Justice in Time

Interdisziplinare Studien zu Recht und Staat Lukas H. Meyer (Hrsg.)

Justice in Time Responding to Historical Injustice

N o m o s Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden

30

Interdisziplinare Studien zu Recht und Staat In Verbindung mit Winfried Brugger, Joachim Hruschka, Arthur Kaufmann f, Hermann Klenner, Ernst-Joachim Lampe, Niklas Luhmann f, Manfred Rehbinder, Hubert Rottleuthner, Riidiger Schott herausgegeben von Werner Maihofer und Gerhard Sprenger Band 30

Lukas H. Meyer (Hrsg.)

Justice in Time

Responding to Historical Injustice

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden

Die Interdisziplinaren Studien zu Recht und Staat sind eine neue Folge des Jahrbuchs fur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, das in den Jahren 1970-1993 beim Bertelsmann Universitatsverlag Reinhard Mohn bzw. Westdeutschen Verlag erschienen ist. Bereits in den letzten Jahren gingen die Inhalte sachlichen Notwendigkeiten gehorchend zunehmend iiber die Bereiche Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie hinaus. Fast immer wurden auch grundlegende Fragen der Rechtsphilosophie und Staatstheorie mitbehandelt. Dies soli im neuen Titel der Reihe zum Ausdruck kommen und noch ein anderes: die in den Jahrbuch-Banden ver6ffentlichten Beitrage und Diskussionen haben durchweg fachiibergreifenden Charakter. Sie sind iiberwiegend aus Tagungen hervorgegangen, die durch das Zentrum fur interdisziplinare Forschung (ZiF) der Universitat Bielefeld gefbrdert wurden. Auch dies sollte in dem neuen Namen deutlich werden. Uberlingen/Bielefeld 1994

Die Herausgeber

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet iiber http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar. ISBN 3-8329-0503-0

1. Aufiage2004 © Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2004. Printed in Germany. Alle Rechte, auch die des Nachdrucks von Ausziigen, der photomechanischen Wiedergabe und der tibersetzung, vorbehalten. Gedruckt auf alterungsbestSndigem Papier.

5

Vorwort

Vom 12.-14. Juli 2001 fand am Einstein Forum Potsdam in Kooperation mit dem lnstitut fur interkulturelle und Internationale Studien der Universitat Bremen eine Tagung zum Thema "Historical Justice/Historische Gerechtigkeit" statt, die die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft und das British Council gefordert und zu der Professor Chaim Gans und ich eingeladen haben. Chaim Gans und ich hatten im Juni 1998 erstmals Qber eine Tagung zum Thema "Historische Gerechtigkeit" gesprochen. Der Uberwiegenden Zahl der Beitrage in diesem Band liegen Referate der Potsdamer Tagung zugrunde. Im Namen aller Beteiligten mochte ich der Direktorin des Einstein Forums, Professor Susan Neiman, und ihren Mitarbeitern, insbesondere Dr. Martin Schaad und Dr. Matthias KroB, fur die Unterstiitzung des mit diesem Band dokumentierten Vorhabens herzlich danken. Matthias KroB machte den Vorschlag, die Veranstaltung am Einstein Forum durchzufiihren. Martin Schaad hat das Zustandekommen und die Durchfiihrung der Tagung beispielhaft und auf vielfaltige Weise unterstiitzt. Frau Susanne Baass, Bremen, hat mit grbBter Geduld und Sorgfalt die Manuskripte fiir den Druck vorbereitet.

Bremen, im Juli 2003

Lukas H. Meyer

7

Table of Contents

Vorwort Lukas H. Meyer Einleitung

1.

Philosophical Perspectives

J. Jeremy

53

Waldron

Redressing Historic Injustice

55

2. Chaim Gans Historical Rights

79

3. Janna Thompson Collective Responsibility for Historical Injustices

101

4. Thomas W. Pogge Historical Wrongs. The Two Other Domains

117

5. George Sher Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights

135

6. Rahul Kumar and David Silver The Legacy of Injustice. Wronging the Future, Responsibility for the Past

145

7. Paul Patton Colonization and Historical Injustice - The Australian Experience

159

8. Lukas H. Meyer Surviving Duties and Symbolic Compensation

173

9. David Heyd Ressentiment and Reconciliation. Alternative Responses to Historical Evil

185

10. George P. Fletcher The Relevance of Biblical Thought for Understanding Guilt and Shame

199

8

Table of Contents

II.

Institutional Responses to Historical

Injustice

11. Ruti Teitel Transitional Historical Justice 12. Jon Elster A Case Study of Transitional Justice. Athens in 411 and 403 B.C. 13. Claus Offe and Ulrike Poppe Transitional Justice in the German Democratic Republic and in Unified Germany 14. David Lyons Unfinished Business. Racial Junctures in US History and Their Legacy 75. Jaime Malamud Goti The Moral Dilemmas about Trying Pinochet in Spain 16. Christian Tomuschat Comments on: Jaime Malamud Goti, "The Moral Dilemmas about Trying Pinochet in Spain" 17. Andrei Marmor Entitlement to Land and the Right of Return: An Embarrassing Challenge for Liberal Zionism 18. Chaim Gans Comments on: Andrei Marmor, "Entitlement to Land and the Right of Return An Embarrassing Challenge for Liberal Zionism" 19. Andreas F0llesdal The Special Claims of Indigenous Minorities to Corrective Justice 20. Axel Gosseries Historical Emissions and Free-riding 21. David A. Crocker Punishment, Reconciliation, and Democratic Deliberation List of Contributors

9

Einleitung*

Lukas H. Meyer

Inhaltsverzeichnis 1.

Das Nicht-Identitatsproblem

11

1.1 Die Schwellenwertskonzeption der Schadigung

12

1.2

Andere Interpretationen historischen Unrechts

13

2.

Die Relevanz hypothetischer Geschichtsverlaufe

15

2.1 Epistemische Probleme und Freiheit der Entscheidung

15

2.2 Unterlassungen in der realen und Leistungen in der hypothetischen Welt

15

3.

Die Aufhebung historischer Anspruche aufgrund veranderter Umstande?

16

3.1 Jeremy Waldrons Aufhebungsthese

16

3.2 Die identitatsstiftende Bedeutung von Land und der Anspruch der Palastinenser auf Riickkehr

17

3.3 Der Anspruch indigener Gruppen auf Restitution der Kontrolle iiber identitatsstiftendes Territorium

20

4.

23

Pflichten aufgrund historischen Unrechts und historischer Schadigung

4.1 Indirekte Pflichten vbn Mitgliedern andauernder Gesellschaften

23

4.2 Geteilte Scham oder kollektive Schuld?

26

4.3 Das Verbot des Trittbrettfahrens

27

5.

30

Strafrecht und Strafverfahren als Modus der Transition to Democracy

5.1 Transitorische Strafverfolgung im internationalen Vergleich

31

5.2 Moralische Dilemmata der Strafverfolgung von Systemverbrechen durch Fremde

32

5.3 Transitorische Strafverfolgung in der Wahlsituation

36

5.4 Transitorische Strafverfolgung in der Notsituation

40

6.

Die Haltung der Opfer

44

7.

Schlussbemerkung

46

10

Lukas H. Meyer

Der Titel Justice in Time. Responding to Historical Injustices verweist auf die Fragen, ob Gerechtigkeit in der Zeit und iiber die Generationen moglich ist, und inwiefern historische Gerechtigkeitsanspriiche sich abhangig unter anderem vom temporalen Abstand zur Unrechtstat andern. Zugleich will der Titel daran erinnern, dass z.B. der Anspruch auf Kompensation wegen historischen Unrechts ein dringender Anspruch ist. Den iiberlebenden Opfern kann nur geholfen werden, solange sie leben. Die vorliegenden Beitrage von Philosophen, Rechts- und Sozialwissenschaftlern untersuchen also die Frage: Welche Reaktion auf historisches Unrecht ist angemessen oder erforderlich? Insbesondere geht es um die Klarung der moralischen Anspriiche, Rechte und Pflichten von Menschen wegen historischen Unrechts. Unter historischem Unrecht wird erstens verstanden: das an anderen Menschen als denen, die heute wegen der Unrechtshandlungen Anspriiche erheben, und von anderen als denen, die heute wegen der Unrechtshandlungen unter Pflichten stehen, in der Vergangenheit verubte Unrecht. Unter historischem Unrecht wird zweitens verstanden: Handlungen, die unter einem vorrechtsstaatlichen Regime als rechtmaBig galten und wombglich positiv sozial sanktioniert wurden, aber gemaB Grundannahmen liberaler politischer Philosophic als Unrechtshandlungen einzuschatzen sind und nach einer Transition zu einer rechtsstaatlichen Ordnung negativ sanktioniert werden konnen oder sollen. Historische Gerechtigkeit hat demnach Aspekte intergenerationeller Gerechtigkeit und der Gerechtigkeit bei der, um den Terminus technicus zu nennen, Transition to Democracy* zum Gegenstand, namlich die normative Bezugnahme gegenwartig lebender Menschen auf das Handeln und das Leiden friiher lebender Personen oder von Personen, die unter einem fruheren, vorrechtsstaatlichen Regime gelebt haben. Es handelt sich dabei um eine Bezugnahme aus Griinden der Gerechtigkeit, wenn von zukiinftig und gegenwartig lebenden Menschen gesagt werden kann, dass sie Rechte gegeniiber gegenwartig lebenden Menschen haben und wenn von gegenwartig lebenden Menschen 1

2

3

5

* 1

2

3 4

5

Fiir Hinweise danke ich Barbara Reiter und Jutta Gabriela Richler. Im Folgenden verwende ich moralische Rechte und legitime Anspriiche gleichbedeutend. Das scheint unproblematisch, solange wir annehmen, dass auch einen legitimen Anspruch zu haben impliziert, dass eine andere Person oder andere Personen unter (der) korvelativen Pflicht(en) stehen, dem Anspruch zu entsprechen. Zu den Annahmen zahlen ein universell geltender Wertindividualismus und ein Kriterium richtigen Handelns, das fiir alle Personen gleichermaGen gilt, und in diesem Sinne neutral ist. Zu den substantiellen Annahmen zahlt die intrinsische Wertschatzung der Handlungsautonomie. Zu den dringendsten Handlungsgriinden im Sinne des genannten Kriteriums richtigen Handelns zahlt, die Verletzung fundamentaler Rechte zu vermeiden: niemand darf f u n d a m e n t a l Rechte von Menschen verletzen, jedenfalls dann nicht, wenn nicht der Schutz anderer ebenfalls durch gleich- oder hoherrangige Menschenrechte geschiitzter Werte eine solche Verletzung erlaubt oder gar erfordert. Ob wir uns j e in einer solchen Situation befinden ist umstritten, und, wenn das zugestanden ist, dann ist umstritten, ob und in welchem Sinne die genannte Bedingung die Verletzung eines fundamentalen Rechts rechtfertigen kann. Siehe mein "Justice, Intergenerational", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford. edu/). Siehe N.J. Kritz, Transitional Justice. Die besonderen Probleme der Transitional Justice gehoren typischerweise zur nicht-idealen Theorie und zwar in beiden von John Rawls unterschiedenen Hinsichten (J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 245f): Transitional Justice ist eine Reaktion auf Unrecht und dessen langfristige schadigende Konsequenzen, und haufig sind zudem die okonomischen, sozialen und kukurellen Bedingungen der Transition fiir die Durchsetzung von Gerechtigkeitsanspriichen ungiinstig. Siehe Abschnitt 5, insbesondere 5. 3-4, und Fn. 5 0 unten. Fur dieses Verstandnis von Gerechtigkeitsanspriichen und Pflichten der Gerechtigkeit siehe z.B. J.S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", Kap. 5.

Einleitung

I1

gesagt werden kann, dass sie unter den korrelativen Pflichten gegeniiber diesen Menschen stehen. Historische Gerechtigkeit wirft eine Reihe philosophischer Fragen auf. Zu ihnen zahlen: Das Nicht-Identitatsproblem (Abschnitt 1), die Frage der Relevanz hypothetischer Geschichtsverlaufe (Abschnitt 2), die der Relevanz veranderter Bedingungen fiir die Geltung historischer Anspriiche (Abschnitt 3), und die Frage, wer aufgrund historischen Unrechts heute unter welchen Pflichten steht (Abschnitt 4). Ein Fokus der philosophischen und rechtswissenschaftlichen Uberlegungen zu Transitional Justice ist die Frage der Legitimist insbesondere strafrechtlicher Sanktionen gegen Menschen aufgrund von Handlungen, die sie unter und womoglich im Namen des Vorgangerregimes verubt haben und die zur Tatzeit als legal galten und womoglich positiv sanktioniert wurden (Abschnitt 5). Wenn Versohnung auch um den Preis des Verzichts auf strafrechtliche Verfolgung als politisches Ziel der Transition ausgewiesen wird, wie prominenterweise in Sudafrika geschehen, verweist dies auf Fragen der Zumutbarkeit fur die Opfer und der Haltung, die fiir sie angemessen ist (Abschnitt 6). Viele Autoren dieses Bandes, z.B. Andreas F0llesdal, Chaim Gans, David Heyd, Andrei Marmor, Lukas Meyer, Paul Patton, und Jeremy Waldron, untersuchen oder bemuhen sich um die Vermittlung von zwei grundlegenden Perspektiven auf vergangenes Unrecht, der zukunfts- und der vergangenheitsorientierten. In zukunftsorientierter Perspektive untersuchen wir die Signifikanz der bleibenden Wirkung vergangenen Unrechts fUr gegenwartig und zukunftig lebende Menschen und insbesondere fiir deren Gerechtigkeitsanspruche. Diese werden dann als Anspriiche distributiver Gerechtigkeit gedeutet. In vergangenheitsorientierter Perspektive untersuchen wir die Implikationen des an friiher lebenden Menschen begangenen Unrechts fiir die Pflichten, unter denen gegenwartig lebende Menschen stehen konnen, und zwar unabhangig von Konsequenzen des vergangenen Unrechts fiir das Wohlergehen gegenwartig und zukunftig lebender Menschen. So es hier um Pflichten der Gerechtigkeit geht, sind dies Pflichten der korrektiven und kompensatorischen Gerechtigkeit. 6

/.

Das

1

Nicht-Identitatsproblem

Die Beziehungen zwischen gegenwartig lebenden und zukunftig lebenden Menschen 6

Wenigstens vier Interpretationen des Verhaltnisses von distributiver und korrektiver bzw. kompensatorischer Gerechtigkeit lassen sich unterscheiden. Erstens, kompensatorische Gerechtigkeit weist Prinzipien aus, die der Wiederherstellung oder dem Erhalt distributiv gerechter Verhaltnisse dienen. Siehe z.B. G.F. Gaus, "Does Compensation Restore Equality?", 4 5 - 8 1 , insb. 54f. Mit diesem Verstandnis des Verhaltnisses konkurrieren wenigstens drei Alternatives kompensatorische Gerechtigkeit ist ein konstitutives Element distributiver Gerechtigkeit, insofern erstere Bedingungen angibt, die es bei der Verfolgung des Ziels der distributiven Gerechtigkeit zu beachten gilt, weil diese Bedingungen Aspekte unseres Verstandnisses distributiver Gerechtigkeit ausdriicken; siehe z.B. E. Anderson, "Compensation within the Limits of Reliance Alone", 178-85, 179f. Zweitens, kompensatorische und distributive Gerechtigkeit sind begrifflich voneinander unabhangig und die Verfolgung des Ziels kompensatorischer Gerechtigkeit kann mit der Verfolgung des Ziels distributiver Gerechtigkeit konfligieren; siehe z.B. J.S. Fishkin, "Justice between Generations", 85-96, 92. SchlieBlich sei auch das Verstandnis erwMhnt, nach welchem kompensatorische und distributive Gerechtigkeit dasselbe Ziel verfolgen; siehe R E . Goodin, "Compensation and Redistribution", 14377, 15 7f, 165f. Zu diesem Fragenkomplex siehe J. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, 303-54. Zu Colemans jiingsten Arbeiten S.R. Perry, "The Distributive Turn", 141-62; Colemans Antwort. "Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions", 2 5 7 - 3 2 2 , 306-16.

7

Siehe mein "Justice, Intergenerational", Stanford Encyclopedia edu/), insbesondere Abschnitte 2.1-2.

of Philosophy

(http://plato. Stanford,

12

Lukas H. Meyer

sind durch eine Reihe von Merkmalen charakterisiert, die nicht fiir die Beziehungen unter Zeitgenossen gelten. Wieder andere Merkmale charakterisieren das Verhaltnis von gegenwartig lebenden zu friiher lebenden Menschen. Aber das Kontingenzproblem, wie ich es nennen werde, stellt sich gleichermaSen fiir wichtige Aspekte beider Seiten der intergenerationellen Beziehungen: hinsichtlich der Pflichten gegenwartiger Generationen, die Rechte zukiinftiger Generationen nicht zu verletzen, und der Pflichten gegenwartig lebender Generationen, die Schaden gegenwartig lebender Menschen zu kompensieren, die ihnen durch die bleibende Wirkung von historischem Unrecht zugefugt werden. Das Kontingenzproblem beruht auf der Tatsachef dass die Existenz und Identitat von zukunftig lebenden Menschen von den Entscheidungen und Handlungen gegenwartig lebender Menschen abhangen konnen. Dies gilt auch fiir Handlungen, die wir gemeinhin als schadigend auffassen. Wenn die schadigende Handlung zugleich notwendige Bedingung der Existenz und Identitat von Menschen ist, wie konnen diese dann aufgrund dieser Handlung als geschadigt gelten?

1.1

Die Schwellenwertskonzeption

der Schadigung 8

Die Schwellenwertskonzeption, nicht aber das iibliche diachronische oder hypothetisch-historische Verstandnis von Schadigung erlaubt uns, Handlungen als zukunftig lebende Menschen schadigende und ihre Rechte verletzende auszuweisen, auch wenn diese Handlungen selbst zu den notwendigen Bedingungen der Existenz und Identitat dieser Menschen zahlen. Sowohl das diachronische wie das hypothetisch-historische Verstandnis setzen voraus, dass die Existenz der geschadigten Person oder Personen als Individuen unabhangig von der schadigenden Handlung besteht. Wenn wir aber die Schwellenwertskonzeption vertreten, dann konnen wir von zukunftig lebenden Menschen sagen, dass sie durch unsere Handlungen geschadigt werden, auch wenn es der Fall ist, dass die Existenz der derart geschadigten Menschen kausal abhangig ist von unserer Entscheidung, diese Handlung auszufUhren. Die Schwellenwertskonzeption kann in der folgenden Formel ausgedriickt werden: Eine Handlung (oder Unterlassung) zum Zeitpunkt 11 schadigt eine Person nur dann, wenn der Handelnde verursacht oder zulasst, dass das Leben dieser Person unter einen spezifizierten Schwellenwert fallt. Entsprechend konnen gegenwartig lebende Menschen, die nicht selbst Opfer der an anderen veriibten Unrechtshandlungen sind, Anspriiche auf Kompensationsleistungen geltend machen, wenn es stimmt, dass an ihren Vorfahren vertibtes Unrecht bleibende Wirkungen hat, die diese Menschen im Sinne der Schwellenwertskonzeption schadigen, 9

10

8

9

10

Das diachronische Verstandnis kann in der folgenden Formel ausgedriickt werden: Eine Handlung (oder Unterlassung) zum Zeitpunkt t\ schadigt eine Person nur dann, wenn der Handelnde verursacht oder zulasst, dass es dieser Person zu einem Zeitpunkt ti schlechter geht, als es ihr zum Zeitpunkt ti ergangen ist. Das hypothetisch-historische Verstandnis kann in der folgenden Formel ausgedriickt werden: Eine Handlung (oder Unterlassung) zum Zeitpunkt t\ schadigt eine Person nur dann, wenn der Handelnde verursacht oder zulasst, dass es dieser Person zu einem Zeitpunkt h schlechter geht, als es ihr ergangen ware, hatte der Handelnde mit dieser (oder mit Blick auf diese) Person nicht interagiert. Fur die Unterscheidungen siehe D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 4 8 7 - 9 0 ; J. Woodward, ' T h e NonIdentity Problem", 802f, 818; E.H. Morreim, ' T h e Concept of Harm Reconceived", 3-33, 23; J.S. Fishkin, "Justice between Generations", 85-96; ders., ' T h e Limits of Intergenerational Justice", 6283, 63f; S. Shiffrin, "Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm", 117-48. Fiir die Bezeichnungen siehe T.W. Pogge, "'Assisting' the Global Poor".

Einteitung

13

und eben auch wenn die historischen Unrechtshandlungen selbst zu den notwendigen Bedingungen der Existenz und Identitat dieser Menschen zahlen. Der Ausweis der Legitimitat derart begriindeter Kompensationsanspriiche der Nachfahren von Opfem historischen Unrechts ist Ausdruck der zukunftsorientierten Interpretation der Signifikanz der Konsequenzen historischen Unrechts." Gabe es keine Losung des Nicht-Identitatsproblems, dann lieBen sich auch, wie George Sher in seinem Beitrag hervorhebt, in den intuitiv plausibelsten Fallen Kompensationsanspriiche der indirekten Opfer wegen historischem Unrecht nicht ausweisen. Die angedeutete Losung, der Ausweis einer identitats-unabhangigen Schwellenwertskonzeption der Schadigung, kann unterschiedlich interpretiert werden. Immer geht es um die Relevanz der Konsequenzen friiherer Zustande der Welt fiir das Wohlbefinden gegenwartig und zukunftig lebender Menschen. Der Vorschlag, die Kompensationsanspriiche gegenwartig lebender Menschen unter Beriicksichtigung des hypothetischen Verlaufs der Geschichte, namlich einer Geschichte ohne die friihere Rechtsverletzung zu bestimmen, diirfte mit einer Schwellenwertskonzeption der Schadigung unvereinbar sein. Unabhangig vom Nicht-Identitatsproblem wirft der Vorschlag die Frage auf, welche Relevanz der hypothetische Verlauf der Geschichte fur die Anspriiche heute lebender Menschen haben kann (Abschnitt 2).

1.2

Andere Interpretationen

historischen

Unrechts

Andererseits sind einige Interpretationen der Signifikanz historischen Unrechts vom Nicht-Identitatsproblem nicht betroffen. Erstens konnte man annehmen, wie in den Beitragen von Patton und Waldron diskutiert, dass weiter bestehenden transgenerationellen Gruppen als solchen Unrecht getan wurde und diese Gruppen heute Trager der entsprechenden Anspriiche auf Kompensation und Restitution sind. Hier tritt das Nicht-Identitatsproblem deshalb nicht auf, weil die Identitat des Opfers, namlich die Identitat der Gruppe, als gleichbleibend angenommen wird. Wenigstens drei Probleme lassen sich mit Blick auf diese Interpretation unterscheiden: Konnen Gruppen als solche Trager moralischer Anspriiche sein? Diese Annahme ist mit dem liberale politische Philosophic kennzeichnenden normativen lndividualismus nicht vereinbar. Handelt es sich tatsachlich um dieselbe Gruppe? Insofern die Gruppe beispielsweise mit dem identifiziert wird, was sie fiir ihre Mitglieder und fiir die Nachfahren der friiheren Mitglieder der Gruppe bedeutet und leistet, sind haufig erhebliche Veranderungen seit dem historischen Unrecht festzustellen. Ist auch angesichts der Bedeutung und der Leistungen der heute bestehenden Gruppe von einer Schadigung aufgrund historischen Unrechts auszugehen und sind Kompensations- und Restitutionsanspriiche plausibel? Diese Frage verweist auf das Problem der Signifikanz hypothetischer Geschichtsverlaufe (Abschnitt 2) und die Mbglichkeit, dass historische Anspriiche durch veranderte Umstande (und damit einhergehende konfligierende Anspriiche anderer) in der Gegenwart Uberholt sind (Abschnitt 3). 12

Zweitens unterbreiten Kumar und Silver den Vorschlag, dass heute lebende Personen fur sie wichtige, ihre Identitat mitkonstituierende Merkmale mit friiher lebenden Menschen teilen, denen schlimmes Unrecht zugefiigt wurde. Deshalb erleiden auch die heute lebenden Personen ein Unrecht, ohne dass sie durch das historische Unrecht geschadigt 11 12

Siehe mein "Past and Future". Hierzu siehe auch schon den Beitrag von D. Lyons, "The N e w Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land", 2 4 9 - 7 2 , 27If.

14

Lukas H. Meyer

waren, namlich solange das an Menschen mit ihren Merkmalen veriibte Unrecht nicht in angemessener Weise restituiert wurde. Fiir die Feststellung, dass heute lebende Personen Unrecht erleiden, ist der Umstand, dass das friihere Unrecht notwendige Bedingung der Existenz und Identitat eben dieser Menschen ist, deshalb von keiner Bedeutung, weil die Identitat der heute lebenden Opfer als Individuen irrelevant ist und das in Frage stehende Unrecht als unabhangig von der Schadigung der fruher lebenden Vorfahren gedacht wird. Allerdings wirft diese Interpretation ihrerseits Fragen auf. Selbst wenn wir mit den Autoren die Plausibilitat des dem Werk Tim Scanlons. entlehnten Verstandnisses von Unrecht voraussetzen, ist es doch zweifelhaft, dass die historischen Anspriiche der Nachfahren etwa der U.S.-amerikanischen Sklaven zutreffend interpretiert sind, wenn die andauernden Konsequenzen der Sklaverei fiir das Wohlbefinden der Nachfahren unberucksichtigt bleiben. Sollen sie im Sinne der Schadigung indirekter Opfer als Individuen beriicksichtigt werden, bedarf es einer Losung des Nicht-Identitatsproblems. Drittens weist Thomas Pogge darauf hin, dass die Legitimist von andauemden Institutionen davon abhangen kann, ob die prozeduralen und anderen Bedingungen, denen sie ihre Existenz verdanken, fair gewesen sind. Sind Entstehungsbedingungen von Institutionen unfair oder Ausdruck historischen Unrechts gewesen, wie dies etwa fiir den Ausschluss derFrauen von politischen Entscheidungen gilt und auch fiir den rechtlichen oder effektiven Ausschluss von Sklaven, friiheren Sklaven und deren Nachfahren von Entscheidungen iiber die Regelungen zur Distribution und Sicherung von Eigentum in den USA, so haftet diesen Entscheidungen, gesetzlichen Regelungen und den auf ihnen beruhenden Institutionen ein Makel an und zwar unabhangig davon, wie wir diese Entscheidungen heute in ihren Konsequenzen und in der Sache beurteilen. Pogge vertritt die Auffassung, dass ein solcher Makel Grund fiir die Anderung der Regelungen sein kann, jedenfalls aber fiir eine Uberpriifung dieser Regelungen unter fairen Bedingungen heute. Auch fiir die Idee uberlebender Pflichten mit Blick auf heute tote Menschen ist das Nicht-Identitatsproblem von keiner Relevanz. Die Konsequenzen friiherer Schadigung stehen nicht zur Debatte, und es wird auch nicht angenommen, dass heute lebende Menschen durch ihr Handeln Verstorbene schadigen oder begiinstigen k5nnen. Entscheidend sind vielmehr die Implikationen der zukunftsorientierten Rechte fruher lebender Personen fiir den Ausweis von Pflichten gegenwartig lebender Menschen mit Blick auf die fruher lebenden Rechtstrager. Ist femer plausibel, dass Menschen generell ein Interesse an einem ihren Handlungen entsprechenden, verdienten, auch posthumen Ruf haben, und ist ihr Ruf dadurch schwer beschadigt, dass ihnen schlimmes oder schlimmstes Unrecht angetan wurde, ohne dass sie als Opfer solchen Unrechts bTfentlich Anerkennung finden und die Tater als solche identifiziert sind, dann konnen gegenwartig lebende Menschen mit Blick auf sie unter der Pflicht stehen, sie offentlich als Opfer solchen Unrechts zu erinnem. Diese uberlebende Pflicht wird als Pflicht zur symbolischen Kompensation interpretiert. Meyer vertritt die vergangenheitsorientierte Position uberlebender Pflichten allerdings nur in Erganzung zu einer zukunftsorientierten der Kompensation fiir die andauernden schadigenden Konsequenzen historischen Unrechts, und letztere setzt die Losung des Nicht-Identitatsproblems voraus. 13

14

13 14

T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other. Untersuchen wir die Anspriiche der iiberlebenden direkten Opfer von Unrecht, z.B. von Unrecht, das unter einem friiheren Regime begangen wurde, ist das Nicht-ldentitatsproblem offensichtlich von keiner Relevanz. Dazu siehe Abschnitt 5 unten.

Einleitung

2. 2.1

Die Relevanz hypothetischer

15

15

Geschichtsverlaufe

Epistemische Probleme und Freiheit der Entscheidung

Nach Auffassung vieler soli zur Bestimmung historischer Anspriiche indirekter Opfer der Vergleich des tatsachlichen Zustands der Welt mit dem hypothetischen, der bestiinde, ware das Unrecht nicht geschehen, relevant sein. Wie betont setzte diese Auffassung eine Losung des Nicht-Identitatsproblems voraus, die ihrerseits mit dieser Auffassung vereinbar ist. (Oder man klammert fiir den Zweck der Untersuchung das NichtIdentitatsproblem aus.) Die Uberlegung fuBt auf der Intuition, dass es indirekten Opfern heute nicht schlechter gehen sollte, als es ihnen gegangen ware, waren ihre Vorfahren nicht Opfer von Unrecht gewesen. Jeremy Waldron ist der Auffassung, dass wir nicht wissen konnen, wie es Menschen heute ginge, ware das Unrecht nicht geschehen. Zudem sei der Geschichtsverlauf von den freien Entscheidungen von Akteuren abhangig und unsere Spekulation dariiber, wie Menschen sich unter den hypothetischen Bedingungen entschieden hatten, sei von keiner normativen Relevanz fur die Einschatzung, was heute lebenden Menschen zusteht. 16

17

2.2

Unterlassungen in der realen und Leistungen in der hypothetischen

Welt

Auch George Sher halt die epistemischen Probleme der Uberlegung fiir enorm, und fuhrt aus, dass, so die Uberlegung mit Blick auf Unrecht mit andauemder Schadigungswirkung relevant sei, wenigstens zwei Faktoren zu beriicksichtigen sind. Diese Faktoren betreffen, was Personen aufgrund ihrer Unterlassungen und Handlungen verdientermaBen zukommt. Die hypothetischen Zustande der Welt, die ohne die Schadigung aufgrund der Verletzung von Eigentumsrechten und ohne anderes sch&digendes Unrecht bestunden, seien nicht unmittelbar relevant fiir die Bestimmung der Kompensationsanspriiche heute lebender (indirekter) Opfer. Die Relevanz sei in dem MaBe unterminiert, indem, erster Faktor, die tatsachlichen Anspriiche einer Person in der Welt, in der wir leben, durch dieser Person zuschreibbare Unterlassungen verringert sind, und, zweiter Faktor, die Anspriiche einer Person in der hypothetischen Welt auf ihre Leistungen in eben dieser Welt zuruckzufiihren sind. Deshalb konne die tatsachlich heute lebende Person nicht all die Giiter beanspruchen, iiber welche die Person in der hypothetischen Welt zu Recht verfugte, sondem habe bestenfalls einen Anspruch auf die "opportunity to acquire these entitlements". Die Moglichkeit des Erwerbs der Anspriiche ist von deutlich geringerem Wert als die Realisierung der Anspriiche. 18

15 16

17

18

Hierzu siehe auch D. Lyons, ' T h e N e w Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land". Wahrend im vorliegenden Band Jeremy Waldron die Relevanz des Nicht-Identitatsproblems betont, aber keine Losung anbietet, erwahnt George Sher Losungen des Problems, ohne sie eingehend zu diskutieren. Robert Nozicks Theorie der Gerechtigkeit griindet unsere Pflichten in vergangenheitsorientierter Uberlegung. Auch Nozick betont die epistemischen Schwierigkeiten bei der Feststellung, was Menschen heute besaBen, hatte es die Ungerechtigkeiten (veriibt an frUher lebenden Menschen) nicht gegeben. Er vertritt aber die generalisierte Vermutung, dass die heute Schlechtestgestellten zu denen gehoren, die auch durch die Konsequenzen historischen Unrechts benachteiligt sind. Nozick schliigt vor, Rawls' Differenzprinzip - ein zukunftsorientiertes Prinzip distributiver Gerechtigkeit solle als ein "rough rule of thumb for rectifying" historische Ungerechtigkeit dienen. Siehe R. N o zick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 152f, 231. Damit ist noch nichts gesagt zum Problem der Nichtanwendbarkeit eines identitatsabhangigen Begriffs der Schadigung. Dieser Band, 140.

16

Lukas H. Meyer

Dies gelte fiir weit zuriickliegendes Unrecht ebenso wie fiir Unrecht aus jiingster Vergangenheit, sei aber, so Sher, besonders signifikant fiir weit zuriickliegendes Unrecht. Denn die Faktoren beeinflussen die Anspriiche der unmittelbaren Nachfahren der Opfer von Unrecht, sowie erneut die Anspriiche von deren Nachfahren usw. - mit dem Resultat, dass je weiter das Unrecht zuruckliegt, desto starker die tatsachlichen Handlungen der Akteure seitdem ausschlaggebend sind fiir die Bestimmung der gegenwartigen Anspriiche gegenwartig lebender Menschen in der Welt, in der sie leben. Im Ergebnis vertritt Sher die Auffassung, dass die Griinde fiir Kompensation mit der Zeit schwacher werden, dass also weit in der Vergangenheit zuriickliegendes Unrecht ("ancient wrongs") heute keine bedeutenden Kompensationsanspriiche nach sich zieht, und jiingstes Unrecht in der Regel starkere Kompensationsanspriiche als weiter in der Vergangenheit zuriickliegendes Unrecht nach sich zieht. Differenzierungen sind allerdings moglich. Unrecht wirkt sich unterschiedlich auf die betroffenen Personen aus und auch auf die Faktoren, die nach Auffassung von Sher die temporale Abschwachung der Kompensationsanspriiche erklaren. Wenn wie im Falle der Sklaverei sich das Unrecht iiber die Generationen stark negativ auf die Moglichkeit der Betroffenen auswirkt, die ihnen offen stehenden Optionen auch zu nutzen, dann sind die Kompensationsanspriiche der heute Lebenden starker. Denn ihre Unterlassungen (und die Unterlassungen ihrer Vorfahren) sind dem schadigenden Unrecht zuzuschreiben und nicht ihnen selbst.

3. 3.1

Die Aufhebung historischer Anspriiche aufgrund veranderter Jeremy Waldrons

19

Umstande?

Aufliebungsthese

Jeremy Waldron vertritt die "supersession"- oder, wie ich sie nennen werde, die Aufliebungsthese: Auch Eigentumsanspriiche (und Anspriiche auf Restitution von Eigentum) sind abhangig von den Umstanden und haufig sind die Umstande heute dramatisch andere als zu dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem die Eigentumsrechte verletzt wurden. Die auf Unrecht fuBenden Anspriiche konnen aufgrund veranderter Umstande ihre Geltung einbiiBen. Die Signifikanz historischen Unrechts hangt von den Umstanden ab. Im vorliegenden Beitrag, wie in friiheren Veroffentlichungen, bezieht Waldron die These der Aufhebung historischer Anspriiche auf die Anspriiche der indigenen Bevolkerung Neuseelands, der Maori, und behauptet: Selbst wenn die anderen Zweifel an der Grundlage des Anspruchs auf Restitution des den Maori von den Kolonisatoren illegitim genommenen Heimatlandes ausgeraumt sind - insbesondere der Zweifel daran, dass die heute lebenden Maori als Trager der Anspriiche der Gruppe der Maori gelten konnen, deren Eigentumsrechte verletzt wurden - , so haben heute doch aridere als die Nachfahren der Maori legitime Anspriiche auf das Land und fur die Nachfahren der Maori ist Eigentum an dem Land von anderer und normativ geringerer Signifikanz. Jedenfalls sei eine Eigentumstheorie generell nur plausibel, wenn sie uns zu beriicksichtigen erlaube, dass Eigentumsanspriiche an beschrankten Ressourcen ihre Geltung ob veranderter Umstande einbuBen konnen. Waldron pladiert dafiir, den zukunftsorientierten distributiven Gerechtigkeitsanspriichen der gegenwartig (und zukunftig) lebenden Bewohnern, etwa Neuseelands, Prioritat einzuraumen. Diesen zukunftsorientierten Ansatz der Interpretation der Signifikanz historischen Unrechts versteht Waldron als Ausdruck des Kantschen "proximity principle", namlich 20

19

Hierzu siehe auch D . Lyons, ' T h e N e w Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land".

20

Siehe insbesondere J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice".

Einleitung

17

"that people have a natural duty to enter into political society with those with whom they find themselves in a condition of unavoidable co-existence". Denn dieses Prinzip konne fiir folgenden Typ von Situation Geltung beanspruchen: Menschen haben unrechtmaBig Land besiedelt, z.B. die Kolonisatoren Neuseelands, heute aber haben ihre Nachfahren in der vierten, funften oder noch spateren Generation "nowhere to return to". Dann aber haben sie und die Nachfahren derer, die von ihren Vorfahren angegriffen und enteignet wurden, also die Nachfahren der indigenen Bevblkerung Neuseelands, "nothing to do but to come to terms with one another and establish a fair basis for sharing the lands and resources that surround them." Die heutigcn Bewohner Neuseelands stehen also unter der Pflicht, eine (distributiv) gerechte politische Ordnung einzurichten und zu erhalten. In Erfiillung dieser Pflicht sind die Konsequenzen historischen Unrechts fiir das Wohlbefinden gegenwartig lebender Menschen zu beriicksichtigen. 21

Waldrons These der Aufhebung von historischen Anspriichen durch Anderung der Umstande ist nicht gleichermaBen fur alle historischen Anspriiche relevant. Genuin vergangenheitsorientierte Anspriiche und Pflichten wegen historischem Unrecht, die fiir das Wohlergehen heute lebender Menschen irrelevant oder wenig relevant sind - etwa die Anspriiche, die sich auf die mangelhafte historische Legitimitat von Institutionen im Sinne der Uberlegung Pogges beziehen, oder die uberlebenden Pflichten zu symbolischer Kompensation, fur deren Begrtindung die schadigenden Konsequenzen friiheren Unrechts fiir heute lebende Menschen irrelevant sind - sind der Moglichkeit der Aufhebung durch veranderte Umstande und damit einhergehende konkurrierende Anspriiche gegenwartig lebender Menschen entzogen.

3.2

Die identitatsstiftende auf Riickkehr

Bedeuiung von Land und der Anspruch der

Paldstinenser

Andrei Marmor, Andreas F0llesdal und Paul Patton fragen, was Waldrons Aufhebungsthese zur Einschatzung spezifischer historischer Anspriiche auf Land beitragt. Mit Chaim Gans teilen sie die Auffassung, dass die identitatsstiftende historische Beziehung einer Gruppe zu einem Territorium einen besonderen Anspruch auf dieses Land und gegebenenfalls auch auf die Restitution des Landes begrunden kann. Ein derart begriindeter historischer Anspruch auf Land ist allerdings dem zukunftsorientierten Ansatz zur Begriindung der Rechte nationaler Gruppen auf Souveranitat iiber ein Territorium untergeordnet: Ob eine Gruppe ein Recht auf Selbstbestimmung hat, ist, so Gans, eine Frage distributiver Gerechtigkeit. Historische Rechte konnen nur dazu beitragen zu bestimmen, auf welchem Territorium die Gruppe gegebenenfalls ihr Recht ausuben darf. In seiner Kritik historischer Rechte unterscheidet Gans genauer erstens zwei Interpretationen historischer Rechte nationaler Gruppen auf Souveranitat iiber ein bestimmtes Territorium, zweitens zwei Anspriiche, die das Recht ausmachen, und, drittens, zwei Typen von Begriindungen solcher Anspriiche. GemaB der ersten Interpretation des gemeinten historischen Rechts hat eine Gruppe dieses Recht, weil sie das Territorium als erste besetzte, und gemaB der zweiten, weil das Territorium in der Geschichte der Gruppe eine besondere, identitatsstiftende Rolle einnimmt, die Gruppe eine besondere Beziehung zu diesem Territorium hat. Die zwei Anspriiche sind: der Anspruch auf Souveranitat iiber ein Territorium, n&mlich der Anspruch, die ungeteilte Macht zu haben, Entscheidungen darviber zu treffen, wer auf einem Territorium leben darf, und wie das Territorium und dessen Ressourcen zu genieBen und zu nutzen sind; zweitens, der An21

Fiir die Zitate siehe den Beitrag von Waldron, 57.

18

Lukas H. Meyer

spruch, Souveranitat Uber ein bestimmtes Territorium auszuiiben. Die zwei Begrtindungstypen sind einerseits die Begrundung des Erwerbs und der Erhaltung territorialer Rechte aufgrund von Uberlegungen der gerechten Verteilung unter alien Anspruchstragern und zweitens die Begrundung der Restitution territorialer Rechte aufgrund von Uberlegungen korrektiver Gerechtigkeit. Gans vertritt die Auffassung, dass restitutive Anspriiche sich auf die Herstellung oder Wiederherstellung distributiv gerechter Verhaltnisse beziehen miissen - korrektive Anspriiche also abhangig sind von distributiven und nicht umgekehrt. Der Autor vertritt folgende substantielle Thesen: Keine der beiden Interpretationen des Rechts kann die Souveranitat iiber ein bestimmtes Territorium begriinden. Beide Interpretationen konnen begriinden helfen, auf welchem Territorium eine nationale Gruppe ihr Recht auf Selbstbestimmung ausuben soli, wenn es als distributiv gerecht gilt, dass die Gruppe ein Recht auf Selbstbestimmung ausiibt. Dabei kann Erstbesetzung zur Begrundung beitragen, dass die Gruppe weiterhin auf einem bestimmten Territorium ihr Recht auf Selbstbestimmung ausuben konnen soli, wahrend die identitatsstiftende Bindung an ein Territorium den Anspruch einer Gruppe auf Restitution begriinden helfen kann, in ihr Recht auf Selbstbestimmung auf diesem Territorium restituiert zu werden, und besonders (aber nicht ausschlieBlich) dann, wenn die derzeit auf dem Territorium lebende Gruppe mit illegitimen Mitteln verhindert hat, dass die Gruppe mit dieser besonderen Beziehung zum Territorium ihr Recht auf Selbstbestimmung auf diesem Territorium ausiibt. Fiir seine These, dass keine der beiden Interpretationen Souveranitatsrechte iiber ein bestimmtes Territorium begriinden kann, spricht nach Auffassung von Gans, dass Erstbesetzung als solche keine normativ wichtigen Interessen mit sich bringt, und die besondere Bindung an ein Territorium einer Gruppe mit wichtigeren anderen Interessen anderer Gruppen oder einer Bindung eben dieser Art konfligieren konnen. Fiir seine Behauptung, dass Erstbesetzung bei der Begrundung eines Anspruchs auf Restitution keine Rolle spielen kann, spricht, dass Erstbesetzung normativ relevante Interessen bestenfalls dann ausweisen kann, wenn das Territorium nach Erstbesetzung weiterhin auch bewohnt wird. SchlieBlich spricht fur die Behauptung, dass die identitatsstiftende Bindung an ein Territorium Restitutionsanspriiche begriinden kann, dass die Ausiibung eines Rechts auf Selbstbestimmung durch eine nationale Gruppe verlangt, dass diese im Heimatland lebt, und Versuche, dem jiidischen Volk die Ausiibung des Rechts auBerhalb des Landes, zu dem es in einer identitatsstiftenden Beziehung steht, zu ermoglichen, gescheitert sind, also ein distributiv gerechter Anspruch auf Selbstbestimmung womoglich nur auf einem spezifischen Territorium realisiert werden kann. Angesichts der haufigen Konflikte des Rechts einer nationalen Gruppe auf Souveranitat uber ein bestimmtes Territorium mit wichtigen Interessen von Menschen, die nicht Mitglieder dieser Gruppe sind, auf diesem Territorium zu leben - auch weil sie als Mitglieder einer anderen nationalen Gruppe in ahnlich identitatsstiftender Beziehung zum selben Territorium stehen - pladiert Gans dafiir zu priifen, ob die berechtigten Interessen von Mitgliedern einer nationalen Gruppe mit Blick darauf, ihr Leben auf dem Territorium zu fiihren, das fiir sie identitatsstiftend ist, nicht schwachere Anspriiche als den Anspruch auf Souveranitat begriinden kann, namlich auf das subsouverane nicht-exklusive Recht der Selbstbestimmung im Heimatland. Dieses Recht lasst sich mit dem glei22

22

Gans bezieht also eine spezifische Position zum Verhaltnis zwischen kompensatorischer oder korrektiver und distributiver Gerechtigkeit, namlich, dass kompensatorische Gerechtigkeit Prinzipien fiir die Wiederherstellung oder den Erhalt distributiv gerechter Verhaltnisse liefert. Siehe oben Fn. 6.

Einleitung

19

chen Recht einer anderen oder anderer Gruppen und auf ein- und demselben Territorium realisieren und mit anderen Interessen anderer auf die Nutzung desselben Landes ausgleichen. Gans deutet an, dass die Anspriiche auf Selbstbestimmung des palastinensischen und des judischen Volkes in Palastina und IsraeJ sich in diesem Sinne gleichermaBen realisieren lassen. Andrei Marmors Studie zum palastinensischen Recht auf Riickkehr in ihr Heimatland und auf Restitution ihres Eigentums betont im Sinne der Thesen von Gans die normative Signifikanz des identitatsstiftenden Territoriums fiir die restitutiven Anspriiche einer Gruppe. Historische Anspriiche, die sich auf die identitatsstiftende Bedeutung eines Territoriums stiitzen, sind, so Marmor, besonders dauerhaft. Fiir den Zweck seiner Analyse und Diskussion beschrankt sich Marmor auf die Kategorie palSstinensischer Fliichtlinge, die aufgrund der Vertreibung durch die israelische Armee wahrend des Krieges 1948 und der Konfiszierung ihres Eigentums durch Israel besonders Not leidend sind, namlich die Fliichtlinge, die nach wie vor in Fluchtlingslagem in Jordanien, Syrien und dem Libanon sowie der West Bank und im Gaza-Streifen leben, und deren Zahl auf zwischen 900 000 und 1,5 Millionen geschatzt wird. Marmor untersucht unter anderem das Argument, der Anspruch dieser Fliichtlinge auf Riickkehr und Restitution ihres Eigentums sei durch veranderte Umstande aufgehoben, weshalb kein individueller Anspruch auf Riickkehr dieser Palastinenser bestehe. Marmor untersucht verschiedene Interpretationen des Arguments: Das schwachste sei das Argument, das sich auf die Idee der "adverse possession" berufe, also die Idee, Eigentumsrechte an Land, das jemand anderem gehore, konnen unter Umstanden durch dauerhafte Nutzung des Landes und Investition in das Land erworben werden. Denn, wie immer diese Doktrin im Besonderen aufgefasst werde, bestunde doch Einigkeit dariiber, dass Rechte durch "adverse possession" nicht gegen den kontinuierlichen und ausdriicklichen Protest des urspriinglichen Eigentiimers erworben werden konnen. Der Protest der Palastinenser sei wahrend der ganzen Zeit ihres Exils nicht zu iiberhbren gewesen. Gegen eine Interpretation des Arguments im Sinne einer Anwendung der Aufhebungsthese von Jeremy Waldron sprechen nach Auffassung von Marmor wenigstens zwei Gesichtspunkte: Erstens handele es sich bei dem Anspruch auf Realisierung der kollektiven Selbstbestimmung auf dem fiir die Gruppe identitatsstiftenden Territorium um ein Recht, das fiir die Autonomic der Mitglieder der Gruppe auch dann wichtig bleiben konne, wenn sie iiber einen langeren Zeitraum an der Realisierung des Rechts mit illegitimen Mitteln gehindert werde. Zweitens hange die Moglichkeit der Aufhebung ihres Rechts auf Eigentum auch davon ab, von welcher Wichtigkeit das Gut fiir das Uberleben und die Autonomie des Opfers ist und ob das Opfer das Gut ersetzen kann. Im Falle der auf den Status von Fliichtlingen reduzierten Palastinensern, die wenig Mbglichkeiten hatten, aus dieser Lage zu entkommen, sprache viel fiir die Dauerhaftigkeit ihrer Anspriiche auf Riickkehr und Restitution. Veranderte Umstande konnten aber zur Qualifikation dieser Anspriiche fiihren. Weil in der Zwischenzeit Israelis zum Teil erheblich in das friihere Eigentum der Palastinenser investiert haben, diirfte es haufig angemessen sein, dass die Palastinenser nicht einfach dorthin zuriickkehrten, von wo sie vertrieben wurden. Gegen einfache Restitution sprache auch, wenn solche den derzeitigen Nutzem des Eigentums besonders schwere Lasten aufbiirde. Allerdings diirfe daraus nicht geschlossen werden, dass Eigentum, das nicht zurtickgegeben werden konne, durch monetiire Leistungen angemessen kompensiert werden konne. Dem Anspruch auf Riickkehr ins Heimatland sei unter solchen Umstanden eher dadurch zu entsprechen, dass die Palastinenser gegebenenfalls andernorts, aber auf dem Territorium ihres Heimatlandes Eigentum erhielten. Es ware offensichtlich

20

Lukas

H.

Meyer

ungerecht, weil willkiirlich, so Marmor, diesen Anspruch auf das Gebiet der Westbank und des Gaza-Streifen zu beschranken, denn Israel sei fiir das Fltichtlingsproblem verantwortlich und habe keinen privilegierten Anspruch auf bestimmtes Land in Israel/Palastina, das fur sie ebenso wie fiir die Palastinenser von identitatsstiftender Bedeutung sei: die Ergebnisse der Kriege und israelischen Besetzungen von 1948 und 1967 seien bestenfalls von pragmatischer Bedeutung fiir die Frage der distributiv gerechten Aufteilung des Landes unter Israelis und Palastinensern. In seinem Kommentar diskutiert Chaim Gans die normative Signifikanz der Grenzen 1967 fiir eine Losung des Konflikts. Gans pladiert dafiir, den Anspruch der Palastinenser auf Ruckkehr in ihr Heimatland in Ausiibung ihres Rechts auf Selbstbestimmung zu vermitteln mit dem Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Juden im Sinne eines liberalen Zionismus, das er fiir legitim halt.

3.3

Der Anspruch indigener Gruppen auf Restitution der Kontrolle iiber identitdtsstiftendes Territorium

Die normative Signifikanz der identitatsstiftenden Beziehung indigener Volker zu ihrem Heimatland betonen Andreas F0llesdal und Paul Patton. Die Anspriiche indigener Volker auf Kontrolle iiber ihr Land bestehen auch viele Jahre nach deren Vertreibung und Enteignung fort: Diese Anspriiche sind aufgrund der Uberlegungen, die Waldron zugunsten seiner Aufhebungsthese anfiihrt, zu qualifizieren, nicht aber ihrer Geltung enthoben. Wie Gans und Marmor bemiiht sich Andreas F0llesdal um die Vermittlung einer vergangenheitsorientierten Interpretation der normativen Signifikanz historischen Unrechts und den zukunftsorientierten Anspriichen distributiver Gerechtigkeit. Historisches Unrecht kann korrektive (restitutive und kompensatorische) Anspriiche nach sich Ziehen. Handlungen seien dann als Unrechtshandlungen zu identifizieren, wenn sie im Sinne der Theorie Scatllons die hypothetisch-kontraktualistische Zustimmung nicht hatten finden konnen. Die Feststellung, dass das Verhalten friiherer Akteure als Unrecht in diesem Sinne einzuschatzen ist, erlaube zwar keine Antwort auf die Frage, wie die Welt heute aussahe, ware das Verhalten aller Akteure immer zustimmungsfahig gewesen; in Verbindung aber mit der begriindeten Vermutung, das friihere Unrecht wirke sich negativ auf das Wohlergehen der heute lebenden indirekten Opfer aus, sei diese Feststellung hinreichend, um Anspriiche auf Restitution und Kompensation zu begriinden, die sich auf den Interessen der heute lebenden indirekten Opfer griinden. Deren Interessen seien jedenfalls im Falle der indigenen Gruppen nach wie vor von dem Zustand gepragt, der vor der Rechtsverletzung bestand: die heute lebenden Mitglieder indigener Volker haben ein Interesse, autonom ihre eigene Lebensform zu erhalten und zu pflegen, und dies setze in ihrem Fall voraus, dass sie iiber die Nutzung ihres Heimatlandes oder jedenfalls bestimmter Territorien desselben die Kontrolle wiedererlangen. 23

24

Folgen wir F0llesdal so beruht der Wert der Mitgliedschaft in kulturellen Gruppen auf dem Interesse von Menschen, ihre Zukunft korrekt vorhersagen zu konnen und legitime Erwartungen zu formen, die von anderen geachtet werden. Die Kontrolle zu haben uber kulturelle Anderungen dient dem Schutz dieses Interesses. Wenn Menschen als Mitglieder einer kulturellen Gruppe solche Kontrolle ausuben, dann ist es ihnen auch eher moglich, so F0llesdal, auf Anderungen der ihnen offen stehenden kulturell vermittelten Optionen durch die Revision ihrer Lebensentwurfe und Plane zu reagieren. 23

Siehe T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each

24

Siehe auch die generalisierte Vermutung Nozicks (Fn. 17 oben).

Other.

Einleitung

21

Zum Beispiel konnen veranderte soziookonomische und bkologische Bedingungen solche Anderungen mit sich bringen. F0llesdal vertritt nun die Auffassung, dass die Anspriiche indigener Gruppen auf Kontrolle kultureller Anderungen starker sind als etwa die Anspriiche nationaler Minderheiten. Denn indigene Gruppen waren typischerweise als Gemeinschaften gefasst, die de facto Kontrolle iiber Ressourcen und Land ausgeiibt und soziale, bkonomische, kulturelle oder politische Institutionen unterhalten haben, bevor Gruppen, die das Land kolonisierten, das Territorium in einen Staat einverleibten und die Institutionen der indigenen Gruppen zerstbrten oder den neu eingerichteten Institutionen des Staates unterordneten. Typisch sei auBerdem, dass die indigenen Gruppen bis heute transgenerationellen Bestand haben, so dass auch heute die Kultur der Gruppe die Erwartungen der Mitglieder pragt, auch wenn die Neuankbmmlinge und ihre Nachfahren schon fur lange Zeit Kontrolle iiber das Land der indigenen Gruppe ausuben. Die Kolonisation ihres Landes ist, so F0llesdal, eine illegitime Verletzung des Anspruchs der indigenen Gruppe auf Kontrolle iiber kulturelle Anderung und sie misst sich an ihrer damalig unbeschrankten Selbstbestimmung und Kontrolle iiber das Land. Das Unrecht besteht nicht nur in der Verletzung von Eigentumsrechten der Gruppe (die besonders bei kommunalem und religibs bedeutsamem Eigentum wichtig sind), sondern auch der ihre Lebensform ausmachenden besonderen Praktiken, die Eigentum oder Kontrolle voraussetzen (etwa im Falle der nomadischen Lebensweise den freien Zugang zum Land). AuBerdem werden durch die Kolonisation des Landes nicht nur berechtigte Erwartungen verletzt, sondern es wird auch die Bildung von Erwartungen unter fairen Bedingungen verhindert. Und insbesondere wird den indigenen Gruppen die Mbglichkeit genommen, Institutionen und Praktiken zu kontrollieren, die kulturell gepragte Projekte ermbglichen und Erwartungen der Mitglieder der Gruppe in Verfolgung der gruppenspezifischen Projekte pragen. Aufgrund dieser andauernden negativen Konsequenzen fiir eine transgenerationell stabile Gruppe reicht monetare Kompensation nicht aus. Vielmehr ist ein vergangenheitsorientierter, auf die Wiederherstellung eines Zustands der Kontrolle iiber kulturelle Anderung zielender, korrektiver Anspruch anzuerkennen, auch wenn ein solcher Anspruch auf Kontrolle des Landes heute mit den Interessen der nicht-indigenen Bevblkerung des Landes vermittelt werden muss. Der Anspruch zielt nicht auf die Herstellung des Zustands heute, der bestehen wiirde, hatte es in der Vergangenheit kein Unrecht und keine Rechtsverletzungen gegeben, sondern auf die Anerkennung eines trotz des Unrechts jedenfalls im Falle indigener Gruppen fortbestehenden Anspruchs auf Kontrolle kultureller Veranderungen ihrer Lebensform unter modernen Bedingungen. Solche Kontrolle erfordert in der Regel keine Sezession des indigenen Volkes im Sinne der rechtlichen und politischen Souveranitat iiber ein Territorium. Es geht vielmehr um die Herstellung von Bedingungen fairer Kooperation unter alien heutigen Bewohnem des Landes und einer fairen Distribution der Ressourcen, wobei anzuerkennen ist, dass die einstmals im Vollsinne realisierten Anspriiche der indigenen Gruppe auf Kontrolle der Veranderungen ihrer Kultur unrechtmaBig verletzt wurden und die heute lebenden Mitglieder der Gruppe einen legitimen Anspruch darauf haben, solche Kontrolle wiederzuerlangen. Haufig wird dies die Fbrderung und Anerkennung einer politischen und kulturellen Autonomic der indigenen Gruppe unterhalb des Niveaus der Souveranitat durch quasi-fbderale Strukturen und besondere Reprasentationsrechte erfordern sowie besondere Rechte der Kontrolle und Verfugung iiber Land und insbesondere von solchem Land, das eine herausragende kulturelle und religibse Bedeutung fiir die Gruppe hat.

22

Lukas H. Meyer

Paul Pattern unterstreicht, dass ein vergangenheitsorientierter Ansatz der Interpretation historischen Unrechts die Frage nach der Relevanz hypothetischer Geschichtsverlaufe fiir die Feststellung der Anspriiche gegenwartig lebender Menschen aufwerfe, der insbesondere Waldron und Sher in diesem Band nachgehen. Aber Patton halt einen vcrgangenheitsorientierten Ansatz korrektiver Gerechtigkeit fiir unverzichtbar: Selbst wenn wir mit Waldron die Mbglichkeit der Aufhebung der Anspriiche wegen historischen Unrechts annehmen, beantworte dies nicht schon die Frage, ob im post-kolonialen Kontext mit Blick auf alle unrechtmaBigen Verletzungen der Anspriiche indigener Bevblkerungen eine Aufhebung von deren Anspriichen anzunehmen ist und deshalb die rein zukunftsorientierte Betrachtung distributiver Gerechtigkeit normativ angemessen ist. Gegen einen exklusiv zukunftsorientierten Ansatz distributiver Gerechtigkeit spreche, dass ein solcher Ansatz die Begrundung von Anspriichen aufgrund der Verletzung durch historisches Unrecht ausschlieBe. Denn fiir die Begriindung von Anspriichen heute lebender Menschen (und auch als Mitgliedern von indigenen Vblkern) sei gemaB einer rein zukunftsorientierten Theorie distributiver Gerechtigkeit zwar deren unverschuldete Schlechterstellung relevant, nicht aber die besonderen Griinde fur diese Schlechterstellung, also das historische Unrecht. Diese sind bestenfalls von pragmatischer Relevanz. Wenn allerdings die Aufhebung der historischen Anspriiche nicht vollstandig ist, wenigstens einige Anspriiche korrektiver Gerechtigkeit nach wie vor Geltung haben, dann ist zu klaren, welche Anspriiche der indigenen Bevolkerungen iiberlebt haben und wie diese unter heutigen Bedingungen zu realisieren sind. Fiir eine angemessene Antwort dieser Frage seien die schon genannten Gerechtigkeitsdimensionen, die der korrektiven und der distributiven Gerechtigkeit unverzichtbar, und dariiber hinaus eine dritte, die der relationalen Gerechtigkeit. Letztere hebt ab auf die Pflichten der wechselseitigen Anerkennung und des Respekts zwischen Gruppen und im untersuchten Kontext auf die Verletzung dieser Pflichten gegeniiber den indigenen Bevolkerungen durch die Neuankbmmlinge und Siedler. Die Relevanz jedes dieser Ansatze sei kontext-relevant. Mit Blick auf die Anspriiche indigener Gruppen sei zum Beispiel der auf Restitution zielende vergangenheitsorientierte Ansatz besonders relevant in den USA, weil dort gewohnlich Vertrage zwischen den Siedlem und den indigenen Bevolkerungen geschlossen wurden, deren Verletzung durch U.S.-amerikanische staatliche Institutionen Rechtsanspriiche der indigenen Bevolkerungen auf Restitution begriinden konnen und die heute einklagbar sind. Wenn aber, wie in Australien, das Land unter Vorgabe der terra nullius Doktrine von den Europaem angeeignet wurde, dann stelle das eine extreme Form der Verweigerung jedweder Anerkennung der Autoritat eines schon existierenden indigenen Rechts und indigener Sitten dar, und es liege nahe, dieses Unrecht im Sinne der Verletzung relationaler Gerechtigkettsforderungen zu interpretieren. Dieser Ansatz, jedenfalls wie James Tully ihn verstiinde, erklare aller25

25

Anders als bei der Kolonisierung des nordamerikanischen Kontinents und Neuseelands sind bei der Kolonisierung Australiens keine Vertrage mit den Ureinwohnern geschlossen worden, weil man diesen Gruppen die Vblkerrechtsfahigkeit absprach und ihre Gebiete als terra nullius betrachtete. Zu den Vertragen mit den indianischen Ureinwohnern Nordamerikas siehe F.P. Prucha, American Indian Treaties; C.N. Eick, Indianervertrage in Nouvelle-France. Zu deren Rechtslage siehe J.W. Singer, Introduction to Property, Kap. 15 "American Indian Property". Zur rechtlichen Situation der australischen Aborigines vor dem Mabo Urteil des High Court (1992) (Mabo and Others v State of Queensland vom 3. Juni 1992, siehe The Mabo Decision.) siehe H. Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty, Kap. 4; J. Chesterman und B. Galligan, Citizens without Rights, Kap. 7. Fur eine skeptische Interpretation der normativen Signifikanz der Vertrage mit Ureinwohnern im Kolonisierungsprozess fur deren Anspriiche heute siehe insbesondere R.E. Goodin, "Waitangi Tales", 309-33. Zu den Unterschieden und Gemeinsamkeiten der Interpretation des Common Law Besitztitels auf Land der

Einleitung

23

dings nicht, welche Relevanz ein hypothetischer Geschichtsverlauf, bei dem die Anspriiche der indigenen Bevolkerungen auf Anerkennung und Respekt nicht verletzt worden waren, fiir die Frage hatte, was angesichts der tatsachlichen Geschichte und ihrer Konsequenzen den heute lebenden Mitgliedern indigener Volker im Sinne korrektiver Gerechtigkeit geschuldet sei.

4. 4.1

Pflichten aufgrund historischen Unrechts und historischer Indirekte Pflichten von Mitgliedern andauernder

Schadigung

Gesellschaften

Wie Patton sieht auch Janna Thompson einen Grund fur die korrektiven Anspriiche australischer Abrogines in historischen Verletzungen der Pflichten relationaler Gerechtigkeit: Deren Anspriiche auf Reparationsleistungen beruhten nicht allein auf der Verletzung von Besitztiteln, sondern auf der unrechtmaBigen Verletzung anderer Rechte, insbesondere der Verletzung der politischen Unabhangigkeit ihrer Gruppe und der Zerstbfung des kulturellen Lebens der Gruppe - Unrecht, das als Ausdruck mangelnden Respekts fur den Status der Gruppe und ihre Lebensform zu werten sei. Im vorliegenden Beitrag geht es Thompson um die Analyse historischer Pflichten, namlich um Beantwortung der Frage: Wem gegenuber haben indirekte Opfer historischen Unrechts welche Anspriiche und warum? Unter liberalen Theoretikern besteht Einigkeit, dass Menschen keine Verantwortung tragen konnen fur Unrechtshandlungen, die (lange) bevor sie geboren wurden von anderen veriibt worden sind. Jedoch argumentiert Thompson, wie auch Rahul Kumar und David Silver sowie David Lyons, dass Menschen als Mitglieder andauernder politischer Gesellschaften, gewbhnlich also als Biirger und Biirgerinnen, Verantwortung dafiir tragen, dass ihre Gesellschaft die Pflichten erfiillt, die ihr daraus erwachsen, dass friiher lebende Mitglieder im Namen der Gesellschaft Unrecht veriibt haben. In der Analyse von Thompson gehoren historische Verpflichtungen zu den vergangenheitsorientierten Verpflichtungen wie die Pflicht, Versprechen zu halten oder Vertrage zu erfiillen. Ihr Verpflichtungsgrund sind vergangene Handlungen und Ereignisse, nicht allein die Konsequenzen vergangener Handlungen fur gegenwartige Bedingungen. Unter einer historischen Verpflichtung versteht sie eine moralische Verantwortung von Personen als Mitgliedern einer intergenerationellen Assoziation oder Gemeinschaft, z.B. als Burger oder als Besitzer oder Manager von Korporationen aufgrund der Verpflichtungen oder Handlungen ihrer Vorfahren bzw. -ganger. Diese Verpflichtungen sind historische, wenn die Nachfahren oder Nachfolger derer, die die Verpflichtungen eingegangen sind, dafiir verantwortlich sind, die Verpflichtungen zu erfiillen. Nationen, Stamme und ahnliche politische Entitaten sind intergenerationell: Sie verfolgen generationenubergreifende Projekte. Insbesondere gehen solche Entitaten auch langfristige vertragliche Verpflichtungen ein. Kbnnten diese Entitaten analog zu Individuen verstanden werden, so ware die Zuschreibung von Verantwortung, etwa die einmal eingegangenen vertraglichen Verpflichtungen auch zu erfiillen oder aufgrund friiherer Unrechtshandlungen heute Reparationsleistungen zu erbringen, unproblematisch. Aber es sind die jeweiligen Mitglieder der Gruppe, etwa die Burger und Biirgerinnen, die die Verpflichtungen zu erfiillen haben, und, insbesondere bei Reparationsleistungen, die Lasten und Kosten zu tragen haben. Dagegen aber kann mindestens eingewandt werden, erstens, dass eine solche Zuschreibung unfair ist, und, zweitens, dass Menschen nur Ureinwohner in Australien, Neuseeland und den U S A siehe R. Bartlett, "Native Title", 282-310.

24

Lukas H. Meyer

verantwortlich sein konnen fiir Handlungen, die sie beeinflussen konnen. Zwar kann fiir das Selbstverstandnis von Menschen konstitutiv sein, dass sie Mitglieder intergenerationeller Gruppen sind, und sie werden dann auch bereit sein, die Lasten und Kosten solcher Mitgliedschaft zu tragen. Aber das gilt, so Thompson, bei weitem nicht fiir alle Mitglieder der uns interessierenden groBen und unpersonlichen Gesellschaften. Aus der Beteiligung an Gruppenaktivitaten kann nicht einfach auf ein solches Selbstverstandnis geschlossen werden. Auch der Umstand, zu den Begiinstigten der Unrechtshandlungen fruher lebender Personen zu zahlen, begriindet per se keine historischen Pflichten, sondern bestenfalls die Pflicht, den Gewinn mit denen, die aufgrund der Handlungen benachteiligt sind, fair zu teilen. Thompson schlagt hingegen vor, den Grund fiir historische Verpflichtungen von Menschen als Mitgliedern intergenerationeller (politischer) Gruppen darin zu erkennen, dass der Anspruch, spater lebende Mitglieder der Gruppe durch heutige Entscheidungen binden zu diirfen, nur dann gerechtfertigt ist, wenn die gegenwartigen Mitglieder ihrerseits akzeptieren, fiir die Erfiillung der von friiheren Mitgliedern der Gruppe eingegangenen Verpflichtungen verantwortlich zu sein. Sind wir fiir die Einhaltung von Verpflichtungen verantwortlich, dann sind wir auch dafiir verantwortlich, im Falle der Verletzung der Verpflichtungen denen, denen Unrecht getan wurde, Reparation und Restitution zu leisten. Unser Anspruch, spater lebende Mitglieder unserer Gesellschaft binden zu konnen, setzt also voraus, dass wir akzeptieren, an entsprechende Entscheidungen friiherer Mitglieder gebunden zu sein, und fiir Pflichtverletzungen durch fruhere Mitglieder einzustehen. Eine weitere Frage ist, was als Pflichtverletzung zahlt. Folgen wir Thompson, so sind dies wenigstens die Verletzung von Pflichten, deren Erfiillung Voraussetzung dafiir ist, mit anderen intergenerationellen Entitaten Verpflichtungen eingehen zu diirfen. Zu diesen zahlt aber insbesondere die Pflicht zum Respekt vor anderen solchen Gruppen, die ihrerseits einen Anspruch auf solchen Respekt haben. Die historischen Ungerechtigkeiten, um die es im Verhaltnis der Kolonisatoren zu den indigenen Bevolkerungen etwa Australiens geht, namlich die Verletzung der politischen Unabhangigkeit der Aborigines und die Zerstorung ihres kulturellen Lebens, sind aber klare Verletzungen dieser Pflicht. Burger Australiens stehen unter der Pflicht, Reparation zu leisten fiir das im genannten Sinne respektlose Verhalten der friiheren Mitglieder ihrer Gruppe gegentiber den Aborigines, ebenso wie die zukiinftigen Mitglieder Australiens unter der Pflicht stehen, gemaB der sie bindenden Entscheidungen der heutigen Burger zu handeln und fiir deren Pflichtverletzungen gegebenenfalls gerade zu stehen. Dies ist Voraussetzung dafiir, dass Australien als respektwurdig gelten und den Anspruch erheben kann, mit anderen intergenerationell andauernden Gruppen Verpflichtungen einzugehen, die auch die zukiinftigen Mitglieder der jeweiligen Gruppen binden. Auch Kumar und Silver schreiben den USA als intergenerationell andauernder Entitat korporative Verantwortung fiir das in ihrem Namen veriibte Unrecht zu und machen die derzeitigen Burger dafiir haftbar, dass der Staat seiner historischen Verantwortung 26

27

26 27

Hierzu das Kapitel von A. Gosseries, das ich in Abschnitt 4.3 vorstelle. Fiir eine eingehende Interpretation der Missachtung einer Person durch Verletzung und Aberkennung ihrer grundlegenden Rechte siehe A. Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung, Kap. 6 "Personliche Identitat und Missachtung. Vergewaltigung, Entrechtung, Entwiirdigung", insbesondere 214-6. Opfer historischen Unrechts sind haufig Opfer der Missachtung in den drei von Honneth unterschiedenen Schichten gewesen: praktische Misshandlung, Entrechtung und Entwiirdigung. Siehe auch A. Honneth, "Anerkennung und moralische Verpflichtung", 2 5 - 4 1 , 33f; ders, "A Society Without Humiliation?, 306-24, Abschnitte V und VI.

