Labour Relations and Industrial Performance in Brazil: Greater Sao Paulo, 1945-1960 (St. Antony's)

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Labour Relations and Industrial Performance in Brazil Greater São Paulo, 1945-60

Renato Colistete

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St Antony’s Series General Editor: Richard Clogg (1999– ), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Recent titles include: Louise Haagh CITIZENSHIP, LABOUR MARKETS AND DEMOCRATIZATION Chile and the Modern Sequence Renato Colistete LABOUR RELATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN BRAZIL Greater São Paulo, 1945–1960 Peter Lienhardt (edited by Ahmed Al-Shahi) SHAIKHDOMS OF EASTERN ARABIA John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead (editors) TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC VIABILITY The Bolivian Experience Steve Tsang (editor) JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG Karen Jochelson THE COLOUR OF DISEASE Syphilis and Racism in South Africa, 1880–1950 Julio Crespo MacLennan SPAIN AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1957–85 Enrique Cárdenas, José Antonio Ocampo and Rosemary Thorp (editors) AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA Volume 1: The Export Age Volume 2: Latin America in the 1930s Volume 3: Industrialization and the State in Latin America Jennifer G. Mathers THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SHIELD FROM STALIN TO YELTSIN Marta Dyczok THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND UKRAINIAN REFUGEES Mark Brzezinski THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND Suke Wolton LORD HAILEY, THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND EMPIRE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR The Loss of White Prestige Junko Tomaru THE POSTWAR RAPPROCHEMENT OF MALAYA AND JAPAN, 1945–61 The Roles of Britain and Japan in South-East Asia

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Eiichi Motono CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SINO-BRITISH BUSINESS, 1860–1911 The Impact of the Pro-British Commercial Network in Shanghai Nikolas K. Gvosdev IMPERIAL POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS GEORGIA, 1760–1819 Bernardo Kosacoff CORPORATE STRATEGIES UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN ARGENTINA Responses by Industrial Firms to a New Set of Uncertainties Ray Takeyh THE ORIGINS OF THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953–57 Derek Hopwood (editor) ARAB NATION, ARAB NATIONALISM Judith Clifton THE POLITICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN MEXICO Privatization and State–Labour Relations, 1928–95 Cécile Laborde PLURALIST THOUGHT AND THE STATE IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE, 1900–25 Craig Brandist and Galin Tihanov (editors) MATERIALIZING BAKHTIN C. S. Nicholls THE HISTORY OF ST ANTONY’S COLLEGE, OXFORD, 1950–2000 Anthony Kirk-Greene BRITAIN’S IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATORS, 1858–1966 Laila Parsons THE DRUZE BETWEEN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL, 1947–49

St Antony’s Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71109–2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

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Labour Relations and Industrial Performance in Brazil Greater São Paulo, 1945–60 Renato Colistete Assistant Professor Department of Economics Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) Brazil

in association with St Antony’s College, Oxford

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© Renato Colistete 2001 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2001 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 0–333–94924–2 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Colistete, Renato. Labour relations and industrial performance in Brazil : greater Sao Paulo, 1945–1960 p. cm. — (St. Antony’s series) Originally presented as the author’s thesis. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–94924–2 1. Industrial productivity—Brazil—São Paulo Metropolitan Area—History. 2. Industrial efficiency—Brazil—São Paulo Metropolitan Area—History. 3. Industrial relations—Brazil– –São Paulo Metropolitan Area—History. 4. Metalworking industries—Brazil—São Paulo Metropolitan Area—History. 5. Textile industry—Brazil—São Paulo Metropolitan Area– –History. I. Title: Labour relations and industrial performance in Brazil. II. Title. III. Series. HC189.S33 C64 2001 331’.0981—dc21 00–069601 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

To my parents

Contents

List of Figures

xi

List of Tables

xiii xv

List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements

xix

Preface

xxi

PART I

THE INDUSTRIAL WORKFORCE AND THE LABOUR MARKETS

1 The Structure of the Labour Markets Industrial employment Workforce growth Industries, cities and employment Employment in selected cases Composition of the workforce Skills Women workers The young workforce Skills in selected cases Wages Wage structure Wage systems and determination Wages and internal division of the workforce

3 3 4 5 9 11 12 15 19 20 22 22 25 26

2 Shaping the Labour Markets Industrialists and the National Service for Industrial Training (SENAI) The industrial training system – SENAI Programmes and problems of industrial training Scarcity, migration and quality of workforce The politics of wage bargaining Workplace and wage bargaining Institutions, political groups and wage bargaining

33

vii

34 35 37 41 45 46 54

viii

Contents

PART II

WORKING CONDITIONS

3 The Factory Environment Medical and hygiene facilities Sector conditions Medical and hygiene facilities in individual cases Occupational health hazards Environmental conditions in the textile sector Environmental conditions in the metalworking sector Industrial safety and accidents Sector conditions Accidents and injuries in individual cases Welfare facilities Sector comparisons Welfare facilities in individual cases Hours of work

65 66 66 69 71 71 74 80 80 81 84 84 86 87

4 Shaping the Factory Environment Legislation and labour rights Origins and enforcement of the labour laws Perspectives on labour rights Industrialists and the Social Service of Industry (SESI) Post-Second World War conflicts and the creation of SESI Welfare and industrial hygiene programmes Workers and the struggle over factory conditions Workers’ shop floor organisation and factory conditions Trade unions, political groups and the struggle over labour rights

93 93 94 96

PART III

99 99 103 108 108 113

INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE

5 Industrial Capabilities Technical capability The machine-tool industry The vehicle parts industry The motor vehicle industry The textile industry The organisation of work The mechanical industry The electrical equipment industry

121 122 122 125 128 132 134 135 136

Contents

The transport equipment industry The textile industry Productivity Productivity performance Sources of productivity growth

ix

137 139 141 141 150

6 The Political Economy of Productivity Performance Interpreting productivity Interpreting the causes of low productivity Productivity in the context of the Cold War The politics of productivity Productivity bargaining in the workplace Political economy, productivity and protectionism

153 154 154 160 164 164 174

7 Conclusions

183

Appendix A: Basic Economic and Labour Statistics

186

Appendix B: Factory Conditions in São Paulo

193

Notes

194

Bibliography

210

Index

222

List of Figures 1.1 Industry share in manufacturing employment (production workers), state of São Paulo, 1949–59 1.2 Skill structure of production workers in the textile industry, Greater São Paulo, 1949–60 1.3 Skill structure of production workers in the metalworking industries, Greater São Paulo, 1949–60 1.4 Proportion of juveniles in the textile and metalworking industries, Greater São Paulo, 1949–60 2.1 Numbers of workers completing SENAI courses and relative share in the total industrial workforce in the state of São Paulo, 1946–60 3.1 Workers with medical facilities by sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–4 3.2 Workers with hygiene facilities by sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–4 3.3 Workers with safety resources by sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–4 3.4 Workers with welfare facilities by sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–4 3.5 Canteen capacity and utilisation by workers, city of São Paulo, 1953–4 4.1 Yearly average of workers enrolled at SESI food shops, state of São Paulo, 1947–60 4.2 Numbers of workers examined by the Thoracic Service and relative share in the total industrial workforce in the state of São Paulo, 1947–60 5.1 Relative levels of labour productivity in the manufacturing industry, selected countries (USA = 100), 1950–73 5.2 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, manufacturing industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 5.3 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, textile industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 5.4 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, metalworking sector, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 xi

5 13 14 19

40 67 68 81 85 86 105

106

142

144 145 145

xii

List of Figures

5.5 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, metallurgical industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 5.6 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, mechanical industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 5.7 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, electrical equipment industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 5.8 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, transport equipment industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59

146 146 147 147

List of Tables 1.1

Manufacturing employment (production workers) in Greater São Paulo cities, 1939–49 (absolute number and percentage) 1.2 Annual workforce rates of growth, city of São Paulo, 1946–60 (percentage) 1.3 Workforce of motor vehicle companies, Greater São Paulo, 1957–60 (total employees) 1.4 Estimated numbers of firms and employees in the parts industry, Brazil, 1941–60 1.5 Gender distribution in the textile industry by skills, Greater São Paulo, 1949–60 (percentage) 1.6 Gender distribution in the metalworking industries by skills, Greater São Paulo, 1949–60 (percentage) 1.7 Estimated skill structure of the motor vehicle and parts industries, Brazil, 1959 (percentage) 1.8 Average real wages and wage dispersion of industrial workers, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 1.9 Average real values and dispersion of foremen’s wages, textile industry, state of São Paulo, 1953–5 1.10 Average earnings (by results) of weavers at the Paramount Textile Mill, 1946–8 (men’s earnings = 100) 3.1 Workers exposed to specific substances in the textile sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–4 (percentage) 3.2 Workers exposed to specific substances in the metalworking sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–5 (percentage) 3.3 Working hours, shifts and days of work in the cotton manufacturing industry, state of São Paulo and Brazil, 1946 A-1 Industrial output and GDP growth in Brazil, 1939–61 (percentage) A-2 Workforce in São Paulo by industry, 1945–60 A-3 Metalworkers in Greater São Paulo by occupations and skills, 1949–60 A-4 Textile workers in Greater São Paulo by occupations and skills, 1949–60 xiii

6 7 9 10 16 18 21 23 27 29 72

75

88 186 187 188 188

xiv

List of Tables

A-5 Share of the state of São Paulo workers in total Brazil, 1940–59 (percentage) A-6 Share of the state of São Paulo industrial output in total Brazil, 1939–59 (percentage) A-7 Gender and age distribution in industries, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 (total workers = 100.0) A-8 Industrial training programmes and conclusions, SENAI-SP, 1943–60 A-9 Average real wages and consumer prices, state of São Paulo, 1939–59

189 189 189 190 191

List of Abbreviations ABC ANFAVEA

ASMOB CACEX CAO CA-RMP CASIT

CBAI CEDEM CETEX CIFTSP

CIPA CISCAI

CKD CLT CNE CNI

Cities of Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo and São Caetano do Sul Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores (National Association of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers) Archivio Storico del Movimento Operaio Brasiliano (Brazilian Working-Class Movement Historical Archives) Carteira de Comércio Exterior (Foreign Trade Department) Curso de Aprendizes de Ofícios (Course for Craft Apprentices) CEDEM/UNESP, ASMOB, Arquivos de Roberto Morena (CEDEM/UNESP, ASMOB, Roberto Morena Papers) Comissão de Assistência Social da Indústria Têxtil (Commission of Social Assistance of the Textile Industry) Comissão Brasileira-Americana de Educação Industrial (Brazilian-American Commission for Industrial Education) Centro de Documentação e Memória (Records and Information Centre) Comissão Executiva da Indústria Têxtil (Executive Commission of the Textile Industry) Centro dos Industriais de Fiação e Tecelagem do Estado de São Paulo (Centre of the Spinning and Weaving Industrialists in the State of São Paulo) Comissão Interna de Prevenção de Acidentes (Commission for Accident Prevention) Comissão Inter-Sindical contra a Cláusula de Assiduidade Integral (Inter-Union Commission Against Full Attendance) Completely knocked down Consolidação das Leis de Trabalho (Consolidated Labour Laws) Conselho Nacional de Estatística (National Council of Statistics) Confederação Nacional da Indústria (National Confederation of Industry) xv

xvi

List of Abbreviations

CNTI COS CRA CRF CRT CSN CST CTB CTM DIEESE

DOPS ECLA FAT FIERJ FIESP FO GDP GEIA GM IAPI IBGE ICEM IDORT IIAA

Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Indústria (National Confederation of Industrial Workers) Comissão de Orientação Social (Commission of Social Orientation) Curso Rápido de Aperfeiçoamento (Short Improvement Course) Curso Rápido de Formação (Short Training Course) Conselho Regional do Trabalho (Regional Labour Council) Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (National Steel Company) Conselho Sindical dos Trabalhadores (Trade Union Council) Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil (Confederation of Brazilian Workers) Curso de Trabalhadores Menores (Course for Working Minors) Departamento Inter-Sindical de Estatísticas e Estudos Sócio-Econômicos (Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies) Departamento de Ordem Política e Social (Department for Political and Social Order) Economic Commission for Latin America Fundação de Assistência ao Trabalhador (Foundation for Worker Assistance) Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Federation of Industries in the State of Rio de Janeiro) Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Federation of Industries in the State of São Paulo) British Foreign Office Gross Domestic Product Grupo Executivo da Indústria Automobilística (Executive Group for the Motor Vehicle Industry) General Motors Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Industriários (Social Insurance Institute for Industrial Workers) Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration Instituto de Organização Racional do Trabalho (Institute for the Rational Organisation of Work) Institute of Inter-American Affairs

List of Abbreviations xvii

ILO INIC IRO LAB MTIC MUT NACP NARA PCB PRO PTB PUI SA SAPS SENAI-DN

SENAI-SP

SESI-DN SESI-SP

SIFTSP

SHSI SP SUMOC TIA

International Labour Organisation Instituto Nacional de Imigração e Colonização (National Institute for Immigration and Colonisation) International Refugee Organisation Ministry of Labour and National Service (United Kingdom) Ministério do Trabalho, da Indústria e do Comércio (Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce) Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores (Unifying Movement of Workers) National Archives Building, College Park, Maryland National Archives and Records Administration Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil) Public Records Office Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labour Party) Pacto de Unidade Inter-Sindical (Inter-Union Unity Pact) Santo André Serviço de Alimentação da Previdência Social (Social Assistance Food Service) Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial, Departamento Nacional (National Service for Industrial Training, National Department) Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial, Departamento Regional do Estado de São Paulo (National Service for Industrial Training, São Paulo Regional Department) Serviço Social da Indústria, Departamento Nacional (Social Service of Industry, National Department) Serviço Social da Indústria, Departamento Regional do Estado de São Paulo (Social Service of Industry, São Paulo Regional Department) Sindicato das Indústrias de Fiação e Tecelagem em Geral do Estado de São Paulo (Syndicate of the Spinning and Weaving Industry in the State of São Paulo) Serviço de Higiene e Segurança Industrial (Industrial Hygiene and Safety Service) São Paulo (capital or state) Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito (Brazilian Monetary Authority) Treinamento na Indústria de Adultos (Training in the Workplace for Adults)

xviii

List of Abbreviations

TIM TRT TST TWI UNRRA UNESP

Treinamento na Indústria de Menores (Training in the Workplace for Minors) Tribunal Regional do Trabalho (Regional Labour Tribunal) Tribunal Superior do Trabalho (Federal Labour Tribunal) Training within Industry United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Universidade Estadual Paulista (Paulista State University)

Acknowledgements In writing this study I have incurred many obligations, and I am happy to thank those who have helped in its preparation. I am particularly grateful to my supervisors at Oxford University, Leslie Bethell and Rosemary Thorp, for their hard work, unconditional support and encouragement along the way. For a year I also worked under the supervision of Alan Knight, to whom I owe insightful comments and valuable suggestions for the improvement of early drafts. I have no doubt about the privilege of working with such a select group of scholars. I would also like to thank Charles Feinstein, first for his guidance in economic history readings, and second for suggestions which were crucial to establishing the central analytical issues addressed in this work. I have a great debt to many people in the archives where I have worked in the last years. Others provided invaluable bibliographical suggestions and helped me to gain access to sources: Marcelo Paiva Abreu, Luis Ayerbe, Philadelpho Brás, Roberto Colistete Jr., Paulo Fontes, Carlos Frausino, Maria Beatriz Guimarães, Claudia Heller, Roy Hora, Carolina Labarta, Maria Lúcia Lamounier, Angus Maddison, Antonio Negro, Marcelo Resende, Fausto Saretta, Helmut Schwarzer, Helen Shapiro, Sérgio Silva, Wilson Suzigan, Tamás Szmrecsányi and Joel Wolfe. Among those who read and commented on individual chapters or the whole study, I should mention: Marcelo Paiva Abreu, Edmund Amann, Maria Beatriz Guimarães, Claudia Heller, Colin Lewis, Maria Alice Ribeiro, Fausto Saretta and Tamás Szmrecsányi. At another level, a special thank is due to Francesca Brizi, who gave me an enormous help with my English text and to Keith Povey, for having helped with the final preparation of this book. I would also like to thank Beverley Tarquini from Palgrave for her patience and support. Several institutions have helped me in the research for this study. Above all, I would like to thank the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq), in Brazil, for the scholarship which funded my research studies in Oxford. Likewise, I am grateful to the Department of Economics of the Paulista State University (UNESP), São Paulo, Brazil, for providing financial support and allowing me to take a long study leave. I should also thank three organisations which gave me grants for research expenses in the United States: John Hicks xix

xx

Acknowledgements

Fund (Oxford University), Carr Fund (St Antony’s College) and Latin American Inter-Faculty Committee (Oxford University). Lastly, my deepest thanks go to Maria Beatriz Guimarães, who has been an enduring source of love, support and friendship. RENATO COLISTETE

Preface Economic history as an academic discipline has a long tradition of analysis of economic growth, industrialisation and economic performance. A more difficult subject has been the links and reciprocal influences between institutions and social actors on the one hand, and economic outcomes on the other. In part, such a difficulty lies in the shortcomings of economic analysis itself, as most economic approaches rule out institutions and social groups as relevant variables in their theories and models. More important, however, are the analytical difficulties in coming to terms with the multifaceted nature of institutions and social actors and their impact on economic outcomes from a historical perspective. The issue has been addressed by scholars from different theoretical perspectives.1 Even so, systematic research in economic history following their steps has been relatively scant. A striking example of this is the paucity of research into the long-term impact of labour relations on economic outcomes such as growth, industrial performance and competitiveness. Such an unsatisfactory state of affairs in economic history is well illustrated by the historiography on industrialisation in Brazil. Although numerous sociological, political and historical studies have provided valuable descriptions and interpretations of the nature and evolution of industrial labour relations in Brazil, there have been very few attempts to address the links between labour and economic outcomes. Overall the Brazilian working class was seen as marked by a lack of class consciousness – owing to its rural origins or political manipulation – which prevented it from playing an effective role in Brazil’s industrialisation process. As argued by a major exponent of this interpretation, what was unusual in Brazil was the absence of ‘conflict between capital and labour’ as a decisive factor in ‘industrial modernisation, democracy and general dynamics of social change’ in Brazilian history. 2 Recently an important revisionist literature has attacked such premises and drawn a more dynamic view of industrial labour relations in Brazil. Nevertheless, following the parameters set by the classic views of labour relations, these revisionist studies have mostly focused on the political aspects of working-class organisation and its relationship with political parties and the state. As a result, the questions raised by this literature xxi

xxii

Preface

have rarely dealt with the economic aspects and consequences of the relations between industrialists, workers and governments in Brazilian history. 3 In the same way, although for other reasons, standard works of economic history have also given little attention to the means whereby labour relations may have had an effect on the conditions and characteristics of the industrialisation process in Brazil. The standard account by economic historians has been one that focuses on the role of labour markets in the industrialisation process – particularly the effects of the abundant supply of labour on wages, income concentration, and limited domestic markets in Brazilian economic history.4 The split between political and economic spheres, and the restriction of the analysis to structural aspects of economic development, have left a large unexplored field of research into the economic history of industrialisation in Brazil. One major result has been the disregard of industrial relations as an important area of historical political economy, that is, of the historical ways in which political decisions and institutions shaped – and were shaped by – economic outcomes, in the context of power relations between interest groups on both national and international levels. This book presents an attempt to deal with this unexplored area of Brazilian economic history, by examining labour relations and their connection with industrial performance in Greater São Paulo, between 1945 and 1960. This latter period – referred to as the post-war years – was one of far-reaching change in Brazil’s social, economic and political structures. The end of the Second World War in 1945 heralded an era of vigorous economic growth in the world economy which had a strong impact on Brazil’s economic position. Moreover, the end of the authoritarian regime, the Estado Novo, led to major institutional changes in the political system, in particular the emergence of a new urban working class in Brazilian public life. By 1960, it was clear that Brazil had undergone profound economic changes as a result of the transformation of the industrial structure caused by heavy investment in the modern sectors. In the early 1960s, Brazil plunged into deep economic and political crises which led to radical institutional changes following the military coup of 1964. As this study aims to examine labour relations and industrial performance under the golden age of post-war politics and economic growth in Brazil, we therefore adopt the last year of the Juscelino Kubitscheck government (1960) as the closing date for the analysis. The Greater São Paulo region is singled out as the main area of investigation because of its economic and social significance at the time.

Preface xxiii

Greater São Paulo is defined here as comprising the state capital, São Paulo, and the metropolitan area known as ABC – the cities of Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo and São Caetano do Sul. As early as 1945 this region had become not only the nucleus of the Paulista5 industry but also the most important manufacturing and urban centre in Brazil. As for the industrial sectors, the study focuses on labour relations in two specific and important manufacturing activities: metalworking and textile industries. These industries are significant examples of dynamic and traditional manufacturing activities which have had different patterns of growth, concentration and internal change. This study places great emphasis on the workplace and the wider relations between workers, industrialists and governments which may have had a direct effect on factory and industrial performance in Greater São Paulo after the Second World War. In this sense, the study stops short of addressing in a systematic way more general issues, such as living conditions and state policies towards social welfare. Thus references to working-class living standards, neighbourhoods, family, and government initiatives in the area of social security, for example, only appear as background to the more specific analysis of labour relations and industrial performance. In particular, this study highlights three basic issues which, being closely related to labour relations, had an impact on industrial performance in Greater São Paulo’s textile and metalworking sectors: wages, industrial training and working conditions. The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with industrial growth, skills and wages in Greater São Paulo. Chapter 1 summarises evidence on growth, skills and wage-setting in different industries (textiles and metal trades) and sections of the workforce (men, women, and young workers). Chapter 2 introduces the main social actors (industrialists, workers and governments) which played a role in the outcomes described in the previous chapter. In particular, the programmes of industrial training and the wage disputes are addressed in detail. In Part II, Chapter 3 describes the factory environment and conditions of work. Chapter 4 deals with the institutions, concepts and social attitudes which shaped conditions of work in Greater São Paulo. Part III is devoted to the issue of industrial performance. Chapter 5 examines the characteristics of the industrial capabilities built up in Greater São Paulo’s textile and metalworking sectors. This chapter explores the means whereby industrial performance in general – and productivity in particular – may have been affected by the previously investigated issues (wages, industrial training and working conditions).

xxiv

Preface

Chapter 6 discusses the institutions and social attitudes which set the framework for productivity growth. This chapter focuses on the strategies for increased productivity devised by industrialists, and the reactions of workers and labour-based organisations. Finally, the concluding remarks sum up the chief arguments of the study and draw more general hypotheses on institutions, social forces and industrialisation in Brazil. A note is necessary regarding the sources utilised and the limitations which may be identified in the arguments presented here. First, as will be clear in the following chapters, this study draws heavily on primary sources produced by several organisations which were, in some way, related to the main theme outlined above. As economic history, the account provided here is perhaps unusual for its extensive use of qualitative and institutional materials – trade union and party press as well as diplomatic, industrialist, and government records. However, the variety of archive material reflects the nature of the subject, that is labour relations and industrial performance, which crosses the boundaries between disciplines and is not amenable – unless artificially – to strictly quantitative and economic analysis. At the same time, the use of the archive material also reflects the belief that the most fruitful approach to economic history is one in which institutions, social attitudes and power relations are examined in connection with economic change. Second, opting for a broader approach to economic history introduces further difficulties in the process of selecting and balancing the key elements comprising the main parts of the analysis. Every historical work requires a choice of actors, events and relations which are seen as central to the process under investigation. In this sense, any historical investigation is limited and covers only a part of the whole complexity of past events. Broadening the scope of economic history tends to worsen this drawback. The best a study such as this can do is to make clear what has been prioritised or left out at the different stages of the argument either by design or because of lack of evidence. Another and, perhaps, more important caveat concerns the data presented in the following chapters. As is often stressed, much of the qualitative and, particularly, quantitative data which this study draws on are meagre, and sometimes tenuous. Such a situation is largely the result of a lack of cumulative and systematic research into economic history in Brazil, especially into the issues and period examined here. However, this constraint was not judged serious enough to prevent the elaboration of tentative hypotheses and interpretations, even when data were

Preface xxv

particularly scarce. The expectation is that, although largely exploratory, the analysis provided will be both convincing and useful to future research. RENATO COLISTETE

Part I The Industrial Workforce and the Labour Markets

1 The Structure of the Labour Markets

The growth of the industrial sector in Greater São Paulo after 1945 epitomised the deep transformation which Brazil’s economy underwent in the post-war period as a result of its changing role in the international division of labour. The structural metamorphosis which occurred during this period brought about vast changes in the conditions of supply and demand of work, in the qualifications of the labour force, in wage structures, and in allocation of the labour force among industries and regions. These conditions set the framework within which the relations between employers, workers and governments evolved at the time. The aim of this chapter is to provide evidence about the basic features of the workforce and wages in the textile and metalworking industries. The chapter will first describe trends in industrial employment during the period as well as the consolidation of Greater São Paulo as the most important industrial centre in Brazil at the time. Second, the composition of the workforce will be charted according to certain basic criteria, namely gender, age and skills. Third, the chapter will outline the main wage trends in the industries selected.

Industrial employment In the 15 years between 1945 and 1960, Brazil’s industry underwent a process of simultaneous rapid growth and extensive diversification which thoroughly altered the previous economic structure. This process reflected the shifting role of the Brazilian economy in the international order, as Brazil moved from being a primary product supplier to an industrial manufacturer. The main geographical area in which this transformation took place was the state of São Paulo (and, in particular, the region of Greater São Paulo). This became the epicentre of far-reaching 3

4

The Industrial Workforce and the Labour Markets

environmental, social and economic changes associated with rapid industrialisation. As a first step in examining the consequences for labour, this section will summarise basic data on industrial growth, its impact on employment, and the relative position of the Greater São Paulo cities which will be the focus of subsequent analysis. Workforce growth Brazil’s economic development in the post-war years made the country one of the success stories of emergent industrialisation in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, the average growth rate of total output between 1945 and 1960 reached 7.5 per cent per annum, a result well above that of several industrialised countries and in that period rivalled only by the performance of the East Asian economies. Average industrial output achieved 9.5 per cent per annum in the same period. 1 The state of São Paulo was very much the motor of this process, since its industry had already achieved, in the 1940s, a very prominent place in the country and continued to expand its share in the national industrial output throughout the 1950s (Appendix A, Table A-6). A similar trend may be identified for industrial employment in São Paulo. The state of São Paulo increased its share of the country’s manufacturing labour force during the period, so that by 1959 46.6 per cent of all manufacturing workers in Brazil were located within its borders, against 38.0 per cent in 1939 and 41.0 per cent in 1949. 2 Metallurgy was the only industry – among those studied here – which saw a slight decline in its national participation. More important still, the concentration in the state of São Paulo was particularly high in the case of other dynamic segments, reaching more than 70 per cent for electrical and transport equipment and mechanical industries at the end of the 1950s (Appendix A, Table A-5). Another important feature of the high-growth period in São Paulo was the shift in the structure of the manufacturing sector. Longestablished industries – here represented by textiles – witnessed a substantial reduction in their relative share of total worker employment in the state. Thus, textile employment went from 37 per cent in 1939 down to 22.6 per cent in 1959. In the meantime, all metalworking industries increased their share in a similarly noticeable manner, as can be seen from Figure 1.1. Together, the metal trades accounted for 28.6 per cent of São Paulo’s manufacturing employment in 1959. Apart from the high concentration of the Brazilian working class in São Paulo, there was a similar trend for labour distribution within the state. Thus, the cities which made up Greater São Paulo (here defined as

The Structure of the Labour Markets

5

40

Percentage

35 30

Textile

25

Metallurgy

20

Mechanical

15

Electrical Equipment Transport Equipment

10 5 0

1939

1949

1959

Figure 1.1 Industry share in manufacturing employment (production workers), state of São Paulo, 1949–59 Sources: IBGE, 1950, 1955, 1966.

the capital, São Paulo, plus Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo and São Caetano do Sul) employed around 60 per cent of the industrial workers of the state of São Paulo throughout the period covered by industrial censuses, as indicated by Table 1.1. Such a concentration was particularly noticeable in the new branches of industry. Indeed, while the textile industry was scattered over a number of smaller industrial centres in the state, most of the jobs in modern industries were to be found in Greater São Paulo. The most extreme case was that of the transport equipment industry (including parts and motor vehicles), which in 1959 came to be concentrated in São Paulo (54.9 per cent), São Bernardo do Campo (24.8 per cent) and the other two ABC cities (6.6 per cent) – amounting to 86.3 per cent of the state. 3 This explains the substantial growth of São Bernardo do Campo in the 1950s (see Table 1.1), which became a symbol of the motor vehicle industry in Brazil. A more exact picture of these changes will be presented in the next section by examining the evolution of employment in Greater São Paulo cities on a yearly basis. Industries, cities and employment The situation of labour markets and the ways in which a changing industrial structure modifies the composition of the workforce are two basic elements which directly affect relations between employers and workers, at both micro and macro levels. For Greater São Paulo, there are few sources available to reconstruct industrial employment trends – by industry and city – on a yearly basis for the period 1945–60.

6


Table 1.1 Manufacturing employment (production workers) in Greater São Paulo cities, 1939–49 (absolute number and percentage) Region and City

1939 a Number

Santo André São Bernardo do Campo São Caetano do Sul Totals of ABC cities

1949 %

Number

1959 %

Number

%

22,183

6.7

24,624

5.0

32,098

4.7

– – 22,183

– – 6.7

4,061 11,306 39,991

0.8 2.3 8.1

21,688 16,214 70,000

3.1 2.4 10.1

São Paulo

174,367

52.9

253,693

51.4

378,983

54.9

Greater São Paulo

196,550

59.6

293,684

59.5

448,983

65.0

State of São Paulo

329,344

100.0

493,633

100.0

690,182

100.0

Note: a Refers to total employees (production workers plus administrative and technical personnel). Sources: IBGE, 1950, 1955, 1966.

The option adopted here is to rely on data from the Regional Department (São Paulo) of the National Service for Industrial Training (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial, or SENAI), which began a comprehensive investigation into the number and structure of the labour force in the state of São Paulo from 1945. Despite the problems over data for the early years and with aggregation, SENAI data have the advantage of being homogeneous and offering a complete series for most of the relevant period.4 Since these data have not previously been published, the raw numbers are reproduced in Appendix A (Table A-2). The first important conclusion to be drawn from these data concerns the very distinct patterns of labour force growth in the industries examined, in line with the figures for the whole state mentioned previously. The average growth rate of the textile industry in the capital was only 1.3 per cent, while the metalworking sector attained 7.5 per cent per annum between 1945 and 1960. 5 The performance of both segments can be seen year by year in Table 1.2. As distinct from the metal trades, employment creation in textiles was quite irregular and from 1955 showed recurrent negative rates of growth. One consequence of the textile industry’s poor performance in terms of labour demand – and of the contrasting growth of metal trades – was that the former rapidly lost its position as the major employer in São Paulo. The metalworking industries overtook textiles in terms of jobs in 1954, both in the capital and in the Greater São Paulo region (Appendix A, Table A-2). As a result, by the end of the 1950s metalworking had


7

Table 1.2 Annual workforce rates of growth, city of São Paulo, 1946–60 (percentage) Year a

Textile

Metalworking

All Industries

1946 b 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 c 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

4.3 3.5 (2.5) 2.6 6.3 4.2 (0.1) 1.8 1.2 4.6 (2.8) 2.7 (3.7) (2.1) (0.6)

3.3 16.0 2.3 1.7 12.6 13.2 7.7 4.8 8.5 1.8 7.9 4.1 8.3 12.5 7.5

(2.7) 8.0 0.3 0.0 10.1 7.3 4.6 3.3 5.5 1.6 3.1 2.3 1.4 4.2 4.4

Notes: a Data for a year refer, unless indicated, to a June/May period (for instance, 1956 = June 1955/May 1956). b December 1946. c January 1954 to May 1955. ( ) = negative rates of growth. Source: Appendix A, Table A-2.

replaced textiles as the main source of industrial employment in Greater São Paulo. The data also help to illustrate the emergence of the ABC cities as the most dynamic industrial centre in the state. As already noted, these cities saw an impressive growth of the labour force employed in metal trades: an average of 12.2 per cent per annum in 1949–60 compared to 8.1 per cent in the capital. Finally, unemployment was also common at the time, despite the overall trend towards high rates of industrial growth. Among possible causes were, first, the downturns in industrial activity resulting from deflationary economic policies. This was the case, for example, in the first years of the Dutra government (January 1946–January 1951) and was reflected in the low rates of workforce growth in 1948 and 1949, as shown by Table 1.2.6 Second, some industries (chiefly mature ones) experienced continuous decline in their workforce. The typical case was textiles, with its sluggish demand for labour throughout the 1950s and even absolute reduction in employment. Third, labour demand differed widely according to the skills required. A common pattern was one of

8


tight labour markets for skilled workers and rather competitive ones for labourers and operatives. In any case, a precise assessment of unemployment in São Paulo (and Brazil as a whole) at the time is still virtually impossible, given the lack of data. In reality, there was no serious attempt by governments or other agencies to measure levels of unemployment.7 Even so there are sparse indications regarding some periods which can help shed light on the matter. In general, contemporary assessments frequently pointed to the low rate of unemployment in São Paulo’s industry. An estimate suggested the normal rate in São Paulo to be 2 per cent at the end of the 1950s.8 A more satisfactory study, carried out in December 1953 in São Paulo, was based on interviews in households and found an unemployment rate of 1.3 per cent in manufacturing.9 This figure is suggestive of the low unemployment rates at the time, as the manufacturing sector was then suffering from a severe energy-supply crisis, which even led to cuts in working time and employment in some undertakings.10 Despite the useful general picture drawn by these estimates, the heterogeneous labour markets and economic fluctuation in São Paulo throughout the period make such generalisations of limited value for specific industries (for instance, textiles), occupations and groups of workers. The erratic behaviour of textile employment in 1946–49 (Table 1.2), for example, was alarming at the time, since it showed the difficulties faced by the single most important industry in keeping up the performance levels it had attained during the war. The crisis was manifest from the first months of 1947 onwards. A contemporary source suggested that by June 1947 there had been about 10,000 dismissals in the capital alone. This corresponded to nearly 12 per cent of the workforce in São Paulo’s textile industry in 1945. 11 Of course, since those who were dismissed may well have found jobs in other activities (particularly because they tended to be unskilled workers), that number cannot be translated into a figure for unemployment. Still, it provides at least a rough idea of the direct impact of falling employment in the textile sector at the time. Another critical juncture occurred in 1957. In this year, a Special Committee was set up by the Ministry of Labour to investigate the extent and causes of the swelling ranks of the unemployed. A report by that Committee, based upon an inquiry by the Federation of Industries in the State of São Paulo (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo, or FIESP), estimated the number of industrial workers laid off to May 1957 as 32,000 in the capital alone, representing about 6 per cent of the city’s industrial labour force in 1956.12 Even in this case, it


9

appears that the metalworking industries remained relatively unaffected by unemployment (see Table 1.2). What these examples indicate is that employment conditions varied across the manufacturing sector, with unequal impacts on specific industries. The next section will examine in more detail the employment performance of the most important industrial sectors in the 1950s. Employment in selected cases The most striking example of industrial growth in Greater São Paulo during the post-war period was the establishment of motor vehicle plants. These were the most evident manifestation of Brazil’s new relationship with the world economy in the 1950s. Investments by transnational firms brought about an enormous impact on labour markets and heavily promoted the metalworking industry which had been undergoing very fast growth in earlier years, as noted before. In addition to the new motor vehicle plants, the dynamic effects spilled over to the parts industry and other related segments. Table 1.3 shows the evolution of the workforce in motor vehicle companies in Greater São Paulo following the start of the incentive programme set out by the Targets Plan (Plano de Metas) in 1957.13

Table 1.3 Workforce of motor vehicle companies, Greater São Paulo, 1957–60 (total employees) Company Ford Motor General Motors International Harvester Mercedes-Benz Scania-Vabis Simca Toyota Vemag Volkswagen Willys-Overland Total Source:

City

1957

1958

1959

1960

São Paulo S. Caetano do Sul Santo André

1,514 2,962 711

2,594 4,754 952

2,620 4,861 844

3,068 3,844 762

S. Bernardo do Campo São Paulo S. Bernardo do Campo São Paulo São Paulo S. Bernardo do Campo S. Bernardo do Campo

1,674

4,791

4,762

5,601

22

– 496

319 883

– 888 796

– 1,480 2,311

38 1,848 3,718

53 2,518 7,924

1,108

3,568

5,153

7,604

Greater São Paulo

9,653

20,472

24,340

32,576

Bittencourt, 1961, p. 4.

– –

–

10


All the companies listed were established in the capital São Paulo and ABC cities. In fact, only one firm which took part in the motor vehicle programme was situated outside Greater São Paulo – Fábrica Nacional de Motores, FNM. It is possible to see how three big new companies – Mercedes (Daimler)-Benz, Volkswagen and Willys-Overland – settled in São Bernardo do Campo. Together with the large General Motors plant in São Caetano do Sul, they would be responsible for the new image of the ABC region as the nucleus of the motor industry in Brazil. The data also show the very rapid increases, within a few years, of the workforce hired by the new companies (see the case of Volkswagen, for example). As will be discussed elsewhere, the rhythm of this process would put considerable pressure on management and labour at the time. The parts industry was another burgeoning sector. For instance, between June 1956 and December 1960, the Executive Group for the Motor Vehicle Industry (Grupo Executivo da Indústria Automobilística, or GEIA) approved 253 projects with foreign exchange incentives for that industry – 50 new plants and 203 expansions or diversifications.14 The estimated number of firms and employees rocketed in the 1950s as shown in Table 1.4. Although these estimates refer to the country as a whole and the parts industry includes branches other than the metal trades (such as tyres and chemicals), most of the plants were located in the state of São Paulo and belonged to the metalworking sector.15 Along with the motor vehicle industry, therefore, parts manufacturing played a major role in shaping labour markets in Greater São Paulo during the 1950s. Table 1.4 Estimated numbers of firms and employees in the parts industry, Brazil, 1941–60 Year

Firms

Employees

1941 1946 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

5 30 250 300 360 520 700 860 1,000 1,220 1,300

n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 15,000 66,000 89,930 100,000

Note: n.a. = not available. Source: GEIA [n.d.], p. 31, passim.

The Structure of the Labour Markets 11

The industrial labour force, however, was not only affected by differentiated rates of growth and spatial concentration. A brief look at its internal composition is also necessary to highlight important features of the working class of Greater São Paulo.

Composition of the workforce Industrial growth in Greater São Paulo was based on a large workforce pool, drawn from the countryside, from other states and even from other nations, concentrated in the urban centres seeking jobs and alternative means of subsistence in factories. Rather than creating an amorphous mass, this process gave rise to a heterogeneous labour force in terms of skills, age and gender which was incorporated under different conditions according to jobs, firms, and industries. What predominated in each industry, in turn, would have an impact on wider factors – from more visible variables such as wages to more complex consequences on effort, capacity of innovation, and productivity. This section will describe the main trends in the composition of the workforce in terms of skills, gender and age in Greater São Paulo. 16 The discussion will only touch upon structural factors (such as demographic structure and migration) affecting labour supply as emphasis will be placed on the structure of employment in the industries selected. First, the analysis will focus on the evolution of the labour force according to different skills. Second, it will chart the presence of women in industries, as well as how this presence evolved. Third, the section will also present a brief discussion of young workers (between 14 and 18 years old) and their importance to industrial labour at the time. Both women and young people are highlighted because of their significance in the Paulista labour force. Finally, this part ends with specific cases providing examples of the overall trends. Skills The skill structure of the labour force in Greater São Paulo was marked by substantial differentiation across industries and over the years. Although classifying skills is a somewhat difficult task, SENAI’s data for 1949–60 provide homogeneous criteria for analysing the textile and metalworking industries in the region. Data will be presented under seven categories: 1. Labourers: workers performing simple tasks (including carrying materials), with no formal training and frequently under the direction of more qualified workers;

12


2. Semi-skilled: workers who performed activities requiring some sort of training, usually on the job but sometimes short periods of formal training in technical schools. Workers in this category were basically operatives who performed routine and simple tasks. In the textile industry, operatives tended machines at different stages in the manufacturing process (fibre preparation, spinning, weaving and finishing), usually being restricted to overseeing operations, loading raw materials, unloading the final product, and mending broken fibres. In the metal trades, apart from operatives who worked with semi-automatic machines, there were also those who performed tasks demanding limited skills in handling machine tools (in machining, welding, forging and painting, for instance). 3. Skilled: workers who participated directly in manufacturing due to their higher skills, usually developed through systematic training over a longer period (a year or longer). In the textile industry, skilled workers had a thorough knowledge of the machinery, raw materials, manufacturing methods and routine production problems. They were able to interpret sketches and designs and repair machines accordingly. In metal trades, skilled workers were able to execute complex tasks such as drawing up and interpreting designs for the production of machine tools, choosing correct materials, preparing moulds and performing precision tasks with specific tools. 4. Foremen: workers with strategic and direct responsibilities for the production process on the shop floor, frequently with two basic duties: dealing with technical issues such as product quality, machine adjustment and performance, and co-ordinating the labour force by allocating tasks, establishing workloads, assessing individual performance, fixing penalties, and sometimes even selecting new workers. Such attributes varied according to hierarchical organisations and workplace arrangements in firms and industries. 5. Engineers: all types of engineers. 6. Technicians: staff applying technical knowledge to different stages of production (such as project, execution, control, and research). 7. Administrative: including clerical and management employees. The first four groups (labourers, semi-skilled, skilled and foremen) will be considered under the labels ‘workers’ or ‘production workers’ which, when added to the other three, formed the total labour force (or total employees) hired by firms. Figure 1.2 shows the development of skills among workers in Greater São Paulo’s textile industry between 1949 and 1960. The data clearly


90

Percentage

80 70

Semi-skilled Skilled Labourer Foremen

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

Figure 1.2 Skill structure of production workers in the textile industry, Greater São Paulo, 1949–60 Source: Appendix A, Table A-4.

demonstrate how the textile labour force experienced far-reaching changes in its skill structure, particularly from 1955 onwards. While in 1955 semi-skilled workers represented about 54.7 per cent of the total workers, that figure soared to 85.6 per cent by 1960. Shifts in skilled workers were symmetrical, with their share falling dramatically from 37.9 per cent in 1955 to 7.2 per cent in 1960. The other categories of workers – labourers and foremen – were much more stable, although it is worth noting that the relative decrease in the number of foremen between 1949 and 1955 was reversed and stabilised from 1956 onwards (Appendix A, Table A-4). As for non-production categories, there was also a clear trend towards a relative increase in technicians and administrative personnel, while the number of engineers fell in 1950 and recovered slowly in the rest of the period, as shown in Table A-4, Appendix A. On the whole, the ratio of managerial staff (comprising all these categories) to production workers rose slightly during the 1950s – from 6.4 per cent in 1949 to 7.5 per cent in 1960. This increase was possibly associated with the development of more complex technical and managerial structures in the textile companies during this period. 17 While the trend was not as clear as in the textile industry, metalworking industries also exhibited a relative increase in semi-skilled jobs as a result of the steady decline in the numbers of skilled workers. Moreover, the number of labourers grew throughout the 1950s as a result of the same process. As indicated by Figure 1.3, the share of skilled workers dropped from 38.4 per cent in 1949 to 28.5 per cent in 1960. The number of semi-skilled occupations, in turn, expanded from

14

The Industrial Workforce and the Labour Markets 90 80

Percentage

70

Semi-skilled Skilled Labourer Foremen

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

Figure 1.3 Skill structure of production workers in the metalworking industries, Greater São Paulo, 1949–60 Source: Appendix A, Table A-3.

50.4 per cent to 55.9 per cent in the same period, while the number of unskilled workers reached 14.1 per cent in 1960 compared to 9 per cent in 1949. The number of technicians and engineers rose significantly in the metalworking industries at the time, as indicated by Table A-3 (Appendix A). Administrative staff also increased in number relative to production workers, although in a lesser extent. As a result, the ratio of managerial staff to production workers grew from 13.2 per cent in 1949 to 15.6 per cent in 1960. The higher proportion of technical and administrative staff in metal trades stands out when compared to the textile industry. It indicates the different technical and managerial structures of the two sectors, with the metalworking industries clearly relying much more on technical personnel (technicians and engineers) than the textile industry. While the demand for labour varied greatly according to industry and skills, the supply side of the equation added some important features to labour markets in Greater São Paulo. For low-skilled and unskilled labour, breadwinners’ low incomes led as many family members as possible to seek jobs in factories. Thus, for example, a 1952 survey revealed that (male) family heads in São Paulo earned only about 66 per cent of household income, the rest being provided by wives (11 per cent), youths (17 per cent) and other family members (2 per cent). 18 In addition, there was a constant flux of migrants from the São Paulo countryside and other states to the capital and ABC cities which provided a large source of cheap labour for industry. From the 1930s, the process of rapid industrialisation acted as a magnet for these migrants towards São Paulo.19


The situation regarding skilled jobs was much more complex, as the growth of new industrial sectors and the modernisation of mature ones (in textiles and metallurgy, for example) required more workers with diversified skills, even as their relative number was declining in the long term. The problems arising from the scarcity of skilled workers resulted, first, in the organisation of training schemes by industrialists (supported by governments) with the establishment of SENAI in 1942, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Second, the scarcity of skills also led to incentives to international migration. Thus, another population influx – now from abroad – was seen as a source of skilled workers in response to a booming demand (see Chapter 2). As will be indicated in the next chapter, however, low wages possibly contributed a great deal to draw the main flow of international migration away from Brazil. In particular, skilled workers made up on average 27 per cent of foreign non-agricultural workers entering São Paulo between 1951 and 1959.20 This represented on average only 3.6 per cent of the total skilled workers employed in the state of São Paulo in the same period. 21 Nonetheless, the impact of skilled immigrants may have been greater than suggested by these relative figures, since these workers may well have concentrated in specific industries and occupations. In effect, there is evidence that in some highly skilled jobs of the motor vehicle industry, for example, foreign workers predominated.22 It seems, therefore, that although immigrant skilled workers were not remarkable for their relative numbers, they did remain an important source of skills for Paulista industry during the 1940s and 1950s, at least in some particular occupations and industries. What has been indicated so far is that the textile and metalworking industries in Greater São Paulo underwent far-reaching changes in the structure of skills and the internal hierarchy of their labour force during the 1950s. Along with skills and hierarchies, however, there are other important divisions to be highlighted. Two essential dimensions of the workforce in Greater São Paulo – gender and age – will be examined briefly in the next sections. Women workers It has been noted that women had a prominent place in São Paulo’s industrial workforce in earlier periods, notably in the textile industry. 23 Figures for metal trades were at the other extreme, with low participation of women workers in metalworking as a whole. Beyond the relative numbers of women, however, in both industries there were important changes in the division of labour between the sexes during the 1950s.

16


Table 1.5 Gender distribution in the textile industry by skills, Greater São Paulo, 1949–60 (percentage) Year

Labourer

Semi-skilled

Skilled

Foremen

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Total Workers (5)

Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 Source:

68.8 74.2 71.2 68.8 67.7 67.7 64.5 65.2 64.6 67.6 66.9 72.1

31.2 25.8 28.8 31.2 32.3 32.3 35.5 34.8 35.4 32.4 33.1 27.9

26.9 27.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 29.5 30.1 29.9 30.4 30.5 31.3 31.4

73.1 72.2 71.2 71.2 71.2 70.5 69.9 70.1 69.6 69.5 68.7 68.6

31.2 31.8 32.3 33.4 34.8 33.9 33.3 36.2 42.8 51.9 61.0 75.4

68.8 68.2 67.7 66.6 65.2 66.1 66.7 63.8 57.2 48.1 39.0 24.6

96.4 96.5 96.6 96.3 95.7 96.4 96.4 96.5 96.6 97.2 97.1 96.8

3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.3 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 2.8 2.9 3.2

31.4 32.5 33.1 33.8 34.3 34.4 34.3 35.0 35.9 36.2 37.2 37.8

68.6 67.5 66.9 66.2 65.7 65.6 65.7 65.0 64.1 63.8 62.8 62.2

as Table A-2, Appendix A.

By looking at the textile industry first, it is possible to see from Table 1.5 (column 5) that women represented more than 60 per cent of total workers in Greater São Paulo during the whole period under discussion. At the same time, it is clear that their relative number fell slightly in the 1950s, from 68.6 per cent in 1949 to 62.2 per cent in 1960. Nonetheless, the most substantial change took place in the categories under which workers were classified in terms of skills. Initially, the sharp decline in skilled workers previously noted was rather unequal in terms of gender distribution, as shown in column 3. Although in 1949–54 there had already been a fall in skilled women workers, from 1955 their relative share plummeted and was soon (in 1958) overcome by male skilled workers. In other words, adjustments in the employment of skilled workers – partially at least as a result of organisational and technical changes in the industry – had a greater impact on women, and for the first time in the decade they were outnumbered by men in more skilled operative jobs. There was another revealing outcome in the largest category – that of semi-skilled workers. In this category, despite the continuous decline in the relative position of women, the basic figures at the end of the 1940s were maintained during the next decade (see column 2). For other


groups of production workers the situation remained one of outright predominance of male workers (columns 1 and 4). For labourers, the number of men was always around 70 per cent. And, most conspicuously, the relative share of males in the supervisory jobs of foremen reached an average of over 96 per cent in this period. How could we explain such differences in the percentage shares of women and men in production workers? It seems that to view these differences simply as the distribution of objective skills and capabilities between male and female workers is inadequate. In effect, there is no reason to assume that – after decades of female predominance in the textile industry – women were not in a position to hold qualified jobs based on experience, dexterity and their capacity to learn new tasks on the job. It is possible that part of the reasons for the sweeping changes in the gender division among skilled workers after 1955 was a redefinition (by employers, SENAI technicians and even male workers) of the concepts of skills, prompted by the ongoing process of organisational and technical change. Thus, the operation of new equipment may well have been assigned to male workers, without a real change in the qualifications needed for the jobs. In the same way, technical and organisational changes may have prompted a redrawing of the line between semi-skilled and skilled jobs, so that what had previously been categorised as a skilled job had moved down the employment ladder. 24 Management policies favouring male workers on the shop floor seem to be the main reason why positions as foremen were so overwhelmingly assigned to men. As this supervisory function was frequently attained through knowledge, experience and leadership, many skilled women workers could have joined their ranks, if only such qualifications had been taken into account. The high percentage of men in the lowest occupations – labourers – also demonstrates that there was no special feature linking males to the top of the employment ladder in the textile industry. In addition to the occasional need for physical strength, women were possibly excluded from working as labourers on the basis of what was considered fitting for them to do, for instance activities requiring attention, dexterity and concentration. Nevertheless, there were other causes for the prevalence of men among foremen and other skilled occupations at the end of the 1950s. One major cause was related to the apprenticeship and training schemes organised by institutions such as SENAI from 1942 onwards. SENAI’s programmes were explicitly geared to reinforcing the traditional roles of women by assigning them to low-level skills schemes, whereas men were regarded as suited to taking higher-level courses leading to skilled

18


Table 1.6 Gender distribution in the metalworking industries by skills, Greater São Paulo, 1949–60 (percentage) Year

Labourer

Semi-skilled

Skilled

Foremen

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Male Female Male Female Male Female

Male

1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

90.7 93.9 96.2 95.5 94.0 93.3 90.8 90.7 89.8 92.2 94.9 94.9

99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9

Source:

as Table A-2, Appendix A.

