KNOWLEDGE AND INFALLIBILITY J. L. Evans Professor of Philosophy University College, Cardiff
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KNOWLEDGE AND INFALLIBILITY J. L. Evans Professor of Philosophy University College, Cardiff
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS NEW YORK
©]. L. Evans 1978 All rights reselVed. For information, write: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
Typeset in Great Britain by Vantage Photosetting Co Ltd Southampton and London Printed in Great britain Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 78-18.(.68 First published in the United States of America in 1979
Library of Congress Cataloging in PubHcation Data Evans,]. L. Knowledge and infallibility. Bibliography: p. Includes index. I. Infallibility (Philosophy) 2. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Title. BD234.E9 121 78-18468 ISBN 0-31 2-45g06-8
Contents Acknowledgements Introduction I
Some Problems about Knowledge
2
Everyday Assumptions about Knowledge
VI
Vll
15
3 Knowledge and Infallibility
29
4 The Infallibility Thesis
44
5 Knowledge and Perception
57
6 Knowing as an Act
75
7 Acquaintance and Intuition
87
8 Knowing as a Mental State
101
9 Knowledge and Belief
121
Bibliographical Notes
141
Index
143
Acknowledgements Many friends have helped me at various stages in the writing of this book. At Cardiff, I have benefited greatly from discussions with colleagues in the Department of Philosophy, and especially with Mr Donald Evans who also commented in detail on an earlier draft; Mr W. O. Evans and Mr H. M. Quinn of the Department of English and Professor F. J. Jones of the Department of Italian gave me invaluable advice, particularly on matters of presentation. Outside Cardiff, Professor R. I. Aaron of Aberystwyth and Professor S. Korner of Bristol assisted me with advice and encouragement. To Professor Sir Alfred Ayer of New College, Oxford lowe a threefold debt: for what I have learned from his writings, for prompting me to write this book and for his sustained interest at every stage in its preparation. My son, Mr D. L. Evans, made many suggestions which I was glad to accept. I would like to thankDrC. W. L. Bevan, Principal of University College, Cardiff, not only for his constant encouragement, but also for his readiness to arrange relief from my administrative duties while I was writing this book, and Professor T. H. McPherson for undertaking them in my place. Finally, I acknowledge with gratitude my debt to previous writers, too many to enumerate here, on the topic of knowledge, but particularly to J. L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle. J. L. Evans
Cardiff Apn·11978
VI
Introduction This book is written both for students of philosophy and for the general reader. It assumes little or no previous knowledge of the subject, yet tries to make intelligible to non-specialists some of the contemporary as well as some of the traditional discussions on the topic of knowledge. As a teacher of philosophy I have found that students are often puzzled by the diversity of views expressed on the concept of knowledge both in the writings of traditional philosophers and in the many books and articles published on the subject in the last twenty years or so. They are further puzzled by the remarkable disparity between the assumptions about knowledge which we make in everyday life and the things which many philosophers say when they theorise about knowledge, and also between the use of the concept by historians and scientists, for example, and the speculations of many philosophers on knowledge. I have tried, ther'e(ore, to provide a critical review of some of the main developments specifically with a view to trying to explain why this disparity has arisen. The main reason for its prevalence is, I believe, the acceptance by many philosophers of certain long standing misconceptions or myths which have hindered our understanding of the concept of knowledge. The influence of these myths can be detected in contemporary as well as in traditional philosophy: their continued survival, in whole or in part, is the justification for this attempt to eradicate them. The primary myth is that knowledge must be infallible in the sense that we can have knowledge only where there is not the possibility of being mistaken, that we can be right only where we cannot be wrong. The second myth is the description of knowing as an experience or as a mental act, something which we do. The V1l
VIll
KNOWLEDGE AND INFALLIBILITY
conjunction of these two myths results in a severe restriction of the extent of our knowledge and in an equally severe restriction on the ways in which knowledge may be acquired. We can know only what cannot be false, and the only procedures which can yield knowledge are those which are immune from the risk of error. The third myth is that knowledge is a mental state or mental attitude which can be equated with being sure, or at least involves being sure. In contrast with these positions is our widespread practice of allowing that there is, in principle, litde or no restriction on the areas where we can get knowledge, and that familiar procedures such as observation and inference, though not exempt from error, can often provide knowledge. A consequence of the acceptance of some or all of these myths is that the relationship between knowledge and belief is misunderstood. A further consequence is that philosophers frequendy seek to replace the concept of knowledge as understood and used in everyday life by a technical, philosophical concept which fits in with their other theories. I do not myself think that it is within the province of philosophy to alter or seek to replace the concepts in common use: its business is, rather, to increase our understanding of these concepts, particularly by exhibiting their relationships with kindred concepts. Nor do I see how the substitution of a technical concept for a familiar one can in any way illuminate it: on the contrary, it can lead only to its distortion. I defend, therefore, the assumptions about knowledge which we commonly make, and try to show that they survive the challenge from the theories based on the myths to which I have referred.
Some Problems about Knowledge I
The reader who is unacquainted with philosophical speculation about knowledge might well think that a discussion of the nature of knowledge should start by giving a clear indication of what it is, and this expectation might well be expressed by asking for a definition of knowledge. Surely, it might be said, before we can profitably consider and assess rival theories about knowledge, it would be appropriate to begin with a definition which might bring out the essential features of knowledge and enable us to distinguish it from related notions with which it might be confused. There are, however, several reasons why this natural expectation must remain unsatisfied. The first obvious rejoinder which we could make is that the proper place for a definition of knowledge would be at the end of our inquiry rather than at the start. Explorers, we might point out, do not start their explorations with a worked-out map of the territory which they are intending to explore; on the contrary, the detailed map can be produced only after the exploration has been successfully completed. Those explorers who set out in search of the source of the Nile, for example, could not already have known the source when they set out. But it would be absurd to suggest that they set out in utter ignorance of what they were looking for: they had hunches which they were trying to convert into certainties. So we, embarking on an exploration of the concept of knowledge, are not, at the start of our inquiry, assured of our conclusions, as our ability to offer a definition of knowledge would imply; nevertheless we are not travelling in wholly unfamiliar
2
KNOWLEDGE AND INFALLIBILITY
territory. We are, after all, dealing with a notlon whiCh is already broadly familiar in everyday life, and signposts are not wholly lacking to guide us. It is not the case that without a map in the form of a definition we do not and cannot know where we are going. In the second place, it might be said in reply to the request for a definition that to provide one might well prejudge some of the issues which should be kept open at the start of an inquiry into knowledge. Philosophers have, indeed, frequently attempted to define knowledge in terms of other related notions such as belief; it has been suggested, for example, that knowledge can be defined in terms of 'justified, true belief. The adoption of such a suggestion would, however, meet with the objection from other philosophers that knowledge is a unique, unanalysable notion, the nature of which would inevitably be distorted by any attempt to define it in terms of any other notion. Further, such an attempted definition could be successful only if the notion of belief was alr