Judgment and Proposition. From Descartes to Kant

Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 118

JUDGMENT AND

PROPOSITION From Descartes to Kant

Gabriel Nuchehnans

North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, Oxford, New York, 1983

ISBN 0 4448 5571 8

Aangeboden in de vergadering van 14 juni 1982

PREFACE

This volume completes - for the time being - a series of investigations that were undertaken with the purpose of tracing in some detail the development of that field of logico-semantic research for which the foundations were laid in the first chapters of Aristotle's De interpretatione and which, in honour of that pioneer, might perhaps be called apophantics. The first part - Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions ofthe Bearers of Truth and Falsitywas published in 1973, followed by a second part - Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories ofthe Proposition - in 1980. The last instalment takes the account from the beginning of the modern period to roughly that point in the nineteenth century from which on discussions of the subject in the recent past and contemporary systematic treatment tend to coalesce. Many of the sources on which the exposition is based are rat her difficult to get hold of. I gladly acknowledge my indebtedness to the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z. W.O.), from which I received two travel grants, in 1974 and 1975, in order to consult libraries in London and Munich. Foot-note references which have the form of a name followed by a year stand for works of which full details are given in the bibliography at the end of the book. Surnames written in capitalletters are abbreviations of items in the list of secondary literature. In the bibliography the year of first publication is, if necessary, added bet ween brackets. Indications of the type '6.3.2.' refer to chapter, section, and subsection of the book itself. University of Leiden, June 1982

CONTENTS

1. The legacy of scholasticism and humanism 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 1.5.

The Thomistic doctrine The objective-existence theory The mental-act theory and logical realism Conceptus obiectivus and thema Conclusion

2. Idea and judgment in Descartes 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6.

The meaning of idea Ideas as the senses of linguistic expressions Ideas and judgment The source of Descartes 's doctrine of judgmen t Truth and falsity Conclusion

3. Repercussions of Descartes 's theory of judgment 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 3.5.

Adherents of the voluntas theory Some opponents of the perception theory of judgment Spinoza Further critical references to the Cartesian doctrine Conclusion

4. Arnauld and the Port-Royal Logic 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5. 4.6.

Arnauld' s conception of an idea Objects of thought and manners of thinking Simple propositions Simple propositions with a complex ingredient Compound propositions Conclusion

9 9 17 26 30 35 36 36 41 43 47 50 53 55 55 61 63 67 69 70 70 73 75 77

83 85 5

5. Some eighteenth-century critics of the Port-Royal view 5.L 5.2. 5.3.

Du Marsais Beauzée Conclusion

6. Geulincx's contribution to Cartesian philosophy oflogic 6.L 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6.

Indicators of mental acts as performed Categorical affirmation and denial Acts of compounding propositions Things in themselves and things as signified Burthogge Conclusion

7. Ideas as images. Gassendi and Hobbes 7.L 7.2. 7.3.

Gassendi Hobbes Conclusion

8. The heyday of British empiricism

88 88 94 98 99 99 105 110 114 117 119 121 121 123 137 139

Locke Berkeley Hume Acts as propositions in practice Hardey and Priesdey Some textbooks of logic Conclusion

139 147 154 159 162 169 172

9. Sensationalism and its cri tics in France

174

8.L 8.2. 8.3. 8.4. 8.5. 8.6. 8.7.

9.L 9.2. 9.3. 9.4.

Condillac' s sensationalist theory of judgment Destutt de Tracy' s idéologie Growing criticism Conclusion

10. Common sense philosophy and nominalism in Great Britain 10.L 10.2. 10.3. 10.4.

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Thomas Reid JeremyBentham James Mill Conclusion

174 180 186 193 194 194 204 210 212

11. Leibniz's logical realism 11 .1. 11.2. 11.3. 11.4.

Ideas as cogitables Complex cogitables Criteria of identity for concepts and propositions Conclusion

214 214 218 223 232

12. The German enlightenment

233

12.1. Ingenium and iudicium 12.2. Hypothesis and thesis

234 240 244

12.3. Conclusion 13. Some problems in Kant and his contemporaries 13.1. Judgment in general 13.2. Problems concerning relation and quality 13.3. Problems concerning modality 13.4. Urteil and Satz 13.5. Conclusion

246 246 248 252 254 256

Epilogue

257

Bibliography

262

Indices

280

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1. THE LEGACY OF SCHOLASTICISM AND HUMANISM

In seeking a solution to problems concerning the meaning of a declarative sentence, the object of propositional attitudes, and the bearers of truth and falsity, scholastic philosophers advanced four main types of theory. In this introductory chapter Iintend to recapitulate those doctrines, paying special attention to the notions of esse obiective and conceptus obiectivus, which are, I think, of crucial importance for gaining a clear insight into the theories of the proposition that were developed by those thinkers who initiated the modern era in the history of philosophy. In this connection I shall also suggest that there is a close relationship between the notion of thema, as it was introduced into logic by Philipp Melanchthon in 1520 and elaborated by his humanist followers, and the notion of conceptus obiectivus.

1.1. The Thomistic doctrine The following sketch of the theory adhered to by orthodox Thomists is chiefly based on the writings of Thomas Aquinas himself (1225/26-1274), occasionally supplemented by the comments of such faithful interpreters as Johannes Capreolus (1380-1444) andJohannes a Sancto Thoma (1589-1644); the latter , it should be noted, was a contemporary of DescartesI. 1.1.1. At the level of the first operation of the mind, the so-called apprehensio simplex, an act of thinking or conceiving of something was considered to have normally as its ultimate object a particular thing existing in the outside world. According to the ontological thesis ofhylomorphism, each individual thing in the world is a compound of two principles: matter (materia) and form (forma, natura, quidditas). In the particular thing as it exists independently of thought the form, which makes it what it actually is, has material being (esse materiaie). Neither the particular thing as such nor the individualized form as it is in the thing according to material being fits into the mind. In order to become immediately present to the mind, the individualized form has to be adapted by the 1.

Of the abundant secondary literature I mention in particular SCHMIDT 1966, LISSKA 1976, and MARRAS 1976.

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active intellect, which, in a process of abstraction, purifies the form as it is found in the memory images (phantasmata) of the particular thing from all individuating conditions. By removing those features which determine the material manner ofbeing of the form in question, the active intellect renders it actually intelligible, more or less in the way in which light renders a colour actually visible. In this abstract and immaterialized condition the form is able to affect the passive intellect and to bring it to an act of apprehending or conceiving. In terms of act and potency, we may say either that the abstract form impresses itself, as a species intelligibilis impressa, on the passive intellect and thereby brings it to a definite thought, or that the passive intellect receives or takes on a certain form and thereby acquires a perfect ion which consists in an act of thinking. At this stage already it should be emphasized that there is a radical difference between the way in which a form is in a concrete thing, according to material being, and the way in which the same form is in the mind. Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of change. When, for instance, a fire heats water, the form of the source of change is received into the subject of the change in such a manner that the form of heat is in both the fire and the water according to material being, or, as it is also called, according to natural being(esse naturaie). But when the heat is perceived by the senses and thought of by the mind, its form is received according to a mode of being which is characterized as esse spirituale, ut intentio quaedam; secundum quem modum res ha bet esse in anima, or as esse intelligibile, or as esse intentionale2 • It is in the light of this difference between the esse materiale or naturale and the esse intentionale of a form that Aristotle's saying that the soul is somehow everything3 should be understood, and also Aquinas's statement that knowing subjects differ from non-knowing subjects in th at the latter have nothing but their own form, whereas knowing subjects are of such a nature th at in addition they can have the form of something else; for the form of the thing known is in the knower (cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus distinguuntur, quia non cognoscens nihil habet nisi formam suam tantum, sed cognoscens natum est ha bere formam etiam alterius rei; nam species cogniti est in cognoscentef. This difference is insisted on even in the case of two immaterial entities. Wh en one angel knows another angel, he does so through a form existing in his mind. But even then we should distinguish between the angel known as he exists in natural being and his form as it is in the mind of the knowing angel according to intentional being5 • On the one hand, an act of thinking of something is explained as a kind of assimilation: the mind receives the same form as is present in the particular thing according to natural being. On the other hand, this assimilation does not go so far as to make the thinking subject

2. 3. 4. 5.

10

In II Sententiarum, 19, 1,3, ad 1; Quaestiones quodlibeta/es, 8, 4; Summa the%gica, I, q. 78, art . 3; De anima, 11, Lect. 24, 551; In II De anima, 24, 553. De anima, lIl, 8, 431 b 21. Summa the%gica, I, q. 14, art. 1. Summa the%gica, I, q. 56, art. 2, ad 3.

a particular thing of the same kind as the thing thought of; I do not become a stone by thinking of a stone. The crucial difference is accounted for by pointing out that one and the same form has two different ways ofbeing, one material or natural, in the particular thing thought of, and one intentional, in the thinking subject. In order to show the full implications of this view it is necessary to add first another item of the Thomistic doctrine. The act of conceiving which consists in the reception of an abstract form by the passive intellect yields a product that remains inside the mind, an internal object that is the terminus intrinsecus of the act of thinking. The immanent product or internalobject is often called intentio intellecta or verbum; it is distinguished from the species intelligibilis impressa by the name species intelligibilis expressa. The most general reason for complementing the act with such an immanent product is no doubt the conviction, which reaches at least as far back as Plat06 , that to think nothing is the same as not to think at alF. Since thinking was usually regarded as ment al speech, this belief could also be expressed by the trui sm that to say is always to say something. In addition, it was pointed out that the intellect must form its own representation of the thing thought of because it thinks indifferently of both present and absent things and also because it conceives of the thing without its material conditions. At the same time, it was held that it is this formed concept or inner word which is the significa te of spoken and written categorematic expressions and also that to . which concepts of a second order - the so-called intentiones secundae, such as universal, species, genus etc. - are applicable. In general, the intentio intellecta is the conceptual content which is analysed and made explicit in a formal definition. According to many Thomists - but this was an extremely controversial issue - the inner word is a quality of the mind which is really distinct from the act of thinking. Nevertheless, it has a mode ofbeing that is entirely dependent upon the act; for its being consists in its being thought (esse intentionis intellectae in ipso intelligi consistitJ. The mode ofbeing of an intentio intellecta is precisely an esse intentionale, that is to say, the abstract form as a conceptual content is in the mind exactly as long as the act of thinking by which it is constituted lasts. It is one and the same form, then, which exists in the particular thing according to material or natural being, is purified from its material conditions by the active intellect, impresses itself upon the passive intellect, thereby bringing it to an actual thought, and exists in the mind according to intentional being as the very content of th at act of thinking. So far, the distinction between the form as it characterizes the individual thing in the outside world and the form as it is immediately present to the mind has been stressed. We now come to another distinction, of equal importance and drawn within the mode ofbeing that the form has in the mind. On the one hand, the form may be considered 6. 7.

8.

Cf. Theaetetus, 189 a 12. Cf. Capreolus 1900, 11, p. 254: Necesse est enim ponere tales conceptus; immo, sine ipsis nihil intelligeremus. Summa contra gentiles, IV, 11 (3466).

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with respect to the knowing subject; from that point of view, it is in the knower as an accident in a subject (sic inest cognoscenti sicut accidens in subiecto) and is that which makes the knower actually know (facit cognoscentem actu cognoscere). On the other hand, the same form may be regarded with respect to the thing known, namely, in so far as it directs the act of knowing to a determinate object (determinat cognitionem ad aliquod cognoscibile determinatum), by being also the form of that object. From that point of view, it is not the fact that the form inheres in the knower as an accident in a subject which is brought into prominence, but rat her the fact that it is somehow related to the thing known (ex hac parte non habet quod insit sed quod ad aliud sitl. Adding this distinction between inesse and ad aliud esse to the distinction between material or natural being and being in the mind, we get a trichotomy: the form of a stone, for example, as it is the quiddity of a particular stone, the form of the stone as it is in the knowing subject as a modification of that subject, and the form of the stone in the mind in so far as it is related to the form of the particular stone in the outside world. As is also clear from the etymology of the word intentio, the abstract form in the mind was seen as tending to and being directed towards the intelligible nature of the particular thing in the outside world. In other words, the abstract form in the mind has a representative or semantic character, and it is this aspect that is of special interest for the purposes of logic and epistemology. That the abstract form in the mind has such a directedness towards an object was explained by the fact that there is a likeness (similitudo) in form between the thinking mind and the thing thought of. Although the media in which the formal traits are present differ, the form itself remains identical in nature and definition. And just as in the case of a portrait which bears a rel at ion of likeness or representation to its subject the portrait itself is called a likeness or representation of that subject, so the immaterialized form in the mind may be described as a likeness or representation of the individual things which share that same form in another medium. It should not be forgotten, however, that the comparison with a portrait mayalso be misleading. Johannes a Sancto Thoma draws a distinction between two kinds of image. An exterior and instrumental image, such as a portrait, causes one to think of some pers on or thing by being first perceived itself (ta lis imago prius debet attingi et cognosci quam obiectum ipsum). An interior and formal image, on the other hand, is not itself an object of knowiedge, but only the form according to which the act of thinking is directed towards a certain object in the world (ipsa est ratio et forma terminans cognitionem, et haec non debet esse cognita obiective, sed solum cognitionem reddere terminatam formaliter respectu obiectiYO. It is only in the lat ter sen se that the abstract form in the mind can be called an image or representation. From the foregoing remarks it is already obvious that the verbum mentale or intentio intellecta which is the conceptual content or internalobject of the act of thinking is not that which is ultimately thought of or apprehended (id quod in9. Quaestiones quodlibetales, 7, 4; De venta te, 10, 4. 10. Johannes a Sancto Thoma 1937, p. 358.

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telligitur). The terminus extrinsecus of the act of conceiving is the individual thing in the outside world in so far as it has an intelligible aspect; assuming, of course, that such a thing exists and that the act is successful. In order to distinguish this externalobject from the conceptual content or internalobject which is constituted by an act of thinking, the verbum mentale or intentio intellecta was characterized as id quo intelligitur or id in quo intelligitur, as that by means of which or in which something is thought of. There are not two objects ofknowledge, as in the case of a portrait, where the perception of the form of the portrait leads to a thought of its subject; but by taking on the form of the external thing thought of, the mind receives into itself that thing according to the mode of being which is peculiar to the mind. Consequently, there is only one movement of thought, namely, towards the intelligible aspect of the external thing as it is present to the mind in the intentio intellecta that is constituted by the act of thinkingll. Although the act of thinking is mediated, or rather directed, by the conceptual content which is its terminus intrinsecus, this fact does not duplicate the object known (non duplicat obiectum cognitum neque cognitionem)12. The conceptual content is not hing but the external thing itself in so far as it has been assimilated by the mind. That the conceptual content of an act of thinking and the intelligibL- features of the external thing thought of coincide is explicitly stated by Aquinas: intellectum autem in intelligente est intentio intellecta et verbum. Though one cannot absolutely identify the concept of man with man in the real world and the statement Homo est verbum is therefore false, it is nevertheless true that man in so far as he is thought of is identical with the concept formed in an act of thinking of man (homo intellectus est verbum)13. It is thus possible to look at the concept that is formed in an act of thinking from two different sides, just as one can go from Athens to Thebes or from Thebes to Athens 14 • Looked at from the mental side, the conceptual content is the explicit and definite form which the intellect takes on in an act of conceiving. Viewed from the side of the external thing thought of, it is nothing but that thing itself in so far as it is actually conceived of and represented in the mind. Aquinas himselfhas no special name for the concept regarded from this latter viewpoint, but later Thomists came to call it conceptus obiectivus. According to Peter Crockaert of Brussels (c.1470-1514), for instance, the term conceptus obiectivus stands for the thing itself, but connotes that this thing is the actual object of an operation of conceiving; thus man in so far as he is actually thought of may be called a conceptus obiectivus (supponit pro re, connotando quod res illa est terminus intellectionis; et sic homo dum intelligitur potest dici conceptus, obiectivus scilicetYS. I postpone a more detailed treatment of the term conceptus obiectivus until the next section. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, 8, 15. Johannes a Sancto Thoma 1948, p. 693. De potentia Dei, 9, 5. Cf. a1so Summa contra gentiles, IV, 11 (3469) . Cf. Aristotle, Physics, lIl, 3, 202 b 13. Petrus de Bruxellis 1514, fol. 49 V.

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The general picture which seems to underlie the Thomistic doctrine concerning the first operation of the mind may perhaps be delineated as follows. If a thing is situated in front of a mirror, it is necessary that there be light in order that the form of the thing becomes actually reflectable in the mirror. Once the thing has been made actually capable of being mirrored, the form of the particular thing may impress itself on the mirror, which receives that form according to the manner ofbeing that is peculiar to a mirror. By taking on the form of the thing the mirror is brought to an actual operation of mirroring. But a mirror cannot actually mirror without mirroring something, without there being a mirror image which exists in the mirror precisely as long as the actual mirroring lasts. This mirror image is, on the one hand, the determinate form by which the mirror is modified, and, on the other hand, the very form of the thing reflected. By having a likeness in form with the thing reflected, the mirror image is a representation of the thing. The representative character of the mirror image is due to the fact that in the medium of the glass the same form is present as in the thing itself. So one may say that the mirror image is the thing itself in so far as it has been assimilated by the mirror according to the appropriate mode of being. The ultimate object th at is mirrored is the thing in front of the mirror, not the mirror image; the lat ter is rather that in which or by means of which the thing is mirrored. W orked out in such detail this analogy is a gross exaggeration. But there can be little doubt that aspects of this sort of picture were the source of the metaphorical expressions th at abound in attempts to describe the various components of the intellectual process of simple apprehension. 1.1.2. In addition to simple apprehension or intelligentia indivisibilium there are two more operations of the mind, namely, propositional concept ion and reasoning.Just as, according to Thomas Aquinas, a definition is the conceptual content or intern al object of an act of simple apprehension, so a propositional concept and a syllogism are the immanent products of the second and the third act (a liquid per huiusmodi actum constitutum)16. Here I shall concentrate on the second opera ti on of the mind and its product. The second operation of the mind, which may be a full-blownjudgment but is at least an apprehensive proposition or mere predication, was regarded as an act of compounding or dividing. This act presupposes two acts of simple apprehension by which two concepts are put before the mind. These concepts are the mental representatives of particular things in the outside world; or, if we look from the other side, a particular thing is in the mind inasmuch as it is represented by the conceptual content belonging to an act of thinking of that thing. The things themselves as particular items of the world cannot enter the mind or become constituents of a ment al operation 17 • But they can change

16. Summa theologica, 11-1, q. 90, art. 1, ad 2. 17. Cf. also Aristotle, De sophisticis elenchis, 1, 165 a 6.

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their way ofbeing, so to speak, and become conceptual contents of mental acts and, as such, appropriate elements of further operations of the mind. The act of compounding or dividing may therefore be seen both as an act of thinking two concepts together or apart by predicating the one of the other in an affirmative or negative way and as an act having reference to unity or diversity in the things themselves; for the things themselves may become involved in mental predication and enter the mind provided that they acquire the appropriate way of being, which in this case consists in being thought of (esse cognitum). In the very act of compounding or dividing two concepts which are the contents of prior acts of simple apprehension, the mind forms or produces a propositional concept (enuntiatio, enuntiabile) as the internalobject of the act of affirmative or negative predication l8 • This immanent product of the act of predication is also characterized as an inner word (verbum cordisJ19; the difference from the inner word th at is the conceptual content of an act of simple apprehension is marked by the fact that the simple concept is signifiabIe by means of an incomplex expression, whereas an inner word that is a propositional concept or mental proposition is signifiabIe by means of a complex expression (significabilis - - - per vocem complexamfo. Such amental proposition has a kind of existence that is limited to the mind21 and presumably has the same features of dependence and fugitiveness as the existence of an intentio intellecta; I its being consists in the circumstance that two concepts are thought together or apart. That this composition or division has a representative or semantic character is due to the fact that the way in which the predicative construction is built in the mind exhibits - at least in the case of a true proposition - a similarity of structure to the way in which form and matter or accident and substance are united or separated in the concrete unity or diversity that is found in the individu al things existing in the world outside thought 22 • The mind forms a predication or propositional concept which in its typically ment al mode of being shows a structural correspondence to the inner constitution, in terms of form and matter or accident and substance, of an individu al thing existing in another medium. Again, it is the presence of an identity of form or structure in different media which makes the mental item a representation or natural sign of the extramental item. The latter, the physical thing with its concrete unity of form and matter or accident and substance, is assimilated by the mind in the manner typical of the second operation and thereby becomes the structurally identical propositional concept. Looked at from the side of the thing in the world, the 18. Summa theologica, I, q. 14, art. 14; De veritate, 2, 7; In IX Metaphysicorum, 11, n. 1898; De potentia Dei, 8, 1. 19 . Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, 9. 20 . De veritale, 4, 2. 21. Summa contra gentiles, I, 58 (490). 22. Cf. In IX Metaphysicorum, 11, n. 1898: Et ideo, si talis operatio intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad causam, oportet quod in compositis substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad materiam - - vel etiam compositio aaidentis ad subiectum respondeat quasi fundamentum et causa veritatis compositioni quam intellectus interius format et exprimit voce.

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propositional concept is the thing as it is in the intellect that conceives of it in a compounding or dividing manner. That this is so is particularly c1ear from the answer given by Johannes Capreolus to the question of wh at is the object of assent. Although, in the last instance, it is the thing in the outside world th at is the object of assent, it would be wrong to say that we assent to the thing (assentio rei), since we do not assent to the thing as it is in the world but to the thing as it is in the mind which conceives of it by means of a ment al composition ~icet res extra sit obiectum assensus, non tamen dicimur rei assentire ut extra est simpliciter, sed ut est in intelligente per modum compositionisf3. In other words, we can assent to a thing only when it has changed its mode of existence by being transposed from the extramental world to the mind and being conceived of in such a way that it becomes a suitable object for an act ofjudgment. We give our assent to a propositional concept that is the significate of the accusative-plus-infinitive phrase required by the verb assentire; but th at propositional concept is the extramental thing itself, in the appropriate mental guise. It may be conc1uded that according to orthodox Thomistic doctrine a proposition (enuntiatio, enuntiabile) is primarily the propositional concept or mental proposition that is the internalobject of an act of compounding or dividing, and derivatively the spoken or written dec1arative sentence which directly or indirectly signifies that mental proposition. From the way in which the mode of being of the inner word is characterized in connection with the fi,rst operation of the mind it may be inferred that the propositional concept too has inesse in so far as it is a quality of the mind which is really distinct from the act of compounding or dividing and, at the same time, ad aliud esse in so far as it is a likeness or representation of the intrinsic constitution of a thing in the outside world. Furthermore, the propositional concept may be viewed either as the immanent terminus of the second operation of the mind or, from the side of the world, as the thing itself in so far as it is actually assimilated by the mind and conceived in the manner which is peculiar to the operation of compounding or dividing. It is this propositional concept, rather than the act of predication, which is the immediate significate of a dec1arative sentence. Moreover , it is in the guise of such a propositional concept that a thing in the world has to be represented if it is made the ultimate object of an attitude signified by a verb requiring an accusative-plus-infinitive phrase as its proper complement; in particular, an act ofjudgment or assent can be directed only at something that is conceived ofin a propositional way. Finally, just as the notions of universal, genus, and species are concepts of second order (intentiones secundae) that are exemplified by things in so far as they are actually apprehended by the mind, so such notions of second order as affirmation, negation, truth, and falsehood have as their instances things in so far as they are actually conceived of in the propositional manner that is peculiar to the second operation of the mind.

23. Capreolus 1900, I, p. 53. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, 11-2, q. 2, art. 2, ad 1; De ma/o, 6, 1, ad 14.

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1. 2. The objective-existence theory Although that which came to be indicated by the terms esse obiective and conceptus obiectivus is already discernible in Aquinas's writings, he did not yet use these expressions as technical terms. Their early history is still rather obscure24 • In this section I shall confine myself to illustrating their meaning from relevant passages in the works of some philosophers who at any rate contributed much to their development as elements of the scholastic idiom. These philosophers are Hervaeus Natalis (d.1323), Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (c.1275-1334), and Petrus Aureolus (1275/80-1322). 1.2.1. It is especially in connection with the concept of truth that Hervaeus Natalis 25 and Durandus26 make use of the contrasting notions of esse subiective and esse obiective. Real entities (entia realia), which have esse rea Ie, are either subjects or accidents which inhere in a material subject, such as heat and quantity, or in the soul, such as acts of conceiving. Those real entities which exist as accidents in a subject are said to have esse subiective. A subset of entities having esse subiective is formed by acts and dispositions that are in the mind. Being in the mind (esse in intellectu) can therefore in a first sen se be ascribed to entities which are in the understanding as accidents in a subject . But in a second sense something mayalso be said to be in the mind in a way that is called obiective. This peculiar manner ofbeing in the mind is explained as being in the field of vision of the intellect, as a thing known in the knower, in the way in which everything seen literally is said to be in one' s field of vision (esse autem in intellectu obiective idem est quod esse in prospectu intellectus sicut cognitum in cognoscente, eo modo quo dicitur esse in prospectu alicuius totum illud quod videtf1. Things which are in the mind in this second sense, that is to say, obiective, are again divided into two kinds. Some of them are in the mind as an object known (sicut obiectum cognitum); all things th at can be thought of and known, entities and nonentities, belong to this class. The other class consists of certain modes which characterize things thought of in so far as they are actual objects of an operation of the intellect and thereby have esse obiective in the mind. As there are three operations of the intellect, there are also three kinds of such modes or concepts of second order. In so far as a thing is actually apprehended by the first operation of the mind, it may be an exemplification of such notions as universal, genus, or species; in so far as a thing is actually conceived of by the compounding or dividing intellect, it may be characterized as an affirmation or a negation, as a truth or a falsehood; and in so far as things are in the discursive mind, the no24. Cf. PINBORG 1974, ADAMS 1977, READ 1977, and HEDWIG 1978. 25. In Quodlibeta, Venetiis , 1486, III, 1 (Utrum veritas Jicat ens rationis), which is extensively quoted in PINBORG 1972, pp. 203-205. 26. In his commentary on the Sentences, I, Dist. 19, q. 5-6 (Durandus a Sancto Porciano 1571, fol. 65 V -66 V). This commentary was written in three versions between 1307 and 1327; the edition of 1571 contains the third version. 27. PINBORG 1972, p. 203.

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tions of antecedent and consequent, of syllogism and enthymeme are applicable to them 28 • There are, then, two categories of en ti ties having esse obiective in the mind: things in so far as they are actually conceived ofby one of the three operations of the mind and the instances of the logical concepts of second order that are used to classify those things according to the way they are conceived of. Notions of second order were regarded as entia rationis. Durandus rejects the view that such entia rationis are in the mind as accidents in a subject; if they were, they would be entia realia. In contradistinction to real entities, which exist independently of any operation of the mind (circumscripta operatione intellectus), entities of the mind have a kind ofbeing that is entirely due to an operation of the intellect (non sunt nisi per operationem intellectus). This kind ofbeing is an esse intentionale in the strict sense29 , which is elucidated by the following example. If a concept ion of a stone in general is looked at from the side of the conceiving person, this general conception is something real having esse subiective as an accident in that person's mind. It should be noted that Durandus rejects the orthodox Thomistic view that an act of thinking produces an inner word which is really distinct from that act and has its own esse subiective as a quality of the mind. He identifies the inner word with the act of thinking itself and considers that act - for instance, a conception of a stone in general- as a real accident of the conceiving subject. If, however, we look at that same cognition from the side of the stone, the fact that the stone is conceived of in a universal manner is not something real in the external stone, but as a universal it is an ens rationis, because its universality is due solely to the operation of the mind that is directed towards it as towards an object (dicitur ens rationis, quia nullo modo competit rei nisi per actum rationis tendentis in ipsum ut in obiectumfO. Another ens rationis is the notion of truth, at least when this concept is taken in a formal sense (formaliter) and not in the derivative sense in which it is attributed to an act of the mind or a declarative sentence. The actual bearer of truth in a formal sense is neither a compounding or dividing operation of the mind nor a declarative sentence, but rat her that which is put before the mind or represented by the second operation of the intellect and, as such, has esse obiective. This object of the compounding or dividing intellect (obiectum intellectus enuntiativi) is also the significa te of a declarative sentence; it may be expressed by an accusative-plus-infinitive phrase, which is the proper subject for est verum in such a sentence as Hominem esse animal est verum ('That man is an animal is true'). In so far as a man is conceived of as being an animal, he has a mode of existence which is variously called esse apprehensum, esse intellectum, and esse obiective, and which is contrasted with his existence as a real entity in the world. A thing may have two kinds ofbeing: as part of the world it has esse reale, and in so far as it is actually conceived ofby the compounding or dividing operation 28. Durandus a Sancto Porciano 1571, fol. 66 V. 29. Durandus a Sancto Porciano 1571 , fol. 155 R (11, Dist. 13, q. 2). 30. Durandus a Sancto Porciano 1571, fol. 66 R.

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of the mind, it may simultaneously have esse obiective. According to Durandus, truth is nothing but a relation of conformity or identity of a thing as it is apprehended or conceived ofby the predicating intellect with that same thing as it really exists in the world (relatio eiusdem ad se ipsum secundum esse intellectum et esse rea Ie). Since that which is true in a formal sense is neither to be found among things in the world (in rebus) nor in the mind as an accident in a subject, it must be in the intellect in the way called obiective; not, however, as the main object of knowIedge, but as a certain mode which belongs to the thing solely in so far as it is known (quod veritas sit in intellectu obiective, non quidem sicut obiectum cognitum principaliter, sed ut quidam modus conveniens rei solum ut est cognitaf!. One of the principal points of difference between orthodox Thomists and Durandus concerns the nature of the inner word. Whereas Aquinas and his followers held that the inner word is an immanent product of an act of conceiving which is really distinct from that act and so has esse subiective as an additional quality of the mind, Durandus identifies the inner word with the act of conceiving. In his view, only the act of conceiving is in the mind as a real accident in a subject. To that which is the internalobject of that act and which was considered by Thomists as something different from the act, having its own esse subiective, he ascribes only esse obiective in the mind; it is a thing in so far as it is conceived ofby the intellect and which, in addition to being conceived of in a certain manner, mayalso really exist in the world outside thought. One of the arguments which were adduced against identifying the inner word with the act of conceiving appealed to the incompatibility of such propositional attitudes as deliberating, assenting, and dissenting. If these acts are the only attitudes that can be adopted towards such a propositional concept or inner word as that the number of the stars is even and if these attitudes are mutually incompatible, the propositional concept or inner word cannot be identified with any such act, since the same propositional concept may be consistently combined with each of the three acts. Moreover , when one pers on errs by denying that there is a first cause and another pers on correctly believes that there is a first cause, both of them form the propositional concept that there is a first cause. While their acts of assenting and dissenting are clearly different and incompatible, the propositional concept th at they form is the same; therefore, this propositional concept or inner word cannot be identical with the act of assenting or dissenting. These considerations were apparently intended to prove that there are separate acts of thinking of the subject-thing and of the predicate-thing, followed by a separate act of compounding or dividing, and that only the immanent product of the act of compounding or dividing is a proper object for additional acts of deliberating, assenting, and dissenting. According to Durandus, however, in each of these cases there is only one total act of conceiving the subject-thing and the predicate-thing whose identity or diversity is at issue. Although the total 31. Cf. also Hervaeus Natalis in PINBORG 1972, p. 203: Veritas est quaedam conformitas rei ad illud quod de ea intelligitur, consequens rem prout est obiective in intellectu enuntiativo.

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acts of deliberating, assenting, and dissenting include acts of simple apprehension and an act of composition or division, these included acts are indistinguishable from the including acts and form with them one indivisible whoie. It is true that the things in the world towards which these total acts are directed remain materially the same, but the total acts by which they are conceived of are entirely different and incompatible. Consequently, the things in so far as they are conceived of by those various acts and have esse obiective in the mind differ formally as much as the acts; there is, therefore, no room for a propositional concept that is the identical object of varying propositional attitudes 32 • Durandus shared the common view that acts of compounding or dividing and acts of deliberating, assenting, or dissenting are acts of conceiving which require an internalobject of a propositional character. He also held that this propositional concept is the immediate significate of the declarative sentences by which such acts are expressed in speech. Thirdly, he regarded such propositional concepts as the exemplifications of the logical notions of second order that are used in connection with the mental operations of predicating and judging. In other words, the propositional concept th at a man is an animal, usually expressed by the accusative-plus-infinitive phrase hominem esse anima I, was introduced as the proper answer to three types of question: What is the content of an act of predicating or judging? What is the meaning of a declarative sentence? What is it that is primarily true or false? That it is a natural answer is reflected by the linguistic fact that such verbs as assentit, signiflcat, and verum est take an accusative-plus-infinitive phrase as their syntactic object or subject. The point at which Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus deviate from the established Thomistic doctrine does not concern these roles which a propositional concept is expected to play; it regards, rather , its ontological status. Whereas Aquinas identified the inner word with the propositional concept and considered it as a real entity whose esse reale is an esse subiective in the mind, Durandus reserved the status of real entity, as far as the mind is concerned, to the act of conceiving, which he identified with the inner word, and attributed to the propositional concept solely an altogether different kind ofbeing, namely, esse obiective. This esse obiective, which is nothing but being before the mind as the actual content of an operation of conceiving, may coincide - in the case of true propositions - with an esse rea Ie , but then this esse reale is of course not the esse subiective of a quality in the mind, but the real existence of a particular thing in the outside world. 1.2.2. The main features of the view defended by Durandus are also found, in a more elaborate form, in the commentary on the Sentences which Petrus Aureolus composed between 1313 and 1318, probably at Toulouse and at

32. Durandus a Sancto Porciano 1571, fol. 77 Rand 78 V (I, Dist. 27, q. 2) .

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Paris33 • Aureolus, too, is more economical than the Thomists in analysing cognitive processes; he does not posit an active intellect, nor any sort of intelligible species. An act of conceiving is the result of the fact that the likeness of a thing affects the passive intellect (notitia actualis, quae dicit compositum ex similitudine rei et ex intellectiva potentia; potentia similitudine informata, quae duo constituunt actum in tellectionisr . The act of conceiving, which is also called actus formalis, activa formatio, cogitatio forma lis, cogitatio formans, conceptio activa, conceptio formalis, or apparitio activa, may be characterized either as an act of inner speech (dicere) or as an act of understanding (intelligere). As an act of inner speech, it is that which makes things appear to the mind (quae res faciat apparere; id quo res apparet), or puts them into a kind ofbeing that is described as an esse apparens, conceptum, formatum, in ten tiona Ie, or obiectivum. As an act of understanding, on the other hand, an active conception is that to which a thing appears (id cui apparet); viewed from this side, it consists in being that in whose field of vision a thing is (esse id cui res est in prospectu), or in being that to which a thing is presented in order that it lights up and appears (est illud cui obiicitur - - - ut luceat et appareat), or in having present something as a thing that appears (habere aliquid praesens per modum apparentisYS. If, then, an active conception is an operation of the intellect which makes something appear to the mind, and is, at the same time, that to which something appears, there must also be a passive concept, something that is made to appear to the mind. In other words, an apparitio activa is correlative with an apparitio passiva. At several places, Aureolus calls attention to the logical necessity that to the activity of thinking there correspond something that is thought; just as someone cannot be a father without having a child, so one cannot think without thinking something in which the act of thinking terminates as in an internal object 36 • Further, he adduces eight examples of sensory illusion which are intended to prove th at acts of sense-perception necessarily involve the existence of something that at least appears to the senses in one way or another. Although this thesis can be rendered most plausible in deceptive cases, Aureolus maintains that it is equally valid for veridical perception, and also for acts of imagination and operations of the intellect37 • Finally, he refers to Augustine' s distinction between a cogitatio formans, which is the act of thinking, and a cogitatio formata or obiectiva, which is the thought in the sense of the immanent product of the act; it is in this lat ter sense that we speak of pious or

33. For the Distinctions 2-8 of the first Book 1 shall refer to E.M. Buytaert's critical edition; for the rest, to the edition of 1596-1605. As to the secondary literature, 1 mention in particular DREILING 1913 and VANNI ROVIGHI 1978. 34. Aureolus 1596-1605, I, p. 321 (I, Dist. 9, art. 1). 35. Cf. Aureolus 1956, p. 709; Aure01us 1596-1605, I, p. 323 (I, Dist . 9, art. 1). 36. Cf. Aureolus 1956, p. 545, pp. 548-550, pp. 696-698, pp. 831-832; Aureolus 1596-1605, I, p. 751 (I, Dist. 35, art. 1): Si enim menti nostrae nil appareat obieetive, nullus dieet se aliquid intelligere, immo erit in dispositione similis dormienti. 37. For this passage (Aureo1us 1956, pp. 696-698) see a1so ADAMS 1977, pp. 156-157.

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sinful or wicked thoughts (cogitationes sanctae vel turpes vel foedaefs. The distinction bet ween the two nuances of meaning of cogitatio is obviously based on the sound criterion of what can be said, and cannot be said, of a thought as an act and of a thought as a product. A similar distinction, between fides actualis and fides obiectalis, was well-known among theologians. In the same passage, Aureolus contends, contrary to Durandus, that it is the cogitatio formata, obiectalis, or obiectiva - which he also calls apparentia obiectalis or obiectiva, notitia obiectiva, and conceptus obiectivus - which is identical with the inner word. According to him, Augustine always uses verbum for the formed thought-content, never for the act. He rejects, though, the Thomistic view that the inner word has real existence in the mind, as an accident in a subject, and that it is only through this inner word that the intellect has access to the things themselves 39 • Rather , the inner word or conceptus obiectivus is the thing itself as it appears to the mind in an act of conceiving; this thing is called conceptus because it includes in itself the very fact that it is actually conceived of (conceptus autem obiectivus non est aliud quam res apparens obiective per actum intellectus; qui dicitur conceptus, quia intrinsece includit ipsum concipi passivumr. As a passive concept, the thing has a special, intentional mode ofbeing, which is a weak form of existence inasmuch as one cannot infer from it that the thing in question exists really and independently of the act of the intellect (quendam specialem modum essendi intentionalem et diminutum, ex quo non licet inJerre esse simpliciter et realer 1 • Aureolus employs a host of expressions for this special kind of existence; in addition to the ones already mentioned, he occasionally uses esse cognitum, esse conspicuum, esse intellectuale, esse intellectum, and various combinations. They all have in common that they indicate a form ofbeing which is contrasted with the independent existence of a real thing in the world and which ultimately consists in being conceived ofby an operation of the intellect and being present to the mind as the internalobject of the act of conceiving (concipi autem idem est quod obiective apparerer2. An act of conceiving is deceptive or false if the thing conceived of has only this weak form of being, that is, if nothing corresponds to it in the world of real existents. On the other hand, it is veridical or true if the thing as it is conceived of and put before the mind is identical to the thing as it really exists in the world. In the case of correct and true conceptions, the object of the act of conceiving is one and the same thing having two different, but concordant, modes ofbeing: the way in which it is conceived of and appears to the mind agrees with the way in which it really exists in the world. In order 38. Aureolus 1956, p. 700. 39. Aureolus 1596-1605, I, p. 320 (I, Dist. 9, art. 1). 40. Aureolus 1596-1605, 11, p. 109 (11, Dist. 9, q. 2, art. J). Cf. Aureolus 1596-1605, I, p. 622 (I, Dist. 27, secunda pars, art. 2): In omni intellectione emanat et procedit, non aliquid aliud, sed ipsamet res cognita in quodam esse obiectivo, secundum quod habet terminare intuitum intellectus; and p. 624: Res ipsae sunt intra mentem obiective praesentes. 41. Aureolus 1596-1605, I, p. 531 (I, Dist. 23, art. 2). 42. Aureolus 1596-1605, I, p. 322 (I, Dist. 9, art. 1). A common phrase for being present to the understanding is obUci intellectui.

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to prove this thesis, Aureolus appeals to certain passages 10 Aristotle, Augustine, and Anselm of Canterbury-43. Aureolus points to Aristotle's statement that a physician who tries to bring about health in a body is led by a form ofhealth which he has in mind, and th at someone who builds a house does so according to a prior idea which he has formed in his mind44 • He also eaUs attention to A verroës' s comments on this passage, in particular to the remark th at the form of health which exists in the mind and the form ofhealth as it exists in the material body are one and the same thing. Or, as it is put by Aureolus: sanitas intellecta et sanitas quae est extra sunt unum et idem realiter, quamvis difJerant in modo essendi, quia in intellectu sanitas habet esse apparens et intentionale, extra vero in corpore ha bet esse existens et reale. A similar point is made by Augustine when he says that in writing characters we first form a letter in our heart and subsequentlyby our hand. The same letter is formed in two different ways, namely, intelligibly in the heart and visibly by the hand (cor enim facit eas intelligibiliter, sed manus visibiliter. Ecce quomodo sunt eadem dissimiliterfS. Aureolus adds: unde apparet, quomodo res quae determinant mentis aspectum et formantur in corde non sunt aliud quam res extra, quamvis dissimiliter habens esse, quia in corde intentionaliter, extmus vero realiter. FinaUy, ment ion is made of Anselm's observation th at an artist who is going to make a work of art fi.rst says it in his mind by a ment al conception46 • For Aureolus this is further confirmation ofhis view that the things themselves are beheld by the mind (unde patet, quomodo res ipsae conspiciuntur mente et illud quod intuemur non est forma alia specularis, sed ipsamet res habens esse apparens et hoc est mentis conceptus sive notitia obiectiva). The view that one and the same thing may first be conceived of in the mind and then be produced as a real existent 47 is a secular variant of the Demiurge myth in Plato's Timaeus as it had been developed by later theologians and philosophers into the theory that in the process of creation things which are being thought as exemplary ideas in God's mind are given an additional kind of existence as items of the created universe. That this theory is at least one of the sourees of the expression esse obiective and its kin is made highly probable by the fact that Duns Scotus had made use of it in precisely that context48 • In view of later developments (2.1.2.), it should also be noted that in scholastic writings

43 . Aureolus 1596-1605, I, p. 320 (I, Dist. 9, art. 1), p. 619 (I, Dist. 27, secunda pars), and p. 844 (I, Dist. 36, art . 1). 44. Metaphysics, VII, 7, 1032 b 11. 45. InJohannis evangelium tractatus CXXIV, Tractatus XVIII, ed. Migne, Patrologia Latina, 35, 1540-1541; Aureolus also refers to Augustine, De cognitione verae vitae, 15, ed. Migne, Patrologia Latina, 40, 1015. 46 . Monologion, 10. 47. See also Durandus a Sancto Porciano 1571, fol. 98 (I, Dist. 36, q. 3): Omneagens perintellectum ha bet penes se rationem rei fiendae quam cognoscit et iuxta quam exemplariter rem producit. - - - In mente artificis sunt ideae artificiatorum, sed idea in mente artificis est ipsamet res artificialis ut praeconcepta. 48 . Cf. READ 1977, pp. 18-19.

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the word idea is commonly restricted to the exemplary notions which are in the mind of God or some human artificer. Just as one and the same thing can have different kinds of existence, so it is, according to Aureolus, also possible that one thing which remains materially the same is conceived ofby different active conceptions and sb is present to the mind in the guise of different passive concepts. At the level of the first operation of the intellect, he distinguishes between two kinds of active conception, one of a particular thing as it is in itself and one of a particular thing as it is qualitatively similar to ot her particular things (eadem res potest concipi sub duplici conceptu, uno quidem rei ut res est absolute, et alio similitudinario et qualitativof9. Aureolus deviates from orthodox Thomistic doctrine not only in holding that a particular thing as such can be conceived ofby the intellect, but also in his interpretation of universal conception. When 'man' is predicated ofSocrates and Plato, man is not something other than the individuals Socrates and Plato; nor yet one thing inhering in them, unless this unity is taken to consist in the fact that the individuals share one way ofbeing conceived of (nec tamen est una res in ipsis, nisi unitate rationis, quae consistit in uno concipi, quia omnes illae res, puta Socrates et Plato, et sic de alUs, conveniunt in uno concipi passive). Formally, speciflc or generic unity is found only in the passive concept, that is, in the thing in so far as it is presented to the intellect and intrinsically includes its being conceived of (est ergo unitas specifica in conceptu obiectivo formaliter, (!t hoc est in re in quantum obiicitur intellectui et includit intrinsece concipi). In the ding as it exists outside the mind that unity is present in a potential and inchoate sense, inasmuch as the thing is apt to cause in the intellect an impression which is similar to the impressions of other things and thus brings about a unity in the act of conceiving and consequently the unity of one passive concept (sed illa unitas est in re extra in potentia et inchoative, in quantum nata est causare in intellectu impressionem perfectam consimilem alterius rei, ex qua sequitur unitas actus et ex consequenti unitas unius conceptus obiectiviJO. Since it would be a contradiction to hold that a thing can enter the mind without being conceived of (res sic est indivisa a suo concipi, quod impossibile est eam accipere per intellectum sine concipi absque conträdictione), and since there is a large variety of active conceptions, each of which generates its own passive concept, it follows that the oneness of a thing as it exists in itself is quite compatible with the plurality of forms in which it appears to the mind (sic potest stare diversitas apparentiarum cum simplici rer. For Aureolus, the plurality of active conceptions by which one and the same thing may be put before the mind is precisely one of the reasons why he feels entitled to posit passive concepts. If the 49. Aureolus 1596-1605, 11, pp. 114-115 (11, Dist. 9, q. 3, art. 3). 50. Aureolus 1596-1605, 11, p. 106, p. 109 (11, Dist. 9, q. 2, art. 1 and 3). 51. Aureolus 1596-1605, 11, p. 70 (11, Dist. 3, q. 2, art . 4) . See also p. 109 (11, Dist. 9, q. 2, art . 3): Secundum a/iud et a/iud concipi est a/ius et a/ius conceptus cum identitate rei; and Aureolus 1596-1605,11, Quod/ibeta, I, p. 6: De eadem re simpliciformantur p/ures conceptus, qui terminantur ad eandem rem; sed sicut conceptiones forma/es existentes in intellectu sunt p/ures, sic i11a res in suo concipi possibi/i apparet p/ures; nec tamen i/Ia p/ura/itas est in re absente, sed in re ut concepta sive in concipi.

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diversity of active conceptions has a correlate on the part of the object, this corresponding diversity cannot reside in the thing as such, since that remains one and the same, but must be ascribed to the thing as it is conceived of and appears to the mind (et ideo nec ex parte rei vanum est aut superj1uum habere huiusmodi diversitatem, non quidem in se, sed in esse concepto et appa ren tiJ2 . It is the circumstance that one and the same thing may be conceived of in different ways which accounts for the second operation of the mind. Aureolus rejects the view that in such a proposition as Homo est animal the conception of animal is predicated of the conception of man; since the two conceptions are different, this interpretation would make the proposition false. The right explanation is, rather, that a thing which is conceived of in one way and, as such, is made the predicate of the proposition is predicated of that same thing in so far as it is conceived of in another way and made the subject of the proposition (oportet quod res annexa uni concipi praedicetur de re annexa alteri concipi)53. The thing itse1f, as a real existent in the world, cannot, of course, enter the mind and become the subject or the predicate of a ment al proposition. On the other hand, it is not normally the case that a proposition is about the conceptions by which the subject and the predicate are thought of; a proposition of 6nt order is about things in the world. Aureolus tried to solve this problem by assuming that the subject and the predicate are passive concepts, that is, a thing in so far as it is conceived of in two different ways and so presents itse1f as two appearances to the mind. Presumably, he also considered the internalobject of the act of predication - by which the two passive concepts which become the subject and the predicate are thought together or apart - as a third passive concept, name1y, the thing concerned in so far as it is conceived of in a propositional manner. For in dealing with notions of second order he says that the technical terms one 6nds in textbooks oflogic, such as oratio definitiva, enuntiativa, syllogistica, do not refer to acts of the intellect, but rather express passive concepts (non fit mentio de actibus intellectus, sed vel de oratione definitiva aut enuntiativa aut syllogistica vel de dicibili incomplexo, quae utique non sunt actus intellectus, sed potius voces conceptus obiectivos exprimentesr. As he there de6nes the word intentio to which the adjectives prima and secunda are joined as a conceptus formatus obiective per actum intellectus, we may conclude that for Aureolus, just as for Durandus, the passive concept which has a propositional character is the internalobject of an act of predication and judgment, the signi6cate of a conventional declarative sentence, and the exempli6cation of those higher-order notions which are associated with the second operation of the mind. From an ontological point of view, only the active conceptions, which are accidents in a thinking subject,

52. Aureolus 1596-1605, 11, Quodlibeta, I, p. 6. 53. Aureolus 1596-1605, 11, p. 70(11, Dist. 3, q. 2, art. 4). Compare Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, I, q. 13, art. 12: In qualibet propositione afflrmativa vera subiectum et praedicatum significant idem secundum rem aliquo modo et diversum secundum rationem. 54. Aureolus 1596-1605, I, p. 532 (I, Dist. 23 , art. 2).

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and the things in the world, which are their ultimate object, have esse reaie. But in addition to these real existents, Aureolus introduces another kind of entity, the passive concept or conceptus obiectivus, which comes into being when the mind assimilates a thing in the world in order to have it present as an appropriate object or, in other words, when a thing enters the mind by being conceived of in one way or another. If the active concept ion makes the intended contact with the world, the two manners of being of the thing concerned, its esse obiective and its esse rea Ie, coincide. In deceptive cases, however, the passive concept to which not hing corresponds in the outside world has merely that weak kind of existence which consists in being conceived of and thus lasts no longer than the act of conceiving on which it is dependent.

1.3. The mental-act theory and logical realism Ontologically speaking, the most important difference of opinion between Thomists and such champions of the objective-existence theory as Durandus and Aureolus is concentrated at two points. Whereas many Thomists held that the internalobject of an act of conceiving is a quality of the mind which is really distinct from the act and has real existence as an accident in a subject, Durandus and Aureolus attributed to it a weakened type of being which consists in the mere fact that something is actually conceived of and presented to the mind. Secondly, Thomists thought that an abstract universal in the mind has a counterpart in reality, where things are compounded of form and matter; while Durandus and Aureolus wanted to ascribe universality exclusively to the internal objects of acts which unite particular things by conceiving of them in the same way. Theoretically, there seem to be two directions in which this debate could be continued. Those who have a robust bias in favour of real particulars may attempt to eliminate altogether those entities to which only a fugitive and weakened kind of being is ascribed. On the other hand, there is the reverse remedy of making the delicate type of existence more respectable by giving it greater strength and permanence. As a matter of fact, both steps were taken in the first half of the fourteenth century. In this section I briefly call to mind the ment al-act theory, usually associated with William ofOckham (c.1285-1349), and the version of logical realism th at was adopted by Gregory of Rimini (d.1358). 1.3.1. In Summa logicae, I, 12, - and elsewhere - Ockham 55 mentions three answers to the question about the nature of that part of amental proposition which is variously called conceptus, intentio, similitudo, and intellectus. Some said that a concept is a quality which exists in the mind as in a subject and is distinct from the act of conceiving (quaedam qualitas subiective existens in anima, distincta ab actu intelligendi). Others held that it is merely something that is formed by the mind (quoddam flctum per animam). And a third answer was that a concept is 55 . For further details see READ 1977 and ADAMS 1977.

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identical with the act of conceiving. Although Ockham had for a long time found it difficult to make a choice among these views, he finally opted for the mental-act theory, probably under the influence of his contemporary Walter Chatton. In doing so, he appealed to his principle of economy ([rustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora), arguing that the main functions of a sign, namely, standing for something else and signifying something else, can be performed by an act of thinkingjust as well as by any other sign. This means that he rejected both the Thomistic view - according to which the intérnal object of a conception is a separate and real existent in the mind - and the objective-existence theory - which regards it as a thing whose existence in the mind is nothing but its being conceived of - on the ground that the whole not ion of an internal object is superfluous. According to Ockham, there is no need to add to the real existents which are acts of the mind and particular things in the world a third category of entities of wh at ever kind, since the parts for which these dubio us beings are destined can be taken over by more acceptable candidates. In particular, Ockham and his followers had definite ideas about the way in which passive concepts of a propositional type can be shown to be dispensablë. They held.that in such statements as Scio hominem esse animal ('I know that man is an animai') and Hominem esse animal est verum ('That man is an animal is true') the accusative-plus-infinitive phrase should be taken according to material supposition and thus stands for the ment al proposition Homo est animal, which is an act of predication. As far as the exemplifications of the higher-level notions of truth and falsehood and the object of knowledge and judgment are concerned, it is, therefore, unnecessary to posit a passive concept. The same line of interpretation was sometimes followed for a statement of the type 'Homo est animal' signifleat hominem esse animal (' "Man is an animai" signifies that man is an animai'). If the subject is a conventional sentence, the accusative-plus-infinitive phrase can again be regarded as standing for the mental proposition in the sense of an act of conceiving. Ockham himself, however, favoured a slightly different view S7 , according to which a spoken or written proposition is a conventional sign, not of a ment al act of compounding or dividing, but of things in the world; it signifies those things, however, in subordination to a ment al act of compounding or dividing. Though this account of the meaningfulness of a conventional sentence is somewhat different from the one mentioned first, the outcome is the same: no passive concept is needed. More troublesome is a statement in which the subject of a verb with an accusative-plus-infinitive phrase is the ment al act itself or the person to whom the act belongs: for instance, 'Soerates est albus' signifleat Socratem esse album (' "Socrates is white" signifies th at Socrates is white') or Petrus intelligit Soera tem esse album ('Peter understands that Socrates is white'). In such cases, a solution was sought by distinguishing between two kinds of interpretation 56. For details see NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 55-70. 57. Cf. also ASHWORTH 1980.

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of the accusative-plus-infinitive phrase. On the one hand, it can be taken as synonymous with the phrase Soerates ens albus ('Socrates in so far as he is white') and as denoting the object in the world which, by being in a certain state, verifies the thought in question. The act of thinking is directed towards a definite object in the world; according as the required object exists or does not exist, the thought is satisfied or left pendent. This explanation was restricted to basic propositions; other propositions were dealt with by stating their truthconditions in terms of the basic propositions. On the other hand, the accusative-plus-infinitive phrase could also be regarded as explicating the import of the mental proposition and indicating the tenor of its directedness. In contradistinction to the material significa te , which is the thing in a certain state as it exists in the world, this import of the ment al proposition was often called its formal signification. If the form which a propositional conception takes is expressed by an accusative-plus-infinitive phrase, the seemingly nominal character of this construction may tempt one to consider that which is expressed by it as a kind of object and then to argue that especially in circumstances where there is no corresponding object in the real world there must at least be some object in the mind. Yielding to this temptation results in the assumption of an inner word, either as a real quality of the mind or as a passive concept that has esse obiective. In order to check this reifying tendency, mental-act theorists denied that in the statements at issue the accusative-plus-infinitive phrase is used in a nominalor categorematic way, emphasizing instead its verbal character and accordingly taking it as a syncategorematic expression. Since a syncategorematic expression cannot be the total subject of asentence, there is no longer any temptation to argue that the accusative-plus-infinitive ph ra se must refer to some sort of thing because it can be made the subject of such a true passive sentence as Soera tem esse album signifieatur per 'Soerates est albus'. The syncategorematic or adverbial interpretation of the accusative-plus-infinitive phrase may be brought out, c1umsily but c1early, by trans lating 'Soerates est albus' significat Socratem esse album as: ' "Socrates is white" signifies-thatSocrates-is-white' or ' "Socrates is white" signifies in a Socrates-is-whitemanner'. These sentences faithfully reflect the manoeuvre by which mental-act theorists got rid of an internalobject; it is completely absorbed by the act of thinking which as a natural sign has a definite directedness towards something in the world. From an ontological point of view, all entities involved are now particular real existents: at themental pole, the directed activity of a thinking subject, at the other pole, if the activity is successful, a thing in the world. 1.3.2. Although variants of logical realism 58 had been put forward before Gregory of Rimini lectured on the Sentences in 1342-1343, notably by William Crathorn59 and Adam Wodeham60 , it was usually discussed in the form in 58. For the name see MORSCHER 1972. 59. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1973, pp. 212-219. 60. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980b •

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which it had been presented by Gregory in his commentary on the Sentenees; accordingly, I shall limit myself to a concise exposition of that version61 • The key-stone of Gregory's doctrine is the notion of a tantum complexe significabile ('something that can be signified only in a propositional manner'). This notion may be clarified by first indicating the relations in which it stands to other notions. Gregory distinguished between two kinds of proposition: mental propositions in a strict sense are acts ofknowing and assenting, which include, or coincide with, acts of naturally signifying th at something is the case, whereas spoken and written propositions and the mental propositions which are images of them are conventional signs, which signify that something is the case in subordination to amental proposition in the strict sense. Now Gregory held th at the object of knowledge and assent is a complexe significabile which is the total or adequate significate of the propositional conception that is included in the act of knowledge or assent and of the conventional signs which happen to be subordinated to that conception. He extensively defends this view against those who regarded the object ofknowledge and assent either as the act of propositional concept ion or as the external thing at which that act is directed. Besides making the complexe significabile the object of assent and the adequate significate of a proposition, Gregory also considered it as a bearer of truthvalues. But he attributed the truth-values to a complexe significabile - or, as he frequently called it, an enuntiabile - only in a derivative sense, bya kind of extrinsic denomination. An enuntiabile is true if the corresponding proposition is true or would be true if it existed, and an enuntiabile is false if the corresponding proposition is false or would be false if it were formed. In characterizing the complexe significabile or enuntiabile in itself, Gregory explicitly denies that it is an entity in the sense of a substance or an accident; it cannot be subsumed under one of the Aristotelian categories. It is, rather, of such a nature that it includes a kind of complexity which is the correlate of the complexio or predication that is a constitutive feature of a propositional conception. It is not a part of the world which might just as well be signified by a nonpropositional expression, but a way things are in the world that is exactly parallel to the way they are represented in a mental act of compounding or dividing. Just as the syncategorematic act of the copula determines the form or essence of a proposition, so the adequate significate of a proposition has the peculiar complexity of a state of affairs that can be grasped only by a compounding or dividing conception. In addition to expressing a syncategorematic act of predication, the copula also indicates time. This indexical feature of the propositional sign too is projected by Gregory into the mode of being of its adequate significate. Differences in the tense of the copula yield different enuntiabilia, namely, past, present, and future ones. Consequently, the truth-value of an enuntiabile may change. The statable that Christ is not risen from the 61. For a more extensive treatment see NUCHELMANS 1973, pp. 227-242, and ECKERMANN 1978, where some new material for the history of the reception of Gregory' s doctrine is brought to light .

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grave, for example, was true before the resurrection, but it ceased to be true and began to be false at the moment of the resurrection. It should be noted, however, that some of Gregory' s followers repudiated this view and held that propositions with different tenses of the copula have nevertheless one and the same adequate significaté2 • While a state of affairs as that which fits only a propositional conception cannot, then, be an entity in the sense of a substance or an accident, there are other senses of the words aliquid, res, ens in which they do apply to it. In their most general sense such words as 'something' and 'entity' can be used for everything that is signifiabie in an incomplex manner or signifiabie in a complex manner, both truly and falsely. It is in this broad sense that falsé as well as true enuntiabi[ia, states of affairs which are not the case as well as states of affairs which are the case, have some kind ofbeing. Moreover, there is another sen se of aliquid, res, and ens, in which these words apply to everything that is signifiabie in an incomplex way and to everything that is signifiable in a complex way, but only truly. In that narrow sense, only a state of affairs which really obtains is called ens or something that is the case. To false enuntiabilia, therefore, the words 'something' and 'entity' are applicable only in their broadest sense; to true enuntiabilia they are applicable both in their broadest sense and in the narrower sense. Both types ofbeing, however, are different from the objective existence which Durandus and Aureolus ascribed to things in so far as they are actually conceived of. Objective existence is entirely dependent up on an act of conceiving and has a duration which is equal to the duration of the act. The kind of being which Gregory attributes to enuntiabi[ia, on the other hand, is quite independent of the acts of conceiving that may be directed at them. Even before the creation of the world it was true that the world would exist (mundum fore) and even aft er the disappearance of the world it will be true that the world has perished (mundum periisse). Gregory suggests that in such cases the truth of the enuntiabilia is grounded in God, the uncreated truth which is the true assent to all enuntiabilia. If we take into consideration that for the objective-existence theorists too God is undoubtedly the ultimate source of the conceptions which make things appear to the mind and which, it should be noted, are the same for all men, the difference betweenobjective existence and the mode of being of enuntiabilia may not after all be so big as it looks at first sight. It is true that objective existents come and go with the acts of conceiving; yet they have a sort of intersubjective identity inasmuch as the import of each of them is ultimately based upon God's thought, which is ever present and wholly immutable. At any rate, if each objective existent were absolutely unique, the fact that we understand one another would be a complete mystery. 1.4. Conceptus obiectivus and thema 1.4.1. Of the four theories outlined in the preceding sections only two were 62. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1973, pp. 239-240.

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still a live issue around 1600. Gregory of Rimini's doctrine of the complexe signiflcabile had never attracted many adherents; if late-scholastic writers mention it at all, they usually do so in order to expo se its implausibility. The mental-act theory was most popular among the so-called nominales; so when that school temporarily disappeared from the scene, around 1530, the mentalact theory lost the prominent place it had occupied during more than two centuries. The two other theories, however, were fully alive in the first half of the seventeenth century. The objective-existence theory, commonly associated with Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, who enjoyed a high reputation, was taken so seriously as a riyal to views of a more or Ie ss orthodox Thomistic type63 that its key-notions of esse obiective and conceptus obiectivus became common property ofboth schools. As a matter of fact, for all philosophers who were steeped in one or another variant of the scholastic tradition, the contrasting terms esse rea Ie/esse obiective and conceptus formalis/conceptus obiectivus belonged to the established technical vocabulary in which they had been taught to conduct their discussions. In view of my purpose in this section, I give just one example of a definition of the pair conceptus formalis/conceptus obiectivus or, as it was also called, intentio formalis/intentio obiectiva. A formal conception, which is viewed from the side of the intellect, is everything that by being a likeness which exists in the intellect leads it to awareness of a thing (in ten tio forma lis ex parte intellectus est illud omne quod intellectum per modum similitudinis in ipso existentis ducit in rei cognitionem). A passive or objective concept, on the other hand, is that which is conceived of and is the object of that likeness (alio modo accipitur intentio obiective, ut distinguitur contra formalem similitudinem, et est illud quod intelligitur et est obiectum illius similitudinisf4. Similar definitions abound in works that were published towards 1600 and during the first half of the seventeenth century6s. Furthermore, it should be remembered that one of the reasons why the notion of a passive concept was introduced was the consideration that, while concepts of first order normally have reference to things as they are in themselves, concepts of second order are exemplified by things in so far as they are conceived of in the mind, that is, by passive concepts. This means th at one of the features

63. One difference of opinion among Thomists concerned the exact nature of the relationship between the act of conceiving and the inner word. Some of them repudiated the thesis that act and verbum mentale are two really distinct qualities of the mind, holding instead that they are the same thing viewed from different standpoints. Cf. Smiglecius 1658, p. 623 : - - - sicut productio est idem realiter cum re producta, tamquam cum suo termino, ita omnis cognitio est idem re cum suo obiecto cognito quatenus in mente existit. Nam sicut productio formaliter est rei productae productio, ita cognitio essentialiter est rei cognitae cognitio et productio quaedam in· tellectualis obiecti in mente, quod obiectum productum in esse intelligibili didtur verbum mentis et terminus intrinsecus intellectionis. See also the survey in Johannes a Sancto Thoma 1937, pp. 344-345, and the passages quoted in MUELLER 1968, pp. 258-260, notes 692-700. 64. Sanchez Sedegno 1616, p. 164. 65. See, for instance, RISSE 1964, p. 388, p . 424, p. 470, p. 479, p. 511; MUELLER 1968, p. 260, notes 701-702; ASHWORTH 1981, pp. 318-321.

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by which a passive concept was characterized consists in its being a suitable instance of a concept of second order66. 1.4.2. I now want to show that the notion of a passive concept, which scholastically minded philosophers indicated by such names as conceptus obiectivus and intentio obiectiva, is very similar , if not identical, to that which many humanist and eclectic philosophers meant by the word thema. In the first sentence of the Topics Aristotle had described the purpose of that treatise as the discovery of a method by which disputants will be able to argue about any propounded question from premisses which are readily believable. Accordingly, Rudolphus Agricola, who se De inventione dialectica was finished in 1479 and printed in 1515, had defined dialectic as the art of disputing about any propounded matter from premisses that are readily believable (ars probabiliter de qualibet re proposita disserendi). In Philipp Melanchthon' s Compendia ria dialectices ratio of 1520 we find a slightly different version of this definition: dialectica est artiflcium apposite et proprie de quocumque themate disserendi. In the Erotemata dialectices of 1547 Melanchthon introduced dialectic as being about all matters or questions concerning which people are to he instructed (circa omnes materias seu quaestiones de quibus docendi sunt hominesf1. The four terms occurring in these definitions - res proposita, thema, materia, quaestio - are no doubt equivalents of the Greek words próblëma and prótasis, which are used by Aristotle for any questionable thesis th at is made the subject-matter of a dialectical debate. In Melanchthon's school it was customary to divide such themes into two kinds: simple themes, which may be expressed by a single word and subjected to the operations of definition and division, and complex themes, which are expressed by whole sentences and form the immediate constituents of argumentations. Two things should be noted. In the first place, it is always stressed that anything whatever can be made the subject-matter of a dialectical search; in particular , what is investigated need not really exist or be the case. Secondly, by being made the subject-matter of a debate, the theme is automatically something that is conceived of and talked about. A second line of thought which is important for our purposes was formulated most explicitly by Jacobus Zabarella, in his De natura logicae of 157868 • For Zabarella, logic and grammar are instrument al disciplines, because they furnish philosophy with tools of inquiry. The artificial instruments made by logicians are second-order concepts (secundae notiones), such as genus, species, enuntiatio, ratiocinatio; they are framed in order to gain a better understanding of concepts which belong to the first order (primae notiones). Whereas fust-order con66. Cf. MUELLER 1968, p. 260, n. 703: Quamquam verG intentionis et notionis vocabu/a praecipue et magis proprie pro conceptu formali accipiantur, cum tamen hoc loco intentio notiove in primam et secundam dividatur, pro obiectivo usurpari solet (quoted from the Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae, Coloniae, 1607). 67. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 155-162. 68. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 191-192.

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cepts are normally instantiated by things in the world which exist independently of any operation of the intellect, second-order concepts are exemplified by things in so far as they are actually conceived of and presented to the mind. Logicians who were influenced by Zabarella agreed with the Melanchthonians that the subject-matter of dialectic may be any thing whatever, but they were careful to add th at logic is concerned with such a thing only in so far as it can be brought under a notion of second order69 • Now, as we saw at the end of 1.4.1., the first-order concepts by which second-order concepts are exemplified were considered to be passive concepts or conceptus obieetivi. When, therefore, the subject-matter of dialectic is regarded as that to which second-order notions are applicable and is also called thema, it may be concluded that the word thema is used in the same sense as the scholastic expres sion conceptus obiectivus. As a matter of fact, the Melanchthonian use of thema and Zabarella' s view concerning the nature of logic came together in the first decades of the seventeenth century. Clemens Timpier, in his Logicae systema methodicum of 1612, states that, in one sense, the primary subject of logic is formed by man's intellectual operations and the secondary subject by the linguistic expressions of those operations, but that in another sense its subject is any theme whatsoever (quodlibet themapo. Even more explicit is Robert Sanderson, in his Logicae artis compendium of 1615. The subjectmatter oflogic is everything, whether existing or not, that we can grasp by the mind or express by speech (materia circa quam versatur, est omne illud, sive ens sive non ens, quod vel mente compleeti vel oratione eloqui possumus). The logician, however, considers all themes, not according to their own nature, but in so far as the logical instruments, that is, concepts of second order, are applicable to them (logicus enim considerat omnia themata, non secundum proprias ipsorum naturas,

sed in quantum logica instrumenta (quae sunt secundae notiones) sunt eis applicabilia). A thema, according to Sanderson, is a quaestio intelligibilis or, with a Greek expression, pan noètón; everything that can be conceived. A few years later, Franco Petri Burgersdijck, in his Institutiones logicae of 1626, defined a thema as that whichcan be put before the mind in order to acquire knowledge about it (quod intellectui cognoscendum proponi potest). His commentator, Adriaan Heereboord, remarks in connection with this definition that a thema differs from a conceptus. A conceptus is a representation of a thing in the mind, whereas a thema is the thing as it is represented and known by means of the representation. A thema, moreover , may be either a real existent or a fiction, such as the palace of the sun; it is every entity and every non-entity that can be known (ideoque thema est omne 69. Cf. RISSE 1964, p. 116, n. 188 (Eius itaque subiectum sunt res omnes sive notiones et conceptus primi - - - ut eas disponat, digerat, distinguat per conceptus secundos); p. 460, n. 100 (Cum logicus versetur circa omnes res, non quidem quatenus sunt - - - sed quatenus notionibus secundis subsunt); p. 466, n. 137 (Nam entia hic spectantur logice, ut praedicari possunt vel subiici); p. 456, n. 76 (Verum logicae subiectum ponimus res om nes, sed non quatenus sunt res - - - sed quatenus secundis notionibus ex iis effingendis sunt convenientes); p. 515, n. 423 (res omnes, prout notionibus secundis - - - substant). 70. Cf. RISSE 1964, p. 467, n. 144.

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ens et non ens quod eognosci potest). This difference between a eoneeptus and a thema is strongly reminiscent of the scholastic distinction between a eoneeptus forma lis and a eoneeptus obiectivus71. Finally, somemore light may be shed on the notion of a thema by taking into consideration what contemporary philosophers had to say about the proper subject-matter of metaphysics. Clemens Timpler, in his Metaphysicae systema methodieum of 1604, is of the opinion that metaphysics should study not only everything that is, but also everything that is not (non tantum eontemplatur ens, sed etiam non ens), and he further characterizes this extended subject-matter as pan noëtón, hoe est omne intelligibile72 • This broad sense of such words as ens, res, aliquid is also acknowledged by Johannes Clauberg, whose Metaphysiea de ente, quae reetius ontosophia was originally published in 1647. He distinguishes three meanings of the word ens: it may denote everything that can be thought of, or everything that exists even if nobody thinks of it, or that which exists by itself, as a substance. Of an entity in the first sen se he says that it is called thema by the dialecticians. It is something that can be conceived of and talked about and consequently has some kind ofbeing. For even if it does not exist in the world outside thought and language, it exists nonetheless in the mind and in speech (nempe, si non existit extra rationem et orationem nostram in mundo, saltem est in sermone, eum dicitur, atque imprimis est in intellectu, dum eogitatur). The kind ofbeing which is attributed to it in so far as it is presented to the intellect and is known by the intellect, is called esse obiectivum or esse eognitum. With respect to this type of entity, then, there is practically no difference bet ween its existence and its being thought of and talked about73 • Clauberg himself identifies an entity in the broadest sense with that which dialecticians meant by the name thema. This word and its synonym res proposita seem to have undergone a slight shift of meaning. Originally, they indicated the thing or the state of affairs propounded as the subject-matter of a dialectical investigation. But as such a subject-matter has to be conceived of in order to be talked about, the verb proponere and the Greek verb tithénai could also easily be taken in the sense of putting before the mind. The res proposita or thema is then the thing or the state of affairs as it is presented to the intellect and thus has esse obiectivum or esse eognitum. It is in this latter sense th at the thema exemplifies the second-order notions which are the instruments oflogic; and as such it is identical with the passive concept which in scholastic circles was called eoneeptus obiectivus. From the point of view oflogic, therefore, a thema is undoubtedly the

71. For Sanderson, Burgersdijek, and Heereboord see also NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 198-201. 72. Cf. COURTINE 1979, p. 252. See also RISSE 1964, p. 451, n. 52. 73. Clauberg 1691, pp. 283-285. Cornpare Sir Kenelrn Digby, Demonstratio immortalitatis animae rationalis, Francofurti, 1664, p. 466: - - - experimur nihil a nobis loquendo exprimi cui entis appellationem non tribuamus, nihil mente concipi quod sub entis notione non apprehendamus. - - - Dubium igitur non est quin negotiatio omnis intellectus circa obiecta sibi proposita sub notione entis versetur. Cf. RISSE 1970, p. 432, n. 40.

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same as a conceptus obiectivus. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the word thema was sometimes used in a rather loose sense. According to objectiveexistence theories, one and the same thing may have esse obiective - in so far as it is actually conceived ofby the intellect (esse in intellectu) and talked about (esse in sermone) - and at the same time esse rea/e, in so far as it really exists in the world. This identity of the thing concerned made it rather easy to extend the meaning of the word thema fr om its strict logical sen se to a looser sense in which it could be used for the thing in itself as well. Another natural step consisted in transferring the word thema from the object of an act of thinking to the act itself and to the word or sentence by means of which that act is expressed. In this derivative sen se the name thema coniunctum, for instance, was applied to a ment al proposition and a declarative sentence. But even authors who indulged in these extensions were fully aware of the necessity of drawing certain crucial distinctions by other means. Burgersdijck, for example, distinguished, with regard to a simple theme, three kinds of attribute. Attributes which belong to a thing irrespectively of whether it is conceived of and talked about or not, are affectiones rei; such an attribute of man is his capability oflaughing. Other attributes belong to a thing only in so far as it is conceived of by the intellect; they are, of course, notions of second order and instruments oflogic (aJfectiones ra tio nis). Finally, there are attributes of language (affectiones vocis), such as being the subject or the predicate of asentence, which belong to things only in so far as they are spoken of by means oflinguistic expressions74 •

1.5. Conclusion Of the four main theories of the proposition which were current in the MiddIe Ages - the Thomistic doctrine, the objective-existence theory, the mentalact theory, and logical realism - only the first two survived in various forms during the period which saw the birth of modern philosophy. They are precisely the theories in which the notions of esse obiective and conceptus obiectivus played an important role. It may, therefore, be presumed that even those thinkers who eventually broke away from the scholastic tradition were quite familiar with these notions and would not always refrain from employing them for their own purposes. This anticipation is strengthened by the fact that many of the eclectic philosophers who flourished during the first half of the seventeenth century did make use of them, ei th er in the traditional terminology or in a new-fashioned vocabulary.

74. For details see NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 195-201.

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2. IDEA AND JUDGMENT IN DESCARTES

Although the border-line bet ween old and new may be drawn at different points and although, wherever it is drawn, it marks less an abrupt break than a continuous transition, there is much to be said for letting the modern era in the history of philosophy begin with René Descartes (1596-1650). In conformity with the purpose of this monograph, the central questions to which an answer will be sought in his works are the following: What makes a declarative sentence meaningful? Wh at is the object ofjudgment? What is the bearer of truth or falsity? One problem with which one is inevitably faced in this connection regards the exact import of the term idea. As even interpreters who were much nearer to Descartes in time disagreed about the way he used this word which is so crucial for his own thought and for later developments in philosophy, a close look at its meaning will not be amiss. A second problem concerns Descartes 's attribution of the act of judgment to the voluntas. Since this doctrine is often misunderstood and these misunderstandings seem to be at least partially due to a lack of insight into the historical background, an attempt will be made at elucidating it in the light of its probable sources.

2.1. The meaning ofidea 2.1.1. Of the three forms of cognition - sensation, imagination, and pure intellection - the first two are explained carefully by Descartes in his conversation with the student Burman, which took place in April 1648. In sensation images are depicted in the brain by the external things, whereas in imagination it is the soul itself that depicts the images in the brainl. Although Descartes occasionally used the word idea for these images2 , it became his general policy to reserve that term for the third form of cognition. At several places3 he elaborates the crucial differences between imagination and pure intellection. 1. Descartes 1964-1975 (abbreviated in this chapter as AT, followed by volume and page), V, 162-163. 2. See, for instanee, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, XII and XIV. 3. Medit4tiones Je prima philosophia, 11 and VI (AT, VII, 31 and 72); Letter to Mersenne,]uly, 1641 (AT, lIl, 395).

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And he repeatedly emphasizes his decision to employ the word idea only for the concepts that are formed in pure intellection, in particular in his replies to Hobbes and Gassendi, who wanted to give another sense to that term 4 • Further, at the end of the fourth discourse of the Dioptrie there is a very remarkable passage in which Descartes repudiates the view that in the case of sensation and imagination the images which are depicted in the brain are exact likenesses of the corresponding things. Instead of taking such images as exact likenesses, one should rather compare them to signs and words or to copperplates, which represent things by having a structure that is somehow systematically related to the form of the things representeds. From this passage it may be inferred that a fortiori the ideas which are formed in pure intellection are not to be regarded as, in some literal sense, likenesses of the things that are conceived of. Accordingly, Descartes is careful to describe ideas as only comparable in certain respects to images (tamquam rerum imagines; veluti quasdam imaginesf. Ideas have a representative character, that is, they are always ideas of something; in th at regard they are like images, but they are not images or likenesses in any literal sense. 2.1.2. In the reply to Hobbes's fifth objection7 Descartes informs us that he has chosen the word idea as the name of the concepts that are peculiar to pure intellect ion because that word was already commonly used by philosophers in order to indicate the forms involved in the conceptions of the divine intellect. As nobody doubts that God's conceptions have nothing whatever to do with corporeal phantasy or imagination, he thought the established name of the divine concepts the best term available for indicating the concepts of pure intellection in general. As we saw in 1.2.2., scholastic philosophers indeed tended to restrict the Latin word idea to the exemplary notions that are in God's mind. Let us take as a fairly typical representative of that tradition Durandus ofSaintPourçain. In his commentary on the Sentences 8 he defines an idea as an intellectual form or concept in conformity to which something can be produced by an agent (non omnis tamen forma intellectualis potest dici idea, sed solum illa ad euius

similitudinem aliquid est producibile; idea est forma vel ratio ad euius similitudinem agens per artem potest alïquid produeere). Examples of such ideas are the divine thoughts after which the created universe has been modelled, and also the preconceptions in the mind of a human artificer according to which he produces his artefacts (sieut in mente divina sunt ideae omnium ereatorum, sie in mente artiflcis sunt ideae artiflciatorum). Durandus explicitly identifies an idea with the thing conceived of as it has esse obieetive in the mind (idea est ratio rei apud intellectum existens obiective). Moreover , he insists that the thing as it is present to the mind 4. AT, VII, 181 and 366; see also Letter to Mersenne,july, 1641 (AT, lIl, 392). 5. AT, VI, 112-114. See also 11 .1. 6. Meditationes, III (AT, VII, 37 and 42). 7. AT, VII, 181. 8. Durandus a Sancto Porciano 1571, fol. 98 (I, Dist. 36, q. 3).

