de 1905 et, de ce fait, avait cessé de jouir de l’immunité.69 La sensibilité des puissances maritimes à l’égard des épaves de leurs navires de guerre gisant dans les eaux étrangères est telle que certaines puissances navales ont élaboré des programmes à long terme pour leur protection.70 Il va sans dire que la mise en œuvre d’une telle politique ne peut se concrétiser qu’avec la coopération de l’Etat côtier sur le territoire maritime duquel l’épave gît. Telle est d’ailleurs la raison d’être des accords internationaux concernant le renflouement des épaves de navires de guerre conclus entre l’Etat du pavillon et l’Etat dans les eaux duquel ils gisent. Ces accords s’avèrent d’autant plus nécessaires qu’une opération de renflouage est incontestablement une activité « sans rapport direct avec le passage » à travers la mer territoriale et que les embarcations qui s’en chargent ne sauraient donc se fonder sur le principe du passage inoffensif pour entreprendre une telle opération sans l’accord préalable de l’Etat côtier.71 Ces accords devraient être considérés comme le point d’aboutissement du processus par lequel l’Etat côtier transfère les informations sur le patrimoine culturel subaquatique à l’Etat intéressé et lui donne l’autorisation d’intervenir sur le patrimoine. La Convention encourage d’ailleurs la conclusion de tels accords en vue d’assurer la préservation de ce patrimoine.72 Ainsi, l’argument selon lequel la conclusion d’accords bilatéraux entre les Etats intéressés pour le renflouage des épaves de navires de guerre gisant dans les eaux territoriales constituerait la preuve de la reconnaissance par l’Etat côtier du principe de l’immunité de ces épaves mérite un nouvel examen. En fait, la

2001. 68

J.P. Quéneudec, op. cit. note 64, p. 680.

69

J.A. Roach « Sunken Warships and Military Aircrafts », Marine Policy, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1996, p. 352.

70

Cf. Instruction du ministère de la Défense de la France en date du 10 juin 1999 ayant pour objet l’instruction préliminaire des dossiers de découverte d’épaves de navires militaires français dans les eaux étrangères. Pour plus de détails, Cf. G. Le Gurin, op. cit., p. 115.

71

Article 19 al. 2f) de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. L. Migliorino « The Recovery of Sunken Warships in International Law », in B. Vukas (ed.), Essays on the New Law of the Sea, Zagreb 1985, p. 253.

72

Article 6 al. 1.

458


série d’accords conclus à cet effet se fonde plutôt sur le titre de propriété de l’Etat identifiable. Ce titre ne peut faire en soi obstacle aux interventions de l’Etat côtier sur les épaves des navires d’Etat aux fins de protection. L’Accord du 6 novembre 1972 entre l’Australie et les Pays-Bas, ce dernier Etat agissant en tant que successeur des propriétaires des navires de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales gisant au large des côtes de l’Australie,73 ainsi que l’échange de notes du 22 septembre 1989 entre l’Afrique du sud et le Royaume-Uni, qui se référait aux droits et intérêts que ce dernier maintient sur les navires de sa marine de guerre,74 confirment le bien-fondé de cette affirmation. La déclaration du 19 janvier 2001 du Président des Etats-Unis, William Clinton, relative à la protection des navires de guerre va dans le même sens. Elle se réfère en effet expressément à l’article IV de la Constitution des Etats-Unis d’Amérique selon lequel seul le Congrès a le pouvoir de disposer d’un territoire ou de tout bien appartenant à l’Etat fédéral, dont les épaves de navires de guerre.75 Il en va de même des explications avancées par le Directeur général du ministère des Affaires étrangères du Japon, le 19 mai 1979, au Parlement de ce pays.76 C’est aussi en se fondant sur le titre de propriété du Royaume d’Espagne sur les deux frégates échouées dans la mer territoriale des Etats-Unis que la Cour suprême refusait de se prononcer, dans sa décision du 20 février 2000, sur deux recours relatifs à des opérations de renflouage de ces bâtiments présentés par l’Etat de Virginie et une société privée.77 Cette argumentation qui semble s’imposer progressivement78 et qui, du reste, est partagée par une partie importante de la doctrine79 a le mérite de ne pas se fonder sur le statut juridique des navires d’Etat, difficilement transposable aux

73

J.P. Beurier, op. cit., p. 55. Texte de l’Accord in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, op. cit.

74

L. Vierucci « Le statut juridique des navires de guerre ayant coulé dans les eaux étrangères : le cas des frégates espagnoles Juno et Gala retrouvées au large des côtes des Etats-Unis », RGDIP, Vol. 105, 2000, p. 720.

75

Statement by the President of the US of America on the US Policy for the Protection of Sunken Warships (19 January 2001); in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, op. cit., p. 447.

76

Jap. Ann. Int’l L., No. 29, 1986, p. 115.

77

L. Vierucci, op. cit., p. 707.

78

Le « Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Great-Britain and Canada Pertaining to the Shipwrecks HMS Erebus ans HMS Terror (5, 8 August 1997) » se réfère néanmoins au principe de l’immunité souveraine des épaves des navires de guerre. Faut-il y voir l’influence du Royaume-Uni, partisan convaincu de cette thèse? Texte in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, op. cit.

79

Cf. le recensement des auteurs qui y sont favorables fait par A. Strati, op. cit., p. 235. Cet auteur dresse aussi la liste des auteurs qui estiment que le principe de l’immunité des navires d’Etat s’étend aux épaves de ces mêmes navires. 459


épaves de ces mêmes navires. En effet, l’immunité que le droit international leur reconnaît se justifie en raison des fonctions que les navires d’Etat assument en tant qu’organes de l’Etat dont ils portent le pavillon. Réduits à l’état d’épaves, ces navires, tout en restant propriété de cet Etat, seront naturellement dans l’incapacité d’exercer des actes de souveraineté et ne pourront dès lors continuer à bénéficier de l’immunité. Seuls les documents officiels et le matériel se trouvant à bord de ces épaves et pouvant encore servir à exercer de tels actes pourront continuer de se voir accorder l’immunité,80 éventualité d’ailleurs difficilement réalisable pour les épaves qui gisent depuis de nombreuses années sur le fond des mers et qui ont subi de ce fait une érosion très avancée. On ne saurait ignorer pour autant que ces épaves, pouvant être assimilées à des cimetières, font partie de l’héritage culturel national et devraient être protégées contre toute interférence.81 *** Les dispositions de la Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique ne s’étendent pas aux droits de propriété. Conformément à cet instrument, la conservation in situ du patrimoine culturel subaquatique doit être considérée comme l’option prioritaire.82 L’intervention sur le patrimoine n’est autorisée qu’à la condition qu’elle contribue de manière significative à la protection, la connaissance ou la mise en valeur de ces biens immergés.83 Il en va ainsi des interventions visant à prévenir tout danger immédiat les menaçant, notamment le pillage.84 Dans ce cas, « les éléments du patrimoine culturel subaquatique qui ont été récupérés sont mis en dépôt, gardés et gérés de manière à assurer leur conservation à long terme ».85 La Convention laisse ainsi entier le statut des biens récupérés. C’est dans cet esprit que la Convention exclut ce patrimoine de l’application du droit de l’assistance et du droit des trésors.86 Néanmoins, l’autorisation de récupérer les épaves pourrait être donnée aux personnes privées par les services compétents des Etats, à condition toutefois qu’elle soit conforme à la Convention et que la protection maximum du patrimoine culturel subaquatique soit garantie.87 La Convention viserait ainsi à éviter que les intérêts privés, plus précisément l’appât

80

L. Vierucci, op. cit., p. 717.

81

J. Pingel « L’immunité des navires de guerre », in La mer et son droit, op. cit., p. 525.

82

Article 2 al. 6.

83

Règle 1 de l’Annexe.

84

Articles 10 al. 4 et 12 al. 3.

85

Article 2 al. 6.

86

Article 4. T. Scovazzi « Un remède aux problèmes poses par l’application de la salvage law au patrimoine culturel subaquatique », in La mer et son droit, op. cit., pp.565-575.

87

Article 4.

460


du gain, n’annihilent pratiquement l’effet des dispositions de la Convention. En effet, toute incitation d’ordre commercial et économique est incompatible avec une bonne gestion du patrimoine.88 Il s’agit incontestablement d’un progrès par rapport à la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, qui semble préserver les droits acquis par les intérêts économiques. En effet, l’alinéa 3 de l’article 303 de cette Convention dispose qu’il n’est pas porté atteinte « aux droits des propriétaires identifiables, au droit de récupérer des épaves et aux autres règles du droit maritime ».89 On était en droit d’espérer qu’en laissant entière la question du statut du patrimoine culturel subaquatique pour accorder la priorité à celle de sa protection, la Convention offrirait de bonnes garanties pour recueillir le maximum d’adhésion et de soutien. Il n’en a malheureusement rien été puisque, plus de cinq ans après son adoption, seuls dix Etats ont déposé leur instrument de ratification. L’hypothèque qui pèse sur la Convention en raison de l’opposition des grandes puissances risque de retarder pour une longue période son entrée en vigueur.90

88

Règle 2 de l’Annexe de la Convention.

89

G. Carducci « New Developments in the Law of the Sea: The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage », AJIL, Vol. 96, April 2002, p. 425.

90

L’article 27 de la Convention prévoit qu’elle entrera en vigueur trois mois après la date de dépôt du 20ème instrument des Etats et des territoires qui jouissent d’une complète autonomie interne conformément à la Résolution 1514(XV) de l’Assemblée Générale et qui ont compétence pour les matières dont traite la Convention. A la date du 30 septembre 2006, seuls deux Etats particulièrement intéressés par la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique, à savoir l’Espagne et le Portugal, avaient ratifié la Convention. 461

THE PENAL LAW OF SHIP-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: SELECTED ISSUES IN PERSPECTIVE Proshanto K. Mukherjee*

I. Introduction

“O

n the one hand, there is the need of society to be able to make use of the resources and facilities offered by nature in order to produce the things it needs and wants and, on the other hand, the need to ensure that man does not so pollute the environment as to make impossible the very activities which depend on the environment for their continuance – activities such as transportation, food production, recreation and industry”. (Thomas A. Mensah) The phenomenon of marine pollution is a menace that is multi-dimensional in scope. Its devastating effects tend to penetrate almost every facet of maritime activity. The need to protect the marine environment, not only for its own sake, but also to enable society to operate effectively and fruitfully in that environment has been unequivocally expressed by Judge Mensah in the above-noted words.1 The grounding of the Liberian tanker Torrey Canyon in March 1967 and the resulting oil spill when the master attempted to take a short cut over the Seven

*

The opinions expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the author. They may or may not be consistent with the views of any institution or organisation with which the author may be associated in connection with this subject matter or otherwise. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Assistant Professor Max Mejia and Faculty Assistant Mrs Carla Escalante Fischer, both of World Maritime University, in editing this work and of Dr Jingjing Xu of University of Plymouth in providing valuable consultation and comments.

1

T.A. Mensah, “Legal Problems Relating to Marine Pollution by Oil”, in P. Hepple (ed.), Water Pollution by Oil, Proceedings of Seminar Sponsored by the Institute of Water Pollution Control and the Institute of Petroleum, published by the Institute of Petroleum, London, 1971, at p. 293.



Stones Reef was a rude awakening for the world maritime community. The vessel was fully loaded with 119,328 tons of Kuwaiti crude oil. Nearly half of the cargo, some 80,000 tons, escaped into waters off the southwestern coast of England, which in 1967 were high seas.2 The magnitude of the oil spill was unprecedented and its effect, needless to say, was environmentally disastrous. Its impact shocked the global maritime community into taking quick and concerted action. It was the start of a learning curve, and a catalyst for the emanation of several international legal instruments on ship-generated marine pollution. The international dimension of marine pollution is exemplified first by the mobile character of the medium itself and the pollutant it carries. Polluted waters at sea are seldom stagnant. Indeed, oil as a floating pollutant knows no bounds and crosses over maritime zones and national and international jurisdictional demarcation lines in directions dictated by wind, current, tidal phenomena and other vagaries of nature. This is, of course, true of air pollution as well, but unlike an exhaust-emitting land-based factory that is firmly grounded, the polluting agent at sea, namely the ship, is a mobile vehicle. This observation, however, triggers the argument that not all marine pollution is generated by ships. Indeed ship-source pollution is the lesser of the two main pollution generating evils. Statistical evidence has confirmed time and again that the volume of pollution from land-based sources entering the sea is far greater than ship-source pollution. Furthermore, the mobile characteristic of the ship has the effect of diversifying the spread of pollution which results in its eventual dissipation aided by natural forces such as wind and current. Besides ship and land-based sources there is yet another source of marine pollution that draws less public attention, and that is pollution from sea-bed activities, or to put it precisely, from offshore exploitation of oil. All these three sources of marine pollution are recognised by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (LOS Convention), which, in its Part XII captioned “Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment”, sets out the basic legal framework for the regulation and control of this phenomenal maritime menace. There is, today, no dearth of international maritime conventions covering almost every conceivable aspect of marine pollution and fleshing out in detail the framework provisions articulated in the LOS Convention. But law-making in this field is no mean task, and implementing and enforcing the conventions by States Parties is even more onerous. Furthermore, there is the question of whether the plethora of conventions and associated soft-law treaty instruments actually produce the desired effect. In this context Judge Mensah wrote in 1971:

2

P.K. Mukherjee and R.S. Lefebvre, “Fishermen and Oil Pollution Damage: The Regimes of Compensation”, in J.-L. Chaumel (ed.), Labour Developments in the Fishing Industry, Canadian Special Publication of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 72, at p. 74.

464

The Penal Law of Ship-Source Marine Pollution

“one merely has to consider the many concerns, organized and individual, public and private, national and international, which have direct and indirect interests in the various resources of the sea, to appreciate the complexity of the problems involved in any regime designed to regulate and control the use of that environment.”3 The principal purpose of this chapter is to analytically examine the penal aspects of the law of ship-source marine pollution. The discussion embraces the major public law conventions in the field including Part XII of the LOS Convention. It then progressively prescribes how the violation provisions of these conventions may be effectuated in functional terms within the domestic legislative regime through the appropriate articulation and characterisation of offences and provision of corresponding sanctions. To put this expressed objective into its proper perspective, it is first deemed necessary to clearly set out the specific and distinctive types of ship-source pollution. The marine pollution conventions are then conceptually cast into a spectrum ranging from public to private law in terms of their respective positions within the continuum of prevention, mitigation and remedy which reflect their particular characteristics. The regulatory/criminal interface of penal offences is then addressed from the perspective of functional effectiveness, and the implications of the interface are discussed by reference to specific case law together with the potential impact of two crucial provisions of the LOS Convention and MARPOL.

II. Types of Ship-Source Pollution It is common ground that ship-source pollution is and should be typified to make distinctions between human intervention and fortuitous causes that result in the entry of pollutants into the sea. Judge Mensah perceptively describes the two types as voluntary and accidental. He refers to voluntary pollution as that which is attributable to “deliberate discharge”; and accidental pollution as the variety that is a consequence of the pollutant escaping accidentally from the ship into the sea.4 The references are to oil, which in the public eye is the most sensational of pollutants. Judge Mensah rightly points to the fact that ships as carriers of cargo and fuel oil voluntarily pollute the seas in the course of their use of that environment. He recognises that much of voluntary ship-source pollution is a necessary outfall of the operational activities of the ship, and opines that any regime designed to curb such pollution must take account of the systematic yet necessary character of such discharges and their cumulative effect.

3

Supra, note 1, at p. 294.

4

Supra, note 2, at p. 295. 465


Judge Mensah also alludes to the fact that land-based industries voluntarily and indiscriminately use the marine environment as a bottomless natural receptacle for their unwanted wastes and effluents. In reference to accidental pollution of the seas, he refers to both spills of oil cargo as well as fuel from bunkers of ships, and also to exploration and exploitation activities conducted on the sea-bed and ocean floor sometimes resulting in catastrophic blowouts.5 Voluntary but necessary ship-source pollution, as distinguished from accidental oil spills, can also be characterised as operational discharges. It is evident that the term “operational discharges” is very much in vogue in the current literature on the subject.6 The terminological appellation aptly circumscribes the element of necessity inherent in this type of ship-source pollution. The operational medium of a ship is the marine environment. As such, discharges incidental to its regular and normal operations, whether it is under way at sea or at anchor in a roadstead or made fast alongside a pier or wharf, end up in that environment. The operational discharges include tank washings from tankers as well as oily wastes from machinery spaces and bilges of tankers and non-tankers alike. While necessity of discharge is a crucial factor, the imposition of regulatory control by setting permissible discharge standards and requiring port reception facilities together with on-board containment of effluent in the absence of such facilities, has undoubtedly proven to be the rational approach to the problem of pollution from ships’ operational discharges. Other technological advancements in tanker operations such as crude oil washing (COW) and the “load on top” (LOT) system have contributed immensely to the overall ameliorative process. Preventive control measures have demonstrably reduced the potentiality of accidental oil spills. Prescriptive mechanisms such as double skins for tankers and other structural refinements in shipbuilding such as the use of segregated ballast tanks (SBT), collision bulkheads and the like are exemplary features of contemporary naval architectural initiatives responding to the environmental needs of the shipping industry and international regulatory requirements. All of the preventive measures against operational discharges and accidental spills observed above are embodied in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by its Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78), variously described as the MARPOL Convention or simply MARPOL. It is undeniable that MARPOL is the single most comprehensive and important Convention among the plethora of international and regional treaty instruments addressing prevention of ship-source marine pollution.

5

Ibid.

6

See C. de la Rue, “Pollution from Ships: EU Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Ship-Source Pollution”, Paper presented at International Colloquium on Maritime Legal Liabilities, Swansea, 14-15 September 2006.

466


However, there is one other pollution type that must not be overlooked. It is the deliberate dumping of wastes at sea which can be a serious menace if the waste is nuclear or radioactive matter. While it is undoubtedly marine pollution by any definition, whether it can be characterised as ship-source, or more appropriately as a land-based source of pollution, is a matter of inconsequential debate. Wastes are dumped at sea from ships although they originate on land. Some wastes are dumped after incineration on board. At any rate, they are transported on board ships in much the same way as cargo oil and fuel oil is carried on board ships. The differences are that wastes are carried to be deliberately dumped at sea, oil or other pollutant cargoes are carried for transportation to a port, terminal or pipeline, and fuel oil is carried for operational consumption on board. In none of these cases does the pollutant enter the sea directly from pipelines or drainage systems ashore. The only issue of relevance is that dumping is neither operational nor accidental. As a maritime activity it is governed internationally by the London Convention on Dumping of Wastes at Sea, 1972 revised by the Protocol of 1996.7 The revised Convention is preventive in scope and its scheme is one of total prohibition in the first instance. Dumping is permissible only if the substance falls within the permissible parameters set out in Annex 1 to the Protocol. The distinction between operational discharge and deliberate dumping is manifested by their mutual exclusions stated expressly in the respective definitions of “discharge” in MARPOL and “dumping” in the London Convention. Discharge and dumping are, in a sense, both voluntary acts, but whereas discharge is necessitated by operational compulsion, dumping is clearly deliberate. It is the element of necessity in operational discharge that accentuates the distinction between the two types. By contrast, an accidental spill is involuntary and nonintentional. It may be attributable to fortuitous circumstances beyond the control of the ship’s master, or to his navigational error or somebody else’s fault. It is apparent from the above discussion that voluntary acts of pollution consist of the two sub-types of operational discharges and deliberate dumping of wastes whereas oil spills belong to the accidental specie. The types and sources of marine pollution together with the attendant Convention instruments through which ship-source pollution types are internationally regulated are illustrated in the diagram below. The Conventions are summarily explained in the next section of this chapter which introduces the spectrum of marine pollution conventions.

7

1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter of 29 December 1972. 467


Fig. 1 Ship source

Air pollution Marpol 73/78 Annex VI

Marine Pollution

Non-ship source

Land based

Seabed

Voluntary

Deliberate (dumping)

Operational (discharge)

Accidental spill

London Convention 1972; 1996 Protocol

Marpol 73/78 Annexes I, II, III, IV, V

OPRC 90 Marpol 73/78 Annexes I, II © Proshanto K. Mukherjee

III. The Continuum of Prevention, Mitigation and Remedy A temporal continuum of measures to be adopted before and after the fact of a ship-source pollution event is essential first to the understanding of this phenomenon, and secondly, to the formulation of rational policy underpinning a comprehensive international regime for its control and amelioration. Within this conceptual framework, the subject of ship-source pollution is perceived in terms of preventive and remedial measures adopted pursuant to prescriptive and mandatory requirements embodied in international convention instruments. Preventive measures are put into place with the object of eliminating or reducing the chances of the pollution occurring; in other words, taking action ahead of time in the timescale of events. By contrast, remedial measures are of two kinds. In relation to operational discharges they are pursued routinely because of the cumulative effect of the pollution occurring over an extended period. In cases of accidental spills, the measures are deployed expeditiously. Remedial measures are introduced when preventive measures fail to materialise and pollution takes place. Particularly for combating oil spills, contingency planning is necessary in contemplation of such failure. The preventive and remedial dimensions of law and policy in this field are thus self-evident. Practical preventive measures take the form of technical requirements in tanker design and installation of pollution prevention equipment on board ships such as oil discharge monitoring and control systems (ODMACS), and transfer of oily wastes to shore-based reception facilities under MARPOL 73/78. Under the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 468


and Cooperation (OPRC), contingency planning and emergency preparedness measures are required to be taken by coastal States as parallel preventive devices. In the wake of an oil spill, mitigation of damage through containment and salvage operations, and remedial measures such as cleanup operations comprise the corresponding response actions. Fig. 2

Prevention

Event/Incident

Mitigation

Remedy

© Proshanto K. Mukherjee

It is obvious that, within the temporal framework of the continuum, preventive measures need to be adopted in anticipation of pollution taking place, whether it is in the form of operational discharges, deliberate dumping of wastes or an oil spill. With regard to operational discharges of oil, there are two considerations; namely, pollution load and the location and vulnerability of the waters in question. Pollution load is best controlled through the setting of mandatory discharge standards for ships. The standards themselves are set at an optimum level, ranging from total prohibition coupled with on-board containment of pollutants to controlled discharges within set limits. Different standards are prescribed for tankers and non-tankers. Discharge standards essentially consist of three parameters, all of which are quantitative. The first is mainly relevant to a vessel that is relatively stationary, such as a fishing vessel engaged in fishing in a particular spot or a vessel at anchor. The second is in terms of the linear distribution of the pollutant over distance when a vessel is under way. The first is expressed in parts per million (p.p.m.) of oil content and the second in terms of quantity in litres per nautical mile. The third parameter is the maximum amount of oil specified as a proportion of the cargo of which the residue forms a part that is allowable in respect of discharges from oil tankers in certain circumstances. When it comes to deliberate dumping of wastes, the activity is governed largely by international convention law, which is given effect through national legislation for the most part. As mentioned above, the regime in question is preventive in scope to the extent that certain substances are totally prohibited from entering the sea whereas dumping of other categories of waste are subject to control measures.8 Oil spills being primarily accidental are another matter. Preventive measures are warranted so that disasters can be avoided. Thus, as indicated above, contingency planning and preparedness is an important 8

Ibid. Annex 1. 469


component of the pollution prevention process in relation to oil spills. Other important measures are strictures imposed on vessels in terms of structural and design requirements, particularly in relation to tankers; the foremost example being the requirement for double hulls, the implementation of which is subject to a phasing-in process.9 Shipping is largely an international activity. As ships navigate through various maritime zones, including the high seas and waters under jurisdictions of coastal States, pollutants entering the sea from such ships also float across maritime boundaries and zonal limits. As such, ship-source pollution is a dynamic cross-boundary phenomenon that is rightfully governed by international law, most of which is contained in treaty instruments of universal application. These are, of course, given effect through national legislation. Furthermore, there are regional conventions that are designed to address particular regional concerns regarding protection of the marine environment from ship-source pollution. The preventive measures so designed and articulated serve to accommodate the various affected interests, both public and private. The international maritime community is mindful of the fact that ships and their owners and operators must not be exposed to “patchwork quilt” regimes with far-flung requirements which would seriously impede seaborne trade in the global context. It behoves us to constantly remind ourselves that tankers carry pollutant cargoes that are dangerous but are also necessaries of contemporary societal existence with economic implications that are at once fragile and volatile. Preventive measures harmoniously provide the linkage between need and precaution within the continuum. In anticipation of the failure of preventive measures, two categories of response action are contemplated. One falls within the scope of practical measures for which a rational action plan is put into place to combat the pollution and the other falls within the domain of liability and compensation, i.e., to provide for the losses suffered by pollution victims. On the practical side, the first course of action in temporal terms is mitigation of damage which is illustrated as the middle element in the conceptualised continuum. Mitigation is essentially damage control. When preventive measures fail it is incumbent upon all concerned to take the actions necessary to contain the damage and prevent it from spreading and proliferating. In the event of a pollution incident attributable to an oil spill, mitigation action may entail such measures as salvage to refloat a grounded or stranded vessel or emergency patching up of a holed hull, booming arrangements, transfer of oil cargo and the like. In the temporal continuum, the other course of action is remedial measures, which is part of the response mechanism, and, as indicated above, consists of

9

See MARPOL 73/78 Convention, Annex I, Regulations 19 and 20. All references to provisions in MARPOL are to the Consolidated Edition 2006.

470


a practical and a legal component. Stated precisely, the practical aspects of the entire continuum are governed by legal prescriptions; albeit they are regulatory in scope. Therefore, the two components of the response mechanism referred to above are better described as regulatory and private law components, the latter embracing liability and compensation issues pertaining to pollution victims. Initially, practical remedial action is taken simultaneously with mitigative action but invariably continues beyond it. The private law component of remedial action is obviously effectuated following the physical damage and, together with its practical counterpart, is therefore situated at the right-hand extremity of the continuum. For the most part, practical remedial action consists of cleanup operations. It is an integral part of the response element in contingency planning and is effectuated after the fact when preventive measures fail, despite preparedness. To put the conceptuality of the continuum in proper perspective, it is to be noted that preventive measures embracing all the three types of pollution discussed above are governed by international convention law of the regulatory variety. They prescribe discharge standards for operational pollution through MARPOL and prohibitions and limitations on dumping of wastes through the London Convention. The MARPOL Convention also incorporates structural requirements for tankers designed to prevent accidental spills caused by casualties such as collisions and groundings. The Conventions provide for violations in respect of which sanctions of adequate severity are required to be put into place through domestic legislation, mainly to serve as deterrent measures. The enforcement of compliance with these Conventions also has two temporal dimensions. Under MARPOL, ships need to go through a process of surveys and certification, which is part of the enforcement mechanism designed to prevent pollution. Such activities as aerial surveillance for the detection of discharges and oil spills, port State control, apprehension and detention of violating ships and judicial proceedings are remedial enforcement measures taken following the pollution event. Thus, the preventive and remedial prescriptions provided in the Conventions are effectuated through practical and legal enforcement measures, including penal sanctions largely of the regulatory type.

IV. Spectrum of Marine Pollution Conventions 1. The Spectrum Concept The international convention regime governing ship-source marine pollution readily lends itself to illustrative analysis by reference to a spectrum variously depicting a range between the public and private law domains. The gamut of conventions on ship-source marine pollution depicted in the spectrum diagram below is illustrative of the fact that virtually no aspect of the regime of ship-source 471


pollution has been left untouched by convention law, although on the private law side, in common law jurisdictions, there is a body of jurisprudence that is decidedly different from the convention law in certain ways. By contrast, the public law is almost entirely convention-based although the application of its penal provisions is largely tempered by the domestic penal law of States Parties to the conventions in question, both in terms of substance as well as procedure. The extremities of the public law domain of the spectrum include public international law and penal law. Public international law in the present context refers to the law governing relationships among subjects of international law, which for the most part consists of sovereign States but extends as well to international institutions. The penal law is characterised by duality of application touching both spheres of jurisdiction, international as well as domestic. As will be elaborated later in this chapter, the penal law is further sub-dividable into regulatory and criminal law. However, for the present purposes, given that there is no specific criminal law convention addressing marine pollution, only the regulatory Conventions are depicted in the spectrum diagram (Fig. 3 below). The regulatory law refers to regulation of activities pertaining to ships that potentially result in ship-source pollution. Much of the content of this law is technical in scope and is closely allied with the regulatory law of maritime safety. The law is thus directed to regulators and enforcement agencies such as port authorities, maritime administrations and coast guards, and also to those at Fig. 3: Marine Pollution Spectrum Convention Interfaces Public

Regulatory

Private

LOS Convention Part XII*, Interventiong, SalvageΔ

MARPOLg, Dumpingg, AFSg, BWMg, Baselg, OPRC¤, OPRC-HNS PROT¤

FUND†, SUPP FUND PROT†, CLC†, HNS†, Bunkers†, Salvage†

Interfaces

Interfaces

LOS Convention Art. 211* j MARPOLg LOS Convention Art. 210, 216* j Dumpingg LOS Convention Art. 212* j MARPOL Annex VIg LOS Convention Art. 196* j BWMg LOS Convention Art. 199* j OPRC¤ LOS Convention Art. 195* j Baselg

MARPOL Annex Ig j CLC†, FUND† MARPOL Annex IIg j HNS† OPRC¤ j CLC†, FUND† OPRC-HNS PROT¤ j HNS†

Interfaces LOS Convention Art 229, 235* j CLC†, FUND†, SUPP FUND PROT†, HNS†, Bunkers† Salvage Art. 9Δ j Salvage Art. 14†

472


Glossary of Symbols g Preventive † Remedial ¤ Preventive/ Mitigative Δ Mitigative * Preventive/ Remedial/ Mitigative Glossary of Conventions – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), 1982 – International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention), 1969 – International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78) – Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (Dumping), 1972; Protocol of 1996 – International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships (AFS), 2001 – International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM), 2004 – Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel), 1989 – International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC), 1990; HNS Protocol (OPRC-HNS Protocol), 2000 – International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), 1992 – International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND), 1992; Supplementary Fund Protocol (SUPP FUND PROT), 2003 – International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), 1996 – International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (Bunkers), 2001 – International Convention on Salvage (Salvage), 1989 © Proshanto K. Mukherjee

the receiving end of the regulatory requirements, namely, ships, their owners, operators, masters and crew, salvors and tug operators. At the far right of the spectrum, the private law domain is depicted. The Conventions shown here are those that pertain to spills of oil and chemicals and address issues of liability of polluters and compensation for pollution victims. Some Conventions are preventive or remedial in scope; others are hybrid or multiple in nature comprising any combination of preventive, mitigative and remedial characteristics. The interfaces and correlations among the Conventions are demonstrable by reference to the spectrum. The diagram also depicts graphically the connectivity between the spectrum of marine pollution Conventions and the prevention-mitigation-remedy continuum.

473


2. The Conventions within the Spectrum At the far left of the spectrum are two public international law instruments. The first is Part XII of the LOS Convention, which provides the framework for the entire international law of marine pollution under the caption “Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment”. This part consists of eleven sections that cover articles 191 to 237. Article 194 is of fundamental significance, as in paragraph 1 it requires States10 to take measures necessary to prevent reduce and control marine pollution from any source (emphasis added).11 With regard to vessel-source pollution, the measures required are those necessary to, inter alia, prevent accidents and handle emergencies to ensure operational safety, and prevent intentional and unintentional discharges.12 It also re-enforces the doctrine of State responsibility in paragraph 2 by requiring States to ensure that no pollution arising out of activities under their jurisdiction or control spreads beyond their respective jurisdictional areas. Article 195, which provides the foundation for the Basel Convention13 requires States to prevent transfer of pollution damage or hazards and transformation from one pollution type to another. Article 196, the foundation for the Ballast Water Management Convention14 requires States to prevent and mitigate the intentional or accidental introduction into the marine environment of harmful, alien or new species. Article 199 requires States to put into place contingency plans for the purpose of responding to pollution incidents (primarily oil spills) and serves as the foundation provision for the OPRC Convention.15 Article 210 addresses the issue of dumping of wastes as a type of marine pollution and is the foundation provision for the London Convention on Dumping.16 10

It is to be noted that “States” is used in contra-distinction to “States Parties”; the latter being a defined term in article 1.2(1). This signifies that the substantive law contained in this provision, among others, is applicable to all States regardless of whether they are States Parties. It reinforces the argument that the substantive law of the LOS Convention is essentially a codification of customary international law.

11

In paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), respectively, the sources are expressly mentioned which include dumping, vessel-source pollution, and pollution from the seabed and subsoil.

12

Article 194.3(b) which also requires States to regulate the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of vessels.

13

Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1989.

14

International Convention for the Control and Management of Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004.

15

International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990; HNS Protocol, 2000.

16

Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972; Protocol of 1996.

474


Article 211 is elaborate and comprehensive; it addresses vessel-source pollution and in its various paragraphs provides the foundations for various aspects of the regulatory regime of the MARPOL Convention including the concept of “special area”. Article 212 is the foundation provision for Annex 6 of MARPOL 73/78, which deals with pollution entering the sea via air polluted by exhausts from ships. Article 216 deals with enforcement respecting pollution by dumping, and articles 217, 218 and 220 deal with enforcement by flag States, port States and coastal States, respectively. Article 221 entitles coastal States to take enforcement measures beyond the territorial sea to protect their coastline or related interests including fishing, arising out of a maritime casualty17 in accordance with customary or convention international law. This provision can be said to provide the foundation for the Intervention Convention.18 Article 230 is a critical provision that deals with sanctions for violations of pollution laws. The sanctions are primarily limited to monetary penalties. In recent times, this provision has not been applied by States in conformity with the requirements. The issue will be addressed in detail later in this Chapter. Article 235 deals with the doctrine of State responsibility and also provides the basis for the articulation of the international regime of liability and compensation for pollution damage. The other Convention under the caption of “public” in the spectrum is the Intervention Convention. It was one of the two conventions that emerged from the deliberations that took place at the diplomatic conference held in Brussels after the Torrey Canyon oil spill disaster in 1967. The Intervention Convention is a public international law Convention with the distinction of establishing for the first time the jurisdiction of coastal States over foreign vessels on the high seas, subject to the conditions set out in the Convention. It allows a coastal State to intervene on the high seas in the event of actual or threatened pollution causing grave and imminent danger to its coastline or interests related thereto. Although the Salvage Convention19 is primarily a private law Convention, it is also included in the left hand side of the spectrum because of certain provisions pertaining to the coastal State’s right to control salvage operations through public authorities and to take measures to protect its coastline or related interests from pollution, actual or threatened, following a maritime casualty.20

17

“Maritime casualty” is defined in paragraph 2 to mean a collision, stranding or other incident of navigation, etc. resulting in material damage or imminent threat of such damage to a vessel or cargo.

18

International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969.

19

International Convention on Salvage, 1989.

20

See articles 5 and 9. 475


In the middle of the spectrum under the caption “regulatory”, six Conventions and one Protocol are mentioned. The principal convention is, of course, MARPOL. It consists of Annexes I to V, which, as indicated in Fig. 1, address the five types of pollutants that enter the sea directly from the ship,21 and Annex VI, which, as also identified in Fig. 1, regulates ship-source air pollution. Annexes I and II are compulsory whereas the others are optional. Regulations 15 and 34 of Annex I prescribe, respectively, the standards for operational discharges emanating from machinery spaces of all ships and cargo spaces of oil tankers utilising three parameters, namely, oil content expressed in parts per million, instantaneous discharge rate expressed in litres per nautical mile and permissible quantity of dischargeable oil expressed as a proportion of the total quantity of cargo of which the residue forms a part. Regulation 34 provides for controlled discharges from oil tankers when they are outside special areas and beyond 50 nautical miles from the nearest land.22 Under this Regulation, discharges from cargo areas of oil tankers are completely prohibited except in circumstances set out in Regulation 4. Under Regulation 15, in the case of ships above or below 400 gross tonnage and whether within or outside a special area, oil content is the single parameter for operational discharge standards. All the controlled discharge provisions are only applicable if the vessel is en route and, in the case of an oil tanker, pursuant to Regulation 34 is fitted with ODMACS that meets the prescriptions in Regulation 31 and is in operation; and in the case of a non-tanker, pursuant to Regulation 15 is fitted with oil filtering equipment as prescribed in Regulation 14. Regulation 29 requires oil tankers to have slop tank arrangements. Within the context of the central theme of this chapter, Regulation 4.2 of Annex I, which is of utmost importance, will be discussed in detail later. The London Convention on Dumping of Wastes has already been alluded to above. It is also an important regulatory Convention albeit addressing dumping as a deliberate polluting activity as distinguished from pollution caused by operational discharges. It is to be noted that the 1996 Protocol is a virtually complete revision of the original Convention of 1972. While it does not provide for any private law liability regime, Article 15 of the Convention requires States Parties to undertake the development of procedures regarding liability in accordance with international law principles of State responsibility. 21

The five Annexes cover, respectively, oil, noxious liquid substances, packaged harmful substances, sewage and garbage.

22

The “special areas” are designated bodies of water specified in Regulation 1, paragraph 11 of Annex I. For the purposes of Annex V the special areas are specified in Regulation 5(1) of that Annex. The other Annexes do not have provisions relating to special areas. The term “nearest land” refers to territorial sea baselines other than in the case of the Australian coast where it is by reference to geographical coordinates specified in the definition. See MARPOL Annex I, Regulation 1, paragraph 10.

476


The other important regulatory Convention is OPRC, which now also has an HNS Protocol dealing with the same subject matter but pertaining to preparedness and response with regard to chemical pollution, i.e., pollution from hazardous and noxious substances. The Basel Convention of 1989 and the BWM Convention of 2004, which appear in the central part of the spectrum as regulatory Conventions, have also been mentioned in the context of their corresponding foundation provisions in the LOS Convention. The AFS Convention23 adopted in 2001 is another regulatory marine pollution Convention that is included in the spectrum. It deals with the control of harmful organotin compounds which are used in ships’ antifouling paints for use on hull surfaces. The right-hand side of the spectrum bears the caption “private”. Here the private law Conventions are placed, which are the CLC,24 Fund and Supplementary Fund Protocol,25 the HNS,26 Bunkers27 and Salvage Conventions. 3. Correlations and Interfaces within the Spectrum The interrelationships among the various Conventions within the spectrum are depicted by symbols and diagrammatic connections. The symbolised depictions relate to the temporal continuum referred to above. As is apparent from the diagram, the LOS Convention Part XII bears the character of all three components of the continuum. By contrast, MARPOL, Dumping, BWM, Basel and AFS are all preventive in character, whereas OPRC and OPRC-HNS Protocol are hybrid instruments being preventive as well as mitigative. The CLC, Fund Convention, Supplementary Fund Protocol, and the HNS and Bunkers Conventions are clearly remedial, all specifically addressing the subject of liability and compensation for different kinds of ship-source pollution damage. The Salvage Convention is essentially mitigative but there are also remedial aspects to it in that it is a saving act and that act itself is also of remedial significance. In the scheme, therefore, it is denoted by the two symbols indicative of these two characteristics. The spectrum diagram shows the interfaces between the three groups of Conventions identified as public, regulatory and private. The correlations among various Conventions or specific provisions of Conventions are also depicted in the diagram. First, the foundation provision in the LOS Convention of a certain type and character of ship-source pollution in the public international sphere and 23

International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships, 2001.

24

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992.

25

International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992; Supplementary Fund Protocol, 2003.

26

International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996.

27

International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001. 477


then the corresponding regulatory Convention or relevant part of a Convention addressing the same subject matter in specific detail is shown. Next, the correlation between a specific regulatory Convention and its private law counterpart is shown. Then the correlation between relevant foundation provisions in the LOS Convention relating to liability issues and specific private law Conventions on liability and compensation for damage from different pollutants is depicted. Finally, the correlation between article 9 of the Salvage Convention, which falls under public international law, and article 14, which deals with special compensation for salvors in marine pollution cases, is identified.

V. The Regulatory/Criminal Interface in Penal Law 1. Violations and Offences The first pertinent point of observation in the present context is that Conventions provide for violations, and, with the exception of detention in the case of regulatory maritime Conventions, do not provide for sanctions.28 The matter of sanctions is left to State Parties to establish in right of their respective national jurisdictions.29 In doing so, States give due regard to their constitutional law or other supreme law of the land or law of general application such as penal statutes or statutes that establish jurisdictions of judicial and administrative bodies. However, Conventions do provide guidance with respect to sanctions through provisions such as the typical clause requiring sanctions to be sufficiently severe to deter potential violators.30 The violation provisions in regulatory Conventions must be transformed into offences in national legislation. Only then can requisite sanctions be created and applied in compliance with the relevant Convention.31 This is invariably the 28

The only sanction that is specifically provided for in the Conventions is detention. See e.g., LOS Convention articles 219 and 220.6; and MARPOL 73/78 article 5(2) and Annex I, regulation 6.3.3 and regulation 11, paragraphs 1 and 2. Detention is essentially an administrative sanction and in many jurisdictions can be imposed without resort to the courts.

29

See e.g., article 4(1) of MARPOL which provides: “Any violation of the requirements of the present Convention shall be prohibited and sanctions shall be established therefor under the law of the Administration of the ship concerned wherever the violation occurs.”

30

See e.g., article 4(4) of MARPOL which provides as follows: “The penalties specified under the law of a Party pursuant to the present article shall be adequate in severity to discourage violations of the present Convention and shall be equally severe irrespective of where the violations occur.”

31

See, for example, section 72(1) of the Merchant Shipping (Marine Pollution) Law, 2001 of the Cayman Islands, which makes failure by an owner or master of a ship to comply with any statutory requirements of Chapter II of Part V of the Law an offence punishable

478


norm in dualistic States where a convention is given effect within the national jurisdiction through enactment of express legislation.32 In monistic States where a treaty can become effective within the national domain upon its ratification or accession, express legislation may still be needed if the treaty is not self-executing or directly applicable.33 If, however, the treaty is self-executing, the violation provisions in the convention will be enforceable under domestic law by reference to the relevant penal statute under which the violation would be an offence, and the attendant sanction will apply.34 As mentioned above, Convention violations are offences under domestic law. Offences belong to the domain of penal law, which is a category of public law. In the realm of marine pollution, as exemplified in the spectrum diagram above, the law ranges from public to private law in all its facets. In this discussion the focus is on the penal aspects of the law of ship-source marine pollution. 2. Traditional Characterisation of Offences in Penal Law An offence relating to ship-source marine pollution derived from a Convention violation falls within the domain of penal law in domestic terms, and can be variously characterised according to the seriousness of the offence and the corresponding severity of the sanction imposed in respect of it. Primarily, the divisions are two, namely, the serious offences which are termed criminal and those of comparatively less serious consequence which are regulatory in scope. Indeed, the characterisation of an offence is frequently recognisable through the sanction that it attracts. In penal law, traditionally, offences have been characterised as those that require proof of mens rea and those that do not; in other words, in the latter case, proof of the actus reus alone is sufficient for a successful prosecution of the offence. The former is typical of a criminal offence the ingredients of which, in the common law tradition at least, are proof of mens rea, the actus reus and

as provided in that section. Notably, Part V is captioned “Prevention of Pollution from Ships” and Chapter II “Prevention of Pollution by Oil”. Part V gives effect to MARPOL 73/78 and Chapter II specifically gives effect to Annex 1 of the Convention. 32

P.K. Mukherjee, Maritime Legislation, Malmö: WMU Publications, 2002, at pp. 128129.

33

Ibid. at pp. 126-128. See also the decision of the Supreme Court of California in Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718 (1952).

34

It is to be noted, however, that the question of whether or not a convention is self-executing is of notorious difficulty; and, in the final analysis is a judicial determination. See supra, note 32, at pp. 127-128 and footnotes 3, 14 and 15, at p. 140 as cross-references. See in particular Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F. 2d 270, at 373 (7th Circ. 1985) and Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F. 2d 848, at 851 (D.C. Circ. 1976) cited in footnote 15 at that page. 479


contemporaneity of the two.35 Obviously, serious offences fall under this category and the corresponding sanctions are also typically criminal sanctions which are relatively more severe. By contrast, those offences that are less serious and do not require proof of mens rea are sometimes referred to as strict or absolute liability offences. The attendant sanctions are obviously less severe; these are regulatory sanctions as distinguished from criminal sanctions. 3. Criminality and Criminal Law In the domestic sphere, an offence punishable under penal law is the counterpart of a wrong in the law of torts for which a civil sanction in the form of a remedy is available. It is the imposition of penal sanction that essentially distinguishes an offence from a civil wrong characterised by a tort or delict.36 The distinction evolved historically from ancient European legal systems as offences against the State or community, otherwise referred to as crimina, and offences against the individual, known as delicta.37 To understand criminality and the criminal law, whether in the domestic or international sphere, it is important to appreciate the existence of three components of the word “crime” as exemplified in the definition articulated by the eminent Professor Glanville Williams. He defines crime as “a legal wrong that can be followed by criminal proceedings which may result in punishment”.38 A close examination of the definition brings to light the three elements of a crime or criminal offence, namely, the substantive, the procedural and the punitive. The first is the criminal act that is a “legal wrong”. This is the substantive element that makes the conduct or act criminal and criminalises the person who carries out that act. Thus, “criminalisation” is a description of conduct or behaviour that constitutes criminality or makes an act or activity illegal; also, in reference to a person, it means turning someone into a criminal by making his activity illegal.39 The second element in the definition is the procedural aspect manifested

35

Thabo Mali v. R., [1954] 1 All ER 373; [1954] 1 WLR 228 (P.C.) In this case the Privy Council considered both English as well as Roman-Dutch law.

36

Similarly, an offence corresponds to a breach in contract law which is also a branch of private law.

37

Sir H. Maine, Ancient Law, London: Oxford University Press, new edn 1931, at p. 307. See also pp. 308-331 where the Roman, Greek, Germanic, Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon legal systems are discussed.

38

G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd edn, London: Stevens & Sons, 1983, at pp. 27-29.

39

B.A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, at p. 161. See also J. Pearsall (ed.), The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 2001. See also Nix. v. Whiteside (1986), 475 U.S. 157.

480


in the words “criminal proceedings”. Finally, the word “punishment” refers to the punitive element, i.e., the sanction. It is interesting to note another definition of crime given by Lord Atkin in the case of Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney General for Canada40 expressed in the following words: “The domain of criminal jurisprudence can only be ascertained by examining what acts at any particular period are declared by the State to be crimes, and the only common nature they will be found to possess is that they are prohibited by the State and that those who commit them are punished.” Criminal sanction, which is an essential element of a crime and which distinguishes it from a civil wrong, is highlighted in the above passage in addition to the statement that an act is a crime when it is expressly declared to be so by the State. This observation is typical of States, such as Canada, that have codified the criminal law through legislation. It is pertinent to note, in this context, that the criminal jurisprudence of England and Wales is not codified but is largely contained in case law and fragmented pieces of criminal statutory law. An act that harms or injures a person or property may be serious enough for the State to notice it as an issue of public policy and declare it to be a crime. The point is noted by Glanville Williams in his definition of the substantive element of the notion of crime. He states that “[A] crime is an act that is condemned sufficiently strongly to have induced the authorities (legislature or judges) to declare it to be punishable before the ordinary courts”.41 4. The Third Dimension of Penal Law In the general legal literature the words “crime” and “offence” are used interchangeably. However, for the purposes of the present discussion, the word “offence” is construed to be associated with any act or omission that falls within the penal domain. As mentioned above, an offence can be categorised as regulatory or criminal depending on the seriousness of it and the commensurate sanction that may be imposed. Furthermore, according to how an offence is characterised, regulatory and criminal procedures can be fundamentally different. Since a criminal offence requires proof of mens rea, a stiffer onus is imposed on the prosecution, and conversely, the stiffness affords a measure of enhanced protection to the accused. The public policy implications are obvious in that the sanctions have a more severe reach and in certain instances may be irreversible, such as in the case of capital punishment. The importance of reversibility is

40

[1931] A.C. 324 (P.C.).

41



manifested in the recognition that, in the final analysis, sanctions are pronounced by judges who are humans and therefore not infallible. The notion of mens rea is based on the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea meaning essentially that only a guilty mind makes an act criminal.42 Thus, a criminal offence is one that bears the hallmarks of criminality in the true sense. In such an offence there must be present an element of wrongful intent or some other species of wrong such as recklessness which must be proven by the prosecution. By contrast, an offence which does not require proof of mens rea is typical of a public welfare offence.43 Acts that are purely accidental are “not criminal in any real sense”44 but the accident could be attributable to negligence. At any rate, they are simply a species of malum prohibitum or a technical offence for which liability may be imposed but without the requirement of proof of mens rea in the form of intent or recklessness.45 An analytical comparison between criminal and public welfare offences was insightfully articulated by Dickson J. of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of R. v. City of Sault Saint Marie46 in the following words: “The distinction between the true criminal offence and the public welfare offence is one of prime importance. Where the offence is criminal, the Crown must establish a mental element, namely, that the accused who committed the prohibited act did so intentionally or recklessly, with knowledge of the facts constituting the offence, or with willful blindness toward them. Mere negligence is excluded from the concept of the mental element required for conviction. Within the context of a criminal prosecution a person who fails to make such inquires as a reasonable and prudent person would make, or who fails to know facts he should have known, is innocent in the eyes of the law. In sharp contrast, ‘absolute liability’ entails conviction on proof merely that the defendant committed the prohibited act constituting the actus reus of the offence. There is no relevant mental element. It is no defence that the accused was entirely without fault. He may be morally innocent in every sense, yet be branded as a malefactor and punished as such.

42

Ibid. at p. 70.

43

Ibid. at pp. 322 & 936-937. See also F.B. Sayre, “Public Welfare Offences”, (1993) 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 and J.C. Coffee Jr., “Does ‘Unlawful’ Mean ‘Criminal’? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law”, (1991) 71 B. U. L. Rev. 193, at p. 199.

44

Williams, ibid. at p. 936.

45

The notion was exemplified by Lord Reid in Sweet v. Parsley, [1970] A.C., at p. 839.

46

[1978] 40 Can. Crim. Cas. (2d) 353 (S.C.C.).

482


Public welfare offences obviously lie in a field of conflicting values. It is essential for society to maintain, through effective enforcement, high standards of public health and safety. Potential victims of those who carry on latently pernicious activities have a strong claim to consideration. On the other hand, there is a generally held revulsion against punishment of the morally innocent.”47 This was a pollution case in Ontario, albeit a non-marine one involving pollution in Cannon Creek and Root River. The charge was framed under section 32(1) of the Ontario Water Resources Act,48 which provided that a person who “discharges, or deposits, or causes, or permits the discharge or deposit of any material of any kind into any water course, of on any shore or bank thereof, or in any place that may impair the quality of water” is guilty of an offence. The advantage of characterising the typical public welfare offence as an absolute liability offence is two-fold. First, it is arguable that in terms of protecting social interests, a relatively high standard of care is required of the potential perpetrator who will be prompted to take utmost care knowing that ignorance or mistake is no defence. The second is one of administrative efficiency. Without the need to prove mens rea, the offence can be successfully prosecuted without too much impediment and that will serve the public interest. As stated by Dickson J.: “proof of fault is just too great a burden in time and money to place upon the prosecution. The required proof of each person’s individual intent would allow almost every violator to escape”.49 In particular, this has been the experience in several jurisdictions in the prosecution of marine pollution offences, typically those in relation to MARPOL-type violations. Dickson J. concluded, in light of the above-mentioned advantages, that absolute liability “is the most efficient and effective way of ensuring compliance with minor regulatory legislation and the social needs to be achieved are of such importance as to override the unfortunate by-product of punishing those who may be free of moral turpitude”.50 But there is a downside. A fundamental premise of penal law is that the sanction must be commensurate with the degree of seriousness of the offence. A sanction at the lower end of the scale of severity may just not be adequate as a deterrent. The dilemma may be resolved by the introduction of a third element into the spectrum of penal offences in a position between the extremities of mens rea based criminal offences and the non-mens rea public welfare or regulatory offences. The device essentially instigates a notional and procedural subdivision

47

Ibid. at pp. 362-363.

48

R.S.O. 1970, c. 332, previously the Ontario Water Resources Commission Act, renamed by 1972, c.1, s.70(1).

49


50

Ibid. 483


of the right-hand side of the spectrum below depicting the non-mens rea offences into those that are at the lowest end of the severity scale and those in respect of which the sanctions should be relatively more severe in terms of the public interest. In this way the fundamental tenet of penal law that the punishment should fit the offence is preserved. This third dimension is the so-called notion of the “half-way house”.51 In this method of characterisation, which squarely fits typical public welfare offences, or regulatory offences in the public maritime law domain, the prosecution initially treats the offence as one of strict liability and carries the burden of proving the actus reus. The accused is then afforded the defence of due diligence to prove on a balance of probabilities that he took every precaution to avoid the “accidental” commission of the offence. In other words, he must prove that he was not negligent or otherwise at fault. There is a reversal of the onus once the actus reus is proven by the prosecution, and if the accused successfully discharges his burden, he is exonerated. If he is not successful, he is found to be guilty and the sanction can be commensurately higher than it would be in the case of an absolute liability offence where no defence of due diligence is available and the accused is found to be guilty once the actus reus is proven by the prosecution. In R. v. City of Sault Saint Marie, Dickson J., after citing references to a number of Australian, New Zealand and Canadian cases, and scholarly writings, introduced the third alternative of the so-called half-way house which, in his opinion, had been attempted by these courts “to seek a middle position, fulfilling the goals of public welfare offences while still not punishing the entirely blameless”.52 He noted that the notion of the half-way house had evolved more substantially in a number of other common law jurisdictions than in England. However, as previously indicated in this chapter, in the House of Lords decision in Sweet v. Parsley,53 Lord Reid attempted to find a middle ground between a mens rea offence and an absolute liability offence, and Lord Pearce referred to the “sensible half-way house” of which, in his view, courts should take cognisance in some absolute liability offences. In rationalising his view in support of the half-way house approach, Dickson J. had this to say: “The correct approach, in my opinion, is to relieve the Crown of the burden of proving mens rea, having regard to Pierce Fisheries and to the virtual impossibility in most regulatory cases of proving wrongful intention. In a normal case, the accused alone will have knowledge of 51

Professor Glanville Williams states that, “[T]here is a half-way house which has not yet been properly utilized, and that is responsibility for negligence”. See Glanville Williams, Criminal Law, 2nd edn, London: Stevens, 1961, at p. 262.

52

Supra, note 46, at pp. 364-366.

53

Supra, note 44.

484


Fig. 4: Characterisation of Penal Offences Penal offences

Criminal offences (mens rea of intent, recklessness, knowledge)

Regulatory/Public Welfare offences (non-mens rea)

Strict Liability or Half-way House affording defence of due diligence to accused (negligence)

Absolute Liability requiring only actus reus.

Fig. 5: Spectrum of Penal Offences

Criminal (Mens rea)

Half-way House (strict Liability with due diligence defence on a balance of probabilities)

Absolute Liability. No mens rea, only actus reus. © Proshanto K. Mukherjee

what he has done to avoid the breach and it is not improper to expect him to come forward with the evidence of due diligence. This is particularly so when it is alleged, for example, that pollution was caused by the activities of a large and complex corporation. Equally, there is nothing wrong with rejecting absolute liability and admitting the defence of reasonable care. In this doctrine it is not up to the prosecution to prove negligence. Instead, it is open to the defendant to prove that all due care has been taken. This burden falls upon the defendant as he is the only one who will generally have the means of proof. This would not seem unfair as the alternative is absolute liability which denies an accused any defence whatsoever. While the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the prohibited act, the defendant must only establish on the balance of probabilities that he has a defence of reasonable care.”54 54



It should be apparent from the foregoing discussion that the terms “strict liability” and “absolute liability” are sometimes used interchangeably and confusingly to mean the same thing.55 At other times, “absolute liability” is used to denote the type of offence where only the actus reus need be proven without further ado to prosecute successfully, whereas “strict liability” is used to signify a half-way house offence. In the opening statement of his decision in R. v. City of Sault Saint Marie, Dickson J. stated that: “In the present appeal the Court is concerned with offences variously referred to as ‘statutory’, ‘public welfare’, ‘regulatory’, ‘absolute liability’, or ‘strict responsibility’, which are not criminal in any real sense, but are prohibited in the public interest: … Although enforced as penal laws through the utilization of the machinery of the criminal law, the offences are in substance of a civil nature and might well be regarded as a branch of administrative law to which traditional principles of criminal law have but limited application. They relate to such everyday matters as traffic infractions, sales of impure food, violations of liquor laws, and the like. In this appeal we are concerned with pollution.”56 It is instructive to heed the analysis of Dickson J. and his final conclusion in this case that “… there are compelling grounds for the recognition of three categories of offences rather than the traditional two”. In his words, the categories are as follows: “1. Offences in which mens rea, consisting of some positive state of mind such as intent, knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by the prosecution either as an inference from the nature of the act committed, or by additional evidence. 2. Offences in which there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the existence of mens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie imports the offence, leaving it open to the accused to avoid liability by proving that he took all reasonable care. … These offences may properly be called offences of strict liability. … 3. Offences of absolute liability where it is not open to the accused to exculpate himself by showing that he was free of fault.

55

See e.g., R. v. Custeau (1971), 6 Can. Crim. Cas. (2d) 179, [1972] 2 O.R. 250 where McKay J.A. in the Ontario Court of Appeal made reference to “an offence of strict liability (sometimes referred to as absolute liability)”.

56


486


Offences which are criminal in the true sense fall in the first category. Public welfare offences would, prima facie, be in the second category. They are not subject to the presumption of full means rea. An offence of this type would fall in the first category only if such words as ‘willfully’, ‘with intent’, ‘knowingly’, or ‘intentionally’ are contained in the statutory provision creating the offence. On the other hand, the principle that punishment should in general not be inflicted on those without fault applies. Offences of absolute liability would be those in respect of which the Legislature had made it clear that guilt would follow proof merely of the proscribed act. The over-all regulatory pattern adopted by the Legislature, the subject-matter of the legislation, the importance of the penalty, and the precision of the language used will be primary considerations in determining whether the offence falls into the third category.”57 Indeed, there are express legislative provisions characterising offences reflecting MARPOL violations as typical half-way house offences. In the United Kingdom legislation giving effect to Annex I of MARPOL, the following provision appears: “(1) If any ship fails to comply with any requirement of these Regulations (other than regulations 12, 13 and 16) the owner and the master of the ship shall each be guilty of an offence and punishable on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum and on conviction on indictment by a fine. (2) … (3) It shall be a defence for a person charged under paragraph (1) of this regulation to show that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.”58 A virtually identical provision is found in the corresponding legislation of the Cayman Islands which reads as follows: “(1) If any ship, or the owner or master thereof, fails to comply with this Chapter, the Schedules related thereto or regulations made under section 73, the owner and the master of the ship is each guilty of an offence and liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of one hundred thousand dollars.

57

Ibid. at pp. 373-374, invoked by Gouge J.A. in R. v. Petro-Canada, [2003] 63 O.R. (3d) 219, at pp. 222-223.

58

Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Regulations, 1996, SI 1996/2154, reg. 36(3). 487


(2) It shall be a defence for a person charged under subsection (1) to show that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.”59 As is apparent from the above, in both cases, the substantive offence is set out in paragraph (1) and subsection (1), respectively. The following diagram shows the range of penal sanctions that might be available for offences with respect to ship-source pollution. Fig. 6: Penal Law Sanctions Penal Law

Half-way House

Mens rea

Absolute Liability

Sanctions

Judicial

Non-Judicial

Incarceration, Fines

Administrative

Detention

Administrative Fines

Other

Compounding of offences

© Proshanto K. Mukherjee

In appropriate cases, incarceration may be a valid sanction so long as there is compliance with the applicable international law as set out in the following section of this chapter. Obviously, this would have to be a judicial sanction. Fines are also imposed as judicial sanctions; however, in some jurisdictions, depending on the quantum, they can be imposed administratively. As mentioned earlier, detention is an administrative sanction that is specified in MARPOL and other regulatory Conventions. Among other non-judicial sanctions, there are devices 59

Cayman Islands Merchant Shipping (Marine Pollution) Law, 2001, section 72(2).

488


such as compounding of offences,60 which are used for relatively minor infractions; these would be suitable for typical absolute liability offences.

VI. International Dimension of the Penal Law 1. The Relevant International Regimes Flowing from the above discussion, which addressed the issue of the criminal/regulatory interface within penal law in general terms, it is now incumbent upon us to examine the international dimension of this issue narrowing it down to the specificities of ship-source pollution. The starting point of this discussion is article 230 of the LOS Convention which has been mentioned earlier in this chapter. The heading of this article is “Monetary penalties and the observance of recognized rights of the accused” and the text is as follows: “1. Monetary penalties only may be imposed with respect to violations of national laws and regulations or applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment, committed by foreign vessels beyond the territorial sea. 2. Monetary penalties only may be imposed with respect to violations of national laws and regulations or applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment, committed by foreign vessels in the territorial sea, except in the case of a willful and serious act of pollution in the territorial sea. 3. In the conduct of proceedings in respect of such violations committed by a foreign vessel which may result in the imposition of penalties, recognized rights of the accused shall be observed.” Regardless of whether a State is party to the LOS Convention, arguably, the above-noted provisions are binding on the basis that they reflect customary international law. Non- States Parties would put forward the opposite argument claiming that the provisions do not constitute customary law and they are therefore not bound by them. Be that as it may, it is regrettable that in recent times,

60

The term means statutory relief from prosecution if a sum stipulated by law is paid by the offender to the appropriate government authority. See e.g. Ghana Shipping Act, 2003, s. 457, which provides that a person in custody suspected of having committed an offence or a ship detained in respect of an offence may be released upon payment of a stipulated sum of money to the Ghana Maritime Authority, and no further proceedings are to be instituted in respect of that offence. 489


a number of States Parties to the LOS Convention have blatantly violated these provisions.61 The LOS Convention provisions referred to above are abundantly clear as to the object, purpose, and teleology of this aspect of the Convention. Indeed, article 230 is an admirable example of the intended characterisation of an offence which can be gleaned from the expressly prescribed sanctions. In paragraph 1, reference is made to waters “beyond the territorial sea”, namely, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the high seas. Even though a coastal State enjoys the right to intervene on the high seas under the Intervention Convention, 1969, in cases of grave and imminent danger of its coastline or related interests being detrimentally affected by oil pollution damage, the exercise of the right is subject to limitations contained in the Convention. It is submitted that the right of intervention in the circumstances set out in the Convention is not a right of coastal State sovereignty, but rather, is one of the exceptions to the general rule of flag State predominance in the high seas under the customary international law of the sea. In the EEZ, the coastal State has legislative and enforcement jurisdiction in relation to protection and preservation of the marine environment.62 In juxtaposition to this jurisdiction, under article 58, foreign ships in the EEZ of a coastal State enjoy three of the six enumerated freedoms of the high seas set out in article 87, namely, those of navigation, overflight and laying of submarine cables and pipelines. In the high seas and the EEZ, only monetary penalties may be imposed, pursuant to paragraph 1 of article 230. Clearly, therefore, any penal provision in national law relating to a spill or discharge of oil by a foreign vessel in these waters cannot create an offence that is characterised to attract a sanction such as incarceration of the accused. Indeed, it would be appropriate to treat it as a non-mens rea offence such as absolute liability or a half-way house. Paragraph 2 also calls for monetary penalties only in the case of a foreign vessel polluting the territorial sea of a coastal State, except where there is a “wilful and serious act of pollution” (emphasis added). The word “wilful” clearly indicates that the provision contemplates a mens rea offence. In such case, it is possible to impose sanctions other than monetary penalties, for example, incarceration, but only if the offence committed in the territorial sea is serious enough to be characterised as a mens rea offence. Paragraph 3 requires the coastal State to observe the recognised rights of the accused in proceedings involving a violation by a foreign vessel. If the accused is a master or other category of seafarer, as is frequently the case, his recognised

61

These violations refer to the criminalisation and unfair treatment of seafarers in the Erika, Prestige and Tasman Spirit oil spill incidents. In the Tasman Spirit, incident, the salvage master was also subjected to the deplorable treatment.

62

R.R. Churchill & A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd edn, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, at p. 169.

490


rights would presumably include rights under the law of the forum jurisdiction as well as his fundamental rights under international law. The other Convention that is relevant in the present context is MARPOL 73/78. Regulations 15 and 34 of Annex I provide, respectively, for various prohibitions and controls in relation to the discharge of oil from machinery spaces of all ships and from cargo spaces of oil tankers, and prescribe methods for the prevention of oil pollution from ships in and outside special areas. Regulation 4 provides for certain exceptions as follows: “Regulations 15 and 34 of this Annex shall not apply to: .1 … .2 The discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixture resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment: .2.1 provided that all reasonable precautions have been taken after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of the discharge for the purpose of preventing or minimizing the discharge; and .2.2 except if the owner or the Master acted with intent to cause the damage, or recklessly and with the knowledge that damage would probably result; …”. It is evident from the formulation of sub-paragraph .2.1 that Regulation 4.2 provides for a “due diligence” defence in respect of discharges resulting from damage to the ship or its equipment. The words “provided that all reasonable precautions have been taken” substantiate this inference. As provided in sub-paragraph .2.2, the defence is unavailable only where it is proven that the owner or master acted intentionally, or recklessly and with knowledge of probability of the damage resulting from the intentional or reckless act. Thus, there is a violation and a corresponding commission of an offence under national law, only in the event of a failure by the person charged to take all reasonable precautions to avoid or minimise the damage from the discharge. The onus of proof naturally rests on the person invoking the defence. If the accused proves that he took reasonable precautions, liability will only ensue upon the mens rea of intent being established by the prosecution; or alternatively, the mens rea of recklessness combined with the mens rea of knowledge that damage would probably result. It is submitted that an offence created in domestic legislation giving effect to Regulation 4 must, in the first instance, be viewed as a regulatory half-way house offence with provision for reasonable precaution or due diligence as a defence. If there is evidence of intent, or recklessness coupled with knowledge – a two-fold requirement – then it must be treated as a criminal offence requiring proof of the requisite mens rea. In any event, the sanction, whether the offence is regulatory or criminal, must be in compliance with article 230 of the LOS

491


Convention, which, it is submitted, is consistent with the fundamental tenet of penal law that the punishment must be commensurate with the offence. As far as ship-source pollution is concerned, there is no doubt or argument that violation of a MARPOL discharge requirement should not go unpunished. Indeed, any discharge that fits the mens rea criteria set out reversely in Regulation 4.2.2.2 of Annex I should be treated as a criminal offence. If a seafarer deliberately bypasses the oil filtering equipment or knowingly enters false information in the oil record book, he should be charged with a criminal offence and punished accordingly but commensurately, and with due regard to the applicable international law, i.e., article 230 of the LOS Convention. Absent the requisite mens rea, such as where the discharge is accidental (resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment) and negligence (want of reasonable precaution) is an issue, the offence should be treated as a half-way house, consistent with Regulation 4.2.2.1 of Annex I. In such case, affording the accused the defence of due diligence with a reversal of onus and standard of proof based on a balance of probabilities, as set out in the judicial decisions mentioned above, is both functional as well as meaningful because it justifies a penal sanction higher than in the case of an absolute liability offence. At any rate, pollution acts that are accidental must be clearly distinguished from those committed intentionally or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result. 2. Dubious Characterisation of Offences and Wrongful Sanctions It is unfortunate that certain States mentioned earlier in this chapter63 have unilaterally and blatantly failed to pay heed to the international law relating to the penal aspects of ship-source pollution discussed in detail above. It is also a matter of deep concern to the international maritime community at large that institutional endorsement of such untoward ignorance of international law is emerging in the form of the now notorious European Union Directive on Ship-Source Pollution.64 It seems that the Directive was driven less by rationality and more by political sentiment and expediency; and this has apparently been admitted by the European Commission itself according to a report in Lloyd’s List.65 Proposed amendments to the Directive would regard ship-source discharges of pollutants as infringements if they are committed with intent, recklessly or by serious negligence; and they are to be regarded as criminal offences by, and in

63

See supra, note 60.

64

Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, [2005] O.J. (L 255), 11, <europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L :2005:255:0011:0021:EN:PDF> (4 November 2005).

65

See S. Speares, “Continuous fire at directive on criminal sanction for polluters”, Lloyd’s List, 7 October 2005, at p. 6.

492


the circumstances set out in a Council Framework Decision supplementing the Directive.66 The European Parliament, it appears, overwhelmingly approved the draft amendment which seeks to criminalise seafarers for accidental pollution.67 The penal provisions of the EU legislation mentioned above are clearly contrary to article 230(2) of the LOS Convention. Under the latter, the act in question must be both wilful, i.e., intentional, and serious. The LOS Convention provision cast in the conjunctive mode does not contemplate the act to be either, wilful or serious, but rather both wilful and serious. By contrast, the EU provision is cast in the disjunctive. That provision is also anomalous when compared with Regulation 4.2.2.2 of Annex I to MARPOL. The expression “recklessly and with knowledge” (emphasis added) in the MARPOL provision is cast in the conjunctive mode. The formulation unequivocally means recklessness and knowledge, as two varieties of mens rea, must co-exist simultaneously to constitute a violation under the Convention. In contra-distinction, the expression “recklessly or by serious negligence” in the EU Directive is cast disjunctively which means that an infringement is a criminal offence if the conduct of the alleged perpetrator constitutes either recklessness or serious negligence. The formulation in the EU legislation is manifestly in conflict with MARPOL under which both recklessness and knowledge must be present as required elements of the violation. Knowledge is certainly not the same thing as serious negligence, and there is serious doubt as to whether there is any such thing as “serious negligence” known to the law. As one commentator has stated: “The notion of ‘serious negligence’ is not a legally established concept, but is uncertain and prone to mislead. In the Directive it is unaccompanied by any criteria or guidance as to what it is intended to mean. Experience shows that in a significant oil spill there is a risk of subjective elements impinging on the decision to prosecute, as the seriousness of alleged negligence may all too readily be judged by the consequences of the incident rather than the culpability of the defendant’s actions.”68 The eminent Judge Mensah has stated in a public lecture that the EU Directive is not in conformity with international law and that an EU State giving effect to it “would be in breach of its obligations to another state party to MARPOL if it seeks to apply sanctions to the vessel of that other state for a discharge that

66

Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the criminal-law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, [2005] O.J. (L 255), 164, <europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_255/ l_25520050930en01640167.pdf> (4 November 2005).

67

See supra, note 6, at p. 3. See also R. Meade, “Legal Challenge Floated on EU Criminalisation”, Fairplay, 3 March 2005, at p. 6.

68



results solely from serious negligence”. He went on to say that “[S]uch a sanction would be exacted against a discharge that does not constitute a violation under MARPOL, and for which the sanctioning state would have no authority under international law as contained in UNCLOS [LOS Convention]”.69 3. The Test Case In the above context, it is pertinent to review the reference case initiated by a coalition of industry entities to test the legal validity of the EU Directive. On 23 December 2005, an application for judicial review was filed jointly by INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO, the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Lloyd’s Register and the International Salvage Union naming the Secretary of State for the Department of Transport of the United Kingdom as defendant. The object was to obtain access to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling on four issues submitted by the claimants via proceedings commenced in the Administrative Court of the High Court of Justice in London.70 For the ECJ to hear cases referred to it in this manner, claimants must demonstrate arguments that are well-founded; in other words, that they anticipate a reasonable prospect of success.71 The four issues were referred to the ECJ by Hodge J. of the High Court with supporting reasons. The issues and corresponding reasons are summarised below.72 On the first question of whether it is lawful for the EU to impose criminal liability for discharges from foreign ships in waters of the high seas and EEZ and to limit the relevant defences afforded under MARPOL, Hodge J. agreed with the claimants’ position that the Directive limited the effect of the MARPOL provisions which entitles all persons associated with ships to rely on those provisions which restrict liability to cases of intent or recklessness. On the second question of whether it is lawful for the EU to exclude MARPOL defences for discharges in the territorial sea, Hodge J. held the claimants had well-founded arguments. These included the submission that MARPOL rules were of “universal purport” as indicated in the Preamble, that the travaux preparatoires indicated that a proposal to treat the

69

Judge T.A. Mensah, The Eighth Cadwallader Memorial Lecture, “The Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction in Criminalisation Cases: Sovereign Rights in Legislation and New Risks for the Shipping Industry”, London Shipping Law Centre, 4 October 2005. See S. Speares, “EU criminalisation rules rapped by Law of Sea judge”, Lloyd’s List, 6 October 2005, at p. 2 and Fairplay, 5 October, 2005.

70

The claimants could not bring proceedings directly before the ECJ, but through the courts of a Member State (United Kingdom), the issues could be referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the merits. See de la Rue, supra, note 6, at pp. 3-4.

71

Ibid.

72

See ibid., the whole paper by C. de la Rue for an excellent account of the High Court judgment highlighting the salient points.

494


Convention standards as minimum was rejected by the diplomatic conference in 1973, and that the combined effect of MARPOL and the LOS Convention was that coastal States’ sovereign rights in this matter were to be uniformly exercised. On the third question of whether the imposition of criminal liability for discharges caused by “serious negligence” was an impediment to the right of innocent passage of a foreign ship in the territorial sea, Hodge J. held that it was clearly arguable that that would potentially be the case if the Directive was adopted. The claimants had argued that only “wilful and serious pollution” as provided in the LOS Convention article 230(2) could negate this right and cited Judge Mensah’s opinion on this point. Hodge J. also pointed out that there would be potential difficulties of incompatibility in the application of MARPOL between EU States, all of whom are parties to MARPOL, and non-EU State Parties to MARPOL. On the fourth question regarding legal certainty of “serious negligence” as a standard of liability, Hodge J. disagreed with the defendant’s contention that the term was sufficiently precise. He was of the view that the claimant’s position that the words could attract the risk of subjectivity in determining whether or not to prosecute was “well founded”. The case is being referred to the ECJ and a hearing and decision should be forthcoming in 2007.73

VII. Summary and Conclusion In this chapter, an attempt has been made to examine the penal law pertaining to ship-source pollution. While the focus of the discussion is on the international Convention law, penal law in the domestic sphere as it largely obtains in the common law tradition has also been addressed in contextual detail. The types of ship-source pollution are first discussed and the notion of the preventionmitigation-remedy continuum of anti-pollution measures is introduced. All the pertinent international Conventions are cast within a spectrum ranging from public international law through regulatory law to private law. The relevant provisions of the LOS Convention Part XII and MARPOL 73/78 are explained with selective particularity and the correlations and interfaces among Conventions within the spectrum are discussed in the context of how they fit into the prevention-mitigation-remedy continuum. The penal law of ship-source pollution is then analysed in terms of characterisation of offences and their corresponding sanctions. In the latter half of the chapter the analysis revolves around the two-fold issue of how MARPOL-type offences should be characterised in national legislation to be compatible with the prescriptions laid out in Regulation 4.2 of Annex I of MARPOL, and how penal sanctions should be imposed in the domestic sphere

73

Ibid. at p. 6. 495


in conformity with article 230 of the LOS Convention. The criminal/regulatory interface within the domain of penal law is analysed in detail in the context of ship-source pollution and the half-way house option for typical regulatory (public welfare) offences is recommended. Examples of how a half-way house offence is articulated in domestic legislation are presented showing the express incorporation of the due diligence defence. It is submitted that in characterising offences and imposing sanctions under national law, due heed must be paid to MARPOL Annex I Regulation 4.2 and article 230 of the LOS Convention. It is regrettable that certain States who are parties to MARPOL and the LOS Convention have failed to comply with the penal prescriptions in those Conventions. The coastal States involved in the Erika and Prestige oil spills took criminal actions that were patently contrary to the Conventions to which they are parties. The Tasman Spirit is another case in point. All these States have blatantly violated the relevant dictates of the international law. It is most discouraging that the European Union through its Directive on Ship-Source Pollution and related instruments is also compelling its Member States to act in violation of the Conventions to which all of them are parties. Several distinguished personalities in the maritime world including Judge Mensah have expressed negative opinions regarding the Directive. In this context, the proceedings initiated by a coalition of industry interests are of relevance. The views and pronouncements of the High Court of England in this case are instructive and exemplary, and a referral to the ECJ is under way in this matter. There is no doubt that marine pollution is a menace that must be rigidly controlled. But the efforts to do so must not simply be pieces of abstractions tempered by popular colourable devices. The emotive public reaction that marine pollution evokes is often triggered by scant information at best and misinformation at worst; and to that extent the over-reactive public sentiments may well be justifiable. But public authorities charged with law-making mandates and administering law and justice should act with unfailing responsibility casting aside their politically influenced biases and motivations. They should apply the penal law of ship-source pollution with rationality and in compliance with the international regimes which they themselves have helped to articulate and by which their States are bound. Only then will the laudable vision of universality in promoting and fostering cleaner seas become a reality.

496

INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING PLACES OF REFUGE FOR TANKERS THREATENING POLLUTION OF COASTAL ENVIRONMENTS Myron H. Nordquist

I. Background

O

n 13 November 2002, the 26-year old, single-hulled tanker Prestige sent a distress call offshore the region of Galicia, Spain. The vessel, carrying 77,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil, had suffered structural failures in heavy seas and had developed a 30 degree starboard list. Aerial observation confirmed a large fuel leak from the distressed vessel that posed a serious threat of pollution to the shoreline and coastal regions of Spain. Spanish helicopters evacuated twenty-four of its twenty-seven crew members. As the tanker was without engine power, Spanish authorities in charge of sea rescue and pollution control were not successful in their attempts to tow the tanker. The following day, however, the Prestige was taken in tow by a salvage ship. Spanish authorities denied permission for the leaking tanker to remain in Spain’s territorial sea or to enter its internal waters to find a place of refuge. As a consequence, the Prestige was towed farther away from shore where, several days later, the vessel broke in two and sank about 130 nautical miles off the Spanish coasts. Extensive damage to the coastal and marine environments of Spain, Portugal and France was caused by the oil that came from the Prestige. At the time of the accident the registered owner of the Prestige was Mare Shipping Inc., a Liberian corporation. The tanker was operated by Universe Maritime Ltd., also a Liberian corporation, whose principal place of business was in Athens, Greece. The Prestige was chartered by Crown Resources A.G., reportedly a Swiss-based Russian oil trader that owned the cargo. The P&I insurer was the London Club. After loading the heavy fuel oil cargo at St Petersburg, Russia, and Ventspils, Latvia, the owners directed the Prestige to proceed to Gibralter for further orders. The tanker sailed under the flag of the Bahamas with a Greek captain and crew largely made up of Filipinos.



Catastrophic damage to the people, businesses and marine environments of Spain, Portugal and France resulted from the Prestige spill. The case presents many complicated legal, policy, economic, environmental and even factual problems well beyond the scope of a brief chapter. For that reason, this analysis is focused on several of the key conventional and customary rules and principles of international law applicable to cases such as the Prestige, in which a tanker in distress posing serious marine pollution threats seeks a place of refuge in a coastal State. The conventional or treaty law applicable to a case such as the Prestige is primarily found in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) as modified by the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention.1 The LOS Convention, often called a “Constitution for the oceans”, currently has 149 State Parties, including Spain and The Bahamas. The LOS Convention entered into force on 16 November 1994.2 The Convention is complex, with 320 articles and nine annexes dealing with virtually all activities in oceans, which cover approximately 70 percent of the earth’s surface. The LOS Convention defines various zones of jurisdiction and allocates the rights and duties of States therein. Waters landward of the coastal baseline are internal waters over which the coastal State exercises sovereignty as complete as over its land territory. The first 12 miles seaward of the baseline constitute the territorial sea that contains an important exception to coastal State sovereignty for the innocent passage of foreign flag ships. Limited coastal State competences for customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary infringements are recognized in an additional 12-mile zone adjacent to the territorial sea. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends 188 nautical miles seaward from the outer limit of the territorial sea and thus includes the contiguous zone. In the EEZ, the coastal State has sovereign rights over living and non-living resources, while foreign flag vessels are entitled to freedom of navigation. The High Seas proper begins beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline although the coastal State has defined seabed resource rights where its continental margin extends beyond its EEZ. The Prestige was either in or headed for the territorial sea of Spain when Spanish officials denied requests on behalf of the tanker for a place of refuge and

1

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, 397 (English language version) (hereinafter LOS Convention). The Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 UNTS 3, modified the LOS Convention in certain respects not relevant to this chapter.

2

Chronological lists of ratifications, accessions, and successions as of Oct. 1, 2005. Oceans and the Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. On April 1, 1998 the European Union acceded to the Convention, the 124th party to the Convention. Spain acceded to the Convention on January 15, 1997 (Party No. 111). The Bahamas ratified on July 29, 1983 (No. 7).

498

International Law Governing Places of Refuge for Tankers Threatening Pollution of Coastal Environments

ordered the ship out of its territorial sea. The foreign flag vessel subsequently sank in Spain’s 200-mile EEZ, which, as noted, is a zone of jurisdiction subject to Spain’s sovereign rights for resource purposes under international law. Spain commenced legal proceedings in the United States against the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) that had certified the structural seaworthiness of the Prestige. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was negligent in conducting an annual class survey in Dubai, United Arab Emirates in May 2002. Defendant countered that the sinking of the Prestige could have been avoided but for the handling of the matter by Spain. As of the fall of 2005, the case was on-going in a US District Court, the Southern District of New York.3 The most relevant provisions of the LOS Convention at issue deal with the Territorial Sea articles 18 (Meaning of passage)4 and 19 (Meaning of innocent passage).5 Analysis of the relevant text in articles 18 and 19 based on the facts in the Prestige case sheds light on the conventional international law rights and duties of Spain as a coastal State and the Bahamas as a flag State.

II. Article 18 Article 18(1) of the LOS Convention defines passage as navigation through the territorial sea either to traverse the 12-mile zone or to enter the internal waters of a coastal State such as a port or place of refuge. In paragraph 2 of article 18 “continuous and expeditious passage” is mandated for foreign flag vessels. The second sentence of article 18(2) defines passage to include stopping and anchoring but only in three instances: (1) when “incidental” to ordinary navigation;

3

See Reino de Espana v. the American Bureau of Shipping, 328 F. Supp. 2d 489 (2004).

4

LOS Convention article 18 which is titled “Meaning of Passage” reads: “1. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: (a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility. 2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress.”

5

Article 19 of the LOS Convention is titled “Meaning of Innocent Passage” and reads in relevant part: “1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with the Convention and with other rules of international law. 2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities: … (h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; … (l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.” 499


(2) when rendered necessary by force majeure or distress; or (3) when rendering assistance to persons, ships, or aircraft in distress. The main thrust of the drafting in article 18 of the LOS Convention is on “continuous and expeditious passage” through the territorial sea. Indeed, the phrase “continuous and expeditious” was carefully crafted text that evolved from laborious and highly political negotiations at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. Many coastal States at the Third Conference were wary of foreign flag ships operating in a zone of coastal State sovereignty near shore. For them, allowing foreign flag vessels to pass was grudgingly accepted as a necessary but temporary right clearly subject to the explicit conditions in article 18. The practical need to interrupt passage to stop and anchor was limited to just a few instances. The qualifier word “only” on the three specified exceptions to continuous and expeditious passage in the text requires a strict construction of the language in the exceptions. The language in the exceptions for force majeure or distress is not clear on its face and was not explained in the official records of the LOS Convention. When the meaning of a treaty text as written is arguably unclear, it is also prudent to examine State practice on the specific item of interest. Here, the most relevant State practice to examine concerns how States have applied the force majeure or distress exceptions to the requirement for continuous and expeditious passage, especially since the LOS Convention entered into force in 1994. Note ought to be taken that “passage” (with the three explicit exceptions in article 18) provides one set of rules that foreign vessels must meet under the Territorial Sea articles in the LOS Convention. The “innocent passage” rules contained in a separate article 19 lay out another distinct standard or set of rules that apply. The LOS Convention must, of course, be read as a whole but the legal requirements in both articles 18 and 19 must be satisfied independently.

III. Article 19 Article 19 first defines “innocent” as “passage not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State”. These words are technical terms of art that evolved from prior codification efforts. Article 19(1) of the the LOS Convention text is identical in substance to article 14(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Article 14(4), in turn, was taken from article 15(3) of the draft text the International Law Commission prepared for the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. During the Third Conference negotiations, it was widely recognized that the general rule that a foreign flag vessel not engage in acts prejudicial to the “peace, good order or security” of the coastal State left considerable discretion in the coastal State. Extensive negotiations were held over a number of years involving many nations in an effort to agree on an exhaustive list of the specific actions by foreign flag vessels that would be considered non-innocent. The resulting text of the LOS Convention reflects a 500


compromise between contending delegations. By retaining the express language that foreign flag vessels not engage in acts “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security” of the coastal State in paragraph 1 of article 19, coastal States have kept intact the general prohibition in customary international law. The retention of this well-established standard in article 19(1) helped satisfy States that were advocating giving greater discretion for coastal States. Article 19(2), by comparison, is worded so that States favoring freedom of navigation at least have an argument that the “list” of prohibited acts in article 19(2) is exhaustive. A problem with this latter argument, however, is that the draftsmen of the text demonstrate elsewhere that they knew how to use words such as “only” to mandate a strict construction of the text. This was not done and it cannot be a mere oversight that article 19(2) does not have words expressly saying the list is exhaustive. In reality, the use of the word “any” in the text of article 19(2) cuts the other way by dictating that the specified prohibited acts are read broadly. It appears that a token effort was made at the LOS Convention to make article 19 a little ambiguous about whether or not the “list” was exhaustive in order to keep support from foreign flag States. The more plausible reading, however, is that the general prohibition that passage not be prejudicial to the “peace, good order or security” was retained from customary law and that the items of the “list” in article 19(2) added clarity to the general standard by citing specific actions that were not innocent. Assuming arguendo for the purposes of this chapter that the list was exhaustive, note that article 19(2)(h) on the list prohibits any act of “willful and serious pollution”. The subjective word “intentional”, well-known in conventional law, was not used in the text. What do the words mean in this case? The Prestige, for instance, was a huge tanker visibly leaking its cargo of heavy fuel oil in Spain’s territorial sea. The master of the vessel had already declared earlier in a Mayday call that his vessel was in danger of sinking and his crew, by and large, abandoned ship. While the master did not intend for the Prestige to pollute in the subjective sense, he certainly “willfully” acted to bring and keep the ship in its polluting condition into the territorial sea of Spain where “serious” pollution was a certainty. The importance of the distinction in article 19(h) between subjective intent and objective acts becomes evident. As the saying goes, actions speak louder than words in article 19(2) of the LOS Convention. Given the facts presented, Spanish officials surely were justified in determining that the Prestige was in violation of LOS Convention article 19(2)(h) that prohibits any act of willful and serious pollution by a foreign flag vessel in its territorial sea. In the author’s opinion, Spain could rely upon article 19(2) in the Prestige case as a legal ground for denying the leaking tanker a place of refuge since such passage is not innocent. Spanish authorities have another independent legal basis under the listing in article 19 to determine that the “passage” of the Prestige was non-innocent.

501


Article 19(2)(l) is the last, “catch-all” provision on the list that prohibits “any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage”. At the Third Conference, a few State delegations and the International Chamber of Shipping expressly criticized the open-ended nature of article 19(2)(l). Specific amendments were even offered to change the thrust of article 19(2)(1), but none was accepted. “Accordingly, a coastal State has some discretion in determining what activities could render passage of a foreign ship as not innocent.”6 In the case of the Prestige, verbal requests advanced and actions taken by the master (and urged by the salvers) to keep a seriously polluting ship in danger of sinking in Spain’s territorial sea are reasonably characterized as non-innocent “other activities” that are not conducive to continuous and expeditious passage. Spanish officials faced a fast moving emergency involving a foreign flag oil tanker in danger of sinking near its shore. These circumstances on their face are not innocent in any ordinary sense of the meaning of language. Thus, the author believes that the activities of the Prestige can reasonably be seen as reaching the realm of coastal State discretion residing in article 19(2)(l). Lastly, unlike article 18, article 19 contains no mention of even a carefully circumscribed exception for force majeure or distress that might excuse noninnocent passage. In fact, language containing a force majeure or distress exception to confer innocent passage status in such cases was expressly and deliberately deleted during the drafting of the LOS Convention text of what became article 19. Objections to this deletion were made by a few State delegations and by the International Chamber of Shipping, but none of the suggestions to restore the exception for force majeure or distress in article 19 to make such cases noninnocent was adopted.7 In summary, in the text of article 18, Parties agreed that a vessel dead in the water due to force majeure may still be deemed to be in “passage”. But force majeure or distress situations do not per se confer the status of “innocent” passage upon foreign flag vessels. Article 19, to the contrary, was deliberately negotiated and drafted to exclude situations wherein a vessel in distress is automatically deemed in “innocent” passage. Under the LOS Convention scrutiny, the Prestige is a classic example of a foreign flag vessel in distress that posed a non-innocent threat of massive marine pollution damage to the coast of Spain. The practice of States in recent years is consistent with the reading of the text of articles 18 and 19 of the LOS Convention as presented in this chapter. This can be seen from the attached table of State practice whereby 23 countries and 39 vessels were denied a place of refuge in factual circumstances akin to those in the Prestige case. This survey of State practice substantiates the author’s view that a coastal State is legally justified

6

M.H. Nordquist et al. (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. II, 1993, 177.

7

Id. at 173.

502


in taking emergency actions near its coast to protect its citizens and coastal territory from massive marine pollution threats from foreign flag vessels. The acquiescence and acceptance of the international community in affirming the actions taken by the United Kingdom in bombing and sinking the Torrey Canyon also supports this view. In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation,8 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States carefully scrutinized the application of both conventional and customary international law. In bygone days, sailing ships were sometimes given places of refuge when in distress due to bad weather, so-called Acts of God or similar involuntary circumstances. This State practice was founded on moral or humanitarian principles, largely to save human life but some times to protect the cargo. But as stated in the Flores case, “A principle is only incorporated into customary international law if States accede to it out of a sense of legal obligation; practices adopted for moral or political reasons do not give rise to rules of customary international law”.9 There are also many outdated cases where foreign flag vessels were excused, inter alia, from paying import duties on their cargo or from being charged with immigration violations for entering an area under coastal State sovereignty under circumstances beyond the vessel or master’s control. These cases are readily distinguishable from the Prestige case since they arose before the advent of giant supertankers whose breakup poses catastrophic marine pollution damage to nearby coastal States. This was also a period before rapid means of communication such as cell phones and helicopters fundamentally altered the ways of saving lives at sea. On 5 March 2004 the Assembly of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted Resolution A. 949(23) titled: “Guidelines on places of refuge for ships in need of assistance”. Footnote 3 in Appendix I was adopted by the IMO’s governing body after participating States had heard competing arguments on the issues from IMO experts. The IMO footnote concisely and accurately captures the current rule of international law as reflected in the text of the LOS Convention and confirmed in recent State Practice. The footnote reads in full: “3. It is noted that there is at present no international requirement for a State to provide a place of refuge for vessels in need of assistance”.

IV. Epilogue The saga of the Prestige epitomizes in many respects why reform is needed in this area of international law. Current international law shelters flags of convenience, single hull tankers, sham corporations, marginal operators, shadowy owners and totally inadequate caps on liability for the actual damages suffered from a

8

343 F. 3d 140 (2nd Cir. 2003).

9

Id. at 154. 503


catastrophic oil spill. This international law scheme is defended at every turn by a highly sophisticated cast of clever maritime lawyers and public relations firms who are well-paid to retain the status quo or, at least, to slow roll changes designed to match financial rewards with adequate liability. The net result is that lip service is paid to owner “responsibility” that, in reality, amounts to monetary liability caps meeting 10 or 15 percent of the actual damages from a massive spill. Meanwhile, others who profit greatly from the transport of oil on the world’s oceans escape not only not paying for any damages but also even public disclosure of their role and potential responsibility. In major oil spills, it is a myth that the polluter pays. In the case of the Prestige, those who suffered the greatest damage from the marine pollution were coastal café owners, small boat fishermen and other bystanders having nothing to do with the business of the passing tanker. The victim or his fellow taxpayers paid. International law must do better.

504


Appendix: States’ Practice – Denied Port/Place of Refuge

505


506


507


508


509


510


511


512


513


514


515


516


517


518


519

PUBLIC TRUSTEESHIP FOR THE OCEANS Peter H. Sand*

T

he revival of the “public trust” for natural resource management has been among the most successful innovations in US environmental law over the past four decades.1 The concept also found its way into several other legal systems; e.g., a landmark environmental decision of the Indian Supreme Court in 1996 declared the public trust doctrine “part of the law of the land”.2 In very simplified terms, the doctrine means that (a) certain natural resources – regardless of their allocation to public or private uses – are defined as part of an “inalienable public trust”; (b) certain authorities are designated as “public trustees” to guard those resources; and (c) every citizen, as beneficiary of the trust, may invoke its terms to hold the trustees accountable and to obtain judicial protection against encroachments or deterioration. Historically, the idea of public trusteeship was closely linked to the fundamental distinction between imperium and dominium over marine space, and to early

*

Comments by Donald K. Anton, David D. Caron, Harrison C. Dunning, Alf-Håkon Hoel, Gail Osherenko, Cymie R. Payne, Andrew R.G. Price, Joseph L. Sax and Jon M. Van Dyke are gratefully acknowledged.

1

For background, see J.L. Sax, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention”, Mich. L. Rev. 68 (1969-1970), 471 et seq.; and the Symposium on “Takings, Public Trust, Unhappy Truths, and Helpless Giants: A Review of Professor Sax’s Defense of the Environment Through Academic Scholarship”, Ecology L. Q. 25 (1998-1999), 325 et seq. For a comparative overview see P.H. Sand, “Sovereignty Bounded: Public Trusteeship for Common Pool Resources?”, Global Envtl. Pol. 4 (2004), 47 et seq.

2

Mehta v. Kamal Nath et al., Supreme Court of India, decision of 13 December 1996, [1997] 1 SCC 388; reprinted in: United Nations Environment Programme, Compendium of Judicial Decisions on Matters Related to Environment: National Decisions 1 (Nairobi: UNEP 1998), 259 et seq.; and followed by subsequent Supreme Court cases. See M.R. Anderson, “International Environmental Law in Indian Courts”, RECIEL 7 (1998), 21 et seq., at 29; and J. Razzaque, “Application of Public Trust Doctrine in Indian Environmental Cases”, J. Envtl. L. 13 (2001), 221 et seq.



claims for “enclosure” of coastal and ocean commons;3 hence, it also has a direct bearing on the current new wave of environmentally motivated jurisdictional claims by coastal States (accurately predicted by Thomas Mensah 35 years ago).4 Yet, even though the historical origins of the public trust – i.e., legal title in tidal lands and coastal waters – place it at the very interface of national and international areas of jurisdiction, there has been surprisingly little debate regarding its potential impact on the global law of the sea. One of the reasons for this curious absence of global discourse may be the fact that the common law concept of trusteeship has no direct equivalent in contemporary civil law,5 and hence tends to be ignored or misunderstood by lawyers outside the Anglo-American legal tradition.6 To begin with, the public trust doctrine evolving from US environmental law is not some kind of inappropriate “private law analogy”, as European observers tend to assume;7

3

See notes 12-14 and 34-40 below, and R.D. Eckert, The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the Law of the Sea (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 1979); L.M. Alexander, “The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect”, San Diego L. Rev. 20 (1983), 561 et seq.; and W.S. Ball, “The Old Grey Mare: National Enclosure of the Oceans”, Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 27 (1996), 97 et seq. On parallels to the enclosure of global genetic resource commons, see C.B. Thomson, “International Law of the Sea/Seed: Public Domain versus Private Commodity”, Nat. Resources J. 44 (2004), 841 et seq.

4

T.A. Mensah, “The IMCO Experience”, in: J.L. Hargrove (ed.), Law, Institutions, and the Global Environment (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana 1972), 237 et seq., at 250. On recent developments, see notes 41-51 below.

5

See H. Motulsky, “De l’impossibilité juridique de constituer un ‘trust’ anglosaxon sous l’empire de la loi française”, RCDIP 37 (1948), 467 et seq., and the decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 13 June 1984 according to which the legal concept of the common law trust is “incompatible with the doctrinal basis of German law”; BGH/IVaZR/196/82, NJW 37 (1984), 2762 et seq. But see also, for more recent developments, R.H. Helmholz and R. Zimmermann (eds), Itinera Fiduciae: Trust and Treuhand in Historical Perspective (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1998); H. Hansmann and U. Mattei, “The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis”, N.Y.U. L. Rev. 73 (1998), 434 et seq.

6

Most famous is the mistranslation of Woodrow Wilson’s term, “sacred trust of civilization”, in article 22 of the 1919 League of Nations Covenant and article 73 of the 1945 United Nations Charter, which had no equivalent in French and therefore was rendered as “mission sacrée”, thereby shifting the legal metaphor from trusteeship to mandate/agency (“heilige Aufgabe” in the German version of the Covenant, “Auftrag” in the Charter); see R. Jacobs, Mandat und Treuhand im Völkerrecht (Göttingen: Universitäts-Verlag 2004), at 82 and 111 et seq.; and N. Matz, “Civilization and the Mandate System Under the League of Nations as Origins of Trusteeship”, Max Planck UNYB 9 (2005), 47 et seq., at 50 and 71 (considering Wilson’s term to be “without specific legal or even political meaning”, though possibly analogous to tutelage or guardianship). See also notes 54-55 and 87 below.

7

H.A. Schwarz-Liebermann von Wahlendorf, Vormundschaft und Treuhand des römischen und englischen Privatrechts in ihrer Anwendbarkeit auf völkerrechtlicher Ebene (Tübingen: Mohr

522

Public Trusteeship for the Oceans

quite on the contrary, it is an integral part of modern American public law and constitutional law (in view of its significant implications for State rights over natural resources in particular), reflecting a dynamic balance of judge-made rules and legislation.8 In actual practice, the conservation of resources in trust is enforced through judicial action initiated either by the attorney general,9 or by citizen suits.10 Legend has it that the public trust doctrine goes back to Roman law;11 more specifically, to the Roman definition of the “commons” (omnium communia) as including the seashore, according to the Institutes and Digest of Emperor Justinian I. (533 AD), based on earlier writings by a learned jurist from the Lebanese seaport of Tyre, Domitius Ulpianus (170-223 AD): “[N]aturali iure communia sunt omnium haec: aer et aqua profluens et mare

1951); and M. Bothe, “Whose Environment? Concepts of Commonality in International Environmental Law”, in: G. Winter (ed.), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change: Perspectives from Science, Sociology and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006), 539 et seq., at 551 and 558. 8

For an historical account, see M. Selvin, This Tender and Delicate Business: The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy 1789-1920 (New York: Garland 1987); see also B.S. Cohen, “The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment”, Utah L. Rev. [1970], 388 et seq.; P. Deveney, “Title, Ius Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis”, Sea Grant L. J. 1 (1976), 13 et seq.; L.H. Kosloff, “Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi [48 U.S. 469]: Is the Public Trust Becoming Synonymous with the Public Interest?”, Envtl. L. Rep. 18 (1988), 10200 et seq.; A. Rieser, “Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory”, Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 15 (1991), 393 et seq.; and R.G. Natelson, “The Constitution and the Public Trust”, Buff. L. Rev. 52 (2004), 1077 et seq.

9

See A. Kanner, “The Public Trust Doctrine, ‘Parens Patriae’, and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources”, Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 16 (2005), 57 et seq.

10

See J.L. Sax, “Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years’ Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act”, Ecology L. Q. 4 (1974), 1 et seq.; D.K. Stone, “The Michigan Environmental Protection Act: Bringing Citizen-Initiated Environmental Suits into the 80’s”, Ecology L. Q. 12 (1985), 271 et seq.; B.B. Bayer and E.E. Meidinger, “Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws”, Buff. L. Rev. 35 (1985), 864 et seq.; D.P. Gionfriddo, “Sealing Pandora’s Box: Judicial Doctrines Restricting Public Trust Citizen Environmental Suits”, B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 13 (1986), 439 et seq.; B. Breen, “Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages: Closing a Gap in Federal Environmental Law”, Wake Forest L. Rev. 24 (1989), 851 et seq.

11

According to the late Ralph Johnson, it may go back even further: “On the third day, God created the oceans; and of course with the creation of the oceans, he must have created the public trust doctrine to protect the oceans”; R.W. Johnson, “The Public Trust Doctrine”, in: D.J. Canning and J. Scott (eds), The Public Trust Doctrine in Washington State: Proceedings of the Symposium, November 18, 1992 (Olympia, WA: Washington Department of Ecology 1993). 523


et per hoc litoria maris. Nemo igitur ad litus maris accedere prohibetur, dum tamen villis et monumenti et aedificiis abstineat, quia non sunt iuris gentium, sicut est mare.”12 English courts from the 18th century onwards interpreted this definition as not only excluding private property rights in tidelands and navigable waters, but also as conferring trusteeship rights and duties on the sovereign so as to ensure public access for the benefit of “the people”.13 US courts in the 19th century took the British Crown’s trusteeship title to seashore areas as having been transmitted to the American colonies upon statehood;14 i.e., designating the State governments (rather than the federal government) as public trustees to ensure beneficial uses of navigable territorial and internal waters as well as subjacent lands. After lengthy federal-State litigation, this formula was eventually confirmed by the US Congress in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (with seaward limits at 3 nautical miles for the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and at 3 marine leagues – i.e., approximately

12

“By the law of nature, these things are common to mankind: the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects habitations, monuments, and buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject [only] to the law of nations.” Institutes II.1.1 (de rerum divisione); English translation by T.C. Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian (London: Longmans Green, 4th edn 1903), at 90. For translation of the related texts by Ulpian (Digest XLVII.10.13.7) and his contemporary Aelius Marcianus (Digest I.8.2), see C.H. Monro, The Digest of Justinian 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1904), at 39-40. See also P.T. Fenn Jr., “Justinian and the Freedom of the Sea”, AJIL 19 (1925), 716 et seq., at 724 (coasts as “sacred trust of civilization”, drawing an analogy to article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, note 6 above).

13

Ward v. Creswell, 125 Eng. Rep. 1165 (C.P. 1741); Gann v. Free Fishers of Whitstable, 11 Eng. Rep. 1305 (H.L. 1865); and the earlier treatise by Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale, De jure maris et brachiorum ejusdem (1667), reprinted in: R.G. Hall, Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the Privileges of the Subject in the Sea Shores of the Realm (London: Stevens & Haynes, 2nd edn 1875), Appendix V. On more recent UK practice, see J. Gibson, “The Ownership of the Sea Bed Under British Territorial Waters”, Int’l Rel. 6 (1978), 474 et seq. Note, however, that the term “public trust” in English legal usage today refers to a different category of (statutory) financial trusteeship; see J. Barratt, “Public Trusts”, Mod. L. Rev. 69 (2006), 514 et seq.

14

Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), at 410-411 (“dominion and property in navigable waters, and in the lands under them, [were] held by the king as public trust”), reprinted in: D.W. Nixon, Marine and Coastal Law: Cases and Materials (Westport, Conn.: Praeger 1994), at 1 et seq.; and Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), at 228-229 (public trust concept extended to all US States, pursuant to the “equal-footing” doctrine). See H.C. Dunning, “The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law”, Envtl. L. 19 (1989), 515 et seq.

524


9 miles – for the Gulf of Mexico and Puerto Rico),15 and subsequently codified in several State constitutions.16 That arrangement was left intact by President Reagan’s subsequent extension of US (federal) territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles in 1988,17 and by President Clinton’s establishment of a further 12-mile contiguous zone in 1999 (“for law enforcement and public health interests, and to prevent the removal of cultural heritage”),18 and of a federally coordinated network of marine protected areas in 2000.19

15

Submerged Lands Act of 22 May 1953, Public Law 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953, as amended 1986).

16

M.T. Kirsch, “Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions”, Duke L. J. 46 (1997), 1169 et seq. E.g., see the constitutions of Florida (art. X § 11: “lands under navigable waters … held in trust for all the people”); Pennsylvania (art. I §27: “Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people”); and Hawaii (art. XI §1: “all public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the People”, which according to arts XI §6 and XV includes the “archipelagic waters of the state”, and according to art. XI §11 as amended in 1988, an “exclusive economic zone”), as implemented by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in its decision of 22 August 2000, In re Water Use Permit Applications for the Waiahole Ditch, 9 Pacific Rep. 3rd 409 (2000), and 93 Pacific Rep. 3rd 643 (2004); see also note 49 below.

17

Presidential Proclamation 5928 of 27 December 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 777: “Nothing in this Proclamation extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or State law or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom.” See J.L. Jacobson, “U.S. Coastal States and the International Law of the Sea”, Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 24 (1993), 393 et seq.

18

Presidential Proclamation 7219 of 2 September 1999, 64 Fed. Reg. 48701: “Nothing in this Proclamation (a) amends existing Federal or State law; (b) amends or otherwise alters the rights and duties of the United States or other nations in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States established by Proclamation 5030 of March 10, 1983; or (c) impairs the determination, in accordance with international law, of any maritime boundary of the United States with a foreign jurisdiction.” – International aspects of underwater cultural heritage have since been addressed by the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at Paris on 2 November 2001 [not signed by the United States]; see R. Garabello and T. Scovazzi (eds), The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage Before and After the 2001 UNESCO Convention (Leiden: Nijhoff 2003); R.C. Blumberg, “International Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage”, in: M.H. Nordquist et al. (eds), Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and China (Leiden: Nijhoff 2006); and the contribution by Djamchid Momtaz in this volume.

19

Executive Order 13158 of 26 May 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 34909; see D.R. Christie, “Marine Reserves, the Public Trust Doctrine and Intergenerational Equity”, J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 19 (2004), 427 et seq.; K.D. Bevis, “Stopping the Silver Bullet: How Recreational Fishermen Can Use the Public Trust Doctrine to Prevent the Creation of Marine Reserves”, Se. Envtl. L. J. 13 (2005), 171 et seq. 525


There seems to be agreement, therefore, that the nature of both federal and State rights exercised within US waters continues to be fiduciary rather than proprietary,20 even though the range of beneficiaries of the trust (“the people”) within the State-held coastal belt appears to have been narrowed down to the residents of the coastal States concerned.21 Individual States have thus designated their own institutions for distributing the income generated by the trust; e.g., Florida’s “Internal Improvement Trust Fund” (administered by a board of trustees composed of the State governor and three cabinet officers, and serviced by the State’s Environmental Protection Department) earmarks revenues from the State’s shoreline and submerged land use fees for resource conservation and management purposes.22 While interpretation of the public trust doctrine differs from State to State, the common core of the concept has

20

On past and present conflicts with private ocean uses (differently resolved for living and non-living resources), see the Note, “The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine”, Yale L. J. 79 (1970), 762 et seq.; T.W. Earnhardt, “Defining Navigable Waters and the Application of the Public Trust Doctrine in North Carolina: A History and Analysis”, N.C. L. Rev. 49 (1971), 888 et seq.; B.W. Wyche, “Tidelands and the Public Trust: An Application for South Carolina”, Ecology L. Q. 7 (1978), 137 et seq.; S. Wilson, “Private Property and the Public Trust: A Theory for Preserving the Coastal Zone”, UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 4 (1984), 57 et seq.; R.W. Johnson et al., “The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington State”, Wash. L. Rev. 67 (1992), 521 et seq.; S. Macinko, “Public or Private? United States Commercial Fisheries Management and the Public Trust Doctrine: Reciprocal Challenges”, Natural Resources Journal 33 (1993), 919 et seq.; D.F. Britton, “The Privatization of the American Fishery: Limitations, Recognitions, and the Public Trust”, Ocean & Coastal L. J. 3 (1997), 217 et seq.; B.J. McCay, Oyster Wars and the Public Trust: Property, Law and Ecology in New Jersey History (Tucson: University of Arizona Press 1998); S. Macinko and D.W. Bromley, Who Owns America’s Fisheries? (Covelo, CA: Island Press 2002); D. Mongeau, “Public Beach Access: An Annotated Bibliography”, Law Libr. J. 95 (2003), 515 et seq., at 536; J. Firestone et al., “Regulating Offshore Wind Power and Aquaculture: Messages from Land and Sea”, Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 14 (2004), 71 et seq., at 105; R. George, “The ‘Public Access’ Doctrine: Our Constitutional Right to Sun, Surf, and Sand”, Ocean & Coastal L. J. 11 (2005), 73 et seq.; M. Higgins, “Public Access to the Shore: Public Rights and Private Property”, in: D.M. Whitelaw and G.R. Visgilio (eds), America’s Changing Coasts: Private Rights and Public Trust (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2005), 183 et seq.; and J.C. Sylvan, “How to Protect a Coral Reef: The Public Trust Doctrine and the Law of the Sea”, Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 7 (2006), 32 et seq.

21

For detailed discussion see D.C. Slade et al. (eds), Putting the Public Trust to Work: The Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to the Management of Lands, Waters, and Living Resources of the Coastal States (Washington, DC: Coastal States Association, 2nd edn 1997).

22

Originally created in 1855; Florida Statutes, Ch. 253 (State Lands), and note 16 above. – National funds for public allocation of offshore oil revenues have been established in Norway (Special Petroleum Fund, 1990), and proposed for Nigeria; see E. Duruigbo, “Managing Oil Revenues for Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria: The Case for Community-Based Trust Funds”, N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 30 (2004), 121 et seq., at 191; further examples in

526


provided a basis for regional cooperation among coastal States, too23 – within the framework of the 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act, which gave coastal States further leeway and requires federal policies to be “consistent” with coastal State laws.24 Furthermore, pursuant to subsequent US environmental legislation implementing the public trusteeship concept – including the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978,25 the “Superfund Act” of 198026 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,27 – federal and State trustees may recover compensation for damage to natural resources, and allocate the proceeds to restoration and mitigation projects.28 The applicability of public trust principles has also been argued for ocean areas outside territorial waters, in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claimed by the United States,29 and – albeit in a short-lived proposal by

I. Bantekas, “Natural Resource Revenue Sharing Schemes (Trust Funds) in International Law”, NILR 52 (2005), 31 et seq. 23

E.g., in the emerging Northeast Regional Ocean Council (comprised of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont); see K.M. Fletcher, “Regional Ocean Governance: The Role of the Public Trust Doctrine”, Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 16 (2006), 187 et seq.

24

Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), Public Law 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972, as amended through 2004); see J.J. Kalo et al., Coastal and Ocean Law: Cases and Materials (St Paul, MN: West Group, 2nd edn 2002).

25

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments (OCSLAA), Public Law 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).

26

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Public Law 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).

27

Oil Pollution Act, Public Law 101-380, 104 Stat. 486 (1990).

28

On potential conflicts, see W.D. Brighton and D.F. Askman, “The Role of Government Trustees in Recovering Compensation for Injury to Natural Resources”, in: P. Wetterstein (ed.), Harm to the Environment: The Right to Compensation and the Assessment of Damages (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997), 177 et seq., at 193-197. – On comparable environmental damage claims by the Italian State “as a trustee for the whole national community”, see A. Bianchi, “Harm to the Environment in Italian Practice: The Interaction of International Law and Domestic Law”, ibid. 103 et seq., at 104; and L. Francario, Danni ambientali e tutela civile (Naples: Jovene 1990).

29

Established by President Reagan’s Proclamation 5030 of 10 March 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605, 22 ILM 465; see M.C. Jarman, “The Public Trust Doctrine in the Exclusive Economic Zone”, Or. L. Rev. 65 (1986), 1 et seq.; J.H. Archer and M.C. Jarman, “Sovereign Rights and Responsibilities: Applying Public Trust Principles for the Management of EEZ Space and Resources”, Ocean & Coastal Mgmt. 17 (1992), 253 et seq.; R.G. Hildreth, “The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal and Ocean Resources Management”, J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 8 (1993), 221 et seq.; J.H. Archer et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and the Management of America’s Coasts (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press 1994); and G. Osherenko, “New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding Property Rights and the Public Trust”, J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 21 (2006), 317 et seq., at 366. 527


the US State Department during negotiations in the UN Seabed Committee in 1970 – for continental shelf areas 60-120 miles beyond the EEZ.30 Presumably, though, the terms of such “international” public trusteeship would change insofar as the beneficiaries (with regard to recognised non-exclusive ocean uses in particular) would now include “people” other than US citizens, to whom the federal government as trustee would be accountable for its proper management of trust resources in accordance with applicable international rules.31 It is worth recalling that as far back as the Bering Sea Fur Seal arbitration in 1893,32 the United States had already (if rather unsuccessfully) claimed to be acting for the conservation of marine living resources in the Bering Sea as “trustee for the benefit of mankind”.33 The potential merit of a trusteeship regime in this wider geographical context is that it might help to re-assert the distinction between imperium and dominium over ocean resources, and mitigate some of the increasing terminological ambiguity

30

“Trusteeship zone” in articles 26-28 of the Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area: Working Paper submitted by the US Delegation to the UN Seabed Committee (23 May 1970), Official Records of the UN General Assembly, 25th Session: Supplement 21, UN Doc. A/8021, Annex V; reprinted in: The Law of the Sea: Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, Legislative History of Articles 133 to 150 and 311(6) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (New York: United Nations 1996), at 150. See also M.G. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? The United States Position on the Development of a Regime for Deep Sea-Bed Mining in the Law of the Sea Convention (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989), at 27; and R. Wolfrum, Die Internationalisierung staatsfreier Räume: die Entwicklung einer internationalen Verwaltung für Antarktis, Weltraum, Hohe See und Meeresboden (Berlin: Springer 1984),at 364.

31

See B.D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine Environment: The Rules of Decision (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988), at 239-249; viz., “democratic accountability” in the terms of C. Redgwell, Intergenerational Trusts and Environmental Protection (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1999), at 68. See also P. Allott, Towards the International Rule of Law: Essays in Integrated Constitutional Theory (London: Cameron May 2005), at 378 (accountability for mare nostrum). – There is no reason why a national trust for EEZ ocean resources should not, by its own choice, have global beneficiaries (I owe this clarification to David Caron).

32

Great Britain v. United States, Arbitration Award (Paris, 15 August 1893); J.B. Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office 1898), 755 et seq.

33

US government statement, in Moore (note 32 above), at 813-814, 852-854 and 875-876. The arbitral tribunal – chaired by French Ambassador Alphonse de Courcel – rejected the claim, with the US arbitrators (Supreme Court Justice John M. Harlan and Senator John T. Morgan) dissenting; see C.P.R. Romano, The Peaceful Settlement of International Environmental Disputes: A Pragmatic Approach (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2000), 133 et seq., at 141.

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and hidden neo-Seldenian agenda34 (“sliding to ownership”) already deplored by Justices Frankfurter and Black in their classical separate dissenting opinions in 194735 and 1954.36 The notorious scramble for “enclosure” of the ocean commons,37 confirmed and codified by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 1973-1982), continues inexorably to date, both in terms of governmental “territorialization”38 and private “propertization”39 – also in the name of environmental conservation (from creeping “green jurisdiction”

34

For a comparison of John Selden’s Mare clausum seu de dominio maris (London: Meighen 1635; English translation by M. Nedham, Of the Dominion, or, Ownership of the Sea, London: DuGard 1652, reprint Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange 2004) and 20th-century claims of marine territory, see J. Schneider, “Something Old, Something New: Some Thoughts on Grotius and the Marine Environment”, Va. J. Int’l L. 18 (1977), 147 et seq., at 150. See also D.D. Caron, “International Sanctions, Ocean Management and the Law of the Sea: A Study of Denial of Access to Fishing”, Ecology L. Q. 16 (1989), 311 et seq., at 351; and Osherenko (note 29 above), at 16.

35

Dissent by US Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), at 44: “Rights of ownership are here asserted – and rights of ownership are something else”.

36

Dissent by US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954), at 279: “Once private property rights in ocean waters are recognized, I am uncertain where lines can be drawn”.

37

See note 3 above, and P.H. Sand, “Green Enclosure of Ocean Space: Déja Vu?”, Marine Pollution Bull. 54 (2007), 374 et seq.

38

K. Booth, “Naval Strategy and the Spread of Psycho-Legal Boundaries at Sea”, Int’l J. 38 (1983), 373 et seq., at 375; and P.E. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), at 169. See also W. Graf Vitzthum, “Terranisierung des Meeres: die Tendenz zu einem rohstoffbezogenen Seerecht”, EA 31 (1976), 129 et seq.; J.A. Knauss, “Creeping Jurisdiction and Customary International Law”, Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 15 (1985), 209 et seq.; E. Franckx, “The 200-Mile Limit: Between Creeping Jurisdiction and Creeping Common Heritage?”, GYIL 48 (2005), 117 et seq.; and B.H. Oxman, “The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea”, AJIL 100 (2006), 830 et seq. – On the first wave of creeping environmental enclosure (Canada’s Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970), see note 55 below.

39

J. Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain”, Law & Contemp. Probs. 66 (2003), 33 et seq., at 50; see also H.N. Scheiber and C.J. Carr, “From Extended Jurisdiction to Privatization: International Law, Biology, and Economics in the Marine Fisheries Debate”, Berkeley J. Int’l L. 16 (1998), 54 et seq.; R. Hannesson, The Privatization of the Oceans (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2004); and K.M. Wyman, “From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property”, N.Y.U. L. Rev. 80 (2005), 117 et seq. – Offshore leases granted under the US Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA, Public Law 83-212, 67 Stat. 462) have long been recognised as creating “vested rights” for private investors; e.g., see Union Oil Co. of California v. Morton, 512 F. 2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975), at 747; Osherenko (note 29 above), at 50. 529


to downright appropriation).40 The ensuing risk of new conceptual confusion in this regard has recently been highlighted by a series of unilateral acts: (a) French President Chirac’s establishment, on 15 April 2003, of a Mediterranean “Ecological Protection Zone” reaching out to 60 miles beyond territorial waters,41 – promptly followed by Croatia’s declaration of an Adriatic “Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone” on 3 October 2003;42 Slovenia’s (competing) “Ecological and Continental Shelf Protection Zone”

40

Both the National Trust in the United Kingdom and the Nature Conservancy in the United States have begun to purchase or lease large intertidal and seabed areas from the government in order to preserve them from commercial exploitation (by analogy to the “land trust movement” dating back to 1894); see M.W. Beck et al., “New Tools for Marine Conservation: The Leasing and Ownership of Submerged Lands”, Conservation Biology 18 (2004), 1214 et seq.; M.W. Beck et al. (eds), Towards Conservation of Submerged Lands: The Law and Policy of Conservation Leasing and Ownership (Narraganset, RI: Rhode Island Sea Grant 2005); and J.D. Echeverria, “Regulating versus Buying the Coast”, in: Whitelaw and Visgilio (note 20 above), 29 et seq.

41

Zone de protection écologique, Act No. 2003-346 of 15 April 2003, implemented by Decree No. 2004-33 of 8 January 2004; J.O. (16 April 2003), 6726, and (10 January 2004), 844. See L. Lucchini, “La zone de protection écologique française et son application en Méditerranée: quelques brèves observations”, An. Dr. Mer 8 (2003), 433 et seq.; S. Marciali, “Instauration d’une zone de protection écologique en Méditerranée”, RGDIP 107 (2003), 447 et seq.; C. Deffigier, “La zone de protection écologique en Méditerranée, un outil efficace de lutte contre la pollution par les navires?”, RJE 28 (2004), 129 et seq. and 257 et seq.; J. Saura, Specially Protected Areas in the Mediterranean: Recent Trends in State Practice, Loyola–LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2005-20 (Los Angeles, CA: Loyola Law School 2005); and S. Wolf, “Neue Tendenzen zur Ausdehnung küstenstaatlicher Umweltkompetenzen auf See: Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der französischen ‘zone de protection écologique’ im Mittelmeer”, ZaöRV 66 (2006), 73 et seq. – Delimitation of the zone is still subject to bilateral negotiations.

42

Decision on the Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea, Narodnie Novine No. 157/03, notified to the United Nations on 29 October 2003, English text in Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 53 (2004), 68, with an amendment (suspension with regard to European Union Member States) ibid. No. 55 (2004), 31; and geographical coordinates ibid. No. 59 (2006), 28. See D. Vidas, “Global Trends in Use of the Seas and Legitimacy of Croatia’s Extension of Jurisdiction in the Adriatic Sea”, Croatian International Relations Review: Dossier 9:32 (2003), 4 et seq.; id., “Politicka tezina ZERP”, Slobodna Dalmacija (26 October 2006); and B. Vukas, “The Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Coastal States in the Adriatic Sea”, in: N. Ronzitti (ed.), I rapporti di vicinato dell’Italia con Croazia, Serbia-Montenegro e Slovenia (Milan: Giuffré-LUP 2005), 251 et seq. – Slovenia and Italy reacted by a series of diplomatic protests, notified to the United Nations on 7 November 2003, 30 August 2004, 15 April and 3 October 2005, and 15 March 2006; see Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 53 (2004), 70; No. 58 (2005), 20; No. 59 (2006), 33; and No. 60 (2006), 127.

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in the Adriatic Sea on 22 October 2005;43 Italy’s “Ecological Protection Zones Beyond the External Limit of the Territorial Sea” on 8 February 2006;44 and by Malta’s simultaneous proposal of a common “regional ecological protection zone” to be established by the European Union;45 (b) British Prime Minister Blair’s proclamation, on 17 September 2003, of a 200-mile “Environment (Protection and Preservation) Zone” around the Chagos archipelago in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), “contiguous to the territorial sea of the Territory”,46 – albeit driven by

43

Notified to the United Nations on 21 February 2006, English text in Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 60 (2006), 56. For background see D. Arnaut, “Stormy Waters on the Way to the High Seas: The Case of the Territorial Sea Delimitation Between Croatia and Slovenia”, Ocean & Coastal L. J. 8 (2002), 21 et seq.; reprinted in D.D. Caron and H.N. Scheiber (eds), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (Leyden: Nijhoff 2004), 427 et seq. – Croatia has requested international arbitration on the question of geographical delimitation; see Note Verbale of 11 January 2005, Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 57 (2005), 125 et seq., at 127.

44

Act No. 61 of 8 February 2006, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana No. 52 (3 March 2006), Riv. Dir. Int. 89 (2006), 606; referring to the LOS Convention, the 1994 Implementation Agreement, and the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (see note 18 above), though excluding application to fisheries activities. For background see G. Cataldi, “L’Italia e la delimitazione degli spazi marini: osservazioni sulla prassi recente di estensione della giurisdizione costiera nel Mediterraneo”, Riv. Dir. Int. 87 (2004), 621 et seq.; and U. Leanza, “L’Italia e la scelta di rafforzare la tutela dell’ambiente marino: l’istituzione di zone di protezione ecologica”, Riv. Dir. Int. 89 (2006), 309 et seq.

45

See Malta Department of Information, “Malta’s Contribution Towards the Commission’s Green Paper on EU Maritime Policy”, Press Release 0181A (8 February 2006). But see the caveat by A.E. Boyle, “EU Unilateralism and the Law of the Sea”, Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 21 (2006), 15 et seq., at 30.

46

Proclamation and geographical boundaries notified to the United Nations on 12 March 2004, text in Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 54 (2004), 99. According to the ministerial statement in 659 Lords Hansard for 31 March 2004 (240331-30), the designation of the area was made “under Article 75 of UNCLOS” (i.e., as an EEZ). See also C. Sheppard and M. Spalding, Chagos Conservation Management Plan (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003); and R. Edis, Peak of Limuria: The Story of Diego Garcia and the Chagos Archipelago (London: Chagos Conservation Trust, rev. edn. 2004). – UK sovereignty claims in the archipelago are contested by Mauritius; see A. Chellapermal, The Problem of Mauritius Sovereignty Over the Chagos Archipelago and the Militarization of the Indian Ocean (Perth: University of Western Australia Press 1984); and A. Oraison, “Le contentieux territorial anglo-mauricien de l’archipel des Chagos revisité”, R.D.I. 83 (2005), 109 et seq. E.g., whereas the United Kingdom, in its instrument of accession to the of the LOS Convention, declared (on 25 July 1997) that the accession extends to the British Indian Ocean Territory, Mauritius in its instrument of ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict declared (on 22 September 2006) that the convention also extends to “the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia”. 531


concerns of military as much as ecological security;47 and (c) US President Bush’s proclamation, on 15 June 2006, of a “Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument” reaching out to 50 miles into the American Pacific EEZ.48 While the White House press release refers

47

The Chagos archipelago includes Diego Garcia Island, which was made available to the US as a strategic airbase under a 50-years’ lease agreement along the lines of the Guantánamo model, signed in London on 30 December 1966 (603 UNTS 273) and followed by eviction of the indigenous population to Mauritius in 1967-1973. See K.S. Jawatkar, Diego Garcia in International Diplomacy (Bombay: Popular Prakashan 1983); J. Larus, “Diego Garcia: The Military and Legal Limitations of America’s Pivotal Base in the Indian Ocean”, in: W.L. Dowdy and R.B. Trood (eds), The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1985), 435 et seq.; R.B. Rais, The Indian Ocean and the Superpowers: Economic, Political and Strategic Perspectives (Towota, NJ: Barnes & Noble 1987), 76 et seq.; A. Oraison, “Une base militaire américaine au coeur de l’océan indien (la cession à bail stratégique de l’archipel britannique des Chagos aus Etats-Unis et la militarisation progressive de l’atoll de Diego Garcia)”, R.D.I. 80 (2002), 223 et seq.; R. O’Keefe, “Decisions of British Courts During 2003 Involving Questions of Public or Private International Law”, BYIL 74 (2003), 461 et seq, at 486; and J. Pilger, Freedom Next Time (London: Bantam Press 2006), 19 et seq. The Diego Garcia base (“Dodge City”) has been crucial for air support in all US operations in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, especially in the US/UK invasion of Iraq in 2003, and is also reported to have served as a detention camp for suspected terrorists (D. Norville, interview with retired US General Barry McCaffrey, MS/NBC-TV: 6 May 2004). On 4 July 2001, the UK Government had designated Diego Garcia as an internationally protected site under the 1971 Ramsar Convention (996 UNTS 245), though specifically exempting part of the area set aside for the US military facility; see D. Taylor et al., Ramsar Sites: Directory and Overview (8th edn Wageningen: Wetlands International 2005), No. 1077 (2UK001). – On the interface of environmental and military claims to authority in the EEZ generally, see J.M. Van Dyke, “The Disappearing Right to Navigational Freedom in the Exclusive Economic Zone”, Marine Policy 29 (2005), 107 et seq.; M.J. Valencia and K. Akimoto, “Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone”, Marine Policy 30 (2006), 704 et seq., at 709 (“temporary” restrictions for environmental reasons); and the contribution by Sam Bateman in this volume.

48

Presidential Proclamation 8031 of 15 June 2006, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,441; taking up the substance of earlier draft legislation introduced in the US Congress by Rep. Ed Case (D-Hawaii) as H.R. 2376 on 16 May 2005. The original Hawaiian Islands Reservation had been established for bird conservation by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1909, subsequently expanded into a Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve by President Clinton under Executive Orders 13178 (4 December 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 76903) and 13196 (23 January 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 7395); see M. Chapman, “The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve: Ephemeral Protection”, Ecology L. Q. 29 (2000), 347 et seq.; and R.K. Craig, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii”, McGeorge L. Rev. 34 (2003), 155 et seq. On 29 September 2005, a Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine Refuge had been created by Governor Linda Lingle for all waters and subjacent lands under State jurisdiction (Hawaii Administrative Rules, title 13, ch. 60.5). The 2006 Presidential Proclamation was made

532


to that area as “U.S. waters”49 – with the proclamation stating that “all federal lands and interests in lands within the boundaries of this monument (including 139,793 square miles [approx. 360,000 km2, i.e. about the size of Germany] of emergent and submerged lands and waters) are hereby appropriated [sic],” – the text of the proclamation also provides that it “shall be applied in accordance with international law”. Presumably, this means that necessary steps are to be taken to have the area multilaterally designated as a ‘particularly sensitive sea area’ (PSSA) by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), as was done in other cases such as the Great Barrier Reef (Australia 1990, extended to the Torres Strait with Papua New Guinea in 2005), the Sabana-Camaguey Archipelago (Cuba 1997), the Wadden Sea (Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, 2002), and the sea around the Florida Keys (USA 2002).50 This new wave of unilaterally established “green” protection areas outside national territorial waters raises a number of legal questions.51 In his presentation of

under the Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities of 8 June 1906 (Public Law 59-209, 34 Stat. 225), section 2 of which authorises the President – bypassing Congress – to restrict land use in areas designated as national monuments “situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States”; see R.K. Craig, “Are National Monuments Better Than National Marine Sanctuaries? U.S. Ocean Policy, Marine Protected Areas, and the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands”, Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 7 (2006), 27 et seq. 49

US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “President Sets Aside Largest Marine Conservation Area on Earth” (NOAA News Release, Washington, DC, 15 June 2006); see also notes 16 and 48 above. All the islands are part of the State of Hawaii, except for the US federal territory of Midway Atoll; on the boundary question, see J.M. Van Dyke et al., “The Exclusive Economic Zone of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands: When Do Uninhabited Islands Generate an EEZ?”, San Diego L. Rev. 25 (1988), 425 et seq.

50

See Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs), IMO Assembly Res. A.982(24) (1 December 2005); R. Lagoni, “Marine Protected Areas in the Exclusive Economic Zone”, in: A. Kirchner (ed.), International Marine Environmental Law: Institutions, Implementation and Innovations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003), 157 et seq.; J.P. Roberts, Marine Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation: The Application and Future Development of the IMO’s Particularly Sensitive Area Concept (Berlin: Springer 2006); and Y. Uggla, “Environmental Protection and the Freedom of the High Seas: The Baltic Sea as a PSSA from a Swedish Perspective”, Marine Policy 31 (2007), 251 et seq. – Alternatively, the area could be designated as an international “marine protected area” (MPA) under article 211(6) of the LOS Convention; but that article has never been invoked in practice and is unlikely to be inaugurated by the United States.

51

Regarding the compatibility of environmental restrictions by coastal States with rights of passage under LOS Convention articles 58(1), 194(4), 211(5) and 220, see Wolfrum (note 30 above), at 640; Van Dyke (note 47 above); A. Merialdi, “Legal Restraints on Navigation 533


Hawaii’s new marine reserve, President Bush did affirm “a solemn responsibility to be good stewards of the oceans and the creatures who inhabit them”.52 Does such an invocation of the “ocean stewardship” metaphor53 – which is often used as a synonym of public trusteeship (as are alternative legal metaphors

in Marine Specially Protected Areas”, in: T. Scovazzi (ed.), Marine Specially Protected Areas (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1999), 29 et seq., at 34; F. Spadi, “Navigation in Marine Protected Areas: National and International Law”, Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 31 (2000), 285 et seq.; R. Lagoni, “Die Errichtung von Schutzgebieten in der ausschliesslichen Wirtschaftszone aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht”, Natur und Recht 24 (2002), 121 et seq.; H.D. Jarass, Naturschutz in der Ausschliesslichen Wirtschaftszone (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2002), at 39 et seq.; D. Czybulka, “Meeresschutzgebiete in der Ausschliesslichen Wirtschaftszone (AWZ)“, ZfU 14 (2003), 329 et seq.; A. Proelss, “Ausschliessliche Wirtschaftszone (AWZ)”, in: W. Graf Vitzthum (ed.), Handbuch des Seerechts (Munich: Beck 2006), 222 et seq., at 257; K. Castringius, Meeresschutzgebiete (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2006), at 127 et seq.; and the contribution by Martin Tsamenyi and Julian Roberts in this volume. For marine protection areas in EEZs in the Baltic and the Northeast Atlantic Sea in particular, see G. Janssen, Die rechtlichen Möglichkeiten der Einrichtung von Meeresschutzgebieten in der Ostsee (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2002), at 68 et seq.; and A. Proelss, Meeresschutz im Völker- und Europarecht: Das Beispiel des Nordostatlantiks (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2004), at 93 et seq. 52

Transcript of White House proclamation ceremony, 15 June 2006 (see note 49 above).

53

See N.A. Robinson, “Stewardship and This New Journal”, Earth L. J. 1 (1975), 3 et seq.; A.V. Lowe, “Reflections on the Waters: Changing Conceptions of Property Rights in the Law of the Sea”, Int’l J. Estuarine & Coastal L. 1 (1986), 1 et seq.; T.P. Brady, “‘But Most of It Belongs to Those Yet To Be Born’: The Public Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic”, B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 17 (1990), 621 et seq.; W.M. von Zharen, “Ocean Ecosystem Stewardship”, Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 23 (1998), 1 et seq.; J.L. Brown, “Stewardship: An International Perspective”, Environments: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 26 (1998), 8 et seq.; P.E. Steinberg, “Lines of Division, Lines of Connection: Stewardship in the World Ocean”, Geographical Review 89 (1999), 254 et seq.; J.E. Moore, The Public Trust Doctrine and Environmental Stewardship in Coastal New Hampshire (Cambridge, MA: PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2000); G. Chao, “Moving from International ‘Good Steward’ to Domestic Integrated Manager: Challenges of Importing Principles of Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management into Canada’s Ocean Law”, Ocean Yearbook 16 (2002), 421 et seq.; the UK Government’s “Marine Stewardship Report” (Safeguarding Our Seas: A Strategy for the Conservation and Sustainable Development of Our Marine Environment, London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 2002); and D. Fuchs, An Institutional Basis for Environmental Stewardship: The Structure and Quality of Property Rights (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003).

534


like “guardianship”,54 “custodianship”,55 or “agency”56) – imply recognition of a wider fiduciary commitment to protecting the sea as a whole,57 regardless of

54

E.g., see Sandars (note 12 above), at 159 (seashores “subject to the guardianship of the Roman people”); and R. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1922, rev. edn 1954), at 111 (State management of common natural resources as “a sort of guardianship for social purposes”). See also the analogy between natural resource trusteeship and guardianship ad litem drawn by E. Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 1989), at 123; Kanner (note 9 above); and the definition of the role of coastal States in the EEZ as “caretakers of marine ecosystems”, by A.H. Hoel et al., “Ocean Governance and Institutional Change”, in: S.A. Ebbin et al. (eds.), A Sea Change: The Exclusive Economic Zone and Governance Institutions for Living Marine Resources (Dordrecht: Springer 2005), 3 et seq., at 12.

55

E.g., Prime Minister Trudeau’s “custodial” justification for extending Canadian environmental jurisdiction to 100 miles under the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act; see R.St.J. MacDonald et al., “The Canadian Initiative to Establish a Maritime Zone for Environmental Protection: Its Significance for Multilateral Development of International Law”, U. Toronto L. J. 21 (1971), 247 et seq.; J.A. Beesley, “Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian View”, J. Mar. L. & Com. 3 (1971), 1 et seq.; id., “The Canadian Approach to International Environmental Law”, CYIL 11 (1973), 3 et seq., at 6; A.E. Gotlieb and C. Dalfen, “National Jurisdiction and International Responsibility: New Canadian Approaches to International Law”, AJIL 67 (1973), 229 et seq., at 249; R.M. M’Gonigle, “Unilateralism and International Law: The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act”, U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 34 (1976), 180 et seq.; R. Stanford, “Canadian Perspectives on the Future Enforcement of the Exclusive Economic Zone: A Paper in Diplomacy and the Law of the Sea”, Dalhousie L. J. 5 (1979), 73 et seq., at 103; and J. Schneider, World Public Order of the Environment: Towards an International Ecological Law and Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1979), at 183 et seq. – In German environmental law terminology, the concepts of “Hüter” (custodian) and “Treuhänder” (trustee) have been used as synonyms, e.g., by R. Wolfrum, Die Internationalisierung Staatsfreier Räume (Berlin: Springer 1984), at 657 (“custodian as a kind of Treuhänder”); and C. Calliess, “Ansätze zur Subjektivierung von Gemeinwohlbelangen im Völkerrecht: das Beispiel des Umweltschutzes”, ZfU 11 (2000), 246 et seq., at 247.

56

Governments claiming environmental damages as “agents” for the international community: D.D. Caron, “The Place of the Environment in International Tribunals”, in: J.E. Austin and C.E. Bruch (eds), The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), 250 et seq., at 257; and id., “Finding Out What the Oceans Claim: The 1991 Gulf War, the Marine Environment, and the United Nations Compensation Commission”, in: Caron and Scheiber (note 43 above), 393 et seq., at 394 and 414.

57

According to the report of the Pew Ocean Commission, America’s Living Oceans: Charting the Course for Sea Change (Philadelphia, PA: Pew Charitable Trust 2003), “the public has entrusted the government with the stewardship of our oceans, and the government should exercise environmental and economic control over these with a broad sense of responsibility toward all citizens and their long-term interests” (chapter titled Uphold the 535


its national and international legal subdivisions?58 At present, the only part of the oceans that may be said to be formally subject to an international (treaty-based) public trust regime is the area under the jurisdiction of the International Sea-Bed Authority established by Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), to administer the mineral resources of the area as common heritage “for the benefit of mankind”;59 and the extended continental shelf zone from 200 to 350 miles, where coastal States have to pay royalties, through the Authority, for their exploitation of deep sea-bed mineral resources.60 Indeed, in the view of Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle (citing Alexandre Kiss),61 the common heritage concept provides “one of the most developed applications of trusteeship or fiduciary relationship in an environmental context”.62 Going beyond the LOS Convention, however, the 1998 report of the Independent World Commission on the Oceans (IWCO, chaired by former Portuguese President Mário Soares) recommended that the high seas altogether “be treated as a public trust to be used and managed in the interest of present and future

Public Trust, at 10). See also J.M. Van Dyke, “The Role of a Constitution for the U.S. Ocean”, Ocean & Coastal Mgmt. 17 (1992), 273 et seq., at 289. 58

On the need for comprehensive “ocean zoning” – instead of fragmented spatial governance for different marine areas – see Y. Tanaka, “Zonal and Integrated Management Approaches to Ocean Governance: Reflections on a Dual Approach in International Law of the Sea”, Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 19 (2004), 483 et seq., at 506; Osherenko (note 29 above), at 71; and L.B. Crowder et al., “Sustainability: Resolving Mismatches in U.S. Ocean Governance”, Science 313:5787 (4 August 2006), 617 et seq.

59

Article 133 et seq. of the LOS Convention, adopted at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 (1833 UNTS 397), entered into force on 16 November 1994, ratified by 154 countries [not including the United States] and the European Union; as implemented by the Agreement on Part XI adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 48/263 on 28 July 1994, entered into force on 28 July 1996, ratified by 128 countries and the European Union [with provisional participation by the United States].

60

LOS Convention Article 82, designating least-developed and land-locked countries among the global beneficiaries of the trust; see A.E. Chircop, “Operationalizing Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A New Role for the International Seabed Authority?”, Ocean Yearbook 18 (2004), 395 et seq.

61

A.C. Kiss, “La notion de patrimoine commun de l’humanité”, RdC 175 (1982), 109 et seq., at 224.

62

P.W. Birnie and A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2002), at 144; see also A.E. Boyle, “Remedying Harm to International Common Spaces and Resources: Compensation and Other Approaches”, in: Wetterstein (note 28 above), 83 et seq., at 84 (common heritage “as a form of international trusteeship”); and the contribution by Andree Kirchner in this volume.

536


generations.”63 Similar proposals for public trusteeship over living ocean resources had previously been formulated by Jon Van Dyke,64 for Antarctica (terrestrial and marine resources) by Keith Suter,65 and for all global commons by Harlan Cleveland,66 – an idea expanded in the 1997 United Nations reform proposal of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to reconstitute the defunct UN Trusteeship Council “as the forum through which member states exercise their collective trusteeship for the integrity of the global environment and common areas such as the oceans, atmosphere and outer space”.67 The general idea of internationalising public trusteeship has found support among a cross-section of writers in the field of environmental and natural resources law,68 especially in the wider context of intergenerational equity (e.g.,

63

IWCO, The Ocean: Our Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), at 17 and 45 et seq.; see also the Commission’s 1998 Lisbon Declaration, RECIEL 8 (1999), 84 et seq.

64

J.M. Van Dyke, “International Governance and Stewardship of the High Seas and Its Resources”, in: J.M. Van Dyke et al. (eds), Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century: Ocean Governance and Environmental Harmony (Washington, DC: Island Press 1993), 13 et seq., at 19 (“guided by principles developed to protect the ‘public trust’ interest in the waters of the United States”) and 478 (editors’ perspectives: “the public trust doctrine should govern decisions”). See also M. Gorina-Ysern, “World Ocean Public Trust: High Seas Fisheries after Grotius – Towards a New Ocean Ethos?”, Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 34 (2004), 645 et seq.; and M. Gorina-Ysern et al., “Ocean Governance: A New Ethos Through a World Ocean Public Trust”, in: L.K. Glover and S.A. Earle (eds), Defying Ocean’s End: an Agenda for Action (Washington, DC: Island Press 2004), 197 et seq.

65

K. Suter, Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage? (London: Pluto Press 1991), at 170 et seq.

66

H. Cleveland, “The Global Commons: A Global Commons Trusteeship Commission Is Needed to Guide Our Use of the Oceans, Antarctica, the Atmosphere, and Outer Space”, The Futurist (May-June 1993), 9 et seq.; see also T. Iwama, “Emerging Principles and Rules for the Prevention and Mitigation of Environmental Harm”, in: E. Brown Weiss (ed.), Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 1992), 107 et seq., at 115.

67

Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, UN Doc. A/51/950 (14 July 1997); see also the Note by the Secretary-General on United Nations Reform Measures and Proposals: A New Concept of Trusteeship, UN Doc. A/52/849 (31 March 1998); and C. Redgwell, “Reforming the United Nations Trusteeship Council”, in: W.B. Chambers and J.F. Green (eds), Reforming International Environmental Governance: From Institutional Limits to Innovative Reforms (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2005), 178 et seq. That proposal – based on earlier suggestions by Maurice Strong in 1988, Maltese Foreign Minister Guido de Marco in 1991, and the Commission on Global Governance in 1995 (see Sand, note 1 above, at 53) – appears to have been superseded, however, by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 of 16 September 2005 (“2005 World Summit Outcome”) winding up the Trusteeship Council.

68

E.g., see V.P. Nanda and W.K. Ris Jr., “The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to International Environmental Protection”, Ecology L. Q. 5 (1976), 291 et seq.; Kiss (note 537


the “planetary trust” advocated by Edith Brown Weiss).69 Some have likened it to Georges Scelle’s concept of domaine public international.70 Others have remained sceptical, and even warn of “insurmountable obstacles to the wholesale application of the public trust doctrine in the international context”,71 mainly because it would require States to relinquish some measure of sovereignty, which would make it “politically unacceptable to the international community.”72 Those fears may be unfounded, though, in the light of well-established State practice in the operation of the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention (WHC),73 which goes back to a US initiative74 and which now has a near-

61 above), at 128 et seq.; R.D. Munro and J.G. Lammers (eds), Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and Recommendations (Dordrecht: Nijhoff 1987), at 43; M.J. Glennon, “Has International Law Failed the Elephant?”, AJIL 84 (1990), 1 et seq., at 28-34; D. Zaelke and J. Cameron, “Global Warming and Climate Change: An Overview of the International Legal Process”, Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 5 (1990), 249 et seq., at 280; A.C. Kiss and D. Shelton, International Environmental Law (Ardsley, NY: Transnational 1991), at 20; K. Bosselmann, Im Namen der Natur: Der Weg zum Ökologischen Rechtsstaat (Bern: Scherz 1992), at 385; E. Duruigbo, “Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in International Law”, Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 38 (2006), 33 et seq., at 67 (calling for “appropriate mechanisms in international law by which nationals can enforce their rights under this trust”). See also Judge C.G. Weeramantry’s reference to the “principle of trusteeship for earth resources” in his separate opinion in the Case Concerning the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) at the International Court of Justice, ICJ Reports 1997, 1 et seq.; 37 ILM 204, at 213. 69

E. Brown Weiss, “The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity”, Ecology L. Q. 11 (1984), 495 et seq.; id. (note 54 above), at 2; id., “Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global Environmental Change”, in Brown Weiss (note 66 above), 385 et seq., at 395. See also Christie (note 19 above); and Redgwell (note 31 above).

70

G. Scelle, Manuel élémentaire de droit international public (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien 1943), at 275 et seq., 336 and 386; id., Plateau continental et droit international (Paris: Pedone 1955), at 51 et seq. See Kiss (note 61 above), at 123 et seq., comparing Scelle and Sax (note 1 above) at 245/fn. 59; and Smith (note 31 above), at 105. On the traditional distinction between maritime public domain (as “public property”), “common property”, and private property resources, see M. Falque (ed.), Marine Resources: Property Rights, Economics and Environment (Oxford: Elsevier JAI 2002), at xxiii.

71

Hong Sik Cho, The Public Trust Doctrine and Global Commons (Berkeley, CA: JSD dissertation, University of California at Berkeley 1995), at 272 et seq. and 377.

72

Ibid. at 332; and the preface by J.P. Dwyer, at 2 (“outside of current international law”).

73

Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation at Paris on 16 November 1972, entered into force on 17 December 1975; 1037 UNTS 151.

74

See R.N. Gardner (ed.), Blueprint for Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill 1966), at 154-155 (1965 White House Conference on International Cooperation convened by President L.B. Johnson, recommending “a trust for the world heritage”); US Council on Environmental

538


universal membership of 184 countries; i.e., one of the most widely accepted multilateral environmental treaties today. Through a process of formal nomination (by a host State) and conditioned acceptance (by a committee representing the community of Member States), cultural and natural – terrestrial or marine – sites are thus “listed” as protected areas, for the management of which the host State (as trustee) is accountable in accordance with internationally agreed criteria.75 Compliance with the terms of the trust is periodically monitored by the Member States (with the participation of non-State actors) and may, where appropriate, be judicially enforced by the national courts of the host State. For example, in a series of decisions, the Australian High Court upheld the protection status conferred on areas listed or proposed for listing under the WHC,76 and in 1997 confirmed legal standing for NGOs with a particular interest in the conservation of world heritage areas – in this case, the Great Barrier Reef (between 15 and 130 miles off the coast of Queensland)77 – to challenge governmental decisions affecting the area concerned.78

Quality, Environmental Quality: Second Annual Report (Washington, DC: CEQ 1971), at 302-303 (message by President Nixon, calling for “a world heritage trust”); R.E. Train, “A World Heritage Trust”, in: E.R. Gillette (ed.), Action for Wilderness (Washington, DC: Sierra Club 1972), 172 et seq.; and R.L. Meyer, “Travaux Préparatoires for the UNESCO World Heritage Convention”, Earth L. J. 2 (1976), 45 et seq., at 46-48. 75

See S. Lyster, International Wildlife Law (Cambridge: Grotius Publications 1985), at 208 et seq.; and P.H. Sand, “A Century of Green Lessons: The Contribution of Nature Conservation Regimes to Global Governance”, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1 (2001), 33 et seq., at 49 et seq.

76

Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (1983); Richardson v. Forestry Commission, 164 C.L.R. 261 (1988); and Queensland v. Commonwealth, 167 C.L.R. 232 (1989). See B. Davis, “Federal-State Tensions in Australian Environmental Management: The World Heritage Issue”, Envtl. & Plan. L. J. 6 (1989), 66 et seq.; M. Tsamenyi, “Implementing International Environmental Law in Australia: Queensland vs. The Commonwealth”, J. Envtl. L. 2 (1990), 117 et seq.; B.W. Boer, “World Heritage Disputes in Australia”, J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 7 (1992), 247 et seq.; D. Anton et al., “Nationalizing Environmental Protection in Australia”, Envtl. L. 23 (1993), 763 et seq., at 768; M.B. Lane et al., “Not All World Heritage Areas Are Created Equal: World Heritage Area Management in Australia”, Envtl. & Plan. L. J. 13 (1996), 461 et seq.; M. Kennedy et al., “Development and Implementation of Conservation Law in Australia”, RECIEL 10 (2001), 296 et seq.; and D. Haigh, “Australian World Heritage, the Constitution and International Law”, Envtl. & Plan. L. J. 22 (2005), 385 et seq.

77

See J.C. Day, “Zoning: Lessons from the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park”, Ocean & Coastal Mgmt. 45 (2002), 139 et seq.; and text at note 50 above.

78

Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc. v. Minister for Environment, 142 A.L.R. 632 (1997), and 147 A.L.R. 608 (1997) [the law suit eventually failed]. See YB Int’l Envtl. L. 7 (1996) 357-358, 8 (1997) 441-442, 9 (1998) 513-515, 10 (1999) 618-619; D.R. Rothwell and B.W. Boer, “The Influence of International Environmental Law on Australian Courts”, RECIEL 7 (1998), 31 et seq.; D. Farrier and L. Tucker, “Beyond a Walk in the Park: Impact 539


Hence, like Molière’s Monsieur Jourdain who was surprised to learn that he had been speaking prose all his life,79 we may have long been practising international public trusteeship without realising it.80 And, contrary to the images of invasive “black helicopters of the United Nations” conjured up by ultra-conservative critics,81 the WHC reinforces rather than threatens the sovereign legitimacy of environmental governance by nation States.82 Even so, if “ocean trusteeship/stewardship” is to be more than a rhetorical promise, we still have miles to go – from the existing patchwork of marine sites under the WHC and various other national and international instruments,83 to a coherent global system of fiduciary ocean governance. One lesson from of International Nature Conservation Law on Private Land in Australia”, Melb. U. L. Rev. 22 (1998), 564 et seq.; D.E. Fisher, “The Impact of International Law upon the Australian Environmental Legal System”, Envtl. & Plan. L. J. 16 (1999), 372 et seq.; Sand (note 75 above), at 50, and id., “Environment: Nature Conservation”, in: P.J. Simmons and C. de Jonge Oudraat (eds), Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2001), 281 et seq., at 295. 79

J.B. Poquelin dit Molière, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme (Paris: Ballard 1670), Act II, Scene 4.

80

The Mediterranean regional seas programme established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1976 has also been described as an existing (treaty-based) public trust regime; see E. Raftopoulos, “The Barcelona Convention System for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution: An International Trust at Work”, Int’l J. Estuarine & Coastal L. 7 (1992), 27 et seq.

81

J.A. Rabkin, Why Sovereignty Matters (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute 1998), at 46. The occasion was a visit to Yellowstone National Park (at the invitation of the US Government) by the UNESCO World Heritage Committee in 1995, for hearings on potential threats to a “listed” protected area from a mining development project in an adjacent area. The incident prompted – unsuccessful – legislative proposals for an American Land Sovereignty Protection Act (H.R. 3752, 104th Cong. 2nd Sess.), providing for congressional approval of all public land designations under international agreements; see D.L. Gebert, “Sovereignty Under the World Heritage Convention: A Questionable Basis for Limiting Federal Land Designation Pursuant to International Agreements”, S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 7 (1998), 427 et seq.

82

See R.O. Keohane, “Global Governance and Democratic Accountability”, in: D. Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press 2003), 130 et seq., at 154 (global governance conditioned on external accountability “also helps the powerful, because they shape the terms of governance”); Sand (note 1 above), at 58.

83

See G. Kelleher et al., A Global Representative System of Marine Protected Areas, 4 vols. (Washington, DC: Great Barrier Reef Authority/World Bank/IUCN 1995); and S. Chape et al. (eds), 2003 United Nations List of National Parks and Protected Areas (Gland & Cambridge: IUCN & UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, 13th edn. 2003). See also T. Scovazzi, “Marine Protected Areas on the High Seas: Some Legal and Policy Considerations”, Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 19 (2004), 1 et seq.; and the Proceedings of the First International Marine Protected Areas Congress, held at Geelong, Australia, in October 2005 (Theme: “Shared Stewardship”, Gland: IUCN, forthcoming 2007).

540


past experience with the “world heritage trust” is the paramount importance of judicial review, with national courts – rather than any supranational bodies – enforcing the terms of the trust against trustee governments, on behalf of the trustor/settlor (i.e., the international community); hence, the phenomenon described as dédoublement fonctionnel,84 well-documented also from other areas of international environmental law.85 To make such judicial review operational and effective, however, institutions are needed also to provide the beneficiaries of the trust (“peoples”, in Rawlsian terms;86 i.e., national and global civil society) with legal powers of representation and standing: either by appointing an independent “Ocean Guardian”87 or “High Commissioner for the Environment”88 (by analogy to parens patriae institutions for the enforcement of environmental public trusteeship at the State level),89 or by empowering multiple civil-society guardians/watchdogs for this purpose90 (by analogy to citizen suits in national

84

Term coined by G. Scelle, Précis de droit des gens I (Paris: Sirey 1932), at 43 et seq.; see A. Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of ‘Role Splitting’ (dédoublement fonctionnel)”, EJIL 1 (1990), 210 et seq.; and note 70 above.

85

See M.E. O’Connell, “Enforcement and the Success of International Environmental Law”, Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 3 (1995), 47 et seq., at 57-64; D. Bodansky and J. Brunnée, “The Role of National Courts in the Field of International Environmental Law”, RECIEL 7 (1998), 11 et seq. On national trusteeship for global beneficiaries see note 31 above.

86

J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1999), at 23.

87

As proposed by M. Bruce and S. Holt, A World Guardian for the Future (Malta: International Ocean Institute 1977); C.D. Stone, The Gnat is Older than Man: Global Environment and Human Agenda (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993), at 84; id., “Defending the Global Commons”, in: P. Sands (ed.), Greening International Law (London: Earthscan 1993), 34 et seq.; id., “Can the Oceans be Harboured? A Four Step Plan for the 21st Century”, RECIEL 8 (1999), 37 et seq., at 44; and by the IWCO (note 63 above), at 21 and 136 et seq. See also note 54 above.

88

As proposed by L.B. Sohn and F. Orrego Vicuña in the context of the report on “Responsibility and Liability Under International Law for Environmental Damage”, AIDI (1997-I), at 288 and 340-341 (alternatively, Orrego Vicuña suggests designation of public trustees, by analogy to the 1990 US Oil Pollution Act, note 27 above).

89

E.g., see Kanner, note 9 above.

90

P.J. Sands, “The Environment, Community and International Law”, Harv. Int’l L. J. 30 (1989), 393 et seq., at 417; id., “Protecting Future Generations: Precedents and Practicalities”, in: E. Agius and S. Busuttil (eds), Future Generations and International Law (London: Earthscan 1997), 83 et seq. See also the Great Barrier Reef case precedent (note 78 above); G. Prins, “Oceanguard: The Need, the Possibility, and the Concept”, Ocean Yearbook 14 (1999), 398 et seq.; and the World Conservation Union’s Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 31 Rev. 2 (Gland/Bonn: International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 1995, 3rd edn 2004), at 154 (commentary on draft article 58, advocating legal standing for “affected” interest groups in areas beyond national jurisdiction, “by analogy to trusteeship rights”). 541


laws).91 Other pertinent empirical models, as well as suggestions de lege ferenda worth exploring in this context, relate to specialised financial institutions – such as a “global commons trust fund”,92 or designation of a suitable existing body like the Global Environment Facility (GEF)93 – to manage potential revenues, including compensation awards (by analogy to environmental damage funds at the national level),94 and trust income from global certification schemes,95 or from proposed international user fees.96

91

See note 10 above.

92

C.D. Stone, “Mending the Seas Through a Global Commons Trust Fund”, in: Van Dyke et al. (note 64 above), 171 et seq. For national and international precedents see note 22 above, and P.H. Sand, “Trusts for the Earth: New Financial Mechanisms for International Environmental Protection”, in: D. Freestone et al. (eds), Contemporary Issues in International Law: A Collection of the Josephine Onoh Memorial Lectures (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002), at 161 et seq.

93

“International waters” was one of the four original focal areas of the GEF, which has provided funding, e.g., for ship-waste programmes in the Caribbean and in the Chinese sea, and for regional marine conservation in the Black Sea. See L. Jorgenson, “The Global Environment Facility: International Waters Coming Into Its Own”, Green Globe YB Int’l Coop. Env’t & Dev. 6 (1997), 45 et seq.; A.M. Duda, “Contributing to Ocean Security: Global Environment Facility Support for Integrated Management of Land-Sea Interactions”, J. Int’l Aff. 59 (2005), 179 et seq.; and D. Freestone, “The Role of the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility in the Implementation of the Regime of the Law of the Sea Convention”, in: D. Freestone et al. (eds), Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006). The GEF has scheduled its 4th International Waters Conference to be held in Cape Town/South Africa from 31 July to 3 August 2007.

94

E.g., Canada’s Environmental Damages Fund, established by the Treasury Board in 1995 and administered by the Environment Ministry as “custodian”; see D.J. Hill et al. (eds), Environmental Damages Fund Evaluation (Ottawa: Environment Canada 2002); see also note 28 above. Lack of an international mechanism of this kind may partly account for the curious fact that, in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War oil spills, the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) never received a claim for environmental damage to areas or resources beyond national jurisdiction; see A. Gattini, Le riparazioni di guerra nel diritto internazionale (Milan: CEDAM 2003), at 468 and 545; Caron (note 56 above); and P.H. Sand, “Compensation for Environmental Damage from the 1991 Gulf War”, Envtl. Pol’y & L. 35 (2005), 244 et seq., at 249 note 28.

95

On the work of the (non-governmental) Marine Stewardship Council, see D.H. Constance and A. Bonanno, “Regulating the Global Fisheries: The World Wildlife Fund, Unilever, and the Marine Stewardship Council”, Agriculture and Human Values 17 (2000), 125 et seq.; but see also S. Ponte, Ecolabels and Fish Trade: Marine Stewardship Council Certification and the South African Hake Industry (Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa 2006).

96

E.g., a proposal by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat für Globale Umweltveränderungen, WBGU) to empower international “trusteeship authorities” to levy charges for the commercial use of global common goods, such as maritime traffic on the high seas; see the WBGU Annual Report, World in Transition: New

542


To be sure, extrapolation of the public trust doctrine from the national to the international level raises what natural scientists and political scientists call a problem of “scale”: viz., the transferability of empirical and theoretical generalisations from one level to another in the dimensions of space and time.97 Yet, modern environmental law is replete with examples of “vertical transplants”; i.e., the effective international adaptation of national legal concepts.98 At the very least, public trusteeship for the oceans may offer an innovative (post-Grotian) “mobilising utopia”,99 the kind of mirage once described by Leszek Kołakowski, “which makes beautiful lands arise before the members of a caravan and thus increases their efforts to the point where, in spite of all their sufferings, they reach the next tiny water-hole. Had such tempting mirages not appeared, the exhausted caravan would inevitably have perished in the sandstorm, bereft of hope.”100

Structures for Global Environmental Policy (London: Earthscan 2001), at 181; and WBGU, Charging the Use of the Global Commons (Berlin: Springer 2002). A similar “ocean development tax” had already been proposed 30 years earlier by Elisabeth Mann Borgese; see the Conference Proceedings of Pacem in Maribus II (Malta, International Ocean Institute 1971); E. Mann Borgese, “The Law of the Sea: Its Potential for Generating International Revenue”, Ocean Yearbook 4 (1984), 15 et seq.; id., The Future of the Oceans: A Report to the Club of Rome (Montréal: Harvest House 1986), 63 et seq. See also Eckert (note 3 above), at 174/fn. 34; and Stone (note 92 above), at 175 et seq. 97

O.R. Young, “The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relations”, Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994), 429 et seq.; and id., The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 2002), at 139 et seq.

98

J.B. Wiener, “Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law”, Ecology L. Q. 27 (2001), 1295 et seq.

99

R.J. Dupuy, Conclusions of the 1984 Workshop of the Hague Academy of International Law, L’avenir du droit international de l’environnement/The Future of the International Law of the Environment (Dordrecht: Nijhoff 1985), 494 et seq., at 513. For an “encouragement of utopian trends”, see also L.A. Teclaff, “The Impact of Environmental Concern on the Development of International Law”, in: L.A. Teclaff and A.E. Utton (eds), International Environmental Law (New York: Praeger 1974), 229 et seq., at 258; and D. Pepper, “Utopianism and Environmentalism”, Envtl. Pol. 14 (2005), 3 et seq.

100

L. Kołakowski, Der Mensch ohne Alternative: von der Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit, Marxist zu sein (Munich: Piper 1960), at 127, English translation in: A.O. Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1967, rev. edn. 1995), at 32; see P.H. Sand, Transnational Environmental Law: Lessons in Global Change (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1999), at 2. 543

LA CHARTE AFRICAINE DES TRANSPORTS MARITIMES: PRINCIPES, RÈGLES ET TECHNIQUES Louis Savadogo*

L’

éloignement des fournisseurs par rapport aux marchés internationaux, les rapprochements douaniers et économiques, et, aujourd’hui et demain, l’exploitation de nouvelles ressources en mer assurent et accroissent le rôle des transports maritimes. Sur ce point, on observe que les Etats africains, tard venus à la mer, souffrent d’une certaine disgrâce. Leur part dans le commerce international est beaucoup plus importante que leur place dans la flotte mondiale : leurs exportations représentent environ 10% des cargaisons sèches transportées dans le monde, leur tonnage étant, en 2006, de 0.6% du tonnage mondial.1 Les flottes marchandes s’insèrent dans le faible potentiel maritime des Etats, en particulier, sur les services maritimes, sur les ports et sur la construction navale. Ce potentiel s’inscrit, à son tour, dans un contexte humain, économique et politique défavorable. Pour obvier ces inconvénients, la troisième Conférence des ministres africains des transports, réunie à Addis-Abeba du 13 au 15 décembre 1993, a souligné l’importance de la coopération régionale aux fins de rechercher des solutions appropriées.2

*

Le présent chapitre n’engage que les vues de son auteur et ne saurait être considéré comme représentatif de la position officielle du Tribunal international du droit de la mer sur le sujet traité.

1

UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 2006, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2006, p. 104, paragraphe C.

2

Sur les prémisses de ce texte v. les travaux de la Conférence spéciale des ministres africains des transports, réunie sous les auspices de l’Organisation de l’Unité africaine et de la Commission économique pour l’Afrique (Addis-Abeba, 10-12 juillet 1989). Elle a adopté une résolution prévoyant la confection d’une Charte maritime africaine. Cf. OUA-CEA, Rapport du Secrétaire général sur la deuxième session de la conférence des ministres africains des transports maritimes, Doc. CM/1614 (LII) 3-7 juillet 1990, 25 p.



La conférence3 a fourni l’occasion d’ouvrir à la signature la Charte africaine des transports maritimes adoptée le 15 décembre 1993.4 L’intitulé du texte témoigne de l’influence idéologique quelque peu en porte-à-faux par rapport à l’évolution de la société internationale.5 Il s’inscrit au demeurant dans la continuité d’un ensemble d’instruments internationaux : Charte de l’Organisation de l’Unité africaine,6 Traité instituant la Communauté économique africaine,7 Convention relative à un code de conduite des conférences maritimes,8 Convention relative au commerce de transit des Etats sans littoral.9 Il faut restituer la Charte dans ce corpus normatif pour en comprendre la véritable signification. Mais pas simplement d’un point de vue chronologique : conceptuellement aussi. Conçue dans un esprit supraétatique, la Charte nous met en présence d’un ensemble cohérent de règles et de principes, produits de négociations et de compromis entre intérêts particuliers. Elle n’a pas d’homologue à l’échelle du monde. La particularité de sa condition légale apparaît notamment dans trois traits.

I. Inspiration et contenu Le thème de la réglementation des communications maritimes a, dès l’origine, marqué le régime des activités de liaison sur le continent, mais son expression la plus forte résulte de la Charte des transports maritimes en Afrique de l’ouest et du centre (5, 7, 8 mai 1975).10 La Charte africaine des transports maritimes du 15 décembre 1993 a enrichi le corpus juridique préexistant.

3

Texte du projet de Charte dans O.U.A., Study on maritime transport situation in Africa with a view to preparing a draft African Charter on maritime transport, WK/GP/MAR/4 (II), October 1989, p. 112.

4

Texte sur Internet : <www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties_fr. htm>.

5

Le terme « charte » semble porter les traces de la Charte des droits et des devoirs économiques des Etats, adoptée par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies (Résolution 3281 (XXIX), 12 décembre 1974). Il est aléatoire d’en faire un élément cohérent du « droit du développement », qui apparaît aujourd’hui appartenir à une rhétorique un peu démodée.

6

Charte de l’Organisation de l’unité africaine, 25 mai 1963, UNTS, Vol. 479, 1963, No. 6947, p. 71.

7

Treaty establishing the African Economic Community [done at Abuja, Nigeria, June 3, 1991] 30, ILM, 1991, p. 1241.

8

Convention relative à un code de conduire des conférences maritimes (avec annexe), 6 avril 1974, UNTS, Vol. 1334, 1983, No. 22380, p. 44.

9

Convention relative au commerce de transit des Etats sans littoral, 8 juillet 1965, UNTS, Vol. 597, p. 42.

10

Texte dans J. marine marchande, 29 mai 1975, pp. 1320-1321.

546

La Charte africaine des transports maritimes

Sa structure rend mal compte de son extraordinaire complexité. Si l’on excepte le préambule qui contient, comme il est d’usage dans les actes conventionnels, un véritable exposé des motifs, la Charte est divisée en neuf chapitres. Selon une habitude anglo-saxonne, certaines dispositions, notamment le chapitre I, fournit la définition des termes utilisés. Le chapitre II énumère les « Principes et objectifs de coopération » (articles 2 et 3). Sous le titre « Organes », le chapitre III contient trois articles (4, 5, 6), qui en réalité définissent également les principes et règles de la coopération régionale dans le domaine des transports maritimes. Le chapitre IV « Coopération dans le domaine des transports maritimes » qui constitue la matière même de la Charte, est divisé en neuf articles (articles 7 à 15). Il doit servir d’appui à d’autres éléments de réglementation inscrits dans l’instrument : « Coopération en matière d’assistance aux chargeurs » (chapitre V, articles 16, 17, 18) ; « Développement et gestion des ports » (Chapitre VI, articles 19 et 20) ; « Coopération dans le domaine de la législation maritime » (chapitre VII, articles 21 et 22). Sous le titre « Coopération entre Etats sans littoral et Etats de transit », le chapitre VIII (articles 23 à 26) consacre des statuts de spécificité ou l’inégalité compensatrice pour les Etats sans littoral.11 Enfin, le chapitre IX, « Dispositions finales », comporte 7 articles (27 à 33) qui correspondent bien à cet intitulé. On voit ainsi que la Charte se compose, en définitive, de 33 articles définissant les principes, règles et techniques de la coopération régionale dans le domaine des transports maritimes, répartis en 9 chapitres, précédés d’une énumération de principes valables en matière de communication, mais s’appliquant aussi bien aux autres secteurs des relations internationales. La Charte n’est pas une première mesure de codification et de développement progressif du droit international, au sens de l’article 13, paragraphe 1, a) de la Charte des Nations Unies, c’est-à-dire un instrument destiné à formuler par écrit les règles du droit coutumier. Les désaccords subsistant sur certains de ses articles lui interdisent, en effet, d’atteindre un tel objectif. Avec cette limitation de ses prétentions, la Charte se présente comme un « Code », au sens technique du terme, c’est-à-dire comme un document unique où se trouvent rassemblés tous les principes et toutes les règles figurant dans des instruments juridiques épars et traitant du commerce maritime. Peut-on encore parler d’un « Code », si les principes et règles qu’il réunit n’ont aucune homogénéité, mais présentent au contraire, des statuts juridiques totalement différents, les uns appartenant déjà au droit positif, les autres ayant une valeur controversée, ou relevant de la seule lex feranda, et même étant considérés par certains comme contra legem ? Faut-il alors ne voir dans la Charte qu’un simple catalogue de dispositions normatives dépourvues de toute portée juridique ?

11

Sur ce concept v. C.A. Colliard, « Spécificité des Etats, théorie des statuts juridiques particuliers et d’inégalité compensatrice », in Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter. Le droit international : unité et diversité, Paris, Pedone, 1981, 584 p (spéc. pp. 153-180). 547


II. Éléments de réglementation Une logique solidariste, globalisante et redistributrice domine la construction. La Charte africaine des transports maritimes emprunte en la matière une démarche qui va du général au particulier. Définissant d’abord certains principes directeurs destinés à guider l’action des Etats, elle traite ensuite, plus précisément des instruments de coopération appelés à les mettre en œuvre. Sur ce point, l’article 2 énonce : « Les Etats membres déclarent leur adhésion aux principes fondamentaux de coopération maritime suivants : – Solidarité et interdépendance des Etats. – Harmonisation et coordination des politiques des Etats membres dans tous les domaines liés au transport maritime international et aux ports. – Recherche d’une efficacité accrue des activités et des services maritimes et portuaires à des fins de développement économique et social. – Droit au libre accès à la mer pour tout Etat membre sans littoral sous réserve du respect des lois et règlements des Etats de transit ». Une place à part doit être ménagée au principe de « solidarité et d’interdépendance ». La souveraineté reste parfaitement viable dans une situation d’interdépendance, qui impose à chaque Etat de tenir compte des intérêts des autres afin d’entretenir avec eux des relations mutuellement profitables. Elle est donc aussi compatible avec la solidarité, en quoi se résument, sur le plan des principes juridiques, les exigences de l’interdépendance, comme la souveraineté exprime celles de l’indépendance. De même, si la souveraineté trouve bien son fondement dans le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes, elle ne revêt une signification en droit international que si elle est reconnue et définie par ce dernier et ne remplit sa fonction protectrice que si elle se résout en un faisceau de droits consacrés par l’ordre juridique international. C’est le droit international, et lui seul, qui peut définir un domaine réservé au droit interne, mais il lui est difficile de le faire sans tenir compte de toutes les données de la réalité, c’est-à-dire en ignorant les effets internationaux des décisions étatiques.12 La conciliation entre souveraineté et solidarité parait ainsi parfaitement possible, même si les deux notions sont naturellement en tension. C’est la raison

12

Cf. M. Virally, « Sur un pont aux ânes : les rapports entre droit international et droits internes », in Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin. Problèmes de droit des gens, Paris, Pedone, 1964, 536 p (spéc. pp. 488-505).

548


pour laquelle nous avons cru pouvoir les faire figurer aux extrémités d’un axe unique, sur lequel pourront prendre place, précisément, toutes les solutions de conciliation. C’est, nous semble-t-il, ce qui a été admis par les rédacteurs de la Charte africaine des transports maritimes, partout où ils ont accepté d’abandonner l’absolutisme doctrinal affiché à propos de la souveraineté. Il ne pouvait d’ailleurs en être autrement, le régionalisme reposant autant sur la reconnaissance de la solidarité que sur celle de la souveraineté.13 Dans certains cas, la solidarité a été conçue simplement comme obligeant l’Etat, dans l’exercice de ses droits souverains, à tenir compte des intérêts légitimes des autres Etats : par exemple en matière de « Coopération entre Etats sans littoral et Etats de transit » (chapitre VIII). Il est inutile de rappeler, d’abord – si n’est que d’un mot – qu’un tel dispositif reflète l’importance du phénomène de l’enclavement en l’Afrique qui compte 15 Etats sans littoral sur un total de 43 partageant cette disgrâce géographique.14 S’y ajoutent la politique des groupements régionaux tournés vers la mer (chapitre III) et, plus spécialement, vers la mise en œuvre de politiques maritimes harmonisées capables de favoriser un développement harmonieux (article 2, alinéa 1), l’adoption de positions communes sur les questions de politique maritime internationale et l’harmonisation des vues relativement à l’application des conventions maritimes internationales (article 2, alinéas 2 et 3). Bien entendu, la solidarité se trouve également à la racine de l’obligation de contribuer à la coopération maritime régionale dont les facettes sont multiples : promotion du transport multimodal (article 10), du cabotage maritime (article 11), mise en place d’un cadre législatif et réglementaire harmonisé (article 13, chapitre VII), développement et gestion des ports (chapitre VI). La réponse privilégiée aux exigences de la solidarité est la coopération. Cette approche recèle une ambiguïté : le passage de l’expression « conviennent » (articles 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20) ou « sont invités à » (article 25), aux termes « s’engagent » (articles 5, paragraphe 2, 11, 12, 15), « doivent » (article 18) semble exprimer l’incertitude sur la nature de la coopération : obligation morale dans le premier cas, droit juridiquement reconnu dans le second. Dans certains cas, il s’agit d’obligations pesant plus spécialement sur les Etats côtiers (article 23). Les aspects unilatéraux et coopératifs sont combinés en ce que la Charte prévoit des

13

V.J.C. Gautron, « Le fait régional dans la société internationale », in Régionalisme et universalisme dans le droit international contemporain, Colloque de Bordeaux de la Société française pour le droit international, 20, 21, 22 mai 1976, Paris, Pedone, 1977, pp. 5-44.

14

Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopie, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Ouganda, Niger, République Centrafricaine, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tchad, Zambie, Zimbabwe. Pour étude d’ensemble sur les Etats sans littoral v. L. Savadogo, Essai sur une théorie générale des Etats sans littoral, Paris, LGDJ, 1997, 389 p. La récente accession du Monténégro à l’indépendance prive la Serbie d’accès à la mer. 549


compétences et des procédures particulières que doivent suivre les Etats membres – ainsi de la création et du renforcement d’organismes maritimes nationaux (article 6) ou de l’assistance directe aux chargeurs (article 16). Il n’y a pas lieu de traiter ici des autres questions de principe qu’on retrouvera lorsqu’on étudiera les techniques légales d’action. Ce qui importait ici est que fût affirmé le principe selon lequel la réglementation édictée s’enracine dans une optique de solidarité. Encore faut-il que cette approche, une fois reconnue telle, revête un contenu particulier, qui ne dépend pas de la logique juridique, mais d’un choix politique lié aux caractères de la société dans laquelle s’insère la construction.

III. Techniques légales d’action L’ambition est ouvertement affichée de donner naissance à un système normatif unifié. La Charte n’en fait-elle pas l’aveu en ces termes : « Considérant les transports maritimes comme un facteur d’intégration économique régionale et continentale » (Préambule, alinéa 7). Dans cet esprit, l’accent est mis sur la responsabilité principale des gouvernements pour les politiques et l’action à mener. Cette approche juridique peut être inférée des principes de la Communauté économique africaine qui, par ses exigences logiques, entraîne une intégration des activités économiques,15 de leurs instruments, de leur exercice dans un nouvel ordre doté d’une homogénéité et d’une cohérence propres.16 Cette homogénéité et cette cohérence supposent, pour se maintenir et se renforcer des conditions d’une nature autre que proprement économique. Le cadre légal de l’activité maritime comporte ainsi des implications juridiques, opérationnelles et politiques. Juridiques, parce que l’uniformité ou l’« harmonisation des politiques maritimes des Etats »,17 techniques préférentielles de la Charte, sont des conditions impératives du bon fonctionnement d’une politique commune et même de son existence. Il est indispensable, en effet, que ces réglementations soient interprétées et appliquées de manière identique entre parties contractantes, de sorte que les opérateurs,

15

Aux termes de l’article 4, paragraphe 2, h) le Traité instituant la Communauté économique africaine devra assurer la création d’un marché commun.

16

Diverses prescriptions du Traité en portent témoignage : harmonisation des politiques nationales en vue de la promotion d’activités communautaires, notamment dans le domaine des transports et des communications (article 4, paragraphe 2, e) ; adoption d’une politique commune dans le domaine des transports et des communications (article 6, paragraphe 2, i)) ; harmonisation des politiques relatives au transport maritime (article 61, paragraphe 2, (c) i).

17

V. Charte africaine des transports maritimes, Préambule, alinéa 12, articles 2, alinéa 2, article 3, alinéa 1, 13 et 21.

550


où qu’ils se trouvent, soient assurés que leurs droits et leurs obligations, seront reconnus dans les mêmes termes. Opérationnelles, parce que l’action normative vise la « promotion d’une coopération bilatérale et multilatérale entre administrations maritimes des Etats » (article 3, alinéa 4), la « promotion et le développement de la coopération maritime et portuaire» (article 3, alinéa 5). Elle prévoit également la création de services publics internationaux, notamment des compagnies régionales et sous-régionales maritimes (article 3, alinéa 6), des d’entreprises conjointes de transport multimodal (article 10). La Charte décrit, ensuite avec une minutie clinique, qui s’explique par le domaine particulièrement sensible concerné, le « soutien au développement des transports maritimes » (article 15). Le suivi, l’évaluation et le financement des flottes marchandes (article 14), le soutien au développement des transports maritimes (article 15), la promotion du cabotage maritime (article 11) font l’objet de prescriptions détaillées. Des mécanismes auquel la Charte confère une grande importance forment le support de la coopération régionale. Ils empruntent deux formes : soit celle de l’Unité continentale de coordination des actions des organisations régionales de coopération maritime et portuaire « UCOMAR » (article 4) soit celle – institutionnalisée – d’organisations régionales et sous-régionales de coopération maritime (article 5). Symétriquement, sont prévues la création et le renforcement d’organismes maritimes nationaux (article 6) et la coopération entre armements africains (article 7). L’article 32 de la Charte organise le règlement des différends. Sa lecture doit être conduite à la lumière de l’article 87 du Traité instituant la Communauté économique africaine à laquelle elle se rattache étroitement, volonté supplémentaire de marquer la filiation de la Charte par rapport à l’instrument conventionnel du 3 juin 1991 et à son optique communautaire.18 Politiques, parce que la Charte africaine des transports maritimes ne survivrait pas, ou tout au moins n’atteindrait pas les objectifs qui la justifient si tant à l’intérieur de l’espace dans lequel elle s’inscrit que vis-à-vis de l’extérieur, continuaient de s’appliquer des politiques nationales différentes. Sur ce point, l’instrument énonce que les parties contractantes considèrent ces politiques comme des sujets d’intérêt commun et les traitent en étroite coopération au sein des organes de la Charte ; ou, mieux encore, que certaines d’entre elles deviennent des politiques communes (article 3). L’émergence de ces politiques communes qui n’est pas sans rappeler celles de l’Union européenne,19 s’explique par les nécessités économiques, sociales

18

Le texte prescrit : « 1. Tout litige relatif à l’interprétation ou à l’application des dispositions du Traité est réglé à l’amiable par accord direct entre les parties au litige. Si celles-ci ne parviennent pas à régler ledit litige, l’une des parties peut saisir la Cour de Justice dans un délai de douze mois. 2. Les arrêts de la Cour de Justice sont définitifs et sans appel ».