Einleitung

25

entspricht. In der Sache geht es ihnen um die Pflicht zu Restitutionsleistungen gegeniiber den heutigen Mitgliedern der African-American Community aufgrund der Versklavung ihrer Vorfahren. Der heutige Staat USA stehe in Kontinuitat mit den USA, die als legitim ancrkannt iiber Autoritat verfugten und als solcher Staat die Behandlung der friiheren Mitglieder der African-American Community als Menschen legitimiert haben, die des Respekts als Personen im Vollsinne nicht wiirdig und deshalb als Sklaven zu behandeln sind. Folgen wir der Studie David Lyons, so haben die Handlungen und Unterlassungen offizieller U.S.-amerikanischer politischer Entscheidungstrager (von Prasidenten, Mitgliedern einzel- und bundesstaatlicher Legislatures Richtern und Exekutivbeamten) die Institution nicht nur legitimiert, sondern zur Schaffung und Erhaltung der Chattel-Sklaverei beigetragen, auch nach der Abschaffung der Sklaverei die African Americans von politischen Entscheidungsprozessen systematisch ausgeschlossen und dafiir gesorgt, dass viele von ihnen zu den in der heutigen U.S.-amerikanischen Gesellschaft soziookonomisch und kulturell Schlechtestgestellten zahlen. Lyons unterscheidet vier Perioden, in denen nach seiner Analyse jeweils Entscheidungen zur Schaffung und Erhaltung einer rassistisch hierarchisierten US-amerikanischen Gesellschaft getroffen wurden, und das, obgleich die politischen Entscheidungstrager durchaus die Altemativen kannten und sich jeweils gegen die Etablierung der Sklaverei, deren Erhalt, den politischen und okonomischen Ausschluss der African-Americans und die brutale Unterdriickung ihrer BemUhungen um Besserstellung hatten entscheiden konnen. Auch Kumar und Silver betonen, dass ebendieser Staat USA sich bis heute nicht in angemessener Weise auf die Verantwortung fiir dieses staatliche Unrecht der Sklaverei bezogen hat. Deshalb sei es plausibel, von den USA als rechtens zu fordern, das Verstandnis zuriickzuweisen, welches sich in der Sklaverei und Behandlung von Menschen als nicht gleichberechtigten Personen aufgrund ihrer Mitgliedschaft in der AfricanAmerican Community ausdriickt. Die autoritative Legitimation dieses Verstandnisses und der Institution Sklaverei durch den Staat habe eben dieser Staat die Pflicht, autoritativ zuriickzuweisen. Was in Erfiillung dieser Pflicht als angemessen und hinreichend gelten konne, sei in starkem MaBe von kulturellen Konventionen abhangig. Erforderlich sei wenigstens eine offizielle Anerkennung der Sklaverei als staatlich legitimiertes Unrecht. Die Burger der USA seien dafiir haftbar zu machen, dass ihr Staat dieser Pflicht entspricht. Ahnlich wie Kumar und Silver (und im Sinne der Analyse historischer Verpflichtungen, die Thompson vorgelegt hat) schreibt Lyons Verantwortung fiir Kompensation und Reparation fiir das Unrecht und den bleibenden Schaden, den gegenwartig lebende African-Americans erleiden, den USA als fortdauemder staatlicher Einrichtung zu. Lyons betont aber den bleibenden Schaden, nicht das von Kumar und Silver identifizierte Unrecht an heutigen Mitgliedern der African-American Community aufgrund des an friiheren Mitgliedern dieser Gruppe veriibten Unrechts. Es gelte fiir eine Politik einzutreten, die die bleibenden Konsequenzen wenigstens fur die Kinder der Nachfahren der US28

28

"Chattel" bedeutet bewegliches Eigentum. Von Chattel-Sklaverei spricht man, wenn eine Person im umfassenden Sinne als Eigentum einer anderen Person gilt. Die Eigenttimerschaft begrundet mehrere Herrschafts-, Nutzungs- und Verfiigungsrechte, so zum Beispiel das Recht auf Ubertragung des (faktischen) Besitzes, das Recht auf VerauBerung des Eigentums oder das Recht, jede Einwirkung Dritter auf das Eigentum oder auf die VerfUgung iiber das Eigentum abzuwehren. Zu den Rechtsbestimmungen, die Chattel-Sklaverei in den U S A begriindeten, siehe den Beitrag von David Lyons in diesem Bd. Die weite Definition von Sklaverei, wie sie sich im Ubereinkommen des Volkerbundes iiber Sklaverei (1926) findet, schlieBt die meisten Formen von Zwangsarbeit ein. Siehe "Zwangsarbeit und Sklaverei im 2 1 . Jahrhundert", herausgegeben von Anti-Slavery International (London) et al.

26

Lukas H. Meyer

amerikanischen Sklaven abschwache. Nicht zuletzt auch wegen des Kontingenzproblems - also der Tatsache, dass die Versklavung und die UnrechtsmaBnahmen, die zur "rassischen Hierarchisierung" der US-amerikanischen Gesellschaft beigetragen haben, zu den notwendigen Bedingungen der Existenz vieler heute lebender African-Americans zahlen - schlagt Lyons vor, eine Politik zur Besserstellung der African-Americans auf einen zukunftsorientierten schwachen Egalitarismus zu griinden. Dieser stiitzt sich auf die Uberzeugung, dass eine Regierung nur dann als legitim gelten kann, wenn sie ihrer vorrangigen Pflicht entspricht, namlich sicherzustellen, dass die sozialen Einrichtungen so beschaffen sind, dass jedes Kind einen fairen Anteil an Lebensaussichten hat. 29

4.2

Geteilte Scham oder kollektive

Schuld?

George Fletcher weist in seinem Beitrag darauf hin, dass geteilte Scham haufig zur Begrundung von Pflichten aufgrund historischen Unrechts angefuhrt werde. Fletcher weist diese Auffassung zuriick: Im Kern sei Scham das Gefiihl, das sich einstellt, wenn die Geschlechts- und die Verdauungsfunktionen dem Blick anderer ausgesetzt sind. Die angemessene Reaktion sei, sich zu bedecken. Auch wenn das Schamgefuhl die Einhaltung moralischer Regeln unterstutzen kbnne, sei es im Unterschied zu Verantwortung und Schuld nicht-rational. Das Schamgefuhl als solches kann nicht handlungsbegriindend sein. Deshalb sei es iiberraschend, wenn das Gefiihl geteilter Scham - etwa der Deutschen angesichts der Verbrechen, die fruher lebende Deutsche im Namen Deutschlands veriibt haben - zur Begrundung von Pflichten angefuhrt wird, etwa der Pflicht heute lebender Deutscher, den Opfern des Naziregimes Kompensation zu leisten. Die hier von Fletcher kritisierte Auffassung wird im vorliegenden Band von keinem der Autoren vertreten. Thompson, Kumar und Silver und Lyons vertreten ja vielmehr die Position, dass die Kompensationspflichten aufgrund historischen Unrechts andauernden staatlichen Einrichtungen zuzuschreiben sind und dass die Mitglieder solcher Einrichturigen unter der (Burger-) Pflicht stehen, dafiir zu sorgen, dass die jeweilige Einrichtung ihren korporativen Pflichten entspricht. Die gegenwartigen Mitglieder gel30

29 30

D. Lyons in diesem Band, 2 7 1 . Eine solche Reaktion sei, so Fletcher, auch dem Gefiihl der Scham nicht angemessen. Denn, ob die gegenwartig lebenden Deutschen die Pflicht erfiillen oder nicht, konne keinen Unterschied machen fur ihr Gefiihl der Scham, richtig verstanden. Das scheint fragwurdig: Auch wenn, wie Fletcher betont, Schamgefiihle als solche nicht Handlungspflichten begriinden konnen, so kann das Gefiihl der Scham (und die Starke dieses Geftihls) doch mit der Verletzung bzw. der Erfiillung oder Nichterfullung von Pflichten angemessen korrelieren. Scham wegen Mitgliedschaft in einer Gruppe ist besonders plausibel, wenn Menschen ihre soziale Identitat als abhangig von nicht selbst gewahlter Gruppenzugehorigkeit verstehen, und diese Identitat gemaB ihrem Selbstverstandnis und der Wahrnehmung anderer dadurch beschadigt wird, dass Gruppenmitglieder (und die Gruppe als solche) ihren Pflichten nicht nachkommen. Diese Beobachtung liegt der Interpretation der Verantwortung dafiir, wer man ist (existentielle Verantwortung), im Gegensatz zu der Verantwortung fiir die eigenen Handlungen zugrunde. Siehe B. Williams, Shame and Necessity, 89-95. Larry May hat die Verantwortung fiir die soziale Identitat der eigenen Person unter dem Titel "Social Existentialism" ausgearbeitet. Siehe L. May, Sharing Responsibility. Zur Interpretation der moralischen Belastung der Gruppenidentitat aufgrund friiheren, im Namen der Gruppe verubten Unrechts und den damit einhergehenden Schamgefiihlen derzeitiger Gruppenmitglieder, siehe ebd., 146-62. Die Interpretation versteht sich als eine Rekonstruktion und Weiterentwicklung von Karl Jaspers Begriff der "metaphysischen Schuld". Siehe K. Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage, 6 5 - 1 4 9 , 108-10. Siehe auch Jean-Claude Wolfs Interpretation "metaphysischer Schuld" als "stellvertretende Haftung" und die Angemessenheit von Schamgefiihlen, wenn letztere akzeptiert wird, in Utilitarismus, Pragmatismus und kollektive Verantwortung, 155-77.

Einleitung

27

31

ten als schuldlos und verantwortlich nur insofern sie Mitglieder des Staates sind. Auch Fletcher halt die gegenwartig lebenden Mitglieder fiir im modernen Sinne schuldlos, vertritt aber die Auffassung, dass kollektive Schuld MaBnahmen der Kompensation fiir von friiheren Mitgliedern im Namen der Gruppe veriibten Unrechts begrunden kann, wenn wir auf Elemente der alttestamentarischen Bedeutung von Schuld zuriickgreifen. Das alttestamentarische Verstandnis von Schuld sei ein objektivistisches: Schuld lasst sich an objektiven Merkmalen der Beschmutzung der Gesellschaft, in der das Verbrechen begangen wurde, festmachen. Die angemessene Reaktion auf solche kollektive Schuld sind Opfer fiir die Gotten Das biblische Verstandnis kennt weder die subjektive Seite von Schuld, also Schuldgefuhle, noch Grade der Schuld. Dies sind aber wichtige Elemente des modernen Verstandnisses. Personen fiihlen sich schuldig. Einige Personen tragen groBere Schuld als andere. Fletcher meint, dass nach modernem Verstandnis der Grad der Schuld einer Person vom AusmaB des schuldhaft verursachten Schadens abhangig sei und die Zuschreibung von Schuld von Kenntnis der Handlung und ihrer Risiken. Nicht das Erbringen von Opfern sondern Bestrafung des Schuldigen gemaB dem Urteil eines zustandigen Gerichts gilt als angemessene Reaktion. Nicht mehr kollektive Schuld sondern individuelle Schuld ist der Standardfall des modernen Verstandnisses. Anders als Scham konne Schuld handlungsbegrundend sein und Schuld konne auch KompensationsmaBnahmen begrunden. Mit Blick auf historisches Unrecht miisste Schuld hier allerdings im Sinne des biblischen Verstandnisses objektivistisch, also als kollektive Beschmutzung verstanden werden. KompensationsmaBnahmen dienten dann der symbolischen Reinigung des Kollektivs. Fletchers Interpretation kollektiver Schuld konnte in vielen Fallen zur Feststellung solcher Schuld fiihren, in denen wir mit der unter anderem von Thompson vertretenen Interpretation historischer Pflichten Gesellschaften korporative Verantwortung und ihren Mitgliedern indirekte Pflichten aufgrund der Unrechtshandlungen friiherer Mitglieder der Gesellschaft zuschreiben. Allerdings sind die Fragen, wann solche kollektive Schuld vorliegt und wem gegeniiber dann Pflichten bestehen, weitgehend unbeantwortet. Vermutlich wird man nicht in alien Fallen von kollektiver Schuld im Sinne Fletchers sprechen wollen, in denen wir im Sinne Thompsons Gesellschaften korporative Verantwortung wegen des Handelns friiherer Mitglieder zuschreiben. 32

4.3

Das Verbot des

Trittbrettfahrens

So ist unklar, ob wir mit Fletcher im Falle der von Axel Gosseries untersuchten schadigenden Konsequenzen der C02-Emissionen fruher lebender Mitglieder andauernder

31

Elemente einer solchen Interpretation finden sich auch in K. Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage; T.W. Adorno, "Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?", 555-72; J. Habermas, "Uber den moralischen Notstand in der Bundesrepublik"; ders., "Zwei Reden"; ders., "Aus der Geschichte lernen?", "Doppelte Vergangenheit", "Das Bedurfnis nach deutschen Kontinuitaten", "Aus welcher Geschichte lernen?"; M , Brumlik und H. Brunkhorst, "Kontingente Identitat und historische Haftung", 2 6 - 4 0 , M. Low-Beer, "Die Verpflichtungen der unschuldigen Nachgeborenen", 61-9.

32

Fletcher versteht kollektive Schuld in einem nicht-distributiven Sinne: Schreiben wir dem Kollektiv Schuld zu, bedeutet dies nicht, dass die einzelnen Mitglieder schuldig sind. Zur Unterscheidung von distributiven und nicht-distributiven Interpretationen kollektiver Verantwortung siehe F.W. Rothenpieler, Der Gedanke einer Kollektiv schuld in juristischer Sicht; R.S. Pfeiffer, "The Meaning and Justification of Collective Responsibility", 6 2 - 8 3 , und J. Feinberg, "Collective Responsibility", 2 2 2 - 5 1 ; J. Feinberg, "The Expressive Function o f Punishment", 95-118.

28

Lukas H. Meyer

Gesellschaften fiir Nicht-Mitglieder, die heute andemorts leben, von kollektiver Schuld sprechen sollten. Von einer Beschmutzung der Gesellschaft durch historisches Verbrechen kann hier nicht die Rede sein. Die fruher lebenden Mitglieder haben selbst nicht schuldhaft gehandelt, weil sie um die schadliche Wirkung fiir spater lebende Menschen nicht wissen konnten. Konnen ihre Nachfahren oder die heute lebenden Mitglieder der andauernden Gesellschaft, also gewohnlich Burger eines Staates, unter historischen Pflichten zu Kompensationsleistungen gegeniiber geschadigten Nicht-Mitgliedern stehen aufgrund der Handlungen fruher lebender Mitglieder ihrer Gesellschaft, wenn sie fiir deren Handlungen nicht nur nicht verantwortlich sein konnen, weil sie deren Handlungen nicht haben beeinflussen konnen, sondem, anders als im Fall der Sklaverei in den USA, die fiir diese Handlungen verantwortlichen Akteure nicht haben wissen konnen, dass sie (spater lebende) Menschen schadigen (wurden)? Im Falle der Emission von Treibhausgasen konnten solche Kompensationsleistungen erbracht werden, indem die zukunftige Emission dieser Gase fiir Staaten unter Beriicksichtigung ihrer friiheren Emissionen reduziert wird, namlich starker dann, wenn ein Staat fiir uberdurchschnittlich hohe friihere Emissionen verantwortlich ist. Dies ist seit vielen Jahren eine politische Forderung. Gosseries akzeptiert, dass aufgrund ihrer Unwissenheit die fruher lebenden Verursacher des Schadens diesen nicht moralisch zu verantworten haben, verteidigt aber die Auffassung, dass gegenwartig lebende Menschen, die um die schadigende Wirkung des Handelns ihrer Vorfahren wissen sollten und Vorteile aufgrund dieses Handelns genieBen, den Geschadigten Kompensationsleistungen schulden konnen, namlich aufgrund des Verbots des Trittbrettfahrens. Fiir den Zweck der Diskussion reduziert Gosseries die Komplexitat der Situation, wie sie aufgrund friiherer Emissionen heute vorliegt, durch stark vereinfachende Annahmen. Er beschrankt sich auf zwei Staaten (die er USA und Bangladesh nennt) und je zwei Generationen, die gegenwartig lebende und eine friihere. Da diese Generationen nicht viberlappen, konnten die gegenwartig lebenden Menschen das Verhalten der friiheren Generation nicht beeinflussen. Ferner beschrankt er sich auf Kohlendioxid-Emissionen, nimmt an, dass die gegenwartig lebenden Generationen beider Staaten kein Kohlendioxid (CO2) emittieren und dass nur die fruher lebende Generation der USA CO2 emittiert hat. Des Weiteren nimmt er an, die friiheren COrEmissionen der USA schadigen einerseits die gegenwartig lebenden Mitglieder von Bangladesh direkt (also nicht indirekt aufgrund der Schadigung ihrer Vorfahren) und seien insgesamt fiir das Wohlbefinden der in Bangladesh lebenden Menschen abtraglich. Er nimmt andererseits an, dass diese C02-Emissionen ihrer Vorfahren die gegenwartig in den USA lebenden Menschen insgesamt indirekt begiinstigen: Sie erlauben den heute lebenden US-Amerikanern ein hbheres Wohlfahrtsniveau zu realisieren. Die moralische Verantwortung der gegenwartig lebenden US-Amerikaner fiir Kompensationsleistungen aufgrund des schadigenden Handelns fruher lebender US-Amerikaner sucht Gosseries mit einer spezifischen moralischen Interpretation des Trittbrettfahrens zu begriinden. Eine Person gilt als Trittbrettfahrer, wenn das Handeln anderer sie begunstigt und die Kosten der Handlung die handelnde Person oder noch andere Personen tragen. Transgenerationelles Trittbrettfahren liegt dann vor, wenn die gegenwartig lebende Generation des einen Staates (USA) aufgrund der Handlungen der friiheren Generation desselben Staates Trittbrettfahrer ist zu Lasten der gegenwartigen Generation des anderen Staates (Bangladesh). Trittbrettfahrer sind die gegenwartig lebenden U.S.-Amerikaner, obgleich sie fiir die schadigenden Handlungen nicht verantwortlich

Einleitung

29

sein konnen, die sie, da sie zum Zeitpunkt ihrer Ausfuhrung noch nicht einmal geboren waren, nicht haben beeinflussen konnen. Das Trittbrettfahren einer Person sei solange moralisch unakzeptabel, als die Person nicht wenigstens im Umfange des Werts ihrer durch das Handeln anderer entstandenen Begiinstigung denen Kompensation leistet, die durch eben dieses Handeln geschadigt sind. Das Verbot des Trittbrettfahrens, wie Gosseries es auffasst, ist weniger anspruchsvoll als das Gleichheitsgebot bzw. eine strikt egalitare Interpretation des Verbots des Trittbrettfahrens. Das von Gosseries verteidigte Verstandnis des Verbots erlaubt eine Ungleichverteilung der Begiinstigungen und Belastungen aufgrund z.B. der COi-Emissionen friiherer Generationen: Die Netto-Begiinstigten sind verpflichtet, Kompensationsleistungen in Hohe des Werts der ihnen entstehenden Begiinstigung zu erbringen; die Erfiillung dieser Pflicht garantiert aber nicht, dass der Schaden vollstandig ausgeglichen wird. Das Gleichheitsgebot hingegen verlangt, dass die Gesellschaft alle unverschuldeten Schlechterstellungen ausgleicht, gleich ob sie sich Ereignissen, dem Handeln anderer oder dem unwillentlichen Handeln der negativ Betroffenen verdanken. Dieses Gebot verlangt die Gleichverteilung der Begiinstigungen und Belastungen aufgrund etwa der CLVEmissionen friiherer Generationen. Weil das Gleichheitsgebot andere und haufig anspruchsvollere Verpflichtungen mit sich bringt, kann das Verbot des Trittbrettfahrens auch der vertreten, der das Gleichheitsgebot ablehnt. Das Verbot des Trittbrettfahrens ist auch in einem zweiten Sinne weniger anspruchsvoll als das Gleichheitsgebot. Ersteres verlangt von den Begiinstigten Kompensationsleistungen nur gemaB ihrer relativen Begiinstigung. Wenn andere Begiinstigte ihren Kompensationspflichten nicht geniigen, dann andert dies den Umfang der zu entrichtenden Kompensationsleistungen nicht. Das Gleichheitsgebot andererseits verlangt eine Gleichverteilung der Begiinstigungen und Belastungen durch Redistribution. Wenn andere ihren Verpflichtungen nicht geniigen oder nicht geniigt haben, kann dies den Umfang der Verpflichtung nach dem Gleichheitsgebot verstarken. Angenommen die von Gosseries vorgeschlagene Interpretation des Verbots des Trittbrettfahrens ist plausibel und seine Analyse der Verpflichtungen, die sich wegen der Schadigungen durch globale Erwarmung aufgrund der CC»2-Emissionen friiherer Generationen ergeben, ist uberzeugend, ist das Verbot des Trittbrettfahrens auch fiir die Analyse und Bewertung anderer Falle historischer Schadigung bzw. historischen Unrechts relevant? Der von Gosseries unterstellte Fall hat mindestens zwei besondere Merkmale: Erstens konnten friihere Generationen nicht wissen, dass die C02-Emissionen schadlich sind (und dass sie durch diese Emissionen spater lebenden Generationen Unrecht tun). Zweitens werden erst spatere Generationen geschadigt. Diese, im Beispiel Gosseries die gegenwartige Bevolkerung von Bangladesh, sind direkt durch die Emissionen der friiheren US-amerikanischen Generation geschadigt. Beide Merkmale treffen etwa auf den Fall der Sklaverei in den USA nicht zu. Dass Menschen dadurch, dass sie in die Sklaverei gezwungen werden, groBer Schaden zugefiigt und ihnen dadurch Unrecht getan wird, haben die Sklavenhalter und die Akteure, die die Institution der Sklaverei geschaffen und legitimiert haben, wissen konnen oder sollen. Dann aber konnen sich andere Verpflichtungen ihrer Nachfahren ergeben, etwa die im Beitrag von Kumar und Silver diskutierten. Dass Menschen in der Vergangenheit Unrecht erlitten haben, ist Voraussetzung auch der von Waldron vertretenen Aufhebungsthese sowie seiner und Shers Uberlegungen zur Relevanz hypothetischer Geschichtsverlaufe, der Argumente von Gans, Marmor, F0llesdal und Patton zugunsten der Restitution der Kontrolle iiber identitatsstiftendes Territorium, der Uberlegungen von Pogge zum Makel andauernder Institutionen aufgrund ihrer illegitimen Entstehungs-

30

Lukas H. Meyer

bedingungen und der Idee uberlebender Pflichten mit Blick auf heute verstorbene Opfer friiheren Unrechts. Inwiefern der Umstand, dass im Falle der C02-Emissionen heute lebende Menschen direkte Opfer sind, normativ signifikant ist, bedarf weiterer Uberlegung. Die gegenwartig lebenden Nachfahren von Sklaven sind indirekte Opfer: Das Leben ihrer Vorfahren, die Sklaven waren, ist durch die Sklaverei gepragt. Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass die Versklavung ihrer Vorfahren notwendige Bedingung der Existenz und Identitat ihrer Nachfahren ist. Die Beurteilung ihrer Anspriiche erfordert demnach eine Interpretation der Relevanz des Nicht-Identitats-Problems (siehe Abschnitt 1). Im Falle der CO2Emissionen friiherer Generationen, die sich erst heute negativ auf die Lebensbedingungen von Menschen andemorts auswirken, konne man nicht mit gleicher Plausibilitat annehmen, so Gosseries, dass die friiheren Emissionen notwendige Bedingung der Existenz und Identitat der heute Betroffenen sind. Das scheint zweifelhaft: Auch wenn die MaBnahmen erst heute negative Konsequenzen haben, so hatten sie schon fruher andere Konsequenzen, die ihrerseits zu den Existenz- und Identitatsbedingungen der heute lebenden geschadigten Menschen zahlen und insbesondere dann, wenn wir haufige Interaktionen zwischen Schadigern und den Vorfahren der Geschadigten annehmen.

5.

Strafrecht und Strajverfahren

als Modus der Transition to Democracy

Das Nicht-Identitats-Problem stellt sich jedenfalls dann nicht, wenn Opfer von Unrechtshandlungen noch leben. Es ist auch irrelevant fiir die Frage, ob die TSter heute strafrechtlich verfolgt werden sollen. Ob Verbrechen, die unter einem vorrechtsstaatlichen Regime verubt wurden, heute wahrend einer Transition zu einer rechtsstaatlichen und demokratischen Ordnung strafrechtlich verfolgt werden sollen, und falls ja, mit welcher Begrundung und mit welchen Zielen, ist allerdings in hohem MaBe umstritten. So sind besondere wie generelle Abschreckungseffekte staatlicher Strafe in hohem MaBe zweifelhaft, wenn die Straftaten im Namen und Auftrag staatlicher Einrichtungen unter den Bedingungen einer Diktatur oder von Mitgliedern paramilitarischer Gruppen unter burgerkriegsahnlichen Bedingungen verubt wurden. Umstritten ist auch, welche Institutionen zustandig sein sollen: die Staatsanwaltschaften und Strafgerichte des Nachfolgeregimes, internationale Institutionen - also eigens eingerichtete so genannte ad hoc Tribunale oder der neu geschaffene internationale Strafgerichtshof - oder Institutionen dritter Staaten, die universelle Jurisdiktion beanspruchen oder deshalb fiir zustandig gelten konnen, weil eigene Burger zu den Opfern zahlen oder Verbrechen auf ihrem Territorium verubt wurden. Ruti Teitel entwickelt mit Blick auf diese Fragen eine soziologische Interpretation der intemationalen Praxis. Jaime Malamud-Goti, Christian Tomuschat, David Crocker, David Heyd, Claus Offe und Ulrike Poppe sowie Jon Elster diskutieren die genannten Fragen mit Blick auf die jeweils von ihnen untersuchten Falle: Exil, Strafverfolgung und Amnestie im antiken Athen bei der Ablosung von diktatorischen Regimen, die Be33

33

Fur skeptische Stimmen siehe J. Malamud-Goti, Game Without End, 10f, A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 76; A. Heller, "The Limits to Natural Law and the Paradox o f Evil", 149-173, 248f, 161; C.S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, 128; M.W. Reisman, "Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human Rights", 75-80, 77; M. Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 145f; M. Ignatieff, "Human Rights" (der in langfristiger Perspektive auf die sich wechselseitig starkende Abschreckungswirkung von militarischer humanitarer Intervention und (nationaler wie internationaler) Strafverfolgung systemischer Menschenrechtsverletzungen setzt).

Einleitung

31

miihungen eines spanischen Richters um Auslieferung des fruheren chilenischen Prasidenten Pinochet wegen Menschenrechtsverbrechen an Spanien, die straf- und zivilrechtlichc Amnestie, die in Siidafrika fiir politische Verbrechen des Apartheidregimes auf Empfehlung der Wahrheits- und Versohnungskommission gewahrt werden konnte, die strafrechtliche Verfolgung der Nazi-Verbrechen in den westlichen Besatzungszonen der spateren BRD sowie die Bemiihungen um strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung der DDRRegimeverbrechen im vereinten Deutschland. Am Beispiel Pinochets erbrtem Malamud-Goti und Tomuschat die Vor- und Nachteile einer Strafverfolgung von Regimeverbrechen durch andere Einrichtungen als die des Nachfolgeregimes. Crocker, Elster, Heyd, Malamud-Goti und auch Offe und Poppe diskutieren die Legitimitat und die Erfolgsaussichten strafrechtlicher Verfolgung von Regimeverbrechen angesichts anderer mbglicher sozialer Sanktionen und mit staatlicher Strafe konkurrierender Werte, insbesondere der Restitution der Opfer durch autoritative Feststellung der Wahrheit iiber das ihnen zugefiigte Unrecht durch die Arbeit von Wahrheitskommissionen und die Fbrderung der Versohnung zwischen Opfern und Tatern auf der Grundlage einer bedingten Amnestie.

5.1

Transitorische Strafverfolgung

im intemationalen

Vergleich

Teitel fasst in ihrem Beitrag die Ergebnisse ihres intemationalen Vergleichs strafrechtlicher Verfolgung und Bestrafung von Regimeverbrechen wahrend der Transition to Democracy zusammen: Wenn strafrechtliche Verfolgung der Verbrechen des Vorgangerregimes zu den transitorischen MaBnahmen z&hlen, so dienen die Strafverfahren kollektiven Lemprozessen, die den Wechsel zu einem liberalen und rechtsstaatlichen Regime befbrdern, indem eine diesem Zweck unter den jeweiligen Umstanden angemessene Interpretation der Wahrheit iiber die Verbrechen des Vorgangerregimes autoritativ etabliert wird. Solche Strafverfahren zielen auf die Uberwindung von gesellschaftlichen Konflikten. Im Ergebnis werden die in der Regel wenigen Verurteilten typischerweise milde bestraft oder miissen ihre Strafe nicht verbiiBen. Dies ist auch Problemen der Zuschreibung individueller Verantwortung fur Systemverbrechen und der mit rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipien vereinbaren Anwendung strafrechtlicher Bestimmungen nach einem Regimewechsel geschuldet. Die Bemiihungen um Etablierung eines internationalen Strafrechts und des intemationalen Strafgerichtshofs zielen, so Teitel, auf die 3

34

Fiir normative und politische Analysen der Legitimitat von Strafe als Antwort auf unter dem Vorgangerregime begangenes Unrecht siehe z.B. O. Kirchheimer, Political Justice, Kap. 1; H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 54-9, 97, 98f, 100, 140, 168, 178, 183f, 186-201, Kap. VII, VIII passim, 4 0 2 (zu Eichmanns Schuld), 374, 377 (zum Riickwirkungsproblem), 5 9 - 6 1 , 74, 9 4 , 181, 379-84, 392-5 (zur Jurisdiktion des Israelischen Gerichts); C.S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, X. Kap. 1 ("Punishment as a Response to Human Rights Violations"), Kap. 4 ("The Morality of Punishing and Investigating Human Rights") und Kap. 5 ("Legal Problems of Trials for Human Rights Violations"); J. Malamud-Goti, Game Without End, 20f, 189, I97f; P. de Greiff, 'Trial and Punishment", 9 3 - 1 1 1 ; K. Giinther, "Der strafrechtliche Schuldbegriff als Gegenstand einer Politik der Erinnerung in der Demokratie", 48-89. Fiir generelle und vergleichende Interpretationen von Strafe als Antwort auf historisches Unrecht siehe z.B. S. Zimmermann, Strafrechtliche Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung und Verjdhrung; G. O'Donnell und P.C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 2 8 - 3 2 ; S. Huntington, The Third Wave, 2 1 1 - 3 1 ; A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 23-94; J. Zalaquett, "Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments", Transitional Justice, Bd. I, 3 - 3 1 ; C.S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial Kap. 3, "Political Problems of Trials for Human Rights Violations".

32

Lukas H. Meyer

Uberwindung der aus diesen Problemen erwachsenen Dilemmata. Gabe es ein wohletabliertes internationales Strafrecht, das unbedingte Mindeststandards fiir das Verhalten aller Akteure verbindlich setzte, dann ware seine Anwendung frei von Problemen etwa der nachtraglichen rechtlichen Beurteilung der Gesetze eines vorrechtsstaatlichen Regimes. 35

5.2

Moralische Dilemmata der Strafverfolgung Fremde

von Systemverbrechen

durch

36

Malamud-Goti untersucht die moralischen Dilemmata einer Strafverfolgung des chilenischen Prasidenten Pinochet in Spanien. Der spanische Richter Baltasar Garzon hatte 1998 die Auslieferung Pinochets wegen dessen Verantwortung fiir massive Menschenrechtsverbrechen innerhalb und auBerhalb Chiles von GroBbritannien gefordert, als sich Pinochet in London aufhielt - letztlich ohne Erfolg, weil die britische Regierung Pinochet einem Gerichtsverfahren in Spanien fiir gesundheitlich nicht gewachsen hielt. Mit Blick auf dieses mogliche Strafgerichtsverfahren in Spanien und Verfahren dieser Art weist Malamud-Goti auf zwei Dilemmata hin. Erstens gebe es eine erhebliche Spannung zwischen der Forderung, Straflosigkeit gerade fur im Namen eines Staates veriibte Menschenrechtsverbrechen (Staats- oder Systemverbrechen) zu bekampfen, und dem rechtsstaatlichen Prinzip einer wenigstens minimalen Gleichbehandlung. Ersterer Forderung sei mit der strafrechtlichen Verfolgung jedes solchen Menschenrechtsverbrechens gedient. Das Prinzip der Gleichbehandlung werde aber verletzt, wenn ein Ausschnitt solcher Staatsverbrechen strafrechtlich verfolgt werde, andere gleichermaBen schlimme Verbrechen dieser Art aber nicht belangt werden und zwar wegen der erheblichen Machtunterschiede in den internationalen Beziehungen. Es sei unvorstellbar, dass etwa ein vietnamesischer Gerichtshof U.S.-amerikanische Staatsburger fiir Menschenrechtsverbrechen wahrend des Vietnamkriegs belangen konne oder generell, dass Strafgerichtshofe der so genannten Dritten Welt Menschenrechtsverbrechen, die im Namen oder Auftrag von Staaten der Ersten Welt verubt wurden, zur Anklage bringen. Derartige Ungleichbehandlung lasse sich auf der Grundlage einer auf Prinzipien beruhenden (retributiven) Strafgerechtigkeit nicht rechtfertigen. Malamud-Goti untersucht aber ein anderes Dilemma. Er vertritt die These, dass mit Blick auf innerstaatliche, im Namen des Staats veriibte Menschenrechtsverbrechen Strafgerechtigkeit nur durch Gerichte "von innen" erreicht werden kann, also von Gerichten, die die in Frage stehenden Taten aus der Perspektive der Tater und Opfer verstehen, was am ehesten dadurch gewahrleistet werden konne, dass die Richter zur selben politischen Gemeinschaft gehoren wie die Opfer und Tater. Diese These hat die Implikationen eines Dilemmas: Denn dem schon genannten Ziel der Bekampfung von Straflosigkeit steht gegeniiber, ein Strafverfolgungssystem vermeiden zu sollen, das der Strafgerechtigkeit nicht dient. Das Ziel retributiver Gerechtigkeit sei aber, der Gesellschaft bei der Etablierung einer auf der gleichen Anerkennung der Rechte aller Mitglieder beruhenden Demokratie dadurch zu dienen, dass es die Opfer mit den Tatern gleichstellt, namlich durch Bestrafung letzterer. Dieses Ziel kbnne nur erreicht werden, wenn die Verfahren und die Urteile der Gerichte innerhalb der Gesellschaft, der die Opfer und Tater angehoren, als autoritativ anerkannt werden, und dies sei nur moglich, wenn die 35 36

Siehe L.H. Meyer, '"Gesetzen ihrer Ungerechtigkeit wegen die Geltung absprechen'", 319-62, insbesondere 346-61. Siehe auch O. HOffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, 367-74, insbesondere 370.

Einleitung

33

Urteile erstens als angemessen gelten, weil sie der Wahrheit iiber die Tatsachen entsprechen, und zweitens fiir unparteilich gehalten werden, weil sie die richtigen Prinzipien, Regeln und Werte reflektieren. Solche Anerkennung beruht aber, so der Autor, und dies gelte gerade fiir Urteile iiber Staatsverbrechen, auf der Glaubwiirdigkeit des Gerichts, und glaubwiirdig sei ein Gericht fQr eine bestimmte Gruppe und aus anderen als bloB formalen Griinden. Das Verhaltnis zwischen dem Gericht und der jeweils relevanten Offentlichkeit sei ein subjektives, insofern fiir die Glaubwiirdigkeit des Gerichts nicht allein die unparteiliche Feststellung der Verantwortung des Taters sondem die Fahigkeit entscheidend sei, den Konflikt zu beenden, auf dem die Klage fuBt. Deshalb konne nicht uberraschen, dass, wenn fiir Staatsverbrechen strafrechtliche Verantwortung zugeschrieben werde, die solcher Zuschreibung zugrunde liegenden Kriterien den Umstand reflektieren, ob die Tater und Richter derselben Gemeinschaft angehbren oder nicht, ob es sich um ein Gericht "von innen" oder "von auBen" handelt, ob seine Glaubwiirdigkeit auf seinem Verhaltnis zur Gemeinschaft der Opfer und Tater beruht oder auf dem Verhaltnis zu einer dieser Gemeinschaft fremden Offentlichkeit. Gerichte von auBen sind die Gerichte anderer Staaten aber auch intemationale Tribunale und Gerichte. Als Illustration seiner These dient dem Autor einerseits die Verurteilung Ernst von Weizsackers durch ein internationales Militartribunal 1945 - ein Gericht von auBen, fiir dessen Glaubwiirdigkeit nicht die deutsche sondern die Offentlichkeit der Siegermachte oder die Weltoffentlichkeit entscheidend gewesen sei, daher die, so Malamud-Goti, nicht nachvollziehbar harsche Schuldzuweisung und das harte Urteil - und andererseits die Verurteilung des Brigadegenerals Orlando Ram6n Agosti durch ein argentinisches Gericht, dessen Richter den Mitbiirger zu einer angesichts der ihm nachgewiesenen Menschenrechtsverbrechen moglicherweise formal rechtfertigbaren, aber jedenfalls auBerst milden Gefangnisstrafe verurteilte. Generell neigen Gerichte von innen, die wahrend einer Transition to Democracy Staatsverbrechen des Vorgangerregimes beurteilen sollen, dazu, den besonderen politischen Umstanden der Tatzeit und der Gegenwart ein groBes (und moglicherweise zu groBes) Gewicht bei der Schuldzuweisung einzuraumen. Hingegen neigen Gerichte von auBen, wenn sie solche Falle verhandeln, dazu, die politische Realitat der Gesellschaft, der der Tater angehbrt, zu simplifizieren, weshalb sie innerhalb dieser Gesellschaft nur bei wenigen Autoritat genieBen, die politische Spaltung der Gesellschaft fordem und zur Etablierung rechtsstaatlicher Autoritat nicht beitragen. Angesichts der heutigen Millionengefolgschaft Pinochets in Chile hatte seine Verurteilung in Spanien durch einen spanischen Richter bestenfalls unvorhersehbare Konsequenzen fur die Etablierung einer rechtsstaatlichen Ordnung in Chile. Auch mit Blick auf Pinochet verspricht sich Malamud-Goti durch ein Verfahren im eigenen Land und durch ein Gericht, das die Binnenperspektive einnimmt, deutlich mehr mit Blick auf das Ziel der Schaffung rechtsstaatlicher und demokratischer Verhaltnisse wahrend der (in Chile andauemden) Transition to Democracy: Ein solches Gericht kbnnte erstens zur Aufklarung iiber das staatsterroristische Regime Pinochets beitragen wie auch zur differenzierten Beurteilung der direkten und indirekten Unterstutzung oder Duldung dieses Regimes und seiner Verbrechen durch weite Teile der Bevolkerung. Wenn am Ende nur die hochstrangigen und schlimmsten Verbrecher strafrechtlich belangt wurden, konne dies nur unter Verweis auf das Ziel der Schaffung demokratischer Autoritat legitimiert werden. Konnen aber derart auf die Herstellung rechtsstaatlich-demokratischer Verhaltnisse zielende Strafverfahren und Urteile als gerecht gelten? Malamud-Goti verweist darauf, dass unter den genannten Bedingungen nur solche Verfahren autoritativ sein konnen,

34

Lukas H. Meyer

die nicht die Spaltung der Gesellschaft vertiefen und die die relevanten Tatsachen und die richtigen Regeln und Prinzipien reflektieren, so dass durch die Bestrafung von Tatern dem Anspruch der zahlreichen Opfer auf Respekt und Wiederherstellung ihrer Wurde geniigt wird und in diesem Sinne retributive Gerechtigkeit sich gegen Rache und das Schaffen von Siindenbbcken durchsetzt. Angesichts der Qualitat der Verbrechen, wie sie unter den Nazis aber auch unter anderen Regimen wie dem Pinochets begangen wurden, sei der Versuch der gerechten retributiven Bestrafung im Sinne genauer und vollstandiger Gerechtigkeit und eines ebensolchen Ausgleichs zwischen Opfern und Tatern zum Scheitern verurteilt. Dann aber scheine die Verfolgung anderer, moralisch wunschenswerter Ziele, wie die Forderung eines mbglichst gerechten politischen Arrangements, durchaus vertretbar. Diese Uberlegungen zugunsten von Strafgerichten von innen, also Gerichten, die die Binnenperspektive einnehmen, konnen aber nur relevant sein, so Malamud-Goti, wenn solche Gerichte bestehen und im genannten Sinne erfolgreich sein konnen. Das konne aber in der Regel nicht fiir die Menschenrechtsverbrechen gelten, die bei ethnischen Konflikten, wie denen, die zwischen Serben und Muslims im friiheren Jugoslawien verubt wurden, oder bei Menschenrechtsverbrechen im Zuge internationaler Kriege. Auch diirfe die Kritik an Gerichten von auBen, also internationalen Tribunalen und Gerichten und Gerichten anderer Staaten, die die AuBenperspektive einnehmen, nicht als Zuriickweisung aller humanitaren Zwangsmassnahmen verstanden werden. Die Kritik richte sich gegen eine spezifische Form der strafrechtlichen Schuldzuschreibung fiir Staatsverbrechen unter den Bedingungen einer Transition to Democracy. Christian Tomuschat, der den Argumenten Malamud-Gotis zugunsten von Strafgerichten, die die Binnenperspektive einnehmen, viel abgewinnen kann, weist in seinem Kommentar darauf hin, dass die von Malamud-Goti beschriebene Alternative zwischen Strafgerichten von innen und Strafgerichten von auBen haufig nicht besteht. Das kann eine Reihe von Griinden haben. Generell wird sich, so Tomuschat, die Frage strafrechtlicher Verfolgung durch Gerichte anderer Staaten politisch nicht stellen, wenn das vorrechtsstaatliche Regime, unter dem Menschenrechtsverbrechen begangen wurden, schnell und mit dem Ergebnis abgelbst wird, dass die friihere innerstaatliche Opposition unumstritten die Macht ausiibt. Rechtlich stelle sich die Frage nicht, wenn andere Staaten keine Jurisdiktion im Sinne universeller Jurisdiktion beanspruchen konnen, und 37

38

37

38

Hierzu siehe ausfiihrlicher Malamud-Gotis zielorientierten "victim-centered retributivism" in J. Malamud-Goti, Game Without End, 9f, 15-17; ders., "Punishment and a Rights-Based Democracy", 3-13. Mit Blick auf schwerste Menschenrechtsverbrechen, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und Volkermord beanspruchen Staaten universelle Jurisdiktion, gleich gegen wen und von wem die Verbrechen verubt wurden, die U S A zivilrechtlich und andere Lander insbesondere auch strafrechtlich. Zur Praxis in den USA: A m 30.6.1980 entschied der United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, dass die paraguayischen Angehorigen eines Folteropfers Zivilklage gegen den der Tat verdachtigten paraguayischen Polizisten bei einem amerikanischen Gericht erheben konnen (Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 6 3 0 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)) (siehe The New York Times, 1.7.1980, Section B; S. 3, Spalte 5; siehe auch die Anmerkungen des Vorsitzenden Richters, Irving R. Kaufman, der das Urteil geschrieben hat, in The New York Times, 9.11.1980, Section 6; 4 4 , Spalte 1). Das Gericht stutzte sich dabei auf ein lang vergessenes Gesetz aus dem Jahre 1789, dem Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA). Das A T C A verleiht U S Bundesgerichten Jurisdiktion fiir Zivilklagen von Nichtstaatsangehorigen w e g e n Verletzungen des Volkerrechts oder von internationalen Vertragen, welche die U S A geschlossen haben. Seitdem sind viele Falle auf dieser Grundlage entschieden worden, unter ihnen auch von eben dem Gericht, das den Fall Pena entschieden hatte, der Fall Kadic v. Karadzic, 7 0 F.3d 2 3 2 (2d Cir. 1995) (siehe T.R. Posner, "International Decision. Kadic v. Karadzic", 658-64). Fiir den Kontext dieser Entscheidungen siehe H.H. Koh, "Civil Remedies for

Einleitung

35

auch keine internationale Institution besteht, vor der die politisch Verantwortlichen hatten angeklagt werden kbnnen. Letztere Griinde hatten fiir die Ablosung des DDRRegimes gegolten. Im Sinne des Pladoyers Malamud-Gotis habe der Einigungsvertrag, nicht zuletzt um den Eindruck der Siegerjustiz zu vermeiden, fiir den strafrechtlichen 39

Uncivil Wrongs", 174-211, 193-5; B. Stephens und M. Ratner, International Human Rights Litigation in US. Courts; S.D. Murphy, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law", 132-62, 143-6. - Aber mit Blick auf schwerste Menschenrechtsverbrechen wird von einigen Staaten universelle Jurisdiktion auch strafrechtlich beansprucht: z.B. hat ein danisches Gericht 1994 Refik Saric, einen bosnischen Fliichtling in Diinemark, wegen Verbrechen in einem Lager in Bosnien-Herzegovina verurteilt. Saric wurde am 22.11.1994 von einem Kopenhagener Gericht zu acht Jahren Gefangnis verurteilt (Ostre Landsrets 3d Div. (1994)) (fiir eine Zusammenfassung siehe http://www.redress.org). Das belgische Parlament hat im Februar 1999 ein Gesetz verabschiedet, das den belgischen Gerichten universelle Jurisdiktion fiir Genozid und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit verleiht. Auf der Grundlage dieses Gesetzes hat ein belgischer Untersuchungsrichter einen intemationalen Haftbefehl gegen den gegenwartigen AuBenminister der Demokratischen Republik Kongo, Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, wegen schwerer Verletzungen humanitaren Vblkerrechts erlassen. Die Demokratische Republik Kongo hat Belgien deshalb vor dem Intemationalen Gerichtshof (ICJ) verklagt (Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (http://www.icj-cij.org/tcjwww/idocket/icobe/icobecr/icobe_icr_toc.html). Ebenfalls auf der Grundlage der Genfer Konventionen haben die Niederlande (Knezevic, HR 11 Nov. 1997), die Schweiz (siehe A.R. Ziegler, "International Decision", 7 8 - 8 2 ) , Australien (Polyukhovich v. Australia (1991) 101 A.LR. 545 (Austl.)) und Deutschland (Entscheidung des BayObLG (1997) im Falle Djajic, Exzerpt des Urteils in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift ( 1 9 9 8 ) , 392) Nichtstaatsangehorige fur an Nichtstaatsangehorigen veriibte Kriegsverbrechen verklagt. Auch England hat jiingst ein Gesetz verabschiedet, das solche Klagen erleichtern wird (The Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act, 1995, c. 27). Das bedeutet auch, dass die nationalstaatlichen Entscheidungen iiber Amnestie fiir Menschenrechtsverbrechen (siehe unten Abschnitt 5.4), so wichtig sie fiir die von ihnen Begiinstigten auch sind, an Bedeutung eingebiiBt haben, weil die amnestierten Personen das Land nicht verlassen konnen, ohne Gefahr zu laufen, straf- und zivilrechtlich belangt zu werden. Allerdings hat der Internationale Gerichtshof im gennanten belgischen Fall entschieden (Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 14. Februar 2 0 0 2 ( w w w . i c j cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm)), dass ein friiherer AuBenminister eines Staates nur mit Blick auf die Handlungen, die er "in a private capacity" ausgeiibt hat der Strafgerichtsbarkeit eines anderen Staats unterworfen werden darf, ein AuBenminister also Immunitat genieBt bei intemationalen Verbrechen, die er als Minister zu verantworten hat - sowohl wahrend als auch nach seiner Amtszeit. Diese Einschatzung des IGH ist scharf als weder vereinbar mit geltendem Gewohnheitsrecht noch der Strafgerechtigkeit dienlich kritisiert worden. Siehe z.B. A. Cassese, "When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?", 853-875. A m 24. Juni 2 0 0 3 hat die belgische Regierung nicht zuletzt auf Druck der U S A beschlossen, dass "the rules o f immunity enshrined in international and customary law will be integrated into the law", und die Jurisdiktion der belgischen Gerichte einzuschrSnken: Sie sollen nur noch dann Jurisdiktion beanspruchen konnen, wenn, erstens, die der Taten Verdachtigte Belgier sind oder ihren Wohnsitz in Belgien haben oder die Opfer Belgier sind oder ihren Wohnsitz seit mindestens drei Jahren in Belgien haben und, zweitens, wenn die Verdachtigten Burger eines Lands sind, das die Taten nicht als Straftaten verfolgt und kein faires Gerichtsverfahren garantiert. Siehe http://www.diplomatie.be/en/press/ homedetails. 39

Nach der Ratifizierung durch 6 0 Staaten ist das Statut des Intemationalen Strafgerichtshof (IstGH) (englisch: International Criminal Court (ICC)) am 1. Juli 2 0 0 2 in Kraft getreten. Der IstGH beansprucht Jurisdiktion iiber folgende Verbrechen: Genozid, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, Kriegsverbrechen und Aggression (Art 5-9). Allerdings ist Aggression im Statut nicht definiert. Art 5(2) sieht vor, dass der IstGH dann Jurisdiktion iiber Aggression haben wird, wenn eine entsprechende Definition durch Anderung des Statuts gemaB Artikel 121 und 123 erganzt wurde. Fiir den Text des Statuts siehe http://www.un.org/icc/romestat.htm und fiir die Liste der Ratifizierungen siehe http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm).

36

Lukas H. Meyer

Umgang mit der DDR-Vergangenheit das Strafrecht der DDR zugrunde gelegt, sofem es nicht generell anerkannten Menschenrechtsstandards widersprach. Politisch stelle sich die von Malamud-Goti diskutierte Alternative aber auch fiir die Falle nicht, in denen die Machthaber des friiheren Regimes jedenfalls informell effektiv die Macht weiterhin ausuben und strafrechtliche Verfolgung im Land unterbinden, kein internationaler Gerichtshof Jurisdiktion beanspruchen kann, und andere Staaten ihre universelle Jurisdiktion nicht ausuben konnen, weil sie der Straftater nicht habhaft werden. Die Situation in Guatemala nach dem Burgerkrieg konne als ein solcher Fall gelten. Strafrechtliche Verfolgung sei nur von innen moglich und erst wenn sich die Machtverhaltnisse effektiv geandert hatten. Die Situation im friiheren Jugoslawien sei ahnlich. Die politische Situation erlaube nicht, dass die Verantwortlichen der wahrend der 90er Jahre veriibten Menschenrechtsverbrechen heute in den Nachfolgestaaten Jugoslawiens strafrechtlich verfolgt werden. Allerdings sei ein internationales Straftribunal eingerichtet worden, an das das friihere Staatsoberhaupt Jugoslawiens, Slobodan Milosevic, ausgeliefert worden sei, nicht aber Radovan Karadzic und Ratko Mladic, die, so Tomuschat, als Kommandeure fiir das Genozid an den mannlichen Einwohnem der Stadt Srebenica verantwortlich seien. Diese befanden sich in relativer Sicherheit im Land, obgleich die entsprechenden Haftbefehle ergangen seien. Mit Blick auf dieses Tribunal pladiert Tomuschat fiir folgende Einschatzung: Statt sie als Gerichtsverfahren von auBen im Sinne des Arguments Malamud-Gotis zu verwerfen, sei ein solches Tribunal der Straflosigkeit der fiir die Staatsverbrechen Verantwortlichen vorzuziehen, zurrial, wie im Fall der internationalen Tribunale fiir die Naziverbrechen geschehen, die Legitimitat der Verfahren und Urteile auch im Land der Tater und Opfer in naher Zukunft Anerkennung finden konnten, und bhne die Arbeit eines solchen Tribunals den Nachfolgestaaten die Aufnahme als gleichberechtigte Staaten in die europaische Staatenwelt verwehrt bliebe. Die Bedenken von Malamud-Goti gegen Gerichte von auBen wurden von der internationalen Gemeinschaft im Ubrigen nicht nur geteilt, sondern seien auch bei der Schaffung des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs sowie der Einrichtung der Tribunale fiir Kambodscha und Sierra Leone beriicksichtigt worden: Was ersteren angehe nicht zuletzt durch das Subsidiaritatsprinzip, das die Vorzugswiirdigkeit von Gerichten von innen klar ausdriicke, bei letzteren auch dadurch, dass unter den Richtern Landsleute der Opfer und Tater sind, die fiir die angemessene Beriicksichtigung des besonderen nationalen Kontexts einstehen, wahrend die internationalen Richter des Tribunals die Fairness und Unparteilichkeit gewahrleisten sollen. Mit Blick auf die gewissermaBen idealtypische Gegeniiberstellung Malamud-Gotis mbchte Tomuschat darauf hinweisen, dass die Alternative Gerichte von innen oder von auBen haufig nicht besteht und internationale Institutionen der Strafverfolgung in ihren Verfahren die Bedenken gegenuber Gerichten von auBen zu berucksichtigen bemiiht sind, ohne das Ziel der Strafverfolgung und Bestrafung von Staatsverbrechen aufzugeben. 40

5.3

Transitorische Strafverfolgung in der Wahlsituation

Das vereinte Deutschland war im Vergleich zu Chile, Guatemala, Kambodscha, Sierra Leone oder dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien sicher ein sehr viel versprechender Ort der historischen Gerechtigkeit: die friiheren Eliten der DDR hatten so gut wie keinen Ein40

Hierzu siehe L.H. Meyer, "'Gesetzen ihrer Ungerechtigkeit wegen die Geltung absprechen"', 34661.

Einleitung

37

fluss auf den Modus der Transition. Insbesondere auch iiber die Frage der strafrechtlichen Sanktionierung der Regimeverbrechen konnte bald nach dem Fall der Mauer frei entschieden werde. Insofern kann man idealtypisch von einer Wahlsituation sprechen: In der Wahlsituation kann eine neue Regierung den Ubergang zu rechtsstaatlichen und demokratischen Verhaltnissen bewerkstelligen und gleichzeitig Strafverfahren gegen Personen effektiv durchfiihren, die verdachtigt werden, Menschenrechtsverbrechen unter dem Vorgangerregime und in seinem Namen veriibt zu haben. Diese Situation nenne ich die Wahlsituation, weil in dieser Situation Strafverfolgung und gegebenenfalls Bestrafung der Menschenrechtsverbrechen eine Option sind, welche die Transition to Democracy nicht gefahrden. Claus Offe und Ulrike Poppe erbrtern in ihrer soziologischen Studie zu Transitional Justice in der friiheren DDR nach dem Zusammenbruch des alten Regimes und in Deutschland seit der Vereinigung, warum die Ergebnisse rtickwartsgewandter staatlicher MaBnahmen der strafrechtlichen Verfolgung und Bestrafung von Tatern und deren Disqualifikation fur Tatigkeiten im bffentlichen Sektor ("Sauberung" ) wenig uberzeugen konnen - und dies trotz der fiir eine rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipien geniigende Aufarbeitung giinstigen Bedingungen im vereinten Deutschland. Dass eine Transition to Democracy nur gelingen kann und glaubwiirdig ist, wenn die notwendige Aufarbeitung des Regimeversagens und der Regimeverbrechen den Anspriichen an Rechtsstaatlichkeit geniigt, also die Aufarbeitung bereits dem Charakter des demokratischen und rechtstaatlichen Nachfolgeregimes entspricht, ist eine Ausgangsthese der Autoren. Im Vergleich zur historisch-moralischen Studie von David Lyons ist der Fokus der Analyse von Offe und Poppe nicht die Begriindung der Zuschreibung von individueller und kollektiver Verantwortung angesichts altemativer Handlungsoptionen, sondern die Analyse und Bewertung auf solcher Einschatzung beruhender MaBnahmen und Sanktionen wahrend der Transition to Democracy. Eine breite und dominante Koalition der 41

42

43

41 42

43

Siehe oben Fn. 32. Sauberung bezieht sich also auf die Entfernung von Personen aus Amtem oder Posiiionen und nicht auf Strafe im strafrechtlichen Sinne. Historisch gesprochen wurden allerdings Verfahren der Sauberung haufig mit strafrechtlichen MaBnahmen vermischt. Fiir vergleichende Untersuchungen und Bewertungen von Sauberung als eine unter anderen moglichen Reaktionen auf historisches Unrecht siehe A. Rzeplinski, "A Lesser Evil?", Transitional Justice, 4 8 4 - 8 7 ; P. Steinbach, "Vergangenheitsbewiiltigungen in vergleichender Perspektive", 20; J.H. Herz, "Denacification and Related Policies", 2 7 5 - 9 2 , 2 7 9 - 8 1 , 2 8 7 , 289. Bei einer Transition to Democracy sind die Moglichkeiten der Durchsetzung kompensatorischer wie auch distributiver Gerechtigkeitsanspriiche von Individuen und Gruppen haufig auBerst beschrankt, soil die Transition zu einer demokratischen Gesellschaft gelingen und Iangfristige Stabilitat und Prosperitat sichergestellt werden. Die entsprechenden pragmatischen Urteile beruhen auf schwierigen empirischen Einschatzungen der wahrscheinlichen Konsequenzen altemativer politischer und okonomischer Strategien, sind abhangig von komplexen Giiterabwagungen und werden haufig verbunden mit moralphilosophischen Einschatzungen der individuellen und kollektiven Verantwortung fur historisches Unrecht und seiner Konsequenzen. Fiir hochst unterschiedliche Ansatze und Beitrage, sowohl was die Erklarung von Transitions to Democracy als auch die Politikempfehlungen angeht, vergleiche z.B. J.H. Herz, "Introduction", "Denacification and Related Policies" und "Conclusion", 3-12, 2 7 5 - 2 9 2 , G. O'Donnell und P.C. Schmitter, Transitions from Auihoritarmn Rule, 28-32; S. Huntington, The Third Wave, 2 1 5 - 3 1 ; A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, Kap. 1 und 2, insbesondere 2f, 23-40, 51-54, 65-99; B.A. Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution, 7 2 - 8 0 ; C.S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, Kap. 3, 117-34; J. Malamud-Goti, zuletzt in "Dignity, Vengeance, and Fostering Democracy", 4 1 8 - 4 5 0 ; und J. Elster, C. Offe und U.K. PreuB, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies. Zur Frage der Vergleichbarkeit der Transitionsprozesse in Lateinamerika und Zentral- und Osteuropa siehe V. Bunce, "Comparing East and South", 87-100; G.L. Munck und C.S. Leff, "Modes of Transition and Democratization", 343-62.

38

Lukas H. Meyer

politischen Akteure habe in Deutschland jedenfalls in den ersten Jahren nach dem Fall der Mauer eine Interpretation des friiheren DDR-Regimes fiir richtig gehalten, nach welcher die rechtliche oder jedenfalls moralische Verantwortung fiir die negativen Ergebnisse des Regimes Individuen zugeschrieben werden kann, die Mitglieder des DDRRegimes gewesen sind. Diese Koalition vertrat auBerdem die Auffassung, dass diese Personen zur Rechenschaft zu Ziehen sind. Offe und Poppe stellen heraus, dass diese Interpretation gerade auch im Vergleich zu anderen friiheren Staaten des so genannten Ostblocks oder lateinamerikanischen Staaten und deren Transition to Democracy ungewohnlich ist. Das friihere Regime wird nicht als eine Katastrophe, sondern als ein Verbrechen bewertet, moralisch-rechtliche Schuldzuschreibungen an Individuen werden systemischen oder strukturalistischen Interpretationen vorgezogen, ferner sind es nicht regimeexterne Akteure, denen die Verantwortung zugeschrieben wird, sondern Mitglieder der eigenen Gesellschaft, und schlieBlich sollen die Tater nicht etwa amnestiert und die Verbrechen vergessen werden, sondern der Staat soil die Tater mit strafrechtlichen und anderen Sanktionen belegen. Zu den Griinden fiir diese jedenfalls in den ersten Jahren nach dem Fall der Mauer weithin geteilte Auffassung gehbrten, so die Autoren, dass wegen der besonderen Umstande dieser Transition die friiheren Eliten der DDR keinen Einfluss auf die politischen Entscheidungen iiber den Modus der Transition nehmen konnten, dass die Erfolgsaussichten (rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipien geniigender) strafrechtlicher Verfolgung zunachst iiberschatzt wurden wie auch die Aussichten, mit solchen Verfahren den Bedurfnissen der Opfer des DDR-Regimes und der Etablierung rechtsstaatlicher Verhaltnisse zu dienen, aber auch Griinde, die sich auf spezifische historische Interpretationen der Defizite des Umgangs mit der Nazi vergangenheit insbesondere in West-Deutschland und der DDR stiitzen, und ferner durchaus instrumentellpolitische Erwagungen der verschiedenen Akteure. Offe und Poppe weisen mit Nachdruck darauf hin, dass die Individualisierung der unter dem DDR-Regime veriibten Verbrechen, wie sie strafrechtliche Verfolgung erforderlich mache, deren systemische Qualitat verkennt, die eben nicht auf die personlichen Qualitaten der Akteure und die moralische Qualitat ihrer Handlungen riickfuhrbar sei. Staatssozialistische Gesellschaften wie die der DDR hatten alle Mittel der gesellschaftlichen Selbstbeobachtung, -bewertung und Kritik zerstort und deren Verwendung verboten, was dazu fiihrte, dass diese Gesellschaften von durchaus unredlichen und unreellen Selbstbeschreibungen abhangig gewesen seien und von der gewaltsamen Unterdriickung derer, die die Wahrheit zu berichten versuchten oder sie mit anderen teilen wollten. Fiir die Aufrechterhaltung solcher Selbstbeschreibung und der Unterdriickung jeglicher Kritik seien enorme Ressourcen verwandt worden. Viele der vom DDR-Regime verursachten Schaden lieBen sich strafrechtlich nicht oder nur ungeniigend erfassen, gerade wenn rechtsstaatlichen Grundsatzen entsprochen werden sollte, namlich z.B. die okonomischen und bkologischen Schaden und auch die Schaden, die sich der kulturellen Repression verdanken. Diese Schaden seien dem System der DDR inharent gewesen. Im vereinten Deutschland seien seit Anfang der 90er Jahre drei staatliche Strategien des Umgangs mit dem DDR-Regime parallel verfolgt worden: Erstens regulare strafrechtliche Verfolgung und Bestrafung durch eine spezielle polizeiliche Ermittlungsstelle, Staatsanwaltschaft und die Strafgerichte, zweitens und ab 1991 die BloBstellung von Tatern durch die Arbeit der so genannten Gauck-Behbrde mit dem Ziel, den Opfern des Regimes die fiir sie relevanten Informationen bereitzustellen, aber auch strafrechtliche Verfolgung zu initiieren oder andere Sanktionen zu erlauben oder zu veranlassen (insbesondere die Disqualifikation aus dem bffentlichen Dienst), und drittens die Arbeit

Einleitung

39

einer Enquete Kommission des Bundestages, die der zeitgeschichtlichen Erforschung und politischen Debatte und Bewertung der DDR-Vergangenheit dient. Uberraschen mag der geringe Erfolg der polizeilichen and staatsanwaltschaftlichen Ermittlungen, misst man den Erfolg an der Zahl der Verurteilungen und verhangten Gefangnisstrafen: Offe und Poppe berichten, dass es bis Ende Marz 1991 in nur 0 . 1 % der iiber 22.000 untersuchten Falle zu Gefangnisstrafen kam, namlich in 20 Fallen, und in nur gut 200 Fallen zu Verurteilungen. Dies sei nur zum Teil damit zu erklaren, dass die Strafverfolgungsbehorden und Gerichte rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipien verpflichtet seien, und dass die im Einigungsvertrag festgeschriebenen Bedingungen die Moglichkeiten der Strafverfolgung und insbesondere der Bestrafung von unter dem DDR-Regime begangenen Handlungen weiter einschrankten. Vielmehr sei die materielle und politische Unterstiitzung fiir die Strafverfolgung insbesondere durch die westdeutschen Lander zuriickhaltend gewesen. Die Autoren benennen zahlreiche Grilnde: das Interesse westdeutscher Eliten, dass ihre Kooperation mit dem Regime der DDR nicht Gegenstand strafrechtlicher Untersuchungen wird, der Umstand, dass die uberwiegende Mehrheit der Burger des vereinten Deutschlands nicht Opfer des DDR-Regimes waren, die Einschatzung der Staatsverbrechen der DDR als wenig schlimm nicht nur im Vergleich zu den Verbrechen des Naziregimes, sondern auch zu denen einiger anderer friiherer Ostblockstaaten, die Einschatzung, dass es angesichts insbesondere der Massenarbeitslosigkeit in der fruheren DDR Wichtigeres zu tun gebe, und nicht zuletzt der Umstand, dass der politische Einfluss der fruheren DDR-Opposition und der Opfer des Regimes im vereinten Deutschland spatestens nach den ersten Bundestagwahlen im vereinten Deutschland gering war. 44

Auch angesichts der mageren Ergebnisse der strafrechtlichen Verfolgung war, so Offe und Poppe, das Interesse an der Arbeit der Gauck-Behbrde groB. Die Verwendung der Informationen, die die Behbrde spezifischen Akteuren zur Verfiigung stellt, liegt nicht in der Verantwortung der Behbrde und fiihrt haufig zu sozialen Sanktionen, gegen die sich die Betroffenen mit Rechtsmitteln nicht wehren kbnnen, oder zu solchen Sanktionen, insbesondere der Entlassung aus dem bffentlichen Dienst, gegen welche zwar zivilrechtliche Klage mbglich ist und haufig auch erfolgreich war, wie Offe und Poppe berichten, deren Begriindung aber weniger strikten Bedingungen unterliegt als strafrechtliche MaBnahmen. Die Angemessenheit der sozialen Sanktionen aufgrund der durch die Gauck-Behbrde zur Verfiigung gestellten Informationen sei schon deshalb haufig fragwiirdig gewesen, weil der Wahrheitsgehalt der auf Unterlagen der fruheren DDR-Staatssicherheit beruhenden Informationen haufig umstritten und die Interpretation dieser Unterlagen jedenfalls schwierig sei. Zudem waren die Entlassungen aus dem bffentlichen Dienst wohl kaum fair, denn die Praktiken der Lander und der jeweils zustandigen Behbrden innerhalb der Lander divergierten erheblich. Der starke Bedarf an bestimmten Beschaftigten, etwa Polizisten, diirfte dazu beigetragen haben, dass man ausgerechnet ihnen gegeniiber Nachsicht walten lieB, sie auch dann als Beamte weiterbeschaftigte, wenn bekannt war, dass sie inoffizielle oder offizielle Mitarbeiter der Stasi gewesen waren. Schon der Umfang des Berichts der Enquete-Kommission, namlich 18 verbffentlichte Bande, die zudem eine verhaltnismaBig friihe Stufe der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des DDR-Regimes reflektieren, haben dazu beigetragen, so Offe und Poppe, dass die bffentliche Aufmerksamkeit fiir den Bericht und auch seine bleibende Wirkung beschrankt sind. In der Sache kritisieren sie den einseitigen Fokus des Berichts auf den

44

Dies bestatigt Teitels Interpretation transitorischer Strafgerechtigkeit. Siehe oben Fn. 32 und Text.

40

Lukas H. Meyer

Unterdriickungsapparat des DDR-Regimes und seine Opfer unter weitgehender Ausklammerung der isystemischen bkonomischen und okologischen Defizite und Katastrophen und ohne Erwahnung der Bereiche des Regimes, die wenig beanstandenswert gewesen seien, etwa die Gesundheitsversorgung.