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in a preconceived form and the thing as it is produced are one and the same thing regarded from different sides. In this connection he appeals to the same passage in Aristotle - Metaphysics, VII, 7, 1032 b 11 - th at was adduced by Aureolus (See 1.2.2.). The account, then, which Descartes himself offers of the introduction of the term idea is astrong indication that this word has something to do with the technical notions of esse obiective and conceptus obiectivus as they were presented in the foregoing chapter. This impression is amply confirmed by those passages in which Descartes explains wh at he means by an idea. In a marginal note added in the Latin edition of the Discourse on Method he says that the word idea should be taken to stand for every thing thought of in so far as it has only some esse obiectivum in the mind (nota hoc in loco et ubique in sequentibus nomen ideae generaliter sumi pro om ni re cogitata quatenus habet tantum esse quoddam obiectivum in intellectu)9. Both Caterus and Arnauld, in their objections to the Meditations, take it for granted that Descartes understands idea in this manner. More or less si mil ar definitions are given elsewhere: an idea is everything that is in the mind when we conceive of a thing, however we conceive of it; an idea is everything that is immediately conceived of by the mind lO • In the third and the fourth definitions added to the second replies Descartes contrasts the realitas obiectiva that is constitutive of an idea with the formalor actual being of the externalobject of an idea. In so far as a thing is present to the mind in the form of an idea, it simply is that idea and so has the realitas obiectiva that is peculiar to an idea, namely, the being of a thing represented by an idea, in so far as it is in the idea (entitatem rei repraesentatae per ideam, quatenus est in idea). When we think of an externalobject, it is obiective - or, as the French text occasionally puts it, by representation (par représentation) - in the ideas we form of it. If these ideas or conceptions are correct, then the thing as it is conceived of coincides with the thing as it actually exists ll . The same contrast between the manner of being by which a thing is present to the mind in the form of an idea (iste essendi modus quo res est obiective in intellectu per ideam) and the actual or formal being of the external thing itself is found in the third Meditation l2 • Although Descartes there admits that the mode ofbeing which is called esse obiective is an imperfect type of existence, he nevertheless maintains that it is not just nothing (non tarnen profecto plane nihil est). It is the way of being that is of the very nature of ideas in so far as they render something present to the mind (iste modus essendi obiectivus competit ideis ex ipsarum natura). In this connection it is important to heed a distinction which Descartes himself stresses in his reply to Caterus\3. If we re gard a thing, for example the sun, as a real existent in the outside world at which an act of con-

9. AT, VI , 559. Cf. AT, VII, 102. 10. Letter to Mersenne, June 16, 1641 (AT, lIl, 383); Letter to Mersenne, July, 1641 (AT, lIl, 392-393); AT, VII, 181 and 185 . 11. AT, VII, 161. 12. AT, VII, 41-42. 13. AT, VII, 102-103.

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ceiving is directed, the fact that the external thing is the ultimate object of the concept ion is not hing real in that thing; it is called an object conceived of only by a denominatio extrinseca, that is, only because of the extrinsic circumstance that some act of conceiving is directed at it. But if the same sun is assimilated by the mind and rendered immediately present to it in the form of an idea, then the sun in so far as it is conceived of simply is the idea; and precisely because it is represented in the mind by the idea, it necessarily has the type of being that is of the essence of an idea, namely, esse obiective. In other words, that an external object as such is rendered present to the mind in some act of cognition is, from the viewpoint of that object, quite contingent; but once it has been received into the mind, it cannot but have there the kind of existence that is peculiar to objects in the mind, that is, to ideas. The fact th at Descartes ascribes esse obiective to ideas as weIl as to things is easily explained if one realizes that an idea is not hing but the thing itself in so far as it is conceived ofby the intellect. The only difference is that an idea, at least in its representative function, has only esse obiective, whereas the external thing may have two modes of existence, esse obiective in the mind and real existence in the world. Although Descartes is primarily interested in the representative function of an idea, he is aware that it can also be regarded from another vantage point. In the preface to the reader which was attached to the Latin version of the Meditations he points to a certain ambiguity in the word idea l4 • It may stand either for an operation of the intellect, in a material way, or for the thing that is represented by th at operation, in a way that is called obiective. What he means by this distinction becomes clear from two other passages, one in the third Meditation and the other in his reply to Arnauld 1s • At the fint place, he states th at ideas may be considered as no more than certain modes of thinking; in that respect they are all similar . But they may also be regarded as representing different things;with respect to that representative function each is dissimilar to the other. In the reply to Arnauld he says that in the former case ideas are taken materially, while in the lat ter they are taken formally. It should be added that Arnauld himself, in his objections, had appealed to a similar distinction in connection with the notion of a positive idea. According to him, ideas are not called positive in so far as they exist as mere modes or ways of thinking; for in that sense they are all positive. But that characterization is based on the esse obiective which they contain in their representative function l6 • Wh at Descartes wants to bring out, I think, is the distinction between an idea as an act inhering in an individu al subject, as the form received by a particular mind, and, on the other hand, an idea as the form or natural sign of something. An idea as the mode of

14. AT, VII, 8. 15. AT, VII, 40 and 232. 16. AT, VII, 206. Compare Suarez 1597, Disp. II, 1, 1: UnJe eolligitur Jifferentia inter eoneep· tum forma/em et obieetivum, quod forma/is semper est vera ae positiva res et in ereaturis qualitas menti inhaerens, obieetivus vero non semper est vera res positiva; eoncipimus enim interdum privationes et a/ia, quae voeantur entia rationis, quia so/um habent esse obieetive in intelleetu.

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thinking of a particular subject he calls an idea in the material sense. Since from the viewpoint of logic and epistemology an idea is interesting only in so far as it is representative by being the form of something, he calls an idea as the form of something an idea in the purely formal sense. It should be noted th at in this context the term forma/is is not opposed to the term obiectivus - as it is in the pair esse forma/e/esse obiective - but rather synonymous with it. This interpretation seems to be corroborated by a definition of idea which I have not mentioned so far. In the second of the definitions that are added to the replies to the second set of objections an idea is defined as th at form of any thought by the immediate awareness of which I am conscious of th at said thought (ideae nomine

intelligo cuiuslibet cogitationis formam iIIam per cuius immediatam perceptionem ipsius eiusdem cogitationis conscius sumr. This somewhat puzzling definition can be most plausibly understood, I submit, if it is taken into account that we are aware of our thoughts, notjust as thoughts, but always as thoughts having the form of something, that is, as representative ideas. From the foregoing considerations it may be concluded that for Descartes an idea is the definite form received by the mind in an act of thinking. Viewed from the side of the intellect, an idea is, on the one hand, the form of a particular mind; as such it is someone's act of thinking, having real existence as an accident in a subject. On the other hand, the idea is at the same time a form of something and thus a representation; in that quality it is directed towards an external thing which corresponds to the representation by satisfying its conditions. An idea is not only someone's act of thinking, but, much more importantly, someone's act of thinking a determinate thought of something. This determinate thought of something or the thing thought of which is the content or internalobject of the act of thinking has a peculiar manner of being which consists in being present to the mind in the very form th at the mind receives in the act of thinking. When the conditions of the mental representation happen to be satisfied by an extemal object in the world, the thing that is present to the mind as the content of the act of thinking coincides with the thing that really exists in the outside world. Viewed from the side of the world and of the real thing existing in it, an idea may therefore also be said to be that thing, but only in so far as the thing has been made present to the mind in the form of the representative idea. In veridical cases the thing thought of in someone's act of thinking a determinate thought of something is identical with the thing that exists in the outside world. In such circumstances one and the same thing has both esse obiective, as that which is present to the mind in the representative idea, and esse actua/e or forma/e, as a real existent outside the mind. In order to understand wh at Descartes means by an idea it is of the utmost importance to pay heed to two identities. In the first place, one and the same idea may be considered either as someone's act of thinking or as a form or representation of something. To put it in scholastic terms, there is no reason at all to suppose that Descartes followed those Thomists who regarded the act of thinking and the 17. AT, VII, 160.

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inner word produced by it as two really distinct qualities of the mind. On the contrary, he held that there is one act of thinking which may be viewed in two respects. As we shall see in 4.1., this is also the interpretation which such a careful thinker as Arnauld gave to the relevant texts. Secondly, there is sufficient evidence to assume th at Descartes identified - at least in cases of nondeceptive thought - the thing as it is conceived of with the thing as it really exists; there is only one thing, but that one thing may have different kinds of existence. In cases of non-deceptive thought, then, two types of real existents are involved: an act of thinking and an externalobject in the world. The two meet, as it were, in the representative idea which is simultaneously the cognitively crucial aspect of the act of thinking and the externalobject in so far as it has been rendered immediately present to the mind. Far from being a sign of originality, Descartes's novel use of the term idea l8 points the way to those regions of the scholastic tradition in which that word in its more restricted sense was at home and with which he must have become familiar during his formative years. Although nowadays there is no lack of awareness of his partial dependence upon traditional thought and terminology l9, it remains difficult to single out any individual sources. His debt is of a very general nature and could have come from any work belonging to a certain climate of thought. There can be little doubt, however, th at one of the main determinants of this climate was the objective-existence theory as it had been developed by such thinkers as Durandus and Aureolus. This is obvious for the crucial notion of esse obiective. And although it is true that Descartes does not employ the technical term conceptus obiectivus, much of what he says about ideas is strongly reminiscent of what others expressed by means of th at term. In this connection it is also interesting to no te that the characterization of universals which he offers in Principia philosophiae, I, 59, is unmistakably a conceptualist view: they are framed by the mind when we make use of the same idea in order to think of several particular things which stand in a certain relation to one another.

2.2. Ideas as the senses of linguistic expressions 2.2.1. The main difference between brutes and man lies, according to Descartes, in the fact that brutes do not make use of a conventionallanguage. Since a conventionallanguage, in contradistinction to such natural signs as cries and groans, serves to express thoughts, it may be concluded that brutes have no thoughts; otherwise they would express them by conventional signs, in the same way as even the deaf and dumb invent particular signs in order to express

18. For the vicissitudes of this word see RITTER, GRUENDER 1976; also, particularly with regard to the seventeenth century, MCRAE 1965 and YOLTON 1975'. 19. See, for instance, GILSON 1913, DALBIEZ 1929, CRONIN 1966, WAGNER 1967, WELLS 1967, LENNON 1974, MONTE COOK 1975.

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their thoughts 20 . That Descartes considered the expressions of a conventional language as the proper instruments by which man communicates his thoughts and conceptions is also clear from his comments on an artificiallanguage in the letter to Mersenne of November 20, 1629, and from his remarks in Principia philosophiae, I, 7421 . Thoughts, then, are th at which such material things as spoken and written words immediately signify22. Whenever we express something by our words in such a way that we understand what we are saying, we have in our mind an idea of the thing which is (mediately) signified by our words 23 . Having some idea of God, for example, is not hing but understanding wh at is (immediately) signified by the word 'God' or some equivalent expression. If one had, in connection with the word 'God', no idea or conception at all, that word would be entirely meaningless 24 . In his replies to Hobbes' s objections Descartes points out that a Frenchman and a German can entertain the same thoughts or reasonings concerning the same things, in spite of the fact that they conceive completely different words. This shows that in reasonings we do not put together names, but rather the things which are (immediately) signified by those names 25 . I have added the words 'immediately' and 'mediately' to the verb 'to signify' in order to distinguish between the sense and the reference of a linguistic expression. What Descartes has in mind in his reply to Hobbes is no doubt the mental components of a reasoning, that is, the ideas or the things immediately signified by the words. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that for Descartes the idea is the thing itself in so far as it is conceived ofby the intellect; so, in a way, the immediate and the mediate significa te of a linguistic expres sion coincide. As we shall see later (6.4. and 6.5.), this point was taken to heart by some of his followers. Ideas, then, are that which a speaker means, a hearer understands, and linguistic signs (immediately) signify. In this role, an idea has the same function as the inner word and the passive concept which were introduced by scholastic philosophers in order to explain the meaningfulness of spoken and written expressions. It is quite obvious that for Descartes it is not the idea as some particular person' s act of thinking that gives meaning to words and sentences, but rather the idea as a form or representation of something.

2.2.2. As we saw in the foregoing chapter, scholastic philosophers used to drawasharp distinction between acts of simple apprehension, with incomplex contents, and acts of compounding or dividing which contain the typical com-

20. Letter to the Marquis of Newcastle, Nov . 23, 1646 (AT, IV, 575); Letter to Morus, Febr. 5,1649 (AT, V, 278). 21. AT, I, 80-81; AT, VIII-I, 37. 22. Letter to Chanut, Febr. I, 1647 (AT, IV, 604). Cf. also AT, V, 150. 23. AT, VII, 160; Letter to Mersenne, July, 1641 (AT, lIl, 393). 24. Letter to Mersenne, July, 1641 (AT, lIl, 393); Letter to Clerselier, Jan . 12, 1646 (AT, IX-l,209-210) . 25. AT, VII, 178-179.

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plexio that consists in an affirmative or negative predication. There can hardly be any doubt that Descartes was familiar with the difference between concepts as elements of propositions and propositional concepts. Nevertheless, it is a fact that he used the word idea for both kinds of concept and thereby made a crucial distinction less clearly recognizable. That he extended the word idea to propos itional concepts (nomen ideae ego vero ad id omne quod cogitatur, extendof6 is, of course, implied by his considering ideas as the objects ofjudgment. Although sometimes he contrasts an idea with a proposition, or a notion which does not involve affirmation or negation with a prejudice, the very fact that he occasionally speaks of ideas which do not involve any affirmation or negation indicates that for him there are also ideas that do involve predication27 • His lack of explicitness, however, could easily lead to confusion. So one of Mersenne's correspondents apparently took Descartes as meaning that ideas of the imagination differ from ideas of pure intellection in that the former are expressed by nouns and the latter by propositions. AIso, it was suggested that ideas are concepts which are expressed by simple terms 28 • Descartes's reactions give the impres sion that the question as to how ideas are expressed did not interest him very much. He took it for granted that ideas are sometimes expressed by nouns, sometimes by propositions; his real concern was the distinction between imagination and pure intellection. Finally, we have the testimony of Claude Buffier that in 1732 the French word idée was used both for a simple apprehension and for an opinion or judgment29 • This common usage, which was certainly older than the eighteenth century, may have facilitated the Cartesian extension of the technical term idea. 2.3. Ideas andjudgment 2.3.1. In Principia philosophiae, I, 48-49, Descartes divides our knowledge into two kinds: knowledge concerning the existence of things and truths belonging to thought alone, or, as it is put in the conversation with Burman, contingent truths and eternal truths30 • Eternal truths, also called common notions or maxims, are not concerned with the existence of things 31 ; they are nothing 26. AT, VII, 366. 27. Letter to Mersenne, July, 1641 (AT, lIl, 396); Letter to Clerselier, Jan. 12, 1646 (AT, IX-1, 206); Letter to Mersenne, July 22,1641 (AT, lIl, 418). 28. Letter to Mersenne, July, 1641 (AT, lIl, 395); Letter to Mersenne, July 22,1641 (AT, lIl, 417). 29. Buffier 1732, pp. 783-784. 30. AT, V, 167. 31. Conversation with Burman, AT, V, 153. Compare what the Scotist Petrus Tataretus, who was rector of the Sorbonne towards the end of the fifteenth century, says about such propositions as Soerates est animal and Homo est animal: they can never be false, whether the subject exists or not, quia ad veritatem talium propositionum non requiritur quod extrema suppo· nant pro aliquo existente, sed sufflcit quod supponant pro aliquo in esse eognito et quod eomponantur ad invieem. - - - Ir 'homo' supponit pro homine in esse eognito et etiam 'animal' pro animali in esse eognito, quod sufflcit ad veritatem talium propositionum (Tataretus 1514', fol. 20).

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outside our thought, but are entirely based upon certain relations between ideas. Since they are directly evident, no one can think of them without assenting to them. For the act of judgment Descartes employs the Latin or French equivalents of such verbs as 'to judge (that something is true)', 'to believe (that something is true)', 'to assent', or a negation of 'to doubt'. The object of the act of judging is usually described by such expressions as 'that which is understood' or 'the thing which is conceived of by the rnind'32. What Descartes means by such expressions is no doubt a complex idea or propositi on al concept. Although the ideas involved in eternal truths are not ideas in the strict sense of being ideas of things, they are nonet hele ss ideas in a broad sense33 . Ideas in a strict sense, then, are ideas that represent some thing. Moreover, according to Descartes, the thing represented by the idea is always conceived of as a possible existent. Necessary existence is included only in the idea of God; although there is a difference between the conception of God as existing and the assertion that he exists, the two are necessarily connected. In the case of ideas of other things, however, the existence included in the idea is merely contingent; therefore, the judgment that the thing represented by the idea exists in reality is often a very risky step34. The judgment involved in such contingent existential statements is characterized as an act of referring that which is represented by the idea to something that exists outside the mind. In other words, it is judged that the ideas which are in the mind have a similarity or conformity to certain extramental things35 . Ultimately, the act of referring an idea to an external thing is based upon the conviction that the idea of a thing or the thing which has esse obiective in the mind is caused by an extramental thing that has at least as much formal reality as the idea contains esse obiective36 •

2.3.2. The distinction drawn by Descartes, with respect to both contingent and eternal truths, between ideas as the objects ofjudgment and the act ofjudging itself is part of a wider distinction, namely, the distinction between thoughts of the mind that are passions and thoughts of the mind that are actions. In a letter to Mesland the soul and its ideas are compared to a piece of wax and the diverse forms which it may receive. Just as in the piece of wax the receiving of different forms is apassion, som et hing that it undergoes, so the receiving of different ideas is a passion in the soul; actions of the soul are only its volitions 37 . In Principia philosophiae, I, 32, Descartes offers a general division 32. AT, X, 386; AT, lIl, 64; AT, VII, 58, 65, 69,145-146,460; AT, VIII-1, 21. 33. Conversation withBurman, AT, V, 153. Cf. AT, VII, 44: Etquia nullaeideaenisi tamquam rerum esse possunt - - - . 34. AT, VII, 116 and 166; AT, lIl, 396. 35. AT, VII, 37; AT, V, 152. Cf. also The PassionsoftheSoul, I, 22, 24, 25. CompareJohannes a Sancto Thoma 1937, p. 370: Iudicium formaliter loquendo non respicit repraesentationem ex· tremorum ut comparatorum et unitorum inter se, sed ipsam enuntiationem comparat per confor. mitatem aut difformitatem ad esse vel non esse in re. 36. AT, VII, 38-42 and 165; Principia philosophiae, 11, 1. 37. Letter to Mesland, May2, 1644 (AT, IV, 113).

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of all modes of thinking. One class consists of perceptions by the understanding and comprises sensation, imagination, and also purely intelligible conceptions of things. It is contrasted with actions of the will by which we determine ourselves; these modes of willing comprise desire, aversion, assuring, denying, and doubting. Elsewhere38 , he declares th at intellectio, or intellectio et visio, forms the passive side of the mind, whereas volitio is its action. The same distinction, between perceptions in a broad sense and actions or volitions, is found in The Passions of the Soul, I, 17 ff., while in the letter to Hyperaspistes it is emphasized that conceptions do not belong to the will, but that they should be reckoned among the functions of the understanding39. That Descartes ascribed acts of judging to the active part of the soul is obvious from Principia philosophiae, I, 3240 • The same view had already been expressed in the third Meditation, where he contrasts acts of willing, fearing, affirming, and denying with the ideas towards which they are directed, and adds that the acts of willing and fearing are called volitions or affections (voluntates sive aJfectus), whereas the acts of affirming and denying - which are apparently meant to have assertive force - are called judgments (iudiciaf1. This doctrine, attacked by Hobbes in his thirteenth objection, was consistently maintained by Descartes until the last years of his life, as is clear Erom a letter to Clerselier of 1646, an answer to Burman in 1648, and especially from the Notae in programma quoddam, published in 164842 • In his comments on the twenty-one theses which his former admirer Henricus Regius had published anonymously in 1647, Descartes reaffirms the division of Principia philosophiae, 1,32. There he had ascribed the act ofjudging, which consists only in assenting, that is, in affirming or denying, not to the perception of the understanding, but to the determination of the will (ipsum actum iudicandi, qui nonnisi in assensu, hoc est in affirmatione vel negatione consistit, non rettuli ad perceptionem intellectus, sed ad determinationem voluntatis). And the reason was his insight that besides perception, which is a prerequisite for judgment, the formation of a proper judgment requires also an act of affirming or denying, and that we are often free to withhold our assent even when we are aware of the thing conceived of (cum viderem praeter perceptionem, quae praerequiritur ut iudicemus, opus esse afflrmatione vel negatione ad formam iudicii constituendam, nobisque saepe liberum esse ut cohibeamus assensionem, etiamsi rem percipiamus). It is less easy to decide whether Descartes already held 38. Letters to Regius, May and December, 1641 (AT, lIl, 372 and 454-455). 39. Letter to Hyperaspistes, August, 1641 (AT, lIl, 432). 40. Cf. also I, 34: Ad iudicandum requiritur quidem intellectus, quia de re quam nullo modo percipimus nihil possumus iudicare; sed requiritur etiam vo/untas, ut rei a/iquo modo perceptae assensio praebeatur. 41. AT, VII, 37. Cf. also AT, VII, 60 (il/os actus vo/untatis sive illa iudicia); AT, VII, 147-148 (rationem forma/em quae movet vo/untatem ad assentiendum; claritatem vel perspicuitatem a qua moveri potest nostra vo/untas ad assentiendum). 42. Letter to Clerselier, Jan. 12,1646 (AT, IX-1, 204: - - - c'est une action de la v%nté que dejuger ou ne pasjuger); Conversation with Burman, AT, V, 158-159 (Sed ipsum iudicium est opus vo/untatis. Est quidem opus vo/untatis et qua ta/e est perfectum - - -); AT, VIII-2, 363.

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this theory during the period which preceded the composition of the Meditations. Although there are some passages, notably in the Regulae and in the Discourse on Method43, which are at least coherent with the later doctrine, there are perhaps also indications that he had not yet embraced the view developed in the Meditations 44 • However that may be, it is certain that in the years 1641-1648 it was his firm and considered opinion that judgments are acts, not of the understanding, which is always passive, but of the active part of the soul, that is, of the will. 2.3.3. That Descartes assigned ideas to the passive part of the soul and judgments to the active part is probably not felt to be very surprising. It may, however, be deemed strange that he identified the activity of the soul with what he usually calls voluntas or volitio, and that consequently for him a judgment is a voluntas or volitio. In this connection I want to make two preliminary remarks. In the first place, occasionally Descartes himself shows signs of indecision concerning the use of the word voluntas. We have seen that in the third Meditation he contrasts voluntates sive affectus with acts of affirming or denying. And in The Passions of the Soul, I, 13, he speaks of the will as the only or at least the principal action of the soul (notre volonté, laquelle est sa seule ou du moins sa principale action). On the other hand, he very often simply identifies actions of the soul with voluntates and accordingly reckons judgments among the latter. This indicates, I think, that in his usage such words as voluntas, volitio, volonté have a certain degree of ambiguity. They may be used either in their common sense - and may then be translated by 'will' or 'act of willing' - or in a broader sense, in which they are also applicable to, for instance, judgments. When the terms have this broad sense, I will employ the Latin word voluntas as their representative. The second point which has to be borne in mind is the fact that both in classical Latin and in the learned Latin which Descartes and his fellowphilosophers wrote the verb veile regularly had the same meaning as 'to hold', 'to assert', 'to assume'. It is not unlikely that this nuance of meaning of the verb veile made it more natural for Descartes to regard judgments as volitiones than it looks from the point of view of other languages. In order to gain a correct understanding of the meaning of voluntas in the broad sense, it is first of all important to notice that at several pi aces Descartes indicates that for him voluntas and voluntarius are equivalent to such expressions as facultas eligendi or arbitrii libertas and liber45 • Freedom is the essence of voluntas. Descartes, however, makes a distinction bet ween liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference. Liberty of indifference, which consists in the state of a pers on in which there is no reason urging him one way rather than the other (cum nulla me ratio in unam partem magis quam in alteram impellitr, is the lowest 43. Regulae ad directionem ingenii, I (AT, X, 361); AT, VI, 23. 44. Cf. KENNY 1972, pp. 1-7. 45. AT, VII, 56, 57,166,191; Principia philosophiae, I, 37; Letters to Mesland, May 2,1644, and Febr. 9, 1645 (AT, IV, 116 and 175). 46. AT, VII, 58. Cf. Letter to Mesland, Febr. 9, 1645 (AT, IV, 173).

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grade of liberty. Whereas Mesland was of the opinion that freedom always includes some degree of indifference, Descartes held that everything that belongs to the voluntas may be called free, irrespective of whether it is accompanied by indifference or not 47 • Indeed, he even contends that the more evident an answer is, the more freely one gives assent to it (neque enim opus est me in utramque partem ferri posse, ut sim liber, sed contra, quo magis in unam propendeo, - - tanto liberius illam eligofB. The highest degree ofliberty consists in assenting to those propositional ideas which are so evident that it is impossible to disbelieve them. This peculiar liberty of spontaneity is elucidated as being first and foremost self-determination, a real and positive power by which a person determines himself and is master of his own actions (auctor suarum actionumf9. This independent control of his actions is the only thing that a pers on can truly eaU his own (il n'y a rien qui véritablement lui appartienne que cette libre disposition de ses volontés). The use he makes of it is the sole reason why he de serves praise or blame50 • It is this conception of voluntas that leads Descartes to hold that even in cases in which overwhelming evidence makes it impossible to withhold one' sassent, the act of judging may still have the character of a free and independent moral decision to resign oneself wholeheartedly to the inevitable.

2.4. The source of Descartes's doctrine ofjudgment 2.4.1. Descartes 's theory of judgment is fundamentaUy different from the view that was generally accepted by scholastic philosophers. According to that common view, there are three operations of the intellect: simple apprehension, acts of compounding or dividing which may simultaneously be acts ofjudging, and reasoning51 • Judgments, therefore, were considered as acts of the intellect. As to the influence of the will on the second operation, a distinction was made bet ween acts of assenting that are directed towards evident propositions and acts of assenting directed towards propositions which compel the intellect to a lesser degree. Thomas Aquinas, for example, held that in the first case to assent or dissent is not in our power, since both in intuitive knowledge and in demonstrative knowledge we are forced to assent to wh at is immediately or mediately evident 52 • In the second case, on the other hand, assent and dissent are in our power and subject to the command of the will. This applies in particular to acts ofbelieving. Though they are acts of the intellect (actus intellectus),

47. Letter to Mesland, May 2,1644 (AT, IV, 116). 48 . AT, VII, 57-58; Letter to Mesland, Febr. 9, 1645 (AT, IV, 175). 49. Principia philosophiae, I, 32, 34, 37; Letter to Mesland, May 2,1644 (AT, IV, 116); The Passions of the Soul, lIl, 152-153. 50. Principia philosophiae, I, 37; The Passions of the Soul, lIl, 153. 51. That Descartes was familiar with this division is proved by AT, VII, 139: sed esse id tantum quod intel/ectu sive apprehendente, sive iudicante, sive ratiocinante percipimus. 52. Summa the%gica, 11-1, q. 17, art. 6; 11-2, q. 2, art. 9, ad 2; De veritate, 14, 1.

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it is the influence of the will that prompts the intellect to give its assent to the articles of faith. That is the reason why acts ofbelieving may be meritorious 53 • In the scholastic tradition, then, all judgments were regarded as acts of the intellect and the influence of the will was restricted to a special class of such acts. This makes it well-nigh impossible th at Descartes's theory ofjudgment was borrowed from a scholastic source. 2.4.2. Fortunately, we need not content ourselves with this negative result. A more positive indication concerning the origin ofDescartes' s theory is given by his follower Louis de la Forge, a physician at Saumur who lived approximately between 1605 and 1679. To a discussion of the Cartesian doctrine ofjudgment he adds the remark th at Descartes is not the first philosopher to reckon acts of judging among the things that belong to the voluntas. For Simplicius, a Peripatetic scholar, and Epictetus seem to be of the same opinion when they count belief among the things that are in our power and belong to the competence of the voluntas. And he supports this observation by a pertinent quotation from Simplicius' s comments on the first sentence of the famous Manual54 • Nearly a century ago, the heuristic value of De la Forge's observation was recognized by F. Seyring, in an article th at was intended as a correction of the wrong-headed interpretation of Descartes's theory given by Franz Brentano, who in his essay 'Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis' of 1889 had attempted to align the Cartesian doctrine with his own trichotomy of mental acts 55 • Let us follow these hints and have a closer look at the Stoic doctrine of assent as it was presented by Epictetus and his pupil Flavius Arrianus in the first half of the second century56. The philosophical gospel preached by Epictetus was based on a fundamental dichotomy between things that are not in our power and things that are in our power. The first class of things consists of external impressions (phantas{ai), which are simply given and thus foreign and indifferent to the true self of each individual human being. They are only the external material of which a certain use can be made by the elements of the second class, which are divided into three kinds: de sire and aversion, choice and refusal, and assent (synkatáthesis). These three types of mental activity form the domain of a man's proha{resis; this technical term is perhaps best translated by 'moral personality' or 'moral character'. A man's proha{resis, or his hëgemonikón, consists mainly in the use he makes of the external impressions (chr'his tOn phantasiOn). In 53 Summa theologica, 11-2, q. 2, art. 9: ipsum autem credere est actu~ intellectus assentientis veriUlti divinae ex imperio volunUltis a deo mOUle per gratÏIJm; et sic subiacet libero arbitrio in ordine ad deum: unde actus fidei potest esse meritorius; Summa theologica, 11-2, q. 4, art. 2: credere est actus intellectus, secundum quod movetur a volunUlte ad assentiendum. 54. De la Forge 1666, pp. 174-175: Au reste Monsieur Descartes n'est pas Ie premierqui a mis Ie jugement entre les choses qui appartiennent à la volonté; car Simplicius, savant Péripatéticien, et Epictète semblent être de eet avis, lorsqu'ils placent I'opinion entre les choses qui sont en notre puissance et du ressort de la volonté. 55. Cf. SEYRING 1893. 56. Epictetus 1916. Cf. also BONHOEFFER 1890, RIST 1969, VOELKE 1973.

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the determination of his attitude towards the external impressions man is absolutely free and autonomous; it is in this sphere of untrammelled sovereignty that he can improve his moral character by exercise and effort, in order to bring it nearer to that state of perfection which consists in living in complete harmony with nature. In the case of assent this means th at even when impressions are so evident that it is impossible to withhold assent from them, one is still free and able to choose the right attitude towards the inevitabIe course of nature by acquiescing in it 57 • The seeming paradox of being simultaneously determined and free had been eliminated by Chrysippus through a distinction between principal and secondary causes. Although an act of assent is necessarily caused by an impression, that impression is only its secondary cause; the principal cause of the act of assenting is nothing but the free and independent personality of the agent. Chrysippus used to illustrate this explanation by the example of the motion of a cylinder and a cone. These objects cannot begin to move unless they are set in motion by an external impulse. But once they have been set in motion, they follow their own nature by, respectively, rolling in a straight line and turning round in a circle58 • This difference between external cause and inner movement is also mentioned in Simplicius's comments on the first sentence of the Manual which are quoted by De la Forge. Epictetus's teachings, as they were laid down in the Dissertations and the Ma nua 1, and Simplicius' s commentary on the Manual were easily accessible in the years around 1600. There were in circulation editions of the original Greek texts, translations into Latin and French, and also many works inspired by the Stoic philosophy in genera15 9 • Now it is worth-while to ob serve how in the Latin translations which were probably used most widely the Greek key-word proha{resis is rendered. In the Latin translation that is added to the edition by Jakob Schegk (Basel, 1554) proha{resis is translated by such expressions as arbitrium, delectus rerum, iudicium et delectus rerum, arbitrium et delectus rerum, deligendi potestas, voluntas, voluntas et arbitrium, animus. In the edition prepared by Hieronymus Wolf (Basel, 1561-1563) proha{resis is nearly always rendered by voluntas; at a few places such expressions as iudicium et voluntas, consilium et voluntas, or libera voluntas are used. It is safe to say, then, that the word voluntas had become the favourite equivalent of the Greek technical term proha{resis. This choice was no doubt facilitated by the fact that Seneca, another extremely popular Stoic author, often employs the word voluntas in a sen se which is very similar to the way proha{resis is used by Epictetus. That the French word volonté

57. Cf. Aulus Gellius. Noctes Atticae. XIX. 1: Visa animi (quas phantas(as philosophi appellant). quibus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad animum rei pellitur. non vo/untatis sunt neque arbitraria, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitanda; probationes autem (quas synkatathéseis vocant), quibus eadem visa noscuntur. vo/untariae sunt fluntque hominum arbitratu). 58. Cicero. De fato, 41-42: - - - sed revertitur ad cylindrum et ad turbinem suum. quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt. IJ autem cum accidit. suapte natura. quod superest. et cylindrum vo/vi et versa ri turbinem putat. Cf. Aulus Gellius. Noctes Atticae. VII. 2. 11. 59. For details see ZANTA 1914 and SPANNEUT 1973.

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acquired the same meaning is shown by a striking passage from La philosophie morale des stoiques, a work composed by Guillaume du Vair around 1585: car notre volonté a la force - - - de disposer notre opinion teIlement qu'eIle ne prête consentement qu'à ce qu'eIle doit, et ce qui sera examiné ou par Ie sens ou par Ie discours; qu'eIle adhère aux choses évidemment vraies, qu 'eIle se retienne et suspende ès douteuses, qu'eIle rejette les fausses 60 • If we add to this evidence the fact that other parts of Descartes ' s philosophy show many signs of strong Stoic influencé1, it becomes practically certain that his theory ofjudgment, in particular the assignment of acts ofjudging to the voluntas, originates from Stoic sources, especially from wh at he had read in Epictetus. The general structure of his theory of judgment is the same as that of the Stoic doctrine of assent. But instead of restricting the matter on which the voluntas is exercised to external impressions, he gives pride of place to ideas as concepts of pure intellection. One of the reasons why he so often stresses the difference between ideas and the images of phantasy or sens at ion is perhaps an awareness that his adopting the Stoic frame of thought might easily tempt others to confuse the two categories.

2.5. Truth and fa Isity 2.5.1. In the third Meditation 62 Descartes connects his famous division of thoughts into ideas and ment al activities with the question as to which of those categories contains the proper bearers of truth and falsity. His answer is th at formal truth and falsity or truth and falsity in a strict sense belong only to judgments, th at is, to those acts by which ideas are referred to something else and are pronounced to have a similarity or conformity to certain things outside the mind. In so far as ideas are considered only in themselves, as mere modes of thinking that are not referred to extramental things, they cannot be called true or false in a proper sense. Apparently, Descartes is speaking here of contingent or synthetic truths and falsehoods, rat her than of eternal truths. The latter , too, are no doubt judged ideas; what is judged in their case, however, is not the conformity of the idea with an extramental thing, but only the agreement or disagreement of the ideas which, as subject and predicate, are the constituents of a propositional concept or complex idea. As we saw in 1.2.1., for such adherents of the objective-existence theory as Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus the proper bearer of truth or falsity was a complex conceptus obiectivus, a state of affairs that is put before the mind by a ment al act of compounding or dividing. Others, however, gave pride of place to the conceptus forma lis or act of judgment as the primary bearer of the truth-values, while considering the content judged as at best a derivative bearer of truth or 60. Les oeuvres de Messire Guillaume Du Vair, Paris, 1625, p. 284. Cf. ZANTA 19i4, p. 293. 61. Cf. D ' ANGERS 1954, BRIDOUX 1966, pp. 210-219, and SPANNEUT 1973, pp. 284-291. 62. AT, VII, 37.

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falsity63. Although Descartes does not mention this controversy, he obviously sided with those who regarded the act of judging as the primary bearer of the truth-values 64 • 2.5.2. Besides formal truth and falsity, which belong exclusively to judgments, Descartes acknowledged a type of falsity which he calls material and ascribes to certain ideas. In discussing ideas of corporeal things in the third Meditation 65 , he states that some ideas, notably those of heat and cold, may be materially false because they represent what is not a thing as if it were a thing (cum non rem tamquam rem repraesenta nt). The idea of cold, for instance, represents cold as something that has the character of a thing and as something positive,(tamquam reale quid et positivum); but if in reality cold is nothing but the absence of heat, the idea is somehow false. In the conversation with Burman66 Descarteschooses another example, viz the idea of colour, in particular of whiteness. Even if this idea is not actually referred to any extramental thing, it may still furnish one with matter for error, since it may give rise to amistaken view about the nature of whiteness, namely, that it is a thing or a quality in reality. That this not ion of material falsity was somewhat hard to understand is shown by Arnauld' s comments in the fourth set of objections to the Meditations and Descartes's reply to them 67 • According to Descartes, ideas are called materially false in so far as they give matter or occasion for error to the activity ofjudging. Arnauld, however, mistakenly speaks ofideas taken formally, that is, as mere representations; as a mere representation an idea is indeedjust what it is and can never be false. As Descartes further excludes ideas taken materially, that is, as operations of the mind considered in abstraction from their representative function, and also, of course, ideas in so far as they are actually affirmed or denied, it is clear th at in calling ideas materially false he looks at them from a very special point of view. In his reply to Arnauld he repeatedly emphasizes that ideas are called materially false in so far as they are matter or occasion for false judgments, obviously exploiting the connection between materia (mandi) and the adverb in materialiter falsa. This adverb, materialiter, was no doubt felt to be the right term to create a sharp contrast with the formal truth and falsity characteristic ofjudgments. In addition, however, we have to take into account the fact that Descartes concludes his reply by the reassuring remark that he is

63. See, for example, Smiglecius 1658, p. 457: Prima igitur ratio veritatis in iudicio est conJormitas iudicii cum re, secunda rio et consequenter est conformitas conceptus obiectivi cum re. 64. In Regulae ad directionem ingenii, VIII (AT, X, 396), we find the statement venta tem proprie vel falsitatem nonnisi in solo intellectu esse posse. As the intellect is there contrasted with sensation and imagination, he probably means that truth and falsity presuppose an act of compounding or dividing and that only the intellect can perform such acts. 65. AT, VII, 43-44, 46. 66. AT, V, 152. 67. AT, VII, 206-207 and 231-235.

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using the word materiaUter in the same sense as Suarez, for example, in his Metaphysicae disputationes, Disp. IX, 2, 4. In that passage Suarez mentions the distinction between a merely apprehensive or predicative proposition and a judicative proposition. Although both types of proposition involve composition or division, truth and falsity in the proper sen se are found only in judicative propositions. Nobody is held to be mistaken or to err until he has passed judgment, even though the apprehensive propositions th at he entertains without judging are as false as you like. According to Suarez, such merely apprehensive propositions are usually grasped by means of concepts of words, that is, by mental images of words, rather than by concepts of things. Now, if there is falsity in a spoken or written proposition, that falsity is not falsity in a strict or formal sense, but falsity as in a sign (sicut in signo). Such an attribution of truth or falsity to a spoken or written proposition was often compared to the attribution of healthiness to urine; as the lat ter is called healthy because it is a sign of a healthy condition of the body, so a conventional proposition is called true or false because it serves as a sign of a true or false judgment. Since, then, a merely apprehensive proposition is grasped by means of ment al images of words, we may ascribe to it the same kind of falsity as to a spoken or written proposition, namely, a falsity th at is in it materially, that is, not as in someone who affirms or says something that is false, but as in a sign, which by itself signifies something that is false (quamvis in ea sit quasi materialiter, id est non tamquam in affirmante vel proferente falsum, sed tamquam in signo, quod secundum se falsum signiflcatr. This is an echo, I think, from the old debate concerning the problem as to whether someone who utters the sentence Dixit insipiens in corde suo 'Non est deus' ('The fooI said in his heart "There is no God" ') has asserted a falsehood because the words Non est deus are embedded in the total statement 69 • Some had attempted to solve this difficulty by pointing out that, while it is true that in this context the sentence Non est deus is uttered, it is not uttered with any assertive force pertaining to it. Rather, it has to be taken according to material supposition, although that does not imply that it loses its meaning. Only if someone were to utter the words Non est deus assertively and not according to material supposition (assertive et non materiaUter), would he assert a falsehood. Otherwise, he has uttered a falsehood (falsum protuUt), but he has not asserted a falsehood {falsum asseruitpo. It seems to me that

68 . Compare Johannes a Saneto Thoma 1948, p. 148: Respondetur veritatem vel fa/sitatem inveniri tam in iudicio quam in enuntiatione, in illo asserta et iudicata, in ista ut significata et apprehensa. Et ita in iudicio est ut in subieeto veritas formalis, in enuntiatione au tem ut in signo - - - . Ex veritate autem apprehensa vel repraesentata tantum non denominatur intel/ectus errans aut sciens et deceptus velfa/sus, sed solum ex veritate iudicata, quando scilicet assentit seu eonsentit deceptioni aut veritati. Nee D. Thomas negat dari veritatem in enuntiatione per modum repraesentationis, sed non dari per modum assensus (No te that here enuntiatio stands for an apprehensive proposition) . Nowadays, we would speak of deseriptive and modal or assertorie truth and falsehood (Cf. E. Stenius, Wittgenstein's 'Traetatus', Oxford, 1964, eh . 9). 69 . Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 81-82. 70. Petrus de Bruxellis 1514, fol. 55 R; Soto 1554, p. 26 R.

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this is exactly what Suarez had in mind. If an apprehensive proposition - for instance Non est deus - is merely entertained without judging, it is uttered in the mind by means of ment al images of words and may therefore be handled in the same way as spoken or written propositions. So we may say the same things of the apprehensive proposition Non est deus as we say of the spoken or written proposition Non est deus when it is embedded in the sentence Dixit insipiens in corde suo 'Non est deus'. Although in that context Non est deus is used according to material supposition, it preserves its meaning . Therefore, someone who utters it in that context utters a falsehood, since he utters a sentence which by itself means something that is false, but he does not assert a falsehood. Consequently, what he says is not false in a formalor strict sense, but only in a material sense; that is, if he were to utter the same sentence, not according to material supposition, but in its signifying function or assertively, he would assert a falsehood or express a false judgment. In other words, the sentence uttered or the proposition entertained is a potential object for a false judgment. It is difficult to teIl to what extent Descartes was really familiar with this kind of problem and the solution which had been proposed for it. The answer to this question is further complicated by the fact that he never draws an explicit distinction between ideas as simple apprehensions and ideas as apprehensive propositions; his examples of materially false ideas seem to belong to the first operation of the mind. On the other hand, it would be rash to assume that he did not quite understand what he read in Suarez. Ifhe did understand it correctly, his notion of material falsity has to be interpreted in the light of wh at Suarez says, albeit with due allowances for the way in which a great philosopher may utilize traditional terminology for his own ends.

2.6. Conclusion The results of this chapter may be summarized as follows. According to Descartes's own testimony, he chose the word idea in order to distinguish the concepts of pure intellection from the images of sensation and phantasy because it was traditionally used for the forms involved in God' s conceptions, which are unmistakably incorporeal. For a correct understanding of the extended sen se in which Descartes employs the traditional term idea it is of vital importance to bear in mind that one and the same idea may be viewed from three different sides. As amental form it is simultaneously some particular person's act of thinking and the form or representation of something. One and the same mental quality has two aspects: it is a modification of someone's mind and it fulfils a representative function. At the same time, as a passive concept, or that which is conceived of, an idea is a thing in so far as it is present to the intellect according to that peculiar kind of existence that was called esse obiective. If the conception is successful, the thing as it is conceived of is identical with the thing as it has real existence or esse forma Ie in the external world. One and the same thing may have two manners ofbeing, one in the mind and one in the outside world.

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Such ideas are the thoughts which accompany the use of conventional signs of a particular language and make them meaningful. In this connection, Descartes hardly pays any attention to the difference bet ween the incomplex conceptions which correspond to categorematic terms and the propositional conceptions that correspond to declarative sentences. Nevertheless, that ideas include propositional concepts is clear from the fact that they are regarded as the objects of judgments pertaining to both eternal truths and contingent states of affairs. In the theory ofjudgment Descartes draws a sharp distinction bet ween passive and active ingredients. Ideas belong to the understanding, which is the passive part of the soul, while judgments belong to the voluntas, which is the active part. Though there are a few places where he uses voluntas or volonté in a more restricted sense, these words are as a rule employed in such a way that they apply also to acts of judging. It is rather misleading to characterize this usage by saying that Descartes assigns judgments to the will. As a matter of fact, it is very plausible that the word voluntas in its broad sen se was borrowed from Stoic texts, in which it had the same meaning as the Greek term proha{resis, which may be translated by such expressions as 'the true self', 'the moral personality'. In all probability, the core ofDescartes's theory ofjudgment was inspired by the Stoic doctrine of assent as it was presented in the works of Epictetus, who was an extremely popular author in the seventeenth century. Finally, while Descartes ascribes truth and falsity in the formal and strict sense exclusively to judgments, he is also prepared to attribute falsity to ideas, but only in a peculiar sense. He calls some ideas materially false because they are matter for error or false judgment. His appeal to a passage in Suarez makes it highly probable that wh at he means by materialiter is connected with an old distinction between propositions that are taken according to material supposition and without assertive force and, on the other hand, propositions accompanied by an act of judging. Though, whether Descartes himself had a full grasp of this historical background is made uncertain by his own confession that he never took much trouble to read the books of the philosophers.

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3. REPERCUSSIONS OF DFSCARTES'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT

Though Descartes 's attribution of the act ofjudging to the voluntas was firmly rooted in a very old tradition, it must have looked novel and strange to those of his fellow-philosophers who were less familiar with Stoic doctrine and felt it to be squarely incompatible with the common view concerning the relationship between the operations of the intellect and the will. In the long run, the Cartesian conception of judgment came to be considered as no more than a historical curiosity; far from being regarded as a serious riyal of the more or less officially established doctrine, it simply disappeared from systematic discussions. Nevertheless, the immediate impact of Descartes's philosophy was so strong th at in the century after bis death many thinkers felt urged to determine their attitude towards his idiosyncratic doctrine of judgment. As we shall see in this chapter, some of them supported and elaborated the Cartesian view. Others laid less stress upon the assignment of judgment to the voluntas, but maintained that an act ofjudging is not merely the perception of an agreement or disagreement between two ideas but also a kind of decision. As is to be expected, Spinoza's response to the Cartesian theory evinces his ability to think for himself; it de serves a special section. Finally, mention will be made of some authors who for various reasons were sceptical about Descartes's claim or downright rejected it.

3.1. Adherents of the voluntas theory 3.1.1. Although there are some traces of Descartes's doctrine ofjudgment in the Logica vetus et nova which Johannes Clauberg published in 16541, I will begin my survey of the vicissitudes of that doctrine with the explicit and wholehearted support given to it by Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669) in a course of lectures on Descartes 's Principia philosophiae2. In the annotations on Principia, I, 32, and the immediately preceding and following articles, Geulincx compares the ideas of the intellect to pictures. Just as a picture considered in

1. 2.

For instanee, Clauberg 1691, p. 789, p. 830. Geulincx 1891-1893, lIl, pp. 389-395.

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itself and according to its own nature (per se et suapte natura) does not hing but exhibit its own form and thus cannot deceive, so an idea as such is never false. Falsity is brought in by the voluntas, which is as it were the painter who often refers his painting to something other than that which it represents according to its own nature (voluntas habet se instar pictoris, qui picturam suam subinde refert ad aliud quam ad quod ipsa natura sua reJertur. - - - Unde error omnis in pictore, in pictura ipsa tantum veritas). Affirming, denying, and doubting, which the Schools always attributed to the intellect, are therefore rightly restored to the will by Descartes (haec Scholae semper dederunt intellectui; Cartesius restituit voluntati, cui et debentur). For besides a perception or representation they contain a certain way of tending towards an object (modus aliquis tendendi in obiectum) which is typical of the will. One has the impression that Geulincx is here alluding to the technical term intentio, which the Schoolmen used for a concept in its representative function, but which according to Geulincx is more appropriate to the relatio voluntatis, that is, to the act of judging by which a representation is referred to something else. It is this same relatio voluntatis which accounts for our speaking, by way of an extrinsic denomination, of an obscure cognition; like a picture considered in itself is never obscure or confused but becomes so only by being referred to something else. 3.1.2. A very enthusiastic and faithful follower of Descartes was Antoine Le Grand (c. 1620-1699), who published an Institutio philosophiae secundum principia D. Renati Descartes in 1672. It is important to note that this member of the Franciscan order was at the same time an ardent apostle of Stoic philosophy; he is the author of Le sage des Stoïques ou l'homme sans passions selon les sentiments de Sénèque, published at the Hague in 16623 • In the part of the Institutio th at is devoted to logic Le Grand adheres to the usual division of modes of thinking into four classes: conceiving, judging, reasoning, and ordering. Conceiving, together with sensation and imagination, belongs to the intellect, which is the passive part of the soul. Ideas are the concepts of pure intellection; they differ from the pictures of sensation and imagination in being entirely independent of the body, in particular of the brain. At the level of the first operation of the mind, which is a purely passive receiving of ideas, there is no possibility of error. Truth and falsity make their appearance only with the second operation, which consists in an act of combining two ideas in an affirmative or negative way and giving assent to this combination (cum mentis suae actione duas inter se ideas coniungendo asserit unam esse alteram; aut unam ab altera negando removetf. Le Grand does not seem to make a clear distinction bet ween the predicative act of compounding or dividing two ideas and the judicative act of assenting to the result. He considers the second operation of the mind, iudicium, as being simultaneously an act of predicating and an act of assenting or dissenting, and contrasts this iudicium with, on the one hand, simple apprehension and, on the 3. 4.

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Cf. SPANNEUT 1973, pp. 280-281. Le Grand 1679, p. 2.

other, the propositio which is the spoken or written declarative sentence by which a judgment is expressed. Although the term propositio mentalis occasionally occurs in the Institutio 5 , there is a general tendency in this period to replace it by the word iudicium and to restrict the word propositio to the spoken or written expression of a judgment. The second operation of the mind, then, is an act of judicative predication. As such it belongs to the active part of the soul, the so-called voluntas (assensus ad voluntatem pertinetf'. Elsewhere in the Institutio 7 Le Grand explains with great care how the term voluntas is to be understood. It is a faculty or power which our intellectual nature possesses to produce out of itself, without any compulsion, all actions and thoughts in which there is room for some choice and determination (voluntas hic sumitur pro ea potentia seu vi quam natura intellectualis habet ex se ipsa, absque ulla coactione, omnes actiones et cogitationes producendi in quibus electio aliqua et determinatio locum ha bet). It belongs to the intrinsic nature of a thinking substance that it is able to act on its own and to determine itself to do something or not to do it (ea enim est rei cogitantis natura, ut in se ipsa spectata aliq uid agere possit et se determinare ad aliquid faciendum aut non faciendum). Those actions which originate exclusively from the thinking substance itself are called volitiones (actiones illae quae nullum praeter ipsam rem cogitantem sui principium cognoscunt, volitiones appellantur). The terms voluntas and liberum arbitrium denote one and the same thing; they differ only in this respect that the former term highlights that power by which a thinking substance independently determines itself (sponte se determinat) and performs all those motions and actions of which it is the sole source, while the latter term design at es the same power in so far as it contains the possibility of choosing (in quantum potestatem habet eligendi). Le Grand fully agrees with Descartes that indifference does not belong to the essence of liberty. On the contrary, wh en we assent to an evident proposition, our liberty of indifference has been reduced to the lowest point, but our liberty of spontaneity is at its zenith. 3.1.3. Two years after Le Grand's Institutio there appeared a much more original and influential work in which Descartes's theory of judgment was adopted and elaborated: the Recherche de la vérité by Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715). In the frrst chapter of the first book the author subscribes to the Cartesian division of the modes of thinking into two faculties: the understanding (l'entendement), which is the entirely passive faculty of receiving various ideas, and the faculty cal1ed la volonté, which is the faculty of receiving various inclinations or of willing different things. As regards the latter faculty, however, Malebranche draws a distinction between la volonté, which he defines as a natural inclination towards the good in general, and liberté, which is characterized as the power the mind possesses to make its natural inclinations 5. 6. 7.

For instanee, Le Grand 1679, p. 68 . Le Grand 1679, p. 25. Le Grand 1679, pp. 223-225, pp. 938-939.

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terminate in some particular object. Although our natural inclinations towards the good and truth in general are voluntary and unconstrained, they are not free ifby freedom is meant liberty of indifference; for we cannot will the opposite of that to which we are driven by our natural inclinations8 • Further, Malebranchedistinguishes between two kinds ofjudgment. He admits that there is a judgment which belongs to the understanding and which consists in the mere perception of a certain relation between ideas. Such ajudgment of the understanding is no doubt identical with what others called an apprehensive proposition, a proposition th at is only entertained, without any act of judging in the strict sense. When a proper act of judgment is added to the matter presented by the understanding, that act is the work of la volonté, which gives its assent to a particular representation by voluntarily acquiescing in it. Malebranche considers assent as an acquiescement; it is a rest or repose reached by the mind, when it ceases its investigation because the matter presented by the understanding is sufficiently evident to exclude the possibility of error. Such an act of acquiescing in a judgment of the understanding is always voluntary, but in cases where some matter is presented with the highest degree of evidence it is not free in the sense that there is liberty of indifference9 • More or less the same thoughts were set forth by the Italian philosopher Michelangelo Fardella (1650-1718) in the treatise on logic which is the first part of his Universae philosophiae systema of 1691. Fardella had spent three years in Paris, where he had become a loyal follower of Descartes and Malebranche. He adopts Malebranche's distinction betweenjudgments of the understanding and judgments of the voluntas. The lat ter con sist in a voluntary act of acquiescing in a representation (ipsa acquiescentia et determinatio voluntatis quae ulterius non procedens veluti sistit et assentiendo quiescit; ipsa acquiescentia in obiecto repraesentato). Such an act is voluntary in that it is the spontaneous result of a natural inclination of the mind (sponte et iuxta naturae rationalis inclinationem procedit). Even if it is necessary, it is nonetheless voluntary; for that which is voluntary is not the opposite of necessity but only of compulsion (voluntarium enim idem sonat ac spontaneum, quod coactioni, non necessitati opponiturYo. One of the few points on which he does not agree with Malebranche concerns the character of the understanding. While Malebranche considered the understanding as a purely passive and receptive faculty, Fardella is of the opinion that the mind is active not only when it directs itself towards the good, but also when it pro duces various ideas and conceives of diverse objects ll . As we shall see farther on in this chapter (3.1.4.; 3.3.), he shared this opinion with others. Further, it is worthy of note that Fardella apparently identifies the judgment on the part of the understanding with what is usually called a propositio. If such a (ment al) proposition is expressed by words, it is called a propositio vocalis12. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

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Malebranche 1962, pp . 41-48 . Malebranche 1962, pp. 49-54. Fardella 1691, p. 306, p. 309. Fardella 1691, p. 306. Fardella 1691, p. 324.

3.1.4. In the last quarter of the seventeenthcentury Descartes's theory ofjudgment was still supported in France by such widely read authors as Jean Baptiste Du Hamel, Pierre Sylvain Régis, and Edmond Purchot. Du Hamel, however, rejected the Cartesian doctrine that the understanding is merely passive and receptive. According to him, the human mind is not like a mirror which only receives images of things, but its conceptions contain an element of activity; it is therefore false that all actions belong to the voluntas l3 • Nevertheless, he concurred with Régis and Purchot in holding that judgment, which is a simple act of the mind, belongs to the voluntas. When we affirm that the earth is round, we decide that this is so, not by a mere conception of the understanding, but by assent and a certain determination of the will (non sola perceptione intellectus, sed assensu et determinatione quadam voluntatis id decernimusr. In matters which we perceive only imperfectly the act ofjudgment depends upon liberty of indifference; to evident propositions, such as axioms, we assent without any liberty of choice, but still voluntarily (non libere, sed voluntarie). Du Hamel restricts the word liber to liberty of indifference, whereas Purchot distinguishes bet ween two kinds ofliberty, namely, freedom from external compulsion and freedom from the internal necessity of a natural inc1ination. Inner acts of the voluntas, such as love and hatred, can never be brought about by external force and are therefore always free in the sense of not being subject to any compulsion15. Finally, the three authors agree in tending to contrast the word iudicium with propositio or enuntiatio; the former stands for the act of judging, which is sometimes characterized as an inner sentence, the lat ter words designate the expres sion of a judgment in spoken or written language l6 • 3.1.5. Practically all aspects of the Cartesian theory ofjudgment which were touched upon in the preceding subsections reappear in the Liber de emendatione intellectus humani, published in 1747 by the Benedictine monk Ulrich Weis (1713-1763), who taught at the university of Salzburg. Weis rejects the scholastic doctrine according to which in cases of incomplete evidence the intellect is brought to an act of assenting by the command of the will. It cannot be true that it is the intellect which assents under the influence of the will, since the very command of the will would already be an act of assenting or at least presuppose such an act. Moreover, from the premisses th at assent to the articles of faith is meritorious and that meritorious conduct is an achievement of the will, it follows that assent belongs to the voluntas. While the perception of that to which assent is given is in the understanding, the act of assenting itself is in the voluntas and is therefore always voluntary. Very often it is also free, namely, when the perception of the understanding is not fully evident (nonnisi percep13. 14. 15. 16.

Du Hamel 1700, p. 218. Du Hamel 1700, p. 218. Cf. Régis 1691, I, p. 208; Purchotius 1751, p. 88. Du Hamel 1700, p. 218; Purchotius 1751 , p. 468. See, forinstance, Du Hamel 1700, p. 8, p. 207, p. 217, p. 219; Purchotius 1751, pp. 86-87, p. 90, p. 103.

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tionem et id cui assentimur esse in intellectu, assensum vero ipsum in voluntate; hunc semper esse voluntarium, plerumque etiam, dum perceptio non plena evidentiae luce perfunditur, liberum). Just as it is the task of the will to make the understanding apply itself to the investigation of some problem, it is likewise its function to acquiesce in a truth that has been sufficiently investigated and to content itself with the evident representation of that truth, without any uneasiness or anxiety17. In connection with the distinction between the object ofjudgment, which is present to the understanding, and the act ofjudging Weis emphasizes the difference between affirmative or negative predication and acts of assenting or dissenting. In so far as the mind only combines or separates ideas, it cannot err; truth and falsity arise when it goes on to consider the ideas as having a conformity with a determinate object to which it refers them (non qua ergo coniungit mens aut divellit ideas, ita folli potest aut errare, sed qua ideas suas sumit obiecto determinato, ad quod ilias reJert, esse similesYS. It is as acts of referring ideas to external objects that judgments are the primary bearers of the truth-values; a propositio or propositio vocalis is true or false only as the linguistic expres sion of a true or false judgment 19 • Already some twenty years before Weis published his book the Cartesian doctrine ofjudgment had been presented to the German-speaking world by the theologian Adam Bernd (1676-1748), in an anti-Lutheran work entitled EinJluss der göttlichen Wahrheiten in den Willen und in das ganze Leben des Menschen and brought out under the pseudonym of Christianus Melodius. The author argues that truth belongs exclusively to the second operation of the mind, that is, to judgment and assent (Urteil, Beifall, Beistimmung). In this connection, he expresses his agreement with the Cartesian view that judgment belongs to the will and is a free activity. He has, though, some reservations about Descartes's identification of freedom and the will; according to him, freedom is not identical with the will, but rat her a separate power that is intermediate between the understanding and the will. Further, he supports the attribution of judgment to the will by an etymological consideration. The word assensus contains the elements ad and sensus. The preposition ad indicates the free activity of the human wiU which is directed towards the sensus, that is, the representations of the passive soul which are offered to the will for approval or disapproval. The will, or rather man's freedom, puts itself as it were in the middle between the external objects and the ideas of the understanding and affirms or denies their mutual conformity20. FinaUy, there is a late echo ofDescartes' s doctrine in a book on logic by Ignaz Troxler (1780-1866), a Swiss philosopher who taught at Basel and Bern. TroxIer caUs attention to a certain similarity bet ween his own idealist view of

17. 18. 19. 20.

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Weis 1747, pp. 116-119. Weis 1747, pp. 123-124, pp. 499-501. Weis 1747, p. 124, p. 500, p. 685 . Melodius 1728, pp. 9-13, pp. 17-21, pp. 24-26, pp. 31-33.

judgments as free and autonomous decisions of the knowing mind and Descartes 's attribution of judgment to the will 21 •

3.2. Some opponents of the perception theory ofjudgment In this section I want to discuss some authors who laid great stress on the element of decision injudgment, but without proceeding so far as to makejudgment belong to the will, as Descartes did. As they all wrote several decades after the publication of Locke' s An Essay concerning Human Understanding in 1690, it is quite likely that in attacking the thesis that judgment is nothing but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas they had that work in mind. But it should also be remembered that already in 1678 Du Hamel had maintained that when we affirm that the earth is round, we decide that this is so, not by a mere perception of the understanding, but by assent and a certain determination of the will (See 3.1.4.). The offensive had started even before Locke made the target conspicuous. At any rate, it is evident that reactions against a mere-perception theory of judgment will come near to at least some aspects of the Cartesian doctrine. 3.2.1. A striking example of this somewhat ambivalent attitude towards Descartes's view is the conception of judgment advanced by Isaac Watts (1674-1748) in his Logic of 1725 and in An Essay on the Preedom ofWill in God and in Creatures of 1732. His Logic is based on the usual division of the operations of the mind into four categories: apprehension, judgment, argumentation, and disposition. The re sult of a conception or apprehension is called an idea. An idea is the thing as it exists in the mind by way of conception or representation, whether the object be present or absent. Every object of an idea is called a theme, whether it be a being or a not-being (Cf. 1.4.2. and 12.2.1.). When such ideas are joined in the mind without words, the combination is called ajudgment; the linguistic expres sion of ajudgment is a proposition. Watts repudiates the view of those writers who had asserted th at judgment consists in a mere perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas; according to him, in most cases the formation of a judgment requires an act of the will. That judgment has something of the will in it and does not merely consist in perception is proved by the fact that we sometimes judge without clearly perceiving and also sometimes perceive without passing any judgment on that which we have before the mind22 • In An Essay on the Preedom of will Watts mentions Descartes 's doctrine of judgment, but only to contrast it with his own, more moderate, position. He is not prepared to alter the common forms of speech by attributing judgment to the will and calling it an act of choice or voluntary operation. But at the same time he insists that the will has a great deal to do in our judgments, at least in 21. Troxler 1829, I, p. 270. 22. Watts 1753, V, pp. 3-6, pp. 71-72.

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those cases where the objects proposed to the mind are not fully clear and distinct and the understanding is not compelled to assent or dissent. In this connection, he makes some interesting remarks about the difference between liberty of choice and liberty of spontaneity or voluntariness. Actions of the soul are said to be free with a spontaneous or voluntary freedom wh en the soul of man pursues any object or performs any act without any consideration wh ether it can choose any other object or perform the contrary action; even necessary actions may be free in this sense. Watts regards this as a most large and extensive sense of the word 'liberty'; indeed, this freedom of the will seems to him to be a dilute idea, as it indicates no more than that something is an act of the will. The more common sense in which the word 'liberty' is used concerns liberty of choice or indifference in things not necessary. According to Watts, it would be better to restrict the words 'liberty' and 'freedom' to the power to choose or refuse which is inconsistent with any necessity23. The fact th at he frequently appeals to common usage reveals how difficult it was to understand Descartes's terminology correctly once it had been detached from its proper historical moorings. 3.2.2. Between 1737 and 1750 there appeared three rat her popular treatises on logic in French whose authors strongly emphasized that an act ofjudging contains an element of decision. The Marquis d' Argens, in his La philosophie du bon sens of 1737, holds that injudging we decide that a thing is or is not. But he ascribes this decision to the understanding (notre entendement - - - prononce une décisionjA. According to the Jesuit Noël Regnault, in his Logique en forme d'entretiens of 1741, an act ofjudging is a decision that is preceded by a comparison of two ideas and the perception that their objects stand in a relation of agreement or disagreement. Such a decision is not the mere perception of that relation, but in taking it the mind adds something to the perception. This is proved by the example of a person to whom a square tower appears as round because of the distance. If he knows th at the tower is square, he will not judge that it is round, although he perceives it as round. A proposition is an assemblage of two terms and a decision. It is a ment al proposition when the act of deciding occurs in the mind; when the decision is expressed in words, it is avocal proposition25 • More or less the same points are made by Jean Cochet, in his La elefdes sciences et des beaux arts, ou la logique of 1750. In order to elucidate the difference between a perception and a judgment he draws attention to the case of a person who hears or reads ajudgment expressed by someone else. As long as the content of that judgment is merely present to his mind, it is not hing but an idea to him. Only when he adds his own decision to the perception of that complex idea, does he form a judgment26 • 23. 24. 25. 26.

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Watts 1753, VI, pp. 377-380. Argens 1737, p. 170, p. 175. Regnault 1742, pp. 86-88, pp. 94-95. Cochet 1750, p. 67.

The case of the mere conception of the content of someone else's judgment is also adduced by Sigmund von Storchenau, in his Institutiones logicae, published in 1770 at Vienna. If I hear ot hers say th at there are impious people who wish that the revealed religion would cease to exist (dari impios qui religionem revelatam exstinctam cupiunt), there is nothing wrong as long as I simply understand and contemplate that idea, without assenting to it. But as soon as I decide that it is so as they say (ita est: sunt impii qui religionem revelatam exstinctam cupiunt), I become responsible for ajudgment of my own. The author adds that this point has some practical importance, because it often occurs that someone feels guilty about wicked thoughts which happen to enter his mind; these scruples are unfounded as long as he does not assent to those thoughts. The wicked thought in Storchenau's example must be the idea that there are such impious people. This interpretation is confirmed by a passage in the Cours de sciences of his fellow-Jesuit Claude Buffier, where a similar discussion of the distinction between a mere idea and judgment had been concluded with the same kind of moral: there is no need to have scruples about unfavourable thoughts concerning one' s fellow-men (des pensées désavantageuses du prochain) as long as they are no more than perceived ideas and are not assented t0 2? Storchenau explicitly mentions Locke and Jean Le Clerc as supporters of the view that judgment is nothing but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. According to him, this view leads to the absurd consequence that false, hasty, rash, or blameworthy judgments are simply impossible28 •

3.3. Spinoza In examining Spinoza's doctrine ofjudgment it is important to bear in mind the difference between those works in which he undertook to expound Descartes's theory, and the works that contain his own view. In the Principia philosophiae Cartesianae and the Cogitata metaphysica, both of 1663, he tries to set forth the Cartesian position as accurately as he can, often quoting Descartes's very words or paraphrasing them. In particular , wh at Spinoza says about the voluntas and its freedom in Cogitata metaphysica, 11, 12, should be taken as an attempt at elucidating Descartes 's doctrine. In the Cartesian philosophy; Spinoza explains, those acts of thinking which have no other cause of themselves than the human mind, are called volitiones. The human mind itself, in so far as it is conceived as a sufficient cause for producing such acts, is called voluntas. In affirming and denying the voluntas always remains free, since the human soul is a thinking subject, that is, a thing of which the essence is constituted by the independent power of affirming or denying (res quae ex sua natura potestatem habet volendi et nolendi, affirmandi et negandi; hoc enim est esse rem cogitantem). As Spinoza was aware that misunderstandings might arise from his expositi on of Descartes 's philosophy, he had asked the editor to mention in the 27. Buffier 1732, pp. 755-756. 28. Storchenau 1770, pp. 104-105; Storchenau 1775, p. 25.

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preface some points on which the author's own opinion diverged from the Cartesian view. The three points to which the editor draws attention, and which therefore must be considered as crucial issues between Descartes and Spinoza, are the foUowing 29 • The voluntas is not distinct from the understanding. Moreover, it does not possess the freedom that Descartes ascribes to it. Thirdly, the voluntas as a faculty of affirming or denying is altogether fictitious; there are only particular acts of affirming and denying, which are nothing but ideas. Before I proceed to a more detailed discussion of these three theses, it may be helpful to caU to mind some relevant aspects of Spinoza's general philosophical system and, in particular, the place ideas occupy in that system. As is weU-known, Spinoza held that of the infinity of attributes which the unique infinite sub stance possesses only two are known to us, namely, thought and extension. Among the modes under the attribute of thought there are finite minds, and among the modes under the attribute of extension there are finite bodies. This does not mean, however, that there exist two realms of entities, a system of minds and a system ofbodies. Rather, there is only one order of things which can be looked at from different points of view: either under the attribute of thought or under the attribute of extension. If something is considered under the attribute of extension, it is an extended thing, in particular a body or a part of a body; if the same thing is viewed under the attribute of thought, it is an idea. An idea, therefore, is nothing but a mode under the attribute of extension or a body in so far as it is represented to the mind and so becomes a mode under the attribute of thought. This concept ion of an idea is strikingly similar to Descartes's definition, according to which an idea is every thing thought of in so far as it has only some esse obiectivum in the mind (See 2.1. 2.). It is also in complete harmony with the traditional view that one and the same thing may have two kinds ofbeing, one in the external world of real existents and one in the mind (See 1.2.). No wonder, then, th at Spinoza saw no problem in adopting the notion of esse obiective in order to characterize ideas. Indeed, he explicitly states that for him an idea is the same as something that has esse obiectivum 30 • Moreover, in his eyes, the notion of esse obiective is closely connected with the way in which things exist in God's mind, which probably was its original field of application 31 • One might even say that in his philosophy that notion was restored to its initial use, since on his view ideas are fini te modes of the infinite sub stance which is God or nature. Whereas Descartes regarded ideas as belonging to the passive part of the soul and sharply distinguished them from the voluntas, which comprises the activity of affirming and denying, Spinoza rejected such a rigorous separation of passive and active components of the mind. In this connection, it should be noted that as a rule he restricts the word voluntas to the faculty of affirming and denying;

29. See also Letters 13 and 21. 30. Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (Spinoza 1925, 11, p. 15); Ethica, 11, Prop. 8, Cor. 31. Cogitata metaphysica, I, 2; Ethica, 11, Prop. 7, Cor., and Prop. 8, Cor.; Letter 32.

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in his usage, voluntas is distinct from desire or cupiditas 32 • Further, he considered the voluntas in the sen se of the faculty of affirming and denying as being altogether fictitious, th at is to say, as no more than a uni vers al which we are accustomed to form out of particular acts of affirming and denying (volitiones). The abstract faculty is related to those particular acts as the not ion of stone-ness (lapideitas) is related to this or that stone or the notion of man to Peter and Paup3. Now Spinoza argues that the voluntas is identical with the understanding, since they are nothing but collections of particular acts of affirming or denying and of particular ideas, and a particular act of affirming or denying and a particular idea are one and the same thing34. That a particular volitio and a particular idea are one and the same thing is proved in the following way. When the mind affirms that the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, this affirmation cannot exist nor be thought without the idea of a triangle35 . Conversely, the idea of a triangle cannot but include the affirmation that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles 36 • While in the Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being, 11, 15-16, Spinoza still agreed with Descartes in considering the understanding as a mere passion, he now identifies ideas with acts of affirming or denying. That is the reason why in his definition of an idea he avoids the word perceptio, which has a connotation of passivity, and prefers the word conceptus, which seems to express an action of the mind 37 . Philosophers are prevented from seeing that ideas are active and involve affirmation or denial because they wrongly compare them to mute pictures on a tablet 38 . Right at the beginning of the Ethica Spinoza offers a definition of freedom: that thing will be said to be free which exists by the mere necessity of its own nature and is determined in its actions by itself alone; on the other hand, that thing will be said to be necessary, or rat her compelled (coacta), which is deter-

32. Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being, 11, 16-17; Ethica, 11, Prop. 48, Scholium. Cf. also Cogitata metaphysica, 11, 12. 33 . Short Treatise, 11, 16; Ethica, 11, Prop. 48, Scholium; Letter 2. 34 . Ethica, 11, Prop. 49. Cf. also Tractatus theologico-politicus, 4 (Spinoza 1925, lIl, p. 62) . 35. Cf. Tractatusde intellectusemendatione (Spinoza 1925, 11, p. 15): praeterideam nulla daturafflrmatio neque negatio, neque ulla voluntas. It should be noted that Spinoza, like Descartes, uses the word idea indifferently for simple apprehensions and propositional concepts; see, for instanee, Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (Spinoza 1925, 11, p. 24): idea sive cohaerentia subiecti et praedicati in mente. 36. Compare what the Logic of Port-Royal (1662) says about the comprehension of the idea of a triangle: it includes extension, figure, three lines, three angles, and the equality of the three angles to two right angles (Arnauld, Nicole 1683, I, 6). 37. Ethica, 11, Def. 3, Explicatio. 38. Ethica, 11, Prop. 49, Scholium; Prop. 43, Scholium. Compare Tschirnhaus 1695, p. 36: omnem conceptum seu, ut alii vocant, ideam non esse aliquid muti, instar picturae in tabula, sed eum necessario aut afflrmationem aut negationem semper includere. It is interesting to no te that in 1671 Jacques Gaillard (c. 1620-1688), in his Collegium logicum Leidense Gallo-Belgicum, had restricted the parts of logic to judgment, reasoning, and disposition, on the ground that ideas coincide withjudgments. Cf. RISSE 1970, p. 102, n. 390.

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mined in its existence and actions by something else in a fixed and de6nite way39. Spinoza explicitly rejected any freedom of indifference or choice, whether in God or in man. When people nevertheless believe that they possess freedom of choice, this illusion is due to their ignorance of the causes by which they are actually determined40 • Freedom in the de6ned sen se belongs exclusively to God, because he alone exists and acts solely according to the necessity of his own nature41 • Man's mind, on the other hand, cannot be the free cause of its own actions, nor possess an unconditioned faculty of affirming and denying; for in affirming something it must be determined by a cause, which again is determined by another cause, and so on. Only those who confuse an idea or the affirmation which an idea involves with the words used to express them believe that they are able to af6rm the opposite of what they cognize in their mind (putant se posse contra id quod sentiunt veile); ' in point of fact, such an af6rmation would be purely verba142 • Besides warning against confusing ideas with images or words - a confusion that is liable to lead to the separation of the understanding and the voluntas Spinoza replies to four possible objections against his doctrine of the identity of ideas and volitiones43 • A 6rst objection might be based on Descartes 's remark in Principia philosophiae, I, 35, that the voluntas is of a much wider range than the understanding. According to Spinoza, this is true only if the understanding is restricted to clear and distinct ideas. The second objection appeals to our common experience ofbeing able to suspendjudgment. Someone who imagines to himself a winged horse, for instance, need not judge that such a horse really exists. Spinoza, however, denies that we are free in suspending judgment. Suspending judgment is nothing but seeing th at we do not have an adequate idea of a thing; in reality, suspension ofjudgment is a kind of awareness (perceptio), not an act of free wil!. Considered in itself, the image of a winged horse does not involve any error; it is just an act of imaging in which wings are attributed to a horse. At this point, Spinoza emphasizes that even such an act of imaging is an act of affirming; forming an image of a winged horse is nothing but affirming wings of a horse (sed nego hominem nihil affirmare quatenus percipit. Nam quid aliud est equum alatum percipere quam alas de equo affirmare?f4. But, although the image of a winged horse does not involve any error as long as it is considered in itself, it may be accompanied by the awareness that it is an inadequate idea; and it is by the latter awareness that we are compelled to have doubts about the

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44 .

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Ethica, I, Def. 7. Cf. Letter 58. Ethica, I, Appendix; 11, Prop. 35, Scholium; lIl, Prop. 2, Scholium; Letters 54, 55, and 58. Ethica, I, Prop. 17, Cor. 2; Letters 43,56,58 and 75 . Ethica, 11, Prop . 49, Scholium; Short Treatise, 11, 16. Ethica, 11, Prop. 49, Scholium. Compare the way in which the Logic of Port-Royal (Arnauld, Nicole 1683, 11, 5) treats such expressions as Dieu invisible: Dieu invisible is equivalent to the relative dause Dieu qui est invisible and presupposes the affirmation that God is invisible.

real existence of the winged horse45 • The third objection tries to establish a difference between the understanding and the voluntas by pointing out that one idea may have more reality or perfection than another idea, whereas we do not seem to need a greater power in order to affirm the truth of that which is true than to affirm the truth of that which is false. Spinoza rejects the latter assumption, on the ground that the two affirmations are related to one another as that which is is related to that which is not; for falsity is not constituted by anything positive in an idea. Finally, if a man had no liberty of action, he would die of hunger and thirst when put in the same position as Buridan's ass46 • To this fourth objection Spinoza laconically replies that a man put in th at position will indeed die of hunger and thirst.

3.4. Further critical references to the Cartesian doctrine In the treatise on logic which Bossuet (1627-1704) composedfor the dauphin in the years between 1670 and 1678, he briefly comments upon the thesis of some philosophers that assent and doubt are to be reckoned among the acts of the will. With regard to such a question, he says, there can be many disputes about words. As to the will, he adopts a view that is somewhat similar to Malebranche's position, namely, that we are determined by our nature to will the good in general, but that we have freedom of choice with respect to particular good things. If acts of the will are taken in this sense, theyare always preceded by an act of the understanding, and since it is more reasonable to attribute assent to the principle than to that which fol1ows from it, judgment should be ascribed to the understanding, which is, moreover, the faculty to which acts of discernment belong. An act of judging consists in a ment al declaration that it is so or that it is not so; if such a ment al enunciation or proposition is expressed in words, it is called an oraison or discours. When the soul examines a truth and assents to it, the activity of the will is limited to two objectives. It directs one's attention to the thesis in question and it decides whether or not the investigation should be continued. Once the understanding is fully satisfied by the evidence, we have no other wish than to enjoy the truth that has been discovered. In this way Bossuet manages to offer a deft compromise between Malebranche' s doctrine of acquiescence and the traditional attribution of judgment to the understanding 47 • In the first of the two treatises on logic which are included in the Cours de sciences of 1732, Claude Buffier (1661-1737) mentions Descartes's view th at

45. Spinoza's reply to the seeond objeetion is diseussed by William James, Principles of Psychology, New Vork, 1890, 11, eh. 21, and by Bertrand Russell, 'On Propositions: what they are and how they mean' (1919) in R.e. Marsh ed., Logic and Knowiedge, Essays 1901·1950, London-New Vork, 1956, p. 312. 46. See also Cogiww mewphysica, 11, 12, where the same eonsideration is addueed in favour of Deseartes 's eoneeption of the volunws. 47. Bossuet 1828, p. 10, p. 123, p. 220; Bossuet 1841, pp. 31-33.

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judgment is an operation of the will, rather than of the understanding. His most conspicuous argument for this thesis is the fact th at we do not judge unless we want to judge. Nevertheless, Buffier thinks that Descartes's controversy with the older philosophers is rat her vain (un peu querelIe d'Allemand). One might as well argue that eating and drinking are operations of the will, rat her than of the body, because it is within our discretion to perform them or not. Though it is true that the will commands the other faculties to exercise their functions, it does not follow that it is the will itself that exercises them. Buffier himself offers various characterizations of the act of judging. One of them is reminiscent of Bossuet' s compromise: in the case of internalor logical judgments - as opposed to external judgments in which an idea is compared with an externalobject - we perceive that one idea agrees or disagrees with another idea, and this perception in so far as the mind acquiesces in it is called judgment. In his first Logic, however, he definesjudgment as a mental act of saying yes or no. There he also ascribes the large number of false judgments to our conceit, which sits as it were in a small tribunal and takes great pleasure in exercising its jurisdiction48 • In the textbook oflogic that was published in 1745 by the Italian philosopher Antonio Genovesi (1713-1769) the Cartesian theory of judgment is rejected in a footnote. It may be true that there are acts of consenting or dissenting which belong to the will, but such acts are preceded by a practical judgment; and a judgment is not hing but the clear understanding of two or more ideas and of the relation of agreement or dis agreement between them or between an idea and the object to which it is referred49 • A perception theory of judgment was also taught at Leiden by WillemJakob 's Gravesande (1688-1742) and his pupil Piet er van Musschenbroek (1692-1761). Both were aware of the existence of a controversy among philosophers as to whether judgment should be assigned to the understanding or to the wil!. They resolutely reject the Cartesian view and limit the function of the will to such activities as choosing the subject of investigation and paying due attention to it. The actual nexus between the ideas that are studied and compared, however, is not a proper object for a &ee choice of the willso . That the word voluntas was commonly restricted to the faculty of &ee choice is also clear from the writings of another Dutch philosopher, Dionysius van de Wijnpersse (1724-1808), who taught at Leiden in the last three decades of the eighteenth century. In the Institutiones logicae he remarks that in his days hardly anybody would deny th at judgment belongs to the understanding. In the Institutiones metaphysicae he offers several arguments in favour of the perception theory ofjudgment and then draws the conclusion that neither the act of judging nor the suspension of judgment is subject to any choice of the will (iudicii determinatio, item suspensio aut dubitatio, non subiectae sunt voluntatis electioniJ1. 48. 49. 50. 51.