19

V.J.Cl. Gautron, « Présentation théorique des politiques communautaires », in Les Communautés européennes en fonctionnement, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1981, p. 217. 551


ou politiques de l’approche communautaire, par la supériorité de plus en plus évidente, en termes d’efficacité, d’une action commune sur les comportements séparés. Dans nombre d’instruments régionaux relatifs au régime des activités à dimension internationale (CEA, l’UEMOA, COMESA20) les politiques communes sont présentes. La gestion internationale des communications maritimes déborde ainsi largement les problèmes les plus étroitement liés aux activités de liaison mais celles-ci constituent à la fois l’élément moteur de la réglementation et son objet principal. Au terme de cette tentative de mise au point, on croit pouvoir conclure sur la Charte africaine des transports maritimes, définie d’abord en compréhension, par un énoncé globalisant. Elle vise l’élimination des obstacles à la réalisation d’un « code » général,21 l’intégration et l’organisation générale des transports maritimes au plan continental. Une telle approche, d’inspiration « solidariste » soulève autant de questions juridiques différentes qu’il serait vain de tenter de résumer en quelques lignes : existence d’un pouvoir de décision, problèmes financiers, question du consentement ponctuel des Etats intéressés, garantie d’exécution, etc. En même temps les conséquences à court terme de ces prescriptions par trop évanescentes sont limitées dans la mesure où l’instrument est entré en vigueur de façon provisoire.22 Aussi, bien loin d’être un astre mort, la Charte pénètre progressivement la réalité juridique et sociale.

20

Traité instituant la Communauté économique africaine « CEA », 3 juin 1991, Chapitre X ; Traité établissant l’Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine « UEMOA » [Bénin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Sénégal, Togo], 10 janvier 1994 (Chapitre II « Des politiques communes » ; Treaty establishing a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa « COMESA » [Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe], 5 November 1993 (Chapter 11, article 84 « Common transport and communication policies »).

21

Sur le concept de codification du droit international : R. Ago, « La codification du droit international et les problèmes de sa réalisation », in Faculté de droit de l’université de Genève/IUHEI, Recueil d’études de droit international. En hommage Paul Guggenheim, Genève, La Tribune de Genève, 1968, XXX- 901, spécialement pp. 93-131 ; Y. Daudet, « Actualités de la codification en droit international », RdC, 2003, Vol. 303, pp. 9-118 ; La Codification du droit international, Société française pour le droit international, Colloque d’Aix-en-Provence, 1999, 344 p.

22

L’article 28 de la Charte dispose : « 1. La présente Charte entrera en vigueur de façon provisoire trente (30) jours après sa signature par au moins vingt (20) Etats membres de l’Organisation de l’Unité africaine. 2. Elle entrera en vigueur de façon définitive trente (30) jours après la réception par le Secrétaire général de l’Organisation de l’Unité africaine des instruments de ratification, d’acceptation ou d’approbation de deux tiers (2/3) des Etats membres de l’Organisation de l’Unité africaine ». Au 31 décembre 2006, 10 Etats ont ratifié l’instrument : Comores, Egypte, Ethiopie, Lesotho, Madagascar, Maurice, Nigéria, Sénégal, Tanzanie, Tunisie.

552

SEA BOUNDARY DELIMITATION AND INTERNAL WATERS Budislav Vukas

I. Internal Waters and the Law of the Sea

S

ince the very beginning of my interest in the law of the sea, I have had the impression that the international community has avoided dealing systematically with the regime of internal waters.1 Even today, after the adoption in 1982 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), the relation between international law and internal waters is as defined by Professor Vladimir Ibler in 1965: “This regime [internal waters] has mostly been determined by national legal rules, and only roughly by international law. This section of international law has not been codified. In fact, the codification up to now has not even seriously been tried. The 1958 Geneva Codification has left out internal waters.”2 Quoting a 17th-century opinion concerning internal waters, R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe agree that: “This view of internal waters as an integral part of the coastal State remains unaltered today, and for this reason they are not the subject of detailed regulations in the Law of the Sea Conventions.”3

1

Even after the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), John Colombos does not even use the term “internal waters”, but “interior”, “inland” or “national” waters; C.J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, 4th revised edn, Longmans, London, 1959, p. 148.

2

V. Ibler, Sloboda mora (Freedom of the Seas), Narodne novine, Zagreb, 1965, p. 85. Anyhow, this author gives one of the best and most comprehensive analyses of the trends adopted by coastal States in the treatment of foreign ships in their internal waters; Ibler, op. cit., pp. 83-88. See also: V.D. Degan, “Internal Waters”, NYIL, Vol. 17, 1986, pp. 3-44.

3

R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 2nd edn, Manchester University Press,



The texts, not only of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,4 but also of the LOS Convention,5 prove the correctness of the above statements. In both Conventions it has been referred to internal waters only in order to clarify some issues relevant to the territorial sea. Thus, in defining the legal status of the territorial sea, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was obliged to admit that the sovereignty of a coastal State extends not only to its territorial sea, but also to its internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, to its archipelagic waters (art. 2(1)).6 In respect of the location of internal waters, the LOS Convention states that internal waters are “waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea” (art. 8(1)). Indirectly, several articles dealing with the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured refer to internal waters. The only provision dealing with the regime of internal waters is the one exceptionally recognising the right of innocent passage in those waters. Innocent passage in internal waters exists only “[w]here the establishment of a straight baseline … has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such …” (art. 8(2)). Besides these scarce rules in the LOS Convention, the only other multilateral instrument dealing with internal waters is the Convention and the Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, adopted in Geneva, on 9 December 1923.7 Due to the small number of ratifications, commentators doubt whether the rules contained in the Geneva Statute can be considered as general customary international law.8 Anyhow, the Conference for the Codification of International Law, held at The Hague in 1930, adopted the Recommendation that the 1923 Convention on International Maritime Ports be completed by provisions on the jurisdiction of States in respect of ships in their internal waters.9

1978, p. 51. See also: L. Lucchini and M. Voelckel, Droit de la mer, Vol. 1, Editions A. Pedone, Paris, 1990, pp. 141-142. 4

UNTS, Vol. 516, p. 205.

5

UNTS, Vol. 1833, p. 3.

6

As at the time of UNCLOS I, the special legal status of the archipelagic States and the archipelagic waters was not yet recognised, art. 1(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone mentioned the extension of the sovereignty of coastal States, in addition to the territorial sea, only to their internal waters.

7

LNTS, Vol. 58, p. 287. The Convention entered into force on 26 July 1926.

8

Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p. 53; see also: G.P. Pamborides, International Shipping Law, Legislation and Enforcement, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, 1999, pp. 26-30.

9

See: Annexe III (II. Voeu concernant les eaux intérieures), in: G. Gidel, Le droit international public de la mer, le temps de paix, Tome III, Paris, 1934, p. 798.

554

Sea Boundary Delimitation and Internal Waters

The Institute of International Law (Institut de Droit international) has also not shown a systematic interest in the location and regime of internal waters. They were only sporadically and indirectly referred to in relation to territorial waters and the legal regime of ships in foreign ports. Thus, a resolution adopted by the Institute at its 1894 Paris session ignores the waters between the coast and the territorial waters: “L’Etat a un droit de souveraineté sur une zone de la mer qui baigne la côte …” (art. 1(1)); “La mer territoriale s’étend à six milles marins … de la laisse de basse marée sur toute l’étendue des côtes” (art. 2).10 Four years later, at its 1898 Hague session, in the resolution “Règlement sur le régime légal des navires et de leurs équipages dans les ports étrangers”, without using the term “internal waters”, the Institute mentioned several parts of coastal waters which have the equal regime as sea ports, and thus they belong to the territory of the coastal State: “Les dispositions du présent Règlement sont applicable non seulement aux ports, mais encore aux anses et rades fermées ou foraines, aux baies et havres qui peuvent être assimilés à ces anses et rades” (art. 1); “Les dites ports, havres, anses, rades et baies, non seulement sont placés sous un droit de la souveraineté des Etats dont ils bordent le territoire, mais encore font partie du territoire de ces Etats” (art. 2).11 At the 1928 Stockholm session, in determining the regime of the territorial sea in time of peace, the Institute does not indicate any areas of coastal waters that could be treated differently from the general regime of the territorial sea.12 It was only at its 1957 Amsterdam session, several months before UNCLOS I, that the Institute adopted a resolution trying to codify the distinction between the regime of internal waters and that of the territorial sea.13 However, this resolution deals only with the treatment of foreign ships in these two parts of “the maritime spaces over which a State exercises its territorial competence” (art. I). In this brief contribution to these essays in honour of my dear friend and colleague, Thomas Mensah, I will not deal generally with the legal regime of

10

Règles sur la définition et le régime de la mer territoriale, in: Institut de Droit international, Tableau général des résolutions (1873-1956), Bâle, 1957, p. 121.

11

Ibid. p. 89.

12

Projet de règlement relatif à la mer territoriale en temps de paix, ibid. pp. 123-126.

13

The resolution “The Dinstiction between the Régime of the Territorial Sea and the Régime of Internal Waters” was adopted on 24 September 1957 (Rapporteur: Frede Castberg); Institut de Droit international, Tableau des Résolutions adoptées (1957-1991), Editions A. Pedone, Paris, 1992, pp. 4-10. 555


internal waters. I will dedicate these few pages to a specific question which has been avoided even more than the general analysis of the regime of internal waters. I will discuss sea boundary delimitation in cases where, in some manner, internal waters are involved. The reasons for this choice are primarily the problems the Republic of Croatia and some other States successors of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) have in the delimitation of the waters on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea. In the delimitation of Croatia with the Republic of Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, internal waters of the former Federation have to be delimited between Croatia and the other three mentioned States, successors of Yugoslavia.

II. UNCLOS III and the Sea Boundary Delimitation The international community, and particularly the leading politicians and diplomats, as well as the generally obedient lawyers dealing with international law, should not be proud of the relevant developments and the existing rules on the delimitations of marine areas between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. Let us just mention the results of UNCLOS III in this field: (a) Internal waters have not been mentioned in connection with the problem of delimitation; (b) The rather vague provision on the delimitation of the territorial sea from the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (art. 12) has been reproduced in the LOS Convention with two minor drafting changes (art. 15); (c) The 1958 rule on the delimitation of the contiguous zone (art. 24(3)) has been omitted from the new law of the sea: the LOS Convention does not include any rule on the delimitation of the contiguous zone; (d) The rule on the delimitation of the continental shelf from the 1958 Convention (art. 6) has been replaced by a vague new rule (art. 83); and (e) The new rule on the delimitation of the continental shelf has been reproduced also for the delimitation of the new regime, the exclusive economic zone (art. 74). Such a fragmentary and confusing “system” of rules on delimitation is one of the segments of the LOS Convention badly needing an efficient system of rules on the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the rules on delimitation. This has been confirmed even by the LOS Convention itself: paragraph 2 of articles 74 and 83 obliges States Parties to resort to the procedures on dispute settlement provided in Part XV if they cannot reach an 556


agreement on delimitation “within a reasonable period of time”. However, contrary to this situation, the LOS Convention permits States Parties not to accept the procedures entailing binding decisions (Part XV, section 2) with respect to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the articles relating to sea boundary delimitation (articles 15, 74 and 83)! Naturally, in this brief text we can discuss neither the history, nor the mentioned developments and its results, nor the problems caused in the delimitation of States at sea. Recalling the obsession of the Conference with the “activities in the Area”, and the imposed compromises concerning the majority of the “classical” law of the sea issues, I increasingly share E.D. Brown’s evaluation of the LOS Convention rules on delimitation: “Both as regards the criteria of delimitation and the settlement of delimitation disputes, it must be said that the provisions of the Draft Convention are abominably bad.”14

III. Internal Waters and the Problem of Delimitation All the rules on delimitation in the LOS Convention concern “delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”.15 As neither the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, nor the LOS Convention mention the delimitation of internal waters, Lucius Caflisch concludes that the delimitation of internal waters of States with opposite coasts should be resolved applying the rules on the delimitation of the territorial sea: “La question devra ainsi être résolue en recourant par analogie, voire a fortiriori, aux règles relatives à la délimitation de la mer territoriale entre Etats qui se trouvent dans l’une ou l’autre situation géographique … .”16 These conclusions seem logical, due to the close link of internal waters and the territorial sea, and the fact that both areas are under the sovereignty of the

14

E.D. Brown, “Delimitation of Offshore Areas – Hard Labour and Bitter Fruits at UNCLOS III”, Marine Policy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1981, pp. 172-184, at p. 181.

15

Article 15, dealing with delimitation of the territorial sea; article 74 on the exclusive economic zone, and article 83 on the continental shelf.

16

L. Caflisch, “Les zones maritimes sous juridiction nationale, leurs limites et leur délimitation“, in: Le nouveau droit international de la mer, D. Bardonnet and M. Virally, eds, Editions A. Pedone, Paris, 1983, pp. 40-41; id., “The Delimitation of Marine Spaces between States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts”, in: A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, R.-J. Dupuy and D. Vignes, eds, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1991, p. 442. 557


coastal State. Yet, taking into account the rules on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, in practice the delimitation of internal waters will only exceptionally be a problem to be resolved between neighbouring States. Namely, all the coasts are surrounded by baselines determined in order to delimit internal waters from the territorial sea of the coastal State. The effect of the application of the rules on normal baselines (art. 5) as well as straight baselines (art. 7) is that: “(the) waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State” (art. 8(1)). Thus, internal waters in the case of normal baselines are the waters landward of the “low-water line along the coasts” (art. 5), which means that they belong to the coastal area which in some periods may even represent land domain of the coastal State. Therefore, the normal baseline, according to the LOS Convention, has to be considered as the line which, without any exceptions, delimits the land domain from the coastal sea areas. It is therefore almost impossible in the case of normal baselines to imagine the situation in which the delimitation of the internal waters of two States with opposite or adjacent coasts would be necessary or possible. On the other hand, the LOS Convention permits the application of the method of straight baselines “[i]n localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity …” (art. 7(1)). Although the provisions of article 7 permit even significant coastal sea areas to be considered as “internal waters”, all these provisions and possibilities concern areas belonging to a single coastal State. In this sense the International Law Commission stated in its 1956 Report on the Law of the Sea: “Straight baselines may be drawn only between points situated on the territory of a single State. An agreement between two States under which such baselines were drawn along the coast and connecting points situated on the territories of different States, would not be enforceable against other States.”17 The position, the legal regime of internal waters, and the above-mentioned rules on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, confirm the claim that the delimitation of internal waters will rarely be a problem between neighbouring countries. Such a problem with opposite coasts is difficult to imagine, and States with adjacent coasts mostly avoid this problem by laying down a single maritime boundary, without distinguishing different zones of their

17

Para. 7 of the Commentary on article 5, Report of the International Law Commission, Covering the work of its eighth session 23 April – 4 July 1956, GAOR 11th Sess., Suppl. No. 9 (A/3159), United Nations, New York, 1956, p. 15.

558


coastal waters.18 Thus, for example, at Quito on 27 August 1975, Ecuador and Colombia signed the Agreement on the Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas and Maritime Co-operation, where they agreed: “To define as the boundary between their respective marine and submarine areas, as they now are or may hereafter be established, the geographical parallel running through the point at which the international land boundary between Ecuador and Colombia touches the sea” (art. 1).19 Similarly, article V(B) of the Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain Rio Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary between United Mexican States and the United States of America, done at Mexico City on 23 November 1970, provided that: “B. The international maritime boundary in the Pacific Ocean shall begin at the westernmost point of the mainland boundary; from there it shall run seaward on a line the delimitation of which represent a practical simplification, through a series of straight lines, of the line drawn in accordance with the principle of equidistance established in articles 12 and 24 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. This line shall extend seaward to a distance of 12 nautical miles from the baselines used for its delineation along the coast of the mainland and the island of the Contracting States.” However, notwithstanding this simplified delimitation, the two parties agreed that: “D. The establishment of these new maritime boundaries shall not affect or prejudice in any manner the positions of either of the Contracting States with respect to the extent of internal waters, of the territorial sea, or of sovereign rights or jurisdiction for any other purpose.”20

IV. Delimitation of the Eastern Adriatic Coastal Waters The last-quoted provision of the 1970 Treaty between Mexico and the United States indicates that, notwithstanding the simplified delimitation, the status of the coastal waters of neighbouring States may cause problems. One of the situations where such problems arise out of the blue is the dissolution of a

18

Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p. 153.

19

United Nations Legislative Series, National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, United Nations, New York, 1980, p. 398.

20

Ibid. UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18, United Nations, New York, 1976, p. 418. 559


coastal State, and the establishment of several independent States sharing the coasts of the former State to which they belonged. This is the situation of the SFRY, the dissolution of which commenced in 1991 and – at least it seems to be the case – has been finalised with the dissolution of the State Community of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006. Out of these dramatic and complicated events, we shall mention only one aspect, relevant to our subject. The Republic of Croatia, one of six new States established on the territory of the former SFRY, on the basis of clear historical developments controls the majority of the eastern coast of the Adriatic, which in the 20th century mainly belonged to Yugoslavia. However, there are three other former Yugoslav Republics, now independent States, controlling some minor parts of the coast of the former SFRY: Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. One of the major problems of the sea boundary delimitation between the new States on the Eastern Adriatic is the fact that in the former Yugoslavia there were no sea boundaries between its constituent Republics.21 In addition to the definition of the land frontiers, Croatia and Slovenia have to come to a compromise solution concerning the Bay of Piran (see Map 1). The land frontier of the two States ends on the mouth of the river Dragonja, in the middle of the shore of the Bay. There are disagreements between the two States concerning the choice of the channel of Dragonja which represents the land border between the two States, and the strange claim of Slovenia that it should have sovereignty over the entire surface of the Bay.22 Taking into account the historical and geographic realities of the Bay of Piran, the first sentence of article 15 of the LOS Convention should be applied: “Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two State is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured.” In accordance with the possibility sometimes mentioned in the negotiations between Croatia and Slovenia, it would be possible that the two States establish a condominium over the entire surface of the Bay of Piran.23 Otherwise, there are no serious reasons to depart from the second part of the quoted provision, i.e. to delimit the waters of the Bay on the basis of the median line. Taking into account

21

B. Vukas, “Maritime Delimitation in a Semi-enclosed Sea: The Case of the Adriatic Sea”, in: Maritime Delimitation, R. Lagoni and D. Vignes, eds, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2006, pp. 205-222.

22

Ibid. pp. 210-211.

23

Ibid. p. 210.

560


the dimensions of the Bay of Piran, the two coastal States should employ the normal and not the straight baselines for determining the median line. Behind several Croatian islands and the Pelješac peninsula, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina possesses an extremely short coast. After the establishment of the independent State of Croatia (1991), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992), on 30 July 1999, the two States concluded the Treaty on State Frontiers. The Treaty has been provisionally applied since the day of its signature, but it will enter into force only when several detailed instruments necessary for its application have been elaborated.24 The two States have used the method of the median line, and Bosnia and Herzegovina has been granted sovereignty in the Bay of Neum and around the Klek peninsula. Although the legal regime of the waters belonging to Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been specified in the Treaty, there is no reason why the waters inside the Bay of Neum could not be considered as internal waters of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the rest of the waters along the coasts of Klek as territorial waters of that State (see Map 2). Anyhow, such a delimitation opens the question of the legal status of the Croatian sea surrounding the areas now belonging to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Can the waters of Croatia, delimited by the territorial sea of Bosnia and Herzegovina, continue to be considered as having the legal status of internal waters? Tullio Scovazzi and Gianpiero Francalanci accept such a result of the delimitation inside the internal waters of Croatia.25 The legal status of the waters at the entrance of the Hercegnovski Gulf, where the southernmost sea area of Croatia has to be delimited with Montenegro, also remains unclear. In December 2002, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which then included Montenegro, concluded the Protocol on the Interim Regime along the Southern Border between the two States. A straight line connecting Konfin (the point where the land frontier between Croatia and Montenegro reaches the sea), and the point three cables from the Cape Oštro, divided the waters of the two States (see Map 3). Although many details of the provisional regime were elaborated (demilitarisation, police control, fishing), the legal status of the waters in the Gulf was not mentioned. Article 6(1) of the Protocol also temporarily delimitated the territorial sea beyond the entrance in the Gulf. The protocol has been applied temporarily as of the day of its signature. It has been stated that the solutions it contains “shall not in any way prejudice delimitation between the two States” (art. 2). Anyhow, it is to be expected that the now independent State of Montenegro will conclude with Croatia an

24

Ibid. p. 215.

25

T. Scovazzi, “Les zones côtières en Méditerranée: évolution et confusion”, An. Dr. Mer, Vol. 6, 2001, pp. 95-108, at p. 102 and note 27. 561


agreement delimiting the waters at the entrance of the Hercegnovski Gulf in a clearer, simpler and more just way. The brief description of the provisional state of the delimitation of Croatia and the other three former federal units, members of the SFRY, unfortunately confirm that the present delimitation in the Eastern Adriatic has not contributed to the clarification of the subject treated in our text. Anyhow, the negotiations of Croatia with Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro continue, and I hope that the final solution will clarify some of the questions mentioned in the present text. Croatia has to resolve the delimitation with Slovenia in the Bay of Piran and in the territorial sea off the entrance in that Bay. Although the mentioned delimitation Treaty between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was concluded back in 1999, there is opposition to its ratification in Croatia. Croatia also intends to build a bridge from its coast to the Pelješac peninsula, which Bosnia and Herzegovina considers as a possible obstacle to the navigation from its waters to the high seas. Finally, Croatia and Montenegro have to conclude a treaty on the delimitation of their waters at the entrance of the Hercegnovski Gulf. We hope it will be clearer that the one provisionally concluded in 2002, which was unjust to Croatia. Be that as it may, I sincerely hope that the delimitation treaties we expect to be concluded on the eastern coast of the Adriatic will contribute to the clarification of the problems dealt with in the present article. Anyhow, I promise to comment on the future developments in this field in the next Liber Amicorum in honour of the first President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea – Thomas Mensah.

562

High Seas

A

45˚30'N

Italian Territorial Sea

Pta Tagliamento

R

D 5 01

4

S Map 21

Promontory of Kastanija

13˚30'E

3 2 1

Pta Sotile (Tenki rt)

Novigrad

0

SLOVENIA

Trieste

SLOVENIA

CROATIA

Land Border

Slovenian Territorial Koper Sea

Gulf of Trieste

Pta Sdobba

Promontory of Madona Gu Piran lf o fP ira Promontory of Savudrija n

Croatian Territorial Sea

IC T

IA

A E

I TA L I A

10 Nm


Appendix: Maps 1-3

563

564

GPF 01

42°53'

C R IN OA T. T W IA AT N ER

42°57''

S

K

A N

A L

Kisk

17°33'

RO )

M

0

PE

A

NI

L

1

NS

I

1

2

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S

2

4

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5 3

N

Map 2 3 Map

3

A

T

C R O AT I A

IA

C

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PE LJ ES (C A

17°33'

6

4 M.

7 km.

Neum

17°40'

C R O AT I A

BOSNIAH E R Z E G OV I NA

17°40'

42°53'

42°57''


N

A

216

Rt. Ziganat

Mitrovici

t

Vodice 454

Rt. Ostro

Rt. Kontin

Rt. Kobila

Rakite

Map 53

Mamula

215

Mrkovi

Rt. Durov Kom Klinci

Rose

Tici

L

Zanjica

U

Zabrue Mitrovici

i vic no e B

Š

Rt. Veslo

218

Radovanici

Bali

T

585

Obosonik

Eraci

Pristao

Kumbor


565

2. ZONAL APPROACH

THE REGIME OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE NEED FOR COMPROMISE? Sam Bateman

I. Introduction

M

ilitary activities in an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) were a controversial issue at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and remain so in State practice. Some coastal States claim that other States cannot carry out military activities, including naval exercises and military surveying, in their EEZ without their consent, and have sought to apply restrictions on navigation and overflight in this zone. This “thickening” of jurisdiction1 over activities in the EEZ is strongly opposed by other States, particularly the major maritime powers. This contribution addresses some of the practical considerations associated with this division of views. It highlights the need for compromise between the positions of some coastal States on the one hand and the major maritime powers on the other. Because relevant disputes involve military activities, it is unlikely that they would be brought before a court or tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3, of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention).2

1

“Thickening jurisdiction” occurs when States seek to deepen their jurisdiction over activities, such as navigation and marine environmental protection, in their offshore zones beyond that which is customarily accepted under international law. It might be distinguished from “creeping jurisdiction” when States use devices, such as excessive straight territorial sea baselines or historic bay claims, to extend the geographical area of their offshore sones. W.S. Ball, “The Old Grey Mare, National Enclosure of the Oceans”, Ocean Dev. & Int’l L., Vol. 27, Nos 1-2, 1996, p. 103.

2

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 1982, reprinted in the Law of the Sea Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, 1983 and 21 ILM 1261, 1982 (LOS Convention). LOS Convention art. 298(1)(b) provides that disputes concerning


III. The Law of the Sea: Zonal Approach

The issues involved are particularly contentious in the Asia-Pacific region, where there have been incidents and disputes that might easily have escalated into open conflict. This propensity for disputation is largely due to the maritime geography of the Western Pacific, with its numerous islands and archipelagoes, and the unique chain of seas between the mainland of East Asia and the off-lying archipelagic chain stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines and Indonesia.3 Large areas of the Western Pacific are enclosed as EEZs by one country or another, but the limits of maritime jurisdiction in the region are often uncertain due to the lack of maritime boundaries and problematic claims to straight territorial sea baselines.4

II. Background Negotiation of the EEZ regime at UNCLOS III was both difficult and complex, with divergent views about the status of this new zone, which would grant coastal States rights over marine resources out to 200 nautical miles from territorial sea baselines. One major group, the “territorialists”, mainly comprising developing countries, saw the EEZ as an extension of national jurisdiction in which the coastal States would enjoy sovereignty subject to certain limitations. However, this position was sharply disputed by the maritime powers, led by the United States and the then Soviet Union, who saw the zone as a part of the high seas where coastal States had some rights over offshore resources. The compromise reached was that the EEZ would be regarded as a separate zone in its own right (“sui generis”); the EEZ is neither high seas nor territorial sea.5 Now, some 25 years later, this political “tug of war” has not gone away. The United States has steadfastly maintained a liberal interpretation of the rights and freedoms other States enjoy in the EEZ of a coastal State, and uses the expression “international waters” to describe collectively the high seas, the EEZ

military activities, including military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, are optional exceptions to section 2 of the LOS Convention Part XV dealing with Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions. 3

The relationship between regional geography, the law of the sea and security in the context of navigational regimes and EEZs was explored in S. Bateman, “Security and the Law of the Sea in East Asia: Navigational Regimes and Exclusive Economic Zones” in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 365-387.

4

V. Prescott and C. Schofield, “Undelimited Maritime Boundaries of the Asian Rim in the Pacific Ocean”, Maritime Briefing, Vol. 3, No. 1, International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, 2001.

5

R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd edn, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 166.

570

The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone

and the contiguous zone.6 While “international waters” might be convenient operational shorthand to describe the area of ocean where the United States perceives there are high seas freedoms of navigation, clearly it is a misnomer. EEZs are not international waters. The coastal State enjoys certain rights and obligations in its EEZ that distinguishes this zone from international waters. These can, in particular circumstances, impact on the freedoms of navigation and overflight of other States. This would be the case, for example, where the exercise of these freedoms does not have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State.7 Similarly, the coastal State is required to have due regard to the rights and duties of other States in exercising its rights and performing its duties in its EEZ under the LOS Convention.8 However, there is a considerable range of opinions regarding the meaning of “due regard” and what precisely are the “rights and duties” of the separate States. The United States believes that the coastal State cannot unduly restrict or impede the freedoms of navigation in and overflight of the EEZ, and its naval commanders are advised that “the existence of an exclusive economic zone need not, of itself, be of operational concern”.9 At the other extreme, China appears to interpret “due regard” as requiring foreign users of its EEZ to refrain from activities that endanger its sovereignty, security and national interests. This is an unsatisfactory division of views that reflects the need for some compromises in recognising the types of activity or regulation that might be contrary to the interests of the other party.

III. Balance of Rights and Duties The basic problem with the EEZ regime lies in the need to find an appropriate balance between the rights and duties of the coastal State and those of other States.10 In the EEZ, coastal States have sovereign rights over natural resources, both living and non-living, and other economic activities, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.11 They also have jurisdiction with regard

6

US Navy, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, pp. 1-6, available on website at: <www.nwc.navy.mil/ild/ publications/nwp%201-14/NWP%201-14%20pub/NWP%201-14M.htm>.

7


8


9

A.R. Thomas and J.C. Duncan (eds), Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, International Law Studies Vol. 73, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1999, p. 130.

10

Churchill and Lowe, see note 5, p. 175.

11

LOS Convention, art. 56(1)(a). 571


to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment (including the conservation of species), as well as other rights and duties, as provided for in relevant provisions of the LOS Convention.12 However, the sovereign rights to marine resources gained under the EEZ regime are not without their costs in terms of obligations of the coastal State for preserving and protecting the marine environment and conserving species in the EEZ, and for having due regard to the rights and duties of other States in its EEZ.13 All other States have freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, as well as the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms.14 However, in exercising these freedoms, other States are required to have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State.15 It is proving very difficult in practice to define an operational test to distinguish between an action that has due regard to the rights and duties of the other party, and one that does not.

IV. Military Activities It has been said that the LOS Convention “is replete with ambiguity concerning military uses of the sea”.16 With respect to military uses of the EEZ, the Convention does not make clear whether military activities are included in the freedoms of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea available under articles 58 and 87 of the LOS Convention.17 Without having to list explicitly their military rights within the EEZ, the maritime powers sought to ensure during UNCLOS III negotiations that the new EEZ regime would not exclude naval operations in the zone. This led to the so-called “Castaneda compromise” with the somewhat over-stated but ambiguous language evident, for example, in articles 58 and 87 of the LOS Convention.18 The United States insists on the freedom of military activities in the EEZ out of concern that its naval and air access and mobility could be severely restricted

12

LOS Convention, art. 56(1), (b) and (c).

13


14


15


16

D.G. Stephens, “The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct of Peacetime Naval/Military Operations”, Cal. W. Int’l L. J., Vol. 29, 1998-1999, p. 283.

17


18

Captain G.V. Galdorisi, USN (ret) and Commander A.G. Kaufman, JAGC, USN, “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict”, Cal. W. Int’l L. J., Vol. 32, 2001-2002, p. 271.

572


by any global trend towards “thickening jurisdiction” over the EEZ. The ability to conduct military activities in the EEZ, including military surveying and intelligence collection, is justified on the basis that they are part of the normal high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight that are available in an EEZ under the LOS Convention. However, some coastal States, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and Pakistan, contend that other States cannot carry out military exercises or manoeuvres in or over their EEZ without their consent. The concern of these States is that uninvited military activities could threaten their national security or undermine their resource sovereignty. Practical problems arise because terms such as military activities, military exercises and military surveying are not particularly precise. As S. Kaye has noted, the LOS Convention “does not deal with security issues to a significant extent” and “almost completely avoids consideration of the laws of naval warfare”.19 He goes on to note that the San Remo Manual on Armed Conflicts at Sea makes it clear that armed conflicts can take place “in certain circumstances, in the EEZ of a neutral State” but that “belligerents must have due regard to the uses to which another State may wish to put its EEZ, and avoid damage to the coastal State”.20 One operational commander from the United States has written that the EEZ regime “does not permit the coastal state to limit traditional non-resources related high seas activities in this EEZ, such as task force manoeuvring, flight operations, military exercises, telecommunications and space activities, intelligence and surveillance activities, marine data collection, and weapons’ testing and firing”.21 Those words were written over ten years ago and would most likely be qualified now at least by recognition of the need for such activities to be conducted with due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State. The basic due regard principle “requires states engaging in military activities not to unreasonably interfere with the exercise of the right of the coastal state to explore and exploit the natural resources of the EEZ”.22 Non-interference with the coastal State’s duty to preserve and protect the marine environment of the EEZ should be added to that principle. For example, scheduling an exercise in an area of intensive fishing activity declared by the coastal State, or in a marine park or marine protected area

19

S. Kaye, “Freedom of Navigation in a Post 9/11 World: Security and Creeping Jurisdiction”, in Freestone, Barnes and Ong (eds), see note 3, pp. 347-364.

20

Ibid. p. 353.

21

W.F. Doran, “An Operational Commander’s Perspective on the 1982 LOS Convention”, Int’l J. of Marine & Coastal L., Vol. 10, No. 3, 1995, p. 341.

22

R. Beckman, “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Towards a Common Understanding” in Y.R. Kassim (ed.), Strategic Currents, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2006, p. 42. 573


declared by the coastal State as required by article 194(5) of the LOS Convention,23 could be considered not to have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State. Similarly, the military activities of other States should not interfere with the legitimate surveillance and enforcement activities of the coastal State aimed at protecting its rights or preventing pollution in the EEZ. It might be regarded as inappropriate, for example, for military forces of another State to order away a bona fide surveillance aircraft of the coastal State from their area of operations. Military activities and exercises can cover a range of naval operations from non-delaying and inoffensive passage exercises by transiting warships through to major exercises or operations involving ships, submarine and aircraft, possibly including the use of live fire. The concepts being considered as part of the US Navy’s Sea Basing programme depend on acceptance of the principle of the freedom to conduct military operations in another country’s EEZ. The mobile offshore base concept, for example, is essentially a floating airport that could be towed to an area of operations, providing a capability to accept large transport aircraft to rapidly build up, deploy and support expeditionary forces.24 Realities of geography, water depth and weather suggest that such a base would only be possible within the EEZ or territorial sea of a coastal State. However, it would be hardly acting with due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State if the military activities in the EEZ implied any threat or use of force against the coastal State.

V. Marine Scientific Research Article 56(1)(b)(ii) of the LOS Convention provides that the coastal State has jurisdiction over marine scientific research in its EEZ. However, the LOS Convention does not define the key terms “marine scientific research”, “survey activities”, “hydrographic survey” or “military survey”.25 While the LOS Convention has established a clear regime for marine scientific research, there is no specific provision in the Convention for hydrographic surveying. Some coastal States require consent with respect to hydrographic surveys conducted in their EEZ

23

This article requires the coastal State to take the measures necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.

24

S.C. Truver, “Sea Basing: more than the sum of its parts?”, Jane’s Navy International, March 2004, pp. 16-21.

25

G.V. Galdorisi and K.R. Vienna, Beyond the Law of the Sea – New Directions for U.S. Oceans Policy, Westport, Praeger, 1997, p. 164.

574


by other States while it is the opinion of other States that hydrographic surveys can be conducted freely in the EEZ.26 The maritime powers believe that “survey activities” are not marine scientific research and point out that the LOS Convention distinguishes between “research” and “marine scientific research” on the one hand, and “hydrographic surveys” and “survey activities” on the other, primarily because these are sometimes referred to separately in the Convention.27 While the coastal State might regulate marine scientific research in its EEZ and on its continental shelf, the United States believes that hydrographic survey and military survey activities are freedoms that the coastal State cannot regulate outside its territorial sea.28 They are freedoms captured by the expressions “other internationally lawful uses of the sea” related to freedoms of navigation and overflight in article 58(1) of the LOS Convention and “inter alia” in article 87(1) of the LOS Convention. Marine scientific research is the general term most often used to describe those activities undertaken in ocean and coastal waters to expand scientific knowledge of the marine environment.29 Marine scientific research includes oceanography, marine biology, fisheries research, scientific ocean drilling and coring, geological/geophysical scientific surveying, as well as other activities with a scientific purpose.30 While marine scientific research was previously conducted only by ships, a variety of other platforms may now be used, such as submersibles, installations and buoys or ocean data acquisition systems, aircraft and satellites. New technologies for marine data collection include remotely operated vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles and seabed landers. This variety of platforms and the ability to collect data remotely serve to complicate arguments regarding the rights to conduct marine scientific research and surveying. There is a tendency in practice to use the term “marine scientific research” loosely when referring to all kinds of data collection (research) conducted at sea. Hydrographers generally regard their surveying activities as part of marine scientific research, and most contemporary hydrographic surveys outside the immediate confines of a port are not restricted purely to the collection of

26

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), The Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific, CSCAP Memorandum No. 6, December 2002, available on website at: <www.cscap.org>, pp. 3-4.

27

J.A. Roach and R.W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, International Law Studies, Vol.66, Newport R.I., Naval War College, 1994, p. 247 and A.H.A. Soons, Implementation of the Marine Scientific Research Regime in the South Pacific – Final Report, FFA Report 95/14 and SOPAC Joint Contribution Report 101, Honiara, Forum Fisheries Agency, 24 October 1994, p. 7.

28

Roach and Smith, ibid. p. 249.

29

Thomas and Duncan, see note 9, p. 21.

30

Roach and Smith, see note 27, p. 248. 575


hydrographic data.31 They employ similar equipment to that used in other forms of oceanographic research. Modern oceanographic and hydrographic survey ships are both fitted with multi-beam, wide-angle precision sonar systems that make it possible to chart continuously a broad strip of ocean floor. Not all data collection conducted at sea necessarily comes within the scope of the marine scientific research regime established by the LOS Convention. Some argue that other activities, such as resource exploration, prospecting and hydrographic surveying are governed by different legal regimes. However, these activities may be difficult to distinguish in practice. Coastal States understandably will be suspicious of any form of survey or research being conducted in their EEZ without their consent. Bathymetric charts providing a description of seabed topography are an example of multi-purpose data collection. These charts are a routine output of hydrographic surveys but are also a basic tool of resource exploration and exploitation. Marine scientific research is sometimes categorised as either “fundamental” or “pure” research on the one hand or “applied”, “commercial” or “military” research on the other, but the distinction between the two categories is often not clear.32 The former refers to marine scientific research intended to add to the scientific knowledge of the world, regardless of its application, while the latter refers to research conducted for a specific practical purpose.33 However, this distinction between “pure” and “applied” research is in a Western tradition and may not appeal to Asian nations.34

VI. Military Surveys Military surveys are activities undertaken in ocean and coastal waters involving marine data collection (whether or not classified) for military purposes.35 Such data is important, even essential, for effective submarine operations,

31

A more substantial discussion of issues arising from the conduct of hydrographic surveying in an EEZ may be found in S. Bateman, “Hydrographic Surveying in Exclusive Economic Zones: Jurisdictional Issues”, Int’l Hydrographic Rev., Vol. 5, No. 1 (New Series), April 2004, pp. 24-33; and S. Bateman, “Hydrographic surveying in the EEZ: differences and overlaps with marine scientific research”, Marine Policy, Vol. 29, 2005, pp. 163-174.

32

E.D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1994, p. 419.

33

A.H.A. Soons, Marine Scientific Research and the Law of the Sea, The Hague, Kluwer, 1982, p. 6.

34

S. Shannon and D.J. Dzurek, “Scientific Research” in J. Morgan and M.J. Valencia (eds), Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992, p. 15.

35

Roach and Smith, see note 27, p. 248.

576


anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and mine countermeasures, particularly in waters such as the South and East China Seas where oceanographic and underwater acoustic conditions vary widely with uneven bottom topography, fast tidal streams and a relatively high level of marine life. Military surveys can include oceanographic, marine geological, geophysical, chemical, biological and acoustic data. Equipment used can include fathometers, swath bottom mappers, side-scan sonars, bottom grab and coring systems, current meters and profilers. While the means of data collection used in military surveys may sometimes be the same as that used in marine scientific research, information from such activities, regardless of security classification, is intended not for use by the general scientific community, but by the military.36 Military surveying is an expression largely coined by the United States, but the United Kingdom talks about military data gathering in similar vein.37 These terms are not specifically addressed by the LOS Convention and there is no language stating or implying that coastal States may regulate their conduct in any manner by coastal States outside their territorial sea or archipelagic waters.38 Thus the United States “reserves the right to engage in military surveys outside foreign territorial seas and archipelagic waters”, and that to “provide prior notice or request permission would create an adverse precedent for restrictions on mobility and flexibility of military survey operation”.39 Similarly the United Kingdom believes that States have a right to engage in military data gathering anywhere outside foreign territorial seas and archipelagic waters without prior notice to, or permission from the coastal State. Some military intelligence collection activities conducted in the EEZ might also be considered as coming within the scope of “scientific research”, and thus within the scope of the marine scientific research regime in the LOS Convention.40 However, the United States and other maritime powers are strongly of the view that while these activities are within the scope of research, they are associated with the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ and not under the jurisdiction of the coastal State. Intelligence collection data is only used for military purposes and is not released for public purposes. Again the boundaries between “military surveys” and “intelligence collection” may be difficult to determine, and one vessel may concurrently undertake both activities although the external appearance of the vessel (e.g. the aerials on a signals or electronic

36

Ibid.

37

But perhaps the term “military data gathering” is less problematic because it does not include the word “survey”.

38

Roach and Smith, see note 27, p. 248.

39

Ibid. p. 249.

40

M.J. Valencia, The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues and Responses, East-Wester Center, Honolulu, 2003, p. 6. 577


intelligence vessel), the equipment it is operating (e.g. the type of sonar), and its movements (e.g. whether it is manoeuvring, stopping or continually underway) might give a good lead on the nature of its data collection. Based on current and planned naval and defence acquisitions in the AsiaPacific region, particularly the growth of regional submarine fleets, military surveying and intelligence-gathering activities in EEZs will increase in the future. These activities might also become more controversial and more dangerous in the region. This trend reflects the increasing demands for technical intelligence; rapidly expanding weapon and sensor acquisition programmes, including electronic warfare capabilities; and widespread moves to develop information warfare capabilities. The growth and wider use of submarine forces creates a need for better oceanographic knowledge. It is not surprising that incidents have already occurred in the Asia-Pacific region, involving disputes between coastal States and other States over their respective rights and duties in an EEZ. Research vessels claiming to be conducting military surveys have been warned out of the EEZs of some coastal States, a Chinese fighter aircraft crashed after colliding with a US intelligence collection aircraft in China’s EEZ off Hainan in April 2001, and alleged “spy ships” have been pursued out of Japan’s EEZ with one vessel even being sunk after hot pursuit into China’s EEZ. There are regular press reports of protests over the activities of research vessels of one country in the claimed EEZ of another.

VII. Prospective Guidelines A group of senior officials, legal experts and maritime specialists from the AsiaPacific region (now known as the EEZ Group 21) met between 2002 and 2005 with a view to clarifying the rights and duties of States in respect of military activities, intelligence collection and surveying in the EEZ.41 The Ship and Ocean Foundation of Japan (now the Ocean Policy Research Foundation) was the major sponsor of these meetings.42 The aim was to produce a set of non-binding, voluntary principles, which would provide the basis for a common understanding and approach to issues arising from the implementation of the EEZ regime. The meetings were an ambitious undertaking that sought to provide an important regional maritime confidence and security building measure.

41

The meetings were held in Bali (June 2002), Tokyo (February 2003), Honolulu (December 2003), Shanghai (October 2004), and Tokyo (September 2005).

42

Other sponsors of separate meetings included the East-West Center, Honolulu; the Centre for South East Asian Studies, Jakarta; and the School of International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University.

578


The last meeting of the EEZ Group 21 held in Tokyo on 15-16 September 2005 reached agreement on Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone (“Guidelines”).43 The Guidelines set out broad principles of common understanding regarding certain aspects of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, including military and intelligence-gathering activities. The Guidelines are written in exhortatory rather than obligatory language, and do not create legally binding obligations between States. They may be generally regarded as reflecting the need for better understanding of the rights and obligations of States wishing to conduct activities in the EEZ of another country. The EEZ Group 21 agreed that the EEZ is a zone sui generis, and that the exercise of the freedom of navigation and overflight in and above EEZs should not interfere with, or undermine the rights or ability of coastal States to protect and manage their resources and environment. For example, the coastal State may, on a temporary basis, place qualifications on the freedom of navigation in areas where special circumstances exist in its EEZ, such as major fishing grounds and marine protected areas, and that these arrangements may be made permanent by reference to the competent international organisation.44 The Guidelines include a list of areas in an EEZ where military activities should not be conducted by another State (e.g. in marine parks or marine protected areas declared by the coastal State as required by article 194(5) of the LOS Convention, or in areas with intensive fishing activities declared by the coastal State).45 The EEZ Group 21, perhaps paradoxically, recognised that the arguments for military surveys in the EEZ, being outside the jurisdiction of the coastal State, appear stronger than those for hydrographic surveys. The considerations that apply to the rights to conduct hydrographic surveys and military surveys in an EEZ are essentially different. Military surveys might be more easily argued as an ancillary activity to the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight available in the EEZ. The data collected is for military purposes only and is not normally released to the public, whereas hydrographic data, virtually by definition, has utility and economic value to the coastal State.

43

The Guidelines are available at: <www.sof.or.jp/topics/2005_e/pdf/20051205_e.pdf>. A discussion of the Guidelines, along with the composition of EEZ Group 21, may also be found in S. Bateman, “Prospective Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone”, Maritime Studies 144, September/October 2005, pp. 17-28 ; Sam Bateman, “Surveying in the Exclusive Economic Zones: Possible Guidelines for Rights and Duties”, International Hydrographic Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (New Series) April 2006, pp. 31-48.

44

EEZ Group 21, Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone, Guideline IId.

45

Ibid. Guideline Vd. 579


In reaching consensus that hydrographic surveying should only be conducted in an EEZ with the consent of the coastal State,46 the EEZ Group 21 appreciated the many changes since UNCLOS III with the practice and technology of hydrographic surveying and the utility of hydrographic data.47 Apart from navigational safety, important applications of hydrographic knowledge include planning the exploration and exploitation of marine resources, the determination of seaward limits of national jurisdiction, coastal zone management, national development (including building new ports and harbours), and the delimitation of maritime boundaries. Areas of disagreement during the EEZ Group 21 meetings related to the meaning of terms in the LOS Convention, as well as to the meaning of specific articles. For example, there were differences with regard to the meaning of “freedom” of navigation and overflight in and above the EEZ, i.e. whether this freedom can be limited by certain regulations by the coastal State, or whether such freedoms are absolute. There were different interpretations regarding the precise meaning of the Convention’s phrase allowing “other internationally lawful uses” of the sea in the EEZ,48 and the nature of the military activities that this phrase might include. The interpretation of this phrase can in turn be affected by the interpretation of such terms as “due regard”, “abuse of rights”, “peaceful purposes”,49 and the obligation not to threaten or use force against other States. Questions arose as to whether some military and intelligence-gathering activities are a lawful exercise of the freedom of navigation and overflight, whether they are an abuse of rights, whether they pay “due regard” to the interests of the coastal State, and whether they are a threat to the peace and security of the coastal State. While the Guidelines recognise that States have the right to conduct military activities in the EEZ of another, this right is a qualified one. A recent writer has noted that this right is limited by four general principles: first, the EEZ must be used for peaceful purposes; secondly, coastal States must have due regard to the rights and duties of other States, and vice versa; thirdly, States must not act in a manner which would constitute an abuse of their rights; and lastly, in exercising their rights and duties under the LOS Convention, States have a duty to cooperate with each other.50 The last-mentioned principle requires that a State carrying out military activities in an EEZ, or planning to carry out such activities, should

46

Ibid. Guideline IXa.

47

These changes are discussed more fully in Bateman, “Hydrographic Surveying in Exclusive Economic Zones: Jurisdictional Issues”, see note 31.

48


49

LOS Convention, art. 88, read in conjunction with art. 58(2), reserves the EEZ for “peaceful purposes”.

50

Beckman, see note 22, pp. 42-43.

580


cooperate with the coastal State, and notify or consult with it. If these military activities were taken to include military surveys, it would seem unlikely that the United States or some other maritime powers would accept this limitation.

VIII. Conclusions Agreement on the EEZ concept at UNCLOS III included many compromises between coastal States and maritime powers resulting in intentional ambiguity in some of its provisions. The LOS Convention was formulated more than 25 years ago in very different political and technological circumstances to those that exist at present. Even the concept of what constitutes a “major maritime power” has changed. The shift in the balance of global maritime power towards the Asia-Pacific region is possibly the most significant development impacting on issues discussed in this chapter. China, India and Japan are all now major maritime powers and their interpretation of the rights and duties of States in EEZs vary from those held by the major Western maritime powers at the time of UNCLOS III. These three countries are all on record as taking restrictive views of the rights and duties of a State wishing to undertake military activities in the EEZ of another State. However, the United States and other countries regard these views as contrary to the principle of acting with due regard to the rights of other States in the EEZ of a coastal State, and as a potential abuse of rights by the coastal State. The discussion in this chapter draws mainly on experiences in the Asia-Pacific region but this is not to say that they are specific to this region. They might also appear elsewhere in the world reflecting a wide-ranging difficulty with putting the general rules of the LOS Convention into practice. Just as Europe has introduced regional variations and agreements on marine environmental protection, and pollution control in particular, it is not improbable that we will see regional codes of conduct and bilateral or multilateral arrangements on the EEZ regime in the Asia-Pacific region. The development of these measures would reflect the extent of EEZs in the region, and the importance that regional countries attach to their rights and duties in that zone. The EEZ Group 21 Guidelines are a “soft law” contribution to this process, although they are yet to gain endorsement in any official forum. The explanation of the problems discussed in this chapter can be traced back to ambiguity in the EEZ regime, as established by the LOS Convention, and to the range of perspectives, very evident in the Asia-Pacific region, with regard to rights and duties under the regime. As time goes by, leaving these problems unresolved might become increasingly dangerous. Even if bilateral arrangements are agreed between parties with opposing views (such as between China and the United States), these rules might not be acceptable to other countries. There is a risk also that national governments may deal with these matters unilaterally 581


in order to protect their security and other interests. If numerous coastal States were to enact unilateral national legislation prohibiting the exercise of military activities in and above their EEZ, then this prohibition could become customary international law through State practice, despite the opposition of some countries. It might be better to anticipate this development through a process of negotiated compromise. These issues are unlikely to be resolved by application to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. However, advisory opinions might be sought from those bodies and these could be helpful in resolving the current situation. Some compromises between the parties with opposing views would avoid a disorderly process whereby countries assert their positions through State practice, followed by protests by countries that disagree, and eventually by diplomatic negotiations. This is an unsatisfactory situation for operational commanders who are potentially faced with conflicting opinions on what activities they might freely undertake in an EEZ and what they might not. Most of the Western Pacific is enclosed as an EEZ by one country or another, and it would clearly be beneficial for regional relations and security if some compromise were reached between the opposing views that are evident at present. The most basic compromise would be some acceptance of the types of activity that might be regarded as an abuse of rights, or an absence of due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State in its EEZ.

582

CATEGORIES OF INTERNATIONAL STRAITS EXCLUDED FROM THE TRANSIT PASSAGE REGIME UNDER PART III OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA Hugo Caminos

T

he United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“the Convention”) recognises several categories of straits used for international navigation which are exempt from the regime of transit passage. These categories are: (a) straits regulated by longstanding international conventions; (b) straits through which there exists a route through the high seas or the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of similar convenience; (c) straits formed by an island of the State bordering the strait and the mainland of the same State where there exists, seaward of the island, a route of similar convenience through the high seas or an EEZ; and (d) straits which connect a part of the high seas or EEZ with the territorial sea of a foreign State.

I. Straits Regulated by Long-standing International Conventions Article 35(c) creates an exception to the regime of transit passage in Part III, where “passage is regulated in whole or in part by long-standing international conventions in force especially relating to such straits”. Although UNCLOS III proceedings do not include a list of specific straits that qualify for this exception, the phrase “long-standing” implies that only those conventional regimes that have been recognised for a long period of time will be considered as such. Examples of conventional regimes thought to qualify under article 35(c) when the Convention was adopted were the Turkish Straits1 (Dardanelles

1

Convention concerning the Regime of the Straits, signed at Montreux, 20 July 1936, 173 LNTS, 213; 7 Hudson, 386 (1941) (hereinafter Montreux Convention). The Convention



and Bosphorus) the Danish Straits2 the Strait of Magellan3 and the Aaland

permitted Turkey to refortify the Straits in exchange for guarantees of free transit through the Straits by foreign vessels, subject to a number of conditions. 2

Treaty for the Redemption of the Sound Dues between Austria, Belgium, France, Britain, Hannover, the Hansa Towns, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the Netherlands, Oldenburg, Prusia, Russia, Sweden-Norway, and Denmark, signed at Copenhagen, 14 March 1857, C. Parry, 116 CTS, 357. The 1857 Convention lifted dues requirements for ships transiting the Straits, in exchange for a one-time indemnity paid to Denmark for its continued maintenance of navigational aids. The United States executed a separate bilateral treaty with Denmark abrogating the Sound Dues for ships flying the United States flag. See Convention for the Discontinuance of the Sound Dues between Denmark and the United States, signed at Washington DC, 11 April 1857, 11 Stat., 719, C. Parry, 116 CTS, 465. For a complete discussion of the straits of the Baltic region, see G. Alexandersson, The Baltic Straits, Nijhoff, The Hague (1982).

3

Boundary Treaty between the Argentine Republic and Chile, signed at Buenos Aires, 23 July 1881, C. Parry, 159 CTS, 45. Argentina and Chile agreed to neutralise the Straits of Magellan, place no fortifications along its shores, and open the Strait to shipping of all nations. Article 10 of the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Argentina and Chile, resolving the Beagle Channel dispute, provides: “The delimitation agreed upon herein, in no way affects the provisions of the Boundary Treaty of 1881, according to which the Straits of Magellan are perpetually neutralized and freedom of navigation is assured to ships of all flags.” The Republic of Argentina agrees to maintain, at any time and under any circumstances, the right of ships of all flags to sail freely and unimpeded through the waters under its jurisdiction to and from the Strait of Magellan”. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Argentina and Chile, 29 November 1984, art. 10, reprinted in 4 Law of the Sea Bulletin, 50 (1985), also reprinted in 24 ILM, II (1985). See generally M. Shaw, “The Beagle Channel Arbitration Award”, 6 Int’l Rel., 415 (1978). The reaffirmation of the long-standing conventional regime of the 1881 Treaty serves as evidence of the will of the parties to retain free passage through this important strait used for international navigation. The regime of transit as it now exists in the Straits of Magellan seems no different to that guarantee by the 1982 Convention. Although Annex No. 2 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship outlines a more restrictive regime than transit passage (by limiting navigational routes to be used, requiring submarines to navigate on the surface and show their flags), these restrictions apply only to Argentine and Chilean vessels navigating between certain ports in the Beagle Channel, in Antarctica and in other specific territorial waters (Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Argentina and Chile, id. Annex No. 2, Navigation between the Strait of Magellan and Argentine ports in the Beagle Channel and vice versa). “In accordance with international law and the provisions of the draft convention itself, only the Strait of Magellan meets the qualifications, requirements and conditions to be considered a strait used for international navigation, the régime of which was established in the above-mentioned Treaty of 1881. The other water courses under the sovereignty of Chile form part of its internal waters and its navigation is subject to the régime pertaining to that maritime space.” See 4 Law of the Sea Bulletin, 63 (1985); Statement by the delegation of Chile dated 7 April 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/WS/19. Both Argentina and Chile are parties to the 1982 Convention.

584

Categories of International Straits Excluded from the Transit Passage Regime

Straits.4 A number of writers have proposed that the 1904 Declaration between Great Britain and France,5 which prohibited the erection of fortifications along the Moroccan coast of the Strait of Gibraltar and guaranteed freedom of navigation through the Strait, qualifies as a “long-standing international convention” exempting the Strait of Gibraltar from the straits provisions of the Convention.6 A similar proposition favouring freedom of navigation through the Strait of Gibraltar was also advanced by the Soviet and Italian delegations during the Sea-Bed Committee debates in 19737 Presenting a contrary point of view, several noted authors maintain that the 1904 Declaration securing “free passage” was simply an acknowledgment of the need to protect navigational rights through the Strait of Gibraltar. According to Professor Gonzalez Campos, the 1904 Declaration had nothing to do with internationalising or neutralising the shores of the Strait of Gibraltar. Its original intent, he argues, was to protect British ships, en route to Egypt and India, from hostile French and Spanish forces located on the Strait’s shores.8 Another Spanish legal commentator, Yturriaga, explains that the phrase “free passage” in the Declaration was not intended to suggest a high seas freedom of navigation; its reference, he affirms, was to the central element of innocent passage through straits.9 Notwithstanding the diversity of opinion on whether the “long-standing international convention” exception applies to the Strait of Gibraltar, when Spain signed the Convention,

4

Convention relating to the Non-fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland Islands (Sweden and Finland), signed at Geneva, 20 October 1921, 9 LNTS, 213; 1 Hudson, 744 (1931). The Convention confirmed the application of the then current international law within the three-nautical-mile band of sea surrounding the Islands.

5

Declaration between Great Britain and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, 8 April 1904, 24 Hertslet’s, 400-402 (1907).

6

See D.P. O’Connell, International Law, Vol. I, 567, Stevens, London (1970) and C.J. Colombos, International Law of the Sea, 220, 6th edn, Longman Group, London (1967).

7

See Statement of the Italian delegate on 19 July 1973, and the Soviet delegate on 24 July 1973, UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.66 and 69.

8

J.D. González Campos, “Navegación por el Mar Territorial incluidos los Estrechos”, in La Actual Revisión del Derecho del Mar: Una Perspectiva Española, Vol. I (1), 395-396, (1974).

9

“Una tal referencia no implica una libertad de navegación como en el caso de alta mar, sino el elemento central de la noción de paso inocente en el caso de los estrechos”. See J.A. Yturriaga Barberan, “Estudio Jurídico del Estrecho de Gibraltar y Consecuencias de la Construcción de una Obra Fija”, 6 Anuario Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho Internacional, 185, 202 (1981). See also by the same author, Straits used for International Navigation: A Spanish Perspective, 88-91, Nijhoff (1990). Other authors with similar opinions include E. Bruel, International Straits, Vol. I-II, 156, Sweet and Maxwell, London (1947). R. Baxter, The Law of International Waterways with Particular Regard to Interoceanic Canals, 335-336, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1964). 585


no mention was made of the 1904 Declaration or of its interpretation.10 One interesting point concerning special conventional regimes for straits has to do with the relationship between regimes not of “long-standing” and the Convention. An example of such a special regime might be the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel currently regulating passage through the Strait of Tiran. In 1978, following the Israeli-Egyptian war, the two countries entered into the “Camp David Framework” which was later incorporated and supplemented by the 1979 Peace Treaty.11 Article V(2) of the 1979 Peace Treaty, covers navigation through the Strait of Tiran: “The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendible freedom of navigation and over flight. The Parties will respect each other’s right to navigation and over flight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.” The special regime established by this article raises three basic questions. First, does the 1979 Peace Treaty qualify as a “long-standing international convention”, exempting the Strait of Tiran from the provisions of the Convention? If not, how long must the period of time be before a conventional regime may be considered of “long-standing”? Secondly, what is the relationship between a special conventional regime not of long-standing and the Convention? Can the 1979 Peace Treaty provisions with regard to passage through the Strait of Tiran take precedence over article 45(1)(b) of the Convention which calls for the application of non-suspendible innocent passage, in straits connecting the high seas or an EEZ with the territorial sea of a foreign State? Thirdly, can a bilateral conventional regime benefit third parties? The first question concerning the length of time required before a special conventional regime may be categorised as one of “long-standing” exempt from the provisions in Part III of the Convention, is a difficult one for which there is

10

For a complete discussion of the physical dimensions of the Strait of Gibraltar, the defence interests, the economic and environmental concerns, and the political and legal issues regarding passage, see S. Truver, The Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, Sijthoff and Noordhoff (1980).

11

Art. V(2), of Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, signed at Washington D.C. 26 March 1979, reprinted in 18 ILM, 362-393 (1979). See also R. Lapidoth-Eschelbacher, The Red Sea and The Gulf of Aden, at 172-183, Nijhoff, The Hague (1982); see generally A.E. Danseyar, “Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran: From Customary International Law to the 1979 Egyptian- Israeli Peace Treaty”, 5 B. C. Int’l & Comp. L. R., 127 (1982); M. El Baradei, “The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and Access to the Gulf of Aqaba: A New Legal Régime”, 76 AJIL, 532 (1982); R. Lapidoth, “The Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel”, 77 AJIL, 84 (1983).

586


no hard and fast rule. Suffice it to say that the conventions that article 35(c) intended to cover date back many years, the most recent being the Montreux Convention of 1936. To argue that the special regime of passage in the 1979 Peace Treaty constitutes a long-standing conventional regime could be seen as premature. The second question concerning the relationship between a special regime not of long-standing and the Convention is quite interesting. One author has suggested that since the 1979 Peace Treaty was entered into pursuant to a United Nations Security Council mandate (resolutions 242 and 338), affirming “the necessity … [f]or guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area”, the provisions of the 1979 Peace Treaty are binding on all Members of the United Nations and override article 45(1)(b) of the Convention.12 Another author has proposed that: “with regard to the relation between the general lex lata and the regime of the Treaty of Peace, it seems to be clear that the latter should supplement the former and prevail since it is a positive and special law that grants more liberal rights of passage on a basis of non-discrimination.”13 Professor Treves has correctly concluded that the relationship between the 1979 Peace Treaty and the 1982 Convention must be determined according to article 311(2) of the Convention14 which reads as follows: “This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this Convention.” Therefore, the key issue in determining whether the straits provision in the 1979 Peace Treaty may take precedence over the regime of passage through straits in the Convention, is whether the two regimes are compatible. The States Parties to the 1979 Peace Treaty have clearly stated their opinion in this regard. The Egyptian ratification of the Convention declared: “The provisions of the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel concerning passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba come within the framework of the general regime of waters forming straits referred to in Part III of the Convention, wherein it is stipulated

12

J.N. Moore, “The Régime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, 74 AJIL, 77, 113 (1980).

13

R. Lapidoth-Eschelbacher, supra, note 11, at 182.

14

T. Treves, “La Navigation” in R.-J. Dupuy (ed.), Traité du nouveau droit de la mer, 793, Economica, Paris (1985). 587


that the general regime shall not affect the legal status of waters forming straits”.15 Israel, supported by the United States16 stated its position in an “objection” to the Egyptian declaration: “[T]he Government of Israel states that the regime of navigation and overflight, confirmed by the 1979 Treaty of Peace …, being fully compatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the regime of the Peace Treaty will continue to prevail and to be applicable to said areas.”17 Clearly, both Egypt and Israel agree that the 1979 Peace Treaty provisions with regard to passage through the Strait of Tiran are compatible with the regime of passage through straits in the Convention. Moreover, in that no contradictions exist between the liberal regime (freedom of navigation) provided for by the 1979 Peace Treaty, and the more restrictive regime (non-suspendible innocent passage) stipulated by article 45(1)(b) of the Convention, the 1979 Peace Treaty, as between parties, should take precedence over the 1982 Convention. The difference, therefore, between those straits regulated by “long-standing international conventions”, and those regulated by more recent conventional regimes, is that the former may be incompatible with the provisions of the Convention, while the latter may not. Consequently, if a convention of long-standing exempt by article 35(c) calls for the application of a more restrictive regime than would be applied under the Convention, the more restrictive regime would take precedence.18 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides the answer to the third question concerning the rights of third States vis-à-vis special conventional regimes. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention specifies that third States may

15

UN, Multilateral Treaties, 731, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SeplE/5 (1986).

16

The United States expressed its support of Israel in a Statement by the United States delegation of 29 January 1982. Quoted in a speech by Professor Shabtai Rosenne at Montego Bay, 17 UNCLOS III, 84, para. 20. Also printed in 128 Congressional Record, No. 47, 97th Congress, Second Session, Senate, 27 April 1982 at 4089: “The United States fully supports the continuing applicability and force of freedom of navigation and over flight for the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as set out in the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. In the United States view, the Treaty of Peace is fully compatible with the Law of the Sea Convention and will continue to prevail. The conclusion of the Law of the Sea Convention will not affect those provisions in any way.”

17

UN, Multilateral Treaties, supra, note 15, at 742. Usage of the term “objection” is not altogether clear in that the Israeli statement is not a protest against the Egyptian Declaration.

18

Treves, supra, note 14, at 793.

588


enjoy the provisions of a treaty, if the States Parties intend the treaty provision to accord that right to third parties.19 Here again, the States Parties to the 1979 Peace Treaty have clearly manifested their intentions to make the Strait of Tiran accessible to international navigation. Indeed, the first sentence of article V(2) opens the Strait “to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendible freedom of navigation and overflight”. To this, Professor Treves would add that third States enjoy the supplementary rights afforded by the 1979 Peace Treaty, but not any of its limitations.20 A related point touching upon the relationship between conventional regimes and the Convention concerns a situation where a special regime is incomplete. Professors Churchill and Lowe suggest that in such cases the provisions of the Convention will serve as supplemental law, providing the rules of transit to fill the gaps. The Montreux Convention of 1936, for example, being the most detailed of the special conventional regimes, restricts the right of passage to certain classes of ships, and requires prior notification on that right. These restrictive provisions continue to apply because of the “long-standing convention” exception of article 35(c) of the Convention. However, in those areas where the Montreux Convention is silent, as with coastal legislative jurisdiction, the Convention provisions would supplement the special regime. In such a case, the detailed rules of a conventional regime of long-standing will coexist with the provisions of the Convention concerning matters outside the scope of the special regime.21

II. Straits Through Which There Exists a High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone Route of Similar Convenience Article 36 contains an important limitation on the applicability of the regime of transit passage. It exempts from Part III of the Convention: “a strait used for international navigation if there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone

19

Article 36 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties reads: “A right arises for a third State from a provision in a treaty if the parties to a treaty intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides.” 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27.

20

Treves, supra, note 14, at 793.

21

R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd edn, Manchester University Press, Manchester (1999). 589


of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics.”22 This provision applies when the narrowest width of a strait exceeds the combined breadth of the territorial sea of the bordering states – usually 24 miles – so that a continuous band of high seas or EEZ runs through the middle of a strait. If that corridor is of “similar convenience” as the route passing through the territorial sea portions of the strait, then the transit passage regime and the non-suspendible innocent passage provision in article 45(2) of Part III of the Convention would not apply even though the strait is “used for international navigation”. Instead, the provisions in articles 58 and 87 of the Convention respecting freedom of navigation and overflight in the high seas would automatically apply within the corridor, and passage outside the corridor, through the territorial sea portions of that strait, would be subject to the provisions of innocent passage through the territorial sea set forth in Part II of the Convention. An interesting situation could arise where one of the States bordering a strait claims a territorial sea of less than 12 miles, forming a very narrow corridor of high seas or EEZ on one side of the strait, and a complete area of territorial sea on the other side of the strait. Because such a narrow corridor would presumably not be “of similar characteristics”, article 36 preserves the regime of transit passage in the entire strait and avoids the restrictions of the innocent passage regime otherwise applicable in the territorial sea portions of such a strait.

III. Straits Formed by an Island of the State Bordering the Strait and the Mainland of the Same State Where There Exists Seaward of the Island a Route Through the High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone of Similar Convenience This category of straits, commonly known as the “Messina Exception” or “island exception”, is found in article 38(1) of the Convention: “1. In straits referred to in Article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded; except that, if the strait is formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, transit passage shall not apply if there exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of

22

Article 36 was originally derived from the 1974 British proposal which was incorporated into the Main Trends document, and in 1975 became the basis for the Draft Articles of the Private Group on Straits. See “United Kingdom: Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea and Straits”, 3 UNCLOS III, Chapter III, Art. 2(4)(a), UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3 (1974).

590


similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics.” Although this exception was originally negotiated as a concession to the Italian delegation and their concerns about the strait between Sicily and the Italian mainland, it seems that the island exception was included into the draft articles of the Private Group on Straits with the idea of accommodating the Pemba Channel (between Pemba island and the Tanzanian mainland).23 Because the island exception in article 38 is phrased in the same terms as article 36, straits with a high seas or EEZ corridor, the two exceptions may be interpreted in the same manner; the question of “similar convenience” always in relation to navigational and hydrographical factors. In this respect, economic, military or political inconvenience is irrelevant, and user States cannot invoke transit passage for such reasons. Another significant similarity between the “island exception” and the “high seas corridor exception” is that, in both types of straits, the rights of overflight and submerged navigation through the territorial sea portions of the strait are not recognised. Unlike the exception in article 36, however, article 38(1) is qualified by article 45(1)(a), which specifically calls for the application of non-suspendible innocent passage through a strait formed by an island of a State bordering the strait. Thus, the right of innocent passage through an article 38(1) strait cannot be suspended, while the right of innocent passage through an article 36 strait, that is, a strait with a high seas or EEZ corridor, may be suspended for national security reasons.24 Of course, in both cases all freedoms of navigation

23

See Italian Proposal in the Sea-Bed Committee, Report of the Sea-Bed Committee, 28 UN GAOR 71, Supp. No. 21 (A/9021), UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.30 and Corr. 1, para. (a) (1973). According to Professor Alexander, there are 22 straits in the world formed by an island of a State and the mainland where there exists a route through the high seas or EEZ of similar convenience seaward of the island. See, L.M. Alexander, “Exceptions to the Transit Passage Régime: Straits with Routes of ‘Similar Convenience’”, 18 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L., 479 (1987).

24

The incongruous treatment of these two exceptions to the right of transit passage, the island exception in article 38 and the high seas/EEZ corridor exception in article 36, seems to have been inadvertent. When the draft articles of the Private Group on Straits were incorporated into the ISNT (Part II), some rearrangement of the articles occurred and the chapter on straits was divided into three sections. As a result, those straits with a similarly convenient high seas or EEZ corridor were moved to a separate article (art. 36) that was not to be governed by Part III (Part II in the ISNT). The other two exceptions to transit passage in the draft articles of the Private Group on Straits, the island exception and straits leading to the territorial sea of a foreign State, were moved to a single article (art. 45) in section 3, which provided for the regime of non-suspendible innocent passage. Treves, supra, note 14, at 789. 591


and overflight would apply in the high seas or EEZ areas seaward of the island or through the corridor. Professor Treves suggests that the “island exception” represents a compromise which originated in the idea that the regime of transit passage should only apply to straits used for international navigation, and not to straits of secondary importance. Although Treves does not expound on the criteria to be used in determining the importance of a strait, he seems to imply that straits of secondary importance are those for which there exists an alternative route of passage; transit passage being reserved for those straits which provide the only viable waterway. Examples of straits falling under this exception are the Messina Strait and the Pemba Channel. The Corfu Channel is not formed by “an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland”, because except for a small portion of the Channel, it is formed by a Greek island and the Albanian mainland. The fact that there may exist a high seas route or an EEZ route of similar convenience seaward of the island does not suggest that the island exception automatically applies. The regime of passage in the Corfu Channel should be one of transit passage and not that of non-suspendible innocent passage otherwise applied under the island exception.

IV. Straits Used for International Navigation Between a Part of the High Seas or Exclusive Economic Zone and the Territorial Sea of a Foreign State Finally, article 45(1)(b) of Part III of the Convention specifically applies the regime of innocent passage in accordance to Part II, section 3, to two types of straits used for international navigation which are excluded from the application of the transit passage provisions. As previously mentioned, these are: the “island exception” straits of article 38(1) and straits which connect a part of the high seas or an EEZ and the territorial sea of a foreign State. Article 45(2) adds the assurance that the right of innocent passage through both types of straits cannot be suspended.

592

THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS Andree Kirchner*

I. Development of the Continental Shelf Doctrine

A

lready before the end of World War II, scientists announced that they had located great resources of petroleum below the waters of the continental shelf and that, due to progress in engineering, the exploitation of those resources was possible.1 Nevertheless, the freedom of the high seas, which was long before recognised as part of the international customary law, constituted in this regard an obstacle to State plans for continental shelf exploitation. States were in an immediate need of a formula that would allow them to take advantage of the resources of their continental shelf. Although the starting point of the development of the continental shelf doctrine could be regarded the Gulf of Paria Treaty of 1942 between Great Britain and Venezuela,2 in which each of the two parties agreed to recognise sovereign rights of the other party over submarine areas in the Gulf of Paria,3 the first attempt to develop a terminology and a philosophy on the doctrine of the continental shelf in an official instrument came from the United States.4 In September 1945, the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, issued a proclamation called “Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural

*

I thank Ms. Elisabeth Batsara, LL.M.Eur. (Bremen), Ph.D. candidate at IMLI for her contribution.

1

J.L. Kunz, Continental Shelf and International Law: Confusion and Abuse, 50 AJIL 828, 829 (1956).

2

Treaty Relating to the Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria, 26 February 1942, Great Britain-Venezuela, 205 LNTS 121 (1944-1946).

3

H. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BYIL 376, 380 (1950).

4

Id.



Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf ”5 known as the “Truman Proclamation”. In that Proclamation, the US government stated that it “regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control”.6 It, however, clarified that “the character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation”7 was by no means to be affected. The doctrine that emerged from the Truman Proclamation turned out to be rather appealing to a number of States. Shortly after the Truman Proclamation, Mexico adapted the doctrine in its proclamation of October 1945 and was soon followed by the other Latin American States. It was then just a matter of time before the new trend in the American continent expanded all over the world. In 1949, almost all States in the Middle East claimed, by a series of proclamations sovereign, rights over their continental shelf, while a similar proclamation was made in the same year by the Philippines. By 1951, some thirty States had already proclaimed sovereign rights over their continental shelf,8 a number that was soon increased in 1952 by the proclamation of South Korea and in 1953 by the proclamation of Australia. Nevertheless, there was no unanimity in State practice, neither with regard to the breadth of the continental shelf nor with regard to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the coastal State. The most obvious declinations from the spirit of the doctrine of the continental shelf as expressed in the Truman Proclamation were recorded in the proclamations of the Latin American States. Characteristic in this regard are the Argentinean and Chilean proclamations. In contrast to the Truman Proclamation, Argentina claimed by Presidential Decree of 11 October 1946 sovereignty not only over its continental shelf but also over the shelf ’s superjacent waters. Even more far-reaching was, however, the Chilean Declaration of 23 June 1947, which proclaimed sovereignty over the Chilean continental shelf of whatever depth and additionally over a maritime zone extending 200 nautical miles from the shore. The claim of a 200-nautical-mile maritime zone adjacent to the coast was also retained in the 1952 Joint Declaration on Maritime Zones that was adopted by Chile, Ecuador and Peru.

5

US Presidential Proclamation No. 2667 “Policy of the United States with respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf ” (28 September 1945).

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

R. Young, The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High Seas, 45 AJIL 225, 225 (1951).

594

The Outer Continental Shelf

It soon became evident that there was an immediate need for the international community to agree upon a limit for the continental shelf and upon the rights of a coastal State over its continental shelf. Therefore, the issue was included in the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the law of the sea and in 1958 the Geneva Conference was called to adopt, among other things, a Convention on the Continental Shelf.9 The Convention’s development was much more than a mere codification of existing law; it was actually a progressive development of international law. Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf defined the continental shelf as referring: (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. The ellipsis of a definite outer limit for the continental shelf in the Convention on the Continental Shelf was not really regarded as a problem by the Geneva Conference since it did not seem at the time that exploitation beyond the 200nautical-mile limit was imminently possible. In the early years of the 1960s, it was, however, asserted that the exploration and exploitation of the vast resources of the seabed at depths beyond 200 metres was technically possible and the leading industrialised States began developing plans to take advantage of the possibility. The prospect of the ocean’s rich resources being exploited by a few powerful States that would in this way be able to control the world’s economy became a major concern for developing and third world States, which at the same time hoped that a share of the resources would help them eliminate their poverty problems. In 1967, the issue was brought up at the United Nations General Assembly by Arvid Pardo, the Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations. Concentrating on the grave consequences that the competition for the exploitation of the seabed’s resources could have for mankind as a whole, Pardo suggested that the ocean seabed beyond national jurisdiction should be declared as “Common Heritage of Mankind” and that its natural resources should be used only for the benefit of mankind as a whole.10 The UN General Assembly responded by establishing at first an Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of

9

Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311.

10

GA, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515 (1967) and A/C.1/PV.1516 (1967). 595


the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction11 and, after a year, a Committee on the same issue, the so-called Seabed Committee, to consider Pardo’s proposal.12 The Committee examined broad issues relating to jurisdiction of the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and on the basis of those examinations the UN General Assembly adopted in 1969 the so-called Moratorium Resolution13 and, one year later, the Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.14 Noting the close interrelation of problems relating to ocean space, the UN General Assembly also declared its decision to convene a conference in 1973 on the law of the sea to deal not only with issues concerning the seabed and ocean floor, but with all contemporary issues of the law of the sea.15

II. The 1982 LOS Convention Provisions on the Continental Shelf At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the regulation of the continental shelf regime in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)16 became the subject of hard negotiations.17 A group of several States whose natural prolongation into the sea exceeded 200 nautical miles from the coast, known as the “broad-margin states”, were not willing to relinquish their rights over their extended continental shelf and, therefore, supported a continental shelf definition that would attribute to them exclusive rights over the part of their continental shelf that extended beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit. These States proposed a 200-nautical-mile limit for the continental shelf that could, however, be extended in case that the natural prolongation of the land territory extended beyond that limit.18 On the other hand, a group consisting of States with a narrow continental shelf, and

11

GA Res. 2340 (XXII) (18 December 1967).

12

GA Res. 2467 (XXIII) (21 December 1968).

13

GA Res. 2574 (XXIV) (15 December 1969).

14

GA Res. 2749 (XXV) (17 December 1970).

15

GA Res. 2750 C (XXV) (17 December 1970), para. 2.

16

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, (LOS Convention), 21 ILM 1261 (1982).

17

For a more detailed presentation of the continental shelf negotiations at UNCLOS III see Ted L. McDorman, The New Definition of “Canada Lands” and the Determination of the Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, 14 J. Mar. L. & Com. 195, 200-206 (1983).

18

See for example the joint submission by Canada, Chile, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand and Norway in UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.4 (1974), art. 19(2).

596


especially of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States, insisted on the 200-nautical-mile continental shelf limit, hoping to place as much of the deep seabed as possible under the legal status of the area,19 the mineral resources of which are regarded as the Common Heritage of Mankind20 (the Area) and are to be administered by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) acting on behalf of mankind as a whole.21 In the middle of the debate between the above-mentioned groups of States the suggestion was made that the only solution would be to recognise the extension of the continental shelf to more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines, but at the same time provide for the requirements of developing land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States by using a revenue-sharing system.22 This revenue-sharing requirement constituted the basis upon which an agreement on the outer limits of the continental shelf became possible. The compromise solution that was eventually achieved at UNCLOS III provides mainly for a 200nautical-mile continental shelf offering, however, to broad-margin States the right to exercise sovereign rights over at least a great part of their continental shelf that extends beyond the 200-nautical-mile distance from the shore (usually called the “outer” continental shelf in contrast to the “inner” continental shelf situated within 200 nautical miles of the coast). The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters and their exercise may not unjustifiably interfere with navigation and the other high seas freedoms.23 The revenue-sharing requirement, which undoubtedly constitutes the most important restriction that was placed on broad-margin States, was incorporated in article 82 of the LOS Convention. According to this article, coastal States that exploit the non-living resources of their outer continental shelf are to make payments or contributions in kind, which shall be distributed through the Authority to developing States. Keeping the above-mentioned background in mind, it is not difficult to understand why article 76(1) of the LOS Convention has significantly changed the continental shelf definition that was included in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, by defining the continental shelf as follows:

19

LOS Convention, art. 1(1)(a).

20

Id. art. 136.

21

Id. art. 137(2). See for example the statement of the Austrian delegate at the 16th Meeting of the Second Committee (2nd Sess.) in UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.16 (1974), para. 4.

22

Statement of the delegate of Mauritius at the 20th Meeting of the Second Committee (2nd Sess.) in UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.20 (1974), para. 42.

23

LOS Convention, art. 78. 597


“The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.” As is obvious, the continental shelf definition of article 76(1) of the LOS Convention is a legal conception rather than a scientific definition.24 It embraces two criteria: the first based on the consideration of natural prolongation and the other in terms of distance. According to the criterion of natural prolongation, which is a geomorphological criterion, a coastal State’s continental shelf may extend to the outer edge of the continental margin. The continental margin is defined as comprising the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State and as consisting of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise.25 It does not, however, include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.26 In accordance with the distance criterion, a coastal State’s continental shelf extends 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured “where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance”. Thus, even in cases where a coastal State’s continental shelf does not extend up to 200 nautical miles into the sea, the coastal State has sovereign rights over the seabed and its subsoil up to that distance. In cases where the continental margin extends beyond the normal 200nautical-mile limit, the outer edge of the continental shelf is generally to be established in accordance with the criteria of article 76(4) to (7) of the LOS Convention. In any case, the continental shelf may legally not exceed a maximum of 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, the line connecting depths of 2,500 metres.27 According to article 76(2) of the LOS Convention, whose purpose is to serve as an additional reassurance to States concerned about coastal State creeping jurisdiction,28 the continental shelf may not extend beyond the LOS Convention limits. However, despite, the detailed instructions and safeguards of article 76 regarding the definition of the limits of the outer continental shelf, it was considered necessary at UNCLOS

24

M.H. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, A Commentary, Vol. II, 873 (1993).

25


26

Id.

27

Id. art. 76(5).

28

Nordquist, supra note 25, at 874.

598


III to establish a Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf consisting of twenty-one international experts from the fields of geology, geophysics and hydrography,29 to oversee the procedure and make sure that States respect the regulations set down in article 76 of the LOS Convention.

III. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the Ten-Year Limit for Submissions under Article 76(8) of the LOS Convention The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is established by article 76(8) of the LOS Convention, which is further elaborated by the provisions of Annex II to the LOS Convention regulating the establishment, functions and operation of the Commission. According to article 76(8), coastal States are to submit information to the Commission on the limits of the continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit (including the particulars of the limits and accompanying scientific and technical data).30 After a thorough examination of the information provided, the Commission shall make recommendations to the State that has provided the information relating to the establishment of the outer limits of its continental shelf. The coastal State shall then establish the limits of its continental shelf ‘on the basis of ’ these recommendations.31 Actually, the establishment of a coastal State’s outer continental shelf limits on the basis of the Commission’s recommendations is a necessary condition for those limits to be regarded as “final and binding”.32 The inclusion of the expression “on the basis of ” in article 76(8) and its substitution for the previous expression “taking into account” during the Ninth Session of UNCLOS III was merely the desire of the geographically disadvantaged States. As expected, the new requirement was not welcomed by the broad-margin States that saw it as unauthorised interference with their sovereign rights.33 The Commission was, however, not empowered to impose its recommendations on the coastal State. Thus, in the case of a disagreement between the Commission and the submitting coastal State, that State shall, within a reasonable time, make

29

LOS Convention, Annex II, art. 2(1).

30

Id. Annex II, art. 4.

31

Id. art. 76(8).

32

Id.

33

L.D.M. Nelson, The Continental Shelf: Interplay of Law and Science, in N. Ando, E. McWhinney and R. Wolfrum (eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda, Vol. 2, 1235, 1239-1240 (2002); and McDorman, supra note 17, at 206-207. 599


a revised or new submission to the Commission.34 It is, however, not clear what should happen if the Commission and the coastal State are unable to agree upon the limits of the outer continental shelf. The issue was examined by the ILA Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf at its 2004 Berlin Conference. According to the Conference’s report, the Committee found that it would be possible for a dispute to be submitted to a dispute settlement mechanism under Part XV of the LOS Convention. The procedure and the consequences of a judgment concerning article 76 would, however, be far from clear.35 Therefore, it is rather important that both sides enter the procedure of article 76(8) of the LOS Convention with goodwill to cooperate with each other in order to reach a solution. With regard to the time-limit within which a coastal State is entitled to submit information on its outer continental shelf limits to the CLCS, article 4 of Annex II to the LOS Convention provides for a ten-year limit for submissions after the entry into force of the Convention. Nevertheless, at the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties to the LOS Convention in June 2000, a number of developing States expressed concern that they would not be able to comply with the time-limit in article 4 of Annex II to the LOS Convention. The Meeting expressed its general support for the concerns raised by developing States and decided to include in the agenda for the Eleventh Meeting the item “Issues with respect to Article 4 of Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, while requesting the Secretariat to prepare a background study on the matter. In addition to the document prepared by the Secretariat,36 the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties, which took place from 14 to 18 May 2001, also received a relevant note verbale from the Government of Seychelles37 and a position paper submitted by the Pacific Island Forum States.38 Introducing the position paper at the meeting, the representative of the Federated States of Micronesia, emphasised the complexity of the preparation of the submission to the CLCS and argued that developing States should not, because of lack of resources or capacity, be

34

LOS Convention, Annex II, art. 8.

35

ILA Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf, Report on the Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf, at 7-12 (Berlin Conference 2004), available at <www.ila-hq.org/pdf/ Outer%20Con%20Shelf/Berlin%20Report%202004.pdf>.

36

Meeting of States Parties to UNCLOS (SPLOS), Issues with Respect to Article 4 of Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Background Paper Prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc. SPLOS/64 (2001).

37

SPLOS, Notes Verbales from the Government of Seychelles Regarding the Extension of the Time Period for Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. SPLOS/66 (2001).

38

SPLOS, Position Paper on the Time Frame for Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Submitted by Australia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu, UN Doc. SPLOS/67 (2001).

600


disadvantaged in respect of access to or use of their resources. He additionally emphasised the fact that States had had a clear idea of how to prepare their submission only after the Commission had adopted its Scientific and Technical Guidelines on 13 May 1999.39 He therefore proposed the following (also included in the common position paper of the Pacific Island Forum States):40 (1) That the States Parties agree to extend the ten-year period prescribed in Annex II; such an extension to be agreed through a decision of the Member States or through an understanding on the interpretation of Annex II; (2) Such an understanding to include an agreement that the ten-year period would not begin to run for any State Party, regardless of its date of ratification or accession, until the date of adoption of the Commission’s Guidelines; (3) The time for making a submission to be further extended beyond ten years where a State Party has been unable, for technical reasons, including lack of technical capacity, to comply in good faith with the time limitation. Many delegations agreed with the arguments of the Pacific Island Forum States and also on the 13 May 1999 as the starting date for the calculation of the new ten-year limit for submission of proposals. The States Parties decided to set up a Working Group to examine the issue. The Working Group prepared a draft decision that was adopted by the Meeting on 29 May 2001.41 The Decision provided that, for a State Party for which the Convention entered into force before 13 May 1999, the date of commencement of the ten-year time period for making submissions to the Commission was 13 May 1999. A rather interesting issue with regard to article 4 of Annex II to the LOS Convention relates to the article’s relationship with broad-margin States that are non-States Parties to the LOS Convention. According to the ILA Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf, although the rules of article 76 have received broad support in State practice including from non-States Parties to the Convention, which could even attribute to some of them the status of international customary law, it does not seem that the LOS Convention accords to third States a right to make submissions to the CLCS.42 Nevertheless, a possible consequence of the

39

CLCS, Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS/11 (1999).

40

Id. para. 8.

41

SPLOS, Decision Regarding the Date of Commencement of the Ten-Year Period for Making Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set out in Article 4 of Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. SPLOS/72 (2001).

42

ILA Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf, supra note 36, at 30-31. 601


designation by States of the outer limits of their continental shelf without the co-action of the CLCS could be the non-recognition of those limits by other States.43 As a solution to this problem, it has been suggested to allow non-States Parties to submit their data to the CLCS for confirmation,44 while another approach to the problem would be to allow to those States to designate the limits of their outer continental shelf in accordance with the provisions of article 76 of the LOS Convention only on condition that they accept the revenue-sharing requirement of article 82 of the LOS Convention.45 This latter proposal seems not only desirable, but could legally be based on the fact that all States are bound by the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle, which is applicable to the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and, therefore, all States wishing to take advantage of the non-living resources of the deep seabed beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit should be obliged to pay the revenue-sharing requirement of article 82 of the LOS Convention as an application of the above mentioned principle of international customary law.

IV. Impact of the Continental Shelf Extension on High Seas Uses Although potential problems of navigation or fisheries caused by continental shelf expansion beyond 200 nautical miles from the shore may have some theoretical interest, the only LOS Convention articles beyond article 76 that make reference to the consequences of the designation of outer continental shelf limits relate to the exploitation of natural resources and to marine scientific research. The main difference between exploitation of the inner and the outer continental shelf is the revenue-sharing requirement of article 82 of the LOS Convention for the exploitation of the outer continental shelf. Without the revenue-sharing requirement of article 82 it would not have been possible for States to reach a settlement on the continental shelf; it was widely accepted that at least this limited inclusion of the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in the outer continental shelf area was the quid pro quo for allowing broad-margin States to take advantage of their continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit.46

43

Nelson, supra note 34, at 1249.

44

T.A. Clingan, The Law of the Sea in Perspective: Problems of States not Parties to the Law of the Sea Treaty, 30 GYIL 101, 112 (1987).

45

ILA Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf, supra note 36, at 31.

46

D.M. Ong, A Legal Regime for the Outer Continental Shelf? An Inquiry as to the Rights and Duties of Coastal States within the Outer Continental Shelf, (paper presented at the Third ABLOS International Conference, Monaco, October 28-30, 2003) at 4, available at <www.gmat. unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOS03Folder/PAPER7-4.PDF> (visited 10 May 2006).

602


In addition to that, the revenue-sharing requirement of article 82 is also thought as protective of the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle against maritime expansionism of broad-margin States.47 With the purpose of restricting coastal State creeping jurisdiction, article 82 imposes on coastal States the obligation to make payments or contributions in kind (the choice is left to the coastal State)48 in respect of the exploitation of the non-living resources of their outer continental shelf.49 In particular, after the first five years of exploitation at an outer continental shelf site, the exploiting State is obliged to pay a rate or contribution amounting to one per cent of the value or volume of the production at the site.50 The rate shall increase by 1 per cent each year to eventually stabilise in the 12th year at a maximum of seven per cent of the production.51 The payments and contributions are to be made to the ISA, which is then to distribute them to the States Parties to the LOS Convention, on the basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of developing States, particularly the least developed and the land-locked among them.52 Developing States that are net importers of a mineral resource produced from their continental shelf are exempted from making such payments or contributions.53 The broad-margin States are, however, compensated to some extent for the revenue-sharing obligation by the establishment in article 142 of the LOS Convention of the primacy of the coastal State rights and jurisdiction over the resources of its outer continental shelf. In particular, not only are activities relating to resource deposits in the Area, which lies beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, to be conducted with “due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of any coastal state across whose jurisdiction such deposits lie”,54 but such activities are subject to the prior consent of the coastal State if there is a possibility of them resulting in the exploitation of resources under the jurisdiction of the coastal State.55 Except for the exploitation of the non-living resources of the outer continental shelf, the LOS Convention makes only a special reference to the outer continental

47

B. Kwiatkowska, Creeping Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles in the Light of the 1982 LOS Convention and State Practice, 22 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 153, 158 (1991).

48

Nordquist, supra note 25, at 945.

49


50

Id. art. 82(2).

51

Id.

52

Id. art. 82(4).

53

Id. art. 82(3).

54

Id. art. 142(1).

55

Id. art. 142(2). 603


shelf with regard to the conduct of marine scientific research (MSR). In particular, under article 246 of the LOS Convention concerning the conduct of MSR in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and on the continental shelf, the conduct of MSR is subject to the consent of the coastal State,56 which, under normal circumstances, is obliged to grant its consent for MSR projects by other States or competent international organisations to be carried out in accordance with the LOS Convention and in order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all mankind.57 Nevertheless, according to article 246(5) of the LOS Convention, coastal States may withhold their consent to the conduct of a MSR project on their continental shelf if that project: (a) is of direct significance for the exploration of natural resources, whether living or non-living; (b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives or the introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment; (c) involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, installations and structures referred to in articles 60 and 80; (d) contains information communicated pursuant to article 248 regarding the nature and objectives of the project which is inaccurate or if the researching state or competent international organisation has outstanding obligations to the coastal state from a prior research project. Paragraph 6, article 246 of the LOS Convention, however, exempts MSR projects to be undertaken in accordance with the LOS Convention provisions on the outer continental shelf from the applicability of subparagraph (a), article 246(5) of the LOS Convention. Thus, a coastal State may not withhold consent if the suggested MSR project is to take place outside those specific areas that the coastal State has publicly designated as areas in which exploitation or detailed exploratory operations focused on those areas are occurring or will occur within a reasonable period of time.58 This is the only special reference in Part XIII of the LOS Convention to marine scientific research on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, which means that in all other cases MSR on the extended continental shelf is subject to the same regulations as MSR on the continental shelf up to a distance of 200 nautical miles from coast. MSR on an extended continental shelf is thus, with the exemption of article 246(4) of the LOS Convention only, subject to the restrictions of, for example, article 248 of the LOS Convention on the duty to provide information to the coastal State, article 249 of the LOS Convention on

56

Id. art. 246(2).

57

Id. art. 246(3).

58

Id. art. 246(6).

604


the duty to comply with certain conditions and article 253 on the right of the coastal State for suspension or cessation of MSR activities. The main difference between the conduct of MSR within and beyond the 200nautical-mile limit of the continental shelf relates, therefore, to the restriction of the coastal State’s discretion to withhold consent to MSR projects from taking place on the continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit. That means that the conduct of MSR on the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction would theoretically be little restricted by the placement under the coastal State’s jurisdiction of seabed areas that until now are considered as parts of the Area. It should be remembered that the Area is open to MSR projects by all States and international organisations59 as long as these projects serve exclusively peaceful purposes and are for the benefit of mankind as a whole.60 Nevertheless, it is submitted that coastal States with a broad continental shelf were rather unwilling at UNCLOS III to accept the restriction of their jurisdiction to authorise the conduct of MSR projects on the outer continental shelf.61 Although those States were eventually unable to change the provision of article 246(6) of the LOS Convention, they are, in practice, very reluctant to incorporate the provisions of article 246(6) of the LOS Convention in their national legislation.62 It has actually been observed that there is in State practice a strong trend towards “a qualitative encroachment of the freedom to conduct MSR in the continental shelf ”.63 There are two methods that are used by coastal States to achieve the restriction of MSR activities on their continental shelf: the first and most common is a lack of distinction between MSR activities conducted on the continental shelf within and beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit, and the second is the effective subordination of the freedom to conduct MSR to the coastal State.64 As an example of the latter method, one could mention the case of Brazil, which has by legislation ascribed to itself the exclusive right to regulate MSR in its continental shelf, without distinction between the inner and outer continental shelf and enforces this legislation by requiring that MSR activities may only be carried out by other States with the consent of the Brazilian Government.65

59

Id. art. 256.

60

Id. art. 143(1).

61

M. Landale and H. Burmester, Australia and the Law of the Sea – Offshore Jurisdiction, in K.W. Ryan (ed.), International Law in Australia, 2nd edn, 390, 407 (1984).

62

Kwiatkowska, supra note 48, at 159-164.

63

ILA Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf, Preliminary Report of the 2002 New Delhi Conference 17 (15 January 2002), available at <www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Outer%20 Con%20Shelf/Outer%20Continental%20Shelf%202002.pdf>.

64

Id.

65

Id. 605


Furthermore, it has been observed that the extension of the outer limits of the continental shelf could cause uncertainty with regard to MSR activities that are carried out in the water column above the outer continental shelf (namely in the high seas), but are directed towards the seabed.66 The wording of article 246(2), which speaks of coastal State consent for MSR conduct “on the continental shelf ” (emphasis added), seems to suggest that the consent requirement does not apply to MSR activities in the water column above the outer continental shelf, an argument that is further supported by article 257 of the LOS Convention which provides all States and international organisations with the right to conduct “research in the water column beyond the limits” of the EEZ (emphasis added).67 Although the consequences that such an uncertainty could have on the conduct of MSR projects directed towards the seabed are eliminated by the provision of article 246(6), the problem could become acute in the case of MSR projects planned above areas on the outer continental shelf that have been designated for exploitation or detailed exploratory operations. Moreover, the current State practice with regard to the conduct of MSR on the outer continental shelf leaves open the possibility for a further restriction of MSR activities. In addition to that, claims on the continental shelf of Antarctica, like that included in the Australian Submission to the Commission on the Continental Shelf, though not likely to become accepted, constitute a possible danger for the freedom of scientific research that is currently enjoyed by scientists in Antarctica.

V. Current Developments There are only eight States in June 2007 that have already made submissions to the CLCS pursuant to article 76(8) of the LOS Convention: Russia, Brazil, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway and France as well as a joint submission by France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.68 The Russian submission, which was received by the Secretary-General on 20 December 2001,69 claimed the extension of the Russian continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in four sea areas: the Barents Sea, the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Central Arctic Ocean. The submission has provoked

66

R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd edn, 407 (1999).

67

Id.

68

See all claims and the relevant documents on the website of the Commission on the Continental Shelf <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm>.

69

CLCS, Receipt of the Submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS.01.2001.LOS (Continental Shelf Notification) (2001).

606


reactions from Japan70 and Norway71 because of unresolved issues of delimitation between each one of them and the Russian Federation, as well as reactions from Canada,72 Denmark73 and the United States,74 which asked for further data and disagreed with some data provided by Russia. In accordance with article 5 of Annex II to the LOS Convention, the Commission, in its tenth session in April 2002, established a sub-committee to deal with the Russian submission and in its eleventh session in June 2002 the Commission adopted its Recommendations to the Russian Federation:75 (1) In the case of the Barents and Bering Seas, the Commission recommended that the Russian Federation, upon entry into force of the maritime boundary delimitation agreements with Norway in the Barents Sea, and with the United States of America in the Bering Sea, transmit to the Commission the charts and coordinates of the delimitation lines as they would represent the outer limits of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation extending beyond 200 nautical miles in the Barents Sea and the Bering Sea respectively. (2) Regarding the Sea of Okhotsk, the Commission recommended that the Russian Federation make a well-documented partial submission regarding its extended continental shelf in the northern part of that Sea. The Commission stated that this partial submission shall not prejudice questions relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States in the south for which a submission might subsequently be made, notwithstanding the provisions regarding the ten-year time-limit established by article 4 of Annex II to the Convention. In order to make this partial submission, the

70

CLCS, Japan: Notification Regarding the Submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS.01.2001.LOS/JPN (2002).

71

CLCS, Norway: Notification Regarding the Submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS.01.2001.LOS/NOR (2002).

72

CLCS, Canada: Notification Regarding the Submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS.01.2001.LOS/CAN (2002).

73

CLCS, Denmark: Notification Regarding the Submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS.01.2001.LOS/DNK (2002).

74

CLCS, United States of America: Notification Regarding the Submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA (2002).

75

GA, Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/57/57/Add.1 (2002), paras 38-41. 607


Commission also recommended that the Russian Federation make its best efforts to effect an agreement with Japan in accordance with paragraph 4 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. (3) As regards the Central Arctic Ocean, the Commission recommended that the Russian Federation make a revised submission in respect of its extended continental shelf in that area based on the findings contained in the recommendations. The next State to make a submission to the CLCS was Brazil. The Brazilian submission,76 which was received by the Secretary-General on 17 May 2004,77 has been contradicted by the United States. The Commission decided, however, in its fourteenth session to disregard the United States’ comments on Brazil’s submission on the ground that, according to Annex II to the LOS Convention and the Rules of Procedure to the CLCS, “only in the case of a dispute between states with opposite or adjacent coasts or in other cases of unresolved land or maritime disputes would the Commission be required to consider communications from states other than the submitting one”.78 Brazil’s submission is currently under consideration. The Brazilian submission was soon followed by one from Australia, which was received by the Secretary-General on 17 November 2004.79 Australia has, inter alia, claimed in its submission80 an extension of the continental shelf of the “Australian Antarctic Territory”.81 As expected, the Australian claim has caused a number of reactions from other States, namely the United States, the Russian Federation, Japan, France, the Netherlands, Germany, India and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, declaring that they do not recognise any territorial claims in Antarctica. The submission of Australia, as well as the notes

76

CLCS, Continental Shelf and UNCLOS Article 76, Brazilian Submission, available at <www. un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/bra04/bra_exec_sum.pdf>.

77

CLCS, Receipt of the Submission made by the Federative Republic of Brazil to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS.02.2004.LOS (Continental Shelf Notification) (2004).

78

CLCS, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, UN Doc. CLCS/42, para. 17 (2004).

79

CLCS, Receipt of the Submission made by Australia to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS.03.2004.LOS (Continental Shelf Notification) (2004).

80

CLCS, Continental Shelf Submission of Australia, Executive Summary, (2004), available at <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/aus04/Documents/ aus_doc_es_web_delivery.pdf>.

81

Id. at 10-13.

608


that have been submitted in reaction to the Australian claim, are currently under consideration. The next State to make a submission to the CLCS was Ireland, whose submission was received on 25 May 2005.82 The only reactions to the Irish submission83 have so far been from Denmark (Faroe Islands) and Iceland, who declared their positions that the submission made by Ireland and any recommendations by the Commission shall be without prejudice to any future submissions made by them with regard to their own continental shelf. Like the Brazilian and Australian submissions, the Irish submission is also under consideration by the responsible CLCS sub-committee, while Russia is expected to make a revised submission under article 8 of Annex II to the LOS Convention. The fifth submission to the CLCS was made by New Zealand on 19 April 2006.84 According to this, New Zealand has claimed sovereign rights over its outer continental shelf in the north, south, east and west.85 However, as is clarified by the note accompanying the submission, this submission is only partial, not including areas of continental shelf appurtenant to the Antarctica. Recognising the special legal and political status in the Antarctica, New Zealand has reserved the right to make a submission with regard to such continental shelf areas later, notwithstanding the ten-year limit of submissions as established by article 4 of Annex II to the LOS Convention. On 19 May 2006, France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland submitted, through the Secretary-General to the CLCS, information on the limits of the continental shelf appurtenant to France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that lie beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial seas of these four coastal States are measured in the portion of the continental shelf in the area of the Celtic Sea and the Bay of Biscay. This portion of shelf is not the subject of any dispute and, in the view of the four coastal States, its consideration by the Commission will not prejudice matters relating to the

82

CLCS, Receipt of the Submission made by Ireland to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS.04.2004.LOS (Continental Shelf Notification) (2005).

83

The Executive Summary of the Irish Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (2005) is available at <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/irl05/irl_exec_sum.pdf>.

84

CLCS, Note from the Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Accompanying the Lodgment of New Zealand’s Submission, (2006) available at <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/nzl_doc_es_ attachment.pdf>.

85

The Executive Summary of the New Zealand Submission to the CLCS (2006) is available at <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/nzl_exec_sum.pdf>. 609


delimitation of boundaries between the four coastal States and any other States. This submission is the only joint submission so far.86 On 27 November 2006, Norway submitted to the CLCS information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured for three separate areas in the North East Atlantic and the Arctic: the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea; the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean; and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea. The submission deals only with the outer limits of the continental shelf in these three areas. A further submission may be made by Norway in respect of other areas.87 On 22 May 2007, France made the eighth and so far final submission to the CLCS. This submission includes areas of French Guiana and New Caledonia.88

VI. Conclusion The issue of the outer continental shelf will receive a lot of attention in the coming years. First of all, although only eight States have already submitted information about their outer continental shelf limits to the CLCS, a great number of submissions are expected before 2009, when the time-limit for submissions expires. On 16 January 2004, the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) requested through a note verbale that some coastal States indicate the timing of their potential submissions to the CLCS. The UN DOALOS document was followed by another note verbale by the CLCS dated July 2004 and addressed to those States that had not responded to the first note. According to the responses from States, it was expected that Nigeria, Tonga, the United Kingdom and probably Norway will make their submissions to the CLCS in 2006, Namibia and Sri Lanka in 2007, Pakistan in 2007/2008, Guyana before 2009, and Myanmar in 2009. Several other States replied that, although they were already preparing their submission to the CLCS, they were not able to predict the date for its completion.89 It is expected that, until 2009,

86

CLCS, information about the joint submission (2006), available at <www.un.org/Depts/ los/clcs_new/submissions_files/frgbires06/joint_submission_executive_summary_english. pdf>.

87

CLCS, information about the submission by Norway (2006), available at <www.un.org/ Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm>.

88

CLCS, information about the submission by France (2007), available at <www.un.org/ Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_fra.htm>.

89

Cf. CLCS, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, UN Doc. CLCS/39 (2004), at 6, and Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, UN Doc. CLCS/42 (2004), at 9-10.

610


States will claim a further 15 million km2 over and above the 60 million km2, or 20 percent, of the ocean that is already under national jurisdiction. In some sea regions, such as, for example, the North Atlantic Ocean, possible State claims could leave only a small proportion of the seabed outside the limits of national jurisdiction. It is, however, obvious from the reactions of other States to the submissions that have already been made to the CLCS that, as each submission meets some kind of negative reaction from other States, the final and binding designation of the outer continental shelf limits of all the submitting States is going to be a complicated and sensitive issue. Moreover, the submissions that have already been made to the CLCS show the importance of the role of the CLCS in restricting the expansionist tendency of some coastal States and in preserving the Area and the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle from creeping coastal State jurisdiction. In respect of the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf, some unauthorised coastal State actions, as for example in the field of marine scientific research, reveal a tendency of some coastal States to stretch or even override the limits of their jurisdiction over their outer continental shelf. Such actions breach the terms under which the consent of other States for jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf was given to broad-margin States and the compromise solution on the limits of the continental shelf itself. Moreover, the preservation of the high seas freedoms and of the Area should be a common goal for all States as they all benefit from the use of the open seas and it is of benefit to mankind as a whole to preserve the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle. It would, thus, be advisable for coastal States to respect the terms of compromise solutions on the continental shelf and to enjoy their rights over their outer continental shelf, while staying within the limits of their jurisdiction under the LOS Convention.

611

OFFSHORE BUNKERING IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE Rainer Lagoni*

I. Introduction

S

hips ply the oceans and seas for different purposes. Merchant ships transport passengers and cargo. Other ships, such as research vessels, supply ships, tug boats or fishing vessels, are operated for various other purposes.1 When they navigate as foreign ships in an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under normal circumstances, they do not affect the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State. But for several years foreign ships operate in the EEZ for other, less traditional purposes, and their operation might possibly affect the public interest of the coastal State. This chapter addresses legal questions, including the options of the affected State that may arise in such situation. Thereby it focuses on the example of tankers that supply gas oil as fuel to foreign fishing vessels in the EEZ of West African States. The tankers and the fishing vessels are not registered in the coastal State, hence they are not under its flag State jurisdiction. The legal backdrop of the issues arising in this situation is the specific regime of the EEZ provided for in article 55 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (LOS Convention).2 According to this regime, the zone is neither a part of the high seas nor of the territorial sea. Therefore activity by a foreign ship in the EEZ is either subject to the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State mentioned in article 56, paragraph 1, of the LOS Convention, or it is, pursuant to article 58, paragraph 1, an exercise of the rights and freedoms of the flag State. In line with the concept of the specific legal regime, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of the

*

The chapter contains the author’s private views.

1

Warships and other government ships are left outside the scope of this chapter.

2

Articles cited in the following without any further reference are those of the LOS Convention.



flag State in the EEZ “are governed by the relevant provisions of the Convention” (article 55), there is no legal presumption for one or the other. However, if a foreign ship uses the EEZ in a manner with regard to which the LOS Convention has not attributed rights or jurisdiction either to the coastal State or to the flag State, and a conflict arises “between the interests” of the States involved, this conflict should be resolved in accordance with article 59. This chapter, however, does not deal with tankers supplying fuel to foreign fishing vessels in the contiguous zone. Such a zone overlaps with the EEZ if the coastal State has established both. Pursuant to article 33, paragraph 1, lit. (a) of the LOS Convention the coastal State may exercise such control in its contiguous zone that is necessary to prevent infringements inter alia of its customs and fiscal laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea. This jurisdiction to control and prevent gives rise to additional legal issues which are beyond the scope of this chapter.

II. The Ongoing Business of Offshore Bunkering Bunkering means filling the fuel bunkers of a ship. In the shipping business, the fuel for the ship is also called its “bunkers”. But in a legal context offshore bunkering is more than the technical activity of refuelling a ship at sea. It is an international business transaction based on a sales contract between a specialised bunkering enterprise and a shipowner. The fuel is delivered by a bunker tanker at a certain date and place at sea which is pre-arranged by radio communication. For example in the Saiga cases, which were decided in 19973 and 19994 by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea under its President Thomas Mensah, a Swiss enterprise sold gas oil as bunkers to the owners of fishing vessels from European States. Hence the Tribunal described “offshore bunkering” as “the sale of gas oil to vessels at sea”.5 These vessels were fishing in the EEZs of West African States on the basis of agreements between the European Community and these States. The bunkering was conducted by the tanker M/V Saiga, which was flying the flag of St Vincent and the Grenadines. The ship was chartered by the bunkering enterprise and operated from the port of Dakar, Senegal. The recent incident of the Russian bunker tanker M.T. Luchegorsk, which was detained by Guinean officials because of supplying fishing vessels in the EEZ of Guinea with

3

M/V Saiga (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), judgment of 4 December 1997, ITLOS Reports 1997, p. 16.

4

M/V Saiga (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), judgment of 1 July 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 10.

5

M/V Saiga (No. 2), ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 56, para. 137.

614

Offshore Bunkering in the Exclusive Economic Zone

bunkers, shows that offshore bunkering is an ongoing business off the coast of West Africa.6 It is a business with certain economic and technical features. Although it could take place in any ocean or sea of the world, economic and technical conditions make it a regional business with West Africa as a main field of operation. A considerable number of foreign fishing vessels operate in this region, far from their home ports in Europe. Offshore bunkering is economically advantageous for them, because the vessels need not call at a port in the region when they can refuel at sea. Thus they are saving time and fuel and may avoid expenses for port dues, customs and taxes. This makes offshore bunkering an attractive activity in West African waters. Furthermore, technical reasons make offshore bunkering in the region an activity which mainly relates to refuelling of fishing vessels. The bunker tankers supply gas oil, which is the common fuel for fishing vessels, whereas merchant vessels use the cheaper heavy fuel oil.7 Container ships normally have large bunker tanks so that it is hardly ever necessary for them to refuel at sea. Apart from that, any master of a merchant ship will normally try to avoid the environmental and safety risks involved in such an operation. Because of its particular features, offshore bunkering may be distinguished from other activities at sea concerning oil: refuelling a ship in transit through the EEZ is also not taken into account in this chapter if it is a fishing vessel, because this activity is essentially related to navigation8 and is of no relevance for fishing in the zone. Transhipping oil as cargo from a tanker or barge to another tanker is not bunkering, but a cargo operation. Supplying artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf with fuel is a regular supply operation under the jurisdiction of the coastal State. The participation of foreign ships in smuggling gas oil into the territory has also to be distinguished from offshore bunkering. Judge Warioba cited in his dissenting opinion to the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case a witness heard by the Tribunal, who reported examples of foreign

6

The M.T. Luchegorsk was chartered by the same Addax Bunkering Service as was the Saiga. According to a press release of a “Swiss high seas bunker specialist” of 11 September 2006, the ship with her master and crew had been detained on 21 August 2006 by Guinean Navy officials on behalf of Guinean Customs authorities while supplying bunkers to fishing vessels in the EEZ of Sierra Leone, approximately 10 miles south of the maritime boundary with Guinea and 30 miles from the coastline. It was charged with unlawfully failing to declare bunkers subject to customs duties supplied in the EEZ of Guinea. After negotiations, also involving the Russian Ambassador, with the Guinean Customs authorities, the M.T. Luchegorsk was released with no charges pending on 2 September 2006.

7

The “bunker c-oil” or “heavy bunker oil” is the common fuel for cargo ships. Because of its high viscosity it needs filtering and often warming before use. It costs presently about USD 300 per ton. Gas oil is a kind of diesel fuel which costs about USD 450 per ton.

8

Similarly Judge Anderson in his Sep. Op., ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 137. 615


fishing trawlers converted into tankers, which were stationed in front of the port of Conakry. They sold drums of gas oil to people who smuggled the fuel on small boats into the country.9 These ships were not used for offshore bunkering but to facilitate smuggling.

III. The M/V Saiga Judgments No legal definition of offshore bunkering exists, nor is it mentioned in the LOS Convention. The classification of offshore bunkering in the EEZ either as an activity subject to flag State jurisdiction or to the jurisdiction of the coastal State was contested between Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Guinea in the Saiga cases. The M/V Saiga had been detained by the Guinean customs authority because it was violating Guinean customs law10 by bunkering foreign fishing vessels in its EEZ. Guinea had exercised its customs jurisdiction in its “customs radius”, extending 250 km from the coast. But in both cases the Law of the Sea Tribunal did not decide the question of jurisdiction relating to offshore bunkering in the zone. In its judgment of 1997, the Tribunal stated: “It is not necessary for the Tribunal to come to a conclusion as to which of these two approaches [regarding offshore bunkering] is better founded in law. For the purpose of the admissibility of the prompt release of the M/V Saiga it is sufficient to note that non-compliance with article 73, paragraph 2, of the Convention has been ‘alleged’ and to conclude that the allegation is arguable or sufficiently plausible.”11 According to article 292, paragraph 1, the Tribunal ordered that the M/V Saiga and its crew should be promptly released from detention upon posting of a reasonable bond. Here is not the place to focus on the reasons given in this judgment, which was adopted by a narrow majority of 12 votes to 9. But it should be noted that the Tribunal mentioned, as an obiter dictum,12 several reasons in support of the views of both Parties on bunkering at sea. In its judgment of the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case, the Tribunal decided in 1999 that Guinea was not empowered by the LOS Convention to apply its customs laws in its EEZ except in respect of artificial islands, installations and structures.13

9

M/V Saiga (No. 2), ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 220 et seq., para. 73.

10

Guinean Law No. L94/007.

11

ITLOS Reports 1997, p. 30, para. 59.

12

ITLOS Reports 1997, p. 29 et seq., paras 57-58. President Mensah called this an unwarranted obiter dictum in his Diss. Op., id. p. 40, para. 6; similarly Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto in their Diss. Op., id. p. 52, para. 25.

13


616


Accordingly the country was lacking jurisdiction to detain the ship. Also in this case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Guinea had exchanged arguments before the Tribunal for and against the jurisdiction relating to offshore bunkering in the EEZ. The Tribunal took note of this fact,14 but again it avoided commenting on the jurisdictional issue: “The Tribunal considers that the issue that needed to be decided was whether the actions taken by Guinea were consistent with the applicable provisions of the Convention. The Tribunal has reached the decision on that issue on the basis of the law applicable to the particular circumstances of the case, without having to address the broader question of the rights of coastal States and other States with regard to bunkering in the exclusive economic zone. Consequently, it does not make any findings on that question” (emphasis added).15 Therefore, one conclusion may already be drawn here from the above-mentioned judgments: offshore bunkering in the EEZ has neither been qualified as being subject to the flag State jurisdiction nor to the jurisdiction of the coastal State by the Tribunal in the Saiga cases. Nevertheless, despite the reluctance of the Tribunal in its judgments with regard to this “broader question”, judges commented on this issue in their dissenting or separate opinions. These opinions shall be taken into account in the following consideration of this issue. And, in the light of the Luchegorsk incident of 2006,16 one may also conclude that the issue is still of practical relevance.

IV. Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction in the EEZ 1. Fishing At first one might ask whether offshore bunkering in the EEZ could possibly be an exercise of the sovereign rights that the coastal State has with regard to the living resources in the zone, pursuant to article 56, paragraph 1, lit. (a) of the LOS Convention. But the answer is, without doubt, in the negative: a bunker tanker is an offshore support vessel, not a fishing vessel.17 Offshore bunkering is not related to the fishing activity or to the processing or transportation of the catch.18 14


15


16

See supra note 6.

17

So rightly Judge Anderson in his Diss. Op., ITLOS Reports 1997, p. 64, para. 6.

18

For decisions and practice regarding the concept of “fishing” see D. Anderson, “The Regulation of Fishing and Related Activities in Exclusive Economic Zones”, pp. 31, 36-42, 617


Fishing may be exercised in the EEZ without offshore bunkering. Economically, it may be advantageous for fishing vessels, but it is not an indispensable condition for their operation, because the vessels can bunker in port. Nevertheless, in 1997, the Tribunal connected the M/V Saiga with fishing vessels.19 And it classified the action of Guinea against the tanker as one which can be seen within the framework of article 73, i.e. the enforcement jurisdiction in fisheries matters.20 But the Tribunal took this view only for the purpose of the prompt release proceedings21 and did not pursue it in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case in 1999. However, article 62 of the LOS Convention specifies the competence of a coastal State to regulate the utilisation of living resources in its EEZ. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of this article, the coastal State has broad jurisdiction to adopt laws and regulations that are binding for nationals of other States fishing in the zone. A number of coastal States, including Guinea,22 also regulate bunkering of fishing vessels in their EEZ in their fisheries laws, but State practice is not uniform.23 They may argue in this context, as Judge Anderson later noted that, from their perspective, “bunkering has a closer connection with fishing and the overall management of the fishery than with navigation”,24 because it avoids the need for navigation and intensifies the fishing efforts of the vessel. The regulation of offshore bunkering as an activity ancillary to fishing would apply to foreign fishing vessels in the EEZ. Whether the respective laws would also be binding on foreign bunker tankers in the zone is, however, contested. Against this, Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto took the view in their Dissenting Opinion to the 1997 M/V Saiga case that there is “no indication that the competence of the coastal State concerning fishing might encompass activities of merchant ships, associated with the freedom of navigation, for the sole reason that they service in: E. Franckx and P. Gautier (eds), La zone économique exclusive et la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, 1982-2000: un premier bilan de la pratique des Etats (The Exclusive Economic Zone and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982-2000: A Preliminary Assessment of State Practice), 2003. 19

As a reason, the Tribunal mentioned: “The notion that bunkering is seen as an activity ancillary to fishing and connected thereto is not unknown in the law of Guinea”, ITLOS Reports 1997, p. 31, para. 64. Guinea, however, did not detain the M/V Saiga on the basis of its Code of Maritime Fishing, but of criminal law and the Customs Code, see Judge Anderson, Diss. Op., ITLOS Reports 1997, p. 64 et seq., para. 6.

20

ITLOS Reports 1997, p. 33 et seq., para. 71.

21

For a critical view on this procedure chosen by the plaintiff, see B.H. Oxman, “The M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) Judgment (ITLOS Case No. 2)”, AJIL, Vol. 94 (2000), p. 140 et seq., at p. 149.

22

See ITLOS Reports 1997, p. 31, para. 64.

23

See Anderson (supra note 18), pp. 46-47.

24

Anderson (supra note 18), p. 47.

618


fishing vessels”.25 Yet, whether offshore bunkering is indeed associated with the freedom of navigation will be scrutinised below.26 2. Economic Exploitation and Exploration of the EEZ Besides its rights and jurisdiction relating to fishing, the coastal State has also sovereign rights in its EEZ “with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone” (article 56, paragraph 1, lit. (a)). Offshore bunkering is an economic activity of a bunkering enterprise. However, it is not an economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, but an activity conducted in the zone. Or, as Judge Laing rightly mentioned in his Separate Opinion to the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case with respect to other such activities: “The text clearly limits these activities to natural resources”.27 Refuelling fishing vessels in the zone takes place in the maritime area where the vessels are fishing. But the bunker tanker does not exploit hydrological or other natural properties of the EEZ “such as the production of energy, from water, currents and winds”.28 In conclusion, offshore bunkering of fishing vessels in the EEZ is neither an exercise of the sovereign rights of the coastal State over the living resources, nor is it another activity for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone. 3. Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment Finally, pursuant to article 56, paragraph 1, lit. (b)(iii) of the LOS Convention, the coastal State has jurisdiction with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment against the dangers of offshore bunkering. Bunkering at sea is indeed clouded with the risk of accidents. The vessels have to come alongside or at least close to each other in order to establish a link with the bunkering hose; and the crew of the fishing vessel has to be trained to handle this operation. Therefore offshore bunkering might be a source of pollution of the marine environment against which all measures necessary shall be taken.29 However, the coastal State’s jurisdiction provided in the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention for such cases of pollution from vessels is limited. It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse these provisions here.30

25


26

See below sections V and VI.

27


28

LOS Convention, art. 56(1)(a).

29

LOS Convention, art. 194(3)(b).

30

As to the jurisdiction to regulate, see art. 211(5), and to enforce, art. 220(3)(5) and (6) of the LOS Convention. 619


V. Flag State Jurisdiction and Freedom of Navigation The right of every State to sail ships “flying its flag”, as provided for in article 90 of the LOS Convention, is closely linked to the status of the ship. Pursuant to article 92, paragraph 1, the ship shall be subject to the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the flag State “on the high seas”. This provision applies to the EEZ as well, but only in so far as it is “not incompatible” with Part V regarding the zone (article 58, paragraph 2, of the LOS Convention). The specific legal regime of the EEZ is different from the status of the high seas. A ship that is navigating in the EEZ enjoys freedom of navigation, and is subject to the jurisdiction of the flag State. But when it is fishing, drilling or conducting marine scientific research in the EEZ, the respective operation in the zone depends upon a licence or permission from the coastal State and is subject to its jurisdiction. Therefore it is not possible to infer from the flag State jurisdiction over the ship, the lawfulness of its operations in the zone. An operation of a ship in the EEZ is lawful if this is in conformity with the international law relating to the zone. In the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines took the view that offshore bunkering is an exercise of the freedom of navigation.31 Pursuant to article 58, paragraph 1, all States enjoy, “subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention”, this freedom in the EEZ. From this follows that a ship may not be excluded from the zone or requested to leave it merely because it is a bunker tanker. The type of the ship is of no relevance, decisive is only the kind of operation that it is performing in the zone. Hence, foreign fishing vessels enjoy the freedom of navigation in the EEZ if they are not fishing; drilling vessels or mobile platforms enjoy the same freedom in the zone if they are not exploring the continental shelf or exploiting its resources; and the situation is, mutatis mutandis, similar for research vessels. These examples show that the LOS Convention distinguishes between navigation in the EEZ on the one hand, and other operations in that zone such as fishing, drilling or conducting marine scientific research on the other hand.32 From this follows the question as to whether the freedom of navigation in the EEZ includes a freedom of supplying foreign fishing vessels with fuel. The answer depends on an interpretation of the term “navigation” used in article 58, paragraph 1, of the LOS Convention. The freedom of navigation is not defined in article 58, or in article 78, to which article 58 refers. The ordinary meaning of the term “navigation” is to drive or to sail a ship. This follows also from its Latin

31

See the summary of the submissions in ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 56, para. 137.

32

While navigation of foreign ships in the EEZ is regulated in art. 58(1), see, for fishing, art. 56(1)(a) and arts 61 et seq.; for drilling, art. 81 and for marine scientific research, art. 246 of the LOS Convention.

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origin;33 and it is in conformity with article 90 of the LOS Convention, which also applies in the EEZ pursuant to article 58, paragraph 2. Article 90 confirms the right of every State “to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas” (emphasis added). Moreover, one has to note that, pursuant to article 58, paragraph 1, the freedom of all States in the EEZ is confined to “navigation”. This is not the encompassing “freedom of the high seas” that, pursuant to article 87, all States enjoy on the high seas and that might include also other freedoms than those mentioned in this provision. Therefore one may assume that “navigation” in the EEZ means only the movement of the ship, not any other commercial operation such as refuelling fishing vessels.34

VI. Other Uses of the Sea Associated with the Operation of Ships In addition to the freedom of navigation, all States enjoy in the EEZ “other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, ... and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention” (article 58, paragraph 1, of the LOS Convention). But is offshore bunkering of foreign fishing vessels in the EEZ an internationally lawful use of the sea? As mentioned above, the bunker tanker is not using the resources, but the space of the EEZ for its operation. Nevertheless, using the zone as maritime space means using the sea. But, unlike, for example, piracy, slave trade, unauthorised broadcasting or illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, offshore bunkering is per se not prohibited in international law. Therefore it may lawfully be conducted on the high seas or, with permission of the coastal State, in the territorial sea or internal waters. The international lawfulness of offshore bunkering in general, however, is a necessary but not a sufficient requirement to solve the jurisdictional issue of this operation within the EEZ. This use of the sea shall be “associated with the operation of ships”. Usually associated with the operation of ships is the transportation of cargo and passengers. As a specific use of a tanker, offshore bunkering at sea is, in fact, also associated with the operation of the respective ship. But pursuant to article 58, paragraph 1, this use of the sea shall also be “related” to the freedom of navigation of the tanker in the zone.35 The term

33

The Latin noun “navigatio” (f.) and the respective verb “navigare” etymologically go back to “navis agere” which means: to drive or to sail a ship.

34

So also Judge Zhao in his Sep. Op., ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 114, para. 3.

35

Offshore bunkering is certainly related to the navigation of the fishing vessels, because they could not navigate without fuel, but it is not associated with their specific operation as fishing vessels. 621


“related”, however, may have a general or a specific meaning: if any kind of relationship whatsoever would be sufficient, the purpose of refuelling fishing vessels in the zone would relate this operation to the navigation of the tanker.36 Then ships would enjoy in the EEZ, like on the high seas, an almost unrestricted freedom of operation. As a consequence, the reference to “other uses of the sea” that are “associated with the operation of ships” in article 58, paragraph 1, would be redundant with respect to ships, because any kind of use of a ship would be an exercise of its freedom of navigation. But redundancy cannot be presumed in the LOS Convention. If, on the other hand, a direct link between the specific operation of the ship and its navigation would be required, only stopping or anchoring that is necessary for or effected by its navigation would be permissible in the EEZ. In this case, offshore bunkering would not be related to navigation. Both solutions are also compatible with the other provisions of the LOS Convention, as it is required by article 58, paragraph 1. As the specific regime of the EEZ provides no general precedence of the coastal State’s rights over the right of navigation in the zone,37 there is no presumption for one or the other solution to the jurisdictional conflict. It should be added that when the division of the jurisdiction between the flag State and the coastal State in the EEZ is contested, the obligation of the flag State pursuant to article 58, paragraph 3, to have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State in the zone, would not solve the issue. This obligation presupposes the existence of the respective rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State, it does not create them. Moreover, the practice of coastal States with regard to offshore bunkering of fishing vessels is neither sufficient nor uniform in West Africa. Therefore the development of regional customary law relating to this operation of ships is still a rather remote possibility. In conclusion, in the case of offshore bunkering, article 58, paragraph 1, of the LOS Convention does not provide a clear and convincing answer with regard to the distribution of jurisdiction between the flag State and the coastal State. In the same vein Judge Zhao observed in his Separate Opinion to the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case: “Unless it is conducted in accordance with ... two conditions, there is no legitimate status for bunkering in the law of the sea”, indicating these conditions as (1) an agreement of the flag State and the coastal State with regard to the

36

This was the view of Judge Vukas in his Sep. Op.: “Supply of bunkers is the purpose of the navigation of a tanker, and refuelling is essential for further navigation of the ship to which gas oil has been supplied”. ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 150, para. 17.

37

See L. Gündling, Die 200 Seemeilen-Wirtschaftszone, 1983, p. 274. A different view has been taken by A. Proelß, in: W.G. Vitzthum (ed.), Handbuch des Seerechts, 2006, p. 260, para. 270, who assumes in case of doubt a precedence of the coastal State’s legal positions over the communication freedoms of article 58(1). A similar view is shared in the context of article 59 by S. Nandan and Sh. Rosenne, in: M.H. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations on the Law of the Sea 1982, A Commentary, Volume II, 1993, p. 569, para. 59.6(b).

622


bunkering activities in the EEZ, and (2) the requirement of licences or approval for bunkering from those States for fishing vessels.38 But even if one would agree with Judge Vukas in the same case39 that offshore bunkering of fishing vessels in the EEZ is an internationally lawful use of the sea, which is associated with the operation of ships and related to the freedom of navigation, one should take into consideration that this kind of activity began after 1982 and that it might seriously affect certain interests of the coastal State. Such conflict of interests between States should be settled in international law before it gives rise to a serious dispute. The question is, however, does the LOS Convention provide a solution for settling such conflict of interests in this context?

VII. Conflicting Interests of the Coastal State and the Flag State In cases where the LOS Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to the flag State in the EEZ, and a conflict arises between the interests of the States concerned, article 59 provides a basis for the solution to such conflict. In general, this provision applies in cases of a gap in the LOS Convention when the respective use of the sea is completely new and unrelated to any kind of operation that has already been regulated in the LOS Convention. In the case of offshore bunkering, however, there is no such legal gap, but rather an interpretation of article 58, paragraph 1, which leaves the meaning of this provision ambiguous. A recourse to the preparatory work of the LOS Convention would provide no solution,40 because offshore bunkering of fishing vessels in the EEZ was an unknown phenomenon at the time of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. As the different views with regard to the interpretation of article 59 reveal a conflict of important interests between the coastal State and the flag State, one might consider an application of article 59 by analogy as appropriate for solving this conflict. Pursuant to this article, the conflict should be resolved in accordance with certain substantial principles. The solution shall be “on the basis of equity and in the light of all relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole”. However, little might be said in abstracto about the requirements of an equitable solution, because, in different

38


39

Sep. Op., ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 150, para. 17.

40

A different view concerning the drafting history took Judge Vukas in his Sep. Op., ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 148, paras 16-17. 623


situations the relevant facts and the interests involved, as well as their relative importance, are different. Nevertheless, with regard to offshore bunkering, some general considerations relating to the above-mentioned elements of such solution might be appropriate. Offshore bunkering for the purpose of rendering assistance to a ship in danger or distress, no doubt, is in conformity with international law.41 But the situation is different in West African waters, where offshore bunkering of fishing vessels is a well organised business and not merely an accidental event. Accordingly, the frequency of bunkering operations in the EEZ, the amount of fuel delivered and the regular economic planning and organisation may be relevant circumstances in order to determine the respective importance of the interests involved. In this context, the nature of the relevant interests is particularly important. First of all, in the case of offshore bunkering, the importance of the interests involved to the international community as a whole is hardly of any relevance.42 It is mainly a bilateral clash of interests between the coastal State and the flag State. The flag State has an important principal (i.e. jurisdictional) and economic interest in the unimpeded operation of ships flying its flag.43 As this interest is generally recognised in the LOS Convention, it has to be taken into account in the context of article 59. On the other hand the coastal State has various interests of a different nature.44 Its interests relating to the EEZ itself or to its resources are based on its sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction in the zone. Besides this, the coastal State also has interests relating to the protection of its territorial integrity based on the sovereignty over its land territory and territorial sea. If the activity of a ship in the EEZ would violate the territorial integrity or the sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction, the interests of the coastal State prevail over the use of the sea associated with the operation of ships. The LOS Convention has codified rules concerning such situations, for example in the case of unauthorised broadcasting from the EEZ45 or a maritime casualty in the zone with a danger of pollution of the coast

41

With regard to innocent passage, article 18(2) of the LOS Convention provides a similar solution.

42

There could be such an interest, however, and to the coastal State as well, if the bunkering operation in the EEZ would cause oil pollution of the marine environment.

43

It may also have an economic interest in the bunkering business if the bunkering enterprise is established in its territory and subject to its taxation. However, in the Saiga cases it was a Swiss enterprise.

44

According to the text of art. 59, only interests of the States may be relevant. Hence economic interests of the bunkering enterprise may not be taken into account.

45

Art. 109(4) LOS Convention, which according to art. 58(2) applies also in the EEZ.

624


and related interests.46 Accordingly, the coastal State may protect its territorial integrity against transmission of unauthorised broadcasting and its sovereign rights against grave and imminent danger of pollution from the zone. But offshore bunkering in the zone violates neither the territorial integrity nor the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State. Therefore, Guinea submitted in the Saiga cases that the bunkering activity of the ship in its zone caused a considerable loss to its national revenues. The fishing vessels had the possibility of avoiding bunkering in a Guinean port, where fuel was heavily taxed. Moreover, according to their licence, these vessels should bunker at least once on every journey in a port in Guinea. Offshore bunkering enabled them to evade this obligation, or at least to decrease the amount of fuel bunkered in port. Hence the operation of the bunker tanker in its EEZ grossly affected Guinea’s fiscal interests. However, it should be kept in mind that the situation may be different in other States.47 For the protection of these interests against the effects of foreign offshore bunkering, Guinea applied its customs and contraband laws in parts of its EEZ. In order to justify this, it relied in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case on the notion of “public interests” or self-protection and on the doctrine of the “state of necessity”. The Tribunal rejected both arguments, stating that the conditions for a “state of necessity” were not fulfilled.48 With regard to the public interest it noted however:49 “In the view of the Tribunal, recourse to the principle of ‘public interest’, as invoked by Guinea, would entitle a coastal State to prohibit any activities in the exclusive economic zone which it decides to characterize as activities which affect its economic ‘public interests’ or entail fiscal losses to it. This would curtail the rights of other States in the exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal is satisfied that this would be incompatible with the provisions of articles 56 and 58 of the Convention regarding the rights of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone.”

46

Art. 221(1) LOS Convention and art. I of the International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties of 1969, which also applies in the EEZ.

47

In a State with different customs and tax laws, the government may even be interested in furthering offshore bunkering in order to attract foreign fishing vessels, because of their catch and the licence fees.

48

ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 56, paras 133-135. The Tribunal referred here as reasons to the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Reports 1997, pp. 40-41, paras 51-52) and to article 33(1) of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility.

49

ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 55, para. 131. 625


Notwithstanding the question of whether or not the underlying reasoning is convincing, this implies that fiscal interests of the coastal State cannot serve as a basis for limiting the freedom of navigation in the EEZ. Hamburg locuta causa finita? The answer is “no”, because this is merely an obiter dictum, since the Tribunal had decided not to address the broader question of the rights of coastal States and other States with regard to bunkering in the EEZ.50 Moreover, fiscal interests are interests of a sovereign State, they are public interests. They would have to be taken into account in a process of balancing the interests pursuant to article 59 of the LOS Convention. This would be even clearer if a State, in contradistinction to Guinea, would apply its fisheries laws instead of its customs and contraband laws to a foreign bunker tanker in its EEZ. In conclusion, the conflict relating to offshore bunkering might involve considerable fiscal interests on the part of the coastal State as opposed to the recognised interest of the flag State in the freedom of navigation, but the interests of the international community as a whole seem to be negligible.

VIII. Ways and Means for a Practical Solution Assuming that the issue of offshore bunkering in the EEZ is essentially a question of balancing the relevant interests involved, because the LOS Convention provides no hard and fast rule on this, one also has to look for ways and means for a practical solution. Any solution along the lines of article 59 of the LOS Convention would not mean that the States concerned have to submit their conflict to a court or tribunal, or to arbitration. However, a binding decision appears to be particularly appropriate in a situation where the law is not clear. The parties are nevertheless free to settle their dispute by way of negotiation and consultation, or any other peaceful means. Guinea apparently maintains a position similar to that in the Saiga cases, as the recent Luchegorsk incident seems to reveal. On the other hand, the coastal State may oblige the fishing vessels by means of licensing pursuant to article 62, paragraph 4, lit. (a) of the LOS Convention to call at a port in its territory, and such licence may also include regulations relating to offshore bunkering. Other coastal States in the region have obviously chosen a different solution, on the basis of their national laws. According to non-official reports, they issue licences for bunker tankers that allow these tankers to operate not only in the territorial sea but, for a greater fee, also in their EEZ. Although these reports are not confirmed, they are nevertheless worth while mentioning here because they indicate a pragmatic solution for the conflicting interests. The bunkering industry seems to accept this practice without contesting its lawfulness. From an economic

50

See the quotations in the judgments supra at notes 11 and 15.

626


point of view, a fee, which may be surcharged on the customers, is preferable to the possible danger of having the tanker detained by a coastal State. Apart from this, coastal States and flag States might also consider an agreed solution that takes the different interests into account.

IX. Conclusion and Outlook Whilst the jurisdiction of the coastal State in its EEZ with regard to fishing, drilling or marine scientific research, as well as the protection and preservation of the marine environment, is provided for in article 56, paragraph 1, the regulation of offshore bunkering is not mentioned in the LOS Convention at all. And despite an obiter dictum implying the contrary, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has not decided on this issue in its judgments on the M/V Saiga cases in 1997 and 1999. This chapter shows that there remain doubts, at least as to whether offshore bunkering of foreign ships is related to navigation in the sense of article 58, paragraph 1, of the LOS Convention. Therefore it is suggested that the interests of the flag State are balanced against those of the coastal State along the lines of an analogy to article 59 of the LOS Convention in order to achieve a practical solution – possibly by agreement. Finally it should be noted that offshore bunkering is only one recent kind of operation of ships that deviates from their traditional use for transportation of cargo and passengers. Others are, for example, ships in an EEZ offering medical treatment such as abortion, which is prohibited in the coastal State. One also could consider the possibility of establishing, without a licence from the coastal State, a casino on a ship in the EEZ in order to offer gambling services. Whether these activities are associated with the operation of ships and related to the freedom of navigation, however, has not been considered in this chapter. Nevertheless, they reveal that unusual kinds of operation of ships in an EEZ seem to be increasing, from which unforeseen jurisdictional conflicts might arise.

627

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE EFFECT OF ARTISANAL FISHING ON MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION W. Michael Reisman and Mahnoush H. Arsanjani*

Introduction

O

ne of the innovations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) is that maritime spaces that had been the subject from time immemorial to the customary and later codified high seas regime of freedom of fishing1 henceforth fall within the exclusive economic zone or possible archipelagic waters of a State. In sharp distinction to the older regime

*

The views expressed are personal views of the author.

1

Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, 29 Apr. 1958, 450 UNTS 11 (entered into force 11 Sept. 1962) available at <www.un.org/law/ilc/tests/hseas.htm> provides: “The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States: (1) Freedom of navigation; (2) Freedom of fishing; (3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; (4) Freedom to fly over the high seas. These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.” Article 1 of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas provides, 29 Apr. 1958, 559 UNTS 285 (entered into force 20 Mar. 1966) available at <www.oceanlaw.net/texts/generafish.htm>: “1. All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their treaty obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of coastal States as provided for in this Convention, (c) to the provisions contained in the following Articles concerning conservation of the living resources of the high seas. 2. All States have the duty to adopt, or to co-operate with other States in adopting,



of freedom of fishing on the high seas, which guaranteed the right to engage in the activity to nationals of all States, article 56(1)(a) of the LOS Convention grants sovereign rights “for the purpose of exploring and exploiting … the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed …” to the State to which the EEZ pertains. Article 49(1) of the LOS Convention establishes, in more sweeping language, that the “sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines …”. It is clear that each of these new maritime zones excludes pro futuro extensive uses or “freedoms” that formerly were available to all States and their nationals. It is, however, unclear as to the effect these zones may have on acquired rights and especially traditional or artisanal fishing rights. The latter types of rights were often treated preferentially in the past and have received a special solicitude in contemporary international law. Thus, this part of the LOS Convention poses an inter-temporal conundrum: what is the status of rights that may have crystallized under a previous international legal regime under a new and different regime? Methodologically, is the question resolved by the texts of the new regime? Where it cannot be clearly and undisputedly concluded, from text or travaux, that the new regime intended to abolish all previously recognized rights, what international law governs?

I. The Concept of Traditional Artisanal Fishing The essential characteristics of artisanal fishing, as it is used in international law, are that the fishing is traditional; while it may be commercial, it is neither large scale nor industrial. In some instances, however, the use of industrial methods of harvesting is explicitly permitted; in others, quotas are established. The concept of traditional artisanal fishing appears in contemporary agreements, has been used by the FAO2 and has been given an explicit and generalized international legal recognition in the Eritrea-Yemen arbitration. There, the Tribunal stated: “The FAO Fisheries Infrastructure Development Project Report of 1995 was a report on fishing in Eritrean waters. However, its findings on artisanal fishing would be of general application in this region. The 1995 Report makes clear that both the artisanal vessels and their gear are simple. The vessels are usually canoes fitted with small outboard engines, slightly larger vessels (9-12 m) fitted with 40-75 hp engines, or fishing sambuks with inboard engines. Dugout canoes and small rafts (ramas) are also in use. Hand lines, gill nets and long lines are used. In such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.” 2

See FAO 24/95 ADB-ERI.4, 27 February 1995.

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Some Reflections on the Effect of Artisanal Fishing on Maritime Boundary Delimitation

its Report on Fishing in Eritrean waters, the FAO study states that this artisanal fishing gear, which varies according to the boat and the fish, is ‘simple and efficient’. However, the term ‘artisanal’ is not to be understood as applying in the future only to a certain type of fishing exactly as it is practised today. ‘Artisanal fishing’ is used in contrast to ‘industrial fishing’. It does not exclude improvements in powering the small boats, in the techniques of navigation, communication or in the techniques of fishing; but the traditional regime of fishing does not extend to large-scale commercial or industrial fishing nor to fishing by nationals of third States in the Red Sea, whether small-scale or industrial.”3 In one instance, the term “traditional fishing” has been reserved exclusively for indigenous peoples, a group which has evolved in the last decades into a special category of international concern.4 But that restriction ratione personae is unusual: in terms of general international practice, recent treaties have been

3

Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, Award, Phase II: Maritime Delimitation, Chapter IV – The Traditional Fishing Regime, at paras 105-106, available at , RIAA, Vol. XXII.

4

For example, in a treaty of 1978 between Australia and Papua New Guinea on maritime boundaries, article 1(1)(l) states that: “‘traditional fishing’ means the taking, by traditional inhabitants for their own or their dependants’ consumption or for use in the course of other traditional activities, of the living natural resources of the sea, seabed, estuaries and coastal tidal areas, including dugong and turtle;” article 1(1)(m) assigns a very specific reference to “traditional”: “‘traditional inhabitants’ means, in relation to Australia, persons who – (i) are Torres Strait Islanders who live in the Protected Zone or the adjacent coastal area of Australia, (ii) are citizens of Australia, and (iii) maintain traditional customary associations with areas or features in or in the vicinity of the Protected Zone in relation to their subsistence or livelihood or social, cultural or religious activities; and in relation to Papua New Guinea, persons who – (i) live in the Protected Zone or the adjacent coastal area of Papua New Guinea, (ii) are citizens of Papua New Guinea, and (iii) maintain traditional customary associations with areas of features in or in the vicinity of the Protected Zone in relation to their subsistence or livelihood or social, cultural or religious activities.” See Australia-Papua New Guinea: Treaty on Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the Countries [Done at Sydney, December 18, 1978], Vol. XVIII, No. 1, ILM, 291 at 293. 631


more generous in defining both the beneficiaries and the extensiveness of the artisanal fishing rights.5 The frequent conjunction of the adjective “traditional” with the term “artisanal fishing” distinguishes the right to engage in artisanal fishing from a “historic” right, a term of art in international law which sets, as will be explained, a different and more demanding threshold of proof for its establishment. It is clear from the analysis of the Eritrea/Yemen award, as well as a review of treaty practice, that traditional artisanal fishing need not be primitive. The reference is not to subsistence fishing; as stated above, artisanal fishing may be undertaken for commercial purposes and the harvest of artisanal fishing may be put in the stream of commerce, though in some of the treaties the commerce is limited to the State of the artisanal fishermen. (The Arbitration Tribunal in Eritrea/Yemen which we consider below did not impose such a limitation.) Finally, traditional artisanal fishing rights are often not internationally transferable, that is to say that they may be transitive within the national community but cannot be transferred to members of other national communities. In some examples, rights pertain to a tribe or ethnic group. The Behring Sea Arbitration award, rendered in 1893, between Great Britain and the United States concerned “questions which had arisen between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, concerning the jurisdictional rights of the United Sates in the waters of Behring Sea, and concerning also the preservation of the fur-seal in or habitually resorting to the said sea, and the rights of the citizens and subjects of either country as regards the taking of fur-seals in or habitually resorting to the said waters … .”6

5

For example, in the 1982 Indonesia-Malaysia Agreement Relating to the Legal Regime of the Archipelagic State, Indonesia regards “traditional fishing rights” as applicable to those who have already fished, and as distinct from “traditional rights to fish”, being applicable to everyone. The “traditional fishing rights” are interpreted as limited to relatively the same area and similar catch as well as the use of traditional fishing equipment, but are not reserved to indigenous peoples. Quoted in B. Kwiatkowska, “Economic and Environmental Considerations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations”, in 1 International Maritime Boundaries 75, 86 note 45 (J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander, eds, 1993). See also article 2(1) of the Agreement between France and Italy for maritime delimitation in the area of the Strait of Bonifacio. For the treaty see 2 International Maritime Boundaries 1571. See also article 4 of the 1984 maritime boundary delimitation between France and Monaco, in id. at 1581; and the 2001Treaty between Honduras and the United Kingdom concern delimitation between the Cayman Islands and Honduras (para. 1 of Annex B and Section 3), HMPO, CM 5535.

6

Behring Sea Arbitration Award between Great Britain and the United States, given at Paris, 15 August 1893, CTS, Vol. 179, 97, No. 8, at 98.

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In paragraph 8 of the award, the Tribunal held: “The Regulations contained in the preceding Articles shall not apply to Indians dwelling on the coasts of the territory of the United States or of Great Britain, and carrying on fur-seal fishing in canoes or undecked boats not transported by or used in connection with other vessels, and propelled wholly by paddles, oars, or sails, and manned by not more than five persons each in the way hitherto practised by the Indians, provided such Indians are not in the employment of other persons, and provided that, when so hunting in canoes or undecked boats, they shall not hunt fur-seals outside of territorial waters under contract for the delivery of the skins to any person. This exemption shall not be construed to affect the municipal law of either country, nor shall it extend to the waters of Behring Sea or the waters of the Aleutian Passes. Nothing herein contained is intended to interfere with the employment of Indians as hunters or otherwise in connection with fur-sealing vessels as heretofore.”7 Nor was Behring the first example of this trend. State practice, by treaties, demonstrates that the tradition of recognizing international trans-boundary resource rights surviving innovative international boundaries substantially predated the 19th century.8

7

Id. at para. 8, p. 103.

8

For example, in the treaty between Sweden and England of 1656, article X provided: “It shall be free for the subjects of the most Serene King of Sweden, to fish and catch herrings and other fish in the seas and on the coasts which are in the dominion of this republic, provided the ships employed in the fishery do not exceed a thousand in number; nor while they are fishing shall they be any ways hindered or molested; nor shall any charges be demanded on the account of the fishing by the men of war of this republic, nor by those who are commissioned privately to trade at their own expense, nor by the fishing vessels on the northern coasts of Britain, but all perfons shall be treated courteously and amicably, and shall be allowed even to dry their nets on the shore, and to purchase all necessary provisions from the inhabitants of those places at a fair price.” Treaty between Sweden and England, signed at London, 17 July 1656, CTS, Vol. 4, 127, article X, at 149. Similarly, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between France and Great Britain of 1713, article XIII, provided: “Dans ladite Isle il ne sera pas permis auxdits Sujets de la Fr. de pescher & de sécher le poisson en aucune autre partie, que depuis le lieu appellé Cap de Bona Vista, jusqu’à l’extremité septentrionale de ladite Isle & de là en suivant la partie Occidentale, jusqu’au lieu appellé Pointe-Riche. Mais l’Isle dite Cap-Breton & toutes les autres quelconques, situées dans l’embouchure & dans le Golphe de St. Laurent, demeureront à l’avenir à la France, avec l’entiere faculté au Roy T. C. d’y fortifier une ou plusieurs Places.” Treaty of Peace and Friendship between France and Great Britain, signed at Utrecht, 11 April 1713, CTS, Vol. 27, 475, article XIII, at 486. 633


There is also substantial State practice with respect to the provision for the continued exercise of traditional activities in areas in which the introduction or firming of land boundaries could disrupt those traditional activities. The practice is all the more striking because, in contrast to fishing rights in the high seas, the acquired rights in question were recognized for purposes of entry into the terrestrial domain of another State. In the early phase of the development of this practice, the recognition of the continuing force of acquired rights was often transitional.9 Some engagements added fishing or access rights as an incidental right required to support related rights or provide for the subsistence of trans-boundary rights-holders.10 In many treaties, traditional acquired resource

9

For example, the declaration between Prussia and Mecklenburg-Schwerin of 1713 respecting Hunting Rights over Wittstock Heath provided: “The King of Prussia and the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin concluded an agreement in 1578. Accordingly, the King and the Duke have the right to hunt in the ‘Wittstocker Heide’ alternatively, each having the right to hunt every other year. However the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin asked the King to give him the right to hunt exclusively for more than just one year. The King agreed that the right to hunt will be granted exclusively to the Duke for a period of 10 years until 1733. The Duke accepted. To express his gratitude he gave twenty soldiers to the King. The King extends the Duke’s right to hunt also to the Duke’s successors until the end of the period of 10 years.” Declaration between Prussia and Mecklenburg-Schwerin respecting Hunting Rights over Wittstock Heath, signed at Berlin/Schwerin, 23 June 1713, CTS, Vol. 28, 241, at 243-244 (unofficial translation).

10

For example, in the Definitive Treaty between Great Britain and Spain of 1783, article VI provided: “[I]t is expressly agreed, that His Britannic Majesty’s subjects shall have the right of cutting, loading, and carrying away logwood, in the district lying between the rivers Wallis or Bellize, and Rio-Hondo, taking the course of the said two rivers for unalterable boundaries, so as that the navigation of them be common to both nations, to wit, by the river Wallis or Bellize. ... The English inhabitants, who shall settle there for the cutting of logwood, shall be permitted to enjoy a free fishery for their subsistence, on the coasts of the district above-agreed on, or of the islands situated opposite thereto, without being in any wise disturbed on that account.” Definitive Treaty between Great Britain and Spain. Signed at Versailles, September 3, 1783 [Confirmed by the 1st additional article to the Treaty of 5th July, 1814] Hertslet’s, Vol. II, 235, article VI at 239 and 241. Explicating these rights in further detail, articles III of the Convention between Great Britain and Spain of 1786 recognized theretofore acquired rights in cutting and drying wood, increasing them to allow previously prohibited manufacturing. Article VI of the convention also expanded the fishing rights of the 1783 beyond its original subsistence purpose. The Convention between Great Britain and Spain, signed at London the 14th of July, 1786, [Confirmed by the first additional article to the Treaty of 5th July, 1814] Hertslet’s, Vol. II, 245, article III at 247, 249, 251. See also article VIII of Boundary Convention between Russia and Sweden-Norway, signed at St Petersburg, 2(14) May 1826, CTS, Vol. 76, 259, at 264; and articles XIV and XV of Decret Impérial portant promulgation du Traité de Délimitation, conclue le 2 Décembre, 1856, entre la France et l’Espagne. – Paris, le 24 Août, 1857, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 47, 765, at 769 and CTS, Vol. 116, 86, at 90.

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rights perpetually survive the introduction of an international boundary that might otherwise obstruct the exercise of such rights.11 These early treaties were not limited to colonial territories or the activities of what are now referred to as indigenous peoples.12 In other examples, traditional artisanal fishing is 11

See article 1 of the 1888 Agreement between Great Britain and France, respecting the Somali Coast, signed at London, February, 1888, (Laid before Parliament, June, 1894), Hertslet’s, Vol. XIX, 204, at 204-205.

12

See for example, article III Convention between France and Switzerland for the Delimitation of the Frontier between Mont Dolent and Lac Leman, signed at Paris, 10 June 1891, CTS, Vol. 175, 169, at 170; article 5 of Arrangement between France and Great Britain fixing the Boundary on the Gold Coast, signed at Paris, 12 July 1893, CTS, Vol. 179, 67, at 71; article V of the Arrangement between Great Britain and France, fixing the Boundary between the British and French Possessions on the Gold Coast, Singed in the French language at Paris, July 12, 1893, Hertslet’s, Vol. XIX, 228, at 229-230; article I of the Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia, singed by the Emperor Menelek II, and by Her Majesty’s Envoy, at Adis Abbaba [sic], May 14, 1897 [Ratified by the Queen, July 28, 1897], Hertslet’s, Vol. XX, 1 at 2; articles I and II of the Convention between France and Great Britain respecting Newfoundland and West and Central Africa, signed at London, 8 April 1904 [Ratifications exchanged at London, December 8, 1904], CTS, Vol. 195, 205, articles I and II, at 206; article III of the Exchange of Notes between Great Britain and France relative to the Boundary between the Gold Coast and the French Soudan. March 18, 1904, to July 19, 1906, Hertslet’s, Vol. XXV, 267, article III, at 271; articles II and V of Agreement between India (Great Britain) and the Khan of Dir, English translation – Aitchison, XI, 435, 13th April 1905, CTS, Vol. 198, 232, articles II and V at 232; Agreement between France and Great Britain relative to the Frontier between French and British Possessions from the Gulf of Guinea to the Niger (Southern Nigeria and Dahomey), signed at Paris, 19 October 1906, CTS, Vol. 203, 51, para. III, at 63; agreement between Ethiopia and Great Britain relative to the Frontiers between British East Africa, Uganda and Ethiopia, signed at Addis Ababa, 6 December 1907, CTS, Vol. 206, 3rd para., at 30; articles III and IV of the Convention between Ethiopia and Italy settling the Frontier between the Italian Colony of Eritrea and Ethiopia – Signed at Adis Ababa [sic], May 16, 1908 [Sanctioned by Royal Italian Decree of July 17, 1908] CTS, Vol. 207, at 28; article 1, para. 2 of the Treaty between Great Britain and the United States for the Protection of Fur Seals, signed at Washington, 7 February 1911 [Ratifications exchanged at Washington, July 7, 1911.], CTS, Vol. 213, 73, at 74; article IV of the Convention between Great Britain, Japan, Russia and the United States respecting Measures for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean, signed at Washington, 7 July 1911, CTS, Vol. 214, 80, at 82; Convention between Great Britain and France supplementary to the Declaration of March 21, 1899, and the Convention of June 14, 1898, respecting Boundaries West and East of the Niger. – Signed at Paris, September 8, 1919 – Convention Supplementary to the Declaration signed at London on March 21, 1899, as an addition to the Convention of June 14, 1898, which regulated the Boundaries between the British and French Colonial Possessions and Spheres of Influence to the West and East of the Niger, Hertslet’s, Vol. XXX, 213, 8th para., at 214; article II of Protocol No. 1. Faisal ibn Al Husain, King of Iraq. Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman Al Sa’ud, The Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies. 1922, C.U. Aitchison, Persian Gulf, 211, No. III, at 211; article 7 of the Hadda Agreement, Agreement between the British Government and the Sultan of Nejd 635


akin to an irrevocable license available to a member of a functional and intergenerational group, defined, cumulatively, in terms of nationality, occupation and prior exploitation of a specific high seas area.

II. The Problem The status of traditional artisanal uses of ocean areas has been thrust to the forefront by the LOS Convention. As areas of the high seas are enclosed erga omnes or are delimited as between two States, what effects, if any, does traditional artisanal fishing, conducted in those theretofore common areas, have on the delimitation of the maritime boundary? If the new boundary is not adjusted to allow continuation of the prior artisanal use, does the solicitude of contemporary international law for the individual express itself in the creation of some sort of “soft” easement in the sense of a special right of access and usufruct for the artisanal fishermen of a State in another State? Or does the artisanal fisherman fall victim to the new ocean zones? Because the new maritime zones were created by conventional international law, inquiry into these questions must look, in the first instance, at whatever arrangements the new conventional regime itself may have made for the accommodation, if any, of preexisting rights. But inquiry must also identify and assess the effect of any rules of customary international law upon the question of whether and to what extent certain rights that may have vested under a previous international legal regime survive in a new international legal regime. Finally, inquiry must consider whether there are any general principles of law, including jus cogens, which could affect the question of the continuing legal vigor of usages that may be deemed to be acquired rights (droits acquis) under a subsequent international legal regime. In questions of this sort, one would think it especially important that reference be made to international law’s relatively new program of the international protection of human rights. Prior to the introduction of the human rights program in the period after the Second World War, the only subjects of international law were States. When territory was transferred as between States, individuals were generally assimilated to the flora and fauna of that territory. Even then, however, one can discern intimations of a customary norm protecting traditional artisanal users of resources now placed across new land frontiers. With the human rights program, rights of individual human beings have been recognized independently from the State. Rights, which are concerned with the creation and

for fixing the frontier between Nejd and Trans-Jordan and for settling certain questions connected therewith, – 1925, C.U. Aitchison, Persian Gulf, 221 No. VI, at 223. 636


special protection of certain individual and group rights, may be relevant to the construction of international instruments, such as the LOS Convention.

III. The Acquisition of Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Fishing Rights In international law, exclusive rights are frequently referred to as “territorial” because sovereignty over territory is exclusive. Hence the apparent oxymoron of a term such as “territorial waters”. The mode of acquisition of exclusive rights involves, centrally, actions of a State or those authorized to act on its behalf and is based upon use by the State or its nationals, accompanied by the exclusion, by force if necessary, of other States and their nationals. The mode of acquisition of non-exclusive rights is based chiefly on the actions of individuals who do not necessarily have an authorization from their governments; the actions involve use of the resource but do not require demonstration that others have been excluded. Thus, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, later Judge of the International Court, wrote: “Whereas claims to exclusive rights founded on the acts of individuals can only be maintained if the individuals were authorized, either in advance, or ex post facto by the adoption and ratification of the acts, such would not appear to be the case where all that is involved is a claim of a non-exclusive character. Thus if the fishing vessels of a given country have been accustomed from time immemorial, or over a long period, to fish in a certain area, on the basis of the area being high seas and common to all, it may be said that their country has through them (and although they are private vessels having no specific authority) acquired a vested interest that the fisheries of that area should remain available to its fishing vessels (of course on a non-exclusive basis) – so that if another country asserts a claim to that area as territorial waters, which is found to be valid or comes to be recognized, this can only be subject to the acquired rights of fishery in question, which must continue to be respected.”13 Sir Gerald relied, in part, on dicta by Judge Alvarez in the Fisheries case14 as well as on certain general principles of law. In particular, he observed that if international law now allowed a State to acquire title by prescriptive or historical right to waters that had formerly been res communis, other States whose nationals had used those waters for a long time would also be able to acquire rights

13

G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: General Principles and Sources of Law”, 30 BYIL 1, 51 (1953).

14

Fisheries case (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 ICJ Reports 116, 150, 153. 637


to specific uses in those waters.15 In this regard and quite logically, Fitzmaurice also emphasized that the vested rights that accrued were not general rights on the order of the classic freedoms of the sea, but were limited to the State whose nationals had actually fished the area. Freedoms of the sea were available to all, but vested rights that came into operation after a change in the legal character of the ocean area did not accrue to countries or their nationals that had had a right to fish the area but never did;16 they were rights that vested by virtue of the prior use. Fitzmaurice had logic on his side, but aside from dicta, he could cite to no compelling authority. Yehudah Blum, in his classic study of historic title, adopted the same view of non-exclusive rights, but he marshaled examples of rights of passage through another State’s territory, or through its internal waters, as well as “traditional fishing rights acquired by the nationals of one State in waters which are claimed by another State as part of its maritime belt”.17 As to the mode of acquisition of non-exclusive international legal rights to a maritime area that are sufficiently durable to survive a change in the legal regime of that area, Judge Fitzmaurice explained: “Whereas in the case of a claim to sovereignty over land territory (which involves a claim of exclusive right), a State must à titre de souverain through authorized persons or, within limits, persons whose acts are subsequently adopted and ratified, this is not so where what is in question is a claim to retain a right to exploit a maritime area – for such a right, being universal and non-exclusive, no authority to exercise it is needed by any individual so far as international law is concerned, and by the exercise of the right on the part of its nationals a State may acquire a vested right in respect of a particular area to its continued exploitation by the nationals of that State.”18 Thus, a State claiming to have acquired a non-exclusive right in waters whose high seas status has been modified in favor of a proximate littoral State is not obliged to marshal evidence of its effectivités à titre de souverain, as it would were the issue claims to rights in land territory that was res nullius or held by another State. A State claiming to have acquired a non-exclusive right in waters whose high seas status has been modified in favor of a proximate littoral State, endowed henceforth with exclusive or sovereign rights in the area concerned, needs only demonstrate that its nationals had been exercising then existing international legal rights in the area concerned.

15

Fitzmaurice, supra note 13.

16

Id. at footnote 1.

17

Y.Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law 311 (1965).

18

Fitzmaurice, supra note 13, at 53.

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With respect to the amount of time over which such rights of user must be shown in order to create non-exclusive rights that can survive a change of the international legal regime of the waters in question, Judge Fitzmaurice simply referred to a “long period”. The Study of the Secretariat of the United Nations, requested by the International Law Commission in 1962, stated that: “the existence of such a title is to a large extent a matter of judgement. A large element of appreciation seems unavoidable in this matter … .”19 Some guidance may be drawn from the jurisprudence of the International Court. In the Right of Passage case, where the Court recognized the existence of traditional Portuguese rights of passage through certain parts of Indian territory.20 The Court attached significance to the unbroken practice of the users of the right of passage and found “a century and a quarter” to be a sufficient amount of time. But those were prescriptive rights in territory adverse to a territorial sovereign, so a very long period is understandable. Apparently, a much shorter period sufficed for non-exclusive rights in high seas. In any event, as will be explained below, the International Court, in one of the recent cases having to do with claims to have acquired fishing rights in theretofore high seas waters, shifted from a temporal test to a consequential test.21 Almost all analyses make a distinction between the effect of private and traditional activities and the effect of State practice. The latter may produce a historic title, which is exclusive; its demonstration requires proof of governmental action or effectivités. The former may produce a right, inuring to an inter-generational functional group of the nationals of a State and allowing members of that group

19

Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, Study Prepared by the Secretariat, ILCYB 1962, Vol. II, Doc. A/CN.4/143, para. 187 (thereafter Secretariat Study).

20

The Court stated: “Goods in general, that is to say, all merchandise other than arms and ammunition, also passed freely between Daman and the enclaves during the periods in question, subject only, at certain times, to customs regulations and such regulation and control as were necessitated by considerations of security or revenue. … [and the Court] therefore concludes that, with regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general there existed during the British and post-British periods a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Daman and the enclaves. This practice having continued over a period extending beyond a century and a quarter unaffected by the change of regime in respect of the intervening territory which occurred when India became independent, the Court is, in view of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied that that practice was accepted as law by the Parties and has given rise to a right and a correlative obligation.” Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory, (Portugal v. India) 1960 ICJ Reports 6 (Judgment).

21

See discussion of Gulf of Maine, infra, at Part VII (Adjustment of the Median Line to Take Advantage of Traditional Artisanal Fishing Rights), 20-21. 639


to use a resource, on a non-exclusive basis, in another State. Establishing this right requires proof of a certain type of private activity. The quantum of activity required for each of these demonstrations varies. A high threshold is set for historic title, precisely because once title vests, a part of the res communis becomes exclusive to a single State, with other States losing their right to benefit from exploitation of the resources there. A lower threshold is set for the acquisition of traditional private rights, for they are non-exclusive and have no general limitative effect on the rest of the international community. Beyond the issues of historic bays, there is scant practice, but as a pure legal matter there would appear to be little doubt that an area of the high seas can, in certain circumstances, become national waters, whose legal regime is effectively that of “internal waters”. The 1958 Convention on Territorial Waters had dealt with the phenomenon of historic bays, but had treated historic waters only in passing. The Secretariat Study on the subject, to which earlier reference was made, concluded: “there seems to be no doubt that, in principle, a historic title may exist also to other waters than bays, such as straits or archipelagos, or in general to all those waters which can form part of the maritime domain of a State. … one should avoid, in discussing the theory of ‘historic waters’, to base any proposed principles or rules on the alleged exceptional character of such waters.”22 Thus, the acquisition of exclusive rights to a part of the high seas is theoretically possible. But the threshold for acquiring such a title would be extremely high, requiring demonstration of action by government officials or private individuals authorized by their governments, which action effectively excluded the otherwise permissible use of the same waters by nationals of other States and/or over time secured the acquiescence of other governments. And, as in Right of Passage, a relatively longer period would be required. This threshold would not be met by ordinary traditional artisanal fishing, which is, by its nature, conducted by private vessels and which involves the exercise of a non-exclusive right in the high seas, a space which international law makes accessible to all for purposes of enjoying the freedom of the seas. Artisanal fishing does not involve the exclusion of the nationals of other States by authorized governmental effort. In Gulf of Maine, a Chamber of the International Court observed: “Until very recently, as the Chamber has recalled, these expanses were part of the high seas and as such freely open to the fishermen not only

22

Secretariat Study, supra note 19, paras 183 and 184.

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of the United States and Canada but also of other countries, and they were indeed fished by very many nationals of the latter. The Chamber of course readily allows that, during that period of free competition, the United States, as the coastal State, may have been able at certain places and times – no matter for how long – to achieve an actual predominance for its fisheries.”23 But the Chamber refrained from inferring from “actual predominance for its fisheries” the acquisition of a historic title. In the Continental Shelf case, the International Court observed with respect to a possible historic title over a maritime area that “[h]istoric titles must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always been by long usage”.24 The Court carefully examined the claim before holding that for the purposes of delimitation of the continental shelf it was not necessary to consider these historic claims: “it may be that Tunisia’s historic rights and titles are more nearly related” to the EEZ (and Tunisia had not chosen to base its claim upon that concept).25 As for the burden of proof in these matters, the Secretariat Study noted the inapplicability of the general allocation of burden of proof: “The burden of proof of title to ‘historic waters’ is on the State claiming such title, in the sense that, if the State is unable to prove to the satisfaction of whoever has to decide the matter that the requirements necessary for the title have been fulfilled, its claim to the title will be disallowed. In a dispute both parties will most probably allege facts in support of their respective contentions, and in accordance with general procedural rules each party has the burden of proof with respect to the facts on which he relies. It is therefore doubtful whether the general statement that the burden of proof is on the State claiming title to ‘historic waters’, although widely accepted, is really useful as definite criterion.”26 Thus a historic title, as a special or relevant circumstance, could necessitate, as a step in the procedure of a maritime boundary delimitation, an adjustment in a provisional median line or, theoretically, the establishment of an enclave.

23

Gulf of Maine (Canada/US), 1984 ICJ Reports 246 (Oct. 12), at para. 235.

24

Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya), 1982 ICJ Reports 73, at para. 100.

25

Id.

26

Secretariat Study, supra note 19, at para. 188, p. 25. 641


IV. International Court of Justice Forays into the Problem A traditional artisanal fishing right would seem to be most comfortably conceived as to generating a right of transboundary access and non-exclusive exploitation of a resource, theretofore in the res communis, but now in a lawful maritime zone exclusive to a single coastal State. Yet international jurisprudence has been remarkably inconsistent, evidencing deep uncertainty as to how to proceed in this difficult and delicate matter. Some International Court case law indicates that, under particular circumstances, a traditional artisanal fishing right may necessitate a spatial adjustment, moving the median line so as to accommodate the traditional right. Other decisions have inclined to easements of various degrees of softness and international supervision. In a number of cases, the International Court has considered the question of whether traditional fishing activities should lead to an adjustment in the provisional median line as one of the later adjustments in the delimitation procedure. In Gulf of Maine, the United States argued that: “the decisive factor here to be the activities pursued by the United States and its nationals since the country’s independence and even before, activities which they claim to have been alone in pursuing over the greater part of that long period. This reasoning is simple and somewhat akin to the invocation of historic rights, though that expression has not been used … .”27 Canada, for its part, contended that: “[t]he only period which in Canada’s eyes should be regarded as relevant was the recent one leading up to, or even continuing beyond, the time when both States finally decided to go ahead with the institution of exclusive fishery zones. Canada was of the view that attention should be especially concentrated on two aspects: the distribution of fish stocks in the various parts of the area, and the fishing practices respectively established and followed by the two Parties … it sought to erect into an equitable principle, of determining force for the purposes of delimitation, the idea that any single maritime boundary should ensure the maintenance of the existing fishing patterns that are, in its view vital to the coastal communities of the region in question.”28 The Chamber of the International Court rejected both of these positions:

27

Gulf of Maine (Canada v. US), see supra note 23, at para. 233.

28

Id. at para. 234.

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“The Chamber cannot … ascribe any decisive weight, for the purposes of the delimitation it is charged to carry out, to the antiquity or continuity of fishing activities carried on in the past within that part of the delimitation area which lies outside the closing line of the Gulf. … It is, therefore, in the Chamber’s view, evident that the respective scale of activities connected with fishing – or navigation, defence or, for that matter, petroleum exploration and exploitation – cannot be taken into account as a relevant circumstance or, if the term is preferred, as an equitable criterion to be applied in determining the delimitation line.”29 Yet the Chamber immediately went on to say: “What the Chamber would regard as a legitimate scruple lies rather in concern lest the overall result, even though achieved through the application of equitable criteria and the use of appropriate methods for giving them concrete effect, should unexpectedly be revealed as radically inequitable, that is to say, as likely to entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned.”30 The Chamber did not explore this tantalizing sentence because, as it said, “[f]ortunately, there is no reason to fear that any such danger will arise in the present case on account of the Chamber’s choice of delimitation line or, more especially, the course of its third and final segment.”31 But the implication of the holding seems clear. Ordinary fishing practices would not justify an adjustment of a line of delimitation achieved by the application of the judicially determined methods called “equitable delimitation”. If, however, a State could demonstrate that the application of such methods would be “likely to entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned”, that projected consequence would constitute a relevant or special circumstance and require an adjustment in the delimitation line. Because, given the delimitation it had determined, that consequence did not arise, the Chamber did not need to pursue the legal consequences that would have flowed from it.

29

Id. at paras 235, 237.

30

Id. at para. 237.

31

Id. at para. 238. 643


That this is the necessary reading of Gulf of Maine is confirmed by the judgment, by a majority of fourteen to one, of the plenary International Court in the Jan Mayen case.32 There the Court stated: “75. As has happened in a number of earlier maritime delimitation disputes, the Parties are essentially in conflict over access to fishery resources: this explains the emphasis laid on the importance of fishing activities for their respective economies and on the traditional character of the different types of fishing carried out by the populations concerned. In the Gulf of Maine case, which concerned a single maritime boundary for continental shelf and fishery zones, the Chamber dealing with the case recognized the need to take account of the effects of the delimitation on the Parties’ respective fishing activities by ensuring that the delimitation should not entail ‘catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned’ (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 342, para. 237). In the light of this case-law, the Court has to consider whether any shifting or adjustment of the median line as fishery zone boundary, would be required to ensure equitable access to the capelin fishery resources for the vulnerable fishing communities concerned. 76. It appears to the Court that the seasonal migration of the capelin presents a pattern which, north of the 200-mile line claimed by Iceland, may be said to centre on the southern part of the area of overlapping claims, approximately between that line and the parallel of 72 degrees North latitude, and that the delimitation of the fishery zone should reflect this fact. It is clear that no delimitation in the area could guarantee to each Party the presence in every year of fishable quantities of capelin in the zone allotted to it by the line. It appears however to the Court that the median line is too far to the west for Denmark to be assured of an equitable access to the capelin stock, since it would attribute to Norway the whole of the area of overlapping claims. For this reason also the median line thus requires to be adjusted or shifted eastwards … .” In Gulf of Maine, the threshold for the adjustment of the median line was the likelihood of “catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic wellbeing of the population.” In Jan Mayen, the threshold did not appear to be as high. But it is important to note that Jan Mayen only related to a specific area of overlapping claims and not simply to the enclosure of an area theretofore legally high seas.

32

Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 1993 ICJ Reports 38, paras 72-78.

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Thus, the International Court has established two distinct standards for two, equally distinct, contingencies: when the traditional fishing took place in an area of overlapping claims, it is, in the words of Jan Mayen, “a factor relevant to delimitation” with the ordinary standard of proof for this type of claim. When the traditional fishing took place in an area, theretofore high seas, which is not one of overlapping claims, it will be “a factor relevant to delimitation” only if ignoring it would “entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population”. Both decisions contemplate adjustment of the median line, if the party claiming it can make its case. Some State practice also supports the view that traditional fishing rights require adjustments to the median line. There have been at least seven instances where traditional fishing directly influenced the delimitation method and the course of the boundary line. In the case of the Mexico-US 1976 Agreement,33 there was a separate fishery agreement simultaneous to the exchange of notes in 1976. This understanding was confirmed by the 1978 agreement (which is not in force). The fishing banks traditionally claimed by US fishermen in the Pacific Ocean influenced the US to use all islands in developing the equidistant line.34 In the agreement between Cuba and Haiti in 1977, Cuba’s coastal fisheries interest may have influenced the location of the boundary in the Gulf of Gonave.35 The 1978 US-Venezuela maritime boundary agreement represents an inverse case. The course of the boundary, especially the granting of full effect to Venezuelan Aves Island, was partly a result of economic assessments indicating no fisheries resources potential in the delimited area.36 The Italy-Tunisia Continental Shelf Agreement of 1971 had a separate fishery agreement signed on the same date as the 1971 agreement.37 The Iceland-Norway Agreement on Fishery and Continental Shelf Matters (Jan Mayen) of 28 May 1980 established a boundary following the 200 mile limit measured from Iceland’s basepoints to accommodate Iceland’s dependence on fisheries.38 The Sweden-USSR Multipurpose Delimitation Agreement of 1988 divided the area into 75 percent for Sweden and 25 percent for the USSR. At the same time, the fisheries arrangement apportioned the resource in inverse proportions (25 percent for Sweden and 75 percent for the USSR).39 The 1989 Poland-Sweden agreement is based partly on the former 33

Fisheries Agreement of 24 November 1976, in 29 UST 823; UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19 at 430. Mexico denounced this agreement on 29 December 1980. Noted in 85 RGDIP 1981 at 563.

34

Kwiatkowska, supra note 5, at 75, 84.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 81, footnote 28.

38

Id. at 83.

39

Id. at 82. 645


provisional boundary agreed by the parties for the purpose of their 1978 fishery agreement. In segment I of this boundary, the equidistant line was simplified to facilitate its use for fishermen.40

V. The LOS Convention Regime It is a commonplace that legislation creates delicts. The LOS Convention created the problem of the later imposition of a State’s exclusive economic zone on high seas areas in which the non-exclusive fishery rights of another State had crystallized by virtue of traditional uses of those rights by its nationals. Because the LOS Convention took an area that had theretofore been high seas and transformed it, at the option of a qualifying coastal State, into archipelagic waters or, by operation of law, into an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a coastal State, it is necessary to analyze the provisions of the treaty in order to determine whether legal arrangements inter se were explicitly or implicitly made for the preservation of prior acquired non-exclusive rights in high seas areas which the Convention transformed into an EEZ. The LOS Convention is a complex instrument that includes mandatory choice of law provisions. Three provisions of it provide explicit interpretive guidance. Article 293(1) provides direct guidance in stating that: “[a] court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention.” Thus, article 293(1) requires a determination as to whether customary international rules apply and also whether conventional rules from multilateral or bilateral treaties to which litigating States are party apply. Article 293(1) would appear to be particularly relevant to applications of the Convention to rights established under the Convention which might conflict with prior acquired rights of third States. In case of a conflict of law, LOS Convention prevails. Article 300 of the LOS Convention provides: “States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.” At least with respect to responsibility and liability, article 304 provides for an actualizing or up-dating mechanism:

40

Id. at 84.

646


“The provisions of the Convention regarding responsibility and liability for damage are without prejudice to the application of existing rules and the development of further rules regarding responsibility and liability under international law.” This provision, fairly common in other conventions dealing with environmental issues, recognizes that this aspect of the law is in the process of development and adjustments should be allowed for future development of law. 1. Traditional Artisanal Fishing Rights in the Territorial Sea In one particular instance, the LOS Convention explicitly indicates that boundary regimes must be adjusted to take account of historic rights. Article 12 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea of 195841 had provided that the provisions for the delimitation of the territorial sea in bilateral situations of coastal adjacency or opposition “shall not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance with this provision”. That language is reproduced in article 15 of the LOS Convention. Articles 12 and 15, in their respective instruments, provide for suspension of the default rules for two contingencies: first, historic title, and, second, another special circumstance. The latter could include acquired rights to non-exclusive uses within those waters. In all cases, the remedy for historic rights or another special circumstance is an adjustment in the delimitation that would otherwise have been made. 2. Traditional Artisanal Fishing Rights in Archipelagic Waters Prior to the LOS Convention, the words “archipelagic State” did not have a legal signification nor did “archipelagic baselines” exist in the international legal universe. The application of these novel concepts meant that ocean space that had theretofore been high seas could now be enclosed by archipelagic baselines and would henceforth be “archipelagic waters”, subject to the sovereignty of the qualifying archipelagic State.42 The innovation of archipelagic baselines explicitly confronted the possibility that the waters thereby enclosed and rendered exclusive by the application of such baselines might infringe pre-existing rights of a third State. With respect to this situation, article 47 (6) of the LOS Convention provides that:

41

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 29 April 1958, 516 UNTS 7477 (entered into force 10 September 1964) available at <www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/ terrsea.htm>.

42

LOS Convention, article 49. 647


“If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State lies between two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring State, existing rights and all other legitimate interests which the latter State has traditionally exercised in such waters and all rights stipulated by agreement between those States shall continue and be respected” (emphasis added). Article 51(1) provides that: “Without prejudice to article 49, an archipelagic State shall respect existing agreements with other States and shall recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately adjacent neighbouring States in certain areas falling within archipelagic waters. The terms and conditions for the exercise of such rights and activities, including the nature, the extent and areas to which they apply, shall, at the request of any of the States concerned, be regulated by bilateral agreements between them. Such rights shall not be transferred to or shared with third States or their nationals” (emphasis added). Now it is clear that both of these provisions are premised on the possibility of the acquisition of non-exclusive rights by another State in or with respect to waters theretofore high seas that the LOS Convention is now subjecting to the sovereignty of a coastal State.43 Significantly, neither provision uses the term “historic rights”, with its higher threshold of necessary proof. Article 51(1), in using the words “traditional fishing rights” would appear to be contemplating a lower threshold of proof but does not indicate the quantum of practice necessary for acquiring those rights. Both provisions imperatively mandate the continued recognition of those traditional rights. Article 47(6) provides in relevant part that “existing rights … which the latter State has traditionally exercised in such waters … shall continue and be respected” (emphasis added). Article 51(1) provides in relevant part that “an archipelagic State … shall recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately adjacent neighbouring States in certain areas falling within archipelagic waters” (emphasis added). Thus, Part IV of the LOS Convention contemplates the possibility of the acquisition of traditional artisanal fishing rights by virtue of the use of certain waters of the then high seas by nationals of another State. Those rights survive the transformation of those high seas waters into archipelagic waters.

43

Article 47(6), which relates to a very specific configuration, goes further and includes “legitimate interests”, i.e., claims that have not crystallized into rights.

