John Wyclif: Scriptural Logic, Real Presence, and the Parameters of Orthodoxy (Marquette Studies in Theology, #36.)

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John Wyclif Scriptural Logic, Real Presence, and the Parameters of Orthodoxy

Marquette Studies in Theology Andrew Tallon, editor Frederick M. Bliss. Understanding Reception Martin Albl, Paul Eddy, and Rene Mirkes, OSF, editors. Directions in NewTestament Methods Robert M. Doran. Subject and Psyche Kenneth Hagen, editor. The Bible in the Churches. How Various Christians Interpret the Scriptures Jamie T. Phelps, O.P., editor. Black and Catholic: The Challenge and Gift of Black Folk. Contributions of African American Experience and Thought to Catholic Theology Karl Rahner. Spirit in the World. CD Karl Rahner. Hearer of the Word. CD Robert M. Doran. Theological Foundations. Vol. 1 Intentionality and Psyche Robert M. Doran. Theological Foundations. Vol. 2 Theology and Culture. Patrick W. Carey. Orestes A. Brownson: A Bibliography, 1826-1876 Patrick W. Carey, editor. The Early Works of Orestes A. Brownson. Volume I: The Universalist Years, 1826-29 Patrick W. Carey, editor. The Early Works of Orestes A. Brownson. Volume II: The Free and Unitarian Years, 1830-35 Patrick W. Carey, editor. The Early Works of Orestes A. Brownson. Volume III: The Transendentalist Years, 1836-38 John Martinetti, S.J. Reason to Believe Today George H. Tavard. Trina Deitas: The Controversy between Hincmar and Gottschalk Jeanne Cover, IBVM. Love:The Driving Force. Mary Ward’s Spirituality. Its Significance for Moral Theology David A. Boileau, editor. Principles of Catholic Social Teaching Michael Purcell. Mystery and Method: The Other in Rahner and Levinas W.W. Meissner, S.J., M.D. To the Greater Glory: A Psychological Study of Ignatian Spirituality Virginia M. Shaddy, editor. Catholic Theology in the University: Source of Wholeness Thomas M. Bredohl. Class and Religious Identity: The Rhenish Center Party in Wilhelmine Germany William M. Thompson and David L. Morse, editors. Voegelin’s Israel and Revelation: An Interdisciplinary Debate and Anthology Donald L. Gelpi, S.J. The Firstborn of Many: A Christology for Converting Christians. Volume 1: To Hope in Jesus Christ

Donald L. Gelpi, S.J. The Firstborn of Many: A Christology for Converting Christians. Volume 2: Synoptic Narrative Christology Donald L. Gelpi, S.J. The Firstborn of Many: A Christology for Converting Christians. Volume 3: Doctrinal and Practical Christology Stephen A. Werner. Prophet of the Christian Social Manifesto. Joseph Husslein, S.J.: His Life, Work, & Social Thought Gregory Sobolewski. Martin Luther: Roman Catholic Prophet Matthew C. Ogilvie. Faith Seeking Understanding: The Functional Specialty, “Systematics” in Bernard Lonergan’s Method in Theology Timothy Maschke, Franz Posset, and Joan Skocir, editors. Ad fontes Lutheri: Toward the Recovery of the Real Luther: Essays in Honor of Kenneth Hagen’s Sixty-Fifth Birthday William Thorn, Phillip Runkel, and Susan Mountin, editors. Dorothy Day and The Catholic Worker Movement: Centenary Esssays Michele Saracino. On Being Human: A Conversation with Lonergan and Levinas Ian Christopher Levy. John Wyclif: Scriptural Logic, Real Presence, and the Parameters of Orthodoxy

John Wyclif Scriptural Logic, Real Presence, and the Parameters of Orthodoxy

Ian Christopher Levy

Marquette University Press

Marquette Studies in Theology No. 36 Series Editor, Andrew Tallon Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Levy, Ian Christopher. John Wyclif : scriptural logic, real presence, and the parameters of orthodoxy / by Ian Christopher Levy.— 1st ed. p. cm. — (Marquette studies in theology ; no. 36) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-87462-688-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Wycliffe, John, d. 1384. 2. Lord’s Supper—Real presence— History of doctrines—To 1500. I. Title. II. Marquette studies in theology ; #36. BV823.L45 2003 234'.163’092—dc22 2003020772 © Marquette University Press 2003 All rights reserved. Marquette University Press Member, American Association of University Presses Association of Jesuit University Presses

Table of Contents Dedication .............................................................................................. 9 List of Abbreviations ............................................................................. 10 Preface .................................................................................................. 11 Introduction ......................................................................................... 13 Chapter 1—Late Medieval Academic Life ............................................ 17 1. Late Medieval Oxford ..................................................................... 18 2. The Process of Inquiry and Censure ............................................... 21 3. The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 ......................................... 23 4. The Parameters of Speculation ....................................................... 27 5. The Condemnations of 1346 and 1347 ......................................... 31 6. The Pelagian Question ................................................................... 36 7. Conclusion ..................................................................................... 44 Chapter 2—The Metaphysics of John Wyclif ....................................... 47 1. Wyclif the Oxford Realist ............................................................... 48 2. Wyclif ’s Theological Realism .......................................................... 55 3. Conclusion ..................................................................................... 60 Chapter 3—The Medieval Reading of Scripture .................................. 63 1. The Richness of Sacred Discourse .................................................. 64 2. Proper and Improper Supposition .................................................. 67 3. The Paris Censure of 1340 ............................................................. 69 4. Authorial Intention among Later Medieval Theologians ................ 71 5. Conclusion ..................................................................................... 79 Chapter 4—John Wyclif and the Logic of Scripture ............................. 81 1. Authorship and the Eternal Scripture ............................................. 82 2. The Logic of Scripture .................................................................... 91 3. The Senses of Scripture ................................................................... 99 4. Defending Scripture de virtute sermonis ...................................... 102 5. The Logic of Christ ...................................................................... 109

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Ian Christopher Levy John Wyclif

6. Scripture and Tradition ................................................................ 112 7. Conclusion ................................................................................... 118 Chapter 5—Medieval Eucharistic Theology ....................................... 123 1 The Ninth Century: Radbertus and Ratramnus ........................... 126 2 The Eleventh Century: Berengar of Tours and Lanfranc of Bec ........................................... 137 3 Developments of the Late Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries .......... 154 4 The Formulation of Transubstantiation ........................................ 166 5 Canon Law and the Decretum ..................................................... 175 6 Thomas Aquinas ........................................................................... 182 7 Duns Scotus ................................................................................. 191 8 John Quidort ................................................................................ 198 9 William of Ockham ...................................................................... 201 10 Popular Piety ................................................................................ 211 11 Conclusion ................................................................................... 213 Chapter 6—The Eucharistic Theology of John Wyclif ....................... 217 1 The Earlier Stages of Wyclif ’s Eucharistic Theology ..................... 221 2 Censure and Condemnation ........................................................ 232 3 Wyclif ’s Reaction to Popular Piety ................................................ 239 4 Reading Christ’s Words: ‘Hoc est Corpus Meum’ ......................... 245 5 Interpreting Tradition and Law .................................................... 255 6 Christ as Sign and Truth ............................................................... 268 7 Metaphysical Objections to Transubstantiation ............................ 275 8 The Attempt to Salvage Transubstantiation .................................. 284 9 Explaining Real Presence .............................................................. 288 10 An Appeal to Christology ............................................................. 300 11 The Question of Donatism ........................................................... 305 12 Thomas Winterton’s Absolutio ..................................................... 308 13 Thomas Netter’s Doctrinale .......................................................... 314 14 Conclusion ................................................................................... 318 Chapter 7—Laying Claim to a Sacred Past ......................................... 321 Bibliography ....................................................................................... 327 Index .................................................................................................. 345

Introduction

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For my parents cum caritate semper

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Abbreviations BRUO = Biographical Register of the University of Oxford. 3 vols. Edited by A. B. Emden. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957-59. CCCM = Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Medievalis. Turnhout: Brepols: 1971CCSL = Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina. Turnhout: Brepols: 1953CSEL = Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Vienna: 1866CUP = Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis. 4 vols. Edited by Heinrich Denifle. Paris: 1889-97. FZ = Fasciculi Zizaniorum Magistri Johannis Wyclif cum Tritico. Edited by W. W. Shirley. Rolls Series, London: 1858. PG = Patrologia Cursus Completus. Series Graeca. Edited by J. P. Migne. Paris: 1857PL = Patrologia Cursus Completus. Series Latina. Edited by J. P. Migne. Paris: 1844ST = Summa Theologiae. 4 vols. Thomas Aquinas. Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1948.

Introduction

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Preface

John Wyclif is still best known as the late medieval English theologian who railed against clerical wealth and various ecclesiastical abuses of power. In that vein, he is often spoken of as the progenitor of the Lollards, those religious dissenters responsible for translating the Bible into English and disseminating their views in the vernacular. All of this is accurate, but still remains only part of the story. Wyclif was a prolific writer who produced often massive volumes covering logic, metaphysics, politics, ecclesiology, biblical studies, and sacraments. Recent scholarship has rightly placed Wyclif in his proper context as the late medieval scholastic theologian, rather than the untimely born Protestant Reformer. This is very important, for it means that the depth of his thought is being more fully investigated with relation to his contemporaries. What I have written here focuses upon Wyclif’s theology, specifically his eucharistic theology and its intersection with his understanding of Scripture. Two points have especially struck me while reading Wyclif over the last ten years: his sense of commitment to the larger continuum of Catholic tradition, and his placement of Christ, the Incarnate Word, at the heart of that tradition. Scripture, for Wyclif, is ultimately identified with the Eternal Word, and proper devotion to the Eucharist is reverence for the Word Made Flesh who instituted this sacrament. At the center of Wyclif’s theology there is always a Living Person. This book has its origins in my 1997 doctoral dissertation. Although the theme and structure are still close to that project, the content varies significantly in places. The intervening years have provided a time for much learning, and one hopes that is reflected in my attempts to correct errors and expand ideas. I began this process

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of extensive revision while teaching at Marquette University, and am completing it as a member of the faculty at Lexington Theological Seminary. The librarians at both institutions have been most helpful all along. When writing the dissertation I had the assistance and encouragement of many people, most notably my director, Professor Kenneth Hagen, who remains a scholarly mentor and a friend. When I returned to this project I again called upon the assistance of scholars and friends, indeed scholars who had become my friends over the years. Dr. Takashi Shogimen read the first chapter of this book covering late medieval academic life, and Dr. Stephen Lahey read portions of the chapter on Wyclif’s eucharistic thought. Their comments proved to be very instructive. Professor Ralph Del Colle provided me with some valuable advice on christological matters. My greatest debt of gratitude is owed to Professor Gary Macy, who read the two largest chapters in their entirety, namely those on medieval eucharistic theology generally, and Wyclif’s eucharistic theology specifically. His detailed responses were extremely insightful and encouraging. This book would not be published at all if not for the efforts of Professor Andrew Tallon, the director of Marquette University Press. I remain grateful to him for accepting this book to begin with, and working with me to see it through to completion. Finally, I give thanks to my dear friend Wendy Bright for her prayers and her presence. Ian Christopher Levy Lexington, Kentucky Easter Sunday, 2003

Introduction

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Introduction

I

n late 1380 an Oxford council convened by the university chancellor censured two eucharistic propositions. The first states that the substance of the material bread and wine remains following the consecration; while the second says that Christ is not present in the Eucharist substantially and corporeally, but instead only figuratively. This censure was directed at John Wyclif, Oxford theologian and apparent dissenter from Catholic orthodoxy. Wyclif had just completed the lectures which formed his De eucharistia, a treatise in which he charged the scholastic doctrine of transubstantiation with being an unscriptural deviation from the true faith of the Church. After issuing a response to these charges, Wyclif would leave the university for his parish in Lutterworth by the end of 1381. In the middle of 1382 a council convened by the Archbishop of Canterbury met at Blackfriars in London and condemned as heretical or erroneous twenty-four propositions, the first three of which pertain to the substantial remnance of the bread and wine, and the denial of Christ’s proper corporeal presence in the host. And while Wyclif was not specifically named, this action was clearly directed at him and his Oxford followers. These condemned propositions would later be incorporated into a list of forty-five errors compiled at the Council of Constance in 1415 as it proceeded against the Czech reformer Jan Hus. While Hus suffered death by burning, Wyclif met with no such fate. He had been permitted to live out his life in peace, dying on St. Sylvester’s Day 1384, following a stroke three days earlier. Gone but hardly forgotten, the Council reckoned a mere condemnation of his doctrines insufficient, ordering his bones disinterred from sacred ground and burned. This directive was finally carried out in 1428 and the ashes were cast into the river Swift. Though dying in communion with the Church, never formally condemned as a heretic in his own lifetime, Wyclif would assume that role posthumously.This study

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offers an appraisal of John Wyclif’s eucharistic theology within the context of some larger medieval developments, none of which can be isolated from one another. As Wyclif was himself a late medieval schoolman, we must look at the climate of academic life in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. For all of his own logical and metaphysical acumen, Wyclif was representative of a conservative reaction to the more recent scholastic trends. He was very much in sympathy with those academic and ecclesiastical officials who were disturbed by what they regarded as scholastic recklessness on the part of bachelors and masters. Of course, the irony is that the very processes which were enacted to censure positions born of such speculation would, in turn, spell his own downfall. When he rejected transubstantiation and proposed ways of expressing Christ’s presence in the Eucharist which he thought to be in keeping with the sacred tradition, he found himself censured by a commission whose duty was to safeguard Catholic truth against novel deviations. For Wyclif, transubstantiation was the novelty, however, and he was the champion of a conservative traditionalism. The problem he faced was all but insurmountable by this time in history, though. For the relatively new scholastic doctrine of transubstantiation was now considered synonymous with real presence itself, such that an absolute adherence to one rather narrow formulation became the standard of orthodoxy. And it is for this reason that we will look at the developments taking place in eucharistic theology throughout the Middle Ages, from the ninth to the fourteenth centuries. One finds that an increasingly sophisticated application of philosophical methods forms an essential component in defining real presence as a matter of doctrine, which will then become a point of law. And yet even as one moves late into the thirteenth century various explanations of real presence are permitted to exist side by side, even those which allow for the substantial remnance of the bread. What must never be lost sight of in all of this is that the concern foremost in everyone’s mind was to protect the truth of Christ’s words from the attacks of heresy and skepticism. Christ had said to his disciples on the night he was betrayed, ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’ Lest the believer’s partaking in this promise of celestial food be reduced to a bare memorial, the Church would have to find ways to preserve the Savior’s veracity while at the

Introduction

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same time providing some plausible explanation of this miracle. If Christ is true, then how can what for all intents and purposes looks like bread and wine really be his body and blood? By Wyclif’s time the field of acceptable answers had shrunk considerably from what it had been even one hundred years earlier, let alone during the Carolingian period. Christ’s words of promise belong at once to the Bible as an inerrant and inspired text, and to the Living Lord, the Author of Salvation. Indeed, the Author of Salvation is the Author of the Sacred Page. As such, addressing the words ‘Hoc est corpus meum’ becomes a matter of discerning the authorial intention behind those words. Eucharistic theology is primarily a matter of biblical exegesis; metaphysics is but a means to explicate sacred grammar. No one was more aware of this than Wyclif himself, and that is why the whole of his eucharistic theology must be viewed in light of his biblical exegesis. Wyclif believed transubstantiation to rest upon a metaphysically impossible premise, positing as it does that accidents can exist apart from their proper subjects. In fact, the entire doctrine is born of an unfaithful reading of Holy Scripture. For above all else it turns Christ into a deceiver, taking bread in his hands and offering to his disciples what is not really bread at all. But then, for Wyclif, transubstantiation was just the most egregious example of scholastic irresponsibility, the willingness of his fellow schoolmen to depart from the logic of the Sacred Page and impose their own homespun theories, all to the delight of admiring students. That Wyclif had only recently completed his massive De veritate sacrae scripturae before embarking upon his De eucharistia cannot be overlooked when assessing his suddenly vehement attack on transubstantiation. He may well have been showing signs of serious misgivings prior to 1380, but something had now put him over the top. His 1377-78 De veritate was the culmination of years of frustration with the application of logical-grammatical methods to the biblical text in an effort to expose its apparent inconsistencies and contradictions. Of course, no one actually believed the Bible could be false, but there are passages that might seem such at first glance. In response, Wyclif argued that the whole of Scripture is true according to the intended sense of its Divine Author. Sacred discourse is subtle and admits no

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errors or contradictions. Locating the sense of the Divine Author, the one who can never lie, stands at the heart of all biblical exegesis, and no more so than when addressing Christ’s offer of his body and blood. Thus Wyclif’s attack on transubstantiation might well be viewed as an extension of his whole exegetical program. As a theologian, a magister sacrae paginae, he reckoned the entire task of theology to be one of biblical exegesis. Yet Wyclif the theologian is by definition also Wyclif the metaphysical realist who envisions an Eternal Scripture, which is itself identical with Christ the Word. The Word is the home of all the eternal exemplars which form the foundation of cosmic order. Loyalty to the truth of Scripture must be identical with one’s unfailing commitment to Christ the First Principle of creation, revelation and redemption. The Eucharist, itself a means to redemption, admits no disjuncture between the sure order of creation and the unshakable veracity of the revealed word. To the very end, Wyclif confessed belief in Christ’s presence in the Eucharist, while denying that the bread and wine must be substantially removed to facilitate this presence. Yet he also denied that Christ’s body was substantially present, arguing that it need not be, in fact cannot be. Wyclif’s task therefore was to undermine transubstantiation as blasphemous and impossible, while simultaneously putting in place a theory of presence that is in accord with the sacred tradition of the Holy Catholic Church. And it was precisely such an attempt which led to the charge that he was forsaking the very tradition he believed himself to be recovering.

Introduction

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1 Late Medieval Academic Life

I

n order to better understand Wyclif’s eucharistic theology, and the subsequent reaction to it, a brief consideration of late medieval academic life is in order. We want to examine some of the more pressing and contentious issues of the schools, as well as the official means of evaluating philosophical and theological propositions which could lead to the sanctioning of perceived threats to academic discipline and orthodox doctrine. In this chapter we are primarily interested in what university and ecclesiastical authorities deemed worthy of censure, rather than the precise philosophical or theological validity of the censured articles themselves. In fact, we shall see that a number of propositions met with opposition not because they were inherently invalid or implausible, but because they were reckoned indicative of larger, more unsettling, academic trends. This means that propositions which might be acceptable in principle could still be censured for the very fact that authoritative commissions disapproved of what they seemed to imply. Throughout this study various events in Wyclif’s life and career will receive due attention; here it suffices to provide the briefest sketch for the sake of providing chronological context. Born c. 1327 in Yorkshire, Wyclif was ordained a priest by 1351, and likely spent his early years as a priest under the tutelage of the reform-minded Archbishop of York, John Thoresby. A secular cleric, Wyclif soon left his native diocese for Oxford, taking his bachelor of arts at Merton College in 1356, and becoming Master of Balliol by 1360. After a rather lengthy study of philosophy he took his bachelor’s degree in theology in 1369, and his doctorate in 1372. With the exception of a brief diplomatic venture to Bruges, Wyclif spent his entire adult life at Oxford until

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being forced out in the middle of 1381, when he then retired to his parish church in Lutterworth.1

1 Late Medieval Oxford After the re-assembling of scholars in 1214, the University of Oxford was placed under the control of the bishop of Lincoln. Throughout the episcopate of Robert Grosseteste (1235-53) there was harmony between the university and its diocesan overseer, though some dissension did arise during the tenure of Grosseteste’s successor, Henry Lexington. By 1280, a provincial synod granted greater power to the university chancellor, thereby paving the way for future academic freedom. While it is true that the university gained substantial independence from the see of Lincoln, it was by no means free from all episcopal control, as the visitations by archbishops Kilwardby (1277) and Pecham (1284) bear witness. England did enjoy much religious peace during the fourteenth century, avoiding the inquisitions the Continent experienced, but by the 1370s Oxford was arousing greater mistrust with regard to its own orthodoxy, culminating in the censures of Wyclif and the Oxford Lollards in the 1380s. What makes such official action especially noteworthy is that prior to this the university had not acted to censure any ideas proposed in the schools since 1315. The task of eradicating Wycliffism at the university was not easily accomplished, though, for while effective measures were taken by Archbishop of Canterbury, William Courtenay, it was left to his successor Thomas Arundel to level the final deathblows (Rashdall, 114-29; Catto 1992). We will later look at the university’s actions against Wyclif, as well as the archbishop’s, when examining Wyclif’s eucharistic thought specifically. The question of heresy aside, as a student and master at Oxford during the middle and later decades of the fourteenth century, Wyclif had arrived at a university which, while still vital, had passed its peak. 1

For the most up to date biographical sketch cf. Wilks, 1-15. Cf. also BRUO 3:210306. For a full-length biography cf. Workman 1926.

1~Late Medieval Academic Life

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This is not to say that Oxford did not still enjoy a strong reputation, but the first fifty years of the century had witnessed the high point of its intellectual contributions. Out from under the shadow of Paris, and developing its own style, its best theologians usually came from the mendicant orders in the first decades of the fourteenth century, though by the middle decades some prominent secular theologians did emerge, including two of Wyclif’s favorites, Thomas Bradwardine and Richard FitzRalph (Courtenay 1992, 1-9). Early fourteenthcentury Oxford may also be noted for its individualism, evinced among these scholarly prolific friars who rarely considered themselves bound to the leading theologians of their own orders. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, enjoyed a brief period of exaltation, but much of that was due to the fallout from the Paris condemnations of 1277, as Dominicans rallied to the defense of their fellow Black Friar. And yet it was the Dominican Robert Kilwardby who, in his capacity as Archbishop of Canterbury, published a shorter list of Tempier’s condemnations eleven days later at Oxford. Indeed, many Oxford Dominicans continued to remain loyal to the pre-Thomistic tradition articulated by Fishacre and Kilwardby, emphasizing an epistemology of divine illumination, plurality of forms, and humanity’s a priori knowledge of God. Throughout the fourteenth century the sense of intellectual independence permeated the religious orders to the extent that one cannot really speak of distinct Dominican or Franciscan schools of thought (Courtenay 1987b, 171-82). But if one order did lead the field at Oxford in the century’s first few decades it was the Franciscans. Though dead by 1308, Duns Scotus provided a foundation upon which much Franciscan theology at Oxford would be built in the following years, most notably in terms of his voluntarism in which he stressed the primacy of God’s will with respect to his intellect, as well as his special emphasis on the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power. Though Scotus may not have been appealed to directly as an authority, such doctrines were at the heart of much Ockhamist thought, even when reworked (Cross, 5-6; Courtenay 1987b, 185-92). With regard to William of Ockham it should be said that Oxford’s initial reaction to his thought was negative, but by 1330 his appeal broadened, evinced in the work of the Dominican Robert Holcot and the Franciscan Adam Wodeham. And

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while there was no Ockhamist school, even among the Franciscans, his name and ideas did stand at the forefront of both theological and philosophical discussion, even as he turned his own attentions to attacking Pope John XXII from the safety of the court of Lewis of Bavaria (Boehner 1958b; Courtenay 1987a, 89-107). By the 1320s, the metaphysical questions which had predominated at the end of the thirteenth century, and the first decade of the fourteenth, would give way to a concentration on the study of logic, grammar, mathematics and physics. While in the earlier Middle Ages, grammar had existed as a discipline in its own right, separate from logic, the intimate connection between language and thought was receiving greater attention, such that by the early fourteenth century grammar was largely subsumed under the study of logic. At Oxford, this was very much the case (Weisheipl 1964; Courtenay 1987b, 18592). Logical-grammatical analysis was applied to matters such as the Trinity, free will and divine action, necessity and contingency, and the Eucharist. The chief controversies of the day concerned contingency and determinism, the psychology of human volition, propositional theory, and the especially provocative question of grace and merit. And though the Eucharist had been a topic of discussion in Ockham’s day, and a bit later with Holcot and Wodeham, it largely disappeared after 1332 until revived in the 1370s by Wyclif (Courtenay 1987b, 255-305; Courtenay 1992, 25-28). Much of the intellectual life at Oxford during the 1360s and 1370s was centered on issues that had been prevalent a generation earlier. Indeed, it so often seems that Wyclif’s dialogue partners are in part men who had been dead for some twenty or thirty years (Courtenay 1987b, 327-55). Thus when looking for allies, Wyclif as often as not turns to the seccular theologians Thomas Bradwardine and Richard FitzRalph, not to mention Grosseteste of a century before, all of whom he reckons fellow pugilists in his fight against moderns and mendicants. One should never imagine that the medieval theologian was detached from the larger Christian society, ensconced behind the university walls. For while some debates were largely confined to the lecture hall, there was no shortage of controversial topics whose ramifications transcended them, many of which were dear to Wyclif’s heart, such as the relative powers of Church and State, and the matter of rightful


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dominion (Pantin, 123-35). Nor could the question of eucharistic presence be counted as simply the stuff of arcane metaphysical quibbling, when one considers the fact that this sacrament stood at the heart of Christian devotion in the late Middle Ages. No debate over the presence of the Lord’s body could be anything less than a matter of supreme importance for the whole Church. Only when this central fact is fully acknowledged can the controversy which Wyclif created be properly comprehended. Wyclif was fully conversant with the logical and grammatical methods of his day, and yet felt himself profoundly at odds with the more strident and adventuresome academic spirits of his own age. Modern scholars have offered various assessments of the fourteenth century as a whole. Very well known is Gilson’s insistence that this century witnessed a “disintegration of the scholastic synthesis,” as reason and revelation were torn asunder (Gilson 1955, 471). Such an idealization of the thirteenth century, upon which Gilson’s assessment is founded, may not be in order, however. For one might well agree with Trapp that fourteenth-century thinkers actually offered a necessary corrective to the speculative theology of the preceding century. The great systems of the thirteenth century were re-evaluated in a new age of sharper, more demanding historical and logical criticism. Standards of proof were raised, whether in demonstrating the logical viability of previously accepted ‘syntheses,’ or in the citation of authoritative texts (Trapp 1956, 146-52). What we are especially concerned with is the reaction of contemporaries in both centuries to academic speculation. We will see that there was often a good deal of friction generated within the university lecture halls that reverberated in the ears of the ecclesiastical authorities whose duty it was to protect sacred doctrine.

2 The Process of Inquiry and Censure As the increasingly refined logical analysis of theological questions, which had begun as early as the eleventh century, was coming into its own by the thirteenth century, so too was the meticulous expert

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scrutiny of its results. By the early thirteenth century the masters of theology were already actively involved in the examination and censure of heresy, working closely with the bishops, as was the case in 1277 in both Paris and Oxford. By 1283, censures were categorized, such that some propositions were deemed heretical, some erroneous, some ill sounding, and others rash (Courtenay 1989, 173-74). Furthermore, there was a distinction between a prohibitio and a condemnatio. The former was limited in its geographic and temporal range, and simply prohibited the dissemination of certain views, while making no further claim as to their correctness. But the latter specifically condemns a given proposition, and applies to all Christians at all times. The distinction between the two was not always so clearly delineated, however (Thijssen, x). While academic condemnation ran the gamut between what was false or erroneous, and what was outrightly heretical, a proposition could be condemned as heretical without its author incurring the charge of being a heretic himself. This meant, in turn, that the accused must be willing to issue a revocatio, and thus refrain from obstinately defending the condemned view, itself the true mark of a heretic. What must be borne in mind, however, is that academics were rarely if ever promoting positions previously condemned as heretical. Rather, in the midst of the lively exchange of ideas, they offered opinions which were only then regarded as suspect by their colleagues (Thijssen, 1-5). Within the university the list of censured propositions formed the parameters of acceptable discourse for future students and were often considered as authoritative as conciliar decisions (Courtenay 1989, 179-81). Cases were usually settled within the confines of the university under the auspices of the chancellor. Bachelors of theology were required to swear an oath never to hold or teach anything contrary to the faith of the Church, nor anything that would offend their audience. Thus one’s duties do not simply extend to avoiding the patently heretical, but even the appearance of impiety. Proceedings generally began when a complaint was lodged against a lecturer, thereby bringing such views to the attention of university authorities who then launched their inquiry. The accused would be summoned to appear before the chancellor and his investigative body of theologians where he was given the opportunity to defend himself. Yet the


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inquiry was not primarily concerned with what the author of a set of propositions actually meant, but what the propositions themselves might be taken to mean ‘just as they sound; as they stand’ (prout sonant, prout iacent). If censure was leveled as the result of this inquiry, the defendant was called upon to swear that he would no longer teach or defend such views, whether publicly or in private. Only when the internal university review did not lead to a recantation did the matter proceed to the episcopal trial court, where real judicial power resided (Thijssen, 9-34). By the middle of the thirteenth century it was generally recognized that fraternal correction should be employed at first, and only if this is not effective in bringing about a renunciation of heresy should coercive measures be used. While the former charitable measure was surely preferable, the latter just measure was necessary to preserve the common good of Christendom (Shogimen 2001, 602-03).