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Buffier 1732, pp. 755-756, p. 759, pp. 805-806. Genuensis 1758, pp. 39-40, p. 228. 's Gravesande 1737, p. 128; Musschenbroek 1748, p. 39. Wijnpersse 1767, p. 64; Wijnpers se 1764, pp. 120-121.

3.5. Conclusion Reading the foregoing pages may wellieave one with the feeling that those authors were right who considered the controversy concerning the attribution of judgment as being mainly a dispute about words. To some extent, it no doubt was. But disputes about words need not be futile. In our case it is even quite obvious that it would be impossible to gain a satisfactory understanding of the debate without paying careful heed to the terminology in which it was conducted. This applies in particular to the key-terms voluntas and libertas. Descartes 's thesis is intelligible and defensible only if it is borne in mind that he employs these words in a very peculiar sense. Some authors duly concentrated on this sense, supporting or developing the view that judgment is an operation of the faculty of spontaneous activity and self-determination. Even Spinoza, who disagreed with Descartes on essential points, fully appreciated the intended nuances of meaning in his opponent ' s vocabulary. On the other hand, to those writers who interpreted Descartes 's words as having reference only to the will as the faculty of free choice, his thesis was bound to appear strange and implausible. In addition to the difficulties of terminology, the participants in the debate were prevented from reaching agreement by the fact that they were not always talking about the same stage in the process ofjudging or about the same type ofjudgment. Furthermore, even among those who were united in defending one or the other of the riyal views there existed remarkable differences in the way they specified the favoured opinion. Some of the adherents of the voluntas theory stressed the positive aspects of judgment, such as assenting or deciding. Others highlighted more negative or omissive features, such as refraining from further investigation and contentedly acquiescing in a final insight. Likewise, supporters of the doctrine that judgment is an act of the understanding had different conceptions of the exact nature of that act. Many of them held that judgment is merely the perception of aspecific relation between two ideas. But others were convinced that something more than sheer perception is involved and described this additional component as an act of deciding. In doing so, they obviously came rather close to some variants of the voluntas theory, so that they might also be reckoned among those who sought a compromise by combining elements ofboth views. Finally, we have seen that Descartes 's characterization of the understanding as purely passive did not remain unchallenged.

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4. ARNAULD AND THE PORT-ROYAL LOGIC

Shortly after Descartes's death two works were published which applied the general principles of his philosophy to fields of study in which he himself had taken little interest. In 1660 Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and Claude Lancelot (1616-1695) brought out a Grammaire générale et raisonnée; :two years later it was followed by La logique ou I'art de penser, which Arnauld had composed together with Pierre Nicole (1625-1695). These textbooks of grammar and logic had their origin in the schools of the famous abbey ofPort-Royal; from there they soon made their way to all corners of the learned world of those days, bringing about considerable changes in the teaching of the subjects with which they dealt. The Port-Royal Logic is divided into four parts. The first part contains reflections about ideas, or about the first operation of the mind, which is called conceiving; the second part is aboutjudgment, the third about reasoning, and the last part deals with method. Whereas Descartes had been rather careless about the distinction between simple concepts and propositional concepts, indicating both indifferently by the word idea or idée, the authors of the PortRoyal Logic restrict this term to the first operation of the mind, in conformity with traditional classifications. But though they devote a separate part to propositions and judgments, it is remarkable that in the Logic there is no trace of the Cartesian doctrine th at judgment belongs to the voluntas. Probably the writers were of the opinion that a treatise on logic was not the proper place to go into that issue. On the other hand, the first chapter of the fust part offers some considerations about the nature and origin of ideas. There the authors stress the purely intelligible character of ideas and the part they play in rendering convent ion al expressions meaningful. Nevertheless, Arnauld's most penetrating comments on the question of what an idea is, have to be sought e1sewhere, namely, in his controversy with Malebranche. As his view is of considerable interest in itself and is moreover presented as the correct interpretation of Descartes 's conception of an idea, I will begin this chapter with an outline of its main features. 4.1. Arnauld's conception of an idea

In 1683 Arnauld published his Des vraies et des fausses idées, an attack on the 70

theory of ideas that -Malebranche had put forward in the Recherche de la vérité. This first step led to a protracted debate, in which the two participants elucidated their respective views without reaching any final agreement'. Malebranche had argued that even in cases where the thing towards which an act of thinking is directed does not exist, the act has an internalobject, since to think of nothing is not to think at all (Cf. 1.1.1.). Moreover, an existing thing which is thought of must be present to the mind; the external thing as such cannot be in the mind; therefore, it is represented by an immaterial idea. As to the origin of the ideas which are the internal objects of acts of thinking and represent extramental things to the mind, Malebranche considered five alternatives and finally opted for the view that we see all things in God. By this vision in God he means th at the ideas by which someone is aware of extemal things are the same ideas as those existing in God's mind. For Malebranche, then, an act of thinking is necessarily related to an internalobject which is identical with an idea in the divine mind and is therefore really distinct from the act and independent of it . This internalobject, in its turn, is contingently related to the extramental thing of which it is the representative idea 2 • It is this conception of an idea as a really distinct and independent object of an act of thinking that Arnauld criticizes in his Des vraies et des fausses idées, particularly in the chapters 4-8. According to him, this conception rests on a misleading analogy between intellectual cognition and visual perception. A condition for seeing an object is that it should be locally present to the eyes. Furthermore, we often see things reflected in a mirror or in water; in such circumstances we are inclined to say that it is not the objects themselves which we see, but only images of them. Now, if we try to elucidate understanding and knowing by analogy with seeing, we are liable to consider the fact that a physical object cannot be locally present to the mind as justifying the conclusion that the mind conceives of it by means of an image or representative entity which is directly present to it. In order to undermine the spurious analogy with ocular vision, Arnauld points out th at the presence to the mind which is characteristic of a thing that becomes the object of an act of thinking is of a very special nature. Far from being local presence, it is that peculiar presence which is called esse obiective. This specific kind of presence has nothing to do with the way in which a thing is represented by a picture or thoughts are represented by spoken or written words; that a thing has esse obiective in the mind means that it is known by the mind and that one is aware of it by having the appropriate idea. Furthermore, ifI see a person in a mirror, it is that person himself whom I see, not his image3 • Arnauld stresses the distinction between the idea of a

1. Arnau1d 1780; Malebranche 1966. See a1so MCRAE 1965, pp. 179-182; COOK 1974; YOLTON 1975, pp. 153-158. 2. For a detai1ed exposition of Malebranche's doctrine see RADNER 1978. 3. Arnau1d 1780, p. 194. Compare Aureo1us 1956, pp. 697-698 : nam pater meus imaginatus a me est ipsemet positus in esse intentionali; non enim est species, quia tune imaginatio non caderet super rem, sed super species tantum - - - .

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thing, which is the thing itself in so far as it has esse obiective in the mind, and the extramental thing to which being conceived of is attributed only by extrinsic denomination. Nevertheless, one and the same thing may have both real existence and a less perfect type of existence in the mind, so th at the thing known is not an additional entity, but the external thing itself. In the definitions which Arnauld offers to summarize his own view he identifies the idea of a thing with the perception of that thing. Although this ideaperception is a single entity, it has two relations: one to the mind which it modifies, the other to the thing conceived of in so far as it has esse obiective in the mind. The word perception4 denotes more directly the first relation, and the word idée the second. Thus the perception of a square figure marks more directly the mind as conceiving of a square, and the idée of a square marks more directly the square in so far as it has esse obiective in the mind. There are not two different entities, but only the one modification of the mind which comprehends essentially these two relations. For I cannot have any perception which is not both an act of my mind and the awareness of something; also not hing can have esse obiective in my mind that my mind does not perceive5 • On Arnauld's view, then, there is no need to assume the existence of separate representative entities which are intermediate between acts of conceiving and the extramental things at which those acts are directed. The acts of conceiving themselves, as modifications of the soul, have a representative character which makes each of them the conception of one thing rather than another. An act of conceiving cannot but have an intrinsic directedness towards a specific kind of object; Arnauld, however, refuses to reify this intrinsic directedness by turning it into a representative entity which is really distinct from the act of conceiving and also, in Malebranche's eyes, quite independent ofit. The only other entity that Arnauld wishes to acknowledge is the extramental thing that happens to satisfy the conditions of aspecific conception. If there is such a thing, then it has both real existence and esse obiective; if there is no such thing, then there is not hing but the one act of conceiving, which, however, necessarily has a certain content. This content is the act itself in so far as it is the conception of one thing rather than another; or, in other words, it is that aspect of the act which determines what features a really existing thing would have to possess in order to match the conception. Presumably, such non-veridical conceptions mayalso be characterized by saying that the thing conceived ofhas no real existence, but merely esse obiective; which means only that the act of conceiving is a conception of that kind of thing or that such-and-such a thing would satisfy the conception if it really existed.

4. Both in French and in English this word may he used in the hroad sense of an act of thinking or having an idea. 5. Amauld 1780, pp. 198-199. Compare Smiglecius 1658, p. 623: sicut productio est idem realiter cum re producta tamquam cum suo termino, ita omnis cognitio est idem re cum suo obiecto cognito quatenus in mente existit. Cf. also the passages quoted in MUELLER 1968, pp. 258-260, notes 693-700, and Condillac 1947-1951, J, p. 334a.

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If an idea is identi6.ed with the act of conceiving, it is quite obvious that we do not conceive of externa1 things immediately in such a sense that we conceive of them without the mediation ofideas, that is, of acts of conceiving. But from this truism it does not follow that we do not conceive of externa1 things immediately in another sense, namely, without the mediation of ideas taken as representative entities that are really distinct from the acts of conceiving. It is this lat ter kind of mediation which Arnau1d categorically rejects; according to him, there is no intermediate entity whatsoever between the act of conceiving and the externalobject. On the other hand, whenever one has a thought or an idea of something, one is aware of having that thought. From this point of view, it is correct to say that our acts of conceiving and therefore our ideas are the immediate objects of such a second-order awareness. But again it does not follow that ideas are also the immediate objects of 6.rst-order conceptions th at are directed towards things in the outside world 6 •

4.2. Objects of thought and manners of thinking 4.2.1. In the introduction to the Port-Roya1 Logic an act of conceiving is described as a mere viewing of those things which present themselves to the mind, without the formation of any judgment. The form by which we represent those things to ourselves is called an idea. Acts of conceiving and ideas belong to the 6.rst operation of the mind; the other three are judging, reasoning, and methodica1 disposition. Whereas the division of the Logic is determined by these four kinds of mental operation, the Port-Roya1 Grammar stat es th at the most important distinction th at can be made with respect to th at which occurs in the mind is the distinction bet ween the objects of our thought and the forms or the manners of our thinking. Ajudgment or proposition, such as 'The earth is round', contains two terms, called subject and attribute, and a copula joining those terms. The terms belong to the 6.rst operation of the mind, because they are the things conceived of and the objects of our thought. The combination of the terms by means of the copula, on the other hand, belongs to the second operation of the mind, which may be said to be the proper activity of our mind and the manner in which we think. Judgment is the chief form of our thinking; other manners are acts of conjoining and disjoining, and a1so such movements of the soul as desires, commands, and interrogations. As th at which goes on in the mind is conveyed to others by means of conventiona1 signs, the distinction between objects of thought and manners of thinking has a parallel in an equally general classi6.cation of words. Nouns, articles, pronouns, particip1es, prepositions, and adverbs designate objects of thought, while verbs, conjunctions and interjections indicate the form or the manner of our thinking 7 •

6. Arnauld 1780, pp. 203-205, p. 210. 7. Arnauld, Lancelot 1676, 11, 1.

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The distinction between objects of thought and manners of thinking is reminiscent of three more or less similar distinctions with which the authors of the Grammar were no doubt familiar. One is the traditional distinction bet ween the matter of a proposition, which consists of the subject-term and the predicate-term, and the form, which is the act of compounding or dividing expressed by an affirmative or negative copula8 • A second distinction which the authors may have had in mind is that between categorematic and syncategorematic signs; the mental copula is a typical modus concipiendt'9. In the third place, it seems to me that the distinction between objects of thought and manners of thinking was an attempt to do at least some justice to the difference between the passive side of the soul, which is prominent when it receives ideas, and the active side, which it shows injudging. This difference, which Descartes had stressed so heavily, was interpreted by the authors of the Grammar as a distinction between the incomplete constituents of the meaning of a sentence and the relatively complete and independent units of thought which are expressed by whole sentences. The proper activity of the mind is shown in what it does with the matter provided by non-complex conceptions. The form that the mind gives to this matter is either the mental activity which is signified by categorical and hypothetical declarative sentences or those movements of the soul which are expressed by non-declarative sentences. 4.2.2. One of the classes of words that indicate the form or the manner of our thinking is the class of verbs. According to the Port-Royal Grammar, the inflexions which are called the moods or the manners of a verb have been invented by man in order to be able to indicate more distinctly what goes on in the mind. The principal activity of the mind is affumation. Simple affirmation is expressed by the indicative mood, while conditional or modified affirmation is indicated by the subjunctive mood. Besides affirming what we think, we also make known wh at we want. For expressing such actions of the willianguages . have developed three moods: the optative, the potential, and the imperative mood. Questions are treated as expressions of a wish to be informed of something lO • It is remarkable that the authors of the Grammar draw a clear distinction between affirmation, whether simple or modified, and actions of the will. Although they must have known Descartes's doctrine ofjudgment very well, they apparently saw no reason to adopt it or even to ment ion his view in this connection. It is true that their division of sentential meanings into affirmations and actions of the will has some similarity to Descartes's distinction between 8. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1973, p. 244. The authors of the Logic make use of this distinction in dividing complex propositions into two classes (11, 5). 9. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1973, pp. 141-142, pp. 241-242. A more detailed treatment of the historical background of this particular aspect will be given in 6.1.2. 10. Arnauld, Lancelot 1676, 11, 13, 16, and 23 . For the historical background of the notion of mood in the Port-Royal Grammarsee SAHLIN 1928, pp. 356-366, and DONZÉ 1971, pp. 112-119. Cf. also MICHAEL 1970, pp. 424-435 .

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iudicia and voluntates sive affectus in the third Meditation; but this distinction is typical of the traditional conception of judgment rather than of Descartes's own view thatjudgment is an act of the voluntas. In all probability, the authors of the Grammar believed that it would suit their purposes better if they adhered to the commonly accepted contrast between judgment and actions of the will. As a matter of fact, their division is strongly reminiscent of the classification of kinds of speech which originally had been proposed by Ammonius, in his commentary on Aristotle' s De interpretatione, and which was based upon the difference between the cognitive and the appetitive functions of the soul l1 • 4.3. Simple propositions In the Logic Arnauld and Nicole take into consideration only one function of the verb, namely, simple affirmation. They leave out those moods of the verb by which actions of the will are expressed, without even attempting to reduce these forms to the privileged class of declarative sentences which are true or false. Likewise, they do not pay special attention to cases of modified affirmation by means of the subjunctive mood. Further, among straightforward declarative sentences which are true or false pride of place is given to simple or categorical propositions. Simple propositions of the subject-predicate form are contrasted with compound or hypothetical propositions which are framed by the manner of thinking that consists in such activities as conjoining and disjoining by means of 'and' and 'or'. 4.3.1. In the chapter on the verb which was inserted from the Grammar into the fifth edition of the Logic 12 a verb is defined as a vox significans afflrmationem. The main function of a verb is to indicate that the group of words in which it occurs embodies the activity of someone who not only conceives of certain things but passesjudgment on a relationship between them and affirms it. The most adequate expres sion of the ment al act of combining the two terms of a proposition would be a bare copula, that is, a form of the substantive verb 'to be' , stripped of all those accretions, such as attribute, subject, reference to time, which are more often than not incorporated into a verb as we normally use it . For example, the one-word sentence Cenasti (' You have eaten') signifies not only that the speaker attributes the action of eating to the hearer, but also that he does so with respect to the past. Ideally, the subject and the act ion of eating should be expressed separately, as in Tu Juisti cenans; in addition, the verb should be made tenseless, in the manner in which it is used to express such eternal truths as 'God is infinite', and the reference to time should be shifted to a separate word or phrase. In the light of this restricted function of the verb as a mere copula, several other definitions of the verb are found to be defective. Aristotle included time, 11. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 86-87. 12. Arnauld, Lancelot 1676, 11, 13; Arnauld, Nicole 1683, 11, 2.

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others both time and person. There are also definitions that are either too broad or too narrow, notably those which determine the essence of a verb as consisting in the designation of actions and passions or in the signification of that which is in a state of flux, in contradistinction to permanent things which are denoted by nouns 13 • As Aristotle had already considered a verb as a sign of things said of something else and had also drawn attention to the possibility of separating the attribute from the copula, it is no wonder that many of the current definitions of the verb stressed its predicative or affirmative function and that this function was often assigned mainly or even exclusively to the substantive verb 'to be'. Augustus Saturnius, for instance, in his Mercurii maioris sive grammaticarum institutionum libri X, which was published at Basel in 1546, called the substantive verb the fountain-head of all other verbs (caput ac fontem reliquorum verborumJ14. In the same vein, Julius Caesar Scaliger and Sanctius, who adhered to the definition of a verb as signifying either an act ion or apassion, thought that both kinds of verb could be reduced to the substantive verb, which Sanctius accordingly characterized as their root and foundation (quod est utriusque radix et fundamentumys. The authors of the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic went to the extreme of this tendency by restricting the category of verbs to the copula and depriving the substantive verb of all other functions except that of tying the predicate to the subject. In doing so they gave a powerful new impulse to a way of analysing categorical propositions that was squarely opposed to the view that adjectival verbs are incomplex and that therefore a proposition of the subject-predicate form never has more than two immediate constituents 16 • It should be noted th at in the definition of a verb as a vox significans afflrmationem the word afflrmatio is not used a potiori, that is, as a designation ofboth affirmation and denial. Although it is not true that all our judgments are affirmative, a verb by itself signifies only affirmation. Negative judgments are formed by adding to the verb a negation or a word including a negation. In the chapter on the proposition which comes after the chapter on the verb affirmation and denial are juxtaposed as species of the genus judgment. When we have conceived of things by dint of ideas, we compare those ideas with each other, and according as they are found to agree or to disagree with one another, we tie them together or separate them; the lat ter activities are called affirming and denying a predicate or attribute of a subject. An affirmative or negative judgment is identified with a proposition, presumably a ment al proposition that is judicative. The authors do not draw any explicit distinction between the activi-

13. For details see DONZÉ 1971, pp. 27-33, pp. 105-108. Cf. also SAHLIN 1928, pp. 292-301; CHEVALIER 1968, p. 180, p. 345; MICHAEL 1970, pp. 56-61, pp. 363-372. 14. P. 19. Cf. CHEVALIER 1968, pp. 338-339. 15. Julius Caesar Scaliger, De causis linguae Latinae libri XIII, Lugduni, 1540, V, c. 110; Franciscus Sanctius Brocensis, Mineroa seu Je causis linguae Latinae commentarius, Salmanticae, 1587, lIl, c. 2. Cf. CHEVALIER 1968, pp. 345-346. 16. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 39-42, pp. 48-50, p. 153.

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ty of merely compounding or dividing and the activity ofjudging, or between a merely apprehensive mental proposition and a judicative mental proposition. 4.3.2. The ph ra se vox significans afflrmationem contains also the many-sided word significare. In connection with it the authors make some interesting remarks about the way in which a verb signifies affirmation and, on the other hand, the way in which such nouns as affirmans and affirmatio signify someone who affirms and the act of affirming 17 • When a speaker uses a finite verb, or rather a finite form of the substantive verb, as a constituent of asentence, the verb is a sign or indication that the speaker not only conceives of certain things, but also performs an act ofjudging and affirming with respect to them, that is, conceives of them in a definite form or manner. Averb, then, signifies affirmation in the sen se that a speaker who uses a finite verb in the appropriate way thereby makes it understood that his words have assertive force and are the expres sion of an affirmative judgment that it is so as he says. The appropriate use of a finite form of the substantive verb signals an affirmative attitude on the part of the speaker, who by the very utterance of the verb performs an act of affirming. The nouns affirmans and affirmatio, on the other hand, belong to the sphere of the objects of thought . Someone who uses them does not by the very utterance of those words perform an act of affirming, but he only conceives of such an act, either of himself, by reflection on his own ment al activity, or of another person. For example, in Petrus affirmat or Petrus est affirmans the verb est indicates th at the speaker performs an act of affirming or judging with respect to Peter. In other words, the verb est makes known the speaker' s manner of thinking with regard to the two objects of thought, Peter and someone who affirms. The predicate-term affirmans, however, is the sign of an object of thought of which the speaker conceives and which he attributes to Peter. Likewise, in Affirmo the verb signifies two affirmations, but in entirely different ways . The element sum in the expanded form Ego sum affirmans signals an affirmative attitude on the part of the speaker. This affirmative attitude or manner of thinking has reference to two objects of thought: the speaker himself and the act of affirming that is conceived of by the speaker and expressed separately by the participle affirmans.

4.4. Simple propositions with a complex ingredient Simple or categorical propositions are distinguished from compound or hypothetical propositions by the fact that they have only one subject and one predicate. This unitary subject or predicate may be simple or complex. The authors of the Port-Royal Logic hold that the canonical form of a complex subject-term or predicate-term always includes a subordinate relative clause, which they caU an embedded or incidental proposition (proposition incidente). The simple proposition Dieu invisible a créé Ie monde visible, for instance, has a com17. For historical comments see 6.1.2.

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plex subject-term and a complex predicate-term, which may be expanded into the canonical forms Dieu qui est invisible and Ie monde qui est visible. In such cases the complexity pertains to the matter of the proposition, the objects thought of; but the complexity mayalso pertain to the form or manner of thinking that is signified by the fini te verb, or, strictly speaking, by the copula. Accordingly, there are two kinds of simple propositions with a complex ingredient: materially complex propositions and formally complex propositions. Chapters 6 and 7 of the second part of theLogic deal with materially complex propositions, while formally complex propositions are discussed in chapter 8. 4.4.1. The most important distinction that can be drawn with respect to the relative dauses which are induded in the standard form of a complex term is marked by the words explication and détermination, which are introduced in chapter 8 of the first part. A relative dause is said to add an explication to the antecedent if it brings out either something that is part of the comprehension of the idea of the antecedent or some accident that belongs to everything falling under that idea. On the other hand, if the relative dause restricts the extension of the antecedent, it is said to add a détermination to it. What the authors have in mind is the distinction between non-restrictive and restrictive relative dauses l8 • As to non-restrictive relative dauses, the authors hold that the attribute of the incident al proposition is affirmed of the antecedent of the relative pronoun only incidentally and in subordination to the whole proposition (incidemment au regard de la proposition totale). For example, in uttering Dieu qui est invisible a créé Ie monde qui est visible the speaker does not primarily int end to affirm that God is invisible or that the world is visible; rather , these affirmations are supposed to have taken place before, yielding now two conceptions, of God as invisible and of the world as visible, which are put together in the actual affirmation that is the speaker's chief concern. But although the secondary affirmations are only accessory and incident al, they remain nonetheless affirmations and are therefore true or false. As a rule, however, the falsity of an incident al proposition does not prevent the principal proposition from being true. The proposition 'Alexander, who was the son of Philip of Macedonia, defeated the Persians' may very well be true even if that which is asserted in the relative dause would turn out to be false. Exceptions are propositions in which there is some necessary connection between the attribute of the principal proposition and the attribute of the incident al proposition, as in' Alexander, who was the son of Philip, was the grandson of Amyntas' . Whereas the assertive force of non-restrictive relative dauses is kept in the background, as it were, by the subordinate position of the incident al affirmation, the judgment that is signified by the copula in a restrictive relative dause 18. This distinction was well-known to scholastic logicians . See, for instance, what Ockham, Summa logicae, 11, 15, says about the two meanings of the sentence Omnis homo qui est albus cumt.

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is seen as being weakened further by the fact that it pertains, not to the actual connectedness of the attribute of the incident al proposition with the antecedent of the relative pronoun, but rather to the mere compatibility of the idea of the attribute with the idea of the antecedent. In uttering the sentence 'Men who are pious are charitable' the speaker does not assert that all or some men are actually pious, but all that he affirms, tacitly and virtually, by means of the verb that occurs in the relative dause, is th at the notions of being a man and being pious may be combined into a single complex concept which is then made the subject of the principal affirmation. Although restrictive relative dauses are therefore propositions only in a very imperfect sense, the authors are nevertheless of the opinion that they may be called true or false. The two incidental propositions that occur in 'Minds that are square are more solid than minds that are round', for instance, may be characterized as false. It is not explained, however, precisely what effect the falsity of a restrictive relative dause has upon the truth-value of the principal proposition. Arnauld and Nicole believed that their account of incident al propositions could shed some light on the well-known question as to whether propositions are the only bearers of truth and falsity. Their answer is that truth and falsity are indeed qualities that belong exdusively to propositions and judgments, but th at complex terms may be interpreted as induding propositions of a peculiar kind and are to that extent proper candidates for an evaluation in terms of truth and falsity. This answer imp lies that they took it for granted that such combinations as homo, qui est anima 1may be aligned with propositions and signify something that is true or false. In point of fact, this assumption was rather controversial. In connection with the definition of a proposition, there was an old dispute whether a group of words which consists of a subject-term, a copula, and apredicate-term has the status of a proposition when it is only part of a larger construction which is a proposition. A particular aspect of this problem is the question whether or not such a combination as homo, qui est animal is a proposition. John Dorp of Leiden (fl. c. 1400), for instance, brings up this question in connection with the definition Propositio est oratio verum vel falsum significans. According to him, some gave an affirmative answer to it, on the ground that homo, qui est animal indudes a group of words which signifies something that is true or false, namely, the group qui est animal, which is true. Others argued that homo, qui est animal is not a proposition, because it does not signify a truth or a falsehood. Dorp subscribes to the latter view, adding that even if qui est anima 1 were a proposition, which it is not, the whole ph ra se would still not be a proposition, since it is neither true nor false 19 • Likewise, William Manderston (fl. c. 1515-1540) denies that homo, qui est chimaera is a proposition, on the ground that it does not signify truly or falsely according to its total signification. He concedes, though, that it signifies truly or falsely according to partial signification because it contains a part, presumably qui est 19. Dorp 1499, Tractatus primus, De oratione. For the general problem see NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 79-85.

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chimaera, which is a proposition; for there is a rule that whatever is signified by a part of some complex is signified by the whole complex20 • About a century later, the sentence Homo qui est iustus diligit deum (' A man who is righteous loves God') was discussed by the authors of the Collegium Complutense philosophicum as an illustration of the thesis that the subject of a categorical proposition can be a single word or a phrase, but also a proposition. In the latter case the proposition, presumably qui est iustus, contributes to the format ion of the subjectterm in which it is induded. Therefore, the copula of the relative dause is called the copula of indusion (copula implicationis); or the subordinate copula (copula minus principalis), because the truth or the falsity of the whole proposition does not depend upon the copula of the relative dause, but upon the main copula21 • To the solution of this much-debated problem the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic made a valuable contribution by drawing an explicit distinction bet ween restrictive and non-restrictive relative dauses. But their daim that before 1660 nobody had observed that a proposition which begins with a relative pronoun may be part of the subject or the predicate of another proposition which is called the principal proposition22 , can be acknowledged only if they are taken to mean that they were the fint to introduce a wellknown logical distinction into the study of grammar . The distinction between an incident al proposition and the principal proposition containing it, which is perhaps of only secondary importance to the formallogician, proved to be very fruitful in linguistics. Finally, I want to drawattention to a critical rem ark made by Claude Buffier in discussing the Port-Royal thesis that the falsity of a non-restrictive relative dause does not necessarily render the principal proposition false, though sometimes it does. Buffier disagrees with this view and maintains that such a sentence as' Alexander, who was not the son of Philip, defeated Darius' should be analysed as a conjunction of the two propositions ' Alexander was not the son of Philip' and 'Alexander defeated Darius' . On this analysis, it is impossible that the whole sentence remains true when the first conjunct turns out to be false. To make a distinction bet ween two degrees of affirmation, a primary affirmation with respect to the principal proposition and a weaker form of affirmation, which is more like a presupposition, with regard to the incidental proposition, is, according to Buffier, a vain subtlety. For the sake oflogical rigour it is preferabie to treat the two propositions on an equal footing and as affirmed with equal force. That does not mean, however, that the circumstances under which the propositions are uttered are totally irrelevant. If the situation makes it de ar that the speaker affirms a proposition only incidentally or inadvertently, it would be une impolitesse ou une injustice dans Ie commerce de la vie civile to con20. Manderston 1528, 5th page. Cf. Tataretus 1514b , fol. 5 R: cum secundum se totam non signiflcet verum neque falsum , liut bene includat propositionem. 21. Collegium Complutense philosophicum 1629, p. 19. Cf. Johannes a Sancto Thoma 1948, p. 26. 22. Arnauld, Lancelot 1676, II, 9 (added to the third edition).

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tradict him on that score. Although from the strict viewpoint of pure logic the speaker has fully affirmed wh at he says, the rules ofbehaviour in polite society forbid the hearer to ignore the circumstances and to take all affirmations equally seriously23. Buffier' s critici sm is a remarkable instance of an appeal to maxims of conversation in order to keep the logical analysis as simple and straightforward as possible.

4.4.2. In the section on the relative pronoun that was inserted into the fifth edition of the Logic of 1683, Arnauld and Nicole express the conviction that their description of the functions of the relative pronoun can also solve the problem concerning the exact meaning of the word que in such sentences as Jean répondit qu'il n'était pas Ie Christ ('John answered that he was not Christ'). In order to appreciate the solution they propose, it is necessary to bear in mind th at there was an old controversy among writers of normative grammars of Latin as to the question whether it is correct to construe such a verb as duere ('to say') with a quod-dause instead of an accusative-plus-infinitive phrase. Those who attempted to make the quod-construction respectabIe appealed to such analogous cases as Non miror quod ('I am not amazed that') or Laetor quod ('I am glad that'), explaining the quod which occurs there as a relative pronoun which has reference to an antecedent that is supplied by an understood prepositional phrase of the type propter id ('because of that')24. Although the situation in French is somewhat different, the explanation offered in defending the Latin quod-construction could point the way to a sirnilar conception of the word que. After mentioning a view according to which the words quod and que are adverbs, Arnauld and Nicole state their own opinion, that in reality these wordsare nothing but the relative pronoun and have the two functions that are characteristic of that kind of word 25 • In the sentencejean répondit qu'il n'était pas Ie Christ the word que has the proper function of a relative pronoun, namely, to connect the proposition il n'était pas Ie Christ to the attribute which is contained in the verb répondit. Further, every pronoun represents the noun to which it has reference. In the present case, this noun is implicit in the attribute contained in the verb répondit, which is equivalent to fit une réponse. Hence, the relative pronoun que has reference to the indeterminate idea of the answer given by John, and at the same time it introduces a proposition th at makes this idea more specific. In the same vein, the sentences Je vous dis que vous avez tort ('I teIl you that you are wrong') and Je suppose que vous serez sage ('I assume that you will be sensible') should be analysed as Je vous dis une chose qui est: vous avez tort and Je fais une supposition qui est: vous serez sage. The dause introduced by que is a restrictive relative dause th at contributes to the formation of the complex attribute of the principal proposition, which, on this analysis, is therefore a sim23. Buffier 1732, pp. 874-876. 24. For details see CHEVALIER 1968, pp. 534-535. 25. Forthe treatment of que in the Port-Royal Grammar (11,9 and 17) see DONZÉ 1971, pp. 82-87, pp. 146-148.

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ple proposition that is complex in its matter, more particularly in its attribute or predicate. 4.4.3. If such a sentence as Je suppose que vous serez sage is analysed in the manner described above, the dominant affirmation is directed towards the relationship between the subject, which is the speaker, and a complex attribute, which consists in assuming that you will be sensible. The complex attribute contains an incidental proposition, vous serez sage, which at best is affirmed only in a diluted sense. That this is not the sole way of understanding such a sentence appears from chapter 8 of the second part of the Port-Royal Logic. There the authors take as an example the sentence Je soutiens que la terre est ronde (' I maintain that the earth is round '). But now they considerJe soutiens as the incident al proposition, which therefore must be attached to a constituent of what has become the principal proposition, namely, la terre est ronde. As it is manifest th at it cannot be attached to the subject or the predicate of the principal proposition, they conclude that the incident al proposition belongs to the copula. That means that the whole sentence is a simple proposition that is complex, not in its matter, but with regard to the form of thinking which is expressed by the main verb. The affirmative attitude with respect to the roundness of the earth is made known in two ways: in the ordinary way by the copula and in a more specific way by the verb of the incident al proposition. The same function of modifying the main affirmation is assigned to such expressions as 'I deny that' , 'It is (not) true that', 'It is necessary that', and even to the first half of the sentence 'The arguments of the astronomers convince us that the sun is larger than the earth'. Unfortunately, the authors leave us in the dark about the precise meaning of the word que in these contexts. Presumably, it still has the function of connecting the incident al proposition to a constituent of the principal proposition; but it is not at all clear what its antecedent could be. The authors are aware of the fact that one and the same sentence may be understood either according to the analysis which takes it as a simple proposition that is complex in its attribute or according to the analysis that regards it as a simple proposition with a complexity in the constituent which carries the manner of thinking. Their example is the sentence Tous les philosophes nous assurent que les choses pesantes tombent d'elles-mêmes en bas. Sometimes, this sentence is uttered with the primary intention of asserting that heavy bodies, when left to themselves, move downwards; then the first part is the incident al proposition. But the principal aim of the utterance may also be the information that all philosophers assure us that it is so; then the sentence coming aft er que is the incident al proposition. Which of these two interpretations is correct can often be decided by looking at the context in which the sentence is used. The first interpretation would be forced upon the hearer if the speaker were to add that stones are heavy and that therefore stones, when left to themselves, move downwards. If, on the other hand, he went on to say that this is an error and that therefore it may happen that an error is taught by all philosophers, the second interpretation would be the right one. Another test would consist in con-

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sidering the truth-value that is assigned to the sentence. According to Buffier, in a critical no te on this passage of the Port-Royal Logic, the sentences La tem est ronde and Je soutiens que la terre est ronde may be practically synonymous in common parlance; then they are false, since it has been discovered that the earth is oval rather than round. But in a situation where philosophical precision is required we mayalso interpretje soutiens que la terre est ronde as an affirmation that the speaker is prepared to defend the thesis that the earth is round; and that affirmation may weIl be true26 •

4.5. Compound propositions Compound propositions (propositions composées), which others called hypothetical propositions and which nowadays are often called molecular propositions, are defined as propositions th at have more than one subject or more than one predicate27 • This definition is to be understood as having reference to the fact that such propositions are composed of two simple or categorical propositions, each of which is of the subject-predicate form. In one kind of compound proposition the composition is overtly marked by a connective. As we saw in 4.2.1., the Port-Royal Grammar divided words into two classes, according as they signify objects of thought or indicate a form or manner of thinking. To the latter class belong verbs, conjunctions, and interjections. If we leave aside interjections and those forms of the verb which were considered to be irrelevant to logic, it may be said that the manners of thinking in which the logician is interested are either those affirmations which are expressed by the copula of a categorical proposition or those acts of conjoining, disjoining or otherwise connecting which are expressed by the conjunctions that serve to combine two categorical propositions into one compound proposition. The difference between the two main types oflogically pertinent manners of thinking is also marked by the fact that the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic tend to restrict the word jugement to the act of affirming or denying an attribute of a subject by means of the copula; the generic term by which they cover both acts ofjudging, together with their expres sion in spoken or written discourse, and acts of connecting by means of grammatical conjunctions is the word proposition. Compound propositions that are overtly marked by one of the grammatical conjunctions are distinguished from a second group of compound propositions consisting of those propositions which were usually called exponibiles, that is, sentences whose hidden logical form has to be brought to light by an operation of analysis or exposition. There are four kinds of such covertly compound propositions: exclusive, exceptive, comparative, and inceptive or desitive propositions. The expounded sentences which exhibit their logical form are always logical conjunctions.

26. Buffier 1732, pp. 876-877. 27. Arnauld, Nicole 1683, 11, 5 and 9-10.

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Arnauld and Nicole distinguish six types of overtly compound proposition. A logical conjunction (copulative) is true if both components are true. In a disjunction (disjonctive) the two parts are taken to be incompatible. The truth of a conditional is determined by the connection between antecedent and consequent; even if the antecedent and the consequent are both false, the whole proposition may be true. For a causal proposition being true, however, it is necessary that both parts be true and that there be a causal connection between them. Relative propositions - which should not be confused with subordinate clauses beginning with a relative pronoun - are illustrated by such a sentence as Ou est Ie trésor, là est Ie eoeur ('Where a man's treasure is, there is his heart'). They include a certain comparison and a certain correlation; their truth depends upon the. . . accuracy of the correlation. Finally, adversative propositions (diserétives) are marked by such connectives as 'but' and 'nevertheless'. According to the Logie, they are true ifboth parts are true and the antithesis is correct; for if there is no opposition between the parts, such a proposition is ridiculous. Whereas Arnauld and Nicole consistently characterize covertly compound propositions by saying that they comprise two judgments as parts, they use that term only once in their comments upon the six kinds of overtly compound proposition, namely, in connection with an adversative proposition. In giving the truth-conditions of overtly compound propositions they nearly always refer to the components of the whole proposition as its parts (parties). On the other hand, they clearly assume that these parts have truth-values. Now it would not be unreasonable to expect an answer to the question whether the truth of a part is asserted or not, or, rather, in which cases a part has assertive force and in which cases it lacks such force2 8 • Given the absence of any explicit answer, we might try to derive one from the terminology used, that is to say, we might frame the hypothesis that in those cases where the authors refer to a component as a judgment they int end to make it clear that the part has assertive force and that in the cases in which they avoid that term they give the reader to understand that the part lacks assertive force and has an unasserted but assertable truth-value. In support of this suggestion it may be pointed out that all cases in which the components are referred to as judgments concern logical conjunctions and th at it is not implausible to hold th at the conjuncts of a conjunctive proposition have assertive force 29 • But then the fact remains th at there are other cases where the components can be held with equal plausibility to have assertive force, but the authors do not call them judgments. Moreover, the authors never draw any explicit distinction between merely apprehensive propositions and judicative propositions, so that it is just possible that occasionally they use the word jugement also for the purely predicative act of affirming or denying an attribute of a subject. It seems safer, then, to conclude that Arnauld

28. For earlier discussions of this problem see NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 82-85. 29. It might be objected, though, that it is not logically impossible for someone to have the belief that P & Q without having the belief that P.

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and Nicole either were not dearly aware of the existence of a problem in this con neet ion or did not think it profitable to eaU attention to it. Another question that is left largely unanswered regards the assertive force, not of the parts of a compound proposition, but of the whole compound proposition. That compound propositions are considered by the authors as having judicative or assertive force is sufficiently proved by the careful attention they give to the precise way in which each type should be contradicted. But they never explain satisfactorily the nature of an act of judging which is directed to a compound proposition, nor do they make it dear exactly which constituent of the spoken or written proposition is the conventional sign of the act ofjudging. It is true that they assign the manner of thinking th at consists in acts of conjoining or disjoining to grammatical conjunctions, but that this cannot be the whole truth is obvious from the consideration that the results of such acts may be merely apprehensive compound propositions to which no act ofjudging is added. By associatingjudgment and affirmation exdusively with the copula of a categorical proposition the authors have bereft themselves of the proper means to drawasharp distinction between apprehensive and judicative compound propositions. By acts of conjoining or disjoining they probably mean judicative or assertive acts of conjoining or disjoining. But then it is no longer true that such acts are signified by grammatical conjunctions alone.

4.6. Conclusion I want to condude this chapter with an examination of the thesis, advanced by several authors JO , that in the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic the words jugement and proposition are used synonymously. EspeciaUy in the two introductory essays that were written by Nicole for the fifth impression of the Logic, the word jugement frequently has the broad meaning of critical faculty of discernment. OccasionaUy, it is also applied to such exercises of that disposition as forming a judgment about the value of something and pronouncing on the correctness of an argument. These uses are left out of consideration here. In ascertaining the meaning ofjugement that is relevant to our purposes it is important to note that a judgment is defined as the second operation of the rnind, between the operation of simply conceiving and the operations of reasoning and methodical disposition, but also as one of the forms or manners of thinking, as opposed to the objects of thought. It is that form or manner of thinking which consists in a mental act of affirming an attribute of a subject and which is expressed by the verb, in particular the copula, of a dedarative sentence. If the judgment is negative, it is signified by the copula together with some kind of negation. Strictly speaking, then, the word jugement is used to refer to a man30. SAHLIN 1928, pp.102-104; DONZÉ 1971, p.132, pp. 218-219. SeealsoS.C. Dik, Coor· dination. lts lmp/ications Jor the Theory oJ Genera/ Linguistics, Amsterdam, 1968, p. 119, n. 7; Q .I.M. Mok, De actualiteit van de Grammaire van Port-Roya/, lnaugural Lecture, Leiden, 1971, p. 13.

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ner of thinking which presupposes two acts of simply conceiving and affirms or denies one of these concepts of the other; this manner of thinking is conventionally indicated by one constituent of a declarative sentence, namely, the copula or the negated copula, while the two presupposed concepts are signified by the other constituents of the declarative sentence. But as the acts of conceiving and the act of affirming or denying may be thought of as performed simultaneously, it was a natural step to extend the meaning ofjugement to the whole judicative mental proposition, of which the whole spoken or written declarative sentence is the conventional sign. It is this extended meaning which the authors of the Logic must have had in mind in declaring th at a judgment is also called a proposition and that it always has two terms. Likewise, the word jugement probably has this extended sense in the Grammar, when it is stated that the sentence Dieu invisible a créé Ie monde visible derives its meaning from three judgments, that is to say, from one ment al proposition with full judicative force and two ment al propositions with a weaker degree of judicative force 3!. And again, wh en the Logic refers to the components of adversative and covertly compound propositions as judgments, it is most likely that the mental propositions corresponding to the two main constituents are meant. It should be noted, however, that the word jugement is consistently restricted to categorical mental propositions and is never applied to compound mental propositions. When in chapter 3 of the second part of the Logic propositions are said to be either true or false according as the signified judgment is true or false, the authors are clearly speaking of vocal or written categorical propositions that correspond to mental categorical propositions. Judgments, therefore, are primary beare~s of truth and falsity, but they are not the only primary bearers of the truth-values, since ment al compound propositions too are considered to be true or false. Further, that the authors do not drawasharp distinction between the act of judging and the propositional content of that act is quite intelligible in the light of Arnauld's view that an idea as an act of conceiving is identical with the idea as the object conceived of. One and the same judgment may be looked at from two different points, either as a mental act or as the affirmative or negative predication which is the content and object of that act. This alleged identity of act and content also explains why the authors are rather careless about the difference between "a merely apprehensive categorical proposition and a judicative categorical proposition. In cases where for some reason more attention is paid to the content than to the act ofjudgment it may thus easily happen that the word jugement is also employed for the predicative aspect of a categorical proposition alone. As to the word proposition, it is first of all to be noted that, contrary to the word jugement, it is not restricted to the categorical type of mental or conventional sentence. Nor do the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic conform to the growing tendency to limit its use .t o the spoken or written expression of a judgment. That it is frequently employed to refer to a ment al proposi31. Arnauld, Lancelot 1676, 11, 9.

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tion is evident from the fact that a judgment is called a proposition, and also from the many passages in which the context points to the mental character of the proposition concerned or in which a proposition is presented as the significate of a conventional sentence. On the other hand, there can be no doubt th at the word proposition is also used for spoken and written declarative sentences. Abundant evidence of this usage is provided by the numerous passages in which propositions are said to have words as elements, to be uttered or heard, to be signs ofjudgments, or to have some kind of ambiguity. The truth of the matter is th at the authors apparently shared the widespread antipathy against the scholastic terminology ofpropositio (or terminus) mentalis, propositio vocalis, and propositio scripta. Hence, they preferred to use the word proposition without any modifier and to leave it to the context and the reader's intelligence to determine the right interpretation. As a rule, this device does not lead to serious difficulties, although there are a few passages where the result is a certain confusion32 • Gathering up the threads, we may conclude that it is far from being true th at in the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic the words jugement and proposition are used synonymously. The former word is used for the act of judging as it is expressed by the copula; to such a more or less isolated act the word proposition does not apply. On the other hand, compound propositions and spoken or written propositions are not referred to by means of the word jugement. The only area where the meanings of the two words coincide is their common denotation of mental categorical propositions.

32. A striking example is the first sentence of the first chapter of the second part of the Logic:

Comme - - - cesjugements sont des propositions qui sont composées de diverses parties, il fout commeneer par l'explication de ces parties, qui sont principalement les noms, les pronoms, et les verbes.

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5. SOME EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CRITICS OF THE PORT-ROYAL VIEW

The interest in universal grammar that had been revivified and considerably broadened by the Port-Royal treatise on that subject continued and bore rich fruit in the eighteenth century. In this chapter I will discuss the conceptions of the nature of judgments, propositions, and verbs that were put forward by César Chesneau Du Marsais (1676-1756) and Nicolas Beauzée (1717-1789), two renowned French writers on philosophical grammar who explicitly opposed the Port-Royal doctrine at essential points.

5.1. Du Marsais 5.1.1. In the Exposition d'une méthode raisonnée pour apprendre la langue latine which Du Marsais published in 1722, he diverges from the Port-Royal Logic in drawing a strict distinction betweenjudgments and propositions. Conforming to the general tendency ofhis time, he defines ajudgment as an act of thinking one thing of another thing, whereas a proposition is an assemblage of words that has a definite meaning and expresses ajudgment. On the other hand, the analysis of a proposition that Du Marsais offers still follows the pattern championed by the Port-Royal authors. In La terre est ronde, for example, the verb is said to indicate that one judges that the earth is round, while ronde is the attribute and signifies th at which is thought of the subject. The simple verb 'to be' is considered as a third constituent of the proposition, fully separated from the attribute. Other verbs are called complex and adjectival because they comprise in one word both the copula and the attribute 1• However, in the Logique ou ré.flexions sur les principales opérations de l'esprit, which was composed some time after 1722, Du Marsais applied a different type of analysis to those sentences which are of interest to the logician. Ajudgment is described as amental operation by which we think that an object exists or does not exist in such-and-such a manner. An act of judging presupposes two ideas or conceptions and consists in regarding the objects of those conceptions as forming a single whoie, that is, in uniting the one with the other. When the

1. Du Marsais 1797, I, pp. 72-73 .

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two ideas and the act ofjudging are expressed by means of words, the entire expres sion is called a proposition. But now the sentence La teTTe est ronde is said to have only two parts, a subject and an attribute which is est ronde. The verb is an essential part of the attribute; it marks the act of the mind that judges that the earth is round or that the earth exists as round2 • The same doctrine is propounded in Du Marsais ' slater contributions to general grammar . In the Principes de grammaire and in the largely identical artide on construct ion which Du Marsais wrote for Diderot' s Encyclopédie he repeats that the verb is an essential part of the attribute, because the verb is said of the subject and indicates the mental act that considers the subject as existing in such-and-such a manner or as possessing or doing such-and-such a thing. And he emphasizes th at the attribute always begins with the verb. In the sentence Vous êtes heureux ('You are happy'), for instance, êtes heureux is the attribute and êtes is the verb. The verb signifies existence and is at the same time an indication of the mental act which attributes a happy existence to the hearer. The speaker affirms that the hearer exists as someone who is happy; he identifies the hearer with a happy existent3 • In the Lettre d'une jeune demoiselle à l'auteur des Vrais principes de la langue française Du Marsais explicitly attacks the PortRoyal thesis th at the verb is a mere copula; his own view is that the verb is an essential part of the attribute, from which it should not be separated. In uttering the sentence Dieu est tout-puissant ('God is almighty') one affirms of God, not just almightiness, but an existence that is characterized by almightiness. The verb signifies realor imaginary existence and attributes this existence, together with the modification expressed by the rest of the predicate, to the subject of the proposition. Du Marsais compares the double function of the verb to the double function of an oblique case of a noun in Greek or Latin. The genitive solis in lumen solis ('the light of the sun') signifies the sun and simultaneously indicates by its ending that there is a certain relation between the sun and the light signified by the word lumen 4 • The controversy between those logicians who argued for a tripartite analysis of a categorical proposition into subject, copula, and predicate, and, on the other side, those who defended a bipartite analysis into subject and attribute had been going on for centuriess. It is dear that Du Marsais came to side with the latter party. Although it is hard to tell under whose influence he changed his mind, it is not difficult to see that the view to which he was converted shows a remarkable similarity to the conception that was put forward by such latescholastic authors as Dominicus Soto (1495-1560) and Martinus Smiglecius (1564-1618)6. These philosophers are typical adherents of the doctrine accor-

2. Du Marsais 1792, I, pp. 18-21. 3. Du Marsais 1792, I, p. 248; Du Marsais 1797, V, p. 44, p. 75. Cf. SAHLIN 1928, p. 116, p. 307. 4. Du Marsais 1797, III, p. 330; also IV, p. 231. Cf. SAHLIN 1928, pp. 307-310. 5. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 39-42, pp. 48-50, p. 153 . 6. Soto 1554, pp. 19-20; Smiglecius 1658, pp. 450-452.

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ding to which the standard form of a declarative sentence is the combination of a subject-term with an adjectival verb that signifies an incomplex thought. The adjectival verb was regarded as a sign of an action in search of a subject, so that the whole proposition becomes the result of completing the attribute by supplying the agent which is the natural complement of the action. Instead of reducing constructions with an adjectival verb to constructions with a copula and a participle of that adjectival verb, the supporters of a bipartite analysis assimilated constructions with a separate copula to constructions with an adjectival verb. In their opinion, the verb 'to be' has only one meaning, namely, some kind of existence; this existence, which was considered as an action in search of a subject7, may be taken either in an absolute sense, as in Socrates est, or in a modified sense, as in Socrates est albus. The lat ter sentence means literally th at Socrates exists as someone who is white8 • In all these cases the attribute, which either is an adjectival verb or includes an adjectival verb, stands for an incomplex concept th at may be viewed from two different sides. As a praedicatum materiale it is that which is attributed to the subject; as a praedicatum forma Ie it is the very act of attribution or predication by which the material predicate is tied to a subject in which it finds its natural fulfilment. If one compares the view set forth by such late-scholastic authors as Soto and Smiglecius and the view defended by Du Marsais, the resemblance is so striking th at one can hardly refrain from concluding that the latter' s change of mind had been brought about by some work belonging to the same tradition as was adhered to by Soto and Smiglecius. Lack of evidence, however, makes it impossible to draw any further conclusions as to the identity of his sources. As Sahlin points out, Claude Buffier was one of the grammarians who diverged from the Port-Royalline by dividing a proposition into a subject and an attribute. According to Buffier, in such sentences as Les gens méprisables se croient aisément méprisés ('Contemptible people easily believe that they are held in contempt ') and Les grands parleurs ne disent rien ('Great talkers do not say anything') the attribute is formed by se croient aisément méprisés and ne disent rien 9 • But although 1732, the year of publication of Buffier' s Cours de sciences, would fit very nicely into the chronological pattern, the relevant passages scarcely contain any consideration from which Du Marsais could have derived a justificati on of his own, much more elaborate view. 5.1.2. As we saw in 4.2., the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar drew a distinction between objects of thought and forms or manners of thinking. Forms of thinking associated with a finite verb were divided into acts of judg-

7. Cf. Smiglecius 1658, p. 452: In omni praedicatione - - - verbum 'est' significa re existentiam - - -, licet non semper significet existentiam rea/em, sed aliquando rea/em, aliquando rationis pro exigentia rerum. - - - non meram coniunctionem significat, sed coniunctionem per modum actionis exercitae, et sic significat existentiam per modum actionis, ut est exercita ab eo quod existit. 8. Cf. Soto 1554, p. 20 V: Et quando dicitur 'Homo est a/bus', concipimus quod existit a/bus. 9. Buffier 1732, pp. 756-757. Cf. SAHLIN 1928, p. 115. See also 9.2.2.

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ing, which are expressed by the indicative or subjunctive mood, and actions of the will, which are expressed by the other moods. In the Principes de grammaire Du Marsais adopts a rather si mil ar view lO : a proposition or sentence is said to be an assemblage of words that expresses either ajudgment or some special consideration of the mind which regards an object as being such-and-such. The common features of these two kinds of sentence are the fact that both contain as their immediate constituents a subject and an attribute which includes averb, and the fact th at both express an activity of the mind. The difference between the two species is established in two ways. The fint criterion is the mood of the verb: sentences with a verb in the indicative mood express judgments, whereas sentences with a verb in the subjunctive or imperative mood express a special way of viewing things. Further, Du Marsais points out that the act of judging associated with a declarative sentence has reference to an actual state of affairs which is supposed to exist independently of our way of thinking, while in the other cases the nexus between subject and attribute is limited to the manner in which the speaker views things in his mind. The examples that Du Marsais gives are such sentences as Soyez sage ('Be sensible'), Si vous étiez sage ('If you only were sensible'), Afin que vous soyez sage ('In order that you be sensible'). In all these constructions the verb is the sign of a ment al activity that links some qualification to a subject; but this linking takes the form of a command, a wish, or a condition, so that it is not a claim to the effect that the predication fits the world, but rather a view of the world as the speaker would like it to beo To put it into modern terminology, judgments have a thought-to-world direction of fit, whereas the other mental activities have a world-to-thought direction of fitII. Du Marsais also attempted to develop an adequate vocabulary for marking the difference between two kinds of sentence that is based on the criteria of the mood of the verb and of its corresponding function. He frequently uses the word proposition in a broad sense; in that sense the word designates either an indicative sentence expressing a judgment or a sentence containing a verb in another mood and expressing some other kind of viewing the nexus between subject and predicate. The difference between the two kinds of sentence is then brought out by calling the first kind proposition directe and the second kind proposition oblique. But occasionally he keeps to traditional usage by restricting proposition to an indicative sentence expressing ajudgment. Then it is contrasted with énonciation, the French version of enuntiatio, which was normally used as a synonym of propositio;' but by Du Marsais énonciation is employed as a generic term for all non-declarative sentences. In traditional terminology, the usual word for asen tence in general was oratio; 'the French equivalent oraison already occurs in the sixteenth century, besides sentence and clauSe!2. The word oratio, 10. Du Marsais 1792, I, p. 242 ff. 11. For the notion of direction of fit seeJ.R. Searle, 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts', in Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 1-29. 12. Cf. DONZÉ 1971, p. 219, n. 76; SAHLIN 1928, pp. 97-98.

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however, had two meanings, one derived from Aristotle's definition of lógos, the other stemming from the grammarians Dionysius Thrax and Priscian 13. In the Aristotelian sense, oratio stood for a group of words, regardless of whether it forms a complete sentence or not. For such a group of words Du Marsais uses the word phrase, which he characterizes as a generic term that is applied to every assemblage of mutually connected words, irrespective of whether it expresses a complete or an incomplete sense14 • On the other hand, Priscian had defined an oratio as a well-ordered group of words that makes known a complete thought. It is in this sense that Du Marsais often employs the word proposition. It took a long time, however, before the term in this broad sense was generally accepted; most grammarians adhered to the traditional narrow sense of the expres sion of a judgment 15 • Further, it is worth mentioning that Du Marsais has a somewhat wider conception of a compound proposition (proposition composée) than the authors of the Port-Royal Logic. Unlike the latter, he defines a compound proposition, which in rhetoric is called a period, as an assemblage of sentences th at are mutually linked by conjunctions and together express a complete sense. In a compound proposition or period there are as many propositions as there are finite verbs, each constituent proposition expressing either a judgment or a view of the mind that applies a qualification to a subject 16 • In this context the word proposition is clearly used in the broad sen se of a sentence or clause in general; and the not ion ofproposition composée is broadened accordingly. Finally, it is not surprising that the double usage ofproposition, both in a broad sense and in a narrow sense, could easily lead to a certain confusion. In the first sentence of his Principes de grammaire Du Marsais declares that a discours is an assemblage of propositions, énonciations, and périodes, all of which should be related to a principal purpose. But the next sentence gives a definition of proposition in the broad sense. 5.1.3. Du Marsais adopted the Port-Royal distinction bet ween principal propositions and incident al propositions, dividing the lat ter into restrictive and non-restrictive incident al propositions. As to the word que, he remarks that it joins sentences in two ways. In such a construction as Le livre que je lis ('The book which I am reading') the word que is the direct object of the verb that comes after it. But in Je dis que les gens de bien sont estimés ('I say that the righteous are held in esteem') que is taken as the direct object ofJe dis, as in Dico quod; and the proposition that comes aft er it is an explication of que1 7 • As it is most likely that Du Marsais considered que as a relative pronoun, he presumably meant to give the same paraphrase of this type of sentence as had been offered 13. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 33-35. 14. Du Marsais 1792, I, pp. 246-247. Cf. SAHLIN 1928, p. 97; CHEVALIER 1968, p. 608, p.683 . 15. Cf. SAHLIN 1928, p. 113. For earlier uses of propositio and enuntiatio in a broad sense see NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 147-148. 16. Du Marsais 1792, I, pp. 256-258. 17. Du Marsais 1792, I, p. 266.

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by the authors of the Port-Royal Logic, namely, 'I tell you something th at is: the righteous are held in esteem' (Cf. 4.4.2.). Understanding que as a contraction of une chose qui est, Du Marsais could regard une chose as the antecedent that is the direct object ofJe dis and les gens de bien sont estimés as an explication introduced by qui est. In several respects, then, Du Marsais followed the pattern of analysis that had been applied to the study oflanguage by the Port-Royal authors. But, besides his deviant concept ion of the nature of the verb, he showed a much clearer awareness of the difference between logical and grammatical analysis. As Ramus had done before him 18, Du Marsais realized that a logician and a grammarian look at quite different features of one and the same sentence and may so come to very different analyses. Whereas Ramus had laid great stress on the autonomous character of logic as the investigation of concepts and combinations of concepts, that is, of pure thought, Du Marsais entered the scene &om the opposite direction, as it were; his main concern was to delimit a proper domain for grammar and to guard it against encroachments from the side oflogic. In the Principes de grammaire he devotes a separate section to the explanation of the difference between a sentence considered from a grammatical point of view and a sentence considered from a logical point of view l9 • The grammarian pays heed to the relations in which the words occurring in the sentence stand to one another, while the logician directs his attention to the total meaning that results from putting the words together. The grammarian is interested in the proposition de l'élocution, that is, the spoken or written sentence by which a thought is expressed, whereas the logician is concerned with the proposition de l'entendement, the mental proposition. In analysing the mental proposition, the logician divides it into such parts as subject and attribute or cause and effect, regardless of the words by which those parts happen to be signified in spoken or written discourse. One of the examples given by Du Marsais is the sentence A lexandre, qui était roi de Macédoine, vainquit Darius (' Alexander, who was king ofMacedonia, defeated Darius'). From a grammatical viewpoint, this sentence contains a principal proposition and an incident al proposition, each of which has a subject and an attribute. But for the logician the words Alexandre, qui était roi de Macédoine stand for a single constituent, namely, the complex subjectconcept of the proposition of which the meaning of vainquit Darius is the attribute-concept. It is clear that, at least as far as declarative sentences are concerned, Du Marsais assigned the study of the various features that are found in spoken and written propositions to grammar20 , while he regarded the mental proposition that is expressed by the conventional signs as the proper subjectmatter of logic. Inasmuch as the mental proposition, which in this context seems to be considered as being primarily ajudgment, and the spoken or writ18. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 172-173. 19. Du Marsais 1792, J, pp. 273-279. 20. Cf. Du Marsais 1797, I, p. 273: La grammaire est donc la science ou I'art qui traite des mots en tant qu'ils sont les signes de nos pensées - - - .

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ten proposition have different structures, the logical analysis of a sentence will differ from the grammatical analysis.

5.2. Beauzée Nicolas Beauzée is the author of a Grammaire générale ou exposition raisonnée des éléments nécessaires du langage, which was published, in two volumes, at Paris in 1767. After the death ofDu Marsais he also contributed articles on linguistic subjects to Diderot' s Encyclopédie2 1 • 5.2.1. According to Beauzée, we use language in order to convey our thoughts and our knowledge to others. Knowledge consists in an act of judgment by which the mind perceives the intellectual existence of a thing in relation to some attribute. Beauzée expresses his agreement with 's Gravesande's conception of ajudgment as the perception of a relation between two ideas (Cf. 3.4.). But he prefers to replace the statement that the two ideas must be present to the mind by the statement that the subject exists in the mind as standing in a relation to some modification. When we judge, the existence ascribed to the subject need not be real existence; rather , it is an intellectual existence, that is, the existence which all objects of acts of thinking have in the understanding as long as we conceive of them. In this sense, even a square cirde may be said to have an intellectual existence in the understanding when we think of it and see that a square cirde is impossible. Likewise, abstract and gener al ideas, when we think of them in order to discover their properties, exist in the understanding even though they have no real existence in the world22 • The unit of language in which a piece of knowledge or a judgment is communicated to others is the proposition. In order to be an adequate expression of a judgment a proposition must have three constituents: one for the definite subject, another for the definite attribute, and an element that signifies the intellectual existence of the subject in relation to the attribute. In Beauzée's opinion, it is the signification of the intellectual existence of the subject in relation to the attribute that is characteristic of the finite verb. Accordingly, he regards the verb as the word par excellence, as the essence or the soul of speech. There is no discourse without propositions and there is no proposition without a verb 23 • It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to have a dear insight into the nature of the verb. Beauzée defines a verb by means of nearest genus and specific difference. Nouns, pronouns, adjectives, and verbs signify things (des êtres). But whereas nouns and pronouns signify things that are determined (des êtres déterminés), adjectives and verbs signify things that are not determined (des êtres indéterminés). 21. For a general survey of his linguistic theories see ROSJELLO 1967, pp. 150-166, and BARTLETT 1975. 22. Beauzée 1767, I, pp. 393-395; 11, pp. 5-6. 23. Beauzée 1767, J, p. 392, p. 395; 11, p. 207.

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The indetermination th at is typical of adjectives and verbs consists in their capability for being applied to something else; they include a vague and general reference to a complement. This capability for being applied to something else becomes an actual application when the adjective or verb is tied to an appropriate word by agreement with it in such respects as number and gender . The nearest genus, then, which is part of the de6.nition of averb, consists in a feature shared with adjectives, namely, the signi6.cation of things that are not determined. The speci6.c difference which distinguishes verbs from adjectives lies, according to Beauzée, in the fact that verbs comprise, besides the signi6.cation of things that are not determined, the precise idea of an intellectual existence in relation to an attribute24 • In other words, a 6.nite verb that is adjectival or concrete has two functions: one of denoting an attribute, that is, something that needs the support of something else to which it is assigned, the other of indicating, through its personal ending, the at least intellectual existence of a thing to which the attribute belongs. The substantive or abstract verb 'to be', on the other hand, indicates only the intellectual existence of a thing th at stands in relation to any attribute denoted by the predicate-term that comes after the copula25 • The main features of this doctrine are very similar to Du Marsais's conception of the verb. Both Du Marsais and Beauzée oppose the Port-Royal view th at a verb in the strict sense is a mere copula. According to them, every verb has also a categorematic signi6.cation in that it denotes either existence as such - in the case of the substantive verb - or existence in some modi6.ed manner - ifit is an adjectival verb. The only differenceis that Du Marsais describes the existence concerned as either realor imaginary existence, whereas Beauzée takes existence in the sen se of esse obiective, that is, as the existence which the objects of acts of thinking have in the understanding as long as they are conceived of. On his view, the personal ending of a 6.nite verb points to a person or a thing that exists only in the weak sense of being actually conceived of as that which is the subject of the attribute denoted by the verb as such. The main point, however, is that both of them are convinced that the tie between subject and attribute is not a separate and extrinsic element, but that the attribute according to its speci6.c nature caUs for complet ion by a subject; this intrinsic need is reflected by the grammatical fact that the verb has to agree with the subject of the sentence26 • In addition to containing a general indication of the person or thing that is to be the subject of the sentence, a 6.nite verb is also chàracterized by a de6.nite mood. According to Beauzée, French has four personal moods, namely, the in-

24. Beauzée 1767, I, p. 397, pp . 402-404; 11, p. 205. 25 . Beauzée 1767, I, pp. 405-406 . 26. Compare Soto 1554, p. 20 R: Non enim unio in mente est sicut quando filum unit duo frusta panni; sed uniuntur duo conceptus propter congruentiam grammaticaiem. Mirum est concedant isti formam se ipsa uniri materiae et accidens subiecto et negent praedicatum uniri subiecto. Respondemus ergo quod, sicut Ir 'homo albus' congrue iunguntur tamquam adiectivum substantivo, ita Ir 'Petrus amat' in mente.

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dicative, the imperative, the suppositive, and the subjunctive27 • Of these four, the indicative mood serves to indicate purely and directly the intellectual existence of a subject in relation to an attribute. That is to say, it is the pure expression of the essential function of a Snite verb, without any of the accessory ideas conveyed by the ot her moods. Like the imperative and the suppositive, but unlike the subjunctive, the indicative indicates the intellectual existence of a subject in relation to an attribute in a direct manner in the sense th at it is the immediate expres sion of the principal thought that one wants to communicate. In this respect the direct moods differ from the subjunctive, which has the function of expressing a judgment that is accessory and subordinate to the principal thought. As we saw in 5.1.2., Du Marsais deSned a proposition as an assemblage of words that, by the totality of the relations in which the words stand to one another, expresses either a judgment or some special consideration of the mind which regards an object as being such-and-such. Accordingly, he divided sentences into direct propositions, which express ajudgment, and oblique propositions, which contain a verb in another mood than the indicative and express a ment al view that is different from judgrnent. Beauzée disagrees with this distinction; in his opinion, there is only one kind of proposition, since every proposition is the complete expres sion of a judgment28 • For if a judgment is the perception of the intellectual existence of a subject in a certain relation to a certain attribute, it is hard to see in wh at respect a judgrnent differs from the considerations of the mind that Du Marsais takes to be typical of oblique propositions. As a matter of fact, every Snite verb indicates the intellectual existence of a subject in relation to an attribute. The only difference between the indicative mood and the other moods lies in the fact that a Snite verb in the indicative mood is the pure expression of th at form of intellectual existence, whereas Snite verbs in other moods signify, in addition to that form of intellectual existence, certain accessory ideas. Beauzée compares the difference between a Snite verb in the indicative and Snite verbs in other moods to the difference between the nominative case of a noun and its oblique cases. The oblique cases preserve the meaning that the nominative case expresses in an unalloyed form, but add to it the accessory ideas that are typical of the nonnominative cases. It is clear that Beauzée tended to give the word jugement a broader sense than it normally had. In his usage, the word applies indifferently to all the various views that the mind can take of a predicative conception of a subject and an attribute. The predicative conception of a subject and an attribute that is the common object of all those attitudes is viewed in pure form by a judgment in the narrow sense, which is expressed by a sentence with an indicative verb, while the other views, which are associated with the non-indicative moods, mix the consideration of the predicative conception with various other ideas. By 27. Beauzée 1767, 11, pp. 207-208. 28. Beauzée 1767,11, pp. 4-7.

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broadening the meaning ofjugement in this way Beauzée succeeded in reconciling the logicians' view that a proposition expresses ajudgment with the grammarians' conception of a proposition as any group of words dorninated by a finite verb, whether indicative or not. One might also say that Beauzée adapted the use ofjugement to the enlarged domain of application that Du Marsais had given to the word proposition. 5.2.2. Beauzée himself contrasts his conception of the nature of the verb with the definition given by the Port-Royal authors, that a verb is a vox signiflcans affirmationem 29 • Besides observing th at this definition has the formal defect of not mentioning the nearest genus, he denies that in such a sentence as Petrus est aJfirmans the word est indicates affirmation on the part of the speaker, whereas affirmans signifies an affirmation that is ascribed to the subject of the sentence. In Beauzée's opinion, the verb est cannot indicate affirmation on the part of the speaker, since its ending points to a third person. That means that a third person, in this case Peter, has intellectual existence in the speaker'~ rnind, or is actually conceived ofby the speaker, in relation to the attribute affirmans. Wh at the verb est signifies is not an affirmation on the part of the speaker, but the general idea of the intellectual existence of some subject of the type indicated by its ending. Which particular subject the speaker has in mind can be found out by looking for the word with which the verb agrees. Consequently, an act of affirming can be attributed to the speaker only by giving the verb the appropria te ending and making the speaker the subject of the sentence, as in Ego sum affirmans. Moreover , the Port-Royal authors are wrong in thinking that affirmation on the part of the speaker has to be expressed by a special word. In order to prove his point Beauzée contrasts affirmation with negation: affirmation is nothing but uttering a word with a positive sen se (la simple position de la signiflcation de chaque mot), while negation is the utterance of the same word in combination with a sign that reverses the original sense. As a rule, therefore, affirmation does not stand in need ofbeing expressed separately; it is only negation that has to be marked in a special way. Beauzée concludes th at affirmation cannot possibly be the distinctive feature of the verb, because it is part of the nature of every word with a positive or affirmative meaning. Further, Beauzée caUs attention to the fact that the Port-Royal definition is hedged by too many exceptions and restrictions. The authors decIare it to be valid only for the principal use of the verb, thereby leaving out of consideration all moods except the indicative. But as a verb is generally considered to comprise all its various forms, an adequate definition should cover this totality. According to Beauzée, the unsatisfactoriness of the Port-Royal definition is particularly obvious in the way the authors deal with the infinitive. In certain cases, for example Volo bibere ('I want to drink'), the infinitive is classified as 29. Beauzée 1767, I, pp. 395-402. For some English grammarians who disputed the criterion of affirmation see MICHAEL 1970, pp. 368-369.

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a noun, whereas in other cases, for instance Scio ma/um esse fugiendum ('I know that one ought to refrain from doing evil'), the in6nitive is regarded as a verb because it preserves the meaning of affirmation 30 • Finally, the nature of a verb cannot be adequately characterized by the function of signifying affirmation, because, as the Port-Royal authors themselves admit, there are several other kinds of word that also signify affirmation. It is true that the authors make a distinction between affirmation in so far as it is merely conceived of (afflrmation conçue) and af6rmation in so far as it is an act performed by the very utterance of certain words (afflrmation produite), but in Beauzée' s eyes the need of this distinction, even if it were justi6ed, would be another sign of the defectiveness of the de6nition of the verb offered by the Port-Royal authors.

5.3. Conclusion In the old dispute concerning the question as to whether a proposition is to be divided into two or into three constituents, the Port-Royal authors had resolutely opted for a tripartite analysis. For them, a proposition consists of a subject-term, a predicate-term, and a separate copula by means of which the attribute is affirmed of the subject. Strictly speaking, the copula is the only verb; accordingly, they de6ned a verb as a word signifying affirmation. Du Marsais and Beauzée, on the other hand, sided with the supporters of a bipartite analysis, considering every verb as comprising both a categorematic signi6cation and some element th at couples the particular concept denoted by the verb to the subject. In their opinion, even the verb 'to be' is never a mere copula; it always has the categorematic signi6cation of existence. A second point at which Du Marsais and Beauzée have been found to diverge from the Port-Royal doctrine is their tendency to broaden the meaning of the word proposition by no longer restricting its use to declarative sentences, which are of special importance to the logician, but extending it to sentences in general, regardless of the mood of the verb. Although indicative sentences still occupy a somewhat privileged place in their theories, the extended use of the word proposition is a sign of the growing awareness among grammarians th at from their particular point of view the similarities between sentences in the indicative mood and sentences in other moods deserve at least as much attention as the differences. While Du Marsais held that among propositions in the broad sen se it is only a subset that corresponds to an inner act of judging, Beauzée went so far as to apply the word jugement to all ways of viewing the predicative relation between a conceived subject and an attribute, so th at in his usage the fields of application of the words proposition and jugement coincide again, albeit in a manner that differs considerably from traditional practice. It is not surprising, then, that Beauzée refused to accept the Port-Royal conception of a verb as essentially signifying affirmation. 30. Arnauld, Lancelot 1676, 11, 17. Cf. also NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 67-68.

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6. GEULINCX'S CONTRIBUTION TO CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC

In 1662, the year in which Arnauld and Nicole published La logique ou l'art de penser, Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669) brought out his Logica fundamentis suis, a quibus hactenus collapsa fuerat, restituta. Geulincx had studied and taught at Louvain; but in 1658 he had left Louvain for Leiden, at the same time becoming a Calvinist. As we saw in 3.1.1., he lectured on Descartes's Principia philosophiae and subscribed to the Cartesian voluntas theory of judgment. Although there are no traces of that doctrine in the Logica, this remarkable work is clearly influenced by the general spirit ofDescartes's philosophy. In particular, it shows many points of resemblance to the Port-Royal Grammar of 1660. Besides expounding some relevant features of Geulincx's philosophy oflogic, I will also devote part of this chapter to his distinction bet ween a thing in itself and the thing as it appears to the knowing subject in thought and language. As Geulincx's view on this matter may have been a source of inspiration to Burthogge, who studied medicine at Leiden, the chapter will be concluded with a few remarks about the latter's elaboration of that distinction.

6.1. Indicators of mental acts as performed 6.1.1. According to Geulincx, the first rule to be observed in giving a proper definition is that one should not try to define that which is already sufficiently clear. Among those things which cannot be clarified by a definition he reckons the operations of the understanding (mens, intellectus) and of the will (animus, voluntas) of which we are immediately aware in our own mind. In addition to the clarity gained by introspecting our thoughts and feelings, we mayalso characterize ment al acts by calling attent ion to those small but well-known words which are used to signal that such an act is being performed. For example, est is the typical mark of an act of affirming, non of an act of denying, ergo of an act of inferring, et and vel of acts of conjoining and disjoining, while omnis and aliquis are signs that a term is distributed or taken particularly. Geulincx calls such a mark of a mental act nota, explaining that it is a sign of an act as performed (signum actus ut exerciti), th at is, a sign by which we signify such an act as affirmation or denial, love or hate, not simply, as would be the case when we would use a noun denoting that act, but rat her as it is here and now performed 99

by us (prout hic et nunc a nobis exercetur). The particle an, for instance, is an indicator of an act of posing a question; by ut tering that word we signify that we are posing a question, that we are here and now performing an act of questioning. Besides words or particles, we also use other means to indicate the character of a mental act as performed. EspeciaUy when acts of the will are concerned, it is the intonation or the modulation of the voice which indicates whether we are posing a question or giving a command, whether we are sad, joyous, or angry. Gestures and facial expressions serve the same purpose. As, however, acts of the will are not true or false, they do not pertain to logic; accordingly, Geulincx leaves them out of account!. 6.1.2. This is perhaps the best place to add a few remarks about the historical background of some features of Geulincx' sapproach and also of those points of the Port-Royal doctrine to which his view has a certain similarity (Cf. 4.2.1., 4.3.2 ., and 5.2.2.). In particular, I want to caU attention to some texts that may shed more light on the pair actus exercitus/actus significatus. In a treatise on the properties oflinguistic expressions th at was written about 12002 , words are divided into dictiones significativae per se, that is, categorematic signs, and dictiones significativae per accidens, that is, such syncategorematic signs as prepositions and conjunctions. Categorematic words are again divided into words that signify a concept and words that signify an affect 3 • The form of an affect or an exercised form (forma affectus sive forma exercita) is said to be a form that is not apprehended by someone who thinks of it but is rather a movement in the soul by which it is moved when it thinks of something else. For example, the word utinam signifies an act of desiring or wishing, not as it is thought of and apprehended (non prout est cogitatum et apprehensum) but as it is a movement in the soul. In general, this way of signifying an affect is typical of interjections. Such categorematic words as desiderium and gaudium, on the other hand, signify a concept, that is, something as it is apprehended and thought of in the rnind. This distinction between words that have a merely expressive function and words that have a descriptive function was based upon the difference between those faculties of the soul that are of a concupiscible or irascible type and the apprehensive faculties 4 • In a treatise on syncategorematic signs which is, perhaps wrongly, ascribed to Robert Bacon and dates from the beginning of the thirteenth century, the distinction between significare per modum affectus and significare per modum conceptus is put to a somewhat different use. According to the author, the proper

1. Geulincx 1891-1893, J, p. 176, pp. 403-405, pp . 462-463 . 2. Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum, in DE RIJK 1967, 11, 2, pp. 708-709. 3. A division of words into interjections, which signify a mentis affectum, and those words which signify a mentis conceptum is also found in Robert Kilwardby and in several other authors who flourished about the middle of the thirteenth century. Cf. PJNBORG 1967, p. 50, and BRAAKHUIS 1979, J, p. 109, p. 432 . 4. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', p. 87.

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function of the word non is to negate (negare); or, rather , it is the speaker who negates or denies, using the word non as an instrument. As no word signifies its own function, it is misleading to say that non signifies negation; it does not signify negation, but it negates (non significat negationem, sed negat). The intended difference mayalso be brought out by saying that the noun negatio and the verb negare sigriify per modum conceptus, whereas non signifies per modum affectus. When the mind apprehends two things, for instance man and ass, which do not belong together, it is moved by a feeling of dissent; the external indication (nota) of this inner dis sent is the word non. In the same vein, the syncategorematic words omnis ('every'), tantum ('only'), si ('if'), et ('and'), vel ('or'), an ('whether'), praeter ('except'), do not signify their function per modum conceptus; rather , they signify per modum affectus, that is to say, they are external marks of a certain state of mind. Every syncategorematic word is an indication of some affect of the soul (omne syncategorema est nota alicuius afJectus animiJ. In another treatise on syncategorematic words, written about 1230 by Johannes Pagus, a similar view is presented in a slightly different terminology. Although afJectus occurs once, in the combination actus vel affectus, the author seems to prefer the word actus. In dealing with tantum and solus he rejects the view that they signify exclusion, on the ground that exclusion is an act which is performed by means of those words (exclusio est actus qui exercetur per praedictas dictiones). No more than the sentence Socrates currit does signify the act of affirmat ion which is performed by means of it, does an exclusive word signify the act of exclusion performed by it. Therefore, these words are not called exclusive because they signify exclusion (ab exclusione significata). Further, the author distinguishes between two ways in which composition or affirmative predication may be signified. A verb signifies composition inasmuch as it is an act of compounding, while the words compositio and compositum signify a composition as it is a thing (ut est resf. In the fourth decade of the thirteenth century Petrus Hispanus composed a treatise on syncategorematic words in which the technical vocabulary is developed still further. Negation in the sen se of a sign or instrument of denying may be signified in three different ways. The noun negatio signifies it as a substance, while the verb nego and the participles negans and negatus signify it as an activity. In these cases negation is taken as something conceived of (ut concepta sive per modum conceptus). But negation mayalso be taken as something exercised or performed (ut exercita); then it is signified by the particle non. A concept is said to be in the mind when not the things themselves but their likenesses are present in it, whereas an affectus sive exercitus is really in the mind, as pain is when I am ill, or as running (cursus) is in my body when I am actually running. In discussing tantum and solus Petrus Hispanus notes that they are called exclusive words, not because they signify exclusion, but because they perform that function (ab exclusione exercita et non ab exclusione significata), just as an ax 5. Cf. BRAAKHUIS 1979, I, p. 109, pp. 141-142, p. 148, p. 153, p. 160, p. 162, p. 164. 6. Cf. BRAAKHUIS 1979, I, pp. 173-174, p. 195, p. 205, p. 222, p. 232.