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3. Traditional Artisanal Fishing Rights in the EEZ Part V of the LOS Convention establishes the Exclusive Economic Zone, in which, as stated above, the EEZ coastal State has “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed …”. The LOS Convention reserves certain rights for all other States in article 56(2) and, in article 58, it sets out those rights, referring explicitly to article 87. Article 58 does not mention the right to fish. But these general provisions are not germane to the inquiry here, for they only address the rights pro futuro of all other States in the EEZ and not the question of the effect of the establishment of the EEZ on pre-existing rights to traditional artisanal fishing. In fact, Part V does not directly address the question of the survival of traditional fishing. There is, in article 62(3), an implicit recognition of the possible existence of traditional fishing in an area which will henceforth be EEZ. That article says that in giving access to other States to the surplus of living resources in its EEZ, the coastal State shall take into account all relevant factors, including “the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone” (emphasis supplied). However, this section only deals with a very specific type of access, namely, access to the surplus of the allowable catch. The article is silent about a general right of access based on traditional rights. The drafters elected to use a softer formula – “habitually fished” – rather than “traditional fishing rights”. Article 62(2) provides: “The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements … give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch, having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in relation to the developing States mentioned therein.” Article 69 deals with the rights of land-locked States, but article 70 deals with the rights of geographically disadvantaged States, a category that includes, according to article 70(2), “States … whose geographical situation makes them dependent upon the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of other States in the subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional purposes of their populations … .” Such States, according to article 70(1), “have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of

649


an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or region … .” Compared to the traditional and historic rights regimes in other sections of the Convention which were considered earlier, this is a relatively soft right. Indeed, it is more a pactum de contrahendo than a right. The softness of the right, as it is elaborated in Part V, is confirmed in the dispute resolution Part of the LOS Convention. Article 286 of the LOS Convention provides for binding third-party decision for “any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention,” but there are exceptions. Article 297(3)(a) provides: “Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with section 2, except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions established in its conservation and management laws and regulations.” Conciliation is called for when, under LOS Convention article 297(3)(b)(ii) and (iii), “(ii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine, at the request of another State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest living resources with respect to stocks which that other State is interested in fishing; or (iii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to allocate to any State, under articles 62, 69 and 70 and under the terms and conditions established by the coastal State consistent with this Convention, the whole or part of the surplus it has declared to exist.” Aside from the fact that conciliation, in contrast to the compulsory and binding procedures available under article 287, is not binding, article 297(3)(b)(iii)(c) reinforces the severe limitations on the conciliation commission by specifying that “[i]n no case shall the conciliation commission substitute its discretion for that of the coastal State”. Thus the “rights” under articles 69 and 70 are not actionable and, for all intents and purposes, are not effective. The termination function of decision, as Harold Lasswell noted,44 is one of the most difficult. In that regard, all the diplomatic conferences prescribing new 44

H.D. Lasswell, The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis (Bureau of Governmental Research, Univ. of Maryland, 1956).

650


zones for the law of the sea had to struggle with the termination or phasing out of rights of other States. What is to be done with long usages or traditional fishing practices of nationals of another State, in a theretofore res communis, which is about to come under the sovereign rights or jurisdiction of a coastal State. This problem became acute after UNCLOS III which adopted the concept of the EEZ and faced the necessity of phasing out the activities of distant fishing States.45 The language of Part V of the LOS Convention is laconic. The decisions of the International Court in the Gulf of Maine, Libya v. Tunisia and Jan Mayen cases have been considered earlier. Professor Attard asks whether articles 62 and 70 of the LOS Convention (which recognize that States which have habitually fished in the EEZ or which have certain socio-economic characteristics may possess participatory fishing rights in foreign EEZs) imply that such considerations should not affect EEZ delimitations. He suggests that: “To exclude the … relevance [of historic fishing rights] would seem to go contrary to the EEZ’s rationale and development, as well as the drafting history of its regime as found in the 1982 Convention. It should be remembered that the weight given to such considerations is dependent on the other considerations which characterize the area. It would therefore seem that such recognition represents a safeguard which ensure [sic] that, even when an equitable solution fails to give due recognition to such considerations, they will continue to be respected.”46 This appears to be an arguable construction, for the regime which has just been described is perfectly compatible with the idea of an exclusive economic zone: if any third State were granted an enforceable pro futuro right with respect to the resources of the zone, the zone’s economic resources would hardly be exclusive to the coastal State. The soft “rights” of any third State with respect to resources in the EEZ regime are, thus, logically necessary. But the text of the LOS Convention does not provide any specific guidance with respect to the status of pre-existing acquired rights in the waters that, theretofore, were high seas, other than to indicate that “habitual” usages (in contrast to traditional rights) are not of an obligatory status. It might be argued that the absence of any mention of pre-existing traditional rights of fishing imports that they were being rejected on the order of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. That interpretative principle would be applicable if the issue were prospective rights but would drafters, who were fluent in international law, abrogate existing rights by implication? International legal interpretation would

45

Sh. Rosenne, “Historic Waters in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, in Reflections on Principles and Practice of International Law 191, 192-93 (T.D. Gill and W.P. Heere, eds, 2000).

46

D.J. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law 268-69 (1987). 651


be loath to infer that States parties to an instrument had impliedly surrendered important economic rights. The application of the interpretative provisions, set out earlier, could be marshaled to argue that pre-existing traditional or historic rights were not terminated by the subsequent establishment of an EEZ. This view could find support in three reasons: (i) logic; (ii) an a fortiori argument to the effect that if the Convention reserved traditional rights in internal waters, which is the legal character of waters landward of archipelagic baselines and imports assimilation to the legal status of territory, it would surely reserve such rights in the EEZ; and (iii) the international legal principle that important rights are not deemed to have been terminated by implication. As a matter of pure logic, the regime for the EEZ has nothing to do with the question of the survival of pre-existing rights. It will be recalled that Judge Fitzmaurice had written: “Thus if the fishing vessels of a given country have been accustomed from time immemorial, or over a long period, to fish in a certain area, on the basis of the area being high seas and common to all, it may be said that their country has through them (and although they are private vessels having no specific authority) acquired a vested interest that the fisheries of that area should remain available to its fishing vessels (of course on a non-exclusive basis) – so that if another country asserts a claim to that area as territorial waters, which is found to be valid or comes to be recognized, this can only be subject to the acquired rights of fishery in question, which must continue to be respected.”47 The footnote which Sir Gerald appended to this sentence stated: “In relation to that particular country, that is: the principle could not apply to countries which, while having a right to fish in the area as res communis, never in fact exercised it” (emphases in original). The converse of this perfectly logical remark is precisely the situation in the EEZ regime in Part V of the LOS Convention: it does apply to countries which, while having a right to fish in the area which was then res communis, never in fact exercised it. It does not apply to countries which had the right to fish and did exercise it. To contend that Part V of the LOS Convention terminated, by implication, acquired rights, one would have to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that international law would construe a text as an implicit termination of rights and, as a matter of fact, that States parties to the LOS Convention would have

47

Fitzmaurice, supra note 15.

652


allowed valuable economic rights that had been acquired by their nationals to be terminated by implication. But, in fact, as explained below, international law supports, as a general principle of law, the survival of acquired rights and there is no evidence in the travaux of the LOS Convention, that the holders of these acquired rights were surrendering them. According to the travaux, the issue of traditional fishing rights arose briefly, but was overshadowed by three factors: a preoccupation with fishing rights in the territorial sea; an emphasis on the rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States; and the application of the principle of optimum utilization. Traditional fishing rights were raised in the context of article 62 and were not rejected. During the drafting of the LOS Convention, claims of non-exclusive historic fishing rights were “among the most controversial features of the law of the sea”.48 However, the debate centered on the situation of foreign fishermen – mainly those engaged in distant-water fishing – who found themselves deprived of fishing rights in areas which were formerly part of the high seas, but which are now claimed as part of the territorial sea of the littoral State.49 This is different from the question of fishing rights in the high seas that stand to fall within the exclusive economic zone of another State, since the EEZ is distinguished from the territorial sea by its particularly large area, its socio-economic significance, its multifunctional character, and its invocation of obligations. Professor Kwiatkowska has observed: “[T]he EEZ regime as established by the LOS Convention is based on a noticeable shift from state powers to duties and a careful balance between the exclusive (coastal state) and inclusive (third states) uses of the sea within the zone.”50 The UNCLOS I and II were preoccupied with the breadth of the territorial sea and not the “broader issue of the geographical extent and quantitative characteristics of coastal state prerogatives over the natural resources of the sea adjacent to its coast, within and beyond its territorial sea”.51 At UNCLOS II, a Canadian proposal for a 12-mile fishery zone elicited strong responses. The Cuban delegate said: “The State whose nationals had thus traditionally fished an area of the high seas could be said to have acquired prescriptive rights in that area;

48

Blum, supra note 17, at 315.

49

Id. at 316.

50

B. Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea 5-6 (1989).

51

II United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary 496 (M.H. Nordquist et al., eds, 1993). 653


those rights could carry even greater weight than those of the coastal State itself – for example, where the latter’s nationals engaged in little or no fishing activity in the area.”52 The US delegate also supported the preservation of historic fishing rights of foreign nationals in the 12 miles from the coast, provided that no increase in foreign fishing would be permitted, and that all increased productivity would benefit exclusively the sovereign coastal State.53 A number of nations including Canada, Iceland and Bulgaria opposed the perpetuation of historic fishing rights on the ground that it discriminated against newly emergent States and those lacking technical and economic resources.54 The New Zealand delegate introduced the idea of a gradual lapse of historic rights and this was included in the joint American-Canadian proposal for a 12-mile fishery zone where traditional foreign fishing would be guaranteed, but would be phased out over ten years unless guaranteed by concessions granted at the discretion of the coastal State.55 This proposal narrowly failed to gain the required two-thirds majority.56 The decision to convene UNCLOS III was based on the understanding that recognition of any extended jurisdiction of a coastal State beyond the territorial sea would “have to be matched by a statement of the general rights of the international community in that extended zone”.57 The question of access to fish in areas that were previously the high seas but would now be the EEZ arose in two main contexts. First, the Group of Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States asserted their rights to access to the living resources in the EEZ.58 This became a “hard-core” issue of the Conference and was the subject of protracted negotiations.59 The emphasis was on reconciling the pro futuro rights of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States with the interests of the coastal States. The rights of States that had traditionally fished in the EEZ were overshadowed.

52

Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, at 41, UN Doc. A/CONF/ 19.8.

53

Id. at 46.

54

Id. at 50, 79 and 113.

55

Id. at 169, UN Doc. A/CONF 19.C. 1/L.10.

56

II United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, supra note 51, at 495.

57

Id. at 496.

58

See Letter dated 30 April 1975 to the Chairman of the Second Committee by the Federal Republic of Germany, Nepal, Singapore, and Zambia: IV Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents 209, 224 (Renate Platzöder, ed., 1982).

59

II United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, supra note 51, at 504.

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Second, the articles on living resources are underpinned by the principle of optimum utilization of resources. “The widespread acceptance of this concept and its application contributed, to a large extent, to the acceptance by the fishing powers of the exclusive character of the rights of the coastal State in the economic zone.”60 Optimum utilization is based on the concern to ensure that “precious resources are not under-utilized at the expense of the international community”61 and thus focused the negotiations on the specific question of future access to the surplus catch and the avoidance of wastage, not the issue of access based on traditional rights. The issue of traditional fishing rights arose during the negotiations over article 62. No explicit protections were put in the final text which could be interpreted to mean that these rights were being terminated by implication. But it is also possible that the issue was eclipsed by debates over future rights to surplus stock and the position of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States.62

60

J. Casteneda, “Negotiations on the Exclusive Economic Zone at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, in Essays on International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs 605, 617 (J. Makarczyk, ed., 1987).

61

Attard, supra note 46, at 157.

62

See the following: – At the 1971 session of the Sea-Bed Committee, the US proposed regulation of fisheries through international fisheries organizations. It suggested that the coastal State be allocated that portion of the allowable catch it could harvest, subject to special consideration for stocks traditionally harvested by other States. A/AC.138/SC.11/L.4, art. III, paras 1 and 2, reproduced in SBC Report 1971, at 241 (USA). – In 1973, the US submitted a revised proposal which was less generous to traditional fishermen. It stated that “whenever necessary to accommodate the allocations to the coastal States traditional fishing may be reduced, without discrimination among those States that have traditionally fished for a resource”. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.9, sections II, V and VI, reproduced in SBC Report 1972, at 175, 176 (USA). – A working paper submitted by Australia and New Zealand set out principles for the utilization of living resources within a coastal fishery zone. Principle VI would have required coastal States to take into account “traditional subsistence fishing” in adopting the measures to manage and utilize the living resources in the zone. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.11, reproduced in SBC Report 1972, at 183-84 (Australia and New Zealand). – Five Eastern European States declared that the problem of full utilization of the living resources could be resolved “on the basis of reasonable combination, through the international regulation of fishing, of the interests of coastal States and of countries which engage in long-distance fishing operations, and not by the adoption of unilateral measures by individual countries”. Declaration on Principles of Rational Exploration of the Living Resources of the Seas and Oceans in the Common Interests of All Peoples of the World” (Moscow Declaration), A/AC.138/85, para. 6, reproduced in SBC Report 1972, at 78 (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and USSR). 655


Are artisanal fishing questions to be located in the category of boundary delimitation disputes or fishing disputes? Article 297(3)(a) of Part XV of the LOS Convention does not subject the coastal State to compulsory jurisdiction for

– At the 1973 session of the Sea-Bed Committee, a draft treaty by Malta would have granted the coastal State authority to “reserve to its nationals the exploitation of some of all of the living resources of its national ocean space” (up to 200 miles) with special consideration for traditional fishing by foreign fishermen. A/AC.138/ SC.II/L.28, arts 88 and 89, reproduced in III SBC Report 1973, at 35, 63 (Malta). – Zaire’s proposal on the coastal State’s authority to manage the living resources focused on the traditional fishing rights of neighboring developing coastal States. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.60, arts 1 and 3, reproduced in III SBC Report 1973, at 114 (Zaire). – In 1974, six East European nations proposed considerations for States which “have been fishing in the region involved” and the granting of access rights “on the basis of long and mutually recognized use”. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.38 (1974), arts 12, 13, 15, 16, III Official Records 214, 215 (Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and USSR). – Draft articles by the US included a listing of priorities to be considered in allocating resources to other States which gave priority to “States that have normally fished for a resource” subject to reductions in order to accommodate an increase in the harvesting capacity of a coastal State. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 (1974), arts 13, 14, 15, III Official Records 222, 223 (USA). – The Evensen Group’s final draft included habitual fishing as a relevant factor to be taken into account in granting access to the surplus of living resources in the EEZ and mentioned the need to minimize economic dislocation. See the Economic Zone (1975, mimeo), art. 6 (Informal Group of Juridical Experts), reproduced in IV Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents 209, 213 (R. Platzöder, ed., 1982). A similar proposal was made by eight Western European States. Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands (1975, mimeo), art. B, reproduced in IV Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents 225 (R. Platzöder, ed., 1982). – Since the debate began to focus entirely on the rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, Spain, in 1980, expressed concern for safeguarding the interests of States whose nationals had habitually fished in zones formerly considered as part of the high seas. See, A/CONF.62/WS/12 (1980), paras 11 and 12, XIV Official Records 149, 150 (Spain). Spain suggested that access for fleets of developed States should be conditional upon the coastal States having previously granted access to other States who had habitually fished in the zone. See II United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, supra note 51, at 634. However, this was not taken up and the text of article 62, with the exception of the references to articles 69 and 70, did not change from its 1975 wording (id. at 635). – Spain made a declaration when signing the LOS Convention seeking recognition of a preference favoring those countries which have habitually fished in the EEZ of other States over the access to which landlocked or geographically disadvantaged developed countries may have a right. See Declaration of Spain, Bulletin, No. 5, July 1985, at 48. 656


“any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of surpluses to other States … .” Professor Armand de Mestral suggested that article 297(3) “reflects the nature of sovereign rights granted to coastal states over fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone. The substantive discretion is so broad and plenary that it is not easy to imagine a situation in which third states would have the right to question the exercise of the sovereign rights of the coastal state”.63 But article 297 does explicitly subject the coastal State to compulsory jurisdiction for “[d]isputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Convention with regard to fisheries … .” When the drafters of the LOS Convention wanted to bar any provision from the scope of compulsory dispute settlement under Part XV, they did so expressly by exclusions. The travaux indicate that disputes relating to fisheries were clearly divided into three categories: those that would remain subject to adjudication (namely, all those that do not fall in the other two categories), those that would be completely excluded from adjudication (and would remain only subject to section 1 of Part XV), and those that would be subject to compulsory resort to conciliation.64 Since a dispute about traditional fishing rights is neither excluded nor subject to conciliation under article 297, it is arguable that such a dispute would fall into the first category of disputes subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the LOS Convention.

VI. The Customary International Legal Regime The LOS Convention is a relatively recent instrument and there are only a few examples of State practice of arrangements to accommodate traditional artisanal fishing that had been conducted in high seas areas which were thereafter enclosed as either the archipelagic waters or EEZ of another State. In circumstances in which the purport of an innovative text is clear, the threshold of State practice necessary to alter it is high, especially when it is plurilateral or multilateral. But when the purport of the text is less than clear, the implication of unclarity is often that the parties were unable to agree and are, in effect, referring decision

63

A.L.C. De Mestral, “Compulsory Dispute Settlement in the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Canadian Perspective”, in Contemporary Issues in International Law, Essays in Honor of Louis B. Sohn 169, 184 (T. Buergenthal, ed., 1984).

64

V United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, supra note 51 at 105. 657


to subsequent negotiation, third party decision (if it is built-in to the agreement in question) or to State practice. A survey of maritime delimitation agreements by Barbara Kwiatkowska found that the accommodation of traditional fishing activities of the parties has played a role in delimitation negotiations in three ways: First, as an element agreed to simultaneously to the maritime delimitation settlement; Second, as an element agreed to shortly before or after the settlement; Third, as a measure undertaken pending the settlement.65

VII. General Principles of Law The question of the force of acquired rights arises most often in cases of State succession. General principles of law, including the rule of law and respect for the individual, have sometimes support the continuing force of acquired rights under the new legal regime. Speaking of acquired rights in the context of State succession, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht stated: “[T]he problem of succession, so far as it is treated as a problem of law, is identical in private and international law. The fundamental fact in both cases is that there take place both substitution and continuation of rights and duties, and that legal stability and acquired rights are not destroyed in consequence of the subject of law ceasing to exist.”66 By analogy, when the subject of law – the freedom of the high seas – ceases to exist in the area 200 miles from the coast, the rights acquired through a long practice of traditional artisanal fishing would not be destroyed. The change in regime from high seas to EEZ might appear to have left the acquired rights of traditional fishermen in limbo, but “[l]aw, like physics, does not tolerate a vacuum”67 and the gap between regimes is filled by the continuity of the international legal order. Lauterpacht referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice’s decision in the German Settlers case. The issue was whether the Polish Government had an obligation to recognize contracts concluded between the German Colonization Commission and individual German settlers who had now become Polish nationals. The Court held:

65

Kwiatkowska, supra note 5, at 75, 81, footnotes 28-31.

66

H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law 125 (1927).

67

H. Lauterpacht, “Succession of States with respect to Private Law Obligations”, in III International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht 121, 126 (E. Lauterpacht, ed., 1977).

658


“[p]rivate rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty … [E]ven those who contest the existence in international law of a general principle of State succession do not go so far as to maintain that private rights including those acquired from the State as the owner of the property are invalid as against a successor in sovereignty.”68 The Court expressly rejected Poland’s contention that since the contracts were of a purely personal nature, they need not be recognized by the successor State. Lauterpacht observes that it is of special importance that the Court “did not restrict the meaning of ‘private right’ to complete title to property, and that it extended it not only to all rights to land, complete and inchoate, but also to other rights”.69 Indeed, the rights before the Court were of a kind intermediate between jura in rem and jura in personam.70 In international law generally, “acquired rights” are rights “corporeal or incorporeal, properly vested in a natural or juristic person, and of assessable monetary value”.71 The traditional fishing rights of the nationals of Barbados can be considered a private property right acquired under international law, especially since artisanal fishing may, as explained earlier, be undertaken for commercial purposes.

VIII. Human Rights Law The doctrine of acquired rights applies with respect to human rights. As Professor Mullerson states: “Human rights are no less important than property rights; moreover, the right to property has become one of the human rights. When international law started to protect acquired rights, there were no international human rights standards, but now the situation has changed.”72 Traditional artisanal fishing rights are acquired by an inter-generational functional group of individuals and not by State activity and, although that group’s State may press for the protection of those rights, the rights belong to members of that functional group. Thus, in Eritrea-Yemen, the Tribunal said, with respect to traditional fishing rights,

68

German Settlers in Poland (Advisory Opinion), 10 Sept. 1923, PCIJ Series B, No. 6, at 36.

69

Lauterpacht, supra note 66, at 295.

70

Lauterpacht, supra note 67 at 121, 134.

71

D.P. O’Connell, The Law of State Succession 81 (1956).

72

R. Müllerson, International Law, Rights and Politics 156 (1994). 659


“There is no reason to import into the Red Sea the western legal fiction – which is in any event losing its importance – whereby all legal rights, even those in reality held by individuals, were deemed to be those of the State. That legal fiction served the purpose of allowing diplomatic representation (where the representing State so chose) in a world in which individuals had no opportunities to advance their own rights. It was never meant to be the case however that, were a right to be held by an individual, neither the individual nor his State should have access to international redress.”73 The point is important for this inquiry, for if traditional artisanal fishing rights belong to individuals, human rights treaties that prohibit the deprivation of property would act to prohibit governments from taking those traditional artisanal fishing rights.

IX. Recent Case Law An important award rendered on 17 December 1999 by a tribunal, two of whose members were judges of the International Court and the President of which was a former president of the International Court, has confirmed, as a matter of customary international law, the survival of traditional artisanal fishing rights of nationals of one State conducted in high seas areas that were later enclosed as the national waters of another State. The dispute concerned claims of territorial sovereignty over islands in the Red Sea and maritime boundary delimitation between Eritrea and Yemen. The Tribunal assigned critical islands to Yemen, but it stated: “126. … In the first place, the conditions that prevailed during many centuries with regard to the traditional openness of southern Red Sea marine resources for fishing, its role as means for unrestricted traffic from one side to the other, together with the common use of the islands by the populations of both coasts, are all important elements capable of creating certain ‘historic rights’ which accrued in favour of both parties through a process of historical consolidation as a sort of ‘servitude internationale’ falling short of territorial sovereignty. [Footnote is omitted.] Such historic rights provide a sufficient legal basis for maintaining certain aspects of a res communis that has existed for centuries for the benefit of the populations on both sides of the Red Sea … …

73

Eritrea-Yemen, supra note 3, para. 101 at 32.

660


128. This traditionally prevailing situation reflected deeply rooted cultural patterns leading to the existence of what could be characterized from a juridical point of view as res communis permitting the African as well as the Yemeni fishermen to operate with no limitation throughout the entire area and to sell their catch at the local markets on either side of the Red Sea. Equally, the persons sailing for fishing or trading purposes from one coast to the other used to take temporary refuge from the strong winds on any of the uninhabited islands scattered in that maritime zone without encountering difficulties of a political or administrative nature.”74 This situation led the Tribunal to conclude in the first phase of the arbitration: “526. In finding that the Parties each have sovereignty over various of the Islands the Tribunal stresses to them that such sovereignty is not inimical to, but rather entails, the perpetuation of the traditional fishing regime in the region. This existing regime has operated, as the evidence presented to the Tribunal amply testifies, around the Hanish and Zuqar islands and the islands of Jebel al-Tayr and the Zubayr group. In the exercise of its sovereignty over these islands, Yemen shall ensure that the traditional fishing regime of free access and enjoyment for the fishermen of both Eritrea and Yemen shall be preserved for the benefit of the lives and livelihoods of this poor and industrious order of men.”75 In the second phase of the arbitration, the Tribunal held that “the traditional fishing regime around Hanish and Zuqar Islands and the islands of Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr group is one of free access and enjoyment for the fishermen of both Eritrea and Yemen”.76 The Tribunal explained: “103. The traditional fishing regime is not an entitlement in common to resources nor is it a shared right in them. Rather, it entitles both Eritrean and Yemeni fishermen to engage in artisanal fishing around the islands which, in its Award on Sovereignty, the Tribunal attributed to Yemen. This is to be understood as including diving, carried out by artisanal means, for shells and pearls. Equally, these fishermen remain entitled freely to use these islands for those purposes traditionally associated with such artisanal fishing – the use of the islands for drying fish, for way stations, for the provision of temporary shelter, and for the effecting of repairs.

74

Permanent Court of Arbitration, Eritrea-Yemen, Arbitral Awards, First Stage of the Proceedings, available at .

75

Id. at para. 526.

76

Id. Second Stage, at para. 101. 661


… 106. However, the term ‘artisanal’ is not to be understood as applying in the future only to a certain type of fishing exactly as it is practised today. ‘Artisanal fishing’ is used in contrast to ‘industrial fishing’. It does not exclude improvements in powering the small boats, in the techniques of navigation, communication or in the techniques of fishing; but the traditional regime of fishing does not extend to large-scale commercial or industrial fishing nor to fishing by nationals of third States in the Red Sea, whether small-scale or industrial. 107. In order that the entitlements be real and not merely theoretical, the traditional regime has also recognised certain associated rights. There must be free access to and from the islands concerned – including unimpeded passage through waters in which, by virtue of its sovereignty over the islands, Yemen is entitled to exclude all third Parties or subject their presence to licence, just as it may do in respect of Eritrean industrial fishing. This free passage for artisanal fishermen has traditionally existed not only between Eritrea and the islands, but also between the islands and the Yemen coast. The entitlement to enter the relevant ports, and to sell and market the fish there, is an integral element of the traditional regime. The 1994 Memorandum of Understanding between the State of Eritrea and the Republic of Yemen for Cooperation in the Areas of Maritime Fishing, Trade, Investment, and Transportation usefully identifies the centres of fish marketing on each coast. Eritrean artisanal fisherman fishing around the islands awarded to Yemen have had free access to Maydi, Khoba, Hodeidah, Khokha and Mocha on the Yemen coast, just as Yemeni artisanal fishermen fishing around the islands have had an entitlement to unimpeded transit to and access to Assab, Tio, Dahlak and Massawa on the Eritrean coast. Nationals of the one country have an entitlement to sell on equal terms and without any discrimination in the ports of the other. Within the fishing markets themselves, the traditional non-discriminatory treatment – so far as cleaning, storing and marketing is concerned – is to be continued. The traditional recourse by artisanal fisherman to the acquil system to resolve their disputes inter se is to be also maintained and preserved. 108. Yemen and Eritrea are, of course, free to make mutually agreed regulations for the protection of this traditional fishing regime. Insofar as environmental considerations may in the future require regulation, any administrative measures impacting upon these traditional rights shall be taken by Yemen only with the agreement of Eritrea and, so far as access through Eritrean waters to Eritrean ports is concerned, vice versa. 109. The traditional fishing regime is not limited to the territorial waters of specified islands; nor are its limits to be drawn by reference to claimed 662


past patterns of fishing. It is, as Yemen itself observes in its Answers to the Tribunal’s Questions, Annex 2, page 63, a ‘regime that has existed for the benefit of the fishermen of both countries throughout the region’. By its very nature it is not qualified by the maritime zones specified under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the law chosen by the Parties to be applicable to this task in this Second Stage of the Arbitration. The traditional fishing regime operates throughout those waters beyond the territorial waters of each of the Parties, and also in their territorial waters and ports, to the extent and in the manner specified in paragraph 107 above. 110. Accordingly, it does not depend, either for its existence or for its protection, upon the drawing of an international boundary by this Tribunal. This much was indeed acknowledged by Yemen in its Answers to the Tribunal’s Questions, when it observed that ‘the holdings of the Tribunal in the first Award with respect to the traditional fishing regime constitute res judicata without prejudice to the maritime boundary that the Tribunal decides on in the second stage of the proceedings’ (Annex 2, page 63). Yemen informed the Tribunal that it was ‘fully committed to apply and implement the Award in all its aspects, including with respect to the perpetuation of the traditional fishing regime for the fishermen of both Eritrea and Yemen’. Nor is the drawing of the maritime boundary conditioned by the findings, in the Award on Sovereignty, of such a regime. 111. As the Tribunal has explained above, no further joint agreement is legally necessary for the perpetuation of a regime based on mutual freedoms and an absence of unilaterally imposed conditions. However, should Eritrea and Yemen decide that the intended cooperation exemplified by the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding and the 1998 Agreement can usefully underpin the traditional regime, they may choose to use some of the possibilities within these instruments. The subject matter of the 1994 instrument has a particular pertinence. (Moreover, it is the understanding of the Tribunal that the Parties did not jointly intend to deprive fishermen of their rights under this traditional regime if they failed to submit a fishing licence to the other Party within three months from the date of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding.)”77 The Eritrea/Yemen arbitration is the strongest statement of the existence of a customary international rule with respect to the survival of traditional artisanal fishing rights that were acquired in res communis areas when those areas later become enclosed national waters. 77

Id. at paras 103, 106-111. 663


In the most recent case, the delimitation of maritime boundaries between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, the question, among others, arose as to the legal significance of Barbadian “historic, artisanal” fishing practices as a possible relevant or special circumstance requiring deviation from the equidistance line. The Arbitral Tribunal stated: “Determining an international maritime boundary between two States on the basis of traditional fishing on the high seas by nationals of one of those States is altogether exceptional. Support for such a principle in customary and conventional international law is largely lacking. Support is most notably found in speculations of the late eminent jurist, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and in the Jan Mayen case (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p.38). That is insufficient to establish a rule of international law.”78 Barbados had also requested that if the Tribunal decided that the pattern of Barbadian fishing activity in the waters off Trinidad and Tobago was not of such nature as to warrant the adjustment of the maritime boundary, the Tribunal might nevertheless issue an order for access by its fishermen to the stocks of flyingfish while they are within the waters of Trinidad and Tobago. While the Tribunal considered that it did not have jurisdiction to make an award on the right of access for Barbadian fishermen to flyingfish within the EEZ of Trinidad and Tobago, because it would be outside its jurisdiction under article 297(3)(a) of the LOS Convention, it nevertheless recalled the request of both parties that the Tribunal expresses a view on that question.79 The Tribunal believed that in such circumstances, it was appropriate for it and would be helpful to the parties to draw attention to certain matters that are necessarily entailed by the boundary line it has drawn.80 Since the flyingfish migrate through the waters of both Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, the Tribunal found article 63(1) of the LOS Convention relevant, placing a duty on Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago “to agree upon the measures necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and development” of the flyingfish stocks. The Tribunal referred to the statements by both Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago indicating their willingness to find a reasonable solution to the dispute over access to flyingfish

78

Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration Between Barbados and The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (11 April 2006) , para. 269.

79

Barbados made the request that the Tribunal should “order a regime for non-exclusive fishing use” and Trinidad and Tobago requested the Tribunal “to find that there was no fishing by Barbados in the area claimed prior to the late 1970s”. Id. para. 283.

80

Id. para. 284. The Tribunal found support of this approach in Qatar v. Bahrain case, 2001 ICJ Reports 112-113, para. 236 et seq.

664


stocks.81 The Tribunal in particular referred to the commitment by the Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago in front of the Tribunal expressing his country’s readiness to negotiate an access agreement with Barbados and found that commitment binding on Trinidad and Tobago.82 In the view of the Tribunal the issue of whether “Barbadian fishing activity is artisanal in nature, and the question of the degree of dependence of Barbados upon fishing for flyingfish, are not material to the making or existence of these commitments, and it is unnecessary to comment upon those questions.”

X. Conclusion Artisanal fishing rights seem a marginal issue in the great games of international politics. But happily contemporary international law has developed concern and sensitivity for people and, in particular, for indigenous peoples. That concern may be engaged by the installation of new boundaries in the sea which could adversely affect people. Certainly, if an accommodation were sought, an easement of access and right of usufruct would preserve the benefits of the EEZ to the coastal State while allowing international law to provide protection for artisanal fishermen. But it is clear from the contradictory case law that the international community has yet to clarify a univocal policy in this regard. It is hoped that these reflections, in honor of our esteemed friend, Thomas Mensah, who has done so much to develop the law of the sea, may contribute in a small way to that clarification.

81

Id. para. 287.

82

Id. paras 288-292. 665

3. OPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH INSTITUTIONS

STATES PARTIES AND THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF Betsy Baker*

I

n the nine and a half years since its first meeting, the activity of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has given rise to many legal and technical questions. On the legal front alone, legal scholars have questioned its capacity, absent any legally trained members, to interpret the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“the Convention”)1 and to provide recommendations that are the basis of “final and binding” determinations of continental shelf limits.2 At the Commission’s request, the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Legal Affairs has rendered an opinion letter as to certain functions and competencies of the Commission;3 and the Meeting of States Parties to

*

This chapter was submitted in November 2006.

1

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done at Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3.

2

Academic literature raising questions as to the character and competence of the Commission includes P.R.R. Gardiner, “The Limits of the Sea Beyond National Jurisdiction – Some Problems with particular Reference to the Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ”, in G. Blake (ed.), Maritime Boundaries and Ocean Resources (1987), 63 et seq.; T.L. McDorman, “The Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World”, 17 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 301, 2002; E. Egede, “The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf: African States and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention”, 35 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 157-178, 2004; R. McNab, “The Case for Transparency in the Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf in accordance with UNCLOS Article 76”, 35 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 1-17, 2004.

3

Letter dated 25 August 2005 from the Legal Counsel, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Legal Affairs, addressed to the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, CLCS 16th Sess., 29 August – 16 September 2005, CLCS/46, Legal opinion on whether it is permissible, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the rules of procedure of the Commission, for a coastal State, which has made a submission to the Commission in accordance with article 76 of the Convention, to provide to the Commission in the course of the examination by it of the submission, additional material and information relating to the limits of its continental


III. The Law of the Sea: Operation and Implementation through Institutions

the Convention has weighed in on the Commission’s Scientific and Technical Guidelines.4 In June 2006, and independently of either the United Nations Legal Counsel, the Commission, or the Meeting of the States Parties, the 72nd Conference of the International Law Association (ILA) identified a total of 22 “Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf ”,5 listing them in an ILA resolution of the same name. Neither the title nor the introductory language of the resolution refers to the Commission but rather to the “Outer Continental Shelf ” and to rules of the Convention that are “of relevance to the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf by States Parties” (emphasis added). To be sure, the Commission is named in six of the 22 legal issues identified, one of which addresses the Commission’s “functions and competence”. But the other five issues that name the Commission all refer to actions of States, and deal with State submissions to the Commission or State reactions to its recommendations, including dispute settlement mechanisms and information made available to States.6 Whether intentional or not, the resolution’s rhetorical focus on the States Parties has the effect of confirming the States, and not the Commission, as the final arbiters of determinations made in connection with article 76. This emphasis appears repeatedly throughout the resolution and is even more evident in the Second Report of the ILA Committee studying Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf,7 which provides the background for the resolution and discusses each of the 22 issues in turn. The ILA’s decision to highlight the States rather than the

shelf or substantial part thereof, which constitute a significant departure from the original limits and formulate lines that were given due publicity by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with rule 50 of the rules of procedure of the Commission (hereafter CLCS/46 Legal opinion). 4

According to the Letter dated 25 August 2005 from the Legal Counsel, CLCS/46 (supra, note 3) at 8, the SPLOS acknowledged the Scientific and Technical Guidelines as “basic documents concerning submissions in accordance with article 76”, an acknowledgment to which the legal counsel ascribes legal significance with respect to the Commission’s legal competence.

5

ILA resolution No. 2/2006, in International Law Association, Report of the Seventy-Second Conference (ILA, Toronto: 2006), available at <www.ila-hq.org/html/layout_committee. htm>; under “Committees”.

6

See ILA resolution No. 2/2006, ibid. Issues 8, 9, 15, 17, 19, and 21. The remaining issues deal primarily with entitlement to the continental shelf, and the meaning of various geographic and other terms in article 76, Part XV, or Annex II of the Convention.

7

Second Report of the Committee Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf, in International Law Association, Report of the Seventy-Second Conference (ILA, Toronto: 2006) (hereafter ILA Second Report). First Report of the Committee Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf, in International Law Association, Report of the Seventy-Second Conference (ILA, Berlin: 2004) (hereafter ILA First Report). The First and Second Reports are available at <www.ila-hq.org/html/layout_committee.htm>.

670

States Parties and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

Commission as the entities in charge of setting these outer limits presumably responds directly to concerns that the Commission, which meets in private,8 was amassing power to impose “final and binding” decisions on States Parties (article 76(8)) and to affect “permanent” descriptions of State-established outer limits of the State’s continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (article 76(9)).9 The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf was established by Annex II to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 3 of that Annex provides that the Commission shall function: (a) to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make recommendations in accordance with article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; and (b) to provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned during the preparation of the data referred to in subparagraph (a). The Commission’s first members were elected in March 1997, some two and half years after the Convention entered into force. The Commission held its first meeting in June 1997, adopting Scientific and Technical Guidelines10 and the majority of the draft Rules of Procedure that the Convention Secretariat had

8

CLCS Rules of Procedure, UN Doc. CLCS/40 (2 July 2004). Rule 23 provides: “The meetings of the Commission, its subcommissions and subsidiary bodies shall be held in private, unless the Commission decides otherwise.”

9

While it should be borne in mind that the ILA resolution is the pronouncement of a scholarly body and not any official organ, the influence and expertise of the assembled Committee members and the weight of the larger Association render its resolution and reports worthy of analysis. It remains an open question whether ILA pronouncements rise to the level of “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” under Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. As to the influence of individual scholars and bodies such as the Institute of International Law, the International Law Commission, the Sixth Committee of the United Nations, see Sir Robert Jennings, “International Lawyers and the Progressive Development of International Law”, in Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century, Essays in honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski (1996), 412-424.

10

Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS/11 (13 May 1999), also available at: <www.un.org/Depts/los/ clcs_new/commission_guidelines.htm>. 671


prepared prior to the election of the Commission.11 In May 2001 the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties effectively extended the filing deadline to 13 May 2009 for initial submissions by any State whose ten-year filing window would have expired before that date.12 This extension was made partially in recognition of the technical advances in maritime measurement that had occurred since the Convention was drafted, the related increase in complexity and expense of submissions, and the need to allow capacity building by many States, as well as to resolve jurisdictional issues of the Commission.13 The Commission voted in 2004 to adopt its own Rules of Procedure, which now guide the Commission, submitting States and all others interested in the submissions process.14 As of November 2006 the Commission has received six submissions: from Russia (2001), Brazil (2004), Australia (2004)15, Ireland (2005), New Zealand (2006),

11

For a detailed explanation of the genesis of the Commission’s Draft Rules, UN Doc. SPLOS/CLCS/WP.1, and final Rules of Procedure, UN Doc. CLCS/40 (supra, note 8), see the DOALOS website, <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_rules.htm>, last visited November 1, 2006.

12

Article 4 of Annex II to the Convention allowed up to ten years from the Convention’s entry into force for the coastal State in question to make a submission to the Commission. See Decision regarding the date of commencement of the ten-year period for the making of submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set out in article 4 of Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea, UN Doc. SPLOS/72 (29 May 2001).

13

See generally, A. Serdy, “Towards Certainty of Seabed Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Territorial Sea Baseline: Australia’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ”, 36 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 201-217, 2005.

14

UN Doc. CLCS/40 (supra, note 8). As the DOALOS website (supra, note 11) provides: “Document CLCS/40 contains the latest version of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, as well as the Modus Operandi and the Internal procedure of the subcommission of the Commission. This document embodies amendments and additions of these documents adopted by the Commission up to 30 April 2004. Annexes I and II of the Rules of Procedure were adopted by the Commission at its fourth session, held from 31 August to 4 September 1998. Annex III was adopted by the Commission at its thirteenth session, held from 26 to 30 April 2004, and replaced the Modus Operandi of the Commission (CLCS/L.3 – 12 September 1997) and the Internal procedure of the subcommission of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS/L.12 – 25 May 2002). Consequently, these Rules and their annexes supersede and replace documents CLCS/L.3 (12 September 1997) and CLCS/L.12 (25 May 2002) as well as all previously issued documents containing the Rules of Procedure of the Commission and their revisions or corrections (documents CLCS/3 (12 September 1997), CLCS/3/Corr.1 (27 April 1998), CLCS/3/Rev.1 (14 May 1998), CLCS/3/Rev.2 (4 September 1998), CLCS/3/Rev.2/Corr.1 (28 March 2000), CLCS/3/Rev.3 (6 February 2001), CLCS/3/Rev.3/Corr.1 (22 May 2001)).”

15

On Australia’s submission, see generally, Serdy (supra, note 13).

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a joint submission from France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom (2006) and, most recently, Norway (2006).16

I. “On the Basis of ” and “Final and Binding” Article 76(8) of the Convention states that the Commission’s recommendations are to be “the basis of ” limits established by the coastal States, which limits are to be “final and binding”. Uncertainty as to how this provision would be interpreted raised perhaps the greatest consternation amongst lawyers.17 Article 76(8) provides: “The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding.”18 D.R. Rothwell called the submissions process “quasi-judicial”, saying of article 76(8): “This rather brief provision in the LOS Convention therefore creates a quasi-judicial process. It is one in which coastal states seek to justify their continental shelf beyond the limits of 200 nautical mile claims by way of a submission to the CLCS, which in turn makes recommendations to those coastal states.”19 The UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) also appears to attach legal significance to the submissions process. The text on the

16

Information on each of the submissions is available on the DOALOS website at <www. un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm>.

17

See, e.g., sources at supra, note 2.

18

Article 76(8) provides in full: “8. Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding.”

19

D.R. Rothwell, “Building on the Strengths and Addressing the Challenges: The Role of Law of the Sea Institutions”, 35 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 131-156, 2004, emphasis added, footnotes omitted, including footnote 10, in which Rothwell points out that McDorman characterizes the role of the CLCS as that of “legitimator”. McDorman (supra, note 2), 319. 673


DOALOS website that explains the Commission’s work specifies that the term “Continental Shelf ” is used in the relevant portions of the Convention as a “juridical term”.20 The 2006 ILA resolution parses these two significant phrases of article 76(8): “on the basis of ” (Conclusion No. 10 of the resolution) and “final and binding” (Conclusion No. 11). The Second Report of the ILA devotes its discussion of Conclusion No. 10 to “The meaning and implications of the term ‘on the basis of ’ contained in article 76(8)”.21 That Conclusion reads in part as follows: “Article 76(8) of the Convention provides that outer limits established ‘on the basis of ’ the recommendations of the Commission shall be final and binding. The term ‘on the basis of ’ circumscribes the freedom of action of a coastal State which ;sic= intends to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in accordance with article 76 of the Convention. The recommendations of the Commission should be formulated in such a way that the coastal State can assess if these recommendations are in accordance with article 76. This assures the coastal State that, in acting on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, it also acts in accordance with article 76.”22 This language stands as a rhetorical pinnacle of the ILA’s interpretation of article 76(8) as confirming the coastal States Parties’ authority and freedom of action. Whereas Conclusion No. 10 speaks of “circumscribing” coastal State freedom of action, the Explanatory Note to that Conclusion omits any references to restrictions on that freedom. The Explanatory Note asserts that: “The term ‘on the basis of ’ defines the freedom of action of a coastal State which ;sic= intends to establish the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in accordance with article 76 of the Convention” (emphasis added).23 This assures the coastal State that, in acting on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, it also acts in accordance with article 76.” This Note successfully

20

“The term ‘continental shelf ’ is used by geologists generally to mean that part of the continental margin which is between the shoreline and the shelf break or, where there is no noticeable slope, between the shoreline and the point where the depth of the superjacent water is approximately between 100 and 200 metres. However, this term is used in article 76 as a juridical term” (emphasis added). <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ continental_shelf_description.htm#definition> (site last visited August 9, 2006).

21

ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 14-15.

22

ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 14, Conclusion No. 10, emphasis added. The ILA First Report had also considered the meaning of “on the basis of ”. ILA First Report (supra, note 7), 22.

23

ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 14.

674


presents procedural constraints as guaranteeing the freedom of States to act confidently, assured that they do so in compliance with the requirements of article 76. Despite this successful dressing of State freedom of action in procedural clothes, the Explanatory Note’s argumentation is somewhat circular as to whether the submitting State or the Commission actually makes the determination that the Commission’s recommendations are in accordance with article 76. What the Explanatory Note may really be saying is, that the materials the coastal State submits are the only raw materials with which the Commission has to work. These materials thus provide the starting point for all subsequent discussion of the limits to be set. The Commission cannot really counter the materials and information that the State submits; it can only consider them to be not reasonably in accordance with the Convention.24 The Explanatory Note to Conclusion No. 10 provides further in this regard: “The information a coastal State is to submit is intended to prove that the outer limit lines contained in its submission are in accordance with these ;substantive= requirements” of article 76 and the Statement of Understanding specified in article 3, Annex II to the Convention.25 This raises the question of whether the burden of proof, if it can be called that, is on the coastal State. What the State has to prove is somewhat of a moving target, with that mobility benefiting the State. The State does not have to prove a specific fact or thing, but only that its submission is in accordance with the procedural requirements of article 76 and the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. As the Explanatory Note to Conclusion No. 10 says: “The main purpose of the submission of information and the making of recommendations is this thus ;sic= to assure that the outer limits of the continental shelf of a coastal State are established in accordance with article 76.” This assertion introduces the possibility that the coastal State can “prove” anything with respect to its proposed shelf limits as long as it does so in accordance with article 76. The penultimate paragraph of the Explanatory Note to Conclusion No. 10 says: “The requirement contained in article 7 of Annex II that the coastal State is to act on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission if it establishes the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200

24

The ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 11, states that “The CLCS should accept a reasonable interpretation of relevant provisions of the Convention provided by a coastal State making a submission. If the Commission considers that the submission of the coastal State cannot reasonably be considered to be in accordance with the Convention, the Commission may make recommendations accordingly”.

25

Article 3, Annex II, is reproduced supra, after note 9. 675


nautical miles indicates that it cannot establish these outer limits on the basis of information that has not been considered by the Commission” (emphasis added).26 The fact that the States Parties cannot claim just any arbitrary basis for their proposed limits, but rather must establish them based only upon information that the Commission has considered, seems to counter the ILA’s emphasis on the States’ freedom of action as long as they act according to the Rules the Commission sets. However, in one sense, the States themselves set the Rules since the Meeting of States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (SPLOS) appoints the members of the Commission, which is competent to adopt the Rules. Through this power of appointment the States Parties are involved, even if only indirectly, in setting the terms by which their freedom of action would be circumscribed. The question of who has the authority to promulgate the Rules of Procedure is but one aspect of the Commission’s competences, which are discussed at length in both the First (2004-Berlin) and Second (2006-Toronto) ILA Reports. The influence of the 2004 ILA Report is evident in the 2005 Legal Opinion of the UN Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Commission.27 For example, the Opinion states that the Convention grants no explicit authority to the Commission to adopt its own Rules of Procedure and that the Commission “can do so only by exercising a power which is conferred upon it by necessary implication being essential to the performance of its duties”.28 The Legal Opinion stresses the competence of the Commission to adopt its own Rules of Procedure and its “ultimate authority” to “determine what particulars of the limits of the continental shelf concerned … meet the requirements of article 76”.29 However, the Opinion balances this competence against the States’ authority to submit “new particulars related to the ;originally= proposed outer limits of its continental shelf ”.30 It also provides that there is “nothing in the Convention that precludes” such a resubmission by the State if, while reassessing in good faith the data contained in its submission” it concludes that some of the particulars need to be adjusted.31 Once the Commission has considered a State’s submission or submissions, it issues a recommendation, which is to serve as the basis of any limits set by the

26


27

CLCS/46, Legal opinion (supra, note 3), 1.

28


29


30


31


676


coastal State.32 In keeping with its emphasis, however understated, on coastal State “freedom of action”, the ILA noted in its First Report that several authors considered the phrase “on the basis of ” to allow the coastal State “a certain flexibility”.33 The Report posited that: “[a]rguably, a coastal State may establish other outer limit lines, as long as these fall within the scope of the reasons indicated by the CLCS for recommending outer limit lines different from those included in the submission.”34 But again, such freedom of action goes only so far, as there must still be some connection between any outer limit lines that are claimed other than those recommended by the Commission and for the reasons the Commissions states in its recommendations. Finally, the history of the phrase “on the basis of ” indicates that the desire was to have some limits on coastal State action. The language originally proposed for the text that later became article 76(8) was “taking into account” but the geographically disadvantaged States argued successfully for replacing this with “on the basis of ”. They reasoned that the original proposal gave too much leeway to the coastal States to disregard the Commission’s recommendations if they had only to take them into account but not determine the limits on the basis of those recommendations.35 Although not discussed in the ILA Reports, domestic legislation is another means by which coastal States influence the outcome of the submissions process, if not exactly an exercise of State freedom of action. Each State’s legislation defining its continental shelf, if it exists, basically serves as the starting point for any submission that State makes to the Commission. The effect is to give the national legislator a formative role in the necessary interplay between domestic legislation and international law in defining the continental shelf.36

32

CLCS/40 (supra, note 8), Rules of Procedure, Rule 53(4): “In case of disagreement” with the recommendation, the state in question “shall make a revised or new submission … within a reasonable time.”

33

ILA First Report (supra, note 7), 22, note 106.

34

ILA First Report, (supra, note 7), 22.

35

ILA First Report, (supra, note 7), 21.

36

See Australia: Pearl Fisheries Act 1952, Submerged land (Petroleum) Act 1967, Continental Shelf (Living Natural Resources) Act 1968 – repealed 1952 Pearl Fisheries Act. Serdy (supra, note 13), 203, states: “The same definition was used in the Continental Shelf (Living Natural Resources) Act 1968, which repealed the Pearl Fisheries Act 1952, and was continued into the present legislation, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, which in its original form gave the Governor-General power to declare by Proclamation ‘not inconsistently with the Convention on the Continental Shelf or any relevant international agreement to which Australia is a party, the limits of the whole or any part of the continental shelf of Australia.’” Serdy continues at 204: “In 1994, in advance of the entry into force of UNCLOS, the Australian Parliament amended the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 to replace the reference to the 1958 Convention with a like reference to UNCLOS.” 677


The ILA’s Explanatory Note regarding the phrase “final and binding” is much shorter than the Explanatory Note discussing “on the basis of ”. Conclusion No. 11 reads in part: “The term ‘final’ means that the outer limits shall no longer be subject to change. The term ‘binding’ implies an obligation to accept the outer limits as established. … Outer limits lines that have not been established in accordance with these requirements ;the substantive and procedural requirements of article 76= will not become binding on other States.”37 The Explanatory Note to Conclusion No. 11 points out that a limits line can be challenged until it is final and binding, and that the grounds for that challenge is that the lines were not established “on the basis of ” the Commission’s recommendations.38 Related to the issue of the finality of limits set by a coastal State is the effect of the closed proceedings on the ability of other States to know whether the limits set by a coastal State are based on the Commission’s recommendations.39 The Commission amended its Rules of Procedure in May 2003 to provide that when the Secretary-General gives due publicity to the limits deposited by the coastal State, as required under article 76(9), it shall also publicize the Commission’s recommendations.40 However, the Commission retains considerable control over which information it makes public under the language of Rule 54(3), which requires the Secretary-General to publicize only those parts of “the recommendations of the Commission which in the view of the Commission are related to those limits”.41 The Second Report of the ILA weighs in on the side of allowing the coastal State and the Commission to control the amount of information made

37


38


39

The ILA First and Second Reports both discuss this effect, see e.g., ILA First Report (supra, note 7), 22, note 108. As the footnote points out, the Commission dealt with this at its twelfth session in May 2003. ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), Conclusion No. 19, “Information available to States other than the State or States making a submission in respect of a submission, its consideration by the Commission and recommendations by the Commission”, 23-25.

40

ILA First Report (supra, note 7), section 5.2, page 13, where, in addition to discussing Rule 54(3), the First Report also points out that States can also decide themselves to publicize additional information beyond that required in Rule 54(3).

41

Emphasis added. Rule 54(3) reads in full: “Upon giving due publicity to the charts and relevant information, including geodetic data, permanently describing the outer limits of the continental shelf deposited by the coastal State in accordance with article 76, paragraph 9, of the Convention, the Secretary-General shall give due publicity also to the recommendations of the Commission which in the view of the Commission are related to those limits.”

678


public. It is at this point that the freedom of action of the coastal State (to retain maximum control and confidentiality over information presented as part of its submission) and the interests of the Commission (in keeping the submissions proceedings confidential) may correspond more directly than at any other point in the submissions process, but this correlation is not a satisfactory grounds for suppression of information. The Second Report focuses particularly on balancing the rights and obligations of the submitting State with those of other States, and on the notion of proportionality: “There are limits to the means the CLCS may employ to make additional information on a submission, its consideration or recommendations available. In imposing requirements on a submitting State, care should be taken to balance the rights and obligations of that State and other States. Additional requirements imposed on the coastal State have to meet the principle of proportionality. The requirements have to be proportionate to the end they intend to accomplish in the light of the interests involved. In addition, the Commission has to act in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and any requirement it imposes on a coastal State has to meet this obligation.”42 The Second Report emphasizes the options for non-submitting States to access information about both the proceedings and the limits ultimately set by the coastal State in question.43 However, neither these measures nor the ILA Reports address satisfactorily the problem of limited access to information for those States not party to the submissions process. This stance is at odds with trends towards greater transparency in other international fora, including the ITLOS itself as well as WTO dispute panels and appellate bodies.44

42


43

Discussion of Conclusion No. 19, ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 23-24: “For instance, article 9 of Annex II provides that the actions of the Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries between States. This provision offers the possibility of requiring the coastal State making a submission to make available certain information on its proposed outer limits. Such requirements have to be proportional to the end they intend to accomplish and have to be in accordance with the Convention.”

44

See generally, McNab, “The Case for Transparency …” (supra, note 2), passim. H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, Unity within Diversity (2003), §321, discusses the WTO’s move toward greater internal and external transparency, albeit with reference to sessions other than dispute settlement proceedings. The Business Roundtable is among groups calling for greater transparency in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings, see e.g. . 679


II. Lack of Legal Expertise and Competence to Interpret the Convention Just how problematic is the absence of legal expertise on the Commission, whose elected members include no lawyers? The First ILA Report indicates that this concern is “mitigated” as long as disputes can be submitted under Part XV of the LOS Convention, and the Commission can turn to the UN Legal Counsel for advice and to the Meeting of the States parties for clarification.45 The First ILA Report mentions the conclusion of the UN Legal Counsel in a 1998 Opinion Letter, that the CLCS “might be considered as a “treaty organ” of the UN,46 and that this fact is relevant to its ability to carry out the functions that the Convention assigned to it. Notable among those Commission functions is the independent evaluation of the submissions it receives from the coastal States. The First ILA Report asserts this at the outset of the discussion on competence, not in order to address specifically the absence of legal experts on the Commission but to set the stage for confirming the competences the Commission needs for its treaty purposes regardless of Commission makeup.47 Because those treaty purposes clearly encompass situations in which the Commission of non-lawyers will have to interpret the legal text that is article 76 of the Convention, the question of its ability to do so needed to be addressed. In 2004, the First Report of the ILA viewed the Commission’s implied competence to interpret 76 restrictively48 in contrast to its express competence to make independent

45

ILA First Report (supra, note 7), 4: “The absence of legal expertise in the Commission is also mitigated by the fact that it can seek advice in legal matters from the Legal Counsel of the United Nations and that the secretariat of the Commission is in the Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea of the United Nations Secretariat. This may assist the Commission to decide how to deal with legal issues that it will be confronted with. The Commission may also consider requesting the Meeting of States parties to the Convention for a clarification or recommendation on specific issues. In the case of controversial issues, it may be difficult for the Meeting of States parties to assist the Commission in this respect.” Footnotes omitted.

46

ILA First Report (supra, note 7), 4, note 21, The Legal Counsel of the United Nations has observed in a legal opinion (CLCS/46, supra, note 3), that “Evidently, the Commission is neither a principal nor a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, but might be considered as a ‘treaty organ’ of the Organization. Indeed, there is a group of organs which, though their establishment is provided for in a treaty, are so closely linked with the United Nations that they are considered organs of the Organization (Letter dated 11 March 1998 from the Legal Counsel, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Legal Affairs, Addressed to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. CLCS/5 of 11 March 1998, at 1, para. 2)”.

47

ILA First Report (supra, note 7), 4.

48

See ILA First Report (supra, note 7), text associated with note 29.

680


assessments of the technical and scientific information it receives.49 In 2006, the Second Report of the ILA tied the Commission’s interpretive competence closely to that needed for performance of its functions and once again emphasized the view that the States’ inherent powers to interpret are determinative if they are reasonable.50 Such a restrictive view of way the Commission’s ability to interpret legal texts is in keeping with the Second Report’s thematic assertion of States Parties’ freedom of action and their ultimate authority over the Commission. The Second Report of the ILA addresses “The functions and competence of the CLCS”, in Conclusion No. 9, concluding as follows: “In carrying out its functions the CLCS may be confronted with different interpretations of provisions of article 76. The Commission has to be presumed to be competent to deal with issues concerning the interpretation or application of article 76 or other relevant articles of the Convention to the extent this is required to carry out the functions which are explicitly assigned to it. This implicit competence of the CLCS does not replace the competence of the States Parties to interpret the Convention. The CLCS should accept a reasonable interpretation of relevant provisions of the Convention provided by a coastal State making a submission.”51 With this passage, the ILA makes very clear that the Commission’s competence to interpret does not replace the States’ competence to interpret. It is almost as though the ILA wants States to assign to the CLCS the competence needed to put it on the same footing as States, but only for the functions that the States have entrusted to the Commission. The ILA may have begun here to articulate reasonableness as its answer to the age-old dilemma of the relationship between an international organization or treaty body and its Member States.52 It presents reasonableness as the limit on both the Commission and the States Parties.

49

Jennings (supra, note 9), 415-416, takes the drawing of maritime boundaries as an example of the usefulness of international lawyers consulting with hydrographers and other scientists, in his larger discussion of “questions and matters where it is better that decisions should be firmly in the hands of people other than international lawyers and where international lawyers as such, if they have a role at all, will have one which is ancillary to the role of decision makers with quite other skills”.

50


51

ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 11: Conclusion No. 9, The functions and competence of the CLCS.

52

J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2005), 12, identifies “the problematic relationship between the organization and its member states” as the “heart of the entire concept of international organization”. While the CLCS is not an international organization in the classic sense, as a treaty organ some of the same issues are relevant in its relationship vis-à-vis the States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. 681


The Commission’s competence is to be interpreted restrictively in its exercise of legal tasks, i.e. interpretation of article 76 and other provisions of the Convention. However, the Commission’s competence is not viewed restrictively when it is exercised in an area of its technical expertise. ILA Conclusion No. 9 continues: “The competence of the CLCS is not to be interpreted restrictively as far as the evaluation of scientific and technical data submitted by the coastal State is concerned. The Commission has the function to make an independent assessment of such scientific and technical data. This implies a power to establish whether the scientific and technical data submitted by a coastal State proves that the conditions which allow the specific delineation of the outer limit of the continental shelf are met.” In its Explanatory Note to Conclusion No. 9, the ILA’s emphasis on the States’ freedom of action is again evident, this time as their broad competence to interpret article 76. The Note also elaborates the limits on the Commission’s competence, pointing to the important legal limit contained in article 9 of Annex II to the Convention, that its “actions shall not prejudice maters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States”.53 The ILA sees a number of consequences for the Commission of this restrictive view of its competence to interpret article 76,54 but no additional obligations for the coastal States. It views the Commission’s Rules of Procedure and its Scientific and Technical Guidelines as acceptable channels for the Commission to “implement or provide an interpretation” of Convention provisions.55 In order to examine potential legal consequences of the Commission’s actions for States Parties, the ILA distinguishes between three areas: the Commission’s own internal procedural rules, its consideration of scientific and technical data, and its “interpretation of substantive provisions of the Convention”.56 With respect to the Commission’s interpretation of article 76, the ILA Explanatory Note states: “[t]he Commission is required to act in accordance with article 76 and it has to establish how this requirement is to be given effect. Actions of the Commission to implement the obligation to act in accordance with article 76 do not curtail the competence of the States Parties to interpret the Convention”.57

53

ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 12, footnote 43; 24.

54


55

ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 13. For the Scientific and Technical Guidelines see supra, note 10.

56

ILA First Report (supra, note 7), 6-7.

57


682


According to the First ILA Report, the coastal State retains considerable interpretive authority, for example as to whether it has established its limits in accordance with the Commission’s recommendations.58 The ILA sees as a consequence of this State authority the result that a court or tribunal, and not the Commission, would be the appropriate body to determine whether the limits have been established in accordance with the Commission’s recommendations.59 In this way, the Commission does not sit as a judge in its own case, and the coastal State would presumably have to follow the recommendation of the court or tribunal if it wanted to be considered as being in compliance with article 76(8) of the Convention.60 The Commission has not generally operated on a vision as explicitly Statecentric as that set forth in the ILA Reports. Indeed the Commission resisted when Brazil sought to submit revised materials as part of the submissions process.61 The Commission questioned Brazil’s authority to determine what new materials could be submitted and eventually sought a Legal Opinion from the UN Legal Counsel. In the end, this was only one factor leading to the Revision of the Rules of Procedure to allow greater participation by the coastal States in determining what materials they present as part of the submissions process.62 The Commission amended the Rules of Procedure in 2006 to require each sub-commission considering a specific case to “invite” the coastal State delegation “to one or several meetings at which it shall provide a comprehensive presentation of its views and general conclusions arising from the examination of a part or all of the submission”.63 This invitation is to take place at an “advanced stage” of the Commission’s examination of the submission. This amendment renders the entire

58

ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 27, note 142: “Only the coastal State is competent to decide what follow-up it will give to the recommendations of the Commission and to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf. This indicates that, also in cases in which the coastal State has established the limits of its outer continental shelf on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, it is the coastal State which is responsible for the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of article 76. A dispute concerning the interpretation or application of article 76 thus constitutes a dispute between the coastal State and the other State(s) concerned.”

59

ILA First Report (supra, note 7), 11.

60

See ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), Conclusion No. 21, more generally for the role of tribunals in deciding disputes between a State and the Commission.

61

For details of the Commission’s response to Brazil’s efforts to submit revised materials, see CLCS/46 Legal opinion (supra, note 3), 1-2.

62

See generally, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the progress of work in the Commission, UN Doc. CLCS/50, CLCS 17th Sess. (20 March-21 April 2006).

63

CLCS/50 (supra, note 62), para. 36, amending section IV(10) of annex III to the Rules of Procedure. In all, the amendment consists of three new paragraphs: 3, 4, and 5. 683


proceeding more collaborative and participatory, in the nature if not in the exact detail of an administrative rule-making procedure in the United States. A more exchange-based but not quite adversarial component is also added by the other amendment made at the spring 2006 meeting of the Commission’s seventeenth session: the coastal State is given the opportunity to present a response to the sub-commission’s presentations and it is only after these presentations that the sub-commission is to prepare its recommendations.64 The document containing the 2006 amendments to the Rules of Procedure, CLCS/50, also contains another indication of efforts to return some of the control of the article 76 submissions process to States Parties, or at least provide them greater participation in it. The Commission voted to amend Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure to diminish its own power to determine which of its proceedings are “relevant” for the purpose of participation by the submitting State. The original version of Rule 52 gave the submitting State the opportunity to participate in the session at which its submission would be considered, without the right to vote, “in the proceedings deemed relevant by the Commission pursuant to section VII of Annex III to these Rules” (emphasis added).65 The revised sentence refers instead to the right to participate, without vote, “in the relevant proceedings of the Commission pursuant to section VII of Annex III to these Rules” (emphasis added). That such State participation would undoubtedly increase the amount of time required to consider each submission was also mentioned (para. 45). The overall effect of this change is to shift the determination of which proceedings are relevant for State participation from the Commission ultimately to the States. This contribution has not considered all legal questions raised by the activity of the Commission, nor all of the legal issues discussed in ILA resolution No. 2/2006 or its First and Second Reports. For example, the need for increased participation by non-submitting States who might be affected by the limits being set is discussed at length in Part 5 of the First ILA Report. Another legal issue that could be discussed at greater length is article 8 of Annex II to the Convention, which allows to a coastal State that disagrees with the Commission’s recommendations a reasonable time to present a revised or new submission.66 This point is taken up in Conclusions Nos 17 through 19 of the ILA Second Report. What amounts to a reasonable time? How much turnaround time should be

64

CLCS/50, ibid. para. 36, which contains the new paragraph 5.

65

CLCS/50, ibid. para. 43.

66

Art. 8 of Annex II: “In the case of a disagreement by the coastal state with the recommendations of the Commission, the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, make a revised or new submission to the Commission.”

684


allowed the Commission? What must the new submission contain and how must it differ from the original submission?67 The Opinion of the Legal Counsel to the United Nations issued at the Commission’s request when Brazil sought to revise its submission68 appears to be trying to find a balance between articulating the necessary limits on the activities of the Commission in answering such questions while at the same time giving this body the leeway it needs in order to accomplish its work as effectively and efficiently as possible. For its part, the ILA continues to emphasize the need for coastal State freedom of action, and the States’ commitment under article 300 of the Law of the Sea Convention to fulfil their obligations in good faith.69 This latter emphasis on good faith offers a useful reminder of the standard applied to States, begging at the same time the question of what standard the Commission should follow. Another ILA Committee, on Accountability of International Organisations, began to offer answers to this important question for organizations with its Final Report in 2004.70 Presumably the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, while not an international organization, is also held to the general rule in article 31, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith”. J. Klabbers, referring to the General Assembly’s obligation to consider in good faith applications for membership,71 suggests a good faith obligation for organs of the United Nations, but does not discuss whether it would extend to a treaty body such as the Commission.72 In discussing the work of the ILA Committee on Responsibility of International Organisations, K. Wellens asserts – again, with reference to international organizations and not to bodies such as the Commission – that “The fundamental principle of good faith is governing all acts, activities and conduct of IO-s, irrespective of their individual or particular category features”.73 The ILA Report itself states “IO-s, their organs,

67

The ILA suggests that the Commission itself can issue clarifications in the course of a proceeding as to what documentation it requires. ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 13.

68

CLCS/46, Legal opinion (supra, note 3).

69

Regarding good faith, see, e.g., ILA Second Report (supra, note 7), 19-22, passim.

70

Final Report, Accountability of International Organisations, in International Law Association Report of the Seventy-First Conference (ILA, Berlin: 2004), available at <www. ila-hq.org/html/layout_committee.htm>; under “Committees”, see List of Committees, Former Committees which have completed their work.

71

As established in Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), advisory opinion, [1948] ICJ Reports 57, Klabbers (supra, note 52), 109.

72

On the Commission’s status as a treaty body, see discussion supra, note 52.

73

K. Wellens, “The Primary Model Rules of Accountability of International Organizations: The Principles and Rules Governing their Conduct or the Yardsticks for their Accountability”, 685


and their agents are under a general legal obligation to act in all their dealings in accordance with the principle of good faith”.74 The Report also asserts that the principle of good faith has “given rise to the need for standards of honesty, fairness, reasonableness”, associating these as well with the need for consistency of treatment in like cases and the related legitimate expectations.75 Whether the answers to legal issues raised in the article 76 submissions process are of small or large import, the Commission, the coastal States that submit proposed limits, and other States potentially affected by such limits all must continue to work toward establishing a working mutual trust. They must be able to develop a system of communication and procedure whereby not every question needs to be answered by a panel of outside academics or by the Legal Counsel to the United Nations. Such a relationship should be understood as the necessary foundation for a properly functioning institution or treaty organ. It can be accomplished by setting clear legal standards for the behavior of all actors. If the Commission can provide tangible evidence that it acknowledges the States’ freedom of action (as it has, for example, in amending Rule of Procedure 52) and can adhere to standards of reasonableness and procedural and operational transparency in carrying out its responsibilities under article 76 of the Convention, the ILA’s repeated emphasis on State freedom of action will become more than a hortatory response to the concerns over legal issues generated by the work of the Commission.

in N.M. Blokker & H.G. Schermers (eds), Proliferation of International Organizations, Legal Issues (2001), 433-470, 452. 74

Final Report, Accountability of International Organisations (supra, note 70), 11. Tellingly, when good faith is mentioned in the indices of recent treatises on international organizations, it is in reference to obligations of States and not of organizations. See e.g., C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2nd edn 2005), 76. Blokker & Schermers do not include the heading in the index to their comprehensive treatise International Institutional Law (2003) (supra, note 44).

75

Final Report, Accountability of International Organisations (supra, note 70), 11.

686

THE RISE AND RISE OF IMO’S LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION REGIMES Rosalie Balkin*

I. Introduction

N

ineteen sixty-seven was a seminal year for the International Maritime Organization (IMO). On 18 March of that year, at 09:11, the supertanker Torrey Canyon, with her cargo of 117,000 tonnes of crude oil, was reported aground on Seven Stones Reef, located between the Isle of Scilly and Lands End, off the south-west coast of the United Kingdom. Eight days later, 60,000 tonnes of that crude oil had already spilled into the sea, polluting hundreds of miles of coastline and beaches. The containment and cleanup operations undertaken by the United Kingdom Government were on a scale such as to prompt it to take the unprecedented step of bringing the incident to the attention of the IMCO1 Council. The issues, both technical and legal, generated by the incident were to form the basis of IMO’s work for many years to come. From the outset, there was general recognition that these could only be satisfactorily resolved through concerted international action, supported by concurrent changes to prevailing international law. As stated by the United Kingdom Government in their note on the subject “international law governing such matters does not adequately take into account the interests of countries which may have no direct interest in the ship or its cargoes but the territory of which may be affected by accident to the ship. In future accidents … in order to protect its coasts from pollution, the Government of the coastal State may wish

*

The views expressed in this article are those of the author personally and do not necessarily reflect those of the Organization.

1

Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. The name was changed to International Maritime Organization in 1982 to take account of the changing nature of the Organization and to reflect the fact that it was no longer merely a consultative body but rather a fully fledged international body with a clearly defined mandate of its own.



to take certain measures which might cut across the rights of owners, salvors and insurers and indeed the Government of the flag of the vessel”.2 Among the major issues confronting the Organization were the legal and procedural obstacles put in the way of innocent victims of pollution incidents who, more often than not, would be unsuccessful in obtaining compensation. Quite apart from the practical measures put in place by IMO to empower coastal States to take action in such situations,3 the Organization, through an ad hoc Legal Committee especially established for the purpose,4 also set about developing a sound legal basis to resolve issues of liability and compensation for damage caused to third parties through accidents involving oil tankers, particularly where the tankers happen to be foreign-flagged vessels in international waters. The result was the adoption of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (CLC)5 and, in quick succession thereafter, that of the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (Fund Convention).6 The United Kingdom, in its initial submission to the IMCO Council, had suggested that: “as the causes of such damage are inherent in the type and quantity of this cargo, it is for consideration whether tanker owners or operators should accept liability, independent of negligence, to cover damage arising out of pollution caused by accidents to tankers … In either case it would be for consideration (a) whether some form of insurance might be made compulsory and (b) whether special principles should be agreed to enable Governments and other injured persons to recover costs of fighting pollution in the sea, cleaning polluted beaches and so on.”7

2

Doc. C/ES.III/3, para. 14.

3

The most immediate being the adoption of the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969, which affirmed the right of a coastal State to take necessary and reasonably proportionate measures to counteract a maritime casualty posing a grave and imminent danger of oil pollution to its coastline or related interests (arts I, V). Art. 211 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 subsequently built on and expanded these provisions.

4

The Legal Committee was elevated to the status of a permanent organ of the Organization in 1975.

5

In considering this issue the Committee was assisted by the Comité Maritime International (CMI) which had prepared a preliminary draft text of the Convention that was to become the CLC. The CLC entered into force on 19 June 1975.

6

This entered into force on 16 October 1978.

7

Doc. C/ES.III/3, para. 14(2).

688

The Rise and Rise of IMO’s Liability and Compensation Regimes

These suggestions formed the parameters of the study undertaken by the Committee8 and helped to fashion the key elements of the liability and compensation scheme for ship-source oil pollution that was ultimately to emerge; and, while this scheme has over the years been subject to regular review, these key elements have, thus far, remained constant. Moreover, these same elements with or without modification, have been repeated in, and have formed the backbone of, other liability and compensation regimes subsequently developed by the Organization.

II. Key Elements The first of these key elements is strict liability, that is, liability independent of fault. Prior to the introduction of the scheme, liability had been linked to the common law (or equivalent) system of fault, necessitating, in practice, that the victim of an oil pollution incident prove that the shipowner (or any other defendant) had negligently discharged the oil in circumstances where a duty was owed to that person not to cause harm and where it was reasonably foreseeable that harm would most likely result. The burden of proof, already notoriously difficult to discharge in the case of accidents onshore, was rendered even more so where the accident took place at sea, given the concomitant problems of establishing jurisdiction and applicable law, especially in an era before the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, and where State practice as to what constituted the territorial sea varied greatly. With the introduction of a treaty provision linking the liability of the owner of the ship to causation alone9 coupled with another requiring all States Parties to ensure that their courts possess the necessary jurisdiction to entertain actions for compensation based on strict liability,10 these problems largely disappeared. The shipowner was exonerated from liability11 only in the limited circumstances set out in the CLC, namely, if he could prove that the damage: – resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character; – was wholly and intentionally caused by a third party; or 8

See Council’s instructions: Doc. C/ES.III/5, para. 16.

9

I.e., that the damage was caused by the incident involving the oil tanker. 1969 CLC, art. III(1).

10

Ibid. art. IX(2).

11

In this connection, a proposal by the oil industry based on its voluntary scheme, the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) that, instead of strict liability, the shipowner should have to prove absence of fault in order to escape liability (the so-called “reverse burden of proof ”) was not accepted. 689


– was wholly caused by the negligence of the Government or other authority responsible for maintaining lights or other navigational aids.12 The scope of application of the above provisions was limited, at first, to “the territory, including the territorial sea, of a Contracting State”.13 Amendments introduced by the 1992 CLC Protocol subsequently extended the scope of application to include the exclusive economic zone of the Contracting State,14 thereby ensuring, to all intents and purposes, liability coverage for all oil tanker spills, wherever at sea they occur. Another key element, that of requiring the shipowner to take out compulsory insurance,15 is aimed at ensuring that the shipowner always has available the necessary financial resources to pay for any compensation that might be decided upon, an outcome that was by no means guaranteed under the hitherto-prevailing system of tortious liability. It is coupled with the provision16 that any claim for compensation may be brought directly against the insurer rather than the injured party being required to proceed in the first instance against the shipowner.17 These innovations have also resulted in substantially simplifying and expediting the process of recovery of damages, in the vast majority of cases without the need to resort to the lengthy and costly litigious proceedings which is an unfortunate hallmark, at least, of the common law system. Moreover, because the right to claim compensation is qualified, not by reference to any particular category of potential claimants, but, rather, in the main, by reference to the nature of the damage that has resulted, that is, pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or been discharged from the ship involved in the incident,18 and, in the absence of any requirement to prove fault on the part of the shipowner, the ready access to insurance to cover such damage has resulted in substantially broadening the range of successful claimants. Prior to the introduction of the CLC/Fund Convention scheme, the legal framework covered a comparatively closed milieu of shipowners, cargo owners,

12

Ibid. art. III(2). See also art. III(3).

13

Ibid. art. II.

14

Or, where a State has not yet proclaimed such a zone, to an area of not more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured: 1992 CLC Protocol, art. 3(a)(ii).

15

1969 CLC, art. VII(1). This is implemented through the requirement that each ship carry on board a certificate attesting that the ship is covered by insurance or other financial security: art. VII(2).

16

1969 CLC, art. VII(8).

17

Which hitherto was required under the “pay to be paid” rule in protection and indemnity (P&I) policies.

18

1969 CLC, art. I(6); 1992 Protocol, art. 2(3).

690


ship passengers and port or harbour authorities. The potential victims of pollution damage emanating from oil tankers the size of, or greater than, the Torrey Canyon are much more numerous and heterogeneous and extend, additionally, to local authorities, the tourism sector which includes hotel proprietors and their guests, restaurant and amusement park owners, market gardeners and other suppliers of goods and services – the list goes on. None are excluded per se from claiming under the scheme although claims for so-called pure economic loss – those unconnected to actual physical damage – will succeed only if they are adjudged to be sufficiently closely linked to the contamination.19 In these cases, proof of causation alone is not sufficient. To balance the obligation to take out compulsory insurance and, indeed, to facilitate that process, the 1969 CLC permits shipowners to limit their liability for damage caused by oil spills at sea.20 The notion of limitation of liability is not new to the shipping world – the practice in various forms dates back centuries21 and the maximum ceiling decided upon in the Convention (for any one incident an aggregate amount of FFR 2,000 for each ton of the ship’s tonnage)22 bears a direct relationship to that available under the then prevailing International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships, 1957.23 Given the trend since that time towards building even larger oil tankers than the Torrey Canyon, with the potential to cause even more serious environmental harm, it was inevitable that the then record limitation ceiling would very quickly be out of date. And so it has proved. Increasing the limits of liability to keep up with the costs of compensation and re-instatement of the marine environment has, accordingly, been a prime motivating factor behind each subsequent round of amendments to the 1969 CLC;24 furthermore, in order to speed up the process of amendments to the limitation ceiling, a new clause introduced into the 1992 19

The criteria for determining whether claims for pure economic loss are admissible under the scheme are, in general, more generous than those used by courts in negligence actions.

20

But not if the incident occurred as a result of the actual fault or privity of the owner: CLC, art. V(2).

21

The practice stems from acknowledgement of the dangers inherent in shipping goods by sea and recognition of the inescapable economic fact that, in the event of an accident, creditors are unlikely to recover their losses in full and are, consequently, better off being guaranteed payment of a substantial percentage of the compensation due rather than have a theoretical but hollow right to full compensation: see C. Hill, Maritime Law, 6th edn, 2003, p. 394 et seq.

22

1969 CLC, art. V(1).

23

It is, in fact, double that amount.

24

Pursuant to article 6(1) of the 1992 CLC Protocol, the shipowner is entitled to limit his liability “in respect of any one incident to an aggregate amount calculated as follows: (a) 3 million units of account for a ship not exceeding 5,000 units of tonnage; 691


CLC Protocol25 empowers the Legal Committee of IMO to amend the limits of liability using the so-called tacit amendment procedure,26 thereby bypassing the traditional, but more cumbersome, procedure associated with amendments adopted by diplomatic conferences.27 It has already been put to good use by the Committee to substantially increase the compensation available to victims of ship-source oil pollution.28 However, the principle of limitation itself has remained a constant feature of the CLC/Fund Convention regime. By way of illustration, a proposal to develop new criteria to make it easier to break the shipowner’s right to limitation, the aim being to empower the 1992 Fund to take recourse action against shipowners operating sub-standard ships, was rejected by a Working Group set up by the 1992 Fund Assembly in April 2000 to examine the adequacy of the international compensation regime established by the 1992 Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. In so doing, the view was expressed that rogue shipowners should be pursued through other international conventions which regulated quality shipping and pursuant to which sanctions might be imposed; but that it was inappropriate to try to achieve this objective by watering down the shipowner’s traditional and firmly entrenched right to limit liability. Alongside the provisions requiring shipowners to take out the requisite insurance are those effectively precluding claims for compensation being pursued against other individuals – the so-called “channelling of liability” provisions, another striking feature of the CLC/Fund Convention regime. The rationale behind this provision is not altogether clear but appears to be based largely on practical considerations, in particular, by requiring claims to be pursued against the shipowner, who must also take out insurance to cover such claims, it clarifies,

(b) for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof, for each additional unit of tonnage, 420 units of account in addition to the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (a); provided, however, that this aggregate amount shall not in any event exceed 59.7 million units of account”. 25

1992 CLC Protocol, art. 15.

26

Used on a regular basis by IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee and Marine Environment Protection Committee to effect amendments of a technical nature to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as amended by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78), respectively.

27

Not only is the need to specially convene a diplomatic conference bypassed by this procedure, but also the need to enact new legislation on each occasion that an amendment is adopted under the tacit amendment procedure.

28

At its eighty-second session in November 2000: see Res. LEG.1(82). The Committee also used the procedure to effect similar amendments to the 1992 Fund Protocol: see Res. LEG.2(82).

692


from the victim’s point of view, not only the person responsible for any pollution damage but also ensures that adequate compensation will be forthcoming.29 Under the original 1969 CLC, channelling meant that no claims for pollution damage “under this Convention or otherwise” might be levied against servants or agents of the shipowner.30 This exclusion was substantially extended under the 1992 CLC, to cover, inter alia, crew members, pilots, charterers, salvors and persons taking preventive measures.31 It is open to the criticism that, by requiring any claims for liability to be directed solely to the registered owner of the ship or his insurer, other parties who might be responsible, at least in part, for their role in causing oil pollution damage are allowed to escape all responsibility,32 thereby failing to discourage the use of sub-standard ships or other, less than safe, shipping practices. Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly the case that strict channelling, together with compulsory insurance and a stringent test for breaking liability, has benefited claimants, especially those without the financial means to sustain long and costly litigation aimed at establishing who may be liable and, if so, whether that person is entitled to maintain the right to limit liability.33 One final feature of the CLC/Fund Convention regime worthy of special note is the burden-sharing arrangement it establishes between shipping interests and oil interests. This emerged as an issue during negotiations at the 1969 diplomatic conference at which the Civil Liability Convention was adopted.34 The concern was two-fold: on the one hand, limitation of liability meant that,

29

Channelling provisions are also contained in the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960; the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963; and the Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, 1971, all of which make the operator of a nuclear installation exclusively liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident occurring in the course of the maritime carriage of nuclear material. As pointed out by H. Tanikawa, “A Revolution in Maritime Law: a History of the Original Legal Framework on Oil Spill Liability and Compensation”, in: The IOPC Funds (ed.), The IOPC Funds’ 25 Years of Compensating Victims of Oil Pollution Incidents, 2003, p. 51 at p. 53, channelling in these instances was motivated by the fact that, without such exemptions from liability, suppliers of nuclear fuels, materials or technology would not agree to supply these to the operators of nuclear installations.

30

1969 CLC, art. III(4).

31

1992 CLC, art. 4(2).

32

Unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result: 1992 CLC, art. 4(2).

33

See A.H.E. Popp, “Oil Spills – Who Pays for them and How Much”, unpublished paper presented at Spillcon, Sydney Australia, September 2002.

34

See T. Mensah, “The IOPC Funds: How It All Started”, The IOPC Funds’ 25 Years of Compensating Victims of Oil Pollution Incidents, p. 45 at pp. 46 et seq., available at <www. iopcfund.org/npdf/jub_en.pdf>. 693


in the more serious incidents, victims might not obtain full compensation, and on the other hand, channelling of liability meant that shipowners bore the entire compensation burden, irrespective of whether others might have been at fault. Due to time constraints, these complex issues could not be resolved at the diplomatic conference. Instead, a resolution was adopted35 calling on IMO to develop a supplementary compensation scheme based on the existence of an international fund, with the aim of fully and adequately compensating victims of oil pollution incidents while, at the same time, relieving the shipowner of the additional financial burden this might entail. The end result was the adoption of the 1971 Fund Convention which established the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund), which could be drawn upon to provide compensation to victims of oil pollution incidents when the compensation under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention was inadequate36 and which was financed by contributions from oil cargo interests.37 The balance of obligations between shipowner interests and oil cargo interests thus established was faithfully carried over into the 1992 Protocols to the two Conventions. More recently, with the adoption of the Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol),38 also financed by contributions from oil cargo interests, there has been a great deal of debate as to whether this balance has been upset and is no longer equitable. To counteract this criticism,39 the International Group of P&I Clubs (International Group) have put in place, as of February 2006, two voluntary schemes known, respectively, as the Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement (STOPIA 2006) and the Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement (TOPIA 2006).40

35

Resolution on the Establishment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969.

36

1971 Fund Convention, art. 4. The term “inadequate” covers situations where no liability arises under the 1969 CLC or where the shipowner is incapable of meeting his financial obligations under that Convention, as well as situations where the damages available under the 1969 CLC are insufficient to cover in full the costs of compensation.

37

1971 Fund Convention, art. 10.

38

Which, taken together with the 1992 CLC and Fund Protocols, makes available some USD 1000 million per incident.

39

And to pre-empt any discussions which might result in the further, formal, amendment of the 1992 Protocols so as to re-establish an equitable burden-sharing arrangement.

40

For a full outline of the scheme see Doc. 92FUND/A.ES. 10/3, dated 1 February 2006. The Agreements are attached as Annexes IV and V, respectively.

694


The STOPIA 2006, which will apply to pollution damage in States for which the 1992 Fund Protocol is in place,41 increases, on a voluntary basis, the limitation amount42 applicable to small tankers43 under the 1992 CLC. However, because STOPIA 2006 does not, by its nature, amount to a formal amendment of the 1992 CLC, but is, rather, a contractual arrangement, the 1992 Fund will, in respect of ships covered by the Agreement, continue to be liable to compensate claimants if and to the extent that the total amount of admissible claims exceeds the limitation amount applicable to the tanker under the 1992 CLC. Nevertheless, the Agreement provides that the 1992 Fund would be entitled to indemnification for any difference between the shipowner’s liability under the 1992 CLC and the agreed sum of 20 million SDRs. The TOPIA 2006 covers all tankers entered in one of the P&I Clubs which are members of the International Group and reinsured through the pooling arrangements of the International Group. Unlike the STOPIA 2006, it applies only to compensation payable under the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. Pursuant to the TOPIA 2006, participating tanker owners agree to indemnify the Supplementary Fund for 50 per cent of its liability to pay compensation under the Protocol for pollution damage. As with the STOPIA, because the scheme established by the TOPIA is contractual in nature, it does not affect the legal position under the 1992 CLC and Fund Protocols or the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol, and, consequently, the Supplementary Fund would remain liable to victims of oil spills up to the limits set by those Conventions.44 Taken together, the STOPIA and the TOPIA reflect the commitment given by the International Group to the Assembly of the 1992 Fund, at its 10th Session in October 2005, to put in place binding contractual arrangements to ensure that the overall costs of claims made under the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol continue to be shared equitably between shipping interests and oil cargo interests. They take into account the perception that oil cargo interests, through the 1992 Fund, bear a relatively higher proportion of the compensation payable in respect of incidents involving small tankers, a situation which could only otherwise be alleviated (from the perspective of oil cargo interests) if the 1992 Protocols were to be amended to increase the limits of liability of shipowners.

41

The original STOPIA, which entered into force on 3 March 2005, applied only to pollution damage in States for which the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol was in force: see Doc. 92FUND/A/ES.9/24.

42

Effectively increasing the maximum amount of compensation payable by small tanker owners to 20 million SDR (special drawing rights – approx. GBP 16.6 million).

43

Ships of 29,548 gross tonnage or less.

44

It is for this reason that the Agreement provides for the owner of the tanker involved in such an incident to pay the indemnification directly to the Supplementary Fund rather than to pay extra sums to the claimant. 695


The introduction of the two voluntary schemes appears, at least for the time being, to have deflected calls for the formal amendment of the 1992 Protocols aimed at changing the liability of shipowners. While it has been inevitable that aspects of the liability and compensation scheme established by the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions and Protocols have, from time to time, been subject to criticism over the 28 years of its existence, by and large the scheme has been well received and it is generally regarded as being effective, practical and having served the international community well. It is certainly a fact that the vast majority of claims for compensation made under the scheme have been settled out of court and within a relatively short period of time.45 Those few that have not, have stemmed from the few more serious incidents involving very large and often complex claims, where court action has been inevitable, if only to interrupt prescription periods. These more serious claims have also necessitated, on occasion, the practice of pro-ration of claims required by article 4(5) of the 1992 Fund Protocol,46 which involves paying out, at least initially, only a proportion of the compensation sought. This has been one of the main sources of criticism of the 1992 liability and compensation regime. With the adoption and entry into force of the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol,47 this practice should, hopefully, become a thing of the past, at least insofar as States Parties to the Protocol are concerned.

III. The HNS Convention Quite apart from its undoubted value in providing compensation to victims of oil pollution incidents involving tankers, from the perspective of IMO, the liability and compensation scheme set up by the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions and Protocols is important also for the precedent it has provided, primarily, although by no means exclusively, in connection with the drafting of other liability and compensation schemes for other sources of pollution damage at sea. In this connection, it should be noted that, during negotiations in the Legal Committee appertaining to the 1969 CLC, among the issues explored was the type of damage that might be covered by the proposed Convention. The Committee had before 45

As at the time of writing, the IOPC Funds have dealt with some 135 incidents in over 20 countries and have paid out approximately USD 1,060 million to victims of oil pollution.

46

Art. 4(5) provides that “where the amount of established claims against the Fund exceeds the aggregate amount of compensation payable … the amount available shall be distributed in such a manner that the proportion between any established claim and the amount of compensation actually recovered by the claimant under this Convention shall be the same for all claimants.”

47

On 3 March 2005. The protocol currently has 20 States Parties.

696


it a report prepared for the CMI by the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin, in his capacity as Chairman of a CMI sub-committee established to consider legal issues arising out of the damage caused by the grounding of the Torrey Canyon. In that report, Lord Devlin had suggested the inclusion of all ultra-hazardous cargoes in any liability and compensation scheme that might be developed, not just crude oil carried as cargo.48 The Working Group, set up by the Committee to consider the matter, acknowledged that such an extension would give the proposed Convention a more universal character, but it nonetheless decided that the Committee should limit its consideration to oil pollution as the most hazardous type of pollutant known to be in existence at the time.49 It was not until 1996,50 with the adoption of the International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS Convention), that other hazardous pollutants became subject to an internationally agreed liability and compensation regime. The HNS Convention is quite evidently modelled on both the 1992 Civil Liability and Fund Protocols, but there are differences.51 The first, and most obvious, difference is that, as with oil carried as cargo, although there are two tiers of compensation centred on shipping interests and on cargo interests, these are contained in one comprehensive treaty instrument, rather than in two. The difference is not merely cosmetic – unlike the CLC/Fund Convention regime, participating States do not have the option of seeking to recover compensation merely from the shipowner or his insurer. Accordingly, as a precondition to joining the scheme, States will be compelled to set up the legal machinery necessary to establish the HNS Fund as a legal entity capable of assuming the rights and obligations conferred on it by the HNS Convention,52 to put in place all the administrative and associated legal arrangements connected with identifying receivers of hazardous and noxious substances and to ensure that the reporting requirements of the HNS Convention, as well as those relating to annual contributions, are complied with. Several considerations were behind the decision to amalgamate the two tiers of liability. These included the strongly felt view that it would be inequitable to expect the shipowner to bear full responsibility for damage occurring in the course of carriage by sea of noxious and hazardous substances. This is particularly so

48

Doc. LEG/WG (II) I/WP1.

49

Doc. LEG/WG (II) I/2.

50

A Diplomatic Conference held in 1984 under the auspices of IMO failed to achieve the consensus necessary to adopt a new international instrument.

51

For a full discussion see R.P. Balkin, “The Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention: Travail or Travaux – The Making of an International Convention”, Vol. 20 Austr. Yb. Int’l L., pp. 1-33.

52

HNS Convention, art. 13. 697


in cases where the shipowner, through no fault of his own, might not have been aware of the hazardous nature of the cargo. In addition, practical experience gained from the application of the CLC/Fund Convention regime over many years indicated that there might well be insufficient market capacity to provide full and adequate compensation for victims through the shipowner alone taking out the requisite insurance. The concept of burden-sharing was thus built into the very structure of the HNS Convention right from the start. The principle of strict liability, fundamental to the CLC/Fund Convention regime, is also an integral tenet of the HNS Convention. Although the term “strictly liable” is not per se included in the actual text, it is reflected, in the first instance, in the provision53 that “the owner at the time of an incident shall be liable for damage caused by any hazardous and noxious substances in connection with the carriage by sea on board the ship …” (emphasis added). No other precondition to liability is included. Under the HNS Convention, the shipowner is exonerated from liability in the same limited circumstances54 set out in article III(2) of the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol. However, the HNS Convention goes on to include an additional ground of exemption from liability, namely, where: “the failure of the shipper or any other person to furnish information concerning the hazardous and noxious nature of the substances shipped either (i) has caused the damage, wholly or partly; or (ii) has led the owner not to obtain insurance in accordance with article 12; provided that neither the owner nor its servants or agents knew or ought reasonably to have known of the hazardous and noxious nature of the substances shipped.” The inclusion of this exemption was quite contentious. As originally drafted,55 the shipowner would have been exonerated from liability in the event that “the consignor or any other person failed to meet the obligation to inform the owner of the hazardous and noxious nature of the substances, and that … the owner … [neither] knew [nor] ought to have known of their nature”. At issue was whether it was fair to hold the shipowner liable where a third party – primarily the consignor or the shipper – had failed to inform him of the hazardous and noxious nature of the substances shipped. During preliminary discussions in the Legal Committee, some delegations were primarily concerned to ensure the

53

Ibid. art. 7(1).

54

Ibid. art. 7(2).

55

Doc. LEG/CONF.10/6(a), art. 6(2)(d).

698


payment of compensation to innocent victims of HNS incidents and argued that considerations of fairness were taken care of, since the shipowner would have the right to exercise recourse action against negligent third parties. Others, on the other hand, were swayed by the consideration that it would be difficult for the shipowner, in the absence of advice from the consignor or shipper, to be aware of the potentially dangerous nature of goods shipped in packages or containers and that, in any event, the proposed HNS Fund would step in to compensate victims in such situations. Ultimately this issue was left for resolution at the Diplomatic Conference56 which decided to include the clause, as modified above. The form of wording ultimately adopted was a compromise, in the sense that the shipowner will only be exonerated from liability if the failure on the part of the third party to furnish the information has either caused the damage or was instrumental in influencing the shipowner not to obtain insurance. The liability of the HNS Fund, like that of the shipowner under the first tier, and as indeed it is under the 1992 Fund Protocol,57 is also based on the principle of strict liability.58 And, like the 1992 Fund Protocol, the HNS Fund’s liability is confined to ship-source damage. This led to some debate within the Legal Committee as to which party should bear the onus of proving causation in situations where no shipowner could be found. In the 1992 Fund Protocol this onus is squarely placed on the claimant.59 Although early drafts of the HNS Convention did not follow this precedent but placed the onus on the HNS Fund,60 the argument was put to the Committee that, since most pollution entering the sea comes not from ships but from land-based sources, it would be unduly costly for the HNS Fund to have to employ resources to determine which incidents of non-attributable pollution did not emanate from ships.61 Ultimately a compromise solution was adopted, which placed the burden of proof on the claimant but which set the standard of proof as that of “a reasonable probability”.62 Using the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol as a model,63 the HNS Convention64 obliges shipowners engaged in the carriage of hazardous and noxious substances to maintain insurance or other financial security, such as a bank guarantee, in

56

See report of the Legal Committee on the work of its 72nd session, Doc. LEG 72/9, para. 56.

57

This is implicit in the wording of art. IV of the 1992 Fund Protocol.

58

This is implicit in the wording of art. 14.

59

1992 Fund Protocol, art. 4(2)(b).

60

Doc. LEG 69/3, Annex, art. 12(3)(b).

61

A joint submission by Japan and the United Kingdom, Doc. LEG 71/3/2.

62

HNS Convention, art. 14(3)(b).

63

Art. VII.

64

Art. 12. 699


the sums fixed by applying the limits of liability prescribed in the Convention.65 This requirement is rightly regarded as one of the lynchpins of the liability and compensation scheme. Its aim is to ensure that victims of an incident involving the spill of hazardous and noxious substances will, in fact, recover due compensation. The inclusion of this provision was seen as necessary because, although the vast majority of responsible shipowners do, even in the absence of legislation, take out this insurance as a matter of course, a small but significant minority fail to do so. By making insurance compulsory, the Convention achieves two ends: the protection of potential victims and a more equitable situation for shipowners in a market where, previously, those shipowners operating according to good practice might be placed at a competitive disadvantage in comparison with their less responsible counterparts. The HNS Convention contains provisions limiting the liability of both the shipowner66 and the HNS Fund.67 While the decision to include such provisions was not itself controversial, the question at which point the liability of the shipowner should cease and that of the HNS Fund should begin was the subject of considerable debate, both at discussions in the Legal Committee and at the Diplomatic Conference. All agreed on the general principle: liability should be shared equitably between the shipowner and the HNS Fund. Developing States, in particular, had argued the case for keeping the shipowner’s limits as low as possible, as high limits would not only have adverse implications for the shipowner but would also adversely effect the growth of their economies generally. Other delegations had argued for higher shipowner limits on the basis that most claims for compensation were likely to be generated by small ships and it would, accordingly, be inequitable for cargo interests to be required to shoulder most of the burden of compensation. While it is still, perhaps, premature to speculate on how the scheme will operate in practice, the ultimate decision to set the limits for small ships (those not exceeding 2000 gt) at 10 million SDRs and to set the overall limits for the first tier at 100 million SDRs,68 while satisfying few delegations, nonetheless appears to favour cargo interests. An examination of the channelling provisions of the HNS Convention reveals that these, too, have been closely modelled on the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol: liability is channelled, not by placing any express obligation on claimants to

65

Art. 9(1).

66

Ibid.

67

Art. 14(5).

68

Art. 9. A provision in the draft text, the effect of which was to “link” the liability of the shipowner under the HNS Convention to existing liability regimes, which had been strongly supported by the insurance industry, and which would have obliged claimants in the first instance to proceed against the applicable existing limitation fund, was dropped at the Diplomatic Conference.

700


pursue the shipowner, but by providing that the shipowner shall be liable for damage caused by hazardous and noxious substances carried on board, and, as a corollary, excluding claims against the servants and agents of the shipowner, as well as against crew members, pilots, charterers, salvors and persons taking preventive measures.69 The main difference in the provision relates to the shipowner’s right of recourse, which, unlike that in the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol which mentions only “third parties”,70 provides expressly71 that the right of recourse includes, but is not limited to, “the shipper or receiver of the substance causing the damage, or the persons included in” the paragraph. This wording was introduced in order to place beyond doubt that recourse action would be available even if the shipowner was in contractual relations with the persons so listed.72 Another major difference between the CLC/Fund Convention regime and the HNS Convention concerns the definition of the term “damage”. Whereas the 1992 CLC73 and Fund74 Protocols confine this notion to pollution damage, including preventive measures, the HNS Convention also expressly covers claims for loss of life and personal injury,75 both on board or outside the ship, with these claims enjoying priority over all others,76 the justification being the risks to human life and limb inherent in the nature of the HNS cargo, which are absent in the case of oil carried as cargo.77 Damage by fire, explosion and toxicity is covered as well, although this is not explicit but to be inferred from the fact that the definition of “damage” in article 1(6)(a) and (b) is qualified only by the requirement that it be caused by the hazardous and noxious substances. At the same time, however, the HNS Convention has been carefully drafted to ensure

69

HNS Convention, art. 7(1) read with art. 7(5). This is subject to the proviso that the damage did not result from their personal act or omission, committed with intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result.

70

CLC Protocol, art. III(5).

71

HNS Convention, art. 7(6).

72

Report of the Legal Committee on the work of its 67th session, Doc. LEG 67/9, para. 62.

73

1992 CLC Protocol, art. II.

74

1992 Fund Protocol, art. 3.

75

HNS Convention, art. 1(6)(a).

76

Ibid. art. 11, save to the extent that the aggregate of such claims exceeds two-thirds of the total amount established in accordance with art. 9(1).

77

N. Gaskell, “The Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances”, in: P. Wetterstein and A. Beijer (eds), Essays in Honour of Hugo Tiberg, (1996), p. 225 at p. 257. 701


that victims do not receive double compensation for claims that might overlap with those made under the 1992 CLC/Fund Protocols.78 With respect to claims for environmental contamination, these mirror the definitions provided for in the 1992 Protocols in all significant respects. These provisions should help to ensure that governments receive due compensation for measures taken to restore the environment after an HNS incident, whilst at the same time exclude open-ended claims for environmental loss, thereby shielding the HNS Fund from those that are not, objectively speaking, reasonable or that amount to excessive claims in situations where the compensation may not be directed to reinstatement of the environment itself. One final feature of the HNS Convention worth mentioning, and one that distinguishes it from the 1992 Fund Protocol, is the division of the HNS Fund into four separate accounts,79 namely, a general account, the oil account, the LNG80 account and the LPG81 account. This system was adopted in order to avoid certain high volume, but not necessarily more dangerous, cargoes effectively subsidising other hazardous and noxious cargoes carried in much lower volumes, an issue which does not arise in the context of the carriage of oil by sea. The effect of having four disparate accounts is that receivers of oil, LNG and LPG will only become liable to contribute towards funding of the second tier compensation if and when an incident occurs for which the HNS Fund will be responsible involving oil, LNG or LPG, respectively. Receivers in the general account will be called on collectively to provide compensation in respect of incidents triggered by any of the other, numerous82 hazardous and noxious substances covered by the general account, provided only that they have received a certain minimum quantity of hazardous and noxious cargo during a particular calendar year.83 The decision to establish four separate accounts was essentialy a political one; hence there are no specific criteria included in the HNS Convention to justify their establishment or operation, despite calls to do so on the part of several delegations.84 When considering the oil industry, it was clear from the

78


79

Ibid. art. 16(1) and (2).

80

Liquified natural gases of light hydrocarbons with methane as the main constituent.

81

Liquified petroleum gases of light hydrocarbons with propane and butane as the main constituents.

82

The precise number is not known, but estimates vary between three to five thousand diverse HNS substances.

83

HNS Convention, art. 18. The formula for annual contributions to the oil, LNG and LPG accounts is set out in arts 19 and 20.

84

At the Legal Committee’s 70th session, the Chairman of the Group of Technical Experts submitted a text with draft criteria (e.g., the stability of the sector for the proposed account and its effects on the viability of the remaining accounts) but this was rejected by

702


discussions that the Legal Committee was undoubtedly influenced not only by the industry’s homogenous nature, but also by its good track record in paying contributions in the context of the 1992 Fund Protocol. Given that it would now be liable for damage by fire and explosion, it was considered inequitable to extend the industry’s liability to cover damage caused by chemical spills in general. The LNG industry likewise impressed the Committee by the excellent safety record of LNG ships85 and argued convincingly that it was homogenous enough and sufficiently well-organised to generate the payment of compensation in the event that an incident involving an LNG ship should cause pollution damage. Similar arguments were made in favour of establishing a separate account for LPG, and despite initial doubts as to whether that industry would be able to offer the same guarantees, it, too, ultimately persuaded the Diplomatic Conference to provide it with a separate account. Conspicuous by its complete absence from the HNS Convention, is damage caused by the carriage of coal. In initial drafts of the definition of hazardous and noxious substances coal was included within the category of “solid bulk materials possessing chemical hazards covered by appendix B of the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes, as amended” (BC Code).86 However, the concerns expressed by both coal-importing and coal-exporting States that, due to the sheer volume in which it was carried, the coal industry would be liable to contribute enormous levies under the second tier of the Convention and so would end up cross-subsidising other, far more dangerous, hazardous and noxious substances, ultimately convinced the Diplomatic Conference to exclude coal altogether from the ambit of the Convention. In retrospect, it might well have been more logical to include coal in the Convention and to deal with issues relating to its potential liability by creating a separate account87 for it, as was done for oil, LNG and LPG.

the Committee in favour of a compromise “package” in terms of which the Convention would contain only a limited number of separate accounts; appropriate entry into force conditions would guarantee the viability of the accounts; additional separate accounts could be added only through a protocol; and separate accounts which were no longer viable could be suspended by the HNS Fund Assembly: report of the Legal Committee on the work of its 70th session, Doc. LEG 70/10, paras 27 to 38. 85

Which are constructed specifically and solely for the carriage of LNG.

86

This category (minus coal) is still included in the HNS Convention: art. 1(5)(vii).

87

In fact, a submission at the Diplomatic Conference by Australia, Canada and Norway did propose that coal should be treated similarly to other HNS substances for the purposes of the first tier (insurance) but that contributions by coal receivers should be triggered only by incidents involving coal alone: see Doc. LEG/CONF.10/6(a), art. 17. This proposal was a refinement of an earlier one submitted to the Legal Committee in which it was proposed to “quarantine” coal from other HNS substances so that financial contributions would be triggered by an incident involving coal or other high volume, low-hazard substances carried in bulk and included in appendix B of the BC Code: see Doc. LEG 70/4/10. 703


However, the reality of the negotiating process at the Diplomatic Conference was such that the “coal question” was dealt with in the context of the definition of the term “hazardous and noxious substances” rather than in the context of second-tier accounts. By the time the latter was under debate at the Diplomatic Conference, an irreversible political decision had already been taken to exclude coal and the subject was never re-opened.

IV. The Bunkers Convention At the time of drafting the HNS Convention, it had been suggested that its scope be extended to include damage caused by bunker fuel oils on vessels other than oil tankers.88 This, however, was rejected on the basis that it would render the proposed Convention too complex because different considerations applied according to whether dangerous substances were carried as cargo or as fuel. By way of compromise it was agreed that, once work on the HNS Convention was completed, the Legal Committee would turn its attention to filling what was acknowledged as a crucial gap89 in the liability and compensation regime. The form and the content of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001 (Bunkers Convention), which resulted from the Committee’s subsequent endeavours, owes much to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and its 1992 Protocol. The principles of strict liability,90 compulsory insurance91 and limited liability92 are very much at the core of the Bunkers Convention, as is the notion of channelling,93 although the provisions are not necessarily identical. One of the first issues to be discussed was the form94 that the treaty instrument should assume. Despite the lure of the relative simplicity of drafting a Protocol to the 1969 CLC, ultimately it was decided to draft a free-standing Convention, 88

The 1992 CLC and Fund Protocols do cover damage caused by spills of bunker fuel oils from tankers: see the definition of “oil” in art. 1(4) 1992 CLC Protocol.

89

Advocates of the Bunkers Convention pointed out that the amount of oil carried on board large passenger ships was likely to be much greater than the amount of oil carried as cargo on smaller tankers and that the type of oil carried as bunkers was heavier, more persistent and, consequently, could cause much more severe environmental damage than oil carried as cargo.

90

Bunkers Convention, art. 3(1).

91

Ibid. art. 7.

92

Ibid. art. 6.

93

Ibid. art. 7(1).

94

The Australian delegation, as lead delegation, submitted Doc. LEG 77/6/1 containing drafts of both a free-standing Convention (based on the 1992 CLC Protocol and the 1996 HNS Convention) and a protocol to the 1992 CLC Protocol.

704


primarily because this was seen to provide greater flexibility to deal with the specific problems posed by bunker spills95 and greater accessibility to States not party to the CLC regime. The scope of application was also a matter of discussion. In this connection, while the principle that an international liability and compensation treaty should apply to all vessels and their bunkers not covered by the 1992 CLC Protocol was clear to all, and that, therefore it would not be acceptable to exempt an entire class of vessels, such as fishing vessels, irrespective of size, from the ambit of the Convention, there was support for the idea that small vessels should be entirely excluded or, at least, subject to special treatment, on account of the scale of the administrative burden such vessels were seen to place on the shoulders of government administrations.96 At the same time, the Committee was fully aware that bunker oil pollution damage was not necessarily related to the size or type of any ship.97 To deal with this problem, a compromise was adopted, which established a threshold from which the obligation to maintain compulsory insurance or other financial security would take effect. Three options were considered, namely, gross tonnage, length and bunker capacity. The gross tonnage option ultimately emerged as the favourite, on the basis that it provided a practical solution which would be based on a well-known figure and which was easily obtainable by maritime administrations.98 The figure of gross tonnage “greater than 1000 registered in a State Party”,99 settled on only at the Diplomatic Conference, reflects a further compromise between those States seeking effectively to exclude most small ships in an effort to minimise the administrative burden of the Convention and those States more concerned with the potentially serious damage caused by bunker spills from small ships.

95

Such as wider definitions of “damage” and “oil” and more latitude in exemptions from strict liability. Doc. LEG 77/6/2, submitted by Australia, compared the advantages and disadvantages of the two formats.

96

See, e.g., Doc. LEG 75/11, para. 61.

97

The US submitted Doc. LEG 78/5/4 which focussed on the management and enforcement of a compulsory financial responsibility system for oil pollution from vessels, including small vessels, in which it was noted that, in its experience, the measures taken to verify the quality of a guarantor under various acceptable methods of establishing financial responsibility had not proven overly burdensome.

98

See Doc. LEG 79/11, para. 199. The possibility of using length as a criterion was not considered a serious option, most likely because it offers little administrative or technical attraction and is not traditionally used in liability conventions. The option of bunker capacity was rejected on the basis that it would impose a high level of administrative burden to flag and port States in determining such capacity, as this measurement is not readily available to administrations.

99

Bunkers Convention, art. 7(1). 705


With respect to the issue of limitation of liability, three possibilities were considered, namely, to tie the limits to the global limitation regime; to tie the limits to the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol; or to create limits specifically for the proposed Bunkers Convention. While each of these options had their champions, the Committee ultimately decided to tie the limits of liability to the global limitation regime, most particularly, the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, as amended, on the understanding that this would, among other things, help to avoid any confusion with respect to the application of that Convention to claims arising under the Bunkers Convention. Nonetheless, in order to accommodate as wide a variety of State practice as possible, it was agreed that the limits might also reflect any other “applicable national or international regime”.100 At an early stage in the negotiations, the Committee decided that adequate compensation for damage caused by bunker spills could be obtained through insurance alone. Unlike the HNS Convention, there was therefore no need for the Bunkers Convention to provide for two tiers of compensation. The question of equitable burden-sharing accordingly did not arise, at least not in that context. However, the absence of a fund did contribute to acceptance of the idea that liability should not fall exclusively on the shipowner, but should rather be channelled to a small group of identified individuals, which would include the bareboat charterer, manager and operator of the ship.101 Since these individuals are all likely to be involved in the operation of the ship, this idea had the added attraction of encouraging safer operating practices, leading to fewer oil spills and greater incentives to minimise damage and potential liability by promptly responding to such spills, as well as providing greater likelihood of compensation.102

V. The 2002 Athens Protocol The Civil Liability and Fund Conventions also exerted a strong influence on the process of revision of the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea, 1974 (Athens Convention), in particular, with regard to the carrier’s liability for death of or personal injury to passengers. Under the 1974 text, that liability is based on fault,103 with the fault for shipping incidents104 being presumed, unless the contrary is proved. The 2002 text,

100

Bunkers Convention, art. 6.

101

Ibid. art. 1(3), to be read with art. 1(4).

102

These ideas were put forward by the US in Doc. LEG 77/4/3.

103

1974 Athens Convention, art. 3(1).

104

Those arising out of or in connection with shipwreck, stranding, explosion or fire, or defect in the ship: 1974 Athens Convention, art. 3(3).

706


by comparison, adopts a two-tier system of liability for shipping incidents, in which the first tier105 is based on the carrier’s strict liability and where, under a second tier, the carrier will be further liable for additional loss unless he proves that the incident which caused the loss occurred without his fault or neglect. In this respect it must be said that the Athens Protocol was modelled on the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, 1999 (Montreal Convention), albeit with some variations. There can be no doubt, however, that the Committee’s ready acceptance of the principle of no-fault liability was conditioned by its familiarity with this principle through its incorporation in other IMO liability and compensation treaty instruments. With regard to death or injury attributable to non-shipping incidents, liability remains fault-based, with the burden of proof lying on the claimant.106 Fault remains a requirement for damage to luggage.107 The Athens Protocol also contains new provisions requiring the carrier to take out compulsory insurance,108 as well as those allowing claims for compensation to be brought directly against the insurer or other person providing financial security,109 which, in this regard, bring the system of liability and compensation for passengers squarely into line with that provided for in the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol. The principle of limitation of liability was, of course, already an integral part of the 1974 Athens Convention, but the actual limits have been upgraded and, in the case of death of or personal injury to passengers,110 these are now calculated per passenger per incident111 rather than, as previously,112 per carriage.113 With respect to the principle of channelling of liability, while the 2002 Protocol requires the “carrier who actually performs the whole or part of

105

Where the loss per passenger per incident does not exceed 250,000 units of account: 2002 Athens Protocol, art. 3(1). Please note that this and future references to the Protocol reflect the provisions of the Protocol proper and not those of the consolidated text.

106

Ibid. art. 3(2). This is similar to the position under the 1974 text: see art. 3(3).

107

Ibid. art. 3(3) and (4).

108

Athens Protocol, art. 5.

109

Ibid. art. 5(10). A proposal by the US to limit the right of direct action was not supported by the Committee: see Doc. LEG 83/14, para. 83.

110

The limits of liability for loss of or damage to luggage were also upgraded: see 2002 Athens Protocol, art. 7.

111

2002 Athens Protocol, art. 6(1).

112

1974 Athens Convention, art. 7(1).

113

Following debate in the Committee on this point, it was decided not to refer to the number of passengers the ship was authorised to carry; accordingly, the provision as drafted is to be read as referring to the number of passengers actually carried: see Doc. LEG 83/14, paras 40 to 48. 707


the carriage” to maintain insurance or other financial security,114 and clearly makes the carrier (including the performing carrier)115 liable, it has, nevertheless, retained those provisions of the 1974 text which enable action to be taken against the agents and servants of the carrier116 and in this sense differs from the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol which forbids such action being taken.117 Following the adoption of the 2002 Athens Protocol, and in the wake of the terrorist atrocities of 11 September 2001 committed in the United States, and the escalation of terrorist activities worldwide thereafter, it became apparent that government concerns about damage caused by acts of terrorism and biochemical and electromagnetic weapons, which are required to be covered by the compulsory insurance certificates issued under the Protocol,118 were proving to be an obstacle to ratification as few, if any, insurers could nowadays be found who were willing to cover such risks. Although these concerns had been raised previously, a conscious decision had been taken to keep these provisions in the Protocol in part, at least, because they mirrored similar provisions not only in the CLC/Fund treaties but also in the HNS and Bunkers Conventions, and that, if they were indeed a problem, it would be better to try to find a solution that might be applicable across the board. The substantial increases in the limits of liability for passenger death and injury were also a matter of concern due to the stated unavailability of insurance under current market capacity. The Committee’s response to both these issues was to develop,119 over its next few sessions, the terms of a reservation (together with a fairly complex set of guidelines to assist in achieving uniformity in its implementation) the crux of which will allow States to become parties to the Protocol subject to reserving the right to issue and accept insurance certificates with such special exceptions and limitations as the insurance market conditions at the time necessitate. The reservation does not exclude totally the requirement for compulsory insurance for death to or personal injury of passengers arising out of a terrorist attack but it does place a cap on the limits of the compensation available for this risk.120 It is anticipated that, with this reservation, States will now be in a position to join

114

2002 Athens Protocol, art. 5(1).

115

Art. 4 of the 1974 text has been retained unaltered and includes the owner, charterer and operator who actually perform the whole or part of the carriage.

116

1974 Athens Convention, art. 11.

117

1992 Civil Liability Protocol, art. III(4). There was little or no discussion on this article, either by the Committee or at the Diplomatic Conference.

118

2002 Athens Protocol, art. 5(2) read with art. 3(1)(a).

119

Under the umbrella of IMO Assembly Res. A.988(24) drafted by the Legal Committee.

120

The full text of the reservations and guidelines is contained in IMO Circular letter No. 2758, 20 November 2006.

708


the Protocol121 although some delegations remained concerned that passengers who were victims of a terrorist attack might not receive adequate compensation. Overall, however, the reservation was acceptable to most delegations as a compromise that would facilitate the early entry into force of the Protocol, thereby substantially improving the international liability and compensation regime for passengers carried by sea. Whether similar reservations will be needed to facilitate ratification of the HNS and Bunkers Conventions remains to be seen,122 as neither of these Conventions is yet in force. At the time they were adopted, terrorism was not considered to be as great a threat to shipping as it is today and, as far as bunker spills are concerned, because the potential damage covered by the Bunkers Convention is confined to environmental damage, the “people factor” so evident in the debate over the reservation in the 2002 Athens Protocol, is not an issue. However, the situation may well be different under the HNS Convention, as compensation is not confined to environmental damage but extends to loss of life and personal injury,123 with these claims taking priority over others.124

VI. The Wreck Removal Convention A discussion of the influence exerted by the Civil Liability and Fund treaties on other IMO instruments would not be complete without at least a brief mention of the Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007 (Wreck Removal Convention), which was adopted by a Diplomatic Conference, in Nairobi, Kenya, on 18 May 2007. The Convention, as originally conceived within IMO’s Legal Committee, was intended primarily to provide a solid legal basis which would enable States to physically remove (or have removed) from waters around their coasts wrecks that pose a hazard to the safety of shipping or the marine environment, the main legal concern at that time being the perceived lack of jurisdiction to take such

121

The Protocol, like most IMO treaty instruments, contains no express provisions on reservations, so the question will be therefore whether the proposed reservation is accepted to be compatible with the objects and purposes of the Protocol: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, art. 19(a). Discussions within the Legal Committee on this point indicated that most delegations regarded it as acceptable.

122

It is not anticipated that the proposed limits of compensation available under these Conventions will be an issue as they are, relatively speaking, not nearly as high as those created by the 2002 Athens Protocol and consequently there should be adequate market capacity to allow them to operate.

123


124

Ibid. art. 11. 709


steps in the exclusive economic zone.125 As the draft progressed, the question of reimbursement of costs related to the location, marking and removal of such wrecks became an issue, which led ultimately to the inclusion of provisions on strict liability,126 limited liability,127 compulsory insurance128 and channelling of liability.129 All of these are modelled on the 1992 CLC Protocol, with adaptations to meet the specific needs of the Convention. The inclusion of these provisions led, in turn, to the proposed scope of application of the Convention being widened to encompass the ‘territory, including the territorial sea’ of a State Party,130 enabling those States that so wish to extend certain provisions131 of the Convention, on a purely voluntary basis,132 to hazardous wrecks located in the sea areas in question and so be in a position to claim the undoubted financial benefits that will accrue from the compulsory insurance package. Accordingly, while the Convention was not originally intended to be part of the package of liability and compensation Conventions and Protocols adopted under the aegis of IMO, this is precisely what it has, in part, become. Despite the Legal Committee being advised133 that the level of war risk cover purchased by shipowners and the P&I Clubs could, in some instances, be insufficient to meet the costs of wreck removal, since it was designed to meet all claims arising out of a terrorism incident, and was not available exclusively for wreck removal claims, that reinsurance policies contain the standard exclusion related to the use of chemical, biological, bio-chemical or electro-magnetic weapons,134 and that war risks policies are subject to that exclusion, the Committee decided not to exempt acts of terrorism from the ambit of the draft Convention. This decision was 125

Many delegations doubted whether the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, provided such a legal basis, particularly in relation to wrecks situated in the EEZ.

126

Doc. LEG/CONF.16/19, art. 10(1); limited exceptions apply: article 11.

127

Ibid. art. 10(2) read with art. 12(1). The same formula was used that is to be found in art. 6 read with art. 7(1) of the Bunkers Convention, except that art. 12(1) contains an express reference to “article 6(1)(b) of the 1976 LLMC, as amended”.

128

Ibid. art. 12.

129

Ibid. art. 12(10).

130

Ibid. art. 3(2).

131

The exclusions are set out in art. 4(4). The question of extension to the territorial sea remained a hotly debated one, even during the Diplomatic Conference, one of the main concerns on the part of certain States being the perceived loss of sovereignty that would ensue from such an extension-hence the decision to make this an optional course of action only.

132

This must be done by means of a written notification to the Secretary-General of IMO, either at the time of expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty or at any time thereafter: art.3(2).

133

See Doc. LEG 92/13, paras 4.54 to 4.66.

134

The so-called “bio-chem exclusion”.

710


based, in part, on the perhaps over-optimistic understanding that, since the draft Convention was solely concerned to provide cover for wreck removal operations that are related to material damage only and not to provide compensation for death and personal injury, sufficient funds would be available. The Committee was also influenced in its view by the parallel negotiations that were then taking place over the proposed reservation to the 2002 Athens Protocol, which might, if needed, possibly be applied in time to the Wreck Removal Convention, despite warnings that that solution might prove not to be adaptable. Although these issues remained on the table at the Diplomatic Conference, providing delegates with an opportunity to reconsider them, this decision was not reversed.

VII. Conclusions From the above brief resume, it may be seen how one event, in this instance the grounding of the Torrey Canyon back in 1967, acted as a catalyst for the creation by IMO of a comprehensive international liability and compensation regime regulating not only environmental damage caused by spills of oil and other hazardous and noxious substances at sea, but also claims for death of, personal injury to and loss of or damage to baggage in respect of passengers carried by sea, and, following the successful adoption by the Diplomatic Conference in May 2007 of the Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, claims for compensation for removal of wrecks posing a hazard to safety of navigation or to the environment of coastal States. Along the way, the work generated by the development of these treaties led to the establishment of the Legal Committee135 as a standing committee of the Organization. At the same time as this Committee was occupied with questions of liability and compensation, work to find technical solutions to the problems of ship safety and marine pollution made manifest by the Torrey Canyon and, subsequently, the Exxon Valdez oil spills, was taking place in parallel in the Maritime Safety Committee, which led in time to the establishment of the Maritime Environment Protection Committee with a separate mandate, as its name implies, to deal with matters relating to protection of the marine environment. As far as the Legal Committee is concerned, with the adoption of the Wreck Removal Convention, much of the essential work on liability and compensation issues will have been completed136 and the focus now is expected to shift away

135

Apart from the governing bodies of the Organization, the Maritime Safety Committee was the only committee to be established under the provisions of the original IMO Convention.

136

It goes without saying that the treaties will be kept under constant review and updated as required. 711


from development of the law to the need for its ratification and enforcement. As at the time of writing, although the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol, which created a third tier of compensation for oil pollution incidents, has entered into force, the same cannot unfortunately be said of the HNS Convention, the Bunkers Convention or the 2002 Athens Protocol. And, until such time as these do enter into force, gaps in the international regime of liability and compensation will continue to remain unplugged. The Legal Committee has already begun to take this problem on board, in the sense that it has included in its agenda an item on monitoring the implementation of the HNS Convention, in terms of which it has sought to identify the reasons why the pace of ratifications has been so slow and to develop solutions to perceived problems. Much more, however, still remains to be done both in relation to this Convention and to the other treaties discussed above and the Legal Committee may, in this connection, need to assist the Organization in developing strategies for implementation and to become more closely involved in the development and provision of technical cooperation to less well developed States in an effort to promote ratification.

712

SUPPRESSING UNLAWFUL ACTS: IMO INCURSION IN THE FIELD OF CRIMINAL LAW Agustín Blanco-Bazán*

Introduction

T

wenty-one years have passed since 7 October 1985 and, still, most articles and talks on the treaties adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO or “the Organization”) on the suppression of unlawful acts start with a description of the Achille Lauro incident. The reason for this repetitious exercise is that the features of that incident remain unique. For once, real life went further than any theoretical scenario that could have been elaborated as a case study to analyse flaws in international law to fight organized crime. Given the present degree of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, it is difficult to imagine that some of these flaws would repeat themselves today. No country would be now politically compelled to fly terrorists to a safe haven after they had committed murder, even if they belonged to a recognized liberation movement. Egypt had to do so, after negotiating the liberation of passengers taken as hostages. The interception of the aircraft in mid-air by the United States Air Force, the ensuing forced landing at a NATO base in Sicily and the stand-off between US and Italian troops are also situations which would be unimaginable today. It would also be difficult to conceive that, after obtaining custody of a terrorist, a country would not only refuse to prosecute or extradite him but simply let him go to another country, as Italy did with Mohammed Abbas. Other flaws of law at the core of the legal farrago which enabled Abbas to escape prosecution and punishment remain virtually intact today. Domestic legislation on piracy in many countries does not follow the regulations contained in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),1 thus

*

The views expressed in this chapter do not necessarily represent those of the UN or IMO.

1

The expression “UNCLOS”, as preferred to that of “the LOS Convention” is used by the author of this chapter bearing in mind that it conforms terminology used in official IMO documents.



leading to lack of unified international criteria to distinguish between piracy and other unlawful acts at sea. As a result, uncertainty still exists as to exactly when any State can detain and try criminals by operation of the principle of universal jurisdiction applicable only to piracy, as opposed to other crimes where jurisdictions of different States concur in their possible application. The division of the sea in “zones” still conspires against the effective enforcement of swift detention, trial or extradition. In too many cases, the prompt establishment of jurisdiction over criminals is frustrated by deliberations on whether a crime on board a ship was committed in or beyond territorial waters. Worse still, the traditional concept of flag State jurisdiction presents a serious obstacle to the expediency needed to prevent the occurrence of terrorist incidents. The potential damage to lives and goods which these incidents could cause are too catastrophic to entirely rely on the authorization which the not always reliable administrations of the flag State should provide for ships flying another flag to effectively intercept and neutralize criminal activity on board. It was against all these odds that IMO had to fight when, in reaction to the Achille Lauro incident, the Organization convened a diplomatic conference in 1988 to adopt the original Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the 1988 SUA Convention) and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988. A further reaction, this time to the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, led to the adoption in 2005 of two protocols with comprehensive amendments to the original treaties. This chapter addresses the historic context of these treaty making activities. It then highlights some paramount features of the 1988 SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol bearing in mind its particular relevance in connection with the law of the sea and maritime law today. Both the 1988 and 2005 Protocols for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms are excluded from this chapter. In this regard it suffices to state here that these two Protocols extend, as appropriate, the regime regulated in the Convention for punishment of crimes against the safety of navigation to the safety of fixed platforms. Thomas Mensah, in his capacity as Director of the Division of Legal and External Affairs of IMO, presided over the elaboration and adoption of the original 1988 SUA treaties. The author of this chapter witnessed Tom’s skills and dedication to solve the many legal and political problems involved in the then novel task imposed upon IMO as a consequence of the spectacular appearance of terrorism at sea. These skills and dedication played a decisive role in the elaboration of the first international treaties devised to counteract this scourge.

714

Suppressing Unlawful Acts

I. Historic Context of the SUA Treaties 1. 1988 SUA Treaties Before 1985, IMO had restricted its purview on crimes at sea to an Assembly Resolution adopted in 1983 containing general recommendations to take action to prevent piracy and armed robbery against ships and small craft at sea committed “in or adjacent to the waters” of the Governments concerned.2 Two years later, another Resolution (A. 584(14), adopted by the IMO Assembly on 20 November 1985), reflected the different reality which had been created by the Achille Lauro incident. To start with, this last Resolution refers not only to piracy and armed robbery but also to other types of crime broadly described as “other unlawful acts” threatening the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews; it also replaces the reference to crimes committed “in or adjacent to their waters” with the much wider concept of crimes “against or on board ship both at anchor and under way”. The addition of the concept of crimes against ships “at anchor” (no matter where), denotes an enlargement of the concept of security to include port installations. Indeed, far from restricting itself to crimes committed in jurisdictional or adjacent waters, as had been the case with the 1983 Resolution, operative paragraph 1 Resolution A. 584(14), calls upon all Governments, port authorities and administrations, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and crews to take steps “to review and as necessary strengthen port and on-board security”. The inclusion of the scope of port security is a step as significant as that of reception facilities in the case of the MARPOL Convention.3 As in this last case, IMO overstepped its traditional limitations of “rules for ships only” to extend its mandate to the regulation of port measures within the scope of the ship-port interface. It is in this way that the mandate of IMO to regulate ship and port security, recently completed with the adoption of amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and the introduction of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), was established well before 9/11. The introduction of the concept of the ship-port interface in the field of maritime security mirrors that of airport and aircraft security. Accordingly, Resolution A. 584(14) refers to the work undertaken by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a precedent to be noted in the development of security to prevent crimes at sea. In 1986 the IMO Maritime Safety Committee, at its 53rd session, adopted the Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts against Passengers and Crews on Board

2

Res. A. 545(13) adopted by the IMO Assembly at its 13th session.

3

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78). 715


Ships,4 which already contain in an embryonic form the main elements of the ISPS Code. There was only one important piece missing: if the work undertaken by ICAO was to be taken into account, then IMO would have to develop a “prosecution or extradition” maritime treaty similar to the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. Otherwise, the narrow scope of provisions on piracy contained in article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the corresponding article 101 of UNCLOS (then not in force), would remain the only international treaty law reference for the punishment of crimes at sea. The problem was that the mandate of IMO was more restricted than that of the ICAO. Certainly, IMO, as a UN specialized agency in charge of issuing safety rules and standards for commercial navigation, was well within its mandate when regulating preventive security measures to be implemented by maritime administrations and port authorities to protect commercial navigation from criminal acts. However, the alternative drafting of a public law treaty typifying those crimes for the purpose of prosecution or extradition presented problems unknown in the field of air law which, on account of its modernity, was not burdened by the weight of customary law prevailing in the field of the law of the sea. To start with, IMO was a specialized agency within the UN system but not the UN itself. After the adoption in 1969 of the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 1969, law of the sea matters had been removed from IMO and given to the UN for the purpose of convening the UN Conference which after ten years of work, managed to adopt UNCLOS. And the drafting of crimes at sea was, at least partially, firmly within the scope of the law of sea. After all, UNCLOS already regulated piracy. Why not other crimes? Why not another UN Conference to adopt a treaty regulating crimes other than piracy? The answer is that the alternative of convening yet another UN Conference to adopt a “prosecution or extradition” treaty was definitely unpractical. UN Conferences are arenas for confrontation, and, as such, unfit for the thorough elaboration of difficult legal treaties. The more so in this case, given the serious political differences existing in the 1980s on how to approach terrorism. The decision to put this urgently needed treaty law task in the hands of IMO is reflected in Resolution 40/61 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1985 in the wake of the Achille Lauro. Operative paragraph 13 of the Resolution requested IMO “to study the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures”. Coming only days after the first IMO Assembly Resolution on the same issue analysed above, this could be interpreted as an endorsement of a work already in progress, were it not for a clear underlying political message. In accordance with the treaty

4

MSC/Circ.443 issued on 26 September 1986.

716


governing its constitution and functioning, IMO pledges to consider any matter referred to it by the United Nations. This pledge, read together with paragraph 13 of Resolution 40/61, fitted like a glove the intentions of several countries to propose the consideration of a maritime “prosecution or extradition” treaty not at the UN but at IMO, which is traditionally an agency where “technical” goals take precedence over political endeavours. True, the General Assembly was only requesting to study the problem and to make recommendations. But Austria, Egypt and Italy interpreted this euphemism as a signal to go much further, and submitted a draft “prosecution or extradition” treaty for the consideration of the IMO Council at its 57th session in November 1986. In order to achieve an expediency unknown even at IMO they dared to suggest bypassing of the normal IMO procedures according to which draft conventions should be first considered by one of the standing committees of the Organization, in this case the Legal Committee. This bypassing was performed in two stages. In the original proposal, the sponsors suggested considering the draft at either an extraordinary session of the Legal Committee or “any other Ad Hoc Committee that the Council may wish to appoint”.5 The chance for the Legal Committee to have a go was finally buried by the oral presentation of the proposal made at the Council by Professor Luigi Ferrari Bravo, Head of the Legal Service of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “This is certainly a legal instrument and one would have a point in thinking that the matter should be considered by the Legal Committee. However, we know that the Legal Committee already has a very heavy schedule for 1987 so that it would be physically impossible for it to negotiate the draft in a speedy way”.6 And the Council understood. At Italy’s request, an Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee not only reviewed the original proposal in two sessions held in March and May 1987, but also prepared a separate instrument, namely a draft protocol dealing with unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf. Many delegates normally attending the IMO Legal Committee were not amused at the “you are too busy” excuse. However, the bypassing of the Committee not only had the advantage of speeding the consideration of the prospective convention. The Ad Hoc Group enabled the gathering of expertise necessary to address international public law and criminal law issues which were normally alien to a body like the IMO Legal Committee, which dealt mainly with private law issues. Besides, the constitution of an Ad Hoc body also sent a message to anyone who could have been opposed to the transfer of the issue from the UN to IMO: at the UN level, IMO was then frequently maligned as an organization representing the interests of shipowners. These charges could be countered with the explanation that the consideration of the fight against terrorism was not

5

IMO Doc. C 57/25.

6

C 57/INF.3. 717


left in the hands of lawyers who at that time were focusing their endeavours on getting a new convention regulating salvage operations and rewards. Nevertheless, the Legal Committee was given an extraordinary session to “consider” the draft SUA treaties before their submission to the 1988 Diplomatic Conference. In October 1987, the Committee was convened to simply to take note of, and comment on, (NB: not to correct or amend) the draft SUA convention and its fixed platforms protocol. This it did in some depth, and in connection with several important items. In the case of the powers of the master to arrest and hand over criminals to the port State, the Legal Committee came second only to Cassandra in its wisdom to foresee many practical problems that the SUA treaties have so far failed to solve with the expediency required. See, for instance, the features of organized crime at present taking place off the coast of Somalia and the legal uncertainties regarding delivery of alleged offenders to the ports of nearby countries. Be that as it may, the original 1988 SUA Convention and its Protocol fulfilled the main purpose of providing an international legal basis for action to be taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships engaged in international navigation and fixed platforms located on the continental shelf. The “unlawful acts” in respect of which Parties are obliged to prosecute or extradite alleged offenders are listed as “offences” in the Convention and their application is extended, as appropriate, by the Protocol to cover fixed platforms. The type of offences listed in the Convention include the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against persons on board ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it. It obliges contracting governments either to extradite or to prosecute those alleged to have committed these offences. Success in treaty law goes beyond the festive adoption of treaties at diplomatic conferences. Treaties should not only enter into force but also be properly implemented, and in the case of universal treaties they should be implemented worldwide. On all these counts, the 1988 SUA Convention succeeded only too modestly. The proclamation that 144 States have become Parties to it disregards the fact that as of 11 September 2001, the number of Parties was only 61. The precipitated flow of ratifications and accessions which occurred after that fateful date represents a political statement to fight terrorism but not always reflect the action needed to effectively implement the 1988 SUA Convention. A substantial number of Parties do not seem to have enacted the comprehensive legislation needed to ensure proper implementation at a domestic level. In particular, no procedural legislation on detention, prosecution or extradition seems to take into account the peculiar features of crimes which should be dealt with in a different way, depending on the sea zone where they are committed and the increasingly complex sets of rights and obligations governing the interaction between flag, coastal and port States.

718


2. 9/11 and the 2005 SUA Treaties The skills and mandate of the Legal Committee to consider amendments to the SUA treaties were beyond discussion when, in response to the terrorist attacks against targets in the United States on 11 September 2001, IMO undertook a comprehensive revision of its antiterrorist regulations under the aegis of IMO Assembly Resolution A. 924 adopted on 29 November 2001.7 Within the scope of this Resolution, the need to revitalize the faded 1988 SUA Convention was brought into the context of a strategy governed by the need to decisively expand the scope of offences and the inclusions of preventive measures related to the imminence of their occurrence. Within the comprehensive strategy devised in Resolution A. 924, the upgrading of preventive measures from recommendations to treaty law was primarily achieved through the introduction of amendments to SOLAS, the most far-reaching of which is the ISPS Code. The decisive extension of the SOLAS scope to preventive measures in respect of ships about to enter, or already operating in their territorial sea, would then be complemented with amendments to the 1988 SUA Convention consisting of provisions on the right of boarding ships beyond the territorial waters where SUA offences were about to be committed, or in the process of commission. While the adoption of the amendments to SOLAS was completed in 2002, it took six sessions from 2002 to 2005 for the IMO Legal Committee to complete draft protocols containing amendments to the 1988 SUA treaties. This work was indeed exhaustive and far reaching. Aside from the novel boarding provisions, consensus enabled the broadening of the list of offences to include the offence of using a ship itself in a manner that causes death or serious injury, or damage. However, this broadening was not achieved without acrimonious discussion. In one case, namely offences consisting of the transport of weapons or equipment that could be used for weapons of mass destruction, the delegations of India and Pakistan vehemently questioned the mandate of the Organization to draft offences involving conduct related to the transport of material related to non proliferation issues covered by other treaties.8 In October 2005, the International Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties held at IMO Headquarters adopted the Protocol of 2005 to the 1988 SUA Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Navigation and the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of

7

The title of this resolution is: Review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships.

8

See, for instance, reservations by India and Pakistan in annex 2 and 3 of the report of the Legal Committee on the work of its eighty-ninth session (October 2004), IMO Doc. LEG 89/16. 719


Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (the 2005 SUA Protocols). By decision of the Conference, the original 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol, as respectively amended by the two 2005 SUA Protocols, constitute consolidated texts which are named as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005 (the 2005 SUA Convention) and of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, 2005 (2005 SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol). It is to some salient aspects of the 2005 SUA Convention that the following sections of this chapter will refer. Rather than addressing the features of the offences regulated in that treaty, the chapter focuses on issues such as the difference between piracy and SUA unlawful acts, and the novel boarding provisions incorporated as part of the 2005 amendments. It also comments on the SUA regulations which, in spite of their decisive importance to make the treaties work are frequently relegated to a secondary place in articles and essays on the SUA treaties, namely those regulations that establish the procedural steps related to the detention, custody, establishment of jurisdiction, prosecution and extradition of the alleged offenders. By way of conclusion, some comments are added on the interrelation between the SUA treaties and the preventive measures incorporated to the ISPS Code in the SOLAS Convention.

II. Piracy and Terrorism The preparatory works leading to the adoption of the SUA treaties were continuously conditioned by the efforts of delegates to clearly distinguish the unlawful acts therein regulated from the acts of piracy regulated in articles 100 to 107 of UNCLOS. On paper, these efforts seem to have been successful. In practice however, neither UNCLOS nor SUA have proved their efficiency to overcome their limitations to establish a unified international regime to prevent the perpetration of crimes at sea, irrespective of whether these crimes are piracy or other types of unlawful acts. Some comparative remarks in connection with both treaties may help to explain the main reasons for these shortcomings. 1. The Territorial Scope In accordance to UNCLOS, acts of piracy can only take place in the “high seas” or “outside the jurisdiction of any State” (article 101(a), (i) and (ii)). The scope of SUA is made wider by combining the location and routeing of the ship’s voyage. In accordance with its article 4, paragraph 1, the SUA Convention applies not only to crimes committed in the high seas but also “if the ship is navigating, or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of

720


the territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States”. The expression “scheduled to navigate” encompasses cases of terrorists preventing a ship from carrying out its intended navigation beyond the territorial sea. Furthermore, there is no territorial limitation for the application of the Convention in cases where the offender or alleged offender is found in the territory of any State Party. For the purposes of the application of SUA, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is totally assimilated to the high seas, by means of relating the application to international trips beyond the boundaries established by the territorial sea. In the case of piracy, this assimilation takes place in a more indirect, ambiguous way by operation of article 58 paragraph 2 of UNCLOS, according to which its articles referring to the high seas, including the regulations on piracy, apply to the exclusive economic zone. The aversion to unify international criminal law at the expense of sovereignty prevented the 1988 SUA Conference from including ships entirely involved in cabotage taking place entirely within the territorial sea of one State. In this regard, it should be noted that internal cabotage could include tourists of different nationalities en tour on board foreign ships cruising islands or ports entirely within the territorial sea of a certain State. Terrorists could see these circumstances as advantageous to avoid the operation of provisions on the establishment of multiple jurisdiction and extradition regulated in SUA. 2. The Intentional Element In UNCLOS, piracy is distinguished from other unlawful acts (including all those regulated under SUA) by reason of motive. In accordance with article 101(a), piracy is committed “for private ends”. The original 1988 SUA offences, (article 3), do not establish any “public motive” as opposed to the vague expression of “private ends”. As a result, in many cases it may be difficult to establish whether the unlawful seizing or destruction of ships or their cargo, or the taking or killing of hostages, is for private ends or for political purposes. True, the SUA plays an important subsidiary purpose in this regard: it covers organized crime which, even if difficult to define as piracy or terrorism still merit adequate punishment. However, in case of doubt, should security forces of any State seize a ship in international waters in accordance with article 105 of UNCLOS, thus making use of the principle of universal or extraordinary jurisdiction, or should it abstain from taking any action, on the grounds that being a SUA offence, it does not have the power even to intercept the ship on which the offence is being committed? It is with this dilemma in mind that the 2005 SUA Protocol regulates boarding provisions in the high seas. The rationale justifying these provisions is that, in a similar way to the powers conferred upon States to take action against acts of piracy, suppression of unlawful acts other than piracy should also entitle States to take measures in the high seas. 721


The new offences introduced by the 2005 Protocol (new articles 3bis and 3ter) explicitly refer to “political ends” as a motive, such as the use of explosive radioactive material or weapons against ships when the purpose is to intimidate populations or to compel governments or international organizations to do, or abstain from doing, any act. However, even in those cases, confusion may arise as to the real motivation for the acts. The uncertainties as to the characterization of crimes at sea as piracy or terrorist acts that arose with the seizure of the Santa María in 1961 and the Achille Lauro in 1985 were not entirely overcome by the entry into force of the 1988 SUA treaties. Neither will they be once the 2005 treaties enter into force, as long as the present disparity between national legislations vis-à-vis the characterization of the crime of piracy remains. In this regard, it may be suggested that the disparities arising out of addressing piracy and other unlawful acts in two different treaties with different jurisdictional regimes, can only be solved through a serious effort by States Parties to first bring their national legislation on piracy in line with UNCLOS Only then can legislation implementing SUA be drafted in such a way that any overlap between piracy and unlawful acts is avoided. In the meantime, doubts as to whether an act constitutes piracy or other type of unlawful act will continue to be the source of delays in detaining, punishing or extraditing alleged criminals. Criminals can wait until they are in international waters to commit their crimes, in the knowledge that in doing so they have a chance of escaping prosecution amid a farrago of discussion as to whether to consider an act as piracy or not, and, if so, whether the State can establish effective jurisdiction to detain and initiate legal proceedings. Certainly, the golden rule would be: “if in doubt, assume piracy, so that you bring offenders into custody and leave further discussions on the establishment of punitive jurisdiction for later”. At least this would make immediate action possible. However, the need to include boarding regulations adopted in 2005 shows that, unless dealing with a typical case of piracy, even the preliminary steps to prevent crimes at sea need to be carefully regulated on the basis of the authorization to be granted by the flag State. An example of the confusion created by the lack of uniform implementing legislation in connection with crimes at sea is the legal uncertainty arising with regard to the increasing incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia. These incidents have included cases ranging from the hijacking of ships carrying humanitarian supplies to attacks against cruise ships. The relationship between international terrorism and the state of anarchy in Somalia, coupled with the non-existence of effective coastal State jurisdiction along the Somali coast has become a typical scenario where the motivation behind apparent acts of piracy is unclear. In the case of an Indian-flagged bulk carrier taken over by pirates and subsequently recaptured by an American destroyer and taken to the port of Mombasa, delivery and prompt handling of the alleged offenders

722


was considerably delayed due to uncertainties as to the real nature and purpose behind the criminal activities of the pirates. The attention of the Security Council was first drawn to the growing problem of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia by Resolution A. 979 adopted by the 24th session of IMO’s Assembly in November 2005. The Resolution expressed particular concern at the indication that, inter alia, that the aim of the attacks on ships sailing off the coast of Somalia was to secure ransom demands to provide the perpetrators with funds for the purchase of arms, in violation of the embargo on all delivery of weapons and military equipment to Somalia established by the Security Council in 1992. In submitting the IMO Resolution for the consideration of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Security Council, the Secretary-General of IMO referred to the possible connection between piracy and terrorist activities. Another interesting case illustrating the legal uncertainties still existing with regard to the characterization of unlawful actions as either piracy or other type of crime is provided by the boarding and consequent damage inflicted upon two Dutch ships by members of Greenpeace. E.D. Brown9 notes that the perpetrators were held to be guilty of piracy iure gentium because their acts had been committed for private ends, being in the opinion of the Court in support of a personal point of view concerning a particular problem. “Not even the environmental lobby, it would seem, is to be permitted to undermine the public order of the oceans by taking refuge behind self proclaimed public ends.”10

III. Boarding The question of delimitation of scope between SUA and UNCLOS has become more crucial since the incorporation the 2005 provisions for boarding in the high seas. In UNCLOS, the right to board pirate ships should be seen as a consequence of regulating extraordinary, universal jurisdiction to punish piracy. In this case, the incorporation of universal jurisdiction into treaty law merely reflects a wellestablished principle of ius gentium customary law, according to which pirates are hostes humani generis, namely enemies of mankind. As such, acts of piracy not only inflict damage upon the victims against whom they are directed, they also imply a direct attack on universal values that every nation has the right to defend, in this case, freedom of commercial navigation in the high seas. Accordingly, any State has the right to establish jurisdiction and take all measures to ensure its application, from seizing of the ship and detaining the

9

E.D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994, pp. 301-302.

10

Ibid. p. 302. 723


pirates to their definitive punishment through due criminal process. The universal jurisdiction regulated by UNCLOS to suppress piracy is, technically speaking, a restriction on the principle of freedom of navigation: unlike the case of any other crime, ships used for piracy can be boarded and seized by anybody in the high seas. From a strict criminal law point of view, piracy does not differ from other offences. All criminal acts are normally considered not only an affront to individuals but also actions affecting society as whole. The peculiarity of piracy is that it takes place in a sea zone where freedom is equal to the absence of any particular State jurisdiction. Accordingly, the right to punish piracy as a crime against mankind is bestowed upon all States. Measured against piracy, the crimes of terrorism at sea are a novelty. As such, they cannot be related to any well-established principle of customary law authorizing universal jurisdiction to ensure prevention and punishment. However, since 9/11, the United Nations has repeatedly expressed the universal consensus that terrorism is a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, the United Nations has also related punishment of terrorism to the collective or individual right to self-defence of all States.11 Surely there are sufficient grounds to consider terrorism at sea as a crime against humanity similar to piracy. The more so if we bear in mind that, as in the case of the “private ends” behind piracy, the ends of terrorism are now universally considered as devoid of any justification whatsoever. In this regard, a comparison with the political atmosphere prevalent at the United Nations at the time of the Achille Lauro may be of use. The title of Resolution 40/61 adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1985 in the wake of that incident was: “Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives including their own, in attempt to effect radical changes”. It seems as if the General Assembly had been trying to find some justification for terrorism in the title, by putting excessive emphasis in its “underlying causes”, rather than in the damaging consequences of terrorist actions. Just compare this language with that used in preambular paragraph 2 of General Assembly in Resolution 57/27, adopted in 2002:“criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them”.

11

See, for instance, S/RES/1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 and A/RES/57/27 of 15 January 2002.

724


The novel SUA boarding provisions should be seen within the context of this new universal consensus according to which terrorism can also be considered a crime against mankind, and therefore comparable with piracy. Universal consensus expressed through a universal body like the UN can be equated to well-established customary law in its legitimacy to become the source of treaty law. Accordingly, a treaty like SUA can also regulate exceptions to freedom of navigation similar to those implied in the establishment of universal jurisdiction to suppress piracy in UNCLOS. The main difference between the UNCLOS seizing provisions to suppress piracy and SUA boarding provisions to suppress unlawful acts other than piracy is that SUA stops short of regulating universal jurisdiction by establishing instead a system of multiple possible jurisdictions to either prosecute or extradite. Boarding according to SUA is subject to limitations unknown in the case of seizing according to UNCLOS, because, unlike piracy, the perpetration of terrorist acts does not imply the disappearance of flag State jurisdiction. Accordingly a pivotal requirement for the setting into motion of SUA boarding operations is the authorization of the flag State of the ship to be boarded. 1. A Treaty within a Treaty (Article 8bis) From the point of view of treaty law technique, the introduction of the 2005 boarding provisions contained in article 8bis of the consolidated SUA Convention can be best described as atypical. Article 8bis is an extremely long article which in itself, reads like a treaty within a treaty. It has its own preambular principles and detailed procedural prescriptions. It really looks like a symbol of the irruption of new times into an old treaty. In essence the article opens new avenues to ensure that the principle of freedom of navigation in the high seas will not be misused for the preparation and perpetration of terrorist acts. The following sentences summarize the main operative features of the boarding provisions contained in article 8bis. Paragraph 5 defines the right of authorized officials of a State Party (the requesting Party) to request information from another State Party (the first Party) in connection with a ship flying the flag or displaying marks of the latter, encountered seaward of any State’s territorial sea. The request for information should be based on reasonable grounds for suspicion that the encountered ship or a person on board that ship has been, is or is about to be involved in the commission of any of the offences regulated by SUA. The request, which should be motivated by the “desire” of the requesting Party to board the ship, should be made in two steps. The first is simply the confirmation of nationality. Only upon confirmation of nationality will the requesting Party ask for authorization to board and take appropriate measures, including stopping, boarding and searching of the ship and cargo, and the searching and questioning of persons on board.

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The request must follow certain formalities. It should, if possible, contain the name of the suspect ship, the IMO ship identification number, the port of registry, the ports of origin and destination and any other relevant information. If a request is made orally, a confirmation in writing should follow as soon as possible. The Convention regulates the duty of the first Party to immediately acknowledge receipt of any written or oral request. Acknowledgment does not mean the provision of the information requested, although it seems obvious that the identification of nationality as expression of the right to fly the flag should come in a short time. A proposal to regulate the consequences of lack of acknowledgment of the request did not find enough support at the IMO Legal Committee. It is in this sense that the appeal to States to cooperate in conformity with international law contained in paragraph 1 acquires important meaning. In principle, lack of acknowledgment or lack of confirmation of nationality may lead to actions governed by the law of piracy rather than the SUA Convention. Legitimate action against the ship could obviously be taken in self defence, in the face of imminent danger. In other cases the requesting State may decide not to act, and keep a prudent distance from the ship it wants to board while insisting in obtaining an acknowledgment to its request. Confirmation of nationality by the first Party becomes the source of a complex set of rights and obligations. It is only after confirming nationality that the first Party becomes, in accordance to paragraph 5(b), formally “the flag State”, and assumes its rights and obligations as such. The request for authorization to board and take consequential measures can be answered by the flag State in different ways, indicated in paragraph 5(c), (i) to (iv). It can simply refuse to authorize boarding without further ado (iv), or indicate that it will conduct the boarding and search with its own law enforcement or other officials (iii). It can also propose to conduct boarding and search together with the requesting Party (ii) or authorize the requesting Party to do so in its behalf (i). In its behalf, because, as is clearly expressed in paragraph 8, in all cases the flag State retains the right to exercise its jurisdiction throughout the whole process of boarding and in all respects. The flag State can only surrender its jurisdiction in favour of another State if the latter can establish its own jurisdiction over the case in accordance with the provisions of article 6. Article 6 regulates which States can establish jurisdiction in connection with SUA offences affecting them, such as crimes committed either against ships flying their flag, or in their territory, or by one of their nationals. It also regulates the optional right to establish jurisdiction for the benefit of those States whose nationals have been particularly affected by an offence, or when this offence has been committed in an attempt to compel those States to do, or abstain from doing, any act.

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As alternatives to the general regime of “case by case” authorization to board, article 8bis regulates the option for States Parties to grant either a qualified or a general blanket advanced authorization for other parties to board ships flying its flag (paragraph 5(d) and (e)): – Upon or after depositing the instrument through which they become parties, States may notify the Depository (namely the Secretary-General of IMO) that they grant authorization for boarding of ships flying their flag in cases where no response has been received four hours after the initial request to confirm nationality. – Similar formalities are requested for the granting of a blanket authorization for boarding without the “four-hour wait” condition. In order to establish from the outset a reliable network of communications among Parties to ensure prompt answers to a request, paragraph 15 obliges States to designate upon or after depositing the instrument through which they become Parties, the authority or authorities in charge of receiving and responding to requests for assistance, confirmation of nationality, and authorization to take measures. This designation should be communicated to the Secretary-General of IMO within one month of the date on which the instrument was deposited. Article 8bis limits the application of the boarding provisions to a comprehensive set of conditions and safeguards. Most of them are basically guidelines, although some could have a decisive weight in the consideration of whether an authorization for boarding should be granted. First and foremost is the need to consider whether, on account of the dangers and difficulties involved in the boarding of ships at sea, it would not be more appropriate to take measures at in the next port of call or elsewhere (paragraph 3). This preliminary guideline on how to act should be related to some important safeguards contained in paragraph 10 according to which, when a State Party takes boarding measures it should take due account of the need not to endanger the safety of life at sea (i), the safety and security of the ship and its cargo (iv) and the safety of the marine environment (vi). In the current political circumstances, it was impossible to avoid the inclusion in paragraph 10(ii) and (iii) of proclamations on the need to preserve human dignity, applicable international law, including human rights law and so on, in spite of the obvious fact that these proclamations are technically redundant in terms of treaty law. The need not to violate international law or humanitarian law is not regulated in treaties. It is self-evident that a treaty cannot violate the very principles in accordance with which it has been developed. To paraphrase Shakespeare, one can say that you “protest too much” if you insist in applying the boarding measures without violating international law. Be that as it may, this emotional phraseology illustrates the care put by the IMO Legal Committee

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in emphasizing the risks implied in the implementation of something as new as the agreement by two States on boarding measures beyond the territorial sea. More effective, in terms of treaty law, is the provision contained in paragraph 10(b) according to which States shall be liable for any damage, harm or loss attributable to them arising out of measures taken in the course of boarding if these measures were unfounded, unlawful or exceeded those reasonably required, depending on the circumstances of the case. A careful distinction is made here: authorization to board per se, cannot be considered a source of liability. Liability only arises in the case of damage, harm or loss caused by boarding measures taken as a consequence of the authorization.

IV. Delivery (Article 8) It is no coincidence that article 8bis was inserted after article 8, which provides for the delivery of an offender. Perhaps it could have been the other way around. Perhaps the provisions on boarding, which represent the very furthest you can go in terms of preventive measures within the scope of SUA Convention should have been followed by the regulations of measures to be taken in order to ensure the safe transfer of the alleged offender from sea to land in order to initiate, once and for all, the proceedings leading to comply with the main purpose of the SUA treaties namely the prosecution or extradition of the alleged offender. As anticipated above, the Legal Committee warned in 1987 that the powers bestowed upon the master of the ship to deliver alleged offenders could become the source of serious obstacles to their prompt delivery.12 The main issue at stake is the right of the authorities of a State Party (“the receiving State”) to accept, or not, delivery of alleged offenders on board a ship flying the flag of another Party (the flag State). The implementation of this crucial step to ensure prosecution and punishment has proved to be one of the weakest features of the SUA Convention. Port States frequently act as if they wanted to avoid the burden of taking suspect terrorists in custody at all costs. In too many countries the steps of detention and initiation of legal proceedings seem to be plagued by legal uncertainties and loopholes in the domestic law. Very frequently States misinterpret the meaning of the SUA Convention by believing that acceptance of delivery will result in their being compelled to establish jurisdiction for prosecution and punishment. This misconception shows that the obligation of States Parties to SUA to cooperate closely to ensure the effective implementation of the treaty is not properly followed or understood. The delivery of alleged offenders, as regulated in article 8, is an essential procedural measure

12

See report of the first extraordinary session of the Legal Committee (19-20 October 1987), paras 28 to 44. IMO Doc. LEG/ES.1/5.

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that does not prejudice any consideration on which country will ultimately exercise punitive jurisdiction. Upon receipt of the alleged offender, procedures will start to establish which State may have jurisdiction in connection with the offence alleged to have been committed. Within this context, acceptance of the delivery is primarily a preventive measure to bring the offender to a secure place. It is in this sense that the port State is obliged to accept delivery, rather than putting the master of the flag State vessel in the uncomfortable position of keeping on board a suspicious person for a long period of time. The obligation to cooperate among Parties, so clearly regulated in the SUA Convention, means at the very least that the receiving State Party has an obligation not to disrupt the navigation of a ship flying the flag of another Party by simply washing its hands of the situation. It is in this regard that the substantive implementing legislation implied in the incorporation of the SUA offences in the legislation of State Parties should be combined with detailed procedural regulations to be applied mainly by port States confronted with a request for delivery. Above all, it must be clear that delivery must be accepted even if the flag State may, eventually, establish punitive jurisdiction. It may be simply unsafe for the ship to navigate a long distance towards a home port with an alleged offender on board. Thus, the obligation to receive an alleged offender is an essential one, and as such is regulated by the SUA Convention. However, how far can this obligation be imposed by the master of the ship? It is in respect of this crucial issue that terrorism at sea differs from other types of terrorism. No wonder the originators of the original 1988 SUA Convention had so much difficulty in addressing this issue without the precedent of other antiterrorist treaties. The issue was addressed by reinforcing the legal condition of the master as a person entitled to establish, on behalf of the flag State, a public law relationship with the receiving State. After referring to the “reasonable grounds” leading the master to believe that a SUA offence has been committed, article 8 imposes upon the flag State the obligation to ensure that “the master of its ship is obliged, wherever practicable, and if possible before entering the territorial sea of the receiving State carrying on board any person whom the master intends to deliver, to give notification to the authorities of the receiving States of his intention to deliver such person and the reasons therefor” (paragraph 2). The flag State should also ensure that the master of the ship furnishes the authorities of the receiving State with the evidence in the master’s possession which pertains to the alleged offence (paragraph 4). So decisive is the obligation of the receiving State to accept delivery proposed under such conditions that the SUA Convention regulates only one reason to refuse the offender, namely, when the receiving State has grounds to consider that the Convention is not applicable to the acts giving rise to the request for delivery. These grounds must be stated in writing (paragraph 3).

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Article 8 even goes to the lengths of regulating the further right of the receiving State to re-deliver the alleged offender to the flag State and also establishes that if the flag State refuses this delivery it must produce a statement of the reasons for refusal (paragraph 5). This provision is decisively important to establish the legal nature of the whole process of delivery. Delivery per se does not entitle the flag State to withdraw its jurisdiction from the case. The main purpose of delivery by the master is to ensure that a situation of risk to commercial maritime navigation is promptly counteracted by bringing the alleged offender into custody. It is from this initial step that the effective application of the whole SUA Convention depends: “no custody, no suppression of unlawful acts”. And it is at this point that the apprehension and proper punishment of Mohammed Abbas, the mastermind of the Achille Lauro attack, failed amidst the legal uncertainties which the SUA treaties aim at erasing once and for all.

V. Custody (Article 7) Custody is carefully regulated by article 7. It should be associated with a preliminary inquiry and it should last as long as it takes, until substantive procedures of prosecution or extradition are put into motion. To this end, the State which has taken a person into custody must immediately notify States which have or may establish jurisdiction of the circumstances of the detention and – yes! – the establishment of jurisdiction is another matter where the detailed provisions already included in the original 1988 SUA treaties do not seem to have been properly taking into account by many of its Parties.

VI. Establishment of Jurisdiction (Article 6) Paragraph 1 of article 6 SUA imposes upon every State Party the obligation to establish jurisdiction for offences committed against or on board a ship flying its flag, by its nationals or in its territory, including the territorial sea. In the first case the establishment of jurisdiction relates to the time in which the offences were committed. This specific request prevents criminals from escaping justice following a change of flag after perpetration. Does the establishment of this compulsory jurisdiction operate ex-lege by the sole entry into force of the treaty in respect of a Party? There is no doubt that this is the case in terms of international law. However, paragraph 1 of article 6 is not self-executing. Bearing in mind the essentially domestic character of criminal procedural law, it states that each Party “shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction”. Accordingly, implementing legislation effecting regulation of the jurisdictional potestas of the domestic courts must be in place by the time of entry into force. 730


In addition to compulsory jurisdiction, paragraph 2 of article 6 regulates the right of States Parties to establish facultative jurisdiction over all or any of the following three cases: when the offence has been committed by a stateless person; or during the commission, a national of that State is seized, threatened, injured or killed; or if it is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act. The murder of Leon Klinghofer and the demand that Israel release Palestine prisoners are the two incidences in the Achille Lauro case echoed by the two last cases. The establishment of any case of facultative jurisdiction must be notified to the Secretary-General of IMO. It is through the combination of all these different types of jurisdiction that the unlawful acts regulated by the SUA treaties stop short of producing an effect similar to the universal jurisdiction regulated by UNCLOS for piracy. SUA does not go that far, but nevertheless leaves little room to enable punishment to be escaped through any jurisdictional loophole. In any case, the SUA Convention contains two important subsidiary catch-all provisions. Paragraph 4 of article 6 obliges each State Party to establish jurisdiction in respect of any alleged offender in its territory who is not extradited to another State. Article 10, paragraph 1 further establishes that, in such cases, this State Party is obliged “without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the law of the State”. In order to avoid cases where leniency of procedural criminal law, for instance, the easy granting of bail, may lead to the escape of the alleged offender, the paragraph adds that the authorities “shall take their decision [to prosecute] in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that State”. It is through the provisions on jurisdiction that the purpose of the SUA Convention becomes clear. The criminalization of the SUA offences implies not only the establishment of jurisdiction to prosecute or extradite but, if in doubt as to which jurisdiction would apply, the ultimate obligation for each State Party to take into custody an alleged offender and to complete prosecution and punishment.

VII. Extradition (Articles 1 to 12) The provisions on extradition contained in articles 11 to 12, although detailed and self-explanatory, are insufficiently incorporated in the implementing legislation of many States Parties. As a result of this shortcoming procedures undertaken to extradite may fail on a technicality. It is therefore useful to remember here that one of the first steps to be taken by a State on becoming Party to SUA is to establish whether or not it has extradition treaties with other Parties. If it does, then offences regulated by SUA are deemed to be included in these treaties as 731


extraditable offences (article 11, paragraph 1). However, in order to alleviate any doubts regarding the operation of this principle, it is advisable to explicitly incorporate all SUA offences as schedules to these treaties. For cases where no extradition treaty exists among any two or more Parties, and one or more of these Parties makes extradition conditional on the existence of the treaty, the Convention devises a clear-cut solution. Parties may consider the SUA Convention as sufficient legal title to enable extradition. States not making extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty must recognize the SUA offences as extraditable. The 2005 amendments finally include the long-awaited provision according to which none of the offences can be regarded, for the purpose of extradition, as political offences, connected to a political offence or inspired by political motives (article 11bis). States Parties can deny extradition if they have substantial grounds for believing that the Party requesting it will prosecute or punish a person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion or gender. The Convention remains silent on, but certainly does not interfere with, the refusal to extradite based on other principles of law upheld by the requested State. In this regard, the most common exception to the obligation to extradite is the possibility of the death penalty.

VIII. The SUA Convention within the Framework of IMO’s Security Strategy Mr Efthimios Mitropoulos, the present Secretary-General of IMO, who presided over the final steps leading to the adoption of the 2005 amendments to the SUA Convention has repeatedly stated his conviction that these amendments constitute a natural complement to the ISPS Code. His statements in this regard represent an opinion that goes further than a mere expression of desire. Both the security measures contained in the ISPS Code and the 2005 SUA Convention should build up a legal order to ensure that unlawful acts against ships, ports and offshore terminals are either prevented or punished in a comprehensive way. This goal can only be achieved through the adoption of a coherent set of implementing legislation drawn up at domestic level. In this regard, it is important to note that the 2002 SOLAS amendments and the 2005 SUA Convention should be read together within the context of the domestic legislation of States Parties to both treaties. Certainly some administrative provisions regulated by the ISPS Code are pure SOLAS, while the definition and punishment of SUA offences belong to the very specific scope of criminal law. However, both SOLAS – the ISPS Code and SUA – meet in the common aim of crime prevention. For instance, the elaborated set of ISPS Code provisions regulating the ship-port interface should provide a framework for cooperation between flag and port State jurisdiction which would erase forever the

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uncertainties described above in connection with the delivery and detention of alleged offenders. In particular, the setting of security levels on board ships and in ports as a precondition to navigation into ports would provide a clear legal title to ensure that delivery and detention are effected without any delays provoked by deliberations by flag State and port authorities unable to discern what their respective responsibilities really are. The SUA boarding provisions bring the IMO prosecution or extradition regime closer than ever to the high seas realm of UNCLOS. Parties to UNCLOS and SUA will have to ensure that their implementing domestic legislation is brought decisively into line with both treaties, so that national authorities can act on the basis of clear and universally applicable distinctions between piracy and unlawful acts. The new rules on long-range identification and tracking of ships (LRIT) regulation incorporated into SOLAS by resolution MSC 81/210 adopted by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee in May 2006 provides a further example of the way in which the scope of international regulations can be extended to the high seas. The regulation allows coastal States access to information about ships navigating up to 1000 miles off their coast. To confirm this increasing proximity between SOLAS and UNCLOS, the IMO website notes that the SOLAS regulation on LRIT “does not create or affirm any new rights of States over ships beyond those existing in international law, particularly, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), nor does it alter or affect the rights, jurisdiction, duties and obligations of States in connection with UNCLOS”. This may be true, albeit up to a point. The present author is of the view that UNCLOS rights, jurisdiction, duties and obligations are necessarily given a new dimension through the development of IMO security regulations. This is a good thing. After all, UNCLOS is a framework convention. It seems a nonsensical tautology to pretend that UNCLOS can only be implemented according to UNCLOS. UNCLOS necessarily relies on other treaties to get its rights and obligations properly implemented. Inevitably, those implementing treaties decisively influence the modalities of application of UNCLOS. But, as stated in the opening footnote, the opinions of the author of this chapter “do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations and IMO”.

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ARTICLE XIV OF THE FAO CONSTITUTION, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY AND THE INDIAN OCEAN TUNA COMMISSION William Edeson

T

he purpose of this chapter is to consider whether the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) has international legal personality. The IOTC was established by an international treaty made under the auspices of article XIV of the FAO Constitution and is located within the FAO framework. It recently entered into an agreement with another intergovernmental organization (La Commission de l’océan Indien) under article XV of its own Agreement. As this article gave it the power to “enter into agreements” with other “intergovernmental organizations”, it seemed clear enough to the IOTC that it had the capacity to do exactly that. However, it was informed by the FAO Legal Office that it did not have the legal personality to do so. It was also argued that the phrase “enter into”1 did not include the power to sign an agreement; only the Director-General of FAO had the necessary legal personality to do this. The issue is important because it has been asserted by the Council of the FAO, on the advice of its Committee on Constitutional and Legal Matters (CCLM) not simply that IOTC has no international legal personality, but that no international body established pursuant to a treaty formulated under article XIV can have international legal personality of its own. As there are at present sixteen treaties formulated pursuant to article XIV, nearly all of which set up international bodies of one kind or another, the view adopted by the FAO Council has potentially important implications. This chapter focuses on the specific instance of the IOTC; however, the conclusions reached will have relevance well beyond that treaty. It will, for example, provide the basis for a consideration whether other bodies established under article XIV treaties can have such personality. In the area of fisheries, these

1

In the French version of the Agreement, the term used is “peut conclure”, while in Spanish, the term is “podra concertar”.



include, in addition to IOTC, the General Fisheries Commission for Fisheries in the Mediterranean, the Regional Commission on Fisheries, and the Asia Pacific Fisheries Commission.2 It will also have implications for the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which is the latest body to be established by treaty under article XIV of the FAO Constitution.3

I. International Legal Personality Underlying the CCLM paper entitled “Legal Status of Bodies Established under article XIV of the FAO Constitution” (“the CCLM paper”)4 is an assumption that international legal personality has to be specifically conferred. Thus, it is said in relation to all bodies established by treaties formulated under article XIV: “Their constituent instruments do not entrust them with a legal personality, i.e. capacity to hold rights and obligations of their own, and therefore they have to act through the organization and drawing on the legal capacity of FAO.”5 What is remarkable about this statement is that it assumes that all bodies established by treaty under article XIV are necessarily the same, irrespective of what the treaties actually say. No attempt is made to ascertain whether there are differences between one treaty or another which might point to differing conclusions. This would require treating as indistinguishable a wide range of international bodies. For example, it embraces the 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which was modelled to a large extent on multilateral environmental treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and where the parties desired to have minimal links with FAO, compared with, at another extreme, an older article XIV body such as the Asia Pacific Fisheries Agreement (1948), which has very close administrative and financial links to FAO, and, indeed, is almost completely dependent on it. Further, the statement ignores the fact that several bodies established by treaty under article XIV have certain capacities which they alone can exercise. The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, for example, has the power to enact binding

2

These agreements can be found on the FAO website <www.fao.org>, under Legal Office and Treaties.

3

This chapter does not address so called article VI bodies, which are not established by their own treaty, instead they are set up as advisory bodies under a resolution of the Conference or the Council of FAO under article VI of the FAO Constitution.

4

Doc. CCLM 77/2, Rome, 7-8 October, 2004.

5

Paragraph 16 of the CCLM paper.

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Article XIV of FAO Constitution, International Legal Personality and Indian Ocean Tuna Commission

international conservation measures which operate directly on the international plane, and which can have impacts on third States (whether or not members of FAO). Likewise, the Governing Body of the 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture has very wide powers.6 What is also remarkable about the view expressed in the CCLM paper is that no attempt was made to assess the substantial recent contributions of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the subject of international legal personality, the dicta of the International Court of Justice or recent academic commentaries on the subject. It is proposed to review briefly here some of the more recent statements on the subject. Typical of what might be described as the modern approach to determining the existence of international legal personality is the following comment found in the fifth edition of Bowett, edited by Professor Sands and Professor Klein: “The attribution of international legal personality simply means that the entity upon which it is conferred is a subject of international law and that it is capable of possessing international rights and duties. The precise scope of those rights and duties will vary according to what may reasonably be seen as necessary, in view of the purposes and functions of the organization in question, to enable the latter to fulfil its tasks. Therefore the test is a functional one; reference to the functions and powers of the organization exercised on the international plane, and not to the abstract notion of personality, will alone give guidance on what powers may properly be implied.”7 Klabbers also emphasised a pragmatic approach:

6

For example, under article 19.3 it can, inter alia: (g) establish and maintain cooperation with other relevant international organizations and treaty bodies, including in particular the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, on matters covered by this Treaty, including their participation in the funding strategy; (k) perform such other functions as may be necessary for the fulfilment of the objectives of this Treaty; (n) approve the terms of agreements with the IARCs [International Agricultural Research Centres] and other international institutions under Article 15, and review and amend the MTA [Material Transfer Agreement] in Article 15; (m) inform, as appropriate, the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity and other relevant international organizations and treaty bodies of matters regarding the implementation of this Treaty.

7

D.W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, 5th edn, London Sweet and Maxwell, 2001, p. 473. 737


“It should come as no surprise, then, that practice has shown a more pragmatic approach to questions of international legal personality, perhaps best captured by the phrase ‘presumptive personality’: as soon as an organization performs acts which can only be explained on the basis of international legal personality, such an organization will be presumed to be in possession of international legal personality.”8 These views are representative of modern thinking on the subject of international legal personality. They leave behind much of the theoretical debate which has surrounded the subject in the past. With the case law of the International Court of Justice, the starting point of the modern approach to international legal personality is found in the landmark advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Reparations case.9 The case is too well known to need revisiting here, except to note that it provided the basis for the developments which have taken place concerning international legal personality, and in particular, the separation of notions of statehood from the attributes of the personality of international organizations. It is enough to refer to one of several more recent dicta by the International Court of Justice which favour a liberal approach to the existence of international personality. Thus, we find the following well known dictum in the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict: “The powers conferred on international organizations are normally the subject of an express statement in their constituent instruments. Nevertheless, the necessities of international life may point to the need for organizations, in order to achieve their objectives, to possess subsidiary powers which are not expressly provided for in the basic instruments which govern their activities. It is generally accepted that international organizations can exercise such powers, known as ‘implied’ powers.”10

8

J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 55-56. See also the very comprehensive discussion in H. Schermers and N. Blokker, International Institutional Law, 4th edn, Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, 2003, at pp. 987-994.

9

ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174.

10

ICJ Reports 1996, p. 66 at p. 79 para. 25. Likewise the ILC in its Report of the 55th session (ILC Doc. A/58/10) (2003) stated: “While the International court has not identified particular prerequisites, its dicta on the legal personality of international organizations do not appear to set stringent requirements for this purpose.” It also commented: “… the Court appears to take a liberal view of the acquisition by international organizations of legal personality under international law” (at pp. 41-42).

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The ILC is currently considering the responsibility of international organizations. The stimulating first report on this subject by Professor Gaja, Special Rapporteur11 merits close attention as this report addressed many aspects of international legal personality in considerable detail. In particular, he sought to fill in many of the gaps in the subject left uncompleted from earlier work on the subject of State Responsibility by the ILC. In this report, following a reference to the advisory opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, by the International Court of Justice, the Special Rapporteur’s report adds: “17. The Court’s assertion of the legal personality of international organizations needs to be viewed in the context of its more recent approach to the question of legal personality in international law. The Court stated in the LaGrand case12 that individuals are also subjects of international law. This approach may lead the Court to assert the legal personality even of non-governmental organizations. It would be difficult to understand why individuals may acquire rights and obligations under international law while the same could not occur with any international organization, provided that it is an entity which is distinct from its members.”13 This comment puts into context the remarkable assertion found in the CCLM paper that bodies established by international treaty under article XIV can have no international legal personality. The point that emerges from this comment by Professor Gaja is that the debate has moved on well beyond international legal personality of “international organizations”, and would most probably very easily embrace an intergovernmental organization such as IOTC as having such personality. In its draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, the ILC has adopted the following definition of the term: “For the purposes of the present draft articles, the term ‘international organization’ refers to an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own inter-

11

G. Gaja, Special Rapporteur, First Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, ILC Doc. A/CN.4/532.

12

ICJ Reports 2001, p. 466 at p. 494 para. 77.

13

See note 11, at p. 9. Later, he added: “In the literature current definitions of the term ‘international organization’ often state that an organization may be characterised as such only if it has been established by an agreement under international law. … What seems to be significant for our purposes is not so much the legal nature of the instrument establishing the organization, as the functions that the organization exercises. A reference to the governmental functions that the organization exercises is directly relevant, while the nature of the constituent instrument has only a descriptive value” (emphasis added) (pp. 14-15). 739


national legal personality. International organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other entities.”14 It has to be borne in mind that the definition was put forward in the context of dealing with the international responsibility of such organizations and that it did not exclude the possibility of liability for bodies that did not possess one or more of the characteristics outlined in the above definition.15 It was also an expansive definition inasmuch as it added to those established by treaty an organization established by other types of instruments governed by international law. The Commission explained the phrase “possessing its own personality” in the following terms: “The legal personality of an organization which may give rise to the international responsibility of that organization needs to be ‘distinct from that of its member States.’ This element is reflected in the requirement in article 2 that the personality should be the organization’s ‘own’, a term that the Commission considers as synonymous with the phrase ‘distinct from that of its member States.’”16 The definition put forward by the ILC supports the view that the IOTC has its own international legal personality as it has been established by its own treaty, and that personality is distinct from its members. Developments in the area of multilateral environmental treaties also provide some useful context for assessing the status of the IOTC. Very briefly, there has been much debate surrounding the role of the conferences of the parties (COPs) and the meetings of the parties (MOPs), with several writers suggesting that these bodies are exercising certain functions of an international person and performing acts on the international plane.17 Without opening up that debate

14

Article 2, see Report of the ILC note 10, p. 33.

15

Commentary to draft article 2, id., at p. 38.

16

Commentary to draft article 2, id., at p. 43.

17

This phenomenon is well identified in the seminal article published in the American Journal of International Law, entitled: “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: a Little noticed Phenomenon in International Law” written by R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, 94 AJIL 623 (2000). See further, J. Brunnée “COPing with consent: Law making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements” 15 LJIL 1 (2002); “Reweaving the fabric of International Law? Patterns of consent in international environmental Agreements” and comments by G. Ulfstein (“Reweaving the Fabric of International Law? Patterns of Consent in Environmental Framework Agreements”, p. 145) and G. Handl (“International ‘Lawmaking’ by Conferences of the Parties and Other Politically Mandated Bodies”, p. 127), in R. Wolfrum and V. Röben (eds), Developments of International Law in Treaty Making, Berlin Springer, 2005, p. 101.

740


here, the actions taken by such multilateral environmental bodies lend support to the view that a body established by treaty can have its own legal personality. The basic point of drawing attention to the dicta of the International Court of Justice, the ILC and recent writings of eminent scholars, including the developments in the cognate area of multilateral environmental treaties, is that it can be safely asserted that international law has evolved to the point where, in general terms, there is a presumption that a body which has been established under a treaty (or other instrument governed by international law) and is distinct from its members, (and which functions on the international plane) has international legal personality. Indeed, the debate has moved on to address the status of individuals, and possibly also NGOs. It would be surprising, against the background of the above materials, if a body such as IOTC did not have such personality.18

II. Are Article XIV Treaties Normal International Treaties? It may seem unnecessary to ask the question whether article XIV treaties are normal international treaties, however, the reason why it has to be asked is that the CCLM paper appears to adopt an approach to treaty interpretation that does not accord with that set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter referred to as the 1969 Vienna Convention). Thus, at paragraph 15, it is stated: “the various conventions and concluded under Article XIV of the FAO constitution, even when they establish bodies entrusted with substantial autonomy, do contain provisions flowing as a natural consequence from the fact that such bodies are placed and operate within the framework of FAO.”

18

The recent view put forward by the CCLM and the FAO Council is not one shared by several lawyers with a close association with the FAO Legal Office. Thus, in 1967, J. Carroz and A. Roche, acknowledged that certain bodies established by treaty pursuant to article XIV were “entities distinct from FAO”: “The Proposed International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas” 61 AJIL 673 (1967) at pp. 698-699. J. Carroz had written extensively on the subject of international fisheries bodies and of international legal personality, including being co-author with Y. Probst of “Personnalité juridique internationale et capacité de conclure des traités de l’ONU et des institutions specialisées” (Paris Foulon, 1953). A. Roche later became Legal Counsel of FAO. More recently, A. Tavares, a member of the Legal Office who has written extensively on fisheries and FAO matters, has also stated that such bodies have a “life of their own”. See “Le comite des pêches de la FAO et son action” 3 An. Dr. Mer 87 (1998) at p. 90. “[L]ife of their own” in the original is “une vie propre”. 741


It then lists several provisions basically drawn from Part R of FAO’s basic texts, for example, the power of the Council or Conference to disallow certain amendments, and the requirement that contributions are to be placed in trust funds to be administered by the Director-General. The most recent treaty concluded under article XIV, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the text of which was approved by the FAO Conference in 2001 before being opened up for signature and ratification, omitted virtually all of the conditions proposed in Part R and listed in the CCLM paper as “flowing as a natural consequence” of being within the framework of FAO. In the case of the IOTC, the power to disallow amendments which are “inconsistent” with the FAO Constitution or its objectives and purposes by the FAO Council (also suggested by Part R “when appropriate”) is restricted to those which are “clearly inconsistent”. Likewise, the IOTC is given the power in article XV to enter into agreements, despite language in paragraph 29 of Part R which states: “When this is found to be desirable, a specific provision shall be inserted … indicating the scope of such authority and specifying that all such arrangements shall be made by the Director-General of the Organization.” As can be seen from article XV of the IOTC Agreement, this was clearly not followed. Nonetheless, the FAO Council approved the Agreement presumably in the knowledge that its language did not conform to paragraph 29.19 The problem with the approach adopted in the CCLM paper, in particular, by not referring at all to the many variations and exceptions that exist between one article XIV treaty and another, is that it appears implicitly to suggest that the actual terms used in such a treaty are not important. In other words, it appears to ignore the rule of interpretation set out in article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which emphasises reliance on the ordinary meaning of the terms actually used in a treaty in their context.