3 The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 The generations of Ockham or Wyclif were hardly the first to witness such censures of course, and one should not imagine that the sweet harmony of the thirteenth century was disrupted by the discordant tones of the fourteenth. For as Southern observes, by the late thirteenth century there were many who seriously doubted that logic and grammar, however ably applied to authoritative texts, could solve all difficulties and provide the Church with the certainty she was seeking. The Paris and Oxford condemnations of 1277, like the others which followed, were symptomatic of the widespread dissent that set in after the apparent concord secured at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 (Southern 1987, 138-39). On December 10, 1270 Stephen Tempier, the bishop of Paris and a former theological master, condemned thirteen propositions attributed to the pagan philosophers. Among the Aristotelian/Averroistic errors condemned were those stating that: the world is eternal; there was no first man; that God does not know other things than himself; that human actions are not governed by divine providence; and that God cannot grant immortality or incor-

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ruptibility to corruptible and mortal things.2 One can clearly see that such propositions, taken as they stand, are repudiations of some of the most fundamental axioms of the Christian faith. Thus Tempier prefaced this condemnation with the threat of excommunication for all those who knowingly teach or assert them.3 As Leff notes, though such propositions were probably just the stuff of lecture hall disputation, presented as opinions for debate, and likely distorted by the record, the whole program which they represented was considered increasingly threatening to the Christian Faith (Leff 1968, 230-31). And in this vein, it is worth pointing out that in 1272 the more conservative members of the Arts faculty had themselves promulgated a resolution designed to rein in those among their ranks deemed too irresponsible to be trusted with sacred material. No bachelor or master of arts was henceforth allowed to determine or dispute a theological question such as the Trinity or Incarnation (Wippel, 184). While the 1270 condemnations were the work of Tempier acting on his own initiative, by January of 1277 the state of affairs was such that Pope John XXI wrote to Tempier, distressed by all the errors cropping up at the University of Paris, this mighty bastion of Catholic faith. Enlisting the help of the theologians, Tempier drew up a list of 219 errors by March 7 (Leff 1968, 229-32). Tempier’s preface is very instructive, for it offers insight into what he thinks has gone wrong with the very workings of academic life, not just the product of those workings. Some members of the Arts faculty are exceeding their properly allotted functions and thus lapsing into patently abhorrent errors. This is not because they necessarily believe what they are saying is true; but then that is a large part of the problem as Tempier sees it. They apparently feel free to say whatever they like in the course of their academic disputations, despite the fact that they may be scandalizing their audience. Note, however, that Tempier does not claim they are asserting that there is in fact the much feared ‘double truth.’ Rather, “they are saying that some things are true according to philosophy, but 2

CUP I, 487: “Quod mundus est eternus (5);” “Quod nunquam fuit primus homo (6);” “Quod Deus non cognoscit alia a se (11);” “Quod humani actus non reguntur providentia Dei (12);” “Quod Deus non potest dare immortalitatem vel incorrupcionem rei corruptibili vel mortali (13).” 3 CUP I, 486: “Isti errores condempnati et excommunicati cum omnibus, qui eos docuerint scienter vel asseruerint a domino Stephano, Parisiensi episcopo …”


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not true according to the Catholic faith, as if there were two contrary truths, and as if there is truth to be found within the sayings of the damnable pagans which stands in opposition to the truth of Holy Scripture.” It is their irresponsibility, their failure to consider the consequences of what they are saying in the lecture halls, which he chastises, precisely because this sort of “reckless discourse” may well entice the less sophisticated into error. It falls therefore to the Doctors of Holy Scripture to take them to task. So it was that with their help Tempier assembled this rather haphazard list of 219 errors, threatening excommunication for anyone who would henceforth presume to teach or defend them.4 Among these propositions are the thirteen errors of 1270, as well as propositions that degrade the theological discipline, such as the claim that the sayings of the theologians are founded upon fables; there is nothing more to be known by knowing theology; and that philosophers are the only wise men of the world.5 We should point out that three have direct bearing on the doctrine of transubstantiation: numbers 139-141. Specifically condemned are the propositions that it is impossible for the accident of quantity to exist per se; that to make an accident exist without a subject involves a contradiction; and that even God cannot make an accident without a subject.6 These articles were likely drawn from the anonymous Commentary on the Physics, 4

CUP I, 543: “… quod nonnulli Parisius studentes in artibus proprie facultatis limites excedentes quosdam manifestos est execrabiles errores … non attendentes illud Gregorii: Qui sapenienter loqui nititur, magno opere metuat, ne ejus eloquio audientium unitas confundatur … Dicunt enim ea esse vera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi sint dues contrarie veritates, et quasi contra veritatem sacre scripture sit veritas in dictis gentilium dampnatorum … Ne igitur incauta locutio simplices pertrahat in errorem, nos tam doctorum sacre scripture, quam aliorum prundentium virorum communicatio consilio districte talia et similia fieri prohibemus, et ea totaliter condempnamus, excommunicantes omnes illos, qui dictos errores vel aliquem ex illis dogmatizaverint, aut deffendere seu sustinere presumpserint quoquomodo …” 5 CUP I, 552: “Quod sermones theologi fundati sunt in fabulis (152);” “Quod nichil plus propter scire theologiam (153);” “Quod sapientes mundi sunt philosophi tantum (154).” 6 CUP I, 551: “Quod accidens existens sine subjecto non est accidens, nisi equivoce; et quod impossibile est quantitatem sive dimensionem esse per se; hoc enim esset ipsam esse substantiam (139);” “Quod facere accidens esse sine subjecto, habet rationem impossibilis, implicantis contradictionem (140);” “Quod Deus non potest facere accidens sine subjecto, nec plures dimensiones simul esse (141).”

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and yet with respect to proposition 139 the Commentary itself is well aware that what might appear contrary to the light of natural reason must still be believed possible by way of a miracle.7 Here is a case in which orthodoxy seems to have been salvaged given the clear provision made for miraculous divine action surpassing human intellectual expectations, and yet it stands censured. Why so? On the one hand Tempier and his commission were content to cast the dragnet wide enough to collect not only the heretical, but all that belongs to that greater pool from which the heretical is bred. And on the other hand, there was a real impatience on the part of ecclesiastical authorities with those statements touching on the faith which stand in need of further explanation and contextualization if their orthodoxy is to be preserved. In the final analysis Wippel seems to be right when concluding that the 1277 condemnation was born of the genuine alarm felt by Tempier and the theologians at what they reckoned to be an uncritical acceptance of pagan philosophy on the part of the Arts faculty, and the illegitimate application of that philosophy to the truths of the faith. It also marks the triumph of the more conservative ‘Neo-Augustinian’ movement, championed by the likes of Bonaventure and Pecham, over both the extreme Aristotelianism of Siger of Brabant, as well as the moderate strain of Thomas Aquinas (Wippel, 195-99). Some eleven days after Tempier published his list, Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby condemned thirty errors at Oxford on March 18, 1277. Of these, four propositions concern grammar, ten concern logic, and sixteen have to do with natural philosophy. Kilwardby states that he is condemning the following errors with the consent of all the Oxford masters. If a master teaches or defends them he will be removed from his post, and if a bachelor, he will not be promoted to master, but will be expelled from the university.8 Given 7

Cf. Wippel, 193: “Nec apparet aliqua, quae aliquando sunt in subiecto, aliquando existere sine subiecto lumine rationis naturalis, licet per miraculum credendum sit hoc posse fieri.” 8 CUP I, 558: “Isti sunt errores condempnati a fratre R. Kilwardebi Archiepiscopo Cantuarensi de consensu omnium magistrorum tam non regencium quam regencium apud Oxoniam …” Ibid., 559: “Qui sustinet, docet, vel defendit ex intencione propria aliquid istorum predictorum, si sit magister, ab officio magisterii deponatur ex communio consilio, si bachelarius, ad magisterium non promoveatur sed ab universitate expellatur.” For the list of propositions cf. CUP I, 558-59.


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the conservative nature of Oxford theology at this time, however, and its rather Augustinian tenor, Leff is likely right that the limited scale of the 1277 Oxford condemnations denote the comparatively small sense of an internal threat to orthodoxy then felt within Oxford itself. If Kilwardby had acted with the unanimous consent of the masters, then the danger may well have been perceived to be an outward one, as the archbishop takes great pains to make sure that it does not infect Oxford (Leff 1968, 290-91).

4 The Parameters of Speculation The Paris condemnations were largely directed against Averroistic determinism, and many of its articles sought to affirm God’s absolute power against any limitations placed upon it by the rules of natural philosophy. God is free to act in any way God sees fit so long as it involves no logical contradiction. Following 1277, recourse to God’s absolute power would then find its way into the treatment of Aristotelian physics and cosmology (Grant 1982). As efforts to emphasize divine sovereignty did increase, so more attention was paid to God’s freedom manifested in his absolute power. While this distinction between God’s absolute and ordained powers, the potentia Dei absoluta and the potentia Dei ordinata, came to play a role in later controversies, the terms themselves may be traced as far back as Peter Damian. The distinction itself was supported by all theologians of the high and late Middle Ages (Courtenay 1973a; Pernoud 1972). Aquinas, for instance, held that even though God never acts in a manner contrary to his divine wisdom, that is not to say that divine wisdom is itself determined, and thus incapable of running a different course. God is quite capable of doing other than he does. Nor does God act as if he were necessitated by his own nature, since his will is the cause of all things.9 Where the change seems to have occurred in 9

ST I, q. 25, a. 5, 142: “Unde divina sapienta non determinatur ad aliquem certum ordinem rerum, ut non possit alius cursus rerum ab ipsa effluere. Unde dicendum est simpliciter quod potest alia facere quam quae facit.” Ibid., 142: “Sed supra ostendimus Deum non agere quasi ex necessitate naturae, sed voluntatem eius esse omnium rerum causam.” Cf. Pernoud, 76-80.

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the fourteenth century was not in the discussion of this dialectic as such, but in the willingness to pursue fully the logical conclusions born of God’s absolute freedom. The absolute/ordained power dialectic did play a role in the eight articles condemned at Oxford in 1315. These articles, which likely belong to an anonymous bachelor of theology, concern the application of this dialectic to divine creation and the Holy Trinity. Specifically condemned was the proposition that God could have, de potentia absoluta, created something prior the generation of the Son. While this is only raised as a possibility, it does strike at the heart of orthodox trinitarianism, since it implies an interval between the Father and the Son’s existence. Traditionally, discussions of what was absolutely possible for God pertained to the created order, the working out of the divine plan; but here it is applied to the uncreated eternal Godhead. The basis for such speculation was likely Scotus’s theory of prioritas originis in quo, whereby one could speak of the divine essence or the Father without necessarily including the other two persons of the Trinity. While Scotus had never proposed what was condemned here, one can detect a Scotistic influence already at Oxford by this time (Courtenay 1991, 15-18). We noted at the outset that Duns Scotus’s emphasis on the primacy of the divine will, manifested in God’s absolute power, served to reaffirm the traditional Augustinian exaltation of divine sovereignty and freedom. Yet for Scotus the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power was never intended to mean that there were some things that God could do that were not in fact ordained, as if this distinction constituted a real division in divine actions. Quite the opposite is true; whatever God does he does ordainedly. From the infinite range of possibilities available to God whatever he actually chooses to do is by definition ordained (Cross, 59). When Ockham argues that God can do some things through his ordained power and others through his absolute power, he too insists that this does not imply two really distinct powers in God. Nor should one think that God can do something absolutely that is not itself ordained, for God can do nothing in an inordinate manner.10 That being said, Ockham 10

Quodlibet VI, 1, 585-86: “Circa primum dico quod quaedam potest Deus facere de potentia ordinata et aliqua de potentia absoluta. Haec distinctio non est sic intelligenda quod in Deo sint realiter duae potentiae quorum una sit ordinata et


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understands the relationship between the two aspects of divine power differently. When Scotus thinks of the many things God can in fact do (de facto), he is thinking of what is open to God through his absolute power. Yet for Ockham, what God does de facto belongs to the realm of God’s ordained power. There are things God can do by his absolute power that he never will do through his ordained power, that is to say, never will do de facto (Randi, 44-45). What God actually does de potentia dei ordinata forms the state of affairs that God commits himself to, even though he could have done otherwise by way of his absolute power. Here in Ockham is the notion of the pact or covenant, whereby God freely pledges himself to certain conditions which he can be counted upon not to violate. It should be noted that this specific application of the pact—as distinct from the pactio of sacramental theology—is not found in Scotus (Cross, 178). Discussion of God’s absolute and ordained power naturally lends itself to questions regarding the level of certainty to be attained through sensible phenomena. Appeals to God’s freedom as First Cause meant accepting a vast array of possible scenarios which would seem to run counter to human expectations of the natural order. This will narrow the field of what can be proven conclusively through natural reason, thereby curtailing the range of philosophy. As a result the field of theology, a science based upon revelational data, must expand, as philosophy, based upon data accessible to the natural faculties, will diminish. Well known is Robert Holcot’s desire to construct a ‘logic of faith’ that will offer carefully constructed arguments which proceed from divinely revealed doctrine. Given the fact that most claims based upon sense perception cannot meet the rigorous criteria of absolute certainty (reduction to the principle of contradiction and knowledge of one’s own existence and mental states) a number of schoolmen pointed out the possibility of God causing creditative acts of non-existent objects (Boler, 471-72). Consider Nicholas Aston, a doctor of theology at Oxford, and later chancellor of the university, who commented on the Sentences between 1345 and 1350. Aston argues that, “all our sensitive cognialia absoluta, quia unica potentia est in Deo ad extra, quae omni modo est ipse Deus. Nec sic est intelligenda quod aliqua potest Deus ordinate facere, et aliqua potest absolute et non ordinate, quia Deus nihil potest facere inordinate.”

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tion which is not infused is not certain, because there can be an illusion in every such instance.” In a lecture hall exchange with a certain colleague (perhaps Thomas Buckingham), Aston raises the question whether his colleague may be Antichrist. For in this present wayfaring state of fallen human nature it is impossible to know whether that man is not a donkey, or is not Antichrist, since the evidence presented to us cannot be counted as infallible. That being said, one may still remain relatively confident even while lacking absolute certainty. “Someone can believe of his colleague that his colleague is not Antichrist, yet one does not know this.”11 As God is free to mislead, then perhaps all the people one sees in the lecture halls are just pieces of wood or stones. For if God so willed he could do even more than this, such that nobody could ever be certain whether the colleague he describes is even a man at all. Again, though, “one should believe that he is a man.”12 Even if this sort of talk might be unsettling, as it was for some, it presents a principled argument. Outward appearances are not always genuine indicators of substantial truth. The transubstantiated host is just such a case, as the substance of Christ’s body exists beneath the accidents of the bread. If sense experience is the basis upon which so many judgments are formed, then one has good reason to proceeed with a measure of caution. This broader acceptance of human fallibility seems less disconcerting, though, than assigning God a deceptive role in the process. Expressing the possibility, however remote, that God might be a deceiver, left many churchmen distressed. Nor were they always placated by the excuse that this was all just harmless speculation that no faithful Catholic would ever really 11

Quoted in Trapp 1956, 231: “Omnis nostra cognitio sensitiva quae non est infusa, non est certitudo quia in omni tali potest esse illusio. … Ideo apparet mihi quod pro statu naturae lapsae et viae, non potest sciri quod ille homo sit ille homo. … Nec potest scire quod ille homo est homo et non asinus. Nec a fortiori, an ille homo sit antichristus. … Et quibus patet quod evidentiae quas habemus quasi ‘determinitas’ sunt fallibiles. … Quilibet potest credere de Socio suo quod Socius suus non est antichristus, non tamen hoc scit.” 12 Quoted in Kennedy 1983a, 54: “Ideo dico quod omnem apparenciam existentem in scholis istis, puta quod in scholis istis sunt homines sedentes et audientes unum legentem, et quod haec sunt ligna et lapides et huiusmodi, et multo maiorem potest Deus facere, nullo homine existente in scholis istis. Et per consequens nullus est certus an id est homo, demonstrando socium suum. Credendum est tamen est homo.”


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believe. For the masters often protested that some of their more outlandish propositions were just tossed up for discussion so that the students could then disprove them. These were merely academic exercises designed to provoke further thought, and thus sharpen young minds—ad dandam viam iuvenibus ulterius cogitandi (Trapp 1965, 241).

5 The Condemnations of 1346 and 1347 Life at Oxford continued rather peaceably throughout the middle of the fourteenth century, but not so Paris. That the Church was convinced that the state of affairs at the University of Paris was perilous is evinced in the censures handed down in 1346 and 1347, in addition to Pope Clement VI’s letter of May 20, 1346. Whether those churchmen whose responsibility it was to evaluate these propositions understood everything that they were reading is open to question, but that they found them dangerous enough to condemn, as they stood or sounded, is significant. Clement writes that some masters and scholars are deviating from the Catholic faith precisely because they are so caught up in strange sophistical teachings, having renounced the philosophy of fellow masters and the expositors of the ancient philosophical texts. What is worse, many theologians have neglected the Bible as well as the sayings of the saints and the expositions of the holy doctors, those very sources from which true theology is acquired. They have lost themselves, says Clement, in philosophical questions and other curious disputations, suspect opinions, and strange doctrines.13 This letter followed just after the 13

CUP II, i, 588: “Nam nonnulli magistri et scolares artium et philosophie scientiis insudantes ibidem, dimissis et contemptis philosophi et aliorum magistororum antiquorum textibus, quod sequi deberent in quantum fidei catholice non obviant, ac veris expositionibus et scripturis, quibus fulcitur ipsa scientia, ad alias varias et extraneas doctrinas sophisticas … Plerique quoque theologi, quod deflendum est amarius, de textu Biblie, originalibus et dictis sanctorum ac doctorum expositionibus (ex quibus vera illa acquiritur theologia, cui non attribeuendum est quicquid ab homnibus sciri potest, ubi plane nulla vanitatis et curiositatis noxia reperitur, sed hoc quo fides saluberrima, que ad veram ducit beatitudinem, initatur (sic) gignitur, roboratur et defenditur) non curantes,

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condemnation of a number of propositions attributed to Nicholas Autrecourt (before May 19, 1346), a few of which we will consider. Central to his thinking, Autrecourt maintained that non-mathematical demonstrative premises can never yield absolute certainty of natural phenomena, for one cannot be sure that God will not intervene by way of his absolute power in a given situation (Serene, 515). The commission went on to condemn as false, and thus in need of revocation, his position that apart from the certitude of faith there is no other certitude except the principle of non-contradiction, and what is concluded in light of it. Also condemned were propositions stating that there is no certain evidence of external material substances; that it is impossible to know evidently that anything other than God could be the cause of any effect; or whether any effect is naturally produced.14 Aside from these epistemological matters there were also propositions more directly concerned with the relationship between God and the believer. Condemned as false, erroneous and scandalous was the proposition that God can command the rational creature to regard him with hatred, and that in so obeying the creature would merit more than if he loves God according to the commandment, since this would require greater effort on his part, inasmuch as it runs contrary to his proper inclination.15 The aforementioned proposition regarding merit seems especially disturbing even though it is simply put forward as being logically possible. The faith of the Church assures one this is not the case, of course, and no Christian need doubt that. Indeed, Autrecourt affirms the certitude of faith. But it raises a specter that is in such stark opposition to the most basic aspect of a believer’s relationship with philosophicis questionibus et aliis curiosis disputationibus et suspectis opinionibus doctrinisque peregrinis et variis se involvunt …” 14 Ibid., 577: “Item, dixi eadem epistola quod excepta certitudine fidei non erat alia certitudo nisi certitudo primi principii vel que in primum principium potest resolvi;” “… quod de substantia materiali alia ab anima nostra non habemus certitudinem evidentie;” “… quod nescimus evidenter, quod alia a Deo possint esse causa alicujus effectus;” “… quod nescimus evidenter, utrum aliquis effectus sit vel esse naturaliter productus.” 15 Ibid., 584: “Quod Deus potest precipere rationali creature quod habeat ipsum odio, et ipsa obediens plus meretur, quam si ipsum diligeret ex precepto, quoniam hoc faceret cum majori conatu et magis contra propriam inclinationem.”


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God that it was bound to evoke a negative reaction. As we have noted, for the more conservative masters and bishops the principal issue was not whether these propositions could be defended when properly explained; their incendiary tone was enough to render them objectionable. As one might imagine, many other factors, political and personal, could well be at work in such proceedings, prescinding from the correctness or orthodoxy of a given set of propositions. Hence, it is not surprising that the fifteenth-century theologian Pierre d’Ailly would later say that many of Autrecourt’s propositions had been condemned out of envy, and were in fact later taught in the university (Thijssen, 89). While Autrecourt admits to having said various things in the context of academic disputation which he does not actually believe, such things could be condemned as “false and scandalous” when taken literally and without further explanation, that is, prout verba sonant.16 But he also makes clear that while he has indeed said all these things in the course of disputation he never obstinately asserted them, and is fully prepared to revoke these propositions at the command of Pope Clement VI. He then must declare his desire to throw himself at the pope’s feet as a prodigal son consumed with sin, pleading for forgiveness.17 The avowal of unconditional surrender in words denoting the most abject servitude may have been pro forma, but they must have been no less humiliating for that. This was the price one had to pay when trying to salvage a career. As it turns out, in 1347 Nicholas publicly recanted, watched the burning of some of his writings, and was deprived of his master’s degree. He was, however, able to secure an appointment to dean of the Cathedral Chapter of Metz in 1350 (Rijk 1994, 2-3). In his letter it seems that the pope was specifically targeting the ‘foreign’ element which had crossed the channel from England and was leading Paris astray from the more traditional Aristotelianism which Clement had followed as a young master some thirty years 16

Ibid., 578: “Item, dixi in quadam disputatione quod Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid.—Falsam et scandalosam prout verba sonant.” 17 Ibid., 578: “Hec omnia dixi disputative et causa collationis nichil asserendo pertinaciter, que paratus sum revocare ad mandatum beatissimi domini nostri Clementis … Vehementius desidero prostratus cadere ante pedes vestre clementie et sanctitatis et cum predictorum detestatione cordiali exemplo filii prodigi dicere: ‘Pater, peccavi in celum et coram te …’”

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earlier (Bianchi, 160-61). Autrecourt was in fact losing patience with Aristotelianism and his adherents, not because he wished to introduce some sort of wildly inventive philosophy in its place, but because he believed true faith, not to mention sound common sense, was being obscured by the study of Aristotle. Ironically, Autrecourt’s response echoes the sentiments of the 1277 condemnations, which were issued in light of the fear that theological doctrines might be tested according to their compatibility with Aristotelian principles, all to the detriment of divine sovereignty. Many Aristotelian conclusions which were presented as demonstrated facts are, in reality, only probable, says Autrecourt, and should be recognized as such; this statement was reckoned as false.18 And while not considered heretical, or even false, it was regarded as presumptuous on Nicholas’s part when he expressed his astonishment that some people are so enamored of Aristotle and Averroes that they abandon matters of morality and the common good.19 In the year following Autrecourt’s condemnation, a gathering of forty-three masters in theology condemned fifty propositions attributed to the Cistercian bachelor in theology, John Mirecourt. He proceeded from the principle that ‘special certainty’ pertains only to necessary truths, while ‘natural certainty’ concerns contingent propositions and permitted reasonable doubt. This is not to say, however, that contingent propositions must be doubted any more than necessary truths (Wood, 58-59). Some of his statements touching on the reliability of God were the very sort that proved so irksome to Wyclif twenty-five years later. Here in 1347 it was considered sufficiently dangerous to claim that Christ was capable of speaking or asserting a falsehood. Another condemned proposition states that it is possible for Christ, according to his created will, to have erred and perhaps 18

Ibid., 580: “Item, quod vidit in dictis Aristotilis et commentatoris mille conclusiones determinatas, contra quas non invenit rationes demonstratas, sed bene occurrerunt sibi alique per quas videtur sibi, quod ita possunt teneri rationes opposite, sicut proposite ab eis, quas tamen dicit esse determinatas, et oppositas non, sed solum probabiles.” 19 Ibid., 581: “Item, quod cum noticia, que potest haberi de rebus secundum apparentia naturalia, possint haberi in modico tempore, multum admiratur quod aliqui student in Aristotile et commentatore usque ad etatem decrepitam, et propter eorum sermones logicos deserant res morales et curam boni communis.”


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even uttered a lie according to his human nature. One more holds that by his created will, Christ could have willed against eternal law at least to the point of venial sin. And still another maintains that Christ’s soul united to the Word can, at least per accidens, hate, spurn or detest God.20 While these were simply propositions presented as the logically possible, and not in fact true, it is no wonder that in the ears of many churchmen they rang of blasphemy, calling into question the veracity of Christ himself. Oxford may not have been quite so unnerved by this sort of speculation, for it is unclear how much attention was paid to the Paris condemnations, though the university was more cautious in the years following 1347. When Wyclif’s academic career began at Oxford there remained some leeway afforded the schoolmen, as seemingly heretical statements were at first given the benefit of the doubt and permitted within the confines of academic exercises. As this speculation was increasingly regarded as irresponsible, however, venturing into the sphere of the heretical, some academic liberty was curtailed (Trapp 1965, 270). Leff sees in all this a skepticism which spelled the end of natural theology, and ushered in the reign of fideism (Leff 1968, 253-54). In this vein, Trapp finds a “fideistic abuse of the potentia dei absoluta,” as the fourteenth-century schools were marked by a sophistication and freedom which led some of the more strident masters into sensationalism. This was not because they undervalued theology, but just the opposite; they were highly doubtful of philosophy’s ability to provide genuine answers (Trapp 1965, 241-42). Kennedy is especially distressed by the state of affairs, not just at Paris, but also at Oxford, where masters like the anonymous Benedictine, Monachus Niger, denied philosophy’s ability to know substances or efficient causes on the basis of our sensible experience of accidents or so-called ‘effects’ (Kennedy 1983a, 43-46). On the other hand, Copleston argues that Autrecourt, for instance, was not a skeptic if that designation refers to 20

CUP II, i, 610: “Quod Christus potuit dixisse et asseruisse falsum assercione creata tam mentali quam vocali;” “Quod possibile est, Christum secundum voluntatem creatam errasse et forsitan secundum hominem menadacium protulisse;” “Quod Christus potuerit voluntate creata velle difformiter contra legem eternam saltem culpa veniali;” “Quod potest dici quod anima Christi Verbo unita saltem per accidens potest odire Deum respuere vel detestari.” For the list of fifty articles cf. ibid., 610-13.

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someone who claims the attainment of certainty is impossible. For he found certainty in logic, mathematics and immediate perception. What is more, he accepted divine revelation as a source of absolute certainty (Copleston, 148). And Courtenay sees no such cause for the alarm sounded by some modern scholars. Because this sort of material was discussed within the realm of the potentia Dei absoluta, it is not so disturbing as it might first appear, given its hypothetical nature (Courtenay 1973a, 82). He argues that while the standard reading of the 1346 and 1347 condemnations presents a desire to curb the extreme results of unchecked potentia Dei absoluta speculation, it is more likely that this was a call to put an end to heated debates in the lecture halls regarding divine will and contingency (Courtenay 1973b, 173-74). Courtenay’s point is well taken, but one still must wonder why the authorities went to such lengths if this was regarded as relatively harmless speculation at the time. For the University of Paris, as well as Pope Clement VI, saw fit to condemn its consequences in the most grave tones. The condemned propositions sprung not from frivolous conjecture, but a meaningful academic inquiry on the part of Autrecourt and Mirecourt. And it is because the entire academic enterprise was considered so meaningful that these questions were treated with such seriousness. The university and ecclesiastical authorities knew very well that ideas have a life of their own apart from the provisos of their creators. Even if they were not properly understood by those who condemned them, they were reckoned to have a tangible effect which transcended the confines and liberties of the lecture halls. As we shall see, Wyclif found much reason to worry, and was not assuaged by assurances that it is all just part of the give-andtake of university instruction.

6 The Pelagian Question The limits of tolerable academic speculation were also at issue in the case of William of Ockham who was called to Avignon in 1324 to defend a list of articles drawn up by a papal commission summoned by John XXII. By 1326 the commission had censured his opinions,


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issuing a list of fifty-one and then forty-nine articles. In the meanwhile Ockham had gotten caught up in the Franciscan poverty dispute and then fled the city in 1328 with his fellow Minorite, Michael of Cesena (Burr 1968, 144). We will address this commission’s censure of his eucharistic theology later, but a brief look at the soteriological issues is instructive when assessing the parameters of orthodox academic speculation. The question centers on a human being’s ability to perform meritorious actions apart from the infusion of divine grace. What is important to bear in mind here is that some articles are censured even though Ockham is only postulating what God could do if he so chose, without ever stating that this is the actual state of affairs. The first article states that the habit of charity is not required to perform a meritorious act, since God by his grace can accept a good movement of the will elicited from a human being’s natural capacities. And such an act will thus be reckoned meritorious through God’s free act of acceptance.21 Article four censures the proposition that through his absolute power God can forgive guilt and punishment apart from the infusion of grace.22 What exactly did Ockham believe? Ockham does say that human beings can act upon their own natural faculties (ex puris naturalibus) apart from grace and so perform works which God will deem suitable enough to reward with the infusion of grace. In other words, human beings are naturally capable of earning a half-merit (meritum de congruo) which is then followed by the infusion of grace necessary to perform the fully meritorious acts which lead to salvation (meritum de condigno). Ockham never claims that a human being can earn his own salvation apart from the grace of God, however, only that he can do his best (facere quod in se) and in that way 21

Article 1, Pelzer, 250: “Reprobando communem modum, quo ponuntur quod habitus caritatis requiritur ad actum meritorium dicit sic: Istud reputo falsum simpliciter, quia bonum motum voluntatis ex puris naturalibus elicitum potest deus acceptare de gratia sua, et per consequens talis actus gratuita dei acceptatione erit meritorius. Ergo ad hoc quod talis actus sit meritorius, non requiritur talis habitus.” 22 Article 4, Pelzer, 253: “Item mouendo dubium vtrum deus potest remittere cuplam sine collacione gratie Respondet sic: dico intendo per gratiam caritatem, quia pono quod sint idem omnino, licet sint hic diuersa nomina et diuersi conceptus. Deus de sua potentia absoluta potest remittere culpam sine collatione gratie. Cuius ratio est, quia quemcumque potest acceptare tanquam dignum vita eterna sine omni gratia inherente. Quare potest remittere culpam et penam sine omni infusione gratie.”