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(securis) is called a chopping-tool, not because the word signifies the act of chopping, but because an ax exercises the function of chopping (ab incisione exercita et non ab incisione significata). Similarly, praeter is called an exceptive word, not because it signifies exception, but because it discharges the function of excepting (non ab exceptione significata - - - sed ab exceptione exercita)1. The distinction between exercising a function and signifying a function is also found in the Syncategoremata which William of Sherwood wrote towards the middle of the thirteenth century. In connection with the word si he points out that there is a difference bet ween signifying the relation between antecedent and consequent in so far as it is thereby actually established (secundum quod exercetur) and signifying it in so far as it is conceived of (secundum quod concipiturJ. A few decades later Henry of Ghent remarks with respect to negation that the words negatio and nego signify it as a thing (ut res significata), whereas non indicates it as a mode of signifying or conceiving, that is, as exercised (ut modus significandi et intelligendi et ita ut exercita). With regard to tantum, solus, praeter, si, an, and vel, he emphasizes that these words do not signify exclusion etc., but that they exercise a certain function in a sentence (in oratione ipsam exercentp. A remarkable compromise was proposed by Nicholas ofParis, in a treatise on syncategorematic words that was written about 1240 and has recently been edited by Braakhuis. Nicholas holds that everything that signifies does so either per modum concepti or per modum affecti. Clear cases are interjections, which signify an affect of the soul, and nouns, pronouns, verbs, and participles, which signify their significates in so far as they are conceived of as things (ut rem). N ow it is evident that such syncategorematic words as tantum and praeter do not signify in the same way as interjections do; so they do not signify an affect of the soul. Neither, however, do they signify in the same way as nouns, pronouns, verbs, and participles signify. If signification is taken in the latter sense, it is incorrect to say that tantum and praeter signify exclusion and exception; rat her , they exercise the function of excluding and excepting. No linguistic expres sion signifies, in that sense, the function which it exercises, nor does it exercise what it signifies; the verb cumt, for instanee, signifies running but it does not perform that activity. Faced, then, with the question as to whether syncategorematic words signify per modum concepti or per modum aJfectus, Nicholas tries to make the best of both worlds by defending the view that such words signify per modum concepti, but in a manner that is different from the signification of nouns and verbs, and that at the same time they signify an affect, but an affect that is different from the affects of the soul signified by interjections. The syncategorematic word praeter, for example, is said to signify exception per modum concepti. But it does not signify exception as a thing, as the noun exceptio and the verb excipere, which are signs of things, do; rather, praeter signifies ex7. BRAAKHUIS 1979, I, p. 252, pp. 265-266, p. 269, p. 277. 8. O'DONNELL 1941, p. 79. Cf. BRAAKHUIS 1979, I, p. 316. 9. Cf. BRAAKHUIS 1979, I, p. 346, p. 354, p. 356, p. 359, pp. 361-362, pp. 371-372.

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cept ion as a sign of a sign (sicut signum signi) and as having its signification through another sign (ut per alterum significativa). The qualification sicut signum signi is probably to be understood in the light of wh at is said concerning the signs of quantity in the Summae Metenses, a treatise on logical problems th at may perhaps be ascribed to the same author. The signs of quantity are called signs, according to that treatise, because they signify the mode of signifying or suppositing possessed by the term to which they are added. They are signs of signs (signa signomm), that is, they signify the modes of suppositing in signs of things (significant modos supponendi in signis rerumyo. The expression per alterum significativa characterizes praeter as a syncategorematic word, in contradistinction to a categorematic word, which is per se significativa ll . The syncategorematic word praeter, then, signifies per modum concepti, but it does so in a peculiar way. At the same time, however, Nicholas does not altogether disagree with those who hold that syncategorematic words signify an affectus, provided that the word affectus is not taken as standing for the kind of affect that is signified by an interjection. If one wishes to say that a syncategorematic word signifies an affectus, Nicholas does not disapprove of that usage so long as affectus is understood as the way in which a categorematic sign is modified in its relation to that which it signifies (affectus qui est signi in relatione ad signatumY2. This conception of the signification of syncategorematic words in general seems to derive from the special case of the signs of quantity; omnis and aliquis determine the mode of suppositing of the categorematic term to which they are added. In the same vein, Nicholas interprets the signification of praeter in praeter Socratem as an indication that the categorematic term Socrates stands for Socrates in an exceptive way; the exception i.ndicated by praeter is an affectus in so far as it is the specific manner in which the categorematic sign Socrates is related to that which it signifies. The word praeter is a signum signi because it indicates the mode of signifying of a categorematic sign 13 • In Summa logicae, I, 66, Ockham points out that many philosophers have fallen into error by disregarding the distinction between an actus exercitus and an actus significatus. In particular, he draws attention to the difference between such sentences as Homo est animal and Animal praedicatur de homine. In the first

10. DE RIJK 1967, 11, 1, p . 482 . 11. Cf. DE RIJK 1967,11,2, p. 708, where a dictio signiflcativa per se is contrasted with a dictio signiflcativa per accidens. 12. Braakhuis helieves that signatum should not he read as signiflcatum and translates it hy •that which is used as a sign' (BRAAKHUIS 1979, I, p. 474). He is proved wrong, I think, hy the passage in DE RIJK 1967, 11, 2, pp. 710-711, where it is said that significa re as used of linguistic expressions indicates a certain relation in which a sign in so far as it is a sign stands to that which it signifies (relationem sive simi/itudinem quandam et convenientiam signi in quantum est signum ad signatum). A little further on we find : 'SignifIcare' enim dictum de utente praedicat agere, 'signifIcare' autem dictum de voce praedicat relationem sive convenientiam signi ad signatum. As in line 32 of p. 710 signiflcatum is apparently considered as the correct reading, there seems to he no reason to prefer signatum at the other places. 13 . Cf. BRAAKHUIS 1979, 11, pp. 88-89, pp. 132-133, p. 168, pp. 337-340.

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sentence the copula est is the sign of an actus exercitus, that is, of an act of predication that is performed by means of that syncategorematic expression. In the second sentence, on the other hand, this act of predication is signified by the verb praedicari; the original act of predication is no longer an actus exercitus but has become an actus signiflcatus 14 • If we apply the distinction intentio prima/intentio secunda to syncategorematic acts as weIl as to categorematic conceptions - an application of which Ockham would approve; see Summa logicae, 1,4 and 12 we mayalso say that the predication that is an actus exercitus in Homo est animal is an intentio prima, a first-order mode of conceiving, whereas that same predication becomes an actus signiflcatus in Animal praedicatur de homine by being the significa te of the verb praedicari, which is an intentio secunda. As a matter of fact, later writers regularly associated the distinction intentio prima/intentio secunda with the distinction actus exercitus/actus signiflcatus. Alsted, for instance, who flourished in the first decades of the seventeenth century, compares the two sentences Deus non est ut homo ('God is not like man') and Deus et homo sunt disparata ('God and man are disparate concepts'). The first sentence is called a praedicatio realis or exercita; it contains only words signifying first-order concepts. The second sentence contains a word signifying a second-order concept and is therefore a praedicatio notionalis or signata. Alsted even goes so far as to explain the word signata, no doubt wrongly, by pointing out that the second sentence contains a logical sign, by which he apparently means a sign of a second-order concept 15 • 6.1.3. Let us now return to the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar and to Geulincx. As we saw in 4.2.1., the former drew a distinction between the objects of thought and the forms or manners of thinking. To the forms or manners of thinking belong, first of all, affirmations, of which the bare copula is the typical mark; further, acts of conjoining or disjoining, marked by such words as et and vel, and acts of the will, of which interjections and non-indicative moods of the verb are characteristic marks. In the same way, Geulincx divided mental operations into three classes. The first class comprises such acts of the understanding as affirmation, denial, supposition, distribution; the results of these acts are categorical propositions. The second class contains all those acts of the understanding which somehow connect two or more categorical propositions. And the third class consists of acts of the will which find their proper expression in non-indicative sentences, which are neither true nor false. Special marks of such acts of the will are gestures, facial expressions, modulations of the voice, and also certain words, for example an for questioning, hem for calling, vae for threatening, 0 for exclaiming 16 • Now if we look only at the words 14. For similar considerations see, for instanee, Burleigh 1955, pp . 16-17. There the sentence Homo distribuitur pro omni homine is contrasted with Omnis homo est anima/, in which the distribution that is signified in the first sentence is exercised (in qua exercetur distributio). 15. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', p. 193. For another example see HICKMAN 1980, pp. 123-125, pp. 130-13l. 16. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 176.

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or lexical elements th at are considered to be the typical marks of these three kinds of act or operation, it is a striking fact that they belong precisely to those word-classes which played such an important role in the history of the distinction actus exercitus/actus significatus. The words that are characteristic marks of acts of the understanding are syncategorematic signs, while the marks of acts of the will are interjections or particles in so far as they have a merely expressive function. The truth of the matter is, I believe, that the distinction between objects of thought and manners of thinking or mental operations is a reflection of the traditional distinction between significare per modum conceptus and significare per modum affectus. Categorematic terms, particularly nouns and verbs, signify something that is conceived ofby the mind in an act of simple apprehension. They provide the material for the other activities of the mind, which are either syncategorematic acts, that is, intellectual modes of conceiving things in a certain way, or various sorts of appetite and feeling. In the earliest treatises on syncategorematic signs there was a general tendency to group syncategorematic words and marks of appetite and feeling under the one rubric affectus. Traces of this somewhat shaky combination are clearly discernible in the trichotomies of the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar and Geulincx. When the latter defines a nota as a signum actus ut exerciti, he is still using the traditional term nota 17 for both syncategorematic words and merely expressive words. Wh at these types of words have in common is the feature that neither of them signifies per modum conceptus in the strict sense in which this phrase applies to nouns and verbs. Although the acts which they help to perform can be signified per modum conceptus, these notae themselves are nothing but instruments by means of which the various operations and movements of the mind are actually exercised. As a logician, of courst:, Geulincx has no difficulty in separating again wh at he has united; he is interested only in notae of syncategorematic modes of conceiving which contribute to the formation of thoughts that are expressed by indicative sentences and are either true or false. At the same time, in order to describe the offices exercised by these notae in the performance of logïcally relevant acts of thinking he has to ascend to the level of second-order concepts which are expressed by nouns and verbs th at signify those acts per modum conceptus, such as affirmatio, affirmare, negatio, negare. In other words, the logician employs intentiones secundae, signified by nouns and verbs, in order to describe the syncategorematic acts performed by reasoners, thereby turning the actus exerciti, which are the subject-matter oflogic, into actus significati.

6.2. Categorical affirmation and denial 6.2.1. The very first sentence of Geulincx' s Logica states that affirmation is the root oflogic (radix logices est affirmatio). By the word affirmatio he means first and 17. Compare the Boethian translation of Aristotle, De interpretatione, 16 b 6-7: Verbum autem est quod consigniflcat tempus, cuius pars nihil extra signiflcat, et est semper eorum quae de altero praedicantur nota.

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foremost the ment al act of affirming as a certain mode of thinking (certus modus cogitandi noster)1a, though sometimes he also uses it for the product of such an act . While each of us daily performs countless acts of affirmation, it is a remarkable fact that hardly anyone ever reflects on that operation; its elucidation is left to philosophers. But even philosophers are unable to give a definition of something that is so fundament al and so familiar. It is true that they try to explain the meaning of affirmatio by saying that it is a declarative sentence which puts parts together (quae partes coniungit) or that it is an act of giving a predicate to the appropriate subject (affirmatio quasi largitur praedicatum suo subiecto)19; but then they are only using metaphors . Actually, all they can do is to give examples or to contrast affirmation with sentences that serve some other purpose than affirming. In addition, it may help to point out that sentences of which the grammarians say that they are in the indicative mood are exactly those sentences which the logicians call affirmations. Further, it is useful to consider equivalents of affirmatio in other languages. In Dutch, for instance, one would translate it by verzekering ('assurance'); every sentence to which it makes sense to prefix the phrase Ik verzeker u ('I assure you') is an affirmation 20 • Finally, one may offer some paraphrase; for example, that affirming is an act of saying, either mentally or by means of spoken or written language, that one thing is another thing, that it is so, that something is true 21 • In this connection, it is worthy of note that Geulincx very seldom employs such words as assentiri, dissentin"22, iudicare, iudicium for the mental act of affirming. The reason why he prefers affirmare and affirmatio is perhaps that these words can be used more readily for both ment al and verbal acts 23 , and also for acts that have merely predicative force as weIl as for acts that are fully assertive. The mark (nota) by which an intellectual act of affirming is externally characterized is the bare copula est. Whereas the extreme terms that become subject and predicate of an affirmative categorical proposition are its body, the verb in the pure and proper sense of a mere copula is its sou}24. Geulincx contrasts the copula of an affirmative categorical proposition, which he calls copula verba lis, with the grammatical copula (copula grammaticalis) which, in the form of such conjunctions as et, vel, si, combines two categorical propositions into a hypothetical or molecular proposition. The verbal copula and the grammatical copula are the principal indicators of intellectual acts of the mind, that is, of those acts or operations which, in contradistinction to acts of appetite or feeling, have reference to truth or falsity. Besides the verbal copula and the gram-

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 2~ .

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Geulincx 1891-1893, Geulincx 1891-1893, Geulincx 1891-1893, Geulincx 1891-1893, Geulincx 1891-1893, Geulincx 1891-1893, Geulincx 1891-1893,

I, p. 459 . I, pp . 200-201, p. 405 . I, pp. 457-458 . I, p. 175, pp. 182-183, p. 201 , pp. 234-235; 11, p. 70. I, p. 438 . I, p. 459 . I, p. 177.

matical copula, there is a third kind of mark of intellectual acts of the mind, which Geulincx calls nota pura; the examples he gives are the nota praecisiva, such as quatenus, in quantum, and the nota conditionalis or suppositiva, such as si, sit25 • When we use the latter indicators as a sign that we are performing an act of assumption, th ere is some reference to truth and falsity inasmuch as we assume that something is true, without, however, knowing whether it is true or false. Whereas we cannot utter such marks as est, et, vel in a meaningful way and in suitable circumstances without committing ourselves to the truth of wh at we say, an act of assumption can be performed without such commitment, although th at which is assumed is either true or false (licet ad veritatem falsitatemve referatur, potest tamen sine veritate exerceri). If I say Petrus sit bos, ergo et bestia erit, then the three words Petrus sit bos taken by themselves do not yet embody any claim to truth; I assume that Peter is an ox and aft er that assumption has been completed there follows an actual claim to truth, associated with the assertion that then he will also be a brute. Geulincx lays great stress on the distinction between a mere assumption, which is not concerned with actual truth or falsity, and affirmation or assent, which consists in committing oneself to the truth of what is said. At the beginning of his Disputationes metaphysicae he enumerates four types of speech act connected with the nota suppositiva. We often avail ourselves of fictions in order to facilitate the understanding of something that is rather complicated. In logical reasonings we make assumptions in order to see what consequences follow from them. Thirdly, denial is directed towards an affirmative proposition which has been put before the mind and whose truth is rejected. Finally, the same non-committing attitude is adopted when people relate things said by others. In all those cases we propound something that is either true or false - perhaps more often false than true - as if it were true, without, however, committing ourselves to its truth. The same applies to such a sentence as Homo quatenus anima I non ratiocinatur ('Man in so far as he is an animal does not reason'). The first three words indicate the performance of an act of separating (praecidere) one aspect from a whole for special consideration; this act may be completed before any claim to truth has been effected26 • Like the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar, Geulincx restricts the function

25. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 463; 11, pp. 16-17, pp. 469-471. A diagram may be helpfui :

nota (actus ut exerciti) animi, vo/untatis

mentis, intellectus nota pura praecisiva

I

suppositiva

copula verba/is

I

grammatica/is

26. For propositiones redup/icarlles and the conceptus praecisivus of which particulae redup/icantes are the characteristic mark see also Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp. 273-274.

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of a verb in the proper sen se to being an indication of the performance of a mental act that consists in attributing a predicate to a subject. Ideally, the verb as a nota afflrmandi should be put at the beginning of the sentence, as is often done with marks of questioning and exclaiming; then the speaker would start with making it clear to the hearer what kind of act he is going to perform (ut sic prima fronte, quem actum celebrare vellet, audienti subindicaret loquensf7. More imp ortantly, however, the finite verb as it is found in naturallanguages often contains elements that are foreign to its purely logical office; in a logically ideallanguage such elements should be expressed separately. Amo ('I love') , for instance, should be read as Ego nunc sum amans, with a tenseless copula and separate words for person, time, and predicate28 • In this connection, Geulincx draws a distinction bet ween temporal affirmation (afflrmare in tempore) and atemporal affirmation (afflrmare extra tempus seu in aeternitate). Such affirmations as Corpus est extensum ('A body is extended') are eternal truths which do not fall under the category of time. On the other hand, contingent affirmations of the type Carolus est rex (' Charles is king'), Carolus fuit exsul (' Charles has been an exile'), Carolus uxorem ducet ('Charles will take a wife') cannot be true unless the time for which they are intended to be valid is somehow made known. Understood as an eternal affirmation Carolus est rex is simply false; its proper interpretation is Carolus nunc est rex, with a tenseless copula and an indispensable separate reference to time. The other two examples, which refer to the past and to the future, should be regarded as equivalent to Carolus nunc est fuens exsul and to Carolus nunc estfuturus (erens) uxorem ducens, in which the copula is tenseless and the reference to the past and to the future has been shifted to the predicate. In this way, all contingent affirmations can be turned into propositions about the present 29 • 6.2.2. Geulincx restricts the word propositio to non-compound declarative sentences (enuntiatio simplex). Such a propositio is either affirmative or negative. An affirmative propositio, however, is simpIer than a negative one in that a negative propositio consists of an affirmation and the adverb non, which indicates that an act of denying is performed. The word negatio is used with several nuances of meaning: it stands for the act of denying, either mental or verbal, for the product of that act, and also for the instrument of denying, the negating word non 30 • Geulincx does not admit the so-called negatio infinitans, a negation added to a noun, adjective, or adverb. According to him, the particle non is an

27. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 460. 28. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp. 464-465; cf. pp. 176-177. 29. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp . 176-177, p. 196, p. 236, p. 257, p. 462, pp. 464-465. Compare Jungius 1957, pp. 68-69, where the sentence Puer diligenter studiis incumbens erit doctus is considered to be equivalent to Puer diligenter studiis incumbens est futurus doctus, and Senex fuit puer to Senex est is qui fuit puer. Cf. also Weise 1719, p. 6, with the example Qui fuit fortis in bello, iam (in praesenti) est is qui erit honoratus in pace. 30. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 177, p. 237, pp. 438-439.

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adverbial variant of Jalsum and can therefore fulfil its negating function only with regard to a complete declarative sentence (negatio non potest cadere nisi in enuntiationem)31. Further, he disagrees with the traditional analysis of such a negative proposition as Non sto or Ego non sum stans, according to which ego is the subject, stans is the predicate, and non sum indicates that the predicate is removed from the subject32 • His own view is that Ego non sum stans should be interpreted as the affirmation that the included affirmation that I am standing is not the case or false. A denial presupposes that an affirmation - in this case Ego sum stans - has been put before the mind; of this afflrmatio inclusa the subject is ego and the predicate is stans, while the whole afflrmatio inclusa is the propositio negata. This included affirmation, however, does not have the force it would have if it were uttered in another context and by itself (non id va lens quidem, quod alibi et seorsum posita valeret); it is only entertained or assumed (sed saltem supposita). Geulincx holds that the status of those fictions, assumptions, and reports which he offers as examples of acts that are marked by a nota suppositiva may guide us to a correct understanding of the status of an included affirmation. The included affirmation is posited only in order to be, as it were, overturned (evertere) or wiped out (expungere) by a subsequent act of denying. The result is that the included affirmation does not remain intact and unimpaired (integra, illibata) but is destroyed and shattered (corrupta refractaque) by the act of denying, like a ship by a storm33 • In brief, the included affirmation as such . does not possess any assertive force; the little force lent to it by the original act of positing is annulled by the denial directed at it. Obviously, the included affirmation is at best a merely apprehensive proposition. The included affirmation becomes the subject34 of the predicate falsum and the whole negative proposition (propositio negans) is an act of affirming this predicate of the accusative-plus-infinitive phrase that contains the included affirmation; for example Petrus non est doctus is equivalent to Petrum esse doctum est falsum. Likewise, the modal adverbs necessario, forsitan, possibile are said to be variants of predicates that are attributed to affirmations in the accusative-plusinfinitive form. In point of fact, a negative proposition is a species of a modal declarative sentence35 • Although a proposition may be expressed in a negative form and is then formaliter et expresse a denial, it is always equivalent to an affirmation that the included sentence is false or that it is true that the included

31. 32. 33. 34.

Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 465, p. 499. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp. 465-466. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 177, p. 200; 11, pp. 16-17. In the Disputationes metaphysicae (Geulincx 1891-1893, 11, p. 471) Geulincx plays with the double meaning of suppositum, namely, subject and that which is posited as true. Compare Hobbes, De corpore, 1,3,3: Concretum autem est quod rei a/icuius quae existere supponitur nomen est, ideoque quandoque suppositum - - - appellatur. 35. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp. 255-259, p. 438, pp. 461-466, p. 491; 11, p. 40. It should be noted that Geulincx refuses to caU the accusative-plus-infinitive phrase that is the subject of a modal predicate dictum, on the ground that dicere means to assert and that the subjectsentence has no assertive force; instead, he caUs it modiflcatum (I, pp. 254-255).

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sentence is false. That a denial is a kind of affirmation is proved by the fact that it can always be preceded by such a phrase as 'I assure you'36.

6.3. Acts of compounding propositions

6.3.1. Geulincx uses the word enuntiatio as the generic name of any declarative sentence. The whole nature of a declarative sentence consists in the assertion (dicere, dictio) that something is the case; therefore, the act of asserting and the declarative sentence are either true or false 37 . With regard to the act of asserting that is essential to a declarative sentence, a distinction is drawn between formaliter aliquid dicere and consequenter or in consequenti aliquid dicere. What one formally asserts is that which is definitely and explicitly stated by the words used, whereas what one asserts in a consequential manner is all that follows logically from that which is formally asserted. When I seriously utter a declarative sentence, I commit myself primarily to the truth of what I am actually and explicitly saying; but in a derivative way I also commit myself to the truth of all the consequences implied by the explicit claim38 . In particular, this means that every sentence, in addition to what it asserts formally, also asserts consequentially that it is true. Since the reverse holds as well, namely, that such a sentence as Me stare est verum ('That I am standing is true') implies Sto ('I am standing'), the two sentences Sto and Me stare est verum may be said to be identical in the sense th at they signify the same in aequivalenti, that is, in so far as they mutually imply one another; formaliter, however, they are very different. When Geulincx declares that in a certain sense every indicative sentence is an affirmation (omnis enuntiatio quodammodo est afflrmatio), what he has in mind is that every indicative sentence, whether it be simple or compound, affirmative or negative, is equivalent, and to that extent identical, to the affirmation that the formal assertion contained in that sentence is true. We have already seen how he applies this view to negative categorical propositions. But he also holds it with respect to such compound sentences as Et sto et loquor ('I am standing and I am talking'); although a conjunction is made up of several affirmations, there is nevertheless one total affirmation, in the sense that Et sto et loquor is equivalent to Et me stare et me loqui est verum, which is an affirmation, that is, an affirmative categorical sentence39 . The distinction formaliter dicere/consequenter dicere is a special case of the distinction expresse dicere/implicite dicere. The above-mentioned distinctions are important in that Geulincx bases his division of enuntiationes into simple declarative sentences or propositiones and 36. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 234, p. 465 . Equivalence is to be understood as mutual implication (I, p. 288) ; see 6.3 .1. 37. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 233 (enuntiatio est verum velfalsum), p. 288 (tOIa natura enuntiationis eonsistit in dieere), p. 499 (enuntiatio est dietio vera vel falsa); 11, p. 10 (enuntiatio est dietio quae didt esse). 38. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp. 237-238, p. 276, pp. 452-453 ; 11, p. 25. For a similar distinction in Paul of Venice and his followers see NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 45-46. 39. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp. 234-235 , p. 288.

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compound declarative sentences on the criterion of whether they formaliter et expresse propound one truth or more than one truth. Although every simple declarative sentence or propositio asserts an infinite number of implied propositions consequenter, wh at it formaliter et expresse signifies is just one truth or falsehood. The latter is obvious in the case of an affirmation. But it applies also to negative propositions since the insertion of a negating sign does not connect an additional truth or falsehood to the negated affirmation, but it simply reverses the truth-value of the affirmative proposition. An enuntiatio simplex or propositio, then, is a declarative sentence which formally and explicitly propounds a single truth or falsehood. An enuntiatio composita, on the other hand, is a declarative sentence whose explicit and observable surface form contains more than one declarative sentence (quae expresse et formaliter plures enuntiationes ingerit). A compound or molecular declarative sentence always has two declarative sentences as its immediate constituents. These two declarative sentences, which should occur in their sentential function and not, for instance, as subject or predicate, are tied together by a copula grammaticalis, which is a mark of the performance of an intellectual act of composition40 • 6.3.2. Examples of a copula grammaticalis are the words et ('and'), vel ('or'), si ('W), ergo ('therefore'), quia ('because'), sicut ('as'), quando ('when'). A grammatical copula is defined as a particle that, when it is added to a categorical declarative sentence, yields an incomplete sense, in such a way that the sense can be made complete again by adding another declarative sentence (particuia quae iuncta propositioni sensum inficit, resarciendum appositione alterius propositionis). The declarative sentence Sto, for example, has a complete sense. If the particle et is added to it, the combination Sto et has an incomplete sense. But if loquor is added to Sto et, the resulting sentence Sto et loquor has again a complete sense41 • Further, Geulincx claims some originality for his division of the grammatical copula into a pure type and an impure type. A grammatical copula is pure if it does not make a contribution of its own to the truth-conditions of the compound sentence, but determines the truth-value of the whole sentence only with the assistance of the truth-values of the constituents (quae se sola non potest inducere veritatem falsitatemve in enuntiationem compositam, sed tantum id praestat adiuta a veritate falsitateve alicuius partis). The particle et, for instance, makes a sentence that is compounded by means ofit true only with the assistance of two true constituents, and false only with the assistance of at least one false conjunct. The other pure grammatical copula, vel, yields the truth of the disjunctive sentence only with the assistance of a true constituent, while it yields falsity only with the assistance of two false parts. A grammatical copula is imp ure if it does make a contribution of its own to the truth-conditions of the compound sentence, without the assistance of the truth or falsity of a constituent (quae se sola veritatem, sine adminiculo partis verae, vel jalsitatem, sine adminiculo partis falsae, 40. Geulincx 1891-1893, J, pp. 237-239, p. 491. 41. Geulincx 1891-1893, J, p. 242, p. 463.

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inducere potest in enuntiationem compositam). In the sentence Quia Aristoteles ambulavit, Aristoteles est doctus ('Aristotle is leamed because he walked about'), the two constituents are true, but the whole sentence is false; that falsity is entirely due to the copula quia. On the ot her hand, in the sentence Quia Petrus est bos, Petrus est brutum ('Peter is a brute because he is an ox'), the falsity is due to the falsity of the two constituents, whereas there is an element of truth in the sentence in so far as the copula quia is concerned. According to Geulincx, an impure copula contains in it asentence, with a subject and a predicate. The sentence Quia est, cogitat ('He thinks because he exists') has three truthconditions, one for the constituent est, one for the constituent cogitat, and a separate one for quia, which contains in it the sentence Existere infert cogitare in eodem ('With respect to the same person, existence implies thought'). Actually, therefore, a compound sentence with an impure grammatical copula is a logical conjunction; Quia est, cogitat is equivalent to Est et cogitat et existere infert cogitare in eodem. In fact, there are only two kinds of compound sentence, conjunctions with et and disjunctions with vel42 • This brings us to a second important distinction which Geulincx draws with regard to compound sentences. 6.3.3. While the distinction between a pure and an impure grammatical copula is based upon what nowadays would be called the truth-functional or non-truth-functional character of the sentence-forming operator, another distinction is connected with the question of whether or not the constituents of the compound sentence preserve their assertive force. According to Geulincx, a conjunctive compound sentence with et is composita stricte because its immediate constituents remain unimpaired and intact (partes suas illibatas integrasque conservat); that is the reason why each conjunct taken by itself follows logically from the whole conjunction. The same is true of sentences compounded by means of ergo, quia, sicut, and quando, which are equivalent to logical conjunctions. The only difference with logical conjunctions proper lies in the fact that the latter do not contain a conjunct that is implicit in the grammatical copula, whereas the compound sentences which are conjunctions only equivalently have a third conjunct, namely, the sentence that is virtually present in the grammatical copula as a separate truth-condition43 • Compound sentences with et, ergo, quia, sicut, and quando, then, have constituents that preserve the same force as they would possess if they were to occur as isolated affirmations. As we have seen, Geulincx held that in addition to the affirmations which are embodied in the constituents there is also a total affirmation consisting in the assurance that the whole conjunction is true. Although sentences with vel and si are formaliter et expresse compound, their

42. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp. 492-493. Locke's remark in An Essay concerning Human Understanding, 111, 7,6, that some particles constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them, is very near in content and time to Geulincx's thesis. See 8.1.2. and 9.2.3. 43 . Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 240, p. 247, p. 277.

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surface form is somewhat misleading. Geulincx does not regard them as compound in a strict sen se (composita stricte), but he caUs them enuntiationes mixtae, on the ground that their parts are broken and thrown into disorder, in such a way that they have no longer the force they would possess in another context and taken by themselves (mixta est quae partes suas confundit et refringit, ita ut non idem in ipsa quod extra ipsam et seorsum positae valeant). IIn the disjunctive sentence Sto velloquor ('I am standing or I am talking') the only affirmation is the total affirmation th at is directed towards the disjunction as a whoIe; neither sto nor loquor is affirmed in the way they would be affirmed if they were uttered by themselves. Actua11y, Geulincx is inclined to consider a disjunctive sentence as an enuntiatio simplex, presumably to the effect that the denial of one of the disjuncts implies the other disjunct. He holds the same view concerning conditional illative sentences, which he is careful to distinguish from, on the one hand, pure conditionals, in which si is a nota pura suppositiva, as in Si bene studueris, dabo tibi pulchrum equum ('If you study hard, 1'11 give you a nice horse'), and, on the other hand, such illative sentences as Sto, ergo stare possum ('I am standing, therefore I am able to stand'). A conditional illative sentence is marked by the possibility of connecting si with ergo, as in Si sto, ergo stare possum. In that case, the grammatical copula is not si but rat her ergo, and the only affirmation is the total affirmation that from the fact that I am standing it fo11ows that I am able to stand (Ex sto sequitur stare possum). The sentences Sto, ergo stare possum and Si sto, ergo stare possum differ only in this respect th at the first sentence is equivalent to a conjunction of three truth-conditions, whereas in the second sentence neither sto nor stare possum is affirmed, but only a connection between the two. Properly speaking, therefore, a conditional illative sentence is not a compound sentence but an enuntiatio simplex. But if one insists on calling it compound, it should be distinguished from the composita stricte type by the characterization mixta 44 • 6.3.4. Geulincx's account of compound sentences may be summarized as fo11ows. If we look at the surface form, there are seven types of enuntiatio composita. But there is only one type, the enuntiatio copulativa, which has a logical form th at coinddes with the surface form. All others have a logical form that differs from their surface form. Further, conjunctive compound sentences and compound sentences with ergo, quia, sicut, and quando may be grouped together as enuntiationes compositae stricte. They have in common th at their conjuncts or the conjuncts of the sentences to which they are equivalent possess assertive force. They differ in that a logical conjunction proper has a pure copula, whereas the others, which are copulativae only aequivalenter, have an impure copula, that is, a copula that contains a sentence which adds an extra truthcondition. With the enuntiationes compositae stricte are contrasted the enuntiationes mixtae, compound sentences of a disjunctive and a conditional illative type, which have in common that their constituents lack assertive force. The 44. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp. 239-247, pp. 276-277, p. 464, pp. 491-494.

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difference lies in the grammatical copula: vel is a pure copula, while si-ergo is an impure copula. Strictly speaking, disjunctive and conditional illative sentences are enuntiationes simplices of a modal kind: Si sto, stare possum, for example, is an affirmation about the affirmation sto, namely, th at it implies the affirmation stare possum 45 • Finally, it is worth mentioning that Geulincx shows some hesitance in answering the question whether a sentence containing a relative clause is an enuntiatio simplex or an enuntiatio composita. On the one hand, he draws attention to two points which make it difficult to regard such a sentence as a compound sentence. The first point is that a sentence of the type Petrus, qui est doctus, est pro bus ('Peter, who is learned, is good') does not satisfy the condition th at a · compound sentence contain explicitly more than one sentence; Petrus est probus is a complete sentence, but qui est doctus is not. Neither does the relative pronoun qui meet the requirements laid down in the definition of a grammatical copula. Even though the addition of qui to Petrus est probus yields an incomplete sense, wh at makes the sense complete again is not the addition of another sentence but of the words est doctus, a verbal copula with a predicate. On the other hand, it is conceded that a sentence containing a relative clause may be equivalent to a logical conjunction, for instance Et Petrus est doctus et Petrus est probus. But this observation does not lead to a discus sion of the difference between sentences containing a restrictive relative clause and sentences containing a non-restrictive relative clause. 46.

6.4. Things in themselves and things as signifled Especially in the Metaphysica ad mentem Peripateticam Geulincx lays great stress on the difference between things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to the mind and are shaped by the various modes of our thinking. In the Metaphysica vera he offers a list of examples of the countless modes of thinking that are found in man' s consciousness: acts of perceiving by one of the

45. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 497. A diagram may he useful:

copula pura

impura

composita stricte

copulativa formaliter (et)

copulativa aequivalenter: rationalis (ergo) causa lis (quia) similaris (sicut) temporalis (quando)

enuntiatio mixta

disiunctiva (vel)

conditionalis illativa (si-ergo)

46. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp. 247-249. See, however, p. 494 and pp. 498-499 for a twofold interpretation, namely, in sensu composito and in sensu diviso, of such sentences as Homo albus non debet esse albus.

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senses, such intellectual acts as affinning, denying, conjoining, disjoining, inferring, abstracting, and also feelings like love, hate, and fear. A thought or cognition indudes a relation to both a knowing subject (cognoscens) and an immanent object (cognitum); it is impossible that there be an act of cognition without a knowing subject or without an object that is the content of that cognition. But whereas the existence of the act of cognition guarantees the real existence of the knowing subject, it is often far from certain wh ether there corresponds a real existent to the immanent object of the act of cognition. It is, therefore, necessary to make a distinction bet ween a thing as it is conceived of and the thing as it exists in the world outside thought and language 47 • For the thing in so far as it is conceived of Geulincx does not use the traditional term conceptus obiectivus. Neither does the word thema occur frequently; once, however, it is said to apply to the thing in so far as it is signified in a certain way bya linguistic expres sion , and Geulincx also notes that logicians are accustomed to call terms themata simplicia and propositions themata complexa 48 • But as a rule he seems to avoid the expressions conceptus obiectivus and thema, speaking instead of things in so far as they have been shaped by the modes of our thinking49 • Philosophers have developed a special set of second-order concepts (notiones secundae) by means of which they characterize things, not as they are in themselves, but rather as they present themselves to the mind and are the immanent objects or adverbial modifications50 of the diverse acts by which they are conceived of. Geulincx devotes extensive discussions to several such secondorder concepts; for instanee, to the notions of one and true, genus and species, whole and part, sub stance and accident, subject and predicate, disjunction and conjunction. All these concepts and terms are, viewed from the things in themselves, denominationes extrinsecae; that is, things in themselves are characterized by them only extrinsically, namely, in so far as they stand in an external relation to some act of the mind. According to Geulincx, it is an orade of wisdom itself that acts of thought and speech do not bring about any change in the things themselves (propter nostrum dicere nihil mutatur in re). He compares second-order concepts to such notions as right and left . That which we grasp with our right hand is called right and that which we grasp with our left hand is called left; but the acts of grasping do not cause any intrinsic difference in the things grasped 51 • Geulincx never tires of warning against our natural indination to project into the things themselves those features which they have only in relation to the modes of our thinking by which they are made present to the 47 . Geulincx 1891-1893, II, p. 148, p. 267. 48 . Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 421, p. 487; see also p. 248. 49. Geulincx 1891-1893, II, p. 199 (res quatenus inficiuntur modis nostrarum cogitationum), p. 275 (rem non simpliciter, sed ut substantem modis nostrarum cogitationum, quibus dum circa illam ver· samur, afficimur), and passim. 50. Cf. Geulincx 1891-1893, II, p. 148, where a mode of thinking is described as follows : hoc non est a/iud quam hoc vel illo modo me ha bere, cuius modi hoc ipso quo illum habeo intime mihi conscius sumo 51. Geulincx 1891-1893, II, p. 199, p. 236, p. 300.

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mind. In his opinion, Peripatetic metaphysicians have been misled by this propensity; they hold that reality as such has the same features as things possess when they appear to the mind, whereas true wisdom consists in considering things as they are in themselves, independently of the modes of thinking by which we conceive of them 52 • Everything that is presented to the mind is conceived of in one of three fundamental forms of thought: in the form of an entity, of a property of an entity, or of a ment al sentence (per modum entis, modi entis et sententiae). When we form a ment al sentence, we are commonly aware that this construction is our own work and th at it belongs exclusively to the re alm of the mind. Accordingly, we do not feel tempted to project a sentential form of thought into reality and to hold that the world contains something that has the character of asentence. With regard to the other modes of conceiving, however, we are strongly inclined to believe that the world itself consists of substances and accidents which correspond to the ways in which we think of aspects of the world in the subjectform and in the predicate-form. But the truth of the matter is that the word ens is nothing but a nota subiecti, a sign by which we give the hearer to understand that we have conceived of something that we want to make the subject of an affirmation and about which we want to say something. Likewise, a modus entis is not hing but that mode of our understanding which we apply to that which we have decided to affirm of something. Subject and predicate are second-order concepts which are applicable only to things as they have been conceived of in such a way that they are fit to play a specific part in the formation of a ment al sentence53 • In the Logica Geulincx repeatedly points out that a thing as it exists in the world cannot possibly be an element of an affirmation. In order to become an element of an affirmation, the naked thing (res nuda) has to be clothed, as it were, in the appropriate forms of thought and speech. In principle, everything in the world can be made the subject of an affirmation, but it is the activity of our mind that moulds it into the proper shape and it is language that puts at our disposal the noun substantive as the right means of giving expression to such an activity. Similarly, a predicate is the product of a certain manner of conceiving; the associated linguistic form is the adjective. Geulincx invokes this distinction between things in themselves and things as they are made subjects or predicates by our mental and linguistic activities in explaining the notion of acceptio logica. He contrasts acceptio with suppositio; the speaker intends his words to stand for certain things and, in successful communication, the hearer takes

52. Geulincx 1891-1893, 11, p. 300, shows that he is sharply aware of the predicament in which the true metaphysician finds himself: Nos non debemus res considerare prout sunt sensibiles (id est, sub certa specie incurrunt in sensum); neque ut sunt intelligibiles (id est, sub certo modo a nobis cogitantur). Sed ut sunt in se, non possumus eas considerare; unde videmus magnam nostram imperfectionem. 53. Geulincx 1891-1893, 11, pp_ 206-207, p. 211 ff., p. 241. For the notion of propositio rea lis see NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 10-13.

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them as standing for the things intended by the speaker. The hearer' s interpretation is divided into acceptio ordinaria and acceptio extraordinaria. An example of the former is Mus rodit caseum ('The mouse gnaws at the cheese'), where the word mus is to be understood as standing for the little animal itself. The acceptio extraordinaria is again divided into acceptio grammatica and acceptio logica. In Mus est syllaba (' "Mouse" is a syllable') the word mus is used in a grammatical or linguistic acceptation; it stands for itself, th at is, for the word mus. In Mus subalternatur animali, on the other hand, the word mus stands for the concept that is signified by it and is said to be a species of animal. An acceptio logica is defined as an act of interpreting a word as standing for a thing in so far as it is signified in a certain way by a word (acceptio vocis pro re quatenus certo modo significata per vocem). Geulincx illustrates these distinctions by means of a comparison. The eyes in a portrait are not the actual eyes, nor are they just coloured spots, but they are the person's eyes in so far as they are represented in the picture by means of coloured spots. Analogously, a word taken according to acceptio logica is understood neither as denoting a thing in the world nor as standing for the word itself, but rather as indicating the thing in so far as it is represented in the mind and in language by means of a conception and the corresponding expression54 • It is quite evident th at these varieties of interpretation correspond to the old doctrine of suppositio personalis, suppositio ma teria lis, and suppositio simplex. Likewise, it is clear that a word taken according to acceptio logica has reference to what was usually called conceptus obiectivus or thema, that is, a thing as it appears to the mind. It is to the thing as it has esse obiective in the mind and as it is formed by the modes of our thinking that the second-order concepts oflogic apply. What is remarkable in Geulincx's exposition of these traditional doctrines is the emphasis he lays on certain idealistic tendencies that had been implicit in them from the beginning. Although he remains convinced that our modes of conceiving do not cause any intrinsic change in the things towards which they are directed, he nevertheless keeps insisting that we can have knowledge of these things only by assimilating and adapting them to the forms of the understanding and the linguistic categories corresponding to these forms. And of the features that characterize things as they appear to the mind he tends to ascribe the great majority to the contributions made by the various modes of intellectual conception, leaving a bare minimum to the things as they are in themselves 55 •

6.5. Burthogge The English physician and philosopher Richard Burthogge, who lived between about 1638 and 1698, graduated in medicine at Leiden in the same year, 54. Geulincx 1891-1893, I, pp. 182-183, pp. 211-213, pp. 478-480 . 55. Cf. CASSlRER 1911-1920, I, pp. 532-543. As to the influences which Geulincx may have undergone, Iconfine myself to observing that there is a striking similarity between Geulincx's views and some of the thoughts that are developed in Jean Gerson's De concordia metaphysicae cum logica propositiones quinquaginta of 1426 (BAUER 1973, pp. 485-503).

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1662, in which Geulincx published his Logica. As some of his doctrines show a close resemblance to views defended by Geulincx, it is not unlikely that he developed them under the influence of the latter's publications and teaching 56 • Both in the Organum vetus et novum of 1678 and in An Essay upon Reason and the Nature ofSpirits of 1694 Burthogge considers it as certain that things to us men are not hing but as they are known by us; and that they are not known by us but as they are in our faculties, that is, in our senses, imagination, or mind. Further, he is convinced th at things are not in our faculties either in their own realities or by way of a true resemblance and representation, but only in respect of certain appearances. He thinks it most probable that these appearances are caused, not by the various impressions that the things make upon us alone, but rather by the impresssions in concurrence with our faculties . Every cogitative faculty, though it is not the sole cause of its own immediate object, yet has a share in making it 57 • The appearances that are the immediate objects of the understanding are also called phaenomena, conceptions, notions, ideas, or noemata; they are the senses or meanings of such linguistic expressions as words and sentences. They are things, but not things of mundane and external existem:e. Rather, they are things of cogitation and notion, intentional things, things that as such have only an esse obiectivum or an esse cognitum, as the School men phrase it. The same Schoolmen used to call notions conceptus obiectivi, a name which, though somewhat barbarous, is very apt according to Burthogge since it brings out that notions are concepts in the mind which yet seem to be in the object; but he that looks for notions in things looks behind the glass for the image he sees in it 58 • Whereas the immediate objects of apprehension are notions in the large sense of any thought or conception, the word 'notion' has also a more restrained sense. In that limited sen se a notion is a modus concipiendi, a particular manner of conceiving things, a purely objective and purely notional element that is present in every conception. It is because of the share which these manners of thinking have in making the immediate object of the understanding that few, if any, of the ideas which we have of things are properly pictures; our conceptions of things no more resemble them than our words resemble our conceptions (See also 2.1.1. and 11 .1.). These manners of conceiving by which the understanding apprehends things and their aspects are, in all respects, the very same to the mind or understanding as colours are to the eye and sound to the ear. In particular, the understanding conceives things under the notion of an entity, and this either a sub stance or an accident; under the notion of a whole or a part; of a cause or an effect. Such manners of conceiving are only entities

56. Cf. FORMIGARI 1970, pp. 159-170, and CASSIRER 1911-1920, I, pp. 543-553. For similar tendencies in Kenelm Digby' s Two Treatises of 1644 see CASSIRER 1911-1920, 11, pp. 207-215. As will be clear from the next chapter, Burthogge mayalso have been influenced by Hobbes's views. 57. Burthogge 1678, p. 12; Burthogge 1694, p. 59. 58. Burthogge 1678, pp. 16-18; Burthogge 1694, p. 79.

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of reason, having no more of any real existence outside the mind than colours have outside the eye or sounds outside the ear. Notions in the narrow sen se are, first of all, those notions which are commonly called by logicians second notions. But Burthogge thinks that his considerations apply as well to such notions as substance and accident, quantity and quality, and all the other general notions under which the understanding apprehends its objects. As he puts it in "Connection with abstraction, things as they are in the mind must put on another dress there and so appear in quite another shape than that they have in the world. The understanding frames primitive notions under which it takes in and receives objects. Consequently, the immediate objects of cogitation as it is exercised by men are entia cogitationis, th at is, phaenomena or appearances that do no more exist outside our faculties in the things themselves than the images that are seen in water or behind a glass do really exist in those places where they seem to be59 •

6.6. Conc/usion From the beginning of the thirteenth century there had been attempts to develop an adequate vocabulary for marking the difference bet ween such pairs oflinguistic expressions as utinam and desiderium, non and negatio, praeter and exceptio. When mental acts of wishing, denying, or excepting are actually performed and words are used as indicators or marks of such actus exerciti, those words were said to be notae which signify per modum affectus. On the other hand, when the mental acts themselves are apprehended and words are used to denote them as objects of reflective thought, those words were said to signify per modum conceptus and the denoted acts were called actus significati. Partly at least, the distinction between signification per modum aJfectus and signification per modum conceptus runs parallel to the distinction between syncategorematic signs, which signifyaliqualiter, and categorematic signs, which signify aliquid. Syncategorematic acts as actus exerciti are modes of conceiving which find their proper expres sion in notae signalling th at such an act is being performed. As objects of reflective thought the syncategorematic acts become actus sign ifica ti, acts conceived of and denoted by the second-order notions and technical terms of logic. It is highly probable that the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar and Geulincx were led by these traditional distinctions when they contrasted the objects of thought with the forms or manners of thinking and divided the formal or functional operations of the mind into the three classes of categorical judgment, composition of categorical propositions, and acts of the will. Omitting the acts of the will and concentrating upon Geulincx, we may conclude that in his Logica he is chiefly concerned with those formal acts of the intellect th at are performed in framing affirmative and negative categorical propositions and in combining such atomic propositions into various kinds of molecular propositions.

59. Burthogge 1694, pp. 56-61.

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When we look at these acts in so far as they are expressed formaliter by dec1arative sentences, there is a c1ear difference between the enuntiatio simplex or propositio and the enuntiatio composita, and a1so bet ween the affirmatio and negatio that are the two species of the enuntiatio simplex or propositio. These differences are determined by the character of the acts of affirmation, denia1, and composition that are marked by the bare copula est, the propositiona1 negation non, and the connectives which are typical of compound dec1arative sentences. But if the same sentences are regarded from the viewpoint of their logical form and in so far as they are equivalent to other sentences, the act of affirmation is seen to be the root of 10gic inasmuch as every dec1arative sentence, whether atomic or molecular , affirmative or negative, is equivalent to the moda1 affirmation that th~ origina1 sentence is true. Besides stressing the distinction between signifyingformaliter et expresse and signifying aequivalenter, which is of particular importance with respect to compound sentences, Geulincx a1so draws attention to the difference between truth-functiona1 and non-truth-functiona1 connectives and to the fact that some operations of the mind, although they have reference to truth and fa1sity, are nevertheless performed without any assertive force. While Geulincx firm1y believes th at the things in the world are not changed by the externa1 circumstance that the various operations of the mind are directed towards them, he is sharp1y aware of the impossibility of introducing the things as they exist in the world into our mental and linguistic constructions. In order to become constituents of thought and speech the things in the world have to be made fit for being present to the mind. In the mind they are represented by the interna1 objects or contents of mental acts which, though they may be elicited by impressions fr om outside, contribute many features that are limited to thought and 1anguage and have no correlate in the outside world. Geu1incx avoids the expressions esse obiective and conceptus obiectivus, but it is quite evident that the thing in so far as it is signified in a certain way by a word is nothing but the thing in so far as it has been assimilated and adapted by our modes of conceiving and so has acquired that intentiona1 existence which is characteristic of the products of ment al acts. Geulincx and Burthogge tend to highlight the idealistic e1ements that are inherent in the traditional doctrine of esse obiective and conceptus obiectivus60 • The indispensab1e instruments of human know1edge, the modes of conceiving and their inner objects, have no counterparts in the things as they are in themselves. The second-order concepts that have reference to things as they appear to us are not exemp1ified in the world outside thought and 1anguage.

60. Compare, for instanee, Smiglecius 1658, p. 623: scientiam esse immediate de obiecto ut est in men te, de re vero extra so/um est tamquam repraesentato per id quod est in men te.

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7. IDEAS AS IMAGES. GASSENDI AND HOBBES

As we saw in 2.1., Descartes repeatedly emphasized that he wanted to draw a sharp distinction between the images of sensation and imagination and, on the other hand, the conceptions of pure intellection, and that he wished to employ the word idea exclusively for concepts of a purely intellectual nature. That in this respect he deviated from the views defended by some ofhis contemporaries was brought to his attention in an especially clear way by the objections which Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) had formulated against his Meditations. Accordingly, in the replies to the third and fifth set of objections Descartes felt urged to underline once again that by an idea he did not understand the images of material things that are depicted in the brain. In this chapter I int end to set forth in some detail the doctrine of ideas that was rejected by Descartes and the theory of the proposition connected with that doctrine.

7.1. Gassendi In the Logica which was published posthumously as the first part of Gassendi's Syntagma philosophicum, the author subscribes to the Ramist view that the primary subject-matter oflogic is thought (cogitatio), which according to a very old tradition mayalso be characterized as inner speech (sermo internus). External speech is nothing but a representation of thought, comparable to a reflection on water or to a mirror image; there can be no external speech without inner speech, but there can very weIl be inner speech without external speech. Logic aims at stating rules for the direct ion of the intellect, in order that it be able to think correctly (bene cogitare), that is, to form correct ideas and judgments (bene imaginari, bene proponere), to reason correctly (bene colligere), and to put the results in correct order (bene ordinareJl. According to Gassendi, an act of imaginari or imaginatio is an act of thinking that terminates in a mental image of the thing thought of (cogitatio seu actio mentis quae ad rei cogitatae imaginem menti obversantem terminatur). This act, which is also called apprehensio, conceptio, or intellectio, consists in attending to amental image of the thing thought of; when we hear the name of a thing, we become 1. Gassendi 1658, I, pp. 31-34, p. 91.

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aware of an image of that thing which is present to the mind and at which we look as it were (obversari nobis in mente experimur illarum imagines, in quas veluti intueamur). At the level of simple apprehension, this act of attending to mental images is not yet accompanied by an act of affirmation or denial. The mental image towards which such a simple act of imaginatio is directed has received different names; Gassendi, who is fairly familiar with the history of logic, mentions the terms idea, species, notio, praenotio, anticipatio, conceptus, phantasma, and declares that he will mostly use the word idea 2 • In explaining what he means by this word and by the words which he apparently regards as more or less equivalent to it, he evidently utilizes his knowledge of ancient empirici st doctrines and in particular of the Epicurean notion of prólëpsis. All ideas have their origin in sense-perception; those who say that there are innate ideas, which have not been acquired by sense-perception, do not prove their point. Every idea enters the mind through sense-perception or is formed out of ideas that directly originate in sense-perception. Like Epicurus, however, Gassendi acknowledges the existence of preconceptions, generalized mental pictures which are the outcome of repeated and remembered particular sensations and constitute a kind of record of previous experience in the light of which new sensations may be interpreted, classined and named. Such preconceptions or generalized ideas, which can be expressed by common nouns, are the main material out of which propositions are made3 • While attending to the images or ideas of things, the mind may ob serve that some of them agree with one another and that others do not belong together. Accordingly, it forms a composite apprehension by affirming or denying one idea of the other. The resulting thought is called propositio because the mind propounds as it were wh at it holds about a certain thing (quasi proponit, quid quapiam de re sentiat); it is also called enuntiatio because the mind declares as it were its view of the matter (quod id quasi enuntiet). Other names mentioned by Gassendi are enuntiatum, pronuntiatum, effatum, profatum, proloquium, and axioma. He also occasionally uses the word iudicium, in whose meaning he stresses the element of decision, and draws a distinction between iudicium enuntiativum, which is a synonym of the Ramist term iudicium axiomaticum, and iudicium illativum, which stands for the conclusion of a syllogism4 • As a proposition is made up of simple ideas, so a syllogism consists of propositions. A syllogism is a thought or inner speech in which the mind perceives that two ideas agree with a third idea and concludes that they therefore agree with one another; or in which the mind perceives that one of two ideas does not agree with a third idea and announces that they therefore do not agree with one another. In conformity to the Ramist tradition Gassendi explains the words syllogismus, collectio, ratiocinatio by pointing out that reasoning is a kind of com2. Gassendi 1658, I, p. 33, pp. 91-92. 3. Gassendi 1658, I, p. 92 ff. 4. Gassendi 1658, I, p. 33, p. 91, p. 99. For details about the different names of a proposition see NUCHELMANS 1973 and 1980'.

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putation in which by adding or subtracting one calculates a sum or a remainder. Just as by adding two to three one gets five as a sum, so by adding the propos ition Omne animal sentit ('Every animal is sentient') to Homo est animal ('Man is an animai') one obtains the conclusion Homo ergo sentit ('Therefore, man is sentient')5. There can be no doubt that for Gassendi the inner language in which the various activities of the mind are performed consists of ment al images and the smaller or larger complexes that are made up of ment al images. When he applies such words as proponere and enuntiare to ment al acts, he is often careful to add the modification quasi. Further, he sometimes uses the verb dicere as a synonym of concipere and imaginari6 • And in his survey of Stoic logic, where he identifies the res significatae with the things as they are in the mind (res prout in anima sunt) and divides them into impressions and ideas, he characterizes ideas as the things in so far as they are uttered in the mind or mentally said as it were (quatenus mente efferuntur seu quasi dicuntur). The Stoic lektón or dictum is accordingly interpreted as an inner saying or word 7 • On the other hand, there are some passages in which thought and inner speech are unmistakably considered as consisting of the same words and sentences as are uttered when we express our thoughts orally; the only difference is that in thought they are used silentlyB. It seems plausible, however, that Gassendi regarded the inner language of ideas as more fundament al; even wh en we think in ment al images derived from spoken or written words, these mental images have meaning only if they are accompanied by mental images of the things denoted by the spoken or written words.

7.2. Hobbes My account of Hobbes's doctrine of the proposition will be based upon the following sources: the third set of objections against Descartes ' s Meditationes de prima philosophia 9 ; Human Nature of 16501°, especially the chapters 4, 5, and 13; Leviathan of 165111, especially the chapters 1-7, and 46; the Appendix ad Leviathan l2 ; De corpore (1655), I, 1-6 (Computatio sive logica)13, and 11, 8 (De corpore et accidenter; and chapter 10 of De ho mine (1657)15.

5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Gassendi 1658, I, pp. 33-34, p. 106. Gassendi 1658, I, p. 92 (dicitur vel concipitur; imaginatur dicitve; dicit animove concipit). Gassendi 1658, I, pp. 49-50. Gassendi 1658, I, p. 32 (nemoque non facile experitur cogitantem se uti tacite ijsdem vocibus quibus cogitata ore exprimerentur), p. 91 (experimur certe quotiens cogitamus nos tacite uti iisdem vocibus quibus cogitata ore exprimeremus). Hobbes 1839-1845', V, pp. 251-274. Hobbes 1839-1845b , IV, pp. 1-76. Hobbes 1839-1845b, lIl . Hobbes 1839-1845', lIl, pp. 511-569. Hobbes 1839-1845', I, pp. 1-80. Hobbes 1839-1845', I, pp. 90-106. Hobbes 1839-1845', 11, pp. 88-94.

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7.2.1. For Hobbes, the universe is corporeal, that is to say, it consists ofbodies which have the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, breadth, and depth. A body is defined as that which has no dependence up on our thought and is coincident or co extended with some part of space. Bodies cannot come into being or pass away; but they appear to us in different ways and under different forms according as their states and properties change. Not the bare substances or entities themselves are apprehended by us, but only the effects of which they are the fundament al cause. These effects, which are called phantasmata, have their origin in accidents or modes which are not the things themselves, nor parts of them, but qualities or states th at inhere in the thing as in a subject. An accident is the mode of a body according to which it is conceived of (modus corporis iuxta quem concipitur) or the mode of conceiving a body (concipiendi corporis modus); it is th at particular aspect of a body which makes it appear to us in a certain way (causa quare aliquid hoc vel illo modo apparet). All accidents except motion and extension are ways in which things appear to us, impressions and images which belong to the sentient subjects rather than to the objects themselves. An accident, then, is both some particular feature of the object which makes it appear to us in a certain way and the appearance itselft6. The particular bodies-with-accidents constituting the universe appear to knowing subjects in sense-perception; they cause impressions each of which is determined by one of the many states or qualities that inhere in one and the same body and form the modes according to which it appears to a sentient being. In addition to the images, representations, or appearances of particular bodies-with-accidents in the outside world that are produced by sen seperception, there are also conceptions or ideas which remain in the mind after the act of perceiving; they are the images of memory and phantasy or imagination. The important point for our purposes is that according to Hobbes all these images or conceptions, whether they belong to sense-perception, memory, or phantasy, are concrete particulars. The word universale does not apply to any thing existing in nature, nor to any idea or phantasm formed in the mind; it is always the name of a linguistic expression. Conceptions in the mind are images or phantasms of individu al things; there is no idea of man as such, for every idea is one and of one thing l7 • Likewise, a succes sion of conceptions in the mind, a series or consequence of one concept ion aft er another, whether casual or orderly, is always a particular mental discourse, being a train of concrete single conceptions 18. 7.2.2. Universality is peculiar to linguistic expressions, in particular to those ingredients of speech which Hobbes calls names (nomina). Names, especially common names, have three functions. The first two functions are connected 16 . De corpore, I, 3, 3, and 11, 8, 1-3, 20-23; Appendix ad Leviathan, 1 (Hobbes 1839-1845', lIl, pp. 528-532); Problemata physica, 4 (Hobbes 1839-1845', IV, pp . 328-329). 17. Human Nature, 5,6; De corpore, I, 2, 9, and 5,8. 18. Human Nature, 4, 1; Leviathan, I, 3.

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with the particular conceptions which occur in the name-user's mind. Even if we leave out of consideration the various types of communication, names are useful to a man who is alone in the world in helping him to remember previous particular conceptions. In such a state of solitude a man may employ names as notes or marks (notae) by means of which he recalls his own thoughts to mind. Hobbes gives the example of a solitary man who has no use of speech at all but who nevertheless finds out th at the three angles of a triangle that he sets before his eyes are equal to two right angles that are placed next to it. If he had not yet invented names as marks, he would have to repeat his discovery for each particular concept ion of a triangle and of two right angles with which he would be faced at some later time. The use of names as sensible marks, however, enables him to remember what he has found out in one particular case and spares him the trouble of going through the same process again and again. The consequence found in an individual complex of conceptions comes to be registered and remembered as a universal rule which is valid for all si mil ar instances l9 • It should be noted that names can fulfil this mnemonic function of marks even when they occur in isolation and are not integrated into whole sentences, which are the typical units of communicative speech. It is also worth mentioning that all names which serve as marks are concrete names; as we shall see later, Hobbes holds that abstract names have their origin in the copula of declarative sentences or propositions. The use of names as mnemonic marks is prior to their function as signs (signa) of communication. When one has learnt to mark particular conceptions by means of conventional names, those same names mayalso be employed to convey the speaker' s conceptions to others. Then the names are no longer mere marks of one's own thoughts but rather signs by which the speaker makes known(significare, demonstrare, docere) his thoughts to others. Names, however, can occur as signs only wh en they are arranged in a sentence of which they form the constituents (signa vero non sunt nisi quatenus in oratione disponuntur et partes eius sunt). Hobbes considers the sentence (oratio) as the natural unit of communication; names can fulfil their function of conveying the speaker's conceptions to others only when they are properly embedded in asentence. An oratio is a complex of human sounds which are arranged in such a way that they are the signs of thoughts. The meaningfulness of a complex ofhuman sounds is due to the fact that to the combination of names there corresponds a combination of conceptions in the speaker' s mind; it is the speaker' s particular thought that is expressed by the series of sounds and so gives meaning to it 20 • On the other side, understanding is nothing but conception caused by speech; when a man, upon the hearing of any speech, has those thoughts which the words of that speech and their connection were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it 21 • It is important to note that whereas every mnemonic 19. Human Nature, 5, 1-2; Leviathan, 1,4; De corpore, I, 2, 1, and 6, 11. 20. De corpore, I, 2, 2-5, and 3, 1. 21. Leviathan, I, 2 and 4. Cf. Human Nature, 5, 8.

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mark seems to be a name, not every sign is a name; in conveying his thought to others in a sentence a speaker makes use of other signs than names, for instance of a copula. Besides serving as mnemonic marks of one's own particular conceptions and being signs which reveal the speaker's conceptions to others in sentences, names are also related to th at which they name (nominare, denotare, designare). Hobbes divides the things named into four classes. The first class consists of bodies, named by concrete names. The second class contains the accidents which inhere in bodies; if they are considered in their own right and in abstraction from the substance in which they are, they may be denoted by abstract names. To the third class belong those denotata of concrete names which are ideas in the fancy, that is, our received or constructed conceptions of things. Finally, with these things named by names of first intention Hobbes contrasts the things named by names of second intention. Such names as universale, particulare, genus, species, syllogismus are used to refer to names and sentences. Hobbes is fully aware that a thing named is not always a thing that really exists in nature, but he thinks it lawful for doctrine's sake to apply the word 'thing' in a broad sense to whatsoever we name. On the other hand, he lays great stress on the differences among the four categories of things named, drawing attention to the errors into which one is liable to fall if these differences are neglected 22 • 7.2.3. As a name is to an idea or concept ion of a thing, so is speech to the discourse of the mind. Speech, of which the natural unit is the sentence, is the connection of names constituted by the will of men to stand for the series of conceptions of the things about which we think 23 • The sentences which are formed by a suitable combination of names are of diverse kinds. Hobbes pays ample attention to the various speech acts performed by non-declarative sentences. Such speech acts are related to those powers of the mind which are called motive, in contradistinction to the cognitive, imaginative, or conceptive powers 24 • Non-declarative speech conveys the speaker's desires and affections, his intentions and purposes, his will and passions; it also serves to please and delight ourselves and others, and to increase or diminish one another' spassion. Interrogations signify the desire of knowing, prayers and commands signify the de sire of having something or of having something done or left undone by another. Promises and threats are expressions of a purpose or intention, affirmations or negations of some action, welcome or unwelcome, to be do ne in the future. Further, deliberation and supposition are expressed subjunctively, whereas the language of vainglory, of indignation, pity, and revengefulness is optative. Hobbes also points out that all passions may be expressed indicatively,

22. Leviathan, I, 4; De corpore, I, 2, 6 and 10, and 5, 2. 23. De homine, 10, 1. 24. Human Nature, 1, 7.

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as in 'I love', 'I fear', 'I will', 'I command'; such cases he probably considered as declarative sentences or propositions25 • Philosophers are interested in only one type of sentence, the declarative sentence, that is, the form of speech which is used by those who affirm or deny something, and which is either true or false. The common name of such a declarative sentence is propositio, but it is also called enuntiatum, pronuntiatum, and dietum 26 • The lat ter name was usually applied to a declarative sentence that is made the subject or the object of a larger sentence and accordingly takes the form of an accusative-plus-infinitive phrase, as in Soeratem esse sapientem verum est. Hobbes himself employs the word in stating that truth consists in speech, and not in the things spoken of (veritas enim in dieto, non in re eonsistit, which is also expressed as: neque ergo veritas rei affectio est, sed propositionisr. Actually, he follows the medieval nomina/es in identifying truth with a true proposition28 • For Hobbes, then, a propositio is always a linguistic expression, a declarative sentence that is either spoken or written. Since he occasionally speaks of words that are conceived of or mentally repeated, it seems plausible that he would also regard the mental images of spoken or written declarative sentences as propositions29 • But he never applies the word propositio to the concrete ment al discourse which lends meaning to a spoken or written declarative sentence and which is conceived of by the hearer when he understands the sentence. Although Hobbes might have given the name propositio imaginata to such a particular combination of inental images of things30 , he consistently restricts the word propositio to the domain oflanguage. Further, among spoken or written declarative sentences, he concentrates almost entirely on categorical propositions; hardly any attention is paid to the various sorts of compound propos ition. Categorical propositions are divided into affirmative and negative propositions. A negative categorical proposition is defined as a proposition whose predicate is a negative name; the negative proposition 'Man is not a stone' is interpreted as having the logical form 'Man is a not-stone' 31. For our purposes , therefore, negative propositions may be left out of consideration. 7.2.4. A proposition is defined as a sentence consisting of two names coupled together by which the speaker makes known that he conceives the latter name

25 . Human Nature, 13,6-7; Leviathan, 1,4 and 6; De corpore, I, 3, 1. 26 . De corpore, I, 3, 1. 27 . De corpore, I, 3, 7. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VI, 4, 1027 b 25-31. See also Geulincx 1891-1893, I, p. 235 (adeo ut est in dicto et est in re verum faciant; sed est in dicto et non est in re falsum faciunt), and, nearlya century later, Hutcheson 1771, p. 31 (aliquando ipsa propositio, quae dictum vocatur, est subiectum et modus de eo praedicatur). 28. Human Nature, 5, 10; Decorpore, 1,3,7. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1973, p. 202, pp. 204-205. 29 . Cf. Human Nature, 5, 4; De corpore, I, 6, 11 (sine omni verborum tam conceptorum quam prolatorum usu). 30. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1973, p. 214. There is a certain similarity between Hobbes's conception of the proposition and William Crathorn's view. 31. Human Nature, 5, 9; De corpore, I, 3, 6 and 15.

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to be the name of the same thing whereof the former is the name, or that the former name is comprehended by the latter. The sentence 'Man is a living creature' , for example, is a proposition, for the speaker makes known that he believes that 'living creature' and 'man' are names of the same thing, or that the name 'man' is contained in the name 'living creature' , in the sense that the predicate is the name of every thing of which the subject is the name32 • A proposition, then, is an utterance by means of which a speaker conveys his opinion to others (significat putare se - - -). Hobbes says very little about the act ofjudgment that is expressed by a proposition. He remarks only that opinion is a mental discourse that consists of thoughts that the thing will be and will not be, or that it has been and has not been. After a stage of doubt, which is a chain of alternating opinions, the mind may reach a last opinion, which is called the judgment, or the resolute and final sentence33 • The object towards which the act ofjudging is directed is constituted by the copula as the sign of propositional combination. The sign of propositional connection, the instrument of conveying that two names are understood to be coupled together or to be names of the same thing, is often a separate word, like the verb est; but it mayalso be the ending of a finite verb or a conventional order of the words concerned. In general, Hobbes is aware of the fact that propositions often vary in ways that are irrelevant to purely logical considerations. Especially when their surface form is misleading as to their logical structure, it is advisable to reduce them to some kind of standard form 34 • As a sign, the copula exercises its proper function in declarative sentences that convey the speaker' s mental discourse to others. It is not, however, a name; it would be wrong to hold that in ut tering such a sentence as 'A man is a living body' we mean that the man is one thing, the living body another, and the is or being a third 35 • In traditional terminology we might say that Hobbes fully appreciates the difference between names as categorematic signs and the copula as a syncategorematic sign. In this connection, it is worth-while to compare his conception of the copula with what he says about the signs of quantity. He distinguishes between names of certain and determined signification .and names of uncertain and undetermined signification. Individual names, such as 'Homer', 'this tree', and universal names, such as 'every tree', have a certain and determined signification for this reason that the hearer conceives in his mind the same thing that the speaker would have him conceive. Particular names, such as 'some tree', and indefinite names, such as 'tree', on the other hand, have an indefinite signification because the hearer does not know what thing it is the speaker would have him conceive. According to Hobbes, the signs of universality and particularity are

32 . De corpore, I, 3, 2. Cf. Human Nature, 5, 10; and also the sixth objection to Descartes's Meditations, where it is said that affirmation consists in conceiving twice the resemblance of a thing to other things. 33. Leviathan, I, 7. 34. De corpore, I, 3, 2 and 12. 35. Leviathan, IV, 46.

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not names, but parts of names (nominum partes). The universal name 'every man' is equivalent to the name 'that man which the hearer will conceive of in his mind', while the particular name 'some man' is equivalent to the name 'that man which the speaker has already conceived of' . It should not be overlooked that in the Latin text a particular name is illustrated by quidam homo, which refers to a certain man whom the speaker knows but does not want to specify any further, so that the hearer may not be able to make out who is meant. The point Hobbes wishes to bring out is that the signs of quantity belong to communicative speech. As long as the speaker uses names only as mnemonic marks, there is no need to use signs of quantity since each of his conceptions is quite determinate without them. But in conveying his concrete thoughts to others, he may offer the hearer some indication as to how to understand the names which are now used as signs. By the use of a universal name the speaker gives the hearer to understand that he may replace the concrete conception which the speaker has in mind by any concrete conception of his own that is directed to the same kind of thing. In the case of a particular name, the hearer is notified that the speaker has a definite idea of the thing to which he is referring, but that he does not want the hearer to know exactly which thing he means. On Hobbes's view, every concept ion is concrete and determinate; so there is no room for an indefinite conception that would correspond to such an expres sion as 'some man'. The onlyfunction Hobbes cangive to theword 'some' is the function of the Latin word quidam, and th at is a typically communicative function: the speaker has a definite idea of the thing for which he uses the indefinite name, but the hearer is left in the dark as to the concrete concept ion which he should form in order to have before his mind the same thing as the speaker has 36 • 7.2.5. Before continuing the account of Hobbes's conception of the nature of the categorical proposition and the copula, I want to call to mind two traditional views which in my opinion are of crucial importance for an adequate understanding of Hobbes's doctrine. The first view is perhaps best known from Ockham' s Summa logicae, 11, 2, where it is stated that for the truth of such a proposition as 'This is an angel' it is sufficient and necessary that the subject and the predicate supposit for the same thing. A rat her similar view, however, was widely held even by those philosophers who did not belong to the school of the nomina les. Let us take as an example the Thomist Johannes a Sancto Thoma, who published hisArs logica only a few decades before Hobbes's Computatio sive logica came out. According to Thomas Aquinas and his followers, an affirmative categorical proposition is true if that which the subject and the predicate signify is the same in so far as the thing denoted is concerned(secundum rem), though it is different in so far as the mode of conceiving is concerned (secundum rationem). In Homo est albus, for instance, the mode of conceiving of something as white is different from the mode of conceiving of something as

36 . De corpore, I, 2, 11.

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a man (alia est ratio albi, alia hominis), but at the same time there is identity with regard to the thing in which those attributes inhere (idem subiecto). Likewise, in Homo est animal the subject and the predicate are the same with respect to the suppositum, and different with respect to ratio. One might also say that such propositions contain a predication which is materially identical (praedicatio materialiter identica) in so far as the different forms that are signified by the terms have reference to the same matter or underlying entity37. In this connection it is also interesting to note that Gassendi, in the posthumously published second part of his Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos, attacked the Aristotelian doctrine that the intellect in forming a categorical proposition either compounds or divides the subject and the predicate. According to Gassendi, even wh en the mind forms an affirmative categorical proposition, it brings about a separation rather than a composition. For in framing the affirmative proposition Homo est animal the intellect forms two different concepts about one and the same thing, namely, one concept that is the proper mode of conceiving of man (sub ratione propria) and one concept that is a more general mode of conceiving of the same thing (sub ratione communi). It is wrong to hold that the copula unit es these concepts; on the contrary, it keeps them distinct, while at the same time embodying the assertion that the two distinct concepts apply to one and the same thing. If it identified the subject-concept and the predicate-concept, the resulting proposition would be false 38 • The modern distinction between extension and intension was well-known to medieval and late-scholastic philosophers and was made use ofby them in attempts to solve approximately the same problems as still confront us at present 39 • One of the guises in which this distinction was presented was the contrast bet ween the material significate, also called res, materia, subiectum, suppositum, and the formal significate or signified form, which was frequently called the ratio, that is, the mode of conceiving or the conception. For example, if the word album is used to refer to a white thing, it was said to denote that thing as its material significate, but to connote whiteness or being white as its formal significate, that is, as the form or mode of conceiving by which the thing is apprehended. It is obvious that one and the same thing may be conceived of and referred to under as many conceptions as there are ways in which the thing presents itself to the mind. Sometimes it does not matter under which de scription or conception it is referred to; but there are contexts in which the mode of conceiving is just as crucial as the existence of the thing conceived of. While it is abundantly clear that Hobbes adopted the main features of this traditional frame of thought, there are two differences. For one thing, he shifts the universality which is involved in referring expressions from the conception to the name. It is the concrete name which is applicable to more than one body that 37. Johannes a Sancto Thoma 1948, p. 357, p. 360. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, I, q. 13, art. 12. 38. Gassendi 1658, lIl, p. 177. 39. For details see NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 55-72.

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is the bearer of universality. Wh at lends meaning to a universal concrete name is the set of individu al conceptions or ideas of which the name is a sign. These conceptions or ideas are the effects of a body on a sentient subject; the individual body, more in particular one of its accidents - which are the modes of a body according to which it is conceived of or the modes of conceiving the body - is the cause why a thing appears in a certain way and also the cause why the thing is named by a certain name. As one and the same body has many accidents, it will appear to the mind in as great a variety of particular conceptions, which in their turn willlend meaning to a multitude of universal concrete names. The central thesis of Hobbes's logic is, I think, the statement that the same thing may enter into account for diverse accidents 40 • The thing which remains the same, the material significate in traditional terminology, he calls by such current names as subiectum, suppositum, and substantia. The body itself is contrasted with its accidents, that is, with those modes which cause different particular conceptions of the same body and, via those various conceptions, different appellations. Hobbes does not follow the scholastic tradition - and that is the second point of difference - in calling the mode of conceiving ratio. Instead, he employs either one of the usual names of a conception or the words consideratio and 'consideration', which stand for the way in which a thing is considered according to one of its accidents 41 • The second line of thought which Hobbes adopted from his predecessors was of more recent origin. As is already conspicuous fr om the title Computatio sive logica, he wholeheartedly subscribed to the Ramist view that reasoning is nothing but computation, th at is, addition and subtraction42 • What is meant by adding and subtracting conceptions is made clear by some examples. When we see a man approaching, we may first have that idea of him which would cause a language-user to call the approaching thing a body, then another idea because of which it would be called animated, and after that a third idea because of which it would be called rational. Finally, when the man stands ne ar us, we are aware of him through the idea of man which is compounded of the three ideas we successively had of him as he appeared to us from a distance. One and the same body causes different appearances according to its various accidents and the resulting conceptions are added into the total idea of man. If the same man gradually vanishes out of sight again, we first subtract the idea of rational from the whole idea of man, and then the idea of animated from the idea of animated body; the last idea through which we are aware ofhim will be the idea of body. This fundament al form of adding and subtracting conceptions or

40. Leviathan, I, 4. Cf. I, 5 ('whereas all bodies enter into account upon diverse considerations') . 41. See, for instance, Human Nature, 5, 7; Leviathan, I, 5; Appendix ad Leviathan, 1 (Hobbes 1839-1845', m, pp. 531-532). Cf. also De corpore, I, 4, 8, where cogitationes occurs, which in the English translation is rendered by 'considerations'. 42. Leviathan, I, 4-5; De corpore, I, 1, 2-3. For Ramus and his followers see NUCHELMANS 198~, pp. 168-169.

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ideas, which may take place without the use of any words, is the starting-point of the more elaborate reckonings in which the logician is interested, namely, adding together two names to make an affirmation, adding together two affirmations to make a syllogism, and adding together many syllogisms to make a demonstration. Hobbes derives his view of reasoning as a kind of reckoning from the fact that the Latins called an account of money ratio, and accounting ratiocinatio; from this special use they extended the word ratio to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. He also points out that the Greek word syllogismós means the summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. Further, he interprets the word considerare as equivalent to the Greek word log{zesthai and the Latin expressions in rationes inferre and in rationes referre, which stand for the act of putting something into an account or bringing something into account. In Latin, whatever can enter into, or be considered in, an account was called nomen; the nomina are the items in bills or books of account 43 • The original picture, suggested by a reflection on certain specialized meanings of the words concerned, is that of a man who keeps account of his money (ratio, ratiocinatio); what he brings into account (in rationes inferre or referre, considerare) is an item or nomen. This way of speaking is extended and adapted to the formation of concepts, propositions, syllogisms, and demonstrations by viewing these activities as calculations or forms of addition and subtraction in which one and the same body is brought into account or considered according to different accidents. The different conceptions or considerations, which are nothing but tQe different appearances of the body according to its various accidents, are registered by names as marks or conveyed to others by names as signs; these names are the items of the account. There is an essential connection between the metaphor of calculation and the traditional view of signification secundum rem and secundum rationem; calculation is possible only if the same thing may enter into account for diverse accidents or if all bodies enter into account upon diverse considerations44 • 7.2.6. Let us now return to what Hobbes says about the nature of the copula and the categorical proposition. With regard to the Cartesian view that there is a difference between ideas in the fancy and ideas in the understanding, Hobbes expresses the opinion that this error may be due to the belief that different kinds of idea correspond to a name and to a proposition45 • According to him, this belief is false. For a proposition signifies only the order of those things which in the same idea are observed one after the other; in uttering the sentence Homo est animal, for instance, we have only one idea, though in that idea we consider that first for which the object is called man, and next that for which 43 . Leviathan, I, 4; De corpore, I, 1, 3, and 3, 4. 44. Leviathan, I, 4-5. 45. Decorpore, I, 5, 9. Compare the passage in Descartes's letter to Mersenne, July, 1641 (AT, lIl, 395) which was mentioned in 2.2.2.