19

An even stronger departure from paragraph 29 is found in article VIII.3 of the Agreement for the Establishment of Desert Locusts Commission, 2000: “The Commission may:(a) enter into arrangements or agreements with Nations that are not Members of the Commission, with national institutions and with regional or international organizations that are directly concerned for common action in connection with the survey, research and control of locusts in the Region; (b) enter into or encourage arrangements, through the Director-General of the Organization, with other Specialized Agencies of the United Nations system for common action on the study of locusts and desert locust control and for the mutual exchange of locust-related information”. The fact that the Director-General is referred to only in paragraph (b) is a direct and unambiguously clear contradiction of the provisions of paragraph 29 of Part R.

742


Further, the notion of context as it is used in the CCLM paper20 is much wider than the meaning given to that term in article 31. In article 31, context is given a restricted meaning which would not include an instrument such as Part R which requires many choices to be made, and which is stated to be merely guidelines. Specifically, Part R would not qualify as an “agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty” in order to form part of the context for the purpose of article 31, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention.21 It seems clear enough that treaties entered under the aegis of article XIV are intended to be full international treaties subject to the rules of international law as reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention.22 This point is supported by P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (5th edn), where, after referring to article XIV of the FAO Constitution, they said: “These conventions are ordinary multilateral treaties within the meaning of the 1969 Vienna Convention and will be binding only on states which become parties to them according to the procedures set forth

20

For example, at paragraph 23, it states that article XV of the IOTC Agreement needs to be interpreted in “in the context of FAO’s Basic Texts”. It then arrives at an interpretation of the article which departs considerably from the ordinary meaning of the words used in that article.

21

Part R itself reflects the view that such agreements are normal international agreements, where it is stated: “3. Article XIV of the Constitution applies to conventions and multilateral agreements concluded under the aegis of the Organization. These are agreements concluded between States with respect to which, in conformity with the principles of public international law, the expressed consent of sovereign entities constitutes the required juridical act”. See also paragraph 7 of Part R. Likewise, paragraphs 9 and 10 reflect the clear intent that article XIV agreements were to be normal international agreements. Article XIV of the FAO Constitution also reflects this assumption in paragraph 7 where it requires that a copy of an agreement approved under article XIV shall, once it has entered into force, be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations “for registration”.

22

Article 5 states: “The present Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization and to any treaty adopted within an international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization”. Even assuming that Part R is a “relevant rule” (which is unlikely as the term probably is intended to refer to rules for the making of treaties”), Part R by its own terms does not impose mandatory requirements on the content of agreements. It is intended to be taken into account in the drafting of such agreements, but once the agreement has been approved and opened for acceptance, its provisions have no further application to that agreement, except possibly as a preparatory work on the treaty or as part of the circumstances of its conclusion under article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. 743


in the organization’s constituent instruments or in the conventions themselves.”

III. Does Article XIV Itself Impose Any Special Conditions? Article XIV itself does not impose any conditions which would prevent a body established by treaty made pursuant to it from having certain capacities on the international plane, and consequently having its own international personality. Article XIV states in part: “1. The Conference may, by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and in conformity with rules adopted by the Conference, approve and submit to Member Nations conventions and agreements concerning questions relating to food and agriculture. 2. The Council, under rules to be adopted by the Conference, may, by a vote concurred in by at least two thirds of the membership of the Council, approve and submit to Member Nations: a. agreements concerning questions relating to food and agriculture which are of particular interest to Member Nations of geographical areas specified in such agreements and are designed to apply only to such areas; b. supplementary conventions or agreements designed to implement any convention or agreement which has come into force under paragraphs 1 or 2 (a).”23 It will be apparent that article XIV does not in its terms impose any restraint on the provisions of an article XIV treaty, for example, by preventing the acquisition of international legal personality by a body established by treaty under article XIV. However, under the Rules adopted by the Conference, one condition is imposed:

23

The only restraint in article XIV itself is found in article XIV 3 (c): “… In the case of conventions, agreements, supplementary conventions and agreements establishing commissions or committees, participation by non-member States of the Organization that are members of the United Nations, any of its specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency or by regional economic integration organizations other than Member Organizations, shall in addition be subject to prior approval by at least two-thirds of the membership of such commissions or committees”. This would not provide a basis for denying the existence of an international legal personality.

744


“The Conference or the Council … may approve only such conventions, agreements, supplementary conventions or agreements as contain provisions to the effect that: any international body or machinery to be set up or any activity to be undertaken under such convention, agreement, supplementary convention or agreement is within the framework of the Organization; ...” It is arguable that “rules” in article XIV in its context relates to rules for making treaties under article XIV rather than providing the basis for controlling the substance of such treaties. Whether or not that is the case, Rule XXI itself contemplates that bodies established by treaties under article XIV are “international” bodies. There would be few such bodies which would not have at least some capacities to act on the international plane, albeit within the FAO framework. Further, as will be seen in the next section, in the case of the IOTC, it is exercising extensive powers directly on the international plane. These were powers given to it in a treaty approved by the FAO Council. Thus, when the Council approved the terms of the IOTC Agreement, it must be presumed that the Council was satisfied that the provisions of the Agreement were consistent with those of a body operating within the FAO framework.24

IV. The IOTC Agreement Itself It is now proposed to consider what evidence emerges from the provisions of the IOTC Agreement and its practice as evidence of at least some international personality. Without going into each and every article, it can be said that the IOTC Agreement is broadly similar to many other regional fisheries commissions: there is a treaty, a commission which has the autonomous power to make binding resolutions and recommendations on a range of matters, which has operated directly on the international plane, and without reference to FAO in the way it has chosen to exercise that autonomous power. In addition to specifically fisheries conservation issues, the Commission has adopted both binding and non binding resolutions dealing with Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties, non-cooperating non-contracting parties, flag of convenience vessels, programmes of inspection in ports, preparation of a list of

24

The same point can be made with the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture which had very few links to FAO written into the treaty. This was endorsed by the FAO Conference when it approved the treaty. (The CCLM also approved the text of the treaty.) 745


vessels presumed to have engaged in illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing, preparation of a list of vessels authorised to operate in the Convention Area, fishing capacity of Parties and Non-contracting Parties, and trade measures. Some of these resolutions are directed, inter alia, towards fishing entities.25 The IOTC resolutions could comfortably be described as typical of measures being adopted by a modern regional fisheries commission, and are clearly intended to operate, and are operating, directly on the international plane. From a purely functional perspective, the activities of the IOTC in the form of its wide ranging resolutions would by themselves support the view that the IOTC has the capacity to act, and has acted, on the international plane, and the requisite personality to do so. This high level of autonomy is reflected also in the budgetary provisions of the Commission. In the Agreement itself, the budget is described as “autonomous”,26 while in the Financial Regulations, it is stated in regulation 4: “After the budgets have been adopted, the appropriations therein shall constitute the authority for the Commission to incur obligations and make payments for the purposes for which the appropriations were voted, and up to the amounts so voted.” The clear intent of regulation 4 is to ensure that the Commission has functional autonomy in budgetary matters as regards the autonomous budget. However, regulation 4 also reflects another, wider, point: if the Commission can incur obligations, financial or otherwise, this could mean that the acts of the Commission derived from those obligations would be attributable to IOTC on the international plane.27 Further evidence in support of international legal personality can be found in article XV of the IOTC Agreement which states: “1. The Commission shall cooperate and make appropriate arrangements therefore with other intergovernmental organizations and institutions, especially those active in the fisheries sector, which might contribute to the work and further the objectives of the Commission in particular with any intergovernmental organization or institution dealing with tuna in the Area. The Commission may enter into agreements with such organizations

25

These resolutions can be viewed on the website of the IOTC: <www.iotc.org>.

26

Article VIII.2.

27

This important subject cannot be pursued here for reasons of space. It has received impetus from the current work of the ILC on the subject, and the work of the International Law Association See the report on “Accountability of International Organizations”. Its final report presented to the Berlin Conference 2004, which covers issues not only of responsibility but more widely accountability and good governance practices for international organizations. Available at <www.ila-hq.org/html/layout_committee.htm>.

746


and institutions. Such agreements shall seek to promote complementarity and, subject to paragraph 2, to avoid duplication in and conflict with the activities of the Commission and such organizations.” It might be thought that, in view of the fact that this was approved by the FAO Council under article XIV of the FAO Constitution, and subsequently accepted by those members which became parties to the Agreement, there was recognition both by the FAO Council itself and the Contracting parties that the IOTC was an “intergovernmental organization” which could enter into agreements. One international legal expert, Professor Martin Tsamenyi, considered that this provision by itself was sufficient evidence of the international legal personality of the IOTC.28 This aspect was not considered in the CCLM paper; however, it is a formidable argument in its own right. The capacity to enter into agreements would by itself provide a powerful indicator of the international legal personality of the Commission. It is worth noting here the following comment by Bowett: “treaty making power is clear evidence of international personality ….”29 Article XXIII of the IOTC Agreement (on dispute settlement) also supports the existence of at least some measure of international legal personality. It states: “Any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement, if not settled by the Commission, shall be referred for settlement to a conciliation procedure to be adopted by the Commission. The results of such conciliation procedure, while not binding in character, shall become the basis for renewed consideration by the parties concerned of the matter out of which the disagreement arose. If as the result of this procedure the dispute is not settled, it may be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the Statute of the International Court of Justice, unless the parties to the dispute agree to another method of settlement.” 28

M. Tsamenyi, “The Legal Substance and Status of Fishing Entities in International Law: a Note” 37 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 123 (2006) at p. 125. Note also the view of Professor Franckx referred to at footnote 32 below.

29

D.W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, 4th edn, London Stevens & Sons, 1982, pp. 341-342. A similar comment can be found in discussion by the International Law Commission on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations in connection with the definition of an international organization as an “intergovernmental organization” On the question whether such a body could enter into treaties, the Commission said: “Either an international organization has the capacity to enter into at least one treaty, in which case the rules in the draft articles will be applicable to it, or, despite its title, it does not have that capacity, in which case it would be pointless to state explicitly that the draft articles do not apply to it”. ILCYB 1981, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 124. 747


The significance of this article is that it concerns actions that can take place solely on the international plane. While the role of the Commission is limited in the provision to the conciliation procedure, the provision would not prevent the Commission from setting up a conciliation procedure which drew on conciliators from outside the Commission itself. It assumes a degree of international personality for this purpose. It does not contemplate any role for FAO or for the Director-General.30 The settlement of disputes provision also has another important aspect: it assumes, correctly as a matter of international law, that the Contracting Parties are primarily responsible (through the Commission) for determining the interpretation or application of the Agreement.31 In summary, the Commission has, and already has exercised, considerable autonomy in decision making on the international plane. This is backed up by the autonomy it possesses in the budgetary provisions, including the capacity to incur obligations once the budget has been adopted by the Commission. Further, it has the power to enter into agreements referred to in article XV of the IOTC Agreement, as well as the limited but significant role given to the Commission in respect of dispute settlement. Finally, at its meeting in December 2003, IOTC was in no doubt also that it had the capacity to sign agreements for itself, and specifically rejected the view put forward by the FAO Legal Office that it lacked international personality to do so.32

V. The Headquarters Agreement Article 3 of the Headquarters Agreement with Seychelles states quite simply that “IOTC shall enjoy legal personality in Seychelles and shall act through its Secretary”. Article 4 requires Seychelles to grant a wide range of privileges, immunities and facilities to IOTC. However, under article 5, it is stated: “Any waiver of immunity under Article 4 shall be done expressly by the Secretary of the Commission.”

30

Though the Director General or the FAO Council would be able to put questions of interpretation concerning article XIV agreements to the CCLM, which could give an advisory opinion or make recommendations: see FAO General Rules XXXIV. Needless to say, it would be up to the Contracting Parties to the Agreement to decide whether or not to accept the views of the CCLM.

31

See in particular article 31.3(a) 1969 Vienna Convention, which permits subsequent agreements or practice of the parties to the agreement to be relevant to its interpretation.

32

IOTC report of the 8th session, paragraphs 53 to 55.

748


It will be noted here that only the Secretary can take the necessary decision to waive immunity. Very simply, the Secretary has important international responsibilities directly imposed on him or her under this Agreement. It should also be noted that the text of this Agreement was first approved by the IOTC, which then invited the Director-General to sign it on its behalf with the government of the Seychelles. This was done. This is strong recognition in an international agreement that IOTC has at least some capacities deriving from an international agreement. It could, by itself, be sufficient to base an argument that IOTC has personality under international law. This is the view held by Professor Franckx, who concluded on the basis of the Headquarters Agreement alone that IOTC did have legal personality.33 Likewise, Mr Gaja, the Special Rapporteur for the ILC concluded in general terms, though not referring specifically to IOTC: “The very existence of a headquarters agreement shows that the organization is already a subject of international law.”34 It is curious, however, that such an important document as the Headquarters Agreement is nowhere addressed directly in the CCLM paper, despite the significance of its provisions on legal personality.35

VI. What is the Meaning of “May Enter into Agreements” in Article XV of the IOTC Agreement? Basically, the CCLM paper has argued at some length that the phrase “enter into agreements” in article XV of the IOTC Agreement somehow precludes the Commission from deciding who should sign any agreement on its behalf. Only the Director-General, it asserts, can do that. It draws heavily from a passage in Part R of the basic texts. The phrase “enter into” seems quite clear in its ordinary meaning. In English, this would permit the taking of all necessary steps to commit the Commission to an agreement. If the agreement required signature, that would as a matter of common sense include the power to designate someone to sign on its behalf. This might be the Director-General. It might be the Secretary of the Commission. It might be the Chairman. The French and Spanish texts are equally clear. The French text uses “peut conclure”, while the Spanish text refers to “podra concertar”.

33

In FAO Legislative Study No. 71, Fisheries Enforcement: Related Legal Issues: National Sub Regional or Regional Perspectives, at p. 156.

34

See note 11, paragraph 19.

35

In footnote 6 in the CCLM paper, it is suggested merely in passing that all that was conferred under the headquarters agreement was “national legal personality within Seychelles”. 749


In sum, article XV of the IOTC Agreement can be interpreted in its ordinary meaning and in its context in the IOTC Agreement. There is nothing in the words used there to warrant importing into them a reference to the Director-General when he is not even mentioned in that article. There is, however, another very simple response to the suggestion that only the Director-General can sign agreements under article XV of the IOTC Agreement. The definition of treaties under the 1969 Vienna Convention does not require that treaties be signed.36 This is well accepted practice even though most treaties are in fact signed.3 7 Thus, it would be possible for the Commission to propose an agreement and invite the other party to accept it. If that were done, there would be an agreement. There seems little point in insisting on a dubious interpretation of article XV of the IOTC Agreement when it could be so easily sidestepped.

VII. Conclusion A principle purpose of this chapter has been to use the case of the IOTC as a testing ground for the proposition whether bodies established by treaty under article XIV of the FAO Constitution can have international legal personality. The conclusion reached is that the IOTC must have such personality for a number of reasons: the character of the Commission as an entity distinct from its members, its wide ranging actions on the international plane, the presence in the Agreement itself of provisions pointing towards that personality (in particular, its capacity to adopt binding and non binding conservation measures, its capacity to enter into certain agreements, and the dispute settlement provisions), and the high probability that many actions it takes would be attributable to it under international law. If the conclusions reached for the IOTC are correct, then it would suggest that other bodies established by treaty under article XIV could also have such personality. However, that would still depend on a careful consideration of each situation in the light of their constituent treaties and practices before a final judgment could be made. That question needs to be left for another occasion.

36

See article 2: “treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.

37

Instances occur where third person notes are exchanged. These are usually only initialed. Other instances can occur where two bodies adopt identical resolutions, in which they have committed themselves to certain obligations. There are other well known examples in treaty practice. See further A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 24 (“Treaties do not have to be signed”).

750

REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS AND NON-MEMBERS Moritaka Hayashi

I. Introduction

S

ince the beginning of 1990s, prompted notably by the serious decline and collapse of some commercial fisheries in various parts of the world, the international community has paid growing attention to the strengthening of approaches and mechanisms for the better conservation1 of marine fishery resources. Urgent efforts at the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations itself have led to the adoption of the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAO Compliance Agreement) and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries by the FAO, and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement) by the General Assembly. These instruments were drafted on the basis of the general provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) relating to the conservation of the living resources. All these instruments attach importance to the role of regional fisheries management organisations (RFOs) for the better conservation of fishery resources. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement in particular contains a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the functions of RFOs, expanding and strengthening considerably the broadly drafted provisions of the LOSC. One of the most serious problems these RFOs have faced is how to cope with the fishing activities conducted in the high seas area within their regulatory mandate by fishing vessels flying the flags of non-members of the organisation concerned. This is the issue of so-called free-riders, who attempt to reap economic

1

Throughout this chapter, “conservation” is used to include “management” of fishery resources.



benefits on the basis of the traditional freedom of fishing, without paying the cost for conservation of the resources by staying out of RFOs. These free-riders cause great damage to RFOs not only by reducing the resources available to members, but also by frustrating serious stock assessment and other scientific efforts through, among other things, their disregard of conservation rules and non-cooperation in supplying statistical data of their catch. Since such free-riders usually target stocks of high value, their large-scale activities lead to overfishing, and also tempt members themselves to disregard regulatory measures, thus contributing to further decline of resources. RFOs have taken several kinds of measures to address this issue, which has in recent years been dealt with as major part of the problems of so-called IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing. Some of these measures are merely appeals or calls for dissuasion to free-riders and their flag States. Certain other measures, however, have the effect of compelling them to cease or rectify their activities. The question may thus be asked as to whether such free-riders, fishing without becoming members of RFOs on the high seas where freedom of fishing prevails, remain completely outside the reach of RFO measures, or, if not, in what way they are affected by such measures. It may also be asked to what extent and under what circumstances can an RFO validly apply its measures against non-members. This chapter attempts to explore these questions by first reviewing the kind of measures being taken by RFOs against non-members, and then analysing the legal issues such measures raise. It should be noted that for most RFOs, “(Contracting) Parties” and “non-(Contracting) Parties” are in effect the same as members and non-members of the principal organs, usually called commissions, established by the constituent instruments.2 In other instruments that do not provide for the establishment of such organs, the meeting of States Parties serves similar purposes. The words “(non-)Parties” and “(non-)members” are therefore used in principle interchangeably in this chapter.

II. Measures Taken Against Non-Members by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations Action taken so far by RFOs against non-members may be divided into the following four main categories:

2

A notable exception is the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), under which only those acceding States that are actively engaged in research or harvesting in the CCAMLR area will receive full membership of the Commission (art. 7(2)(b)).

752

Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Non-Members

(a) Identification of non-Parties whose vessels have been engaged in activities that diminish the effectiveness of conservation measures, followed by diplomatic and other measures against such countries; (b) Establishment of IUU vessel lists, followed by trade and other measures against such vessels; (c) Adoption of catch document or statistical document programs; and (d) Presumption of undermining RFO conservation measures, followed by trade measures. 1. Identification of Non-Parties for Taking Diplomatic and Other Measures The first category of action is aimed at identifying those non-Party States whose vessels have been engaged in activities that undermine the RFO’s conservation measures, and applying some kind of coutermeasures against such countries. In 1994, recognising that a significant number of vessels registered in nonParties were catching Atlantic bluefin tuna, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) adopted a resolution entitled “Action Plan to Ensure Effectiveness of the Conservation Programme for Atlantic Bluefin Tuna”.3 Under the Action Plan, ICCAT would each year identify those non-Party States whose vessels had been fishing for Atlantic bluefin tuna in a manner that diminished the effectiveness of its conservation measures. Then the Parties would jointly or individually request such non-Parties to rectify their activities. Upon reviewing the performance of the non-Parties concerned each year, ICCAT was expected to take “non-discriminatory trade restrictive measures”, consistent with international obligations, on all bluefin tuna and its products from such non-Parties. Under this Plan, ICCAT identified Belize, Honduras and Panama as such non-Parties, and subsequently took decisions to prohibit imports of bluefin tuna and its products from them.4 This was the first time that an RFO took trade measures, and the ICCAT Plan has become a model for subsequent action by other RFOs. Although much weaker in tone and content, the Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) adopted in 1999 a “Policy to Enhance

3

ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period, 1994-1995, Part I (1995), p. 91, reproduced in R. Lee and M. Hayashi, eds, New Directions in the Law of the Sea: Regional and National Developments (Oceana Publications), IX, 6. a (3). A similar action plan was also adopted for Atlantic swordfish in 1995.

4

ICCAT, Compendium of Management Recommendations and Resolutions adopted by ICCAT for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and Tuna-like Species, pp. 96-11 and 96-12. 753


Cooperation between CCAMLR and Non-Contracting Parties”.5 The Policy asked the secretariat to develop a list of non-Parties whose vessels undermined the effectiveness of its conservation measures. The CCAMLR Chairman then wrote to such non-Parties, requesting or encouraging them to take actions to cooperate with such measures. Parties were also required to take individually or collectively “all appropriate efforts” to implement the Policy. In 2000, the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) also adopted a similar “Action Plan”,6 empowering the Commission to impose trade restrictive measures on southern bluefin tuna products in any form from non-Parties who were identified as those whose vessels had undermined the effectiveness of its conservation measures. CCSBT has taken certain decisions regarding Belize, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea and Honduras with warnings under the Action Plan, but without imposing trade measures.7 In the same year, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) adopted “Resolution on Fishing by Vessels of Non-Parties”,8 with similar procedures for identifying non-Parties whose vessels undermined the IATTC conservation measures, and with the possibility of taking measures to ensure that non-Party vessels do not engage in such activities. 2. Establishment of IUU Vessel List Followed by Trade Measures The actions targeting flag States described above are obviously not entirely effective in eliminating IUU fishing vessels, since one of their well-known practices is to reflag by changing their State of registration from one country to another, including in some cases to member States of the RFO concerned. Some RFOs therefore tried to focus on the fishing vessels themselves and prepared black-lists of such vessels in the 1990s. They soon started to develop a more expanded and systematic procedure of listing IUU fishing vessels, accompanied by trade restrictive measures. These developments were spurred on by the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU),9 adopted by the FAO in 2001. The document encourages

5

Report of the 18th Meeting of CCAMLR, Hobart, Australia, 25 October – 5 November 1999, Annex 8, reproduced in Lee and Hayashi, supra note 3, XIV, a (9).

6

CCSBT, Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting, Second Part, 21–23 March 2000, Annex I.

7

See CCSBT, Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting, Miyako, Japan, 15 – 19 October 2001, Attachments G and H, reproduced in Lee and Hayashi, supra note 3, III, 6. a (7). The 2003 decision to take no action for the time being was due to “the current lack of catches” from these countries. See Report of the Extended Commission of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Commission, 7-10 October 2003, Christchurch, New Zealand, para. 27.

8

IATTC, Minutes of the 66th Meeting, San Jose, Costa Rica, 12, 14 and 15 June 2000, Appendix, reproduced in Lee and Hayashi, supra note 3, XII, 4. a (10).

9

Text available at the FAO home page <www.fao.org/documents/>.

754


RFOs to take all steps necessary, consistent with international law, to prevent fish caught by vessels identified by them to have been engaged in IUU fishing from being traded or imported into their territories, and advises that such identification of vessels should be made through agreed procedures in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.10 Thus, in 2002, ICCAT adopted a Recommendation to establish an IUU list,11 containing the names of non-Party vessels presumed to have carried out IUU activities in its regulatory area. Such vessels are presumed to have done so when a Party presents evidence that they have conducted one of several enumerated acts contrary to ICCAT conservation measures. On the basis of the information provided by Parties, each year the secretariat invites comments from the suspected States, and prepares a provisional IUU list for examination by a Working Group, which then finalises the list for submission to the Commission for approval. Upon adoption of the list, the Commission and Parties are to take a range of measures. The Commission must request the non-Parties concerned to take all the necessary measures to eliminate IUU activities. Parties must take “all necessary measures” under national legislation, including prohibition of imports, or landing or transhipment, of tuna from vessels on the IUU list, refusing to grant their flag to such vessels, and prohibiting the chartering of such vessels. About a month later, in December 2002, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) adopted a Resolution on establishing an IUU list,12 copying almost in toto the above-mentioned Recommendation of ICCAT. This was followed by IATTC, which adopted in 2004 a resolution on establishing an IUU list with almost the same contents.13 An essentially similar procedure, but with somewhat a different format, was adopted by CCAMLR as Conservation Measure regarding “Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with CCCAMLR Conservation Measures”.14 This Scheme is actually an expanded version of the scheme with

10

IPOA-IUU, para. 66.

11

“Recommendation to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the ICCAT Convention Area”, ICCAT, Report for Biennial Period, 2002–2003, Part I (2002), Appendix 8.23, reproduced in Lee and Hayashi, supra note 3, IX, 6. a (18).

12

Resolution 02/04 on Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing in the IOTC Area, Report of the Seventh Session of the IOTC, Victoria, Seychelles, 2–6 December 2002, Appendix X, reproduced in ibid. III, 6. a (9).

13

Resolution to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, IATTC Minutes of the 72nd Meeting, Lima, Peru, 14–18 June 2004, Appendix 2, reproduced in ibid. XII, 4. a (17).

14

The latest version is Conservation Measure 10-07 (2005), ICCAT, Schedule of Conservation Measures in Force 2005/2006, p. 33. 755


the same title as was originally adopted in 1997 and subsequently amended a few times.15 This Scheme is unique in that it contains not only the elements of IUU list accompanied by possible trade measures, but also those of the presumption of undermining CCAMLR measures, followed by trade measures, which will be discussed under subsection 4 below. The establishment of the IUU vessel list follows detailed and carefully arranged stages to ensure a fair and transparent process. On the basis of information gathered, the secretariat draws up a draft list each year, and circulates it to the non-Parties concerned, as well as to all Parties, for comments. The secretariat then prepares a revised provisional list and circulates it again to all relevant countries, including the non-Parties concerned. At each CCAMLR annual meeting, a committee reviews the provisional list and prepares a Proposed NCP-IUU Vessel List for submission to the Commission for final approval. Parties are then obliged to take measures against vessels on the list, including prohibition of landing or transhipment in their ports, prohibition of imports of toothfish from such vessels, a ban on their flagged vessels from participating in transhipment or joint fishing operations with such vessels, and refusal to grant their flag to such vessels. Furthermore, CCAMLR shall request the non-Parties concerned to take necessary steps to address the IUU fishing activities, and review annually the actions taken by such non-Parties. Particularly with respect to toothfish, the Commission is further required to “decide appropriate measures” so as to address the IUU issues with such non-Parties, including multilaterally agreed trade measures consistent with WTO rules. 3. Catch Document or Statistical Document Programs One useful way of preventing the trading of certain fish harvested inconsistently with an RFO’s measures is to require that traded fish be accompanied by official documents certifying that they were properly harvested. In 1992, in order to address the problems created by catches of tuna primarily by non-Parties, ICCAT pioneered in initiating this idea through its Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program.16 It requires that every bluefin tuna Party imports be accompanied by a statistical document validated by the flag State of the harvesting vessel. Subsequently ICCAT adopted similar programs for bigeye tuna and Atlantic swordfish.17

15

Conservation Measures 118/XVI, 118/XVII, and 118/XX. See M. Hayashi, “Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing: Global and Regional Responses”, in D.D. Caron and H.N. Scheiber, eds, Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (2004), p. 105.

16

ICCAT Recommendations 92-1 (on frozen products), 92-3 (on fresh products), and subsequent supplementary recommendations and resolutions.

17

ICCAT Resolutions and Recommendations Index Nos 01-21 (bigeye tuna) and 01-22 (swordfish), reproduced in Lee and Hayashi, supra note 3, IX, 6. a (17).

756


Under the Bluefin Tuna Program, the statistical document must contain various kinds of information, including the name of the issuing State, the names of exporter and importer, the area of harvest of the fish, the type of product and total weight, and the point of export. At ports, officials inspect the statistical document, and may also inspect the contents of each shipment to verify the information on the document. Non-Parties fishing and exporting bluefin tuna to Parties are also urged to make arrangements for the government validation of such documents. The ICCAT Program was followed closely by CCSBT in its Southern Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program that became effective in 2000.18 Similarly, IOTC introduced its Bigeye Tuna Statistical Document Program in 2002.19 For its part, CCAMLR adopted a Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp. (toothfish) in 1999,20 which had been developed on the basis of the ICCAT Program, but with some unique features. The primary purpose of the Scheme is to identify the origins of toothfish entering the markets of Parties and to determine whether the toothfish harvested in the Convention area and imported into its territories were caught in a manner consistent with CCAMLR conservation measures. Under the Scheme, each Party must require the master of its flag vessels authorised to harvest toothfish to complete a Dissostichus Catch Document (DCD) for each catch landed or transhipped. The DCD must include various information regarding the vessel involved, toothfish to be landed or transhipped, the dates of catch, and so on. Each Party shall require that each landing of toothfish at its ports and transhipment to its vessels be accompanied by a completed DCD, and prohibit landing without a DCD. Each shipment of toothfish imported into or exported from the territory of each Party must be accompanied by the export-validated DCD or validated re-export document that account for all the toothfish contained in the shipment. Non-Parties seeking to cooperate with CCAMLR by participating in this scheme may likewise issue a DCD to its flag vessels. Copies of the DCD will remain with each part of the catch through all export and import stages, while also being kept by the flag State and the secretariat. 4. Presumption of Undermining RFO Measures, Followed by Trade Measures Starting with the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), several RFOs have adopted schemes of port State measures based on the assumption that

18

CCSBT, Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting (Second Part), 21-23 March 2000, Attachment J, reproduced in ibid. III, 6. a (5).

19

IOTC Resolution 01/06, reproduced in ibid. III, 6. a (8).

20

CCAMLR Conservation Measure 170/XVIII, subsequently revised several times. A latest version, Conservation Measure 10-05 (2004), is reproduced in ibid. XIV, a (13) (b). 757


certain non-Party vessels have undermined their conservation measures. NAFO established the procedure in 1997 with its Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with the Conservation and Enforcement Measures.21 Under the Scheme, a non-Party vessel which has been sighted engaging in fishing activities in the NAFO regulatory area is presumed to be undermining the effectiveness of its conservation measures. In the case of transhipment activities involving a sighted non-Party vessel, the presumption of undermining its measures applies to any other non-Party vessel which was engaged in such activities with the former. When a vessel under such presumption enters a port of any Party, it shall be inspected and be prevented from landing or transhipping any fish until the inspection has taken place. If the inspection reveals that the vessel has on board species regulated by NAFO, the landing and transhipment of all fish from that vessel will be prohibited in all ports of the Parties, unless the vessel proves that the fish in question were caught either outside the NAFO area or, for certain species, that it observed the NAFO measures. In 1998, the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) also adopted similar schemes, incorporating the main provisions of the NAFO Scheme.22 These examples were closely followed in the same year by ICCAT23 and in 2001 by IOTC.24 A notable difference in these schemes is that, while under the other schemes the presumption of undermining RFO measures applies to those vessels which are merely “sighted engaged in fishing activities”, the ICCAT and IOTC schemes deal with only those vessels sighted fishing not in conformity with the RFO or with cases where “there are grounds for believing that these vessels are fishing contrary to” such measures. These additional requirements in these latter schemes are necessitated by the fact that these RFOs have competence to manage only tuna and tuna-like species, and not all the fishery resources in their regulatory areas. Subsequently, in 2002, ICCAT adopted a significantly expanded scheme by the above-mentioned Recommendation on the establishment of an IUU vessel

21

NAFO/GC Doc. 97/6, reproduced in ibid. IX, 6. a (10).

22

“Recommendation for a Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with Recommendations Established by NEAFC”, NEAFC, Summary Report of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting, 17-20 November 1998, Annex F, reproduced in ibid. IX, 6. a (15).

23

“Recommendation concerning the Ban on Landings and Transhipments of Vessels from Non-Contracting Parties Identified as Having Committed a Serious Infringement”, ICCAT, Compendium of Management Recommendations and Resolutions adopted by ICCAT for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and Tuna-like Species, 98-11.

24

Resolution 01/03 Establishing a Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with Resolutions Established by IOTC, Report of the 6th Session of the IOTC, Victoria, Seychelles, 10–14 December 2001, Appendix IX, reproduced in Lee and Hayashi, supra note 3, III, 6. a (8).

758


list.25 Under the new scheme, the presumption of IUU fishing activities is based on the presentation by a Party of evidence that a non-Party vessel, inter alia, has harvested tuna or tuna-like species in the ICCAT area. When such a vessel is placed on the final IUU vessel list, Parties “shall take all necessary measures, under their applicable legislation” for a range of purposes enumerated. These include banning of landings or transhipments in their ports, and prohibition of the imports of tuna and tuna-like species from such vessels. CCAMLR adopted a similar scheme following almost immediately on the NAFO scheme.26 It has, however, developed and expanded the scheme considerably in subsequent years. The latest version of the Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measures27 contains, as pointed out earlier in this chapter, not only the procedure for the presumption of IUU fishing but also that for establishing the IUU vessel list. Under the CCAMLR Scheme, the presumption of undermining its conservation measures will be made when a non-Party vessel is sighted engaging in fishing activities in the Convention area, or the vessel had been denied port access, landing or transshipment in accordance with the CCAMLR measure on mandatory port inspection of all vessels carrying toothfish.

III. Legal Issues Relating to RFO Measures Against Non-Members The above review of the measures taken by RFOs against non-Members indicates that each of the four categories of measures involves some degree of unilateral action on the part of the RFO or its members against third parties, and hence the question may be raised as to their consistency with international law. The relevant international law rules would be those particularly of the law of the sea and the WTO. 1. Law of the Sea Under the LOSC, reflecting customary international law, all States have the basic freedom of fishing on the high seas, subject to their treaty obligations and the provisions of the Convention (arts 87(1) and 116). The relevant provisions include the duty to take measures for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas, and to cooperate with other States in the conservation and

25

See supra note 11 and the accompanying text.

26

“Conservation Measure 118/XVI: Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measures”, CCAMLR, Report of the 16th Meeting, Hobart, Australia, 27 October – 7 November 1997, reproduced in Lee and Hayashi, supra note 3, XIV, a (6).

27

Schedule of Conservation Measures in Force (2005/2006), p. 33. 759


management of such resources and in establishing, as appropriate, RFOs to that end (arts 117 and 118). In addition, in exercising such freedom, all States shall pay due regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas (art. 87(2)). It is thus clear that freedom of fishing is not absolute in the sense that the State exercising the freedom does not need to pay attention to the activities of other States which are also exercising the same freedom as well as the conservation measures taken by other States, particularly those taken by them through an RFO. Conversely, an RFO and its members have no absolute right to deny the fishing activities of the other States in any part of the high seas. The legality of two types of measures taken by existing RFOs as described under section II above can be assessed in light of these LOSC provisions. One of them is the identification and naming of those non-Party States whose vessels have been fishing in the regulatory area of an RFO in a manner that diminishes the effectiveness of its conservation measures, or the publication of the list of such vessels. This is done by the RFO normally for the purpose of requesting the non-Parties concerned to rectify the fishing activities and cooperate with the RFO in implementing conservation measures. These RFO actions would, in principle, cause no legal difficulties. Arbitrary naming of a country may invite diplomatic protests, but identification of such non-Parties is usually done each year through established decision-making processes of the RFO concerned, thus avoiding arbitrary or abusive decisions. The requests for rectified behaviour of fishing vessels would not cause legal issues either, since the type of action taken is essentially an appeal in its form and diplomatic in its approach. It is legally up to the non-Party State concerned to heed to the requests or to take no action whatsoever. Another type of measure taken by RFOs is the scheme of port State measure against non-Party vessels on the basis of the presumption of undermining their conservation measures. Port State measures include compulsory inspection and prohibition of landing and transhipment in all ports of the Parties, and not simply in the first port of call. The controversial aspect of this scheme is the automatic “presumption of undermining RFO measures” imposed on certain vessels. If the vessel wants to avoid enforcement action by the port State, it must bear the burden of proving that it was not fishing in the regulatory area, or, in the case of some RFOs, it was fishing in conformity with the RFO measures. Under such a scheme, a non-Party vessel that conducts fishing activities in an area covered by an RFO, or without compliance with its conservation measures, could de facto be denied of access to any port of its Parties. For commercial fishing vessels targeting highly valued fish like tuna and toothfish, such a scheme could effectively prevent non-Party vessels from exercising the freedom to fish on the high seas, particularly since the main countries which import them are all Parties to the relevant RFOs. The

760


question may be raised, therefore, whether the Parties to such RFOs, when they enforce such scheme strictly, are not imposing their agreements against third parties, in contravention of LOSC article 116 and the principle of pacta tertiis. Some authors suggest that such third-party effect of RFOs measures is now justified because the duty to cooperate in respect of high seas fisheries by becoming their members or acting through RFOs, or by agreeing to apply the conservation measures adopted by such RFO, as provided for in article 8(3) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement,28 has become part of customary international law. Rayfuse thus argues that State practice appears to accept not only the customary duty to cooperate through RFOs but that an essential element of that duty is the requirement for both parties and non-parties alike to respect the RFO measures either by compliance or through restraint from fishing.29 Even before the adoption of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Burke suggested that under the LOSC, any new entrant into a high seas fishery “must accept the previously established arrangements”, including those regarding a share of the stock.30 The present author does not share these views, despite total sympathy with their emphasis on the need to strengthen the role of RFOs. While Rayfuse gives a detailed set of developments to justify her case, they do not appear to be sufficiently convincing to show that the obligation to join RFOs or comply with their conservation measures is now part of customary law and binding on all States. As an important basis for her argument, she stresses the fact that non-Parties have acquiesced in the ever-stronger assertions by RFOs of their policy and action against non-Parties. One may wonder, however, whether the de facto acceptance of the RFO demands by non-Party vessels was done under a belief that it was their legal obligation to do so, or more importantly whether their flag State also supported such an action by its vessels or otherwise accepted the demands as legally sound. In other words, as the International Court of Justice stressed, were States acting “with a belief that [such practice was] rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it”?31

28

The effect of this provision is further buttressed by stipulating that only those States which are members of such RFO, or which agree to apply the conservation and management measures adopted by such RFO, shall have access to the resources concerned (art. 8(4)).

29

R. Rayfuse, “To Our Children’s Children’s Children: From Promoting to Achieving Compliance in High Seas Fisheries”, 20 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 525 (2005); See also R. Rayfuse, Non-Flag State Enforcement in the High Seas Fisheries (2004), p. 373.

30

W.T. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond (1994), p. 131.

31

The North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 44. 761


Burke’s view appears to contradict the ordinary, plain language of article 118, which provides only for the duty of States concerned to cooperate to establish RFOs, and not to establish and participate in them. It appears premature, therefore, to conclude that conservation measures adopted by RFOs are applicable under customary law to all States, including their non-members. It may be due to such a legal situation regarding the duties of third States vis-à-vis RFO conservation measures that all the RFOs concerned have been rather cautious and use the expression “undermining” the effectiveness of their conservation measures, and not “violating” them, when referring to undesirable activities of non-Parties. 2. WTO Rules There are three types of measures identified under section II above which may involve issues of consistency with WTO rules. The first type concerns measures some RFOs adopt, after having identified the non-Party State or their vessel that has been involved in activities that undermine the effectiveness of their conservation measures, to bring stronger pressure on the non-Parties concerned. Such measures are trade-restrictive measures, or any other appropriate measure that these and other RFOs may yet decide to take. The only kind of such action so far employed by RFOs is the prohibition by ICCAT of the import of the species of tuna (and tuna products) targeted by the vessels of non-Parties identified under the first stage of action. The import ban is thus not only on the fish caught by the particular vessel identified, but on the specific species of fish and its products from the flag State of the vessel. Although the RFO measures under discussion are to be limited to only those which are “consistent with international obligations” or “in accordance with international law”, the question may still be asked as to whether such a ban is in fact implemented in a manner consistent with the trade restriction rules under WTO, more specifically the GATT 1994. The GATT 1994 provides, inter alia, in article XX (General Exceptions): “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures: … (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; …” (emphasis added).

762


In the Shrimp/Turtle case,32 the WTO Appellate Body clarified that “exhaustible natural resources” in paragraph (g) includes living resources.33 The exceptions to trade bans or restrictions would be permitted therefore as far as the conditions in the chapeau of article XX are met.34 In applying the chapeau, the Appellate Body stressed that it is an expression of the principle of good faith, and one application thereof is the doctrine of abus de droit, which prohibits the abusive exercise of a State’s rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right impinges on the field covered by a treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, i.e., reasonably.35 With respect to the term “disguised restriction”, the Appellate Body, earlier in the United States – Gasoline case, stated that it “may properly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally within the terms of an exception in Article XX”, and that the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” may also be taken into account in determining the presence of a “disguised restriction”.36 In light of these clarifications, does the import ban in question constitute an “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same condition prevail”, or a disguised restriction on international trade? It appears to be clear that the ICCAT import ban against the three non-Parties was taken equally among the three countries where the same condition prevailed, in that all of them were identified as having been engaged in activities which undermined the ICCAT measures. The action was taken in a fair manner and with due process, in accordance with the established procedures, on the basis of formal decisions multilaterally agreed upon.37 The action was taken step by step, with sufficient time given for rectification after due warning. The import prohibition of all Atlantic bluefin tuna and its products can be justified because all such species of tuna are regulated by conservation measures of ICCAT.

32

United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AG-1998-4, Report of the Appellate Body, 38 ILM 121 (1999).

33

Ibid. para. 128.

34

Ibid. para. 150.

35

Ibid. para. 158.

36

United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, AB-1996-1, Report of the Appellate Body, 35 ILM 603 (1996), p. 629.

37

Recommendation Regarding Belize and Honduras, pursuant to the 1994 Bluefin Tuna Action Plan Resolution, and Recommendation Regarding Panama, pursuant to the 1994 Bluefin Tuna Action Plan Resolution, adopted at the 10 Special Meeting of ICCAT, Proceedings of the 10th Special Meeting of the Commission, San Sebastian, 22-29 November 1996, Annex 5, reproduced in Lee and Hayashi, supra note 3, IX, 6. a (6). 763


The second type of RFO measures with possible inconsistency with WTO rules are those “necessary measures” that could be taken by some RFOs like ICCAT and IOTC against non-Parties whose vessels are included on an IUU vessel list, with a view to banning landings, transhipments and imports from such vessels, as well as taking of other measures to deny benefits for such vessels. The exact contents of such “necessary measures” to be taken “under their applicable legislation” are not entirely clear, and thus subject, at least theoretically, to abuse or arbitrary application by an individual Party. There appears to be no multilaterally agreed standard for the contents of such legislation. Should the national legislation require different treatment among certain non-Party States, is it possible to satisfy the requirements in the chapeau of article XX? It is also debatable whether unjustifiable discrimination would not result from different kinds of measures imposed by two different Parties, in accordance with their legislation, against two non-Parties that have been engaged in the same kind of activities. It remains to be seen whether these doubts will be satisfactorily solved by the RFOs concerned. The third type of measures that must be examined are the catch or statistical document programs. These programs make no distinction between imports from Parties and those from non-Parties. Non-Parties are requested or urged to participate in the programs and cooperate with their implementation, and those non-Parties who choose to do so would receive the same treatment at ports as Parties. On the other hand, those non-Parties who do no participate in the program would be totally deprived of the opportunity to land at the ports of any Party, and thereby discriminated against. Such discrimination, however, may be justified under the chapeau of article XX since such measures are not applied “between countries where the same conditions prevail”. When the program was being worked out at CCAMLR, the drafters took particular account of the recent developments concerning the Tuna/Dolphin and the Shrimp/Turtle cases at the WTO.38 Thus at least the CCAMLR program, and presumably the other similar programs, are intended to be compatible with the WTO rules. There appears to have been no major problem raised on this point, apart from the occasional complaints regarding the veracity or accuracy of data logged in the relevant documents. This is, however, not a guarantee that the programs would not be implemented in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in the future.

38

D.J. Agnew, “The Illegal and Unregulated Fishery for Toothfish in the Southern Ocean, and the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme”, 24 Marine Policy 370 (2000).

764


IV. Conclusions This study has shown that several RFOs have taken a number of increasingly stronger measures to deter vessels of non-member States from exercising their freedom of high seas fishing in their regulatory areas. Some of such measures include those which could effectively exclude such vessels from the regulatory areas, or from conducing landing or transhipping activities therein. These non-member States, though bound by the general obligations to cooperate with other States in the conservation of resources under the LOSC, are legally third parties to the regime established by the RFOs, and thus not necessarily bound by their specific measures. This situation would prevail until the provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (art. 8(4)), stipulating that only those States which are members of an RFO or agree to apply its measures shall have access to the fishery resources in its regulatory area, become part of customary law. Until such a desirable situation becomes reality, the possibility cannot be excluded that some of the RFO measures that are addressed to non-members may become controversial. This is particularly true in case of certain traderestrictive measures when they are enforced in an abusive or arbitrary manner. As a recent study by the Ministerially-led Task Force on IUU Fishing on the High Seas concluded: “There is a real concern among many countries, particularly smaller countries, that such [restrictive trade] measures can in fact be a disguise of punitive measures that are really intended to alter trade flows.”39 It is thus important that RFOs be cautious in applying trade measures against non-members, acting in good faith, so that they may not cause arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or constitute a disguised restriction on international trade, as interpreted by the WTO.

39

High Seas Task Force, Closing the Net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Seas (2006), p. 31, available at <www.high-seas.org/docs/HSTFfinal/HSTFFINAL_web.pdf >. 765

THE EU DIRECTIVE ON SHIP-SOURCE POLLUTION AND ON THE INTRODUCTION OF PENALTIES FOR INFRINGEMENTS: DEVELOPMENT OR BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? Doris König

I. Criminalisation of Seafarers

“C

riminalisation in Shipping: Human Pawns in Legal and Political Games” – this was the subject of the 7th Cadwallader Annual Memorial Lecture organised by the London Shipping Law Centre in October 2004. On that occasion the IMO Secretary-General Mitropoulos demanded that “shipping should no longer be treated as the scapegoat against which to turn so that people that apparently know little about the industry may be seen as doing something, anything (as, for example, in the case of pollution incidents irrespective of their causation, even when such incidents may be attributed to force majeure instances) because such people consider it easier to seek legislation condemning the industry when their energies should, for better results, be directed towards the real sources of problems such as, in the example of pollution, the land-based sources”.1 Who was the target against which the shipping industry’s and IMO’s anger was turned? The discussion was triggered by the sinking of the Prestige off the Spanish coast in November 2002 where most of her cargo of heavy fuel oil was released into the sea and long stretches of coastline in Spain, Portugal and France were polluted. In reaction to this disaster, the European Council called for specific measures on ship-source pollution and a system of sanctions, including criminal sanctions, for pollution offences. The European Community introduced legislation

1

The London Shipping Law Centre, The 7th Cadwallader Annual Memorial Lecture, 6 October 2004, Transcript (on file with the author).



to curb ship-source pollution and to fight substandard shipping in European waters. Among other things, the Commission made a proposal for a “Directive on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of sanctions, including criminal sanctions, for pollution offences” in March 2003, imposing criminal liability for all discharges committed “with intent, recklessly or by serious negligence”.2 During the legislative process, the Directive was already highly controversial, mainly because the draft did not make sufficient distinction between operational and accidental discharges. In the shadow of the arrest and imprisonment of the Greek captain of the Prestige by Spanish authorities, representatives of the shipping industry raised concerns about an unfair criminalisation of seafarers in cases of accidents. They were of the opinion that the Commission’s proposal was not in conformity with the 1973/78 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). Despite these concerns and opposition from Greece, Malta and Cyprus, the biggest flag States in the EU, the Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements 3 and the Council framework decision 2005/667/JHA to strengthen the criminal law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution4 were adopted and entered into force on 1 October 2005. Member States have to implement the Directive by 1 April 2007 (article 16). In December 2005, five industry bodies filed an application for judicial review of the Directive in the Administrative Court of the High Court of Justice in London.5 The claimants contended that the Directive is inconsistent with the international law obligations contained in MARPOL by which all EU Member States are bound, and with the provisions of the LOS Convention with regard to coastal States’ legislative competences. In June 2006, the judge held that the claimants’ arguments were well-founded on four different grounds, three of which relate to conflict with international law. He decided to refer four questions to the ECJ, which is expected to hear the case in 2007.6 The three issues relating to inconsistency with MARPOL and the LOS Convention are:

2

COM (2003) 92 Final (5 March 2003).

3

OJEC (L 255), 30.9.2005, 11.

4

OJEC (L 255), 30.9.2005, 164. On 8 December 2005, the Commission brought an action before the ECJ contending that the framework decision infringes its competences and has to be anulled (Case No. C-440/05).

5

The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Lloyd’s Register and the International Salvage Union; the defendant is the British Secretary of State for Transport.

6

Judgment of 30 June 2006, Case No. CO/10651/2005, [2006] EWHC 1577 (Admin).

768

The EU Directive on Ship-Source Pollution and on the Introduction of Penalties for Infringements

(1) Whether it is lawful for the EU to legislate for the territorial sea other than in accordance with MARPOL; (2) Whether the standard of liability of serious negligence in the Directive breaches the right of innocent passage; and (3) Whether it is lawful for the EU to legislate independently of MARPOL for third country vessels on the high seas or the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). At the 8th Cadwallader Annual Memorial Lecture in October 2005, Judge Thomas A. Mensah elaborated on these issues and came to the conclusion that the Directive does not conform with international law.7 This paper will, with all due respect and for the sake of an academic discussion, offer a different view.

II. The EU Directive on Ship-Source Pollution Before analysing the issues mentioned above, the most relevant provisions of the Directive shall be summarised. The purpose of the Directive, as set out in article 1, is “to incorporate international standards for ship-source pollution into Community law and to ensure that persons responsible for discharges are subject to adequate penalties … in order to improve maritime safety and to enhance protection of the marine environment from pollution by ships”. The scope of the Directive is set out in article 3. It shall apply, “in accordance with international law”, to discharges of polluting substances in the internal waters, including ports, of a Member State, the territorial sea, straits used for international navigation subject to the regime of transit passage, the EEZ and the high seas. It is applicable to any ship, irrespective of its flag, with the exception of warships and government-owned ships on non-commercial service. The scope of infringements is defined in articles 4 and 5. According to article 4, Member States are obliged to regard ship-source discharges of polluting substances into any of the marine areas, mentioned above, “as infringements if committed with intent, recklessly or by serious negligence” (emphasis added). These infringements, if sufficiently severe, are to be regarded as criminal offences. Article 5 provides for exceptions from criminal liability. According to article 5, paragraph 1, discharges of polluting substances shall not be regarded as infringements if satisfying the conditions set out in MARPOL Annex I, Regulations 9, 10, 11 lit. a) or lit. c), or in Annex II, Regulations 5 and 6 lit. a) or lit. c). This

7

T.A. Mensah, Sovereign Rights in Legislation of Member States under UNCLOS and MARPOL, Summary of Presentation at the 8th Cadwallader Annual Memorial Lecture, 4 October 2005, 8 (manuscript on file with the author). 769


means that a discharge is not prohibited if it is either necessary for the purpose of securing the safety of the ship or saving life at sea (“safety of ship or saving life at sea” exception), or if it is used for the purpose of combating specific pollution incidents in order to minimise the damage from pollution (“pollution fighting” exception). According to article 5, paragraph 2, a discharge shall not be regarded as an infringement for the owner, the master and the crew when acting under the master’s responsibility if it satisfies the conditions set out in MARPOL Annex I, Regulation 11 lit. b) or in Annex II, Regulation 6 lit. b). The effect of this exception is that the owner, master and crew are not criminally liable if the discharge results from damage to a ship or its equipment, provided that all reasonable precautions have been taken after the occurrence for the purpose of preventing or minimising the discharge, and that the owner or the master have not acted either with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result (“damage” exception). This exception, however, does not apply in the internal waters and the territorial sea of a Member State. In this respect, the Directive is more stringent than the “damage” exception spelt out in MARPOL Annex I and II, which is applicable in all areas “within the jurisdiction” of States Parties (article 4 para. 2). According to article 8 of the Directive, Member States have to ensure that infringements are subject to “effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties which may include criminal and administrative penalties”, and to apply such penalties “to any person who is found responsible for an infringement”. This provision has to be read in connection with the Preamble which says: “(7) … the required dissuasive effects can only be achieved through the introduction of penalties applying to any person who causes or contributes to marine pollution; penalties should be applicable not only to the shipowner or the master of the ship, but also to the owner of the cargo, the classification society or any other person involved.” This means that any actor in the shipping chain other than the owner of the ship, the master and the crew, who has caused or contributed to a discharge “with intent, recklessly or by serious negligence” will be criminally liable wherever that discharge occurs, even in the EEZ or on the high seas. These actors cannot rely on the “damage” exception set out in MARPOL Annex I, Regulation 11 lit. b) or in Annex II, Regulation 6 lit. b). The Directive is only enforceable vis-à-vis foreign ships which enter an EU port (article 6). For ships in transit in the territorial sea or the EEZ, the Directive provides for an obligation of close cooperation between Member States which will make it possible to initiate proceedings at the next port of call. If that port is outside the EU, the port State shall be informed of the suspected discharge and requested to take appropriate measures (article 7 paras 1 and 2). Only where there is clear, objective evidence that a ship navigating in the territorial sea or

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the EEZ of a Member State has, in that State’s EEZ, committed an infringement resulting in a discharge causing major damage or a threat of such damage to the coastline or related interests of the State concerned, may that State institute proceedings, including detention of the ship (article 7 para. 3). The Council framework decision supplementing the Directive provides that penalties may take the form of fines for natural and legal persons, and also the form of imprisonment. In both cases, the minimum highest levels are harmonised, depending on the gravity of the offence. Such penalties shall only be applied in accordance with the safeguard provisions set out in the LOS Convention, section 7 of Part XII (article 9 of the Directive).

III. Is It Lawful for the EU to Legislate for the Territorial Sea Other than in Accordance with MARPOL? As mentioned above, the limitation of the “damage” exception for the owner of the ship, the master and the crew to incidents occurring in the EEZ and on the high seas, but not in the territorial sea, exceeds the MARPOL regulations. The first question, therefore, is whether a coastal State may adopt more stringent rules than those provided for in MARPOL with respect to polluting discharges in its territorial sea. This issue shall be analysed in two different steps: first, it has to be clarified whether under the LOS Convention, to which both the European Community and the Member States are parties, a coastal State is permitted to adopt rules more stringent than “generally accepted international rules and standards”. If the first question is answered in the affirmative, there will arise the second question: whether the EC and its Member States are, nevertheless, bound by MARPOL standards as maximum standards which no State Party is permitted to exceed. 1. The Coastal State’s Legislative Competence in the Territorial Sea under the LOS Convention The legislative competence of flag States, port States and coastal States with regard to vessel-source pollution is codified in article 211 of the LOS Convention. This provision refers to “generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organisation or general diplomatic conference”. It is generally agreed that the “competent international organisation” in this field is the IMO and that this formula encompasses, inter alia, the provisions of the MARPOL 1973/78 Convention itself as well as of the obligatory Annexes I and II which prohibit the discharge of oil and other noxious

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liquids.8 According to article 211, paragraph 2, flag States are obliged to adopt rules and regulations to prevent, reduce or control marine pollution which “shall at least have the same effect as that of generally accepted international rules and standards”. With regard to flag States, MARPOL regulations are minimum standards which the flag State shall not fall short of. In contrast, coastal States, as set out in article 211 paragraph 5, may, in respect of their EEZ, only adopt laws and regulations “conforming to and giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards”. In this case, the MARPOL standards are maximum standards that the coastal State is not allowed to exceed. The legislative competence of a coastal State with regard to its territorial sea is stipulated in article 211 paragraph 4 of the LOS Convention. This paragraph expressly mentions that coastal States may, “in the exercise of their sovereignty within their territorial sea”, adopt pollution laws and regulations concerning foreign vessels, including those in innocent passage. It does not refer to the “generally accepted international rules and standards” laid down in MARPOL, but to the provisions of Part II, section 3 of the LOS Convention which codify the coastal States’ legislative competences in their territorial sea in general. In this connection, it is emphasised that coastal States’ laws and regulations “shall … not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels”. According to article 21, paragraph 1, lit. f), the coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in accordance with the LOS Convention and other rules of international law, relating to innocent passage, in respect of the preservation of the environment and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof. In article 21 paragraph 2, it is expressly stated that such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning and equipment (CDEM standards) of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards. Thus, as far as CDEM standards are concerned, the international standards laid down in MARPOL or SOLAS are once again maximum standards which the coastal State is not permitted to exceed. The reason for this limitation of coastal States’ legislative competences is that it is impossible for foreign ships to comply with each coastal State’s different CDEM standards whenever they pass through the territorial sea of several coastal States. Such a legislative competence for coastal States would have the effect of denying the right of innocent passage. By means of an argumentum e contrario, coastal States retain the competence based on their sovereignty over their territorial sea to regulate the activities of foreign ships, such as the discharge of harmful substances into the sea. This argument

8

Churchill/Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, 1999), 346; Molenaar, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution (1998), 172 et seq.; Hafner, in: Vitzthum (ed.), Handbuch des Seerechts (2006), 387, §116; Schult, Das völkerrechtliche Schiffssicherheitsregime (2005), 83; Franckx/Molenaar, Final Report of the ILA Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction Relating to Marine Pollution (2000), 39 and note 202.

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is supported by considering the fact that under customary international law prior to the LOS Convention, a coastal State was allowed to prescribe any legislation relating to pollution that it deemed necessary in its territorial sea, provided that such legislation did not have the effect of hampering innocent passage.9 There were no clear limits on the prescriptive jurisdiction of coastal States with regard to marine pollution. As a result of the negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the coastal State’s legislative competence has been somewhat reduced in respect of the kind of pollution regulations that may be adopted in exchange for being expanded in respect of the geographical area to which such regulations may be applied.10 So, if it had been intended to further restrain a coastal State’s jurisdiction in its territorial sea, such restriction should have been explicitly mentioned in the LOS Convention, as in the case of the restricted jurisdiction in respect of CDEM standards. A clear and explicit restriction of coastal States’ prescriptive jurisdiction can also be found in article 42, paragraph 1, lit. b), according to which the prevention, reduction and control of pollution is limited to laws and regulations giving effect to “applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait”. This further restriction of coastal States’ jurisdiction with regard to ship-source pollution in international straits is in conformity with the objective of the transit passage regime, i.e. to guarantee freedom of navigation through international straits.11 On the other hand, it can be inferred that coastal States’ legislative powers with regard to discharge activities are broader in the territorial sea. Finally, foreign ships are – other than in the case of CDEM standards – capable of complying with different discharge standards in the territorial sea, provided that these have been given appropriate publicity by the coastal State. Thus, different requirements with regard to discharge activities in the territorial sea usually do not impair the right of innocent passage. This conclusion seems to be supported by the travaux préparatoires finally leading to the adoption of articles 21 and 211. The history of negotiations at UNCLOS III shows that the main controversy between maritime and coastal States with regard to the latter’s competence to regulate ship-source pollution focused on the issue of CDEM standards. Informal negotiations led to the inclusion of the following provision into the 1975 ISNT/Part III: “The coastal State may establish, in respect of the territorial sea, more effective laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of 9

Churchill/Lowe (note 8), 344.

10

Churchill/Lowe (note 8), 347; MacGonigle/Zacher, Pollution, Politics, and International Law (1979), 244 et seq.

11

Churchill/Lowe (note 8), 104 et seq., 347; Vitzthum, in: Handbuch des Seerechts (note 8), 147 et seq., §§178 and 180. 773


marine pollution from vessels. In establishing such laws and regulations the coastal State shall, consistent with the aim of achieving maximum possible uniformity of rules and standards governing international navigation, conform to international rules and standards referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. Such laws and regulations must not have the practical effect of hampering innocent passage through the territorial sea.”12 After further negotiations, this paragraph was revised in the 1976 RSNT/Part III. It was shortened by cross-referring to the relevant article in Part II on the duties of the coastal State with regard to the innocent passage of foreign vessels in the territorial sea: “3. Coastal States may, in the exercise of their sovereignty within their territorial sea, establish national laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels. In establishing such laws and regulations, coastal States shall, in accordance with Article 23 of Part II of the Convention [now article 24 of the LOS Convention], not interrupt or hamper the innocent passage of foreign vessels” (emphasis added).13 During the negotiations in respect of article 21 concerning the legislative competences of the coastal State in its territorial sea, discussions focused on the questions as to whether the list in paragraph 1 was exhaustive or not and whether there should be any limitations to the coastal State’s competence. These discussions finally led to the adoption of paragraph 2, which only refers to CDEM standards. A proposal made by the United States in 1977 which, inter alia, added to paragraph 2 the following phrase: “Coastal States, in establishing such laws and regulations, shall promote uniformity of international rules and standards”14 was not accepted. Instead, the 1977 ICNT contained the current wording which remained unchanged at the adoption of the Convention. To sum up, coastal States are, in general, permitted to adopt in the territorial sea national rules and standards regulating certain activities such as polluting

12

See for details Rosenne/Yankov (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, A Commentary, Vol. IV (1991), §211.8, 189.

13

Ibid. §211.9, 189 et seq.

14

Nanda/Rosenne (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, A Commentary, Vol. II (1993), §21.7, 194 et seq.

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discharges at sea which are more stringent than “generally accepted international rules and standards”, as set out in MARPOL and its Annexes I and II.15 2. Prohibition against Adopting More Stringent Rules under MARPOL? The next question to arise is whether the EU Member States, which are all States Parties to MARPOL, and the EC itself – either according to the obligation of mutual loyalty in article 10 TEC or in analogous application of article 307 TEC16 – are, nevertheless, obliged not to exceed MARPOL standards in their territorial sea. This would be the case if MARPOL standards were maximum standards for all States Parties bound by the Convention. First, the relationship between the LOS Convention and MARPOL has to be assessed. According to article 311 paragraph 2, the LOS Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements, provided these are in conformity with the Convention and do not affect the rights and duties of other States Parties. MARPOL is, without doubt, compatible with the LOS Convention, which implicitly refers to the former several times in Part XII. Other States Parties’ rights and duties would not be affected if MARPOL obliged its States Parties not to use their regulatory competence to adopt more stringent rules in respect of their territorial sea. Secondly, it is crucial to decide whether MARPOL standards have to be qualified as maximum standards, thus curtailing coastal States’ broader legislative competence under the LOS Convention with regard to the territorial sea. The answer to this question depends on the interpretation of MARPOL in accordance with articles 31 to 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 31 paragraph 1 of the VCLT states that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. The wording of the MARPOL provisions, in article 4 paragraphs 1 and 2 in particular, is not entirely clear. The main focus of article 4 of MARPOL is to oblige States

15

See also Hafner, in: Handbuch des Seerechts (note 8), 386, §115; Churchill/Lowe (note 8), 347; Molenaar (note 8), 200 et seq.; Schult (note 8), 118 et seq.; Frank, “Consequences of the Prestige Sinking for European and International Law”, Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 20 (2005), 1 (13); Boyle, “EU Unilateralism and the Law of the Sea”, Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 21 (2006), 15 (25).

16

Vitzthum, “Europäisches Seerecht – Eine kompetenzrechtliche Skizze”, in: Brenner et al. (eds), Der Staat des Grundgesetzes – Kontinuität und Wandel, Festschrift für Peter Badura zum 70. Geburtstag (2004), 1189 (1204 et seq.); Petersmann/Spennemann, in: v.d.Groeben/ Schwarze (eds), Kommentar zum Vertrag über die Europäische Union und zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (6th edn, 2002), Vol. IV, art. 307 TEC, §25; Schmalenbach, in: Calliess/Ruffert (eds), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag (2nd edn, 2002), art. 307 TEC, §4; Krück, in: Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar (2000), art. 307 TEC, §15; Geiger, in: EUV/EGV (4th edn, 2004), art. 307 TEC, §7. 775


Parties to adopt and enforce national legislation prohibiting discharges as set out in the Convention and its Annexes, and to establish sanctions adequate in severity to discharge violations. This wording could support both interpretations, i.e. MARPOL standards could be qualified either as minimum or as maximum standards. In this context, article 9 paragraphs 2 and 3 have to be taken into account.17 Article 9 paragraph 2 states that the MARPOL provisions shall not prejudice the codification and development of the law of the sea at UNCLOS III nor the present or future claims and legal views of any State concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State jurisdiction. According to article 9 paragraph 3, the term “jurisdiction” shall be construed in the light of international law in force at the time of application or interpretation of MARPOL. This means that MARPOL leaves room for more extended legislative competences of coastal and flag States, if such competences are permitted under the LOS Convention. Therefore, one could argue, as the EC does, that MARPOL gives way to more stringent rules adopted by coastal States in their territorial sea, provided that such competence is in conformity with the LOS Convention. Is that interpretation compatible with the object and purpose of MARPOL? The claimants of the English law suit, mentioned above, answer this question in the negative, and rely heavily on the preamble and the travaux préparatoires.18 They point out that the preamble in its fifth paragraph states: “considering that this object [to achieve the complete elimination of intentional pollution of the marine environment by oil and other harmful substances and the minimisation of accidental discharge of such substances] may best be achieved by establishing rules not limited to oil pollution having a universal purport, …” (emphasis added). This wording is interpreted as supporting the opinion that pollution standards everywhere in the world have to comply with MARPOL in order to achieve uniform rules on a global level. This formulation can, however, also be interpreted in a different way. Its objective might have been to point out why States Parties thought it necessary to exceed the scope of the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) and include other harmful substances in a universal – as opposed to a regional – convention, thus regulating all kinds of ship-source pollution in one legal instrument being applicable worldwide. This view is supported by the fact that the format of the Convention – a new composite Convention dealing with all forms of shipgenerated pollution or separate Conventions each dealing with a specific form

17

Molenaar (note 8), 210 et seq.

18

See de la Rue/Fawcett-Ellis, “How Shipping Took on the EU Legislators (Part I)”, Lloyd’s List, 5 July 2006, and id., “Luxembourg Must Clear Muddy Waters of Pollution Directive (Part II)”, Lloyd’s List, 12 July 2006.

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of pollution – was disputed among the participants of the 1973 International Conference on Marine Pollution. The compromise accommodating the opposing views was a comprehensive Convention with two mandatory and three optional Annexes.19 In addition, others refer to the first, second and fourth paragraphs of the preamble which state: “being conscious of the need to preserve the human environment in general and the marine environment in particular, recognising that deliberate, negligent or accidental release of oil and other harmful substances from ships constitutes a serious source of pollution, … desiring to achieve the complete elimination of intentional pollution of the marine environment by oil and other harmful substances and the minimisation of accidental discharge of such substances, …”. Read in connection with the operational articles 4 and 6, which oblige both flag States and coastal States to prohibit and adequately sanction the violations specified by the Convention, MARPOL could be interpreted as an instrument designed to oblige States Parties to exercise their legislative and enforcement jurisdiction under specified circumstances not to restrict these powers in any way.20 To sum up, the preamble allows both interpretations and is thus inconclusive. With regard to the negotiations at the 1973 Conference, the claimants pointed out that a Canadian proposal that the Convention be treated as a minimum standards regime, and a compromise text that would have allowed more stringent measures under specified circumstances, were rejected. This compromise text trying to accommodate the opposing views of flag and coastal States stated: “(1) Nothing in the present convention shall be construed as derogating from the powers of any Contracting State to take more stringent measures where specific circumstances so warrant, within its jurisdiction, in respect of discharge standards. (2) A Contracting State shall not, within its jurisdiction, in respect of ships to which the convention applies other than its own ships, impose additional requirements with regard to ship design and equipment in respect of pollution control. The requirements of this paragraph do not apply to waters the particular characteristics of which, in accordance with accepted scientific criteria, render the environment exceptionally vulnerable.

19

Timagenis, International Control of Marine Pollution (1980), 327 et seq.

20

Coleman, “Guiding Missiles of Criticism to the Right Target (Part I)”, Lloyd’s List, 21 June 2006. 777


(3) States which adopt special measures in accordance with this Article shall notify them to the Organisation without delay. The Organisation shall inform Contracting States about these measures” (emphasis added).21 The basic elements of this text were the possibility, for coastal States in particular, to adopt more stringent discharge standards, within areas under their jurisdiction, under specific circumstances on the one hand, and uniformity with regard to ship design and equipment on the other hand. The compromise text met with two main points of criticism. First, some delegations were concerned about the vagueness of the text with regard to the second paragraph. It was pointed out that the meaning of “particular characteristics”, “accepted scientific criteria” and “environment exceptionally vulnerable” were open to interpretation. Therefore, many delegations were afraid that coastal States could make ample use of this exception, thus defeating the main objective of the provision, which was uniformity.22 Secondly, some delegations were of the opinion that this matter was prejudicial to UNCLOS III and should therefore not be decided upon in MARPOL. The compromise text was finally rejected by the plenary, mainly because States wanted to leave the decision on coastal States’ jurisdiction with regard to ship-source pollution to the negotiations at UNCLOS III.23 During the debate on the deletion of the provision, statements were given on the abovementioned conflicting views. Opponents of the compromise text, such as France, pointed out that “the Conference would strengthen the value of the Convention by deciding to delete article 9 and in so doing would recognise that contracting States could not take special measures within their jurisdiction and consequently go against its objectives”.24 Supporters, such as Canada and Australia, made it clear that they would not accept the view that the rejection of the compromise text carried the implication that within their jurisdiction they may not impose more stringent standards than those embodied in MARPOL.25 To conclude, the rejection of the compromise text leaves room for different interpretations. Read, with hindsight, in the context of articles 21 and 211 paragraph 4 of the LOS Convention, the conclusion could be drawn that, as laid down in the compromise, a greater flexibility and freedom of coastal States was recognised with regard to

21

Timagenis (note 19), 494 et seq.

22

Ibid. 495.

23

Ibid. 501. There were 26 votes in favour, 22 votes against with 14 abstentions. The compromise text thus failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority of 33 votes; MacGonigle/Zacher (note 10), 209 et seq.

24

Timagenis (note 19), 502.

25

Ibid. 503 and 505; MacGonigle/Zacher (note 10), 218, note 36.

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discharge standards, while uniformity was preserved on ship design, construction, manning and equipment.26 Another argument brought forward in favour of the interpretation of MARPOL as a maximum standards regime is that shipping is a worldwide business needing uniform international standards, and that more stringent regional measures might lead to retaliation against European ships in other parts of the world. At first sight, this political and economic argument seems quite convincing. MARPOL itself, however, leaves room for different standards. Whereas only Annexes I and II are obligatory, the adoption of the other Annexes is optional. Consequently, some States accept MARPOL standards with respect to other sources of pollution, while others keep their discretionary regulatory powers or do not regulate these matters at all. In addition, if MARPOL standards were maximum standards this regime would be applicable to both coastal States and flag States, because MARPOL does not distinguish between them in this respect. Such interpretation is in conflict with article 211 paragraph 2 of the LOS Convention which expressly states that, with regard to flag States, the “generally accepted international rules and standards” are minimum standards. Even though it would be desirable to have uniform pollution standards everywhere, this objective is not completely realised under MARPOL and the LOS Convention. To sum up, the interpretation of MARPOL as a maximum standards regime is not imperative. On the contrary, there are some well-founded arguments pointing in the other direction, i.e. that flag States and coastal States are permitted to take more stringent measures within their jurisdiction. The answer to the first question should therefore be given in the affirmative. The European Community is allowed to legislate for the territorial sea other than in accordance with MARPOL.

IV. Does the Standard of Liability of Serious Negligence in the Directive Breach the Right of Innocent Passage? The claimants of the English law suit, mentioned above, contended that “passage where there is negligent or seriously negligent pollution remains innocent and lowering the threshold of liability hampers innocent passage”.27 According to article 211 paragraph 4 of the LOS Convention, coastal States’ anti-pollution laws and regulations within their territorial sea shall not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels. In article 19 paragraph 1 of the LOS Convention, innocent passage is defined as passage “not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State”. Article 19 paragraph 2 of the LOS Convention

26

Timagenis (note 19), 507.

27

Judgment of 30 June 2006 (note 6), §49. 779


lists a number of activities which are considered prejudicial in this sense. According to article 19, paragraph 2, lit. h), “any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention” renders passage non-innocent. Among law of the sea scholars, there is a dispute as to whether the list in article 19 paragraph 2 of the LOS Convention is exhaustive or not. If the latter were the case other activities not listed in paragraph 2, such as seriously negligent pollution causing considerable damage, could be regarded as non-innocent, provided it is considered as prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Some scholars, among them Thomas Mensah, are of the opinion that the list in article 19 paragraph 2 is exhaustive. Consequently, in the absence of wilful and serious pollution, passage by a foreign ship has to considered as innocent.28 This argument is based on the wording of article 19 paragraph 2 which does not contain an “inter alia” phrase and seems to suggest an exhaustive list. In addition, paragraph 2 aims at meeting the desire expressed by many delegations at UNCLOS III for more objective criteria for innocent passage by specifying the types of activity which have to be considered “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State”.29 This objective could best be met by interpreting the list in article 19 paragraph 2 as being exhaustive.30 For support, the authors refer to an agreement between the United States and the former USSR adopted at Jackson Hole in 1989 (Jackson Hole Agreement) in which the two Governments agreed that, between them, the list in article 19 paragraph 2 of the LOS Convention shall be considered exhaustive.31 Conversely, it is argued that the wording of article 19 paragraph 2 is ambiguous.32 The general principle set out in article 19 paragraph 1 would not have any meaning of its own if the list in article 19 paragraph 2 were exhaustive. Therefore, a normal reading of the two paragraphs leads, according to the proponents of this view, to the conclusion that the second paragraph does not limit the scope of the first but rather defines certain activities, which by their nature and without proof of actual prejudice, render a passage non-innocent.33 Support for this interpretation has been drawn from the legislative history of article 19 paragraph 2. Several proposals which

28

Presentation at the 8th Cadwallader Annual Memorial Lecture, 4 October 2005 (note 7), 7.

29

Nanda/Rosenne (eds), Commentary, Vol. II (note 14), §19.10 (b), 174; Churchill/Lowe (note 8), 85.

30

Vitzthum, in: Handbuch des Seerechts (note 8), 123 et seq., §123.

31

Reproduced in: ILM 28 (1989), 1444.

32

Yang, Jurisdiction of the Coastal State over Foreign Merchant Ships in Internal Waters and the Territorial Sea (2006), 162.

33

Coleman (note 20); Niemann, “Die Befugnisse des Küstenstaates zur Verhinderung von Ölunfällen”, in: Tomuschat (ed.), Schutz der Weltmeere gegen Öltankerunfälle (2005), 79 (81).

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would have expressly stated the exhaustive character of the list of activities mentioned in paragraph 2 were rejected at UNCLOS III.34 Besides, it is argued that the Jackson Hole Agreement, which is not binding on third States, would not have been necessary if the character of the list had been clear.35 This dispute can, however, be set aside. Even if a passage through the territorial sea leading to an accidental discharge caused by serious negligence still had to be considered as innocent, a more stringent liability standard does not per se hamper the right of innocent passage. According to the broad interpretation of the respective provisions of the LOS Convention and MARPOL, mentioned above, the coastal State is entitled to adopt more stringent laws and regulations with regard to the discharge of harmful substances, which also includes liability standards. If a coastal State makes use of this competence it cannot ipso facto be accused of hampering innocent passage. As mentioned above, these laws and regulations will, according to articles 6 and 7 of the Directive, not be enforced against ships in transit. To conclude, the standard of liability of serious negligence in the Directive does not breach the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea.

V. Is It Lawful for the EU to Legislate Independently of MARPOL for Third Country Vessels in the High Seas or the Exclusive Economic Zone? According to article 211 paragraph 5 of the LOS Convention, in the EEZ, coastal States may only adopt national laws and regulations conforming to and giving effect to international standards, as set out in MARPOL. Port States are only allowed, in accordance with article 218 paragraph 1 of the LOS Convention, to undertake investigations in respect of discharges on the high seas in violation of international rules and standards. Is the Directive in conformity with such standards? Under the Directive, as already mentioned, every person in the shipping chain who causes or contributes to marine pollution is criminally liable. This includes cargo-owners, managers, charterers, classification societies and salvage companies. With regard to the territorial sea, the liability test for all these persons is lower than that set out in MARPOL and its Annexes I and II. Each accidental discharge must be sanctioned when any of the operators in the shipping chain acted with intent, recklessly or even with serious negligence. With regard to the high seas and the EEZ, the Directive took over the “damage” exception specified in Regulation 11 lit. b) of Annex I and Regulation 6 lit. b) of Annex II in a

34

Nanda/Rosenne (eds), Commentary, Vol. II (note 14), §§19.4–19.6, 169 et seq.; Yang (note 32), 162.

35

Churchill/Lowe (note 8), 86. 781


slightly modified way. Consequently, the shipowner and the master will only be sanctioned for an accidental discharge if they acted with intent or recklessly in the knowledge that damage would probably result. This exception was extended to members of the crew when acting under the master’s responsibility. On the other hand, all other actors in the shipping chain are criminally liable for any act committed with intent, recklessly or with serious negligence which caused or contributed to an accidental discharge on the high seas or in the EEZ of a Member State. This raises two more questions: first, whether it is admissible to extend criminal liability to operators in the shipping industry not mentioned in MARPOL, and secondly, whether it is lawful not to apply the “damage” exception set out in MARPOL Annexes I and II to these other potential violators. In MARPOL, there is no specific provision as to the persons who are criminally liable if a discharge occurs. Does the reference in Annex I, Regulation 11 lit. b) and Annex II, Regulation 6 lit. b) to the shipowner and the master mean that under MARPOL only these two groups should be held liable for polluting discharges? This conclusion cannot easily be drawn. For there appears, as Thomas Mensah put it, “some justification for the view that the purpose of Regulation 11 of Annex I (and Regulation 6 of Annex II) is not to list the persons who may be held responsible for pollution resulting from a maritime accident, but rather to define the conditions under which the exception provided by the Regulation does not apply”.36 It could therefore be argued, as the European Community does,37 that, since MARPOL is silent on this matter, there is a regulatory gap which can be filled in by coastal States’ legislation. In respect of the territorial sea, this competence derives from the coastal State’s sovereignty over the waters adjacent to its coast. This is, as has been argued above, in conformity with the LOS Convention provisions on the legislative competence of coastal States in the territorial sea. With regard to the EEZ and the high seas, the issue is more complicated. In the EEZ, the coastal State only has certain sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources, and limited jurisdiction on certain subject matters, among them the protection and preservation of the marine environment (article 56 para. 1 lit. b)(iii) of the LOS Convention). In using its legislative and enforcement competences, the coastal State has to have due regard to the rights and duties of other States (article 56 para. 2 of the LOS Convention). This means that a coastal State, in adopting laws and regulations to control pollution in its EEZ, has to take into account the freedom of navigation of third States. As far as polluting discharges on the high seas are concerned, the

36

Presentation at the 8th Cadwallader Annual Memorial Lecture, 4 October 2005 (note 7), 5.

37

MEMO/05/244, 5 July 2005, Questions and Answers on the New Legislation on ShipSource Pollution, 2.

782


port State may only enforce applicable international rules and standards (article 218 para. 1 of the LOS Convention) in accordance with the safeguards set out in section 7 of Part XII. Since neither territorial nor other sovereign rights of that State are involved, the port State acts as some kind of agent or trustee for the international community.38 As can be seen, both coastal and port States’ competences are limited. It could be argued, however, that the competence to fill in the regulatory gap left by MARPOL is necessary to efficiently achieve the purpose laid down in Part XII, i.e. to protect and preserve the marine environment (article 192 of the LOS Convention). Such competence is also in line with the object and purpose of MARPOL, namely to minimise the accidental discharge of harmful substances. On that reading, the European Community is permitted to extend criminal liability to persons not expressly mentioned in MARPOL. Is it lawful though not to apply the “damage” exception to any person in the shipping chain other than owner, master or crew? It could be argued that an accidental discharge which is not caused with intent or recklessly by the shipowner or master is not illegal under MARPOL. Such discharge has to be left unsanctioned even though someone further up the chain contributed to it by acting seriously negligently. That means that once the exception is applicable to the owner or master and crew, everyone else should benefit from it as well. This argument is not convincing. The “damage” exception relates to unintentional discharges after the occurrence of the damage, or the discovery of a discharge that could not be prevented. A necessary requirement of this exception is that both shipowner and master must have done their best to prevent or minimise the discharge.39 Both the owner and master shall only be criminally liable in cases of intent or recklessness, not in cases of negligence. The reasoning for this privilege is based on the fact that decisions on how to prevent or stop the accidental discharge must usually be taken in a situation that is uncertain and dangerous for ship and crew. This reasoning does not apply to other operators such as charterers, cargo owners or inspectors of classification societies who do not have to act under similar circumstances. Therefore the “damage” exception should only privilege the owner, master and crew, but not other potential violators.

VI. Safeguards It has to be noted that coastal and port States, when exercising their enforcement powers, have to comply with the safeguards set out in section 7 of Part

38

See König, Durchsetzung internationaler Bestands- und Umweltschutzvorschriften auf Hoher See im Interesse der Staatengemeinschaft (1990), 248 et seq.

39

Timagenis (note 19), 454. 783


XII (articles 223 to 233 of the LOS Convention). Most relevant, in the context of criminal proceedings in respect of polluting discharges, are the provisions in articles 228 and 230. According to article 228 paragraph 1, proceedings instituted by a coastal State in the case of a pollution incident committed by a foreign vessel beyond its territorial sea must normally be suspended when the flag State takes proceedings in respect of the same incident within six months. There is no obligation to suspend proceedings, however, if the pollution offence was committed in the territorial sea or caused major damage to the coastal State, or if the flag State has repeatedly disregarded its duty to enforce effectively generally accepted international pollution rules and standards against its ships. Furthermore, the wording of article 228 paragraph 1, 3rd sentence seems to imply that the coastal State may continue its proceedings if the flag State did not bring the proceedings taken over by it to a conclusion.40 Article 230 paragraph 1 provides that only monetary penalties may be imposed on foreign vessels with respect to pollution offences beyond the territorial sea. Article 230 paragraph 2, dealing with pollution offences within the territorial sea, stipulates that nonmonetary penalties, i.e. imprisonment, are only allowed in cases of wilful and serious acts of pollution. In addition, recognised rights of the accused have to be observed (article 230 para. 3). Both article 9 of the Directive 2005/35/EC and article 4 paragraph 8 of the Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA refer to section 7 of Part XII of the LOS Convention in general and to article 230 in particular. The Member States are, therefore, obliged to enforce their pollution laws and regulations in accordance with these safeguards.41

VII. Conclusion The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that those three questions being the starting-point of my deliberations should be answered as follows: First, it is lawful for the EU to legislate for the territorial sea other than in accordance with MARPOL. Under the LOS Convention, coastal States are permitted to take more stringent measures than those embodied in MARPOL in respect of polluting discharges in the territorial sea. The MARPOL Convention might be interpreted as setting up universally uniform standards which coastal States may not exceed unilaterally. Such interpretation is, however, not imperative. On the contrary, there are well-founded arguments pointing in the other direction. Therefore, under MARPOL, coastal States are not prohibited against fully using the legislative competences given to them under the LOS Convention, i.e. to

40

Churchill/Lowe (note 8), 350 et seq.; for more detail see Molenaar (note 8), 460 et seq.; Schult (note 8), 152 et seq.

41

This is also pointed out in MEMO/05/244 (note 37), 3; see also Frank (note 15), 48.

784


adopt stricter rules and standards with regard to discharge violations in the territorial sea. Secondly, the standard of liability of serious negligence in the Directive does not breach the right of innocent passage. Since coastal States are permitted to take more stringent measures in the territorial sea, such stricter laws and regulations do not per se hamper the right of innocent passage for foreign ships, provided that this legislation is enforced in conformity with the provisions set out in Parts II and XII of the LOS Convention. Thirdly, it is also lawful for the EU to legislate independently of MARPOL for third-country vessels on the high seas and in the EEZ. MARPOL does not contain any provisions with regard to the persons who shall be held criminally liable for discharge violations. It is, therefore, left to the coastal State to fill in this regulatory gap. Accordingly, the inclusion of all operators in the shipping chain is in conformity with both the LOS Convention and MARPOL. The “damage” exception set out in MARPOL Annex I, Regulation 11 lit. b) and in Annex II, Regulation 6 lit. b) is specifically tailored to the shipowner or the master of a ship in the case of an accidental discharge. It is not suitable in all other cases where operators acted with serious negligence. Not applying this exception to persons other than the owner or master is, therefore, no infringement of the LOS Convention or MARPOL. Accordingly, the Directive may be contested from a political rather than a legal point of view. Unilateral measures, be they national or regional, are often conceived as an impediment to a global business such as international maritime commerce. They could be considered as undermining the concept of global uniform shipping rules, weakening the IMO’s authority and setting a precedent for other regions to establish their own regimes.42 Conversely, unilateral measures might become a catalyst for change through negotiation at IMO.43 It has to be noted, though, that in a global business, unilateralism, as a policy option, should be used with great care.44 Coming back to the issue of increasing criminalisation in shipping, the well-founded criticism of the treatment of seafarers should not be turned against the EU, which intends to harmonise the criminal sanctions for ship-source pollution and their enforcement, but against those Member States which have reacted to accidental pollution incidents in an inadequate and disproportionate manner.

42

Frank (note 15), 22.

43

For more details see Boyle (note 15), 17; Frank (note 15), 24 et seq.

44

Boyle (note 15), 31. 785

THE REGULATION OF NAVIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TOOL FOR PROTECTING SENSITIVE MARINE ENVIRONMENTS Julian Roberts and Martin Tsamenyi

I. Introduction

H

istorically, States have failed to regulate navigation for environmental purposes, since there are often strong objections to the placing of prohibitions or restrictions on navigation, on the grounds that these run counter to the freedom of navigation enshrined in international law. The historical debate over the regulation of shipping for environmental purposes is characterised by two dichotomous points of view – those that wish to see the adoption of ever-more stringent regulations for the protection of coastal States’ marine resources, and those that view coastal States’ environmental regulation as a threat to traditional rights of freedom of navigation and therefore wish to limit the regulation of navigation for environmental purposes. The development, over the past 50 years, of international law relating to vessel-source pollution specifically and the law of the sea generally, has sought to resolve this conflict by defining more precisely the jurisdictional rights and responsibilities of States. Thus, the current international legal framework, codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),1 the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78)2 and the

1

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1983, UNTS Vol. 1833, 397.

2

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, 1 June 1978, in force 2 October 1983, UNTS Vol. 1340, 61.



International Convention for the Protection of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),3 provides for varying levels of protection to coastal States depending on the maritime zones within which the protective measures are applied. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is firmly established as the pre-eminent organisation for the regulation of all aspects of maritime activities.4 While the IMO’s regulatory efforts initially focused largely on improving the safety of shipping, the development of a comprehensive regulatory regime for the prevention and control of marine pollution has established the IMO at the forefront of global efforts to protect the marine environment. Furthermore, despite its early focus on marine pollution, since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, the IMO has taken a broader view of marine environment protection and many of its instruments now address wider issues of marine biodiversity conservation and habitat protection.5 Notable examples include amendments to SOLAS to explicitly provide for the adoption of navigation control measures for the purpose of environmental protection, the development of the particularly sensitive sea area concept, developments in the control and management of invasive species and the phasing out of harmful antifouling compounds. This chapter discusses the regulation of navigation, and in particular the application of ships’ routeing measures through the IMO, for the protection of 3

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November 1974, in force 25 May 1980, UNTS Vol. 1184, 2.

4

See for example: P. Birnie, “The Status of Environmental ‘Soft Law’: Trends and Examples with Special Focus on IMO Norms”, in H. Ringbom (ed.), Competing Norms in the Law of Marine Environmental Protection (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 35; A. Blanco-Bazán, “The Environmental UNCLOS and the Work of the IMO in the Field of Prevention of Pollution from Vessels”, in A. Kirchner (ed.), International Marine Environmental Law: Institutions, Implementation and Innovations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), p. 31; Analysis undertaken by the Legal Division of the IMO points out that although the IMO is explicitly referred to in only one of the LOSC articles, it is implicitly recognised as the “competent international organisation” in respect of setting rules and standards for the protection of the marine environment from the impacts of vessel-source pollution and for maintaining safety of navigation. Furthermore, the use of the singular “competent international organisation” reinforces that only one organisation, the IMO, is competent for the purpose of establishing such rules and standards: LEG/ MISC/3/Rev.1, Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization, prepared by the IMO Secretariat, 6 January 2003, p. 3. This interpretation is supported by R. Wolfrum. See R. Wolfrum, “IMO Interface with the Law of the Sea Convention,” in M.H. Nordquist and J. Norten Moore (eds), Current Maritime Issues and the International Maritime Organization (The Hague: Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), p. 223.

5

For a general discussion on the development and application of IMO measures, see generally E.J. Molenaar, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998).

788

The Regulation of Navigation under International Law

the marine environment from the activities of shipping. After describing coastal State jurisdiction in the various maritime zones, it reviews the evolution of IMO measures to address marine environmental concerns and discusses the option of seeking mandatory ship routeing and ship reporting measures.

II. Coastal State Jurisdiction to Regulate Navigation for Protection of the Environment It is widely acknowledged that protection of the environment is a secondary benefit of the enhancement of navigational safety,6 since measures for the safety of maritime traffic usually prevent environmental hazards as well. However, State practice has evolved to recognise the legitimacy of using navigation measures for the primary purpose of protecting the marine environment from pollution and other damage from ships. In the context of this chapter, the following measures are considered to be true ships’ routeing measures, as described in the General Provisions on Ships Routeing (GPSR):7 traffic separation schemes (TSSs); two-way routes; recommended tracks; areas to be avoided; no anchoring areas; inshore traffic zones; roundabouts; precautionary areas; and deepwater routes. It is also recognised that vessel traffic services (VTS) and in particular ship reporting systems (SRSs), may contribute to the protection of the marine environment.8 While these are given some attention in this chapter, the main focus of the discussion below is related to ships’ routeing systems. While the different legal status of the maritime zones does not directly influence the way safety and anti-pollution measures are enforced on board ships by flag States, the existence of maritime zones becomes relevant in determining how coastal State jurisdiction should be exerted in connection with the enforcement of navigation and anti-pollution standards.9 In general, IMO treaties do not attempt

6

See for example the report of the Lord Donaldson Inquiry which concludes that “pollution control and safety are very closely linked, because the best way to maintain safety and to prevent pollution is to preserve the integrity of the ship”. Para. 1.11, Safer Ships Cleaner Seas: the Report of Lord Donaldson’s Inquiry into the Prevention of Pollution from Merchant Shipping, 17 May 1994.

7

IMO Resolution A.572(14), General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing, adopted 20 November 1985, as amended by Resolution A.827(19) of 23 November 1995.

8

For a general discussion on this issue see G. Plant, “The Relationship between International Navigation Rights and Environmental Protection: A Legal Analysis of Mandatory Ship Traffic Systems”, in H. Ringbom (ed.), Competing Norms in the Law of Marine Environmental Protection (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 11-27.

9

LEG/MISC/3/Rev.1, note 4, p. 9. For the purposes of this chapter, the relevant zones are ports and internal waters, the territorial sea and the EEZ. Since the focus of the discussion in this chapter relates to coastal State jurisdiction to regulate navigation and discharge 789


to regulate the nature and extent of coastal State jurisdiction. Thus the degree to which coastal States may enforce IMO regulations in respect of foreign ships on innocent passage in their territorial waters, or navigating in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), is exclusively subject to be regulated by the LOSC. 1. Jurisdiction in Ports and Internal Waters International law acknowledges, in principle, full coastal State jurisdiction within ports.10 By entering foreign ports and other internal waters, ships put themselves within the territorial jurisdiction of the coastal State.11 As such, coastal States have extensive authority to regulate ships that enter their ports.12 Based on the principle of territoriality, this jurisdiction provides a port State not only with the ability to close down its ports to international shipping13 but also with the ability to set port entry conditions.14 Pursuant to article 211(3) of the LOSC, States may establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports. Accordingly, as Molenaar and others argue, port State jurisdiction under the LOSC is, in principle, unlimited.15 The rights of a port State to prescribe conditions for entry into ports also apply, mutatis mutandis, to a coastal State’s prescriptive jurisdiction within its internal waters.16 Thus, according to Molenaar: “the view that port State jurisdiction is in principle unlimited implies

standards, no analysis will provided on the rights of a State to intervene with a casualty. Accordingly, no reference will be made in this chapter to a State’s powers of intervention in either the EEZ or the high seas. 10

See LOSC, art. 11.

11

R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd edn (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 65.

12

L.S. Johnson, Coastal State Regulation of International Shipping (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 2004), p. 35.

13

For a discussion on the issue of port closure, see ibid. pp. 36-38.

14

Johnson, see note 12, p. 35.

15

Molenaar, see note 5, p. 104. Johnson (see note 12, p. 42) argues that if proper notification is given to a ship of the existence of such conditions and the vessel still voluntarily enters a port, it can be argued that the vessel has agreed to be bound by such conditions. For a comprehensive overview of the rights of access to ports used for international trade, see generally L. de La Fayette, “Access to Ports in International Law”, 11 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. (1996), pp. 1-22.

16

Internal waters are those waters which lie on the landward side of the baseline from which the territorial sea and other maritime zones are measured (LOSC, art. 8(1)).

790


that coastal State jurisdiction over its internal waters is in principle also unrestricted.”17 Consequently there is no right of innocent passage, such as exists in the territorial sea.18 2. Jurisdiction in the Territorial Sea It is a well-established rule of international law that ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.19 That is to say, foreign vessels enjoy a right of unimpeded navigation through the territorial sea to the extent that it does not adversely affect the interests of the coastal State.20 Notwithstanding this, the LOSC recognises that coastal States retain a significant degree of authority to prescribe and enforce their laws over foreign ships engaged in such passage.21 The territorial sea is part of the coastal State’s territory and subject to its sovereignty. As such, in its territorial sea, a coastal State may, pursuant to the provisions of article 21 of the LOSC, legitimately regulate innocent passage with respect to inter alia: – The safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;22 – The conservation of the living resources of the sea;23 and – The preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof.24

17

Molenaar, see note 5, p. 186.

18

An exception to this rule exists where the internal waters were created by the drawing of a straight baseline that encloses waters that were previously considered to be territorial waters. See LOSC art. 8(2). Under these circumstances, ships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the internal waters as if those water remained part of the territorial sea. Accordingly, the regime of jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution applies within such waters as well.

19

Innocent passage is broadly defined in articles 18 and 19 of the LOSC. For a detailed discussion of the meaning of the term see for example K. Hakapaa and E.J. Molenaar, “Innocent Passage – Past and Present”, 23 Marine Policy (1999), pp. 131-135; E.J. Molenaar, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 195-199; Churchill and Lowe, see note 11, pp. 68-73.

20

B. Smith, “Innocent Passage as a Rule of Decision: Navigation versus Environmental Protection”, 21 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. (1982-1983), p. 49.

21


22

LOSC, art. 21(1)(a).

23

LOSC, art. 21(1)(d).

24

LOSC, art. 21(1)(f). 791


Thus article 21(1) would appear to provide a general authority for the adoption of routeing measures for the purposes of environmental protection. Furthermore, article 22 of the LOSC provides that coastal States may: (1) Designate sea lanes and prescribe TSSs for the regulation of innocent passage of ships through its territorial sea, where necessary having regard to the safety of navigation; and (2) Require tankers, nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials to confine their passage to such sea lanes.25 Even though article 22 specifically relates only to the adoption of sea lanes and TSSs for the purpose of safety of navigation, it should be read more broadly in the context of the general authority provided by article 21, and also of article 22(2) which specifically address those types of ships and hazardous cargoes that may present a threat to the marine environment.26 Similarly article 21 does not place any restriction on the type of routeing measure that may be adopted. As such, it should not be assumed that coastal State jurisdiction is limited only to sea lanes and TSSs.27 In further support of these arguments is the scope of article 211(1) of the LOSC, which explicitly provides for the adoption of ships’ routeing measures for the purposes of preventing, reducing and controlling pollution of the marine environment. Thus the establishment of environmentally-aimed routeing measures within a coastal State’s territorial sea appears wholly consistent with the provisions of the LOSC. Articles 21 and 22 when read together with article 211(1), confirm that coastal States have the power to adopt routeing measures to protect vulnerable areas and can regulate the environmental impacts of international shipping.28 It should be noted, however, that while the adoption of routeing measures is clearly within the competence of coastal States within their own territorial seas,

25

The subject of coastal State rights with respect to ships carrying hazardous cargoes has attracted a great deal of attention in recent times. High profile incidents such as the Prestige and the Erika have prompted several coastal States to propose ever-increasingly stringent measures to protect their coastal waters. See for example generally J. Roberts, T. Workman, M. Tsamenyi and L. Johnson, “The Western European PSSA: A ‘Politically Sensitive Sea Area’”, 29 Marine Policy (2005), pp. 431-440; V. Frank, “Consequences of the Prestige Sinking for European and International Law”, 20 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. (2005), pp. 1-64.

26

D. Bodansky, “Protecting the Marine Environment from Vessel-Source Pollution: UNCLOS III and Beyond”, 18 Ecology L. Q. (1991), pp. 750-751.

27

For a broader discussion of this argument, see Molenaar, note 5, pp. 203-204.

28

Johnson, see note 12, pp. 69-71.

792


a coastal State needs to take into account the recommendations of the IMO with respect to the design and adoption of ships’ routeing systems, even if it need not consult with that organisation. Furthermore, while coastal States are entitled to establish vessel routeing systems as a right, subject to the requirements discussed above, it is widely acknowledged that approval by the IMO, if not necessary, is highly desirable.29 Routeing measures adopted through the IMO are more likely to be observed by international shipping. Therefore the establishment of routeing systems is best conducted through the IMO.30 Furthermore, schemes not adopted by the IMO will not be published in Ships’ Routeing,31 and consequently there is no guarantee that the scheme will be known by vessels sailing the waters in which the scheme lies.32 3. Jurisdiction in the EEZ Coastal States’ rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ relate to the natural resources of the EEZ. Article 56(1)(a) of the LOSC provides that States have inter alia sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superadjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil. With respect to pollution, article 56(1)(b) confers on coastal States jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of the Convention with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. The relevant provisions are to be found in Part XII. This Part gives the coastal States the legislative and enforcement competence in the EEZ to deal with inter alia pollution from vessels.33 These rights notwithstanding, article 58 of the LOSC specifically provides that ships enjoy freedom of navigation in the EEZ. As such, coastal States are not generally permitted to prescribe navigational standards within the EEZ, except in certain circumstances, which are outlined below. However, while the LOSC

29

See for example J. Roberts, “Protecting Sensitive Marine Environments: the Role and Application of Ships’ Routeing Measures”, 20 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. (2005), pp. 135159. Paragraph 3.16 of the GPSR recommends that Governments establishing routeing systems entirely within their territorial sea should designate them in accordance with the criteria established by the IMO and submit them to the IMO for adoption.

30

See G. Plant, “A European Lawyer’s View of the Government Response to the Donaldson Report”, 19 Marine Policy (1995), p. 464.

31

IMO, Ships’ Routeing, 7th edn (London: IMO 2003), updated to include amendments adopted up to December 2003.

32

T. Ijlstra, “Maritime Safety Issues under the Law of the Sea Convention and their Implementation”, in Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute (Honolulu: Law of the Sea Institute, 1989), p. 219.

33

For a general discussion of coastal State rights and duties in the EEZ, see Churchill and Lowe, note 11, pp. 137-140. 793


does not specifically give competence to coastal States to adopt routeing measures in their EEZ in any way analogous to those provisions for the territorial sea, pursuant to the provisions of article 211(1) and with the consent of the IMO, a coastal State may still legitimately impose controls on navigation in the form of routeing measures. It has been a traditionally held view that the establishment of routeing measures for the purpose of protecting the marine environment must relate to pollution.34 It was reasoned that article 56 is subject to the requirements of article 211(5), which restricts coastal States’ rights to regulate ships transiting the EEZ, and stipulates that measures established in the EEZ for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels must conform to and give effect to generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organisation. Thus, in the context of article 56, and other provisions of Part V of the LOSC, a coastal State had to tie adverse effects from ship-source pollution to its EEZ resources in order to make the case for imposition of environmental rules and standards. However, what if a coastal State’s concerns relate to environmental impacts other than pollution? Johnson35 and others argue that States exercising their sovereign rights under Part V of the LOSC may adopt measures for the purpose of protection and preservation of the marine environment and for conserving and managing natural resources. As such, coastal States may seek to establish navigational controls for impact to EEZ resources that are not directly associated with pollution. It thus follows logically that, in order to give effect to the obligations under article 56 (as well as articles 192 and 194(5)), the IMO may

34

While Part XII of the LOSC places a general obligation on States to protect and preserve the marine environment (art. 192) the measures set out in Part XII relate exclusively to the prevention, control and reduction of pollution. Therefore, it is widely viewed that article 194 relates to damage that may be attributable to pollution, rather than being a more general provision dealing with all activities that may harm rare and fragile ecosystems (such a bottom trawling). Birnie and Boyle argue that the focus of the LOSC is: “no longer on the control of sources of marine pollution, but more broadly on the prevention of environmental degradation and the protection of ecosystems”. P. Birnie and A.E. Boyle, International Law and The Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 347. However, the primary concern of Part XII does seem to be the prevention of pollution, given that article 192 figures first among a series of provisions relating to marine pollution. McConnell and Gold, confirm this view that the subject matter of Part XII is pollution of the marine environment. In contrast, clauses relating to the preservation of biological resources are contained within the sections of the conventions regulating each of the established marine zones. See M.L. McConnell and E. Gold, “The Modern Law of the Sea: Framework for the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment?” 23 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. (1991), p. 89.

35

For a detailed discussion of this argument, see Johnson, note 12, pp. 103-106.

794


similarly adopt measures for the purposes of protection and preservation of the marine environment and for conserving and managing natural resources. The United States of America (US) has taken this position, claiming jurisdiction to protect biological resources within maritime zones under its sovereign rights, from non-pollution related impacts of international shipping.36 For example, the US successfully argued for an amendment to the GPSR to include no anchoring areas as a recognised ships’ routeing measure. Clearly anchor damage is not “pollution” per se but the US argued that: “there is clearly a need to establish a measure for no anchoring areas in the GPSR. Such areas could be proposed and established where anchoring may be unsafe, unstable, hazardous, or where there is the possibility that unacceptable damage to the marine environment would result.”37 On the basis that this argument would be accepted, the US also proposed the establishment of three mandatory no anchoring areas to protect the coral reefs of the Flower Garden Banks in the Gulf of Mexico.38 Subsequently, the US sought the adoption of three mandatory no anchoring areas is an integral part of a proposal to identify the marine area around the Florida Keys as a particularly sensitive sea area (PSSA).39 The US has also applied this approach to the protection of North Atlantic right whales off the east coast of the US. Two mandatory SRSs were adopted by the IMO in 1998 in order to: “provide important protection for endangered large whale species, in particular the critically endangered northern right whale. … Communication between shore-based authorities and ships in these areas would reduce the risk of collision damage to ships and the whales as well as provide beneficial information to ships.”40 Similarly, Canada has also amended a TSS in the Bay of Fundy for the purpose of reduce ship strikes on North Atlantic right whales, by shifting the traffic lanes of the TSS from an area with the highest density of right whales to an area where

36

See Bodansky, note 26, pp. 766-767.

37

NAV 46/3/2, Proposed amendments to the General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing to provide for a no anchoring area routeing measure, submitted by the United States, 5 April 2000, para. 2.

38

NAV 46/3/3, No anchoring areas for Flower Garden Banks in the Northwestern Gulf of Mexico, submitted by the United States, 5 April 2000.

39

NAV 47/3/1, No anchoring areas in the Tortugas Ecological Reserve and the Tortugas Bank in the Florida Keys, submitted by the United States, 15 February 2001.

40

NAV 44/14, Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation forty-fourth session: Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, 4 September 1998, Annex 8, para. 1. 795


there is a lower density.41 Despite the approval of these measures by the IMO, it should be noted that in order to give full effect to the obligations under article 56 it may be necessary to establish measures in the EEZ that are not approved by the IMO. As Johnson notes, the fact that a coastal State cannot act unilaterally in the EEZ does not mean it should be assumed that it has no ability to regulate to conserve and manage its natural resources.42 For example, additional measures for the protection of right whales have been proposed by the US under domestic legislation. The National Marine Fisheries Service is considering regulations to implement a strategy aimed at reducing mortality to right whales as a result of vessel collision. The strategy may include such measures as speed restrictions in designated traffic lanes, as well as routeing measures.43 Each of these proposals were premised on the basis of resource jurisdiction and a coastal State’s rights to regulate navigation to protect against activities that affect its resources in the EEZ. However, a coastal State relying on Part V must clearly tie any proposed regulation to its natural resources and economic activities associated with them.44 Thus, while article 56 is clearly important in justifying coastal State action, the more general provisions of Part XII, especially articles 192 and 194(5), provide a broader mandate for IMO action. 4. Straits Used for International Navigation The regime dealing with navigation through international straits is found in Part III of the LOSC. While the LOSC does not define the term “strait”, the ordinary meaning of a strait as “a natural passage or arm of water connecting two larger bodies of water” appears to be accepted.45 Straits may comprise: internal waters; territorial seas; exclusive economic zones; and even areas of the high seas.46 What is important, therefore, is the legal status of the waters constituting a strait, as it is this factor that determines the navigational rights of other States through a strait.47 41

See NAV 48/3/5, Amendment of the traffic separation scheme in the Bay of Fundy and approaches, submitted by Canada, 5 April 2002; MSC 76/23, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-Sixth Session, 16 December 2002, para. 113.

42


43

69 Federal Register at 30857. Endangered Fish and Wildlife; Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) for Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction (June 1 2004).

44


45

Churchill and Lowe, see note 11, p. 102; Molenaar, see note 5, p. 283.

46

See B.H. Dubner, “On the Interplay of International Law of the Seas and the Prevention of Marine Pollution – How Far Can a State Proceed in Protecting Itself from Conflicting Norms in International Law?”, 11 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. (1998), p. 147.

47


796


Part III of the LOSC recognises four types of passage through international straits: (1) The right of “transit passage” through straits used for international navigation which connect one part of the high seas or an EEZ with another part of the high seas or an EEZ;48 (2) ‘Innocent passage’ through straits used for international navigation formed by the mainland and an island of the State bordering the strait where there exists no seaward route through the high seas or a route of similar convenience;49 (3) Normal freedoms of navigation and overflight as prescribed in the LOSC in straits used for international navigation, through which there exists a high seas or EEZ corridor;50 and (4) The legal regime in straits created by previously negotiated longstanding international conventions regarding passage by shipping through those straits, which conventions are not affected by Part III of the LOSC.51 The Transit Passage Regime The transit passage regime implies, as regards navigation, that the strait is excluded from the territorial sea of a strait State and that coastal State powers in the strait are different from those it can exercise in the territorial sea.52 Thus, in a strait where the transit passage regime exists, the rules of innocent passage are supplanted by the more relaxed rules of transit passage. The transit passage regime has been described as sitting somewhere between the regime of “innocent passage” and “free navigation”.53 Coastal State Jurisdiction to Regulate Transit Passage The regime of transit passage generally applies in areas where there is no equally convenient alternative route or in some cases no alternative route at all.54 As a result, interference with navigation in these areas may be a serious problem and, unlike the innocent passage regime of the territorial sea, strait States have

48

LOSC, arts 37 and 38.

49

LOSC, arts 38(1) and 45.

50

LOSC, art. 36.

51

LOSC, art. 36(c).

52

See M. George, “Transit Passage and Pollution Control in Straits under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention”, 33 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. (2002), p. 194.

53


54

LOSC, art. 37. 797


no unilateral regulatory powers to impose routeing measures on ships in transit passage.55 Notwithstanding this, a coastal State may still impose controls on navigation. Article 42 of the LOSC prescribes the limits of the regulatory powers of States bordering straits relating to transit passage. Accordingly, strait States may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage, inter alia with respect to the safety of navigation and maritime traffic and the prevention and control of pollution. Pursuant to article 41 of the LOSC, strait States have the right to prescribe sea lanes and traffic separation schemes to minimise the number of accidents and to enhance the safety of navigation, provided they conform to international regulations and are submitted to the IMO for adoption.56 Similarly, pursuant to article 42(1)(b), States have the right to establish national laws to give effect to “applicable international regulations” respecting vessel discharges in a strait. Brubaker argues that, based upon State practice and the legislative history of this provision, strait States have competence to prescribe discharge provisions as set out in MARPOL 73/78.57 However, this competence is extremely limited, since under articles 42(2) and 44 of the LOSC, coastal States are not to hamper, impair, deny or suspend transit passage in international straits, even for violations of domestic laws and regulations. Thus, the implication of the transit passage regime for all strait States is that user States have unlimited and maximum freedom of passage. Innocent Passage in International Straits Innocent passage applies to those straits used for international navigation which are excluded from the regime of transit passage58 or which are between a part of the high seas or an EEZ and the territorial sea of a foreign State.59 The innocent passage regime is set forth in Part II of the LOSC and is discussed above in the context of coastal jurisdiction in the territorial sea. However, in the context of

55

B.H. Oxman, “Environmental Protection in Archipelagic Waters and International Straits – The Role of the International Maritime Organization”, 10 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. (1995), p. 476.

56

LOSC, art. 41(4). Given that coastal States have no jurisdiction to act unilaterally, and given that IMO approval of such measures is required, there does not appear to be any reason why the procedure set out in article 41 could not equally apply to other internationally accepted measures such as ship’s routeing measures and SRS. Molenaar (see note 5) at p. 295, elaborates on this argument. However, State practice in this area does not assist in clarifying whether this is the case, as the treatment by the IMO of applications by coastal States for other measures has not been addressed in a consistent manner.

57

R.D. Brubaker, “Straits in the Russian Arctic”, 32 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. (2001), p. 268.

58

LOSC, art. 45(1)(a).

59

LOSC, art. 45(1)(b).

798


the international straits regime, such innocent passage is non-suspendable.60 5. Archipelagic Sea Lanes A similar but separate issue to straits used for international navigation applies in the case of archipelagic States and their waters. The regime governing archipelagic States is addressed in Part IV of the LOSC, which contains a number of similarities to the straits regime. Article 46(a) defines an archipelagic State as “a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos61 and may include other islands”. As Molenaar notes, central to Part IV, is the definition of the sovereignty of archipelagic States set forth in article 49, which “extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47”.62 Thus archipelagic waters are those waters contained within archipelagic baselines as defined in article 47. The regular maritime zones, such as the territorial sea, extend seawards from these archipelagic baselines.63 However, while an archipelagic State has sovereignty over its archipelagic waters, this sovereignty is subject to a number of rights enjoyed by third States. For the purposes of this chapter, the most important of these are navigation rights. To address these rights, as with straits used for international navigation, two navigation regimes are applicable to archipelagic waters: the regime of innocent passage, as provided for in Part II of the LOSC, and the regime of non-suspendable archipelagic sea lane passage. International shipping enjoys the same right of innocent passage in archipelagic waters as it does in the territorial sea.64 This right may only be suspended, temporarily and in specified areas, where such suspension is necessary for security reasons.65 Furthermore, any such suspension must be publicised. Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage Archipelagic sea lanes passage applies to sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft

60

LOSC, art. 45.

61

An archipelago means: “a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such” (LOSC, art. 46(b)).

62

Article 47 is a complex article of many paragraphs that defines the procedures for determining the limits and extent of archipelagic baseline. For a discussion on archipelagic baselines, see for example Churchill and Lowe, note 11, pp. 123-125.

63


64

LOSC, art. 52(1).

65

LOSC, art. 52(2). 799


through and over archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea designated by the archipelagic State after adoption by the IMO.66 The similarities between archipelagic sea lanes passage and the right of transit passage in straits are clearly apparent when comparing the provisions of the LOSC that relate to each.67 Indeed, Churchill and Lowe argue that the right of archipelagic sea lane passage is essentially the same as transit passage through straits and the rights and obligations of both flag and archipelagic States are the same as the rights and obligations of flag and strait States in respect of transit passage.68 Geographically, passage must be between one part of the high seas or EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ. Passage under the regime is concerned with transit and carries no requirement of innocence.69 Furthermore, such transit must be unobstructed70 and cannot be suspended.71

III. Regulation of Navigation by the IMO for the Protection of the Environment IMO instruments do not attempt to regulate the jurisdictional power of the coastal State. This is a subject exclusively within the scope of the LOSC.72 The LOSC provides the enforcement framework for IMO instruments by establishing the degree to which coastal States may legitimately interfere with foreign ships in order to ensure compliance with IMO rules and standards.73 However, specific competences are attributed to the IMO by a range of international instruments. Thus, the IMO has developed a broad range of protective measures within its competence that may be used to regulate international vessel traffic.

66

LOSC, art. 53. The approval role of the IMO is crucial in the designation of archipelagic sea lanes. As such the IMO has adopted procedures for the designation of archipelagic sea lanes. For a discussion of the IMO approval role, see for example C. Johnson, “A Rite of Passage: The IMO Consideration of the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea-Lanes Submission,” 15 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. (2000), pp. 319-325; Oxman, see note 55, generally.

67

For example LOSC, arts 39, 40, 42 and 44, which relate to transit passage, apply mutatis mutandis to the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage – see art. 54.

68


69


70

LOSC, art. 53.

71

LOSC, arts 54 and 44.

72

For a general discussion of the relationship between the LOSC and the various IMO instruments, see Blanco-Bazán, see note 4, pp. 31-47.

73

LEG/MISC/3/Rev.1, see note 4, p. 11.

800


1. Particularly Sensitive Sea Area Concept The ability of the IMO to designate a particularly sensitive sea area (PSSA) is provided through IMO Assembly Resolution A.982(24)74 (PSSA Guidelines). The 2005 Resolution supersedes and updates the three previous Resolutions A.720(17), A.885(21) and A.927(22). The PSSA Guidelines define a PSSA as: “An area that needs special protection through action by IMO because of its significance for recognised ecological, socio-economic, or scientific attributes where such attributes may be vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities.” In general, to be designated as a PSSA, three elements must be present: (1) The area must meet at least one of the three given criteria (ecological; social, cultural and economic; or scientific and educational); (2) It must be vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities; and (3) There must be measures that can be adopted by the IMO to provide protection to the area from these specifically identified international shipping activities. Measures to Protect PSSAs The designation of a PSSA has no legal significance because the concept is created by a non-binding IMO Assembly resolution and is not set forth in a convention. As Peet75 notes: “Identification as a PSSA is nothing more (and nothing less) than a qualification and a basis on which protective measures may be taken through IMO measures.” The PSSA guidelines require, therefore, the adoption by the IMO of “associated protective measures” (APMs), such as the routeing measures discussed above, to address the vulnerability of the area to damage by international shipping activities. PSSA designation offers a number of benefits:76 (1) It provides a comprehensive management tool whereby the vulnerability of an area to damage from international shipping activities can be examined

74

IMO Assembly Resolution A.982(24), Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, adopted 1 December 2005, para. 1.2.

75

G. Peet, “Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas – A Documentary History”, 9 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. (1994), p. 469.

76

Roberts et al., see note 25, p. 433. 801


and a measure adopted by the IMO can be narrowly tailored to address the identified vulnerability; (2) It provides global recognition of the special significance of a designated area through identification of PSSA status on international charts; (3) It informs mariners of the importance of taking extra care when navigating through a region; and (4) It gives coastal States the opportunity to adopt additional protective measures to best address the particular risks associated with international shipping in the area. The fourth benefit is the critical part of any PSSA designation because, as noted above, by itself, PSSA status confers no direct regulatory benefits. 2. Application of Ships’ Routeing Measures SOLAS recognises the IMO as the only body for establishing and adopting routeing measures at an international level, while COLREGS77 provide specifically for the adoption of TSSs.78 This competence is supplemented by the GPSR.79 While vessel routeing measures have been used in the protection of the marine environment for many years, the explicit application of such tools for this purpose has only been formally recognised by the IMO within the last decade. The basis of this relatively recent development may be traced to the development of the PSSA concept. When the IMO Assembly adopted Resolution A.720(17)80 it also requested the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to incorporate the PSSA concept into relevant provisions of the GPSR.81 This would expressly permit the application of ships’ routeing measures for purely environmental purposes. This reiterated an earlier request to IMO’s Sub-committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV) that it amend the GPSR to incorporate environmental concerns as grounds for the establishment of ships’ routeing measures.82

77

Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 20 October 1972, in force 15 July 1977, UNTS Vol. 1050, 16 (hereafter COLREGS).

78

Rule 10 of the COLREGS deals with the behaviour of vessels in or near traffic separation schemes adopted by the Organisation.

79

See Ijlstra, note 32, p. 219.

80

Resolution A.720(17), Guidelines for the Designation of Special Areas and the Identification of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, adopted 6 November 1991.

81

Paragraph 4 of the preamble to Resolution A.720(17).

82

Following the adoption of Resolution A.720(17), a series of meetings was organised by the University of Hull Law School, and cosponsored by the IMO, which brought together an international group of experts, to discuss legal issues associated with the PSSA concept. At the first of these meetings, the group of experts reached general agreement that it

802


The IMO first incorporated environmental concerns into the GPSR in June 1992 with an amendment to Resolution A.572(14) which added to paragraph 1.1 of section 1 (Objectives) the following: “Ships’ routeing may also be used for the purpose of preventing or reducing the risk of pollution or other damage to the marine environment caused by ships colliding or grounding in or near environmentally sensitive areas.” The matter was considered further at the 40th session of NAV, at which the Sub-committee agreed to submit further draft amendments to the GPSR to the MSC for their consideration. The MSC finally adopted amendments to the GPSR in 1995.83 Regulation 8 of Chapter V of SOLAS was also amended to reflect the potential application of vessel routeing measures to protect the environment.84 The 1995 amendments to the GPSR effected the following changes: (1) Inserted a specific objective (1.2.6) addressing the organisation of safe traffic flow in or around or at a safe distance from environmentally sensitive areas; and (2) Inserted a new procedure to specifically address the adoption of a routeing system which is intended to protect an environmentally sensitive area, as follows: “in deciding whether or not to adopt or amend a routeing system which is intended to protect the marine environment, IMO will consider: (i) whether the proposed routeing system can reasonably be expected to prevent or significantly reduce the risk of pollution or other damage to the marine environment of the area concerned;

would be consistent with the LOSC for routeing measures, such as those prescribed under the GPSR, to be adopted for the purpose of environmental protection, as well as to serve the needs of maritime safety. The group noted the importance of the request made by the IMO Assembly in paragraph 4 of Resolution A.720(17) and suggested that that resolution could provide a means to incorporate environmental concerns reflected in the PSSA Guidelines into the GPSR. For a discussion of the history of this development, see K.M. Gjerde and D. Ong, “Protection of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas under International Marine Environmental Law”, 26 Marine Pollution Bull. (1993), pp. 9-13. See also MEPC 33/INF.27, Report of the international meeting of legal experts on particularly sensitive sea areas, University of Hull, 20-21 July 1992, submitted by the IMO Secretariat, 1 September 1992, para. 7.1.1. 83

Refer to Annex 3 of Resolution A.827(19) for the amended text for the GPSR – Resolution A.827(19), Ships’ Routeing, adopted 23 November 1995.

84

Resolution MSC.46(65), Adoption of amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, adopted 16 May 1995. The amendments entered into force in January 1997. 803


(ii) whether given the overall size of the area to be protected, or aggregate number of environmentally sensitive areas established or identified in the geographical region concerned, the use of the routeing systems – particularly areas to be avoided – could have the effect of unreasonably limiting the sea area available for navigation; and (iii) whether the proposed routeing system meets the requirements of the IMO’s General Provisions.” Application of Mandatory Routeing Measures While coastal States are entitled to establish mandatory domestic ships’ routeing measures within their territorial sea, the concept of mandatory routeing systems is a fairly recent development at the IMO. Until 1997, only TSSs and not the other routeing measures adopted under SOLAS could be made mandatory.85 However, pursuant to amendments to SOLAS Regulation V/8,86 the IMO may now adopt any ships’ routeing measure as mandatory87 in appropriate cases. Paragraph 1 of SOLAS Regulation V/1088 states that: “Ships’ routeing systems are recommended for use by, and may be made mandatory for, all ships, certain categories of ships, or ships carrying certain cargoes, when adopted and implemented in accordance with the guidelines and criteria developed by the Organisation” (emphasis added). Furthermore, paragraph 7 of Regulation V/10 states that: “A ship shall use a mandatory ships’ routeing system adopted by the Organisation as required for its category or cargo carried and in accordance with the relevant provisions in force unless there are compelling reasons not to use a particular ships’ routeing system” (emphasis added). Although mandatory routeing measures have been approved four times since the ability to do so became available in 1997,89 the concept of mandatory routeing measures, and in particular mandatory areas to be avoided, was not

85

For a discussion on this issue, see for example Molenaar, note 8, pp. 212-213; Plant, note 7, p.14.

86

See note 84.

87

For a precise definition of “mandatory routeing system” refer to paragraph 2.2 of the GPSR.

88

As a result of subsequent amendments to SOLAS, the previous Regulation V/8, became Regulation V/10 in 2000.

89

The four are: the deep-water route in the German Bight, the three mandatory no anchoring areas for the Flower Gardens, the three mandatory no anchoring areas for Florida Keys and the mandatory area to be avoided off the north-east coast of New Zealand.

804


unanimously supported during the early discussions within the IMO. Several delegations voiced particular concern over the concept of mandatory areas to be avoided, noting that “mandatory areas to be avoided could undermine the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea and freedom of navigation on the high seas under international law”.90 The concept of mandatory versus recommended routeing measures was also considered by the Donaldson Inquiry,91 which concluded, inter alia, that provision of clear explanations of why particular guidance was being given was more likely to deliver high levels of compliance than the imposition of a mandatory rule that could not be enforced.92 While the inquiry was not convinced of the benefits of mandatory schemes in general, it did concede that certain areas may benefit from special protection in the form of elimination of traffic. In this context the inquiry did consider the applications of mandatory areas to be avoided.93 During the deliberations on an application by New Zealand for a mandatory area to be avoided within its territorial waters, the matter of mandatory versus recommended was once again raised as an issue. While the application received widespread support, it was noted that the adoption of this measure was a significant step for the IMO, since this was the first time a mandatory area to be avoided had been approved. Several delegations expressed the view that future applications for similar measures should be approached cautiously and should be the subject of stringent review. A subsequent application by several Baltic States for a mandatory area to be avoided within the Swedish EEZ94 failed to gain the support of the Subcommittee. As part of the process to designate a large part of the Baltic Sea as a PSSA,95 the proponent States submitted proposals for several APMs to the 51st session of the NAV Sub-committee. While all of the measures were approved

90

MSC 63/23, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its sixty-third session, 3 June 1994, para. 7.36.

91

See note 6.

92

Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas, paras 14.92-14.94 (see note 6).

93

L.M. Warren and M.W. Wallace, “The Donaldson Inquiry and its Relevance to Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas”, 9 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. (1994), p. 528.

94

For a full description of each of these new APMs, see NAV 51/3/6, New traffic separation schemes in Bornholmsgat and North Rügen, recommended deep-water route in the eastern Baltic Sea, amendments to the traffic separation schemes off Gotland Island and South of Gedser and new areas to be avoided at Hoburgs Bank and Norra Midsjöbanken, submitted by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, 3 March 2005.

95

See MEPC 51/8/1, Designation of the Baltic Sea area as a particularly sensitive sea area, submitted by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, 19 December 2003. The final designation of the Baltic Sea as a PSSA was achieved through the adoption of an IMO Resolution: MEPC.136(53), Designation of the Baltic Sea area as a particularly sensitive sea area, adopted 22 July 2005. 805


by the Sub-committee, concerns were raised over the mandatory nature of the proposed areas to be avoided. Since the areas to be avoided lay entirely within the Swedish EEZ, IMO approval was a pre-requisite for their implementation. The IMO will not adopt a proposed routeing measure until it is satisfied that the proposed system will not impose unnecessary constraints on shipping and it is completely in accordance with the requirements of SOLAS and the GPSR. In particular, an area to be avoided will not be adopted if it would impede the passage of ships through an international strait. When determining areas to be avoided for all ships or certain classes of ships, the necessity for creating such areas should be well demonstrated.96 In the case of the Baltic Sea, the proponents argued that the areas to be avoided should be mandatory due to the environmental significance of the area to be protected. The NAV Sub-committee, however, did not accept this argument, preferring instead to approve non-mandatory (recommended) areas to be avoided in both cases.97 Given that SOLAS now provides for the establishment of mandatory routeing measures, for the purposes of environmental protection, subject to satisfactorily demonstrating the need for such mandatory status, it must be assumed that the Baltic States did not provide a sufficiently strong argument to support the adoption of such a measure. Despite the supposed significant status of PSSA designation, identification of the area as a PSSA in and of itself clearly was not a significant factor in the decision as to whether the areas to be avoided should be mandatory for the purpose of protecting the marine environment. This therefore emphasises the increasingly important role of the IMO in striking a fine balance between the rights of traditional maritime States wishing to maintain traditional navigation rights and the prerogative of coastal States to protect the marine environment. Thus, while the adoption of the New Zealand mandatory area to be avoided does represent a significant step and a precedent for the IMO, it can be anticipated that future applications for mandatory measures, and in particular areas to be avoided, will be subject to stringent review. 3. Vessel Traffic Services Vessel Traffic services (VTS) systems98 are shore-based systems that range from the provision of simple information messages to ships, from the position of other

96

GPSR, para. 5.6 (see note 7).

97

The NAV Sub-committee expressed the opinion that the PSSA proposal did not justify the establishment of mandatory areas to be avoided. The delegation of Sweden, while accepting the decision, stated that they were not satisfied with this decision. Accordingly, the matter is to be revisited at the 52nd session of the Sub-committee in June 2006. See NAV 51/19, Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation fifty-first session: Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, 4 July 2005, para. 3.50.

98

For a comprehensive overview of the development and application of VTS see generally

806


traffic or meteorological hazard warnings, to extensive management of traffic within a port or waterway. VTS can improve the safety and efficiency of navigation, and protect the environment by providing the interactive management of traffic along a coastline, or in other sensitive areas. This could include, for example, monitoring and controlling the passage of ships carrying hazardous cargoes through or around a sensitive marine area.99 Generally, ships entering a VTS area report to the authorities, usually by radio, and may be tracked by the VTS control centre.100 They encompass a wide range of techniques and capabilities, aimed at preventing vessel collisions and groundings in the harbour, harbour approach and inland waterway phase of navigation. They are also designed to expedite ship movements, increase transportation system efficiency, and improve all-weather operating capability. The value of VTS in navigation safety and protection of the marine environment is recognised in the IMO Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services (VTS Guidelines).101 The VTS Guidelines note that a VTS is particularly appropriate in areas that include such characteristics as high traffic density, traffic carrying hazardous cargoes, conflicting and complex navigational patterns, navigational difficulties, narrow channels, difficult hydrological and meteorological elements, or environmental sensitivity.102 These Guidelines are associated with SOLAS Regulation V/12 and, together with the Annexes to Resolution A.857(2) set out the objectives of VTS, outline the responsibilities and liability of the governments involved and give guidance for planning and implementing a VTS. SOLAS Regulation 12 (Vessel Traffic Services) states inter alia that: “VTS contribute to safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of navigation and protection of the marine environment, adjacent shore areas, work

T. Hughes, “Vessel Traffic Services (VTS): Are We Ready for the New Millennium?”, 51 Journal of Navigation (1998), pp. 404-420. A basic summary of VTS is also provided on the IMO website <www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=387>. 99

See MEPC 49/8/2, Draft guidance document on associated protective measures for particularly sensitive sea areas, submitted by WWF, 8 May 2003, para. 2.3.

100

VHF-FM communications network forms the basis of most major services. Transiting vessels make position reports to a vessel traffic centre by radiotelephone and are in turn provided with accurate, complete, and timely navigational safety information. The addition of a network of radars and close circuit television cameras for surveillance and computer-assisted tracking, similar to that used in air traffic control, allows the VTS to play a more significant role in marine traffic management, thereby decreasing vessel congestion, critical encounter situations, and the probability of a marine casualty resulting in environmental damage.

101

IMO Resolution A.857(20), Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, adopted 27 November 1997.

102

Ibid. para. 3.2.2. 807


sites and offshore installations from possible adverse effects of maritime traffic. (i) Contracting Governments undertake to arrange for the establishment of VTS where, in their opinion, the volume of traffic or the degree of risk justifies such services. (ii) Contracting Governments planning and implementing VTS shall, wherever possible, follow the guidelines developed by the Organization. The use of VTS may only be made mandatory in sea areas within the territorial seas of a coastal State.103 (iii) Contracting Governments shall endeavour to secure the participation in, and compliance with, the provisions of vessel traffic services by ships entitled to fly their flag.” Despite the benefits of VTS in assisting in navigational safety and environmental protection, the IMO VTS Guidelines make it clear that decisions concerning the actual navigation and manoeuvring of a vessel remain solely with the master.104 The VTS Guidelines also highlight the importance of pilotage in a VTS and reporting procedures for ships passing through an area where a VTS operates.105 4. Ships’ Reporting Systems SRSs aim to give coastal States notice of the presence, in a designated zone of adjacent waters, of all or specified categories of vessels. An SRS may apply to transiting traffic as well as vessels entering a port. A typical system may require the reporting of the vessel name, radio call sign, position, course speed (and any additional information relevant to its purpose) to a coastal station when entering or departing the zone.106 SRS are also recognised as contributing to the protection of the marine environment,107 following amendments to Regulation V/8.1 of SOLAS (made

103

Resolution A.857(20) at para. 2.2.2 (see note 101) also notes that a contracting government, in planning and establishing a VTS, should ensure that a legal basis for the operation of a VTS is provided for and that the VTS is operated in accordance with national and international law.

104

Resolution A.857(20), para. 2.6.2 (see note 101).

105

The use of pilotage services in areas where traffic is heavy or navigation particularly hazardous can have clear benefits in terms of risk reduction. Accordingly, the IMO has approved a number of pilotage services worldwide, including many in environmentally sensitive areas. Hughes, see note 97, p. 404.

106

Plant, see note 8, p. 18.

107

SOLAS, Regulation V/11 states that: “Ships’ reporting systems contribute to the safety of life at sea and efficiency of navigation and/or protection of the marine environment.”

808


at the same time as those amendments to Regulation V/8 discussed above). The major contribution of such a measure in terms of protection of the environment is to serve as a mechanism for notifying coastal States of the presence of ships that may present a threat. In this way, coastal States may respond more effectively in the event that such a vessel becomes distressed. If a ship leaves its planned course, or if circumstances point to a risk of collision or grounding, the coastal State can then give a timely warning or take other action deemed appropriate. Despite these benefits, an SRS does not permit the routeing of vessels away from sensitive areas in the same manner as a ships’ routeing system. If the purpose of such a measure were to prevent certain classes of ships from entering or navigating within a specific area, then this would be in contravention of the fundamental principles of the LOSC, if those ships were otherwise in compliance with international rules and standards. However, the innovative application of such a measure may well contribute to the protection of the marine environment in specific circumstances by providing mariners with information about specific environmental conditions. For example, the establishment of an SRS may enable a coastal authority to warn a ship of environmental or other hazards, and of the need to take special care if passing through an area where there are critical environmental interests to be protected. At the same time, the authority can identify such things as the identity of a vessel, its intended movement and next port of call, speed, and the general categories of any hazardous cargoes on board (e.g., oil, noxious liquid substances, radioactive materials). If a violation of discharge regulations is detected, knowledge of the ship’s whereabouts and its next port of call may assist enforcement efforts. Therefore, in conjunction with ships’ routeing systems, an SRS may contribute to the overall protection of a given area. By virtue of amendments to SOLAS, reporting systems may now be voluntary or mandatory. The IMO SRS Guidelines,108 set forth guidelines for voluntary systems and criteria for mandatory systems. Mandatory systems must be adopted by the MSC and implemented in conformity with the IMO SRS Guidelines. There are now a number of areas throughout the world where mandatory reporting is required. Australia, for example, has two reporting systems: the Australian Ship Reporting System (AUSREP) and Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef (Inner Route) Ship Reporting System (REEFREP). The latter system covers the Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef, while the AUSREP system covers the western and southern approaches to the continent, as well as most of the Australian coastline.109 Similarly, the US has implemented two IMO-approved mandatory

108

IMO Resolution MSC.43(64), Guidelines and Criteria for Ship Reporting Systems, adopted 9 December 1994.

109

Hughes, see note 97, p. 409. For details of both systems, see the AUSREP and REEFREP Booklet available online at <www.amsa.gov.au/Shipping_Safety/AUSREP_and_REEFREP/ 809


SRSs in order to provide important protection for endangered large whale species, in particular the critically endangered northern right whale.110

IV. Conclusions While the potential to regulate navigation or to ban ships wholly or partly from environmentally sensitive areas of the marine environment would seem to be in conflict with the basic principles of the LOSC, current State practice addresses this concern. The application of ships’ routeing measures as a means to regulate shipping for the specific purpose of protecting sensitive areas of the marine environment is becoming more widespread and widely accepted by the international community. Despite criticisms levelled at traditional maritime States and the IMO in general, it is clear that the international community is prepared to adopt the most stringent measures to protect sensitive areas, provided it can be demonstrated that there is both a need for the protection and that traditional freedoms of navigation will not be unnecessarily adversely affected. Furthermore, while previously the application of ships routeing systems have been aimed at the impact relating to ship-source pollution, clearly there is an increasing acceptance that international shipping poses environmental threats other than pollution. In this regard the innovative application of routeing measures to protect natural resources is both a welcome and overdue development in the regulation of shipping.

AUSREP _and REEFREP_booklet.asp>. 110

NAV 44/14, Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation forty-fourth session: Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, 4 September 1998, Annex 8, para. 1.

810

SOME INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE USE OF VESSEL MONITORING SYSTEMS FOR PREVENTING ILLEGAL UNREPORTED UNREGULATED FISHING Tullio Treves

I. International Law Instruments Referring to VMS

T

hrough a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) a vessel equipped with a transmitter that is capable of fixing its position (and consequently the position of the ship carrying it) automatically transmits at pre-set intervals such position by a communication system (normally including satellites) to a monitoring station.1 Its importance for fishery management and control has been recognised in relevant international law instruments. The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted on 31 October 1995, provides in article 7.7.3 that “States, in conformity with their national laws, should implement effective fisheries monitoring, control, surveillance and law enforcement measure including, where appropriate, observer programmes, inspection and vessel monitoring systems” (emphasis added).2 The FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted in 2001,3 provides in paragraph 24.3 that States 1

See R. Gallaghter, “Current status of vessel monitoring systems, satellite and other technologies for fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance”, Appendix 1, to the Report of the Expert Consultation on the Use of vessel monitoring systems and satellites for fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance, FAO Fisheries Report No. 815, FIPL/R815 (2006); as well as FAO, Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No 1, Fishing Operations. 1. Vessel Monitoring Systems, Rome, 1998, still a very useful source, even though the Expert Consultation held in 2006 has suggested its revision (Report FIPL/R815 quoted above, para. 45).

2

The text of the code can be read in: FAO, International Fisheries: Instruments with Index, New York, 1998, p. 56.

3

Adopted at the 24th session of COFI on 2 March 2001, and endorsed by the 120th session of the FAO Council on 23 June 2001. The text can be read in a booklet bearing the title



should undertake comprehensive monitoring control and surveillance including by “implementing, where appropriate, a vessel monitoring system (VMS) in accordance with the relevant national, regional or international standards, including the requirement for vessels under their jurisdiction to carry VMS on board”; and specifies in paragraph 47.1, that conditions under which authorisation to fish in the high seas is issued may include “vessel monitoring systems”. The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (LOS Convention) relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the Straddling Stocks Agreement) adopted on 4 August 1995,4 provides in article 18 that measures to be taken by flag States of fishing vessels shall include “requirements for recording and timely reporting of vessel position” (paragraph 3(e)) and “the development and implementation of vessel monitoring systems, including as appropriate, satellite transmitter systems” (paragraph 3(g)(iii)). Article 6 of Annex I to the Agreement provides that: “States or, as appropriate, subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements should establish arrangements for verifying fishery data such as: (a) position verification through vessel monitoring systems …”. In 2006, the “Outcome” adopted by the Review Conference of the Straddling Stocks Agreement contains a recommendation that States individually and collectively through regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) “[e]nsure that all vessels fishing in the high seas carry VMS as soon as practicable”.5 In the 2005 Rome Declaration on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted by the FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries on 12 March 2006, the Ministers, after indicating their awareness that “effective fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) is essential to combat IUU fishing and that integrated MCS, including vessel monitoring systems (VMS) as well as a comprehensive global record of fishing vessels within FAO, are key tools in this endeavour”, declared that they would renew their efforts “to ensure that all large-scale fishing vessels operating on the high seas be required by their flag States to be fitted by VMS no later than December 2008, or earlier if so decided by their flag State or any relevant RFMO”.6 On the basis of this declaration, the FAO held in October 2006 an Expert Consultation on the use of VMS and satellites

of the Plan published by FAO in 2001. 4

Opened for signature on 4 December1995; FAO, see note 2, p. 1; ILM, Vol. 34, 1995, p. 1547.

5

UN Doc. A/CONF.210/2006/15 of 5 July 2006, Annex (Outcome of the Review Conference) para. 43. See also para. 104 of the main document reporting inter alia the proposal made for a deadline of 2008 for the carrying of VMS by vessels fishing in the high seas.

6

FAO Doc. CL 128/INF/11-Corr.1, 13th paragraph of the preamble to the Declaration (and see also the 14th) and the 7th point of paragraph 3 of the operative part.

812

Some International Law Aspects of the Use of Vessel Monitoring Systems

for fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance, which, while considering that the negotiation and adoption of a new binding instrument would not be advisable, recommended that the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) considers “additional mechanisms such as an IPOA, declaration, or strategies to guide and facilitate enhanced global implementation of VMS”.7 A number of States, as well as the European Union, provide in their legislation the obligation for certain categories of fishing vessels to be fitted with VMS. Among these States can be mentioned Argentina, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, South Africa, and the United States.8 In most cases, the rules cover fishing vessels flying the flag of the regulating States and foreign vessels fishing in the regulating State’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or fishing zone. Moreover, most RFMOs either have established or are in the process of establishing a VMS system with the obligation for their Member States to participate. Such obligation in some cases (such as the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)) applies also to certain non-members that establish a cooperative relationship with the relevant RFMO, the Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties.9

II. VMS and Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance The present paper is limited to the use of VMS for fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance. It will not touch the expanding field of VMS use for data gathering, nor will it consider its connection with satellite remote sensing. Unlike satellite remote sensing, VMS is a “cooperative” system as only cooperating vessels, i.e. vessels which have been fitted with the VMS equipment, are monitored. The main data VMS can provide are the identification of the vessel and its position at given time intervals and in almost real time. Through automated readings by the equipment or assessment by the monitoring entity of various positions in time, VMS can also give indications as to the speed and

7

See the Report quoted at note 1, para. 45. The author of the present paper participated as an invited expert to the Consultation. Many elements on which the present paper is based derive from the materials discussed at the meeting and from the illuminating insights provided by the other participants, which are gratefully acknowledged.

8

See the review by E.J. Molenaar and M. Tsamenyi, Satellite-based Vessel Monitoring Systems, International Legal Aspects & Developments in State Practice, FAO Legal Papers Online No. 7, April 2000, pp. 33-39, available at <www.fao.org/Legal/prs-ol/lpo7.pdf>.

9

Molenaar and Tsamenyi, ibid. pp. 39-42. More up-to-date information was made available by FAO. As regards co-operating non-contracting Parties, interesting observations are in High Sea Task Force, Closing the Net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Seas, 2006, p. 48, available at <www.high-seas.org/docs/HSTFfinal/HSTFFINAL_web.pdf>. 813


route of the vessel. These indications as to speed, position and route may permit conclusions to be drawn as to whether the vessel is engaged in fishing and also in what kind of fishing (for example, trawling and long-line fishing leave different “signatures”, or routing patterns). Other useful data, in particular about catch, can be transmitted through VMS but not automatically. They must be entered by the vessel operator. From the brief indications above, it is evident that VMS, as it permits inter alia to know in real time whether a fishing vessel is present in an area where fishing is permitted or prohibited, is a powerful tool in the management of fisheries by coastal States in their jurisdictional zones and by RFMOs in the areas for which they have regulating authority. It is also a powerful means for all States to comply with their responsibilities as flag States of fishing vessels independently of where they fish. The provisions of the above-mentioned Straddling Stocks agreement and declarations and other soft-law instruments appear, consequently, to be fully justified. It would, however, be a mistake to consider that a VMS solves all problems of fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance. It is just an important element in MCS systems, whose usefulness depends on how well it is integrated with other means contained in such systems, such as patrol vessels, planes and helicopters. While at sea, enforcement may be facilitated by VMS, it requires, nevertheless, sea or airborne capacity to perform it. The FAO 2006 Expert Consultation observed that: “VMS was a valuable tool in the MSC toolkit. It complemented and strengthened existing and traditional MCS mechanisms but could not, nor should, replace them. VMS was not a panacea for all MCS challenges nor had it eliminated IUU fishing but it had increased the efficiency of MCS operations and had made traditional means of surveillance more cost effective. The Consultation noted that some fisheries management authorities, including some of those responsible for MCS, were under the mistaken impression that VMS would eliminate the need for other MCS tools.”10 Technical problems can create obstacles to the efficient use of VMS. Differing data formats and communications standards are one. Another concerns tampering with the equipment in order to stop its function or to feed it false data for transmission. The FAO Expert Consultation agreed that “it would be extremely difficult” to eliminate tampering completely, even though the use of independent verification systems such as satellite and surface or air platforms could be used to verify false positions.11 10

Report of the Expert Consultation FIPL/R815, see note 1, para. 8.

11

Ibid. para. 16.

814


The use of VMS-obtained data also raises delicate legal questions that have arisen especially before domestic courts, even though, as will be discussed below, they might also arise before international courts. These include the degree of confidentiality of these data, in particular whether they may be used, and under which conditions, for purposes different from those for which they were obtained. They also include the value of VMS data as evidence in legal proceedings.

III. International Law Aspects: Law-Making and Enforcement From the viewpoint of international law, various questions arise. First, as far as law-making is concerned: which States can prescribe the use of VMS and as regards which ships and which areas of the seas? Second, as regards enforcement: which States are entitled to perform enforcement activities connected with compliance with VMS prescriptions (such as boarding, inspection, arrest, institution of legal proceedings) and on which States and in which maritime areas? The first observation to be made is that flag States enjoy the full right to prescribe the use of VMS to ships flying their flags, wherever they navigate and independently of whether they are fishing vessels. Such right may become an obligation under applicable treaties or other international law instruments: RFMOs, and decisions authorised under them, and Community regulations are clear examples. It would seem difficult, however, to hold the view that there is a general flag States’ obligation to prescribe the fitting of their ships with VMS under the general international law rules on the responsibilities of flag States and under article 18, paragraph 3(g)(iii) of the Straddling Stocks Agreement. The mention of “satellite transmitter system” in this provision is qualified by “as appropriate” and the above-mentioned Outcome to the 2006 Review Conference indicates that the fitting with VMS is an objective to be reached “as soon as possible”. These rules may, however, be seen as indicating an obligation of due diligence to consider VMS as a means for complying with them when circumstances so require. Coastal States enjoy the right to prescribe the use of VMS to all vessels fishing in their territorial seas and exclusive economic or fishery zones. This right corresponds to the obligation of nationals of other States fishing in the EEZ to comply with the terms and conditions established in the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State according to article 62, paragraph 4, of the LOS Convention. Such laws and regulations may relate inter alia to “vessel position reports” and to “enforcement procedures”.12 These subjects correspond to the purposes of VMS to provide vessel position reports, and to serve for enforcement activities.

12

LOS Convention, art. 62, para. 4, (e) and (k). 815


The fitting of a fishing vessel with a VMS may consequently be prescribed by the coastal State as a condition for granting a licence to fish in its EEZ. In the Volga judgment of 23 December 2002, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, while deciding that the prescription to be fitted with a VMS could not be considered as a “bond or other security” under article 73, paragraph 3, of the LOS Convention, expressly stated that it was not appropriate in the proceedings “to consider whether a coastal State is entitled to impose such conditions in the exercise of its sovereign rights under the Convention”.13 The Tribunal was clearly unwilling to make a statement not necessary for the decision on the prompt release case before it. It was nonetheless keen to avoid any implication that in deciding that the VMS requirement could not be counted as a bond or other security, it was inclined to consider that the prescription of this condition is not included in the powers of the coastal State concerning fisheries in its EEZ. On the contrary, it clearly indicated that the matter is to be discussed in the framework of the exercise of the coastal State’s sovereign rights. As the right to prescribe the use of VMS is an aspect of the right of the coastal State to adopt laws and regulations concerning fishing, it is important that such prescription concern vessels that can be encompassed in such right. These obviously include fishing vessels. Questions may arise as regards vessels that, while not directly engaged in fishing, exercise activities that are in various ways connected or ancillary to fishing. Vessels used for transshipment of fish, in particular the so-called “reefer” (refrigerated cargo) vessels, can be included in this category, and are so included in the fishery laws of a number of countries. The Juno Trader case judgment handed down by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on 18 December 2004,14 may be seen as confirming this view. The Tribunal had to decide on a request for the prompt release of a “reefer” vessels flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines detained by the authorities of Guinea Bissau for violation of Bissauian law provisions on “operations related to fishing” in light of article 73, paragraph 2, of the LOS Convention (prompt release of vessel detained in the exercise of the coastal State’s sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources of the EEZ). The fact that the Juno Trader was used for carrying frozen fish probably after transshipment from the vessel having fished them was not even envisaged as an argument for holding that article 73 was not applicable. Less clear seems the answer as regards vessels engaged in bunkering activities. In some legislations and treaties, these vessels or these activities are mentioned

13

The Volga case, Russian Federation v. Australia, judgment of 23 December 2002, ITLOS Reports 2002, 10, para. 76, at 34.

14

The Juno Trader case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea Bissau, judgment of 18 December 2004, ITLOS Reports, 2004, 17.

816


as ancillary to fishery vessels or activities. While this would militate in favour of holding that the coastal State is entitled to prescribe the use of VMS by these ships, the Saiga judgments of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea seem to indicate that some caution is necessary before reaching this conclusion. In both judgments, the Tribunal, while stating that, in the cases before it, there was no need to decide on the question, mentioned the various opinions that could be held (and that were submitted by one or other party to the case) as to bunkering activities, namely: that they constitute the exercise of freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to freedom of navigation, that they are a commercial activity and that they are activities ancillary to the activity of the vessel receiving the bunker (and so, if the vessel is a fishing vessel, an activity that can be assimilated to fishing).15 As regards enforcement, it can be said that flag States are entitled to enforce the prescriptions they may have adopted for the fitting of their ships with a VMS. They may, for instance, impose fines for the lack of such fitting, or for the malfunctioning of, or the tampering with, the equipment and, when such violations occur, they may withdraw fishing licences from vessels that have the fitting of a VMS as a requirement. Coastal States can similarly enforce the prescriptions they are entitled to adopt for the fitting with a VMS of ships fishing in their EEZ. It must not be forgotten, however, that a VMS is not an end in itself, and that, consequently, the enforcement of provisions for the fitting of ships with it is not the only problem to be considered. A VMS is a means for the enforcement of the laws and regulations concerning fisheries that flag or coastal States have adopted for the exercise of fishing in the waters under their sovereignty or jurisdiction or on the high seas, as regards the former, and in the EEZ as regards the latter. The further problems that arise concern the use of VMS in the context of the enforcement of fishery laws and regulations. While in many cases, information obtained thorough VMS is only a preliminary for enforcement action at sea or by air, in some cases the question of the evidentiary value of VMS-obtained data may arise. This question has so far been considered by domestic courts, and on the basis of the not necessarily identical domestic laws of evidence such courts are bound to apply. It is not inconceivable, however, for such a question to arise before an international court or tribunal. Would, for instance, information gathered through a VMS be considered as providing to a coastal State “good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State” thus justifying hot pursuit in the high seas according to article 111, paragraph

15

The M/V Saiga case, prompt release, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, judgment of 4 December 1997, ITLOS Reports 1997, 16, paras 56-59, at 29 et seq.; The M/V Saiga (No. 2) case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, judgment of 1 July 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, 10, paras 137-138 at 56 et seq. 817


1, of the LOS Convention? And would the position of the ship obtained through a VMS be considered sufficient to believe that the ship that might be submitted to hot pursuit is in fact in a certain zone as required by the same provision? In at least one prompt release case before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the “reasonableness” of the security prescribed by the coastal State was discussed in light of assumptions concerning how much of the fish found in the detained ship had been captured in the high seas and how much in the EEZ. This discussion was conducted on the basis of inconsistencies between various sources of information.16 Data such as those VMS could provide, concerning the position and the navigation pattern during the days or weeks before detention would have been very helpful in order to make the findings more precise. In a case such as this, as in those in which the questions envisaged above as regards hot pursuit were to arise, the development of international law criteria as to the evidentiary value of VMS data would become important.

IV. VMS and Fishing Vessels Exercising Navigational Rights Perhaps the most difficult international law question in the field of VMS concerns navigation by fishing vessels. Can the coastal State prescribe that unlicensed fishing vessels exercising innocent passage in their territorial sea or freedom of navigation in their exclusive or fishery zones use VMS during their passage or navigation? Can passage through the territorial sea by a fishing vessel not equipped with VMS or not operating an existing VMS apparatus be considered as non-innocent passage? Can navigation by a fishing vessel trough the EEZ be made conditional upon the carrying and operating of a VMS? In order to answer these questions one should, in the view of the present author, keep in mind the distinction between the right to prescribe and the right to enforce, and the fact that VMS is a modality to facilitate enforcement. As regards passage through the territorial sea, the coastal State is entitled to adopt laws and regulations concerning innocent passage, regarding, in particular, “the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic”, “the conservation of the living resources of the sea” and “the prevention of the infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State” (LOS Convention, article 21, paragraph 1(a), (d) and (e)). It may be argued that the prescription of the use of VMS could be included in such laws and regulations as a means to facilitate control of compliance and that innocent passage through the territorial sea is an exception to the sovereignty enjoyed by the coastal State, so that an extensive interpretation of the prescriptive power of the latter would

16

The Monte Confurco case, Seychelles v. France, judgment of 18 December 2000, ITLOS Reports 2000, 86, para. 88, at 112.

818


be in order. Before accepting this conclusion, one must, however, consider that under article 21, paragraph 2, of the LOS Convention, the laws and regulations relating to innocent passage “shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards”. The literal meaning of “equipment” could include VMS apparatus and its operation, as it includes radar equipment and its operation. It could nevertheless be argued, to the contrary, that “equipment” in context includes only apparatus necessary to or connected with the normal functioning of a vessel, in other words navigation. Even assuming that VMS is included in the mention of “equipment” in article 21, paragraph 2, the coastal State would not be entitled to prescribe the fitting with VMS apparatus in its laws and regulations concerning innocent passage, unless in doing so it would be “giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards”. The meaning of “generally accepted international rules and standards”, as mentioned in the LOS Convention, is controversial. In the view of the present author, while not being tantamount to a customary international law rule, it requires that the rule or standard in question be accepted by a broad and representative majority of States.17 In the case of VMS, one cannot say that this requirement is satisfied as regards binding rules, as the Straddling Stocks Agreement, the most important international agreement mentioning VMS, although it might be seen as representative, is far from binding on a broad majority of States. Moreover, as remarked above, it is not entirely prescriptive as regards VMS. A better case could perhaps be made as regards non-binding, soft law instruments, but it seems questionable that this (if it amounted to a generally accepted “standard”) would be appropriate as regards a possible extension of law-making powers of coastal States. If the conclusion were reached that VMS is not even the kind of equipment that, under the condition that its prescription gives effect to generally accepted rules and standards, may be included in coastal States’ laws and regulations relating to innocent passage, it would seem that there is no basis for prescription in such laws and regulations. In conclusion, it would seem that there is no basis for the coastal States prescribing that vessels not authorised to fish and exercising innocent passage be fitted with VMS equipment. The lack or non-use of such equipment could not be imputed to the vessel in passage as a violation making passage non-innocent. Similar conclusions can be reached as regards navigation by foreign fishing vessels in the EEZ. Ships, including fishing vessels, are entitled to exercise freedom of navigation in the EEZ as they are in the high seas (article 56 of the LOS Convention). States different from the flag State are not entitled to adopt

17

T. Treves, “Navigation”, in: R.J. Dupuy, D. Vignes (eds), A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, 1991, pp. 835-976, at 874 et seq. 819


prescriptions concerning such navigation by ships in the EEZ, exactly as on the high seas. The only exception set out in the LOS Convention is article 211, paragraph 5, concerning laws and regulations for the purpose of enforcement, as regards the prevention, reduction and control of pollution in special areas established under paragraph 6 of the same article. It is clear that this has nothing to do with VMS for fishing vessels. It must, however, be kept in mind that VMS is a tool of enforcement activities and that enforcement not only concerns violations of rules. It also concerns the suspicion that such violation has been perpetrated and the activities aiming at verifying whether such suspicions are well-founded. From this viewpoint, the use of VMS may be beneficial both to the enforcing State and to the fishing vessel. If a fishing vessel is navigating across the EEZ of a State, to have VMS making the coastal State aware of its identity, route and position may make it clear that the vessel is not engaging in fishing activities rendering unnecessary the stopping of the vessel for inspection of possible violations of the coastal State’s fisheries laws, which the coastal State is entitled to perform under article 73 of the LOS Convention. This would result in a more expeditious voyage for the vessel and in lesser expenditure for patrol boats, planes or helicopters for the coastal State. The lack of VMS or of its operation would arouse suspicion and encourage inspections and so would the malfunction of the VMS, which would be an indication of tampering. In light of this, the coastal State, while not entitled to prescribe the use of VMS to fishing vessels navigating through its EEZ, may make it known that it will consider as suspicious any vessels not having a functional VMS and focus its inspection activities on those. The legal situation is similar to that of domestic laws such as that of France as regards its Antarctic territories that provide that a foreign fishing vessel entering the EEZ must notify the quantity of fish it carries, with the possible consequence that in case of lack of notification, all the fish carried will be presumed to have been (illegally) fished in the French EEZ.18 It may be argued that this prescription goes beyond what is permitted by international law in regulating navigation in the EEZ. It is nonetheless certainly within the law, and useful for navigating fishing vessels, that entering vessels know the consequences that a lack of notification may entail in terms of enforcement and even in terms of evidence before the courts (independently of the question of whether the presumption can be seen as always having to be taken into account in order to determine what is a “reasonable” bond or guarantee for the release of the vessel). 18

Article 2 of French Law 66-400 of 18 June 1966, as amended by Law of 18 November 1997, was considered in the Monte Confurco judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, see note 16, paras 37, 44, 87. On the legal problems of navigation of fishing vessels, and for further references, see T. Treves, “Codification du droit international et pratique des États dans le droit de la mer”, RdC, Vol. 223, 1990 IV, pp. 9-303, at 197202.

820

ALLOCATING FISH ACROSS JURISDICTIONS Jon M. Van Dyke

I. Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries

O

ur generation has awakened to a worldwide crisis in fisheries that demands immediate and urgent attention. The decimation of fish populations around the globe has been well documented,1 but a few examples help emphasise the urgency of the present situation: – Scientists now understand that without “highly precautionary management”, most deep-sea fisheries are unmanageable, because the characteristics of deep-sea species – “long life spans, late maturity, slow growth, and low fertility” – make them particularly vulnerable to overfishing.2 – Recent research has revealed that deep-sea species in the North Atlantic are on the brink of extinction because of large-scale bottom trawling. “A recent study on the Scotian Shelf cod stocks in the North Atlantic reveals that they are now four per cent of their estimated biomass in 1853,

1

D.E. Pitt, “Despite Gaps, Data Leave Little Doubt that Fish Are in Peril”, N.Y. Times, 3 Aug. 1993, at C4, col. 1 (national edition). See generally J.M. Van Dyke, Durwood Zaelke, and Grant Hewison (eds), Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century: Ocean Governance and Environmental Harmony (1993) 13-22. Among the stocks that are now seriously depleted are Atlantic halibut, New Zealand orange roughy, bluefin tuna, rockfish, herring, shrimp, sturgeon, oysters, shark, Atlantic and some Pacific Northwest salmon, American shad, Newfoundland cod, and haddock and yellowtail flounder off of New England. Associated Press, “Steps Must Be Taken to Counter Overfishing, U.S. Panel Warns”, Honolulu StarBulletin, 23 Oct. 1998, at A-19, col. 2 (quoting from a study led by Stanford biologist Harold Mooney and funded by the National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences).

2

K.M. Gjerde and D. Freestone, “Editor’s Introduction: Unfinished Business Deep-Sea Fisheries and the Conservation of Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction”, 19 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 209, 210-211 (2004); see generally L.A. Kimball, “Deep-Sea Fisheries of the High Seas: The Management Impasse”, 19 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 259 (2004).



with most of the drop occurring since World War II”.3 Other cod stocks in the North Atlantic are now at less than ten per cent of their original biomass.4 After the collapse of the cod stocks in the 1980s and 1990s, bottom trawling became common, causing some stocks to plummet by 98 per cent in one generation, putting them into the “critically endangered” category.5 Scientists have been trying to bring this problem to the world’s agenda – and in February 2004, more than 1,000 marine scientists issued a statement expressing their “profound concern ... regarding the unsustainable nature of many deep-sea bottom trawl fisheries on the high seas, and the physical destruction wrought by bottom trawling, including damage to rare and endemic species and critical habitats”.6 – Fisheries in the exclusive economic zones of the United States remain dangerously depleted, and members of the US Ocean Commission and its private counterpart, the Pew Commission, issued a recent report saying that if immediate action is not taken, the crisis will become irreversible in five to seven years.7 The international community has developed global and regional treaties, but practical decisions must be made regarding how best to determine how many fish of each species can be harvested each year, how to determine how much of this amount each country should be allowed to harvest, and how to enforce the decisions that are made.

II. The 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention The acceptance by the negotiators at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea8 of the simple direct and elegant language of article 192 marked a turning point in the human stewardship of the ocean: “States have the obligation

3

K.M. Gjerde, “Editor’s Introduction: Moving from Words to Action”, 20 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 323 (2005).

4

Id.

5

“Earthweek: Deep-Sea Damage”, Honolulu Advertiser, 8 Jan. 2006 (citing an article by J. Devine of Newfoundland’s Memorial University in Nature).

6

Gjerde and Freestone, supra note 2, at 211 (citing Protecting the World’s Deep-Sea Coral and Sponge Ecosystems, at <www.mcbi.org/DVC_statement/sign.htm>).

7

“U.S. Gets D+ Grade for Ocean Policies”, Honolulu Advertiser, 5 Feb. 2006.

8

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122; reprinted in 21 ILM 1261 (1982); as of April 2007, 155 countries had ratified the Law of the Sea Convention.

822

Allocating Fish Across Jurisdictions

to protect and preserve the marine environment”.9 Each word has importance and power. The operative word “obligation” makes it clear that countries have positive duties and responsibilities and must take action. The verbs “protect” and “preserve” reinforce each other, to emphasise that countries must respect the natural processes of the ocean and must act in a manner that understands these processes and ensures that they continue for future generations. The “marine environment” is a purposively comprehensive concept covering all aspects of the ocean world – the water itself, its resources, the air above and the seabed below – and it covers all jurisdictional zones – internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zone, continental shelves, archipelagic waters and high seas. Article 192 thus recognises the profound responsibility that all countries have to govern the oceans in a manner that respects the marine creatures that inhabit them. The marine environment must thus be preserved for the benefit of those who will come later to exploit its resources, to study its mysteries and to enjoy the many pleasures that the oceans offer us. The provisions of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention regarding fisheries are general in nature but nonetheless clearly articulate an overarching duty to cooperate in all situations involving shared fisheries. Article 56 recognises coastal State sovereignty over the living resources in the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), but articles 61, 62, 69, and 70 require the coastal State (a) to cooperate with international organisations to ensure that species are not endangered by over-exploitation, (b) to manage species in a manner that protects “associated or dependent species” from over-exploitation, (c) to exchange data with international organisations and other nations that fish in its EEZ, and (d) to allow other States (particularly developing, land-locked, and geographically disadvantaged States) to harvest the surplus stocks in its EEZ. Article 63 addresses stocks (or stocks of associated species) that “straddle” adjacent EEZs, or an EEZ and an adjacent high seas area, and requires the States concerned to agree (either directly or through an organisation) on the measures necessary to ensure the conservation of such stocks. Article 64 requires coastal States and distant-water fishing States that harvest highly migratory stocks such as tuna to cooperate (either directly or through an organisation) to ensure the conservation and optimum utilisation of such stocks. Article 65 contains strong language requiring nations to “work through the appropriate international organization” to conserve, manage and study whales and dolphins. Article 66 gives the States of origin primary responsibility for anadromous stocks (e.g., salmon and sturgeon), but requires the States of origin to cooperate with other

9

See generally J.M. Van Dyke, “International Governance and Stewardship of the High Seas and Its Resources”, in Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century, supra note 1, at 13-22; J.M. Van Dyke, “Sharing Ocean Resources in a Time of Scarcity and Selfishness”, in H. Scheiber (ed.), The Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage and Emerging Challanges (2000) 3-36. 823


States whose nationals have traditionally harvested such stocks and States whose waters these fish migrate through. On the high seas, articles 118 and 119 require States to cooperate with other States whose nationals exploit identical or associated species. Article 118 is mandatory in stating that nations “shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned” (emphasis added), and suggests creating regional fisheries organisations, as appropriate. Article 120 states that the provisions of article 65 on marine mammals also apply on the high seas. These provisions thus reinforce the duty to cooperate that has always existed in customary international law. Because they are not specific enough to resolve conflicts that have arisen as species have been over-exploited, the 1995 Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement was negotiated.

III. The 1995 Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement 10 On 4 December 1995, the nations of the world settled on the text of an important document with the cumbersome title of “Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”.11 It builds on existing provisions

10

Some of the material in this section is adapted and updated from J.M. Van Dyke, “The Straddling and Migratory Stocks Agreement and the Pacific”, 11 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 406 (1996).

11

Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, UN Doc. A/CONF.164/37, 8 Sept. 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (1995). See generally J.E. Colburn, “Turbot Wars: Straddling Stocks, Regime Theory, and a New U.N. Agreement”, 6 J. Transnat’l Law & Policy 323 (1997); D.M. Kedziora, Comment, “Gunboat Diplomacy in the Northwest Atlantic: The 1995 Canada-EU Fishing Dispute and the United Nations Agreement on Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks”, 17 Nw. J. of Int’l L. & Bus. 1132 (1996-1997); M. Hayashi, “The 1995 Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the Law of the Sea Convention”, 29 Ocean & Coastal Mgmt. 51 (1996); Id., “Enforcement by Non-Flag States on the High Seas Under the 1995 Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, 9 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1996-1997); D.A. Balton, “Strengthening the Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, 27 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 125 (1996); J.R. Mack, Comment, “International Fisheries Management: How the U.S. Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishing on the High Seas”, 26 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 313 (1995-1996); M. Christopherson, Note, “Toward a

824


in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention described above, but it also introduces a number of new strategies and obligations that have been requiring fishers to alter their operations in a number of significant ways. In addition to strengthening the role of regional organisations, as explained below, it also promotes peaceful dispute resolution by applying the dispute-resolution procedures of the Law of the Sea Convention to disputes involving straddling and migratory stocks. Ratifications of the 1995 Agreement have been steady, but many important countries have not become contracting parties. As of March 2007, 66 countries had ratified the Agreement, including most European countries, the United States, India, and Liberia, but key fishing countries like South Korea, China, and most of the Latin American and African countries, and many of the countries providing flags of convenience had not yet ratified the Agreement.12 Professor Rosemary Rayfuse has recently suggested that “even in the absence of ... wider ratification, it is arguable that certain principles embodied in the FSA [Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement] and the [FAO] Compliance Agreement may now be binding on all states as a matter of customary international law”.13 Her primary example of a provision that has become obligatory through State practice is “the obligation to co-operate in respect of high seas fisheries through the medium of RFMOs [regional fisheries management organisations] or other co-operative arrangements”.14 1. The Duty to Cooperate The guiding principle that governs the 1995 Agreement is the duty to cooperate. This core concept is given specific new meaning, and the coastal nations and distant-water fishing nations of each region are now required to share data and manage the straddling fisheries together. Article 7(2) requires that “[c]onservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety” (emphasis added). This duty gives the coastal State a leadership role in determining the allowable catch to be taken from a stock that is found both within and outside its EEZ, as evidenced by the requirement in article 7(2)(a) that contracting parties “take into account” the conservation measures established by the coastal State under article 61 of the

Rational Harvest: The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species”, 5 Minn. J. Global Trade 357 (1996). 12

Website of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (visited 23 June 2007).

13

R. Rayfuse, “To Our Children’s Children’s Children: From Promoting to Achieving Compliance in High Seas Fisheries”, 20 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 509 (2005), 525.

14

Id. 825


Law of the Sea Convention for its EEZ “and ensure that measures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of such measures”. This polite diplomatic language indicates clearly that catch rates outside a 200-nautical-mile EEZ cannot differ significantly from those within the EEZ. 2. The Duty to Work Through an Existing or New Fisheries Organisation The 1995 Agreement requires coastal and island nations to work together with distant-water fishing nations in an organisation or arrangement to manage shared fisheries. Article 8(3) addresses this issue, and it is quoted in full here because its somewhat ambiguous language requires close examination: “Where a subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement has the competence to establish conservation and management measures for particular straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks, States fishing for the stocks on the high seas and relevant coastal States shall give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming a member of such an organization or a participant in such an arrangement, or by agreeing to apply the conservation and management measures established by such an organization or arrangement. States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned may become members of such organizations or participants in such arrangement. The terms of participation of such organizations or arrangements shall not preclude such States from membership or participation; nor shall they be applied in a manner which discriminates against any State or group of States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned” (emphasis added). It is hard to read this language without concluding that the coastal and island nations must cooperate with the distant-water fishing nations fishing in adjacent high seas areas either by allowing them into an existing fishery management organisation or by creating a new one that all can join. All States “having a real interest” in the shared fishery stock must be allowed into the organisation. Only those States that join a regional organisation or agree to observe its management regulations can fish in a regional fishery (art. 8(4); and see art. 17(1)). Article 13 requires existing fisheries management organisations to “improve their effectiveness in establishing and implementing conservation and management measures”. Article 11 addresses the difficult question as to whether new distant-water fishing nations must be allowed into such an organisation once established. Do the nations that have established fishing activities in the region have to allow new entrants? The language of article 11 does not give a clear answer to this question, but it seems to indicate that some new entrants could be excluded if the current fishing nations have developed a dependency on the shared fish stock in 826


question. Furthermore, developing nations from the region would appear to have a greater right to enter the fishery than would developed nations from outside the region. “Article 25(1)(b), implies some degree of preference for developing countries that are new members, by requiring states to ‘facilitate access [to high seas fisheries] ... subject to articles 5 and 11”.15 The 1995 Agreement emphasises the need to cooperate, and it requires the coastal and island nations to cooperate with the distant-water fishing nations operating in the adjacent high-seas areas to the same extent that the distant-water fishing nations must cooperate with the coastal and island nations. 3. The Precautionary Approach The “precautionary principle” has gained almost universal acceptance during the past decade as the basic rule that should govern activities that affect the ocean environment.16 This principle requires users of the ocean to exercise caution by undertaking relevant research, developing nonpolluting technologies and avoiding activities that present uncertain risks to the marine ecosystem. It requires policy-makers to be alert to risks of environmental damage, and the “greater the possible harm, the more rigorous the requirements of alertness, precaution and effort”.17 It rejects the notion that the oceans have an infinite or even a measurable ability to assimilate wastes or support living resources, and it instead recognises that our knowledge about the ocean’s ecosystems may remain incomplete and that policy-makers must err on the side of protecting the environment. It certainly means, at a minimum, that a thorough evaluation of the environmental impacts must precede actions that may affect the marine environment. All agree that it requires a vigorous pursuit of a research agenda in order to overcome the uncertainties that exist. Some commentators have explained the precautionary principle by emphasising that it shifts the burden of proof: “[W]hen scientific information is in doubt, the party that wishes to develop a new project or change the existing system has the burden of demonstrating that the proposed changes will not produce unacceptable adverse impacts on existing resources and species”.18 Others have suggested that the principle has an even more dynamic element, namely that

15

M.W. Lodge and S.N. Nandan, “Some Suggestions Towards Better Implementation of the United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 1995”, 20 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 345 (2005), 374.

16

See generally J.M. Van Dyke, “The Evolution and International Acceptance of the Precautionary Principle”, in D.D. Caron and H.N. Scheiber (eds), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (2004) 357-379.

17

D. Freestone, “The Precautionary Principle”, in R. Churchill and D. Freestone (eds), International Law and Global Climate Change (1991) 21, 36.

18

Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century, supra note 1, at 477. 827


it requires all users of the ocean commons to develop alternative non-polluting or non-burdensome technologies. The precautionary principle is given centre stage as the primary basis for decision-making in the new Straddling and Migratory Stocks Agreement. Article 5(c) of the Agreement lists the “precautionary approach” among the principles that govern conservation and management of shared fish stocks, and article 6 elaborates on this requirement in some detail, focusing on data collection and monitoring. States are required to improve their data collection, and to share their information widely with others. When “information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate”, States must be “more cautious” (art. 6(2)) and they must take “uncertainties” into account when establishing management goals (art. 6(3)(c)). Species thought to be under stress shall be subjected to “enhanced monitoring in order to review their status and the efficacy of conservation and management measures” (art. 6(5)). If “new or exploratory fisheries” are opened, precautionary conservation measures must be established “as soon as possible” (art. 6(6)). Then, in Annex II, the Agreement identifies a specific procedure that must be used to control exploitation and monitor the effects of the management plan. For each harvested species, a “conservation” or “limit” reference point as well as a “management” or “target” reference must be determined. If stock populations go below the agreed-upon conservation/limit reference point, then “conservation and management action should be initiated to facilitate stock recovery” (Annex II(5)). Overfished stocks must be managed to ensure that they can recover to the level at which they can produce the maximum sustainable yield (Annex II(7)). The continued use of the maximum sustainable yield approach indicates that the Agreement has not broken free from the approaches that have led to the rapid decline in the world’s fisheries,19 but the hope is that the conservation/ limit reference points will lead to early warnings of trouble that will be taken more seriously. 4. The Duty to Assess and to Collect and Share Data Article 5(d) reaffirms the duty to “assess the impacts of fishing, other human activities and environmental factors” on stocks, and articles 14 and 18(3) (e) explain the data collection requirements necessary to facilitate such assessments. Article 14 requires contracting parties to require fishing vessels flying their flags to collect data “in sufficient detail to facilitate effective stock assessment” (art. 14(1)(b)). Annex I then explains the specific information that must be collected, which includes the amount of fish caught by species, the amount of fish discarded, the types of fishing methods used, and the locations 19

Fishing to attain the maximum sustainable yield inevitably means reducing the abundance of a stock, sometimes by one-half or two-thirds. This reduction can threaten the stock in unforeseeable ways and also will impact on other species in the ecosystem.

828


of the fishing vessels (Annex I, art. 3(1)). In order to permit stock assessment, each nation must also provide the regional fishery organisation with data on the size, weight, length, age and distribution of its catch, plus “other relevant research, including surveys of abundance, biomass surveys, hydro-acoustic surveys, research on environmental factors affecting stock abundance, and oceanographic and ecological studies” (Annex I, art. 3(2)). These requirements, if taken seriously, will revolutionise the fishing industry, where the competitive nature of the quest for fish has encouraged each nation to hide its activities from others to the extent possible. The data collected “must be shared with other flag States and relevant coastal States through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements” in a “timely manner”, although the “confidentiality of nonaggregated data” should be maintained (Annex I, art. 7). Decision-making at regional fishery organisations must now be “transparent” under article 12, and international and non-governmental organisations must be allowed to participate in meetings and to observe the basis for decisions. 5. The Methods of Enforcement Article 18 further requires contracting parties to establish “national inspection schemes”, “national observer programmes” and “vessel monitoring systems, including, as appropriate, satellite transmitter systems” to manage their flag fishing vessels with some rigour. Article 21(1) gives these requirements teeth by authorising the ships of a nation that is party to a regional fisheries agreement to board and inspect on the high seas any ship flying the flag of any other nation that is a party to the same agreement.20 If the boarded vessel is found to have committed a “serious violation”, it can be brought into the “nearest appropriate port” for further inspection (art. 21(8)). The term “serious violation” is defined in article 21(11) to include using prohibited fishing gear, having improper markings or identification, fishing without a licence or in violation of an established quota, and failing to maintain accurate records or tampering with evidence needed for an investigation. 6. Dispute Resolution Part VIII of the Agreement requires contracting parties to settle their disputes peacefully, and extends the dispute-resolution mechanisms of the Law of the Sea Convention to disputes arising under this new Agreement. These procedures are

20

Nations already have the power to board, inspect and arrest vessels violating laws established to “control and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone”. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 8, art. 73(1). 829


complicated and somewhat untested, but should provide flexible and sophisticated mechanisms to allow nations to resolve their differences in an orderly fashion. 7. Recognition of the Special Needs of Developing Nations The 1995 Agreement recognises in articles 24-26 that the burden of conservation may affect the coastal fisheries that many communities rely upon for subsistence. These articles state that developing States should not be required to shoulder a “disproportionate burden of the conservation action” (art. 24(2)(c)), and they call for increased technical and financial aid to developing countries to allow them to meet their duties of data collection and dissemination.

IV. The 2000 Honolulu Convention The Pacific Island and distant-water fishing nations with an interest in the Pacific met in Honolulu every six months for several years in the late 1990s to draft an important new treaty governing the migratory fish stocks of the Pacific Ocean. Formally called “The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean”21 and signed in Honolulu in September 2000, this treaty creates the regional organisation anticipated by article 64 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention22 and by the 1995 Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement.23 The 2000 Honolulu Convention is breathtakingly innovative in a number of significant respects. It is huge in its geographical scope, covering much of the vast Pacific Ocean and governing territorial seas and EEZs as well as high-seas areas. It creates a Commission with the authority to set catch limits and allocate catch quotas to fishing nations both within and outside the EEZs of coastal and island nations. The Commission can also regulate vessel types, fish size and gear, and can establish area and time limitations. Decision-making is by consensus for the central issues – such as allocation of fish to contracting parties – and by chambered voting on others, requiring a majority of support from the two chambers – one consisting of the ten distant-water-fishing nations and the other

21

The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Honolulu, 4 Sept. 2000, <www.spc.org.nc/ coastfish/Asides/Conventions/> (26 March 2001); see generally V. Botet, “Filling in One of the Last Pieces of the Ocean: Regulating Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean”, 41 Va. J. Int’l L. 787 (2001).

22

Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 8, art. 64; see generally J.M. Van Dyke and S. Heftel, “Tuna Management in the Pacific: An Analysis of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency”, 3 U. Haw. L. Rev. 1, (1981), 11-17.

23

1995 Straddling and Migratory Stocks Agreement, supra note 11.

830


consisting of the 16 island nations – thus carefully protecting both groups. Decisions of the Commission can be reviewed by an arbitral review panel to ensure consistency and protect against discrimination. This new treaty requires fishing of migratory species in the high seas to be compatible with the regulations that apply within adjacent EEZs. It relies on the precautionary approach as its basic foundation throughout. It reinforces the importance of the duty to cooperate. It allows Taiwan to participate in decisionmaking (as “Chinese Taipei”), it allows non-selfgoverning territories to participate (pursuant to rules to be adopted), and non-governmental organisations can also participate in appropriate ways. Compliance will be through flag-State and port-State enforcement, boarding and inspection rights, obligatory transponders on all high-seas fisheries, and regional observers on the vessels. The final negotiating session was held in Honolulu from 30 August to 5 September, 2000, and a treaty was signed by most of the negotiating parties, although China, France and Tonga abstained24 and Japan and South Korea refused to sign the agreement.25 The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) members worked hard during the three-year negotiating period to ensure that the Convention area was as large as possible, that decisions could be made without unanimous agreement, that developing countries would receive financial assistance to carry out their obligations under the treaty, that the treaty could come into force even if the distant-water fishing nations did not ratify it, and that a vessel monitoring system would become mandatory for all vessels. Although not all the FFA positions were achieved to the extent desired,26 the final version of the treaty was signed in September 2000 by all the FFA members except Tonga. Since then, Korea, Japan, and China have ratified the Honolulu Convention, along with all other countries involved in the negotiations except the United States and Indonesia,27 and the contracting parties have been meeting regularly

24

China abstained because of its concern about Taiwan’s classification as a “fishing entity”, with some rights to participate separately in decision-making, and France abstained because it wanted the French islands in the Pacific to have separate status in the Commission that is to be established.

25

Japan and South Korea stated that they viewed the treaty as too restrictive of their historic fishing practices in the high seas. These countries did, however, later ratify the Convention.

