Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge Middle East Library)

Cambridge Middle East Library

Jordan in the 1967 war

Cambridge Middle East Library Editorial Board ROGER OWEN, EDMUND BURKE, SERIF MARDIN, WALID KAZZIHA, AVI SHLAIM, BASIM MUSALLAM

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Jordan in the 1967 war SAMIR A. MUTAWI

The right of the University of Cambridge to print and sell all manner of books was granted by Henry VIII in 1534. The University has printed and published continuously since 1584.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE NEW YORK PORT CHESTER MELBOURNE SYDNEY

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The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon 13,28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © Cambridge University Press 1987 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1987 Reprinted 1989 First paperback edition 2002 A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Mutawi, Samir A. Jordan in the 1967 war. (Cambridge Middle East library) Bibliography. Includes index. 1. Israel-Arab war, 1967 - Jordan. 2. Jordan - Foreign relations. I. Title. II. Series. DS127.9.J6M88 1987 956'.046 87-33451 ISBN 0 52134352 6 hardback ISBN 0 52152858 5 paperback

To all those I love my parents, my wife and my children without whose support and love this book would not have been

Contents

Preface Acknowledgements Map I. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Map 2. Operations on the Jordanian Front, 5-7 June 1967 Map 3. The Campaign in Jerusalem, 5-7 June 1967 1 The decision-making process in Jordan 2 The principles and practice of Jordanian foreign policy 3 Friends and enemies: Jordan in inter-Arab affairs 4 Samu 5 The gathering crisis 6 On the brink of war 7 8 9 10

page ix xi xii xiii xiv 1 19 46 69 85 108

The war The war in perspective The aftermath Conclusion

122 141 163 181

Appendix: Timetable for the movement of Iraqi forces to Jordan

186

Biographical notes Notes Bibliography Index

187 191 213 218

vu

Preface

The seeds of the idea for this book, and indeed the seeds of the war itself, were sown at the first Arab summit conference in Cairo in 1964. Like many fellow Arab journalists, I was excited to be covering an event that marked, for all intents and purposes, the beginning of a new era of Arab politics, and more importantly, of joint Arab action. I had grown up in the 1950s and early 1960s with feelings of great frustration over the fragmentation of Arab opinion on the Palestinian question and the total lack of understanding of Jordan's legitimate defence problems against Israel. To most Arabs, the summit represented a real opportunity of overcoming these problems, particularly as Nasser himself had called for the conference. Nasser was seen at that time, by the Arab masses and intellectuals alike, as the only leader capable of uniting the Arabs in their common goal of facing up to the Israeli danger. While talking to some officials who had attended the closed sessions, I had discovered that the Syrian head of state had accused the Arab leaders of cowardice because they refused to confront Israel. He claimed that Palestine could be liberated in six hours if they did decide to fight. Even with my little knowledge of military logistics, this exaggeration was difficult to swallow. To drive a car from Safad in the north to Gaza in the south, would probably require twice as long. How then, I thought, could an Arab leader think he could overrun Israel in six hours? I left Cairo with grave doubts, despite the general euphoria surrounding the summit. This unease remained with me, and on the morning of 5 June 1967 it proved fully justified. I was in London working for the BBC Arabic Service as a producer of current affairs programmes. Although the news of the outbreak of the war was not totally unexpected, it stillfilledme with apprehension. My first duty was to try and treat the events as dispassionately as possible, in conformity with the BBC's code of objectivity and professional conduct. I had to put aside my own feelings as a Jordanian whose hometown, Jerusalem, had been captured by the Israelis. I did survive the next six days, but have failed to overcome the war's traumatic effects to this day. ix