5.4

Transitorische Strafverfolgung

in der Notsituation

Hatten die politischen Eliten des vereinten Deutschlands erheblichen Gestaltungsspielraum in der Wahl des Modus der Transition to Democracy und auch mit Blick auf die Sanktionen ob der DDR-Regimeverbrechen, so konnen idealtypisch die politischen Rahmenbedingungen der Transition im antiken Athen 403 v. Chr. und der sudafrikanischen Ablosung des Apartheidregimes durch eine demokratische Ordnung Anfang der 90er Jahre jeweils als eine Notsituation beschrieben werden: In beiden Fallen war zum jeweiligen Zeitpunkt nur durch Verzicht auf insbesondere die Bestrafung der Verbrechen des Vorgangerregimes eine friedliche Transition moglich. Anders als im vereinten Deutschland, indem die friiheren Eliten der DDR so gut wie keinen Einfluss auf die Gestaltung der Transition to Democracy nehmen konnten und die zu treffenden Entscheidung in der Verantwortung insbesondere der westdeutschen Eliten lag, hat im Falle der zweiten Transition im antiken Athen eine externe Macht, namlich Sparta nicht nur die Ablosung der vordem von Sparta protegierten DreiBig Tyrannen ermbglicht sondern seinen Einfluss auch zugunsten der Straffreiheit der Tyrannen und ihrer Helfershelfer und des Schutzes ihrer Eigentumsinteressen eingesetzt. Im Falle Sudafrikas war eine Bedingung fiir eine friedliche Transition vom Apartheidregime zu einer demokratischen Post-Apartheid-Ordnung, dass denen, die fiir die im Name des Apartheidregimes vertibten Verbrechen verantwortlich sind, eine wenn auch bedingte straf- und zivilrechtliche Amnestie eingeraumt wurde. Andernfalls drohten Teile des Militars und der Sicherheitskrafte mit Sabotage der Transition und Biirgerkrieg. 45

In der so genannten Notsituation ist also der Verzicht auf Strafverfolgung und Bestrafung eine Bedingung des friedlichen Ubergangs zu rechtsstaatlichen Verhaltnissen, unter denen Menschenrechtsverbrechen effektiv verhindert werden konnen. Eine postdiktatorische Regierung kann sich hier nur unter Bedingungen einer weitgehenden Amnestierung der unter dem Vorgangerregime veriibten politischen Straftaten etablieren. Dass die je besonderen Umstande einer Notsituation im Falle Athens und Sudafrikas vorlagen wird von Jon Elster in seiner Interpretation der Transitions im antiken Athen ebenso vorausgesetzt wie von David Crocker in seiner Kritik an den moralischen Argumenten von Erzbischof Desmond Tutu zugunsten der siidafrikanischen Wahrheitsund Versohnungskomission. Zwar diirften externe Faktoren und insbesondere der Einfluss Spartas den Modus der Transition im Jahre 403 v. Chr. im starken MaBe bestimmt haben, aber, so Elsters zentrale These, die erheblichen Unterschiede der zwei kurz aufeinander folgenden Transitions to Democracy im antiken Athen, namlich im Jahre 411 und 403 v. Chr., seien auch als Ausdruck eines Lernprozesses zu verstehen. Die erste Transition habe im Wesentlichen das Ziel retributiver Gerechtigkeit und das Ziel der Abschreckung weiterer diktatorischer Umsturzversuche zugunsten der Ruckkehr zu einer populistischen Demokratie verfolgt. Dies habe der Tradition einer bis auf die Be46

45 46

Ein anderer klarer Fall ist Chile. Siehe z.B. C.S. Jorge, "Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations", 1455-85, 1457-63. Siehe auch den Beitrag J. Malamud-Gotis in diesem Bd. Zur Transition im Jahre 4 0 3 v. Chr. siehe auch schon J. Elster, "Coming to Terms With the Past", 7-48.

Einleitung

41

muhungen Solons zuriickreichenden Serie von Reformen entsprochen, die zu Verhaitnissen fuhrten, in denen populare Macht weitgehend unbeschrankt gait. War diesen Verhaltnissen schon die erste nur vier Monate dauernde Diktatur geschuldet, so zahlen sie wenigstens auch zu den indirekten Ursachen der zweiten, namlich der Diktatur der DreiBig, die von Sparta unterstiitzt 404 v. Chr. ein Terrorregime einrichteten. Die Transition to Democracy im Jahre 403 verfolgt das Ziel der Versbhnung und des Ausgleichs der Interessen der Biirgerkriegsparteien durch bedingte Teilamnestie, die Abschreckung von Klagen von Verbrechen, die unter die Amnestie fallen, das legalisierte Exil fiir die, die nicht unter die Amnestie fallen, und den Schutz von unter der Diktatur erworbenem beweglichen Eigentum. Die Schaffung rechtsstaatlicher Verhaltnisse auf der Grundlage von Verfassungsanderungen habe der Stabilisierung demokratischer, nicht aber populistischer Verhaltnisse gedient. Andere MaBnahmen sorgten dafiir, dass die Tyrannen und ihre Helfershelfer langerfristig von politischen Entscheidungsfunktionen ausgeschlossen wurden. Elster versteht diese zweite Transition nicht einfach als von Sparta, dem fruheren Verbiindeten der Tyrannen, aufgezwungen, sondern als einem positiven Lernprozess geschuldet, der angesichts einer zweiten Diktatur in kurzer Zeit auf die Schaffung eines stabilen demokratischen Regimes durch Interessenausgleich setzt, auch wenn dies bedeutete, auf strafrechtliche Verfolgung der fiir die Regimeverbrechen Verantwortlichen und ihrer Helfershelfer weitgehend zu verzichten wie auch erhebliche Abstriche zu machen bei den durchaus legitimen Anspriichen auf Kompensation der Opfer und der Eigentumsanspruche der in die Stadt zuruckkehrenden Demokraten. Erzbischof Desmond Tutu, war Vorsitzender der siidafrikanischen Wahrheits- und Versbhnungskommission (Truth- and Reconciliation Commission, im Weiteren TRC). Nicht Tutus praktische Erwagungen, die die besonderen Umstande der siidafrikanischen Notsituation reflektieren, sondern dessen moralische Argumente zugunsten der mit der TRC verbundenen bedingten Amnestie der unter dem Apartheidregime veriibten Menschenrechtsverbrechen sind Gegenstand der Studie David Crackers. Crocker kritisiert die moralische Rechtfertigung, die der neben President Nelson Mandela wohl wichtigste Reprasentant des neuen Siidafrika, Desmond Tutu fiir den Modus der siidafrikanischen Transition sowohl in seiner Rolle als Vorsitzender der TRC als auch als Autor gegeben hat. Selbst wenn die Notsituation eine Transition nur unter der Bedingung einer Amnestie erlaubte, kann doch die bffentliche Rechtfertigung einer solchen Amnestie kritisiert werden. Crocker unterscheidet zwei Argumente Tutus, das "Argument gegen Rache" und das "Versohnungsargument", weist beide zuriick und vertritt die These, dass richtig verstanden Bestrafung und Versbhnung auBerst wichtige moralische Ziele sind, die sich nicht ausschlieBen miissen, wenn sie auf angemessene Weise verfolgt werden. Tutus Argument gegen Rache sei ein nicht-konsequentialistisches Argument, das Strafe mit Retribution identifiziere, Retribution mit Rache gleichsetze und zu dem Schluss komme, dass Strafe moralisch falsch sei, weil Rache zu nehmen moralisch abzulehnen ist. Tutus Versohnungsargument sei ein konsequentialistisches Argument, das die Bestrafung von Menschenrechtsverbrechem fiir moralisch falsch halt, weil sie frilhere Feinde weiter entzweie und soziale Heilung verhindere. Versbhnung, also die (Wieder-) Herstellung sozialer Harmonie, werde am besten befbrdert, wenn die Gesellschaft Amnestie gewahre und die Opfer den Tatem vergeben. Mit Blick auf Tutus Argument gegen Rache weist Crocker daraufhin, dass Tutu selbst die Drohung mit staatlicher Strafe fiir legitim halten muss, denn das Amnestieangebot der TRC ist ein bedingtes, und fur Straftater, die die Bedingungen nicht erfiillen, gilt, dass sie strafrechtlich belangt werden sollen und diirfen. Ferner konne Retribution

42

Lukas H. Meyer

nicht mit Strafe gleichgesetzt werden. Vielmehr sei Retribution eine Rechtfertigung fiir Strafe: Nur aufgrund seiner Straftat darf der Tater bestraft werden, weil er es dann verdient hat, in einer der Schwere der Straftat angemessenen Weise bestraft zu werden. Solche Strafe konne aber auch abschreckende, den Tater rehabilitierende oder versohnende Wirkung haben. Allerdings seien solche Konsequenzen nach Auffassung des Retributivisten keine Rechtfertigung fiir staatliche Strafe. Retribution diirfe nicht mit Rache und Vergeltung gleichgesetzt werden. Zwar sei richtig, dass Retribution und Rache in vorrechtlichen Sitten und der Praxis der Strafgerichte und des Strafvollzugs nicht immer und nicht vollstandig getrennt werden. Richtig verstanden unterscheide sich Retribution aber von Rache in wenigstens den folgenden Hinsichten: Retribution beziehe sich ausschlieBlich auf Unrechtshandlungen, nicht auf irgendwelche Verletzungen oder Krankungen, auf die mit Rache reagiert werden kann; wahrend Rache keine Grenzen kenne, unersattlich und unbeschrankt sei, diene Retribution der Rechtfertigung und Festsetzung gerechter Strafe; retributive Strafe entspreche dem Gerechtigkeitsideal der Unparteilichkeit, wahrend Rache personlich und parteilich sei und auf Befriedigung dessen ziele, der Rache nehme, eine Emotion, die der Retribution fremd sei; retributive Strafe, nicht aber Rache sei dem Prinzip, gleiche Falle gleich zu behandeln, verpflichtet; und Retribution erlaube nur die Bestrafung der Unrechtstater, wahrend Rache auch an Mitgliedern der Gruppe oder Angehorigen der Tater genommen werden konne. Deshalb scheitere Tutus Argument gegen Rache: Auch wenn Rache zu nehmen moralisch falsch sei, weil Rache ganzlich unabhangig von der unparteilichen Beurteilung des Verdiensts von Personen auf deren Verletzung ziele und auch der Gleichbehandlung gleicher Falle nicht verpflichtet sei, konne sich daraus kein Argument gegen retributive Strafe ergeben. Das konsequentialistische Versohnungsargument untersucht Crocker, indem er drei Konzeptionen von Versohnung unterscheidet und argumentiert, dass einerseits die sozial heilende Wirkung von Amnestie und Vergebung nicht iiber- und andererseits die versbhnende Kraft der Gerechtigkeit nicht unterschatzt werden diirfe. Die erste Versohnungskonzeption ist das von Tutu vertretene Ideal des Ubuntu, das auf soziale Harmonie durch die Restitution der moralischen Beziehungen zwischen Tatern und Opfem als hochstes Gut zielt. Weder sei aber, so Crocker, soziale Harmonie per se gut, noch biete diese Konzeption Antworten auf die Fragen, wie mit denen umzugehen sei, die zur Versohnung nicht bereit seien, und wie die Aufrichtigkeit der verlangten moralischen Bemiihungen der Burger zu iiberpriifen ist. Viel weniger voraussetzungsreich sei die Versbhnungskonzeption der friedlichen Koexistenz friiherer Feinde. Solche Koexistenz verlange von alien lediglich die Nicht-Verletzung der Grundrechte anderer. Deutlich weniger voraussetzungsreich sei auch die Versbhnungskonzeption der demokratischen Reziprozitat, gemaB welcher von friiheren Feinden, Tatern, Opfern und Unbeteiligten verlangt werde, sich wechselseitig als Burger anzuerkennen, die gleichberechtigt an demokratischen Verfahren teilhaben, mittels welcher Entscheidungen gerade auch iiber die Fragen getroffen werden, in denen kein Konsens erzielt wird. Beide Alternativen verlangen von den Opfern keine Vergebung und zielen nicht notwendig auf Harmonie im Sinne Tutus. Versohnung als demokratische Reziprozitat uberlasst es den Biirgern zu entscheiden, in welchen Regelungsbereichen welche Werte welchen Rang genieBen sollen, und die Burger konnen sich gemaB dieser Versbhnungskonzeption mit Blick auf unter und im Namen des Vorgangerregimes veriibte Menschenrechtsverbrechen fiir Bestrafung der Tater im Sinne der Retribution entscheiden. Crocker spricht sich fiir die Versbhnungskonzeption demokratische Reziprozitat aus und argumentiert, dass die im Sinne der Retribution gerechte Bestrafung der schlimms-

Einleitung

43

ten Menschenrechtsverbrecher (sowie die gerichtlich verordnete Restitution der Opfer) zur Durchsetzung solcher Versbhnung beitragen kann: Denn diese Urteile der Straf- und Zivilgerichte, so sie gerecht und Ergebnis fairer Verfahren sind, konnen die wechselseitige Anerkennung aller als Burger mit gleichen Rechten in einer rechtsstaatlichen Demokratie fbrdern. Aus dem Umstand, dass das Angebot einer in Verbindung mit der Einrichtung der Wahrheits- und Versbhnungskommission gewahrten bedingten Amnestie in Sudafrika Voraussetzung fiir die friedliche Transition zu einem Post-Apartheid Regime gewesen sei, konne nicht geschlossen werden - und die entsprechenden empirischen Behauptungen Tutus hielten einer Uberprufung nicht stand - , dass staatliche Strafe fiir Regimeverbrechen der Durchsetzung der fiir eine Demokratie angemessenen Konzeption von Versbhnung generell abtraglich sei oder gar dass Vergebung der Opfer und die Annahme solcher durch die Tater Voraussetzung fiir Versbhnung sei. Inwiefern strafrechtliche Verfolgung und Bestrafung von schlimmen, im Namen des Vorgangerregimes veriibten Verbrechen wiinschenswert sei, ob solche Verfolgung und Bestrafung Aufgabe der Institutionen des Nachfolgeregimes, der Institutionen anderer Staaten oder internationaler Institutionen sein solle, ob und wie insbesondere Wahrheitskommissionen mit den Strafverfolgungsbehbrden und Strafgerichten kooperieren sollen, und gegebenenfalls zu welchem Zeitpunkt retributive Gerechtigkeit ein angemessenes politisches Ziel sein konne, dies seien Fragen, die nur unter Beriicksichtigung der jeweils besonderen Bedingungen einer Transition zu rechtsstaatlichen Verhaltnissen zu beantworten und in haufig schwierigen Guterabwagungen zu begrunden seien. Gerade die jiingste internationale Praxis - etwa die Bemiihungen um strafrechtliche Verfolgung Pinochets und die Einrichtung internationaler Straftribunale und des intemationalen Strafgerichtshofes - unterstreiche, dass die Durchsetzung retributiver Gerechtigkeit sowohl um ihrer selbst willen als auch wegen ihrer positiven Auswirkungen fur eine Transition zu rechtsstaatlichen Verhaltnissen geschatzt werde. Allerdings hat Crocker zwar Tutus Verstandnis retributiver Strafe kritisiert, aber kein Argument zugunsten retributiver Strafe um ihrer selbst willen formuliert. Crocker ist der Auffassung, dass strafrechtliche Verfolgung und staatliche Strafe von Regimeverbrechen unter Hinweis auf den Wert der Retribution zu rechtfertigen sind. Zugleich halt er die Entscheidung fiir Sache des demokratischen Gesetzgebers. Offenbar vertritt Crocker nicht die Position des positiven Retributivismus, die man so verstehen kann, dass der Schuldige ohne Ausnahme bestraft werden muss und zwar in dem MaBe, wie er es aufgrund des von ihm veriibten Unrechts verdient. Man kbnnte Crocker vieimehr die Position eines schwachen Retributivismus zuschreiben: Staatliche Strafe kann zwar unter Hinweis auf den Wert der Retribution legitimiert werden, kann aber nie allein unter Hinweis auf die durch Strafe realisierte retributive Gerechtigkeit legitimiert sein. GemaB dieser Position des schwachen Retributivismus ist Retribution also ein notwendiger, aber kein hinreichender Grund fiir staatliche Strafe, oder werttheoretisch ausgedriickt, Retribution ist nur ein, wombglich das zentrale konstitutive und intrinsisch wertvolle Element gerechter Strafe. Retributive Gerechtigkeit fur sich genommen kann 47

47

Siehe J.L. Mackie, "Morality and the Retributive Emotions", 3-10; D. Dolinko, "Some Thoughts about Retributivism", 5 3 7 - 5 9 , 5 3 9 - 4 3 . Die Behauptung, solche Bestrafung der Tater sei auch dem Opfer geschuldet, ist eine zusatzliche. Ein einflussreiches Argument zugunsten dieser Behauptung lautet, dass der Unrechtstater sich durch die Tat einen unfairen Vorteil verschafft hat, indem er die fiir alle gleichermaBen und zum Schutz aller geltenden Regeln der Verhaltenseinschrankung verletzt hat, und dass seine Bestrafung dazu dient, ihm diesen Vorteil gegeniiber denen, welche die Regeln einhalten, und insbesondere gegeniiber dem Opfer wieder zu nehmen (siehe z.B. J.B. Murphy, "Marxism and Retribution", 217-43).

44

Lukas H. Meyer

demnach den Staat nicht verpflichten, einen Straftater zu bestrafen, und erst recht gibt sie dem Opfer kein Recht auf Bestrafung des Taters. Schwacher Retributivismus ist ein Typ einer Mischtheorie der Rechtfertigung von staatlicher Strafe, insofem der schwache Retributivismus retributive und andere Griinde fur notwendige und nur zusammen genommen hinreichende Rechtfertigungsgriinde staatlicher Strafe erachtet. 48

6.

Die Haltung der Opfer

Crackers Kritik an den moralischen Argumenten Tutus zielen auf den Ausweis gerechter politischer Prinzipien der Transition to Democracy. David Heyd macht in seiner vergleichenden Interpretation der Position Tutus und der Uberlegungen von Jean Amery deutlich, dass, erstens, fiir beide die moralische Reflektion, welche Haltung der Opfer von schlimmen Regimeverbrechen angemessen ist, grundlegend ist, dass aber, zweitens, im Falle Tutus diese Reflektion die Rechtfertigung zukunftsorientierter politischer Prinzipien fiir die Transition to Democracy pragen, wahrend Amery darauf beharrt, dass die Plausibilitat der von ihm fiir angemessen gehaltenen vergangenheitsorientierten Haltung der Opfer nicht an ihren politischen Implikationen gemessen werden kann. Damit weist Heyd auf eine fiir das Verstandnis der Position Tutus wichtige moralische Dimension hin, namlich die Fundierung seiner politischen Bemuhung um Versohnung in der christlichen Moral. Zugleich erinnert seine Interpretation der Position Amerys daran, dass eine moralisch plausible Haltung der Opfer, namlich die des Ressentiments, mit der Position Tutus unvereinbar ist. Wahrend Tutu im Post-Apartheid-Afrika auch in seiner Funktion als Vorsitzender der Wahrheits- und Versohnungskommission fiir restaurative Gerechtigkeit und Versohnung eintritt, verteidigt Amery das Ressentiment als moralische Reaktion des Opfers von Unrecht. Bei seinem Vergleich der Positionen geht es Heyd insbesondere um zwei Fragen: Erstens, sind und inwiefern sind die vergangenheitsorientierte Reaktion der retributiven Gerechtigkeit und des Ressentiments und die zukunftsorientierte der restaurativen Gerechtigkeit und der Versohnung moralisch? Zweitens, in welchem Verhaltnis steht die moralische Reaktion des Opfers zu den moralisch ausweisbaren politischen Prinzipien des Umgangs mit Unrecht und der Transition to Democracy . Das moralische Urteil kann zukunfts- und vergangenheitsorientiert sein. Typischerweise soil ein solches Urteil handlungsanleitend sein. Andererseits kann ein solches Urteil den Wert von Handlungen beurteilen, die langst ausgefiihrt und nicht mehr zu beeinflussen sind. Der Gegenstand moralischer Urteile kann die distributiv gerechte Verteilung von Gutern in der Zukunft sein, die retributiv gerechte Bestrafung sowie verdammende oder belobigende Beurteilung von Menschen aufgrund von friiheren Handlungen oder Leistungen, aber auch die moralische Angemessenheit von mentalen Einstellungen und personlichen Reaktionen auf Unrecht. Auch letztere konnen zukunfts- oder vergangenheitsorientiert sein: Einerseits Hoffnung, die Bereitschaft zu Ver1

48

Der bekannteste Typ der Mischtheorie ist der von H.L.A. Hart, "Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment", 1-27: Das Strafe generell rechtfertigende Ziel ist utilitaristisch aufzufassen, die Verfolgung dieses Ziels unterliegt aber einer retributivistischen Einschrankung im Sinne des negativen Retributivismus, gemaB welchem nur der Schuldige, der fur die Tat im relevanten Sinn Verantwortliche, bestraft werden darf. GewissermaBen ist Harts Position spiegelverkehrt zu der des schwachen Retributivismus, insofern fur Hart andere als retributive Griinde, namlich utilitaristische, die zentralen Rechtfertigungsgriinde sind, wahrend es fiir den schwachen Retributivismus die retributiven sind. Siehe auch N. Lacey, State Punishment, Kap. 2. Fiir eine Kritik des Retributivismus siehe z.B. D . Dolinko, 'Three Mistakes of Retributivism", 1623-57.

Einleitung

45

sohnung und dazu, die ursprungliche Beziehung wiederherzustellen, andererseits Rachsucht, Groll und nicht bereit zu sein zu vergessen und zu vergeben. Wahrend die Gerechtigkeitsurteile politisch sind und beanspruchen, fiir das Kollektiv handlungsanleitend zu sein, beziehen sich die Urteile iiber die angemessene Haltung auf die Reaktion insbesondere des Opfers von Unrecht. GemaB Heyds Interpretation exemplifizieren die Urteile Tutus und Am^rys iiber die Angemessenheit der Reaktion der Opfer die Urteile je eine der Orientierungen moralischer Urteile, die Zukunfts- und die Vergangenheitsorientierung. Folgen wir der Interpretation Heyds, so ist fiir Amery die Haltung der Opfer moralisch grundlegend. Von der Gesellschaft als Ganzer kann nur eine zukunftsorientierte, ihre Fortexistenz sichernde Reaktion auf Unrecht erwartet werden. Die angemessene Reaktion der Opfer ist aber die des Ressentiment, eine Haltung, die sie darauf insistieren lasst, dass das Unrecht erinnert wird, und auch von denen, die dazu neigen, es zu vergessen. Diese Reaktion ist nach Auffassung Am6rys moralisch angemessen, obgleich sie unnatiirlich ist, sich gegen die natiirliche Zukunftsorientierung unserer gewohnlichen normativen Einschatzungen wendet. Die Reaktion des Ressentiments ist moralisch angemessen, auch wenn sie sich politisch nicht durchsetzen kann. Fur Am6ry ist die moralische Position, die zahlt, die personliche des individuellen Opfers von Unrecht. Ressentiment als Haltung zielt weder auf die Bestrafung des Schuldigen noch auf die Vergebung der Schuld. Angesichts schlimmsten Unrechts zielt Moral, wie Amery sie versteht, weder auf einen retributiv gerechten Ausgleich noch den Neuanfang nach Schuldeingestandnis und Vergebung. Moral verlangt vielmehr, dass die Rechnung offen bleibt, dass wir auf die Vergangenheit orientiert sind und bleiben. Groll ist die angemessene Haltung der Opfer, Scham die derer, die der Tatergruppe angehbren. Kollektive Scham angesichts des in ihrem Namen veriibten Unrechts sollte konstitutives Element der Haltung der Nachfahren der Tater sein. 49

Fur Tutu hingegen ist das Ziel der Auseinandersetzung mit historischem Unrecht die (Wieder-)Herstellung gerechter Verhaltnisse und die Versbhnung von Opfern und Tatem. Ziel ist nicht Rache und Bestrafung, noch darf das Unrecht vergessen werden. Vielmehr sollen Opfer und Tater im Verfahren der Wahrheits- und Versbhnungskommission die Wahrheit iiber die Unrechtstaten aufdecken und mit dieser Wahrheit konfrontiert ihre Beziehung heilen. Von den Tatem wird verlangt, dass sie ihre Taterschaft vollstandig offen legen, den Opfern wird als wiinschenswert nahegelegt, dass sie um der Herstellung gerechter Verhaltnisse willen ihren Groll und ihre Rachegefiihle iiberwinden. Die Aufdeckung und autoritative Feststellung der Wahrheit dient der Transfor50

49 50

Hicrzu siehe Fn. 2 8 oben. Opfer des Apartheidregimes haben die siidafrikanische Wahrheits- und Versohungskommission (Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)) insbesondere dafiir kritisiert, dass die von der Kommission gegebenenfalls gewahrte Amnestie auch alle zivilrechtlichen Anspriiche der Opfer ausschlieBt, also die Anspriiche der Opfer auf .Compensation und Restitution gegen die Tater. D a s siidafrikanische Verfassungsgericht hat eine entsprechende Klage zuriickgewiesen. Fur eine Analyse siehe F. Venter, "Die verfassungsmaBige Uberprilfung der Rechtsgrundlagen von Sildafrikas 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission'", 147-57. Fur das Argument, dass Reparationsleistungen durch die fiir die Verbrechen unter dem Apartheidregime Verantwortlichen notwendige Voraussetzung fiir die Koexistenz von schwarzer und weiBer Bevolkerung in Siidafrika sind, siehe W. Soyinka, The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness, Teil I, insbesondere 35f. Die Republik Siidafrika hat die Verantwortung fiir Reparationszahlungen ubernommen. Im Bericht der siidafrikanischen Wahrheitskommission wird auf die knappen Ressourcen des Staates hingewiesen, die angesichts der vielen direkten und indirekten Opfer des Apartheidregimes umfangreiche Reparationszahlungen an Personen, die Opfer politisch motivierter Menschenrechtsverbrechen unter dem Apartheidregime geworden sind, ausschlieBen (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South

46

Lukas H. Meyer

mation von Tatern und Opfern, der Heilung ihrer Beziehung und der (Wieder-) Herstellung gerechter Verhaltnisse. Zwar kann von den Opfern nicht verlangt werden, dass sie den Tatern vergeben. Politisch jedoch wird den Tatern, die ihre Tat bekennen, Aranestie gewahrt. Heyd weist darauf hin, dass Tutu, anders als Amery, in der bedingten Amnestie der Tater nicht alleine einen politischen Kompromiss mit den Tatern erkennt, der wegen der Transition zu rechtsstaatlichen Verhaltnissen notwendig ist. Vergebung ist fiir Tutu christlich-theologisch fundiert. Auch Tater schlimmsten Unrechts sind "Kinder Gottes". Vergebung setzt die Ehrlichkeit ihres Schuldeingestandnisses ebenso wie ihre Fahigkeit, sich zu andern voraus, und setzt zugleich auf die transformatorische Wirkung der Vergebung. Wenn die Position Tutus eine transitorische Auseinandersetzung mit der Vergangenheit verlangt, so dient diese dem zukiinftigen Wohl der Gesellschaft als Ganzer. Amerys Beharren auf dem Ressentiment als der moralisch einzig angemessenen, standi gen und nicht zu transformierenden Haltung der Opfer, die auf die immer wieder zu aktualisierende Erinnerung von Unrecht zielt, ist damit schwer zu vereinbaren. Bleibt zu betonen, dass Opfer, die die Haltung des Ressentiments einnehmen, auch keinem anderen transitorischen Programm dienen mochten.

7.

Schlussbemerkung

Historische und transitorische Gerechtigkeit werfen unterschiedliche Fragen auf. Die spezifischen philosophischen Probleme intergenerationeller Gerechtigkeit mit Blick auf historisches Unrecht, namlich insbesondere die mit der Kontingenz der Existenz und Identitat von Personen verbundenen Probleme (Abschnitt 1), sind von praktischer Relevanz allein fiir die Einschatzung der Anspriiche der den Opfern von Unrecht nachfolgenden Generationen, der indirekten Opfer. Haufig sind indirekte Opfer historischen Unrechts allerdings auch direkte Opfer von neuem schadigendem Unrecht. Dies ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn sie als indirekte Opfer keine Anerkennung finden und ihre Anspriiche auf Kompensation oder Restitution deshalb nicht erflillt werden. Weder das Nicht-Identitatsproblem noch die Uberlegungen, auf welchen Jeremy Waldrons Aufhebungsthese beruhen, sind, wie in Abschnitten 1.2 und 3. betont, fiir die Interpretation aller besonderen Anspriiche wegen historischen Unrechts und Pflichten gegeniiber Opfern oder mit Blick auf Opfer historischen Unrechts relevant. Fiir die Uberlegungen, die fiir die Abschwachung historischer Anspriiche wegen veranderter Umstande sprechen, gilt, dass sie, so sie relevant sind, in unterschiedlichem MaBe fiir die Einschatzung der Starke spezifischer historischer Anspriiche und der Moglichkeiten ihrer Realisierung relevant sind (3.2-3.3). In einem konkreten Fall historischen Unrechts sind also eine Reihe von Uberlegungen wichtig fur die Einschatzung verschiedener Anspriiche der Opfer und indirekten Opfer sowie der Pflichten heute lebender Personen. Ein theoretisch sehr anspruchsvolles Unterfangen ware es, alle diese Uberlegungen integrieren zu wollen, so dass wir iiber eine generelle Theorie der Gerechtigkeit in der Zeit verfiigten, deren wombglich univer51

51

Africa Report, Bde. 1-5, Bd. 1, 129). D i e s diirfte fur die Nachfahren der Sklaven in den U S A gelten (siehe den Beitrag von D. Lyons) und fiir die Nachfahren der Roma und Sinti, die Opfer des versuchten Genozids der Nazis gewesen sind, auch wenn ihre Anerkennung als (indirekte) Opfer in jiingster Zeit auch im Sinne der Durchsetzung von Kompensations- und Restitutionsanspriichen deutliche Fortschritte auf weist. Zu den Roma und Sinti, siehe L.H. Meyer, "Transnational Autonomy", 2 6 3 - 3 0 1 , 268f, 2 7 7 - 9 , 295-9.

Einleitung

47

sell geltende Prinzipien im konkreten Fall bestimmte Reaktionen auf das Unrecht als geboten ausweisen konnten. Eine plausible Theorie dieser Art ist mir nicht bekannt. So bemiihen sich die Autoren dieses Bandes vielmehr - wenn auch auf durchaus unterschiedlichen Ebenen der Abstraktion und Generalitat - um die Analyse der normativen Signifikanz einzelner Aspekte historischen Unrechts sowie den kontextsensiblen Ausweis der Bedeutung solcher Uberlegungen fiir die Einschatzung von Rechten, Anspriichen und Pflichten angesichts bestimmter Falle historischen Unrechts und ihrer anhaltend schadigenden Wirkung auf das Wohlergehen heute und zukunftig lebender Menschen. 52

52

Eine solche Theorie ware eine nicht-ideale Theorie oder schlosse jedenfalls eine nicht-ideale Theorie ein. Philosophen neigen zu der Auffassung, dass es eine generelle nicht-ideale Theorie nicht geben konne. S o unterschiedlich etwa John Rawls' und Brian Barrys Auffassung auch mit Blick darauf sind, wie in einer vertragstheoretischen Argumentation nicht-ideale Handlungsbedingungen zu beriicksichtigen sind - siehe B. Barry, "Can States Be Moral?", 159-181, 169f; siehe auch die Kritik der Rawlsschen Position durch G.A. Cohen in "Incentives, Inequality, and Community", 2 6 1 - 3 2 9 ; ders, "Where the Action Is", 3-30; fiir eine Verteidigung der Rawlsschen Position siehe T.W. Pogge, "On the Site of Distributive Justice", 137-69 - , teilen Rawls und Barry doch die Uberzeugung, eine generelle Theorie des Verhaltnisses von idealer normativer zu nicht-idealer normativer Theorie konne es nicht geben (siehe J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2 4 5 - 2 4 6 , 3 5 1 , 575f; B. Barry, Theories of Justice). Auch Otfried Hoffe mbchte in Strategien der Humanitat keine generelle Theorie politisch-moralischer Entscheidung entwickeln, sondern "Bausteine" einer Theorie der Entscheidungsfindung iiber rjffentliche Handlungen in modernen Industriegesellschaften ausweisen (siehe insbesondere 336-337). Gegen die Moglichkeit einer generellen nichtidealen Theorie spricht, worauf Jon Elster mit Nachdruck hinweist, dass wir keine Theorie haben, die "can help us predict the long term steady-state consequences of global policy changes." (J. Elster, "The Possibility o f Rational Politics", 115-42, 122) Uns fehlt eine Theorie des "general social and economic equilibrium", welche die Grundlage fur die entsprechenden Vorhersagen sein konnte (siehe R.G. Lipset und K. Lancaster, ' T h e General Theory of the Second-Best", 11-32); siehe auch A. Margalit, "Ideals and Second Bests", 77-90. Jeremy Bentham und seine Anhanger waren da sehr viel ehrgeiziger. Bentham beanspruchte sowohl ein letztgiiltiges, fiir alle Handelnden gleichermaBen und universell anzuwendendes Kriterium richtigen Handelns auszuweisen (das Nutzen-Prinzip) und auch eine universell anwendbare Methode der Entscheidungsfindung (den so genannten hedonistischen Kalkulus). Siehe J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Kap. i "Of the Principle of Utility", 12; fiir den hedonistischen Kalkulus siehe Kap. iv "Value o f a Lot of Pleasure or Pain, H o w to be Measured". Fiir eine Kritik von Benthams Kalkulus als weder anwendbar noch als eine adaquate Reflektion des Benthamschen Nutzen-Prinzips siehe O. Hoffe, Strategien der Humanitat. Fiir eine Kritik von Benthams Nachfolgern in der Wohlfahrtsokonomie und der Theorie sozialer Entscheidung siehe ebd., Kap. v. Vielfach modifizierte utilitaristisch-konsequentialistische Positionen mit Blick auf die moralischen Anspriiche von Individuen unter nicht-idealen Bedingungen haben aber auch Verteidiger gefunden: P. Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", 2 2 9 - 4 3 ; D. Birnbacher, Verantwortung fur zukunftige Generationen, 16-23, 173-5, 187-90; und P. Unger, Living High and Letting Die. Fur eine Kritik der utilitaristisch-konsequentialistischen moralischen Forderungen als unfair siehe L.B. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory.

48

Lukas H. Meyer

Bibliographie Ackerman, B.A., The Future of Liberal Revolution, Yale University Press, 1992. Adorno, T.W., "Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?" (1959), Schriften, Bd. 10.2 Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, 1977. Anderson, E., "Compensation within the Limits of Reliance Alone", Compensatory Justice (Nomos 33), J.W. Chapman (Hg.), New York University Press, 1991 Anti-Slavery International (London) et al. (Hg.), "Zwangsarbeit und Sklaverei im 21. Jahrhundert", 2001 (deutsche Fassung von "Forced Labour in the 21st century", 2001). Arendt, H., Eichmann in Jerusalem. Ein Bericht von der Banalitdt des Bosen, Piper, 1986. Barry, B., Theories of Justice. A Treatise on Social Justice, Bd. 1, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989. Barry, B., "Can States Be Moral? International Morality and the Compliance Problem", Ethics and International Relations, A. Ellis (Hg.), Manchester University Press, 1986 (wieder abgedruckt in Barry, Liberty and Justice. Essays in Political Theory 2, Clarendon Press, 1991). Bartlett, R., "Native Title. From Pragmatism to Equality before the Law", Melbourne University Law Review 20 (1995). Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, erstverbffentlicht 1789, Methuen, 1982. Birnbacher, D., Verantwortung fur zukiinftige Generationen, Reclam, 1988. Brumlik, M., und H. Brunkhorst, "Kontingente Identitat und historische Haftung. Ein Gesprach mit Karl-Otto Apel", Babylon. Beitrdge zur judischen Geschichte 7 (1990). Bunce, V., "Comparing East and South", Journal of Democracy 6 (1995). Cassese, A., "When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case", European Journal of International Law 13 (2002). Chesterman, J. und B. Galligan, Citizens without Rights. Aborigines and Australian Citizenship, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Cohen, G.A., "Incentives, Inequality, and Community", The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Bd. xiii, G.B. Petersen (Hg.), University of Utah Press, 1992. Cohen, G.A., "Where the Action Is. On the Site of Distributive Justice", Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1997). Coleman, J., Risks and Wrongs, Cambridge University Press, 1992. Coleman, J., "Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions", Analyzing Law. New Essays in Legal Theory, B. Bix (Hg.), Oxford University Press, 1998. Dolinko, D., "Some Thoughts about Retributivism", Ethics 101 (1991). Dolinko, D., "Three Mistakes of Retributivism", UCLA Law Review 39 (1992). Eick, C.N., Indianervertrage in Nouvelle-France. Ein Beitrag zur Volkerrechtsgeschichte, Duncker & Humblot, 1994. Elster, J., "The Possibility of Rational Politics", European Journal of Sociology 28 (1987), (wieder abgedruckt in Political Theory Today, David Held (Hg.), Polity Press, 1991). Elster, J., "Coming to Terms With the Past. A Framework for the Study of Justice in the Transition to Democracy", Archives Europeenes de Sociologie 39 (1998).

Einleitung

49

Elster, J., C. Offe und U.K. PreuB, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies. Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (zusammen mit F. Boenker, U. Goetting und F.W. Rueb), Cambridge University Press, 1998. Feinberg, J., ' T h e Expressive Function of Punishment", The Monist 49 (1965), wieder abgedruckt in Feinberg, Doing and Deserving. Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, Princeton University Press, 1970. Feinberg, J., "Collective Responsibility", Doing and Deserving. Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, Princeton University Press, 1970 (in einer kiirzeren Fassung erstverbffentlicht in Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), wieder abgedruckt in Collective Responsibility.. Five Decades of Debate in Tfieoretical and Applied Ethics, L. May und S. Hoffman (Hg.), Rowman & Littlefield, 1991). Fishkin, J.S., "Justice between Generations. Compensation, Identity, and Group Membership", Compensatory Justice (Nomos 33), J.W. Chapman (Hg.), New York University Press, 1991. Fishkin, J.S., "The Limits of Intergenerational Justice", Justice Between Age Groups and Generations, P. Laslett and J.S. Fishkin (Hg.), Yale UP, 1992. Gaus, G.F., "Does Compensation Restore Equality?", Compensatory Justice (Nomos 33), J.W. Chapman (Hg.), New York University Press, 1991. Goodin, R.E., "Compensation and Redistribution", Compensatory Justice (Nomos 33), J.W. Chapman (Hg.), New York University Press, 1991. Goodin, R.E., "Waitangi Tales", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2000). Greiff, P. de, 'Trial and Punishment. Pardon and Oblivion", Philosophy & Social Criticism 22 (1996). Gunther, K., "Der strafrechtliche Schuldbegriff als Gegenstand einer Politik der Erinnerung in der Demokratie", Amnestie oder die Politik der Erinnerung, G. Smith und A. Margalit (Hg.), Suhrkamp, 1997. Habermas, J., "Uber den moralischen Notstand in der Bundesrepublik" (1966), Philosophisch-Politische Profile, Suhrkamp, 1981. Habermas, J., "Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Apologetische Tendenzen, Vom bffentlichen Gebrauch der Historie, Nachspiel", Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Kleine Politische Schriften Bd. VI, Suhrkamp, 1987. Habermas, J., "Zwei Reden. Keine Normalisierung der Vergangenheit. Uber den doppelten Boden des demokratischen Rechtsstaats", Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Kleine Politische Schriften Bd. VI, Suhrkamp, 1987. Habermas, J., "Aus der Geschichte lernen?", Die Normalitdt einer Berliner Republik. Kleine Politische Schriften Bd. VIII, Suhrkamp, 1995. Habermas, J., "Aus welcher Geschichte lernen?", Die Normalitdt einer Berliner Republik. Kleine Politische Schriften Bd. VIII, Suhrkamp, 1995. Habermas, J., "Das Bedurfnis nach deutschen Kontinuitaten", Die Normalitdt einer Berliner Republik. Kleine Politische Schriften Bd. VIII, Suhrkamp, 1995. Habermas, J., "Doppelte Vergangenheit", Die Normalitdt einer Berliner Republik. Kleine Politische Schriften Bd. VIII, Suhrkamp, 1995. Hart, H.L.A., "Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment", Punishment and Responsibility. Essays in the Philosophy of Law, Clarendon Press, 1968. Heller, A., "The Limits to Natural Law and the Paradox of Evil", On Human Rights, S. Shute und S. Hurley (Hg.), Basic Books, 1993. Herz, J.H., "Conclusion". From Dictatorship to Democracy. Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, Herz (Hg.), Greenwood, 1982.

50

Lukas H. Meyer

Herz, J.H., "Denacification and Related Policies", From Dictatorship to Democracy. Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, Herz (Hg.), Greenwood, 1982. Herz, J.H., "Introduction. Method and Boundaries", From Dictatorship to Democracy. Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, Herz (Hg.), Greenwood, 1982. Hbffe, O., Strategien der Humanitdt. Zur Ethik offentlicher Entscheidungsprozesse, Suhrkamp, 1985. Hoffe, O., Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, Beck, 1999. Honneth, A., Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, Suhrkamp, 1992. Honneth, A., "A Society Without Humiliation? On Avishai Margalit's Draft of a 'Decent Society'", European Journal of Philosophy 5 (1997). Honneth, A., "Anerkennung und moralische Verpflichtung", Zeitschrift fiir philosophische Forschung 51 (1997). Huntington, S., The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Ignatieff, M., "Human Rights. The Midlife Crisis", New York Review of Books, 20.5.1999. Jaspers, K., Die Schuldfrage, Lambert Schneider, 1946, wieder abgedruckt und mit einem Postskriptum (1962) versehen in Jaspers, Hoffnung und Sorge. Schriften zur deutschen Politik 1945-65, Piper, 1965. Jorge, C.S., "Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations. The Chilean Case after Dictatorship", Notre Dame Law Review 67 (1992). Kirchheimer, O., Political Justice, Princeton University Press, 1961 (Poiitische Justiz. Verwendung juristischer Verfahrensmbglichkeiten zu politischen Zwecken, Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1993). Koh, H.H., "Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs. Combating Terrorism through Transnational Public Law Litigations", Texas International Law Journal 22 (1987). Kritz, N.J. (Hg.), Transitional Justice. How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes, Bde. I-III, United States Institute of Peace, 1995. Lacey, N., State Punishment. Political Principles and Community Values, Routledge, 1988. Lipset, R.G., und K. Lancaster, "The General Theory of the Second-Best", Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7). Low-Beer, M., "Die Verpflichtungen der unschuldigen Nachgeborenen", Babylon. Beitrage zur judischen Geschichte 7 (1990). Lyons, D., "The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land", Social Theory and Practice 4 (1977). Mackie, J.L., "Morality and the Retributive Emotions", Criminal Justice Ethics 1 (1982). Malamud-Goti, J., "Punishment and a Rights-Based Democracy", Criminal Justice Ethics 10(1991). Malamud-Goti, J., Game Without End. State Terror and the Politics of Justice, University of Oklahoma Press, 1996. Malamud-Goti, J., "Dignity, Vengeance, and Fostering Democracy", Inter-American Law Review 29 (1998). Margalit, A., "Ideals and Second Bests", Philosophy for Education, Seymour Fox (Hg.), Van-Leer Foundation, 1983.

Einleitung

51

May, L., Sharing Responsibility, The University of Chicago Press, 1992. Meyer, L.H., 'Transnational Autonomy: Responding to Historical Injustice in the Case of the Saami and Roma Peoples", International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 8 (2001). Meyer, L.H., '"Gesetzen ihrer Ungerechtigkeit wegen die Geltung absprechen'. Gustav Radbruch und der Relativismus", R. Alexy, Meyer, S.L. Paulson, G. Sprenger (Hg.), Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie, NOMOS, 2002. Meyer, L.H., "Intergenerational Justice", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, URL = http.//plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2003/entries/justice-intergenerational. Meyer, L.H., "Past and Future. The Case for a Threshold Conception of Harm", Rights, Culture, and the Law, L.H. Meyer, S.L. Paulson und T.W. Pogge (Hg.), Oxford University Press, 2003. Mill, J.S., "Utilitarianism", Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. X: Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, J.M. Robson (Hg.), University of Toronto Press, 1969. Minow, M., Between Vengeance and Forgiveness. Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence, Beacon Press, 1998. Morreim, E.H., "The Concept of Harm Reconceived. A Different Look at Wrongful Life", Law and Philosophy 7 (1988). Munck, G.L., und C.S. Leff, "Modes of Transition and Democratization. South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective", Comparative Politics 29 (1997). Murphy, J.B., "Marxism and Retribution", Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1973). Murphy, L.B., Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, Oxford University Press, 2000. Murphy, S.D., "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law", American Journal of International Law 95 (2001). Nino, C.S., Radical Evil on Trial, Yale University Press, 1996. Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Blackwell, 1974. O'Donnell, G., und P.C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Johns Hopkins Press, 1986. Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, 1984. Perry, S.R., "The Distributive Turn: Mischief, Misfortune and Tort Law", Analyzing Law. New Essays in Legal Theory, B. Bix (Hg.), Oxford University Press, 1998. Pfeiffer, R.S., "The Meaning and Justification of Collective Responsibility", Public Affairs Quarterly 2 (1988). Pogge, T.W., "On the Site of Distributive Justice. Reflections on Cohen and Murphy", Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (2000). Pogge, T.W., "'Assisting' the Global Poor", D.K. Chatterjee (Hg.), The Ethics of Assistance. Morality and the Distant Needy, Cambridge University Press, i.E. 2003. Posner, T.R., "International Decision. Kadic v. Karadzic", American Journal of International Law 90 (1996). Prucha, F.P., American Indian Treaties. The History of a Political Anomaly, University of California Press, 1994. Przeworski, A., Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 1991. Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1971. Reisman, M.W., "Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human Rights", Law and Contemporary Problems 59 (1997). Reynolds, H., Aboriginal Sovereignty, Allen und Unwin, 1996.

52

Lukas H. Meyer

Rothenpieler, F.W., Der Gedanke einer Kollektivschuld in juristischer Sicht, Duncker & Humblot, 1982. Rzeplinski, A., "A Lesser Evil?", Transitional Justice. How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes, Bd. I: General Considerations / Bde. I-III, N.J. Kritz (Hg.), United States Institute of Peace, 1995. Scanlon, T.M., What We Owe To Each Other, Harvard University Press, 1998. Shiffrin, S., "Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm", Legal Theory 5 (1999). Singer, J.W., Introduction to Property, Aspen Law & Business, 2001. Singer, P., "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1972). Soyinka, W., The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness, Oxford University Press, 1999. Steinbach, P., "Vergangenheitsbewaltigungen in vergleichender Perspektive. Politische Sauberung, Wiedergutmachung, Integration", Historische Kommission zu Berlin. Informationen Beiheft 18 (1993). Stephens B., und M. Ratner, International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, Transnational Publishers, 1996. The Mabo Decision. With Commentary by Richard H. Bartlett, Butterworths, 1993. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Bde. 1-5, Macmillan, 1998. Unger, P., Living High and Letting Die. Our Illusion of Innocence, Oxford University Press, 1996. Venter, F., "Die verfassungsmaBige Uberpriifung der Rechtsgrundlagen von Sudafrikas 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission'", Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 57 (1997). Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice", Ethics 103 (1992). Williams, B., Shame and Necessity, University of California Press, 1993. Wolf, J - C , Utilitarismus, Pragmatismus und kollektive Verantwortung, Herder, 1993. Woodward, J., "The Non-Identity Problem", Ethics 96 (1986). Zalaquett, J., "Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments. Principles Applicable and Political Constraints", Transitional Justice. How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes, Bd. I: General Considerations / Bde. I-III, N.J. Kritz (Hg.), United States Institute of Peace, 1995. Ziegler, A.R., "International Decision, In Re G. Military Tribunal", American Journal of International Law 92 (1998). Zimmermann, S., Strafrechtliche Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung und Verjdhrung. Rechtsdogmatische und -politische Analyse mit vergleichenden Ausblicken nach Tschechien, Ungarn und Frankreich, Max-Planck-Institut fiir auslandisches und internationales Strafrecht: edition iuscrim, 1997.

Philosophical

Perspect

4

55

Redressing Historic Injustice

Jeremy

1

Waldron

1. Each person, said Kant, and each group has the right to approach other peoples in the world with a view to "offering to engage in commerce". Though the privilege is terribly abused, still "such abuse cannot annul the right of citizens of the world to try to establish community with all [others] and, to this end, to visit all regions of the earth." Kant insists that this is not the same as a right of settlement in lands which are already inhabited. For that a genuine agreement is required, an agreement that does not allow one or other party unscrupulously to take advantage of the other so far as the acquisition of land is concerned. It is less clear what Kant thought should happen once violations of this principle have become established, i.e. once settlement and intermingling have taken place, and have become more or less permanent, even without the agreement of the original inhabitants. He had no doubt that such violations occurred - indeed he thought they were pervasive in contemporary European incursions into Africa and the Americas. And he had little patience with the justifications that were usually adduced for the colonial en2

3

4

5

1

2 3

4 5

First published in the University of Toronto Law Journal LI1 (2002), 135-160. Reprinted by permission of University of Toronto Press. This paper is an adaptation of a preliminary draft of the second ch. of a book entitled Cosmopolitan Right. The book takes as its starting point Immanuel Kant's rather fragmentary discussion under the same heading in The Metaphysics of Morals, trans, by M. Gregor, 158-9 (352-3 of Volume 6 of the Prussian Academy edition of Kant's works). Ch. 1 of the draft, entitled "Kant's Heading 'Cosmopolitan Right'" (which is available upon request), sets out s o m e of the main features of Kant's cosmopolitanism. See also the discussion in J. Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?", 227. The book is not intended as an exercise in Kant exegesis. As I say, it takes Kant's discussion as a starting-point, but it proceeds from that starting point to continue doing (for our circumstances) the sort of thing that Kant took himself to be doing (for his circumstances), and to continue asking and if possible answering - the general questions that Kant asked. The aim is not to say what Kant did and why; but rather to approach certain problems (that might have been quite unfamiliar to Kant) - problems around multi-culturalism and identity politics - in a Kantian spirit and under the discipline of some general principles that Kant was rather insistent on. The most important such Kantian principle is the one I call "the Proximity Principle" - viz., that everyone has a natural duty to c o m e to terms, in civil union, with those with whom he finds himself unavoidably side-by-side, whether he likes them or trusts them or shares anything else with them ( c o m m o n culture, c o m m o n understandings) or not. I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 158 (352). It seems to be a privilege in Hohfeld's sense: i.e., no duty not to; but it doesn't correlate with any duty to respond in any particular way, except not to act as though the overture itself were wrongful. (See I. Kant, "Perpetual Peace", 106: "Hospitality ... means the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another. The other can turn him away, if this can be done without destroying him, but as long as he behaves peaceably where he is, he cannot be treated with hostility." ( 3 5 8 ) I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 158 (353). Ibid., 159 (353).

56

Jeremy Waldron 6

terprise: bringing civilization to the natives, or Lockean arguments about the superiority of European modes of land use. He imagines someone asking whether the mere fact of one's arrival in a country can justify setting up a colony, as a sort of application of the Proximity Principle or as a way of fulfilling what he said in his cosmopolitan musings in Perpetual Peace about the importance of mankind spreading out over all the earth: 7

8

9

Lastly, it can still be asked whether, when neither nature nor chance, but just our own will, brings us into the neighborhood of a people that holds out no prospect of a civil union with it, we should not be authorized to found colonies, by force if need be, in order to establish a civil union with them and bring these men (savages) into a rightful condition (as with the American Indians, the Hottentots, and the inhabitants of New Holland; or (which is not much better) to found colonies by fraudulent purchase of their land, and so become owners of their land, making use of our superiority without regard to their first possession. Should we not be authorized to do this, especially since nature itself (which abhors a vacuum) seems to demand it, and great expanses of land in other parts of the world, which are now splendidly populated, would have otherwise remained uninhabited by civilized people...? 10

Kant's response is unequivocal: this would be an abuse of the Proximity Principle. "It is easy", he says, "to see through this veil of injustice, ... which would sanction any means to good ends. Such a way of acquiring land is, therefore, to be repudiated." Still, there is a problem. Kant's response there turns crucially on the voluntary nature of the would-be colonists' presence - "when neither nature nor chance, but just our own will, brings us into the neighborhood of a people." That applies clearly enough to the first generation of settlers, and maybe even the second. But today, we are talking about people who are fourth - or fifth generation descendants of the original voluntary colonists, and for these people - us, here and now - there is little choice in the matter. This is where we are settled - this is where we are - now we can say in truth unavoidably side-by-side. And that remains true, in spite of the violations committed by our ancestors, and in spite of the transparent illegitimacy of their justifications. What are we to say about this situation? All Kant says in the Doctrine of Right is that the stain of historic injustice cannot be erased from such settlement, by our present good intentions. He is right, and as we shall see (towards the end of this chapter) this is something that we must pay attention to. But it does not help very much in figuring out what now is to be done - as a practical matter - so far as the rectification of the injustice is concerned. My hunch, however, - and now, in this chapter, the argument becomes constructive, not just interpretive - is that Kant held the view of common sense here. If a new settlement - originally wrong and unlawful under principles of cosmopolitan right - becomes 11

6 7 8

9 10 11

Idem. Ibid., 89 (268f)- See J. Locke, Two Treatises, II, sect. 4 1 ; see also J. Tully, "Rediscovering America". I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 12 If: "When you cannot avoid living side-by-side with all others, you ought to leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a rightful condition, that is, a condition of distributive justice" or (in Hastie's translation) "In the relation of unavoidable coexistence with others, thou shalt pass from the state of nature into a juridical union constituted under the condition of a distributive justice." See I. Kant, "Perpetual Peace", 110 (362-5); I deal with this in detail in ch. 1 of this book, and also in J. Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?", 236f. I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 86f (266). Ibid., 87 (266).

Redressing

Historic

Injustice

57

established over several generations, then the descendants of the original settlers are likely to have nowhere to return to. If that is the case, then - without denying the historical fact of the injustice - they and the descendants of those whom their ancestors invaded and expropriated now have nothing to do but come to terms with one another and establish a fair basis for sharing the lands and resources that surround them.

2. Certainly, that is what is suggested by the Proximity Principle - that is, by the general tenor of Kant's observation that people have a natural duty to enter into political society with those with whom they find themselves in a condition of unavoidable co-existence. True, if the coexistence is the product of my choice and I have the option of withdrawing, then, as we have seen, the Proximity Principle does not apply: I should not be there in the first place, and I should turn round and leave. But if that option has evaporated over the centuries, then our coexistence must be treated as a brute fact. Even if the explanation of our being side-by-side now is the existence of injustice in the past, still we have a duty to bring our present relationship under the auspices of right and legality, and that means we must form and sustain a political society among us - all of us - whether we like one another, or the circumstances under which we came into one another's company or not. It's worth reiterating, I think, the distinctive feature of Kant's Proximity Principle. Though Kant used a contractarian model to illuminate the main features of his political theory, his approach to basis of political cooperation did not have the voluntarist character of certain historical contract accounts. A theorist like John Locke might argue that people have a choice whether to enter into political community with others or not: 2

The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. 13

But for Kant, the implication - that it would be morally permissible to remain outside the locally constituted political community - was quite unacceptable. And that was not because of any jiggery-pokery with tacit consent. It was because entering into political society with those with whom you were otherwise likely to be in conflict - was a matter of natural duty. Indeed it is something that a person might legitimately be forced to d o . Kant was well aware that the compulsory character of the move into civil society distinguished his version of contractarianism from that of others (like Locke). Qua contract, he says, the contract establishing civil society "is of an exceptional nature": 14

15

In all social contracts, we find a union of many individuals for some common end which 12

13 14 15

In this regard Kant's approach is similar to John Rawls's early political theory: Rawls used a contractarian device to illuminate the content of justice; but the duty to be just was understood by him as a categorical natural duty, not as a contractually-incurred obligation: see J. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 114ff. J. Locke, Two Treatises, II, sect. 95. I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 122 (307). This paragraph and the next are adapted from J. Waldron, "Kant's Legal Positivism", 1562ff. (See also J. Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, ch. 3.)

58

Jeremy Waldron they all share. But a union as an end in itself which they all ought to share and which is thus an absolute and primary duty in all external relationships whatsoever among human beings (who cannot avoid mutually influencing one another), is only found in a society in so far as it constitutes a civil state, i.e. a commonwealth. 16

One can imagine a Lockean individual refusing to join the social contract because he found the company of his prospective fellow-citizens uncongenial. He dislikes them; their ancestors were mean to his ancestors; they don't share common understandings or a common religion or a common culture or whatever. And for all these reasons he elects to take his chances in the state of nature. For Kant however there is something wrong in this posture, if it is the case that he is going to have to interact with the others (with whom he is refusing to contract). The very reasons which make the others uncongenial to him are likely also to be reasons which put their views about how these interactions should be handled at odds with the outsider's understanding of how these interactions should be handled. And it's no good appealing to objective morality or natural law or the correct theory of justice to handle this problem. The problem is one of disagreement and conflict (about what objective morality or justice or natural law require): [H]owever well disposed and law-abiding men might be, ... individual men ... can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has [his] own right to do what seems right and good to [him] and not to be dependent upon another's opinion about this. So, unless [he] wants to renounce any concepts of Right, the first thing [he] has to resolve upon is the principle that [he] must leave the state of nature, in which each follows [their] own judgment, unite [him]self with all others (with which [he] cannot avoid interacting), subject [himjself to a public lawful external coercion, and so enter into a condition in which what is to be recognized as belonging to [him] is determined by law.' 7

The alternative is war and violence, justified on each side by contrary claims of justice, which for Kant is a moral obscenity. So, Kant suggests, if there are issues of resource use that need to be resolved among us - and there almost always are when we are unavoidably side-by-side - then we must come to terms with one another and resolve them in a common framework, that will then stand authoritatively over us. It is not good enough for each to act towards the others as his conscience or his sense of justice dictates. We need to construct a common sense of justice and embody it in our laws: we need, in other words, to set up a single system of property, even despite (indeed, precisely because of) our disagreements over what an appropriate system of property would be. I find this position attractive. In recent communitarian political philosophy, there has been a tendency to insist that a well-ordered society should be thought of as something constructed among those who share certain fundamental understandings and beliefs. At a minimum, some have suggested that mutual trust should be a condition precedent to the formation of any political community; and of course it is arguable that historic injustice can undermine the basis for trust. By contrast, the great virtue of Immanuel Kant's work in political philosophy (as also of the work of Thomas Hobbes) is that he begins from the opposite assumption, Kant assumes that we are always likely to find ourselves, in the first instance, alongside others we don't trust, others with whom we 18

1

16 17 18 19

I. Kant, "Theory and Practice", 73 (8:289). I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 124 (6:312). For the explanation, see J. Waldron, "Kant's Legal Positivism", 1557-62 and The Dignity Legislation, 52-57. See, e.g., M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice.

of

Redressing Historic Injustice

59

share little in the way of culture, mores or religion, others who disagree with us about justice. Neverthless if we are to have dealings with them (which includes such things as upholding putative property rights - or any rights - against them) we must enter into political community, where mine and thine (or even ours and tlieirs) can be determined as a matter of positive law. The presence or absence of trust, or shared culture, or shared understandings, are simply irrelevant to that moral necessity. For my money, that approach seems both more realistic in the mixed-up circumstances of the modern world, and less dangerous than the opposite, communitarian view. It is less dangerous, certainly, when one thinks what is likely to be done - what has in fact been done - to turn the communitarian assumption into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 20

3. The argument of section 2 takes us only so far. Kant's Proximity Principle gives us arguments against things like separatism, ethnic cleansing, and the sort of fastidious abhorrence of one another (on, say, ethnic or historical grounds) that might impede political cooperation. Those strategies are wrong in themselves; and a fortiori they cannot be justified by the historical fact of injustice in past dealings between peoples. But it still leaves open the question of what justice requires in relation to the historic injustice to which we are stipulating. That we are required to come to terms with each other, and set up a system of property that takes account of all our claims, is quite compatible with an insistence that such property system should attempt to respond to the injustice and iniquity of the events that brought us into each other's proximity in this way. That we are required to come to terms with one another in political community, under the auspices of positive law, doesn't mean that we are required to let bygones be bygones so far as issues of compensation or the rectification of injustice are concerned. Arguments can be imagined, of course, in this context for wiping the slate clean, or for treating the grievances of persons or peoples as mere historic sentiments, irrelevant to issues of justice. The best known argument of this sort is that of David Hume in Book III of the Treatise of Human Nature. On the Humean model, we start from an assumption of something like Hobbesian conflict driven by limited altruism and moderate scarcity. People grab things and use them; they argue and fight over them. Over time, the holdings determined in this way are going to be largely arbitrary. Nevertheless if any sort of stable pattern of de facto possession emerges, then something like a peace dividend may be available. It may be possible for everyone to gain, both in terms of the diminution of conflict and in terms of the prospects for market exchange, by an agreement not to fight any more over possessions. I agree to respect what you have managed to hang on to, and you agree to respect what I have managed to hang on to: "By this means, every one knows what he may safely possess". Such an agreement, if it lasts, may amount over time to a ratification of de facto holdings as de jure property. According to Hume we should not concern ourselves, he argues, with the distributive features of the possessory regime that emerges from the era of conflict. Our aim should be to ratify any distribution that seems salient - that is, any distribution support for which 21

20 21

This last paragraph is adapted from J. Waldron, "Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility". Hume, Treatise, Bk. Ill, Part II, sect, ii, 489. For a modern version of the Humean approach, see J.M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty, esp. chs. 1-4. The account (and the criticism) of the Humean approach in the text is adapted from J. Waldron, "The Advantages and Difficulties of the Humean Theory of Property".

60

Jeremy Waldron

promises to move us away from fighting about who uses what, and towards the benefits promised by a system of positive law and an orderly marketplace. Indeed, Hume says it is kind of a pragmatic self-contradiction to complain of the distributive injustice of the system that emerges or of the injustice by which resources were seized by various people during the era of conflict. Issues of justice, he insists, are logically posterior to settlement on property rights. If justice is a matter of "To each his own", then no question of it can be raised until some system of "mine" and "thine" is agreed. After this convention, concerning abstinence from the possessions of others, is enter'd into, and everyone has acquir'd a stability in his possessions, there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice; as also those of property, right, and obligation. The latter are altogether unintelligible without first understanding the former. 22

The claim is that those who lost control of resources in the era of unregulated conflict can hardly complain on grounds of justice without kicking away the very foundation of the intelligibility of justice-discourse. Justice discourse does not become possible, Hume says, until a settlement of resources has been achieved on some basis other than justice. And so, he argues, we can't then turn round and use the principles of justice established on that basis to criticize the events that took place priori (and as a way of establishing) the foundation. But the Humean argument is fallacious. Even if we accept his point about the logical priority of the establishment of a distribution to the emergence of sentiments of justice, it does not follow that those sentiments cannot then be intelligibly applied with regard to events temporally prior to the establishment of the distribution. Of course, we cannot hope now to regulate those events. But we do have control over the ramifications that those events are taken to have in our present day system of property rights, and those ramifications can intelligibly be informed by the sense of justice established after the events in question took place. In other words, suppose our sentiments of justice date from a settlement in (say) 1840. Then obviously we cannot use those sentiments to regulate events that took place prior to that in (say) 1825. But we can develop post-1840 principles which make what is to happen now a function of what we can find out about what took place in 1825. And there is nothing self-contradictory or unintelligible about deploying and applying such a principle in (say) 2 0 0 1 . 23

22 23

Hume, Treatise, 490f. Of course this assumes that as part of the 1840 settlement, people develop procedural (historical) principles of justice. Why would they do this, on the Humean account? Well, suppose a Humean convention has been set up in 1840, so that people recognize and respect one another's holdings. What happens if new resources are discovered or come into existence after that date? Are we then to go through the same process all over again - fighting and grabbing until a pattern of retention emerges? Hume says "No" ... tho' the rule of the assignment of property to the present possessor be ... useful, yet its utility extends not beyond the first formation of society; nor would anything be more pernicious, than the constant observance of it; by which restitution wou'd be excluded and every injustice would be authoriz'd and rewarded. We must, therefore, seek for some other circumstance, that may give rise to property after society is once establish'd.... (Treatise, Bk. Ill, Part II, sect, iii, 505.) He argues for the establishment historical/procedural principle - the Principle of First Occupancy as a post-convention principle of acquisition (on several grounds including the disutility o f leaving any issue of property rights unsettled while a new resource passes through several hands). But if this principle gets established in popular consciousness as the appropriate standard to use to judge post-1840 acquisitions, then it is quite imaginable that people are tempted in time to apply it also to what they know about the origin of pre-1840 holdings. And what they will find is an incongruity, since if anything the principle on which pre-convention holdings were recognized was a principle of

Redressing Historic Injustice

61

So judgements about past injustice, and demands for compensation for past injustice, and a structuring of the present system of property so that it takes account of the dire and unfair effects of past injustice - none of this can be ruled out on the Humean approach. Our Kantian responsibility to set up a system of justice is not necessarily a requirement that we do so in a "ground-zero" sort of way. If there are difficulties with the idea of present-day reparations for historic injustice - and I believe there are - they must have a different sort of basis.

4. In an article published some time ago, I drew attention to some of the difficulties that historic rectification would involve. Suppose, first, that it is our aim to do justice to the legitimate grievances and claims of individuals in this context. If the individuals whose entitlements were violated were still alive, then we could deal with the matter by way of direct restitution and compensation. But of course they are not. Many generations have passed since the injustice complained of took place. The best hope of reparation is to make some sort of adjustment in the present circumstances of those who are descended from the persons who suffered injustice (and also anyone else whose present position has been affected by these past events). It seems, then, the task of reparation is to transform the present so that it matches as closely as possibly the way things would be now if the injustice had not occurred. This is the approach urged by Robert Nozick in his account of the role played by a principle of rectification in a theory of historic entitlement: 4

25

This principle uses historical information about previous situations and injustices done in them (as defined by the first two principles of justice [justice in acquisition and justice in transfer]...), and information about the actual course of events that flowed from these injustices, until the present, and it yields a description (or descriptions) of holdings in the society. The principle of rectification presumably will make use of its best estimate of subjunctive information about what would have occurred (or a probability distribution over what might have occurred, using the expected value) if the injustice had not taken place. If the actual description of holdings turns out to be one of the descriptions yielded

Last Occupancy, relative to 1840, not First Occupancy. N o matter who first held or occupied or made or cultivated some resource, no matter how many times it was subsequently lost or seized or grabbed, the person who got the benefit of the rights established through the convention was the person left holding it that moment. People are likely therefore to criticize that process, much as w e find critics bringing (say) quasi-Lockean standards to bear on issues o f aboriginal rights. N o w if those governed by the convention deploy their new standards of justice in this way, Hume can hardly argue that they are making a logical mistake. Even though they could not have had such standards to apply to any acquisition unless pre-convention holdings had been ratified, still, once the deployment of such standards has gotten underway, there is nothing contradictory about turning them on the pre-convention holdings themselves and calling the whole basis o f subsequent transactions into question. Thus, showing (as Hume does) that recognition of existing holdings is a precondition for the deployment of any principle of justice is not, in itself, a way of showing that the recognized holdings and the market outcomes that flow from them cannot be scrutinized by such a principle. 24 25

S e e J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice", 4-28. An earlier version of this paper was published as "Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession". Bear with me on this. W e move to considering injustice done to groups in a moment (towards the end of this section and in the sections that follow).

62

Jeremy

Waldron

by the principle, then one of the descriptions yielded must be realized. The difficulties in this task are those of all counterfactual speculation. How can we know what would have happened if some event which in fact did occur had not taken place? The difficulty is particularly acute when we are tracing a counterfactual sequence of events that is not understood as a deterministic sequence. The sequence of events that interests us is a sequence that involves choice. When we ask 'What would have happened if this injustice, had not occurred?' we are imagining a train of events involving human agents - the bearers of entitlements - and their exercise of freedom. For example, suppose (counterfactually) a certain block of land in New Zealand had not been wrongfully appropriated from some Maori group in 1865. Then we must ask ourselves, 'What would the rightful owners of that land have done with it, if the wrongful appropriation had not taken place?' To ask that is to ask in part about how they would have exercised their freedom if they had a real choice. Would they have held on to the land, and passed it on to their children and grand-children? Or would they have sold it - but this time for a fair price - in response to the first honest offer they were given? And, if they had, then what would the purchaser have done with it? Sold it again? Passed it on to his children? Lost it in a poker game? Part of our difficulty in answering these questions is that it is not at all clear what we are doing when we try to make guesses about the way in which free will would have been exercised. I don't mean that the exercise of choice is necessarily unpredictable. We make predictions all the time about how people will exercise their freedom. But it is not clear why our best guess or prediction on such a matter should have moral authority in the sort of speculations we are considering. Let me repeat: this is not an epistemic difficulty. It is not that there is some fact of the matter (what A would have chosen to do with his land if things had been different) and our difficulty lies in discovering what it is. The thing about freedom is that there is no fact of the matter anywhere - knowable or unknowable - until the choice has been made. Worse still, particularly in the contexts with which we are concerned, the events of justice and injustice may make a considerable difference to who exists at a later time. We cannot simply hold the dramatis personae constant in our speculations. Children may be conceived and born, and leave descendants, who would not have existed if the injustice had not occurred. Short of putting them to death for their repugnancy to our counterfactuals, the Nozickian approach offers no guidance at all as to how their claims are to be dealt with. Does it make any difference to this critique that the violated entitlements in fact belonged to a group (e.g. a tribe) rather than a natural (and mortal) individual? Often the injustice complained of in these cases is that some renegade member of the tribe has 27

26 27

R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 152f. Suppose I am trying to predict how my uncle will dispose of his estate. M y best guess, based on all the evidence, is that since he has no children he will leave it to me, his favorite nephew. S o I make that prediction, communicate it to my friends ... and we sit down to watch what happens. In fact, my uncle surprises us by leaving his whole estate whimsically to an obscure home for stray dogs that he has only just heard of. M y prediction is confounded. Even though it was a reasonable prediction the best available - it is my uncle's whimsical decision that carries the day. M y reasonable guess has no normative authority whatever with regard to the disposition of his estate. N o w if this is true of decision-making in the real world, then I think it plays havoc with the idea that, normatively, the appropriate thing to do in the rectification of injustice is to make rational and informed guesses about how people would have exercised their freedom. For if such guesses carry no moral weight in the real world, why should any moral weight be associated with their use in counterfactual speculation?