26

Among the many compromises, for instance, was the decision-making provision that established “chambers” consisting of the FFA and the non-FFA members of the Commission, and provided that each chamber would need to support a decision by a three-fourths majority, with the proviso that no proposal could be defeated by fewer than three votes in either chamber.

27

Status of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, WCPFC/Comm.2/07 Rev. 1, available at <www.spc.int/OceanFish/Html/WCPFC> (visited 20 Feb. 2006). 831


to establish the institutions created by the Convention and to start making the difficult decisions required to implement it. The United States is expected to ratify the Convention. President Bush recommended ratification in May 2005,28 and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on it on 29 September 2005.29 Pending ratification, the United States has attended meetings in recent months as a “cooperating non-member”.

V. Allocation Options Everyone who has ventured an opinion about the challenge of allocating fish agrees that such allocations should be both “equitable” and “efficient”, but giving meaning to those terms remains elusive. One typical well-meaning but vague pronouncement on this topic provides the following language: “Equity in the allocation of both rights and obligations. Regimes that balance the competing interests of all participants are likely to be perceived as the most legitimate, which should in turn promote higher levels of compliance with agreed fishing rules. Among the many balances to be found are: those that have historically participated vs. new entrants; coastal States vs. distant water fishing States; developed States vs. developing States.”30 1. Conservation is Paramount Michael W. Lodge and Satya N. Nandan make the important point that “allocation rights, both in the EEZ and on the high seas, are subordinate to the obligation to conserve”.31 At the present time, they note, “neither UNFSA, nor the decision rules of many existing RFMOs, provide mechanisms for allocation that balance conservation interests with the economic and social interests of States. In fact, within many RFMOs, negotiated criteria for catch allocations are often based on the notion of historical catch, which is a powerful incentive to indulge in a race to fish”.32 And, they add, the problem of overfishing may be exacerbated by “adding developing state fishing capacity to existing overcapacity, especially

28

Press Release, G.W. Bush, Message to the United States Senate Regarding WCPF Convention (16 May 2005), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050516-7. html> (visited 4 Sept. 2005).

29

151 Cong. Rec. S D990 (daily edn, 29 Sept. 2005).

30

See D.A. Balton and D.C. Zbicz, “Managing Deep-Sea Fisheries: Some Threshold Questions”, 19 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 247 (2004), 257.

31

Lodge and Nandan, supra note 15, at 374.

32

Id.

832


where this operates simply as a mechanism to support reflagging and transfer of effort by distant water fishing nations (DWFNs)”.33 Professor Ted L. McDorman notes that “the setting of the total allowable catch (TAC)” and “quota allocation decisions ... are inevitably the most controversial” for RFMOs.34 He suggests looking to the considerations listed in article 11 of the Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement governing the participation of new members of fishery organisations for guidance regarding allocation rights within the fishery – “the status of the stocks and existing fishing efforts; existing fishing patterns (historic fishing activity); economic need and coastal state dependence; and contribution to conservation”.35 He stresses that consensus is important to ensure support for the allocation decisions, and suggests, in order to promote consensus “in years, and for stocks where consensus cannot be reached, that the quotas for each member decline by a pre-set amount (e.g. 20 per cent) for each year non-consensus prevails”.36 “Equity” is a complicated and multifaceted concept, with different applications in different contexts. It certainly includes the concept of being “fair”, but just as certainly it does not inevitably mean that everyone should receive an equal amount. In the maritime boundary context, articles 74 and 83 of the Law of the Sea Convention require opposite and adjacent States to reach an “equitable solution”, the phrase being chosen in preference to a form of words stating that boundaries should be drawn along the “median” or “equidistance” line separating the land areas of the countries. The concept of an “equitable solution” in the boundary context has generated a series of specific rules, as discussed below,37 including, for instance, that the boundary that would exist if the equidistance line were utilised should be adjusted in light of the length of the coastlines of the competing countries, because the coastlines provide some rough indication of the relationship between the country and the adjacent waters.38

33

Id.

34

T.L. MacDorman, “Implementing Existing Tools: Turning Words Into Actions – DecisionMaking Processes of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs)”, 20 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 423 (2005), 425.

35

Id. at 438.

36

Id. at 440 (noting that the quota reductions “can be justified on the basis of precaution” and that this procedure would provide “an important incentive to agree on allocations”).

37

See infra text at note 45.

38

See, e.g., J.M. Van Dyke, “The Aegean Sea Dispute: Options and Avenues”, 20 Marine Policy 397 (1996), 398-401. 833


2. Common but Differentiated Rights and Responsibilities Both the Law of the Sea Convention and the Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement contain provisions recognising that countries have common but differentiated responsibilities and rights. These treaties recognise that the formal equality of States does not inevitably mean that all States are similarly situated, because some have better means to protect the global environment and to assist other States and some have stronger claims to shared resources than others. This idea was identified in Principle 23 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,39 which explained that “it will be essential in all cases to consider ... the extent of applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for developing countries”. Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration40 went on to say more directly that: “[i]n view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities”. This principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” has two prominent elements – asymmetry of obligations and financial support for developing countries. The Law of the Sea Convention recognises these different responsibilities in several articles, including, for instance, article 207 on land-based pollution, which refers to the economic capabilities of developing States when articulating the responsibility to deal with this problem.41 Other provisions in the Law of the Sea Convention providing special preferences for developing and otherwise disadvantaged countries include: – Article 62(2) and (3) – granting developing countries preferential rights to the surplus stocks in the EEZs of other coastal States in their region. – Articles 69 and 70 – giving developing landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States preferential rights to the surplus stocks in EEZs of coastal States in their region. – Article 82 – exempting developing States from making payments from continental shelf resources beyond 200 nautical miles and giving them preferential rights to payments made by other States.

39

Stockholm Declaration of the Human Environment, Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, UN Document A/CONF/48/14/Rev. 1 (1972).

40

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Document A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992).

41

Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 8, art. 207(4): “States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference, shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, taking into account characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of developing States and their need for economic development …” (emphasis added).

834


– Article 119 – apparently giving developing countries some preferential rights to the living resources of the high seas. – Article 194(1) – stating that States must prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment “using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities” (emphasis added). – Article 199 – requiring States to develop contingency plans for responding to pollution incidents “in accordance with their capabilities” (emphasis added). – Articles 202-203 – stating that developing States are entitled to training, equipment and financial assistance from developed States and international organisations with regard to the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution. – Article 206 – explaining that the duty to assess environmental impacts of planned activities extends “as far as practicable” (emphasis added). – Articles 266-269 – stating that developing countries are entitled to receive “marine science and marine technology on fair and reasonable terms and conditions”. The 1995 Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement42 also contains a number of provisions recognising the special rights of developing countries: – The Preamble recognises “the need for specific assistance, including financial, scientific and technological assistance, in order that developing States can participate effectively in the conservation, management and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks …”. – Article 3(3) says that “States shall give due consideration to the respective capacities of developing States to apply articles 5, 6 and 7 within areas under national jurisdiction and their need for assistance as provided for in this Agreement” (emphasis added). – Article 11(f) gives developing States preference in entering into a fishery and into a fishery organisation as a new member. – Article 24 addresses the financial needs of developing countries: “1. States shall give full recognition to the special requirements of developing States in relation to conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and develop-

42

Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 11. 835


ment of fisheries for such stocks. To this end, States shall, either directly or through the United Nations Development Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other specialized agencies, the Global Environment Facility, the Commission on Sustainable Development and other appropriate international and regional organizations and bodies, provide assistance to developing States …” (emphasis added). – Article 25 provides more specific language regarding these obligations: “1. States shall cooperate, either directly or through subregional, regional or global organizations: (a) to enhance the ability of developing States, in particular the leastdeveloped among them and small island developing States, to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and to develop their own fisheries for such stocks; (b) to assist developing States, in particular the least-developed among them and small island developing States, to enable them to participate in high seas fisheries for such stocks, including facilitating access to such fisheries subject to articles 5 and 11; and (c) to facilitate the participation of developing States in subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements …” (emphasis added). – Funding is addressed in article 26: “1. States shall cooperate to establish special funds to assist developing States in the implementation of this Agreement, including assisting developing States to meet the costs involved in any proceedings for the settlement of disputes to which they may be parties. 2. States and international organizations should assist developing States in establishing new subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements, or in strengthening existing organizations or arrangements, for the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks” (emphasis added). From these many provisions it should be clear that one element of any “equitable” approach to allocation is that developing countries must receive a share linked to their greater needs and must also receive financial assistance so that they can take proper advantage of the fish in their region.

836


3. Should Allocation be Based on Population? Or on a State’s “Dependence” on Fish for Food Security? If the focus remains on “equity”, then obviously some attention to the numbers of mouths that need to be fed is relevant to any allocation decision. Some may argue that a fish-per-capita allocation system, perhaps with some modifications for unique “equitable” considerations, makes sense and offers elegant simplicity. Others would point out that some communities “depend” on fish or enjoy eating fish more than others, and would argue that historical fishing practices should be recognised as the baseline from which allocations should be made. Still others43 might suggest that utilising historical fishing practices will inevitably reward the more developed countries, which have been able to finance large fishing operations, and will once again disadvantage developing countries. Basing allocations on historical fishing activities will tend to reward those countries that have overcapitalised and subsidised their fishing fleets, thus giving benefits for activities that have distorted the market and which would be punished in other economic sectors. 4. The Importance of “Contiguity” or Geographical Proximity A system focused on population would allow populous nations to come into all regions with priorities to harvest the fish, and would ignore the link between the residents of the area and the nearby fish. Any equitable system of allocation will have to recognise the importance of geographical proximity, or contiguity, to the allocation choices that must be made. Especially since regional fishery management organisations frequently have responsibilities over fish within EEZs as well as fish on the high seas, the allocation decisions made by the organisations must recognise the “sovereign rights” that States have to the fish in their EEZs, which gives them a substantial priority in any allocation scheme. In the Pacific, the Pacific Island communities must have a priority to the fish in their region because of their geographical proximity and because they are developing nations that are entitled to assistance and priorities under both the Law of the Sea Convention and the Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement. 5. What Other “Equitable” Criteria are Relevant? Other ideas for equitable criteria to apply to allocation decisions can be gleaned from the criteria developed in maritime boundary delimitation adjudications, from criteria relevant to disputes over sovereignty of remote areas and from the Rio Principles. In maritime boundary disputes, members of decision-making tribunals usually start with an equidistance or median line, but then adjust it to

43

See supra text at note 15 for the quote on this topic from Lodge and Nandan. 837


correspond to “special circumstances” and equitable considerations.44 The factor that has been used most consistently to adjust this line has been the proportionality of the length of the coastlines of the disputing States.45 This criterion has been preferred over candidates such as coastal population and economic activity in the coastal waters, because it is a stable factor that is unlikely to change over time. Another element of these boundary decisions that has been relatively consistent during the past four decades has been that the decisions tend to reject an “all-ornothing” approach and to allocate to each State at least some maritime space, and thus to find a solution that each country can live with. Decision-makers tend to recognise that even geographically disadvantaged countries have rights to maritime resources, and, as sovereign States, have the right “to participate in international arrangements as an equal”.46 Maritime delimitations thus tend to recognise the vital security interests of each nation, and to craft a solution that protects these interests.47 Food security is certainly a crucial element of any State’s national security interests, and access to food sources is important to every community. The case where this interest was recognised most directly is the Jan Mayen case, where Norway (which had sovereignty over Jan Mayen Island) was allocated a maritime zone sufficient to give it equitable access to the important capelin fishery that lies between Jan Mayen and Greenland.48 If we look at the criteria that have been applied to resolve sovereignty disputes over remote land territory, we find tribunals focusing on links between the claimants and the territory expressed through “discovery” and “effective occupation”, focusing in particular on recent displays of sovereignty. “Contiguity” is sometimes discounted, but has played a role in other situations. The judicial and arbitral decisions regarding sovereignty disputes over islands since World War II have focused more on which country has exercised actual

44

See generally Van Dyke, “Aegean Sea Dispute”, supra note 38, at 398-401.

45

This approach has been used particularly in the Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United States), ICJ Reports 1984, 246, Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), ICJ Reports 1985, 13, paras 66 and 75, Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), ICJ Reports 1993, 38, [hereafter cited as Jan Mayen case], and the Delimitation of the Maritime Areas Between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon), 31 ILM 1149 (1992). See generally J.I. Charney, “Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law”, 88 AJIL 227 (1994), 241-243.

46

Charney, supra note 45, at 249.

47

This principle was also recognised in the Jan Mayen case, supra note 45, where the Court refused to allow the maritime boundary to be too close to Jan Mayen Island, and it can be found in the background to all recent decisions. The refusal of tribunals to adopt an “all-or-nothing” solution in any of these cases illustrates their sensitivity to the need to protect the vital security interests of each nation.

48

Jan Mayen case, supra note 45.

838


governmental control over the feature during the previous century than on earlier historical records.49 The first major decision by the International Court of Justice regarding ownership of an isolated uninhabited island feature was the decision in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case,50 where the Court explained that: “What is of decisive importance, in the opinion of the Court, is not indirect presumptions deduced from events in the Middle Ages, but the evidence which relates directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups” (emphasis added).51 This view was followed in the Gulf of Fonseca case,52 where the Court focused on evidence of actual recent occupation and acquiescence by other countries to determine title to disputed islets, and in the decision in the Eritrea-Yemen arbitration,53 where the tribunal relied explicitly on the Minquiers and Ecrehos judgment for the proposition that it is the relatively recent history of use and possession of the islets that is most instructive in determining sovereignty and that the historical title claims offered by each side were not ultimately helpful in resolving the dispute: “[t]he modern international law of acquisition (or attribution) of territory generally requires that there be: an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of jurisdiction and state functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis”.54 This very same approach was utilised by the Court in its recent decision resolving a dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over two tiny islets – Ligitan and Sipadan.55 The larger of the islets (Sipadan) is 0.13 square kilometers in size.56 Neither has been inhabited historically, but both have lighthouses on them and Sipadan has recently been “developed into a tourist resort for scuba-diving”.57 The Court first addressed arguments based on earlier treaties, maps and succession, but found that they did not establish any clear sovereignty.58 It then looked at the “effectivités” – or actual examples of exercises of sovereignty over the islets, and explained that it would look at exercises of sovereignty even if they did “not

49

See generally M.J. Valencia, J.M. Van Dyke and N.A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea (1997) 17-19.

50

Minquiers and Ecrehos case (France/United Kingdom), ICJ Reports 1953, 47.

51

Id. at 57.

52

Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Reports 1992, 351 [hereafter cited as Gulf of Fonseca case].

53

Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, <www.pca-cpa.org> (1998-1999).

54

Id. 1998 Award, para. 239.

55

Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, ICJ Reports 2002, 625 (17 Dec. 2002).

56

Id. para. 14.

57

Id.

58

Id. paras 58, 72, 80, 92, 94, 96, 114, and 124. 839


co-exist with any legal title”.59 Indonesia claimed title, based on various naval exercises in the area conducted by itself and previously by its colonial power (the Netherlands), but Malaysia prevailed, based on the governmental actions of its colonial power (the United Kingdom) exercising control over turtle egg collection and constructing lighthouses on both islets.60 Contiguity, or geographical proximity, has not always played a decisive role in adjudications, but it sometimes has been a significant factor. Arbitrator Max Huber rejected contiguity as a basis for a claim of title in the Palmas arbitration,61 and a number of countries include land areas quite distant from other parts of the country. Nonetheless, a land area closely linked to another land area, and utilised by residents of the adjacent area, may “belong” to that adjacent area as a matter of logic, common sense and historical practice. Some islets are viewed as “dependent” on other islands, and some groups of islands have historically been viewed as units; in these cases it would not be logical to divide such islands between two different sovereigns. Even Arbitrator Huber acknowledged that “[a]s regards groups of islands, it is possible that a group may under certain circumstances be regarded as in law a unit, and that the fate of the principal part may involve the rest”.62 The International Court of Justice viewed, for instance, the Minquiers group as a “dependency” of the Channel Islands (the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey) and thus ruled that they should be subject to the same sovereign authority.63 In the Gulf of Fonseca case, the ICJ Chamber concluded

59

Id. para. 126 citing Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), ICJ Reports 1986, 587 para. 63; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), ICJ Reports 1994, 38 paras 75-76; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea intervening), ICJ Reports 2002, 353, para. 68.

60

Id. para. 132.

61

The Arbitral Award Rendered in Conformity with the Special Agreement Concluded on January 23, 1925 Between the United States of America and the Netherlands Relating to the Arbitration of Differences Respecting Sovereignty over the Island of Palmas (or Miangas), 2 RIAA 829 (4 April 1928), reprinted in 22 AJIL 867 (1928), 893-894 [hereafter cited as Palmas Arbitration]. Palmas is an isolated island, but when one looks at a map it seems to be closer to the Philippines than Indonesia because it is 48 miles from the large Philippine island of Mindanao and the Indonesian islands it is near (it is 51 miles from Nanusa) are small and seem isolated themselves. Arbitrator Huber wrote that: “Although states have in certain circumstances maintained that islands relatively close to their shores belonged to them in virtue of their geographical situation, it is impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive international law to the effect that islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a state from the mere fact that its territory forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of considerable size).” Id. at 893. Any such rule, he explained, would be “wholly lacking in precision and would in its application lead to arbitrary results”. Id.

62

Id. 22 AJIL 894; 2 RIAA 855.

63

Minquiers and Ecrehos case (France/United Kingdom), ICJ Reports 1953, 47, 71.

840


that Meanguerita was an “appendage” to or “dependency” of Meanguera, and thus should be awarded to El Salvador along with its larger neighbour.64 The recent development of the regimes of the continental shelf and the EEZ, as well as the extension of the territorial sea from three to 12 nautical miles in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, are all to some extent based on a recognition of the importance of “contiguity”.65 Another clear example of a tribunal’s reliance upon concepts of contiguity can be found in the 1998-1999 Eritrea-Yemen arbitration.66 The tribunal awarded to Yemen the lone island of Jabal al-Tayr and the al-Zubayr group, because Yemen’s activities on these barren islands were greater, and because they are located on the Yemen side of the median line between their uncontested land territories.67 The tribunal recognised the relevance of geographical proximity or contiguity, utilising the “presumption that any islands off one of the coasts may be thought to belong by appurtenance to that coast unless the State on the opposite coast has been able to demonstrate a clearly better title”.68 The Mohabbakahs and the Haycock Islands were thus awarded to Eritrea because they were mostly within 12 nautical miles of the Eritrean coast. The Rio Principles69 are another important source for ideas regarding relevant equitable principles governing the allocation challenge. Perhaps the most relevant is Principle 4, which says that: “[i]n order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”. This confirms the point made recently by Lodge and Nandan70 that conservation values must remain paramount in any allocation regime. The oceans and their resources are the common heritage of humankind, and public trust values must be applied to any system dividing these resources.71

64

Gulf of Fonseca case, supra note 52, ICJ Reports 1992, 351, 579, para. 368.

65

See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht, “Sovereignty over Submarine Areas”, 27 BYIL 376 (1950), 428.

66

Eritrea-Yemen arbitration, <www.pca-cpa.org> (1998-1999).

67

Id. 1998 Award, paras 509-524.

68

Id. para. 458.

69

Rio Declaration, supra note 40; see generally J.M. Van Dyke, “The Rio Principles and Our Responsibilities of Ocean Stewardship”, 31 Ocean & Coastal Mgmt. 1 (1996).

70

See supra text at notes 31-33.

71

See J.M. Van Dyke, “International Governance and Stewardship of the High Seas and Its Resources”, in Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century, supra note 1, at 19. 841


VI. How Should States be Rewarded for Good Behaviour? Careful management of fish stocks is expensive and challenging, and countries that make financial sacrifices to monitor and maintain threatened fish stocks should receive some reward for their actions. This principle forms the basis of article 66 of the Law of the Sea Convention, which says that “[s]tates in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary interest in and responsibility for such stocks”. Because the spawning habitat of salmon and other anadromous species must be maintained carefully to enable them to reproduce successfully, it has been recognised that countries that maintain their river systems to permit successful spawning should be able to reap the bounty of the salmon harvest. This principle means that even when the salmon are in the high seas, they cannot be caught without explicit permission of the country of origin. If we extrapolate from this principle, we should find ways of rewarding countries that invest in the monitoring and maintenance of fish stocks by giving them allocation bonuses.

VII. Should States Be Punished for Misbehaving? 1. Selfish and Destructive Fishing Practices Another aspect of “equity” is that countries must be held accountable for taking more than their share and engaging in destructive fishing practices. The highly destructive high seas bottom trawling, for instance, is an unsustainable practice that does “major damage” to biodiversity and destroys “resources that should be available to all states”.72 Other examples of selfish and unacceptable activities include providing a flag to vessels that engage in improper fishing activities and distorting the market by subsidising fishing vessels. 2. Controlling IUU Fishing Obviously, any solution to the overfishing of high seas fisheries must involve true cooperation and transparency, which must include bringing the practice of illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing under control. This effort will require revisions to the flag-of-convenience system that allows many fishing vessels to operated with limited regulation. It will also require use of modern satellite-based vessel-monitoring-system (VMS) technology, on-board independent observers and detailed boarding and inspection programmes to increase monitoring and thus permit active enforcement of regulations.73

72

Kimball, supra note 2, at 273.

73

See Balton and Zbicz, supra note 30, at 249-250.

842


3. Flags of Convenience The problem of IUU fishing is directly related to the extensive use of flags of convenience: “there has to be a collective effort to deal with the related and urgent problems of IUU fishing and free riders. The problem is that, despite the advances made by the 1995 Agreement and the various measures adopted through the FAO, not all flag states are able or willing to exercise effectively their responsibilities for fishing vessels flying their flags on the high seas. Urgent action is needed to address this problem. It is a matter of great concern that seven out of the 11 cases before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea related to the activities of fishing vessels flying so-called flags of convenience, or flags or non-compliance.”74 Numerous strategies have been proposed to deal with the flag-of-convenience conundrum, such as “co-ordinating global and regional high seas vessel registers, vessel monitoring systems, port state measures, the use of trade measures and so on”, but the essential answer is that States must “take full responsibility for the activities of their nationals, regardless of the flag of the fishing vessel concerned”.75

VIII. Evolving into a Rights-Based System The allocation decisions that will be made by regional fishery management organisations in the next few years are extremely important, because it is almost inevitable that the allocation schemes will evolve into something akin to a “rights-based” system, and that countries will view their allocation quotas as a vested property right that they are entitled to maintain in future years. Professor McDorman seemed to recognise this phenomenon when he proposed that countries’ quotas from the last year be automatically cut 20 per cent for the current year if they cannot reach a consensus on the allocation for the current year.76 In other words, he appeared to accept the idea that last year’s quota would be the starting point for any discussion about allocation for this year and coming years. Each allocation will thus have importance not just for the current year, but because it will set a baseline for future years, and States will seek to maintain and increase their allocation. States will make investments in reliance on the

74

M.W. Lodge, “Improving International Governance in the Deep Sea”, 19 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 299 (2004), 307.

75

Id. at 308.

76

McDorman, supra note 34, at 440. 843


allocations given to them, and they will insist that they are entitled to continue fishing at the rate that they have fished in previous years.

IX. Summary and Conclusion The decisions made by the regional fishery management organisations allocating fish must be “equitable” and “efficient”. Translating such vague terms into actionable criteria is one of the major challenges of our generation. The analysis presented above suggests that these criteria must include the following elements: – Conservation values must be paramount, and the precautionary approach must be utilised to ensure that fish stocks remain bountiful for future generations. Countries must share data regarding their fishing activities and must support scientific research to understand the life cycle of each species and its relationships with other species in its ecosystem. – Developing countries must be given priorities in the allocation of stocks and must be given assistance so that they can utilise their allocations effectively. – Geographical proximity to the fish stocks must be recognised as an important element of any allocation scheme. When the stocks straddle EEZs of States, those States have a particularly strong claim to a substantial share of the allocation quota, but even for stocks outside the EEZ, the countries in the region should have a priority over those outside the region. – Countries that make expenditures to monitor and maintain the fish stocks should be rewarded with enhanced allocations. – Those countries that misbehave by abusing the flag-of-convenience system, by permitting IUU fishing, by allowing their vessels to engage in destructive high-seas bottom trawling and by subsidising their fishing industry should be punished by having their allocations reduced. – The population of a country, its historical dependence on the fisheries in question, and its historical consumption of sea food and need for it as “food security” are also relevant considerations, although of less importance than those listed above. Decisions must, of course, be made through a transparent process and by consensus whenever possible. The process of allocation will be one of trial-and-error in the early years, and, because we still know so little about many species and many ocean areas, caution must always guide the allocations.

844

4. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 283 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA David Anderson*

Introduction

T

he International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, when presided over by Judge Thomas Mensah, was the first court or tribunal acting under Part XV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention or LOS Convention) to have occasion to consider article 283. This was in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases where the Tribunal stated its view that “a State Party is not obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, section 1, of the Convention when it concludes that the possibilities of settlement have been exhausted”.1 The Tribunal was slightly more specific in its Order prescribing provisional measures in the MOX Plant case in stating that “a State Party is not obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching agreement have been exhausted”.2 A more extensive review of article 283 by the Tribunal was made in the Land Reclamation case,3 and this in turn was followed by a full consideration in the Barbados/Trinidad case by an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the Convention.4 It is timely, therefore, to examine this provision. It will be recalled that Article 283 of the Convention reads as follows: “Obligation to exchange views 1. When a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties to the dispute shall

*

This chapter was submitted in November 2006.

1

ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 280, at p. 295.

2

ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 95, at para. 60.

3

ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 10.

4

45 ILM (2006) 798. The decision is also available on <www.pca-cpa.org>.


III. The Law of the Sea: Settlement of Disputes

proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means. 2. The parties shall also proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views where a procedure for the settlement of such a dispute has been terminated without a settlement or where a settlement has been reached and the circumstances require consultation regarding the manner of implementing the settlement.” Several questions arise about this seemingly simple provision. Why was it included? What is its effect? Does it amount to a precondition for the reference of a dispute to a court or tribunal (similar to the precondition of diplomatic negotiations contained in compromissory clauses in some bilateral and multilateral treaties)? How has it been applied by tribunals? This chapter will attempt to give some answers.

I. Legislative History The preparatory work on what became article 283 began in 1975 when the Working Group on Dispute Settlement (WG), co-chaired by Ambassador Harry of Australia and Ambassador Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, considered the question of the settlement of disputes. The WG drew up four draft articles of a general nature: they became articles 279, 280, 282 and 283. Draft article 4 reads as follows: “1. If a dispute arises between two or more Contracting Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, those Parties shall proceed expeditiously to exchange views regarding settlement of the dispute. 2. Similarly, such an exchange of views shall be held whenever a procedure under this Convention, or another procedure chosen by the parties, has been terminated without a settlement of the dispute.”5

5

Doc. DSG/2nd session/No.1/Rev.5 dated 1 May 1975; reproduced in R. Platzöder (ed.), Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents, Vol. XII (1987), p. 108. Ambassador Galindo Pohl expressed the view in 1976 that it would have been better to have used the term “consultations” rather than “exchange of views” since consultations “were more formal and detailed and included consideration of the settlement of disputes” (58th Plenary Meeting, Official Records, Vol. V, p. 8). The word “consultation” does now appear in the final version of article 283(2).

848

Article 283 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

An unchanged draft article 4 was included by the President in his Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) of 21 July 1975.6 The text was similar to what became article 283, but it should be noted that there is no express mention of negotiation as a means of settlement. On 31 March 1976, President Amerasinghe submitted a Memorandum7 introducing the part of the ISNT concerning dispute settlement. Paragraph 10 of the Memorandum referred to the first four articles concerning the general obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means. He included the following comments about the obligation to exchange views: “While imposing the general obligation to exchange views and to settle disputes by peaceful means, these articles give complete freedom to the parties to utilize the method of their own choosing, including direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement.” The President went on, in paragraphs 14 and 15, to state: “14. An exchange of views is also prescribed whenever any procedure for settlement has failed to bring about a settlement. 15. The text, therefore, whilst imposing the general obligation does not limit in any way the method for dispute settlement that the parties may wish to utilize.” After a debate in Plenary, the President included an unchanged draft article 4 in his revised ISNT of 6 May 1976.8 In his Revised Single Negotiating text of 23 November 1976, the obligation to exchange views was set out in article 3. Paragraph 1 was unchanged, but paragraph 2 had been expanded by the addition of the final phrase about consultations concerning the implementation of a settlement. When the Informal Composite Negotiating Text in 1977 appeared, the equivalent of the present article 283 followed immediately after article 280. Its paragraph 1 had been revised as follows: “1. If a dispute arises between States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of the present Convention, the parties shall proceed expeditiously to exchange views regarding settlement of the dispute through negotiations in good faith or other peaceful means.”9 The reference to “negotiations … or other peaceful means” was added to the end of the first paragraph of the draft at this stage. In a sense, the phrase had

6

Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9.

7

Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9/Add.l, dated 31 March 1976.

8

Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9/Rev.1.

9

Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10, article 281. 849


been implicit from the outset. The mention of “good faith” was omitted after a review by the Drafting Committee since a general clause about good faith had been inserted into the draft Convention in 1980. Draft article 281 moved to become article 283 in the Draft Convention of 1981. The following account of the discussions has been given by a participant, Mr Adede (Kenya): “One of the fundamental features of the comprehensive system for the settlement of disputes, combining flexible choices of non-compulsory and compulsory procedures was the right of the parties to agree on the appropriate procedure for a particular dispute. There was accordingly the need to create an obligation for an expeditious exchange of views between the parties on the selection of the appropriate mode of settlement. Draft article 4, paragraph 1, was intended to create such an obligation.”10 Later in his account of the discussions, Mr Adede stated: “As originally conceived by the Working Group, the article was aimed at encouraging States to exchange views expeditiously for the purposes of agreeing on a suitable settlement procedure. Its application was intended to prevent an automatic transfer of a dispute from either the non-compulsory procedures to the compulsory procedures, or from one forum of compulsory procedures to another.”11 Still later, Mr Adede states the following: “The drafting history of article 283…shows that its proper application was … aimed at preventing automatic transfer of a dispute from one mode of settlement (non-compulsory) to another (compulsory) through manoeuvres of one party to the dispute. The emphasis was also placed on expeditious manner in exchanging views so as to avoid turning the procedure into a mechanism for delaying the process of actual settlement …”12 Another participant in the discussions, Mr Ranjeva (Malagasy Republic) has stated the following: “Those who drafted the informal basic text intended to prompt parties to enter into negotiations in order to define by common agreement and as quickly as possible the procedure for settling disputes. As far as the participants were concerned, exchanging views was designed to make it easier to decide

10

A.O. Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1987), p. 47.

11

Ibid. p. 93.

12

Ibid. p. 247.

850


on a means of settlement acceptable to both parties rather than to resolve the dispute.” He adds that “the strongest objections were voiced against any idea of placing a deadline on the duration of diplomatic negotiations.”13 The Virginia Commentary, written by two participants (Shabtai Rosenne (Israel) and Louis Sohn (US)), includes the following: “A text similar to article 283 had been inserted in the text prepared by the informal working group … as a result of the insistence of certain delegations that the primary obligation should be that the parties to a dispute should make every effort to settle the dispute through negotiation. The text refers to this obligation in an indirect fashion, making it the main objective of the basic duty ‘to exchange views’ regarding the peaceful means by which the dispute should be settled … This mandatory exchange of views is not restricted to negotiations but also includes ‘other peaceful means,’ thus re-emphazing the provision in article 280 that parties are free to agree at any time on the settlement of the dispute ‘by any peaceful means of their own choice.’”14 My own recollections and materials about the discussions in the WG in 1974-1976, as a member of the British delegation, show that many States saw arrangements for the settlement of disputes as an essential part of any future convention. These States wished to include provision for the settlement of disputes about the interpretation or application of negotiated texts by recourse to courts and tribunals which would give binding decisions; many delegations supported the idea that recourse to such courts and tribunals should be compulsory, not optional. Other States, most notably the Soviet Union and its supporters, were concerned about the whole idea of judicial settlement and especially about the possibility of their being exposed to compulsory jurisdiction – two things they had consistently opposed. At many Conferences convened during the 1950s and 1960s to consider and adopt law-making conventions, these States had supported the settlement of disputes by way of negotiation to the exclusion of other means. Following the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea in 1958, successive conferences had adopted a series of purely Optional Protocols to Vienna Conventions. All these Protocols were widely regarded as ineffectual since participation, being optional, was limited in numbers. In the context of the negotiations in the 1970s, the Soviet and similarly-disposed delegations were prepared for the first time to consider not only negotiation but also some other possibilities mentioned in article 33

13

R.J. Dupuy and D. Vignes (eds), Handbook on the New Law of the Sea (1991), pp. 13441345.

14

M.H. Nordquist et al. (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary, Vol. V (1989), p. 28. 851


of the UN Charter. This shift in position, signalled in 1974 and 1975, was welcome. However, these delegations required several reassurances. Negotiation would be given pride of place. There would be freedom of choice of means by the parties to a dispute, and any existing bilateral or regional arrangements would be left intact. Furthermore, the parties to a dispute could agree on their own arrangements. The role of the Convention would be to fill any remaining gaps. Even here, there would be more than one possibility: recourse could be had to both standing and ad hoc courts and tribunals. Conciliation and mediation would be available. Exceptions and qualifications could be made. Finally, there was the reassurance that they would not be taken before a court or tribunal by surprise or before they had been alerted to the risks facing them by an exchange of views about the possible means of settlement. It was in the context of negotiating arrangements which included a measure of compulsory jurisdiction that the idea was advanced for an exchange of views. Delegations which normally supported the inclusion in multilateral conventions of provisions for compulsory dispute settlement did not see any great need for the requirement of an exchange of views on procedures; it was unusual and unnecessary; it could lead to delays; it was especially questionable in regard to paragraph 2 concerning the implementation of settlements; however, despite all their hesitations these delegations considered that the requirement was probably harmless and worth including if it helped to secure wide acceptance of Part XV as a whole. Article 283 was part of the “package” on dispute settlement.

II. Textual and Contextual Analysis The term “exchange of views” is descriptive: it is not a term of art. Each party to a dispute expresses to the other its view(s) on the same question, namely the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or other peaceful means. The flavour is “consultation”, a word used in paragraph 2. Views have to be exchanged “expeditiously” (in French “promptement”) indicating the limited nature of the obligation. Views may be expressed in diplomatic communications or across the table. The exchange is completed when the second State expresses its view in response to the first or chooses to remain silent after a reasonable time for response has elapsed. An exchange of views could result in an agreement to negotiate, or the parties could agree to have recourse to another peaceful means of settlement, such as conciliation. In both instances, there would be two strands in the contacts: first, the exchange of views and secondly the negotiations or the conciliation (or whatever had been agreed). In practice, the two strands often become inter-twined, especially where negotiations or exchanges on points of substance take place. Equally, an exchange of views may result in no agreement on any point of substance or procedure. Even so, by clarifying intentions or removing uncertainty, it could still have diplomatic value in reducing the degree 852


of friction in the bilateral relations. Uncertainty can exacerbate disputes, whereas consultation is almost invariably useful. An exchange of views, within the meaning of article 283, is clearly something distinct from a “negotiation” within the meaning of article 33 of the UN Charter. While the word “negotiation” appears in article 283, it does so as an example of a means of settlement. Negotiation as a means of settlement is subject to some doctrine: e.g. in the judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf case.15 However, this doctrine does not apply to exchanges of view, even in the sense of consultation: there is no requirement to seek to reach agreement. The immediate context of article 283 is section 1 of Part XV: this section contains seven articles, the first five of which (articles 279 to 283) are interlinked. In particular, article 283 follows article 279 (recapitulating the general obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means) and article 280. There is a close link between article 280 concerning the choice of means of settlement by the parties and article 283 providing for the obligation to exchange views: the subject-matter of this exchange is precisely the choice of a peaceful means of settlement. Another link can be seen between article 282 governing the situation where the parties to a dispute have agreed upon a procedure that entails a binding decision and article 283 calling for an exchange of views since that exchange should result in the identification of any procedure that has been already agreed by the parties in a bilateral, regional or global treaty. In other words, article 283 is concerned with the identification of the appropriate means of settlement of disputes. Pursuant to paragraph 1, the parties may choose negotiation or some other peaceful means such as conciliation. They may agree to submit the dispute as a whole or some specific aspect of it to arbitration or adjudication. Very often a dispute has more than one aspect to which different provisions in the Convention would apply: for example, a boundary dispute may involve issues to do with access to fish stocks straddling the future boundary. The parties can clarify the scope of the dispute in preliminary exchanges and identify those questions that are best suited to litigation and those that are best settled by later negotiations. They may have different views on the question of how best to proceed, in which case the exchange of views may end without agreement, or there may be a compromise, or one side may change its position and accept the other’s views on the means of settlement. Paragraph 2 is also concerned with procedures: more specifically, it has to do with what happens when one procedure has terminated and a new situation has arisen in relations between the parties which then has to be dealt with. One possible benefit of article 283 is that an exchange views on the means of settlement may clarify the situation in relation to other provisions in section 1

15

The North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, at p. 47. 853


of Part XV before litigation has begun. More specifically, the exchange of views could alert the would-be applicant State to the existence of other treaties in force with the respondent State which had been overlooked or given insufficient attention by the applicant State and which were relevant in relation to article 282 or 281.16 An early examination of these other relevant treaties may serve the useful purpose of avoiding the risk of a State instituting legal proceedings that eventually fail for lack of jurisdiction.

III. The Case Law The case law has two aspects: first the question whether negotiations or some exchanges are required before litigation can be started; and secondly the interpretation of article 283. 1. Prior Diplomatic Negotiations As regards the former question, in the Right of Passage case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered whether there had to be negotiations before a State could have recourse to the Court. India had made a preliminary objection that Portugal had not complied with the rule of customary international law requiring diplomatic negotiations to be started and continued to the point where it was no longer profitable to pursue them. India argued that Article 36(2) of the Statute, by referring to legal disputes, required a definition of the dispute through negotiations. The Court held that, assuming the Indian contention had substance, the requirement had been complied with to the extent permitted by the circumstances of the case. The legal issues had been sufficiently disclosed by the diplomatic exchanges. The applicant State had complied with the conditions for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.17 A similar question arose in the case between Cameroon and Nigeria regarding the maritime boundary issue. There the ICJ rejected a preliminary objection by Nigeria to the effect that there had been no negotiations concerning the delimitation of the EEZ/continental shelf. Nigeria invoked articles 74 and 83 of the LOS Convention, although the Convention was not in force at the time. The Court made no mention of article 283 and held that it had been seised of

16

For example, a maritime dispute between two Member States of the European Union may raise issues under the LOS Convention and also EC law. In that situation, it may not be immediately apparent to the applicant that article 282 is applicable in the particular dispute. In the MOX Plant litigation, the bringing of Ireland’s case against the UK before the Annex VII arbitral tribunal was eventually found by the European Court of Justice to have infringed article 292 of the EC Treaty: Case C 459/03, Commission v. Ireland.

17

The Right of Passage case (Portugal v. India), ICJ Reports 1957, p. 125, at p. 149.

854


the dispute under declarations made under Article 36(2) of the Statute. Since those declarations did not “contain any condition relating to prior negotiations to be conducted within a reasonable period” the objection was rejected.18 In paragraph 56 of its judgment, the Court stated: “Neither in the Charter nor otherwise in international law is any general rule to be found to the effect that the exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations constitutes a precondition for a matter to be referred to the Court. No such precondition was embodied in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, contrary to a proposal by the Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920 (Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-verbaux of the proceedings of the Committee (16 June-24 July 1920) with Annexes, pp. 679, 725-726). Nor is it to be found in Article 36 of the Statute of this Court. A precondition of this type may be embodied and is often included in compromissory clauses of treaties.”19 No such precondition was included in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Article 283 is one of the compromissory clauses of the LOS Convention; however, the article does not go so far as to impose the precondition that diplomatic negotiations must have been held, far less exhausted, before recourse may be had to one of the mechanisms in article 287 of the Convention. 2. The Application of Article 283 To date, there have been four cases in which issues have arisen under article 283: (1) Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT), (2) MOX Plant, (3) Land Reclamation and (4) Barbados v. Trinidad. The four cases were arbitrations under Annex VII of the LOS Convention. In the first three cases, the applicant State also requested the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to prescribe provisional measures under paragraph 5 of article 290 of the Convention, pending the constitution of the arbitration tribunal. As a result, the question of article 283 was considered by two separate tribunals in both the SBT and MOX Plant cases, first before the Tribunal in Hamburg (applying a prima facie test) and secondly before the particular Annex VII tribunal. a. Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) Cases In the provisional measures phase of the SBT cases, both applicants, Australia and New Zealand, had expressed views to Japan in diplomatic Notes as to the most appropriate means of settling the disputes (i.e. the compulsory procedures under

18

Para. 109 of the judgment of 11 June 1998: ICJ Reports 1998, p. 275, at p. 321.

19

The Land and Maritime Boundary case (Cameroon v. Nigeria), ICJ Reports 1998, p. 275, at p. 303, para. 56. 855


the LOS Convention) before they had commenced arbitrations under Annex VII. Before the Tribunal, both produced documentary evidence showing that there had been an exchange of views satisfying the requirements of article 283. New Zealand’s Application annexed a diplomatic Note to Japan in which New Zealand had rejected Japan’s proposals of mediation and arbitration under the SBT Convention of 1993 and had indicated its decision “to commence compulsory dispute resolution procedures under Part XV”. The Note went on: “New Zealand reiterates that there has been an exchange of views for the purposes of Article 283 …”. Australia acted similarly.20 Before the Tribunal, Japan contended that the applicants had not exhausted the procedures under section 1 of Part XV through negotiations or other peaceful means. Japan’s emphasis was upon article 281: indeed, the practice of Australia and New Zealand appears to have been fully consistent with article 283. The Tribunal’s Order, having noted in paragraph 57 that “negotiations and consultations” had taken place between the parties, implicitly accepted the applicants’ contentions in paragraph 60: “a State Party is not obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, section 1, of the Convention when it concludes that the possibilities of settlement have been exhausted.”21 The word “exhausted” was a clear echo of Japan’s argument and the ICJ’s finding in Cameroon v. Nigeria rather than a reflection of any wording contained in article 283; similarly, the reference to “agreement” did not reflect the words used in article 283. In essence, the Tribunal determined in paragraph 60 that the requirements of this article had been satisfied, but without so stating in terms. The Annex VII tribunal held it was without jurisdiction over the dispute for reasons that were based on article 281, not article 283. As regards the latter, the tribunal found that the negotiations, in which the LOS Convention had been invoked, “may also be regarded as fulfilling another condition of UNCLOS, that of article 283…”.22 b. MOX Plant Case During the provisional measures phase of the proceedings, the question of article 283 arose in the following circumstances. In its Statement of Claim, Ireland had contended that: “there has been a full exchange of views on the dispute for the purposes of Article 283(1). Ireland has written to the United Kingdom on numerous occasions, and has received either inadequate or no responses.”23

20

ITLOS Pleadings 1999, Vol. 4, Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, pp. 15 and 25 (NZ) and p. 83 (Australia).

21


22

Para. 55 of the Award, 39 ILM (2000) p. 1359, at p. 1389.

23

Statement of Claim, para. 36.

856


In its Written Response, the United Kingdom argued that: “The letters to which Ireland appears to be referring are requests for the public disclosure of certain information withheld from the public versions of the reports following public consultations on the economic case for the MOX plant. They did not invite the United Kingdom to engage in any exchange views with the aim of settling by negotiation or other peaceful means what Ireland now characterises as the dispute arising under UNCLOS. Indeed they did not mention UNCLOS at all.”24 The Tribunal’s Order includes the following: “54. Considering that the United Kingdom contends that the requirements of article 283 of the Convention have not been satisfied since, in its view, there has been no exchange of views regarding the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or other peaceful means; … 56. Considering that the United Kingdom maintains that the correspondence between Ireland and the United Kingdom did not amount to an exchange of views on the dispute said to arise under the Convention; 57. Considering that the United Kingdom contends further that its request for an exchange of views under article 283 of the Convention was not accepted by Ireland; 58. Considering that Ireland contends that, in its letter written as early as 30 July 1999, it had drawn the attention of the United Kingdom to the dispute under the Convention and that further exchange of correspondence on the matter took place up to the submission of the dispute to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal; 59. Considering that Ireland contends further that it has submitted the dispute to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal only after the United Kingdom failed to indicate its willingness to consider the immediate suspension of the authorization of the MOX plant and a halt to related international transports; 60. Considering that, in the view of the Tribunal, a State Party is not obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching agreement have been exhausted; …”25 This latter formula, again echoing the ICJ’s finding, left open the question of the scope of the agreement, that is to say, whether the agreement in question was

24

Written Response, para. 188.

25

Para. 60 of the Order in the MOX Plant case: ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 95. 857


confined to the procedures for settling a dispute or extended also to the substance of the dispute. The formula indicates that it is open to a party to draw its own conclusions after an exchange of views: a party may conclude that there is no agreement on the choice of a means of settlement or on the substance of the dispute. Michael Wood has argued that “If and to the extent that the Tribunal was suggesting an essentially subjective test, this formulation seems to be open to criticism.”26 In a separate opinion, I expressed doubts about the reasoning in paragraph 60 of the Order on the basis of the facts presented.27 Article 283 does not in terms require the parties to seek to reach agreement, let alone to exhaust the possibilities. It simply obliges them to indicate a view on the most appropriate means of settlement in the circumstances existing at the time, in the context of consultations. This is not the same as announcing an intention to have recourse to litigation: before that step, there should have been exchanges about the possible means of settlement of the particular dispute. The arbitral tribunal under Annex VII, presided over by Judge Mensah, included the following in its Order No.3: “With regard to the international law issues raised by the United Kingdom, there has clearly been an exchange of views between the Parties, as required under article 283 of the Convention, and the United Kingdom does not now contest this.” c. Land Reclamation Case Before the LOS Tribunal, the parties advanced different arguments concerning their exchanges of views. In its turn, the Tribunal gave lengthy consideration to article 283. The Tribunal’s Order contains the following recitals: “33. Considering that Singapore contends that the requirements of article 283 of the Convention have not been satisfied since, in its view, there has been no exchange of views regarding the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or other peaceful means; 34. Considering that Singapore maintains further that negotiations between the parties, which article 283 of the Convention makes a precondition to the activation of Part XV compulsory dispute settlement procedures, have not taken place; …

26

In a paper entitled “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and General International Law” read at the Tribunal in September 2006, to be published in 22 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. (forthcoming in 2007). (The author was the UK Agent in the litigation).

27

ITLOS Reports 2001, at p. 125.

858


36. Considering that article 283 of the Convention applies ‘when a dispute arises’ and that there is no controversy between the parties that a dispute exists; 37. Considering that article 283 of the Convention only requires an expeditious exchange of views regarding the settlement of the dispute ‘by negotiation or other peaceful means’; 38. Considering that the obligation to ‘proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views’ applies equally to both parties to the dispute; 39. Considering that Malaysia states that, on several occasions prior to the institution of proceedings under Annex VII to the Convention by Malaysia on 4 July 2003, it had in diplomatic notes informed Singapore of its concerns about Singapore’s land reclamation in the Straits of Johor and had requested that a meeting of senior officials of the two countries be held on an urgent basis to discuss these concerns with a view to amicably resolving the dispute; 40. Considering that Malaysia maintains that Singapore had categorically rejected its claims and had stated that a meeting of senior officials as requested by Malaysia would only be useful if the Government of Malaysia could provide new facts or arguments to prove its contentions; 41. Considering that Singapore maintains that it had consistently informed Malaysia that it was prepared to negotiate as soon as Malaysia’s concerns had been specified and that Malaysia had undertaken to supply reports and studies detailing its specific concerns but did not do so prior to 4 July 2003; 42. Considering that Singapore states that, after receiving the Notification and Statement of Claim submitted by Malaysia on 4 July 2003 instituting arbitral proceedings in accordance with Annex VII to the Convention, Malaysia and Singapore agreed to meet in Singapore on 13 and 14 August 2003 to discuss the issues with a view to resolving them amicably; 43. Considering that Singapore maintains that Malaysia abruptly broke off the negotiation process of 13 and 14 August 2003 by insisting on the immediate suspension of the reclamation works as a precondition for further talks; 44. Considering that Malaysia stated that a further exchange of views could not be expected while the reclamation works were continuing; 45. Considering that Malaysia stated further that a party is not obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching agreement have been exhausted; 46. Considering that in fact the parties were not able to settle the dispute or agree on a means to settle it;

859


47. Considering that the Tribunal has held that ‘a State Party is not obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, section 1, of the Convention when it concludes that the possibilities of settlement have been exhausted’ (Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Order of 27 August 1999, paragraph 60), and that ‘a State Party is not obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching agreement have been exhausted’ (The MOX Plant Case, Order of 3 December 2001, paragraph 60); 48. Considering that, in the view of the Tribunal, in the circumstances of the present case Malaysia was not obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concluded that this exchange could not yield a positive result; 49. Considering that the discussions held between the parties on 13 and 14 August 2003 were conducted, by agreement of the two parties, without prejudice to Malaysia’s right to proceed with the arbitration pursuant to Annex VII to the Convention or to request the Tribunal to prescribe provisional measures in connection with the dispute; 50. Considering that these discussions were held after Malaysia had instituted proceedings before the Annex VII arbitral tribunal on 4 July 2003 and, accordingly, the decision of Malaysia to discontinue the discussions does not have a bearing on the applicability of article 283 of the Convention; 51. Considering that, in the view of the Tribunal, the requirement of article 283 is satisfied; … .” Four comments on these recitals may not be out of place. It is not entirely clear from the recitals whether the parties had ever exchanged views about the specific matter of the means of settlement, as distinct from the dispute itself. Paragraph 48, in stating the Tribunal’s conclusion, contrasts with the unilateral conclusions in the two earlier cases recalled in paragraph 47. As Judge Chandrasekhara Rao put it in his separate opinion, “the obligation (in article 283) must be discharged in good faith, and it is the duty of the Tribunal to examine whether this is being done”.28 The formula in paragraph 51 is a judicial finding that complements the conclusion reached in paragraph 48. Secondly, in paragraph 34, Singapore’s argument that article 283 makes negotiation a precondition seems to go too far: it is an exchange of views that is a precondition. Next, the Tribunal was clearly correct in pointing out in paragraph 38 that article 283 imposes an obligation on both parties to a dispute. However, the article does not

28


860


specify what happens if the respondent does not express any views at all: after a reasonable time, the first State should be free to proceed. Finally, Malaysia’s argument recorded in paragraph 44 that an exchange of views could not be held while the disputed activity was continuing cannot be correct since the whole purpose of the exchange is to open the way towards finding some means for settling the on-going dispute. The Annex VII tribunal was able to give an Award on Agreed Terms, following the entry into force of the settlement agreement between the parties: accordingly, no question of article 283 arose at this stage. d. Barbados v. Trinidad In the arbitration under Annex VII of the LOS Convention between Barbados and Trinidad, the parties again submitted lengthy arguments about article 283 and their contacts. Trinidad’s Counter Memorial argued, with reference to article 283, that “there was no exchange of views of any kind between the termination of the processes under articles 74(1) and 83(1) and the notification” instituting proceedings under Annex VII, which “came without warning”.29 Trinidad invoked both paragraphs of article 283, the second in the context of a transfer of the dispute from negotiations to litigation. Barbados, in its Reply, argued that the lengthy negotiations had satisfied article 283’s requirements; it characterized Trinidad’s argument as “excessively formalistic” and one that would frustrate the object and purpose of Part XV in that the respondent State could make a declaration under article 298(1)(a)(i) with immediate effect. The arbitration tribunal made extensive findings about article 283 which merit a full citation, as follows: “201. Recourse to Part XV brings into play the obligation under Article 283(1) to ‘proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means’. The Tribunal must preface its consideration of Article 283 with the observation that that Article does not readily fit the circumstances to which Articles 74 and 83 give rise, nor does it sit easily alongside the realities of what is involved in ‘negotiations’ which habitually cover not only the specific matter under negotiation but also consequential associated matters. The Tribunal notes that Article 283 is of general application to all provisions of UNCLOS and is designed for the situation where ‘a dispute arises’, that is where the first step in the dispute settlement process is the bare fact of a dispute having arisen. Articles 74 and 83 involve a different process, in that they impose an obligation to agree upon delimitation, which necessarily involves negotiations between the Parties, and then takes the Parties to

29

Para. 117, available on <www.pca-cpa.org>. 861


Part XV when those negotiations have failed to result in an agreement. In this situation Part XV – and thus Article 283 – is thus not the first step in the process, but one which follows the Parties’ having already spent a ‘reasonable period of time’ (in the present case several years) seeking to negotiate a solution to their delimitation problems. 202. The Tribunal consequently concludes that Article 283(1) cannot reasonably be interpreted to require that, when several years of negotiations have already failed to resolve a dispute, the Parties should embark upon further and separate exchanges of views regarding its settlement by negotiation. The requirement of Article 283(1) for settlement by negotiation is, in relation to Articles 74 and 83, subsumed within the negotiations which those Articles require to have already taken place. 203. Similarly, Article 283(1) cannot reasonably be interpreted to require that once negotiations have failed to result in an agreement, the Parties must then meet separately to hold ‘an exchange of views’ about the settlement of the dispute by ‘other peaceful means’. The required exchange of views is also inherent in the (failed) negotiations. Moreover, Article 283 applies more appropriately to procedures which require a joint discussion of the mechanics for instituting them (such as setting up a process of mediation or conciliation) than to a situation in which Part XV itself gives a party to a dispute a unilateral right to invoke the procedure for arbitration prescribed in Annex VII. 204. That unilateral right would be negated if the States concerned had first to discuss the possibility of having recourse to that procedure, especially since in the case of a delimitation dispute the other State involved could make a declaration of the kind envisaged in Article 298(1)(a)(i) so as to opt out of the arbitration process. State practice in relation to Annex VII acknowledges that the risk of arbitration proceedings being instituted unilaterally against a State is an inherent part of the UNCLOS dispute settlement regime (just as a sudden submission of a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is a risk for other States having already spent a ‘reasonable period of time’ (in the present case several years) seeking to negotiate a solution to their delimitation problems. 205. The Tribunal reaches the same conclusion in respect of the possibility that the requirement to negotiate a settlement under Articles 74(1) and 83(1) could be regarded as a ‘procedure for settlement’ which had been ‘terminated without a settlement’ so as to bring paragraph 2 of Article 283 into play, and by that route require the Parties to ‘proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views’ after the unsuccessful termination of their delimitation negotiations. To require such a further exchange

862


of views (the purpose of which is not specified in Article 283(2)) is unrealistic. 206. In practice the only relevant obligation upon the Parties under Section 1 of Part XV is to seek to settle their dispute by recourse to negotiations, an obligation which in the case of delimitation disputes overlaps with the obligation to reach agreement upon delimitation imposed by Articles 74 and 83. Upon the failure of the Parties to settle their dispute by recourse to Section 1, i.e. to settle it by negotiations, Article 287 entitles one of the Parties unilaterally to refer the dispute to arbitration.” Once again, a few comments on some of the interpretations and assessments set out in these paragraphs may be appropriate. As regards paragraph 201, maritime boundary negotiations vary considerably in scope and character: there are few “habitual” or “consequential associated matters”. To my mind, article 283 is perfectly capable of fitting the circumstances of boundary negotiations. For example, after the parties have explored fully the possibilities of reaching agreement in accordance with articles 74 and 83 without success, they could turn (perhaps at a separate “stock-taking” meeting) to an exchange of views on the question of finding a settlement by further negotiations, or mediation or conciliation (as in the case of Iceland and Norway over Jan Mayen)30 or other agreed means such as invoking the good offices of the UN Secretary-General. Alternatively, they could follow the practice of Australia and New Zealand and address Notes Verbales to the other party to the dispute indicating with reference to article 283 which method of settlement was considered to be the most appropriate in the prevailing circumstances. One party might wish to end negotiations and proceed at once to arbitration or litigation: the other party could be of a similar mind, in which case they could exchange views about the scope of the question(s) to be posed, the best forum, the timing and other procedural arrangements. Equally, the other party might disagree, in which case it could make a new offer in the negotiations or call for conciliation or for a pause for internal reflection. Recourse to litigation in inter-governmental relations can have wider implications, both in domestic politics and bilateral relations. Seen in this light, article 283 could represent a useful safety valve and could fit the circumstances of a change from negotiation to litigation rather well. In paragraph 203, the arbitral tribunal argues that article 283(1) “cannot reasonably be interpreted to require that once negotiations have already failed to result in agreement, the Parties must then meet separately to hold “an exchange of views” about the settlement of the dispute “by other peaceful means.” The tribunal considered that the “required exchange of views is also inherent in

30

J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds), International Maritime Boundaries (1993), Vol. II, Report No. 9-4, pp. 1755 et seq. 863


the (failed) negotiations.” But is this persuasive? In my experience, while some negotiations have extended to discussing the possibility of litigation if agreement were to prove unattainable, most sets of boundary talks have been confined to the boundary issues and have not extended to the question of submitting the dispute to a court or tribunal, even in instances where the parties were far apart. Boundary negotiations often last several years and involve each side making small steps towards meeting the other somewhere around the middle of the area under negotiation. If one party loses patience after a few months of talks and wishes to litigate whilst the other wishes to continue with the process of making small steps, article 283 still serves the useful purpose of protecting the latter from being taken completely by surprise. The tribunal’s argument that article 283 “applies more appropriately to procedures which require a joint discussion of the mechanics … than to a situation in which Part XV gives a party to a dispute a unilateral right to invoke the procedure for arbitration” is all very well, but this argument still does not mean that article 283 has no application whatsoever in the latter situation. Nor should the requirement of an exchange of views be dismissed as “unrealistic,” as asserted in paragraph 205 in regard to article 283(2). The whole article may be unusual, but it forms part of the Convention and it was part of the price of securing consensus on Part XV as a whole. Its requirement may be wholly appropriate on different facts or in different circumstances. In paragraph 204, the tribunal argues that this “unilateral right would be negated if the States concerned had first to discuss the possibility of having recourse to that procedure, especially since … the other state could make the declaration of the kind envisaged in article 298(1)(a)(i) …”. However, the right is not absolute: the Convention conditions this particular unilateral right, first in article 283 by requiring an exchange of views on means of settlement and secondly in article 298 by allowing the opt-out declaration. In order to avoid provoking the latter, the negotiating State intending to go to arbitration may have to draft its statement of view with care, even finesse; article 283 requires nothing less. The allusion in paragraph 204 to the jurisdiction of the ICJ prompts the thought that many Governments that have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction under the optional clause have added a reservation to guard against being taken by surprise by an opportunistic acceptance of the jurisdiction by another State with which there is a dispute. Surprise is often a bad thing in diplomatic relations. In paragraph 206, the tribunal states that “In practice the only relevant obligation upon the Parties under Section 1 of Part XV is to seek to settle their dispute by recourse to negotiations …” and also that “Upon the failure of the Parties to settle their dispute by recourse to Section 1, i.e. to settle it by negotiations, Article 287 entitles one of the Parties unilaterally to refer the dispute to arbitration”. These statements do less than justice to the actual terms of section 1 as a whole and article 283 in particular.

864


Without commenting on the merits of the tribunal’s decision on this point in the context of the relations between the parties, the actual reasoning advanced in the paragraphs 210 to 206 is not persuasive.

Conclusions When a dispute arises, in practice what usually happens is that the two Governments remain in diplomatic relations: accordingly, through Embassies and foreign ministries, they exchange diplomatic messages, setting out their respective positions; if there is no progress, they hold talks about the dispute. The respective Ambassadors and Foreign Ministries will be in regular contact. This applies to all types of disputes, including ones that involve the interpretation or application of the Convention. The Governments will characterize the dispute as a fisheries dispute or an environmental/pollution dispute or a boundary dispute, according to the substance; the interpretation of the Convention will be at best a secondary factor. Foreign Ministries are familiar with handling incipient disputes; they are unlikely to look in a Convention for guidance on the procedures to be followed. Contrary to what article 283(1) seems to require, Governments do not usually begin by holding talks about how to handle the dispute: instead, they focus on the substance of the outstanding issues, looking to clarify positions, to reduce the scope of differences and to limit possible damage to bilateral relations. In other words, article 283 is an unusual prescription. At the same time, it may have a certain usefulness in some instances: the exchange may cause one party or the other (or both) to re-examine its position on the substance of the dispute or the means of settling it. When a maritime dispute first arises, it is not always apparent that a provision of the LOS Convention is relevant, especially where other treaties in force between the parties have a bearing on the issues or where the issue is in the agenda of an international organisation to which the disputants belong. Some time may be spent on establishing the facts through diplomatic exchanges before the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention can be identified. Even then, the legal aspect may be minor in relation to some very obvious economic or political aspects. The strands of negotiation, consultation, dispute-handling and exchanging views about the means of settlement may often become entangled. The simple sequence of events anticipated in article 283(1) may often not correspond to the convoluted facts of an actual dispute. Even so, exchanging views may bring greater clarity to the overall situation facing the parties. Article 283 was intended to protect respondent States from being taken by surprise. Thus, a State which has agreed to negotiate or which has entered into negotiations over a maritime issue should not change from negotiation to litigation without first fulfilling its obligations towards its negotiating partner. The LOS Convention has created new jurisdictional possibilities, including 865


compulsory procedures leading to binding decisions. However, there are some qualifications, including the duty to exchange views on the available means of peaceful settlement prior to having recourse to one of them unilaterally. In actual litigation, the applicant’s failure to comply with article 283 could be invoked as a preliminary objection concerning jurisdiction and admissibility. It may be more effective if invoked by the respondent and decided by the court or tribunal as a preliminary objection separately from the merits, as in Cameroon v. Nigeria before the International Court of Justice. The inclusion of the reference to “negotiation” in article 283 may have been intended to give negotiations a certain pre-eminence as a means of settlement. However, read in the context of section 1, article 283 appears to be confined to the choice of means of settlement by the parties. It should not be taken to mean that negotiation is a precondition to be fulfilled before recourse to compulsory procedures is permissible. In the words of President Amerasinghe, article 283 is a general obligation which does not limit the freedom of choice of the parties. In that perspective, an exchange of views appears to be something different from an obligation to negotiate. It is a much lesser thing, even when understood in the sense of consulting. Indeed, article 283 may be satisfied by relatively little effort on the part of the complaining State. It may be sufficient to draw attention to some facts, to invoke specified provisions in the LOS Convention, to point to the existence of a defined legal dispute under the Convention, and to express a preference from among the various means of settlement. The respondent State would then procrastinate at its peril. The practice to date of applying article 283 appears to show that there is often confusion between an obligation to negotiate and one to exchange views. This confusion has arisen from the facts of particular disputes and their handling by the parties. The clearest practice in applying article 283 has been that by Australia and New Zealand, who separated the strands of negotiations about questions of substance from exchanges of views about means of settlement. Both the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and arbitral tribunals have shown a reluctance to find that article 283 has not been complied with. (In the case of the Tribunal when acting under article 290, the standard is simply that of a prima facie case on jurisdiction. Compliance with article 283 goes to admissibility more than jurisdiction, but the prima facie standard is applicable there also.) The requirement imposed by article 283 is not to enter into a lengthy discussion or to make genuine attempts to reach a compromise over the means of settlement. The obligation is simply to exchange views or to consult, and to do so expeditiously. So long as the applicant can produce some evidence of relevant exchanges, article 283 is unlikely to act as a bar to proceedings. However, it forms part of the Convention and should be applied by all concerned, whether political leaders, diplomatists or judges, as indicated by Judge Chandrasekhara Rao in the Land Reclamation case.

866

THE SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA CASE AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE Nisuke Ando

I. Introduction

O

n 4 August 2000, an Arbitral Tribunal, constituted pursuant to article 287(1)c of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) of 1982, rendered an award on the Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) case brought before it by Australia and New Zealand against Japan. In the award, the Tribunal decided that it was “without jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the dispute” and, consequently, revoked the provisional measures ordered earlier by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).1 The core issue of the award was whether the dispute settlement regime provided by the LOS Convention could allow the dispute settlement procedure established by the tripartite (Japan, Australia and New Zealand) Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) of 1993. On the one hand,

1

For the record of the case, see <www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/bluefintuna/main. htm>. See, also, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Southern Bluefin Tuna Case – Australia and New Zealand v. Japan Jurisdiction (7 vols); B. Kwiatkowska, “International Decision Southern Bluefin Tuna”, AJIL 94 (2000) 1, 150-155 and AJIL 95 (2001) 1, 162-171; S. Marr, “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case: The Precautionary Approach and Management of Fish Resources”, EJIL 11 (2000) 4, 815-831; S. Schwebel, “The Bluefin Tuna Case”, in N. Ando et al. (eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda (Kluwer Law International, 2002), Vol. 1, 743-748; N. Tanaka, “Some Observations on the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration”, Jap. Ann. Int’l L. 44 (2001), 9-34; J. Peel, “A Paper which Dissolves in Rain? The Future for Resolving Fisheries under UNCLOS in the Aftermath of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration”, Melb. J. Int’l L. 3 (2002) 1, 53-78; M. Kawano, “L’Affaire du thon à nageoire bleue et les chevauchements de juridictions internationales”, AFDI 49 (2003), 516-541.



it is sometimes argued that the dispute settlement regime of the LOS Convention is designed to precipitate a decision, binding on States Parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the LOS Convention, which may be called a “compulsory dispute settlement procedure”.2 On the other hand, the CCSBT provides for a dispute settlement procedure workable only with the consent of all the States Parties concerned, which may be called a “voluntary dispute settlement procedure”.3 Thus, the award of the Arbitral Tribunal is of great significance in order to clarify the relationship between compulsory dispute settlement procedure under the LOS Convention and voluntary dispute settlement procedure under CCSBT. The award also referred to other issues such as the nature and admissibility of the dispute. While this chapter briefly refers to those issues as well, its primary concern is the issue of dispute settlement procedures. Therefore, it will first follow the factual development of the case; then it will summarise the main arguments of both the States Parties; thirdly, it will analyse the relevant parts of the award; and finally, it will make some observations on the case in a Japanese perspective.

II. Factual Development of the Case 4 SBT is one of the highly migratory species of fish listed in Annex I to the LOS Convention. Their spawning ground is supposedly located in the waters south of Indonesia. Young SBT go south, circle Australia and New Zealand, then move westward through the Indian Ocean to the southern part of the Atlantic, from where they turn eastward back to Indonesian waters. It takes them several years to grow to a weight of 250 kilograms. SBT fishery was initiated by the Japanese early in the 1950s, who were later joined by the Australians and New Zealanders. In 1961, the total catch amounted to 82,000 tonnes, but thereafter started to decline. As a result, in 1982, Japan, Australia and New Zealand began an informal negotiation to regulate the fishery and in 1985 agreed to limit the total allowable catch (TAC) to 35,650 tonnes, which was further reduced in 1989 to 11,750 tonnes, with Japan limited to 6,065 tonnes, Australia to 5,265 tonnes and New Zealand to

2

See, e.g. Australia and New Zealand arguments infra. See, also, LOS Convention arts 286, 287(1)(2) and 288(1)(2).

3

See, e.g. CCSBT art. 16 infra.

4

Hereafter the summaries of the relevant facts and legal arguments are mainly based on N. Ando, Minamimaguro Chusaisaiban-jiken no Senketsuteki-Koben (Preliminary Objections in the case of SBT Arbitration), Kokusaiho Gaiko Zasshi (Journal of International Law and Diplomacy), 100 (2001), 309-340.

868

The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case and Dispute Settlement under the UN LOS Convention

420 tonnes. Finally, in 1993, the three States concluded the aforementioned CCSBT, establishing a tripartite Commission that would determine TAC as well as its share among them. Due to the absence of a unanimous vote, however, the Commission continued to fail in performing its duty, but until 1997 the three States maintained TAC and their shares as agreed in 1989. In the meantime, fishermen from Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia started catching SBT, with a total catch said to amount to 5,000 tonnes in recent years. Since 1996, under the circumstances, Japan has proposed an Experimental Fishing Program (EFP) in the tripartite Commission, to authorise a limited amount of test-catch, outside of the TAC, for the purpose of securing data to assist the Commission in breaking its deadlock. Faced with persistent objections from Australia and New Zealand, Japan announced in 1998 that it would proceed with a unilateral EFP and made a catch of 1,400 tonnes. Subsequently, Australia and New Zealand recognised the usefulness of an EFP, but while Australia agreed to a 1,500 tonne test-catch, Japan insisted on 1,800 tonnes, and tripartite negotiations broke down in August 1998. This situation prompted Japan to conduct a second unilateral EFP in 1999, against which Australia and New Zealand decided, on 30 July 1999, to submit the dispute to an arbitral tribunal to be established under article 287(1)c of the LOS Convention. At the same time, pursuant to article 290(5) of the same Convention, they sought ITLOS to issue an order prescribing provisional measures to stop the Japanese unilateral EFP. After holding written and oral proceedings in Hamburg, ITLOS issued the requested order on 27 August 1999. According to article 290(5): “Pending constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being submitted ... ITLOS may prescribe ... provisional measures ... if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or affirm those provisional measures.” By a subsequent agreement between Japan and Australia and New Zealand, the tribunal, composed of five judges, was constituted. Following the written pleadings, a hearing was held at the seat of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which served as Registrar, in Washington, DC from 7-11 May 2000.

869


III. Legal Issues in Dispute: States Parties’ Arguments 5 The four main issues in dispute between Japan and Australia and New Zealand may be summarised as: (1) the essence and nature of the dispute; (2) the relationship between CCSBT and the LOS Convention; (3) the applicability of the compulsory dispute settlement procedure under the LOS Convention to this dispute; and (4) the issue of admissibility and abuse. The core arguments of the States Parties on each of the issues will be reviewed below. 1. Essence and Nature of the Dispute Japan asserts that the essential feature of this dispute lies in the different scientific evaluation between the States Parties concerning the current situation as well as the future prospect of SBT stock. While Japan considers that the SBT stock has been recovering in recent years, Australia and New Zealand do not agree and maintain that continued restraint of TAC is necessary. The conflict of views stems from conflicting data resulting from different scientific methodologies adopted by Japan and Australia and New Zealand. Thus, the dispute is over the difference in scientific evaluation, which cannot be properly resolved by judicial procedure and is, therefore, non-justiciable. Australia and New Zealand contend that a difference in scientific evaluation may constitute a legal dispute. They point out that, while Japan regards the dispute arising exclusively under CCSBT, Australia and New Zealand see it as arising under the LOS Convention as well. In their view this difference confirms the very existence of a legal dispute between the States Parties and makes the dispute justiciable. 2. Relationship between CCSBT and the LOS Convention Japan admits that the LOS Convention and CCSBT may exist in parallel. However, it asserts that, as far as the conservation and management of SBT stock is concerned, CCSBT, including its provisions on dispute settlement procedure, as lex specialis, excludes or subsumes the LOS Convention as lex generalis. Consequently, this dispute comes exclusively under CCSBT. Australia and New Zealand contend that the issue of lex specialis v. lex generalis can arise only where the two conflict with each other, but that there is no such conflict between the LOS Convention and CCSBT. Under both the conventions, they emphasise, Japan is obligated to cooperate with them in taking measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas, which include SBT. Therefore, the dispute settlement procedure of the LOS Convention should be applied to this dispute.

5

Ibid.

870


3. Applicability of the Compulsory Dispute Settlement Procedure under the LOS Convention to this Dispute As to the applicability to this dispute of the compulsory dispute settlement procedure provided in LOS Convention Part XV, Japan asserts that LOS Convention Part XV does not exclude a CCSBT-type agreement with a voluntary dispute settlement procedure, and that, even if LOS Convention Part XV is applicable, Australia and New Zealand’s claims do not meet the pre-requisite conditions set forth by the LOS Convention itself. First of all, article 311(2) provides that the LOS Convention “shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this Convention”, and Japan maintains that CCSBT is compatible with the LOS Convention and does not detract from the enjoyment of rights under the LOS Convention. Secondly, article 280 allows States Parties to the LOS Convention to agree to settle their disputes concerning its interpretation and application by any peaceful means of their own choice, and, according to Japan, CCSBT constitutes such an agreement. Thirdly, article 281(1) states that, when a CCSBT-type agreement is concluded, the procedures provided in LOS Convention Part XV apply “only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure”. In this regard, Japan holds that, while no settlement has been reached between Japan and Australia and New Zealand in this case, Australia and New Zealand are to blame because they have failed to exhaust such a means by rejecting the Japanese proposal to settle the dispute by submission to arbitration. In addition, Japan argues that CCSBT article 16 clearly excludes “any further procedure”. Moreover, Japan emphasises that a very large number of treaties that have been concluded among many States Parties to the LOS Convention do not provide for “compulsory dispute settlement procedure”, and if the compulsory dispute settlement procedure under the LOS Convention is to override all these treaties, as claimed by Australia and New Zealand, it would contradict this prevailing State practice and entail irreparable confusion in the international community. Australia and New Zealand counter that article 311(2) requires compatibility with the LOS Convention of other agreements, including CCSBT, and that Australia and New Zealand reject the Japanese proposal for arbitration because Japan has refused to suspend its unilateral EFP, which they insist on as a pre-condition for accepting the proposal. Furthermore, Australia and New Zealand argue, article 281 presupposes that a dispute settlement procedure mentioned therein should entail a binding decision and CCSBT, with its voluntary dispute settlement procedure, is excluded. With respect to the State practice emphasised by Japan, Australia and New Zealand contend that the LOS Convention, establishing a comprehensive, fundamental regime for the law of the sea, needs a compulsory dispute settlement regime in order to maintain its integrity. In fact, article 311 871


establishes the primacy of the LOS Convention over other treaties, and if States Parties to the LOS Convention can freely opt out of its compulsory dispute settlement regime, as Japan claims, then the constitutional order of the law of the sea designed by the LOS Convention will be destined to collapse. 4. Admissibility and Abuse Japan repeats its assertion on the non-justiciable nature of this dispute because its essence concerns difference in scientific evaluation. Japan also asserts that, since Japan has proposed a 1,500 tonne test-catch, which Australia proposed earlier in 1998, the dispute becomes moot. On either ground, according to Japan, Australia and New Zealand’s claims are inadmissible and the Arbitral Tribunal cannot proceed to judge on the merits of the dispute. In addition, Japan argues that Australia and New Zealand chose to sue only Japan under the LOS Convention although other States Parties to the LOS Convention such as Indonesia and Korea allow their nationals to catch SBT freely. Moreover, Australia and New Zealand sought ITLOS to issue an interim order despite their knowledge that the second Japanese EFP, which started in June 1999, would end only a few days after the order could be issued and that the situation would not meet the requirement of urgency. Both these facts may raise the issue of abuse, although Japan does not intend to raise it. Australia and New Zealand repeat that a scientific difference may constitute a legal dispute. Furthermore, they respond that the Australian proposal of a 1,500 tonne test-catch has been withdrawn. As to the issue of abuse, Australia and New Zealand have no dispute with Indonesia or Korea. In the summer of 1999 Australia and New Zealand had no choice but to sue Japan before ITLOS because Japan was engaging in its second unilateral EFP, ignoring their protest. Therefore, they regret that Japan refers to the issue of abuse, though they have no intention of blaming Japan for acting in violation of “good faith”.

IV. Arbitral Tribunal’s Award 6 In its award rendered on 4 August 2000, the Arbitral Tribunal deals with all of the arguments raised by Japan and Australia and New Zealand, as summarised above in four issues. Broadly speaking, the Tribunal sided with Australia and New Zealand on issues (1), (2) and (4) but with Japan on issue (3). As indicated above, the Tribunal decided that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the dispute. As a result, it does not find it necessary to pass upon questions of the admissibility (para. 65). However, the Tribunal notes that the 6

See the record quoted in note 1 supra. For the convenience of readers, relevant paragraph numbers of the award are indicated in brackets.

872


dispute is not confined to matters of scientific evaluation only. The Tribunal also notes that the dispute is not moot, since Australia and New Zealand have withdrawn their proposal of a 1,500 tonne test-catch and that both the quantity and quality of EFP have not been agreed upon. In addition, the Tribunal observes that it does not find the proceedings brought before ITLOS and before itself to be an abuse of process (paras 45-46). The Tribunal further notes that Australia and New Zealand do not hold Japan to any independent breach of an obligation to act in good faith (para. 64). With respect to the relationship between CCSBT and the LOS Convention, the Tribunal does not accept the Japanese contention that the former excludes or subsumes the latter. On the contrary, the Tribunal points out that, in international law as well as in State practice, sometimes one and the same dispute bears upon more than one treaty and that there is a parallelism of treaties both in their substantive content and in their provisions for dispute settlement arising thereunder. In fact, the Tribunal notes that, while in its view this dispute falls within the provisions of CCSBT, some provisions of the LOS Convention, such as article 117 on States Parties’ obligation to take measures against their nationals necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas “in general” or article 119 to debar discrimination “in form or fact aginst the fishermen of any State”, have no corresponding provision in CCSBT. Consequently, the Tribunal concludes that the dispute between Australia and New Zealand and Japan arises under both Conventions (para. 52). As to the applicability to this dispute of compulsory dispute settlement procedure under the LOS Convention, the Tribunal notes that article 286, which introduces Part XV section 2, entitled “Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions”, stipulates “any dispute concerning the interpretation and application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section”. At the same time, the Tribunal holds that article 286 must be read in context, particularly in relation to the qualifying provisions of article 281(1). According to the provisions of article 281(1), if States that are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the LOS Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute “by a peaceful means of their own choice”, the procedures provided for in LOS Convention Part XV apply only where (a) no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and (b) the agreement between the parties “does not exclude any further procedure”. In the view of the Tribunal, CCSBT, in particular the provisions of its article 16, constitutes such an agreement (para. 54). As noted elsewhere,7 these provisions provide only for a “voluntary dispute settlement procedure”.

7

See note 3 supra. 873


The question for the Tribunal to determine is, therefore, whether the two conditions (a) and (b) are met in this particular case. As to (a), the Tribunal notes that article 16(1) of CCSBT requires Japan and Australia and New Zealand to “consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice”. The Tribunal also notes that CCSBT article 16(2) requires the parties, having failed to resolve the dispute under article 16(1), to refer it to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration “with the consent ... of all parties to the dispute”. However, according to the Tribunal, these provisions do not require the parties to continue their effort to settle the dispute indefinitely, and, considering the circumstances as stressed by Japan and Australia and New Zealand, the Tribunal concludes that “no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means” as required by article 281(1) of the LOS Convention, thus meeting the condition (a) above. As to (b), the Tribunal notes that CCSBT article 16(2) additionally provides that “failure to reach agreement on reference to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 above”. In the view of the Tribunal, the effect of this express obligation to continue to seek resolution of the dispute by the listed means of article 16(1) is not only to stress the optional or voluntary nature of dispute settlement procedure under CCSBT. That express obligation also clarifies the intention of article 16 to remove proceedings under that article from the reach of the complsory procedures of LOS Convention Part XV section 2. Thus, the Tribunal concludes that CCSBT article 16 “exclude[s] any further procedure” within the meaning of LOS Convention article 281(1), thus meeting the condition (b) above as well (paras 56-59). The Tribunal goes on to add two other considerations that support its conclusions. The first consideration is the extent to which compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions have in fact been prescribed by LOS Convention Part XV for all States Parties to the LOS Convention. Article 286, as quoted above, subjects the jurisdiction of the courts or tribunals established thereunder to broad restrictions of “section 3”: i.e. article 297 limits the application of section 2 compulsory procedures to a coastal State’s exercise of sovereign rights only in certain specified cases in territorial waters, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf; article 298 authorises a State, coastal or not, to declare that it does not accept any one or more of the section 2 compulsory procedures in respect of disputes relating to sea-boundary delimitations or historical bays or titles as well as disputes relating to military activities, in addition to disputes concerning law enforcement activities by a coastal State; and article 299 provides that disputes excluded by article 297 or exempted by article 298 from application of section 2 compulsory procedures may be submitted to such procedures “only by

874


agreement of the parties to the disputes”. Thus, in the Tribunal’s view, the LOS Convention falls significantly short of establishing a truly comprehensive regime of compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding decisions (paras 60-62). The second consideration is, as emphasised by Japan, the fact that a significant number of international agreements concerning the law of the sea, concluded after the adoption of the LOS Convention, exclude unilateral reference to compulsory dispute settlement procedures. Therefore, the Tribunal considers, the existence of this treaty-practice tends to confirm that States Parties to the LOS Convention may agree to preclude their dispute from the application of section 2 compulsory procedures in accordance with article 281(1) (para. 63). All in all, the Arbitral Tribunal concludes that it is without jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the dispute and decides to revoke the provisional measures earlier ordered by ITLOS (paras 65-66). However, in so doing, the Tribunal pays attention to the fact that agents of both Japan and Australia and New Zealand have confirmed each of their States’ readiness to explore all productive ways of finding a solution to the dispute.8 The Tribunal also emphasised that the prospects for a successful settlement of this dispute will be promoted by the Parties’ abstaining from any unilateral act that may aggravate the dispute as long as a solution has not yet been achieved (para. 70).

V. A Japanese Perspective The present writer served as one of the counsel for Japan in the oral proceedings both before ITLOS and the Arbitral Tribunal. He wishes to end this chapter by making a few observations based on his experience as counsel. First of all, he wants to stress the importance that the SBT case has in terms of the Japanese attitude towards international arbitration. The SBT case is the third international arbitration that Japan has engaged itself in since it joined the international community in the middle of the 19th century. The first international arbitration for Japan was the Maria Luz case of 1875 and the second the House Tax case of 1905. Japan won the first but lost the second, and that loss has been considered as a cause of Japanese reluctance to settle its

8

In fact, Japan, Australia and New Zealand continued their negotiation to settle the dispute, and in the special meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Bluefin Tuna held on 16-18 November 2000, they agreed to design a joint EFP, to which Korea declared it would accede. In the 7th annual meeting of the same Commission held on 18-21 April 2001, the joint EFP was adopted. It was also agreed to expand the Commission so that Taiwan could participate as well. Finally, on 28 May 2001, after meeting the Japanese Foreign Minister, the Australian Foreign Minister announced in Tokyo that the difference regarding SBT fishery management had been resolved. 875


international dispute by arbitration in subsequent years.9 This explains why Japan has abstained from being involved in international arbitration for almost a century after the House Tax arbitration. Thus, any outcome of the SBT case is bound to affect the Japanese attitude towards arbitration. In that sense it is lucky that Japan somehow won the case. It is strongly hoped that the case will encourage Japan to take more positive approach to the use of arbitration in resolving its international disputes.10 Secondly, in the view of this writer, the SBT case highlights the limitations that any ambitious international law-making must face in attempting to restrict the exercise of sovereign rights by States. Australia and New Zealand argue that the LOS Convention, like WTO, is one of the great general regulatory treaties of the modern time and provides for mandatory or compulsory dispute settlement procedures in order to maintain the legal order that they intend to build. The original aim of the LOS Convention may have been to enact a constitutional instrument on the law of the sea with compulsory dispute settlement procedures. However, as the Tribunal’s award makes abundantly clear, LOS Convention Part XV has not established a comprehensive regime of compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding decisions on all States Parties. Rather, Part XV preserves a consensual basis for all dispute settlement procedures as exemplified by CCSBT, and very many States Parties to the LOS Convention have chosen to enter into an international agreement of maritime elements with a voluntary dispute settlement procedure. Thirdly and lastly, it needs to be emphasised that the SBT case testifies the vailidity and weight of State practice in defining interpretation of a treaty provision. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which sets out general rules on treaty interpretation, explicitly states that, together with the context, account shall be taken of “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. Thus, in interpreting various provisions of LOS Convention Part XV, it is essential to examine the practice of States Parties to the LOS Convention that concern dispute settlement procedures. As pointed out above, the relevant State practice indicates that, while LOS Convention Part XV section 2 provides for compulsory dispute settlement procedures, Part XV allows at the same time a treaty concerning the law of the sea to provide for voluntary dispute settlement procedure.

9

See Y. Ishimoto, “International Arbitration in the Meiji Era”, Jap. Ann. Int’l L., 7 (1963), 30-37.

10

In these years, Japan has started to participate actively in WTO proceedings.

876

DELIMITATION DISPUTES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES P. Chandrasekhara Rao

I. Introduction

A

rticles1 15, 74 and 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the “Convention” or “LOS Convention”) deal with delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts, respectively. Accordingly, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of those provisions would invite the dispute settlement procedures set out comprehensively in Part XV of the Convention. Further, paragraph 2 of article 74 and of article 83 declare that, if no agreement is reached within a reasonable period of time, the “States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV” of the Convention. The absence of a similar provision in article 15 may not, however, be construed as implying that Part XV procedures are not applicable in regard to disagreements concerning the delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. Is there any overlap of obligations under Part XV with the obligations under articles 74 and 83?2 What is the extent to which the delimitation disputes are covered by the procedures provided for in Part XV?3

1

Unless otherwise specified, references to articles are to be taken as references to articles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

2

See the Award dated 11 April 2006 of the Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to article 287, and in accordance with Annex VII, of UNCLOS in the matter of an arbitration between: Barbados and The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (the “Arbitral Award of 2006”).

3

See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. V, pp. 107-141 (Shabtai Rosenne and Louis B. Sohn eds, 1989) (“Virginia Commentary”); Tullio Treves, “What have the United Nations Convention and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to offer as regards Maritime Delimitation Disputes?”, in Rainer Lagoni and Daniel



II. Dispute Settlement Procedures (Part XV) The dispute settlement procedures are contained in all three sections of Part XV. Section 1 lays down voluntary procedures; section 2, compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions; and, section 3, “limitations and exceptions” to the applicability of section 2 and (non-binding) compulsory conciliation. 1. Voluntary Procedures (Section 1) The voluntary procedures provided for in section 1 are well-known in general international law. They require States Parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means and underline their freedom to do so by means of their own choosing.4 States Parties are free to arrive at an ad hoc agreement as to the peaceful means to be adopted to settle the particular dispute which has arisen. Where they have done so, then their obligation to follow the procedures provided for in Part XV will arise only where no settlement has been reached through recourse to the agreed means and their agreement does not exclude any further procedure.5 Where the States Parties have agreed upon a binding dispute settlement procedure, under a general regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, in regard to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, that procedure applies in lieu of the procedures provided for in Part XV, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.6 Such procedure establishes compulsory jurisdiction invokable at the instance of any party to the dispute. It is thus open to States Parties to submit their disputes, by agreement, to any binding dispute settlement procedure, including any procedure provided for in section 2. When a dispute arises, the parties are required to proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means.7 A similar exchange is also required (i) where a procedure for the settlement of such a dispute has been terminated without settlement or (ii) where a settlement has been reached and the circumstances require consultation regarding the manner of implementing the settlement.8 A State Party to a dispute may also invite the other party to submit the dispute to conciliation and, “[i]f the invitation is not accepted or the parties do

Vignes (eds), Maritime Delimitation, 2006, pp. 63-78; Alan E. Boyle, “Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction”, 46 ICLQ (1997), pp. 37-54; Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (2005), pp. 253-263. 4

See arts 279 and 280.

5

See art. 281. See also para. 200 of the Arbitral Award of 2006.

6

See art. 282.

7


8


878

Delimitation Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

not agree upon the procedure”, the conciliation proceedings are deemed to be terminated.9 Section 1 thus lays down several procedures and the application of any of the procedures depends on the facts of each case. If, for instance, the parties are bound by a previous agreement to settle the dispute by a procedure of their choice (article 281) or to submit their dispute to a procedure entailing a binding decision (article 282), then that procedure applies to the exclusion of other procedures. If the parties start with a clean slate, then the provision requiring the parties to exchange views regarding settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means applies. In certain cases, more than one procedure may apply. 2. Compulsory and Binding Procedures (Section 2) Before any compulsory procedure entailing a binding decision is invoked, section 2 lays down certain pre-conditions which need to be satisfied. Either party may invoke a compulsory procedure only if its application is not negated by the limitations and exceptions referred to in section 3 and no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1. If these pre-conditions are satisfied, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention may be submitted at the instance of any party to it to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under section 2. Section 2 thus introduces binding dispute settlement procedures endowed with compulsory jurisdiction. Article 287 allows a State the freedom to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the following four compulsory procedures for the settlement of their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention: (a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (the “Tribunal”); (b) the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”); (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII (“Annex VII arbitral tribunal”); and, (d) a special tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein (“Annex VIII arbitral tribunal”). An annex VIII arbitral tribunal is not empowered by the Convention to deal with the category of delimitation disputes. Where a State Party, that is a party to a dispute, has not made a declaration accepting any of the compulsory procedures or where the parties made declarations but have not accepted the same procedures, the dispute may be submitted only to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.10 Thus arbitration is used by the Convention as the default procedure. It may be difficult to infer from the scheme of the Convention that arbitration is recommended as the preferred means for the settlement of disputes. In fact, the Convention expects States to make deliberate

9

See art. 284.

10

See art. 287, paras 3 and 5. 879


choices in the matter of binding procedures. This may also be inferred from the fact that successive United Nations General Assembly resolutions on the law of the sea have called upon States to make article 287-declarations. Only about one quarter of States Parties have made such declarations. A vast majority of States Parties have yet to make conscious decisions in regard to binding procedures. A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 exercises jurisdiction over any dispute concerning: (i) the interpretation or application of the Convention which is submitted to it in accordance with Part XV; and, (ii) the interpretation or application of an international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention, which is submitted to it in accordance with the agreement.11 In the event of a dispute over the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, under article 287, that court or tribunal, exercising its compétence de la compétence, settles the matter by its decision. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is further dealt with in article 21 of its Statute. 3. Exceptions to Applicability of Compulsory and Binding Procedures (Section 3) As noted earlier, section 3 carves out certain limitations and exceptions to the applicability of section 2. The “limitations” set out in article 297 are automatic in the sense that their applicability is not dependent on any action of the States Parties to the Convention. They do not, however, extend to delimitation disputes. In contrast, the “exceptions” specified in article 298 to the applicability of section 2 come to life only when declarations are made by States. Article 298 makes provision for a State to declare (when signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention or at any time thereafter) that it does not accept any one or more of the compulsory procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes: (a) disputes concerning articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations or those involving historic bays or titles; (b) disputes concerning military activities or law enforcement activities by a coastal State with respect to fisheries and marine scientific research in areas subject to its jurisdiction; and, (c) disputes in respect of which the United Nations Security Council is exercising its functions under the Charter of the United Nations. Article 298, paragraph 1(a)(i), further provides that when a State makes a declaration that it does not accept any of the compulsory procedures in regard to the disputes specified in (a) above, “[It] shall, when such a dispute arises subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention and where no agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between the parties, at the request of any party to the dispute, accept submission of the matter to conciliation under

11

See art. 288, paras 1 and 2.

880


Annex V, section 2; and provided further that any dispute that necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land territory shall be excluded from such submission” (emphasis added). A State thus enjoys several options under article 298. It may not accept any one or more of the compulsory procedures with respect to disputes specified in article 298, paragraphs 1(a)(i), 1(b) and 1(c). Or, it may accept only any one or more of the compulsory procedures with respect to certain categories of disputes and not the other. Paragraphs 1(a)(i) and 1(b) of article 298 contain more than one category of disputes. For instance, disputes relating to sea boundary delimitations specified in article 15 appertain to a category of disputes which is separate from the category of disputes relating to delimitations specified in article 74 or article 83. Since declarations under article 298 constitute exceptions to the application of compulsory procedures, and since it is reasonable to expect that the Convention would want to keep the exceptions to the minimum and within narrow limits, article 298 may be construed as permitting exceptions even narrower than those stated expressly therein.12 It is interesting to note that not many States have made declarations under article 298. Of the 26 States (less than one-sixth of the States Parties) that have made declarations, nine rejected the application of any compulsory procedure with respect to all categories of disputes specified in article 298. Sixteen States excepted the application of compulsory procedures to delimitation disputes specified in article 298. These are: Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, Chile, China, Equatorial Guinea, France, Italy, Mexico, Palau, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Spain, Tunisia and Ukraine. One State – Iceland – does not accept any binding procedure with respect to delimitation disputes referable to article 83. The United States declared that, when it becomes a party, it intends to declare that it does not accept the compulsory procedures with respect to any of the categories of disputes specified in article 298.13 While the declarations excluding the delimitation disputes are not very many, they have the effect of excluding to a great extent binding procedures with respect to delimitation disputes in certain areas, such as the Southern cone of South America, North America and most of the Mediterranean; however, such procedures are still applicable in large regions in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean.14

12

See also Virginia Commentary, supra note 3, p. 115.

13

John A. Duff, “A note on the United States and the Law of the Sea: Looking Back and Moving Forward”, 35 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. (2004), p. 214.

14

See Treves, supra note 3, p. 74. 881


The declarations made under article 298 do not in any way affect the obligations arising under section 1 of Part XV.15 There is thus a system to direct the parties toward some channel for the pacific settlement of every dispute, without any exception whatever. A State may at any time withdraw its declaration.16 However, a new declaration, or the withdrawal of a declaration, has no retroactive effect on the proceedings pending before a court or tribunal.17 A State may agree to submit a dispute excluded by its declaration to “any procedure specified in this Convention”.18 The “procedure” mentioned here obviously refers to a compulsory procedure provided for in section 2, since article 298-declarations are without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1. The agreement with the other party in this regard will be an ad hoc one, for the declaration as such is not withdrawn. When a State Party has made a declaration, it cannot submit any dispute falling within the excepted category of disputes to “any procedure in this Convention” as against another State Party.19 Here too, the “procedure” obviously refers to a compulsory procedure provided for in section 2. Article 298, paragraph 4, provides that, if any of the States Parties has made a declaration under paragraph 1(a), any other State Party may submit any dispute falling within the excepted category against the declarant party to “the procedure specified in such declaration”. It cannot be that the expression “the procedure specified in such declaration” refers to a compulsory procedure specified in section 2; it has been suggested that that expression should be understood as referring to the compulsory conciliation procedure specified in article 298, paragraph 1(a).20 Even so, where is the need for the declaration in question to specify a procedure, since paragraph 1(a) expressly states that conciliation procedure becomes obligatory “at the request of any party to the dispute”? Declarations and notices of withdrawal of declarations under article 298 are required to be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is required to transmit copies thereof to the States Parties.21 It appears that such declarations and notices take effect from the moment they are received by the Secretary-General.22

15


16


17


18


19


20

See Virginia Commentary, supra note 3, p. 116.

21


22

See Virginia Commentary, supra note 3, pp. 140-141.

882


Unless excluded by a declaration made under article 298, paragraph 1(a) (i), compulsory procedures provided for in section 2 are available in respect of delimitation disputes (or those involving historic bays or titles), whether they have arisen before the entry into force of the Convention (“pre-Convention delimitation disputes”) or arise subsequent to “the entry into force of the Convention” (“post-Convention disputes”). Any State making a declaration excluding any or all delimitation disputes is, nevertheless, bound by different settlement procedures with respect to post-Convention disputes. The Convention calls upon the parties to enter into negotiations with a view to reaching agreement in regard to such disputes.23 If no agreement is reached “within a reasonable period of time”, conciliation under Annex V, section 2, at the request of any party to the dispute, becomes compulsory.24 Article 298 thus uses compulsory conciliation as a subsidiary procedure of dispute settlement. Even in regard to post-Convention disputes, there are further exclusions from any submission to conciliation. These are as follows: (a) mixed disputes referred to in the second proviso in article 298, paragraph 1(a)(i); (b) disputes finally settled by an arrangement between the parties;25 and, (c) disputes that are to be settled in accordance with a bilateral or multilateral agreement binding on the parties.26 Not all exclusions from conciliation are easy of application. Article 298 does not lay down precise criteria to distinguish between pre-Convention and post-Convention delimitation disputes. The legal problems that may arise in this regard are accentuated by the consideration that every dispute may have some roots in the past.27 The issue relates to the dating of the dispute, for the Convention refers to a dispute that arises subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention. This depends primarily on the facts and circumstances of each case. Again, the meaning of the expression “the entry into force of the Convention” is not quite clear.28 Does it refer to the entry into force of the Convention in general as specified in article 308, paragraph 1, or entry into force of the Convention between the parties to the dispute as specified in article 308, paragraph 2? Or, it is also arguable that in respect of the first sixty States Parties to the Convention, the expression “entry into force of this Convention” has the meaning assigned to it in article 308, paragraph 1, and, in respect of all other States Parties, that

23

See art. 298, para. 1(a)(i).

24

Ibid.

25

See art. 298, para. 1(a)(iii).

26

Ibid.

27

See Virginia Commentary, supra note 3, p. 124.

28

See Treves, supra note 3, p. 76; Paul C. Irwin, “Settlement of Maritime Boundary Disputes: An Analysis of the Law of the Sea Negotiations”, 8 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. (1980), p. 126; Klein, supra note 3, p. 258. 883


expression has the meaning assigned to it in article 308, paragraph 2. It may be recalled that the expression “entry into force” as defined in article 308 has different meanings in respect of different States Parties. Problems may also arise in the determination of what constitutes a mixed delimitation dispute (that is, a dispute relating to a sea boundary delimitation that necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land territory), referred to in the second proviso in article 298, paragraph 1(a)(i). The procedure for conciliation may be started in accordance with Annex V, section 2. The commission is empowered to decide disagreements as to its competence.29 Articles 2 to 10 of section 1 of Annex V govern different aspects of the constitution and functioning of the conciliation commission. Generally speaking, the conciliation procedure is less adversarial and less legalistic than any compulsory and binding procedure. It involves assisted negotiation.30 This aspect is particularly underlined in Annex V, which invites the commission to draw the attention of the parties to any measures which might facilitate an amicable settlement of the dispute31 and to make proposals to the parties with a view to reaching such settlement.32 The conciliation commission is given a specific time-limit – 12 months from the time the commission is constituted – to render its report.33 The report must record any agreements reached and, failing agreement, the commission’s conclusions on all questions of fact or law relevant to the matter in dispute and such recommendations as the commission may deem appropriate for an amicable settlement.34 It is required to be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the parties to the dispute.35 The report of the commission, including its conclusions and recommendations, is not binding upon the parties.36 Nevertheless, it cannot be dismissed as being of no value. Any party to the dispute ignoring the report may invite adverse international opinion. Further, the conclusions and recommendations of the commission may exert their own pressure in any eventual settlement of the dispute. The Convention itself calls upon the parties to negotiate an agreement

29

See art. 13 of Annex V.

30

See Irwin, supra note 28, p. 129.

31


32


33


34

Ibid.

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.

884


on the basis of the report.37 It is a legal requirement that the parties should negotiate in good faith38 and with a view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely go through a formal process of negotiation.39 Article 298, paragraph 1(a)(ii), states that, if the negotiations do not result in an agreement, the parties “shall, by mutual consent, submit the question to one of the procedures provided for in section 2, unless the parties otherwise agree”. Though the use of the words “shall, by mutual consent” is somewhat misleading, it appears that those words are intended to indicate that the parties are under an obligation to at least try to reach an agreement to select one of the procedures under section 2 of Part XV for settling the dispute, unless they agree otherwise.40 If no such agreement can be reached, the obligations under article 283 in section 1 of Part XV come fully into play.41 A dispute excepted by a declaration made under article 298 may be submitted to a procedure provided for in section 2 only by agreement of the parties to the dispute.42 Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3 of Part XV, the parties to the dispute may agree to some other procedure for the settlement of such dispute or to reach an amicable settlement.43 It bears emphasis that the Convention does not restrict the freedom of the parties to go their own way for the settlement of the dispute provided the means chosen by them for the settlement are peaceful. Subject to the provisions of article 309, it does not impose any public policy consideration on their freedom to devise their own procedures different from those enshrined in the Convention.

III. Sea Boundary Delimitation Disputes It is trite to say that disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Convention concerning sea boundary delimitations are subject to the dispute settlement procedures laid down in the Convention. Several issues may arise when compulsory procedures provided for in section 2 are involved for the settlement of delimitation disputes.

37

See art. 298, para. 1(a)(ii).

38

See art. 300.

39

See North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 85.

40

See the Virginia Commentary, supra note 3, p. 134.

41

Ibid.

42

Art. 299, para. 1.

43

Art. 299, para. 2. 885


1. Contentious Jurisdiction The jurisdiction of a court or a tribunal to decide such issues depends on answers to a number of questions, including: (i) whether the parties before it are parties to the Convention; (ii) whether it is the forum in terms of article 287 to hear and determine the dispute; (iii) whether there is a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention; (iv) what the scope of the matters which constitute the dispute to be dealt with by a court or a tribunal is; (v) whether a mixed delimitation dispute concerns the interpretation or application of the Convention; (vi) whether it is barred from hearing the dispute on account of the declarations made under article 298; and, (vii) whether the parties have failed to settle their dispute by recourse to section 1. Answers to questions (i) and (ii) above may be ascertained without much effort. Questions (iii), (iv) and (v) above may be considered together. Application of judicial mind is required to find out whether there is a dispute on the facts of the case. A dispute arises at a time when the opposing views of the parties on a point of law or fact take definite shape.44 The existence of the dispute does not depend on the articulation of its precise scope, so long as the record indicates with reasonable clarity the scope of the legal differences between the parties.45 The negotiations between the parties towards reconciling the divergent views should reach a deadlock and, on its facts, the dispute warrants solution by other means. The dispute settlement mechanisms in the Convention are all geared up to a one and only task: resolution of disputes concerning “the interpretation of the Convention” or an “international agreement related to the purposes” of the Convention.46 This applies both to a court or tribunal referred to in article 287.47 When there are clear provisions in the Convention or the international agreement referred to above on any matter, disputes relating to them obviously fall within the jurisdiction of dispute settlement mechanisms. Where the parties differ as to the scope of the matters which constitute the dispute referred to a court or tribunal, it is arguable that that body may hold that the dispute also includes matters which are “sufficiently closely related” to the dispute submitted to it. In other words, the ambit of the dispute mentioned in the submission may become wider because of the close connection between what is expressly submitted to a court or tribunal and what has to be decided as

44

See the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case (Jurisdiction), 1924, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, p. 35.

45

See the Arbitral Award of 2006, supra note 2, para. 198.

46

See Part XV of the Convention and, in particular, art. 288, paras 1 and 2.

47

In the case of the Tribunal, see also art. 21 of its Statute.

886


part of that submission.48 This may be so especially where all the matters said to fall within the scope of the dispute are dealt with expressly in the Convention. a. Mixed Disputes There is yet another, perhaps more complex, issue concerning a dispute, part of which is governed by the express provisions of the Convention and part by no such provisions. Does it qualify itself as a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention? The Convention does not purport to deal with this question in direct terms. It may be fruitful to discuss this question with respect to a sea boundary delimitation dispute. In itself a dispute involving land sovereignty or other rights over land territory may not be a dispute governed by the provisions of the Convention. Does it become part of a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention when its consideration is necessary for the disposal of a sea boundary delimitation dispute? What does the exclusionary clause in the second proviso of article 298, paragraph 1(a)(i), signify? Does it mean that, but for that clause, a submission to conciliation would enable the conciliation commission to deal with a mixed dispute? Or, was this clause included ex abundanti cautela? There is no clear statement in the preparatory work of the Convention on the meaning to be given to this clause. It may be relevant to recall the legislative history of this exclusionary clause. Under the relevant provision in the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), a State had discretion to designate a regional or other third party dispute settlement procedure entailing a binding decision for delimitation disputes in place of the compulsory procedures specified in section 2 of Part XV. That provision allowed declarations to be made excluding, from the compulsory procedures specified in section 2, any one or more of the following categories of disputes: “(a) Disputes concerning sea boundary delimitations between adjacent or opposite States …, provided that the State making such a declaration shall indicate therein a regional or other third party procedure,

48

In the matter of an arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the parties differed on the question as to whether the dispute submitted to the Annex VIII Tribunal included the delimitation of the maritime boundary in relation to that part of the continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles. The Tribunal, while answering the question in the affirmative, relied upon more than one ground in this regard. The Tribunal observed: “The Tribunal considers that the dispute to be dealt with by the Tribunal includes the outer continental shelf, since (i) it either forms part of, or is sufficiently closely related to, the dispute submitted by Barbados, (ii) the record of the negotiations shows that it was part of the subject-matter on the table during those negotiations, and (iii) in any event there is in law only a single ‘continental shelf ’ rather than an inner continental shelf and a separate extended or outer continental shelf ” (emphasis added). See the Arbitral Award of 2006, supra note 2, para. 213. 887


entailing a binding decision, which it accepts for the settlement of such disputes; ….”49 The Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) permitted similar declarations to be made excluding, from the compulsory procedures specified in section 2, any one or more of the following categories of disputes: “(a) Disputes concerning sea boundary delimitations between adjacent or opposite States …, provided that the State making such a declaration shall, when such dispute arises, indicate, and shall for the settlement of such disputes accept a regional or third-party procedure entailing a binding decision, to which all parties to the dispute have access; and provided further that such procedure or decision shall exclude the determination of any claim to sovereignty or other rights with respect to continental or insular land territory.”50 The above provision appears to suggest that a regional or other third-party procedure referred to therein would be competent to delimit a maritime boundary where that could be done without determining any claim to sovereignty or other rights with respect to continental or insular land territory. It seems to have been inserted to allay the fears of some States that under the guise of a dispute relating to a sea boundary delimitation, a party to a dispute might bring up a dispute involving claims to land territory or an island, notwithstanding their declarations excluding delimitation disputes from the compulsory procedures specified in section 2.51 Accounts of the negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea do not disclose that similar fears were expressed with regard to mixed disputes involving both land and sea delimitations being heard by the compulsory procedures specified in section 2. In other words, the second proviso was inserted at the instance of States making the permissible declarations excluding delimitation disputes from the purview of compulsory procedures specified in section 2. This is understandable with regard to States not wanting adjudication of delimitation disputes either by the compulsory procedures specified in section 2 or any other substituted procedure. It appears that the question of making the exclusionary clause in the second proviso applicable to the compulsory procedures specified in section 2 with regard to States not making article-298 declarations never arose at the Third Conference.

49

See art. 18, para. 1, of Part IV of the RSNT. For text, see Virginia Commentary, supra note 3, p. 111.

50

See art. 297, para. 1(a), of the ICNT. For text, see Virginia Commentary, supra note 3, p. 113. See also Irwin, supra note 28, p. 114.

51

Virginia Commentary, supra note 3, p. 113.

888


ICNT/Rev.2 reformulated (a) above as follows: “(a)(i) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations …, provided that the State having made such a declaration shall, when such a dispute arises subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention and where no agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between the parties, at the request of any party to the dispute, and notwithstanding article 284, paragraph 3, accept submission of the matter to conciliation provided for in Annex V, and provided further that there shall be excluded from such submission any dispute that necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land territory.”52 What the second proviso in the above provision appears to do is to exclude the very submission of a delimitation dispute to a conciliation commission when that “necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land territory”. This does not necessarily mean that a conciliation commission would not be competent to deal with delimitation disputes when they do not necessarily involve the concurrent consideration of land territory disputes. The present text of article 298, paragraph 1(a)(i), is based on the afore-said provision in the ICNT/Rev.2. The preparatory work of the Convention does not appear to give any reason for giving the exclusionary clause in the second proviso in article 298, paragraph 1(a) (i), a special meaning different from that which it generally bears. Accordingly, that clause must be interpreted in its “most natural meaning”.53 Taken in its ordinary sense, the exclusionary clause suggests that but for its inclusion in the second proviso in article 298, paragraph 1(a)(i), the question of a mixed dispute would have remained within the competence of a conciliation commission. As

52

See art. 298, para. 1(a)(i), of the ICNT/Rev.1. For text, see Virginia Commentary, supra note 3, p. 114.

53

See Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, para. 35. In para. 33 the ICJ held: “in accordance with customary international law, reflected in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty. As a supplementary measure recourse may be had to means of interpretation such as the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.” See also Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, pp. 21-22, para. 41. 889


a logical corollary to this, it follows that, since the exclusionary clause does not apply to a compulsory procedure provided for in section 2 of Part XV, a mixed dispute, whether it arose before or after the entry into force of the Convention, falls within the jurisdiction of a compulsory procedure. If the intention of the Convention is to provide that the exclusionary clause in the second proviso made applicable to conciliation should apply with equal vigour to the compulsory procedures in section 2, then it ought to have made this clear in a provision applicable to such compulsory procedures. It has been argued that since the Convention does not deal with questions of sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land territory, the compulsory procedures specified in section 2 are not competent to deal with mixed disputes.54 The argument runs as follows: “… the declarant exercising its option [under article 298] to except maritime delimitation questions has no option as to whether land territory questions will also be included. They ‘shall’ be excluded from any determination through a substituted procedure. Query, whether one may infer from this that land territory questions are excepted from jurisdiction under Part XV in any case – regardless of the exercise of an exclusion option under article 298. The effect of the explicit territorial exclusion in article 298(1)(a) then becomes simple clarification of the fact that the optional exclusion and substituted procedure does not somehow operate to wipe out the otherwise automatically applicable territorial exclusion.”55 In support of such a reasoning, attention is drawn to article 121 on islands which deals only with the effect of the islands on the ocean regime and is not determinative of the legal status of the islands per se. It is further added that the regime of islands as set out in the Convention clearly suggests that the substantive articles of the Convention do not deal with matters of land territory and, accordingly, it would be inappropriate for the dispute settlement provisions to cover land territory disputes.56 This chain of reasoning has its attractions and cannot be dismissed lightly. There is, however, another side to this contention which deserves to be noted. There is no doubt that the interpretative mechanism of the Convention may not be competent to deal with land territory issues per se. That is not the whole issue.

54

See Bernard H. Oxman, “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980)”, 75 AJIL (1981), p. 211 at p. 233; Irwin, supra note 28, pp. 114-115, 138-139.

55

Irwin, supra note 28, p. 138-139.

56

Irwin, supra note 28, p. 114.

890


The question here is whether, when there is no declaration under article 298 to except maritime delimitation disputes, a mixed dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the compulsory procedures specified in section 2. If the exclusionary clause in the second proviso is merely clarificatory in nature, as contended, where was the need for incorporating the exclusionary clause with respect to conciliation and not with respect to the compulsory procedures specified in section 2? There is also a functional reason as to why a compulsory and binding procedure is applicable to a mixed dispute. If a court or tribunal were to refuse to deal with a mixed dispute on the ground that there are no substantive provisions in the Convention on land sovereignty issues, the result would be to denude the provisions of the Convention relating to sea boundary delimitations of their full effect and of every purpose and reduce them to an empty form. Although the Convention does not contain specific provisions with regard to land sovereignty issues, let it not be forgotten that article 293 lays down the applicable law which is not only the Convention but also “other rules of international law not incompatible with the Convention”. The Preamble to the Convention also affirms that matters not regulated by the Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law. It is not uncommon to see the adjudicative forums referred to in article 287 deciding matters of general international law that are not strictly part of the law of the sea. A court or tribunal referred to in article 288 being thus empowered to apply general international law suffers from no inherent limitation even in resolving disputes involving the land element. Throwing out mixed disputes from out-of-binding procedures is like throwing the baby out with the bath water. If such disputes lose the protection of binding procedures under the Convention, where else would the parties to the dispute get the benefit of such procedures except through special agreement which is a matter of choice for the parties? The competence of binding procedure to deal with mixed disputes also arises by, what the ICJ referred to in a different context as, “necessary intendment” of the Convention.57 There is nothing in the Convention which excludes such competence. It is also well established in municipal legal systems that where any power is expressly granted by a statute, there is included in the grant, and without special mention, every power the denial of which would render the grant itself ineffective; this is a statement of a necessary rule of construction of all grants of power. It is not that the land and the sea are unrelated. It is well-established that the land dominates the sea and is the legal source of the power which a State may

57

See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174. 891


exercise over territorial extensions to seaward.58 Maritime rights derive from the coastal State’s sovereignty over the land.59 The terrestrial territorial situation thus constitutes the starting point for the determination of the maritime rights of a coastal State.60 Islands too enjoy the same status and therefore generate the same maritime rights as other land territory.61 There may be a number of situations in which the determination of entitlements over land is a must before disputes concerning sea boundary delimitations are resolved. For example, in the Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, the ICJ found: “In order to determine what constitutes Bahrain’s relevant coasts and what are the relevant baselines on the Bahraini side, the Court must first establish which islands come under Bahraini sovereignty” (emphasis added).62 In sum, where no exclusionary declaration is applicable with respect to delimitation disputes under article 298, a court or tribunal would be competent to deal with a mixed dispute. It may not deal with disputed land territory issues if there is no necessary connection between them and the dispute concerning sea boundary delimitation, unless the parties otherwise agree. b. Applicability of Section 1 If the competent court or tribunal is not barred by an article 298-declaration from proceeding with the dispute, then it will have to inquire as to whether the parties to the delimitation dispute made efforts to reach settlement by recourse to section 1 of Part XV. More particularly, under articles 74 and 83, where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the EEZ and of the continental shelf are to be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.63 Where there is no agreement, the States concerned are given a “reasonable period of time” to reach agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, in order to achieve an equitable solution.64

58

North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 39, p. 51, para. 96; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 36, para. 86.

59

North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 39, p. 51.

60

Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 40, para. 185.

61

Ibid.

62

Ibid. para. 186.

63

See art. 74, para. 4, and art. 83, para. 4.

64

See art. 74, para. 2, and art. 83, para. 2.

892


If no such agreement can be reached, “the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV”.65 Ordinarily, the expression “procedures” mentioned above should include the procedures provided for in sections 1, 2 and 3 of Part XV. Are there any reasons as to why it should be taken as referring only to the compulsory procedures under sections 2 and 3? The Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, in its Arbitral Award of 2006, considered this matter in some depth. It observed that the obligation under articles 74 and 83 to agree upon delimitation “necessarily involves negotiations” between the parties. While noting that recourse to Part XV should as a general rule bring into play the obligations under article 283, the Arbitral Tribunal held that article 283 does not readily fit the circumstance to which articles 74 and 83 give rise or sit easily alongside the realities of what is involved in “negotiations” which habitually cover not only the specific matter under negotiation but also consequential associated matters, that the required exchange of views under article 283, paragraph 1, is also inherent in the (failed) negotiations, that to require a further exchange of views after the termination of delimitation negotiations is “unrealistic”, and that article 283 applies more appropriately to procedures which require a joint discussion of the mechanics for instituting (such as setting up a process of mediation or conciliation) than to a situation in which Part XV itself gives a party to a dispute a unilateral right to invoke a compulsory procedure under section 2 of Part XV.66 The Arbitral Tribunal concluded: “In practice the only relevant obligation upon the Parties under Section 1 of Part XV is to seek to settle their dispute by recourse to negotiations, an obligation which in the case of delimitation disputes overlaps with the obligation to reach agreement upon delimitation imposed by Articles 74 and 83. Upon the failure of the Parties to settle their dispute by recourse to Section 1, i.e. to settle by negotiations, Article 287 entitles one of the Parties unilaterally to refer the dispute to arbitration.”67 The Arbitral Tribunal further observed that the unilateral right to refer the dispute to a compulsory procedure would be negated if the States concerned had to first discuss the possibility of having recourse to that procedure, especially since in the case of a delimitation dispute the other State involved could make a declaration of the kind envisaged in article 298, paragraph 1(a)(i), so as to opt out of the arbitration process.68 In short, the Arbitral Tribunal holds that the expression “procedures provided for in Part XV” in articles 74 and 83 should be

65

Ibid.

66

See the Arbitral Award of 2006, supra note 2, paras 201-207.

67

Ibid. para. 206.

68

Ibid. para. 204. 893


interpreted as referring to the procedures in section 2, rather than the procedures in section 1 of Part XV. There is also another, perhaps more logical, way of looking at the issue which allows the expression “procedures provided for in Part XV” in articles 74 and 83 to have its most natural meaning. When articles 74 and 83 require the parties to reach agreement on delimitations on the basis of international law, they do not presume that there is already a dispute between them. It is only when the parties fail to reach agreement that the opposing views of the parties take “definite shape”69 and, consequently, a dispute may be said to arise. The negotiations between the parties until the stage when they fail to reach agreement concern the identification of the basis on which an agreement can be reached rather than the resolution of a dispute that has already arisen. And the failure of the parties to reach agreement on such basis implies that the parties “reached a deadlock”70 and that a dispute has arisen between the parties, making the application of the procedures for the settlement of disputes under Part XV obligatory. It is not without significance that articles 74 and 83 make it obligatory for the “States concerned” to resort to the procedures under Part XV. If this be so, the procedures under section 1 of Part XV apply and there is no direct entry to a compulsory procedure under section 2 at that stage. Even going by this interpretation, unless the parties agreed or agree on a different procedure, recourse to Part XV could bring into play the obligations under article 283. Any negotiations after the parties failed to reach agreement on the principles of international law applicable to delimitation should be taken as negotiations within the framework of article 283, paragraph 1, for the settlement of the dispute. Articles 74 and 83, read with section 1 of Part XV, generate a two-stage negotiation process: first, negotiations for effecting delimitation by agreement as envisaged in articles 74 and 83 and, second, negotiations after the parties failed to reach agreement, as provided for in article 283, paragraph 1. It may be recalled that article 283, paragraph 1, applies “when a dispute arises” and requires an expeditious exchange of views regarding the settlement of the dispute by “negotiation or other peaceful means”. Article 283, paragraph 2, also requires an expeditious exchange of views where a procedure for the settlement of such a dispute has been terminated without a settlement. This further exchange is obviously intended to enable the parties to agree on other peaceful means for settlement such as good offices or conciliation or identification of appropriate compulsory procedure among the several procedures provided for in article 287.71

69

See the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case (Jurisdiction), supra note 44, p. 35.

70

See the Interhandel case, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 21.

71

See also A.O. Adede, “Settlement of Disputes arising under the Law of the Sea Convention”, 69 AJIL (1975), p. 798 at p. 803.

894


As held by the Tribunal, it should be kept in view that a State Party is not, however, obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching agreement have been exhausted.72 The requirement of article 283 regarding an exchange of views is not, however, an empty formality to be dispensed with at the whims of a disputant. The obligation in this regard, like any other international obligation, must be discharged in good faith and, when called upon, it is the duty of a competent court to examine whether this is being done.73 The observation in the Arbitral Award of 2006 that the provision for an exchange of views provided for in article 283, paragraph 2, allows a disputant to opt out of a compulsory procedure by making a declaration of the kind envisaged in article 298, paragraph (1)(a)(i), is not persuasive, for a disputant need not, wait for negotiations to reach the stage envisaged in article 283, paragraph 2; it is open to a disputant seeking to avoid a compulsory procedure to make a declaration at any stage anterior to it. The alternate approach suggested above, in preference to the one followed by Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, avoids the need to give an expansive interpretation to articles 74 and 83 and to declare that the obligation under section 1 overlaps with the obligation under articles 73 and 84. Above all, it makes the obligations under section 1 uniformly applicable to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83. 2. Advisory Jurisdiction While the above account holds good in relation to contentious proceedings, the Tribunal is also empowered to give an advisory opinion on a “legal question if an international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention specifically provides for the submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an opinion”.74 It is open to the States concerned or an international organisation, if an international agreement so provides, to seek opinions of the Tribunal on, for example, what principles and rules of international law are applicable to the sea boundary delimitations in question on the basis of which the parties would be able to negotiate an agreed delimitation. It may be recalled that the ICJ discharged a similar task though in a contentious proceeding.75

72

Mox Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 95, para. 60.

73

Land Reclamation In and Around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, Separate Opinion of Judge Chandrasekhara Rao, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 36, para. 11.

74

Art. 138 of the Rules of the Tribunal.

75

North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 39, at pp. 46-52. 895


IV. Conclusion The Convention provides specific provisions with respect to the delimitation of the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. It requires that the delimitation of overlapping maritime zones must be effected by agreement on the basis of international law in order to achieve an equitable solution. It has not been easy for States to reach agreement on this “apparently simple and imprecise formula”. A majority of the overlapping maritime zones still remain to be fixed. Ambiguities in this regard affect various interests in the disputed areas concerning such matters as fishing, scientific research, oil spills and collisions and thereby reduce the efficacy of the Convention. There is, therefore, an element of urgency in regard to settlement of delimitation disputes. It is obvious that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations fall within the ambit of the dispute settlement procedures provided for in Part XV of the Convention. The obligations under section 1 of Part XV are omnipresent and are not cut down in any manner by articles 74 and 83 which do not lay down procedures for dispute settlement. Where disputes are not settled by recourse to voluntary procedures in section 1 of Part XV, compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions are invokable at the instance of any party to the dispute. Even a mixed dispute, referred to in article 298, paragraph 1(a)(i), involves, both by way of implication of what is provided for in the said article and also by way of necessary intendment of the Convention, the interpretation or application of the Convention and attracts, consequently, the procedures under Part XV. Any other view would render articles 15, 74 and 83 ineffective and should be eschewed. There is also the opposite view that a mixed dispute falls outside the scope of the interpretative mechanism of the Convention. The issue in this regard has yet to receive judicial attention. The application of the compulsory procedures in section 2 may, however, be blunted by a State making a declaration under article 298. It is significant that not many States have filed such declarations. It may be that a large majority of States Parties to the Convention still believe in the efficacy of the compulsory procedures for the settlement of delimitation disputes. As a general rule, compulsory procedures are available for the settlement of delimitation disputes. So far, sea boundary disputes have been the subject matter of decisions of the ICJ and awards of arbitration tribunals. In fact, the ICJ came into this field only in recent years. The Convention has established the Tribunal as a standing court for the settlement of all law of the sea disputes. The bodies referred to above enjoy the same kind of jurisdiction under article 288. They are likely to follow about the same or substantially the same legal approaches to delimitation disputes. There are, however, advantages in preferring settlement through standing courts rather than ad hoc bodies in terms of consistency of jurisprudence and costs. 896


The fact that delimitation disputes have earlier been decided by one adjudicative body and not the other should not be taken either as having established the superiority of that body over the others or as supporting the reservation of such disputes in favour of bodies having accumulated experience in deciding such disputes. A different view would support keeping delimitation disputes within the exclusive domain of arbitration, since it is the most ancient of all dispute settlement procedures with regard to the settlement of disputes relating to sea boundary delimitations. States would, of course, select a court or tribunal depending upon their perception of that body and, in particular, its capacity to conduct the proceedings expeditiously and to provide balanced solutions to disputes. The competence of the Tribunal’s judges in the field of the law of the sea is worthy of note. Equally important is the Tribunal’s access to entities other than States, including international organisations. There is the additional advantage that the Tribunal is also competent to give advisory opinions in regard to delimitation disputes. Independently of the compulsory jurisdiction of a court or tribunal referred to in article 287, States may also consider entering into special agreements for conferring jurisdiction on such bodies in regard to delimitation disputes, thereby giving greater precision to the scope of the dispute and focussing attention on the core issues of the dispute. Article 21 of the Tribunal’s Statute also provides a broad basis for the consensual jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

897

FROM PORT STATE TO COURT STATE? INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AS A POSSIBLE WEAPON TO COMBAT SUB-STANDARD SHIPS Robin Churchill*

I

t is both a pleasure and a great honour to contribute to this Liber Amicorum for Tom Mensah, whom I have known for more than 30 years. My contribution deals with two of the major preoccupations of Tom Mensah’s professional life – the safety of shipping and the settlement of disputes. I want to link these two matters by asking whether international litigation could be a worthwhile means to try to reduce the number of sub-standard ships sailing the seas. The premise of this chapter is that sub-standard ships remain a major problem, despite extensive efforts by the international community over many years to try to eliminate them. The cause of the problem is not, as is often the case in international law, a lack of appropriate legislation (in the shape of treaties) or the failure of States to ratify those treaties. There are, in fact, a number of treaties that contain detailed and demanding norms aimed at ensuring that ships are seaworthy and their crews well-trained. They include, in particular, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea1 (SOLAS), the International Convention on Loadlines2 (the Loadlines Convention) and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers3 (the STCW Convention), all of which were adopted

*

I am grateful to Mr Ho-Sam Bang, one of my Ph.D students, for supplying me with the information contained in Tables 1 and 2 at the end of this chapter.

1

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (opened for signature 1 November 1974, entered into force 25 May 1980) 1184 UNTS 2. The Convention has been amended on numerous occasions since its entry into force.

2

International Convention on Loadlines (opened for signature 5 April 1966, entered into force 21 July 1968) 640 UNTS 133.

3

International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (opened for signature 1 December 1978, entered into force 28 April 1984) 1361 UNTS 2. The Convention was extensively amended in 1995: see 1969 UNTS 41.



under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). These treaties have been very widely ratified – the SOLAS Convention is binding on 156 States, which collectively have 98.79 per cent of the world fleet by weight under their flags, the Loadlines Convention also binds 156 States (with 98.76 per cent of the world fleet) and the STCW Convention 150 States (98.78 per cent).4 Thus, the problem is not a lack of treaties or parties to them.5 Rather, it is that a significant number of States parties are unwilling or unable to take the necessary steps to ensure that ships flying their flag comply with the norms laid down in these Conventions, with the result that there are a significant number of sub-standard ships sailing the world’s oceans and presenting a threat to those on board, to other ships and to the marine environment. Although the international community has taken a variety of measures over a number of years to try to improve compliance with international safety standards by flag States, it will be argued that these measures have not yet succeeded in reducing the number of sub-standard ships to an acceptably low level. It is therefore worth considering other means to tackle the problem. One such possible means would be for a State concerned about sub-standard ships to utilise the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea6 (LOS Convention) and bring a case against a State having a significant number of sub-standard ships under its flag. Such a step has occasionally been suggested in passing,7 but, as far as I am aware, has not yet been explored in detail. The aim of this chapter is to make an initial contribution to exploring this matter, and to consider how feasible and worthwhile such international litigation might be in practice. The chapter consists of two main sections. The first seeks to justify the premise of the chapter set out above, while the second explores what would be involved in bringing a case under the LOS Convention dispute settlement machinery.

4

<www.imo.org/> (2 December 2006). The information given was correct at 31 October 2006.

5

This is not true of the conventions produced by the International Labour Organization (ILO) that deal with the welfare of seafarers. For reasons of space, these conventions are not considered in this chapter because they are of less direct relevance to the problem of sub-standard ships than the IMO Conventions referred to above.

6

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (opened for signature 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3.

7

See, for example, D. Fitzpatrick and M. Anderson (eds), Seafarers’ Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005), 123 and 126. This book is the product of a research project guided by a Steering Committee of which Tom Mensah was chair.

900

From Port State to Court State? International Litigation to Combat Sub-Standard Ships

I. Current International Measures to Address Sub-Standard Ships The premise of this chapter is, as was mentioned earlier, that current measures taken by the international community to address the problem of sub-standard ships have not (yet) succeeded in reducing the number of sub-standard ships to an acceptable level. To justify this premise, this section looks at the steps taken by the international community and seeks to assess their success in the light of such empirical data as exists. First, it is necessary to begin with some preliminary issues, by asking what is meant by a sub-standard ship, why sub-standard ships are undesirable, and why they exist. The term “sub-standard ship” is widely used, but it is not a term of art. For the purposes of this chapter, a sub-standard ship is considered to be a ship that fails to meet the standards of safety and seaworthiness laid down in the relevant conventions, particularly the SOLAS, Loadlines and STCW Conventions, to such a degree that that ship poses a significant risk of harm to the seafarers on board, to other ships and/or to the marine environment. This last point shows why sub-standard ships are undesirable. Seafaring is the most dangerous of all occupations in terms of the numbers of deaths and serious injuries as a percentage of those employed in it. At least 1500 seafarers die every year as a result of maritime disasters and occupational accidents, and many more are seriously injured.8 Although there are no figures relating to this matter, it is likely that a high proportion of these fatalities and injuries occur on sub-standard ships. Flag States with a poor record for the safety and seaworthiness of their ships (as revealed by port State control9) have an above average casualty rate for their ships. This suggests that sub-standard ships are not only a danger to those on board because they are more likely to sink or run aground than other ships, but also that they are more likely to be implicated in collisions with other ships. Furthermore, some, though by no means all, of the major environmental disasters caused by ships involve sub-standard ships. The extensive oil pollution caused by the break-up and sinking of the sub-standard Erika (in 1999) and Prestige (in 2002) are the two most recent examples. As to why sub-standard ships exist, the reasons are primarily economic. A shipowner can save money by not complying with the more demanding safety standards, by keeping manning levels low, and by employing as crew inadequately qualified seafarers from developing States. All these factors will reduce the costs

8

Fitzpatrick and Anderson (note 7), 32-33. There is a lack of comprehensive and detailed figures, something that has been severely criticised: see International Commission on Shipping, Final Report (2005), 5-6, available at <www.icons.org.au/pdfs/Report_27072005. pdf>. (8 December 2006).

9

See further below, section II 2. 901


of operating a ship, but they will, of course, also compromise its safety. However, as long as there are States that are prepared to register such ships under their flag, classification societies that are prepared to certify such ships as safe (a likelihood that has been fuelled by the growth of classification societies of doubtful repute), and insurers that are prepared to insure such ships, there is nothing to prevent or deter an unscrupulous shipowner from operating a sub-standard ship. This problem is compounded by the fact that the beneficial owner of a sub-standard ship can arrange for that ship to be legally owned by a single-ship company, whose only assets are the sub-standard ship. Thus, if the latter becomes liable for damage and that liability is not covered by insurance, the beneficial owner will not incur liability to pay for the damage from its other assets. These economic reasons for the existence of sub-standard shipping are well known.10 They are not, however, easily susceptible to being effectively addressed by law, or indeed other means, particularly given the international character of the shipping industry and the fact that in recent decades the industry has often been in economic recession. As far as law as a means of combating substandard ships is concerned, the use of national law, especially when used in isolation, is particularly ineffective because a shipowner can simply relocate its activities outside the jurisdiction of the State concerned, including setting up a ship-owning company in another State and registering its ships there. The use of international law is, in principle, more likely to be effective because of its transnational reach, but by its nature it cannot directly regulate non-State actors such as shipowners, insurers and classification societies.11 It can regulate only through the intermediary of a State, whether it be the territorial State, the State of nationality of individuals and companies, or the flag State. As already explained, the international community has had relatively little difficulty in adopting appropriate safety standards for ships and their crews. That has been the easier part. The more difficult has been seeking to ensure compliance 10

For extended discussion of the issue, see, for example, A.D. Couper, et al., Voyages of Abuse: Seafarers, Human Rights and International Shipping (Pluto Press, London 1999); International Commission on Shipping, Ships, Slaves and Competition (2001), available at <www.icons.org. au/images/ICONS-fullreport.pdf>. (last accessed on 5 December 2006); OECD, Competitive Advantages Obtained by Some Shipowners as a Result of Non-Observance of Applicable Rules and Standards (1996), available at <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/10/2754615.pdf> (last accessed on 5 December 2006); OECD, Maritime Transport Committee Report on the Removal of Insurance from Sub-Standard Shipping (2004), available at <www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/58/15/32144381.pdf> (last accessed on 5 December 2006); and A. Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006), 4-10, 34-45.

11

This is true even of the IMO’s much vaunted International Safety Management Code (ISM Code). Although the primary thrust of the Code is to impose safety requirements on ship owners and operators, implementation (and enforcement) of the Code is still through the medium of flag States.

902


with international standards. The primary responsibility for securing compliance with international safety standards lies with flag States. It has been clear for many years that quite a number of flag States are either unable or unwilling to take the necessary action to secure such compliance. The international community has taken a number of steps to address this issue. In 1992 the IMO set up a special committee to monitor implementation of its Conventions by flag States, and in 1997 adopted a set of Guidelines, which specify the means for flag States to establish and maintain measures for the effective application and enforcement of the relevant conventions.12 The 1995 amendments to the STCW Convention introduced for the first time a requirement on States parties to report to the IMO on their implementation of one of its conventions. Based on such reports, the IMO publishes a list of States parties that are deemed to have implemented the Convention satisfactorily. Unfortunately such a reporting system has yet to be extended to any other IMO safety conventions. Nevertheless, in 2005 the IMO adopted a voluntary Member State Audit Scheme under which a Member State may ask the IMO to audit the extent to which it complies with and enforces the provisions of IMO conventions to which it is a party.13 The scheme has yet to become operational, so it remains to be seen how far IMO members, especially the flag States of sub-standard ships, will avail themselves of it. It is obviously a drawback that the scheme is voluntary and lacks any mechanism to deal with such instances of non-compliance as are revealed by the audit.14 In 1986 UNCTAD attempted to strengthen the link between the flag State and its ships by adopting the UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships.15 This attempt was, however, unsuccessful as the Convention has not yet come into force and is unlikely ever to do so. The IMO has sought to address the problem of sub-standard classification societies by adopting guidelines on the authorization of classification societies by flag States.16 The most important steps to try to secure compliance of ships with international safety standards has been the increased emphasis on the powers of port State control given by the SOLAS, Loadlines and

12

IMO Assembly Res. A.847 (20) (1997). The UN General Assembly has also urged flag States without an effective maritime administration to establish or enhance the necessary machinery to ensure effective compliance with, and implementation and enforcement of, inter alia IMO safety conventions: see UNGA Res. A/58/240 of 23 Dec 2003, para. 27, reiterated in UNGA Res. A/59/24 of 17 Nov 2004, para. 38 and UNGA Res. A/60/30 of 29 Nov 2005, para. 47.

13

IMO Assembly Res. A.974 (24) (2005).

14

International Commission on Shipping (note 8), 12-13.

15

UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships (adopted 7 February 1986, not in force) (1986) 7 Law of the Sea Bulletin 87.

16

IMO Assembly Res. A.379 (18) (1993) and Res. A.789 (19) (1995). 903


STCW Conventions,17 their enhancement by means of amendments to those Conventions, and their co-ordinated exercise through regional memoranda of understanding (MoUs).18 In spite of all these steps taken to try to secure compliance with international safety standards and substantially reduce the number of sub-standard ships, the problem appears to be almost as intractable as ever. The most straightforward way to gauge the dimensions of the problem and the effects of measures to tackle it is to examine the record of inspections under the regional MoUs on port State control. Tables 1 and 2 (at the end of the chapter) give the numbers of deficiencies found and ships detained as a result of inspections under the Paris and Tokyo MoUs, the two most important regional MoUs in terms of the numbers of annual inspections and the length of time each MoU has operated.19 The figures in the tables need to be interpreted with some care. As regards deficiencies, the number of deficiencies per inspection is a relatively crude form of measurement as it treats each deficiency alike, although some deficiencies are likely to be much more serious than others. Secondly, the number of regulations for compliance with which ships are inspected has increased over the years. All other things being equal, one would expect this to lead to an increase in the number of deficiencies discovered, especially in the years immediately following the introduction of a new regulation. Thirdly, since the mid 1990s both the Paris and Tokyo MoUs have targeted inspections at ships, or types of ships, that are suspected of being more likely not to comply with international safety standards. Thus, one cannot compare the figures for earlier years with those for more recent years, and so it is difficult at present to determine any long-term trends. Nevertheless, if one looks at the figures since the mid 1990s it seems permissible to conclude that a long-term trend in the reduction of the number of deficiencies per inspection and the percentage of ships detained, and thus in the number of sub-standard ships, has not yet been established. It is true that since 2001 (in the case of the Paris MoU) and 2003 (in the case of the Tokyo MoU) there has been a decrease in both the deficiency and detention rates, but it remains too soon to say whether this is a long-term trend. In any case, it may not mark a global decrease in the number of sub-standard ships, but indicate instead perhaps that such ships have

17

ILO Convention No. 147 concerning Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships also provides important powers of port State control.

18

For a more detailed discussion of the steps just described, see, inter alia, P. Boisson, Safety at Sea – Policies, Regulations and International Law (Edition Bureau Veritas, Paris 1999), Z.O. Özcayir, Port State Control, 2nd edn (Lloyds of London Press, London 2004), and the publications listed in note 10.

19

More inspections are carried out every year under each of the Paris and Tokyo MoUs than all the other regional MoUs combined. Figures for the latter, comparable to those in Tables 1 and 2, exist only for the period since about 2000.

904


transferred their operations to other areas of the world where there are no, or less stringent, regional MoUs. Whatever the situation, it is surely of concern that in the case of both the Paris and Tokyo MoUs over a thousand ships a year are being detained because they are so sub-standard that it is not safe to allow them to proceed to sea without repairs being carried out first.

II. International Litigation as a Means of Combating Sub-Standard Ships If existing measures to tackle sub-standard ships have not reduced their number to an insignificant level, as the record of regional MoUs on port State control suggests is the case, this leads to a consideration of the central question of this chapter – could international litigation be a feasible and worthwhile means of combating sub-standard ships? At the outset it should be made clear that it is not being suggested for one moment that international litigation should replace existing measures or that it is superior to them. Rather, the aim is to see whether international litigation could be a useful supplementary measure. The three main conventions relevant to sub-standard ships that have been referred to above – the SOLAS, Loadlines and STCW Conventions – do not contain any provisions on dispute settlement, not even a provision urging States parties to settle their disputes by diplomatic means. Thus, there is no possibility under those Conventions for one State party to bring another State party before a judicial body, requesting it to find the defendant State in breach of one or more of those Conventions by reason of that State’s failure to ensure that its ships and their crews comply with the norms laid down in the Conventions in question. Nor does the IMO, under whose auspices the Conventions were concluded, have machinery for this purpose. A State party could bring a complaint of non-compliance before an arbitral tribunal or the International Court of Justice if a flag State having sub-standard ships agreed to this, but it seems extremely unlikely that such agreement would be forthcoming. A State could also refer a case unilaterally to the International Court of Justice if it had made a declaration under Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute (the optional clause) and the defendant State had done likewise. However, this is neither a very practical nor a particularly attractive option as very few flag States of sub-standard ships are parties to the optional clause and cases before the ICJ currently take upwards of five years on average before a judgment is given. An alternative, and very much more attractive, option, at least in theory, would be to utilise the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of the LOS Convention. Although a dispute settlement body of the LOS Convention would not have jurisdiction formally to determine allegations that a State was not complying with the SOLAS, Loadlines or STCW Conventions, it could effectively do so by other means, as will be explained. The attractions of

905


using the LOS Convention dispute settlement machinery as opposed to the ICJ is that it can be used against any of the current 152 parties to the LOS Convention, that the body hearing a case may be a specialist one, and that it will be very much quicker than the ICJ. To assess the practical utility of the LOS Convention dispute settlement machinery as a means of combating sub-standard ships, it is necessary to consider a number of questions: (1) of which provisions of the LOS Convention would it be most fruitful to allege a breach; (2) against which flag State(s) would it be most appropriate to consider bringing a case; (3) which would be the most appropriate State(s) to bring the case; (4) before which body would a case be brought; (5) what particular issues of procedure, evidence and proof would arise; (6) if the case was successful, what would the likely remedy be; and (7) is it likely that a successful case would have any effect on the behaviour of flag States and others involved in the operation of sub-standard ships? An attempt will now be made to answer each of these questions. 1. Which Provisions of the LOS Convention Might be the Subject of Litigation? The most obvious provision of the LOS Convention of which to allege a breach by the flag State of a substandard ship is article 94, which sets out various duties of flag States. Under paragraph 1 “every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag” (emphasis added). Paragraphs 3 and 4 go on to provide that every State shall take such measures for its ships as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard to the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; the manning of ships, labour conditions and training of crews; and the maintenance of communications and collision avoidance. Such measures shall include those necessary to ensure that a flag State’s ships are properly surveyed and have the necessary equipment for safe navigation and that the crew is properly qualified and required to observe international regulations concerning safety of life at sea, collision avoidance and pollution prevention. Most importantly, paragraph 5 stipulates that “in taking the measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is required to conform to generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any steps which may be necessary to secure their observance”. This last paragraph raises the question of what is meant by “generally accepted international regulations”. Similar rules of reference in the pollution prevention provisions in Part XII of the LOS Convention have given rise to considerable debate. In a masterly analysis of the question and a comprehensive survey of the existing literature, the International Law Association’s Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction relating to Marine Pollution has concluded that “generally accepted international regulations” include the SOLAS, Loadlines 906


and STCW Conventions, and that the effect of the rules of reference is to make them binding on parties to the LOS Convention that are not parties to the three conventions concerned.20 The advantage of the three Conventions being incorporated into the LOS Convention by reference as a result of article 94(5), and thus being binding on all parties to the LOS Convention, is that if litigation is commenced under the dispute settlement procedures contained in Part XV of the LOS Convention, it avoids any argument as to whether a LOS Convention dispute settlement body is seeking improperly to exercise jurisdiction under the SOLAS, Loadlines and STCW Conventions: clearly it would not be. It also avoids any debate about whether it is permissible to consider the three Conventions as applicable law. Under article 293(1) a LOS Convention dispute settlement body is required to apply the Convention and “other rules of international law not incompatible with” the Convention. There would be no need to consider whether the latter phrase could include the three Conventions – they would be applied as part of the LOS Convention. The effect of the incorporation of the SOLAS, Loadlines and STCW Conventions in the LOS Convention by reference is that a State party to the latter could successfully argue that another State party was not complying with article 94 of the LOS Convention if it was able to point to that other State’s non-compliance with one or more of the three Conventions, as revealed by inspections by port States. Another provision of the LOS Convention which might also be considered as the subject of litigation is article 91, which provides that there must be a “genuine link” between a State and the ships flying its flag. It could be argued that certain flag States, particularly flags of convenience, are in breach of article 91 because of the lack of a genuine link with the ships flying their flags. It is probably not worthwhile pursuing such an approach. There is no definition of “genuine link” in the LOS Convention and no consensus amongst States as to its meaning.21 An attempt by Guinea before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the Saiga case to argue that there was no genuine link between the Saiga and its flag State, St Vincent, was quite unsuccessful, the Tribunal concluding that the purpose of the genuine link requirement was “to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag State, not to establish criteria

20

Second Report of the Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction relating to Marine Pollution in International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Eighth Conference (International Law Association, London 1998), 372 at 378-382; and Final Report of the Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction relating to Marine Pollution in International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference (International Law Association, London 2000), 443 at 475-481.

21

For a detailed discussion of this question, see R.R. Churchill, The Meaning of the Genuine Link Requirement in relation to the Nationality of Ships. A Report prepared for the International Transport Workers’ Federation, 2000, available at <www.oceanlaw.net/hedley/pubs/ ITF-Oct2000.pdf>. 907


by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in a flag State may be challenged by other States”.22 As this statement suggests, it is preferable, and simpler, to allege that the flag State of sub-standard ships is not complying with article 94, rather than article 91. In any case, the flag States of sub-standard ships are by no means all flags of convenience. 2. Against Which State(s) Might Proceedings be Brought? It is obviously necessary that the putative defendant State be a party to the LOS Convention, although, as we have seen, it is not necessary that it should also be a party to the SOLAS, Loadlines or STCW Conventions. It would obviously be easier to prove a breach of article 94 if it could be shown that the defendant State had a record of consistent failure to ensure that its ships comply with the Conventions, rather than a few isolated instances of non-compliance. The Paris MoU on Port State Control publishes a “black list” of States that have a poor record of compliance as revealed by its members’ inspections. The obvious State to choose as a defendant would therefore be a State that features on recent black lists. The most recent black list produced by the Paris MoU, which is based on inspections and detentions for the period 2003-2005 inclusive, contains no fewer than 18 States.23 Of these, five (Cambodia, North Korea, Syria, Taiwan and Turkey) are not parties to the LOS Convention. The remaining 13, in order of degree of poorness of performance, are Albania, Tonga, Honduras, Comoros, Georgia, Slovakia, Bolivia, Algeria, Lebanon, St Vincent, Brazil, Egypt and Ukraine. The Tokyo MoU also publishes a black list. Its most recent black list covers the same period as the Paris MoU list.24 Five of the 13 LOS Convention parties appearing on the Paris list also appear on the Tokyo list, namely Honduras, Bolivia, Egypt, Georgia and Tonga.25 The most appropriate State to select as a defendant would therefore be either a State on both the Paris and Tokyo lists (although Tonga and Bolivia might be discounted on the basis that the number of inspections of

22

M/V Saiga (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (Merits) (Judgment of 1 July 1999), para. 83, (1999) 38 ILM 1323.

23

The list is available at <www.parismou.org/upload/anrep/BlackGreyWhitelist%20 2005%2027-06-20061.pdf> (17 October 2006).

24

Annual Report on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region 2005, 29-30, available at <www.tokyo-mou.org/> (17 October 2006).

25

Three of these States (Honduras, Bolivia and Georgia) appear on the shipping industry’s list of flag States with the most negative performance indicators. Most of the other 14 States on this list feature on either the Paris or Tokyo black lists. See Maritime International Secretariat Services Ltd., Shipping Industry Flag State Performance Table, available at <www. marisec.org/flag-performance/FlagStatePerformanceTable2005.pdf> (8 December 2006).

908


their ships was much smaller than those of the other States) or a State near the beginning of one of the lists. 3. Which State Might Bring Proceedings? Since what is being contemplated is use of the dispute settlement machinery of the LOS Convention, the State bringing the proceedings must obviously be a party to the Convention. Such a State must be able to show that a dispute exists between it and the putative defendant State. In the Headquarters Agreement case the ICJ explained that a dispute exists, inter alia, “where one party to a treaty protests against the behaviour or decisions of another party, and claims that such behaviour or decision constitutes a breach of the treaty”.26 The potential applicant State must therefore first notify the putative defendant State that it considers the latter’s conduct to breach article 94 before instituting dispute settlement proceedings under the LOS Convention. As explained below, the applicant State must also seek to resolve the dispute through consensual means before resorting unilaterally to binding third party settlement. A further question is whether any State party to the LOS Convention can bring a case against any other party over an alleged breach of article 94. There is no actio popularis in international law. A State instituting dispute settlement procedures must therefore be able to show that it has sufficient legal interest in the matter. Is simply being a party to the same multilateral treaty sufficient, or must the State be able to show that it has some direct interest in the putative defendant State’s alleged breach of article 94, for example because its coasts have been polluted by the sub-standard ships of that State or its nationals killed or injured as a result of the poor quality of that State’s ships? The latter situation clearly gives the would-be applicant State a sufficient interest. But the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts27 suggest that a State party to the LOS Convention that had not been materially harmed by the sub-standard ships of the putative defendant State, although not an “injured State”, would be able to invoke the responsibility of the defendant State under article 48. The latter provides that any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State if inter alia “the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group.” Clearly, the obligations under article 94 are owed to a group of

26

Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 (Advisory Opinion) [1988] ICJ Reports 12, 28. See further J. Collier and V. Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999), 10-14.

27

Report of the 53rd Session, International Law Commission (2001), GAOR 56th Sess., Suppl. 10. 909


States (the States parties to the LOS Convention). They are also established to protect a collective interest of the States parties, namely their interest in the safety of shipping. Thus, any State party to the LOS Convention may institute legal proceedings against any other party in respect of alleged breaches of article 94. According to paragraph 2 of article 48, States parties doing so which are not injured States may claim only cessation of the breach of article 94 and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition of the breach. A State that had a material interest (in the sense explained above) in the defendant State’s alleged non-compliance with article 94 or that as a port State inspecting ships of the defendant State had become exasperated by the latter’s poor quality shipping, would be more likely in practice to consider instituting legal proceedings than States without such interests. It is unlikely that the latter would want to be bothered with the effort and expense of bringing a case, however strongly they might feel about the problem of sub-standard shipping, unless they considered that the outcome of any proceedings would have a significant effect on the behaviour of flag States of sub-standard ships. This latter point is considered below. It also has to be recognised that States whose nationals beneficially own shipping registered with sub-standard flag States – and quite a number of OECD States come into this category – are extremely unlikely to consider undertaking litigation against such flag States. Where a State was minded to litigate, it would find it easier to do so if it was a party to a regional MoU, especially the Paris or Tokyo MoU, because (as will be explained below) this would facilitate the collection of evidence to show non-compliance with article 94. States, particularly less well-off States, might be more willing to institute legal proceedings under the LOS Convention dispute settlement machinery if encouraged and helped by NGOs with an interest in combating sub-standard shipping. There are precedents for such NGO support for international litigation. It was at least in part in response to lobbying and advice from NGOs that the World Health Organization and the UN General Assembly decided to request advisory opinions from the ICJ on the legality of nuclear weapons.28 4. Some Procedural Issues Under the dispute settlement machinery of Part XV of the LOS Convention, it is not possible for a State party unilaterally to refer a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the LOS Convention for binding third-party settlement immediately such a dispute arises. An attempt must first be made by the parties to the dispute to settle it by agreed diplomatic or judicial means, in accordance with section 1 of Part XV. Article 283 provides that when a dispute

28

See N. Grief, The World Court Project on Nuclear Weapons and International Law, 2nd edn (Aletheia Press, Northampton MA 1993).

910


arises, “the parties to the dispute shall proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means”. The parties are also to proceed to a second exchange of views where they have failed to settle the dispute by such means. In a number of applications for provisional measures under article 290(5) of the LOS Convention, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (hereafter ITLOS), in assessing whether prima facie the tribunal due to consider the merits of the case would have jurisdiction, has commented on the scope of article 283. It has taken the view that despite its language, article 283 requires only a single expeditious, and not a double, exchange of views and that the applicant State is not obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching an agreement have been exhausted.29 The ITLOS also appears to consider that as long as there has been an expeditious exchange of views, further negotiations are not necessary.30 If the ITLOS is correct in its views of article 283 (and it should be noted both that these views have been expressed in provisional measures applications, where there is less opportunity for consideration of the matter than in the main proceedings on the case, and that the views of the ITLOS have been criticised31), it would seem that the State initiating the dispute settlement procedures of the LOS Convention against a flag State of sub-standard ships over the latter’s alleged unsatisfactory application of article 94 need do little more than exchange views with the flag State over the matter. In this context paragraph 6 of article 94 is relevant. It provides that a State “which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and control with respect to a ship have not been exercised may report the facts to the flag State. Upon receiving such a report, the flag State shall investigate the matter and, if appropriate, take any action necessary to remedy the situation.” A putative applicant State which contacted the intended defendant State under article 94(5) would, in doing so, probably satisfy the requirements regarding an exchange of views under article 283. Such a step would also show that a dispute existed if this had not already been established, as explained above. Unless it became clear from its response that the defendant flag State intended to put its house in order as far as sub-standard ships were concerned, the putative applicant State would also be able to show that there was no prospect of the 29

Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999), paras 56-61 (1999) 38 ILM 1624; MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001), para. 60 (2002) 41 ILM 405; and Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) (Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003), paras 37-38, available at <www.itlos.org>.

30

This is the implication of the order of the ITLOS in the Land Reclamation case. For justifications for such a conclusion, see the separate opinions of Judges Jesus and Ndiaye.

31

See, for example, N. Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005), 33 and 63. 911


dispute over the application of article 94 by the defendant State being resolved by agreed diplomatic or judicial means. It could therefore at that stage proceed to invoke the compulsory binding dispute settlement procedures of section 2 of Part XV of the LOS Convention. 5. Before Which Body Would the Case be Brought? If both the applicant and defendant States had made declarations under article 287 of the LOS Convention selecting one or more of the ITLOS, the ICJ, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention or a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII as their preferred means for hearing disputes brought under section 2 of Part XV of the LOS Convention and their choices coincided, that would be the means for dealing with the dispute. If their choices did not coincide or if neither or only one of them had made a declaration under article 287, the dispute would be heard by an Annex VII arbitral tribunal. Only about a quarter of the parties to the LOS Convention have so far made declarations under article 287, so statistically the likelihood is that a case concerning an allegation of non-compliance with article 94 of the LOS Convention would be heard by an Annex VII arbitral tribunal. There would, however, be nothing to stop the parties to the dispute agreeing to transfer the hearing of the dispute from the Annex VII tribunal to the ITLOS. There would, in fact, be some advantages in doing so, principally the saving of the States concerned from the effort and expense of finding and paying for arbitrators, premises and officials to service the arbitration. Arbitration does, of course, have the advantage that the parties to a dispute may choose the arbitrators, but almost the same advantage could be obtained if the case was referred to a chamber of the ITLOS, rather than the full Tribunal, because the parties could in practice choose the judges for that chamber. Although their choice would be limited to the 21 judges of the ITLOS, together with any judges ad hoc, that ought to be sufficient to enable the parties to select three or five judges with whom they were happy and in whom they both had complete confidence. The only reason why the parties to a dispute might prefer arbitration would be if they wanted to employ a procedure significantly different from that of the ITLOS (which seems a little unlikely) or if they did not wish proceedings before the arbitral tribunal to be made public (which again seems unlikely in the case of allegations of non-compliance with article 94). 6. Issues of Evidence and Proof The burden of proof would be on the applicant State to show that the defendant State had not complied with its obligations under article 94 to ensure that its ships and their crews complied with international standards relating to the safety and seaworthiness of ships and the training and qualifications of seafarers. There are a number of ways in which the applicant State could seek to show this. The first 912


and most obvious would be to point to the record of inspections of the defendant State’s ships under the Regional MoUs on Port State Control. The data bases of these MoUs will have details concerning the deficiencies found on the defendant State’s ships during inspections by port States and concerning the detention of ships too unsafe to proceed to sea. Secondly, the applicant State may be able to obtain the records of inquiries into shipping casualties of the flag State. Under paragraph 7 of article 94 a flag State is obliged to hold an inquiry into every marine casualty or incident of navigation concerning one of its ships that involves serious injury or loss of life to the nationals of another State, serious damage to the ship of another State, or serious harm to the marine environment. Failure to hold such an inquiry would itself, of course, be a breach of article 94. Thirdly, it is possible that the reporting procedures in relation to the various ILO conventions involving the safety and well-being of seafarers, which require the parties to such conventions to report to the ILO on their implementation and application, would reveal breaches of article 94 by the flag State. Fourthly, information about crewing conditions on board the defendant flag State’s ships could be obtained from trade union bodies (notably the International Transport Workers’ Federation) and charitable bodies working with seafarers. Finally, it is possible that some information held by classification societies relating to the surveying and condition of ships is in the public domain, although no doubt much such information is protected by commercial confidentiality. Overall, it would seem that it should not be too onerous for an applicant State to assemble a convincing dossier of evidence to show that the defendant State was not complying with article 94. 7. Possible Remedies If a case was successful and the defendant State was shown to be in breach of article 94, the question would arise as to what remedies would be available. As explained above, a State that, in the terminology of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, was not an “injured State”, could obtain no more than a declaration stating that the defendant State was in breach of article 94. If a State was “injured” and it, its nationals or its ships had suffered loss as a result of the actions of one or more ships registered in the defendant State and those actions could be shown to be due to the failure of the defendant State to comply with article 94, compensation (damages) could also be claimed. There is no provision for punitive or exemplary damages in international law. 8. The Possible Effect of a Successful Case on the Behaviour of Flag States The crucial question, and one that determines whether a State would consider it worthwhile to invoke the dispute settlement procedures of the LOS Convention, is whether a successful case would be likely to have any effect on the behaviour of the defendant State, of other States that allow sub-standard ships to operate 913


under their flag, or indeed of owners and operators of sub-standard ships. A case that resulted simply in a declaration that the defendant State was in breach of article 94 would effectively be little more than an exercise in “naming and shaming”. As such, it would add little to the condemnation of being named and shamed by being put on the black list of a regional MoU, except perhaps that a finding of non-compliance with article 94 by a LOS Convention dispute body, especially the ITLOS or the ICJ, might carry more weight and attract more publicity. Whether it would compel the defendant State to put its house in order is more doubtful. The amount of political or legal pressure that could be applied to induce that State to accept the consequences of the court or tribunal’s judgment that it had to exercise its flag State responsibilities more effectively would appear to be fairly limited. What might have more effect would be if shipowners got fed up with their ships always being targeted for inspection by port States because of flying the flag of a State that had been condemned for being in breach of article 94, and decided to register their ships elsewhere. Of course, they might simply re-register their ships under the flag of a State that required no stricter observance of safety standards but had succeeded in attracting less bad publicity and therefore was less likely to be targeted as much. A case that resulted in the award of damages against the defendant State – or, indeed, even the threat of such a case – might have some deterrent effect and persuade that State to exercise its flag State responsibilities more seriously, especially if it was a relatively poor State. Again, the consequences might simply be that shipowners would desert that State for a different, but no more reputable, flag, so that there would be no diminution in the number of sub-standard ships. Would successful litigation against one sub-standard flag State have any effect on the behaviour of other States with sub-standard ships on their registers? This would seem to be likely only if such States felt that they, too, would have legal proceedings taken against them. Given the number of sub-standard flag States, it seems extremely unlikely that all, or indeed even many, of them would be targeted as the objects of litigation for non-compliance with article 94 of the LOS Convention. Such a sub-standard flag State would probably conclude, therefore, that the threat of being proceeded against was not sufficiently great to warrant it changing its behaviour and exercising its flag State responsibilities more effectively, especially as this might lead to a loss of income from ship registration if the owners of ships under its flag decided to re-register their ships elsewhere so as to avoid the imposition of the higher, and therefore costlier, safety standards that would result from it exercising its duties more responsibly. Overall, therefore, it appears rather unlikely that utilising the dispute settlement machinery of the LOS Convention against sub-standard flag States would actually make much impact on the problem of sub-standard ships. Nevertheless, it might still be worth bringing a test case to see whether this conclusion is too pessimistic.

914


Table 1: Inspections under the Paris MoU, 1986-2005

Total number of inspections

Number of deficiencies per inspections

Total number of ships detained

No. of ships detained as a %age of the total no. of inspections

1986

11,740

1.34

307

2.6

1987

11,451

1.45

280

2.4

1988

11,224

1.35

295

2.6

1989

12,459

1.49

344

2.8

1990

13,955

1.62

441

3.2

1991

14,379

1.80

525

3.7

1992

14,783

1.84

588

4.0

1993

17,294

2.49

926

6.4

1994

16,964

3.14

1,597

9.4

1995

16,381

3.32

1,837

11.2

1996

16,070

3.36

1,719

10.7

1997

16,813

3.17

1,624

9.7

1998

17,643

3.28

1,598

9.1

1999

18,399

3.30

1,684

9.2

2000

18,559

3.65

1,764

9.5

2001

18,681

3.68

1,699

9.1

2002

19,766

3.49

1,577

8.0

2003

20,309

3.54

1,431

7.0

2004

20,316

3.16

1,187

5.8

2005

21,302

2.93

994

4.7

Year

Source: Annual Reports of the Paris MoU

915


Table 2: Inspections under the Tokyo MoU, 1994-2005

Total number of inspections

Number of deficiencies per inspection

Total number of ships detained

No. of ships detained as a %age of the total no. of inspections

1994

8,000

1.8

282

3.5

1995

8,834

2.2

524

5.9

1996

12,243

2.6

689

5.6

1997

12,957

3.2

830

6.4

1998

14,545

3.6

1,061

7.3

1999

14,931

3.4

1,071

7.2

2000

16,034

3.6

1,101

6.9

2001

17,379

4.0

1,349

7.8

2002

19,588

3.8

1,307

6.7

2003

20,124

4.2

1,709

8.5

2004

21,400

3.4

1,393

6.5

2005

21,058

3.5

1,097

5.2

Year

Source: Annual Reports of the Tokyo MoU

916

THE 2006 BARBADOS/TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO MARITIME DELIMITATION (JURISDICTION AND MERITS) AWARD Barbara Kwiatkowska

I. Introductory Remarks: Some Memories and Progressing “Judicial Habit”

I

t is a great pleasure to dedicate this chapter in honour of inaugural President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the triennium 1996-1999 and eminent member of that Tribunal in 1996-2009 – Judge Thomas A. Mensah, whose presidency over the ITLOS as an autonomous treaty organ within the United Nations system coincided with then newly assumed African leadership of the United Nations by Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan.1 Judge Mensah’s friendship as one of the principal architects of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), coupled with hospitality of his charming wife Akoss and enhanced by his 20-year membership in Advisory Board of our Yearbook of International Organizations and the Law of the Sea and by our continuing, joint contributions to the Rhodes Academy of Oceans Law and Policy, count amongst the most valued, stimulating and rewarding relationships in my professional life.2 My previous essay on the State practice of Ghana written

1

1 ITLOS Yearbook 1996-1997, 23, 29 (1999); Statement of First President Thomas A. Mensah at the 10th ITLOS Anniversary, coupled with Statements of ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins, UN Legal Counsel Nicolas Michel and current ITLOS President Rüdiger Wolfrum, and with Symposium on The ITLOS Jurisprudence: Assessment and Prospects, ITLOS Press Release No. 105 of 29 September 2006; and ITLOS First Regional West Africa Workshop, Dakar, Senegal, 31 October – 2 November, ITLOS Press Release No. 106 of 6 November 2006 at <www.itlos.org>. On UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s four visits to the ICJ in 1997-2006 and on the 2006 Cameroon/Nigeria Agreement as a landmark event completing his term of office, see infra notes 16, 23.

2

International Organizations and the Law of the Sea – Documentary Yearbook of the Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea (NILOS), Editor-in-Chief B. Kwiatkowska, Co-Editors A.H.A.



in 1994 in Judge Mensah’s honour as the then newly elected President of the famous Law of the Sea Institute (LSI) at University of Hawaii, has been recently relied upon in a valuable survey of African State practice concerning the outer continental shelf beyond 200 miles, which supported my suggestion that Ghana is in a position to make a Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) by 2009.3 It was also a distinct honour for me to accompany Judge Mensah during his visit to one of the principal architects of the modern oceans regime, Judge Andres Aguilar-Mawdsley of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). And after the election of Judges Thomas Mensah and Rüdiger Wolfrum as the ITLOS President and Vice-President respectively, inauguration of the Tribunal’s judicial activity by the 1997 M/V Saiga (Prompt Release) Judgment4 was welcomed in

Soons, A. Oude Elferink, E. Molenaar and H. Dotinga, Vols 1-18 (1985-2005) at <www. brill.nl/product_id18776.htm> and <www.law.uu.nl/nilos>. For Rhodes Oceans Academy, see Virginia Center for Oceans Law and Policy (COLP) at <www.virginia.edu/colp> and NILOS Biennial Report 2004–2005 at <www.uu.nl/content/biennial0405.PDF>; and for the Rhodes Oceans Academy’s 11th Session, 2-21 July 2006, see <www.virginia.edu/ colp/pdf/DraftSchedule.pdf>. 3

B. Kwiatkowska, Some Remarks on Africa, with Particular Reference to the State Practice of Ghana, in T.A. Mensah ed., Ocean Governance: Strategies and Approaches for the 21st Century, 511-539, esp. 520 (LSI: Honolulu 1996), as relied upon by Nigerian E. Egede, The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf: African States and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 35 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 157-178, esp. 159-160, 167 (2004). See also K.-D. Ali, Legal and Policy Dimensions of Coastal Zone: The Case of Ghana, id. at 179-194 and Ghana’s Legislation at <www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/africa. htm>. On the CLCS, see infra notes 49-52.

4

1997 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea M/V Saiga (Prompt Release) Judgment (ITLOS Case No. 1), 37 ILM 360 (1998) and B.H. Oxman, 92 AJIL 278 (1998); followed by the 1998 M/V Saiga (Provisional Measures) Order and the 1999 M/V Saiga (Jurisdiction and Merits) Judgment (both forming ITLOS Case No. 2), 37 ILM 1202 (1998), 38 ILM 1323 (1999) and B.H. Oxman and V. Bantz, 94 AJIL 140 (2000). After the 1997 M/V Saiga Judgment, the parties requested then President Thomas A. Mensah to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to article 3(e) of the LOS Convention Annex VII, but thanks to his diplomatic skills, the action was discontinued and the M/V Saiga Case No. 2 was transferred to the ITLOS. See Sir E. Lauterpacht CBE QC, The First Decision of the ITLOS: The M/V Saiga, in G. Hafner ed., Liber Amicorum Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern 395-418 (1998); B. Kwiatkowska, Inauguration of the ITLOS Jurisprudence: The Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea M/V Saiga Cases, 30 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 43-77 (1999). On the controversial issue of the legal regime of bunkering of the fishing vessels, which the Tribunal did not find necessary to resolve in the 1999 M/V Saiga (Jurisdiction and Merits) Judgment, see appraisal by ITLOS Judge (1996-2006) David Anderson, The Regulation of Fishing and Related Activities in Exclusive Economic Zones, in E. Franckx and Ph. Gautier (eds), The Exclusive Economic Zone and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982-2000 31-49 (Bruylant 2003); K.M. Braide, The Political Economy of Illegal Bunkering in Nigeria (2004) at <www.nigerdeltacongress.com/particles/political_economy_of_illegal_bun.htm>. For

918

The 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Delimitation (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award

Statement to the 53rd United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) of our another illustrious friend, then ICJ President Stephen M. Schwebel, as “a notable event in the life of international courts” and as a testimony that “the judicial habit may stimulate healthy imitation”.5 Significantly, it was the M/V Saiga case, the phase of merits of which was, thanks to President Mensah’s diplomatic skills, transferred in 1998 from an LOS Convention Annex VII Tribunal to the ITLOS, that subsequently marked the first reliance in ICJ proceedings upon the ITLOS jurisprudence.6 President Schwebel’s appreciation of the ITLOS practice and his optimistic concept of “judicial habit” progressing amongst international courts, have been reiterated in the illuminating 2002 Message delivered by the ICJ on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the LOS Convention and in the 2006 Statements of current ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins, and have been substantiated by the practice of not only the ITLOS but meanwhile also five LOS Convention Annex VII Arbitral Tribunals; the latter including:

comparative survey of ITLOS decisions, see Y. Tanaka, Prompt Release in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Some Reflections on the ITLOS Jurisprudence, 51 NILR 237-271 (2004) and 2006 Symposium on The ITLOS Jurisprudence: Assessment and Prospects, supra note 1. 5

Statement of ICJ President Stephen M. Schwebel to the 53rd UNGA, UN Doc. A/53/PV.44, 27 October 1998, at 1-5; ICJ Yearbook 1998-1999, 316-323 (No. 53); ICJ Presidents at <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/iprstats.htm>. See also Statement of ICJ President Schwebel to the 54th UNGA, id. and UN Doc. A/54/PV.39, 26 October 1999, at 1-5; ICJ Yearbook 1999-2000, 282-288 (No. 54), welcoming the creation of specialised international tribunals as making “international law more effective” and reiterating that: “[a] greater range of international legal fora is likely to mean that more disputes are submitted to international judicial settlement. The more international adjudication there is, the more there is likely to be; the ‘judicial habit’ may stimulate healthy imitation”; as analysed by B. Kwiatkowska, The Law of the Sea Related Cases in the International Court of Justice During the Presidency of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel (1997-2000) and Beyond, 2 Global Community YB Int’l L. & Jurisprudence 27, 32-34 (2002 Vol. I) at <www.oceanalaw.com/ main_product_details.asp?ID=298>, revised as of 3 November 2006 at <www.law. uu.nl/nilos> – Publications, Online Papers; and infra notes 7, 11-16, 106; Statement of ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins at the 10th ITLOS Anniversary on 29 September 2006 at <www.itlos.org>; her Statement to the 61st UNGA of 26 October 2006 at <www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2006/ga10523.doc.htm> and <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ iprstats.htm>; and her views quoted infra note 37. On the 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award having dismissed the Annex VII Tribunal’s jurisdiction on a sole ground of the LOS Convention article 281, which was not adjudged upon by the ITLOS in the process of upholding a prima facie jurisdiction, see infra notes 34-42. On Former ICJ President Schwebel’s important contribution aimed at accelerating the US approval of the LOS Convention, see his Chairmanship of the 2006 Roundtable Discussion in Remembrance of Louis B. Sohn, infra note 18.

6

Iran v. United States Oil Platforms (Merits) Hearings, CR 2003/13, 33 [US Counsel Murphy, 26 February 2003], quoting the 1999 M/V Saiga (Jurisdiction and Merits) Judgment, and CR 2003/14, 34 [Counsel Pellet, 28 February 2003] at <www.icj-cij.org>. 919


– the inaugural Australia/New Zealand v. Japan Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal under Judge Schwebel’s presidency, followed by the Ireland v. United Kingdom Mox Plant Tribunal under Judge Mensah’s presidency, which both involved the doctrine of treaty parallelism between dispute settlement procedures laid down in “an umbrella” LOS Convention Part XV and “self-contained” clauses agreed in its implementing treaties that fall within the ambit of “sister” articles 281-282, – one more environmentally focused Malaysia v. Singapore Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor Arbitration under Christopher Pinto’s presidency, which was discontinued due to the parties having reached the 2005 Settlement Agreement, – as well as the two Annex VII Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana/ Suriname Tribunals, which were presided over by Judge Schwebel and former ITLOS President Dolliver Nelson respectively and whose 2006 and 2007 Awards adjudged equitable maritime boundary delimitation jointly with certain preliminary objections which were raised regarding jurisdiction of these Tribunals by Trinidad and Tobago (and also Barbados), and by Suriname.7

7

Message from the International Court of Justice on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, conveyed to the 57th UNGA on behalf of then ICJ President Gilbert Guillaume by one of the LOS Convention’s principal architects, Judge Raymond Ranjeva, ICJ Press Release No. 2002/38, 10 December 2002 at <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipreven. htm>; UN Doc. A/57/PV.70, 9 December 2002, at 18-19. See also Message from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea of 9 December 2002, conveyed on behalf of then ITLOS President Nelson by another of such principal architects, Judge Alexander Yankov, id. at 19-21 and <www.itlos.org>. On the 2000 Annex VII Southern Bluefin Tuna (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Award (ICSID) and the Annex VII Ireland v. UK Mox Plant Arbitration (PCA), coupled with the 2003 OSPAR Ireland v. UK Mox Plant Award (PCA) and the 2006 European Commission v. Ireland Mox Plant Judgment (ECJ), see infra notes 34-42. On the 2005 Annex VII Malaysia v. Singapore Award (PCA), including Settlement Agreement, see infra note 35. All these three environmentally focused cases were coupled with provisional measures prescribed by the ITLOS under LOS Convention article 290(5), pending establishment of the respective Annex VII Arbitral Tribunals. For analysis of the 2002 ICJ Message [supra], in the context of the Annex VII Arbitrations and Judge Schwebel’s concept of “judicial habit” [supra note 5], see B. Kwiatkowska, Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation, as Exemplified in the Work of the International Court of Justice During the Presidency of Judge Gilbert Guillaume (2000-2003) and Beyond, 5 Global Community YB of Int’l L. & Jurisprudence 51, 85-92, 164-171 (Vol. I 2005) at <www.oceanalaw.com/main_product_details.asp?ID=417>; and B. Kwiatkowska, The World Court and Peaceful Settlement of Oceans Disputes, in D. Freestone and R. Barnes (eds), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects 433-457 (2006) at <www.oup.co.uk/ catalogue/?ci=9780199299614>.

920


The significance of this jurisprudence for compulsory jurisdiction over contentious cases examined further below in the context of the 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award’s holdings, has been paralleled by two important suggestions aimed at enhancement of advisory jurisdiction. One of them is the suggestion promoted by three consecutive ICJ Presidents Stephen M. Schwebel, Gilbert Guillaume and Shi Jiuyong (1997-2006) as supported by Shabtai Rosenne and other authorities, who have appreciated the virtue in enabling other international tribunals – both those which are organs of the United Nations (such as the ICTY or the ICTR) and those which are not (such as the ITLOS or the ICC) – to request advisory opinions of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations on issues of international law that arise in cases before those tribunals and are of importance to the unity of international law.8 In view of the prospective ratification of the LOS Convention by the United States, it seems noteworthy that the suggestion to authorise the ITLOS to request such advisory opinions from the ICJ was originally made by members of the US delegation at an early stage of the travaux préparatoires of

8

Statement of ICJ President Schwebel (54th UNGA), supra note 5, at 3-4, adding that the ITLOS (or the ICC), if they so decide, could “request the United Nations General Assembly – perhaps through the medium of a special committee established for the purpose – to request advisory opinions of the Court” and P.H.F. Bekker, The 1999 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice, 94 AJIL 412, 415 (2000); as supported by, inter alia, UN Legal Counsel Hans Corell, The Feasibility of Implementing The Hague/St. Petersburg Centennial Recommendations Under the UN System, in Peaceful Resolution of Major International Disputes 31-48 (UN 1999); Statement of President Jacques Chirac of France, ICJ Press Release No. 2000/7, 29 February 2000 at <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ ipresscom/ipreven.htm>; Statements of ICJ President Gilbert Guillaume to the 55th UNGA, ICJ Press Release No. 2000/36, 26 October 2000, at 5, to the 56th UNGA, UN Doc. A/56/ PV.32, 30 October 2001, at 4, and to the 57th UNGA, UN Doc. A/57/PV.37 (2002), at 4 (also Russia’s Statement, at 5), ICJ Press Release No. 2002/29, 29 October 2002, at 6, reprinted in ICJ Yearbook 2000-2001, 319-326 (No. 56) and ICJ Yearbook 2001-2002, 308-313 (No. 57); ICJ Presidents at <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/iprstats.htm>; Statement of ICJ President Shi Jiuyong to the 6th Committee of the 59th UNGA (2004), id., summarised in Press Release GA/L/3266 of 5 November 2004, pp. 5-6 at <www. un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/gal3266.doc.htm>. See also, e.g., R. Etinski, Appearance of Specialized Tribunals and the Question of the Balanced Application of International Law, 1 Facta Universitatis 389, 391 (2000) at ; Sh. Rosenne, The Perplexities of Modern International Law, 291 RdC 132-133 (2001); B.H. Oxman, Comments on the “Horizontal” Growth of International Courts, in ASIL, The Legalization of International Relations, Proceedings of the 96th Annual Meeting, Washington D.C., 13-16 March 2002 373, 375-376 (2002); G. Guillaume, La Cour internationale de Justice a l’aube du XXIeme siecle: Le regard d’un juge 43-45 (Editions A. Pedone 2003); Kwiatkowska, ICJ President Guillaume’s Triennium (2005), supra note 7, at 88-90; Sh. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005 39-40 (4th edn 2006). See also references to preliminary rulings infra note 40. 921


the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference.9 Another suggestion was made by Judge Mensah’s former Vice-President (1996-1999) and current ITLOS President Rüdiger Wolfrum (2005-2008), who drew the attention of the 60th UNGA to various means of utilising the jurisdictional powers of the ITLOS and its Chambers, including the possibility of by ITLOS giving advisory opinions on maritime delimitation or other legal issues, if an agreement related to the purposes of the LOS Convention (concluded in pursuance of articles 20-21 of its Annex VI, ITLOS Statute) so provided.10 Along with judgments and possible (as envisaged above) advisory opinions of the ICJ, the ITLOS and the ECJ, as well as awards of the Annex VII and other Arbitral Tribunals, the progressing “judicial habit” is also revealed by States resorting to settlements through various other third-party fora, such as the OAS Belize/Guatemala Territorial and Maritime Mediation or the UN Secretary-General Guyana/Venezuela, Cameroon/Nigeria and Gabon/Equatorial Guinea Good Offices promoted within the framework of the United Nations Charter,11 and in frequent reliance by States on the possibilities of third-party settlements in numerous other ongoing disputes. The last-mentioned can be exemplified by the oft-resurfacing Greece/Turkey intention to resubmit their Aegean Sea territorial, delimitation and navigational disputes to the ICJ, which, along with the ITLOS, are also being suggested as a means of resolution of, for example, recently revived East and Southeast Asian disputes involving Takeshima/Tok-do (Liancourt) Rocks and Senkaku/Diaoyu (Chunxiao Gas Field) Islands,12 or fisheries controversies caused

9

J.R. Stevenson and B.H. Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AJIL 1, 32 (1974), as quoted by Oxman, supra note 8, at 375-376. On the possible approval of the LOS Convention by the United States and on its prospective choice of Annex VII Arbitration, see infra note 18.

10

Statement of ITLOS President Rüdiger Wolfrum at the 60th UNGA, ITLOS Press Release No. 101, 30 November 2005 at <www.itlos.org>, also noting discussion on his suggestions at Round Table on Advisory Proceedings Before the ITLOS held at the United Nations on 29 November 2005; and his Statement at the 16th SPLOS, 19 June 2006 at <www. un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sea1860.doc.htm>. See also generally the 2002 ITLOS Message from President Nelson on the 20th UNCLOS Anniversary, supra note 7; T. Treves, A System for Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement, in The Law of the Sea (2006), supra note 7, at 417-432; Luncheon Address of President Rüdiger Wolfrum, Reflections on the 10th ITLOS Anniversary, at the 2006 ASIL Symposium In Remembrance of Louis B. Sohn, infra note 18.

11

See infra notes 88, 103.

12

Greece/Turkey Aegean Sea Disputes: Italy/Turkey Island of Castellorizo Delimitation Order, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 51 (1933); Greece v. Turkey Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Interim Measures) Order and Greece v. Turkey (Jurisdiction) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1976, 3 and 1978, 3; Former Greek President Stephanopoulos’ Suggestion on the “Package Solution” through the ICJ of 2 June 2006 at <www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=126450>; Japan/China Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands (Chunxiao Gas Field): East Asia Row of 25 April 2006 at ; Japan’s Provocation of China (including Map of their overlapping claims) of 7 June at <www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=32897> and 30 August 2006 at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t269599.htm> and <en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands>; Japan/South Korea Takeshima/Tok-do (Liancourt) Rocks: 27 April 2006 at ; South Korea Calls for Stronger Defence against Japan of 22 June at <www.brunei-online.com/bb/fri/ jun23w15.htm>; Inconclusive Talks of 5 September 2006 at <www.rigzone.com/news/ article.asp?a_id=35854> and <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liancourt_Rocks>. 13

IWC: Australia v. Japan Whaling: Japan Led Coalition Wins Pro-Whaling Vote of 20/21 June 2006 at , ; Samoa Wants New Zealand and Japan to Resolve Whaling of 6 September 2006 at <www.nzherald.co.nz/section/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10399878>; infra note 47; and current news at .

14

See supra notes 5-9.