Preface

The June 1967 war was, arguably, the most shattering event in recent Arab history. While the 1948 war lost the Palestinian Arabs the larger part of their homeland, they did at least retain an area that included such vital cities as Jerusalem, Nablus and Hebron. The three days of fighting on the Jordanian front between 5 and 8 June 1967 left all this area under Israeli occupation, and forced another huge wave of frightened refugees to run for their lives. For Jordan, the results of the war were equally catastrophic - the army and air force had been decimated, leaving the East Bank defenceless; half the country had been lost to Israel; the economy had been shattered beyond any short-term repair; and a new wave of refugees had arrived on the East Bank. I returned to Amman shortly afterwards to see all this for myself, but nothing had prepared me for the chaos that confronted me. My immediate reaction was that if this was the price that Jordan had to pay for its commitment to Arab solidarity and brotherhood, then it was a terribly expensive price. My second reaction involved questions that have haunted me ever since. Why did it happen? How did it all start? Could it have been averted? Were only Arab leaders to blame or were Arab masses just as guilty? In this book I have attempted to answer some of these questions, exploring the motives behind Jordan's decision to enter the war, and its position immediately before the outbreak of hostilities. While Jordan's unreserved participation in the war came as a surprise to most observers, it did not surprise Jordan's decision-makers. No effort, therefore, is complete without the main decision-making institutions being examined and the prominent role of King Hussein being stressed. This is thoroughly examined in chapter 1, and the values and images of the King's formulation of foreign policy are fully analysed in chapter 2. In chapters 3 and 4 the outbreak of war is placed against the background of inter-Arab rivalries, which dominated the Arab world in the years prior to 1967, and Jordanian perceptions of Syria's role in encouraging Arab-Israeli conflict in the immediate period before. In subsequent chapters I have examined in some detail the events of the war itself, including an accurate restructuring of all that went on in the operations room and in the field minute by minute. I have also looked at Jordan's position in the post-war period, including the rebuilding of the Jordanian armed forces and the JordanianIsraeli confrontation in the Jordan valley town of Karameh in March 1968. I have interviewed all the surviving Jordanian participants, politicians, military commanders, intelligence personnel, and most importantly, His Majesty King Hussein. I was also given permission by the Army Commanderin-Chief, General Sharif Zaid Ben Shaker (himself commander of the 60th armoured brigade in the June war), to research all the relevant army documents. I have restricted my study to Jordan's role in the 1967 war because I felt that a tragic misunderstanding of Jordan's intentions by both Arabs and Israelis was

Preface

a major cause of the war, and indeed a continuing source of friction. First, as to the reasons behind Jordan's policy of non-confrontation with Israel, and secondly, as to the depth of Jordan's commitment to the Arab cause and to the cause of Palestine. I also wanted to correct, in some way, the imbalance in the literature currently available on the 1967 war. There are many detailed accounts of Israel's role in the war, but none of Jordan's. I do not know whether this is because of a lack of information from the Arab side, the natural disinclination of the defeated to talk about the war, or as some would claim, a general prejudice against the Arabs. I hope this book does convey the balanced picture that I have tried to achieve.

Acknowledgements I am truly grateful to H.M. King Hussein, whose kind and detailed answers to my questions enriched my experience and knowledge of the crucial period of Jordan's history this book covers. My sincere appreciation also goes to General Sharif Zeid Ben Shaker, Commander in Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces, for permitting me to research army records and documents related to the 1967 war. Brigadier Fawzi Ebeidat, Commander of the Royal War College, deserves a special thank you for his directions to me on military and strategic issues. Prime Minister Zeid Rifai, Adnan Abu Odeh, Minister of the Royal Court, Marwan Al-Kassem, Chief of the Royal Diwan, and other politicians and military commanders were very helpful, not only in responding patiently and objectively to my questions but also in contributing invaluable comments and views. I wish to record my sincere appreciation to all of them. The same goes to Professor Peter Campbell, Dr Avi Shlaim and Dr Peter Woodward who guided my efforts while I was preparing my thesis at Reading University. To all these and others who contributed their expertise and knowledge to the making of this book, I say a special healt-felt thank you.

XI

Preface

a major cause of the war, and indeed a continuing source of friction. First, as to the reasons behind Jordan's policy of non-confrontation with Israel, and secondly, as to the depth of Jordan's commitment to the Arab cause and to the cause of Palestine. I also wanted to correct, in some way, the imbalance in the literature currently available on the 1967 war. There are many detailed accounts of Israel's role in the war, but none of Jordan's. I do not know whether this is because of a lack of information from the Arab side, the natural disinclination of the defeated to talk about the war, or as some would claim, a general prejudice against the Arabs. I hope this book does convey the balanced picture that I have tried to achieve.

Acknowledgements I am truly grateful to H.M. King Hussein, whose kind and detailed answers to my questions enriched my experience and knowledge of the crucial period of Jordan's history this book covers. My sincere appreciation also goes to General Sharif Zeid Ben Shaker, Commander in Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces, for permitting me to research army records and documents related to the 1967 war. Brigadier Fawzi Ebeidat, Commander of the Royal War College, deserves a special thank you for his directions to me on military and strategic issues. Prime Minister Zeid Rifai, Adnan Abu Odeh, Minister of the Royal Court, Marwan Al-Kassem, Chief of the Royal Diwan, and other politicians and military commanders were very helpful, not only in responding patiently and objectively to my questions but also in contributing invaluable comments and views. I wish to record my sincere appreciation to all of them. The same goes to Professor Peter Campbell, Dr Avi Shlaim and Dr Peter Woodward who guided my efforts while I was preparing my thesis at Reading University. To all these and others who contributed their expertise and knowledge to the making of this book, I say a special healt-felt thank you.

XI