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it is called living creature (unicam habemus ideam, etsi in ea idea prius id consideretur propter quod vocatur homo, posterius vero id propter quod vocatur animai). In other words, since that for which something is called by a certain name is an accident which makes the thing appear to the mind in a certain way46, a proposition consists in bringing into account or considering one and the same thing accor. ding to two different accidents. One thing is put into the account as two items or nomina. In every proposition there are three constituents: two names, which are the subject and the predicate, and the copula. The two names raise in the mind the thought of one and the same thing, whereas the copula makes us think of the cause for which those names are imposed on th at thing (copulatio autem cogitationem inducit causae propter quam ea nomina iUi rei imponunturf7. When, for example, we utter the sentence Corpus est mobile (' A body is movable'), we think of the thing itself which is denoted by both those names; however, the mind does not rest there, but searches farther what it is to be a body (esse corpus) and to be movable (esse mobile), that is, what differences from other things there are in the thing denoted for which it is so called· and the other things are not so called (quae sint in ea re diversitates ab aliis rebus quare illa sic vocetur, aliae non vocentur). In this search the mind is seeking in things the causes of their names (quaerunt in rebus nominum suorum causas). It seems to me that in this passage too the main point is the insistence that a proposition consists in thinking of one thing by means of two different conceptions. By stating that the subject and the predicate raise a thought of one and the same thing, Hobbes emphasizes that the material significate of the two names is identical. But by adding that the copula makes us think of the cause for which those names are imposed on that thing, he stresses the fact that from the viewpoint of the formal significate or, in traditional terminology, secundum rationem - th at identical material significate is brought into account or considered according to different accidents or appearances. This becomes even more manifest when we look at the way in which Hobbes describes the mental discourse that corresponds to such a syllogism as 'Man is a living creature; a living creature is a body; therefore, man is a body'48. First, there is conceived a phantasm of the thing named with that accident or quality ofit for which it is called by the name 'man'. Next, the mind forms a phantasm of the same thing with that accident or quality for which it has the name or mnemonic mark 'living creature'. Thirdly, the mind returns to the thing named as having that accident in it for which it is called by the name 'body' . Lastly, remembering that all those accidents belong to one and the same thing, it concludes that the three different names are also names of one and the same thing, and that the conclusion is true. Hobbes is convinced that such a process of thought which corresponds to a syllogism that consists of universal proposi46 . De corpore, 11, 8, 2, and 20. 47 . De corpore, I, 3, 3. 48. De corpore, I, 4, 8.

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tions cannot occur in living beings that lack the use of names. For in reasoning syllogistically it is not sufficient to think of one thing, but we must also by turns think of different names of the thing which are applied to it because of the different ways the thing is conceived of (cum inter syllogizandum oporteat non modo de re, sed etiam alternis vicibus de diversis rei nominibus quae propter diversas de re cogitationes adhibita sunt, cogitare). Although the thing thought ofby someone who affirms that a man is running is the same as the thing thought ofby a dog which sees his master running, the crucial difference between the two cases lies in the fact th at brutes can have only ideas, whereas human beings are able to mark concrete ideas by universal names and so to bring into account or consider one and the same thing by means of different names which are the mnemonic marks of the various ways in which the thing appears to them. A syllogism is an assemblage and linkage of names by the word est; brutes, however, though they can have an idea of the thing named, th at is, of the material significate of the diverse names, are incapable of formingthe universal names that are indispensabIe for marking the alternative conceptions under which the material significate is considered49 • In this connection, it mayalso be noted that for Hobbes, as for most nominales, the material significate of a proposition is nothing but the particular object in the world that by having a certain accident satisfies the categorematic terms of the proposition. The signification of the syncategorematic copula does not consist in any peculiar correlate in the world, but rather in the claim that the subject-idea and the predicate-idea are conceptions of one and the same thing. For Hobbes, there is a close connection between the division of propositions into propositions that are contingently true and propositions that are necessarily true, and the division of propositions into categorical and hypothetical propositions. In the case of necessarily true propositions, the categorical proposition, for instance Homo est anima I, is equivalent to such a hypothetical proposition as Si quis homo est, is etiam animal est ('If someone is a man, then he is also an animaI'). But the contingently true universal proposition Omnis corvus niger est ('Every raven is black') is not equivalent to the hypothetical proposition Si quid corvus sit, id nigrum est. In a necessarily true proposition, the predicate is either equivalent to the subject, as in Homo est animal rationale, or part of an equivalent expression, as in Homo est animal. This means that in the corresponding hypothetical proposition the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent being true50. Now there are some indications that Hobbes, in defining the copula, had in view mainly propositions that are necessarily true. In the Leviathan he characterizes truth and falsity by stating that when two names are joined together into a consequence or affirmation, as thus, 'A man is a living creature', or thus, 'If he be a man, he is a living creature', if the latter name signifies all that the former name signifies, then the affirmation or consequence is true; otherwise false. In the same work he draws a distinction bet ween 49. See the fourth and the sixth objection to Descartes's Meditations. 50. De corpore, 1,3, 10-11.

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names, which are used either as marks or as signs, and the copula, which serves to show the consequence or repugnance of one name to another. When someone says 'A man is a body', he intends that the name 'body' is necessarily consequent to the name 'man', as being but several names of the same thing; which consequence is signified by coupling them together by the word 'is' or some other device. The copula 'is' and such expressions as 'to be a body' or 'corporeity' , which are derived from it, are no names of things, but signs by which we make known that we conceive the consequence of one name or attribute to another. When we say , A man is a living body' , we cdo not mean th at the man is one thing, the living body another, and the is or being a third, but rat her that the man and the living body is the same thing, because the con sequence 'Ifhe be a man, he is a living body' is a true consequence51 • In view of this evident predilection for necessarily true propositions, we might say that for Hobbes the essential function of the copula in 'A man is a body' is brought out more explicitly in the equivalent hypothetical proposition 'If he be a man, he is a body', and that asserting this hypothetical proposition is tantamount to claiming that there is a necessary connection between being a body and being a man. This brings us to Hobbes's thesis that abstract names have their origin in the proposition and can have no place where there is no affirmation (nomina abstracta orta sunt a propositione nec potuere constitui sine supposita affirmationeJ2. 7.2.7. A concrete name, such as album or ensalbum ('a white thing'), is a name of a thing that is assumed to exist in the world (rei alicuius quae existere supponitur nomen est). Especially when the concrete name is universal, it is obvious that it has its cause in the individual body, more in particular in one of the many accidents that inhere in the body. It is one body-with-accidents that appears in the conceptions of sentient beings and is denoted by concrete names, but its appearances and appellations vary according to the particular accident that is taken into consideration. Concrete names are said to be prior to the propositions into which they may enter as constituents; in other words, they are marks as well as signs 53 • Abstract names, such as esse motum, moveri, motus ('to be moving', 'to move', 'motion'), are defined as those names which denote the cause of a concrete name which exists in the thing that is assumed to be part of the world (in re supposita existentem nominis concreti causam denotat). Since the cause of the concrete name is the same accident that makes the thing appear in a certain way, this mayalso be expressed by saying th at an abstract name is the name of an accident, in contradistinction to the corresponding concrete name, which is the name of a body-with-accident. Accidents are neither things nor parts of things; they cannot be severed from the bodies in which they inhere. The reason why their names are called abstract is th at a certain concrete name is considered apart from all the other names of the same individual body. Abstraction is nothing 51. Leviathan, 1,4, and IV, 46 . 52 . De corpore, I, 2, 13. 53. De corpore, I, 3, 3-4, and Il, 8, 2.

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but considering a phantasm or a name apart from all the other considerations and names of the same concrete body (cum nihil aliud sit quam phantasmatis vel nominis ab aliis omnibus eiusdem concreti considerationibus et nominibus separata consideratio). Accidents cannot be separated from their bodies, but they do cause distinct considerations of the same body (separatas eiusdem rei considerationes). When attention is shifted from the identical thing or material significate of which the various appearances and concrete names are considerations and appellations to the mutual differences among the appearances and names of that same thing, the differences among the concrete names in their formal signification and thus among the accidents by which they are caused may be made prominent by the format ion of appropriate abstract names 54 • In contrast with concrete names, which according to Hobbes were invented before propositions were introduced, abstract names could have no being till there were propositions, from whose copula they proceed. It is unlikely that the final clause means no more than that such an abstract name as esse motum contains the infinitive of the finite verb est; for Hobbes holds th at both the abstract name and the tie between subject and predicate may take other forms, either in the same language or in different languages. There must be a deeper reason. As we saw at the end of 7.2.6., Hobbes, when discussing the copula, tends to concentrate up on necessarily true propositions. That such a proposition as 'A man is a body' is necessarily true means that it is equivalent to the hypothetical proposition 'If something be a man, it is a body'; but that means that it is also equivalent to the assertion that the name 'body' and thus the accident by which that appellation is caused is necessarily consequent to the name 'man' and the accident by which that name is caused. If we choose the latter version, we can do so only by introducing either the names of concrete names or the abstract names of the accidents by which the concrete names are caused; we might say, for instance, that being a body or corporeity is necessarily consequent to being a man or humanity. The use of abstract names is tied to the copula and the formation of propositions because only at the stage of expressing the belief that two different concrete names denote one and the same thing are we forced to pay attention to the difference between the two concrete names and between the accidents by which they are caused, in order to decide whether the concrete names are connected in such a way that they are caused by accidents of one thing. In the case of necessarily true propositions, this decision can be reached without any need to look at the thing in the world which has the different accidents; inspection of the accidents and the concrete names caused by them is sufficient to see that they cannot but belong to the same thing, whether that thing really exists or not. Inspection of the accidents as such, however, requires that they be kept before the mind and be made accessible to others; and that can be done only by giving them abstract names. In the case of contingently true propositions, on the other hand, it does not suffice to inspect merely the accidents and their abstract names; since the connection between the different ac54. Appendix ad Leviathan, 1 (Hobbes 1839-1845', lIl, pp. 528-532) .

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cidents and the different concrete names is only contingent, we have to make sure that there is a thing in the world that is the identical bearer of the two accidents and the identical material significate of the two concrete names. But it is important to notice that in this case too it rnight be said that the assertion of 'A man is white' involves the claim that there is a connection between being white or whiteness and being a man or humanity, though now this connection is a contingent fact which can be discovered only by examining the world. As we shall see later, in 11.3.1., Leibniz attempted to bring out this difference between necessary and contingent propositions by stipulating that the correct form of the assertion that every man is rational is Omnis homo est rationalis, whereas the correct form of the assertion th at every man is white is Omnis qui est homo, est albus ('Everyone who is a man, is white'). His reason for this differentiation is the observation that in the former case there is an unmediated connection between rationality and humanity, while in the lat ter case there is no such unmediated connection between whiteness and humanity (quia albedo humanitati immediate non cohaeret). The mediators, of course, are the individualswith-accidents in the world.

7.3. Conclusion Both Gassendi and Hobbes oppose the thesis that there is a fundament al difference between the images of sensation, memory, and phantasy and, on the other hand, the ideas of pure understanding. Gassendi, however, is somewhat less radical than Hobbes in that he adopts the Epicurean view that mental pictures may be generalized and so become universal preconceptions which lend meaning to the common nouns of external speech. Accordingly, a proposition is first and foremost amental saying that two such preconceptions agree with one another, or do not agree with one another. Hobbes is unwilling to bestow even this weak form of universality upon our thought about the world. Just as the world itself consists throughout of particular bodies-with-accidents, so the phantasms or ideas in which these bodies-with-accidents appear to the mind of sentient beings are all particular concrete conceptions. Universality belongs exclusively to language. Universal concrete names are either mnemonic marks of similar private thoughts or conventional signs by which the speaker' s ideas are conveyed to others. In both cases they are primarily names of particular bodieswith-accidents. Besides the distinction between the mnemonic and the communicative use oflinguistic expressions, which is reflected in the characterization of names as marks or as signs, and the distinction between names as marks or signs of thoughts and names as names of something named, Hobbes also draws a sharp distinction between names and the copula. The latter , mostly a fini te form of the verb 'to be', combines two names into a proposition, the basic unit of communication, and signifies that the speaker regards the two different names as names of one and the same thing. The copula, then, is simultaneouslya sign of diversity and a sign of unity. The unity consists in the claim that there is one body in the world th at is the bearer ofboth the accidents by which the subject-name and the predicate-name are caused. The diversity is 137

rooted in the fact that one body has a multitude of particular accidents, each of which causes the body to appear under a different conception and to be named by a different concrete name. It is this diversity of accidents, appearances, and concrete names that is the essential factor in likening propositions, syllogisms, and demonstrations to calculations. Every form of reckoning presupposes diversity; one thing may enter into an account only for diverse accidents and upon diverse considerations. This emphasis on the separate considerations of a thing, in contrast with the thing itself, is particularly clear in the case of necessarily true propositions. The truth of' Man is rational' does not primarily depend upon the actual existence of something in the world, but rat her upon an analytical connection between the two concrete names and so bet ween the accidents by which they are caused. That is the reason why such a necessary categorical proposition may be rewritten as a conditional or as the statement that rationality is necessarily consequent to humanity. As these forms of expression are equivalent, they also provide us with an explanation why Hobbes held that abstract names originate in the copula of a categorical proposition.

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8. THE HEYDAY OF BRITISH EMPIRICISM

In the main, this chapter will be devoted to the conceptions of the proposition that were set forth by British thinkers in the period between the publication of Locke's An Essay concerning Human Understanding, in 1690, and the rise of the Scottish philosophy of common sense, in the years aft er 1760. This period is dominated by the great representatives of classical British empiricism, John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), and David Hume (1711-1776). Of these three it is especially Locke who has had a remarkable impact on thought about the proposition in the eighteenth century. Among the many philosophers who elaborated or radicalized his views, two in particular deserve a place in this chapter: David Hardey (1705-1757) and J oseph Priesdey (1733-1804). In addition, we shall see that Locke's work is at least one of the factors th at contributed to a certain difference in the way traditional material was treated in some of the textbooks of logic which appeared during this period. In so far as there were any innovations in introductions to logic, they are mosdy due either to Locke or to the Port-Royal Logic. Finally, this chapter seems to be the right place for a few remarks about that somewhat isolated doctrine put forward by William Wollaston (1659-1724) according to which human acts are a kind of proposition.

8.1. Locke In An Essay concerning Human Understanding, IV, 5, 2 and 5, Locke defines a proposition as a joining or separating of signs. As there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of, namely, ideas and words, there are two sorts of propositions, mental propositions and verbal propositions. In amental proposition the ideas in our understandings are without the use of words put together or separated by the mind, perceiving, or judging of, their agreement or disagreement. Verbal propositions, on the other hand, are words, the signs of our ideas, put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences. Though Locke admits that purely mental propositions, that is, propositions formed without any use of words, are rare, he leaves no doubt whatever as regards their being prior to spoken and written propositions in this respect that they determine the meaningfulness of the latter. As he puts it in An Essay, III, 2,1, the use of words is to be sensible marks of ideas, and the ideas they stand for are their proper and 139

immediate signification. In his second reply to the bishop of Worcester , Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699), Locke declares that the new way of ideas and the old way of speaking intelligibly was always, and ever will be, the same. The concern with meaningfulness is expressed by the prescription that a man use no words but such as he makes the signs of certain determined objects ofhis mind, in thinking, which he can make known to another. And in Of the Conduct of the Understanding, 28, this pre script ion is repeated for the hearer: they who would advance in knowledge and not deceive and swell themselves with a little articulated air should lay down this as a fundament al rule, not to take words for things, nor suppose that names in books signify real en ti ties in nature until they can frame clear and distinct ideas of those entities 1 • Above all, then, we shall have to turn our attention to the mental proposition, the complex natural sign that is framed by the mind and, in its full-blown assertive form, consists of two ideas, a copula or tie bet ween those ideas, and an act of assent or dissent directed towards an object that is either true or false. 8.1.1. If a spoken or written declarative sentence derives its meaning from the mental proposition that precedes or accompanies it, the constituents which are the subject-term and the predicate-term will be rendered meaningful by the two conceptions or ideas that correspond to them in the mind. The groups of sounds or letters that form the spoken or written subject-term and predicateterm have a meaning in so far as speaker and hearer or writer and reader associate with them specific acts of thinking of something. In the tradition, this view of the meaningfulness of utterances was usually expressed by the statement that categorematic terms or names signify immediately conceptions, which, being always conceptions of something, are natural signs of things in the outside world; it is only through the conceptions which they immediately signify, or to which they are subordinated, that names signify things in the world. In order to be talked about in a thoughtful and meaningful way, things have to be conceived of in some specific manner and put before the mind. Locke clearly adopts the main features of this traditional view. Especially in the third book of An Essay he repeatedly insists that the use of words, more in particular of positive names, is to be sensible marks of ideas and that the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification. A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things or of conceptions in the mind of another whereofhe has none in his own. For thus they would be the signs ofhe knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothingZ. Speaking of a thing necessarily implies conceiving of it in some definite way. Ideas, however, are not only the immediate significates of names; they are also signs themselves. Since the things that the mind contemplates are none of them, besides the mind itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it; and these 1. Locke 1740, I, p. 574; lIl, p. 410.

2. Essay, lIl , 2, 2.

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signs or representations are ideas3 • Whereas spoken and written words are regarded as conventional signs of ideas and, indirectly, of things in the world, ideas are natural signs; their sign-character consists in the fact that awareness and acts of thinking are always awareness of something and acts of thinking of something. While there can hardly be any dispute about Locke's explicit view that ideas have two kinds of relation, one to the names by which they are immediately signified, and one to the things in the world of which they are signs, the situation is quite different with the question as to what he actually means by an idea. Although this question is made more intricate by the fact that Locke uses the word 'idea' with a variety of senses and also by certain difficulties arising from his classification of ideas, the difference of opinion concerning the correct answer to it has a deeper source than these complicating factors. Roughly, there are two parties. The more or less established doctrine about the nature of ideas ascribes to Locke the view that an idea is a separate mental entity which has the character of an image, copy, or resemblance and which is the immediate object towards which the mental act of knowing is directed, so that the ex ternal things can be reached only through a further step which leads from the copies in the mind to the originals in the world. Since this step seems to require some kind of independent access to the originals, and since it is hard to see how such a requirement can be met, Locke's view, it is argued, ultimately results in epistemological scepticism. One of the first critics of An Essay, John Sergeant (1622-1707), summarized this consequence of representationalism or mediate realism very neatly by stating that we cannot know any idea to be a right resemblance of a thing unie ss they be both of them in our comparing power, that is, in our understanding or reason, and there viewed and compared together4 • But what is perhaps more surprising, Locke himself shows a clear awareness of the sceptical implications of representationalism. In An Examination ofP. Malebranche's opinion ofseeing all things in God he more than once points out that on Malebranche's view it is impossible for us to know that the universe contains anything other than God and the ideas that are in God. For how can we know that the picture of any thing is like that thing when we never see that which it represents?5. In view of the various unsatisfactory implications of ascribing to Locke a representationalist doctrine of ideas, a growing number of commentators ofhis work have co me to uphold a different interpretation of the import of the word 'idea'. According to one of the ablest supporters of this rival opinion, J . W. Yolton, Locke follows Arnauld in rejecting the view that ideas are separate entities which are distinct from the acts of awareness 6 • As we saw in 4.1., Arnauld identified the idea of a thing with the perception of the thing. There is 3. 4. 5. 6.

Essay, IV, 21, 4. Cf. also 11,32,16 and 19; lIl, 3,11; IV, 4, 4; IV, 5, 2. Sergeant 1697, Preliminary 11, section 13. Cf. YOLTON 1956, pp. 98-114. Locke 1740, lIl, p. 451, p. 460, p. 465. Cf., for instanee, YOLTON 1975 b , especially pp. 382-384.

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a single entity which has two relations, one to the mind which is modified by the act of apprehending, and one to the thing conceived of in so far as it has esse obiective in the mind. Viewed as an act of a particular mind, the apprehension is aperception; considered as an apprehension of something, that is, as an act with a definite content, it is an idée. This conception of the nature of an idea, as one entity with both an active and a passive aspect, was also regarded by Arnauld as the view that had been held by Descartes. Although the fact that so many intelligent commentators and critics have adopted the representationalist interpretation is sufficient evidence that such a reading is not entirely without support in the texts, it seems to me th at there is much more to be said for an interpretation along the lines indicated by Arnauld. For one thing, this would explain the remarkable fact th at Locke identifies an idea both with an actual perception and with the object of perception. In this connection, it should be noted th at Locke, like Arnauld in French, often uses the word 'perception' in a broader sense than we might do nowadays. In this broad sense, the word covers not merely acts of sense-perception, but also acts of intellectual understanding or thoughts. Locke explicitly identifies an idea with such a perception or act of awareness and frequently uses the words 'idea' and 'perception' synonymously7. On the other hand, he also speaks of the actual perception of an idea, declaring th at perception is the same thing as having ideas 8 • As is well-known, he defines an idea as whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, or as the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding 9 • In the epistle to the reader that was added to the fourth edition of An Essay in 1700, he explains his usage of the word 'idea' by saying that he means by it some object in the mind, such as it is there seen and perceived to be, and so is objectively in the mind. The words 'to be in the understanding' signify to be understood lO • That which is objectively in the mind or is understood is an appearance which the mind has in its view or before its view. All these characterizations are strongly reminiscent of the traditional terminology of conceptus obiectivus and esse obiective. A perception or act of awareness, which as such is a modification of a particular mind in which it is as in a subject, cannot but be a perception of something, that is to say, it necessarily has a definite content or internalobject. This content or internal object is the passive or objective aspect of the act, that which is conceived of and appears to the mind as its immediate object. As we saw in 1.4.2., it was often called the theme, th at which is put before the mind; John Newton, for example, in An Introduction to the Art of Logick, which was published in London in 1671, states that a theme is any thing propounded to the understanding th at it

7. Essay, 1,4,20; II, 10,2; II, 32,1,3, and 14; cf. alsö Essay, II, 8, 7; lIl, 4,14 and 15; lIl, 9, 18; IV, 4, 4. 8. Essay, 1,4,20; II, 1, 9; II, 2, 1; II, 10, 2. 9. Essay, I, 1, 8; II, 8, 8; II, 10,2; IV, 1, 1. Cf. also Locke's reply to the bishopofWorcester (Locke 1740, I, p. 429) . 10. Essay, I, 2, 5.

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may be known. The fact that Locke identifies an idea both with an actual perception and with the immediate object of perception is explained most satisfactorily by the assumption that in outline he adheres to the traditional view according to which one and the same act has a subjective aspect, as a modification of a particular mind, and an objective or passive aspect, as that which is conceived of. Sometimes the act-side is highlighted, on other occasions it is the content-side that is brought into prominence. The hypothesis that Locke follows the Arnauld-line easily fits in with his critical attitude towards Malebranche andJohn Norris (1657-1711), who was an ardent disciple of the French philosopher ll . Like Arnauld (See 4.1.), Locke attacks especially Malebranche' s claim that an act of thinking has an object that is identical with an idea in the divine mind and is thus really distinct from the act and independent of it. It is somewhat less easy, however, to account for a remark made by Locke in his second reply to Stillingfleet, in connection with the views that had been expressed by John Sergeant in his Solid Philosophy asserted against the Pancies of the Ideists of 1697. Sergeant tried to defend direct realism by insisting that the thing as known, which is qlled a notion, is identical with the thing in itself as it exists in extramental reality. Notions are the very natures of the things known, but one and the same nature may exist in two different ways: it has real existence in so far as it determines matter in the outside world and it has spiritual or intentional being in so far as it is received by the mind 12 • As Stillingfleet had shown some sympathy for this view - which is rather close to the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine as it was outlined in the first section of our first chapter - Locke expresses his hope that the bishop will not go so far as to believe that as often as he thinks of his cathedral church or of Descartes ' s vortices, the very cathedral church of Worcester or the mot ion of those vortices itself exists in his understanding; when one of them never existed but in that one place at Worcester, and the other never existed anywhere in rerum natura. Locke concludes that the immediate objects of the mind are not the very things themselves existing in the understanding 13 • Now it is not astonishirig that Locke, in the marginal notes in his copy of Solid Philosophy asserted against the Pancies of the Ideists, protests against Sergeant's tendency to interpret ideas throughout as copies or resemblances 14 • But apart from this obvious error in Sergeant's interpretation of Locke and other ideists, one would

11. Cf. ACWORTH 1979. An Examination ofP. Ma/ebranche's opinion ofseeing all things in God and Remarks upon some ofMr. Norris's books were published in the Posthumous Works of 1706. 12. Cf. YOLTON 1956, pp. 103-114; COONEY 1972-1973. CompareSir KenelmDigby, Demonstratio immortalitatis animae rationa/is, Francofurti, 1664, p. 461: Non est cur dubitemus ipsissimam rei quae apprehenditur naturam in apprehendentis mente esse, et quod rem aliquam ab ho mine apprehendi sit eandem in se existentem habere, ac denique quod homo apprehendendo aliquid id ipsum fiat quod apprehendit, non sui in illud mutatione, sed illius in se assumptione. Cf. RISSE 1970, p. 431, n. 38. 13. Locke 1740, I, p. 554. 14. Cf. YOLTON 1951 and YOLTON 1956, pp. 110-112.

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have expected Locke to show some appreciation of the substantial agreement between certain fundament al points of the traditional doctrine and his own view. Since Locke never replied to Sergeant' s criticisms in any systematic way, it is hard to tell exactly where he disagreed with the latter's theory of notions. Orthodox Thomists considered the inner word th at is the content of an act of thinking as something that is distinct from the act itself; but that point is certainly not stressed by Sergeant. It is more probable, I think, th at Sergeant, as a champion of direct realism, was chiefly interested in the identity of the not ion with the thing itself, whereas Locke concentrated upon the difference bet ween the immaterial mode of existence of an idea and the real existence of a corporeal object in the outside world. This tendency to emphasize the difference in the mode of existence may have been strengthened by Locke's rejection of universal natures th at exist in the things themselves and so are proper candidates for being identified with the general notions in the mind. Being a conceptualist, Locke was prevented from accepting even the weak type of formal or structural identity that Thomists ascribed to concepts in the mind and quiddities in the things themselves. In his view, general ideas have no exact counterparts in the world, but fulfil a peculiar function of their own. It is precisely Locke's theory of abstract and general ideas 1S which becomes much more readily understandable if it is viewed in the light of such traditional conceptualist doctrines as the objective-existence theory defended by Petrus Aureolus (Cf. 1.2.2.). Let us take one of Locke' s own examples and assume that somebody sees a particular thing and conceives of it as a triangle. Regarded as amental activity, this conception consists in a process of abstraction by which certain features of the particular appearance are left out of consideration and others are retained, so that the particular thing is conceived of as similar in some respect to other particulars with which it is thereby grouped together. The particular things towards which such a generalizing conception may be directed do not share any universal feature in so far as they are concrete items in the world, but they do have in common that each of them is thought of in the specific manner that belongs to a conception of a triangle in general. In other words, in so far as the different particular things are all conceived of in the same way, with the same features left out and the same features retained, they acquire a unity which consists in the fact that each of them becomes the passive object of one specific act of conceiving. As the content of a generalizing conception, that is, as a creature of the understanding, the whole set of concrete triangles becomes one conceptus obiectivus or idea because the idea is nothing but the passive unity that corresponds to the unity of the active conception. Although each act of conceiving, considered as a modification of some mind, is a particular existent, that which is conceived, the content that makes the concept ion a conception of something, is a general sign in so far as it can be applied indifferently to any member of a class of particular things. If it is assumed that 15. Thecrucial passages are Essay, 11, 11, 8-9; III, 3, 6-9; IV, 7, 9; III, 3,11. Cf., for instanee, TAYLOR 1978.

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an abstract idea is simultaneously amental activity that selects certain features of a particular appearance and leaves out others, and also the content which makes the activity the general conception of one thing rather than another, many of the difficulties that are supposed to beset Locke's theory of abstract ideas disappear. The problems arise mainly because it is overlooked that an abstract idea is, on the one hand, the generalizing act of conceiving itself, and, on the other hand, the particular thing in so far as it is th at which is conceived of by the generalizing act and so has intentional being in the mind. 8.1.2. As we saw at the beginning of the previous subsection, Locke defines a ment al proposition as a proposition in which the ideas in our understandings are without the use of words put together or separated by the mind, perceiving, or judging of, their agreement or disagreement. In framing this definition, he apparently had in mind those instances of forming a proposition in which the act of affirmative or negative predication coincides with the act ofknowing or believing th at the predicate belongs, or does not belong, to the subject. And it is indeed so that in many circumstances there is no urgent reason to insist on a sharp distinction bet ween the act of mere predication, who se product is a merely apprehensive proposition, and the act of knowing or believing, which turns a merely apprehensive or entertained proposition into a proposition that is effectively held to be true. There are, however, indications that Locke himself sometimes saw the function of the copula as merely predicative and accordingly used expressions that refer to the act of propositional combination in the weak sense of joining and separating or affirming and denying in a purely comparative and contemplative manner, whereas on other occasions he employed the same expressions in the strong sen se of joining and separating or affirming and denying in a knowing or believing way. For example, in An Essay, IV, 5, 6, the act ofjoining or separating two ideas clearly has the force of perceiving, believing, or supposing that the ideas agree or disagree one to the other, while in many other passages it is equally clear that the formation of the proposition precedes the act of assenting to it or taking it to be true. When, therefore, Locke characterizes the expressions 'is' and 'is not' as the general marks of the mind affirming or denying, it is rat her difficult to tell whether he is thinking of affirmative and negative predication or of the full-blown act ofjudging in an affirmative or negative way. He offers this characterization of the copula in An Essay, 111, 7, where he deals with particles. Besides words which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of to signify the connection that the mind gives to ideas or propositions one with another. Such particles show or inti mate some action of the mind with respect to ideas, in particular acts of affirmation and negation, but they also connect whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse and to inform the hearer of the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, exceptions, and other ways of thinking that are in the speaker's mind. After elucidating the various nuances of meaning of the discretive or adversative conjunction 'but' , Locke concludes the chapter on par145

ticles with the observation that some of them constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sen se of a whole sentence contained in them. lalready drew attention to this rem ark in 6.3.2., in connection with Geulincx's analysis of such sentences as Quia est, cogitat. In general, Locke's treatment of particles is strongly reminiscent of the traditional distinction between significare per modum conceptus and significare per modum affectus which was mentioned in 6.1.2. In fact, it looks like a watered-down version of such views as were developed by the authors of the Port-Royal Grammar with respect to the difference between objects of thought and manners or forms of thinking, and by Geulincx concerning notae as signa actus ut exerciti (See 4.2.1. and 6.1.3.). Since Locke, in conformity to this kind of doctrine, lays great stress on the difference bet ween names of ideas and particles, characterizing the lat ter as marks of some action of the mind, and since, on the other hand, he defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, that is, presumably, as the having of an additional idea of a relation, it is most likely, I think, that he considered the copula as being fiISt and foremost a mark of mere predication. Especially in the fourth book of An Essay, Locke draws a sharp distinction between the propositional attitude ofknowledge and the propositional attitude ofjudgment. Certainty ofknowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition 16 • Such knowledge is partly necessary, partly voluntary. What is voluntary in our knowledge is the employing or withholding any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects, and also a more or less accurate survey of them. But once we have decided to employ our faculty of understanding, our will has no power to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or other; that is done only by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered 17 • Judgment, on the other hand, is the faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had. When this faculty is exercised immediately about things, it is called judgment; when it is exercised about truths delivered in words, it is most commonly called assent or dissent 18 • Whereas in the first book of An Essay Locke occasionally uses the word' assent' in a broad sense, so as to include certain knowledge 19 , in the fourth book he tends to restrict its application to cases where the connection between the ideas is only probable. In general, the words 'assent' and 'dissent' seem to preserve the dialogical component of their original meaning; they denote an attitude adopted towards a proposition that has been expressed in words and propounded for consideration, either by someone else, in a real dialogue, or by the judger himself, in silent deliberation. Locke defines judgment as the putting ideas together or separating them from one another in the mind wh en their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so. According 16. 17. 18. 19.

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Essay, Essay, Essay, Essay,

IV, 6, 3; IV, 1,2; IV, 7, 2 and 4; IV, 14,4. See also Essay, 11, 21, 5. IV, 13. IV, 14. I, 2, 5; I, 2, 8; I, 2, 12.

to him, such an assent is no more in our power than knowledge; wh at upon full examination I find the most probable, I cannot deny my assent to. But, analogously to the case ofknowledge, we can hinder assent by stopping our inquiry and not employing our faculties in the search of any truth 20 • Locke's ethics of belief, then, seems to pertain, not to the actual assent itself, but rather to the duty of a rational man to examine all the grounds of probability and see how they make more or less for or against any proposition, before he assents to or dissents from it 21 • Though Locke concedes that ideas are often called true or false, he insists th at properly speaking truth and falsehood belong only to propositions. Since truth and falsity always lie in some affirmation or negation, ment al or verbal, ideas are not capable of being true or false till the mind passes some judgment on ~hem, that is, affirms or denies something of them 22 • Accordingly, knowledge and belief, which are the main forms of holding something true, have as their objects propositions 23 • Locke distinguishes between ment al truths and truths of words, dividing the latter into realor instructive truths and truths which are purely verbal or trifling. Trifling propositions are identical propositions, in which a term is affirmed of itself, or propositions in which two abstract terms are affirmed one of another, as in 'Parsimony is frugality', or propositions in which a part of a complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole, as in 'Lead is a metal'; in sum, all propositions that are barely about the signification of sounds 24 •

8.2. Berkeley One of the interests which Berkeley shared with Locke was a keen concern . for the significant use of language. Initially, he even seems to have been attracted by much the same doctrine regarding the art of speaking intelligibly as had been put forward by Locke. When, however, he realized that the close connection between words and ideas on which that doctrine was based formed one of the main reasons for positing abstract ideas, he became criticalof the predominant role that was assigned to ideas in Locke's theory of meaning. Accordingly, he attempted to limit the part played by ideas and in doing so he called attention to aspects of meaningful speech that are easily neglected by those who adhere to the Lockean approach. 8.2.1. In Berkeley's eyes, the theory of meaning that leads to the positing of abstract ideas comprises three closely connected theses. The first thesis is the received opinion that language has no other end but the communicating our ideas; that the true end of speech is merely, or principally, or always, the imp ar20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Essay, IV, 20, 16. Cf. Essay, IV, 15,5; IV, 16, 1; IV, 19, 1. Essay, 11, 32, 1-3; 11, 32, 19; IV, 5, 2-3 and 6. Essay, lIl, 1, 6; lIl, 9, 21. Essay, IV, 5, 6; IV, 8.

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ting or acquiring of ideas 25 • This one-sided view of the use of language entails, as a second thesis, the notion, current among those that pass for the deepest thinkers, that a proposition, the natural unit of cognitive or informative speech, cannot otherwise be understood than by perceiving the agreement or disagreement of the ideas marked by the terms of it 26 • From this notion it is only one step to the third thesis, that words, as signs, do or should stand for ideas; so far as words suggest ideas, they are significant, whereas words that suggest no ideas are insignificant 27 • Now that which seems to Berkeley principally to have driven men into the conceit of general ideas is the opinion that every name has or ought to have one only precise and settled signification. For wh en men were indubitably conscious to themselves that many words they used did not denote any particular ideas, lest they should be thought altogether insignificant, they were of necessity driven into the opinion that they stood for general ones 28 • As it is Berkeley's firm conviction that there are no abstract ideas, he wants to undermine the view that every name stands for an idea, a view which makes words and ideas thought much more inseparabie than in truth they are, and he sets himself the difficult task of dissolving a union so early begun and confirmed by so long a habit as that between words and ideas 29 •

8.2.2. AlreadyinPhilosophical Commentaries, 720, Berkeley noted that when he said that he would reject all propositions in which he did not know fully and adequately and clearly so far as knowable the thing meant thereby, this was not to be extended to propositions inthe scripture. In matters of revelation, where we cannot comprehend and understand the proposition, an humbie implicit faith becomes us, such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in Latin. That words may be used to good purpose without bringing into the mind determinate ideas is further proved by such examples as the fact that we are affected with the promise of a good thing though we have no idea of wh at it is, and the effect of the sentence' Aristotle has said it', when it is uttered with the intention of disposing the hearer to receive the opinion in question with that deference and submission that custom has annexed to that name30 • As Berkeley pointed out in a letter to Samuel Johnson, words as often terminate in the will as in the understanding, being employed rat her to excite, influence, and direct action than to produce clear and distinct ideas. Signs have other uses besides barely standing for and exhibiting ideas, such as raising proper emotions, producing certain dispositions or habits of mind, and directing our ac-

25. Princip/es ofHuman Know/edge, Introduction, 19; A/ciphTon, VII, 14. Cf. Philosophica/ Com· mentaries, 312, 3. 26. FiTst Drajt of the IntToduction to the Princip/es, 19. Cf. A/ciphTon, VII, 3. 27. A/ciphTon, VII, 2. Cf. Philosophica/ Commentaries, 312, 3; 354; 354a; 356; 378; 422; Berkeley 1948-1957, IV, pp. 235-236; FiTst Drajt, 19; Princip/es, IntToduction, 19. 28. FiTst Drajt, 18 and 20; Princip/es, Introduction, 18-20; AlciphTon, VII, 5. 29. FiTst Drajt, 23. 30. FiTst Draft, 19-20; Princip/es, IntToduction, 20.

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tions in pursuit of that happiness which is the ultimate end and design, the primary spring and motive that sets rational agents at work 31 • But even within the limits of the cognitive or informative use of language ideas have a much more modest function than Locke's semantics would have us believe. In the first place, of course, Berkeley rejected abstract general ideas in the sense in which he thought they had been taken by Locke. As is wellknown, for Berkeley an idea, which considered in itself is particular , becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. When, for instance, a geometrician, in demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts, draws a line, that line is always a particular phenomenon, but it is nevertheless general with regard to its signification since, as it is used by the geometrician, it represents indifferently all particular lines whatsoever32 • Ironically, Berkeley' s own interpretation of the generality of an idea is quite similar to one of the characterizations given by Locke, in An Essay, lIl, 3, 11. Berkeley, then, believes that he that knows he has no other than particular ideas will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. But there is more: he th at knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour oflooking for ideas where there are none to be had33 • Among the words that tempt us to look for ideas where there are none to be had are those linguistic expressions which refer to the mind and to ment al operations. Right at the beginning of the Principles of Human Knowledge Berkeley draws attention to the fundamental distinction between a perceiving, active being, variously called mind, spirit, soul, or self, with the diverse operations which it exercises, and the passive objects of knowIedge, which he calls ideas. A spirit is one simpIe, undivided, active being; as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the Will34 • In the Philosophical Commentaries the acts or operations of the mind are frequently referred to as volitions; volitions are the active side of the soul, as opposed to ideas, which are passive and inert35 • Although Berkeley holds that it is impossible to conceive perception without an idea or an idea without perception and that the existence of anything imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception36 , he nevertheless lays great emphasis on the difference between the act of perceiving or imagining and that which is perceived or imagined, the passive object of the act. These passive objects of acts of perceiving or imagining Berkeley calls ideas, rather than things, for two reasons. In the first place, the term 'thing', in contradistinction to 'idea', is generally supposed to denote something that exists

31. 32. 33 . 34. 35. 36.

Berkeley 1948-1957, 11, p. 293; Alciphron, VII, 14. Principles, Introduction, 12. First Draft, 24; Principles, Introduction, 24. Principles, 27. Cf. Alciphron, VII, 17 (Berkeley 1948-1957, III, p. 317) . Philosophical Commentaries, 429a; 611a; 621; 643; 644; 663; 667; 788; 808. Philosophical Commentaries, 572; 792.

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outside the mind. The second reason is that 'thing' has a more comprehensive signification than 'idea', including spirits, or thinking things, as weU as ideas. Since, according to Berkeley, the objects of sense exist only in the mind and are, moreover, thoughtless and inactive, he has chosen to mark them by the word 'idea', which implies precisely those properties37 • An idea may nonetheless be regarded as a thing provided that it is understood that the thing is an extended thing, which may have passive modes of thinking, but no active modes, and that it is the thing only as it is known and perceived by US 38 • By an idea Berkeley means any sensible or imaginable thing in so far as it is the immediate object of thought, that is to say, any thing whose existence consists in being perceived, imagined, or thought of. Berkeley' s principal reason for using the word 'idea' is that this term is understood to imply a necessary relation to the mind 39 • In his opinion, it is nonsense to speak of things considered in themselves, as opposed to things considered with respect to us. Things are that which is perceived of them and appears to the mind; we have no access to them except by having ideas of them. But our ideas are the things themselves in so far as they are perceived and thought of4O. On the one hand, then, according to Berkeley' s doctrine aU things are entia rationis, inasmuch as they exist only in the mind (solum ha bent esse in intellectuft. On the other hand, he insists that the distinction between ens rationis and ens reale is kept up by his doctrine as weU as by any other doctrine. In The Third Dialogue he explains the difference between real things and products of the imagination by invoking criteria of vividness and dependence on the will, and also by appealing to the ex tent to which they are connected and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives 42 • Whereas particular ideas or passive objects of acts of perceiving and imagining may be invoked to lend meaning to the words associated with them, Berkeley repeatedly points out that it is impossible to explain the meaning of words that stand for the mind and its activities by a similar appeal to corresponding ideas. Since ideas are objects of the understanding and an idea can resembie nothing but an idea, an agent or active mind cannot be an idea or like an idea. It would be a contradiction to say that I, or any other inteUigence, have an idea of a volition or act of the mind. Such is the nature of spirit or that which acts that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produces 43 • Consequently, if we are not prepared to regard words for the mind and its activities as empty sounds, we have to admit that words may be significant although they do not stand for ideas. In this connection Berkeley 37. Principles, 39. Cf. Philosophical Commentaries, 689. 38. Philosophical Commentaries, 623; Principles, 83. 39. Philosophical Commentaries, 427 a; 472; 775; The Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous (Berkeley 1948-1957, 11, p. 235). 40. Philosophical Commentaries, 832; 427; 427 a. 41. Philosophical Commentaries, 474. For the notion of objective being see also 781 and 819. 42. Philosophical Commentaries, 474a; 535; Berkeley 1948-1957, 11, p. 235. 43. Philosophical Commentaries, 523; 657; 663; 665; Principles, 27; 135; Alciphron, VII, 5.

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points to particles, of which Locke had said that they are marks of some action or intimation of the mind, without being names of ideas 44 • In the years between 1732 and 1734 he began to use the word 'notion' as a more or less technical term in the theory of meaning: we have a notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind inasmuch as we knowor understand the meaning of the corresponding words. Being able to use mind-words significantly is having a notion of the mental activities indicated by them4S • But even in cases where words do stand for ideas the words do not become in significant if they should not every time they are uttered excite the ideas they signify in our minds. It is sufficient that we have it in our power to substitute ideas for their signs when there is occasion. In this respect, words are comparabie to letters in algebra, or to counters that are used at a card-table, or to figures in casting up a sum of money46. But Berkeley goes much farther than admitting that words may be perfectly significant even though the ideas associated with them do not always happen to be present to the mind. There are also signs that contribute to meaningful speech without there being any possibility at all of offering or exhibiting a corresponding idea to the mind. We cannot form distinct simple ideas of number, but we can nevertheless make a very proper and significant use of numeral names. Even the algebraic mark which denotes the root of a negative square has its use in logistic operations although it be impossible to form an idea of any such quantity47. Likewise, scientific theories comprise, for instance, evident and useful propositions relating to force in spite of the fact that when we lay aside the word 'force' and exclude every other thing from our thoughts, we shall find it extremely difficult to form an idea of force. The same applies to such a religious term as 'grace': although we cannot attain a distinct idea corresponding to it, it fulfils a vital function in discussions about the object of faith and in the direction of our life and actions. There is a practical faith or assent which shows itselfin the will and actions of a man although his understanding may not be furnished with those abstract, precise, distinct ideas which are acknowledged to be above the talents of common men48 • While in matters of faith Berkeley stresses the edifying and dynamic aspects of religious language, his observations concerning mathematical signs and terms of scientific theory aptly draw attent ion to the fact that at least sometimes the meaning of a word consists in the way it is handled according to operational rules, rat her than in an indolent perception of ideas. In such cases the examination of the mutual relationships among words and of the opera ti ons that can be performed with them on the basis of that network of relations is far more important than the question whether they are accompanied by certain conceptions.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

Philosophical Commentaries, 661; 667. For details see WOOZLEY 1976. Principles,Introduction, 19; Alciphron, VII, 5. Alciphron, VII, 5 and 14. Alciphron, VII, 6-7 and 9.

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In the light of the foregoing survey of the bounds which Berkeley sets to the contributions made by ideas to the meaningfulness oflinguistic expressions, it is easier to comprehend his criticisms of Locke's thesis that we understand a proposition by perceiving the agreement or dis agreement of the ideas marked by its terms. Ifknowledge is the perception of the connection or dis agreement between ideas, he who does not distinctly perceive the ideas marked by the terms, so as to form a ment al proposition answering to the verbal, cannot possibly have knowiedge. No more can he be said to have opinion or faith, which imply a weaker assent, for still he must assent to a proposition the terms of which are understood as clearly, although the agreement or dis agreement of the ideas may not be so evident as in the case of knowledge49 • In attacking that part of Locke's thesis which has regard to the ideas signified by the terms of a proposition, Berkeley utilizes Locke's own remarks concerning purely verbal or trifling propositions. No ment al propositions in the sen se in which Locke had defined them correspond to such overtly or covertly identical or tautological sentences as 'A stone is a stone', 'The whole is equal to its parts' , Homo est homo, Cogito ergo sum 50 • Likewise, Berkeley considers the sentences 'Gold is a metal' , 'Gold is yellow' , and 'Gold is fixed' as only nominal; they have no mental propositions answering to them. Another counterexample that may have been suggested to Berkeley by Locke's An Essay is the sentence 'Fortitude is a virtue', for which it is hardly possible to find a corresponding ment al proposition51 . Further, Berkeley mentions such sentences as 'I see', 'I feel' , adding that there are no mental propositions formed answering to these words and that in simple perception there is no affirmation or neg at ion and consequently no certainty. Perhaps he means that such phrases are mere avowals of ment al states52 . In addition to these brief and scattered notes in the Philosophical Commentaries, there is one passage in the FiTSt Draft of the Introduction to the Principles where the author attempts to refute the Lockean thesis in a more elaborate way53. His example is the sentence 'Melampus is an animal' . Whereas Berkeley deerns it evident that the name 'Melampus' denotes one particular idea, he thinks it absurd and incomprehensible to suppose that the word 'animal' stands for a universalnature or for an abstract idea. Indeed, in this proposition it does not stand for any idea at all. If all thought of the words 'Melampus is an animal' is laid aside, there will remain in the mind one only naked and bare idea, namely, th at particular idea to which the name 'Melampus ' is given.

49. First Draft, 19; Alciphron, VII, 3 and 8. 50. Philosophical Commentaries, 592; 728; 738. Cf. also 668. 51. Philosophical Commentaries, 793; 809. Cf. An Essay concerning Human Understanding, IV, 8, 12-13. 52 . Philosophical Commentaries, 731. Cf. what was said about the distinction significare per modum conceptus/ significare per modum affectus in 6.1.2. , and compare G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, London, 1949, p. 102, p. 183. 53 . FiTSt Draft, 19.

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All that the speaker intends to signify by such a proposition is this, that the particular thing called Melampus has a right to be called by the name' animal ' . Apparently, Berkeley reasons as follows. If every name stands for an idea, the word 'animal' stands either for the general, abstract idea of animal, which is impossibIe, or for the idea of any one particular animal. The latter is equally impossible since, if it stands for a particular idea that is different from the idea marked by the name 'Melampus', the proposition is false and includes a contradiction, while, if it signifies the same particular idea that is signified by the name 'Melampus', the proposition is a tautology. The only way out, in Berkeley's eyes, is the assumption, confirmed by introspection, that the word 'animal' , as used in this sentence, does not stand for any idea at all. For an interpretation of the sentence which does not require the positing of an additional idea he probably drew his inspiration from Locke's An Essay, lIl, 3, 12, where it is said that to be of any species and to have a right to the name of that species is all one. Choosing the more linguistic version, Berkeley accounts for the meaning of the sentence by the fact that the particular idea which makes 'Melampus' significant as a name of the dog in question is at the same time a suitable representative of the set of particular things to which the general name 'animal' has been attached and thus makes the use of th at general name significant as well. This solution is very similar to Hobbes' s view: as we saw in 7.2.6., Hobbes held that in uttering the sentence Homo est animal we have only one idea, but in this particular idea we consider that first for which objects are called by the name homo and next that for which they are called by the name anima/. Analogously, in uttering the sentence 'Melampus is an animal' we have only one particular idea, of the dog in question. This particular idea is first considered with its full and unique content and next only in so far as it is a representative of a great many particular objects each of which has an equal right to be called by the name 'animal'54. If Berkeley had developed that part of his theory of propositional meaning that makes use of ideas, he would, as a consequence of his belief that there are only particular ideas, almost certainly have arrived at a view very like Hobbes's doctrine. Besides disagreeing with the role Locke had ascribed to ideas in the formation of the mental proposition which was supposed to give meaning to a spoken or written declarative sentence, Berkeley also had a rat her different opinion about the nature of such propositional attitudes as knowing and judging. In the Philosophical Commentaries he notes that to be sure or certain of what we do not actually perceive we must not be altogether passive; there must be a disposition to act, there must be assent, which is active, there must be actual volition. Iudicium includes volition. Accordingly, error is not in the understanding, but in the will, the active part of the soulSS. The decree of the judgment cannot be abstracted from the command of the will. Every man of common sen se knows

54 . First Drajt, 11. 55 . Philosophical Commentaries, 777; 743; 816.

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that it is the mind which considers its ideas, chooses, rejects, examines, deliberates, decrees, in one word, acts about them, and not they about it 56 • Science and faith agree in this, th at they both imply an assent of the mind. The true end of studying the arts and sciences is to supply general rules or theorems to direct the operations of the mind, for the human mind is designed, not for the bare intuition of ideas of things particular and concrete, but for action and operation about them. Likewise, faith is not an indolent perception, but an operative persuasion of mind, which ever works some suitable action, disposition, or emotion in those who have it 57 • It is evident that Berkeley sided with such thinkers as Descartes and Malebranche in stressing those features of judgment and assent which belong to the will or the active aspect of the soul, rather than to the passive understanding. For him, belief and action are so closely connected that in many cases the effects of an utterance on the hearer are far more important than his understanding what is said by having appropriate ideas. 8.3. Hume

8.3.1. Berkeley's assertion that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term which gives them a more extensive signification and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals which are similar to them was praised by Hume as one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that had been made oflate years in the republic ofletters. Subscribing wholeheartedly to the principle th at ideas or ment al images are particular in their nature, but general in their representation, he elaborated it by assigning an important role to the customary association bet ween general words and the particular ideas that they are apt to evoke in the mind. A particular idea becomes general by being annexed to a general term, that is, to a term which, from a customary conjunction, has a relation t{) many other particular ideas and readily recalls them in the imagination 58 • The element of generality lies in the custom or power to form any of an indefinite number of particular ideas which resembie one another in a specific respect and are thereby made fit to accompany any token of a common name. It might be expected that Hume' s restriction of ideas to particular and fully determinate pictures or co pies of given experiences would lead him to a similar criticism ofLocke's definition of amental proposition as had been put forward by Berkeley. In fact, Hume does criticize the traditional attempts to distinguish amental proposition from simple apprehension, but his strictures are based upon somewhat different considerations. In a long footnote to A Treatise of Human Nature, 1,3, 7, he attacks the usual division of the acts of the understanding into conception,judgment, and reasoning, as well as the definitions given in support of that division. Conception was commonly defined to be the simple 56. Alciphron, VII, 17 (Berkeley 1948-1957, lIl, p. 314, p. 317). 57 . Alciphron, VII, 10-11. 58. A Treatise ofHuman Nature, I, I, 7. Cf. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 12, 2 (125).

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survey of one or more ideas; judgment to be the separating or uniting of different ideas; reasoning to be the separating or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others, which show the relation they bear to each other. According to Hume, however, it is far from being true that in every judgment which we form we unite two different ideas. As a counterexample he adduces existential propositions of the type 'God exists'. Hume repeatedly points out that we have no idea of existence distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form. Thus, when after the simple conception of anything we would conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea. When we affirm that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being as he is represented to us; nor is the existence which we attribute to him conceived by a particular idea which we join to the idea of his other qualities and can again separate and distinguish from them 59 • In the proposition 'God exists' , then, the idea of existence is no distinct idea which we unite with that of the object and which is capable of forming a compound idea by the union. Furthermore, we may reason without employing more than two ideas and without having recourse to a third to serve as a medium between them; we do so when we infer a cause immediately from its effect. Hume concludes that the three acts of the understanding, if they are taken in a proper light, resolve themselves into the first and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects. Whether we consider a single object or several, whether we dweIl on these objects or run from them to others, and in whatever form or order we survey them, the act of the mind exceeds not a mere conception. Hume' s critical attitude towards the traditional trichotomy of the acts of the understanding and towards the definitions on which it is based is no doubt partly brought about by his awareness of the importance of forms of reasoning that are not syllogistic and by his view that existence is not a predicate. For him, the reference of an idea to an extern al object, that is, the claim that something exists not only in idea, but also in fact and reality, is an extraneous denomination, of which the idea in itself bear§. no mark or character60 • In addition, his tendency to minimize the differences among the acts of the understanding may be a consequence of the same sort of consideration as is often found in the writings of the nominalef>l, namely, that very different forms of conceiving - for instance, a complex concept corresponding to 'The warm sun' and a ment al proposition corresponding to 'The sun is warm' - may be verified by one and the same object in the world. If we look at the formal signification of the acts of the understanding, there are striking differences; but from the viewpoint of the

59 . A Treatise ofHuman Nature, I, 2, 6; I, 3, 7; Appendix. Compare Descartes 1964-1975, lIl, p. 396; VII, p. 116 and p. 166 (See 2.3.1.). 60. A Treatise of Human Nature, I, 1, 7. 61. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 54-56.

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material significate, they may practically coincide. However this may be, the context makes it clear that above all Hume wanted to emphasize that all acts of the understanding have in common that they are mere conceivings. As such they are jointly contrasted with cases in which we attach belief to the conception and are persuaded of the truth of what we conceive. Like the Cartesians in general and Malebranche in particular62 , Hume was much more interested in the difference between mere concept ion and belief than in the various forms which acts of conceiving may take. 8.3.2. Hume's analysis of belief or assent 63 concerns almost exclusively conceptions of a certain type. He is very brief about assent to propositions concerning relations of ideas. The person who assents to propositions that are proved by intuition or demonstration not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily determined to conceive them in that particular manner, either immediately or by the interposition of ot her ideas. Wh at is demonstratively false implies a contradiction; and what implies a contradiction cannot be conceived. Fully understanding an analytic proposition is tantamount to accepting it. Further, with regard to propositions concerning matters of fact, the belief or assent which always attends the senses and memory is, according to Hume, nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present. In this case, to believe is to feel an immediate impression of the senses or a repetition of that impression in the memory. The act of the judgment is constituted merely by the force and liveliness of the perception64 • Hume's problem concerns empirie al propositions that are not about wh at is sensibly or introspectively evident, but rather about states of affairs that go beyond wh at is immediately present to sense or introspection. He is chiefly interested in the difference between mere conception and belief in those cases where past experience of a constant conjunction is activated by a present impression, so that the impression brings to mind the idea of th at which was found to be regularly conjoined with it in the past. When experience has taught me that a barking sound is constantly conjoined with the sight of a dog, a present impression of a barking sound will make me think of a dog in such a manner th at I attach belief to th at thought and expect it to be confirmed by subsequent observations. Although such an expectation is founded on a gener al belief with respect to the steady conjunction or causal connection between the items concerned, Hume is silent about the nature of assent to generallaws and concentrates entirely on

62. Compare Malebranche 1962, I, 2, 1, p. 49: - - - que l'ent;ndement ne juge jamais, puisqu'jf ne fait qu 'appercevoir, ou que les jugements et les raisonnements même de la part de l'entendement ne sont que de pures perceptions; que c'est la volonté seule qui juge véritablement en acquiesçant à ce que l'entendement lui représente et en s'y reposant volontairement - - -. 63. The crucial passages are A Treatise ofHuman Nature, I, 3, 7, and Appendix; An Abstract of a Book Iately published; An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 5, 2 (39-45) . Cf. PRICE 1969, pp. 157-188; HODGES, LACHS 1976-1977. 64. A Treatise ofHuman Nature, I, 3, 5.

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assent to particular indirect empirical propositions based on inductive generalizations. What, then, is the difference between, for instance, merely thinking or conceiving of an unseen dog which produces a barking sound and really believing that there is now some particular dog outside whose barking I am hearing? The beginning of Hume's answer has the form of a dilemma: either belief is some new idea which we join to the simple conception of an object, or it is merely a peculiar feeling or sentiment. Now the difference cannot lie in the circumstance that the belief contains a new idea th at is absent from the mere conception. The most plausible candidate for beingjoined to the mere conception of an object would be an idea of reality or existence. But we have no abstract idea of existence distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects. The conception of the existence of any object is no addition to the simple conception of it. Likewise, the belief of the existence joins no new idea to those which compose the idea of the object. When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea ofhim, that is, what I conceive of and wh at I believe, neither increases nor diminishes. Moreover , the view that belief consists in joining an idea of existence or reality to the mere concept ion of objects, implies that it would be in our power to believe anything that we can conceive, simply by adding the new idea to the original conception. But in Hume's opinion, this implication is false; belief is something that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles of which we are not masters65 • It may be concluded that the hypo thesis according to which belief consists in a new idea annexed to the conception must be rejected. We are therefore driven to the other horn of the dilemma, namely, that belief is merely a peculiar feeling or sentiment. It would be wrong, however, to suppose that belief consists in some separate impres sion or feeling distinguishable from the conception and only annexed to it in the same manner that will and desire are annexed to particular conceptions of good and pleasure. Besides being contrary to experience, this hypothesis is superfluous; Hume is confident that the phenomenon of belief can be satisfactorily accounted for without the supposition of a distinct and separate impression66 • According to him, an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea that is different from a mere conception or a fiction, not in the nature or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceived and in its feeling to the mind; in sum, it is an idea conceived in a peculiar manner. Hume's characterization of belief as a peculiar manner of conceiving has to be seen, I think, in the light of the distinctions bet ween the objects of thought and the forms or manners of thinking and between conceiving acts and performative acts which were commented upon in 4.2.,4.3.2., and 6.1. His insistence that judgment is not an element of that which is conceived of, but rat her the form or manner in which we conceive of something is strongly 65. A Treatise ofHuman Nature, Appendix; An Abstract. 66. A Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix.

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reminiscent of the view defended by the Port-Royal authors and is, in the last instance, an echo of the fundamental distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic signs. We might say that Hume's doctrine of belief reflects the traditional thesis that the copula, in both its copulative and its assertive function, is a syncategorematic sign th at indicates the mode in which the subject and the predicate are conceived of (significat aliqualiter); as such it does neither increase nor diminish the total content of that which is conceived of. At the same time, Hume may have been aware of the traditional view that one and the same thing may have two modes ofbeing, intentional being, as an object that is present to the mind, and real existence in the outside world, or, as he puts it himself, existence in idea and existence in fact and realit y67. This view, with its emphasis on the identity of the thing as it is conceived of and as it really exists, naturally leads to the corollary that the difference bet ween mere conception and belief can lie only in the attitude taken towards the identical thing, not in that which is conceived itself. Moreover , against this background it becomes intelligible that Hume does not regard existence as a predicate. Ascribing real existence to an idea is not a categorematic act of conceiving an additional idea, but rat her a syncategorematic act of combining the concept ion of the original idea with a certain attitude. In this connection, it should be remembered that the counterexample which Hume adduces against the definition of ajudgment as the separating or uniting of different ideas is precisely the existential proposition 'God is'. An act of judging that something really exists is not directed towards a propositional complex consisting of a subject-concept and existence as the predicate-concept. Rather , it is, in the spirit ofDescartes, an act of referring that which is represented by an idea to something that exists outside the mind. This act of referring is nothing but a change in the manner of conceiving, or in the attitude taken towards the thing conceived of. To a certain extent, Hume's doctrine of judgment may be called non-propositional, in the sense that not every act of judgment presupposes the formation of an apprehensive proposition. In the Cartesian tradition, the distinction between objects of thought and forms or manners of thinking virtually coincides with the distinction bet ween the passive side of the soul and the active side, which, in a broad sense, is also called the will. Now it may seem that Hume opposes this tradition in holding, perhaps not quite consistently68, that belief or judgment is wholly involuntary. The act ofjudging itself does not depend on our will, but arises from certain determinate causes and principles of which we are not masters. Once a present impression and a steady connection are given, we cannot help assenting to the idea connected with the impression. But Hume's insistence on the involuntary character of the act of judging does not imply that he was unaware of the close relationship between judgment and activity. His treatment of belief certainly shows the originality which he claims for it in this respect that he serious67 . A Treatise ofHuman Nature, I, 1, 7. 68 . Cf. PRICE 1969, pp. 239-240.

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ly attempts to elucidate the manner of conceiving which makes belief different from merely having an idea. In trying to shed some more light on what everybody vaguely knows by experience, Hume is bound to invoke only such characteristics of belief as do not alter the content of the conception to which assent is given. In the unphilosophical variety of terms by which he endeavours to describe the peculiar nature of the judicative manner of conceiving, we find, on the one hand, words for proper ties that belong to believed ideas as momentary occurrences and are immediately given with the ideas as such. Ideas that are conceived in the manner peculiar to belief differ from mere conceptions in having a superior degree of vivacity or liveliness, in being more intense and more present. On the other hand, Hume also shows a clear tendency to seek the essence of belief in attributes which characterize a believed idea as a lasting influence on our actions and passions. Compared with a merely entertained idea, a believed idea is steady, firm, solid, stronger, and more infixed and enforced in the mind; it has more weight and importance, more force and influence. This tendency towards a dispositional view of belief reaches its climax in Hume' s statement that belief renders an idea the governing principle of our actions. The mind is said to acquiesce in a conception which is the object of conviction and assurance, to fix and repose itself on it, to have a firmer hold of it, but also to be actuated and moved by it. Hume's theory of the causes of belief, which he summarizes in the general maxim that, when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity69, leaves no room for any freedom of choice in matters of judgment and assent. Nevertheless, he has a keen eye for the guidance which a belief, once it has been acquired, gives to the diverse aspects of our active life. According to him, the difference between belief and fiction or mere conception lies in the fact that truth or what is taken for truth has a more forcible effect on the operations of the mind and on behaviour in genera!.

8.4. Acts as propositions in practice Whereas Berkeley and Hume caUed attention to a quite plausible connection between judgment and behaviour, a much closer and less readily acceptable relationship between propositions and actions was upheld by some rational intuitionists in the field of ethics. Locke had maintained that morality is capable of demonstration as weU as mathematics. The measures of right and wrong may be made out from self-evident propositions by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics70 • In A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations ofNatura 1Religion and the Truth and Certainty ofthe Christian Revelation of1706, Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) defended a similar view. According to him, that there is a fitness or suitableness of certain circumstances to certain persons and an insuitableness of others, and that from the different 69. A Treatise of Human Nature, I, 3, 8. 70. An Essay concerning Human Understanding, lIl, 11, 16; IV, 3, 18; IV, 12, 8.

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relations of different pers ons one to another there necessarily arises a fitness or unfitness of certain manners ofbehaviour of some persons towards others, is as manifest as that the properties which flow from the essences of different mathematical figures have different congruities or incongruities between themselves 71 • The contention th at moral judgments are one aspect of that perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas which constitutes knowledge led Clarke to such conclusions as that he that wilfully refuses to honour and obey God is really guilty of an equal absurdity and inconsistency in practice as he that in speculation denies the effect to owe anything to its cause or the whole to be bigger than its part. And with regard to equity, he asserts that the reason which obliges every man in practice so to deal always with another as he would reasonably expect that others should in like circumstances deal with him, is the very same as that which forces him in speculation to affirm that if one line or number be equal to another, that other is reciprocally equal to it. Iniquity is the very same in action as falsity or contradiction in theory. It would be impossible for men not to be as much ashamed of doing iniquity as they are of believing contradictions. To deny the principle of equityeither in word or action is as if a man should contend that though two and three are equal to five, yet five are not equal to two and three72 • The line of thought suggested by Clarke's observations was taken up by William Wollaston, in his The Religion ofNature delineated of 1722. Wollaston argues that if there is a supreme being upon whom the existence of the world depends, then to own things to be as they are is to take things as he gives them, to go into his constitution of the world, and to submit to his will, revealed in the books of nature . To do this must be agreeable to his will, while the contrary must be disagreeable to it and therefore wrong. Following nature is acting according to the natures of things, that is, treating things as being what they in nature are, or according to truth. Every intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself that he should treat every thing as being what it is. Now one way of treating things as being wh at they in nature are is the use of true propositions; for true propositions are propositions which express things as they are. A proposition which expresses things otherwise than as they are in nature interferes with nature; a false proposition is unnatural or wrong in nature. But if a false proposition is wrong, then no act which implies such a proposition, or is founded in it, can be right, because the act is the very proposition itself in practice. No act, whether word or deed, of any being to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right. A true proposition, then, may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by deeds as well as by express words or another proposition. In support of his thesis that deeds are propositions in practice W ollaston points to the fact that there is meaning in such acts and gestures as weeping, laughing, shrugs, and frowns; they are a sort of 71. RAPHAEL 1969, I, 226, p. 192. 72. RAPHAEL 1969, I, 232, p. 200; 242, pp. 207-208.

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universallanguage. Further, there are many acts of other kinds which have in nature a signification and imply some proposition, as plainly to be understood as if it was declared in words. If what such acts declare to be is not, they must contradict truth as much as any false proposition or assertion can. If, for example, a body of soldiers, seeing another body approach, should fire upon them, this action would declare that they were enemies; and if they were not enemies, this military language would declare wh at was false. Especially acts which have a natural and unalterable signification express our thoughts even more strongly than words; and to contradict any proposition by deeds is a fuller and more effectual contradiction than can possibly be made by words only. Words are but arbitrary signs of our ideas, but deeds may be taken as the effects of them, or rather as the thoughts themselves produced into act, as the very conceptions of the mind brought forth and grown to maturity. Wollaston, therefore, lays it down as a fundamental maxim that whoever acts as if things were so, or not so, does by his acts declare and notify that they are so, or not so, as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwise, his acts contradict those propositions which assert them to be as they are. Moreover , he holds that what has been said about acts inconsistent with truth applies also to many omissions or neglects to act. True propositions may be denied to be true by omissions, as, for instance, the proposition th at God exists would be denied by never praying to him or worshipping him at all73 • W ollaston' s theory is an at tempt to identify the moral qualities of good and right with truth, and those of evil and wrong with falsehood. In all our conduct, both verbal and non-verbal, the owning of things to be as theyare is direct obedience to him who is the author of nature, while not to own things to be or to have been that are or have been, or not to be what they are, is direct rebellion against God. At bottom, therefore, the difference between good and evil is the same as the difference between true and false. When a man lives as ifhe was what he is not, his.whole conduct breathes untruth; he lives a lie. This doctrine is strikingly similar to the view th at had been put forward by Anselm of Canterbury in De veritate, in the years between 1080 and 1085. The fifth chapter of that dialogue deals with the truth or rectitude of natural and nonnatural actions. Anselm distinguishes between the necessary rectitude or truth of an action, for instance in the case of fire that warms, and the non-necessary rectitude or truth of typically human actions. In the ninth chapter he argues th at every action signifies something true or false (quod omnis actio significet verum aut falsum). By the very fact that someone does something, he says and signifies that he ought to do this. When he ought to do wh at he does, he speaks the truth; but when he ought not to do it, he speaks untruth (eo ipso quod aliq uis

aliquidfacit, dicit et significat hoc se debere facere. Quod si debet facere quodfacit, verum dicit. Si autem non debet, mentitur). It is evident that both Anselm and W ollaston based their assimilation of actions to propositions on the view that there is a 73. RAPHAEL 1969, I, 274-294, pp. 240-254. Cf. TWEYMAN 1976, FEINBERG 1977, and BAMBROUGH, HOLLAND 1980.

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true order of things and that deeds as well as words may agree or disagree with the true nature of things. W ollaston enjoyed considerable prestige in intellectual circles and several writers on ethics felt urged to comment upon his extension of propositional vocabulary to non-verbal behaviour. John Balguy (1686-1748), in The Foundations of Moral Goodness, which -was published in 1728-1729, agrees with W ollaston that the moral goodness of an action consists in a conformity to the truth of things. Although it may therefore be called either a true or a right action, Balguy prefers the latter adjective, in order to avoid ambiguity and confusion. For the same reason he would not call conduct that is dissonant to the natures of things a contradiction to some true proposition, but rather a counter-action to the truth or the real natures of things 74 • Besides the observation that W ollaston' s way of speaking might obfuscate indispensable distinctions, it was also pointed out that his theory is unable to account for the fact that virtues and vices admit of degrees. According to Wollaston, virtue and vice increase as the importance of propositions affirmed or denied; but signification of truth and falsehood does not so increase; therefore, signification of truth and falsehood cannot be identical with virtue and vice 75 • In the same vein, it was objected that on Wollaston's view the absurdity of talking to a post, or otherwise treating it as ifit was a man, is precisely of the same nature with that of injuring a man; for in both cases we treat the post and the man as being what they are not. Consequently, on his theory, if it be morally evil to injure a man, it is likewise morally evil to talk to a post76 • Finally, if, as Bentham puts it, there is no harm in any thing in the world but in telling a lie and if murdering your own fat her is nothing but a particular way of saying th at he was not your father, then this leaves us under the same difficulty to give a reason why truth is virtuous and falsehood vicious, as to account for the merit or turpitude of any other action 77 •

8.5. Hartley and Priestley 8.5.1. Although Hartley's Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty and his Expectations was published a decade after Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, it shows no traces of any influence from the latter work . Like Hume, but apparently independently of him, the author endeavoured to account for the

74. RAPHAEL 1969, I, 452 , pp . 400-401. 75 . Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct ofthe Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, London, 1728 (RAPHAEL 1969, I, 368, p. 316); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, lIl, i, 1. 76 . John Brown, Essays on the Characteristics of Lord Shaftesbury, London, 1751 (L.A . SelbyBigge ed., British Moralists, Indianapolis-New York, 1964,11,738, p. 203) . 77. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Oxford, 1789 (RAPHAEL 1969, 11, 959, p. 320); David Hume, A Treatise ofHuman Nature, lIl, i , 1, footnote 1; Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficu/ties in Morals, London, 1758 (RAPHAEL 1969, 11, 727, p. 174).

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operations of the human mind by means of the laws of association between ideas, in the same way as Newton had succeeded in explaining the behaviour of material bodies by means of the law of gravity. As he states at the beginning of the book, his chief design is to expound the doctrines of vibrations and association. The first of these doctrines, which is a physiological counterpart to the theory of mental phenomena, will be left out of consideration here. The doctrine of association was taken from what Locke and others had said concerning the influence of association over our opinions and affections. While Hartley acknowledges Locke as the main source of his doctrine of association, he tends to restrict the ultimate elements ofknowledge to simple ideas of sensation. All the most complex ideas arise from sensation; reflection is not a distinct source. At the same time, he agrees with Berkeley that there can be no such thing as abstract ideas 78 • According to Proposition 8, sensations, by being often repeated, leave certain vestiges, types, or images of themselves, which may be called simple ideas of sensation. By means of association such simple ideas of sensation will run into complex ideas. And, again by association, complex ideas will run into decomplex or doubly complex ideas. As in language the sounds or letters of words adhere closer together than the words of sentences, so the associations bet ween the complex parts of decomplex ideas are Ie ss close and permanent than those between the simple parts of complex ones 79 • Besides associations that connect ideas to one another, there are also ties of association bet ween words and the ideas which give meaning to them. Such names of simple sensible qualities as 'white' and 'sweet' excite simple ideas of sensation. Words of this category cannot be defined, in contrast with names of natural bodies and geometrical figures, which excite aggregates of sensible ideas and may be defined by an enumeration of their properties and characteristics. In addition to these two classes of words which are meaningful by being associated with an idea, Hartley distinguishes two further classes, one consisting of expressions that have definitions only, and the other of particles, which have neither ideas nor definitions. To the third class belong signs for algebraic quantities, such as roots, powers, surds; further, scientific terms of art and most abstract general terms, moral, metaphysical, and vulgar. Particles, such as 'the', 'of', 'to', 'for', 'but', are said to vary the sense of the principal words of a sentence and yet to signify nothing of themselves. Hartley likens them to the algebraic signs for addition and subtraction and to indexes and coefficients; these are not algebraic quantities themselves, but they alter the import of the letters that are. The correct use of adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions is learnt in the same way as unknown quantities in algebra are determined and deciphered by means of the known signs with which they are joined. Either we may insert different particles in sentences whose import is known and in 78. Hardey 1834, I, 'OfLogic'. 79. Hardey 1834, I, Proposition 12. For the word 'decomplex' ('derived from complex parts ') compare Aldrich 1704, p. 4: lam quae simplicem apprehensionem exprimit vox simplex est; quae iudicium, complexa; quae discursum, decomplexa.

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which the substantives, adjectives, and verbs remain the same, or we may use the same particle in sentences in which the principal parts are different. To this interesting observation concerning the manner in which the use of particles is learnt Hardey adds the no less pertinent remark that both children and adults learn the ideas belonging to whole sentences many times in a summary way, and not by adding together the ideas of the several words in the sentenceso . His treatment of the four classes of linguistic expressions proves th at he had gained two extremely important insights. Probably under the influence of Berkeley's writings, he had come to see that the meaningfulness of words does not depend solelyon the having of corresponding ideas, but mayalso be based upon rules of use that determine their contribution to a whole in who se structure they have a certain place. This awareness of other types of meaningfulness than correspondence to an idea was apt to lead to a holistic view of the sentence as the fundament al unit of speech, a view which from about the middle of the eighteenth century gradually won considerable support 8!. Hardey tends to keep in focus the most concrete case, that of giving practical assent to a proposition, and th en to work downwards from this most complex idea to the several layers that a progressing analysis may discover . For expo si tory purposes, however, it is easier to go the opposite way. Let us first consider sentences or propositions in abstraction from the assent or dissent directed towards them. As many words have complex ideas annexed to them, sentences, which are collections of words, will usually have collections of complex ideas, that is, decomplex ideas, annexed to them. In most cases the decomplex idea belonging to a sentence as such is not compounded merely of the complex ideas belonging to the terms ofit; for the sentence mayalso contain particles, which make their own peculiar contribution to the decomplex idea. In this connection, the question arises what Hardey has to say about predication. He pays special attention to two types of proposition: mathematical propositions and propositions about natural bodies82 • When a mathematical proposition is fairly simpie, as in the case of 'Twice two is four', the entire coincidence of the visible or tangible idea of twice two with that of four is impressed upon the mind by various objects; we see that 'twice two' and 'four' are only different names for the same impression. Where the numbers are so large that we are unable to form any distinct visible ideas of them, as when we say that 12 times 12 is equal to 144, it is the coincidence of the words that is seen to arise from some method of reckoning. Coincidence, then, is the foundation of our assent to mathematical propositions, coincidence of ideas in simple cases, coincidence ofideas and terms together, or of terms alone, in complex ones. A mathematical proposition is a complex idea which is not merely the sum of the ideas belonging to the terms of the proposition, but also includes the idea, or internal feeling, which belongs to equality and coincidence. As Hardey 80. Hartley 1834, I, Proposition 80. 81. Cf. LAND 1974. 82. Hartley 1834, I, Proposition 86.

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does not mention the copula in his list of particles, which have neither ideas nor definitions, but explicitly says that there is an idea belonging to coincidence, it must be concluded that for him the predicative tie which holds together the subject and the predicate of a mathematical proposition consists in the idea of coincidence. In all probability, he held a similar view with regard to propositions concerning natural bodies, such as 'Milk is white', 'A dog barks'. These are nothing but acts of forming a present complex idea belonging to material objects into a proposition, or adding some of its common associates, so as to make it more complex. What is added to the ideas of the subject and the predicate is an idea or internal feeling of a peculiar relationship between them. The latter interpretation is in harmony with Hartley's explicit statement that assent and dissent consist chiefly of additional complex ideas, not included in the terms of the proposition. He insists that assent and dissent, whatever their precise and particular nature may be, must come under the notion of ideas, being only those very complex internal feelings which adhere by association to such clusters of words as are called propositions in general or affirmations and negations in particular83 • He distinguishes bet ween rational or verbal assent and practical assent. Rational assent to a proposition is defined as a readiness to affirm it to be true, proceeding from a close association of the ideas suggested by the proposition with the idea, or internal feeling, belonging to the word 'truth'; or of the terms of the proposition with the word 'truth'. Rational dissent is the opposite to this. Practical assent is a readiness to act in such manner as the frequent vivid recurrency of the rational assent disposes us to act; practical dissent is the contrary. Just as rational assent proceeds from an association between the ideas of the apprehensive proposition and the idea of truth, so the practical assent is proportional tothe vividness of the ideas of utility and importance that are joined to the proposition assented t~ . As a rule, mathematical propositions admit only of a rational assent. A mathematical proposition, with the rational assent arising in the mind as soon as it is presented to it, is not hing more than a group of ideas united by association; this very complex idea is not merely the sum of the ideas belonging to the terms of the proposition, but includes the ideas, or internal feelings, whatever they be, which belong to equality, coincidence, and truth . In the rare cases where a mathematical proposition is attended with a practical assent, the whole idea will be made even more complex by the inclusion of the ideas of utility and importance. In general, however, the lat ter ideas occur more frequently in connection with propos itions concerning natural objects. Such propositions are often attended with a high degree of practical assent, arising chiefly from some supposed utility and importance. This practical assent is usually the natural and necessary con sequence of rational assent, when sufficiently impressed; but in some cases the practical assent may take pI ace even before the rational assent. With regard to propositions about the past, Hartley considers the question how a narration of an event supposed to be certainly true, supposed doubtful, 83. Hardey 1834, I, Proposition 12, Proposition 86.