15

See infra notes 38-42. 923


victory for the rule of law and a model for the resolution of similar conflicts in Africa and elsewhere.16

II. The Course of the Proceedings and the Procedural and Substantive Complexity of the 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award 1. The Course of the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Proceedings The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago dispute emerged during nine rounds of negotiations concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Western, Central and Eastern sectors of their overlapping claims to the continental shelf and 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Caribbean Sea (five rounds) and associated questions posed by the continuing access of Barbadian fisherfolk

16

Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening; Land and Maritime Boundary (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, 303 – the maritime boundary delimitation is dealt with in the Judgment’s paras 226-307 and operative para. 325 IV (dispositif); P.H.F. Bekker, The 2002 Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening Judgment, 97 AJIL 387-398 (2003); J.R. Crook, The 2002 Judicial Activity of the ICJ, id. at 354-355; J.G. Merrills, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Merits, Judgement of 10 October 2002, 52 ICLQ 788-797 (2003); Kwiatkowska, ICJ President Guillaume’s Triennium (2005), supra note 7, at 134-140, 150-163, 170-171; Kwiatkowska, ICJ President Schwebel’s Triennium (2002), as updated on 3 November 2006, supra note 5, at 50-53 and 64-70, including references in her note 178 to: United Nations Fifth Summit on 12 June 2006 held with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan <www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/index.shtml> in New York and Cameroon/ Nigeria Agreement on Nigeria’s Withdrawal from Bakassi Peninsula and Other Measures Completing Implementation of the 2002 ICJ Judgment [supra] of 12 June 2006 at <www. un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18825&Cr=cameroon&Cr1=nigeria> and the Agreement’s text at <www.cameroon-info.net/cmi_show_news.php?id=17737>, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Statement at <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/ afr1397.doc.htm>, <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10511.doc.htm> and <www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2083> and his Press Conference <www.un.org/ apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=884>, Cameroon/Nigeria Joint Communique of 12 June 2006 at <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sg2113.doc.htm> and British FCO Minister for Africa Lord Triesman’s Statement at <www.gnn.gov.uk/Content/Detail.asp?Releas eID=207343&NewsAreaID=2>; Nigeria Hands Cameroon Formal Control of Bakassi Peninsula under UN-Sponsored Deal of 14 August 2006 at <www.un.org/apps/news/ story.asp?NewsID=19509&Cr=cameroon&Cr1=nigeria> and ; UNSG Letter to the UNSC President, UN Doc. S/2006/778 of 29 September 2006 and UNSG Kofi Annan Hails Steady Cameroon/Nigeria Demarcation Progress of 6 October 2006 at <www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20163&Cr =Nigeria&Cr1=Cameroon>. On UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Visits to the ICJ, see infra note 23.

924


to flying fish stocks south of prospective equidistance in the Western sector (four rounds). Having understood the negotiations to be deadlocked when, according to Barbados, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago declared on 16 February 2004 the issue of the maritime boundary “intractable” and invited Barbados to proceed, if it so wished, with arbitration,17 Barbados invoked the compulsory arbitration provisions of Part XV, section 2 of the LOS Convention.18 Upon its establishment, the Annex VII Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitral Tribunal, which comprised President Stephen M. Schwebel, Sir Arthur Watts, Mr Ian Brownlie, and Professors Francisco Orrego Vicuña and Vaughan A. Lowe, adopted the Rules of Procedure and issued in 2004 four Orders, followed by joining 17

On the contention of Barbados that Trinidad’s Prime Minister Manning characterised the maritime boundary dispute as “intractable”, and challenged Barbados to take it to arbitration, statements that Trinidad and Tobago denied were ever made, see 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 56, 68, 75, 100 and Hearings Day 1, 36-66 [Examination of Witness Teresa Marshall, 17 October 2005], 74 [Counsel Reisman], Day 2, 49 [Co-Agent Volterra, 18 October], Day 5, 10 [Reisman, 24 October], Day 6, 61 [Agent Mottley, 25 October 2005] at <www.pca-cpa.org/>.

18

Since neither of the parties had made a declaration under article 287 of the Law of the Sea Convention, they were deemed to have accepted pursuant to “Riphagen (or Montreux) clause” of article 287(3), arbitration in accordance with Annex VII. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, reprinted in 21 ILM 1261 (1982) (entered into force 16 November 1994). For the current status of the Convention and the Agreement for the Implementation of its Part XI, see UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS) at <www.un.org/Depts/los/>. On the prospective US choice of Annex VII Arbitration, see United States: President’s Transmittal of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI to the U.S. Senate with Commentary of 7 October 1994, 34 ILM 1393, 1399 (1995) and M.A. Browne, The Law of the Sea Convention and U.S. Policy 8, 13-14 (4 August 2005) at <www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05aug/IB95010.pdf>. On importance attached by the United States to the CLCS, see infra note 49. See also the Roundtable Discussion: Should the United States Join the Convention? If So, What Are the Prospects?, chaired by Former ICJ President Stephen M. Schwebel, with participation of US Ambassador David A. Balton, John Noyes and Edwin Willamson at the ASIL Symposium in Remembrance of Louis B. Sohn: The Law of the Sea in the Twenty-First Century, George Washington University Law School, Washington D.C., 24 October 2006 at <www.asil.org/pdfs/sohnprogram1. pdf>, as followed by President G.W. Bush’s Statement on Advancing US Interests in the World Oceans of 15 May 2007 at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070515-2.html>, , <www.asil.org/ilib/2007/05/ilib070521.htm> and . On concerns of the United States that its ratification of the LOS Convention could harm the ability to board ships engaged in the transportation of terrorists or weapons of mass destruction (WMD), see Press Release of the US National Center for Public Policy Research of 10 August 2006 at <www.nationalcenter. org/PRNPA542LawoftheSeaTreaty0806.html> and the Report by D.A. Ridenour, Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty: A Not-So-Innocent Passage, at <www.nationalcenter.org/ NPA542LawoftheSeaTreaty.html>; Proliferation Security Initiative at <www.state.gov/t/ np/c10390.htm>. 925


of Trinidad and Tobago’s Preliminary Objections to the phase of Merits,19 and by holding of the Hearings (including cross-examination of witnesses) in London on 17-28 October 2005.20 The vital interests of the two States in valuable oil and

19

On such a joinder occurring in the practice of the ICJ and other courts in cases involving reasonable probability of upholding jurisdiction, see Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Hearings Day 1, supra note 17, 22-23 [Counsel Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, 17 October 2005] and, e.g., Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea M/V Saiga (Jurisdiction and Merits) Judgment (ITLOS Case No. 2), 38 ILM 1323 (1999), Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Jurisdiction and Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, and the 2007 Annex VII Guyana/Suriname Maritime Delimitation (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award, President L.D.M. Nelson, PCA at <www.pca-cpa.org/>. For examples of decisions confined to jurisdiction which was not upheld, see the 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award and the ICJ Judgments quoted infra notes 24 and 32. Notwithstanding the joinder of all Preliminary Objections to the Merits, every aspect of numerous jurisdictional and likewise substantive issues remained notably contentious until the closing day of the Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago Oral Hearings, supra note 17. See Day 7, 10 [Counsel Greenwood, 27 October 2005].

20

The Tribunal’s Rules and Orders Nos 1-4 were placed directly on the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), Peace Palace, The Hague, which agreed to serve as the Registrar at <www.pca-cpa.org/>. After delivery of the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Delimitation (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award (UN Law of the Sea Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, 11 April 2006), all the written pleadings (Memorial, Counter-Memorial, Reply and Rejoinder) and transcripts of the Hearings (Days 1 to 8, 17-28 October 2005) were – along with the Award – posted at the PCA website as well. For the Award’s text, see also 45 ILM 800 (2006) at <www.asil.org/resources/ilm.html>. For the Award’s dispositif with Maps, see UN Law of the Sea Bulletin 99-106 (2006 No.61). For CVs of Arbitrators, see President Stephen M. Schwebel ICJ Yearbook 1999-2000, 49-50 (No. 54); <www.icj-cij. org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icvjudge/Schwebel.html>; Johns Hopkins University at <www.sais-jhu.edu/programs/ir/intlaw/index.html> and <www.willamette.edu/wucl/ news/2003_04/16.htm>; Transnational Dispute Management’s Editors at <www. transnational-dispute-management.com/editors/content.htm>; Sir Arthur Watts KCMG QC at <www.20essexst.com/bar/q_watts_a/watts.htm> and <www.dow.cam.ac.uk/ www_server/Fellows/A.D._Watts.html>; Ian Brownlie CBE QC at <www.blackstonechambers. com/cv.asp?StaffID=25>; Vaughan A. Lowe at <www.essexcourt.net/index.cfm?do=viewBa rrister&barristerID=47>; Francisco Orrego Vicuña at <www.rzuser.uni-heidelberg,de/~p00/ english/cv_orrego.html>; Hydrographer D.H. Gray and PCA Registrar Anne Joyce assisted by Dane Ratliff. For a summary of the 2006 Award’s decisions, see the main text accompanying infra notes 26-31; ASIL/ILIB of 28 April 2006 at <www.asil.org/ilib/2006/04/ilib060428. htm>; and UN Secretary-General Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/61/63/ Add.1, paras 175-176 (2006). For the 2006 Award’s analysis, see B. Kwiatkowska, The 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Case Report, 101 AJIL 149-157 (2007); Session 4 on “From Jan Mayen Judgment to Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award” (26 June 2006), IBRU Workshop on Options for Unlocking Maritime Boundary Disputes, Paris, 26-28 June 2006 at <www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/workshops/2006/maritime.html>; Lectures of B. Kwiatkowska on “The 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award” (11 July 2006) at the 11th Rhodes Academy of Oceans Law and Policy, Rhodes, Greece, 2-21 July 2006 at <www.virginia. edu/colp/pdf/DraftSchedule.pdf> and her Tribute in Remembrance of Louis B. Sohn at the

926


fishery resources and high intensity of the factual and legal (both procedural and substantive) contentions forcefully disputed by the parties as represented by the leading international counsel,21 were accompanied by a number of procedurally incidental issues that arose in the context of confidentiality of the proceedings and treatment of evidence.22 2. The Procedural and Substantive Complexity of the 2006 Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award The unanimous Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Delimitation (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award was rendered on the eve of the 60th Anniversary of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), celebrated with the participation of UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan on 12 April 2006,23 and the posting after the

2006 ASIL Symposium, supra note 18; Y. Tanaka, The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Case Report, 21 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 523-534 (2006 No. 4). 21

The Barbados team included: Agent Mrs Mia A. Mottley QC, Co-Agent Robert Volterra, Counsel and Advocates Sir Elihu Lauterpacht CBE QC [founder and honorary Director of the Cambridge Research Center at <www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/about_the_centre/sir_elihu_lauterpacht.php> and <www.20essexst.com/bar/q_lauterpacht_e/lauterpacht.htm>], Michael Reisman, Jan Paulsson, Sir Henry Forde QC, Stephen Fieta and other experts, while the Trinidad and Tobago team included: Agent John Jeremie, Co-Agents John Almeida and Laurie Watt, Counsel James Crawford SC [current Cambridge Centre’s Director at <www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/people/professor_james_crawford.php>], Christopher Greenwood CMG QC, Samuel Wordsworth and other experts.

22

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 10, 349, noting dismissal in mid-2004 (pursuant to practice of not allowing intervention in arbitrations) of neighbouring Guyana’s request for an access to then confidential written pleadings, which could perhaps lead to its attempted intervention into arbitral proceedings, and which access to the pleadings both parties did not agree to afford Guyana [infra note 61]; Award’s paras 11-18 and 106, referring to “self-help” of Barbados with respect to Trinidad’s four oil blocks, Barbados’ Memorial, paras 89-91 and Trinidad’s Rejoinder, paras 171-180 and the Tribunal’s Orders 2, 3 and 4, which rejected Trinidad’s request for disclosure of information on this “self-help” (with Trinidad not having resubmitted that request); Award’s paras 21-28, 53 and 110-113, referring to objections raised in early 2005 by Barbados (as contested by Trinidad) to the admissibility of the Joint Reports recording the five-year confidential negotiations and Trinidad’s Rejoinder, paras 11-28, which Reports Barbados ultimately agreed to admit to the proceedings; Award’s paras 32-36, concerning submission (on Barbados’ initiative) by both parties of certain supplementary evidence shortly prior to the Hearings and Day 5, 33-34 [Co-Agent Volterra, 24 October 2005]; Award’s para. 39, quoting the President’s Statement requesting the parties to observe confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings in connection with the Trinidad’s press reports published in the course of the Hearings and Day 5, 4-6 [Co-Agent Volterra, 24 October 2005], 36 [President Schwebel], 71-72 [Volterra].

23

60th ICJ Anniversary, including Statements of UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan and ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins, 12 April 2006 at <www.icj-cij.org/60/index.htm>, 927


Award’s delivery on the Internet of not only its text but also its voluminous written and oral pleadings marked the unprecedented instance of allowing public access to inter-State arbitral proceedings involving boundary delimitation.24 Although this arbitration was instituted on the unilateral application of Barbados, whose proposal for simultaneous exchange of pleadings was rejected by Trinidad and Tobago to the advantage of sequentially filed pleadings, it is important to note that the Award’s title (also repeated on the title pages of all pleadings) does not use the term “versus” but states: “Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration Between: Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago – Award of the Arbitral Tribunal” (emphasis added). This, in combination with the joining of the Preliminary Objections to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to the phase of Merits and with not only filing of those Objections by Trinidad and Tobago but also filing of one Objection by Barbados, justifies the use of slash (“/”) instead of versus (“v.”) in the abbreviated title of the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award on the PCA website, as accordingly used in the present chapter and elsewhere.25 The substantial 385-paragraph Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award has a format and composition closely modelled upon ICJ Judgments, with “the total comprising a unity”.26 It commences:

as alluded to in the 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 223, quoted infra note 65. On previous visits of UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan to the ICJ during triennium of President Stephen M. Schwebel on 2-3 March 1997 and 17 May 1999, see ICJ Press Releases No. 1997/5, 24 February 1997 and No. 1999/21, 17 May 1999 at <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipreven.htm>; and during triennium of President Gilbert Guillaume on 22 November 2002, see id. and ICJ Press Release No. 2002/35. 24

See supra note 20. On the previously established precedent of direct public access to all pleadings of the inaugural Annex VII Southern Bluefin Tuna (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Award, President Stephen M. Schwebel [39 ILM 1359 (2000); 119 ILR 508]; ICSID at <www.worldbank.org/icsid/>, as also allowed in the next environmentally focused OSPAR and Annex VII Ireland v. United Kingdom Mox Plant Arbitrations (PCA), see B. Kwiatkowska, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case Report, 95 AJIL 162-171 (2001). The Southern Bluefin Tuna precedent of public access to the pleadings was also followed in the case of the 2005 Belgium/Netherlands Iron Rhine Award, President Rosalyn Higgins (ICJ President in 2006-2009), PCA at <www.pca-cpa.org/> and <www.asil.org/ilib/2005/06/ ilib050614.htm>.

25

PCA website, supra note 20 and on the Barbados proposal concerning simultaneous exchange of pleadings, see 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 7. On the joining of Preliminary Objections to the phase of Merits, see supra note 19; and on one such Objection raised by Barbados, see infra note 49.

26

Sh. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1997 1585-1590 (3rd edn 1997) and 1920-2005 1531-1536 (4th edn 2006).

928


– with the introductory qualités comprising the formal history of the proceedings and narrative of the facts as well as the arguments of the parties concerning both jurisdiction and merits, which are presented in a helpful form of questions raised by many specific procedural and substantive issues disputed in this complex case, followed by the final submissions of the parties (Chapters I-III, paras 1-187).27 The subsequent 198-paragraph legal reasoning of the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal deals: – with Preliminary Objections to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (Chapter IV, paras 188-218), and – with Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation (Chapters V-VIII, paras 219-383 and Technical Report), which comprises general considerations concerning applicable law and the delimitation process (Chapter V, paras 219-245), followed by three sectors of the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago boundary. While the short Central segment of about 16-mile equidistant line was not disputed by the parties and is thus dealt with in one paragraph (Chapter VII, para. 294), the delimitation in two other disputed sectors is addressed by 136 paragraphs of the Award dealing with the Western sector (Chapter VI, paras 246-293) and the Eastern sector (Chapter VIII, paras 295-383). The Award ends: – with the operative clause (dispositif), comprising three decisions concerning jurisdiction (para. 384), as well as two decisions related to maritime delimitation (para. 385(1)-(2)) and one decision committing the parties to resolve the issue of Barbados access to fisheries within Trinidad and Tobago’s EEZ (para. 385(3)), and is signed for purposes of authentication by President Schwebel, the four Arbitrators and the Registrar. Since the parties differed as to whether the maritime boundary and fisheries negotiations were part of a single negotiating process/dispute or separate negotiations/disputes, Trinidad and Tobago, which supported the latter option, contested in its 2004 Preliminary Objections the Annex VII Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the grounds both of non-fulfillment of preconditions laid down in Part XV, section 1 for resorting to section 2 procedures and of automatic exclusion from those procedures of fisheries disputes by virtue of article 297(3) of section 3. Barbados, for its part, considered fisheries as an inherent part of the dispute over the EEZ/continental shelf (CS) delimitation falling within the Tribunal’s

27

See id. at 1585 (1997) and 1531 (2006), noting with respect to the qualités that “[f]requently overlooked, this is an essential element, since it places what follows in context”. 929


jurisdiction, which, however, in Barbados’ view (contested by Trinidad), could not cover the outer continental shelf beyond 200 miles that was claimed by Trinidad and Tobago in areas overlapping with the EEZ claimed by Barbados in the Eastern sector. By means of its notably complex and unanimous resolution, the Annex VII Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitral Tribunal dismissed Trinidad’s objections and upheld its jurisdiction over delimitation of the overlapping EEZ/CS areas of the parties in accordance with LOS Convention articles 74/83, which it effected by means of the drawing of a single, equidistance-based boundary.28 Whereas the single boundary line so construed did not involve overlapping areas of the outer continental shelves extending beyond 200 miles, the Tribunal concluded that, as a matter of principle, it had – as Trinidad and Tobago contended and Barbados contested – jurisdiction over such a delimitation as well.29 The Tribunal also upheld its jurisdiction to consider the possible impact upon a prospective delimitation line of Barbadian fishing in waters affected by the delimitation.30 Given that the Tribunal excluded actual applicability of such an impact in the instant case and thereby separated the fisheries issues from the dispute over maritime boundary delimitation, the Award’s dispositif upheld Trinidad’s preliminary objection that by virtue of article 297(3), the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to render a substantive decision as to the fisheries regime in waters forming part of Trinidad and Tobago’s EEZ. Therefore, and since Barbados’ dependence on straddling stocks of flying fish has kept fisheries controversies at the heart of these proceedings, the five-Member Tribunal unanimously found it appropriate to adjudge that both parties are under a duty codified in article 63 to agree upon

28

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, dispositif paras 384(i) and 385(1)-(2), referring to the list of pertinent points set forth in para. 382, illustrative Maps VI-VII and Technical Report of the Tribunal’s Hydrographer, D.H. Gray, attached to the Award. As Award’s para. 382(3) and Technical Report specify, the geographical coordinates and azimuths of the boundary line are related to the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84) geodetic datum. The Tribunal’s single boundary starts from the tripoint between Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and it ends at the intersection of the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago boundary with Trinidad and Tobago/Venezuela Treaty’s boundary. According to dispositif para. 385(2), “[c]laims of the Parties inconsistent with this Boundary are not accepted”. In accordance with practice conforming with LOS Convention articles 75/84, the coordinates of the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago single boundary were deposited by the parties with the UNDOALOS’ Charts and Lists of Geographical Coordinates at <www.un.org/Depts/los>.

29

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, dispositif para. 384(ii) and illustrative Maps II-IV. On the Award’s use of the term “outer continental shelf ”, which the Arbitral Tribunal preferred over the term “extended continental shelf (ECS)” used by the parties, see para. 65 no. 4 and Hearings Day 4, 91 [Counsel Crawford, 21 October 2005].

30

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, dispositif para. 384(iii).

930


measures of conservation and management of these stocks and to negotiate in good faith and conclude a new fisheries agreement.31

III. Jurisdiction of the LOS Convention Annex VII Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago Arbitral Tribunal In deciding for the first time upon its compulsory jurisdiction (la compétence de la compétence) over the maritime delimitation dispute32 pursuant to article 288(4) of Part XV, section 2 of the LOS Convention, the Annex VII Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitral Tribunal recalled the parties’ general obligation codified in articles 279-280 of section 1 to settle their disputes by peaceful means of their own choice within the framework of the United Nations Charter,33 as paralleled by the requirements laid down in identical articles 74/83(1)-(2) that the EEZ/ CS delimitation has to be effected “by agreement on the basis of international law” and that if this cannot be reached “within a reasonable period of time”, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV. The Tribunal then approached – from two important perspectives – provisions of section 1 (in particular “sister” articles 281-282 and article 283), coupled with articles 74/83, in terms of preconditions of resorting unilaterally, where no settlement has been reached through the agreed means, to the compulsory procedures of section 2 in pursuance of article 286.

31

Id. and dispositif para. 385(3). See also UN Doc. A/61/63/Add.1, para. 176 (2006), supra note 20.

32

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 196-198, stating that the Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago dispute concerned legal rules and the resulting boundary line being applicable to their EEZ/CS delimitation “on the basis of international law”, as referred to in articles 74/83; and Award’s paras 272-277. This definition of Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago dispute conforms with the ICJ definition of the dispute, in Cameroon v. Nigeria (Preliminary Objections) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, 314-315, para. 87; as reaffirmed by Liechtenstein v. Germany Certain Property (Preliminary Objections) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, 18, para.24 and Democratic Republic of Congo v. Rwanda Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Jurisdiction) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2006, para.90 at <www.icj-cij. org>.

33

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 200(i). See also the emphasis on the importance of LOS Convention articles 279-280 by the 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award, supra note 24, para. 53; and Sh. Rosenne, Provisional Measures in International Law 123-124 (2005), stressing that article 279 commences Part XV by proceeding from the basic principle that States Parties shall settle their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the LOS Convention by peaceful means in accordance with article 2(3) of the UN Charter, and by using means indicated in Charter’s article 33(1). 931


1. “Sister” Articles 281-282 and Articles 74/83 First, noting that LOS Convention article 282, which covers standing bilateral or multilateral treaties providing for the resort to compulsory procedures that can apply in lieu of section 2 procedures, was of no relevance to the instant dispute, the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal made an unprecedented pronouncement concerning preconditions set forth in its “sister” article 281.34 Bearing in mind the fact that in the 2003 ITLOS Malaysia v. Singapore (Provisional Measures) Order, ITLOS considered application of article 281 to the agreement of both parties that their negotiations would be without prejudice to Malaysia’s right to proceed with Part XV, section 2 procedures, the Five-Member Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal now not only authoritatively alleviated this application to the status of general rule enshrined in article 281, but also placed it into the inter-related context of articles 74/83 by clarifying that: “Article 281 is intended primarily to cover the situation where the Parties have come to an ad hoc agreement as to the means to be adopted to settle the particular dispute which has arisen. ... In the present case the Parties have agreed in practice, although not by any formal agreement, to seek to settle their dispute through negotiations, which was in any event a course incumbent upon them by virtue of Article 74(1) and 83(1). Since their de facto agreement did not exclude any further procedure [as is required by Article 281(1)], and since their chosen peaceful settlement procedure – negotiations – failed to result in a settlement of their dispute, then both by way of Article 74(2) and 83(2) and by way of Article 281(1) the procedures of Part XV are applicable” (emphasis added).35

34

See the 2001 Ireland v. United Kingdom Mox Plant (Provisional Measures) Separate Opinion of one of the most influential architects of the LOS Convention, then ITLOS President Dolliver Nelson, paras 5-6 [41 ILM 405 (2002); <www.itlos.org>], recalling that the 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award, supra note 24, para. 59, found that the requirements of article 281(1) had not been met, forcefully stressing that: “[t]he point being made here is that it is in the requirements contained in articles 281 and 282 that can be found the crucial test whereby there can be any resort to the compulsory procedures embodied in Part XV, section 2. In other words the bar created by these Articles can only be circumvented when the requirements are met”; as also emphasised in Mox Plant (Provisional Measures) Separate Opinion of another principal LOS Convention architect, Judge David Anderson, para. 1.

35

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 200 and the Tribunal’s preceding holdings in paras 193-199 on articles 74/83. See also the Malaysia v. Singapore Land Reclamation In and Around the Straits of Johor (Provisional Measures) Order, 8 October 2003, President L.D.M. Nelson, paras 54-57 at <www.itlos.org>, in which the ITLOS found that both parties agreed pursuant to article 281 that their negotiations would be without prejudice to Malaysia’s right to institute the Annex VII Arbitration or to request the ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures. For the 2005 Annex VII Malaysia v. Singapore Award,

932


The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago holdings quoted above enhance the compulsory jurisdiction – be it of Annex VII Tribunals, the ICJ or the ITLOS – over maritime delimitation and other LOS Convention-related disputes and provide an important clarification of the scope of agreements falling within the ambit of article 281 which has been hotly debated in a follow-up to the 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Award. While the Annex VII Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal dismissed its jurisdiction to the advantage of the “self-contained” dispute settlement clause of the 1993 Southern Bluefin Tuna Convention (article 16, modelled upon article XI of the Antarctic Treaty) on a sole ground of article 281, which was entirely disregarded by the 1999 ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional Measures) Order,36 this dismissal raised the issue of number of

including Settlement Agreement, see PCA at <www.pca-cpa.org/> and Singapore MFA at . On the unquestioned absence in the UNCLOS III travaux préparatoires of any support whatsoever for the sometimes mistakenly advanced argument in the literature that exclusion by the agreements falling under article 281 of “any further procedure” (under Part XV, section 2) should – as this article does not specify – be “express”, see M.H. Nordquist, Sh. Rosenne and L.B. Sohn (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 – A Commentary, Vol. V, 22-24 [article 281] (1989); and works of Kwiatkowska, Rosenne and McDorman quoted infra note 37. 36

Accordingly, the again sometimes mistakenly advanced argument in the literature that the 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award contradicted the ITLOS’ interpretation is misplaced in that the ITLOS did not in its 1999 Order rely upon article 281, which was entirely disregarded in its legal reasoning [the Award could, thus, not contradict an interpretation which did not exist]. See also Southern Bluefin Tuna Award’s paras 65-69, stressing significant role played by the 1999 ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional Measures) Order [38 ILM 1624 (1999)] in efforts aimed at resolution of the dispute. Note that given a low standard of prima facie jurisdiction, its upholding does not require the ICJ or ITLOS “to satisfy itself beyond doubt that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case”. See, e.g., the eight Legality of Use of Force (Provisional Measures) Orders, ICJ Reports 1999, 140, 273, 374, 433, 492, 557, 671, 773, which upheld prima facie jurisdiction and which were followed by the eight 2004 Legality of Use of Force (Jurisdiction) Judgments at <www.icj-cij.org>, which dismissed jurisdiction over the merits of these cases; Sh. Rosenne, Settlement of Disputes, a Linchpin of the Convention: Reflections on Fishery Management Disputes, in UN Proceedings of the 20th Anniversary Commemoration of the Opening for Signature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 110, 127 (57th UNGA: New York 2002) at <www.un.org/Depts/los>, rightly stresses that: “[a]ny talk of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitral Tribunal ‘overriding’ the decision of ITLOS is utterly baseless, because prima facie jurisdiction to presecribe provisional measures pending the determination of the case and unreserved jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case are two entirely different legal concepts”. Along with apparent non-acquaintance of some law of the sea authors with these obvious aspects of the settlement of oceans disputes within the framework of the UN Charter, their misconceptions concerning the Southern Bluefin Tuna case also partly result from as innovatory and anomalous authorisation given by LOS Convention article 290(5) to decide on prima facie jurisdiction and that over the merits by the two distinct 933


other special treaties implementing the LOS Convention, which, like the 1993 Convention, could be considered as “excluding any further procedures” of LOS Convention Part XV, section 2, being applicable mutatis mutandis to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement.37 The Trinidad/Barbados and Tobago Tribunal’s present clarification quoted above that article 281 is intended “primarily” not to cover standing agreements but “ad hoc agreements” between States to settle their maritime boundary or any other disputes by negotiations, means a bright future for compulsory jurisdiction in that it logically follows that the potential bar posed by “self-contained” clauses of standing agreements, such as the 1993 Southern Bluefin Tuna Convention, is very limited. This clarification is particularly welcome in a situation that compulsory procedures on unilateral request agreed in special treaties (articles 292 EC and 192-193 Euratom) falling under “sister” article 282 were determined by the 2006 European Commission v. Ireland Mox Plant Judgment of the European Court Justice (ECJ) as posing a serious bar to LOS Convention compulsory procedures, which in this case was the suspended Annex VII Ireland v. United Kingdom (ITLOS and Annex VII Tribunal) courts, as criticised by ICJ President Higgins in her essay quoted infra note 37. 37

For an analysis of doctrinal debates – in a follow-up to the 1999 ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional Measures) Order (Cases Nos 3/4), 38 ILM 1624 (1999) and 94 AJIL 150-155 (2000), and the 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award, supra note 24 – on special treaties falling within the ambit of LOS Convention article 281, see contributions in N. Ando and R. Wolfrum (eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda (2002) by President Stephen M. Schwebel, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, at 743-748 and by Chusei Yamada, Priority Application of Successive Treaties Relating to the Same Subject Matter, id. at 763-771; B. Kwiatkowska, Case Report, supra note 24 and The Australia and New Zealand v. Japan Southern Bluefin Tuna (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Award of the First Law of the Sea Convention Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, 16 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 239-293 (2001) at <www.brill. nl/product.asp?ID=18253> and B. Mansfield, Letter to the Editor-in-Chief: Comments on Professor B. Kwiatkowska’s Article, id. at 361-366, updated as of 15 June 2006 at <www. law.uu.nl/nilos> – Publications, Online Papers; Rosenne, Settlement of Disputes (2002), supra note 36, at 110-145; Judge Rosalyn Higgins (ICJ President in 2006-2009), The ICJ, the ECJ and the Integrity of International Law, 52 ICLQ, 1, 18-19 (2003), stressing that “the arbitrators concerned, the President of whom was a former Judge of the International Court, made copious and knowledgeable reference to the jurisprudence of the International Court in carrying out their task”, and that “all that this case shows is how anomalous it is for the Law of the Sea Convention to have given the Hamburg Tribunal under article 290(5) injunctive powers in respect of cases always intended by the parties to go elsewhere for their merits to be determined”; B. Kwiatkowska, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitral Tribunal Did Get It Right: A Reply to David A. Colson and Peggy Hoyle, 34 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 369-395 (2003); T.L. McDorman et al., International Ocean Law 413-423 (2005) at <www.cap-press.com/books/1247>; Kwiatkowska, The World Court (2006), supra note 7, at 433-457 at <www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/?ci=9780199299614>; T. Treves, A System for Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement, in The Law of the Sea, supra note 7, at 417-432; Rosenne, The Law and Practice (2006), supra note 26, at 33-34, 38, 1398.

934


Mox Plant Arbitration.38 In view of strong concern displayed in the Mox Plant Judgment over a risk of ruling by Annex VII or any judicial or arbitral forum other than the ECJ on the scope of obligations imposed on EU Member States by Community law (of which the LOS Convention forms a part), it seems that even an option of joint institution by Ireland and Britain of the Mox Plant proceedings outside the Community judicial system would perhaps not in case of this EC law dispute par excellence, be legitimate, despite the consent-based ending clause (“unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree”) of LOS Convention article 282 providing that the parties can jointly agree to use another procedure than those laid down in their special treaties.39 The 2005 Belgium/Netherlands Iron 38

On the Mox Plant dispute, which in accordance with the doctrine of treaty parallelism expounded by the 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award, raised the issue of the applicability pursuant to LOS Convention article 282, of the ECJ’s exclusive jurisdiction under articles 292 EC Treaty and 193 Euratom Treaty over disputes between the EU Member States concerning interpretation or application of the LOS Convention as “a mixed agreement” (to which – under LOS Convention articles 305-307 and Annex IX – both the Community and its Member States are parties), see B. Kwiatkowska, The Ireland v. UK Mox Plant Case: Applying the Doctrine of Treaty Parallelism, 18 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 1-57 (2003) at <www.brill.nl/product.asp?ID=18253>; Kwiatkowska, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitral Tribunal Did Get It Right and Kwiatkowska, The World Court, supra note 7; the 2003 OSPAR Ireland v. UK Mox Plant Award, President Michael Reisman, PCA at <www. pca-cpa.org/>; 42 ILM 1118 (2003); ASIL/ILIB of 25 July 2003 at <www.asil.org/ilib/ ilib0613.htm> and T.L. McDorman, The OSPAR Mox Plant Case Report, 98 AJIL 330-339 (2004); ECJ European Commission v. Ireland Mox Plant Case C-459/03, O.J. C 7/24 (2004) at <europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c_007/c_00720040110en00240024. pdf> and Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 12 January 2006 [Oceans and the Law of the Sea; Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/61/63, para. 75 (2006) at <www.un.org/Depts/los>] and the ECJ European Commission v. Ireland Mox Plant Judgment of 30 May 2006 at <curia.eu.int/jrisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher &numaff=C-459/03> and Cases since 1989 at <curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index. htm>, and PR No. 45/06 at <curia.eu.nt/en/actu/communiques/cp060045en.pdf> and <www.asil.org/ilib/2006/07/ilib060706.htm>, which adjudged that by initiating the LOS Convention Annex VII Ireland v. UK Mox Plant Arbitration, President Thomas A. Mensah, Arbitrators Sir Arthur Watts KCMG QC, L. Yves Fortier CC QC, James Crawford SC, Gerhard Hafner, PCA at <www.pca-cpa.org/> and <www.asil.org/ilib/ilib0613.htm>, Ireland violated articles 10 and 292 EC Treaty and articles 192-193 Euratom Treaty.

39

2006 ECJ EC v. Ireland Mox Plant Judgment, supra note 38, para. 110, providing that: “[i] t appears that the matters covered by the provisions of the Convention [LOS Convention] relied upon by Ireland before the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal are very largely regulated by Community measures”; para. 132, stating that “an international agreement such as the Convention cannot affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court in regard to the resolution of disputes between Member States concerning the interpretation and application of Community law”, and that “[a]rticle 282 of the Convention precisely makes it possible to avoid such a breach occurring, in such a way as to preserve the autonomy of the Community legal system” (emphasis added) [also paras 125-127]; para. 154, stressing that “the institution and pursuit of proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal ... involve 935


Rhine Award was distinct from the Mox Plant case in that both parties agreed that the core of their Iron Rhine dispute related to the 1839 Separation Treaty and they both requested the Arbitral Tribunal “to render its decision on the basis of international law, including European law if necessary, while taking into account the Parties’ obligations under article 292 of the EC Treaty”; the Iron Rhine Tribunal construed its position as analogous to that of a domestic court with respect to preliminary rulings under EC article 234 (previously 177), but the Tribunal ultimately did not find such ECJ ruling necessary given that there was no need for the Tribunal to decide on any question of the interpretation of EC law.40 In the case of a singular Mox Plant dispute centred on the alleged violations of the EC legislation, the resumption of the Annex VII Mox Plant Arbitration – which was initiated by Ireland unilaterally and raised the serious objections of Britain to the Annex VII Tribunal’s jurisdiction, objections that were endorsed by the 2006 ECJ Mox Plant Judgment – could perhaps materialise due to the now joint accord of Britain and Ireland that the Annex VII Tribunal actually request the ECJ for “preliminary ruling” for the purpose of rendering its Award adjudging the merits of the Mox Plant case.41

a manifest risk that the jurisdictional order laid down in the Treaties and, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system may be adversely affected” (emphasis added); and paras 176-177. The concern over preservation of the autonomy of the EC legal system was previously also likely an inarticulate reason for the decisions taken in Spain v. Canada Fisheries Jurisdiction Case Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, 432 and Case Report, 93 AJIL 502-507 (1999); the 2003 OSPAR Ireland v. UK Mox Plant Award, supra note 38; and the 2001 ITLOS EC/Chile Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean Order, 40 ILM 475 (2001) and Order of 29 December 2005 further suspending proceedings until 1 January 2008 at <www.itlos.org>. 40

2005 Belgium/Netherlands Iron Rhine Award, supra note 24, paras 13-15, 97-105, 119-120, 137, 206. See also suggestions (made by him originally in 1987 at the Dutch ILA Branch) by Judge S.M. Schwebel, Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the Instance of National Courts, 28 Va. J. Int’l L. 495 (1988) and Sh. Rosenne, Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the Instance of National Courts: A Reply, 29 Va. J. Int’l L. 401 (1989); and suggestions of ICJ Presidents Schwebel, Guillaume and Shi (1997-2006) to enable other international courts to request Advisory Opinions of the ICJ on issues of international law referred to supra notes 8-9.

41

Such an unlikely but not impossible solution would amount to ingenious application of the consent-based clause “unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree” of LOS Convention article 282 [supra note 39] without prejudice to EC law, and would also amount to unprecedented seeking by one international court (Annex VII Tribunal) of legal findings and conclusions of another court (ECJ) enjoying jurisdictional primacy with respect to a particular (Mox Plant) dispute. The application of such a “preliminary ruling” solution remains possible in the light of the Annex VII Mox Plant (Suspension of Periodic Reports by the Parties) Order No. 5 of 22 January 2007 and Press Release of 21 February 2007 at <www.pca-cpa.org/>.

936


The jurisdictional problems revealed in both the Southern Bluefin Tuna and the Mox Plant cases did not, however, prevent the significant impacts which the procedural decisions rendered in those cases had both on ultimately satisfactory resolution of the disputes concerned and on exposition of certain doctrines and concepts, notably of the doctrine of treaty parallelism between LOS Convention Part XV and “self-contained” procedures agreed in special treaties covered by articles 281-282, as well as of the effects of the EC participation in the LOS Convention as “a mixed agreement” (of which provisions fall both within the exclusive Community’s competence and within its competence shared with Member States), contributing to the development of procedural law of peaceful resolution of the oceans disputes.42 2. Article 283 and Articles 74/83 Secondly, the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitral Tribunal reaffirmed the holdings endorsed by other courts that LOS Convention article 283 (and corresponding requirements of article 281) cannot reasonably be interpreted to require that, when several years of negotiations have already failed to resolve a dispute, the parties should embark upon further and separate exchanges of views regarding its settlement by negotiations, which would amount to what Barbados’ Counsel W. Michael Reisman characterised colourfully as “Baron Van Munchausen tactics” and “Ground Hog Day scenario”.43 In this context,

42

On these and other examples of important impacts displayed in the cases which did not proceed to the phase of Merits, see Kwiatkowska, The World Court (2006), supra note 7 and McDorman, The OSPAR Mox Plant Case Report, supra note 38, at 337-339, rightly countering Philippe Sands, whose laments as Ireland’s Counsel permeated his textbook on Principles of International Environmental Law 857-858 (2003), and correctly concluding [at 339] that: “[t]he better perspective, however, is that most states will be heartened by the OSPAR Arbitration. The Tribunal resolved the issue before it in accordance with constitutive instrument, which is precisely what third-party arbitration is supposed to accomplish. Moreover, by maintaining a litigational approach to international environmental law, the Tribunal’s Award will encourage states to make greater use of international arbitration in the future”. Note also that the principles governing the preventive triad of environmental impact assessment and prior notification and consultations, which lay in the heart of the Mox Plant dispute in the context of the EC law (conforming with the LOS Convention and general international law), form the main contentions in the pending Argentina v. Uruguay Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case at <www.icj-cij.org>. On the treatment of this preventive triad in the Hungary/Slovakia Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, 7, see Kwiatkowska, ICJ President Schwebel’s Triennium and Beyond (2002), revised as of 3 November 2006, supra note 5, at 42-48.

43

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 201-208 and ITLOS jurisprudence quoted in para. 69, including the ITLOS 1999 Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional Measures) Order, para. 60, the 2001 Mox Plant (Provisional Measures) Order, para. 60 and the 2003 Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Provisional Measures) Order, paras 937


the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal drew again several unprecedented conclusions on the relationship (not involved in previous jurisprudence) between articles 74/83 and 283, including the authoritative findings: – that the requirements of article 283(1)-(2) for settlement by negotations are subsumed within the negotiations which articles 74/83 require to have already taken place, and – that reference in articles 74/83(2) to “the States concerned” (in the plural) resorting to the procedures of Part XV, must be understood as referring to those procedures in the terms in which they are set out in Part XV, namely by either the joint or the unilateral action of States.44 It therefore appears that had the part concerning maritime boundary delimitation of the Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening dispute been submitted to the ICJ pursuant to LOS Convention Part XV, the Court would have rejected

47-52 at <www.itlos.org>, all rendered under LOS Convention article 290(5) pending the establishment of the respective Annex VII Tribunals; and the 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award, supra note 24, para. 55 and Barbados’ Reply, para. 91 n. 184, para. 101 n. 198; Hearings Day 1, 66-79, esp. 76 [Counsel Reisman, 17 October 2005], remarking, in the context of Trinidad’s interpretation of the LOS Convention in pursuance of the Vienna Convention’s rules, that: “[i]t is, Mr President, a tactic reminiscent of Baron Van Munchausen for a party to impose an absurd reading on a clear text, and then to use its own absurd concoction as a warrant to rummage through an enormous travaux in search of a document that ostensibly supports its position”; and Day 5, 8 [Counsel Reisman, 24 October 2005], referring to “a popular Canadian film entitled ‘Ground Hog Day’ in which a character was obliged to live through the same day again and again and again”, and asking the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal: “[d]oes UNCLOS [LOS Convention] really call for a Ground Hog Day scenario?”. See also Award’s paras 70 and 198, referring to characterisation by Barbados of Trinidad’s approach (rejected by the Tribunal) as “idiosyncratic”, “unrealistic and formalistic”, and even, in the terms of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (articles 31-32), “manifestly absurd or unreasonable”, and as frustrating the object and purpose of Part XV of the LOS Convention as a whole. See also 2007 Guyana/Suriname Award, supra note 19. For appraisal of the rules governing treaty interpretation, see A. Aust, Handbook of International Law 88-98 (2005) at <www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521823498>. 44

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 71, 75-77, 201-202, 205-206 and Hearings Day 7, 17-18, 50 [Questions of Judge Sir Arthur Watts, 27 October 2005], 45-64 [Counsel Wordsworth]; and Award’s para. 207, rightly rejecting an argument based on reference to “the States concerned” in the plural in articles 74/83(2), as relied upon in Trinidad’s Rejoinder, para. 40(2) and as countered by Counsel Reisman, supra note 43. The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award’s conclusion that the requirements of article 283 are subsumed within articles 74/83 applies as much to negotiations of delimitation agreement under articles 74/83(1) as to every effort made by States under articles 74/83(3) to enter into provisional arrangements pending conclusion of such agreement. See also 2007 Guyana/Suriname Award, supra note 19.

938


Nigeria’s Preliminary Objection based on articles 74/83 in reliance on the reasoning similar to that now applied by the Annex VII Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award.45 Moreover, while the five-Member Tribunal was well aware that like in the case of all obligations to negotiate in international law, delimitation negotiations under articles 74/83 must be “meaningful” but not necessarily successful, it endorsed in another part of its reasoning (related to the future Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Fisheries Agreement) the restrictive Lake Lanoux standard as to “the reality and nature of an obligation to negotiate an agreement”, which should be construed as equally applicable to the Tribunal’s holdings concerning articles 74/83.46

45

The Cameroon v. Nigeria Land and Maritime Boundary (Preliminary Objections) Judgment, President Stephen M. Schwebel, ICJ Reports 1998, 322-325, paras 103-111 and at 326, dispositif para. 118(1)(g), dismissed Nigeria’s Seventh Preliminary Objection and its argument that a precondition of prior negotiations was not fulfilled under articles 74/83, on the grounds that [para. 109] the Court had not been seised on the basis of LOS Convention Part XV but on that of the Optional Clause under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, which did not contain any condition relating to prior negotiations to be conducted within a reasonable time period, and that [paras 107 and 110] the parties “entered into negotiations with a view to determining the whole – up to Point G and beyond – of the maritime boundary” and have not been able to agree on the continuation of the negotiations beyond Point G; as reaffirmed by Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening (Merits) Judgment, President Gilbert Guillaume, ICJ Reports 2002, 416-417, paras 226, and at 422-424, paras 239-245, adding [at 424, para. 244], that, like all similar obligations to negotiate in international law, the negotiations pursuant to articles 74/83 “have to be conducted in good faith” but articles 74/83 “do not require that delimitation negotiations should be successful”. For reaffirmation of this latter principle of “meaningful negotiations” as not allowing that either of the parties “insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it”, see also Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, 78, para. 141, reaffirming North Sea Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 47, para. 85. For analysis of articles 74/83 related holdings of the 1998 and 2002 Cameroon v. Nigeria Judgments, see Kwiatkowska, ICJ President Guillaume’s Triennium and Beyond (2005), supra note 7, at 144-145, 148-150.

46

See reaffirmation of the principle of “meaningful negotations” by the 1997 Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project Judgment, supra note 45 and 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 292, quoting the 1956 France v. Spain Lake Lanoux Award, President Petren, RIAA XII, 285; 24 ILR 101; 53 AJIL 156 (1959), holding that: “one speaks, although often inaccurately, of the ‘obligation of negotiating an agreement’. In reality engagements thus undertaken by States take very diverse forms and have a scope which varies according to the manner in which they are defined and according to the procedures intended for their execution; but the reality of the obligations thus undertaken is incontestable and sanctions can be applied in the event, for example, of an unjustified breaking off of the discussions, abnormal delays, disregard of the agreed procedures, systematic refusal to take into consideration adverse proposals or interests, and, more generally, in cases of the violation of the rule of good faith”; as further referred to infra note 74. 939


3. Other Jurisdictional Holdings The Tribunal also upheld the arguments of Barbados that unilateral invocation of the Annex VII arbitration could not by itself be regarded as an abuse of right contrary to the general rule codified in LOS Convention article 300.47 It stressed that the unilateral exercise of a right envisaged by paramount article 286 without discussion or agreement with the other party (which could incline that party to opt out of the compulsory procedures by making a declaration under article 298(1)(a)) is “a straightforward exercise of the right conferred by the treaty”, in the manner similar to unilateral institution of the ICJ proceedings in reliance on the Optional Clause under article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute.48 The foregoing jurisdictional findings did not require separate fulfillment with respect to the outer continental shelf beyond 200 miles, because this shelf was, in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal’s view, included within the scope of the dispute submitted to arbitration and falling within its jurisdiction. After reluctance originally displayed in the 1992 Canada/France (Saint Pierre et Miquelon) Maritime Delimitation Award which was relied upon by Barbados, the Tribunal was now convinced that its jurisdiction over the delimitation of the outer continental shelf would not – as Trinidad and Tobago argued – interfere with the core functions of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), whose practice must, in turn, in accordance with LOS Convention article 76(10) and the 2004 CLCS Rules of Procedure (Rule 46 and Annex I),

47

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 88-102, 105, 208; Barbados’ Reply, paras 107-117 and Hearings Day 7, 64-68 [Counsel Wordsworth, 27 October 2005]. See also reaffirmation of the fundamental principle of good faith by the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, 66, 78-79; Cameroon v. Nigeria (Preliminary Objections) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, 296, para. 38; and 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award, para. 64, supra note 24. The 2000 Award did not exclude instances in which the conduct of a State Party to the LOS Convention and to its implementing fisheries treaty would be so egregious, and risk consequences of such gravity, that an Annex VII or any other court might find that the Convention’s obligations under article 300 provide a basis for jurisdiction. Note that in a situation that the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) does not possess any dispute settlement clause [161 UNTS 72; 338 UNTS 366], the above possibility envisaged in the 2000 Award’s para. 64 with respect to breach of article 300, could perhaps be relied upon by Australia for the purposes of instituting the proceedings against Japan due to its intention of resuming commercial whaling. For reference to ICRW (which provided a model for Japan’s southern bluefin tuna programme), see 2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award’s para. 38(i). For IWC, see <www.iwcoffice.org/index.htm> and current news on whaling at .

48

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 204 and 208, both referring to the ICJ Optional Clause; and appraisals by J.G. Merrills, The Optional Clause at Eighty, in Liber Judge Oda, supra note 37, at 435-450, and by F. Orrego Vicuña, The Legal Nature of the Optional Clause, in id., supra note 37, 463-480; Rosenne, Evaluation of Compulsory (Optional Clause) Jurisdiction, in The Law and Practice, supra note 26, at 831-836 (1997) and 797-802 (2006).

940


remain without prejudice to the delimitation of these areas between the States concerned and the resolution of the respective territorial disputes.49 Were any of such numerous pending disputes to be submitted to third-party settlement, the ICJ or Arbitral Tribunal would most likely rely upon the pioneering decision of the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal to uphold its jurisdiction and would accordingly effect such delimitation of the outer continental shelf beyond 200 miles as might perhaps also apply to the certain portion of the Caribbean shelf involved in the Nicaragua v. Colombia Territorial and Maritime Dispute case (provided Colombia’s Preliminary Objections are dismissed and this case proceeds to the phase of Merits).50 The same would apply to an eventual third-party involvement 49

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 63-65 and Map II, paras 80-87, quoting [para. 82] the 1992 Canada/France (St. Pierre and Miquelon) Award, paras 75-82, [RIAA XXI, 267; 31 ILM 1149 (1992)] and [para. 86] the 2002 Newfoundland and Labrador/Nova Scotia (Phase II) Award [<www.gov.ns.ca/>], 2006 Award’s Map III, paras 174-187, 189-190, 196, 213-215, 217, 367-368, dispositif para. 384(ii); Trinidad’s Counter-Memorial, paras 265-269, 287-288; Barbados’ Reply, paras 125-145; Trinidad’s Rejoinder, paras 157, 219; Hearings Day 1, 85-87 [Counsel Reisman, 17 October 2005], 94-95, 105 [Co-Agent Volterra], Day 4, 77-87 [Counsel Greenwood, 21 October], 88-109 [Counsel Crawford], Day 6, 39-49 [Reisman, 25 October], Day 8, 32-59 [Crawford, 28 October 2005], 42-43 [Questions of the President and Lowe]; supra note 29 and infra notes 84-85, 106. See also the 2006 Montreal Report of the ILA Committee on Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf, Chairman Judge Dolliver Nelson, Rapporteur Alex Oude Elferink at <www.ila-hq. org/INDEX.htm>. On preparation of Barbados’ Submission to the CLCS, see infra note 58. On importance attached by the United States to the CLCS, see US Letters at this website concerning Submissions of Russia, Brazil and Australia, and Statements of Ambassador Bolton, UN Doc. A/60/PV.54, 3-4 (28 November 2005) and Mrs Constance Arvis, 16th SPLOS, 19-23 June 2006 (20 June) at <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sea1861. doc.htm> and CLCS at UNDOALOS website, supra note 18.

50

On the procedural issues involved in the pending Nicaragua v. Colombia Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Preliminary Objections) proceedings, see ICJ Press Release No. 2007/16 of 8 June 2007; P.H.F. Bekker, Nicaragua Sues Colombia Before the ICJ, ASIL Insights (2001) at <www.asil.org/insights/insigh79.htm>; E. Valencia-Ospina, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Pact of Bogota, in Liber Amicorum Judge Jose Maria Ruda 291-329 (2000); J.R. Crook, The 2001 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice, 96 AJIL 397, 408-409 (2002); Merrills, supra note 48, at 449; Rosenne, The Law and Practice (2006), supra note 26, at 787. On the Nicaragua v. Colombia territorial questions and maritime delimitation, see M. Pratt, The Honduras/Nicaragua Boundary, 9 IBRU Boundary & Security Bulletin 108-116 (2001 No. 2) at <www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/ publications/bulletin>; Oceans and the Law of the Sea – Reports of the Secretary-General, UN Docs A/55/61, para. 249 (2000), A/57/57, paras 44, 564-567 (2002) and A/59/62, para. 37 (2004) at <www.un.org/Depts/los/>; Nicaragua’s Law No. 420 on Maritime Areas of 5 March 2002, proclaiming its 200-mile EEZ [instead of the until then claimed 200-mile territorial sea] and 350-mile (sic) continental shelf, La Gaceta [Diario Official], Managua (22 March 2002 No. 57) and Colombia’s Department of San Andres and Providencia at <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Andres_and_Providencia>; J. Donaldson and M. Pratt, International Boundary Developments, 9 Geopolitics 501, 527-529, including 941


in the seaward extension (beyond Point D) of the 1984 Gulf of Maine single (perpendicular) boundary, which, upon agreement of both parties, was stopped by the ICJ Chamber at a point on the US 200-mile limit, a point that is only about 176 miles from Canada’s baselines and beyond which lies a potential grey area of overlap between Canada’s EEZ and the US outer continental shelf, followed by the outer shelf of both States still extending beyond 200 miles for a considerable distance.51 In view of the “final and binding” nature of all the Judgments and Awards, it appears that the CLCS will not make any Recommendations on such a shelf, but will just take due notice of its delimitation between opposite/adjacent States, notwithstanding whether such outer continental shelf will (e.g., in the future delimitations in the Gulf of Maine, and between France (Crozets)/South Africa (Prince Edward Islands), Guyana/Suriname and Suriname/France (French Guyana), and perhaps (depending on the method used) between Barbados/ Guyana) or will not (e.g., in Nicaragua v. Colombia case, and perhaps in the Bering and Barents Seas delimitations relevant to Russia’s Submission) border on the International Seabed Area.52

Map (2004); V. Prescott and C. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries 269-270, 350-351 and Figure 14.1 at 606 (2005) at <www.brill.nl/product_id21967.htm>. 51

Canada/United States Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, 253-255, para. 5, at 339, para. 228, Map at 346, and Technical Report at 351, para. 15; as analysed by D.R. Robinson, D.A. Colson and B.C. Rashkow, Some Perspective on Adjudicating before the World Court: The Gulf of Maine Case, 79 AJIL 578, 585 (1985); D.A. Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf Between Neighbouring States, 97 AJIL 91, 104-105 (2003); and as relied upon by Trinidad and Tobago, in Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Hearings, Day 4, 99 [Counsel Crawford, 21 October 2005], Day 8, 40 [Crawford, 28 October 2005], making an allusion to Judge Schwebel’s membership in the Gulf of Maine Chamber [infra note 64] and remarking: “[i]t would come as a slight surprise if there needs to be another arbitration in the Gulf of Maine, but no doubt, Mr President, you will enjoy sitting on it”; infra notes 99-100. On no progress made to date in addressing the Gulf of Maine boundary landward of its Point A due to the continuing Canada/United States sovereignty dispute over Machias Seal Island and North Rock, see Gulf of Maine Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, 265-266, para. 20, at 332-333, paras 210-213; D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith, North American Maritime Boundaries, in International Maritime Boundaries Vol. V, infra note 62, 3401, 3402; McDorman (2005), supra note 37, at 91-93; Machias Seal Island Dispute at <www.siue.edu/GEOGRAPHY/ONLINE/Schmidt.htm> and <www.wikinfo.org/wiki. php?title=Machias_Seal_Island>.

52

In the case of Russia’s 2001 Submission, the CLCS in any event requested to be merely provided with charts and geographical coordinates of the delimitation agreements (upon their entry into force) with the United States and Norway for the Bering and Barents Seas where – as between Colombia/Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea – the shelf beyond 200 miles likely does not border on the International Seabed Area. For emphasis on its “final and binding” nature, see the 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, dispositif para. 385(2), supra note 28; and generally, Rosenne, The Law and Practice (2006), supra

942


The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award marked, moreover, the first jurisprudential application of automatic exclusion from compulsory procedures under LOS Convention Part XV, section 2 of disputes over fisheries in the 200-mile EEZ pursuant to article 297(3), which the Tribunal considered in the context of the role played by fisheries in the Western sector of maritime delimitation analysed further below.53

IV. Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation and Foreign Access to Straddling Fish Stocks in the EEZ 1. Relevant Geography and Factual Context While highlighting the geographical setting of the dispute, the 2006 Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Delimitation (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award specifies that the islands of Trinidad and Tobago lie off the northeast coast of South America and that at their closest, Trinidad and Venezuela are a little over 7 miles apart.54 It notes that Barbados is not part of the volcanic Windward Islands, which start 70 miles to the northwest and comprise Grenada, St Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia, Martinique, Dominica and others, and which collectively with islands farther north make up the Lesser Antilles Islands. The island of Barbados (of 441 square kilometers and with a population of 272,200) is situated northeast of Tobago by 116 miles and nearly 80 miles east of St Lucia. The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago comprises the islands of Trinidad (of 4,828 square kilometers and with a population of 1,208,300) and, 19 miles to the northeast, the island of Tobago (of 300 square kilometers and with a population of 54,100), and a number of much smaller islands that are close to those two main islands, which are all essentially the eastward extension of the Andean range of South America. East of Trinidad and Tobago, the coast of South America trends in an east-southeasterly direction, first with part of the coast of Venezuela, then the coasts of Guyana, Suriname and French Guyana. The Windward Islands lie as a string of islands in a south to north orientation starting directly north of the Boca del Dragon, the channel between the northwest corner of the island of Trinidad and the Peninsula de Paria of Venezuela. In contrast to the Eritrea/Yemen and Qatar v. Bahrain cases, where only one of the parties (Yemen and Bahrain) ratified the LOS Convention, both Trinidad and

note 26, at 1598-1605 [The Res Judicata] and 1605-1606 [The Judgment and Third Parties]. 53

See infra notes 73-75.

54

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 42-45. 943


Tobago and Barbados (like the parties to the Cameroon/Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea case) ratified it on 25 April 1986 and 12 October 1993 respectively. By virtue of the 1978 Marine Boundaries and Jurisdiction Act and the 1986 Archipelagic Waters and Exclusive Economic Zone Act, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago established their 12-mile territorial sea and 200-mile EEZ and Trinidad and Tobago also claimed under the 1986 Act an archipelagic status and baselines conforming with LOS Convention Part IV and producing water-to-land ratio of 1.4:1 (2,027: 1,540 square miles).55 The 1978 Act favoured delimitation by equidistance between Barbados and any adjacent or opposite State located less than 400 miles away (article 3(3)-(5)), while according to the 1986 Act, Trinidad and Tobago displayed preference for delimitation “on the basis of international law in order to achieve an equitable solution” (article 15).56 As the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal held in accordance with the well-recognised principle that “the delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect” [“la délimitation des espaces maritimes a toujours un aspect international”]: “[t]he fact that in 1978 Barbados enacted legislation providing that in the absence of agreement with a neighbouring State the boundary of its EEZ would be the equidistance line does not result in any form of recognition of, or acquiescence in, the equidistance line as a definitive boundary by any neighbouring State”.57 Barbados has, since the

55

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 44, 47-49, Maps I-II, paras 95, 114, 161, Map III, paras 326, 332-334, 356, 373, 381-382, Maps VI-VII, Technical Report; Trinidad’s Counter-Memorial, paras 190-198; The Law of the Sea – National Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone 21-29 [Barbados 1978 Act], 369-377 [Trinidad’s 1986 Act] (UN 1993); B. Kwiatkowska, Archipelagic Waters: An Assessment of National Legislation, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Law of the Sea at the Crossroads 107, 117 (Berlin 1991); Trinidad and Tobago’s Baselines Notification of 14 May 2004, UN Law of the Sea Information Circular 41-42 (2004 No. 20) and UN Law of the Sea Bulletin 29 (2004 No. 55).

56

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 95 and 302-303, quoting these provisions and adding [para. 303] that Trinidad and Tobago’s position was confirmed in its 1992 Note Verbale to Barbados.

57

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 365, forming part of the Tribunal’s reasoning concerning maritime boundary in the Eastern sector. See also the Award’s para. 270, stating in the context of the dismissal of Barbados’ contention that the provisional equidistance should be adjusted in the Western sector by taking account of its fisheries interests, that: “[t]he Tribunal finds further confirmation of its conclusions in the undoubted, repeated recognition by Barbados that its fisherfolk were fishing in waters of the EEZ of Trinidad and Tobago, and that, insofar as they so fished without the licensed permission of Trinidad and Tobago, they were subject to lawful arrest”. For previous precedents of “the delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect” principle, see Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1951, 132; as reaffirmed by Denmark (Greenland) v. Norway (Jan Mayen) Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, ICJ Reports 1993, 150-151 and other decisions quoted by B. Kwiatkowska, Decisions of the World Court Relevant to the United Nations Convention on the

944


mid-1990s, also been preparing Submission to the CLCS concerning the limits of its outer continental shelf beyond 200 miles.58 Both States were constrained from reaching their full 200-mile EEZ entitlement and any full potential outer continental shelf claim in the Eastern sector by their mutual presence (with equidistance extending to 192 miles from Trinidad and Tobago’s baselines, or 220 miles from the southern part of the island of Trinidad until their terminus at the tripoint with Guyana) as well as by the presence of Venezuela, Guyana and Suriname.59 The southern limit of Trinidad and Tobago’s entitlement to maritime areas was established by the 1990 Trinidad and Tobago/ Venezuela Delimitation of Submarine Areas Treaty, which superseded the famous Gulf of Paria Treaty.60 Having protested in early 2002 against the 1990 Treaty as encroaching into Guyana’s provisional maritime boundaries and its potential claims to the outer continental shelf, Guyana concluded the Exclusive Economic Zone Treaty with Barbados on 2 December 2003, establishing their joint fishery and minerals development zone (negligible size of which seems to point to a political dimension to the 2003 Treaty) to the south of Trinidad and Tobago/Venezuela boundary, and instituted in early 2004 the LOS Convention Annex VII Guyana/Suriname proceedings, followed by Guyana’s unsuccessful

Law of the Sea (2002) at <www.brill.nl/product_id20709.htm> updated as of 2006 at <www.law.uu.nl/nilos> – Publications, Books. 58

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award’s Map II, paras 103, 157 and Hearings Day 1, 94-95, 105 [Co-Agent Volterra, 17 October 2005], Day 5, 27-29 [Volterra, 24 October 2005]; and CLCS at UNDOALOS website, supra note 18. On Barbados’ measures in postAward period, see infra note 102. On initiation in 2006 of preparation of Submission to the CLCS by Suriname, see Press Conference [“Surinames expansiedrift voor noordelijke grens”], De Ware Tijd [in Dutch] of 11 March 2006 at <www.dwtonline.com/website/ home.asp?menuid=2>; 19 March 2006 at <www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article_local_news?id=48383158>.

59

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 156-157, Map III, and para. 324. See also main text accompanying supra note 52; and equidistance boundaries anticipated in this area by Prescott and Schofield (2005), supra note 50, at 336-338, 361 and Map at 603.

60

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 51, 164, 168, Map III, 345-348, 371, 374, 381-382; 1942 Trinidad and Tobago/Venezuela Gulf of Paria Treaty, 205 LNTS 121; 1990 Trinidad and Tobago/Venezuela Delimitation of Submarine Areas Treaty and 1991 Exchange of Notes, 1654 UNTS 293, 614 and attached Map, reprinted in International Maritime Boundaries Vol. I, infra note 62 Reports Nos 2-13(1) and 2-13(3), at 639-654, 675-689; identical Notes Verbales of Guyana to Trinidad and Venezuela of 7 February 2002, UN Law of the Sea Bulletin 62 (2002 No. 48) and Note Verbale of Trinidad and Tobago to Guyana of 27 March 2002, id. at 63; Trinidad/Venezuela Resume Oil and Boundary Talks of 14 December 2005 at <www.vheadline.com/readnews.esp?id=47415>; Trinidad and Tobago/Venezuela Unitisation Treaty to Be Signed Soon of 19 July 2006 at <www. caribbeannetnews.com/cgi-script/csArticles/articles/000024/002413.htm>; and infra notes 86-89. 945


attempt of obtaining access to the pleadings in the parallel Annex VII Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration.61 2. An Appraisal of Modern Application of the Law and Process of Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation Infra Legem Prior to the drawing of a single Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago boundary, the Tribunal appraised the substantive issues pertaining to modern application of the law and process of equitable maritime delimitation by mutually reinforcing decisions of the ICJ and Arbitral Tribunals, combining the need for predictability and stability within the rule of law and the need for flexibility (entailing a certain degree of judicial discretion) in the outcome.62 In an unprecedented express

61

2002 Notes Verbales, supra note 60; 2003 Barbados/Guyana Exclusive Economic Zone Treaty [in force: 5 May 2004] at <www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article_affairs?id=6402111> 2277 UNTS 201; UN Law of the Sea Bulletin 36 (2004 No. 55); International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. V, infra note 62, Report No. 2-27, at 3578-3597 and its review by A. Oude Elferink, 53 NILR 145, 148 (2006), noting likely political dimension of the 2003 Treaty. On contentions of the parties concerning the 2003 Barbados/Guyana Treaty and the Tribunal’s finding that it was res inter alios acta in respect of Trinidad and Tobago, see 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 10, 40, Map I, paras 103, 164, 171, Map III, 349 [quoted infra note 81] and para. 358; Barbados’ Memorial, paras 22-24, 92; Trinidad’s Counter-Memorial, paras 26-27, 188; Barbados’ Reply, paras 203-204; and Hearings Day 5, 35-36 [Questions of Arbitrator Lowe, 24 October 2005], Day 6, 11-12 [Co-Agent Volterra, 25 October], Day 8, 14-15 [Counsel Crawford, 28 October 2005]. On rejection by the Tribunal, upon request of both parties, of Guyana’s attempt to obtain access to the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago pleadings, see supra note 22.

62

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, Chapter V, paras 219-245. For doctrinal surveys of such balanced doctrine of equitable maritime boundary delimitation infra legem, see Sir H.M. Waldock, The International Court and the Law of the Sea (Cornelius van Vollenhoven Memorial Lecture, T.M.C. Asser Institute 1979); Sir R. Jennings, Equity and Equitable Principles, 42 ASDI 27-38 (1986) and The Principles Governing Marine Boundaries, in Festschrift für Karl Doehring 398-408 (1989); P. Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation – Reflections (1989); L.D.M. Nelson, The Roles of Equity in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, 84 AJIL 837-858 (1990); Sh. Rosenne, An International Law Miscellany, Chapter 7: The Position of the ICJ on the Foundations of the Principle of Equity in International Law, 201-230 (1993); Plenary Address by then Court’s President Stephen M. Schwebel on The Contribution of the ICJ to the Development of International Law, in W.P. Heere ed., International Law and The Hague’s 750th Anniversary 405-416 (TMC Asser 1999) and B. Kwiatkowska, The ICJ and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation, id. at 61-72; J.I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RdC 315-345 (1998); N. Antunes, Towards Conceptualization of Maritime Delimitation (2003); Collected Essays of Former ICJ President Gilbert Guillaume, La Cour Internationale de Justice a l’Aube du XXIeme Siecle: Le Regard d’un Juge 287-318 (2003) and G. Guillaume, Conclusions, in Le Processus de delimitation maritime: Etude d’un cas fictif, Monaco, 27-29 Mars 2003 390-400 (Bruylant 2004); ICJ Registrar Ph. Couvreur, Le Reglement juridictionnel, id. at 349-388; Kwiatkowska, ICJ President Guillaume’s Triennium (2005), supra note 7,

946


exposition of both its “right and duty to exercise judicial discretion in order to achieve an equitable result”, the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal, having appraised the equitable principles as developed in treaty and customary law and international jurisprudence, held that: “Within those constraints imposed by law, the Tribunal considers that it has both the right and the duty to exercise judicial discretion in order to achieve an equitable result. There will rarely, if ever, be a single line that is uniquely equitable. The Tribunal must exercise its judgment in order to decide upon a line that is, in its view, both equitable and as practically satisfactory as possible, while at the same time in keeping with the requirement of achieving a stable legal outcome. Certainty, equity, and stability are thus integral parts of the process of delimitation” (emphasis added).63 The paramount (and sometimes underestimated in the literature) importance of the rule codified in identical LOS Convention articles 74/83(1) providing for the effecting of EEZ/CS delimitation “by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in article 38 of the ICJ Statute, in order to achieve an equitable solution”, was anticipated by the Canada/United States Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area Chamber (of which Judge Stephen M. Schwebel was a member) when it stated that: “[a]lthough the text is singularly concise it serves to open the door to continuation of the development effected in this field by international case law”.64 The soundness of this visionary Gulf of Maine anticipation was 20 years later confirmed by the interpretation of the Barbados/

at 51-171. For Digests and Commentaries, see International Boundary Cases: The Continental Shelf, Vols. I-II (Cambridge Research Centre for International Law, 1992); Kwiatkowska, Decisions of the World Court (2002), supra note 57, at 57-111; R. Kolb, Case Law on Equitable Maritime Delimitation/Jurisprudence sur les Délimitations Maritimes selon l’Équite (2003); McDorman (2005), supra note 37, at 61-146; International Maritime Boundaries, Vols I-II, J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds), (1993), Vol. III (1998), Vol. IV, J.I. Charney and R.W. Smith (eds), (2002), Vol. V, D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds), (2005) at <www. brill.nl/product_id21989.htm>, reviewed by Barbados’ Counsel Jan Paulsson, 100 AJIL 978-980 (2006). 63

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 244. See also the explanation (previously made neither by the ICJ nor by any other Arbitral Tribunal) in Award’s Chapter VIII, para. 373, infra note 87, of how the Tribunal exercised this judicial discretion “within the limits set by the applicable law”. This explanation was likely inspired by Barbados’ appeal – based on such appeal repeatedly voiced in the Opinions appended by Judge Schwebel to the ICJ maritime delimitation Judgments – for transparency in the Tribunal’s reasoning and decision-making process, in Hearings Day 6, 38-39 [Counsel Reisman, 25 October 2005], 57-59 [Counsel Sir Elihu Lauterpacht].

64

Canada/United States Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, 294, para. 95, and Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel, 357, remarking that: “[o]n a question such as this, the law is more platic than formed, and 947


Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal, which basing itself on the highest cumulated competence of its five Members, construed articles 74/83(1) as follows: “This apparently simple and imprecise formula allows in fact for a broad consideration of the legal rules embodied in treaties and customary law as pertinent to the delimitation between the parties, and allows as well for the consideration of general principles of international law and the contributions that the decisions of international courts and tribunals and learned writers have made to the understanding and interpretation of this body of legal rules.”65 The Tribunal also reaffirmed that the above equitable principles/relevant circumstances rule of customary law codified in articles 74/83 (EEZ/CS) produces much the same result as the equidistant/special circumstances rule now retained in article 15 (territorial sea).66 Whereas Trinidad and Tobago characterised the boundary line proposed by Barbados with a view to preserving its interest in flying fish stocks in the Western sector as illustrating what President Schwebel criticised in his Denmark v. Norway Opinion as “maximalist claims”, Trinidad in fact made such “maxi-

elements of judgment, of appreciation of competing legal and equitable considerations, are dominant” (emphasis added). 65

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 222. See also para. 223, noting the relevance of bilateral treaties and adding that: “[i]n a matter that has so significantly evolved the last 60 years, customary law also has a particular role that, together with judicial and arbitral decisions, helps to shape the considerations that apply to any process of delimitation”; and, e.g., reference to “general international law, as it has developed through the case-law of the Court and arbitral jurisprudence, and through the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea”, in Denmark (Greenland) v. Norway (Jan Mayen) Maritime Delimitation Judgment, ICJ Reports 1993, 62, para. 55; R. Barnes, D. Freestone and D.M. Ong, The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, in The Law of the Sea (2006), supra note 7, at 14, remarking that: “[p]erhaps nowhere is the impact of general international law felt more strongly than in the context of maritime boundary delimitation”, and that articles 74/83 “explicity mandate the application of general international law”.

66

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 305; reaffirming Denmark v. Norway Judgment, ICJ Reports 1993, 101-106, paras 45-63, citing [para. 46], the 1977 Anglo/ French Continental Shelf Decision, para. 70 [RIAA XVIII, 3, 271; 18 ILM 397, 463 (1970); 54 ILR 139, 213]; 1999 Eritrea/Yemen Maritime Delimitation (Phase II) Award, infra note 70, paras 13, 23-24, 116 and 131-133; Qatar v. Bahrain Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, 111 para. 231; Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening; Land and Maritime Boundary (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, 440-442, paras 285-290, esp. 288. For the travaux préparatoires of articles 15 and 74/83, see M.H. Norquist, S.N. Nandan and Sh. Rosenne (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 – A Commentary, Vol. II, 132-143 [article 15], 796-816 [article 74], 948-985 [article 83] (1993).

948


malist claim” itself as well with a view to obtaining the largest access to the Atlantic (“salida al Atlántico”) in the Eastern sector.67 Neither of these – each in its way amazing – claims was ultimately rewarded in the two-stage process of the Tribunal first drawing a provisional, single equidistant boundary and then considering whether that boundary must be adjusted in the light of the existence of primarily geographical and other special circumstances, as well as the test of proportionality a posteriori, to obtain an equitable result.68 The Tribunal was cautious to reaffirm the well-established position of all other courts by stressing that the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago boundary was without prejudice to boundaries between either of the parties and any third State which did not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.69

67

See Trinidad and Tobago’s Counter-Memorial, paras 4-7, quoting Denmark (Greenland) v. Norway (Jan Mayen) Maritime Delimitation Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, ICJ Reports 1993, 126-127, as supported by, e.g., E. Decaux, L’Affaire Danemark c. Norvege de la délimitation maritime dans la région située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen – Arrêt de la C.I.J. du 14 juin 1993, 39 AFDI 495, 512-513 (1993); R.R. Churchill, The Greenland/Jan Mayen Case and its Significance for the International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimination, 9 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 1, 26 (1994); and Trinidad and Tobago’s Counter-Memorial, paras 1-3, noting that the boundary proposed by Barbados in the Western sector suddenly veers south-west to convert the island of Tobago into a semi-enclave and to deprive its coastline of any effect in terms of generating EEZ vis-à-vis Barbados; infra notes 70-75. On Trinidad’s “maximalist claim”, see infra notes 83-85, 90.

68

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 242, 300, 304-307 and 317, quoting [para. 242] Prosper Weil, supra note 62; and reaffirming Qatar v. Bahrain (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, 94, para. 176, at 104, para. 217, at 111, para. 230 and Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, 441-42 paras 288-290. On “the delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect” principle, see supra note 57. On the primary importance of geographical factors, see also infra notes 71, 76-79, 84, 89; on fisheries factors, see section IV 3 in this chapter below; and on the mineral resources factor, see infra note 82. On respecting by the boundary of international shipping lanes connecting to Strait of Bab el-Mandeb and the southern approaches to the Suez Canal, see the 1999 Eritrea/Yemen Maritime Delimitation (Phase II) Award, infra note 70, paras 18, 24-26, 41, 43, 45-46, 124-128, 155 and 163. On the test of proportionality a posteriori, see infra note 89. For an appraisal of multiple roles played by special circumstances other than geographical, see B. Kwiatkowska, Resource, Navigational and Environmental Factors, in International Maritime Boundaries Vol. V, supra note 62, at 3223-3244, at <www.brill.nl/product_id21989.htm>.

69

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 86, 162-168, 218, 381-382; supra notes 28, 60-61. 949


Map 1.

950


3. Equitable Maritime Boundary in the Western Sector and Barbados’ Access to Straddling Fish Stocks in Trinidad and Tobago’s EEZ Barbados contended that, faced with conflict over access to fisheries in the context of a boundary delimitation in the Western sector, the Tribunal had two legal options at its disposal: – either to adjust the provisional equidistance to ensure equitable access for the vulnerable population, as it occurred by virtue of applying the Gulf of Maine exception of “catastrophic repercussions” in the 1993 Denmark (Greenland) v. Norway (Jan Mayen) Judgment, with the maximalist adjustment proposed by Barbados depriving Tobago’s coastline of any effect in terms of generating an EEZ, – or to keep the equidistance intact, but establish a regime of non-exclusive access of that population, which would guarantee continuation of its fishing rights, as did the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitral Tribunal in its 1998/1999 Awards by means of perpetuating the traditional fishing regime around the islands of Jabal al-Tayr, the Zubayr Group and the Zuqar-Hanish Group, which were attributed to the sovereignty of Yemen.70 Accentuating the primacy of predictable criteria of a geographical character and uniqueness of liberal Jan Mayen resolution, the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal upheld, however, Trinidad’s arguments as to absence of conditions that

70

Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Hearings, Day 2, 21-29 [Counsel Reisman, 18 October 2005], noting at 25, that Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal’s President Schwebel was notably critical in his 1993 Separate Opinion [ICJ Reports 1993, supra note 67, at 118-129] of the former option of applying the Gulf of Maine exception in the Denmark (Greenland) v. Norway (Jan Mayen) Judgment, notwithstanding this exception’s previous rejection by the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, 41, para. 50, the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Delimitation of Maritime Boundary Award, paras 121-123 [25 ILM 251 (1986)] and the 1992 Canada/France (St. Pierre et Miquelon) Award, paras 83-84, supra note 49. But as Barbados’ Counsel Reisman also noted, Judge Schwebel as the Eritrea/Yemen Tribunal’s member did concur with the unanimous perpetuation of the traditional fishing regime in the 1998 Eritrea/Yemen Sovereignty (Phase I) Award, paras 525-526 and dispositif para. 527(vi), as clarified in the 1999 Eritrea/Yemen Maritime Delimitation (Phase II) Award, paras 62-69, 87-112 [40 ILM 900, 983 (2001); RIAA XXII, 211, 335]. See W.M. Reisman, Case Reports on the Eritrea/Yemen Awards (Phase I), 93 AJIL 668-682 (1999), and (Phase II), 94 AJIL 721-736 (2000); B. Kwiatkowska, The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 32 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 1-25 (2001) and 8 IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 66-86 (2000 No. 1) at <www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/ resources/links> and <www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/bulletin>, revised and updated as of 15 June 2006 at <www.law.uu.nl/nilos> – Publications, Online Papers; R. Volterra, Two UNCLOS Eritrea/Yemen and Qatar v. Bahrain Cases (2001) at <www.gmat.unsw.edu. au/ablos/ABLOS01Folder/VOLTERRA.PDF>. 951


would justify the Gulf of Maine exception in the instant case, and also rejected applicability of the Eritrea/Yemen solution, which was devised in the specific context of awarding sovereignty and with a view to excluding the impact of fisheries on the course of the boundary.71 That, and likewise Qatar v. Bahrain holdings on “the right of innocent passage accorded by customary international law”, which merely drew attention to legal provisions relevant to the position of the parties as that position resulted from the boundary line drawn by the ICJ, was, in the view of Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal, “very different from saying that a Tribunal has an inherent power to create a right of access by way of a remedy infra petita in a delimitation dispute”.72 71

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 72, 88-150, 186-187, 228 [noting that: “[t]he quest for neutral criteria of a geographic character prevailed in the end over area-specific criteria such as geomorphological aspects or resource-specific criteria such as distribution of fish stocks, with a very few exceptions (notably Jan Mayen), singularity of which is also stressed in para. 269”]; Award’s para. 241 [quoting “catastrophic repercussions” exception of Canada/United States Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, 342, para. 237], Award’s paras 246-271, supporting Trinidad’s contentions that Barbados’ fishing off Tobago did not amount to traditional, artisanal fishery but rather to large-scale semi-industrial operations of an ice boat fleet [paras 254, 266] and that the results of lack of access by Barbados to the waters in issue would not be “catastrophic” [paras 256-258, 267-270 and supra note 57] and noting that “injury does not equate with catastrophe” [para. 267], Map VI, paras 277-279, rejecting the Eritrea/Yemen Awards as a precedent for granting Barbados fishery access by means of a remedy infra petita in the present case, and dispositif para. 384(iii); supra notes 30, 67. For rejection of post-1951 Anglo/Norwegian Fisheries Judgment’s speculations by the eminent Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice relied upon by Barbados, see Award’s paras 134 and 269; Barbados’ Reply, paras 391-392 and Trinidad’s Rejoinder, paras 120-124; Hearings Day 2, 16-19 [Counsel Reisman, 18 October 2005], Day 4, 45-46 [Counsel Greenwood, 21 October], Day 5, 59-60 [Reisman, 24 October], Day 8, 100-101, 110 [Greenwood, 28 October 2005], 129 [Agent Jeremie]. See also Kwiatkowska (2005), supra note 68, at 3231-3235.

72

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 279 [supra note 71] and para. 282, quoting Qatar v. Bahrain (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, 110, para. 223 and at 117, dispositif, para. 252(2)(b). See also Declaration of Judge Herczegh, id. at 216, Separate Opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren, 223, para. 2, and Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Torres Bernardez (designated by Qatar), 443-445, paras 544-545 and 550, pointing out that this right of innocent passage falls within the scope of the res judicata of the Judgment concerning the Hawars; Kwiatkowska, ICJ President Schwebel’s Triennium and Beyond (2002), supra note 5, at 56-57. Other precedents, of which relevance – in terms of remedies infra petita, which, in the Tribunal’s view, they did not exemplify – was rejected by the 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 277-278 and 280-283, included: Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction (Merits) Judgments, ICJ Reports 1974, 3, 175; Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, 18; Right of Passage Judgment, ICJ Reports 1960, 6; and the 2002 UN Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary (Merits) Decision, 41 ILM 1057 (2002) and Eritrea/Ethiopia (Determinations) of 7 November 2002, President Sir Elihu Lauterpacht CBE QC, Arbitrators B. Ajibola, W.M. Reisman, Judge S.M. Schwebel and Sir Arthur Watts

952


Having rejected both the impact of fishing activities on the actual course of the boundary line along the singular Jan Mayen application and the relevance of the Eritrea/Yemen, Qatar v. Bahrain and several other precedents for granting Barbados fishery access by means of a remedy infra petita in the present case, the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal considered itself barred from ruling upon the rights and duties of the parties in relation to fisheries within waters that fall, as a result of the drawing of a single equidistant boundary, within Trinidad’s EEZ. Such ruling would, in the Tribunal’s view, be ultra petita, because disputes over these fisheries rights and duties fell outside its jurisdiction by virtue of automatic exceptions to compulsory jurisdiction laid down in LOS Convention article 297(3).73 Therefore, and given that both parties have requested that the Tribunal express a view on the question of Barbadian fishing within the EEZ of Trinidad and Tobago, the Tribunal – basing itself on ICJ and ITLOS practice, the binding commitments made by the Agents of both parties and on their duties concerning fisheries straddling their EEZs – identified and applied: – the third legal option of calling upon the parties not only to negotiate in good faith but also to conclude an agreement providing for fishery access of Barbados (being the world’s “land of the flying fish”) to Trinidad and Tobago’s EEZ on mutually acceptable conditions conforming with the rules codified in the LOS Convention.74

KCMG QC, overviewed in Reports of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Docs S/2005/142 (2005), paras 13-16 and Annex I [President Lauterpacht’s 16th Report] with Enclosures 1-4 and S/2006/749, Annex II [President Lauterpacht’s 21st Report] (2006) at <www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/2006/749>, and S/2007/33, Annex II [President Lauterpacht’s 22nd Report] (2007) at <www.un.org/Docs/journal/ asp/ws.asp?m=s/2007/33>, and PCA at <www.pca-cpa.org/>. 73

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 79, 215-217, 258, 272-283, dispositif para. 384(iii); Hearings Day 5, 72 [Arbitrator Lowe’s Question, 24 October 2005], Day 8, 15 [Counsel Greenwood, 28 October 2005], 69-70 [Counsel Wordsworth], 119-121, 125 [Greenwood], 129 [Agent Jeremie].

74

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 284-293 and jurisprudence relied upon therein and dispositif para. 385(3); supra note 31; and commitments made by the Agents, in Hearings Day 1, 12-14 [Agent Mottley, 17 October 2005], Day 8, 128, 130 [Agent Jeremie, 28 October 2005]. See also generally, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 641-644 (1998) and 612-614 (2003); and on the role played by commitments made by the British Agent during the Mox Plant proceedings, see Kwiatkowska, The Ireland v. United Kingdom Mox Plant Case (2003), supra note 38, at 35-36. On the restrictive Lake Lanoux standard applied in Award’s para. 292 with respect to “the reality and nature of an obligation to negotiate an agreement”, see supra note 46. Note that in a follow-up to judicial (of the ICJ and the ITLOS) and arbitral precedents quoted in Award’s para. 291 in support of the Tribunal’s holdings that “commitments made by Agents of States before international tribunals bind the State, which is thenceforth under a legal obligation to act in conformity with the commitment so made” and that this “follows from the role 953


The rationale of this Tribunal’s unanimous decision is significant in its principal reliance on a duty of both parties codified in LOS Convention article 63 and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement to agree upon measures of conservation and management of the straddling stocks, and in the Tribunal’s express emphasis on the dependence of access of Barbados as a fishing State to Trinidad’s EEZ not upon the nature (artisanal or traditional) of the Barbadian fishing, but upon the limitations and conditions of their future Fisheries Agreement and upon the fundamental “right and duty of Trinidad and Tobago” as a coastal State “to conserve and manage the living resources of waters within its jurisdiction” in pursuance of articles 56 and 61-62.75 The Tribunal’s appreciable awareness of unquestioned exclusivity of the coastal State’s sovereign rights over fisheries in its EEZ, as reaffirmed and consolidated by the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, points at the binding commitments made by the Agents referred to above as primarily underlying the legitimacy of the Tribunal’s directing the parties to conclude the new Agreement providing for Barbados’ access to flying fish stocks within Trinidad’s EEZ. 4. Equitable Maritime Boundary in the Eastern Sector, Disparity in Lengths of Coastal Frontages and Ultimate Test of Proportionality a Posteriori The governing role of single all-purpose equidistance as the equitable boundary delimiting the overlapping entitlements to the continental shelf and the EEZ was also reinforced by the Tribunal – in accordance with international jurisprudence – in the Eastern sector, without prejudice to the separate existence of the legal regimes of those maritime spaces.76 At the first stage of drawing a provisional

of the Agent as the intermediary between the State and the tribunal”, the Argentina v. Uruguay Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Provisional Measures) Order, ICJ Reports 2006, President Rosalyn Higgins, paras 56 and 83-84, relied upon a commitment made by Uruguay during Hearings “to comply in full with the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay and its application” and to conduct “continuous joint monitoring with the Argentine Republic” regarding the environmental consequences of the pulp mills’ future operations in accordance with EU standards for the industry, at <www.icj-cij.org>. 75

See supra note 31. Note that this unquestioned exclusivity of the coastal State’s sovereign rights over fisheries in its EEZ provided a rationale for automatic exception set forth in article 297(3) referred to supra note 73. For a recent assessment of these rights, see The Eclusive Economic Zone (2003), supra note 4. Note also that in a follow-up to the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, Trinidad and Tobago ratified the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement on 25 September 2006 at <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/lt4399.doc.htm>, which Agreement was ratified by Barbados in 2000 at <www.un.org/Depts/los/>, and see M.W. Lodge and S.N. Nandan, Some Suggestions Toward Better Implementation of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, 20 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 345-379 (2005).

76

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 224-227, 234, 298 and jurisprudence quoted therein, emphasising coexistence of the continental shelf and the EEZ as separate

954


equidistant line, the Tribunal did not find persuasive Trinidad and Tobago’s distinction of two different sectors of the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean where the parties would allegedly be in the relationship of oppositeness and adjacency respectively, because in the view of Tribunal, the distinction between opposite and adjacent coasts, while relevant in limited geographical circumstances, had no weight where delimitation was concerned with vast ocean areas.77 The Tribunal agreed with Barbados that identification of basepoints contributing to the calculation of equidistance have a role in effecting the delimitation, but it dismissed Barbados’ contention that these basepoints are solely determinative of the coastal lengths by stressing: “[b]ut relevant coastal frontages are not strictly a function of the location of basepoints, because the influence of coastlines upon delimitation results not from the mathematical ratios or from their contribution of basepoints to the drawing of an equidistance line, but from their significance in attaining an equitable and reasonable outcome, which is a much broader consideration”.78 Accordingly, broad coastal frontages (some of which even have a clearly easterly orientation) of the island of Trinidad and the island of Tobago as well as the resulting disparity in coastal lengths between the parties were the major and objective relevant circumstances to be taken into account at the second stage of the Tribunal’s decision-making process in considering whether this disparity was sufficiently great to justify adjustment – be it major or limited – of the provisional equidistance.79 The Tribunal squarely ruled out any effect, influence or relevance of the 1987 Dominica/France (Guadeloupe and Martinique) Delimitation Treaty, which was relied upon by Trinidad as applying in the region north of Barbados and as entailing a recognition of a departure from the equidistance in order to avoid a cut-off effect (depriving Dominica and Martinique of an outlet to the Atlantic), and which was found by the Tribunal as having no connection at all

institutions which are separately covered by LOS Convention Parts V and VI. 77

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 121-124, 308-316, 355, also rejecting analogies to judicial and arbitral decisions – including the 1969 North Sea Judgment, the 1977 Anglo/French Decision, the 1984 Gulf of Maine Judgment and the 2001 Qatar v. Bahrain (Merits) Judgment – and the 1953 Report of the International Hydrographic Organization, relied upon by Trinidad and Tobago in justification of its approach.

78

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 329 and paras 325-334, 350, 356. On Trinidad and Tobago’s baselines conforming with LOS Convention Part IV, see supra note 55.

79

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, supra note 78 and paras 114-116, 230-233, stressing the objective nature of the criteria of the length and configuration of the relevant coasts, contributing, along with the objective nature of equidistance method, to predictability and stability of equitable maritime boundary delimitation infra legem. On the Tribunal’s two-stage decision-making process, see supra note 68. 955


to the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago dispute, directly or indirectly.80 Nor did the Tribunal (which previously, upon request of both parties, rejected Guyana’s attempt to obtain an access to the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago pleadings) accept Barbados’ contentions on the need to take account of the 2003 Barbados/ Guyana EEZ Treaty, which was held by the Tribunal to be res inter alios acta in respect of Trinidad and Tobago and as such as not having any influence on the delimitation in the present dispute, except in so far as it would reflect the limits of Barbados’ maritime claim.81 Relevance of hydrocarbon activities of both parties as justifying the adjustment of the provisional equidistance was rejected due to not meeting the test determined by the 2002 Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening Judgment that they should be based on express or tacit agreement between the parties.82 Most importantly, in view of disparity in lengths of coastal frontages abutting the disputed area of overlapping claims, the Tribunal felt compelled to reject Trinidad and Tobago’s maximalist claim aimed at facilitating its “salida al Atlántico” by the use of disputed turning Point A and the vector approach, which the Tribunal found as not adjusting but substituting equidistance by a wholly artificial construction and as, thus, being untenable as a matter of law and method.83 As a result of this Tribunal’s appreciable compliance with the 80

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 163, 177, 180, 340, 342-344; Barbados’ Reply, para. 186 and Hearings Day 4, 69-71, 102-104, alleging that the Dominica-proposed extension of the boundary beyond Dominica’s 200 miles but into France’s EEZ was opposed by France’s then Legal Adviser Gilbert Guillaume (ICJ President in 2000-2003) [Counsel Crawford, 21 October 2005], Day 6, 40 [Counsel Reisman, 25 October 2005]; 1987 Dominica/France (Guadeloupe and Martinique) Delimitation Treaty, International Maritime Boundaries Vol. I, supra note 62, Report No. 2-15, at 705. On the Barbados/ France (Guadeloupe and Maritinique) Delimitation Negotiations initiated in a follow-up to the 2006 Award, see infra note 102.

81

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 349 and other Award’s holdings and sources concerning 2003 Barbados/Guyana Treaty quoted supra note 61.

82

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 106 [supra note 71], quoting the Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, 447-448, para. 304 and 2006 Award’s paras 361-366 [supra note 57], adding [para. 364] that while the issue of seismic activity was regarded as significant by the Greece v. Turkey Aegean Sea (Provisional Measures) Order, ICJ Reports 1976, 10, para. 30, which was relied upon by Trinidad and Tobago (as contested by Barbados), “the context of that decision on an application for provisional measures is not pertinent to the definitive determination of a maritime boundary”; Hearings Day 4, 60-61 [Counsel Crawford, 21 October 2005], Day 5, 25-26 [Co-Agent Volterra].

83

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 170-173, Map III, paras 308, 319, 322, 341, 350-360, Map VI and Hearings Day 1, 28-31, 35 [Counsel Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, 17 October 2005], Day 2, 68-70 [Counsel Paulsson, 18 October], Day 4, 74-75 [Counsel Crawford, 21 October], Day 6, 17-31 [Paulsson, 25 October], 54-57 [Sir Elihu Lauterpacht], 70 [Agent Mottley], Day 8, 79, 20-25 [Crawford, 28 October 2005]. See also equidistance

956


fundamental equitable principle providing that maritime delimitation is “not a question of totally refashioning geography” (“il ne s’agit pas de refaire totalement la gèographie”),84 the single equidistant Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago boundary did not delimit the outer continental shelf beyond 200 miles and the Tribunal did not, therefore, need to deal with the controversial (and according to Barbados, practically “unworkable”) trumping of Barbados’ EEZ by Trinidad and Tobago’s outer continental shelf, which the use of the maximalist Point A and vector approach involved.85 However, relying upon Trinidad’s contentions that courts consistently minimise cut-off (or encroachment) effects which are necessarily a matter of both delimitation and entitlement,86 the Tribunal exercised its judicial discretion by adjusting the last segment of a single equidistance to the presence of the coastal frontages of the islands of both Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the resulting disparity in coastal lengths between the parties, and it ended that boundary at the point where it intersects the boundary agreed in the 1990 Trinidad and Tobago/Venezuela Treaty.87 Although the Tribunal considered the 1990 Treaty as “quite evidently res inter alios acta in respect of Barbados and every other country”, it felt bound to take this Treaty into account in so far as it

boundaries anticipated by Prescott and Schofield (2005), supra note 50, at 336-338, concluding that: “[t]he main effects of lines of equidistance in this area prevent Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago claiming a full EEZ of 200 miles and from making any claim to the continental margin of the Atlantic coast beyond 200 miles”. 84

North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 49-50, para. 91; as reaffirmed by all subsequent judicial and arbitral decisions, including Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, 435, para. 279, at 437, para. 281 in fine, at 443-444, para. 295.

85

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 367-368, adding [para. 368 in fine] with respect to the relationship of CS and EEZ rights in the proposed area of overlapping EEZ/outer CS, that: “[t]he Tribunal therefore takes no position on the substance of the problem posed by the argument advanced by Trinidad and Tobago”; and other references quoted supra notes 49-52. See also Postscript on “unworkable” EEZ/outer CS overlap in the main text accompanying infra notes 90-101.

86

Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 232, 321, para. 375, stressing that: “[i]n effecting this adjustment the Tribunal has been mindful that, as far as possible, there should be no cut-off effects arising from the delimitation and that the line as drawn by the Tribunal avoids the encroachment that would result from an unadjusted equidistance line”; para. 379 and Hearings Day 8, 16-17 [Judge Brownlie’s Question, replied by Counsel Crawford, 28 October 2005]. See also Day 7, 32 [President Schwebel’s Question, 27 October 2005], replied at 32-33 [Counsel Greenwood] and in Day 8, 29-31 [Crawford].

87

Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 320-321, 331-334, 369-375, referring in para. 373 to the Tribunal’s exercising “judicial discretion within the limits set out by the applicable law” [supra note 63], paras 379-382, dispositif para. 385(1), Maps V-VII and Technical Report; supra note 28. 957


established the southern limit of Trinidad and Tobago’s entitlement to maritime areas and as it thereby partly determined the maximum extent of overlapping areas between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago; in other words, a critical element of the Tribunal’s drawing of the single boundary line in the Eastern sector consisted in the fact that, by reason of its Treaty with Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago had itself excluded the possibility that the Tribunal draw a line that would extend into waters already allotted under that Treaty to Venezuela.88 While stressing, in reliance on the judicial and arbitral decisions, that the test of proportionality is not a mathematical exercise that results in the attribution of maritime areas as a function of the length of the coasts of the parties or other such exact ratio calculations, the Tribunal unanimously considered that the single equidistant boundary subject to the above adjustment satisfied a broader sense of proportionality as the ultimate a posteriori test of the equitableness of that boundary.89

88

For 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award’s holdings related to the 1990 Trinidad and Tobago/Venezuela Delimitation of Submarine Areas Treaty [supra note 60] as establishing the southern limit of Trinidad and Tobago’s entitlement to maritime areas, see supra note 60. See also Award’s paras 345-348, noting [paras 345-346] in the context of a northwards – adverse to Trinidad – shift in the equidistance under that Treaty, that Barbados cannot be required to “compensate” Trinidad and Tobago for the boundary it agreed with Venezuela. On that boundary appearing to be based upon assumption that disputed Esequibo land belongs to Venezuela and not to Guyana, see Guyana’s 2002 protests against the 1990 Treaty, supra notes 60-61; Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Hearings Day 6, 14-15 [President Schwebel’s Question, Co-Agent Volterra, 25 October 2005], Day 8, 132-133 [Agent Jeremie, 28 October 2005]; 1899 UK (Guyana)/Venezuela Boundary Award, President Frederic Martens, No. 207/Stuyt; 43 AJIL 523-530 (1949); 44 AJIL 683-693, 720-727 (1950)] and J. Gillis Wetter, The International Arbitral Process: Public and Private, Vol. III, 39-44, 83-109, 126-127, 145-148, 168-175 (1979); UN Guyana/Venezuela Mediation of 29 September 2003 at <www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2003/db092903.doc.htm>, 12 January 2006 at <www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article_editorial?id=41278928> and <www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=47689> and 19 March 2006 at <www. stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article_local_news?id=48383158> and <www.mre.gov. ve/Esequibo>. On potential Guyana/Suriname/Venezuela tripoint depending on the sovereignty over disputed Esequibo, see C.G. Lathrop, Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in International Maritime Boundaries Vol. V, supra note 62, at 3305, 3334.

89

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 119-120, 158-161, 232-233, 236-240, quoting [para. 237] North Sea Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 50, para. 91; Libya/Malta (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, 46, para. 59; Denmark (Greenland) v. Norway (Jan Mayen) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1993, 68, para. 68; 2006 Award’s paras 326-329, 335-338, 376-379, quoting [para. 377] Canada/USA Gulf of Maine Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, 323, para. 185, and other jurisprudence quoted by the 2006 Award. On the 8.2:1 ratio of eastward-facing coastal frontage of Trinidad and Tobago of 74.9 miles and that of Barbados of 9.2 miles, see Award’s paras 159, 326, 352 and Hearings Day 1, 30 [Counsel Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, 17 October 2005]; Tanaka (2006), supra note 20, at 530-531. For an analysis of the treatment of the proportionality test in the previous judicial and

958


5. Postscript on the “Unworkable” EEZ/Outer CS Overlap As regards the maximalist claim by Trinidad and Tobago to its “salida al Atlántico”, which, as explained above, was found by the Tribunal to be untenable within the equitable maritime boundary delimitation infra legem effected in the Eastern sector,90 it appears that neither would similar claims, even if they were advanced in different geographical contexts which would not preclude application of such claims, be easily accepted by the ICJ, ITLOS or another Arbitral Tribunal, unless upon a joint request of both parties to a particular dispute. Such joint request does not seem likely in practice, given that even treaties concluded as a result of direct negotiations between States, which are not constrained by the limits set out by the applicable law, only very exceptionally provide for different boundaries for the continental shelf and the EEZ, as is exemplified by the 1978 Australia/ Papua New Guinea Torres Strait (Joint Protected Zone) Treaty.91 Nevertheless, Trinidad’s unsuccessful attempt and the pertaining high-quality pleadings of both parties provided an interesting opportunity of considering pros and cons of this unusual solution of trumping the EEZ of Barbados by the outer continental shelf of Trinidad and Tobago extending beyond 200 miles. To start with, Trinidad’s contention that its rights to such a shelf could not be trumped by Barbados’ EEZ because claims to the shelf were prior to claims to the EEZ, was correctly countered by Barbados’ argument that the outer limits of the shelf beyond 200 miles were only laid down in the LOS Convention (article 76) and do not become “permanently” valid until their establishment through the CLCS procedure and completion of the respective maritime boundary delimitations.92 In addition, the historical precedence of the shelf doctrine relied

arbitral decisions, see also Kwiatkowska, ICJ President Guillaume’s Triennium (2005), supra note 7, at 126-127, 155. 90

See references quoted supra notes 67 and 83-85.

91

On the 1978 Australia/Papua New Guinea Torres Strait Treaty, 18 ILM 291 (1979), see 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 177, 235; Trinidad’s Counter-Memorial, para. 380; Barbados’ Reply, para. 164; Trinidad’s Rejoinder, para. 137; Hearings Day 4, 104-105 [Counsel Crawford, 21 October 2005]. See also Tunisia/Libya (Merits) Dissent Oda, ICJ Reports 1982, 234; Pleadings, Vol. II, 212, 268 [Libya’s Counter-Memorial], Vol. V, 246 [Question II of Judge Schwebel, 9 October 1981], 504 [Libya’s Reply to Schwebel]; Gulf of Maine Pleadings, Vol. IV, 443 [US Counter-Memorial], Vol. VI, 169 [Counsel Weil, 5 April 1984], State Practice Vol. I, 529; Gulf of Fonseca Hearings, C 4/CR 91/45, 19 [Counsel Bowett, 10 June 1991], CR 91/46, 52-53 [Counsel Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, 11 June], CR 91/47, 27 [Bowett, 12 June], CR 91/48, 29 [Lauterpacht, 13 June 1991]; Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening (Merits) Hearings, CR 2002/6, 71 [Co-Agent Pellet, 25 February 2002] at <www.icj-cij.org>.

92

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 174, 184; Hearings Day 6, 54-55 [Counsel Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, 25 October 2005]; and 2006 Report of the ILA Committee on Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf, supra note 49. 959


upon by Trinidad was not entirely accurate in that the famous 1945 President Truman’s Proclamation on the Continental Shelf was – as is often forgotten, but of which the Tribunal was likely well aware – accompanied by his simultaneous Proclamation on Coastal Fisheries, the combined effect of which (unintended by the United States) triggered directly claims by Chile, Ecuador and Peru (CEP), Mexico, Argentina and other States to a 200-mile zone, considered by them as juridical precedents of the EEZ.93 The central consideration putting the soundness of such an overlapping EEZ/outer CS area in doubt amounts to what Barbados repeatedly characterised as the “unworkable situation of overlap between sea-bed and water column rights”.94 Although application of this solution was precluded due to the Tribunal’s primary reliance upon geographical circumstances and it taking no position on the substance of the problem posed by Trinidad and Tobago’s claim, certain doubts as to practical implementation of the overlap in question could perhaps be inferred from the Tribunal’s general emphasis that its single boundary line had to be “both equitable and as practically satisfactory as possible, while at the same time in keeping with the requirement of achieving a stable legal outcome”.95 This holding was meant to express an overall approach of the Tribunal to equitable maritime boundary delimitation, but, when read from the viewpoint of suggested EEZ/outer CS overlap, it could be construed as implying that such an overlap would neither be “as practically satisfactory as possible”, nor contribute to “a stable legal outcome”. This is because all sovereign rights and jurisdiction which the coastal State possesses within its EEZ – except those over pelagic fisheries (sedentary fisheries remaining within shelf rights), non-resource related economic activities and

93

M.M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 4, 752-760 and 945-962 [Truman Proclamations], 763-764, 1060-1070, 1089-1096 and 1200-1201 [CEP and other Latin American States] (U.S. Department of State, 1965); F. Orrego Vicuña, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Legal Nature under International Law 3 (Cambridge 1989), stressing that the EEZ “originates in the proclamation by the President of Chile in 1947”; and reliance in jurisprudence on both Truman Proclamations [40 AJIL 45-47 (1946)] as marking origins of the EEZ, in Kwiatkowska, Decisions of the World Court (2002), supra note 57, at 39, 70. On the donation by the United States of President Truman’s portrait to the United Nations on 19 June 2006, see <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10519.doc.htm> and <www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18919&Cr=United&Cr1=states>.

94

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, paras 178, 180-185, stressing [para. 185] that: “Trinidad and Tobago’s approach is thus a formula for inequity in this case and for chaos and conflict in any other cases in which it might be applied”; Barbados Reply, paras 157-158; Hearings Day 4, 60-61, 104 [Counsel Crawford, 21 October 2005], Day 5, 25-26 [Co-Agent Voterra, 24 October 2005] and other references to Hearings, supra note 49, 83, 86.

95

2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 244, quoted in the main text accompanying supra note 63; and Award’s para. 368, quoted supra note 85 (emphasis added).

960


vessel-source pollution – are the same as its rights and jurisdiction within the continental shelf, for which reason the shelf regime within 200 miles is, as LOS Convention article 56(3) evidences, absorbed by the legal regime of the EEZ.96 Within the area of overlapping EEZ/outer CS, it would at face value be possible to confine Barbados’ competences only to its sovereign rights over pelagic fisheries and non-resource related economic activities (such as production of energy from waters, currents or winds) and to its jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution. But even such reduced EEZ rights would be potentially conflict-creating in that: – Barbados could, for example, insist on setting up, through the IMO, special areas under LOS Convention article 211(5) which could affect Trinidad and Tobago’s shelf rights, or could undertake, pursuant to article 220(5)-(6), physical inspection and detention of vessels of Trinidad or other States engaged into maritime operations within what would also be Trinidad and Tobago’s outer continental shelf.97 The most sensitive part would be the effecting of a clear-cut distinction of all the remaining rights and jurisdiction, which would then in principle be absorbed from Barbados’ EEZ back into Trinidad’s outer CS, but which could nevertheless raise all kinds of practical controversies concerning the specific competences over: – artificial islands and installations under articles 60/80 (e.g., Barbados could insist on retaining jurisdiction over some such islands and installations or on Trinidad’s duty of removing those which Barbados would find as affecting its fisheries interests, or Trinidad could construct its seabed installations without providing prior notification to Barbados on their possibly adverse environmental impact as is required by article 198); or marine scientific research under articles 246 and 253 (e.g., Barbados could nevertheless claim the right of prior consent for any research related to its fishery resources and the right of ceasing or suspending certain research authorised by Trinidad and Tobago, or could grant consent for its fisheries related research in specific areas designated by Trinidad under article 246(6)); or submarine cables and pipelines under article 79, coupled

96

For this reason Barbados was correct in arguing, in Hearings Day 1, 33 [Counsel Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, 17 October 2005], Day 6, 55-56, 59 [Lauterpacht, 25 October 2005], that article 56(3) prescribes method and not, as Trinidad and Tobago argued, subordination of the EEZ to the continental shelf or priority of the shelf rights over EEZ rights. See also 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, para. 182; Barbados’ Reply, para. 157; Hearings Day 4, 82-88 [Counsel Greenwood, 21 October 2005], Day 7, 32-33 [President Schwebel’s Question, Counsel Greenwood, 27 October], 34-36 [Arbitrator Lowe’s Questions, Greenwood], Day 8, 50-52 [Counsel Crawford, 28 October 2005].

97

On uncertainties surrounding exercise of these vessel-source pollution related rights, see B. Sage, Precautionary Coastal States’ Jurisdiction, 37 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 359-387 (2006). 961


with article 56(3) (e.g., Barbados could insist on retaining its right to regulate those cables and pipelines which enter its territory or territorial sea); or ocean dumping under article 210 (e.g., Barbados could claim the right to authorise dumping along with Trinidad and Tobago in the area of overlap). Both Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago could also, for example, unnecessarily chase each other’s and third States’ vessels within the right of hot pursuit applicable to alleged violations of the relevant EEZ and shelf legislation of each of them in pursuance of article 56(1)(c) and article 111. Consequently, unless jointly and exceptionally agreed upon bona fide by both parties, as was not the case in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago proceedings, the establishment of any area of overlapping EEZ/Outer CS, involving such a multiplicity of intertwined rights and jurisdiction of the two coastal States, which would yet have to be duly coordinated with the high seas jus communicationis exercised within this area by all other States by virtue of articles 58 and 78, could – as Barbados correctly maintained – be viewed as “a formula for chaos and conflict”.98 The Award which would endorse this solution – in its maximalist form claimed by Trinidad and Tobago or in any lesser form of a narrower corridor – would, therefore, amount to dispute stimulation instead of dispute resolution, which would be particularly unwarrantable in such a strategically important region as the Caribbean Sea. Similarly, it would appear preferable to avoid the grey area of overlapping EEZ/outer CS (of less than about 100 square miles) of Canada and the United States in the Gulf of Maine and instead, to fix – by means of bilateral negotiations or any future third-party settlement – their single boundary beyond the 1984 Gulf of Maine Judgment’s Point D: – in the way which would either extend Canada’s EEZ to the exclusion of the potential US outer continental shelf, or would extend such US shelf (or grant the United States an additional EEZ area) to the exclusion of the potential Canada’s EEZ; in each of these cases, the boundary could be somewhat shifted in favour of this State, whose maritime area was excluded, and, in the case of resolution by bilateral negotiations (any judicial or arbitral forum could not engage in this kind of trade-offs), such exclusion could perhaps be balanced by awarding the sovereignty over

98

See supra note 94. Note that in the case of some uses, e.g., bunkering of fishing vessels referred to supra note 4, it would moreover be controversial whether they fall under EEZ sovereign rights or jus communicationis and that such doubts would have to be resolved pursuant to Castaneda formula of “residual rights” laid down in article 59. On uncertainties surrounding the boarding – within jus communicationis – of ships engaged in the transportation of WMD and terrorists, see supra note 18.

962


disputed Machias Seal Island and North Rock to that State (e.g., Canada’s sovereignty over these islets could be agreed jointly with extension of the U.S. outer continental shelf throughout the whole grey area), – or less preferably – in the way which would reinforce Canada’s reduced EEZ, but would establish the joint outer continental shelf of both States within the grey area.99 Whether by means of bilateral negotiations or any future third-party settlement, the determination of Canada/US boundary beyond Point D could perhaps in any event be coupled with resolution of the Machias Seal dispute and the ensuing completion of their single boundary landward of Point A which the ICJ Chamber left undefined.100 It seems also noteworthy that, while the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award is significant in the clear upholding – in continuation of more hesitant approach adhered to by the 1992 Canada/France Award – of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over delimitation of the outer continental shelf, France abandoned in early 2006 the extension of its outer shelf off Saint Pierre et Miquelon (called by France “a discontinued juridical shelf ”) due to concern that the required “leapfrogging” over Canada’s EEZ could, despite technically favourable sea-bed conditions, affect its friendly relations with Canada by posing the difficult political and legal issues exemplified above.101

99

These options are based on my consultations held with Dr Alex Oude Elferink of NILOS on 23 August 2006. See also references quoted supra notes 50-52. On well-advanced Canada/ US cooperation in the Gulf of Maine, see Secretary-General Law of the Sea Report, UN Doc. A/53/456, para. 263 (1998) at <www.un.org/Depts/los>; Canada/US Boundary Commission at <www.internationalboundarycommission.org>; and on the Northeast Consortium – US Congressional policy response (since 1999) in the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank fisheries, see T.W. Hartley and R.A. Robertson, Emergence of Multi-Stakeholder Driven Cooperative Research in the Northwest Atlantic: The Case of Northeast Consortium, 30 Marine Policy 580-592 (2006) at <www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol>.

100

See supra note 51.

101

1992 Canada/France Award, supra note 49; France’s Extraplac Submission to the CLCS at <www.extraplac.fr/FR/extensions/geographie.php>; BBC interviews of 6-8 March 2006 at and . On the preceding Report prepared for France by Ron Macnab of Canada’s Geological Survey, testifying that the technical seabed conditions (which were uncertain at the time of 1992 Award) are favourable for extension of the shelf beyond 200 miles in the region south of Newfoundland and Saint Pierre et Miquelon, see 17 November 2005 at <www.vivelecanada.ca/ article.php/2005111708555716>, <www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/11/17/ miquelon_051117.html> and <www.cbc.ca/nl/story/nf_stpierre_20051118.html>. On Barbados/France (Guadeloupe and Maritinique) Maritime Delimitation Negotiations undertaken in a follow-up to the 2006 Award, see infra note 102. 963


V. Concluding Remarks The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award unanimously resolved the complex maritime delimitation dispute to the satisfaction of both parties and provided an incentive for the resolution of their associated fisheries dispute, promoting thereby resource development and friendly relations of the two Caribbean island States102 and providing encouragement for peaceful settlement of other territorial and maritime disputes (e.g., OAS Belize/Guatemala, UN Guyana/Venezuela, Annex VII Guyana/Suriname or Venezuela (Aves Island)/ Eastern Caribbean States) in this strategically important region.103 The revival of the Aves Island dispute in parallel with the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago proceedings gave rise to an interesting issue of whether article 13 of LOS Convention Annex VII, providing that: “[t]he provisions of this Annex shall apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute involving entities other than States Parties”, could apply

102

In all Statements issued upon the delivery of well-balanced Award, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago (each claiming victory for itself) commended the maritime boundary and hoped for conclusion of a new fisheries agreement. See, e.g., 12 April 2006 at <www.barbadosadvocate.com/NewViewNewsleft.cfm?Record=25419> and <www.barbadosadvocate. com/NewViewNewsleft.cfm?Record=25408>; 13 April at <www.caribbeannetnews. com/cgi-script/csArticles/articles/000012/001253.htm> and 17 April at <www. thetobagonews.com/index.pl/article?id=6536488>; 24 April at <www.barbadosadvocate. com/NewViewNewsleft.cfm?Record=25583>; 26 April at <www.barbadosadvocate.com/ NewViewNewsleft.cfm?Record=25617>, also noting Barbados’ preparation of its Submission to the CLCS [supra note 58]; 28 April <www.barbadosadvocate.com/NewViewNewsleft. cfm?Record=25630>; 13 June at <www.barbadosadvocate.com/NewViewNewsleft. cfm?Record=26369>; 29 June 2006 at <www.barbadosadvocate.com/NewViewNewsleft. cfm?Record=26599>. See also Trinidad Oil of 28 April 2006 at <www.thetobagonews. com/index.pl/article?id=6706022>; Barbados Oil Bidding and Drilling in 2006-2009 of 22 April 2006 <www.barbadosadvocate.com/NewViewNewsleft.cfm?Record=25567>; 29 June at <www.upi.com/Energy/view.php?StoryID=20060629-031852-9292r> and 25 August 2006 at <www.barbadosadvocate.com/NewViewNewsleft.cfm?Record=27517>. On ratification by Trinidad and Tobago of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in a follow-up to the 2006 Award, see supra note 75. On undertaking in a follow-up to the 2006 Award of Barbados/France Delimitation Negotiations, see 18 June 2006 at <www.barbadosadvocate. com/NewViewNewsleft.cfm?Record=26431>.

103

See references to Aves Island dispute, in Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Hearings, Day 6, 16 [Co-Agent Volterra, 25 October 2005], 68-69 [Agent Mottley], Day 7, 27-28 [Counsel Greenwood, 27 October], Day 8, 26 [Counsel Crawford, 28 October 2005], 133 [Agent Jeremie]; OECS and CARICOM Team Up on Aves Rock Issue of 10-12 November 2005 at <www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=46812> and <www.vheadline.com/readnews. asp?id=46851>. On OAS Belize/Guatemala Territorial/Maritime Mediation, see Documents at and . On UN Guyana/Venezuela Mediation, see supra note 88. For subsequently rendered 2007 Guyana/ Suriname Maritime Delimitation (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award, see supra note 19.

964


to Venezuela as a non-State Party to the Convention.104 At the same time, the Award illuminated the 60th ICJ anniversary by enhancing the potential of compulsory jurisdiction under LOS Convention Part XV and by reinforcing and enriching the doctrine of equitable maritime boundary delimitation in a manner consistent with notably successful jurisprudence of the World Court and Arbitral Tribunals which will hopefully be extended to the first delimitation case brought to the ITLOS in not too distant future.105 The – to large extent, unprecedented – Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago jurisdictional holdings provided far-reaching incentives for the acceleration of an optimistic concept of “judicial habit stimulating healthy imitation” amongst international courts and for the promotion of the important work of the CLCS, which – as the Award authoritatively clarified – is not affected but is facilitated by judicial and arbitral settlements concerning delimitation of the outer continental shelf beyond 200 miles.106 The legal reasoning and conclusions drawn in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award against the background of its voluminous pleadings (accessible via the Internet) will undoubtedly attract many full-scale academic analyses and will guide judges, counsel, legal advisers and other practitioners in the application and implementation of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention as a part of the global system of peace and security in the decades to come.

104

Virginia Commentary Vol. V (1989), supra note 35, at 437 [Annex VII, article 13]. See also, e.g., perceptive comments on jurisdiction of the ITLOS and Annex VII Tribunals over “entities other than States Parties” by B.H. Oxman, Does the ITLOS Have Jurisdiction over Disputes with Taiwan?, 2 Taiwan Int’l L. Q. 205-226 (2005); M. Sheng-Ti Gau: The Practice of the Concept of Fishing Entities: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 37 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 221-243 (2006).

105

See Statements of ITLOS Presidents Nelson and Wolfrum quoted supra note 10.

106

On the “judicial habit” concept, see supra notes 5-9, 11-16. On the 2006 Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago Award’s holdings concerning delimitation of the outer continental shelf beyond 200 miles and the CLCS functions, see supra notes 49-52, 85; and on direct impact in terms of newly undertaken Barbados/France delimitation negotiations, see supra note 102. 965

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: SOME OBSERVATIONS L.D.M. Nelson*

T

he International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has a seemingly wide jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction over all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It also has jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention, which is submitted to it in accordance with the agreement (article 288). This competence is limited. It arises “where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1” and is subject to the limitations and exceptions contained in section 3, in particular articles 297 and 298. The Seabed Disputes Chamber has mandatory jurisdiction over all disputes with respect to activities in the international seabed area (the Area). The Tribunal does have, what may be termed, a residual compulsory jurisdiction with respect to the prompt release of vessels (article 292) and the prescription of provisional measures under article 290(5). It is hardly surprising that the majority of disputes which have been submitted to the Tribunal fall under these two headings.1 *

This chapter is a revised and expanded version of a lecture given at the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge on 5 May 2004, and was submitted in October 2006.

1

M/V Saiga (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (Order of 13 November 1997) ITLOS Reports 1997, 4; M/V Saiga (No.2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (Order of 20 January 1998) ITLOS Reports 1998, 4; Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Orders of 3 August 1999) ITLOS Reports 1999, 262 and 268; Camouco (Panama v. France) (Order of 17 January 2000) ITLOS Reports 2000, 4; Monte Confurco (Seychelles v. France) (Prompt Release, Judgment of 18 December 2000) ITLOS Reports 2000, 86; Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks (Chile/European Community) (Order of 20 December 2000) ITLOS Reports 2000, 148; Grand Prince (Belize v. France) (Prompt Release, Judgment of 20 April 2001) ITLOS Reports 2001, 17; Chaisiri



I. Prompt Release of Vessels A State party is entitled to submit to the Tribunal in certain specific circumstances the question of release from detention of a vessel flying its flag where the authorities of another State party have detained the vessel and “it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied with the provisions of the Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security”. In the seven prompt release cases submitted to the Tribunal article 73 was the relevant provision for the application of article 292. Thus the Tribunal has not yet been required to answer the important question whether the unique procedure for prompt release contained in article 292 should be available in cases other than those specific provisions of the Convention providing for release upon the posting of a bond or other financial security. The Judgment in the M/V Saiga case on prompt release in an obiter dictum seems to support “a non-restrictive interpretation” of article 292 in the sense that “the applicability of article 292 to the arrest of a vessel in contravention of international law can also be argued, without reference to a specific provision of the Convention for the prompt release of vessels or their crew”.2 On the other hand the view has been put forward that “the right to complain about detention is restricted to the cases expressly provided for in the substantive parts of the Convention” that is articles 73, 220 and 226).3 Given the very nature of this procedure which is tantamount to an “interference” in the coastal State’s judicial authority, it is wiser and indeed consonant with the meaning of the text and its legislative history to adopt a restrictive approach and confine the applicability of article 292 to articles 73, 220 and 226.4

Reefer 2 (Panama v. Yemen) (Order of 13 July 2001) ITLOS Reports 2001, 82; MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Order of 13 November 2001) ITLOS Reports 2001, 89; Volga (Russian Federation v. Australia) (Prompt Release, Judgment of 23 December 2002) ITLOS Reports 2002, 10; Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) (Order of 10 September 2003) ITLOS Reports 2003, 4; Juno Trader (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea-Bissau) (Prompt Release, Judgment of 18 December 2004) ITLOS Reports 2004, 17. 2

M/V Saiga case (Judgment), ITLOS Reports 1997, 28 para. 53.

3

Ibid. Park, Nelson, Chandrasekhara Rao, Vukas and Ndiaye, Diss. Op., 62 para. 24.

4

“Adoption of the non-restrictive position would favour flag state interests over those of coastal States in a manner not contemplated at UNCLOS III”. J.E. Noyes, “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” (1998) 32 Cornell Int’l L. J. 110-182 on 15.

968

The Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

II. Reasonable Bond The expression “reasonable bond” can be found in both articles 292 and 73. In particular, article 73 declares that “[a]rrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other security”. As the Tribunal has so rightly stated: “According to article 113, paragraph 2, of the Rules of the Tribunal, the Tribunal ‘shall determine the amount, nature and form of the bond or financial security to be posted’. The most important guidance in this determination is the indication contained in article 292, paragraph 1, of the Convention that the bond or other financial security must be ‘reasonable’. In the view of the Tribunal, the criterion of reasonableness encompasses the amount, the nature and the form of the bond or financial security. The overall balance of the amount, form and nature of the bond or financial security must be reasonable.”5 It is the task of the Tribunal – not an easy one – to give meaning to the expression “reasonable bond” in the specific cases which have been submitted to it.6 In these prompt release cases the Tribunal has been engaged in clarifying the rule contained in article 292 of the Convention and developing its own jurisprudence especially with regard to the meaning of a reasonable bond. The locus classicus of the factors which the Tribunal believes are relevant in the assessment of a reasonable bond can be found in the Camouco case which states: “The Tribunal considers that a number of factors are relevant in an assessment of the reasonableness of bonds or other financial security. They include the gravity of the alleged offences, the penalties imposed or imposable under the laws of the detaining State, the value of the detained vessel and of the cargo seized, the amount of the bond imposed by the detaining State and its form.”7 In the Monte Confurco case the Tribunal importantly went on to add that the list outlined above was not closed and further observed that it was not its intention

5

M/V Saiga case (Prompt Release, Judgment), ITLOS Reports 1997, 35 para. 82.

6

With reference to the use of similar expressions such as “adequate grounds”, “unjustifiable interference”, “reasonable measures” and so on, François stated that “[i]n the opinion of the International Law Commission, a codification of international law can no more do without these expressions than can national law. Any attempt to codify international law without using such expressions will prove vain. In contentious cases, the meaning will have to be decided by an impartial authority, to which disputes regarding the interpretation of these expressions in specific cases are to be submitted”. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1958) Official Records IV, 33-34.

7

Camouco case, op. cit., 31 para. 67. 969


to lay down rigid rules as to the exact weight to be given to any of those factors8 which gives the Tribunal a certain discretion in assessing the reasonableness of the bond. This may create a measure of unpredictability. Nevertheless this flexibility leaves room for an evolutive approach to a provision which may yet have to adapt to changing situations. It is a curious fact that each of these prompt release cases has thrown up its own unique features which makes it difficult to produce a “formulaic solution” applicable to all cases.9

III. Illegal, Uncontrolled and Undeclared Fishing An important question which arises in these prompt release cases relates to the problem of illegal, uncontrolled and undeclared fishing in the Southern Ocean – Camouco, Monte Confurco, Grand Prince and Volga – a matter which as the proceedings in the Volga case showed is of some international concern. Diplomatic notes were sent to Australia by, for instance, Chile, France, New Zealand and South Africa.10 To what extent must the Tribunal take this factual background into account in determining a reasonable bond? It will be recalled that in the Monte Confurco case France stated that “among the circumstances constituting what one might call the ‘factual background’ of the present case, there is one whose importance is fundamental. That is the general context of unlawful fishing in the region concerned”. The Tribunal declared in response that it took note of this argument.11 In the Volga case Australia urged the Tribunal to take full account of the context of illegal, uncontrolled and undeclared fishing in the Southern Ocean and more especially in the Australian exclusive economic zone adjacent to the Territory of Heard Island and McDonald Island.

8

Monte Confurco case, op. cit., 109 para. 76.

9

Lowe has argued “[T]hat the core issues in prompt release cases are sufficiently narrow and similar for one to expect the judgments to be taking on by now an almost formulaic quality”. V. Lowe, “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2000”. (2001) 16 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 549-570 on 570.

10

There is a precedent for the submission of such diplomatic correspondence in Annex 4 to the Common Rejoinder of Denmark and the Netherlands in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. ICJ Pleadings 1968, Vol. I, 546.

11

Monte Confurco case, op. cit., para. 79. Nelson argued in the Camouco case that the context of illegal, uncontrolled and undeclared fishing in the Antarctic Ocean constitutes part of the “factual matrix” of the case and “ought to have played some part, not by any means a dominant part, but a part nevertheless in the determination of a reasonable bond”. Camouco case (Sep. Op. Nelson), 49.

970


The argument can be made that in the Volga case the Tribunal went somewhat further in this matter when it declared: “The Tribunal understands the international concerns about illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing and appreciates the objectives behind the measures taken by States, including the States Parties to CCAMLR, to deal with the problem.”12 The Tribunal has to a certain extent qualified this observation when it went on to add that: “The Tribunal must, however, emphasize that, in the present proceedings, it is called upon to assess whether the bond set by the Respondent is reasonable in terms of article 292 of the Convention. The purpose of the procedure provided for in article 292 of the Convention is to secure the prompt release of the vessel and crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond, pending completion of the judicial procedures before the courts of the detaining State” (emphasis added).13 The use of the word “however” in the above statement seems to suggest that the “problem of continuing illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean” is a factor which is somewhat alien to the object and purpose of article 292.14 The Tribunal’s business is to determine a reasonable bond and “what is reasonable and equitable in any given case must depend on the particular

12

Volga case, op. cit., para. 68.

13

Ibid. para. 69.

14

P. Weckel, “Chronique de jurisprudence internationale”, (2003) 107 RGDIP 182-188 on 183. It has been remarked that: “Or, l’évaluation du juge doit se faire dans le cadre restreint de sa compétence, et par conséquent par rapport à l’objet de la procédure de l’article 292 de la Convention qui est, non de veiller à la préservation du milieu marin, mais de garantir la prompt mainlevée de l’immobilisation du navire dès le dépôt d’une caution raisonnable. Le Tribunal statuerait ultra vires s’il se risquait à apprécier le montant de la caution au regard de la gravité objective des faits de l’espèce”. C. Laly-Chevalier, “Activité du tribunal international du droit de la mer (2001-2002)”, (2002) XLVIII AFDI 363-380 on 370. It has also been observed that: “[I]llegal fishing is morally reprehensible and environmentally destructive but the Tribunal has made it clear that these conditions are not relevant to what amounts to a reasonable bond except for deciding the likely penalties for the alleged conduct that may be imposed by a domestic court”. M. White and S. Knight, “ITLOS and the ‘Volga’ case: the Russian Federation v Australia”, (2003) 17 Maritime L. Ass’n Austl. & N.Z. J. 39-53 on 51-52. 971


circumstances”.15 It may be argued that “reasonableness cannot be assessed in isolation from those circumstances”.16

IV. The Tribunal and National Courts It has been argued that “the notion of reasonable bond to be determined by the Tribunal must be an international notion based on the Convention. It does not necessarily have to coincide with what can be considered as reasonable from a domestic point of view”.17 Thus it is for the Tribunal and not for the coastal State to determine the reasonableness of the bond.18 This approach coincides with the view that the Tribunal is invested with a competence to limit the discretionary power of the coastal State with respect to the fixing of bonds. It has pertinently been remarked that “[l]a notion de raisonnable est souvent invoquée dans le souci de limiter les compétences discrétionnaires que les Etats possèdent dans certains domains”.19 However it may be pointed out that certain judges have invoked the concept of “margin of appreciation” as primarily developed by the European Court of Human Rights to limit the powers of the Tribunal in determining whether a bond set by the coastal State is reasonable.20

15

Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1980, 96 para. 49. As Lachs has remarked: “‘Reasonableness’ requires that the realities of a situation, as it affects all the Parties, be fully taken into account”. North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) (Diss. Op. Lachs), ICJ Reports 1969, 239.

16

Volga case (Diss. Op. Shearer), para. 7. See too I. Gallala, “La notion de caution raisonnable dans la jurisprudence du Tribunal international du droit de la mer” (2001) 195 RGDIP 932-967 on 960-963 and A. Choquet, “La prompte mainlevée et l’immobilisation d’un navire et la libération de son équipage” (2001) 616 DMF 540-554 on 547-549. Lowe has pointed out that “[t]he ITLOS has, arguably, a particular obligation to the LOSC States Parties to hold to the balance struck in the 1982 Convention as a whole; and that surely requires that it keep an eye on the implications of all its decisions, including those in prompt release cases, for other rights and duties of States under the Convention”. Op. cit. note 9, 561.

17

Camouco case (Diss. Op. Treves), 74 para. 4. To the same effect see ibid. (Declaration Laing), 43.

18

See ibid. (Sep. Op. Nelson), 48 citing the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case (Great Britain v. United States) (Award of 7 September 1910), XI RIAA 189.

19

J.J.A. Salmon, “Le concept de raisonnable en droit international public”, in Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter, Le droit international: unité et diversité (Pedone, Paris 1981), 447-478 on 459.

20

In the Volga case Cot referred specifically to a dictum in the case of Mellacher and Others which read: “Provided that the legislature remains within the bounds of its margin of

972


In this context it should be observed that in the Monte Confurco case the Tribunal held that it was “not precluded from examining the facts and circumstances of the case to the extent necessary for a proper appreciation of the reasonableness of the bond. Reasonableness cannot be determined in isolation from facts”.21

V. Non-Financial Conditions A significant question which arose in the Volga case for the first time in these prompt release cases related to whether the coastal State is entitled to include in a “bond or other security”, as provided for in article 73(2), conditions which are non-financial in nature. In the Volga case Australia had made the release of the “Volga” dependent, inter alia, on certain non-financial conditions: the carriage of a fully operational vessel monitoring system and the observance of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) conservation measures until the conclusion of legal proceedings (the so-called “good behaviour bond”). The Russian Federation contended that Australia could not attach “conditions of release which do not relate to the provisions of a bond or other security in terms of article 73(2) of UNCLOS”.22 Australia for its part argued that: “This element of the bond is designed to ensure that the Volga complies with Australian law and relevant treaties to which Australia is a party until the completion of the domestic legal proceedings. A State is entitled to eliminate the prospect of illegal fishing contrary to its laws by a vessel it has arrested and released pending the completion of the relevant legal proceedings relating to the past conduct of that vessel. The purpose of the inclusion of this element of the bond is intrinsically linked to the release of the vessel and the level of that inclusion is reasonable.”23

appreciation, it is not for the Court to say whether the legislation represented the best solution for dealing with the problem or whether the legislative discretion should have been exercised in another way” (Judgment of 19 December 1989), ECHR Series A, No. 169, 53. Volga case, 5 et seq. See also Camouco case (Diss. Op. Wolfrum), 70-71 para. 14; ibid. (Diss. Op. Anderson), 50-51. 21

Monte Confurco case (Judgment), 10 para. 74. In his Declaration Mensah cautioned “that any ‘examination’ of the facts must be limited to what is strictly necessary for an appreciation of the reasonableness or otherwise of the measures taken by the authorities of the arresting State”. Ibid. at 121. Lowe, op. cit. note 9, 566.

22

Memorial of the Russian Federation, 12 para. 5, <www.itlos.org>.

23

Statement of Response, ibid. at 19 para. 55. 973


The Tribunal held that the term bond or other security “must be seen in its context and in light of its object and purpose” and noted that “[t]he relevant context includes the provisions of the Convention concerning the prompt release of vessels and crews upon the posting of a bond or security. These provisions are: article 292; article 220(7); and article 226(1)(b))”.24 Here it should be pointed out that article 73(2) speaks of “reasonable bond or other security” but article 292(1) with which it must be read, does refer to “reasonable bond or other financial security” and that article 220(7) and article 226(1)(b) use respectively the expressions “bond or other financial security” and “bonding or other appropriate financial security”. The Tribunal’s approach should be seen as an application of the general rules of interpretation embodied in article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, though not expressly mentioned. As the International Court of Justice has made clear – “a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given in the light of its object and purpose. Interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty”.25 The Tribunal further added that “[a] perusal of article 73 as a whole indicates that it envisages enforcement measures in respect of violations of the coastal State’s laws and regulations alleged to have been committed. … [A] ‘good behaviour bond’ to prevent future violations of the laws of a coastal State cannot be considered as a bond or security within the meaning of article 73, paragraph 2, of the Convention read in conjunction with article 292 of the Convention” (paragraph 80). This interpretation met with criticism. Ad hoc Judge Shearer made the point that: “Such a narrow interpretation of the provisions of article 73, paragraph 2, and 292 cannot, in my opinion, be supported. In the short period since the conclusion of the Convention in 1982, and in the even shorter period since its entry into force in 1994, there have been catastrophic declines in the stocks of many fish species throughout the world. The words “bond” and “financial security” should be given a liberal and purposive interpretation in order to enable the Tribunal to take full account of the measures – including those made possible by modern technology – found necessary by many coastal States … to deter by

24

Para. 77. See also article 111, para. 4(d), of the Rules of the Tribunal.

25

Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) (Judgment), ICJ Reports 2002, 645 para. 37. See also Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (Judgment), ICJ Reports 1994, 21-22 para. 41; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar/Bahrain) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment), ICJ Reports 1995, 18 para. 33.

974


way of judicial and administrative orders the plundering of the living resources of the sea.”26 It must be acknowledged that the circumstances in which the mechanism for prompt release was meant to operate has, to a certain extent, changed but as has so often been said the task of tribunals and courts is to interpret and not to revise or reconstruct the terms of treaties.27 That is perhaps why the Tribunal adopted a textual approach rather than a more functional or teleological approach.

VI. The Value of the Vessel The rules of the Tribunal stipulate that the application for the release of a vessel and its crew ought to contain, where appropriate, data relevant to the determination of the value of the vessel.28 It is generally agreed that the value of the ship is a paramount consideration in the assessment of a reasonable bond. However the Tribunal has stated that “the value of the vessel alone may not be the controlling factor in the determination of the amount of the bond or other financial security”. Assessment of the true value of the vessel is made more difficult when the parties differ on the value of the vessel as in the Camouco case.29 It may be observed that in the Volga case the vessel had been valued at USD 1 million (approximately AUD 1.8 million) and the value of fuel, lubricants and equipment amounted to AUD 147,460. In contradistinction to the Camouco case where the parties differed on the value of the “Camouco” (the Camouco case, paragraph 69) there was no dispute between the parties as to value of the vessel and its cargo.30

26

Volga case (Diss. Op. Shearer), 71 para. 17. See also ibid. (Diss. Op. Anderson), 59-65.

27

Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Second Phase, Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports 1950, 229; Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France/USA) (Judgment), ICJ Reports 1952, 196; and the Acquisition of Polish Nationality (Advisory Opinion), 1923 PCIJ Series B, No. 7, 20.

28

Article 111, 2(b).

29

“During the oral proceedings, expert testimony was offered by the Applicant and not challenged by the Respondent to the effect that the replacement value of the Camouco was FF 3,717,571. On the other hand, the value assessed by the French authorities for the purposes of the domestic proceedings is FF 20 million but there is no evidence on record to substantiate this assessment”. Camouco case, 32 para. 69.

30

Gallala, op. cit., 951-953. 975


VII. Proceeds of the Sale In the Monte Confurco case France had argued that the seizure of the fish on board and of the fishing gear was not before the Tribunal but was subject to different proceedings under French law. In the Tribunal’s view however, the seizure of the fish, the fishing gear and the vessel was effected with reference to the same offence – part and parcel of the same proceedings.31 As a consequence it considered the value of the fish and fishing gear seized was also to be taken into account as a factor relevant to the assessment of the reasonableness of the bond and held that the proceeds from the sale of fish on board the “Monte Confurco” was to be treated as part of the security. In assessing the correctness of this approach it must be remembered that there was some uncertainty as to the location and amount of the catch caught in the exclusive economic zone of the Kerguelen Islands. The finding in that Judgment has been criticized.32 Professor Crawford in his oral pleadings in the Volga case has put such criticism in a particularly graphic form: “If I came home late one night and discovered a burglar escaping with the family silver, I would be unimpressed with the argument in subsequent legal proceedings that the burglar was entitled to deposit the silver as part of his bond. It is not his silver”.33 This matter again arose in the Volga case. The catch of Patagonian toothfish and the bait found on board the “Volga” was seized by the Australian authorities and sold for a total of AUD 1,932,579.28 and the proceeds of the sale were held in trust, pending the final outcome of the domestic proceedings against members of the crew. The Russian Federation, relying primarily on the findings in this matter in the Monte Confurco case, argued that the proceeds of the sale of the catch should be treated as security given by the owner.34 The Tribunal held that “[a]lthough the proceeds of the sale of the catch represent a guarantee to the Respondent, they have no relevance to the bond to be set for the release of the vessel and the members of the crew. Accordingly, the question of their inclusion or exclusion from the bond does not arise in this case”.35 The proceeds of the sale consequently did not form part of the bond determined by the Tribunal. It is fair to state that the Tribunal has moved away or in the words of Judge ad hoc Shearer “distanced itself ” from the findings on this question in the Monte Confurco case.

31

Monte Confurco case, 111 paras 85-86.

32

Ibid. (Diss. Op. Jesus), 144 para. 33.

33

ITLOS/PV.02/02, <www.itlos.org>.

34

Memorial of the Russian Federation, 15 para. 18, <www.itlos.org>.

35

Volga case, 37 para. 86.

976


VIII. Linguistic Divergence – “Reasonable” and “Suffisante” There is a linguistic divergence between the English and French versions of the Convention in article 73, paragraph 2: [English] “Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security” (emphasis added). [French] “Lorsqu’une caution ou une garantie suffisante a été fournie, il est procédé sans délai à la mainlevée de la saisie dont un navire aurait fait l’objet et à la libération de son equipage” (emphasis added). It may here be pointed out that all the other language versions use the equivalent of the English term “reasonable” in article 292, paragraph 1, and the majority of the language versions (Arabic, English, Russian and Spanish) utilize the term “reasonable” or its equivalent in article 73, paragraph 2. The question relating to this linguistic divergence has been raised in three prompt release cases – the Camouco, the Monte Confurco and the Volga.36 In the Camouco case Panama’s application dealt at some length with a linguistic analysis of the relevant texts and arrived at the conclusion that “even if the French version of the text of the Convention entails a different translation of one concept (that of a reasonable bond), the other versions …. and other linguistic versions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea quite clearly establish the necessarily reasonable nature of the bond” (emphasis added).37 In the Monte Confurco case, France, in its Statement of Response, pointed out that: “the French text of article 73(2), does not use the adjective ‘reasonable’ in reference to the bond, but rather the following expression: ‘Lorsqu’une caution ou une garantie suffisante a été fournie ….’, whereas the English text says: ‘the posting of a reasonable bond or other security’. This difference between the two language versions certainly does not indicate a difference in meaning between them but does, however, provide an indication of the meaning that may be attached to the concept of reasonableness” (emphasis added).38

36

See E. Franckx, “‘Reasonable Bond’ in the Practice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea”, (2002) 32 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 303-342.

37

Panama’s Application, 36, Oral Pleadings, ITLOS/PV.00/3. See observations of Anderson in his Diss. Op., Camouco case, 56-57.

38

Statement in Response of the French Government, para. 11. 977


This matter arose yet again in the Volga case where Dr Bennett (Australia), in his oral submission, referred to this linguistic divergence of the English and French texts. He interpreted the difference between the two language versions as meaning that “[I]f there is a range of values or possibilities, the bond should secure the maximum”. That in his view was “the significance of the French word ‘suffisante’, the English word ‘sufficient’”.39 Although this matter has been raised in the separate and dissenting opinions of certain judges the Tribunal itself has not pronounced on it. The dominant view among those who have addressed this linguistic divergence40 seems to be that the term “reasonable” and the term “suffisante” are presumed to have the same meaning and thus the use of the word “suffisante” adds nothing more.41

IX. Provisional Measures The Tribunal also has a special residual compulsory jurisdiction with respect to the prescription of provisional measures. Article 290(5), which grants this competence, reads as follows: “Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being submitted under this section, any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or, with respect to activities in the Area, the Seabed Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures in accordance with this Article if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or affirm those provisional measures, acting in conformity with paragraphs 1 to 4.”

39

ITLOS/PV.02/03, 6, <www.itlos.org>.

40

See Monte Confurco case (Sep. Op. Nelson), 125-126; Volga case (Sep. Op. Cot), 54-55 para. 23; and Volga case (Diss. Op. Shearer), 70 para. 14.

41

As the International Law Commission has so rightly remarked “the plurality of the authentic texts of the treaty is always a material factor in its interpretation, since both or all the texts authoritatively state the terms of the agreement between the parties”, and it went on pertinently to add: “[B]ut it needs to be stressed that in law there is only one treaty – one set of terms accepted by the parties and one common intention with respect to those terms – even when two authentic texts appear to diverge” (1966) II ILCYB 225 (emphasis added). It will be remembered that in the Case concerning filleting within the Gulf of St. Lawrence between Canada and France the Arbitral Tribunal resorted, inter alia, to a comparison of the six authentic texts in order to interpret article 62, para. 4(a), of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (1986) XIX RIAA 225.

978


Here the Tribunal is called upon to prescribe provisional measures pending the final decision given not by the Tribunal itself but by an arbitral tribunal yet to be constituted to which a dispute has been duly submitted – where the merits as well as questions of jurisdiction and admissibility will be decided. Thus a finding by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea that “prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction” leaves that tribunal free to find that it lacks jurisdiction as indeed famously occurred in the Southern Bluefin Tuna arbitration. This procedure has already been invoked in three cases – the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, the MOX Plant case and the Land Reclamation case. It should be noted that in the M/V Saiga No. 2 case the Tribunal gave its Order on provisional measures on 11 March 1998 under article 290(1) of the Convention.42

X. Pending the Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal In the Land Reclamation case Singapore had argued that, as the Annex VII arbitral tribunal was to be constituted not later than 9 October 2003, there was no need to prescribe provisional measures given the short period of time remaining before that date.43 In a sense there was no urgency. The Tribunal took the opportunity to cast some useful light on the operation of the mechanism embodied in paragraph 5 of article 290. It considered that the period before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal “is not necessarily determinative for the assessment of the urgency of the situation or the period during which the prescribed measures are applicable and that the urgency of the situation must be assessed taking into account the period during which the Annex VII arbitral tribunal is not yet in a position to modify, revoke or affirm those provisional measures”.44 In this case the Tribunal had no competence to prescribe provisional measures after 9 October 2003, the date fixed by the terms of Annex VII, article 3(e) concerning the appointment of arbitrators by the President of the Tribunal. The Tribunal was, however, free to prescribe such measures at any time before 9 October since any provisional measures prescribed by the Tribunal would apply until the Annex VII arbitral tribunal was in a position to modify, revoke or affirm these provisional measures. Thus that date itself could not determine the urgency of the situation.

42

On which see P. Chandrasekhara Rao, “ITLOS: The First Six Years”, (2002) 6 Max Planck UNYB 183-300 on 236.

43

Land Reclamation case (Order), para. 66.

44

Ibid. para. 68. 979


It went further to add that “the provisional measures prescribed by the Tribunal may remain applicable beyond that period”.45 It might be noted that the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitral Award revoked the measures prescribed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Whereas the provisional measures prescribed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea were affirmed by the MOX Plant Arbitral Tribunal in its Order No. 3 Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures (2003).46 It will be recalled that in the MOX Plant case the Tribunal had stated that “in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal does not find that the urgency of the situation requires the prescription of the provisional measures requested by Ireland, in the short period before the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal”.47 In prescribing provisional measures under article 290(5), the Tribunal has taken into consideration not only the elements contained in that paragraph but also those embodied in paragraph 1,48 i.e., (i) the preservation of the respective rights of the parties or (ii) the prevention of serious harm to the marine environment. Incidentally the latter consideration is novel and in fact represents an international community interest.49 An instance where the Tribunal treated these elements as a whole is found in the MOX Plant case where the urgency of the situation as required by paragraph 5 was interpreted – to quote the words of the Tribunal “in the sense that action prejudicial to the rights of either party, or causing serious harm to the marine environment is likely to be taken before the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal”.50

45

Ibid. para. 69.

46

For order see website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration <www.pca-cpa.org>.

47

MOX Plant case, 110 para. 81.

48

It may be recalled that the informal texts specifically referred to paragraphs 1 and 2. Paragraph 2 then consisted of what are now paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 290 of the Convention. See, for example, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3.

49

R. Wolfrum, “Provisional Measures of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea”, in P. Chandrasekhara Rao and R. Khan (eds), International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston 2001) 176. Compare article 31(2) of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks which reads as follows: “Without prejudice to article 290 of the Convention, the court or tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted under this Part may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent damage to the stocks in question, as well as in the circumstances referred to in article 7, paragraph 5, and article 16, paragraph 2”.

50

MOX Plant case, 108 para. 64.

980


In the prescription of these provisional measures the Tribunal, has taken fully into account the necessity to prescribe practical measures which would assist the parties to find a solution, utilizing its powers under the rules of procedure (article 89, paragraph 5) to prescribe measures other than those requested.51 With reference to the provisional measures prescribed by the Tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, for instance, Professor Crawford, who acted as counsel in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, had this to say: “There, the Tribunal’s intervention at the stage of provisional measures played a very significant role in bringing the parties – Australia, New Zealand and Japan – back to negotiations with each other … the eventual result was that the Southern Bluefin Tuna Commission was revitalized. It is now functioning well.” The Southern Bluefin Arbitral Tribunal itself had adverted to this significant role of the provisional measure prescribed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea when it declared that: “However, revocation of the Order prescribing provisional measures does not mean that the Parties may disregard the effects of that Order or their own decisions made in conformity with it. The Order and those decisions – and the recourse to ITLOS that gave rise to them – as well as the consequential proceedings before this Tribunal, have had an impact not merely in the suspension of Japan’s unilateral experimental fishing program during the period that the Order was in force, but on the perspectives and actions of the Parties” (paragraph 67). The provisional measures prescribed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the Case concerning Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) seem to have provided the means of actually resolving the dispute between the parties. On 1 September 2005 the Arbitral Tribunal handed down an Award on agreed terms based on the report of the Group of Experts which had been established according to the terms of the provisions prescribed by the Tribunal.52 Commenting on this development in the context of the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, Rosenne made these important observations: “This indicates that carefully crafted provisional measures prescribed by ITLOS may have an implication for the future actions of the parties

51

See my chapter entitled “Reflections on the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea”, in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (OUP, Oxford 2006) 28 where this matter has also been discussed.

52

For Award see website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration <www.pca-cpa.org>. 981


and lay the basis for the final solution of the dispute, even when the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the dispute. There is no reason why this notion should not be given a wider application, in that way making the provisional measures proceedings an important element in the general procedures available to States for the pacific settlement of their international disputes” (emphasis added).53 The provisional measures prescribed by the Tribunal under article 290, paragraph 5, thus may enable the parties to resolve their dispute – which is of course the purpose of resorting to dispute settlement mechanisms.54

XI. Settlement of Disputes by Peaceful Means Chosen by the Parties The Convention grants the parties to a dispute complete freedom with respect to the means of settling their disputes (see article 280). Two specific provisions in Part XV, section 1, were to a certain extent designed to implement this cardinal principle – article 281 and article 282. 1. Article 281 “If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure” (emphasis added).

53

Sh. Rosenne, Provisional Measures in International Law: the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (OUP, Oxford 2005) 157-158.

54

Article 89, para. 5 of the Rules of the Tribunal reads as follows: “When a request for provisional measures has been made, the Tribunal may prescribe measures different in whole or in part from those requested and indicate the parties which are to take or to comply with each measure”. This provision expressly gives the Tribunal a degree of discretion in prescribing such provisional measures. Unlike the International Court of Justice the Tribunal has no power to prescribe such measures propio motu (see article 75, para. 1, of the Rules of the International Court of Justice on which article 89, para. 5 is modelled). However, in my view it is certainly competent to prescribe measures not requested by the parties which may help in the resolution of the dispute whilst preserving the respective rights of the parties pending a decision by the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal. See Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (Diss. Op. Shearer), 328-329; G. Eiriksson, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague/London/Boston 2000) 220; M.G. García-Revillo, El Tribunal Internacional del Derecho del Mar (Córdoba 2005) 481-508.

982


In the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases Japan argued, inter alia, that recourse to the arbitral tribunal was excluded because the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna of 1993 provided for its own dispute settlement procedure (article 16). In response the Tribunal stated that “in its view the fact that the Convention of 1993 applies between the parties does not preclude recourse to the procedures in Part XV, section 2 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea”.55 The Tribunal did not elaborate on this finding. The relationship between article 16 of the Convention of 1993 and article 281 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea was the subject-matter of much debate in the Southern Bluefin Tuna arbitral proceedings. The Arbitral Tribunal was of the view that article 16 of the Convention of 1993 fell within the terms and intent of article 281(1) as well as article 280 and concluded that “article 16 of the 1993 Convention exclude(s) any further procedure” within the contemplation of article 281(1) of UNCLOS,56 although not explicitly. As a consequence it found that the Arbitral Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute.57 It may be remarked that Justice Sir Kenneth Keith in his Separate Opinion, relying on the same requirement in article 281, came to a very different conclusion, holding that Article 16 of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna did “not ‘exclude’ the jurisdiction of this tribunal in respect of disputes arising under UNCLOS”.58

55

Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, 294 para. 55.

56

Southern Bluefin Tuna Award, (2000) 39 ILM 1390 para. 59.

57

The Tribunal seemed particularly impressed by the argument of Japan which ran as follows: “A very large number of treaties that relate to the law of the sea have dispute settlement provisions which have no compulsory element. If the approach of Australia and New Zealand in espousing the governance of the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS were to apply to these treaties, parties to those treaties who had no intention of entering into compulsory jurisdiction would find themselves so bound” (para. 38(i)). In particular it stated: “It is plain that the wording of Article 16(1) and (2) has its essential origins in the terms of Article XI of the Antarctic Treaty; the provisions are virtually identical. In view of the States that concluded the Antarctic Treaty – divided as they were between some States that adhered to international adjudication and arbitration and a Great Power that then ideologically opposed it – it is obvious that these provisions are meant to exclude compulsory jurisdiction” (para. 58). Per contra Oxman has observed that “[t]he question, let us recall, is not whether the obligations of states under these agreements are subject to compulsory jurisdiction, but whether these agreements, notwithstanding the absence of an express provision to that effect, will be interpreted to block compulsory jurisdiction under the LOS Convention with respect to obligations arising under that Convention”. Bernard Oxman, “Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction”, (2001) 95 AJIL 277. To the same effect, among others, see Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (OUP, Oxford 2003) 203.

58

Southern Bluefin Tuna Award, op. cit., 1397 para. 10. See Nelson, MOX Plant case (Sep. Op. Nelson), 116. 983


2. Article 282 Article 282 plays a similar role to its companion article 281 – it forms part of what can be referred to as an internal control mechanism. It reads as follows: “If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.” In the MOX Plant case one of the United Kingdom’s main contentions was that Ireland was precluded by the terms of article 282 from having recourse to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal. In its view the main elements of the dispute submitted to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal were governed by the compulsory settlement procedure of the OSPAR Convention or the EC Treaty or the Euratom Treaty.59 Thus through the operation of article 282 the arbitral tribunal would not have jurisdiction and thus the Tribunal was not competent to prescribe provisional measures under article 290(5). In this case the Tribunal gave a number of reasons for rejecting this contention (see paragraphs 48-53). Paragraphs 49, 50 and 51 in particular read as follows: “Considering that the dispute settlement procedures under the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty deal with disputes concerning the interpretation or application of those agreements, and not with disputes arising under the Convention; Considering that, even if the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty contain rights or obligations similar to or identical with the rights or obligations set out in the Convention, the rights and obligations under those agreements have a separate existence from those under the Convention; Considering also that the application of international law rules on interpretation of treaties to identical or similar provisions of different treaties may not yield the same results, having regard to, inter alia, differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes, subsequent practice of parties and travaux préparatoires.”

59

MOX Plant case, op. cit., para. 43.

984


The notion of each treaty having a “separate existence” is based on a dictum of the 1986 Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua which read as follows: “There are a number of reasons for considering that, even if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in content, and even if the States in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence” (emphasis added).60 And it went on to state that: “It will therefore be clear that customary international law continues to exist and to apply, separately from international treaty law, even where the two categories of law have an identical content”.61 It can be argued that the relationship as spelled out by the Court between two formal sources of law – treaty law and customary international law – is not on the same plane as that which arises here. The MOX Plant Arbitral Tribunal also had to deal with the scope and effect of article 282 with respect to what that Tribunal called the community law issue. In this regard the question which exercised the Tribunal was: “whether the provisions of the Convention [on the Law of the Sea] on which Ireland relies are matters in relation to which competence has been transferred to the European Community and, indeed, whether the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, with regard to Ireland and the United Kingdom as Member States of the European Community, extends to the interpretation and application of the Convention as such and in its entirety.”62 The Arbitral Tribunal decided in its Order No. 3 of 24 June 2003 to suspend the proceedings on the jurisdiction and the merits. In a further Order of 14 November

60

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits, Judgment), ICJ Reports 1986, 95-96 para. 178; see also MOX Plant case (Sep. Op. Treves), 138, and ibid. (Sep. Op. Wolfrum), 131-132. Per contra see ibid. (Sep. Op. Nelson), 115-117; ibid. (Sep. Op. Anderson), 125; and ibid. (Sep. Op. Jesus), 141-142.

61

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits, Judgment), ICJ Reports 1986, 96 para. 179.

62

MOX Plant case, Order No. 3 2003, Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures, (2003) 42 ILM 1187 para. 21. 985


2003 the Tribunal suspended further proceedings “until the European Court of Justice has given judgment or the Tribunal otherwise determines”.63 The parties agreed in argument that if the European Court of Justice were to hold that the interpretation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in its entirety fell within the exclusive competence of the European Court of Justice as between Member States of the European Union that would preclude the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal entirely by virtue of article 282 of the Convention.64 The Tribunal made a far-reaching observation: “bearing in mind considerations of mutual respect and comity which should prevail between judicial institutions both of which may be called upon to determine rights and obligations as between two States, the Tribunal considers that it would be inappropriate for it to proceed further with hearing the Parties on the merits of the dispute in the absence of a resolution of the problems referred to. Moreover, a procedure that might result in two conflicting decisions on the same issue would not be helpful to the resolution of the dispute between the Parties.”65 In this writer’s opinion the arbitral tribunal acted wisely in exercising its discretion to suspend proceedings in this case motivated by “considerations of mutual respect and comity” which it claims “should prevail between judicial institutions”. Judicial restraint is all the more necessary in the face of what can be referred to as the phenomenon of the multiplication of international courts and tribunals. Moreover the suspension of proceedings in order to obtain the views of the European Court of Justice would ensure a proper application of article 282 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.66

63

MOX Plant case, Order No. 4 2003, Further Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, para. 1a, <www.pca-cpa.org>.

64

Ibid. Order No. 3, para. 22.

65

MOX Plant case, op. cit., para. 28. This issue was also raised in the Swordfish case (Chile/ European Community) since, when the Tribunal became seized of the case, a dispute arising from similar facts had already been submitted to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body by the European Community raising the prospect of two dispute settlement procedures running in parallel which could have resulted “in two conflicting decisions on the same issue”. The parties have suspended further proceedings both before the special chamber of the Tribunal and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. See Rao, op. cit. note 42, 280-284.

66

For observations, see among others, A. Gattini, “Un regard procedural sur la fragmentation du droit international”, (2006) 110 RGDIP 303-336 on 316-317; N. Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 51; V. Röben, “The Order of the UNCLOS Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal to Suspend Proceedings in the Case of the MOX Plant at Sellafield: How Much Jurisdictional Subsidiarity?”, (2004) 73 Nord. J. Int’l L. 223-245 on 229-230; Y. Shany, “The first MOX Plant Award: The Need

986


In Case C-459/03 – Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, the Court of Justice declared that, by instituting dispute settlement proceedings against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning the MOX plant, “Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 10 EC and 292 EC and under Articles 192 EA and 193 EA”. The Court noted, inter alia, that the Convention having been signed and approved by the Community now formed an integral part of the Community legal order, by making reference to Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA (2006) ECR I-0000 paragraph 36. In the view of the Court, article 282 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea preserved “the autonomy of the Community legal system” in that it ensures that “the resolution of disputes set out in the EC Treaty must in principle take precedence over that contained in Part XV of the Convention”.67 The arbitral tribunals established under Annex VII did not seem to accept the interpretation put upon these provisions by the Tribunal. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases the arbitral tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction because the Convention of 1993 implicitly excluded any further procedure thus ruling out any resort to the compulsory procedures under section 2 of Part XV. In the MOX Plant arbitration where the interpretation or application of article 282 was at stake it may be contended that the arbitral tribunal did not accept the reasoning of the Tribunal especially with regard to community laws as we have just seen. Of course it may be argued that the Arbitral Tribunal has had the opportunity of conducting a more thorough examination of the circumstances of the case especially within the context of community law than could have been carried out by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. It must be remembered also that the Tribunal’s business was only to ascertain the prima facie jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal and that the arbitral tribunal did not disturb that finding. As has already been mentioned the Tribunal affirmed the measures prescribed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. In the view of this writer the purpose of both articles 281 and 282 is to preserve the principle of freedom of choice of the parties to choose a peaceful means for the settlement of disputes and in interpreting and applying these provisions a measure of caution must be maintained lest they be rendered ineffective.

to Harmonize Competing Environmental Regimes and Dispute Settlement Procedures” (2004) 17 LJIL 815-827 on 826. 67

Paras 124 and 125 of the Judgment of the Court of Justice. 987


XII. Conclusions The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was designed to play a pivotal role in the resolution of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. It has not yet fully developed its potential as a specialised judicial organ of the international community for the settlement of maritime disputes. However, in the last ten years it has succeeded in dealing effectively and expeditiously with a number of cases which have been submitted to it and has already made a significant contribution to the international law of the sea.68

68

On which see the Statement of the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Judge Dolliver Nelson, to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 9 December 2002 being the Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, <www.itlos.org>.

988

ARBITRATIONS UNDER ANNEX VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA Shabtai Rosenne

I.

O

ne of the major differences between the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 19581 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (hereafter “LOS Convention” or “Convention”)2 relates to the compulsory settlement of disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the instrument. In 1958 provision for the compulsory settlement of disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the 1958 instruments was set out in an Optional Protocol.3 A State which was a party to any one or more of the Conventions was free to accept that Protocol or not. In 1982 the compulsory settlement of those disputes was an integral part of the negotiation that preceded the adoption of the LOS Convention. That led to Part XI (articles 186 to 191) and Part XV (articles 279 to 299) of the LOS Convention with Annexes V, VI, VII, and VIII. The negotiation, especially on Part XV, was complicated by two provisions of the Charter. Article 33, paragraph 1, gives a list of the means that are available for the pacific solution of any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and a fortiori

1

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, in force from 10 September 1964, 516 UNTS 205; Convention on the High Seas, in force from 30 September 1962, 450 UNTS 11; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, in force from 20 March 1966, 559 UNTS 285; Convention on the Continental Shelf, in force from 10 June 1964, 499 UNTS 311.

2

LOS Convention, entered into force, together with the Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI, from 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3, 1836 UNTS 41.

3

Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, in force from 30 September 1962, 450 UNTS 169.



when the dispute does not reach that level of danger to the international community. A member of the United Nations is obliged to have recourse to one of these whenever involved in such a dispute. This list includes both arbitration and judicial settlement. That is matched by Article 95 according to which nothing in the Charter shall prevent members of the UN from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals than the International Court of Justice, by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.4 The existence of these two provisions was widely interpreted as meaning that no preference was to be given to any one of the traditional methods of third-party settlement of a dispute and that the principle of freedom of choice remained the guiding principle even when an issue of compulsory recourse to one of these methods of pacific settlement was being contemplated. This basic issue of principle was further complicated by the extreme reserve of some of the participants in the Conference towards the ICJ following its decisions in the contentious South West Africa cases.5 A debate during the fourth session of the Conference in 1976 showed a decisive preference for arbitration as the chosen method for the compulsory settlement of disputes arising out of the Convention.6 This was finally embodied in article 287 of the LOS Convention, on the choice of procedure for the compulsory settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.7 The choice is between the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the ICJ, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII and a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for specified categories of dispute. Following a compromise suggested by the Dutch delegate W. Riphagen in earlier discussions on the settlement of disputes, article 287 goes on to provide for a State party8 to indicate its preferred choice, and in a particular

4

Sh. Rosenne, “Article 95 of the Charter Revisited”, Studi di Diritto Internazionale in onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz 1387 (2004).

5

ICJ Reports 1962, 319 and ICJ Reports 1966, 6.

6

Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records Vol. V (58th to 64th plenary meetings).

7

M.H. Nordquist, Sh. Rosenne and L. Sohn (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. V, (hereafter “Virginia Commentary”) 40 (1989).

8

By art. 1, para. 2(2) of the LOS Convention, the Convention applies mutatis mutandis to the entities referred to in art. 305, para. 1(f) which become parties to the Convention in accordance with the conditions relevant to each, “and to that extent ‘States Parties’ refers to those entities”. Subpara. (f) refers to “international organizations”, a term which by Annex IX (on participation in the Convention by international organizations) means “an intergovernmental organization constituted by States to which its member States have transferred competence over matters governed by this Convention, including competence to enter into treaties in respect of those matters”. However, this does not confer any jurisdiction on the ICJ which is only open to States. To the time of writing

990

Arbitrations under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

case the respondent’s choice will be applicable. If neither party to a dispute has made a choice, arbitration in accordance with Annex VII is the only procedure open to those States.9 In turn, this made it necessary to include in Annex VII provisions to prevent any wilful frustration of the obligation to have recourse to arbitration whenever arbitration would be the applicable compulsory method of settling one of these disputes. This led to the complicated structure of the provisions of the LOS Convention regarding the compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions. These provisions are contained in Part XV, section 2 (articles 286 to 296), together with the limitations and exceptions to the application of section 2 of section 3 (articles 297 to 299). This has to be read together with article 309 prohibiting any reservations or exceptions to the LOS Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles. The Convention’s substantive provisions are completed by the detailed procedural provisions contained in Annex V, section 2 (articles 11 to 14), on compulsory submission to conciliation procedure pursuant to section 3 of Part XV, Annex VI, the Statute of ITLOS, Annex VII, on arbitration and Annex VIII on special arbitration.10 Article 286 establishes the general obligation. Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the LOS Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to the general provisions of section 1 (articles 279 to 285) be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section. Article 282 (in section 1) is a general savings clause for obligations under general, regional or bilateral arrangements. If through such an agreement the parties have agreed that such a dispute shall be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, “that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part [Part XV] unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise”. Article 287 regulates the choice of procedure as the means for the compulsory settlement of these disputes. Article 288 deals generally with the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal referred to in article 287. Article 289 empowers any such court or tribunal to sit with scientific or technical experts in disputes involving scientific or technical matters. Article 290 provides for provisional measures, with special

only the European Union meets the requirements of Annex IX and is a party to the LOS Convention. 9

See “UNCLOS III – The Montreux (Riphagen) Compromise”, Sh. Rosenne, An International Law Miscellany 495 (1993).

10

There are no special provisions in the LOS Convention relevant to the ICJ. For those States parties to the LOS Convention that are also members of the UN, Article 92 of the Charter maintains the standing of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN. At the time of writing two States parties to the LOS Convention are not members of the UN, namely the Cook Islands and Niue, together with the European Community. 991


provisions in paragraph 5 empowering ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures when the chosen means for the settlement of disputes is arbitration and the arbitral tribunal has not yet been established when the request for provisional measures is made.11 Measures prescribed by ITLOS under this provision remain in force unless modified or revoked by the arbitral tribunal after it has been constituted. Article 291, entitled simply access, provides that all the dispute settlement procedures specified in Part XV shall be open to States parties. However, this cannot override the provision of Article 34 of the Statute of the ICJ that only States can be parties in cases before the Court.12 Article 292 deals with the prompt release of vessels and crews.13 Article 293, on the applicable law, requires any court or tribunal having jurisdiction under section 2 to apply the Convention and “other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention”. Article 294 introduces something new into international litigation. Entitled “Preliminary proceedings”, that article empowers the competent court or tribunal to determine, at the request of any party or may determine proprio motu, whether the claim constitutes an abuse of legal process or whether prima facie it is well founded.14 Article 295 addresses the application of the exhaustion of local remedies rule “where this is required by international law”.15 The section ends with article 296 which deals with the finality and binding force of decisions of the competent court or tribunal.

II. Embedded in Part XV of the LOS Convention and its related annexes is a fail-safe system of residuary provisions designed to prevent any foreseeable deliberate attempt to thwart the compulsory settlement of any relevant dispute that comes with the scope of Part XV. The fundamental rule for this appears in article 288,

11

Further on this, see Sh. Rosenne, Provisional Measures in International Law: the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (2005).

12

By virtue of article 43 of the Rules of Court as amended in September 2005, a limited procedural capacity may be available to public international organizations in cases in which the construction of a convention to which that organization is a party may be in question in a case before the Court. On that, see Sh. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-2005, Vol. III, p. 1454.

13

On this special jurisdiction, see A.-K. Escher, “Release of Vessels and Crews before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea”, 3 Law & Prac. Int’l Cts. & Tribunals 205 and 411 (2004).

14

In the ICJ this would probably be regarded as a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the case.

15

The International Law Commission currently has the topic of exhaustion of local remedies under examination.

992


paragraph 4, of the Convention: “In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal” (emphasis added). This is paralleled by relevant particular provisions applicable to each one of the means for settlement prescribed by article 287. In the case of the ICJ Article 36(6) of its Statute performs that function. For ITLOS article 288(6) of the LOS Convention is sufficient. For the arbitral tribunals under each of Annexes VII or VIII, in addition to article 286 of the LOS Convention, the principle underlying article 73 of the Hague Convention of 1907 or its modern reproduction in article 9 of the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure are to the same effect.16 This is complemented for both types of arbitration by detailed provisions regarding an appointing authority should either of the parties not do what is incumbent on it in order to establish the required arbitral tribunal. In the case of a “regular” Annex VII tribunal, in the absence of agreement Annex VII, article 3, on the constitution of an arbitral tribunal designates the President (or Acting President) of ITLOS as the appointing authority both for members of the tribunal and for its president. The ITLOS President appointed the three non-party arbitrators in the Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor case (see below) after consultation with the parties. For the special arbitrations Annex VIII, article 3, on the constitution of a special arbitral tribunal, follows the equivalent provision of Annex VII, with the substitution of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations as the regular appointing authority in the absence of agreement between the parties. Annex VII also spells out the procedure for instituting arbitration proceedings.17 By article 1, subject to the provisions of Part XV any party to a dispute may submit the dispute to the arbitral procedure of Annex VII “by written notification addressed to the other party or parties to the dispute. The notification shall be accompanied by a statement of the claim and the grounds on which it is based”. By article 3(b), the notification is to include the name of the party appointed arbitrator. The respondent party is required to appoint its arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of the notification, and if the appointment is not made within that period the applicant party may have recourse to the appointing authority. The two parties are then given sixty days within which they must agree on the other three members of the arbitral tribunal and appoint the tribunal’s president. If

16

ILCYB 1958, Vol. II (A/3859, ch. II). The Model Rules were adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1262 (XIII), 14 November 1958. On the use made of them in the preparation of Annex VII, see the Virginia Commentary, Vol. V, p. 421. Art. 9 of the Model Rules corresponds to art. 11 of the draft convention on arbitral procedure adopted by the Commission in 1953 (ILCYB 1953, Vol. II (A/2456, ch. II).

17

Similar provisions apply to the institution of Annex VIII arbitrations, by virtue of Annex VIII, art. 1. 993


they are unable to reach agreement on the appointment of one or more of the members of the tribunal or on the appointment of the president, the appointing authority is to make “the remaining appointment or appointments … at the request of a party to the dispute”. In this context, particular interest attaches to the LOS Convention, article 290, paragraph 5, on provisional measures of protection: “Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being submitted under this section [Part XV, section 2], any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea … may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures in accordance with this article if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or affirm those provisional measures in conformity with [relevant provisions of the article].”18

III. The LOS Convention entered into force on 16 November 1994. Since then there have been six instances of the institution of arbitration proceedings under Annex VII, in the following cases: – M.V. Saiga (St. Vincent & the Grenadines v. Guinea); – Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan);19 – Mox Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom); – Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) (hereafter Straits of Johor case); – Maritime Delimitation between Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago (Barbados v. Trinidad & Tobago); – Maritime Delimitation between Guyana and Suriname (Guyana v. Suriname) (pending).

18

This is amplified by art. 89, paras 2 and 4, of the Rules of the Tribunal, and by the Tribunal’s general rules (Rules, arts 89 to 95) applicable to all requests in ITLOS for the prescription of provisional measures of protection. Further on this, see Sh. Rosenne, op. cit. in note 11 above.

19

These cases were instituted separately and were joined by ITLOS in connection with provisional measures proceedings. ITLOS Reports 1999, 274.

994


Each of these cases presented its own peculiarities, so each will be considered in turn. The M.V. Saiga. The incident involving this vessel, flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and customs patrol boats of Guinea on 27 October 1997, gave rise to two separate proceedings in ITLOS. On 13 November 1997 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines filed in ITLOS an application under article 292 of the LOS Convention for the prompt release of the vessel and its crew. In a judgment of 4 December 1997 ITLOS ordered the prompt release of the vessel and fixed the details of the requisite bond.20 On 22 December 1997 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines submitted to Guinea a formal notification instituting proceedings under Annex VII, and on 13 January 1998 it filed in ITLOS a request for the prescription of provisional measures under article 290, paragraph 5, of the LOS Convention. While those proceedings were in progress the parties concluded an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters by which they agreed to submit the dispute to ITLOS. Under that agreement the dispute was deemed to have been submitted to ITLOS on 22 December 1997, the date of the original notification, and the request for the prescription of provisional measures was deemed to have been submitted under article 292, paragraph 1, of the LOS Convention. ITLOS was satisfied that the parties had agreed to submit the dispute to it. On 11 March 1998 ITLOS issued its order prescribing provisional measures, and the proceedings continued their regular course. On 1 July 1999 ITLOS published its judgment.21 That judgment contains an important statement of the Tribunal’s understanding of the effect of the transfer of jurisdiction to it: “In the view of the Tribunal, the object and purpose of the 1998 Agreement was to transfer to the Tribunal the same dispute that would have been the subject of the proceedings before the arbitral tribunal. Before

20

ITLOS Reports 1997, 16. This was the first case submitted to ITLOS.

21

ITLOS Reports 1999, 10. For the exchange of letters on the transfer of the case to ITLOS and making the necessary formal procedural adjustments, see ibid. 1998, 10. For the provisional measures, see ibid. 24. The second set of proceedings were the subject of a new entry in the Tribunal’s General List, and the case was entitled “The M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) Case”. In its submission the applicant asked that the respondent pay the costs of the arbitral proceedings and other costs incurred by it. For its part the respondent requested payment by the applicant of its “costs of the proceedings”. The judgment (paras 181, 182) simply explains that the Tribunal saw no need to depart from the general rule that each party should bear its own costs. “Accordingly, with respect to both phases of the present proceedings, it decides that each party shall bear its own costs.” There is no mention of the costs of the arbitral proceedings. The joint declaration by Judges Caminos, Yankov, Akl, Anderson, Vukas, Treves and Eiriksson, which would have awarded costs, likewise makes no mention of the costs of the arbitral proceedings (p. 77). Similarly the separate opinion of Vice-president Wolfrum (at p. 112). Mensah was president of ITLOS throughout these proceedings. 995


the arbitral tribunal, each party would have retained the general right to present its conclusions. The Tribunal considers that the parties have the same general right in the present proceedings, subject only to the restrictions that are clearly imposed by the terms of the 1998 Agreement and the Rules [of the Tribunal]. In the present case, the Tribunal finds that the reservation of Guinea’s right in respect of the specific objection as to jurisdiction did not deprive it of its general right to raise objections to admissibility, provided that it did so in accordance with the Rules and consistently with the agreement between the parties that the proceedings be conducted in a single phase. The Tribunal, therefore, concludes that the 1998 Agreement does not preclude the raising of objections as to admissibility by Guinea” (paragraph 51). The judgment therefore deals first with a series of objections to the admissibility, which it dismissed. It then goes on with its findings, awarding a liquidated sum of damages to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The Southern Bluefin Tuna case. The southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus maccoyi) is a commercially valuable migratory species of pelagic fish, a delicacy on the Japanese table fetching a high price on the Tokyo fish market. It is included on the list of highly migratory species in LOS Convention Annex I. In danger of being overfished, it is regulated by the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna of 10 May 1993.22 In their migrations through the southern hemisphere the fish traverse principally the high seas and the exclusive economic zones and territorial seas of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, spawning in the waters south of Indonesia. Commercial harvesting of this species began in the early 1950s. It peaked in the 1960s and by the early 1990s the stock had been seriously overfished. The disputes between Australia and New Zealand, attempting to control the stock, and Japan began in the late 1990s and led to political tension. Attempts to settle it through the machinery of the 1993 Convention failed and on 15 July 1999 first New Zealand and later on the same day Australia each submitted the formal notification and statement of claim to Japan in accordance with Annex VII. On 30 July first New Zealand and later Australia filed in ITLOS requests for the prescription of provisional measures in accordance with article 290(5) of the LOS Convention, at the same time intimating that they were parties in the same interest and each nominating Professor Shearer as judge ad hoc. On 16 August ITLOS joined the proceedings on the requests for provisional measures, in that way enabling Japan to file a single statement in response. On 27 August the ITLOS issued its order

22

1819 UNTS 360. For an account of this fishery, see A. Bergin and M. Haward, “Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery”, 18 Marine Policy 263 (1994).

996


prescribing provisional measures, the first order of this type made by ITLOS.23 The basic legal issue that arose in this case was whether the 1993 Convention or the LOS Convention was governing. ITLOS did not decide that issue which related to the merits, and limited itself to finding that in its view the arbitral tribunal “would prima facie have jurisdiction over the disputes” (paragraph 62). That was sufficient to enable ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures, which it went on to do. Pending a decision of the arbitral tribunal, the three countries were each to ensure that no action was taken which might aggravate or extend the disputes submitted to the arbitral tribunal and each was to ensure that no action was taken which might prejudice the carrying out of any decision on the merits which the arbitral tribunal might render. The order went on to prescribe measures for the annual catches of each party for the years 1999 and 2000 and “without prejudice to any decision of the arbitral tribunal account shall be taken of the catch during 1999 as part of an experimental fishing programme”. The parties were required to resume negotiations without delay with a view to reaching agreement on measures for the conservation and management of the stock. They were also required to make further efforts to reach agreement with other States and “fishing entities” – a reference to Taiwan – engaged in fishing for these fish with a view of ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of maximum utilization of the stock. They were to submit an initial report to the Tribunal (as required by its Rules) by 6 October and thereafter as the ITLOS president might consider desirable. The parties then set about organizing the arbitration. They agreed on the arbitrators and first met with the President (Schwebel) at The Hague on 19 January 2000. At that meeting they reached agreement on a schedule of written and oral pleadings on preliminary objections to jurisdiction raised by Japan. They also agreed on inviting the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to provide registry services. No rules of procedure as such were adopted, procedural issues being decided ad hoc as they arose. The written pleadings were filed according to the agreed schedule and hearings were held at the ICSID headquarters of the World Bank in Washington D.C. on 7-11 May 2000. The award was rendered on 4 August 2000.24

23

For the proceedings in ITLOS, see ITLOS Reports 1999, at pp. 262, 268, 274 (joinder) and 280 (provisional measures). Judge Mensah was president of ITLOS for this case. The different operative paragraphs of the provisional measures order were adopted by substantial majorities of ITLOS. For this author’s comment on those proceedings, see Sh. Rosenne, “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Survey for 1999”, 15 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 443 at 464 (2000).

24

For the text of the award, see 119 ILR 508. The arbitral proceedings are available on the website of the World Bank at <www.worldbank.org/icsid>. The author was one of the counsel for Japan in the arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal was composed of Judge S.M. Schwebel (President), F. Feliciano, Sir Kenneth Keith (appointed by Australia and 997


In its award the Arbitral Tribunal decided that it was without jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the case and that the provisional measures were revoked from the day of the signature of the award. The award included the following passage: “[R]evocation of the Order prescribing provisional measures does not mean that the Parties may disregard the effects of that Order or their own decisions made in conformity with it. The Order and those decisions – and the recourse to ITLOS that gave rise to them – as well as the consequential proceedings before this Tribunal have had an impact: not merely in the suspensions of Japan’s unilateral experimental fishing program during the period that Order was in force, but on the perspectives and actions of the Parties” (paragraph 67). It appears that implementation of the provisional measures had gone some way in reducing the diplomatic tensions engendered by this dispute. After the arbitration the parties resumed their negotiations. As required by the ITLOS order, a scientific research programme was created, designed by a panel of international fishery scientists and endorsed by the Commission established under the 1993 Convention. That laid the basis for an agreed settlement which was finally announced by the Australian Government in a press release of 28 May 2001.25 The Mox Plant case. This dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom gave rise to a cluster of cases in four different instances, in ITLOS, in two separate arbitral proceedings, and finally in the European Court of Justice. Its origins lie in the construction and operation of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Plant at the Sellafield site on the north west coast of England and Ireland’s concern over the consequent alleged radioactive pollution of the Irish Sea. This plant recycles material from nuclear reactors and converts it into MOX. The necessary British authorizations were given as far back as 1994 and construction of the Plant was completed in 1996. In appropriate proceedings held in 1997 in England for the commissioning of the Plant, Ireland expressed its opposition as it would

by New Zealand), P. Tresselt and C. Yamada (appointed by Japan). The proceedings were conducted in English, with special arrangements for translation of the oral proceedings into Japanese for the convenience of the large Japanese delegation. 25

Media release AFFA01/42TU, 28 May 2001. And see B. Mansfield (counsel for New Zealand), Letter to the Editor in 16 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 361 (2001). The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna was reorganized, the principal change being the establishment of an Extended Commission under the 1995 Convention and the admission of Taiwan, as a fishing entity, into it. On this, see A. Serdy, “Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: The Legal Personality of a Fishing Entity”, 75 BYIL 183 (2004).