9.3 6.1 3.8 4.5 6.0 6.7 9.2 9.3 10.2 7.8 5.1 5.1

87.3 86.6 85.2 84.2 84.6 84.6 84.6 84.7 85.0 85.5 86.4 87.1

12.7 13.4 14.8 15.8 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.3 15.0 14.5 13.6 12.9

99.8 99.8 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.8 99.8 99.8

0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2

Total Workers (5)

Female Male Female 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1

92.7 92.5 91.6 91.0 91.0 90.7 90.4 90.5 90.4 90.9 91.6 92.0

7.3 7.5 8.4 9.0 9.0 9.3 9.6 9.5 9.6 9.1 8.4 8.0

and supervisory occupations.25 SENAI’s programmes will be discussed in the next chapter, but it should be noted here that such an institutional arrangement acted as a powerful force in defining skills on the shop floor in Greater São Paulo and directly affected the results thus far examined. The same relation between institutions and occupations can be seen for the managerial categories (Appendix A, Tables A-3 and A-4). In these groups, only a minority of women were counted in the administrative staff, whereas technical occupations (technicians and engineers) included few or no female employees. The situation was rather different for the metalworking industries. The relative number of women workers was traditionally low and this did not change during the 1950s. In this sense, the metal industries in Greater São Paulo reproduced the typical sector profile at international level. Indeed, the share of male workers never fell below 90 per cent of the total number of production workers in this period, as shown in Table 1.6, column 5. However, individual categories present some interesting facts. First, the segment with the highest female percentage was that of semi-skilled workers (column 2). While increasing between 1949 and 1952, this category showed a downward pattern after the mid-1950s – a similar

Percentage

The Structure of the Labour Markets 19 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

Textile Metalworking

1949 1950 195119521953 1954 195519561957 1958 19591960

Figure 1.4 Proportion of juveniles in the textile and metalworking industries, Greater São Paulo, 1949–60 Note: Juveniles were divided by total workers plus administrative staff. Sources: as Table A-2, Appendix A.

outcome to the skilled women workers in the textile industry previously described. This pattern coincided with the growth, in the first phase, of some particular branches which employed a greater number of women in their labour force – metallurgy and electrical equipment (Appendix A, Table A-7). In contrast, in the second phase, the relative number of females fell, in line with the growth of new motor vehicle companies in the transport equipment industry. A similar movement was observed for labourers. Again the increase of the female share over the initial years of the 1950s was accompanied by a sudden decline from 1958 (column 1). Such fluctuations had an effect on the overall numbers of workers, which followed the same trend – though less pronounced – as these individual groups. Second, skilled and supervisory occupations were almost totally held by males in the metalworking sector, as indicated by columns 3 and 4. There were practically no possibilities for women to enter these occupations, a fact which was also reinforced by the apprenticeship and training schemes set up by SENAI. In the case of managerial employees, the presence of women was less than that observed in the textile industry, including administrative staff numbers. 26 The young workforce Another important section of the labour force in Greater São Paulo was that of young workers, between 14 and 18 years old, who were legally regarded as apprentices. Young workers were an important group in Greater São Paulo’s textile industry, as shown by Figure 1.4. In the

20


period 1949–60, they made up an average of 16.9 per cent of the workforce in that industry. Two important features should be highlighted within this period. First, in the initial years there was a sharp increase in young labour in the textile industry, reaching 18.9 per cent in 1952. From then on, there was a continuous decline, only temporarily reversed in 1956. Second, during the most intensive period of technical and organisational changes in the textile industry, the relative position of young workers was basically maintained despite the absolute reduction in the numbers of workers employed after 1957. There is no clear explanation for the rise in the numbers of young people employed in the textile industry between 1949 and 1952. However, this may have been linked to the unfavourable political conditions of the time for the labour movement, still recovering from the tough measures adopted by the Dutra government. It seems possible, therefore, that industrialists were tempted to replace adults with young people, as part of a perceptible drive to cut back labour rights on the shop floor at the time (see Chapters 2 and 4). There was also significant youth employment in the metal trades, although this was less noticeable than in the textile industry. As indicated in Figure 1.4, the average proportion of young people in the labour force was about 9.8 per cent in metalworking industries, with a slightly declining trend over the period. In both industrial sectors, gender distribution among young people exhibited features that differed from the total aggregates, including adults. In the textile industry, the share of girl workers increased throughout the 1950s and its average reached about 81.7 per cent of the young workforce – while in the aggregate (including adults) the average of women workers was 65.3 per cent. In the metal trades, despite the prevalence of boys, the employment of girls rose sharply over the period and its average (18.7 per cent) was well above the proportion of women in the total metalworking labour force (8.7 per cent). It seems, therefore, that the dwindling participation of young people in the labour force identified earlier was accompanied by an increasing number of 14–18 year old girls, even in the predominantly male metalworking industries.27 Skills in selected cases The distribution of skills in the most dynamic segments in Greater São Paulo and Brazil, the motor vehicle and parts industries, displays some important features to which attention has already been drawn (see Table 1.7). First, the relative number of skilled workers in both groups

The Structure of the Labour Markets 21 Table 1.7 Estimated skill structure of the motor vehicle and parts industries, Brazil, 1959 (percentage) Occupation Management Clerical Engineers Technicians Foremen and inspectors Skilled Semi-skilled Unskilled Total

Motor Vehicles

Parts

Total

1.8 13.2 0.7 1.5 3.6 18.2 38.0 23.0 100.0

2.5 16.9 0.7 1.6 3.3 26.4 27.3 21.3 100.0

2.2 15.1 0.7 1.6 3.5 22.3 32.7 22.2 100.0

Note: The estimated figures refer to 11 motor vehicle and 1,200 parts companies, most of which were located in Greater São Paulo. Source: ANFAVEA [n.d.], p. 25.

(22.3 per cent) was slightly below that for the metalworking sector aggregate in Greater São Paulo in 1959 (25.2 per cent; calculated from Table A-3, Appendix A). Moreover, Table 1.7 indicates that the motor vehicle plants had a significantly lower number of skilled workers (18.2 per cent) than the parts plants (26.4 per cent), showing that reliance on a less-qualified labour force was a definite characteristic of the motor vehicle manufacturing industry from the outset. New investment in the motor industry seems to have given new impetus to reducing the number of skilled jobs in the metal trades as a whole. Second, the proportions of semi-skilled and unskilled workers (labourers) in the motor vehicle industry also differed from those observed in the metalworking labour force in Greater São Paulo. What stands out here, consistent with the previous case, is that the number of workers regarded as unskilled was substantially higher in the motor vehicle industry (22.2 per cent on average) than in the metalworking sector in Greater São Paulo in 1959 (11.1 per cent; see Table A-3, Appendix A). Again such a tendency was clearer in motor vehicle plants. Third, the presence of foremen in the workplace was also apparently more common in the motor vehicle industry – 3.6 per cent against 1.3 per cent in the metalworking sector in Greater São Paulo, in 1959 (Table A-3, Appendix A). This is consistent with the fact that a higher number of semi-skilled and unskilled workers would in turn necessitate a higher number of supervisory occupations, particularly those directly linked to the shop floor – that is, foremen. Finally, conditions for administrative and technical jobs were also different. The motor vehicle industry

22


had a much larger managerial staff than the metalworking sector in all categories. Indeed, the ratio of managerial staff to production workers in the motor vehicle industry in 1959 was 24.3 per cent, while in the metalworking sector it reached 15.6 per cent in Greater São Paulo. So far, we have shown how the workforce in the two industries in Greater São Paulo between 1945 and 1960 was marked by – and developed under – different conditions in terms of dynamism, labour supply, skills, gender and age structure. Together, these features had a direct impact on a crucial variable in industry – wages. The next section will summarise basic information about wage levels and their evolution in the textile and metalworking industries.

Wages Uneven workforce growth, demographic conditions, migration and the predominance of particular structures of skills, gender and age shaped wage scales in the textile and metalworking industries. At the same time, the new sort of links with the international economy, symbolised by transnational investments in the motor vehicles and parts industry, directly affected existing labour markets and wage-fixing procedures. All these elements influenced the complex process of wage bargaining between employers, workers and governments, and established certain characteristics of the industrial landscape which emerged at the end of the 1950s in São Paulo and Brazil. As a preliminary step to analysing these events, this section will summarise basic evidence on industrial wage levels in the selected industries and, where possible, in the specific sections of the labour force addressed above. Wage structure Wage levels for production workers in the textile and metalworking industries underwent significant changes during the 1940s and 1950s. Systematic data for the period are limited and can focus only on the state of São Paulo as a whole, which will be taken here as representative of the situation in the industrial region of the capital and ABC cities. A broad indication of the development of workers’ average wages and their distribution related to the levels of the manufacturing sector is given in Table 1.8. The first observation to be made on these data refers to the wage dispersion, which maintained a downward trend during the 1950s. There were several reasons for this, including factors analysed elsewhere

The Structure of the Labour Markets 23 Table 1.8 Average real wages a,c and wage dispersionb of industrial workers, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 Industry

1949

1953

1955

1957

1959

Value Index Value Index Value Index Value Index Value Index Manufacturing Metallurgy Mechanical Electrical equipment Transport equipment Textile

1,409 1.00 1,456 1.00 1,608 1.00 1,730 1.00 1,624 1.00 1,759 1.25 1,762 1.21 1,890 1.18 1,981 1.14 1,797 1.11 1,894 1.34 1,927 1.32 2,001 1.24 1,995 1.15 1,908 1.17 1,690 1.20 1,780 1.22 1,865 1.16 2,054 1.19 1,831 1.13 2,156 1.53 2,034 1.40 1,967 1.22 2,168 1.25 1,966 1.21 1,292 0.92 1,287 0.88 1,426 0.89 1,525 0.88 1,453 0.89

Notes: a Nominal average wages converted to cruzeiros at 1952 rate using the consumer price index of São Paulo Prefecture. b Manufacturing sector = 1.00. c Number of workers on monthly average basis. Sources: as Table A-9, Appendix A.

regarding industrial dynamism and composition of the labour force in different industries. Worker mobilisation and minimum wage policies possibly also had a major impact on the overall trend. As a matter of fact, the second half of the 1950s was marked by the enhanced bargaining power of trade unions and a more active minimum wage policy by governments, which helped to lift the wage floor (see Chapter 2). Another important fact in Table 1.8 is the distinct wage patterns of the different industrial sectors. Thus, in the metalworking sector, the transport equipment and mechanical industries tended to pay the highest average wages among the industrial sectors examined over the years, followed by the metallurgical and electrical equipment industries. It seems that part of the explanation for these different performances in the metalworking sector was associated with labour force characteristics. First, gender composition was quite heterogeneous in metal trades, as noted earlier. The electrical equipment and metallurgical sectors employed a high percentage of women (for example, in 1949, 19.9 and 11.6 per cent, respectively) as well as under-18s (15.2 and 12.4 per cent, in 1949). Ratios for the transport equipment industry, for example, were 1.7 per cent for women and 8.3 per cent for youths – see Table A-7, Appendix A. It seems plausible, therefore, to assume that the higher participation of female and young workers helped to keep down the average wages of workers in the electrical equipment and metallurgical industries.

24


Second, it has been often assumed that the high level of skills demanded in certain industries, notably mechanical, pushed up wage levels for those activities. Although this is a key element in explaining differences in earnings between industries with very different skills content, it seems less adequate to account for differences within the metalworking sector. In particular, the higher average wages of the transport equipment sector do not appear to fit in with the trends shown in skills. Indeed, despite lack of data on skill composition by individual segments of metal trades, there is evidence to indicate that the transport equipment industry employed a higher number of unskilled workers (and a lower number of skilled workers) than the metalworking aggregate, as mentioned above. It seems, therefore, that the relatively high wages in the transport equipment industry were associated with factors other than skills – such as a strong demand for labour, and companies’ labour policies. Labour force composition has been also proposed as an important factor in determining wages in the textile industry. As shown by Table 1.8, average wages in this industry remained well below those recorded in manufacturing and metalworking industries. During the 1940s and 1950s, the textile industry continued to make use of a large pool of women and young workers pressed by economic need to take up employment under unfavourable conditions of work and pay. This was certainly an important cause of the lower average earnings observed in textile mills. In this sense, São Paulo’s case was similar to that of many (but not all) countries which had textile wages below the manufacturing average. 28 On the other hand, although it is tempting to relate meagre earnings to the supposedly low-level skills required in textile mills, the evidence is not as conclusive as frequently assumed. Several tasks in the textile industry required a number of specific abilities which could be learned only through long-term on-the-job experience and practice. In the case of operatives of both automatic and non-automatic looms and spindles, productivity relied to a large extent on workers’ ability to tend machines and to prevent problems continually interrupting production. Low wages in São Paulo’s textile industry, in fact, appear to have been pursued by companies having little concern for training, labour systems and workforce quality. Attracted by a vast reserve of labour and protected from external competition, textile companies favoured a lowwage, low-skills strategy which hampered all attempts to achieve a steady increase in productivity throughout the 1940s and 1950s, as discussed elsewhere.


Wage systems and determination Systems of wage calculation were often rather complex and varied widely because of diverse institutional and industrial conditions. Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify two basic pay schemes in the 1940s and 1950s: payment by time and payment by results (piece rate). In each of these systems, however, there were several possible variants and combinations, depending upon industry, specific job and firms’ labour policies. Thus, it was usual to find mixed schemes consisting of hourly rates determined by legislation or negotiation, combined with some sort of piece-rate system. It was also common to include bonuses related to skills, efficiency, performance, seniority or cost of living. Another possibility was to have earnings based exclusively on a piece-rate system, even though an hourly rate could be used to prevent wages from falling below a certain minimum. 29 Wage systems in Greater São Paulo were similarly diversified and, given the lack of systematic data on companies, it is premature to generalise about trends in the textile and metalworking industries. Yet sparse information exists which may provide a tentative overview of pay schemes found in these industries in the post-Second World War period.30 To begin with, metal trades typically had complicated systems of payment, reflecting the highly diversified structure of jobs and skills in this sector. In addition, the period in question was marked by sweeping internal changes in production, which made job evaluation and rate fixing particularly difficult and, hence, a potential area of dispute between labour and management. The evidence is that most metalworkers in Greater São Paulo were paid under an hourly-rate system. It seems that skilled workers (such as toolmakers, mechanics and moulders) were frequently paid according to this system. A mixed system of fixed hourly wages and piece-rate wages tied to individual or group production was also quite common in Paulista workshops, particularly in some departments and activities (for instance, foundries and rolling mills) where output was more easily measured. These additional piece rates in turn assumed distinct forms. Common examples were those established by fixed targets (tarefas) and by variable individual output. There were also cases where payment was based exclusively on the piece-rate system, although this does not seem to have been frequent in the Greater São Paulo metal trades. Finally, workers with supervisory functions (foremen) in metalworking companies appear, as a rule, to have received monthly wages. In the case of motor vehicle companies, an average of 27.8 per cent of the labour force, comprising foremen, administrative and technical employees, were paid fixed monthly wages.31

26


In textile firms, wage systems were similarly complex, although they exhibited other characteristics. The hourly-rate system was widespread in several occupations and undertakings and for many workers the possibility of enhancing their wages depended on payments for overtime and performance. It also seems that hourly wages were often linked to a daily production target, as a means of bringing into line different levels of effort and skills. Another wage system found in textile mills, particularly for spinning and weaving, was the piece-rate system. In these activities, individual production was measured by intricate schemes which took into account the type of raw material, the tempo of production, and the type of equipment. Piece rates were usually established by considering all these elements. In 1949, for example, one weaving department employing 75 workers had 219 different classified fabrics and picks given specific rates. Individual earnings in this plant depended upon output calculated in metres of fabric. 32 Such diverse systems meant that both weavers’ effort and skills were decisive elements in their final productivity (along with allocation of work by foremen, maintenance of looms and quality of raw materials). Furthermore, working with a manual or an automatic loom, apart from leading to huge differences in individual output, also gave rise to different pay schemes. Thus, for example, at a Matarazzo textile mill in 1951, weavers tending manual looms were paid by a mixed system of basic wage plus a percentage per 1 million picks and a bonus for performance, whereas those in charge of automatic machines earned by piece-rate and bonus only.33 As for the foremen (mestres and their assistants, the contramestres), a collective dispute (dissídio coletivo) in 1945 established a clause tying their earnings to the performance of operatives. Thus, the foremen’s minimum wages were calculated as a fixed percentage (30 per cent for mestres and 25 per cent for contramestres) above the average payment of two-thirds of the best-paid workers under their supervision. 34 Earnings also varied across different sectors of the labour force in Paulista industry, as noted above. The next section will introduce evidence on the different rates of pay in the textile and metalworking industries, based on considerations of skills, gender and age. Wages and internal division of the workforce The skills structure of the labour force was a primary factor in establishing a clear-cut hierarchy for workers’ earnings. Far from static, however, the definitions of skills changed throughout the period, paralleling changes in the industrial organisation of both textile and

The Structure of the Labour Markets 27 Table 1.9 Average real valuesa and dispersionb of foremen’s wages, textile industry, state of São Paulo, 1953–5 Workers

Textile Workers Foremenc Mestres Contramestres

1953

1954

1955

Value

Index

Value

Index

Value

Index

1,281 2,861 3,401 2,321

1.00 2.23 2.65 1.81

1,496 3,022 3,617 2,427

1.00 2.02 2.42 1.62

1,451 3,165 3,783 2,548

1.00 2.18 2.61 1.76

Notes: a At 1952 prices. b Average wages of textile workers = 1.00. c Mestres and contramestres (simple mean). Sources: Registro Industrial, in IBGE, Produção Industrial, 1953–5; Leck et al. [n.d.].

metalworking industries, as discussed earlier. Moreover, labour supply to specific occupations was also modified over the years, which had a direct effect on earnings, even on those for skills considered more valuable. However, a proper evaluation of skills and wages is difficult, due to the absence of data at firm and industry level. Once again, the alternative adopted here is to use the sparse evidence available to provide guidelines which may be useful for the subsequent analysis. In textile mills, the clearest wage segmentation occurred between foremen and operatives. However, among the latter, different rates of pay led to significant divergences in final earnings. For example, at the Tecelagem Jafet in 1951, a weaver was reported as earning an average of Cr$ 738 a month while a spinner earned about Cr$ 984. 35 Similarly, at the Tecelagem Assad, a female worker in the sizing department received Cr$ 3.1 per hour (about Cr$ 692 a month) while weavers earned a monthly average of Cr$ 1,230. 36 Such disparities in wages were also influenced by company labour policies and technical conditions, which determined varying payment schemes among their operatives and helpers. Wage differentiation involved an explicit hierarchy between foremen and production workers. The central role occupied by mestres and contramestres in the production process assured them a prominent place on the wage ladder of every textile mill in Greater São Paulo. Detailed research in the 1950s confirmed that earnings of foremen were well above the textile industry average. 37 As indicated in Table 1.9, their wages (in the three years covered by the survey) were always more than

28


twice as high as the average wage of production workers in the textile industry. The very high number of occupations, changing production processes and the growing importance of semi-skilled jobs meant that the wage structure in the metalworking industries was markedly heterogeneous and complex. In the case of the new motor companies, for example, it was difficult even to establish definitions for the many different job classifications, given the seemingly trivial fact that because the firms came from different countries (Germany, France, Sweden, United States, Japan and Italy), job descriptions and titles were translated into differing Portuguese terms. 38 As in the textile industry, foremen in the various branches of the metal trades earned the highest wages among production workers. An illustration of this is that foremen at the Usina São José rolling mill, in 1945, earned on average more than twice as much as the semi-skilled workers.39 Second in line in the wage hierarchy, a relatively small group of skilled workers received higher wages than other production workers. Blacksmiths (in foundries), mechanics, toolmakers, and those working on milling machines (in the mechanical and transport equipment industries) were typical examples of workers with highly-valued skills much sought after by firms and, as a result, receiving relatively high earnings.40 Nonetheless, the wage gap between skilled workers, on the one hand, and semi-skilled and unskilled workers, on the other, varied substantially across industrial sectors – as shown in contemporary evidence for mechanical, foundry and parts industries.41 Another important divergence in the internal wage structure of firms and industries arose from gender. It is beyond question that average wages for women were well below those of males during the period analysed. 42 However, the reasons for this divergence and for specific patterns in industrial sectors are unclear. In the textile industry, women on average earned less than men despite the former being in the majority in the trade. 43 There are indeed indications that many firms established different pay rates (especially hourly wages) for women, even though this was explicitly prohibited by law under the new 1946 Constitution, but, as time went by, such overt discrimination became less common.44 At least in occupations paid by results – such as weavers and spinners – it appears that piece-work rates were usually fixed on a common basis, for men and women alike. What needs to be explained is why women’s earnings were, on average, consistently lower, even though they were paid under an identical piece-rate system. This would also help to explain, at least in part, the low wages of the textile

The Structure of the Labour Markets 29 Table 1.10 Average earnings (by results) of weavers at the Paramount Textile Mill, 1946–8 (men’s earnings = 100) Workers

March 1946

September 1948

Men

Women

Men

Women

Full payrolla All workers Selected workersc

100 –

91 –

100 100

83 91

Restricted payrollb All workers Selected workersc

– –

– –

100 100

87 96

Notes: a All workers employed at the weaving section. b Women workers present both in March 1946 and September 1948 plus men workers in the section. c Workers receiving at least two-thirds of the attendance bonus. Sources: Siqueira Sobrinho, 1949, appendixes 2–3.

industry as compared with the manufacturing and metal trades industries. Rather than a straightforward correlation between women and low wages, the evidence suggests that it is necessary to look at multiple factors which may have affected women’s earnings. An analysis of a firm in Greater São Paulo – Tecidos Paramount – illustrates the problems encountered in identifying the causes for wage disparities between men and women workers. Workers in the weaving department of this mill were paid by results, which translated into very different monthly earnings among the workforce. In February 1946, this department employed about 55 workers, of whom nine were male. In September 1948, there were about 75 workers in the same section, including only five men. The latter were all weavers, and it will be assumed here that all women workers were in the same occupation.45 A summary of the data in terms of monthly earnings is shown in Table 1.10. The mean wages of all women in the weaving department in March 1946 was 91 per cent of those received by men. In September 1948, the gap became wider, with women earning only 83 per cent of the wages received by men. These simple figures confirm the existence of a significant wage differential between men and women in a typical activity of the textile industry, although the 1946 difference is much less significant. In this particular firm, men were gradually replaced by

30


women, which may have accounted for the widening differential within a few years. Nonetheless, these conclusions must be weighed against certain characteristics of the female labour force. First, the high percentage of young women was a likely cause of lower productivity (and wages), compared to those in upper-age groups with more job experience. Experience and skills accumulated over a long period were key factors in explaining individual output in the tending of weaving machines. At Tecidos Paramount, there were probably different conditions among the female labour force in terms of age and experience. Second, the rates of absenteeism for women were usually higher than those for males, directly affecting their final wages under a piece-rate system. The double role of worker and housekeeper, sometimes combined with having to care for children, made both young and mature women more likely to miss work. Third, there is evidence that the participation of Paulista women in the labour market was much more sporadic and more intermittent than that of males, with a significant number of women leaving the workforce after getting married, or being able to stop work due to improved family incomes, or with the entrance of children into the labour market. 46 This was possibly reflected in the very high turnover in Paramount’s weaving department which in 1948 retained only 13 of the 36 women it had employed in 1946. The impact of these characteristics of the female labour force can be estimated in the case of Tecidos Paramount. The results are shown in Table 1.10, from which it is possible to draw a different picture from the primary data after the introduction of certain compatible hypotheses. Thus, if the cases of absenteeism are partially discounted, the earnings gap between women and men in 1948 is substantially reduced from 17 per cent to 9 per cent.47 This suggests the importance of women’s absences in reducing their individual earnings, with a consequent impact on aggregate average. In the same way, if only the female workers who continued to be employed between 1946 and 1948 were taken into account (which would serve as a representation of accumulated experience), the outcome would also be different from that described above. The remaining 13 women, compared to the five male workers employed in 1948, would see their wages reaching 87 per cent of the latter. Finally, by discounting those with less than two-thirds attendance rate from this sample, the disparity between male and female wages would be reduced to only 4 per cent. This simple exercise illustrates how certain specific features of the female workforce may have affected their average earnings in the


São Paulo’s textile industry. Although a single case cannot be regarded as representative of the whole industry, it suggests that women’s experience in labour markets was diversified and did not always imply low standing in the wage hierarchy.48 Furthermore, at least in some occupations and contexts in which there were similar employment conditions, women appear to have taken home equal or even better wages than men. An example of this can be found in Tecidos Paramount’s weaving department, where the highest earnings in the two months examined were those of women weavers. The situation of women in metalworking industries was likely to have been worse, since they could rarely gain access to the more skilled jobs. Females were largely employed in assembly, inspection, packing and forwarding departments in the electrical equipment and mechanical industries. In metallurgy, they were also employed as semi-skilled operatives on a relatively large scale. In all these contexts, women filled occupations regarded as less skilled, and therefore less well paid, than the average for the metal trades. In this sense, women in the metalworking industries – unlike those in the textile industry – appear rarely to have competed with males in the same occupations. The result of such division of labour was that women earned consistently lower wages than men. Even so, it is necessary to look at specific conditions in each industrial sector. Thus, research carried out in 1960 showed that men earned on average 51.1 per cent more than women in three key segments in São Paulo’s metal trades – mechanical, foundries and parts industries. Nevertheless, the figures for individual sectors were far from uniform: 90.4 per cent in mechanical, 60.3 per cent in foundries and only 27.3 per cent in the parts industries. 49 This was likely to have been a common feature among different firms and sections of the metalworking industries. Finally, wages for the young workforce (those between 14 and 18 years old) were significantly lower than those earned by adults, whether men or women. Legally, minimum wages for apprentices were set at 50 per cent of those for adults. However, in practice, nearly all workers under 18 were paid on that basis, whether they were actually apprentices or not.50 In a department of Nitro Química rayon factory, for example, most of its 250 workers were reported to be younger than 18 and earned between 50 and 60 per cent of adult wages.51 In other cases, however, young workers’ earnings were reduced to even less than half of adults’, since the latter exceeded the legal minimum wage in several instances. At the Ipiranga Jafet, in 1951, young workers were reported as receiving about 31 per cent of the adult average. 52 In another large

32


company, the Mariângela Matarazzo mill, young workers in the finishing department earned between 33 and 44 per cent of adult wages.53 In the metal trades, wage imbalances were similar. At the United Shoe metal works, for instance, youngsters in the packing department earned hourly wages which – at most – reached 34 per cent of the estimated adult wages in that factory. 54 In others, such as the Metalúrgica Matarazzo, the hourly wages of minors were about half of those of adults. 55 The issues discussed in this chapter bring to the fore a different aspect of the labour markets, that of institutions and attitudes of management, labour and governments. Indeed, later chapters will not look at wages and skills as products solely of the interaction between supply and demand or structural elements; rather, wages and skills will be depicted in a wider context involving other aspects of industrial life and society. The determination of wages and skills is linked with working conditions, technical and organisational capabilities of firms and industries, as will be discussed elsewhere. But wages and skills are also a product of labour market institutions and the balance of power between workers, employers and governments. In view of this, the next chapter will address the attitudes of the actors and institutions concerned with wage setting and workforce qualification.

2 Shaping the Labour Markets

Fast growth in dynamic sectors put a great strain on the conditions of labour markets inherited from the period of the Second World War and before, during which a substantial industrial base had been built up, stimulated by recurrent external crises, expanding domestic markets and, later in the 1930s, by targeted economic policies. From the 1940s onwards, what was at stake was not only the organisation of people for the emerging industry, but also a more complex process of turning a largely deprived workforce into one able to deal with the requirements of new manufacturing activities both in the textile and metalworking industries. At the same time, the post-war juncture witnessed the emergence of an industrial working class large enough to become a chief player in electoral politics. For industrial workers in Greater São Paulo, the immediate post-war years represented an opportunity to assert rights and demand rewards long postponed by successive political interventions and economic hardship. Now, the pressures for better wages and working conditions could not be held back any longer and negotiations for workers to have a larger share in industrial prosperity were explicitly incorporated into the outlook of relevant social actors. This chapter will deal with two central aspects of the operation of labour markets in Greater São Paulo between 1945 and 1960 – the industrial training schemes devised to fit the labour force to a thriving industrial sector, and the process of wage bargaining which predominated at different economic and political junctures. These two dimensions were connected in the sense that they were both shaped by social forces and institutions which – alongside structural conditions of supply of and demand for labour – left their mark on the skills and wage trends examined in the previous chapter. The chapter will initially focus on industrial training and the strategy pursued to determine the 33

34


conditions and supply of skilled and semi-skilled labour. The second part of the chapter will discuss how the particular aims of management, workers and governments concerning wages were accommodated.

Industrialists and the National Service for Industrial Training (SENAI) The issue of labour-force qualification for the various new posts demanding different levels of training and skills was one of the most pressing problems faced by the new industrial plants which had sprung up in the Greater São Paulo area. The traditional method of relying on skilled foreign workers and on-the-job training – which had been valid until the end of the 1930s – continued to play a key role in the following years, but it soon became clear that such a method could not satisfy the needs of a rapidly expanding industrial base. This section will briefly describe the industrial training programmes created at the time and how they were combined with other means of supplying skilled labour, together with the underlying philosophy which inspired the establishment of industrial training in São Paulo and Brazil. The industrial training system – SENAI The National Service for Industrial Training (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial, or SENAI), established in January 1942 through Decree no. 4,048, was the main response to the problem of training the labour force. The Decree was signed by the president, Getúlio Vargas, and his ministers of labour and education at the height of the Estado Novo (New State) – the authoritarian regime existing between 1937 and 1945. The complex decision process which led to the enactment of this Decree shows the substantial influence which Paulista industrialists had achieved in the making of key state decisions at the time. The intervention of industrialists, particularly of Roberto Simonsen, in the issue of industrial training dates to 1939, when Estado Novo technicians worked out Decree no. 1,238 aimed at establishing vocational courses for most male youths and adults. The industrialists opposed the comprehensiveness of the Decree, and backed an alternative that was closely based on experiments in industrial training carried out by a nucleus of modernising entrepreneurs and technicians in São Paulo during the 1920s and 1930s.1 The industrialists lobbied for a model based to a large extent on ideas put forward by the Institute for the Rational Organisation of Work (Instituto de Organização Racional do Trabalho, or IDORT) and

Shaping the Labour Markets 35

influenced by the ideas of engineer Roberto Mange on the rational organisation of the work process. The model was based on two principles: the first was the subordination of training to the immediate and practical needs of industry, and the second was the concentration on a small core of technicians and skilled workers, amounting to no more than 10–15 per cent of the industrial labour force. 2 Such were the tenets held by the high-level commission formed in mid-1941 – after months of disagreements – to draw up a definitive proposal for industrial training. As one of the three members of this governmental commission, it was probably Simonsen who formulated the decree establishing SENAI at the beginning of 1942. 3 SENAI was funded by a federal tax on all of Brazil’s industrial enterprises. Initially, the tax was per employee, modified in 1944 to 1 per cent of the company payroll. Companies which had adequate conditions (schools and instructors) could ask for full or partial exemption. In addition, companies with more than 500 employees paid an extra 20 per cent over the normal levy. 4 The striking feature of SENAI’s funding was that the huge resources of the federal tax collected by the Social Insurance Institute for Industrial Workers (Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Industriários, or IAPI) were fully controlled by the industrialists themselves. This unusual scheme for the management of a public fund was devised by the businessmen who were on the government commission and the scheme was included in the final decree without apparent modification. Under this scheme, these public funds would be administered by regional and national councils which matched the official trade union structure of industrialist representation at state (Industrial Federations) and federal (National Confederation of Industry, Confederação Nacional da Indústria or CNI) level. Thus, FIESP would be entitled to most of the tax resources collected from the industrial companies in the state, with total autonomy over their allocation. 5 The training model established by SENAI differed greatly from the contemporary experiences of other countries which had been developing partnerships between employers, workers and governments. The pattern prevalent in Europe, Japan and the United States, for example, was one where the state had a substantial role in the management of the whole scheme, often combined with the participation of trade unions. Duration and contents of apprenticeship programmes, off-the-job and vocational training, as well as changes in the direction of skills development, were typical issues subject to negotiation between employers, governments and, frequently, the labour force itself.6

36


The training system created in Brazil in 1942, however, contained no provision for trade unions to have a seat on SENAI’s governing board, whereas the seats occupied by government representatives were merely formal. In fact, the participation of trade unions in the national training agency had been strongly opposed by Simonsen from the moment the idea had been aired in the initial plans drawn up by the Ministry of Labour in 1939. 7 This stance allowed the industrialists to gain control over all aspects: principles, organisation, targets and execution of training schemes in both industrial enterprises and schools set up with public funding through SENAI. The origins of this particular framework of the industrial training system can only be understood in the light of the political conditions of the Estado Novo regime. By the time SENAI was created, free trade unions had been shattered by the Vargas dictatorship and only the structure of official organisations and directorates remained in place. Although leftists and independent militants sought to work amid such hostile conditions, most trade unions continued to be an arm of the Estado Novo labour policy and propaganda until 1945 and even beyond. 8 As a result, there was little (if any) opportunity for independent working-class voices to raise questions regarding the management of the training schemes (which had been under discussion since the end of the 1930s), let alone the content of programmes, definition of skills and number of workers involved. At best, some worker demands would be introduced by Estado Novo technocrats who had the task of bringing together corporatist interests in the institutional framework being elaborated in government circles. Nonetheless, the obvious imbalance in class representation in the Estado Novo allowed the industrialist leaders to lobby freely without any real opposition, even from recognised trade unionists. It is not surprising, then, that industrialists were much more vocal on the crucial issue of industrial training. 9 The result of all this was that the industrialist leadership had a firm hold on the industrial training system, even after the end of the authoritarian regime in 1945. In the years that followed, trade unions never recovered the ground they had lost in this area. Despite the election of independent and left-wing officials in Greater São Paulo in 1951–2, trade unionists apparently limited themselves to general pleas for greater state control over SENAI and participation of the labour force in its management. In part, this may be attributed to the image successfully created by SENAI of a technical and efficient agency which was at the forefront of the improvement of labour standards in Brazil.10


At the same time, the failure of trade unions to press consistently for an alternative model of management (whereby they would finally have a say in SENAI’s programmes) reveals as much weakness among labour ranks as difficulties posed by the problems related to industrial training. There was little doubt at the time that the training system was crucial to the standing of labour and management and their bid for control, performance and rewards in the workplace. For example, for large sections of the workforce, wage levels were established through definition of skills.11 The same went for decisions about what should be taught in apprenticeship schemes and other courses – whether more specific or general, all-round skills – or who would be included or not in formal programmes (women, certain industries, specific occupations, and so forth). In addition, tipping the balance of external and internal labour markets decisively towards employers at the micro level meant that control over the training system also had a potential impact on macro aggregates such as the overall level of qualification of the labour force and competitiveness of the industrial structure as a whole. 12 The next section will provide some examples of the way particular concepts developed by SENAI took shape in its industrial training programmes during the 1940s and 1950s. The aim is to indicate how such ideas helped define the basic features of labour markets in Greater São Paulo, as were described in the previous chapter. Programmes and problems of industrial training SENAI was set up in response to a sense of urgency caused by the shortage of skilled labour in the wake of rapid industrial growth and diversification during the Second World War. The directorate of the regional branch of SENAI in São Paulo was appointed directly by Simonsen and its first step was to launch an ‘emergency plan’ to deal with the problem of supplying skilled labour to the war economy. This plan took the form of two courses: Short Training Courses (Cursos Rápidos de Formação or CRFs) and Short Improvement Courses (Cursos Rápidos de Aperfeiçoamento or CRAs). 13 Although these short courses had been devised as emergency schemes for companies involved in the war effort, they continued to be offered after 1945 and throughout the 1950s. The main sector targeted was the metalworking industry, which had been identified as the principal focus of skill shortage in Paulista industry during the war. The short courses started in January 1943, with different schedules and objectives: the CRFs, aimed at youths and adults, provided general and practical notions of the trade and were scheduled for three, four or five months;

38


the CRAs focused on adults who already had extensive practical experience and taught advanced concepts in technical design, mathematics and technology during five- or ten-month courses (which were later extended to one year). The first courses organised reflected the type of skills which were particularly scarce in metalworking plants. In 1943, for example, five areas were listed in SENAI CRFs: filing machine, mechanics, gas welding, arc welding and moulding. Improvement Courses (CRAs) were set up in interpretation of industrial design, mechanics (two types) and electrical equipment. Some of these programmes (for example, welding, mechanics and electrical equipment) were maintained over the 1940s and 1950s and others were launched or discontinued according to demand. Thus, for instance, a new Short Training Course for mechanical fitters was introduced from 1951 and another in motor car plating from 1954, reflecting the new skills demanded by industrial diversification in the 1950s.14 The situation was apparently different in the textile industry, as there were only a few specific programmes organised for the industry within the short courses category. It seems that in the initial years of SENAI’s operation, the availability of skilled textile workers was not particularly problematic. Indeed, there is no record of emergency courses in this trade during the first year (1943). Only a programme of basic skills (Adestramento Têxtil) was scheduled in 1944, and even then it was carried out in a regional centre (Jundiaí, near São Paulo), until 1946. From 1946, short courses (mostly CRAs) were established in two categories: for operatives (cotton weaving and spinning) and foremen (weaving and spinning). And yet, these programmes turned out only a few specialised workers when compared to those who were trained in metalworking skills.15 Apart from launching emergency courses, the second step taken by SENAI in 1942 was to carry out a thorough study of tasks performed by workers in key industrial occupations. SENAI staff visited factories and noted down routine movements and time allocated by workers to each task, so that they could establish the basis for a methodical approach to regular apprenticeship courses. 16 The resulting programmes made up the nucleus of SENAI’s self-proclaimed long-term goal: the Courses for Craft Apprentices (Cursos de Aprendizes de Ofício, or CAOs), aimed at youngsters in the 14–18 age group. These schemes were complemented by the Courses for Working Minors (Cursos de Trabalhadores Menores, or CTMs), for those below the legal working age (12–14 years old), and provided general notions of literacy, numeracy and factory routine. 17


The apprenticeship courses started in August 1943, with students dividing their day between factory and SENAI schools. During the first two years, the intake of new apprentices was channelled into eight metalworking or related crafts, such as mechanical fitting, lathe operation and carpentry. The courses usually lasted three years and were taught in the rapidly-growing number of SENAI schools or in the few companies which had been allowed to train their apprentices under supervision. In 1944, for example, only six companies in the entire state of São Paulo were authorised by SENAI to run their own courses: three railway enterprises, two textiles, and one chemical company. 18 As with the short courses, the CAOs in metal trades expanded their coverage in the 1950s to occupations demanded by new industrial activities – such as a course for motor vehicle mechanics set up in 1952.19 Textile apprenticeship programmes, in turn, were organised from November 1945 and usually lasted two years. The courses were basically intended to lead to skilled occupations in weaving and spinning of cotton, wool, silk and jute.20 Apart from these regular programmes, SENAI ran other specific schemes with variable duration and aims, including schemes for foremen. There was a major departure from the traditional SENAI approach in the mid-1950s, when the very rapid growth of employment in the metalworking industries called into question the school-based system and its capacity to supply the required skilled and semi-skilled workers in both new and established occupations.21 The change came with the acknowledgement that about 70 per cent of skilled metalworkers of the time had been trained on the job.22 The first modifications were introduced in 1954, when four-month workplace courses were organised in four large São Paulo metalworking enterprises – Elevadores Atlas, Metalúrgica Matarazzo, Máquinas Piratininga and Ford Motor. These initial in-service programmes targeted foremen and skilled workers and aimed to update and complement knowledge of technology, industrial design and human relations. In 1955, this system was extended to other companies (14 in total, including two textile firms), mostly in Greater São Paulo.23 Such experiments were followed by a far-reaching reform of the SENAI system in 1956, in which on-the-job training became a central part of the agency’s programmes. Three new courses of action were devised: first, to give priority to the training of apprentices in mechanics, vehicles and maintenance of industrial equipment; second, to train 14–18 year-olds on the shop floor, particularly in semi-skilled occupations; and third, to improve and upgrade the technical and

The Industrial Workforce and the Labour Markets 20,000 18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0

5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0

Percentage

Numbers

40

194619471948194919501951195219531954195519561957195819591960 Workers completing SENAI courses

Percentage of industrial workers in São Paulo

Figure 2.1 Numbers of workersa completing SENAI courses and relative share in the total industrial workforce in the state of São Paulo, 1946–60 Note: a Data for 1949–50 not available. Sources: as Tables A-2 and A-8, Appendix A.

human relations knowledge of adults (semi-skilled, skilled workers and foremen).24 To accomplish these aims, new types of in-service courses were established based on those recently introduced. The first group was the Training in the Workplace (Treinamento na Indústria) for youngsters and adults. The other group was a tried and tested US programme, Training Within Industry (TWI), which was directed at supervisory functions in the workplace (foremen and chiefs).25 The TWI had first been applied in US industry during the Second World War and later in several European countries and Japan in the wake of American technical and financial assistance during the 1940s and 1950s. At the federal level, the TWI was introduced in 1952 by the Brazilian-American Commission for Industrial Education (Comissão Brasileira-Americana de Educação Industrial, or CBAI), with support from the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce.26 A branch of CBAI was set up in São Paulo at the same time and became specialised in delivering the TWI courses, in association with the State Department of Labour. With the switch to on-the-job training, SENAI started to include TWI among its formal courses and rely on the CBAI for assistance in setting up its workplace programmes. 27 Figure 2.1 gives an approximate idea of the number of workers who completed any of the programmes organised by SENAI in the 1940s and 1950s: apprenticeship, short courses and on-the-job training. Initially, it is clear from the figure that the relative number of workers completing any type of SENAI course remained stable until 1955. As a result of the emphasis laid on short-term workplace training, the share of workers


gaining a SENAI certificate (and of youngsters enrolled in on-the-job programmes) grew more than six-fold between 1955 and 1960. Despite this impressive growth, however, the ratio of completion (plus that of youngsters enrolled) never exceeded 2 per cent of the total industrial workforce in the state of São Paulo. Even isolating the two main targets (textile and metalworking) of SENAI’s programmes, that figure would at most reach 4 per cent at its peak in 1960.28 These data indicate that, despite efforts to extend coverage in the mid-1950s, SENAI did not fulfil its stated objective of training at least the upper echelons of the labour force. In any case, industrialists had firm control over the training system throughout the 1940s and 1950s and were able not only to determine the content of the programmes, but also to decide what should be labelled as skilled and semi-skilled occupations. There is evidence that the boundaries between these latter classifications were frequently revised during that time, partly as a result of pressures from the industrialists themselves. This was possibly an important way of influencing pay conditions for specific jobs in Paulista industry. 29 At the same time, although it was unable to match the demand for skilled jobs in fastgrowing industries (such as metalworking), SENAI did help to ease the pressures on the labour markets of those occupations under strain. In this sense, SENAI programmes reduced the bargaining power of skilled and semi-skilled workers and, thus, affected pay conditions in these categories. 30 The concentration of SENAI programmes on skilled jobs and SENAI’s inability to meet the demand of booming sectors made the existence of alternative sources of labour supply crucial for the relative position of managers and workers in labour markets. The next topic will discuss briefly how both skilled and unskilled occupations were usually filled in the textile and metalworking industries. Scarcity, migration and quality of workforce Despite SENAI’s actions, complaints about the scarcity of skilled workers continued during the whole period examined. There was a clear perception that SENAI programmes were powerless to satisfy the increasing demand from industry. As a specialist put it in 1959, ‘[t]he large surplus of unskilled manpower coincides with considerable shortages of workers in the semi-skilled, skilled and – most of all – the highly skilled grades’. 31 Particular groups of employers expressed concern about problems in industrial training at different times and with variable degrees of urgency, given their different labour market conditions. Textile industrialists, for

42


example, claimed in the immediate post-war years that they were being seriously affected by insufficiently trained workers as well as a lack of technicians and skilled operatives in the market place. In the expanding economic situation of 1945, the textile employers’ syndicate maintained that there was a ‘near total’ lack of skilled workers, who often left to seek better wages and working conditions. According to the industrialists, the increased bargaining power of skilled workers even halted production in certain factories. 32 In the following years, however, such extreme observations became less frequent among the textile leadership as the textile mills were plunged into crises and rationalisation measures in the 1950s. The situation was entirely different in the metal trades, since the problems of supply of skilled labour in these segments remained acute during the whole period examined. Not only was the demand for skills in metal trades the reason for the establishment of SENAI, as discussed previously, but pressures by industrialists even gained momentum, particularly during the second half of the 1950s. The review undertaken of SENAI’s approach was not sufficient to tackle the issue of skilled workers as, at the same time, further demands for machine operatives arose from new industries. The motor vehicles programme is illustrative of the difficulties faced at the time. The huge demand for labour generated by the investments of motor vehicle firms posed serious problems for recruiting both skilled and semi-skilled workers. There were numerous complaints of metalworkers going over to motor companies, lured by better wages. Poaching was a common phenomenon at the end of the 1950s, with recruiters coming to the gates of rival companies to offer higher wages to qualified workers. 33 Despite the differences between industrial segments, however, a recurrent response by employers and governments to the scarcity of skilled workers was to attract immigrants. Europe had long been seen as a source of industrial abilities in the first decades of São Paulo industrialisation. After the Second World War, this alternative remained a high priority for industrialists eager to find a short-term solution to the scarcity of skilled workers. Indeed, following the outcry at the end of the war regarding the scarce supply of skilled workers, the textile employers’ syndicate conceived a campaign to attract immigrants to São Paulo. The objective, the syndicate remarked, was to bring in ‘the splendid workers who in Europe, before the war, exerted their activities in textile factories of France, Italy and other occupied countries’. 34 Some years later, a national convention of the textile industry insisted upon measures to stimulate the influx of migrant workers. 35


Given the international dimension of the problems involved, however, the state was to assume the most important role in immigration policies. The Brazilian government participated in the first programmes hosting Europeans displaced by the war. Early in 1945, Vargas had signed a Decree (no. 7,575 of 21 May 1945) allowing once again foreign immigration which had been prohibited since 1941. 36 The Brazilian government continued to support international initiatives to settle displaced people, particularly those from Europe, initially through the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) set up in 1946, and later through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) established in 1951.37 Although a number of non-qualified workers came with their families, the explicit aim was always to absorb those workers whose skills were scarce in industry. A major initiative was taken at the end of 1955 through the Pre-Placing Labour Plan (Plano de Mão-de-Obra Pré-Colocada), intended to place skilled immigrant workers in pre-established jobs. Employers contributed to the travel expenses and could apply directly for the skilled immigrant workers under an agreement between ICEM and its counterpart in Brazil – the National Institute for Immigration and Colonisation (Instituto Nacional de Imigração e Colonização, or INIC). 38 In its first year, the programme received more than a thousand applications for skilled workers in industry, mostly for skilled technicians and particular categories of semi-skilled workers. Yet the response by European workers was less than enthusiastic, since only 200 workers actually came to Brazil. 39 In fact, the next years would see a great difficulty in attracting European workers to São Paulo’s industry. First, the recovery of European countries reduced the inducement to the labour force to emigrate. Second, and more importantly, other countries looking for skilled workers (such as Canada and Australia) were able to offer much better wages and conditions from the outset. 40 Since the emphasis was placed on skilled workers, the large number of labourers and operatives received less attention from the industrialists. Overall, the industrialists showed very little concern with the training, standards and quality of the largest segment of the industrial labour force. Instead, the continuous influx of people from the countryside and other states into Greater São Paulo from the 1930s onwards was usually regarded as a source of cheap labour for industry, and one which would reduce the pressures on wages amid rapid industrial growth. However, even the short-term advantages of such a strategy were less evident in the context of new industries and modernisation. There were complaints about the supply of the intermediate group of

44


machine operatives, which grew during the 1950s. The conventional SENAI assumption that this large segment of the workforce should be left without formal training was soon shown to be inadequate and was partially modified, as described before. Yet these changes produced little immediate effect and the scarcity of semi-skilled workers in booming industries became serious in the 1950s. Even the supply of unskilled labour was problematic in some cases. An example was the announcement in 1959 by GEIA of a wide-scale programme to recruit workers from the north-east, the most impoverished region in Brazil. A large number of workers from north-eastern states were already employed in the new motor plants in Greater São Paulo. Now GEIA planned its first training centre in a north-eastern state (Ceará); one which would recruit and directly prepare workers for the São Paulo motor industry. The centre would provide intensive, 10-week courses, incorporating ‘notions of discipline, hygiene, social relationships in the workplace, and basic notions of mechanics, after which they [the workers] will be brought in to São Paulo, to be allocated to several companies [ . . . ]’. The aim was to spread such centres over the cities of the north-east, ‘in order to train between 10,000 and 15,000 men a year, who will lessen [ . . . ] the pressures on the Paulista labour market’. 41 Despite the public announcement of such an ambitious programme, it never came into effect.42 The demand for unskilled workers continued to be satisfied by spontaneous migration of streams of people from impoverished regions. The responses given to the problem of supply of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, therefore, did not effectively change the industrialists’ approach to the qualification of the labour force. In effect, the reform of SENAI programmes in 1956 preserved the idea that only small sections of the labour force should undergo formal training. Semiskilled workers were only partially targeted by specific programmes seeking to alleviate tensions observed in certain occupations and industries. The question of unskilled workers, in turn, was raised only at the peak of the motor companies’ investments in Greater São Paulo, when it was apparently problematic to recruit even the lowest ranks of the workforce. Emergency programmes were drawn up, first, to cope with the threats to the operation of the new industrial plants and, second, to prevent the balance of power from shifting towards workers in a tight labour market. Reliance on a poorly educated and trained labour force, therefore, became a distinguishing characteristic of the industrial strategy in São Paulo during the 1940s and 1950s. Most of the large number of workers


classified as semi-skilled and unskilled had little or no alternative but to continue learning their jobs in the workplace. The generally low literacy rate of these workers meant that opportunities for improvement in the company, stability, better wages and working conditions were quite limited.43 Such conditions disproportionately affected certain groups of workers, such as women. They were formally barred from SENAI training programmes for supervisors (mestres and contramestres) for the textile industry, despite their being in the majority in that trade. The few courses open to women tended to have a distinct emphasis on cooking and home tasks. 44 As suggested in the previous chapter, these facts undoubtedly contributed to confining women workers to the more lowly-paid, lowly-valued jobs. And this was a situation which textile industrialists of the time seemed unwilling to change. Labour-market conditions, reinforced by training systems, had an obvious impacts on wages. The next section will describe the main aspects of negotiations between government, employers and workers that shaped wage trends in Greater São Paulo between 1945 and 1960.

The politics of wage bargaining As with industrial training, wage bargaining was a major aspect of the operation of labour markets in Greater São Paulo. Unlike the training system set up in the 1940s, however, the settlement of wage disputes between 1945 and 1960 became a contentious area in which both workers and the state played an important role. Whether in trade unions or in the workplace, there was a relentless mobilisation by workers during this period to preserve and – when conditions so favoured – to increase their real earnings. Predictably, industrialists were also very concerned and active on pay issues, both at corporate level and in the economy as a whole. These stances reinforced wage levels, first and foremost as a key political variable concerning the relative position of workers and employers in the wider society. Wage bargaining was also central to issues such as shop-floor incentives, co-operation, and growth in productivity which were at the heart of the industrial system. This section will address attitudes and institutions concerning wages and how they, combined with the structural elements previously described, shaped pay standards. Attitudes and institutions will be set in the context of the political and macroeconomic environment, both domestic and external, which defined prospects and constraints for the specific demands of social groups. Initially, the section will analyse shop-floor bargaining between workers and managers in individual

46


companies in the textile and metalworking industries. This neglected side of wage bargaining will form an essential part of the subsequent analysis of the negotiating process involving trade unions, employers’ organisations and the government. Workplace and wage bargaining Although it has historically represented an important sphere in which pay and conditions are established in industry, the workplace has largely been neglected in the analysis of wage setting in São Paulo and Brazil as a whole. The following discussion, however, will argue that shop-floor settlements between management and workers were crucial for the definition of pay levels in Paulista industry. In fact, there are elements to suggest that in Brazil the particular economic and political conditions at the time made the workplace even more central for wage bargaining than had been experienced in other countries. While repression had a harsh impact on the traditional channels of labour representation (trade unions), it did not stop localised deals being made directly between management and workers in individual companies. In other words, the same repressive approach to trade unions, employed to lessen political and economic pressures on firms, opened the door to agreements on a firm-by-firm basis, according to firm-specific conditions and labour policies. These issues came to the fore in 1945–7. In May 1945, hundreds of industrial plants in São Paulo were brought to a standstill because of wage claims led by groups of workers, without the support of trade unions. Despite initial resistance, industrialists were forced to negotiate directly with factory commissions in most cases – with the mediation of the Ministry of Labour. Pay increases varied from 20 to 40 per cent, depending on individual basic wages. This was the first unequivocal demonstration that labour struggles could not be kept within the strict limits of permitted bargaining desired by Estado Novo officials and employers. 45 The rank and file, indeed, did not show themselves satisfied with the pay rises granted. In 1945–6, two economic reasons appeared central to such discontent: first, the cumulative deterioration in real wages during previous years, when trade unions were under strict control; second, the high cost of living, despite attempts at price control by government and employers. 46 The employers’ leadership even called on firms to refrain from raising prices in an effort to prevent a further backlash among workers.47 Such attempts were vain, and fresh demands for wage increases sprang up over São Paulo at the end of 1945 and during 1946.