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prepare himself to accept God’s saving grace when offered. While the human being can love God above all things based upon his own right reason, he still cannot earn condign merit apart from charity.23 That God can be counted upon to respond with the infusion of grace is bound up in the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power. By his absolute power God is under no obligation to reward such acts, but he has pledged to do so within the presently constituted order. The natural act of detesting sin is sufficient to expel guilt and so merit the infusion of grace. In fact, de potentia Dei ordinata, God cannot refuse man this grace.24 Ockham at once preserves divine freedom while guaranteeing the stability of the created order. He is relatively sanguine about the wayfarer’s natural capacities to further his own prospects of salvation. But he has not diminished divine sovereignty in the process, precisely because the rewarding of such acts rests solely with the divine prerogative. God is always trustworthy, and he has established this system to which he is wholly, though freely, committed. When charged with Pelagianism, Ockham rightly points out that Pelagius’s error was in thinking that a human being can eradicate all sin, and thereby merit eternal life by relying solely on his own natural capacities, thus apart from infused grace.25 It is true that Ockham does say that, de potentia Dei absoluta, a human being can be saved without created charity. One reason being, that if God can accomplish immediately whatever he chooses to accomplish through secondary causes, he is free to dispense with the secondary cause of created charity.26 But then Aquinas also admitted 23

Quaestio VI, 11, 320: “Ad argumentum dico aliquis de congruo potest mereri gratiam ex puris naturalibus sicut aliquis diligens Deum super omnia naturaliter secundum rectam rationem, at alias circumstantias requistas ad actum meritorium, meretur primam infusionem caritas. Sed de condigno non potest aliquis mereri gratiam et gloriam sine caritate.” 24 Reportatio IV, 10-11, 233: “Si quaeras an ille actus detestandi sufficiat ad expulsionem culpae et infusionem gratie, respondeo quod itse actus solus est sufficiens [ad] meritum de congruo. Nam habito isto actu Deus statim infundit gratiam, et forte de potentia dei ordinata non potest non infundere.” 25 Quaestio VI, 11, 320: “Ad errorem Pelagii dico quod ipse posuit quod aliquis ex puris naturalibus potest vitare omne peccatum, et actuale et originale, mereri vitam aeternam de condigno, et in hoc erravit.” 26 Quodlibet VI, 1, 587: “Circa secundum articulum dico primo quod homo potest salvari sine caritate creata de potentia Dei absoluta. Haec conclusio probatur


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the general principle that God is free to forego the use of secondary causes. At any rate, Ockham affirms the orthodox teaching as he argues that no one will ever be saved, or even elicit a meritorious act according to the laws presently ordained by God, without created grace. How does he know this? Because Holy Scripture and the saints tell him so.27 Ockham points out that Pelagius was a heretic because he claimed that the infusion of grace is not required to attain eternal life de facto, that is, according to the presently constituted order. Ockham simply says that this could have been the case had God so established it through his absolute power.28 God could have chosen to save human beings apart from the habitus gratiae (Scotus says this too), but he has not done so. That being said, Ockham knows by the infallible testimony of the Sacred Page that this is not the present state of affairs: “According to the laws presently ordained by God, it is impossible for God to forgive guilt or punishment apart from the infusion of grace, and this only can be proven by Holy Scripture.”29 Human speculation regarding all that is possibly true always bows to the sacred authority which tells him just what is true in fact. Ockham is committed to the Catholic faith as expressed through the authentic tradition of the Church, but such loyalty to the eternal truth of faith also means that a person should never revoke an error unless it is clearly proven to him to be contrary to the Catholic truth. To do otherwise is tantamount to telling a lie, since one would then be speaking against one’s own conscience. Thus until the error is clearly demonstrated to the man suspected of heresy he must not be corrected (Shogimen 2001, 612-17).30 primo sic: quidquid Deus potest facere mediante causa secunda in genere causae efficientis vel finis, potest immediate per se …” 27 Ibid., 588: “Secundo dico quod numquam salvabitur homo nec salvari poterit, nec umquam eliciet vel elicere poterit actum meritorium secundum leges a Deo nunc ordinatas sine gratia creata. Et hoc teneo propter Scripturam Sacram et dicta Sanctorum.” 28 Ibid., 588-89: “Respondeo quod non, quia Pelagius posuit quod de facto non requiritur gratia ad vitam aeternam habendam sed quod actus ex puris naturalibus elicitus est meritorius vitae aeternae de condigno. Ego autem pono quod solum est meritorius per potentiam Dei absolutam acceptantem.” 29 Ibid., VI, 4, 598: “Tertio dico quod secundum leges iam ordinatas a Deo non potest Deus remittere culpam nec poenam sine infusione gratiae, et hoc solum potest probari per Scripturam Sacram.” 30 I Dialogus iv, 14, quoted in Shogimen ibid., 612: “Dicunt enim nonnulli quod nullus correctus a praelato vel iurisdictionem habente tenetur errorem revocare

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Despite Ockham’s various distinctions, in the final analysis, his soteriology was out of step with the more traditional medieval doctrine of merit. The notion that a person could merit the infusion of grace, relying solely upon his own natural faculties, was not in keeping with earlier formulations. Now it is certainly true that the distinction between meritum de congruo and de condigno was recognized by the orthodox schoolmen before him. Aquinas, for instance, says that meritorious works can proceed from human free will, or from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If from the former there is no condignity on account the maximum inequality between the deed and the reward. Still, there is some congruity, or fittingness, owing to a certain proportional equality. In order to earn condign merit, worthy of eternal life, the work must proceed from the grace of the Holy Spirit.31 That being said, there remains a crucial difference between Aquinas and Ockham here. Aquinas reckons that all the good which the human being does is itself from God, inasmuch as the very means and measure of human power to do the good is entirely dependent upon God. Thus all human merit is the result of divine ordination.32 Indeed, for Aquinas the good movement of the free will by which the person is then prepared to receive the gift of grace is itself an act of the free will moved by God. No one can prepare himself for grace without the help of grace itself.33 Bonaventure, for his part, clearly states that in antequam fuerit sibi patenter ostensum modo praedicto quod error suus est contrarius veritati.” 31 ST I, ii, q. 114, a. 3; 567-68: “Si consideratur secundum substantiam operis, et secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, sic non potest ibi esse condignitas, propter maximam inaequalitatem. Sed ibi congruitas, propter quandam aequalitatem proportionis. … Si autem loquamur de opere meritorio secundum quod procedit ex gratia Spiritus Sancti, sic est meritorium vitae aeternae ex condigno.” 32 ST I, ii, q. 114, a. 1; 565-66: “Unde non potest hominis ad Deum esse iustitia secundum absolutam aequalitatem, sed secundum proportionem quandam: inquantum scilicet uterque operatur secundum modum suum. Modus autem et mensura humanae virtutis homini est a Deo. Et ideo meritum hominis apud Deum esse non potest nisi secundum praesuppositionem divinae ordinationis.” 33 ST I, ii, q. 112, a. 2; 551: “Et secundum hoc, ipse bonus motus liberi arbitrii quo quis praeparatur ad donum gratiae suscipiendum, est actus liberi arbitrii moti a Deo: et quantum ad hoc, dicitur homo se praeparare, secundum illud Prov. 16 [1]: Hominis est praeparare animum. Et est principaliter a Deo movente liberum arbitrium.” ST I, ii, q. 109, a. 6; 534: “Ergo homo non potest se praeparare ad gratiam absque auxilio gratiae.”


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order for a person to prepare himself to receive heavenly grace he must first receive the gift of grace freely given (gratia gratis data). Thus if anyone is to receive the sanctifying grace which produces works of condign merit, namely the gratia gratum faciens, his free will must dispose itself with the help of the gratia gratis data.34 Modern scholarship has designated Ockham a ‘semi-Pelagian’ based upon his confidence in the wayfarer’s ability to earn the habit of grace on his own, even as he denied that within the presently ordained system anyone could ever secure the ultimate end of salvation without the habit. That being said, his fundamental position hardly died out with him, as the work of Gabriel Biel, among others in the fifteenth century, attests. The Oxford theologian, Thomas Bradwardine offered a markedly Augustinian response to the whole question of grace and merit. Even a brief glance is instructive when documenting the more conservative line of thinking at Oxford to which Wyclif himself was very much indebted, and whose cause he consciously sought to champion a generation later. A secular cleric, and later Archbishop of Canterbury, Bradwardine was a fellow of Merton College until 1336, and as a young academic concentrated on the physics and mathematics for which Merton was so famous (BRUO 1:244-45). It was during his student years that he experienced a marked transformation in his perception of God’s power and the role of grace in human affairs. He laments that as a young student attending the lectures of the philosophers he rarely heard anything of grace, only that human beings are the lords of their own free acts, endowed with the power to do good or evil. With a flash of grace, however, his mind was changed, as he came to realize that the grace of God precedes all good works in both time and nature. God must be the principal actor freely effecting merit within the believer prior to any human action.35 His 1344 De causa 34

Breviloquium V, 2; 298: “Hinc est etiam, quod ad hoc ut se praeparet ad donum supernae gratiae, cum sit in se recurvus, indiget dono alterius gratiae gratis datae, maxime post naturam lapsam …” Ibid., V, 3; 299: “Postremo, quia praedispositio ad formam completivam debet esse ei conformis; ad hoc quod liberum arbitrium se disponat ad gratiam gratum facientem, indiget adminiculo gratiae gratis datae.” 35 De causa Dei contra Pelagium I, 35; 308: “In Scholis enim Philosophorum, raro solebam quicquam audire de gratia, nisi aequivoce forsan dicta; sed tota die audivi, quod nos sumus domini nostrorum actum liberorum, et quod in nostra potestate est, operari bene vel male, habere virtutes vel vitia, cum similibus suis

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Dei contra Pelagium is born of just such a spirit and is indicative of the rise of a very powerful Augustinian resurgence in the fourteenth century, and most especially at Oxford, evinced in the wider variety of Augustine’s texts quoted and the increased number of commentaries on his works. While it is true that Oxford had quite a long history of Augustinian theology, starting with Grosseteste during the early thirteenth century, and later with Kilwardby and Scotus, what marks this current of Augustinian thought is the emphasis on praedestinatio ante praevisa merita (Courtenay 1980). As we shall see, Wyclif’s own soteriology was very typical of this strain of Augustinianism. While the Venerable Inceptor rightly distanced himself from Pelagius, his entire program was reckoned by Bradwardine to be an infringement upon divine sovereignty. God will save whom he will such that the faithful, by virtue of their predestination, gain final perseverance through the grace of God alone, apart from any human acts of preparation. Good works can only follow justification, and in no way contribute to it.36 As such, Bradwardine rejects the notion that any human work could be meritorious before God in the absence of grace. And while Ockham insisted on the present need for grace to merit condignly, Bradwardine even discounts the notion that one really merits eternal life de condigno, inasmuch as no work is so good or meritorious in God’s sight.37 As Oberman points out, for Bradwardine meritum de condigno must be regarded as a gift from God granted to accomplish the goal of salvation which God has determined from all eternity (Oberman 1957, 158). Bradwardine was dead by 1349 and the debate of over Pelagianism was likely over by the 1360s at Oxford, though Wyclif does weigh in multis. … Postea vero adhuc nondum Theologiae factus auditor, praedictio argumento velut quodam gratiae radio visitatus, sub quadam tenui veritatis imagine, videbar mihi videre a longe gratiam Dei omnia bona merita precedentem tempore et natura, scilicet gratiam Dei voluntatem, qui prius utroque modo vult merentem saluari, et prius naturaliter operatur meritum eius in eo, quam ipse, sicut est in omnibus motibus primus Motor.” 36 Ibid., I, 43, 394: “Hominem iustificari per fide sine operibus legis; non quin credens, post per dilectionem debeat operari, ut et Abraham voluit filium immolare; Sequentur enim opera iustificatum, non praecedunt iustificandum, sed sola fide sine operibus praecentibus fit homo iustus.” 37 Ibid., I, 39, 360: “Dicitur autem quod nullus meretur condigne vitam aeternam, quia nullus opus est tam bonum aut tam meritorium apud Deum …”


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on it around 1370, while still a bachelor of theology. His reaction is worthy of a brief note too, as it will help define our picture of Wyclif’s mindset: the ‘conservative’ side of the debate he chose to align himself with, even if a generation past. Against those whom he calls the “modern Pelagians,” Wyclif argues that their error springs from the manner in which they employ the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power (Robson, 207-12). He recognizes this distinction of course and protests that he would never claim that God, in his absolute power, could not save a man without special grace, or could not allow someone to merit eternal life without sanctifying grace.38 But while such things are true in principle, Wyclif is clearly bothered by the speculative quality of the semi-Pelagian position. He argues that grace is the cause of every human action, but these “moderns” think grace is only required under God’s present order, and not absolutely, even though such a position has no grounding in Scripture.39 And this is the aspect of the speculative process he abhors the most, the positing of possibilities that have no basis in revealed truth, namely that truth which was given to the Church in Holy Writ and preserved under the aegis of the Holy Spirit. More than merely vain speculation, it is for Wyclif that sort of prideful curiosity born of ingratitude which finds he so distasteful. Everywhere lurks the exaltation of the creature at the expense of his sovereign creator. But the fact remains that God enjoys full dominion over all creation and is under no obligation to reward anything. It is only by his grace that he so orders the human free will that one might earn some reward.40 In his 1374 De dominio divino, written two years after becoming a doctor, Wyclif contends that no one can merit without a special 38

De volucione Dei, in De ente librorum duorum II,vii, 195-96: “Set absit a me ista sentencia, deus enim de potencia absoluta non posset servare hominem sine speciali gracia nec permittere ipsum mereri vitam eternam sine speciali gracia gratum faciente.” Cf. ibid., 195 where Wyclif refers to the “pelagianos modernos.” 39 De scientia Dei, quoted in Robson, 210: “… et per consequens multo magis est [gracia] causa cuiuslibet operis vel accidentis positivi huius creature. … Unde multi Modernorum ad tantum desipiunt quod ponunt requiri talem graciam de lege, sed non de potencia dei absoluta. Sed si non fallor, in toto corpore Scripture non potest fundari talem graciam esse dandam.” 40 De scientia Dei, quoted in Robson, 212: “Congruum namque est valde quod deus, habens plenum dominium creature, de gracia sua ordinet creaturam liberi arbitrii ut propter observanciam liberam rectitudinis mereatur premium.”

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prevenient grace.41 He specifically notes the error of Pelagius in positing that someone can merit apart from created grace, for no one can merit anything unless God makes him acceptable through an external grace which precedes all merit on the part of the creature.42 Indeed, it was Pelagius’s mistake to so extol free will that he thought man could be deserving of merit apart from grace.43 Here Wyclif argues that as all merit on the human being’s part is itself a gift of God, it follows that no creature can earn a condign merit from God, but only a congruous merit, inasmuch as the creature has really done nothing fully worthy of reward. After all, God freely grants the reward, the means to attain the reward, and even moves the will through prevenient grace to seek the reward.44

7 Conclusion Wyclif’s reaction to the “modern Pelagians” points out his own strong Augustinian tendencies with such an emphasis placed upon divine sovereignty in every aspect of the soteriological process. Indeed, his own ‘conservative’ nature puts him very much in the mainstream of fourteenth-century theology. His reaction to the use of the potentia Dei absoluta is illustrative of that antipathy for such speculation 41

De dominio divino III, v, 240: “Talem ergo ponendo sine pluri plana est Scripture sententia quomodo nemo potest mereri sine speciali gracia previe concurrente….” 42 Ibid., 239: “Et in istum errorem grossum propter defectum methaphisice credo Pelagium cum suis complicibus incidisse: posuit enim hominem posse mereri sine creata gracia … Sed sententia apostoli est luculenter fundabilis, quod nemo potest mereri aliquid nisi Deus ex externa gracia faciat eum gratum, ex qua gratitudine vel gratia naturaliter previe requisita precedit quodcunque meritum creature.” 43 Ibid., 243: “Tollitur secundo errorr Pellagii ad tantum extollentis liberum arbitrium, quod ponit hominem posse sine gracia promereri.” 44 Ibid., 226: “Et patet quod omnis donnacio divini muneris creature est praestacio, et contra. Et patet verus sensus doctorum dicencium quod idem est Deum servientem suum quomodolibet premiare et munus proprium coronare. Ipse enim prestat omnino meritum et instrumentum merendi, ac preveniendo excitat et necessitat ad merendum. … Ex istis sequitur quod nulla creatura potest a Deo mereri aliquid nisi de congruo, sic quod nichil penitus de condigno.”


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regarding the hypothetical order which he shared with those more conservative lights in his time. It also signals the desperate need he felt to construct a system of abiding security. That quest for assurance, for certitude, is the subject of our next chapter. Despite Wyclif’s misgivings, and those of his contemporaries, about the trend of speculation, it is true that one can present at least the possibility of a heretical conclusion while still remaining steadfastly orthodox. That may not legitimize such remarks, but there are principled reasons for saying this sort of conduct is acceptable in the lecture hall. Many capable thinkers in positions of authority at the time were not swayed by those reasons, however. It is not that the ecclesiastical and academic authorities must always have doubted the personal orthodoxy of these scholars. From their perspective, scholars function in a wide arena and are responsible for the greater good of the university. Proposing the possibility of events which contradict the most basic teachings of the Catholic Faith exceeds the warrants of constructive pedagogy and simply scandalizes. Indeed, all sides were convinced that divine revelation, handed down to the Church under the infallible guidance of the Holy Spirit, was by definition entirely trustworthy. Nobody was proposing a re-evaluation of Catholic truth itself, but some had sharply curtailed the field of what could be known by natural reason, and it was left to faith to make up the difference. Merely admitting the limitations of natural reason did not make one a danger to faith and morals, though; it was the speculation regarding the range of divine possibilities that proved so worrisome. We must be careful not to read our own assessments of the relative lack of danger back into the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, thereby dismissing the legitimate concerns raised by many thoughtful and gifted men of that age. This means taking their concerns very seriously, and dealing with them on their own terms. While we might say with confidence that the great creeds of the Church were never really in danger, many schoolmen and ecclesiastics were genuinely worried about the tenor of the debate, precisely because they feared where it might lead. The otherwise orthodox scholar speculates on all manner of possibly heretical scenarios and soon these thoughts find a a life of their own. The threat of heresy, that which could unravel the whole fabric of the Christian faith and society, was understood to be

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so great as to warrant constant vigilance on the part of ecclesiastical authorities. The schools of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the universities of the thirteenth and fourteenth, were regarded as the great bulwarks in the fight against heresy, the places where true doctrine would be systematized and thereby secured. No wonder diligent oversight was deemed increasingly necessary as the Middle Ages wore on, lest the very enterprise which provided orthodoxy with its intellectual edifice might now construct the mallet of heterodoxy.


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2 The Metaphysics of John Wyclif

W

yclif was convinced of the inexorable connection between realist metaphysics and theological orthodoxy. His positions on a whole host of topics, not the least of which being Scripture and the Eucharist, are scarcely comprehensible apart from his metaphysical realism. In realism he believes he has located an unshakeable foundation upon which he could then fortify confidence in the abiding order of creation and the absolute trustworthiness of God. Moreover, as one examines the structure of Wyclif’s realism one cannot help but be struck by the affective piety that courses through his entire discussion of universals. Very quickly the reader realizes that this is a sacred subject for Wyclif, just as it was for so many of his Christian predecessors. Modern scholars have not always agreed upon the precise manner in which Wyclif’s realism reveals itself within his thought as a whole, though this is hardly surprising given its multifarious manifestations in works concerning ecclesiology, biblical exegesis, dominion, and sacramental theology. What is undeniable, however, is that the influence is abiding even when not solely determinative. Workman lays a great deal of stress on Wyclif’s philosophical training, arguing that Wyclif was primarily a metaphysician (Workman 1:30-40). Thomson maintains the centrality of Wyclif’s realism in the formulation of his theological principles apart from which, he says, Wyclif would not have become embroiled in the later controversies (Thomson 1931) For Robson, Wyclif was a thinker imprisoned by his own tendentious, and ultimately infeasible, realist system (Robson, 3-5). On the other hand, Kenny displays a great deal of sympathy for Wyclif’s realist thought as it is posed in opposition to nominalism. In fact, he expressly rejects Robson’s negative appraisal of Wyclif’s abilities, speculating that had Wyclif not been deemed a heretic he

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may have taken his place with the likes of Ockham and Scotus (Kenny 1985, 104-05). Leff would revise some of his earlier views and come to the conclusion that Wyclif offered a well-reasoned metaphysical program which permeated many aspects of his theology (Leff 1987). Over the course of this study, there will be opportunity to examine the impact of Wyclif’s realism upon some of the central facets of his theological outlook, but suffice it to say here that even in places where his metaphysical realism may not have been the overriding factor it was always an integral factor. Because realism formed the foundation upon which he understood the relationship between God and creation, it is present in all aspects of his thought. Thus any disagreement among scholars regarding its role in a given theological question should focus on the precise manifestation of that influence, and not its existence as such.

1 Wyclif the Oxford Realist Despite the fact that Wyclif sometimes writes as if to convey the impression that he heads a small minority battling to defend realist principles against the onslaught of nominalism, the truth is that realists long formed the majority at fourteenth-century Oxford, even if the university did produce the great nominalist William of Ockham. Despite the fact that realism continued to dominate the scene in Wyclif’s own day, that still did not prevent him from being genuinely troubled by nominalism and the skepticism he thought it engendered. Hence a brief look at the central points of difference separating the two camps is in order before taking up Wyclif’s own views specifically. Walter Burley, an older contemporary of Ockham, and one of his most persistent critics, was much praised by Wyclif. Burley’s own brand of moderate realism was common among almost all of Ockham’s fellow schoolmen, as he held that the human person is a collection of universals, all of which exist outside of the intellect. These universals are distinct from one another and from the particular, though they are not found apart from the individual (Weisheipl 1968, 174-80; Adams 1982, 411-12). For Ockham, though, the universal is not a substance

2~The Metaphysics of John Wyclif

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existing outside the mind, but rather an intention of the mind or a voluntarily instituted sign. Propositions are composed of universals, but these universals are not substances.1 Ockham does believe that signs are able to signify the truth, and that words have the power as signs to convey reality within a proposition. For instance, to say that ‘Socrates is white’ denotes that Socrates is that thing which possesses the quality of whiteness.2 One cannot say, however, that in this proposition the predicate ‘white’ supposits for the form ‘whiteness,’ as if ‘whiteness’ were itself a real thing separate from Socrates.3 Wyclif came on the scene some thirty years after Ockham had left Oxford and early on began to develop a unique style of realism. This was not lost on his contemporaries and, as it turns out, his lectures on metaphysics were apparently quite popular with students. By the time Wyclif was a master of arts in 1360 his metaphysical system was in place, though he admits to a youthful indiscretion, flirting with nominalism for a time until learning from Holy Scripture the true meaning of eternal ideas.4 That his lectures would have found such a following is really not surprising, for as Robson observes, to those also troubled by skepticism, Wyclif’s system offered the possibility of epistemological certitude, in light of his belief that human beings can attain through metaphysics a knowledge of the Divinity, and other 1

Summa Logicae I, 15, 53: “Quod etiam ratione confirmari potest, nam omne universale, secundum omnes, est de multis predicabile; sed sola intentio animae vel signum voluntarie institutum natum est praedicari et non substantia aliqua; ergo sola intentio animae vel signum voluntarie institutum est universale.” Ibid., 54: “Item, propositio non est nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; igitur partes eius non sunt nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; huiusmodi autem non sunt substantiae particulares. Constat igitur quod nulla propositio ex substantiis componi potest. Componitur autem propositio ex universalibus, universalia igitur non sunt substantiae ullu modo.” Cf. Adams 1987, 1:29-31. 2 Ibid., I, 63, 194: “Et sic, proportionaliter, dicendum est de praedicato: nam per istam ‘Sortes est albus’ denotatur quod Sortes est illa res quae habet albedinem, et ideo praedicatum supponit pro illa re quae habet alibedinem.” Cf. Boehner 1958a, 176-81. 3 Ibid., 194: “Ex quo sequitur quod falsum est, quod aliqui ignorantes dicunt, quod concretum a parte praedicati supponit pro forma; videlicet quod in ista ‘Sortes est albus’ li albus supponit pro alibedine, nam haec est simpliciter falsa ‘albedo est alba,’ qualitercumque supponant.” 4 De dominio divino I, ix, 63: “Et diu fuit antequam ex Scripturis intellexi istam sentenciam de ydeas; quam cum illustratus a Deo perfunctorie repperissem, cum

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things necessary for salvation (Robson, 142-47). Wyclif’s metaphysical assurance is born not of an over-confidence in the innate capabilities of human reason, but is instead rooted in a longstanding Augustinian realist tradition which recognized the vital connection between spiritual purity and intellectual vision. Divine illumination opens up the truth of the divinely constituted cosmos. Wyclif is convinced therefore that divine illumination is essential when comprehending the articles of faith, for if they were demonstrable by the light of natural reason alone the pagan philosophers would have recognized the Trinity.5 Notwithstanding that, there is real congruity between faith and reason, such that the saints could prove articles of faith like the uncreated Trinity, precisely because they are not only believable, but reasonable as well.6 Augustine set much of the tone for the next thousand years of Christian realism, though the degree to which he was followed on specific aspects varied. Wyclif will find in the Bishop of Hippo a man after his own heart, who could be relied upon to provide guidance in the quest for truth. When Augustine had been troubled by the skepticism of the New Academy he found in Neoplatonism a basis for certainty, namely the intelligible realm of truth, of which the sensible is but a reflection.7 But where Plato spoke of an independent realm of eternal and immutable forms, Augustine the Christian Neoplatonist located such forms within the Divine Mind.8 This eternal plane of forms, grounded in God himself, offered Augustine a foundation gaudio gracias egi Deo, cum suo famulo Augustino et aliis quos Deus eternaliter ordinat ad hoc ministeraliter me iuvare.” 5 De trinitate II, 17: “Item, si articuli fidei essent demonstrabiles in lumine naturali, tunc verisimile est quod philosophi hoc scivissent, quia non reperitur aliquos philosophos invenisse trinitatem personarum in lumine naturali, ergo hoc est non invenibile.” 6 Ibid., III, 28: “Quantum vero ad philosophos post incarnacionem, dico quod beatus Johannis Evangelista, beatus Augustine, et multi alii sequentes eos congrue probaverunt trinitatem increatam et alios articulos fidei; nec dubium legenti libros Augustine perfecte, quin de intencione sua fiat quod trinitas personarum non solum est credibilis sed intelligibilis.” 7 Contra Academicos III, 17, 37; CCSL 29; 57: “ … Platonem senisse duos esse mundos, unum intellegibilem, in quo ipsa veritas habitaret, istum autem sensibilem, quem manifestum est nos uisu tactuque sentire; itaque illum uerum, hunc ueri similem et ad illius imaginem factum …” 8 De diversis quaestionibus 83, 46, 2; CCSL 44/a; 73: “ … atque has rationes rerum principales appellat ideas Plato, non solum ideae, sed ipsae verae sunt, quia


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upon which to render sure judgments, for here was the unchanging truth which surpassed his own mutable mind.9 There is a strong moral element involved in this epistemological program, though, as Augustine insisted that such forms could only be perceived by the soul insofar as it is purified and clings to what it encounters through love.10 The searcher must transcend himself, turning his gaze from the carnal to the spiritual, and thus properly ordering his affections.11 No longer looking to himself, the Christian Neoplatonist focuses all his attention on Christ the Teacher dwelling within the human heart.12 For Robert Grosseteste, the thirteenth-century theologian and bishop whom Wyclif so admired, the truth of things is measured in terms of their conformity to their own eternal reasons existing in the Eternal Word.13 And while Grosseteste did not reject the Aristotelian principle that knowledge is gained through sense experience of particulars, he still believed that all knowledge, whether pertaining to aeternae sunt et eiusdem modi atque incommutabiles manent.” Ibid., 71: “Sunt namque ideae principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae divina intellegentia continentur.” 9 Confessiones VII, 17, 23; CCSL 27; 107: “Quaerens enim, unde approbarem pulchritudinem corporum siue caelestium siue terrestrium et quid mihi praesto esset integre de mutabilibus iudicanti et dicenti: ‘Hoc its esset debet, illud non ita’, hoc ergo quaerens, unde iudicarem, cum ita iudicarem, inueneram incommutabilem et ueram ueritatis aeternitatem supra mentem commutabilem.” 10 De div. quaest. 46, 2; CCSL 44/a; 73: “Sed anima rationalis inter eas res, quae sunt a deo conditae, omnia superat et deo proxima est, quando pura est; eique in quantum caritate cohaeserit …” 11 De vera religione XXXIX; CCSL 32; 234: “Quid igitur restat, unde non possit anima recordari primam pulchritudinem, quam reliquit, quando de ipsis suis vitiis potest? … Recognosce igitur, quae sit summa conuenientia. Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi. In interiore homine habitat ueritas. Et si tuam naturam mutabilem inueneris, transcende et te ipsum. … Tu autem ad eam quarendo uenisti non locorum spatio, sed mentis affectu, ut ipse interior homo cum suo inhabitatore non infima et carnali, sed summa et spiritali uoluptate conueniat.” 12 De magistro XI; CCSL 29; 195-96: “De uniuersis autem, quae intellegimus, non loquentem, qui personat foris, sed intus ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus ueritatem, uerbis fortasse ut consulamus admoniti. Ille autem, qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus …” 13 De veritate in Die philosophischen Werke, 137: “Cum autem, ut praedictum est, veritas cuiuscunque est eius conformitas rationi suae in aeterno Verbo, patet, quod omnis creata veritas non nisi in lumine veritatis summae conspicitur.” Ibid., 141-42: “Nec scitur vere aliquid creatum esse, nisi in mente videatur ab aeterno Verbo supportari.”