998


lead to “additional radioactive marine discharges … into the Irish Sea …”. Ireland has complained of inadequate information and co-operation from the United Kingdom. Ireland initiated the first proceedings, entitled Dispute concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention, in 2001, and they were terminated by an award rendered on 2 July 2003. They concerned information requested by Ireland under relevant provisions of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR [Oslo/Paris] Convention), 22 September 1992. The Arbitral Tribunal found that Ireland’s claim for information did not fall within the OSPAR Convention and that accordingly the claim that the United Kingdom had breached its obligations under that instrument did not arise.26 While those proceedings were pending, on 25 October 2001 Ireland submitted the formal notification and statement of claim against the United Kingdom under Annex VII, alleging breaches of the LOS Convention. On 9 November 2001 Ireland filed in ITLOS a request for the prescription of provisional measures under LOS Convention article 290(5). On 3 December 2001 ITLOS issued its order prescribing provisional measures.27 Under this order the parties were required to exchange further information with regard to the possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the commissioning of the Plant, to monitor risks or the effects of the operation of the Plant for the Irish Sea, to devise appropriate pollution prevention measures, and to submit a report to ITLOS. After delivery of the order the parties set about organizing the arbitration. This was completed by February 2002 when Rules of Procedure were adopted and the Permanent Court of Arbitration was appointed as Registrar.28 Ireland’s memorial was filed as required. In its counter-memorial the United Kingdom raised a series of objections to the jurisdiction and rejected allegations that it was in breach of the LOS Convention. The Tribunal decided that before hearing argument on the merits it needed to be satisfied at least that there were no substantial doubts as

26

For that award see 126 ILR 334. The Tribunal was compose of M. Reisman (Chairman), Griffith and Lord Mustill. The Permanent Court of Arbitration provided registry services and information relating to this case is available on the PCA website, <www.pca-cpa. org>. For the OSPAR Convention see 23 Law of the Sea Bulletin 32 (1993).

27

For this case, see ITLOS Reports 2001, 95. For Mensah’s separate opinion, see p. 118.

28

The arbitral proceedings are available on the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, <www.pca-cpa.org/>. Order No. 3 is reproduced in 126 ILR 314 and Order No. 4 at p. 332. The arbitral tribunal was composed of Judge T. Mensah (President, a member of ITLOS), J. Crawford (appointed by Ireland), Maître Fortier, G. Hafner and Sir Arthur Watts (appointed by the United Kingdom). The full name of this case in the arbitration proceedings was Dispute Concerning the MOX Plant, International Movements of Radioactive Materials, and the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Irish Sea (hereafter Mox Plant arbitration). 999


to its jurisdiction and that before proceeding to any final decision on the merits it must satisfy itself that it had jurisdiction “in a definitive sense”. Hearings were held between 10 and 21 June 2003. In the course of those hearings, on 16 June Ireland filed a request for further provisional measures. On 24 June the Arbitral Tribunal issued its Order No. 3 on the suspension of the proceedings on jurisdiction and merits and on Ireland’s request for further provisional measures. In this connection, the Arbitral Tribunal found that “none of the issues raised casts doubt on its prima facie jurisdiction” (paragraph 17). On 15 October the appropriate authorities of the European Community instituted proceedings against Ireland in the European Court of Justice29 and on 14 November the Arbitral Tribunal issued its Order No. 4 suspending all further proceedings until the European Court of Justice had given judgment or the Tribunal otherwise determined. The suspension of the proceedings was to be without prejudice to various paragraphs of the dispositif of Order No. 3 (dealing with Ireland’s request for further provisional measures), and the Tribunal was to remain seised of the dispute. The objections fell into two categories. The first were a series of objections to the jurisdiction and to the admissibility in respect of Ireland’s claims of breach of the LOS Convention. The Tribunal did not accept an objection that Ireland had failed to state and plead a case arising substantially under the LOS Convention (paragraph 19). The second category consisted of objections relating to the position of the parties in relation to the European Community. Here the Tribunal found that until various issues concerning the internal operation of the European Communities were determined within the Communities framework, substantial doubts remained whether the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction could be firmly established in respect of all or any claims in the dispute (paragraph 25). Order No. 3 continues: “27. The Tribunal observes that the resolution of the essentially internal problems within the European Community legal order may involve decisions that are final and binding. The Tribunal further observes that its decision, including a decision on jurisdiction, will be final and binding on the Parties by virtue of article 296 of the Convention and article 11 of Annex VII to the Convention. 28. In the circumstances, and bearing in mind considerations of mutual respect and comity which should prevail between judicial institutions both of which may be called upon to determine rights and obligations

29

European Court of Justice, Case No. C-459/03 Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, 2006 ECR I-4635, claiming that by instituting proceedings against the United Kingdom under the LOS Convention, Ireland had failed to fulfil its obligations under various provisions of the Community law, the Community being a party to the LOS Convention.

1000


between two States, the Tribunal considers that it would be inappropriate for it to proceed further with hearing the Parties on the merits of the dispute in the absence of a resolution of the problems referred to. Moreover, a procedure that might result in two conflicting decisions on the same issue would not be helpful to the resolution of the dispute between the Parties.” On that basis the Tribunal decided on the suspension of the proceedings, at the same time accepting jurisdiction under LOS Convention article 290, paragraph 1, to address Ireland’s request for the prescription of further provisional measures. Here the Tribunal first examined whether there had occurred a change in the circumstances in which ITLOS had prescribed provisional measures. It answered that question in the affirmative. The changes consisted in several elements: the Annex VII Tribunal had been constituted, and the time that would elapse before the Tribunal could reach a decision on the merits was likely to be greater than had been expected when ITLOS made its order (paragraph 40). This was sufficient to enable the Tribunal to find that prima facie it had jurisdiction over the dispute (paragraph 41). As the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure did not address provisional measures, the Tribunal decided to apply the applicable rules of the International Court of Justice, after drawing the parties’ attention to this and receiving no comment from either of them. The Tribunal then passed to a detailed analysis of Ireland’s requests. It concluded that there was no urgent and serious risk of irreparable harm to Ireland’s claimed rights which would justify it in prescribing provisional measures relating to discharges from the MOX plant, and dismissed Ireland’s request for further provisional measures. On the other hand the Tribunal was satisfied that since the ITLOS order there had been an increased measure of co-operation and consultation as required by that order (paragraph 66). It made a series of recommendations to the parties for co-operation and consultation and intergovernmental notifications. It also instructed the Registrar to provide a copy of the order to the European Commission. The proceedings in the European Court (Grand Chamber) proceeded without incident. Sweden was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of the order sought by Ireland and the United Kingdom was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Commission. On 30 May 2006 that Court rendered its judgment.30 The Court declared that, by instituting dispute-settlement proceedings against the United Kingdom under the LOS Convention, Ireland had failed to fulfil its obligations under the relevant provisions of the Community law. Invoking article 282 of the LOS Convention, the Court found that the Community’s system for the resolution of disputes provided for procedures resulting in binding decisions and the Community provisions for the

30

See previous note. 1001


settlement of disputes “must in principle take precedence over that contained in Part XV of the Convention”. The judgment explains that the provisions of the LOS Convention on which Ireland was relying came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Community and its organs, in accordance with LOS Convention Annex IX and the Community’s declaration when it became a party to the LOS Convention. In Order No. 4, the Arbitral Tribunal had maintained in force the general suspension of the proceedings following Order No. 3 until the European Court had given its judgment. It prescribed various arrangements regarding the reports on compliance with the provisional measures, and required Ireland to submit reports on developments in the proceedings in the European Court. After the judgment of the European Court, on 22 January 2007 the Tribunal issued Order No. 5. It decided to suspend the obligation on the parties to submit reports and information on compliance with the provisional measures as well as Ireland’s obligation to report on developments in the European Court. The Tribunal remained seised of the dispute and reserved subsequent procedure for further decision. There the position rests at the time of writing (May 2007). The Straits of Johor case. On 4 July 2003 Malaysia instituted Annex VII proceedings against Singapore in a dispute concerning land reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor. On 5 September Malaysia submitted a request to ITLOS for the prescription of provisional measures. On 8 October 2003 ITLOS issued its order prescribing appropriate provisional measures.31 The most important measure required the parties to establish a group of independent experts to determine within one year the effects of Singapore’s land reclamation and to propose as appropriate measures to deal with any adverse effects of the land reclamation. The experts were to prepare as soon as possible an interim report on the subject of infilling works in a sensitive area. The parties were to submit their initial report to ITLOS and to the Annex VII Tribunal not later than 9 January 2004. The parties then proceeded to organize the arbitration. By July 2004 they had settled the Rules of Procedure, designated the Permanent Court of Arbitration to provide Registry services, and set a schedule for the proceedings.32 In November the Group of Experts made a presentation to the parties and they embarked on a series of meetings between themselves. In January 2005 the Arbitral Tribunal convened a meeting with the parties who informed the Tribunal that they had agreed ad referendum on the text of a draft settlement agreement. This agreement was duly ratified and notified to the Tribunal which, on 1 September 2005, 31

ITLOS Reports 2003, 10. ITLOS was unanimous on each one of the operative clauses of this order (at p. 27).

32

The arbitral proceedings are available on the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The arbitral tribunal was composed of M.C.W. Pinto (President), K. Hossain (appointed by Malaysia), B.H. Oxman (appointed by Singapore), I. Shearer and Sir A. Watts.

1002


issued an award on agreed terms, with the settlement agreement attached as an annex.33 This is the second example in the short history of the first half dozen Annex VII arbitrations where the ITLOS prescription of provisional measures has laid the basis for an agreed settlement of the dispute. Maritime Delimitation between Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago. This is the first Annex VII arbitration that has proceeded to the final award on the merits without intervening proceedings in ITLOS or in any other court or tribunal. On 16 February 2004 Barbados instituted these proceedings concerning its maritime boundary with Trinidad and Tobago.34 This maritime boundary related to the delimitation of a single maritime boundary between the exclusive economic zones of the two parties and the continental shelf appertaining to each. Rules of Procedure were adopted and the PCA was invited to assume the Registry functions. In May the first procedural decisions were reached through a conference call. In June the Tribunal ordered a schedule for the first round of written pleadings, leaving open whether and which further pleadings were to be exchanged simultaneously or sequentially. In August agreement was reached for a further round of written pleadings to be submitted sequentially. In December Trinidad and Tobago filed a statement of what it called preliminary objections, at the same time pleading to the merits. It suggested that the objections be joined to the merits. Hearings were held in London in October 2005 and the Tribunal issued its final unanimous award on 11 April 2006, little more than two years after the institution of these proceedings. In that award it rejected the objection and effected the requested delimitation, including delimitation of the maritime boundary in relation to that part of the continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles. An appendix to the award sets out a highly technical report of the Tribunal’s hydrographers, appointed with the parties’ agreement. The principal jurisdictional issue in these proceedings related to the “outer continental shelf ”, that is the continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline. The Tribunal answered that question in the affirmative for several reasons related to the record of the negotiations between the parties, 33

Singapore’s agent has written: “The unanimous report of the group of experts presented the two parties with a common basis of facts. The subsequent negotiations were successful partly because the parties were negotiating on a common basis of facts. Without it, the negotiations would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. The lesson is that where the facts are in dispute the parties should consider using a third party procedure in order to establish a common basis of facts.” Tommy Koh and Chang Li Lin, The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore’s Diplomats 202 (2005). Koh was the President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and was Singapore’s agent in all these proceedings.

34

These proceedings are available on the website of the PCA, <www.pca-cpa.org/>. The Arbitral Tribunal was composed of Judge S.M. Schwebel (President), I. Brownlie (appointed by Trinidad & Tobago), V. Lowe (appointed by Barbados), Fr. Vicuña and Sir A. Watts. 1003


and finally because “in any event there is in law only a single ‘continental shelf ’ rather than an inner continental shelf and a separate extended or outer continental shelf ” – a useful and important clarification.35 In the proceedings questions arose about fishing rights and Barbadian fishing activity in relation to flying fish – a species of pelagic fish that moves seasonally to the waters off Tobago, and a staple component of the Barbados diet. The award also deals with that issue. While the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to consider the possible impact upon a prospective demarcation line of Barbadian fishing activity in waters affected by the delimitation, it had no jurisdiction to render a substantive decision as to an appropriate fisheries regime to apply in waters which may be determined to form part of the EEZ of Trinidad & Tobago. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the parties were under a duty to agree upon the measures necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and development of flying fish stocks. They were to negotiate in good faith and conclude an agreement that would accord fisherfolk of Barbados access to fisheries within the EEZ of Trinidad & Tobago, subject to the limitations and conditions of that agreement and to the right and duty of Trinidad & Tobago to conserve and manage the living resources of waters within its jurisdiction. This is believed to be the first decision to formulate a duty on both parties to negotiate and conclude an agreement on specific matters of fisheries management. The Maritime Delimitation between Guyana and Suriname case. Guyana instituted these proceedings on 24 February 2004.36 Again the Permanent Court of Arbitration is providing the registry services. The written pleadings are proceeding according to schedule. A hearing took place in December 2006 and the award can be expected in early 2007. By agreement, the written and oral proceedings in this case are to be confidential. The Permanent Court of Arbitration expects that the award will be made public after it has been rendered, and no further information regarding this case is currently available.

35

Nevertheless it has to be noted that in this respect this Tribunal did not follow the decision in the Delimitation of Maritime Areas between France and Canada (St. Pierre & Miquelon) arbitration (1972). That Court of Arbitration declared itself incompetent to carry out a delimitation which affected the rights of the international community represented by organs entrusted with the administration and protection of the international sea bed area, that is since the entry into force of the LOS Convention, the International Seabed Authority. There is no comment on this. For that arbitral award, see 95 ILR 645.

36

These proceedings are available on the website of the PCA. The Arbitral Tribunal was composed of Judge D. Nelson (President), Th. Franck (appointed by Guyana), H. Smit (appointed by Suriname, replacing A. Phillip, deceased), I. Shearer and K. Hossain. Rules of Procedure were adopted in July 2004 and the PCA is serving as the Registry. Nelson was president of ITLOS at the time.

1004


IV. Despite this six-fold invocation of Annex VII procedures within a relatively short period of time, caution is needed in seeing if any general conclusions can be made from this. However, at this stage one aspect stands out and is worthy of special mention. Of the five cases that Annex VII Arbitration Tribunals have handled, in two of them, Southern Bluefin Tuna and the Straits of Johor the arbitration proceedings led to an agreement which brought the dispute to an end, without any pronouncement on the merits by the Arbitral Tribunal. The parties reached a direct settlement of the dispute through a freely negotiated agreement. In the Tuna case, the Tribunal’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the merits removed a stumbling block which had impeded negotiations both before the proceedings were commenced and after ITLOS had prescribed appropriate provisional measures. In Straits of Johor the proceedings did not reach so far. ITLOS had prescribed as a provisional measure that the parties were to enter into consultations in order to establish promptly a group of independent experts with the mandate to conduct a study, on terms of reference to be agreed by the parties, of the matters in dispute between them. That expert group set to work while the arbitration proceedings were being organized. Through it the parties were able to iron out the difficulties that had existed between them. That led to a Settlement Agreement and the termination of the arbitral proceedings. The Arbitral Tribunal examined the Settlement Agreement and concluded that no further proceedings were necessary. The Settlement Agreement was annexed to final Award on Agreed Terms. That award was final and binding, like any other Annex VII arbitral award. Common to both these cases is the report which Article 95, paragraph 1, of the Rules of ITLOS requires. ITLOS introduced that provision, which in its imperative language was an innovation, in its Rules. It reads: “Each party shall inform the Tribunal as soon as possible as to its compliance with any provisional measures the Tribunal has prescribed. In particular, each party shall submit an initial report upon the steps it has taken to ensure prompt compliance with the measures prescribed.”37

37

A former judge of ITLOS (who was a member when the Rules were adopted) has explained that the reporting provisions “reinforce the binding nature of the measures and the continuing role of the Tribunal in their implementation”. The Tribunal can be expected to set out further details on how these provisions are to be implemented in a given case which would take account of the measures prescribed. In particular, it would be expected to lay down a schedule for the reports of the parties. G. Eiriksson, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 226 (2000). For the practice of the ICJ, see Sh. Rosenne, Provisional Measures in International Law: The International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 178 (2005). For practice in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, see Th. Buergenthal, “Interim Measures in the Inter-American Court of Human 1005


In neither of these cases did the Arbitral Tribunal decide on how the dispute was to be settled. Rather to the contrary. In a situation in which the parties entered directly or indirectly into negotiations to implement provisional measures prescribed by another Tribunal, ITLOS, operating within the same juridical framework, the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal did nothing that would interfere with those negotiations. This is a new form of third-party dispute settlement. It enables the parties to air before a tribunal some of their juridical difficulties which have obstructed negotiations. That tribunal makes a prima facie finding on the issue of jurisdiction (which is one step removed from the merits). It goes on to indicate in a binding way how it thinks the parties should act in the immediate future pending final determination of their dispute, and requires them to report by a fixed date on their compliance with the tribunal’s provisional measures. The negotiation conducted in those conditions, with the clarification of some of the legal issues, opens the way to a political settlement. There are possibilities here which no doubt will be refined and developed in the course of time. Indeed, the Mox Plant arbitration which is technically pending at the time of writing may well provide a further clarification and development for this new approach to the role of a combination of a standing international court and an ad hoc arbitral tribunal in the pacific settlement of international disputes.

Rights”, R. Bernhardt (ed.), Interim Measures Indicated by International Courts 69 at 82 (1994). 1006

THE CONTRIBUTION OF ITLOS TO OCEANS GOVERNANCE THROUGH MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION Donald R. Rothwell*

I. Introductory Remarks

F

ollowing the entry into force of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)1 on 16 November 1994 there has been growing interest in both oceans governance and dispute resolution. Oceans governance, whilst still a developing concept and accordingly difficult to fully define, is partly a product of the integration of global regimes dealing with the law of the sea and international environmental law blended with “participatory decision making” involving not just government agencies and departments but the full spectrum of broader participants with an interest in the management of local, regional and global oceans issues.2 Oceans governance therefore has a firm foundation in international law, and to that end the role of the International

*

The author acknowledges previous collaborations with Professor David VanderZwaag and Dr Tim Stephens from which aspects of this work have been drawn and developed; all errors or omissions remain the responsibility of the author.

1

1833 UNTS 397.

2

See discussion in J.M. Pureza “International Law and Ocean Governance: Audacity and Modesty” (1999) 8 RECIEL 73-77; R.W. Knecht “A Perspective on Recent Developments That Could Affect the Nature of Ocean Governance Regimes” in S.-Y. Hong, E.L. Miles and C.-H. Park (eds) The Role of the Oceans in the 21st Century (Honolulu, The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii: 1995) 177-190; W.T. Burke “State Practice, New Ocean Uses, and Ocean Governance Under UNCLOS” in T.A. Mensah (ed.) Ocean Governance: Strategies and Approaches for the 21st Century (Honolulu, The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii: 1996) 219-234; L.K. Kriwoken et al. (eds) Oceans Law and Policy in the Post-UNCED Era: Australian and Canadian Perspectives (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996); D.R. Rothwell and D.L. VanderZwaag (eds) Towards Principled Oceans Governance: Australian and Canadian Approaches and Challenges (London: Routledge, 2006).



Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in interpreting and applying the LOS Convention is essential. As Foundation President of the Tribunal, and also one of the Foundation Judges, Judge Thomas Mensah played a pivotal role in the development of the Tribunal and helped shaped its early jurisprudence. It is only fitting therefore, that due recognition and attention be given to Judge Mensah’s service to ITLOS and the legacy it will have for marine environmental protection and international oceans governance. Various legal principles have emerged through international instruments, declarations and codes of conduct, and they are contributing to changes in the normative foundations which apply to oceans governance and the law of the sea.3 Those principles include, amongst others, integration, precaution, the ecosystem approach, community-based management and indigenous rights.4 However, each of the principles tends to be confusing because of multiple meanings and still evolving interpretative discussions.5 For example, the integration principle carries at least nine different connotations6 with the two most common uses in the oceans governance context being the calls for integrated coastal/ocean management7 and integrated maritime compliance and enforcement.8 It is within this dynamic system of developing ocean governance norms and principles that ITLOS sits. It has a unique capacity to contribute to the development of these norms and principles through its jurisprudence.9 While the LOS Convention was responsible for the establishment of a number of new institutions for the law of the sea, the ITLOS was perhaps the most anticipated

3

See J.M. Van Dyke “The Rio Principles and Our Responsibilities of Ocean Stewardship” (1996) 31 Ocean & Coastal Mgmt. 1-23.

4

Other principles include pollution prevention, polluter pays, public participation, intragenerational and intergenerational equity. For further discussion on the role of the principles, see P. Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal Principles” in Winfried Lang (ed.) Sustainable Development and International Law (London: Graham and Trotman, 1995) 53-66.

5

See J. Ellis “The Straddling Stocks Agreement and the Precautionary Principle as Interpretative Device and Rule of Law” (2001) 32 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 289-311.

6

See discussion in D. VanderZwaag, G. Chao and M. Covan “Canadian aquaculture and the principles of sustainable development: Gauging the law and policy tides and charting a course” (2002) 28 Queen’s L. J. 279 at 286-287.

7

See V. Sakell “Operationalizing Integrated Coastal and Oceans Management in Australia: the Challenges” in Rothwell and VanderZwaag, above note 2, 72-98.

8

S. Bateman et al. “Integrated Maritime Enforcement and Compliance in Australia” in Rothwell and VanderZwaag, above note 2, 119-141.

9

In this respect, the author rejects the suggestion that ITLOS could be considered “a great mistake”, however the full potential of the Tribunal remains to be revealed; see J. Seymour “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Great Mistake?” (2006) 13 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 1 at 2.

1008

The Contribution of ITLOS to Oceans Governance through Marine Environmental Dispute Resolution

This reflected the significance given to dispute settlement in the Convention, and also a curiosity as to how the law of the sea would respond to its own distinctive tribunal capable of settling and resolving disputes arising under the new regime ushered in by the LOS Convention. There was also uncertainty as to how ITLOS would interact with other dispute settlement bodies, especially the ICJ,10 and speculation on whether given the prominent jurisprudence of the ICJ in law of the sea matters there was the potential for conflicting interpretations arising. This potential was highlighted in extra-judicial remarks of Judge Mensah, who when writing at the time he was President of ITLOS, noted: “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and, as appropriate the Seabed Disputes Chamber, have a major role in the interpretation and application of provisions in UNCLOS regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment in disputes between Parties to the Convention and other appropriate entities concerning those provisions. … The Tribunal is conscious of the special role it may be called upon to play in interpreting the provisions of the Convention on the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”11 To date the principal focus of the Tribunal’s work has been with respect to prompt release cases, often paralleling fisheries disputes, and also to a lesser extent matters addressing marine environmental issues either in the context of a fisheries dispute or as part of a distinctive claim. Not surprisingly the Court’s jurisprudence has attracted considerable interest from law of the sea commentators eager to assess how the new institution is developing and a voluminous literature had began to develop around the work and impact of the Tribunal’s decisions. It is not the intention here to specifically comment on all ITLOS decisions to date, other than to note that the Tribunal has seemed anxious to fulfil the role conferred upon it in the LOS Convention and to develop a distinctive approach to its work. What does seem clear however is that from the cases which ITLOS has been involved in there is considerable potential for it to play an important role in oceans governance, not only through its resolution of disputes but also through a contribution to the development and understanding of the law as it particularly applies to marine environmental protection. A selected review will therefore be undertaken of ITLOS jurisprudence which has particular impact upon the marine environment with these factors in mind.

10

For discussion on how the decisions of ITLOS may interact with the ICJ, see A.E. Boyle “Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problem of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction” (1997) 46 ICLQ 37-54.

11

T.A. Mensah “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment” (1999) 8 RECIEL 1 at 5. 1009


II. The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases The Southern Bluefin Tuna cases between Australia/New Zealand and Japan are an interesting study in dispute resolution under the law of the sea because they saw attempts by the parties to utilise a number of the dispute resolution mechanisms provided for under Part XV of the LOS Convention. They are also somewhat distinctive from other law of the sea disputes in that they involve fisheries rather than maritime boundaries, but also concern the application of not only the LOS Convention but also other international instruments including those dealing with the environment. In 1993, Australia, New Zealand and Japan concluded the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).12 The Convention, which generally entered into force on 20 May 1994, establishes a regime for the conservation and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin tuna,13 a fish stock which is highly migratory but which is found in significant quantities in the Australian and New Zealand EEZ.14 Japan, as a principal market for the stock, has long had an interest in exploiting the fishery, and accordingly the three States working within a LOS Convention framework negotiated this regional instrument to regulate access to the fishery. The Convention does not exclude other States acceding,15 however, it has only been since 2001 that other States have begun to express an active interest in becoming a party to the Convention with South Korea formally acceding in October 2001. The Convention establishes a Commission which is responsible for oversight of the Convention during which at annual meetings determinations are made regarding catch quotas. Between 1997 and 1998 there emerged different views within the Commission over the acceptable quota for the take of Southern Bluefin Tuna and this eventually resulted in Japan establishing an experimental fishery program (EFP) partly in an effort to establish appropriate scientific data on the status of the stocks and the viability of continued commercial fishing. Australia and New Zealand disagreed with the Japanese action and notwithstanding discussions within the Commission, resolution of the differing views proved impossible. In 1999, Australia and New Zealand began to move towards the commencement of formal dispute resolution under the CCSBT, article 16 of which essentially mirrors reliance upon traditional peaceful means of dispute settlement. Following the failure of the parties to reach agreement over the dispute resolution

12

[1994] Austl. T.S. No. 16.

13

CCSBT, art. 3.

14

For background on the CCSBT, see A. Bergin and M. Haward “Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery: Recent Developments in International Management” (1994) 18 Marine Policy 263-273.

15

CCSBT, art. 18.

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process, Australia/New Zealand in August 1999 commenced an application for provisional measure before ITLOS. The request for provisional measures against Japan to halt the EFP for southern bluefin tuna was granted by ITLOS on 27 August 1999. In doing so, ITLOS sought to exercise jurisdiction under the LOS Convention, article 290(5) by which the measures were issued pending the constitution of an Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal which Australia and New Zealand had both indicated was their eventual intention. By a majority, ITLOS agreed the prima facie jurisdiction of the Annex VII Tribunal was established, and accordingly under article 290(5) ITLOS had a capacity to issue provisional measures. This was an important decision given the context of the dispute which was one that had primarily arisen under the CCSBT and not the LOS Convention, though clearly important principles of oceans governance under the LOS Convention were at stake. The decision to issue provisional measures had particular ramifications given that Part XV of the LOS Convention acknowledges in article 282 that in the case of a “general, regional or bilateral agreement”, procedures that entail a binding decision “shall apply in lieu of the procedures” provided for in Part XV. A principal question therefore in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases was characterisation of the dispute under one of a number of relevant international instruments. Was it a dispute which arose only under the CCSBT, in which case the parties had open to them the dispute resolution provisions provided for under that Convention, or rather was this a dispute which ultimately raised such fundamental issues of fisheries management and conservation within EEZ areas that the dispute was more properly characterised as one which fell under the LOS Convention? While some consideration was given to this question by ITLOS,16 it was not the subject of exhaustive consideration. In addition, there was little detailed discussion as to the urgency of the provisional measures sought notwithstanding that this too is a matter which arises for consideration under article 290(5).17 The Tribunal issued the provisional measures sought and ordered the parties to refrain from continuing with the EFP and to not exceed their annual allocations of total allowable catch as agreed to under the CCSBT. Notwithstanding that the parties were moving towards final resolution of the dispute before an Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, ITLOS also encouraged the parties to resume negotiations to reach agreement on measures for the conservation and management of the stock. Ultimately, in 2000 the Annex VII Arbitration Tribunal found by a 4/1

16

See the discussion in the judgment by Judge ad hoc Shearer.

17

See the discussion in the judgments by Judge Vukas and Judge Treves, and comment by B. Kwiatkowska “The Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) Cases” (2000) 15 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 1 at 21-23. 1011


majority,18 that in this case the dispute was substantially founded under the CCSBT and that article 16 of that instrument did not anticipate the parties resorting to any other method of dispute settlement, including those available under the LOS Convention. The Tribunal therefore declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the dispute, though in doing so it reminded the parties of their obligation to reach a peaceful settlement. Both the 1999 ITLOS decision and the 2000 Annex VII Arbitration Tribunal decision have been the subject of exhaustive comment in the academic literature.19 Whilst at one level the case seems to reflect a failure of the Part XV dispute resolution mechanisms, from an environmental governance perspective it provided a means for the parties to take the dispute to third party settlement when their relationship within the Southern Bluefin Tuna Commission had broken down. As such, the LOS Convention framework provided an important pressure release valve for the parties. As Mansfield has noted, in the context of the overall dispute resolution processes employed in this matter: “both the ITLOS and the Arbitral Tribunal saw their roles as going beyond consideration of the legal issues and the formal relief sought, and pointing the parties in the right direction to resolve their underlying difficulties. … There can be little doubt that the full range of interim measures ordered by the ITLOS were a key factor in moving the parties forward towards a resolution of the issues at the heart of the dispute.”20

III. The MOX Plant Case The MOX Plant case was the first ITLOS matter which provided the Tribunal with the opportunity to address a matter which at its core dealt with the protection of

18

The majority members were Judge Schwebel (President), Judge Feliciano, Judge Tresselt, and Judge Yamada; Judge Keith was in dissent.

19

See for example T. Stephens “A Paper Umbrella Which Dissolves in the Rain? Implications of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case for the Compulsory Resolution of Disputes Concerning the Marine Environment under the 1982 LOS Convention” (2001) 6 Asia Pacific J. Envtl. L. 297-318; M. Hayashi “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: Prescription of Provisional Measures by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” (2000) 13 Tul. Envtl. L. J. 361-385; S. Marr “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: The Precautionary Approach and Conservation and Management of Fish Resources” (2000) 11 EJIL 815-831; B. Kwiatkowska “The Australia and New Zealand v. Japan Southern Bluefin Tuna (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Award of the First Law of the Sea Convention Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal” (2001) 16 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 239-293.

20

B. Mansfield “Compulsory Dispute Settlement after the Southern Bluefin Tuna Award” in A.G. Oude Elferink and D.R. Rothwell (eds) Oceans Management in the 21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and Responses (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff: 2004) 255 at 265.

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the marine environment. The case concerned environmental objections raised by Ireland regarding the building by the UK of a MOX plant at Sellafield adjacent to the Irish Sea. Sellafield lies in Cumbria, in the Northeast of England, on the coast of the Irish Sea about 112 miles from the Irish coast. The UK government has recognised that Ireland has a “legitimate interest” in the activities carried out at Sellafield, given its proximity and potential impact on the Irish Sea. Ireland has long pressed Britain to stop discharging radioactive waste into the Irish Sea, claiming it contaminates its shores and affects its citizens health. It claims that routine and accidental discharges of artificial radionuclides into the Irish Sea from Sellafield have occurred since the early 1950s, making the Irish Sea one of the most radioactively polluted seas in the world. Irish protests accelerated since the mid 1990s, however, for the most part Britain ignored Irish concerns.21 Following final approval for the commencement of operations at the Sellafield MOX Plant facility in mid 2001, Ireland began to seriously explore options for the commencement of compulsory dispute resolution proceedings against the UK under the LOS Convention. On 25 October 2001 this resulted in a request by Ireland for Provisional Measures from ITLOS and also a notification that the dispute would go to an Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal. ITLOS handed down its orders regarding Provisional Measures on 3 December 2001, which assumed the parties would proceed to a eventual 2002 hearing before an Annex VII Tribunal.22 Like the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, a key issue for ITLOS in the MOX Plant case was establishing prima facie jurisdiction and to that end much attention was given in the orders to relevant provisions of the LOS Convention, Part XV. The UK rejected the primacy of the LOS Convention and argued that the parties were obliged to settle their disputes under a range of other related instruments, including the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention),23 and the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM),24 and that these obligations triggered the application of article 282, LOS Convention, which deprived ITLOS of jurisdiction. However, ITLOS noted that even if those instruments “contain rights or obligations similar or identical to with the rights or obligations set out in the Convention, the rights and obligations under those agreements have a separate existence from those under the [LOS] Convention”.25 Accordingly, the existence of other international or regional instruments under which Ireland 21

Independent, 25 November 2001; Guardian, 26 November 2001.

22

“MOX Plant Dispute” (2002) 32 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 25-26.

23

(1993) 32 ILM 1068.

24

298 UNTS 167.

25

The MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) Request for Provisional Measures (Case No. 10) (3 December 2001), para. 50. 1013


may have been able to obtain relief was not fatal in this instance to a finding that ITLOS had prima facie jurisdiction as the claim made by Ireland was one founded on the LOS Convention.26 ITLOS then began an assessment of the scope of its jurisdictional capacity under LOS Convention, article 290 to issue provisional measures and in particular considered the “urgency of the situation”.27 Following a review of the situation and evidence presented by Ireland and the UK, the Tribunal took the view that this ground had not been made out sufficiently to justify “the prescription of the provisional measures requested by Ireland, in the short period before the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal”.28 In this regard Judge Mensah wrote an important Separate Opinion in which he highlighted the distinction between the capacity of the Tribunal to prescribe provisional measures under article 290(1) of the LOS Convention, and under article 290(5).29 As in this instance ITLOS was acting under article 290(5), Judge Mensah noted that the: “tribunal is only required and empowered to determine whether, on the evidence adduced before it, it is satisfied that there is a reasonable possibility that a prejudice of rights of the parties (or serious damage to the marine environment) might occur prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal to which the substance of the dispute is being submitted. This difference in the temporal dimension of the competence of the tribunal imposes a measure of constraint ….”30 The difference in the approach when considering the test in determining whether provisional measures should be issued was further highlighted by Judge Mensah as follows: “In such a situation it is important for the Tribunal to appreciate at all times that it is not for it to determine whether or not there is a potential for prejudice of rights or harm to the marine environment in the abstract, but rather whether there is evidence that potential prejudice or harm might occur in the period covered by its competence, that is to say, in the period pending the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.”31

26

Ibid. paras 53-62; Ireland had founded its claim on the LOS Convention, arts 192, 193, 194, 207, 211, 213.

27

LOS Convention, art. 290 (5).

28

The MOX Plant case, para. 81.

29

The MOX Plant case, Separate Opinion of Judge Mensah.

30

Ibid.

31

Ibid.

1014


Notwithstanding the position taken by ITLOS on the formal Irish request for provisional measures, it was nevertheless persuaded that given the importance of cooperation to prevent marine pollution under general international law, and considering its capacity to issue orders at variance with those which had originally been requested, it would be appropriate to issue certain provisional measures in this instance.32 To that end, ITLOS ordered that Ireland and the UK: – Exchange information with respect to possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the commissioning of the MOX plant; – Monitor risks or the effects of the operation of the MOX Plant; and – Devise measures to prevent marine pollution which might result from the operation of the MOX Plant.33 In late 2001, the MOX Plant was formally commissioned and became operational. Proceedings before the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal were subsequently suspended until the European Court of Justice handed down judgment in a related case concerning European Community law issues.34 Judgments were handed down in May 2006 in this matter with findings that both Ireland and the UK had been in breach of their obligations under European Community law.35 In parallel, Ireland had also commenced proceedings under the OSPAR Convention with an award handed down in July 2003.36 At one level the decision in the MOX Plant case could be seen as a retreat from placing importance on marine environmental protection given the refusal of ITLOS to issue the provisional measures sought by Ireland. However, as emphasised by Judge Mensah in his Separate Opinion each application depends upon the quality of the evidence presented and the “urgency” of the situation at hand. As to its jurisdiction, the MOX Plant case shows the willingness of the Tribunal to find prima facie jurisdiction notwithstanding the potential claims which Ireland may have had available to it under a range of related international instruments.

32

The MOX Plant case. paras 82-88.

33

Ibid. para. 89.

34

See “MOX Plant Arbitral Tribunal Issues Order No. 4 Further Suspending Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits” Press Release – Permanent Court of Arbitration (14 November 2003).

35

Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 30 May 2006 [Case C-459/03]; Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 4 May 2006 [Case C-508/03].

36

Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Permanent Court of Arbitration (2 July 2003) at <www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/OSPAR/OSPAR%20final%20award%20 revised.pdf>. 1015


Here, ITLOS seemed to reaffirm the broad view that it took on the issue of prima facie jurisdiction in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, while also reinforcing that environmental and marine regimes create distinctive rights and obligations and that though there is clearly a strong connection between these instruments the remedies available under them are in each case separate.

IV. The Volga Case In early December 2002 the Russian Federation commenced proceedings against Australia in ITLOS seeking the prompt release of the Volga, a Russian-flagged long-line fishing vessel detained by Australian authorities for illegal fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone surrounding Australia’s Heard and McDonald Islands. The Volga was arrested by Australian authorities on 7 February 2002.37 A total of 131 tonnes of toothfish were found on board at the time of the arrest.38 The Volga was escorted to port at Fremantle in Western Australia, over 4000 km away. The Volga arrived on 19 February 2002 and was detained along with four of its crew members, one of whom died shortly afterwards.39 Australia set a bond of approximately AUD 3.33 million for the release of the Volga.40 This comprised: – AUD 1.92 million (approx) representing the agreed value of the Volga together with the fuel, lubricants and fishing equipment on board;41 – AUD 0.42 million (approx) representing an amount for potential fines against the three crew members;42 – AUD 1 million for the guarantee of non-repetition of IUU fishing by the Volga as monitored by VMS.43

37

Statement in Response of Australia, (hereafter “Australian Statement in Response”), pp. 5-6. The Application by the Russian Federation, Memorial of the Russian Federation and the Australian Statement in Response are available at <www.itlos.org>.

38

Ibid. p. 7.

39

Ibid. p. 6.

40

The Volga case (Russian Federation v. Australia), Case No. 11, 23 December 2002, (2003) 42 ILM 159, paras 54, 72.

41

Australian Statement in Response, above note 37, p. 13, para. 23.

42

David Bennett QC, The Volga case, Verbatim Record of Oral Submissions, p. 7. Available at <www.itlos.org> (23 December 2002).

43

Vessel Monitoring System; Effectively this amount represented a “good-behaviour bond” to be refunded on the conclusion of forfeiture proceedings provided that the Volga did not enter the Australian exclusive economic zone without permission in the interim; see David Bennett QC, above note 42, p. 7.

1016


In addition Australia refused to release the vessel unless information was provided as to the ultimate beneficial owners of the Volga, the names and nationalities of directors of any parent company, the name, nationality and location of the manager(s) of the Volga’s operations, and details on the insurers and financiers of the vessel. The ITLOS Judgment was delivered on 23 December 2002 in which it held that the bond set by Australia for the release of the vessel was not reasonable. ITLOS held by 19 votes to two that: – Australia did not comply with the provisions of the LOS Convention for the prompt release of the Volga or its crew on the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security;44 and that, – Australia must promptly release the Volga on the posting of a bank guarantee of AUD 1.92 million.45 As Russia alleged that Australia failed to comply with article 73(2) by setting a bond that was unreasonable and by imposing impermissible conditions for the release of the Volga,46 there were two questions before ITLOS. The first was the reasonableness of the bond set by Australia. That question turned on two issues: (a) the relevance of various factors in assessing the reasonableness of the bond; and (b) the weight to be accorded to those factors found relevant. The second question was whether Australia could, consistent with article 73, set non-financial conditions for release of the Volga such as the carriage of a VMS together with the AUD 1 million good behaviour bond to be forfeited if VMS data revealed that on release the Volga had entered the AEEZ without authorisation.47 Accordingly, when the Tribunal considered the first relevant factor, the alleged offences against Australian law, the Tribunal held that no direct weight was to be placed on the serious problem of IUU fishing in the area of the Southern Ocean under the jurisdiction of the 1982 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).48 While ITLOS said that it “understands the international concerns about [IUU] fishing and appreciates the objectives behind the measures taken by States, including the States Parties

44

The Volga case, para. 95(3) (Judge Anderson and Judge Shearer dissenting).

45

Ibid. para. 95(4), (5) & (6) (Judge Anderson and Judge Shearer dissenting).

46

Ibid. para. 60.

47

Russia also alleged that the Volga had been arrested in breach of art. 111 LOS Convention which provides for hot pursuit, however, the Tribunal did not consider this issue holding that the circumstances surrounding the arrest were irrelevant to prompt release proceedings: Ibid. para. 83.

48

1329 UNTS 47. 1017


to CCAMLR”49 it noted that the task set for the Tribunal under article 292 was to decide whether the bond set by Australia was reasonable and that it was only by reference to possible penalties for the alleged offences that ITLOS could determine their gravity.50 After considering the gravity of the offences, ITLOS considered the bond sought by Australia and noted its tripartite nature (representing sums for the vessel, for the potential fines against the crew, and for the “good behaviour bond”).51 In relation to the vessel the Tribunal held that the amount of AUD 1.92 million, representing the agreed value of the vessel (including fuel, lubricants and gear) was reasonable for the purposes of article 292 of the LOS Convention.52 This marked a substantial upholding of the bond sought by Australia and a rejection of the amount of AUD 500,000 suggested by Russia to be reasonable. In relation to the potential fines against the crew, the Tribunal noted that it was unnecessary to consider the issue given the crew’s release.53 The remaining component of the bond (the issue of VMS, other non-financial conditions, and the “good behaviour bond” of AUD 1 million to guarantee non-repetition of future illegal fishing) was then addressed. The majority held that whether or not non-financial conditions could be imposed hinged on whether or not they could be described as a “bond or other security” as that phrase is used in article 73(2) of the LOS Convention.54 It was held that in light of the object and purpose of article 73(2), the phrase must be taken to refer to a bond or security “of a financial nature”.55 The majority concluded that the whole purpose of article 73(2) (when read together with article 292) was to enable a flag State to secure the release of detained vessels and their crew “by posting a security of a financial nature whose reasonableness can be assessed in financial terms”.56 In relation to the security of AUD 1 million (the so-called good behaviour bond) required by Australia in connection with the VMS, the Tribunal held that such a security could not come within article 73(2) because the bond or other security referred to is for the release of “arrested” vessels alleged to have

49

The Volga case, para. 68.

50

Ibid. para. 69.

51

Ibid. paras 71 & 72.

52

Ibid. para. 73.

53

Ibid. para. 74.

54

Ibid. para. 76.

55

Ibid. para. 77.

56

Ibid. para. 77.

1018


committed offences.57 A bond to prevent future illegal activity, it was held, was not encompassed by article 73(2).58

V. The Straits of Johor Case The Straits of Johor case involved Malaysia and Singapore and concerned land reclamation work being carried out by Singapore in and adjacent to the Straits of Johor, a narrow strait which separates the island of Singapore from the Malay Peninsula. The strait consists of a main channel which runs to the west and north of Singapore, which then opens out into the Singapore Strait proper. A number of small islands are found in the north-east of the Johor Strait, creating smaller channels adjacent to the Peninsula. Malaysia commenced its ITLOS claim against Singapore seeking Provisional Measures whilst at the same time requesting that an Arbitration Tribunal be constituted under Annex VII of the Convention to resolve a number of claims, including the delimitation of the territorial waters between the two States.59 Before the ITLOS, the Malaysian claim for Provisional Measures requested that Singapore suspend its land reclamation activities, provide Malaysia with information on current and projected works and be given a full opportunity to comment on the works and their potential, and that Singapore agree to negotiate with Malaysia on all unresolved issues. The ITLOS case arose against a background of Malaysia’s 4 July 2003 request for an Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal to be constituted, and a breakdown in negotiations between the two States in the weeks which followed. Malaysia’s ITLOS Provisional Measures application commenced on 5 September, and in accordance with its procedures in Provisional Measures applications, the Tribunal promptly handed down its decision on 8 October 2003. Consistent with the approach the ITLOS has adopted in previous Provisional Measures cases, the Tribunal focussed on two issues in this case: the existence of jurisdiction, and the merits of the Provisional Measures application. On the first issue, the Tribunal reviewed the arguments of both parties noting the Malaysian claim that the dispute with Singapore was based upon a variety of provisions of the LOS Convention.60 Singapore challenged jurisdiction on a number of grounds. First, it argued that the obligation to exchange views had not been

57

Ibid. para. 80.

58

For detailed discussion of this decision and its implications, see D.R. Rothwell and T. Stephens “Illegal Southern Ocean Fishing and Prompt Release: Balancing Coastal and Flag State Rights and Interests” (2004) 53 ICLQ 171-187.

59

Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) Provisional Measures 8 October 2003 (Straits of Jahor case), para. 22.

60

LOS Convention, arts 2, 15, 123, 192, 194, 198, 200, 204, 205, 206, 210 and 300. 1019


met.61 On this point the Tribunal reviewed the facts and the intent of the LOS Convention, article 283. Noting its comments in both the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases and the MOX Plant case, the Tribunal concluded that “in the circumstances of the present case Malaysia was not obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concluded that this exchange could not yield a positive result”.62 Secondly, Singapore argued that the two parties had embarked on a course of negotiation under the LOS Convention, article 281, in order to arrive at an amicable solution thereby precluding reference of the dispute to the Tribunal. However, on this point the Tribunal noted that meetings between Malaysia and Singapore on 13-14 August 2003 took place after Malaysia had commenced formal dispute resolution proceedings before the Annex VII Tribunal, and accordingly article 281 was not applicable in this instance.63 With the dismissal of the Singapore objections, the Tribunal concluded that the Annex VII Tribunal had prima facie jurisdiction over the dispute, which thereby confirmed its own jurisdiction in this instance.64 As to the merits of the Malaysian Provisional Measures request, the Tribunal not surprisingly focussed on the key issue of “urgency” under article 290. In this regard it was observed that while the Annex VII Arbitral tribunal was to be constituted by no later than 9 October 2003,65 this was not “determinative for the assessment of the urgency of the situation” for the matter had to be considered by taking into account the period when the Arbitral tribunal would actually be able to act.66 The Tribunal, however, firmly rejected the existence of a claim to an area of territorial sea as being a matter of urgency in this case and found no basis for the issuing of provisional measures with respect to Singapore’s land reclamation in the sector of Tuas.67 As regards Malaysia’s claims concerning the environmental impact of Singapore’s land reclamation work, the Tribunal briefly reviewed arguments concerning the precautionary principle.68 In this regard, the Tribunal was influenced by a series of assurances given by Singapore during the course of the ITLOS hearings in relation to its continued conduct of land reclamation works.69 The Tribunal, noting the change in attitude between

61


62

Straits of Johor case, note 59 at para. 48.

63

Ibid. at para. 57.

64

Ibid. at para. 59.

65

This being the day after the ITLOS Order was handed down.

66

Straits of Johor case, note 59 at para. 68.

67

Ibid. at para. 73.

68

Ibid. at paras 74-75.

69

This included a statement from the Agent of Singapore of 27 September 2003, the final day of public sittings, in which it was asserted: “Concerning Malaysia’s first [requested

1020


the parties over cooperation concerning the issues before it, considered that it “is urgent to build on the commitments made to ensure prompt and effective cooperation of the parties in the implementation of their commitments”.70 Provisional Measures were accordingly issued pending a decision by the Annex VII Arbitral tribunal. These included: – that Malaysia and Singapore cooperate by establishing a groups of experts to study the effects of Singapore’s land reclamation and measures to deal with any adverse effects; – the exchange of information on and assessment of risks or effects relating to Singapore’s land reclamation works; – consultations with a view to temporary measures with respect to certain infilling operations; and – that Singapore not conduct its land reclamation in any way to cause irreparable prejudice to the rights of Malaysia.71 In 2005, the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal established to consider this matter was informed that the parties had agreed ad referendum on the text of a draft Settlement Agreement and this was adopted by way of an Award on Agreed Terms on 1 September 2005 without need for a hearing or determination on the merits of the dispute.72

VI. Marine Environmental Disputes and ITLOS A phenomena in international law over the past 50 years has been the development of international environmental law, and in particular the nearly parallel development of modern international environmental law alongside the law of the sea. This is clearly reflected not only in the terms of the LOS Convention but measure] for Singapore to stop its reclamation works immediately, which was modified by the Malaysian agent this morning, … Singapore is pleased to inform the Tribunal that regarding Area D, no irreversible action will be taken by Singapore to construct the stone revetment around Area D pending the completion of the joint study, which should be completed within a year”, Straits of Johor case, note 59 at para. 87. 70

Ibid. at para. 98.

71

Ibid. at para. 106. Not all members of the Tribunal were comfortable with the issuing of Provisional Measures in this instance, including President Nelson and Judge Anderson, see Straits of Johor case, Declaration of President Nelson, para. 4. and Declaration of Judge Anderson, para. 4.

72

See Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) (1 September 2005) at <www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/MASI%20Award. pdf>. 1021


also in the conclusion of many multilateral environmental agreements in the period from the late 1960s through to the early 1990s. Whilst Part XII of the LOS Convention represented a significant step forward in the development of marine environmental protection law, it creates more of an overarching framework than detailed rules for the protection of the marine environment. The content of these rules which have been developed consistently with international environmental law and the law of the sea are more often to be found in IMO conventions dealing with pollution from shipping, regional marine environmental instruments adopted in Europe and the Southwest Pacific, fisheries instruments which provide the foundation for regional fisheries management organisations such as CCAMLR, and in actual state practice which has given effect to the precautionary principle and sustainable development.73 As ITLOS has the capacity to render judgment in disputes that not only arise under the LOS Convention’s marine environmental provisions but also under these related instruments and principles the Tribunal’s potential to develop the law dealing with marine environmental protection and ultimately oceans governance is considerable. ITLOS has clearly recognised this potential and the need for it to respond to the special challenges such disputes may raise. Judge Mensah played an important role in ITLOS taking the initiative in this area. During his time as foundation President of the Tribunal a “Chamber for Marine Environmental Disputes” was established under the Annex VI “Special chambers” mechanism.74 Judge Mensah described the organisation of this Chamber as evidence of the Tribunal being “‘user-friendly’ in respect of cases relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment”.75 However, as this Chamber has yet to have any dispute come before it, its potential for the time being remains unrealised. In the principal decided cases to date, the Tribunal has laid the foundation for developing a more significant role in marine environmental dispute resolution and oceans governance. Notwithstanding the limited nature of the request before it in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, ITLOS accepted the need for provisional measures given the potential impact of Japan’s EFP upon the fishery and in doing so made important observations about the precautionary approach. Whilst a more cautious approach was taken in both the MOX Plant and Straits of Jahor decisions, the Tribunal was still prepared to order provisional measures thereby highlighting Judge Mensah’s important qualifications as to the Tribunal’s role under article 290(5). In both instances the provisional measures Order allowed the

73

See J.M. Van Dyke “The Evolution and International Acceptance of the Precautionary Principle” in D.D. Caron and H.N. Scheiber (eds) Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff: 2004) 357-379.

74

ITLOS Press Release No. 5 (3 March 1997); Judge Wolfrum was appointed the first President of the Chamber.

75

Mensah, note 11 at 5.

1022


Tribunal to have a continuing impact upon the dispute resolution process whilst the parties were exploring their options before an Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal or other bodies. In this way, ITLOS had a pivotal role to play in the initial formal dispute resolution processes relied upon by the parties. The Tribunal’s Orders in both cases therefore allowed it to have ongoing influence even though it was not ultimately the body selected for final determination of the dispute.76 Whilst the Volga decision saw the Tribunal dealing with its more common caseload of prompt release, the circumstances of Australia’s justification for the strong stand it was taking against Southern Ocean IUU fishing permitted some consideration of the linkage between prompt release procedures and marine environmental protection. The Tribunal’s judgment reflects something of a balancing of those factors, and whilst not going as far as Judge Anderson and Judge ad hoc Shearer would have preferred, nevertheless ultimately recognised the legitimacy of the Australian arrest of the Volga and the need to have strong enforcement mechanisms in place to partly act as a deterrent to illegal fishers. These decisions therefore reinforce the environmental credentials of ITLOS and go some way to demonstrate the potential the Tribunal has to play in not only resolving marine environmental disputes but also in making a substantial contribution to marine environmental jurisprudence.77

VII. Concluding Remarks Oceans governance is beginning to have an increased influence on the contemporary law of the sea with the result that the legal and institutional frameworks created by the LOS Convention and reflected in bodies such as ITLOS will increasingly be impacted upon by this development.78 As coastal States begin to place greater emphasis on integrated oceans management, taking into account not only obligations under the law of the sea but also environmental responsibilities for sustainable development and planning, a greater mixing will take place of traditional law of the sea obligations and international environmental law. Part of the challenge here will be to ensure some degree of integration between the various multilateral, regional, sub-regional, and bilateral instruments which

76

For additional analysis of the provisional measures orders issued in these cases see Sh. Rosenne Provisional Measures in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 215-218.

77

See also B.H. Oxman “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” in Caron and Scheiber, note 73, 285 at 290, who notes “What we learn from these cases is that the Tribunal takes conservation and environmental duties very seriously”.

78

For general comments see P. Birnie and A. Boyle International Law and the Environment 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 390-391. 1023


have been negotiated over the past 30 years. It will also be important to ensure that the instruments and the regimes which they create are flexible enough to respond to change. The ITLOS decisions considered above represent foundation attempts by the Tribunal to address some of these issues. The lesson from these decisions during the term of Judge Mensah is that coastal States seeking to rely upon existing and developing marine environmental principles do have open to them clear means by which they can seek some resolution of the normative debate from the new LOS Convention institutions.79 ITLOS has already signalled its interest in hearing marine environmental cases. The ITLOS judges have certainly shown their individual interest in such disputes through their judgements and willingness to go beyond a narrow assessment of the law and take into account environmental principles. It is possible to conclude therefore, that subject to overarching technical limitations such as founding jurisdiction, ITLOS does have a clear potential to play an important role in marine environmental disputes whether it be through the speedy issuing of provisional measures or resolution of substantive issues. This is not only an important institutional development for marine environmental protection, but also significant for the further development of the law. As coastal States and the international maritime community generally grapple with the challenges of effective oceans governance and implementation of and compliance with international obligations, the emergence of ITLOS as an international institutional capable of contributing to that process is to be welcomed.

79

In this respect, the role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the International Sea-Bed Authority should also not be ignored.

1024

PROMPT RELEASE CASES IN ITLOS Michael White

I. Introduction

I

have been particularly pleased to be asked to contribute to this book to commemorate Judge Thomas Mensah’s work and life, including his period as a president and a judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). I first met him when he visited Australia, at the Centre for Marine Studies, Wollongong University, when Dr Sam Bateman AM, had asked us both to participate in a seminar. My admiration for his professional and personal qualities was then started and continues to this day. My chosen topic is the cases that ITLOS has addressed concerning the “prompt release” of arrested vessels cases under article 292 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). The chapter deals with each of the “prompt release” cases in turn and sets out what the Tribunal held in each such case. The conclusions to my chapter include the proposition that setting the amount and terms on which a ship should be released under article 292 could also take into account the test used in civil admiralty maritime law cases. It is a test that admiralty and shipping lawyers have long established, which is that the court orders that the bond be the highest reasonably arguable figure for the claim plus interest and costs. The terms of the bond are, once again, simple in that they are a bond, bank guarantee or other financial security which the successful party will have no difficulty in enforcing should that be necessary. There have been many publications on the “prompt release” provisions from the LOS Convention, but this chapter will work from the original ITLOS cases.1 In doing so no lack of respect is shown to the authors of those articles, but the

1

The Library at ITLOS is able to provide an impressive list of publications about the prompt release cases. However, I should also mention the recent article of my colleague Vincent Vantz “Views from Hamburg: The Juno Trader Case or How to Make Sense of the Coastal State’s Rights in the Light of its Duty of Prompt Release” (2005) 24 U. Queensland L. J. 415-444.



primary purpose here is to work from the original material i.e. from the opinions of the judges as expressed in their judgments. Prompt release cases, being essentially admiralty and shipping law cases, are the sort of cases in which many of the ITLOS judges had had limited or no previous experience. A criterion for their selection is expertise and competence in the law of the sea,2 which is different to admiralty and shipping law. I suggest that had they also been experienced in admiralty and shipping the jurisprudence which the Tribunal has eventually established would have been achieved much earlier. In contrast, Judge Mensah had spent many years with the IMO and had mixed professionally with many maritime law practitioners and academics, so he knew about the area. He also had the common law background and training to see the important difference between pleadings (allegations) and established facts. This difference is critical in prompt release cases, which are interlocutory hearings, not trials or appeals. Judge Mensah has also addressed the topic of prompt release in his paper to the symposium on ITLOS jurisprudence in September 2006. His most helpful summary of the issues before the Tribunal in relation to prompt release was: “The major issues of jurisprudence on substantive questions that emerge from the judgments relate, inter alia to: (a) The basis of jurisdiction to deal with an application; (b) The circumstances in which an application is admissible; (c) The burden to be discharged by the applicant; (d) The nature and contents of the order to be issued by the Tribunal; (e) The considerations and criteria to be taken into account in determining a ‘reasonable’ bond or other financial security to be posted for the release; and (f) The relationship of the order of the Tribunal to the merits of the arrest and detention and to proceedings in other fora.”3 One may see that one of the substantive issues he identified were the criteria to be taken into account in determining a reasonable bond or other financial security and, although the other topics are of abiding interest, it is on this topic that this chapter will concentrate.

2

LOS Convention, Annex VI, art. 2(1).

3

Mensah, T. “The Tribunal and the Prompt Release of Vessels”, Symposium on The Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Assessment and Propects, ITLOS, Hamburg, 29-30 September 2006, p. 2. It was organised by the International Foundation for the Law of the Sea, the University of Hamburg and others.

1026

Prompt Release Cases in ITLOS

In short, this chapter will deal with each of the prompt release cases that have come before ITLOS, set out the admiralty law relating to the amount and style of a bond for release of a detained/arrested ship and then draw some conclusions. In each of the ITLOS cases it will expressly mention where Judge Mensah stood in the decision. Because of restrictions on space it is not possible to canvass the exact positions of all of the other judges. The author will also offer a useful critical analysis of so much of the decisions as are relevant to this chapter and it is hoped that no one is offended by comments which fail to reflect whole-hearted enthusiasm for their position.

II. The ITLOS Cases There have been 13 cases that have been dealt with by ITLOS and, of these, seven are “prompt release” cases and an eighth is the substantive case following from a prompt release case in which the Tribunal sets out the damages payable resulting from an unlawful ship arrest. Eight out of 13 of the cases before ITLOS are, therefore, on shipping. Of the remaining five cases, two related to provisional measures in the same case, two related to provisional measures in other cases and the fifth has been adjourned. Of the prompt release cases, the two applications on which the Tribunal did not proceed to judgment on the merits were the Grand Prince case, where the Applicant failed to establish that the Tribunal had jurisdiction,4 and the Chaisiri Reefer 2 case, where the parties settled the matter themselves.5 It will be seen that in the first three applications in which judgment was passed on the reasonableness of the required bond, the Saiga No. 1 case,6 the Camouco case7 and the Monte

4

The Grand Prince case (Belize v. France), Prompt Release (2001). See judgment at 93-94, ITLOS website, <www.itlos.org/case_documents/2001/document_en_88.doc>.

5

The Chaisiri Reefer 2 case (Panama v. Yemen), Prompt Release (2001). See ITLOS Press Release 52, dated 16 July 2001, ITLOS website, <www.itlos.org/news/press_release/2001/ press_release_52_en.doc>.

6

The M/V Saiga (No. 1) case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Prompt Release (1997). The judgment of the Tribunal in this case can be found at <www.itlos.org/ case_documents/1997/document_en_60.doc>. More analysis of this application can be found in White, M. “The New International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” (1999) Maritime Studies March-April 1999, 1; id., “ITLOS The First Two Cases” (1999) 41 ILN 8-17. In the second Saiga case, M/V Saiga (No. 2) case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (1999), the Tribunal determined the penalty to apply for the wrongful arrest of the Saiga. The judgment of the Tribunal in this case can be found at <www.itlos.org/ case_documents/2001/document_en_68.doc>.

7

The Camouco case (Panama v. France), Prompt Release (2000). The judgment of the Tribunal 1027


Confurco case,8 the Tribunal grappled with the task of formulating principles. By the fourth, the Volga case,9 some jurisprudence was emerging and in the most recent case, the Juno Trader,10 it was starting to take some settled form. The basis for jurisdiction for prompt release is LOS Convention article 292 in which the key phrase is that proceedings may be commenced where one State Party has detained the vessel flagged to another and it is alleged that there has not been compliance with the LOS Convention provisions for the “prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security”.11 The two parties may agree on the forum12 to decide about the release but, failing that occurring within 10 days of the detention, ITLOS has the jurisdiction. Article 292 combines with article 73(2) which provides that arrested vessels and their crews are to be promptly released on the posting of a reasonable bond or other security. There are also Rules13 under ITLOS about prompt release, but this article is more concerned with the substance of the cases rather than the Rules. The facts and the position taken by the majority and by Judge Mensah in each of these prompt release cases will now be summarised. 1. The Saiga Cases Nos 1 and 2 In the Saiga No. 1 the facts were that the Saiga was an oil tanker flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines bunkering fishing vessels off the coast of

in this case can be found at <www.itlos.org/case_documents/2001/document_en_129. doc>. 8

The Monte Confurco case (Seychelles v. France), Prompt Release (2000). The judgment of the Tribunal in this case can be found at <www.itlos.org/case_documents/2001/ document_en_115.doc>.

9

The Volga case (Russian Federation v. Australia), Case No. 11, 23 December 2002.

10

The Juno Trader case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea-Bissau), Case No. 13, 18 December 2004.

11

Other, but less immediately relevant, provisions in the LOS Convention are art. 220(6) that the coastal State may seek to enforce in the EEZ if there is a violation of the pollution requirements and (7) where a reasonable bond is posted the vessel must be allowed to proceed; and art. 226 that vessels voluntarily in the coastal State port may not be unreasonably detained and the flag State may seek its release under Part XV (Settlement of Disputes; which part includes art. 292).

12

The offended party may choose in accordance with art. 287, or the parties may agree otherwise.

13

Sec. E of the Rules deals with prompt release. Art. 112 provides that prompt release cases have priority. Judge Mensah deals with the Rules in his paper on prompt release, supra note 3.

1028


Guinea when it was arrested by Guinean Customs patrol boats.14 Whilst in the Guinean EEZ it was attacked and two crew members injured and the vessel taken into a Guinean port and there the vessel and cargo (gas oil for bunkering fishing vessels) and some of the crew were detained. Guinea sought to justify the arrest on the grounds that the bunkering was an infringement of its customs legislation in avoiding its tax. It alleged that the bunkering took place in its contiguous zone and was followed by a hot pursuit into the EEZ where the arrest was made.15 Another argument presented by Guinea was that there was no requirement for prompt release under article 73(2) as no reasonable bond or other security had been posted. The majority dismissed this argument as Guinea had refused to discuss any bond so the Applicant could not be held responsible for not having posted one.16 In the result the Tribunal, by 12 votes to nine, held the application was admissible, that the vessel be released on a bond of the amount of the gas oil taken from the vessel by Guinea and a further financial security of USD 400,000. It is disappointing that the Tribunal majority did not discuss any of the principles on what was a reasonable bond beyond stating that the “criterion for reasonableness encompasses the amount, the nature and the form of the bond”.17 These are hardly criteria and the majority judgment then merely sets out the calculations by which it arrived at the figures. Of the nine judges in dissent, one was President Mensah who set out his opinion. Basically he agreed with the other dissenting opinions and he differed from the majority opinion on the following grounds: (a) this was a case for prompt release of the vessel under article 292 for noncompliance but the applicant had not discharged the onus of proof on it to show non-compliance by the detaining State relating to prompt release. Applications under article 292 were not preliminary or incidental but definitive proceedings and, as such, the applicant had to prove is case;18 (b) he disagreed with obiter dicta by the majority that regulation of bunkering of a fishing vessel was within the competence of the coastal State; (c) coming as he did from nearby Ghana, President Mensah was interested in the details of the Guinean claim that the Saiga had violated its fishing 14

The facts are taken from the judgment, paras 25 and following.

15

Para. 60.

16

Paras 75-78.

17

Judgment para. 82.

18

Dissenting Opinion President Mensah, para. 5. There has to be some doubt about whether President Mensah was right on the aspect in being of the opinion that the Applicant had not shown non-compliance. 1029


laws. He analyses its claim carefully, brings to bear some detailed aspects of that country’s governmental organisation and then expresses the view that he can see no basis for holding that the Saiga had violated them;19 (d) however, the substantive basis for disagreement in this aspect is that President Mensah rightly points out that the majority is not entitled to reconstruct the argument for any party and where it does so, in relation to what Guinea possibly could have argued as the basis for the detention, it is clearly in error.20 As President Mensah was of the view that the Applicant had not shown noncompliance with the LOS Convention and as, therefore, the prompt release was not justified, he did not address the question of the amount or terms of the bond. When Saiga No. 2 came before the Tribunal in mid-1999 President Mensah was in the majority on all of the substantive aspects of the case but he still gave his own separate opinion. There was much agreement in Saiga No. 2 as the Tribunal was unanimous on some counts and there were only two or three in dissent on the other counts. The Tribunal awarded damages to the applicant of USD 2,123,357, which was made up of damages for the vessel, medical expenses and pain and suffering for the injured crew members. It did not award any compensation to the Applicant itself for the wrongful violation of rights in detaining its flagged vessel or the use of excessive force in effecting the detention, holding that its mere declaration to that effect was sufficient. In President Mensah’s opinion, having voted for operative provision No. 3, i.e. that the objection by Guinea to Saint Vincent and Grenadines having any standing as the Saiga was not one of its flag at the relevant time, he then spends 23 paragraphs explaining that this submission by Guinea is correct but that the error in the Saiga was merely “technical” and that “justice” required that the claim be heard because it would have “far reaching consequences” for the injured and other persons if the case was not heard.21 It must be said that this reasoning is somewhat thin. The fundamental test is “justice according to law” and whether a party can bring a matter before a court or tribunal is fundamental law. However, the Saiga No. 2 was not a prompt release case but a case for determining liability and then damages, so we will move on.

19

Dissenting Opinion President Mensah, paras 9-17.

20

Dissenting Opinion President Mensah, especially para. 27.

21

Seperate Opinion President Mensah, para. 20.

1030


2. The Camouco Case 22 The Camouco was a longline fishing vessel flagged with Panama and detained by a French naval frigate in the French EEZ off the Crozet Islands (French Southern and Antarctic Territories) on 28 September 1999. It was escorted to Port-des-Galets, Reunion, where the master and vessel were detained. The catch was sold and the monies held by the French authorities pending outcome of the proceedings. Panama brought an application for prompt release of vessel and master on determination of a reasonable bond. France made a number of objections to various aspects of the application. Judgment of the Tribunal, by 19 votes to two, ordered the release of the vessel and master on Panama lodging a bank guarantee, or other agreed financial security. The amount of the bond, by 15 votes to six, was ordered to be fixed at FFR 8 million. Judge Mensah, by then he had relinquished the presidency, was with the majority but published his own separate declaration. In their judgments the Tribunal consolidated some of the jurisprudence from the Saiga No. 1 case and made some new rulings. France had submitted that the application was not admissible as it had not been brought promptly and, in particular, not within 10 days of the arrest. The majority held that this argument misreads the requirement of article 292 of the LOS Convention. The time requirement is that if no agreement is reached within 10 day of detention an application may then be made.23 One would have thought that this was perfectly clear from reading the article, but perhaps in the French version it is not so clear. France also argued that domestic legal proceedings had to be exhausted before international relief could be sought, an established general principle of international law but not appropriate in interlocutory matters such as this. The Tribunal held that any recourse in local courts, irrespective of their being exhausted or not, did not preclude proceedings for prompt release being brought to the Tribunal.24 It held that under article 292 the interests of the coastal State were safeguarded by the posting of a reasonable bond and its posting safeguarded the ship and crew from a long and, perhaps unmeritorious, detention.25 The Camouco judgment devoted some time to article 73(2) and whether a bond had to be posted before the application could be made and it affirmed its

22

The Camouco case (Panama v. France), Case No. 5, Judgment delivered 7 February 2000.

23

Judgment para. 54.

24

Judgment paras 56 and following.

25

For conciseness, I will shorten the phrase “bond or other financial security” to just refer to “the bond”. 1031


decision in the Saiga No. 1 case26 that no bond needed to be posted before an application could be made to ITLOS. The other aspect under article 73(2) argued was what was meant by the phrase that the bond or other financial security should be “reasonable”. Once again the judgment affirmed the order in the Saiga No. 1 case27 that the reasonableness related to the amount, the nature and the form of the bond or financial security and that the factors that should be taken into account are the gravity of the alleged offences, the penalties imposed or imposable, the value of the vessel and cargo and the amount and form of the bond demanded by the detaining State.28 In discussing this point, the judgment pointed to the Rules requiring certain material to be in the Statement of Facts and it may have confused this issue. A proper reading of Rule 111 is that it requires only what should be in the Statement. This does not necessarily determine what the Tribunal should take into account in fixing the reasonableness of the bond.29 The Statement takes the form of pleadings which, of course, refer to the allegations of final fact or law and not to the evidence on which the facts are based. Whilst referring to the Rules one notes that the judgment held that for its jurisdiction to be established it had to find that the allegation of non-compliance with the requirement for prompt release was “well-founded”. This phrase, “wellfounded”, is not in articles 292 or 73(2) but is only in Rule 113. Judge Mensah, however, points out in his separate Declaration, that he does not agree with this. He says, rightly, that a Rule may not import this requirement into the substance of the LOS Convention and must be subordinate to it.30 He held that the test is not whether the allegation of non-compliance in Rule 113 but whether the requirements of articles 292 and 73 have been met. Judge Mensah is right on this point although it goes further because there is also the added dimension that the Tribunal must be satisfied that the application is well-founded, in that it is not a fiction or fanciful. The Tribunal does not, of course, weigh up conflicting evidence but its members do have to be satisfied that there is some evidence to support the application and, from this point of view, it has to be well-founded. Finally on the Camouca case, the reasonableness of the amount of the bond and its form were the subject of some attention. As to the amount, France had sought FFR 20 million but the judgment fixed it at FFR 8 million after taking into account, rightly, the amount of money held from the sale of the catch.31 The judgment was valuable in asserting that in calculating the amount of a

26

Saiga No. 1 case, judgment paras 76-77.

27

Saiga No. 1 case, judgment para. 82.

28

Judgment para. 67.

29

Judgment para. 69.

30

Judgment para. 49; Judge Mensah’s Declaration, paras 4-5.

31

The monies from the sale of the cargo was FFR 350,000; see judgment para. 64.

1032


reasonable bond the Tribunal should take into account the gravity of the offences, the penalties imposed or imposable, the value of the vessel and cargo and the amount of the bond sought.32 As to the form of the bond, once more the Tribunal was helpful in developing the jurisprudence when it ordered that the bank guarantee should expressly state why it was given, that the issuer undertakes to pay the amount as determined by any final judgment (up to FFR 8 million) and that it be done promptly after receipt of a written demand for it accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment. The next case for prompt release was in December 2000, the same year, with France again being the arresting party. 3. The Monte Confurco Case 33 The Monte Confurco was a fishing vessel, flying the flag of the Seychelles, registered in that country and licensed by it to engage in fishing in international waters. It was boarded by the crew of the French frigate Floréal in the French EEZ offshore from the Kerguelen Islands, in the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, on 8 November 2000. The offences alleged against it were in failing to announce its presence and the quantity of fish aboard, fishing without an authorisation and attempting to evade investigation. It was escorted to Port-des-Galets, Reunion. 34 It had some 158 tonnes of the very profitable Patagonian toothfish onboard. The catch, valued at FFR 9 million, was sold and the monies held in court. The French court of first instance at Saint Paul set a total bond for release of the vessel of FFR 56.4 million, comprised of FFR 1 million to secure the appearance of the master, FFR 4 million to secure payment of any damage caused and FFR 55 million to secure payment of any fines and value of the vessel if confiscated. The bond was to be in cash, certified cheque or banker’s draft paid into the Deposits and Consignments Office. The French court’s reasons included that the bond must be “reasonable” as required by articles 73(2) and 292 of the LOS Convention and that it strike an overall balance based on “the seriousness of the contraventions …, the penalties that could be imposed ..., the value of the arrested vessel and … cargo”.35 Seychelles commenced proceedings for prompt release on the basis that the bond was excessive and should be about FFR 2.2 million, comprised of FFR 2 million for failure to notify of the vessel’s presence and FFR 2 million for being in the EEZ without notice and having its 158 tonnes of fish cargo. It also advanced

32

Judgment paras 66-67; affirming Saiga No. 1 case para. 82.

33

The Monte Confurco case (Seychelles v. France), Case No. 6, judgment 18 December 2000.

34

Judgment paras 27-32.

35

Judgment paras 35-41. 1033


the argument, in effect, that the Monte Confurco was only passing through the French EEZ and not fishing in it or preparing to do so. The two parties were well apart on the facts; including where the vessel was and whether it could have been fishing or not in that area. The judgment of the Tribunal was given by 19 votes to one (Judge Anderson dissenting) that the vessel be released on posting a reasonable bond, the amount of which was fixed, by 17 votes to three (Judges Anderson, Laing and Jesus dissenting) at FFR 9 million in the form of a bank guarantee, to be invoked if the security already held (value of the catch) was insufficient to pay the fines etc of the final French domestic forum (court).36 The majority judgment included the following: (a) the Master being detained under “court supervision” was the same as detention for present purposes, as decided in the Camouco case; (b) the Tribunal is not an appellate forum from a national court but a forum that fixes a reasonable bond; (c) the Tribunal may examine the facts and circumstances of the case for a proper appreciation of the reasonableness of the bond but as the proceedings must be concluded without delay this limits its ability to seek evidence in support of the allegations of the parties (see also the Saiga No. 2 case to this effect);37 and that (d) there be no presumption that all of the catch onboard was taken in the French EEZ and there was no evidence proving that this was the case (differing from the French court in this aspect).38 Seven of the ITLOS judges appended declarations, including Judge Mensah. His concern was that the judgment came perilously close to entering into the merits of the case regarding the expert evidence before the Tribunal and how the French court arrived at its final bond. He notes that the French court reasons, and the French argument before the Tribunal, made it clear that there was no presumption that all of the catch was caught in the French EEZ and, in fact, the French court made it clear it had only taken one-half of the catch into account in fixing the amount of the bond.39 Judge Mensah was critical of the impression that could be created that the Tribunal was entering into a determination of the issues or the merits in the case but he agreed that the Tribunal may take

36

Judgment para. 93, Operative provisions.

37


38

Judgment paras 87-88. This was relevant to the seriousness of the offence and hence the likely amount of the fine in determining the amount of the bond.

39

Judge Mensah’s Declaration, para. 3.

1034


account of the facts and circumstances in order to examine the reasonableness of the bond. As mentioned, a further six judges issued declarations, but there is not space here to explore them. This then, for present purposes, ended the Monte Confurco case and it can be seen that it added nicely to the jurisprudence of the prompt release cases. The majority judgment and the declaration by Judge Mensah showed that the Tribunal was now close to common ground in reasoning as to what amounted to a reasonable bond. It took into account the gravity of the offence and likely amount of the fines arising from a conviction, the context of the circumstances surrounding the unlawful fishing in the area where the vessel was detained, and the value of the vessel, and that the catch and the fishing gear that could be forfeited after a conviction. In relation to crew, it also took into account the likely fines should they be convicted. Against that amount, the Tribunal acknowledged what security the detaining State already had, such as the catch (or value of its sale). All of this is correct. The next case before ITLOS was the Swordfish Stocks case40 in which a special chamber of five judges was formed. However, by agreement the parties deferred the case to 1 January 2008 and the President and Registrar made an order to that effect on 29 December 2005. There was no issue, therefore, concerning prompt release in this case; at least to date, so it remains to consider the next case, also involving France. 4. The Grand Prince Case 41 The facts of the Grand Prince case are similar to those of the Monte Confurco in that the Grand Prince was a fishing vessel, flying in this case the flag of the Belize, boarded by the crew of a French frigate, in this case the Nivose, in the French EEZ offshore from the Kerguelen Island, in the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, which took place on 26 December 2000. (No Christmas holidays with the family for these crews!) The alleged offences were in failing to announce its entry into the EEZ, failing to declare having fish cargo aboard, fishing without an authorisation and attempting to evade investigation. It, too, was escorted to Port-des-Galets, Reunion.42 France alleged that fresh, as well as frozen, toothfish were found onboard, which pointed to their being taken illegally in the French EEZ.

40

Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the SouthEastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. European Community), Case No. 7, 29 December 2005.

41

The Grand Prince case (Belize v. France), Case No. 8, judgment 20 April 2001.

42



The master pleaded guilty and the court at Saint-Paul fixed the amount of the bond at FFR 11.4 million, taking into account appropriate matters.43 Only 11 days later, the matter was before the Criminal Court which convicted, confiscated the vessel, equipment and fish cargo, fined the Master FFR 2 million and declared the order be immediately enforceable irrespective of any appeal. The ship owners filed an appeal and tendered the FFR 11.4 million to the court of first instance to secure the release of the ship and master but the latter held that it no longer had jurisdiction because the Criminal Court had dealt with it. This, of course, had to be correct. Belize then applied for prompt release in ITLOS. At the hearing Belize argued, amongst other things, that it was not a reasonable bond, that as the bond had been tendered then not releasing the vessel promptly was a breach by France of LOS Convention article 73(2) and the purported “confiscation” only a few days after arrest was a “trick” and a “fraud of law” and, if successful, would make article 73 a dead letter.44 France advanced three major arguments: (a) the French domestic court had delivered a judgment on the merits and if the Tribunal were to entertain the application it would amount to interfering with a judgment of a municipal court given on the merits, which was contrary to article 292(3) of the LOS Convention;45 (b) the judgment ordering confiscation was made in full compliance with French law, which flowed from article 73 and which in turn empowered the coastal State to define its fishing laws, offences and penalties, including confiscation; (c) the application, in effect, did not deal with prompt release but with the exercise by France of its sovereign rights and, further, when France ratified the LOS Convention it declared that it did not accept the compulsory procedures with respect to disputes concerning law enforcement including relating to article 297 paragraphs 2 and 3.46

43

Judgment para. 45.

44

Judgment para. 54. This purported confiscation brings to mind the provisions of the Australia Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), which is to similar effect in purporting to confiscate the vessel, equipment and cargo but without a court hearing and only giving, later, the owners the right to seek compensation, as to which see post in the Conclusions.

45

It may assist readers to remind them that article 292(3) provides: “3. The court or tribunal shall deal without delay with the application for release and shall deal only with the question of release, without prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic forum against the vessel, the owner or its crew. The authorities of the detaining State remain competent to release the vessel or its crew at any time”.

46

Article 297 provides for limits on applicability of the compulsory dispute procedures with regard to marine scientific research (para. 2) or fisheries relating to the allowable

1036


These are fascinating arguments, although one may speculate that the arguments advanced by France had a deal of speculation of their own. However, these matters were not aired because the Tribunal decided the application, by 12 votes to nine, that Belize had no standing (locus standii) to bring the application and so the application was dismissed. Judge Mensah was with the majority and gave no separate declaration. The reasoning of the majority on the lack of standing was based on the obligation of a Tribunal or court not to proceed unless it found that it had jurisdiction and, although France had not advanced argument on this aspect, jurisdiction is a matter for the Tribunal proprio motu (of its own motion). The documents showed that the Grand Prince was not a registered vessel with Belize at the material time, which was the date of the application and hearing. The dates are important and the material ones are that the vessel was detained on 26 December 2000 and that, after a preliminary letter, the application to the Tribunal was filed on 21 March 2001. In the meantime, the documents showed that the registration of the Grand Prince under Belize law had expired on 29 December 2000 and, if that was not enough, its registration had been withdrawn on 4 January 2001 as this was the second violation by this vessel. Belize had argued that its document on 30 March 2001 was sufficient to give Belize standing but the majority was against this assertion, including because the document merely stated that Belize considered the vessel as still registered. The majority relied on the decision in the Saiga No. 2 case that the Tribunal must satisfy itself and that the onus lay on the applicant.47 The majority held that it was not a question of fact but one of law in construing the legal effect of all of the documents before it. In this way it avoided the difficult question, one that Judge Mensah had concentrated on in the earlier cases, that the Tribunal is not empowered to embark on a hearing on the merits of the facts. In all the circumstances the majority held that Belize had not discharged this onus and so it did not have standing to bring the application and so the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction.48 In the light of this decision the Tribunal had no need to discuss the criteria for the amount of any bond. The next case in the series of prompt release ones is the Chaisiri Reefer 2.49 Yemen detained this vessel and Panama applied to ITLOS on 3 July 2001 but by

catch etc (para. 3). Article 298 allows for declarations and France’s declarations related to disputes relating to sea bed boundaries, military activities and the UN Security Council exercising certain of its functions; see a reprint in the ITLOS Yearbook 2004, p. 159. See also the Judgment paras 57 and following. 47

The Saiga No. 2 case, Judgment, see supra note 6, para. 40.

48

The Grand Prince case, Judgment, see supra note 4, paras 84-93.

49

The Chaisiri Reefer 2 case, (Panama v. Yemen), Case No. 9, 13 July 2001, see supra note 5. 1037


12 July the parties had settled it and the vessel was released. The President and Registrar signed an order the next day recording its discontinuance and removing it from the list of cases.50 As so little occurred of substance, this case will not further be dealt with. The case after that, however, had much of substance and involved Australia and Russia having their first appearances before ITLOS. 5. The Volga Case 51 The Volga was also a long-line fishing vessel, in this case flying the Russian Federation flag and owned by Olbers Co. Ltd., a company incorporated in Russia. The Master was a Russian national.52 The fishing licence carried by the Volga entitled it to fish in the “open sea and coastal zones of foreign countries” but observing the rules, laws and international conventions.53 The Volga was targeting the Patagonian toothfish in the Australian EEZ in the Southern Ocean. The whole problem of Australia’s enforcement against illegal, unreported and unregulated fisheries in the Southern Ocean concerning the Patagonian toothfish is very well discussed in two recent books, but there is not space to go into them in this chapter.54 Personnel from the Australian naval ship HMAS Canberra boarded the Volga on 7 February 2002 on the high seas just beyond the Australian EEZ between Heard and McDonald Islands in the Southern Ocean. Australia’s case was that the Volga had been observed fishing illegally in the EEZ and fled into international waters when alerted to the Australian Navy’s presence. It was escorted to the port of Fremantle, near Perth in Western Australia.

50

Order dated 13 July 2001.

51

The Volga case, (Russian Federation v. Australia), see supra note 9.

52


53

Some of the facts and points about prompt release in the ITLOS cases made in this chapter were discussed as co-author in White, M. & Knight, S. “Illegal Fishing in Australian waters – the Use of UNCLOS by Australian Courts” (2005) 11 J. Int’l Maritime L. 110-125.

54

For an excellent book on the industry and the law relating to fisheries around Australia, see Baird, R. Aspects of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Southern Ocean, 2006, Springer, especially Chapter 8 where she discusses the Australian Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) and her reservations about it, but it was written before the most recent amendments to that Act. See also Riddle, K. “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Is International Cooperation Contagious?”, (2006) 37 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 265. For a full discussion of the Patagonian toothfish industry, it structure and profitability and the 14 day pursuit, detention and prosecution by the Australian authorities in the Southern Ocean of the Viarsa in 2003, see Knecht, B. Hooked: A True Story of Pirates, Poaching and the Perfect Fish, 2006, Allen & Unwin. The Viarsa case is not discussed in this chapter as it was not litigated in ITLOS, but it was heavily litigated in Australia; see White and Knight, supra, note 53.

1038


The master and crew were detained under powers in the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) and the vessel and catch were seized. The Chief Mate, the fishing Master and the fishing Pilot, all of whom were Spanish nationals, were charged with unlawful fishing in the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ)55 while the members of the crew not charged were released and later repatriated to Spain. A bail bond of AUD 75,000 each and a further AUD 20,000 for additional charges laid against the fishing Master, making a total of AUD 245,000, was fixed. The Russian master was not charged as he was seriously ill when they reached Fremantle and he later died in hospital from this prior illness. There has been much litigation over the Volga, starting with an appeal about the amount of bail, which was increased by a single judge of the Supreme Court of Western Australia56 but on further appeal the Full Court set this aside and restored the Magistrate’s orders while putting in place several conditions.57 As the owner had posted the bail monies and satisfied the conditions, all three bailed crew members were allowed to return to Spain pending trial.58 Under the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) the catch (value), vessel, nets and equipment of the Volga were all liable to forfeiture by order of a court.59 The catch, some 131 tonnes of Patagonian toothfish, and 21 tonnes of bait were sold for AUD 1,932,579.28 and the monies held by the Australian government pending a final court order. The Australian litigation continued with the owner, Olbers, contesting the forfeiture of the vessel and its catch, in the Federal Court, as it had to do to avoid their final confiscation to the government.60 The Australian government later brought an application for security for costs of the Federal

55

The AFZ is coterminous with the Australian EEZ; sec. 4 of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth).

56

Director of Public Prosecutions; who has charge of prosecutions under Commonwealth laws.

57

See The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v. Lijo & Ors [2002] WASC 154, Supreme Court of Western Australia, MCS 30 of 2002, judgment delivered 14.06.02, Wheeler J; and Lijo & Ors v. The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] WASCA 4, The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, FUL 105 of 2002, judgment delivered 16.12.02, Anderson and Templeman JJ with Ollson AUJ.

58

The Volga case (Russian Federation v. Australia), Prompt Release (2002) at 37-49.

59

Sec. 106A Fisheries Management Act 1991. This Act has been since amended and these amendments raise serious concerns concerning purported forfeiture without a conviction, see below note 69. In an international forum such as ITLOS it is, of course, not necessarily a defence to its breach of international obligations for a State to call in aid the provisions of its domestic laws; see arts 27 and 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.

60

Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), secs 106A and following. 1039


Court proceedings.61 The application for security for costs was dismissed as the owners had been placed in the position of a defendant in the matter and security for costs is not usually awarded against a defendant.62 The day before judgment was handed down in the costs matter Olbers filed a motion of its own seeking a stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal charges against the members of the Volga’s crew. It was held that there was nothing to suggest that the outcome of Olbers’ action against the Australian government would prejudice the criminal proceedings and Olbers’ motion was dismissed.63 More to the point for this chapter, is that the parties were unable to agree on the amount and terms of a bond so the vessel was not released by the Australian government. On 2 December 2002 Russia filed an application in ITLOS seeking release of the three officers, vessel, the value of the sold catch and bait, etc on posting a reasonable bond and, after pleadings (Statements) and oral hearings were filed, the judgment was delivered on 23 December. By 19 votes to two the Tribunal found that the application was well founded and the vessel should be released on the posting of a bond of AUD 1.92 million. Judge Mensah voted with the majority but in this case did not append any separate declaration. The real contest in ITLOS was over the amount of the bond and its conditions. Australia had sought three separately defined amounts, the first of which was AUD 1.92 million as security to cover the value of the vessel including its fuel, lubricants and fishing equipment. (This assessment was not really in contest).64 The second amount was AUD 412,500 as security for the payment of potential fines that might be imposed under pending criminal proceedings against the three crew. (The amount of the court bond had been posted, so there was no real contest here either).65 The third amount was AUD 1 million to be paid as a guarantee that the Volga would install and carry a vessel monitoring system, which would allow the vessel’s position to be checked at any time electronically, and observe the directives of the Commission for Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources until the conclusion of legal proceedings.66 As noted, Australian authorities already held the monies in trust from the sale of the catch, the value of the vessel was not really in contest and it also had the bail monies

61

Olbers Co Ltd v. Commonwealth of Australia and Australian Fisheries Management Authority, [2002] FCA 1269, Federal Court of Australia, WA Registry, W 151 of 2002, judgment delivered 16.10.02, French J.

62

Ibid. at 13 and 19.

63

Olbers Co Ltd v. Commonwealth of Australia and Australian Fisheries Management Authority (No. 2), [2003] FCA 177, Federal Court of Australia, West Australian Registry, W151 of 2002, judgment delivered 11.03.03, French J.

64

The Volga case (Russian Federation v. Australia), Prompt Release (2002) at 72.

65

Ibid.

66

Ibid. see also 78.

1040


for the three Spanish officers (AUD 245,000). Russia argued that a further AUD 500,000, together with the monies from the catch and the bail monies, was a reasonable bond. During argument before the Tribunal counsel for Australia submitted that the Tribunal should deal with each of these amounts separately and not treat them all as elements of the same bond.67 This submission was rejected with the Tribunal holding that it treats all amounts of money and conditions claimed by a detaining state as amounting to one bond rather than a number of separate bonds. The judgment stated that “the overall balance of the amount, form and nature of the bond [implying all demands of the detaining state will be seen as part of the overall balance] … must be reasonable”.68 This is, of course, correct. In terms of the gravity of the alleged offences, Australia argued that the Tribunal should take into consideration both the high penalties that applied to illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean under Australian domestic law69 and the international concern generally in regard to illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing.70 The Tribunal concluded that, because article 292 refers only to the imposition of a reasonable bond to ensure the appearance of a master in the courts of the detaining country and the payment of penalties, it was only by reference to the penalties applicable under domestic law that the Tribunal

67

ITLOS, Public Sitting held on Friday, 13 December 2002, at 10 a.m., at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Hamburg, President L. Dolliver M. Nelson presiding – The “Volga” case (Application for prompt release) (Russian Federation v. Australia) Verbatim Record at p. 7, lines 45-47. The transcript may be found at <www.itlos.org/case_documents/2002/ document_en_213.doc>. The leading counsel on behalf of the Respondent was Mr David Bennett QC, Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth of Australia.

68

The Camouco case (Panama v. France), Prompt Release (2000) at 66 quoting the M/V Saiga (No.1) case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Prompt Release (1997) at 82.

69

Ibid. at 67. Under secs 84 and 106 of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), any foreign boat, support boat or fishing equipment used in an offence is forfeited to the Commonwealth of Australia without any court conviction and may be seized and even destroyed if the officer merely has “reasonable grounds” to believe it is forfeited. Further amendments to the Act in 2006 add powers of imprisonment for fisheries offences in the territorial sea, which is against the spirit of the provisions against such imprisonment of foreigners in art. 73(3) of the LOS Convention that imprisonment for fisheries offences by foreigners in the EEZ is not permissible. These Australian provisions are most concerning although they have been upheld by an Australian domestic court (Full Court of the Federal Court). In an international forum, such as ITLOS, it is, of course, not necessarily a defence to its breach of international obligations for a State to call in aid the provisions of its domestic laws; see arts 27, 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Dr Rachel Baird in her book, above note 54, sets out the background of major unlawful fishing activities in Australian waters that had led the Australian government to enact these amendments.

70

Ibid. at 68. 1041


should make its determination on the amount of a reasonable bond.71 It made clear that it would not impose a sanction in the form of a higher bond simply because the offences for which the vessel had been arrested related to acts that were the subject of international concern. The Tribunal did accept, however, that the offences allegedly committed by the Volga were considered grave ones under Australian law as demonstrated by the high maximum penalties. This is, once again, a correct statement of principle. In relation to the amount of the bond attributable to the value of the vessel, in the “Camouco” case the Tribunal had stated that “the value of the vessel alone may not be the controlling factor in the determination of the amount of bond or other financial security”.72 This is so, as it has always felt itself under an obligation to consider whether issues such as crew liability for fines, value of any seized cargo or delay in complying with the procedure set down by the LOS Convention having a bearing on the amount of bond that will be deemed “reasonable”. What the Tribunal’s judgment in the Volga case decides is that if the parties agree on a particular value for the arrested vessel and the vessel is liable to forfeit then this amount will constitute the minimum bond that will be set. In deciding the reasonableness of the amount of AUD 412,500 as security for the release of the vessel’s crew the Tribunal concluded it was unnecessary for such a bond to be set because bail had already been obtained from the Supreme Court of Western Australia allowing the crew to leave Australia.73 An important and new issue was whether the additional conditions sought by the Australia, requiring the guarantee for installation of a vessel monitoring system etc, were capable of inclusion in the phrase “bond or other security” as used in article 73(2) of the LOS Convention.74 The Tribunal referred to the other provisions of the LOS Convention75 that deal with the prompt release of vessels and crews and found that the word “bond” was always used to describe the amount and type of financial security and nothing more.76 Reading the provisions of articles 73(2) and 292(1) together in this light the majority of judges in the Tribunal found that the mechanism provided exists solely to “obtain the prompt release of a vessel and crew arrested for alleged fisheries violations by posting a security of a financial nature whose reasonableness can be assessed

71

Ibid. at 69.

72

The Camouco case (Panama v. France), Prompt Release (2000) at 69.

73


74

Ibid. at 75-76.

75

The Tribunal referred to art. 292(1), which contains the phrase “bond or other financial security”; and arts 226(1)(b) and 220(7), which both contain the phrase “bonding or other appropriate financial security”.

76


1042


in financial terms”77 and this does not encompass a “good behaviour bond to prevent future violations of the laws of a coastal State” or any other kind of non-financial conditions.78 In this regard the Tribunal also paid no heed to Australia’s emotive submission that the real owners were in all likelihood a “shadowy gang of international criminals” who “show contempt … for their flag state” and “would benefit from any order requiring release on a lesser bond”.79 The majority, therefore, dismissed Australia’s claim that it was empowered to impose conditions that the vessel carry identification equipment and that a bond be lodged against breach of this condition. Further, the Tribunal did not consider that the circumstances of the Volga’s seizure were relevant to determining the amount of the bond.80 This position is consistent with the Tribunal’s earlier ruling in the Saiga No. 1 case that it was not the proper purpose of the Tribunal to rule on whether or not the arrest itself was legitimate but whether the bond asked in return for release was reasonable.81 The Tribunal in the same case rejected the idea that a “reasonable bond” could ever be only nugatory or symbolic because the arrest of the vessel by the detaining state was arguably immoral or unlawful.82 In this case the Tribunal majority established again that it will not involve itself in determining the merits, whether moral or legal, of the activities that resulted in the arrest of a vessel beyond considering the likely fines that may result. In the result the Tribunal majority determined that a reasonable bond for the release of the Volga would be AUD 1,920,000.83 This amount is, of course, the value of vessel and its fittings. In relation to how the bond or security was to be provided Russia submitted that a bank undertaking would be sufficient84 while Australia argued for a cash payment to be held in trust by the Australian authorities or a bank guarantee from an Australian bank.85 The Tribunal decided that a guarantee from a bank present in Australia or having corresponding arrangements with an Australian

77

Ibid. at 77.

78

Ibid. at 80.

79

The Volga case (Russian Federation v. Australia), Verbatim Record, at p. 6, lines 9-13.

80


81

The M/V Saiga (No. 1) case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Prompt Release (1997) at 62.

82

Ibid. at 81.

83


84

Ibid. at 91.

85

Ibid. at 92. 1043


bank would suffice.86 Each of the State parties was to bear its own costs.87 Neither party had achieved precisely what it had sought but the jurisprudence for prompt release cases was now fairly clearly established by this judgment affirming the principles laid down in the earlier cases. It is hard to support that some of the Australian submissions should even have been made and there is little doubt that the majority of the Tribunal was correct in dismissing them. Judge ad hoc Shearer88 and Judge Anderson dissented. Judge Shearer opined that a broader interpretation of articles 73(2) and 292 allows for the seriousness of the offence, the risk to the species, contumelious disregard of catch restrictions and similar matters to be taken into account. On the important new point about the power to order that conditions of release and the bond to include an amount against their breach, he was of the view that this was allowable.89 Judge Shearer discussed the seriousness of the fact that the vessel’s records showed it had been fishing illegally in the Australian EEZ for quite some time, that in January it had been expressly warned not to do so. He also noted that its sister vessel, the Lena, had been detected and arrested nearby for unlawful fishing and he drew the inference that the Lena warned the Volga to leave the Australian EEZ just before it was arrested.90 Judge ad hoc Shearer had support in his dissent on this point from Judge Anderson (but who otherwise substantially agreed with the majority decision).91 In summary, there was really only one substantive point in the Volga case and that was whether the detaining State could add to the bond an amount as a guarantee to ensure compliance with conditions. A court can do so in the common law jurisdiction and frequently does, but, so the majority held, adding conditions and a bond in default of keeping them is not available in prompt release cases under the LOS Convention because its terms do not allow for it. It follows that it would need an amendment to the treaty for this to be allowable.

86

Ibid. at 93.

87

Ibid. at 94.

88

Judge ad hoc Shearer, a professor of international law, was the Australian appointment.

89

The Volga case (Russian Federation v. Australia), Prompt Release (2002), Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Shearer at 16-17. The dissenting opinions of Judges Shearer and Anderson were well set out in a note by Piotrowicz, R. “International Focus: The Song of the Volga Boatmen” (2003) 77 A.L.J. 160-163.

90

Ibid. at 4-5.

91

Judge Cot gave a separate opinion, in which he agreed with the majority but discussed the “margin of appreciation”. This expression really relates to the discretion, in the common law terms, which lies with a court and beyond which that court must go before another court or Tribunal would interfere with its exercise.

1044


6. The Juno Trader Case 92 The last of the prompt release cases arises from the detention of the Juno Trader by Guinea-Bissau on 26 September 2004. The Juno Trader was a refrigerated cargo vessel flagged with the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, owned by Juno Reefers Ltd., based in Cape Town, South Africa. The facts are disputed. According to the Juno Trader team the vessel was merely steaming through the EEZ, having earlier received over 1,000 tonnes of frozen fish and fish meal from its sister ship, the Juno Warrior, a trawler operating under a Mauritian fishing licence, when armed persons started shooting at it and wounded one of the crew. According to the Guinea-Bissau team the Juno Trader was anchored in company of the fishing Vessel Flipper and weighed anchor and fled on arrival of the Navy vessel Cacine.93 The vessel was escorted to port and inspection of the catch found all but one species were to be found in Guinea-Bissau waters. After its boarding, the Juno Trader captain had refused to produce log books and other documents. As a result Guinea-Bissau alleged violation of its fishing legislation and an offence by the captain for failing to cooperate, so the Inter-Ministerial Commission imposed fines and ordered forfeiture of the vessel and the catch. However, the Regional Court, on application of the ship owner, ordered cancellation and annulment of these fines and forfeiture and that the prohibition on vessel and crew from leaving the country be lifted. The Guinea-Bissau inspection service countered with an order that the vessel be forfeited to the State due to non-payment of the fine. An application to ITLOS for prompt release followed. The judgment of the Tribunal was unanimous, a first, with eight of the judges appending separate opinions. The first issue before ITLOS was whether it had jurisdiction. Guinea-Bissau argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction as the ownership of the vessel had passed to Guinea-Bissau before the application for prompt release was lodged, relying on the decision in the Grand Prince case, and it followed, therefore, that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was not the flag State and so had no jurisdiction to bring the application. The Tribunal was against this submission on the basis that any fines already imposed in Guinea-Bissau can be subject to appeal, that the Regional Court had made an order suspending any fines anyway and, thirdly, that there were no circumstances in this case that the nationality of the Juno Trader had changed from being flagged with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.94 The Tribunal particularly stated that the obligation of prompt release “includes elementary considerations of humanity

92

The Juno Trader case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea-Bissau), Case No. 13, 18 December 2004.

93


94



and due process of law” and that there must be a “concern for fairness” in the process of fixing a reasonable bond.95 The facts underlying the argument for release of vessel and crew were disputed and they depended on which party was asserting them. The vessel’s P&I Club had volunteered a bond of EUR 50,000, but this offer had been ignored. The crew had been detained, along with their vessel, but Guinea-Bissau maintained that their passports had been returned. Guinea-Bissau had not notified Saint Vincent and the Grenadines of the detention, as required by LOS Convention article 73(4) and had not mentioned what bond it required for release of the vessel, catch and crew.96 And so it went on. The Tribunal cut through all of this and found that the application was well founded and vessel, cargo and crew must be released. It then turned to discuss the bond. In determining the amount and terms of the bond the Tribunal relied on its earlier decisions in the Camouco case, the Monte Confurco case and the Saiga No. 1 case, thereby assisting stable and dependable jurisprudence. It confirmed that its task was to have the vessel and crew released promptly while securing their appearance for the court and leaving a fund for payment of any fines imposed by it. In doing so it is not precluded from examining the facts and circumstances of the case but the assessment of these relevant factors must be done objectively.97 When it came to the details of the amount of the bond, once again the parties could not agree, this time on the value of the vessel and the cargo. The Tribunal looked to the competing evidence as to the vessel (Applicant USD 460,000; Respondent USD 800,000) and the cargo (Applicant USD 63,280 less an unquantifiable amount for the deterioration whilst in detention; Respondent no view) and held again that the circumstances of the seizure could not be taken into account. The Tribunal then fixed the bond at EUR 300,000. It took into account that EUR 8,770 had previously been paid for the fine against the master. It ordered that the P&I Club letter offering a bond of EUR 50,000 be returned once the bond was paid. It ordered instead that the bond be in the form of a bank guarantee issued by a bank present in Guinea-Bissau and set out that it should state that it was payable on decision by a court of final jurisdiction and that it be up to the limit of EUR 300,000. Each party was to bear its own costs. Judges Mensah and Wolfrum, in their joint opinion, stated that they felt the importance of the point relating to the confiscation of the vessel depriving the flag State of a right to apply for prompt release, was of such importance as to warrant further development. They did not question that a coastal State could confiscate if it is “proved” that they engaged in illegal fishing, but this could 95

Judgment para. 77.

96


97


1046


only be done within the provisions of the LOS Convention, other international law and particularly the international instruments on the protection of human rights, including those providing for the “protection of a fair trial and due process”.98 They pressed this point further when they set out that the “obligation of States … under [LOS Convention] and general international law, includes the obligation not to deny justice or due process of law, especially in respect of legal judicial procedures that involve interference with the property rights of aliens”.99 They then turned to the argument that the alleged change of ownership (to Guinea-Bissau) had changed the nationality of the vessel and that it was not then flagged with the applicant country. This argument they dismissed on the basis that change of ownership does not result in any automatic change of the flag of a ship. It was for each State to establish conditions for granting nationality and for registration and that “nationality” was merely shorthand for the “jurisdictional connection between a ship and a State”. They also found as totally untenable the Guinea-Bissau argument that confiscation could lead to the result that the vessel was no longer detained and that a prompt release application can be set aside “by mere administrative action, particularly when … judicial procedures available under the laws of the State are still in progress”. Finally, Judges Mensah and Wolfrum made the very important point that prompt release applications should be made at an early stage and without undue delay as once the final judicial procedures had been exhausted “the Tribunal will have neither the competence nor the possibility to apply the prompt-release procedure under article 292”.100 Overall this separate joint opinion added nicely to the jurisprudence established by the case. This then concludes the survey of the ITLOS cases concerning prompt release and it is appropriate to draw some conclusions about them. However, before doing so it is intended to set out the parallel law in admiralty relating to how courts in ordinary civil cases deal with calculation of the bond in applications for release of arrested vessels for monies alleged to be owing.

III. Calculation of the Bond in Arrests in Admiralty Maritime Law Applications for release from detention of vessels that have been arrested by the court in allegations of monies owing have been before domestic courts of many countries for several hundreds of years. Where one party alleges that it is owed money by, or it has been caused damage by, a foreign vessel it may 98

Joint separate opinion of Judges Mensah and Wolfrum, para. 3.

99

Ibid. at para. 6.

100

Ibid. at paras 11-17. 1047


request the court to arrest the vessel provided it can show it has a right to a lien over the vessel; an action in rem. Once the vessel is arrested the owners or other interested parties may lodge a bond for its release the amount and terms of which the parties may agree or the court decides. If no bond is lodged for its release the vessel stays arrested until after the court has given final judgment in the matter. If the arresting party is successful, the vessel is sold and the monies applied to discharge the debt and if there is any balance left over it is paid to the party that lodged it. The situation is the same for cargo. The test for calculation of the amount of the bond is the subject of this section of this chapter. It is not feasible to canvass the law in all relevant countries but sufficient will be mentioned to show that there is a general consensus of this established jurisprudence. It is the author’s suggestion that this jurisprudence could usefully be taken into account by the ITLOS judges in deciding prompt release cases. The English courts currently apply the principle that adequate security for the release of a vessel is to be calculated as a sum sufficient to meet the plaintiff ’s “reasonably arguable best case” in relation to the ship or cargo the subject of the lien plus interest thereon plus costs.101 The law in other common law countries, such as Australia,102 New Zealand103 and Canada,104 is the same. The steps involved are to note the amount of the claim and add any interest likely to be ordered between the debt being incurred and judgment and any costs likely to be awarded, with the total sum amounting to the bond. The parties can agree on the form of the bond or failing that the court will take any evidence offered and hear argument and then make an order. The form of the bond is usually monies lodged with the court, an acceptable letter of credit, a bank guarantee 101

See cases such as The “Bazios 3” [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 101 and The Moschanthy [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 37. The major text books all support this test; see Hill, C. Maritime Law, 2003, LLP, p. 119 (“sufficient security to cover the amount of his claim with interest and costs on the basis of his reasonably best arguable case”), citing The Moschanthy [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 37; and see to like effect Meeson, N. Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice, 3rd edn, 2003, LLP, pp. 143, 145; Jackson, D. Enforcement of Maritime Claims, 2005, LLP, pp. 425, 432.

102

Examples of the application of these principles include The Owners of the Ship “Carina” v. The Owners or Demise Charterers of the Ship “MSC Samia” [1997] 1115 FCA (24 October 1997, unreported, Tamberlin J.); Morlines Maritime Agency Ltd v. Skulptor Vuchetich [1997] 858 FCA (29 August 1997, unreported, Tamberlin J.); Freshpac Machinery Pty Ltd and Lacteos de Poblet S.A. v. The Ship “Joana Bonita” No. NG594 of 1994, FED No. 661/94 (16 September 1994, unreported, Sheppard J.).

103

A New Zealand case in which this principle has been endorsed is The “Clarabelle” [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 479 (NZCA).

104

A Canadian case in which the principle has been endorsed is Mr and Mrs Stephen Striebal v. Sovereign Yachts (Canada) Inc and “The Chairman” [2002] FCT 925 (30 August 2002) (unreported, per Hargrave P.).

1048


or some such similar enforceable security. The vessel can then be released to go about its lawful business and the parties can subsequently litigate over who is entitled to the security thus established. In summary, this “reasonably arguable best case” test is an excellent test and is widely used in experienced admiralty law countries because it results, as one court put it, in a sufficient bond to “cover the amount of the claim, the amount of any interest that might be recoverable and the amount of any costs”.105 If there is any security already held then its value is deducted from the amount of the bond. Extending this discussion to look at some European countries one notes that in Belgium if the parties cannot reach an agreement on the appropriate amount of security then the court will fix the amount as being the amount of the claim plus interest and costs.106 In Denmark the security offered must be sufficient to cover the amount claimed, interest due and payable as well as probable costs of the arrest, validation proceedings and the legal proceedings for recovery.107 In Germany and in Italy the general rule is that the amount of security is to be equal to the amount of the claim plus costs.108 No direct assessment is made of the merits of the claim or of the financial resources of the defendant but the court always has a discretion which is why it decides what is a “reasonably arguable” claim and the reasonably likely amount of interest and of the costs. To decide what is “reasonable” the court hears argument, accepts evidence and then makes a considered decision. An important upper limit is that the security is not to exceed the value of the vessel (and/or cargo) the subject of the lien109 because, after all, the purpose of the security is to replace the arrested ship or cargo. It may be accepted, therefore, that the “reasonably arguable best case” test is widely accepted in commercial maritime law as the amount for a reasonable bond or other financial security. The United Kingdom and most of the other European major maritime nations are signatories to the 1952 Brussels Convention on the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships.110 Australia and New Zealand are not, but they give effect to most of its provisions. Under the 1952 Convention a ship is entitled to release on the provi-

105

The “Polo II” [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 115 at 119; See also The “Gulf Venture” (1984) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 445 at p. 449.

106

Berlingieri, Francesco Berlingieri on Arrest of Ships: A Commentary on the 1952 and 1999 Arrest Conventions, 4th edn, 2006, CMI Informa, p. 222.

107

Ibid.

108

Ibid. at 224.

109

Art. 4(2) of the 1999 Convention and see Berlingieri, supra, pp. 237-238.

110

The Brussels Convention came into force on 24 February 1956 and has since been the subject of either ratification or accession by 70 different countries. A list of current State Parties may be found through the website of the Comité Maritime International, <www. comitemaritime.org/ratific/brus/bru12.html>. 1049


sion of “sufficient bail or other security”.111 The 1999 International Convention on the Arrest of Ships has the phrase “sufficient security”112 but has provided a guide to its interpretation by specifying that it is not to exceed the value of the arrested ship.113 (It is dealing here with arrest of ships, but similar principles also apply to cargo). It should be mentioned that the 1999 Convention has not attracted much support, although the number of ratifications and accessions is steadily working towards the ten needed for it to come into force.114 It is now convenient to summarise and to draw some conclusions from what has been set out above in this chapter.

IV. Conclusions The chapter has looked at the decisions that the majority judges of ITLOS have made concerning the prompt release of vessels from detention, as provided under LOS Convention Articles 292 and 73, and also at what Judge Mensah has decided in each case. Readers will have seen that the first major case, the Saiga No. 1 in 1997 established the basic principles for the cases that followed. However, there were some differences amongst the judges and Judge Mensah went to some trouble to make the point that the Tribunal should not enter into the merits of the case except to gain a concept of the possible amount of the fines and other financial detriments that may be sought in the amount of any bond. In the subsequent cases the Tribunal gradually built on this initial jurisprudence. In the Camouco, the Monte Confurco and the Volga the earlier principles were consolidated and new points established. By the time of the Juno Trader decision in 2004 it can be said that the Tribunal had established some reasonable certainty about the principles applicable to the calculation of the amount of the bond in these prompt release cases. That this jurisprudence is well on the way to being established is a sufficient basis, therefore, on which to attempt to draw some conclusions. The first conclusion is that the amount of the bond or financial security, which of course has to be reasonable, will be fixed at a sum that will provide an adequate amount if the arresting State is successful in court but the vessel, the catch and any crew charged with offences are no longer in its power to enforce against them. This amount should cover a reasonable sum for the likely fines

111

1952 Brussels Convention on the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships, art. 5.

112

1999 International Convention on the Arrest of Ships, art. 4(1).

113

Ibid. art. 4(2). It comes into force six months after the 10th ratification or accession.

114

See the list of States to have ratified or acceded to the 1999 Convention on the UNCTAD website .

1050


relating to the vessel and any crew charged, to which is added the value of the vessel and catch if the arresting State law allows for their confiscation. It is not expressly stated by any of the ITLOS judgments, but it can be inferred that in appropriate cases to this amount may be added any likely interest115 or costs116of arrest, lawyers, ship keeping, etc. This will be reduced by the amount of any security that the arresting State already holds, such as the value obtained from sale of the bunker fuel, the catch or any bail that has already been lodged. This bond will not cover an amount for any breach of extra conditions imposed by the arresting State that go beyond the precise wording allowed under articles 292 and 73. A second conclusion is that this test laid down by ITLOS sits reasonably comfortably with the admiralty maritime law test for the bond amount; namely, the reasonably arguable best case test. The differences between the approach of ITLOS in establishing a reasonable bond and the admiralty maritime law courts of various countries are small. ITLOS takes into account the seriousness of the charges only to arrive at the likely amount of any fines and, in this regard, there is a little confusion in some of the judgments between issues going to penalty and issues going to fix the amount of the bond. Only the latter is relevant in prompt release cases but the two issues do overlap as the court cannot decide on the seriousness of the charges, and therefore to fix a likely maximum fine, without looking at all of the relevant circumstances. In comparing the two tests it should be noted that the ITLOS situation goes beyond that for the ordinary admiralty maritime law situation, in that ITLOS has also to take into account likely fines whereas the admiralty maritime situation is guided by the amount that the arresting party is claiming. In both situations, however, there are the usual skills required by a judge in assessing what is reasonable. A third conclusion is that the terms for the form of the bond are moulded for the individual case. Basically, those terms should ensure that the monies will be easily and promptly available to the arresting State if it succeeds in its allegations. A fourth conclusion is that the applicant , the flag State of the detained vessel, must establish its right to bring the application (its locus standii) but this will not be destroyed by the device of the arresting State asserting that there is an automatic forfeiture on the allegation, in effect, of the offence. The Tribunal will insist on “elementary considerations of humanity and due process of law”.117 In countries such as Australia, where the domestic legislation purports to

115

See the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (1999), para. 172.

116

The Juno Trader case, para. 103 and the ITLOS Statutes art. 34 (unless otherwise decided by the Tribunal each party shall bear its own costs).

117

The Juno Trader case, para. 77. 1051


automatically forfeit the vessel and catch before any trial and conviction,118 this cannot be relied upon to assert that the ownership of the vessel has changed to Australian and that, for some reason, the flag State therefore has no jurisdiction to bring the application. In conclusion it can be said that the ITLOS judges are to be congratulated on steadily building up this stable and fairly clear jurisprudence in the prompt release cases under LOS Convention articles 292 and 73. A little more clarity in some judgments would help but the Tribunal has come a long way since its first case. In achieving this outcome, Judge Mensah can rightly claim his share of the credit in so doing, both in his judgments and in his paper to the ITLOS conference in 2006.119

118

Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), secs 84 and 106. This issue was broadly canvassed by V. Vantz in his article mentioned above, note 1.

119

See above, note 3.

1052

PART IV

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES Charles E. Di Leva

W

e remain without a high degree of political consensus on a number of the great environmental challenges of the day, despite the scientific consensus on many key environmental threats. In some cases, even where political consensus exists, we remain without adequate funding to address these threats. It is therefore disappointing that the political and financial impasse to address some of these threats occurs at a time not only of potentially massive environmental harm, but also at a time when the effects of globalisation provide decision-makers with better information than ever before. The difficulty in attaining consensus when facing the potentially dire consequences of global warming was evident in the recent argument before the US Supreme Court concerning whether the US Environmental Protection Agency should be required to regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant that causes global warming.1 The lawyer representing the US Environmental Protection Agency stated as follows: “After carefully considering the issue the nation’s expert agency in environmental matters concluded that Congress has not authorized it to embark on the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions to address global climate change. And that even if it has, now is not the time to exercise such authority, in light of the substantial scientific uncertainty surrounding global climate change and the ongoing studies designed to address those uncertainties.”2 Needless to say, those States that brought the lawsuit against the US Environmental Protection Agency took a different stance, noting that there was enough

1

Massachusetts, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al. (US Supreme Court No. 05-1120, 29 November 2006), <www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts. html>.

2

Id. at 25.


IV. Environmental Law

scientific certainty to act, and that the agency “ignored all of the indications pointing toward endangerment”.3 Often, even where we have consensus, we have moral conflict over whether and how to proceed. The field of biotechnology also faces such conflicts. At the 2005 annual meeting of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, a gathering of international agricultural specialists, Norman Borlaug, the Nobel Prize winner and father of the green revolution, noted that the world would not be able to feed itself without the use of biotechnology. Yet, outside the conference venue, Mexican farmers protested because of their fear that bio-engineered corn from US producers would threaten their way of life, and their health. An example of international institutions failing to come to consensus on the same issue arose in the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) recent Dispute Panel ruling on genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The dispute panel determined that the Convention on Biological Diversity, of which 188 countries are Parties, and the Biosafety Protocol, which is specifically developed by the international community to address GMOs, were not relevant to the analysis under the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The reasons are methodically laid out, and logical, but leave one somewhat ill at ease with the overall coherence of the international system. Not to mention dissatisfied, if one were hoping for a review by the Panel concerning the safety of GMOs. Within development agencies professionals often struggle with differing environmental and developmental viewpoints. Some environmental economists believe that decisions about development undervalue environmental services. Other classical economists consider it essential to focus first on growth, as did industrialised countries, because they contend that only after adequate growth will it be possible to focus on the environment. Some of these advocates refer to the theory of the “Kuznet curve” for support. This theory posits that domestic environmental indicators improve once domestic economic wealth takes hold. At the same time, some studies claim the Kuznet curve is not substantiated when it comes to protecting critical environmental values that can be irreparably harmed, such as biodiversity impact, endangered species that face extinction, and climate change. Protection of the environment constantly challenges traditional notions of pro-growth development, despite progress on how we look at those traditional notions and development of so-called “win-win” opportunities. This note briefly identifies some of the key global environmental challenges, and then provides ideas on how an international financial institution like the World Bank can help address them.

3

Id. at 54-55.

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International Approaches to Global Environmental Challenges

I. Challenges 1. Addressing Poverty If China were ever to match the US for per-capita ownership of cars, or consumption of beef, or fish, the world’s total supply of each of these would need to roughly double. How will we be able to raise the living standards of over 1 billion people who live on less than USD 1 each day if such resource pressures continue to mount? Half the world – nearly three billion people – lives on less than USD 2 a day. As it stands, even without the tremendous growth in emerging economies such as China and India, when the North requires exports from the lands of developing countries for their own sustenance, these export demands are often also unsustainable. The water necessary for meat breeding that is increasingly pushing back the Amazon forest is reported to be about 190 gallons per animal per day, or ten times what a normal Indian family is supposed to use in one day. Overall, animal farms use nearly 40 per cent of the world’s total grain production. In the US, nearly 70 per cent of grain production is fed to livestock.4 With such consumption underway, in some parts of the world, poverty is on the decline. Yet, the backdrop of this global growth portrays global inequity. Today, 20 per cent of the world’s people in the highest-income countries account for 86 per cent of total private consumption expenditures – the poorest 20 per cent a miniscule 1.3 per cent.5 Just a few hundred millionaires now have as much wealth as the world’s poorest 2.5 billion people. The world’s three richest people have greater wealth than the GDP of the poorest 48 nations. This growing inequality of wealth does not bode well for sustainability. The poor are often forced to carry out environmentally damaging land-use practices. While poor developing countries do not lose land to suburban sprawl at the same rate as the US (one million acres a year); slash-and-burn agriculture continually depletes their soils. Yet, how do we ask them to curtail these practices when around a billion people suffer from hunger and 2-3.5 billion people have a serious nutritional deficiency? The inability of the poor to have access to clean water and sanitation is also a severe environmental health threat in the 21st century. The Millennium Development Goals challenge us to meet a target for 2015 of reducing by half the more than one billion people without access to sanitation and clean water. In this way, the development community can address diseases carried in water that are responsible for 80 per cent of illnesses and deaths in developing countries, killing

4

V. Shiva, Stolen Harvest, 2000, at 70-71.

5

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis, 2006. 1057


a child every eight seconds. More than five million people die from waterborne diseases each year – ten times the number killed in wars around the globe. Despite these shortages for the poor, global water consumption rose six-fold between 1900 and 1995 – more than double the rate of population growth. Perhaps most daunting in this effort to curtail poverty is the sheer growth of human population.6 Statistics from the US Census Bureau demonstrate that the world’s population will reach over 9 billion by 2050. This represents a doubling over just a hundred years. What changes in policies will this require to enable development to become sustainable? 2. Addressing Climate Change To address climate change, policy-makers face similar decisions to those when addressing poverty. Both challenges force consideration of environmental and social justice. One key example of this issue is that the US, with just one-twentieth of the global population, has contributed one-fourth of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.7 The impacts of climate change are clearly falling disproportionately on the poor. Whether one agrees with the novelist Michael Crichton, who debunks much of climate change science, or the National Academy of Sciences, American Meteorological Society and American Geophysical Union who contend that it is real – the adverse impacts of severe weather are hundredfold more likely to damage the poor than the rich. The mudslides in Guatemala, the impact of hurricane Mitch on Honduras, the tsunami’s disproportionate devastation of shanty homes in Sabah, and the impact of hurricane Katrina on the Ninth Ward in New Orleans all depict the degree to which the poor live and suffer in the most exposed environments. Indeed, during the 1990s (before Katrina) climate change affected an average of 200 million inhabitants per year in the less developed countries and only one million in the developed countries. Compounding the unequal distribution of impacts, on a per capita basis, poor countries consume only 5 per cent of the modern energy services consumed by wealthy (OECD) countries. Nearly 2.4 billion people use traditional biomass fuels – wood, agricultural residues and dung – for cooking and heating, and nearly 1.6 billion do not have access to electricity. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), if these poor are to have access to clean electricity we need USD 300 billion per year from today through to 2030. At the same time, the world will need almost 60 per cent more energy in 2030 than in 2002. Unfortunately for those concerned with climate change, fossil fuels will have to be used to meet most of these needs.

6

US Census Bureau, Global Population Profile, 2002, at 11.

7

S.M. Enzler, Environmental Economics and Environmental Policy, Lecture Notes, March-April 2005.

1058


In this light, what will happen when China and India’s hundreds of millions of farmers move to the cities, or get cars, or link up to a coal-fired power grid? Each week, China and India complete a total of three energy-generating facilities at approximately 1,000 megawatts each. Two of these are coal, the other likely to be hydro, or natural gas, or even more likely in the future, nuclear. (Indeed, China has 300 large hydro facilities planned.) In 2005, China commissioned 66 gigawatts (GW) of new power plants, of which 48 GW were coal-fired. It is critical to note that the developing world’s energy use will increase more than eightfold between 2000 and 2050. This increase is underway.8 In the first half of 2003, China’s car sales rose by 82 per cent compared with the same period in 2002. Its demand for oil is expected to double in 20 years. In contrast with India, as of 2000, the average American consumed 200 times more gasoline than the average Indian. Yet, in India, sports utility vehicles account for 10 per cent of all vehicle purchases, and could soon overtake car sales. In addition, use of oil in the US has increased by almost 2.7 million barrels a day – more oil than the daily current use of both India and Pakistan. According to the World Meteorological Organisation and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, at current rates, greenhouse gas emissions are projected to be a factor of 1.6 to 3.5 above present levels by 2050. Based on this data, many agree that environmental concerns and economic growth are on a collision course. Chinese research facilities have announced that they face 400,000 premature deaths each year from urban air pollution.9 While a solution could be a mobile system to replace dirty coal plants until new ones are built, Chinese planners do not believe they can afford the shut down costs that would occur even during the short period of time it would take to take the existing plant off-grid. As of today, coal, oil and gas, in that order, represent 60 to 80 per cent of energy supplies for developing and economies in transition. Because of these supplies, policy and technological decisions taken today will have a profound impact on development paths for 40 to 60 years. For that reason, policy-makers need to decide on the right tools for achieving the needed changes. Is the right tool a regulatory framework that imposes a cap on greenhouse gas emissions? As the argument before the US Supreme Court demonstrated, at this time, the US Environmental Protection Agency contends it does not have the authority to establish one without congressional authorisation. Prominent business leaders in the oil industry have been skeptical of such a need, at least until very recently. While some portray the industry as changing, the new head of Exxon called “unfortunate” US President Bush’s comment that the US was addicted to

8

IEA, UNFCC and USDOE/CAIT.

9

Press Release, United Nations Foundation, 5 August 2002. 1059


oil.10 When the Vice Chairman of Chevron spoke at the World Bank during World Bank Energy Week, he emphasised the need for global energy security, and for conservation.11 But he also noted that “[a]llowing market signals to prevail will do more than a raft of well-intended but counterproductive regulations getting in the way of developing energy resources”. Also, when asked whether security and conservation would be enhanced through regulation, he stated that such regulation was not necessary as the market price would be sufficient. People will indeed shift to smaller automobile models if the price of gas goes up, but the full impact of that will be minimal in terms of the global needs and because of the volume of oil reserves. Indeed, at current rates and supplies of fossil fuels, CO2 emissions will increase by 2050 relative to 2000 by a factor of 2.3 to 5.2. Thus, one of the great challenges is to find a way to entice the major economic powers, both current and emerging, toward some form of policy framework, even if it is not the current Kyoto model. There must also be powerful incentives for China, India and Brazil to reduce their emissions. There seems to be scientific consensus that even if CO2 stabilises at 550 parts per million, mean temperatures will increase by approximately 3 degrees Celsius. However, at this time, the price of fossil fuel is unlikely to lead to the lower output necessary to achieve stabilisation. It would seem that environmental threats from a warmer world must become driving factors. If governments can push the private sector to develop new technologies to enhance public safety, they can also address greenhouse gas emissions through environmental regulation. 3. Addressing Habitat and Species Loss The World Conservation Union’s Red List of Threatened Species states that more than 12,000 species (out of 40,000 assessed) face some extinction risk, including one bird in eight, 13 per cent of the world’s flowering plants and a quarter of all mammals. Nearly all face a dwindling habitat.12 Within 15 years, about a fifth of central Africa’s forests will disappear, according to some estimates. Indonesia is losing an area about the size of Massachusetts each year due to logging, most of it illegal.13 Even where the logging is legal, making way for plantations or farms, it is having devastating environmental effects, while releasing greenhouse gases from burning.

10

J. Mouauwad, “The New Face of an Oil Giant”, New York Times, March 30, 2006.

11

Remarks of Peter Robertson, Vice Chairman of Chevron, World Bank Energy Week, 6 March 2006.

12

IUCN, 2006 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species and J. Loh (ed.), Living Planet Report, 2000.

13

“Down in the woods – The logging trade”, The Economist, 25 March 2006, at 73-75.

1060


At the same time, 52 per cent of fish stocks are fully exploited, which means that they are being fished at their maximum biological capacity. Another 24 per cent are overexploited, depleted or recovering from depletion.14 The Georges Bank fishery off New England and Canada was for centuries the richest fishing ground in the world. It collapsed in the late 20th century.15 The loss of arable soil also threatens global food production. The so-called “Dead (hypoxic) Zone” of the Mississippi River that also flows into the Gulf of Mexico, is caused by fertiliser and nutrient runoff. The zone now covers almost 8,000 square miles of water. Within that spatial range, the average volume of dissolved oxygen is a mere two parts per million.16 The result is a devastated fishery that once produced boundless quantities of protein. In some cases, invasive species, a product of globalised trade, pose the greatest threat to native plants and animals. Invading non-indigenous species in the US cause major environmental damages and economic losses adding up to more than USD 138 billion per year. There are approximately 50,000 species considered foreign to their current residence, and the number is increasing. In fact, roughly 42 per cent of the species on the Threatened or Endangered Species Lists are at risk primarily because of non-indigenous species.17 4. Institutional Challenges – Public and Private Multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) and developed country policy-makers must face the fact that they are no longer as able as they were in the past to influence public policy given that private sector foreign direct investment has become larger and has potentially greater impact. At the same time, this private capital is rarely oriented directly toward the poor and is concentrated in a few major emerging markets. This change in influence affects the ability of MFIs to address the challenges discussed in this chapter and has posed greater responsibility on the private sector to successfully embrace this responsibility. In some developing countries, development policy influence is lessened for a different reason – that some developing countries now have adequate financial reserves that enable them to avoid borrowing from MFIs. As a result, they can also choose to ignore the policy choices that can mitigate the environmental and social

14

<usunrome.usmission.gov/UNIssues/Fisheries/docs/a5030902.htm>.

15

M.J. Fogarty and S.A. Murawski, Do Marine Protected Areas Really Work?, Oceanus Magazine, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2004, available at <www.whoi.edu/cms/files/dfino/2005/4/ v43n2-fogarty_2402.pdf>.

16

NASA, Mississippi Dead Zone, 10 August 2004, available at <www.nasa.gov/centers/ goddard/news/topstory/2004/0810deadzone.html>.

17

D. Pimentel, L. Lach, R. Zuniga & D. Morrison, Environmental and Economic Costs Associated with Non-Indigenous Species in the United States, 12 June 1999, available at <www.news. cornell.edu/releases/Jan99/species_costs.html>. 1061


impact of project finance. This poses a new challenge for emerging institutions in these countries. In some cases, such as in the national environmental agency of China, officials are developing bold new plans, often surpassing developed countries in their ambition to develop new laws and plans. While there are positive aspects to the fact that developing countries have grown at a pace that enables them to be more self-sufficient, it would be unfortunate to move away from a range of positive environmental and social measures that MFIs have helped to develop. It would also be unfortunate to face global environmental challenges by adopting the approach that modern voluntarism can suffice as the answer. The times abound with the promises of major private and industrial actors to conform to sustainability goals. Indeed, the UN Global Compact posed a challenge to the UN family to join with the private sector to pledge environmentally responsible behaviour. A similar challenge awaits the Equator Banks, commercial banks who provide up to 80 per cent of global project finance.18 Yet, today we see the increase in adverse environmental indicators that have been only briefly outlined above. Even on the social level, while global growth continues at a healthy pace, global inequality has only increased.

II. Solutions to Some of These Challenges Can multilateral institutions such as the World Bank solve the world’s problems? Not alone. The Bank lands on average USD 20 billion a year, yet as noted, energy needs for the poor alone are USD 300 billion per year. Even if MFIs could address these needs, they address only some developing countries. Nevertheless, tools to solve challenges are evolving. A small sampling of them follows. The World Bank faced an environmental and social challenge in a precedent-setting loan to Chad, the world’s fourth poorest country. In light of the environmental and social impact of oil development in Ogoni land in Nigeria, the Bank helped set up, through a new law, a transparent social fund revenue-sharing mechanism for local communities, extensive environmental and social management plans, and oil spills plans. Unfortunately, the government decided to override the revenue-sharing arrangement after the price of oil more than doubled, and renewed armed conflict took place. They contended that they needed the funds for security, as opposed to education and social needs of the poor. Nevertheless, it was agreed that this new approach was a step in the right direction for development. Similarly, the Bank helped convince project developers of the Nam Theun II hydro project, the largest financial investment ever in Lao PDR, that the project should include extensive village livelihood schemes and that the project should

18

<www.ifc.org/equatorprinciples>.

1062


not go forward without an environmental mitigation scheme protecting an area that could replace the area that would be inundated. The Bank also worked with the government to develop Lao PDR’s first transparent revenue-reporting scheme. These transparent, revenue-sharing practices are now more broadly practised following the World Bank Group sponsored Extractive Industries Review (EIR).19 Consistent with the EIR, the Bank has also put in place a new Indigenous Peoples policy20 that requires it not to finance activity affecting indigenous peoples unless there has been free prior informed consultation leading to the indigenous peoples’ broad community support. To the extent that some governments may have chafed at the fact that they have to apply environmental and social policies of different international institutions, international financial agencies have issued the Paris Declaration on Harmonisation to make the policies consistent, and more importantly, to embark on a process by which they can use acceptable local systems, provided that where they are weak, the Bank can help put in place the capacity to make them function. Through this “Use of Country Systems”,21 the Bank can help finance the “implementation” that has been so often lacking in many parts of the developing world. Another example of how to work toward the improvement of local systems took place in Bank projects seeking to help address the recent rural unrest in China. In China today, extensive relocation of rural farmers has been taking place so that their land can be used to make way for economic development zones. Thus, in a series of urban development projects, the Bank is helping Chinese officials set up mechanisms whereby individual farmers can have their own formal rights to new urban property, and is working to arrange compensation for the land they lived on to be paid to the farmers directly, not through collectives.22 World Bank efforts in China have also sought to help address global warming. The Bank began with very small-scale energy efficiency projects, but recently

19

<web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/0,,contentMDK:2030668 6~menuPK:592071~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336930,00.html>.

20

.

21

<web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/ 0,,contentMDK:20453156~pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184 ,00.html>.

22

The taking of farmland for private enterprise zones in China raises an interesting analogy to case of public land taken for private purpose in the City of New London, Connecticut, upheld against the challenge of homeowners who were forced to give up their homes for commercial development. This action was upheld in the recent US Supreme Court opinion in Kelo v. City of New London (2005), see <www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/04slipopinion. html>. 1063


completed a purchase of greenhouse gas emissions for close to USD 1 billion. In this project, the World Bank, on behalf of carbon fund participants that the Bank manages, will purchase emission reductions from the incineration of HFC-23, one of the world’s most potent greenhouse gases. Revenue for this arrangement will also go to establish a Sustainable Development Fund, which can help finance additional clean energy projects in China. Similar “umbrella funds” are now being unveiled in a number of countries, bundling up large volumes of projects, including the prospect of modernising entire cities, and putting on the carbon market opportunities to buy the reduced emissions coming from entirely new municipal efficient energy supplies. In addition to collaboration with international institutions, China has shown willingness to seek solutions to its pollution problems on its own. By 2008, China will have a more efficient car fleet than the US when its new fuel efficiency standards have been fully implemented. Also, since January 2007, a new law on renewable resources has come into effect, aimed at ensuring that by 2020, 10-12 per cent of the country’s total energy mix will come from renewable resources. What effect will the US reluctance to engage in the current Kyoto system have on addressing global warming? Perhaps it will be addressed if the global community can agree upon a set of technologies that should be applied. In this light, it is worth recalling the success of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol arranged for funding to help reduce and eliminate up to 90 different types of ozone depleting substances. Ozone is the most important trace gas in the earth atmosphere. It succeeded because US and British scientists discovered the technology that could achieve this objective, and that would enable the substance switch to take place without great economic hardship. Perhaps there is a need to develop incentives for a new international funding mechanism such as that for the Montreal Protocol in order for scale production of global warming technology (such as “carbon capture and storage”). Unfortunately, in a number of countries, clean carbon technology is not fully financially viable without internalising at least some of the environmental externalities into the price of energy. The lack of financial viability is exacerbated by fossil fuel subsidies that hide the true cost of fossil fuel to the tune of about USD 250 billion per year. Thus, without government intervention to address these distortions, the use of environmental voluntary measures and price may not be enough to achieve the goal. For this reason, many contend that without a “stable” regulatory framework beyond the current commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol of 2012, it will be difficult to attract the scale of private finance necessary to have the have major impact on the amount of fossil fuel currently projected for use. Perhaps such a framework could be based on a variety of common targets, technologies or policies. If it is developed, as with the case

1064


of the Montreal Protocol, or the domestic acid rain programme in the US, the programme must be long-term, predictable and credible. One “win-win” arrangement to help preserve the natural habitat and also reduce greenhouse gases is the World Bank-established BioCarbon Fund.23 This fund finances projects that support sequestration or conservation of carbon in forests, ecosystems and some agricultural settings. The projects support activities that seek to achieve land use, land use change and forestry activities that can generate emission reductions units which the participants may wish to accumulate to help address global warming. The World Bank and other international agencies also address depleted fisheries and forest resources by supporting labelling and certification for timber and fisheries products such as with the Forest Stewardship Council and Marine Stewardship Council. Each Council helps arrange a process whereby forest operations and species-specific fisheries can be certified as environmentally and socially sound. Labels can be affixed to the products for consumer review and choice. Some labelling provisions have been challenged as an interference with the free flow of trade, or act as disguised restrictions on trade. This view is unfortunate, interferes with consumer choice and forces governments to rely on traditional means of enforcement to prevent illegal logging and fishing. The traditional solution of “command and control” enforcement at the Georges Bank, where governments have put 20,000 square km off limits, has been successful in helping species return, and fishing restrictions in other areas have proved successful. This has given greater confidence to scientists that marine-protected areas can help regenerate threatened species. As a result, some claim that setting aside (and policing) 10-20 per cent of the world’s oceans are enough to ensure full regeneration of ocean-dwelling species. The World Bank Group’s private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), has a major role in developing solutions that are influencing foreign direct investment. IFC’s key role in the launch by the so-called “Equator Banks” in June 2004 of the Equator Principles has created a new approach to socially responsible investment by these influential banks. Financial investors have also been influenced. Socially responsible investment firms have pledged to invest worldwide in companies that they consider to operate sustainably, with one of them24 reporting that 2005 was the first time more than half of investors who did not hold socially responsible funds are now interested in investing in them. This new attitude may make it easier for corporations to pursue new

23

<web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/0,,contentMDK:2 0276738~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244381,00.html>.

24

Calvert Funds states that it offers mutual funds with a view to help build sustainability and quality of life. One strategy integrates social or environmental criteria into financial analysis. Available at <www.calvert.com/funds.html> (last visited 2 December 2006). 1065


environmentally sound technologies. In this light, the US-based firm, General Electric (GE) issued its first “Citizenship Report” that looks at environment, social and labour issues within the company and their 3,000 suppliers. GE did so in part by using the Global Reporting Initiative, a reporting methodology used by many companies committed to sustainable operations. New inspection mechanisms at international financial institutions have also been unrolled as a solution to the claim that they are not suitably accountable for the impact of their projects. These mechanisms, such as the World Bank Inspection Panel, serve to help ensure that projects comply with environmental and social policies, and follow modern, sound, public consultation practices. Due to the advocacy work within and outside these institutions, each international financial institution now has such a mechanism. Similarly, Human Rights Commissions have expanded their realm of investigation and have now addressed the loss of lands by poor indigenous tribes in binding decisions. US federal courts are engaged in addressing whether multinational corporations have responsibility for actions overseas that allegedly harm environmental interests, or infringe on human rights. These areas of litigation and advocacy may also further the possibilities of environmental and social justice. In conclusion, while the global environmental challenges remain prominent, the understanding of their nature has grown, as has the range of possible solutions. Now that we see this array of solutions, the key is a steady commitment of political will and financial capital. More needs to be done to ensure this commitment.

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THE IRON RHINE ARBITRATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF A PRINCIPLE OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW Christian Dominicé*

I. An Important Decision

A

rbitration has played, and still plays, a significant role in the development of international law. Some well-known arbitral awards are landmarks in the theory and the consolidation of international law. As a tribute to Judge Mensah for his contribution to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, I would like to discuss an important aspect of a recent arbitral award, one which is relevant for the theory of the sources of international law. I refer to the Iron Rhine arbitration, an award handed down on 24 May 2005 by an arbitral tribunal under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.1 The parties to the arbitration were the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The dispute related to the Iron Rhine, which is a 162 km railway line linking the port of Antwerp (Belgium) to the Rhine Basin in Germany, via the Netherlands’ provinces of Nord-Brabant and Limburg. Article XII of the Treaty of Separation of 1839 conferred on Belgium a right of transit across Dutch territory and stipulated further details concerning this right. In 1873 a Convention between Belgium and the Netherlands provided inter alia for the passage of a railway line from Antwerp to Germany through Limburg (The Iron Rhine Treaty). The railway was duly constructed and completed in 1879. From that time until World War I, the railway was used continuously2 although after

*

The author would like to thank Mr Djacoba Liva Tehindrazanarivelo, Ph.D. in International Law (GIIS), for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this text.

1

The Arbitral Tribunal was composed of Judge Rosalyn Higgins (President), Professor Guy Schrans, Judge Bruno Simma, Professor Alfred A. H. Soons and Judge Peter Tomka.

2

A Railway Convention was concluded by the two Governments in 1897 to transfer the ownership of the track to the Netherlands. That ownership had previously been transferred



the War, it was used with varying intensity. The track was destroyed during World War II and although rebuilt, only light use was made of the line, which since 1991 has not been used for through traffic between Belgium and Germany. During the 1990s, the Netherlands took certain steps to designate nature reserves in the provinces of Nord-Brabant and Limburg. For its part, the Government of Belgium indicated its interest in the reactivation of the Iron Rhine Railway. Discussions between the two Governments led to the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of March 2000 providing for the completion of certain environmental impact studies prior to any reactivation. Other aspects of the MoU gave rise to disagreement between the Parties, who decided in 2003 to submit their dispute to arbitration. The Arbitration Agreement raised three questions for determination by the Tribunal. They related: to the extent of the application of the Netherlands legislation and the decision-making power based thereon relative to the use and restoration of the historical route of the Iron Rhine Railway on Netherlands territory; to the various rights of Belgium on Netherlands territory with respect to works to be undertaken for the reactivation of the Iron Rhine Railway, as well as the right of Netherlands to require the building of underground and above-ground tunnels, diversions and the like; to the question of the costs to be borne by the Netherlands and Belgium. The most essential aspect of the Award is its contribution to the method of integrating international environment law in the decision-making process.3 It also discussed other important and interesting issues of international law.4 Of interest here is a problem of sources, namely the identification of the principles to be applied for solving the conflict between the right of transit of Belgium, as guaranteed by the Treaty of Separation, and the environmental requirements imposed by the Netherlands legislation. Dealing with the question of the interpretation of article XII of the Treaty of 1839, the Tribunal drew attention to the problem of inter-temporality in the interpretation of treaty provisions. Referring to article 31, paragraph 3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of

from the Belgian concessionaire to the Government of Belgium. 3

See V. Barral, “La sentence du Rhin de fer, une nouvelle étape dans la prise en compte du droit de l’environnement par la justice internationale”, 110 RGDIP, 2006, p. 647.

4

The question of the relationship to Community law was considered thoroughly, and also the question of whether or not limitations to territorial sovereignty should be interpreted restrictively. The discussion of the legal meaning of the MoU gave useful indications on the method to be used to identify the intention of the parties. The question of the method of interpreting treaties is given much consideration. But, above all, basic principles of international environmental law are put forward. On the relationship to EC law, see I. van Bladel, “The Iron Rhine Arbitration Case: On the Right Legal Track? An Analysis of the Award and of its Relation to the Law of the European Community”, 18 Hague Yb. Int’l L. (2005), pp. 3-22.

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The Iron Rhine Arbitration and the Emergence of a Principle of General International Law

Treaties (1969), which makes reference to “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”, it stated that international environmental law was relevant.5 Considering that particular branch of international law, the Tribunal said: “Importantly, these emerging principles now integrate environmental protection into the development process. Environmental law and the law on development stand not as alternatives but as mutually reinforcing, integral concepts, which require that where development may cause significant harm to the environment there is a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate, such harm (see paragraph 222). This duty, in the opinion of the Tribunal, has now become a principle of general international law.”6 What was the process through which the principle had emerged? Does this process correspond to one of the methods by which international law is created? These are the questions that will be dealt with in this chapter.

II. A Principle of General International Law General international law is universal international law, otherwise stated, the rules and principles of general application. These are general principles of law (Art. 38, para. 1(c)) of the ICJ Statute), as well as customary international law, including principles of international law. The principle that was identified and applied by the Tribunal, and “has now become a principle of general international law”, reads as follows: “[W]here development may cause significant harm to the environment there is a duty to prevent, or at least to mitigate, such harm ….” This principle is an integration of both the requirement to protect the environment7 and the need for development. It is a major contribution to the consolidation of

5

Para. 58: “Provisions of general international law are also applicable to the relations between the Parties, and thus should be taken into account in interpreting Article XII of the 1839 Treaty of Separation and Article IV of the Iron Rhine Treaty. Further, international environmental law has relevance to the relations between the Parties.”

6

Para. 59 and paras 121 et seq. of the Award dealt with the consequences to be drawn from the duty so formulated.

7

The Tribunal noted that “‘environment’ is broadly referred to as including air, water, land, flora and fauna, natural ecosystems and sites, human health and safety, and climate. The emerging principles, whatever their current status, make reference to conservation, management, notions of prevention and of sustainable development, and protection for future generations”. 1069


the important concept of sustainable development8 and to its concrete meaning. The principle so formulated does not directly determine the rights and obligations of States in a specific case. It is a principle which has to be applied concretely, taking into account all the circumstances, legal and factual, of the case. In the Iron Rhine arbitration, the right of transit guaranteed to Belgium had to be respected, and its reactivation and upgrading was a positive factor of development as it implied a “modal shift” from road to rail and corresponded to Belgian economic needs. However, Netherlands sovereignty and its environmental legislation had to be taken into account and that meant that specific measures, including important works (tunnels, deviations, protection against noise, and so on) were to be accepted as in conformity with the obligation of the Netherlands towards Belgium, provided they did not infringe unduly upon that State’s right of transit. The allocation of the costs was based on the principle that environmental costs must be part of the financing of a project. Of interest here is the principle as it emerged, not the merits of the case, although it is important to observe that the application of the principle did not result in a limitation or restriction of Belgium’s right, but implied important measures of environmental protection, most of them being imposed by Netherlands legislation, as well as significant costs to be apportioned. The Tribunal carefully substantiated its assertion of the above-mentioned duty to prevent or at least to mitigate the significant harm that may be caused by development. The Award referred to the development of international law relating to the environment initiated by the Stockholm Conference (1972), and then quoted Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) which provides that “environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”.9 After stressing again that “[e]nvironmental law and the law of development stand not as alternatives but as mutually reinforcing, integral concepts …”, the Tribunal stated the specific duty that, in its opinion, had become a principle of general international law. It is interesting to observe that the precise principle as formulated by the Award, appears in a broader sense in relevant international legal instruments.10 It is new as a legal principle that can be applied in a specific case.

8

Sustainable development is frequently defined as a concept, but there are now good reasons to consider it as a principle. Cf. Judge Weeramantry’s separate opinion in the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros case, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 88.

9

Text reproduced in 4 ILM (1992), p. 877.

10

Compare, for instance, this duty to prevent or at least mitigate environmental harm in the development process with the broader statement of Principle 4 of the 1992 Rio Declaration (“environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process”). See also similar statement in other international provisions, inter alia: art. 4, para. 3 of the

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This new principle takes place in the general development of international law observed so far, but the award goes a step further. In the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros judgment, which is quoted by the Tribunal, the International Court of Justice stated that “new norms and standards have been developed”, without enunciating any of them, apart from the general “need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment”. In the Iron Rhine case, a precise principle has been stated. This means that if significant harm may result from a development project, that harm must be prevented. If the project, for whatever reason, must be implemented, protective measures must be taken in order to mitigate harm (noise, safety, and so on). Furthermore, when alternative solutions exist (various routes, or a deviation), the solution that is the least detrimental to the environment must be selected. The identification of the principle was the result of a general trend in diplomatic practice to insist upon sustainable development and was reached by an intellectual and logical deduction. It was in no way a fortuitous invention of the Tribunal, but instead was merely the sound conclusion of a persistent affirmation of values.11 Sustainable development, as a concept, or even as a principle,12 has to be translated or incorporated into more concrete and practicable rules and principles. That is what the Tribunal did in enunciating the duty discussed here. In a similar vein, the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources appears to have done the same thing in the field of management of natural resources. According to article XIV of the African Convention: “1. The Contracting States shall ensure that conservation and management of natural resources are treated as an integral part of national and/or regional development plans. 2. In the formulation of all development plans, full consideration shall be given to ecological, as well as to economic and social factors. […]”

1976 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean; art. 10 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity; art. 3, para. 4 of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; para. 8 of the 2000 Malmö Ministerial Declaration of the UNEP; and art. III of the 2003 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. 11

On that respect, see the Schrijver and Weiss’ book which analyses the evolution of principles of sustainable development and tend to “demonstrate that there is ‘practice’ of sustainable development”; N. Schrijver and F. Weiss (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Principles and Practice, 2004, p. 711, at xi.

12

Cf. Judge Weeramantry’s separate opinion, supra note 8; Centre de droit international du développement durable, “Qu’est-ce que le droit du développement durable? Un essai du CDIDD”, 2005, available at <www.cisdl.org/francais/pdf/whatis_sdl.pdf>. 1071


III. The New Principle and the Sources of International Law Such an “identification” or “creation” of a new principle must be understood within the broader context of the sources of international law. If it is a new phenomenon, it has to be integrated within the general system of formation of international law in order to preserve the unity and coherence of the international legal order. The emergence of such a non-written legal principle fits within the general category of norms “spontaneously” created, which means that their legal validity is not due to a pre-existing rule.13 Among such norms are the “general principles of law” (Art. 38, para. 1(c)) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice), although they are of a different nature to the principle discussed here. “General principles of law” are, in the opinion of the present author, inherent in the very notion of law and legal order. One example is the principle of good faith.14 In the present case, the principle has just emerged to become a principle of general international law. Is there any similitude with customary international law? It is generally agreed that rules and principles of customary law grow out of practice. Practice creates law when it is uniform and constant, provided an opinio juris can be observed.15 The principle under consideration here did not emerge out of such a process. What can be called “exceptional” customary rules are those rules which are not evidenced by constant material practice, because they are frequently violated, but they are consolidated and strengthened by uniform opinio juris. The Nicaragua case16 illustrates this type of customary international law. The principle of non-use of force was recognised as a rule of customary international law primarily because it was affirmed and repeated in many important international instruments, on the basis that, when violated, the violating State is quick to argue that it was acting under an exception to the principle, thus confirming the rule’s validity. In the field of human rights, it is evident that the expressed opinion of the States – whether sincere or not – is the

13

The very notion of spontaneous law was first suggested by R. Ago in his lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law, “Science juridique et droit international”, RdC, Vol. 90 (1956-II), p. 851.

14

According to the Iron Rhine Award, good faith is a general principle of international law (para. 49). It is of course a general principle of law; cf. R. Kolb, La bonne foi en droit international public, 2000.

15

In my opinion “classical” customary law grows out of practice; opinio juris is not a constitutive element but a criterion necessary to distinguish a rule of law from a mere usage.

16

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14.

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decisive element and not actual practice.17 The true basis of such an approach is certainly the weight of moral values.18 The respect for basic human rights and the prohibition of the use of force are certainly part of a universal code of conduct based on ethical values and confirmed by important diplomatic instruments. This explains why opinio juris is the decisive element. In the same way, it is adequate to speak of a new law of fundamental values adopted by the international system,19 but it must be clear from the theoretical point of view that this process takes place within the vast realm of customary law, repetition in declaratory practice being the key factor.20 The principle discussed here did not emerge in the same way, but there is a common feature; namely, the significance of repeated declarations and statements in official instruments concerning sustainable development.21 However, the process is different. In the examples mentioned above, there was at the outset a legal proposition (the principle of non-use of force, various propositions regarding human rights). Consequently, the question was to determine if the alleged rule had been accepted as law. For the reasons already indicated, the answer was positive for the non-use of force and most of the basic human rights because of the constant and uniform assertion of those rules. The principle applied in the Iron Rhine arbitration – the duty enunciated by the Tribunal – had not been expressed as a rule and repeated in international practice.22 The key factor in the Award was the reasoning concerning sustainable development and its philosophy and definition. The principle applied could not

17

O. Schachter, “New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice”, in: Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 1996, p. 532.

18

Cf. Ch. Dominicé, “Le grand retour du droit naturel en droit des gens”, in: Mélanges en l’honneur de Jacques-Michel Grossen, 1992, p. 399.

19

Cf. L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and Value, 1995, p. 39: “This development can be explained as something new – the growth of a systemic constitutional law of fundamental values identified and adopted by the international system” (emphasis in original text).

20

On the role of opinio juris, see R. Higgins, “General Course on Public International Law”, RdC, Vol. 230 (1991-V), p. 9, at 48.

21

As indicated earlier, the Iron Rhine Award referred to several Declarations; cf. paras 58-59 of the Award.

22

One could refer here to distinctions made by D. Bodansky between “rules” and “standards”, and between “obligation” and “principle”, which “cuts across … important aspects of environmental norms”; D. Bodansky, “Rules vs. Standards in International Environmental Law”, 98 ASIL Proceedings (2004), p. 275. According to this author, “Rules define in advance what conduct is permissible and impermissible. Standards, in contrast, set forth more open-ended tests, whose application depends on the exercise of judgment or discretion […] A principle, unlike an obligation, sets forth a consideration to be used in evaluating conduct, not a form of conduct itself ”; ibid. pp. 276-277. 1073


be based on any other ground. Therefore, without expressly stating it, but by necessary implication, the Award gave to sustainable development the weight and the nature of a legal principle.23 It could be argued that it does not matter too much whether it is a “concept”,24 an “objective”,25 or a principle of international law. This is true to some extent because the important factor is its influence on the behaviour of States and other actors.26 However, there are two elements which are to be considered. First, if it is a legal principle, it certainly gives weight to emerging principles27 which are on their way to becoming legal norms. Secondly, when a project is at variance with the essence of sustainable development it must be considered illegal. The international responsibility of the author would be engaged. Since it is a principle that cannot be applied in a specific case without further elaboration, the role of a tribunal, when facing the task of reconciling development with the protection of the environment, is to state or formulate the rule or principle it sees fit to apply.28

23

In the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros case, sustainable development was described as a “concept” but, as pointed out by the Court, some articles of the Treaty of 1977 offered a basis for measures protecting the environment.

24

As the ICJ described it in the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros judgment.

25

The Doha Declaration describes sustainable development as an objective; cf. art. 6, reproduced in 41 ILM (2002), p. 746.

26

Judge Simma stated that “it is inevitable that content and contours of an integrative concept such as that of sustainable development which was endorsed as such by the world community as a whole, lacks the kind of clarity of articulation of concepts one might be accustomed to in a more limited, homogeneous group of states… Indeed, it may well have been the very lack of conceptual rigor which permitted the entire world community to embrace it”; B. Simma, “Foreword”, in N. Schrijver and F. Weiss (eds), op. cit. note 11, at vi. See also A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, 1999, mainly their analysis of the influence of sustainable development in the evolution on international law and policy on the protection of the environment, at 5.

27

This expression appears in the Iron Rhine arbitration. It is also frequently used in practice and by doctrine. See for instance Ph. Sands, “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development”, 65 BYIL (1994), p. 304 et seq.; M.-C. Cordonier Segger and A. Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices and Prospects, 2004, at 5.

28

During the discussion of rules to be applied by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the solution of disputes brought before it, one member of the Advisory Committee of Jurists rightly held that concerning “rules which were not … yet positive law … it was precisely the Court’s duty to develop law, to ‘ripen’ customs and principles universally recognised, and to crystallise them into positive rules”; Procès-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists (1920), Annexe No. 3, p. 294; quoted by A. Pellet, “Article 38”, in A. Zimmermann et al., The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, 2006, p. 686.

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It can be said that when a very broad, basic principle becomes part of international law – and sustainable development has acquired such a status – its application occurs in two steps. First, its existence is observed and confirmed. The second step is to formulate in more concrete terms the rules or principles which flow from it and must be applied. In the Iron Rhine case, the arbitral tribunal made a sound and convincing application of the principle of sustainable development in two steps. First, without spelling it out expressis verbis, the Tribunal recognised sustainable development as a principle of international law. This emerges from the Tribunal’s reasoning on the need to reconcile, or integrate, economic development and protection of the environment. This is a general obligation which finds its expression in the concept of sustainable development, a concept that has become part of general international law – thus a principle. The second step was to spell out the more precise obligation which was to be applied. The duty referred to by the Tribunal was nothing entirely new. The principle of prevention has been enunciated as one of the main principles of international environmental law. The Tribunal was, however, aware of Belgium’s right of transit and of the need for development. The duty to prevent was thus modified to become a duty to mitigate. Various measures, as prescribed by the Netherlands legislation, were accepted as being in accordance with that purpose. The principle of general international law as enunciated by the Tribunal came out of the application of the principle of sustainable development in a situation where prevention (i.e. the prohibition of the restoration) was both legally doubtful and economically unwise. In conclusion, some observations may be made from the more general perspective of the theory of the sources of international law: (a) An obligation such as the duty stated in the Iron Rhine Award that becomes a principle of general international law acquires a legal status similar to that of customary international law. When such a principle is identified and applied, it can be considered as belonging to customary international law for the purpose of further cases where it could be applied. (b) A principle of general international law is different, in the opinion of the present author, from a general principle of law, the latter being valid as such in international law. A principle of general international law may emerge in various ways, generally through the customary process, or even the exceptional customary process, based mainly on opinio iuris in spite of non-conclusive material practice (i.e. the principle of non-use of force). (c) A different process is illustrated by the Iron Rhine arbitration. Some principles of general international law may be a logical and necessary consequence flowing from a broader concept. When this concept becomes legally 1075


binding, the more detailed principles necessary for its implementation become principles of general international law but only under certain conditions. Not only must it be a logical deduction from the broader principle, it must also incorporate notions or principles already accepted in the field of international law concerned. The principle identified and applied in the Iron Rhine case was a logical and necessary legal precept for implementing, in the circumstances of the case, the principle of sustainable development, and it incorporated, and was an adaptation of, the principle of prevention already accepted in the international law of the environment. If such strict conditions are not respected, there is a risk of arbitrary decisions, therefore of incoherence in judicial and arbitral practice. The Iron Rhine arbitration is a valuable illustration of creative decision-making in the respect of strict methodology.

1076

THE ESTABLISHMENT, ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY: OPERATIONALISING COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY? David Freestone*

I. Introduction

T

he Global Environment Facility (GEF) was first established in a pilot phase in 1991. In the decade and a half since then, the GEF has provided over USD 6.2 billion in grants and generated over USD 20 billion in co-financing from other sources to support over 1,800 projects designed to produce global environmental benefits in 140 developing countries and countries with economies in transition.1 However, it has not been free from controversy and in 1994 was totally restructured to meet demands for a more inclusive and transparent decision-making process. This chapter will look at the origins of the GEF, the restructuring after the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and the institutional arrangements that this process put in place. It deals with the international environmental treaty regimes for which the GEF provides financial resources, and the way that it has evolved over the first fifteen years of its existence.

II. Origins The origins of the GEF can be traced back at least to a proposal by the 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the *

The views expressed in this chapter are the personal views of the author and should not be taken to represent the official views of the World Bank. He is grateful to a number of colleagues for their assistance, particularly Charles Di Leva, Atsuko Okubo, Dr Maurizio Ragazzi and Sophie Smyth. The final text is his responsibility.

1

See <www.thegef.org/What_is_the_GEF/what_is_the_gef.html>.



Bruntland Commission) which proposed the “development of a special international banking programme or facility linked to the World Bank … to finance investments in conservation projects and national strategies”.2 This idea was further supported and developed by the Washington DC based World Resources Institute as a proposal for an International Environmental Facility (IEF).3 The idea was operationalised during the 1989 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings. Professor Boisson de Chazournes reminds us that it was the French Prime Minister who, at the Board of Governors meeting, proposed the establishment of a grant-making fund devoted to addressing global environmental issues and pledged a French commitment of 900 million French francs over a three years period. The Federal Republic of Germany also pledged its support.4 The World Bank was asked to explore the potential for donor support for addressing global environmental concerns in developing countries.5 As a consequence, a series of meetings was held – culminating in Paris in November of 1990 – with potential donors, a number of developing countries and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The Paris meeting finalised a proposal for a Global Environment Facility with a commitment from donors of some 1 billion Special Drawing Rights (approximately USD 1.2 billion) over a three-year pilot phase. On March 14 the following year, the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors agreed to establish the Global Environment Trust (GET) Fund.6 In October 1991, UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank concluded a unique tripartite arrangement to cooperate in the implementation of the Facility.7 This arrangement for “Operational Cooperation under the Global

2 3

4

5

6

7

G.H. Brundtland (ed.), Our Common Future (1987), at p. 338. WRI (F. van Bolhuis, ed.), Natural Endowments: Financing Resource Conservation for Development (1989), p. 14. L. Boisson de Chazournes, “The Global Environment Facility Galaxy: On Linkages among Institutions”, 3 Max Planck UNYB (1999), pp. 243-285 at p. 246 citing 1989 Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Summary Proceedings, pp. 79 and 81-82 respectively. World Bank in this context means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The other organisations within the World Bank Group are the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). A proposal for the establishment of a Global Environment Trust Fund was approved by the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors by Resolution No. 91-5 on 14 March 1991, 30 ILM (1991), p. 1735. See also I.F.I. Shihata, “The World Bank and the Environment: a Legal Perspective”, 16 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade (1992), pp. 1-42. Reproduced in 30 ILM (1991), p. 1766. As part of the same process the three entities also agreed in March 1991 to co-operate in relation to “protecting the Ozone Layer in the context of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer” 30 ILM (1991), p. 1770 and the World Bank signed an cooperation agreement with the Executive Committee of the Interim

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The Establishment, Role and Evolution of the Global Environment Facility

Environment Facility” formally initiated the GEF Pilot Phase. The World Bank was to act as Trustee of the Fund and with UNEP and UNDP to act also as an Implementing Agency.8

III. UNCED and the Negotiation of the Restructured Instrument In part, the motive for the establishment of the GET in 1991 had been to “acquire useful experience which could provide a useful input into the deliberations of the UN Conference on Environment and Development” to be held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.9 In retrospect it is easy to forget the significance of that Conference. Attended by some 114 Heads of State, including the first President Bush, the UNCED “Earth Summit” was an attempt at the application of what this author has elsewhere called an “international holistic approach” to global environmental problems.10 In the run up to UNCED, a permanent Secretariat was established in Geneva and the three Working Groups of the Preparatory Committee met at regular intervals for more than eighteen months. National governments, international organisations, NGOs and scientific bodies all made submissions to this process. In addition, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committees (INCs) established to develop international conventions on climate change and conservation of biological diversity held working sessions over more than two years to try to finalise their texts in time for the Conference.11 Hopes that conventions on Desertification and on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of Forests might also be concluded in time for UNCED were not realised,12

8 9

10

11

12

Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol to establish an Ozone Projects Trust Fund funded from the Multilateral Fund and to collaborate with UNDP and UNEP in the implementation of that Fund in accordance with the policies adopted by the Executive Committee, 30 ILM (1991), p. 1773. The governing bodies of each of the agencies then approved the Arrangement. Preamble to the GEF concept paper 30 ILM (1991), pp. 1739, 1740. For a comprehensive overview including all the major documentation see S.P. Johnson (ed.), The Earth Summit (1993). See D. Freestone, “The Road from Rio: International Environmental Law after the Earth Summit”, 6 J. Envtl. L. (1994), pp. 193-218, at p. 193. On the work of the climate change INC see J. Barrett, “The Negotiation and Drafting of the Climate Change Convention”, in R. Churchill and D. Freestone (eds), International Law and Global Climate Change (1991), pp. 183-200. The much anticipated Forest Convention became a Non Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests. See UN Doc. A/CONF.151/6//Rev.1, reproduced in Johnson, op. cit., p. 111 and 31; ILM (1992), p. 881. 1079


although the Desertification Convention, concluded in 1994, is often also termed a Rio Convention.13 While there was obviously co-ordination, and indeed overlap, between the officials taking part in all these processes, including the donor meetings leading to the establishment of the GET, there was some dissatisfaction evidenced at the Rio Conference at the processes by which the agencies had gone forward with this initiative. Although welcoming the idea of such a facility, a great deal of discussion focussed on its future governance. The result was that Agenda 21 – the 600 page Action Plan for the global environment into the next century – recommended that the GEF should be “restructured” so as to, inter alia, “ensure a governance that is transparent and democratic in nature, including in terms of decision-making and operations, by guaranteeing a balanced and equitable representation of the interests of developing countries, as well as giving due weight to the funding efforts of donor countries”.14 Similar provisions are expressly included in the text of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),15 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),16 which both make a direct link between the restructuring process and the possibility that the GEF would assume a more permanent role as the financial mechanism for these Conventions. UNFCCC, article 21(3) provides that “[t]he Global Environment Facility of the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development shall be the international entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism referred to in article 11 on an interim basis” (emphasis added). It then goes on to provide that “in this connection, the Global Environment Facility should be appropriately restructured and its membership made universal to enable it to fulfil the requirements of Article 11” (emphasis added).17 In a similar vein, the CBD provides in its article 21 that there “shall be a mechanism for the provision of financial resources to developing country Parties for the purposes of this Convention on a grant or concessional basis” and goes on to require that “[t]he mechanism shall operate within a democratic and transparent system of governance”.18 In article 39 it specifies that “[p]rovided it has been fully restructured in accordance with the requirements of Article 13

14 15 16 17

18

Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa, 33 ILM (1994), p. 1328. Chapter 33.16(a)(iii), reproduced in Johnson, op. cit., 125 et seq. 31 ILM (1992), p. 851. 31 ILM (1992), p. 818. Note that article 11 requires the Conference of the Parties at its first session to review the interim arrangements in article 21(3) and to decide whether to maintain these arrangements. Within four years the financial mechanism shall be reviewed and “appropriate measures” taken. CBD, article 21(1).

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21” the GEF shall be the institutional structure referred to in Article 21 on an interim basis …” (emphasis added).19 1. The Restructuring Process The “restructuring process” involved negotiations among 73 States and was described by a participant as “neither easy nor unimportant”.20 After two years and seven meetings, it was completed in Geneva in March 1994. The text of a new “Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility”21 was agreed and at the same time donors agreed to replenish the facility to the level of USD 2 billion for the period 1994-1998. The innovative organisational and decision making structures that were agreed in the restructuring are set out in the Instrument, which is also innovative in a number of other ways. Its legal status may be unique and the collaborative mechanism between UN entities and a Bretton Woods institution that it represents is also highly novel.22 The Instrument itself is a sui generis document which does not follow the format of an international treaty.23 After the text had been negotiated, it was approved by three separate resolutions of the three Implementing Agencies – the Executive Directors of the World Bank,24 the Governing Council 19

20

21

22

23

24

CBD, article 39, which goes on to give this interim status “for the period between the entry into force of this Convention and the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties or until the Conference of the Parties decides which institutional structure will be designated in accordance with Article 21”. See S.A. Silard, “The Global Environment Facility: A New Development in International Law and Organization” 28 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. (1995), pp. 607-654, at p. 633. The author is a former World Bank finance lawyer. For text of the Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility, Report of the GEF Participants Meeting, Geneva 14-16 March 1994, see 33 ILM (1994), p. 1273. (Hereinafter, “Instrument”). See further I.F.I. Shihata, “The World Bank’s Contribution to the Development of International Environmental Law”, in G. Haffner, G. Loibl, A. Rest, L. Sucharipa-Bermann and K. Zemanek (eds), Liber Amicorum Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern – in honour of his 80th birthday (1998), pp. 631-657. See J. Werksman, “Consolidating Governance of the Global Commons. Insights from the Global Environment Facility”, 6 YB Int’l Envtl. L. (1995), pp. 27-63. Although form is not dispositive, the participants in the GEF must be states but they do not sign or accede to the Instrument. The Instrument is not registered with the UN. See further Boisson de Chazournes who points out that the “states’ approval of the text of the Instrument does not rise to ‘consent to be bound’” for the purposes of the law of treaties” but is “not without legal value”, 3 Max Planck UNYB (1999), at p. 255. She also points out that the two-stage approval process (states plus formal agency approval) is mirrored in the amendment procedure (discussed further below). See also L. Boisson de Chazournes, The Global Environment Facility as a Pioneering Institution (2003) GEF Working Paper, where she suggests an analogous entity established by international organisations: the Joint Vienna Institute, at p. 22. The Executive Directors of the World Bank adopted the instrument at a meeting in 1081


of UNEP25 and the Executive Board of UNDP.26 The governance system for the restructured GEF draws on elements of both the UN and the Bretton Woods systems. It established a permanent Secretariat which, although housed within the World Bank, would be “functionally separate” from the Bank. This addressed concern voiced at UNCED that a new organisation should not result from the process, and also created a clear functional space between the activities of the GEF and those of the World Bank. A representative Council was established to meet twice a year overseen by an Assembly with universal membership, which the Instrument envisaged meeting every three years and which would have authority, inter alia, to “consider for approval by consensus, amendments to the present Instrument on the basis of recommendations by the Council”.27

IV. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development sets out the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. It provides that: “States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.”28

25

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27 28

Washington, D.C., on 24 May 1994 (Resolution No. 94-2, “Global Environment Facility Trust Fund: Restructuring and First Replenishment of the Global Environment Facility”), and the Board of Governors of the Bank adopted a resolution on 7 July 1994, approving cooperation by the Bank with other international organisations as appropriate to achieve the purposes of the GEF (Resolution No. 487, “Protection of the Global Environment”). The Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme adopted the instrument at a special meeting of its Governing Council in Nairobi on 18 June 1994 (Resolution ss.iv.1, “Adoption of the Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility”). The Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund adopted the instrument at a meeting in New York on 13 May 1994 (UN Doc. DP/1994/9, “Report on the Second Regular Session”). Instrument, para. 14(d). See further below. UN Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1, 13 June 1992; 31 ILM (1992), p. 874. See further C.D. Stone, “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law”, 98 AJIL (2004), pp. 276-301. Also, more generally P. Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (2003).

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The conventions for which the GEF provides financial resources are among those instruments that most clearly articulate the principle.29 The GEF Instrument itself talks of providing “new and additional … funding to meet the agreed incremental costs of measures to achieve agreed global environmental benefits”.30 However, the four focal area conventions each contain important provisions that attempt to reflect concrete ways in which the new concept of common but differentiated responsibilities can be operationalised. 1. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change The UNFCCC was opened for signature in June 1992 at UNCED and entered into force on 21 March 1994.31 Article 2 states that the basic objective of the Convention is to achieve “stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow eco-systems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”. The Convention is based on a number of the innovative principles set out in the 1992 Rio Declaration, notably the precautionary principle32 and inter-generational equity33 but also, most prominently, the 29

30 31

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33

The four discussed below. Note that the principle can also be found in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer (as amended). Original text in 26 ILM (1987), p. 1550. Also the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 21 ILM (1982), p. 1261. Instrument, para. 2. The UNFCCC now has 190 parties. Its 1997 Kyoto Protocol entered into force 16 February 2004. It currently has 169 parties. Art. 3(3) UNFCCC. See also Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration (UN Doc. A/Conf.151/5/ Rev.1, 13 June 1992). There is an extensive literature on the precautionary principle, see e.g., L. Gündling, “The Status in International Law of the Principle of Precautionary Action”, in D. Freestone and T. IJlstra (eds), The North Sea: Perspectives on Regional Environmental Co-operation (1990), p. 23; D. Freestone, “The Precautionary Principle”, in R. Churchill and D. Freestone (eds), International Law and Global Climate Change (1991), p. 21. See also T. O’Riordon and J. Cameron (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (1994); D. Freestone and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The Challenge of Implementation (1996); more recently, A. Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (2002); and the same author, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (2006). Art. 3(1) UNFCCC provides that “The Parties shall protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. See also Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration, supra. On the principle of intergenerational equity see E. Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity (1989); C. Redgwell, “Intergenerational Equity and Global Warming”, in Churchill and Freestone, see note 32, pp. 41-56. 1083


principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”.34 The generally hortatory obligations of all Parties are set out in article 4(1), but the full significance of the common but differentiated obligations emerges in article 4(2)35 where the developed countries and countries with economies in transition (which are listed in Annex I) undertake to adopt policies and measures which will “demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention”. While a number of particular factors are listed, the article does recognise that “a return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions ... would contribute to such modification”. The Convention does not however provide any modality by which this return to “earlier” levels can be made – nor indeed does it indicate which particular earlier levels should be used as the benchmark. Nevertheless, article 4(3) does provide an unequivocal obligation that the developed countries listed in Annex II36 shall provide “new and additional financial resources” to meet the “agreed full costs” incurred by developing countries in meeting their communication obligations under article 12 and to meet the “agreed full incremental costs” in implementing the measures envisaged in article 4(1) and which are agreed between the developing country Party and the “entity or entities referred to in Article 11” (i.e. the Financial Mechanism).37 The Annex II countries also undertake to assist countries particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in meeting the costs of adaptation to those adverse effects38 and to take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other parties, particularly developing countries, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention.39 34

35 36

37

38 39

Art. 3(1) UNFCCC, text in footnote above. The text of the article continues: “Accordingly the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse impacts thereof.” See also Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, supra. As well as other articles of the Convention, see e.g. art. 12. Annex II differs from Annex I in that it does not contain the countries with economies in transition. Under article 21(3), the Global Environment Facility, see below, shall be “the international entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism referred to in Article 11 on an interim basis”. Note that article 4(3) does qualify the obligation to provide “agreed full incremental costs” by requiring that account be taken of the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of fund and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties. Art. 4(4). Art. 4(5). For a wider discussion see D. Freestone, “The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Kyoto Mechanisms”, in D. Freestone and C. Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work (2005), pp. 3-24.

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However article 4(7) goes even further in imposing what might be called a “blanket” implementation conditionality. It provides that: “The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed Country Parties of their commitment under the Convention relating to financial resources and transfer of technology.”40 The chief modality for the mobilisation of the new financial resources required by the Convention is the Financial Mechanism defined by article 11 that will provide financing on a grant or concessional basis. The Mechanism is to function under the guidance of, and be accountable to, the Conference of the Parties, but its operation shall be entrusted to one or more existing international entities. 2. Convention on Biological Diversity The CBD was also opened for signature on 5 June 1992 and came into force 29 December 1993.41 The Preamble affirms that States have sovereign rights over their own biological resources but also affirms that the conservation of biological diversity is a “common concern of humankind”.42 Like the UNFCCC it also embraces precaution.43 The objectives of the Convention are set out in article 1 as “the conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding”. Funding therefore is mentioned right at the beginning of the Convention. As with the UNFCCC, developed countries undertake to provide “new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the full incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfil the obligations of the Convention and to benefit from its provisions and which costs are agreed between a developing country Party and the institutional structure [i.e. the Financial Mechanism] referred to in Article 21”.44 40

41

42 43

44

Art. 4(7) goes on to say that this implementation will also “take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties”. It currently has 190 parties see: <www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp>. Its 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety entered into force on 11 September 2003 and currently has 137 Parties, see <www.biodiv.org/biosafety/background.shtml>. Preamble, para. 3. Preamble, para. 9, which reads “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing measure to avoid or minimise such a threat”. Art. 20 (2). 1085


The differentiated and conditional obligations of the CBD, that echo article 4(7) UNFCCC, are in article 20(4) which provides that “[t]he extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under this Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitment under this Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology”. And, the provision continues, “will take fully into account the fact that economic and social development and the eradication of poverty are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties”.45 So, whereas under the UNFCCC the effective implementation of the obligations of the developing country Parties is entirely dependant on incremental financial support from developed countries, under the CBD the issue is more nuanced. The Convention appears to say that, while there may be local advantages of the conservation of biological diversity, the allocation of resources is always a question of priorities and the Convention acknowledges that developing countries may have more pressing priorities such as poverty alleviation. There are of course many development specialists who would question the basic premise that the conservation of ecosystems is an either/or in the process of development. Evidence increasingly shows how important it is for countries seeking to achieve real long-term national economic gains to pursue environmentally sustainable development pathways.46 3. The UN Convention to Combat Desertification Concluded in 1994, the Convention came into force on 26 December 1996.47 Its basic agenda is somewhat different from the 1992 Conventions. It is clearly not acceptable, politically or socially, for countries affected by desertification to refrain from taking any actions to address these problems unless developed countries find incremental resources to finance such actions. Indeed, the people who are affected by desertification are at the centre of the concerns of the Convention, and it specifically recognises that “desertification and drought are problems of global dimensions”.48 Nevertheless it is clear that substantial new resources are needed to combat these problems and article 6 articulates that approach. Developed country Parties undertake to “actively support … the efforts of affected Country Parties”, provide

45 46

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Art. 20 (4). See e.g., Sustainable Development in a dynamic world: transforming institutions, growth, and quality of life, The World Bank, World Development Report 2003, Washington D.C., 2003. It currently has 191 parties. Preamble. But desertification is not classified as “a common concern of humankind” in the way that both the UNFCCC and the CBD define their issues.

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substantial financial resources and other forms of support to such parties, and “promote the mobilisation of new and additional resources”.49 Article 20 on Financial Resources also adopts a different approach to the 1992 Conventions. Developed country Parties undertake to “mobilize substantial resources … to support the implementation of programmes to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought”; “to promote the mobilization of adequate timely and predictable financial resources, including new and additional funding from the Global Environment Facility of the agreed incremental costs of those activities concerning desertification that relate to its four focal areas, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Instrument establishing the Global Environment Facility”.50 Article 21 goes on to envisage the establishment of a Global Mechanism for the Convention.51 4. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants Concluded in March 2001, the Stockholm POPs Convention came into force 17 May 2004.52 Its overarching objective is “to protect human health and the environment from persistent organic pollutants”.53 It accepts the general legal principles underlying the preceding agreements, derived from the Rio Declaration; indeed the article 1 objective is expressly “mindful of the precautionary approach set forth in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration”. The preamble acknowledges the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 and notes, “the respective capabilities of developed and developing countries, as well as the common but differentiated responsibilities of States as set forth in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration …”.54 Article 13 relates to financial resources and mechanisms. Article 13(2) provides that developed country Parties shall provide “new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties and Parties with economies in transition to meet the full incremental costs of implementing measures which fulfill their obligations under this Convention as agreed between a recipient

49

50

51 52 53

54

Art. 6(a)-(c). Para. (d) refers to mobilisation of resources from the private sector and non-governmental sources and (e) access to appropriate technology, knowledge and know-how. Para. 2 of the original text of the 1994 GEF Instrument designated four focal areas: climate change, biological diversity, international waters and ozone layer depletion. Para. 3 provided that “The agreed incremental costs of activities concerning land degradation, primarily desertification and deforestation, as they relate to the four focal areas shall be eligible for funding”. After the 2002 Amendments (discussed below) “land degradation, primarily desertification and deforestation” is now one of the six focal areas. Art. 21(4)-(7). 40 ILM (2001), p. 532. It currently has 136 Parties. The preamble also acknowledges that precaution underlies the concerns of all the Parties and is embedded in the Convention. Preamble. 1087


Party and an entity participating in the [financial] mechanism described in paragraph 6 below”.55 This mechanism defined by article 13(6) is to be entrusted to an entity or entities decided by the COP but, according to article 14, shall on an interim basis be entrusted to the GEF, which should “fulfill this function through operational measures related specifically to persistent organic pollutants taking into account that new arrangements for this area may be needed”.