In both the textile and metalworking industries, the resolution of conflicts varied according to specific arrangements in firms, with some of them seeking a quick compromise and others adopting a hardline stance. 48 Negotiating procedures also depended on timing, given that workplace settlements became more difficult from February 1946, in the wake of the prohibition of public meetings and the strike law, both decreed by the new Dutra government on 27 February and 15 March respectively. The consequences of these decrees in relation to wage demands in the metal trades (and other sectors) were immediate. Indeed, while textile industrialists settled an across-the-board pay rise on 27 February 1946 (that is, at precisely the same time as the prohibition of public meetings was being signed) after wildcat strikes had nearly paralysed their sector, strikes in the main companies of the metalworking industry went ahead, since no general agreement was apparently reached on that occasion. By 8 March 1946, for example, four of the largest metalworking companies in the state of São Paulo remained closed due to strikes, after protracted, frustrated negotiations.49 The changing political situation bolstered those firms which had adopted a stern attitude towards direct negotiation with workers. This seems to be exactly what happened to the large metalworking companies which had been on strike since February 1946, such as Cia. Mecânica Importadora and Laminação Nacional de Metais. In addition to redundancies, these and other firms blacklisted workers, allegedly with the help of the Federation of Industries. 50 In March, intervention by police in localised conflicts had become routine and those companies unwilling to compromise were strengthened by the reversal in the political situation. The cases of Nitro Química, Cia Brasileira e Metais, Tapetes Atlântida, Tinturaria Brasileira – which made systematic use of police action, persecution and dismissals – were representative of this trend in 1946. 51 In the meantime, the government attempted to speed up the settling of collective disputes (dissídios coletivos) in the Labour Tribunal, which at times decreed wage increases even when companies did not want to compromise. The combination of legal settlements and repression, in fact, seems to have been an explicit strategy pursued by the government to contain rank-and-file demands in 1946 and the beginning of 1947. 52 Apart from the political climate, economic conditions underwent a substantial change under the Dutra government, with its emphasis on stabilisation and control of inflation. From the beginning of 1946 the government announced strict monetary, fiscal and wage policies to curb the public deficit and rising prices. Along with the shifting

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domestic situation, a new political framework on a worldwide scale was being designed and achieved its definitive form in Truman’s speech early in 1947, which sparked off the Cold War.53 Despite this adverse juncture, however, textile and metal workers continued to put pressure on management for wage increases at the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947. The new factor introduced at this time was that the wagebargaining procedure in firms had to comply with the social chapter introduced in the new Constitution, promulgated in September 1946. Among other rights, Article 157 of the Constitution established immediate financial gains through payment for a weekly day of rest and holidays. Workers in some companies obtained these payments by means of legal action against employers’ opposition. Likewise, strikes broke out in February 1947 calling for holiday pay as well as wage rises and a Christmas bonus. 54 Even though they were mild compared to the events in 1945 and 1946, stoppages in early 1947 were sufficient to ignite large-scale repression by the government, crushing organised labour and leftist groups from May 1947 onwards.55 Available evidence suggests that factory organisations were severely affected between May 1947 and the end of 1951. The Dutra government’s crackdown on trade unions and militants gave companies the upper hand and enabled them to revoke advances which labour had made during previous years. Such action was not only politically inspired, there was also an economic ingredient which helped to inject further tension into labour–management relations in the form of declining industrial output and job creation (see Appendix A, Table A-1; Chapter 1, Table 1.2). Under such economic circumstances, it seems a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that management saw the repression of the workforce not only as an opportunity to seize the initiative on the shop floor, but also to reduce pressures on firms constrained by dwindling industrial output and by crisis. 56 As a result, labour’s recently increased power was replaced by faltering demand and dismissals. The decline of real wages in 1947, therefore, is evidence that political repression and industrial crisis helped transfer the burden of economic downturn and inflation onto the shoulders of industrial workers in São Paulo.57 However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that Paulista industrialists ruled with a free hand from May 1947 or adopted a uniform attitude on wages. As will be shown below, there is evidence that despite the attack on organised labour there were settlements in many firms, according to specific wage policies. In this respect, not only were companies’ labour policies decisive, but workplace organisations (now frequently informal) kept up pressure on management.


From 1948, shop-floor organisations again took the lead in wage demands, after a short period in which trade unions started to echo the rank-and-file claims in 1946–7. This fact is illustrated by the negotiating process embarked on by textile and metal workers at the beginning of 1948.58 In the case of metal trades, direct bargaining started in about forty enterprises. Despite repression, a few companies reached a settlement with their workforce and others apparently followed suit.59 With regard to the textile sector, in March 1948, after direct bargaining had failed, the trade union in São Paulo (under government intervention) agreed on a formal dissídio coletivo, which reflected several demands raised by factory commissions for textile workers. An initial favourable decision for workers by the Regional Labour Tribunal was fiercely opposed by the industrialists, so that a legal battle changed the content and suspended the application of the dissídio until the end of 1949.60 The official stance of the textile employers’ syndicate, while recognising the legitimacy of wage claims, was to refuse any rise because it would destroy industry’s ability to compete successfully in external markets. Parallel to the legal process, however, negotiations continued in individual companies and it seems that partial wage rises were agreed even without overall settlement. 61 During 1949 and 1950, the situation continued to be one of tough negotiation between workers’ commissions and management. Nonetheless, a shift in the macroeconomic environment, with expansionist economic policies being adopted by the Dutra government, growing industrial output and job creation strengthened the position of workers and was likely to have favoured agreements in the workplace. 62 Some disputes were settled by the Labour Tribunal after long individual grievance procedures, whereas others led to short stoppages, police intervention and dismissals. In addition to wage adjustments and a Christmas bonus, workers fought for the application of Law no. 605 of January 1949, which regulated the principle of a weekly paid day of rest, as well as paid holidays, as laid down by the Constitution of 1946. Workers from several firms resorted to the Labour Tribunal to obtain this right, which could represent a wage increase of about 17 per cent.63 Nevertheless, the Law also contained an attendance clause which foresaw the removal of the weekly paid day of rest for employees who had failed to attend work for the full number of hours during the previous week. The setback imposed on labour by the Dutra government started to change more substantially only when a number of claims and strikes broke out between the end of 1950 and early 1951, in the first year of the second Vargas government (January 1951–August 1954). Throughout

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1951 a higher number of firms than in previous months were forced to agree to pay rises, in view of the recovery of worker organisation on the shop floor and the leverage in the form of the first elections to trade union offices after the government interventions of 1947.64 Extensive mobilisation of textile and metal workers at the end of 1951 and the beginning of 1952 heralded a clear departure from previous years. It seems that industrial growth and the Vargas government’s compromise with sections of organised labour made for growing confidence on the shop floor. Moreover, the return of high inflation compelled labour to move to defend their earnings. First, both textile and metal workers staged large-scale strikes in December 1951 in a bid for pay rises and the end of the attendance clause. On 19 December, about 30,000 metalworkers from some 80 firms in the capital went on strike for 24 hours. There was also another walkout at the time, involving 5,500 metal workers in 19 companies, over a Christmas bonus. On 20 December textile workers staged a 24-hour strike, calling for a 50 per cent increase in basic wages and the end of the attendance clause. In December 1951 there were other strikes over Christmas bonuses in several mills.65 Although trade unions played a major role, these initiatives were to a large extent pushed ahead by factory commissions. The results for the workers were positive overall, enabling them to obtain pay rises of 50 per cent (metalworkers) and 25 per cent (textile workers), Christmas bonuses, and the end of the attendance clause. However, in various enterprises the movement continued well into January and February 1952 because of the refusal by management (mainly in textile mills) to comply with the agreements.66 The most outstanding event for industrial relations in the period 1952–5, however, was the strike by 300,000 workers in March and April 1953. A key aspect of the strike was the strong presence of workplace organisations, whose decisive role in the tough bargaining with industrialists before and during the strike has long been noted by historians.67 From the beginning of 1953, factory commissions and trade unions had found most industrialists resistant to negotiation of any adjustment, because of alleged economic difficulties. After discussions had ended in a stalemate, workers (mostly women) at large enterprises – such as Matarazzo Belenzinho and Cotonifício Paulista – walked out even before trade unions had announced official strike action. It took a 29-day strike for textile and metal workers (not counting other categories) to win, through the Labour Tribunal, a 32 per cent increase over wage levels of February 1952 (for textile workers) and January 1952 (for metalworkers). Some 300,000 workers took part in the strike in the


state of São Paulo, with an estimated 297 firms being affected in the metal trades alone. The rank and file were very active in the organisation of the strike and there are several reports of factory commissions being formed and consolidated in the wake of the industrial action. 68 At the same time, the largest and more militant trade unions in the state set up the Inter-Union Unity Pact (Pacto de Unidade Inter-Sindical, or PUI). In the following years, the PUI turned out to be the most representative and influential labour organisation in São Paulo, despite the fact that it was never granted official recognition by successive governments. As with the Confederation of Brazilian Workers (Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil, or CTB) in 1946–7, the PUI formed a broad coalition of independents and left-wing activists who held key positions in Paulista trade unions.69 The aftermath of the strike did not end conflicts between management and workers. First, tension arose from the large-scale sacking of the more militant workers in various companies. Second, workers in many firms had to strike again in an attempt to force management to comply with the legal decision.70 Furthermore, a group of 56 textile firms (out of the 1,144 located in the capital) appealed to the Federal Labour Tribunal (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, or TST) to revoke the 32 per cent increase decreed at regional level. In September 1953, the TST decided to attach to that wage adjustment the full attendance clause (which had been removed from contracts by the 1951 agreement). This measure produced a new wave of short stoppages – often 15 minutes a day – in those firms that applied the new rule.71 The issue was only definitely settled in the textile industry during a new round of wage negotiations in June 1954, when the attendance clause was deleted from the agreement to a 20 per cent increase (over wage levels of April 1953). 72 The pursuit of wage adjustments in the face of persistently high inflation continued to fuel labour demands during 1954 and 1955. In the textile industry, as in much of the metalworking sector, new agreements were signed at the end of 1954 and 1955. In numerous cases it seems that these across-the-board deals reflected the increases which companies had already been granting their workforces. 73 Economic growth and new political conditions during 1956–60 led to the full recovery of trade unions as the main channel of working-class demands, with substantial changes in the role of workers’ organisation on the shop floor. In particular, the gap between the rank and file and trade unions in the textile and metalworking industries narrowed as a result of either deliberate policies by labour leaders or rank-and-file

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pressures. Evidence of this was the proliferation of representatives appointed by the trade unions in firms, with the explicit aim of establishing links with the workplace. This is a phenomenon barely studied so far, but sparse evidence suggests that the number of trade union delegates in factories grew substantially from 1956 and assumed an important role in organised labour’s activities in the period. In effect, trade union records indicate that there were about 400 delegates in textile firms only in the capital by 1957. In the metalworking sector, the number of delegates appointed by the metal workers’ trade union in the city of São Paulo jumped from 56 in September 1956 to 156 a year later. 74 These trade union delegates were in charge of formulating demands and conducting negotiations with management. That was the case at the Nitro Química rayon factory which, although having its workforce affiliated to the chemical workers’ trade union, maintained an industrial organisation and labour force similar to that of large textile companies in São Paulo. From 1956, the trade union promoted the choice of delegates in rayon and chemical companies and a works council was formally established at the Nitro Química plant. This shop-floor commission would have a central role in the tough struggles over wages and working conditions at Nitro Química in the following years. As in other companies, the nominations were officially approved by the Regional Labour Department, the state labour agency operating in São Paulo and dominated by the trabalhistas from the Brazilian Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, or PTB). 75 Although these formal links between shop-floor delegates and trade unions may have been important at the time in certain companies, their strength should not be overestimated. Trade unions were still recovering from heavy setbacks in previous years and experiments with formal delegation on the shop floor were apparently new, despite the attempts made by trade unionists dating back at least to the 1920s. Moreover, political instability and management opposition to workers’ representation on the shop floor posed a real threat to delegates and works councils, despite the fact that the latter were set up under the auspices of the Regional Labour Department. 76 Still, it seems wrong to dismiss the importance of the network of delegates which began to be formed in the second half of the 1950s.77 Thus, shop-floor organisations – whether connected to trade unions or informal ones existing in the factories – remained quite active in wage bargaining in Greater São Paulo during the period 1956–60. They gave support to trade unions’ demands for wage increases in yearly


collective bargaining, such as that of 1956. 78 Although mediation by state agencies helped to prevent strikes in 1956, it could not prevent them in 1957. During that year, there was strong pressure in individual firms for bonus and wage adjustments in the face of rising prices, with wildcat strikes happening in August and September. In October, six categories of workers in São Paulo decided to walk out in industrial action which was even more widespread than in 1953. It was estimated that some 400,000 workers stopped throughout the state during the eight days (15–22 October) of the strike.79 In the end, the Regional Labour Tribunal (Tribunal Regional do Trabalho, or TRT) decreed a 25 per cent pay increase (over wages of October 1956) for textile and metal workers, which was hailed by the strikers as a victory. The industrialists, in turn, complained about the increase arbitrated by the TRT. Employers in the textile industry showed themselves particularly unwilling to compromise and their syndicate appealed to the TST, contesting the settlement. Eventually, in January 1958 the TST reduced the increase to 18 per cent for all categories, while maintaining the previous rule that any wage review should be conditional on firms’ ability to pay. 80 Conflicts arose as a result, with protests and threats of renewed walkouts by the trade unions and the PUI. Despite this, however, the leadership held back and avoided calling another strike, fearing political instability. The textile industrialists were still the ones most determined not to compromise. On the other hand, FIESP argued that many firms had given pay increases above the level established by the TST. Evidence shows, indeed, that agreements were reached on an individual basis, although many textile enterprises may have been excluded from this. 81 The tough negotiations of 1957 were at least in part a result of the fall in employment and growth rates, which was felt to be serious at the time. 82 Furthermore, the textile industry was undergoing an extensive process of rationalisation, which resulted in wide-scale dismissals of workers in 1956 and following years. Certainly, the shifting conditions in the labour markets empowered the industrialists in this sector to renege on industry-wide wage deals and to take an assertive stance in the workplace. As dismissals continued after a brief interval in 1957, it is probable that this attitude became even more pronounced in the following years, up to 1960. To a large extent, soaring inflation was responsible for the wrangling over wage levels. Up to 1960, mobilisation of the workforce was characterised by the struggle to catch up with ever-increasing prices. Unlike 1957, however, the very intense industrial growth from then on

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facilitated wage bargaining at all levels. In the following years, wage settlements were reached in a more straightforward fashion, the textile industry included, even though scaremongering remained a feature of practically all negotiations between industrialists and workers. 83 In the same vein, industry-wide deals did not prevent walkouts in individual firms. One example was the lengthy strike by workers of the Fiação e Tecelagem Santo André in 1959, as well as short union-led strikes on the eve of collective negotiations. 84 The analysis so far has drawn attention to the role of shop-floor organisations as a crucial sphere in understanding wage settlements in Greater São Paulo in the post-Second World War years. The next section will address other institutions – political parties, trade unions, employers’ syndicates and governments – and how they formed the framework for wage negotiations at the time. Institutions, political groups and wage bargaining Wage negotiations in Brazil reflected the broad interests of various social groups and political parties, which were in turn firmly bound up with the turbulent international situation of the immediate post-war years and the 1950s. Indeed, economic demands were stimulated as much by the direct needs of the working class as by the strategic considerations of political groups seeking hegemonic representation among workers. In the same sense, the industrialists were always wary of the threats that an assertive working class and labour-based political parties could pose, both to their immediate economic gains and to their authority in the workplace and in society at large. Moreover, developments in the international economy and the Cold War became points of reference for the prospects and attitudes of all concerned. Trade unions emerged from the Estado Novo dictatorship with very few links to the rank and file, as they were frequently dominated by officials with little involvement in direct disputes between management and workers over pay and conditions. This picture changed significantly between 1945 and 1947, once the intense conflicts early in 1945 started to be channelled through the trade unions. In several instances, the rank and file forced officials to act and took the lead in conducting negotiations or initiating dissídios coletivos. As noted by the US Labor Attaché, ‘[t]he strikes were not called or sponsored by the syndicates but the movement reached such proportions that they were forced to take either a stand in favor of the workers or else fall into greater disrepute as nonentities’. 85 From the outset, left-wing militants assumed a important role in shop-floor activities and trade union life in Greater São Paulo.


They negotiated with trabalhistas (from the PTB) and officials long entrenched in trade union bureaucracy, assumed major positions within organised labour and, as such, had to deal with the urgent issue of pay conditions in factories. It was apparent, however, that throughout the period the communists and other groups had only a limited amount of influence on the rank and file. In 1945, the Unifying Movement of Workers (Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores, or MUT), set up by the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista do Brasil, or PCB) as a parallel organisation responsible for its trade union policy, was committed to avoiding strikes and, hence, clashed with the upsurge of wildcat strikes in São Paulo.86 The ‘national unity’ strategy, however, was rapidly undermined by political developments in Brazil, particularly by repressive raids on MUT militants and the election of Dutra. By January 1946, the wage-restraint policy adopted by the communists in São Paulo had in practice been discarded – far ahead of the Cominform meeting in September 1947 which set out a new policy for the world’s communist parties after the breakdown of anti-fascist alliances. 87 Other events central to wage bargaining conditions in São Paulo were a result of trade union meetings in 1946. The consolidation of distinct parties among organised labour was a signal that high-level settlements with employers over wage demands would be rather difficult. The CTB was set up by left-wingers and independents and clearly diverged from the government-sponsored group of labour leaders in that the former took an aggressive stance on affiliation and organisation of labour. Although it held a cautious line and sought to resort extensively to dissídios, the CTB did uphold the pay demands of its affiliates. As the CTB had by far the strongest support among labour, any high-level negotiation over pay and conditions had to involve the most militant trade unions. At a wider level, the CTB also outlined far-reaching proposals for labour rights, and for economic and social policy. 88 The importance of these developments is evident by the way the industrialists saw the existing trade union groups. It seems doubtless that Paulista employers did not foresee any comprehensive wage pact with militant sections of organised labour, or admitted consultation with them for overall issues of economic and social policy. Rather, during the period 1945–47, employers tried hard to favour the labour leaders linked to the Ministry of Labour in contentious bargaining with workers. Amidst the strikes of early 1946, for example, FIESP expressed publicly that the Coligação Sindical (a group which included labour leaders associated with the Estado Novo and the Ministry of Labour)

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was the only recognised partner – rather than MUT – in discussions over pay and conditions of work.89 Meanwhile, the industrialists viciously attacked other groups as being ‘manipulated by agitators inspired by ideologies alien to [the country’s] civilisation and moral standards’ as well as plotting the communist overthrow of the government. Despite such strictures, employers were forced to deal with other political groups representing labour as much at this time as in nearly all major walkouts in the period. 90 The industrialists seem to have realised quickly how difficult it was to find both a reliable and a representative leadership among organised labour, so that during the 1946 strikes they were already calling for (and winning) the declaration of a state of emergency and anti-strike measures in São Paulo to contain workers’ demands. In the following months, probably further encouraged by economic crisis and the reversal of economic policy, the industrialist leadership made clear its uncompromising attitude and put strong pressure on the government for decisive action against workers’ claims.91 In late 1946, two crucial changes at the ministerial level were to have a direct impact on labour and wages. First there was the appointment of a new Minister for the Economy, the banker Pedro Corrêa e Castro, determined to tighten up the stabilisation policy which set out strict targets for monetary, fiscal and wage variables. The result of this policy was a sharp decline in industrial output and job creation in the following months (Appendix A, Table A-1; Chapter 1, Table 1.2). Second, the appointment of the vice-president of FIESP, Morvan Dias Figueiredo, to the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce represented a decisive move by the Dutra government to strengthen its already tough policy on industrial relations. The large-scale intervention in trade unions from May 1947, coupled with the ban on the CTB and the Communist Party, put an end to months of hesitant behaviour in the face of strong pressures for wage increases which had been increasingly conveyed by left-wing and independent trade unionists in Greater São Paulo. Despite the moderate stance adopted by these groups for most of the time, they were pushed forward by shop-floor demands. Even the reluctant Communist Party switched to a more aggressive wage policy from January 1946. The blow struck by government repression altered the political scenario for organised labour and industrialists. 92 Although the communists had been the alleged target, repression hit all active trade unions and militants in São Paulo and Brazil. In the meantime, the Ministry of Labour replaced many officials with hardcore ministerialistas (trade unionists linked to the Ministry of Labour)


who had been identified with the Coligação Sindical and the Estado Novo apparatus. With these appointments and purges, the Minister again attempted to establish a new cadre of trusted officials which he could rely on to speak to the government and industrialists. At the national level, the policy resulted in the official installation of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Indústria, or CNTI) in June 1947. The industrialists applauded these measures and gave their enthusiastic support to the government’s actions. At the CNTI’s inauguration, for example, the CNI threw a banquet for over 700 guests, most of whom were ministerialista labour leaders. In the same way, there are reports that employers collaborated by sacking workers identified as leftists.93 The overwhelming intervention in industrial relations alienated all groups not identified with the labour bureaucracy directly controlled by the Ministry of Labour. In the case of the communists, state repression led to a substantial change in their policy towards trade unions, which set the tone for the new Cold War reality. As well as abandoning their proposals for collaboration with employers and the government, the communists devoted their energies to organising workers in the workplace, creating parallel associations and encouraging wage demands on the shop floor. 94 There is very little information with respect to other groups in the labour movement in this period, but it seems that many activists temporarily deserted the trade unions and sought to work at the factory level. Like the communists, they emphasised shop-floor organisation for rights and wage increases.95 It seems, however, that all efforts by industrialists and the government to consolidate a reliable leadership were in vain. Early in 1948, Morvan Figueiredo, FIESP’s representative in charge of the Dutra administration’s labour policy, was the first to admit that the appointed trade unionists had very little appeal at grass-roots level. In a confidential interview, Figueiredo blatantly stated that although he favoured free trade unions, they were not viable in Brazil at the time since ‘there were no responsible working-class leaders’ – they ‘either become Communists or virtual members of the Ministry of Labour staff’. 96 The alternative, Figueiredo implied, was to suspend all free elections for trade unions and stick to a hardline policy on labour. Furthermore, there are reports that the recruitment of trade unionists willing to work under the Ministry of Labour and police surveillance became increasingly difficult, and many of the original staff resigned their posts.97 Along with the crackdown on trade unions, the other side of the Dutra government’s stabilisation policy regarding wages was its refusal

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to adjust the legal minimum wage. The previous minimum-wage level had been established in December 1943, during the Estado Novo era, and was due to be reviewed in December 1946. With the suspension applied by the Dutra administration, new regional levels were established only by the next government, in December 1951. As a result, as has been argued above, agreements over pay during the period 1947–51 were reached mainly through direct bargaining between management and labour as well as through legal disputes at the Labour Tribunal, with very little participation by the trade unions. These developments seem to have fitted in well with the industrialists’ aims of wage restraint and shop-floor control after the big push for pay rises in 1945–7 and the fastdeteriorating economic environment. The period between 1952 and 1955 was marked by high political instability and intermittent measures implemented against political groups and trade unions. Even so, organised labour initiated its first inter-union campaigns since 1947, and they would have a substantial impact on wage-bargaining in Greater São Paulo. An important mobilisation that united several trade unions was that against the attendance clauses applied to collective agreements and the paid weekly day of rest (from 1946 and 1949, respectively). In August 1952, an Inter-Union Commission (Comissão Inter-Sindical contra a Cláusula de Assiduidade Integral, or CISCAI), representing some sixty trade unions, was set up in São Paulo. Later, in November, 89 trade unions (21 from São Paulo) and 179 delegates (33 from São Paulo) gathered in Rio de Janeiro for a national conference of the regional branches of the CISCAI. The InterUnion Commission promoted large-scale demonstrations and lobbied Congress for the approval of MP Lúcio Bittencourt’s proposal to discontinue the application of the attendance clause for new wage settlements negotiated by the Labour Tribunals in collective disputes. 98 After a long struggle, the bill was eventually ratified as Law no. 2,510 in June 1955. Although the Law only referred to wage levels established by dissídios, it appears that before long trade unions also successfully negotiated the removal of the attendance clause from agreements regarding the paid weekly day of rest. 99 Another important focus of inter-union mobilisation was the setting of the minimum wage. Particularly after the ground-breaking strike of the 300,000 in 1953, the trade union movement greatly increased its voice in the process for the setting of basic wage levels. The key to this outcome was the creation of the PUI in the aftermath of the 1953 strike in São Paulo, as previously described. Since the minimum-wage agreement affected the large category of unskilled workers (especially in


the textile industry), it became a short cut for raising the level of basic pay among the labour force as a whole. Furthermore, any change in minimum-wage levels entailed immediate bargaining with management to adjust the remaining wages, because of the crucial role of the value accorded to the hierarchy of skills and earnings in an industrial organisation. Trade unions and the PUI clearly pursued this strategy of focusing on minimum-wage levels from the end of 1953, when they realised that the acceleration of price increases could no longer be dealt with by sector bargaining only. Simultaneously, labour organisations began to address the problem of soaring prices by demanding specific measures to contain inflation.100 For the first time since 1947, trade unions were widening their scope of action and perceiving the macroeconomic sphere as a direct area of concern. In this way, the doubling of the minimum wage in May 1954 by Vargas – a daring political move – may only be understood as a result of the growing influence of labour organisations at the time. 101 All these actions by organised labour were headed by left-wing and independent leaders who had regained the influence they had lost during previous years. Although very critical of the Vargas government, the communists adopted an active policy of alliances and collaboration with other political forces to take over the directorates of the main trade unions in São Paulo as well as the PUI. Together with the emerging independent and trabalhista labour leaders, the communists pushed for wage increases, attempted to forge stronger links with the rank and file and successfully eclipsed the hard-core labour bureaucracy. Under the leadership of the PUI, this militant wing of the trade union movement led effective campaigns such as the massive 24-hour strike on 2 September 1954. This concerted walkout demanded the freezing of basic prices, compliance with the decreed minimum-wage level by reluctant firms and a uniform pay rise for all categories on strike. Despite the highly delicate political situation caused by Vargas’s suicide a few days previously, the strike went ahead and the PUI successfully halted a very substantial number of industrial undertakings in the state of São Paulo.102 This large-scale strike was staged after months of PUI campaigning for centralised negotiation with FIESP. Industrialist leaders, however, refused contact with PUI on the grounds that the PUI was illegal, and advised only sector negotiation with specific trade unions. 103 FIESP had also intensively lobbied the government against a real increase in minimum-wage levels since the end of 1953. In May 1954, the industrialist federation joined other employers’ syndicates in a heavy attack

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on Vargas’s minimum-wage decree and drew a catastrophic picture of over-whelming unemployment, explosive inflation and subversion of relations between management and labour as a consequence of the new wage levels.104 Nevertheless, Paulista industrialists rapidly assimilated the pay increases and immediately undertook negotiations with trade unions to adjust the earnings of those workers not covered by the minimum-wage agreement.105 More importantly, the industrialists seem to have been much more concerned about what they saw as the pitfalls of the exchange auction system established by the Instrução no. 70 – SUMOC (October 1953) concerning the protection of the domestic manufacturing sector. As early as June 1954, FIESP applauded the government’s decision to submit to Congress a proposal for ad valorem tariffs (Bill no. 4,441) while a reform of the entire system of protection was being studied by a joint governmental commission.106 Organised labour was able to overcome the interventions attempted by the Café Filho government between August 1954 and November 1955 and from then on trade unions and the PUI experienced a significant expansion in their activities and influence among the working class. 107 Certain issues which had been emerging during the previous period found their way onto the official agenda of labour organisations in Greater São Paulo. Initially, trade unions conducted periodic minimum-wage campaigns as a way to co-ordinate their attempts to keep pace with rising prices. In July 1956, the Kubitscheck government (January 1956 – January 1961), decreed its first revision of minimumwage levels after another crusade by labour unions.108 With this decision, the government gave in to inflation and strong pressures for an earlier review of the legal basic wage levels, although the review had not been due until three years after the previous decree in May 1954. In December 1958, a review was again brought forward to adjust the minimum wage in response to high inflation and a concerted campaign by trade unions.109 Along with its minimum-wage concerns, the PUI co-ordinated sector negotiations and conducted the tough discussions leading to the ‘strike of the 400,000’ in October 1957. In 1956, the trade union movement in São Paulo also became more vocal about economic policy and its outcomes. In particular, they demanded the institution of price controls and that the government took efficient measures against inflation. Trade unions systematically denied that wage demands were a primary cause of escalating prices, arguing that periodical revisions were necessary to avoid further deterioration of earnings which were already very low. In the meantime, they called for immediate action through price monitoring and measures


concentrating on the tax structure, transport, food supply, agrarian reform, and cuts in superfluous public spending. 110 An illustration of the broadening scope of trade unions at the time was their 1957 decision to set up a technical body dedicated to economic analysis and cost-of-living research – the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (Departmento Inter-Sindical de Estatisticas e Estudos Sócio-Econômicos, or DIEESE) in São Paulo. Until then, wage bargaining had been based on either the price index of the São Paulo Prefecture or industrialists’ own estimates, which were always distrusted by trade unions. Now, in all negotiations with the industrialists, trade unions took as their reference the cost-of-living index and studies prepared by the DIEESE.111 Under the flexible labour policy adopted by the Kubitscheck government, the militant sections of the trade union movement expanded their influence in São Paulo. Despite resistance by the government, the PUI (and from late 1959, the Coligação Sindical dos Trabalhadores) became the most significant voice on pay and other issues affecting the working class. 112 Broadly speaking, the left and independents showed great eagerness to collaborate with the government in a programme which included fast industrial growth and economic development. The majority of the working-class leaders also lent support on various occasions to the protection of national industry, price controls and full-employment economic policies.113 However, in all these cases – unlike what had happened for a short time after the Second World War – the leadership did not put aside the demand for better earnings, workplace improvements and social rights. There was no talk of wage restraint in exchange for state welfare, political gains, or for the sake of industrial growth. Rather, trade unions and the PUI advanced a view that economic development should incorporate and share its benefits with the working class, by means of increasing real wages and social rights. Partial accommodation of these demands was to a large extent made possible by the fast industrial growth in most of the period 1956–60. The full commitment of the government to the transformation of the industrial structure was attractive to both workers and industrialists. Even so, fundamental differences of perspective and behaviour remained. The industrialists held a restricted view of the participation of workers in the benefits of economic growth, which clashed with the programme of the trade union movement. In reality, FIESP and other employers’ associations fought hard to block any measure in Congress or espoused by the government which could represent pecuniary

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benefits for labour – such as earlier reviews of minimum wages, unemployment insurance, full pay for young workers, profit share schemes, and social insurance.114 The crucial issue for São Paulo industrialists seems to have been that they were still highly suspicious of the leadership of the major trade unions and inter-union organisation at the time. By 1955, both employers and government had failed in their attempts to promote a strong alternative grouping amongst the working class. They were looking for moderate players for direct negotiations and were faced instead with a large group of left-wingers and independents who, though also committed to economic growth and industrialisation, called for a share of income and rights beyond what industrialists were prepared to negotiate. Furthermore, this militant leadership was mostly on the other side of the divided world of the Cold War. The result was that, even though favourable conditions of economic growth and democracy existed at the time, relations between industrialists and labour remained essentially hostile and antagonistic. In the following two chapters, the discussion will turn to another central dimension of the industrial relations in Greater São Paulo – the factory environment and conditions of work. As with labour markets, it will be argued that factory conditions were an important area of bargaining and conflict, bound to have an appreciable impact on economic performance at the time.

Part II Working Conditions

3 The Factory Environment

Factory environment and working conditions are important aspects of historical experiences of industrialisation, including Brazil. In addition to the most visible issues, such as hours of work and accidents, the factory environment also consists of other issues which affect the labour force and its performance on the shop floor: elements such as hazardous substances, sanitary conditions, and welfare resources (such as toilets, changing rooms, crèches, medical facilities and housing). Although these issues have been relatively neglected by economic (and social) history literature, it will be argued that they are constituent parts of overall factory conditions, and that they had a marked longterm impact on labour and industrial performance in Greater São Paulo. The main purpose of this chapter is to describe and assess the conditions of work in the metalworking and textile industries in Greater São Paulo during the post-Second World War period. Working conditions will be understood as the various aspects which formed the shop-floor environment and which left their mark on factory operation at the time in the region. First, the chapter will describe the situation in terms of medical and hygiene facilities in textile and metalworking factories. Second, it will address the issue of the exposure of workers to materials which may have affected their health and hence their performance in the workplace. Third, a brief assessment of industrial accidents will be presented, as they accounted for one of the most direct and visible impacts on the work process. Fourth, the chapter will put together data on welfare facilities in Greater São Paulo companies which aimed at offering the workforce basic services and goods. Finally, a brief discussion on hours of work will conclude the chapter. 65

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Working Conditions

Medical and hygiene facilities Any assessment of working conditions in the Greater São Paulo industry after the Second World War faces the usual difficulties of an analysis of factory life in Brazil, as very little systematic and quantitative evidence has been uncovered to date. In addition, the scattered nature of the qualitative information drawn from newspapers, bulletins and other sources, makes any attempt to portray the evolution of factory conditions over the 1940s and 1950s particularly difficult. The alternative adopted in this chapter is, first, to resort to a comprehensive inquiry carried out by the Social Service of Industry (Serviço Social da Indústria, or SESI) in the city of São Paulo between 1953 and 1955 (see Appendix B). Second, qualitative data from official agencies, industrialists, political groups and trade unions will be used to illustrate specific cases and compare them to overall results of the statistical analysis. The records of medical and hygiene services in Brazil’s largest industrial centre, before the Second World War, suggest that they were initially concentrated in large undertakings and mainly in those which were far away from the city centres. From the 1930s it appears that an increasing number of São Paulo’s mills, at least in the textile sector, were introducing various health and welfare services.1 The evidence which has been collected so far is scant, but it seems that at the end of the Second World War such facilities were scattered among large enterprises and were regarded as unsatisfactory by both workers and the industrialist leadership alike. The following section will compare the facilities in the textile and metal trades. In a further section, cases of individual firms will be introduced to help describe the features and development of medical and hygiene services in the factories at the time. Sector conditions The distribution of medical and hygiene facilities in the textile and metalworking industries in São Paulo can initially be shown by 1953–4 data based on the SESI survey (Appendix B). Figure 3.1 shows that the relative number of workers covered by medical services in both sectors was similar in two aspects but points to disparity in two other important services. Figure 3.1 shows that the textile and metalworking industries had similar percentages of workers being offered separate rooms for first-aid treatment (sick bays). The percentages were roughly similar for professional nurses who worked in the mills under part-time or full-time schemes, with only 1.3 per cent more metalworkers being provided

The Factory Environment

60.7%

53.0%

67

52.4%

44.7%

20.0% 19.6%

27.1% 28.4%

Textile Metal Trades

Sick Bay

Figure 3.1

Consulting Room

Nurse

Doctor

Workers with medical facilities by sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–54.

Source: Appendix B.

with such service than textile workers. Yet the figure for access to doctors was 8.3 per cent greater in the textile industries than for the metalworking sector. This was one of the most important services in industrial undertakings, since doctors could mean greater care for a labour force short of regular medical treatment and exposed to many job hazards. The difference was equally higher in the textile sector for consulting rooms (8.3 per cent). All the same, the data for doctors should be considered with caution. Their presence did not mean necessarily that any sort of preventive industrial hygiene programme was being implemented in the workrooms. On the contrary, literature on the subject tells us that most medical assistance in the factories was simply ‘curative’. Thus, medical care was mostly directed at the immediate treatment of a labour force which had, to a great extent, flooded into São Paulo from the countryside, suffering from several basic health problems.2 In addition, the number of workers treated by doctors must be considered in the context of the doctors’ employment relationship. More refined data indicate that the number of full-time doctors hired by both textile and metalworking companies was negligible (only 1 per cent for textile workers and none for metalworkers). These figures also suggest that the differences between medical care in the two industrial sectors examined were even wider than shown above. Whereas 59.3 per cent of textile workers were looked after by part-time doctors, the percentage for metalworkers was 41.1 per cent – that is, less than the previous figures. One consequence was that, in the metalworking sector, 11.2 per cent of workers received medical assistance from

Percentage

68

Working Conditions

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0


Drinking Fountain

Figure 3.2

Lavatory

Shower

Changing Room

Clothing

Workers with hygiene facilities by sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–4.

Source: Appendix B.

emergency doctors which could be called in if necessary (‘call-out’ doctors) – the percentage for textile was 0.4 per cent. With regard to hygiene facilities, the textile sector had a sizeable advantage over the metalworking sector in terms of drinking fountains, as Figure 3.2 shows. At the same time, the metalworking sector was ahead regarding provision of clothing to workers, if only relatively. Such facilities were important aspects of workforce hygiene and health, as they might keep at bay potential sources of diseases such as contaminated water and toxic substances. The other facilities appeared more balanced between the sectors, with smaller disparities. A larger proportion of textile workers than metalworkers had access to lavatories and changing rooms, but there were more shower rooms available in the metal trades. These facilities also had a direct impact on worker health, particularly in those jobs which involved the handling of toxic products. Therefore, what may be inferred from the sample figures is that medical and hygiene facilities followed distinct patterns in the textile and metalworking sectors. On the whole, medical services were rather scant in both of them. More than 70 per cent of workers did not have access to first-aid rooms or professional nurse care in the factories. The number of workers with access to medical care by doctors (as well as with consulting rooms) was higher, but even so 47.6 per cent of metalworkers and 39.3 per cent of textile workers did not enjoy such a facility in the workplace. The hygiene facilities, on the other hand, displayed better figures, at least in certain services. However, the records for drinking fountains and, particularly, protective clothing were poor for both sectors.


69

In terms of comparative performance, there is little room for generalisation as the sectors performed better or worse in relation to specific facilities and services. One particular exception is the relatively high number of doctors (and consulting rooms) in the textile sector compared to that in the metal trades. Still, the drawback of this sort of information – resulting from non-controlled sampling and absence of other years for comparison – is that the figures above should be treated with caution. In any case, making use of other references may confirm or alter the overall picture painted so far. The next section will address these alternative sources. Medical and hygiene facilities in individual cases The descriptions found in union and political groups’ newspapers as well as industrialists’ publications may bring to light useful information on the hygiene and medical conditions in the textile and metalworking industries. These additional data will be of particular help in qualifying the preceding figures. To begin with, the medical facilities made available by firms did not necessarily have the properly trained personnel or proper equipment or installations to provide adequate care on the shop floor. Thus, for example, the official newspaper of the São Paulo metalworkers’ trade union recorded, in 1958, that the Semeraro metal works, which employed about 400 workers, could not provide adequate medical care for them, notwithstanding the existence of a consulting room on its premises. The problem was that the consulting room had no nurse, nor was it equipped for examinations and other activities.3 Another common situation, seemingly, was that many firms had nurses working only part time. That was the case of the Aços Paulista metal works, with nearly 500 employees in 1957, which had a nurse between 7 a.m. and 12 noon only. 4 Other large firms, such as motor vehicle companies, afforded more satisfactory conditions. For example, as early as 1950 General Motors had already set up four rooms and equipment for medical examinations, and the Willys-Overland sick bay was, later, considered modern and very well equipped. Large textile firms were also described as having good medical facilities. 5 Nevertheless, the usual conditions of equipment, rooms and attendance of personnel seemed to be precarious in most firms which had medical services in both the metal and textile industries. In fact, a 1956 doctor’s study revealed that medical installations in the majority of companies consisted of only a few, adapted rooms (that is, not purpose-built), with inadequate furniture and equipment.6

70

Working Conditions

Beyond the factory walls, the concern about workers’ medical care became a major aspect of the programme of welfare and social assistance initiated by SESI, which had been founded in June 1946. Outpatient clinics were set up to provide cheap medical treatment for industrial workers in São Paulo. From September 1947 a service to detect and treat cases of lung disease, mostly tuberculosis, among factory workers was launched by SESI’s regional department. This SESI programme used mobile units (ambulances) which visited factories and made on-site examinations of workers. 7 Such initiatives, however, seem to have done little to combat the large scale of workers’ health problems, within and outside the factory (see next section). Hygiene facilities should be also compared to the actual number and conditions of maintenance and cleanliness of those rooms available to workers. Even in large companies, it was common to have few toilets for a huge number of workers. One source reckoned that at the Matarazzo Belenzinho textile factory, for example, with an estimated 4,500 workers (mostly women), there were only 20 toilets for each group of 1,000 workers. At the Pirituba woollen mill, one section with 80 women had just one toilet for all of them.8 Similar figures applied to metalworking firms as well. At Aços Paulista, for instance, it was revealed that there were just five toilets for 200 workers in the foundry department, while at the Cia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração the number reached six toilets for the estimated 1,042 workers of the factory.9 Not only there were few toilets, they were often dirty and badly maintained.10 Although the data collected do not provide any evidence of the development of medical and hygiene facilities in factories, it seems fair to suppose that conditions may have improved during the post-war years, whether resulting from local measures or from the setting up of modern enterprises in the metalworking sector. In particular, the arrival of new motor vehicle companies in the second half of the 1950s, along with new plants in the parts industry, seems to have given rise to more concern about medical and hygiene issues on the shop floor.11 Nevertheless, the foregoing evidence has suggested that the overall conditions remained quite inadequate in many facilities well into the 1950s at least. Thus, even those firms which did have medical and hygiene facilities might not have attained minimal standards in terms of personnel, equipment and maintenance. Moreover, examples have indicated that large companies were among those which provided rather inadequate services and installations. An additional aspect of the factory environment, which was closely related to medical and hygiene conditions in the workshops, will be addressed in the following section. It will give a broader understanding


71

of the environment in which workers laboured in Greater São Paulo industry after the Second World War.

Occupational health hazards The reports of occupational hazards in Greater São Paulo industries before the Second World War have suggested that the shop-floor environment was often highly dangerous for the large contingent of workers which crowded into this emerging industrial centre. By focusing particularly on cases of accidents and unhealthy jobs in the textile industry, historians have stressed the hardship for women and children who toiled away in the mills.12 The evidence collected here will be presented separately for the two industrial sectors under discussion. The aim is to describe the potential hazards to workers which could impair their health and performance in various ways. First, the analysis focuses on the general levels of dust, vapour, gas and fumes most frequently found in the textile and metalworking sectors. Second, other aspects of the workplace environment (heat and noise) will be addressed by considering specific firms and, whenever possible, factory departments in both industrial groups. Environmental conditions in the textile sector The most important dangers to affect the textile workplace, according to the SESI study, were organic dusts, with 30.3 per cent of all workers in the factories visited being exposed to them (see Table 3.1). The prevalence of airborne dust had been a quite serious cause of lung disease in the history of the textile industry, and at Paulista mills it was no different. Around the 1940s, the specific pneumoconiosis associated with the work of spinners and weavers – byssinosis – had already been identified as an illness distinct from tuberculosis. Byssinosis has been widely related to the processing of cotton fibres, even though the precise agent causing it has not yet been found. Symptoms in the early stages manifested themselves as upper respiratory tightening on Mondays (or on the first day of the working week), gradually progressing to lung damage and, ultimately, to the incapacity of the worker. ‘Weavers cough’ was another disease linked to cotton dusts (and humidity). It was an asthmatic condition which provoked shortness of breath, wheezing, coughing, and then serious distress to workers. 13 The second group of harmful substances in the São Paulo textile industry were the chemical products, with 8.8 per cent of workers being subjected to them. Chemical substances were frequently used in the

72

Working Conditions Table 3.1 Workers exposed to specific substances in the textile sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–4 (percentage) Substance Organic dusts Chemical products Dermatosis agents Mineral acids Petroleum products Alkalis Other gases Anilines Carbon monoxide* Non-silica dusts Organic acids Chlorine* Organic solvents Alcohols Chromium* Oils and greases Lead* Paints Aldehydes Silica dusts Sulphur*

Textile Sector 30.3 8.8 7.3 3.1 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1

Note: * substances already classified under general criteria. Source: SESI-SP, 1955a, Table 10.

dyeing and finishing processes of fibres and fabrics, whether natural or man-made. For instance, workers had to bleach cotton fabrics with lime or caustic soda solutions as well as other chemicals. If the scoured fabric was to be dyed, other products such as sodium hypochlorite would also be applied. Continuous exposure to substances like these was harmful to workers, causing benign and malignant tumours and, in some cases, seriously affecting the bladder (in the case of contact with benzene dyes). 14 A similar number of workers, 7.3 per cent, were affected by organic substances likely to give rise to dermatosis, with irritation or damage to the skin. Allergic and irritant contact dermatitis might be caused by agents such as fibres and oils. Thus, dermatosis tended to cause distress and facilitate further contamination through the skin tissue. 15 Table 3.1 lists other substances, or specific ones already classified under general titles, which were also present on the textile shop floor. Despite the


73

relatively lower incidence of other materials, the table gives an idea of the wide range of materials posing health risks to workers. Although these aggregate data do not permit the assessment of conditions in specific industries of the textile sector, additional evidence suggests that the cotton workrooms in Greater São Paulo were affected by serious problems caused by airborne particles, both as a source of lung diseases and dermatoses. In the cotton industry, fibre dust has long been known as particularly prevalent in the early stages of manufacturing. 16 SESI data suggest, indeed, that airborne particles were present in most preparatory activities for spinning. Thus, in five companies handling cotton and mixed raw materials for which information has been found, dusts were detected in the workrooms for fibre preparation (opening and cleaning of cotton bales, carding, combing and drawing) and, in some cases, even in the spinning activity (with ring frames). Whether this scenario is a good indication of conditions prevalent in most of the cotton firms is hard to ascertain, as it is with respect to the dust levels in each department. Still, since the companies mentioned were all large ones, it might well indicate that airborne dusts could also be found in other firms which could have afforded, in theory at least, proper devices to remove particles from the workplace. For the same reason, cotton dusts would tend to occur even more frequently in smaller enterprises. Similar figures for the wool industry were not found, but in any case it is usually accepted that wool dusts were much less harmful to workers’ health. 17 Workers in the man-made materials industry seemed to have suffered from other substances, such as acids, gases and vapours. Particularly in those factories which had specialised in processing cellulose into rayon yarn, there were reports of exposure to and damage by chemical materials. The Rayon Matarazzo, a very large firm situated in São Caetano do Sul, was a case in point. In 1951 a source recorded that workers who processed cellulose, and those in washing and spinning departments at this factory, usually had their hands injured by acids and caustic agents, while their eyes were affected by vapours arising from the machines. Two years later, another report on Rayon Matarazzo stated that cases of intoxication by vapours were common among spinning workers while those at the cellulose shop could not avoid inhaling gases all the time. 18 Other rayon companies were also reported to have similar conditions with regard to dangerous chemical substances.19 At the same time, the cotton, mixed and wool industries maintained, in many cases, units for dyeing and finishing which exposed workers to similar hazards. 20

74

Working Conditions

Aside from toxic substances, textile manufacturing had traditionally experienced problems with noise and temperature levels in the workrooms. Noise had long been identified as a serious threat in several departments of a typical textile plant. By the 1940s it was usual to point out that the industry was second only to the metal trades in noise exposure.21 Such conditions resulted from the normal operation of machines both in spinning and weaving sections. The potential damage to workers varied in line with the sound pressure level (measured in decibels – dB) and length of exposure. There was already some agreement that continuous exposure to levels between 80 and 90 dB was sufficient to produce chronic loss of hearing in the long term. In addition, such a sound intensity was said to be correlated to growing fatigue and low performance. In typical industrial processes in the 1940s and the 1950s, noise in machine rooms could easily reach 90 dB or more.22 In São Paulo’s textile mills at the time, the evidence indicates that workers had to work amidst high levels of noise on the shop floor – lack of systematic measuring notwithstanding. In fact, SESI data on factory shops suggest that virtually all stages of manufacturing which involved machinery were recorded with sound levels bound to cause physical distress or damage to workers. Such a pattern was similar in all textile groups examined, from cotton to wool industries.23 Another reason for concern was the temperature levels reached in the textile workshops. Heat tended to become an important factor in tropical regions, with poorly ventilated workrooms. The physical consequences might range from fatigue and heat exhaustion to the extreme manifestation of heat stroke, a serious disorder with profound effects upon vital body functions. 24 By looking into the SESI data, it is apparent that all textile industries tended to present high temperatures in sizing and dyeing. Other sources also stated the presence of heat in such operations, though there were accounts of such a problem in other departments as well. Thermal problems were further exacerbated in sections where mechanical humidifying of fibres took place, in which workers often worked while wet.25 Environmental conditions in the metalworking sector Environmental conditions in the metal trades have been less emphasised by the historiography on São Paulo’s industrialisation, even though workers subjected to health hazards in this sector seemingly outweighed those in the textile sector. According to the SESI inquiry, the principal materials to which metalworkers were exposed were the


75

Table 3.2 Workers exposed to specific substances in the metalworking sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–5 (percentage) Substance

Metalworking Sector

Non-silica dusts Petroleum products Other gases Carbon monoxide* Organic dusts Lead* Organic solvents Chemical products Silica dusts Dermatosis agents Silica derivative dusts Paints Enamel and varnish Mineral acids Oils and greases Alkalis Antimony* Cyanides Chromium* Alcohols Organic acids Aldehydes Anilines Asbestos dust* Cadmium* Mercury*

34.9 24.9 20.2 13.0 11.0 9.2 8.7 7.9 5.3 5.2 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.0 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Note: * substances already classified under general criteria. Source: SESI, 1955a, Table 10.

non-silica dusts (see Table 3.2). The latter consisted mainly of solid airborne particles from metals and their compounds (such as iron, steel, lead, chromium, nickel, zinc and manganese). The potential health effects of these materials vary broadly, from typical lung disorders such as bronchitis to carcinogenic developments.26 The range of activities producing airborne dusts is equally wide, although foundry and final processing (cleaning, machining, welding, among others) have been described as more dusty than the intermediate stage of metal working (rolling). 27 Lead was by far the most prevalent metal on the Paulista metalworking shop floor – more than 9 per cent of all workers were in contact with the metal. The high toxicity of lead was already well

76

Working Conditions

established at that time. The metal was associated with many symptoms (colic, fatigue, anaemia, weakness and others) which might lead, after continuous and prolonged exposure, to chronic renal failure. 28 The second group of materials highlighted in the SESI survey were the petroleum products (except solvents). Almost 24.9 per cent of the sampled workers were in contact with fluids and lubricants used to smooth, cool down and clean surfaces in metal processing. Skin diseases, such as folliculitis and contact dermatitis, could result from the handling of these materials. What is more important, mineral oils (without added water) had long been known to contain varying degrees of carcinogenic substances.29 Gases emitted from welding operations (nitrogen oxides, ozone and metal oxides) were among the most important classified under ‘other gases’, which together affected 20.2 per cent of the workers. This item also included gases such as sulphur dioxide – generated in smelting, for instance. Consistent exposure to these substances was capable of producing, in several cases, respiratory tract irritation, bronchitis and irreversible lung damage. 30 Individually, the most conspicuous gas was carbon monoxide, which was commonplace for 13.0 per cent of the sample’s workforce. The gas was often present in many metal working stages, such as foundry, machining and welding. Carbon monoxide affects the blood’s capacity to carry oxygen and can provoke neurological and behavioural symptoms in those chronically exposed. 31 The next materials to adversely affect the workplace in the metal trades were the organic dusts – 11.0 per cent of workers affected. These particles were not specific to any production stage, and could cause respiratory disorders and skin diseases. Other organic compounds, solvents, were equally significant, with 8.7 per cent affected. Organic solvents include a wide range of substances (aromatic, halogenated, ketones and others) and their consequences varied in accordance with their particular chemical properties. Apart from being an immediate irritant of the respiratory tract and of the skin, solvents could also lead to more serious forms of disease by affecting several organs, depending upon the time of exposure and the specific product. For instance, benzene (an aromatic) has been recognised as a carcinogen and trichloroethylene (halogenated) as leading to neurological symptoms in metalworkers. 32 Table 3.2 also shows other materials which were present in the environment of the metal firms studied. Those that should be highlighted, due to their prevalence, were silica and silica derivative dusts, which together affected 9.0 per cent of all workers. A product of the


77

combination of silicon and oxygen, the chief crystalline form of silica is quartz, a mineral common in the sand used in metal manufacturing. The inhalation of very small particles of this compound and its derivatives had long been associated with a lung disease known as silicosis. Starting at first as lung fibrosis (scars), as time goes on the disease tends to diminish pulmonary functions and predispose workers to other conditions such as bronchitis, emphysema and tuberculosis.33 There are no systematic data to compare particular industries, but an idea of typical health hazards may be drawn from the press. In the metallurgical industry, dust and inhalation of other aerosols in foundry operations were commonplace in São Paulo mills in 1952.34 At the Laminação Nacional de Metais, for example, metal dust and fume poisoning were said to be endemic throughout the foundry and other shops. In the zinc foundry, it was recorded that the corrosive action of aerosols visibly hurt the workers’ noses. Other cases referred to further aspects, such as exposure to lead. 35 Indeed, a typical metallurgical factory in Greater São Paulo during the 1950s comprised several operations, each with its own particular hazards. On the other hand, it is difficult to speak of typical conditions since the production lines varied greatly – and with them the potential risks. In a specialised foundry plant, for example, one detailed study carried out in 1959 indicated that 159 out of 214 workers (74.3 per cent) on the shop floor were subjected to silica (53.3 per cent) and iron and steel dusts (21 per cent).36 A factory whose output included floats and siphons, in turn, had more diversified activities and dangers. In the preparation of tubes, which involved metal casting, the air was impregnated with lead and carbon monoxide. In shell moulding and core making, there were silica dusts and smoke; in the foundry, metal fumes, carbon monoxide and various dusts; in the electroplating department, chromic acid, nickel and sodium cyanide, and so on. In the end, of the firm’s 118 workers, 32.0 per cent were exposed to lead, 23.7 per cent to silica dusts, 16.1 per cent to metal fumes, 15.3 per cent to carbon monoxide, and 2.5 per cent to trichloroethylene, among other substances.37 In the transport equipment industry, stimulated by the thriving motor vehicle companies, the conditions were also complex given the multiple stages of the production process. Taking specific departments of one large motor car company at the time may illustrate the point. In a group of sections which included forging and assembling, with 383 workers (17.1 per cent of the total), carbon monoxide was detected, as well as carbon dioxide, ozone and metal fumes. In the engine and

78

Working Conditions

motor vehicle assembly, with 98 workers (4.4 per cent), there was the presence of xylene, toluene, iron and zinc oxides, carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen oxides and others. In the painting section, with 165 workers (7.4 per cent), xylene, toluene, iron and zinc oxides were recorded in the rooms. In the cleaning and painting of parts and chassis, 32 workers (1.4 per cent) were affected by xylene, toluene, iron oxide, sulphur acid, ammonia, caustic sodium, and iron phosphates, among others. Thus, all shop-floor workers at this factory worked among substances like these.38 At the same time, specific substances were more concentrated in certain departments and tasks. In the beginning of the 1960s, lead was a case in point, due to its prevalence in the chassis finishing operations of motor vehicle companies. 39 In the mechanical industry the situation was probably similar. Stages such as galvanising, in which parts were coated with zinc, nickel, chromium, lead and other metals to avoid corrosion, carried with them the risks of metal oxide and fume contamination. Welding and paint spraying, too, were common in machine manufacturing, as was their capacity for releasing fumes, gases, vapours and other sorts of toxins. The typical machining operations (with lathes, grinding, drilling, milling and hacksaw machines) were sources of dust and oil contamination. Moreover, it seems that, in São Paulo, many mechanical factories also had foundry installations, which increased the potential environmental hazards on the shop floor. 40 In the electrical equipment industry, several operations were similar to those in the mechanical and metallurgical industries. Indeed, a large manufacturer of showers and fuses, in 1954, had sections of iron working, forging, machining and welding, among others, with health risks similar to those already indicated. Other companies which had distinct product lines (for example, refrigerators and radios) had similar departments.41 Yet what apparently was by far the most hazardous activity in the electrical equipment industry was the production of accumulators. An investigation into the hygiene conditions in six companies in São Paulo in 1953 described in detail the several types of risks present in this trade. The handling of lead in most sections, such as foundry and lead oxide preparation, poured out fumes and oxides which reached the workers in charge of the operations. In others, like the paste and electric preparation, air poisoning with sulphuric acid was commonplace. It was then reckoned that nearly 60 per cent of all workers in those firms were directly exposed to lead.42 Another study a few years later confirmed this overall diagnosis. In a major accumulator company, workers were affected by lead and other substances


79

(such as sulphuric acid) in most rooms, often with little or no protection.43 As with the textile sector, metal trades were also plagued by noise in the workrooms. The problem seemed even worse in the latter given the technology involved in the machines, equipment and processes of the metalworking industries.44 Actually, studies carried out by SESI of specific factories consistently measured noise levels above 90 dB – that is, higher than the established safe level for hearing over an 8-hour shift. It seems that most departments which used mechanical devices, in all industries, were equally prone to high sound levels. Thus, for instance, in a large railway vehicle firm, in 1959, readings of up to 90 dB were taken near various operations in the foundry and in other sections where there was metal machining. In a foundry plant owned by a leading motor car company, the average noise intensity was 92 dB for the cleaning shop, 92 dB for the core shop and 93 dB for the moulding department – the maximum in the latter, for example, peaking at 115 dB.45 Heat in the metal trades appeared to follow a relatively regular pattern in São Paulo. Apart from the variable ambient temperature in specific factories, which was affected by factors like air velocity and physical activity, labour in metalworking companies usually faced radiant heat emitted by sources such as furnaces, melting metals and welding torches. Accordingly, evidence from individual plants indicates that foundries and welding shops were the main places in which the ambient temperature was raised to excessive levels. Other activities – mainly forging – were also recorded, although less often. 46 Such findings seem to be confirmed by other references which describe temperature conditions in the metalworking plants. 47 Owing to such distribution, thermal stress would therefore be most likely in those firms and industries in which foundry, welding and forging activities were most commonly found. The data presented on occupational hazards have shown that the toxic materials which affected the workforce in Greater São Paulo were quite numerous in both textile and metalworking factories, although more diverse in metalworking processes. In any case, a large number of workers were destined to see not only their health but also their ability to work and perform in the workplace crippled. First, this situation tended to be exacerbated by the scant protection available in the majority of the firms. The means to rid the shop floor of these hazards (exhaust ventilation, air cleaners, respirators) were rather limited. 48 Second, organisational conditions in the workplace tended to reflect

80

Working Conditions

the overall situation, as will be addressed in the next chapter. The replacement of substances, the installation of costly protection materials, and changes in labour processes, which together could improve the standards of health, were most likely resisted by employers and, sometimes, turned into issues of dispute. The next section will deal with another side of the dangers on the shop floor.