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universals or singulars can be found within the divine intellect (McEvoy, 83-84). The comprehension of a thing is always more certain and more pure in its exemplar state than in its temporal instantiation. For as the divine mind is the very brightest light, the eternal reasons of creatures are most lucid as they subsist in that divine mind.14 Commenting on the Posterior Analytics, Grosseteste’s own sense of the nexus forged by devotion and contemplation comes to the fore when he speaks of the eternal exemplars as the principles of knowledge and being upon which the purified intellect can fix its gaze, and in which it will know created things most clearly and truly.15 Vision is inseparable from purity: “The reason why the soul’s vision is clouded over through the weight of the corrupted body is that the soul’s affections are inseparable from its ability to see clearly.” One’s disposition, must be pure, free from the snares of the flesh. For if the love and the affections of the soul incline toward the body and the enticements of the flesh, sight too will be drawn away from its light and fall into darkness and sloth.16 Wyclif’s own realist system is apparent in the earliest of his surviving works, the 1360 De logica, written while a master of arts. Here Wyclif offers a threefold classification of universals. “The first is the universal 14

De veritate, 142: “Sed cum duplex sit rei cognitio, una in se, altera in exemplari, vel similutidine sua, cum similitudo vel exemplar lucidoris est essentiae, quam ipsa res, cuius similitudo, nobilior et clarior et apertior est rei in sua similitudine vel exemplari cognitio. … Ac per hoc, cum divina essentia sit lux lucidissima, ominis cognitio eius per similitudines, quam per se ipsam obscurior, in rationibus vero aeternis creaturarum exemplar lucidissimum, omnis creaturae cognitio certior et purior et manifestor est, quam in se ipsa.” 15 Commentarius in posteriorum analyticorum libros I, 7, 139-40: “Cognitiones enim rerum creandarum que fuerunt in causa prima eternaliter sunt rationes rerum creandarum et cause formales exemplares et ipse sunt etiam creatrices. Et hae sunt quas vocavit Plato ydeas et mundum archetypum, et he sunt secundum genera et species et principia tam essendi quam cognoscendi, quia, cum intellectus purus potest in his defigere intuitium, in istis verissime et manifestissime cognoscit res creatas, et non solum res creatas, sed ipsam lucem primam in qua cognoscit cetera.” 16 Commentarius I, 14, 215-16: “Causa autem quare obnubilatur visus anime per molem corporis corrupti est quod affectus et aspectus anime non sunt divisi.” Ibid., 216: “Cum igitur amor et affectus anime convertitur ad corpus et ad illecebras corporales necessario trahit secum aspectum et avertit eum a suo lumine.” Ibid., 216: “Aspectus autem mentis a suo lumine aversus necessario convertitur in tenebras et otium.” Cf. Southern 1993, 3-14.


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of causation, such as God, the sun, the moon etc.; the second is the universal of communication, such as human nature, or angelic etc., and they are called universals of communication because they are universal natures, communicated to a number of subjects. And in this way human nature is communicated to all individuals of the human species. … The third is the universal of representation, such as those terms ‘man,’ ‘animal’ and ‘stone,’ whether they be written terms, spoken terms, or intentions in the mind interchangeable with them. And they are called universals of representation, because they principally represent real universals, just as the term ‘man’ principally or primarily represents human nature, for that nature is the universal species of all men, and a real universal.”17 Writing in the early 1370s, Wyclif offers something similar: “The first is the universal of causation, as God is the most universal cause, and after him there are the created universals according to the order by which they originate from God. The second is the universal of communication as, for instance, a reality is communicated to many subjects, as is the case with human nature and other common and specific natures. The third is the universal of representation, which is a sign of the prior universals; and these are only called universals equivocally, as a picture of a man is equivocally the man.”18 Hence, the first sort is the universale ante rem; the second is the universale in re; and the last is the universale post rem.

17

De logica I, ii, 8: “Iam consequenter dicendum est de universalibus, supponendo primo quod tripliciter dicitur universale: primum est universale causacione, ut Deus, sol, luna etc.; secundum est universale communicacione, ut natura humana, sive angelica etc.; et dicuntur universalia communicacione, quia sunt universales naturae, communicate pluribus suppositis. Et sic natura humana communicatur omnibus individuis speciei humane … Tercium est universale representacione; sicut isti termini, homo, animal, lapis, sive sint termini scripti, sive termini vocales, sive intenciones in anima cum illis convertibiles. Et dicuntur universalia representacione, quia principaliter representant universalia a parte rei, sicut iste terminus, homo, respresentat principaliter vel primarie naturam humanam, que natura est species universalis ominium hominum, et universale a parte rei …” 18 De universalibus I, 15-16: “Primo quod triplex est maneries universalium in genere. Primum est universale causatione, ut Deus est causa universalissima et post eum res universales creatae secundum ordinem, quo originantur a Deo. Secundus est universale communicatione, ut puta res communicata multis suppositis, ut natura humana et aliae naturae generales et specificae. Tertium est universale repraesentatione, ut signa priorum universalium, quae aequivoce

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Wyclif’s own threefold system bears a genuine resemblance to that of the sixth-century Neoplatonist Simplicius, whose commentary on the Categories was translated into Latin by William of Moerbeke in 1266.19 If Wyclif had read this work at some point he makes no mention of it. But his own system is also quite similar to Grosseteste’s, recounted by Wyclif in his Tractatus de universalibus. Here he attributes five categories of universals to Grosseteste, the first of which is the eternal exemplar idea subsisting in God; the second the common created reason in superior causes such as the celestial spheres; the third the common form in singulars; the fourth the common form in its accidents; while the fifth is just the sign or concept.20 Yet for all the similarity Wyclif never claims to have adopted or modified Grosseteste’s system. And while we noted that Wyclif’s philosophical lectures were well attended by fascinated students, on the other side of the coin, there is no record of Wyclif himself having studied under any master (Robson, 144).

dicuntur universalia sicut homo pictus aequivoce homo.” Note that Kenny provides an excellent translation of Tractatus de universalibus, but for the sake of consistency throughout the whole study any translations are my own. 19 In Praedicamenta Aristotelis V, 110-11: “Forte igitur summendum triplex commune, hoc quidem exemptum a singularibus et causa communitatis … Secundum autem est commune quod a communi causa differentibus speciebus distribuitur et inest ipsis, sicut id quod in unoquoque animal; tertium autem quod in nostris intellectibus per abstractionem consistit, posterium genitum existens …” 20 Tractatus de universalibus II, 59: “Primo quod est dare quinque maneries universalium, ut declarat Lincolniensis, I Posteriorum, capitulo 7. Primum et supremum genus est ratio vel idea exemplaris aeterna in Deo. Secundum genus est ratio communis creata in causis superioribus, ut intelligentiis et orbibus caelestibus. Tertium genus universalium est forma communis fundata in suis individuis. Et illa, inquit Lincolniensis, sunt genera et species de quibus loquitur Aristoteles. Quarto: forma communis in suis accidentibus, apprehensa ab intellectu infimo, est universale. Sed quintum modum universalium—pro signis vel actibus intellegendi—dimmittit Lincolniensis ut sibi impertinens.” Cf. Grosseteste, Commentarius I, 7 139-41.


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2 Wyclif ’s Theological Realism Wyclif explicitly looks to Augustine, Grosseteste and Aquinas when stating that the eternal truths are identical with God inasmuch as God causes them, though formally speaking they are distinct both from each other and from God.21 Aquinas knew that divine simplicity would be compromised if the divine intellect were to be formed by the many things it knows. Actually, the ideas’ existence derives from the very fact that God knows them. “Whereupon, the many ideas are in the divine mind as the things known by it.”22 So it is that while Wyclif says God knows his creation primarily through universals and secondarily through individuals, these universals of the first order exist in God as second intentional concepts (Lahey, 336). Thus when explaining the Apostle’s words that, ‘God chose us in him [Christ] before the foundation of the world (Ephes 1:4),’ Wyclif calls exemplar reasons the eternal universals which are necessarily presupposed with respect to the existence of a creature. Here one must distinguish between the existence of the creature and the means by which it subsists through the exemplar reason or divine essence, however. For it is the creature’s exemplar reason which was in God before the foundation of the world. And while the creature is not God, it is still the same as God in its exemplar reason, precisely because the reasons belong to the divine intellect and thus to the divine essence.23 In Christ, the Eternal 21

De ente librorum duorum I, 6: “Ulterius quo ad dictum sancti Thome et Lyncolniensis in libris suis de veritate, patet que intendunt, sicut et quicunque alii probabiliter sapientes in ista materia, quod nulla talis veritas, quamvis sit eterna a parte ante, dicit aliquam essenciam vel naturam sic eternam, nisi solum deum. Unde in predicacione secundum causam concedunt doctores quod quelibet talis veritas est deus, sicut scriptura vocat deum illuminacionem, resurreccionem, et quotlibet talia; cum sit omnia in omnibus. Et tamen, loquendo formaliter, non dubium quin distinguntur ab invicem et a deo, ut patet per Augustinum de ydeis 83 questionum questione 46.” 22 ST I, q. 15, a. 2, 91: “Hoc autem quomodo divinae simplicitati non repugnet, facile est videre, si quis consideret ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est forma faciens intellectum in actu. … Non est autem contra simplicitatem divini intellectus, quod multa intelligat: sed contra simplicitatem eius esset, si per plures eius intellectus formaretur. Unde plures ideae sunt in mente divina ut intellectae ab ipso.” Cf. Clarke, 122-23. 23 De dominio divino I, ix, 62-63: “Et iste raciones exemplares sunt universalia eterna, que sunt necessario presupposita ad existenciam creature … quia equivocatur in

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Word, there subsists the first category of universal, that causal principle which is the universale ante rem. Christ the Word is the principle of all creation, and Scripture itself testifies to the reality of universals. That great philosopher Moses spoke of the creation of the beasts of the earth being fashioned in their genus and species, and was well aware that these were not simply human concepts and terms, but rather universal natures communicated to many supposits.24 Nominalism must be contrary to Scripture therefore since it claims that genus and species are no more than the product of human understanding, meaning that such things did not exist prior to their human establishment.25 Yet while Scripture is aware of such truths concerning universals there remain those who travel the dangerous road of opposing its sacred logic.26 In their rejection of real universals the nominalists, or doctores signorum, as Wyclif calls them, have inverted creation, now exalting words above the creative Word. The first category of universals, those causal exemplars, exhibit their full meaning only insofar as they are understood to be causal principles existing in the Word. This is what is meant by saying Christ is ‘omnia in omnibus (1 Cor 15:28).’ Christ the Word, the Second Person of the Trinity, is the essential foundation in whose being all creation subsists, as Scripture affirms: Quod factum est in ipso erat (Jn 1:3-4).’27 Here realist metaphysics and the Creed intersect: Christ is the Word of God, eternally begotten of the Father, medio a racione exemplari vel divina essencia ad existenciam creature. Et si queritur, quid hoc est, ante mundi constitutionem, dicitur quod racio exemplaris et per consequens Deus; et hoc est ista creatura: et tamen ista creatura non est Deus, sed idem Deo in racione exemplari, et secundum esse intelligibile adintra est Deus.” 24 De universalibus II, 69: “Nam quando ille eximius philosophus et propheta Moyses dixit, Genesis 1: ‘producat terra animam viventem in genere suo, iumenta, reptilia et bestias terrae secundum species suas’, non intellexit terminum vel conceptum humanum per ‘genus’ et ‘speciem’, sed naturae universales communicatas multis suppositis, ut loquitur Commentator.” 25 Ibid., XIV, 353-54: “… nec valet dicere quod institutio humana constituit genus et speciem, tum quia tunc non foret genus et species ante institutionem humanam—quod est contra Scripturam sacram, Genesis 1.” 26 Ibid., IX, 181: “Alii autem obstinati et rebelles logicae Scripturae nolunt sic intelligere et sic praecipitantur per vias difficiles.” 27 De dominio divino I, vi, 39: “Tunc enim cognoscemus quomodo Christus secundum raciones exemplares est omnia in omnibus illapsus, ut dicit apostolus,


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through whom all things were made. For Wyclif, like Grosseteste, as all creation proceeds from the Word of God, so every being is true to the extent that it conforms to the Word, the First Truth, eternally spoken by the Father, perfectly conformed to God.28 All words of predication must be grounded in the Word. Wyclif will specifically appeal to Burley when defending real propositions against the nominalists, arguing that they are established ex parte rei, since are they formed by God himself.29 It is not the imposition of terms which accounts for the level of agreement between real things (res extra), but the fact that these differences are grounded essentially in the things themselves, and not in signs.30 God is the Author of all true propositions, and as such, it is impossible that human understanding would find its conclusion in nothing more than a term or concept.31 It is precisely because common nature is first thought by God before being communicated to concrete reality that metaphysical truth does not depend upon the human created intellect, but instead upon the divine uncreated intellect. All things are created in their effects from an eternal intellectual knowledge. Missing this crucial fact, says Wyclif, led Ockham and the other ‘doctors of signs’ to reject real universals.32 As the truth of things is grounded in the eternal truth of Christ the Word, source of all being, Wyclif draws upon Grosseteste in locating I Cor. xv. 28. Ipse autem est fundamentum essenciale, quod secundum esse vitale adintra est omnia, iuxta illud Ioh. i. 3, 4, Quod factum est ipso vita erat.” 28 De ente librorum duorum I,iii, 19: “Et cum deus non solum dicit se, set omnia alia, cuiuslibet alterius rei modus essendi conformiter ad verbum eternum ipsum dicens, est eius veritas.” Ibid., I, 22: “Ideo certum est quod a verbo vel cogitacione dei procedunt omnes creature … Cum ergo omne ens sit conforme illi verbo, vel secundum esse primum (ut omnes creatura) vel secundum esse secundum (ut omnis defectus) patet quod omnis entitas est veritas.” Cf. Grosseteste, De veritate, 137. 29 De universalibus I, 21: “Ille autem qui sciret fundare quod veritas ex parte rei, quam Deus componit ex subiecto et praedicato, sit realis propositio, ut ponit Magister Walterus Burleigh negaret minorem argumenti.” 30 Ibid., I, 49: “Ex istis colligi potest: Cum nec impositio nec imponibilitas termini sit causa quare res extra magis aut minus conveniant—quod convenientia et differentia specifica rerum fundantur essentialiter in rerum principiis et non in signis …” 31 Ibid., VII, 147-48: “Non enim est color quod omnis scientia humana terminatur obiective solum vel conceptum.” 32 Ibid., II, 65: “Metaphysici tamen sciunt quod natura communis prius naturaliter intelligitur a Deo ut communicata multis suppositis quam in effectu communicatur

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four notable unities in Christ: his unity of essence with the Father; unity of person achieved in the Incarnation; general unity by which all creatures share a common nature. And the fourth is, “the exemplar unity by which every exemplar reason, and consequently every existent thing, is essentially the Word himself.” That is why the theologian concedes that he knows nothing except Christ (1 Cor 2:2), for he is the summation of all reality. In contrast to those “worldly philosophers” who start from the existence of the creature and ascend to its intelligible being, “the theologian commences from intelligible being and then proceeds through the faith of Christ to the existence of the creature. Hence, theological knowledge is not perfected until it is fulfilled in heaven, at which time it is sustained in this order, and all things will be seen in the Word.”33 Indeed, intuition of the ideas as God knows them is possible only for those who have been thoroughly purified, the blessed.34 This is the end to which man is naturally eisdem. Et sic universalitas vel veritas metaphysica non dependet ab intellectu creato, cum praecedit ipsum, sed dependet ab intellectu increato. Quae—ex aeterna notitia intellectuali—producit omnia in effectu! Et ignorantia huius sensus fecit Ockham et multos alios doctores signorum ex infirmitate intellectus declinare ab universali reali.” 33 De dominio divino II, v, 198: “Tercio patet cum fide quod dominus Iesus Christus sit subiectum theologie distincte metaphisica ethnicorum. Illud declarat dominus Lincolniensis in suo Exameron, capitulo septimo, ponens primo quod in Christo sunt quatuor notabiles unitates. Prima est unitas essencie cum sua Origine atque Dono; de qua Ioh. x. 30. Ego et Pater unum sumus. Secunda est unitas persone … Sed tercia est unitas generalis, qua omnis natura corporalis vel spiritualis est idem Christo. Et quarta est unitas exemplaris qua omnis racio exemplaris, et per consequens omne ens, est essencialiter ipsum Verbum. Et sic non verecundatur theologus concedere se nichil scire, cum apostolo, nisi dominum Iesum Christum, qui subiectum priumum dignitate, adequacione sue sciencie, cum non potest scire aliquid nisi ipsum. Theologus autem incipit ab esse intelligibili, procedendo per fidem Christi ad existenciam creature. Unde non perficitur sciencia theologia antequam perficiatur in patria, quando servato eodem ordine in Verbo videbuntur omnia. Econtra autem mundani philosophi incipiunt ab existencia creature, et ascendunt ad eius esse intelligibile.” Grosseteste actually speaks of a three-fold unity which Wyclif refers to as such in another passage very similar to the above. Cf. Ibid., I ,vi, 42-43. Cf. also Grosseteste, Hexameron I, i, 49. 34 De universalibus XV, 364: “ … stricte loquendo de intuitione, intueri ideam nisi sit beatus, scilicet intueri ideam plene secundum omnes veritates de illa noscibiles ut puta quod a Deo cognoscitur et intenditur produci ad hunc et hunc finem. … Nam, primo, patet quod nemo potest sic plene intueri aliquid, nisi sit Beatus et intuitive cognoscat omnia.”


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ordained, that happiness which consists in the contemplation of the truths of the faith, the final reward that is the clear vision in heaven.35 The creature’s existence, like his knowledge, is still unfulfilled in this lifetime, awaiting its completion when it enters into the divine essence. On the other hand, while it is true that the ‘wayfarer’ cannot fully comprehend God during this pilgrimage, seeing as he does through a glass darkly, it is also true that no one could know anything of creation unless at some level he knows God, inasmuch as every being signifies God, just as an accident does its subject.36 Human intellectual errors combined with misguided affections regarding universals have led to sin’s reign in the present age, says Wyclif. Man’s own disordered love wreaks havoc in the realm of knowledge, as people forsake the greater, more universal goods for the inferior individuals.37 As with Grosseteste, so too for Wyclif, the intellectus and affectus are inseparable. The searcher after truth must conform his will to the divine will and love the superior truth more than the inferior; Holy Scripture itself demands this.38 Ignorance is the result of pride, and sin paves the way for man’s abysmal descent, as many pretend to be wise while lacking the very humility that forms the 35

De trinitate I, 9: “Sed natura nihil ordinat nisi quod naturaliter potest esse, igitur potest esse quod viator cognoscat naturaliter huiusmodi veritates. Assumptum est ex hoc, quod finis ad quem naturaliter ordinatur homo est felicitas que consistit in contemplacione fidei veritatum. Unde secundum theologum loco fidei meritorie in via succedet clara visio pro premio fidei existenti in patria.” 36 De dominio divino I, vi, 39-40: “Quotlibet sunt talia dicta Scripture que sonant quod nulla creatura habet in proprio genere nisi incompletum et equivocum dependens esse respectu divine essencie quam speramus beatifice intueri … Et secundum istam maneriem videndi loquitur evangelium Ioh. i, 18, Deum nemo vidit unquam, supple, nullus pure viator pro viacionis tempore. Et de prima maneria videndi loquitur apostolus, I Cor. xiii. 12, Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate; tunc autem facie ad faciem … sic nemo potest noscere creaturam nisi sub aliquo gradu noverit Deum suum, cum omne ens ipsum signat, ut accidens fundamentum.” 37 De universalibus III, 77: “Sic igitur indubie error intellectus et affectus circa universalia est causa totius peccati regnantis in saeculo. Quod autem bona universaliora sint bonis privatis meliora patet ex hoc quod universalius est prius natura suo inferiori, gratia cuius sustenandi est inferius ordinatum …” 38 Ibid., 78: “Ideo debeo, conformando voluntatem meam voluntati divinae, plus diligere veritatem superiorem quam inferiorem. Et ideo salubriter monet Propheta, Zachariae 8: ‘Veritatem tantum et pacem diligite,’ quia in hoc sequimur Deum, de quo Propheta, Psalmo 50, testatur: ‘Ecce,’ inquit, ‘veritatem dilexisti.’”

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foundation of wisdom.39 What is more, to misunderstand universals is to court heresy. If Joachim of Fiore did accuse Peter Lombard of creating a quaternity out of the Holy Trinity, this error was born of his own ignorance of universals. And that he was censured by the faithful doctors of the Fourth Lateran Council owes to the fact that they were inspired by the Spirit and instructed in the truths of universals.40

3 Conclusion Wyclif’s metaphysical program envisions a perfectly stable universe, anchored in God the Word as its source and sustaining power. As we shall see in the following chapters, his biblical exegesis and eucharistic theology are constructed upon the abiding certitude to be found within this power. Christ the Word, as he is manifested in Scripture and creation, is the locus of eternal truth and order. Thus as an expression of the divine essence, no particle of that universe can be annihilated. For as all creation is ultimately grounded in the divine essence, were God to annihilate a creature this would entail the annihilation of the entire created universe. And so while he admits that individual things can lose their existence, insofar as they are converted into other things, their essential being, that relationship they have to their own species, will always remain. In this regard, Kenny aptly refers to Wyclif’s “theology of being,” which cannot allow for the annihilation of any substance as that would, in turn, destroy the whole system of causal relationships which holds the 39

De trinitate III, 29: “Ex quibus verbis Apostoli … Tercio quod gravitum est peccatum eorum in hoc quod ex superba presumpcione cessaverunt gracias agere deo. Quarto, quod ex presumpcione redarguerunt sibi ipsis cum non solum inciderunt in ignoraciam sed pretenderunt se esse sapientes, cum tamen defecerunt in humilitate que est fundamentum sapiencie, ut patet Isaie XLI de timore Dei.” 40 De universalibus XI, 240: “Unde ex aeterna ordinatione Spiritus Sancti fuit quod fideles doctores Ecclesiae, congregati ad tractandum dissensiones inter Ioachim et Magistrum Peter Lombardum, ad tantum instructi sunt in veritatibus universalium …” Ibid., 263-64: “Quod si Ioachim ita dixit, non dubium quin ex ignorantia universalium dixit falsissimum et summe haereticum!” Joachim believed that Lombard posited three persons in addition to a common essence. Cf. Friedberg 2:6-7.


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cosmos together (Kenny 1985, 29-30). As every creature has its created being in the first created analogue it may not perish, since its being is preserved therein. Only if the analogue were annihilated could the creature be annihilated; but the destruction of the analogue would mean the annihilation of the universe.41 As one might expect, this perception of creation will bear directly upon his eucharistic theology, since Wyclif cannot permit the annihilation of substance which some theories demand. For Wyclif, there is no aspect of creation which is not valuable and thus inherently worthy of preservation. Every single creature is essential to the order of the universe. God’s own goodness will not allow him to inflict punishment, nor permit damnation, except on the occasion of guilt. This means that God would never annihilate even the smallest creature, for the very fact that such a creature assists his fellows, thereby beautifying the universe, without which the rest of creation would be unjustly diminished.42 Wyclif was a biblical exegete, a political theoretician, a reformer; but as a late medieval schoolman he was also a logician and metaphysician. Above all else he was a theologian who combined all of these roles under that one noble calling, precisely because they are vitally connected in the greater nexus of divinely instituted reality. Wyclif the theologian could never have conceived of taking off one hat and putting on another, inasmuch as he saw before him a seamless robe of divine truth into which all these things were woven. His duty as a theologian was to protect the sacred garment against all diabolical attempts to rend it asunder. 41

De universalibus XIII, 307-08: “Ex quo videtur, primo, quod Deus non posset annihilare aliquam creaturam nisi annihilaret totam universitatem creatam, quod tamen non potest propter Christus et Beatos. Ideo videtur quod non potest annihilare, nam omnis creatura habet esse creatum in primo creato analogo, ut patet ex praedictis. Sed illud esse, cum non dependet ab esse contractiori, non potest perdi, servato illo esse analogo. Igitur, nullius creaturae omne esse creatum potest desinere, servato esse analogo. Cum ergo nulla creatura potest annihilari, servato aliquo eius esse creato, sequitur quod nulla creatura potest annihilari nisi esse analogum, et, per consequens, nisi universitas annihiletur.” 42 Ibid., 317: “Deus ergo, ratione bonitatis suae—qua non potest nisi occasione culpae poenam infligere vel damnum permittere—non potest annihilationem permittere, nam annihilata minima creatura—cum quaelibet iuvat quamlibet et pulchrificat universum—totum residuum sine causa imperficeretur.”

3 The Medieval Reading of Scripture

D

rawing on the rich inheritance of antiquity, the medieval world recognized the vital nexus between language and thought, and in no sphere was this more important than the study of the Bible. Discovering the meaning conveyed by the language of Scripture meant searching for the intended sense of the Divine Author. Throughout the Middle Ages the interpretation of the Bible hinged upon the veracity of those writings whose principal author is God. While appreciation for the role of human authors in crafting and compiling the biblical texts had long been acknowledged, and increased over time, such human beings were always viewed as God’s inspired agents of revelation. Given the intersection between the divine and human, medieval thinkers were especially concerned with clarifying the question of authorship and authority, and the corresponding relationship between the various senses of Scripture. The later Middle Ages witnessed an increasing precision in the application of theories of authorship, theories which served to safeguard the veracity of the divinely inspired text while at the same time allowing for a certain level of freedom on the part of the inspired human auctor. It should be kept in mind that an auctor was not simply a writer, but was an authority, someone worthy of respect. The writings of an auctor possessed auctoritas, that is to say, truthfulness and wisdom. The greater the auctor the more auctoritas he possessed. Holy Scripture must then be the ultimate authoritative text, since its principal auctor is none other than God (Minnis 1984, 9-12). Serious appraisal of the different grades of authorship would make manifest the inherent difficulties posed for faithful exegesis, while also creating the means to cope with them. In order to properly grasp Wyclif’s own understanding of authorship, authority, and the interaction of literal and figurative language, it is essential that we examine the greater medieval tradition of which he was very much a part. For, as is so often

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the case with Wyclif, he offers a unique mixture of the commonplace and the idiosyncratic.