Redressing

Historic

Injustice

63

disposed of tribal property as though it were his own private property. If a piece of land is tribally owned and its alienation prohibited by tribal custom, is there any point in asking counterfactually how it would have been disposed of if the injustice in this individual's dealing with it had not occurred? Some will say: surely we can assume that, if the land had not been wrongfully disposed of, it would have remained tribal property; so there should be no difficulty in showing that the counterfactual approach requires its present restoration to the tribe. Unfortunately, things are more complicated than that. The members of the tribe might have decided, in the exercise of their powers as communal owners, to sell some of the land; or the members of the tribe might have decided, in the exercise of their sovereign powers over their own laws and customs, to abrogate the system of communal property. Both possibilities need to be taken into account in any realistic estimation of what would have happened if the injustice had not taken place. The second possibility is particularly important. All societies change their customs and laws, including their property laws, from time to time, and there is every reason to suppose that such change might be a probable and legitimate response to changing conditions on the part of such flexible and resourceful polities as Maori tribes. If we are honestly inquiring into what would have happened in a just world, we have to take at least the possibility of such adaptive exercises of sovereignty into account. More abstractly, the problem of the role of contingency and choice in a counterfactual account does not evaporate when we shift the focus from individuals to groups. Groups can act freely too; and there is the same problem of saying how they would have exercised that freedom, if certain other events had not taken place.

5. Individual men and women are mortal; but groups are not, or not necessarily, certainly not in the same way. I said at the beginning of section 4 that if the persons whose entitlements were violated were still alive, then we could deal with the injustice by way of direct restitution and compensation. Now in fact many of the legal persons whose entitlements were violated have survived: in New Zealand the historic injustices complained of were done to tribes and other groups - iwi and hapu - as well as to individual men and women, and the iwi and the hapu are still there, even if their individual membership has changed. This ought to make a great deal of difference. For if the person whose rights were violated remains in being, then the first priority, particularly in the case of a property right, is to put an end to the violation by restoring the property to its rightful owner. So far as that imperative is concerned, counterfactual speculation about what the owner would have done with the property in the meantime is quite irrelevant. Suppose someone stole my car yesterday. That is an unjust act that took place at a certain place and at a certain time: at 9.30 a.m. on September 14, my car was stolen from the parking lot. Clearly anyone committed to the prevention of injustice should have tried to stop the theft taking place. But once the car has been driven nefariously out of the parking lot, the matter does not end there. For now there is a continuing injustice: I lack possession of an automobile to which I am entitled, and the thief possesses an automobile to which he is not entitled. Taking the car away from the thief and returning it to me, the rightful owner, is not a way of compensating me for an injustice that took place in the past, or adjusting the present to fit some counterfactual hypothesis; it is

64

Jeremy Waldron

simply a way of remitting an injustice that is on-going into the present. Phrases like 'Let bygones be bygones' are inappropriate here. The loss of my car is not a bygone: it is a continuing state of affairs. The implications of this example are clear for the historic cases we are considering. Instead of regarding the expropriation of aboriginal lands as an isolated act of injustice that took place at a certain time now relegated firmly to the past, we may think of it as a persisting injustice. The injustice persists and it is perpetuated by the legal system as long as the land that was expropriated is not returned to those from whom it was taken. On this model, the rectification of injustice is a much simpler matter than the approach we discussed in the previous section. We do not have to engage in any counterfactual speculation. We simply give the property back to the person or group from whom it was taken, and thus put an end to what would otherwise be its continued expropriation. This is a very important difference of perspective. But the move works only if two conditions are met. First, we must be sure that the person who makes the claim in the present really is the same person as the person who suffered the original injustice. Nominal identity is not sufficient; we need an assurance of actual identity in the relevant sense. Secondly, we must be sure that the entitlement (of the surviving person or group) that was originally violated all those years ago is an entitlement that survives into the present. The approach we are considering depends on the claim that the right that was violated when white settlers first seized the land can be identified as a right that is still being violated today by settlers' successors in title. Their possession of the land today is said to be as wrongful vis-a-vis the present tribal owners as the original expropriation. Can this view be justified? Obviously the two conditions are connected. But they are not the same. I will deal with them in the two sections that follow. 28

29

6. I hope somebody has got a little bit further along than I have in their thinking about what it is for a group (such as a tribe) to survive over (say) four or five generations, in the context of claims about injustice. My hunch is that survival in the relevant sense may not be the same as the notional inheritance of a group name and structure. It is not enough to point to some present-day entity or group that may be regarded for some purposes as identical to an entity or group whose rights were violated in the past. We must be sure that they are identical in a sense that is relevant and appropriate so far as the issue of justice - and the specific approach intimated in section 5 - are concerned.

28

These is a corresponding question also about the entity that committed the injustice. But we do seem to be dealing, in the N e w Zealand case, with an entity - the Crown, or the N e w Zealand government - that is committed to taking responsibility for crimes committed by and in the name o f the British crown, or the imperial authorities, in the period after 1840. S o there would seem to be less of a problem at that end.

29

B y saying "we must be sure..." I don't mean to suggest anything in particular about the burden of proof. This is political philosophy and claims about burden o f proof are out-of-place given the leisure that philosophers have and the inconsequentiality of their conclusions. But if there were a burden of proof issue I guess it would be governed by at least two considerations: (i) those proposing a massive disturbance in the status quo have some sort of burden of proof to show that the status quo is so tainted by persisting injustice as to have no special claim on our forbearance; and (ii) those who acknowledge or ought to acknowledge that historic injustice did actually take place have some sort of burden of proof to advance reason why it should not now be rectified. I have no idea how to balance these considerations against each other.

Redressing

Historic

Injustice

65

For example, suppose an injustice is done to a certain family, G , at a time, m, when families have comprehensive responsibility for the social and economic well-being of their members: there is no social "safety-net" beyond that, no public education etc. The injustice at m deprives G of most of its wealth. As time passes - and that specific injustice remains unrectified - the social structure changes, and now the wider community or the state takes on the socio-economic responsibilities that were previously vested in the family. But G survives - at least nominally - as an enduring entity that outlasts its individual members: the family at time m, i.e. G , has survived through to time n, many generations later. It now presents itself as G„. And G demands reparation of the original injustice. Are we so sure, in light of the changed social structure, that G„ is identical in the relevant sense to G ? They are certainly identical in some sense, but can we be sure that the sense in which G and G are identical is a sense that is relevant for the purposes of restitution and historic reparation? Here's an example of the difference it might make. The violation against G was a very serious one. But the best account of that seriousness makes reference to G ' s responsibilities for the welfare of its members, which are responsibilities G„ does not have. G has endured as G„, but G„ does not play the role that G played. Can we say that the outstanding violation - now conceived as a violation against G„ - is as serious now as it was when it took place? m

m

m

n

m

n

m

30

m

m

m

Or suppose that people organize themselves into groups at time n on quite a different basis than the basis on which they organized themselves into groups at the time, m, when the injustice was committed. The original group survives, in some sense, but people configure themselves differently in relation to groups. Take a concrete example the issue posed in a recent New Zealand case about Maori fishing rights. The Court of Appeal had to consider whether schemes to settle Maori grievances about the expropriation of fishing rights in the nineteenth century should be focused solely on traditional tribes or iwi or whether beneficiaries might also include more recently constituted Urban Maori Authorities. Justice Thomas provides some background: 31

With the advent of colonization after 1840, the tribes were systematically dispossessed of their lands by purchase, confiscation or legal artifices. From the 1860s Maori fishing rights were under threat, and Maori struggled to retain fishing rights independent of land. ... Gradually the rights were all but fully lost. A burgeoning Maori population on an inadequate land base meant that life in tribal polities was no longer tenable. Urban migration followed, especially in the post-war years, actively encouraged by the urban relocation programme of the government of the day. ... Maori underwent the fastest urbanization of any indigenous peoples in the world. In 1956, 76 per cent of Maori were considered rural; by 1976, 78 per cent had become urban. ... The reality for Maori today is that most no longer live in compact kin-based tribal collectives on a defined land base. Their people live in scattered whanau units both within and away from the old tribal boundaries. ... A number of Maori, 112,566 to be precise, indicated in the last census taken that they did not know the name of their iwi, while another 40,917 neither specified nor identified their iwi. Twenty-five per cent of Maori either do not know their iwi or for some reason or other choose not to affiliate with it.... But Maori are a communal people. The ... transformation of tribalism ... led to the emergence of quasi-tribes in the form of urban 30

T o flesh out the algebra: take the oldest surviving English aristocratic dynasty that you can think of, and consider the earliest unrectfied injustice done to that family that anyone can remember. S o - the value o f F is the Delacey's, for example, and the values of m and n, respectively, are 1086 and 2 0 0 0 , respectively. Suppose the 1086 injustice deprived the first Baron Delacey of his place at the King's Great Council. Are we sure that the late twentieth century Delacey family survives as the entity which still suffers this deprivation?

31

E.g., Te Waka Hi Ika o Te Arawa v. Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries

Commission

[2000] 1 NZLR 285.

66

Jeremy Waldron Maori organizations. A mix of tribal, religious and secular groups were formed for the purpose of providing material and spiritual support for Maori and the preservation of Maori culture. These voluntary groups perform the functions once carried out by the tribe. Urban marae developed. ... Many of these groups became delivery and service mechanisms for the government. To the forefront in this transformation have been the Urban Maori Authorities (UMA). 32

However, the political process whereby redress for historic injustice is sought under the auspices of the Treaty of Waitangi (1840) has been dominated, on the Maori side, by representatives of the traditional iwi, for they through their chiefs were of course the signatories to the Treaty. The settlement reached in regard to fisheries provided, in effect, that the assets held by the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission be distributed to traditional iwi, or other descent-based groups. A number of UMA challenged this settlement, on the grounds that it would not benefit a very large number of urban Maori no longer affiliated with iwi. The response by counsel, Joseph Williams, for the Commission was that since iwi had had the fishing rights wrongfully taken away from them, it is to iwi that they should be returned: UMA had not suffered comparable injustice, for they did not exist at the time the expropriations took place, and so they were not entitled to any redress. That argument prevailed with the majority in the Court of Appeal (insofar as they went beyond simple statutory interpretation). The settlement was of the historical grievances of a tribal people. It ought to be implemented in a manner consistent with that fact. With all due respect to UMA, who are formed on the basis of kaupapa not whakapapa, they cannot fulfil such a role. In saying this we do not intend to disparage UMA. They are worthy organizations of great value to Maoridom and to the wider New Zealand community. They are, and should be, held in high regard. In their short histories they have accomplished much good and their role in the delivery of benefits emanating from central and local government is vital and increasing. But they cannot legitimately claim to be tribes or the successors of tribes. 33

But it seems to me the dissenting Appeal Court judges had a point when they remarked that the argument confuses the benefit of collective rights of individual Maori with the benefit to be conferred pursuant to the settlement. ... Mr. Williams asserts that the benefit of the settlement should be directed to those who have lost their rights; that is, on his argument, the traditional tribes. This, he argued, is only logical. But the settlement is for the benefit of all Maori, not just the traditional tribes. In whatever manner distribution is effected, the benefit of the settlement is to go to all Maori, not just the members affiliated with the tribes who claim to have been the holders of the fishing rights which have been extinguished. 34

In other words, there is a sort of unhealthy formalism about an argument that moves from the sociological proposition that "[t]he settlement was of the historical grievances of a tribal people" to the conclusion that the particular tribal entities that suffered the violation should be the sole beneficiary of the settlement, notwithstanding the very different and attenuated position that those entities presently occupy in modern Maori society. And I think this formalism is the occupational hazard of those who simply cast around to find a way - any way will do - of sustaining the business of historic reparations without regard to the human circumstances of those they claim to be benefitting.

32 33 34

Ibid., 338f (per Thomas J., dissenting). Ibid., 377f (per Blanchard J.). Ibid., 341 (per Thomas J., dissenting).

Redressing Historic Injustice

67

7. Even if we were sure that we had the right entity - the right right-bearer - we would need additional assurance that the right in question had survived, if we were to pursue the approach intimated in section 5. (Remember the argument there was that the counterfactual conundrums of section 4 are irrelevant: we simply give the property rights back to the enduring group from whom they were taken, and thus put a stop to what would otherwise be on-going injustice.) So now we have to ask whether the rights remain stable during the prodigious lifetime of the group. On the face of it, it seems implausible that they would remain stable. After all, there have been massive changes in the last century or two, in a country like New Zealand, whose history we acknowledge has ben marred by injustice and expropriation. The most striking change is in population: there is now a huge settled population - Maori, pakeha and mixed-ancestry - larger by a factor of about twenty than the population in (say) 1840. There is no question of the descendants of European settlers returning en masse to Europe or anywhere else (although concern has been expressed from time to time about the number who do!) And so the land and other resources of the country are now used on a basis that is staggeringly different from the basis on which they were used at the time the violations took place. This, I think, has to make a difference to how we think about rights - even violated rights - which are alleged to have survived from that earlier era into the present. Consider the following hypothetical example. It involves two alternative scenarios. (1) On a large bounded plain, a number of groups appropriate water holes, in conditions where it is known that there are enough water holes for each group. So long as those conditions obtain, it seems reasonable for the members of a given group, G, to use the water hole they have appropriated (H ) without asking permission of other groups with whom they share the plain; and it may even seem reasonable for them to exclude members of other groups from the casual use of H , saying to them, "You have your own water hole. Go off and use that, and leave ours alone." But suppose one year there is an ecological disaster, and all the waterholes dry up except the one that the members of G are using. Then in these changed circumstances, notwithstanding the legitimacy of their original appropriation, it is surely no longer permissible for G to exclude others from H . Indeed it may no longer be in order for members of G to casually use H as "their own" waterhole in the way they did before. In the new circumstances, it may be incumbent on them to draw up a rationing scheme that allows for the needs of everyone in the territory to be satisfied from this one resource. Changing circumstances can have an effect on ownership rights notwithstanding the legitimacy of the original appropriation. (2) Suppose as before that in circumstances of plenty various groups on the savannah are legitimately in possession of their respective waterholes. One day, motivated purely by greed, members of group F descend on the waterhole, H , used and possessed by group G and insist on sharing that with them. (What's more they do not allow reciprocity; they do not allow members of G to share the water hole Hf that was legitimately in possession of the F group.) That is an injustice. But then, as in story (1), circumstances change, and all the water holes of the territory dry up except the one that originally belonged to G. The members of group F are already sharing that H on the basis of their 35

g

g

g

g

g

g

35

The example is drawn from J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice". It was suggested to me originally by the arguments in D. Lyons, "The N e w Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land", 371.

68

Jeremy Waldron

earlier incursion. But now that circumstances have changed, they are entided to share that water hole. Their use of H no longer counts as an injustice; it is now in fact part of what justice now requires. The initial injustice by F against G has been superseded by circumstances. I do not think this possibility - of the supersession of historic injustice - can be denied, except at the cost of making one's theory of historical entitlement utterly impervious to variations in the circumstances in which holdings are acquired and withheld from others. If circumstances make a difference to what counts as a just acquisition, then they must make a difference also to what counts as an unjust incursion. And if they make a difference to that, then in principle we must concede that a change in circumstances can affect whether a particular continuation of adverse possession remains an injustice or not. So everything depends on whether circumstances make a difference. I think it is very difficult to resist the conclusion that entitlements are sensitive to circumstances. Certainly, the level of our concern for various human predicaments is sensitive to the circumstances that constitute those predicaments. One's concern about poverty, for example, varies depending on the extent of the opportunities available to the poor: to be poor but to have some opportunity for amelioration is to be in a better predicament than to be poor with no opportunities at all. Similarly, our concern for the homeless may vary with the season of the year or the climate of the state in which they live; and global warming may make their predicament a little bit less of a concern than it was. Moreover, these are not just fluctuations in subjective response: they are circumstantially sensitive variations in what we would take to be the appropriate level of concern. Once this is conceded then the argument for the circumstantial variability of property rights is straightforward. The (appropriate) level of our concern about the poor and the needy is directly related to the burden of justification that must be shouldered by those who defend property rights. I will argue the point for an individual owner, though I think it is petty clear it applies to collective or group owners as well. If an individual makes a claim to the exclusive use or possession of some resource, then the burden of defending and sustaining that individual's claim as a moral proposition varies in proportion to the level of concern that one has about the plight of other persons or groups who will have to be excluded from the resource if her claim is recognized. (The only theory of property entitlement that would be totally immune to variations in background circumstances would be one that did not accept any burden of justification at all in relation to such concerns.) We can express this claim about sensitivity to circumstances as follows. In the case of almost every putative entitlement, it is possible to imagine a pair of different circumstances, Ci and C2, such that the entitlement can only barely be justified in C] and cannot be justified at all in C2. The shift from C\ to C2 represents a tipping point so far as the justification of the entitlement is concerned. Thus a scale of appropriation that might be appropriate in a plentiful environment with a small population may be quite inappropriate in the same environment with a large population, or with the same population once natural resources have become depleted. In a plentiful environment with a small population, an individual appropriation of land makes no-one worse off. As John Locke put it: g

36

H e that l e a v e s as m u c h as another can m a k e u s e of, d o e s as g o o d a s take n o t h i n g at all. N o B o d y c o u l d think h i m s e l f injur'd b y the drinking o f a n o t h e r M a n , t h o u g h h e t o o k a g o o d D r a u g h t , w h o h a d a w h o l e R i v e r o f the s a m e W a t e r left h i m t o q u e n c h his thirst.

36

For an argument to this effect, see J. Waldron, "Property, Justification and Need", 185-215.

Redressing

Historic

Injustice

69

And the Case of Land and Water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same. But as Locke also recognized, the picture changed once population increased to the point where scarcity was felt. If one person's appropriation cast a shadow on the survival prospects of others, then evidently it raised questions of a moral character that were not raised when resources were as plentiful as water in a river. One does not need the exact formulation of a "Lockean proviso" to see this. The point is simply that there are real moral concerns that have to be addressed in the one case that are not present in the other. 38

So far I have talked about one acquisitive act, A\, taking place in one set of circumstances, C|, and another acquisitive act, A 2 , taking place in different circumstances, C2. What happens, though, if circumstances change after the moment of the acquisitive act but during the time that the act has effect, i.e. during the period of ownership to which the acquisitive action gives rise? An individual performs an acquisitive act A], in circumstances Ci that make it legitimate. It establishes a title that endures through time. During that time circumstances change, so that conditions C 2 now obtain, and conditions C2 are such that an equivalent act of appropriation would not be legitimate. What effect does this change have on the legitimacy of the title founded by action A | ? The answer has to be that it calls the legitimacy of the individual's entitlement into question. Property entitlements constrain others over a period of time and they do so continually in the literal sense that, again and again, the owner repels boarders, so to speak, rebuffing their claim that they ought to have access to the resource in question or participate in its management. Day after day, the owner faces explicit or implicit challenges from others, wanting to use her resource; if she didn't have the entitlement to rely on she would not be in a moral position to rebut or resist these challenges. So each time she resists an encroachment, she relies on the entitlement founded by A|. At each of those times, the legitimacy of what she does depends on the appropriateness of her entitlement as a moral right at that time. Now, so long as circumstances remain unchanged or so long as any changes are broadly consonant with the necessary conditions for the legitimacy of her entitlement, the entitlement is, so to speak, renewed automatically. But if circumstances change radically in the way we have been envisaging, then continued application of her entitlement can not be taken for granted. (It's like the automatic renewal of a library book until another reader puts in a request for it.) If this is accepted so far as justice in acquisition is concerned, it must also apply to issues and allegations of injustice. Suppose a person has legitimately acquired an object in circumstances of plenty, Cj, and another person comes along and snatches it from him. That act of snatching, we may say, is an injustice. But the very same action of snatching an already appropriated object may not be wrong in a different set of circumstances, C2, where desperate scarcity has set in and the snatcher has no other means of

37 38

J. Locke, Two Treatises, II, sect. 33. The same point is recognized by R. Nozick (Anarchy, State and Utopia, 174ff). The principle of acquisition that forms the lynch-pin of Nozick's theory depends for its acceptability on the claim that individual appropriations of previously unowned goods do not worsen anybody's situation. (Nozick wishes, as far as possible, to present initial acquisition in the same light of Pareto-improvement as consensual transfer.) W e need not worry about the exact details of this proviso. What is clear is that in any plausible theory of historic entitlement, there is some spectrum of social circumstances, relating to the effect a putative acquisition would have on the prospects and lifechances of other people, such that the further one goes along this spectrum the less inclined we are to say that the acquisition in question generates legitimate rights.

70

Jeremy Waldron

staying alive. One and the same type of action may be an injustice in one set of circumstances and not an injustice in another. And that is where our second story about the waterholes comes in. I said that the burden of justifying an entitlement depends (in part) on a moral assessment of the impact on others' interests of their being excluded from the resources in question, and that that impact is likely to vary as circumstances change. Similarly an acquisition which is legitimate in one set of circumstances may not be legitimate in another set of circumstances. From this I inferred that an initially legitimate acquisition may become illegitimate or have its legitimacy restricted (as the basis of an on-going entitlement) at a later time on account of a change in circumstances. By exactly similar reasoning, it seems possible that an act which counted as an injustice when it was committed in circumstances Ci may be transformed, so far as its on-going effect is concerned, into a just situation if circumstances change in the meantime from Q to Ci. When this happens, I shall say the injustice has been superseded. None of this changes when we move from individuals to groups: for all the argument posits is that there are others affected by the acquisition and by its continuance as an entitlement, and that the legitimacy of their exclusion maybe called in question by changes in circumstances. It is a mistake to think that there is any less difficulty in justifying collective entitlements than in justifying individual entitlements. There would be a difference if the collective comprised all those who might conceivably have a claim against the resource. But that is not usually the case, and it is certainly not the case in New Zealand where the groups at the focus of debates about historic injustice were historically and prehistorically engaged in the warlike exclusion of other groups from the use of the resources they now claim. It may be objected that the whole line of reasoning in this section generates a moral hazard - an incentive for wrongdoers to seize others' lands confident in the knowledge that if they hang on to them wrongfully for long enough their possession may eventually become rightful. But the argument of this section is not that the passage of time per se supersedes all claims of injustice. Rather, the argument is that claims about justice and injustice must be responsive to changes in circumstances. Suppose there had been no injustice: still, a change in circumstances (such as a great increase in world population) might justify our forcing the aboriginal inhabitants of some territory to share their land with others. If this is so, then the same change in circumstances in the real world can justify our saying that the others' occupation of some of their lands, which was previously wrongful, may become morally permissible. There is no moral hazard in this supersession because the aboriginal inhabitants would have had to share their lands, whether the original injustice had taken place or not. I do not think this possibility - of the supersession of historic injustice, of historic injustice being, so to speak, overtaken by circumstances - can be denied, except at the cost of making one's theory of historical entitlement utterly impervious to variations in the circumstances in which holdings are acquired and withheld from others. If circumstances make a difference to what counts as a just acquisition, then they must make a 39

39

See R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 178: "We should note that it is not only persons favoring private property who need a theory of how property rights originate. Those believing in collective property, for example those believing that a group of persons living in an area jointly o w n the territory, or its mineral resources, also must provide a theory of how such property rights arise; they must s h o w why the persons living there have rights to determine what is done with the land and resources there that person's living elsewhere don't have (with regard to the same land and resources)."

Redressing Historic Injustice

71

difference also to what counts as an unjust incursion. And if they make a difference to that, then we cannot deny that a change in circumstances can affect whether a particular continuation of adverse possession remains an injustice or not. Of course, from the fact that supersession is a possibility, it does not follow that it always happens. Everything depends on which circumstances are taken to be morally significant, and how as matter of fact circumstances have changed. It may be that some of the historic injustices that concern us have not been superseded, and that, even under modern circumstances, the possession of certain aboriginal lands by the descendants of those who expropriated their original owners remains a crying injustice. My argument is not intended to rule that out. But there have been huge changes since North America and Australasia were settled by white colonists. The population has increased many fold, and most of the descendants of the colonists, unlike their ancestors, have nowhere else to go. We cannot be sure that these changes in circumstances supersede the injustice of their continued possession of aboriginal lands, but it would not be surprising if they did. The facts that have changed are exactly the sort of facts one would expect to make a difference to the justice of a set of entitlements. Quite apart from anything else, the changes that have taken place over the past two hundred years mean that the costs of respecting primeval entitlements are much greater now than they were in 1800. Two hundred years ago, a small aboriginal group could have exclusive domination of "a large and fruitful Territory" without much prejudice to the needs and interests of very many other human beings. Today, such exclusive rights would mean that many people going hungry who might otherwise be fed, and many people living in poverty who might otherwise have an opportunity to make a decent life. Irrespective of the occurrence of past injustice, this imbalance would have to be rectified sooner or later. That is the basis for my argument that claims about historic injustice predicated on the status quo ante may be superseded by our determination to distribute the resources of the world in a way that is fair to all of its existing inhabitants in their existing circumstances. 40

8. There is, as I said, a connection between the question raised in section 6 - has the group G survived in the relevant sense, into the present as successor to grievances arising form events that took place generations ago? - and the question raised in section 7 - does G have the same rights now that it had at the time the historic violation took place? The questions come together when we consider the basis of G ' s initial entitlement. It was based on the fact that the structure of G , as a collective entity, was oriented to G ' s organization of the means of subsistence for its members. The importance of G ' s entitlement is related not to the sheer metaphysics of G ' s existence as an enduring group but to the human role that it played in a particular society. Property rights are often defended on the ground of the pervasive role that a resource comes to play in the life of its owner. An individual who takes possession of an object or a piece of land, and who works on it, alters it and uses it, makes it in effect a part of her life, a pivotal point in her thinking, planning and action. She shapes it in a certain way - ploughing it, for example, or practicing good husbandry in her hunting over it - so as to allow it to perform a certain role in her life and activity not only now but in the future. If someone m

m

m

m

m

40

The phrase is from J. Locke, Two Treatises,

II, sect. 4 1 .

72

Jeremy Waldron

else comes along and seizes the resource, then this whole structure of action is disrupted. And that's the basis of the injustice. But if this is the sort of line we take about the importance of property, then unfortunately our justification is going to be vulnerable to something like historical prescription: we are going to have a justification that is weakened by the historic persistence of dispossession, a justification that does fade over time. If something was taken from me decades ago, then the claim that it now forms the center of my life and that it is still indispensable to the exercise of my autonomy is much less credible. For I must have found some way to live in the meantime; I must have developed some structure of subsistence. And that will be where my efforts have gone, and where my planning and my practical thinking have been focused. I may of course yearn for the lost resource and spend a lot of time wishing that I had it back. I may even organize my life around the campaign for its restoration. But that is not the same thing as the basis of the original claim. The original entitlement is based on the idea that I have organized my life around the use of this object, not that I have organized my life around the specific project of hanging onto it or getting it back. It is probably a little harsh to say that this is the case with some of the groups that are now claiming the benefit of historic reparations: that whereas G was a group oriented to its members' subsistence and treasured its property rights accordingly, G„ is a group oriented mainly to its historic grievances and treasures its (violated) property rights as a source of lingering claims against others, well aware that its members have now for several generations been organizing their subsistence on a different basis altogether. As I say, that's a bit harsh, as applied for example to Maori groups. Butt here is more than a grain of truth in it - certainly enough to raise questions about whether the group now demanding the property rights back is similar in any important respect to the group of the same name that 150 years ago was demanding that its property right not be violated. Again, the moral hazard objection rears its head. Some will object that this argument furnishes an incentive to anyone who is inclined to violate another's rights. The thief knows that if he steals resources and hangs on to the proceeds, his victim will have to re-order her life and, once she does, she will no longer be in a position to claim that the stolen resources should be restored because of their centrality to her plans. But I do not see how this difficulty can be avoided. We cannot pretend that a long-stolen resource continues to play a part in its original owner's life when in fact it does not, merely in order to avoid a moral hazard. What the objection shows, I think, is that the normal line of argument for property entitlements is simply insufficient to establish imprescriptible rights. And I can't conceive what would be sufficient to establish property rights in contested resources that were fully imprescriptible. m

9. It does not follow from what has been said we should attach no importance to historic injustice of the sort that disfigured the colonial history of countries like New Zealand. The arguments made in sections 4-8 are directed at a particular way of thinking about that injustice and a particular way of approaching its remediation. I have criticized the approach that aims, as it were, to wind the tape back to the injustice and try and make the world as though the injustice had never happened: I have argued that the counterfactuals that that involves are impossible to figure out (if not incoherent), and I have argued too that such an approach tries to do justice to the wrong entities (viz. modern

Redressing Historic Injustice

73

day successors to the groups that were important at the time the injustice took place) and to vindicate the wrong rights (rights that obtained in virtue of circumstances quite different from those of the modern world). The reparationist enterprise fails to take proper account of the fact that the people, entities and circumstances in relation to which justice must now be done have changed radically form the peoples, entities and circumstances in relation which violations were historically committed. Some of those changes are a result of the historic injustice. But, as I argued in the early sections of the chapter, that doesn't mean they can be ignored or reversed. We must come to terms with each other here and now, irrespective of how we all got here. Behind the thesis of supersession lies a determination to focus upon present and prospective costs - the suffering and the deprivation over which we still have some control. The idea is that any conception of justice which is to be made practically relevant for the way we act now must be a scheme that takes into account modern circumstances and the way those impact on the conditions under which people presently live their lives. Arguments for reparation take as conclusive claims of entitlement oriented towards circumstances that are radically different from those we actually face: claims of entitlement based on the habitation of a territory by a small fraction of its present population, and claims of entitlement based on a determination to ignore the present dispersal of persons and peoples on the face of the earth, simply because the historic mechanisms of such dispersal were savagely implicated in injusti.ce. And yet, here we all are. The present circumstances are the ones that are real: it is in the actual world that people starve or are hurt or degraded if the demands of justice in relation to their circumstances are not met. Justice, we say, is a matter of the greatest importance. But the importance to be accorded it is relative to what may actually happen if justice is not done, not to what might have happened if injustice in the past had been avoided. I have tried not to make the argument of this chapter depend on anything about the sheer passage of time or the need for social amnesia. Some people do believe that violated rights are capable of "fading away" in their moral importance by virtue of the passage of time, i.e., by the sheer persistence over the generations of what was originally a wrongful infringement. In the law of property, we recognize doctrines of prescription and adverse possession. In criminal procedure and in torts, we think it important to have statutes of limitations. The familiarity of these doctrines no doubt contributes to the widespread belief that, after several generations have passed, certain wrongs are simply not worth correcting. And despite the perennial objection about moral hazard - an incentive for wrongdoers to cling to their ill-gotten gains, in the hope that the entitlement they violated will fade away because of their adverse possession - , that view (that certain rights are prescriptable) does have something to be said for it. Some of the things favor prescriptability are simply pragmatic. Statutes of limitations are inspired as much by procedural difficulties about evidence and memory, as by any doctrine about rights. It is hard to establish what happened if we are enquiring into events that occurred decades or generations ago. There are non-procedural pragmatic arguments also. For better or worse, people build up structures of expectation around the resources that are actually under their control. If a person controls a resource over a long enough period, then she and others may organize their lives and their economic activity around the premise that that resource is 'hers', without much regard to the distant provenance of her entitlement. Upsetting these expectations in the name of restitutive justice is bound to be costly and disruptive. But in this chapter I have tried not to rest on these considerations except to the extent that they enter into the meaning and application of other substantive principles. (I have

74

Jeremy Waldron

in mind here the argument developed in section 8.) For it is not appropriate to simply announce a principle of prescription. The important thing is to understand the living issues of morality and justice that such a principle expresses in its bluff, peremptory way. So I have tried to focus on the underlying issues, and I have not been particularly concerned whether a bland one-size-fits-all principle of prescription can be erected on the basis of them. I rely even less on the plea, that is sometimes heard, for a sort of collective amnesia. "Can't we forget about the past?" people complain, "Why do we have to keep dredging up these historic grievances. Can't bygones be bygones." There are many important reasons why the answer to that question must be a categorical "No", and why it is very important for me that my argument in this chapter should be taken as an argument against a particular misuse of historic memory and not at all against the importance of historic memory as such. To begin with, those who plead for forgetfulness with the slogan "Let bygones by bygones" are acting complacently as though they have nothing to learn from their own history. An historical judgement about the past, if it is also a moral judgement, necessarily says something for the present and future. All moral judgments are practical and prescriptive in their illocutionary force; they purport to guide choices. When I make a moral judgement about an event E, I do so not in terms of the irreducible particularity of E but on the basis of some reproducible feature of E that other events might share. In saying, "E was unjust", I am saying, "There is something about E and the circumstances in which it was performed, such that any act of that kind performed in such circumstances would be unjust." Thus, I am not so much prescribing the avoidance of E itself (a prescription that makes no sense if E is in the past), but prescribing the avoidance of E-type events. Though E occurred 150 years ago, to condemn it is to express a determination now that, in the choices we face, we will avoid actions of this kind. The point of doing this is not that we learn new (and better) moral standards for our lives now from the judgments we make about the past. Unless we had those standards already, we wouldn't make those judgments. But our moral understanding of the past is often the best way of bringing to life the force and full implications of principles to which we are already in theory committed. To be disposed to act morally, it is not enough to be equipped with a list of appropriate principles and values. One also needs a sense of the type of situation in which these things may be suddenly at stake, of the sort of temptations or difficulties that might lead one to betray them, of the circumstances and entanglements that lead otherwise virtuous people to start acting viciously. That, among other things, is what history provides. And one of the most lamentable features of the mythmaking that is sometimes substituted for history is that, by making the past look better and more straightforward than it was, it obscures this invaluable sense of what is like to face real moral danger. Beyond that, there is an importance to the historical recollection of injustice that has to do with identity and contingency. It is a well-known characteristic of great injustice that those who suffer it go to their deaths with the conviction that these things must not be forgotten. It is easy to misread that as a vain desire for vindication, a futile threat of infamy upon the perpetrators of an atrocity. But perhaps the determination to remember 41

41

Opinions differ in meta-ethics about whether this illocutionary function provides a complete explanation of the distinctively moral meaning of words like 'right', 'wrong', 'unjust', etc. For the view that it does, see R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals. But most moral philosophers concede that even if it is not the whole story, still it is an essential part of the explanation of the meaning of such a words that they have this prescriptive function.

Redressing Historic Injustice

75

is bound up with the desire to sustain a specific character as a person or community against a background of infinite possibility. That this happened rather than that - that people were massacred (though they need not have been), that lands were taken (though they might have been bought fairly), that promises were broken (though they might have been kept) - the historic record has a fragility that consists, for large part, in the sheer contingency of what happened in the past. What happened might have been otherwise, and, just because of that, it is not something one can reason back to if what actually took place has been forgotten or concealed. 42

Each person establishes a sense of herself in terms of her ability to identify the subject or agency of her present thinking with that of certain acts and events that took place in the past, and in terms of her ability to hold fast to a distinction between memory so understood and wishes, fantasies, or various other ideas of things that might have happened but did not. But remembrance in this sense is equally important to communities - families, tribes, nations, parties - that is, to human entities that exist often for much longer than individual men and women. To neglect the historical record is to do violence to this identity and thus to the community that it sustains. And since communities help generate a deeper sense of identity for the individuals they comprise, neglecting or expunging the historical record is a way of undermining and insulting individuals as well. 43

When we arc- told to let bygones be bygones, we need to bear in mind also that the forgetfulness being urged on us is seldom the blank slate of historical oblivion. Thinking quickly fills up the vacuum with plausible tales of self-satisfaction, on the one side, and self-deprecation on the other. Those who as a matter of fact benefited from their ancestors' injustice will persuade themselves readily enough that their good fortune is due to the virtue of their race, while the descendants of their victims may too easily accept the story that they and their kind were always good for nothing. In the face of all this, only the deliberate enterprise of recollection (the enterprise we call history), coupled with the most determined sense that there is a difference between what happened and what we would like to think happened, can sustain the moral and cultural reality of self and community. I also want to mention the role that the payment of money (or the return of lands or artifacts) may play in the embodiment of communal remembrance. Quite apart from any attempt to genuinely compensate victims or offset their losses, reparations may symbolize a society's undertaking not to forget or deny that a particular injustice took place, and to respect and help sustain a dignified sense of identity-in-memory for the people affected. A prominent recent example of this is the payment of token sums of compensation by the American government to the survivors of Japanese-American families uprooted, interned and concentrated in 1942. The point of these payments was not to make up for the loss of home, business, opportunity, and standing in the community which these people suffered at the hands of their fellow-citizens, nor was it to make up for the discomfort and degradation of their internment. If that were the aim, much more would be necessary. The point was to mark - with something that counts in the United States a clear public recognition that this injustice did happen, that it was the American people and their government that inflicted it, and that these people were among its victims. The payments give an earnest of good faith or sincerity to that acknowledgment. Like the gift I buy for someone I have stood up, the payment is a method of putting oneself out,

42

For a moving discussion, see H. Arendt, "Truth and Politics".

43

See J. Locke, An Essay Concerning

Human Understanding,

Book II, ch. xxvii, sects. 9-10.

76

Jeremy Waldron

or going out of one's way, to apologize. It is no objection to this that the payments are purely symbolic. Since identity is bound up with symbolism, a symbolic gesture may be as important to people as any material compensation. I want to end by emphasizing two other points that qualify or clarify my thesis of the supersession of historic injustice. First, what I have said applies only if an honest attempt is being made to arrange things justly for the future. If no such attempt is being made, there is nothing to overwhelm or supersede the enterprise of reparation. My thesis is not intended as a defense of complacency or inactivity, and to the extent that opponents of reparation are complacent about the injustice of the status quo, their resistance is rightly condemned. Repairing historic injustice is, as we have seen, a difficult business and, as a matter of fact, it is almost always undertaken by people of good will. The only thing that can trump that enterprise is an honest and committed resolve to do justice for the future, a resolve to address present circumstances in a way that respects the claims and needs of everyone. Secondly, my thesis is not that such resolve has priority over all rectificatory actions. I claim only that it has priority over reparation which might carry us in a direction contrary to that which is indicated by a prospective theory of justice. Often and understandably, claims based on reparation and claims based on forward-looking principles will coincide, for, as we saw in Section Three, past injustice is not without its present effects. It is a fact that many of the descendants of those who were defrauded and expropriated live demoralized in lives of relative poverty - relative, that is, to the descendants of those who defrauded them. If the relief of poverty and the more equal distribution of resources is the aim of a prospective theory of justice, it is likely that the effect of rectifying past wrongs will carry us some distance in this direction. All the same, it is worth stressing that it is the impulse to justice now that should lead the way in this process, not the reparation of something whose wrongness is understood primarily in relation to conditions that no longer obtain. Entitlements that fade with time, counterfactuals that are impossible to verify, injustices that are overtaken by circumstances - all this is a bit distant, I am afraid, from the simple conviction that, if something was wrongly taken, it must be right to give it back. The arguments I have made may seem to deflate a lot of the honest enthusiasm that surrounds aboriginal claims, and the hope that now for the first time in centuries we may be ready to do justice to people and peoples whom we have perennially maltreated. The arguments may also seem to compromise justice unnecessarily, as they shift from the straightforward logic of compensation to an arcane and calculative casuistry that tries to balance incommensurable claims. But societies are not simple circumstances, and it does not detract one bit from the importance of justice nor from the force of the duties it generates, to insist that its requirements are complex and that they may be sensitive to differences in circumstance. It is true that in many cases the complexity of these issues does not diminish our ability to recognize acts of injustice - stark and awful - like direct expropriation and genocide. The fallacy lies in thinking that the directness of such perception and the outrage that attends it translate into simple and straightforward certainty about what is to be done once such injustices have occurred. "First come, first served." "We were here first." These simplicities have always been unpleasant ways of denying present aspirations or resisting current claims of need. They become no more pleasant, and in the end no more persuasive, by being associated with respect for aboriginal peoples or revulsion from the violence and expropriation that have disfigured our history.

Redressing

Historic

Injustice

77

Bibliography Arendt, H., "Truth and Politics", Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. Six Exercises in Political Thought, Viking Press, 1968. Buchanan, J.M., The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, University of Chicago Press, 1975. Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals, Clarendon Press, 1952. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford University Press, 1973. Kant, I., "Cosmopolitan Right", The Metaphysics of Morals, trans, by Mary Gregor, Cambridge University Press, 1991. Kant, I., "Perpetual Peace", Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss, transl. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1970. Kant, I., "Theory and Practice", Immanuel Kant, Political Writings. Kant, I., Kants Werke, Bd. vi, Akademie Werkausgabe, Walter de Gruyter, 1968. Kant, I., Kants Werke, Bd. viii, Akademie Werkausgabe, Walter de Gruyter, 1968. Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Clarendon Press, 1987. Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge University Press, 1967. Lyons, D., ' T h e New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land", Reading Nozick, ed. J. Paul, Basil Blackwell, 1982. Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basil Blackwell, 1974. Rawls, J., Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1971. Tully, J., "Rediscovering America. The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights", Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy. Locke in Contexts, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Waitangi Fisheries Commission, Te Waka Hi Ika o Te Arawa v. Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission [2000] 1 NZLR 285. Waldron, J., "Historic Injustice. Its Remembrance and Supersession", Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, ed. G. Oddie and R. Perrett, Oxford University Press, 1992. Waldron, J., "Superseding Historic Injustice", Ethics 103 (1992). Waldron, J., "Property, Justification and Need", Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 6 (1993). Waldron, J., "The Advantages and Difficulties of the Humean Theory of Property", Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1994). Waldron, J., "Kant's Legal Positivism", Harvard Law Review 109 (1996). Waldron, J., The Dignity of Legislation. The 1996 Seeley Lectures, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Waldron, J., "Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility", Citizenship in Diverse Societies, ed. W. Kymlicka and W. Norman, Oxford University Press, 2000. Waldron, J., "What is Cosmopolitan?", Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (2000). Walzer, M., Spheres of Justice, Basic Books, 1983.

79

Historical Rights

Chaim Gans

Contents 1.

Introduction. Two Conceptions of Historical Rights

79

2.

First Occupancy

84

2.1 First Occupancy as Grounds for Sovereignty

84

2.2 Grounds for Determining the Location of a People's Self-determination

86

3.

88

The Right to Formative Territories

3.1 Grounds for Territorial Sovereignty

88

3.2 Grounds for Determining the Site of Self-determination

92

J.

Introduction. Two Conceptions of Historical Rights

The people of Sparta submitted various petitions to Emperor Tiberius during the first few decades of the Common Era demanding the return of Messene to their possession. They had lost it to the Thebans some centuries earlier (in 371 BC). The Spartans regarded Messene as part of their fatherland. When they lost Messene, their crown prince Archidamus bewailed it, equating its loss with the loss of Sparta itself. This sounds familiar and totally contemporary. Many or perhaps most of the territorial disputes in the last two centuries revolve around similar demands. The Serb demands to hold on to the Albanian-populated Kosovo is the most recent example. One or both parties to these territorial disputes base their claim on what they usually call their "historical rights" to the territory. Claims on the basis of "historical rights" are perhaps not confined to the realm of territory alone. Thus, for example, Melina Mercury, Greece's Minister of Culture in the 1970s, demanded the return of the Acropolis treasures from the British Museum on the basis of similar arguments. 1

2

When political philosophers refer to historical rights they have in mind such rights as A's right to a piece of land because he was first to occupy and cultivate it, or because he

1 2

See Tacitus, The Annals of Imperial Rome, ch. 4 3 . "I should feel disgraced [...] if I did not strive with all the strength that is in me to prevent this territory, which our fathers left to us, from becoming the possession of our slaves [ . . . ] . To be sure, if we are in a mood not to defend our title to anything, not even if they demand that we abandon Sparta itself, it is idle to be concerned about Messene; but if not one of you would consent to live if torn from the fatherland, then you ought to be of the same mind about that country; for in both cases we can advance the same justifications and the same reasons for our claim." (Isocrates, Archidamus, ch. 8-11, 24). (I am grateful to Irad Malkin for pointing out this example to me.)

80

Chaim Gans 3

acquired it by means of a contract, or will or through matrimony. These rights are different from such rights as the right to freedom of speech, the right to a minimum wage, or the right to privacy. The latter can be said to be ahistorical. Their holders acquire them by virtue of belonging to general categories, such as being human or adult citizens, and not by virtue of particular events with which they are specifically associated. The rights of the former type are "historical" because their holders acquire them by virtue of specific events that occurred at particular points in time. In this very broad sense of the term, whatever takes place in time is "historical". Thus, every sneeze and hiccup could be considered historical. However, the term "historical" is usually used in more narrow contexts. It does not denote each and every event occurring in time, but rather those events that we perceive as significant. For example, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo on a summer moming in 1914 is regarded as an event worthy of being called "historical", in contrast, for example, to the fact that the Archduke brushed his teeth the same morning. The historical rights to be discussed here - those that are used in nationalist disputes mainly in order to justify territorial claims - are "historical" in this narrow sense; that is, they are historical by virtue of being acquired through significant events (or series of events). In public and academic political discourse, the notion of historical rights in this narrower sense oscillates between two conceptions. One conception focuses on the primacy of the national group in the history of the territory over which it demands sovereignty, while the other conception focuses on the primacy of that territory in the history of the national group demanding the sovereignty. 4

5

According to the first conception, the fact that a national group was first to occupy a disputed territory (at least in relation to existing national groups), is conceived within modern nationalist disputes (and perhaps not only modern disputes) as a crucial link in the history of that territory for the purpose of determining sovereignty over it. On the basis of such a claim, Thomas Masaryk tried to convince the leaders of the countries that won World War I to include the Sudeten district, then mostly inhabited by Germans, within the Czechoslovakian republic. Masaryk referred to Czechoslovakia's right to sovereignty in the Sudeten district as a historical right, as it was the first in a succession of sovereigns in that area. This conception of historical.rights, a "first occupancy conception", is also implicit in Iraq's demand for Kuwait and in that of the Iranians for 0

7

3 4 5 6

7

The tradition of calling such rights "historical" has developed since R. Nozick's book Anarchy, State and Utopia. Compare with the analogous distinction between special and general rights, H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?", 84. Philosophers o f history call this "the problem of selection". S e e W.H. Dray, Philosophy of History, 37f. Without taking sides in the dispute regarding whether or not, and to what extent nationalism is a modern phenomenon, it should be noted that territorial conflicts in which national or quasi-national groups invoke their primacy in the disputed territory are not entirely modern. The Spartans' complaint to Tiberius mentioned earlier is not the only example. A very similar story appears in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 9 1 , 1). It is about a dispute between the Israelites and Canaanites which was brought before Alexander the Great. The Canaanites argued that they had lived in Canaan before the Israelites and supported their claim with evidence from the Torah according to which the land of Canaan was promised to the Israelites. ("Command the children of Israel, and say unto them, When ye c o m e into the land of Canaan (this is the land that shall fall unto you for an inheritance, even the land of Canaan according to the borders thereof.)" (Numbers 34:1)). By calling it the land of Canaan, the Torah in fact admits that the Canaanites had indeed inhabited the land before the Jews. The Canaanites should therefore own it. T.G. Masaryk, The Making of a State, 385f.

Historical Rights

81

some of the islands of Abu Musa from the United Arab Emirates. The same conception figures in the Tamil-Sinhalese dispute over Sri Lanka, the Jewish-Palestinian dispute over Palestine, and the territorial demands which Native Americans, New-Zealandcrs and Australians have made against the European populations of their countries. The great appeal of this argument in disputes between nations is sometimes demonstrated by the fact that the parties that seem to be the underdogs in these disputes do not try to deny the validity of this argument. What they do instead is construct a genealogy that supposedly demonstrates their kinship ties to extinct peoples who had occupied the disputed territories before their rivals. They thus win the argument by themselves becoming the first occupants. For example, among the peoples that exist today, the Hungarians were the first to maintain organized settlements in Transylvania. Romanians try to prove that they were the first by claiming to be descendants of the Romans who conquered Dacia (of which Transylvania is a part), in the Second Century A D . Since among the peoples that exist today, the Jews were the first to maintain an organized settlement in Canaan, that is, Eretz Yisrael or Palestine, the Palestinians have tried to prove they were the first occupants by claiming to have descended from the Canaanites, who had occupied the land before the ancient Hebrews." According to the second conception, the fact that the disputed territory is of primary importance in forming the historical identity of the group, is considered as strong enough reason for purposes of determining sovereignty over it. Israel's declaration of independence clearly expresses this conception. It states that it was in Eretz Yisrael that "the Jewish people came into being", and that it was there that "the people's spiritual, religious and political image was forged", where "it lived a life of sovereign independence, in which it created national and universal cultural treasures". "Bearing this historical tie", the declaration goes on to say, "the Jews of every generation have striven to return and re-embrace their ancient homeland." These passages express a view according to which the experiences which the Jews underwent in Palestine were formative in their becoming a nation. This is why they strive now to return to Palestine. As implied here, the Jews have an historical right to Eretz Yisrael, not because they were the first among contemporary peoples to occupy it, but rather because it was of primary importance in forming their identity as an historical entity. 9

10

The second conception of historical rights shifts the emphasis from a people's primacy in a given territory to the primacy of this territory for a given people. One result of this shift is that the primacy considered relevant is mainly value-based rather than chronological. Moreover, according to the first occupancy conception, the normative importance of the entitling fact is based upon its chronological primacy, while within the second conception which could be called "the formative territories conception", the chronological primacy is based on the normative importance of the territory. Because the territory is of primary importance in the formation of the group, it is also the first territory in the chronological sense in which the group as such ever existed. 8 9

10 11

See F. Mehr, A Colonial Legacy. On the demands o f the aboriginal peoples against the settlers' nations s e e for example: D . Lyons, ' T h e N e w Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land"; J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice"; J.A. Simmons, "Historical Rights and Fair Shares"; M. Moore, "The Territorial Dimension o f Self-determination"; A. Sharp, Justice and the Maori; R. Poole, Nation and Identity; D. Ivison, P. Patton and W. Sanders, Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. See N. Stoicescu, The Continuity of the Romanian People. Few years ago an Israeli daily published a news item with the following title: "Palestinian Archeologists: We have uncovered Canaanite buildings from 3 0 0 0 B.C., which confirms our historical right to Palestine." (Ha'aretz, 4 August 1998.)

82

Chaim Gans

Both conceptions of historical rights, namely, that of "first occupancy" and that of the "right to formative territories", involve problems that pertain to the criteria to be used in order to apply each of their key concepts. That is, with regard to first occupancy, when can a people be said to "occupy" a territory? Can a people occupy a territory that lies beyond the area actually inhabited by its members? Similar problems are raised by the notion of historical rights as rights to formative territories. When can a territory or an object justly be said to be "of formative value" to the historical identity of a given people? Should we adopt objective and uniform criteria for answering the above questions? Or should we ascribe some importance to the subjective feelings of the people whose right is in question, provided that there is documentation of these feelings? I believe these difficulties can somehow be resolved, but do not wish to elaborate on them here. The more significant problems concerning historical rights do not pertain to how the conceptions of occupancy and formativeness should be applied, but rather to the normative status of these conceptions. Does the fact that a given people were the first to occupy a certain territory, or that the territory is of formative value for a given people indeed justify granting this people sovereignty over this territory and/or the right to demographic and cultural presence there? In answering this question, the significance of claiming a right to sovereignty must be borne in mind. A right to sovereignty over a given territory means a power to subject the whole world to the right-holder's decisions regarding life within this territory and to his or her decisions regarding the use and enjoyment of this territory and the resources which it contains. To sustain such significant consequences, a claim to such a right must be backed by powerful considerations. In what follows I will examine what considerations regarding vital needs and interests of the people concerned could be linked to first occupancy and formativeness respectively. However, my discussion requires two further distinctions. The first distinction pertains to whether first occupancy and formativeness could justify acquisition of territorial rights within the framework of distributive justice, as opposed to whether they could justify restitution of territorial rights within the framework of corrective justice. When national groups nowadays invoke historical rights in order to justify territorial claims they usually do so in order to demand the restitution of territorial rights. However, it must be noted that such demands for restitution are inconceivable if the historical rights under consideration did not also justify rights of acquisition in the first place. If the demand to restore the sovereignty of a given nation in a given territory is based either on first occupancy or on a formative tie, then it necessarily presupposes that this occupancy and formative tie were also grounds for its sovereignty over the territory in question before the physical tie with that territory was lost. Only if this presup12

13

14

12

13

14

With regard to this point, Rousseau scoffed at the practice of fifteenth and sixteenth-century European discoverers to stake a claim to the places they reached by sounding declarations in ceremonies held for this purpose. S e e J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, ch. 9. Answering these normative questions is my main concern in this article. However, this should not conceal the fact that national movements invoke claims of historical rights as mobilizing tools and that their efficiency as such deserves a separate discussion. It should be noted that such claims usually sustain popular participation in national movements only to the extent that they are supported by expectations of concrete gains or losses. Moreover, it also should be noted that claims to sovereignty over territories have more often been recognized not as a result o f acknowledging their moral justifiability, but rather because of victory in war or international treaties that support a particular balance of power. Thus, territorial sovereignty seems to be more than ownership. On the need to distinguish between the two see L. Brilmayer, "Consent, Contract and Territory", 15.

Historical Rights

83

position is indeed valid, that is, only if the historical rights under discussion here constitute primary rights of acquisition within distributive justice, can the loss of the physical tie with the territory be considered a wrong which must be remitted by returning the territory to the possession and sovereignty of the group that has lost it. The distinction between the role of historical rights as grounds for acquisition within distributive justice, and the role of historical rights as grounds for restitution within corrective justice is important in practice not only because their validity as rights of distributive justice is a necessary condition for their ability to play a role within corrective justice, but also because this validity is merely a necessary condition. As we shall see below, historical rights as grounds for acquisition do not constitute a sufficient condition for restitution. Especially for reasons associated with limitation, prescription and adverse possession, the fact that historical rights may play a certain role within the context of distributive justice, does not automatically justify granting them a similar role within the context of corrective justice, especially not for purposes of restitution. 15

The second distinction that my discussion requires is between the right to territorial sovereignty and, on the other hand, how the location of territorial sovereignty is to be determined. The need to make this distinction stems from the fact that peoples' right to territorial sovereignty could be based on ahistorical considerations such as their right to self-determination and independent statehood. National groups could be entitled to independent statehood and therefore to territorial sovereignty simply by virtue of being national groups and not by virtue of particular events with which they may specifically be associated. If national groups have a right to territorial sovereignty, then in order to exercise it, questions concerning the location of the territories to be under their sovereignty must first be resolved. First occupancy and formativeness could serve as bases for resolving the issue of location even if they cannot serve as bases for the very right to territorial sovereignty. However, it must be noted that considerations for determining the location of sovereignty do not necessarily apply to the scope of this sovereignty. The scope of this sovereignty could perhaps be determined by the size of the groups, their lifestyles and other factors. Thus, it could be the case that the territorial sovereignty of a given national group (the specific location of which is determined either by first occupancy or formativeness) would extend only over part of the territory which was first occupied by that group or with which this group has formative ties. It need not necessarily extend over the entire territory. Hence the practical importance of the present distinction. In the second section below, I shall discuss the possibility that historical rights in their first conception - that of first occupancy - could form a basis for the right to terri15

It must be stressed that the existence of corrective/remedial rights in the realms o f sovereignly and property, though they are necessarily historical (for people have them by virtue o f events with which they are specifically connected), does not entail the existence o f distributive/primary historical rights. John S i m m o n s seems to believe otherwise. According to him, since our moral and legal practices take historical rights of rectification very seriously, w e need also take historical rights in acquisition seriously ( S e e J.A. Simmons, "Historical Rights and Fair Shares", 156). However, it seems to me that this conclusion is misconceived. One may take rectification rights seriously, as legal and moral practices in fact do. Yet this does not entail that the primary rights themselves are historical. It is possible for a person to have been the owner of a piece of property not necessarily because he was the first to occupy it or because he had a formative tie with it, but because like e v e ryone else, he is entitled to a piece of property for one reason or another. If one believes that X ought to compensate Y for a piece o f land of which he dispossessed him, one need not necessarily believe that Y ' s original title to this piece was based necessarily on Y ' s first occupancy of it, or his formative tie with it. On the relationship between distributive and corrective historical rights see also note 35 below.

84

Chaim Gans

tonal sovereignty. In the third section, I shall discuss the possibility that historical rights in their second conception - that of formative ties - could form such a basis. The first conception (first occupancy) has been discussed extensively in the legal and philosophical literature dealing with the right to private property. Within this literature, first occupancy has been a dead horse for a long time. This issue should perhaps be invoked again in the context of national disputes because it is frequently used by nationalists. In any case, it might help clarify the role played by historical rights in national disputes when they are conceived as rights to formative territories. In the next section, after rejecting first occupancy as a basis for the very right to territorial sovereignty, I shall argue that it can serve as a basis for the right to determine the site of sovereignty for purposes of acquisition, but not for purposes of restitution. In section 3 I shall argue that formative ties could also not serve as a basis for the very right to sovereignty. However, formative ties could serve as a basis for determining the site of national self-determination, sometimes not only with regard to the original acquisition and preservation of that site, but also in order to restitute physical ties with it.

2. 2.1

First

Occupancy

First Occupancy as Grounds for

Sovereignty

According to Raz, to have a right means to have an interest that justifies imposing a duty or duties on others. If we accept this definition, then it follows that a nation's first occupancy of a given territory justifies its sovereignty over it if it has interests in it (due to the fact that it was its first occupant) that justify imposing the duties that correspond to sovereignty rights on the whole world. It is clear that neither the interest that national groups have in their own continuous survival, nor their interests in self-determination (such as the interest in cultural preservation, or the interest in determining their own destiny), necessarily require their sovereignty over the territories in which they were the first occupants. With regard to the interest in continuous survival, national groups could also survive without any sovereignty rights. This, in fact, has been the case for many national groups. The survival of national groups certainly does not depend on gaining sovereignty over the specific territories that they were first to occupy. As for the interests in self-determination, it is widely believed that the fulfillment of these interests usually requires territorial sovereignty. I shall argue below that self-determination is, indeed, typically connected with the specific territories that have acquired primacy in the nation's history. However, it is not clear why self-determination has anything to do with first occupancy in any specific territory. The interests which national groups have in self-determination do not seem to derive from the fact that they were first to occupy a given territory. Nor does it seem that the satisfaction of these interests depends on the territories that they were first to occupy. 16

If first occupancy plays any special role whatsoever, that is, if it constitutes a source of any human interest, then this interest must in some way be related to the expectations held by the first occupants with regard to the territories they occupied. David Hume was of the opinion that first occupants of a territory would eventually develop expectations to continue occupying this territory for a prolonged period. Perhaps first occupants 17

16 17

See J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, ch. 7. See Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, ch. 2, sect. 3. See also J. Bentham, "Principles of the Civil Code"; J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, 286.

Historical Rights

85

may develop such expectations because they did not evict anyone from the territories in which they were first occupants. However, most nations existing today, including those who resort to historical rights, cannot seriously claim that they are first occupants in this sense (except, perhaps, for some of the aboriginal peoples of North America, Australia and New Zealand). At most they can claim that they are first relative to all other nations that exist today. They therefore expect that none of the latter should object to their occupation for reasons related to a common past. However, could such expectations serve as a basis for sovereignty rights? It seems that the answer to this question must be negative not only with regard to occupants whose occupancy is first relative to all other nations that exist today, but also with regard to occupants whose primacy is absolute. If absolute first occupants still occupy the territories in which they were the first occupants, then they could at most assume that it is prima facie undesirable to push them out of these territories by resorting to violent or fraudulent means. Those who are first occupants only in the relative sense could assume, ex hypothesis, that no existing nation could resort to grievances pertaining to a common past in order to justify evicting them. However, this does not justify sovereignty rights, since sovereignty means a right to govern the territory even if others are currently occupying it. The duties corresponding to this right involve the risk of losing sources of livelihood as well as the conditions necessary for freedom. It seems unlikely that the expectations of absolute first occupants, and especially the expectations of those whose occupancy is first only relative to other existing nations, could be important enough to justify endangering such urgent interests. Rousseau stated this point clearly. "How can one man or a whole people take possession of vast territories, thereby excluding the rest of the world from their enjoyment, save by an act of criminal usurpation, since, as the result of such an act, the rest of humanity is deprived of the amenities for dwelling and subsistence which nature has provided for their common enjoyment?" 19

20

21

The above quote from Rousseau contains two points. One pertains to the intensity of the sacrifice entailed by the duties corresponding to sovereignty rights. The other concerns the inequality resulting from the imposition of these duties. Rousseau deals with the possibility of obtaining sovereignty by virtue of first occupancy, without specifying the interest which is to be protected by granting sovereignty to first occupants. However, it seems safe to believe that his arguments and conclusion apply if the interest in question is the first occupant's interest that his expectations be respected. People develop various sorts of expectations and might have an interest that their expectations be 18

It is likely that only s o m e of these groups could claim absolute primacy in these territories. S e e W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 2 2 0 . R o s s Poole argues that the Australian aborigines have lived there for 6 0 , 0 0 0 years. "In terms of any conceivable human experience o f time, the Aborigines have been in Australia forever." (R. Poole, Nation and Identity, 129). S e e also M. Moore, ' T h e Territorial Dimension of Self-determination", 143.

19

According to the Talmudic source cited in note 6 above, the Jews who presented their dispute with the Canaanites to Alexander acknowledged the fact that they were not really the first occupants in Canaan. T o overcome this difficulty, they quoted the biblical curse according to which the Canaanites were doomed to be slaves. ("Cursed be Canaan; A servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren" (Genesis 9, 25)). They then argued that slaves could not o w n property. Again, this is similar to the Spartan-Messenian case. The Spartans acknowledged the fact that they were not the first occupants o f Messene, but claimed sovereignty over it since they regarded its original occupants to be their slaves. This is explicitly stated by Archidamus quoted in note 2 above.

20

These points are similar to those cited by Waldron from Kant and others with regard first occupancy as a basis for the right to private property. See J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, 267f. J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, ch. 9.

21

86

Chaim Gans

respected. However, whether these expectations could serve as a basis for rights depends on the price others would have to pay for respecting these rights. In our case it seems quite obvious that first occupancy cannot serve as a basis for acquiring sovereignty. Many of those who use the historical rights argument in the first occupancy sense tend to speak of first occupancy without adding elements which play a central role in what is held to be the best philosophical version of the original acquisition argument for private property, namely, that proposed by John Locke. Locke insisted not merely on first occupancy, but on first cultivation of what beforehand had been common property. One might want to believe that the first occupancy argument for sovereignty could be rescued if it were stated in terms of Locke's original acquisition argument for private property. However, this would not save the argument. Rousseau's objections against first occupancy regarding the magnitude of the burdens imposed by acknowledging first occupancy as grounds for sovereignty, and the inequality entailed by such recognition also apply to original acquisition by labor and cultivation. The purpose of the above arguments is to deny the possibility of granting sovereignty to first occupants who still occupy the territories over which they claim sovereignty. According to these arguments, first occupancy cannot be a basis for acquiring and preserving sovereignty within the framework of distributive justice. However, as noted above, the national groups that usually resort to arguments based on historical rights are national groups that lost their occupancy many generations ago and wish to restore it. They do not demand the preservation of the status quo, but rather the restitution of a previous state of affairs. If the wisdom inherent in Rousseau's dictum is sufficient for denying sovereignty to first occupants who still occupy the territory in question, then, a fortiori, it must be sufficient for denying sovereignty to first occupants who have lost their occupancy. From this it does not follow that a possession fraudulently or violently usurped in recent times need not be returned to its former possessor. However, what the perpetrator could grant the victim is that the victim repossess the property. If the arguments which claim that first occupancy in a territory cannot justify sovereignty over it in the first place are sound, then first occupancy cannot justify sovereignty merely because the occupant had been dispossessed and was later reinstated. 22

2.2

Grounds for Determining the Location of a People's

Self-determination

Thus, first occupancy cannot serve as grounds for territorial sovereignty. However, if a general right of nations to territorial sovereignty could be justified by ahistorical considerations such as their interests in self-determination, should first occupancy serve as the basis for resolving the issue of determining the site of this sovereignty? I would like to argue that it could in principle serve as such a basis, since merely determining the location of a given people's sovereignty does not involve imposing on others the type of concessions that derive from the duties and liabilities corresponding to sovereignty rights. Given the scarcity of resources and space in the world, grounding sovereignty

22

Jeremy Waldron has convincingly shown this in detail with regard to private property and with regard to all possible sorts of unilateral acquisition, not only with regard to first occupancy. He formulated Rousseau's arguments in terms of contractarian political morality. Waldron also has demonstrated how the standard method by which adherents o f original acquisition theories of property attempt to avoid the present criticism, namely, modifying it by a Lockian Proviso, is bound to fail. See J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, ch. 7.

Historical

Rights

87

rights on first occupancy may, as shown above, endanger the livelihood and autonomy of many people. However, no such danger is involved if first occupancy only serves as grounds for determining the location of sovereignty. People will only have to pay the price of being excluded from specific areas. These areas would not be any larger than those from which they would in any case be excluded, if the territorial rights accompanying self-determination were justly distributed among national groups. Furthermore, unlike the expectations of first occupants that they be granted sovereignty, their expectation that first occupancy should serve to determine the site where their territorial rights are to be realized is justifiable. This is so since the issue of the site for the realization of such rights, as opposed to, for example, the issue of the scope of these territories, can only be resolved by methods of pure procedural justice such as flipping a coin. There are no independent substantive criteria for determining this issue. Since chance is involved here, why not resort to historical chance, that is, to the fact that certain peoples happened to occupy certain regions before others did? Why is flipping a coin any better for that purpose than historical chance? In order to see that this is indeed the situation, it is sufficient to imagine a kind of original position with a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. What people know is that they belong to a certain people and that this people is located in a certain territory. However, they don't know which people they belong to and which territory it occupies. Would they opt for flipping a coin or for staying put? The risk of moving to worse places due to flipping the coin is equal to the risk of being in a bad spot due to staying put. Consequently, they are likely to choose the latter. Moreover, the criterion of first occupancy provides the simplest, most convenient and most economical procedure for solving the problem of determining the site of the territorial sovereignty (or lesser territorial rights accompanying self-determination) of various peoples. Any other procedure would entail the relocation of peoples, which would be costly and would involve extreme discomfort. The expectation of the first occupants of a territory that their occupancy should serve as grounds for locating their territorial rights are thus sound, and can serve as grounds for determining the site of these rights. 23

24

All this, however, if it indeed proves to be correct, applies only when the first occupant is also the present occupant. First occupancy could serve as a basis for determining the site of sovereignty for the purpose of acquiring and preserving it. If a certain people was the first occupant of a given territory but lost its physical tie with it, then considerations of convenience and economy can no longer be invoked to justify the location of this peoples' self-determination in that particular territory. To the contrary, these considerations now favor determining the territory in question as the site for the current occupants' self-determination. Of course, this is subject to the condition that the later occupant did not attain occupancy through morally objectionable means. If this occupancy was attained through such means then, firstly, it would not be supported by one of the reasons cited above as supporting the current occupancy as grounds for determining the location of sovereignty, i.e.: historical coincidence as preferable to flipping a coin, for the occupancy is not a result of a morally neutral coincidence. Secondly, there would be reasons for not allowing the present occupant to enjoy the occupancy since it was attained through violence. However, if the later occupancies are not associated with such moral wrongs, or if they are associated with ancient wrongs that are subject to prescrip-

23 24

On the concept of pure procedural justice see J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 86. Such substantive criteria could, for example, be different peoples' taking turns in occupying given territories. However, this of course is impractical.

88

Chaim Gans

tion, then these later occupancies rather than the first occupancy are supported by the reasons presented above as favoring first occupancy. Hence, in cases of restoring a previous state of affairs, first occupancy does not only fail to provide a basis for territorial sovereignty, but also fails to justify a more limited potential right, namely, a right to determine the site of territorial sovereignty. This is significant in view of the fact that historical rights are most often employed to demand the restitution of old regimes, not the preservation of existing ones. As we shall see below, the alternative construal of historical rights as rights to formative territories may constitute a better basis for the restitution of sites for sovereignty, a basis which may be of practical significance in at least some cases.