Industrial safety and accidents The most obvious workplace hazards in Greater São Paulo industry, as is often the case, were accidents. The immediate consequences of work injuries, both to the worker him/herself and to the morale of those involved, made the issue a matter of early concern to legislators, labour activists and, sometimes, industrialists. In Greater São Paulo the problem had been identified from the very beginning of the textile industry when the cases of industrial accidents increased with growth and diversification of the mills. In the next sections, specific information on protection resources in the textile and metalworking mills will be presented, followed by an overall assessment of physical hazards on the shop floor. Sector conditions Figure 3.3 shows that the distribution of safety resources differed substantially according to the industrial sector. First, only in the metal trades were there safety inspectors in charge of accident prevention, with 14.5 per cent of the labour force in this sector covered by the service. Another important item was the existence of internal commissions for accident prevention (Comissões Internas de Prevenção de Acidentes, or CIPAs), joint bodies formed by employees and management and established by federal legislation in 1944 for all plants with more than 100 employees.49 From the sample data for 1953–4, it is possible to see that more workers in the textile sector – 10.1 per cent more – than in metal trades were employed in companies which had set up CIPAs. The legislation recommended that these joint committees should include, when available, a doctor or an engineer to give technical advice on accident prevention. In this respect, textile mills maintained a larger number of doctors in CIPAs whereas the metal plants employed more engineers, as may be verified by Figure 3.3. The presence of these professionals, however, did not mean the CIPAs carried out an active programme of workplace safety. Such a statement seems to be borne out by the


51.1%

81

47.0%

41.0% 33.0%

36.9%


25.9% 14.5%

0.3% 0.0%

0.0% Inspector

Figure 3.3

CIPA

Doctor

Engineer

Protected Machinery

Workers with safety resources by sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–4.

Source: Appendix B.

evidence that practically none of the factories in the sample had machines fully protected – in fact, just one in the textile sector did. The next section will give more details on the conditions in particular industries and firms. Accidents and injuries in individual cases Accidents seemed to be a major occurrence in industrial undertakings in Greater São Paulo during the 1940s and 1950s. There is quantitative evidence that both frequency and severity were strikingly high at the time compared with international standards. 50 In the textile industry, a study of 150 São Paulo mills in 1948 showed a frequency coefficient of 35.43. The severity coefficient was 1.41, with on average 40 days lost for each accident. Both rates were very high by any yardstick – for instance, in comparison with the coefficients in US industry.51 The coefficients for the metal trades were apparently above those found in the textile industry. A SESI study of companies with more than 100 employees in 1960 disclosed that, on average, metalworking industry figures were well above those for the textile industry. Thus, taking the latter’s coefficients as base 100, the mechanical industry showed rates of frequency and severity, respectively, 161 per cent and 1,215 per cent greater than those of the textile industry. The metallurgical industry came second, with frequency 152 per cent and severity 373 per cent higher than the coefficients in the textile industry. The transport equipment rates, in turn, were 66 per cent and 245 per cent, and the electrical equipment 104 per cent and 32 per cent above the

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Working Conditions

textile industry for frequency and severity coefficients respectively. These data seem to confirm the fact, verified in other countries, that metalworking factories tended to exhibit injury rates much above those observed in textile mills.52 Industrial injuries were bound to increase under circumstances of unprotected equipment and lack of safety programmes in most undertakings, as suggested previously. In the textile industry, typical problems of running spinning, weaving and other machines were already well recognised and had been noticed even by technicians from employers’ organisations. In 1943, for instance, the newly-established SENAI carried out a meticulous study of the main movements performed by a typical female weaver, as a basis for drawing up its training programmes. The main risk identified was the shuttle becoming loose from its box and hitting workers nearby, with possible serious injuries to the torso, eyes and head. It was also common for workers to have their hands and fingers crushed in machine gears. Other quite serious injuries were caused by women’s clothing and hair being caught up in drive belts. 53 These sorts of accidents and injuries were indeed frequently reported in publications at the time. An appalling case, for example, was registered in SESI’s periodical for accident prevention. A 17-year-old girl, working with a sewing machine without any protection from its pulleys and drive belts, got her dress entangled in one of the pulleys. Whilst trying to release herself, she was caught up by the gear shaft, which took off her hair. The report pointed out that the absence of machine protection was then (in 1961) common in most industries, and that such an accident might have been avoided if the engine had conformed to basic safety standards and the worker had been supplied with proper clothing and a hat. 54 While there is an indication that clothing was provided on a more regular basis than machinery protection in the textile sector (compare Figures 3.2 and 3.3), it seems clear that the former alone could not be an efficient way to deal with such a potentially hazardous environment. The problem of shop-floor injuries was even more severe in the metalworking sector, as has been explained previously. At the same time, certain industries in this sector were apparently more acutely affected than others. At least to a degree, the dominant technical and organisational conditions in specific activities were conducive to a high accident rate among workers. The mechanical industry seems to have been a case in point. In this industry, the machining activities (that is, the several ways of shaping the metal accurately, such as milling,


83

grinding, riveting and boring) all required close proximity of the workers to the processing parts of the tool and the piece of work, so that they were exposed to all sorts of scraps expelled by machines or cutting surfaces over the working day. The metallurgical industry’s labour force also undertook equally risky tasks. The foundry shop, for instance, was well known for the physical hazards presented by the melting, casting, moulding and cleaning operations. That foundries and machining plants showed relatively more accidents than the other metalworking industries had been already highlighted by an ILO committee in 1949. 55 All these technical conditions, in themselves a threat to worker safety, were compounded by the dearth of accident prevention methods in the Paulista metalworking industry, as reflected in the previous figures. A case which might be well representative of the situation in the 1940s and the 1950s was that of a metallurgical plant investigated by SESI’s industrial hygiene service in 1959. The factory employed 168 workers and did not run any sort of active safety programme. Thus, in the siphon and tube departments, with 11 workers, those in charge of lead fusion worked without gloves, aprons, boots or safety glasses. In the rolling area, with four workers, there was no protection from the dangerous parts of the rolling mill, nor glasses for those operating the hacksaw. In the forging section, with eight workers, the forging press was also not protected.56 It seems likely that the picture was different in specific companies. The Elevadores Atlas SA and the Fundição de Aços Villares (which together had 3,500 employees in 1953), for instance, boasted a rehabilitation programme for those injured by accidents.57 In 1950, the General Motors plant was reported to have a modern safety system in its workshops and an efficient CIPA which had led to a reduction in injuries since its installation in 1948. 58 Even among large and leading companies, however, safety conditions sometimes left a great deal to be desired. A compelling example was that of an important motor vehicle plant with 2,669 employees in 1959, recently organised in São Paulo, which had countless physical hazards in almost all sections of the factory. 59 In any case, the existence of more adequate facilities, whether medical or safety ones, cannot be correlated to lower figures regarding workplace injuries. Disaggregated SESI data (not shown here) indicate that the mechanical industry was at the same time a sector with a comparatively higher degree of safety facilities and with the most hostile environment. A plausible reason for this was that, as noted earlier, mechanical manufacturing (as well as metallurgy) consisted of

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Working Conditions

typically risky tasks owing to the prevailing technical conditions in the industry. At the same time, there is evidence that the absolute injury rates, at least for the textile industry, were quite high by international standards. 60 This is not surprising, as hazardous places tended to be rendered more so by organisational problems and lack of adequate protection of machines and workers. The next section will deal with a somewhat different matter – welfare facilities – which were nonetheless as important to the overall conditions of work on the shop floor.

Welfare facilities Access to welfare services in the factory was a significant aspect of industrial life, since it could lead not only to real material benefits to, but also to an enhanced commitment by, the workforce. By the beginning of the twentieth century, large companies in Greater São Paulo had already set up facilities on their premises such as canteens and crèches. After 1943, specific legal regulations relating to company provision of crèches had been laid down by the Consolidated Labour Laws (Consolidação das Leis de Trabalho, or CLT). 61 The need to keep the labour force together during the working day, the aim of achieving productivity or, simply, the geographical locality of the plant, were all factors which could justify the installation of other facilities, such as canteens. The next sections will review existing data on basic welfare resources for textile and metalworking companies in Greater São Paulo. The analysis will at first focus on contrasts in terms of sector, and then look at individual cases so as to draw general conclusions. Sector comparisons The sample distribution of welfare facilities indicated by Figure 3.4 shows, at first sight, that a greater number of textile than metal workers benefited from welfare facilities in factories. The difference is more noticeable for two significant facilities, crèches and canteens – however, for different reasons. Crèches were more prevalent in the textile sector because of the high proportion of women workers in the labour force and of the legislation which made compulsory the installation of such services in all undertakings with more than 30 women over 16 years old. 62 Food shops, with supposedly lower prices than street markets, and schools, which provided some kind of education, were available to more workers from textile firms. However, the figures for those benefiting from such facilities were obtained by totalling the numbers of workers in those factories which


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70.7% 61.1% 49.7% Metal Trades Textile 17.7% 13.9%

15.5% 11.0%

School Figure 3.4

Food

9.4%

Crèche

Canteen

Workers with welfare facilities by sector, city of São Paulo, 1953–4.

Source: Appendix B.

maintained the services. In the case of canteens, it is possible to verify that this procedure grossly overestimated the real number of workers catered for, since not all of them were always able to utilise the facility. In fact, the picture changes altogether when the capacity of the rooms and the effective number of workers making use of them are taken into account (see Figure 3.5). Thus, the textile firms’ potential canteen capacity plummeted to 24.2 per cent of the workforce, whilst only 18.0 per cent of that total took their meals in those rooms. The metalworking companies, in turn, had the capacity to cater for 39.6 per cent of their workers, although a smaller percentage (27.8 per cent) actually made use of the canteens. Either way, the metal factories outstripped the textiles in providing such a basic facility. There are no similar data for crèches, or for the other facilities. However, the results might well be that the effective availability of places in the former, for example, would be below the total number of women workers. It is illustrative to see how the firms conformed to the legislation concerning the installation of crèches. In the textile sector, only 58.0 per cent of women employed in factories with more than 30 adult women workers could enjoy childcare – in the factory or under contract. The same figure for the metalworking sector was 14.0 per cent. Therefore, it seems that, despite the law, a large proportion of the women who were entitled to crèche facilities on the shop floor were not in reality granted the service by firms. Additional information may help to portray the situation concerning welfare facilities in the Greater São Paulo industry after the Second World War.

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70.7% 60.5%

39.6% Textile 27.8%

24.2%

Metal Trades

18.0%

Room Capacity Figure 3.5 1953–4.

Effective Utilisation

Workers

Canteen capacity and utilisation by workers, city of São Paulo,

Source: Appendix B.

Welfare facilities in individual cases Welfare conditions in the factories were frequently covered in many sources in São Paulo at the time. The lack of canteens even in large undertakings was routinely noticed in both the textile and metal trades. 63 As common were reports of firms which, despite having specific rooms for meals, did not have adequate hygiene conditions for them. For instance, the Cia. Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração metalworking company, with 1,042 workers in 1946, maintained only a dirty, shed-like place in which workers could have their meals. In 1951, the Rayon Matarazzo textile canteen was described as filthy and close to the toilets.64 Another problem was companies which did not furnish enough seats for the workforce. At Aços Paulista, with 500 workers and only 50 places in the canteen, the majority of the workforce had to eat in the workshops. 65 At times, firms improvised canteens along with changing rooms. The most modern and well-equipped canteens were reported in large firms, particularly motor vehicle and mechanical – although textile companies were also noticed. 66 The situation was likely to be similar with regard to childcare on the shop floor. As a matter of fact, not all companies which had crèches provided the necessary places or good sanitary installations. The case of Mariângela Matarazzo might be illustrative, since it was a large and important mill in the 1950s. In 1950, this mill had been reported as having no childcare for its workforce (estimated at 1,500 – most of


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them women). Six years later, another report showed that the company had then set up a crèche which, however, did not have adequate facilities for the children. Despite employing about 2,000 workers at the time, the crèche had only 13 places and was located in a wet room, it was said. 67 Other companies appeared to provide better childcare for the workforce but they were fewer in number than those which, if large, afforded only poor facilities. 68 Finally, one important welfare provision which had not been recorded before, housing, became a major component in the social policy of specific companies in São Paulo. It had already been a major development in previous decades, particularly in big textile firms. 69 After 1945, the provision of housing seems to have continued to play a key role in those firms, although there is evidence that this facility was restricted mostly to the old textile enterprises. 70 As with the foregoing topics, the analysis of welfare facilities has not provided evidence concerning their development throughout the period in question. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that welfare resources tended to improve over the 1950s, for the same reason as was pointed out regarding medical and hygiene facilities. The motor vehicle companies, again, were a major example. Long-established firms had been increasing their resources in the area – General Motors set up canteens between 1950 and 1952 – whilst new ones seem to have provided adequate facilities from the outset during the second half of the 1950s. It is likely that there was an increase in standards in the transport equipment industry soon after the SESI inquiry of 1953–4 was conducted. Nevertheless, there is evidence suggesting that the overall situation remained precarious for most services at the end of the decade. The records for all industries for canteens, for instance, hardly improved significantly from their low 1953–4 levels. For crèches, likewise, there was no obvious change for the better from those years onwards.

Hours of work The final aspect of factory conditions worth mentioning concerns the hours of work spent on the shop floor. The importance of this issue is shown by the sorts of risks described above, which the labour force faced in its normal, everyday activities in the factories. Indeed, long hours tended to affect directly workers’ ability to work safely, because of their increasing exposure to health hazards generated by unsanitary environments and accidents. Working time was also critical in

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Table 3.3 Working hours, shifts and days of work in the cotton manufacturing industry, state of São Paulo and Brazil, 1946 State

Activity

Total Firms Visited Annual Days Working Hours Shifts Firms of Work Per Day

São Paulo Spinning and Weaving Spinning Weaving Total

57

56

292

14

2

28 149 234

28 129 207

236 270 281

10 10 12

2 1 2

Brazil

409

379

296

13

2

Source:

Total

CETEX, Feb. 1950, Appendix b.

determining firms’ output and workers’ earnings. In the historical contexts where the final output (and profits) depended mainly upon the time spent by workers on the shop floor – rather than upon increases in productivity – the working hours were often a crucial target for management and a primary source of disputes with labour.71 It is no surprise, therefore, that the regulation of working hours was one of the first issues which brought about working-class mobilisation in São Paulo during the early twentieth century.72 Nonetheless, even though productivity growth occupies a higher priority in firms’ strategies, the number of working hours do not necessarily cease to be relevant. As the cases of Paulista companies will show, management of firms in Greater São Paulo during the 1950s continued to pursue long hours at the same time as they were implementing productivity measures. More than the other issues examined in this chapter, the assessment of working hours in the Paulista industry during the 1940s and 1950s is hampered by a lack of quantitative evidence. One of the few attempts to estimate average shifts refers to the textile industry in the immediate post-war years. Table 3.3 presents data about working hours spent by workers in the cotton mills of the state of São Paulo during 1946, as published by the Executive Commission of the Textile Industry (Comissão Executiva da Indústria Têxtil, or CETEX). CETEX’s data for 1946 show that São Paulo’s cotton textile workers were on a 12-hour average daily shift. This figure is particularly significant given the 8-hour working day (for a 6-day week) legally set by the CLT. According to the legislation, any overtime hour was to be paid at a percentage (20 per cent) of the standard time. The data in Table 3.3 also show that there were different work schedules according to the textile


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manufacturing phase. The highest figures were recorded in textile companies performing both spinning and weaving activities – an average of 14 hours a day. For the other two groups, specialising in either spinning or weaving, the average shift was 10 hours a day. Such inflated average shifts as those found in cotton manufacturing in 1946 were part of a long-hours culture which had evolved in Greater São Paulo industry during previous decades. 73 In addition, major changes in economic and political circumstances from the late 1930s engendered new pressures on working time in the factories. First, the Paulista textile industry operated at full capacity, with night shifts and extended hours to meet the exceptional level of foreign demand brought about by the collapse of traditional channels of supply in international markets during the Second World War. Second, a government decree of July 1944 brought the textile industry under the ‘special war regime’ which had been applied to other sectors since 1942 – when Brazil had entered the war. Among other modifications in labour rights, the 1944 decree suspended the enforcement of the 8-hour day in the mills until December 1945, when the government finally revoked the war regime in the textile plants. Third, the independent labour organisations were severely repressed during the harsh years of the Estado Novo dictatorship, so that there were few means available for workers to act against a firm’s unilateral extension of the working day. Together, these economic and political conditions combined to extend the number of working hours to the limit, as shown by the CETEX data above. Although quantitative evidence is lacking, it seems that the situation in the metalworking sector was not much different. For example, large metal works in Greater São Paulo operated under the army’s supervision and became heavily involved in the war effort from 1942 – which usually meant long working hours. 74 There are no similar quantitative data on the average number of working hours in São Paulo manufacturing industry for later years. Nevertheless, major political and economic developments in Paulista industry at the time tended to make more widespread the enforcement of the 8-hour day and full pay for overtime, as prescribed by the CLT. Also, the recovery of the labour movement in the 1950s brought the issue of long hours to the fore once again, after the setback caused by the Dutra government’s intervention in trade unions. During the 1950s, workers in factories and trade unions mobilised against the imposition of overtime by management. Whereas trade unions denounced compulsory overtime at specific firms, the PUI engaged in a campaign to approve a bill in Congress which aimed to reduce the

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Working Conditions

legal number of working hours for those under 18 from eight to six hours a day. 75 On the other hand, as will be seen in Chapter 6, during the post-war years several industrial companies embarked on measures aimed at improving worker productivity on the shop floor. Potentially at least, these measures enabled firms to diminish their reliance on extended working hours as the principal means of increasing production. It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that such political and economic changes during the 1950s tended to make compliance with the 8-hour legal shift more frequent than in the textile industry in 1946. Still, there is evidence that pressures to maintain long hours continued to be strong in the late 1940s and the 1950s. If it is likely that the 14-hour average shift reported by CETEX for one branch of the textile industry was reduced after 1946, there is also an indication that overtime continued to be important to certain firms and activities in the Paulista manufacturing industry. Indeed, the productivity schemes implemented by firms implied more machines per operative, tighter discipline and stricter control over the level of work effort. Along with these measures, certain companies seem to have continued to regard overtime as a key aspect of their labour policy. This is a difficult issue to assess, because initially the workers themselves tended to put in extra hours so as to improve their normally quite low earnings. Furthermore, given the lack of quantitative information, it is impossible to estimate the extent of the phenomenon of overtime in the 1950s, for individual industrial sectors or the manufacturing industry as a whole. Nevertheless, there are convincing indications of a resurgence of extended working hours in São Paulo’s industry during the 1950s, explained largely by pressures exerted by management to increase output in the workplace. A few examples should suffice to draw a general picture of working hours in Greater São Paulo industry during the 1950s. In 1952, for example, the Fábrica de Tecidos e Bordados Lapa mill established that workers at the weaving section (among others) would have to comply with a 10-hour shift policy. Given the threat of a new worldwide conflict brought about by the Korean War, the company sought to base its case on the same Decree (no. 6,688 of 13 June 1944) which had extended to the textile industry the ‘special regime’ during the Second World War. 76 Apparently, management often attempted to impose a fixed amount of overtime hours on the workforce, even though it meant breaking the law (which established that overtime should be agreed upon by the parties involved). At the Ipiranga, too, there were


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accounts that the basic shift was up to 12 hours long, with threats of dismissal for those who refused to comply.77 This strategy was pursued not only by firms with a poor record in terms of conditions of work, but also by ones which boasted advanced labour policies. That was the case, for instance, of the Alpargatas textile mill. By 1950, this firm was imposing a 10-hour shift and firing those who, according to management, were ‘contradicting the spirit of co-operation’ at the factory by refusing to work the prescribed overtime.78 Long working hours were also common in the metal trades, as suggested by records in the press. At the Laminação Nacional de Metais, for example, discipline and work pace were said to be rather tight, including shifts between 12 and 18 hours long. 79 Similarly, metalworking firms known for their good facilities were also reported to be adopting long shifts – for instance, General Motors in 1952. 80 Extended working hours remained a characteristic of both industrial sectors into the late 1950s. At the Ipiranga Jafet textile mill, for example, a press report described that the management had fixed the piece-rate in such a way that many weavers did not reach the legal minimum wage level even though they worked continuously for 10 or 11 hours a day.81 At the spinning section of the Rayon Matarazzo mill, changes in the regular shifts were recorded along with rationalisation, lay-offs, and an increase in the number of machines tended by each worker. In this case, it was said that the spinners were forced to take on overtime of three hours a day.82 This sort of adjustment in the working hours may well have been frequent throughout the textile industry, as a consequence of the sweeping rationalisation process which led to an absolute reduction of workers employed in the sector (see Chapter 1). There were also accounts of extended hours in the metal trades. At Fundição Brasil metal works, for example, most workers were said to be on daily shifts of up to 16 hours. 83 Accordingly, in 1958, an evaluation of factory conditions by a trade union activist indicated that long working hours were a well-known feature of the Paulista metalworking industry.84 These records seem to fit in with the trends of rationalisation and productivity measures adopted by the textile and metalworking companies in the 1950s. It seems that, for a substantial number of firms, the enforcement of overtime work was coupled with productivity schemes, and remained a major aspect of management strategies for raising the levels of output on the shop floor. Though data to assess the extent of this phenomenon are lacking, it seems clear that the setting of working hours retained its place as an important source of dispute between

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Working Conditions

management and labour in Greater São Paulo industry during the post-Second World War period. All the generalisations made in this chapter must be treated with caution, given the restrictions of the sample highlighted. These limitations notwithstanding, the resulting overall discussion seems to provide a fair picture of working conditions in the factories at the time. In effect, it is possible to see that long-established industries, such as textiles, had already built up basic facilities which sometimes outstripped those in metalworking industries, despite the fact that the former were clearly – in terms of economic dynamism – lagging behind the metal trades after the Second World War. Similarly, the data suggested that dynamic industries, such as mechanical and transport equipment, were improving their medical, hygiene and welfare capabilities. Still, it is also clear from the evidence presented in the chapter that the overall conditions of work in Paulista factories were rather precarious. Inadequate medical facilities, hazardous substances, accidents, few welfare facilities and long working hours combined to produce an overall factory environment which was sub-standard and unfavourable to workers on the shop floor. Given such conditions, it is no surprise that work performance tended to be negatively affected. As will be seen elsewhere, these conditions contributed to hindering the achievement of higher industrial standards and performance in São Paulo manufacturing during the post-war years. These matters bring in a set of concepts, with a variety of contents, which may be tackled only by introducing (apart from the technical and economic background) the relevant social actors and the institutional framework within which they operated. Thus, the next chapter will address the concepts, attitudes, and policies upheld by employers, workers and governments which shaped the basic features of the factory environment in Greater São Paulo during the post-war years.

4 Shaping the Factory Environment

Apart from the economic and technological background which determined important features of the factory environment in Greater São Paulo from the Second World War onwards, working conditions were also shaped by legal, social and ideological forces which formed and changed industrial relations during the period up to 1960. In particular, the bargaining power of industrialists and labour directly affected the use of the workforce, its environment and achievement of its rights. As will be argued in this chapter and elsewhere, conditions in the workplace also had an impact on industrial productivity and performance. This chapter will discuss how the overall concept of industrial relations was translated into ideas and policies on factory conditions. The focus will be on how issues of industrial hygiene, welfare resources, and hours of work were dealt with by governments, industrialists and workers. First, the chapter will address the main items of labour legislation relating to working conditions and the predominant views of the legal code from both national and international contexts. Second, industrialists’ endeavours to organise industrial hygiene and welfare schemes will be examined in some detail. This section will also show the industrialists’ reactions to attempts by trade unions and legislators to extend or enforce social rights throughout the period. Third, the chapter will introduce evidence of workers’ organisation on the shop floor, in trade unions and the action of political groups, as well as their attitudes to the existing working conditions.

Legislation and labour rights The most important single event for any discussion of labour rights and factory conditions in Greater São Paulo and Brazil after the Second 93

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World War is the enacting of the Consolidated Labour Laws (CLT), which, in 1943, brought together and expanded the various pieces of labour legislation formulated throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The CLT covered various aspects of factory life pertaining to industrial hygiene, welfare provisions and hours of work, as well as specific items on female and child labour. In addition, the CLT consolidated a threelevel labour court system to arbitrate on conflicts between workers and employers on the interpretation or application of the law.1 The following discussion will outline the origins, and the perceptions of governments and industrialists, of the legal framework governing factory conditions which developed in Greater São Paulo during the period examined. Origins and enforcement of the labour laws Concern about recognition of labour rights and protection in Brazil followed a pattern similar to other industrialising countries in which ruling classes and governments were faced with emergent working classes, along with dislocation of social alignments and changes in the way politics were played out in national systems. In Brazil, during the first decade of the twentieth century, an elitist political system began to face a growing working class which, although quite new and inarticulate, received the direct impact of events and ideologies unfolding in Europe. In the years during and after the First World War, the São Paulo urban working class staged major demonstrations calling for an 8-hour working day and other rights which alarmed employers and the authorities. The reaction was similar to that in most European countries and other parts of the world, and a large-scale conservative backlash from 1920 crushed the emerging labour movement in Greater São Paulo and other urban centres. 2 However, these events also had the effect of making labour and social legislation (which had been discussed in Congress from 1917) into a definite priority not only for reformers but also for conservatives in the government and in Congress – although with rather different motivations and objectives. From then on, alongside outbursts of blatant repression and continuous intervention in the labour movement, governments, politicians and employers would take part in a complex process of bargaining on social and labour laws aimed specifically at placating the emerging urban working class in Brazil. 3 Brazil’s connection with international events may also be seen through the underlying principles of the labour laws. At the international

Shaping the Factory Environment 95

level, perhaps the best indication of the growing concern over the issue of workers’ rights – and the potentially disruptive consequences of neglecting them – was the establishment of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), as part of agreements reached at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Even though this was an initiative mainly led by a few developed countries (especially Britain and France), the ILO soon became a forum for the reform of working conditions and regulations the world over. 4 Although difficult to say with certainty, there is evidence that the reformist approach to labour issues manifested by the Versailles Treaty and in the creation of ILO had a significant influence upon discussions and projects approved in Brazil from the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. 5 A comprehensive legal system dealing with labour issues started to be elaborated, incorporating and adapting several principles put forward in international forums. The bulk of labour legislation was drawn up throughout the 1920s and 1930s – most of it under repressive regimes – and in 1943, during the Estado Novo dictatorship, it was consolidated into the CLT.6 By the mid-1940s, however, it could hardly be said that industrialists had been fully tested on their commitment to the new and old labour laws. 7 From 1935 all traces of independent workforce organisation had been swept away, first with the state of emergency and later, in 1937, with the beginning of the Estado Novo dictatorship. Under the authoritarian political regime, direct bargaining with the labour force was, at best, reduced to inarticulate and localised demands. Furthermore, the institutional and personnel systems in place to enforce the legislation were rather precarious, even in Greater São Paulo.8 This situation worsened with Brazil’s entry into the war in 1942 and the subsequent issue of Decree no. 4,937 on 31 August. This Decree and its following amendments suspended the application of basic labour regulations for those companies and industrial segments (mostly metalworking industries) regarded as strategic to war production. Inter alia, the legal minimum working day was increased from eight to ten hours, night work for women and for over-16s was reintroduced, strikes were prohibited and a ‘transference certificate’ issued by former employers became compulsory for workers moving to other firms.9 As late as 1944, a new Decree (no. 6,688, of 13 July 1944) also included the textile industry in the war effort after the government joined the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).10 As a result of these measures, whereas in Europe and the United States the war effort gave rise to improvements in factory conditions and to new formulas of worker participation, the same period in Greater São Paulo

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Working Conditions

witnessed the tightening of the control over the workforce and, as a result, a deterioration in working conditions. 11 Therefore, the effective application of the labour laws was obstructed by the extraordinary political circumstances of pre-1945. Industrialists were practically given a free hand to deal with the contentious issue of working conditions in the factories. They learnt that accepting the labour laws did not necessarily mean they had to apply them. In fact, Paulista industrialists even joined the government in boasting about the modernity and comprehensive nature of the Brazilian labour code, as we shall see. Perspectives on labour rights The Estado Novo’s outlook on labour legislation had been developed since 1937, with a reorientation in 1942 which led to new governmental efforts to reinforce the official system of industrial relations. 12 The official view was that the unfettered expression of social conflict in Brazil – for instance, strikes – was a phenomenon of the past, when no social contract had yet been developed. First, it was argued that labour legislation covered all aspects of workers’ needs and thus did away with the causes of significant conflicts in the workplace. Second, it was claimed that the machinery of the labour courts and their formal procedures would deal with any breach or divergent interpretation of the laws without degenerating into open struggle. In any case, it was argued, the fundamental guarantee of smooth operation of the official industrial relations system was the fact that the CLT was one of the most advanced pieces of labour legislation in the world.13 Paulista industrialists fully adopted this view when the signals of dissolution of the Estado Novo became more evident and the safeguards against labour and social unrest consequently deteriorated. There is evidence that industrialists were concerned about the issue of social unrest before 1945. 14 Yet it was the outbreak of strikes and labour mobilisation in the beginning of that year that brought this apprehension to a peak. These protests marked the beginning of a critical period in the post-war years which ended only in 1947, with government intervention in the trade unions and the banning of left-wing militants. This, coupled with political manoeuvring and appeals to order, was followed by the industrialists’ engagement in a campaign to stress the modern character of the labour legislation which formed the CLT. Thus, industrialists argued, workers should recognise that this labour code put Brazil at the forefront of nations with the most advanced provisions for the protection of the labour force and their benefits. In


the same way, resorting to strike action was regarded as unacceptable, since the CLT also provided the mechanism for properly dealing with worker grievances.15 This view of the advanced nature of the CLT continued to be developed in the post-war years and included comparisons with specific countries. In 1951, for example, an article in the FIESP bulletin argued that labour rights in Sweden were inferior to those provided by the Brazilian labour legislation. The article maintained that Brazil was among those countries which best catered for the needs of the working classes.16 In another publication, a report of a visit by an industrialist to Japan in 1960 described the labour conditions in Japanese textile plants as being far below the standards achieved in Brazilian plants.17 Such a view was also stated by industrialists and government representatives at international meetings. An illustrative example was given by Euvaldo Lodi, the president of the powerful CNI. He claimed at an ILO Conference in 1949 that Brazil was a world leader in worker protection and then added: ‘[we] Brazilian employers are bold enough to agree on measures which often appear too progressive for our actual conditions’.18 However, it would be misleading to regard these statements as representing only the industrialists’ perceptions of labour legislation. At the time, it was well known that actual labour rights in factories were very different from the rights accorded to workers by law. Much evidence, both official and unofficial, showed that it was clearly understood that many principles established by the CLT were not complied with in a number of cases in Greater São Paulo.19 In reality, such an understanding became a common assumption for industrialists from 1945 as pressures from below became more resistant. In the post-war years, industrialists rejected the idea that the ongoing experience of social reform in European countries could be transplanted to Brazilian conditions, since conditions in Brazil were distinct. By this time, they argued, application of labour legislation still needed a lot more work, and that compliance and improvement should guide the actions of both government and labour. In looking at events abroad (Europe), it was contended, workers were being misled and, instead, should recognise that the attempts to impose higher wages and better working conditions were unrealistic considering the degree of industrial development in São Paulo.20 This double-edged view of labour legislation and its enforcement was, conceivably, a key aspect of the strenuous efforts made by Paulista industrialists to keep control over factory life from 1945 onwards. The emphasis on the progressive character of the CLT served to answer widespread criticism of working conditions during that time. In particular,

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this outlook became a weapon to resist attempts by legislators and trade unions to improve labour rights during the 1950s. That was the line adopted in 1955 by the president of FIESP, Antônio Devisate, who criticised harshly several bills in Congress aimed at extending labour rights. This was a time in which pro-labour legislators and trade unions were campaigning for improvements in the CLT, following the political opening of 1951–2. According to Devisate, Brazil’s labour legislation was the most advanced in the world and new benefits would place an unbearable burden on business. 21 That was the FIESP’s stance on practically all bills aimed at reforming the CLT at the time.22 In addition, Paulista industrialists rejected any legal measure which might grant the workers a greater say in their working conditions. At a time when trade unions were stepping up pressures for an efficient inspection of labour legislation in factories, the industrial leadership repudiated outright any form of partnership in the matter. A proposal of joint supervision by the São Paulo State Department of Labour in 1953, for example, was promptly refused on the grounds that it would ‘break the essential discipline’ of the factory and ‘damage the harmony between capital and labour’. 23 The same argument had been used a few months earlier against a bill which provided for the appointment by trade unions of inspectors in all factories to supervise working conditions. 24 Finally, even when recognising the deterioration of working conditions or non-compliance with the labour laws, industrialists contended that such a situation was a result of the stage of industrial development. They argued that São Paulo’s economic backwardness compared to other parts of the world should be taken into account and changes should not be forced through by either governmental or union pressure. After all, enforcing or improving factory conditions should rest on the shoulders of the industrialists themselves, since they alone were capable of assessing the real needs of industry and its development. 25 These arguments put forward by Paulista industrialists represented a corollary of their acceptance of labour legislation. As had happened during negotiations on the labour laws before 1945, after the Second World War the industrialists’ representation of CLT as an international example of progressive social legislation did not imply concessions to either state or worker influence on the factory, still less to their right to manage. At the same time, Paulista industrialists engaged in a comprehensive programme of industrial welfare which was intended to take the initiative away from government agencies and labour organisations. The following section will deal with the latter issue.


Industrialists and the Social Service of Industry (SESI) As pointed out in the previous chapter, it seems that various health and welfare services were introduced in large enterprises during the 1930s and 1940s in Greater São Paulo. Despite such steps, there is also strong evidence that neither workers nor employers were satisfied with measures taken by industrialists by 1945. With the unequivocal signs of social unrest appearing suddenly early in that year, the industrial leadership sought to counter the threats by launching renewed initiatives on social welfare and industrial hygiene in São Paulo. This section will discuss the origins and the underlying aims of these initiatives – particularly SESI. Post-Second World War conflicts and the creation of SESI Even before the explosion of strikes in May 1945 in Greater São Paulo, there were signs that industrialists had been aware of the importance of working conditions in defining labour attitudes, especially after years of authoritarian regime and war mobilisation. In January 1945, for instance, Roberto Simonsen spoke out declaring that much still needed to be done in the area of social welfare and that employers were delaying the necessary measures to deal with the problem in São Paulo. He was reported as concluding that the supply of social services was ‘the adequate, effective way of combating the exotic ideas that [did] not fit in with the Brazilian reality.’26 One month later, an internal FIESP circular to its affiliates announced the creation of a Department of Social Assistance, which would be responsible for collecting data on social and hygiene facilities in Paulista factories. The objective was to give a prompt response to press reports about the paucity of the social services in industrial enterprises. 27 In the first months of 1945, therefore, the conditions of work in industrial plants had already been publicly recognised as a matter on which urgent action was needed. At this stage, the proposals were limited to calling on industrialists to launch individual initiatives and to a public relations offensive in the face of mounting criticism. This attitude, apparently, started to change from the strikes in May 1945. The first moves in this direction were reportedly made by the textile employers, through the Syndicate of the Spinning and Weaving Industry in the State of São Paulo (Sindicato das Indústrias de Fiação e Tecelagem em Geral do Estado de São Paulo, or SIFTSP). In a meeting of this Syndicate on 28 June 1945, textile industrialists found the new situation created by the walkouts threatening and decided that serious

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attention should be paid to social services. They initially called on IAPI (the Social Insurance Institute for Industrial Workers) to assume its duties in the area of medical and social assistance. They also suggested that employers could give the Catholic Church resources to build houses for workers. In the end, the meeting set up a commission (later named the Commission of Social Orientation, Comissão de Orientação Social, or COS) to study welfare projects for the textile industry – including a Social Assistance Fund to be funded by voluntary contributions from textile employers. 28 One of the first steps taken by the COS was to conduct an enquiry into the health and nutrition of 573 students – all under 18 years old – enrolled on SENAI courses. The results were appalling. Lack of regular feeding and undernourishment were common and, after medical examination, over 12 per cent of the students were considered to be utterly unfit to work. Another finding was that the accident rate in the textile mills was high, involving a great waste of time and resources. In the meantime, the Commission devised plans for setting up food stores, industrial kitchens, and worker housing. Courses in social assistance were scheduled and the COS started to publish a series of articles by a British economist, Harcourt Rivington, about and against communist ideas. Other planned activities included medical assistance, radio programmes and leisure activities. 29 These plans were ready in September 1945 and the Commission met the São Paulo governor (interventor) to hand in and discuss the proposals on 20 October. One central point included the creation of the Commission of Social Assistance of the Textile Industry (Comissão de Assistência Social da Indústria Têxtil, or CASIT). This would be established in each factory to boost social welfare and harmony between workers and employers. These factory committees would be formed by workers but presided over by employers or their representatives. The Commission also presented projects for food stores and a Cooperative of Popular Housing. 30 These plans, however, did not progress well. There is only one report of a food store being established in a working-class neighbourhood of the capital, and even then it was operational for no more than six months. The only other activity which seemed to have been initiated was the distribution of the anti-communist propaganda mentioned above. 31 The major problem in setting the projects in motion was probably a lack of funds, since funding relied on voluntary contributions by industrialists as well as government support. In addition, there is no sign that industrialists agreed with the idea of factory councils

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designed to bring labour and management together to discuss working conditions. These restrictions, enough to abort the SIFTSP’s initiatives, were further strained by continuing unrest in several industrial sectors at the end of 1945. It soon became clear to the textile leadership that the scale of labour demands was well beyond the capacity of an isolated industrial segment, which moreover did not have the necessary instruments – or will – to mobilise resources for the enterprise. 32 Despite rising concern, it seems that the main industrialist organisation, FIESP, was unable to work out a practical proposal to resolve the issues being raised in factories until the beginning of 1946. Indeed, in November 1945 FIESP restricted itself to remarks in support of a Social Peace Charter drawn up by the National Confederation of Commercial Associations, which declared the need for improving living conditions and extending social assistance at enterprise level. 33 With the start of a new wave of strikes in February 1946, FIESP continued to speak of general ideas to improve workplace conditions – apart from the heavy attacks on ‘agitators’ and ‘foreign ideologies’.The first indication that FIESP was going to take practical measures regarding social services and working conditions appeared in March 1946. Strikes continued at that time, even though the Dutra government had practically outlawed them under Decree no. 9,070 enacted in March. In a public manifesto, FIESP compromised on a programme to set up canteens, food stores and crèches in working-class neighbourhoods, among other measures. Furthermore, ‘committees of efficiency and welfare’ were to be set up in all premises with more than 50 workers. These joint councils would be concerned with the improvement of working conditions and of other issues outside the factory, such as housing, food and leisure.34 This proposal clearly resembled the SIFTSP’s, analysed before, and had possibly been taken over by FIESP as a global project for the entire manufacturing industry. The project would be run by the Foundation for Worker Assistance (Fundação de Assistência do Trabalhador, or FAT), whose statute was formally approved in April 1946. In this piece, the basic allowances mentioned above were reaffirmed, except for an important item: the committees of efficiency and welfare.35 It is difficult to establish the precise reason for the abandonment of these committees in such a short time – if they were ever really taken seriously at all. A possible cause might be linked to the political turnaround visible already in April 1946. By this time, the tough measures decreed by the Dutra administration against labour organisations had already started to produce their effects. With the anti-strike law enacted a few days previously, concessions to workers on the shop floor to examine factory

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conditions possibly looked unnecessary. Moreover, and probably more important, there is little evidence that the majority of firms wished to accept such a degree of intervention in what they regarded as exclusively their internal affairs. In any case, the FAT appeared as an initiative entirely controlled by industrialists and without any concession to joint councils. As the preliminary studies on the Foundation started in February 1946, Roberto Simonsen – the most influential name in the FIESP – was engaged in dialogue with the new government. An objective of these contacts was to transfer to the employers’ control the food depots maintained by the federal administration through the Social Assistance Food Service (Serviço de Alimentação da Previdência Social, or SAPS). 36 The SAPS had been set up in 1941 by Getúlio Vargas (being subordinated to the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce) and was intended to establish a wide network of restaurants, industrial kitchens and food stores in industrial cities all over the country. The project started promisingly in the federal capital, Rio de Janeiro, where large restaurants were built, as were food depots and kitchens. Yet the planned extension to other cities did not take place and Greater São Paulo, the main industrial centre, was left with only a few depots. Simonsen brokered a deal with the government in March 1946 to transfer the three food stores in São Paulo to the FAT, to be run exclusively by industrialists.37 During the next three months, the initial plans regarding the structure of the agency were once again modified. In June 1946, President Dutra signed a Decree creating a new organisation which would become the definitive form assumed by the industrialist project – the Social Service of Industry (SESI). The reason for this new departure is still unclear, but the new agency was patently inspired by the successful training organisation, SENAI, set up in 1943 by Vargas.38 In the same way, SESI was mainly a product of effective lobbying by the Paulista industrialist leadership, as had happened before with SENAI. Indeed, the evidence is that the decree was even prepared by Simonsen himself.39 The creation of SESI was greatly determined by sweeping industrial unrest in Greater São Paulo at the time. The agency was devised as a weapon to confront the growing challenge posed by workers and labour-based parties (especially the communists) in factories, neighbourhoods and on the political scene, an objective clearly stated by the industrialist leadership. Labour upheaval and increasing worker organisation were singled out as the underlying justification for SESI. 40


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Industrialists, at the same time, associated any independent (that is, non-government-controlled) labour movement to communist influence. In a private interview with the British Labour Attaché, Clifford German, for instance, Simonsen ‘admitted frankly that SESI was intended to serve as a weapon against Communism. In the first place it would reduce the causes of discontent of which the Communists took advantage and in addition it would actively combat communism by counter propaganda and education’.41 On the other hand, SESI also seems to have represented an initiative designed to break an ingrained resistance of the industrialists themselves to being involved in voluntary programmes. Simonsen identified the narrow-minded profiteering mentality of employers as a major problem at the time, as it prevented a comprehensive action against labour threats by means of social assistance, improved working conditions and propaganda.42 In this sense, the compulsory 2 per cent payroll tax per company established by federal decree avoided the basic drawback of the former proposals by ensuring the necessary funding to the large-scale programme envisaged by Simonsen and his allies. Therefore, the voluntary and individualised approach to the issue of social welfare which had predominated in 1945 gave way to a mandatory tax which would be able to force a compromise upon all industrial companies at both regional and national levels. As will be seen next, the nature of this arrangement would have a marked impact on the way working conditions were dealt with in the following years in Greater São Paulo. Welfare and industrial hygiene programmes The creation of SESI in June 1946 incorporated two noteworthy characteristics which reflected the political and ideological context of the period in Brazil. First, despite being established by a federal decree – and relying on a public fund – the new organisation was from the outset designed to be exclusively controlled and run by the industrialists themselves. The administration of the resources channelled from the payroll tax was assigned to the CNI, the employers’ national organisation. Twenty-five per cent of the taxes collected were destined for a national fund and 75 per cent for the regional bodies – which enjoyed full autonomy and were in fact the foundation of the whole structure. It was a repetition of the scheme applied a few years previously to SENAI and represented an enormous transfer of public funds to the private administration of industrialists. 43 Second, SESI did not include any worker representation at any level of bureaucratic organisation. The

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Executive Council was to consist entirely of those nominated by regional industrialist federations, as would be the Advisory Council – which in São Paulo was composed of 50 names in 1947. In this sense, as pointed out by the British Labour Attaché, ‘[t]he scheme [was] vitally concerned with the self-interest of big business which is in full control of the organisation’. 44 These two features show the close relationship between Paulista industrialists and the Dutra government in 1946 as well as the compromise reached in the face of threats from workers and labour-based organisations. In a more strategic sense, the shape of SESI was an affirmation of long-nurtured principles of non-intervention in the sphere of factory life – whether by the government or labour. By retaining control of SESI, the industrialist leadership wanted to dictate the nature, extent and enforcement of measures on conditions of work and welfare called for by workers and other segments at the time. The lack of effective state-sponsored agencies to take on such roles ensured that the possibility became a reality. In addition, the agency could be used to launch an ideological offensive against those sections of the labour movement which contested the full prerogatives of management on the shop floor. SESI’s line of action reflected these general characteristics and the work of the Food Supply Division clearly illustrates this point. This SESI department was designed to set out an emergency food-supply programme in working-class areas of Greater São Paulo and other industrial cities in the state. Food depots were established with impressive speed. In June 1946, SESI inherited three stores from the SAPS (as mentioned before), located in different parts of the capital – Largo do Riachuelo, Mooca and Lapa. Less than a year later, in May 1947, there were already 77 posts, including 37 in the capital plus Santo André and 40 in industrial cities across the São Paulo countryside.45 The depots aimed to sell goods at prices lower than those in private shops and offered around 70 types of products (mainly foodstuffs). Only unionised workers were entitled to buy there. Also, each customer had to provide a detailed record with information on the whole family and received a card on which purchases were carefully registered.46 SESI’s choice of where to set up the new shops deliberately focused on areas which, apart from their high concentration of working-class inhabitants, had been identified as a focus of strong communist influence.47 There is also evidence that this initiative sought to combat – and evict – similar shops influenced by the communist militancy. The Cooperative of Unionised Workers (Cooperativa de Consumo dos


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5,000,000 4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 0 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 Workers enrolled

Figure 4.1 Yearly average of workers enrolled at SESI food shops, state of São Paulo, 1947–60 Source: SESI-SP, 1965a, p. 48.

Trabalhadores Sindicalizados) had sponsored the creation of food posts since 1942 in São Paulo and apparently the communists had a foothold in such an enterprise. By the end of 1945, there were at least six Cooperative shops in different parts of the capital. Some were large, such as one in Mooca which was launched in November 1945 and reportedly started up with 3,000 members. The shops were said to be administered by factory workers and their aim was to reduce prices of basic foodstuffs by selling them at only 10 per cent profit.48 The industrialists’ response to this threat was consolidated in the following years. The SESI programme expanded throughout the 1950s, as shown by Figure 4.1. The number of workers enrolled at the SESI food shops soared from 680,455 in 1947 to 4,643,167 in 1960. In 1948, the Food Supply Division also started to provide meals to factories in Greater São Paulo. Industrial kitchens were organised in the capital and other cities. In 1953, for example, there were five units in São Paulo, and one each in Santo André, Santos, and Americana – which together prepared meals for between 20,000 and 24,000 workers. 49 Another illustration of SESI’s strategy – most important for the present discussion – is given by the Industrial Hygiene and Safety Service (Serviço de Higiene e Sequrança Industrial, or SHSI), created in 1948. This was a unit which dealt with the prevention of accidents and occupational diseases and gathered together, among others, doctors and engineers specialised in industrial hygiene, some of them pioneers in this area in Brazil. 50 Activities related to medical and hygiene issues for the labour force had in fact started in September 1947, with the Thoracic Examination Service (Serviço de Recenseamento Toráxico).