1 The Richness of Sacred Discourse The translation of the Bible, this most holy of books, raised questions as to how ‘faithful’ the translator should be to the original text. Jerome confessed that when translating all other writings he was permitted the opportunity of expressing the larger meaning of the text. But because the Bible is unique among all writings in its sacred inspiration and character he would translate it word for word (verbum e verbo), since its various meanings are infinite, contained as they are in the very order of the words. This is what Jerome, following Horace, understood by the designation ‘fidus interpres,’ namely one who puts aside his rhetorical skills and adheres instead to the literal sense of the text, defined as word for word translation (Schwarz, 74-75).1 Indeed, while churchmen as erudite and steeped in classical learning as Jerome knew the value of pagan teaching in rhetoric and grammar, they also knew its limitations when it comes to treating this sacred text. Thus Gregory the Great made it clear that he would never allow celestial eloquence to be bound by the rules of Donatus.2 The supposedly barbaric discourse that so offends the grammarians is replete with the wisdom of the Divine Author. As he says in the preface to his Moralia, one can trust that the author of the book of Job is none other than the Holy Spirit, speaking through the voice of his inspired scribe.3 1

Epistula LVII, 5, CSEL 54; 508: “ego enim non solum fateor, sed libera uoce profiteor me in interpretatione Graecorum absque scripturis sanctis, ubi et uerborum ordo mysterium est, non uerbum e uerbo, sed sensum exprimere de sensu.” Ibid., 509-510: “sed et Horatius, uir acutus et doctus, hoc idem in Arte poetica erudito interpreti praecipit: ne uerbum e uerbo curabis reddere fidus interpres.” 2 Moralia, epistola missoria, c. 5; PL 75; 516: “Nam sicut hujus quoque epistolae tenor enuntiat, non metacisimi collisionem fugio, non barbarisimi confusionem devito, situs motusque et praepositionem casus servare contemno, quia indignum vehementer existimo, ut verba caelestis oraculi restringam sub regulis Donati.” 3 Moralia, praefatio, c. 2; PL 75; 517: “Sed quis haec scripserit, valde supervacue quaeritur, cum tamen auctor libri Spiritus sanctus fideliter credatur. Ipse scripsit,

3~The Medieval Reading of Scripture

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Jerome expressed his intention of sticking so closely to the original biblical text as he translated it, because he was aware of the myriad of meanings to be found within the words and their arrangement. Locating such meanings was the task of the exegete. No Christian writer was more aware of Scripture’s unique method of discourse, and the precision needed in discerning its many nuances, than Augustine. He knew that Scripture has its own eloquence, its own locutio.4 The Bible is a text filled with subtleties of expression and it is of paramount importance that the reader be versed in the complexities of scriptural language. His De doctrina christiana is specifically devoted to clarifying matters of signification within the Sacred Page, and it remained an exegetical paradigm throughout the Middle Ages.5 That the biblical text may be misunderstood is largely due to the fact that meanings are hidden under unknown or ambiguous signs. Linguistic signs, in turn, vary between the proper and the transferred.6 If ignorance of metaphorical signs leaves the reader perplexed this is a cue that he must devote himself to studying not only words, but the very things which are signified. It is crucial therefore that the biblical exegete possess more than grammatical aptitude; he must be well acquainted with the natural sciences too if he hopes to understand what is signified metaphorically.7 All the liberal arts will be pressed into service, for beyond the trivium there remains the study of the quadrivium, learning the ways of the natural world, those phenomena for which linguistic terms supposit. Of course, the question will arise qui et in illius opere inspirator exstitit, et per scribentis vocem imitanda ad nos ejus facta transmisit.” 4 Enarrationes in Psalmos CIV; CCSL 40; 1546: “Locutio scripturarum est sicut est: In qua habitabunt in ea: qua locutione divinae paginae plenae sunt.” Cf. Evans 1984, 1-6. 5 De doctrina christiana II, 3; CCSL 32; 33: “Horum igitur signorum genus, quantum ad homines attinet, considerare atque tractare statuimus, quia et signa diuinitus data, quae scripturis sanctis continentur, per homines nobis indicata sunt, qui conscripserunt.” 6 Ibid., II, 15; 41: “Duabus autem causis non intellegentur, quae scripta sunt, si aut ignotis aut ambiguis signis obteguntur. Sunt autem signa propria vel translata.” 7 Ibid., II, 23; 48: “In translatis uero signis, si qua forte ignota cogunt haerere lectorem, partim linguarum notitia partim rerum inuestiganda sunt.” Ibid., II, 24; 49: “Rerum autem ignorantia facit obscuras figuratas locutiones, cum ignoramus uel animantium uel lapidum uel herbarum naturas aliarumue rerum, quae plerumque in scripturis similitudinis alicuius gratia ponuntur.”

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as to how one can discern in a given situation whether something should be taken properly or metaphorically, whether its meaning had been transferred or not. To this Augustine provides what would become a standard rule in medieval biblical exegesis: whatever does not promote charity and faith must be read figuratively.8 During the time of the Carolingian Renaissance there had been a return to the trivium largely inspired by a renewed appreciation of Augustine’s De doctrina christiana. Christian scholars like Alcuin of York, Boniface, and the Venerable Bede had all written commentaries on Donatus’s Ars maior and Ars minor. Yet while they were at first concerned with the study of the grammatical works of late antiquity, scholars were increasingly concerned with the nature and organization of language itself, no longer limiting themselves to the mere comprehension of Latin grammatical rules (Rijk 1967, 97-98; Pinborg 1973, 496-509). While grammar and dialectic were treated as separate subjects for quite some time, by the eleventh century these two aspects of the trivium began to converge and dialectic emerged as the dominant art, thus beginning to permeate the study of grammar. The effect of this convergence would last for many centuries to come. But even as it was generally believed that to understand the Bible more completely one had to be well versed in the nuances of the Latin language, the re-emergence of dialectic was viewed by some with apprehension. For whereas the third element of the trivium, rhetoric, was considered relatively harmless, some scholars recognized the inherent dangers in a dialectical method if not properly applied. Nevertheless, the relationship between language and thought was becoming a central issue as the study of language passed from the domain of the grammarians and was treated within the greater context of logical analysis. This is evident by the 1030s in the logicalgrammatical questions of Fulbert’s cathedral school at Chartres. The grammatical and logical textbooks used there may well have influenced the glossing of the Bible by this time. Indeed, Fulbert’s student Berengar of Tours, as well as Berengar’s later opponent Lanfranc of 8

Ibid., III, 14; 86: “ Et iste omnino modus est, ut quicquid in sermone diuino neque ad morum honestatem neque ad fidei ueritatem proprie referri potest, figuratum esse cognoscas. Morum honestas ad diligendum deum et proximum, fidei ueritas ad cognoscendum deum et proximum pertinet.”


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Bec, both glossed the Pauline epistles employing dialectical methods (Smalley 1978, 37-48). All of this was aided by, if not the product of, the fact that a number of Aristotle’s works, which prior to the late eleventh century had been largely unknown to the schools of Northern Europe, were now drawing considerable attention. By the middle of the twelfth century, as theologians were especially adept at handling the rules of inference presented in Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, they were well on their way to forming original approaches to logic which would shape the scholarship of coming centuries (Rijk 1967, 95-96).

2 Proper and Improper Supposition While it was admitted that each language had its own set of unique rules, it was also understood that there were properties of language common to all, and these were open to scientific study. The study of grammar, reconstructed as a philosophy of language, was developed with the assistance of logic. This nexus formed by the two arts established the basis for what would come to be known as grammatica speculativa. The emphasis was placed increasingly on syntax and the significative functions of terms within their verbal context, as dialecticians moved further away from a concern with the original derivation of individual words. In fact, new terminology was invented in order to describe just such a trend: suppositio. While the natural meaning of a word, that of its original coinage, was known as its significatio, the role the word played in its syntactical context was known as the suppositio, since it had to do with what the word ‘stood in for’ at that particular moment (Rijk 1967, 99-125). Supposition, simply put, is the positing of one thing for another, and in that sense it signifies. Hence, while signification strictly speaking had to do with a word’s natural properties, supposition addressed the manner in which a word was used within a proposition. The inherent subtlety of language was well recognized; it was understood that words could stand for different things in different situations (Henry, 47-49). Speculative grammar was concerned therefore with the manner in which a term could signify in a given construction, its modus significandi

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(Pinborg 1982, 257-65). This is naturally connected to the whole matter of authorial intention as the focus is now placed upon the word’s particular function within a given proposition, one which could vary depending upon the manner in which the author chooses to employ it. Supposition was broken down into two basic types: the proper and the improper. The latter allowed for metaphorical speech, while the former did not. Walter Burley offers a standard definition: “Supposition is proper when the term stands in for something it is permitted to stand in for according to the force of the word (de virtute sermonis). Supposition is improper, however, when the term stands in for something by way of transference, or according to the dictates of customary speech (de usu loquendi).”9 Every term was understood to have its proper meaning, that signification which stems from its original coinage, and when so understood it abides by ‘the force of the word,’ the virtus sermonis. Conversely, when taken figuratively, it adopts a meaning it did not originally have, accepting an improper signification granted to it in common parlance, the usus loquendi. With regard to the terminology governing proper speech there was some variation over time. Thus the terms vis and proprietas were most commonly used until the thirteenth century when virtus began to be replace them. A variety of phrases could be employed by theologians like Aquinas and Bonaventure, all denoting the proper, or literal, sense of the word such as: de virtute sermonis, ex virtute vocabuli, ad virtutem vocabulorum, in virtutem dictionum, in addition to occasional employment of the older expressions, de vi vocis, and proprietas sermonis (Courtenay 1984, 114). Refinements in the study of grammar and the nature of language in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries served to intensify further the study of proper and improper supposition. In order to understand the intention of the one who employs terms metaphorically the reader must be aware of this distinction lest confusion result. All of this is of the utmost importance, precisely because these logical-grammatical 9

De puritate artis logicae I, 1; 2: “Suppositio propria est, quando terminus supponit pro aliquo, pro quo de virtute sermonis permittitur supponere. Suppositio impropria est, quando terminus supponit pro aliquo ex transsumptione vel de usu loquendi.”


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distinctions were being applied to the sayings of the Church Fathers as well as the Bible. As Southern rightly points out, biblical inerrancy was essential for maintaining the stability of the schools and could not be abandoned without thereby losing the very doctrine of divine authorship. Within this enterprise, logical and verbal analysis had the greatest effect when it came to reconciling seemingly contradictory texts (Southern 1995, 125-31). Peter Abelard was well aware of this when, in his Sic et Non, he observed that one way of resolving perceived contradictions among patristic sources is to consider the difference between the usus and the proprietas of words. Abelard recognizes that people must alter words depending on the audience, since it often happens that a word’s proper signification is unknown to some or rarely employed. Actual usage therefore should be the determinative factor in such cases.10

3 The Paris Censure of 1340 We have already examined the way in which scholastic advances and refinements could lead to censure when the stuff of lecture hall disputation was judged to have overstepped the bounds of responsible academic inquiry. The abuse of the distinction between proper and improper supposition might also impinge upon the faith of the Church, and was seen to be doing just that when, on December 29, 1340, the faculty of Arts at the University of Paris listed various types of argumentation which could no longer be employed by the masters or students. Here the entire question of authority, authorship and authorial intention arises, as the commission specifically censures those who apply the standards of ‘proper’ speech to the texts of the Fathers and the Bible in an effort to test the their truth value, 10

Sic et Non, prologus, 89-90: “Saepe etiam, pro diversitate eorum quibus loquimur, verba commutari oportet; cum frequenter eveniat ut verborum propria significatio nonnullis sit incognitia aut minus usitata. Quibus quidem si ad doctrinam ut oportet, loqui volumus, magis eorum usus quam proprietas sermonis aemulandus est, sicut et ipse grammaticae princeps et locutionum instructor Priscianus edocet.” Cf. Courtenay 1984, 113-14.

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irrespective of authorial intention. The statute portrays a situation in which some of the masters and bachelors in the Arts faculty were willing to label various sayings of the Fathers false, whether simpliciter or de virtute sermonis, even when fully aware that the author is saying something which is indeed true if read as intended i.e., figuratively. Indeed, the commission regards the situation as “dangerous,” especially in light of the fact that such practices were being extended even to the propositions of Scripture.11 The statute responds to what is counted as the reckless manipulation of linguistic theory by stating that discourse derives its force (virtus) from the imposition and common usage of the authors, and that is what establishes the force of the word (virtus sermonis).12 The author’s intended meaning constitutes the literal sense, thereby giving the word its true ‘force.’ Furthermore, the statute declares that as the Bible and the Fathers convey their meaning with a conscious use of metaphor and figure, it is incumbent upon the reader to bear this in mind when attempting to understand the intention of the writer. For schoolmen to say that no proposition ought to be accepted as true unless taken in its ‘proper sense’ is to misunderstand the very way in which the Bible and the Fathers speak. “The Bible and the authorities do not always employ words according to their proper sense. Therefore, it is more fitting when affirming or negating discourses to pay attention to the subject matter, rather than the proper meaning of the words.”13 This was not the end of the matter of course, as Wyclif would complain about the very same thing some thirty years later. And he was not alone, for at Oxford, in about 1360, when Wyclif was still a 11

CUP II, i, 506: “Videlicet quod nulli magistri, baccalarii, vel scolares in artium facultate legenetes Parisius audeant aliquam propositionem famosam illius actoris cujus librum legunt, dicere simpliciter esse falsam, vel esse falsam de virtute sermonis, se crediderent quod actor ponendo illam habuerit verum intellectum; sed vel condeant eam, vel sensum verum dividanta sensu falso, quia pari ratione Biblie absoluto sermone essent negande, quod est periculosum.” 12 Ibid., 506: “Et quia sermo non habet virtutem, nisi ex impositione et usu communi actorum vel aliorum, ideo talis est virtus sermonis …” 13 Ibid., 506: “Item quod nullus dicat propositionem nullam esse concedendam, si non sit vera in ejus sensu proprio, quia hoc dicere ducit ad predictos errores, quia Biblia et actores non semper sermonibus utuntur secundum proprios sensus eorum. Magis igitur oportet in affirmando vel negando sermones ad materiam subjectam attendere, quam ad proprietam sermonis …”


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Master of Arts, Richard Brinkley reported that some were subordinating mental propositions to the written and spoken forms, such that truth and falsity depended upon the proper meaning of the verbal expression (secundum proprietatem vocis) rather than the intention behind their formation. And in Paris c. 1375, the Austin Friar Angelus Dobelin declared that all Scripture was true de virtute sermonis, defining the designation ‘virtus sermonis’ as the signification applied to the words by the author. Understood in this way, every biblical proposition is true according to some manner of speaking, since the literal meaning (virtus sermonis) is counted as the intended meaning (Courtenay 1984, 124-25).

4 Authorial Intention among Later Medieval Theologians No one had more invested in discerning the authorial intention behind Holy Scripture than the medieval theologians. For no matter how much truth might be discernible through the natural light of human reason, it paled in comparison to the knowledge made known to humanity through divine revelation. The source of divine revelation was Holy Scripture, and its study was the unique province of the theologian, the magister sacrae paginae. Because the Bible was the lifeblood of all theological inquiry, the theologian had to be attuned to all of its subtleties of expression. To misread the sacred text was to take the first step down the road of heresy. We will briefly look at four theologians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, all of whom contemplate the relationship between the different senses of Scripture and the question of authorship. Wyclif was very much in sympathy with these men, even when he does not entirely adopt their exegetical methods. But these theologians, among others to be sure, represent the sort of sober and respectful approach to the sacred text that Wyclif often laments is lacking in his own day.

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a~Bonaventure In the prologue to his Breviloquium, the thirteenth-century Franciscan theologian St. Bonaventure, focuses on the disposition of the expositor of Holy Scripture. Christ dwells in the heart of the believer, and this is the knowledge of Christ which forms the basis of understanding all Holy Scripture. “Whereupon, it is impossible that anyone could begin to understand it unless he first possesses the faith of Christ infused into him.”14 Bonaventure addresses the veracity of Scripture and grounds its truthfulness squarely upon its divine authorship. How is that all of its narratives are to be believed when one has no means of proving whether particular events actually occurred? God provides Scripture with the certitude of authority, one which surpasses all human standards of examination. Only God the Holy Spirit is incapable of either deceiving or being deceived, and so only Scripture possesses the authenticity which comes through divine revelation. “Therefore, nothing in [Scripture] can be condemned as useless, nothing rejected as false, or repudiated as wicked, for the very fact that the Holy Spirit, its most perfect author, could say nothing false, superfluous or debased.”15 It stands to reason then that Bonaventure defines a heretic as “someone who would obstinately deny the things which are written in Holy Scripture. Because Holy Scripture is promulgated by the very Uncreated Truth, and by the Holy Spirit, the person who would contradict Holy Scripture, contradicts him to whom faith assents for its own sake, namely the Highest Truth 14

Breviloquium, proemium; 241: “… et per fidem habitat Christus in cordibus nostris. Haec est notitia Jesu Christi, ex qua originaliter manat firmitas et intelligentia totius scripturae sacrae. Unde est impossibile est, quod aliquis in ipsam ingrediatur agnoscendam, nisi prius Christi fidem habeat sibi infusam, tanquam ipsius totius scripturae lucernam, januam, et etiam fundamentum.” 15 Ibid., 246: “… loco certitudinis rationis providit Deus huic Scripturae certitudinem auctoritatis, quae adeo magna est, quod omnen perspicacitatem humani ingenii superexcellit. … qui falli non possit et fallere nesciat, nisi Deus et Spiritus sanctus: hinc est, quod ad hoc, quod Scriptura sacra modo sibi debito esset perfectae auctoritatis, vel authentica, non per humanam investigationem est tradita, sed per revelationem divinam. Ideo nihil in ipsa contemnendum tanquam inutile, nihil respuendum tanquam falsum, nihil repudiandum tanquam iniquum, pro eo quod Spiritus sanctus ejus auctor perfectissimus nihil potuit dicere falsum, nihil superfluum, nihil diminutum.”


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himself.”16 An offense against Scripture is nothing less than an offense against Christ the Truth. Scripture’s inherent authority and inerrancy is naturally tied to the question of its meaning, or better said, ‘meanings.’ Because Scripture has its own special manner of proceeding, says Bonaventure, it must be explicated accordingly; and that demands that one account for the various senses of Scripture. “Since [Scripture] conceals a manifold understanding under one letter, the expositor should bring the hidden parts into the light, and clarify that part he has drawn out by way of another passage of Scripture which is more clear.”17 He then briefly explains the four classic senses to his readers: the literal/historical, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical. As to the rules governing the exegete’s own decisions, he cites Augustine’s famous dictum that the text must be read so as to promote charity and faith. But Bonaventure also recognizes the authority of sacred tradition preserved by the Church when it comes to ascertaining the correct interpretation of the text, and specifically condemns those who would venture to offer novel positions. “Nothing is to be received which disagrees with the tradition of the ecclesiastical masters and the approved theologians. Nor must anything be called into doubt which they will have reasonably defined universally together with the testimonies of the Holy Fathers. For having discerned the truth, the one who is moved by a superfluous subtlety to examine curiously realms still higher, really only endeavors to defile the depths of the Scriptures. He does this as if there were something new to be discovered which others have not already found, for he is but a lover of vanity seeking after a lie.”18 16

Sent. III, d. 24, a. 1, q. 2; 522: “Ad illud quod objicitur, quod haereticus judicaretur, qui pertinaciter negaret quae in sacra Scriptura scribuntur. … Quia enim sacra Scriptura est edita ab ipsa Veritate increata, et a Spiritu sancto, qui contradiceret sacrae Scripturae, contradiceret ei, cui fides assensit propter se, videlicet ipsi summae Veritati.” 17 Breviloquium, 246: “Quemadmodum autem scriptura haec specialem habet modum procedendi, sic juxta suum procedendi modum, speciali suo modo debet intelligi et exponi. Cum enim ipsa sub una littera multiplicem tegat intelligentiam, expositor debet abscondita producere in lucem, et illam eductam manifestare per aliam scripturam magis patentem.” 18 De profectu Religiosorum II, 73; 427: “Nihil recipiendum est, quod ab ecclesiasticorum magistorum, et approbatorum theologorum traditione disonat; nec revocandum in dubium, quod ab eis universaliter cum testimoniis sanctorum Patrum fuerit rationabiliter definitum: quia, veritate reperta, qui curiose per supervacuam subtilitatem altius perscrutando fodere nititur profunda

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b~Thomas Aquinas Wyclif often cites Thomas Aquinas approvingly, praising his skill as an astute biblical commentator who is well aware of the nuances of Scripture and its inherent logic. While Aquinas acknowledges that Scripture is preserved from falsehood under the aegis of the Holy Spirit, he is still keen on preserving the distinctive levels of authorship, divine and human, which form this sacred text. Thus when he applies Aristotelian theories of causation to the exposition of the Bible he counts God as its principal cause, while the human authors are subordinated to the divine as instrumental causes. This way of presenting the relationship between the different levels of authorship raises the question of just what constitutes the literal sense of the inspired text. While medieval exegesis had traditionally located the spiritual meanings of the text hidden beneath the letter, Aquinas places them within the letter itself. This is not to say that he thereby rejects the standard four-fold sense of Scripture. God is the Author of Scripture, and is capable of signifying both through words and things. “That primary signification, by which words signify things, pertains to the first sense, which is the historical or literal sense. Yet that signification by which things are signified by words, and again signify other things, is called the spiritual sense, which is founded upon the literal and presupposes it.”19 Aquinas states that parabolical or metaphorical speech is contained in the literal sense, precisely because the literal sense is not to be equated with the figure, but rather that which the figure symbolizes. As such, when Scripture speaks of the ‘arm of God’ the literal sense must be what is signified by the bodily member, namely divine power.20 In his Galatians commentary he writes: “Through the literal Scripturarum, quasi novi aliquid reperturus, quod ab aliis non fuerit inventum, vanitatem diligens, mendacium quaerit.” 19 ST I, a. 10; 9: “Respondeo dicendum est quod auctor Sacrae Scripturae est Deus, in cuius potestate est ut non solum voces ad significandum accommodet (quod etiam homo facere potest, sed etiam res ipsas). … Illa ergo prima significatio, qua voces significant res pertinet ad primum sensum, qui est sensus historicus vel litteralis. Illa vero significatio qua res significatae per voces, iterum res alias significant, dicitur sensus spiritualis, qui super litteralem fundatur, et eum supponit.” 20 Ibid., 9: “Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus parabolicus sub litterali continetur: nam per voces significatur aliquid proprie, et aliquid figurative, nec est litteralis


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sense something can be signified in a double fashion, whether according to the rules of proper speech, as when I say ‘the man laughs,’ or by way of similitude or metaphor when I say, ‘the meadow laughs.’ And we employ both ways in Holy Scripture, just as when we say with regard to the first sort that Jesus ascended, and when we say that he sits at the right hand of the Father in keeping with the second. So it is that the parabolic or metaphorical is included in the literal sense.”21 For Aquinas, the literal sense is broad enough to encompass the spiritual senses for the very fact that he equates the literal sense with the intended sense of the Divine Author. “Truly then, the literal sense is that which the author intends. Now the author of Holy Scripture is God, who comprehends all things within his intellect simultaneously. Thus it is not unfitting, as Augustine says in Book Twelve of his Confessions, if in keeping with the literal sense there would be many senses in one letter of Scripture.”22 Aquinas exhibits a rich appreciation for the literal sense, defined as the meaning of the Divine Author. The whole truth resides within the letter even as the inspired human author is conveying more senses within that letter than he may realize at the time. The human author, as secondary author or instrumental cause, is no mere automaton taking sacred dictation. And yet at the same time he does not necessarily understand the full import of everything he is writing. “Hence, even if the expositors of Holy Scripture adapt some truths to sensus ipsa figura, sed id quod est figuratum. Non enim cum Scriptura nominat Dei brachium, est litteralis sensus quod in Deo si membrum huiusmodi corporale: sed id quod per hoc membrum significatur, scilicet virtus operativa. In quo patet quod sensui litterali sacrae Scripturae nunquam potest subesse falsum.” 21 Ad Galatas IV, 7; 230-31: “Per litteralem autem sensum potest aliquid significari dupliciter; secundum proprietatem locutionis, sicut dico: Homo ridet; vel secundum similitudinem seu metaphoram, sicut cum dico: Pratum ridet. Et utroque modo utimur in sacra Scriptura, sicut cum dicimus quantum ad primum quod Jesus ascendit, et cum dicimus quod sedet a dexteris Dei, quantum ad secundum. Et ideo sub sensu literali includitur parabolicus seu metaphoricus.” Note that the Galatians commentary belongs to the reportatio made by Reginald of Piperno covering 1 Cor 11 through Hebrews. Cf. Torrell, 340. 22 ST I, a. 10; 9: “Hic autem sensus spiritualis triafarim dividitur. … Quia vero sensus litteralis est, quem auctor intendit: auctor autem Sacrae Scripturae Deus est, qui omnia simul suo intellectu comprehendit: non est inconveniens, ut dicit Augustinus XII Confess., si etiam secundum litteralem sensum in una littera Scripturae plures sint sensus.” Cf. Augustine, Confessiones XII, 42; CCSL 27; 240-241.

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the letter which the [human] author does not understand, there is no doubt but that the Holy Spirit, who is the principal author of Divine Scripture, will have understood. Thus every truth which, without violating the circumstance of the letter, can be adapted to the Divine Scripture, is its sense.”23 Such a remark leads Minnis to wonder whether allegory for Thomas is not just a human phenomenon, while the Divine Author has one literal meaning in mind all along (Minnis 1975, 4-5). This question will be especially important when looking at Wyclif’s own theory of authorship with respect to the different senses, especially in light of his own sense of affinity with the Angelic Doctor.

c~Nicholas of Lyra The Franciscan biblical scholar, Nicholas of Lyra was also praised by Wyclif as an insightful commentator. Lyra published his Postilla litteralis in 1331, and follows an approach similar to Aquinas, while providing further refinements. For Lyra there is a historical-literal sense and a spiritual or prophetical-literal sense, both of which are intended by the Divine Author. Like Aquinas, he is concerned primarily with the intention of the Divine Author, yet Lyra further hones Aquinas’s system such that the letter may sometimes have what he calls a “double literal sense” (sensus duplex litteralis). A prophetical text like Hosea 11:1 has a double literal sense considered in light of Matthew 2:15. The first sense does indeed refer to God leading the Israelites out of the land of Egypt, yet the second, perfect sense applies to Christ, the true Son of God (Spicq, 340-41). When commenting upon 2 Kings 7, Lyra notes that a figure can be taken in three ways: sometimes it is only the thing itself and no more, while at other times it is only a figure of something else, and yet on an another occasion it can be both. There are times when Scripture speaks of Solomon secundum se, and thus he does not function as a figure of Christ. Other times things are said of Solomon only to the extent that he is figure of 23

De potentia IV, 1; 119: “Unde si etiam aliqua vera ab expositoribus sacrae Scripturae litterae aptentur, quae auctor non intelligit, non est dubium quin Spiritus sanctus intellexerit, qui est principalis auctor divine Scripturae. Unde omnis veritas quae, salva litterae circumstantia, potest divinae Scripturae aptari, est ejus sensus.”


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Christ. But with respect to that third alternative, Scripture can say things about Solomon which, while they can be verified, are still said less perfectly of him and more so of Christ.24 Commenting on the Psalter, Lyra draws upon the four Aristotelian causes which can be applied to a book, observing that the efficient cause can itself be considered in two ways, such that the principal efficient cause is God, while the instrumental efficient cause is David. There is no discord between these two types of causation, for the mind of the prophet concurs with God, the principal agent (Minnis 1975, 19-20).

d~Richard FitzRalph Another of Wyclif’s favorites was the theologian and later Archbishop of Armagh, Richard FitzRalph. And like Wyclif he admitted that as a young scholar he had found apparent errors in the Bible born of logical-grammatical analysis.25 With all of that behind him he made an important contribution to fourteenth-century biblical commenting with his Summa de questionibus Armenorum, written during the 1340s at the request of Clement VI. Together with Bradwardine’s De causa Dei, this would become one of the most frequently cited books at Oxford in the second half of the fourteenth century, and thus in Wyclif’s own time of scholastic tenure. FitzRalph was himself very much influenced by Lyra’s Postilla, which proved a great source of information as he also considered the role of the auctor in the interpretation of Scripture (Walsh 1985, 254-57). Because the Armenian Christians would not necessarily accept Western Fathers and 24

Biblia Sacra cum Glossis, Interlineari et Ordinaria II, 104v: “Sic igitur illud quod est figura alterius potest tripliciter considerari. Uno modo ut est res in se tantum. Alio modo ut est figura alterius tantum. Tertio modo secundum utrumque. Sic igitur in sacra scriptura aliqua dicuntur de Salomone secundum se, et sic non fuit figura Christi, sicut quod fecit templa idolorum, ut habetur infra, iii. libro. xi. capi. Aliqua autem dicuntur de ipso inquantum fuit figura Christi tantum, quae non possunt verificari de Salomone secundum se, sed tantum de Christo … Alia autem dicuntur in scriptura de Salomone utroque modo, quae scilicet verificata sunt de ipso, licet minus perfecte, et de Christo perfectius …” Note that in transcribing the text I have provided the complete forms of the abbreviated Latin. 25 De questionibus Armenorum Bk. 19, ch. 19, quoted in Robson, 94: “Fateor enim michi sepius apparuisse falsitatem et nonnumquam contrarietatem fuisse in multis locis scripture, ubi tamen clara veritas fuerat expressa sed etiam negligentius attendebam …”

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traditions in the course of theological debate, FitzRalph bases his arguments on the text of Scripture alone (Walsh 1981, 147-48). Pantin thinks that FitzRalph’s stress on the literal sense of the Bible was in keeping with the spirit of an age which increasingly valued scriptural proofs to scholastic arguments (Pantin, 133). And on that score, Walsh believes Wyclif to have been moving in the direction of a sola scriptura position, and speculates whether, in light of FitzRalph’s own ideas, this might not have been part of a respected Oxford tradition (Walsh 1987, 267-68). Claiming at the outset of his Summa that he will argue from the literal sense of Scripture, the question arises as to what exactly constitutes the literal sense (sensus litteralis). Rather than worry too much about such details, however, FitzRalph simply decides that the literal sense is whatever the author intends. One should just know “the mind of the author.”26 In the actual practice of interpreting the biblical text FitzRalph accepts the Thomist principle, as most had by this time, that theological doctrine must be based on the literal sense of the text. He also adopts Lyra’s sensus duplex litteralis, as both men approach the Bible in some sense as a literary production. Of course, they recognize that the Bible is inspired and infallible, which means that important distinctions with respect to the formulation of such a book must be clearly delineated (Minnis 1975, 11-12). One of the most important among them perhaps is the difference between the assertor and the compilator. Drawing on the distinction employed by the schools between ‘asserting’ a position as one’s own, and simply ‘reciting’ it, FitzRalph holds than an auctor is one who ‘asserts’ a position, and is thus responsible for its content, while a compilator merely ‘recites’ it. When Jacob lies to Isaac, for example, then he is the assertor of the lie while Moses is only the compilator who recites what Jacob says. By this distinction the veracity of Scripture is preserved (Minnis 1984, 10002). Along these same lines, though in the scholastic context of his earlier Oxford days when commenting on the Sentences, FitzRalph addresses 26

Bk. 1, ch. 1, quoted in Walsh 1981, 171: “Quia ex litterali sensu scripture sacre intendis in hoc opere tractare Armenorum propositas questionis, ostende michi primo quis sensus scripture sacre dici debeat litteralis.” Ibid., 171: “Non refert quis sensus proprie dici debeat litteralis alicuius scripture, dum tamen scias mentem auctoris.”