3. 3.1

The Right to Formative

Territories

Grounds for Territorial

Sovereignty

Unlike the above interpretation of historical rights, if historical rights are interpreted as rights to formative territories, it is not difficult to identify interests that these rights are meant to protect. Attempts to identify such interests are far less unnatural than my above efforts to extricate a particular interest that is to be protected by historical rights in their first occupancy conception. If the events thought to have formed the historical identity of a national group took place in specific territories, it seems likely that these territories would be perceived by the members of that group as bearing deep and significant ties to their national identity. A natural analogy which would explain the ties between peoples and their formative territories is that of the ties between individuals and their parents. Many languages have a term for the concept of "fatherland". This concept represents an abstraction of territories common in many cultures, and is consistent with the above analogy. If we appeal to this analogy, then the claim that national groups possess some important interests in their formative territories is in need of no elaborate proof. Providing evidence for the existence of such an interest is much like attempting to prove that the tie between children and their parents forms a source of special interests. The existence of such interests would seem to be clear and self-evident, requiring no proof. However, while no evidence is necessary for the existence of these interests, the normative implications that they entail do require some elaboration. The interest in formative territories which the parental ties analogy represents is the desire to be in close physical proximity to one's loved ones, that is, not to be separated from them or to spend one's life in a state of pining. The crucial question is whether the force of these interests renders them solid grounds for sovereignty rights, which, as noted above, imply the power to subject the whole world to the right-holder's decisions regarding the regulation of life within the territory over which he/she is the sovereign and to his/her decisions regarding the use and enjoyment of this territory. In order to 25

26

25

See the quote from Archidamus in note 2, above. The notion of fatherland was common not only in ancient European civilization (on this see, for example, M. Viroli, For Love of Country, 18), but also in the pre-European American world. "In 1761," says Tully "the Chippewa leader Minivavana enlightened the English trader Alexander Harvey at Michilimackinace in the following typical manner: 'Englishman, although you have conquered the French, you have not yet conquered us. We are not your slaves. These lakes, these woods and mountains, were left to us by our ancestors. They are our inheritances: and w e will part with them to none.' " (J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 119).

26

On this abstraction see A . D . Smith, "States and Homelands", 196f. S e e also A.D. Smith, National Identity; L.K.D. Kristof, "The State-Idea, The National Idea and the Image o f the Fatherland".

Historical Rights

89

answer this question I would like to return here to the example of Melina Mercury's demand that the British restore the treasures of the Acropolis to Greece. A comparison between this case and historical rights as grounds for territorial sovereignty may serve to provide a comparative perspective. The interest that the British have in the prestige of their museums would seem to constitute a rather weak rival to the historical interest that the Greeks have in the treasures of the Acropolis. It would seem that the latter could rather easily override the former. However, can the interest national groups have in their formative territories also easily override its rivals, namely, people's interests in their livelihood and freedom? The interest in formative territories is certainly a much more serious candidate for overriding the interests in livelihood and freedom than the interests underlying first occupancy claims. This is so not only because it is a more real and powerful interest, but also because acknowledging it as a basis for sovereignty does not endanger the interests that others might have "in dwelling and subsistence" to the same extent that acknowledging first occupancy does. The reason for this is that the process in which formative relations are formed between a territory and a national group is a relatively slow and long process whereas first occupancy can be acquired instantly. The danger of the sort to which Rousseau was referring, namely, the danger of depriving people of the "amenities for dwelling and subsistence", seems much less threatening when one acknowledges formative links between nations and territories as a basis for sovereignty, than when one recognizes first occupancy as such a basis. However, dangers smaller than other dangers could nevertheless be serious. Since national entities are dynamic in their nature, since new ones are continually formed and old ones expand or shrink, the danger under consideration is far from negligible. It therefore seems to me that it is dangerous to acknowledge the interest national groups have in their formative territories as a basis for territorial sovereignty. The last two centuries provide ample examples as to why this is so. We must here discern various types of cases. The first type consists of national groups whose sovereignty actually extends over their formative territories. However, some of those territories are vacant and could serve the basic needs of some other community. The second type consists of national groups whose sovereignty actually extends over their formative territories. Yet, some of these territories are actually inhabited by another group and serve its members' basic needs. The third type includes groups whose sovereignty actually extends over their formative territories, while the population of some of those territories is not homogeneous in its nationality. Cases of national groups who have no sovereignty whatsoever but have formative ties with vacant territories which are under the sovereignty of others form the fourth type. The fifth category comprises national groups that have no sovereignty, but have formative ties with territories that are inhabited and ruled by others. Most of these are of course abstractions from concrete examples, some of which I mentioned earlier. Should the Serbs hold on to their sovereignty over Kosovo with which they claim to have formative ties, despite the fact that its population is mostly Albanian? Should Transylvania be under Hungarian or Romanian sovereignty? Should the fact that the native minorities of North America do not enjoy sovereignty in any way determine whether their formative ties to territories there could serve as a basis for sovereignty rights over some of these territories, at least those which are vacant? Should the fact that the Jewish people did not enjoy sovereignty determine whether its formative ties to Eretz Yisrael could serve as a basis for sovereignty rights in those territories, even if those territories were populated? These cases demonstrate that, given the world's scarce territorial resources, the question of the territorial sovereignty of particular national groups can hardly ever be

90

Chaim Gans

determined only on the basis of their formative ties with certain territories. The first two types of cases show that a formative tie can probably not be the basis for sovereignty even from the point of view of distributive justice and for the purposes of acquiring sovereignty and retaining it. The first case is of the type in which a group has sovereignty over its formative territories some of which are vacant. These vacant territories are required in order to satisfy the basic needs of other populations which do not actually reside there. Recognizing a formative tie as the basis for sovereignty in cases like this means, in the name of this tie, allowing one group to ignore the most urgent material interests of another group, namely, their interests in "amenities for dwelling and subsistence." This is so because sovereignty over a territory includes the authority to refuse any sort of use by other parties. (This does not, of course, entail the conclusion that in every case in which one party's sovereignty allows it to ignore the basic needs of another, the sovereignty of the former party is nullified. All that is claimed here is that formative ties cannot be sufficient grounds in and of themselves for justifying the creation of such situations.) The second case is that of groups exercising sovereignty over their formative territories, some of which are inhabited by other groups. To regard the formative tie as a basis for sovereignty in such cases would in effect mean to deny the interests of the other groups in self-government, since sovereignty over a territory also includes political rule over its population. Some typical contenders for historical rights in cases of the present type try to circumvent the fact that their position implies the denial of other peoples' rights to self-government, by expressing a willingness to grant certain limited governance prerogatives to the populations of the territories over which they continue to assert their dominance. The Serbs are currently being forced to make such an offer to the Albanians of Kosovo. In the last decade, Israel has been under pressure to make such an offer to the Arabs living in the West Bank. (Israel still refuses to grant the same rights to the Arabs living in East Jerusalem). We must bear in mind that this sort of attempt at circumvention cannot succeed, because what is offered are limited governance rights that would perpetuate the political inferiority of the populations in question. It should be noted that it is not logically possible to offer more than such limited governance rights while simultaneously endorsing the position that the formative ties form a sufficient basis for sovereignty rights. To offer the other group more in effect means to offer it either sovereignty or joint sovereignty. In either case, the first group's sovereignty or at least it's exclusive sovereignty is forfeited. Cases where historical rights are used to justify demands to restore a prior state of affairs are, of course, more problematic, at least with regard to demands by national groups to return and resume their sovereignty over currently inhabited territories as well as their presence in these territories. There are three reasons why this is more problematic. The most significant of these reasons is the danger of uprooting the territory's present inhabitants and turning them into refugees. How substantial this danger may be depends, of course, on the density of the population of this territory, the size of the returning population, the relations that develop between them, the relative political and military strength of these groups as well as other factors. Despite the fact that such dangers may not actually be realized, we may deduce from history that these dangers may indeed be significant. The second reason for rejecting formative ties as grounds for restoring former sovereignties over populated territories is that doing so means denying the rights of the current populations of these territories to self-government. I clarified this point earlier when discussing the possibility of viewing historical rights as grounds for acquiring and/or perpetuating sovereignties over territories populated by other national groups. The third argument against recognizing formative ties as grounds for re-

Historical Rights

91

storing old sovereignties over populated territories is that such recognition sometimes entails ignoring the formative ties that the present inhabitants have with the territory. It should be remembered that specific territories could play a formative role in the historical identity of more than one national group. Take for example the Maori and Pakeha in Aotearoa/New Zealand, or the Jews and Palestinians in Eretz-Yisrael/Palestine. To acknowledge only the formative role of Aotearoa in the Maori identity means to ignore the formative role New Zealand plays in the Pakeha identity. To acknowledge only the formative role that Eretz-Yisrael has in Jewish identity means to ignore the formative role of Palestine in the Palestinian identity. 27

Incidentally, it should be noted that this fact, namely, that specific territories do sometimes play a formative role in the historical identity of more than one national group, is the major disadvantage of historical rights arguments when understood under the formative territories conception, compared to the first occupancy conception. Unlike the latter conception, the formative territories conception of historical rights does not imply that the right in question is necessarily an exclusive one. This point should be emphasized as it reveals the elusive ambiguity of the notion of historical rights. If a territorial right is historical due to the primacy of the people in the history of the territory, then this people is the exclusive possessor of this right. This is so because (notwithstanding the difficulties concerning the individuation of territories), it is unlikely that more than one people was the first in the history of a given territory. Conversely, if the right is historical due to the primacy of the territory in the history of the people, this does not necessarily mean that the people in question is the exclusive possessor of such a right. A single territory could obviously be primary in the history of more than one people. In addition to the aforementioned examples of Palestine/Eretz-Yisrael for the Palestinians and the Jews, and New-Zealand/Aotearoa for the Pakeha and Maori, one might also cite Transylvania for Romanians and Hungarians, Sri Lanka for the Tamil and Sinhalese, Kosovo for the Serbs and Albanians, as well as many other cases. All this makes the ambiguity of the notion of historical rights a potential source for political self-deception or malicious manipulation. Those who most frequently resort to historical rights in order to claim sovereignty prefer (even if inadvertently) to oscillate between its two meanings, thus enjoying the best of both worlds. On the one hand, they seek the exclusivity attached to historical rights in the first occupancy conception. On the other hand, they wish to take advantage of the considerable normative power of historical rights when construed as rights to formative possessions. However, if historical rights are first occupancy rights, then they do indeed belong exclusively to one group but they are also, as shown earlier, normatively void for purposes of corrective justice and restitution. On the other hand, if historical rights are rights to formative possessions, then they do have a ceitain normative weight but they are not necessarily exclusive. The formative ties of the nation occupying the territory compete with the formative ties of the nation demanding restitution. Allowing restitution would mean ignoring the ties of the occupying nation. 28

Let me return to the main discussion. As I noted earlier, questions of territorial sovereignty must mainly be decided by considering interests more urgent than people's in27 28

See O. O'Neill, "Justice and Boundaries", 77. The proviso concerning problems of individuating territories is important, for a people can claim to be the first occupant of a territory which it conceives as one individuated territory, while another people can claim to be first occupant on part of that territory, and regard this specific part as a separate territory. For example, the Sinhalese claim to be the first occupants of Sri Lanka, while the Tamil claim to be the first occupants of the northern part of the island.

92

Chaim Gans

terest in not being cut off from the territories from which their national groups originated. Such interests are, firstly, their interest in "amenities for dwelling and subsistence" and then their interest in self-government. Given the limited territorial resources of the world, as well as its demographics, these interests do not allow much leeway for people's interests in their formative territories to serve as grounds for sovereignty rights. But does this imply that the fact that certain territories constitute formative territories for a given nation is normatively meaningless? I will now try to answer this question negatively. I will try to show that if considerations of self-determination can indeed serve as justification for granting territorial rights to national groups, then historical rights as rights to formative territories ought to play a role in determining the location of these rights. This would pertain to the acquisition of such rights, the preservation of such rights as well as, in some cases, for purposes of restitution.

3.2

Grounds for Determining the Site of

Self-determination

The distinction between justifying territorial rights and determining their site was explained in my earlier discussion of historical rights as first occupancy rights. I shall adhere to the assumption I made there, namely, that peoples have territorial rights and that these are derivatives of the right to national self-determination. This justification for territorial rights does not address the question of determining the location where these rights should be realized. I would like to argue that if first occupancy can sometimes serve as grounds for resolving the issue of location for purposes of acquiring territorial rights, then, a fortiori, the formative links that a given people might have to a particular territory could also serve as such grounds. As noted above, the fact that a given group was the first to occupy a particular territory can serve as grounds for determining the location of this group's self-determination in that territory. This is so because the burdens that this will impose on others do not involve the type of sacrifices required by the duties corresponding to the actual right to territorial sovereignty. Determining the site of sovereignties, does not necessarily entail that sovereignty applies to all of the historical territories. Consequently, the burdens involved do not include the possibility that people may have to risk their interests in "amenities for dwelling and subsistence". They only involve the risk that people will have to abstain from realizing these interests in certain territories, that is, in the territories where others have attained realization of their own right to sovereignty. (However, they will have to abstain not from areas any larger than those from which they would in any case be excluded, if sovereignty rights are justly distributed among national groups.) If these sacrifices are considered acceptable in relation to first occupancy, then it is all the more acceptable in relation to the interest of peoples and their members in their formative territories. For peoples and nationally conscious individuals, the interest in not being severed from their formative territories touches on emotions that are inextricably intertwined with their conception of their identities. The expectations and emotions that accompany this matter concern a much deeper human level than the expectations and emotions stirred in first occupants. As we have seen, the expectations of the latter type, if indeed sound, are sound by virtue of considerations of objective rationality which, from a personal point of view, are totally neutral. Just the opposite is true of the emotions and expectations regarding the interest in formative possessions. These are interests tied to some of the deepest layers of identity, both in their origin (the percep-

Historical Rights

93

tion of selfhood) and in the consequences which result from the deprivation of these needs (feelings of alienation and longing). Perhaps there is more to it than that. Given the centrality of historical territories in the formation of national identities, there seems to be an inherent link between these territories and the right to national self-determination. Unlike the case of first occupancy, the territories in question are not only suitable for determining the location of this right. They are territories that are essential for determining this location. This inherent link is implied in the considerations used by certain contemporary writers to account for the distinction they make between rights to self-government and polyethnic rights. According to these writers, self-government rights, which enable members of a national group to live their lives as fully as possible within their national culture, apply to national groups living in their homeland. Moreover, multicultural or polyethnic rights, according to which groups of common national origin may express their original culture while mainly living their lives outside that culture, apply in cases of national groups not living in their homeland. If living in the homeland may indeed be considered a criterion for the distinction between the cases in which self-government rights apply, and those in which polyethnic rights are warranted, then this presupposes that historical territories under their present conception are essential for the realization of self-determination. If living in the homeland were not a condition for exercising the right to self-determination, why would it then be improper to grant self-government rights in places where national groups have no formative ties, and to grant polyethnic rights in places where they do have such ties? The claim that formative territories are not merely suitable but also essential for the implementation of the right to self-determination also enjoys certain empirical support. History has shown that the chances for successfully implementing this right in territories to which national groups have no historical ties are very slim indeed. Experiments in this field are of course very rare. The only one known to me is the case of the Jewish people. The attempts to realize its right to self-determination outside its formative territories were failures; e.g., Britain's plan in East Africa (the "Uganda Plan"), and Stalin's attempt to establish Jewish autonomy in Birobidzhan. In contrast, the attempt to implement Jewish self-determination in territories to which Jews had historical connections did succeed. 9

30

The force with which the interest in formative territories provides grounds for determining the location of self-determination is not its only advantage over the grounds that first occupancy provides for this purpose. It has additional advantages. One of them is that the formative tie is not dependent on whether the group demanding to realize its sovereignty at that particular site was really the first occupant in this territory. As noted earlier, most national groups cannot seriously make territorial claims on the basis of historical rights if they mean to claim that they were first to appropriate and live in the territories in question. As stressed above, most groups demanding territories in the name of historical rights were first occupants only relative to other groups that exist today. Their occupancy was usually acquired by means of crimes committed by them against the previous occupants of the territories in question and by bringing about the physical or at least cultural and political destruction of the latter. Thus, it is not clear why this justifies sovereignty rights, or even rights to determine the location of sovereignty. The interpretation of historical rights as based not on the primacy of given national groups in the history of given territories but rather on the primacy of these territories in the histo29 30

See W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, mainly 2 6 - 3 1 . Raz distinguishes between these two sorts of rights without resorting to homelands (J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, ch. 6 and 8). See also A.D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, 219f.

94

Chaim Gans

ries of the groups in question does not involve this moral entanglement. It is not dependent on the question of whether the group invoking historical rights was really the first group to inhabit the territory, or on the means by which it became first relatively to other groups that exist today. However, the main advantage of historical rights as rights to formative territories is that they are a serious candidate for determining the location of self-determination not only for purposes of acquisition and perpetuating existing states of affairs, but also for purposes of restoring former states of affairs. As explained earlier, first occupancy cannot do this. It can provide grounds for determining the location of self-determination only for the purpose of acquiring this site within the framework of distributive justice. Some of the reasons due to which first occupancy can serve as grounds for determining the location of self-determination, that is, reasons of economy, convenience and simplicity, lose their force when the first occupant ceases to occupy the territory in question. In contrast, the interest in formative territories is not tainted by this disadvantage. A national group's interest not to be cut off from its formative territories remains in force regardless of whether or not the group and its members are currently occupying these territories. This applies when members of the national group have sustained this tie despite physical separation. In this sense the physical separation between members of a national group and their formative territories is not dissimilar to the physical separation between people and their respective family members. Both constitute ties that can continue to be a part of one's being and identity even when they are not physically manifest. Hence, unlike the reasons supporting a national group's expectations as first occupants, a national group's interest in occupying their formative territories, does not necessarily disappear with the loss of the physical connection to these territories. Nevertheless, does the fact that formative ties do not lose their force with the loss of the physical connection constitute a sufficient reason for determining the location of national self-determination in cases where restoring former states of affairs is in question? Or does it merely constitute support in favor of this solution? Given the geo-demographic conditions of the world and given its history, it is likely that the cases in which national groups resort to their formative ties to territories as grounds for returning to these territories, will be cases where all the relevant territories are inhabited by members of other national groups in a way which does not allow exclusive or even dominant presence of the claimant group without placing at least some of the current residents of these territories in danger of being uprooted. From the normative standpoint, groups that aspire to have their sovereignty in sites located within their historical territories would find themselves in a situation very similar to the position they would have been in if they had resorted to their histories as grounds for their very right to sovereignty. They would be placing the current residents of these territories in danger of being uprooted, and in any case would be denying them of their right to self-rule. It must be noted that these geo-demographic problems cast a shadow not only on the possibility that the historical tie would have some practical impact on determining the location of the right to territorial sovereignty for purposes of restitution, but also require further qualification of my earlier comments about the possibility of viewing formative ties as grounds for locating national sovereignty for the purpose of perpetuating the status quo. In cases in which the historical territories of certain national groups cease to be solely or mainly populated by these groups (following migration, or war, or population transfers), doubts arise as to whether such territories can be subject to the territorial sovereignty of those 31

31

See J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice", 17, note 13.

Historical Rights

95

groups. In fact, it is because of problems of this type that I elsewhere rejected the statist conception of the right to national self-determination and consequently the possibility that this right could ever be a basis for the right of national groups to territorial sovereignty. However, it must be noted that rejecting this possibility does not entail denying any normative value whatsoever to historical ties as formative ties. Such ties could still serve as a basis for establishing the location of self-determination under sub-statist conceptions of this right, both for purposes of acquisition and for purposes of restitution. Such self-determination does not involve sovereignty of the national group over the territory in which it exercises self-determination. It merely involves demographic and cultural presence that could be exclusive only if the historical territories of the group include vacant territories. This would not be possible if no such vacant territories existed. Accordingly, the formative ties of the Jewish people to Eretz-Yisrael could have justified its choice of that particular place in order to realize its national self-determination. However, since Eretz-Yisrael was not a vacant territory, not even at the inception of Zionism, the Jews were not justified in interpreting their right to self-determination there as a right to statist and territorial sovereignty. The ordinary justifications of the right to self-determination certainly could not justify the right of the Jewish people to statist and territorial sovereignty. As noted above, the historical rights of a given nation to a given territory, when understood as referring to the primacy of the territory in the history of that nation, are not always the exclusive rights of the claimant nation. The case of the Jewish people and Eretz-Yisrael is a paradigmatic case of this sort. As noted above, the territory in question is Palestine for the Palestinians. In my view, the only way in which the Jewish people could have exercised its right to self-determination in Eretz-Yisrael/Palestine is under a sub-statist conception of self-determination, which allows both Jews and Palestinians to realize their self-determination there. If what I said in relation to the Jewish example is correct, then historical rights as rights to formative territories are valid for purposes of restitution regardless of whether the national group that presently occupies the territory is the group that dispossessed the group demanding restitution. If nations have an equal right to sub-statist self-determination, and if it is correct that such a right is essentially linked with the concept of homeland, then the question of whether the nation which presently occupies the territory is the nation which caused the dispossession of the claimant nation does not make much difference in terms of the applicability of this right. The restoration of the group to its homeland thus seems to be a realization of a type of justice which is partly corrective and partly distributive. It is corrective because it revolves around restoring previous states of affairs, and it is distributive because the party which is required to make the concession is required to do so not because it wronged the other party, but because the 32

33

34

32 33 34

C. Gans, The Limits of Nationalism, ch. 3. On the sub-statist conception of self-determination see C. Gans, The Limits of Nationalism, ch. 3. This must be qualified with one reservation. During the 1930s and 1940s in Europe, the Jews' need for political independence was not only a consequence of the usual interests justifying self-determination. For many of them, this need was also motivated by the most basic human interests, namely, those in life, in bodily integrity, in self-respect, and in "amenities for dwelling and subsistence". These interests were violated in the most brutal manner. In this particular period it seems to have been justifiable or at least excusable for the Jewish people to try to achieve independent statehood. Its formative historical connection with Eretz Yisrael was good reason for this attempt to be located there rather than elsewhere. However, this could not justify all the means which were used by the Jewish community in Palestine for this purpose. It certainly cannot justify Israel's current attempts at territorial expansion in the name of Jewish historical rights.

96

Chaim Gans

present distribution of the right to self-determination among national groups demands this concession. If historical rights as rights to formative territories have practical significance in cases where the current occupants of the territories have not wronged those demanding to return to the territory in question, then historical rights are certainly of practical significance if a wrong has been committed. There may be doubts concerning the right of the Jewish people to realize its self-determination in Palestine because the Palestinians did not originally wrong them. However, such doubts could not apply to the right of the aboriginal peoples of North America, Australia and New Zealand to restore their selfdetermination in territories from which they were dispossessed by the European settler nations. The latter are the ones who dispossessed the former from these territories. Even if the first occupancy and the formative tie of the aboriginal peoples did not justify the realization of their self-determination in all the territories which they in fact occupied and from which they were dispossessed by the settler nations, they surely justified their self-determination in some of these territories proportional to their size (and perhaps also their lifestyles) at different times. If, as a result of the dispossession, the aboriginal nations lost their physical ties with lands in which their self-determination should have been realized, the dispossessing nations must return some of these territories to their possession, either for their exclusive presence, or for their joint presence (demographic and cultural). They need not return all these territories, firstly because it is not certain that they all should have been under the aboriginal peoples' self-determination at the time of dispossession, and mainly because in the centuries that have passed since the original dispossession, the settler nations have themselves forged formative ties with some of these territories. Moreover, members of the dispossessing nations have their lives established there. The questions of what proportion of these territories ought to be restored to the native nations' possession, in what proportion of these territories should the groups reside side by side, and what proportion of these territories should be allocated to each group separately, are matters to be resolved by complex calculations which cannot be very accurate. My main concern here was firstly, to distinguish historical rights as rights to formative territories from historical rights as rights of first occupancy or original acquisition. Secondly, I attempted to show that historical rights as rights to formative territories are valid not only within the context of distributive justice and for purposes acquiring and preserving certain territorial rights, but also for purposes of restitution. The purpose of all the above was mainly to emphasize the concept of the homeland in the context of national self-determination. Recent judicial decisions made 35

36

37

38

35 36 37

On the possibility of participatory presence see also M. Langton, "Estate of Mind", 7 3 . See, e.g., P. Haveman, Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, 4. These calculations must be based on principles of distributive and corrective justice. With regard to distributive justice, the present size of the groups, their lifestyles, and how deeply they identify with different parts of the territories in question must be considered. With regard to corrective justice, the damages suffered by the dispossessed group from the time o f the dispossession must be considered. On the other hand, the fact that the present members and institutions of the dispossessing group are not personally responsible for the dispossession must be considered. However, it must be noted that the wrongs committed by their ancestors form a part of their collective identity. They might therefore feel responsible for the rectification of these wrongs. Each of these points requires a detailed and complex discussion that is beyond the scope of the present study. On this matter see J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice"; J.A. Simmons, "Historical Rights and Fair Shares"; G. Sher, Approximate Justice, ch. 1; D. Lyons, "The N e w Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land".

38

On the importance of homelands in national identities and for national self-determination see also D. Miller, "Secession and the Principle of Nationality", 68; M. Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism, 167, 176, 191.

Historical

Rights

97

in Australia and Canada are compatible with this approach that stresses the notion of homeland. In view of this emphasis on this notion, the aboriginal peoples are entitled to demographic and cultural presence in certain territories because of the identity relationship that they have with these territories. At least in some of these territories, they have to live with the settler nations because the latter also have identity relations and material needs which justify this. In sum, what I have salvaged of the historical rights argument is much less than what most proponents of historical rights could wish. The proponents of historical rights vacillate between their national groups' precedence in the histories of the territories over which they claim sovereignty, and the primacy of these territories in the histories of their national groups. They use historical rights as justification for the very right of sovereignty, and in general as grounds for claims to territorial expansion. I rejected the possibility that claims to historical rights in these two senses could serve as grounds for the very right to sovereignty. If my arguments on this matter have been persuasive, then historical rights cannot be grounds for the claims of national groups who enjoy self-determination and sovereignty to expand their sovereignty to additional territories. Among all the claims to a historical right, I have tried to salvage a consideration for determining the location of peoples' territorial rights. If used for the purpose of perpetuating an existing state of affairs, both the right of first occupancy and the right to formative territories could serve as grounds for determining the location of the territorial rights of national groups. If used for the purpose of restoring the status quo ante, it is only the right to formative territories that may be used as a consideration for determining the location groups' territorial rights. This consideration determines the location of such rights if they follow from the right to self-determination. 39

40

39

On the importance of traditional lands for the identities of aboriginal peoples see J. Borrows, "'Landed' Citizenship"; J. Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy, 153f; R. Poole, Nation and Identity, 131. R.H. Bartlett, "Native Title in Australia", 417f, emphasizes the historical and traditional identity links of the Australian aborigines to their lands as the central reason for the change that the Mabo no. 2 case (Mabo v. Queensland (no. 2) (1992) 175 CLR1) brought about with regard to their title in their traditional lands. He emphasized the centrality o f their lands in their identities, and not their primacy in these lands relative to the European settlers, as the reason for acknowledging their title. Other writers (such as J. Webber, "Beyond Regret", 72ff) emphasize the constitutional significance of the Mabo no. 2 case and similar recent decisions (Delgamuukw v. British Columbia ( 1 9 9 7 ) 153 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC)). They argue that these decisions do not only pertain to property law but also to the constitutional issues of self-determination. Self-determination is linked with the formative role that the traditional lands have in the identities of the aboriginal nations. The present writers also emphasize that for these reasons the settler nations must share sovereignty with the native nations.

40

See also R. Poole, Nation and Identity,

138.

98

Chaim Gans

Bibliography Bartlett, R.H., "Native Title in Australia. Denial, Recognition, and Dispossession", Indigenous Peoples', Rights in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, ed. P. Haveman, Oxford University Press, 1999. Bentham, J., "Principles of the Civil Code", The Theory of Legislation, ed. C.K. Ogden, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931. Borrows, J., "'Landed' Citizenship. Narratives of Aboriginal Political Participation", Citizenship in Diverse Societies, ed. W. Kymlicka and W. Norman, Oxford University Press, 2000. Brilmayer, L., "Consent, Contract and Territory", Minnesota Law Review 74 (1989). Dray, W.H., Philosophy of History, 2nd edition, Prentice Hall, 1993. Gans, C , The Limits of Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, 2003. Hart, H.L.A., "Are There Any Natural Rights?", Theories of Rights, ed. J. Waldron, Oxford University Press, 1984. Haveman, P., Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, Oxford University Press, 1999. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford University Press, 1973. Ivison, D., P. Patton and W. Sanders (eds.), Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Cambridge University Press, 2000. Kristof, L.K.D., "The State-Idea, The National Idea and the Image of the Fatherland", Orbis 11 (1967). Kymlicka, W., Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, 1995. Langton, M., "Estate of Mind. The Growing Cooperation between Indigenous and Mainstream Managers of Northern Australian Landscapes and the Challenge for Educators and Researchers", Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, ed. Haveman, Oxford University Press, 1999. Lyons, D., "The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land", Reading Nozick. Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia, ed. J. Paul, Basil Blackwell, 1982. Masaryk, T.G., The Making of a State, George Allen and Unwin, 1927. Mehr, F., A Colonial Legacy. The Dispute over the Islands of Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs, University Press of America, 1997. Miller, D., "Secession and the Principle of Nationality", National Self-determination and Secession, ed. M. Moore, Oxford University Press, 1998. Moore, M., "The Territorial Dimension of Self-determination", National Self-determination and Secession, ed. M. Moore, Oxford University Press, 1998. Moore, M., The Ethics of Nationalism, Oxford University Press, 2001. Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basil Blackwell, 1974. O'Neill, O., "Justice and Boundaries", Political Restructuring in Europe. Ethical Perspectives, ed. C. Brown, Routledge, 1994. Poole, R., Nation and Identity, Routledge, 1999. Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1973. Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986. Raz, J., Ethics in the Public Domain. Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, revised edition, Clarendon Press, 1994. Rousseau, J.J., The Social Contract, book I. Sharp, A., Justice and the Maori. The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New Zealand since the 1970s, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 1997.

Historical Rights

99

Sher, G., Approximate Justice. Studies in Non-ideal Theory, Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. Simmons, J. A., "Historical Rights and Fair Shares", Law and Philosophy 14 (1995). Smith, A.D., "States and Homelands. The Social and Geopolitical Implications of National Territory", Millennium 10 (1981). Smith, A.D., National Identity, Penguin, 1991. Smith, A.D., Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford University Press, 1999. Stoicescu, N., The Continuity of the Romanian People, Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1983. Tacitus, The Annals of Imperial Rome, Penguin Classics, 1973. Tully, J., An Approach to Political Philosophy. Locke in Contexts, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Tully, J., Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge University Press, 1995. Viroli, M., For Love of Country. An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism, Oxford University Press, 1995. Waldron, J., The Right to Private Property, Clarendon Press, 1988. Waldron, J., "Superseding Historic Injustice", Ethics 103 (1992). Webber, J., "Beyond Regret. Mabo's Implications for Australian Constitutionalism", Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ed. D. Ivison, P. Patton and W. Sanders, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

101

Collective Responsibility for Historical Injustices

Janna

Thompson

Contents 1.

Historical Titles

2.

Theories of Collective Responsibility

103

3.

Posterity-binding Commitments

107

4.

Respect for Nations

110

5.

Advantages of the Theory

112

102

When the Prime Minister of my country (Australia) is asked to make an official apology for the injustices inflicted on Aborigines in the last two centuries of colonization, he customarily replies that present generations of citizens should not be expected to take responsibility for the deeds of past generations. He is expressing an attitude to demands for reparation for historical injustice that many people are inclined to share. If it is unjust to punish people for crimes committed by others, then why isn't it equally unjust to demand an apology or reparation from those who had no role in committing the wrongs? Even if we allow that the debts of parents can sometimes be visited on their children this does not explain why all citizens of a certain category - for example all non-Aboriginal Australians - should apologize or make reparation. Many citizens of a nation are likely to deny that they possess an inherited debt - either on the grounds that they or their ancestors were recent immigrants to the country or because their ancestors had no role in committing the wrong. This chapter defends the view that historical obligations and entitlements exist. A historical obligation is a moral responsibility incurred by individuals as citizens, owners or executives of corporations, or members of some other inter-generational association or community, as the result of the commitments or actions of their predecessors. Those to whom this obligation is owed have a historical entitlement. The relationship between past actions and present responsibilities or entitlements is established by a moral argument. 'We ought to keep the treaty made by our national predecessors because treaties 2

3

1 2

3

S o m e parts of the argument o f this paper were presented in "Historical Obligations", and a detailed account of my theory is presented in Taking Responsibility for the Past. John Howard, Speech to the Reconciliation Convention in Melbourne, Australia, 2 6 May, 1997. Howard has repeated the same opinion on many occasions. Other politicians and commentators have expressed similar views. Committing on demands that the US government make an official apology for slavery, C. Paglia, writes that 'an apology can be extended only by persons who committed the original offence' ("Who is Really to Blame for the Historical Scar of Black Slavery?", 353). Paglia (ibid., 353) adds that her grandparents were born in Italy and had nothing to d o with the African slave trade.

102 Janna Thompson ought to be honored.' 'We ought to make recompense for the dispossession of indigenous people because this was unjust, and injustice require reparation'. The past is a source of obligation or right not merely because of the effect of past deeds on present conditions. Historical obligations and entitlements are duties or rights defined by past happenings - by the fact that a treaty was signed or an unjust deed done. Historical obligations belong to the more general category of 'past-referring obligations' which include the duty to keep promises and honor contracts, to pay debts and make compensation for wrongs done, and to punish only the guilty. Past referring obligations are historical when those who are supposed to be responsible for keeping the promise, honoring the contract, paying the debt or making reparation are not the ones who made the promise or did the deeds but their descendants or successors. In many cases those to whom historical obligations are owed are not the victims themselves but their descendants or successors. These successors are claiming a historical entitlement. A historical injustice, as I will understand it, is a wrong done either to or by (or both to and by) past people. I will focus on claims for reparation for historical injustices which, like many of those done to indigenous people, occurred before most people now living were born or came to maturity. And I will be concerned in this paper only with wrongs done by and to 'nations' - understood in this paper to be politically organized inter-generational communities (but not merely nation-states).

1.

Historical

Titles

In most philosophical discussions the existence of historical entitlements and obligations is predicated on the existence of 'historical titles' - that is, on historically acquired rights of property or possession that are passed on to people of succeeding generations. If someone takes possession of a good that was before unowned, says Robert Nozick, then he or she has thereby acquired a right of possession. If she chooses to give or sell it to someone else then by this act she transfers the entitlement to the recipient. If a person's right of possession is violated then she has a right to 'rectification' - to be returned, so far as this is possible, to the situation that would have existed if the injustice had not been done. A historical entitlement to rectification exists, according to this account, if and only if someone's historical title has been unjustly violated. This person, or her descendants or successors, has a right to get back what was taken, or an equivalent in compensation. The existence of her entitlement is a sufficient reason for requiring illegitimate possessors to give it back. There is no need to establish guilt or the complicity of ancestors. According to this account, historical obligations depend wholly on the existence of a historical entitlement. Whether historical titles exist at all is a controversial issue. Whether they persist long enough to justify reparative claims made by community members long after the injustice has occurred is even more doubtful. Even if titles persist in some form, changed circumstances are likely to make it unjustifiable for heirs to demand back all of what their ancestors once possessed. Most discussions of Nozick's view of rectification have 4

5

6

4 5

6

R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 150-3. J. Waldron presents some objections to the theory of historical title in Right to Private Property, ch. 6. D. Lyons, ' T h e N e w Indian Land Claims and Original Rights to Land", argues that the claim of Indians to the land of their ancestors cannot be derived from an original title. Waldron, "Superseding Historical Injustice", argues that the right of the dispossessed to land they or their ancestors possessed is superseded in the course of time. A.J. Simmons, who defends the theory of historical title, nevertheless argues that those making

Collective

Responsibility

for Historical

Injustices

103

concentrated on the issues of whether historical titles exist or persist. However, the assumption that historical obligations amount to the rectification of property rights also needs to be questioned. Unjust acts, Bernard Boxill insists, do not merely violate rights to possession. They are demonstrations of disrespect, and he thinks that reparation requires 'an acknowledgment on the part of the transgressor that what he is doing is required of him because of his prior error', as well as the return, where possible, of whatever was unjustly taken. Those who think it appropriate to demand or give an apology for historical injustice subscribe to this view of reparation. The belief that an act of contrition is necessary seems particularly appropriate when those wronged suffered not merely or mainly from loss of a possession, but from evils of another kind - violations of political independence, destruction of cultural life or other injustices that involve what Boxill identifies as a lack of respect. Such wrongs are beyond the scope of a theory of historical title. Moreover, acknowledgment of wrong done plays no role in rectification, as Nozick understands it. But those who agree with Boxill - those who demand or think that they ought to give an apology for historical injustices - are faced with the problem of explaining why present people can apologize, or in some other way show contrition, for acts done by others. There is another respect in which a theory of reparation which predicates obligation on the existence of a title is counter-intuitive. According to this theory, those now in possession of property that belongs to someone else have an obligation of return. For example, those who now have their homes or businesses on land illegitimately taken from Indian tribes ought to give it back. The question is not merely whether the tribe really has a better claim than guiltless people who have come to depend on the land for the livelihood. Even if we do think that the land should be given back, it seems unfair that those now in possession should be forced to shoulder the whole burden of reparation. But if we insist that the government should compensate those who have to give up property to satisfy the claims of indigenous people then we are tacitly accepting the idea that present citizens are collectively responsible for reparation - and this requires justification of another kind. 7

8

These considerations suggest that a theory of reparation cannot concentrate merely on the question of whether a historical title exists. Responsibility for acts of reparation, it seems, is a collective responsibility shared by all citizens or citizens of a certain category. The problem is explaining how this responsibility can exist.

2.

Theories of Collective

Responsibility

Nations, tribes, and similar political entities endure through time and down the generations. They can pursue long term policies and make promises that are supposed to be binding on future citizens, and for this reason are often treated as if they were individu-

7 8

claims may be entitled only to part of what their ancestors lost. See "Historical Rights and Fair Shares". B. Boxill, ' T h e Morality o f Reparation", 118. When Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of post war Germany, offered to pay reparation to Israel for the persecution, slaughter and dispossession of Jews, neither he nor anyone else supposed that any payment could compensate for the harm done. The crimes were beyond rectification. Nevertheless, he believed that an act showing that Germans acknowledged the seriousness of past wrongs was morally (as well as politically) required. For an account see E. Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, ch. 1.

104 J anna Thompson als. So long as we think of them in this way it seems no more difficult to explain why citizens have historical obligations and entitlements than it is to explain why ordinary individuals have duties in respect to their past actions or can be owed debts by others. Indeed, most people accept that they have a responsibility for keeping treaties made by past governments of their nation. If this burden is a legitimate one, then why should they not also accept the burden of reparation for past misdeeds of their nation? The problem is that nations are not really individuals, and it is a fundamental issue of justice how the benefits and burdens that result from their actions and policies should be distributed among their members. Those who deny that they have historical obligations for reparation believe that it is unfair to burden them with reparative responsibilities. Even treaties raise the issue of responsibility. What gives a government the right to bind citizens of the future to an agreement that they have had no say in making? Why should the democratic will of a people be limited by agreements of their predecessors? A theory of historical obligation has to answer these question as well as answering the objections of those who refuse to accept the burden of making reparation for their nation's historical wrongs. An acceptance of historical obligations does not seem to follow simply from the recognition that nations are intergenerational. But if we turn to what philosophers have said about collective responsibility the case seems no better. Standard accounts of why members bear moral responsibility for activities of their group reinforce the idea that there is no obligation without participation. These theories have the objective of determining whether and to what extent individuals are responsible for the deeds of their leaders or other members of their group - whether, for example, ordinary citizens bear some responsibility for the involvement of their country in an unjust war. Almost all of them agree that it would be unjust to hold individuals liable for actions which they had no possibility of influencing. Joel Feinberg, for example, lists 'opportunity for control' as one of the necessary conditions for liability for an action or practice of a group. 'Individuals are responsible for and creditable with only those negativities and positivities that they themselves engender through their own suitably deliberate actions,' says Nicholas Rescher. His conception of responsibility might be criticized for being too narrow. Let us agree with the widely accepted view that citizens of a democracy - even ones who don't vote or pay attention to politics - bear some responsibility for the wrongs done by officials of their state. They could have been more informed and politically active; they could have spoken out against injustice. But even this wider conception of responsibility does not provide a justification for historical obligations. Present people had no way of influencing the acts of past generations - no way of objecting to agreements they made or injustices that they did. If moral responsibility depends on liability, and liability on control or participation, then historical obligations do not exist. However, defenders of historical obligation often have in mind a different idea of how members of nations acquire responsibilities. The wealth of nations, in many cases, has been built on past injustices. Non-indigenous Americans, Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans, and Canadians are now benefiting from injustices done to indigenous communities - from the consequences of broken treaties, from land that was seized and settled. 9

10

9 10

J. Feinberg, "Collective Responsibility", 687. He briefly discusses, but s e e m s to dismiss, a way in which individuals might have responsibility without control (687f). N. Rescher, "Collective Responsibility", 5 2 . Rescher does not allow for omissions - cases where individuals are culpable because of their failure to act. But cases of negligence could be incorporated into the definition without interfering with its essential point.

Collective Responsibility for Historical Injustices

105

If the Aborigines had not lost their land, and had maintained their traditional relationship with the land on which their well-being depended, then white Australian society could not have developed in the way it has, whites would not enjoy the high levels of well-being they enjoy, Aborigines would not have suffered significant losses in self-esteem, and nor would they have been so culturally devastated." The beneficiaries of this injustice, the authors go on to say, have a duty to repair the injuries suffered by the victims. There are two ways of understanding this argument. According to the first, those who have gained through social interactions of the past should share their benefits with those who have suffered loss. The fact that the losses suffered by indigenous people are the result of injustice plays no essential role in the argument so understood. Beneficiaries would have just as strong a reason for sharing if their gains, and the losses of others, had been the result of economic contingencies for which no one could have been blamed. What this interpretation of the argument calls for, in other words, is compensation for disadvantage - not reparation. Compensation of this kind is required by many theories of equity - and so the common belief that beneficiaries of past injustices owe something to people who have been harmed is probably best accounted for in this way. 12

The second interpretation insists that the beneficiaries of historical injustices are the receivers of stolen goods. They have been unjustly enriched. Justice demands the return of these goods to their rightful owners, or at least appropriate compensation. However, this interpretation is predicated on the existence of historical titles and raises all of the questions and difficulties associated with this notion. And it does not give us what we need - an idea of collective responsibility that makes the existence of collective historical obligations plausible. Standard philosophical ideas about collective responsibility are individualistic - they concentrate on the contributions of individuals and often dole out responsibilities in proportion to contribution. This approach seems to ignore an important psychological fact. People sometimes do feel guilt or shame for injustices committed by members of their group, or are made uncomfortable by the knowledge that they are benefiting from past injustice. Many citizens are sorry about the wrongdoing of their predecessors and are prepared for this reason to shoulder the burden of reparation. An account of collective responsibility that takes these responses seriously and tries to explain them seems a more promising direction to take in the search for a justification of historical obligations. Alasdair Maclntyre thinks that the explanation for such responses comes from the fact that we are bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone's son or daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle ... I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles. As such I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. The self, he says, has a history that stretches back before her birth. And he contrasts this 'narrative view of the self with the viewpoint of modem individualism which detaches the self from all social relationships and denies that a person can be held respon-

11 12

J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter, and R. Young, "Land, Well-Being and Compensation", 335. Most discussions, it seems to me, run together the two interpretations. B i g e l o w , Pargetter, and Young do so in "Land, Well-being and Compensation".

106 Janna Thompson 13

sible for 'what his father did or from what his country does or has d o n e ' . The modern individualist is likely to deny historical obligations, but those with a narrative view of themselves cannot. Maclntyre makes a person's special obligations depend on the nature of his or her self. But not all selves are narrative selves, and those that are will tell many different stories. Maclntyre himself thinks that individualist selves are becoming more common in the modern (or post-modern) world, but these are the people most likely to deny that they have communal or historical obligations. Even those who do regard themselves as attached in an essential way to others are likely to have different ideas about the relations that form their identity. Some people regard their family as central to their lives but have little interest in their nation. The immigrant may continue to derive his selfidentity from the land of his ancestors and have no sense of responsibility for the inheritance of his new nation. Nor does acceptance of responsibility necessarily follow from identification. A person can locate herself within a history and identify with a group without thinking that she is obliged to do anything about the commitments or injustices of past people. And there is no necessary connection between feeling shame or regret for the sins of predecessors and taking responsibility for reparation. Maclntyre's narrative view of the self can account for why some people are prepared to take responsibility for the past of their community, but it is not able to establish that all members of nations or states have historical obligations for the deeds of their predecessors. The possibility remains that we acquire commitments and obligations, including obligations in respect to the past, through participation in communal activities. Margaret Gilbert thinks that a joint commitment comes into existence when people participate in joint activities or signal their readiness to participate. Having shown through their actions that they have entered a commitment, they constitute with others a plural subject and acquire responsibilities for fulfilling its intentions. Most of Gilbert's examples of joint commitment focus on personal relations. By using conventional gestures or words to signal that I accept an invitation to dance I thereby commit myself to forming a couple for that purpose. But she thinks that we also acquire joint commitments as members of more enduring plural subjects like nations or states. We signal our readiness by participating in public events, voting in elections, or even by our use of language - by the use of 'we', as in 'We are engaged in a war against terror'. Once individuals have committed themselves to being part of such a plural subject they acquire responsibility for its deeds. Having this responsibility does not depend on participation, and lack of culpability is no reason for denying obligation. Since a nation or state is an ongoing, inter-generational plural subject, joint commitment means sharing responsibility for its past. Gilbert wants to explain why people sometimes feel guilty for what their nation has done even when they bear no responsibility as individuals. But her position also implies that people who don't feel guilt may nevertheless have obligations, including historical obligations, as citizens. A.J. Simmons objects that there is a large gap between personal relations that give rise to legitimate expectations and the relations of individuals in a large, impersonal society. By signaling a willingness to dance you clearly commit yourself to becoming part of a dance floor couple. It is not so plausible to suppose that members of a political society through their actions or by their acceptance of certain ways of speaking incur 14

15

13 14 15

A. Maclntyre, After Virtue, 2 2 0 . M. Gilbert, "On Feeling Guilt for What One's Group Has Done". S e e also her "Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings". A.J. Simmons, "Associative Political Obligations", 2 5 8 .

Collective

Responsibility

for Historical

Injustices

107

obligations as participants in a plural subject. His objection seems right. In face to face relationships people can make it clear to each other what commitments they have made and what each is entitled to expect, especially if they are following well understood conventions. The mere fact that people participate in public events or use 'we' when speaking of their nation is not enough to establish that they are participants in a joint commitment. Even if these activities did indicate commitment they would not tell us what responsibilities people have accepted or exactly whom they are committed to. They may be signaling a commitment to the people of their nation, but not a readiness to fulfill the intentions of leaders, still less to take responsibility for what leaders or officials did in the past. As far as commitment is concern, the use of 'we' is ambiguous and its implications are unclear. Are there actions that do signal this commitment? Expressing pride in the past deeds of the nation may be one. 'Can one accept the benediction and reject the curse? Can one accept the legacy and avoid the duty of paying its debts?' But this point, though it may be correct, does not get us very far. We have returned to the problems associated with Maclntyre's conception of the narrative self. Having responsibility is made to depend on a response that many people belonging to a nation - recent immigrants, for example - may not share. And worse, it is not a response that requires any particular action. Those who experience it may think that the very act of feeling sorrow, guilt or remorse is sufficient, and that reparation is not required. This discussion of views about collective responsibility does not exhaust the field. Nor am I likely to have proved to everyone's satisfaction that Maclntyre, Gilbert, and others are wrong. Nevertheless, the difficulties encountered by both individualist and 'collectivist' ideas of collective responsibility indicate that there is good reason for looking for another approach. 16

3.

Posterity-binding

Commitments

I will begin my presentation of this alternative account by explaining why presently existing citizens or members of nations are obliged to keep the treaties of their predecessors. Understanding why this historical obligation exists will put us in a better position to understand why citizens have an obligation to make reparations for historical violations of agreements and other wrongs committed against nations. All arguments begin with assumptions. I will take it for granted that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rightly regards a treaty as having the legal and moral force of a promise or contact. A promise is supposed to entitle those to whom it is made to trust that it will be kept. Violation of a treaty, like the violation of a promise, is the breaking of a trust - which counts as an injustice even if the recipient of the promise does not suffer loss. The obligation to keep a promise is a duty all things being equal, and a complete account of promise or treaty making would have to define the circumstances which can make commitments void or inapplicable (as the Vienna Convention does in its codification of international conventions concerning treaties). But in the absence of these circumstances it is assumed that states and nations ought to honor their agreements. 17

18

16 17 18

J. Jedlicki, "Heritage and Collective Responsibility", 55. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Treaty violations are common occurrences in the affairs of nations. But this does not detract from their moral force. Indeed the very existence of a treaty system depends upon the prevalence, at least

108 Janna Thompson I will also assume that citizens of democratic nations, or nations that provide their members with means of controlling the behavior of leaders or governments, are collectively responsible for the policies and political actions of their representatives and officials. This includes a collective responsibility for keeping agreements that their representatives make. The issue is how these citizens can have an obligation to honor agreements that were made not by their representatives but by leaders and officials of the past. I do not assume any particular account of why citizens have collective responsibilities. Collectivist accounts of collective responsibility, as we have seen, do not relieve us of the task of justifying historical obligations. But the standard, weaker account will suffice. By their nature treaties are 'posterity-binding': they are meant to impose obligations on our political successors as well as ourselves. To be perpetually valid, or even valid for a reasonable period of time, a treaty has to bind citizens of the future. Those with whom it is made are being given an entitlement to trust that this will be so. This means that if we endorse such an agreement then we must suppose that our successors have an obligation to keep it - at least so long as it can be regarded as applicable and fair. The problem is not merely that our control over what future people will do is limited. The primary issue is moral. What gives us the moral entitlement to perform an act that imposes obligations on future people? And why should these future people regard themselves as bound by our agreements? Suppose that through our elected representatives we are making a posterity-binding treaty with another community. Let us assume that everyone concerned is sincere and morally responsible. We intend to keep the agreement and have the capacity to do so. But our sincerity and situation are not sufficient to give us the right to make an undertaking on behalf of our successors. Having a moral entitlement to make such a posteritybinding commitment, I suggest, depends on this act taking place within the framework of a moral practice that requires us to take responsibility for fulfilling posterity-binding commitments of our political predecessors. That this is so follows from a basic assumption about morality - that 'like cases ought to be treated alike': that making an authoritative moral judgment about what another should do means accepting a moral practice that requires (among other things) that you accept that the same judgment would apply to anyone who is in a relevantly similar situation - including to yourself. Moral prescriptions associated with treaty making are different in one respect from more familiar judgments about what we ought to do. The people on whom we are imposing duties are our successors, and not just our contemporaries. This means that 'treating like cases alike' commits us to accepting similar obligations in cases where we are the successors. Why not say that the possibility of making a posterity-binding commitment requires only that we take steps to ensure that our successors will carry it out? We could make a law designed to force them to do this, or even enshrine the treaty in the constitution of our political society. (Making treaties into law is in fact a standard practice in many countries.) We could indoctrinate our children to honor our commitments. The problem with these suggestions is not merely that they might fail. The issue is not the effectiveness of the means we might use to induce our successors to do what we want. What 19

19

as a guiding idea, of what the Convention calls 'good faith'. 'Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith' (Article 26 o f the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). R.M. Hare, in Freedom and Reason argues for the centrality of this rule to moral reasoning and discusses its application.

Collective Responsibility for Historical Injustices

109

needs to be explained is how we can presume an entitlement to impose a moral obligation on our successors. What gives us the authority to say that they ought to honor our agreements. The answer is that our moral authority is predicated on our accepting the duty to honor agreements of our predecessors. Having this commitment, it should be noted, is not dependent on our actually making posterity-binding agreements. It follows simply from a belief that if we were to make such an agreement then our successors ought to keep it. This explanation of why we have a historical obligation to honor treaties made by our predecessors may seem like an unnecessarily complicated way of defending what almost everyone concedes: that nations ought to keep their promises. The complexity is justified by special problems raised by historical obligations and the fact that other ways of dealing with these problems do not seem adequate. My account does not presuppose an identification of citizens with the history of their nation. But nevertheless it obliges them to see themselves as participants in inter-generational relations in which each generation inherits obligations from its predecessors and passes on obligations to its successors. I have been assuming, however, that we are morally responsible citizens, that we intend to keep the agreements our representatives have made and think that our successors ought to keep them. But suppose that we intend to deceive. We have no intention of keeping our agreement and no desire to bind our successors. Does this mean that through duplicity we avoid incurring an obligation to honor the commitments of our predecessors? The issue raised by this question is particularly relevant to our actual situation. For we have good reason to believe that in many cases our predecessors did not intend to honor their treaties - particularly those made with indigenous nations. In other cases the motivations of our predecessors are unknown and now probably unknowable. People do not escape incurring obligations by promising insincerely. There is no question that our predecessors committed injustices if they made promises they did not intend to keep. The more difficult issue is whether we have an obligation to fulfill their insincere promises. The answer depends on how we interpret the 'treat like cases alike' requirement: whether it requires us to fulfill the intentions of our predecessors or to keep their promises. How we interpret this rule depends in tum on what we, as morally responsible citizens, think that our successors should do. The answer seems clear. We think they ought to honor our agreements not because this is what we intend them to do - not out of regard for our desires or other psychological states - but because we think our agreements should be honored. In other words, we are assigning them an obligation to honor our commitments, not a duty to fulfill our intentions. And so the appropriate and relevant description of our obligation in respect to the agreements of our predecessors is to fulfill their promises. Their intentions, good or bad, are not relevant - at least not to the determination of what it means to treat like cases alike. What is morally important is not the state of mind of those who made a commitment, but the fact that it was made. This way of reasoning about our historical obligations has the obvious advantage of relieving us of problems associated with the intentions of past people. It does not require us to respect or fulfill their intentions. It does not require that we know what their intentions were. Moreover, it puts us in a good position to deal with another problem concerning intentions. A question that often arises when dealing with agreements from the past is how we should interpret their terms or determine their validity. Should we interpret and apply them according to the intentions of those who made them (so far as

110 Janna Thompson we know what they were)? But to do so may require us to act in a way we think to be unjust - either because the terms of the treaty were meant to favor the interests of the powerful, because circumstances have changed, or because our predecessors' conception of justice was different from ours. Or should we interpret and apply the agreement, so far as we can, according to contemporary ideas of justice? My account of why we have an obligation to keep the agreements of our predecessors favors the second idea of how agreements should be interpreted and applied. We think our successors ought to keep our commitments not simply because these commitments were made but because we regard the terms as fair and honorable. But we know that circumstances change and that our ideas about what is fair are not above criticism. The duty we assign to our predecessors is to be fair - to interpret and apply our agreement in a just way according to the circumstances. We have the same obligation in respect to the agreements of our predecessors - whether we believe that they were trying to be fair or not. By accepting the moral practice of making posterity-binding commitments citizens are also accepting the obligation of making reparation for violations of commitments. If people fail to honor an agreement without a legitimate excuse then they owe to those whose trust has been violated some form of recompense (if only an apology). If you were to make a commitment but deny that you have any reparative obligations for failing to fulfill what you promised, you would not merely be acting in bad faith. You would be undermining your entitlement to make the commitment. Deceitful people acknowledge their responsibilities but fail to fulfill them. They are acting in bad faith. But refusing to recognize that a reparative obligation exists does not merely make agents immoral. It removes them from the practice of commitment making altogether. When commitments are posterity-binding, the practice associated with them requires that all the duties they entail be accepted by the successors of people who made them. Intergenerational commitments create intergenerational obligations. The practice of making these commitments thus requires our successors to make recompense for violations - including our violations - of our posterity-binding commitments should they occur. And we have a corresponding obligation to make reparation for the violations of our predecessors. This reasoning does not explain what this duty involves, but it explains why it exists.

4.

Respect for Nations

What if citizens choose not to engage in, or approve of, the practice of making intergenerational commitments? Radical democrats or extreme individualists might consistently refuse. They might argue that no one should be burdened with the responsibility for the acts of past people - neither themselves nor their successors. A defense of historical obligations is not complete without an explanation of why there should be such commitments in the first place. Answering this question is not only a necessary step in an argument for the existence of historical obligations. It is also vital in some of the debates concerning injustices done to indigenous nations. British and Australian governments systematically refused to make treaties with Aboriginal communities in Australia. Appealing to the fiction of 'terra nullius' - the idea that the country was empty of people and available for settlement - governments appropriated the land and opened it to pastoralists, farmers and prospectors. Aborigines were pushed out of territory that their people had occupied for thousands of years, and when they resisted they were

Collective Responsibility for Historical Injustices

111

punished. None of these actions violated a treaty, but they clearly count as injustices and a theory that accounts for the existence of historical obligations has to encompass them. A theory of historical obligations must also encompass injustices to communities that are not directly associated with treaty making - for example, destruction of culture and subversion of political independence. However, the first step in providing such an account is to explain why commitment making is sometimes obligatory. The practice of treaty making presupposes that the parties regard each other as worthy of respect: if they respect each other then they will also accept that their relations ought to be governed by commitments that all can agree are just. This is the conclusion of an Eighteenth Century British royal commission that issued the following proclamation on the legal position of the Indian nations of the New World. The Indians, though living among the king's subjects in these countries, are a separate and distinct people from them, they are treated as such, they have a policy of their own, they make peace and war with any nation of Indians, when they think fit, without control from the English ... So that from thence I draw this consequence, that a matter of property in lands in dispute between the Indians as a distinct people and the English subjects, cannot be determined by the law of our land, but by a law equal to both parties, which is the law of nature and nations; and upon this foundation, as 1 take it, these commissions have most properly issued. 20

The Commission concluded that relations between settlers and Indians had to be governed by 'a law equal to both parties'. Since the British in the New World could not help but interact with Indian nations, to encroach on their lands, 'the law of nature and nations' required them to reach such understandings and to abide by the agreements they made. Waldron in reaches a similar conclusion, starting from a consideration of the obligations imposed on communities by proximity. The Commissioners picked out as conditions for respect the characteristics that make it possible for an inter-generational political societies - what I call nations - to make and keep their contracts, to determine and pursue an objective, and to be trustworthy nations in a world of nations. Most contemporary theorists think that there is a further condition that nations must fulfill in order to be worthy of respect. Michael Walzer in explaining why aggression is the crime of international society insists that the moral standing of a state rests on the consent of its members. '"Contract" is a metaphor for the process of association and mutuality, the ongoing character of which the state claims to protect against external encroachment.' What counts as consent of the governed is a matter for debate, but Walzer thinks that the condition is likely to be satisfied by most states. In fact, it was also likely to have been satisfied by the Indian nations referred to by the Royal Commission. Let us assume the following. A nation has a moral standing and is thus worthy of respect if and only if it is capable of acting as an agent (which even 'dependent nations' are able to do within limited spheres) and its authority rests in some sense on the consent of the governed. The moral standing of nations explains why it is wrong of one nation to invade another, undermine its institutions, and why relationships between them ought to be based on mutually acceptable understandings - whether these take the form of treaties or less formal or tacit agreements. It explains why members of nations cannot 21

22

20 21 22

R. Costo and J. Henry, Indian Treaties, 6. J. Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice", sects. 1-3. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 54.

112 J anna Thompson eschew the practice of agreement making so long as their nation has relations with other nations. Since nations are intergenerational communities these agreements, or at least the commitment to maintaining a particular relationship with another nation which enables fair agreements to be made is also intergenerational. Morally responsible members of nations will demand that their successors maintain this relationship. As in the case of formal promises, this posterity-directed demand brings with it an intergenerational obligation to make recompense for past failures to establish or maintain a relationship of respect. Why can't we simply insist that our predecessors will have a general duty of respect - the same as we do - but not one that requires either them or us to make reparation for the injustices of predecessors? The position I am taking supposes that relations that result from a particular history of interactions give us (and therefore our national successors) special obligations to particular others. In many cases this history results in understandings or even formal agreements that require us to treat a particular agent in a way that we are not required to treat others. But even where our obligations demand no more from us than would be required anyway by a duty of respect, the fact that they arise from a particular understanding gives them a special force. These are the obligations that we pass on to our successors and which in turn require us to accept an obligation to maintain relations of respect or to make reparation for the failure of ourselves or our predecessors to maintain them. The obligation of respect involves more than making treaties when this is required by circumstances or mutual concerns. It requires us to respect the political and communal integrity and independence of those nations we interact with (unless they fail to satisfy the prerequisites of respect). Just as we have an obligation to make reparation to a nation for the failure of our predecessors to keep their commitments to it, so too we have an obligation to make reparation for other forms of disrespectful behavior. This obligation is the consequence of a belief - which all morally responsible citizens should hold - that our successors have an obligation to maintain respectful relations with those communities they interact with and repair any acts of disrespect that they, or we, have committed. 5.

Advantages of the Theory

The argument I have presented for the existence of historical obligation and entitlement moves from forward to backward looking considerations. It insists that we have an obligation to keep commitments of the past and to make reparation for past injustices, but it derives the motivation for this practice from our desire as morally responsible citizens to establish and maintain, now and into the future, respectful relations with the nations we interact with. My account has some obvious advantages. It does not rest content with the insistence that citizens have historical obligations simply because they are citizens. It reveals the moral mechanisms behind treaty keeping and related 'duties of state' and thus provides an explanation for why responsible citizens should accept the sacrifices that these duties entail. My account does not require us to think that we have a duty to the dead or a duty to fulfill the intentions of our predecessors. It thus avoids the problems associated with the intentions of past people and the difficulty of believing that we can harm or benefit the dead. It does not require that people feel guilt or shame for what their political predecessors did - though it does not claim that such feelings are irrational. It does not make responsibility depend on ancestry. To have a historical obliga-

Collective

Responsibility

for

Historical

Injustices

113

tion it is not necessary that you be a descendant of someone who made or violated an agreement. Bloodlines are as irrelevant to historical obligations of citizens as they are to other duties of citizenship. You assume the responsibility when you become a citizen however that occurs. Recent immigrants may not be inclined to feel guilt or shame for such misdeeds - people are probably more likely to feel shame or guilt for the deeds of those they count as their ancestors. But this has nothing to do with their responsibilities as citizens. My theory thus makes it possible to understand how repairing historical injustice can be the collective responsibility of members of a nation. The account I have given makes a less obvious, but equally important, contribution to discussions about justice in a political society. It brings to prominence something that is ignored or marginalised in most theories of justice: the moral relationship between the generations. Maintaining a political society capable of acting justly in a world of nations depends on a moral practice that requires each generation of citizens to take responsibility for keeping the commitments of its predecessors and repairing their injustices. Most citizens acknowledge the obligation to keep the agreements of their predecessors (unless these agreements have been made void by changing circumstances or were the result of force or fraud). My account not only explains why this obligation exists. It shows that the reasons for their accepting this duty are also reasons for accepting the obligation to make reparation for their nation's historical wrongs. A justification of historical obligations which emphasizes ongoing relations between communities also provides an alternative to theories of reparation which focus solely on title. Whether present citizens have a historical obligation depends on the history of a relationship between their nation and another community - what commitments were made, what wrongs were done, and what past people have done to right these wrongs and not simply on whether a historical title exists. Wrongs requiring reparation include all actions that can be regarded as acts of disrespect - and not merely unjust dispossession. The theory thus explains why it seems appropriate to offer an apology or some other kind of acknowledgment of past wrongs. And it explains why all citizens, or citizens of a certain category, can be required to make sacrifices for the sake of righting a wrong. My account of historical obligations does not exclude the acceptance of a theory of historical title. We could continue to insist, as Boxill does, that return of possessions is a requirement of reparation. Nevertheless, a theory that emphasizes the establishment or maintenance of respectful relations between nations encourages a different approach to reparative justice - one that can be called 'reconciliatory'. Rather than supposing that the point of reparative justice is to return victims to the situation they were in before the injustice was done, those who take a reconciliatory approach to reparation aim at re-establishing just and respectful relations with those they have wronged by coming to terms with the past - by performing actions that their victims can regard as an appropriate response to the wrong done. A reconciliatory approach can make sense of acts that many people think are central to reparation: acknowledgment or apology for past wrongs, and also for acts of reparation in cases where there is no question of being able to undo the injustice. It can take into account not merely the original injustice - but the whole history of a relationship, including more recent and contemporary injustices. And it can also avoid the difficulties associated with historical titles. Reparation as reconciliation can explain why it might be appropriate, say, to make reparation to an indigenous community by giving it some of the land it once possessed without having to suppose that the community ever had a indisputable title or that their title has persisted

114 Janna Thompson through time and change. Such an act might be justified as be the most appropriate way of compensating for a history of injustice and making it possible for communities to establish relations that all can regard as just. A reconciliatory approach can also allow that the return of possessions is not necessarily the best way of making it possible for nations to establish just and respectful relations in circumstances as they now exist. A theory which concentrates on the entitlements and responsibilities of nations as politically organized communities has another advantage. It implies that no group can demand reparation for injustices done by a nation that no longer exists or make a claim on behalf of a non-existent political community. No one can be expected to pay reparation for the crimes of the Roman Empire. Nor can a group of people claim reparation just because they have a cultural, religious or linguistic connection to a nation that was once unjustly treated but has vanished from the face of the earth. This result supports the intuitively plausible belief that claims based on ancient injustices are not likely to be valid. More controversially, my theory gives no support to Serbia's claim to Kosovo and could not have been used to support the Zionist claim to Palestinian territory. The Palestinians had no obligation of reparation and the Zionists had no basis for a reparative claim. On the other hand, my account seems to give no support to reparative demands that many people do find plausible. For example, it does not support the demands of black Americans for reparation for the slavery of their ancestors. African Americans do not constitute a nation, as I have used that term. Unlike many indigenous people, they are not members of a semi-independent, politically organized intergenerational community, and thus a theory which demands respect for nations and reparation for wrongs done to nations does not apply to them. The fact that they belong to a group that has been historically oppressed is not sufficient to support a reparative claim (as Sher argues in his ch.). This result might be regarded as a vindication of the position of those who think that we should concentrate on repairing present injustices to individuals. However, the theory I have been presenting motivates another way of regarding the issue. A nation is an intergenerational society in which members have responsibilities in respect to future and past generations. The former is acknowledged in theories of justice which insist that members of a society ought to be concerned about the well being of their descendants. If we think that we can make demands on our successors for the sake of future members of our family lines then perhaps it can be argued that we have a duty to make reparation for injustices committed against family lines in the history of our society - in particular, those injustices which continue to have an impact on the present. Slavery, an institution perpetuated by enslaving the offspring of slaves, seems to be an obvious example of an injustice against family lines. The suggestion is that a theory of historical obligation which takes a wider view of intergenerational obligations may be able to justify some reparative claims made by descendants of victims of injustice. Whether this suggestion is reasonable would require much more discussion. But it is worth pointing out that a theory which focuses on moral relations between generations rather than relations 24

25

23

24 25

The fact is that most actual titles are the result of conquest and other illicit acts. Nozick recognises this and suggests that for the time being w e should forget about historical title and distribute resources according to the requirements of equity {Anarchy, State and Utopia, 2 3 1 ) . G. Sher, "Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights", esp. sects. 4f. For example, in A Theory of Justice, J. Rawls argues for obligations to future generations by assuming that those in the original position are representatives of family lines - i.e. people who can be expected to care about the well being of their children and grandchildren.

Collective

Responsibility

for Historical

Injustices

115

between people and property could have important implications for many debates about reparation and historical injustice. 26

Bibliography Barkan, E., The Guilt of Nations. Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices, W.W. Norton, 2000. Bigelow, J., R. Pargetter, and R. Young, "Land, Well-Being and Compensation", Australian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1990). Boxill, B., ' T h e Morality of Reparation", Social Theory and Practice 2 (1972). Costo, R., and J. Henry, Indian Treaties. Two Centuries of Dishonor, The Indian Historical Press, 1977. Feinberg, J., "Collective Responsibility", Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968). Gilbert, M., "On Feeling Guilt for What One's Group Has Done", Living Together. Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation, Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. Gilbert, M., "Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings", Journal of Ethics 1 (1997). Hare, R.M., Freedom and Reason, Oxford University Press, 1963. Jedlicki, J., "Heritage and Collective Responsibility", The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals, ed. I. Maclean, A. Montefiore, P. Winch, Cambridge University Press, 1990. Lyons, D., ' T h e New Indian Land Claims and Original Rights to Land", Social Theory and Practice 4 (1911). Maclntyre, A., After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, 2 Edition, Duckworth, 1981. Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974. Paglia, C , "Who is Really to Blame for the Historical Scar of Black Slavery?", When Sorry Isn't Enough, ed. R.L. Brooks, New York University Press, 1999. Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971. Rescher, N., "Collective Responsibility", Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1998). Sher, G., "Ancient Wrongs and Modem Rights", this volume. Simmons, A.J., "Historical Rights and Fair Shares", Law and Philosophy 14 (1995). Simmons, A.J., "Associative Political Obligations", Ethics 106 (1996). Thompson, J., "Historical Obligations", Australian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000). Thompson, J., "Historical Injustice and Reparation. Justifying the Claims of Descendants", Ethics 112(2001). Thompson, J., Taking Responsibility for the Past. Reparation and Historical Injustice, Polity, 2002. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Basic Documents in International Law, ed. I. Brownlie, 4 Edition, Oxford University Press, 1995. Waldron, J., Right to Private Property, Oxford University Press, 1988. Waldron, J., "Superseding Historical Injustice", Ethics 103 (1992). Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Penguin, 1977. n d

th

26

I argue for this position in "Historical Injustice and Reparation", and also in part 2 of Responsibility for the Past.

Taking

117

Historical Wrongs. The Two Other Domains

1

Thomas W. Pogge

Contents 1.

Introduction

117

2.

Can the Holistic Effects of Past Wrongs Affect Present Moral Reasons for Action?

117

2.1 Can Past Wrongs Strengthen Present Moral Reasons to Refrain from, or to Prevent, Like Wrongs?

118

2.2 Can Past Wrongs Weaken Present Moral Reasons to Refrain from, or to Prevent, Like Wrongs?

119

3.