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Numbers

120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0

Percentage

20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

160,000 140,000

1947194819491950 1951195219531954195519561957195819591960 Workers examined

Worker coverage (percentage)

Figure 4.2 Numbers of workers examined by the Thoracic Service and relative share in the total of industrial workforce in the state of São Paulo, 1947–60 Sources: SESI-SP, 1947–1960 (1947 includes only September–December); Table A-2, Appendix A.

This programme used ambulances to visit industrial plants and make on-site examinations of workers to detect lung disease – especially tuberculosis and silicosis – which afflicted the São Paulo workforce. Another initiative in the area was the CIPA Jornal of 1950, which brought information and advice on accident prevention and was distributed in industrial enterprises. Yet it was only from the early 1950s onwards that the range of activities was expanded and a more systematic approach to industrial hygiene in São Paulo initiated. By the end of the 1950s, the SHSI counted upon a very well-trained group of experts and conducted technically sophisticated analyses of problems affecting workers in the workplace. 51 Technical expertise notwithstanding, the fact that SESI was unilaterally controlled by industrialist organisations seemed to place effective constraints on its activities. First, the industrial hygiene programmes sponsored by the agency had relatively low coverage considering the growing number of industrial workers in the state of São Paulo as a whole. To take one of the largest schemes carried out by SESI during that time, the Thoracic Examination Service reached only a small percentage of industrial workers in the state, as shown by Figure 4.2. The number of workers examined peaked at 19.6 per cent in 1952, then dropped and maintained an average of 14.1 per cent in the years to 1960. Given that the principal aim of this service was to tackle a disease – tuberculosis – believed to be common in several branches of the industry, that average could hardly be regarded as satisfactory.


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Second, programmes supported by SESI relied upon a voluntary approach, in which firms decided when to call in the agency’s technicians and which particular sort of service they wanted. That was the case with an important 1950s programme of visits to factories involving doctors and engineers. In 1960, for instance, SESI staff assessed 34 plants on their general conditions or specific aspects of the workplace environment – noise, airborne particles, chemical contamination and the like – previously determined by the companies. 52 Third, SESI staff had no official authority to demand the enforcement of any recommendation contained in studies drawn up as a result of factory visits. Thus, even the few enterprises which requested an analysis of industrial hygiene by SESI had no obligation to adopt the measures suggested or to undertake more detailed assessments of the problems identified. As in the case of the visits themselves, the decision about what to do rested exclusively with the management. Lastly, the total control of SESI by industrialists limited significantly the medical approach to the social causes of occupational diseases and hazards in São Paulo factories. Apart from housing, feeding, and sanitation in neighbourhoods, the role of other elements directly linked to management decisions – such as wage policy and application of labour laws – tended to be systematically ruled out in technical analyses. In the same way, management duties regarding the industrial hygiene and safety measures were minimised in favour of a normative stance which avoided discussion of firms’ policy on the shop floor. In view of their complete power over SESI, therefore, Paulista industrialists were able to embark on a welfare programme which preserved the principle of little or no intervention on the shop floor. As for industrial hygiene and safety, SESI turned down pressures on individual firms and in the 1950s became a body specialising in accident prevention, education and in the provision of technical assistance to those interested, for whatever reason, in improving working conditions. New ‘social centres’ opening in working-class neighbourhoods helped to shift the emphasis further away from the workplace to places in which workers could receive assistance.53 As a result, social policies at the micro level continued to be determined by the specific conditions, strategies or needs of individual firms. SESI’s particular development consolidated the view of the factory environment as a sphere where decisions were made only by management. Such a model, however, was not accepted by all actors. In particular, workers and their organisations challenged that view during the whole post-war period. This issue will be discussed in the following section.

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Workers and the struggle over factory conditions In Chapter 3 it was possible to see trends in the evolution of welfare and hygiene facilities according to various criteria. It is much more difficult, however, to discern the notions and attitudes which shaped different results in the different sectors and industries. In addition to the technical and economic conditions previously mentioned, management strategies and labour organisation were potentially key elements in defining the conditions in which the labour force was used. This section will address the perceptions developed by workers about factory conditions and the way they mobilised themselves and struggled for their objectives, in both the workplace and larger environments. In this part, reactions and individual attitudes by firms will be also examined, which may help to explain different outcomes in working conditions noted in the previous chapter. Workers’ shop floor organisation and factory conditions In the immediate post-war years, working conditions emerged as an important issue in the grievances aired and demonstrations staged by the textile and metal workers in Greater São Paulo. Indeed, it was one of the reasons why the improvement of social resources in factories began to be urged by the industrialist leadership as early as 1945. Such a fact, however, was hardly recognised in many approaches in contemporary and later analyses, which were often accompanied by an assumption of Paulista (and Brazilian) working-class backwardness. The low visibility of the issue was probably one reason why it was practically disregarded. Most worker actions of the time focused on wage demands, given the deterioration of real labour incomes. Particularly in walkouts, grievances concerning factory conditions were at best attached to basic-wage claims and clearly occupied a place of secondary importance. Also, it seems that demands regarding conditions of work had their specificity: in several cases they were a product of the day-to-day struggles – usually conducted by more or less consolidated factory commissions – between workers and employers. These characteristics of workplace organisation can be traced in several cases reported in the press during the post-war years. In the 1945–7 period, for instance, metalworkers of the Mecânica Paulo Meneghetti firm went on strike demanding a wage improvement and included claims for the weekly paid day of rest and an 8-hour working day. 54 Reduction of the working time to eight hours also appeared on the agenda of a dispute at the Tecelagem Santa Branca wool mill. 55 Even


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in cases where the demand which gave rise to the legal process of collective dispute (dissídio coletivo) related only to a wage increase, other claims usually surfaced hinting at the sort of problems which concerned workers on the shop floor. For example, at the Rhodiaseta Brasileira textile mill, the basic claim in a strike of March 1946 referred to wage increases. Still, during the dispute a worker came forward and denounced the bad conditions of the plant. According to him, the working day often lasted 12 hours or more; the environment of the sizing department affected the women’s health; they had only 20 minutes for meals; there were few toilets – always dirty and damaged; and there were no showers. In the end, the statement made it clear that workers would take part in a company productivity campaign only as long as they received an adequate wage and improved conditions of work.56 The usual procedure was that elected commissions negotiated the demands with the management. The structure of these commissions seems to have varied significantly in terms of objectives, continuity and representation. It was common to have workers elected by their workmates to take specific requests to management, with the commission being disbanded later. Such a procedure did not necessarily mean a lack of strength, for informal contacts and discussions might continue all the time.57 In other cases, more permanent commissions co-ordinated the bargaining strategy as well as the main topics to take to management. 58 For example, it was reported in the beginning of 1946 that a worker commission at the Tecelagem Santa Branca textile firm had started negotiations for better conditions of work. Issues included the provision of housing, a canteen, a first-aid room, and better lighting in the factory – in addition to the 8-hour working day. A few months later, the negotiations led by the commission had already resulted in a new canteen, drinking-fountains, a doctor, medicines, and an 8-hour working day. 59 As argued before, the strict repression initiated in May 1947 by the government led to a sharp decline in trade union and factory commission activity in Greater São Paulo. There is evidence that industrialists attempted to take advantage of the moment by rescinding labour rights negotiated during the previous years.60 On the other hand, other firms may well have looked ahead and tried to combine repression and improvement of working conditions. A case in point was the Nitro Química rayon factory. After facing a strong labour mobilisation in 1945–7, this company devised a stick and carrot policy in which social services received great emphasis.61 There is no evidence, however, that

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such a strategy was pursued in any consistent manner by companies at the time. Rather, it is possible that new efforts to expand social services were limited to some firms which had already initiated an active welfare policy (such as Nitro Química). For other firms, the repression of labour organisations probably meant a welcome opportunity to contain claims for better factory conditions and even to cut back labour rights.62 As workplace organisation was fiercely attacked by management at the time, the drive for improvement of working conditions was greatly affected. Even before the wave of interventions from May 1947, it appears that several factory commissions in the textile industry had already gone underground.63 The continuity of some type of shop-floor organisation seems to have varied according to individual firms – possibly depending on the existence of organising traditions in the plant and on the policy adopted by management. Three years after the beginning of the interventions, for example, at the Souza Noschese metal works a meeting of 20 workers decided to rely on informal contacts – instead of a commission – for fear of dismissals. Yet in others there were signals that mobilisation was recovering. At the Tecelagem Assunção textile mill in 1950, it was reported that there was already an established commission, which was calling for more toilets and other issues. At the Itrepila metal works, a commission negotiated with management and achieved clean water and showers.64 Whether openly tolerated or acting covertly, shop-floor organisations continued to push ahead with demands related to conditions of work, as had happened in regard to wages. Indeed, there are records of local actions involving various services and conditions for the whole period. In 1948, workers at the Tecelagem Mariângela Matarazzo pressed for – and got – a water supply and regular cleaning of toilets.65 Metalworkers from a department of Metalúrgica Paulista went on strike in the first half of 1950 over the supply of protective masks. It was reported that they returned only after the firm agreed to provide the equipment.66 In March 1951, metalworkers at the United Shoe demanded cheaper meals in the factory canteen, installation of fans, free supply of overalls and aprons, and payment of the unsanitary fee (taxa de insalubridade).67 Meanwhile, conflicts relating to the length of the work day continued to be reported. For example, reduction from an 11-hour to an 8-hour day was an important claim which ignited a strike at a textile firm in April 1951. 68 Labour organisations started to recover in 1951–2, particularly thanks to the renewal of trade union officials and a more moderate stance by the Vargas government. There are strong indications that shop-floor


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organisations were now expanding in Paulista industry. 69 These developments, however, coincided with two events which served to worsen any hopes for further improvements in working conditions in Greater São Paulo at the time. First, the energy crisis which affected industry from 1952 led to changes in working shifts and an increase in night work in both the textile and metalworking industries. Second, there was the government’s decision, in 1951, to rule out application of the labour laws in companies regarded as strategic for the Korean War effort. The deterioration of factory conditions stemming from these various elements put a great strain on the workforce and made for increasing tension between management and workers over the period 1951–3. The impressive strike of 300,000 in March–April 1953 was a product of this critical set of circumstances. Apart from the real wage decline, hardship in the workplace possibly became a key element for explaining the militancy and extent of the walkout. After this major event, conflicts in the workplace persisted and new protests at work schedules ensued. 70 Pressures for better working conditions seem to have received a great impulse with the setting up of several new factory commissions in the wake of the strike. A contemporary account pointed out that meetings in the workplace reviewed the existing conditions in relation to the labour laws and found that, in several firms, most of the CLT provisions were not being enforced. Workers were noting the main problems and negotiating them with employers.71 Even in firms known for providing good social facilities, there were signs of mobilisation. At the Elevadores Atlas metal works, for instance, in addition to issues relating to delays and working time, a commission won the installation of a door in a department to protect workers against variable temperatures. 72 At the Alpargatas textile mill, which boasted advanced social facilities and very few labour conflicts, workers were calling for the crèche to be located within the factory, better canteen food, and clean water. 73 From 1956 onwards, there was a remarkable strengthening of trade unions and encompassing organisations (such as the PUI) which co-ordinated inter-union demands. At this point, several issues relating to working conditions began to be addressed more systematically in broader campaigns involving different labour organisations. Nonetheless, workplace mobilisations continued to play an important role at the time, even though they became less visible among the general claims made by the trade union movement. In fact, the problems arising from the shop floor, with a multitude of grievances relating to industrial hygiene and social assistance, were barely addressed by trade unions in

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an adequate way – as will be shown later. On the other hand, it seems that the closer relationships between rank and file and trade unions initiated in the first years of the 1950s deepened further. This fact may have helped to reinforce the grass-roots demands for changes in factory conditions. 74 One such example was reported by a woman weaver, at the Tecelagem Mariângela Matarazzo, who pointed out the great lack of machine protection in the plant. She said that accidents involving shuttles being ejected from the loom and hitting workers were common, adding that this had recently happened to her. The trade union intervened and as a result the machine on which she worked was protected – but others remained unprotected.75 Similar actions resulting from grievances in workshops possibly gained momentum from 1956 as the number of union delegates in both textile and metalworking industries rapidly increased. In the meantime, cases of pressure and conflict continued to be recorded in newspapers. At the Fundição Brasil metal works, a letter from the shops denounced work using acids at the parts washing department as extremely unhealthy, there was no adequate protection, and the legal unsanitary fee was not being paid.76 A letter by a director of the Santo André’s Metalworkers Trade Union denounced the Fichet & Schwartz metal works for inadequate health and safety conditions, with no clean water, proper toilets or washrooms. 77 Finally, the second half of the 1950s witnessed the rise of the motor vehicle companies, which distinguished themselves by their provision of extensive medical and social benefits. Together with the longestablished Ford and General Motors, the newcomers Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, Vemag and Willys-Overland shared a philosophy in which the social welfare network was central to their industrial relations systems. At General Motors and Willys, for example, it seems that the comprehensive facilities were part of a policy designed to elicit worker engagement, coupled with a persistent anti-trade union bias. 78 Such a particular arrangement may well have helped to distract workers’ attention from aspects of the shop environment relating to health and safety standards – apart from wages and work norms. Health hazards in a typical motor vehicle plant, as described in the previous chapter, showed that serious problems affected the workshops of motor vehicle companies. As a matter of fact, even though new hazards had been introduced in the new factories (such as lead poisoning in the chassis finishing department), the basic health and safety problems in motor vehicle plants were similar to the risks which had long marked the metalworking industries in Greater São Paulo.


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The cases discussed so far illustrate how the working environment frequently became an issue in worker protests in Greater São Paulo after the Second World War. It is difficult to determine the extent to which grass-roots militancy prompted changes in factory conditions. Nevertheless, the very examples suggest that conditions of work were a pervasive issue in the bargaining between management and labour and that such a process may have led to improvements in those conditions. These came about either as a result of direct pressure from workers or by means of attempts by management to anticipate labour demands and defuse conflicts. In this way the particular balance of forces between management and labour in the larger society and in the workplace, at different political stages, influenced factory conditions in Greater São Paulo. Labour organisation and management policies varied widely from firm to firm throughout the period, but it is possible to observe some trends with regard to the way working conditions were dealt with by both sides. In firms with inadequate or non-existent facilities, conflicts were rife and workers mobilised on a wide range of issues, from the most basic (toilets, showers, crèches) to those relating to their activities (shifts, health, safety). In firms with advanced social provisions, the situation was somewhat different: apparently most companies in this group sought to fend off labour militancy and defuse conflicts by means of an aggressive social policy combined with an anti-trade union stance. Typical examples of this were the motor vehicle companies, such as Willys-Overland, but textile mills such as Alpargatas were also included. Yet this policy did not necessarily imply adequate working conditions as various problems remained in the shops. Nor did it mean the ending of conflicts and workers’ mobilisation. Rather, the content of grievances seemed to differ from the first group of enterprises, with greater emphasis on working schedules, quality of services and health and safety standards. Trade unions, political groups and the struggle over labour rights The involvement of trade unions in factory conditions was strongly affected by the political scene of the time. When the political climate was favourable, issues relating to conditions of work began to be introduced along with wage claims. Between 1945 and 1947, for example, the first indications of a broad agenda for labour demands appeared as early as October 1945, while various trade unions were preparing the First São Paulo State Congress of Workers. The officials of most trade unions were still hostile to rank-and-file initiatives, but in various cases

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militant pressure forced the discussion and the presentation of proposals for the Congress. 79 In the case of the São Paulo textile union, for instance, women and men took part in debates and elaborated proposals regarding the conditions of women’s work, the Social Insurance Law, housing, and the 8-hour working day law.80 In Santo André, a joint meeting of trade unions of the ABC cities preparing for the State Congress addressed issues relating to social insurance, housing, factory canteens, unsanitary work, industrial hygiene and women’s and young people’s labour, among others.81 In the same way, a demonstration in São Paulo in March 1947 called on industrialists and the government to enforce the various rights established by the CLT that had recently been introduced into the new Constitution under article 157.82 The crackdown by the Dutra government on labour organisations in May 1947 axed the previous initiatives and had enduring consequences for the articulation of labour rights demands by trade unions. Until the elections for officials from 1951, the issues relating to working conditions were kept alive almost only by shop-floor actions. The recently established CTB was one of the few union organisations which struggled to keep going despite the repression, to take on factory conditions as a major issue. A contemporary outline of the principal demands to be upheld by CTB included: control by workers of the Social Security system, a 6-hour working day for 14–18-year-olds, the installation of canteens in enterprises with more than 100 employees, proper hygiene and sanitary conditions in the workplace, reduction in hours for hazardous occupations, paid maternity leave of 16 weeks, full support for injured workers and opposition to work schedules which increased accident rates.83 Nevertheless, the outright ban of the CTB soon deprived this organisation of its links with trade unions, although the communist militants attempted to keep it alive during the Dutra years and later. Between 1952 and 1955, the issue of working conditions reappeared on the agenda of union organisations. At a meeting of textile workers in São Paulo, for instance, the illegal night work by women and children in large enterprises such as Matarazzo, Moinho Santista, Cotonifício Crespi, and Lanificio Varan was denounced by young women workers. 84 In the same vein, the First Women National Assembly met in Rio de Janeiro in November 1952 and condemned the widespread breach of the labour legislation regarding women’s work. In addition to the ‘equal work, equal pay’ principle, they pointed to frequent violation of the clauses related to pregnancy protection, time for feeding children, crèches in the workplace, and the common practice of firms of sacking


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pregnant or recently married women.85 At the end of 1953, the first steps towards an inter-union organisation in São Paulo – to be known later as PUI – included the enforcement of the CLT prescriptions as a major point in its programme.86 It was from 1956, however, that trade unions in Greater São Paulo set about more comprehensive initiatives to address working conditions. The First Municipal Conference of São Paulo Metalworkers, in February 1956, was the first meeting called by the capital’s trade union and discussed the problems of industrial hygiene and safety in factories and the enforcement of CLT, among other issues. Two months later, the First Women Conference of the Metalworking Sector took place in São Paulo and claimed that many laws related to women’s work existed only on paper. At this conference, the proposals called not only for the enforcement of the existing legislation but also for the extension of labour rights. Thus, for example, the women demanded crèches in all factories with more than 10 women (instead of 30 as already prescribed by CLT), longer time for feeding children at work, and penalties for those firms discriminating against married workers. Subsequently, several similar meetings occurred in the state of São Paulo. In February 1959, for instance, the First State Congress of Metalworkers gathered in Ribeirão Preto (a São Paulo country town) to approve resolutions concerning the inspection of the work of women and children, shorter shifts, enforcement of the weekly day of rest, industrial hygiene and safety issues, libraries with technical books in factories with more than 50 skilled workers, and the categorisation of any work in vehicle repair and foundries as unsanitary jobs according to CLT provisions.87 In these years, there were also specific meetings that addressed the problem of factory conditions. One example was the First Conference of Metalworkers on Accident Prevention (September 1956) convened by the São Paulo trade union to examine the matter of safety and industrial hygiene in metalworking companies. The Conference discussed topics on the organisation and functioning of CIPAs, occupational diseases and accident prevention. With this type of initiative, the Metalworkers’ Trade Union even claimed to have influenced the new Accident Law no. 2873, enacted on 18 December 1956.88 In March of the same year, trade unions in São Paulo had called the Paulista Conference for the Study and Defence of Social Laws, which also drew attention to industrial hygiene and safety in the workplace.89 As has been shown so far, both factory commissions and trade unions faced different situations and constraints in the post-war years which had an impact on the way they fought for better working conditions.

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An important complement to this story refers to the role played by workers’ political groups in these struggles – particularly the communists, given their standing among workers at the time. In the immediate post-war years, the communist militants in particular saw working conditions as a chief aspect of the relations between management and labour which should be highlighted. 90 Such a stance may be illustrated, for example, by the numerous accounts of conditions of work appearing in the communist newspaper Hoje in São Paulo. In the same way, the significant penetration of communist militants in Greater São Paulo factories owed a great deal to their espousal of shop-floor demands, many of them relating to the factory environment and conditions of work.91 This general picture for the post-war period seems not to have been significantly modified over the subsequent years in Greater São Paulo until the 1960s. Mobilisation for working conditions was very important, for example, amidst the harsh repression during the Dutra years. Having been stripped from any foothold in trade unions, the communists targeted working conditions as a primary means to boost workplace organisation, unofficial trade union structures and, whenever possible, official trade unions. The action of parallel structures became the cornerstone of the Communist Party’s trade union policy at the time. A report of the General Union of Workers of São Paulo in 1950 summarised the choice of delegates, in various firms from the capital and ABC, by commissions which put together demands regarding pay and working conditions. These delegates were meant to take part in the reorganisation of the CTB, whose national conference was to take place in June 1950. In São Paulo, for example, the Municipal Conference met on 28 May 1950 and approved a comprehensive list of claims to be endorsed by the national organisation. On working conditions and labour rights, the Conference espoused the struggle for the application of the 8-hour working day; unemployment insurance; full wages for those suffering accidents; application of the legal guarantees for pregnant women; ‘better hygiene in the workplace, with ventilation, toilets and washrooms [ . . . ], changing rooms and sufficient number of toilets’; supply of gloves, safety glasses, masks, boots and aprons; and installation of crèches and canteens, among others. 92 In subsequent years, the strategy of bringing to the table shop-floor conditions would remain central to the communists (particularly to their grass-roots militancy) and trade unions in which they had greater influence – for example, the Textile Union in São Paulo and the Metalworkers Unions in São Paulo and ABC. Other political groups with an


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involvement in the labour movement also took up the banner of factory conditions. One example seems to have occurred in the wake of the splits in the PCB between 1956 and 1957. One of the splinter groups, the Trade Union Renewal Movement, counted on representative sections of former Communist Party trade unionists in São Paulo and apparently sought to give labour issues a status as important as the links with governments – in what would be a criticism of the PCB’s growing emphasis on contacts in high places during the second half of the 1950s.93 Important though the commitment to working conditions may have been at the time, several problems remained concerning the approach and actions taken by trade unions and shop-floor organisations. For one thing, these difficulties stemmed from the very principles contained in the CLT. This was the case with the payment of the fee on unsanitary jobs (in fact, an addition to wages) prescribed by the Code, the value of which was often a fraction of the legal minimum wage. The basis for levying the fee remained a matter of contention during the entire period. Employers always wanted the minimum wage as reference, whilst workers contended that extra pay should be calculated over the actual wages received. As the resulting sum was frequently insignificant in its present form, the fee gave a strong incentive for firms to avoid the installation of protective equipment and changes in the organisation of the labour process. Even then, many did not pay the unsanitary fee, including large companies. It seems that a great deal of effort by labour organisations was spent on the issue of the payment of the fee, which diverted attention from more effective principles requiring changes in the legislation. Indeed, research on industrial hygiene had already highlighted at the time the need for a scale for reducing the working day in the case of exposure to harmful substances – that is, the greater the hazards the fewer the working hours should be. 94 Another example concerns the widespread belief among workers that the drinking of milk would prevent contamination by chemicals and other substances in the workplace. Medical knowledge had already established that such an effect could not be attributed to milk and that by no means could it be seen as a substitute for effective protective measures. However, the supply of milk remained a continual demand in the workplace, and there were plenty of protests recorded in the press when the product was withdrawn or its provision reduced by firms. 95 At best, many companies appeared to have bought off workers’ acquiescence to working in unhealthy environments by supplying what was supposed to be the right amount of milk per day, usually one litre.

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These two examples indicate some flawed notions entertained by the trade union movement regarding working conditions. In fact, the subject was rather complex in its technical content, which was even worsened by the generation of new problems arising from new products and processes. All these elements reduced the effectiveness of labour struggles for improved working conditions. This may well have been an important reason in explaining the figures shown in Chapter 3, in which some facilities (shower, lavatories, drinking fountains) were more frequent than others (safety and control of health hazards). The situation was greatly worsened by the fact that the most comprehensive public-funded institution devoted to industrial hygiene – SESI – was completely under the employers’ control. In the absence of technical expertise and effective mechanisms of enforcement, pressures from the shop floor and even from trade unions in Greater São Paulo were inadequate to deal with the complex nature of the problems generated by the factory environment. Although discussed separately here, the matter of factory conditions belongs to the wider area of workplace life, which also comprises authority patterns, work effort and labour–management attitudes. The following chapters will discuss these issues by examining technology, work organisation, and production practices in the workplace, as well as strategies and struggles involving the relevant actors. Along with working conditions, training and wages, these issues – it will be argued later – had enduring consequences on productivity and industrial performance in Greater São Paulo.

Part III Industrial Performance

5 Industrial Capabilities

The vigorous growth and diversification of industry have been pointed out as an essential development for labour relations in Greater São Paulo following the Second World War. Yet many of the questions about labour, industrialists and governments on the one hand, and industrial performance on the other, require the examination of another set of issues, related to production technology and production organisation predominant in Paulista industry at the time. In fact, only when such issues are examined can the full magnitude of the process of industrial transformation undertaken in post-war Greater São Paulo be revealed. This is particularly important for labour relations for two main reasons: first, because prospects of real wage increases lie mostly in the technical and organisational capabilities of the industrial system and its capacity to generate productivity (and, in a broader sense, competitive strength); and second, because the workforce conditions are often critical to the effective operation of organisational or technical systems at the factory level. Industrial output and the labour force were examined in Chapter 1, and the discussion below will address the qualitative changes in the textile and metalworking industries in Greater São Paulo in the postwar years. First, the chapter will summarise the sparse evidence on the technical conditions for specific industries, by focusing particularly on user–producer relations between firms, means of technology assimilation and rationalisation measures. Second, it will draw an overall picture of an important aspect of the productive organisation – the work systems adopted in Greater São Paulo industry. Finally, the chapter will present data on productivity and wage costs in the textile and metalworking industries. 121

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Technical capability As shown in Chapter 1, in the 1940s the state of São Paulo had already become the largest industrial centre in Brazil. This industrialisation process has long been examined by economic historians, which have drawn attention to foreign exchange shortages, state policies, the transfer of revenues from agriculture and protectionist barriers as some of the most important determining factors for the product diversification and the rapid industrial growth which occurred. A less studied aspect, however, is the complex process of building up competence in producing goods and mastering increasingly sophisticated techniques in an economy affected by severe import limitations. From this point of view, the industrialisation in São Paulo and Brazil may also be described as a long and difficult learning process which involved large-scale mobilisation of resources, human effort and strategy. This section will show the extent and features of this qualitative transformation in a group of individual branches of industry, which illustrate not only the changes brought about by the new, dynamic sectors but also the obstacles and difficulties encountered by the traditional activities. The machine-tool industry Machine-tool manufacture is an example of the qualitative transformation undergone by industry in Greater São Paulo and Brazil as a whole. The beginning of this industry dates back to the 1920s, when a few workshops in São Paulo began to specialise in the repair and maintenance of the increasing stock of machines and equipment. Historical accounts have shown that a group of small firms engaged in an active learning process which allowed them to embark on the production of simple, general-purpose machine tools. By the outbreak of the Second World War, these firms had gained experience in solving technical problems, adapting designs and making simple machinery, enabling them to take full advantage of severe import restrictions to establish themselves as part of the emerging nucleus of the capital goods industry in Brazil. After a critical period following the war, the industry gained strength in the 1950s spurred by the noticeable expansion of the metalworking sector. By that time, the Brazilian machine-tool industry began to figure among the world producers, albeit with rather small shares. 1 Despite its limited participation on an international scale, Brazil’s machine-tool manufacture shows the increasing complexity of the industrial base in the country. A number of firms – old and new – supplied a substantial portion of the domestic demand for essential machinery in

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the metalworking industry. The state of São Paulo alone had 88.8 per cent of the establishments and 94.7 per cent of the workforce employed in the country’s machine-tool industry in 1961. 2 Aside from traditional locational advantages, this extremely high geographical concentration of firms and labour was also related to the specialised aspects of machine manufacturing. São Paulo’s industrial area had accumulated the knowledge, skills and resources to meet standards of precision and product quality which were hardly ever seen in sectors other than machine-tool production. The regional concentration also facilitated a close relationship between users and producers, particularly because suppliers were increasingly having to tailor part of their output to meet the specific requirements of their existing and potential clients. Although there is as yet no systematic research on this issue in Brazil, evidence from a few case studies suggests that the exchange of information between users and producers may have played a significant role in the suppliers’ learning process and incremental upgrading of standard designs and products, becoming a major determining factor for their competitiveness in local and foreign markets. 3 A closer look at the structure of machine-tool manufacturing reveals that, by the end of the 1950s, a group of firms had acquired significant expertise in a range of products, especially those of a more intensive and all-purpose use in industry. The detailed study carried out by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in Brazil in 1961 revealed that lathes and presses, in particular, had attained international standards and were being exported to Latin America, the Middle East and even European countries ‘with long-standing traditions in manufacturing machine tools’. 4 A core of organisational and technical competence was identified in about eight of the companies studied, which developed efficient production systems. These plants used up-todate designs and methods of production and, according to the report, performed studies and experiments with new models which led to the registration of patents in the 1950s.5 However, the ECLA study also revealed that most of the manufacturers lagged far behind the leading group in terms of organisational and technical capabilities. Only 9 per cent of the plants examined were efficient; the rest were factories with outdated equipment and methods of production. Although, as highlighted by the study, the leading establishments employed about 55.4 per cent of the labour force and 63.6 per cent of the installed capacity, overall the machine-tools industry lacked strength in crucial technical and organisational resources. According to the report, this situation was largely due to the small

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average size (well below international standards) of the factories, which prevented most of them from exploring potential economies of scale. 6 While the report put emphasis on size and returns to scale as the major causes of low industrial performance, there is no clear evidence to support such an interpretation. More recent studies, based on a variety of historical experiences, have shown that smallness of size and flexibility may well be associated with efficient organisations, adapted to particular market conditions and products. 7 Machine-tool manufacturers in São Paulo seem to have favoured flexible plants which could meet the demand of low-volume and rather unstable markets. In fact, batch production was a common form of organisation in the machinetool industry in other countries as well.8 In contrast to the flowprocesses of mass production, the batch organisation allowed for shorter production runs, application of general-purpose tools, and more intensive use of skills, which often became more suitable to small and fluctuating markets. Furthermore, a large number of São Paulo factories examined in the report maintained one or more production lines outside the sector, that is, in areas of metalworking other than machine-tools. 9 This was probably an attempt to make the best use of firms’ resources and market conditions. If all this is true, then it is necessary to look for other causes for the low productivity and competitiveness identified by the ECLAC study with respect to the majority of machine-tool producers in São Paulo. There is strong evidence from various historical experiences that industrial competitiveness arises from a combination of institutional, technical and organisational conditions – at both company and macroeconomic level – which produce an environment conducive to creative adaptation, learning, and innovation. 10 In the case of São Paulo’s machine-tools, as indicated before, there was a long process of learning, exploration of opportunities, and investment in a complex industry, which demanded relatively advanced knowledge in key areas of manufacturing. Yet, this process was deeply affected and limited by the overall conditions of the industrialisation process in Brazil. Here it is necessary to look not only at typical macro-issues such as state policy and balance of payments, but, also, more importantly, at how the development of production techniques was influenced by institutional, social and technological conditions at the time. Previous chapters have described the sphere of labour relations and some factors affecting industrial performance. Wages, industrial training and working conditions produced a framework that – while it did not prevent substantial achievements in industrial growth and


diversification – was far from an incentive or susceptible to creative adaptation, quality improvement and innovation: in short, all those activities which have historically accounted for the long-term increase in industrial capability and competitiveness. These issues will be addressed later in this chapter, after examining other branches of industry. The vehicle parts industry Another example of the industrial transformation of Greater São Paulo is the parts manufacturing sector. This industry grew in tandem with the flourishing markets for the replacement and repair of imported motor vehicles in Brazil. In addition, Ford and General Motors had long established their assembly operations in São Paulo (1919 and 1925, respectively) and had become the major suppliers of motor vehicles to the internal market. The sharp import restrictions brought about by the Second World War were a major factor increasing domestic production. These restrictions represented a strong incentive for new and established metalworking firms to produce parts and components. Even a typical assembly company such as General Motors had to do some in-house production, for instance, springs, during the war.11 In the following years, the domestic manufacture of parts and components in Greater São Paulo grew rapidly. From 1947 onwards, many firms diversified into parts manufacturing in the wake of successive external crises and import restrictions. General Motors, for example, embarked on the production of coach bodies in 1948, using raw materials from the newly-established National Steel Company (Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, or CSN). 12 Another example of this was Sofunge (a metalworking company established in 1941 to produce wheels for trains), which had been hit by the liberal import policy implemented in 1946–7. During the external crisis which followed, however, the company managed to diversify its product line and began to target a larger range of markets. With the serious foreign exchange crisis in 1952–3, Sofunge finally entered the parts manufacturing industry and soon became an important supplier of diesel engine parts to Mercedes-Benz. 13 It is estimated that a large number of new firms set up immediately after the war and at the beginning of the 1950s, mostly in Greater São Paulo (see Chapter 1). More important than absolute growth, however, was that a representative group of domestic firms formulated an aggressive strategy of transfer and assimilation of foreign technology, through partnerships with European and American companies. One example was the Companhia Fabricadora de Peças (or Cofap), founded

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in São Paulo in 1951. As early as 1952, this company entered into a technical assistance agreement with the Perfect Circle Corporation (an American group) to produce piston rings. In 1954, Cofap began the construction of three new industrial plants, two of which were to manufacture parts under licence from other American companies – Thompson Products Inc. (cylinder parts) and Monroe Auto Equipment (dampers). The company instructed specific departments to study original designs and adapt them to Brazilian market conditions and to perform quality control according to the norms laid down by its foreign partners.14 These learning and adapting activities were probably crucial to Cofap establishing its strong competitive position in the years that followed. The company soon became a market leader (particularly in dampers and piston rings) and one of the leading high-profile cases of successful domestic groups in the emerging motor vehicle industry.15 There is evidence that other companies also embarked on substantial research and development programmes in their efforts to improve and adapt foreign techniques to local conditions. Metal Leve, for example, started in 1950, and relied on technical assistance from the German group Mahle for the production of pistons and piston pins. At the same time, Metal Leve from the outset engaged in an active programme of learning and research which allowed the company to deliver highquality products and successfully compete with international firms in domestic and foreign markets. 16 Metal Leve used this strategy once again in 1957, when it launched a new company (Bimetal) producing connecting-rod bearings. Bimetal was set up with technical assistance from the American Clevite Corporation, this comprising planning, building and organising a new factory in São Paulo as well as training the workforce.17 Several other domestic firms in the parts industry sought to forge similar links with foreign groups as a way to acquire and develop expertise in new processes and products. In some cases, these firms were encouraged – and even pressed – to establish external partnerships by big motor vehicle assembly companies, which faced increasing restrictions on importing parts from 1952 onwards. 18 In other cases, domestic firms took advantage of incentives issued from the end of 1956 to import entire packages of machinery and equipment incorporating the latest techniques. 19 Foreign firms in theory had direct access to the newest technologies and to the experience accumulated by their parent companies. However, Brazilian subsidiaries commonly suffered from their marginal position in the parent company’s global strategy, which prevented many from taking advantage of the group’s resources and


knowledge. 20 Therefore, it seems that the success of both national and foreign companies rested on their ability to develop their own expertise in methods of production, product quality and marketing strategies. A capacity to adapt to local market conditions was crucial to the competitive strategy of companies operating in São Paulo. Like the machine-tool industry, most parts makers pursued a strategy of lowvolume, flexible and user-oriented production to meet the needs of fluctuating, relatively small markets. This was the case for Grassi SA, a producer of bodies for buses. According to a technical report, each of the Grassi bodies was ‘custom built and requir[ed] a complete set of drawings’; and ‘[t]he fact that this organization [was] in custom production would make it a comparatively simple matter to shift to the production of another item or items in the same general field’.21 Parts firms also attempted to negotiate long-term agreements with assembly companies, through which they could forge stable relationships with users and mitigate market uncertainty. In addition, parts firms often turned down dedicated tools associated with mass production in favour of all-purpose equipment which allowed for higher flexibility in product lines and easier modification of the original designs. This latter development became a key aspect of the competitive edge gained by the most successful local parts firms in both domestic and, later in the 1970s, external markets. 22 Thus, a group of national companies managed to gain a foothold and consolidate their positions in the most competitive markets of the parts industry, even though the foreign firms steadily increased their participation in the Brazilian parts industry from the 1960s onwards. Recent research by Caren Addis has suggested that the dwindling share of national firms in this industry was a result of the aggressive strategies of foreign companies, the lack of a coherent industrial policy by the state and the failure by parts industrialists themselves to act collectively on behalf of the whole range of parts makers, whether large, medium or small.23 However, domestic firms also faced – perhaps even more decisively – serious constraints in terms of the predominant technological, social and institutional conditions in Brazil in the 1950s. As for labour relations, the parts industry (like the machine-tool industry) was directly affected by the low level of industrial training and the inadequate conditions of work which prevailed in the metalworking sector. Wages were also a focus of conflict and scarcely of a level to exert pressure to scrap inefficient techniques and raise standards on the shop floor. While these issues will be discussed elsewhere in conjunction with industrial performance, it is important to note one of their major outcomes: the drive for creative adaptation, innovation and high-quality

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production did not spread to the industrial practices in the whole parts industry. This was a decisive factor since, unlike their foreign counterparts, local parts manufacturers could not keep relying on the transfer of techniques from abroad. After the preliminary stage, during which they could rely on foreign technology and assistance, local firms had to develop their own capabilities in product design, engineering, quality control, and embark on incremental innovation if they were to survive domestically and gain ground in external markets. A core group of local parts companies did succeed in developing such capabilities, thus becoming major players in domestic and international markets. Yet the majority of the national producers were far behind in their achievements and remained locked into replacement markets or low-quality production. The motor vehicle industry The driving force behind the impressive growth of the metal trades in Greater São Paulo was the investment of the large motor vehicle companies in the 1950s. Although the history of the motor vehicle industry has been analysed in greater detail than that of any other metal trade, there is still very little knowledge of the industry’s technical and organisational features in Brazil during the 1950s. As indicated before, the foreign exchange difficulties and the industrial policy at the beginning of the 1950s heralded a new phase of increasing procurement of motor vehicle parts by traditional assemblers. By 1950, for example, General Motors had instructed its production manager to travel and seek domestic suppliers of imported components. The company had already set up a department to analyse and test local parts before their acquisition was finally authorised. 24 On the other hand, the increase in the local content of domestic motor vehicle components was addressed explicitly by the government through its Advisory 288 of 19 August 1952, prohibiting the import of 104 motor vehicle parts already being produced in Brazil. After new legislation was enacted in the following years, the policy framework for the domestic manufacture of motor vehicles culminated in the Targets Plan of 1956, which set up a progressive five-year schedule for the local production of 90 to 95 per cent by weight of the vehicles. 25 The number of companies (11) eventually approved by GEIA to operate in Brazil during the second half of the 1950s by far surpassed what the domestic market could absorb if economies of scale were taken into account. While the economies of scale at the time were thought to vary between 100,000 and 600,000 units per year per plant (for motor


cars and light lorries), the estimated market for all motor vehicles in Brazil was 100,000 vehicles. This implied that the 11 companies which finally came to produce in Brazil had to compete for a market which was far below the potential realisation of scale economies by individual plants.26 One immediate effect was that all companies worked far below their full capacity.27 More important, however, was that firms had to partially adapt their mass-production techniques to small markets. There is as yet no study on the specific form which such adaptations may have taken – or their range – in motor vehicle plants in Brazil during the 1950s. Even so, it is possible that the overall trend was to reduce the number of single-purpose machines whenever the short production runs did not justify large-scale investments in inflexible equipment.28 Another possible adaptation was the search for more interchangeability among parts and components used in different models, as pursued by some international companies operating in developing countries in the 1960s. Finally, most companies had to establish the in-house production of parts and components which were not easily or adequately found in local markets, on a scale well above that observed in developed economies. 29 It is certain, however, that such adjustments to local conditions did not consist of an active search for new product designs and production techniques by individual motor vehicle companies. Rather, the changes made were probably part of the marginal shifts in standard models and methods of production which were often carried out by international firms when operating in industrialising countries. Available evidence on firms installed in Greater São Paulo – such as long-established and powerful assembly companies like General Motors and Ford – seems to confirm this overall statement. For strategic reasons, both companies fiercely opposed the Brazilian government’s policy of having increasingly higher local content for motor cars, so much so, that they entered into this segment only in the 1960s. In the meantime, General Motors and Ford adhered to the Targets Plan by presenting projects for lorries. 30 Apparently, management in these companies believed that although Brazil’s small markets did not economically justify the production of cars, the manufacture of lorries could achieve better results, given its potential to attain increasing returns to scale with a relatively low volume of sales.31 Indeed, in November 1958 Ford inaugurated new facilities for foundry works (Osasco), engines (São Paulo) and forging work (São Paulo) to supply its line of lorries. 32 General Motors, in turn, launched its first

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nationally-produced lorry in 1958, having set up factories in São José dos Campos (foundry and engines) and São Caetano do Sul (assembly). 33 Both companies had to make significant investments in training employees for their new plants, particularly for the engine factories. Accordingly, General Motors and Ford brought in engineers, technicians and even foremen from their parent companies; these employees stayed for up to six years in São Paulo to train local counterparts. 34 The US companies also set up modern facilities for testing and quality control of parts and components contracted out for manufacture by local companies.35 It is possible that local production by GM and Ford led to the expansion of engineering work, such as that related to the testing of materials, adaptation of parts, and adjustment to road conditions. Well before the Targets Plan was introduced, General Motors’ engineering department in São Caetano do Sul spent 18 months performing tests and adaptations for a new coach launched in 1948 – which included a chassis specially designed in the United States.36 Nonetheless, it seems that neither company made major changes in its products during the installation stage of the motor vehicle industry. Their strategy was to replicate their well-known models, which had already been tested in developed markets, without major changes to their original designs or specifications. Furthermore, there is evidence that some plants even used second-hand and obsolete equipment transferred from factories abroad. For instance, Alberto Mortara, an ex-Ford employee, asserted that during the installation period, Ford and General Motors (among others) imported a significant volume of old equipment for their domestic investments. Mortara declared that GM’s first engine-casting factory in São José dos Campos, for example, employed equipment which had been in use in the United States for almost 30 years. In general, second-hand equipment was less automated and efficient, affecting the factory’s entire technical organisation and performance.37 Other lorry producers followed a similar pattern to GM and Ford regarding technology transfer and possibilities of model changes. Mercedes-Benz, for example, was formed in 1953 as a joint-venture between a Brazilian resident (with 75 per cent of the shares) and Daimler-Benz (25 per cent). All the technical and organisational aspects of the project – planning, installation and operation of the factory; key managerial and technical personnel; trade mark and patents – were provided by the German company. German engineers came to São Paulo to instruct their Brazilian counterparts, and Brazilian foremen went to Germany to be trained at Daimler-Benz’s factories. The firm


also set up an apprentice school which was supervised by SENAI instructors and technicians from Germany. Mercedes-Benz started its production in 1956 with two lorries and (from 1958) a coach, and there is no record of substantial shifts from the original models. At the time, the company was also reported to be building up its new facilities using a large amount of second-hand equipment. 38 Certain companies adopted a more thorough approach to domestic production, while in other aspects they do not seem to have differed from the trend outlined so far with respect to technology transfer. For example, Scania-Vabis do Brasil was set up in 1957 as a joint venture between the Swedish company (two-thirds of the shares) and Vemag SA (one-third), a Brazilian firm. Under this enterprise, Scania-Vabis would provide engines for a heavy lorry to be assembled by Vemag, using technology and expertise from the Swedish firm. In May 1959, Scania inaugurated in São Paulo its first diesel engine factory outside Sweden. Soon, however, Scania was pressed to take up all assembly activities, apparently due to the inadequate manufacturing standards attained by Vemag, so that in 1960 the Swedish firm bought full control of the enterprise. 39 On the surface, it seems that these events were part of the serious difficulties arising from Scania’s production methods. Actually, it was reported that the company’s strategy of small-scale production and extremely rigorous quality control of parts had led to many conflicts with suppliers at the time. 40 Motor car manufacturing also centred exclusively on imported products which did not seem to undergo any significant modification from the original designs and specifications. Volkswagen was the most successful venture in the long term. In the face of the government’s restriction on the importation of built vehicles, Volkswagen acquired in 1953 a complete assembly line from Brasmotor (a local enterprise) to build its completely-knocked-down (CKD) cars brought from Germany. From 1957, the company took part in the Targets Plan by launching two vehicles: a minibus (in 1957) and a popular car, the Beetle (in 1959). Plans for local manufacture led Volkswagen to begin the in-plant production of an unusually high proportion of its requirements for parts and components. A primary reason for this development was said to be the technical characteristics of the vehicles, such as the chassis structure of the minibus. Apart from this adaptation, there are no reports that Volkswagen conducted major experiments to tailor its vehicles to Brazilian conditions during the installation period.41 Willys-Overland do Brasil was another large motor vehicle manufacturer in the 1950s. This company was set up in 1952 by local importers, with

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minor participation by the US company, Willys-Overland (later bought by Kaiser Industries). At first, the aim was to assemble CKD jeeps imported from the American company, but with Kaiser’s decision to stop production in the United States (in 1955) and transfer its facilities to São Paulo (in 1956), Willys-Overland became a major competitor in the Brazilian car market until its takeover by Ford in 1967. 42 In addition to machinery, managers and technical personnel, Willys also brought from the United States its most successful project, the Jeep, and a recent release which had failed to take off in the American market, the Aero. Willys-Overland also formed a joint venture with Renault to produce a popular car. Like other cases noted previously, Willys was well known for making intensive use of second-hand equipment and seems not to have committed any appreciable resources to product and process changes. 43 Overall, Brazil’s motor vehicle programme in the 1950s was highly successful in setting up an industry which, until then, had been mostly located in developed countries. 44 With regard to technical development, however, both national and foreign groups confined themselves to marginal adaptations to basic products already established in other markets. This is not surprising, given the lack of expertise and tradition in the motor vehicle manufacturing sector in Brazil. In effect, producers strove to overcome the many difficulties in parts supply, labour training, and engineering skills which plagued both foreign and national companies in the 1950s. This process is essentially different from the Japanese experience of late development of the motor vehicle industry, particularly due to the predominance of foreign companies and the absence of solid capabilities in engineering, technical knowledge and workforce skills in Brazil. 45 These factors probably explain in part the reluctance of the local motor vehicle industry to pursue an active policy of development and improvement of products and processes based in domestic and foreign markets. The textile industry The textile sector, which had long been established in Greater São Paulo, was a rather different story. By 1945, the Brazilian textile industry showed clear signs of obsolescence, having been stretched to its limits during the war and having received very little investment, at least since the 1930s. In the post-war years, there were attempts by government and industrialists to overcome the basic fragility of the textile sector infrastructure by calling for modernisation and the renewal of factories and equipment. 46 An indication of the problems


suffered by the sector was the sharp decline in exports to Latin American and African markets following the end of the war, after a noticeable expansion during the conflict. In the face of the return of foreign buyers to their traditional sources and the recovery of Japan in international markets, Brazilian textiles had virtually ceased to be an export product by 1952–3. 47 Apart from problems caused by an overvalued exchange rate and the absence of export incentives, the primary reason for declining exports was acknowledged by contemporary observers to be a lack of industrial capabilities, which prevented the textile sector from competing in quality and price in foreign markets.48 As well as falling exports, another of the problems faced by the textile industry after the Second World War was the predominance of traditional equipment in most factories in São Paulo, and Brazil as a whole. Thus, the proportion of automatic looms in cotton mills in the state of São Paulo was only 7.6 per cent in 1946. 49 This proportion was increased by investments in new textile machinery after the war, which resulted in high volumes of imported equipment between 1945 and 1949.50 As a result, it is estimated that the proportion of automatic looms rose to 12.5 per cent in the Paulista cotton industry in 1951. 51 Investment in new machinery and rationalisation gained impetus in the 1950s and became a major cause of the profound changes in the textile labour markets in São Paulo, as described in Chapter 1. In fact, the proportion of automatic looms in the cotton mills reached 39.6 per cent in the state of São Paulo in 1960. 52 As will be discussed later in this chapter, there were indeed increases in average productivity in São Paulo during the 1950s, resulting as much from the application of new methods of work organisation as from the renewal of the textile equipment itself – one consequence being the sharp drop of skilled workers in the textile industry noted in Chapter 1. Moreover, foreign companies began to invest in Brazil, attracted by incentives and protected markets, as in the case of the wool industry.53 The growing number of automatic machines, however, did not lead to any significant improvement in the competitiveness of São Paulo’s textile sector in international markets during the 1940s and 1950s. There are two basic reasons for this. First, the efficient use of modern machinery requires high-quality preparation of yarn, accurate adjustment and maintenance of machines, and rigorous standards of temperature, lighting and cleanliness in the factory environment. 54 Second, managerial skills, workforce quality and work organisation were crucial to achieve the best performance. All these elements, however, were rather deficient in most of São Paulo’s textile

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mills and could not be improved by introducing modern equipment alone.55 In a more general sense, limits placed on innovative capacity also had a decisive influence on the performance of the textile industry. Although textile manufacturing processes involved typically standardised technology, several minor improvements in the different stages of fibre preparation, spinning, weaving and finishing made for substantial productivity gains in the long term. Leading producers the world over struggled to make significant advances in the search for speed, the automatic replacement of spools, continuous-process systems, new dyeing techniques, and research into new fibres.56 With regard to the Paulista textile industry, while leading firms built up modern mills, there is no information that they made substantial efforts towards incremental improvements in processes and products. An in-depth survey of 1951, for example, found that a group of spinning mills in São Paulo stood out as a result of their management structures, quality control procedures, laboratories and well-trained technicians.57 These firms may well have engaged in minor experiments with products and processes, although it is unlikely that such activities attracted much attention from the management or brought about significant modifications in the product line. Thus, at least at an aggregate level, the evidence is that the efforts at modernisation stopped short of transforming the overall lack of efficiency and competitiveness of the textile industry during the 1940s and 1950s. What happened instead was the consolidation of a heterogeneous industrial base of firms with very different levels of capabilities and resources.58 As with other industries, the prospects of development of the textile sector were greatly dependent upon production practices located in the factory. The following section will address one such practice – the work organisation – which had an important impact on economic outcomes in Greater São Paulo industry.