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another issue which very much bothered Wyclif: whether God can deceive human beings. Here he distinguishes between deception per seipsum and per accidens. FitzRalph will concede that God can deceive someone, but he never will deceive anyone. He deceived the devil indirectly when concealed under the form of a man; but there the misunderstanding rests with the devil himself. One does not deceive per se therefore except when one intends to deceive.27 And with respect to the question that outraged Wyclif above all else: whether Christ was able to lie, FitzRalph argues that he was not, because to lie includes more than just speaking a falsehood. Lying pertains to the intention of deceiving, and as such, while Christ was able to speak a falsehood he was not able to lie.28

5 Conclusion Having briefly examined the application of logical-grammatical analysis to the biblical text, as well as the considerations of authorial intention integral to the search for sacred meaning, the stage is set to look at Wyclif’s own positions. We have seen the way in which the very advancements which can further the goals of the Church in reconciling apparently contradictory authoritative texts, whether patristic or scriptural, can also be their undoing. The Paris censure of 1340 speaks to the fear of just such an eventuality. Universities were the places where catholic truth was to be defended, and the theologians had the resources to do just that in the books of the Fathers, and above all in Scripture. The four theologians we have just looked at sought to explicate Holy Scripture in all its subtlety, confident that the Church could only prosper the more she knew of the Divine Author’s manner 27

Lectura sententiae I, q. 16, quoted in Leff 1963, 30: “Respondeo quod … hec est vera quod deus potest aliquem decipere, sed tamen nunquam decipiet aliquem, et hoc dico per seipsum. Sed tamen per accidens decepit dyabolum quando latuit sub forma hominis, et dyabolus ex hoc credidit ipsum aliquando non esse filium dei. Unde non dicitur per se decipere nisi intendat decipere.” 28 Ibid., 30: “Non sequitur ergo potuit mentiri, quia mentiri plus includit quam dicere falsum, scilicet intentionem fallendi, et ideo non sequitur christus potuit dicere falsum, ergo christus potuit mentiri.”

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of discourse, and the book he had constituted to communicate sacred history. Wyclif the theologian, and thus magister sacrae paginae, shared this same vision, and yet he will finally run afoul of the ecclesiastical authorities for the very fact that his interpretation of Holy Scripture leads him to support positions which some prelates and doctors deem erroneous and heretical. Believing that he has located the intended sense of the text, he constructs a theological edifice upon that divinely sanctioned foundation. Only when one has a clear picture of Wyclif’s own conception of the nature of Scripture, and the way in which authority and authorship are manifested within that conception, will his own exegetical methods become clear. The extent to which Wyclif was genuinely in accord with the greater medieval tradition of biblical interpretation, and just how he understood that tradition, are questions not easily answered. Notwithstanding that, examining some key texts, many of which were written very shortly before the time he rejected transubstantiation, will help us form some solid conclusions regarding his understanding of the greater theological task, as well as the place of his eucharistic theology within that task. This will the subject of the following chapter.

4~John Wyclif and the Logic of Scripture

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4 John Wyclif and the Logic of Scripture

E

arlier in this study, we looked at the logical speculation of the schools and the attendant question of heresy. What some regarded as the harmless give-and-take of the lecture halls, others viewed with deep suspicion. Wyclif regarded all such speculation as dangerous, but he was especially troubled by the reckless application of logical-grammatical methods to the biblical text. As we shall see, his main opponents are the members of the Arts faculty, the ‘sophists’ as they were called. Yet he thinks that this sort of behavior has even infected the ranks of the theologians, as they forsake their sacred calling as magistri sacrae paginae: “It seems that our own theologians walk into the lecture hall one day dressed as sheep with the purpose of commending the law of Scripture, only to acquire the teeth of foxes all of a sudden, adding then a viper’s tail. They say that Holy Scripture is impossible for the most part and even blasphemous when read according to the literal, verbal, and fleshly sense.” He remains unmoved by their excuse that this is all for the sharpening of young minds, since they must later refute all the arguments they have just made against Scripture. Indeed, Wyclif likens them to thugs offering medicine to the very person they have injured.1 The sacred text is not to be tampered with, even for a moment. But the very fact that some could find apparent inconsistencies and falsehoods brings the whole question round to authorial intention. While everyone agreed that 1

De veritate sacrae scripturae I, xii, 272-73: “unde videtur, quod theologi nostri uno die intrantes scolam in veste ovina ad comendandum legem scripture et statim apponentes dentem wlpinum addunt caudam vipeream. verumptamen inquiunt: scriptura sacra ut plurimum est impossibilis et blasfema, quia ad literam, ad verbum vel sensum carnalem. … ut omne argumentum, quod sciunt facere contra scripturam ipsimet obligati sunt dissolvere, fatentes quod scriptura non debet habere sensum illum fictum, sed sensum catholicum, quem exponent. … verumptamen non est satis … ministrare persone, quam leserit, medicinam.”

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Scripture bears no falsehood in actuality, the way in which Wyclif defends its inherent veracity is integrally connected to his whole theological program and view of divinely ordered reality. Modern scholars have generally been critical of Wyclif’s exegetical approach, reckoning him at odds with the greater medieval tradition of scriptural interpretation. Smalley concludes that Wyclif’s metaphysical convictions forced him into the most arbitrary interpretations of the biblical text (Smalley 1981). Minnis also concludes that Wyclif, driven by his metaphysical realism, placed overwhelming weight on the divine authorship at the expense of the human, thereby putting him at odds with fellow fourteenth-century exegetes, Nicholas of Lyra and Richard FitzRalph (Minnis 1975). Ghosh argues that Wyclif’s attempts to defend scriptural veracity only lead him into selfconstructed contradictions as he attempts to locate the divinely intended sense (Ghosh 1998).

1 Authorship and the Eternal Scripture As we have observed, the question of authorship loomed large in later medieval biblical exegesis; and this was no less the case within Wyclif’s writings. For Wyclif, the question of authorship is inexorably linked to his understanding of an eternal Scripture. We should proceed by first looking at what Wyclif has to say about authorship and authority specifically, before drawing the connections to the very nature of Scripture itself. In his 1377-78 De veritate sacrae scripturae, Wyclif offers an account of the relationship between human and divine authorship: “One must first suppose that authority is that which makes someone formally an author. Second, it is necessary to distinguish in what manner someone is an author in and of himself, as is the case with God alone; while someone else is an author in a participatory and derivative manner, which is the case with human beings to whom God imparts his own power for the benefit of Church.”2 Wyclif 2

Ibid., xv, 391: “hic oportet primo supponere, quod autoritas sit illud, quo quis est formaliter autor. secundo oportet distingwere, quomodo aliquis est autor de se et in se, ut solus deus, et aliquis participative et derivative ut homines, quibus deus participat potestatem suam ad utilitatem ecclesie.”


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contends that God, the Holy Trinity, possesses a supreme and pure authority, such that every truth God speaks is of equal authority. “For the entire Scripture is of equal authority with respect to every single one of its parts. And it is clear that insofar as the entirety of Holy Scripture is the unique word of God, and our authors are only God’s scribes or heralds charged with the duty of inscribing his law which he has dictated to them, so when compared to God they are only authors in an equivocal sense.”3 Thus Wyclif says, “it is futile to quarrel over who might have been the scribe, the composer of the manuscript, or the Lord’s reed-pen, whom God infused with divine knowledge. For it is sufficient to believe that God spoke the given knowledge through some of his saints in particular, and through individuals generally.”4 It would seem here that Wyclif is not so much oblivious to the literary distinctions proposed by the likes of FitzRalph as he is specifically opposed to them. From Wyclif’s vantage point, such classifications of human authorship can only lend aid and comfort to those who would undermine Scripture’s veracity, and thus its inherent authority. What one must recognize here, though, is that Wyclif’s entire conception of authorship and authority hinges upon his conception of Scripture as a living, eternal entity. In his 1375-76 De civili dominio, Wyclif describes Scripture as the Book of Life and the eternal truths grounded therein, while the manuscripts are called Scripture in an equivocal sense, like a remote picture humanly imposed for the sake of signifying the prior, higher levels of Scripture. And so too, once someone deforms Scripture with an erroneous sense it ceases to be Holy Scripture, just as the person who defaces an image in so doing renders it no longer the man depicted. On the other hand, the catholic who all the while devoutly understands the truth, possesses Scripture in his soul.5 By the time of his De veritate sacrae scripturae, Wyclif 3

Ibid., 392: “ex quo patet corellarie, quod tota scriptura est paris autoritatis secundum singulas eius partes. patet eo, quod tota scriptura sacra est unicum verbum dei, et autores nostri non sunt nisi scribe vel precones dei ad scribendum suam legem, quam eis dictaverit, et non autores nisi equivoce in comparacione ad eum.” 4 Ibid., x, 218: “ideo vanum est contendere, quis fuit scriba, compositor codicis vel fistula domini, cui deus infundit talem scienciam, cum satis est credere, quod deus locutus est datam scienciam per aliquos sanctos suos specialiter et per singulos in communi.” 5 De civili dominio III, xix, 403-04: “Istud autem dubium relinquo loycis pertractandum, solicitus ad intelligendum librum vite et veritates eternas in ipso

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contends that Scripture has five different levels: “As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the law of God subsists beyond the manuscripts and sensible signs which yield the signified truth, and so is more suitably called Holy Scripture than the manuscripts themselves. Hence, I have been in the habit of describing Holy Scripture as the inscription of sacred truth, whether in its revealing of other truths, or insofar as it is the very revelation of truth itself. I have customarily posited five levels of Holy Scripture. The first is the Book of Life, which Apocalypse speaks of in Chapters 20 and 21. The second consists of the truths inscribed in the Book of Life, according to their intelligible being. Both levels of these Scriptures are absolutely necessary, although they do not differ essentially, but rather according to reason, as I said of this matter in On Ideas. On the third level, Scripture is considered in light of the truths which are to be believed in their proper genus. These are inscribed in the Book of Life according to existence and effect. The fourth level considers Scripture in light of the truth which must be believed as it is inscribed in the book of the natural man, that is, in his mind. Some people call this Scripture an aggregate abstracted from actions and truths, spoken of in the third manner. For some this is an intellective habit, and for others it is an intention or species. Yet in the fifth manner, Holy Scripture is understood as referring to the manuscripts, sounds or other artificial signs designed to bring to mind that First Truth.”6 Scripture may be eternally true, but it is also under siege, and so there exists a five-fold armor by which the faithful exegete can defend it. With Scripture by his side the catholic will ward off the sophists’ javelins and insults, as they attempt to subvert the truth of the Sacred fundatas; quorum uterque est scriptura sacra. Codices autem nostros voco scripturam sacram equivoce tercio modo dictam; equivoce dico, quia non est nisi pictura remota humanitus imposita ad significandum scripturas priories. … Unde difformans ipsa per sensum erroneum facit ea tunc non esse scripturam sacram, sicut deturpans ymaginem facit ut tunc non sit homo pictus; verumtamen catholicus pie intelligens habet scripturam sacram in anima.” 6 De veritate I, vi, 107-09: “nam sicut ostendi alibi, de lege dei est preter codices vel signa sensibilia dare veritatem signatam, que pocius est scriptura sacra quam codices.—unde solebam ponere quinque gradus scripture sacre: primus est liber vite, de quo Apoc. vicesimo et vicesiomo uno, secundus est veritates libro vite inscripte secundum esse earum intelligibile, et utraque istarum scripturarum est absolute necessaria, non differens essentialiter, sed secundum racionem, ut dictum est in matteria De Ydeis. tercio sumiter scriptura pro veritatibus credendis


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Page.7 While sophists are applying their logical-grammatical methods, Wyclif also seems to be disturbed by the results of textual-critical analysis. The fourteenth century was a time of increased concern for the accuracy and consistency of biblical and patristic texts. And it is in this vein that Wyclif envisions attacks generated by those scholars he thinks are fixated on the lowest level of Scripture, those who are uncovering textual inconsistencies. Hence, he chastises his contemporaries for their preoccupation with this lowest level, seeking after signs which are really only of value to the extent that they exemplify Scripture on its highest level. For there is nothing sacred about Scripture in its manuscript form unless it is serves to lead the faithful into the knowledge of the heavenly Scripture.8 He reiterates the principle that Scripture must not be equated with the material codex, for it is in fact an aggregate formed from the manuscript and the sacred sense that the catholic grasps from the material aspect as in a sign. The truth garnered through the believer’s intellection is really Scripture in the best sense of the term, though even when existing as a mental intellection it is only true to the extent that it conforms to the objective truth of the Eternal Scripture.9 in genere, que secundum existenciam vel effectum inscribuntur libro vite. quarto sumiter scriptura pro veritate credenda, ut inscribitur libro hominis naturalis ut anima, quam scripturam quidam agregatum ex actibus et veritatibus tercio modo dictis, quidam, quod est habitus intellectivus, et quidam quod est intencio vel species. sed quinto modo sumitur scriptura sacra pro codicibus, vocibus aut aliis artificialibus, que sunt signa memorandi veritatem priorem.” On Wyclif’s unpublished De Ydeis cf. Thomson 1983, 32-34. 7 Ibid., viii, 167-68: “unde sicut est quintuplex manieres scripture, sic est quintuplex armatura, secundum quam defendi potest a callidis sophistis, qui nituntur sibi imponere falsitatem. pro quo notandum, quod, sicut sunt quinque arma spiritualia defensiva, que recitat Augustinus in libello Ad Spiritum sanctam de scriptura apostoli Ephes. sexto. … sic correspondenter sunt quinque genera armorum defensivorum celestis logice, per que potest catholicus iacula et omnes insultus sophistarum evertere incassum nitencium sacre pagine veritatem de virtute sermonis subvertere.” 8 Ibid., vi, 114: “de scriptura vero quarto vel quinto modo dictis scriptura sacra facit nullam aut modicum mencionem, et tamen generacio moderna signa querens ad illam scripturam attendit precipue, ipsa autem non habet, quod sit scriptura pocius …” 9 Ibid., ix, 189: “nam sacra scriptura est agregatum ex codice et sensu vel sentencia sacra, quam catholicus habet de illa materiali ut signo. … illa enim mentalis intelleccio est verius scriptura quam lineacio membrane, que non est scriptura sacra, nisi per habitudinem ad illam, nec scriptura mentis est sacra, nisi per scripturam obiectivam, quam concipit.”

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In his 1372 Principium, the inaugural lecture delivered upon receipt of his doctorate, Wyclif calls Scripture “a mirror in which eternal truths are reflected,” leading the weary pilgrim’s soul to final salvation.10 This image appears repeatedly in De veritate sacrae scripturae, and is invoked in its opening paragraph, thereby setting the tone for the rest of the work. The salvation of the faithful rests in Holy Scripture, which is the foundation of every Catholic opinion, the exemplar and mirror designed to extinguish all error and heretical depravity. To admit even the smallest mistake in that principle would bring about the death of the Church. The Truth is present in Scripture more permanently than any place else, inasmuch as Scripture is eternal and indelible, the very radiance of eternal light, that flawless mirror of divine majesty spoken of in Wisdom 7:26. And because Scripture is a mirror of the divine will, of the God who cannot lie, those who live by faith may trust that the Truth will deign to descend and instruct them apart from all deception. For in a mirror so clear as this there abides neither deceit nor falsehood. Moreover, this Truth is the very cause of the indissoluble nexus formed between the written book, the truths therein, and the writer himself. Here is the Word of Life (Jn 14:6), the gospel which Paul proclaimed to the Galatians (Gal 1:69).11 As Wyclif speaks of Scripture in this manner it becomes clear that Scriptura Sacra is interchangeable with Veritas and Sophia, the Truth and Wisdom which are none other than the Verbum, that is, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity. Thus to hold up all doctrines to the eternal mirror of Scripture is to judge them in light of a living, 10

Text transcribed in Smalley 1964, 295: “Ipse enim sunt speculum in quo veritates eterne relucent, via per quam viator ad terminum salutis perducitur, et consolatorium in quo languentis animus vigoratur.” 11 De veritate I, i, 1-2: “… sed et exemplar est et speculum ad examinandum et extigwnedum quemcunque errorem sive hereticam pravitatem.” Ibid., I, vi, 11112: “veritas enim est ibi permanencior, quia eterna et indelebilis, liber est serenior, quia candor lucis eterne et speculum sine macula, Sap. septimo, et est causata ydemptias libri scripti, veritas scripte et persone scribentis, quod omnia hec tria distincta secundum racionem sunt verbum vite et veritates in abstracto, Joh quarto decimo, et ista scriptura est evangelium, de quo doctor gencium ad Gal primo sic loquitur …” Ibid., I, xv, 377: “… quam si deus, qui mentiri non potest, in scriptura sua, que est speculum voluntatis sue, hoc dixerit, igitur verum.” Ibid., II, xvii, 42: “non est in tam claro speculo mendacium, falsitas vel directe deceptio.”


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eternal Person, not some vague, ethereal book hovering above the plane of human affairs. Scripture is a ‘who’ not a ‘what.’ Scripture is Christ. Wyclif need look no further than John 10:35-36 for proof that Christ is identical with Scripture, since the Lord himself says, ‘the Scripture cannot be destroyed, whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world.’ Wyclif had in fact been equating Scripture with Christ as early as 1372, when arguing in his De benedicta incarnacione that the hypostatic union cannot be dissolved. Much of this material would reappear almost verbatim five years later in his De veritate sacrae scripturae. Christ the Truth is not referring to Scripture here as that artificial aggregate made up of the pelts of dead animals; after all, those scriptures are destroyed on a daily basis. He means the Book of Life in which all things are inscribed, the intrinsic Sermo Dei. The Holy Spirit leaves us an example when he speaks of the “living Scripture,” by supplying the masculine gender “quem Pater sanctificavit,” thereby implying the relationship with the Son.12 When Wyclif picks up this theme in De veritate sacrae scripturae one finds the “whole Trinity” at work again. The Word in his divinity sent himself into the world, for in his humanity he is the nobleman of Luke 19:12 who went off to a distant country to receive his kingship and then return. That this book i.e., Christ cannot be destroyed is verified by the fact that his divinity and humanity are insolubly united in a single person. Again it is both a Christological and a Trinitarian matter, as we read of the Holy Spirit so ordaining the correct manuscripts to read the relative pronoun in the masculine (quem), thus referring to Christ. For as Christ is fully human, born of a woman, and fully divine, begotten not made, so God ‘made’ the manuscripts sacred in regard to Christ’s humanity, while he ‘begot’ Scripture and ‘caused’ it to be sacred with respect to his divinity, with the result that Scripture must be supremely authentic, surpassing all 12

Tractatus de benedicta incarnacione V, 72: “Primo quod Veritas non loquitur de scriptura nostra artificiali aggregata ex ficturis atramenti et pellibus mortuorum; tum quia talis scriptura cottidie per artifices potest solvi … Unde Spiritus Sanctus ad relinquendum nobis exemplar, quod loquitur de scriptura vitali, subdit in genere masculino—‘quem Pater sanctificavit’—innuendo nobis relacionem faciendum ad Filium.” Cf. Oey, 181-92 who thinks Wyclif is replying to the question whether the hypostatic union could be disolved de potentia Dei absoluta.

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sensible signs.13 Here again the sensible Scripture found in manuscripts is only Holy Scripture in an equivocal sense, as one might say the painted image of a man is the man himself. This lowest level is the Scripture liable to destruction in the jaws of dogs and contamination at the hands of fool and heretics.14 The composition and subsequent plight of Scripture is remarkably close to that of Christ the Incarnate Word. Just as Christ is fully God and fully man, so Scripture can be seen as the product of a hypostatic union, namely the Divine Word and the parchment. The Word assumed perishable flesh, liable to injury and death at the hands of sinners, and so too the Word is united to cured calfskin, liable to scribal error and the yet worse blasphemous senses imposed upon it by impious sophists. Yet as Christ could not suffer in his impassible divinity, so the Word, the Book of Life, cannot be altered or destroyed in its eternal truth. Those who deface Scripture can do no damage to the truth preserved in the devout catholic soul where Christ, the substance of Scripture, dwells. This is the Eternal Person who became incarnate and offered testimony to Truth in word and deed, thereby providing the Church with a perfect example of the sacred conduct which brings the faithful into conformity with the creative Word, the source and principle of all being. The words of Scripture are the words of Christ the Word, the one who cannot lie. Wyclif is concerned with the veracity of a Living Person, not the correctness of a fixed record. By the time of his 1382 Trialogus, Wyclif has narrowed down his five-fold Scripture to a tri-partite system, though the Christological theme is still intact. “As I should speak more succinctly, you must remember that there is some equivocation with regard to the term 13

De veritate I, vi, 109-110: “ymmo tota trinitas et per consequens ipsummet verbum divinitus misit se ipsum, humanitus est homo nobilis, quo abiit in regionem longinquam accipere sibi regnum et reverti. iste liber non potest solvi … ordinavit spiritus sanctus in correctis codicibus hoc relativum ‘quem’ et non ‘quam’ … deus ergo fecit dictam scripturam sanctam quoad humanitatem, et genuit vel causavit sanctam quoad divinitatem. et patet ex fide scripture, quod oportet esse scripturam summe autenticam preter signa sensibilia.” 14 Ibid., 111: “unde ista scriptura sensibilis in vocibus vel codicibus non est scriptura sacra nisi equivoce, sicut homo pictus vel ymaginatus dicitur homo propter similititudinem ad verum hominem. … ymmo a cane solubilis et corrigibilis a scurra sicut maculabilis, et omnis scriptura foret a quotlibet hominibus hereticabilis, dampnabilis et adversabilis …”


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‘Scripture.’ First of all, the term ‘Holy Scripture’ signifies Jesus Christ, the Book of Life, in whom every truth is inscribed, in keeping with John 10: ‘the Scripture cannot be broken, whom God sanctified and sent into the world.’ In the second manner, it signifies the truths inscribed in the very Book of Life, whether they are the eternal exemplar reasons or other temporal truths. In the third manner, which is better known to the general public, it signifies that aggregate which is derived both from the manuscripts of God’s law, and from the truth which God imposes upon them. Yet this bare material Scripture should not be called Holy Scripture, inasmuch as those manuscripts are only sacred to the extent that the sacred meaning accompanies them.”15 Both the earlier fivefold version, and this condensed version, seem strikingly similar to Wyclif’s system of universals. For in both systems Scripture on its highest level is Christ the Word. And as the Word is the repository of the eternal exemplar reasons, then it seems the next level must be equated with those exemplar reasons. For just as the exemplar reasons subsisting in the divine intellect are not essentially distinct from the divine essence, so the truths inscribed in the Book of Life are not (as he says) essentially different from the Book itself. In the fivefold system, the first and highest level is Christ the Word and Book of Life, thus corresponding to the divine intellect. The second level corresponds to the truths inscribed therein; these are the eternal exemplar reasons (universale ante rem). The third level corresponds to the universals existing in the individual subject (universale in re), since these are “the truths that must be believed in their genus, which according to existence or effect are inscribed in the Book of Life.” Level four, which is “an aggregate abstracted from actions and truths of the third level,” corresponds to the universals existing in mente, here called “intention or species.” These are the conceptual 15

Trialogus III, xxxi, 238-39: “Sed ut loquar strictius, notanda est tibi aequivocatio de scriptura. Primo enim scriptura sacra signat Jesum Christum librum vitae, in quo omnis veritas est inscripta, juxta illud Johannis x: ‘non potest solvi scriptura, quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum.’ Secundo modo signat veritates in ipso libro vitae inscriptas, sive sint rationes exemplares aeternae sive veritates aliae temporales. Et tertio modo famosius quo ad vulgus signat aggregatum ex codicibus legis Dei et ex veritate quam Deus ipsis imponit; sed hoc nudum scriptum materiale non didici vocare scripturam sacram, quia illi codices non sunt sacri, nisi illis assit sententia sacra.”

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universals abstracted from particulars (universale post rem). The fifth and lowest level consists of the written or vocal signs formed on the basis of these concepts. And bear in mind that the manuscripts i.e., the fifth level of Scripture, are only called Scripture in an equivocal sense, just as his lowest level of universal is only called such equivocally. In fact, both are specifically compared to the portrait of a man bearing only the likeness of the real person. For this universale repraesentatione is but a sign of the prior universals. Looking at the later threefold version of Scripture, one can chart the correspondence in the following way: the first level is the divine intellect; while on the second level Wyclif locates the “exemplar reasons” (universale ante rem), as well as the “temporal truths,” namely the universals subsisting in individual subjects (universale in re). The last level corresponds to the signs formed from those abstracted universals which exist in the mind (universale post rem). The first level in this later version is still that of the earlier, while the second level now conflates levels two and three of the earlier version. The lowest levels are the same in each, though level four of the earlier version, namely the universal existing in mente, is now implicit in the lowest level of the later version, since the level of signification presupposes a mental concept. Either way, this last level refers to the universale post rem. Minnis contends that Wyclif did not regard Scripture as “a book per se,” and in this sense his approach is to be distinguished from the more ‘literary’ method of FitzRalph (Minnis 1975, 13-14). This is correct; one could even go as far as to say that Wyclif grants to Scripture a genuine personhood, that of Christ the Word. Scripture thus assumes the role that the book as literary production cannot, that of living Savior. Nor is Scripture an eternally static Book of Life, for it is precisely the personhood of Scripture which gives it that dynamic quality which distinguishes it from a fixed volume of immutable laws. The truth of Scripture is grounded not in laws, but in a Person. Scripture is true because Christ is true. Christ is the Truth, the source and content of divine revelation throughout the Old and New Testaments. Yet as the Person of Christ, Scripture also performs its salvific function as a ‘book,’ since it is the immutable truth revealed in the flesh of the sensible parchment, proclaiming the highest level of saving gospel. The parchment and ink present the Word to the


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senses much as the flesh and blood of Christ present the Second Person of the Trinity. Just as the principle of unity in the person of Christ is the Person of the Word, which thus provides the foundation of the hypostatic union, so the highest level of Scripture is the locus of truth for the lower levels. Wyclif’s account of Scripture in its different levels bears not only a Christological character, but speaks to the way in which the Second Person of the Trinity interacts with the Third Person, who adorns the work of the former. The Word is the Book of Life sent into the world, and it is the Holy Spirit who preserves and testifies to the truth of the Word in his ‘humanity’ by protecting those manuscripts which attest to the highest level of eternal truth. Wyclif cannot think of Scripture apart from Christology and Trinitarianism, precisely because he is a creedal theologian, with his eye on the entirety of sacred tradition.

2 The Logic of Scripture That Scripture possesses its own logic, its own eloquence, was axiomatic for the medieval biblical exegetes. But so too did the medieval tradition takes its cue from Augustine’s De doctrina christiana when employing both the trivium and quadrivium in an effort to uncover the mysteries of that sacred discourse. As Wyclif was a product and proponent of this tradition it will be instructive to look at what he has to say about the place of the liberal arts in the interpretation of the sacred text. We have already mentioned Wyclif’s earliest known work, the De logica, with regard to the development of his realism. The prologue is worthy of attention, for here he tells the reader that this work is the result of having been asked by “certain friends of God’s law” to compile a dependable treatise which would help them understand “the logic of Holy Scripture.” Thus to sharpen their minds, Wyclif will show them various proofs which should be drawn from Scripture. What follows is a straightforward discussion of the rules and terminology of grammar and logic. Wyclif takes it for granted that these are important tools in the explication of the sacred text, which itself can be understood to contain logical propositions.