V. Legal Structure of the Restructured GEF 1. The Secretariat An innovative feature of the Instrument is the status it confers on the Secretariat that operates under a Chief Executive Officer/Chairperson. The Rio Conference did not want to create new institutions. Consequently, the GEF is not an international organisation nor even is it a separate legal entity. The GEF Secretariat, which services and reports to both the Assembly and to the Council, is “supported administratively by the World Bank” but is mandated to “operate in a functionally independent and effective manner”.56 The second Overall Performance Study of the GEF which preceded the third replenishment included a recommendation for strengthening and greater autonomy for the Secretariat, recommending that “the GEF Council consider a review of options to strengthen GEF’s institutional structure, including providing it with separate legal status”.57 Issues at large included the signing authority of the CEO in relation to arrangements with various entities pursuant to paragraph 28 of the Instrument58 and in relation to arrangements and agreements with the Conferences of the Parties to conventions for which the GEF serves as the financial mechanism.59 Also at large was the authority of the CEO vis-à-vis the 55

56 57

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Art. 13(2) continues “the implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy, predictability, and timely flow of funds and the importance of burden sharing among the contributing Parties”. Para. 21, Instrument. Focusing on the Global Environment: The First Decade of the GEF, Second Overall Performance Study (OPS2), GEF, Washington D.C., January 25, 2002, p. 119, para. 465. Para. 28 envisages the Implementing Agencies making arrangements with other entities such a regional development banks and UN agencies as executing agencies. Under para. 20(f) the Council may request the Secretariat to make similar arrangements. Given the absence of GEF legal personality the question was whether such arrangements could be signed by the CEO for the GEF or whether these had to be signed by the Trustee. Para. 27 of the Instrument envisages similar agreements with the conferences of the parties to the conventions referred to in para. 6 of the Instrument being approved by the GEF itself through decision of the Council. In the absence of GEF legal personality, para. 7

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staff of the Secretariat. The GEF staff had historically been recruited as World Bank staff and served under Bank terms and conditions, despite the fact that the Instrument gives the CEO express authority for the organisation, appointment and dismissal of Secretariat staff. Both issues were addressed by internal Bank administrative means and after careful consideration the Council decided that separate legal status was neither necessary nor desirable.60 As the head of the Secretariat, the Chief Executive Officer is appointed by the GEF Council on the joint recommendation of the Implementing Agencies to serve on a full time basis for a three-year term. However before making their joint recommendation the Implementing Agencies are required to consult the Council. Once the CEO has been appointed, the Council has the exclusive right to reappoint him/her.61 The CEO is accountable to the Council for the functioning of the Secretariat and is responsible for its organisation as well as the appointment and dismissal of staff. The CEO also has a number of specific responsibilities set out in paragraph 21(a)-(j) of the Instrument. These include coordinating and overseeing the implementation of programme activities pursuant to the joint work programme, ensuring the implementation of the operational policies adopted by the Council through the preparation of common guidelines on the project cycle, reviewing and reporting to the Council on the adequacy of the arrangements made by the Implementing Agencies to implement such guidelines. The CEO also has the power to chair interagency groups, co-ordinate with Secretariats of other international bodies particularly those of the Conventions for which it acts as a financial mechanism (which are set out in paragraph 6 of the Instrument)62 as well as those of the Montreal Protocol and the Desertification Convention. 2. The Council As should be apparent from the above, the primary decision making body of the GEF is the Council. This is made up of 32 members: sixteen of the Council

60

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of Annex B of the Instrument gives the Trustee power to “formalize” these arrangements or agreements. This has never been deemed necessary – see discussion below. Clarifying the Roles and Responsibilities of the GEF Entities: Administrative Arrangements to Enhance the Functional Independence and Effectiveness of the GEF Secretariat, GEF/C.19/8/Add.1, 23 April 2002. Para. 21, Instrument. Since its inception until 2003 the GEF CEO was Dr Mohammed El-Ashry (Egypt). His successor was Mr Len Goode (Canada). In 2006 Ms Monique Barbut (France) was appointed CEO. These originally were the UNFCCC and the CBD but by an amendment of 2002 the Stockholm POPs Convention was added (see discussion below). Note also that the CDD COP has proposed that the GEF become a financial mechanism for the Desertification Convention which would require a further amendment of the Instrument, See Legal, Operational and Financial implications of an Amendment to the GEF Instrument to reflect the designation of the GEF as a financial mechanism of the UNCCD (GEF/C.30/7, 3 November 2006). 1089


Members are from developing countries, fourteen are from developed countries and two from countries with economies in transition.63 The major donors to the trust fund (or “non-recipients” as they are termed by the Instrument) hold individual seats (or “chairs”) on the Council.64 The other Council chairs represent constituencies of a number of members. Some of these constituencies include a mix of countries including both recipients and non-recipients.65 Each constituency chooses both its Member and an Alternate Member, who represent that constituency for three years unless the constituency members decide otherwise. Either may be reappointed. While the Instrument envisages that decisions will be made by consensus,66 there is provision for a formal vote if consensus is unattainable.67 The formal vote procedure requires a “double weighted majority” – sixty percent of the votes of the participants and sixty percent majority of the contributions. This represents a unique combination of the UN voting system of “one State, one vote” and the Bretton Woods voting system, which depends solely on shareholding. However, the formal voting system of Paragraph 25(c) has never actually been used; all decisions to date have been by consensus. The Council is mandated to meet twice a year – it usually meets in the spring and late autumn – “at the seat of the Secretariat”.68 This latter provision was designed to prevent it being subjected to the extra expense and administrative disruption of holding each of its sessions in different countries – as the Conferences of the Parties to the conventions tend to do. However in 2003 one of the

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Instrument, para. 16. France, Germany, Japan, UK and US. See Annex E of the Instrument, which sets out the criteria for the formation of constituencies and the procedures to be followed. Instrument, para. 25(b): “Decisions of the Assembly and the Council shall be taken by consensus. In the case of the Council if, in the consideration of any matter of substance, all practicable efforts by the Council and its Chairperson have been made and no consensus appears attainable, any member of the Council may require a formal vote.” Instrument, para. 25(c): “Formal Vote: (i) Unless otherwise provided in this Instrument, decisions requiring a formal vote by the Council shall be taken by a double weighted majority, that is, an affirmative vote representing both a 60 percent majority of the total number of Participants and a 60 percent majority of the total contributions. (ii) Each Member of the Council shall cast the votes of the Participant or Participants he/she represents. A Member of the Council appointed by a group of Participants may cast separately the votes of each Participant in the constituency he/she represents. (iii) For the purpose of voting power, total contributions shall consist of the actual cumulative contributions made to the GEF Trust Fund as specified in Annex C (Attachment 1) and in subsequent replenishments of the GEF Trust Fund …”. Instrument, para. 17.

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Council members was refused a visa to enter the US to attend a Council meeting and the World Bank Legal Vice Presidency was asked to provide legal advice on the visa status of such Council Members and also on the requirements of the Instrument regarding the location of GEF Council Meetings – so as possibly to avoid such issues in the future. The legal advice clarifies that, like delegates attending other World Bank meetings, Council members do not per se have special diplomatic status and are subject to normal US visa requirements.69 The advice also indicates that, although it has been the practice for the Council to meet at the same location as the Assembly immediately prior to the Assembly, the Instrument does require such meetings to take place at the seat of the Secretariat.70 Consequently it was proposed to the Council, and then to the GEF Assembly in 2006, that this requirement be amended. The 2006 Cape Town Assembly approved such an amendment.71 At each meeting the Council elects a Chair from among it members, alternating between recipient and non-recipient countries. The Instrument envisages this person being co-Chair with the CEO and allocates specific responsibilities to each of the co-Chairs. The CEO chairs the discussions of the Council on issues relating to the approval, monitoring etc of the work programme; the utilisation of resources and relations with the Trustee; and of matters relating to the requirements that GEF financed activities conform to policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria decided by the relevant Conferences of the Parties.72 The Elected Chair has responsibility for chairing discussions relating to the monitoring and evaluation of GEF policies, programmes, operational strategies and projects; the role of the Council as focal point for the purpose of relations with the relevant Conferences of the Parties; the appointment, etc. of the CEO and oversight of the work of the Secretariat; review and approval of the budget, including periodic financial and performance reviews of the Secretariat and the Implementing Agencies (regarding work done for the Facility); and approval of the annual reports and liaison with the Commission on Sustainable Development.73 The Instrument also envisages that the two Chairs will jointly chair discussion relating to the review of the operation of the Facility regarding it purposes, scope and objectives.74

69

70 71

72 73 74

See Participation of Council Members in Council Meetings, GEF/C.22/Inf.15/Rev.1, 14 November 2003, p. 3. Ibid. See below. But it did not approve an amendment that the Assembly be held every four years rather than every three. I.e., according to para. 18, those items listed in para. 20(e), (f) and (h). Ibid. items in para. 20(b), (g), (i), (j) and (k). Ibid. para. 20(a). 1091


3. The Assembly The Assembly is the plenary meeting of the Participants in the Facility,75 currently 177 States. The Instrument envisages the Assembly meeting once every three years.76 However, ostensibly for economic reasons the Council has agreed to only three Assembly meetings to date, coinciding with the replenishment discussions. The first Assembly took place in Delhi in March 1998, the second in Beijing in October 2002 and the third in Cape Town in September 2006. Each Participant appoints a Representative and an Alternate to the Assembly, which then elects a Chair from among its members – traditionally the host. The powers of the Assembly are set out in paragraph 14 and are largely formal: to review the general policies of the Facility; to review and evaluate the operation of the Facility on the basis of reports submitted by the Council; to keep under review the membership of the Facility and lastly to consider, for approval by consensus, amendments to the Instrument. Such amendments must be recommended by the Council, thus requiring de facto the prior approval by the Council, which must take into account the views of the Implementing Agencies and the Trustee. Once the Assembly has approved these amendments,77 they do not become effective until the Implementing Agencies and the Trustee, in accordance with their respective rules and procedural requirements, have adopted them.78 75 76

77

78

States which are both recipients from, and contributors to, the Trust Fund. Para. 13: “The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of all Participants. The Assembly shall meet once every three years. Each Participant may appoint one Representative and one Alternate to the Assembly in such manner as it may determine. Each Representative and each Alternate shall serve until replaced. The Assembly shall elect its Chairperson from among the Representatives.” See Instrument, para. 14: “The Assembly shall ... (d) consider, for approval by consensus, amendments to the present Instrument on the basis of recommendations by the Council.” Para. 34: “Amendment or termination of the present Instrument may be approved by consensus by the Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council, after taking into account the views of the Implementing Agencies and the Trustee, and shall become effective after adoption by the Implementing Agencies and the Trustee in accordance with their respective rules and procedural requirements.” The amendment procedure has only been invoked twice. At its May 2002 meeting the GEF Council approved a request from the INC of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants that Global Environment Facility be its financial mechanism, as well as a proposal that land degradation become a full “focal area”. The Council approved proposed amendments to the Instrument to allow it to accept this invitation and to increase its focal areas from four to six to add Persistent Organic Pollutants and Land Degradation. These amendments were approved by the GEF Assembly at its meeting in Beijing in October 2002, and entered into force on June 19, 2003, once they had been approved by the governing bodies of the three Implementing Agencies. For text see 44 ILM (2005), p. 1002, with note by M. Ragazzi. In 2006, at the third GEF Assembly in Cape Town, South Africa, an amendment was approved to para.

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4. The Role of the Trustee The restructured Instrument provides that with the establishment of a new GEF Trust Fund “the World Bank shall be invited to act as the Trustee of the Fund”.79 The Instrument envisages that the Pilot Phase GET would be terminated and “all funds, receipts, assets and liabilities” would be transferred to the new Fund.80 The Instrument makes the Trustee accountable to the Council in the performance of its fiduciary responsibilities, but it also recognises that in performing this function it does so as an autonomous international financial organisation with its own legal structure. Para 8 provides that “in serving as the Trustee of the Fund, the World Bank shall serve in a fiduciary and administrative capacity, and shall be bound by its Articles of Agreement, by-laws, rules and decisions, as specified in Annex B”.81 Annex B to the Instrument set out in detail the role of the Trustee, which will act as legal owner, and hold in trust the assets of the Fund. Its specific responsibilities include mobilisation of resources for the Fund (including preparation of such studies and arrangements as may be necessary); financial management of the Fund; disbursement to implementing and executing agencies and preparation of financial reports, maintenance of records and accounts and providing for their audit; monitoring of the budget and project funds to ensure they are being used in accordance with the Instrument and decisions taken by the Council, including regular reporting to the Council on the status of the Fund resources.82

79 80 81

82

17 of the Instrument to permit the Council to meet elsewhere than at the seat of the Secretariat if the Council so decides. It also provides that, for meetings of the Council, two-thirds of the Members shall constitute a quorum. It did not approve another proposed amendment regarding the frequency of Assembly Meetings (GEF/A.3/5). At time of writing the amendment has not yet entered into force. Note that further amendments may be necessary, see Legal, Operational and Financial implications of an Amendment to the GEF Instrument to reflect the designation of the GEF as a financial mechanism of the UNCCD, note 62. Para. 8. Para. 32. In 1978 Sir Joseph Gold, former General Counsel of the International Monetary Fund, identified the proliferation of arrangements bearing the name “trust” within the practice of international organisations and analysed their key characteristics. He argued that “... the establishment of trust funds for administration by existing international organisations under implied or express powers avoids the need to create new organisations with limited purposes and makes use of the experience and demonstrated skills of organisations already in the field”. See J. Gold, “Trust Funds in International Law: The Contribution of the International Monetary Fund to a Code of Principles”, 72 AJIL (1978), pp. 856-866. See also P. Sand, Transnational Environmental Law (1999), p. 300 et seq. Annex B, para. 4(a)-(d). 1093


Other provisions relate to conflicts between the decisions of the Council and the Trustee’s own legal requirements and also provide a procedure for the Trustee to terminate its role as Trustee.83 As part of the Trustee’s responsibility for managing the Fund and disbursing to Implementing Agencies the Trustee has entered into Financial Procedures Agreements with UNEP and UNDP as Implementing Agencies.84 In the case of the Bank the legal conundrum of an institution signing an agreement with itself was solved by the signing of a Financial Procedures arrangement between the Department that administers the Trust Fund and acts as Trustee and the Department responsible for implementing the GEF that acts as the Implementing Agency. The Trustee is also authorised to enter into “arrangements and agreements with any national or international entity as may be needed in order to administer and manage financing for the purposes of, and on terms consistent with, the Instrument”.85 When the Council decided to expand opportunities for a number of Executing Agencies so as to give them direct access to GEF funds without going through an Implementing Agency, it was the Trustee that negotiated these agreements. Drawing on the modalities it had used for the Financial Procedures arrangements with the Implementing Agencies, two documents were signed: a Memorandum of Understanding with GEF Secretariat (which it will be recalled does not have independent legal personality) and a Financial Procedures Agreement with the Trustee. The MoU between the GEF Secretariat and the Agency on Direct Access to GEF Resources (signed by the CEO) covers issues such as administration of GEF resources, fees, standard of care, procurement (according to agency rules), record keeping and reporting (including to the GEF Monitoring and Evaluation unit). At the same time the Trustee and the Executing Agency entered into a Financial Procedures Agreement covering the detailed financial requirements for transfers of monies from the Trustee to the Agency, verification of and use of funds, fees, use of investment income and disbursements as well as recording and reporting obligations. Annex B, Para 7 of the Instrument also envisages the Trustee “formalizing” arrangements or agreements considered and approved by the Council with the Conferences of the Parties for which it provides resources. This provision was presumably designed to remedy the lack of independent legal status of the GEF. In practice however these arrangements have not been signed by the Trustee, nor by the GEF Secretariat but are negotiated and then endorsed between and by the COP and the GEF Council.86 This interesting procedure and the use of an 83 84 85 86

Annex B, para. 14. In the case of UNDP the agreement dates from the Pilot Phase. Annex B, para. 7. See e.g., in relation to the UNFCCC, Decision 12/CP.2 Memorandum of understanding between the Conference of the Parties and the Council of the Global Environment Facility (FCCC/

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instrument of unclear legal status, which is then endorsed by both the decisionmaking bodies involved, adroitly addresses the fact that neither the GEF nor, arguably, the COP has legal personality.87 5. Implementing Agencies The Implementing Agencies are specifically designated as UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank. They are mandated to “prepare cost effective GEF projects and to implement them in accordance with the operational polices, strategies and decisions of the Council”.88 Annex D of the Instrument envisages that the “areas of particular emphasis” of the three agencies would be as follows: the role of UNDP would be the development and management of capacity building programmes and technical assistance projects, and to contribute to the development of regional and global projects in cooperation with the other Implementing Agencies. The UNEP role would be catalysing the development of scientific and technical analysis and in advancing environmental management of GEF-financed activities. It would provide guidance on relating GEF-financed activities to global regional and national environmental assessments, policy frameworks and plans and to international agreements. UNEP would also be responsible for establishing and supporting the Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee (STAP). The World Bank’s role would be in ensuring the development and management of investment projects, including mobilising private sector resources.89 Over the years the roles of the three Implementing Agencies has tended to become less clear, with investment projects and capacity building projects being

87

88 89

CP/1996/15/Add.1) and see: . CBD Decision III/8 on Memorandum of understanding between the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Council of the Global Environment Facility: <www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.aspx?lg=0&dec=III/8>. The Stockholm Convention INC conducted a comparative review of the content of the two MoUs and invited comments from the two secretariats see UNEP/POPS/INC.7/INF/9 (6 June 2003) and at its first meeting by Decision SC-1/11 adopted a similar MoU (text at UNEP/POPS/COP.1/31) <www.pops.int/documents/meetings/cop_1/meetingdocs/ en/default.htm>. The CCD COP7 also approved an MoU with the GEF Council (Decision 6/COP.7) which was then approved by Council in June 2006. At its sixth session the CDD COP by Decision 6/COP.6 agreed that the GEF would be invited to act as a financial mechanism for the CDD. To finalise this arrangement para. 6 of the Instrument would need to be amended to reflect this (as it was amended in 2002 for the POPs Convention). See Legal, Operational and Financial implications of an Amendment to the GEF Instrument to reflect the designation of the GEF as a financial mechanism of the UNCCD, note 62. But see R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law”, 94 AJIL (2001), pp. 623-659. Instrument, para. 22. Annex D, para. 11(a)-(c). 1095


taken on by all the Implementing Agencies and by those Executing Agencies given direct access to resources through the Expanded Opportunities Policy. The Council is looking at the whole issue anew in order to refocus respective agencies’ comparative advantages.90 6. Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee (STAP) The STAP is an Advisory Body designed to provide strategic scientific and technical advice to the GEF on its strategy and programmes. UNEP provides a Secretariat and operates as the liaison between the GEF and STAP.91 It has fifteen members who are internationally recognised experts in the GEF’s key areas of work: biodiversity, biosafety, climate change, coastal and fresh water management, sustainable land management, persistent organic pollutants, and integrated ecosystem management. STAP also maintains a roster of experts who advise on individual projects. Reporting directly to the Council, the tasks it has been entrusted with include identifying and providing strategic advice on scientific and technical priorities, the scientific and technical coherence of GEF operational programmes and strategies, and on emerging issues and gaps relevant to the implementation of operational programmes. It also provides scientific and technical advice aimed at strengthening the scientific and technical quality and underpinnings of GEF projects. It advises on capacity building efforts in science and technology relevant for development and implementation of GEF projects and after the agreement of Council that the GEF should support “targeted research” it provides advice on such research as it is relevant to GEF strategic priorities.

VI. GEF Programmes GEF main programmes provide funding for: – Enabling activities (for countries to fulfil their international environmental law treaty obligations);92 – Project Grants (which include project preparation grants (PDFs) up to USD 1 million); – Small grants for NGOs (administered by UNDP); and – Medium Size projects – up to USD 1 million aimed at NGO executors. 90

91 92

See Council Papers: Comparative Advantages and Complementary Roles of the Implementing Agencies and Executing Agencies of the GEF, GEF/C.28/15, 9 May 2006. Roles and Comparative Advantages of the GEF Agencies, GEF/C.30/9, 7 November 2006. Instrument, para. 24. There are also a series of smaller programmes to support Council member capacity etc.

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The procedures for the approval of GEF-funded operations require a double approval system, in that they must meet GEF policy and procedural requirements but also the requirements of the host agency. For projects for which the World Bank acts as Implementing Agency they are treated in the same manner as other Bank operations.93 Approval by the Bank’s Board of GEF projects proposed by the Bank helps ensure that the quality of the Bank’s work as Implementing Agency meets the usual standards of quality, including cost-effectiveness, of Bank operations. In the course of the project preparation, Bank-GEF projects are circulated to members of the GEF Council as part of the work programme before the Bank’s Board considers them. The role of the GEF Council is to approve the work programme, although it can and does comment in detail on individual project proposals. It receives project documents before their final approval by the implementing agency and may discuss their conformity with GEF policies and procedures (at the request of four of the Council members). As indicated above, in 1999 the GEF Council decided to expand opportunities for other entities – such as the regional development banks and certain other entities – to access GEF resources both for project preparation activities and for project implementation directly from the Trustee. Under this initiative, the appropriate boards or other governing bodies of such entities approve such projects that are conducted under their existing policy and procedure frameworks.

VII. Operational Programmes and Incremental Costs The original GEF Instrument envisaged incremental financing to be provided by the Facility in four focal areas: ozone depletion (to the extent not covered by the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund), international waters, conservation of biodiversity, and climate change. After the 2002 Amendment to the Instrument, a further two focal areas were added to the GEF mandate: land degradation, particularly desertification and deforestation, and persistent organics pollutants.94 In addition, paragraph 3 recognises that “the agreed incremental costs of activities to achieve global environmental benefits concerning chemicals management as they relate to the [existing six] focal areas shall be eligible for funding”. There are currently 15 Operational Programmes (OPs) approved by the Council that map out strategy in each focal area and provide synergies and crosscutting themes between the focal areas.95

93

94 95

Under the Bank’s Operational Policy such projects must comply with Bank policies and procedures. Instrument as amended, para. 2. The full texts of the OPs are available on the GEF website at <www.gefweb.org>. 1097


Biodiversity: OP1. Arid and Semi-Arid Zone Ecosystem; OP2. Coastal, Marine, and Freshwater Ecosystems; OP3. Forest Ecosystems; OP4. Mountain Ecosystems; OP13. Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity Important to Agriculture. Climate Change: OP5. Removal of Barriers to Energy Efficiency and Energy Conservation; OP6. Promoting the Adoption of Renewable Energy by Removing Barriers and Reducing Implementation Costs; OP7. Reducing the Long-Term Costs of Low Greenhouse Gas Emitting Energy Technologies; OP11. Promoting Environmentally Sustainable Transport. International Waters: OP8. Waterbody-based Operational Program; OP9. Integrated Land and Water Multiple Focal Area Operational Program; OP10. Contaminant-Based Operational Program. Multifocal Area: OP12. Integrated Ecosystem Management. Persistent Organic Pollutants: OP14. Draft Operational Program on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Land Degradation: OP15. Operational Program on Sustainable Land Management. The GEF only finances “incremental costs” – the cost of those activities and investments that represent a gain to the international as opposed to the national environment. In relation to climate change this concept may be relatively easy to calculate – or at least to understand. Here the GEF might, for example, finance the extra cost of converting a “least-cost” but climate damaging project (such as a coal-fired power station) to a climate friendly project (such as a wind farm or a solar thermal plant). In such a situation, the country contributes the amount it would have contributed to the “least-cost” project and the GEF finances the additional (incremental) costs of the climate friendly technology. However, these incremental cost calculations are more difficult in relation to other focal areas. The Council is currently considering this issue specifically in relation to the new land

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degradation focal area96 but the issue is also important in relation to biodiversity or international waters (IW) projects. For this reason perhaps, initial investments in IW under the OP8 on “Waterbody-based programs” concentrated on pollution and nutrient reduction in large inland water bodies – Lake Victoria, the Aral Sea, the Caspian Sea – where the global “public goods” benefits of protecting a shared international water body were more obvious to appreciate. By the same token, the global public goods aspects of marine pollution from land based sources are relatively easy to recognise and this prompted GEF support for the Global Programme of Action on Land Based Sources of Marine Pollution, where a classic project was the Black Sea and Danube Strategic Partnership involving an investment of USD 50 million with USD 450 million in co-financing.97 This same approach prompted GEF support for a range of regional seas projects and also led to its support, under OP8 (waterbody-based operations) for the Large Marine Ecosystem programme as well as incremental financing to small island developing States98 for the development of a series of regional fisheries convention negotiations such as the West and Central Pacific (which led to the finalisation of the Honolulu Conventions).99

VIII. Replenishments Since the restructuring process and first replenishment was completed in 1994 the GEF has been replenished on three further occasions. The agreed process is that at the end of the replenishment period an Overall Performance Study is conducted by outside consultants. The assessments and the recommendations of these Performance Studies play an important role in the Replenishment discussions. It is noticeable that these discussions have become more difficult and more protracted over the years and that despite the concept of common but differentiated responsibility the donors are beginning to attach more rigorous requirements to their financing – an obvious recent example being the new

96

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98 99

Legal, Operational and Financial implications of an Amendment to the GEF Instrument to reflect the designation of the GEF as a financial mechanism of the UNCCD, note 62, at paras 37 et seq. Nutrient or pollution run-off from a littoral state into an international watercourse which causes major down stream damage to an international water body while causing no harm to the littoral state is a classic “tragedy of the commons” situation. Here the GEF provides the “global public goods” financing. Under the SIDS component in OP9. See further D. Freestone, “The Role of the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility in the Implementation of the Regime of the Law of the Sea Convention”, in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (2006), pp. 308326. 1099


Resource Allocation Framework.100 Although global environment issues show no sign of diminishing and extra focal areas have been added to the GEF mandate the amounts of the replenishments, although substantial, have not reflected a continuing incremental increase in total resources. It will be recalled that the initial commitments for the GET pilot phase amounted to 1 billion Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) – equivalent to about USD 1.2 billion. After the restructuring, the Global Environment Trust Fund established for the pilot Phase was closed and its assets were transferred to the new GEF Trust Fund.101 The Restructuring involved pledges of USD 2 billion to this new Trust Fund, for the four-year period 1994-1998. Although there had been an Independent Evaluation of the Pilot Phase in November 1993 conducted by the evaluation departments of the Implementing Agencies,102 the first Overall Performance Evaluation of the restructured GEF was completed in February of 1998 by a team led by Gareth Porter.103 In March 1998 at a meeting in Paris the negotiations for the second replenishment – GEF-2 – were completed with commitments totalling USD 2.75 billion for the four-year period to 2002.104 As the third replenishment drew near the Second Overall Performance Evaluation was conducted under the leadership of Leif Christoffersen and completed in January of 2002.105 In August 2002 after a long negotiating process the GEF was replenished for a third time to a total sum of USD 2.92 billion for the period 2002-2006. The negotiations had begun in 2001. The expectation has been that the third replenishment would be incrementally larger than the second in order to accommodate new funding for persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and for land degradation that were added to the focal areas. Indeed, at its first Meeting, the Conference of the Parties to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants requested the GEF to be its financial mechanism. The GEF Council at its meeting in May 2002 considered this request and the Council approved proposed amendments to the Instrument to allow it to accept this invitation, which were then approved by the GEF Assembly at its meeting in Beijing in October 2002.106 Many of the projects that it expected to

100

101 102

103 104

105

106

See further, below for discussion of the RAF. Note the policy requirements for the GEF replenishment, for example Draft Negotiating Texts: Policy Recommendations for the Fourth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund, GEF/R.4/32, 19 May 2006. As provided for by para. 32 of the Instrument on “Termination of the GET”. Report of the Independent Evaluation of the Global Environment Facility Pilot Phase, 23 November 1993, UNEP/UNDP/World Bank, 192 pp. Study of GEF’s Overall Performance, 1998, GEF. See D. Freestone, et. al., “The World Bank Group”, 9 YB Int’l Envtl. L. (1998), pp. 669, 671. The First Decade of the GEF: The Second Overall Performance Evaluation, 25 January 2002, GEF. See note 78, above.

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finance involve the reduction of “run-off ” into marine environments. To address these issues the GEF Council designated FAO and UNIDO as executing agencies under its Expanded Opportunities policy so that they would be able to assist with the implementation of projects in this new focal area.107 In June of 2005, a team led by Mark Wagner finalised the third OPS.108 Another protracted negotiation ensued and despite major reductions in the pledges of two major donors, the US and Japan, the GEF was replenished to a sum of USD 3.12 billion.109 A major aspect of the replenishment was the approval of a Resource Allocation Framework (RAF) that had been first raised at the second replenishment discussions. 1. The Resource Allocation Framework In September 2005, the GEF Council adopted a new system for allocating GEF resources to recipient countries to increase the impact of GEF funding on the global environment.110 Based on donor driven resource allocation systems in place at other international financial institutions, such as the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the new Resource Allocation Framework is designed to allocate resources to countries based on each country’s potential to generate global environmental benefits and its capacity, policies and practices to successfully implement GEF projects. These objectively determined criteria will be based on two Indices. The GEF Benefits Index (GBI) and the GEF Performance Index (GPI). The RAF builds on GEF’s existing country-driven approach and partnerships with Implementing and Executing Agencies, and provides countries with increased predictability in the allocation of GEF funds. Implementation will begin in July 2006 and will apply to resources for financing biodiversity and climate change projects. The indicative allocations, based on these two indices, for each country during a replenishment period will be publicly disclosed at the outset of each replenishment period. These allocations will be adjusted every two years to reflect changes in each country’s capacity and potential to deliver global environmental benefits. The RAF will not affect the allocation of other resources. All eligible countries will still have access to resources for biodiversity and climate change to support enabling activities and projects in these areas. Each country will work with the 107

108 109

110

Under the “Expanded Opportunities for Executing Agencies” Programme – which also includes the four regional development banks and IFAD (with its comparative advantage in the land degradation area). On IFAD, see GEF/C.17/13, Criteria for the Expansion of Opportunities for Executing Agencies, May 2001. OPS3: Progressing towards Environmental Results, June 2005, GEF. Summary of the negotiations on the Fourth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund, Paper for the Third GEF Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa, August 2006 (GEF/A.3/6). For more details, see The GEF Resource Allocation Framework, 17 October 2005, GEF/C.27/ Inf/8/Rev.1. 1101


GEF Implementing and Executing Agencies to develop project proposals to be financed from its indicative allocation. Country allocations will be published once funding for the next four year phase of the GEF has been finalised. The RAF is intended to strengthen each country’s ability to ensure that GEF financing is based on country priorities and reflects guidance from the international environmental conventions for which the GEF serves as the financial mechanism. The Council has expanded support for GEF national focal point development and national capacity development so that countries can better address global environmental challenges and strengthen their capacities to work through the RAF approach. Two new initiatives – a Country Support Program (CSP) for Focal Points and the GEF National Dialogue Initiative – will provide opportunities for stakeholders to seek clarification and provide feedback about the RAF.111 In addition to their allocations, countries can receive GEF financing for projects in the other focal areas (international waters, land degradation, ozone layer depletion, and persistent organic pollutants), cross-cutting capacity building projects and the Small Grants Programme, which finances smaller projects that encourage wider participation by civil society, and through regional and global projects.

IX. The New Climate Change Funds In Marrakech in November 2001, at the seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP7), the COP invited the GEF as the financial mechanism of the Convention to establish and operate two new funds related to the UNFCCC. By decision 7/CP.7 it decided to establish a Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)112 and a Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF).113 By decision 10/CP.7 it also established a new fund related to the Kyoto Protocol (Adaptation Fund) which would be financed by a “share of the proceeds” of Clean Development Mechanism project activities, as envisaged by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and by additional funding invited from those Annex 1 Parties intending to ratify the Protocol.114 While COP7 did not provide full guidance on these funds the COP Decision did lay down certain types of activities which might be financed by these funds. The Special Climate Change Fund will be available to finance activities, programmes and measures relating to climate change, in accordance with paragraph 2 of decision 7/CP.7, that are complementary to those funded by the 111

112 113 114

An independent review of the operational experience with the RAF will be undertaken by the GEF Evaluation Office after two years of implementation. 7/CP.7, para. 2. Ibid. para. 6. 10/CP.7, para. 2.

1102


resources allocated to the climate change focal area of the GEF and by bilateral and multilateral funding, in the following areas: (a) adaptation, in accordance with paragraph 8 of decision 5/CP.7; (b) transfer of technologies, in accordance with decision 4/CP.7; (c) energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management; and (d) activities to assist developing country Parties referred to under article 4, paragraph 8(h) (i.e., countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products) in diversifying their economies, in accordance with decision 5/CP.7. Initial guidance on the Least Developed Countries Fund was provided by decision 7/CP.7: (a) as a first step, to provide funding from the LDCF to meet the agreed full cost of preparing the national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs), given that the preparation of NAPAs will help to build capacity for the preparation of national communications under article 12, paragraph 1, of the Convention; (b) to ensure complementarily of funding between the LDCF and other funds with which the operating entity is entrusted; (c) to ensure separation of the LDCF from other funds with which the operating entity is entrusted; (d) to adopt simplified procedures and arrange for expedited access to the Fund by the least developed countries, while ensuring sound financial management; (e) to ensure transparency in all steps relating to the operation of the Fund; (f) to encourage the use of national and, where appropriate, regional experts; and (g) to adopt streamlined procedures for the operation of the Fund. In accordance with paragraph 1 of Decision 10/CP.7, the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund is to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes as well as the following activities identified in paragraph 8 of decision 5/CP.7: (a) starting to implement adaptation activities promptly where sufficient information is available to warrant such activities, inter alia, in the areas of water resources management, land management, agriculture, health, infrastructure development, fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems, and integrated coastal zone management; (b) improving the monitoring of diseases and vectors affected by climate change, and related forecasting and early-warning systems, and in this context improving disease control and prevention; (c) supporting capacity building, including institutional capacity, for preventive measures, planning, preparedness and management of disasters relating to climate change, including contingency planning, in particular, for droughts and floods in areas prone to extreme weather events; and (d) strengthening existing and, where needed, establishing national and regional centers and information networks for rapid response to extreme weather events, utilising information technology as much as possible. 1. Governance of the Climate Change Funds The main issues have not been with the mandate of the new funds but with their governance. In response to the request from the COP mentioned above, the Trustee 1103


and the Secretariat prepared a paper for the May 2002 GEF Council Meeting regarding the arrangements proposed for the establishment and operation of these new funds.115 This envisaged that the World Bank would act as Trustee for the three funds but that they would each be managed separately from the GEF Trust Fund. Mobilisation of resources for these funds would also not be through the four-yearly GEF replenishment process (managed by the World Bank as Trustee) but through a separate process managed by the Secretariat. It was also agreed that the operational policies and procedures and governance structure of the GEF would apply to these voluntary funds. These arrangements were reported to the eighth session of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP8) in New Delhi. Further guidance was provided by COP8 on the LDCF as a result of which the Trust Fund was made operational and by spring of 2003 pledges in the order of USD15 million were received from nine donors.116 Since that time, procedures have been established for the governance of the LDCF and the SCCF. The GEF Council will meet as the LDCF/SCCF Council.117 Any Council member is eligible to take part and participate or attend as an observer. Formal voting will be by consensus but in the event of the vote the normal GEF rule will be amended to require both 60 percent majority of GEF Participants represented at the LDCF/SCCF Council and 60 per cent majority of the total contribution to such fund.118 In relation to the Adaptation Fund, no decisions have yet been taken. However in the COP decision cited above (10/CP.7) the Conference of the Parties had decided that the Adaptation Fund should be operated by an entity entrusted with the financial mechanism of the Convention. It will be recalled that under the Kyoto Protocol article 12(8) a “share of the proceeds from certified emission reductions” under the Clean Development Mechanism shall be made available “to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation”. Hence this Fund is not intended to be primarily a donor fund – although donors may contribute to it. The Council has made a submission to the UNFCCC COP/MOP regarding possible Arrangements for the Management of the Adaptation Fund119 and has agreed that should the COP/MOP give further guidance to the GEF on the

115 116

117

118

119

GEF/C.19/6, Arrangements for the Establishment of the New Climate Change Funds. For further details see: GEF/C.21/5/Rev.1, Operation of the LDC Trust Fund for Climate Change. The first such meeting took place in December 2006. See, <www.thegef.org/documents/ council_documents/LDCF_SCCF_1/CouncilMeetingDecember2006.html>. As of November 2006, pledges to the LDCF stood at USD 115 million and to the SCCF at USD 37.7 million. See, Status Report on the Climate Change Funds (GEF/LDCF/SCCF.1/ Inf.2/Rev. 1). Submission of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) on Possible Arrangements for the Management of the Adaptation Fund, GEF/C.29/Inf.2, August 8 2006.

1104


management of the Adaptation Fund, then the Council would meet as the Council of the Adaptation Fund. Decisions regarding the operation of the Adaptation Fund would be taken by consensus among the Council Members representing Participants that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The Council would agree a formal voting procedure for the Adaptation Fund following further guidance from the COP/MOP and taking into account the GEF Instrument.

X. Conclusions In the fifteen years of its existence there is no doubt that the GEF has had a number of major impacts. These have, first and foremost, been on the environmental concerns that it has sought to address, but in doing so it has also had an impact more broadly on the international environmental agenda. The GEF is the first effective partnership between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions. It is clear that its existence has had a major influence in mainstreaming environmental thinking and programming within the World Bank and UNDP as well as a range of other agencies. Its impact is not restricted to the more than USD 6.2 billion dollars that it has itself committed since 1991 but also includes the more than USD 20 billion that has been mobilised in co-financing by a range of international and bilateral agencies as well as the private sector. The “family” that it has established includes governments, NGOs, as well as international agencies, academic and scientific institutions and eminent individuals.120 The Third Overall Performance Study in 2005 found that the GEF has “achieved significant results particularly at the outcome level in biodiversity, climate change, international waters and ozone depletion”.121 As the world’s largest governmentfunded mechanism for biodiversity conservation in developing countries the study concluded that it “has had a notable impact on slowing or reducing the loss of biodiversity” and that according to the IUCN it has supported protected area investments that constitute almost 17 percent of the total land area protected globally.122 In the area of climate change while its role in mitigating changes is obviously minor, it has “played an important catalytic role in developing and transforming markets for energy and mobility in developing countries”.123 In the field of international waters it has been “an effective agent for policy, legal and institutional reforms” and has “supported the negotiation and implementation

120

121

122 123

See e.g., C. Streck, “The Global Environment Facility – A Role Model for International Governance”, 2 Global Envtl. Pol. (2001), pp. 71-94. OPS3: Progressing Toward Environmental Results, GEF, Washington, D.C., June 2005, p. 3. International Union for the Conservation of Nature, 2003. Ibid. p. 4. 1105


of a number of global and regional conventions”.124 In the focal area of ozone depletion the GEF has essentially achieved it main objective – to eliminate the consumption (that is the production, exports and imports and emissions) of ozone depleting substances (ODSs) in countries with economies in transition, with more than 99 percent of the agreed phase out having been accomplished”.125 These achievements are impressive by any account. In the new land degradation and POPs focal areas – added in 2002 to the GEF portfolio – the OPS3 team thought it premature to assess results but thought the programmes “seem poised to learn from the experiences of other more mature focal areas”.126 The innovative partnership between the three Implementing Agencies has from the outset involved a wide range of other agencies acting as Executing Agencies. But the “expanded opportunities” programme now means that some seven Executing Agencies, including the four regional development banks,127 FAO, IFAD and UNIDO, have, for different types of projects, direct access to financing from the Trust Fund without processing through the Implementing Agencies. Negotiating these “direct access” agreements has incidentally provided an interesting learning experience for the World Bank as Trustee. This experience and that of taking on the role of Trustee of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,128 for which it also does not have implementation responsibilities, may have modeled an important global public goods role for the Bank in the future in mobilising resources for such initiatives. NGOs have been recipients of grants from the Small Grants programme administered by UNDP but the Medium Size Project Programme also allows projects up to USD 1 million to be implemented by a diverse range of entities, which include bodies such as IUCN, universities and national conservation groups.129 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration urged States to “co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth ecosystem”. The family of institutions that make up the GEF has been able to establish a partnership system that extends far beyond States themselves.

124

125

126 127

128 129

See D. Freestone, “The Role of the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility in the Implementation of the Regime of the Law of the Sea Convention”, above note 99. Note that the GEF’s role complements that of the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol by financing reduction of ODSs in countries not eligible for support form the MFMP. Ibid. OPS3, p. 4. African Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Set up in January 2002. See generally Boisson de Chazournes, The Global Environment Facility as a Pioneering Institution, op. cit., chapter 4.

1106


This “family” also includes the institutions of, and parties to, the conventions for which the GEF acts as a financial mechanism. OPS3 again found that while it is a major challenge to remain responsive to the wide spread of guidance and priorities which the conferences of the parties provide, GEF has nevertheless been generally able to be responsive to the mandates given to it by those conventions.130 As we have seen above,131 all these conventions premise their financial mechanisms on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Over the last fifteen years the focal areas have grown from four to six. The conventions for which the GEF provides a financial mechanism have also increased from two to four. Yet the financial resources available to it have not grown at the same rate. Between 1991 and 1998 the replenishment totals grew from USD 1 billion to nearly USD 3 billion. This figure has not increased significantly since then.

130 131

OPS3, pp. 7-8. Above, at note 27 et seq. 1107

THE UNCC FOLLOW-UP PROGRAMME FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AWARDS Mojtaba Kazazi*

Introduction

T

his chapter comprises four sections. Section I provides an introduction to the United Nations Compensation Commission (“the Commission” or “the UNCC”) and its ground breaking work in the resolution of 170 claims from 12 Governments for environmental loss and depletion of natural resources totalling approximately USD 85 billion: work that was led by Judge Mensah, as the Chairman of the panel of Commissioners for the UNCC environmental claims (the F4 panel), together with two other eminent Commissioners.1 Section II provides information on the role of the UNCC Governing Council in monitoring the distribution of compensation awards in general, and in the tracking of monitoring and assessment projects funded by the UNCC in particular. Section III, provides an overview of the Guidelines for the Follow-up Programme for Environmental Awards that was established by the Governing Council of the UNCC in December 2005 in order to monitor, technically and financially, the implementation of the remediation projects that were the subject-matter of the compensation awards approved by the Governing Council, on the basis of recommendations from the F4 panel. Section IV refers to a related development that has arisen, albeit indirectly, from the environmental claims of the UNCC, i.e., a new regional initiative that has brought together the principal claimant Governments involved in the F4 claims, and subsequently in the Follow-up Programme for Environmental Awards (Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait),

*

Comments from Thomas Walker, Emily Ohler and Michael Armstrong are acknowledged with gratitude. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the UNCC.

1

Commissioner José R. Allen and Commissioner Peter H. Sand. The F4 panel was assisted in its work by a dedicated team within the UNCC Secretariat as well as a multi-disciplinary team of outside expert consultants.



as well as the Government of Iraq, with the primary aim of assisting Iraq in the remediation of its war-related environmental damage.

I. The Work of Environment Claims Panel The UNCC was established by the Security Council in 1991 at the end of the Gulf War2 to process claims and pay compensation for direct loss, damage or injury resulting from Iraq’s August 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait.3 The Commission received over 2.7 million claims through nearly 100 Governments and a number of international organizations. The total amount claimed by all claimants was approximately USD 352 billion. All of the claims have now been resolved. The Commission has awarded in total over USD 52 billion in compensation, and has so far paid over USD 22 billion to successful claimants. As of May 2007, all but the largest 39 compensation awards are paid in full.4 The Commission, located at the United Nations European headquarters in Geneva, comprised three organs. First, the fifteen-member Governing Council, composed of the representatives of the current members of the Security Council at any given time, is the policy-making organ of the Commission.5 Second, the Commissioners, appointed by the Governing Council, reviewed the claims and determined whether there was a direct link between Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait and the alleged loss, assessed the value of direct losses suffered by claimants, and recommended compensation to the Governing Council. There were 19 panels of Commissioners, each composed of three members, reviewing

2

See Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 692 (1991), and Secretary-General’s Report of 2 May 1991 (UN Doc. S/22559).

3

See paragraph 16 of the Security Council resolution 687 of 3 April 1991: “Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”

4

For texts of pertinent Security Council resolutions, decisions of the Governing Council and the reports and recommendations of the panels of Commissioners see the Commission’s website <www.uncc.ch>. See also Documents of the United Nations Compensation Commission, Vol. 1 – Basic Documents (hereinafter “UNCC Documents”), UN Doc. S/AC.26/ SER.A/1, which contains relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and decisions of the Governing Council.

5

The Governing Council establishes the criteria for the compensability of claims, the rules and procedures for processing the claims, the guidelines for the administration of the Compensation Fund and the mechanisms for the payment of compensation.

1110

The UNCC Follow-up Programme for Environmental Awards

instalments of individual, corporate or governmental claims. As of June 2005, all panels had finalized their work and disbanded. Finally, the Secretariat6 services the Governing Council, and assisted the panels of Commissioners.7 The role of the UNCC on claims does not end with the issuance of awards by the panels of Commissioners and its approval by the Governing Council. The Commission has a built-in mechanism for ensuring payment of its awards, with no extra procedures or cost, through which it pays the successful claimants from the United Nations Compensation Fund.8 It is important to note that the UNCC is not an international court or tribunal,9 but an administrative fact-finding body created as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council at the end of the Gulf War, to pay compensation to the victims of military operations, under the auspices of the United Nations.10 Claims for environmental damage and depletion of natural resources (the F4 claims) were filed by 12 Governments for a total claimed amount of USD 85 billion. The F4 claims were primarily related to damage to terrestrial resources, damage to marine resources, depletion of natural resources, damage to public health, clean up and remediation/restoration costs relating to oil spills, and damage to cultural heritage.11 The F4 panel commenced its work in December 1998 after the expiry of a relatively long deadline for the filing of environmental claims. The Secretariat grouped and prepared the environmental claims, and submitted them in five instalments to the F4 panel after a preliminary review and claims development. Instalment one comprised past and future monitoring and assessment claims that were to be reviewed by the panel with priority, in order to determine the

6

The Secretariat comprised lawyers, accountants, loss adjusters, information technology specialists, other experts and support staff.

7

The Commission presently consists of the Governing Council, and a residual Secretariat that supports the council, continues to effect payment to remaining unpaid awards, and carries on the monitoring tasks assigned to it under the Follow-up Programme for Environmental Awards.

8

The Compensation Fund currently receives 5 per cent of the proceeds from the sales of Iraq’s oil. See Security Council resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003, para. 21.

9

See Secretary-General’s Report of 2 May 1991 (UN Doc. S/22559), at para. 20.

10

For more information on the UNCC and its claims processing see the Commission’s website <www.uncc.ch>; and, e.g., M. Kazazi, “Environmental Damage in the Practice of UNCC” in M. Bowman and A. Boyle (eds.), Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law: Problems of Definition and Valuation, Oxford University Press 2002, at pp.111-120.

11

For an overview of the processing and valuation of the UNCC environmental claims see M. Kazazi, ibid. at pp. 120-126; and P.H. Sand, “Compensation for Environmental Damage from the1991 Gulf War” in Envtl. Pol’y & L., Vol. 35 No. 6 (Dec. 2005), p. 244. 1111


existence of environmental harm and its nature and extent.12 Instalment two was devoted to claims related to measures already taken to remedy and restore the environment. This instalment included all the non-regional claims as well as some of the incurred cost claims from Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. A primary component of this instalment was the mine clearance and ordnance disposal claim from Kuwait in the amount of USD 703 million for which USD 688 million was awarded. This claim was administered in two parts: one for the removal of ordnance and another for disposal of ordnance.13 Instalments three and four claims were for future measures to clean and restore the damaged environment.14 Instalment five included claims for damage to public health, claims for depletion of natural resources, and cultural heritage.15 The panel submitted to the Governing Council its report and recommendations on claims for monitoring and assessment of environment losses in March 2001,16 and issued its reports and recommendations for the four instalments of substantive environmental claims between then and March 2005. The panel’s review and evaluation of claims was based on the criteria set for the processing of claims of Governments and international organizations,17 and the Governing Council’s further explicit guidance for the Commissioners in deciding which claimed environmental losses are direct.18

12

See Report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning the first instalment of F4 claims (hereinafter the “monitoring and assessment report”), (UN Doc. S/AC.26/2001/16).

13

See Report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning the second instalment of F4 claims (UN Doc. S/AC.26/2002/26).

14

See Reports and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning: the third instalment (UN Doc. S/AC.26/2003/31); part one of the fourth instalment (UN Doc. S/AC.26/2004/16); and part two of the fourth instalment (UN Doc. S/AC.26/2004/17) of F4 claims.

15

See Report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning the fifth instalment of F4 claims (UN Doc. S/AC.26/2005/10).

16

See the monitoring and assessment report, supra note 12.

17

See Governing Council decision 7 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1), paras 30-42.

18

See paragraph 35 of decision 7: “35. [Compensation is] available with respect to direct environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. This will include losses or expenses resulting from: (a) Abatement and prevention of environmental damage, including expenses directly relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil in coastal and international waters; (b) Reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment or future measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to clean and restore the environment;

1112


In total the panel awarded USD 5.3 billion for environmental damages to successful claimants. The awards included USD 243 million to five governments for monitoring and assessment studies; USD 864 million for natural resource losses and damage to public health; and USD 4.2 billion for cost of future environmental restoration. For purposes of discussion, the five instalments of F4 claims are grouped below into three broad categories: 1. Claims for Environmental Monitoring and Assessment There were 107 claims related to environmental monitoring and assessment activities that accounted for an approximate amount of USD 1 billion. Recognizing the importance for claimant Governments of monitoring and assessment studies to identify and substantiate the scope and extent of the environment loss, and that such studies are often time consuming and costly, the Governing Council adopted a number of measures and decisions that assisted in the speedy resolution and payment of monitoring and assessment claims: (a) In 1992, while establishing criteria for processing of environmental claims, the Council specified that claims for the costs of reasonable monitoring and assessment of environmental damage including those related to long term effect on human health are compensable by the Commission.19 (b) In 1992, the Council set a five-year deadline for filing the environmental claims, a period much longer than the deadlines fixed for filing of other categories of claims,20 in order to allow time for conducting the monitoring and assessment studies in advance of the filing period. (c) In September 1998, the Governing Council decided to accord priority to the processing of environmental monitoring and assessment claims, so that such claims could be resolved quickly and separately from the resolution of the related substantive claims for environmental damage. The Council directed that all claimants should identify and file separately, within a specified short time period, those portions of their claims already filed

(c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage for the purposes of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the environment; (d) Reasonable monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings for the purposes of investigation and combating increased health risks as a result of the environmental damage; and (e) Depletion of or damage to natural resources.” 19

Ibid.

20

See decision 12 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/1992/12). The original deadline of February 1997 was later extended in some exceptional cases by the Governing Council up to February 1998. 1113


with the Commission that pertained to the monitoring and assessment of environmental damage.21 (d) Finally, the Governing Council decided that “successful environmental monitoring and assessment claims will be given priority” in the overall claims payment process.22 On that basis, in June 2001, while approving the F4 panel’s report and recommendations on 107 monitoring and assessment claims, the Governing Council expedited the payment to the five successful claimant Governments by authorizing the full and immediate payment of the approved USD 243 million.23 These measures addressed a number of important issues that the claimants had raised with the Commission. Further, it made it possible for the F4 panel to review all the claims for the costs of monitoring and assessment projects together in one consolidated instalment in advance of the substantive claims, and to pronounce its views on them through the panel’s report and recommendations to the Governing Council.24 The guidance and direction from the panel, provided through its determinations on the monitoring and assessment claims, on the appropriateness and reasonableness of the proposed monitoring and assessment studies, were critical for the claimants as at that time almost none of the required studies that were presumably required to support claimants’ substantive environmental claims had yet been carried out.25

21

See the decision of the Governing Council of 30 September 1998, in UNCC Documents, at p. 186. The Council’s decision was made in response to a joint request from the five main claimant Governments (i.e., Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria).

22

See paragraph (e) of decision 100 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.100 (2000)).

23

See decision 132, (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.132 (2001)).

24

See generally the monitoring and assessment report, supra note 12. For an overview of the F4 panel report and recommendations on 107 claims for monitoring and assessment of environment losses see M. Kazazi, supra note 10, at pp. 126-129.

25

At its June 2001 session, the Council also adopted its decision 124 concerning the provision of technical assistance to Iraq (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.124 (2001)). The aim was to “facilitate the promotion of legitimate interests of Iraq with respect to F4 claims, which give rise to particular questions due to their complexity and the limited amount of relevant international practice”, and also to assist the F4 panel of Commissioners in the conduct of its tasks by ensuring the full development of the facts. Through this decision the Council initially made USD 5 million available to Iraq from the Commission’s administrative budget. This fund, which was eventually increased to a maximum of USD 14 million, was used by Iraq for retention of legal counsel and various experts to assist in preparing its views and comments on environmental claims, and for attending hearings with the panel and claimant Governments.

1114


2. Substantive Environmental Claims Large claims for environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources in the Persian Gulf region including those resulting from oil-well fires and the discharge of oil into the sea, were filed by five Governments in the region: Iran (USD 13.5 billion), Jordan (USD 5.6 billion), Kuwait (USD 16 billion), Saudi Arabia (USD 44.8 billion), Syria (USD 3.8 billion), and Turkey (USD 10.6 million).26 The F4 panel reviewed the substantive environmental claims in instalments two to five. Claims for compensation for costs already incurred and claims for funds for remediation and restoration projects were both included in this group. Awards for remediation projects were related to: terrestrial oil contamination in Kuwait (USD 2.2 billion and an estimated programme duration of ten years); coastal oil contamination in Kuwait (USD 4 million and an estimated programme duration of one year) and in Saudi Arabia (USD 463 million and an estimated programme duration of ten years); groundwater contamination in Kuwait (USD 41.5 million and an estimated programme duration of ten years); physical damage to desert rangelands resulting from military operations in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (USD 475 million for Kuwait and USD 619 million for Saudi Arabia with an estimated programme duration of 15 years for each), and in Jordan and Iran resulting from movement and temporary settlement of refugees and their livestock (USD 160 million and an estimated programme duration of 20 years for Jordan and USD 188,760 and an estimated programme duration of one year for Iran). 3. Non-Regional Claims This group comprised relatively small claims for costs incurred by the Governments of Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States in providing assistance to countries that were affected by the environmental damage. The total amount claimed by six Governments outside the affected region was USD 43 million for which USD 8.3 million was awarded. The claims covered assistance provided in relation to the alleviation of the damage caused by the oil-well fires, the prevention and clean up of pollution, the provision of manpower and supplies, and monitoring and assessment of environmental damage.27

26

These were claims for damage to forest caused by refugees, for which the F4 panel recommended no compensation primarily due to evidentiary issues.

27

See Report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning the second instalment of F4 claims (UN Doc. S/AC.26/2002/26). 1115


II. Monitoring and Tracking of Environmental Awards 1. Governing Council Role in Monitoring of Distribution of Payment in General Payment of claims being an important function of the UNCC, the Governing Council established guiding principles and mechanisms for payment of approved claims and has revised the payment process as appropriate. The Council has regulated the order, priority, and transparency of payment to successful claimants28 and monitors the distribution of payment for compensation awards.29 Governments and international organizations are obligated to distribute funds to successful claimants expeditiously and to report to the Commission on payments made to claimants. Any funds not distributed to claimants within 12 months of receiving payment by Government or international organizations shall be returned to the Commission.30 In the context of F4 claims, however, various unique issues arose with regard to monitoring the “distribution” of award funds. More specifically, because the F4 claims consisted of both financial and substantive technical elements, the question of how to ensure that the funds were distributed to successful claimants became one of ensuring that the funds were used to undertake the specific environmental projects approved by the F4 panel. 2. Tracking the Monitoring and Assessment Awards The issue of how to monitor the use of funds awarded for the environment arose first in 2001 when the Governing Council awarded USD 243 million to five Governments for the environmental monitoring and assessment projects that had been approved by the F4 panel. In other categories of claims, the purpose of the Governing Council monitoring of the payment of awards was to ensure that funds paid by the Commission reached the individuals or the entity concerned. In the first environmental awards that were approved for payment, the Council had extra concerns arising from the nature of the environmental claims and monitoring and assessment awards.

28

See decision 17 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.17 (1994)).

29

See decision 18 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.18 (1994)).

30

Further payments to Government and international organizations concerned shall be suspended where they fail to report on the distribution of funds to successful claimants or fail to return undistributed funds on time. See Governing Council decision 48 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.48 (1998)), and the Governing Council’s decisions of 25 March 1999 and 30 September 1999, in UNCC Documents, at pp. 188 and 191. A final deadline of September 2006 for finding unlocated claimants has now expired and the UNCC does not make further repayments to such claimants.

1116


In reviewing the monitoring and assessment claims, the panel had recommended funding for those monitoring and assessment projects where it was reasonable to assume that there was damage resulting from military operations, without requiring conclusive proof beforehand that there existed in fact environmental damage.31 The panel had noted, “such an approach would deprive the claimant of the opportunity to generate the very evidence that it needs to demonstrate the nature and extent of damage that may have occurred”.32 The Council, while agreeing with the panel’s approach on monitoring and assessment claims, was mindful of a situation where the initial monitoring would show that there was no environmental loss at all or that the damage had been remedied naturally. Further the Council wanted to ensure that the awarded funds would be spent for the projects that they were awarded for. The Council therefore sought a mechanism to retain the discretion to re-visit the monitoring and assessment awards, even after the payment had been made, in the light of the new information that could become available as a result of monitoring and assessment projects, and to stop a monitoring and assessment project at any stage that it became clear that there was no benefit in continuing it. To address this issue, the Council directed the panel of Commissioners to set up a tracking mechanism with respect to the expenditure of the awarded funds and in its decision approving the first instalment of environmental claims containing monitoring and assessment claims requested the F4 panel of Commissioners: “to ensure that funds are spent on conducting the environmental monitoring and assessment activities in a transparent and appropriate manner and that the funded projects remain reasonable monitoring and assessment activities .…”33 For this purpose, the F4 panel of Commissioners was also requested “to issue procedural orders directing claimant Governments to submit periodic progress reports concerning the environmental monitoring and assessment projects to the panel”,34 and to keep the Governing Council “informed of such progress reports for any appropriate action that may be required”.35 The panel implemented the Council’s decision and requested that the claimant Governments submit bi-annual progress reports concerning their environmental monitoring and assessment projects and the use of the awards funds. Further, under the supervision of the panel, a dual tracking system was developed by the Secretariat that reviewed the

31

See the monitoring and assessment report, paras 29-32.

32

Ibid. para. 33.

33

See Governing Council decision 132 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.132 (2001)), para. 6.

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid. 1117


information received from the claimant Governments in response to F4 panel procedural orders, as follows: (a) The Secretariat reviewed the information received and prepared reports for the panel on the financial aspects of the monitoring and assessment projects, including certification of an audit of award funds that the Governing Council agreed to at a later stage at the recommendation of the panel. The Secretariat also compared the percentage of actual reported progress with the fund spent in each project; and (b) A team from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) also reviewed the monitoring and assessment information received from the claimant Governments and submitted substantive reports on them to the panel.36 Through this exercise, the panel was able to ascertain and report to the Governing Council the progress made and amount of funds spent on each monitoring and assessment project and whether there were surplus funds or not. Between September 2002 and early 2005 (when the panel completed its work on F4 claims) the panel submitted eight reports to the Governing Council on this issue,37 confirming that all but four of the projects remain reasonable monitoring and assessment activities.38 Further, the panel brought to the attention of the Council a Government’s non-use of the full amount of the funds awarded for its monitoring and assessment projects.39 In considering the panel’s tracking reports, the Council sought further information as necessary from the Governments concerned and acted upon the technical and financial recommendations from the panel taking into account the further explanations provided by the claimant Governments as to the actual status of the projects and their relevance to the remediation projects proposed

36

The Post-Conflict Assessment Unit of UNEP provided advice to the panel, and also assisted in creating for the UNCC a databank of the monitoring and assessment information, pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding dated 5 August 2002 between the UNCC and UNEP, which expired at the end of 2004.

37

See Report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning the fifth instalment of F4 claims (UN Doc. S/AC.26/2005/10), note 120.

38

The F4 panel reported to the Governing Council that, as of February 2005, 53 of the 69 approved projects were completed and that those 53 projects together with 12 of the ongoing projects constituted reasonable monitoring and assessment activities. With respect to the remaining four projects, the panel concluded that “further work on these projects was no longer necessary as far as the Commission was concerned” and recommended to the Governing Council that the remaining funds with respect to these monitoring and assessment project be returned by the Governments concerned. See ibid. para.782.

39

The saving in costs had resulted from the use of local experts and also from reducing the scope of some of the projects.

1118


by the panel. In instances where there were extra funds after completion of the projects,40 the Governments concerned abided by the request from the Governing Council and returned the extra funds. 3. Tracking of Substantive Environmental Awards The issue of monitoring the expenditure of substantive environmental awards and the extent of involvement of the Governing Council in that exercise surfaced again in late 2003 when the F4 panel report and recommendations on the third instalment of environmental claims, the first report to include recommendations on substantive environmental claims, was submitted to the Council for approval.41 The monitoring issue was more complicated for substantive environmental claims due to the magnitude of the awards, the longer time needed for the implementation of the projects (some of them are estimated to take between 15 to 20 years), and the fact that the panel would disband after finalizing its work on F4 claims and the UNCC was scheduled to phase out its activities. At the same time, the Government of Iraq submitted a written request to the Governing Council, mainly on the necessity of tracking the expenditure in substantive claims in order to ensure that the funds are spent for the purpose for which they were awarded and in a transparent manner under the control of the Governing Council. This request, as further explained by the delegation of the Government of Iraq at the plenary meetings of a number of Governing Council subsequent sessions, was timely as the Council had on its agenda the consideration of the F4 panel report on the third instalment as well as the issue of the monitoring of the use of funds.42 The discussion of the issue at the Council session revealed that, while more time and work was needed to work out and agree on the modalities and details of an appropriate mechanism, there was consensus among the Council members on the need for the tracking of substantive claims and a monitoring mechanism tailored to the nature of environmental projects. Therefore, in approving the panel report on the third instalment of F4 claims (on 18 December 2003) and later in approving three subsequent panel reports concerning parts one and two

40

The Secretariat continued the financial monitoring of the ongoing projects after the panel disbanded in March 2005.

41

See Report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning the third instalment of F4 claims (UN Doc. S/AC.26/2003/31).

42

Another related topic on the agenda of the December 2003 session of the Governing Council was the issue of a new payment mechanism. A joint statement on this issue was presented to the Council by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, also on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the State of Kuwait, for expediting the payment of the environmental remediation awards. 1119


of the fourth instalment (on 9 December 2004) and the fifth instalment of F4 claims (on 30 June 2005) the Governing Council directed that, “to ensure that funds are spent on conducting the environmental remediation activities and monitoring and assessment activity in a transparent and appropriate manner and that the funded projects remain reasonable remediation activities and monitoring and assessment activity, claimant Governments are directed to submit to the Secretariat every six months progress reports concerning the status of the funds received and the environmental remediation projects and monitoring and assessment activity. The Secretariat will keep the Governing Council informed of such progress reports for any appropriate action that may be required. The Governing Council shall consider what further measures may be necessary to ensure that the funds will only be used for reasonable remediation projects and monitoring and assessment activity, and shall specify any mechanism that may be necessary or take any appropriate action that may be required”.43 In January 2005, the Governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in a joint letter to the Commission expressed their support for Iraq’s proposal to establish a follow-up programme and suggested that the UNCC call for a meeting of the claimant Governments and Iraq in March 2005 to discuss the issue. Subsequently, a number of regional meetings were held with the participation of the claimant Governments and Iraq under the auspices of the UNCC. In these meetings the outline and elements of a monitoring programme and its objectives were discussed in detail.44 In the meantime, the Council continued its consideration of the issue in light of the progress that was being made at the regional meetings. In September 2005, the Council requested that the secretariat develop detailed guidelines for monitoring the technical and financial aspects of the environmental remediation projects for consideration by the Council. On that basis, the Secretariat prepared draft guidelines with expert assistance. The guidelines were discussed and agreed on at a follow-up meeting with the claimant Governments and Iraq that was held under the auspices of the UNCC in Geneva on 23 November 2005, and the participant Governments requested that the draft guidelines be submitted to the Governing Council for approval. The Governing Council discussed the draft

43

See decisions 212 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.212 (2003)), 234 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.234 (2004)) 235 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.235 (2004)) and 248 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.248 (2005)) of the Governing Council. Text in italics appears only in decision 248.

44

These meetings brought together high officials from Iraq and Kuwait, as well as other claimant Governments, for close cooperation perhaps for the first time since 1990.

1120


guidelines at a number of informal meetings in advance of its December 2005 session and adopted the guidelines at that session.45 At the time the guidelines were approved in December 2005, no significant follow-up action had taken place on the actual monitoring of the use of funds in substantive awards, primarily because the claimant Governments had not yet commenced the implementation of the approved restoration projects due to the fact that at that time the UNCC had paid out only a small percentage of the awards on environmental claims.

III. Guidelines for the Follow-up Programme 1. Overview In December 2005, the Governing Council established the Follow-up Programme for Environmental Awards (the “Programme”) through adoption of decision 258 and the attached Guidelines for the Programme.46 The Governing Council created the Programme in response to a specific request from the Government of Iraq dated 16 December 2003; the statements made by the Iraqi delegation at the opening plenary meetings of the fifty-third session in September 2004 and the fifty-fourth session in December 2004 regarding monitoring of the use of environmental awards and transparency in expenditures; and the positive response by the concerned F4 claimant Governments consisting of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. As noted earlier, the issue of how best to monitor the implementation of substantive F4 awards by claimant Governments had been a concern of the Council for a number of years. While approving various instalments of substantive F4 claims, the Council had already established the foundation for a tracking and reporting programme for environmental awards,47 in addition to the general reporting requirements already in place for all categories of claims.48 Through the

45

As an important step for the claimant Governments, at the same session, the Council also concluded its ongoing discussion regarding a new payment mechanism and priority of payment for the outstanding claims and adopted its decision 256 that provides, inter alia, priority in the payment of substantive environmental awards. See decision 256 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.256 (2005)).

46

See decision 258 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.258 (2005)) adopted at the fifty-eighth session of the Governing Council held from 6 to 8 December 2005 and the attached Guidelines for the Follow-up Programme for Environmental Awards (hereinafter “Guidelines”), on the UNCC website.

47

See decisions 132 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.132 (2001)), and decisions quoted in supra note 43.

48

See decision 18 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.18 (1994)). 1121


Guidelines the Council established further measures that it considered necessary for the reporting process to ensure that funds will only be used for reasonable projects, as it had repeatedly stated in a number of decisions.49 The Programme was created to ensure transparency, and as a mechanism for monitoring the financial and technical aspects of various environmental projects being undertaken by the Governments of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia with funds awarded by the Governing Council under the F4 category of claims. Not all successful F4 claims are subject to the Guidelines under the Programme. From the total F4 awards of USD 5.4 billion, the claims governed by the Programme include environmental projects totaling in excess of USD 4.3 billion. This comprises USD 3 billion to remedy terrestrial/marine oil contamination and military damage to desert rangelands in Kuwait; USD 1.2 billion for Saudi Arabia’s remediation projects addressing terrestrial military damage and coastal oil spill contamination; USD 161 million for Jordan’s rangeland restoration project; and USD 0.2 million for rangeland restoration in Iran. In addition to the 12 remediation and restoration projects, the Follow-up Programme provides oversight to ensure that 14 continuing monitoring and assessment projects50 in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran remain reasonable from both the technical and financial perspectives.51 As implemented by the Secretariat, the Programme is a cooperative process that brings together four claimant Governments, the Government of Iraq, and the UNCC for the successful and environmentally sound implementation of remediation projects of unprecedented size and complexity. The Guidelines define the roles and responsibilities of key players in the Programme.52 In addition to ensuring transparency and reasonableness in the expenditure of award funds, the Programme’s technical monitoring involves ensuring that remediation and restoration activities undertaken by the claimant Governments are consistent with the objectives and goals of the F4 panel recommendations as approved by the Governing Council. A key element of the Guidelines is

49

See decision 258 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.258 (2005)), recalling decisions 212, 234, 235 and 248.

50

Thirteen from the first instalment and one from the fifth instalment.

51

For a list of the projects covered by the Programme, including claim and instalment numbers and award amounts, see annex I to the Guidelines for the Follow-up Programme for Environmental Awards. Excluded from the Programme are: the completed monitoring and assessment projects from the first instalment; the second instalment in its entirety because it consisted of claims for compensation in respect of projects that had already been undertaken and completed and claims for compensation in respect of strict monetary losses without a technical or project-based component; and natural resource damage awards in third, fourth and fifth instalment.

52

See Guidelines, paras 7-32.

1122


that they contemplate changes in the approved restoration projects on the basis of new knowledge resulting from further scientific assessments and field demonstrations. The UNCC therefore will consider material changes to projects provided the proposed modification is a more effective way of achieving the remediation objectives, and that it will not have any significant unintended adverse consequences on the ecosystem.53 Under the Guidelines, each claimant Government is to designate a National Focal Point to act as both coordinator and administrator of the projects, and as liaison between the claimant Government and the UNCC. The claimant Governments are responsible for the implementation of the remediation projects, for recommending experts as Independent Reviewers for the UNCC approval, and for reporting and responding to requests for information from the UNCC on the ongoing projects.54 Each claimant Government is required to report to the UNCC, thorough the Independent Reviewers, on its ongoing projects. The critical project stages for which information should be reported include both the initial planning and the project implementation phases. In addition, the Independent Reviewers should address project modifications or problems in their reports.55 The Government of Iraq participates in the Programme and designates a National Focal Point for contacts with the claimant Governments and the UNCC. Further, through a regional committee of National Focal Points “Iraq and claimant Governments will meet for coordination, cooperation and exchange of information, as necessary”. In addition, the Government of Iraq will be informed of the projects and the progress made, will be provided by the Secretariat with copies of the final reports of the Independent Reviewers. Responses or comments received from Iraq will be submitted to the Governing Council.56 At the time of adoption of the Guidelines, the Governing Council was aware of an ongoing effort by the claimant Governments and Iraq to cooperate further through a regional cooperation programme outside the UNCC and that the regional programme may also provide a means for Iraq to receive information about the environmental projects.57 2. Independent Reviewers Critical to the programme’s monitoring function is the role of individual Independent Reviewers, who are nominated by each claimant Government and approved by the UNCC. Their role is to review the technical and financial

53

Ibid. para. 43.

54

Ibid. paras 7 to 11.

55

Ibid. para.12.

56

Ibid. paras 22-23.

57

Ibid. para. 24. 1123


progress of each project, from the planning phase forward, and provide detailed periodic reports to the Secretariat for presentation in turn to the Governing Council. The Guidelines describe the main responsibilities of the Independent Reviewers as follows: “(a) to follow each project closely in cooperation with the claimant Governments and to provide regular monitoring and evaluation reports to the UNCC on the implementation of the remediation/restoration projects according to the technical and financial guidelines; (b) to identify any material modifications in the projects; (c) to identify significant problems that may arise in the implementation of the remediation/restoration projects; and (d) to notify the Secretariat of any such modifications and problems in a timely manner. The reports of the Independent Reviewers will be based on documents provided by claimant Governments, site inspections and discussion with project personnel, that they determine to be necessary.”58 The concept of Independent Reviewers, as international or local experts who are independent with respect to the projects and who work closely with the Secretariat, was developed by the Secretariat in consultation with the claimant Governments in order to facilitate the management of the Programme and to alleviate the need for a large staff at a time that the UNCC was winding down its operations. As a result, while the Secretariat’s staff allocated to the Programme is minimal, the core staff expertise is reinforced by the Independent Reviewers recruited by each Government. The number of Independent Reviewers contracted and the expertise represented will be different for each claimant Government based on the specific technical requirements of their respective projects. For example, while Jordan’s claim pertains to a massive rangelands restoration project, Saudi Arabia has large marine and coastal restoration claims, and Kuwait has various projects including the remediation of oil lakes and consequent restoration of the affected terrestrial landscape. The Independent Reviewers, while not reporting to the claimant Governments, will work collaboratively and interact closely with them in order to follow each project on an ongoing basis, so as to be fully and promptly informed of the progress in the projects as well as of any material modifications to the approved projects that may become necessary. Close collaboration with the Governments concerned should make it possible for Independent Reviewers to detect any significant problems as early as possible and to raise concerns or objections at an early stage of the project, before significant time or money is spent.

58

Ibid. para. 16.

1124


It is important to note that the role of an Independent Reviewer is not limited to auditing progress, but is intended to be collaborative and transparent, with the purpose of assisting the Governments concerned by alerting them early in the process rather than disagreeing with an act or finding problems after the fact. For this purpose the Secretariat has encouraged the participating Governments to appoint the Independent Reviewers as early as possible and to consult with them on all aspects of setting up the projects including planning, bidding for contracts, selection of contractors, etc. Therefore, it is expected that Independent Reviewers, in addition to reporting on progress in the projects, will be a valuable resource to the concerned Governments, particularly with respect to quality assurance. Further, while the claimant Governments are required to provide full information and supporting documentation on the projects to Independent Reviewers, the Programme is designed to reduce the workload for the Secretariat through the filtering of information by the Independent Reviewers.59 At the same time the Secretariat has the authority to ask for more information or documents from the Governments or Independent Reviewers, to make site inspections or to appoint its own experts (who will be recruited ad hoc as necessary) to provide further opinions. Working with the Secretariat, claimant Governments have been assembling Independent Reviewer teams that represent the areas of expertise pertinent to the projects involved; that have real-world, practical experience with large scale projects; and where possible that represent diverse geographical and technical perspectives. Although not foreseen in the Guidelines, the Secretariat and the participating Governments have discussed whether for practical purposes each Government should also designate an IR Coordinator in order to facilitate the communication among the Government concerned, the Secretariat and the Independent Reviewers, or whether that task should be taken up by the office of the National Focal Point. Given that the evaluation of most of the remediation projects covered by the Programme will require a wide array of expertise, it will be helpful if a Coordinator, who may well be one of the Independent Reviewers, can facilitate the exchange of views and discussions among various Independent Reviewers assigned to projects of a Government before each Independent Reviewer team finalizes its periodic reports to the UNCC. Nonetheless, it is agreed that the role of the Coordinator will remain organizational, administrative and logistical, and should not affect the independence and accountability of each Independent Reviewer.

59

Ibid. paras 13 and18. 1125


3. Funds Withholding and Phasing Plans Two mechanisms for withholding project award funds are built into the Guidelines, as a means of encouraging the Governments to stay on a course consistent with the direction provided by the Governing Council and the F4 panel recommendations. First, for each project, 15 percent of the award is to be withheld until successful completion of the project.60 Second, “[w]here projects with long duration are being implemented in multiple phases, the Governing Council may decide to withhold a higher percentage of the relevant awards to be released proportionally to the successful completion of each phase”.61 For that purpose, the Governing Council has decided that this measure shall be applied to the five projects covered by the Programme with awards greater than USD 50 million. For these projects, which represent 98 per cent of the amount covered by the Programme, technical and financial phasing plans must be submitted by the claimant Governments and approved by the Governing Council before commencement of the project.62 Apart from the impact of phasing on financial monitoring of the projects, the Guidelines generally recommend a phased approach in implementation of the restoration/remediation projects in order to ensure remediation and restoration measures can be modified as necessary over time to improve their success. Phasing is consistent with the F4 panel’s recommendations, will facilitate the implementation of the remediation projects, and builds in flexibility and responsiveness to new information that may be obtained at an earlier phase or as a result of pilot projects.63 The Guidelines do not provide details of the criteria to be used by the UNCC for evaluating phasing plans submitted by governments, leaving room for flexibility. Therefore, the Secretariat will generally review phasing plans to determine whether they provide reasonable and practical approaches for ensuring that adequate funding for ongoing remediation/restoration efforts is made available to claimant Governments on a timely basis, while at the same time ensuring that the Governing Council maintains the ability to verify that expenditure of the awards results in cost-effective achievement of the environmental objectives specified by the F4 panel. 4. Programme Funding An additional point of interest about the Programme is the fact that its costs are borne by the claimant Governments through voluntary contributions 60

See decision 258 (UN Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.258 (2005)), para. 3.

61

Ibid.

62

Ibid. para. 4.

63

See Guidelines, para. 44.

1126


deducted proportionally from their F4 awards, and therefore the Programme does not burden the UNCC administrative budget. Under the Guidelines, the UNCC is required to use such funds proportionally with respect to projects of each claimant Government. As approved compensation awards, the remediation projects that are covered by the Programme are funded from payments out of the Compensation Fund.64 Of over USD 4.3 billion of awards that are covered by the Programme, almost 20 per cent has been paid to date. The UNCC continues to make payments on a quarterly basis in accordance with decision 256 of the Governing Council regarding the payment mechanism and priority of payment of the outstanding claims that was adopted by the Governing Council at its December 2005 session. Decision 256, inter alia, established priority in payment of substantive environmental awards approved for the third, fourth and fifth instalments of category F4 environmental remediation claims after the full payment of individual awards.65

IV. Regional Environmental Remediation Advisory Group Since early 2006 and in parallel to the Follow-up Programme, the claimant Governments and Iraq, with the assistance of the Secretariat as an observer, have been negotiating the creation of a regional environmental initiative, known as the Regional Environmental Remediation Advisory Group (RERAG), primarily to allow Iraq an opportunity to address its war-related remediation projects. This initiative emerged from a consensus among all participants in the Followup Programme that Iraq’s environment also had sustained extensive damage, that it was in dire need of remediation after a long period of neglect and war, and that Iraq was not in a position to finance such projects on its own. Further, as pollution does not recognise borders, there was a need to develop a regional long term integrated management approach, as it will not always be feasible to restore the damaged ecosystems of Iraq’s neighbours absent remediation activities in Iraq, and vice versa. At the same time, it was not feasible to allocate a portion of the environmental compensation awards for Iraq’s remediation projects, as Iraq initially requested, due to the fact that each award had been approved in favour of a particular Government and for a specific project, based on the documents and information provided by claimants and the evaluation of the F4 panel of the needs and costs of the project. Moreover, such a course of action, even if the Governments concerned would agree to it, would involve the UNCC in issues beyond its mandate and the scope of the Follow-up Programme. Therefore, the claimant Governments and

64

See supra note 8.

65

See decision 256 (S/AC.26/Dec.256 (2005)), and supra notes 42 and 45. 1127


Iraq agreed to address the needs of Iraq in a separate programme outside the UNCC that would not be affected by the inherent limitations of the UNCC but would benefit nonetheless from the experience and the structure put in place through the Follow-up Programme (e.g., National Focal Points and Independent Reviewers). A draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the establishment of the RERAG has been prepared and is currently under consideration by the participating Governments. A number of meetings on regional cooperation have been held to date in the region and in Geneva. The RERAG will consist of the National Focal Points of the members (i.e., Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), with the UNCC Secretariat as an observer. The general objective of the RERAG is to assist Iraq in identifying and developing its environmental rehabilitation requirements. The four claimant Governments view the RERAG as an appropriate means for helping to finance Iraq’s environmental rehabilitation projects. Further, members will cooperate in the field of environmental damage assessments and will share relevant scientific information.66 Funding of the RERAG is entirely independent from the UNCC. It is planned that the RERAG will be headquartered in Kuwait. Kuwait and other participating Governments have gained considerable experience through conducting numerous large monitoring and assessment studies since 2001, some of which are ongoing. It is valuable that the participating Governments are willing to share their experience, knowledge and know-how with Iraq. This will hopefully save Iraq considerable time and money in starting and carrying out its own monitoring and assessment projects. It goes without saying that if the MoU is signed by the participating Governments and the RERAG is launched, the benefits of the contemplated cooperation among the Governments concerned may go beyond the environmental remediation projects in Iraq and in the region, creating the potential for far reaching positive results.

66

At the most recent regional cooperation meeting, held in Kuwait on 22 November 2006, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UNCC participated. At that meeting, Kuwait’s Minister of Energy, in his capacity as the President of the Kuwait National Focal Point Ministerial Committee, announced Kuwait’s readiness and the decision by the Government of Kuwait to assist the Government of Iraq begin its environmental monitoring and assessment programme. Iraq’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Minister of the Environment were present at the meeting. In the meantime, a workshop is being organized by Kuwait, with the assistance of the UNCC, to assist Iraq’s experts in preparing and developing a blueprint for Iraq’s monitoring and assessment initiative that will focus on war-related environmental damage and possible remediation approaches and priorities.

1128


V. Final Observations Monitoring the use of funds awarded for the environmental rehabilitation projects was a natural extension of the role that the Governing Council had played in monitoring the distribution of payment to all categories of claims in general and with respect to the environmental monitoring and assessment projects in particular. Specifically, the Follow-up Programme has become more effective and legitimate because it was established by the Governing Council of the UNCC, at the request of the Government of Iraq, and with the full concurrence of the four claimant Governments concerned, to ensure that the awarded funds are spent on the environment and in a sound and transparent manner. Not only is the Programme unique on account of its undertaking of both financial and technical monitoring of post-conflict environmental remediation and restoration efforts, but the structure is also innovative. As a self-financed, collaborative Programme with minimal direct staff and costs, and through the development of the role of qualified and experienced Independent Reviewers, the Programme is designed to achieve its goals by actively involving all parties in a collaborative and organic process at all stages of the remediation projects. In this sense, the Programme is perhaps the first compliance measure of its kind in international law and could well serve as an interesting model for future monitoring programmes. The creation of a regional environmental infrastructure, designed to complement the Follow-up Programme, is also an important development. It is hoped that this effort will promote inter-governmental cooperation on the environment in the areas that are not within the scope of the Follow-up Programme thereby helping Iraq implement its own war-related monitoring and assessment and remediation projects.

1129

STRICT LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW Alexandre Kiss† and Dinah Shelton

T

he principle that a State is responsible for causing environmental harm outside its territory in breach of an international obligation has been slow to evolve to address the allocation of loss due to accidents. The issue was not before the arbitral tribunal in the well-known dispute between the United States and Canada1 concerning the activities of the Canadian smelter located in Trail, British Colombia. The arbitral tribunal asserted a general duty on the part of a State to protect other States from injurious acts by individuals within its jurisdiction. The arbitral agreement itself recognized the responsibility of a State for the acts of non-State actors as well as those of the State or its organs. Summing up, the tribunal found that “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence”.2 The tribunal noted the difficulty of determining what constitutes an injurious act. Despite claims for absolute prohibition of harmful activities, the tribunal agreed with national court precedents that States should take reasonable precautions to prevent harm, the same as those it would take to protect its own inhabitants. It may be concluded that a State’s failure to regulate or prevent serious harm from polluting activities, in instances where it would protect its own inhabitants, would constitute a wrongful act. The Trail Smelter arbitration set the foundations for discussions of responsibility and liability in environmental law3 but it left open the question of whether a State exercising all due diligence would be liable if transfrontier harm results despite the State’s best efforts. More generally, the tribunal did not clarify whether a State is liable only for intentional, reckless or negligent behavior (fault based

1

1931-1941, 3 RIAA 1905.

2

3 RIAA 1938, 1965.

3

The case continues to be invoked. In 1972, Canada referred to the judgment when an oil spill in Washington polluted beaches in British Colombia. 11 CYIL 333-334 (1973).



conduct) or whether it is strictly liable for all serious or significant transboundary environmental harm. In subsequent developments, international environmental law has come to distinguish responsibility, which arises upon breach of an international obligation, and liability for the injurious consequences of lawful activities. Progress towards clarification on this subject remains slow, however, as the following discussion demonstrates.4

I. State Responsibility Following the Trail Smelter arbitration, the ICJ asserted a general duty to avoid transboundary injury in the 1949 Corfu Channel case, which referred to “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used contrary to the rights of other States”.5 The same year as this decision, the United Nations Survey of International Law concluded that there is “general recognition of the rule that a State must not permit the use of its territory for purposes injurious to the interests of other States in a manner contrary to international law”.6 Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration restated the norm formulated in the Trail Smelter arbitration and other cases as follows: “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law … the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” The rule was reiterated in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration and was again confirmed in the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. It has also been reaffirmed in declarations adopted by the United Nations, including the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the World Charter for Nature, and has been adopted by other international organizations and conferences.7 4

On these topics, see T. Scovazzi, “State Responsibility for Environmental Harm”, 12 YB Int’l Envtl. L. 43 (2001); J.G. Lammers, “International Responsibility and Liability for Damage Caused by Environmental Interferences”, 31 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 42 (2001); R. Bratspies & R. Miller (eds), Transboundary Harm in International Law; Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (2006); G. Handl, “Transboundary Impacts”, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (2007); A. Boyle, “State Responsibility and International Liability For Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited By International Law: A Necessary Distinction”, 39 ICLQ 1 (1990).

5

ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22.

6

UN Doc. A/CN.4/1/Rev.1, at 34 (1949).

7

See e.g., Preliminary Declaration of a Program of Action of the European Communities in respect to the Environment, OJEC C 112/1, 20 December 1973; Final Act, Conference

1132

Strict Liability in International Environmental Law

Its content is inserted in the Convention on the Law of the Sea8 as well as in art. 20 of the ASEAN Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.9 The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution reproduces Principle 21 stating that the Principle “expresses the common conviction that States have” on this matter. Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration appears in the preamble of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Finally, the International Court of Justice recognized in an advisory opinion that “[t]he existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment”.10 This statement was repeated in the judgment concerning the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project, in which the Court also “recall[ed] that it has recently had occasion to stress … the great significance that it attaches to respect for the environment, not only for states but also for the whole of mankind”.11 While Stockholm Principle 21 and similar formulations can be read to impose absolute State responsibility for any transfrontier harm, whether intentional or accidental, States generally have not invoked it to assert claims for accidental harm, however damaging the impact. The Chernobyl incident is a case in point.12 Following the 26 April 1986 explosion in reactor Number 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the resulting fire melted a portion of the uranium fuel. Although there was no nuclear explosion and the core of the reactor did not melt, the fire which engulfed the reactor was serious and released a large quantity of radioactive material into the air. Large amounts of fallout occurred near the plant and spread beyond. Between 27 April and 8 May, nearly 50,000 persons were evacuated from towns located within a 30 kilometer radius of the plant. Two persons were immediately killed by the explosion, 29 died shortly after, and hundreds were afflicted with radiation poisoning. The foreign consequences were also severe, even though no deaths were immediately attributed to the accident. Following rapid changes in the

on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, August 1976. 8

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 194(2).

9

ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1985), 15 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 64 (1985).

10

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, pp. 241-242, para. 29.

11

Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 41, para. 53.

12

See L. Malone, “The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International Law Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution”, 12 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 203, 222 (1987). 1133


wind direction, the radioactive cloud which had formed crossed the airspace of a series of countries beginning with those of Scandinavia. Four days after the incident, radiation measurements along the Swedish coast were ten times higher than normal. The radioactive cloud moved south, crossing Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Italy. No conventional international regulation applied at the time the accident occurred in the Soviet Union. The interpretation then given to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution13 excluded pollution by radioactive elements. The USSR was not a contracting party to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.14 Indeed, among the States that suffered effects from the radioactive cloud, only Yugoslavia had signed and ratified the Convention. There remained, therefore, only the recourse to general rules of international environmental law and after consideration none of the affected States presented a claim to the Soviet Union. States did request the Governing Council of the IAEA to convene an extraordinary session with a group of governmental experts in order to elaborate measures to reinforce international cooperation in the field of nuclear security and radioactive protection. This meeting took place in Vienna from 21 July to 15 August 1986, and drafted two conventions which were adopted one month later by the IAEA General Conference. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, signed 26 September, entered into force on 27 October; the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency was signed the same day and also rapidly ratified by the signatories. The instrument on assistance traces a general framework for cooperation between States on the one hand, and between the States and the IAEA on the other, in the case of a nuclear accident or other radiological emergency. It seems that the last term can be interpreted as covering any danger caused by radiation, whatever the cause, and includes nuclear arms testing. Had the Convention on Assistance existed at the time of Chernobyl, any State exposed to radiation could have claimed assistance, whether or not the origin of the accident or emergency was found within its territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control.15 It is clear, however, that States parties did not accept any obligation other than cooperating among themselves and with the Agency in order to facilitate early response.16 Apparently no government pushed to conclude rules on State liability for accidental environmental harm. Negotiations would no doubt have been lengthy and perhaps unsuccessful over such matters as proximate harm, and 13

Geneva, 13 November 1979.

14

21 May 1963.

15

Art. 2, para. 1.

16

Art. 1, para. 1.

1134


mitigation of damages. The difficulty of evaluating the cost of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, especially the precautionary measures taken by the affected countries, also may have been a determinant factor in avoiding the issue of State responsibility. It also seems, however, to be consistent with the general reticence displayed towards rules imposing strict liability on States for damages caused by that State or its citizens. The emphatic preference remains measures of prevention rather than cure. Finally, in August 2001, the International Law Commission completed its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which the UN General Assembly “took note of ” in Resolution 56/83 (December 2001).17 According to article 2 of the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission, there is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. Article 3 adds that the characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. In other words the primary rules of conduct for States, i.e. their rights and duties, establish whether an act or omission constitutes a wrongful act. At present, as discussed in the next section, only a handful of treaties make States strictly liable for any harm that occurs in another State’s territory as a result of specific activities, even if the State has otherwise complied with its legal obligations. The large majority of multilateral environmental treaties focus not on the harm to the injured State, but on the conduct of the acting State, imposing duties of comportment and of result.

II. Strict Liability of States in Environmental Agreements Strict liability is foreseen in texts regulating activities considered as especially new or dangerous, such as the exploration and exploitation of outer space, and which are largely conducted by State actors. The Convention on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies,18 provides both for State responsibility and strict liability. First, article VI provides that the States Parties bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, require

17

The General Assembly recommended the articles to the attention of Member States “without prejudice to the question of their final adoption or other appropriate action”.

18

27 January 1967, International Environmental Law, Multilateral Treaties (EMUT) 967:07. 1135


authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State, thus ensuring State involvement. Article VII adds that each State that launches or procures the launching of an object into space and each State from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is liable to another State or to its natural or juridical persons for harm caused by such object, or its component parts, on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Taken together, these two provisions distinguish between responsibility based on fault (art. VI) and strict liability for the injurious consequences of space activities (art. VII). The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects19 develops these principles and gives several details concerning their implementation. According to its article II, a launching State is absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight. Whenever two or more States jointly launch a space object, they are jointly and severally responsible for any damage caused. A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched shall be regarded as a participant in a joint launching. Exoneration from strict liability is granted to the extent that a launching State establishes that the damage has resulted from another’s gross negligence or from an intentional act or omission. No exoneration will be granted in cases where the damage has resulted from activities conducted by a launching State in breach of international law. Nationals of the launching State or foreign nationals participating in the launching cannot ask compensation for the damage caused by the launching State (art. VII). A UN General Assembly resolution which proclaims several Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space20 refers to the Space Treaty and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects: “Each State which launches or procures the launching of a space object and each State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched is internationally liable for damage caused by such space objects or their component parts. This fully applies to the case of such a space object carrying a nuclear power source on board. Whenever two or more States jointly launch such an object, they shall be jointly and severally liable for any damage caused, in accordance with article V of the above-mentioned Convention.” Such provisions establish a regime of strict liability and not of responsibility. Within the Antarctic system, efforts to conclude a liability annex to the 1991 Madrid Protocol partially succeeded in June 2005, with conclusion of a limited 19

29 March 1972, EMUT, 972:24.

20

UNGA Res. A/47/68, 23 February1993 (32 ILM, 921).

1136


agreement on environmental emergencies, defined as any accidental event that takes place after the entry into force of the Annex when the accident results in or imminently threatens significant and harmful impact on the Antarctic environment. The agreement, adopted as Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection, will enter into force once all the present Consultative Parties have ratified it. The scope of potential liability extends to all governmental and non-governmental activities for which advance notice is required under the Treaty, including tourism. The system is thus a “mixed” one of liability for operators whether they are governmental or non-governmental actors. This is significant because many activities in Antarctica are conducted or sponsored by governments. Each State party is to require its operators to undertake reasonable preventive measures, establish contingency plans for responses to incidents with potential adverse environmental impacts, and take prompt and effective responsive action when an emergency results from its activities. If the operator fails to take response action, the relevant party is “encouraged” to take such action, as are other parties after notifying the party of the operator, if such notification is feasible. Any operator that fails to take prompt and effective response action is liable to pay the costs of response action taken by parties. Where the defaulting operator is a State operator and no party took response action, the State operator is liable to pay the equivalent of the costs of response action that should have been taken. This sum is paid into a fund.21 Liability is strict, but an operator will not be liable if the operator proves that the emergency was caused by (1) an act or omission necessary to protect human life or safety; (2) an exceptional natural disaster which could not have been reasonably foreseen, provided all reasonable preventive measures have been taken; (3) an act of terrorism; or (4) an act of belligerency against the activities of the operator. Sovereign immunity for warships is maintained, limits on liability are provided, and operators are to be required by each party to maintain adequate insurance or other financial security. Residual State liability is also included in the Annex. Although article 10 is drafted in the negative, to assume no liability, it nonetheless sets forth circumstances in which a party will be held liable: “A Party shall not be liable for the failure of an operator, other than its State operators, to take response action to the extent that the Party took appropriate measures within its competence, including the adoption of

21

Article 12 of the Liability Annex mandates the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty to maintain and administer a fund for the reimbursement of the reasonable and justified costs incurred by a party or parties in taking response actions to environmental emergencies. 1137


laws and regulations, administrative actions and enforcement measures, to ensure compliance with this Annex.” Although this article refers to liability, it seems to discuss State responsibility instead, because its focus is a State’s failure to comply with its legal obligations to take appropriate measures to prevent harm by non-State actors within its jurisdiction. Such omissions are often the basis of claims against States under the law of State responsibility.

III. The Development of Norms on State Liability for Hazardous Lawful Activities Since 1978, the International Law Commission has considered the question of “international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law”. In 1997, the ILC decided to deal only with the question of prevention of transboundary damage from hazardous activities and within four years it was able to present to the UN General Assembly a completed set of 19 articles on this topic.22 The General Assembly reviewed the articles and, pressed by certain member States, asked the ILC to continue working on the topic of international liability, “bearing in mind the interrelationship between prevention and liability…”.23 By July 2004 a draft set of principles on Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities was provisionally adopted by the Commission on first reading,24 and after comments by States, adopted on second reading in May 2006.25 To a large extent, these efforts can be seen to supplement and complete the ILC articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Conduct,26 although the content of the adopted rules appears largely to repudiate State liability when the State has complied with the Draft Articles on Prevention.

22

See Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess. Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, 370 (2001).

23

UN Doc. A/Res/56/82 of 18 January 2002.

24

UN Doc. A/59/10, 153-156.

25

See Draft Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, Chapter V: International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law (International Liability in Case of Loss from Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.693/ Add.1, 9 June 2006.

26

Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 55th Sess. Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001).

1138


The draft principles correctly approach the issue as one of allocating the risk of loss due to harm resulting from lawful economic or other activities, when the relevant State has complied with its due diligence obligations to prevent transboundary harm. The articles have merit in providing a general framework for States to adopt domestic law or conclude international agreements to ensure prompt and adequate compensation for the victims of transboundary damage caused by lawful hazardous activities. It is also explicitly stated that an additional purpose of the draft principles is “to preserve and protect the environment in the event of transboundary damage, especially with respect to mitigation of damage to the environment and its restoration and reinstatement”. This progressive principle should be read in the light of the broad definitions of damage,27 environment28 and hazardous activity29 set forth in Principle 2. The last definition in particular extends strict liability considerably beyond that provided in most domestic law. While there is an important restriction in the exclusion of harm to the commons from the scope of these principles, on the whole they give a prominent place to the protection and preservation of the environment per se for the benefit of present and future generations. The draft principles support existing State practice, described in the following section, which largely channels liability to the owner or operator and demands financial guarantees against future harm. As with many existing environmental treaties, the Principles call for imposing strict liability on the operator or other person or entity and requiring financial security to cover claims of compensation. In appropriate cases, industry-wide funds should be established at the national level. The articles do not support strict liability between States, unless the State itself is the operator.30 Principle 4(5) provides only that in the event that the measures for operator liability are insufficient, “the State of origin should also ensure that additional financial resources are made available”. Other obligations are placed on the State, however. It must promptly notify all States that are potentially or actually affected, ensure that appropriate response measures

27

In addition to personal and property losses, damage includes “loss or damage by impairment of the environment, the costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the environment, including natural resources, and the costs of reasonable response measures” (Principle 2(1)(iii-v)).

28

Environment includes natural resources, both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora and the interaction between the same factors, and the characteristic aspects of the landscape (Principle 2(b)).

29

In probably the broadest definition given in the draft articles, a hazardous activity “means an activity which involves a risk of causing significant harm” (Principle 2(c)).

30

The Commentary to the Draft Principles expressly States that “[i]t is envisaged that a State could be an operator for purposes of the present definition”. UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.693/ Add.1, 41, para. 33. 1139


are taken, and provide domestic remedies. Other measures are recommended, including consultation on measures of mitigation, seeking the assistance of competent international organizations, and providing appropriate access to information on remedies. In addition, States may negotiate specific agreements on the topic of strict liability. The lack of any serious consideration of State liability may be understood in the context of the prior articles on prevention: failure to fulfill the due diligence duty to prevent is considered to breach an international obligation and shifts the applicable legal regime to one of State responsibility. Still, to dismiss liability as “a case of misplaced priority”31 ignores existing positive law which, as described above, has accepted the principle of State liability without fault in a series of treaties concerning ultrahazardous activities that are largely conducted by State actors. These are clearly circumstances in which the primary obligation of a State is to ensure/insure that harm does not occur. Nonetheless, the ILC appears to have decided that strict liability of States does not even have support as a measure of progressive development in the law.32 Instead, the ILC limits itself to noting that certain categories of hazardous activities might be included in treaties providing for State-funded compensation schemes to supplement civil liability. It stops well short of finding that such compensation is legally required. Strict liability of States thus remains very controversial and the preference is clearly in favor of imposing civil liability on operators. Those subject matters for which State liability has been accepted in practice uphold this preference because they largely concern activities typically undertaken by government actors, at least until recently: e.g. outer space exploration and exploitation and Antarctic scientific research. States seem willing to accept liability for their own conduct, but not for that of private actors.

IV. Strict Liability of Non-State Actors Treaties related to environmental protection include clauses establishing strict liability of individuals. In interstate relations such liability is linked with specified activities, considered as potentially damaging for the environment. Current treaties on civil liability number about one dozen, nearly all of them concerned with a single hazardous activity (e.g. nuclear energy or oil transport). Several conventions address vessel-source marine pollution or nuclear damage, while pollution from offshore oil and gas exploitation, carriage of dangerous goods

31

P.S. Rao, First Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, UN Doc. A/CN.4/531 (2003), 7.

32

P.S. Rao, Third Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, UN Doc. A/CN.4/566 (2006), para. 31.

1140


by various means of transport, and transboundary movements of hazardous wastes are each regulated by a single treaty. Three nuclear liability treaties adopted in the 1960s aim partly to protect potential victims and partly to insulate nuclear industry from devastating claims. The 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention)33 was concluded in the context of OECD. It was intended to provide unified rules for adequate and equitable compensation while still supporting development of nuclear energy. The Paris Convention has not been widely ratified, nor have other agreements in this field been broadly accepted. There are no known transnational claims brought to date based on the Paris Convention, although some national claims34 have been based on legislation implementing the Paris Convention. The Paris Convention was later enhanced in 1963 with a Supplementary Convention (Brussels).35 Protocols amending the Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention were adopted in February 2004,36 broadening the concept of nuclear damage and the geographic scope of the Convention. However, environmental damage on the high seas or deep seabed remains excluded. The Paris Convention became linked to a 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage37 by a Joint Protocol adopted in 1988 and by the 1997 Protocol of Amendment.38 The 1997 Amended Vienna Convention provides that it in principle applies to nuclear damage wherever suffered, with limited exclusions. These conventions take the same approach to liability: – Liability is channeled exclusively to the operators of the nuclear installations; – Liability of the operator is strict, i.e. the operator is held liable irrespective of fault; – The amount of liability is limited, although the limits may be raised or removed if fault is shown;39

33

55 AJIL 1082 (1961).

34

E.g. Merliun v. British Nuclear Fuels, (1990) 3 All ER 711.

35

The Supplementary Convention allows compensation beyond the liability limits of the Paris Convention. All claims must be brought in the State where the incident occurred if there is one and if not then the territory of the installation or the operator liable. Claims must normally be brought within ten years of the date of the incident and awards are enforceable in any State party. Eleven States are parties to the Supplementary Convention.

36

Protocol of 12 Feb. 2004 amending the 1960 Paris Convention; Protocol of 12 Feb. 2004 amending the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention.

37

2 ILM 727 (1963).

38

36 ILM 1462 (1997).

39

The Vienna Convention does not fix an upper ceiling for compensation, while the Paris 1141


– Liability is limited in time;40 – The operator must maintain insurance or other financial security for an amount corresponding to his liability; if such security is insufficient, the installation State is obliged to make up the difference up to the limit of the operator’s liability; – Jurisdiction over actions lies exclusively with the courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear incident occurred; and – A guarantee of non-discrimination of victims on the grounds of nationality, domicile or residence is provided. In 1988, as a result of efforts by the IAEA and OECD/NEA, a new Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention combined them into one expanded liability regime. Parties to the Joint Protocol are treated as though they were Parties to both Conventions and a choice of law rule determines which of the two Conventions should apply to the exclusion of the other in respect of the same incident. The 1997 Protocol41 sets the possible limit of the operator’s liability for a single nuclear incident at not less than 300 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) (equivalent to USD 400 million). The Amended Paris Convention changed the unit of account to the euro and more than doubled the minimum amount to at least 700 million euro. The 1997 Protocol also redefined nuclear damage to include the concept of environmental damage and preventive measures, extended the geographical scope of the Vienna Convention, and extended the period during which claims may be brought for loss of life and personal injury. It also provides for jurisdiction of coastal States over actions incurring nuclear damage during maritime transport. In addition, a 1971 Convention relating to

Convention sets a maximum liability of 15 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The Brussels Supplementary Convention established additional funding beyond the amount available under the Paris Convention up to a total of 300 million SDRs, consisting of contributions by the installation State and contracting parties. 40

Originally, compensation rights were extinguished under the Paris and Vienna Conventions if an action was not brought within ten years from the date of the nuclear incident. Longer periods were permissible if, under the law of the installation State, the liability of the operator is covered by financial security. National law may establish a shorter time limit, but not less than two years (the Paris Convention) or three years (the Vienna Convention) from the date the claimant knew or ought to have known of the damage and the operator liable. The Amended Conventions extend the statute of limitations with respect to loss of life or personal injury from ten to thirty years.

41

Two instruments were in fact signed: the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention, 36 ILM 1462 (1997) and a Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 36 ILM 1473 (1997).

1142


Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material42 provided for shipowner liability if the shipowner committed or omitted an act with intent to cause damage. Even more than nuclear operations, environmental injury caused by marine oil pollution is regulated by an entire system based on the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution as modified in 1971, 1976, 1984 and 199243 together with the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, also modified by protocols, the latest being adopted in 2003.44 The 1969 Convention established the liability of the owner of a ship45 for pollution damage caused by oil escaping from the ship as a result of an incident on the territory of a party. Other marine liability conventions include the 1976 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from the Exploration for or Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources,46 the 1996 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS Convention),47 and the 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage.48 The Oil Pollution Convention defines pollution as “loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, and 42

11 ILM 277 (1972).

43

In contrast to the treaty system, some States, notably the US, have enacted national legislation with much higher limits of liability, including some contexts in which liability is unlimited. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Public Law 101-380, enacted following the Exxon Valdez disaster of 1989.

44

IMO Doc. 92 FUNA/A.8/4.

45

The owner of the ship is not responsible if he can prove that the damage resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character. The same is true if the damage results from an act or omission of a third party done with intent to cause damage or results from the negligence or other wrongful act of any government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids.

46

17 December 1976, 16 ILM 1451 (1977).

47

3 May 1996, 35 ILM 1415 (1996); IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.10/8/2 (9 May 1996). The HNS treaty system of liability is similar to the 1992 oil pollution agreement, imposing strict liability for damage caused. It has a wide definition of hazardous and noxious substances, excluding nuclear materials. Insurance is required and liability is limited on a sliding scale depending on the size of the ship. A second tier of compensation applies when shipowner not liable because the incident falls within the treaty’s exceptions or the owner has no reason to know of the nature of the substances being transported, or where the claim exceeds the liability limits. A fund is created, financed by levies on the importation of HNS cargoes.

48

23 March 2001, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.12/DC/1. 1143


includes the cost of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures”. While the 1969 Convention applied to incidents wherever occurring, article 3 of the 1992 Protocol specified that the Convention covers only damage suffered in the territory, the territorial sea or the EEZ of a Contracting State. The Convention also applies to preventive measures, wherever taken, to prevent or minimize such damage, including environmental damage. It states, however, that compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken.49 The owner may limit liability except in case of actual fault and must maintain insurance or other financial security to cover its liability. Strict liability for maritime pollution was extended to other hazardous substances in 1996 with the adoption of the HNS Convention.50 The Convention covers claims for damage arising from the carriage of such substances at sea, i.e. that period during which the substances are on the ship or ship’s equipment. Article 1(6) of the HNS Convention defines damage to include, in addition to loss of life or personal injury or the loss of or damage to property, loss or damage by contamination of the environment caused by hazardous and noxious substances, provided that compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to the costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken, and the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures. The marine pollution system balances strict liability with limits on liability. The Protocol of 1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims of 19 November 1976,51 established a ceiling defined by IMF

49

Art. 8(2) of the Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities Convention which never entered into force also provided for strict liability for damages “in the event that there has been no restoration to the status quo ante”. The Council of Europe rules on compensation for damage caused to the environment include among the definitions given in article 2(9): “‘Measures of reinstatement’ means any appropriate and reasonable measures aiming to reinstate or restore damaged or destroyed natural resources or where appropriate or reasonable to introduce the equivalent of these resources into the environment.” In all cases, restoring the environment to its status quo ante is the preferred remedy and this is especially true where it is difficult to assess the harm and the corresponding compensation. Only when restoration is not possible would it then be necessary to measure the damages.

50

For a similar strict liability regime, see the earlier Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels of 10 October 1989.

51

2 May 1996, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.10/8 (9 May 1996).

1144


special withdrawal rights.52 The Protocol differentiates between types of claims. Claims for loss of life or personal injury have a minimum limit of two million Units of Account, a limit which increases with the tonnage of the involved ship. In respect of any other claim the minimum is one million units which is augmented following the same method. For States which are not members of the IMF the corresponding amounts are respectively 30 million and 15 million monetary units (art. 8(2)). A claim of compensation for pollution damage may be brought directly against the insurer or other persons providing financial security for the owner’s liability for pollution damage. In order to benefit from the limitation on liability, the owner must deposit the sum representing the limit of his liability with the court or other authority with jurisdiction. If liability is found, the fund is then distributed among the claimants in proportion to their established claims.53 The owner of a ship registered in a contracting State and carrying more than 2,000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo must maintain insurance or other financial guarantee of compensation in case of liability for pollution damage. An insurance or guarantee certificate must be issued to each ship by the appropriate national authority and contracting States are obliged to prevent a ship from trading unless the appropriate certificate has been issued. Each State must recognize the certificates issued by other contracting States. The 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, as modified, aims to assure payment of compensation for pollution damage to the extent that protection afforded by the Liability Convention proves insufficient. The Fund is required to pay compensation to any person suffering pollution damage if the person is unable to obtain full and adequate compensation for the damage under the terms of the Liability Convention, either because no liability arises under the treaty, because the owner is financially incapable of payment, or because the damage exceeds the owner’s liability under the Convention. However, the total amount of damages that the Fund will pay is also limited, to 135 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR). This ceiling can be raised to 200 million for certain polluting accidents.54 Contributions to the Fund are made by any person who has received total quantities of oil in excess of 150,000 tons during the prior calendar year.55

52

Protocol art. 2(2).

53

Arts 5(3) and 5(4).

54

Art. 4(4)(c).

55

Art. 10. 1145


The system has been active. Between 1971 and 2000, the Fund paid out nearly 300 million British pounds sterling with respect to 102 incidents.56 The system also continues to evolve. As a result of the marine disasters concerning the Nakhodka in 1997 and the Erika in 1999, the 2004 Protocol established a new international body, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Supplementary Fund, and created an optional third tier above those provided by the Civil Liability Convention and the Fund Convention. The Supplementary Fund, to be financed by oil receivers, will increase the aggregate available amount to 750 million SDR for any one incident. The 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage addresses the category of vessels responsible for the majority of oil spills. In contrast to earlier conventions dealing with damage caused by the cargo of relatively small and well-defined categories of vessels, the Bunker Convention potentially applies to all ships, defined as “any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft whatsoever”. Bunker oil means “any hydrocarbon mineral oil, including lubricating oil, used or intended to be used for the operation or propulsion of the ship, and any residues of such oil”. The definition of “pollution damage” is identical to that of the 1992 Convention on Civil Liability. It is also subject to the same limitation in that it does not cover damage to the environment in itself, but only clean-up costs and the loss of profit suffered by victims such as fishermen and local industries dependant on ocean resources and the tourist trade. Actions for compensation may only be brought in the courts of the States where damage was suffered. Ships must carry certificates attesting to their financial security and claims for compensation may be made directly against the insurer or other provider of financial security. Unlike other treaties, the Bunker Oil Convention does not channel liability to a single person but defines ship owner to include others who have joint and several liability However, only the registered owner of a ship over 1,000 gross tonnage is required to provide financial security. The regulation of mutual liability is left to national law. Article 6 provides that the ship owner may limit liability “under any applicable national or international regime”, such as the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims.57 Under this Convention, the limits of liability are on a sliding scale depending on the size of the ship. A 1996 protocol, not in force in 2006, will raise the limits. In any case, the reference to national and international law means a lack of uniformity in liability limits for oil spills from non-tanker vessels. While it was proposed to exclude from liability any person taking reasonable measures to prevent or minimize the effects of oil pollution, no agreement was reached to include such

56

See International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, Annual Report for 2000, 37-40.

57

16 ILM 606 (1977).

1146


a provision. Instead, the conference recommended legal provisions for such persons in domestic laws.58 For land-based activities, a Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal59 has further developed the regime of civil liability for environmental damage. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive regime for liability and for adequate and prompt compensation for damage resulting from transboundary waste movements, including illegal traffic. It defines damage broadly to include loss of income directly deriving from an economic interest in any use of the environment, when that loss is incurred as a result of impairment of the environment. Compensation extends to the cost of measures of reinstatement of the impaired environment, limited to the costs of measures actually taken or to be undertaken and the costs of preventive measures, including any loss or damage caused by such measures. Preventive measures are defined as any reasonable measures taken by any person in response to an incident to prevent, minimize, or mitigate loss or damage, or to affect environmental clean-up. The Protocol applies to damage due to an incident occurring during a transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes and their disposal, including illegal traffic, in particular in relation to movements destined for disposal operations specified in Annex IV of the 1989 Basel Convention (art. 3). The Basel Protocol imposes strict liability on, first, the person who provides notification of a proposed transboundary movement according to article 6 of the Basel Convention, and, thereafter, the disposer of the wastes. Liability for damage is subject to financial limits specified in article 12(1) and Annex B to the Protocol. During the ten year period of liability, those potentially liable shall establish and maintain insurance or other financial guarantees. Liability limits are removed if the responsible person causes or contributes to causing damage by failure to comply with the provisions implementing the Basel Convention, or due to wrongful intentional, reckless or negligent acts or omissions. The Protocol imposes upon the Contracting Parties the obligation to adopt the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures necessary to implement the Protocol and to inform the Secretariat of the Protocol of the measures it has taken. For the rest, the Protocol shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties under the rules of general international law with respect to State responsibility. The competent jurisdictions are the courts of the State where the damage was suffered or the incident occurred or the defendant has his habitual residence or has his principal place of business. All matters of substance or procedure regarding claims before the competent court shall be

58

See IMO Resolution on the Protection of Persons Taking Measures to Prevent or Minimize the Effects of Oil Pollution, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.12/18.

59

Basel, 10 December 1999. 1147


governed by the law of that court. Enforceable judgments thus handed down shall be mutually recognized and enforced. A regional model for comprehensive civil liability is the Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damages Resulting from the Exercise of Activities Dangerous for the Environment.60 It establishes general standards for indemnification of those injured by hazardous activities and products. The Convention broadly imposes responsibility on all persons and companies and State and all agencies exercising control over dangerous activities, irrespective of the place of the harm. However, if the damage occurs in a non-contracting State, the Convention permits reservations to be filed demanding reciprocity of remedies. The Convention applies to dangerous activities and substances, including living modified organisms. The quality of dangerousness is largely based upon assessment of the risk of harm to man, the environment or property. Nuclear damage is excluded if the incident is regulated by the Paris Convention on Civil Liability of 1960 or by the Vienna Convention of 1963 with its amendments, or by national legislation at least as favorable to the plaintiffs as the Conventions. Workplace accidents covered by social security and automobile accidents in places inaccessible to the public as well as assimilated to other activities within the installation also are excluded. In addition to compensation for death, bodily harm, and injury to property other than that found on the site or within the installation where the dangerous activity has taken place, recovery can be had for environmental harm,61 limited to the costs of reasonable measures taken to restore or rehabilitate the environment to its prior State. Recovery is also possible for the costs of mitigating measures and any losses or damage caused by such measures after an incident or event. The maximum amount of liability may be fixed by local law, which should also insist upon adequate insurance coverage taking into account the risks associated with the activity. Anyone who is in control of a dangerous activity is responsible for damages caused by that activity.62 The problem of multiple or long-term sources is solved imposing joint responsibility and by placing the burden of proof on the various persons who were in control of the activity or activities to prove they were not responsible. In cases where the activity has ceased when the damage occurs, the

60

21 June 1993, 32 ILM 1228 (1993).

61

For these purposes, environment is broadly defined to include biotic and abiotic natural resources, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora, the interaction between them, cultural property and characteristic aspects of the countryside.

62

States parties may reserve to the basic principle of liability, to the extent of allowing the defendant to escape liability if it can show that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the moment of the incident was insufficient to indicate the dangerous properties of the substance or the organism.

1148


last person in control will be liable unless he can show that the causative event took place before he was in control. Liability is not imposed if damage occurs as a result of armed conflict, a natural disaster, an intentional act of a third party, a State command, “pollution of a level acceptable having regard to the relevant local circumstances”, or if the activity was taken for the benefit of the person damaged, to the extent it was reasonable for the latter to be exposed to the risks of the dangerous activity, or if the injured party was at fault. From the perspective of the plaintiff, there are several favorable provisions. Article 10 provides that in examining the proof of causality, a judge in any case falling within the terms of the Convention should take into account the probable risk of damage inherent in the dangerous activity in question. Moreover, the time limits for claims are rather long. According to article 18, actions should be brought within five years of the date on which the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the damage and of the identity of the person in control. No action may be brought more than 30 years after the causative event or the last in a series of causative events. For waste disposal sites, the final date is 30 years from the closure of the site. Forum selection is also made possible: article 20 permits the action to be filed either in the courts of a State party where the damage occurred, where the dangerous activity took place, or where the defendant has its permanent residence. Injunctive relief may be sought by environmental associations in the courts where the dangerous activity takes place, on conditions set by internal law. States may declare at signature, ratification, or accession that this possibility will be open to non-governmental organizations based in other States parties. Environmental groups may demand prohibition of any illegal dangerous activity threatening serious environmental harm as well as injunctions against the person in control of a dangerous activity, in order to require preventive or remedial actions be taken. Where remedial action is sought, the courts of the State where the action should be taken also have jurisdiction over the case. Public authorities have the right to intervene when environmental groups bring actions. Article 19 is explicitly subject to reservations. All judgments rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction according to the Convention are entitled to be recognized in other States parties unless they are contrary to public order, the defendant was not properly notified of the action in time to prepare a defense, or if the decision is irreconcilable with a decision rendered between the same parties (res judicata). Finally, the Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters was formally adopted and signed by 22 countries at the Ministerial Conference “Environment for Europe” in Kiev, Ukraine, on 21 May 2003. It is a Joint Protocol to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary

1149


Watercourses and International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents. The Protocol gives individuals affected by the transboundary impact of industrial accidents on international watercourses a legal claim for adequate and prompt compensation. Companies will be liable for accidents at industrial installations, including tailing dams, as well as during transport via pipelines. Physical damage, damage to property, loss of income, the cost of reinstatement and response measures are covered by the Protocol. The Protocol sets financial limits of liability depending on the risk of the activity, i.e. the quantities of the hazardous substances that are or may be present and their toxicity or the risk they pose to the environment. To cover this liability, companies will have to establish financial securities, such as insurance or other guarantees. The Protocol establishes a principle of non-discrimination among victims: victims of the transboundary effects cannot be treated less favorably than victims from the country where the accident has occurred. In sum, several common traits are found in the liability agreements: (a) Identification of the polluter is assured through a presumption which channels responsibility. Thus, in case of damage, the responsibility automatically is imputed to the exploiter or the ship owner. (b) The system of liability is settled by imposing strict liability for damage, but specifying a limited set of excuses. (c) Jurisdictional competence is determined by designating the proper forum, in some cases that of the plaintiff, in other cases that of the polluter or in permitting the victim the free choice of tribunal. (d) Time limits are imposed. The Lugano Convention makes it three years from the date of knowledge or the time when the plaintiff reasonably should have known of the damage and the identity of the operator. An absolute bar to suit is imposed after thirty years. (e) Liability limits are coupled with mandatory insurance requirements. (f) The execution of judgments is assured. It must be noted, in conclusion, that some of the eleven major liability treaties are not in force, because many States oppose the limits on liability that these agreements contain. The Lugano Convention has not been ratified by any State as of October 2006. The HNS Convention has only 8 parties, the Bunker Oil Convention has 11 ratifications, and the Nuclear Carriage Convention has 17 parties. The 1992 Amended Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution, the most widely accepted Convention, has 114 parties, followed by the 1992 Amended Fund Agreement which has 98 adherents. The fact of holdout States in turn discourages others from accepting what becomes an unequal burden-sharing.

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Limited liability originated in maritime law, in recognition of the value of maritime transport and the hazards of shipping, but some see it today as an unwarranted subsidy at the expense of other interests and as undermining the polluter pays principle.63 Those favoring limited liability respond that unlimited damage awards could drive responsible shipowners out of business.64 It is also argued that unlimited liability will make maritime transport uninsurable. In fact, liability limits have been set in large part according to insurance industry indications, rather than degree of risk and needs of victims. The problems are political and practical rather than principled.

V. Conclusion As a rule, strict liability is linked with hazardous activities and States draft laws or regulations to identify such activities. States appear hesitant to accept international rules that would oblige them to restrict or accept liability for activities whose harmful environmental consequences are likely to be limited to their own territory; in this respect economic interests play a major political role. There are specific activities, however, which present a significant risk for the environment of the commons or of other States. Environmental damage from nuclear activities and marine pollution, in particular, may escape the territorial limits of States and cause transboundary damage to persons and/or to the environment. While international law has been slow in placing the risk of loss on the actor profiting from the enterprise, economic globalization potentially could lead to progress by harmonizing the conditions of operation in certain fields of activities dangerous to human health and to the environment.

63

See G. Gauci, “Limitation of Liability in Maritime Law: An Anachronism?”, 19 Marine Policy 65 (1995).

64

See R.R. Churchill, “Facilitating (Transnational) Civil Liability Litigation for Environmental Damage by Means of Treaties: Problems and Progress”, 12 YB Int’l Envtl. L. 3, 35-36 (2001). 1151

THE INTEREST OF CARIBBEAN STATES IN THE NUCLEAR AGE: WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Anthony Amos Lucky*

T

his chapter is confined to examining the topic “oceans in the nuclear age” from a Caribbean perspective and focusing on the sea transport of nuclear materials, hazardous waste and pollution in the Caribbean Sea and, in a broader context, the preservation of this Sea for future generations. The Caribbean Sea is a heavily trafficked sea area that also provides economic (in the form of oil and gas) and recreational support to the people of the region. Therefore it will be convenient to consider briefly the geographical, historic and political directorates of this region. Since 1962, several island States have achieved independence from the United Kingdom: Jamaica, Bahamas, Belize, St Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Barbados, and St Kitts and Nevis. (Trinidad and Tobago is the only Republic amongst these.) At present, this sub-region remains sensitive to geo-political, geo-economic and other perspectives. Past and present political links with metropolitan powers have determined the pattern of trade and economic alignments within the region. “The discovery of oil and natural gas, predominantly in the earth, the dumping of nuclear waste, transportation of nuclear waste, and neglect of the environment, to use the oceans in so callous a manner affects the food chain, and by extension, humanity” (Preamble to the Convention Establishing the Association of Caribbean States, signed 24 July 1994 in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, ACS). In order to jointly exploit, manage, monitor and regulate certain specific activities, including the shipment and transshipment of nuclear and other hazardous materials, the States bordering the Caribbean Sea ought to pursue

*

This chapter was originally presented at the luncheon of the conference “Oceans in the Nuclear Age: Legacies and Risks”.



juridical recognition of the Caribbean Sea as a Special Area1 in the context of sustainable development. A critical element in this process must be the support of all circum-Caribbean Sea States,2 including the “metropolitan presence” (United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands). The critical implication of the presence of metropolitan maritime powers, including nuclear shippers in the Caribbean, is relevant.3 The Caribbean Sea is a large oceanic basin with an area of 1.02 million square miles (2.64 million square kilometers) with almost 90 per cent of its circumference separated from the Atlantic Ocean by continental and insular land masses. It provides a classic example of a semi-enclosed sea, as defined in article 122 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the 1982 LOS Convention). It possesses all of the vulnerabilities – pollution, waste from oil and gas exploration and exploitation, fishing and shipping4 – that one would associate with such a fragile eco-system. The Caribbean Sea is also the second most important area for marine species and biodiversity in the world. CARICOM (the Caribbean Community) and its Member States, with their full range of interests in the marine environment5 (tourism fishing, endemic marine biodiversity,6 its role as a carbon sink,7 transportation of oil, gas, methanol and other chemicals, petroleum and natural gas exploration), have expressed particular concern with respect to the pollution of their air, streams, rivers and seas. In the case of many States, their environment is their only ongoing resource and, if preserved, is one that is potentially inexhaustible.

I. A Historical Perspective “For over four and a half centuries the West Indies have been the pawns of Europe”8

1

Association of Caribbean States (ACS); the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS); Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); IMO; UNEP; UNESCO.

2

The Cartagena Convention, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, MARPOL and its Protocol.

3

Notification (verbal). French ship passing through with nuclear waste through Panama Canal on its way to Japan (26 January 2006).

4

Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Tourism (CARICOM records).

5

In Trinidad and Tobago, the Environment Management Agency.

6

Buccoo Reef, Trinidad and Tobago.

7

Ministry of Energy Reports.

8

Dr Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1942-1969 (Andre Deutch Limited, 1970).

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The Interest of Caribbean States in the Nuclear Age

Dr Williams expressed the view that slave labour from Africa, contract (indentured) labour from India and China, Christianity, Hinduism and Islam (to which I would add Marxism) have all left their mark on West Indian society. “Of the West Indies,” he writes, “more than most geographical areas it is possible to say that we are one world. But, in intellectual, as in political matters, the Caribbean is a geographical expression”.9 Williams, like many West Indian scholars, was of the view that if the West Indian chain of islands was a united group it would have possessed considerable influence in international affairs. For example, it is recognised that the Caribbean Sea is a gateway to the Panama Canal. Past and present links with metropolitan powers have determined the pattern of trade in the region, which is now moving towards strengthening economic ties among CARICOM members. The discovery of oil and natural gas in offshore areas (the southeast coast of Trinidad and, to a much lesser extent, off the north coast of Trinidad and west coast of Tobago) has directed States to venture into the Atlantic Ocean. In this context, it must be noted that the Caribbean Sea is the location of two dozen littoral States or territories with varying degrees of interest in aspects relating to the specific use of the marine environment. An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with a radius of 200 nautical miles has effectively partitioned this entire marine region into zones in which the coastal States, according to article 56 of the 1982 LOS Convention, enjoy “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and subsoil”. In the tightly packed area of the Caribbean Sea, nationally declared EEZs necessarily overlap and the close proximity of the Caribbean States, particularly the island States, serves to emphasise the fact that marine pollution, for example, cannot be effectively regulated or controlled within the maritime boundaries of a single State.10 A major hurdle for the EEZ regime in the Caribbean as it relates to the protection of the environment of the Caribbean Sea is the need to seek solutions, at regional (CARICOM) level, and then expand them to a wider regional, and finally a wider international level, with the support of relevant international agencies such as UNEP, IMO, WTO and UNESCO.

9

See infra. The States are diversified. At present there is no “unified front”.

10

The Standing Committee of Ministries responsible for foreign affairs of CARICOM proposed that the sub-region manifest its recognition of the oceans and seas as an ecological whole and of the sea, together with the land and air, as part of a single eco-system (CARICOM Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 2001). 1155


II. Disputes Further “hurdles” are the political diversity of the countries in the region and their past and present links with metropolitan countries (United Kingdom, France, the United States of America); differences in political philosophies regarding the super powers (e.g., Chavez of Venezuela and Castro of Cuba); economic dependency and competition for investment and currencies; and potential boundary disputes – Guyana and Suriname (arbitral tribunal under the 1982 LOS Convention), Trinidad and Tobago with Barbados (arbitral tribunal under the 1982 LOS Convention), Venezuela and Columbia, and the dispute over Aves or Bird Island. It can be stated that in the Caribbean Sea there are several factors leading to potential conflict that are based on unique historical roots. These roots are “historical” because during the period of colonialism there was little or no political interaction between the colonies. So, upon achieving independence, each new State had to depend upon its ambassadors, virtual “new kids on the international block”, to survive in the international community.11

III. Protection of the Caribbean Sea – The Marine Environment Environmental challenges that face the region and the Caribbean Sea include: – acid rain due to refineries and chemical plants (e.g. in Trinidad and Tobago, the oil refinery, Federation Chemicals, agro industries, Methanol Plant, and the Steel Mill); – ozone depletion; – rise in sea levels; – climatic change; – loss of biodiversity, toxic and hazardous products and waste leading to the pollution of rivers and seas; – depletion of freshwater resources; – shipping; – over-fishing; and – oil and gas exploration.

11

“The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Trinidad and Tobago” by Sir Ellis Clarke, former Attorney General, former Ambassador to the United States and first Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the United Nations, Governor General and former President of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Distinguished Lecturer Series (17 June 1988), Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies.

1156


The presence of metropolitan maritime powers, including nuclear shippers through the Caribbean Sea on the way to the Panama Canal, is also relevant. On 26 January 2006, the Environmental Management Authority of Trinidad and Tobago launched an investigation into barrels that washed ashore on Mayaro Beach on the east coast of the island. The labels on the barrels read “Caution: Radioactive Material”.12 It was reported that this was not the first time such barrels had washed up on the seashore. The question is, from where did the barrels originate? The transshipment of hazardous material on the oceans and the dumping of nuclear waste in the seabed need to be controlled. As recently as January 2006 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CARICOM Division, was verbally informed that a “secure” cargo of nuclear waste was passing through the Caribbean Sea on a French ship on its way to Japan via the Panama Canal. A note to the French Embassy was prepared setting out Trinidad and Tobago’s position on this matter.

IV. Protection of the Marine Environment in the Caribbean Sea The 1982 LOS Convention provides for a range of regional arrangements and international co-operation mechanisms. The aforementioned CARICOM proposal that the Caribbean Region should seek judicial recognition of the Caribbean Sea as a special area in the context of sustainable development was made after considering several proposals at a meeting of the Heads of State.13 A critical element in this process, as alluded to above, is the support of all States and territories located in or bordering the Caribbean Sea. Political consensus, involving, inter alia, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Netherlands, and the continental and Caribbean countries, is crucial. CARICOM cannot be the sole vehicle in a joint proposal for judicial recognition of “ownership” of the Caribbean Sea. Collaboration and cooperation of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), GRULAC (Group of Latin American and Caribbean States), IMO, UNDP and UNESCO are vital and therefore political agreement is crucial. Furthermore, States should immediately take positive action, not only by concluding regional or international conventions but by including the provisions of the relevant

12

The Daily Express, 27 January 2006, p. 5.

13

The initiative to have the Caribbean Sea recognised as a Special Area in the context of sustainable development requires the support of all CARICOM States including the metropolitan presence to be successful. 1157


international agreements/conventions in domestic legislation. Let us examine the approach of Trinidad and Tobago.

V. Extent of Pollution in the Caribbean Sea 1. Trinidad and Tobago What, if anything, is being done by Caribbean States to protect the marine environment? Trinidad and Tobago, although small in size, is a large producer of oil and natural gas. Exploration and exploitation takes place in the Caribbean Sea on the north of the island, but predominantly on its southeast coast in the Atlantic Ocean. The Oil Pollution of Territorial Waters Act currently in force will be repealed and superseded by a comprehensive Act, which, as the Shipping (Marine Pollution) Bill, is being considered by a joint select committee of Parliament. It provides for powers and jurisdiction in relation to pollution of the seas from ships, intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution, dumping of waste at sea, prevention of pollution from ships, preparedness for and response to oil pollution emergencies, liability and compensation for pollution damage and matters incidental thereto. The Bill recognises, enhances and implements the provisions of relevant international conventions. When the Bill is passed, it will incorporate the relevant provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention: the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties; the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena de Indias 1983) (Part V, section 39); the 1996 Protocol of the London Convention; the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto and Protocol and Annexes thereto (MARPOL) and Solas 1974; the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, including its Protocol of 1978 and all amendments applicable to Trinidad and Tobago. The following “special areas” are defined in section 43 of the Bill: – “the Mediterranean Sea Area”; – “the Baltic Sea Area”; – “the Black Sea Area”; – “the Red Sea Area”; – “the Gulfs Area”; – “the Gulf of Aden Area”; – “the Antarctic Area”; 1158


– “the North Sea Area”; and – “the Wider Caribbean Region”, as defined in article 2, paragraph 1 of the Cartagena Convention meaning the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea proper including the bays and seas therein and that portion of the Atlantic Ocean within the boundary constituted by the parallel of 30 degrees North from Florida eastward to the meridian of 77 degrees 30 minutes West, thence a rhumb line to the intersection of the parallel of 7 degrees 20 minutes North and the meridian of 50 degrees West, thence a rhumb line drawn south westerly to the eastern boundary of French Guiana. “Substances other than oil” are defined in the Bill as: “(a) those substances enumerated in the First Schedule; and (b) those substances which are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.” This conforms with the definition of “substances” in the Helsinki Commission for the Protection of the Baltic Sea Environment (HELCOM). The concept of the Caribbean Sea as a Special Area provides a greater degree of flexibility, notwithstanding its use in MARPOL 73/78, which recognises the fragile system of this semi-enclosed sea. What is necessary is a detailed list of the attributes that the region might use to define the Caribbean Sea as a “Special Area” in international law and use this as the basis for the formulation of a proposal that CARICOM can present to other States which border the Caribbean Sea. As previously stated, the 1982 LOS Convention provides for a range of regional arrangements and international cooperation mechanisms. In support of the proposal that the Caribbean Sea should be juridically recognised as a Special Area, the following should be noted: the concept and specialised usage of a Special Area is set out in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL 73/78); the IMO also recognised the concept of a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area. The Cartagena Convention and Protocols recognise an awareness of the social and economic value of the marine environment. 2. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Part IX) Noting that a Special Area is defined in Annexes I, II, and V of MARPOL 73/78 as “a sea where, for recognized technical reasons in relation to its oceanographical and ecological condition and to the particular character of its traffic, the adoption of special mandatory methods for the prevention of sea pollution by oil (Annex I), noxious liquid substances (Annex II) or garbage (Annex V), as applicable is

1159


required”,14 it seems to me that articles 122, 123 and 194 of the 1982 LOS Convention can be invoked to support the proposal that the Caribbean Sea is a “Special Area” in the context of sustainable development. In 1996, the initial proposal by the Prime Minister of St Lucia was for a “review of the concept of the Caribbean Sea as Patrimonial Sea in order that the region might pursue juridical recognition of ownership of the Caribbean Sea (in the context of, inter alia, the shipment of nuclear and other hazardous materials through the Caribbean Sea)”. It is therefore imperative that Caribbean States and other circum Caribbean Sea States should take the necessary action individually, collectively and through the relevant international organisations to have the Caribbean Sea internationally recognised as a Special Area in the Context of Sustainable Development.

14

Sustainable Oceans Management and Development (CARICOM policy planning (plenary) initiatives).

1160


Map 1. Islands of the Caribbean

Appendix

1161

Map 2. Central America and the Caribbean


1162

REFLECTIONS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ ROLE IN NEGOTIATING THE PRE-RIO CONFERENCE ENVIRONMENT-RELATED TREATIES: A PROPOSAL OF ACTION FOR ENHANCING THEIR ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS W. Paatii Ofosu-Amaah

T

he purpose of this chapter, in celebration of the retirement of Judge Thomas A. Mensah,1 is to assess the contributions of developing countries in the development of international environmental treaties, focusing particularly on the 1980s and especially the period immediately before the 1992 Rio United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). It will assess how developing country viewpoints were taken into account during the respective negotiations, review key issues of concern to them as weighed against those of developed countries, and consider whether the global community achieved an appropriate balance in its decisions. Most importantly, in the final part of this chapter, given the increasingly critical nature of global environmental-related issues, it will offer a plan of action for how developing countries can enhance their negotiating capabilities for the future.

1

Judge T.A. Mensah is a long-standing family friend of the writer. He was Acting Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Ghana when the author entered law school in 1968 and, later on, he had the distinct honour and privilege to request his services as a consultant to the World Bank to write a background paper on international environment for the World Development Report of 1992. His distinguished career as an international lawyer and international environmental lawyer is an inspiration to all. This chapter’s proposed plan of action and suggestions for how developing countries prepare and engage in international negotiations in the future is intended as a contribution to the celebration of Judge Mensah’s life as a path-breaker for developing country lawyers. The vast contributions of this notable scholar should galvanise all concerned lawyers to participate in a process of assisting developing countries, which are otherwise outmatched during international negotiations in terms of resources and capacity. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not represent those of the World Bank Group.



While recognising that significant progress has been made in developing country participation in international negotiations covering all sectors, in particular in trade negotiations as researched and demonstrated by Sheila Page2 and her colleagues in the Overseas Development Institute’s studies financed by the Department of International Development of the United Kingdom, there is still considerable room for improvement. In particular, it would seem appropriate to harness the talents, knowledge and experience of developing country luminaries in the legal, environmental, scientific and other fields for the benefit of developing countries in their participation in future environment-related global negotiations.

I. Introduction Prior to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972 which, inter alia, established the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), there were only a few truly noteworthy international treaties dealing with environment-related issues.3 Those in force were adhered to by only a few countries, mainly countries that now belong to the European Union, as well as the United States and Canada. Most of these agreements had limited coverage and were binding in a large part through the operation of law in the colonial territories. Most agreements focused on issues related to the use of natural resources, especially where they crossed national borders. And, special focus was placed on the use of international waterways rather than on pollution or ecological issues. This state of affairs changed significantly in the early 1970s, particularly after the Stockholm Conference and with the realisation by the scientific community in the world that the rapid deterioration of the environment would in the long run be harmful to the sustainability of the human race. It was recognised that the uncontrolled pollution of the atmosphere and international waters and the haphazard use of the natural resources would seriously undermine the ecological resources of the world. For many developing countries that gained independence from their colonial powers in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, their respective national interests was to take advantage of the natural resources that

2

Page, S., Developing Countries in GATT/WTO Negotiations, Overseas Development Institute Study, February 2002; Page, S., Developing Countries: Victims or Participants? Their Changing Roles in International Negotiations, Globalization and Poverty Programme, Overseas Development Institute, 2003; Lecomte, H.-B., Effectiveness of Developing Country Participation in ACP-EU Negotiations, Overseas Development Institute Study, October 2001.

3

Weiss, E., “International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order”, 81 Geo. L. J. 675 (1992-1993).

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Reflections on Developing Countries’ Role in Negotiating the Pre-Rio Environment-Related Treaties

they possessed to bring about economic growth and the alleviation of poverty which they saw in their countries in contrast with the relative affluence they observed in developed countries. Environment-related concerns were not at the forefront of development policy in these countries. The Stockholm Conference brought the focus of the world on environmentrelated issues and even though there was a contrast, sometimes stark, in the approaches and positions of developing and developed countries during the Conference, the Stockholm Declaration4 foreshadowed a new era in international cooperation on environment-related issues. On the basis of several Principles in the Stockholm Declaration, there was acknowledgement and agreement that actions formerly considered to be within the sovereign rights of States and therefore of “national” or “local” concern had impacts far and wide on the environment. Therefore, appropriate legal frameworks were required to promote appropriate human health and environment in the world. In reaching this consensus, the special position of developing countries was recognised and Principle 11 provides that “the environmental policies of all States should enhance and not adversely affect the present and future development potential of developing countries”. Developing countries unveiled their own development plans, taking the Declaration into account but focusing on the improvement of the livelihood of their peoples. Drawing inspiration from the Stockholm Conference and with useful and noteworthy assistance from UNEP, agencies from developed countries as well as other specialised agencies of the United Nations, such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the newly independent countries proceeded with the development and promulgation of a bevy of national environmental laws dealing broadly with all areas of environment and national resources management, ranging from forestry, wildlife and protected areas, to marine resources, air quality and hazardous substances.5 These developing countries also participated for the first time more systematically in the negotiations leading to the adoption of major international environment-related conventions and agreements, including those specifically negotiated and agreed under UNEP’s auspices, in particular, as part of the Program for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law (the Montevideo Programme).6

4

Sohn, L.B., “The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment”, 14 Harv. Int’l L. J. 423 (1973).

5

Sand, P., New Directions of Environmental Legislation and Administration in Developing Countries, revised and updated for strictly internal purposes for a World Bank Seminar on environmental law in developing countries, 15 December 1988.

6

Ntambirweki, J., “The Developing Countries in the Evolution of an International Environmental Law”, 14 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 905 (1991). See also, Adede, A.O., 1165


The preparations for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) also known as the Rio Conference, brought a significant sense of awareness on environment-related issues worldwide. This was also the case in developing countries which were grappling with the promotion of sustainable development, a notion developed by the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development – Our Common Future.7 The prospect of the Earth Summit and the consciousness on environmental issues across the globe based on increasing global news reporting, served as a critical impetus for the three convention negotiations which are the subject matter of discussion in this chapter. The roles played by developing countries in the negotiation of the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer and its 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer8 will be alluded to in view of the generally held view that the Montreal Protocol is one of the most successful environment-related treaties in the history of the world largely on the basis of the convergence of the interests of developed and developing countries, as well as the major role played by scientific evidence. This chapter reflects on the lessons of experience from the negotiations of the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, respectively.

II. The Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal9 The immediate need for action on the issue of hazardous waste, while not originally a transnational issue, became an area of concern for the global community because of the transboundary movement of such wastes particularly

“International Environmental Law from Stockholm to Rio-An Overview of Past Lessons and Future Challenges”, 22 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 88 (1992). 7

Bruntland, G. (ed.), Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and Development, Oxford University Press, 1987.

8

Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 26 ILM 1529 (1988) and its Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 ILM 1550 (1989). See also, New Developments in International Environmental Law, A Panel Discussion – Proceedings of the 85th Annual Meeting of The American Society of International Law, Washington D.C., April 17-20, 1991. See also, Weiss, E., “The Five International Treaties: A Living History”, in: Weiss, E. and Jacobson, H. (eds), Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, 135-157, 1998.

9

The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 22 March 1989, 1673 UNTS 126; 657 (1989).

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from developed to developing countries. This led to international negotiations culminating in the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal which was adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 22 March 1989, in Basel, Switzerland. While the detrimental effects on human health and environment of hazardous waste were recognised much earlier through scientific research, the potential detrimental effects in developing countries, which neither had the expertise nor resources to produce and utilise significant amounts of hazardous materials nor the facilities to manage or dispose of them in an environmentally sound manner, raised special concerns. Between 1988 and 1989, unregulated shipments of such wastes with potentially dangerous human health and environment consequences were reported in the international press, largely through the efforts of Greenpeace, the environmental non-governmental organisation. These events were also reported in the media in developing countries which led to a strong response by their governments. Two examples stood out – the transportation of about 14,000 tons of hazardous incinerator ash from Philadelphia, which was shipped to a number of willing developing countries for disposal over a two-year period and about 3,800 tons of hazardous wastes, including polychlorinated biphenyls, which were discovered in Koko, Nigeria. In addition, there was news of a deal to “sell” hazardous wastes to Guinea-Bissau for an amount at least four times its gross domestic product. Wastes were also reportedly dumped in some island States in the Caribbean and in parts of Asia.10 The outrage in developing countries, particularly in Africa, was immediate and the high potential for detrimental effects of this practice were recognised in a Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as by the UNEP Governing Council under whose auspices the Basel Convention was negotiated. UNEP had earlier identified this as a global issue under its Montevideo Programme and had, indeed, established a working group on the subject which developed principles on the environmentally sound transport and management of hazardous wastes, knows as the Cairo Guidelines in 1987. These guidelines were the foundation upon which the Basel Convention was built. The key issues on which debate ensued during the sessions of the Working Group of Experts for the Draft Convention on Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes included the following: definition of hazardous waste, total ban or merely control of transboundary movements, the process to be followed for shipment and whether the “prior informed consent” principle was useful in light of the dearth of scientific knowledge in developing countries, agreements not subject to the provisions of the Convention, liability, financial

10

Adler, J., “United States’ Waste Export Control Program: Burying our Neighbors in Garbage”, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 885 (1991). 1167


support from developed countries and technology transfer. These were all issues of great importance to developing countries. Representatives of developing countries came to these negotiations bolstered by the highly negative publicity in the international media, generated in particular by the incidents in Africa, including a resolution from the Organisation of African Unity (Resolution 1153(XLVIII)) at its 48th Council of Ministers which considered “the dumping of industrial and nuclear wastes in African countries as a crime against Africa and the African people”.11 Developing country representatives were united in the view that the Convention should define “hazardous wastes” as broadly as possible and, more importantly, should, as a matter of principle, impose a complete ban on any transboundary movements as the best way to protect their territories from the harmful effects of hazardous wastes. A major consideration for this position was the lack of appropriate technology in their territories, the lack of resources and technical expertise to establish appropriate mechanisms to carry out tests on substances exported to their territories to discern hazardous and non-hazardous substances. The lack of capacity or facilities for sound management and disposal of such wastes also weighed heavily in the decision. This tough approach to the problem was not acceptable to the developed countries, which argued that not all wastes were necessarily hazardous and, further, some wastes are governed by existing international conventions such as the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the conventions on nuclear wastes under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency.12 More importantly, developed countries agreed that they had existing agreements, the provisions of which may be inconsistent with the proposal of a ban on transboundary movements. They noted that such a ban would disrupt ongoing and legitimate transboundary movements between developed countries. Thus, all the developing countries represented at the negotiations favoured a global ban on exports to their countries; industrialised countries favoured a system of controls and promoted the idea of “prior informed consent” for transboundary movements to take place. Another contentious issue revolved around the issue of the consequences of illegal trafficking and the ability of States to penalise individuals and firms who undertook hazardous waste trading across borders. Developing country representatives argued strongly that where a transboundary movement has taken place in a manner inconsistent with the notification and prior informed consent of a party to the Convention, this should be deemed to be “illegal trafficking” and should be subject not only to penalties in the country of origin or the recipient

11

Unpublished Paper, Nigeria’s Position on the Basel Convention, distributed during the Basel Convention Negotiations.

12

Johnson, S., “The Basel Convention: The Shape of Things to Come for United States Waste Exports?”, 21 Envtl. L. 299 (1991).

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country, but the country to which the individual or enterprise belonged. In short, States were to be held accountable for the export of hazardous wastes originating from their territories. Industrialised country representatives argued that it was unreasonable for them to take responsibility in such circumstances. Another issue of importance to the interests of developing countries, and which nearly toppled the negotiations, related to the ability of parties to the proposed Convention to enter into agreements regarding the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes with non-parties, having regard to the provision in the Convention that prohibits parties from permitting the export of hazardous wastes to a non-party or the import by a non-party. Developing countries argued vehemently that parties must ensure that the provisions of the Convention applied to all transboundary movements of hazardous waste movements in their country. Simply put, becoming a party to the Convention meant that its principles and the policies embedded in it would be taken seriously and incorporated into the laws of each party. On the other hand, developed country representatives argued that there were agreements already subsisting, including agreements between developed countries, and this stringent approach would affect the validity of such agreements. In the end, after much debate, the Convention permitted such agreements, so long as they “do not derogate from the environmentally sound management of hazardous and other wastes as required by the Convention”. In addition, it was made clear that such agreements should not stipulate provisions which are not less environmentally sound than those provided for in the Convention, taking into account the interests of developing countries. Without a definition of what “environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes” meant, this provision left it to parties to make their own determination of what actions were in conformity with the provisions of the Convention, an end result which was significantly remote from the proposals made by the developing countries. An undercurrent persisting throughout the negotiations related to the knowledge base of developing countries compared to those of developed countries in this sophisticated and technologically challenging area. In this connection, developing countries called for developed countries to provide or facilitate technology transfer on a grant or highly concessional basis. With respect to this issue, developed countries indicated a willingness to consider a funding mechanism in the future through the establishment of a fund and to support the establishment of regional or sub-regional training centres on the management of hazardous wastes. They also agreed to special emphasis being placed in the Convention on the need for cooperation among the contracting parties in order to improve the management of hazardous wastes. And, to that end, the secretariat of the Convention was identified as the main instrument for cooperation, including playing a clearing house role in facilitating cooperation and exchange of information.

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When the delegates negotiating the Convention met in March 1989 in the final session in Basel, after four negotiating sessions in Geneva, Caracas, Geneva and Luxembourg, there were wide differences on several of the key issues raised by developing countries. This was the case even though a special meeting had been held in Senegal earlier in 1989 to deal with issues specifically raised by the African countries. These issues were large in number and had some influence in the negotiations, as well as the negative reports in the press. Efforts were therefore made by the developed countries and by UNEP to hear their views and to deal with the issues raised by them. The Africans felt that they had the most to lose by the establishment of a control mechanism rather than a ban. Even through these intense discussions, the African representatives arrived in Basel determined to get their issues resolved or to walk away from the negotiation. At the end, the negotiations characterised by several separate working groups and smaller-sized meetings, did not deal sufficiently with their concerns and therefore the African countries (41 strong), while expressing appreciation for the efforts of UNEP, and, in particular, its Executive Director, abstained from signing the Convention. Subsequently, in 1991, these countries adopted the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes with Africa,13 which, inter alia, established a total ban on all importation of hazardous wastes into Africa and limited the transfer of such wastes in Africa. Out of 116 countries participating in the final negotiating session, only 35 countries (including the European Union), signed the Convention with most of the signatories being from developed European countries. Lessons of experience can be drawn from the process and outcome of these negotiations. Developing countries did not achieve their objectives since several of their key proposals were not accepted or were watered down to the lowest common denominator or consideration deferred to the Conference of Parties and to the future. This result may have to do with the balance of power among the parties negotiating the Convention and the lack of resolve to torpedo the negotiations. It could also be attributed to the fact that, from a tactical standpoint, it was preferable to have a Convention which, at least, brought global attention to this global issue rather than maintain the status quo. Moreover, the developing countries as a group were uncoordinated, unprepared and uninformed. What one may refer to as structural, organisational and capacity issues, also affected the less than desirable outcome from their standpoint. Developing country representation was uneven throughout the various sessions, with their representatives changing from location to location because of the expenses involved in terms of

13

Donald, J.W., “The Bamako Convention as a Solution to the Problem of Hazardous Waste Exports to Less Developed Countries”, 17 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 419 (1992). See also Shearer, C.R., “Comparative Analysis of the Basel and Bamako Conventions on Hazardous Waste”, 23 Envtl. L. 141 (1993).

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travel and other costs, while developed countries representation was consistent throughout the period. Further, developed countries were, generally speaking, represented by experienced delegates in adequate numbers who had prior and sometimes significant experience in international negotiations, particularly on environment-related matters. Some had participated in the deliberations leading to the Cairo Guidelines and clearly had an advantage over their developing country counterparts. Several of the developing country representatives were new to environment-related negotiations and very often came from the embassies in the countries in which the particular session was held, having received instructions to represent their countries near the time of the session. They consequently arrived without very clear instructions from their authorities and had to react to suggestions from developed country counterparts thereby frequently resorting to the bracketing of clauses in the draft Convention. This reaction to issues undermined trust with other negotiators. Equally important was the fact that there were several concurrent sessions on the key issues and these countries did not have the manpower to cover all of them adequately. The subject matter was clearly of more interest to developing countries, as demonstrated by the positions they took, but, in the end, the tremendous pressure brought to bear led them to reluctantly agree to the provisions of an agreement which they considered as unsatisfactory, and, at best, representing the lowest common denominator. Actions have been taken in the ensuing years by the Conference of Parties, such as the adoption of an amendment to the Convention to include a ban on hazardous wastes exports for final disposal and recycling from parties that are members of the European Union, OECD and Lichtenstein to all other countries parties to the Convention.14 This example clearly demonstrates that some of the key issues raised by developing countries were well-founded.

III. Convention on Biological Diversity 15 Conservation of biological diversity is an important issue for the international community. It is found in every continent of the world but it is agreed that it is in much greater density and quantity in the developing countries. Loss of biological diversity has been proceeding on a large scale particularly in the 20th century with the potential adverse impact on the genetic heritage of mankind. In recognition of this, biological diversity, wherever located, is now regarded to have a global dimension leading to the requirement of global action. Conservation of flora and fauna has, therefore, been an area of concern to be addressed

14

Decision 111 on the Amendment to the Convention, adopted at the Third Meeting of the Conference of Parties in Geneva, Switzerland, on 22 September 1995.

15

The Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 ILM 818 (1992). 1171


by the international community over a long period of time. Actions have been taken since the early 20th century and with greater awareness and interest after the Stockholm Conference. Several agreements have been concluded between 1970 and 1990 dealing with specific species, the most acclaimed being the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which entered into force in July 1975.16 With the vast resources in developing countries, it would follow that they would have a greater say and influence in determining how such resources should be conserved for the benefit of the world. Following the Stockholm Conference and a realisation that CITES, while of great value, had issues related to its implementation, more focus has been placed on conservation. In this connection, world attention has been drawn by a number of specialised interest groups and organisations to the dramatic loss and commercial extraction of the biological diversity in all countries. Through these efforts, biological diversity, which had been previously viewed as resources within the sovereign decision-making power of each State, has now become part of the “common heritage of mankind”. Schemes, such as debt-for-nature swaps, have been hatched to provide financial assistance in terms of debt relief to developing countries, which preserved areas filled with biological resources in return for the creation of conservation areas. UNEP and other UN agencies, such as FAO, had been concerned about the issue and the UNEP Governing Council, in 1987, called for the establishment of a working group of scientists and renowned biologists to investigate the desirability of bringing the substantive elements of existing agreements under one framework, with a view of facilitating a comprehensive framework for dealing with this issue and to promote coherence in action. This group had concluded that, for various reasons, a global convention containing such a comprehensive framework would be the optimal solution for harmonisation and coherence. These recommendations, therefore, gave impetus to the desirability of a global convention which would cover the full range of sectors or sub-sectors included under the rubric of biological diversity. The formal negotiating process leading to the adoption in 1992 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), begun in February 1991. The CBD was signed at the Rio UNCED conference. The negotiations used as its base material the useful work which had been undertaken by the UNEP-organised group of experts and scientists and its recommendations were transformed into a draft framework Convention prepared by a group composed of staff from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, FAO and UNEP, the

16

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243.

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institutions which had most directly worked on the diversity-related issues over a relatively long period of time.17 The negotiations began poorly because developing countries, which have the bulk of the world’s biological diversity, needed to be convinced that it was in their interest for these resources to be considered as a “global common” and thus the subject of a global Convention. They were also affected by the usual discussion of global economic disparities between the rich and the poor and the fact that this could be another effort to stem the development prospects of the developing countries. Some delegates recalled the negotiations of the Basel Convention where the global nature of the hazardous waste issue was questioned and were of the view that the uses to which biological resources were put should be within the sovereign right of each State. Many also felt that the negotiations were starting too late for a draft to be completed by the UNCED Conference and critical issues of interest to developing countries would therefore not be appropriately dealt with. Also, there were complicated political issues relating to the interrelations among the UN agencies, such as UNEP and FAO, having mandates related to biological diversity. The draft Convention also raised complex and difficult scientific, technical and legal issues which brought to light concerns among developing countries about their capacity, knowledge and experience to cope with the negotiation process. Nevertheless, as part of the community of States, developing country representatives agreed to participate in this process, also convinced of the fact that loss of biological diversity had impacts well beyond national boundaries, and while domestic mitigative measures were needed to be taken at the country level, coordinated action was required on a worldwide basis. More importantly, it was recognised that the loss of biological diversity had impacts on medical science and biotechnology, which were crucial to the health and well-being of the global community, that it undermined agricultural production particularly in developing countries affecting productivity of crops and livestock, and, more importantly, the loss of biodiversity affects food production and undermines ecosystem resilience. At the outset of the negotiating process, developing country representatives expressed the position drawing upon Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, that sovereign States had the right to exploit their resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, but recognising the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. They were consequently concerned that the Convention could infringe on sovereignty if it promoted uncontrolled access to the genetic and biological resources within States. At the very least, adequate compensation must be paid for access to such

17

Tolba, M. with Rummel-Bulska, I., Global Environmental Diplomacy, Negotiating Environmental Agreements for the World, 1973-1992, 1998. 1173


resources. To that end, developing country delegates felt that there should be a great deal of flexibility for their countries to undertake implementation of conservation and sustainable use measures and this should be done at their own pace, based on available resources, and not according to some fixed and internationally imposed timetable. The negotiations were contentious throughout their duration,18 with developing country representatives focusing on key issues of concern to them. They felt that there was an imbalance in the treatment of genetic resources that were concentrated in developing countries and which had fairly unrestricted access while access to technology that was in the developed world was protected through intellectual property rights. An appropriate balance in these competing interests ought therefore to be agreed and in particular they sought significant contributions from the developed world both in terms of technology transfer and financial resources in return for access. In addition, they argued that parties to the Convention should fairly and equitably share results of research and development, and profits from the commercial and other utilisation of genetic resources. They also noted that while protection was to be dealt with through intervention by the private sector, market forces alone did not provide sufficient incentives for socially desirable levels of protection. Developing countries were also concerned about the importance of biotechnology and proposed that there should be appropriate arrangements to facilitate access and transfer, as well as equitable sharing of benefits resulting from the use of genetic material. These issues, together with other contentious issues, such as the relationship between “ex situ” and “in situ” conservation, the establishment of global lists of threatened and/or otherwise important species and ecosystems and rights of country-of-origin, were the subject of the difficult deliberations during the negotiating sessions. More importantly, the developing countries were fairly united in their views during the negotiating process and were acutely conscious not to legalise free and open access to biodiversity in their countries. To that end, they strongly put forward the proposal that adequate financial resources should be made available to support activities within their territories consistent with the achievement of the intended objectives of the Convention. Such financial resources were to be provided by countries and should be “new and additional”. Their strong preference was to have a financial mechanism within the Convention itself and under the authority of the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Convention in view of the influence they would have in the allocation of resources. Developed countries were uncomfortable about the recognition of national sovereignty over biological diversity but recognised that protection of these resources required financial assistance from them. They

18

Bragdon, S., “The Convention on Biological Diversity”, in 6(2) Global Environment Change 177 (1996).

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preferred, however, financing through the Global Environment Facility (GEF)19, a facility jointly managed by the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP, but with the Bank acting as Trustee even though developing countries were skeptical of its governance structure. The outcome on this issue was clear – if developing countries needed financial resources, they would have to accept the GEF as the “interim financial mechanism” of the Convention. There were other contentious issues which divided developing and developed countries. These included issues relating to biotechnology, the relationship between the proposed Convention and ongoing discussions over intellectual property rights, especially in the trade area, the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities and the burden to be taken on by developed countries, and the rights of indigenous peoples to share in the benefits accruing from use of resources from their territories. In the end, in view of the timing of the Rio Conference and the relatively stable positions taken by developing countries on the one hand and developed countries on the other, agreement was reached on a Convention that was procedural in character, leaving contentious issues to be debated and agreed in the future. The Convention thus provided a general legal framework regulating biological resources and the sharing of benefits arising from their use.20 The main lesson of experience for developing countries was that they managed to ensure agreement on a framework Convention leaving room for the complex and contentious issues to be clarified and defined in the future. This gave them the time to reflect and be better prepared for the negotiations of the Protocols envisaged under the Convention and to ensure that their respective rights were protected. Their useful participation in the deliberations leading to the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-Safety is testament to this strategy.21

19

The GEF was established by Resolution 91-5 (14 March 1991) of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The Facility is operated in cooperation between the IBRD (informally known as the “World Bank”), UNEP and UNDP. The GEF was restructured in 1994 by virtue of an international “Instrument” adopted by the IBRD, UNDP and UNEP. See, 33 ILM 1273 (1994).

20

Sand, P., “UNCED and the Development of International Environmental Law”, 3 YB Int’l Envtl. L. 3 (1993).

21

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 39 ILM 1027, entered into force on 11 September 2003. 1175


IV. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 22 Another Convention that was signed during UNCED was the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which was adopted in New York after five sessions of intergovernmental negotiations during February 1991 and May 1992.23 Much like the Vienna Convention and its Montreal Protocol, its formulation was prompted by scientific evidence built up over many years and, in particular, the work of a distinguished group of renowned scientists, represented on the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC’s work followed the earlier work carried out by the World Meteorological Organisation and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) which had been charged by the First World Climate Conference in 1979 to carry out research data collection and impact studies. The very useful scientific work carried out by the IPCC that assessed the state of existing knowledge on the climate system and changes, as well as the environmental, economic and social impacts of climate change informed the intergovernmental discussions on this issue. In particular, its report to the Second World Climate Conference was the main reference point for the issues discussed during the intergovernmental negotiations of the UNFCCC. In that respect, the IPCC identified serious impacts of global climate change, particularly on sub-Saharan Africa, the coastal nations throughout the Caribbean Region and small island States in Asia and the Far East. These impacts included increased stress on arid and semi-arid parts of the world, where water is already scarce, changes in sea levels that may promote coastal shore erosion and floods, as well as changes in coastal fish stock due to shifting migration patterns. The IPCC also covered the negative effects and impacts on the developed countries. With this significant scientific and technical work as a basis for discussions by the international community, the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution recognising the need for further scientific research into the sources of climate change and established a single intergovernmental negotiating process (INC) under the auspices of the General Assembly to prepare an effective framework Convention on climate change with these negotiations to be completed at or before UNCED. UNEP and WMO were designated as supporting agencies and the negotiations were open to all member countries of the UN, Specialised Agencies, and non-governmental organisations with interests in this issue.

22

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 ILM 849 (1992).

23

Pulvenis, J.-F., “The Framework Convention on Climate Change”, in: Campiglio, L., Pineschi, L., Siniscalco, D. and Treves, T. (eds), The Environment After Rio: International Law and Economics, 1994.

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One of the first issues raised at the start of the negotiations was whether the Convention should contain binding obligations on States or whether, like the Basel and Biological Diversity Conventions, it should be an agreement establishing an overall framework which promotes coordinated, preventive and mitigative actions by the international community. While there were differences of opinion on this issue, a mutually shared view among developing and developed countries was that there should be a well-defined process for dealing with the specific and incremental actions under any scenario. While developing countries had by and large been united on several of the major issues debated in Basel and on the Biological Diversity Convention, there were some clear differences among them on key issues before the INC. For instance, while many developing countries had a clear position on the concept of convergence of per capita emission levels, Brazil, Mexico and Malaysia were non-committal and countries within the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries opposed both concept and the emission level approach, and were also against the proposed setting of targets and timetables for emission reductions. Also, in view of the significant effect on their territories, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) favoured a very strong Convention with clear actions by countries to tackle global warming.24 They wanted their special circumstances to be taken into account and underscored the need for the developed countries to take responsibility for remedial action.25 One issue on which developing country views converged was the issue of the financing by developed countries of actions to be undertaken by developing countries. This solidarity was based on the generally held position that the developed countries had been mainly responsible for the excessive levels of emissions of gases that had brought about the global warming phenomenon and, to that extent, an equitable solution was for them to institute significant reductions in the production of such gases over a given period of years. Those countries responsible for the problems that the international community faced should be accountable and should take more aggressive action towards the amelioration of the problem. Thus, the developing countries believed that if they are to take requisite action, then assistance should be given to them by the developed countries, including the provision of “new and additional financial resources” to cover incremental costs incurred by developing countries in this effort. In their view, this new and additional funding should be operated under the Convention since developing

24

See, The Status of Negotiations on a Framework Convention on Climate Change, submitted by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), at the close of the Fifth Negotiating Session, New York, 28 February 1992.

25

Richards, M., A Review of the Effectiveness of Developing Country Participation in the Climate Change Convention Negotiations, Overseas Development Institute Study, December 2001. 1177


countries had more influence under UN Rules rather than the GEF, the preferred financial mechanism of the developed countries. While acknowledging their diverse views and positions on some key issues, the positions taken by the developing countries during the negotiations are illustrated by the paper presented by the Joint Secretariat of the Group of 77 and China at the Fifth Session of the intergovernmental negotiating conference on 28 February 1992, in New York. These elements included: – “A clear, unified, and unambiguous stance on the part of the developed countries regarding their specific commitments. – A clear commitment by developed countries that they would be willing to provide the adequate, new and additional financial resources that would be required on a predictable basis by the developing countries within the context of this Convention. – A clear commitment by developed countries that the technology required by the developing countries to ensure that their development is environmentfriendly will be available on terms that will maximise its use, on most favorable, concessionary and preferential terms. – A meeting of minds between developed and developing countries on the delivery mechanisms for financial resources and technology transfers. We must together clearly define and agree upon the characteristics of any potential delivery mechanisms so that their structure, governance, eligibility and project selection criteria, administration, implementation, assured and adequate replenishment, are defined and ruled by the Conference of parties irrespective of any functional and cost-effective linkages that might emerge from the ongoing debate. – Agreement by the developed countries that the commitments that might be entered into by developing countries under this Convention are contractually dependent on the fulfillment of the financial and technology transfer obligations that must be entered into by developed countries that are in the main responsible for the urgency of the present situation. An understanding of the fact that the developing countries are already totally committed to doing whatever they can with their limited resources for their own citizens to improve their local environment. While a concentration of rhetoric on global impact may be useful for the developed countries in terms of their own constituencies, this artificial distinction between local and global impact must be done away with. – The issue of the need for a section on principles has yet to find a sufficiently positive response from the developed countries. As a statement of guiding principles will provide a foundation of what will follow, this section needs

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to be tackled from a position of sincerity rather than by a juridically pedantic approach. – The issue of preparation and exchange of data and information also requires transparent and realistic treatment. In all developing countries projects funded by external donors, be they bilateral or multilateral, naturally undergo a process of consultation in order that they can be further refined. However, the proposal for broad national reviews cannot be used as a means for institutionalizing a new form of conditionality”. There were also differences of views among the developed countries on several of these issues, particularly those related to specific commitments on stabilising emissions. With the developed country grouping and the developing countries wide apart on several of the foregoing issues, the negotiations headed towards collapse with no meaningful commitments being agreed by the parties. If agreed, one expected the text to reflect the lowest common denominator. The negotiations were, however, salvaged by the chairperson of the INC who proposed a text which contained several watered down provisions which at least would serve as the basis for further negotiations. The Convention text eventually agreed for signing at UNCED addressed many of the contentious issues in a general way on the understanding that undertakings would be reviewed regularly on the basis of the best available scientific information. The agreed Convention included the following elements. There was acceptance that “precautionary measures” needed to be taken to reduce global warming; this was viewed as an application of the “precautionary principle”. States were called upon to prepare national inventories on greenhouse gas emissions and take actions to reduce them, on the basis of agreements to be reached in the future. While some developed countries opposed firm emission limitation targets, a provision was included in the Convention acknowledging the desirability of reductions and a voluntary goal of cutting back emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. Parties were also required to formulate and implement programmes for the control of climate change, undertake cooperation in technology, incorporate suitable policies and undertake education and training policies controls, all designed towards reduction in the generation of gases. In that connection, the Convention recognised the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, a major concession to the developing countries. Developed countries committed themselves to take special measures to limit their anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and to enhance the capacity of their sinks and reservoirs for the stabilisation of such gases. Finally, the developed countries agreed to provide financial and other resources required by the developing countries to comply with their obligations under the Convention. Financial assistance was, however, limited to the incremental costs to be borne by the developing countries. In that respect, the GEF was selected as the Convention’s interim financial mechanism

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to be accountable to the Convention’s COP, a matter to be discussed at the first meeting of the COP. This Convention was clearly a step forward in dealing with a global environmental issue and its great benefit was to establish a framework with a well-defined process for the States to make steady progress in dealing with this global issue, taking into account new scientific evidence. The Convention reflected a desire on the part of both developed and developing countries to find and achieve consensus, since specific undertakings, other than those reflecting the “lowest common denominator, may have been unlikely to be agreed. The notion of “common but differentiated” responsibilities of developing and developed countries also reflected a major concession on the part of the developed countries. Nevertheless, it is viewed as a disappointment by those who were seeking to have the developed countries that had been responsible for the generation of a significant portion of the gases causing global warming to accept specific and binding obligations to reduce such gases in the future. To an extent, this disappointment may have been ameliorated by the UNFCC’s Kyoto Protocol,26 although the promise of the Protocol has been threatened due to decisions by some major developed countries not to become parties to the Protocol.

V. Lessons of Experience and a Proposal for Action by Developing Countries On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it would appear that, on the whole, developing countries have not achieved their objectives in these negotiations on environment-related global issues. This conclusion is based on the fact that, while they have made progress in environment-related negotiations, the most important objectives they have sought to achieve have been elusive. The Basel Convention deals with a problem that has been exacerbated by actions from entities in developed countries, whose actions were to the detriment of developing countries. Developing countries “owned” a significant part of the “biological diversity” in the world and, to the end, should have “dictated” the terms of engagement on the exploration and exploitation of this resource. And, the problem of “global warming” was largely created by significant emission from the developed countries. Yet, in all these negotiations, developing countries could not ensure the inclusion and acceptance of provisions reflecting their respective positions on the key issues. This situation requires concerted action by developing countries in environment-related negotiations even if there appears to be some progress made by these countries in more recent international negotiations.

26

“The Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change”, 37 ILM 22 (1998).

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Progress has been made in trade negotiations and in the protocols and other complementary and supplemental agreements including those related to global environment issues. However, unlike bilateral negotiations which entail the need to acquire all relevant knowledge necessary to respond to the positions taken by the other party, international negotiations are much more complicated, very often involving a multitude of parties with varying interests, with parties or groups of parties firmly defending their positions and their national interests. Such negotiations require participants to have the ability to form alliances on different issues if a party is to achieve its objectives. Persistence is often an important ingredient for success and this is illustrated, for instance, by the fact that the ban on transboundary movements called for by the developing countries, a near deal breaker at the Basel negotiations, has now been adopted, and specific targets and commitments have been agreed under the Kyoto Protocol after much debate and persistence by the developing countries, supported by some major developed countries, although its implementation is still a matter of concern. With the significant increase in developing country expertise in all areas of professional life, particularly in law, development and the environment, this chapter proposes ways in which this large source of knowledge may be harnessed in support of the aspirations of developing countries in international negotiations, particularly those related to the environment. This is especially important as senior members of this pioneer group of experts originating from developing countries begin to retire. It is also prescient to consider this subject, because of the perceived progress made by developing countries’ delegations in the trade area and in negotiations between them and international financial organisations such as the World Bank. These experiences provide excellent lessons which may usefully guide developing country preparations for negotiations on international environment issues. The great advances that have been made in telecommunications, internet-based communications and the ease of travel from continent to continent would also allow for the establishment of a mechanism which is cost effective and may assist in the promotion of knowledge creation and dissemination. There are key elements that may be required if developing country negotiators are to serve the interests they represent in international negotiations, particularly on environment-related issues. Countries need to be represented by experienced negotiators with significant qualifications and experience on the legal, scientific and technical issues of the subject matter of the negotiations. This is a pre-requisite for getting to “yes”. In this connection, the negotiations on hazardous wastes illustrated the need for the negotiators to have been involved in the development of the Cairo Guidelines a few years before the call for a global framework treaty, and, in respect of the biological diversity negotiations, to have been knowledgeable of the work of the experts on CITES and the work of the group of experts on biological diversity which had been assembled by UNEP.

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Similarly, the issues surrounding liability in the Basel negotiations could have had a better outcome if delegations, including developing country representatives, had detailed knowledge of the liability regimes under the IMO treaties. The ability to stand firm in the face of negotiating pressure comes with experience garnered over the life of the careers of representatives. This is also a necessary ingredient in negotiating teams. The mandates given to developing country negotiators, based on this author’s experience, are often lacking in clarity and this fact was evident in the negotiations of Basel, Biodiversity and Climate Change. This may have had to do with the dearth of expertise in the subject matters in the countries concerned as well as the relative lack of interest in these matters. This state of affairs may be compared to the position of developed country counterparts who came to the negotiations well prepared and with an ability to refer back for instructions more easily. This dichotomy is to be expected. The lack of capacity and expertise is especially the case where the negotiations involve sophisticated issues requiring significant resources not only to acquire the necessary information but also to be able to analyse them thoroughly and to formulate appropriate positions. What developing countries need is a vehicle which will enable them to establish an information base which can continually provide high-quality advisory services on specific issues during ongoing and future international negotiations, including meetings of COPs and negotiation of protocols to existing environment-related framework agreements. While it is recognised that there are many factors at play that lead to the successful conclusion of treaties, it is generally acknowledged that, on the whole, developing countries have not been as effective as their developed country counterparts in achieving their objectives in global environment-related negotiations. Even recognising that economic power and factors are at play in such negotiations, the likelihood of good and effective participation and outcomes will only be possible by the preparedness and the ability of these countries to articulate their respective positions in a clear, effective and convincing manner focused on their interests. The authors Roger Fisher and William Ury27 have said that “negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed.” To achieve outcomes consistent with their interests, more needs to be done to enable developing country representatives to be at least as prepared as their counterparts from developed countries. They must therefore utilise all the resources at their disposal to gain equality with developed country participants, especially in terms of knowledge and experience.

27

Fisher, R. and Ury, W., with Patton, B., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Without Giving In, 1981.

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VI. The Network Proposal To that end, it is proposed that developing countries need to harness the talents, experience and knowledge in the diaspora, in addition to experts and officials within their countries, to assist them in preparing and participating at an appropriate level in ongoing or new environment-related negotiations at the international level. They need to have negotiating teams with the most solid qualifications and experience and with the specific knowledge, in science and other disciplines, required to deal with the particular issues being negotiated. Thus, apart from the “homegrown” experts and government officials responsible for particular sectors, it is proposed that consideration be given to attracting developing country nationals with significant international environment and legal experience in all fields to serve as members of a network with the specific purpose of providing advisory services on international environmental issues to developing countries. Particular attention should be given to experts, such as Judge Thomas Mensah, who have established an excellent track record of diligence and innovation and held positions of responsibility in organisations dealing with the major environmental issues to be the fulcrum of the network of experts. A database of experts of a high calibre should be instituted with categorisation of areas of expertise. And, while this proposal focuses on experts with developing country origins, it need not be restricted and experts from developed countries may also wish to participate in the network. This proposal builds on this potentially useful contribution and is intended to enhance the work of the government negotiating teams by infusing new, creative and innovative thinking on key issues, with a special emphasis on provision of information to developing countries. The proposal is therefore to establish a network, a distinguished advisory panel or council, operating as a not-for-profit entity or foundation which will be devoted solely to improving the ability of developing countries to participate in forthcoming environment-related negotiations by providing high-level policy, legal and scientific advisory services. The network will: – develop appropriate positions and proposals to inform developing country delegations on issues involved, in particular during negotiating processes; – establish a network with links to developing country and other experts and facilitate exchange of information among developing countries; – create modules for training of developing country officials where necessary and organise workshops and meetings, as appropriate, in partnership with international organisations active in this field; and – establish strong links with environmental think-tanks worldwide, associations and institutes which have sprouted in all regions of the developing

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world and, in particular, in Africa, Asia and Latin America with special focus on those groups with long-standing interest and which are doing work on environment-related matters. In order to be manageable, the network will focus initially on international issues rather than those in the national context where countries appear to already receive a fair amount of assistance from institutions such as UNEP, IUCN, the World Bank and other institutions. The role of the network is to assist in galvanising the participation of developing countries in international negotiations by providing just-in-time advice and information generated by the network participants to be made available to developing countries. With the assembly of recognised international experts, a key element is the building of an information base drawing on high-level policy and issue-oriented advice developed by them. The network would thus build initially an information base taking advantage of the knowledge and experience of participants of the sources of existing environment-related academic works. Initially, this will focus on the learned works of the experts. In addition, the network will “mine” the publicly available information of the key national and international institutions involved in this area of work. It will strive to be a network with a truly international character, with experts with high quality skills, and an assembly of the right mix of experts, depending on the issue in question. To that end, for every important or critical issue that arises out of particular environmental negotiations, a team drawn from the network would be assembled, perhaps in a “virtual arrangement”, utilising internet-based discussion fora to minimise costs, to engage and to debate the issue taking into account the experiences of the relevant experts. The use of video conferencing and conference calls will be maximised and thus interactions among experts would take place through the opening of a “chat room”, “discussion spaces”, or “help desks” to promote open debate on the ramifications of the issues, develop appropriate options together with supporting information. At the conclusion of each discussion, a report containing the views expressed and options proposed will be prepared and disseminated to developing country representatives participating in the specific negotiations. In view of the fact that there is unlikely to always be consensus or even uniformity of views on a particular issue, all views will be transmitted to the governments concerned. Also, in recognition of the fact that not all developing countries today have the same socio-economic and political circumstances, arrangements will be made so that special attention is paid to the needs of the least developing countries that have neither the means to carry out the research and develop options, nor the personnel or experts to represent their interests. Where necessary, and depending on funding available, a meeting of the experts will be organised to debate particular issues at the network centre, with the participation of the negotiators of developing countries interested in receiving advice from the network of experts. Moreover, the network experts, 1184


where invited, may participate in the negotiating processes but this would not be a major part of its activities.

VII. Some Practical and Administrative Aspects of the Network The network administration will be located in a place which is easily accessible to developing countries and will have a small staff (composed of a few professionals and requisite support staff) acting mainly as supporting staff to the distinguished legal and scientific experts who will form part of the network. The staff will, inter alia, be responsible for the organisation of an information base for the network, drawing on data from relevant international organisations operating in the environment-related field and academic sources and will establish a “library”, which will be internet-based, on the major issues being dealt with on the network’s “chat rooms” or “discussion space”. The staff will make efforts to ensure that information produced is in form and content that is useful to developing country representatives. The intention is not to establish a huge bureaucracy, and to that end the network could also be housed in the premises of one of the leading environmental think-tanks in a developing country. Financing for the initiative will be sought from bilateral agencies which have supported the efforts of developing countries in the negotiations of international environment-related agreements, and developing country corporations which have an interest in environment-related issues. Proposals for a possible work programme will be sent out with requests for financing, but the network will be not-for-profit and will receive such subventions as are required for its operations. Consideration will be given to establishing an endowment after an initial period of operation. It will also collaborate with international institutions active in the field which have so far provided useful and neutral technical information to negotiation processes.

VIII. Conclusion The dynamics in negotiation of the pre-UNCED conventions clearly point to a need for developing countries to be much better prepared to engage with developed country counterparts who participate in the deliberations with experienced and well-prepared representatives. It is believed that while significant progress has been made by developing countries in negotiations in many subject areas, such as trade in particular, major negotiations skills, experience and resource gaps remain. Thus, harnessing the post of senior developing country experts to provide just-in-time advisory services to developing countries might usefully assist in improving outcomes for these countries. Such experts will greatly assist in dealing with the complex issues attendant in these negotiations and bring added 1185


value to the process for all countries, both developed and developing. Given the urgency of many environment-related matters, it helps all countries if the skills exist to move negotiation processes forward in as informed and participatory a manner as possible.

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Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah

Encyclopedia of Public International Law : Settlement of Disputes vol. 1

Dictionary of Environmental Law

Intelligent produzieren: Liber amicorum

Principles of International Environmental Law

The Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Sir Bob Hepple QC

Select Bibliography 2004 (Law of the Sea)

Select Bibliography 2004 (Law of the Sea)

The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law

Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law)

Environmental protection law

Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition

Planning and Environmental Protection: A Review of Law and Policy

Company Law (Principles Of Law)

The Book of the Law Liber Al Vel Legis

International environmental law

Family Law (Principles of Law)

Commercial Law (Principles of Law)

Child Law (Principles Of Law)

Oregon Environmental Law Handbook (State Environmental Law Handbooks)

Wisconsin Environmental Law Handbook (State Environmental Law Handbook)

The Mythology of Modern Law (Sociology of Law and Crime)

Indiana Environmental Law Handbook (State Environmental Law Handbook)

Dispute Settlement in International Space Law (Studies in Space Law)

Principles of Land Law (Principles of Law)

Of War and Law

Encyclopedia of public international law 11: LAW OF THE SEA· AIR AND SPACE

The Europeanisation of Law (European Law Series)

Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law)

Applicable Law in International Investment Disputes

Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law)

Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah

Encyclopedia of Public International Law : Settlement of Disputes vol. 1

Dictionary of Environmental Law

Intelligent produzieren: Liber amicorum

Principles of International Environmental Law

The Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Sir Bob Hepple QC

Select Bibliography 2004 (Law of the Sea)

Select Bibliography 2004 (Law of the Sea)

The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law

Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law)

Environmental protection law

Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition

Planning and Environmental Protection: A Review of Law and Policy

Company Law (Principles Of Law)

The Book of the Law Liber Al Vel Legis

International environmental law

Family Law (Principles of Law)

Commercial Law (Principles of Law)

Child Law (Principles Of Law)

Oregon Environmental Law Handbook (State Environmental Law Handbooks)

Wisconsin Environmental Law Handbook (State Environmental Law Handbook)

The Mythology of Modern Law (Sociology of Law and Crime)

Indiana Environmental Law Handbook (State Environmental Law Handbook)

Dispute Settlement in International Space Law (Studies in Space Law)

Principles of Land Law (Principles of Law)

Of War and Law

Encyclopedia of public international law 11: LAW OF THE SEA· AIR AND SPACE

The Europeanisation of Law (European Law Series)

Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law)

Applicable Law in International Investment Disputes

Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law)

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