Can the Rule-Shaping Effects of Past Wrongs Affect Present Moral Reasons for Action?

124

3.1 Procedural Injustice in the Creation of Present Legal Rules

124

3.2 Unjust Background Conditions in the Evolution of Present Institutional Arrangements

128

4.

133

1.

Conclusion

Introduction

Central to the topic of historical injustice, as I understand it, is the question whether and how past injustice and, more generally, wrongs can affect present moral reasons for action. We can distinguish three subquestions, which emerge from appreciating that the possible moral effects of past wrongs can be organized into three main - mutually exclusive but perhaps not jointly exhaustive - domains: (1) the distributive effects of past wrongs: One or more individual or collective agents - "the perpetrators" - acted wrongly at to, effecting a continuing change in the distribution of status or assets at ti. It may follow that some agents at t| have moral reason to alter this distribution of status or assets at tj, presumably with an eye to mitigating the distributive effects that the wrongdoing at to will have had from ti on.

1

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Einstein Forum, Potsdam, and to the Jurisprudence Discussion Group, Oxford. I thank both audiences, and especially David Heyd, Lukas Meyer, and Samantha Besson, for their comments and criticisms, which inspired numerous clarifications and modifications.

118

Thomas W. Pogge

(2) the holistic effects of past wrongs: One or more individual or collective agents acted wrongly at to. It may follow that some agents at ti have more, or less, moral reason to see to it that they and others will not commit similar wrongs from ti on. (3) the rule-shaping effects of past wrongs: One or more individual or collective agents acted wrongly at to, effecting a continuing change in the social rules (in the laws and practices of a country, perhaps, or in the global economic order) prevailing at ti. It may follow that some agents at ti have moral reason to revise these social rules prevailing at t\, presumably with an eye to mitigating the effects that the wrongdoing at to will have had on what rules prevail from ti on. Most attention within the burgeoning historical-justice literature has been devoted to discussing the distributive effects of past wrongs. I therefore leave this topic largely to one side, concentrating on the other two instead.

2.

Can the Holistic Effects of Past Wrongs Affect Present Moral Reasons for Action ?

This second subquestion goes in two opposite directions, as historical wrongs may strengthen or weaken present moral reasons to refrain from, or to prevent, like wrongs now and in the future.

2.1

Can Past Wrongs Strengthen Present Moral Reasons to Refrain from, or to Prevent, Like Wrongs?

A strengthening of moral reasons may be indicated when people say, emphatically, that some specific wrong must never be repeated. This has been said, for instance, about the German holocaust and also about military dictatorships in Latin America ("nunca mas"). Such statements would be relevant to our second topic, if they expressed the thought that we have more moral reason to prevent another holocaust now or in the future than similarly placed people had to prevent the German holocaust. But this thought is quite implausible for at least two reasons. It is implausible because it suggests that the moral importance of preventing some particular wrong can be affected by the mere fact that it comes before, rather than after, another wrong, that a second holocaust somehow has a greater impact on the overall moral quality of human history than the first. (This need not include the even more implausible thought that it is somehow less urgent to protect those in danger of becoming early victims of some kind of wrongdoing than those in danger of becoming victims of such wrongs later on.) It is implausible also because we cannot read off from a particular wrongdoing token which description of it fixes the type of wrong we now have more reason to refrain from or to prevent: Is it the mass killing of Jews, genocide, any mass killing, the persecution of Jews, the persecuting of any ethnic group, or what? A second, somewhat more plausible interpretation of the nunca-mas sentiment holds that we have more moral reason to refrain from, and to prevent, a wrong when its victims would be persons who had been victimized by like Wrongdoing in the past. This view might be supported by considerations of overall fairness: Other things being equal, it is worse for one person to be victimized twice over than for two persons to be victimized once each. While this rationale seems to have some force, it may assign excessive significance to the quality of prior harms suffered. Yes, other things equal we may have more moral

Historical Wrongs

119

reason to prevent an assault on a person who has been assaulted before; but do we then not also, other things equal, have more moral reason to prevent an assault on a person who had experienced a painful kidney operation, a car accident, or the death of a spouse? And likewise for the converse: Other things equal, perhaps we have, with respect to persons who were assaulted in the past, more moral reason to prevent their being assaulted again; but do we then not also, other things equal, have more moral reason to protect such former assaultees from other harms (such as a painful operation, an accident, or the death of a spouse)? If this is so, then the nunca-mas sentiment, on this interpretation, dissolves into a much more general thought: We have more moral reason to ward off harms from persons who are already worse off through no fault of their own. This bland thought - though it is not what the "nunca mas" slogan seeks to articulate - captures one way in which past wrongs could arguably affect present reasons for action. There is yet a third interpretation of the nunca-mas sentiment, which 1 find the most plausible by far. On this interpretation, "nunca mas" means that, in working against injustice and wrongdoing, we should make good use of available historical knowledge and understanding. With the experience of the holocaust in our past, we are better able to focus our vigilance and to prepare for effective resistance against evil than were moral persons 70 years ago. On this interpretation, historical wrongs do affect our present moral reasons for action: As compared with people who lived earlier, we have more moral reason to be alert and prepared in certain specific ways. Yet, historical wrongs do not affect our ultimate moral reasons; they only affect what our ultimate moral reasons are reasons to do concretely.

2.2

Can Past Wrongs Weaken Present Moral Reasons to Refrain from, or to Prevent, Like Wrongs?

Let us now consider the inverse case: historical wrongs potentially weakening moral reasons to refrain from, and to prevent, like wrongs now and in the future. A paradigm example of this is customary international law, as conventionally understood. States are thought to have a moral (and, controversially, a legal) obligation to comply with customary international law. But whether some particular rule is part of customary international law or not depends on the historical incidence of compliance with this rule: The more frequently and severely this rule has been violated in the past, the less moral reason states now have to comply with it, or so it is thought. The rationale behind this principle is not that actual state conduct is the best available indicator of right and wrong - an idea that is too ridiculous to be put forward even by states. The rationale is better captured, 1 think, by the label "sucker exemption," which I have used elsewhere: Agents have less moral reason to honor valid moral constraints when doing so would or could lead to their being "made a sucker" by non-compliers. And so states, in particular, have less moral reason to comply with valid moral constraints when other, competing states have not complied. I have found that most people endorse this idea, and that their endorsement is motivated by a commitment to fairness - a notion that is central to Anglophone moral z

2

E.g., World Poverty

and Human Rights,

127.

120

Thomas W. Pogge

thought and, as we see here, also somewhat corrosive of it. The notion of fairness centrally involves the thought that agents, especially when they are competing over outcomes or resources, should have equal opportunities on a level playing field. This thought is taken to imply that it would be unfair for some to be hampered by moral constraints while others are not. Such unfairness supports the idea that one cannot be morally required to be a sucker, that is, someone who loses out on account of self-imposed moral constraints that others cheerfully ignore. We can analyze the appeal of the sucker exemption into an essential backward-looking and an essentially forward-looking component. Let me illustrate these, once more with the example of state conduct. According to the essentially backward-looking version, states have less moral reason to deny themselves a wrongful gain when other, perhaps competing states have enjoyed or are still now enjoying the fruits of analogous wrongful gains. This version appears in the argument the Athenians put to the Melians. And it also comes up in present debates between developing and developed countries, with the former asking: "Why should we have to hamper our economic development through environmental and labor standards, given that you had allowed yourselves to grow more rapidly without them?" And: "Why should we have to fight the international trade in addictive drugs now when such trade is bad for the developed Western states, given that these same Western states had fought quite brutally for free trade in addictive drugs when such trade was good for them?" According to the essentially forward-looking version, states have less moral reason to deny themselves a wrongful gain when they have grounds for believing that competing states are disposed to help themselves to analogous wrongful gains. This version of the argument is frequently adduced by realists and might be used to justify breaches of international law and treaties by reference to the well-grounded expectation that other states are disposed to violate such legal constraints when doing so promises significant gains. It is morally regrettable that other states are so disposed, but, in a world of such states, we do not have strong moral reason to honor ideal moral rules when doing so would expose us to being taken advantage of by others. It is obviously important to keep the backward-looking and forward-looking versions distinct, because the latter is, while the former is not, vulnerable to the retort that a powerful state has a significant opportunity to moralize the international order with the result of changing the prevalent disposition of states so as to reduce or even eradicate the fear that compliance with international rules would be taken advantage of by other states. 3

4

5

3

According to Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, B o o k 5, the Athenian negotiators said to the Melians: "you know as well as we do that right, as the world g o e s , is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." There may well be an admixture of the forward-looking appeal in the Athenian position as Thucydides recounts it.

4

The moral force o f this question is obviously much better accommodated if the rich countries shoulder or at least share the cost of the poor countries' fulfilling these standards than if the poor countries likewise fail to fulfill them. One reason for this will be explored below: B y disregarding environmental and labor standards now, the developing countries would be harming innocent third parties rather than prior non-compliers.

5

This is an allusion to the so-called opium wars prosecuted by Great Britain and other Western powers against China in the middle of the 19th century. The first invasion was initiated in 1839 when Chinese authorities in Canton (Guangzhou) confiscated and burned opium brought in by foreign traders (http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/heroin/opiwarl .htm).

Historical Wrongs

121

Focusing here on historical injustice, let us put this latter, forward-looking version of the sucker exemption aside. We can then, within the backward-looking version, make two distinctions that seem relevant to deciding to what extent and in what contexts appeals to this sucker exemption are plausible. Typically, the rationale for moral constraints involves protecting basic interests of persons from adverse conduct by other agents. Thus, violations of moral constraints by agents, P (for perpetrators), normally tend to harm the interests of certain persons, V (for victims). Appeal to the sucker exemption seeks to justify such violations by invoking the fact that other agents, W, have violated those moral constraints as well. My first distinction is drawn by asking whether V is or is not a subset of W. If the former, we can ask further whether the harm V is now suffering exceeds the benefit V derived from, and/or the harm V inflicted through, V's earlier violations. These questions yield five possibilities (1-5). Just as the present victims V may or may not be previous perpetrators, so the present perpetrators P may or may not be previous victims. This is the second distinction, which can be further refined by asking about the former possibility whether the benefit P stands to derive from P's present violation merely recoups (in full or in part), or rather exceeds, the losses from P's own earlier victimization. The second distinction is then a three-fold one (a-c). Putting both distinctions together, we arrive at the following 15 possibilities.

( l a ) P ' s violation harms o n l y

( l b ) P ' s violation harms o n l y

( l c ) P ' s violation harms o n l y

past violators, and the harm

past violators, and the harm

past violators, and the harm

it inflicts on V e x c e e d s

it inflicts on V e x c e e d s

it inflicts on V e x c e e d s

neither the harm V ' s prior

neither the harm V ' s prior

neither the h a r m V ' s prior

violations inflicted nor the

violations inflicted nor the

violations inflicted nor the

benefit V d e r i v e d from V ' s

benefit V derived from V ' s

benefit V d e r i v e d f r o m V ' s

prior violations. T h e benefits

prior violations. T h e benefits

prior violations. P n e v e r

P derives from P ' s violation

P derives from P ' s violation

suffered any harms f r o m

d o not e x c e e d the harms P

e x c e e d the harms P suffered

p r e v i o u s violations.

suffered from p r e v i o u s

f r o m previous violations.

violations.

(2a) P ' s violation harms o n l y

(2b) P ' s violation harms only

(2c) P ' s violation harms o n l y

past violators, and the harm

past violators, and the harm

past violators, and the harm

it inflicts on V e x c e e d s the

it inflicts on V e x c e e d s the

it inflicts on V e x c e e d s the

harm V ' s prior violations in-

harm V ' s prior violations

harm V ' s prior violations

flicted but not the benefit V

inflicted but not the benefit

inflicted but not the benefit

derived from V ' s prior

V derived from V ' s prior

V derived from V ' s prior

violations. T h e benefits P

violations. T h e benefits P

violations. P n e v e r suffered

d e r i v e s from P ' s violation d o

d e r i v e s from P ' s violation

any harms from p r e v i o u s

not e x c e e d the harms P

e x c e e d the harms P suffered

violations.

suffered f r o m p r e v i o u s

from previous violations.

violations.

122

Thomas

W.

Pogge

(3a) P's violation harms only past violators, and the harm it inflicts on V exceeds the benefit V derived from V's prior violations but not the harm V's prior violations inflicted. The benefits P derives from P's violation do not exceed the harms P suffered from previous violations.

(3b) P's violation harms only past violators, and the harm it inflicts on V exceeds the benefit V derived from V's prior violations but not the harm V's prior violations inflicted. The benefits P derives from P's violation exceed the harms P suffered from previous violations.

(3c) P's violation harms only past violators, and the harm it inflicts on V exceeds the benefit V derived from V's prior violations but not the harm V's prior violations inflicted. P never suffered any harms from previous violations.

(4a) P's violation harms only past violators, but the harm it inflicts on V exceeds both the benefit V derived from V's prior violations and the harm V's prior violations inflicted. The benefits P derives from P's violation do not exceed the harms P suffered from previous violations.

(4b) P's violation harms only past violators, but the harm it inflicts on V exceeds both the benefit V derived from V's prior violations and the harm V's prior violations inflicted. The benefits P derives from P's violation exceed the harms P suffered from previous violations.

(4c) P's violation harms only past violators, but the harm it inflicts on V exceeds both the benefit V derived from V's prior violations and the harm V's prior violations inflicted. P never suffered any harms from previous violations.

(5a) P's violation harms innocents. The benefits P derives from P's violation do not exceed the harms P suffered from previous violations.

(5b) P's violation harms innocents. The benefits P derives from P's violation exceed the harms P suffered from previous violations.

(5c) P's violation harms innocents. P never suffered any harms from previous violations.

Further subtleties could be added, of course. Thus one might well think that the three comparisons - V ' s present losses with V's earlier gains, V's present losses with the losses V previously inflicted, and P's present gains with P's earlier losses - should not be binary (does the former exceed the latter or not?) but scalar (e.g., what is the ratio of the former over the latter?). Further, one may also think that, when P was a past victim and V a past violator, the appeal to the sucker exemption gains further plausibility if and to the extent that P was a victim of V's past violations. Finally, the degree of similarity among the harms may also be deemed to enhance the plausibility of appeals to the sucker exemption: The fact that V is a thief, and has perhaps even stolen from P in the past, may weaken the moral reason P has not to steal from V more than it weakens the moral reason P has not to damage V's car, say. I am not here concerned to decide all these issues, only to indicate what I think the relevant factors are that determine the plausibility of particular appeals to the sucker exemption.

Historical Wrongs

123

Leaving these further complexities aside, let us concentrate on the simpler scheme of 15 possibilities as outlined. Clearly, appeal to the sucker exemption is at its most plausible in box (la), and especially plausible, perhaps, when P was among the victims of V's prior violations. Thus imagine that P has the opportunity to cheat V out of $400. Ordinarily, P has moral reason not to do this. But V had once, in a similar way, cheated P out of $500. And this fact does indeed seem to weaken or even erase the moral reason P would ordinarily have not to cheat V. Appeals to the sucker exemption become less plausible as we move toward the right. Thus consider an illustration in the (lc) box: Once again P has the opportunity to cheat V out of $400, and once again V had antecedently, in a similar way, cheated someone out of $500. However, P has never been cheated (or otherwise harmed) by V or by anyone else. The whole benefit of cheating V would therefore be a net gain for P. We may want to insist that P has moral reason not to cheat V. But do we not also judge that P has more moral reason to refrain from cheating others who have never cheated anyone? If we make this latter judgment we implicitly acknowledge that P's ordinary moral reason against cheating V is weakened by V's prior cheating record. Appeals to the sucker exemption also become less plausible as we move downward. Thus consider an illustration in the (5a) box: Some time ago, W had cheated P out of $500. Now P has an opportunity to recoup some of this loss by cheating some innocent third party, V, in a similar way out of $400. We may want to say that P has moral reason not to cheat V. But do we not also morally regret the fact that P was harmed by W through no fault of P's own? And do we not think it would be morally good if P's loss were diminished or compensated? But if such compensation counts as a moral good, does it not weaken, somewhat at least, the moral reason P would otherwise have not to cheat V (at least if there is no morally more acceptable way for P to recoup the loss W had inflicted on P)? The exemption, already quite dubious in boxes (lc) and especially (5a), becomes thoroughly implausible, not to say outrageous, in the (5c) box: P has an opportunity to cheat some innocent party V out of $400. The whole benefit of cheating V would be a net gain for P, who has never been cheated or harmed by anyone. In this case, the fact that some W had cheated people out of money in the past does not seem to weaken in the slightest the moral reason P would ordinarily have not to cheat V. My discussion of the holistic effects of past wrongs has yielded these tentative conclusions: Past wrongs do not strengthen the moral reasons to refrain from and to prevent like conduct now and in the future (except in the bland sense emerging from the second interpretation of "nunca maV). But past wrongs may weaken such moral reasons, most clearly in cases where P can, through conduct that harms only those who have wrongfully harmed P in the past, recoup some of P's loss from their previous wrongdoing. I have not discussed whether it makes sense here to add the proviso that the harms P inflicts upon W must be of the same kind as the harms W had inflicted upon P earlier. 6

6

I am here concerned solely with the backward-looking version of the sucker exemption. Thus I leave open the possibility that P's well-grounded expectation that others are generally disposed to cheat may weaken P's moral reason not to cheat even those P knows thus far to have been innocent of cheating.

124 3.

TTtomas W. Pogge Can the Rule-Shaping Effects of Past Wrongs Affect Present Moral Reasons for Action?

Let me turn to our third and final subquestion: To what extent can the effects of historical wrongs on present social rules provide moral reasons to revise these rules? One may think that this whole subquestion is moot because present social rules, no matter how they may have come about, ought to be revised if and insofar as, and only if and insofar as, they are now unjust. There is surely some truth in this thought, but this truth does not suffice to render the question moot. The reason is twofold. First, there is not, for each particular context, only one single just set of social rules, determinate down to the most minute detail. Rather, many features of a social order are morally open or discretionary, and with respect to these features historical pedigree may well matter. Second, there is bound to be controversy over whether present social rules are just or unjust, and those who deem some such rules unjust may reasonably hold themselves to have less moral reason to comply with, and more moral reason to oppose, these rules if they were also instituted in an unjust manner. You may acquiesce in a law that you consider mildly unjust if it has been democratically adopted over your opposition; and yet you may refuse to acquiesce in this same law if its passage was facilitated by votebuying in the legislature. I conclude that the issue is not moot, that the manner in which present social rules have once been instituted can affect present moral reasons for action in regard to these rules. Let us consider then how this manner of institutionalization can matter.

3.1 Procedural Injustice in the Creation of Present Legal Rules Let us begin by focusing on the narrower issue of procedural injustice, that is, on the question: What difference can the fact that present social rules have been instituted in an unjust manner make to how we now have moral reason to conduct ourselves with regard to these rules? Consider an example. A long time ago, a country was founded. Its founders gave it a constitution, formulating the central features of its political system and the more important individual rights. And they entrenched this constitution by including a clause to the effect that changes of the constitution require a two-thirds majority in a nationwide referendum. Since the country was somewhat overpopulated even then, a clause was included in the constitution prescribing that, upon the death of any landowner, his or her land shall generally pass to the eldest son or, should there be no son, to the eldest daughter. The unobjectionable intent of this clause was to prevent divisions and subdivisions of land, which could easily lead to unviable plots, economic inefficiency, and hence poverty and starvation. This need to forestall division of plots is still widely accepted today. But a sizable fraction of the female population, the so-called feminists, object to the sex asymmetry in the inheritance rules. They advocate the substitution of an alternative clause under which the oldest child would inherit, irrespective of his or her sex. This rule change, however, is opposed by many who, conceding that favoring male over female children is morally arbitrary, are also convinced that favoring those born earlier over those born later (or lottery winners over lottery losers, for that matter) is no less arbitrary from a

Historical

Wrongs

125

moral point of view. A referendum is held, and the feminist proposal receives 60 percent - a solid majority, but less votes than needed for a revision of the constitution. Now the feminists present a new argument. At the time of the founding and for more than a century thereafter, they say, women were completely excluded from the political process. To be sure, the injustice of their erstwhile exclusion has since been widely acknowledged, and a constitutional amendment guaranteeing equal female political participation was passed by a wide margin (with men alone voting) some 80 years ago. But laws passed before this enfranchisement of women remain in place. That they do is perhaps no injustice in the case of ordinary laws, which the legislature could change at any time by a simple majority. But it is problematic with regard to the constitution because of its supermajoritarian entrenchment. It is quite possible that, if women had had an equal say when the constitution was first adopted, the existing sex-asymmetrical provision would have lost out to a sex-symmetrical one - perhaps to the very provision now proposed by the feminists. The feminists conclude from these considerations that the 40-percent minority have moral reason not to use their legal power to block the constitutional revision. The minority ought to support a re-run of the referendum and ought then to vote in favor of the revision proposed by the feminists - not on the substantive ground that the revised clause is morally superior (for this the minority does not grant), but on the procedural ground that a simple majority deserves to win because the sex-asymmetrical provision they are seeking to dislodge was entrenched in an unjust manner. The feminists' new argument has quite radical implications. After all, the default rule about inheritance is not the only constitutional provision marred by historical injustice. The argument casts a shadow over all constitutional provisions adopted more than 80 years ago (when women were enfranchised). It suggests that all these "ancient" provisions should be subjected to a referendum, that any provisions opposed by a present majority should be voted on a second time, and that proponents of such unpopular ancient provisions should then, in any such second referendum, vote with the majority (that is, against the ancient provision). It might make sense that the first ancient provision to be subjected to this test should be the entrenchment provision: Back then, at the founding, men decided that revisions of their constitution should require a two-thirds majority; and this requirement can be acceptable to women today only if it is reaffirmed by a collective decision in which they are included. Only when the entire constitution has been reexamined and (with possible modifications) reaffirmed, is any undue political power of the ancient male political elite erased. Or is it? One might use the feminists' argument to challenge the constitution not merely on account of what was included in it, but also on account of what was excluded from it, before universal suffrage. Suppose that one candidate provision that never managed to gain enough votes for adoption would have protected citizens against discrimination on the basis of their sex. And suppose that another constitutional provision banning discrimination on the basis of race was adopted before women received the right to vote. One might then argue that, had women already been part of the political process at the time the ban on race discrimination was considered, they could and might well have pressed for the inclusion of sex by making clear that they would withhold support from any provision banning discrimination on account of race alone. Many of those eager to establish a constitutional protection against race discrimination, realizing that they need women's support to pass it, might well have been willing, in exchange, to support the protection against sex discrimination demanded by women. As it is, however, the sup-

126

Thomas W. Pogge

porters of a constitutional provision against race discrimination already have what they want and can therefore afford to vote against an equal rights amendment for women. Acceptance of the feminists' new argument would have quite dramatic implications for the hypothetical country I have imagined, and dramatic implications also for some existing states with "ancient" constitutions, such as the United States, whose actual history bears some obvious resemblance to the story just told. In the US, most women and many men have, in recent decades, supported the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) which, had it won, would have afforded women the same protection against discrimination that the 15th Amendment affords people of color. Supporters of the ERA could challenge their defeat on the ground that people in 1870 (when the 15th Amendment was ratified) might well not have singled out race and color to the exclusion of sex if women had then been part of the political process. If women had been part of the political process then, they could have made their support of the 15th Amendment conditional on the inclusion of sex as a protected characteristic. It is just not right that men should have had the opportunity, from 1787 until 1920, to pack into the Constitution everything they care about (including the second-amendment right to bear arms) without giving women the slightest say, and that a male minority should now still enjoy the power to veto provisions that all women and many men seek to add. The whole constitution is marred by historical injustice. The decision to have a constitution at all, the decision to entrench it against the majority of legislators, and all decisions about what exactly to include - all these decisions were made without the slightest participation of women. The only way to end this continuing injustice is to start from scratch, now on a level playing field that gives all adult citizens an equal opportunity to influence the decisions: about whether to have a constitution at all, about whether and how to entrench it, and about what to include. 7

Let me add three clarifications about the kind of argument here developed. First, the most common response to arguments from historical injustice is the challenge "how do you know what would have happened if ...?". In the present case, this response is entirely beside the point. The feminist argument, as I have conceived it, does employ the thought that, had women had the vote from the beginning, the constitution might well now have a different content than it does have. But the argument makes no claim about what this different content would be, and it certainly does not demand that we should now switch over to any such alternative content. Rather, the argument claims that the creation of the constitutional provisions was marred by a significant injustice, the exclusion of women from the political process, which was not clearly causally irrelevant to the result. And the thrust of the argument is entirely negative, demanding that the existing constitutional provisions should not enjoy the benefit of an undeserved entrenchment.

7

In numbers: Suppose men and women each constitute 5 0 % o f the electorate. 80% of men and 80% of women support banning race discrimination. Half of these people, namely 10% of men and 7 0 % of women strongly support banning sex discrimination and would be willing to block a weaker amendment targeting race discrimination alone. If only men vote, this weaker anti-discrimination amendment will pass with 7 0 % of the vote, against its opponents (20%) and against the votes of the male feminists (10%). Even if universal suffrage is introduced later, only 4 0 % will support adding a ban on sex discrimination. On the other hand, if women are eligible to vote from the start, the 40% strongly supportive of banning sex discrimination are able to block a provision targeting race discrimination alone and can thereby bargain for the support of those who more strongly favor banning race discrimination than they oppose banning sex discrimination.

Historical Wrongs

127

Can we really draw even this weak conclusion from showing that some historical injustice merely might well have - rather than: has - made a difference? After all, such a showing of might-well-have is compatible with the claim that the historical injustice also might well have made no difference. One response to this objection is that it is quite unlikely that, had women been fully enfranchised from the beginning, the exact same constitution would have been formulated and identically entrenched by the political process. But this response risks getting us embroiled in the kind of historical speculation that so often bogs down arguments invoking the distributive effects of past wrongs. Better then to rely on another, independent response: Suppose there is indeed a possible parallel history in which women were fully enfranchised from the beginning and still the exact same constitution is formulated and identically entrenched by the political process. In that fictional parallel world, this constitution, though indistinguishable from ours, would have much greater moral legitimacy than it has in our world. In that parallel world, there would be much less moral reason, if any, to start over. Second, the argument need not challenge the existing legal system and its cumbersome procedures for constitutional change. It can be presented as a merely moral appeal among fellow citizens: If a majority favors constitutional change, a minority should not use the veto power it may have, thanks to historically unjust entrenchment, to block the majority's will. Were this appeal honored, the entrenchment would be formally respected (with new constitutional provisions fully sanctified by the prescribed procedure), but it would be practically set aside for moral reasons as opponents of the revisions would let the proponents win when they realize that the latter have even merely a simple majority. Third, while the feminists' position has dramatic implications, it is also less radical than it might be. A more radical argument developed by Michael Otsuka would reject any exercise of political power by past people over the living. Even a procedurally flawless referendum just 19 years ago should not be allowed to thwart the majority will today. And the rectifying procedure proposed by the feminists should thus be extended to all constitutional provisions, irrespective of whether they were adopted before or after the enfranchisement of women. We see here that the position suggested by the feminists' new argument - by challenging some entrenched constitutions - is intermediate between a radical position that challenges all entrenched constitutions and a conservative position that challenges none (unless they are legally flawed, as when the constitutionally prescribed mode of constitutional amendment was not correctly followed). In another respect, however, the radical and conservative positions agree against the intermediate one. They agree that the moral quality of the historical process through which presently entrenched constitutions once 8

9

8

9

Imagine a group o f people playing poker. At the end of the evening, they find that the deck of cards was one short. A debate ensues: Should the games be annulled by returning all players to their initial cash holdings or should the present distribution of cash be allowed to stand? The proponents of annulment claim that the defect in the deck might well have made a difference to the outcome. If this claim were false, if it were certain that the same gains and losses would have c o m e about even if the deck had been complete, then the opponents of annulment may have a case. (Perhaps the players switch decks periodically, and the opponents of annulment can show that the defective deck was never u s e d ) But it is plainly not enough for such opponents to claim that the same gains and losses could - or even: might well - have come about even if the deck had been complete. That some particular result might well have emerged from a fair historical process does not help justify this result if it in fact emerged from an unfair historical process. In his Libertarianism without Inequality, ch. 7, ' T h e Problem of Intergenerational Sovereignty".

128

Thomas W. Pogge

were adopted has little or no bearing on present moral reasons for action. In this dispute, I side with the intermediate position. Against the radicals I hold that long-term entrenchment can have some moral standing, which is at stake when the fairness of the manner of entrenchment is under challenge. And against the conservatives I hold that it matters now, morally, whether and how significantly the entrenchment of some provision was aided by injustice or other wrongs. These views could and should be defended at greater length. But let me instead develop the intermediate position a little further, beyond the topic of procedural injustice as illustrated by the entrenchment of constitutional provisions.

3.2 Unjust Background Conditions in the Evolution of Present Arrangements

Institutional

It is well known that the rules of an institutional order have distributive effects. An obvious example is a society's tax code, whose specific design affects not only the long-term growth and vibrancy of the national economy, but also the incidence of poverty, inequality, unemployment, and much else. Less widely understood is the inverse influence: how the distribution of income and wealth prevailing in a society is reflected in the rules of its political and economic order. We know very well, of course, especially if we have lived in the United States, that money can buy political influence and that wealthy individuals and powerful firms often spend large sums on so-called "campaign contributions", Political Action Committees (PACs), lobbying efforts, and the like - transactions that differ little from legalized bribery. But we do not think much about how the abstract distribution of income and wealth itself affects the design of the institutional order which then, in turn, acts back upon this economic distribution. Still, it is clear upon reflection that the amount of time and money the rich, or the poor, spend on efforts to shape the tax code in their own favor depends in good part on how much time and money they have. And this, in turn, depends on what the structure of the tax system is now. There is the possibility, then, of what economists call multiple equilibria, each of which would be self-sustaining in the same society: A low-inequality equilibrium with highly progressive tax rates would maintain itself because supporters of a less progressive tax scheme do not, under the scheme as it is, have sufficient incentives, money, and political influence to defeat the more numerous and likewise reasonably well educated and prosperous defenders of the status quo. And a highinequality equilibrium with much less progressive effective marginal tax rates would also maintain itself because defenders of the status quo enjoy great advantages in wealth, influence, and education which motivate and enable them to defeat the majority's interest in achieving greater economic equality. Whether some particular society is in a low-inequality equilibrium (like Norway and Sweden) or in an also feasible high-inequality equilibrium (like Brazil) or in some feasible intermediate equilibrium (like the United Kingdom and the United States) depends then on historical contingencies. Which specific feasible equilibrium a society is in is path-dependent. 10

10

The word "feasible" is meant to allude to the fact that, for any society or other social system, there are outer bounds to the space of durable economic equilibria (distinguishable, roughly, by their degree of economic inequality). When inequality exceeds certain limits, it tends to be disadvantageous even to the rich. Thus extreme inequality is associated with a risk o f rebellion that worsens the

Historical Wrongs

129

This thought could be developed to encompass further complexities. Involved in the causal feedback loop are not only the rules of the tax code, but also the laws governing the financing of political campaigns and the electoral method as well as non-legal practices and conventions which are shaped by, and in turn help reproduce, the prevailing distributional pattern. All these factors, and others as well, bear to the existing economic distribution a relation of reciprocal influence which will tend to be one of mutual reinforcement. While the causal picture is more complex, the central point remains: Within certain outer bounds, a given degree of economic inequality is often self-reinforcing or entrenched. This fact provides the basis for an argument that, though less punchy and clear-cut, is analogous to the one on procedural injustice sketched in the preceding subsection: Insofar as a society's present economic equilibrium is path-dependent, its moral legitimacy depends in part on the moral legitimacy of the path on which it evolved. And the moral legitimacy of an existing high-inequality equilibrium may then possibly be challenged by tracing it back to antecedent conditions that were marred by injustice - antecedent conditions like the highly unequal distribution of wealth in the United Kingdom at the end of the feudal period, for instance, or that in the United States when slavery was abolished. The poor in the UK today could then launch their own "new argument", somewhat akin to the one constructed for the feminists in the preceding section: We all agree now that the feudal order was deeply unjust. But when this order was dismantled, the heavily skewed economic distribution that had evolved over centuries of injustice was left intact. Democratization thus took hold against the background of large economic inequalities, which afforded the rich grossly disproportionate influence in shaping the political and economic ground rules of the democratizing country to be inegalitarian. The high-inequality equilibrium existing in the UK today may well then be a continuing legacy of the economic inequalities accumulated under the unjust feudal order." This new argument casts doubt on the legitimacy of the existing extent of economic inequality. But what sort of change, if any, can it justify? Does it not provide as much support to anti-egalitarian critics of the present tax code (who charge this code with being overly progressive, thereby generating too equal an economic distribution) as it proprospects of the rich relative to what these prospects would be with less inequality and no rebellion (as one might learn from the experience of the French aristocracy in 1789). The rich themselves therefore have a vested interest in keeping inequality well below the rebellion threshold. Since this interest is widely shared across society, it is likely to prevail, so long as there is common knowledge about where, roughly, the rebellion threshold lies.

11

A more restrictive outer bound, unique to the last two centuries, is imposed by popular sovereignty. S o long as the exercise of political power depends on regular elections that involve nearly all adult citizens and give roughly equal weight to the vote o f each, there is a limit to how far inequality can be increased without creating a popular majority prepared to field and to vote for candidates and political parties promising reversal. Income inequality in the United Kingdom, as manifested in a Gini coefficient of 36.8, is greater than in any other major European country. Inequality is still greater in the United States, whose Gini is 4 0 . 8 , and very much greater in South Africa, with a Gini of 59.3, as well as in Brazil, with a Gini of 60.7, and in most other Latin American countries. The Scandinavian countries and Japan have Ginis in the mid-20s. The corresponding income ratio of the top 10% to the bottom 10% of the population of these countries are (with the year of the last survey in parentheses): Japan 4.5 ( 1 9 9 3 ) , Norway 5.3 (1995), Germany 7.1 (1994), France 9.1 (1995), UK 12.3 (1995), US 16.6 ( 1 9 9 7 ) , South Africa 42.5 (1993-4), Brazil 65.8 ( 1 9 9 8 ) , Paraguay 91.1 (1998). All these data are taken from Human Development Report 2002, 194-6.

130

Thomas W. Pogge

vides to egalitarian critics of the present tax code (who charge this code with being insufficiently progressive, thereby generating too unequal an economic distribution)? This apparent symmetry is broken by the value of democratic equality. Economic institutions are widely thought to depend for their legitimacy upon the free and informed endorsement of a majority of citizens, with each citizen's view counting for as much as any other's. When a society's distribution of income and wealth is highly uneven, it is quite difficult to obtain such free and informed majority consent and more difficult still for citizens to be sure that there is such consent. The reason is that, in such a society, the rich enjoy great advantages over the poor in such respects as education, access to the mass media, free time they can devote to political activities, funds they can contribute to political parties and causes, and so forth. When a society's distribution of income and wealth is reasonably even, then it is, by contrast, much easier to ensure that economic institutions designed through the democratic political process enjoy the free and informed endorsement of a majority of citizens. In such a society, a democratically adopted institutional change toward greater inequality can have legitimacy as reflecting the majority's belief that this change will be beneficial to the society and to most of its members by entailing greater affluence and faster economic growth without undermining the fairness of the democratic political process. In this way, the widely accepted value of democratic equality breaks the apparent symmetry and saves this new argument against entrenched economic inequality from being inconclusive. To understand this new argument correctly, it may help expressly to distinguish it from more common arguments invoking the distributive effects of past wrongs. Such conventional arguments claim about specific persons or groups that they would be better off now than they actually are if some past injustice or wrongdoing had not occurred. The claim might be, for instance, that blacks in the United States would today be less disadvantaged relative to other groups if their ancestors had not been enslaved or if their ancestors, once freed from bondage, had been given a fairer start. This claim naturally leads to demands for compensation or rectification designed to bring the claimants - individuated rigidly as individual persons or generically as members of some natural group - up to where they would now be if the historical injustice had never occurred. The standard response to such arguments is to demand proof of the relevant subjunctives: to demand proof that the selected persons or groups would really be better off than they are had the injustice not occurred. Would blacks be better off today if Africa had not been raided by colonialists and slave traders? Would African-Americans be better off today if Sherman's promise of forty acres and a mule had been kept? It is quite 12

12

For a brief account, see http://www.isomedia.com/homes/bhd2/40_acres_and_mule.htm: On January 12, 1865, in the midst of his "March to the Sea" during the Civil War, General William T. Sherman and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton met with 2 0 Black community leaders of Savannah, Georgia. Based in part to their input, General Sherman issued Special Field Order # 1 5 on January 16, 1865, setting aside the Sea Islands and a 30 mile inland tract o f land along the southern coast of Charleston for the exclusive settlement of Blacks. Each family would receive 4 0 acres of land and an army mule to work the land, thus "forty acres and a mule". General Rufus Saxton was assigned by Sherman to implement the Order. On a national level, this and other land, confiscated and abandoned, became the jurisdiction of the Freedman's Bureau, which was headed by General Oliver Otis Howard (Howard University). In his words he wanted to "... give the freedmen protection, land and schools as far and as fast as he can". However, during the summer and fall of 1865, President Andrew Johnson issued special pardons, returning the property to the ex-Confederates. Howard issued Circular 13, giving 4 0 acres as quickly as possible. Learning about this, Johnson ordered Howard to issue Circular 15, returning the land to the ex-Confederates.

Historical Wrongs

131

hard to decide such subjunctives; and if they involve particular rigidly individuated persons, there is the additional difficulty of showing that these persons would even have come into being without the injustice. The new argument is entirely different. It poses a direct challenge not to the present distribution (of wealth, income, status, powers, or whatever) over specific persons or groups, but rather to this present distribution abstractly considered: to the present extent of inequality. Involving the three elements we found exemplified by the new feminist argument, it claims that existing economic institutions (such as the tax code) evolved against a background of unjust inequality; that their content may well have been influenced by these unjust background conditions; and that these economic institutions and any inequalities and deprivations persisting under them are therefore morally tainted. To remove this stain, those economic institutions must be reformed in an egalitarian direction to the point where it is clearly true that the affirmation of economic institutions by the democratic political process is tantamount to their free and informed endorsement by a majority of citizens. To be sure, an attack on the present extent of inequality also challenges, indirectly, the present concrete distribution. But this challenge is different from a challenge invoking the distributive effects of past wrongs. It does not suggest that some persons or groups are richer, and others poorer, than they would now be if certain historical wrongs had not occurred. Its suggestion is, rather, that some persons or groups are richer, and others poorer, than anyone would now be if certain historical wrongs had not occurred. It is not suggested that past wrongs live on in the advantages of status, wealth, and education that, once unjustly accumulated, are passed on within specific family lines or within ethnic or kinship groups. The suggestion is rather that economic inequalities, once unjustly accumulated, live on in the economic institutions (paradigmatically the tax code) that in tum strongly influence the extent of future inequality: If there had not been the historical injustice of feudalism, then there might well now exist a more egalitarian economic equilibrium: a more progressive tax code reinforcing and reinforced by a less unequal economic distribution. An argument invoking the distributive effects of past wrongs could be defeated by showing that the 19 -century ancestors of the super-rich in the UK today belong mostly to the working class and, in any case, not to the nobility. But the "new argument" in favor of a more progressive tax code for the UK would be wholly undisturbed by such a finding. 13

lh

14

Once again, we can situate the new argument between two extremes, one radical and the other conservative. The radical view holds that in order to conclude that a present institutional order ought to be reformed in an egalitarian direction we only need a forward-looking argument that shows this order to be inferior in its distributional effects to some feasible alternative. If we find that the existing economic rules have a feasible alternative (involving more progressive tax rates, for instance) that would reduce both poverty and inequality (would better satisfy Rawls's difference principle, say), then we have all the reason we could need for demanding reforms. The conservative view holds 13 14

S e e D. Parfit, Reasons

and Persons,

ch. 16.

There is yet another argument in the vicinity that mine should be distinguished from. This third argument would claim that historical injustice has (or might well have) influenced the ordinal distribution of persons over socio-economic positions. This argument, too, could be adduced to support change in an egalitarian direction. But I will not examine this argument here. Still, it should be clear that, even if the claim of the third argument were known to be false, this would not damage the "new argument" explored in the text.

132

Thomas

W.

Pogge

that one should respect the historically grown institutional arrangements of one's society except in extreme cases (e.g., late feudalism, perhaps, or early-Stalin communism) where these arrangements cause widespread, severe and avoidable suffering. Both views agree that the causal influence of past wrongs on the evolution of the existing institutional order is irrelevant to its moral legitimacy. I dissent from this agreement. As I see it, the radicals are right that forward-looking considerations (evaluating the comparative effects of present institutional arrangements) have substantial and often decisive moral weight, and the conservatives are right that the institutional status quo can have some countervailing moral standing. But, rather than simply split the difference between the two views, I hold that the moral legitimacy of this institutional status quo crucially depends on how it has actually evolved. An institutional order whose evolution was heavily influenced by grievous injustice and wrongdoing may have no moral standing at all. The history of an institutional order may therefore tip the scales with respect to the question whether the continued imposition of this order is morally acceptable or not. And this history may also make a difference to how unacceptable it is to impose such an institutional order. An economic order may produce so much avoidable poverty and inequality that it can be condemned on forward-looking grounds alone, which suffice to show that this order would be unjust even if it had come about in the most benign way one might imagine. However, suppose that the evolution of this economic order was in fact marred by grievous injustices or other wrongs. In this case, it and its imposition would be even more unjust. The present global economic order is a case in point. I have argued in a recent book that this order is gravely unjust on account of the enormous inequality and severe poverty it reproduces: The "high-income" countries with 15.6 percent of the world's population have 81 percent of the global product. All those below the World Bank's "$2/day" poverty line - defined in terms of daily per capita income with the purchasing power that $2.15 had in the US in 1993 - constitute 47 percent of the world's population with VA percent of global income. The annual death toll from poverty-related causes is about 18 million or one third of all human deaths. Today's world economy illustrates dramatically the mutual reinforcement of unequal distribution and inegalitarian institutions. The rules of the world economy are negotiated among governments or established simply through their conduct and practice. If these governments, because of vast international economic inequality, differ dramatically in bargaining power, those rules will reflect a highly skewed bargaining equilibrium that favors the interests of those already much advantaged. Under such rules, the lion's share of global economic growth will go to the rich, entrenching and perhaps even expanding their economic advantage. Given the vast human death toll and suffering they avoidably produce, existing global institutional arrangements would surely be severely unjust even if the economic inequality sustaining them had come about in a most innocent way. We could imagine, for instance, that before the populations of different continents took notice of one another, the Europeans had worked much harder than others and built up a great stock of economic and human capital while people elsewhere were living hand-to-mouth. When significant intercontinental interaction then arose, the Europeans already had a significant economic head-start that allowed them to dominate the shaping of global institutional arrange15

15

See n. 2 above.

Historical

Wrongs

133

merits. Even with this benign history, we would have sufficient forward-looking moral reasons to reform the global institutional order so as to preclude, at least, life-threatening poverty. Yet, these reasons become even stronger when, substituting the actual history, we recall that existing global economic inequality accumulated over the course of an historical process that has, through colonialism, genocides, and enslavement, devastated the societies and cultures of four continents. At the end of this extremely violent occupation, when Africa was hastily decolonized around 1960, the countries of the "First World" enjoyed an enormous 30:1 advantage in per capita income over the new African states. This unjustly accumulated advantage enabled these countries to shape the rules of the global economic order in their favor and thereby still today taints these inegalitarian rules as well as the unequal economic distribution they help reproduce. (It is often said that colonialism cannot possibly have any significance for explaining today's suffering on the African continent, that even Apartheid is too long ago now to matter. To see the falsehood of this view, just consider what a 30:1 advantage means: Even if all of Africa, starting in 1960, consistently achieved each and every year one percent higher growth in per capita income than the First-World countries, it would take until early in the 2 4 century for Africa to catch up. ) My suggestion is then that in thinking about how much economic inequality is morally acceptable and about how morally (unAcceptable some given degree of economic inequality is, we should be sensitive also to how this inequality and the rules sustaining it came about. I conclude that appeals to the rule-shaping effects of past wrongs are far more promising than appeals to the distributive effects of past wrongs as made within the standard arguments thus far put forward under the 'historical injustice' label. The former appeals cannot, however, justify compensation to specific persons or natural groups. Instead, they challenge the existing extent of inequality as heavily influenced by historical wrongs. Such a challenge naturally leads to demands for a "new deal" that would increase equality and thereby reduce the influence of historical wrongs on the shaping of social institutions and the extent of economic inequality. We do not need to know what these influences are, exactly, to conclude that they should not give rise to the severe inequalities our world displays today. th

4.

16

Conclusion

My objective in this paper was to mitigate the concentration, among those working on historical injustice, on one subquestion: regarding the distributive effects of past wrongs. This concentration would make sense, if the other two subquestions were less interesting or of lesser practical relevance. As I have tried to show, it is more likely that the opposite is true. The holistic effects of past wrongs (and especially the backwardlooking version of the sucker exemption) and the rule-shaping effects of past wrongs seem well worth sustained study, and the latter are likely of greater present distributional significance than the distributive effects of past wrongs. I am well aware that I could 16

It is not easy to achieve such higher rates of growth under rules hammered out in intergovernmental negotiations with counter-parties who have vastly greater bargaining power. At any rate, actual growth in per capita income was slower in most African countries than in the First World, and so that the ratio has expanded to 40:1.

134

Thomas W. Pogge

here merely raise these issues, not treat them with anything like the thoroughness they deserve.

Bibliography Otsuka, M., Libertarianism without Inequality, Oxford University Press, 2003. Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, 1984. Pogge, Th., World Poverty and Human Rights, Polity Press, 2002. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, W.W. Norton & Company, 1998. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002, Oxford University Press, 2002.

135

Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights

George Sher

It is widely acknowledged that persons may deserve compensation for the effects of wrong acts performed before they were born. It is such acts that are in question when we say that blacks deserve compensation because their forebears were originally brought to this country as slaves, or that American Indians deserve compensation for the unjust appropriation of their ancestors' land. But although some principle of compensation for the lasting effects of past wrongs seems appropriate, the proper temporal scope of that principle is not clear. We may award compensation for the effects of wrongs done as many as ten or twenty generations ago; but what of wrongs done a hundred generations ago? Or five hundred or a thousand? Are there any temporal limits at all to the wrong acts whose enduring effects may call for compensation? In the first section of this essay, I shall discuss several reasons for addressing these neglected questions. In subsequent sections, I shall discuss some possible ways of resolving them.

1. A natural initial reaction to questions about compensation for the effects of ancient wrongs is that these questions are, in the main, hopelessly unrealistic. In the case of blacks, Indians, and a few analogous groups, we may indeed have enough information to suggest that most current group members are worse off than they would be in the absence of some initial wrong. But if the wrong act was performed even longer ago or if the persons currently suffering its effects do not belong to a coherent and easily identified group, then such information will not be available to us. There are surely some persons alive today who would be better off if the Spanish Inquisition had not taken place or if the Jews had never been originally expelled from the land of Canaan. However, to discover who those persons are and how much better off they would be, we would have to draw on far more genealogical, causal, and counterfactual knowledge than anyone can reasonably expect to possess. Because this information is not and never will be completely available, the question of who, if anyone, deserves compensation for the current effects of these wrongs will never be answered. But if so, why bother asking it? This relaxed approach to compensation has the virtue of realism. The suggestion that we might arrive at a complete understanding of the effects of ancient wrongs is a philosopher's fantasy and nothing more. Nevertheless, despite its appeal, I think we cannot rest content with a totally pragmatic dismissal of the issue of compensating for ancient wrongs. For one thing, even if compensatory justice is a partially unrealizable ideal, its theoretical limits will retain an intrinsic interest. For another, even if we cannot now ascertain which persons deserve compensation for the effects of ancient wrongs, the insight that such persons exist might itself suggest new obligations to us. In particular, if the victims of even the most ancient of wrongs can qualify for compensaFirst published in Philosophy Princeton University Press.

and Public

Affairs

10 (1981), 3-17. Reprinted by permission of

136

George Sher

tion and if our current compensatory efforts are therefore aimed at only a small subset of those who deserve it, then we will at least be obligated to enlarge the subset by extending our knowledge of the effects of ancient wrongs as far as possible. Alternatively, the discovery that desert of compensation is not invariant with respect to temporal distance might force us to reduce our compensatory efforts in certain areas. These considerations suggest that clarifying the theoretical status of ancient wrongs may dictate certain (rather marginal) changes in our actual compensatory policies. But there is also another, far more significant implication that such clarification might have. Given the vastness of historical injustice and given the ramification of every event over time, it seems reasonable to assume that most or all current individuals have both benefited from and been harmed by numerous ancient wrongs. For (just about) every current person P, there are likely to be some ancient wrongs that have benefited P but harmed others, and other ancient wrongs that have benefited others but harmed P. In light of this, neither the distribution of goods that actually prevails nor that which would prevail in the absence of all recent wrongs is likely to resemble the distribution that would prevail in the absence of all historical wrongs. But if so, and if the effects of ancient wrongs do call as strongly for compensation as the effects of recent ones, then it seems that neither compensating nor not compensating for the known effects of recent wrongs will be just. On the one hand, since the point of compensating for the effects of wrong acts is to restore a just distribution of goods among the affected parties, the injustice of the distribution that would prevail in the absence of recent wrongs will undermine our rationale for restoring it. However, on the other hand, even if that distribution is unjust, the distribution that actually prevails is no better; and so a failure to compensate for recent wrongs will be every bit as unpalatable. The only strategy that is just is that of restoring the distribution that would have prevailed in the absence of all historical wrongs. But this, as we have seen, we will never have sufficient information to do. How to respond to this combination of pervasive injustice and indefeasible ignorance is a complicated and difficult question. One possible strategy is to argue that even if compensating for recent wrongs would not restore full justice, it would at least bring us substantially closer to a totally just distribution than we are now. A second alternative is to revise our account of the aim of compensating for recent wrongs - to say that the point of doing this is not to restore a fully just distribution among the affected parties, but rather only to nullify the effects of one particular set of injustices. A third is to accept Nozick's suggestion that we "view some patterned principles of distributive justice [e.g., egalitarianism or Rawls' difference principle] as rough rules of thumb meant to approximate the general results of applying the principle of rectification of injustice." A fourth is to abandon hope of achieving justice by either compensating or not compensating and simply start afresh by redistributing goods along egalitarian or Rawlsian lines. If their positions can be grounded in either of the latter ways, egalitarians and Rawlsians may hope to rebut the charge that they ignore such historical considerations as entitlement and desert. But as interesting as these issues are, it would be premature for us to consider them further here. The choice among the suggested options arises only if ancient wrongs do call for compensation as strongly as recent ones; and so that claim must be investigated first. The discussion so far has been merely 1

2

1 2

R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 2 3 1 . For development of this charge as it pertains to entitlement, see ibid., ch. 7. For discussion involving desert, see G. Sher, "Effort, Ability, and Personal Desert".

Ancient

Wrongs

and Modern

RigfUs

137

to establish the claim's importance. Having done that, we may now tum to the question of its truth.

2. Intuitively, the effects of ancient wrongs do not seem to call as strongly for compensation as the effects of recent ones. Indeed, the claim that persons deserve compensation even for the effects of wrongs done in biblical times appears to be a reductio of the ideal of compensatory justice. But we shall be wary of intuitions of this sort. It is perfectly possible that they reflect only an awareness of the epistemological difficulty of establishing desert of compensation for ancient wrongs; and if they do, then all the problems limned above will remain untouched. To clarify the force of our intuitions, we must ask whether they can be traced to any deeper source in the notion of compensation itself. Is there anything about compensation that reduces the likelihood that ancient wrongs may call for it? More precisely, are there any necessary conditions for desert of compensation that become progressively harder to satisfy over time? Prima facie, the answer to this question is clearly yes. On its standard interpretation, compensation is the restoration of a good or level of well-being that someone would have enjoyed if he had not been adversely affected by another's wrong act. To enjoy (almost) any good, a person must exist. Hence, it seems to be a necessary condition for X's deserving compensation for the effect of Ts doing A that X would have existed in A's absence. Where A is an act performed during X's lifetime, this requirement presents few problems. However, as A recedes into the past, it becomes progressively more likely that the effects of the non-performance of A will include X's non-existence. If X's currently low level of well-being is due to the defrauding of his great-grandfather in Europe, the very same fraudulent act that reduced X's great-grandfather to poverty may be what caused him to emigrate to America and so to meet X's great-grandmother. Because the prevalence of such stories increases as the relevant wrong act recedes into the past, the probability that the effects of the wrong act will call for compensation must decrease accordingly. And where the wrong act is an ancient one, that probability may approach zero. This way of explaining our intuitions about ancient wrongs may at first seem quite compelling. But once we scrutinize it more closely, I think doubts must arise. If X cannot deserve compensation for the effects of A unless X would have existed in the absence of A, then not only ancient wrongs, but also the slave trade, the theft of the Indians' land, and many other acts whose effects are often deemed worthy of compensation will turn out to be largely non-compensable. As Lawrence Davis notes, "were we to project 200 years of our country's history in a rectified movie, the cast of characters would surely differ significantly from the existing cast." Moreover, even if we were to accept this conclusion, as Michael Levin has urged that we do, further problems would remain. Even in the case of some wrong acts performed very shortly before their victims' existence (for example, acts of environmental pollution causing massive genetic damage), it seems reasonable to suppose that it is not the victim, but rather some other person, who would exist in the absence of the wrong act. And there are also cases in which wrong acts do not produce but rather preserve the lives of their victims, as when a kidnapping accidentally prevents a child from perishing in the fire that subsequently 3

4

3

L. Davis, "Comments on Nozick's Entitlement Theory", 842.

4

M. Levin, "Reverse Discrimination, Shackled Runners, and Personal Identity".

138

George Sher

destroys his home. Since compensation may clearly be deserved in all such cases, it seems that the proposed necessary condition for deserving it will have to be rejected. If we do wish to reject that necessary condition, there are at least two alternatives available to us. One is to alter our interpretation of the counterfactual presupposed by the standard account of compensation - i.e., to read that counterfactual as requiring not simply that X be better off in the closest possible world in which A is absent, but rather that X be better off in the closest possible world in which A is absent and X exists. A more drastic alternative, for which I have argued elsewhere, is to modify the standard view of compensation itself - i.e., to say that compensating X is not necessarily restoring X to the level of well-being that he would have occupied in the absence of A, but rather that it is restoring X to the level of well-being that some related person or group of persons would have occupied in the absence of A. Although both suggestions obviously require further work, it is clear that neither yields the unacceptable consequences of the simpler account. However, it is also true that neither implies that the probability of desert will decrease over time. Hence, the shift to either of them will call for a different explanation of our intuitions about compensation for ancient wrongs. 5

6

3. A more promising way of explaining these intuitions can be extracted from a recent article by David Lyons. In an important discussion of the American Indian claims to land, Lyons argues that property rights are unlikely to be so stable as to persist intact through all sorts of social changes. Even on Nozick's extremely strong conception of property rights, the "Lockean Proviso" implies that such rights must give way when changing conditions bring it about that some individuals are made worse off by (originally legitimate) past acts of acquisition. In particular, this may happen when new arrivals are disadvantaged by their lack of access to established holdings. Because property rights do thus change over time, Lyons argues that today's Indians would probably not have a right to their ancestors' land even if it had not been illegitimately taken. Hence, restoring the land or its equivalent to them is unlikely to be warranted as compensation. But if this is true of America's Indians, then it must be true to an even greater degree of the victims of ancient wrongs. If property rights are so unstable, then rights held thousands of years ago would surely not have survived the world's drastic population growth, the industrial revolution, or other massive social changes. Hence, their violation in the distant past may appear to call for no compensation now. Because wrongful harm and deprivation of property are so closely connected, this approach initially seems to offer a comprehensive solution to our problem. However, here again, a closer examination reveals difficulties. First, even if we grant Lyons' point that changing conditions can alter people's entitlements and that new arrivals may be entitled to fair shares of goods already held, it remains controversial to suppose that these fair shares must be equal ones. If the shares need not be equal, then the instability 7

j ; j i

i

j

5 6

7

G. Sher, "Compensation and Transworld Personal Identity", Although I have presented them as alternatives, the two suggestions need not be viewed as mutually exclusive. Indeed, the most promising approach appears to be to combine them. The first suggestion appears the more natural in those cases where there are many close alternative worlds that lack the initial wrong act but contain the victim himself, while the second appears indispensable in those instances where the initial wrong is so intimately associated with the victim's existence that there is no such world. D. Lyons, ' T h e N e w Indian Claims and the Original Rights to Land".

Ancient

Wrongs

and Modern

Rights

139

of property rights may well permit the preservation of substantial legitimate inequalities through both time and inheritance. Moreover, second, even if property rights do fade completely over time, there will still be many current persons whom ancient wrongs have in one way or another prevented from acquiring new property rights. Because these new rights would ex hypothesi not have been continuations of any earlier rights, they would not have been affected by the instability of those earlier rights. Hence, the persons who would have held them will apparently still deserve to be compensated. Finally, despite the close connection between property and well-being, there are surely many ways of being harmed that do not involve violations of property rights at all. As many writers on preferential treatment have suggested, a person can also be harmed by being deprived of self-respect, by being rendered less able to compete for opportunities when they arise, and in other related ways. Although these claims must be scrutinized with considerable care, at least some appear clearly true. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the psychological effects of a wrong act are any less long-lived, or any less likely to be transmitted from generation to generation, than their economic counterparts. It is true that the psychological effects of wrong acts are often themselves the result of property violations; but the case for compensating for them does not appear to rest on this. Because it does not, that case seems compatible with any view of the stability of property rights.

4. Given these difficulties, Lyons' insight about property does not itself resolve our problem. However, it suggests a further line of inquiry that may. We have seen that because property rights are not necessarily stable, we cannot assume that anyone who retains his property in a world without the initial wrong is entitled to all (or even any) of it in that world. A world in which that particular wrong is rectified may still be morally deficient in other respects. Because of this, the real question is not how much property the victim does have in the rectified world, but rather how much he should have in it. Moreover, to avoid arbitrariness, we must say something similar about persons whose losses do not involve property as well. If this is not generally recognized, it is probably because deleting the initial wrong act, which is properly only necessary for establishing what the victim should have had, is easily taken to be sufficient for it. But whatever the source of the oversight, the fact that the operative judgments about rectified worlds are themselves normative is a major complication in the theory of compensation, for normative judgments do not always transfer smoothly to the actual world. By spelling out the conditions under which they do not, we may hope finally to clarify the status of ancient wrongs. Let us begin by considering a normative judgment that plainly does not carry over from a rectified world to our own. Suppose that X, a very promising student, has been discriminatorily barred from entering law school; and suppose further that although X knows he will be able to gain entry in another year, he becomes discouraged and so does not reapply. In a rectified world Wr which lacks the initial discrimination, X studies diligently and eventually becomes a prominent lawyer who enjoys great prestige and a high salary. In that world, we may suppose, X is fully entitled to these goods. However, in the actual world, Wa, the compensation to which X is entitled appears to fall far short of them or their equivalent. Hence, our normative judgment does not fully carry over from Wr to Wa.

140

George Sher

Why does our normative judgment about Wr not fully carry over? In part, the answer to this question seems to lie in X's own contribution to the actual course of events. Given more perseverance, X could have avoided most of the effects of the initial wrong act; and this certainly seems relevant to what he should now have. However, quite apart from what X does or does not do in Wa, there is another factor to consider here. Insofar as X's entitlements in Wr stem from what X does in law school and thereafter, they arise through a sequence of actions that X does not perform in Wr until well after the original wrong and that he does not perform in Wa at all. These entitlements are not merely inherited by X in Wr, but rather are created anew by his actions in that world. But if X's actions in Wr are themselves the source of some of his entitlements in that world, then it will make little sense to suppose that those entitlements can exist in an alternative world (that is, the actual one) which lacks the generating actions. To say this would be to hold that what a person should have may be determined by certain actions that neither he nor anyone else has actually performed. We are plainly unwilling to say things like this in other contexts (nobody would say that a person deserves to be punished simply because he would have committed a crime if given the opportunity), and they seem to be no more supportable here. In view of these considerations, it seems that the transferability of a person's entitlements from a rectified world to the actual one is limited by two distinct factors. It is limited, first, by the degree to which one's actual entitlements have been diminished by one's own omissions in this world and, second, by the degree to which one's entitlements in a rectified world are generated anew by one's own actions there. In the case of X, this means that what transfers is not all of his entitlements in Wr, but at best his entitlement to the basic opportunity to acquire these entitlements - in this instance, the entitlement to (the value of) the lost opportunity to attend law school. Of course, the value of this opportunity is itself determined by the value of the further goods whose acquisition it makes possible. But the opportunity is clearly not worth as much as the goods themselves. This reasoning, if sound, sheds considerable light on the general concept of compensation. But because the reasoning applies equally to compensation for ancient and recent wrongs, its connection with our special problem about ancient wrongs is not yet clear. To bring out this connection, we must explore its implications over time. So let us now suppose that not just X, but also X's son Z, has benefited from X's admission to law school in Wr. As a result of X's wealth and status, Z enjoys certain advantages in Wr that he does not enjoy in Wa. Assuming that X is fully entitled to his advantages in Wr, and assuming also that X only confers advantages upon Z in morally legitimate ways (whatever these are), it follows that Z too is fully entitled to his advantages in Wr. Under these circumstances, Z may well deserve some compensation in Wa. However, because Z's entitlement to his advantages in Wr stems directly from X's exercise of his own entitlements in that world, it would be anomalous to suppose that the former entitlements could transfer in greater proportion than the latter. Moreover, and crucially, given the principles already adduced, it seems that Z's entitlements in Wr will have to transfer to Wa in even smaller proportion than X's. The reason for this diminution in transferability is easy to see. Just as the transferability of X's entitlements is limited by certain facts about X's omissions in Wa and X's actions in Wr, so too is the transferability of Z's entitlements limited by similar facts 8

9

8 9

This point is discussed in a more limited context in G. Sher, "Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment", 166ff. For discussion, see T. Nagel, "Moral Luck".

Ancient

Wrongs

and Modern

Rights

141

about Z's omissions in Wa and Z's actions in Wr. More specifically, the transferability of Z's entitlements is also limited by Z's own failure to make the most of his opportunities in Wa, and by the degree to which Z's entitlements in Wr have arisen through his use of his own special opportunities there. Of course, the opportunities available to Z in Wr and Wa may be very different from the opportunity to attend law school; but this difference is hardly a relevant one. Whether Z's advantages in Wr and Wa take the form of wealth, political power, special skills or abilities, or simply self-confidence, the fact remains that they are, inter alia, potential opportunities for him to acquire further entitlements. Because of this, the way they contribute to his total entitlements in these worlds must continue to affect the degree to which his entitlements in Wr can transfer to Wa. Once all of this is made clear, the outline of a general solution to our problem about ancient wrongs should begin to emerge. Because the transferability of Z's entitlements is diminished twice over by the contribution of actions performed in Wr and omitted in Wa, while that of X's entitlements is diminished only once by this contribution, it follows that Z is likely to deserve proportionately less compensation for the effects of the original wrong than X; and Z's offspring, if any, will deserve proportionately less compensation still. Moreover, since few original entitlements are preserved intact over succeeding generations (quite apart from any instability of property rights, the consumption of goods and the natural non-inheritability of many entitlements must each take a large toll), the progressive diminution in the transferability of entitlements from Wr to Wa must be absolute, not just proportional. But if the transferability of entitlements from rectified worlds does decrease with every generation, then over the course of very many generations, any such transferability can be expected to become vanishingly small. Where the initial wrong was done many hundreds of years ago, almost all of the difference between the victim's entitlements in the actual world and his entitlements in the rectified world can be expected to stem from the actions of various intervening agents in the two alternative worlds. Little or none of it will be the automatic effect of the initial wrong act itself. Since compensation is warranted only for disparities in entitlements that are the automatic effect of the initial wrong act, this means that there will be little or nothing left to compensate for.

5. This approach to the problem posed by ancient wrongs is not dissimilar to the one extracted from Lyons' discussion. Like Lyons, I have argued that a proper appreciation of the entitlements upon which claims to compensation are based suggests that these claims must fade with time. However, whereas Lyons argued that the entitlement to property itself fades with time, I have held instead that it is the transferability of that and other entitlements from rectified worlds to the actual one that becomes progressively weaker. By thus relocating the basic instability, we avoid the objections that the analysis of property rights is controversial, that some claims to compensation do not view the right to the lost property as continually held in a rectified world, and that other claims to compensation do not involve property at all. But although our account is not open to these objections, it may seem to invite others just as serious. More specifically, it may seem that our presupposition that entitlements are historically transmitted is itself controversial, that our distinction between newly generated and continuing entitlements is problematical, and that we have failed to account satisfactorily for the status of

142

George Sher

wrongs that are neither recent nor ancient. In this final section, I shall consider each of these objections in its turn. The first objection, that the historical transmission of entitlements is as controversial as any analysis of property, is easily answered. Put briefly, the answer is that this presupposition is controversial, but that unlike any special view of property rights, it is internal to the very notion of compensation that generates our problem. If entitlements were never historically transmitted - if a person's entitlements at a given time were never derived from the prior entitlements of others - then someone like Z would not be entitled to any special advantages in Wr and so would not deserve any compensation in Wa. Moreover, although it is less obvious, the same point holds even if Z is only minimally well off in Wr, but is extremely disadvantaged in Wa. It may seem, in that case, that Z's entitlements in Wr are independent of X's - that Z, like everyone else in Wr, is entitled to a certain decent minimum no matter what X was entitled to or did in the past. But even if this is so, it cannot form the basis for compensating Z for the effects of the initial wrong act; for if Z is absolutely entitled to such a minimum in Wr, then he will also be absolutely entitled to it in Wa, and so the original wrong act will drop out as irrelevant. Given these considerations, some form of historical transmission of entitlements is plainly presupposed by any view permitting compensation for a variety of prenatal (and so a fortiori ancient) wrongs. But just because of this, there may seem to be a problem with our central distinction between continuing and newly produced entitlements. This distinction appeared plausible enough when we first considered X's entitlements in Wr. However, once we take seriously the fact that people can transmit, confer, and waive their entitlements, the distinction seems to blur. When a parent confers advantages upon his children by educating or bequeathing wealth to them, the entitlements acquired are both related to earlier ones and the product of new generating actions. Moreover, something similar may be said to hold even when someone merely retains his own entitlement to property; for he too is acting at least in the sense that he is refraining from transferring or waiving that entitlement. Because human actions and omissions are thus crucial in perpetuating so many entitlements, our premise that this role cancels transferability from rectified worlds may well appear too strong. Given this premise, it seems to follow that not only ancient wrongs, but also recent ones, such as systematic racial discrimination, and perhaps even fresh property crimes, are largely non-compensable. These worries are serious ones and would require careful consideration in any full account of compensation. Here, however, I shall only outline what I take to be the correct response to them. Put briefly, my response is that the transferability of entitlements from rectified worlds should be viewed as disrupted not by all intervening acts or omissions in those worlds, but rather only by those acts or omissions that alter previously established structures of entitlements. When an entitlement is already established in a rectified world and is naturally stable over a period of time, its retention during that period is totally explainable in terms of its initial acquisition. In this case, the entitlement need not be attributed to any further doings of the agent; and so those doings seem irrelevant to the entitlement's transferability to the actual world. Moreover, assuming the legitimacy of inheritance, something similar may well hold for advantages that are transmitted to one's offspring; for here again, the resulting entitlements can be viewed 10

10

Thus, compensation is in one sense a strongly conservative notion. One can consistently advocate redistributive measures on compensatory grounds or on non-historical consequentialist grounds, but not, I think, on both grounds together.

Ancient

Wrongs

and Modern

Rights

143

as natural continuations of initial ancestral acts of acquisition. Of course, the principle of the conservation of entitlements that underlies these remarks would require considerable elaboration to be fully convincing. But something like it does seem initially plausible, and anything along these lines will nicely preserve the conclusion that desert of compensation is not entirely momentary and evanescent. A final difficulty remains. Our argument has been that desert of compensation fades gradually over time and that ancient wrongs therefore call for no significant amounts of compensation. But even if this is correct, it does not dispose of the vast intermediate class of wrongs that are not ancient, but were still done one or more generations ago. Since the process we have described is gradual, our account suggests that such wrongs do call for some compensation, although not as much as comparable recent ones. But if this is so, then our account may seem at once too strong and too weak. The account may seem too strong because it will classify as intermediate even the wrongs done to blacks and Indians - wrongs that appear to be among our paradigms of full compensability. However, the account may also seem too weak, since it implies that very many partially compensable wrongs remain undiscovered and that our problem of how to act justly in the face of incurable ignorance is therefore unresolved. Because any response to one aspect of this objection will only aggravate the other, the difficulty seems intractable. But this dilemma is surely overdrawn. On the side of the claims of blacks and Indians, it may first be said that even if the initial wrongs to these persons do go back several centuries, the real source of their claims to compensation may lie elsewhere. As Lyons notes, the truly compensable wrong done to the Indians may be not the initial appropriation of their land, but rather the more recent acts of discrimination and neglect that grew out of this; and the same may hold, mutatis mutandis, for the truly compensable wrongs done to blacks. Moreover, even if the compensable wrongs to blacks and Indians do go back a number of generations, they may be highly atypical of other wrongs of that period. We have seen that one reason that compensability fades over time is that victims neglect reasonable opportunities to acquire equivalent entitlements; and so if slavery or the appropriation of Indian lands have made it specially difficult for their victims to recoup their lost entitlements, then these wrongs may call for far more compensation than others of similar vintage. Here our earlier results provide a natural framework for further inquiry. Finally, even if these suggestions do not establish full compensability for blacks and Indians, they do at least promise very substantial compensation for them; and this is perhaps all that is needed to satisfy our intuitions on the matter. 11

The other horn of our dilemma - that this account leaves untouched our incurable ignorance about past compensable wrongs - is also overstated. The account does leave us unable to diagnose more than a small fraction of the past wrongs requiring compensation; but by itself, this only implies that we cannot right all of history's wrongs. The deeper worry, that in rectifying one injustice we may only be reverting to another, is at least mitigated by the fact that the most significant period of history from the standpoint of compensation is also the best known. Given this fact, the likelihood that our compensatory efforts will make things better rather than worse is greatly increased. If this solution is less precise than we might wish, it is perhaps the best that we have a right to expect.