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Of course, it is never a matter of imposing logical systems on the text, but rather explicating a text inherently replete with its own logic.16 His definitions follow traditional lines, as he begins by defining the nature of a term and proceeds to explain the difference between simple and compound terms, categorematic and syncategorematic, as well as substantial and accidental terms. When classifying propositions his metaphysical realism comes to the fore, noting that in a real proposition human nature, for instance, is really predicated of an individual human being, since it essentially inheres within him. Thus the proposition denotes a real joining of a man with his nature.17 With respect to supposition, Wyclif followed the traditional categorization of the proper and improper, the former being divided into material, simple and personal. Regarding improper supposition, he also follows along traditional lines, defining it as the process whereby the term relinquishes its primary manner of signification and adopts one in keeping with customary discourse (ex usu loquendi).18 This is of special interest, for in his later defense of scriptural veracity, he will equate the literal sense of the text with the author’s intended meaning, thereby encompassing improper discourse within the literal meaning. Having received his doctorate in 1372, Wyclif embarked upon his Postilla on the entire Bible which he completed by 1379. The work stands as a remarkable achievement, not as much for its content, which is rather straightforward and non-controversial, but for the very 16

De logica I, i, 1: “Motus sum per quosdam legis dei amicos certum tractatum ad declarandam logicam sacre scripture compilare. Nam videns multos ad logicam transeuntes, qui per illam proposuerant legem dei melius cognovisse, et propter insipidam terminorum mixtionem gentilium in omni probacione proposicionum propter vacuitatem operis eam deserentes, propono ad acuendum mentes fidelium ponere probaciones proposicionum que debent elici ex scripturis.” Note that we cannot be sure this prologue was part of the original work and not appended later by Wyclif. Cf. Robson, 163-64. 17 Ibid., v, 15: “Proposicio realis est, ut iste homo, iste lapis etc. quia sicut in alia proposicione est subiectum et predicatum et copula, sic in isto homine est dare istam personam, que est pars subiecta speciei humane, que est tamquam subiectum; et est dare similiter naturam humanam, que essencialiter inest isti homini tamquam predicatum, et realiter predicatur de isto homine. Et est dare essenciam istius hominis, que est realis copula copulans istum hominem cum sua natura.” 18 Ibid., xii, 39: “Supposicio impropria est quando terminus significat aliter ex usu loquendi quam ex primaria significacione: ut Anglia pugnat; bibi ciphum. In ista proposicione, iste terminus Anglia, supponit pro homnibus in Anglia, vel pro aggregato ex homnibus in Anglia.”


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fact that he actually completed such an undertaking. Nobody had postillated on the entire Bible since Lyra had completed his Postilla litteralis in 1331, and no secular had done anything comparable since Stephen Langton some two hundred years earlier (Smalley 1953, 187). But this effort seems to be part of a general trend, for despite a lull in the production of commentaries in the middle of the fourteenth century there was resurgence by the last quarter of the century (Courtenay 1985, 185-87). In the following section we will look at some of the passages of his Postilla which are particularly illustrative of his larger exegetical program. As a newly incepted doctor, Wyclif delivered his Principium, abiding by the tradition of praising Scripture and the study of theology, while noting the inferiority of the secular sciences, as well as listing a series of conditions necessary for worthwhile study: humility, purity of conscience, purgation of carnal desire and the practice of virtue (Smalley 1964, 255, 270). Here Wyclif reckons three things are bestowed upon the pure in heart that they might arrive at a fitting knowledge of Scripture: moral disposition informing one’s affections; training in the three types of philosophy, namely linguistic, natural and moral; and the virtuous operation which renders the effect of the aforementioned habits.19 In words that ring of Grosseteste, Wyclif declares that the biblical scholar must shun mundane enticements, inasmuch as the soul whose affections are fastened to the things of this world will be surely drawn away from its natural home.20 Nothing is more essential for the pilgrim, and especially the theologian, than the proper ordering of his affections, apart from which theological truth is unattainable. Since the will is the highest power of the soul, its righteousness is chiefly required in all matters. This is all the more so

19

Text transcribed in Smalley 1964, 288: “Tria sunt que magis conferunt mundicordibus ut perveniant ad notitiam debitam Scripturarum. Primum est moralis dispositio informans affectum … Secundum est laudabilis habitudo intellectus in triplici philosophia, scilicet sermonicali, naturali, et morali … Tertium est virtualis operatio producens effectum secundum habitus supradictos.” For the Principium cf. also Benrath, 338-46. 20 Ibid., 290: “Et indubie afflictio spiritus affixi istis mundialibus in affectu est signum infallibile quod dicta affixio sit innaturalis, retardans et retrahens animum a fine sibi debito per naturam.”

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for those studying the Book of Life, “whose author is the Holy Spirit and to whom the will personally corresponds.”21 Wyclif’s lecture maps out the secular sciences which will aid the reader of Scripture, beginning with the trivium. Grammar will aid one in recognizing the meaning of terms when discerning the literal sense, and figurative constructions and tropes when reading the mystical senses. Dialectic is for detecting the hidden truths and elucidating the question of universal substances, and resolving doubts concerning the extension of present time and divine foreknowledge, thereby allowing one to speak in conformity with Scripture and beyond the domain of the sophists. Rhetoric aids one in presenting the faith by pleasing, teaching, and persuading one’s audience. After all, the ultimate goal of Christian eloquence is that everything necessary for salvation might be heard more obediently, willingly and intelligibly.22 Natural philosophy will also be needed to understand Scripture as the theologian studies the mystical and parabolic senses. In keeping with the Augustinian program, Wyclif considers knowledge of nature essential for

21

Ibid., 290: “… quia dicta dispositio affectus est primarie necessaria in statu quolibet viatoris, et specialiter intendentibus huic scientie … unde quamvis infidelis, hereticus, vel peccato mortali quolibet irretus putat se satis cognoscere sapientiam Scripturarum, errat tamen in hoc quod non sapit sapore debito propter discrasiam potentie voluntavie … Cum voluntas sit summa et finalis potentia animi, eius rectitudo debita, que est iustitia, est prima requisita omnium … et multo magis in disciplina libri vite, cuius auctor est Spiritus sanctus, cui voluntas personaliter correspondet.” 22 Ibid., 290-91: “Constat quidem quod philosophia sermonicalis, que includit grammaticam, dialecticam, et rhetoricam, est perutilis huic scientie. Grammatica quidem in docendo quid nominis [sic] terminorum pro sensu literali, figuras constructionum et tropos locutionum pro senso mistico, ut allegorico, tropologico, et anaogico capescendo. … cum dialectica vel ars sillogizandi non minus est utilis, cum ipsa detegit veritates in (visceribus nature) absconditas, dilucidat universales substantias plebis incognitas et extendit presentiam successivorum … ad solutionem dubiorum que concernunt Dei prescientiam aut necessitatem contingentium futurorum, et ad loquendum compendiose ac libere conformiter cum Scriptura extra domignium [sic] sophistarum. … Rhetorica autem ex quarto libro De doctrina christiana noscitur huic sapientie subservire, cum decet ecclesiasticum eloquentem esse ut delectet, ut doceat et ut flectat. … Finis enim universalis totius eloquentie christiani est ut obedientius, libentius, et intelligibilius audiatur in his que sunt necessaria ad salutem.” On the logical, natural and metaphysical knowledge to be found in Scripture cf. FZ, 453-54.


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making sense of metaphorical language, precisely because the Author of Scripture is none other than the Author of Nature.23 At just about the time of his inception, Wyclif was involved in a debate with a very able theologian, the Oxford Carmelite John Kynyngham. Here Wyclif is already speaking of an Eternal Scripture, and the effect on the debate is noteworthy. While Kynyngham acknowledges the existence of eternal truths known to the patriarchs, he does not equate these truths with Scripture per se; for they would only be later inscribed as ‘Scripture’ by subsequent human ‘authors.’ Wyclif, on the other hand, explicitly equates such truths with Scripture, which cannot be considered apart from the Eternal Antiquity of its one ‘Divine Author.’ When Kynyngham insists that no writing can be more ancient than the author himself the difference between the two theologians emerges.24 The Carmelite thinks in terms of many human auctores, while Wyclif always has in mind the one divine Auctor. The nature of authorship leads naturally enough to the issue of just what constitutes the literal sense of the sacred text. The question is whether the interpreter of Scripture should imitate the language of Scripture. Kynyngham says no; the exegete should only seek the sense of the scriptural text, thereby understanding Scripture’s manner of speaking before explaining it in clear language. Because the truth may be hidden under a multitude of expressions the reader must be alert to cases of improper supposition. Wyclif considers it nothing less than sinister to suggest that we should not imitate the modus loquendi Scripturae in its figurative locutions.25 But Kynyngham’s point is well 23

Ibid., 292: “Quorum cognitio, quantum profecerit ad intellectum Scripturae noverunt theologi, qui studuerunt in expositionibus misticis et parabolicis Scripturarum. Ibid., 294: “Secundo, ut plus coniciat quod sicut auctor Scripture intendit istas proprietates ysopi et alias quotlibet in visceribus nature absconditas, sic indubie cuiuslibet creature, cuius Scriptura meminit, intendit proprietates, quotquot auctor nature indidit eidem.” 24 FZ, 43: “Nullam scriptum alicujus auctoris est secundum mensuram prius, vel antiquius eodem auctore; sed tam Enoch, quam alius quiscunque sanctus, creatus est solum temporalis et non aerternis a parte ante.” Ibid., 17: “… ergo [Augustinus] intellexit ibi nomine Scripturae notitiam propheticam respectu legis futurae, quam Abraham expressit verbis vel factis, cujus etiam veritas postmodum descripta in literis.” Cf. Augustine, De civ. Dei XVIII, 38; CCSL 48; 633-34. 25 Ibid., 68: “Dicit ergo primo Magister meus quod ego trado perversam et sinistram doctrinam, cum assero quod in figurativis locutionibus non debemus imitari modum loquendi Scripturae.”

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taken as he notes that some of the Church’s most infamous heresies were introduced precisely by reading Scripture de virtute sermonis. The intention of Scripture may be clear, says Kynyngham, but the strict signification of its words can be erroneous. When presented with such instances the exegete must consider the peculiar characteristics of speech. Kynyngham thereby limits the parameters of what it means to speak de virtute sermonis to the strict grammatical conventions which exclude improper or figurative constructions, thus forcing the reader to press beyond the literal sense where need be in order to grasp Scripture’s intended sense. While many scriptural propositions should be denied according to the dictates of proper speech, one may nonetheless concede the sense which the ‘authors’ of Scripture principally intend.26 Because Wyclif insists that Scripture possesses a grammar all its own, manifested in its sacred manner of speaking, these same improper or figurative constructions cannot permit falsity de virtute sermonis, for they are in fact all included within the literal sense, which is nothing other than the intended sense of the Divine Author. Wyclif considers it axiomatic that insofar as anything is false de virtute sermonis it is false. If Scripture is false in this way, then it too is simply false.27 The proper grammatical construction is whatever the Divine Author deems fit for conveying the sacred meaning of Scripture, which is most truly Scripture itself. For Wyclif, the words of Scripture derive their virtus, that is, their import and signifying power, directly from God. Wyclif knows that some of his arguments seem suspect to grammarians, but interpreting Scripture is the work of theologians. Well aware of Augustine’s admonition that Scripture’s own eloquence is not suitable for everyone, Wyclif applies this to the untrained grammarian who, ignorant as he is of the mysterium scripturae, is likely to speak unfittingly when employing the language of Scripture. 26

Ibid., 26: “ … quia multae sunt propositiones Scripturae, quas volo negare de vi vocis, sed concedere sensum quem auctores Scripturae principaliter intendunt.” Ibid., 42: “… et ita de multis aliis quarum [sensus] ad intentionem Scripturae satis planus est, sed tamen significatio sermonum quam praetendunt est erronea.” 27 Ibid., 459: “… cum tunc Scriptura sacra esset impossibilissima de vi sermonis; et indubie quam falsum est aliquod de vi sermonis tam falsum est. Ideo Scriptura sacra foret tunc falsissima.”


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Members of the Arts faculty should steer clear of this type of discourse. Leave it to the experts; leave it to the theologians. Only they are permitted to speak in this way under the authority of Scripture, bringing out its hidden sense.28 As a theologian, and thus magister sacrae paginae, he bitterly resents members of the Arts faculty testing their methods against the propositions of Holy Scripture. To his mind, not only do the sophists lack the proper reverence due this most holy of texts, but they are rank amateurs when it comes to deciphering the Bible’s sacred grammar. If Scripture is going to be considered as a text subject to the same rigorous analysis as any other, measured according to accepted rules of logic and grammar, one must develop means to defend it when it appears to falter under such rules. This was the task Wyclif set himself to in his 1377-78 De veritate sacrae scripturae. Because Wyclif claims that Scripture is true de virtute sermonis with respect to any of its parts, professors of Scripture are obliged to imitate its manner of speaking, its eloquence and logic. The Christian is called to speak under the authority of Scripture, and to speak those words in keeping with the form that Scripture itself dictates.29 When it comes to explicating and understanding Scripture one must be willing to learn a new grammar and logic; Donatus will not be sufficient for this task. Wyclif sees himself following in a line of saints like Gregory who stood under the authority of the sacred text and yielded to the new senses of biblical terms they had not encountered in their old grammar books.30 28

Ibid., 463: “Conceditur tamen cum Doctore quod rudium grammaticorum, et polemicorum, ac aliorum quorum animus est phantasmatibus temporalium involutus, non est sic loqui, cum margaritae non sunt spargendae inter porcos; sed altissimorum theologorum ac eos intelligentium, quando loquuntur de veritatibus supra tempus, et praeter tempus, illud mysterium.” Ibid., 468 : “… nos autem sub auctoritate Scripturae decet pro loco et tempore sic loqui, ut sensus celatus plus pateat theologis diligentibus veritatem.” 29 De veritate I, i, 2: “Primo igitur arguitur multipliciter contra veritatem et consequenciam scripture sacre, de qua dixi sepius, quod ista vera de virtute sermonis secundum quamlibet eius partem et quod professores scripture sacre debent sequi eam in modo loquendi quoad eloquenciam et logicam plus quam aliquam alienam scripturam gentilium.” Ibid., iii, 51-52: “cristianus debet loqui sub autoritate scripture verba scripture secundum formam, qua scriptura ipsa explicat.” 30 Ibid., iii, 42: “hic sepe dixi quod falsum assumitur, cum oportet in scripturam sacram exponendo vel intelligendo adiscere novam grammaticam ac novam logicam, sicut patet per beatum Gregorium et alios sanctos, quo exponunt

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Scripture is the repository of every law, philosophy, logic and ethic.31 And, as in every genus there is one principle which serves as the measure of the rest, so in logic it must be the logica Scripturae, the sole standard for the Church.32 This is not to say, however, that Wyclif is hostile to the pagan philosophers in principle. He readily admits that Aristotle was a great philosopher whose books should be studied, but where he went astray (e.g. the eternity of the world) the logic of Scripture will destroy his errors.33 True philosophy, for Wyclif, is true theology. Thus to the extent that Aristotle is in accord with Scripture his work retains the status of true philosophy.34 Truth be told, there is solely Divine Discourse, solely Divine Logic. Human discourse is only meaningful, human logic only coherent, to the extent that it mirrors the eternal Eternal Speech of the Eternal Word. When it does not it ceases to be a real language or philosophy. All that remains is a fraudulant cacophony devoid of all meaning. autoritate scripture novos sensus terminorum scripture, qui nusquam orginantur ex libris grammatice.” Cf. Gregory, Moralia, epistola missoria, c. 5; PL 75; 516. 31 Ibid., ii, 21-22: “ideo vere dicit Augustinus secundo De Doctrina Cristiana in fine, quod ‘omnis sciencia est copiosissime in scriptura …’ et idem dicit epistola tercia ad Volusianum ostendens, quod omnis lex, omnis philosophia, omnis logica et omnis ethica est in scriptura sacra.” Cf. Augustine, De doc. chr. II; 42 CCSL 32; 76-77; and Ad Volusianum c. 5; PL 33; 524. 32 Ibid., iii, 48-49: “item cum in omni genere sit unum principium, quod est metrum est mensura omnium aliorum, patet, quod in genere logice oportet, vel logicam scripture esse regulam aliis logicis vel e contra. et cum aliena logica non regulat illam eo, quod, ‘si quid noxium ibi est, dampnatur, et si utile, approbatur’, sequitur, quod ista logica sit regula omnium aliarum.” Ibid., 49: “item ecclesia catholica debet eandem logicam observare, sed nullam, si non logicam scripture sacre, ergo illa est generaliter observanda.” 33 Ibid., ii, 29-30: “non nego tamen, quin Aristoteles fuit magnus philosophus cuius libri licite legentur et meritorie adiscuntur; errores suos de eternitate mundi, maris, temporis et aliorum, que cristianus ponit creacione cepisse, non debemus adiscere, sed raciones scripture, ut sciamus errores suos destruere et sophismata sua dissolvere.” 34 Ibid., 31-32: “probatur: omnis philosophia est sciencia, igitur omne philosophicum est scientificum, sed nullam falsum est scientificum, cum illud, quod non est nisi scitur, igitur nullum falsum est philosophicum, et per consequens non est philosophicum falsum quodcunque asserere vel tenere.—et ex hoc patet, quod nulla philosophia Aristotelis vel cuiuscunque alterius philosophi repugnat theologie, licet errores philosophorum repugnant huic sacre sciencie, secundum quos exciderunt a nomine veri philosophi.”


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3 The Senses of Scripture Wyclif equates the sense of Scripture with the truth that the Catholic perceives in the text, for its sacred meaning is nothing less than the Book of Life which Christ “authentically” closes and opens.35 In determining the sense of Scripture, Wyclif looks to both Aquinas and Lyra, the latter praised as “an eloquent and ingenious postillator of Scripture.”36 He acknowledges the traditional four-fold sense of Scripture, repeating the classic verse for his readers: Litera gesta docet etc. Yet he maintains that any sense which the letter possesses can in fact be designated the literal sense, insofar as it is in keeping with the Divine Author’s intended sense. The literal sense is whatever the Holy Spirit first imparted for the sake of leading the faithful soul upwards into God. Hence, in one instance it is the historical when pertaining to the deeds of Christ and the patriarchs, while at others times it is the tropological, the allegorical, or the anagogical.37 Consider Wyclif’s reading of Galatians 4:22-24. Here, as one moves beyond the historical sense, Abraham signifies God the Father, while his sons signify the two testaments. Someone reading Scripture according to the first, most basic sense alone, will understand only the historical sense, while the person who adds the secondary sense understands the allegorical meaning through the very same letter. Hence, it is quite possible for the faithful reader to understand the mystical sense purely through Genesis 17, while not discounting the history. In that way the allegorical sense becomes for him the literal, as Wyclif appeals to Aquinas’s dictum that the symbolized mystical

35

Ibid., vi, 124-25: “… ut veritas, quam catholicus sentit de scriptura, vocatur sensus scripture, quomodo loquitur Cristus Luc. vicesimo quarto: tunc apperuit eis sensum, ut intelligerent scripturas. … et ista sententia est liber vite, quam Cristus autentice nunc claudit, nunc apperit sine aliquo impedimento, ut dicitur Apoc. tercio …” 36 Ibid., xii, 275: “unde doctor de Lyra, licet novellus, tamen copiosus et ingeniosus postillator scripture …” 37 Ibid., vi, 119-20: “quamvis autem quilibet sensus, quem habet litera, possit de virtute sermonis dici congrue literalis, doctores tamen communiter vocant sensum literalem scripture sensum, quem spiritus sanctus primo indidit, ut animus fidelis ascendat in deum.”

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sense is the literal.38 For Wyclif, any orthodox sense which is first conceived is the literal sense, such that the literal sense is sometimes the bare historical sense, sometimes the allegorical, while at other times they are mixed. This is possible because he reckons the literal sense to be the catholic sense, the one immediately elicited from Scripture. As such, the other three senses, if immediately derived from Scripture, are the literal. If elicited in a mediate fashion, however, they are the allegorical, tropological or anagogical, but not the literal.39 Commenting on Galatians 4:24 in his Postilla, Wyclif says that the same passage may have a multiple literal sense as in 2 Samuel 7:14 and 1 Chronicles 22:10, ‘I will be as a father to him.’ This was said literally (ad litteram) about Christ, but also about Solomon inasmuch as he symbolizes Christ. If this were not so then Paul would lack the authoritative text to prove that Christ surpasses the angels (Heb 1:5). That this can also be said of Solomon, however, is proven by 1 Kings 5:5 where Solomon applies it to himself. “Consequently, any sense of the author which the letter produces can be called the literal. Now an author who is as authentic as the Author of Scripture would know whichever one of [the letter’s] senses the principal author intended, such that any mystical sense would be just as authentic as the literal sense.”40 As long as the letter bears the sense of the Divine Author, richly varied as that may be, it conveys the literal sense of the text. 38

Ibid., 121-23: “unde legens scripturam ad sensum primum sine sensu secundo habet solum sensum historicum, ille autem, qui superaddit sensum secundum habet de eadem litera sensum allegoricum. ... unde videtur michi, si per possibile fidelis intelligat pure sensum misticum, per textum Gen. septimo decimo non discredendo historiam, quod sensus allegoricus foret sibi literalis. … ideo vere dicit sanctus Thomas sensum parabolicum, qui est satis misticus, et sensum figuratum esse literalem.” Cf. Aquinas, ST I, a. 10; 9. 39 Ibid., 123-24: “… quod de racione sensus literalis est, quod sit sensus catholicus immediate elicitus ex scriptura, et alii tres sensus, si immediate eliciuntur ex scriptura, tunc sunt literales. si autem mediate, tunc sunt sensus allegoricus, troplogicus vel anagogicus, non literalis.” 40 Text transcribed in Benrath, 371: “Unde stat eandem scripturam habere sensum litteralem multiplicem ut illud 2 Regum 7 et primo Paralipomenon 22 in terminis Ego ero illi in patrem etc. fuit dictum ad litteram de Christo et Salomone ut ipsum figurante, quia aliter apostolus ad Hebreos 1 deficeret in loco ab auctoritate ad probandum Christum excellere angelos. Et quod intelligitur de Salomone patet 3 Regum 5, ubi Salomon exponit hoc de seipso. Quilibet ergo sensus autoris quem litera gignit, dici potest litteralis. Unde autor tam autenticus sicut est autor scripture, sciret quemcumque sensum eiusdem quem autor


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Having said all this, Wyclif does take up the question of the role of the human author in cases where Scripture comments upon itself. Whenever a biblical writer expresses the mystical sense of another biblical passage it is no less authoritative than the literal-historical sense, precisely because there are no grades of authorization among the senses of Scripture; they are all equally authoritative. Thus Paul, who knows the full sense of the Old Testament just as authentically as Moses and Solomon, may yield a perfectly faithful reading of a passage through the mystical sense.41 Wyclif proceeds to make the further point that, as every sense which the letter principally begets is the fittingly called the literal sense, then it would seem that four people can ascertain four distinct senses from the same text, any one which is the literal, such that the second would be the duplex, the third the triplex, and the fourth the quadruplex. For the first person understands the grammatical sense grammatically, while the second adds the allegorical, and so forth with the tropological and anagogical. But the point again is that literal sense is not always to be equated with the historical.42 All of this does bear similarity to Aquinas’s remark that every truth which does not violate the circumstance of the letter can be applied to Scripture, and thus be its sense (De potentia IV, 1; 119). As one might expect, some modern scholars are troubled by Wyclif’s arrangement of the senses. Minnis admits that Wyclif takes after FitzRalph in equating the literal sense with the sense immediately elicited from the text, but argues that Wyclif is actually pressing the traditional duplex sensus litteralis to the breaking point, abandoning primarius intendebat, tam autenticus foret quilibet sensus misticus sicut sensus litteralis.” 41 Ibid., 371-72: “Quando autem apostolus et alius autor exprimit quemcumque sensum scripture alterius, tam autencticus est ille sensus sicut est aliquis sensus litteralis, cum non sunt gradus autorisacionis sensuum scripture. Apostolus igitur sciens plenum sensum antiqui testamenti tam autentice sicut Moyses, Salomon vel alius autor citra deum, dat tantum fidem quecumque sensum pretenderit, sicut aliqua alia autoritas quacunque littera intellecta.” 42 Ibid., 372: “Nec video quod isti sensus de vi vocis dividuntur ex opposito, cum omnis sensus quem principaliter littera gignit, potest congrue sensus litteralis. Unde contingit de eadem scriptura quattuor homines habere quattuor sensus distinctos quorum quilibet sit litteralis, secundus duplex, tercius triplex et quartus quadruplex, ut posito quod primus intelligat grammatice grammaticum sensum, secundus addat sensum allegoricam et consequenter alii. Unde patet quod non quilibet sensus litteralis est historiacus.”

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any real distinction between the four senses as he seeks only the sense of the Divine Author (Minnis 1975, 26-27). Ghosh likewise regards Wyclif’s equation of the literal sense with the divinely intended sense troubling, as the relationship between the human and Divine Author is neglected in favor of the latter alone (Ghosh, 208-11). It must be admitted that Wyclif shows little concern for the human author in these discussions, focused as he is on the one Divine Author who ensures the eternal veracity of Scripture. Yet one must also bear in mind that Wyclif’s primary purpose is to preserve the ‘literal truth’ of the divinely intended sense over and against the charges of falsehood emanating from the dictates of proper supposition. Thus in his effort to safeguard Scripture’s veracity and integrity, the notion of a dual sense is subordinated in the hope that one unimpeachably valid sense might emerge. Having said that, we might legitimately ask how different Wyclif is from Aquinas when assessing the literal sense. Both concede the existence and employment of all four senses, and still both equate the literal sense with intended sense of God, the Principal Author of Scripture. Wyclif is so fond of citing Aquinas because he is convinced that in the Angelic Doctor he has found a compatriot, and he marvels at the way holy doctors like Thomas have endeavored to absolve Holy Scripture from falsehood. Unlike the sophists Wyclif must contend with, these saints knew that the literal sense could never bear an impossible meaning.43

4 Defending Scripture de virtute sermonis In a vein reminiscent of Bradwardine and FitzRalph, Wyclif acknowledges that he had once been carried away by youthful arrogance and 43

De veritate I, vi, 122-23: “ideo vere dicit sanctus Thomas sensum parabolicum, qui est satis misticus, et sensum figuratum esse literalem.” Ibid., iv, 65: “quantum ad istud dicitur, quod omnes figurative locuciones scripture sacre sunt vere, ut dicit sanctus Thomas in De Potencia …” Cf. Aquinas, De Potentia q. VII, a. 5, 22529. Ibid., iv, 73: “unde sanctus Thomas parte prima Summe … ecce, quante sancti doctores laborarunt ad excusandum scripturam sacram a falsitate. ipsi enim nescierunt, quod aliquis sit sensus scripture literalis verbalis, qui sit impossibilis.” Cf. Aquinas, ST I, q. 1, a. 10; 8-9.


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could have been numbered among those odious sophists. For in seeking vainglory he had fallen away from the doctrine of Scripture, coveting a reputation for lecture hall prowess. Indeed, he too may once have found Scripture false, though he now recognizes that the humility of biblical logic is the antidote to such sophistical contentions.44 As a youth he was perplexed in his efforts to understand and defend Scripture according to the rules of proper supposition, until God in his grace revealed to him the subtlety of biblical equivocation.45 Having grasped this use of equivocal speech, he could then proceed to equate the ‘proper’ reading with the author’s intended sense, such that reading Scripture de virtute sermonis meant locating the divine sense, which amounts to the literal. When reading of the mouth, arm and heart of God he once read them “carnally,” instead of following the holy doctors who knew they refer to the divine persons. And so it is that when Christ refers to one’s tunic or eye, Wyclif now realizes these are counsels applicable to the inner man.46 Acquaintance with the equivocation of terms in Scripture will clear up all such misunderstandings, and most importantly, will prove that there are really no contradictions in the sacred text. Any supposed 44

Ibid., ii, 23: “unde de ista vana gloria confiteor, sepe tam arguendo quam respondendo prolapsus sum a doctrina scripture, cupiens simul apparenciam fame in populo et denudacionem arrogancie sophistarum.” Ibid., 29: “ideo humilitas logice scripture est tyriaca ad destruendum contenciones tales sophisticas.” Ibid., II, xvi, 5: “primo tamen profiteor, quod, si umquam dixero, scripturam sacram esse falsissimam, hoc multum displicet michi modo, et illud humiliter revoco et retracto tamquam pessime sonans, hereticum et blasfemum.” 45 Ibid., vi, 114: “unde quando loquebar ut parvulus, fui anxie intricatus ad intelligendum ac defendendum istas scripturas de virtute sermonis, cum manifestum sit, quod non verificantur de pellibus bestiarum, et demum dominus ex gracia sua apperuit michi sensum ad intelligendum equivocacionem predictam scripture, et sic intellexi scripturam sacram nunc loqui ad literam singulariter de scriptura primo modo dicta, nunc pluraliter de scriptura secundo et tercio modo dicta et sic de libro.” 46 De civili dominio III, xx, 404: “Unde quantum ad dicta Christi consilia, patet in IV huius capitulo XIII quomodo debent intelligi; non enim debeo carnaliter dicta intelligere per os, brachium, cor et cetera deitatis que scriptura exprimit membra sua carnalia, sicut intellexi quando fui ignarus grammatice et equivocacionis; quas sancti doctores exprimunt de scripturis, sed debeo intelligere personas vel nociones divinas sicut sancti doctores dilucidant. Et sic per tunicam, pallium, oculum, vel maxillam debent intelligi vires et habitus interioris hominis, habendo sensum scripture et dictis consiliis, et non partes aut vestimenta exterioris hominis que corporaliter intuentur.” Cf. also De civili dominio II, xiii, 159.