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or supposed entirely fictitious, differs in its effects upon the mind, the words being the same in each case. His answer is that they differ in having the terms 'true', 'doubtful', and 'fictitious', with a variety of usual associates to these, and the corresponding internal feelings of respect, anxiety, dislike etc. connected with them respectively. Further, if the event is sufficiendy interesting, the affecting related ideas will recur more often, and by so recurring agitate the mind more, in proportion to the supposed truth of the event. Likewise, practical assent to propositions about the fut ure depends upon the recurrency of the ideas and upon the degree of agitation produced by them in the mind. Finally, Hardey mentions the many speculative and abstract propositions that are put forward in the fields oflogic, metaphysics, ethics, and divinity. With respect to such propositions, the practical assent or dissent arises from the ideas of importance, reverence, piety, duty, ambition, jealousy, envy, self-interest etc. which interrnix themselves in these subjects and, by doing so, in some cases add great strength to the rational assent, in others destroy it and convert it into its opposite. The ideas belonging to assent and dissent, then, are highly complex ones. For besides the coincidence of ideas and terms, they include ideas of utility, importance, respect, disrespect, ridicule, religious affections, hope, fear etc., bearing some gross gener al proportion to the vividness of these ideas. The abundance of ideas in terms of which Hardey felt compelled to characterize the nature of assent and dissent is strikingly parallel to the unphilosophical variety of words which Hume deemed necessary to describe belief as a manner of conceiving. But whereas Hume firmly rejected the concept ion of belief as a peculiar idea, Hardey apparendy saw no reason to explain the phenomena of predication and assent otherwise than by the way of ideas. 8.5.2. Hardey's theory of the proposition was, in all its main features, subscribed to by Joseph Priesdey. According to the latter, the principle of thought is nothing more than the power of simple perception, or our consciousness of the presence and effect of sensations and ideas. He takes it for granted that this one property of the mind being admitted, all the particular phenomena of sensation and ideas respecting their retention, association etc. and the various faculties of the mind to which those affections of our sensations and ideas give rise, such as memory,judgment, volition, and the passions, will admit of a satisfactory explanation on the principles of vibration84 • Like Hardey , he distinguishes two types of proposition. Propositions relating to number and quantity contain a subject and a predicate which, upon comparison, appear to be in reality not hing more than different names for the same thing. Another class of propositions consists of those which affirm a universal and necessary connection bet ween the subject and the predicate; examples of this type are 'Milk is white' and 'Gold is yellow' . Both the perfect coincidence of the ideas belonging to different terms and the universal and necessary concur84. Priestley 1777, Section 8, Objection 1.

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rence of two ideas are signified by the substantive verb or by that part of a verb that expresses the idea of simple affirmation85 • Every sentence that contains an affirmation must necessarily contain three ideas, namely, two belonging to the subject-term and the predicate-term, the agreement of which is expressed, and one belonging to the substantive verb or copula, which denotes their agreement. Priestley, then, states quite explicitly that the copula corresponds to an idea. Judgment is the perception of the coincidence or concurrence th at is expressed by the copula; it is necessarily determined by the perceived agreement or disagreement of ideas. The rem ark that every declarative sentence corresponds to at least three ideas is made in A Course ofLectures on the Theory ofLanguage and Universal Grammar. There Priestley also maintains that as the sole use of speech is mutual information, men would never have occasion to name any object but to affirm something concerning it. Their first efforts in speech, therefore, would be to form a proposition. And to express the agreement or coincidence of two ideas, men would probably, at first, only name them one after the other, as children do when they first learn to speak. They would say, for example, 'A lion strength' or 'A lion strong' instead of saying 'A lion has strength' or 'A lion is strong'. Soon, however, it would be found convenient to introduce a separate word to denote the affirmation. This word, which simply expresses the affirmation of one idea of another, is called the verb substantive; every word that is called a verb includes it. Averb, then, either expresses the simple affirmation only or the simple affirmation joined with the name of the state or condition of the subject concerning which the affirmation is made86 • This passage contains two noteworthy features. In the first place, Priestley considers the declarative sentence as the fundamental unit of speech, probably under the influence of Hobbes, who, as we saw in 7.2.3., stressed the same point. At the same time, the proposition is regarded to be one complex whoie, which, as a total structure, determines the functions of the elements that may be discovered in it by a progressive analysis. Priestley makes this point by giving it a genet ic turn and presenting it as a thesis about diachronic development, but it is evident that this historical conception did not remain without influence on the systematic treatment of the relationship between the proposition and its constituents. It is interesting to compare Priestley' s view of the priority of the proposition with the more elaborate doctrines put forward by Maupertuis (See 9.1.1.) and, a few decades later, by Adam Srnith (1723-1790), in the Considerations concerning the First Formation of Languages and the Different Genius of Original and Compounded Languages, which was added to the third edition of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments in 1767. According to Smith, verbs must necessarily have been coeval with the very first attempts towards the formation oflanguage. For we

85. Priestley 1775, Introductory Observations, p. XXXVII . 86. Priestley 1762, Lecture IV. See also 9.1.2.

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never speak but in order to express our opinion that something either is or is not, and no affirmation can be expressed without the assistance of some verb. In all probability, the first verbs, perhaps even the first words, made use of in the beginnings oflanguage, were such impersonal verbs as Pluit ('It rains ') and Ningit ('It snows'). They express in one word a complete event and preserve in the expression that perfect simplicity and unity which there always is in the object and in the idea, supposing no abstraction or metaphysical division of the event into its several constituent members of subject and attribute. Impersonal verbs, which expressed at once the whole of a particular event, became, in the progress oflanguage, personal. The one word Venit, for example, was originally used as an impersonal verb, denoting the co ming of one particular object, such as the lion. But once names had been given to diverse animais, the name of any other animal would be joined to Venit, as in Venit ursus ('The bear comes') and Venit lupus ('The wolf comes'), so that the initial meaning of Venit was decomposed into two elements, the element of coming, which gradually became more abstract, and an open place for any subject to which that attribute could be ascribed. Smith compares this process of decomposition with wh at has happened in the art of writing. When mankind fiISt began to express ideas by writing, every character represented a whole word. But the number of words being almost infinite, the memory found itself quite loaded and oppressed by the multitude of characters which it was obliged to retain. Therefore, necessity taught them to divide words into their elements and to invent characters which should represent, not the words themselves, but the elements of which they are composed. In like manner, the impersonal verbs which expressed particular events as undivided wholes developed, by the division of the event into its elements and by a concomitant process of generalization, into constructions consisting of a personal verb and a subject. But in Smith's eyes, this division of the event into two parts is altogether artificial, being the effect of the imperfection oflanguage, which is incapable of expressing at once the whole matter of fact that is meant to be affirmed.Just as in traditional theories of the proposition the predicative conception of states of affairs was often regarded as an imperfection of human thinking as contrasted with divine thought, so philosophers who admitted only particular ideas as constituents of thought were apt to contrast the concrete picture of the event as an undivided whole with the division into elements and the abstraction that are forced upon us when we express such an idea in speech. If adherents of the view that there are only particular ideas wish to speak of the ment al counterpart of a declarative sentence as a proposition at all, they can hardly mean by it anything else than the complex mental image of the event as a whoie. What Smith projects into the past is a verbal approximation to precisely this kind of mental proposition87 • 87. Smith 1861, pp. 524-527. Cf. LAND 1974, pp. 80-87, and BERRY 1974. For a comparabIe appreciation of the fundament al status of the proposition in James Harris, Hermes, or a Philosophica! Inquiry concerning Language and Universa! Grammar, London, 1751, and in Lord Monboddo, Of the Origin and Progress of Language, EdinburghLondon, 1773-1792, see SUBBIONDD 1976 and LAND 1974, pp. 92-101.

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8.6. Some textbooks oflogic 8.6.1. The impact of Locke's philosophy on introductions to logic is already clearly discernible in the Logica sive ars ratiocinandi which was published in 1692 by the Swiss scholar Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736). He definesjudgment, which is contrasted with the proposition as its expres sion in words, as the perception of the relation that connects two, or more, ideas; the mind acquiesces in that perception and does not make any further inquiries about the matter. When the object judged is evident, there is no freedom of choice ~ibertas); as soon as the proposition is understood, the mind necessarily acquiesces in it, without feeling the slightest inclination to make any further inquiries about it. In matters that are obscure, however, we are free to give our assent or to withhold it 88 • Elsewhere, in the philosophy of mind which is the second part ofhis Ontologia et pneumatologia, Le Clerc distinguishes libertas from voluntas or spontaneitas, the spontaneous activity of the mind. This activity may be free, as in the assent which is given to obscure matters, or not free, as in the assent given to an evident proposition. In the latter case, we are free to direct our attention towards some other object, but if we keep the evident proposition before our mind, we cannot but assent to it. This is one of the circumstances in which we may speak of veile non libere89 • It is evident that Le Clerc'is at least as much indebted to the Cartesian tradition as to Locke. Another Swiss admirer of Locke's philosophy was Jean-Pierre De Crousaz (1663-1750), whose La logique of 1712 has much in common with Le Clerc's treatise. According to De Crousaz, the act ofjudging presupposes that we have at least two ideas and that we compare them to one another. On comparison, we perceive th at one of the ideas contains the other or excludes it; finally, we acquiesce in that perception. The relation perceived exists between a part of an idea and the whole of that idea or between one part and another part of the whole idea. We begin with forming some vague idea of an entire object and gradually make it more determinate by adding new ideas. We compare the late st idea with the totality of the ideas already formed and, in judging affirmatively, we perceive that they belong together 90 • Among British logicians, on the other hand, there was a tendency to consider judgment as something more than mere perception of a relation between ideas. Henry Aldrich (1648-1710), who se rather traditional textbook of logic was published almost simultaneously with Locke's An Essay concerning Human Understanding, defines judgment as that operation by which the mind not only perceives two objects, but also formally declares inwardly, as ajudge in a lawcourt, that they belong together or do not belong together (quasi pro tribunali

88. Le Clerc 1692', pp. 45-46. Buffier 1732, p. 869, rightly observes that it is hard to see how assent to an obscure proposition can be reconciled with Le Clerc' s definition ofjudgment as the perception of arelation between two ideas. 89. Le Clerc 1692b, pp. 87-89. Compare 3.1.4. 90. De Crousaz 1725, lIl, pp. 177-187.

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sedens, expresse apud se pronuntiat illa inter se convenire aut dissiderer. As we saw in 3.2.1., the perception-view ofjudgment was rejected even more emphatically by Isaac Watts in his Logic of 1725. And indications of a similar attitude are found in William Duncan (1718-1760) and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746). The former states that upon comparing the idea of two added to two with the idea of four, we at first glance perceive their agreement and thereupon pronounce that two and two are equal to four 92 • Hutcheson uses the Latin phrase ferre sententiam ('to pass judgment') to characterize the second operation of the mind93 • 8.6.2. Like most other logicians of this period, Hutcheson distinguishes the act of judging, iudicium, from the propositio, the dedarative sentence that is the spoken or written expression of the act of judging. That the word iudicium could also be taken as standing for the ment al proposition which is the content of an inner act of judgment is dear from his remarks about truth and falsity. Dedarative sentences that seem to be both true and false are in reality ambiguous, since they signify two judgments or mental propositions (sunt duplices aut duo notant iudicia). In particular , verbs which are uttered at different times are not seldom signs of different ment al propositions (ubi verba eadem diversis temporibus pronuntiantur, efficiunt nonnumquam propositiones vere diversasr. In these cases, where a criterion is sought for deciding whether a dedarative sentence is ambiguous and may therefore change its truth-value, it is the iudicium in the sense of a ment al proposition as the content of an act of judging that settles the issue. But Hutcheson also invokes the iudicium as a decisive factor with regard to the distinction between simple and complex propositions. A simple proposition is dedared to be a proposition that signifies a single judgment, while a complex proposition signifies more than one judgment (simplices unicum notant iudicium, et complexae notant plura iudiciar. Apparently thinking of chapter 8 of the second part of the Port-Royal Logic (See 4.4.3.), he states that modal propositions are commonly reckoned among the complex propositions. In point of fact, however, they signify only one judgment of the speaker and are therefore simpie. For either modal adverbs serve to lend greater force to the affirmation or denial of the dictum, or the dictum is the subject and the modal attribute is the predicate. If Hutcheson means, as he presumably does, th at on each of these two interpretations of a modal sentence only one judgment is involved, then it is likely that iudicium is taken in the sen se of the assertive act of judging, rat her than in the sense of the content ofjudgment. This supposition is corroborated by the fact that he goes on to apply his criterion to those pro-

Aldrich 1704, p. 2. Duncan 1748, p. 6. Hutcheson 1771, p. 11, p. 26. Hutcheson 1771, p. 27. Compare Watts 1753, V, p. 86. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp . 131-138. 95 . Hutcheson 1771, pp. 31-32.

91. 92. 93. 94.

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positions which in the Port-Royal Logic are called compound. Such propos itions are either overtly composed of more than one categorical proposition or may be expanded into a molecular form (See 4.5.). The point at issue can thus hardly be the question whether or not more than one apprehensive mental proposition is involved; it must be the assertive force of the act of judging that is meant. Using precisely this criterion, Hutcheson comes to the conclusion that in conditionals, disjunctions, and negative conjunctions the constituent propositions are not asserted and that consequently they must be considered as being simpie. In addition, relative propositions, which have their parts joined by such particles as express a rel at ion or comparison of one thing to another, assert merely th at the parts compared are equal or not equal and are therefore simple to0 96 • On the other hand, conjunctions, causal, adversative, exclusive, inceptive, and desitive propositions are truly complex; their constituent propositions are the object of an act of judging and so have assertive force 97 • 8.6.3. A third point which is worthy of note concerns the difference between affirmative and negative categorical propositions. Aldrich observes that ajudgment is distinguishable from a complex apprehension by the fact that it is signified by the particles est and non est. If it is thought strange that both particles are called copula, one should remember that grammarians speak of disjunctive conjunctions98 • De Crousaz mentions the same difficulty and proposes a twofold way out. Either one may say that with regard to negative propositions the words 'copula' and 'attribute' are applied only in an improper sense; they are retained because in negative propositions their denotata occupy the same place as the genuine copula and attribute occupy in affirmative propositions. Or it may be maintained that with regard to negative propositions these words have the same proper sen se as with regard to affirmative propositions, provided that in the negative instances the attribute is understood as the exclusion of that which is indicated by the second term. IfI assert, for example, th at matter does not think, what I attribute to matter is the exclusion of thought. According to the Hobbesian solution which is apparently favoured by De Crousaz, affirma ti on is the assertion that the second idea is contained in the first, whereas denial is the assertion that the exclusion or complement of the second idea is contained in the first. He adds that there is an obvious difference bet ween not seeing that the second idea is contained in the first and seeing that the complement of the second idea is contained in the first 99 • A somewhat different solution to the problems concerning the copula is offered by William Duncan. He characterizes the copula as that word in a proposition which connects two ideas together; as a rule, it is the substantive verb. If a negative particle is annexed to the copula, we thereby understand th at the 96. 97. 98. 99.

Geulincx (See 6.3.3.) regarded a relative proposition as composita stricte. Compare a1so Watts 1753, V, pp. 83-85. A1drich 1704, p. 2. See a1so 13.2.2. De Crousaz 1725, lIl, pp. 187-189. For Hobbes see 7.2.3.

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ideas are disjoined. Duncan insists that the negation ought to affect the copula. The copula, when placed by itself, between the subject and the predicate, manifestly binds them together. It is evident, therefore, that in order to render a proposition negative, the particle of negation must enter it in such manner as to destroy this union. Two ideas are disjoined in a proposition wh en the negative particle is so referred to the copula as to break the affirmation included in it and undo that connection it would otherwise establish. The negation, therefore, by destroying the effect of the copula, changes the very nature of the proposition, insomuch that instead of binding two ideas together, it denotes their separation. So far, Duncan's explanation seems to apply to the merely predicative function of the copula and of the negated copula. The copula by itself is the sign of the agreement between two ideas which is expressed by an affirmative apprehensive proposition, while the negated copula is the sign of the disagreement between two ideas which is expressed by a negative apprehensive proposition. After this elucidation, he goes on to admit that perhaps it may still appear a mystery how a copula can be said to be a part of a negative proposition, whose proper business it is to disjoin ideas. In his opinion, this difficulty will vanish if we caU to mind that every judgment implies a direct affirmation and that this affirmation alone makes the true copula in a proposition. In the case of agreement between the ideas compared, the copula alone suffices for affirming this agreement, because it is the proper mark whereby we denote an identity or conjunction of ideas. But where ideas disagree, there we must caU in a negative particle. This gives us to understand that the affirmation implied in the copula is not of any connection between the subject and the predicate, but of their mutual opposition and repugnance H)(). In other words, Duncan now seems to appeal to the assertive force of the copula, that is, to the act of judging which is directed either towards an agreement between ideas as it is expressed in an affirmative apprehensive proposition or towards the dis agreement between two ideas as it is expressed in a negative apprehensive proposition. The copula has, first, a merely predicative function; this function of linking two ideas in an affirmative predication can be destroyed by a negative particle. But the copula has an assertive function as weU; as such, it cannot be negated. Dissenting from a proposition is the same as assenting to its negation. In several respects, Duncan's view is reminiscent of the conception of negative propositions put forward by Geulincx (See 6.2.2.)1°1. 8.7. Conclusion

In summarizing the views of the authors th at were examined in this chapter, it is convenient to concentrate upon the question wh at contributions ideas make to the meaningfulness of a declarative sentence. In the light of this question, Locke is found to adhere most closely to the tradition. The abstract general ideas which he posits as mental counterparts of common names are in 100. Duncan 1748, pp. 156-160. 101. Cf. a150 NUCHELMANS 1980', pp . 90-91.

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all probability to be interpreted along the lines of traditional objective-existence theories. Abstract general ideas are the contents of acts of conceiving things in an abstract and general way; they are not separate entities, but rat her the acts themselves, considered in a passive manner. The copula is a particle, that is, the verbal sign of an exercised ment al act of compounding or dividing two ideas. Berkeley rejected wh at he held to be Locke' s interpretation of abstract general ideas, invoking instead only a general use of concrete and determinate ment al images. Even so, he considerably limited the appeal to ideas in explaining the meaning of linguistic expressions. Hartley and Priestley agreed with Berkeley and Hume in repudiating the view that there are ideas of an abstract and general nature; moreover , they considered sensations to be the sole ultimate source of knowiedge. At the same time, they made a more generous use of ideas in accounting for the meaning oflinguistic expressions; both the mental ingredients corresponding to the copula and assent or dissent are characterized as ideas. In general, they attempted to explain the meaning of a declarative sentence entirely in terms of ideas and associations between ideas. What corresponds to a fullblown assertion is a highly complex concrete idea, which may be successively analysed into elements of a less complex character. Their holistic view of the sentence and of the complex concrete idea that lends meaning to the sentence gave rise to the hypo thesis - advanced in the most elaborate form by Adam Smith - that in the beginning linguistic expressions were as concrete and undifferentiated as the complex ideas which still accompany the sentences that we build now. Perhaps one reason why during this period the word 'proposition' tended to be restricted to spoken and written declarative sentences is the fact that, as a consequence of the thesis that there are only concrete and determinate ideas, the similarity of structure that had been held to exist between ment al propositions and spoken or written propositions became too negligible to be of much explanatory value. Ideas were invoked as a general guarantee of the cognitive meaningfulness oflinguistic expressions, rat her than as an aid to the elucidation of the structure of a sentence by correlating its elements to underlying acts of thinking. Most authors of this period avoid the term 'mental proposition', employing instead the word iudicium, in the sense of the content ofjudgment. The same word was commonly used for the act of judging, mostly without restricting it, in the way Locke did, to cases where there is a lack of certain knowiedge. As for the nature of the act ofjudging, it was especially Hume who forcibly argued for the view that it is not an idea or object of thought, but rat her a manner of conceiving or a form of thinking. With Berkeley, he also realized that assent is very closely connected with a preparedness to act on the proposition which is assented to. This insight was to prove more fertile than W ollaston' s assimilation ofhuman actions to propositions, based on the Anselmian consideration that both actions and propositions may have a rectitude which consists in their conformity to the true nature of things.

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9. SENSATIONALISM AND lTS CRITICS IN FRANCE

As we saw in the foregoing chapter, David Hartley gave a sensationalist turn to Locke's epistemology by refusing to consider reflection as an independent form of basic knowiedge. In France, where An Essay concerning Human Understanding had been made more widely accessible by Pierre Coste's translation, which was published in 1700, a similar development took place. From about the middle of the eighteenth century, a group of philosophes, among whom Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780) de serves our special attention, began to propagate an elaboration of Locke's doctrines that culminated in a radical attempt to reduce all mental phenomena to sensations as the ultimate elements of human knowiedge. This first wave of sensationalism, which of course comprised a peculiar view ofjudgments and propositions, was succeeded by a movement whose members considered themselves as pioneers of a new science of ideas, which they called idéologie. The central figure of this remarkable movement was undoubtedly Antoine Louis Claude, Comte Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), whose Éléments d'idéologie reached its completion precisely at the moment that the monarchy was restored. The change in the political situation accelerated the dissolution of a school of thought which had already been viewed with suspicion by Napoleon. The main critics of the orthodox sensationalist programme, Pierre Laromiguière (1756-1837) and Victor Cousin (1792-1867), paved the way for an eclectic spiritualism th at was to dominate French philosophy in the first half of the nineteenth century.

9.1. Condillac's sensationalist theory ofjudgment 9.1.1. Although Condillac' s Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines, which was published at Amsterdam in 1746, appeared two years before Maupertuis' s Réj1exions philosophiques sur l'origine des langues et la signification des mots, it is convenient to start our discussion of French sensationalism with the latter work. Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) was led to investigate the origin of language by his convict ion that language is a crucial factor in human knowledge and that by studying the structure of languages we can discover traces of the first development of the human mindl. Evidently influenced by 1. Maupertuis 1756, pp. 259-261.

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Hobbes, he supposes th at the initial use oflanguage consisted in distinguishing particular perceptions by means of monolithic marks. Such marks, represented by the letters A, B, R, were unanalysable expressions that had the same meaning as the articulated sentences 'I see a tree', 'I see a horse', 'I see the sea'. A subsequent stage in the development of language set in when it was realized th at certain perceptions shared a similar feature which could be indicated by the same sign. Expressions of the type A or B were replaced by expressions having the structure CD or CE, in which the recurrent feature of seeing is represented by the same letter. Conversely, if there are different perceptions of the same object, for instance 'I see a horse' and 'I hear a horse', the structure of the pertinent expression would be CD and ED. Even more structure was exhibited in expressions of the type CGH and CIK, which are roughly equivalent to our sentences 'I see two lions' and 'I see three ravens'2. Besides pointing out that some of the signs introduced were general, while others were particular , Maupertuis also called attention to the fact that certain perceptions differ in their total force, rather than in the constituent parts. Accordingly, he proposes to contrast expressions of the type CD ('I see a tree') with expressions of the type cd ('I saw a tree'). Similarly, the seeing of a tree in a dream might be expressed by signs whose over-all force is characterized by using Greek letters for the same parts. In the same way as a perception in the past or in a dream has less force than a present perception, a perception may become more real and forceful by occurring repeatedly in connection with the same place. Such a reinforced perception is expressed by saying 'There is a tree', which is roughly equivalent to 'I shall see a tree every time I go to that place'. In connection with existential propositions, which seem to claim that the existence of an object is independent of our perceptions, Maupertuis also raises the question whether or not different kinds of perception, such as sight and touch, can have the same object. Though he is convinced that there must be a cause by which all our perceptions are determined, he believes that the discovery of that cause is beyond our intellectual capacities3 • Maupertuis is of the opinion that the diversity of philosophical systems is not caused by any diversity in our first perceptions, but that it is due to the circumstance th at in different languages signs are allotted to parts of perceptions in different ways . The decomposition of wh at originally was one undivided whole could be attained in many different ways; the actual selection that has been made is therefore highly arbitrary. One should realize that the several sciences are intimately connected with the manner in which perceptions are analysed by means of linguistic signs, and that the questions and propositions which they comprise might have been quite different if other devices had been used to decompose our first perceptions 4 •

2. Maupertuis 1756, pp. 164-167. Cf. KRETZMANN 1967, p. 384 . 3. Maupertuis 1756, pp. 270-271, pp . 277-283. 4. Maupertuis 1756, p. 168, pp. 275-276. See a1so 8.5.2.

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9.1.2. In the Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines of 1746, Condillac still followed Locke in holding that there are two sources of knowiedge, sensation and reflection. But in the Traité des sensations, which came out in 1754, he had changed his mind, maintaining now that sensations are the one kind of experience in terms of which all our knowledge can be explained. The sens ationalist theory of judgments and propositions which was derived from this general position was worked out in the Cours d'études which Condillac composed in the years bet ween 1758 and 1767 for the benefit of the Prince of Parma, and in La logique ou les premiers développements de l'art de penser and La langue des calculs, both published posthumously. Dividing the faculty of thinking into the will and the understanding (l'entendement), Condillac explains the name of the lat ter faculty by pointing out that as the ear apprehends sounds, so the soul apprehends ideas (Comme l'oreille entend les sons, l'ame entend les idées). The soul apprehends ideas in making ihem the object of attention, in comparing them, in judging and reasoning about them. All the operations which the faculty of understanding comprises are reducible to sensation, which undergoes various transformations 5 • Attention is nothing but having a particularly vivid sensation, which tends to exclude all other impressions . The difference betweenjust having asensation and paying attention to it may be likened to the difference between hearing and listening, or between seeing and looking. Comparison is then characterized as the operation of giving attention to two things or ideas at once. As soon as there is such a comparison, there is also judgment, which consists in the awareness of a rel ation of resemblance or difference bet ween the ideas compared. Finally, reasoning is nothing but a chain of judgments that depend on each other. It is along these lines that Condillac tries to substantiate the often repeated main thesis of his philosophy of mind: th at attention, comparison, judgment, and reasoning are merely transformations of the fundamental faculty of sensing6 • The reason why Locke had inserted the third book into An Essay concerning Human Understanding was his realization that knowledge has so near a connection with words that, unless their force and manner of signification was first weIl observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge 7 • This observation was taken to heart by Condillac, who held that human knowledge advances by a progressive analysis of the material that is presented to the senses, and that such an analysis becomes possible only with the use of artificial signs. Language as we know it is the outcome of a long process of development which started with the cries and gestures by means of which primitive man naturally and spontaneously expressed his needs and feelingsB . Condillac lays great stress on the point that the final product , that 5. Condillac 1947-1951, I, pp. 414-415. 6. Condillac 1947-1951, I, pp. 27-28, pp. 226-227, p. 263, pp. 326-327, pp. 412-413, p. 436, p. 446 , p. 518; 11, pp . 384-386, pp . 409-411. 7. Essay, 11,33, 19; lIl, 9, 21. 8. Cf. ACTON 1966, p. 148; KRETZMANN 1967, pp. 385-386; LAND 1974, pp. 89-91.

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is, a refined system of arbitrary verbal signs, is not only an instrument for expressing and communicating thoughts, but that it is just as much an indispensabie aid to the very formation of these thoughts. Language is a constitutive part of thinking in that it enables us to break up the confused input of sen seperception into neatly separated elements and to become aware of recurrent features in otherwise diverse complexes. The thesis that artificial signs are necessary for the decomposition of ment al operations is best illustrated by the distinction that Condillac draws between two kinds ofjudgment 9 • If ajudgment is defined as the perception of a relation between two ideas which one compares, it might be objected that judgment is more than a mere perception: in saying that a tree is big, one affirms that it reaIly has th at quality. Condillac's answer to this objection is that, viewed from the side of the mind, perception and affirmation are one and the same operation, considered from two different angles. If we regard the relationship betw~n being a tree and being big only from the viewpoint of perception (dans la perception), then it is evident that perception andjudgment are one and the same thing. But if the relationship is considered from the point of view of the ideas of tree and big (dans les idées), then the judgment becomes an affirmation that the idea of big belongs to the idea of tree, independently of our perception. The difference between judgment as perception and judgment as affirmation lies in the fact that the latter type of judgment is impossible without the use of artificial signs. Whereas in a judgment as perception the ideas occur simultaneously and confusedly, in one undivided and unorganized complex, in a judgment as affirmation they are considered separately and successively, as in the proposition that is the linguistic expres sion of the judgment. The decomposition that is typical of a judgment as affirmation, in which ideas are considered separately, compared, and brought together, is made possible by the use of words. It is the structure of the proposition, as the linguistic expres sion of a judgment, that enables us to change the chaos of our original perceptions into perspicuously articulated and weIlordered thoughts. That is why Condillac can say that affirmation resides less in our mind than in the words which are used to express the relationship perceived. It is also the reason why he holds that animais, though capable ofjudgments as perceptions, are incapable of judgments as affirmations. One of the chief tools by which a decomposition of a confused perception is achieved consists of common nouns. According to Condillac, abstract and general ideas are nothing but names. An abstract and general man, for instance, can exist neither in nature nor in the mind; what is abstract and general is only the word 'man'. Such abstract and general words help us to discover and to keep hold of the recurrent features that are shared by a multitude of particular ideas. In order to become aware of the importance of language for thinking, one should realize that we cannot reason without genera and species, that we would not have genera and species if we were not able to discover common features in several particular ideas, and that we would not have the lat ter capaci9. Condillac 1947-1951, I, pp. 437-438 . See also 9.3.2.

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ty without the formation of abstract and general words. It follows that we reason weIl or badly only because our language is weIl or badly made 10 • Condillac's distinction of two kinds of judgment makes it clear that his definition of a proposition as the expression of a judgment l1 covers only one part of the function of a proposition. Besides being a means of conveying our thoughts to others, the proposition also assists us in giving a definite shape and structure to our perceptions. Whereas in the tradition the mental proposition was commonly invoked to account for the logical form of spoken or written declarative sentences, Condillac tends to reverse that order by ascribing the transformation of judgment as perception into judgment as affirmation to the influence of language. While for conceptualists it is the mental operation that serves to explain the linguistic counterpart, those who adhere to the extreme nominalism of Hobbes are forced into going the opposite way. For them, the ingredients of the mind taken by themselves simply have too little variety and structure to be of any explanatory value; at best, they have a derivative form which is due to the manner in which they are shaped by the categories and the patterns of the language in which they are expressed. Judgments, then, acquire the form of affirmations only when they are moulded upon the pattern of a proposition. In this sense, every discourse is a judgment or a sequence of judgments, since every discourse is a proposition or a sequence of propositions. A proposition is a linguistic unit considered from the point of view oflogic, that is, as something that is either true or false. The same unit regarded from the point of view of grammar is called phrasé 2 • Like Priestley (See 8.5.2.), Condillac supposes that originally a proposition had the form of ajuxtaposition of a noun and an adjective, as in Monstre terrible. Later, when verbs had been introduced, the copula became the mark of affirmation, that is, of coupling one idea with another. A full-blown proposition, therefore, is the expression of a judgment which consists of at least three words: two words which are the signs of the two ideas that are compared, and a third word which is the sign of the ment al operation by which we pronounce a judgment about the relationship bet ween the two ideas. According to Condillac, ajudgment is always simpIe, because it never consists of more than two ideas that are compared. A proposition, on the other hand, may be either simpIe, when it ex-

10. Condillac 1947-1951, Il, pp. 401-402. Compare Leonhard Euler (1707-1783), Lettresà une princesse d'Allemagne, I, Paris, 1812: - - - un langage est aussi nécessaire aux hommes pour poursuivre et cultiver leurs propres pensées que pour se communiquer avec les au tres (Letter 101, February 10,1761, pp. 449-450); Si Adam avait été laissé tout seul dans Ie paradis, il serait resté dans la plus profonde ignorance sans Ie secours d'un langage. Le langage lui aurait été nécessaire, non tant pour marquer de certains signes les objets individuels qui auraient frappé ses sens, mais principalement pour marquer les notions générales qu 'il en aurait formées par abstraction, afin que ces signes tinssent lieu dans son esprit de ces notions mêmes (Letter 102, February 14, 1761, pp. 454-455). 11. Condillac 1947-1951, I, p. 450, p. 452. 12. Condillac 1947-1951, I, p. 450; lIl, p. 464. There are, however, passages in which proposi. tion is used in the broad sen se of grammatical sentence.

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presses a single judgment, or complex, when it is the expres sion of more than one judgment. Complex propositions (propositions composées) are propositions that have more than one subject, or more than one predicate, or both. Condillac does not discuss hypothetical or molecular propositions of any other type 13 • Especially in his last works, La logique and La langue des calculs, Condillac came to consider the language of mathematics as the perfect example of a wellmade language and therefore of an analytic method. There is, however, no real difference between mathematics, in which the elements of reasoning are equations, and the other sciences, in which one reasons with propositions; for equations, propositions, and judgments are at bottom the same thing. If it is true that the transit ion from what we know to wh at we do not yet know is not hing but an unfolding of what is given, the successive steps of this analysis must evidently be propositions of identity. In order to forestall the objection that propositions of identity are trivial, Condillac distinguishes between propositions concerning an identity that resides in the words (dans les termes) and propositions concerning identity that resides only in the ideas (dans les idées). What makes such a proposition as 'Six is six' trivial is the fact that the identity relates to the words as well as to the ideas. But it is quite different with the proposition 'Three plus three is six', in which the identity relates only to the ideas. It is undeniable that there are circumstances in which such a proposition is instructive 14 • 9.1.3. The core of Condillac's views was shared by several of his contemporaries. Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771), for instance, held that all our thoughts originate from two passive powers, the power of sensation and the power of memory; memories, however, are nothing but faded sensations. While Condillac maintained a sharp distinction between matter and mind, Helvétius presents his sensationalism as neutral with respect to the question whether the two basic faculties are modifications of a spiritual substance or of a material substance; his doctrine is compatible with either of these hypothesesIS . Others defended a materialist version of sensationalism. Holbach (1723-1789) contended that an analysis of our intellectual faculties makes it clear that they are modes of being and acting which result from the organisation of our body16. Jean-Baptiste René Robinet (1735-1820) elaborated Hartley's theory by explainingjudgment, which he defined as the perception of a relationship between ideas th at are compared with each other, in terms of a correspondence between vibrations of cerebral fibres and reactions of the mind 17 . In order to prove the thesis of sensationalism, Helvétius starts with the state-

13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Condillac 1947-1951, I, p. 85, pp. 452-453. Condillac 1947-1951, 11, p. 410, p. 432. Helvétius 1777, 11, pp. 1-7. Holbach 1771, I, 8, p. 111. Robinet 1761, IV, 20, pp. 435-437.

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ment that all mental operations consist in our capacity of noticing resemblances and differences between objects. The objects th at are presented to us in sensation stand in certain relations both to ourselves and to each other; the word idée is restricted by Helvétius to such relations. Now the activity of the mind is nothing but a comparison of our sensations and our ideas, a comparison which is prompted by the interest that certain situations have for us and by the attention we consequently pay to them. Since judgment can be regarded as an account of what we perceive in making such a comparison, all operations of the mind may be reduced to judgment. But judgment is merely a peculiar form of sensation. This is most obvious in cases where the act ofjudging concerns the immediate data of sense-perception, for example wh en someone judges that red is different from yellow. It is also true, however, of suchjudgments as that in a body strength is preferabie to size, or that justice is preferabie to goodness. Probably under the influence of Berkeley, Helvétius likens such abstract terms as 'strength' , 'size' , 'justice' , 'goodness' to the letters used in algebra. They become significant only when they are applied to concrete situations which supply us with the sensations and ideas on which the judgment is based. Actually, suchjudgments are convenient abbreviations of concrete perceptions l8 •

9.2. Destutt de Tracy's idéologie That the atmosphere of enlightenment that had been established by the philosophes continued into the French Revolution and the first years of the ni neteenth century is mainly due to the activities of the so-called idéologues, a loosely organized group of thinkers who were strongly influenced by Locke and Condillac and strove after cultural and educational reforms that would be in agreement with the new science of ideas l9 • As Destutt de Tracy presented a theory of the proposition that is most typical of this rat her short-lived movement, I shall begin with an examination of the relevant doctrines in his Éléments d'idéologie, a work that was published in four parts between 1801 and 1815 2°. 9.2.1. In the first two chapters of the Grammaire2 1 Destutt immediately propounds the fundament al thesis that all speech expresses either isolated sens ations and ideas or complete judgments. As the purpose of communication is the exchange of knowledge and knowledge consists of judgments, it is only the expression ofjudgments that makes speech significant, interesting, and useful. Moreover , even if speech is composed of names of isolated ideas, it still expresses judgments, albeit in an implicit way. When I utter the word 'man', I make thereby known that I have the idea of man before my mind or that the idea which is present to my mind is called by the name 'man'. What I utter is 18. Helvétius 1777, 11, pp. 7-11; lIl, pp. 73-79 . 19. The two standard monographs are PICA VET 1910 and MORA VIA 1974. Cf. a1so ACTON 1966 and KRETZMANN 1967, pp. 387-389. 20. Cf. SMITH 1967 and, for a wider view, KENNEDY 1978. 21. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, 11, pp. 16-37.

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therefore an elliptical proposition. Since, then, all speech expressesjudgments, the proposition is the basic unit of speech. A sentence th at expresses ajudgment - which Destutt commonly caUs proposition, but also occasionally proposition énonciative22 - must contain a verb. As verbs may have different moods, he sees it as his next task to show that a judgment is expressed not only by a sentence with a verb in the indicative mood, but also by sentences with a verb in the conditional, subjunctive, optative, imperative, interrogative, or dubitative mood. He solves this problem by reducing all non-indicative sentences to equivalent indicative sentences. Sentences in the optative, imperative and interrogative mood, for example, become indicative sentences beginning with 'I wish', 'I want', 'I ask' . In this connection, it is worth noting th at Destutt holds that the ultimate subject of every proposition is always the speaker himself. The sentence 'This tree is green', for instance, is really tantamount to the sentence 'I perceive (know, see) that this tree is green'. It is only because the preamble about the speaker is always and necessarily contained in all our propositions that we usually feel no need to express it explicitly23. Once it has been established that all speech consists of propositions expressing judgments, and that it is therefore the operation of judgment th at makes our use of language significant, it becomes evident that a grammarian should consider the elucidation of the act ofjudging as his primary task. That theories of language have remained in such an unsatisfactory state is mainly due to the fact that grammarians have neglected to investigate the exact nature of judgment. Destutt himself opts for a plainly sensationalist theory ofjudgment. Our whole life as intelligent and thinking beings consists in having sensations. Sensations occur either in a pure form or with the particular character of memories, judgments, and desires 24 • An act ofjudging is the perception that one idea can be attributed to another idea, or that the subject-idea implicitly includes in its comprehension the attribute-idea. According to Destutt, the extension of an idea has absolutely nothing to do with the judgment that is made about it 25 • Wh at we judge is that the attribute-idea is contained in the comprehension of the subject-idea, or, in the case of negative propositions, that .the comprehension of the subject-idea includes the complement of the attribute-idea. For his treatment of negative propositions 26 Destutt is no doubt indebted to Hobbes, whose De corpore he translated into French. According to his own statement in the Discours préliminaire to the Logique, the general conception of a judgment as the realization that the subject-idea contains the attribute-idea was suggested to him by Claude Buffier27 • That same author is said to be the source of his 22. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, lIl, I, pp. 224-225 (principes logiques, 8) . 23. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, lIl, I, p. 225 (Principes logiques, 8). See also 10.2.1. 24. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, 11, p. 16, p. 27 (Grammaire, 1-2); lIl, I, pp . 151-152, p. 160, p. 176 (Logique, 2-4); lIl, 2, p . 205, p. 235 (Principes logiques, 3 and 9). 25. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, lIl, 2, p. 239 (Principes logiques, 9). 26. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, 11, p. 18, p. 21 (Grammaire, 1). 27. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, lIl, I, pp. 115-116. Cf. Buffier 1732, pp. 757-758, pp. 765-766.

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view that an argument is nothing but a sequence of judgments which are arranged in such a way that one idea contains a second idea, the second idea a third, and so the first idea the third. Destutt likens reasoning to the process in which the several sections of a telescope are successively drawn forth 28 • If Condillac had known Buffier's work, he would not have been misled into thinking that every proposition is a statement of identity. Neither would he have upheld his doctrine that all reasoning is a form of calculation; in fact, calculation is only one species of reasoning29 • 9.2.2. Destutt followed Condillac in supposing that the oldest way of giving expres sion to a judgment consisted in using a primitive language of cries and gestures. Once verballanguage had been invented, interjections became the more usual vehicle of thought . Interjections do not exhibit any kind of decomposition; they are monolithic devices for the communication of a total judgment, without having any intern al structure or being part of a larger expression30 • In the course of the development of mankind, the originally used interjections were gradually decomposed into parts. The first step was the analysis of the undivided whole into a subject and an attribute, or a noun and a verb. In this connection, Destutt mentions again Buffier as the author to whom he is indebted for the insight that the immediate and indispensable constituents of a proposition are a noun, which performs the function of subject, and averb, which is the whole attribute31 • It is clear that Destutt, like Du Marsais and Beauzée before him (See 5.1.1. and 5.2.1.), firmly adhered to that philosophical tradition which defended a bipartite analysis of the proposition. Buffier did not play a conspicuous role in that tradition, but some ofhis remarks were fruitful in stimulating others to keep it alive. Destutt illustrates the development of an interjection, which expresses a judgment as an unanalysed whoie, into a binary compound by the exclamation ouf When this expression is made more specific by the addition of a sign that refers to the speaker, as in Je ouf, the interjection loses part of its meaning and comes to indicate only the attribute, in contradistinction to the separately expressed subject. The jointless interjection oufis decomposed into j'étouffe (' I am choking'), which contains distinct parts for the subject and the attribute. The signs for the subject and the attribute are, as it were, the fragments into which the original whole is broken down 32 • The words which are fit to fill the subject-place are nouns and pronouns. Pronouns stand in for nouns and have the peculiar property of designating an idea only in relation to the act of

28. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, lIl , I, p. 144 (Logique, 1). 29. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, lIl , I, p. 276 (Logique, 8). 30. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827,11, pp. 50-52, p. 95 (Grammaire, 3); lIl, 1, p. 303 (Logique, 9); lIl, 2, pp. 224-225 (Principes logiques, 8) . 31. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, lIl, I, p. 115. Cf. Buffier 1732, pp. 756-757. 32. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, 11, p. 24, p. 52, p. 60 (Grammaire, 1 and 3); lIl, 2, p. 226 (Principes logiques, 8) .

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utterance33 • A noun is the sign of an idea as existing by itself. Destutt insists that a noun which fills the subject-place always denotes existence, either real existence or existence in the mind of the speaker. When I utter the word 'man', I make thereby known that man has at least existence in my mind. As subject, therefore, every noun is in the enunciative or indicative mood of the present tense. The particular mode ofbeing denoted by a noun in subject-position is independent existence; accordingly, substantive nouns might be called absolute or subjective (a bso lus ou subjectifsf4. Besides a noun as subject, the decomposition of the original interjection also yields a verb as attribute. A verb always signifies either existence as such or existence in a certain way. Even if adjectival verbs have the form of a single sign, that sign has reference to two ideas, namely, to the general idea of existence and to the particular idea of a certain kind of existence. For this type of verbs, then, the analysis may be carried a step further by decomposing the adjectival verb into two elements: the element étant or existant ('being', 'existing') and some adjective. The adjectival verb 'walking', for instance, would then become 'existing (as) walking'. According to Destutt, adjectives or, as he prefers to call them, modificatives (modiflcatifs) have two functions: they may be used either to form new subjects of propositions or to form attributes of the subjects. In the latter function, adjectives express an idea in so far as it is capable of existing in another idea or is destined to exist in a subject, without, however, ascribing to the idea any actual existence in a subject. Adjectives taken by themselves are incomplete attributes or mutilated verbs. They become verbs only when they are combined with the general idea of existence expressed by the element étant or existant. Instead of considering the verb substantive, 'being' or 'existing', as the sole verb, Destutt prefers to have two types of verb: the verb that denotes existence as such, and such verbs as 'being wise' and 'walking', which are composed of an element of general existence and a particular manner of existing, either overtly or covertly35. A verb may appear in three different guises. In the form of an infinitive it is a noun, fit for filling the subject-position. The standard form of a verb is the present participle: étant stands for the verb that denotes mere existence, étant rouge and étant aimant for, respectively, the verb that denotes existence as red and the verb that denotes existence as loving. It is the element denoting existence that carries the moods and the tenses; for if something is to exist in a certain manner and at a certain time, it has first of all to exist. But as long as a verb appears in the form of the present participle, it expresses the mode ofbeing concerned only in a vague and indefinite way. A judgment is expressed by making the verb finite and so indicating that the idea denoted by the adjective does in-

33 . Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, 11, pp. 53-59 (Grammaire, 3). 34. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, 11, p. 30, pp. 38-40, pp . 45-46, p. 53, p. 61, p. 69 (Gram· maire, 2 and 3); lIl, 1, pp. 303-304 (Logique, 9) . 35. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, IJ, p. 36, pp. 40-49, pp. 63-65, p. 68, p. 71, pp. 110-111, p. 130 (Grammaire, 2-4); lIl, 1, p. 304 (Logique, 9); lIl, 2, p. 226 (principes logiques, 8).

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deed exist in the subject at a definite time and in a definite way. The finite verb is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the formation of a proposition as the expres sion of a judgment36 • A verb that denotes a particu1ar manner of existing includes, first of all, an adjective, which expresses an idea in the peculiar form ofbeing capab1e of existing in a subject; the idea indicated by an adjective is destined to have a dependent existence. This mode of dependent existence is added by the other element of the verb, the constituent étant which it explicitly or implicitly contains. But in order to become the actual expres sion of a judgment, this combination of an adjectiva1 idea and dependent existence has to be made quite definite by a specification of the exact manner and time of the dependent existence. This specification is contributed by the finite form of the verb. A proposition, as a combination of a subject-expression and an attributeexpression, signifies the two ideas denoted by those expressions and a1so the idea of existence as it is included in the subject-idea and in the attribute-idea. The subject-expression signifies an idea as existing by itself, under a substantive or nomina1 form, whereas the attribute-expression signifies an idea as existing in the subject-idea, under an attributive or adjective form. The kinds of existence indicated by the two expressions are therefore different; namely, independent existence for the subject-idea and existence in something else for the attribute-idea. This ana1ysis of the proposition has an obvious affinity with the views advanced by Du Marsais and Beauzée, who, as we saw in 5.1.1. and 5.2.1., elaborated their own version of the bipartite theory of the proposition. The asymmetry of the subject and the predicate which is characteristic of that doctrine is brought out in a particularly clear way by Destutt in his rejection of Condillac's concept ion of the proposition as an equation37 • He considers the thesis that every judgment is a kind of a1gebraic equation and that the two ideas compared in a true judgment are identica1 as entirely wrong. The fact that Condillac was forced to introduce the dubious notion of a partia1 identity already shows that there are many propositions which do not really have the form of an equation. The truth of the matter is that equations are only one particular kind ofjudgment. They consist in the perception that the idea which one forms of a quantity comprises the idea that this quantity is equal to another quantity which is expressed in a different way. As the verb is a1ways the real attribute of a proposition, equations may be characterized as those judgments in which the attribute is formed by the idea of being equa1 to some quantity. Further, even in the case of propositions which have the form of an equation, it is far from being true that the two terms are identical. For one thing, if it is judged that the square of 12 is equa1 to 144, there are evident differences between the two ideas, in the way they are expressed, in the way they are generated, in their properties, and in the uses that can be made of them. But even in such trivia1 36. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, 11, pp. 42-49, pp. 130-134 (Grammaire, 2 and 4); III, 1, p. 304 (Logique, 9). 37. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, lIl, 1, pp. 130-136 (Logique, 1).

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equations as 'x is x' the two terms are not really identical. For the first term is 'x' and the second term is 'being x'; and the idea of x is different from the idea of being x. The judgment is trivial, not because the same thing is said twice, but because it is too obvious that the idea of x contains the idea ofbeing x. Strictly speaking, therefore, no judgment has two terms which are identical. 9.2.3. Destutt advanced his holistic theory of the proposition in the form of the historical hypothesis that originally interjections were used to express an entire judgment. Interjections, which do not yet exhibit any decomposition, are the oldest type of proposition; being themselves propositions, they are not subordinate constituents of a proposition, but rather independent parts of discourse. According to Destutt, conjunctions share an important feature with interjections. Like interjections, they deputize for a whole proposition and are therefore parts of discourse rather than constituents of a proposition. Among the illustrations offered the most convincing cases are perhaps the conjunctions et ('and'), mais ('but'), and si ('if'). The sentence 'Cicero and Caesar were eloquent' may be expanded into the standard form 'Cicero was eloquent - to this I add that - Caesar was eloquent' . Analogously, the adversative conjunction is analysed as the proposition 'To th at which was saidjust before it should be added by way of corrective th at ' . And si is declared to be equivalent to the propos ition 'Given the assumption that - - - one must conclude that - - -'. As is shown by such examples, the proposition of which a conjunction is the compact form differs from the proposition represented by an interjection in that the latter is an independent unit of discourse, while the former has a twofold rel ationship of dependence upon other propositions. A proposition involved in a conjunction must be completed by the addition of two other propositions which the conjunction serves to connect. Since such a proposition has two blanks, it acquires its full sense only when these blanks have been duly filled. There is one conjunction that resists analysis into a proposition; it is the conjunction que ('that'), which occurs one or more times in each of the analyses of the other conjunctions. Destutt thinks it most likely th at que came into the language as a preposition. It differs, however, from other prepositions, such as de in Ie livre de Pierre ('The book of Peter'), in that it connects two propositions, as in Je vois que vous êtes Ià ('I see that you are there'). Once this first sign of a connection between two propositions had been introduced, the other conjunctions were formed by a procedure which consisted in combining the connecting function of que with some modification that in its expanded version is a whole proposition. In this respect, que may be likened to étant; just as all verbs that denote a particular way of existing contain étant as a component th at signifies the notion of existence in general which is modified by the following adjective, so all conjunctions other than que contain this fundamental sign of a connection between propositions, together with an additional proposition that modifies the connection38 • Although the only source of inspiration acknowledged by 38. Destutt de Tracy 1826-1827, 11, pp . 92-103, pp. 112-113 (Grammaire, 3).

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Destutt is the chapter on conjunctions in Beauzée' s Grammaire générale, it is interesting to compare his doctrine of conjunctions with Geulincx' s discussion of the copula grammaticalis impura (See 6.3.2.).

9.3 . Growing criticism Perhaps the most salient feature of orthodox sensationalism is the emphasis it lays on the passive character of ment al phenomena. The passivity of the mind when it is affected by sensations is extended to the other forms of mentallife by regarding them as mere transformations of sensation. The differences among the several manifestations of our mental capacities are not accounted for by invoking corresponding operations or activities of the mind, but are rather explained by an appeal to the workings oflanguage. This tendency to consider the mind as wholly passive and to assign all formative influence to language met, from about 1800, · with an increasing feeling of dissatisfaction, even among those philosophers who otherwise showed some sympathy towards the views of Condillac and the idéologues. In this section I shall first discuss the criticisms advanced by Joseph Marie Degérando (1772-1842) and Pierre Laromiguière, who still have sufficient affinity with the idéologues to be reckoned as at least peripheral members of that group. Victor Cousin, on the other hand, with whom I shall conclude the examination of the sensationalist theories of judgment in France, already belongs to an altogether different climate of thought. 9.3.1. Right at the beginning of his Des signes et de l'art de penser considérés dans leurs rapports mutuels of 1800, Degérando opposes Condillac's reductionism by insisting that the transit ion from the passive state of having sensations to perception is due to the mental activity that is called attention. As this active contribution of the mind marks a crucial difference between merely undergoing sensations and taking notice of things in int ent ion al observation and perception, all mental phenomena that are based on such attentive perception will share its active character. The chief act of the mind that depends upon perception is judgment. Degérando distinguishes between judgments of sensation or memory and judgments of the imagination, which have to do with ideas. Every judgment of sens at ion presupposes a relationship between at least two perceptions. This relationship is of two kinds, being either a relationship of association or one of comparison. If a perception of asensation occurs together with the perception of the self that is modified by the sensation or together with the perception of an object as existing outside the subject , the act of judging consists in associating the sensation either with the self as being its subject or with the object as being its cause. By this association the sensation becomes a fact (fait); a fact is a sensation in so far as it is considered as existing in relation to a subject which has the sensation or to an externalobject which causes the sensation. The notion of existence is essential to a judgment and a proposition, for it is in their existence that the two perceptions are united and associated with one another. Judgment, which transforms perceptions into knowledge (con186

naissance), is nothing but the awareness of a facto Degérando rejects the common view that every judgment consists in the comparison of two sensations, on the ground that even someone who never had more than one sensation would still be able to form such a simple judgment of sensation as Je sens (' I have a sens ation'). It is even wrong to hold that every judgment is a comparison of two perceptions. When I say Je sens, I do not merely compare two perceptions, but I add a link of mutual association between those perceptions. That association is founded on the realization that the two things are joined in a common existence. The type of judgment that involves comparison is more complicated than the simple judgments of sensation which are acts of associating two perceptions. When two sensations are perceived in a single act of attention, we may form a judgment that consists in recognizing the fact that the two sensations are similar or different. Strictly speaking, such a judgment of comparison is the result of two simple judgments in which the perception of each sensation is first related to the self that is affected by them39 • Degérando defines a sign in such a way that it involves the notion of an idea, that is, of the product of the imagination, our second source ofknowledge. Accordingly, he holds that someone who had only sensations, which are the primary source of our knowiedge, would be able to perform the acts of attentive perception and judgment, whether of association or comparison, without using any signs. On this point, he manifestly disagrees with Condillac and his followers, who refused to ascribe any activity to the mind and so were forced to invoke the assistance of language at a much earlier stage. Besides judgments pertaining to sensations, which are either simple judgments of association or complexjudgments of comparison, we also form judgments involving ideas, the products of our second source of knowiedge, the faculty of imagination. In the realm of ideas too, there are first of all judgments which are nothing but the awareness of the fact that such-and-such an idea is present to the mind. As these simple judgments, taken in isolation, are rather sterile, they are usually overlooked by philosophers. As a rule, pride of place is given to a second type of judgment involving ideas, namely, those judgments in which either an idea is considered as having reference to an empirical matter of fact or one idea is compared with a second idea. In such cases, the judger may be likened to a painter who, after making a portrait, either compares it with the sitter or with ot her pictures. Judgments concerning relations between ideas are divided into abstract principles, which are immediately evident, and those statements which are deduced from the principles. According to Degérando, it is especially the operation of reasoning, by which conclusions concerning relations between ideas are established, that stands in need of the use of signs. Apart fromjudgments of memory about the value given to the signs used, reasoning requires as an indispensable ingredient judgments concerning the relations between signs and ideas, and also judgments concerning the mutual relations in which signs stand to each other. Signs are essential to the 39. Degérando 1800, I, 1, 1, 1, pp. 14-30.

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more complicated kinds of ment al operation. Finally, it is worthy of note th at Degérando invokes the notion of identity only in connection with judgments concerning relations between ideas. Sometimes the identity which unites two ideas is only partial; that is to say, the predicate-idea is included in the comprehension of the subject-idea. In other cases, such as 'Twice two is four' , the relation bet ween the two ideas is one of complete identity"O. 9.3.2. Although Pierre Laromiguière, w ho se Leçons de philosophie contains the lectures he gave at the University ofParis in the years 1811-1813, was a great admirer of Condillac, critical study of the latter' s works had led him to develop a view of his own which is considerably different from the sensationalist doctrine ofjudgment. Laromiguière distinguishes two aspects of the soul: the will and the understanding (l'entendement). The understanding is partly passive and partly active. The passive side of the understanding consists of four capacities ofbeing affected by some form of awareness. These four sources ofknowledge, from which all our ideas and thoughts originate, are the capacity ofhaving sensations, the capacity of being conscious of one' s own mental operations, the capacity ofbeing aware of relations, and a kind of moral sense. These sentiments provide the active powers of the understanding with the material at which they can set themselves to work. The active side of the understanding comprises three kinds of operation, namely, attention, comparison, which is a twofold attention, and reasoning, which is a twofold comparison. Laromiguière draws a sharp distinction bet ween the acts of attention, comparison, and reasoning and, on the other hand, the products of those acts. All our ideas, which together form l'intelligence, are the result of the application of an active power to the material supplied by one of the four passive capacities. More in particular, the act of attention yields a perception as its product, while the act of comparison yields ajudgment or the perception of a relationship. The word raisonnement is ambiguous bet ween the act of reasoning and the argument brought about by that act. Now, according to Laromiguière, reflection upon the first operation of the mind, the act of attention, makes it already abundantly clear that there is a fundamental difference between sensation and, on the other hand, attention and perception. In having asensation, the understanding is entirely passive, whereas in attending to the sensation and thereby changing it into a perception, the understanding acts or reacts upon the material offered by the senses. Condillac' s reductionist thesis that attention is nothing but a peculiar kind of sensation completely ignores the altogether new element of activity that is introduced by the operation of attention. It is absolutely inconceivable that such a typical activity as attention could be reduced to something that is purely passive. Another difference between sensation and attention is the fact that we can have sensations without the use of any signs, whereas attention requires language in order to keep hold of its objects 41 • 40. Degérando 1800, 11, 1, 2, 3, pp. 46-49, pp. 69-71; IV, 2, 2, 4, pp. 116-121. 41. Laromiguière 1837, 1,4, pp. 71-79; I, 5, pp. 98-108; I, 14, p. 250; 11, 5, pp. 95-96; 11, 6, pp. 100-105.

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In his treatment of judgment, Laromiguière follows the main lines of a distinction that had been put forward by Condillac. As we saw in 9.1.2., Condillac had distinguished two levels of judgment: a lower level at which we judge dans la perception, without any decomposition or use of signs, and a higher level at which we judge dans les idées, affirming one thing of another by means of language. Laromiguière refines upon this distinction by introducing three degrees ofjudgment. In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas Condillac uses the word perception more or less synonymously with sensation, Laromiguière is careful to apply perception and percevoir only to the product of the act of attention. Accordingly, he characterizes the three kinds ofjudgment as sentir des rapports, percevoir des rapports, and affirmer des rapports. The first kind may be roughly identified with Condillac' s judgments dans la perception, while the two other kinds are a subdivision of Condillac' s judgments dans les idées. The first type of judgment, which as a rule is not called by that name at all, is a mere sentiment de rapport, an unarticulated awareness of a relationship that remains wrapped up entirely in the manifold of sensations with which it forms an undivided unity. In this sense, a lion may be said to judge that he is strong ifhe has a feeling of strength, even though he is unable to split this feeling into the components of a subject and a quality that belongs to it. Likewise, a baby may be said to judge that it is weak if it has a feeling of weakness, even though it is not yet able to decompose this feeling into an idea of itself and the idea of weakness. Such primitive sentiments de rapport are manifestations of one of the passive capacities of the understanding; they may occur without the assistance of any words or signs. They should, however, be distinguished from sensations in the sense of impressions caused by external objects. The passive awareness of a relationship does not correspond to any externalobject. Whereas to the simultaneous sensations of a tree and a house there correspond two things in the outside world, there is no externalobject that corresponds to the awareness of difference that accompanies the sensations 42 • It is rather obvious that the lowest degree of judgment was postulated as a starting-point, both in time and for systematic description, from which the process of decomposition by mental activities and linguistic means could be presented as taking its beginning. In order to become ajudgment in the current sense of the word, a sentiment de rapport must be analysed into two distinct ideas. This analysis is accomplished by the first active power of the understanding, attention, which needs the aid of signs in order to keep hold of the separated elements. Subsequently, the two perceptions which result from the two acts of attention are compared in a twofold act of attention. The product of this act of comparison is the perception of a relationship. According to Laromiguière, the special relationship which is typical of a judgment consists in the circumstance that the predicate-idea is contained in the subject-idea. He rejects the view th at the copula, by which this relationship is ultimately expressed, denotes real existence; it indicates only that the subject includes the predicate. The perception 42. Laromiguière 1837, I, 5, p. 102; 11, 5, pp. 85-91.

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of this relationship is not itself an activity of the understanding, but the product of the act of comparison. Once the work of attention and comparison has been done, the mind comes to rest in the perception of the rel at ion discovered. That so many philosophers consider this type ofjudgment as an act is due to the error of confusing act and product. No judgment is reached without the activity of the understanding, but as a perception de rapport it is a state of repose resulting from that activity'l3. The perception of two distinct ideas as connected by the relation of inclusion, then, is the re sult of the analysing operations which the active part of the understanding, assisted by the use of signs, performs on the material offered by a sentiment de rapport. In so far as a judgment is a perception de rapport, it is not yet asserted; rather , that which is present to the mind and contemplated by it, is a proper object for a final act of assent or dissent. The process of judgment is completed by the affirmation or pronouncement that in reality things are so related as we perceive them to be related. Whereas neither in a sentiment de rapport nor in a perception de rapport there is any risk of error, an affirma ti on may be false; man is liable to assent to relations which he does not perceive44 • It is clear that Laromiguière' s distinction between judgment as percevoir des rapports and judgment as affirmer des rapports echoes the old distinction between an apprehensive proposition and a judicative proposition, or, as it appears in Malebranche (See 3.1.3.), between a judgment of the understanding and a judgment of the will. It is remarkable, however, that Laromiguière, like Condillac and his followers, regards language as a necessary instrument for changing a sentiment de rapports into a perception of a propositional relationship and an affirmation that the content of that perception is in conformity with reality. This means that both a judgment as perception and a judgment as affirmation always occur in a linguistic guise; as Laromiguière puts it, the art of thinking can be reduced to the art of speaking. Nevertheless, he insists at the same time that the use of signs is accompanied by manifestations of the active powers of the understanding. Although ajudgment as perception is not itself an activity, it results from the activities of attention and comparison. He also leaves no doubt that affirmation belongs to the active part of the understanding45 , though he is rat her silent about the exact nature of the act of affirmation. In sum, we may say that for him it is the alliance of the active powers of the mind with the use oflanguage that makes judgments in the current sense of the word possible. Laromiguière himself anticipates the objection that if a judgment is defined as a perception of a relationship, every idea will be ajudgment. For in framing an idea of something, we distinguish the object from other objects; that is to say, we perceive one or more differences between the thing in question and the 43. Laromiguière 1837, I, 4, pp. 78-79; I, 8, pp. 142-143; I, 14, p. 250, pp. 262-263; 11, 5, pp. 85-91, pp. 95-96. 44. Laromiguière 1837, I, 14, pp. 262-263; 11, 5, pp. 88-91. 45. Cf. especially Laromiguière 1837, I, 14, p. 263.

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rest; but that means th at we perceive a relationship. Laromiguière concedes that an idea is indeed ajudgment of a very peculiar kind. The main point of difference with a judgment in the normal sense is that in framing an idea we delimit only one term and leave the others, with which it is contrasted, indefinite, whereas in forming a normaljudgment we determine a subject and an attribute in such a way that both of them are definite terms. If we wish to regard an idea as a sort ofjudgment, it is ajudgment that is presupposed by all other kinds of judgment. In judging that Paul is a physician, for example, I must have formed an idea of Paul by noticing those features which make him distinct from an indefinite number of other individuals; similarly, I must have formed an idea of a physician by noticing those features which make that profession different from an indefinite number of other professions. After these preliminary judgments, which involve only one definite term, have been completed, the two resulting definite terms may be united in the actual judgment that Paul is a physician46 • 9.3.3. Whereas the criticisms which Degérando and Laromiguière advanced against Condillac can still be seen as corrections and further developments within the general frame of a common programme, Victor Cousin' s opposition to the sensationalist and ideologïcal movements was much more radical. Like Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard (1762-1845), whom he succeeded at the University of Paris, and Théodore Simon Jouffroy (1796-1842), who translated Thomas Reid' s works into French, he was deeply influenced by the Scottish philosophy of common sense. Just as the common sen se philosophy was areaction against the impact ofBritish empiricism, so Cousin and his associates attempted to curb the undesirable consequences of sensationalism and idéologie by propagating a kindred form of spiritualism. In his Philosophie sensualiste au dix-huitième siècle, a series of lectures given in 1819, Cousin attacks three theses which lie at the he art of Condillac's philosophy. In the first place, there is a fundament al difference between sensation and attention, so that it is impossible to reduce attention and the intellectual faculties that involve attention to sensation. An additional argument for rejecting Condillac's reductionism is the difference between attention and such intellectual faculties asjudgment and knowiedge. According to Cousin, attention belongs to the will, not, like the other faculties, to the understanding. Furthermore, Cousin is of the opinion that the wrongheaded dogma of sensationalism and the emphasis on the passivity of the understanding that follows from it induce Condillac to assign an exaggerated role to language. Memory, imagination,judgment, and reasoning are not products of language. Memory, imagination, and reasoning depend upon the activity of the will; though it is true that reasoning is facilitated by the use of language, its essential character is determined by attention and comparison, both of which are activities of the will. Judgment is simply the power of perceiving the truth and as such it is independent of language, at least in its 46. Laromiguière 1837, 11, 5, pp. 83-84, pp. 91-95.

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primitive forms. That man is superior to brutes, then, is not due to language, that is, to something exterior, but rat her to the inward powers of his own mind. Finally, Condillac had compared the way in which sensation preserves its identity through the metamorphoses which it undergoes in becoming ot her types of mental phenomena to the identity of an algebraic quantity in a series of equations. This comparison is only a particular aspect of his general thesis that all judgments are equations and statements of identity. According to Cousin, this thesis is doubtful with regard to mathematics and certainly false in its general application. If identity is taken in a strict sense, the thesis implies that there can be no progress in science. If the identity is merely partial, as Condillac sometimes concedes, it is not identity at all47 • One or more of the objections which Cousin raises against Condillac' s views can also be found in Destutt de Tracy, Degérando, and Laromiguière. That these common strictures are not a sign of agreement in other respects is especially clear from the critical examination to which Cousin subjected Laromiguière's Leçons de philosophie immediately after the publication of each of the two volumes 48 • As is already obvious from wh at was noted above, Cousin fundamentally disagrees with Laromiguière concerning the anatomy of the soul. Whereas Laromiguière restricted the will to desire, preference, and liberty of choice, assigning attention, comparison, and reasoning to the active part of the understanding, Cousin stresses the voluntary aspect of attention, comparison, and reasoning by reckoning them among the activities of the will. Understanding or intelligence is, on his view, practically identical withjudgment. Thoughjudgment presupposes sensation, attention, and comparison as preparatory factors, it is a special faculty which consists in perceiving that two ideas belong together and which, as such, has not hing to do with the Will 49 • With regard to the traditional distinction between affirmative and negative judgments, Cousin holds that in circumstances where there is room for reflection and deliberation affirmative and negative judgments always go together. In such cases, one contemplates both the affirmative proposition and its contradictory, so that judging that the affirmative proposition is true coincides with judging that its contradictory is false, while denying the affirmative proposition is tantamount to affirming its contradictory. Sometimes, however, a proposition presents itself with such overwhelming evidence that we affirm it without spending any thought on its contradictory. In these immediate and pure perceptions of the truth the highest degree ofliberty is combined with the highest degree of fatality: it is impossible not to yield to the truth, but at the same time I refrain fr om doing anything that might impede this submission50 • 47. Cousin 1856, 2, pp . 62-65; 3, pp. 80-81, pp. 102-106. 48. Another cri tic of Laromiguière was François Pierre Maine de Biran (1766-1824) , who se Examen des Leçons de philosophie de M. Laromiguière was composed in 1817. Starting from a position that was rather close to the idéologie, Maine de Biran became the most original representative of the spiritualist current of thought. 49. Cousin 1826, pp. 30-35. 50. Cousin 1836, 14, pp. 136-138. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 90-91.

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9.4. Conclusion During the second half of the eighteenth century French philosophers, inspired by Locke, but also by Hobbes and Hardey , developed a sensationalist theory of judgment. The most extreme version of this doctrine may be characterized by three theses that were defended by Condillac. According to this influential thinker, the passive faculty of sensation is not only the sole source of our knowiedge, but also the basic form of all other mental phenomena. Judgment, for instance, he considered as merely one of the transformations that sensation may undergo. Originally, judgment was not hing but a complex and confused sensation. The gradual analysis or decomposition which changed this primitive kind of judgment into the more sophisticated structures which are typical of later stages in the development of mankind is the work, not of any special active power of the mind, but rather of language. Condillac insisted that language is not merely an instrument of communication, but first and foremost an essential factor in the very formation of thoughts. Wh at differences there are between sens at ion and fully articulated judgment can be accounted for by the effects of the use of artificial signs. This emphasis on the formative function oflanguage was presented under the guise of a historical hypothesis. It seems quite plausible, however, that it was also meant as a contribution to the systematic explanation of the structure of judgments and propositions. The same is no doubt true of the holism and the relativism that are inherent in this sort of theory. Finally, Condillac was so impressed by the language of mathematics that he identified a proposition, at least in its ideal form, with an equation and regarded a calculus as the perfect instrument of analysis. Although the idéologues adhered in many respects to the main lines of Condillac' s sensationalism, even Destutt de Tracy, who systematized their views in the most representative form, took exception to one of its fundament al tenets. He criticized Condillac's identincation ofjudgments with equations from the standpoint of a dichotomic analysis of a proposition according to which there is an irreducible asymmetry between subject and attribute in that the subjectterm denotes independent existence, whereas the attribute-term indicates the dependent existence of a modifying characteristic in a subject. Others felt increasingly dissatisfied with the central thesis of reductionism and attempted to refute it by highlighting those features of the human mind which are undeniably active and can thus scarcely be mere metamorphoses of sensations. For some of these critics the prominence of the autonomous and irreducible activity of the mind was a sufficient reason to limit the explanatory appeal to language. Others, notably Laromiguière, saw linguistic signs as a necessary supplement to the operations of the understanding.

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10. COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY AND NOMINALISM IN GREAT BRITAlN

The Scottish philosophy of common sense was already mentioned in the previous chapter as an important source of inspiration for those French philosophers who opposed sensationalism in the name of a spiritualist approach to mentallife which laid great stress on the spontaneous and irreducible activity of man's inner powers. In this chapter I shall examine this common sense philosophy itself, more in particular the theory of judgment put forward by its founder and most original representative, Thomas Reid (1710-1796). Side by side with the school initiated by Reid, however, the empiricist current of thought that had its origin in the works of such philosophers as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Hartley continued to flourish , especially in those circles which, from a somewhat different point of view, are often referred to as the philosophical radicals or utilitarians. Among the adherents of this movement, bothJeremy Bentham (1748-1832) andJames Mill (1773-1836) developed pronounced views on the nature ofjudgments and propositions. As we shall see in the second half of this chapter, in doing so they were strongly influenced, not only by their British precursors, but also by some of the French thinkers who were treated in the foregoing chapter.

10.1. Thomas Reid In conformity with the traditional distinction between the understanding and the will, Reid divided his fin al views on the nature of the mind into two parts: the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, published in 1785, and the Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, which came out three years later. The former work, which is most relevant to an examination of his theory of judgment, contains an introductory essay in which the author points out that the chief and proper source ofknowledge concerning the mind and its faculties is accurate reflection upon the operations of our own minds, but that it mayalso be helpful to pay attention to the structure of language. There are, in all languages, modes of speech by which men signify their judgment or give their testimony, by which they accept or refuse, by which they ask information or advice, by which they command, threaten or supplicate, by which they plight their faith in promises and contracts. The study of the linguistic signs may 194

throw considerable light on the various operations of the understanding, will, and passions that are signified by them. Moreover, besides the common division into powers of the understanding and powers of the wilt there is another division into solitary and social operations of the mind. Whereas a man may apprehend, judge, and reason though he should know of no intelligent being in the uni verse besides himself, there are also operations that necessarily suppose an intercourse with some other intelligent being. When a man asks information or receives it, bears testimony or receives the testimony of another, asks a favour or accepts one, gives a command or receives one, plights his faith in a pro mise or contract, his act is an act of social intercourse which cannot take place in solitude. Although these social acts can be expressed as easily and as properly as judgment, which is a solitary act, philosophers have paid very little attention to them. Following Aristotle, they have concentrated their efforts up on judgments and propositions, which, as bearers of truth and falsity, are most important for logic. Reid, however, is of the opinion that an analysis of other kinds of speech and of the operations of mind which they express would be of real use and perhaps would reveal how imperfect an enumeration the logicians have given of the powers ofhuman understanding when they reduce them to simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning 1• Reid himself does not undertake any such analysis; consequently, we have to content ourselves with what he has to say about the descriptive use of sentences and the mental operations which underlie that kind of speech. 10.1.1. For our purposes, it is particularly important to take notice of Reid' s views on the nature of the object of various acts of the understanding. One of the principles he takes for granted is that in most operations of the mind there must be an object distinct from the operation itself. To see without having any object of sight is absurd. Likewise, one cannot remember without remembering something. In general, to know without having any object ofknowledge is an absurdity too gross to admit of reasoning. Every man who thinks must think of something; the object he thinks of is one thing, his thought of that object is another. Many things may be affirmed of the operation of the mind in thinking which cannot without error, and even absurdity, be affirmed of the object of the operation. This fundament al principle is reflected in the fact that the operations of our minds are denoted by active transitive verbs which require not only an agent, but also an object of the operation 2• The only exception to the general rule is sensation. Though the form of such an expression as 'I feel pain' might seem to imply that the feeling is something distinct from the pain felt, in reality there is no distinction between the feeling and the thing felt. When I am pained, I cannot say that the pain I feel is one thing, and that my feeling it is another. They are one and the same thing and cannot be disjoined, even in imagination. Sens at ion supposes a sentient being and a certain manner 1. Reid 1969', I, 5, pp. 54-55; I, 8, pp. 71-74; Reid 1863, p. 692. Cf. also JENSEN 1979. 2. Reid 1969', I, 1, pp. 13-14; I, 2, pp. 37-38; 11, 9, p. 160.

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in which that being is affected; there is no third thing, called an idea, which is the object of the act of sensation3 • For Reid, the three primary sources of non-inferential contingent knowledge are perception, consciousness, and memory. Perception of an ex ternal object of sen se is accompanied by one or more sensations, but in addition it involves some conception or notion of the object perceived and also astrong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence. Inner consciousness differs from perception in that it is immediate knowledge of the present operations or modes of thinking of our own minds. As the objects of perception and of consciousness must be something that is present, so the object of memory, or that which is remembered, must be something that is past. Memory is always accompanied by the belief that its object existed in the past. As is already clear from these brief characterizations of the three indispensable sources of our factual knowledge, one of the respects in which perception, consciousness, and memory differ from sensation is the necessity of drawing, with regard to them, a clear-cut distinction between act and object. In the case of memory, for instance, it is obvious that the remembrance of something is a particular act of the mind which exists now, while the thing remembered belongs to the past. Now given the fact that each of these ment al operations must have an object that is distinct from the act itself, the question arises what that object is. According to Reid, the only objects of perception are really existing material things, together with their individual qualities; the objects of consciousness are one's own presently existing psychological states; and the objects of memory are individual things or states of affairs which really existed in the past. When an act of perception, consciousness, or memory has the veridical character suggested by the words that are commonly used to denote the act, it supposes three kinds of real existent: the subject, the particular act performed by the subject, and some individual thing or state which exists in the external world or in the mind, or has existed there. Reid leaves no room for a fourth thing, as it is introduced by the philosophical theory of ideas, according to which there are two objects, an immediate object, also called idea, species, or form, and a mediate or external object. He firmly rejects the indirect or representational realism which is based upon the assumption th at the direct objects of mental acts are ideas in the mind. In his opinion, this theory of ideas, which he ascribes to such thinkers as Descartes, Locke, and Hume, and which he holds responsible for the sceptical tendencies inherent in their philosophies, is untenable. One of the areas where it is evidently at variance with the intuitions of common sen se is formed by the operations of perception, consciousness, and memory". The act of conceiving which is part of the operations of perception, consciousness, and memory mayalso be considered in its own right. As such, it is 3. Reid 1969', I, 1, p. 27, p. 29; 11, 11, p. 197; 11, 16, p. 243, p. 249; 11, 18, pp. 269-270; lIl, 1, p. 324. 4. Reid 1969', I, 1, p. 20; 11, 5, pp. 111-113; lIl, 1, pp. 324-325; IV, 1, p. 404; IV, 2, p. 408, pp. 420-421; V, 1, p. 464. Cf. CUMMlNS 1974.

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amental phenomenon in which we should carefully distinguish between the act itse1f and its object. The word 'conception' is ambiguous: properly it signifies the ment al act of thinking of something, but it is also used for the object of conception or the thing conceived. The cardinal difference between conception and the other operations of our minds is that the latter are employed about real existences and carry with them the belief of their objects, whereas the faculty of conceiving is not employed sole1y about things which have existence. I can conceive a winged horse or a centaur as easily and as distinctly as I can conceive a man whom I have seen. But this distinct conception does not indine my judgment in the least to the belief that a winged horse or a centaur ever existed. It is the very nature of the faculty of conceiving that its object, though distinctly conceived, may have no existence5 • The prejudice that wh at we conceive must always have some kind of existence may be a consequence of the fact that conception is commonly described in analogical and figurative language. This figurative language is chiefly derived from the strong analogy that is thought to exist between painting or ot her plastic arts and the power of conceiving objects in the mind. In order to avoid the error into which this analogicallanguage is apt to draw us, it is proper to attend to the dissimilitudes between conceiving a thing in the mind and painting it to the eye, no less than to their similitude. One difference to which Reid points is that painting is a transitive act which produces an effect distinct from the operation, name1y, the picture, whereas conceiving, like planning or resolving, be10ngs to what the Schoolmen called immanent acts of the mind, which produce nothing beyond themse1ves6 • That which is commonly called the image of a thing in the mind is no more than the act or operation of the mind in conceiving it. 'Conception' and 'having the image of a thing in the mind' are synonymous expressions. The image in the mind is not the object of conception, nor is it any effect produced by concept ion as a cause. It is conception itse1f. When I think of a cirde, the object of my conception is not an image or resemblance of a cirde, but a cirde. Likewise, when I conceive an individu al object that really exists, such as St Paul's cathedral in London, the immediate object of the concept ion is not an image of that church, but the church itse1f. Although th at church is hundreds of miles distant and although I have no reason to believe that it acts upon me or that I act upon it, I can nevertheless think ofit, that is, have an idea ofit? There are, then, only two possibilities. Either an act of conceiving is directed towards something that really exists; in that case the object of the conception or the thing conceived is that real existent. Or an act of conceiving is a thought of something that has no real existence; then all we can say is that, though an act of conceiving

5. Reid 1969', IV, 1, pp. 404-405; IV, 2, p. 422. 6. Reid 1969', IV, 1, pp. 389-391. Compare Durandus a Sancto Porciano 1571 , fol. 77 V: Per operationem intra manentem nihil constituitur vel producitur; sed intelligere vel dicere in· telligibile sunt operationes intra manentes; ergo per eas nihil constituitur vel producitur. See also Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 8, 1050 a, and, for Durandus, 1.2.1. 7. Reid 1969', IV, 1, pp. 390-391 ; IV, 2, p. 419, pp. 422-423.