11

D. Lyons, ' T h e N e w Indian Claims", see esp. 2 6 8 - 2 7 1 . See also B. Biltker, The Case for Reparations, ch. 2.

Black

144 George Sher Bibliography Bittker, B., The Case for Black Reparations, Random House, 1973. Davis, L., "Comments on Nozick's Entitlement Theory", Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976). Levin, M., "Reverse Discrimination, Shackled Runners, and Personal Identity", Philosophical Studies 37 (1980). Lyons, D., "The New Indian Claims and the Original Rights to Land", Social Theory and Practice 4 (1977). Nagel, T., "Moral Luck", Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press, 1979. Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974. Sher, G., "Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment", Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (1975). Sher, G., "Compensation and Transworld Personal Identity", Monist 62 (1979). Sher, G., "Effort, Ability, and Personal Desert", Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (1979).

145

The Legacy of Injustice. Wronging the Future, Responsibility for the Past

Rahul Kumar and David Silver^

Contents 1.

Introduction

145

1.1 The Central Claim

145

1.2 The Forwards Doubt and the Backwards Doubt

147

2.

148

How Wrongs Can Go Forward

2.1 The Existential Worry

148

2.2 Contractualist Wrongs

149

2.3 Slavery as Contemptuous Devaluing of Others

151

3.

152

How Responsibility Can Go Backwards

3.1 Problems with Responsibility for Historical Wrongs

152

3.2 The Corporate Responsibility of the State

153

3.3 Responsibility of the American People: Citizenship and Ethnicity

154

3.4 Implications for Present-Day American Individuals

156

4.

157

1. 1.1

Concluding Remarks

Introduction The Central Claim

Do present-day African-Americans have a valid claim to rectification in virtue of the history of American slavery? Part of the difficulty in answering this question is that it is just not clear what the demand is, what its basis is, who the wronged party or parties is or are, and of whom the demand is being made. There are different answers available to all these questions, and we do not propose to even begin to try and adequately map the complicated field of ways to make sense of claims made in the name of the rectification of historical injustices. Rather, our purpose is to explore one particular way of explicating, at least in principle, the basis for modern 1

For helpful discussion and criticism of previous drafts of this paper, we would particularly like to thank those who attended presentations of this material at Queen's University, the University o f Delaware, the University of Pennsylvania Humanities Forum, and the Eastern Division o f the American Philosophical Association. For particularly helpful written comments and discussion, we thank Samuel Freeman and Michael McKenna.

146 Rahul Kumar and David Silver African-Americans having a claim to rectification. The claim, roughly, goes like this: those who comprise the modern African-American community - which consists of those individuals who at the very least are identified as members of the community, whether or not they self-identify with it - have a claim against the present-day American state to some form of rectification due to the state's role in enabling and legitimating various specific injustices that were visited upon African-Americans during the period in which the institution of chattel slavery was not explicitly and officially recognized by the state, both officially and through its activities, as wrong. Let us call this the central claim. Two points should be noted at the outset concerning the subject matter of our discussion. First, what we are concerned with is claims against a culpable party for rectification in virtue of its past conduct and in virtue of which the wronged party can be said to have been wronged. What we are not concerned with here are issues concerning reparations and the liabilities of the culpable party. It is an open question to what extent our arguments may have implications for questions concerning reparations. The way we are using these terms, reparations aim to address the consequences of one's wrongful treatment of another (or others). Rectification, on the other hand, aims to address the fact that one has related to another wrongfully. It is a matter of addressing what one's having wronged the other person says about one's understanding of how it is appropriate to relate to the person one has wronged. This certainly calls for more than just the acknowledgment of oneself as the culpable party. It is also requires acknowledgment of the seriousness of the wrongdoing as a moral failure about which one is repentant. It may also call for an acceptance of guilt, punishment, criticism, and the need to make reparations. These concepts have a natural home in maintaining relations of mutual respect between individuals in their daily interactions with one another; how they translate into the more complicated case of the wronging of African-Americans by the state is a complicated matter, about which we will say something in the latter part of the paper. Second, one might think that it can only be true in an attenuated sense to claim that anyone today owes anyone today anything by way of rectification for the wrongs of slavery. Those who were in fact culpable for the wrongs of slavery, and those who were in fact wronged by the institution of slavery, are dead. If the present-day state, for example, owes rectification to the present-day African-American community, it only does so in virtue of its being the inheritor of the rectificatory obligations incurred by the past wrongdoing done in the name of the state, by the state at that time. To the extent that the present-day African-American community is entitled to press these claims against the state, it is not in virtue of themselves having been wronged by the past wrongdoing. Rather, it is in virtue of having inherited the claims from others to whom they are related and in whose name they are entitled to press those claims against the present-day state. Our claim is stronger. What we seek to defend is the claim that the present state is the proper place to direct a claim for the rectification of a wrong and not merely a place to direct a claim for the payment of a liability. In other words, our view is that it is at least in principle possible to claim that conduct associated with the institution of chattel slavery has resulted in the wronging of modern African-Americans. The claim, therefore, has a distinct backward-looking element, insofar as rectification is sought for events in the past that have resulted in the wronging of present-day African-Americans; any acceptable form of rectification, therefore, must be understood to be one that is addressed to the rectification of the past wrongdoing. In this respect, the kind of claim we

The Legacy

of Injustice

147

are concerned with is not a claim concerning distributive justice, in which claims can be made concerning the needs of a badly-off group. The normative basis of such claims are usually based on how well or badly off individuals are now; facts concerning past generations may be illuminating for questions concerning how present-day individuals came to be as badly, or as well, off as they are at the present time, but they are not significant for the understanding the normative basis of the relevant kind of claim. For this reason, distributive justice claims are to be classified as ahistorical. Our analysis of the central claim is decidedly historical. We do not plan to take a stand on whether or not the central claim is legitimate. What we plan to do is remove some conceptual doubts about its coherence that philosophers have offered, and that one hears now and again in the debate over whether anything is owed to present-day African-Americans. Our defense of the possibility of there being such a legitimate claim also has clear implications for what it makes sense to claim is owed, insofar as anything can be defended as being owed. It also has surprising implications for the question of whether there is just one legitimate claim, or different claims that are difficult to see because of the close conceptual and practical connections between the distinctive wrongs and the relevant wrongdoers. We will briefly touch upon these matters at certain points in the discussion, though they are not the central focus of the paper. 2

1.2

The Forwards Doubt and the Backwards

Doubt

The doubt that we are concerned with interprets the central claim as saying that the present-day members of the African-American community have a claim against the state because of the enslavement of their ancestors. The specific puzzle with which we are concerned has two principal strands. First, the general question can be posed: how can that which was done to individuals generations ago be appealed to as the basis of a claim to rectification for having been wronged, given that those who are pressing the claim (a) were not even alive at the time, and (b) would not exist today had it not been for the very history in virtue of which they claim to have been wronged? Let us call (a) the question of 'how wrongs can go forward', and call (b), which is of particular importance, 'the existential worry'. The second strand of the doubt we shall call the question of 'how responsibility can go backward'. Let us suppose that sense can be made of the thought that present-day African-Americans have a legitimate claim to have been wronged by slavery. Isn't it the case that the wrongdoers, or the culpable parties, no longer exist? Are they not, in fact, our ancestors? Perhaps something is owed in the name of settling the debts of our ancestors. But this does not amount to, and ought not to be taken to be, an acknowledgment of culpability for those particular wrongs. After all, settling old debts does not amount to an acknowledgment of responsibility as the wronging party. Aside from vague fantasies about Methuselah-like figures, how could it be that the existence of modern-day culpable parties is even a possibility? At least one reason for thinking that there is no such possibility is that it is a deep feature of common-sense morality that one

2

We do not mean to suggest, however, that no facts about a person's past are relevant for understanding what an individual may be owed in the name of distributive justice. Justice claims are now generally understood to be sensitive to considerations of an individual's responsibility for her present state. This kind of sensitivity to facts about a person's past does not, in our view, justify speaking of distributive entitlements as historically grounded.

148 Rahul Kumar and David Silver cannot be held responsible for that over which one had no control. Events that took place several hundred years ago certainly fall outside the relevant sphere of control, if anything does. Taking the path of least resistance we shall examine each strand individually and, in the final section of the paper, return to the question of the extent to which we have shown the central claim to be conceptually coherent. There we will consider what we take to be the limits of our analysis. Finally, our analysis explicitly takes advantage of the resources of a contractualist (non-consequentialist) framework for understanding claims of having been wronged. We do not intend to defend this framework against other ways of understanding the basis of claims to have been wronged, nor do we intend to defend our interpretation of Scanlonian contractualism. We believe that the extent to which our defense of the central claim relies on the resources of contractualism should itself count as a powerful vindication of its plausibility as a characterization of at least a central aspect of ordinary moral reasoning. 3

2. 2.1

How Wrongs Can Go Forward The Existential

Worry

The existential worry is easily seen by considering the following principle concerning wrongs, advanced by Christopher Morris in his Tixistential Limits to the Rectification of Past Wrongs'. According to Morris, the following is a plausible counterfactual test for the conceptual coherence of a claim to have been wronged in the kind of case with which we are here concerned: 4

V is w r o n g e d b y W via act A o n l y if V , in the a b s e n c e o f A , (1) E x i s t s ( 2 ) Is not injured or w r o n g e d b y W

The existential worry is that the claim of the contemporary African-Americans to have been wronged cannot be made sense of, as it will not pass the counterfactual test. The identity of the present-day African-American community is what it is because of its past and in particular because of the wrongful ways in which the ancestors of its members were treated during the period of American slavery. Were those facts to be significantly different, its identity would be quite different. For present-day African-Americans to claim to have been wronged in virtue of what was done in the past, they would have to claim that the fact of slavery is not plausibly thought of as an identity-fixing fact; that is, it would have to be the case that if slavery had never occurred, their identity would still be as it is now.

3

4

It is important that the relevant claims are claims to have been wronged. This suggests that an adequate analysis of the wrong in question must have a backward-looking element that is at odds with standard consequentialist analyses o f wrongdoing, which explicate claims concerning moral wrongness almost exclusively in forward-looking considerations. This suggests that rectificatory claims are best analyzed in distinctively non-consequentialist terms. See T. Nagel, "War and Massacre", sect. V, for relevant discussion. On contractualism, see T.M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism" and T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other. C. Morris, "Existential Limits to the Rectification of Past Wrongs".

The Legacy

of Injustice

149

We agree with Morris that it is not intuitively plausible to deny that slavery is an identity-fixing fact. Now, thus far we have left the notion of 'identity' unanalyzed. Morris and others, particularly Derek Parfit, have taken the appeal to identity here as a metaphysical claim, and have suggested that, as a matter of metaphysics, those who constitute the modem African-American community would have been different people had its history been radically different. How the metaphysics of identity needs to be understood here, to best make sense of this intuition, is a matter that we will not pursue here. What matters, for our purposes, is that it is intuitively plausible that identity would not be preserved in the proposed counterfactual world. Why is it that accepting this intuition is supposed to a priori undermine the central claim? The line of reasoning goes as follows: to be wronged by another requires that the way one has been treated counts as a way that one is morally entitled not to be treated, and that, as a result of being treated in this way, one is adversely affected. By 'adversely affected', the thought is that one has been made worse off than one would have otherwise been had one not been treated in the objectionable way. To claim to have been wronged by another, then, involves an implicit appeal to a counterfactual. What the considerations concerning identity undermine is the availability of this counterfactual element. 5

6

2.2

Contractualist

Wrongs

The conception of wrongdoing as involving the harming of another, or the imposition of an unjustifiable burden upon another, is not implausible. Quite the contrary - most are inclined to find it very plausible. No doubt that is due to its associations with an understanding of culpable wrongdoing at the heart of the liberal tradition, namely the harm principle. We believe, though, that this approach to understanding wrongdoing does not do justice to our subject matter. What is required is a broader conception of wrongdoing broader, insofar as it allows for the possibility of a person's being wronged, where the basis of the person's claim need not appeal to his having been made worse off than he otherwise would have been. Scanlonian contractualism provides, we believe, a plausible account of the relevant sense of moral wrongness. It is not our claim, however, that in order to accept our claims as plausible, one must also accept contractualism as a plausible characterization of moral reasoning. There is no reason to think that the plausibility of our defense of the central claim requires accepting anything more than those aspects of the contractual ist characterization of moral reasoning that are integral to our analysis. Two features of the contractualist account of moral wrongness are of particular interest for the purposes of our analysis. First, on the contractualist account, a wrongdoing consists in the violation of legitimate expectations concerning interpersonal consideration and conduct. Individuals are entitled to these expectations in virtue of a system of 7

5 6

7

D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 351-379. Note, though, that it is not necessary to interpret the appeal to identity here as one of metaphysical identity. One might have in mind a more social or explicitly normative understanding o f identity, concerning shared memories, customs, habits etc. For present purposes, w e believe w e can remain agnostic on the question of how the appeal to identity here is best understood. The 'relevant sense' here being wrongs that have a particular agent-relative character, insofar as the wrong is the wronging of another, or others, not just a wrong "from the point of view o f the universe".

150 Rahul Kumar and David Silver principles whose purpose is to regulate how individuals ought to relate to one another if they are to do so on a basis of mutual respect as beings capable of rational selfgovernance in the pursuit of a meaningful life. A proper full explication of this claim will take us into issues that are interesting, but not relevant for purposes of this discussion. What is important to note is that, on the picture that emerges here, the moral system that is constituted by these principles establishes legitimate expectations for mutually respectful conduct and consideration between individuals understood, at least in some cases, to instantiate a certain type (as opposed to being a certain token). The 'type' appealed to here is that of one capable of rational self-government in the pursuit of a meaningful life. This is a normative characterization of the person that, on the contractualist account, is central for understanding the basis and contours of specific duties that persons owe one another as a matter of mutual respect. The idea here may be helpfully clarified if one imagines oneself thinking about what one might morally legitimately expect of another if one found oneself standing in a certain relation to another under particular circumstances. In so imagining, one is taking for granted that there are pre-existing legitimate expectations for how individuals ought to relate to one another which are fixed by the moral system. The principles which constitute this moral system are also important for the arbitration and clarification of these expectations in cases of conflict and uncertainty. To have wronged another, then, is to have violated certain legitimate expectations that the moral system demands that one respect in how one conducts oneself. The wrongdoing thus takes place at the point at which the wrongdoer violates certain legitimate expectations concerning conduct and consideration of others imposed on her by the moral system, with which it is reasonable to have expected the wrongdoer to have complied. The wronged party is at this point wronged insofar as a valid claim is created by the violation of those expectations. Notice, though, that we may only be able to characterize the wronged party or parties as those who instantiate a particular type; that is, the wrongdoer's conduct creates a legitimate claim to which any token of the relevant type is entitled to appeal as the basis of her claim to having been wronged by another. Having wronged another, then, does not, on the contractualist account, require the claim that one has made the wronged party worse off. All that is required is that there have been, at the time of the wrongdoing, certain legitimate expectations concerning interpersonal consideration and conduct with which it was reasonable to have expected the wrongdoer to comply. Insofar as she failed to do so, her conduct results in the creation of a legitimate claim to have been wronged. In the standard cases, we identify the wronged party as a particular person, and not indirectly as someone who instantiates a particular type; however, in those cases where we can identify the wronged parties as those who instantiate a particular type, we get some results that are interestingly different from the standard cases. For example, there may be a large temporal gap between 8

9

8 9

For further discussion, see "Who can be Wronged?". The point o f this last clause is that one ought not to be held culpable for just any violation of the legitimate expectations of others that occur as the result of her activity. In order to be held culpable, it need only be the case that it is reasonable to have expected the person to have understood herself as standing in certain kinds of relations with others, in virtue of which certain things may be legitimately expected of her concerning conduct and consideration with respect to those individuals. She need not, however, be in a position to know the particular identity(ies) of these others)) concerning the particular identity(ies) of these others, nor need there be a fact of the matter at the time, in order for her to be legitimately bound by certain legitimate expectations. For a more comprehensive discussion of this general issue, see "Who Can B e Wronged".

The Legacy of Injustice

151

the moment of wrongdoing and there being any particular person who is entitled to claim to have been wronged insofar as she is a token of the relevant type. The only thing that is necessarily the case at the moment of the wrongdoing is that the wrongdoer violate a principle which could serve as the basis of a claim to have been wronged by someone who instantiated the relevant type. With this analysis of wrongdoing in hand, we believe that we have successfully dispatched the existential worry as a threat to the central claim. There is another aspect of the contractualist characterization of moral reasoning, however, that is important for present purposes. Principles in the contractualist account serve as the basis for deliberation and criticism. To have a grasp of a specific valid principle in the kind of situation one finds oneself in is to see certain kinds of considerations as relevant, and others to be irrelevant, for determining how one ought to be relating to others in both thought and action. Some of these considerations - and here we come to the important aspect of contractualism essential for our analysis - may have nothing to do with the avoidance of harm, or with considerations having to do with well-being. Rather, their importance is to be explained in their relevance for persons' being able to relate to one another on terms that are mutually respectful of one another as capable of rational self-government in the pursuit of meaningful lives. The general point we are concerned to draw attention to is that the wronging of another need not be limited to actions that diminish the well-being of those who are wronged. Rather, according to the contractualist account of wronging, a person can also be wronged just in virtue of the failure to recognize their value as one who is capable of rational self-governance. Examples of a failure to recognize one's value as one capable of rational self-governance include: stigmatization, intentional humiliation, discrimination, certain kinds of paternalism, insults and intentional sleights, and 'looking through another'. Note that while these ways of relating to others can have implications for the well-being of the wronged parties, their wrongness consists, at least in part, simply in the failure of the wrongdoer to appropriately recognize in her understanding of how to relate to others the status of the wronged parties as persons. 10

With this in mind we can now turn to a contractualist analysis of at least one of the ways in which conduct associated with the institution of chattel slavery resulted in the wronging of African-Americans.

2.3

Slavery as Contemptuous Devaluing of Others

There is no such thing as the wrong of slavery; however, a particular kind of wrong that is relevant for understanding the central claim is that of failing to appropriately take into account, in one's thinking and conduct, the value of the other as a rational self-governor. What this draws attention to, and is otherwise easy to overlook, is the way in which Negroes - i.e., those belonging to the actual or perceived racial category - were wronged by the institution of slavery. The institution of slavery wronged them insofar as 10

This discussion o f contractualism is incomplete in at least one crucial respect: it does not explain why it is that contractualism is to be understood as an analysis of not just wrongdoing, but of the basis of claims to have been wronged. One could imagine certain forms of utilitarian theory that are vulnerable to Parfitian non-identity considerations making use o f the idea o f a framework of legitimate expectations and the token/type apparatus to circumvent the non-identity concerns. But such an analysis would still not be an analysis of wrongness in the sense with which w e are here concerned, and is crucial to the distinctiveness of our analysis. For further discussion of this general matter, see R. Kumar, "Who Can Be Wronged?".

152 Rahul Kumar and David Silver it presupposed a humiliating, patronizing and contemptuous understanding of their value as persons. The attitude towards them was not just that they were unlucky in the way that a conquered people who lose a war might end up being enslaved by the victors. Rather, the attitude towards them was that their status as slaves was in some sense deserved, or fitting, given their status as inferior beings, especially in regards to a capacity for rational self-governance. In this respect, the institution of slavery resembles the colonization of a people, where the attitude towards the colonized is one of a contemptuous superiority and a patronizing noblesse oblige, expressed by the purported aim of the institutions being one of 'civilizing' certain groups within the society, or if that is not possible, of finding a place in society for people of their lesser natural capacities. Indeed, when we speak of the African-American identity what we mean to appeal to is the historically specific identity which was imposed upon Negroes - despite their quite different ethnicities - who were forcibly brought, or were descended from those who were forcibly brought, to be enslaved in the territories which now comprise the United States of America. There are numerous ways that individuals in this group were wronged because they were seen to have this identity. What we wish to focus on is how they were wronged simply in virtue of taking them to be deserving of an inferior social, political and legal status. We can see, then, two important ways in which African-Americans can claim to have been wronged by slavery. In the first instance they can claim to be wronged insofar as they instantiate the type 'Negro'. The institution of slavery presupposed an understanding of those who instantiate this type as not entitled to respect as persons capable of rational self-governance. In this way African-Americans have an equal claim to be wronged as other non-Americans who instantiate, or are perceived to instantiate, the type 'Negro'. It is on this basis that we hold that many present-day Africans are also wronged by past American slavery. A second way that African-Americans can claim to be wronged by slavery is insofar as they instantiate the type 'African-American'. The wrong in question has to do with slavery's denial of protections and benefits of American citizenship to Negroes that they would have been entitled to were they of the relevant race. To the extent that these understandings of what it is to be a Negro what it is to be an African-American have not been fully repudiated in the appropriate way, slavery can continue to wrong anyone who instantiates these types. In this way, it is possible for slavery to continue to wrong African-Americans today, despite the fact that the institution of slavery no longer exists. Understanding the importance of this last point takes us to the second strand of our analysis.

3. 3.1

How Responsibility

Can Go Backwards

Problems with Responsibility for Historical

Wrongs

In the last section we utilized aspects of contractualist moral thinking to show how it is intelligible to say that today's African-Americans have been wronged by slavery, even though they would not have existed in its absence. This still leaves open the question of where - if anywhere - it is appropriate to direct a claim for rectification in virtue of these past wrongs. According to the central claim, present-day African-Americans have a claim to rectification against the American state as it is constituted today.

The Legacy of Injustice

153

There are difficulties, however, in sustaining such a claim. Chief among these is that no American alive today was personally involved (either through commission or omission) in the wrongful acts of slavery. This appears to be a problem because of the following two principles: The Rectification Principle: it is appropriate to make a claim upon X for rectification of Y only if X is responsible for Y (where Y could stand for any judgment-sensitive attitude)." One might object to the Rectification Principle on the grounds that it leaves no room for cases of strict liability; however, we need to distinguish between a rectification of a wrong and a compensation for a harm. It may indeed be the case that someone could be liable to compensate someone for a harm even if he were not responsible for the wrongful act in question (or indeed even if there were no wrongful act at all); however, this sort of compensation should not be construed as an instance of a rectification of a wrong. And since we are trying to make sense of the central claim as a response to a particular wrong associated with slavery, and not with any attendant harms, the central claim depends on the present-day existence of a culpable party. And it is here that we run up against another principle: The Responsibility Principle: X is responsible for Y only if X stands in some sort of relation of control with respect to Y. Given these two principles it follows that no American alive today is the appropriate person to make a claim upon for a rectification of the historical injustices of slavery. We agree with these principles. Indeed, they explain why it is that present-day African-Americans lack any sort of claim on other present-day Americans as individuals. Our position, however, is that there are claims upon the American state, and on the American people, both of which once had the relevant sort of control over some of the wrongful conduct associated with slavery. We pursue this line of thought further in the following sections.

3.2

The Corporate Responsibility of the State

In this section we will defend the claim that the American state, as an institution (or complex of institutions), bears corporate responsibility for its past wrongdoings. Of the many wrongs of the American state vis-a-vis slavery, we shall focus on one that could only be accomplished by the state through the exercise of authoritative, legitimate state power. The wrong in question can be generally characterized as one of adding the authoritative imprimatur of the state to a widespread understanding of African-Americans that denies their status as persons capable of rational self-governance. It is in virtue of authoritatively legitimating the denial of the legitimate entitlement of African-Americans to respectful treatment that the state wronged them. Specifically, the state made it legitimate to engage in discriminatory practices on the grounds that African-Americans are of inferior status. Of central importance here is that the democratic state was in a unique position to confer an authoritative imprimatur on a certain pernicious understanding of the status of African-Americans. The idea of an authoritative imprimatur can be clarified by appeal

11

See T.M. Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other, ch. 12, for the relevant discussion of judgmentsensitive attitudes that we here presuppose.

154 Rahul Kumar and David Silver to a simple analogy. Imagine being picked on, and called names by, other children in the playground at the mid-morning school recess break. It is one thing to be picked on by the other children, but it is another thing altogether to be picked on, and have the teacher stand by observing what is being done to you, not intervening because it is you who is the object of the bullying, rather than someone who 'counts'. The presence of the authority figure, and his or her inaction and indifference, clearly legitimates what is being done to oneself in the eyes of others, and no doubt to oneself (at least to some extent). This general kind of wronging of African-Americans by the state has at least two aspects. To the extent that slavery was a private enterprise conducted by private individuals, the state had an obligation to protect the interests of the enslaved. Insofar as the state failed to do so, either through a failure to enact policy or through a failure to fairly enforce existing policy, it failed to take the appropriate measures needed to authoritatively repudiate the understanding of African-Americans that denied their full status as persons. This constituted a serious failure of the state to comply with the minimal set of duties it owed to them. Of at least equal significance is the way in which the state's wrongdoing was accomplished through its activities, rather than its failures to act. These activities can, once more, be grouped into two general types. First, state officials, acting both in their official capacity as representatives of the state, actively propagated attitudes towards African-Americans that were clear failures to recognize their true status as persons. Examples of authoritative expressions of contempt towards African-Americans are to be found throughout the historical record of the activities of state legislatures, the Congress, state and federal courts (especially including the Supreme Court), local, state and federal police, and other agents of the state, such as Presidents and Governors. Second, chattel slavery was not an unregulated practice, hidden from the gaze of public authority, like the underground economy. Rather, it was a legally authorized institution. In holding slaves, slave owners were exercising the legal powers granted to them by the legitimate laws and regulations governing property. In other words, the state actively enabled the practice of holding slaves, by recognizing slaves as a legitimate form of property, whose use, ownership, and disposal was governed by an elaborate set of legal regulations. ' It is worth noting that the denial of the status of American-Americans as persons of equal value continued to play an important role in the public deliberations of the state well after the period of legal slavery ended. One need only consider the kinds of justifications offered by authoritative institutions for the Jim Crow laws to see that. To the extent, then, that (i) the present state can be understood as minimally continuous with its past, and (ii) it is reasonable to claim that the state engaged in wrongful conduct via its conferral of legitimacy upon the denial of the reality of African-Americans as having value as persons and (iii) these ways of seeing and treating AfricanAmericans have yet to be adequately repudiated by the state, it follows that (iv) it makes sense to hold the present state culpable for the wrongs of slavery. It is on this basis that we claim that the American state bears corporate responsibility for at least the wrongs of having contributed to the authoritative legitimation of an understanding of African-Americans in virtue of which their status as persons and as being entitled to the benefits and protections of American citizenship was historically 2

12

W e are grateful to Samuel Freeman for discussion on this point. See D. Lyons, "Unfinished Business. Racial Junctures in U S History and Their Legacy".

The Legacy of Injustice

155

denied, and continues to be denied. In virtue of this corporate responsibility we take it that the state is obligated to repudiate these pernicious understandings of the status of African-Americans. Indeed, the state's repudiation of this understanding is necessary for its proper repudiation, as we understand it, for only the state has the power to revoke the authoritative imprimatur that it earlier conferred upon that understanding. Insofar as this has not been done to an adequate degree, contemporary African-Americans have a continuing, unmet claim upon the American state for the rectification of a wrongdoing perpetrated against them due to its activities that began during the period of chattel slavery.

3.3

Responsibility

of the American People. Citizenship and Ethnicity

In this section we argue that the American people bears both collective liability and collective responsibility for the American state's wrongful conduct associated with slavery. In order to defend this claim we first need to distinguish two different conceptions of what it is to be an American. To be an American in one sense is to be a full-fledged citizen of the American state and thus a holder of a particular legal status. Let us refer to this as being American by citizenship. The second conception of what it is to be an American views it as being someone with a particular (for lack of a better term) etlmicity - as being defined, in part, as someone who is part of a people which, through much of its history, acted via the actions of the American state. We take it, however, that the American people acted prior to the existence of the American state, and that it was in fact the American people qua ethnicity that established the American state. The conditions for being an American by citizenship are not identical to those for being an American by ethnicity. For example, one could renounce one's American citizenship without thereby ceasing to be an American by ethnicity. Indeed, becoming an American by ethnicity involves a prolonged process of socialization and once the appropriate socialization has occurred one cannot simply decide to stop being an ethnic American. On the other hand, one could become an American citizen without going through this socialization process and thereby fail to identify with the American people qua ethnicity. Insofar as one is an American by citizenship, one is, as it were, a shareholder of the American state which bears corporate responsibility for its wrongful actions associated with slavery. Citizenship carries with it both benefits and burdens, and one of those burdens is the liability that one bears for the corporate wrongdoing committed by the state. Note that a citizen need not be the beneficiary of slavery in any direct or indirect way in order to appropriately bear this liability. It is simply one of the burdens that are part of full citizenship, a status one may have just in virtue of birth, or may acquire through a legitimate legal process. Moreover, these past wrongs of the American state need not reflect on how an American by citizenship sees oneself. That is, one's obligations as a citizen need not have any subjective implications for one's self-conception, i.e. one need not think of oneself as a 'wrongdoer', nor is some sense of collective guilt necessarily appropriate. The wrongdoing of the state in question reflects not on the character of the person but, rather, on the past quality of the ongoing state of which one is now a citizen. 13

13

On Hannah Arendt's account o f collective responsibility, one also gains liability for the wrongs of the state in which one finds oneself. On her account, however, there is no requirement that one be a citizen of the state one finds oneself in in order to gain liability for its past actions. See Arendt,

156

Rahul Kumar and David Silver

Things are different, however, when we consider Americans by ethnicity. A crucial part of the socialization process of becoming an American by ethnicity involves coming to see the actions of the American people as, in a sense, one's own. One sees the actions of the American people as 'our actions'. To the extent, then, that the American people has acted wrongly, this means that an American by ethnicity should think, 'We acted wrongly'. One might worry that it makes no sense to say that the American people (or any other people for that matter) acted. The right response to this line of thought, we believe, is that whenever persons and institutions that are recognized as being rightfully empowered to act in the name of a given people act within the ambit of their recognized authority, the people obtain what we call national responsibility for that action. Thus, if we can find instances where persons or institutions that are recognized as being rightfully empowered to act in the name of the American people contributed (within the ambit of their recognized authority) to the wrongs of slavery, then we should attribute national responsibility to the American people for those actions. Unfortunately, it is all too easy to find instances of such acts. We might start by looking to the adopters of the Constitution who spoke in the name of "We the People" and are (now) generally recognized to have done so authoritatively. By affirming the legitimacy of the institution of slavery these individuals implicated not only themselves, but also the American people, insofar as they are recognized as the legitimate agents of the American people acting within the ambit of their authority. Given the control that the American people exercised over slavery, the Responsibility Principle provides no barrier to thinking that the American people qua ethnicity is responsible for these wrongs. And, given this fact, the Rectification Principle provides no barrier to thinking that the American people - understood as an ethnicity - is an appropriate body upon which to make a claim for the rectification of these wrongs. This, of course, just is to address the demand for rectification to the state, as the state is now the sole legitimate and authoritative agent through which the will of the American people is enacted. We may summarize our view as follows: first, African-Americans have a direct claim to rectification from the American state insofar as it bears corporate responsibility for wrongful conduct associated with slavery, and the American people qua citizenry can rightfully be called upon to bear the liability associated with that corporate responsibility. Second, we are suggesting that African-Americans have an indirect claim against the American state insofar as it is the legitimate agent of the American people (understood as an ethnicity) which bears collective responsibility for the wrongful conduct of the American state vis-a-vis slavery. 14

14

"Collective Responsibility", 43-50. The persons and institutions that are recognized as being rightfully empowered to act in the name of a people - often state officials and institutions - have the power to utilize the power of the state to act in ways that are not within the ambit of their recognized authority. In such cases w e recognize the existence o f a kind of state responsibility for those actions that does not immediately translate into national responsibility for them. However, in the case of American slavery, the state's responsibility for the wrongs of slavery does immediately translate into the American nation's responsibility, since in many cases the official persons and institutions were acting fully within the ambit of their recognized authority.

The Legacy of Injustice 3.4

Implications for Present-Day American

157

Individuals

In this section we will address the implications of what we have said above for presentday American individuals. At the very least all Americans should be supportive of efforts to get the state to adequately address its own corporate wrongs. In addition, insofar as one takes oneself to be an American by ethnicity, one should be supportive of efforts of the state to adequately address the nationai wrongs of the American people. Moreover, we are open to the idea that an American by ethnicity should feel a kind of guilt (or, in any event, something closely related to guilt) in virtue of the American people's past wrongful conduct associated with slavery. This guilt, of course, would be quite different (in terms of its ethical implications if not in terms of its phenomenology) from the guilt one might feel in relation to one's own individual wrongdoing. It would be a guilt rooted in the recognition of what 'we did' rather than a recognition of what T did'. The connection between being an American by ethnicity and appropriately feeling guilt for the actions of the American people is not a simple matter, and we will not attempt to do it full justice here. Something does need to be said, though as to why it is (usually) inappropriate for African-Americans to feel guilty in virtue of the fact that the American people qua ethnicity wronged both their ancestors and themselves. Our suggestion is that it does not make sense for (most) African-Americans to feel guilt for the wrongful conduct of the American people vis-a-vis slavery because they sensibly do not identify with the American people (qua ethnicity) according to the selfunderstanding of what it is to be an American that informed that wrongful conduct. Indeed, that self-understanding of what it is to be an American explicitly excluded the possibility of African-Americans' being full-fledged citizens. This is by no means to say that African-Americans are Americans only insofar as they are Americans by citizenship. Rather, we take it to be significant that the self-understanding of what it is to be an American has broadened through time, and has broadened in particular to see African-Americans as full members of the American people. We take it then that African-Americans can be Americans by ethnicity, but only in relation to a self-understanding of what it is to be an American that includes themselves as full-fledged members. 15

4.

Concluding

Remarks

We have argued here that it is intelligible to make what we have been calling the central claim. According to this claim the African-American community of today has a claim to rectification against the American state in virtue of the wrongs done by the state during the period of American slavery. Although we think that this claim is intelligible, we agree that whether or not the claim is valid is a matter that can sensibly be contested. There are at least three ways in which this claim may be contested, all of which appeal to the historical record. First, one might question whether the present state, or the American people as presently constituted, are sufficiently continuous with the past to ground an attribution to them of responsibility for the wrongs of slavery. Second, one might contest the claim that the American people and/or the American state engaged in wrongful actions during the period of American slavery. Such claims strike us as deeply 15

Why a kind of guilt is appropriate (in addition to feelings of shame) is discussed in D. Silver, "Collective Responsibility and the Ownership of Actions".

158 Rahul Kumar and David Silver implausible, but not unintelligible. Third, one might grant that these wrongful actions occurred, but hold that they have already been adequately repudiated by the state. Here, one might appeal to the efforts associated with the civil rights movement, or national policies of affirmative action, as having provided the kind of appropriate rectification that was required. But the significance of this history, and whether it is appropriate to understand it to be entwined with rectificatory considerations, is a matter of serious ongoing debate, and can only be advanced through further research by historians, legal scholars, and other social theorists. Even if, however, we assume the central claim to he valid, it is a difficult matter to determine what this entails by way of appropriate redress. At a minimum, we hold that an official acknowledgment and apology carried out by the American state is required. Though what is involved in making an apology is reasonably clear, what counts as an acknowledgment might not be. Something further may be demanded by the idea of acknowledgment, such as a national museum documenting the extent and nature of the wrongs perpetrated against African-Americans during the period of slavery. We will not attempt here to more fully determine the requirements of rectificatory justice in relation to American slavery. Rather, we will try to diagnose the difficulty in coming to a view on this matter: we take it to be a main part of the difficulty of determining these requirements stems from the fact that what we owe to each other in terms of rectificatory justice is largely a matter of cultural convention. To the extent that these conventions differ between the wrongdoer and the victim, this diminishes the ability to easily achieve an acknowledgement of the wrong that is effectively communicated and received. Moreover, for certain kinds of collective wrongdoings there may be no cultural conventions at all on either side dealing with the appropriate way to acknowledge the wrong. Here genocide, slavery, expulsion of a people from their homeland, and other forms of systematic dehumanization come to mind. Here we want to add that the fact that no convention exists presently does not mean that we do nothing. After all, as difficult as they are to start, conventions must start somehow; and, whatever process this involves, we have an obligation to embark on it.

Bibliography Arendt, H., "Collective Responsibility", Amor Mundi, ed. J.W. Bernauer, Dordrecht, 1987. Kumar, R., "Who Can Be Wronged?", Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2003). Lyons, D., "Unfinished Business. Racial Junctures in US History and Their Legacy", this volume. Morris, C , "Existential Limits to the Rectification of Past Wrongs", American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984). Nagel, T., "War and Massacre", Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press, 1979. Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, 1984. Scanlon, T.M., "Contractualism and Utilitarianism", Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. A. Sen and B. Williams, Cambridge University Press, 1982. Scanlon, T.M., What We Owe to Each Other, Harvard University Press, 1998. Silver, D., "Collective Responsibility and the Ownership of Actions", Public Affairs Quarterly 16 (2002).

159

Colonization and Historical Injustice - The Australian Experience

Paul Palton

Contents 1.

Decolonization and the Requirements of Justice

159

2.

Distributive, Reparative and Relational Justice

160

3.

Applicability and Limits of These Aspects of Justice

162

A.

Is Colonial Injustice Superseded?

167

5.

The Complexity of Colonial Injustice

170

1.

Decolonization

and the Requirements of Justice

The history of European colonization followed a depressingly similar pattern in many parts of the world. In most cases, indigenous populations were dramatically reduced by the combined effects of newly introduced diseases, encroachment upon traditional lands and conflict with settlers. But whatever their number, indigenous peoples were soon relegated to the status of social minorities and their cultures marginalized. The consequences of dispossession, displacement, systematic discrimination and policies designed to force assimilation have been devastating. Colonized indigenous peoples continue to suffer higher rates of disease, mortality, unemployment and criminalization, while remaining under-represented in all the institutions of public social life. The destruction of indigenous societies in various parts of the new world is an enormous and shameful cost of the spread of European civilization. Only recently has it become possible for the descendants of colonists to begin to appreciate what was almost entirely destroyed, namely sophisticated societies with their own concepts of ecological, social and spiritual order. Confronted with indigenous peoples whose conceptions of their social and natural environment departed from European models, the colonizers tended to assume that difference automatically implied inferiority. Like those "noble races" from an earlier period who, as Nietzsche comments, 'left the concept of "barbarian" in their traces wherever they went', colonial governments applied different rules outside the borders of their own "civilized" world. They only recognized the authority of aboriginal nations when forced to do so, and then all too frequently set about undermining the treaties and agreements which they had signed. 2

The collapse of the system of belief that sustained colonization, along with the reconstitution of indigenous cultures and political organization, may yet turn out to be one of the great cultural achievements of the latter part of the twentieth century. These de1

I am grateful to Moira Gatens for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

2

Nietzsche, The Genealogy

of Morality,

First Essay, para. 11.

160 Paul Patton velopments have made possible an appreciation of the injustice involved in colonization that extends beyond the indigenous communities most affected. They have enabled many countries that were established through colonization to embrace the project of establishing just relations between their indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. In Australia, this project was formally adopted in 1991 with the passage of an Act of Parliament designed to achieve reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples by the end of the decade. Two of the judges in the 1992 Mabo judgment - a landmark High Court decision which acknowledged the survival of common law Aboriginal title to land - expressed a similar aspiration for the recognition of past injustice when they said that the "acts and events" by which legal dispossession was carried out "constitute the darkest aspect of the history of this nation. The nation as a whole must remain diminished unless and until there is an acknowledgment of, and retreat from, those past injustices". In a speech given the following year, in the context of fierce national debate over the far-reaching revision to the legal terms of colonization proposed in Mabo, Prime Minister Keating asserted that this judgment had created a unique opportunity for the country to reconstruct the fundamental relationship between the nation and its indigenous people "on just foundations". 3

4

5

Nevertheless, in Australia as elsewhere, this process of internal decolonization has stalled, partly because of an inability to agree on the requirements of justice in this context. While there is widespread agreement that colonization involved injustice towards indigenous peoples, there is less agreement over the respects in which colonization was unjust and how we should respond to that injustice. Given that it is beyond our power to change the past, and assuming that our primary responsibility is towards the present and the future, what is required now to establish relations with indigenous citizens on just foundations? Contemporary political philosophy offers at least three distinct paths toward an answer to this question: one oriented towards the present distribution of rights and social goods on the basis of a presumption of equal entitlement for all; one oriented towards reparation or restitution in respect of past wrongful acts; and one oriented towards the establishing of relations of mutual recognition and respect between the indigenous and settler communities within a given postcolonial state. While the discussion that follows is geared to the circumstances of decolonization in Australia, the overriding aim is to argue that all of these approaches are necessary to address the complex and interdependent forms of historical injustice involved in colonization and that none by itself is sufficient. For this reason, they may be regarded not as alternative approaches to the injustice of colonization but as complementary approaches to distinct aspects or dimensions of injustice, each of which is relevant although in varying degrees according to the details of a particular colonial history. The complexity of the injustice involved also has consequences for criticisms directed at each of these aspects of justice taken separately. Accordingly, the latter sections of this chapter will examine the consequences of the interdependence of these three dimensions of injustice for Jeremy Waldron's influential criticism of the applicability of reparatory justice to the present circumstances of decolonization. 6

3 4 5 6

Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991 (Cth). For a brief discussion of this project and its failure see P. Patton, Reconciliation, droits aborigenes et paradoxe constitutionnel en Australie. Deane and Gaudron, in The Mabo Decision, 82. Mabo v Queensland (1992) is reported at 175 CLR 1;66 A L J R 4 0 8 ; 107 ALR 1. Keating, The H. V. Evatt Lecture, 6. J. Waldron, "Historic Injustice"; ders., "Superseding Historic Injustice"; ders., "Redressing Historic Injustice".

Colonization

2.

Distributive, Reparative and Relational

and Historical

Injustice

161

Justice

The first approach relies upon the principle of equality as the only acceptable basis for the distribution of rights and access to social goods. According to this view, justice involves equal treatment for all, where this requires not only the formal equality that comes with equal treatment before the law and the absence of discrimination, but also substantive equality of access to public goods and services. The concept of substantive equality implies that all individuals and communities should enjoy the same services and benefits of citizenship, regardless of race or circumstance. The underlying idea is that all individuals are of equal moral worth and that none should be disadvantaged, relative to others, through no fault of their own. The equality approach provides a philosophical basis for the current Australian government's policy of "practical" reconciliation which aims to target government services and expenditure at key areas of indigenous disadvantage, especially health, employment and education. Here, as in many other countries, the indigenous population is significantly disadvantaged relative to other citizens in relation to health, education, employment, treatment by the criminal justice system and a range of other indicators of socio-economic well being. Whether or not these inequalities can be directly attributed to policies inflicted by colonial governments, they constitute a clear case of undeserved disadvantage. Liberal justice requires that they be removed. According to some theorists, the equality based approach to justice also provides limited support for differential political rights. Thus, Will Kymlicka relies on the principle of equality with respect to access to basic goods in order to argue for minority cultural rights. He argues that, since liberal equality guarantees to each individual "an equal share of resources and liberties in order to pursue the things they value", and since cultural membership is a crucial resource which individuals require in order to exercise their freedom to choose and revise their life plans, all should be entitled to the good of cultural membership on an equal basis. Since the viability of minority cultures may be threatened by the actions of the majority in multicultural states, there is justification for differential treatment in the form of special rights to protect minority cultures. However, as Kymlicka acknowledges, there are limits to the degree and kinds of differential rights that may be supported by this argument. 1 comment further below on the limitations of this approach to colonial injustice. The second approach relies on the idea that justice should involve reparation or recompense for past injustice or wrongful actions. It is a common response to historic injustice to invoke the inalterability of the past. However, the effects of past injustice may continue to be felt in the present. The force of the appeal to reparative justice lies in the fact that, although we cannot undo the past, we can change the present to make it as if the past event had not occurred. The simplest case is restitution where this involves the replacement of a stolen item. Restitution is an accepted principle in law as well as in the practice of treaties or other agreements between indigenous peoples and colonial states. This principle lies behind the commonsense view that, since colonization in7

8

9

7 8 9

W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 182. W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 109f. Waldron suggests that this amounts to "a sense in which w e can affect the moral significance o f past action" (J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice", 7). However, it is not obvious that the moral significance o f past acts of dispossession or the violation of rights is affected by efforts to redress s o m e of the consequences. Is it the moral significance of theft which is affected by restitution or is it rather precisely because of the moral significance of theft that restitution is an appropriate remedy?

162 Paul Patton volved unjust appropriation of Aboriginal lands, a just settlement must begin with recognition of their historical claim to the lands and other goods that were stolen from them. David Lyons outlines this kind of argument as the "natural" way of reasoning about Native American land claims: "Before the European invasion of America, the land belonged to them. In the course of that invasion and its aftermath, the land was illicitly taken from them. The rightful owners of the land were dispossessed ... Ideally, the land should be restored to its rightful owners". There are, of course, severe difficulties with the suggestion that land should be restored in its entirety to the descendants of the rightful owners. Lyons, Waldron and others have provided good reasons to dispute the claim of historical entitlement. These will be considered in more detail below as I seek to question the force of these criticisms in their application to present colonial circumstances. However, even if the principle of reparation were fully accepted alongside the principle of equality and compensation for undeserved disadvantage, this would not exhaust the present requirements of justice for colonized indigenous peoples. The third approach focuses on the character of the relationship between elements of the political community in question. What is missing from considerations of distributive or reparative justice is respect for the other parties to the colonial relation. In particular, the concepts of distributive and reparative justice do not address the sense of injustice that flows from the belief that colonization itself was a violation of fundamental rights of indigenous peoples. For this reason, James Tully privileges a third conception of justice which requires a certain kind of recognition of others. He begins his Seeley lectures by suggesting that, among the many questions of justice which may be raised in relation to the situation of colonized indigenous peoples, "a certain priority is claimed for justice with respect to cultural recognition in comparison with the many other questions of justice that a constitution must address". Tully argues that the question of justice for colonized indigenous peoples is a special case of justice with respect to cultural recognition. This question is posed in respect of constitutional arrangements and as such enjoys priority since the answer given will determine the normative and institutional framework within which other questions of justice (with regard to the distribution of social goods and the rectification of historical justice ) will be addressed. Tully further asks what principles of constitutional association could sustain a just relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. His answer points to the "common constitutionalism" that emerged in the course of interactions between Aboriginal and Common Law systems during the early modern period. This Aboriginal and Common Law system rested upon the three principles of mutual recognition, consent and continuity of entitlements as these were expressed in the Great Law of Peace of the Iroquois Confederacy, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and in the US Supreme Court judgments of CJ Marshall especially Worcester v State of Georgia 1832. These are "norms that come into being and come to be accepted as authoritative in the course of constitutional practice, including criticism and contestation of that practice". Tully argues that this set of common constitutional principles provides a normative framework which embodies the principles of just association between European and Aboriginal nations. 10

11

12

10 11 12

D. Lyons, ' T h e N e w Indian Land Claims and Original Rights to Land", 358. J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 6. Ibid., 116.

Colonization and Historical Injustice 3.

163

Applicability and Limits of These Aspects of Justice

The first point to note about these three approaches to the injustice of colonization is that each of them will be more or less relevant in a particular context, depending upon the historical details of the process of colonization and the resultant legal and constitutional form of capture of indigenous land and resources. For example, in those parts of North America or in countries such as Aotearoa/New Zealand where treaties purporting to set the terms of cooperation between European and indigenous nations were signed, demands for reparation or restitution with regard to failure to meet the terms of a given treaty will often be appropriate. By contrast, in Australia where no treaties of any kind were entered into and where the assertion of sovereignty and subsequent allocation of property rights took place on the basis of the principle of terra nullius, the question of recognition of Aboriginal peoples as peoples with their own laws, cultures and systems of governance assumes particular importance. Here, colonial occupation took the extreme form of a refusal to acknowledge in any way the prior existence and authority of indigenous law and custom. The sovereign authority of present Australian governments derives from the British sovereignty which was imposed on indigenous peoples without their consent and without regard for their laws and practices of government. As a result, there is good reason to suppose that justice toward indigenous people in the present requires recognition of the past and continuing injustice that flows from the non-recognition of rights and duties associated with indigenous law and culture. 13

A second conclusion to be drawn is that in itself each of these approaches is deficient as a response to the injustice of colonization. For example, Tully's argument is open to the following objection: it is all very well to spell out the principles of a just constitutional association. It is helpful to know that the three conventions of recognition, consent and continuity have been incorporated into some legal and political institutions at some periods during the long history of European colonization. But in the end, these are no more than the principles of an ideal form of association which does not obtain in practice. It may be useful to envisage an historically counterfactual state of affairs in which colonization as we know it did not occur but quite different modes of contact between European and indigenous peoples did take place. These might have allowed indigenous societies to adopt elements of European culture and technology on their own terms and at their own pace. Novel and sustainable hybrid cultures may have evolved instead of the demoralized cultures of poverty and welfare dependence that are often the consequences of colonialism. In these terms, Tully's thought experiment provides us with a normative ideal against which present constitutional and political relationships between indigenous societies and settler states may be judged. But this does nothing to alter the unequal power relations that do in fact obtain. It does little to undermine the asymmetrical relations between European and indigenous law, culture and belief systems. These consequences of colonization and the system of colonial domination which they sustain remain largely intact and unchanged, along with substantial disparities in access to basic social goods. 14

13

14

Aboriginal leader and former chair of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Patrick Dodson refers to "the reconciliation of recognition" and clarifies what this means by saying that: ' T h e sovereign position that Aboriginal peoples assert has never been ceded. Recognition starts from the premiss that terra nullius and its consequences were imposed upon the Aboriginal peoples P. Dodson, "Lingiari - Until the Chains are Broken", 266. J. Tully responds to this kind of criticism in ' T h e Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom", 36-59.

164 Paul Patton The equality based policy of practical reconciliation may also be argued to be of limited value in that it only addresses the consequences of colonization, without regard to the particular circumstances of dispossession, relocation and forced assimilation as these were carried out under colonial administrations. To the extent that other requirements of justice such as reparation or recognition are not addressed, this approach alone is an inadequate response to the injustice of colonization. Kymlicka's argument for minority cultural rights is equally open to criticism with regard to the limited manner in which it addresses the consequences of colonization. While it may be applied to the situation of indigenous peoples in Canada, Australia and elsewhere, it only addresses their situation at a certain level of generality, namely in so far as these peoples are in a position of disadvantage with respect to the survival of their culture as a consequence of conditions beyond their control. It is apparent that Kymlicka's argument for minority cultural rights will apply to any group that is a minority through no fault of its own, say a population relocated in response to natural or economic disaster. Indeed, the argument in Liberalism, Community, and Culture relies upon treating the disadvantage to which indigenous minority cultures are subject as equivalent to natural rather than chosen disability. There are a number of ways in which this neglects specific features of colonization and the resultant cultural marginalization of indigenous peoples. The argument owes nothing to the fact that these are indigenous peoples with their own cultural values and forms of attachment to their lands. It does not address the sense of injustice at the very fact of colonization and the associated failure to acknowledge Aboriginal law and culture. Even less does it address the sense of injustice that flows from the particular legal form assumed by colonization in Australia, namely, the imposition of British sovereignty and law on the grounds that this country was a legal terra nullius. Finally, as Waldron has pointed out in the series of papers referred to earlier (see note 6 above), there are a number of problems with the application of narrow principles of rectification or reparatory justice in order to eliminate or ameliorate the consequences of colonial injustice. This approach treats the injustice as an isolated act located in the past and seeks to rectify the consequences of that act. The problems have to do with the length of time that has elapsed since the initial injustice occurred and, as a consequence, the difficulty of determining how the present might look if that original injustice had not taken place. One set of problems arises in relation to the manner in which the counterfactual present involves assumptions about choices on the part of those affected. How do we know what the original owners may have decided to do with land? How do we know what anyone will decide until they actually make a decision? This problem becomes particularly intractable when the choices that could affect present outcomes extend over generations and where these are path-dependent so that certain choices will affect the possibility of future choices or even the very existence of the subjects of possible choices. In "Superseding Historic Injustice", Waldron canvasses one possible response, namely to rely on rational choice assumptions such that no choice would be supposed to leave the chooser worse off. On this basis, we could at least determine a minimal level of present outcomes of past choices and then compensate according to the difference between this minimum and the actual condition of present descendants of those dispossed. In this way, it would be possible to alter present circumstances in the direction that they may have taken if past injustice had not occurred. At this point, however, further problems arise. Firstly, we need to consider the way in which injustices perpetrated by a few will affect outcomes for all those who trade in 15

16

15

See J. Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice", 61f.

16

J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice", 11.

Colonization and Historical Injustice

165

the market in land. In this way, by virtue of the contagion of injustice through the market, it is not just the present holders of illegitimately obtained land who benefit from injustice, but all present landholders. However, this only presents a problem for reparative justice if we rely on narrow Nozickean assumptions about the transmission of injustice through property transfers and the resultant responsibility for the costs of reparation. Market contagion is only a problem because it expands the class of beneficiaries of the initial injustice to include those with scrupulously just titles to their land, when it was assumed that only the descendants of the perpetrators of injustice would benefit and should therefore bear the cost of reparation. In response, it may be argued that the principle underlying this attribution of responsibility in the present is defective since there may well be descendants of perpetrators who have in fact derived no benefit from the illicit acts of their forebears. More importantly, the contagion argument may be irrelevant with regard to the justice of any acquisition under the particular conditions of colonization. In the Australian case, where it was assumed that there were no owners of the land prior to the arrival of the British Crown, it may be argued that that all subsequent allocations or transfers of title are infected by the injustice of this initial imposition of sovereignty. 17

In fact, like the contagion of property acquisition on the basis of the terra nullius principle, the contagion of injustice through the market might be used as an argument for assigning responsibility for reparations to the entire present population of beneficiaries. An obvious procedure to distribute the costs of reparation in this manner would be via the tax system. Bigelow, Pargetter and Young argue for this kind of response in suggesting that present day non-indigenous Australians as a whole have a responsibility to compensate the indigenous population. Their approach is structural rather than linked to individual unjust acts. They suggest that the responsibility on the part of non-indigenous people derives from the fact that their level of well-being is causally linked to indigenous dispossession: "the essential part of the argument for compensation is that a causal path can be traced from the low well-being of the Aborigines to the high wellbeing of the whites, and the high well-being of the whites is traceable to the low wellbeing of the blacks". In common with this wholistic approach, it might be argued that the distribution of benefits through the market actually simplifies the problem of assigning responsibility for the present consequences of wrongful dispossession. 18

An analogous problem also arises in relation to the putative beneficiaries of reparation, namely the descendants of those dispossessed. They would be "privileged" relative to other disadvantaged individuals in that they would be insulated from the consequences of poor judgment or external circumstances in a way that the others are not. This seems unfair and likely to fuel resentment among elements of the non-indigenous underprivileged. Resentment of precisely this kind did in fact emerge in Australia and assume a political form around Pauline Hanson and the "One Nation" movement. However, in this case, too, the problem arises because of the assumption that it is only the descendants of those who suffered wrongful dispossession who should be compensated for undeserved disadvantage. As Waldron implicitly recognizes, some liberal theories of equality such as Dworkin's resource equality would indeed recommend rectifying the situation of all those disadvantaged through no fault of their own. 19

17 18

19

J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice", l l f . J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter and R. Young, "Land, Weil-Being and Compensation". Justice Brennan supports this approach in his Mabo judgment when he notes that the dispossession of Aboriginal peoples "underwrote the development of the nation" (The Mabo Decision, 50). In "Superseding Historic Injustice", 13, he writes: "Ultimately, what is raised here is the question of

166

Paul Patton

More generally, the objection here involves the moral arbitrariness of singling out the injustice of colonial dispossession from amongst all the other injustices or undeserved harms perpetrated on the ancestors of the present population. In reply, it may be argued that the appearance of arbitrariness is an effect of confining the issue to that of reparation for the loss of property. If we take a broader view of the colonial experience, then it is apparent that property loss forms only a part of the injustice suffered by indigenous peoples: forced resettlement, violence and sexual assault, confinement under so called "protection acts", subjection to policies of assimilation and removal of children are some of the additional ways in which their culture, self-esteem and agency were systematically undermined. Against the background of a broader understanding of the nature and effects of colonial administration, reparation might be described not simply as the attempt to rectify the consequences of particular past injustices but rather as part of the attempt to constitute a moral and political community where before there was none. Viewed in this light, the significance of reparation payments is as much a matter of symbolism as it is an attempt to erase the material consequences of past injustice. Like acts of apology, reparations signal the desire for a form of moral community based upon mutual recognition and sympathy for past suffering. In these terms, the payment of reparations concerns the form of relationship between the indigenous and non-indigenous communities and falls under the purview of relational rather than reparatory justice. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive and the point here is to suggest that treating them as separate approaches to the issue of justice or injustice is in large part a matter of theoretical artifice. The general conclusion to be drawn from these difficulties in application to colonial circumstances is that, in this context, considerations of relational, distributive and reparative justice and injustice cannot easily be separated. The injustice of colonization is a complex phenomena involving elements of all three approaches to justice and an adequate response must necessarily take this interdependence into account. To the extent that injustice in colonial contexts often involves communal property and the rights of corporate entities such as a people, clan or kin group, the problem of restitution might be supposed to be simplified since these are entities that persist over time even though their members change. Restitution would seem to be simply a matter of returning land or other resources to its owners. In fact, however, the circumstances of colonial history often complicate the issue of the persistence even of such corporate entities. Thus, in the Australian case, the Mabo judgment recognized that the relationship of a particular group to a parcel of land may have been obliterated by virtue of the fact that the relevant coroporate entities had not survived, or that their relationship to the land in accordance with traditional laws and customs had not been maintained. In at least one major case involving Aboriginal people in the relatively settled south east of the continent, the claimed entitlement has been found to have been swept away by the 20

20

whether it is possible to rectify particular injustices without undertaking a comprehensive redistribution that addresses all claims of justice that may be made The point has often been made in the Australian debates over reconciliation, as it has elsewhere, that symbolic reparations - including apologies - are important for the constitution of collective identity as a moral community. Although his primary concern is with material reparation, Waldron acknowledges the importance that recollection and acknowledgment of past injustice may have for the constitution o f individual and collective identity: "Quite apart from any attempt genuinely to compensate victims or offset their losses, reparations may symbolize a society's undertaking not to forget or deny that a particular injustice took place, and to respect and help sustain a dignified sense of identity-in-memory for the people affected" ("Superseding Historic Injustice", 6).

Colonization

and Historical

Injustice

167

21

"tide of history". The issues here include whether or not the claimant group is sufficiently continuous with the one which was dispossessed and, in the terms of the test established for the continuation of native title, whether or not the traditional relationship with the land in question had been maintained. In addition, there remains the fundamental issue of whether or not that relationship is sufficient to sustain a form of ownership which includes the right to exclude or at least to limit the use and access of others, and whether such a property right persists through the change of circumstance which comes with colonization.

4.

Is Colonial Injustice

Superseded?

The problems raised in relation to reparation for past unjust acts do not automatically arise in cases where the unjust act itself is ongoing. The rectification of injustice in this situation need not involve counterfactual reasoning since, at least in the first instance, the appropriate response is to put an end to the ongoing injustice, leaving open the question of restitution or compensation for the previous loss of enjoyment. This is in effect the procedure followed by the Australian High Court in Mabo. By dispelling the legal misconception that ownership of land had passed to the Crown upon the assertion of sovereignty, and by showing how the common law allowed that a form of Aboriginal title to land could survive the change of sovereignty, the Court put an end to the injustice in respect of indigenous property right which had been perpetrated since 1788. However, at the same time, a bare majority of the judges held that there were no legal grounds for compensation for past unjust appropriation of land. This did not necessarily mean that they thought there was no moral basis for compensation, but only that they did not provide grounds for a legal remedy. Perhaps they took the view this was a matter more appropriately addressed by political means. However, Waldron points out that a different set of problems does arise in connection with the idea that injustices initially committed in the past are ongoing. Most importantly, problems arise in connection with the underlying view of property entitlement that supports reparative claims. The assumption here is that, once acquired, entitlements continue until they are relinquished or transferred. Against this view, Lyons and Waldron both argue that entitlement and rights are sensitive to the passage of time and changes of circumstances. It is not a novel idea in law that rights may fade as circumstances change. There are good pragmatic reasons for statutes of limitations and for the doctrine of adverse possession. But there are also reasons of principle for thinking that entitlements may change over time. These involve, firstly, the basis of rights themselves. Lyons and Waldron follow Nozick in rejecting Locke's labor theory of initial entitlement to land as too strong, making it difficult to explain how subsequent transfer of entitlement is possible. Waldron replaces the Lockean theory with an account that relies upon the degree to which the land in question has become part of the individual's life plans and projects, or her general "structure of action". Acquisition that disrupts the plans of no one else may be supposed to take priority over acquisition that does disrupt another's plans. However, Waldron points out, this asymmetry is sensitive to changes of

21

The Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v State of Victoria (1998) FCA 1606. This case was upheld in the Federal Court (Yorta Yorta v Victoria ( 2 0 0 1 ) 110 FCR 244) and then in the High Court (Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria 2 0 0 2 H C A 5 8 . Similar issues are raised in the case involving Maori fishing rights and Urban Maori Athorities discussed by J. Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice", 64-6.

168

Paul

Patton

circumstance which affect the plans of the parties involved. Thus, the entitlement of original owners will weaken over time if they are separated from the land. This seems to provide an incentive to hold onto stolen land. Waldron accepts this consequence of the theory, but concludes that it shows the tension between an argument for property entitlements based on autonomy and the desire for such entitlements to be imprescriptible. Whatever the precise details of the basis of original entitlement, if entitlement is sensitive to background circumstances then it is vulnerable to prescription. This is the core of Lyons' argument against the common sense view that Native American land claims are founded on the violation of rights which were in operation at the time of invasion and which remain in force today: "From the fact that they had morally defensible claims two hundred or four hundred years ago it cannot be inferred that those claims persist". It is also the key argument for Waldron's conclusion that historic injustice may be superseded. He suggests that the principle of sensitivity to circumstances, which implies that what is legitimate acquisition in one case is not necessarily so in another, is already implicit in Locke's proviso that acquisition of land in a state of nature is legitimate only as long as we leave "enough and as good" for others. If we further suppose, as the rejection of Locke's theory of original acquisition above suggests, that property entitlement is not once and for all but that its legitimacy may be open to challenge at any moment, then legitimate entitlement will depend on circumstances at the time. It is as though the claim were renewed each time. As a consequence, legitimacy may fade over time as circumstances change: the legitimate ownership of a waterhole in times of plenty may not entail the right to exclude others in times of scarcity. Lyons and Waldron both argue that it is ownership rights themselves which are variable rather than saying that rights of ownership might be overridden by, say, a humanitarian duty to redistribute property to others. Lyons takes the view that "property rights themselves, and not just their exercise or contents, are relative to circumstances", while Waldron argues that property entitlement is itself a set of claim rights, liberty rights and powers that are "circumstantially sensitive". 22

23

24

In a world in which there is enormous poverty and disparity of entitlement, this might appear to render all property rights precarious. Apparently unpeturbed by this consequence, Waldron develops the further argument that, if legitimate entitlement is sensitive to changes in background circumstances, then the same must apply to illegitimate acquisition. He gives an example in which the violation by one group of the legitimate rights of others to a given waterhole is overtaken by ecological catastrophe such that the interlopers acquire a right to share what they had wrongly begun to use. In these circumstances, "they are entitled to share that water hole. Their use of Hg no longer counts as an injustice; it is now in fact part of what justice now requires. The initial injustice by F against G has been superseded by circumstances". More gener25

26

22 23 24 25

26

J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice", 25; J. Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice", 70. D . Lyons, "The N e w Indian Land Claims", 375. D. Lyons, "The N e w Indian Land Claims", 370; J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice", 23; J. Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice", 67f. If the implications of this conclusion do not alarm Lyons and Waldron, then it is not clear why they should be concerned about large scale transfers of property or wealth in the course of rectifying the historical injustices of colonization. J. Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice", 68; see also page 70, where he writes: "it seems possible that an act which counted as an injustice when it was committed in circumstances Q may be transformed, so far as its ongoing effect is concerned, into a just situation if circumstances change in the meantime form Q to C . When this happens, I shall say the injustice has been 2

Colonization

and Historical

Injustice

169

ally, unjust infringement of rights of others may become justified in light of changed circumstances. This conclusion is unavoidable unless we make legitimate entitlement impervious to circumstance. It follows then that a change in circumstances might justify forcing the indigenous owners of a given territory to share their land with others, even though it might have been unjustly appropriated in the past: "If circumstances make a difference to what counts as just acquisition, then they must make a difference also to what counts as an unjust incursion". This argument leaves unanswered a number of questions about the terms and conditions on which territory might be shared. Does it imply that sovereignty over the entire territory ought to be ceded? Does it imply that indigenous people should be removed or excluded from their traditional lands? These are exactly the kinds of changes forced upon in the course of colonization. 27

Nevertheless, let us assume for the sake of argument that the case for the possibility of supersession of injustice is sound. It does not follow that this has in fact occurred in any particular colonial context. Waldron admits that the conceptual possibility of historic supersession does not mean that it has occurred in any given situation: "Everything depends on which circumstances are taken to be morally significant and how as a matter of fact circumstances have changed". Nevertheless, he does think that the changes which have occurred in countries such as Aotearoa/ New Zealand and Australia are "exactly the sort of facts one would expect to make a difference to the justice of a set of entitlements over resources". These include the fact that "population has increased manyfold and the descendants of the colonists have nowhere else to go", as well as the occurrence of "demographic and ecological changes". While it is undoubtedly true that such changes have taken place, their precise moral implication remains to be determined. There are, after all, significant differences between the kind of case on which Waldron relies in order to argue for the possibility of supersession and the actual circumstances of colonization. The argument for the conceptual possibility of supersession relies on a hypothetical case of ecological disaster such that the need of others to make use of the resources owned by the indigenous population was both extreme and brought about by circumstances beyond their control. It is by no means clear that the colonial occupation of countries such as Aotearoa/ New Zealand and Australia occurred under morally similar circumstances. Whatever the reasons for the initial settlement in indigenous territories, and whatever the justification for the initial claims to sovereignty over these territories, their effective occupation took place over centuries and, in the Australian case, involved neither negotiations nor treaties with the indigenous inhabitants. These were not regarded as having any rights or entitlements which required recognition and, as a result, the issue of whether or not settlement occurred in response to a greater need or in response to circumstances beyond the control of those who came never arose. In the terms of Waldron's example, it is relevant to the entitlement of the colonists to ask whether there is a compelling moral case for their appropriation of indigenous land. Yet it is far from obvious how we would begin to answer this question. The historical reality of the motives behind colonization and the often brutal manner in which it was carried out are simply glossed over in benign talk of population increase, demographic and ecological changes. 28

29

27 28 29

superseded" (See also J. Waldron, J. Waldron, "Redressing Historic justice", 25. J. Waldron, "Redressing Historic justice", 25. J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic

"Superseding Historic Injustice", 24). Injustice", 68; see also J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic InInjustice", 7 1 , see also J. Waldron, "Superseding Historic InInjustice", 26.

170

Paul

Patton

Moreover, even if we accept that questions about the circumstances and methods of colonial occupation have no bearing on the situation of the descendants of the original colonists, it still remains to be asked how exactly the changes wrought by colonization (increase of the settler population, ecological changes, etc.) affect the claims of the descendants of the indigenous owners. Assuming that wholesale repatriation of the settler population is not an option, how should we strike a balance between their interests and those of the surviving indigenous peoples? It is surely too strong to suggest that the interests of the latter group are simply invalidated by virtue of the supersession argument. Perhaps they should be modified to the extent necessary to take into account the legitimate interests and aspirations of the descendants of the original invaders? Conversely, we may ask whether the interests of these descendants and other more recent arrivals exclude the possibility of considerable reparation for those who still suffer the adverse consequences of historical injustice?

5.