The organisation of work In principle, both the efficiency of a given technology and the ability to change it are contingent on the way that the productive unit organises its human and physical resources to achieve the best outcome possible. Apart from typical organisational arrangements such as management hierarchy and its relationship with suppliers, the enterprise must also rely on its workforce’s skills and effort not only to perform routine production activities but also to implement the incremental improvements


and the more substantial changes in products and processes which will be decisive for its competitive position in the long run. Thus, a crucial issue to industrial performance is the way work is organised, that is the set of norms, incentives and practices that guide the relationship between management and labour in the workplace. More specifically, the organisation of work defines the framework in which the work effort evolves over time. This is the organisational aspect of firms and industries which will be addressed in this section. 59 Textile and metalworking firms in Greater São Paulo implemented diversified schemes in their attempts to control the levels of effort made in the workplace. On the one hand, background conditions were the main shapers of the type of work organisation in specific firms, in terms of production technology, product line, labour force skills, and the origin of capital. On the other hand, changes in work organisation also depended on the development potential of particular industries. Thus, in the case of Greater São Paulo, the metalworking industry was undergoing sweeping growth and transformation, while the textile sector was under severe pressure to adjust to sluggish markets and standardised products. Such diverse conditions, therefore, directly affected the strategies pursued by firms for the technical and hierarchical organisation of work. This section will discuss how both industrial production technology and market conditions determined different systems of work organisation. The mechanical industry Although the metalworking sector had generally homogeneous features with respect to the composition of its labour force (see Chapter 1), specific circumstances led to major differences in the work organisation of individual industries. In the mechanical industries (such as the machine-tool makers discussed previously), firms could often count on a great number of skilled workers to perform specialised tasks in designing, machining, welding, and surface-finishing, for instance. 60 Apart from the technical complexity of the manufacturing process itself, the high number of skilled workers in the mechanical industry was possibly also linked to the small and discontinuous markets for machinery and equipment in Brazil during the post-war years. This description fits in with the organisational structure of Elevadores Atlas, a large lift manufacturer in São Paulo. In 1953, a team of American technicians visited one of Atlas’s plants and noted that ‘[i]n only a few instances were there any evidences of production line assembly’. According to the team, the reason was that ‘[t]he nature of the products ma[de] production line

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planning difficult. Most elevators must be custom designed for specific installations’. With respect to the company workforce, the team pointed out that ‘[m]any of the employees on machine operation and on mechanical and electrical assembly require[d] a high degree of skill and knowledge’.61 The typical organisational form of manufacturing in the mechanical industry was the small batch plant, in which workers (at least the most skilled amongst them) enjoyed greater freedom in setting the pace of their activities in the production process. Such a feature was accentuated by the predominance of multi-purpose machine tools aimed at small markets and individual orders, which required all-round skills by the labour force. Even so, variants in work organisation may well have developed across individual branches of the mechanical industry. In particular, the large companies producing heavy metal-transforming equipment – such as hydraulic turbines, rolling mills and steel castings – also faced small and discontinuous markets, but it is likely that their more standardised outputs resulted in a more intensive use of singlepurpose machinery and semi-skilled workers than in the mechanical industry as a whole. 62 The electrical equipment industry A different pattern developed in the electrical equipment industry. The segment of heavy electrical manufacturing, which started to grow rapidly in 1955, probably followed strategies of work organisation similar to the heavy mechanical producers mentioned earlier. Big foreign companies such as Brown-Boveri, General Electric, Siemens and Babcox & Wilcox, together with joint ventures and domestic firms, operated in a low-volume market which depended on government orders and fluctuating demand from private companies.63 Although there is as yet no information on the probable differences in management structures stemming from the varied nationalities and traditions of these companies, they probably employed a relatively low number of skilled workers when compared, for example, to the mechanical industry as a whole. These characteristics were, nonetheless, more visible in the light electrical equipment industry. Manufacturing processes in this branch favoured the implementation of work systems which relied heavily on semi-skilled and unskilled labour. The assembling departments of firms producing electrical consumer goods, for example, were often a primary focus of fragmentation of work into very specialised tasks. At Wallita, an electrical goods manufacturer, a 1953 account held that assemblers


executed only a single, repetitive operation, in order to obtain ‘the necessary perfection and the absolute identicalness of every product’. 64 Possibly the most common situation was one where assemblers performed a limited range of tasks at individual workbenches, following strict timetables and being closely supervised by foremen. 65 Certainly, these production methods enabled firms make women and young people perform repetitive sets of tasks and to decrease the average pay in the electrical equipment industry (as shown in Chapter 1). In 1954, for example, a radio manufacturer in São Paulo, with a labour force of 156 workers, employed 53 assemblers – 16 adult men, 22 adult women and 15 young workers.66 Likewise, in the radio receiver department at Phillips do Brasil, ‘the work [was] set up on a production line basis. Most of the work [was] done by girls and no high degree of skill or knowledge [was] required’. 67 The transport equipment industry The transport equipment industry also had different patterns of work organisation, according to products, production techniques and strategies. Companies which manufactured parts (and which had access to the latest production technology, through foreign technical assistance or domestic development) probably facilitated an enhanced role for individual workers on the shop floor, given their intensive use of general-purpose machinery and skilled labour. An example of the work involved in the production of high-quality parts is the case of Moto-Peças SA. This firm specialised in technically sophisticated parts – for example, for multi-speed gears – and worked under contract to Vemag and International Harvester. As well as having modern equipment, Moto-Peças maintained its own facilities for producing special machine tools. The first step in manufacturing was to develop detailed plans for the design, the type of material and the quality control of parts ordered by users. Then the specifications were passed on to skilled workers for successive stages of casting, machining and quality assessment. The flexible organisation and accurate work carried out on the shop floor were reported to be the main reasons for the high quality and low cost of parts produced by Moto-Peças.68 It is likely that qualified workers received a further boost to their position on the shop floor because of the scarcity of skilled labour during the 1950s. In one case at least, such a situation led to experiments in work organisation, which both reinforced the role of skilled workers and, at the same time, downgraded typical tasks of the mechanical trade. In 1953, Cofap devised a system for its piston ring department

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whereby, to compensate for the lack of a skilled workforce, the foreman (mestre geral) was put in charge of training workers in the complex functions of parts manufacturing. First, the foreman retrained a group of skilled workers to work as fitters. Second, the mestre geral selected a large number of operatives without any mechanical experience to tend machines. Thus, the hierarchical structure of piston ring manufacturing was organised with the mestre geral at the top, supervising the intermediate work of fitters (one for every three machines), whose main function was to adjust the machine tools and keep them functioning properly, with semi-skilled workers, the largest group, operating the equipment. The innovation consisted in the retraining of skilled workers of varied abilities to work as fitters, and the employment of operatives for tasks which usually required skilled workers. At the same time, the foreman played a role greater than that which was usual in other workshops. In 1958 this model was reported to be so successful that it was adopted in other departments at Cofap.69 There is also evidence that even leading firms in the parts industry employed large numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled labour whenever possible. For instance, photographs taken in 1954 reveal that many women at Cofap worked in jobs usually classified as unskilled, such as inspection, classification and packing.70 At Magal, a casting joint venture, several women were recorded as working in the cleaning shop, working with tools for cleaning and adjusting motor vehicle parts. 71 In both factories, women are shown at workbenches performing repetitive and standardised tasks. Although a moving assembly line is not shown, the work organisation at the departments in question suggests that the concept of time and motion control was widespread in certain stages of manufacturing in the parts industry. Even so, in 1959, the parts sector as a whole employed a higher share of skilled workers than the motor vehicle industry (see Chapter 1), which is consistent with the idea that parts manufacturing required more intensive skills than other segments in the transport equipment industry. The motor vehicle companies were the most noticeable examples in Brazil of the application of the Fordist principle, that the machine must set the pace of work. According to contemporary accounts, the extensive use of single-purpose machinery by motor vehicle firms was complemented by greater separation of tasks in the various stages of manufacturing, which substantially reduced the amount of skill required on the shop floor. Traditional jobs in the metal trades – such as foundry work, machining, forging and welding – were stripped of their familiar content through the use of semi-automatic and automatic


equipment, along with the standardisation of routines. At the same time, the use of conveyor systems and gravity slides speeded up the delivery of materials and increased the control over the pace of work in the production process. Through careful layout of machines and studies of time spent on each task, engineers could set the rhythm to which a large part of the labour force did its work. The Fordist approach also led to the increase in the number of supervisors and inspectors. This was a direct effect of attempts to eliminate the role of skills and worker intervention in the labour process which lay at the heart of the Fordist philosophy of production. 72 The ideal of complete control over the work process, however, was rarely achieved, even in the most favourable economic and political conditions for mass production in the United States. One of the main reasons was that the typical motor vehicle factory still depended on skilled workers to prepare, adjust and fix tools, machines and the forging presses. 73 In the Brazilian case, however, there were specific conditions which may have had an additional impact on the Fordist approach to the organisation of work in the motor vehicle industry. First and foremost, the adaptation of motor vehicle firms to low-volume markets (as mentioned in the previous section) may have reduced the margin for mechanisation on the scale seen in other countries. Thus, the relatively intensive use of general-purpose machinery or non-automatic equipment in São Paulo required a more versatile labour force, which might be employed in different functions in the factory. Second, the high content of production carried out within motor vehicle companies in São Paulo must have intensified the incidence of irregular manufacturing of parts and components due to lack of specialisation, with probable effects on work organisation. At any rate, neither of these elements would necessarily have restricted the control of the pace of work by management, since the Taylorist approach to production organisation, which advised careful time and motion study, fragmentation of tasks and tight discipline might well have offset the relatively loose Fordist system in Paulista motor vehicle plants. The textile industry Finally, work organisation in Greater São Paulo’s textile mills underwent sweeping changes between 1945 and 1960, as part of the effort towards modernisation and rationalisation of production processes. During the Second World War, the opening of new markets allowed the Paulista textile industry to work at full capacity, often including night shifts. It was reported that there was an acute shortage of skilled

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workers. Work systems employed were mostly experimental regarding assignment of tasks as well as time and motion control.74 With the end of the war, firms also faced high rates of turnover and absenteeism, since tight labour markets stimulated workers to seek better wages and working conditions. 75 Thus, along with the wearing out of the installed equipment, inadequate work organisation rendered textile firms particularly vulnerable to adjustments brought about by the return of competitors to international markets from 1946 onwards. Now, the textile firms had to attempt a broad overhaul of their methods of production and organisational structures in order to compete in the domestic markets and try to recover lost foreign markets. Signs of shifting work organisation were already visible at the beginning of the 1950s. In 1951, the Paulista textile industry was recorded as operating at full capacity once more and, in addition to long working hours, firms introduced new equipment and made workers tend more machines than before.76 Some mills sought to instruct their supervisory staff in the principles of scientific management. The Fiação e Tecelagem Ypiranga Jafet, for example, set up a school to teach foremen formal methods for monitoring and increasing labour force productivity. 77 By increasing the number of machines per worker and the control of the work process, textile companies promoted changes on the shop floor which were felt more clearly with the absolute decline of the textile labour force from 1956 onwards (see Chapter 1). At the time many firms were reported to be reforming work systems and assigning more weaving and spinning machines to each worker, often with the immediate consequence of tighter discipline on the shopfloor and workers being fired.78 These efforts by textile companies to rationalise the work systems resulted in increased productivity. However, the improvements were inconsistent and limited in the sense that they did not bring about a substantial transformation of the capabilities of the textile industry as a whole in Greater São Paulo. There remained serious deficiencies in managerial structures, preparation of raw materials, quality control, condition of machinery, quite apart from the organisation of work itself; all of which contributed to the co-existence of efficient mills and a much larger number of factories with very low technical and organisational standards. 79 Furthermore, textile manufacture in São Paulo continued to rely on a low-skilled and deprived labour force, which directly affected the productive use of the installed equipment. Both non-automatic and automatic looms, for example, depended on weavers’ ability to solve


frequent technical problems such as broken threads and machine stoppages. Because of this, the number of looms assigned to weavers varied according to individual workers’ skills and effort. This was one of the main reasons for the relatively low number of looms assigned to each weaver in São Paulo, compared to other textile centres abroad.80 The discussion thus far has aimed to provide an overall picture of the productive transformation of the textile and metalworking industries in the post-war years. Developing capabilities in production techniques and work organisation have been highlighted as two major aspects of the industrial growth which took place in Greater São Paulo at this time. The next section will discuss the connections between these capabilities and labour relations as well as their possible impacts on productivity.

Productivity Production technology and work organisation were particularly important for labour relations in São Paulo because they shaped the development potential of industry and thus the latter’s ability to accommodate the conflicting demands between wages and profits, both in the workplace and in society at large. In fact, long-term increases in real wages can only take place when productivity also rises as a result of the introduction of more efficient methods of production and organisation. At the same time, the effective use and improvement of production techniques and work organisation in São Paulo’s industry were also influenced by labour relations. In particular, the previous discussion has stressed three areas in which this influence can be identified – wage setting, working conditions and labour-force training. The following section will deal with these issues and provide evidence on labour productivity in the textile and metalworking industries in São Paulo during the 1950s. Productivity performance The post-Second World War development of São Paulo’s industry was marked by increases in the number of firms in dynamic sectors which acquired substantial technical and organisational competence. There were important changes in methods of production and organisational structures, which resulted in higher levels of productivity and efficiency, particularly in the 1950s. At the same time, such a process fell short of radically transforming industrial practices and productive capabilities. Manufacturing industry in São Paulo, as in much of Brazil,

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80 70

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Figure 5.1 Relative levels of labour productivity in the manufacturing industry, selected countries (USA = 100), 1950–73 Note: * European Four: France, Germany, Netherlands and United Kingdom. Source: Van Ark, 1993, appendix, table iv. 4.

continued lagging far behind in terms of international competitiveness throughout the post-war years. The international performance of the Brazilian manufacturing sector in the post-war years, largely influenced by the behaviour of Paulista industry, provides a broad perspective of the extent of industrial change which has been examined thus far. Figure 5.1 shows labour productivity in the Brazilian manufacturing sector relative to the United Sates during the period 1950–73. 81 Two important observations can be drawn from these data. First, they demonstrate that, after the Second World War, most of Brazil’s efforts to catch up with the United States came about in the 1950s, rather than the 1960s and 1970s. Second, Figure 5.1 illustrates the fact that, notwithstanding the achievements in the 1950s, the productivity gap between Brazil and leading industrial economies remained very large. Thus, these data give an indication of the rather limited international competitiveness of Brazilian manufacturing industry in terms of productive capabilities during the post-war years.82 Apart from the performance of the manufacturing sector as a whole, the immediate impact of industrial change in São Paulo was translated into variable rates of productivity between branches of industry, reflecting specific economic and institutional conditions within them. This outcome is particularly relevant given the fact that the post-war years were marked by high rates of industrial growth (see Table A-1, Appendix A). As will be seen below, the varied patterns of productivity


growth under such circumstances suggest that neither high output growth nor technical and organisational modernisation were a guarantee of immediate and significant increases in industrial efficiency in São Paulo after the Second World War. As with the previous comments on the increases in productivity in the Brazilian manufacturing industry, the following discussion about São Paulo is based on estimates of labour productivity rather than total factor productivity. The main reasons for this approach are the well-known theoretical limitations of and difficulties in estimating the latter index – for example, in respect of the weights chosen to measure the specific contribution of factors of production and the reliability of capital stock indicators.83 Such drawbacks are magnified in the case of Brazil during the post-war years, given the problems with available investment statistics (necessary to calculate the growth of capital stock over time) and estimates of factor (including labour) and sector shares. 84 In contrast, although also beset by methodological problems, the concept of labour productivity provides a relatively straightforward and simple estimate of the effective impact of production and organisational changes on industrial performance in São Paulo, which fits well the present discussion.85 Furthermore, labour productivity indices may also be roughly compared with the general trend of productivity growth in Brazil mentioned above. Thus, sectoral labour productivity figures first show the immediate, short-term effects of technical and organisational methods on aggregate industrial output, and then the basis on which real wages could be increased, given the predominant technical and organisational conditions of Paulista industry during the 1940s and 1950s. Figures 5.2–5.8 present available data on labour productivity, real wages and wage costs for the manufacturing industry (Figure 5.2) and the various sectors between 1949 and 1959 in the state of São Paulo. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show that the textile and metalworking sectors both exhibited a similar, upward trend in labour productivity throughout the 1950s – in 1959, both branches displayed a productivity increase of about 40 per cent compared to productivity levels of 1952. Despite this similarity, individual results in specific industries and years differed in important ways. After recovering from a fall between 1950 and 1952, the textile sector (Figure 5.3) showed small improvements in productivity levels until a new boost in 1958 and 1959. The latter rise in productivity coincided with a period of rationalisation and an absolute reduction of the textile labour force in São Paulo. At the same time, the relatively poor

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Figure 5.2 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, manufacturing industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 Notes for Figures 5.2–5.8: (a) Labour productivity index: valor da transformação industrial (a measure similar to the industrial value added: see IBGE, 1990, p. 370) divided by the yearly average number of workers of a specific industry. (b) Real wage index: nominal average wages (production workers) converted to cruzeiros at 1952 rates, using the consumer price index of São Paulo Prefecture, and divided by the yearly average number of workers. (c) Wage cost index: real average wage index divided by the labour productivity index. (d) All indexes on 1952 basis. (e) 1951 data: not available. Sources for Figures 5.2–5.8: 1949 and 1959 – IBGE, 1955, 1966. 1950 – Registro Industrial, in IBGE, Anuário, 1952. 1952–5 – Registro Industrial, in IBGE, Produção Industrial. 1956–8 – Registro Industrial, in IBGE, Produção Industrial.

performance of previous years suggests that investments in new machinery and equipment did not translate into much better aggregate economic results. It is also difficult to assert whether the productivity increases from 1958 came mainly from organisational and technical changes, since there is also evidence that working hours significantly increased in the Brazilian manufacturing industry at the time.86 In any case, the rise in labour productivity ensured that real wage gains achieved by textile workers from 1954 did not mean higher wage costs. In fact, only in 1956 and 1957 was productivity growth slightly outpaced by real wages, only to witness a clear reversal in 1958.


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Figure 5.3 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, textile industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59

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Figure 5.4 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, metalworking sector, state of São Paulo, 1949–59

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Figure 5.5 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, metallurgical industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59

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Figure 5.6 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, mechanical industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59


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Figure 5.7 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, electrical equipment industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59

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Real wage index

1957

1958

1959

Wage cost index

Figure 5.8 Labour productivity, real wages and wage costs, transport equipment industry, state of São Paulo, 1949–59.

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Labour productivity levels for the metalworking sector (Figure 5.4) suffered a major setback in 1953, mostly due to the bad performance of the transport equipment industry. It seems that the latter was severely hit by restrictions on the import of essential goods triggered by the foreign exchange shortage at the time.87 In 1953, as industrial output fell more rapidly and steeply than the numbers of workers employed, dragged down by the collapse of the transport equipment industry, the metalworking sector experienced its most significant decline in labour productivity during the 1950s. Although real wages also fell, the productivity slump was even worse and pushed up wage costs to their highest relative level in the decade. This situation, however, was quickly reversed as industrial output for transport equipment recovered from 1954 onwards. Thus, while real wages rose slightly during subsequent years, labour productivity grew faster, allowing for substantial reductions in wage costs in the metalworking sector. Productivity in the transport equipment sector presented highly erratic behaviour during the 1950s (see Figure 5.8). The data show that, at first, output in this industry underwent a sharp fall in 1953, which led to an equally acute fall in productivity levels. Then, after years of moderate recovery, labour productivity jumped nearly 50 per cent in 1957 only to slow down in 1958 and increase again in 1959. It seems that the explanation for these erratic results lies both with the foreign exchange shortage of 1953 and the transitory phase of building up capacity by motor vehicle and parts makers, which started at the beginning of the 1950s and accelerated from 1957 onwards. In any case, the available data suggest that, after the slump of 1953–4, firms in the transport equipment industry managed to raise productivity amid huge investments in new plants and the employment of thousands of new workers within a very short time span. As a result, rising labour productivity combined with only patchy increases in wages accounted for substantial reductions in wage costs from 1953–4 onwards – except for 1958. Despite these sharp oscillations, labour productivity in the metallurgical sector exhibited a clear upward trend until 1958 (Figure 5.5). The fact that this industry was directly boosted by huge investments in the motor vehicle sector did not prevent productivity losses occurring in 1955 and 1957. Such falls accompanied the demand crises which drove down both employment and activity levels for the metallurgical plants during these years. Since there were only small increases or a slight reduction (in 1957) in wage costs during the decade, real wage costs were always below the 1952 level and diminished substantially in 1958.


In 1959, a sharp decline in labour productivity was partially offset by the deterioration in real wages, so that there was only a slight increase in wage costs. The most striking figures for the metalworking sector are those for the electrical equipment sector (Figure 5.7). Nearly all recorded years show a steady increase in labour productivity which, combined with usually moderate wage expansion, led to reductions in wage costs for most of the 1950s. Companies in this industry seem to have been successful in applying their productive and work systems towards eliciting greater effort by the labour force in the context of expanding output and employment, at the same time as they deflected pressures for higher wages. It is also possible that these favourable productivity levels were caused in part by an increase in working hours. The mechanical sector had a relatively poor record of labour productivity during most of the 1950s, a situation which clearly altered only in 1958–9 (Figure 5.6). It seems that despite the existence of efficient, competitive enterprises (such as the machine-tool manufacturers mentioned before), these companies were unable to boost significantly the productivity levels of the industry as a whole. This result, however, had only a partial impact on wage costs, since real wages were contained for most of the period (except for 1954) or offset by increases in productivity. This is particularly significant, as the mechanical industry employed a large number of skilled workers and was growing at a fast rate at the time . This outline suggests that short-term labour productivity did not respond directly to the investments in modernisation or to the better position of specific industries in terms of skills, working conditions and wages. The case of the transport equipment sector is noteworthy because it indicates the problems in increasing productivity amidst the deep changes taking place in this industry during the 1950s. The same can be said about the mechanical industry, which, despite its relatively good position regarding skills, conditions and wages, only achieved appreciable productivity increases after 1957. The metallurgical and electrical equipment industries were more responsive to output growth. They showed high productivity rates in the years of booming industrial output, indicating that both industries were able to muster their internal capabilities to push up labour productivity. Finally, the textile industry showed serious difficulty in translating its investments in new equipment into higher productivity rates during the 1950s, probably due to the inadequate use of its production and work systems. The divergent behaviour of labour productivity

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levels, therefore, seems to be a clear indication of the problems faced by firms in consolidating efficient production techniques and organisation in industry in Greater São Paulo during the 1950s. Sources of productivity growth The economic performance of specific industries shows that important technical and organisational capabilities had been acquired in the state of São Paulo by 1960. Traditional and new industries grew at high rates and productivity rose in most of them during the 1950s, especially when compared to real wages. At the same time, most of the products of these manufacturing activities lacked the strength to stand up to international competition. The limited achievements of Paulista industry were a result of a wide variety of influences. Scholars have pointed to overall factors concerning Brazil’s economy and institutions, such as the weak education system, the negligible spending on research and development, and the appalling social inequalities, which together undermined innovation and the search for improved industrial standards.88 Beyond the general institutional and economic set-up of Brazilian society, however, there were also elements connected to how firms operated, and their productive and organisational structure. In the realm of labour relations, the previous chapters have stressed three main elements which had a major long-term impact on the effective use of production technologies and organisational structures and on industrial performance as a whole. First, inadequate labour training meant that the industrialisation process in Greater São Paulo had available only a poorly-educated and poorly-trained workforce, which could hardly have been an incentive to upgrade products and processes incrementally. Such minor improvements are particularly important in the case of industrialising countries. In effect, as the latter have historically focused on mature technologies and products, incremental changes carried out on the shop floor represented the basic means by which latecomers could build up competitive strength. 89 In this respect, the low technical standard of the majority of the workforce in Greater São Paulo was not favourable to creative adaptation and improvement of products and processes. Second, working conditions and the factory environment also negatively affected the work of the labour force and production systems in Greater São Paulo factories. Accidents and health hazards held up the production process, increased labour turnover and reduced workers’ ability to perform their normal tasks on the shop floor. Although difficult to measure and often neglected, these factors seem to have


limited the capacity to raise manufacturing standards in Greater São Paulo during the 1940s and 1950s. Third, low wages allowed firms in Greater São Paulo to compensate for technical and organisational inadequacies and to avoid scrapping obsolete equipment. The lack of cost pressures from wages – that is, wage discipline – meant that plants could survive in Paulista industry despite having backward production and organisational methods. That was, for example, one of the main reasons for the existence of highly heterogeneous conditions in terms of competitiveness and efficiency of the industries previously examined. In such an environment, most firms could pursue a strategy based on cutting wages, worsening conditions and maintaining a low-qualified workforce in order to boost profitability. As a result, there was very little pressure from labour markets on firms to get out of low-quality products and processes. Finally, the system of industrial protection predominant in Brazil also favoured the establishment and further development of inefficient manufacturing activities. Actual and potential competition from foreign products was practically non-existent in most industrial sectors, given the indiscriminate, extremely high trade (that is, tariff and nontariff) barriers of the 1940s and 1950s. Protectionism in Brazil was very high not only compared to the industrial powerhouses in Europe and the United States, but also in relation to small European countries where agriculture and processing of raw materials had been crucial for their economies historically. For example, at the beginning of 1960, overall averages for import duties and charges were 60 per cent in Brazil, whereas the same indicator was 4 per cent in Denmark, 12 per cent in Norway, 14 per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany, 15 per cent in the United Kingdom and the United States, 16 per cent in Austria and 18 per cent in France. 90 In addition, long-established manufacturing activities in Brazil enjoyed exceptionally inflated protection – the textile industry, for example, whose average rate of duties and charges was about 93 per cent in 1960.91 These high levels of protection were partially offset by internal competition in domestic markets. Nonetheless, unusually high trade barriers continued to be an essential requirement for the survival of most of the companies, whether national or foreign, operating in local markets. High levels of protectionism, therefore, provided Greater São Paulo’s firms with a shelter from foreign competition which would otherwise have threatened their strategy which was based on inefficient industrial practices. By discarding intensive labour training, keeping bad working conditions and paying low wages, these firms could not consistently

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improve their internal capabilities in production technology and organisation. In particular, the necessary effort to produce the incremental improvement of products, processes and organisational structures was severely undermined by such industrial practices, with direct consequences for productivity levels, which largely define the international competitive position of industries and countries in the long term. In this sense, it was the deficient industrial capabilities which made São Paulo’s textile and metal manufacturers so dependent upon over-whelming protectionist barriers during the 1940s and 1950s. Finally, industrial capabilities were also a key determinant of long-term wage increases. Real wage growth is ultimately limited to or boosted by the capacity of industry to produce more efficiently under given technical conditions, to improve or introduce new products and processes. This is the basis upon which incomes can rise and accommodate conflicting demands by social groups with regard to wages and profits. In São Paulo, the behaviour of real wage trends became crucial for the profitability of the large section of industry which adopted backward technical and organisational methods. In this way, most companies exerted strong pressure over wages, either to increase profits or to survive despite deep-rooted productive inefficiency. As argued in the previous section, it seems that both metalworking and textile firms were quite successful in reducing or, at least, holding down real wages in a period of rapid growth and relatively tight labour markets – thus counteracting deficiencies in their production and organisational systems. The discussion so far has suggested that industrial performance was directly affected by issues closely related to labour relations such as wages, conditions of work and labour training. Specific results, however, particularly the improvement of production technologies and organisational structures, depended ultimately upon social actors’ attitudes towards innovation and change, both on the shop floor and in society at large. The next chapter will therefore examine how the issues of efficiency and productivity were dealt with by industrialists, workers and governments in Greater São Paulo in the post-war years.

6 The Political Economy of Productivity Performance

A complement to the history of industrial transformation examined in the previous chapter refers to the social forces and attitudes predominant in São Paulo and Brazil after the Second World War. Industrialists, in particular, strove to gain a foothold in the making of economic policy and to develop a consistent view in which their interests would be portrayed as the realisation of economic development and social progress of the nation. Only full support for rapid industrial growth and substantial levels of protection against foreign competitors would enable Brazil to overcome underdevelopment and catch up with the advanced industrial countries. Calls for high levels of trade protection and incentives for industry gained support even among the trade union movement and left-wing political groups. At the same time, however, industrialists had to deal with concerted attempts – by workers, trade unions and labour-based parties – to subvert deep-seated notions of management authority in the workplace and of the low rank of labour in Brazilian political economy. This chapter will address two aspects of social attitudes which had a direct impact on industrial performance in the textile and metal trades in Greater São Paulo. First, it will outline the predominant views of the causes of low industrial productivity, as well as the main proposals for increasing the efficiency of the Paulista manufacturing sector in a sustained way after the Second World War. In particular, this section will explore the conflicting explanations for the weakness of local industry compared to international competition, the means envisaged to boost productivity, and the role of labour in the analyses and measures proposed. Second, the chapter will discuss productivity bargaining at work, notably schemes designed by management to achieve greater labour effort and how workers and political groups reacted to them, 153

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given the circumstances examined before about industrial training, conditions of work and wages.

Interpreting productivity The gradual restoration of international trade after the end of the Second World War laid bare the productivity gap of the manufacturing sector in Brazil relative to industrial nations. The failure of the textile industry – a long-established manufacturing activity – to withstand foreign competition clearly showed the shortcomings of the industrialisation process in São Paulo and Brazil. The productivity problem not only raised concern among industrialists, labour organisations and governments in São Paulo and Brazil, but also became part of the US foreign policy aim of encouraging steady economic growth as a response to social conflicts within its sphere of influence. This section will outline the basic understanding of the problem of low industrial efficiency in São Paulo and Brazil, and the solutions devised to solve the problem, focusing in particular on how the industrialists saw the role of the workforce in the process of increasing productivity. Interpreting the causes of low productivity At the end of the Second World War, Paulista industrialists started to address the problems of an industrial structure which had developed through years of exchange crises and international disruption. The immediate concern was the renewal of the productive capacity which had been stalled by the collapse of the foreign supply of capital goods. General demands for importation of new machinery and equipment, however, concealed strong disquiet about the position of domestic industry in the face of the return to normality of the international economy and of the pressures for better wages and conditions by workers. For industrialists, the key issues were to gain access to modern equipment and machinery produced abroad, and to find ways to deal with the deep-rooted deficiencies in methods of production and organisation of industry, exacerbated by operation at full capacity during the war. Textile industrialists were among the first to point to the structural problems facing industry at the end of the war. In early 1945, Pupo Nogueira, a prominent leader of Paulista employers, called for far-reaching modernisation of the textile industry in order to confront the expected increase of foreign competition in the years to come. He argued that urgent measures were needed: first, the replacement of the vast stock of

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obsolete equipment used by most of the textile industry in Brazil and, second, scientific management as a solution to the highly wasteful, imperfect and costly methods of production which, according to Pupo Nogueira, predominated in domestic industry at the time.1 The industrialists were also aware of other traditional sectors suffering from serious problems of inefficiency and lack of competitiveness. A case in point were São Paulo’s rolling mills, which in 1945 were reported to rely on entirely obsolete machinery and work organisation copied from antiquated workshops. According to a contemporary account, the survival of these plants was seriously threatened by recent wage rises and the enforcement of the 8-hour day. As an alternative, it was suggested that the rolling mills should become more modern and turn to flexible methods of production, rather than mass production systems, in order to be able to adapt to small domestic markets. 2 Perhaps the clearest evidence of the fragility of the domestic industry relative to foreign competitors was the eventual elimination of Brazilian textile goods from international markets after the war. The problems began with the failure to meet the goals of international agreements during 1945 and 1946, as will be described later in this chapter. To make matters worse, the declining supply of fabrics in the domestic market, with consequent soaring prices, led CETEX temporarily to restrict exports in 1946. 3 Although they often complained bitterly about CETEX’s temporary intervention in 1946, textile industrialists saw the slump in exports as primarily related to the recovery of traditional competitors and the drawbacks of local manufacturing. Indeed, it was the disparity in prices and product quality between local and foreign manufacturers which represented the definitive blow to the hope of keeping up the industry’s share in international markets in the following years. In some instances, increasing wages were even singled out by industrialists as the major factor which could price domestic textiles out of foreign markets.4 The failure of textile exports left an enduring impression on policymakers and industrialists with respect to the competitive strength of the domestic industrial sector. In contrast to what has usually been maintained, policy-makers grew increasingly aware of the potential role of manufactured exports in an economy heavily dependent on primary products and capital inflows for the financing of the high levels of imports associated with rapid industrial growth.5 Reflecting the concern with external imbalances, from early 1953 economic policy began to address the concept of non-traditional exports and to provide manufactured goods with differential exchange incentives. 6 Such a policy was

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always troubled by the overvaluation of the special parities fixed by the financial authorities due to domestic inflation. Nevertheless, governmental directives consistently aimed at giving an incentive to industrial exports and to diversify the range of goods exported. That was, indeed, the aim of successive legislation issued by the Brazilian Monetary Authority (Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito, or SUMOC) following the major reform of the exchange system brought about by Instrução no. 70 of October 1953.7 Already in the 1950s, and although small in comparison with coffee, cotton, cocoa and other primary products, the increase in manufactured exports was understood as an important development of the industrialisation process in Brazil. Unlike the case in the war, most of these exports were of non-textile products – for example, rubber materials, furniture, lathes, electrical and mechanical machinery, and electrical appliances. 8 For their part, Paulista industrialists also engaged in campaigns for increased exports and forcefully lobbied government to enact favourable legislation. In October 1954, FIESP announced the setting up of a Commission of Foreign Trade aimed at stimulating export sales. According to the commission president, Sylvio Brand Corrêa, ‘it was necessary to create [ . . . ] an export mentality’ among industrialists. 9 In July 1955, the industrialist organisations launched a monthly bulletin the objective of which was to ‘present [ . . . ] the possibilities of the national industry in the international competition’. This bulletin presented opportunities for exports and reported successful cases of local exporting firms and products – such as Romi’s lathes and Elgin’s sewing machines. 10 Industrialists also lobbied government officials in charge of trade policy. In December 1954, for example, the director of CACEX (Carteira de Comércio Exterior), Ignácio Tosta Filho, took part in a meeting at FIESP and announced plans to set a special exchange rate (Cr$ 50 per US dollar) for manufactured exports.11 A few days later, in January 1955, the government enacted Instrução no. 112, which put industrial goods in the exchange category with the highest bonus (official rate of Cr$ 18.36 plus a bonus of Cr$ 31.70 per US dollar). Significantly, a FIESP meeting in February 1955 hailed the new piece of legislation and praised Sylvio Brand Corrêa for his ‘dedication and effort to make manufactured exports a reality’. 12 All these steps by industrialists, nonetheless, had to mesh with a realistic view on the possibilities of domestic industrial goods in international markets. Compelling evidence of such an awareness was given by Corrêa himself. FIESP’s director argued that the immediate outcome of all efforts made would be ‘only symbolic exports’, as the industrialists


had no ‘illusions about the possibility that national industry would achieve, promptly, massive manufacturing sales abroad’. Before that could happen, he continued, it was necessary to overcome the basic problems which affected local industrial manufacturing.13 Corrêa’s view of the possibility of increasing exports was a down-to-earth recognition of the overall lack of those production capabilities which could make Paulista industry competitive in international markets. Government incentives to exports were pursued as a way of opening up potential markets and it seems that Paulista industrialists succeeded in making their voice heard about this issue during the 1950s. But industrial exports could respond significantly only if far-reaching organisational and technical changes were undertaken in São Paulo’s manufacturing plants. Following this widely-held perception, calls for the modernisation and rationalisation of factories in São Paulo became commonplace in the publications, speeches, and demands of industrialists during the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s. Alongside using new equipment and machinery, many industrial firms started to experiment with new methods of pay, time and motion study, and sometimes even with the introduction of social facilities as a way to improve work commitment. The publication and distribution of technical and organisational measures to increase productivity became more intense and apparently reached a wider audience among rank-and-file industrialists than they had in previous years. For example, the São Paulo textile syndicate, SIFTSP, published a bulletin – Revista Têxtil – which by the end of the 1940s became a vehicle for technical studies of the various aspects of textile manufacturing, from organisational issues to new equipment releases. Overall, the message of these studies was that management had to strive to adopt efficient equipment and techniques if it was to stand up to local and foreign competition. Apart from the technical and organisational aspects of modernisation, industrialists saw the effort made by workers in the production process as a critical aspect in the pursuit of efficiency. In part, this view came from the recognition that, to a large extent, the difficulties experienced by local manufacturers stemmed from backward organisational structures. Increased work effort would thus be nothing more than one of the organisational changes needed in industry. However, the great appeal of placing special emphasis on worker involvement in the production process was that it offered a practical response to the problems encountered in the workshops. First, management could focus on Taylorist techniques to seek to attain unilateral improvement of labour performance, through tight discipline, careful time and motion study,

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and separation of tasks. If successful, such measures could make for substantial increases in productivity without major changes in technology or concessions to workers. Second, the focus on work intensity legitimised the view that the burden of the efficiency drive should fall on the workforce. This not only helped to play down the role of firms in maintaining industrial inefficiency but also acted as a powerful argument in disputes with labour organisations. Even so, the importance of the workforce in productivity growth was rarely stated clearly by industrialists in their speeches and publications. The industrialist approach was on the whole vague and pragmatic, as the arguments varied according to circumstances and the public involved, and were even adapted to political uses. The first example which can be given is a study carried out by FIESP’s Economic Department, amidst the expanding industrial juncture of 1946. This study singled out four serious problems affecting industry at the time: scarce labour supply, high labour turnover, low assiduity, and declining productivity. According to FIESP, the great demand for labour had tipped the balance in favour of workers, who were exercising their market power by demanding higher wages, rapidly moving to betterpaid jobs and failing to keep regular attendance. There was also waste of time, material and energy in the factories, which were ascribed to ‘little willingness to work’ and ‘some indiscipline’ by workers. All these factors combined had been having a severe impact on productivity in São Paulo’s industry in previous months. The research also speculated that other basic causes, related to overall living conditions – such as a bad public transport system, sub-standard housing and increasing prices of consumer goods – could equally have had a negative impact on productivity. Nevertheless, the report did not explore the possible role of the latter factors in lowering productivity and, instead, reaffirmed the primacy of what was called ‘workers’ near-monopoly of the labour market’.14 Apart from failing to appreciate the role of living conditions as a possible cause of low productivity, the FIESP study also failed to address seriously both working conditions and work organisation in Paulista factories, so that the disorganised production which resulted in falling productivity at the time was blamed exclusively on workers’ irresponsibility on the shop floor. The solutions advanced, thus, centred on schemes to prevent labour from exercising their ‘exit power’ – from changes in the pay systems (introduction of bonus and piece rate) to increased migration to São Paulo and collusive action among employers to avoid disruptive pay rises by individual firms.15


Although powerful and influential, this was not the only view of the connections between labour and productivity held by industrialists in the 1940s and 1950s. A second example of the industrialist position is the very creation of organs like SENAI and SESI (see Chapters 2 and 4), which shows that at least leading employers were convinced of the effects of labour qualification and social conditions on industrial performance. This perception was also found in technical analyses which sought to identify the causes of productive inefficiency in the textile industry. More than one author writing in industrialist publications argued that the precarious living conditions of the working class were one of the fundamental causes of low labour productivity. 16 The attack on social deprivation, however, could hardly be a goal on industrialists’ agenda. Social assistance programmes – such as SESI’s – were limited and unable to deal with the scale of the problem, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4. On the other hand, the low wages and poor living conditions of industrial workers were largely the outcome of struggles rather than predetermined policy. To address the issue of the social conditions of the working class would mean a substantial shift in power relations, an increase in real wages and an extension of rights – precisely what industrialists were consistently fighting against during the 1940s and 1950s. It was no surprise, therefore, that the reform of labour conditions was never associated with the campaign for increased productivity carried out by employers at the time. Rather, the latter tended to highlight work behaviour and favour Taylorist techniques as a means of increasing industrial efficiency. A final illustration of the pragmatic industrialist approach to the role of labour in productivity growth was given in the same year (1946) that the foregoing analysis of labour behaviour was published in one of the FIESP periodicals. The industrialists launched a violent attack on the communists, accusing them of being the main cause of the decline in productivity in São Paulo’s industry. The charge was made during the strikes of early 1946 and indeed aimed at claims for better wages and conditions led by workplace organisations and trade unions at the time (see Chapter 2). 17 In reality, although the Communist Party’s trade unionists had in practice dropped the wage-restraint stance of previous months, they were still committed to a policy of ‘national unity’ which – as the party’s leader Pedro Pomar pointed out in January 1946 – stood for ‘greater productive efficiency in co-operation with progressive employers’. 18 This position was reaffirmed in March 1946, when FIESP published a manifesto setting forth its views on the wage demands and strikes

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which were then upsetting São Paulo’s industry. While deploring FIESP’s refusal to negotiate wage increases, the communist newspaper, Hoje, shared the concern expressed by employers over low attendance and productivity. Communists saw increased industrial efficiency as the basis for lower prices, better earnings and living conditions; but, whether because of strong pressure from the rank and file or their own convictions, they were unwilling to engage in a productivity drive which ruled out material gains for the working class. 19 These same views on wages and productivity divided the industrialists and the most militant trade unions in São Paulo during the immediate post-war years and later. In the 1950s, trade unions became suspicious about the repeated calls by industrialists for greater efficiency, as they were accompanied by the systematic use of repression and a tight grip on the work process during the Dutra government and later. More importantly, whereas industrialists stressed work intensity and effort, the independent and left-wing trade unions argued for better wages, improved working conditions and a greater say on the shop floor as the way to achieve steady productivity growth. Before these different perspectives can be examined as they unfolded in Greater São Paulo, the next section will discuss briefly how the disputes over the conditions of productivity growth also had a wider significance in the context of the Cold War. Productivity in the context of the Cold War By the end of the 1940s, low productivity and the weakness of underdeveloped countries began to be addressed explicitly by US foreign policy. This strategic review was in line with the emphasis on productivity growth which had been the cornerstone of the United States’ approach to European recovery, as conveyed by the Marshall Plan.20 The major expression of the new foreign policy appeared in the words of Truman’s inaugural speech in January 1949. The re-elected US president announced a programme to ‘strengthen the free world’ by means of technical assistance which, in the long term, would help underdeveloped areas to increase productivity and improve living conditions. 21 Point Four, as the programme came to be known, consisted of agreements with individual governments for the transfer of skills and knowledge in a wide range of areas including food supply, health, sanitation, education and industrial productivity.22 Thought of as an extension of US security policy, the chief objective of Point Four was primarily to reduce social and political unrest in order to contain the


spread of communist influence in impoverished areas. With the escalation of the Korean conflict, the programme also aimed to ensure access to raw materials in the areas of the US sphere of influence in the event of a new world conflict.23 Highly publicised at the time, Point Four was originally conceived as a technical assistance programme, which did not imply any massive flow of resources to troubled economies. United States foreign economic policy towards underdeveloped regions continued to focus on trade liberalisation and private capital flows as the principal means of stimulating economic development, complemented only marginally by traditional public lending by the World Bank and the Eximbank.24 For this reason, Point Four was unenthusiastically received by the Brazilian government and others in Latin America. When asked about the technical assistance programme by US officials, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Raúl Fernandes, bluntly replied: ‘What good are technicians without capital?’. 25 That was the dominant feeling among governments which had long been asking for substantial loans and grants for Latin America following the Marshall Plan model. Nevertheless, Point Four was executed according to Truman’s speech. On 23 October 1952, a technical assistance agreement for medium and small industrial firms was signed by the governments of Brazil and the United States, complementing a general agreement established in 1950. The industrial programme resulted from the initiative of the Labour Minister, Segadas Viana, who had in early 1952 set up a government commission to carry out a broad campaign to increase industrial productivity in Brazil. However, after contacts with the US government’s Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) in 1952, the original plans were dropped and a new approach was adopted in the spirit of the productivity programmes which had been launched in Europe a few years earlier as part of the Marshall Plan. 26 The bilateral agreement included assistance in machinery selection, layout, finance and accounting, labour–management relations and industrial hygiene. An office (Escritório Técnico de Produtividade), headed by a Brazilian and an American official, was set up at the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce, to co-ordinate the programme’s execution.27 However, the history of the productivity office was turbulent and short-lived. The Brazilian government failed to meet the financial costs of the Escritório de Produtividade and the latter became entangled in political disputes between groups within the Vargas government. In the end, four regional centres were established in São Paulo and other states, but soon they were ‘quietly closed and in

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December 1953 the Brazilian Director resigned’. Finally, the Point Four office was shut down in May 1954.28 Other similar bodies were set up in the 1950s, but it seems that only the initiatives led by industrialists made some headway. In September 1956, for instance, the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce launched a National Productivity Commission responsible for nationwide campaigns for increased industrial efficiency. Yet the federal government again failed to grant the scheduled financial provision and the Commission had very little impact on industry, if any. 29 A relatively more successful endeavour in late 1954 was the Productivity Department created by the Federation of Industries in the State of Rio de Janeiro (Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, or FIERJ). The FIERJ department, nonetheless, limited itself to publicising the productivity gospel through films, seminars and public meetings, since its main programme of factory visits was aborted due to lack of interest by firms, except for some large, mainly US companies. However, FIERJ’s initiative influenced the establishment of similar productivity departments by FIESP and other industrialist federations.30 Later, in June 1958, the CNI set up a National Centre for Productivity in Industry to co-ordinate the regional offices created in the previous years. Following the experience of the FIERJ department, the National Centre for Productivity was devised essentially as a technical publicity body which ruled out engagement in factory programmes. 31 The structure and fate of the Point Four office and other similar initiatives are indicative of the prevalent approaches to productivity in Brazil during the 1940s and 1950s. In the first place, they show the ingrained resistance by industrialists to any interference in their ordinary business at factory level. As noted by a keen foreign observer of local industrial issues, the British Labour Attaché, Brazilian firms did not welcome external programmes of productivity growth because they were ‘secretive about their processes and profitability’.32 This was, in fact, the same principle of non-intervention fought for by Paulista industrialists, which had shaped the structure of SENAI and SESI a few years earlier. Even the director of the FIERJ Productivity Department, in a private talk in 1955, spoke out frankly about the dilemma faced by the productivity programmes: ‘Employers, while interested to a point, are not inclined to adopt any of the Department’s recommendations. Apparently, they are not prepared to sacrifice any of their large profits in order to step up production. This is the main obstacle to progress at the moment and obviously much will have to be done to make employers productivity-minded’.33


Perhaps such opinions have not done justice to the efforts made by industrialists to revitalise industrial practices. Both IDORT and SENAI programmes, for example, demonstrate that there had for years been active attempts to propagate scientific management methods in São Paulo, as shown in Chapter 2. The difference is that these latter programmes were based on a voluntary approach, eschewing external scrutiny of factory business, and were entirely under management control. At the same time, the critical remarks noted before corroborate existing evidence that the productivity drive was quite limited in industrial establishments in São Paulo during the 1940s and 1950s. The systematic search for increased productivity took place only in a relatively small group of firms which aimed – or were forced by a more competitive environment – to upgrade their methods of production and organisation. Nonetheless, with the containment of wages and foreign competition, most firms could pursue high profitability levels through backward production processes which helped consolidate a rather heterogeneous industrial structure in terms of economic efficiency. The second feature of the prevalent approach to productivity in Brazil, revealed by what happened to the organisations discussed before, was the lack of participation by trade unions in the management of industrial efficiency programmes. Again, the same principles which inspired the creation of SENAI and SESI influenced the productivity offices in the 1950s. The unsuccessful National Productivity Commission set up in 1956 by the Federal Government was the only body that specified the participation of trade unions, albeit through the CNTI alone. All the other initiatives described above did not provide for labour representation at any level of the productivity offices. This fact led contemporary observers to be pessimistic about the efficacy of productivity campaigns, since trade union partnership was understood to be an essential ingredient for shifting attitudes and processes in the workplace.34 For Brazilian industrialists, however, labour participation posed a serious challenge to entrenched notions of authority and the distribution of the benefits of productivity growth. As the most influential labour organisations were not prepared to relinquish their demands for rights, better conditions and increased wages, there was a very tenuous basis for collaboration between workers and employers over productivity measures – save perhaps within the sphere of specific company schemes. In this context, international programmes such as Point Four were unable to alter deep-seated practices and production methods in

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Paulista industry. While the focus on productivity grew in importance on the agenda of employer organisations and industrial companies, and began to show clear results in the second half of the 1950s, there was no departure from the way in which the issue had been dealt with by industrialists since at least the 1940s. In particular, the efficiency drive would not be associated with high wages and mass production of the American model. Rather, productivity schemes would be subordinated to the power relations and institutions predominant in Brazil at the time. These issues will be addressed in more detail in the next section.