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something is performed, the object of the conception or the thing conceived does not exist. Reid is not prepared to ascribe any form of existence to a thing thought of which does not properly exist in reality. While adherents of the objective-existence theory posited a peculiar kind of existence which they defined as being the internalobject of an act of conceiving or as being the passive side of an act of conceiving, Reid refuses to apply the word 'exist' to any things but those which populate the world in a literal and straightforward sense. According to him, 'a thing being in the mind' is a figurative expression, signifying merely that the thing is conceived or remembered. When we say that a thing is in the mind, this can mean no more than that it is conceived by the mind or that it is an object of thought. Things barely conceived should be carefully distinguished from things that exist B• The difference between Reid and such adherents of the objective-existence theory as Durandus ofSaint-Pourçain and Petrus Aureolus (See 1.2.) seems to be very small indeed. We might perhaps say that it consists in a slight divergence in the interpretation of such a phrase as esse apprehensum. Adherents of the objective-existence theory read this phrase as denoting a modified form ofbeing or existing (esse): it is applicable to something that exists, but that exists only in the weak sense of being apprehended. Reid, on the other hand, understands the phrase as simply equivalent to apprehendi; the constituent esse does not refer to any kind of existence, but is a mere sign of passivity. On Reid' s view, which is closely related to Ockham's mental-act theory (See 1.3.1.), the notion of existence applies in any case to the particular act of conceiving. Every act of conceiving must have an object; that is to say, it must be a conception of something. When the act fails to make contact with a really existing part of the world, the object does not have any type of existence ofits own. It is that which is conceived ofin the particular act of conceiving; it is the act considered passively. When the act does make contact with something in the world, the object is identical with the thing that exists in reality and shares with it the norm al form of literal and straightforward existence. Adherents of the objectiveexistence theory would agree with this description except that they lay a little bit more weight on the peculiar status of the object of concept ion by allowing themselves to speak of it in terms of existence. They hasten, however, to add that the objective or intentional existence which is typical of things in so far as they are thought of is nothing but being the inner object or the passive aspect of the act of conceiving. Reid is prevented from seeing the fundamental agreement between the objective-existence theory and his own view by his fear of the scepticism resulting from any form of indirect or representational realism that is based on the assumption that the immanent objects of thought have some kind of existence of their own. Although he devotes a whole chapter to the view defended by Arnauld in his controversy with Malebranche (See 4.1.), he remains reluctant to consider the author of Des vraies et des fausses idées as being wholly on his side. In Reid's eyes, Arnauld still does not go far enough in deny8. Reid 1969', IV, 2, p. 422; V, 5, pp. 507-508; VI, 3, p. 577.

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ing the existence of ideas in the philosophical sense of that word; wh at he had given up with one hand, he takes back with the other9 • At the same time, Reid disagrees with the interpretation Arnauld had given to Descartes's doctrine of ideas. In this connection, it is interesting to no te that another Scottish philosopher, Thomas Brown (1778-1820), expressed serious doubts about Reid's too ready assumption th at Locke is one of those philosophers who contend for ideas as some sort of entities that are distinct and different from the perception itself. That Locke did not conceive the idea to be any thing different from the perception itself is, according to Brown, sufficiently apparent from innumerable passages, both of An Essay itself and of the correspondence with Stillingfleet 10 • The object of conception is either an individual thing or a general concept. A general concept is an attribute that is predicable of many subjects, a genus or species belonging in common to several individuals. Moreover , it is th at which is signi6ed by a general word. To conceive the meaning of a general word is the same thing as to conceive the abstract general concept of which the word is a sign. The minds of children are nunished with general conceptions in proportion as they learn the meaning of general words 1t • Although Reid confesses his ignorance as to the manner in which we conceive universals, he is convinced of two points. First, a word, which considered in itself is merely an individu al sound, can be called general only because that which it signi6es is general. But a general word takes this denomination, not from the act of the mind in conceiving, which is an individual act, but from its object, which is general. One of the reasons why Reid applies the distinction between act and object to conceptions is undoubtedly the fact that a conception regarded as a particular act of some mind is always individual, while th at which is conceived may be general. The meaning of a general word, then, is not the particular act of conceiving which accompanies its utterance, but rather the general object of that act, the abstract content that may be made explicit in a de6nition l2 • The second point on which Reid insists is that the general objects of conceptions do not exist. Every thing that really exists is an individual; a being and an individual being are the same thing. Now the act by which a general notion is thought is an individual act and thus belongs to the realm of existents. But the abstract concept which is the object of such an individual act is not an individu al being; consequently, it cannot be regarded as something that exists. In Reid's opinion, all the mystery would be removed from the subject of general concepts if we only could bring ourselves to take away the attribute of existence and suppose them not to be things that exist, but things that are barely conceived\3. 9. Reid 1969', 11, 13, pp. 204-210. 10. Brown 1820, Lecture 27. For a similar criticism advanced by Joseph Priestley in An Examination of the Scotch Philosophers of 1774 see GRAVE 1960, p. 12 ff. 11. Reid 1969', IV, 1, pp. 393-395; V, 2, p. 471; V, 6, p. 519, pp. 522-523, p. 528. 12. Reid 1969', V, 2, p. 471, p. 477; V,S, pp. 506-507. 13. Reid 1969', IV, 2, p. 422; V, 3, p. 482; V,S, pp. 506-508; V, 6, pp. 516-518, p. 526; VI, 3, p. 577.

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In the explication of words with which Reid begins his Essays on the Intellectual Powers ofMan he distinguishes between a popular and a philosophical meaning of the word 'idea'. In popular language, 'idea' signifies the same thing as 'conception' , 'apprehension', or 'notion' . To have an idea of any thing is to conceive it. Since in the popular sense an idea is an act of thinking and such an act is always an individual act, there can be no general idea in that sense. According to the philosophical meaning of the word 'idea', it does not signify that act of the mind which we call thought or conception, but rat her the immediate object of the mind in thinking. Adherents of the philosophical doctrine of ideas hold th at besides the mind that thinks, the act of thinking, and the object thought of, there is a fourth ingredient, namely, an idea which can have no existence but in a mind that thinks and which, as the immediate object of thought, is contrasted with the remote or mediate object. Reid adds th at he will have no occasion to use the word 'idea' in this philosophical sense in expressing his own opinions, because he believes ideas, taken in this sense, to be a mere fiction of philosophers. And with regard to the word in its popular sense he remarks that there is no need to use it, because there are equivalent words which are less ambiguous l4 • There is a meaning of 'idea', however, which he would willingly adopt if use did permit. In the original sense which the Platonists attached to the word 'idea' it might be used for the purpose of distinguishing things barely conceived from things that exist, provided, of course, that we do not follow the Platonists in ascribing existence to the ideas. If the attribute of existence were taken away from the Platonic characterization of ideas, this tour de force would make the word 'idea' in the original sense eminently suitable for covering those objects of thought which are things we either believe never to have existed, such as Don Quixote and Utopia, or think of without regard to their existence, such as abstract species and genera. In this usage, the word 'idea' would be restricted to things that are barely conceived, in contradistinction to all those objects which we not only can think of, but which we believe to have a real existence, such as the creator of all things and all his creatures that fall within our notice l5 • 10.1.2. An act of conceiving may be a simple apprehension in the sense that it is a thought of a thing that is fit to become the subject or the predicate of a propositional complex. According to Reid, it is preferable to hold that such simple apprehensions are got by analysing more complex operations of the mind, rat her than to hold that the more complex operations are formed by compounding simple apprehensions l6 • In the same vein, then, we may assume that for Reid the natural unit of thought is a full-blownjudgment, but that by abstrac14. Reid 1969', 1,1, pp. 15-20; 11, 9, p. 159; 11,14, pp. 211-212; IV, 2, p. 408; V, 6, p. 515; VI, 3, p. 581. For Reid's notes on the history of the word ' idea' and on the doctrine of species see Reid 1863, pp. 925-928, pp. 951-960. 15. Reid 1969', V, 5, pp. 507-509; VI, 3, p. 582. 16. Reid 1969', IV, 3, pp. 427-428.

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ting from the act of judging we can reach a level of analysis at which only the predicative complex th at forms the object of the act of judging is taken into consideration. Although Reid scarcely gives any details about the difference between simple apprehension and predicative conception, it may be presumed that he would explain the latter along traditionallines as an act of compounding or dividing. Further, it seems reasonable to ascribe to him the view that an act of predicative conception must have an object, namely, that which is conceived in a predicating manner, but that such an object need not exist. Fortunately, he is more explicit about the border-line between a merely predicative conception and a fulljudgment. It should be noted, however, that his use of the expres sion 'simple apprehension' is twofold. On the one hand, he means by it the concept ion of the isolated terms of a propositional complex. On the other hand, he employs the same phrase for the act of merely conceiving a propositional complex, without judging it to be true or false. He repeatedly insists that a propositional complex may be simply apprehended without forming a judgment of its truth or falsehood . The difference between merely entertaining a propositional complex and adopting an attitude of assent or dis sent towards it is especially dear in those circumstances in which a propositional complex is presented to the mind before we judge of it or in which contradictory propositions are conceived at the same time. We might say that a merely entertained propositional complex is simultaneously the actual object of an operation of predicatively compounding or dividing and the potential object of an act of judging17 • In the many passages where Reid states thatjudgment is expressed in speech by a proposition he evidently takes the word 'proposition' as standing for a dedarative sentence that is uttered with assertive force 18 • Not seldom, however, he also employs the word 'proposition' both for a dedarative sentence that expresses a merely apprehended propositional complex and is thus uttered without assertive force, and for that which is conceived in an act of predication and may become the object ofjudgment or belief when it is held to be true or false. To put it in traditional terminology, Reid uses the one word 'proposition' for a dedarative sentence th at expresses ajudgment or ajudicative mental proposition, for a dedarative sentence th at expresses an apprehensive ment al proposition, and for the apprehensive mental proposition itself. Especially the lack of a dear terminological distinction between the latter two senses is liable to cause some confusion. When, for instance, it is said that to conceive or apprehend a proposition is to understand its meaning or to conceive what it means 19 , what must be intended is th at to conceive an apprehensive mental proposition is to understand the meaning of the corresponding

17. Reid 1969', I, 1, p. 12; 11, 20, p. 289; IV, 3, p. 425, pp. 431-432; VI, 1, p. 535, p. 544; VI, 3, p. 570; VI, 4, p. 593; Reid 1969b , V, 7, p. 460. 18. Reid 1969', I, 7, p. 67; I, 8, p. 73; 11, 20, p. 289; IV, 1, p. 385; VI, 1, p. 536, p. 544; VII, 1, p. 711. 19. Reid 1969', IV, 3, p. 425, pp. 431-433; VI, 1, p. 535, p. 544; VI, 4, p. 593.

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declarative sentence. According to Reid, an act of judging presupposes an act . of conceiving a propositional complex that is a suitable object of judgment. There is no belief without conception, for he that believes must believe something, for example that the sun is greater than the earth. But practically the only explanation offered of the act of conceiving a propositional thought is the statement that it consists in understanding the meaning of the corresponding declarative sentence. Before we can determine the truth or falsity of a sentence, we must comprehend what it means and what assertible it expresses. 10.1.3. Repudiating Locke's distinction bet ween knowledge and judgment, Reid uses the word 'judgment' in the generic sense in which it is roughly synonymous with 'belief' and 'conviction' and covers cases of unreserved assent and dissent as well as of doubt. From a more external point of view,judgment is characterized as that which is expressed by an assertive sentence or proposition and as the second operation of the mind, situated between simple apprehension and reasoning. Reid maintains a strict distinction between judgment and simple apprehension, both in the sense of the thought of a propositi on al term and in the sense of an act of merely entertaining a propositional complex. In particular, he rejects Hume's view that belief is nothing but a peculiar manner of conceiving, on the ground th at it is absurd to hold that belief and mere conception should differ only in degree. As regards the difference between judgment and reasoning, Reid remarks that although we are taught in logic that judgment is expressed by one proposition, whereas reasoning requires two or three, the modes of speech are so various that wh at in one mode is expressed by two or three propositions may in another mode be expressed by one. Thus I may say either 'God is good; therefore good men shall be happy', which is a reasoning, or 'Because God is good, good men shall be happy', which is a causal proposition. Since the reasoning expresses no more than the causal proposition does, Reid concludes that reasoning as well as judgment must be true or false and that both versions are accompanied with assent or beliepo. Though Reid is of the opinion that belief, assent, and conviction, being perfectly simple and sui generis, do not admit of logical definition, he nevertheless offers some considerations which may serve to elucidate the notion of judgment. Judgment is an act of the mind whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another. Every judgment is amental affirmation or negation. The use of the word 'judgment' is probably grounded on the analogy between a tribunal ofjustice and the inward tribunal of the mind. As ajudge, aft er taking the proper evidence, passes sentence in a cause, and that sentence is called his judgment, so the mind, with regard to whatever is true or false, passes sentence or determines according to the evidence that appears. In this perspective, then, a judgment may be characterized as a ment al act by which we determine, concerning any thing that is expressible by a proposition, whether it be true or 20. Reid 1969',

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m, 7,

pp . 377-380; VI, 3, pp. 569-571, p. 591; VII, 1, pp. 710-711.

false 21 • Reid' sinsistenee that judgment is an act of determining may be taken as a sign of his dis agreement with Locke' s concept ion of judgment as a mere perception of a relation bet ween ideas. In point of fact, however, Reid's critici sm of Locke' s definition is directed first and foreniost against the introduction of ideas as the terms between which a relation of agreement or disagreement is discerned. In this connection, it should be remembered that Reid rejected the system of ideas as it had been defended, at least in his opinion, by Locke, and that he wanted to restriet the word 'idea' to things barely conceived, in contradistinction to objects of thought th at really exist. In particular , it seemed to him th at the word 'idea' would be a suitable term for general concepts. Arguing from this position, he comes to the conclusion that Locke's definition fits only those judgments which consist in perceiving the agreement or dis agreement of abstract and general concepts. But besides such abstract and necessary truths, there is a vast c1ass of contingent truths concerning the real existence of things and their various attributes and relations. If we have any knowledge of our own existence or of the existence of what we see about us and of things past, that knowledge cannot consist in perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas 22 • As to the relation of judgment to the will, Reid holds that it is not in our power to judge as we will. The judgment is carried along necessarily by the evidence, realor seeming, which appears to us at the time 23 • Further, he points out that there is a difference between judgment and testimony. Though bothjudgment and testimony are expressed by an affirmation or a denial,judgment is a solitary act of the mind to which the expres sion by affirmation or denial is not at all essential, whereas testimony is a socia! act to which it is essential to be expressed by words or signs. A tacit testimony is a contradiction, but there is no contradiction in a tacit judgment. Moreover , in testimony a man pledges his veracity for what he affirms, so that a false testimony is a lie. But a wrongjudgment is not a lie; it is only an error. Although testimony and judgment are expressed by the same form of speech, we can easily see, from the matter and circumstances, whether a man intends to give his testimony or barely to express his judgment 24 • Finally, it is worthy of note that Reid, in discussing the possibility of understanding a necessarily false proposition, makes mention of the act of supposing or conceiving a proposition to be true. He contends that notwithstanding the fact that we cannot give any degree of assent to an impossible proposition, we are certainly able to understand its meaning and also to suppose or conceive it to be true in the sense that we can draw consequences from it. An act of supposing is intermediate between a mere apprehension of a propositional thought and an actual judgment that it is true 25 • 21. Reid 1969', 11, 20, p. 289; III, 7, p. 379; VI, 1, pp. 532-536, p. 544; VI, 3, p. 570; Reid 1969b, V, 7, p. 460. 22. Reid 1969', VI, 3, pp. 574-590. 23. Reid 1969', VI, 4, p. 593. 24. Reid 1969', VI, 1, pp. 532-534. 25. Reid 1969', IV, 3, pp. 432-433. Compare 6.2.1.

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10.2. Jeremy Bentham Although there is a conspicuous difference between the fundamental principles which underlie the common sense philosophy as it was developed by Reid, and the general drift ofBentham's rather unsystematic writings, the difference becomes much smaller when we look only at Bentham's theory of judgments and propositions and compare that part of his work with what Thomas Brown, for instance, had to say about the same subject. This convergence is mainly due to the fact that the French idéologues and in particular Destutt de Tracy exercised a considerable influence on some of their British contemporaries. Thomas Brown, in the lectures on the philosophy of the human mind which he gave between 1810 and 1820 at the University of Edinburgh as Dugald Stewart's assistant, borrowed so much from Destutt de Tracy and Laromiguière that he has been accused of plagiarism 26 • Destutt de Tracy's impact is also clearly visible in the essays concerning logic, language, and universal grammar on which Bentham worked intermittently in the years between 1811 and 1831 and which, together with the Chrestomathia, were published from the manuscripts by Bowring in 184327 • As will be shown in this section, there is a striking similarity between the essential features of Destutt de Tracy's doctrine of the proposition (See 9.2.) and the central parts of Bentham 's view. 10.2.1. Bentham believes that an attempt at reforming logic should be based on a thorough study of language. He distinguishes between the solitary or intransitive and the social or transitive use of language. When signs are applied to the mind of that person alone by whom they are employed, that is, when the use oflanguage is purely self-regarding, language is an instrument for the creation and Hxation of thought itself. This self-regarding use of language is presupposed by its social use, which priinarily consists in the communication of thought, in the conveyance of thought from the mind of a speaker to the mind of a hearer. Since Bentham identiHes the social use of language with its being used for conveying information, either purely or for the purpose of excitation, he naturally comes to the conclusion that every discourse is an assemblage of propositions, the smallest complete units of communicative speech. Although he draws a distinction between asentence, which is an element of grammatical analysis, and a proposition, which belongs to logic, on his view every sentence is either an assertion or a combination of assertions. A simple sentence is a single proposition, in the logical sen se of the word 'proposition' , while a compound sentence may contain any number of propositions. To be subservient, then, to any use or purpose, every assignable portion of

26. Brown 1820, especially Lectures 48, 49, and 51. For Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), who was a close follower of Reid, see AARSLEFF 1967, pp. 101-112. 27. Bentham 1843, pp. 1-191 (Chrestomathia), pp. 213-293 (Essay on Logic), pp. 295-338 (Essay on Language), pp. 339-357 (Fragments on Universa 1Grammar).

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language must, on each occasion, be enunciative or suggestive of at least some proposition28 • The thesis that in the last instance all discourse consists of propositions gets its main support from Bentham's contention that the only immediate subject of discourse is the state of the communicator' s mind. As all thought belongs either to the intellectual or to the volitional department of the mind, the state of the speaker's mind which is always the immediate subject of a communication made by language is either the state of the passive and receptive part of it or the state of the active or concupiscible part. What is primarily asserted by such indicative sentences as 'Eurybiades struck Themistocles' and 'This pen exists' is that it is my opinion th at Eurybiades struck Themistocles and that it is my opinion th at this pen exists. In general, in every portion of discourse by which the existence of a matter of fact exterior to the person of the speaker is asserted is included a communication made of the state of the judicial department of the speaker' s mind, of an opinion entertained in relation to that same matter of facto This means that such propositions as 'I am hungry', 'That apple is ripe', which are simple in appearance, are, in their import, complex. The immediate subject of the communication made is the intellectual state of the speaker's mind, while the ulterior subject is the state of the corporeal part of the speaker's frame or the state of some object other than, and exterior to, the speaker. Since, however, this kind of complexity is inherent in every assertive utterance, for most purposes the consideration of the primary assertion may be dropped, so that the ulterior subject becomes the sole subject of the communication made. This autobiographic analysis of indicative sentences, which had already been suggested by Destutt de Tracy (l'idée-sujet de la proposition est toujours en déflnitif notre moi), seems to be the natural outcome of applying the method that was traditionally used in reducing non-indicative sentences to propositions, to propositions themselves. Bentham, like Destutt de Tracy, makes use of the traditional method in handling non-indicative sentences. What is intimated by the imperative sentence 'Come hither' , for instance, is th at it is my desire that the hearer should come to me. Understood properly, the imperative sentence conveys information concerning a volitional state of the speaker's mind 29 • 28. Bentham 1843, pp. 186-188, pp. 228-229, p. 242, p. 301, p. 320, p. 333. 29. Bentham 1843, p. 299, pp. 320-322, pp. 329-330, pp. 353-355. Thereis a striking similarity between Destutt de Tracy and Bentham 's view and the elaborate theory of the sentence developed by the German grammarian Georg Fränklin, in his Versuch einer neuen Lehre von

den vornehmsten Gegenständen der deutschen Sprachlehre nach den RegeIn der VernunJtlehre in sechs Abhandlungen verJasst. which was published at Regensburg in 1778. Fränklin defines a sentence (Rede) as the verbal indication (Anzeigung) of the mental attitude (Gesinnung) which the speaker adopts towards a propositional content. Even with regard to indicative sentences, one should distinguish between the speaker's cognitive attitude, which is primarily made known, and the object of that attitude, which is expressed only indirectly; as a mIe, there is a difference between that which is angezeigt and that which is vorgestellt. According to the mental state indicated, there are five fundamental kinds of sentence: Ausspruchsrede. Pragrede. Antreibungsrede. Zugebungsrede. and Wunschrede. The author also

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With regard to the historical development oflanguage, Bentham adheres to the by now familiar doctrine that originally discourse was uttered in the form of entire propositions. The first words must, in their import, have been equivalent to whole sentences, to sentences expressive, for example, of suffering, of enjoyment, of desire, of aversion. Of this originallanguage which was in use before the parts of speech were formed the best examples are interjections. Every interjection may be considered as the equivalent of some proposition: 'Alas' as the equivalent of 'I am grieved', 'Hurra' of 'I rejoice'. To form the words of which language is at present composed has been the work of abstraction and analysis, of a chemico-Iogical process. Words were formed by the decomposition of propositions, as afterwards in written discourse letters were formed by the decomposition of words. The parts of speech may be regarded as so many fragments into which the integers of the earliest language were broken down 30 • For Bentham, however, this priority of the whole proposition is not only of a historical nature; it is also the key to a correct systematic understanding of the workings of language. If the sole function of language in its social use is the communication of thought, the integer to be looked for in language must be an entire proposition . Of this integer no one part of speech, not even that which is most significant, is anything more than a fragment. In this respect, the word 'part' in the phrase 'part of speech' is instructive: it conveys an intimation to look out for the integer of which an expression is a part. Bentham contrasts his holistic approach, which is based on the consideration that every man who speaks, speaks in propositions, with the synthetic picture that is found in the logic of Aristotle and his followers. They begin with terms and then go on to the consideration of propositions in the character of compounds capable ofbeing composed out of these elements. The terms are accordingly spoken of as possessing of themselves an original and independent signification and as having existence before anything of the nature of a proposition came to be in existence, as if firiding these terms endowed, each of them, somehow or other, with a signification of its own, at a subsequent period some ingenious persons took them in hand and formed them into propositions31 • The proposition, then, is of central importance to the study of language in that all sentences, when properly understood, are propositions and that the proposition is the original and systematic integer of which the parts of speech are merely fragments. Further, on Bentham's view every proposition expresses primarily an intellectual state of the speaker's mind, more precisely his judgment or opinion that something is the case. Since, however, the intimation of the judicial state of the speaker' s mind is a constant element in every proposi-

notes that sometimes the actual force of a sentence may be different fr om what is suggested by its form. For instance, an indicative sentence may have the force of a request; then it hasfremde AnzeigungskraJt. Cf. ]ELLINEK 1913-1914, 11, pp. 477-481. 30. Bentham 1843, pp. 322-323, p. 331, p. 357. 31. Bentham 1843, p. 188, pp. 321-322. Cf. LAND 1974, pp. 166-169.

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tion, in most cases attention will be paid only to the variabIe state of affairs which is the object ofjudgment. Hence, in order to gain a satisfactory insight into the fundamental unit of discourse it will be necessary to answer at least two questions: one concerning the nature of judgment and one concerning the act of predication by which proper objects of judgment are formed. According to Bentham, ajudgment is said to have been passed when upon and after examination and comparison made of any two or more objects that have presented themselves to the mind any inference is made or conclusion come to in relation to them. Whereas the act of applying the faculty of attention to the objects concerned and the act of giving expression to the judgment are acts of the volitional faculty, judgment itself is an operation that belongs to the intellectual part of the mind. Nevertheless, Bentham seems to regard it as a kind of decision or determination, in the sense th at by the act ofjudgment the process of examination is brought to an end32 • Bentham's answer to the second question is considerably more detailed. He defines a proposition as any portion of discourse by which the existence of some quality in some subject is asserted, or as a mass of discourse by which an assertion is conveyed to the effect that in the subject a property or quality has had, has, or will have existence. The subject is named by a noun substantive, the quality by a noun adjective, while the word by which the existence of the quality in the substance is indicated is called the copula. The copula is the sign of the act of the mind by which the attribution of a quality to a substance is performed. It is the verb substantive, which is the only member of the class of simple verbs; all other verbs are complex in that they include both the copula and a quality. A propositional complex which is a proper object of judgment may therefore be analysed into three components, of which the copula fulfils the cardinal function of presenting a quality as existing in a subject 33 • Besides such an analysis into three components, Bentham also offers an analysis into four elements. The proposition 'Sugar is sweet' , for instance, may be expanded into the more explicit form 'Sweetness is in sugar'. Then we have a subject, a quality, a certain relation between that subject and that quality, of which the word 'in' is the sign, and that which is expressed by the verb substantive, namely, the existence of that relation between the subject and the attribute34 • What Bentham wants to emphasize by this alternative analysis is, I think, that the essence of a propositional complex consists in the presentation of a quality as having dependent existence in relation to a subject. In this respect too, he seems to be heavily indebted to Destutt de Tracy's Éléments d'idéologie. 10.2.2. It had been Jeremy Bentham's wish that his nephew, the famous botanist George Bentham (1800-1884), should publish the manuscripts on logic and language. The lat ter left that wish unfulfilled - the manuscripts were 32. Bentham 1843, p. 225 , pp . 320-321. 33. Bentham 1843, p. 186, p. 189, p. 246, pp . 333-336, p. 348. 34. Bentham 1843, p. 337.

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eventually published by John Bowring in 1843 - but he did write an Outline of a New System afLagic in which he adopted several ofhis uncle's ideas. At the same time, he interspersed his exposition with critical comments upon the

Elements afLagic which had been brought out by Richard Whately (1787-1863) in 1826. Whately's textbook is rather traditional; here I mention only some points which are of interest for our subject. After giving the usual division of the operations of the mind into simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning, the author remarks that language affords the signs by which these operations are not only expressed and communicated to others, but even, for the most part, carried on by ourselves. Logic is entirely conversant about language. If any process of reasoning can take place, in the mind, without anyemployment oflanguage, orally or mentally, such a process does not come within the province of logic35 . The only verb recognized by logic is the copula 'is' or 'is not', which indicates the act ofjudgment, as by it the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject. All other verbs are compound, being resolvable into the verb 'to be' and a participle or adjective. The copula, as such, has no relation to time, but expresses merely the agreement or disagreement of two given terms. If any other tense of the verb besides the present is used, the difference of tense may either be regarded as a matter of grammatical propriety only or, if it is essential to the sen se of the whole proposition, the circumstance of time is to be regarded as a part of one of the terms. The sentence 'This man was honest', for example, should be read as 'This man is one formerly-honest', or, presumably, 'This man is now one formerly- honest' . That Whately considered the copula as atemporal, rat her than as always indicating the present, is clear from a footnote in which he repudiates the view that the Lord's declaration to Pilate 'My kingdom is not of this world' is to be understood as containing an implicit 'now', as opposed to 'hereafter'36. Further, Whately is of the opinion that the copula, merely as such, does not imply real existence. As an example he offers the proposition 'A faultless man is a being feigned by the Stoics, and which one must not expect to meet with' . In such sentences as Deus est, on the other hand, existence is expressed by the understood predicate ens or existens37 • Finally, Whately holds that belief and disbelief are not two different states of the mind, but the same state considered in reference to two contradictory propositions. To deny or to disbelieve a proposition is to assert or to believe its contradictory; and to assent to or maintain a proposition is to reject its contradictory38. One of the points on which George Bentham explicitly disagreed with Whately concerns the way in which a judgment is related to a proposition and asentence. According to Whately, a proposition is ajudgment expressed in 35. Whately 1848, 11, I, 2, pp. 63-64. 36. Whately 1848, 11, 1,2, p. 67. Cf. PRIOR 1957, pp. 104-105. See also 4.3.1.,6.2.1., and 12.2.1. 37. Whately 1848, 11, 1,2, p. 67. See also 9.3.2. 38. Whately 1848, 11, 2, 3, p. 82. See also 8.6.3. and 9.3.3.

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words. As an indicative sentence it is distinct from other types of sentence, such as questions and commands. That Whately considered the proposition as a species of the genus sentence is also clear from his insistence that the distinction categorical/hypothetical is not peculiar to propositions, but rather a common feature of all sentences; there are, for instance, conditional questions and disjunctive commands. Propositions are categoricalor hypothetical in so far as they belong to the genus sentence39 • George Bentham, on the other hand, rejects the view that a sentence is the genus of a proposition and is, consequently, a more extensive notion. He adheres to his uncle's thesis that all sentences are propositions and that therefore the notion of a sentence and the notion of a proposition are exactly coextensive. The two notions differ in this respect that a proposition is a logical concept, th at is, a sentence considered as the result of an exercise of the judicative faculty and as having reference to ideas, whereas a sentence is a grammatical concept, inasmuch as it is the enunciation of ajudgment or proposition by visible or audible signs, the physical expression of the ideas in question. George Bentham assumes, with Whately, that logic is concerned withjudgments expressed in language, but he also assumes, contrary to Whately, th at all speech is expressive ofjudgments. Every complete utterance, therefore, is a proposition if we attend to the judgment and the ideas which it involves, while it is a sentence if we look only at the words of which it consists. The utterance 'An intemperate man will be sickly' , for instance, may be considered as ajudgment or proposition; then it consists of three parts, namely, the subject 'an intemperate man', the predicate 'sickly', and the copula 'will be'. Considered as asentence, however, it is composed of six words. One might say th at the two viewpoints differ in the method of segmenting and counting and thus yield different sets of elements. As is obvious from the above, George Bentham regards questions and commands as propositions; they are the enunciation of the state of our mind with regard to the faculty of desire. In this connection, he draws a distinction between simple and compound propositions. A proposition is compound when one of the terms is a proposition and the other, expressed or implied, some one of our psychical faculties. The general form of a compound proposition is 'I ask, command, hope, fear etc. that (this or th at proposition)'. So, the utterance 'Come here' is a compound proposition, since it may be paraphrased as 'I command th at you come here'. The utterance 'I fear death', on the other hand, is a simple proposition, because in its standard form, 'I am a person-fearingdeath' , it contains two terms both of which are names of entities or substantive locutions. The author concedes th at it might be objected that every proposition which he has called simple is the expres sion of absolute belief with relation to another proposition and therefore not simple but compound. But, likeJeremy Bentham, he thinks th at there are good reasons to ignore the complexity in these cases and to treat propositions of which unmodified belief is a constant component as simpie. Such simple propositions express a relation between two 39. Whately 1848, 11, 2, 1, pp. 70-72.

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ideas. By quantifying the predicate-term as well as the subject-term George Bentham is able to interpret the relation that is expressed by the copula as one of identity or non-identity and to reduce all propositions to five fundamental types of equation. With regard to the relation of time which is commonly included in the copula, he remarks that this relation is not taken into consideration in the process oflogical deduction, though certain precautions against being led into error by modifications of time are necessaryW.

10.3. James Mill The doctrine of predication and belief set forth by James Mill in his A na lysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind of 1829 shows many traces of the author' s indebtedness to Hobbes's Computation or Logic and to the associationism of Hume and Hartley. He begins his considerations about predication by calling attention to two purposes oflanguage. We use language to mark sensations or ideas singly, or to mark them in trains and to mark the order of them. The trains whose order we have occasion to mark are either the series of objects perceived by the senses, which exhibit an order of succes sion or position, or the trains of thought which pass in our minds. The items of the lat ter sequences are connected in three principal ways: as cause and effect, as resembling each other, and as included under the same name41 • Now there would be no difficulty in marking the order of ideas if all names were names of one sort. But the facility of communication requires names of different degrees of comprehensiveness. The fact that we use names of species and genera as well as names ofindividuals brings with it a perpetual need of the substitution of one name for another. This substitution cannot be indicated by mere juxtaposition, as in 'J ohn, man' , but to effect the communication that the word 'man' is a mark of the same idea of which 'John' is a mark, and a mark of other ideas along with it, we have to use a special mark which, placed between themarks 'John' and 'man', conveys that 'man' is another mark of that idea of which 'John' is a mark. In English, that special mark is the copula 'is', the sign of predication. The product of an act of predication is a proposition, a form of words consisting of a subject, a predicate, and a copula. By the act of predication the predicate is set down as a name to be used for every thing of which the subject is a name; the copula indicates that the predicate is to be taken as a substitute for the subject. Predication, then, consists essentially in the application of two marks to the same thing. According to James Mill, however, the term 'predication' should be restricted to cases where the two names that are applied to the same thing differ in extension. Cases where the two names are of equal extension, as in 'Man is a rational animal ' , are not predications in the proper sen se of the word. Further, he holds that propositions containing a predicate that is a difJerentia, proprium, or accidens can always be reduced to propositions with a species or genus as predicate. All 40. Bentham 1827, p. SS, pp. 120-135, p. 141. 41. Mill1869, I, 4, 4, p. 159, pp. 180-191.

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predication, therefore, consists in predicating a species or a genus of an individual or in predicating a genus of a species. Besides being a sign of such predication, the copula also indicates time. In the author' s opinion, that combination of functions is a great convenience. The opposite is true, however, of the widespread practice of signifying mere predication by a verb which also denotes existence. This double meaning of the copula has produced a most unfortunate confusion of ideas and has involved in mystery the whole business of predication42 . James Mill's insistence that the end which predication is destined to fulfil is to mark the order in which sensations and ideas follow one another in a train can be explained, I think, by two considerations. As far as propositions, the linguistic expressions of the act of predication, are taken by themselves, he probably had in mind such a remark as Hobbes had made concerning the proposition 'Man is a living creature'. According to Hobbes, that proposition signifies only the order of those things one aft er another which we ob serve in the same idea of man. The proposition raises but one idea in us, but in that idea we consider that first for which he is called man and next that for which he is called living creature43 . At the same time, however, it is quite likely that James Mill adhered to the thesis that all discourse consists of propositions. The examples he offers of trains whose order is marked by predication are sequences of propositions which together form a coherent portion of speech. A syllogism, for instance, is a series of thoughts which is marked in order by the three propositions or predications of which it consists. In all cases, then, where a train of ideas extends beyond a single proposition, it still has propositions as its constituents and predication will thus be the means by which its order is marked. James Mill divides cases of judgment or belief into three types. The simplest cases are those in which we believe that we have a present sensation or a present idea. In such circumstances there is no difference between having the sensation or the idea and believing that we have it; there is but a single thing, with a double name. Further, there is belief in events or real existences, present, past, and future. This kind of belief - to which belief in testimony, being belief in events upon the evidence of testimony, can be reduced - is wholly resolvable into association. I believe in the battle of Marathon, for instance, because the evidence calls up irresistibly the idea of that battle. The belief is the idea of the real event, irresistibly forced upon me by the testimony44. The third type is belief in the truth of propositions, that is, in verbal truths. Here belief in the truth of contingent singular propositions does not need any special explanation. The proposition 'Mr. Brougham made a speech in the House of Commons on such a day', for instance, marks a case either of experience or of testimony. In the first case, the belief of the proposition is another name for the memory of the event; in the second case, it is of the same type as belief in the 42. Mill1869, I, 4, 4, pp. 159-178. 43. Hobbes 1839-1845', I, p. 54 (De corpore, I, 5, 9). See also 7.2.6. 44. Mill1869, I, 11, pp. 341-345, p. 382, p. 386.

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battle of Marathon. Accordingly, James Mill concentrates upon belief in merely verbal propositions which contain only general names; in his opinion, that is by far the most numerous and the most important class of propositions. When the two general names of a merely verbal proposition are of equal extension, as in 'Man is a rational animal' , what is .meant by the truth of the proposition is the coincidence of the names; belief in that truth is only another name for the recognition of the coincidence. Assent to such a proposition can be explained entirely in terms of association. The meaning of each of the two names is recognized by association. In addition, the meaning of the second name is recognized as the same with the meaning of the first name. The recognition of this sameness consists simply in having a certain cluster of ideas, and thereby knowing it to be what it is, and having that cluster of ideas again. When of two names, applied to the same thing, one is ofless, another of greater extension, as in 'Man is an animal ' , belief is nothing more than the recognition of the partial coincidence of the two general names. The association is now more complex in that the cluster of ideas belonging to 'animal' is partly the same with, and partly different from, the cluster belonging to 'man'. But knowing that they are partly the same and partly different is still a matter ofjust having the two clusters of ideas. Although James Mill is of the opinion th at predication by difference, property, or accident may be reduced to predication by genus or species, he nonetheless offers an alternative explanation of belief in propositions whose predicate is of one of the former kinds. In 'Man is rational' , for example, the word 'man' marks a certain cluster of ideas, while the word 'rational' marks a portion of that cluster. Believing the proposition is nothing but recognizing that the cluster signified by 'rational' is included in the cluster signified by 'man'4S. Whereas in the standard interpretation of predication and beliefJames Mill obviously follows Hobbes, this alternative description of belief is more akin to the view of predication put forward by such writers as Buffier, Destutt de Tracy, and Jeremy Bentham.

1004. Conclusion Of the three views onjudgments and propositions to which this chapter has been mainly devoted, Reid's doctrine is particularly interesting because of his detailed examination of the not ion of conceiving. Although his discus sion is focused on simple apprehension as the first operation of the mind, the essential points of his theory may be assumed to apply no less to the act of conceiving a propositional complex, that is, to the act of understanding the meaning of a declarative sentence. Reid's view of conception is, first of all, areaction against the philosophical theory of ideas which he ascribes, perhaps wrongly, to Descartes and Locke. According to this theory, which is a form of indirect or representational realism, the immediate object of thought is always an idea in the mind from whose mental existence the actual existence of the ultimately in45. Mill1869, I, 11, pp. 386-393.

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tended object has to be somehow inferred. In Reid's eyes, such a double-object theory is bound to issue in scepticism. It is probably also his fear of sceptical consequences that prevents him from fully appreciating Arnauld's version of the objective-existence theory; even the introduction of such a weak form of existence as objective or intentional being might prove to be dangerous. Reid's own view is a variety of the mental-act theory. An act of conceiving is always simultaneously a particular act of an agent and a concept ion of something. In so far as the act is considered as being the conception of something, it may be said to have an object. However, this indispensabIe object need not have any kind of existence, apart from the particular existence of the act who se specific directedness may be indicated by saying that it has that object. Indeed, general concepts, which because of their generality should be distinguished from the particular acts of which they are the objects, never have any existence. And if the intended object of a thought does exist, it has the straightforward sort of existence that belongs to individual things in the world. Reid's theory of conceiving lies somewhere on the line of thought that connects Ockham in the beginning of the fourteenth century with Franz Brentano in the beginning of this century"6. The core of Jeremy Bentham 's theory of the proposition is formed by three fundament al theses which are also prominent in Destutt de Tracy' s Éléments d'idéologie. First, he holds th at all discourse consists of propositions, the verbal expressions ofjudgments. That every sentence is a proposition follows from his view that every complete portion of speech conveys in the fi.rst instance the speaker's state of mind. Further, he adheres to the doctrine of the priority, both historical and systematic, of the proposition as the integer to which every analysis into parts must remain related. The third thesis concerns the import of a propositional complex formed by an act of predication. This import is said to consist in the presentation of a quality as having dependent existence in relation to a subject. Traces of this conception of the import of a predicating complex are also found in James Mill. His standard view of predication, however, sterns from Hobbes. On this view, the copula indicates that the subject-name and the predicate-name are entirely or partially coincident in that they are applicable to the same thing or things. Since a proposition signifies the order of those things one after another which are observed in the same idea and since, moreover , all discourse consists of propositions, James Mill considers predication as the grand expedient by which language is enabled to mark not only sensations and ideas, but also their order when they occur in trains. Belief in the truth of propositions, especially in the truth of merely verbal propositions which contain only general names, is identified with the recognition of the coincidence, entire or partial, of the two general names. Like other types of belief, belief of a proposition is wholly explainable in terms of ideas and association.

46. Cf. Franz Brentano, 'Was an Reid zu loben. Ueber die Philosophie von Thomas Reid'. Grazer philosophische Studien, 1 (1975), 1-18 (from a manuscript of 1916).

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11. LEIBNIZ'S LOGICAL REALISM

Anyone who is looking for an answer to some definite questions in the writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) is confronted with a corpus that consists of a huge number of extremely various texts spread over a long period of time. Moreover, a great part of that product ion remained unpublished until fairly recently. As a consequence, Leibniz's impact on the period with which we are concerned was much less than might be expected on the ground of our present knowledge about his doctrines. With respect to the problems in which we are interested, the difference between the sources that were available to such an eighteenth-century philosopher as Thomas Reid and the abundant material that is accessible now may be realized by pondering on the rat her meagre account of the system ofLeibniz which Reid offers in his Essays on the lntellectual Powers of Man of 1785. In this chapter I shall attempt to gat her the main features ofLeibniz's views on the nature and status ofideas and on the act of predication which combines concepts into a propositional complex. Furthermore, one section will be devoted to his remarkable treatment of the difference between contexts in which coextensive concepts may be freely substituted for one another and contexts in which such a substitution is liable to interfere with the requirement of preservation of truth-value. On the whoie, Leibniz's opinions concerning these matters seem to have been fairly uniform throughout his career; at least, I have been unable to find any significant changes.

11.1. ldeas as cogitables As is clear from a letter to the Duchess Sophia of Hanover and from Nouveaux essais, 11, 9, 8, Leibniz drew a sharp distinction between ment al images and ideas. Since ideas have the character of definitions, there are ideas of things which are neither material nor imaginable 1 • While Leibniz, then, disagreed with such a view ofideas as had b'een defended by Gassendi and Hobbes, yet this dis agreement did not induce him to embrace one of the other doctrines that were current in his time. In his eyes, the view of the Schoolmen, Descartes, and Arnauld, according to which an idea is a modification of the soul, an actual 1. Leibniz 1875-1890, IV, p. 293; V, p. 124.

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thought of something, is unsatisfactory. If an idea were the form of thought, as velocity and direction are the quality and form of movement, the idea would exist only in so far as we are thinking of it; every time we think of it anew we have another, though similar, idea of the same thing. In order to avoid this undesirable dependence of that which is thought upon the mind' s actual performance of an operation of thinking, Leibniz wishes to drop, first of all, that sense of the ambiguous word 'idea' which has reference to the act of thinking. Concentrating instead on the immediate object of thought or the objective reality of that which is thought, he further makes a distinction between a notion or concept, which is the thought-content in so far as it is actually conceived of, and an idea, which is a thought-content that may be in the mind before and aft er the actual thought of it. Whereas Arnauld, for instance, considered an idea as, on the one hand, a modification or form of a particular mind, and, on the other hand, a thing in so far as it is actually thought of, Leibniz refuses to use the word 'idea' for either of these aspects and reserves it for something that exists in the mind regardless of whether it is the actual object of thought or not 2 • At the same time, however, he is not prepared to follow Malebranche in identifying the objects of thought with the ideas in the divine mind. He repeatedly stresses that ideas in his sense are our own ideas and that they reside in our minds. Though there is a very close connection between the divine ideas and the ideas in a human mind, they do not coincide. The two types of ideas may be kept separate by calling the ideas in the human mind its internal immediate objects, as opposed to the extenial immediate objects that correspond to them in God' s mind 3 • In the few pages in which Leibniz tries to formulate a positive answer to the question Quid sit idea, he makes it quite clear that the key to a correct understanding of his own interpretation of ideas is to be found in the notion of expression. As we saw in 2.1.1., Descartes had already opposed the view that the images which are depicted in the brain are exact likenesses of the corresponding objects. According to him, they should rat her be compared to such things as copperplates, which represent objects by having a structure that is related in some systematic way to the form of the objects represented. Another example he gives is that of a blind man who explores the diverse proper ties of things by means of his stick; in such a case there is a kind of isomorphism bet ween his awareness of the movements of the stick and the qualities of the things touched, although the expressing thing and the thing expressed do not resembie one another in any ordinary sense of the word. In the same vein, Leibniz holds that to the expres sion of one in another it suffices that there is a certain constant law of relations by which the singulars in one can be referred to corresponding singulars in the other (Sufficit enim ad expressionem unius in aUo, ut constans 2. Leibniz 1875-1890, III, p. 659; IV, pp. 451-453; V, p. 99 , pp. 127-128; ROBINET 1955, pp. 73-74, p. 215 . 3. Leibniz 1875-1890, I, p. 423; lIl, p. 659; IV, pp. 453-454; V, p. 99, p. 279; ROBINET 1955, p. 148, p. 321, p. 490 .

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quaedam sit lex relationum qua singula in uno ad singula respondentia in alio referri possintf. For example, a circle can be expressed or represented by an ellipse because to each point of the circle there corresponds a point of the ellipse, and vice versa, according to a constant law of relation. Other cases of expression are the relationships between an algebraic equation and a geometrical figure, between a map and a geographical region, or between a model of a machine and the machine itself. For our purposes, it is particularly important to note th at there is a threefold connection between an idea in the Leibnizian sen se and the relation of expression. First of all, since every entire effect expresses the whole cause, the human soul as the seat of ideas is an expression of the divine mind. Further, ideas express or represent the things of which they are ideas. But they are also th at which is expressed by speech, as numbers are represented by certain characters. In the Discours de métaphysique, 28, Leibniz states that it is only because of the continual action of God upon us that we have in our soul the ideas of all things. Since every effect expresses its cause, the essence of our soul is an expres sion of the divine essence, thought, and will, and of all the ideas which are comprised in God. For example, when we see the sun or the stars, it is God who has given to us and pre serves in us the ideas of them and who determines us actua11y to think of them whenever our senses are affected in a certain manner. The soul, then, expresses God, and with him all actual and possible beings, as an effect expresses its cause. Nevertheless, Leibniz insists that we think through our own ideas and not through those of GodS. In the divine mind all ideas, together with the eternal truths which exhibit the necessary relations among the ideas, are the object of an uninterrupted act of thinking. Everything that is cogitable in the sense ofbeing thinkable without contradiction is always actua11y conceived ofby God. Ideas in the human mind, however, have a dispositional character. As Leibniz puts it in the preface to the Nouveaux essais, ideas and truths are in us as inclinations, dispositions, habits, or natural capacities, not as actions; they may be compared to the veins in a block of marbIe which mark out the figure of Hercules rather than other figures 6 • As dispositions, ideas are cogitabilia or cognoscibilia not only in the sense of being thinkable without contradiction, so that their reality consists in cogitabilitas, but also in the sen se of being potential objects of actual conceptions 7 • On the one hand, the word cogitabile seems to indicate th at which others sometimes referred to by the Greek term pan noëtón (See 1.4.2.); then it stands for everything, entity and 4. COUTURAT 1903, p. 15. Cf. Leibniz 1875-1890, I, p. 383; 11, p. 112; V, p. 118; VII, pp. 263-264; Leibniz 1948, 11, p. 540. For details see KULSTAD 1977. 5. Leibniz 1875-1890, IV, pp. 453-454. 6. Cf. also ROBINET 1955, p. 148; Leibniz 1875-1890, IV, p. 451; V, p. 77, p. 79, p. 97, p. 279; VII, p. 263. 7. Leibniz 1875-1890, I, pp. 271-272; 11, p. 470; Leibniz 1948, 11, p. 550; COUTURAT 1903, pp. 511-512. Already in the Disputatio metaphysica de principio individu i of 1663 Leibniz insists that the formal concept is founded in the objective concept, rather than reversely (Leibniz 1875-1890, IV, p. 26).

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non-entity, in so far as it can be consistently thought of and is actually thought of by God. On the other hand, it characterizes an idea as something that can become the content of actual thoughts and remains in the mind, as a permanent possibility, even when the mind does not happen to conceive of it. Viewed passively, an idea is an innate pattern of thought which underlies our actual thinkings and makesthem conformable to the specific way in which the corresponding idea in the divine mind is interrelated with other ideas. Since God is the cause of the dispositional idea, the effect, that is, the definitional structure of that which is either thought of or may be thought of, must be isomorphic to the idea that is always present to the divine mind as an element ofits uninterrupted thinking. The active side of the idea as cogitabile is the facultas cogitandi, our capacity to think according to a certain pattern, which is actualized every time we think of one particular thing rather than of other things. How ideas represent the things of which they are ideas becomes clear when we take into account what Leibniz says about the relation of expression in Quid sit idea. Effects which arise from the same cause express each other mutually, as, for instance, gestures and speech; so deaf people understand speakers not by sound, but by the motion of the mouth. Now God is the creator of the things in the world as well as of the human mind; and the world therefore expresses in some way God, its cause. But if the world and the human mind express, as effects, God, they also express each other mutually. In particular, the ideas in the human mind are expressions or representations, in the Leibnizian sense, of the things in the world. That our ideas are ideas of things means nothing but that God has impressed such a power of thinking upon the mind that it can by its own operations derive truths which correspond perfectly to what is subsequently shown by the things themselves. Although the idea of a circle does not resemble a circle, we may yet infer from it truths which experience would undoubtedly confirm concerning a real circleB• In this connection, it should be noted that for Leibniz an idea is first and foremost a definition in its dynamic . aspect, that is to say, as a source of necessary truths. A clear and distinct notion of an object enables us to come to know many truths about it by means of a priori proofs9 • Leibniz defines speaking as signif:ying one's thought by means of articulated sounds, and understanding as reaching a thought from signs. Accordingly, a noun (nomen) is said to be a sign of a notion, that is, of a simple operation of the mind in which no truth or falsity is involved. W ords in general are divided into nouns, which are signs of concepts, ideas, or termini, and particles, which are signs of modes of conceiving or syncategorematic actslO. That Leibniz considered the semantic tie between a noun and an idea as an instance of the relation of expres sion in his specific sen se is shown by the fact that in Quid sit idea he mentions that tie as one of the various kinds of expression (oratio exprimit cogita8. Leibniz 1875-1890, VII, p. 264. Compare I, p. 370. 9. Leibniz 1875-1890, V, p. 77, p. 203. 10. COUTURAT 1903, p. 243, p. 432, p. 497; Leibniz 1875-1890, 11, p. 470.

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tiones et veritates), along with the relation between characters and numbers. There is reason to believe, however, that in rus opinion this relation of expression exists to the full extent only between the artificial signs of an ideallanguage and our concepts. In an ideallanguage the characters representing thoughts are to be formed and arranged in such a way as to have among themselves the same relation th at the thoughts have among themselves. The law of expressions is that the expression of a thing is to be composed of the characters of those things the ideas of which compose the idea of the thing that is to be expressed. If every linguistic expression representing a composite concept is duly composed of expressions that represent the components of the concept, people will be unable to speak or write about anything except what they understand and they will be less liable to overlook a contradiction which a composite concept may involve ll . It may be concluded, then, that for Leibniz ideas in the human mind are first of all expressions of the ideas in the divine mind. Whenever we think of something, that mental act is a manifestation of a permanent capacity to conceive of the object in question according to a pattern that is related to the way God thinks of it. Sometimes Leibniz seems to consider ideas as no more than the ways in which our actual and potential thinking is related to God' s thought (des rapports)12. Since both the world and the human inind have been created on the model of the exemplary ideas in the divine mind, each of them expresses these divine ideas and hence they also express one another. The expressive or representative nature ofideas as schemes for thinking of something finds its explanation in the similarity of structure which both the world and the human mind derive from their common cause. Besides being expressions of the divine ideas and of the things in the world, ideas are also that which is expressed by the nouns of spoken and written language, albeit often imperfectly. A more satisfactory expres sion can be obtained only by the construction of a language that fully exhibits the structure of our ideas and of the combinations into which they may enter. 11.2. Complex cogitables

We have seen that at the level of the first operation of the mind Leibniz divides the categorematic ingredients of a proposition into three kinds. Nominal expressions of a naturalor artificiallanguage are signs of the notions or concepts which make them meaningful, and these notions or concepts are the manifestations of ideas, the permanent possibilities of thinking with which the mind has been endowed by God. As is to be expected, the same trichotomy recurs at the level of the second operation of the mind, where the units of the

11. Leibniz 1875-1890, IV, p. 424; VII, p. 263; BODEMANN 1895, pp . 80-81; COUTURAT 1903, p. 156. 12. ROBINET 1955, p. 148, p. 490; Leibniz 1875-1890, VI, p. 576.

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first operation are combined into propositional complexes by the acts of predication and judgment. 11.2.1. For a spoken or written declarative sentence Leibniz commonly uses the words propositio and enuntiatio. A propositio is a sentence in which one act of affirming or denying is involved (oratio in qua semel afflrmatur vel negatur)D. There are passages, though, which make it clear that the word propositio can also stand for the ment al counterpart of a declarative sentence. In Nouveaux essais, IV, 1,2, for instance, a proposition is contrasted with an idea. The distinction between an incomplex theme and a complex theme is there explained as the difference between a thing or idea and a thesis, proposition, or truth. There are, moreover , themes which are intermediate between an idea and a proposition, namely, questions, in particular yes-or-no questions 14 • A similar indefiniteness is found in Leibniz's use of the word terminus. As a rule, he employs this word for the notions or concepts that are the categorematic extremes of amental proposition, but it mayalso indicate the noun which expresses the subject-concept or the predicate-concept 15 • At this point, it should be mentioned further that in Leibniz's opinion the traditional division of the subject-matter of logic into concepts, propositions, and reasonings is not of such an absolute nature as to exclude mutual reductions. According to him, every incomplex term may be considered as involving something complex, inasmuch as it affirms the possibility of the thing conceived of. Moreover, such an abstract term as 'the rationality of man' is nothing but the truth of the proposition 'Man is rational' . On the other hand, propositions or complexa may be reduced to incomplex terrns. For example, 'Man is rational' can be paraphrased as 'That man is rational is the case' (ta Hominem esse rationalem est), in which the original proposition has become the subject-term. In this connection, it is important to note th at Leibniz also mentions cases in which such a nominalized proposition as Hominem esse rationalem is the cause or ground (causa, ratio) of something; we shall have to co me back to this point in the next section. Here it suffices to point out that along the same lines a consequentia which underlies a reasoning can be regarded as a statement that the consequent is contained in the antecedent, as one term is contained in another term. In general, hypothetical propositions are reducible to categorical propositions of subject-predicate form if the consequent is seen as that which is contained in the antecedent 16 • This assimilation was perhaps facilitated by the fact that in 13. COUTURA T 1903, p. 498. Cf. also COUTURA T 1903, p. 397 (propositio - - - pronun· tiat - - - dicit); Leibniz 1875-1890, VII, pp. 43-44 (propositio - - - exprimit). 14. Leibniz 1875-1890, V, p. 338. For the word 'theme' see 1.4.2. 15. Cf., for instance, COUTURAT 1903, p. 243. In a passage quoted from a manuscript by RISSE 1970, p. 193, n . 768, a terminus is deSned as quicquid per secogitabile est seu quid subiec· tum vel praedicatum a/icuius propositionis esse potest, but at the same time it is contrasted with particles. A terminus is primarily the Snal point of an analysis. 16. Leibniz 1875-1890, 11, pp. 472-473; COUTURAT 1903, p. 377, pp. 381-382, p. 389, pp. 397-398.

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Ramist logic the words antecedens and consequens were the current means of referring to the subject and the predicate of a categorical proposition!7. It is evident that all these endeavours to reshape the ordinary expressions of concepts,judgments, and arguments were aimed at the construction of a purely rational language that would be more adequate to the purposes of logic and philosophy. 11.2.2. Taking a proposition as a sentence in which one act of affirming or denying is involved, that is to say, as a non-modal categorical proposition, we may ask next wh at exactly is the nature of the ment al operation of mere predication which combines two concepts into a propositional complex, and of the act by which this complex is judged to be true. In answering this question, it will be helpful to bear in mind that the word afflrmatio is not seldom doubly ambiguous. It may stand for a speech act, either of merely predicating in an affirmative way or of asserting that something is the case; often, but not always, the act of predicative affirmation will coincide with an act of assertive affirmation. The same distinction is applicable to affirmations in the sense of inner acts of affirming, that is, to mental operations of merely predicating and ofjudging that something is the case. Here I shall be concerned only with the mental operations which make the verbal expressions meaningful, and of these I shall first consider mere predication. N ow, according to Leibniz, an affirmation is an act of thinking of two things in so far as the concept of one thing contains the concept of the other (afflrmatio est cogitatio de duobus quatenus conceptus unius conceptum alterius continet). That which contains, the res continens, is the subject, and that which is contained, the res contenta, is the predicate l8 • In a true affirmative proposition, whether it be necessary or contingent, universalor singular, the predicate-notion is induded somehow in the subject-notion, so that the predicate-term is attributable to everything to which the subject-term is attributed. When I say, for example, 'Everybody who is pious is happy' , what I mean is that anyone who understands the nature of piety will also understand that true happiness is contained in it l9 • Although this containment theory of predication implies that, if there are any individu als of which the proposition is true, the predicate-notion and the subject-notion will coincide in those individuals, Leibniz makes it quite dear that for him predication is first and foremost an act of establishing a special relation between two concepts. He prefers to consider ideas and their combinations in so far as they are independent of the existence of individuals to which they are applicable. Following the methodus per notiones instead of the methodus per individua, he goes so far as to regard such an existential proposition as 'Some man is a laugher' as true even when no laughing man actually exists, on the ground th at in the region of ideas 17. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', p. 168, p. 175, p. 178 . 18. COUTURAT 1903, p. 324. 19. Leibniz 1875-1890, Il, p. 52; VII, p. 43 ; COUTURAT 1903, p. 51, p. 85, p. 262, p. 365, p. 397, p. 407. Cf. also LENDERS 1971 , pp . 42-53 , ABRAHAM 1975.

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there is a consistent notion of man which includes the consistent not ion of laugher. To put it in terms of the distinction between extension and intension which was introduced by Leibniz himself - in Nouveaux essais, IV, 17, 8 - the containment theory of predication is thoroughly intensionapo. As far as the act ofjudging is concerned, Leibniz confines himself to incidental observations. In connection with Locke's use of the term 'judgment' he remarks that others do not restrict this word to opinions that are only probable, but employ it for any kind of pronouncement. Further, he adds some lines about the difference between presuming and conjecturing, especially in the language of the law 21 • Elsewhere, in a table of definitions for an , encyclopedia22 , he defines supposing as assuming, without acceptance, something as a true antecedent in order to infer from it that a consequent is true. Judgment, on the other hand, is there characterized as the faculty of cognizing the truth. It is said to be an answer to complete questions, that is, to questions to which it suffices to answer 'It is so' or 'It is not so' ('est' aut 'non est? At the same time, iudicium is contrasted with inventio; the latter is a way of answering questions which contain a blank that has to be filled by the respondent . In a recently published essay on the analysis of particles Leibniz offers a more detailed list of such adverbs of assertion (adverbia assertionis) as 'yes' and 'no' and their various modifications. The particle an is a means of asking which sign of assertion or pronouncement (assertionis vel enuntiationis) has to be added. Therefore, to every proposition which counts as an answer one of the signs of affirmation and denial must be prefixed, or at least such a sign must be understood . A sign of affirmation leaves everything as it is, while a sign of denial brings about a change. Consequently, a negation preflXed to a negation yields an affirmation. For an affirmation and a negation extend not only over a proposition, but also over a proposition taken together with the prefixed sign (feruntur non tantum supra propositionem, sed et super propositionem una cum signo praefixo su mptam)23 . Presumably, this means that a sign of affirmation or neg ation is either a means of expressing assent or dissent with respect to the apprehensive proposition th at conveys the content of a yes-or-no question, or a means of strengthening or destroying the assertive force of a sign that has been prefixed to the proposition already. At any rate, it may be concluded that in all probability Leibniz considered the act ofjudging as the ment al analogue of the adverbs of assertion, as an inner saying yes or no. 11.2.3. Just as Leibniz at the level of the fiISt operation of the mind gives pride of place to ideas, th at is, to the permanent possibilities of thinking which are manifested by the actual thoughts that accompany the utterance of nouns, so he regards the declarative sentences and the predicative or judicative acts of the 20. 21. 22. 23.

Leibniz 1875-1890, VII, p. 211; COUTURAT 1903, p. 53, p. 82, p. 235, p. 387. Leibniz 1875-1890, V, pp. 438-439. COUTURAT 1903, p. 495. Leibniz 1979, p. 153.

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mind which we have discussed so far as secondary to that which is true or held to be true in a strict sense. First of all, he repudiates the Hobbesian view that truth depends on names or characters and thus, in the last instance, on the arbitrary definitions given to words. The geometry of the Greeks, Latins, and Germans is the same; there is no Hebrew, Greek, or barbarian truth 24 • For the same reason, he rejects the definition of truth which Locke had offered in An Essay concerning Human Understanding, IV, 5, 2. If truth is nothing but the joining or separating of signs, then wh at is synonymously expressed in Latin, German, English, and French will not be the same truth. It does not help to reply that there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of, namely, ideas as weIl as words, and that, therefore, there are both mental and verbal propositions or truths. For once we start to distinguish truths on the basis of the signs used, there will be an endless variety of them: truths on paper, truths on parchment, and truths written with several kinds of ink. In fact, there is a fundamental difference between the truths themselves, which consist in the ways our ideas are mutually related and which are not within our discretion, and on the other hand the means of expressing them, which we may choose as we think fit 2S • At the same time, Leibniz holds that truths in the primary sense are not always actually thought by the human mind. Truth belongs to possible propositions or thoughts (veritatem esse propositionum seu cogitationum, sed possibilium), in the sense that this at least is certain that if anyone should think in this way or in the opposite way, his thought would be true or false 26 • Just as an idea is a cogitabile or cognoscibile simplex, a truth in the strict sense is a cogitabile or cognoscibile complexum. A truth, after all, is nothing but a relation between ideas which consists in the fact that one idea is contained, or is not contained, in another idea 27 • Although the term cogitatio possibilis may be understood in the active sense of a disposition to form actual thoughts of a certain import, it seems to indicate primarily a content of thought which is possible in a twofold respect. First, this content of thought is something that may become the object of an act of thinking and asserting but is nevertheless totally independent of actual thinkings and sayings. It is a pattern of thought that God has impressed on the human mind, so that every truth which that mind conceives has a structure which is conformable to the manner in which that truth is continually present to the divine mind. This means, however, that such a content of thought is also possible in the sense of being free from contradictions. As such, it belongs to the region of ideas, that is, to the lofty world of thinkables whose existence is determined solely by the criterion of consist ency28. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

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Leibniz 1875-1890, IV, p. 158; VII, p. 191, p. 219; ROBINET 1955, p. 154. Leibniz 1875-1890, V, pp. 377-378. Leibniz 1875-1890, VII, p. 190. Cf. also V, p. 73, p. 79, pp. 96-97, p. 127. COUTURAT 1903, p. 512; Leibniz 1875-1890,11, p. 470; V, p. 377. An extreme form of logical realism was developed by Bernhard Bolzano (1781-1848), in his Wissenschaftslehre of 1837. In support of his not ion of Satz an sich, Bolzano invokes especially two passages in Leibniz' s writings, the first half of the Dialogus de connectione inter verba et res (Leibniz 1875-1890, VII, pp. 190-191) and Nouveaux essais, IV, 5, 2 (Leibniz 1875-1890, V, pp. 377-378). Cf. Bolzano 1929-1931, I, p. 85, p. 92, pp. 120-121.

11.3. Criteria of identity for concepts and propositions As was noted above, in Nouveaux essais, IV, 17, 8, Leibniz employs the pair extension/intension with a meaning that is quite similar to the sen se in which the English words 'extension' and 'intension' are used nowadays. The proposition 'Every man is an animal' means that the class of men is included in the class of animais, but also that the idea of animal is contained in the idea of man. The term 'animal' comprises more individuals, more exemplifications, or more exten sion than the term 'man', but the latter comprises more ideas, or formalities, more degrees of reality, more intension 29 • In discussing Leibniz's criteria of identity for concepts and propositions, I shall therefore be able to make use of the words 'extension' and 'intension' in their present sense without becoming guilty of any anachronism. But it should also be realized that most often Leibniz expresses the extension/intension distinction by means of a terminology which is both more traditional and less familiar to modern ears. For that reason it may be helpfui to have a brieflook at some older versions of the distinction and at the technical vocabulary in which they were clothed.

11.3.1. At the outset of the Categories Aristotle draws a distinction between things that are homonymous and things that are synonymous. While in both cases the things have a name in common, the difference consists in the fact that in the case of homonymous things the definition of being which corresponds to the name (ho katà tounoma lógos t~s ous{as) is different, whereas in the case of synonymous things it is the same. When from this distinction between homonymous and synonymous things a distinction between equivocal and unequivocal names was derived, authors who wrote in Latin came to use the pair res/ratio in order to indicate the difference bet ween the thing named and the sen se or conception associated with the word naming the thing. An unambiguous word could then be characterized as a word that denotes many things according to one ratio or way of conceiving them; an ambiguous word, on the other hand, denotes many things according to more than one way of conceiving. It was also said that the various predicates which are attributed to God apply to one and the same thing, but do so according to different rationes. Similarly, in a true affirmative proposition the subject-term and the predicate-term were held to signify different aspects of a thing as far as the form of conceiving is concerned (secundum rationem), but one thing if we look at the outside world (secundum remyo. Already the Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui of 1663 shows that Leibniz was familiar with this current meaning of ratio as opposed to res31 • The res/ratio distinction was also applied to the special case of such connotative terms as albus. Connotative terms were said to have both a material significate and a formal significate. The material significa te is the particular 29. Leibniz 1875-1890, V, p. 469. 30. See 1.2 .2. and 7.2.5. Cf. a150 NUCHELMANS 1980", p. 19, pp. 70-71. 31. Leibniz 1875-1890, IV, pp. 19-20.

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thing to which the property ofbeing white, for instance, is ascribed; as such it is also called subiectum or materia. Besides denoting a particular thing, however, a connotative term also connotes the property ascribed to that thing. This connotatum, variously called ratio formalis (raison formelle), formalitas ([ormalité), consideratio, modus considerandi, modus concipiendi32 , is the aspect of the thing which is taken into account, the conception under which it is thought of. If that which is connoted by a connotative term is regarded in abstraction from the metaphysical matter or subject in which it inheres, it may be expressed by an abstract term, such as albedo ('whiteness'). The abstract term was said to indicate the formalor adequate significate of the connotative term, the immediate or proper concept associated with it. Abstract notions represent the diverse predicates which can inhere in one and the same thing. Compared with the notions of concrete things, they are incomplete, since each of them is only one specific way of conceiving a thing33. Leibniz, however, is very sensitive to the philosophical dan gers involved in the use of abstract words and is therefore reluctant to admit them into the ideallanguage which he is trying to construct. According to him, they are best considered as abbreviations: animalitas, for instance, is short for to aliquid esse animal ('the circumstance that something is an animal')34. In order to bring out that the connotative term is to be taken in abstraction from the subject which it may denote, it is even better to add the particle quatenus. Wisdom is the circumstance that someone is wise precisely in so far as he is wise (Sapientia est to esse sapientem quatenus est sapiens), and justice is the circumstance that someone is just precisely in so far as he is just (Justitia est to esse iustum quatenus est iustus). Adding quatenus guarantees that the notion or ratio which is the formal significate of sapiens or iustus is kept separate from all other ways in which a thing may be conceived35 . In an essay on the analysis of particles, Leibniz explains the meaning of quatenus as follows. The sentence Homo est immortalis quatenus homo est mente praeditus (' Man is immortal in so far as man is possessed of a mind') means that man is immortal on account of the fact that he is possessed of a mind (Homo est immortalis respectu habito ad hoc: homo est mente praeditus). Leibniz adds that he frequently uses this particle in his analyses 36 . As a nota praecisiva (See 6.2.1.) the particle quatenus limits the mind's attention to precisely one way of conceiving a thing and excludes all other conceptions which may be suggested by the same thing; it serves, therefore, the same purpose as an abstract term. 32. For these terms see, for instanee, Leibniz 1875-1890, V, p. 344; VI, p. 584 (raison formelIe); IV, p. 25; V, p. 469; Leibniz 1948, I, p. 139; COUTURAT 1903, pp. 432-433, p. 435 (formalitas,Jormalité); Leibniz 1948, Il, p. 577 (consideratio); COUTURAT 1903, p. 520 (modus considerandi); COUTURAT 1903, p. 367; Leibniz 1960, p. 475 (modus concipiendi). 33. Leibniz 1875-1890, Il, p. 39; IV, p. 120; V, p. 314; COUTURAT 1903, p. 375, p. 437, p. 520. 34. COUTURAT 1903, p. 389. Cf. also Leibniz 1875-1890, Il, p. 472; IV, p. 147; Leibniz 1948, Il, pp. 547-548. 35. Leibniz 1948, Il, pp. 576-577. 36. Leibniz 1979, p. 153.

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Concepts may be considered per se or per accidens. The fi,rst point of view has reference to the formalities (secundum ipsas formalitates), abstracting from the metaphysical matter and subject, and also from time, place, and circumstances. Concepts per se are expressed by such abstract words as humanitas, pulchritudo ('beauty'), and tripedalitas ('tripedality'). On the other hand, concepts are viewed per accidens when a coincidence of several formalities in the same subject is considered, as for example poetic talent and jurisprudence may happen to be in the same subject37 • Elsewhere, in the Defensio trinitatis of 1669, Leibniz draws a distinction between propositions per se and propositions per accidens38 • It is correct to say Omnis homo est rationalis, because there is an immediate connection between being a man and rationality. But it is not correct to say Omnis homo est albus, because there is no immediate connection between being a man and whiteness (quia albedo humanitati immediate non cohaeret). Instead, one should say Omnis qui est homo est albus ('Everything that happens to be a man, is white'). The same paraphrase is put forward for Omnis musicus est albus, and also for singular propositions: Petrus apostolus fuit primus episcopus Romanus ('The apostle Peter was the fi,rst bishop of Rome') becomes Omnis qui est Petrus apostolus fuit primus episcopus Romanus39 • In proposing this notational differentiation between propositions per se and propositions per accidens, Leibniz appeals to the treatment of the copula th at had been suggested a few decades earlier by Johannes Rauen. As a matter of fact, however, the procedure goes back as far as the fourteenth century40. It is intended to bring out the difference bet ween propositions that can be verified by inspecting the ideas as such, without any mediation of a subject in which they may inhere, and propositions that can be verified only by attending to the subjects in which the qualities concerned are asserted to be united, that is, to the plurium formalitatum concursus in eodem subiecto. In verifying the first kind of proposition, attention is confined to the formal significates of the terms involved, whereas testing the second kind of proposition requires that the material significate be taken into account. A similar distinction between cases where the mind's attention is focused on the proper concept associated with a term and cases where the material significa te or subject is in the foreground, occurs also in a rat her different context. The traditional doctrine of supposition contains a distinction between material supposition and formal supposition. The former type of supposition is found in such propositions as Homo est disyllabum and Homo est nomen, where the word homo stands for itself (pro se ipso) and for all tokens belonging to the same type. Formal supposition was often divided into simple supposition (suppositio simplex) and personal supposition. Simple supposition is usually illustrated by the example Homo est species, in which homo stands for the proper 37. 38. 39. 40.

COUTURAT 1903, p. 391, pp. 432-433 . Leibniz 1875-1890, IV, pp. 118-119. Cf. also Leibniz 1875-1890, IV, pp. 50-51; V, p. 468. See, for instanee, Paulus Venetus, Logica magna, 11, 11,8 (De signiflcato propositionis). Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980", pp. 62-64.

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concept associated with that word and not for any thing to which the concept applies. If the word homo is used for the purpose of signifying a thing in the world outside thought and language, as in Homo est a/bus, its supposition was said to be personal. In the course of the fourteenth century there had grown a tendency to take the original material supposition and simple supposition together as material supposition and to contrast this one type with the varieties of formalor personal supposition. This dichotomy was a natural one in that material supposition in the broader sense covers all cases in which a term is mentioned in order to say something about its phonic make-up, its grammatical status, or its conceptual content, whereas formalor pers on al supposition covers all cases in which a term is actually used to refer to something outside thought and language, that is, not pro se, but pro alio. This fundament al distinction, which is a forerunner of the modern distinction between met a-level and objectIevel, is c10sely connected with the distinction bet ween intentio prima and intentio secunda. A proposition in which the subject or thing talked about is a firstord~r concept taken in and by itself will as a mIe have a second-order concept oflogic as its predicate. One might even say that it is the specific meta-character of the predicate that forces the hearer to interpret the subject-term as standing for the associated concept as such, according to material supposition. Furthermore, the distinctions between formal and material supposition and between intentio prima and intentio secunda are c1early a11ied to the distinction between actus exercitus and actus significatus (See 6.1.2.). Now two points are worthy of note. In the first place, the meanings of the words 'material' and 'formal' as they are used in connection with the denotation and connotation of terms are roughly the reverse of the meanings which the same words have in the theory of supposition. That the word homo in the proposition Homo est a/bus has formal or personal supposition means that it stands for an individu al in the world to which the associated concept of man is applicable; but that means that it stands for the material significate when it is considered as a connotative term. On the other hand, that the word homo in the proposition Homo est species has material or simple supposition means that it stands for the proper concept itself, that is to say, for the formal significa te or formalitas in the terminology of connotative terms. Secondly, the distinctions between formal and material supposition and between actus exercitus and actus significatus could also be brought under the opposition directus/reflexus or reflexivus. In the case of formal supposition and an actus exercitus, thought and speech are situated at the lowest level, from which there is a direct reference to items in the external world. But if we reflect upon the units of thought and speech themselves, and if we conceive of them and mention them in abstraction from their direct reference to the world, this reflection necessarily turns an actus exercitus into an actus significatus and makes use of words that have to be taken according to material supposition. So, the word reflexivus could easily acquire a meaning that is c10sely akin to the modern sense of the prefix 'meta-'. 11.3.2. The foregoing considerations enable us to appreciate the reason why 226

Leibniz distinguished two ways in which the identity / diversity opposition may be applied. Two terms may be the same or different with respect to the materia, subiectum, or res, or according to the ratio formalis,formalitas, conceptus immediatus, modus concipiendi, modus considerandi, or consideratio. That is to say, they may be the same or different materialiter and realiter or formaliter and conceptualiter. That in drawing this distinction bet ween an extensional and an intension al type of identity and diversity Leibniz was indebted to the scholastic tradition is made abundantly clear by the Disputatio metaphysica de principio individu i of 1663. Among the examples given elsewhere a favourite is the pair 'triangle/ trilateral '. These two terms are the same realiter, but they differ formaliter, because 'trilateral' as such (qua tale) mentions sides, whereas 'triangle' as such mentions angles. That is to say, the proper concepts or formalities associated with the words are different, both in themselves and with respect to the logical consequences that may be drawn from them. Likewise, albus Socrates and musicus Socrates are one and the same individual, but he sings well in so far as he is musical (qua musicus), not in so far as he is white. A man in so far as he is capable of knowledge is no other thing than a man; nevertheless the proper concept associated with the words homo quatenus est scientiae capax is different from the concept belonging to homo. And although a number which is a multiple of 3 and 5 is the same as a number which is a multiple of 15, yet the terms involved are different 41 . Concepts may be divided into three classes. Complete concepts ofindividuals are the concepts associated with such expressions as 'Alexander the Great', 'Augustus', 'St Peter'. Further, there are general concepts signified by such common nouns as 'pious', 'happy', 'triangle', 'trilateral' . Thirdly, propositions may be considered as a peculiar type of complex concept. With regard to each of these three kinds of concept, Leibniz introduces the notion of coincidence (coincidentia), which applies to those cases in which two concepts, though different and differently expressed, have the same extension (aeque late patere; coextendi). Such coincident concepts are like a straight line viewed in different directions, from A to Band from B to A42. They are termini aequivalentes in so far as they signify the same thing or things 43 . Moreover , they imply each other and are in principle resolvable into last elements which are formally the same, although the way in which these elements are structured may differ for each of the two concepts44 . In addition to these criteria for coincidence, Leibniz also frequently offers the rule that two concepts or two propositions are coincident if they are intersubstitutable in any proposition with preservation of truth-value (salva veritate). According to this rule, the concepts associated respectively with 'Alexander the Great' and 'The king of Macedonia who

41. MATES 1974, p. 108, n. 12; Leibniz 1875-1890, 11, p. 471; V, p. 344; BODEMANN 1895, p. 113; COUTURAT 1903, p. 241. 42. COUTURAT 1903, p. 349, p. 563; Leibniz 1875-1890, VII, p. 196, p. 236. 43. COUTURAT 1903, p. 240. 44. COUTURAT 1903, p. 47, p. 52, p. 56, p. 324, pp. 362-363.

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defeated Darius', with 'triangle' and 'trilateral' , with 'Man is an animal' and '''Man is an animaI" is true' are coincident or extensionally identical, since in all contexts - except those which will be mentioned in a moment - one can be substituted for the other with preservation of truth-value45 • The contexts in which Leibniz declares the principle of the intersubstitutability of coincident concepts to be invalid are so-called reduplicative propositions. In the scholastic tradition 46 , propositions containing the particle in quantum or quatenus were divided into those in which the particle is taken in a specificative sense and those in which it is taken in a reduplicative sense. When the particle is used specificatively, as in Corpus in quantum mobile est subiectum libri Physicorum, it limits that to which it is added to a certain mode of understanding or considering (ad certum modum vel rationem accipiendi vel considerandi). One and the same body can be considered in various ways; by the addition of 'in so far as it is subject to change' these possibilities are reduced to just one. When, on the other hand, the particle is taken in a reduplicative sense, the proposition containing it was held to be exponible, th at is, analysable into a conjunction of propositions. Such reduplicative propositions are of two types: those in which the reduplication is performed in order to introduce a concomitance (gratia concomitantiae) and those in which the reduplication is performed in order to introduce a cause (gratia causae). Such a proposition as 'Socrates in so far as he is capable oflaughing is a man' is of the first type and may be analysed into the following conjunction: 'Socrates is a man and Socrates is capable of laughing and everything that is capable of laughing is a man and if anything is capable oflaughing, it is a man' . The fourth conjunct expresses a consequentia necessaria, based in this case on the fact that the property ofbeing capable oflaughing necessarily goes together with the property ofbeing a man (risibilitas necessario concomitatur hominem). The second type may be illustrated by the example 'An isosceles in so far as it is a triangle has three angles which are equal to two right angles'. The analysis of this proposition consists in forming a conjunction of five propositions, of which the first four are similar to the analysans of the proposition mentioned above. The fifth proposition is of the form 'Because an isosceles is a triangle, therefore it has three angles which are equal to two right angles', or of the equivalent form 'It is on account ofbeing a triangle that an isosceles has three angles which are equal to two right angles' (Triangulus est causa isosceli habendi tres angulos aequales duobus rectis). The cause which is introduced by the reduplicative word may be a formal cause, a material cause, an efficient cause, or a final cause. Accordingly, reduplicative propos itions of this second type were also regarded as causal propositions in a broad sense47 •

45 . COUTURAT 1903, p. 261 , p. 264, pp. 362-363; Leibniz 1875-1890, VII , p. 219, p. 236. Cf. FELDMAN 1970; ISHIGURO 1972, pp. 17-34; CASTANEDA 1974. 46 . See, for instanee, Burleigh 1955, 11, 3, 2, 3, and William of Ockham, Summa logicae, 11, 16. Cf. MUGNAI 1979. 47. Cf., for instanee, Arnauld, Nicole 1683, 11, 9.