The Complexity of Colonial Injustice

Waldron's discussion of the possible supersession of property entitlements approaches the issue of Aboriginal claims to land and resources from the perspective of historic injustice in order to ask whether what may have been unjust appropriation by settlers in the past continues to constitute injustice in the present (given the changes in background circumstances etc.). By contrast, Justice Brennan's judgment in Mabo approaches the issue from the perspective of the principle of equality and suggests that the legal justifications previously offered for refusing to recognize indigenous rights and interests in land are "unjust and disciminatory" and can no longer be accepted: "It is contrary both to international standards and to the fundamental values of our common law to entrench a discriminatory rule which, because of the supposed position on the scale of social organization of the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony, denies them a right to occupy their traditional lands". In practice, with regard to the nature of native title and the conditions under which it may have evaporated or be susceptible to extinction by the Crown the Mabo judgment and subsequent decisions confirm that it is a weaker form of title destined to give way to the interests of other land users. Although the arguments advanced for treating native title in this way are legal and pragmatic rather than moral, the end result is not dissimilar to the outcome suggested by Waldron's argument for prescriptibility. 30

In effect, the issue of justice in respect of indigenous entitlements to land involves questions of equal treatment before the law, of the continuation of the corporate entity which has the entitlement and the relationship to land on which it is based, as well as the legitimate rights and expectations of the non-indigenous population. In addition, it may be argued that the ongoing injustice - wrongful dispossession - is also bound up with another form of continuing injustice, namely the lack of acknowledgment, recognition and respect for the identity, law and culture of a particular people. This was a crucial part of the legal basis on which Aboriginal land was appropriated in the Australian colonies: it was only possible to consider the land terra nullius and therefore legally available for claim on the condition that Aboriginal law was not recognized as law and the people not recognized as capable of having legitimate entitlements to property. To the extent that Aboriginal law and culture has survived, then the failure to recognize this is an ongoing injustice. It may well be true that the overall circumstance in relation to 30

The Mabo Decision,

29.

Colonization and Historical Injustice

171

the need for and use of land and resources has changed so that the livelihood of nonindigenous peoples now depend on access to and use of these same resources. It may well be true, as Waldron suggests, that "the costs of respecting primeval entitlements are much greater now than they were in 1800". This is an argument for taking these legitimate interests into account, which is what is achieved in effect by the legal rules relating to the vulnerability of native title to extinguishment and to co-existence with other rights and interests in land, but not an argument for the supersession of the property rights of the indigenous peoples. Moreover, the legal basis on which this pragmatic accommodation is achieved is the sovereign power of the colonial judiciary, a sovereignty imposed by means of the doctrine of terra nullius. To the extent that this remains the basis for the legal authority of the colonial state, the injustice of non-recognition is ongoing. Australian indigenous people have made it clear what is required to redress this wrong, namely their recognition as parties to an eventual negotiated settlement, treaty or document of reconciliation. 31

If it is correct to insist upon the complex and interrelated forms of injustice that are bound up in colonization, then it is premature to speak of the supersession of injustice. The distinctions between distributive, reparative and relational justice are a matter of theoretical convenience rather than historical experience. They do not in themselves justify their application to the circumstances of colonization in isolation from one another. An adequate response to the injustice of colonization requires that we take into account all three forms of injustice along with their historical interaction.

31

J. Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice", 7 1 .

172 Paul Patton Bibliography Bartlett, R.H. (ed.), The Mabo Decision, Butterworths, 1993. Bigelow, J., Pargetter, R. and R. Young, "Land, Well-Being and Compensation", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1990). Dodson, P., "Lingiari - Until the Chains are Broken", 4 Annual Vincent Lingiari Memorial Lecture, Essays on Australian Reconciliation, ed. M. Grattan, Black Inc Books, 2000. Keating, P., The H.V. Evatt Lecture - New Visions For Australia, Evatt Foundation, 1993. Kymlicka, W., Liberalism, Community and Culture, Clarendon Press, 1989. Kymlicka, W., Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, 1995. Lyons, D., "The New Indian Land Claims and Original Rights to Land", originally published in Social Theory and Practice, 4 (1977), republished in Reading Nozick. Essays on Anarchy, State and Utopia, ed. J. Paul, Blackwell, 1982. Nietzsche, F, Genealogy of Morals, trans. W. Kaufmann, Vintage Books, 1969. Patton, P., "Reconciliation, droits aborigenes et paradoxe constitutionnel en Australie", Alterite et Droit: Contributions a Vetude du rapport entre droit et culture, ed. Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, Editions Bruylant, 2002. Tully, J., Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1994 John Robert Seeley Lectures), Cambridge University Press, 1995. Tully, J., "The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom", Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ed. D. Ivison, P. Patton, and W. Sanders, Cambridge University Press, 2000. Waldron, J., "Historic Injustice. Its Remembrance and Supersession", Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, ed. G. Oddie and R. Perrett, Oxford University Press, 1992. Waldron, J., "Superseding Historic Injustice", Ethics, 103 (1992). Waldron, J., "Redressing Historic Injustice", this volume. th

173 1

Surviving Duties and Symbolic Compensation

Lukas H. Meyer

Contents 1.

Introduction

173

2.

Surviving Duties

174

3.

Carrying Out Acts of Symbolic Compensation in Fulfilling a Surviving Duty Towards the Dead Victims

178

Concluding Remarks

181

4.

1.

Introduction

Our obligations to provide measures of compensation for past injustices are often justified by appeal to the interests of contemporaries and future people: We should attempt to counteract the negative consequences of these past wrongs for the well-being of current and future people. However, such a forward-looking interpretation of the relevance of past injustices is incomplete when understood as a statement of how we ought to respond to the fact that past people were severely wronged. The true moral significance of past wrongs does not lie in their impact on currently living and future people's well-being; rather, the significance of past wrongs should be seen in the fact that past people were victims of these injustices. We need to enquire into the question of what we owe to the dead victims of past public evils. The forward-looking interpretation is misleading in suggesting that we owe them nothing - that, in the words of Max Horkheimer, "[p]ast injuries took place in the past and the matter ended there. The slain are truly slain." One could defend the claim that we are obliged to the past victims of injustices by attributing rights to them. To attribute rights to dead people may seem unproblematic if we assume that people continue to exist after their physical death, that they exist as people who can be affected by the events of this world or that they might even be able lo act in ways that have an impact on what happens in the world. These assumptions about the ontological status of previously living people are at least as controversial as the as2

1

2

For helpful discussion, comments and suggestions I should like to thank Brian Barry, Brian Bix, Axel Gosseries, David Heyd, Stanley L. Paulson, Walter Welsch, Andrew Williams, and two anonymous referees o f Revue Philosophique de Louvain (which published the article under the title "Obligations Persistantes et R6paration Symbolique" in 101 (2003). "Das vergangene Unrecht ist geschehen und abgeschlossen. Die Erschlagenen sind wirklich erschiagen." In a letter to Walter Benjamin 1937, as quoted in R. Tiedemann, Dialektik im Stillstand, 107.

174 Lukas H. Meyer 3

sumption that dead people do not exist as persons. A presupposition that is equally compatible with at least some of the controversial and mutually exclusive presuppositions on the ontological status of dead people can be considered a suitable starting point for a philosophical investigation into the question of whether we can stand under duties to previously living people. In the following discussion I am proceeding on the assumption that dead people either do not exist (al) or, if they do, that there is no connection between them and currently living (a2). The second assumption (a2) is meant to imply that for currently living people dead people are neither passive nor active subjects. In other words, I am proceeding on the assumption that the end of the physical existence of a human person, that is, his or her death, is the end of the possibility of this person acting in a way that she has an impact on the world as we know it and of events of this world or currently living persons' actions affecting the dead person (presupposition (A), that is: (al) and (a2)).

2.

Surviving

Duties

Is this presupposition compatible with an interpretation of the claim that the true significance of past wrongs lies in the fact that past people were the victims of these injustices? The position of surviving duties is compatible with presupposition (A). The duties survive the death of the bearer of the right . While the bearer of the right does no longer exist, currently living people can stand under the correlative duties. The notion of surviving duties relies on the idea that the reasons for a person's right imply reasons for a duty under which other people stand after the death of the bearer of the right. If it is a moral right, then these reasons will also include general social reasons which are relevant not only for the bearer of the right but also for the bearer of the surviving duty, his contemporaries (and future people). For example, we all have reasons to protect people's trust that promises be kept and that people have the reputation they deserve. The reasons for the surviving duties also include the reasons that are necessary for showing that a particular person had the moral right. 4

5

For the following discussion I will assume: (A*) Dead people have no interests or rights with respect to the state of affairs in the world as we know it. (B) Currently living people can stand under duties. Claim (B) seems unproblematic. Claim (A*) corresponds to presupposition (A) as introduced above. The position under consideration relies upon the following claims: (C) Some rights are future-oriented in the sense that they impose duties in the future, (c) Such rights can impose surviving duties: The rights imply duties that are (also) binding after the death of the bearer of the right if the appropriate bearer of the duty is identified. I would like to comment on these claims by investigating the reasons for surviving duties with the help of an example of a person who wishes to establish posthumously a 3 4

5

See T. Mulgan, "The Place of the Dead in Liberal Political Philosophy", 5 2 - 7 0 , 54f. S e e C. Wellman, Real Rights, 155-7. For a critique of positions on "posthumous harm" that are compatible with presuppostion (A) but do not support the claim under consideration, see A. Gosseries, Intergenerational Justice, ch. iv, ' T h e Dead End of Intergenerational Justice. What D o We O w e Our Ancestors" (on file with author). Or of a person's legitimate claim. In the following I will speak o f moral rights rather than moral claims, but nothing hinges on this as long as it is understood that people can stand under a duty to respond to the legitimate claims o f others.

Surviving Duties and Symbolic Compensation

175

prize for the sciences. I will call the person Alfred Nobel even though the example and the variations on the example I will use in the following discussion make no claim to resemble the historical person Alfred Nobel to whose bequeathal we owe the Nobel Prize. "A right implies a duty" means that a proposition about the right's validity implies a proposition that some duty exists. Such an implication relies upon the claim that the reasons for the right contain (some of) the reasons for the duty. In the case of rights that are future-oriented in the sense indicated, the reasons for the rights of people while alive are sufficient for holding currently living people under a duty, that is, a surviving duty. With respect to moral rights specifically moral reasons are among these reasons. Such reasons are meant to protect the conditions of a morally speaking valuable social life. Suppose Alfred Nobel kept to himself his wish to establish posthumously a prize for the sciences. Although he accumulated the fortune necessary for the purpose, Nobel neglected to write it in his will. Hiking in isolated mountains together with his friend Barbara, Nobel has an accident and both he and his friend realize that he will die before they can call on somebody for help. He asks his friend to promise him that she will make sure that his fortune will be spent for the establishment of a prize for the sciences and that his wish to this effect will be acknowledged as if it had been written in his will. Why should Barbara keep his promise? The particular strength of the position under consideration is to be seen in its connecting the surviving duty both to the previous right of the deceased person and to those general moral reasons which are relevant for the bearer of the duty and his contemporaries. First, the particular reasons which ground the right of the no longer existing person imply reasons for the validity of the surviving duty. Some of the reasons for a currently living person to stand under the duty towards the deceased person are implied by the reasons for attributing the corresponding right to the deceased person while alive. This is also the sense in which we stand under surviving duties towards the deceased person. For example, the surviving duty to keep a death-bed promise is valid, inter alia, for the reason that the promise was given to the deceased person and that is why the latter, while alive, had a moral right that the promise given to him be kept. If the duty is not understood to be binding due to the fact, inter alia, that the deceased person had the future-oriented right, surviving duties could not be distinguished from interpretations of, for example, death-bed promises according to which the duty to keep the promise is owed to our contemporaries alone (and possibly to people living in the future). The position under consideration differs from some consequentialist interpretations of, for example, death-bed promises by insisting that a surviving duty necessarily be based upon, inter alia, the reasons for the previous future-oriented right and that these reasons contain the specific reasons for the attribution of the previous right to the deceased person. 6

So far I have investigated one type of reason for a current person to stand under a duty towards the deceased person. These reasons are implied by the reasons for attributing the corresponding right to the deceased person while alive. However, and second, there are other reasons too. These reasons are general in that they concern the protection or promotion of values important for the quality of social life. With respect to death-bed promises trust and the protection from betrayal are at stake. We all have reasons to protect the value of people having confidence that promises be kept. In so far as people can and do have an interest in future posthumous states of affairs of the world as we know it, and in so far as pursuing such interests can be of high importance to the well-being of

6

Ernest Partridge discusses the example of Alfred Nobel and defends a rule-utilitarian reading of death-bed promises in his "Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect", 243f, 259-61.

176 Lukas H. Meyer 7

people while alive, it is important for people that others can bind themselves by promises or contracts to the effect that they will carry out certain actions after the promisee's death, and that when others have done so, that they can be confident that the promise will be kept. For the practice of such promises, trust is of special importance, for the promisee will not be able to determine whether the promise was kept. Thus, the practice of such promises is particularly dependent upon the protection of the value of people having confidence in promises being kept. At the same time, if such promises have often not been kept, this is likely to undermine the confidence in promises being kept generally. The right of the deceased person that the promise, given will be kept is based on, among others, these reasons. Although the right and the person who is the bearer of the right has ceased to exist, the moral reasons are still valid and the duty of the person who gave the promise continues to be binding on the basis of these reasons. As these reasons are general moral reasons they are not only relevant for the individual bearer of the right but also for the surviving bearer of the correlative duty and his contemporaries. The death of the bearer of the right leaves these moral reasons unaffected and the surviving duty is based on these reasons in conjunction with the reasons that are implied by the particular reasons for the attribution of the correlative right to the deceased person while alive. Thus, contemporaries of a person who stands under a surviving duty have reason to impose sanctions on the person should he not keep his promise. One might wonder whether this interpretation of surviving duties as currently living persons' duties towards deceased people is compatible with the presupposition that dead people are bearers of neither interests nor rights and that they cannot be affected by the actions of currently living people. At the very least, the position of surviving duties I am defending presupposes the possibility of the attribution of posthumous properties and, more particularly, of their change. If Barbara were not to keep his promise, Nobel would have the posthumous property of being the person with respect to whom Barbara violated the duty to keep the promise she gave. Such posthumous predication is incompatible with the claim (D) If X has the property P at a particular time t, then X exists at t. For our understanding of posthumous duties is to be compatible with the mortality assumption (al), that is, with the assumption that dead people do not exist. The idea of surviving duties presupposes the possibility of posthumous predication of properties to no longer existing persons and, thus, the rejection of (D). More particularly the idea of surviving duties presupposes the possibility that previously living people undergo a change of properties after their death. If a property is attributed to an entity at a particular point in time and it was not true of the entity at an earlier point of time, and it might not be true of the entity at a later point in time, then the entity undergoes change. For example, John forges the will of Nobel with the result that Nobel's fortune is spent contrary to his wishes. A short time later Barbara uncovers the fraud, Nobel's will is restored and his wishes are fulfilled. At first, the deceased Nobel is posthumously the person who is betrayed by John's forgery of his will; later on, it is true that Nobel has the property of being the person whose will is restored and whose wishes are fulfilled. How can Nobel undergo such changes if he is non-existent? Here we can rely on an explanation of posthumous predication as introduced by David-Hillel Ruben. His explanation relies on two distinctions, namely, the distinction 8

7

See also L.H. Meyer, "More than They Have a Right to", 137-56, 141-43.

8

See W.J. Waluchow, "Feinberg's Theory o f 'Preposthumous' Harm", 7 2 7 - 3 4 .

Surviving Duties and Symbolic Compensation

177

between real and non-real changes and the distinction between relational and non-relational properties. The first distinction is the distinction between changes as ordinarily understood and changes that are only apparent: The change in a schoolboy if he comes to admire Socrates whom he did not admire before is an example of real change, whereas the change in Socrates when the schoolboy comes to admire him is an example of non-real change. The second distinction concerns the distinction between non-relational properties and relational properties. For the non-relational property of an object one can ascribe the property without knowing anything else about other objects. This does not hold true for the relational property of an object. The property that an object has as the result of a change of its color might be an example of a non-relational property while the property that Adam and Eve have each time they acquire a new descendant is an example of a relational property. 9

10

11

In our example, John forges Nobel's will. This is an event, a change in the state of affairs that is based on non-relational changes in the person John. John undergoes a change and that brings about a non-relational property of John he did not have before. John violates a duty by acting contrary to the reasons that are valid for him. Not fulfilling his duty might cause feelings of guilt on his part - a non-relational change of the person John. What is more, his not fulfilling his duty can have certain consequences and this is the case in our example: When the forgery is uncovered John's contemporaries criticize his breach of duty. Doing so requires of them to act or to refrain from acting in certain ways. All these non-relational changes are real changes in the state of affairs. However, John's violation of his surviving duty also entails relational changes. First, John's relations with Nobel undergo a change. Nobel now is a person with respect to whom John violated a duty under which John would not have stood had Nobel not been the bearer of the correlative right. Second, John's relations with his contemporaries undergo change. Because of his breach of duty John is now considered a person deserving of a sanction. According to the interpretation of surviving duties as sketched above, John has general moral reasons to fulfill his duty, and when he acts contrary to these reasons this is a matter of general moral concern. Thus, I would like to maintain that Nobel can be a relatum of a relational change. Because Nobel is non-existent he cannot undergo non-relational changes. According to Ruben's analysis, for each relational change there is a simultaneous or earlier non-relational change to which the relational change is owed or on which the relational change depends. We can distinguish several types of the relationship between relational and non-relational changes. If a currently living person acts contrary to the surviving duty under which he stands, then only one of the relata which undergoes a relational change also undergoes a real change, namely, the currently living person - in our example, John. The other relatum, the deceased person, undergoes only a non-real change, namely, a relational change - in our example, Nobel. John, the person who violates the duty undergoes a real change and because of this he also undergoes a change in his relation 12

13

9

10 11

12 13

See D.-H. Ruben, "A Puzzle About Posthumous Predicaton", 2 1 1 - 3 6 , 2 2 3 - 3 1 . S e e also P. Geach, Logic Matters, 3 1 8 - 2 3 ; P. Geach, God and the Soul, 66f, 7 0 - 3 , 98f; Michael Dummett discusses "phoney changes" in Frege. Philosophy of Language, ch. 14. Ruben understands this be a sufficient condition. See D.-H. Ruben, "A Puzzle About Posthumous Respect", 2 1 7 , fn. 7. Ibid.. 216f, 2 2 3 . In the following I will speak of relational and non-relational changes. The former change brings about that an object has a relational property the object did not have before; the latter brings about that an object has a non-relational property the object did not have before. Ibid.. 230. Ibid., 2 2 4 , 231.

178 Lukas H. Meyer to Nobel, the deceased person. Since the latter person is dead, he cannot undergo a real change but only non-real changes. We are now in a position to qualify the claim (D), which we found to be incompatible with the idea of surviving duties. The claim reads: If X has the property P at a particular time t, then X exists at t. This holds true if the property in question is a matter of undergoing real change. The modified claim reads: (D*) If X has the property P at a particular time t and the property is a matter of undergoing real change, then X exists at t. Only existing bearers of properties can have properties that indicate that the bearer undergoes real change; non-existing bearers of properties can have properties that indicate a change in their relations to other entities owing to real changes in the latter. It is true that real changes at time t presuppose existence at time t. However, this does not mean that non-existing entities cannot undergo non-real changes. In other words the posthumous attribution of non-real changes is possible. The idea of surviving duties presupposes the possibility of such attribution, namely of attributing the following property to a deceased person: being the person whose previous future-oriented right is now violated by a living person; the latter person breaches a surviving duty and thus undergoes a real change owing to which the relations between the living and the deceased person undergo a change without the deceased person's thereby undergoing a real change. The notion of dead people being wronged or harmed presupposes a real change in the dead person. If dead people cannot undergo real changes they cannot be harmed or wronged. 14

3.

Carrying Out Acts of Symbolic Compensation in Fulfilling a Surviving Duty Towards the Dead Victims

Does the position of surviving duties help us in responding to the objection against the forward-looking understanding of the significance of historical injustices? I shall propose the idea that since people as members of ongoing societies can be said to have an obligation to compensate surviving and indirect victims of past injustices, they may also have an obligation symbolically to compensate dead victims of past injustices, that is people who cannot be affected by our actions. As I have argued above, we can stand under surviving duties towards past people even though neither can we change the value to them of any moment of their lives since they cannot be affected by what people do after their death nor can they be thought to be bearers of interests or rights. Until now I have discussed duties towards dead people with reference to (variations on) the example of Alfred Nobel and his bequeathal. Currently living people can act in ways that will constitute a violation of the surviving duties under which they stand owing to the rights past people had in the past. We stand under particular surviving duties towards past people owing to their future-oriented projects, the promises we made to them or the contractual obligations we entered with them. However, not all people have the opportunity or the wish to have a specific impact on posthumous states of affairs. Not all people pursue projects that are future-oriented in the relevant way and not all people oblige others to bring about what for them are posthumous states of affairs. Here I want to suggest that we can stand under surviving duties towards dead people owing to the fact that they were victims of historical in15

14

Ibid., 2 3 2 , 2 3 6 .

15

S e e L . H . Meyer, 'Transnational Autonomy", 2 6 3 - 3 0 1 , sect. 8.

Surviving

Duties and Symbolic Compensation

179

justices. For us to show that currently living people can stand under such duties, we will have to assume that people generally have interests with respect to posthumous states of affairs. Indeed, people can be thought to generally have the interest to enjoy a good reputation both during their lifetime and posthumously. When people were violated in their rights and badly so, their posthumous reputation depends upon their being publicly acknowledged as victims of these wrongs and others being identified as the wrongdoers. In acknowledging past people as victims of egregious wrongs we cannot affect their well-being. Also, such acknowledgement cannot be expressed vis-a-vis the dead victims, but only vis-a-vis currently living people in light of the wrongs past people suffered. However, if it is true that we stand under surviving duties towards past victims of historical injustice owing to the wrongs they suffered, then our fulfilling the duty by publicly acknowledging the past injustices they suffered will change the relation between us and the dead victims of historical injustice. It will be true of the past victims of these injustices that they have the posthumous property that we fulfilled our surviving duty towards them. To be sure, a change of the relation between a currently living person and a dead person does not bring about or rely upon a real change of the latter person. Rather the relational change is based upon the real change of the person who carries out the act. For us to bring about the public acknowledgment of past people as victims of historical injustice can require different measures under different circumstances. Currently living people can express their acknowledgment of past people as victims of past wrongs in an indirect way, namely, by providing measures of compensation for those who are worse off than they should be owing to the effects of the past injustices suffered by their predecessors. The message of such measures of compensation can contain the acknowledgment that past people were victims of past wrong. Here I would like to suggest that we can understand efforts at finding appropriate forms of commemoration of today's dead victims as efforts at bringing about measures of symbolic compensation and restitution. Establishing a memorial is the typical course of action where the effort is made to realize the symbolic value of compensating those victims who are no longer living. A memorial may be a public speech, a day in the official calendar, a conference, a public space or a monument - for example, a sculpture or an installation. Often these memorials are meant to commemorate crimes that previous members committed in the name of a political society whose currently living members now want to carry out actions of public symbolic compensation or restitution for these crimes towards the victims and their descendants. While there is still no established practice for such efforts at public symbolic compensation, such acts of symbolic compensation have been carried out since the 1970s in Germany and we have been observing the beginnings of an international practice of symbolic compensation. How can we understand this practice of symbolic compensation? Here I can only adumbrate the basic idea: the value of real compensation - the rectification or compensation at which we would aim if only it were possible - is imputed, at least in part, to the act of symbolic compensation. The imputation of the value of real compensation to the acts of symbolic compensation is partly based upon the expressive value of acts of symbolic compensation. For those who carry out acts of symbolic compensation these acts make it possible to express attitudes towards the past victims - attitudes that are consti16

17

16 17

For a comparison of the memorials for the victims of the Shoa in Poland, Germany and Israel, see J.E. Young, ' T h e Texture of Memory", 1799-811. S e e R. Nozick's analysis of symbolic value in chs. 1 and 2 of his The Nature of Rationality.

180 Lukas H.Meyer tutive of acts of compensation. Acts of symbolic compensation make it possible for us to act in such a way as to express an understanding of ourselves as people who wish to, and would, carry out acts of real compensation if this were only possible. If successful we will have firmly expressed an understanding of ourselves as persons who would provide measures of real compensation to the previously living person or people if this were only possible. Acts of symbolic compensation can be valuable for those who carry out the acts since doing so helps to express attitudes that are important for their self-understanding and, thus, for their identity. They understand themselves to be persons committed to support the just claims of those who have been injured and to be persons prepared to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a just political society. Indeed, acts of symbolic compensation will not help us in fulfilling our duties towards the past victims of wrongs and thus in bringing about a change in our relationship to the dead victims unless we succeed in expressing that we are people who wish to, and would, carry out acts of real compensation if this were only possible. Carrying out acts of symbolic compensation can symbolize that one is a person who shares this identity, can be evidence of one's being such a person and, importantly, can have the consequence of helping one to secure the self-understanding of being such a person. The latter is a real consequence of such acts and can be of great importance to the person carrying out the act. However, we will not succeed in bringing about these consequences in carrying out acts of symbolic compensation if we aim to bring about these consequences as such. Carrying out an act of symbolic value as a means of bringing about certain consequences will change the character of the act and, thus, the reasons that speak on behalf of carrying out the act in the first place. It is certainly not the case that we will become a person of a certain identity simply in virtue of our carrying out an act in a specific situation in which a person of this identity would have carried out the act. Carrying out acts of symbolic compensation does not by itself cause one to become a person of this identity. While such consequences for the self-understanding of a person can be an important factor in explaining the person's acts, in choosing what to do the person cannot herself explicitly take into account this type of consequence without thereby diminishing or undermining this very effect of her act. Carrying out acts of symbolic compensation will have consequences for others as well. There will often be surviving and indirect victims of past injustices. Acts of symbolic compensation can have consequences for the surviving victims, for the descendants of victims, and for the group whose previous members were harmed by the injustices: The public acknowledgment of the suffering of past people who were wronged by, say, a genocidal policy cannot be separated from the acknowledgment of those who survived the same policy and suffer as an effect of this policy or from those who suffer as indirect victims of the policy. Those who carry out acts of symbolic compensation will want to provide measures of real compensation to those who currently suffer as a result of the same past wrongs. The reasons for acts of symbolic compensation include the reasons for carrying out measures of real compensation where this is possible. Measures of symbolic compensation belong to the measures likely to have the effect of providing surviving victims with assistance in recovering or regaining the status of membership in their respective societies, such that they are once again able to lead lives under condi18

18

Elizabeth Anderson provides a theory of expressive reasoning and the relation between expressive reasoning and consequentialist reasoning in Value in Ethics and Economics. I would need to say a good bit more if I were going to bring what I say here to bear on Anderson's theory.

Surviving

Duties

and Symbolic

Compensation

181

tions of justice. In so far as people were wronged as members of a group that continues to exist, the public acknowledgment of past victims also provides a measure of acknowledgment for the group whose previous members were wronged. Carrying out acts of symbolic compensation may hinder us from realizing other values, may have negative consequences or have consequences less positive than other courses of action - and this can be the case even if carrying out such acts can bring about positive consequences for others. First, carrying out acts of symbolic compensation can compete with acts that make possible the realization of important non-symbolic values. Of course, we may well find that realizing non-symbolic values is more important than realizing symbolic values. The conflict may be due to the fact that carrying out the act of symbolic compensation is costly, materially speaking. Indeed, establishing a monument or a museum as a measure of public commemoration of victims of past injustices can be costly. However, if we find ourselves in a situation in which we have to choose between carrying out such a measure of symbolic compensation and realizing another project that is meant to improve the conditions of the worst off by, say, establishing a medical facility for homeless people, there will often be alternative ways of expressing the value of symbolic compensation, some of which are likely to be less costly. For example, the establishment of a day of commemoration in the official calendar may well make it possible for us to realize the value of symbolic compensation and be less costly than the establishment of a museum or a monument. Depending upon the specific situation in which we find ourselves - depending upon, for example, what measures of public commemoration have been established - , a less costly alternative may be as good in expressing the value of symbolic compensation as the more costly one. In any case, there does not seem to be a general correlation between material expenditure in carrying out such an act and the success in symbolically realizing the value in question. If so, it then seems likely that a conflict of the sort referred to can be resolved or mitigated by choosing one of the less costly alternatives in carrying out acts of symbolic compensation. 19

Other conflicts might be more difficult to resolve. Carrying out acts of symbolic compensation may compete with realizing other symbolic values. Also, carrying out such actions can have consequences that undermine or threaten the self-understanding of groups that members of these groups want to preserve. For example, public acts of this sort may undermine the stability of a particular institution, say, the military, whose compliance with the rules of the new regime, yet to be established, may well be a condition of the success of a "transition to democracy". I doubt that one can say much in general in response to these types of conflicts. How we assess the conflicts depends upon, inter alia, how we assess the self-understandings of the groups and institutions that are said to be threatened. These self-understandings might well not deserve our respect. Our assessment will also depend upon who is negatively affected and in what ways and by whom as an effect of our carrying out actions of symbolic compensation. At the same time, it can be true that our success in realizing the symbolic value in question does not require our carrying out acts of a sort that have threatening negative consequences for others. Indeed, since such consequences are connected with our attempt at symbolically compensating people, this very connection may well undermine our chances of realizing the symbolic value in question, which in part depends upon the 19

The Roma (Gypsies) were victims of a racially motivated genocide committed by the Nazis - a truth that has been long denied with the result that most surviving victims as well as the descendants of those murdered were excluded from compensation and restitution. See L.H. Meyer, 'Transnational Autonomy", 269.

182 Lukas H. Meyer public acknowledgment of the past victims as victims of wrongs. We might often be able to find an alternative course of action that is more promising with respect to both our chance of realizing the symbolic value in question and diminishing the threatening consequences to others.

4.

Concluding

Remarks

I presented the interpretation of symbolic compensation as a response to an objection to the forward-looking understanding of the significance of historical injustices. According to the forward-looking interpretation past injustices matter only and insofar as they have an impact on the well-being of currently living and future people. The forward-looking interpretation of the relevance of historical injustices is incomplete: the significance of past wrongs should also be seen in the fact that past people were victims of these injustices. Symbolic compensation as understood here provides an interpretation of our relating to the fact that past people were victims of injustices without presupposing that past people can be bearers of interests or rights today. Insofar as people while alive generally have an interest and a just claim to enjoy the reputation they deserve and insofar the reasons for their just claim can oblige us even after the bearer of the interest and the just claim has ceased to exist, our carrying out acts of symbolic compensation can be understood as fulfilling a surviving duty towards dead people who were wronged in the past, namely, the duty of restoring the posthumous reputation they deserve. Our measures of symbolic compensation, if successful, will change our relations to past victims of wrongs without changing the value to these past victims of any moment of their lives. Such a change of our relations to the past victims does not presuppose a real change in the past people. Rather, the relational change is based upon real change of the person who carries out the act. Bringing about this relational change can be important for the self-understanding of the people who carry out the acts. Carrying out acts of symbolic compensation can have positive consequences for surviving and indirect victims as well.

Surviving

Duties

and Symbolic

Compensation

183

Bibliography Anderson E., Value in Ethics and Economics, Harvard University Press, 1993. Dummett, M., Frege. Philosophy of Language, Duckworth, 1973. Geach, P., God and the Soul, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969. Geach, P., Logic Matters, Basil Blackwell, 1981. Gosseries, A., lntergenerational Justice. Probing the Assumptions, Exploring the Implications, 2000 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Louvain). Meyer, L.H., "More than They Have a Right to. Future People and our Future-Oriented Projects", Contingent Future Persons, ed. N. Fotion and J.C. Heller, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997. Meyer, L.H., "Transnational Autonomy. Responding to Historical Injustice in the Case of the Saami and Roma Peoples", International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 8 (2001). Mulgan, T., ' T h e Place of the Dead in Liberal Political Philosophy", Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999). Nozick, R., The Nature of Rationality, Princeton University Press, 1993. Partridge, E., "Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect", Ethics 91 (1981). Ruben, D.-H., "A Puzzle About Posthumous Predicaton", Philosophical Review 97 (1988). Tiedemann, R., Dialektik im Stillstand. Versuche zum Spatwerk Walter Benjamins, Suhrkamp, 1983. Waluchow, W.J., "Feinberg's Theory of 'Preposthumous' Harm", Dialogue 25 (1986). Wellman, C , Real Rights, Oxford UP, 1995. Young, J.E., ' T h e Texture of Memory. Holocaust Memorials and Meaning", Remembering for the Future. Jews and Christians During and After the Holocaust, Pergamon Press, 1988.

185

Ressentiment and Reconciliation. Alternative Responses to Historical Evil

David Heyd

Contents 1.

Looking Backwards and Looking Forwards

185

2.

Jean Amery and the Moral Power of Ressentiment

188

3.

Desmond Tutu and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

192

4.

Hope or Despair. Dealing with Historical Evil

195

1.

Looking Backwards and Looking

Forwards

Little is known of Lot's wife. We do not even know her name. This woman's claim to fame comes from one single, dramatic verse in the Old Testament: "Lot's wife looked back, and she thereupon turned into a pillar of s a l t " . Why did she do so? We know that God specifically warned Lot "Flee for your life! Do not look behind you, nor stop anywhere in the Plain". Many interpretations were offered in the Jewish exegetical literature for Lot's wife's disregard for the divine command: feminine curiosity, the woman's empathy with her daughters who were left behind, her sinful attachment to her material property, or her pity for the city of Sodom to which she belonged according to tradition. And the reason for her death is usually associated with seeing the face of God, who descended himself from heaven to perform the act of destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Since none of these interpretations is directly supported by the biblical text, I can take the liberty and add my own reading: looking backwards is in itself a petrifying act, particularly when the object of gaze is a past trauma from which one tries to escape. Compare Lot to his wife. Lot, I wish to argue, is a survivalist, from beginning to end. When negotiating with his uncle, Abraham, how to divide the land between the two. Lot chooses the plain of the Jordan since it is "well watered" (and despite its people being "very wicked sinners against the Lord". Then, when fleeing from Sodom before God pours on it sulphury fire, Lot negotiates with God so as to make his escape the quickest and safest. Unlike his wife, Lot looks only forwards, trying to save his life. Finally, after his wife's death, his two surviving spouse-less daughters make Lot drink wine and lie with him one after the other so as to "maintain life through our father". Again, life 12

3

4

1 2 3 4

Genesis, 19:26. Tanakh, The Holy Ibid., 19:17. Ibid., 13: 1 0 , 1 3 .

Scriptures.

186 David Heyd proves to be stronger than morality and Lot's posterity survives: he becomes the father of all Moabites and all Ammonites. Lot's wife, in contrast, looks backwards. She is not preoccupied with her future survival but with the processing of the trauma of the previous night's encounter with the wicked Sodomites. She cannot resist the urge to see the punishment of the people of Sodom. Her satisfaction arises out of being witness to the annihilation of the evil culture. She knows the risk of this vindictive or vengeful attitude, since God explicitly warned her husband against looking backwards. But she cannot overcome the impulse to personally witness the justified punishment for the sins committed against her family and God. She cannot forget being the victim of the Sodomites' evil. But looking back is a deadening act. It surely goes against the evolutionary imperative: if chased by a predator, run away as quickly as possible; any attempt to look back may cause you to waste time, trip and be hunted down. The natural direction of human sight and human movement is forwards. We are not built so as to simultaneously look back and move on. Thus, unlike many interpretations of the story, which highlight the motive of the violation of a taboo and the gaze at the forbidden (as in Pandora or Cupid and Psyche), I am focusing on the backward movement. In a more philosophical vein, moving forwards is flowing on with time, whereas looking back, being stuck with the past, is an attempt to abolish time by freezing it. Lot is constantly concerned with time: he is aware that time is short and that it might be too short for him to be saved. He asks God to let him flee to a closer place so as not to miss the opportunity to find refuge. The whole story is colored by the sense of time: first, Lot's delay in leaving Sodom and then his panicky haste. Lot's wife, in contrast, ignores the dimension of time in making the perspective of the past a substitute for the realistic future-oriented movement. She thus becomes a timeless witness to the evil of Sodom and the divine penalty, a fossilized person in the form of a monument, a pillar of salt. This paper is concerned with the bi-directional axis of our temporal consciousness, the backward- and forward-looking. Where does morality lie on this axis? On the one hand, moral judgment is aimed at the future: it is typically prescriptive, action-guiding, ideal-based; it commands and commends what should be done; it posits models for emulation and imitation like the virtuous character. The future-oriented perspective presupposes the human capacity to change, to transform one's own personality and the world. The "ought-implies-can" principle presupposes hope in the possibility of morality to ameliorate the human condition. On the other hand, moral judgment is reactive, it responds to past behavior and events. In this judgmental function, morality serves to decide the value of actions which can no longer be molded or altered. In the particular sphere of justice, one may say that distributive justice is typically, though not exclusively, geared to the future. It decides what the right way of allocating a resource will or would be, i.e. serves as a guiding principle for action. Retributive justice is typically backward-looking, being concerned with the right response to past wrongs (or good deeds), in many cases in terms of assigning punishment (or rewards), or at least making a condemning (or commending) judgment. However, morality is also preoccupied with mental attitudes and personal reactions to past wrongs, and as we shall 5

6

5 6

Ibid., 19: 30-38. D. N o y , "The Reversal of Lot's Wife". N o y , an important Jewish folklore scholar, points out the dominance of the motive of urgency in the divine goading of Lot's escape (8), but does not read his wife's reversed look in testimonial terms. It is true that many later Jewish readings of the story ascribe to Lot's wife a negative character, lack of faith, or stinginess, though some hypothesize that she was motivated by a sense of loyalty to her family and city.

Ressentiment and Reconciliation

187

see, these can also concentrate either on the future or on the past: hope, reconciliation, and the willingness to restore the original relationship, or, alternatively, vindictiveness, resentment and the unwillingness to forget and forgive. Here we are getting close to the subject of historical justice. The two faces of morality, the backward- and forward-looking, can be complementary and even mutually reinforcing. For instance, learning from the past in order to avoid future wrongs is one function of moral judgment and punishment. Evaluating past behavior is an effective means of moral education and the strengthening of virtues of character. Closer to our particular concern, admission of past wrongs by the perpetrators and forgiveness by the wronged party are often the only way to true reconciliation in the future. However, there are contexts in which it seems that the relationship between the two perspectives is tense and that the two are incompatible or even mutually exclusive. This is the focus of the following discussion. Justice is a sphere in which judgment about the past and judgment about the future are closely inter-related. Thus, what should be allocated to members of a group is often a function of their past behavior. Judgments of future deserts are based on judgments on past actions. In being corrective or compensatory and re-distributive, justice restores a desirable condition, thus overcoming the past condition, making the past morally irrelevant. However, judgments of justice are also concerned with private and collective attitudes, and here the possibility of correction and restoration becomes itself morally controversial. Forgiveness and resentment are typical examples from the personal sphere. Even if a past wrong is punished and the wronged party compensated, it is not a moral duty for the latter to forgive the wrongdoer, to restore previous relations. Resentment is not only an understandable attitude but may even be expected as the morally correct attitude of the victim of a crime towards its perpetrator. Despite many theoretical problems, the extrapolation of distributive and retributive justice from the individual to the collective level is easier than the parallel move in matters of moral attitudes. The reason is simple: attitudes are in their nature personal; they belong to the psychological domain of the way individuals feel and respond. Distributions of goods or the imposition of penalties are impersonal and can be applied to groups as well as to individuals. Historical justice, by its nature, is concerned with collective rather than individual justice. It is accordingly based on impersonal principles of collective responsibility, reparation, compensation, and re-distribution, rather than on the more personal attitudes of forgiveness or resentment, empathy and vindictiveness. It is easier to ascribe groups with agency (action) than with emotions. There are however cases in which the personal dimension spills over to the impersonal in the way historical justice ought to be carried out. I would like to deal with two alternative kinds of such penetration of the personal into the political or historical: Jean Amery and Desmond Tutu, two radically different moral approaches to the question of the right response to historical evil. There is very little historical or circumstantial connection between the two cases of post-war attitude to Germany and post-apartheid relations between blacks and whites in South Africa. But the juxtaposition of the two allows us to examine the deep ethical views which underlie the two conceptions. I am taking my lead from the two key concepts used by the two thinkers in their attempt to justify their normative conclusions: ressentiment on the one hand, and reconciliation on the other. My general proposition is that the two typically express the two directions of moral judgment: the backward- and forward-looking. The two thinkers have much in common: their writing is equally passionate, their moral integrity equally impeccable (and based on being victims to the history of their

188 David Heyd respective societies); neither of them is a philosopher in the professional sense of the word and their writing is, accordingly, not based on an abstract systematic argument, but rather amounts to a more personal and moving plea to their readers, to the world around them. Although the rhetoric of the two is often moralistic in nature, trying to preach from high ground, they address a deep philosophical issue, worthy of theoretical examination.

2.

Jean Amery and the Moral Power of Ressentiment

Jean Amery, born as Hans Mayer in 1912, grew up in west Austria and then in Vienna. His father was an assimilated Jew and his mother a catholic, and till the Nuremberg laws he was hardly aware of his Jewish identity. After having married a Jewish woman in 1937 and the Anschluss in 1938, Amery fled to Belgium where he was arrested by the Belgian police in 1940 as a foreign German citizen and exiled to southern France, where he was interned in various camps. In 1941 Amery escaped from the camp, arrived illegally back in Belgium, was arrested again, this time as a Jew, tortured by the Gestapo for his involvement in the resistance movement and sent to concentration camps, first Auschwitz and then Bergen Belsen. After the war, Amery stayed in Brussels, adopted, as he himself tells, "a pseudonym with a Romance ring" (the surname being an anagram of his former name). He earned his living from journalistic writing for various papers and only in the 1960's started writing essays about his war experiences. In 1978 Amery committed suicide in Salzburg, an act whose inevitability can be detected in his essays, including the most touching final sentences of the essay on Ressentiments which is our subject. 7

Despite his wide-range education and studies in philosophy (particularly of the positivist movement) and his extensive writing on philosophy, Amery was not a professional philosopher and his writing was never academic. His literary style is typically personal, very passionate, often angry, sometimes poignant. He does not try to suggest general abstract arguments or a moral theory, but rather to express what seems to him an authentic voice of an individual victim that should be given a particular moral weight. I would like to argue that the claim for the validity of the particular angle of the victim is itself a philosophical argument. It says that the position from which certain claims about historical justice are made is no less relevant in assessing the force of the claims than their substantive content, or to be more precise, that the substantive content of ethical judgment is partly colored by the experience and attitudes of the person making it. It is not merely the principle of integrity ("are you in a position to tell me how to behave"), which does not directly affect the prepositional content of the moral judgment but only the authority of its subject, but a personalistic view of ethical judgment itself: the justified moral response to historical evil should be informed by the mental attitude of its victims. Society cannot be the moral judge, since it "thinks only about its continued existence", i.e. looking forwards so that evil does not happen again. 8

9

7 8

9

For a very moving discussion of Amery's suicide on the background o f his personal and philosophical reflections, see S. Neiman, "Jean Amery Takes his Life", 7 7 5 - 7 8 2 . In that respect I wish to go beyond Neiman, who identifies the personal character of Anldry's writings in the "representative" features of his life (ibid., 775). Amery, in my understanding, proposes a general thesis about the role o f resentment in moral judgment in the context of historical justice. J. Amery, At the Mind's Limits, 70.

Ressentiment

and Reconciliation

189

"Resentments" (originally "Ressentiments") is one of five essays published in 1966 in a collection under the title Jenseits von Schuld und Siihne. Both the title of the essay and that of the collection which is of course intentionally reminiscent of Jenseits von Gut und Bose refer to Nietzsche, whose view of ressentiment is put under sharp critical examination. The background of the essay is the author's sense of grudge experienced while traveling around the beautiful landscape of Germany and witnessing the peaceful and prosperous life of the German people. The aim of the essay as defined by the author is to "justify [this] psychic condition that has been condemned by moralists and psychologists alike". Amery wants to deal with the alleged sickness of the grudge and legitimize it. However, he is aware that this expression of personal "retrospective grudge" may make the reader feel uneasy. In other words, the very imposition of the essay on the public is a manifestation of "lack of tact". Tact, says Amery is an important feature in everyday behavior. I may add that tact's virtue lies in its ability to make inter-personal relations smoother by leaving unsaid what could be offensive or difficult to swallow. Amery is aware of the incompatibility of tact and full honesty in some circumstances and pleads with the reader to allow him the latter at the cost of the former. The object of Amery's resentment is Germany's post-war re-awakening, the relative indifference to its past, its present prosperity and above all its return to normality. He cannot forgive the rapid disappearance of remorse, the physical re-building of the country, and more deeply the sense that the past has already been atoned for and hence "overcome". Ame"ry does not seek revenge, the pathetic attempt to punish the perpetrator by the same means originally used against the victim. But he does cherish ressentiment, that particular moral sentiment (rather than vengeful deeds) which insists on remembering and reminding those who tend to forget. The English phrase "harbouring resentment" is appropriate in the context of Amery's discussion, since the verb "to harbour" means primarily giving shelter to someone who is persecuted. And indeed, Amery feels that the sense of ressentiment is being aggressively silenced by the "enlightened" world, inside and outside Germany. It is considered, as he says, both a psychological sickness which should be treated and a moral taint which should be removed. Amery's task is to defend resentment against both accusations. The critique of resentment in terms of its pathology is difficult to ignore since the survivor is aware of the "warping" effect of his personal trauma. But the moral clarity and confidence in which he views the appropriateness of his grudge reassures him of the validity of his emotional response, even against the widespread societal denial of its "health". Even if resentment is a sign of sickness, it is "a form of the human condition that morally as well as historically is of a higher order than that of healthy straightness". What primarily disturbs Amery, as can be seen from the opening sentences of his essay, is the visual images of contemporary Germany, the beautiful landscape, the idyllic towns and villages, the clean and modem cities. His visual fantasy is the perpetuation of the image of Germany in ruins, the scenery of 1945, a huge potato-field. Does not that ring a biblical bell? It is the satisfaction of seeing Sodom and Gomorrah in flames and in total destruction, which Lot's wife, like Amiry, could not and would not resist. It is 10

11

12

13

14

15

10 11 12 13 14 15

Amery, At the Mind's Limits. All references are to this English edition, first published in 1980. Ibid., 6 5 . Ibid., 64. Ibid., 65. See D. Heyd, 'Tact. Sense, Sensitivity, and Virtue", 2 1 7 - 2 3 1 . Am6ry, At the Mind's Limits, 68.

190 David Heyd the personal testimony, both of the historical evil and the ultimate retribution which motivates the reversal of the look. The philosophical tone of the whole essay is explicitly anti-Nietzschean. For Nietzsche, ressentiment is the vengeance of those who have no power to inflict real harm on those they hate. They are forced to rest content with imaginary revenge which they entertain in the dark privacy of their minds. Resentment is the single most important emotion underlying herd-morality, the means by which the weak try to force the powerful to play according to their moral rules of egalitarian justice and the authority of "bad conscience". According to Nietzsche, the general loathsome feature of the sentiment of resentment is its being reactive rather than active. It involves the negation of the other instead of the affirmation of oneself (which is the sign of real virtue). In being merely a response to others, it is the sign of the unauthentic and dishonest character. And of course it could not escape Amery's eyes that the source of the slave revolt in morality is ascribed by Nietzsche to the resentment of the priestly Jews. Now, if Nietzsche's genealogy of morals is a striking reversal of the deepest assumptions of Judeo-Christian ethics, a radical transposition of the fundamental concepts of good and evil, Amery boldly turns Nietzsche's theory of resentment on its head! Ressentiment is the heart of his morality, the authentic indication of honesty and moral integrity, the true sign of personal non-conformity and power to escape the herd. But tragically Amery is only partly successful in his anti-Nietzschean gambit. He is forced to admit that both his idea of resentment and Nietzsche's have one feature in common: they are both forms of revolt against life. Life is in Nietzsche's conception a value which must be fostered and expanded; it is the overall expression of the spiritual will to power. But for Amery, life is simply the irresistible force moving us onwards, biologically and politically. While for Nietzsche life is the ultimate ideal, for Amery it is sheer survival. While for the former it is a normative concept, for the latter it is a positively "given" fact. Unlike Nietzsche, for whom life is a self-aware attempt to flourish by transcending the daily business of biological and social survival, Amery views life as routine normality, most typically characterized in terms of non-reflective inertia. 16

17

18

But upon reflecting on it, Amery becomes aware that Resentment is not only an unnatural but also a logically inconsistent condition. It nails every one of us onto the cross of his ruined past. Absurdly, it demands that the irreversible be turned around, that the event be undone. Resentment blocks the exit to the genuine human dimension, the future. I know that the time-sense of the person trapped in resentment is twisted around, dis-ordered, if you wish, for it desires two impossible things: regression into the past and nullification of what happened. 19

Amery speaks again and again about the "natural time-sense" ("natiirliches Zeitgefiihl"), that consciousness which is future-oriented: "what will be tomorrow is more valuable than what was yesterday". But his whole essay is a heroic effort to counter 20

16 17 18

19 20

'Therefore, I did not strive for an explicative account ... I can do no more than give testimony" (Amery's preface to the 1977 reissue of the above quoted book, viii). F. Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, sects, 7, 8, 10, Second Essay, sect. 11. Amery mentions also Max Scheler, whose work on ressentiment closely follows Nietzsche's. Scheler speaks of "the ressentiment of the vitally unfit against the fit, of those who are partially dead against the living!". M. Scheler, Ressentiment, 162. Unlike Nietzsche, Scheler refers to the psychological and sociological dimension of resentment rather than to the moral and hence is less of a challenge to Amery's analysis and defense. Amery, At the Mind's Limits, 68. Ibid., 76.

Ressentiment

and Reconciliation

191

that natural direction of time. Amery uses the language of delay: he is aware that he is "not in tune". with the present, that he "clings to the past", that he is stubborn. He knows that resentment means staying behind. But he will not give in, since this is in his mind the only way to respond in a moral way to historical evil. Adaptation to the requirements of the present and the imperative of the "better future" are seen by Amery as moral treason. Like Nietzsche's overman, the man of resentment must bear extreme loneliness, but for opposite reasons: unlike the Nietzschean free spirit which is alone in its sense of the future, the resentful victim is desperately stuck in the past. As we shall see, healing is a central metaphor used by both Amery and Desmond Tutu. Healing is fundamentally a typical physiological process associated with health and survival. Unhealed wounds tend to inflame and eventually poison the whole body. Healing is the natural course of events which usually takes place without medical intervention. It captures the natural aspect of the future oriented direction of biological and social movement. On the psychological level it is often connected with forgetting; on the moral level it is usually manifested in forgiveness. But again, AmeYy's self-imposed mission is to intentionally stop the natural process of healing, forgetting and forgiveness. Reconciliation is not only morally dubious in Amery's eyes, but also "hostile to history", that is to say to the honest handling of the past. 21

22

24

23

2 5

We arrive at the deep level of morality. In its essence morality is not only non-natural in the Kantian sense, but also un-natural. Moral judgment is a "revolt against reality", a constant protest against the power of nature to spontaneously heal wounds and overcome evil. The natural time-sense is not only extra-moral but ann'moral. In its very normativity, moral judgment cannot be "natural", either in its attempt to shape the future rather than simply accept it as it will be, or in judging the past rather than understanding why it was. And in the double function of morality, which was the starting point of this paper, the response to the past, primarily of crimes and atrocities, has priority over the attempt to shape the future. But Amery is not naive. He knows that in the battle between the two senses or directions of time, the future, the natural, the realistic will always have the upper hand. Life is stronger than morality. Evolution made us a species that can survive only on the condition of a far-reaching degree of forgetfulness, adaptability and reconciliation. 26

But then, although on the social level, the sober-minded Am£ry knows all too well that there is no real hope for inspiring (or infecting?) a whole society with the resentful perspective of the victim (what he calls "an extravagant moral daydream" ) he insists that the genuine moral stance is individual and personal. Politically he is on the losing side. Nietzsche's fear of the victory of the herd-morality of resentment is unfounded. Life overpowers moral conscience. All that is left for historical justice is the authentic 27

21 22 23 24 25

26 27

Ibid., 65. Ibid., 67. Ibid. Ibid., 7If. Cf. Jean Amdry's response to Simon Wiesenthal's query about the issue of forgiveness to a dying SS officer in S. Wiesenthal, The Sunflower, 105-109. Amdry stresses that to the extent that forgiveness is a psychological matter, he is indifferent whether it is granted; if it is a theological issue, he, as an atheist, does not understand its import; and if it is a political question, then it should by no means be granted. In the same volume (181-183), Primo Levi strongly rejects the option of forgiveness in this context since its request by the Nazi officer was a childish and impudent act which would have meant much to him but nothing to Wiesenthal, creating an unjust balance between perpetrator and victim. Am6ry, At the Mind's Limits, 7 2 . Ibid., 79.

192

David Heyd

expression of the resentful individual. But the victim is eventually expected to "finish" with that ressentiment, "finish" - as Amery alarmingly adds - in the sense of killing. In a most shocking, though delayed correspondence of theory and practice, Jean Amery committed suicide twelve years after having concluded his essay on resentment with a plea for patience by the public disturbed by the grudge of the victim. As I mentioned, the title of Amery's collection of essays is "Beyond Guilt and Atonement". Playing on the Nietzschean idea of transcending common morality in favor of a higher one, Amery seems to be trying to similarly transcend legal justice and theologically based morality. Guilt is the identifiable aspect of the crime to which a punishment can be attached. Retributive justice balances the guilt by a penalty. Analogously, sin can be atoned for and consequently wiped out. Legal justice and religious atonement are both means of achieving closure, of settling the balance of the horrifying atrocities of the past. But morality does not seek a "settlement". On the contrary, its aim is to leave the account open. But this means a persistent look backwards, and as we learnt from the story of Lot's wife, this is a deadening perspective, petrifying, or even literally killing. Historical justice can be achieved only if history is "moralized", that is to say, if instead of reconciling ourselves with the past and overcoming it, both perpetrators and victims place it in the center of their consciousness: this implies a degree of resentment (not revenge) on the part of the victim and a sense of shame (not guilt) by the people of the perpetrators. German society, according to Amery, must internalize the Third Reich as part of its past on an equal footing as the Enlightenment and Gothe. The objects of pride and shame are symmetrically relevant in society's self-image. Furthermore, although there is no justification for collective guilt, there is a place for collective shame, since guilt is a function of what we do while shame arises out of what we are; and what we are, our identity, is partly a collective matter. 28

29

3.

Desmond Tutu and the Truth and Reconciliation

Commission

Desmond Tutu's conception of historical justice is a kind of mirror image of Amery's. Tutu's moral fervor equals that of Amery, as does his commitment to moral honesty. Both are devoted to the pursuit of historical justice following a trauma caused by evil of an unimagined scale. Both are aware of the inherent tension between moral judgment and practical needs. However the historical circumstances in which they live and their personal position in society are very different. Although both are victims of past evil which they want to address and redress, Tutu is a public figure, whose approach is deeply informed by political considerations, while Amery is a private bystander and observer. Furthermore, while German Jews were integrated in German society before the Nazi period, black South Africans were never seen by the whites as equal. But paradoxically, it is Tutu who is speaking of reconciliation, as if there was a pre-apartheid inter-racial relationship which should be restored, while Amery despairs of any chance 28

A fine example of Amery's prophetic insight is how quickly the uniqueness o f the Nazi evil will be lost by the end of the 20th century when "everything will be submerged in a general 'Century of Barbarism'" (ibid., 80).

29

This important point was raised by Richard Rorty too. He asks why the Left in America cannot be proud of s o m e of the good achieved by American society and is exclusively obsessed by the shameful wrongs for which it is responsible. It is the mirror image of the complacent post-war German attitude which took pride in Germany's glorious past, skipping the shameful twelve years of the Nazi period.

Ressentiment and Reconciliation

193

of genuine restoration of the pre-war relations. On the other hand, for South Africa there is no practical alternative to co-existence, and hence reconciliation seems to be imperative, whereas dissociation of Jews from German culture and society was an option, both psychological and political. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was the ingenious institutional tool for promoting a feasible plan for redressing past wrongs without losing the chance of future co-existence. This was by no means an original institution. At least twenty truth commissions were established and proceeded with varying success throughout the world since 1970. The South African institution was established by a 1995 law, after careful reflection and a wide public debate. Archbishop Tutu was nominated as chairman and after three years of intensive (and painful) work the commission submitted its long report to President Mandela. We are not concerned here with the working of the TRC or its success (which is controversial), but with the philosophical conception underlying it, primarily as it is expressed by Desmond Tutu himself. The name of the institution is of course revealing. Truth and reconciliation are assumed to be high values. But are they? Furthermore, they are supposed to be related, maybe in a quasi-causal way. The logo of the Commission refers to truth as the road to reconciliation. But in what way is it so? Take truth first. One can think of four sources of value of "truth". First, truth as such is good. Secondly, the knowledge of truth is valuable. Thirdly, the memory of truth is what is cherished. And fourthly, the process of exposing the truth is what really counts. Truth as such is a particularly abstract notion and cannot be the aim of a truth commission. And anyway there was no chance for consent on the narrative of the apartheid period. Knowing the truth gets closer to the idea of such a commission, although it is still a relatively abstract condition. It is definitely morally wrong to suppress information about atrocities, or to deny what happened, or to hide the fact that someone was responsible for these atrocities. We are not willing to accept that people simply disappeared or that that evil "just happened". But knowledge in itself does not guarantee a moral transformation. Remembering the truth is an essential constituent of historical justice, since it involves the persistence of knowledge and its bequest to future generations. Forgetting is often considered a major moral sin against the victims of historical crimes. It expresses indifference not only to their plight but also to the basic components of the collective identity of society. Tutu was accordingly against a general amnesty, the granting of which would have meant legitimizing a general amnesia. Finally, exposing or the process of revealing truth is of independent moral value, which I call "confessional". It involves an interpersonal, or collective dynamic, in which people undergo a psychological transformation, leading to a new phase in their moral consciousness. 30

1

It seems that it is here that Tutu's main commitment to truth as a moral goal lies. His writing is replete with terms like "healing", "catharsis", "coming to terms with" and, above all, "reconciliation". Truth as such, its knowledge or its memory does not mean being reconciled with it. But the process of uncovering it may bring forth the ability to cope with it, change one's attitude to others, even forgive. For Am£ry, truth and the constant reminder of truth to those who are liable to suppress and forget it, is the safeguard for the persistence of ressentiment, of a hostile attitude and the attempt to foster shame in the camp of the evildoers. For Tutu, truth is the exact opposite: the instrument of moral reform and mutual reconciliation of the victim with the perpetrator. But this 30 31

For one of the many books on the history, procedures, testimonies and outcomes of the T R C , see K. Christie, The South African Truth Commission. See A. Margalit, The Ethics of Memory.

194 David Heyd can happen only if truth is achieved through the right process, which is the public, personal confession, with all its pain and shame. For Tutu truth is of a therapeutic value, and its exposure is an interim procedure which should come to an end. In that respect, unlike Ambry's resentment, which in its nature should persist as long as possible, down into the long future of German society, the idea of the TRC was typically transitional and was institutionally devised with a strict time limit. It was designed to lead to a new phase in South African history. Yet, Tutu is aware that reconciliation is not an easy goal, not only politically but also morally: Forgiveness and reconciliation has a price tag attached to it. We've got to where we are, a democratic dispensation, by negotiation. And the heart of that negotiation was compromise. And people have got to acknowledge that yes, we were on the brink of civil war in 1994 ... that's part of the cost. And you say to those who say we want justice, that if there were no amnesty, then we would have had justice and ashes. 32

Like Amery, Tutu admits that reconciliation means renouncing a legitimate moral sentiment. But this is a necessary compromise which in itself is of a moral value since it saves society from total destruction. We are back at the time axis, now looking forwards rather than backwards, justifying the need for rapprochement in terms of the vital interests of the future. Even if on the personal level, resentment and vengeance are understandable, on the social and political level they are suicidal and in the name of collective survival should be overcome. This does not mean that Tutu wishes to completely relinquish the individual's perspective. For example, he acknowledges the freedom of the victim to refuse to forgive the wrongdoer, and he does not require remorse of the wrongdoer as a condition for amnesty. But he supports the principle that once a confession of truth is fully and honestly made, immunity from legal prosecution should be secured. Forgiveness, which is a personal matter, is left to the individual's discretion. But legal pardon is automatically given on the basis of the interests of society and the moral effect of the public confession on both the confessor and the wide audience. Tutu's conception of justice in the historical sense is accordingly not retributive but rather restorative. It does not seek punishment or revenge, even though these are in themselves morally legitimate, but the creation of a new kind of relationship. But this future-oriented approach is not blind to the past. It requires a transitional phase in which the process of disclosure and direct confrontation between the evildoer and the victim serves as a necessary means. Unlike Amery, Tutu wants closure, a "settlement", since this is the only way to open a new page for a society with such a troubled moral history. Reconciliation is an alternative to vengeance since it is based on acknowledgment of the crime. By insisting on the full disclosure of the evil deeds, these deeds become "accounted for", which in turn means accountability of the perpetrators. For Tutu, some form of monetary compensation is important in the process of reconciliation since it is a symbolical manifestation of the moral acknowledgment involved in the confessional act 33

32 33

Quoted in K. Christie, The South African Truth Commission, 65. A distorted version of the future-oriented perspective of justice in post-apartheid South Africa is expressed by the main female protagonist of J. M. Coetzee's recent novel Disgrace. The young white woman, who was raped by a black youth, prefers not to take any punitive measure against him. This is explained by her black neighbor involved in the crime: the lady is looking forwards, not backwards. Her father, in contrast, cannot stand her conciliatory approach and develops a typically resentful attitude to the violators of his daughter.

Ressentiment and Reconciliation

195

of telling the truth. For AmeYy, compensation is incompatible with resentment and hence his suspicion that the grand restitution scheme of post-war Germany might serve to relieve German society of the need to face its past. Although Tutu does not expect every individual victim to grant forgiveness, he entitles his book "No Future without Forgiveness". The alternatives to the TRC were either forgetfulness (like the Zimbabwean case or the aim of the South African National Party), or Nuremberg-style trials and the perpetuation of resentment. Tutu boldly attempted a third way, in which a political goal is achieved through a morally powerful procedure, a future-oriented aim of collective survival through a personal confrontation with the past. But this ingenious device of reconciliation can be achieved only on the basis of deep theological or religious assumptions, primarily relating to a fundamental moral credit (given even to the agents of the most atrocious deeds) and to the model of God's forgiveness as boundless. These are exactly the assumptions which are shared by neither Amery nor Primo Levi. Wynand Malan, a member of the Amnesty Committee in South Africa, says, 35

36

If we want to judge the past on the basis of superimposing present choices or moral frames ... we have no chance of dealing with it - hence I have totally discarded a moral frame as a basis for reconciliation. 37

In the absence of a theologically based ethics, the sole basis for the morality of dealing with evil is, as Amery insists, "humanistic", and this either implies the necessity of resentment or the pragmatic acceptance of sheer compromise. Tutu, through his religious faith, is trying to "humanize" the perpetrator, his assumption being that every person is created in God's image. It is as if he has to "import" a metaphysical principle to save the humanity of the cruel murderer. But forgiveness requires faith also in another sense: as Tutu is fully aware, there is a measure of risk in any act of asking for or granting forgiveness; it can be met with a negative response, and one must give credit that the forgiven party will indeed change in the future and that the confession of evil was sincere. The power of forgiveness is that though it assumes good faith it also tends to create good faith even in those who lack it. This is the deep dynamic behind the ideal of reconciliation. Truth and reconciliation are the two poles of the Janus-face of morality: the shaping of the future in the light of the judgment of the past. Truth is not simply the adequate picture of what really happened but an experience or sensibility, a moral perception. In that respect, Tutu cannot be described as a biblical Lot. He is not a mere survivalist. But he aspires to be freed from the risk of being enslaved to the past by feelings of bitterness 38

39

40

34 35 36

37 38 39

40

Apology not followed by restitution means nothing, says Tutu. See D. Shriver, An Ethic for Enemies, 2 2 4 . D. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness. See T. Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable", 64. Govier discusses both the German and the South African cases in examining the limits of forgiveness and emphasizes that for Tutu even in the most monstrous criminal there is an element of decency. Quoted in K. Christie, The South African Truth Commission, 139. D. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, ch. 5. In my work on supererogation I argued that forgiveness, being beyond duty, is typically shown to people with whom w e have personal relations; but its moral power lies also in its potential to create such personal relationship when shown to people with whom the forgiver had no such prior relationship. D. Heyd, Supererogation, 162. P. Duvenage, "The Politics of Memory and Forgetting after Auschwitz and Apartheid", 2 2 . ' T h e memory o f who we are, what we have done to others, is thus a precondition o f the exercise o f moral judgement".

196 David Heyd and resentment, since those are explicitly associated with un-health and "death-dealing spirits". This is why forgiveness plays such a major role in his theology of hope. But forgiveness consists of a very tense, even impossible relation between memory of the past and a change of heart for the future. In one of the most poignant scenes in Frances Read and Deborah Hoffman's documentary film A Long Night's Journey into Day, a black mother faces the murderer of her son and says in a most resentful and angry tone: "I forgive you", adding "I will never forget your face". The possibility of genuine reconciliation remains empirically to be proven and conceptually controversial. 41

4.

Hope or Despair. Dealing with Historical Evil

The first priority of morality is fighting evil. But historical evil cannot be undone. It can be only addressed, suppressed or redressed. We have examined in some detail two points of view which equally resist forgetfulness or indifference. Both Amery and Tutu realize the limits of retributive justice and the pressing force of social stability and peace, and recognize the irresistible power of life, survival and inertia. But while for Tutu these have a moral meaning, for Amery they belong to the political. For unlike Tutu, Amery does not believe that the moral, which in his case is purely personal, can be transformed into the political order. Reconciliation for Amery means at most an inevitable pragmatic settlement (for instance, he himself complains that the new capitalist "system" in Germany is making use of his own public appearances in the media). Both take as their starting point the personal response of the individual - resentment on the one hand, forgiveness on the other - but only Tutu strives to use it as a lever for a new social order. It is a difference between the morality of hope and that of despair and resignation, opposite strategies in processing a deep trauma. Nowhere is this contrast more concisely expressed than in the different understanding of healing. For healing is a basic natural process, an epitome of what happens in a standard way, "by itself, if not interfered with or given the right conditions. Tutu repeatedly refers to healing as the primary goal of the TRC, since it is exactly the transitional phase in a wounded organ before being restored to its former, healthy condition. The ultimate goal is the disappearance of the wound, although this goal can be achieved only if the process (of healing) takes place in the right way. For Amery this is exactly what is repugnant in healing: the wound should remain open, indefinitely. All restorative ideals are illusory or suppressive of truth. There is a close association between healing and kitsch, or sentimentality. Harboring resentment is valuable because it counters the natural process. And while for Tutu forgiveness is supererogatory (that is to say of a particular moral value due to its free discretionary aspects), for Amery it is wrong. We saw Amery's contempt for forgiveness in his response to Wiesenthal's moral query in The Sunflower. A later edition of the book contains Tutu's reply too. He takes issue with the Jewish view that no forgiveness can be granted for the horrors of the Holocaust and calls for Jewish thinkers to reopen the case and come to a different conclusion "for the sake of the world". 42

Both thinkers are "humanists". But while for Amery humanism means ethics without God, Tutu's humanism is informed by uhuntu, the traditional sense of humanness and compassion, and is theologically based on the divine image engraved in every human being. For Amery it is human to feel re-sentiment as an ongoing and self-perpetuating 41

D. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness,

42

Ibid., 2 2 5 .

122.

Ressentiment and Reconciliation

197

response to evil which cannot be undone. For Tutu the touching characteristic of human beings is their capacity to reconcile, that is etymologically speaking to re-combine or re-gain. We may conclude with Hannah Arendt who sharply perceives the bi-directional attitude on the time axis of human action. Past deeds are irreversible, cannot be undone. Future deeds are infinitely unpredictable and create a chaotic uncertainty. Human beings deal with the two limitations by their power to forgive (past actions) on the one hand and make promises (future actions) on the other. These are means for overcoming the fixation with the past and for managing the unexpected future, or in our terms, for settling past wrongs and surviving in the future. Arendt would not accept Amery's ressentiment, although she admits that extreme crimes are not forgivable. But neither does she agree with the theologically based analysis of forgiveness as suggested by Tutu, since she interprets the New Testament view of forgiveness in human terms. But how should we relate to exactly those cases of extreme evil is a question which is left open. We cannot escape the conclusion that resentment and reconciliation are two deep alternative responses to historical evil which cannot be fully reconciled. 43

Bibliography Amery, J., At the Mind's Limits, trs. Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld, Granta Books, 1999 (English edition, first published in 1980). Arendt, H., The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, 1958. Christie, K., 77ie South African Truth Commission, Macmillan, 2000. Duvenage, P., "The Politics of Memory and Forgetting after Auschwitz and Apartheid", Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (1999). Govier, T., "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable", American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1999). Heyd, D., Supererogation. Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1982. Heyd, D., "Tact. Sense, Sensitivity, and Virtue", Inquiry 38 (1995). Margalit, A., The Ethics of Memory, Harvard University Press, 2002. Neiman, S., "Jean Amery Takes his Life", Yale Companion to Jewish Writing and Thought in German Culture 1096-1996, ed. S.L. Gilman and J. Zipes, Yale University Press, 1997. Nietzsche, F., Genealogy of Morals, trans. W. Kaufmann, Vintage Books, 1969. Noy, D., ' T h e Reversal of Lot's Wife", Festschrift for Zalman Shazar, ed B.Z. Lurie, Kiryat Sefer, 1973 (in Hebrew). Scheler, M., Ressentiment, trans. W.W. Holdheim, The Free Press, 1961. Shriver, D., An Ethic for Enemies. Forgiveness in Politics, Oxford University Press, 1995. Tanakh, 77t