The politics of productivity The campaign for increased productivity in São Paulo industry after the Second World War had a broader significance than can be gleaned from public statements by the actors involved or from official schemes set up by domestic and international organisations. But most important were the effective attempts by firms to come to grips with the causes of industrial inefficiency. Apart from production technology and the organisation of work discussed in the previous chapter, a basic prerequisite for high levels of productivity was that management had to enforce a greater level of effort in the workplace. The complexity of the task is made clear by the fact that the work effort was shaped not only by what happened on the shop floor, but also by the overall conditions of wages, rights and political alignments that affected labour and management attitudes and the possibilities of compromise and conflict. This section will outline the strategies for controlling work effort in Greater São Paulo’s textile and metalworking industries during the postwar years. Initially, the analysis will focus on the relations between management and labour at factory level. Then, the section will address the actions taken by labour organisations, industrialists and the government regarding productivity measures. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the links between productivity performance and protection as negotiated by the main actors in the 1950s. Productivity bargaining in the workplace The industrialists’ concern about productivity growth in the immediate post-war years and in the 1950s can be seen from the way that firms addressed the problem on the shop floor. The appeal of scientific management was reaffirmed among employers, so that experiments with new wage systems and time and motion study, combined with company welfare and technical modernisation, became increasingly


common in the region after the Second World War. At the same time, traditional methods of dealing with the labour force remained in place. In particular, repression and a staunch anti-union outlook continued to be implemented in Paulista factories and were often coupled with Taylorist methods. The feeling among industrialists that changes were needed in their approach to the workforce grew rapidly after a long period of relative negligence during the war. As discussed in Chapter 2, the explosive strikes in early 1945 showed that discontent was rife among the workforce. The high rates of turnover and absenteeism reported in São Paulo industry are further evidence of unrest. Roberto Simonsen had already drawn attention to the matter in December 1944, and argued that costs were going up as a result. 35 Problems became more serious in the following months, even with various industrial sectors being ruled by the strict norms of the war economy. Late in 1944, the Brazilian government had included the textile firms in the ‘special war regime’, which suspended several labour rights (such as the 8-hour day and dissídios) and forbade workers changing jobs without a formal authorisation issued by employers.36 These restrictions, however, apparently only increased dissatisfaction among workers and did not prevent them from changing jobs, failing to attend work and taking action for wage adjustments.37 There were reports at the time that disquiet among the working classes influenced production levels. This happened in the textile industry, which did not meet the terms of the 1944 agreement with UNRRA to supply fabrics to the areas devastated by the war. The textile firms were unable to raise production consistently and, after successive irregularities in their deliveries, UNRRA finally cancelled the contracts in September 1946.38 To increase their output, textile firms had mostly relied on extending working hours, introducing further shifts and making more efficient use of machinery. However, as contemporary observers pointed out, the extra production effort was severely undermined by a lack of skills, deficient organisation and resistance by workers (through high turnover, low attendance and strikes) to take part in a speed-up drive under the existing conditions in the factory.39 There is no precise evidence regarding the particular reasons for (and the spread of) the phenomenon of high turnover and absenteeism in the immediate post-war years in Greater São Paulo industry. Probably, the deterioration in wages and working conditions in wartime played a major role in workers’ decisions, as it did for strikes. Moreover, economic growth and new opportunities to work in the thriving metalworking

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companies stimulated job mobility. At first, employers tackled the problem at the institutional level by working out an ambitious social assistance programme through SESI and winning the government’s approval for assiduity clauses in wage contracts, as discussed in Chapter 2. At factory level, management began to rework their labour policy and work organisation, often advised by organisations such as SENAI. An example of shifting approaches to labour policy can be seen in a 1945 judicial dispute at the Cia de Parafusos e Metalurgia Santa Rosa metal works. Management at this company refused to negotiate a wage review without an equivalent increase in production. To support its position, the company argued that production had gone down in the previous months as a result of prior wage adjustments. 40 Another case was a productivity programme set out by the Rhodiaseta textile company in 1946, by which management increased the number of machines, from one to two, tended by each worker in the weaving department.41 Initiatives such as these were bound to result in bitterness among employees on the shop floor. At the Santa Rosa metal works mentioned above, for example, workers took the case to the Labour Tribunal in São Paulo and despite the mediation of the metalworkers’ trade union, which even struck a deal with the company accepting its demands, they refused to give in and continued the legal dispute. In this case, the Labour Tribunal eventually decided in favour of the workers and decided on a wage adjustment without conditional clauses – although such a favourable result was not the rule at the time.42 At Rhodiaseta, the combination of wage demands and dissatisfaction with the strenuous work pace probably explains, to a great extent, the conflicts and strikes in the factory at the time. As reported in the press, workers declared they were ready to take part in the firm’s productivity campaign as soon as they had adequate wages and conditions of work. 43 Experiments with new schemes between 1945 and 1947 were not at odds with more traditional methods of dealing with the labour force. Several companies in Greater São Paulo industry seem to have attempted to confront the problems of low productivity by resorting to more traditional methods of enforcing discipline, penalties and, often, repression. In 1946, for example, the Labor textile mill introduced a new system whereby its workforce was searched at the end of the shifts, causing anger among women workers, followed by fights, police intervention and a stoppage which only ended after two foremen were sacked.44 In another case, alleging declining individual productivity, the Cia Mecânica Importadora suspended several skilled workers for rejecting orders to work in unskilled jobs. In a further conflict, an entire


department stopped in solidarity and sought the mediation of the trade union.45 Many firms also tried to respond to the disruption caused by industrial action by calling in the police and sacking workers. In March 1947, following a dispute involving bonuses for increased production, the police invaded the Tinturaria Brasileira mill just two hours after a stoppage was called.46 At the Calfat mill, about sixty workers were arrested when a commission took a complaint to the management, demanding payment for eight days spent in an industrial action some months previously. 47 In 1945, the São Jorge mill sacked workers when they went on strike because of the firm’s decision to establish a 10-hour shift for everyone.48 There were similar cases in other industries during the period between 1945 and 1947. For example, dismissal seemed to be the way favoured by large metalworking companies to contain the stream of walkouts in early 1946. 49 Although productivity schemes were being introduced in Paulista factories, it seems that the process was still in its infancy by 1947. From this date on, it appears that the efficiency drive gained impetus and affected a larger number of firms and workers in Greater São Paulo’s textile and metalworking industries. Two immediate factors were probably behind this process, apart from the overall reasons mentioned earlier in this chapter. First, the exchange crisis and deflationary policy caused industrial output to fall sharply in 1947. As firms had to work under tight conditions of credit and demand, they began to redress their labour policy and focus on productivity growth in a more urgent way than ever before. Second, full-scale repression against labour organisations, also launched in 1947, gave firms the upper hand in their relations with workers. As with wages and conditions of work, tough government measures were a further incentive for industrial companies to promote changes on the shop floor towards greater work intensity and productivity. The schemes for increased output implemented during the hardest phase of labour mobilisation – that is, between 1947 and 1951 – were diverse in scope. Some major firms, for example, introduced new methods of monitoring the pace of work and reducing the workforce’s input in the production process. Indústrias Filizola, a scale manufacturer, is perhaps representative of changes in leading companies at the time. From August 1948, this firm embarked on a programme of innovations ‘aiming at the most perfect control of production [ . . . ] and precision of its products’, which implied sweeping modifications in layout, quality control and reorganisation of work among departments.50 In the same

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way, Fundição Atlas metal works was reported as hiring ‘one Mr Brown’, from the United States, ‘to increase production to 25 per cent and lower the costs of the workforce’. 51 General Motors, too, declared a great increase in labour productivity in the manufacture of coaches as a result of efficiency measures they had recently implemented. 52 Changes such as these were invariably associated with tight discipline and speed-ups. By the beginning of the 1950s, there were numerous accounts of how workers were under great pressure to work longer, faster and under greater surveillance in the textile and metalworking plants in Greater São Paulo.53 The strength acquired by workers in factories since 1945 was severely weakened by the repressive climate and government intervention in trade unions from May 1947 onwards. Firms took advantage of their upper hand to proceed with unilateral changes aimed at increasing productivity. Nonetheless, there were strong reactions when workers were confronted with the consequences of such measures. Conflicts seem to have been particularly acute in the textile industry, perhaps owing to the range of adjustments in the work processes in this sector. At the Tecidos Elmi, for instance, there were usually about 60 women tending 200 machines in 1950. Then the company automated the equipment and instructed that the same number of machines be operated by only ten workers. Those weavers who opposed what they saw as work overload were summarily dismissed.54 There was a similar dispute at the Textilia mill in 1951, when workers took action against the directive instructing them to work on four machines instead of two. After protests, however, the majority of weavers was persuaded and began to tend the number of machines required – apparently in exchange for higher wages. As a result, dozens of workers were discharged. Disputes over alterations in wage systems were also characteristic of the textile industry. 55 In the metal trades, labour actions were mainly levelled at modifications to pay schemes. At Confab, a group of workers deliberately held down production to a minimum during conflicts over bonuses and individual output following the introduction of new equipment. 56 Similar events were observed in other firms when management altered pay systems in order to increase production.57 Apparently, go-slows were the instrument most utilised by metalworkers to confront unilateral measures to increase productivity.58 It is difficult, however, to ascertain if workers’ tactics on the shop floor had any impact on company strategy at the time. The evidence suggests that in most cases, both in the textile and metal trades, employers met with little impediment to


pursuing intended changes, especially given the harsh repression against labour organisations from May 1947 onwards. Repressive measures were, in fact, a noticeable part of the overall approach of companies to productivity growth in this period. Police, for example, often intervened in clashes between labour and management. Employers had close contacts with the political police, the Department for Political and Social Order (Departamento de Ordem Politica e Social, or DOPS), and often resorted to it when there were signs of unrest among the workforce.59 Other companies, well known for providing advanced social facilities in the workplace (such as the Alpargatas textile mill), also resorted to police intervention to quell labour demands. 60 There were many cases of workers accused of being communists and being fired when conflicts erupted on the shop floor. 61 Some factories, such as Confab and certain undertakings of the Matarazzo group, even maintained their own internal police.62 This repressive approach supported the enforcement of managerial prerogatives on the shop floor and paved the way for changes in work processes and pay systems designed to increase productivity. This was particularly significant given the emergence of an assertive labour movement after the Second World War which demanded rights and a greater share in the income generated by industry. The offensive against organised labour during the Dutra government allowed firms to consolidate, in a critical political juncture, a productivity approach which ruled out compromise with labour. The lack of data does not allow certainty as to whether management power was translated into substantial productivity increases in the period 1947–51. Still, it seems clear that many companies benefited from the containment of labour pressures and were able to carry out important adjustments to labour systems, enabling them to improve productivity performance, then and in the future. By the end of 1951, industrial relations were again under pressure from an increase in labour actions and a more conciliatory political approach by the Vargas government. The drive for productivity continued in the factories, as shown by many contemporary accounts. In 1952, for example, a Matarazzo textile mill doubled the number of machines (from two to four per worker) tended in the weaving department after technical upgrading of equipment. At the same time, the company reduced the piece-rate in order to offset the expected boost in production.63 The General Motors plant in Santo André is another example. For a daily output of 4–5 units a day, the coach body department reduced its workforce from 200 to 80 workers and, in 1954, was

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considering a further cut of 20 workers in the assembly department. There were inspectors monitoring the fixed time for assembly and production of parts. It was reported that, for an average of 23 workers, there were two chiefs, four foremen and two ‘production leaders’. GM also maintained an internal police which searched workers twice a day in the factory.64 Evidence also suggests that tight discipline continued to be a major aspect of the productivity strategy of many companies in Greater São Paulo. In 1952, the Matarazzo metal works was said to keep a private police force, which had been supplemented by Italians accused of being fascists. In this company, workers were only hired upon presentation of the ‘ideology certificate’ – an anti-leftist warrant issued by DOPS. 65 Another Matarazzo firm, the Mariângela textile mill, introduced an innovative system to search workers after their shifts: each worker had to pull a key to draw a ball – if red, she or he would be searched thoroughly. 66 Like General Motors, Ford also maintained an internal police and carried out regular searches at its plant in São Paulo. 67 There was also a special concern with more basic habits in the workplace, such as workers using the lavatories. The Santa Celina mill, for example, kept two inspectors whose task was to monitor and control the access and time spent in the toilets. 68 Increases in the work pace and rigid schemes for monitoring the work effort were thus noticeable facts of industrial life in Greater São Paulo in the first half of the 1950s. The new fact was that, after 1951 in particular, management had to deal with an increasingly forceful labour mobilisation on the shop floor and within trade unions. The most compelling illustration of this new context was the already-mentioned ‘strike of the 300,000’, in March and April 1953. It seems likely that the productivity measures implemented by firms – more strenuously from 1947 onwards – fuelled labour determination to embark on a far-reaching strike on that occasion. Thus, heavy pressure to work harder, along with low wages and inadequate working conditions, was part of an overall approach to industrial relations which led to harsh disputes involving management and labour in Greater São Paulo – in which the ‘strike of 300,000’ was just the most visible example. Given these conditions, it is small wonder that conflicts over productivity measures appear frequently in contemporary accounts. For instance, in 1953 there were stoppages protesting at an overload of work and an increased number of machines assigned to each worker. 69 Again, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which such actions and other sorts of protests affected management decisions. The available


evidence suggests that Paulista companies maintained the initiative in their search for increased efficiency, as had happened earlier. Several firms kept to their rigid rules on the shop floor and were even able to contain workforce mobilisation following the successful strike of the 300,000, through dismissals, legal appeals and changes in pay systems (see Chapter 2). Meanwhile, bargaining conditions were also shifting qualitatively due to a strengthening of labour organisation on the shop floor and in trade unions in the first half of the 1950s. Possibly, more frequently than in the previous period, management had to negotiate with workers issues which were sensitive for both sides, which reflected different perceptions of the conditions required for productivity growth. At the Atlas lift manufacturing company, for example, a shop-floor commission linked to the trade union won a 10-minute leeway for delays, totalling 30 minutes a week for each worker.70 At Fundição Brasil metal works, too, about 600 workers walked out in protest against management attempts to force them to carry weights beyond what was regarded as reasonable. The workers won the dispute. 71 Events like these may well have taken place in other industrial companies of Greater São Paulo in the period 1952–5. If so, it is likely that management had to proceed with productivity measures under more intense disputes over work effort, in which both open conflict with and concessions to workers tended to be more frequent. Between 1956 and 1960, two important developments had a major impact on the political economy of productivity in Greater São Paulo industry. First, the economic boom allowed firms which invested in productivity measures to take advantage of expanding demand to increase output. Furthermore, economic expansion and new investments in production capability reinforced the use of modern methods of production and organisational principles in the local industry. Second, economic growth and the more flexible labour policy put into practice by the Kubitscheck government gave labour a new impetus to push ahead with traditional demands regarding wages, conditions and rights. This new political reality had a visible impact on the strategies to control work effort in the workplace. More than ever before, the second half of the 1950s saw productivity programmes becoming a well-established feature of the industrial scene in Greater São Paulo. Important companies continued to rationalise their labour processes and employ fewer workers for a greater number of machines and tasks. Whereas for management these changes meant increased efficiency, for workers they frequently represented a substantial

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increase in work intensity and working hours.72 As one critical observer of the efficiency programmes pointed out in 1956, ‘the intensification of the pace of work in São Paulo’s companies, guided by North-American technicians specialised in “industrial productivity”, is imposing on workers an unbearable strain, which exhausts them and destroys their health in a short time’.73 Such a diagnosis shows the potential for conflict between labour and management in the second half of the 1950s, although the intensity of disputes varied greatly across firms and industries. One reason for such diversity was that, in certain companies, it was possible for management to focus on the level of work effort in exchange for relatively high wages and improved working conditions. This strategy was particularly important to leading companies in the metalworking sector, but also with respect to the textile industry (see Chapters 3 and 4). Still, there were also instances of fierce disputes between management and labour at large plants. A case in point occurred at the Ipiranga Jafet textile mill in 1956. This firm decided to increase from two to three the number of looms assigned to each worker at Weaving Department Number 1. The weavers rejected the change and brought the section to a standstill for about 12 days, despite the lay-offs ordered by management. Subsequently, workers at another department, Number 2, took industrial action in solidarity, followed by further dismissals. And finally, threatened with an increase from 12 to 18 looms for each worker, weavers at the Automatic Machines Department also went on strike soon afterwards. According to a contemporary report, the industrial action in the three departments ‘threw production at Jafet into complete disarray’. Only after 12 days was an agreement settled between the parties, by which weavers could choose whether to tend two or three looms in Department 1. 74 Apparently, such an extensive mobilisation was not typical. In most cases, management was not confronted by a highly organised resistance by workers, let alone action as effective as that described at the Jafet plant. This seems to be particularly true in the textile industry, which was then under such a strong pressure to adjust that there was an absolute reduction of the labour force, as shown in Chapter 1. Having said that, even in the extreme case of the textile companies, there is substantial evidence that management had serious difficulty in trying to elicit work compliance by means of unilateral efficiency measures. The type of problems faced by firms was made plain at the IV National Conference of the Textile Industry (1958), when a resolution pointed out that workers ‘were not accepting a reduction in their


piece-rate proportional to the increase in output resulting from productive modernisation’.75 Later, a lawyer of the textile industrialist syndicate in São Paulo reported that workers were rebelling against changes in work processes. According to him, ‘there [had] been serious problems in a large number of factories which [attempted] to increase their production by assigning a greater number of looms to each employee’. 76 By late 1960, the problem was considered to be so momentous that the Regional Labour Department in São Paulo announced its intention to regulate the issue. In response, the industrialists put forward a flexible piece-rate regime and, for the first time in official publications, entertained a proposal of worker participation in the gains of productivity growth.77 The evidence, therefore, suggests that labour action on the shop floor made it more difficult for management to control work effort in Paulista factories during the second half of the 1950s. There is little ground to argue that workers’ attitudes had a significant impact on management decisions regarding efficiency measures in factories; but in the face of soaring demand in product markets, tight labour supply and strengthened worker organisation, seemingly management was forced to diversify its strategy to influence the level of work effort. In this context, it is probable that firms felt more pressed to negotiate wages, conditions and benefits with their workforce in exchange for some degree of corporate involvement in the production process. When linked to effective changes in methods of production and organisational structures, it seems reasonable to argue that the bargaining process on the shop floor is a factor which helps explain the general increase in productivity levels observed in the metalworking and textile industries in the late 1950s. As mentioned earlier, the situation in Greater São Paulo was in marked contrast with that in the immediate post-Second World War years. Whereas in the latter period the major industrial sector (textiles) confronted serious problems when it tried to engage its labour force in intensified production, the leading industries in the 1950s were able to put pressure on the workforce and achieve a substantial increase in productivity. The efficiency measures undertaken by several companies after the war were the crucial factor. It seems, therefore, that a difficult process of organisational and production changes allowed most firms simultaneously to accommodate growing pressures from organised labour and to boost productivity in the post-war years. This process of industrial change took place under the constraints of the power relations prevalent in Brazil at the time. Productivity schemes

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drew heavily on strict Taylorist techniques for monitoring and controlling the work effort, with very little room for wage increases. In crucial moments, repressive methods became a part of the overall approach to improve industrial efficiency. Although the leading firms did not substantially diverge from this pattern, they had the resources to entertain a labour policy focused on relatively high wages and welfare programmes which could serve as a basis for a greater involvement of the workforce in the production process. As shown in Chapters 3 and 4, there were companies which did embark on such a strategy during the 1940s and 1950s. However, the much larger group of backward enterprises was at most half-heartedly committed to new labour policies and wielded strong pressure against workers’ demands for wages, conditions and social rights during the entire period examined. For these firms at least – as happened in an extreme fashion during the Dutra years – the containment of labour remained vital to compensate for their productive and organisational inefficiency. As will be shown in the following section, an understanding of the Brazilian political economy in the post-war years is essential to explain such developments at factory level. Political economy, productivity and protectionism Reflecting the increasing importance of the manufacturing sector in the Brazilian economy, industrial interests exerted strong political leverage before and during the Second World War on a number of government commissions and policy decisions. With the end of the war, a basic question which concerned industrialists was how to protect old and new industries against foreign competition in a world of restored trade and financial flows. This was, in effect, one of the major topics of the first national congress of Brazilian industrialists in early 1945. In the economic programme approved on that occasion, the employers asked for an ‘organic and rational system’ of protection which could shore up those industries benefiting from comparative advantages in international markets.78 There is little evidence to establish whether or not the industrialist leadership believed that a rational protection system (understood to be transitory and focused on specific industries) was sufficient to withstand the external competition which would follow the recovery of the international economy. There is evidence, however, that at least among industrialists in São Paulo the general feeling was that the manufacturing sector suffered from a fundamental weakness which could only be overcome by radical changes in methods of production and organisational


structures, as mentioned previously. In this context, the protection required would be much more extensive and permanent than was implied by the 1945 economic manifesto. In any case, events in the following year shattered illusions about the competitive potential of domestic industry. In the first place, international instability proved more deep-seated than previously anticipated, with a worldwide escalation of exchange restrictions and import controls invoked to confront the chronic dollar shortage. As with many other countries, industrialised or not, Brazil plunged into a serious balance-of-payments crisis after a brief experiment with a liberal import policy during 1946 and part of 1947. Exchange controls, quantitative restrictions on imports and, on the home front, expenditure-reducing policies were the economic strategies used to face up to the crisis.79 Such a critical environment gave strength to the protectionist lobby and the demand for a halt in import-competing goods was legitimised as a necessary step to deal with the chronic balance-of-payments instability. By the end of the 1940s, there was little doubt that the protection regime favoured by industrialists was, in practice, rather different from that stated publicly in 1945. Yet, more than international economic instability and global restrictive practices, what seems to have been decisive to the reassurance of the protectionist outlook by Paulista industrialists was the recognition of the poor standing of the domestic manufacturing sector with regard to foreign competitors. As argued earlier in this chapter, FIESP leaders soon identified the need for sweeping technical and organisational changes in factories to achieve a steady increase in industrial efficiency. Significantly, the stabilisation programme adopted by the Dutra government was coupled with a sweeping curb on wage demands and an offensive against labour organisations. Seen in the wider economic context, the attack on labour was not only an expression of external economic imbalance and of the new Cold War scenario, but also an expression of the difficulty of industrial companies in meeting workers’ demands for wages, conditions and enforcement of social rights. In the immediate post-war years, the majority of these firms lacked the capability to raise industrial standards in order to accommodate the pressure from the working class. The attitudes of organised labour towards productivity growth and protectionism evolved within the volatile political context of the 1940s and 1950s. In the immediate post-war years, trade unions were still controlled by ministerialistas and frequently acted only under pressure from the rank and file. Even so, in the wake of the strikes of early 1946,

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there were signals that compelled trade unions to look towards broader issues which affected the jobs of their membership. The post-war economic adjustments were already being felt in Paulista industry, so much so that an inter-union meeting in February 1946 argued for measures to increase production in order to preserve employment levels. Furthermore, the trade unions demanded the prohibition of non-essential imports which could hit the domestic industry. 80 The labour movement also debated the conditions which affected the performance of the workforce in factories. For example, the congress which set up the CTB in September 1946 specifically addressed the matter of absenteeism, which was having an impact on industrial productivity. Unlike the industrialist view described in the previous section, the trade union congress identified the cause of low attendance as the deteriorating factory environment, low wages and poor living conditions faced by industrial workers. According to the trade unions, only through an improvement in earnings, health and welfare of the working class could a greater engagement in production be expected. 81 The position announced in the CTB congress expressed the view of the large section of independent and leftist trade unionists in São Paulo. As shown before, the communists in particular were willing to compromise with what they regarded as ‘progressive employers’ in the pursuit of greater production and efficiency after the war. The MUT, the umbrella trade union organisation set up in April 1945 by the Communist Party, was avowedly engaged in a co-operative effort with industrialists to sort out production problems arising from the transition from a war economy to normality.82 To increase productive efficiency was, indeed, the appeal made by the leader, Pedro Pomar, in an outline of communist policy in 1946. However, the difference from the industrialist view was that, from early 1946, the communists abandoned the wage-restraint policy which they had been supporting until then and linked productivity growth to higher wages, better working conditions and enforcement of social rights. The clampdown on trade unions and the left by the Dutra government only made these opposite views even more irreconcilable. Except for those appointed by the Ministry of Labour to take over the trade unions which suffered intervention from May 1947, the large majority of labour activists were at odds with government policy and tended to be critical of the unilateral efficiency measures which many firms were introducing at the time. Although there is little evidence about other political groups, for the communists the opposition to the productivity schemes implemented by firms came to light in various episodes


involving militants on the shop floor and in parallel organisations set up during 1947–51. Indeed, the increase in work intensity brought about by rationalisation schemes was one of the most prominent issues to which the communists drew attention in their attempts to reorganise during the Dutra years. In 1950, for example, a conference in the capital, São Paulo, supported by communist trade unionists, resolved to ‘struggle against changes in the work system when they [led] to the reduction of wages and greater individual effort’.83 The recovery of trade unions between 1952 and 1955 was largely dominated by certain pressing issues (mainly freedom of organisation and wages), so that there was little debate about the productivity measures which were being introduced in Greater São Paulo. Even so, from 1952 the labour movement focused on the assiduity clauses which tied both the weekly paid day of rest and pay increases to full attendance (see Chapter 2). The assiduity clauses were laid down in the 1940s in an attempt to counteract the high levels of absenteeism which affected industrial companies in São Paulo and other states. Not only did these clauses help control the labour force’s earnings, they also became an important means of influencing the level of effort in the workplace. The employers saw this legislation as a useful mechanism for securing discipline in the factories and strongly resisted attempts by the trade unions to drop it from labour legislation. Not surprisingly therefore, the campaign led by organised labour was condemned as a ‘malicious manoeuvre [which] undermin[ed] the basis of national prosperity’ and which, therefore, should be rejected outright.84 The first large demonstration by trade unions against the effects of the productivity drive in São Paulo apparently took place at a conference in early 1956, which addressed a broad range of political and social rights issues. According to a left-wing newspaper, the meeting discussed the ‘fight against the step-up in exploitation which, under the pretext of “increasing productivity”, is today falling upon the proletariat, imposing a hellish pace of work’.85 Specific groups of workers also included the issue in their regular meetings. Thus, for example, the Second Congress of Metalworkers in the state of São Paulo passed a resolution ‘against the negative consequences of automation and the application of new techniques to the means and methods of production’.86 In a similar vein, in 1959 the newspaper of the Metalworkers Trade Union argued that ‘in the last four years’ there had been an increase in the profits of, and a decline in the wages paid by, metalworking companies and, therefore, special attention should be given to ‘the concealed ways of super-exploitation’ in industry.

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Labour organisations and workers, the argument followed, ‘must approach the question of technical progress [ . . . ], including automation, in terms of its impact on standard of living, of health and social and working conditions of the labouring classes’.87 Despite these strictures, it is difficult to assess the real impact of organised labour on the efficiency drive being implemented in factories. There is evidence that the new links formed by trade unions with the rank and file over the 1950s bolstered workers in their negotiations with management. In 1960, for example, Elevadores Atlas metal works reduced the standard time spent on routine tasks and workers rejected the changes. After six months of fruitless bargaining between factory commission and management, the São Paulo trade union stepped in and asked for the mediation of the Regional Labour Department. According to a report in the press, two round-table meetings later the company was persuaded to accept workers’ demands.88 However important as a possible trend in the late 1950s, this sort of direct intervention by the trade union seems not to have been frequent in Paulista industry at the time. As this example suggests, it is likely that trade union actions were highly dependent on the strength and initiative of shop-floor commissions in specific plants. Apart from the expected difficulty of mobilising at the grass-roots level in a labour movement which had only recently been reorganised, trade unions in Greater São Paulo had to face a highly heterogeneous industrial structure in terms of technical and organisational conditions. All these factors tended to undercut trade union initiatives and to give the rank and file a prominent role in conducting the bargaining over productivity measures with management. The critical outlook assumed by organised labour on industrial rationalisation in Greater São Paulo was only one aspect of its increasing concern with general economic issues. In the second half of the 1950s, trade unions felt strong enough to demand a greater say in economic policy and in other issues which more or less directly affected their position in society. Apart from a minimum wage, inflation and social rights, labour organisations also became increasingly vocal regarding the industrial policy implemented by the Kubitscheck government, particularly with respect to foreign capital and trade protection. Such a trend can be clearly detected on the trade union agenda at the time. As the most influential inter-union organisation in São Paulo, the PUI engaged in a broad nationalist campaign which combined the protection of national industry with opposition to all sorts of incentives given to foreign companies – the key of the Kubitscheck industrial policy.


In 1959, for instance, amid threats of large demonstrations which led to emergency talks with ministries and two meetings with President Kubitscheck, the PUI delivered a memorandum which listed its principal demands regarding industry: measures against foreign exchange reserve losses; public credit to be allowed only to ‘national productive enterprises’; specially reduced exchange rates for the import of oil and machine tools for basic industry; and repeal of the SUMOC Instrução no. 113, which gave foreign companies special rights to import equipment without foreign exchange restrictions.89 Another example of the nationalist position of trade unions refers to the controversial case of the American Can Company’s investments in São Paulo during 1957–8. The US company had acquired 60 per cent of a Brazilian firm (Metalúrgica Elva) and asked for permission to import (under the SUMOC Instrução no. 113) about $3 million-worth of machinery and equipment for a new can plant which was being built in São Paulo. 90 This event gave rise to a high-profile campaign by the Communist Party and nationalists to attack the influence of American firms in Brazilian industry and the alleged conflicts with local companies. In actual fact, the issue had first been raised by the Matarazzo conglomerate, the largest economic group in Brazil at the time, which would be affected by the installation of a new can plant. In a way similar to the industrialists’ opposition to the terms of the Instrução no. 113, Matarrazzo representatives claimed that privileged access to imports by foreign companies was discriminatory and unfair.91 The uneasy alliance between the largest economic group in Brazil and left-wingers was even noticed by US intelligence. Although a Matarazzo director acknowledged that he was ‘embarrassed’ to find himself aligned with the extreme nationalists, he stated that due to the unfairness of the case his group would maintain the campaign as long as necessary. 92 Highly influenced by the left, the São Paulo Metalworkers’ Trade Union also organised independent demonstrations to protest against the possibility of government permission being given to the US company. In the face of criticisms by the rank and file that the leaders had been ‘sold out’ to the industrialists, the trade union newspaper contended that the development of the national industry was beneficial to workers.93 The pro-industry, nationalist standpoint taken up by the PUI and the Metalworkers’ Trade Union was dictated by the left and independent groups which controlled the most important trade unions in São Paulo. Even so, the nationalist policy advocated by the PUI created dissension among left-wing trade unionists, such as those linked to the

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Liga Socialista Independente. This group bitterly denounced the nationalism shown by the communists and others, which led trade unions to support both the official developmentalist strategy and the industrial bourgeoisie.94 There was also divergence on the right of the ideological spectrum in the labour movement. Those trade unionists linked to the CNTI, for example, backed a watered-down version of nationalism which refused to see foreign capital (especially American) as a negative factor in domestic development, as argued by the communists. 95 Nonetheless, whether in the more radical form supported by the communists or in the moderate version of the ministerialistas, the fact is that most sections of the trade union leadership were entirely in agreement with the support lent to the protection of the domestic industry, incentives to national firms and rapid economic growth. Dissenting and radical views such as that of the Liga Socialista Independente attracted only a minority of trade unionists and were overshadowed by more moderate political groups during the second half of the 1950s. The position of the majority of the labour movement on protectionism and rapid economic growth shows an important aspect of the social basis of the industrialisation process in Brazil during the 1950s. Trade unions at the time joined forces with industrialists and other social groups in championing economic policies which focused on industrial growth and diversification. There was little debate, if any, about antimanagement practices which could raise doubts on the defence of industry proposed by the labour leadership and left-wing political groups. In a sense, the straightforward support to the protection of domestic firms was in conflict with the action of the most militant trade unions, as their struggle for wages, conditions and rights called into question the industrial practices predominant in São Paulo and Brazil as a whole. It seems, however, that such conflict between day-to-day struggles and overall orientation regarding protectionism and industrial growth never found expression in the debate over policy among Paulista trade unions during the 1950s. For the Brazilian political economy, the significance of a broad coalition underpinning rapid industrialisation and protectionism was that it seemed to be the only politically viable alternative to accommodate conflicting social demands in the post-war years. Severe deflationary policies, such as that implemented by the Dutra government during 1947–8, were revealed to be highly costly in both political and economic terms and, as a result, tended to face the opposition of business sectors, political forces and workers. Except in critical junctures brought about by external imbalances or acute political instability, economic policy in


the context of an emerging working class and encompassing industrialist interests was to be increasingly focused on rapid industrial growth and diversification. This by no means suppressed critical, liberal voices from the economic debate at the time, as shown by the continuing influence of Eugênio Gudin (a liberal Minister of Finance between August 1954 and April 1955); but the scope for deflationary economic policy was always rather limited and tended to give way to developmentalist programmes. 96 Notwithstanding the relative convergence of views about economic growth, there remained fundamental issues which split large sections of the trade union movement and industrialists in Greater São Paulo. First, conflicts over the distribution of gains from productivity growth were rife. As argued elsewhere, the efficiency drive was conducted within the framework of the power relations prevailing in Brazil and ruled out any significant improvement in wages, working conditions and labour rights. Both on the shop floor and in trade unions, organised labour challenged the productivity notions sustained by management and wrangling over the benefits of industrial growth remained intense during the post-war years. Second, industrialists and the most influential trade unions in São Paulo came down on radically opposed sides in the political spectrum shaped by the Cold War. The industrialists strove to establish (but did not succeed) representative trade unions which could become reliable partners in wage bargaining and other issues. Trade unions in Greater São Paulo were largely dominated by independent and left-wing officials, who pushed for an agenda of social reform and economic improvements for the working class, which clashed with the industrialist programme. In such a political environment, the productivity drive carried out in Paulista firms could only exacerbate the antagonistic relations between industrialists and labour. By the end of the 1950s, the reality of labour politics in São Paulo was one in which the most powerful trade unions were in open conflict with industrialists on a series of fundamental economic matters – despite their overall support to national firms, protectionism, and rapid industrial growth. What divided the industrialists and the trade union movement was not only abstract political notions, but more sensitive and urgent issues related to wages, working conditions, and social rights. Such a division was also strong between management and labour at factory level, since it was at grass-roots level that the hardships were mostly felt. In these circumstances, the introduction of productivity measures could hardly be more than another source of conflict when

182


they predominantly took the form of traditional speed-up methods and tight control over the pace of work. Thus the stern reality of the political economy clashed with the manifested aim of employers and governments to transform industrial practices in a substantial way. At the same time that labour was contained by all means available, industrial practices based on restricted training, low wages, and precarious working conditions gained strength in São Paulo and dominated the market. Counteraction by labour organisations was not sufficient to reverse the self-perpetuating mechanisms which buttressed productive inefficiency. Meanwhile, the protectionist policy reinforced the drawbacks of the manufacturing sector. The politics of productivity, as described in this chapter, strengthened these trends and left deep marks on the industrialisation process in Greater São Paulo during the post-war years.

7 Conclusions

The foregoing chapters have examined various aspects of labour relations in Greater São Paulo and their connections with industrial performance during the post-Second World War period. The study sought to explore the ways in which socio-economic conditions and the balance of power between management, workers and governments interacted to shape important features of the industrialisation process in São Paulo and Brazil. This perspective required a somewhat detailed analysis of wage-setting, industrial training and conditions of work, in an attempt to show the forces which determined their basic characteristics in post-war Greater São Paulo. The study proceeded to investigate how the varied aspects of labour relations affected the industrial capabilities built up after the Second World War. The first step was to describe the setting of wage levels and the determination of labour-force skills in the two industrial sectors selected for analysis – textiles and metal trades. Wage levels in different industries were determined by particular conditions in terms of demographic structure, labour force composition, economic dynamism and the balance of power between industrialists and workers, both on the shop floor and in society as a whole. Trade unions, employer organisations and governments occupied a central place in this story, since their attitudes towards wages resulted in a highly confrontational and antagonistic pattern of industrial relations. With regard to training of the labour force, the system set up in the 1940s by SENAI was the main institutional innovation which affected the supply of industrial skills in the Paulista manufacturing sector. SENAI was from the outset entirely controlled by industrialists and implemented a concept of industrial training which focused only on a minority of the labour force. By excluding most workers from its programmes, SENAI helped consolidate 183

184


the low-skills strategy which characterised industrial firms in São Paulo during the post-war period. Another important issue in post-war São Paulo’s industrial life was working conditions. The evidence indicated that working conditions were unsatisfactory in most undertakings, and remained so in the 1950s, despite the probable improvement stemming from the installation of new modern plants and the upgrading of established ones. One group of firms adopted relatively advanced welfare policies in both the textile and metalworking trades. The explanation for this tended to vary according to firms, but as a rule, the improvement of welfare facilities seems to have been associated with strategies for increasing productivity through a higher commitment on the part of the workforce. In any case, the number of firms which really embarked on welfare policies was not sufficient to change the general picture of the rather precarious conditions of work in industrial Greater São Paulo. Neither was SESI, the social agency controlled by the industrialists, able to do much in that direction. Despite SESI’s achievements in the area of industrial hygiene, for the majority of workers which did not benefit by its programmes the outcomes remained quite unsatisfactory. As a result, working conditions could hardly be considered an incentive to the generation of better industrial practices in most Paulista factories during the post-war period. Finally, there is the question of the industrial capability developed in Greater São Paulo in the post-Second World War era. As with other historical experiences, Brazil’s industrialisation was a complex and long-term process of building up competencies in manufacturing, by means of copying, adapting and upgrading technologies and organisational structures. Although a group of leading firms succeeded in establishing a strong competitive position in their markets, the majority of industrial companies pursued a low-standards strategy regarding wages, conditions and training which seriously undermined creative adaptation, quality improvement and innovative search in Greater São Paulo. At the same time, despite the avowed intention of industrialists and governments to raise industrial standards, the predominant approach to both productivity growth and power relations did not help to improve industrial capabilities in the long run. The result was that firms in general had neither the means nor the incentives to get away from inefficient, low-quality production. Rather, such practices dominated the market, shaped the overall features of the industrial structure and kept away activities based on quality and innovation which could produce sustained growth in the long term. This

Conclusions

185

was a typical example of an economy locked in to inefficient industrial practices and technologies, resulting from individual and small – if crucial – events in history. Thus, most firms in São Paulo and Brazil as a whole could only operate under high protection barriers, as they could not have stood up to the fierce competition of international markets, whether in the area of traditional or more complex manufactured products. In a sense, the main theme of this study is an old issue which has long been investigated by historians, that of the discrepancy between stated, conscious aims and actual historical outcomes. The obstinate pursuit of a favourable environment for industrial growth always served to justify the containment, by all means available, of labour demands and aspirations of social reforms in post-war Brazil. While such determination, upheld by the ruling social groups, allowed for exceptional profitability in the short term and rapid economic diversification, in the long run its effects were the cause of some of the most significant weaknesses of the industrial and socio-economic structure as a whole, which undermined sustained growth and competitiveness. As this study has attempted to show, these contradictory outcomes were all part of the real, and often crude, history of industrialisation, power relations, and social conflicts in post-war Brazil, a history which will still stamp its mark on the lives of million of Brazilians, today and in the future.

Appendix A: Basic Economic and Labour Statistics

Table A-1

Industrial output and GDP growth in Brazil, 1939–61 (percentage)

Years

Industry a

GDP (1) a

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961

12.1 4.0 8.5 (2.9) 6.4 5.7 6.4 14.4 4.6 12.9 11.5 10.3 7.9 6.5 11.2 6.5 10.1 7.0 5.3 15.7 10.8 11.6 9.9

3.9 1.3 7.9 (5.5) 8.0 4.7 2.8 12.5 4.2 9.1 8.7 7.1 4.3 7.1 5.8 6.5 10.3 2.1 8.1 10.6 9.7 10.3 7.7

Notes: a Calculated from Zerkowski and Veloso, 1982, pp. 337–8. b Calculated from Maddison, 1995, pp. 188–9. ( ) = negative rate. Sources: as indicated above.

186

GDP (2) b 3.3 1.6 7.0 (3.7) 6.4 3.7 2.7 10.5 3.5 7.7 6.4 6.1 4.8 6.0 4.8 6.6 7.3 1.4 8.3 9.1 8.4 8.3 7.5

81,442 84,901 87,893 85,735 87,933 93,472 97,425 97,346 99,133 100,294 104,857 101,929 104,678 100,787 98,683 98,138

SP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9,255 11,579 14,351 14,435 17,399 17,772 18,141 19,514 18,771 19,192 19,520 18,624

ABC

Textile

n.a. 156,754 161,022 158,715 158,677 169,733 177,440 176,343 184,404 188,484 193,475 195,018 198,538 191,572 185,190 181,851

SP State

SP 55,277 57,114 66,238 67,787 68,903 77,579 87,785 94,535 99,080 107,463 109,402 118,028 122,898 133,080 149,728 160,950

Workforce in São Paulo by industry, 1945–60

n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6,161 9,657 10,816 12,257 12,594 13,572 13,895 14,629 14,636 16,282 18,747 20,109

ABC

Metalworking

Notes: SP – São Paulo; ABC – Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo and São Caetano do Sul. Sources: 1945–8: SENAI-SP, 1946 to 1949. 1949–60: SENAI-SP, Levantamento Industrial do Estado de São Paulo (1949–60). SENAI-SP Archives.

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

Years

Table A-2

n.a. 80,530 91,605 96,094 99,421 111,420 125,181 135,837 142,781 154,095 159,349 171,664 182,088 198,793 231,327 249,754

SP State 335,461 326,486 352,642 353,530 353,479 389,202 417,461 436,850 451,086 475,850 483,373 498,322 509,901 517,113 538,759 562,213

SP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 28,021 35,748 56,974 59,466 62,253 60,423 61,328 68,023 67,245 73,512 86,633 88,527

ABC

All Industries

n.a. 552,487 597,228 610,109 619,196 672,869 735,898 769,186 802,608 840,825 856,502 888,937 904,631 909,569 945,068 969,112

SP State

187

188

Appendix

Table A-3

Metalworkers in Greater São Paulo by occupations and skills, 1949–60

Year

Labourers

Semiskilled

Skilled

Foremen

Administrative

Technical

Engineers

1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

6,109 8,119 9,486 10,652 11,368 12,911 12,903 14,032 14,271 16,581 20,809 24,511

33,395 38,072 48,800 51,696 54,618 59,815 61,669 66,312 70,357 76,543 91,254 97,259

25,456 27,042 31,260 32,564 33,879 35,439 35,833 38,506 39,810 42,295 47,170 49,586

1,367 2,050 2,356 2,348 2,185 2,225 2,253 2,366 2,269 2,331 2,488 2,547

8,374 9,193 11,432 13,335 13,856 15,073 15,400 16,440 16,621 19,188 23,714 25,544

177 158 218 209 212 257 269 336 420 589 656 727

187 209 326 356 384 412 451 508 537 677 808 909

Source:

as Table A-2.

Table A-4

Textile workers in Greater São Paulo by occupations and skills, 1949–60

Year

Labourers

Semiskilled

Skilled

Foremen

Administrative

Technical

Engineers

1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

4,371 4,767 5,209 6,173 6,593 6,842 7,108 7,036 6,996 6,059 6,490 6,424

52,896 55,752 59,012 58,589 60,747 61,010 62,960 67,379 82,478 89,779 91,400 92,978

32,760 36,664 38,898 38,335 40,279 41,209 43,584 37,761 24,558 14,840 10,716 7,831

1,348 1,389 1,429 1,467 1,477 1,374 1,422 1,443 1,454 1,431 1,423 1,404

5,605 6,301 7,092 7,001 7,207 7,399 7,665 7,558 7,685 7,562 7,859 7,823

147 157 172 185 199 205 230 232 243 263 272 263

61 21 24 31 30 27 29 34 35 45 43 39

Source:

as Table A-2.

Appendix 189 Table A-5 Share of the state of São Paulo workers in total Brazil, 1940–59 (percentage) Years

Textile

Metallurgy

Mechanical

Electrical Equipment

Transport Equipment

Manufacturing

1939 1949 1959

43.5 46.1 49.3

37.1 49.2 48.4

72.0 62.6 73.9

68.3 75.5 78.7

37.9 46.9 72.5

38.0 41.0 46.6

Note: Number of workers on 1 Sept. 1940, 1 Jan. 1950 and 3 Dec. 1959. Sources: IBGE, 1950, 1955, 1966.

Table A-6 Share of the state of São Paulo industrial output in total Brazil, 1939–59 (percentage) Years

Textile

Metallurgy

Mechanical

Electrical Equipment

Transport Equipment

Manufacturing

1939 1949 1959

60.6 58.6 58.9

41.4 51.8 48.3

73.0 69.5 79.3

67.5 78.2 82.8

87.1 74.1 88.0

45.3 47.8 55.7

Sources:

IBGE, 1950, 1955, 1966.

Table A-7 Gender and age distribution in industries, state of São Paulo, 1949–59 (total workers = 100.0)a Industries

Manufacturing Metallurgy Mechanical Electrical equipment Transport equipment Textile

1949

1959

Male

Female

Juveniles

Male

Female

67.4 88.4 99.2 80.1 98.3 37.7

32.6 11.6 0.8 19.9 1.7 62.3

16.0 12.4 11.9 15.2 8.3 20.8

75.2 92.3 96.7 81.9 96.6 44.8

24.8 7.7 3.3 18.1 3.4 55.2

Notes: a Refers to production workers (including foremen). Sources: IBGE, 1955, 1966.

Juveniles 12.7 9.2 9.2 11.4 7.6 18.1

190

Appendix

Table A-8 Years

1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

Industrial training programmes and conclusions, SENAI-SP, 1943–60 Apprenticeship a

Rapid Courses b

On-the-Job c

Textile

Metal

Total d

Textile

Metal

Total d

TIM e

TIA

– – – – 106 160 270 213 53 210 341 370 181 392 189 117 41 25

– – –

– – –

73 229 288 334 413 501 541 614 727 871 918 983 1,117 1,343 1,658

73 399 601 n.a. n.a. 696 918 1,204 1,399 1,430 1,750 1,565 1,624 1,748 2,013

– n.a. n.a. 183 119 n.a. 63 41 350 20 19 24 277 48 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

534 n.a. 849 697 503 408 481 611 340 367 388 461 281 387 419 452 700 866

534 956 1,210 1,108 1,079 1,087 n.a. n.a. 918 564 572 732 894 784 733 807 1,133 1,337

– – – – – – – – – – – – – 1,300 1,423 9,234 8,444 13,603

– – – – – – – – – – – 21 237 705 322 452 525 1,137

Notes: a Completions in regular apprenticeship programmes. b Completions in all types of rapid courses. c On-the-job training in all industrial segments: TIM – Training in the Workplace for Minors (14–18 years old). TIA – Training in the Workplace for Adults (supervisory and skilled workers). d Total gaining certificates. e Refers to youngsters (between 14 and 18 years old) enrolled in on-the-job programmes. Sources: SENAI-SP, 1944 to 1960.

Manufacturing

1,171 (79) 1,375 (92) 1,362 (92) 1,274 (86) 1,213 (82) 1,337 (90) 1,190 (80) 1,225 (82) 1,409 (100) 1,530 (103) n.a. 1,488 (100) 1,456 (98) 1,610 (108) 1,608 (108)

1939 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955

1,398 (74) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,759 (93) 1,904 (101) n.a. 1,884 (100) 1,762 (94) 1,871 (99) 1,890 (100)

Metallurgy 1,659 (86) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,894 (98) 2,024 (105) n.a. 1,936 (100) 1,927 (100) 2,066 (107) 2,001 (103)

Mechanical 1,234 (69) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,690 (95) 1,857 (104) n.a. 1,786 (100) 1,780 (100) 1,766 (99) 1,865 (104)

Electrical Equipment 2,134 (97) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,156 (98) 2,252 (102) n.a. 2,205 (100) 2,034 (92) 2,086 (95) 1,967 (89)

Transport Equipment

Average real wages 1,3 and consumer prices,2 state of São Paulo, 1939–59

Year

Table A-9

1,073 (84) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,292 (101) 1,371 (108) n.a. 1,274 (100) 1,287 (101) 1,482 (116) 1,426 (112)

Textile

– 10.9 15.9 35.9 25.0 14.5 30.2 8.5 –2.2 5.7 8.7 23.0 22.0 18.0 19.8

Consumer Prices

191

1,713 1,730 1,799 1,624

1956 1957 1958 1959

2,002 (106) 1,981 (105) 2,043 (108) 1,797 (95)

Metallurgy 2,092 (108) 1,995 (103) 2,066 (107) 1,908 (99)

Mechanical 2,029 2,054 2,046 1,831

(114) (115) (115) (103)

Electrical Equipment 1,870 (85) 2,168 (98) 2,292 (104) 1,966 (89)

Transport Equipment 1,558 (122) 1,525 (120) 1,578 (124) 1,453 (114)

Textile

21.7 19.4 15.3 37.5

Consumer Prices

Notes: 1 Nominal average wages converted to cruzeiros at 1952 rate using the consumer price index of São Paulo Prefecture and divided by the number of production workers. 2 Annual percentage growth rates. 3 ( ) = All indexes on 1952 basis. Sources: (a) 1942–8: IAPI, state of São Paulo, in IBGE, Anuário, 1941 to 1945, 1947, 1948, 1951. Figures refer to wages paid in July of the year in question. (b) 1950–8: Registro Industrial, state of São Paulo, in IBGE, Anuário, 1952 (for 1950); IBGE, Produção Industrial, 1952 to 1955 and IBGE, Produção Industrial, 1956 to 1958. Except for 1939, when figures were taken of the workers employed on 1st September 1940, the mean wages of the other years refer to the monthly average workers. (c) 1939, 1949 and 1959: IBGE, 1950, 1955, 1966. (d) Consumer prices for São Paulo (capital), 1944–59: Prefecture of São Paulo, in IBGE, 1990.

(115) (116) (121) (109)

Manufacturing

(continued)

Year

Table A-9

192

Appendix B: Factory Conditions in São Paulo A Note on Sources The quantitative analysis of factory conditions, presented in Chapter 3, is based on a survey carried out by the Industrial Hygiene and Safety Service (Serviço de Higiene e Segurança Industrial, or SHSI) of the Social Service of Industry (SESI), São Paulo Regional Department. The study was conducted between September 1953 and January 1955 and surveyed 2,137 industrial companies of all sizes and activities in the city of São Paulo. A complete explanation of the methodology adopted by the survey can be found in SESI-SP, Inquérito Preliminar de Higiene Industrial no Município de São Paulo (São Paulo, 1955), introduction. The team responsible for the survey was B. Bedrikow, S. F. Redondo, S. Maiberg and H. Pataracchia. The present study draws on information recorded by the SHSI, on questionnaires completed by the researchers during their visits to the factories: including 111 textile and 173 metalworking companies. In certain cases, additional evidence was available on environmental conditions (illumination, noise, temperature, protected machinery, and means of controlling environment hazards) in specific departments of the firms investigated. Such data form only a part of the original research and therefore do not follow any statistical sampling procedure. All companies were visited between September 1953 and December 1954. Following the conditions laid down by the President of SESI-São Paulo for the use of such data in this study, no information regarding individual companies can be released to the public.

193

Notes

Preface 1. North, 1990; Olson, 1982; Dobb, 1946. 2. Rodrigues, 1974, p. 134; see also Weffort, 1978. 3. A pioneering work is Maranhão, 1979. More recent works which have followed this track will be quoted elsewhere in this study. 4. Prado Jr., 1945; Furtado, 1958. 5. ‘Paulista’ denotes someone or something that belongs to the state of São Paulo.

1. The Structure of the Labour Markets 1. Zerkowski and Veloso, 1982, pp. 337–8; Maddison, 1995, p. 43, appendix b; Abreu and Verner, 1997, pp. 21–4. 2. Reference to workers hereafter will always mean production workers, while total employees will also include administrative and technical personnel. 3. IBGE, 1966. Greater São Paulo retained 58.4 per cent of the textile workers (monthly average) in the state, in 1959. 4. The problem with aggregation is that SENAI did not break down the metalworking sector in its constitutive parts. On SENAI and other sources, CNI, 1950, p. 31; Boletim do Dieese, no. 2 (1961), pp. 4–5. 5. Only data for the capital, São Paulo, are available for the entire period 1945–60 (Appendix A, Table A-2). 6. The critical period for industrial growth was 1947, which was only later reflected in SENAI data given the interval June/May. Appendix A, Table A-1 for rates of industrial growth in Brazil. 7. Public Records Office [hereafter PRO] Foreign Office [hereafter FO] 371/ 68167, Labour Report [hereafter LR] no. 36, 21 Apr. 1948, pp. 1–2. 8. Fischlowitz, 1959b, p. 405. 9. Andrade et al., 1954, p. 30, table 3. 10. Tendler, 1968, pp. 9–17. 11. PRO FO 371/61205, LR no. 28, 28 Oct. 1947, pp. 2–3. 12. Fischlowitz, 1959a, p. 46; 1959b, p. 405. 13. On the Targets Plan and the motor vehicle industry, Shapiro, 1994. 14. GEIA, [n.d.], p. 4. 15. Revista da Indústria Automobilística [hereafter RIA], no. 29 (1961), pp. 16–25. 16. Three other important categories in Greater São Paulo – race, regional and national origins – were not covered by SENAI data. 17. Such a trend would be identical whether foremen were included as part of the ‘managerial staff’: the ratios would be 7.8 per cent in 1949 and 8.8 per cent in 1960. For historical comparisons using the latter ratio, Gospel, 1991. 18. Wells, 1983, p. 161, table 2. 194

Notes 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50.

195

Merrick and Graham, ch. 6. Calculated from Krause, 1962, p. 24, table v. Calculated from Table A-2, Appendix A; Krause, 1962, p. 24, table v. SENAI-SP, 1992, p. 140. Ribeiro, 1988, ch. 5. For historical analyses and examples of the elusive nature of skills, as well as the understanding of employers and male workers of the concept, see Berg, 1985, ch. 10; Hudson, 1992, pp. 225–33. Weinstein, 1996, pp. 119, 128–9. According to primary SENAI-SP data, quoted in the sources of Table A-2, Appendix A. Figures calculated from the sources of Table A-2, Appendix A. In Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, India and Netherlands, for instance, textile wages were close to or even above average industrial wages, between 1938 and 1949. See ILO, 1952, table iv. ILO, 1951; ILO, Metal Trades Committee, 1949c. The following comments are based upon a selection of cases from newspapers (Hoje, Notícias de Hoje, Voz Operária and Gazeta Sindical) and cases from the São Paulo’s Regional Labour Tribunal, totalling 41 for textile firms and 49 for metalworking companies. SENAI-GEIA, [n.d.], p. 68. This figure includes FNM (which was located in Rio de Janeiro). Report by Siqueira Sobrinho, 1949, appendix 1. The firm was Indústria de Tecidos Paramount SA. Tribunal Regional do Traballio [hereafter TRT] 542/51, São Paulo [hereafter SP], Acórdão [hereafter Ac.] 1570/51, 3 Sept. 1951. Circular SIFTSP, no. 2,711, 21 Dec. 1945, appendix. Gazeta Sindical [hereafter GS], 15–30 June 1951. All monetary values hereafter will be presented at 1952 prices. GS, 15–31 Aug. 1951. Average monthly wages are calculated here by multiplying the hourly wage by a working month of 225 hours. Leck et al. [n.d.]. SENAI-GEIA [n.d.], p. 5. Conselho Regional do Trabalho [CRT] 611/45, SP, Ac. 227/46, 6 May 1946. Suplemento Bi-mestral da Revista de Estudos Sócio-Econômicos, no. 2 (1962), pp. 3–9. Boletim do DIEESE, no. 4 (1960), pp. 1–6. Conjuntura Econômica [hereafter CE], no. 9 (1949), p. 38. ILO, 1952, table vii. Circular SIFTSP, no. 3,010, 19 Mar. 1947; Noticias de Hoje [hereafter NH], 26 Apr. 1953. Siqueira Sobrinho, 1949, appendixes 2–3. Wells, 1983, p. 163. Absenteeism was partially deducted by taking only workers that earned at least two-thirds of the attendance bonus. The attendance bonus of 5 per cent was introduced by Paramount in Mar. 1946. For a historical and analytical elaboration on this, Thane, 1996. Boletim do DIEESE, no. 4 (1960), p. 3. Inquéritos Econômicos, in IBGE, Anuário, 1960, p. 213.

196 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

Notes Voz Operária [hereafter VO], 14 Aug. 1952. VO, 10 Mar. 1951. VO, 29 Sept. 1951. VO, 31 Mar. 1951. VO, 31 May 1952.

2. Shaping the Labour Markets 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

Weinstein, 1996, chs 2–3. Antonacci, 1993; SENAI-SP, 1991. Weinstein, 1996, pp. 84–100. SENAI-DN, 1973. See Weinstein, 1996, pp. 84–100, although the author tends to see the tax rather as a private contribution by industrialists. ILO, Textiles Committee, 1948b, p. 54; ILO, Metal Trades Committee, 1949b, ch. 4. Weinstein, 1996, p. 95. Mazzo, 1991. For a different interpretation, Weinstein, 1996, pp. 91–3. Weinstein, 1996, pp. 194–202. Revista Industrial de São Paulo [hereafter RISP], no. 11 (1945), p. 27. For an analytical and historical discussion on the importance of industrial training from this point of view, Ashton and Green, 1996. SENAI-SP, 1942–3, pp. 17–18. Data drawn from SENAI-SP, 1942–3, 1961. SENAI-SP, 1946–61. SENAI-SP, 1943. SENAI-SP, 1942–3, pp. 17–18. SENAI-SP, 1944, p. 24. SENAI-SP, 1952, p. 36. SENAI-SP, 1946, pp. 38–9; SENAI-DN, 1946. SENAI-SP, 1992, pp. 72–3; Weinstein, 1996, pp. 251–61. Informativo SENAI [hereafter IS], no. 120 (1956), p. 1. SENAI-SP, 1955, p. 35; IS, no. 115 (1955), pp. 1–2. SENAI-SP, 1956, p. 3; IS, no. 120 (1956), p. 2; 123 (1956), p. 2. SENAI-SP, 1956, p. 25; IS, no. 120 (1956), p. 2. IS, no. 118 (1955), pp. 1–2; E. Sheridan to W. Mauck, Monthly Report for January, 13 Feb. 1953 (Enclosure: IIAA, Activities and Future Plans of the Comissão Brasileira-Americana de Educação Industrial (CBAI), January 3, 1946 to Jun. 30, 1952, 5 Aug. 1952), Record Group [hereafter RG] 469, F-BR2052, National Archives Building, College Park, MD [hereafter NACP]. IS, no. 120 (1956), p. 2; Weinstein, 1996, pp. 254–7. Calculated from Appendix A, Tables A-3 and A-4. Weinstein, 1996, p. 201. Ibid., p. 259. Fischlowitz, 1959b, p. 406. Circular SIFTSP, no. 2,556, 30 Apr. 1945. SENAI-SP, 1992, p. 140.