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Let us now have a closer look at the passages where Leibniz discusses the exceptions to the principle of the intersubstitutability of coincident concepts with preservation of truth-value. The principle is said to be inapplicable in those cases wh ere it is indicated that a term is considered with a definite restriction. Although, for instance, the notions of trilateral and triangle are extensionally the same, yet if one says 'A triangle in so far as it is a triangle has 180 degrees' , there is no possibility of substituting the notion of trilateral for the notion of triangle in the reduplication; for there is something material in that saying48 • This must mean that the substitution would turn the true proposition 'A triangle has 180 degrees on account of its being triangular' into the false proposition 'A triangle has 180 degrees on account of its being trilateral' . The particle quatenus restricts the mind's attention to precisely that concept which is the immediate or proper concept belonging to the word 'triangle'; it is only this concept of triangularity which serves as a basis for inferring the property of having 180 degrees. The proposition has a quasi-material character in that, just as in' "triangle" is a noun' the word 'triangle' stands for itself, according to material supposition, so the word 'triangle' in the reduplication stands for the concept of triangularity that is its adequate and formal significate. This interpretation is confirmed by another passage, where Leibniz declares that reduplicative propositions are exceptions to the rule of intersubstitutability sin ce in them we indicate th at we are speaking of some term so restrictedly that we do not want another term to be substituted for it. For reduplicative propositions are reflexive and have the same reference to thoughts as material propositions have to words 49 • Elsewhere, he characterizes such propositions as formal propositions, in which one of a group of coincident concepts is taken so formally that it is distinguished from all the others. In reality, such propositions are reflexive and are not so much about a thing as about our way of conceiving it SO • The re strict ion to one definite conception as opposed to all other conceptions by which one and the same thing may be grasped, that is, to one formal significate rat her than to a common material significa te , is equally prominent in a fourth passage. There Leibniz excludes from his rule those cases where not 48. COUTURAT 1903, p. 261: Nisi prohibeatur, quodfit in iis, ubi terminus aliquis certo respectu considerari declaratur. Verbi gratia, lieet trilaterum et triangulum sint idem, tamen si dicas 'triangu/um, quatenus ta/e, ha bet 180 gradus', non potest substitui trilaterum. Est in eo aliquid materia/e. 49 . COUTURAT 1903, p. 403: Excipiendae autem sunt propositiones rejlexivae in quibus nos testamur de termino aliquo ita stricte /oqui ut alium substitui nolimus. Sunt enim rejlexivae et respectu cogitationum se habent ut propositiones materia/es respectu vocum. Cf. Leibniz 1875-1890, V, p. 266. Compare also Hieronymus Pardus, Medu/la dia/ectiees, Parisiis, 1505, fol. 91 R: Terminus appe/lans suam rationem quodammodo accipitur materialiter et quodammodo persona/iter. Nam accipitur persona/iter in hoc quod dat intelligere suum significatum ultimatum et accipitur materia/iter in hoc quod dat intelligere conceptum quo mediante suum significatum significat. For the notion of appe/latio rationis see NUCHELMANS 1980', p. 58 ff. 50. CO UTURAT 1903, pp. 366-367: Nisi in propositionibus quas dicere possis forma/es, ubi unum ex coincidentibus ita formaliter assumitur, ut ab a/iis distinguatur, quae revera sunt rejlexivae et non tam de re /oquuntur quam de nostro concipiendi modo, ubi utique discrimen est.

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the thing itself is under discussion, but rather the mode of conceiving it or the respect in which coincident concepts are different. He gives as an example the notion of St Peter and the notion of the apostle who denied Christ. These notions are extensionally identical, so that the one term may be substituted for the other, unless we are considering precisely the mode of conceiving, a viewpoint that is sometimes called reflexive. Wh en I say, for instance, 'Peter in so far as he was the apostle who denied Christ sinned', I certainly cannot alter this proposition into 'Peter in so far as he was Peter sinned'SI. The reason, of course, is that the truth of the first proposition is based upon the specific connection between the abstract notion of being an apostle who de nies Christ and the abstract notion of sinning, a connection that is entirely independent of the individual to which these conceptions happen to be applicable. The substitution would take away exactly that conception in which the transition to the conception of sinning is grounded. Evidently, Leibniz was fully aware of the difference between extensional and intensional contexts. In an extensional context substitution of one concept or proposition for another is permitted on condition that the external thing or situation conceived of remain the same. Since it is the thing or situation which determines the truth of the whoie, it does not matter in wh at way the thing or the situation is conceived of; therefore, a weak requirement of coincidence or extensional identity is sufficient to justify the substitution. In an intensional context, however, the truth of the whole is dependent upon aspecific manner of conceiving a thing or a situation. It is no longer possible to refer to a thing or a situation under any conception whatever, that is, we cannot freely choose fr om among a disjunction of coincident concepts, because a change in conception may cause a change of truth-value. As one of the most effective instruments for keeping a reference within the limits of just one conception is such a particle as in quantum or quatenus, Leibniz illustrates the not ion of an intensional context by means of reduplicative propositions. The predominance, in such propositions, of the specific mode of conceiving over the thing or the situation conceived of he stresses by calling them quasi-material, reflexive, or format, in the senses which I have tried to explain. He might also have called them per se, as opposed to per accidens. For the truth of the decisive proposition in the analysans of a reduplicative proposition, that is, the one that contains the consequentia necessaria or the cause, depends entirely on the connection between concepts that are considered in abstraction from the subject to which they happen to be applicable. The difference bet ween propositions per se and propositions per accidens mayalso be illustrated by a passage in which Leibniz contrasts

51. Leibniz 1960, p. 475: exceptis tamen i/lis casibus ubi non de re sed de modo concipiendi agitur, quo utique differunt; ita Petrus et Aposto/us qui Christum abnegavit idem sunt et unus terminus in a/terius /ocum substitui potest, nisi cum hunc ipsum concipiendi modum considero, quod quidam voo cant rejlexivum. Exempli causa cum dico 'Petrus quatenus fuit Aposto/us qui Christum abnegavit eatenus peccavit', utique non possum substituere Petrum, seu non possum dicere 'Petrus quatenus fuit Petrus peccavit'.

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a complete concept of an individual substance, which contains everything that can be predicated of it, with the incomplete concepts of abstract qualities inhering in the substance. From the complete concept of Alexander the Great, for instance, it may be inferred that he was strong, a king, commander of an army, victorious in the battle of Arbela; for all these properties are included in the notion of Alexander the Great. But from the property ofbeing strong as such we cannot infer the property ofbeing king, nor from the property ofbeing commander of an army the property ofbeing victorious in the battle of Arbela (Ex robusto non potest inferri rex neque ex duce victorJ2. That is precisely the reason why the reduplicative proposition 'Alexander the Great in so far as he was the commander of an army won the battle of Arbela' is false. In other words, wh at is required for the truth of a proposition per se is a connection between abstract and incomplete concepts that is not mediated by the notion of an individual substance in which both concepts happen to be included. The distinction between extensional and intensional contexts runs parallel to the distinction bet ween two kinds of criteria for the identity or difference of concepts and propositions. One kind of criterion concentrates on the denotative or referential aspect of conceptions and, derivatively, of their linguistic expressions . According to this criterion, different conceptions may be regarded as coincident or extensionally identical provided that the thing conceived of, the material significate, remains the same. Such coincident concepts are intersubstitutable in those propositions whose truth-value does not depend on one specific manner of conceiving some item of the external world. If, however, the truth of the whole is essentially determined by one definite mode of conceiving, it is the formal significate that becomes the decisive criterion for the identity or difference of concepts and propositions. In that case, wh at is required is a guarantee that, however the linguistic expressions may perhaps vary, they all have the same intensional meaning. Though there may be room for a choice among different verbal expressions of the one mode of conceiving, that mode of conceiving itself cannot be replaced by any other mode, since that would automatically be a different conception and so endanger the preservation of truth-value. The crucial role which Leibniz assigns to the mode of conceiving is understandable if we keep in mind that for him an idea is a logical pattern to which our actual thoughts conform. Cogitables are bearers of a certain logical power which consists in the total amount of entailments that they make possible. Each cogitable is an intersection oflogical relations in which it stands to other cogitables. When, therefore, the truth of a proposition is essentially dependent upon the conceptions as such, considered in abstraction from any exemplification, any alteration of these conceptions and of the cogitables underlying them would interfere with the logical form that is the guarantee of the truth of the whole.

52. Leibniz 1960, pp. 475-476. Cf. Leibniz 1875-1890, 11, p. 46; IV, p. 433; COUTURAT 1903, p. 375.

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11.4. Conclusion Though Leibniz, like many of hls contemporaries, tends to use such words as terminus and propositio rat her indifferently for both linguistic expressions and the corresponding thoughts, he is undoubtedly chiefly interested in the sphere of the mental counterparts of words and sentences. In that mental sphere, he views the intermittent and fugitive thoughts of the human mind and the contents which determine their specific import as manifestations of permanent dispositions, for which he reserves the word idea. In explaining wh at he means by an idea, he utilizes the notion of expression, in the special sense th at had been anticipated by Descartes. Since an effect expresses its cause, the ideas in the human mind are isomorphic to the ideas in the mind of its creator, and thereby representative of the order of things in the world. Moreover , the same kind of relation is supposed to hold between the characters of a reformed language and the ideas they are destined to convey. Ideas are thinkables which form the pattem of thought that is common to the operations of the divine and the human mind, is reali~ed in the essential order of things, and finds its adequate expression in a rationallanguage. Incomplex ideas or cogitables are the definitions which determine the roles that concepts can play in a priori truths and reasonings. Complex cogitables or possible propositions are the primary bearers of truth and logical relations. Their core is the tie of predication, which Leibniz sees as an act of presenting the predicate-concept as contained in the subjectconcept. The complex cogitable which is realized in an actual mental proposition but remains entirely independent of the thoughts directed at it, may be compared to the complexe significabile of Gregory of Rimini and kindred medieval thinkers, and also to the Satz an sich which was to be introduced much later by Bemhard Bolzano. As to the identity of incomplex and complex cogitables, Leibniz draws a distinction between extensional and intensional identity and difference. In elucidating this important distinction, he clearly shows his familiarity with traditional scholastic doctrines.

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12. THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT

It cannot be said that the German philosophers who were active in the first half of the eighteenth century made any contributions to the solution of the problems with which we are concerned that could riyal with Leibniz' s highly original approach. But there are two subjects which were extensively discussed during that period and which therefore deserve separate treatment. These two themes are the contrast between ingenium and iudicium and the analysis of a categorical proposition into a hypothesis and a thesis. The first theme is particularly conspicuous in the manuals of logic written by Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) and his followers. This group of philosophers had its centre in the universities of Leipzig and Halle and generally sympathized with the religious movement of pietism. From a pedagogical point of view, they have a certain importance in that they favoured a new type of university, designed to provide a gentlemanly education (weltmännische Bildung, Weltklugheit) for courtiers and administrators. Accordingly, their philosophy is a philosophia aulica, a kind of worldly wisdom for the upper classes, rather than a school philosophy of the traditional sort. The main representatives of this branch of the early German enlightenment are Johann Franz Budde (1667-1729), Andreas Rüdiger (1673-1731), AdolfFriedrich Hoffmann (1703-1741), August Friedrich Müller (1684-1761), and Christian August Crusius (1715-1775). The second point is characteristic of the doctrine of the proposition that is found in the textbooks oflogic published by Christian Wolff (1679-1754) in 1713 and 1728, and in the many works that were to a greater or less extent indebted to the W olffian philosophy. Among the authors whom I have consulted are Joachim Georg Darjes (1714-1791), Johann August Ernesti (1707-1781), Friedrich Christian Baumeister (1709-1785), Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1693-1750), Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768), Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), and Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777)1.

1. For general surveys of the period see WUNDT 1945, TONELLI 1966, BEeK 1969, and RISSE 1970, pp. 553-706.

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12.1. Ingenium and iudicium 12.1.1. Of the six traditional parts of rhetoric - invention, arrangement, style, memorization, delivery, and judgment - Peter Ramus had transferred memorization, invention, arrangement, andjudgment to dialectic. Taking arrangement (dispositio) andjudgment (iudicium) together, he arrived at the basic division of dialectic into invention and judgment, with memory as a third fundamental faculty2. An echo of this trichotomy is found in Leibniz's Nova methodus discendae docendaeque iurisprndentiae, I, 22, where it is said that since propositions can be memorized, formed, and judged, there are three habits proper to men: of memory, of invention, and ofjudgment. Of these habits there is a threefold doctrine, consisting of mnemonics, topics, and analysis 3 • A slightly different trichotomy is mentioned in several of Francis Bacon' s writings. According to Bacon, the parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of man's understanding: history to the memory (memoria), poetry to the imagination (phantasia), and philosophy to man's reason (ratio)4. Now, if we leave memory aside, it is interesting to note that invention and imagination as they are opposed to judgment and reason were often brought under the rubric of ingenium. Already in antiquity, iudicium was contrasted with ingenium 5 • And Rudolphus Goclenius, in his Lexicon philosophicum of 1613, defined one of the meanings of iudicium as a kind of reflective rumination on the things that are offered by the ingenium (eornm quae ingenii sunt); judgment is the activity of the mind whereby we examine the things which have been ingeniously contrived (qua ingeniose inventa perpendimus). Bacon, in turn, held that poetry, which from the beginning has been attributed to the imagination, should be considered as a play of the ingenium, rather than as a form of knowledge (pro lusu potius ingenii quam pro scientia habendal'. In English, the word ingenium was usually translated by 'wit'. In Leviathan, I, 8, Hobbes defines natural wit as consisting principally in two things: celerity of imagining, that is, swift succession of one thought to another, and steady direction to some approved end. In particular, those persons who observe similitudes of things which are but rarely observed by others are said to have a good wit or a good fancy. This intellectual virtue is contrasted with good judgment or discretion, which consists in distinguishing between thing and thing and observing differences and dissimilitudes. A similar distinction between wit and judgment is drawn by Locke in An Essay concerning Human

2. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1973, pp. 189-190; NUCHELMANS 1980', p. 172. 3. G.W . Leibniz, Sämt/iche Schriften und Briefe, VI, 1, Darmstadt, 1930, p. 277. 4. The Advancement of Learning, 11 (The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. J. Spedding, R.L. EUis, D.D. Heath, lIl, London, 1857, p. 329); Descriptio globi intel/ectualis, 1 (The Works, lIl, London, 1857, p. 727); De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum, 11, 1 (The Works, I, London, 1857, pp. 494-495). Cf. SCHEPERS 1959, p. 43 . 5. See, forinstance, Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, VIII, 3, 56 (Ingenium iudicio caret); X, 1, 130 (Vel/es eum suo ingenio dixisse, alieno iudicio). 6. The Advancement of Learning, 11 (The Works, lIl, London, 1857, p. 383, n. 1).

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Understanding, 11, 11, 2. There wit is said to lie in the assemblage of ideas, in putting together with quickness and variety those ideas wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy. Judgment, on the contrary, lies in separating carefully one from another ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being mis led by similitude and by affinity to take one thing for another . Often, however, it would be inapposite to examine the entertainment and pleasantry of wit by the severe rules of truth and good reason. In addition, it is important to take notice of a remarkable movement in the literature of the baroque period which flourished especially in Italy and Spain and is therefore commonly referred to as concettismo or conceptismo. Writers belonging to that movement strove to show their wit (ingegno, ingenio) and subtlety (acutezza, agudeza) by making frequent use of clever and unexpected combinations of thoughts and so exhibiting aspects of things that remain unnoticed by lesser minds. One of the Spanish authors who exploited the distinction ingenium/iudicium in this sense was Baltasar Gracián y Morales (1601-1658). He wrote an Arte de ingenio, which was republished in 1648 with the title Agudeza y arte de ingenio, and he also composed the famous Orácu/o manual. This lat ter work was particularly popular with Christian Thomasius and his followers. We know that Thomasius lectured on it, and in the years 1716-1719 it was translated into German by Rüdiger's pupil August Friedrich Müller 7 • 12.1.2. In order to give an idea of the prominent place which under these diverse influences was assigned to the notion of ingenium by philosophers of the early German enlightenment, I shall concentrate upon Rüdiger's De sensu veri et falsi, which was published in 1709. Like Thomasius, Rüdiger divides the active powers of the mind into memoria, ingenium, and iudicium; these three active powers are contrasted with the senses, which are the passive part of the understanding8 • The senses and memory supply the ingenium with the necessary material, that is to say, with the ideas which the inventive and imaginative part of the mind can use in order to form all kinds of possible combinations. The feature which by all authors is emphasized as most typical of the faculty of ingenium is a readiness to see likenesses among ideas, a quickness in bringing together what at first sight may seem to be disparate9 • According to Rüdiger, the function of the ingenium consists in propounding merely possible affirmative or negative predications, without any commitment to the truth of such hypotheses. When the products of that activity are intended to be subjected to further examination, the faculty of judgment compares the

7. Cf. SERNA 1980; WUNDT 1945, p. 28, p. 36, p. 114. 8. Thomasius 1696, VIII, 3; Rüdiger 1722, I, 2, 27, nota q. Cf. SCHEPERS 1959, pp. 44-47. 9. Thomasius 1696, VIII, 3; Budde 1706, p. 119; Müller 1733, pp. 36-37, p. 98; Crusius 1745, p. 825; Hollmann 1767, p. 107; Darjes 1742, p. 99; Ernesti 1769, p. 139.

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possibilities suggested with the data of perception and approves of them or rejects them according to the rules of probability. It is clear that Rüdiger here has in mind the formation of apprehensive propositions which are destined to become the object of critical judgment. The framing of merely apprehensive propositions is the work of the inventive and imaginative part of the soul, but this source of possible candidates for truth has to be checked by judgment and the canons of reason lest we fall into the foolish errors of alchemists, magicians, astrologers, geomancers, chiromancers, and physiognomists lO • But besides recognizing the important role of the properties of inventiveness and imaginativeness in framing hypotheses which are seriously meant to be tested for truth or probability by the critical faculty ofjudgment, Rüdiger also admits the existence of affirmative or negative predications which, being the product of pure phantasy, are not intended as potential claims to truth. Such poetical propositions as 'A phoenix is a bird' or 'There is a Platonic state' express mere fictions and do not contain any truth at all. To poetical propositions, which are neither true nor false, he joins rhetorical propositions (propositiones oratoriae), which in spite of the fact th at they may be true do not elicit assent by rational methods but rather by influencing the emotions ll . The well-known passage in Aristotle's De interpretatione wh ere statement-making sentences are distinguished from sentences which are neither true nor false and thus belong rather to the study of rhetoric and poetry is apparently utilized here in order to draw a distinction within the class of indicative sentences of subject-predicate form. Rüdiger is not thinking of the difference bet ween assertions and, on the other hand, prayers, commands, questions, or wishes. Rather, he takes into consideration only indicative sentences and divides them into those which express serious and scientific claims to truth and those which serve merely literary purposes or secure assent by rhetorical devices. In all probability, he is following the old doctrine that a well-formed sentence may be considered from three points of view. When it is used for persuasive or dissuasive purposes, it is studied in rhetoric; in so far as it contributes to delectation or fiction, it belongs to the subject-matter of poetics; and inasmuch as it is true or false, it is the logician 's concern 12. 12.1.3. In connection with the distinction between ingenium (Erfindungskraft, Einbildungskraft, Dichtungskraft) and iudicium (Beurteilungskraft, Urteilungskraft, Urteilskraft), it is worth-while to mention some points of terminology. In many writings of this period the expression propositio logica or enuntiatio logica occurs. If we leave aside one passage in which propositio logica is contrasted with propositio rea lis 13 , that expression can be interpreted in a threefold way. In the first

10. Rüdiger 1722, I, 2, 28, nota t; 1,2,35-45. Cf. Müller 1733, pp. 36-37, pp. 97-98. 11. Rüdiger 1722, 11, 1, nota a. Cf. Müller 1733, pp. 373-374; Hollmann 1767, p. 107; Ernesti 1769, p. 139. 12. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', p. 87. 13. Weise 1719, p. 11. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 11-13.

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place, it was used to bring out the difference bet ween sentences that are in the indicative mood and serve the purpose of making a statement and sentences which are in a non-indicative mood and serve some other purpose. In the Doctrina logica of 1681, Christian Weise (1642-1708) still follows traditional custom in expressing this distinction by opposing an enuntiatio or oratio enuntiativa sive logica to an oratio non enuntiativa, which is the proper instrument for uttering wishes, questions, prayers, or commands. But in the German treatise on logic which he published in 1696 we find the phrase in enuntiationibus optativis und interrogativis; the word enuntiatio has taken the place of oratio and stands for a sentence in general, rather than for a declarative sentence 14 • Now there had always been incident al uses of enuntiatio or propositio in the broad sense of oratio l5 • In the period under consideration, however, it became normal usage to contrast a propositio enuntiativa or logica, which is a statement-making sentence as it is studied by logic, with a propositio non enuntiativa or non logica, which is an explicatio voluntatis. Sentences conveying an appetitive attitude were said to have a grammatical nexus that differs from an affirmative or negative predication, but they were nevertheless treated as cryptic or elliptical assertions about a state of mind l6 • Further, within the class of propositiones enuntiativae, it was customary to draw a distinction between a propositio logica or enuntiatio logica and a propositio oratoria or periodus. The former is a declarative sentence in so far as it is studied in logic and accordingly analysed into the three parts - subject, copula, and predicate - which are relevant to the purposes of that discipline . The latter is a declarative sentence in so far as it is taken with all the amplifications and embellishments which are the proper subject-matter of a rhetorical analysis and description. In this narrower sense, then, a propositio logica or logischer Satz is a declarative sentence which is considered and analysed precisely in so far as it expresses the indispensable elements of a judgment l7 • The third nuance of meaning of the phrase propositio logica is connected with Rüdiger's distinction between affirmative or negative predications which are seriously offered as evident or probable truths and predications which are presented only as propositiones poeticae or oratoriae. Since all affrrmative or negative predications are called by the name of propositio or enuntiatio, Rüdiger thinks it bet ter to stress the difference between the two types by giving a special name to those propositions which are most respectable from a scientific point of view; he calls them veritas enuntiativa ('a statement-making truth ')18. His 14. Weise 1719, p. 9, p. 389; Weise 1700, p. 725. 15. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980', pp. 147-148. 16. Budde 1706, p. 109; Crusius 1747, pp. 413-414; Hollmann 1767, pp.160-161; Baumeister 1765, p. 112; Baumgarten 1773, p. 57. 17. Wei se 1719, p. 8; Weise 1700, pp. 43-47; Meier 1762, pp. 484-485; Baumgarten 1773, pp. 56-57. Compare Zeno' s saying, as reported by Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, 11, 17: - - - rhetoricam palmae, dialecticam pugni similem esse dicebat, quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. 18. Rüdiger 1722, 11,1, nota a.

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pupil Müller brings out the same distinction by contrasting logical propositions with non-Iogical propositions. The former type of proposition is an act of combining a noun with averb, performed by the faculty ofjudgment with the intention that the resulting complex shall be a truth; such propositions Müller also calls judiciöse Propositionen. Poetical and rhetorical propositions, on the other hand, are combinations of the faculty of ingenium only; they are not proposed as truths, and are therefore nicht logikalische or ingeniöse Propositionen 19 • The broad sense of the words enuntiatio and propositio is no doubt partly explainable by the tendency to treat non-indicative sentences as crypt ic or elliptical forms of autobiographic statement-making sentences. From a logical point of view, all sentences were considered to be enuntiationes or propositiones, either overt or covert. This broad use was, moreover, reflected in the German term Satz, which in the first half of the eighteenth century gradually became the common translation of the Latin words. The noun Satz was felt to be connected with the verb setzen, in the sense of the Greek verb tithénai or the Latin verbs proponere, enuntiare, statuere. Accordingly, Satz was regarded as the equivalent of thesis and thema; it refers to the second operation of the mind and its product, which in Baumgarten' s terminology are studied in the logica th etica, which is intermediate between the logica noetica and the logica dianoetica 20 • In so far as the verb setzen was used to translate the Latin verbs proponere, enuntiare, and statuere, it indicated an act of putting before the mind, an act of putting forward a thesis for discussion, an act of asserting, or an act of expressing ajudgment. Although Satz, just like propositio and enuntiatio, was sometimes employed both for amental and for a verbal act of affirming or denying 21 , there was a general tendency to restrict it to the expres sion of a judgment (Urteil) in spoken or written language 22 • But besides the use of Satz to indicate the linguistic side of the opposition between an inner act of judging and its verbal expression, the same word was also used to mark the distinction between an act of judging and the product of that act. This distinction is stressed by Hollmann, who states that the word iudicium is ambiguous between the act of affirming or denying one thing of another and the immediate effect of the act, which is a sententia produced by the affirmative or negative combination of ideas 23 • Logicians writing in German sometimes called the content of judgment Satz, as the product of an Urteil or act of setzen, adding as synonyms such words as positio, thesis, propositio, thema 24 • 19. 20. 21. 22.

Müller 1733, p. 98, pp. 373-374. Baumgarten 1773, p. 17, p. 55 . See, for instance, Crusius 1747, p. 187, p. 377, p. 406, p. 413. Wolff 1754, p. 70; Baumeister 1765, pp. 109-111; Meier 1762, p. 685; Reimarus 1766, p. 117; Baumgarten 1773, p. 55; Lambert 1764, I, p. 77; Feder 1794, p. 54; Storchenau 1775, p. 62. 23. Hollmann 1767, p. 159. 24. Metz 1816, pp. 75-76; Mehmel1803, p. 48; Gerlach 1827, p. 35. Cf. also Thanner 1807, p. 118, p. 125, where Satz simultaneously indicates the product of an act of judging and its verbal expression.

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It is worthy of no te th at two of the authors who draw this distinction between the act of judging and that which is judged, namely, Mehmel and Gerlach, eaU the act the subjective judgment and the product or Satz the objective judgment. That the traditional pair 'subjective/objective' was still quite weU understood in the eighteenth century is clear from Baumgarten' s Deutsche Metaphysik of 1766. There, in section 738, it is said that the Christian faith taken objectively (fides sacra obiective sumpta) is the content or that which is believed, whereas the fides sacra subiective sumpta is the act of assenting (Beifall) to the revealed articles of faith. In the same vein, the Kantian philosopher Kiesewetter distinguished between two kinds of inference (Schluss); taken subjectively, it is the act of drawing aconclusion from premisses, while taken objectively, it is the totality of contents of judgment that are related in a definite way2S. On the one hand, then, it is obvious that Mehmel and Gerlach are still using the pair 'subjective/objective' in the traditional sense (See 1.2.). But it is remarkable that Metz and Mehmel elucidate the notion of objective judgment or Satz by pointing out that it applies to the judgment in so far as it is considered in abstraction from the act of the mind (in der Abstraktion von der Handlung des Geistes; mit Abstraktion von dem Geiste, dessen Handlung es ist, betrachtet). That which is judged is regarded as dependent upon an act of judging; it is the passive aspect of the act. But what is emphasized is the possibility of considering that which is judged in itself, apart from the act, and characterizing it in ways which do not fit the act. In this connection, it is interesting to no te that Bernhard Bolzano mentions Leibniz, Mehmel, Metz, and Gerlach as authors who already had a clear idea of a Satz an sich. He disagrees, however, with Gerlach's remark that the subjective act of judging is the condition of the objective content of judgment. Bolzano holds the opposite: we would not have conceived contents ofjudgment if there were not independent contents of judgment (Wir würden nicht gedachte Sätze haben, wenn es nicht Sätze an sich gäbef6. Moreover, he quotes section 50 of Baumgarten' s Acroasis logica (unum quod percipitur est obiectum conceptus et conceptus obiectivus; perceptio ipsa conceptus formalis est) in support of his notion of Vorstellung an sich, adding that the objective side of an idea, as opposed to its subjective side, is nothing but the matter or content of an act of conceiving27 . It is quite evident, I think, that Bolzano wants his own notions of Vorstellung an sich and Satz an sich to be understood in the light of the traditional opposition between the active or subjective and the passive or objective aspect of conceptions. But whereas most earlier adherents of this doctrine made the existence of the objective concept entirely dependent upon the subjective act of conceiving and stressed only the difference between the things th at can, or cannot, be said of the act and the things that can, or cannot, be said of the content, he 25. Kiesewetter 1796, p. 70. 26. Bolzano 1929-1931, I, pp. 84-86 . Compare Leibniz 1875-1890, IV, p. 26 : - - - nam eoneeptus potius forma lis fundatur in obieetivo - - -. 27. Bolzano 1929-1931, I, pp. 226-227.

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follows Leibniz in making the content independent of the act in a very strong sense: there are objective concepts even when they are not actually thought of. The words 'subjective' and 'objective' gradually acquired their present meaning in consequence of the greater emphasis that came to be laid on the difference between the psychologïcal factors involved in a mental act and the independently given object towards which such an act may be directed. 12.2. Hypothesis and thesis 12.2.1. According to Wolff, there are three operations which the mind may perform with regard to a cognoscibile: simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning. A cognoscibile is every thing, whether actually existing or merely possible, of which the mind can form a notion or idea and to which it can turn its attention through the idea formed ofit. We cannot apprehend a thing unless we form a notion or idea of it 28 • Consequently, a judgment is always an act of compounding or separating two ideas, though this affirmative or negative combination of ideas is intended to be a reflection of the way the things represented by the ideas are connected, or not connected, in the extramental world 29 • Since the copula denotes a nexus between the subject and the predicate as they are represented in the mind, and that nexus is thus always something present, the only genuine copula is the verb substantive in the present tense. In such propositions as Lapis fuit calidus ('The stone was warm') or Lapis ent calidus ('The stone will be warm') the copula is hidden in the verbs fuit and ent. It is that hidden copula which signifies the nexus between the subject and the attribute as they are put before the mind at the time of the act of judging; the past or future tense indicates that the state in which the subject is now represented has gone by or is still to come30 • A word or term is a sound that signifies a notion or idea; at the same time, it denotes a thing of which we have an idea or are able to form an idea. We understand a word only when we can associate an idea with it. Ajudgment is expressed by an enuntiatio, propositio, or Satz, that is, by a combination of words (oratio, Rede) that serves the purpose of conveying to the hearer wh at attribute belongs, or does not belong, to a certain thing. Combinations of words which only seem to correspond to a judgment but in fact do not, are empty sentences (enuntiationes inanesfl. If two propositions contain a subject-term, or a 28. Wolff 1740, pp. 127-128, pp. 136-137. Compare Storchenau 1770, pp. 55-57: Triplici modo mens nostra facultatem cognoscendi quam ha bet circa res cogitabiles exercet - - - . Obiectum ideae est res quaecumque per ideam menti repraesentata est. - - - Omnis res de qua cogitari potest, potest no bis per aliquam ideam repraesentari atque adeo obiectum nostrarum idearum est omnis res cogitabilis. Res cogitabilis vel actu existit, ut hic mundus; I,el non existit quidem, attamen potest ex· istere, ut mundus alter; hinc obiectum nostrarum idearum aliud est possibile, aliud existens. See also 1.4.2., 3.2.1., and 11.1. 29. Wolff 1740, pp. 129-130. Cf. LENDERS 1971, pp. 110-111, pp. 158-159. 30. Wolff 1740, pp. 217-218. See also 4.3.1.,6.2.1., and 10.2.2. 31. Wolff 1754, pp. 70-71; Wolff 1740, pp. 128-129, pp. 131-132.

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predicate-term, or both, of such a kind that the extern al form is the same but the corresponding notions are different, the propositions express different judgments and are instances of equivocation. If, on the other hand, two propositions contain subject-terms, or predicate-terms, or both, of such a kind that their external forms are different but the corresponding notion is in each case the same - as with 'differential calculus' and 'method of fluxions' - the two propositions express the same judgment and are synonymous. From a logical point of view, they are one and the same proposition32 • Some authors called declarative sentences which signify the same judgment equipollent (logisch gleichgültigJ3. Others distinguished between formal and material equipollency. Examples of formal equipollency are such grammatical variations as active and passive constructions and sentences of the type 'Marcus is the father of Paulus' /' Paulus is the son of Marcus' . Material equipollency does not originate in linguistic usage, but rather in the fact that the sentences concerned contain words which, though signifying different concepts, denote the same thing, so that they can be substituted for one another without change of truth-valueJ4. W olff admits that if only the external form is taken into account, there is a distinction between categorical and hypothetical propositions. A categorical proposition is a proposition in which the predicate is attributed to the subject in an absolute way or without the addition of any condition, while a proposition is hypothetical if such a condition is explicitly added. But he also holds that there must always be a sufficient reason why the predicate belongs to the subject, or does not belong to it. This sufficient reason is to be sought either in a property that inheres in the subject, either essentially and permanently or contingently, or in something other than the subject. Therefore, if such propositions as 'A stone is heavy', 'A stone warms the bed', 'A stone is warm' are made fully explicit, they contain two parts, namely, the condition (Bedingung, hypothesis) on which the predicate belongs to the subject or does not belong to it, and the actual predication (Aussage). Strictly speaking, then, the abovementioned propositions have a hypothetical form: 'If a stone is a material body, it is heavy', 'If a stone is warm, it warms the bed', 'If a stone has been put into hot water or on a hot stove, it is warm'. When the condition on which the subject has the predicate is explicitly added as a determination of the subject, every categorical proposition becomes universal; and this universal character is best expressed by changing the categorical proposition into a hypothetical one. All categorical propositions are equivalent to hypothetical propositions and can be reduced to them35 •

32. Wolff 1740, pp. 286-289. 33 . Feder 1794, p. 79. Kant denies that immediate inferences which are based on iudicia aequipollentia are genuine inferences. For a judgment remains the same, even with respect to its form, when words that signify one and the same concept are substituted for one another (Logik, ed. Jäsche, J, 3, 47). 34. Bilfinger 1742, p. 132; Reimarus 1766, pp. 156-160; Lambert 1764, J, pp. 90-91. 35. Wolff1754, pp. 71-76; Wolff1740, pp. 224-232.

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12.2.2. The analysis of propositions into the actual predication or assertion

(enuntiatio, thesis, Satz, Nachsatz) and the condition on which the predication holds (conditio, hypothesis, Bedingung, Vorsatz) was considered as a typical feature of the W olffian school. Practically all authors who adhered to that movement adopted it 36 • Moreover , at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a similar view was endorsed by Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), whose influence on later generations oflogicians was considerably strengthened by the fact that Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch (1802-1896) subscribed to kindred ideas in a widely used textbook, the Neue Darstellung der Logik of 1836. According to Herbart, any pair of concepts may give ri se to the question whether or not there exists some connection between them. In order to formulate such a question, which is preliminary to a subsequent judgment, we have to posit (auJstellen) one of the concepts as subject and the other as predicate. Subject is the concept which is posited first, as that to which something else is to be assigned, while the concept that is destined to be assigned to the subject-concept is the predicate. A concept becomes the subject of a question only in so far as it awaits some predicate th at is going to be assigned to it, just as the other concept is the predicate only in so far as it is related to a definite subject. It is because of this relative character of both the subject-concept and the predicate-concept that neither of them is posited in an absolute manner. In particular, framing a question by making one concept subject and the ot her predicate does not involve a claim as to the actual existence of the subject. Herbart refers approvingly to W olff' s thesis that categorical propositions are reducible to hypothetical ones and especially to his view that in universal categorical propositions the attribution of the predicate to the subject is dependent upon the implicit definition of the subject. The proposition 'A is B' does not imply th at A exists, but means only that, if the correct definition of A were known, the attribute B would be found to be contained in it or at least to be compatible with it. Wh at is decisive is the way in which concepts are connected one with another37 • After framing a proper object for judgment, in the form of a question in which one of two concepts acquires the function of subject and the other the function of predicate, one may perform an act ofjudging which consists in an affirmative or negative response to the question, expressed by such particles as 'yes' and 'no'. In Herbart ' s opinion, the nature ofjudgment is primarily de termined by its quality;judging is essentially an act of accepting or rejecting. The quantity of a judgment is of secondary importance since the correctness of the decision depends upon the content of the concepts rat her than on their extension. Likewise, it is wrong to divide judgments, according to modality, into

36. Heineccius 1738, p. 79; Darjes 1742, p. 101; Ernesti 1769, pp. 320-321; Baumeister 1765, p. 114, pp . 123-125; Bilfinger 1742, pp . 123-125, pp . 128-130, p. 207; Meier 1762, pp . 490-491; Reimarus 1766, pp. 120-124, p. 146; Baumgarten 1773, p. 58; Lambert 1764, I, p. 85. Cf. also RISSE 1970, p. 264, n. 1041; p. 267, n. 1058; p. 634, n. 503; p. 640, n.534. 37. Herbart 1808, pp. 11-13; Herbart 1912, pp. 96-99; Drobisch 1836, pp. 23-25 .

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assertoric, problematic, and apodictie ones. Every judgment as such is assertoric; it becomes problematic when we do not decide bet ween a proposition and its contradictory , and it becomes apodictie wh en the contradictory proposition is simultaneously denied. Quantity and modality, therefore, cannot be regarded as adequate criteria for a satisfactory division of judgments. Neither can relation, since the division into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments is based exclusively on differences in linguistic form which are entirely irrelevant to logic as the study of thought. From the point of view of logic, categorie al and hypothetical propositions have an essential feature in common: in both of them two thoughts are tied together. In a categorical proposition the concepts which are posited as subject and predicate are already available as completely formed thoughts; they are tied together by the copula which indicates the inherence of the predicate-concept in the subject-concept. In a hypothetical proposition, on the other hand, the subject-concept and the predicate-concept are not yet readily available; they are formed in the very process of constructing the antecedent and the consequent. The propositional thought which is framed in the antecedent is that which is posited first (das Vorausgesetzte), while the propositional thought which is formed in the consequent is th at which is to be connected to the assumed thought (das Anzuknüpfende). The connection is indicated by a conditional particle which is a sign of dependenee of one thought upon another. In both categorical and hypothetical propositions, however, the essential and common element is the act of tying together two thoughts, whether as subject and predicate, by the copula as the sign of inherence, or as antecedent and consequent, by a conditional particle as the sign of dependence. It is this one form of connection that is finally accepted or rejected by an act of judgment 38 • In standard propositions the subject and the predicate are correlative terms; the two concepts which are combined into a propositional complex fulfil the function of subject and of predicate precisely in so far as each stands in a definite relation to the other. In particular, the concept which has the function of predicate is determined and limited by the specific relation in which it stands to the subject. This means, according to Herbart, that only so much of the predicate-concept is taken into account as actually applies to, or is inherent in, the subject. The content of the subject-concept limits the extent to which the predicate-concept is assigned to it. Consequently, if the content of the subjectconcept decreases, the extent to which the predicate applies to it will increase proportionally. It is on the basis of this observation that Herbart offers an explanation of such propositions with an impersonal verb as 'It rains' and of existential propositions of the type Sunt homines ('There are human beings'). In these cases, the subject has no content at all and is purely formal. As a consequence, the predicate loses its relative character and is no longer limited by the content of the subject-concept; it is posited in an independent and uncondition38. Herbart 1808, pp. 17-19; Herbart 1912, pp. 99-101, pp. 105-108; Drobisch 1836, p. 29, p. 33, p. 52. Cf. 11.2.1.

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ed way. When a proposition consists of the copula and a noun as predicate, as in Sunt homines, it may be considered as the result of gradually diminishing the content of the subject-concept: from 'Europeans are human beings', via 'Human beings are human beings', 'Some mortals are human beings', 'Some beings are human beings', to the complete disappearance of the subject . Since at the final stage there is no longer a subject to which the copula can assign the predicate in a conditional way, the copula changes its meaning and comes to indicate existence39 • While traditional doctrines of existential propositions commonly regarded homines as the subject-term and analysed sunt into the copula and the not ion of existence, Herbart considers homines as the predicate-term: Sunt homines is used to assert, quite in general, that the predicate homines is exemplified, without making any mention of a subject that would condition and limit the application.

12.3. Conc/usion One of the remarkable features which we found in the treatises on logic written by German thinkers of the early enlightenment is the prominence given to the contrast between ingenium and iudicium. These philosophers show a keen appreciation of the important role played by inventiveness, phantasy, and wit in the discovery of possible combinations of ideas and in the formation of apprehensive propositions which are subsequently subjected to critical examination by the faculty of judgment. In the process of acquiring scientific knowiedge, heuristic talents are deemed to be no less indispensabie than methods of verification. Besides indicating cleverness at con tri ving hypotheses, however, ingenium also stands for that faculty which is the source ofliterary fiction and rhetorical use of language. Declarative sentences - and all sentences, if made fully explicit, are declarative sentences - are either serious claims to truth or mere products of the imagination and ingenious means of persuasion. As claims to truth they are propositiones logicae, whereas sentences which serve only literary and rhetorical purposes are propositiones poeticae and oratoriae. In this period the word Satz becomes the equivalent of the Latin terms enuntiatio and propositio. It is commonly used to indicate the spoken or written sentence which expresses ajudgment. At the same time, there is also a tendency to employ the word Satz for that which is judged to be the case, as opposed to the act ofjudging. Ajudgment or Urteil has two aspects: the subjective act ofjudging and the objective content of the act. The latter is called Satz, in the sense of das Gesetzte. Further, attention was drawn to the analysis of categorical propositions into a hypothesis and a thesis which is characteristic of the W olffian school. Although the correspondence between categorical and hypothetical propositions had been pointed out by other philosophers, Wolff and his followers established it on the more fundamental ground that an affirmative or negative proposition should contain a sufficient reason why the predicate is asserted or denied of the 39. Herbart 1912, pp . 109-112; Drobisch 1836, pp. 48-51.

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subject and that therefore the predication is always dependent upon certain conditions. A similar view was defended by Herbart and Drobisch in the course of the nineteenth century. They laid great stress on the way in which two concepts that are made subject and predicate of a proposition come to depend on each other, and in particular on the way in which the assignment of the predicate is conditioned and limited by the content of the subject-concept. If that content is reduced to zero, as in 'It rains' and Sunt homines, the predicateconcept was held to apply in an independent and indefinite manner.

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13. SOME PROBLEMS IN KANT AND HlS CONTEMPORARIES

As the title indicates, the task I have set myself in this fin al chapter is a rather modest one. There is no lack of literature on German idealism in general and on the theories of judgment that go with it in particular 1 • I shall therefore con fine myself to making a few remarks about points of detail on which Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and some of his contemporaries disagreed.

13.1. Judgment in general Before going into detail, it may be worth-while to have a brieflook at Kant' s conception of the general form of judgment. For th at purpose, it is necessary to bear in mind his distinction between the viewpoint of formallogic and the viewpoint of transcendental logic. Formal logic abstracts from all objects of knowledge and their differences; it attempts to establish principles to which discursive thinking about any objects must conform if it is to be valid. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, seeks to ascertain what holds of anything that would be a possible object of knowiedge; it tries to separate out from our knowledge of an object that part which originates with the understanding alone2 • Now when Kant defines a judgment (Urteil) from the point of view of formallogic, his definitions hardly show any divergence from the characterizations that were current in the middle of the eighteenth century. In Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren of 1762, he states that to judge is to co mp are something as an attribute with a thing. The thing itself is the subject, the attribute is the predicate, and the comparison is expressed by the copula, which may be either affirmative or negative. Judgment is the awareness of the agreement or disagreement of the content of one conception with the content of another conception. Practically the same Lockean definition had been offered a few years before by such writers as Meier, an abstract of whose textbook Kant used in his lectures, and Reimarus 3 • That Kant 1. See, for instanee, LENK 1968.

2. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B IX, B 77, 79-80, 85, 87. Cf. STUHLMANN-LAEISZ 1976, pp. 19-53; PINDER 1979.

3. DiefalscheSpitzfindigkeit, 1 and6; Meier 1762, p. 482; Reimarus 1766, pp. 116-117.

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adhered rather closely to traditionallogical definitions of judgment is further confirmed by several notes in hls Nachlass. In item 3920, he says th at when something x th at is apprehended by a representation A, is compared with another concept B, which it either includes or excludes, then this relation (Verhältnis) is a judgment. Judgment is the perception of an agreement or disagreement. In item 3042, a judgment is defined as the perception of the oneness of given concepts, namely, that B, together with several ot her things x, y, z, faIls under the same concept A, or that the manifold which faIls under B also faIls under A, or that the concepts A and B can be represented by one concept B. According to item 3053, ajudgment is the awareness th at one concept is subordinate to another concept; and according to item 3128, a judgment asserts that to everything to which the concept of the subject belongs the predicate also belongs 4• Kant does not make a sharp terminological distinction bet ween the act of judging and the product or content of such an act. The word Urteil is often employed by him in the verbal sense of urteilen; then it indicates the act of combining, connecting, or uniting two concepts (Verbindung, Verknüpfung, Vereinigung), or the act of awareness by which the relation between the two concepts is perceived (Erkenntnis, Vorstellung, Bewusstsein). But he also uses the word Urteil for the relation (Verhältnis) between concepts which is that which is judged, in the sense of the product, content, or immediate object of the act of judging5 • Further, it is clear th at several of Kant' s definitions of judgment have the very defect that he himself, in the Kritik der reinen Vemunft, B 141, points out with regard to traditional definitions, namely, that they are applicable only to categoricaljudgments. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that for him a judgment may be a connection not only between nonpropositional concepts but also between propositional concepts or judgments. In the lectures on logic edited by Jäsche, for instance, he defines a judgment as the representation of the unity of consciousness of different representations, or the representation of the relation between those different representations in so far as they constitute one concept. The given bits of knowledge (Erkenntnisse) which are brought to the unity of consciousness are the matter of the judgment, whereas its form is the determination of the manner in which the different representations as such belong to one consciousness. That the word Erkenntnis covers here both concepts and judgments is manifest from the fact that Kant goes on to divide the differences among judgments with respect to their form into those of quantity, quality, relation, and modality; according to relation, there are categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments. When the word Erkenntnis is taken in this broad sense, it is obvious that such a definition of 4. Kant 1910 ff., XVII, pp. 344-345; XVI, p. 629, p. 633, p. 671. For a survey of similar definitions see Tieftrunk 1825, pp. 107-116. 5. Compare, for instance, Prolegomena, 22 (Die Vereinigung der Vorstellungen in einem Bewusst· sein ist das Urteil) with Kant 1910 ff., XVI, 3044, p. 629 (das Verhältnis der Unterordnung der Begriffe untereinander).

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judgment as is given in the so-called Wiener Logik - if one conceives two representations as they are joined together as bits of knowledge (Erkenntnisse) and together form one bit ofknowledge (Erkenntnis), then it is a judgment - applies to hypothetical and disjunctive judgments as well as to categorical ones6 • The difference bet ween the viewpoint of formallogic and the viewpoint of transcendentallogic becomes particularly clear when we compare Prolegomena, 18-20 (andLogik, ed. Jäsche, I, 2, 40) with the passage B 141-142 in the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In the Prolegomena Kant divides empirical judgments into judgments of perception (Wahrnehmungsurteile) and judgments of experience (Erjahrungsurteile). A judgment of perception, such as 'In touching the stone I have a sensation of warmth' , claims no more than that two perceptions happen to occur in one and the same subject; it is only subjectively valid. Such ajudgment of experience as 'The stone is warm', however, includes a reference to an object; it claims general and objective validity for every time and for everyone. For us, the main point is that Kant here regards both types as genuine judgments, which they no doubt are if they are considered from the viewpoint of formallogic. In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 141-142, on the other hand, he restricts the term Urteil to relations which are objectively valid. Such a sentence as 'IfI am carrying a body, I feel the pressure of something heavy' expresses a mere association of two representations in the same subject; a real judgment is expressed only by the sentence 'The body is heavy'. In this passage, then, and in many others7 , Kant ties the notion of judgment to the notion of objective validity and so to the employment of the categorical concepts of the understanding. When the class of judgments is delimited by criteria that are typical of transcendentallogic, it has a different membership from the one that is determined by criteria of purely formallogic. We shall meet with a similar difference in connection with the division of judgments according to quality.

13.2. Problems concerning relation and quality 13.2.1. While, as we saw in 12.2., the Wolffians and Herbart tended to disregard thc difference between categorical propositions and, on the other hand, hypothetical and disjunctive propositions, Kant denied the possibility of reducing these types ofjudgment to each other, assigning them as three distinct forms of thinking to the dimension of relationB• According to him, they differ not only with respect to matter - concepts in the case of categorical judgments, and categoricaljudgments in the case ofhypothetical and disjunctive judgments - but also with regard to the manner in which these material components are 6. Logik, ed. Jäsche, I, 2, 17-20; Kant 1910 ff., XXIV, p. 928 . Cf. STUHLMANN-LAEISZ 1976, p. 19, n . 1, pp. 55-58.

7. Kritik der reinen Vernunji, B 92-94; Metaphysische AnJangsgründe der Naturwissenschaji, Vorrede, n. 2; Kant 1910 ff., XVI, 3045, p. 630; XVIII, 5923, pp. 386-387. 8. Kritik der reinen Vernunji, B 98-99; Logik, ed. Jäsche, I, 2, 23-29.

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combined. In a categoricaljudgment, the form of thinking determines a relation of agreement or disagreement between a subject-concept and a predicateconcept, and is expressed by the copula9 • The form of a hypotheticaljudgment consists in an act of subordinating a categorical judgment as a consequence to another categoricaljudgment on which it depends. And the form of a disjunctive judgment lies in the disjunction itself, that is, in an act of determining the relationship among the compounded judgments in such a way that they exclude each other and together exhaust the whole domain of the concept that is being divided. That the acts of thinking involved in categorical and hypotheticaljudgments are different was emphasized also by Johann Kiesewetter (1766-1819) and Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770-1842). Krug, who had succeeded Kant at Königsberg, admits that the two judgments 'IfGod isjust, then evil-doers will be punished' and 'A just God will punish evil-doers' share the same matter. But in the former judgment the punishing of evil-doers is presented as a consequence of God' s beingjust, whereas in the latter judgment it is presented as an attribute of ajust God. Since a consequence is to be considered as dependent on something, but an attribute as inherent in something, the points of view from which eachjudgment is made are altogether different. The hypotheticaljudgment that B is a consequence of A differs no less from the categoricaljudgment that B is in A than a particular judgment differs from a universal one 10 • About a decade before Krug composed his treatise on logic the different nature of categorical and hypothetical judgments had been denied by Salomon Maimon (1754-1800), one of Kant's opponents. According to Maimon, the only difference between the two types of judgment lies in the fact that the matter of a categorical judgment consists of concepts and intuitions, while the matter of hypothetical judgments consists of judgments. Their form, however, is the same, namely, in both cases a relation of determinabie and determination or of determinability in general (Verhältnis der Bestimmbarkeit überhaupt). Taking this very broad view of the form of judgments, Maimon sees no reason to distinguish between categorical and hypotheticaljudgments: saying 'If A is B, then it is also C' is tantamount to saying 'A which is B, is C'll. 13.2.2. With regard to categoricaljudgments, there is one passage in Kant's writings where he tries to answer the old question as to what is the difference 9. The word copula could also be understood in a broader sense, as standing for any tying together of representations by which an object of thought is determined in consciousness, that is to say, for the relation of consequence and disjunction as weIl as for the relation of agreement or disagreement between subject and predicate. See, for instance, Bardili 1800, pp. 7-10, and Krug 1806, p. 195, pp. 213-214, p. 217. On theother hand, Umbreit 1833, pp. 50-51, reckons the copula, together with the subject-concept and the predicateconcept, among the material components of a categorical judgment, whose form then consists in an act of affirmation or negation. 10. Kiesewetter 1796, p. 52; Krug 1806, pp. 214-215. 11. Maimon 1794, p. XXII, pp. 57-59. Cf. also Twesten 1825, p. 53.

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between such a compound concept as 'The black man' or 'The man who is black' and the judgment 'The man is black'12. Kant points out that in the former case a concept is thought as determined (bestimmt), whereas in the latter case the action of determining the concept is thought. It is therefore correct to say that in the concept which is put together the unity of consciousness is given as subjective, while in the putting together of the concepts the unity of consciousness is formed objectively. In the compound concept the man is merely conceived of or represented as black, without any claim to truth; the judgment, however, demands recognition of the fact th at the man is black. In this connection, it is also interesting to note that Kant considers the proposition ' The black man (who is black at a certain time) is white (at another time)' as contradictory . On the other hand, the propositions 'The man is black' and 'The man is not black' , wherein the same man is referred to at different times, may both be true, because in both judgments only the action of determining is indicated 13 • As is well-known, Kant divides categorical judgments according to their quality into affirmative, negative, and infinite or limitative judgments. He admits, however, that this division is valid only from the viewpoint of transcendental logic. In formal logic, where the content of the concepts is disregarded and therefore the affirmative or negative character of the predicateconcept is left out of account, infinite judgments are reckoned among affirmative judgments, so that under the rubric of quality there are then only two types ofjudgment, those with an affirmative copula and those with a negative copula14 • Most contemporary logicians seem to have agreed with the view that in so far as the mere form ofjudgments is concerned there is no room for a separate category of infinite judgments l5 • Some doubt was expressed, though, by Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843). He does not see why the logical form of the concept that serves as predicate should not be considered as belonging to the form of the judgment. If lam familiar with a concept A, I am in general also acquainted with its contradictory non-A, so th at A and non-A differ only on account of their logical form l6 • Those philosophers who favoured a division into affirmative and negative judgments usually followed the tradition l7 , and Kant, in regarding the affirmative or negative form of the copula as the criterion on which the dichotomy is to be based. From this point of view, infinite judgments were regarded as a species of affirmative judgments. At the same time, it was recognized th at this

12. Letter to Beek, July 3,1792 (Kant 1910 ff., XI, pp. 333-334). Cf., for instance, Darjes 1742, pp. 98-99; Crusius 1747, p. 377. See also 12.2.2. 13. Compare NUCHELMANS 1980', p. 57. 14. Kritik der reinen Vernunjt, B 97; Logik, ed. Jäsche, I, 2, 22. 15 . See, for instance, Kiesewetter 1796, p. 48; Metz 1816, p. 63; Schulze 1831 , p. 69; Krug 1806, p. 203; Drobisch 1836, p. 34. 16. Fries 1837, p. 100. 17. Cf. Wolff 1740, p. 221: - - - canon scholasticorum: In propositione negativa negatio afficere debet copulam.

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particular class of affinnative judgments is equivalent to negative judgments l8 • There were other philosophers, however, who had difficulties with the notion of a negative copula (See also 8.6.3.). Christoph Gottfried Bardili (1761-1808) even went so far as to contend that thinking as such does not admit of any difference in quality. In particular, negating the copula in a categoricaljudgment would be tantamount to a contradiction in th at an act of thinking would be presented as an act of not thinking l9 • In the same vein, August Heinrich Ritter (1791-1869) maintained that since a negative judgment includes the nonconnection of subject and predicate and non-connection can hardly be the purpose of thought, such a judgment can be considered only as an intermediate stage in the format ion of a genuine judgment, which is always positive20 • For philosophers who shared these misgivings about a negative copula the only possibility to pres erve the distinction between affirmative and negative judgments was the Hobbesian manoeuvre of considering all negative judgments as judgments with an affirmative copula and a negated predicate. This solution was adopted by Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833), who rejects the notion of a negated copula, on the ground that a non-connecting or separating copula would destroy the act of judging, and explains a negative judgment as an act of subsuming a representation under a negative concept 21 • Likewise, Krug regards a negative copula, that is, a copula that does not conneet, as a contradiction; ajudgment with a negative copula would be ajudgment without any synthesis of representations and therefore no judgment at all. He disagrees, however, with Bardili' s claim that thinking as such does not admit of any difference in quality; for then to think th at A is B would be the same as to think that A is not B. In Krug's opinion , there is a separate category of negative judgments, but the negative element should be sought in the predicate rather than in the copula22 • This view was attacked by August Twesten (1789-1876), who points out that the commonly used formulation of the principle of excluded middle refutes it. If it is asked whether A is B, the act ofjudging, which is expressed by the copula, may take the form of answering 'yes' , meaning that it is, but also the form of answering 'no', meaning that it is not . If it were true that the negation belongs to the predicate, then the question should be 'Is A B? Is A not-B?', and the answer could only be 'yes' to one of the two parts. Moreover, according to Twesten, there is a difference of meaning between 'A is not B' and 'A is not-B'; the latter asserts that wherever A is found, not-Bis found, while the former asserts that where A is found, B need not be present. Twesten believes that the Il).istaken view is due to the fact that its adherents attach too much weight to the etymological meaning of the word

18. Meier 1762, pp. 487-488; Feder 1794, p. 55; Maimon 1794, p. XXII ; Thanner 1807, p. 123; Drobisch 1836, p. 34. 19. Bardili 1800, pp . 6-7. 20. Ritter 1824, p. 109. Cf. Metz 1816, p. 63. 21. Schul ze 1831 , p. 67 . 22 . Krug 1806, pp . 205-208, p. 237. Cf. Reimarus 1766, pp. 117-118; Feder 1794, p. 55.

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copula. The form of judgment does not consist in an act of literally tying together, but rather in an act ofbringing into relation or determining a relation in genera}23. 13.3. Problems concerning modality Modality, according to Kant, is a feature ofjudgments which has nothing to do with their content or matter, but concerns only the force of the copula in relation to thought in general; it indicates the manner in which something is asserted or denied injudgment . From this point of view, ajudgment may be problematic, assertoric, or apodictic24 • For our purposes, it is especially the difference between problematic and assertoric judgments that deserves attention. Kant offers several, by no means equivalent, criteria according to which these two types of judgment can be distinguished. First of all, he says that in a problematic judgment no decision is taken as to the truth or falsity of that which is judged. Or, as Fries puts it, every judgment is first conceived of in thought, as a question that is to be answered by one of the two forms of assertion: by 'yes' if the judgment formed is declared to be true, by 'no' if it is declared to be false. Fries is careful to distinguish between qualitative affirmation and negation (qualitative Bejahung und Verneinung) and the affirmation and negation of modality (modalische Bejahung und Verneinung). The former is the affirmative or negative predication that constitutes a potential object of an act of judging, whereas the lat ter is that act of judging itself~5. Elsewhere, Kant elucidates the difference between a problematic and an assertoric judgment by pointing out that in the former case I think something of an object or add a predicate to the subject only in my thought, while in the latter case I add a predicate to an object that is outside of me and is not conceived of only in my thought 26 • In the same vein, Fries, after distinguishing between the act of representing performed by a subject and the objective content of the act, states that the content of a representation, the thing represented, may be viewed either as something that is merely conceived in an inner act of thinking or as something that is claimed, in an act of asserting, to have actual existence. In other words, every act of representing has an objective content; in the case of problematic representations, this content is left in the state of being merely thought of, whereas in the case of assertoric representations it is related to the world of actually existing things 27 • AIso, Kant brings the notion of problematic judgment in relation with the notion of possibility. Given his insistenëe that modality has nothing to do with

23. Twesten 1825, p. 42; Thanner 1807, p. 123. 24. Kritik der reinen VernunJt, B 99-101 ; Logik, ed. Jäsche, I, 2, 30. Cf. WILSON 1978. 25. Logik, ed. Jäsche, I, 2, 30; Fries 1837, pp. 118-119. Cf. Jakob 1794, p. 78. Compare3.1.5. 26. Metaphysik L2' Einleitung, Prolegomena und Ontologie nach Pölitz, Kant 1910 ff., XXVIII , p. 554. Cf. WILS ON 1978, p. 264, n. 14. 27. Fries 1837, pp. 25-27.

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the matter or content of judgment, it may be assumed th at he did not have in mind those cases where an act of judging assertively has reference to the possibility of a state of affairs, but that he was thinking of cases where the act of judging problematically is accompanied by the awareness of mere possibility28. This awareness of mere possibility, however, is susceptible of various interpretations. If it pertains only to the circumstance that in a problematic judgment the choice between an affirmative and a negative decision is left open, this criterion practically coincides with the two mentioned above. But that Kant sometimes meant more than this is clear from a letter to Reinhold where he says that judgments in so far as they are problematic are possible in the sense that they are in agreement with the principle of noncontradiction29 . Presumably, this statement has to be related to the widely accepted doctrine that nothing that can be thought involves a contradiction. This conception of the possibility of problematic judgments as freedom from contradiction was adopted by other authors JO , leading some of them to deny that negative judgments can be problematic. For in a negative judgment the predicate contradicts (widerspricht) the concept of the subject or the subject itself31 . On the other hand, Kant' s statement in the letter to Reinhold hardly squares with a footnote in Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden 5011, where he declares that the judgment 'Some bodies are simpie' , in spite of its contradictoriness, can nonetheless be formed in order to see what would follow from it if it were to be asserted32 . In that passage, then, the format ion of a contradictory proposition is admitted among problematic judgments; moreover , a problematic judgment is considered as involving the propositional attitude of supposing or assuming that its content is true. At other places, Kant goes even further and identifies an act of judging problematically with opining (meinen), as opposed to believing and knowing33. On that view, a problematic judgment is one of the epistemic varieties, a species of the generic act of holding something to be true (Fürwahrhalten) that consists in a provisional judgment which is accompanied by the awareness that the contradictory of that which is judged is also possible. It must be concluded, then, that a problematic judgment was characterized in at least four different ways: as the formation of a potential object ofjudging assertively, in the sen se of the traditional apprehensive proposi28. For this distinction see Crusius 1747, p. 429, p. 454; Fries 1819, p. 122; Twesten 1825, p.45. 29. Letter to Reinhold, May 19, 1789 (Kant 1910 ff., XI, p. 45). 30. Metz 1816, p. 76: indem auch durch den problematischen Satz etwas gesetzt wird, die Widerspruchslosigkeit nämlich zwischen den gegebenen Vorstellungen. Cf. also Gerlach 1827, pp.46-47. 31. Kiesewetter 1796, p. 56; Maimon 1794, p. 62. 32. Ueber eine Entdeckung, I, A, footnote (Kant 1910 ff., VIII, p. 194). 33 . Kritik derreinen VernunJt, B 850-851; Logik, ed. Jäsche, Einleitung, IX. Cf. Crusius 1747, p. 429 (zweifelnde Bejahung); Bardili 1800, p. 118; Schulze 1831, p. 71; Ritter 1824, pp. 111-112.

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tion, as an act of positing the non-contradictoriness of a proposition, as an act of merely assuming something for the sake of argument, and as an act of reaching an uncertain opinion. In addition, the word Urteil was used both for the act of judging and for its content. Kant leaves no doubt that he considers the antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical judgment and the disjuncts of a disjunctive judgment to be problematic, as opposed to assertoric. If a hypothetical or disjunctive judgment has assertive force, this force pertains to the relation of consequence or disjunction in which the parts stand to one another, but not to the parts themselves. In such reasonings as the modus ponendo ponens, for instance, the antecedent and consequent of the major premiss are only problematic; what is asserted is the relation of consequence between the two. In the minor premiss, however, the content of the antecedent becomes the object of an act of asserting; similarly, the content of the consequent is asserted in the conclusion34 • This view, which goes back at least as far as the fourteenth century35, was also adopted by many of Kant's contemporaries36 • Some of them denied that hypothetical and disjunctive judgments admit of a difference in quality. Just as in the case of categorical judgments a negative copula was held to be the expres sion of an act of thinking which destroys itself, so the negation of an act of establishing a relation of consequence or disjunction between judgments was believed to preclude the formation of a truly hypothetical or disjunctive judgment37 •

13.4. Urteil and Satz As I frequently had occasion to point out in the foregoing chapters, there was a general tendency in the seventeenth and eighteenth century to employ such words as iudicium, jugement, Urteil for the mental act of judging and the thought-content associated with it, and, on the other hand, such words as enuntiatio, propositio, Satz for the spoken or written declarative sentence by which a judgment is expressed. In Ueber eine Entdeckung Kant rejects this current use of the words Urteil and Satz, on the ground that it obscures the distinction between problematic and assertoric judgments. In his opinion. we cannot judge without making use, in our thoughts. of words, but not every judgment so expressed is a Satz in the sense he wishes to attach to that word. For him. a Satz is something that is asserted; a problematic judgment. then. cannot be a Satz, since, although it is clothed in words. it is not asserted. The ph ra se pro-

34 . Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 98-101 ; Logik, ed. Jäsche, 1,2,25-29; I, 3, 75-77; Ueber fine Entdeckung, I, A, footnote (Kant 1910 ff., VIII, p. 194) . 35. Cf. NUCHELMANS 1980' , pp. 82-85. See a1so 6.3 .3. 36. Kiesewetter 1796, p. 55; Krug 1806, pp. 214-217, p. 230; Fries 1837, p. 102, p. 104, p. 108; Gerlach 1827, p. 44; Twesten 1825, pp. 49-50, p. 53, p. 56. See, however, Maimon 1794, p. 64, where it is contended that a hypothetica1 judgment is a1ways apodictic, even when , for instance, its antecedent is assertoric and its consequent prob1ematic. 37. Bardili 1800, pp. 7-10; Krug 1806, pp. 219-221.

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blematischer Satz is a contradictio in adiecto 38 • It is dear that Kant is using the word Urteil in so broad asense th at it covers both problematic and assertoric judgments; and that he wants to use the word Satz in so narrow a sen se th at it is applicable only to asserted contents of thought. In his view, the common distinction between Urteil and Satz is superfluous because it is impossible to judge without words 39 • Although Kant's proposal for using the words Urteil and Satz in this special sense - to which he himself does not always conform - was endorsed by some of his followers 40 , it was far from being generally accepted. Krug, for example, contends that the restricted meaning of the word Satz is an arbitrary deviation from common usage. He rejects the argument that it is impossible to judge without words; thoughts occur before the appropriate expressions have been learnt or found. Moreover , even in those cases where thoughts are expressed in words, there are so many differences between the forms of judgment and the forms of the sentences in which our thoughts are embodied that a distinction betweenjudgment and sentence is fully justified. Krug also points out that the identification of a Satz with an assertoric judgment has the unfortunate con sequence that then the word Urteil tends to be restricted to problematic judgments. A judgment is not called a Satz because it always serves to assert something (ponere, setzen); for by a judgment we may just as weIl deny som et hing (tollere, aufheben). Rather , a judgment is so called because by means of a Satz our thought acquires a firm and stable outward form (weil dadurch das gedachte Urteil äusserlich fixiert oder konstituiert wird). The Latin equivalent of Satz is not positio, but propositio or enuntiatio 41 • As we saw in 12.1.3., still another interpretation of the word Satz was offered by those writers who took it to stand for the objective content of an act of judging or setzen. In that sense, a Satz is opposed to the formalor subjective act of forming a judgment and giving assent or dissent to it; the distinction between an asserted and an unasserted judgment and the distinction between a merely thoughtjudgment and its verbal expression are then irrelevant. The verbal expression of such a Satz was sometimes called Vortrag, as a species of Rede (oratioJ2. Occasionally, a Satz was also defined as a thesis or axioma, that is, as a judgment that is performed with a clear insight into the necessity of the perceived relation between representations; the expres sion of a judgment was then called Redesatz43 • Others took the opposite direct ion and interpreted the

38 . Uebereine Entdeckung, I, A, footnote (Kant 1910 ff., VIII, pp. 193-194); Logik, ed. Jäsche, 1,2,30; Letter to Reinhold, May 19, 1789 (Kant 1910 ff., XI, p. 45). 39. Cf. also Meier 1762, p. 652, p. 685. 40. Cf., for instance, Kiesewetter 1796, p. 53: Nur die assertorischen und apodiktischen Urteile nennt man Sötze. 41. Krug 1806, pp. 192-193, pp. 226-229, p. 233. Cf. also Thanner 1807, pp. 118-119, pp. 125-126; Twesten 1825, p. 62. 42. Metz 1816, pp. 75-76. 43. Krause 1803, p. 229.

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distinction Urteil/Satz in such a way that Urteil stands for a judgment in some strict sense, while Satz is applied to constructions that for one reason or another do not fulfil the requirements set for a genuine judgment44. 13.5. Conclusion

This chapter offers a survey of some problems concemingjudgment and proposition that were discussed in the writings of Kant and those German logicians who felt the immediate impact of Kant's critical philosophy. Guided by the headings of the Kantian table ofjudgments, we have seen, under the rubric of relation, that many authors opposed the reductionism that was typical of the W olffian school and maintained that categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments are fundamentally different forms of thinking. With regard to the quality ofjudgments, there was almost general agreement that from the viewpoint of purely formallogic there is no reason to consider infinite or limitative judgments as a separate category. This is one of the points where the criteria of forma110gic and of transcendentallogic lead to divergent results. There was, however, considerable difference of opinion conceming the way in which negative judgments are to be interpreted. $ome defended the traditional view according to which in a negative proposition the negation affects the copula. Others found the notion of a negative copula incomprehensible and took a negative proposition to consist of an affirmative copula and a negated predicate. Under the rubric of modality, I have called attention to the different manners in which the class of problematic judgments was distinguished fr om the class of assertoric and apodictic judgments. A problematic judgment was variously characterized as the formation of a merely entertained proposition, as an act of positing the non-contradictoriness of a propositional content of thought, as an act of assuming a proposition for the sake of argument, and as a proposition to which the lowest degree of assent is given. Finally, in this period the pair Urteil/Satz was employed to mark at least three different kinds of opposition. Most authors adhered to the tradition, using Urteil for the mental operation and its product, and Satz for the verbal expression of ajudgment. Others, notably Kant, wanted to stress the difference between unasserted and asserted judgments; they reserved the word Satz for assertoric and apodictic judgments. A third distinction that was made by means of the words Urteil and Satz is the old distinction between the formalor subjective act of conceiving and the passive or objective propositional concept that is the content of the act. According to the various nuances of meaning that could be attached to the verb setzen, a Satz was seen as that which is put before the mind, or as that which is asserted, or as the outward form in which an inner judgment acquires its firm and stabie determination. 44. Ritter 1824, pp. 68-69, p. 108, p. 110; Umbreit 1833, p. 49, p. 54. Cf. also Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, 11, 1, 2, Anmerkung; lIl, 1, 2 (ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig, 1923, 11, p. 24, p. 267); Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, I, 3, 167 (ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig, 1920, p. 163).

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EPILOGUE

This monograph on the various theories in the field of the semanties of statement-making sentences that were prominent in the period lying between the middle of the seventeenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, naturally centres round the question what, in the eyes of the authors examined, lends meaning to a declarative sentence and so makes us speak intelligibly when we utter such asentence. Given that it is not uncommon to consider a declarative sentence as the verbal expression of an inner act of holding something to be true, this focus mayalso be specified as the question wh at it is that is held to be true and is, as a matter of fact, true or false. The main problems facing attempts at answering these questions concern the nature of the acts and attitudes of holding something to be true, the form and status of the atomie and molecular propositional complexes towards whieh these acts and attitudes are directed, and the character of the elements into whieh the propositional objects are analysable. Moreover, these three types of closely connected problems usually present themselves in three dimensions: as problems about the operations of the human mind and their products, as problems concerning the linguistic means of giving expres sion to our thoughts, and as problems involving the independently existing world about whieh we think and talk. Within the limits of this field of inquiry, it has been found that there are, first of all, some very general issues whieh keep philosophers of the period under consideration divided. To begin with the notion of declarative sentence, many of them adhere to the view that all sentences, if duly analysed and interpreted, are of a declarative nature and that the sole and ultimate function of speech is the communication ofknowledge th at something is the case. For these authors, the semanties of declarative sentences coincides with the theory of sentencemeaning in general. Others oppose this extreme reductionism and draw attention to those features which seem to them to be compelling reasons for upholding the distinction between the statement-making use of language and the multitude of other purposes that speech may serve. In their opinion, the study of the meaning of declarative sentence~ is only one part of sentential semantics. Next, the proposed explanations of the meaningfulness of declarative sentences differ considerably in the extent to which they invoke ment al operations or confine themselves to linguistie factors. When the con-

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tributions of inner acts and their products are deemed to be essential, the role oflanguage is generally regarded to be purely instrumental, as a means of communicating thoughts that have been formed independently of it. Those thinkers, however, who subscribe to some version of nominalism tend to make the contribution of ment al phenomena as small as possible; correspondingly, they consider language not only as an instrument of communication, but as first and foremost an indispensable aid to the very formation of our thoughts. In addition to this fundament al difference between a more conceptualist and a more nominalist approach to the problems concerned, the theories discussed also diverge in the emphasis they lay on the extensional or on the intensional aspects of the meaning of a declarative sentence and its components. In general, the authors of this period are fully aware of the importance of the distinction between extension and intension and of the problems connected with it. Nominalists as weIl as conceptualists take due account of the difference between the res, the item in the world to which reference is made, and the ratio, the specific way in which that item is presented to the mind and characterized by linguistic means. At the level of the constituents of the propositional objects of acts of judgment and assertion, the problems concerning their nature may in this period often be-construed as the question of the exact meaning of the widely used word idea. Of the theories concerning the status of categorematic concepts that had been developed by scholastic philosophers, it is especially the objectiveexistence theory that continued to attract many thinkers in the modern era. Authors defending this view hold that one and the same act of thinking of something may be looked at from two different sides: as someone's mental act it is a particular quality inhering in a subject, and as an act of thinking of something it necessarily includes an object thought of. To the object thought of - the conceptus obiectivus - they ascribe a peculiar form of existence - an esse obiective - , which is entirely dependent upon actual opera ti ons of conceiving and consists in no more than being actually thought of. One of the reasons why they posit such a realm of entities th at are merely thought of and talked about is no doubt the fact that the inner objects of thought, but not the acts by which they are thought, can be seen as exemplifications of logical concepts of second order. Conceptus obiectivi or themata may therefore also be viewed as the domain of objects to which second-order notions are applicable. Further, it is notabie that the strict distinction bet ween the thing as it is conceived of and the thing as it exists independently of thought led some adherents of the objectiveexistence theory to doctrines that are strikingly similar to Kant' s critical idealism. Whereas such influential thinkers as Arnauld and, probably, Descartes and Locke followed the main lines of the objective-existence theory, others, notably Reid, rejected the peculiar form of existence ascribed to objective concepts and limited the realm of existents to particular ment al acts and those of the things intended which exist in a literal and straight forward sense. Leibniz, on the other hand, went in the opposite direction by reserving the word idea for the permanent patterns of thought of which actual human con-

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ceptions are the intermittent manifestations and which are isomorphic to the structure of the divine mind and the order of things in the created world. While these three doctrines - the objective-existence theory, a more or less adverbial act-conceptualism, and logical realism - have clear parallels in the scholastic literature, the theory advanced by those philosophers who may be called nominalists in a modern sense, is relatively new. lts novelty consists mainly in the tendency to restrict ideas in the mind to concrete and particular sen sa ti ons or mental images, with a minimum of form and structure. Although ideas in this restricted sen se are a general guarantee of the cognitive meaningfulness of the verbal expressions associated with them, they have practically no explanatory value with respect to the most essential features of the components of declarative sentences. According to the nominalists, the explanation of these features is to be sought in language itself. In so far as categorematic conceptions are indispensable constituents of the propositional complexes that are the object of judgment and assertion, the above-mentioned theories apply also to the nature and status of those propos itional complexes. Although there are exceptions, as a rule the level of propos itional thoughts and expressions was carefully distinguished from the level of simple apprehensions. The distinction was based on the crucial act of predication, to which most authors therefore pay much attention. One of the fundamental points on which they have been found to be at variance is the question whether a propositional complex should be analysed into three or into only two immediate constituents. Whereas those writers who favour a trichotomous analysis intro duce a separate copula as the tie between subject and predicate, adherents of a dichotomous analysis, who are by no means a negligible minority, tend to see the combination that is typical of a propositional complex as the effect of a process of integration by which a predicate that is inherently incomplete and dependent finds its natural complement in an added subject. In this connection, it is also worth mentioning that from the middle of the eighteenth century we meet with several speculations about the origin of language according to which the oldest units of speech were monolithic wholes comparabie to interjections. On this view, the sophisticated structures shown by declarative sentences are the result of a gradually proceeding decomposition or analysis that is mainly or entirely due to the application of ever more refined linguistic devices to the original integers. Such historical hypotheses have a systematic counterpart in the convict ion that a holistic approach th at starts from a complete unit of communication and breaks that down into layers of functional constituents is preferabie to synthesizing methods of putting together elements that may just as welliead a life of their own . In addition to the efforts to elucidate the way in which the basic categorical propositions are related to their essential components, extensive discussions were devoted to the manner in which categorical propositions are connected to form further propositional complexes of a molecular type. On the border-line of the distinction bet ween categorical and molecular propositions lies the problem of negation; as is to be expected, the difficult question of the correct inter-

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pretation of negative propositions got widely different answers. Further, mention should be made of the W olffian thesis that all categorical propositions are reducible to conditional ones, in which the antecedent contains a sufficient reason for the truth of the consequent. Moreover , at least some authors of this period were quite aware of the difference between truth-functional and nontruth-functional sentence-forming connectives. Also, there were some remarkable comments on the question in which cases the components of a molecular proposition have assertive force and when they lack such force. This brings us to the acts or attitudes of holding something to be true. Although several of the authors examined point to the difficulty or even impossibility of defining such basic notions as judgment and belief, yet they usually endeavour to shed some philosophicallight on these familiar phenomena, mostly by help of analogies and metaphors. In general, the views propounded may be divided into mere-perception theories, according to which the act of judging is an awareness of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, and theories that stress the more active elements injudgment, such as some sort of decision or a preparedness to act on the propositional content involved. Closely connected with this problem of the nature of judgment and belief is the question as to where exactly the faculty of judging should be located in relation to the other powers of the human mind. A constantly recurring characteristic of attempts at establishing an anatomy of the soul is the division into active and passive parts or aspects, which is also often referred to as the distinction between will and understanding. With respect to the act ofjudging, this division is apt to lead to the further question as to whether such an act is determined or free; and if the lat ter , in which respects it is &ee and in which sense of th at many-sided word. Of no less importance is the distinction between objects of thought and forms or manners of thinking, a modern version of the traditional distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic signs or between conceptions, which are expressed by nouns denoting things, and modes of conceiving, which are expressed by performative particles. In terms of this cardinal distinction, judgment is described as a typical mode of conceiving things. Finally, it is rather evident that a full appreciation of the problems concerningjudgment and proposition with which the authors of our period were dealing and a clear understanding of the solutions they proposed can be gained only by paying due attention to the conceptual apparatus in which these problems and solutions were specified. As such a conceptual apparatus finds its most manifest expression and articulation in the system of technical terms associated with it, I have throughout this study devoted much space to terminological matters. In doing so, I have always tried to restrict such semantic considerations to those aspects of the meaning of the words in question which are relevant to the subject under discussion, without, however, refraining &om taking a somewhat wider view if that prornised to be illuminating. For the period with which we have been occupied, careful investigation of the pertinent vocabulary is, moreover , particularly desirabIe because there are two complicating factors. Even those modern authors who still wrote in Latin tended to adapt the tradi260

tional terminology, which had been coined by the Schoolmen and variously extended by humanist logicians, to their own special purposes . At the same time, it became customary to compose philosophical works in the nationallanguage. And this meant that the authors who preferred the vernacular were themselves constantly confronted with terminological difficulties.

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