Notes 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65.

197

Circular SIFTSP, no. 2,556, 30 Apr. 1945. Circular Têxtil [hereafter CT] (Nov. 1949) (special issue), p. 11. Circular SIFTSP, no. 2,580, 13 Jun. 1945. ILO, 1959, p. 46. PRO Ministry of Labour and National Service [hereafter LAB] 13/1016, Background Report for the Six Months ended 31st December 1955, 9 Feb. 1956, p. 8; Background Report for the Seven Months ended 31st Jul. 1956, 12 Dec. 1956, p. 4. Fuller, 1956, pp. 64–6. PRO LAB 13/1016, Report on Labour and Social Developments in Brazil for Six Months ended June 1958, 16 Sept. 1958, p. 5; PRO LAB 13/1339, LR no. 31/59, 10 Sept. 1959, p. 2; IS, no. 164 (1959), p. 4. Latini, 1959, p. 51. Negro, 1994, p. 88. For the low average years of education per person in Brazil, Maddison, 1995, p. 77, table 3–12; Maddison et al., 1992, p. 87. Weinstein, 1996, pp. 128–9. Wolfe, 1993, pp. 120–3; Costa, 1995, pp. 33–43. Wolfe, 1993, pp. 89–92, 101–8; Table A-9, Appendix A. RISP, no. 10 (1945), p. 21. Hoje, 5 Jan. 1946; 10 Feb. 1946; 23 Jan. 1946. Hoje, 8 Mar. 1946. E. Rowell, Monthly Labor Review [hereafter MLR] (February 1 to April 1, 1946), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, p. 14; Hoje, 13 Mar. 1946; 9 Mar. 1946; 20 Mar. 1946. Hoje, 4 Mar. 1946; 12 Mar. 1946; 20 Mar. 1946; 4 Jun. 1946; 19 Jun. 1946; 22 Jul. 1946. PRO FO 371/61205, LR no. 20, 24 Apr. 1947, p. 5. LaFeber, 1997, pp. 49–58; PRO FO 371/61204, Outlawing of the Communist Party in Brazil, 4 May 1947, p. 2. Hoje, 29 Nov. 1946; 13 Feb. 1947; 19 Feb. 1947. PRO FO 371/61205, LR no. 23, 18 Jun. 1947, p. 3. E. Rowell, MLR (October 1 to November 1, 1947), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, p. 8. For wage levels, Table A-9, Appendix A. E. Rowell, MLR (January 1 to February 29, 1948), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, pp. 12–14. Paes, 1979, p. 168; Wolfe, 1993, pp. 155–6. Almeida, 1981, pp. 134–7; Wolfe, 1993, pp. 154–5; Circular SIFTSP, no. 3,157, 2 Feb. 1949. CT, no. 1 (1948), p. 7; GS, 27 Aug. 1948. Table A-1, Appendix A; Chapter 1, Table 1.2; Vianna, 1990a, pp. 119–22. TRT 549/49, SP, Ac. 814/49, 8 Aug. 1949; TRT 1119/50, SP, Ac. 1269/50, 13 Nov. 1950. CTB Informativo, no. 9 (1951), pp. 6–8; VO, 17 Jan. 1951; CEDEM/UNESP, ASMOB, Roberto Morena Papers [hereafter CA-RMP], Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 4, ‘Greves de Extensão em 1951’ [n.d.], pp. 2–3; GS, 15–30 Apr. 1951; 15–30 June 1951. CA-RMP, Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 4, ‘Greves de Extensão em 1951’ [n.d.], pp. 5–6; Wolfe, 1993, pp. 169–71; VO, 12 Jan. 1952; 19 Jan. 1952; 26 Jan. 1952.

198

Notes

66. Circular SIFTSP, no. 3,341, 17 Jan. 1952; VO, 1 Feb. 1952; 16 Feb. 1952; 23 Feb. 1952. 67. Moisés, 1978; Harding, 1973, pp. 254–6; Wolfe, 1993, pp. 176–83; Costa, 1995, ch. 4. 68. PRO FO 371/103253, LR no. 70, 30 Apr. 1953. 69. NH, 9 May 1954; 15 May 1954; 2 Sept. 1954. 70. NH, 29 Apr. 1953; 9 May 1953; 10 May 1953; 14 May 1953. 71. Circular SIFTSP, no. 3,552, 24 Sept. 1953; NH, 2 Sept. 1953; 3 Oct. 1953; 11 Oct. 1953; 13 Oct. 1953. 72. Circular SIFTSP, no. 3,645, 28 Jun. 1954. 73. Circular SIFTSP, no. 3,707, 30 Nov. 1954; 3,831, 7 Dec. 1954; Boletim Informativo da FIESP [hereafter BI], no. 264 (1954), pp. 181–2; 323 (1955), pp. 154–5. 74. Almeida, 1981, pp. 226–7; Lopes, 1992, p. 66. 75. Fontes,1997, pp. 145–8; Benevides, 1989, p. 104. 76. Rodrigues, 1968, pp. 147–9. 77. For a different view, see Weinstein, 1996, pp. 304–6. 78. VO, 28 Jul. 1956. 79. J. Fishburn and J. Shea, Fourth Quarter Labor Report – October to December 1957, 10 Mar. 1958, RG 59, 832.06/3–1058, NACP, pp. 3–4; Harding, 1973, pp. 379–5; Leite, 1986. 80. Circular SIFTSP, no. 4,060, 26 Nov. 1957; 4,074, 24 Jan. 1958; Brasil Têxtil [hereafter BT], no. 12 (1957), pp. 2–5; BI, no. 428 (1957), pp. 137–8; 433 (1958), pp. 91, 95, 106. 81. NH, 14 Jan. 1958; 23 Mar. 1958; VO, 18 Jan. 1958; BI, no. 434 (1958), pp. 113, 119; Lopes, 1992, p. 72. 82. CE, no. 2 (1958), pp. 39–45. 83. Circular SIFTSP, no. 4,163, 13 Nov. 1958; 4,313, 20 Nov. 1959; 4,427, 18 Nov. 60; D. Mann, Monthly Labor Report – November, 1959, 9 Dec. 1959, RG 59, 832.06/12–959, NACP, p. 1; BI, no. 518 (1959), pp. 1524–5; 519 (1959), p. 8. 84. BT, no. 7 (1959), pp. 13–14; 9 (1959), p. 25; B. Sowell, Official Report on Labor, Year 1958, 16 Mar. 1958, RG 59, 832.06/3–1659, NACP, pp. 3–4. 85. E. Rowell and R. Godfrey, MLR (June 1 to Aug. 1, 1945), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, p. 9. 86. MUT – Boletim de Orientação Sindical, no. 1 (1945); 2 (1945). 87. Hoje, 1 Nov. 1945; 4 Nov. 1945; 29 Dec. 1945; 31 Dec. 1945; 5 Jan. 1946; 23 Jan. 1946; 24 Jan. 1946; E. Hoover to F. Lyon, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4 Apr. 1946, RG 59, 832.00B/4–446, NACP. On the Cominform meeting, Claudin, 1975, pp. 307–16, 465–79; Zubok and Pleshakov, 1996, pp. 125–33. 88. Henry, 1947, pp. 437–42; PRO LAB 13/498, LR no. 15, 3 Jan. 1947; E. Rowell, MLR (February to Mar. 1, 1947), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, p. 8. 89. On Coligação Sindical, E. Rowell, MLR (February 1 to Apr. 1, 1946), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, pp. 4–5. 90. Hoje, 14 Mar. 1946; 8 Mar. 1946; Circular FIESP, no. 45/46, 25 Feb. 1946; RISP, no. 17 (1946), p. 19. 91. Vanguarda Socialista, 1 Mar. 1946; Hoje, 21 Feb. 1946; E. Rowell, MLR (February 1 to Apr. 1, 1946), RG 84, 850.4, NACP, pp. 13–14.

Notes

199

92. These changes in the trade union movement and the communist position were strongly connected with international developments in 1947. See particularly Niethammer, 1996, and Sassoon, 1997, ch. 4. 93. PRO FO 371/61205, LR no. 24, 26 Jun. 1947, p. 2; PRO FO 371/61205, LR no. 23, 18 Jun. 1947, p. 3. 94. Costa, 1995, ch. 3; E. Rowell, MLR (January 1 to February 1, 1948), 9 Apr. 1948, RG 84, 850.4, NACP, p. 11. 95. Rodrigues, 1968, pp. 130–2; Wolfe, 1993, pp. 155–6; Lopes, 1992, p. 174; Almeida, 1981, pp. 141–3. 96. PRO FO 371/68167, LR no. 37, 26 Jan. 1948, p. 2. 97. Ibid., p. 4; E. Rowell, MLR (May 1 to June 1, 1948), 27 Jul. 1948, RG 84, 850.4, NACP, p. 15. 98. Telles, 1962, pp. 58, 65; CA-RMP, Box no. 20, A 1, 46 (6) – 01, ‘Luta Contra a Assiduidade Integral’, 1952; GS, 1–15 Aug. 1952; 15–30 Nov. 1952; 15–31 Dec. 1952; Anais da Câmara dos Deputados, xxxv (1952), pp. 189–91, 341–3; xlviii (1952), pp. 182–6. 99. VO, 14 Jun. 1955; 25 Jun. 1955; Circular SIFTSP, no. 3,785, 6 Jul. 1955; 3,831, 7 Dec. 1955; BI, no. 365 (1956), pp. 210–1. 100. NH, 14 Jan. 1954; 24 Feb. 1954; 2 May 1954; VO, 30 Jan. 1954; 8 May 1954. 101. HW. Briggs, The Minimum Wage Decision and its Probable Consequences, 20 May 1954, RG 59, 832.06/5–2054, NACP. 102. NH, 24 Aug. 1954; 26 Aug. 1954; 29 Aug. 1954; 31 Aug. 1954; 1 Sept. 1954; 2 Sept. 1954; 3 Sept. 1954; PRO LAB 13/503, L. Mitchell to A. Greengough, 13 Sept. 1954. 103. BI, no. 260 (1954), pp. 42–3; 261 (1954), pp. 77–8; Jornal Sindical, 15 May 1954; NH, 18 May 1954; 22 May 1954. 104. BI, no. 221 (1953), p. 455; 222 (1954), p. 499; 223 (1954), p. 24; 224 (1954), pp. 33–43; 238 (1954), pp. 106–7; 240 (1954), pp. 171–2; 241 (1954), p. 202; D. Gilsinn, São Paulo Reaction to New Minimum Wage Decree, 7 May 1954, RG 59, 832.061/5–754, NACP. 105. BI, no. 248 (1954), p. 53; BT, no. 7 (1954), p. 61; 9 (1954), p. 46; PRO LAB 13/1016, LR no. 83, 28 Jan. 1955, p. 5. 106. BI, no. 222 (1954), pp. 492–3; 225 (1954), pp. 76–8; 226 (1954), pp. 122–3; 244 (1954), pp. 298–318; 246 (1954), p. 370. 107. PRO LAB 13/503, LR no. 81, 14 Oct. 1954, pp. 1–2. 108. VO, 14 Jul. 1956; 28 Jul. 1956; I. Salert, Quarterly Labor Report – Third Quarter, 16 Oct. 1956, RG 59, 832.061/10–1656, NACP, p. 1. 109. NH, 27 Mar. 1958; 10 Sept. 1958; 28 Dec. 1958; VO, 22 Nov. 1958; 6 Dec. 1958; PRO LAB 13/1300, R. Morris to A.G. Wallis, 31 Dec. 1958, p. 2; B. Sowell, Official Report on Labor, Year 1958, 16 Mar. 1959, RG 59, 832.06/3–1659, NACP, pp. 2–3. 110. For instance, PUI’s conferences in 1957, VO, 30 Mar. 1957, and 1959, Lopes, 1992, p. 81. 111. O Metalúrgico [hereafter OM], Sept./Oct. 1957; Jul. 1959; Chaia, 1992, ch. 1. 112. PRO LAB 13/1339, LR no. 16/59, 10 Jun. 1959, p. 5. 113. OM, Sept. 1958; NH, 1 May 1958; 11 Jan. 1959; PRO LAB 13/1339, LR no. 16/59, 10 Jun. 1959, p. 3.

200

Notes

114. BI, no. 337 (1956), pp. 82–4; 333 (1956), pp. 198–9; 355 (1956), p. 142; 394 (1957), pp. 107–21; 461 (1958), pp. 985–6; 481 (1958), pp. 332–3; 437 (1958), appendix; 398 (1957), p. 231; 372 (1956), pp. 174–6; 440 (1958), p. 313; 445 (1958), pp. 609–10.

3. The Factory Environment 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

Dean, 1969, pp. 154–5; Wolfe, 1993, pp. 45–6. Nogueira, 1967, p. 32. OM, Sept. 1958. NH, 20 Mar. 1957. Willys-Overland, 1961; IS, no. 52 (1950), p. 3; RISP, no. 9 (1945), p. 20; BI, no. 186 (1953), pp. 108–10. Quoted in Nogueira, 1967, p. 37. SESI-SP, 1953–61. VO, 29 Sept. 1951; NH, 28 Aug. 1953. The Consolidated Labour Laws (or CLT), enacted in 1943, established that factories must have at least one toilet for each group of 20 workers. See Brasil, 1979, chapter v, section ii, article 173. NH, 20 Mar. 1957; Hoje, 18 Feb. 1946. VO, 29 Feb. 1952; 21 Feb. 1953. RIA, no. 6 (Mar. 1959), p. 13; Willys-Overland, 1961; Vemag, 1963, p. 7. Ribeiro, 1988, ch. 5. Schachter, 1994, pp. 210–4; Kilburn, 1992, p. 36. Bannister et al., 1978, p. 352. Sherertz and Storrs, 1994, pp. 518–24; Scott, 1995, ch. 5. Neefres, 1982, p. 562; Schachter, 1994, p. 210. Scott, 1995, p. 352. VO, 11 Aug. 1951; NH, 5 Mar. 1953. VO, 13 Oct. 1956. Hoje, 22 Mar. 1947; VO, 29 Sept. 1951. ILO, Textiles Committee, 1948a, p. 65. ILO, Textiles Committe, 1946, p. 71; Dunn and Marenberg, 1994, pp. 675–7; Rees and Duckert, 1994, p. 311; Neefres, 1982, p. 569. Thirty-six companies were examined, all visited in 1953–54. See Appendix B. ILO, Textiles Committe, 1948a, pp. 59–60; Nadel and Cullen, 1994, pp. 659–63. VO, 30 Jan. 1954; NH, 28 Aug. 1953; 19 Mar. 1957; GS, 1–15 Aug. 1951; VO, 10 Mar. 1951. McDonald, 1995, pp. 10, table 2.1. Soule, 1984, p. 126. Landrigan, 1994, pp. 746–8; Fischbein, 1992, pp. 742–4. Sprince et al., 1994, pp. 814–17. Barnhart, 1994, pp. 229–30; Beckett, 1994, pp. 841–2, 845. Beckett, 1994, pp. 839–40. Lundberg et al., 1994, pp. 766–79. Wagner, 1994, pp. 829–31; Scott, 1995, pp. 103–4; ILO, Metal Trades Committe, 1949a, pp. 60–8.

Notes

201

34. VO, 7 Nov. 1952. 35. VO, 11 Jul. 1953; 18 Jul. 1953. 36. SESI-SP, Relatórios de Visitas às Fábricas, 1959. These are reports on industrial hygiene conditions in specific factories carried out by the staff of SESI’s Serviço de Higiene e Segurança Industrial (SHSI). 37. SESI-SP, Relatórios de Visitas às Fábricas, 1959. 38. SESI-SP, Relatórios de Visitas às Fábricas, 1959. 39. Bedrikow and Rugai, 1965; Zaia, 1965. 40. VO, 7 Nov. 1952. These observations were also based on the analysis of production stages of seven mechanical firms surveyed by SESI in 1954. See Appendix B. 41. Six companies were taken into account for the analysis. See Appendix B. 42. Fonseca, 1953. 43. SESI-SP, Relatórios de Visitas às Fábricas, 1958. 44. ILO, Textiles Committee, 1949a, p. 65. 45. SESI-SP, Relatórios de Visitas às Fábricas, 1959, 1960. 46. 65 firms were analysed: six electrical equipment, five transport equipment, seven mechanical and 47 metallurgical. See Appendix B. 47. VO, 11 Jul. 1953; GS, 1–15 Nov. 1950. 48. SESI-SP, 1955a, table 14. 49. Braga, 1965, pp. 54–5. 50. The frequency coefficient relates the number of accidents occurred in a given period and the average person-hours of work in a factory or industry. The severity coefficient measures the average time lost due to accidents in a factory or industry. See ILO, 1947; CIPA Jornal, no. 9 (1950), p. 1; 19 (1951), p. 1. 51. CIPA Jornal, no. 19 (1951), p. 3. 52. CIPA Jornal, no. 103 (1961); 50 (1954). 53. SENAI-SP, 1943, p. 10. 54. CIPA Jornal, no. 104 (1961), p. 1. 55. ILO, Metal Trades Committe, 1949a, p. 54. 56. SESI-SP, Relatórios de Visitas às Fábricas, 1959. 57. BI, no. 186 (1953), pp. 111–12. 58. IS, no. 52 (1950), p. 2. 59. SESI-SP, Relatórios de Visitas às Fábricas, 1959. 60. CIPA Jornal, no. 19 (1951); 50 (1954). 61. Brasil, 1979, chapter iii, section iv, article 389. 62. Ibid. 63. NH, 16 Sept. 1952; GS, 1–15 Nov. 1950. 64. Hoje, 18 Feb. 1946; VO, 11 Aug. 1951. 65. NH, 20 Mar. 1957. 66. Negro, 1994, ch. 3; Willys-Overland, 1961; Vida na GM, no. 9 (1949); IS, no. 52 (1950), p. 3; RIA, no. 7 (1959), p. 13; BI, no. 186 (1953), pp. 111–12, 108–10. 67. GS, 15–31 May 1956. 68. VO, 29 Aug. 1953. 69. Blay, 1985, chs 3, 5. 70. RISP, no. 9 (1945), p. 20; Hoje, 26 Oct. 1945; BI, no. 186 (1953), pp. 108–10. For housing at one metalworking firm, Máquinas Piratininga, BI, no. 139 (1952), pp. 17–19.

202

Notes

71. On the relations between hours and productivity in particular historical cases, Pollard, 1978, pp. 156–9; Lee, 1978, items vi/vii. 72. Fausto, 1976, pp. 146–9. 73. Ribeiro, 1988, pp. 162–9. 74. Costa, 1995, pp. 12–20; Wolfe, 1993, pp. 97–102. 75. OM, Oct. 1953; VO, 25 Jan. 1958. 76. TRT 1571/51, SP, Ac. 674/52, 3 Mar. 1952. 77. VO, 10 Mar. 1951. 78. TRT 228/50, SP, Ac. 358/50, 28 Mar. 1950. 79. VO, 11 Jul. 1953. 80. VO, 7 Jun. 1952. 81. NH, 7 Nov. 1956. 82. NH, 17 Apr. 1958. 83. NH, 31 Jan. 1958. 84. VO, 15 Mar. 1958.

4. Shaping the Factory Environment 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

Rodrigues, 1968, ch. 2; Erickson, 1977, ch. 3. Maier, 1975, ch. 3; Gomes, 1979, chs 3–4; Fausto, 1976, pp. 188–90. Malloy, 1979, pp. 46–8; Gomes, 1979, chs 2, 4. Shotwell, 1934; Weindling, 1995. Malloy, 1979, pp. 37–8; ILO, 1941b, p. 18; Belloch, 1941; Sussekind, 1984. Gomes, 1979, chs 5–6, 8; Gomes, 1994, chs 3–4, 6–7. Ribeiro, 1988, pp. 151–7; Vianna, 1978, ch. 2. Costa, 1995, pp. 12–20; Wolfe, 1993, pp. 117–19; Mazzo, 1991, pp. 81–3; PRO FO 371/61204, LR no. 12, 20 Dec. 1946, p. 1 Circular FIESP, no. 238/45, 26 Dec. 1945. Boletim do Ministério do Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio [hereafter BMTIC], no. 120 (1944), pp. 25–30. ILO, Metal Trades Committee, 1947, pp. 55–7; ILO, 1941a; Costa, 1995, pp. 15–20; French, 1992, p. 135. Gomes, 1994, chs 6–8. Marcondes Filho, 1945. Schmitter, 1971, p. 185. RISP, no. 8 (1945), p. 11; 12 (1945), p. 29. BI, no. 99 (1951), p. 5 BT, no. 6 (1960), p. 22. ILO, 1949, p. 157. PRO LAB 13/498, LR no. 19, 6 Mar. 1947, pp. 1–2. RISP, no. 5 (1945), p. 11; 12 (1945), p. 29; 14 (1946), p. 66. BI, no. 319 (1955), pp. 13–17; CT, no. 89 (1949), p. 3; BT, no. 2 (1957), pp. 6–7. See on working (‘English’) week, BI, no. 98 (1951), p. 31; on the extension of maternity leave, ibid., 156 (1952), p. 326; on compensation for accidents, ibid., 223 (1954), pp. 26–32; on restrictions to night work, ibid., 452 (1958), pp. 701–2. BI, no. 208 (1953), pp. 55–6

Notes

203

24. Bill no. 1825–1952, Anais da Câmara dos Deputados, ii (1952), pp. 435–6. The bill was later rejected by the Congress’s Social Legislation Commission; see ibid., xxxii (1952), pp. 71–2. 25. BI, no. 372 (1956), pp. 174–6. 26. RISP, no. 2 (1945), p. 11. 27. Circular FIESP, no. 39/45, 21 Feb. 1945. 28. Revista Têxtil [hereafter RT], no. 7 (1945), p. 39. 29. Victor, 1949, pp. 72–4, 78–94. 30. RT, no. 10 (1945), pp. 29–36. 31. Victor, 1949, pp. 87, 94. 32. Ibid., pp. 100–1. 33. RISP, no. 12 (1945), pp. 32–3; 14 (1946), pp. 20, 28. 34. Circular FIESP, no. 54/46, 13 Mar. 1946; Hoje, 14 Mar. 1946, p. 11. 35. ‘Projeto de Estatutos da Fundação de Assistência ao Trabalhador’ (São Paulo, Apr. 1946), Roberto Simonsen Library. 36. Simonsen, [n.d.]. 37. PRO LAB 13/498, LR no. 32, 29 Dec. 1947; PRO LAB 13/498, LR no. 17, 25 Feb. 1947, p. 2; Simonsen, [n.d.], pp. 9–10. 38. Weinstein, 1996, pp. 112–13. 39. PRO LAB 13/498, LR no. 17, 25 Feb. 1947, p. 2; Simonsen, 1946. 40. Simonsen, 1946, p. 23; Weinstein, 1996, pp. 140–3. 41. PRO LAB 13/498, LR no. 17, 25 Feb. 1947, p. 4. 42. Simonsen, 1946, p. 23. 43. PRO LAB 13/498, LR no. 17, 25 Feb. 1947. 44. Ibid., p. 3. 45. SESI-SP, 1965, p. 9; Simonsen, [n.d.], p. 12. 46. PRO LAB 13/498, LR no. 17, 25 Feb. 1947, pp. 5–6. 47. Ibid., p. 4; Weinstein, 1996, p. 146. 48. Hoje, 24 Oct. 1945; 7 Nov. 1945. 49. SESI-SP, 1954, pp. 9–11. 50. Testimonial by Pedro Zaia (former Director of the SHSI) to the author, on 11 Dec. 1995. 51. Bedrikow and Rugai, 1965; Zaia, 1965. 52. SESI-SP, Relatórios de Visitas às Fábricas. 53. PRO LAB 13/1243, Visit to São Paulo, 17th to 21st December 1956, 7 Jan. 1957, p. 2. 54. Hoje, 13 Feb. 1947. 55. Hoje, 13 Apr. 1946. 56. Hoje, 22 Mar. 1947. 57. This was common practice at the metalworking company Fichet & Schwartz in Santo André, according to interview of Mr Philadelpho Brás by the author, 4 Apr. 1996. 58. Almeida, 1981, p. 18. 59. Hoje, 13 Apr. 1946; 23 Aug. 1946. 60. Almeida, 1981, pp. 131–3. 61. Fontes, 1997, pp. 119–20. 62. CA-RMP, Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 5, ‘Programa de Luta da CTB’ [n.d.], p. 1. 63. Almeida, 1981, p. 109.

204

Notes

64. CA-RMP, Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 5, ‘Relatório da União Geral dos Trabalhadores de São Paulo’, 1951, pp. 2–3. 65. GS, 27 Aug. 1948. 66. CTB Informativo, no. 4 (1950), p. 5. 67. NH, 31 Mar. 1951, p. 8. The unsanitary fee was laid down by the CLT to be added to wages for those workers labouring in unsanitary jobs. 68. GS, 15–30 Apr. 1951. 69. Costa, 1995, pp. 152–9; Wolfe, 1993, ch. 6. 70. NH, 13 Oct. 1953; 19 May 1954. 71. VO, 29 Aug. 1953. 72. GS, 15–30 Nov. 1953. 73. NH, 25 Oct. 1953. 74. Almeida, 1981, pp. 225–7; Lopes, 1992, p. 66; Fontes, 1997, pp. 145–8. 75. GS, 15–31 May 1956. 76. NH, 21 Jan. 1958. 77. NH, 23 Apr. 1958. 78. Negro, 1994, pp. 36–7, 54, ch. 4; IS, no. 52 (1950), pp. 2–3. 79. E. Rowell, Resolutions Approved by Plenary Sessions of the First Workers Syndical Congress of the State of São Paulo, 16 Jan. 1946, RG 59, 832.5043/ 1–1646, NACP. 80. Almeida, 1981, pp. 107–8; 110–11. 81. Hoje, 20 Oct. 1945; 23 Oct. 1945. 82. Hoje, 18 Mar. 1947. 83. Henry, 1947, p. 441; CA-RMP, Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 4, ‘AntiProjeto [sic] de Programa da CTB’ [n.d.], pp. 1–2. 84. NH, 18 Aug. 1953. 85. CA-RMP, Box no. 20, A 1, 46 (6), ‘la Assembéia Nacional de Mulheres’, 1952, pp. 1–2. 86. GS, 15–31 Oct. 1953. 87. Lopes, 1992, pp. 63–4, 80. 88. Lopes, 1992, p. 66; Pupo Nogueira, 1957. 89. VO, 21 Jan. 1956. 90. Hoje, 24 Jan. 1946. 91. Mazzo, 1991, Part I, chs 23–27; Part II, chs 2–4; French, 1992, ch. 5; Fontes, 1997, ch. 4. 92. CA-RMP, Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 5, ‘Relatório da União Geral dos Trabalhadores de São Paulo’, 1950, pp. 3–4. 93. Harding, 1973, pp. 339–43. 94. Cavalheiro, 1961, p. 7. 95. VO, 11 Aug. 1951; 18 Jul. 1953; 6 Apr. 1957.

5. Industrial Capabilities 1. Gupta, 1989, chs 3–4; Lago, 1979; Leff, 1968. Brazil’s share in the international production of machine tools grew from 0.15 per cent in 1955 to 0.95 per cent in 1962. Calculated from United Nations, 1969, annex i, p. 39. 2. ECLA, 1969, p. 75.

Notes

205

3. Gupta, 1989, pp. 49–56. For a theoretical approach to the importance of user–producer relationships, Lundvall, 1992. 4. ECLA, 1969, pp. 80–1. 5. Ibid., p. 78. 6. Ibid., pp. 76–84. 7. Sabel and Zeitlin, 1997; Berg, 1994; Freeman and Soete, 1997, ch. 9. 8. United Nations, 1969, pp. 30–1. 9. ECLA, 1969, p. 76, table 2. 10. OECD, 1992, pp. 239–41; Freeman and Soete, 1997, chs 2–7, 12. 11. GM, 1995, p. 63. 12. Ibid., p. 61. 13. Caspari [n.d.], pp. 3–4; Vianna, 1990b, pp. 125–8. 14. RIA, no. 1 (1958), pp. 21–3; Revista Paulista da Indústria [hereafter RPI], no. 24 (1954), pp. 23–38. 15. Addis, 1993, chs 4–5. 16. RPI, no. 24 (1954), pp. 40–4; Addis, 1993, chs 4–5. 17. RIA, no. 6 (1959), pp. 8–10. 18. Addis, 1993, ch. 2; Nascimento, 1976, p. 65. 19. GEIA [n.d.], p. 33. 20. Addis, 1993, pp. 305–8. 21. E. Plowden to W. Mauck, Monthly Report on the Activities of the CBAI, 13 Mar. 1953 (Enclosure: Visit to Industrial Plants in São Paulo), RG 469, FBR-2058, NACP. 22. Addis, 1993, chs 2, 5. 23. Ibid., ch. 6 24. Interview with N. V. Simões, 1990, by Ciro Dias Reis, ANFAVEA Archives, CDHA 670, MPTK 1; Vida na GM, no. 11 (1950), p. 16. 25. Shapiro, 1994, ch. 2; Addis, 1993, pp. 91–130; Gattás, 1981, chs 6–7. 26. Addis, 1993, pp. 130–5; CEPAL, 1963, pp. 13–4, 26–8. 27. CEPAL, 1963, pp. 27–8. 28. Addis, 1993, pp. 133–4. 29. Baranson, 1969, pp. 54–5, 79–80. 30. Shapiro, 1994, ch. 3. 31. For management’s views on investing in developing countries, Sloan, 1986, pp. 315–16; Donner, 1967, pp. 62–3. On lorries’ markets: CNI, 1959, p. 12. 32. RIA, no. 3 (1958), p. 4. 33. GM, 1995, pp. 63–4. 34. Interview with A. Mortara, 4 Jun. 1990, by Ciro Dias Reis, ANFAVEA Archives, CDHA GG3, MPTK 1. 35. A. Tângari, Relatório de Visitas, 2 Aug. 1957, ANFAVEA Archives, Doc 153, 1.1 corresp. 1957. 36. Vida na GM, no. 13 (1951), p. 3; GM, 1995, pp. 61–2. 37. Interview with A. Mortara, 4 Jun. 1990, by Ciro Dias Reis, ANFAVEA Archives, CDHA GG3, MPTK 1. 38. Mercedes-Benz do Brasil, 1957; interview with A. Mortara, 4 Jun. 1990, by Ciro Dias Reis, ANFAVEA Archives, CDHA GG3, MPTK 1. 39. RIA, no. 9 (1959), pp. 16–17; Visão, 22 Nov. 1976; Vemag, 1963, pp. 2–3. 40. Visão, 22 Nov. 1976.

206

Notes

41. RIA, no. 7 (1959), pp. 8–12; A. Tângari, Relatório de Visitas, 2 Aug. 1957, ANFAVEA Archives, Doc 153, 1.1 corresp. 1957. 42. Negro, 1994, ch. 2; Cobbs, 1992, pp. 201–26. 43. RIA, no. 8 (1959), p. 9; Interview with A. Tângari, 1990, by Ciro Dias Reis, ANFAVEA Archives, CDHA 664, MPTK 1. 44. Shapiro, 1994, ch. 1. 45. Cusumano, 1985. 46. Stein, 1957; Versiani, 1971. 47. CE, no. 2 (1955), pp. 17–18. In 1947, Brazil had been the sixth-largest world exporter, after the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Japan and France. See ILO, Textiles Committee, 1948a, p. 157 48. CETEX, 1946, pp. 81–7; ECLA, 1951a, p. 255; RISP, no. 4 (1945), pp. 24–5. 49. For Brazil, the index was 3.4 per cent, CETEX, Mar. 1950, p. 40. Other countries’ indexes were (all data are for 1939): United States (68.5 per cent), Japan (12 per cent), Soviet Union (10 per cent), the United Kingdom (3 per cent). Brazil’s proportion of automatic looms was estimated at 5.6 per cent in 1939, see CETEX, 1946, pp. 87–8. 50. CE, no. 1 (1954), table i, p. 42. 51. ECLA, 1951b, table 6, p. 34. For Brazil, automatic looms amounted 4.8 per cent in 1951. 52. ECLA, 1963a, table 52, p. 33. The share for Brazil was 25.5 per cent. 53. Banas, 1957. 54. Whewell, 1978, p. 661; ILO, 1960, pp. 528, 530. 55. Oswald, 1951; ECLA, 1951b, p. 17; ECLA, 1963a, p. 83. 56. Whewell, 1978, pp. 649–51, 662, 672; ILO, 1960, pp. 528–9. 57. ECLA, 1951b, p. 23. 58. ECLA, 1963a, p. 54; Araújo Jr. and Pereira, 1976, p. 18. 59. Lazonick, 1990, introduction, ch. 10; Lewchuk, 1987. 60. RISP, no. 11 (1945), pp. 26–7; RPI, no. 20 (1954), pp. 18–23. 61. E. Plowden to W. Mauck, Monthly Report on the Activities of the CBAI, 13 Mar. 1953 (Enclosure: Report of Plant Visit, 13 Feb. 1953), RG 469, F-BR-2058, NACP. Elevadores Atlas employed about 3,000 workers in 1953. 62. ECLA, 1963b, pp. 52–60. 63. Desenvolvimento & Conjuntura, no. 11 (1959), pp. 51–7. 64. BI, no. 124 (1952), p. 11. 65. As shown by a photo taken at General Electric’s electrical motor assembly department in São Paulo. RPI, no. 29 (1954), p. 57. 66. SESI data, Appendix B. 67. E. Plowden to W. Mauck, Monthly Report on the Activities of the CBAI, 13 Mar. 1953 (Enclosure: Report of Plant Visit, 13 Feb. 1953), RG 469, F-BR2058, NACP. The radio receiver department employed a static assembly line. 68. Auto & Motor, no. 10 (1958), pp. 6–14. 69. RIA, no. 10 (1958), p. 23. 70. RPI, no. 24 (1954), pp. 37–9. 71. RPI, no. 24 (1954), p. 208. 72. Góes Filho [n.d.]; Barros Jr. [n.d.]. On the origins and principles of the Fordist approach, Hounshell, 1984, ch. 6. 73. Meyer, 1989. 74. CETEX, 1946, p. 152; Pupo Nogueira, 1945.

Notes 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

207

RISP, no. 25 (1946), pp. 40–1. CE, no. 1 (1952), p. 26; VO, 11 Aug. 1951. VO, 20 Dec. 1952. VO, 21 Jan. 1956; 15 Dec. 1956; NH, 22 Nov. 1956; 17 Apr. 1958. ECLA, 1963a, chs 5–6. Klauser, 1945, pp. 57–62; Kanitz, 1956, pp. 52–4. Van Ark, 1993, pp. 92–3; appendix, table iv.4. Van Ark’s figures refer to labour productivity measured by industrial value added per (estimated) hour worked for all manufacturing industries in Brazil. See Van Ark, 1993, appendix iii. For a historical analysis of the relations between productive capabilities, exchange rates and competitiveness, see Dahmén, 1988, pp. 6–7, 12–14. For the concept of total factor productivity and its problems, Link, 1987, pp. 11–13, 15–24. Maddison et al., 1992, pp. 49–52. Link, 1987, pp. 13–15. Wells, 1983, p. 165. ECLA, 1954, table 184, p. 211; CE, no. 1 (1954), p. 27. Maddison et al., 1992, pp. 52–5; Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993. Hikino and Amsden, 1994, pp. 291–2. Macario, 1964, p. 72, note 29. Macario, 1964, annex ii, table A, p. 92.

6. The Political Economy of Productivity Performance 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Pupo Nogueira, 1945, pp. 17–18. Lanari Jr., 1945, p. 35. Galliez, 1946, pp. 40–3. SIFTSP, 1949, p. vi; SIFTSP, 1948, pp. 2–3, 7. For a contrary view, Bergsman, 1970, pp. 98–101. CE, no. 3 (1953), pp. 49–54; 4 (1958), pp. 57–63. CE, no. 9 (1956), pp. 11–14; no. 2 (1960), pp. 55–63. CE, no. 3 (1955), pp. 49–53. BI, no. 264 (1954), pp. 171–2. BI, no. 303 (1955). BI, no. 270 (1954), pp. 366–7. BI, no. 279 (1955), pp. 267–8. BI, no. 264 (1954), pp. 171–2. F. B., 1946, pp. 40–1. Ibid., p. 41. RT, no. 1 (1955), pp. 24–35; Oswald, 1951. RISP, no. 16 (1946), p. 68; 17 (1946), p. 19. Hoje, 23 Jan. 1946. Hoje, 14 Mar. 1946. Maier, 1987; Carew, 1987. Pollard, 1985, pp. 203–9. Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1949, vol. I, part 1, pp. 776–83, ‘Objectives and Nature of the Point IV Program’. For the (unclear) origins of Point Four, Erb, 1985, pp. 268–9.

208

Notes

23. FRUS, 1951, vol. I, pp. 316–17, ‘Essential Points of Mutual Security Program’; 1951, vol. II, pp. 1041–6, ‘Justification for the Point Four Program in the Other American Republics – FY 1952’. 24. Baldwin, 1966, chs 2–3. 25. FRUS, 1949, vol. II, pp. 574–7, ‘Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Harold Midkiff of the Division of Brazilian Affairs’. 26. I. Salert, Embassy Despatch no. 1461, 19 Feb. 1952, RG 59, 832.06.3–552, NACP. 27. R. Groves and G. Sadler, Report of Industrial Productivity Program (June 1952 – December 1953), RG 469, NACP. 28. PRO LAB 13/1300, LR no. 3/58, 23 Dec. 1958, p. 3; G. Sadler to W. Mauck, 9 Nov. 1953, RG 469, NACP. 29. IDORT – Revista de Organização e Produtividade, no. 299–300 (1956), p. 1; PRO LAB 13/1300, LR no. 3/58, 23 Dec. 1958, p. 4. 30. PRO LAB 13/1300, LR no. 3/58, 23 Dec. 1958, p. 3. 31. Ibid., p. 4. 32. Ibid. 33. PRO LAB 13/1015, Mitchell to Greenhough, 19 Apr. 1955, p. 1. 34. PRO LAB 13/1300, LR no. 3/58, 23 Dec. 1958, p. 5. 35. RISP, no. 1 (1944), p. 53. 36. BMTIC, no. 120 (1944), pp. 25–30. 37. Victor, 1949, pp. 61–5. 38. CETEX, 1946, pp. 186–93. 39. Galliez, 1946, p. 40; Victor, 1949, pp. 61–5. 40. TRT 736/45, SP, Ac. 240/46, 24 May 1946. 41. Hoje, 22 Mar. 1947. 42. TRT 736/45, SP, Ac. 240/46, 24 May 1946. 43. Hoje, 22 Mar. 1947. 44. Hoje, 8 Oct. 1946. 45. Hoje, 27 Sept. 1946. 46. Hoje, 13 Mar. 1947. 47. Hoje, 27 Sept. 1946. 48. TRT 172/45, SP, Ac. 188/45, 28 May 1945. 49. TRT 713/46, SP, Ac. 13/47, 9 Jan. 1947; TRT 54/1947, SP, Ac. 137/47, 6 Feb. 1947. 50. TRT 929/49, SP, Ac. 1277/49, 28 Nov. 1949. 51. VO, 17 Jun. 1950. 52. Vida na GM, no. 10 (1950), p. 13; CA-RMP, Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 5, ‘Relatório da União Geral dos Trabalhadores do Estado de São Paulo’, 1950, p. 11. 53. VO, 11 Aug. 1951; CA-RMP, Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 1, ‘Informe do Secretariado da CTB à reunião da Comissão Executiva’, 1951, p. 8. 54. CA-RMP, Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 1, ‘Informe do Secretariado da CTB à reunião da Comissão Executiva’, 1951, p. 8. 55. VO, 27 Aug. 1951; NH, 9 May 1954; GS, 1–15 Sept. 1950. 56. TRT 881/49, SA, Ac. 888/50, 6 Jul. 1950. 57. CTB Informativo, no. 2 (1950), p. 4; TRT 1060/48, SP, Ac. 1143/48, 18 Nov. 1948; TRT 766/49, SP, 1042/49, 26 Sept. 1949. 58. TRT 323/47, SP, Ac. 437/50, [n.d.]; TRT 1401/51, SP, Ac. 1447/51, 6 Nov. 1951.

Notes

209

59. TRT 335/49, SP, Ac. 776/49, 28 Jun. 1949; TRT 1041/49, SP, Ac. 1407/50, 11 Dec. 1950; PRO LAB 13/498, LR no. 13, 19 Nov. 1946. 60. TRT 1219/50, SP, Ac. 1312/50, 16 Nov. 1950. 61. TRT 1168/48, SP, Ac. 1328/48, 21 Dec. 1948; TRT 12/51, SP, Ac. 173/51, 12 Feb. 1951. 62. CA-RMP, Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 1, ‘Informe do Secretariado da CTB à reunião da Comissão Executiva’, 1951, p. 9; Folder 5, ‘Relatório da União Geral dos Trabalhadores do Estado de São Paulo’, 1951, p. 11. 63. TRT 362/52, SP, Ac. 716/52, 24 Apr. 1952. 64. VO, 16 Oct. 1954. 65. VO, 31 May 1952. 66. VO, 29 Feb. 1952. 67. VO, 21 Feb. 1953. 68. NH, 30 Jul. 1953. 69. NH, 3 Oct. 1953; 3 Sept. 1953. 70. GS, 1–15 Nov. 1953. 71. GS, 15–30 Nov. 1953. 72. VO, 21 Jan. 1956; 6 Apr. 1957; NH, 21 Jan. 1958; 17 Apr. 1958. 73. VO, 21 Jan. 1956. 74. NH, 1 Nov. 1956; 20 Nov. 1956; 21 Nov. 1956; VO, 15 Dec. 1956. 75. BT, no. 12 (1958), p. 6. 76. BT, no. 11 (1959), p. 35. 77. RT, no. 11 (1960). 78. BMTIC, no. 130 (1945), p. 197. 79. Saretta, 1995, pp. 115–19; Vianna, 1990a, pp. 105–14; Eichengreen, 1996, ch. 4. 80. Hoje, 19 Feb. 1946. 81. Henry, 1947, pp. 441–2. 82. MUT – Boletim de Orientação Sindical, no. 1 (1945). 83. CA-RMP, Box no. 17, A 1, 39 (4) (6), Folder 5, ‘Relatório da União Geral dos Trabalhadores do Estado de São Paulo’, 1951, p. 4. 84. BT, no. 6 (1954), p. 21. The assiduity clause for dissídios coletivos was banned in Jul. 1955 by Law no. 2,510. 85. VO, 21 Jan. 1956. 86. OM, Apr. 1959. 87. Ibid. 88. OM, Jul.–Aug. 1960. 89. PRO LAB 13/1339, LR no. 16/59, 10 Jun. 1959. On Instrução no. 113, Bergsman, 1970, pp. 73–5. 90. American Can Company Case, 24 Feb. 1959 and 27 Mar. 1959; Records of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Roy Rubottom), 1957–9; RG 59; NACP. 91. BI, no. 360 (1956), pp. 235–45. 92. OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Reel VI – Brazil, ‘Nationalism in Brazil’, Intelligence Report No. 8002, 21 Aug. 1959, pp. 56–9. 93. OM, Sept. 1958. 94. Ação Socialista, Jun. 1959; Sept. 1959. 95. Tribuna Sindical, Mar. 1958. 96. Bielschowsky, 1988.

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Index Australia, 43 Austria, 151 Brazilian-American Commission for Industrial Education (CBAI), 40 Brazilian Labour Party (PTB), 52, 55 British Labour Attaché, 103, 104, 162 Café Filho, João, 60 Canada, 43 CASIT, see Commission of Social Assistance of the Textile Industry CBAI, see Brazilian-American Commission for Industrial Education CETEX, see Executive Commission of the Textile Industry Cold War, 48, 54, 57, 62, 160, 175, 181 Collective disputes (dissídios coletivos), 47, 54, 55, 58, 165 Commission of Social Assistance of the Textile Industry (CASIT), 100 Commission of Social Orientation (COS), 100 Communist Party of Brazil (PCB), 55, 56, 116, 117, 159, 176, 179 Competitiveness, 37, 124, 125, 133, 134, 142, 151, 155, 182 Confederation of Brazilian Workers (CTB), 51, 55, 56, 114, 116, 176 Consolidated Labour Laws (CLT), 84, 88, 89, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 111, 114, 115, 117 Cooperative of Unionised Workers, 104 Corrêa e Castro, Pedro, 56 Corrêa, Sylvio Brand, 156 CTB, see Confederation of Brazilian Workers Denmark, 151 Department for Political and Social Order (DOPS), 165, 170

Devisate, Antônio, 98 DIEESE, see Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies DOPS, see Department for Political and Social Order Dutra, Eurico Gaspar, 7, 20, 47, 48, 49, 55, 56, 58, 89, 101, 102, 104, 114, 116, 160, 169, 174, 176, 177, 180 ECLA, see Economic Commission for Latin America Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 123, 124 Estado Novo, 34, 36, 46, 55, 57, 89, 95 Europe, 35, 42, 43, 94, 95, 97, 151, 161 Executive Commission of the Textile Industry (CETEX), 88, 89, 90, 155 Executive Group for the Motor Vehicle Industry (GEIA), 10, 44, 128 Factory commissions, 46, 49, 50, 51, 108, 109, 110, 111, 115 Factory conditions accidents, 65, 71, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87, 92, 100, 105, 106, 107, 112, 114, 115, 116 health hazards, 67, 71, 74, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 87, 107, 112, 117, 118, 150 industrial hygiene, 67, 83, 94, 99, 105, 106, 107, 111, 114, 115, 117, 118 occupational diseases, 68, 70, 71, 73, 76, 105, 107, 115 FAT, see Foundation for Worker Assistance Federation of Industries in the State of São Paulo (FIESP), 8, 35, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 156, 158, 159, 175 Fernandes, Raúl, 161 222

Index FIESP, see Federation of Industries in the State of São Paulo Figueiredo, Morvan Dias, 56, 57 Food Supply Division – SESI, 104, 105 Fordist production methods, 138, 139 Foreign workers, 15, 34 Foundation for Worker Assistance (FAT), 102 France, 28, 42, 95, 142, 151 GEIA, see Executive Group for the Motor Vehicle Industry Gender, 3, 11, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 28 General Union of Workers of São Paulo, 116 Germany, 28, 131, 142, 151 Gudin, Eugênio, 181 IDORT, see Institute for the Rational Organisation of Work ILO, see International Labour Organisation Immigrants, 15, 42, 43 Industrial capabilities foreign technical assistance, 126, 128, 137, 160, 161 learning process, 122, 123, 124, 126 technical and organisational conditions, 13, 16, 17, 20, 32, 82, 121, 123, 124, 128, 130, 132, 140, 141, 143, 144, 150, 151, 152, 157, 175, 178 work organisation, 118, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 155, 158, 164, 166 Industrial exports, 133, 155, 156, 157 Industrial Hygiene and Safety Service (SHSI–SESI), 105 Industrial performance, 65, 118, 121, 124, 127, 135, 143, 150, 152, 153, 159 Industrial training, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 45, 127 Institute for the Rational Organisation of Work (IDORT), 34, 163 Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA), 161 Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), 43

223

International Labour Organisation (ILO), 83, 95, 97 International Refugee Organisation (IRO), 43 Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (DIEESE), 61 Inter-Union Unity Pact (PUI), 51, 59, 60, 61, 111, 115, 178, 179 Italy, 28, 42 Japan, 28, 35, 40, 97, 133 Korean War, 90, 111, 161 Kubitscheck, Juscelino, 60, 61, 171, 178 Labour political groups Coligação Sindical, 55, 57 Coligação Sindical dos Trabalhadores, 61 communists, 55, 56, 59, 102, 105, 116, 159, 160, 176, 177, 180 independents, 51, 55, 61, 62 Left in general, 36, 51, 54, 56, 59, 96, 153, 179, 180, 181 ministerialistas, 56, 175, 180 Labour Tribunals (TRT and TST), 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 58, 166 Latin America, 123, 133, 161 Liga Socialista Independente, 180 Lodi, Euvaldo, 97 Mange, Roberto, 35 Marshall Plan, 160, 161 Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce (MTIC), 8, 36, 40, 46, 55, 56, 57, 102, 161, 162, 176 National Centre for Productivity, 162 National Confederation of Industrial Workers (CNTI), 57, 163, 180 National Confederation of Industry (CNI), 35, 57, 97, 103, 162 National Service for Industrial Training (SENAI), 6, 11, 15, 17, 18, 19, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 82, 100, 102, 103, 159, 162, 163, 166 National Steel Company (CSN), 125

224

Index

Nationalism, 179, 180 Norway, 151 Point Four, 160, 161, 162, 163 Pomar, Pedro, 159, 176 Productivity productivity growth, 88, 142, 143, 148, 150, 154, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 167, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 181 productivity measures, 88, 91, 163, 164, 167, 170, 171, 177, 178, 181 work effort, 90, 157, 164, 170, 172, 173, 174 Productivity Department – FIERJ, 162 Protectionism, 60, 61, 151, 153, 164, 174, 175, 178, 180 PTB, see Brazilian Labour Party PUI, see Inter-Union Unity Pact Pupo Nogueira, Otávio, 154 Regional Labour Department, 52, 173 Repression, 46, 47, 48, 49, 56, 57, 94, 109, 110, 114, 116, 160, 165, 166, 167, 169 Santo André, 5, 6, 9, 104, 105, 112, 114, 169 São Bernardo do Campo, 5, 6, 10 São Caetano do Sul, 5, 10, 73, 130 São Paulo (capital), 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 22, 50, 51, 52, 100, 104, 105, 115, 116, 177 Simonsen, Roberto, 34, 35, 36, 37, 99, 102, 103, 165 Skills foremen, 12, 13, 17, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 39, 40, 130, 137, 138, 140, 166, 170 semi-skilled labour, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 21, 28, 31, 34, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 136, 138 skilled labour, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 115, 133, 137, 138, 139, 166 unskilled labour, 8, 11, 14, 21, 28, 41, 44, 136, 138

Social Assistance Food Service (SAPS), 102, 104 Social Insurance Institute for Industrial Workers (IAPI), 35, 100 Social Peace Charter, 101 Social Service of Industry (SESI), 66, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 79, 81, 82, 83, 87, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 118, 159, 162, 163, 166 Strikes company, 47, 50, 54, 59, 109, 110, 169, 172 sectoral, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 95, 96, 99, 101, 111, 159, 165, 166, 170, 175, 176 Sweden, 28, 97, 131 Syndicate of the Spinning and Weaving Industry in the State of São Paulo (SIFTSP), 99, 101, 157 Targets Plan (Plano de Metas), 9, 128, 129, 130, 131 Taylorist production methods, 139, 157, 159, 165, 174 Trade union delegates, 52, 112, 116 Trade Union Renewal Movement, 117 Training within Industry (TWI), 40 TWI, see Training within Industry Unemployment, 7, 8, 9, 60, 62, 116 Unifying Movement of Workers (MUT), 55, 56, 176 United Kingdom, 151 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 95, 165 United States, 28, 35, 95, 130, 132, 139, 142, 151, 160, 161, 168 US foreign policy, 154, 160 US Labor Attaché, 54 UNRRA, see United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Unsanitary fee (taxa de insalubridade), 110, 112, 117 Vargas, Getúlio, 34, 36, 43, 49, 50, 59, 60, 102, 110, 161, 169 Viana, Segadas, 161

Index Wages legal minimum wage, 23, 31, 58, 60, 91, 117, 178 low wages, 15, 24, 28, 29, 151, 159, 170, 176, 182 wage bargaining, 22, 33, 45, 46, 52, 54, 55, 61, 181 wage costs, 121, 143, 144, 148, 149

225

wage levels, 22, 24, 37, 45, 51, 53, 58, 59, 60, 91 wage systems, 25, 26, 164, 168 Women workers, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 37, 45, 50, 70, 71, 84, 85, 87, 95, 114, 115, 116, 137, 138, 166, 168 Young workers, 19, 20, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 114, 137

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