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falsehoods are the result of our own ignorance, as Scripture bears the inerrant stamp of supreme authority.47 The Bible’s use of equivocal speech is founded upon the authority which belongs to biblical logic, in addition to the basic principle that in equivocations there is no contradiction.48 Because the Bible cannot possibly contain any falsehood or logical inconsistencies, the onus rests with the reader to test his own exegetical method. “If Holy Scripture possesses such an impossible sense, then God must have given it that sense, and consequently it would no longer be sacred; but that is impossible. This is why the saints do not allow a material document of this sort to be understood in such a way that it would not be Holy Scripture, but instead some deformed writing. Whereupon, I do not think that the sense of Holy Scripture is false, even though some people elicit a false sense from Scripture.” Of course, the saints know that any unfitting sense which one might elicit from the text cannot possibly be the sense of Scripture.49 Apparent contradictions are just lessons in equivocation. Did Christ did lie when he told his disciples he would not go up to the feast with them (Jn. 7:8-10)? No, he spoke the truth that he would not go up, but the faithful reader must supply all that Christ intended here, namely the words ‘publicly at this hour.’50 Equivocal 47

De veritate I, viii, 174: “quinta armatura quasi cingulum latum aplectens hec omnia est noticia equivocacionis terminorum scripture, qua cognoscitur non esse contradiccionem in signis equivocis …” Ibid., iii, 61: “ecce regula huius sancti est, ut honoremus scripturam sacram, credentes quod, quandocunque falsa de illa concipimus, est ex nostra ignorancia, ipsa manente undique summe autoritatis incorrigibiliter ordinata.” 48 Ibid., i, 9: “… cum Joh. decimo dicat veritas, que mentiri non poterit: ego sum ostium. … fundatur autem Augustinus super autoritate scripture in ista logica et super isto famoso principio logico: in equivocis non est contradiccio, cum non sit nominis tantum, sed rei et nominis.” 49 Ibid., ix, 193: “si enim scriptura sacra habet talem sensum impossibilem, tunc deus daret sibi illum sensum et per consequens non foret tunc sacra, sed impossibilis. unde literam talem materialem prohibent sancti sic intelligi, que non est scriptura sacra, sed scriptura deformata. unde non videtur michi, quod sensus scripture sacre est falsus, licet aliqui eliciunt sensum falsum ex scriptura.” De veritate III, xxviii, 141: “ideo tradunt sancti pro regula, quod, quandocunque videtur ex scriptura sequi inconveniens secundum sensum elicitum, sciunt indubie, quod ille non est sensus scripture sacre, sed illo dimisso alius est rimandus.” 50 De veritate I, ii, 24: “sic, inquam, Cristus interrogatus a fratribus pro hora sue asecensionis in Jerusalem, ut illic ascenderet, verissime asseruit, quod non ascenderet, supple: publice pro hac hora.”


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speech i.e., improper supposition frees one from the taint of contradiction, for when Christ’s proposition is understood in this sense it no longer contradicts the notion that he ascended in private. Christ the Savior, the most subtle logician of all, was not ashamed to speak in such an apparently unsophisticated way, despite those who might find his discourse riddled with contradictions.51 The faithful reader must be ever attuned to the deft reasoning of his master, ever vigilant to all he says and leaves unsaid. The question arises whether John the Baptist lied when he claimed not to be a prophet, given the fact that Christ refers to him as Elijah (Matt 17:11-13). Unwilling to accept the subtleties of equivocal speech, some find contradictions in such instances. But in the process—and this is the most devastating aspect of it all—they make Christ, the Author of Scripture, into the greatest liar, while much of his Scripture is rendered blasphemous. What they refuse to accept is that Christ equivocates in his use of the name Elijah just as John equivocates in his use of the term ‘prophet.’52 Agreeing with Augustine, Wyclif finds that Christ refers to John as Elijah with respect to his office, not his proper person, and in that regard he could indeed be called Elijah by way of similitude. Thus John is not speaking here according to the propriety of the thing itself, even though Christ is speaking truly, though by way of prefiguration. In his humility John speaks equivocally by denying that he is a prophet, since Christ is the true prophet.53 The ‘sophists’ believe they have discovered logical inconsistencies which render the text false, at least according to the rules of proper supposition. But what the proud sophists count as 51

Benrath, 362-63: “Et patet quod, cum in equivocis non sit contradiccio, quod proposicio Christi Ego autem non ascendam ad sensum expositum non contradicit huic quod Christus privatus ascendit et sic habemus duas coniugaciones quattuor doctrinam notabilium ex logica Salvatoris … Salvator autem subtilissimus logicus non verecundabatur insophistice dicere verba, ex quibus male concipientes in penam peccati conceperunt contradiccionem …” 52 De veritate II, xvii, 49: “ad tercium dico, quod manifestum est ex fide scripture, baptistam negantem, se esse prophetam, non in hoc commisse menadacium, quia per idem tolleretur equivocacio de Helia et de quocunque, quod scriptura exprimit ad sensum equivocum. et sic autor scripture Cristus foret mendacissimus, sicut maior pars scripture sue foret blasfemum mendacium.” 53 Ibid., 50: “… et post solvit per hoc, quod Cristus dicit, ‘Johannem esse Heliam officii condicione, non personali proprietate.’ … et sic Johannes loquitur secundum rei proprietatem, Cristus vero secundum prefiguracionem, nec preco

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contradictions, the humble Christian concedes according to the equivocal sense.54 Again, the authority of any text is inexorably connected to its author. Were Scripture to be false, so also its author. Wyclif is not interested in playing speculative games, wondering whether Christ might have been able to lie, or whether Scripture may have deceived someone. If there were even the possibility that Scripture could deceive someone then God is a liar who designed a document to mislead his beloved children. But Scripture is the Word of God, and thus unable to deceive by definition. Sinfulness on the part of the reader is the reason for any misunderstanding, not the Word. Wyclif thus refuses to entertain those lecture hall questions that set one nature against the other, pondering whether Christ could have asserted a falsehood according to his human nature. To even speculate upon the veracity of the Incarnate Word is to invite the collapse of the Catholic Faith. 55 Commenting on Luke 9:3 in his Postilla, Wyclif notes that there are those who find some biblical propositions false de virtute sermonis in figurative and mystical instances, and especially those negative propositions which seem to require that one affirm the opposite. For example, Christ says: ‘My teaching is not mine (Jn 7:16), and ‘The word you hear is not mine (Jn 14:24).’ To this Wyclif responds that every part of Scripture must be true de virtute sermonis, for there are no expressions, no turns of phrase, which the Author of Scripture did not place there to denote a sacred mystery. Here Christ, being of two natures, offers due reverance to his Father in keeping with his human nature, by saying that this word or teaching originally, authoritatively, falsum nec iudex falsum, cum non fuit Helias per proprietatem, sed per similitudinem. et post solvit, quomodo Johannes non pure propheta ad Cristum … Johannes itaque servando humilitatem cavebat mendacium …” Cf. Augustine, Tract. in Ioh. iv; CCSL 36; 33-35. 54 Ibid., I, i, 10: “Est ergo generale et exemplare misterium, humilis cristianus non verecundetur concedere talia ad sensum equivocum, que tumorosis sophistis et aliis minus bene intelligentibus videntur esse contradicenda.” 55 Ibid., II, xviii, 67: “et sic infallibilis est scripture sacre autoritas, nedum quia neminem fallit de facto, sed quia neminem potuit fefellisse. si enim scriptura sacra falsificata quemquam falleret, cum hoc non posset, nisi ex preordinacione divina, deus ordinasset scripturam non sacram, sed mendacem ad fallendum filios suos karissimos, que mendacitas redundaret indubie in autorem. … nec refert, sive quoad divinitatem sive quoad humanitatem ista asseruit, quin, si fuerint falsa, demonstrarent deum mendacium tam opere quam sermone. et patet, quod


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derives from his Father who sent him.56 Wyclif addressed this same point in his De benedicta incarnacione, when commenting on the seeming incongruity between Christ’s words, ‘The Father is greater than me (Jn 14:28)’ and ‘I and the Father are one (Jn 10:30).’ There is no contradiction here, he concludes, as long as one keeps Christ’s two natures in mind. Equivocal discourse will allow one to say that the same Father is both greater than Christ and simply equal to Christ. Nor should one reject such predications de virtute sermonis just because they are figurative. Indeed, all human speech concerning God is figurative whenever, for instance, suffering is attributed to God.57 Because the intention of the author must always be considered, the question of proper and improper speech will have to be accounted for, bearing in mind that the literal sense may include metaphorical and parabolic speech. Metaphorical speech cannot be excluded from the realm of proper signification. Consider the case of whether Christ may properly be called a lion. Wyclif observes that propriety and improscriptura sacra, que est verbum domini, non potuit aliquem fefellisse, licet ex peccato multi male accipiant occasionem fallendi et peccandi in eam.” 56 Benrath 362: “Quidam autem nituntur tales proposiciones scripture esse falsas de virtute sermonis cuius sunt quotlibet proposiciones figurative vel mistice et specialiter proposiciones negative, quarum affirmitative contradictorie sunt concedende ut Joh 7 Doctrina mea non mea, et Joh 14 Sermonem quem audistis, non est meus, et Joh 7 Vos ascendite ad etc. … Unde supposito pro principio, quod non sit aliquid accidens diccioni positum ab auctore scripturae sine notando misterio, devenerunt sancti ad veritates secretissimas absconditas in scriptura, et sic per illud Johannis 7 et 14 notatur, quod Christus est duplicis nature secundum quarum unam fecit reverenciam patri dicendo, quod doctrina vel sermo non fuit suus, significat illam originaliter vel auctoritative, sed patris mittentis.” 57 De benedicta incarnacione VII, 115: “Et hinc vere dicit Veritas, Ioh. 14. ‘Pater maior me est:’ quia, cum Christus sit tam equivoce divinitas et humanitas, potest respectu predicati absoluti intelligi secundum racionem divinitatis vel secundum racionem humanitatis, sicut exigit predicatum. Et patet ex dictis superius quod non est repugnancia—Pater est maior Christo—et—idem Pater est simpliciter equalis Christo—: ymo, intelligendo personam Christi secundum duas naturas equivoce, non est repugnancia inter ista—Pater est maior Christo—et idem Pater non est maior Christo -: nec debent tales predicaciones abici de virtute sermonis quod sunt figurative, quia per idem negaretur hoc—Ego et Pater unum sumus— Pater et Filius et Spritus Sanctus sunt unus Deus, etc.—cum in prima sit equivocacio, et in secunda concepcio personarum. Ymo, si non fallor, omnis locucio nostra de Deo est figurativa, ut quandocunque dicitur quod Deus et mobilis, natus, passus etc. est construccio non synedochia sed figura, que antropospatos dicitur, quando scilicet humana passio Deo attribuitur; ab antropos

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priety are two-fold, pertaining to the figure and the thing that is symbolized. Christ is not properly a lion according to the properties belonging to a roaring four-legged beast, and in that way he is a lion by way of improper speech owing to the impropriety of the figure. That being said, however, he is properly a lion when speaking by way of the analogous propriety of the thing which is symbolized. This form of discourse, by which Christ is designated a lion in the Book of Revelation, may in fact be considered proper since the analogy can only refer to Christ. For no one else is worthy to open the book and break the seven seals except Christ, the Lion of the tribe of Judah (Rev 5:5).58 Where secular rules of logic will not permit analogy or metaphor within proper speech, the logic of Scripture does. Scripture has its own way of speaking, its own eloquence. Wyclif turns to pseudo-Dionysius who had also affirmed the necessity of attending to the intention of the Divine Author, the virtus intencionis verbi. One must be willing to relinquish common uses when it comes to understanding divine things, since the words of the Lord are proper unto themselves.59 All the signs within Scripture are put in place by its Author for the sake of signifying the truth in its entirety. One cannot mangle Scripture by choosing words and phrases as may seem convenient; one must cite it according to the Author’s sense.60 When the reader comprehends Scripture in its entirety, according to the sense of the Author, it is found to be true. Because the whole of Sacred Scripture is the one Word of God, as he insists, every part must be read homo et patos passio. Non enim habemus nomina, quae sine figura Deum signant.” 58 De veritate I, iii, 40: “pro quo notandum, quod duplex est proprietas ac improprietas, scilicet figure et figurati. Cristus igitur non proprie proprietate bestie quadrupedis rugitive est leo, ideo est leo improprie loquendo de improprietate figure, verumptamen est leo proprie, loquendo de proprietate analoga figurati, cum nemo dignus est in celo vel terra, apperire librum et solvere eius signacula preter leonem de tribu Juda et agnum, qui occisus est, ut dicitur Apoc. quinto.” 59 Ibid., 43-44: “unde subiungit Dionisius, ‘est quidem, ut estimo, irracionabile et stultum sue vanum seu pravum, non attendere virtuti intencionis verbi videlicet et autoris, sed diccionibus secundum wlgarum usum acceptis. hoc enim non est proprium volencium intelligere divina, cum sermones domini sint maxime per se proprie dicti, sicut eos suscipit non wlgus, sed sapiens.’” Cf. pseudo-Dionysisus, De divinis nominibus, PL 122; 1134d-1135b. 60 Ibid., iv, 82: “istis premissis dico, signa recitata sunt vera, si sunt partes scripture sacre, quia sunt signa imposita ab autore huius scripture ad signandum veritatem


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thoroughly in light of the whole Word, the very Word comprising all truths which the blessed gaze upon in heaven.61

5 The Logic of Christ Given all this talk of biblical logic, one is still left with perhaps the most difficult question of all: by what means can the reader actually discern the intended sense of the Divine Author? For as we shall see, Wyclif’s eucharistic theology largely depends upon the principle that he knows how to interpret the passages which his opponents have supposedly misconstrued. We have seen how Wyclif equates Scripture with Christ. It is not surprising then that, based upon this very equation, Wyclif will contend that if anyone would hope to discern the logic of Scripture, he must draw close to Christ and grasp the logic of the subtlest logician of them all. And this, in turn, demands that the reader purify his heart. Scripture’s mysteries are hidden from the proud and the vain as they seek out lecture hall celebrity. The true disciple of Scripture has a virtuous disposition, humbly accepting the authority of Scripture and the testimony of the holy doctors, trusting in the witness they render to the sacred truth.62 But beyond that, one must seek out the one illuminating Magister; Christ the Light and the Principle of all knowledge. One must conform oneself to Wisdom, all adequatam suo integro; ideo non licet lacerare scripturam sacram, sed allegere eam in sua integritate ad sensum autoris.” 61 Ibid., 80: “quantum ad tales instancias oportet capere scripturam in sua integritate pertinenter ad sensum autoris, et tunc invenitur undique, quod sit vera.” Ibid., II, xix, 112: “quantum ad secundum obiectum sepe dictum est, quod tota scriptura sacra est unum dei verbum, et quelibet pars eius debet ingrossari usque ad illud verbum integrum, quod beati in patria vident multiudinem veritatum a deo dictarum.” 62 Ibid., ix, 198: “unde solebam dicere, quod virtuosa disposicio discipuli scripture specialiter stat in tribus, scilicet in autoritatis scripture humili acceptacione, in sui et racionis conformacione et sanctorum doctorum testificacione. Ibid., I, ix, 201: “quoad tercium partem veneracionis scripture in suis testibus et devotis discipulis … quomodo credendum est eorum testimonio. si enim legistam oportet credere in causa suspecta testimonio fallaci, multo magis crederet catholicus testimonio sanctorum doctorum …”

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the while believing so that one might understand.63 As he reads 2 Corinthians 3:6, ‘The letter kills but the Spirit brings life,’ Wyclif is sure that no one can understand anything of Scripture unless the Holy Spirit opens up the sense to him, as Christ did for the Apostles.64 Insisting that a genuine interpretation of the biblical text depends upon divine inspiration is as old as the Christian exegetical tradition itself. Locating the parameters within which this inspiration manifests itself, and so produces an acceptably Catholic result, can be a point of great contention. While Wyclif seeks the aid of exegetes from Augustine to Aquinas in deciphering the subtleties of scriptural discourse, and would not for a moment consider himself to be standing outside the sacred Catholic continuum, he also seeks an intimacy with Christ so as to secure the true sense of the Word. Only when the Christian conforms his sense to the sensus Christi can he hope to understand Scripture. Only then does Scripture truly become sacred, for only then does its sensus and logica emerge. “It is obvious that the Christian must conform his own sense to the sense of Christ if he is going to understand Scripture. For otherwise, it could not be sacred. Thus it is essential that the Christian conform his own logic to the logic of Christ and turn away from a contrary logic which would lead him to make inappropriate statements about Scripture. For all manner of evils are bound to follow from that error in the principle of faith.”65 While he reckons Jerome correct in his assertion that ignorance of Scripture is tantamount to ignorance of Christ, Wyclif is all the more adamant that the Christian

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Ibid., 201: “quintum autem, scilicet dei instruccio, est medium tam necessarium, quod impossibile est, quemquam aliquid adiscere sine sapiencia prima docente, ut Augustinus in libro suo De Magistro …” Cf. Augustine, De Magistro XIV, 46, CCSL; 202-203. 64 De civili dominio III, xix, 402: “Et sic potest intelligi dictum Apostoli II Cor. III,6: Littera occidit, Spiritus autem vivificat. Nemo enim sufficit intelligere minimam scripture particulam, nisi Spiritus Sanctus aperuerit sibi sensum, sicut Christus fecit apostolis.” 65 De veritate II, xvi, 20. “et patet, quomodo ex conformitate sensus cristiani ad sensum Cristi oportet intelligere scripturam, quia aliter non poterit esse sacra, et sic necesse est, cristianum conformare logicam suam logice Cristi et declinare logicam contrariam dudecentem ad dicta inconveniencia de scripture, quia ex illo errore in principio fidei sequerentur quotlibet mala.”


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must assimilate himself to Christ such that he can even be said to become Christ himself.66 Wyclif’s assurance that every part of Scripture is true de virtute sermonis can only be genuinely understood in light of Christ, since Christ is both the author and the subject matter of Scripture. Every part of Scripture is literally true according to the Divine Word. The virtus sermonis is derived from the virtus Verbi. One must grasp the gospel of Christ precisely because the whole of Scripture points to Christ, who is at once the Author of Scripture and the Author of Salvation.67 Wyclif is interested first and foremost in what Scripture conveys, the content of its message: Christ, the gospel. When Christ speaks, the Truth speaks. Christ, the guarantor of Scripture, does not lie. Scripture is true because Christ is true. Wyclif believes Christ, and Christ authorizes the words on the page, the words that signify the Word. The whole exegetical task must therefore place conformity to the sense of Christ, the law of Christ, at the center. And this law, Wyclif insists, is perfectly revealed in Scripture for the sake of the Church; most briefly put it is love itself, the fullness of the law (Rom 13:10).68 Yet he does not relegate this task to the confines of mysticism, though it certainly bears much of that character. It calls for conformity with the very life of Christ exemplified in the Gospel narratives and later born out in the primitive apostolic Church. After all, Christ is not only the eternal substance of Scripture, but also the protagonist in its unfolding drama. Here is where the reader is presented with a standard 66

Ibid., xxii, 184: “… et apostolus Gal. secundo: vivit in me Cristus. et hinc dicit sanctus Ieronymus, ut recitatur tricesima octava dist., quod ‘ignorare scripturam sacram est ignorare Christum et fidem.’ oportet enim, christianum esse per assimilacionem quodammodo ipsum Christum …” Cf. Jerome, In Isaiam; PL 24; 17; and also Friedberg 1:142. 67 Ibid., I, v, 103: “ideo soleo dicere, quod quelibet pars scripture sacre est vera de virtute sermonis divini. que quidem virtus est verbum ac eius virtus et sapiencia incarnata …” Ibid., III, xxxi, 242: “ideo oportet, primo capere ewangelium Cristi et apostolorum ac ad eius regulam scripturas alias concodare. conclusio autem finalis tocius scripture et cuiuslibet partis sue est, quod Cristus, deus et homo, est humani generis secundum modum congruentissimum redemptor, tocius salutis autor et ultimus premiator.” 68 Ibid., I, vii, 156: “verbum autem abbreviatum illius legis est declinare a malo et facere bonum et, ut brevius dicam, secundum apostolum Rom tredecimo: plenitudo legis est dileccio.”

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by which to judge heresy and orthodoxy. It is from this foundation that he begins his ascent to the Eternal Word, in that place where he encounters the Incarnate Word, now imitating the life he led, one defined by poverty and humility. Here is where evangelical perfection can be found.

6 Scripture and Tradition We are primarily concerned with Wyclif’s view of Scripture and his exegetical methods, and cannot go too far afield in examining his theories of ecclesiastical authority. But in the matter of biblical interpretation the question of legitimizing a particular reading is a foremost concern. Does Wyclif’s insistence upon conformity with the logica Christi inevitably result in a mystical quest devoid of all earthly constraints? In the pages of his De veritate sacrae scripturae he addresses charges recently leveled against him by a “certain doctor”—most likely William Barton, the future university chancellor who convened the council which censured Wyclif’s eucharistic theology. At issue here are Wyclif’s views on dominion and clerical disendowment which had met with papal condemnation in May of 1377.69 We have just seen Wyclif declare in his 1376 De civili dominio (from which the condemned propositions were taken) that no one can possibly grasp the sense of Scripture if it is not opened up for him by the life-giving Spirit (2 Cor 3:6). Now in 1378 reliable sources tell Wyclif that this doctor (Barton) assumes that he has fallen into so many errors precisely because he adheres to the sensus verbalis of Holy Scripture. One example Barton has chosen is Wyclif’s reading of 1 Corinthians 2:15, ‘The spiritual man judges all things.’ This is significant, for what Barton means is that Wyclif counts himself as spiritually gifted, and 69

Ibid., xiv, 345: “sic enim salutatus sum nuper a quodam doctore, quem credidi amicum meum specialem et defensorem precipium catholice veritatis. … imponitur autem michi primo, quod tamquam periculosissimus inimicus ecclesie sum doctor fallaciarum …” Robson identifies this person as Barton from a marginal note in MS. Peterhouse, Cambridge 223, fo. 230r which so names him. Cf. Robson, 223. For more on Barton cf. BRUO 1:123-24.


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thus free to read the text outside the parameters of current ecclesiastical interpretation. Such a ‘spiritual’ submits to no judgment but his own and God’s; a sure sign of the unbridled heretic.70 It is worth pointing out that Wyclif claims he is prepared to revoke his statements on dominion if they are proven to him heretical. But as it stands now he is convinced that his position is in keeping with the faith of Scripture as explicated in the commentaries of the holy doctors.71 The spiritualism Barton labels Wyclif with seems to be the sort associated with the more radical Franciscans, evinced in the remarks about poverty which follow, as well as a discussion of Ockham’s purported ‘heresy.’ Despite Wyclif’s later attacks on the mendicant orders, his affinity for the Spiritual Franciscans and their exaltation of strict poverty is clear, as is his desire to see this evangelical principle applied to the clergy as a whole. He is sure that while Scripture and the saints allow Christ’s priests the simple use of life’s necessities, civil ownership is prohibited.72 In keeping with the lex Christi, the Lord’s chief disciples must be poor in the manner of our abbot Christ. For not only was Christ poor, but he was the poorest man of all; obstinately defending the contrary is heretical.73 Not surprisingly, Wyclif whole-heartedly supports the Spirituals’ most cherished papal decretal: Nicholas III’s Exiit qui seminat of 1279, which declares the 70

Ibid., 346: “… quod doctor assumit, me initi sensui verbali scripture sacre, racione cuius in errores plurimos sum prolapsus, ut inter multa exemplificat, quomodo ex illo textu apostoli prima Cor. secundo: spiritualis homo iudicat omnia, reputando me sic spiritualem, nullius iudicio nisi divino iudicio et proprio me submitto; hoc autem est maximum signum heretici.” 71 Ibid., 356: “ … cum sim paratus ad revocandum et emendandum me, si sim doctus, quod sit heretica. et iterum, cum sentencia mea sit catholica, rei publice directiva, a fide scripture secundum postlillaciones sanctorum concorditer eliquata …” 72 De civili dominio III, ix, 137: “Sed sepe dictum est iuxta sentenciam scripture et testimonia sanctorum, quod prohibito cadunt super possessione proprietaria civili seu ab apostolico officio retardante et non super usu simplici necessariorum ex nudo titulo.” 73 Ibid., i, 10: “Quantum ad secundum, patet quod non repugnat sed convenit legi Christi suos precipuos discipulos esse pauperes et egenos, cum Christus abbas noster fuit huiusmodi.” Ibid., viii, 114: “Et istis patet scrutani profundius quod nedum est catholicum quod Christus fuit pauperrimus, sed pertinaciter defendere oppositum est manifeste hereticum.” Oey finds similarities between Wyclif’s views and the Franciscan christological emphasis on the suffering human nature of Christ. Cf. Oey, 175-200.

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poor life of the friars to best resemble that of Christ and the apostles, thereby proving the most perfect. Christ’s very intentions for his Church were confirmed by this decretal, says Wyclif, as it ratified the most perfect form of evangelical life; and so great pains must be taken to defend it.74 As Exiit confirmed poverty as the most perfect Christian state, so Wyclif envisioned a Church in which her prelates would recognize the life of poverty as one more closely approximating the state of innocence, thus leading them to embrace the counsel of evangelical poverty as a privilege.75 On this score, there is much to Aers’s observation that while Wyclif rejects the traditional distinction between precepts and counsels as unscriptural, he seems to demand that the clergy alone abide by the latter (Aers, 125-130). Wyclif does indeed hold his fellow priests to a higher ideal, but one that he feels personally compelled to achieve. For clerics, poverty is equated with the most genuine form of discipleship, as made clear in a very personal confession: “I must forsake the conclusions of the flesh and the world, following Christ in poverty, if I am destined to be crowned.”76 Of note here is that he refers specifically to poverty and not, for instance, to faith or love, though they are doubtless implied therein. To follow the poor Christ is to be conformed to the inferences of his logic manifested in the examples of the Gospels. This matter does bring us to modern scholarly assessments of Wyclif’s exegetical principles. At issue is whether the inexorable nexus Wyclif forged between personal sanctity and divine illumination— the conformity to the vita Christi which thereby unlocks the sensus 74

De potestate papae V, 81: “Christus enim ipsam eligerat in se et suis apostolis; quod omnipotens et omnisciens non faceret, nisi quia scivit quod perficeret statum suorum militum. Et idem confirmatur ex decretali ecclesie, quam papa Nicolaus tercius in sexto incorporat, Exiit qui seminat, ubi declaret quod status fratrum Minorum est ideo celestis et perfectissimus, quia statui Christi et apostolorum simillimus. Ex ex istis credo quod ecclesia Romana, decretiste et fratres, sed specialiter fratres Minores, defenderet istam sentenciam.” Cf. Friedberg 2:110921. 75 De ecclesia VIII, 177: “Confirmatur secundo: Ille status est perfectissimus, ut patet in VIo decretalium, cap. Exiit qui seminat, per Nicolaum III., et omne ponere viatorum in statu tam alto est proporcionaliter privilegiare ipsum, ergo conclusio.” Ibid., 180: “… nam lex consiliorum est perpetua, non habens contrarium, cum ponit hominem in statu, statui utriusque innocenie propinquiori …” 76 De veritate I, xiv, 357: “conclusiones itaque carnis et seculi oportet me deserere et sequi Cristum in pauperie, si debeam coronari.”


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Christi—has led him into outright subjectivism. Minnis concludes that Wyclif lost the balance between personal piety and respect for the authority of tradition, as his “extremism” placed the weight squarely on the former at the expense of the latter (Minnis 1975, 25). Along similar lines, when Hurley notes Wyclif’s undoubted attachment to the poor Christ as a guide to scriptural interpretation, he goes as far as to portray Wyclif as one involved in a “revolt against the intellect,” which resulted in a radically individualistic method of exegesis apart from Church tradition (Hurley, 350). In response to these characterizations it must be admitted that Wyclif does believe that the means to understand the eternal truth of Scripture is to be found in the apostolic life so described in Scripture. Only the person who is conformed to the human Christ, poor and meek, can hope to grasp the meaning of the divine Christ, the Eternal Word. None of this is to say that such an undertaking must be a purely individualistic affair, however, carried out apart from the Church. For in calling upon all the clergy to take up this cross he thereby envisions an authoritative body which lives in conformity with the purest manifestation of a long and sacred tradition. One can dissent from the dominant positions on some admittedly complicated and evolving issues, without thereby rejecting the corporate nature of the Church, either in principle or in fact. That being said, one must still ask whether he is willing to depart from the wider historical tradition, one which transcends the presently constituted ecclesiastical hierarchy. We might briefly consider Wyclif’s view of the relationship between Scripture and that greater Tradition, the way in which they intersect, and the ultimate question of their relative authority. If Wyclif’s supposed willingness to dissent from Holy Mother Church was not lost on Doctor Barton, neither was it lost on that implacable foe of Wycliffism, the fifteenth-century Carmelite Thomas Netter. Excoriating Wyclif personally in his massive Doctrinale fidei catholicae, written some forty years after Wyclif’s death, Netter reckons Wyclif a capricious, heretical manipulator of the sacred texts, with no respect for the authority of the Church. Netter’s own statements regarding the relationship between Scripture and the Church are worthy of note, depicting as they do a standard late medieval position. He is the first to admit that the authority of the Church is subject to the authority

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of Scripture.77 Yet he insists that Scripture cannot be read, nor understood with certainty, apart from the authority of the Church.78 The authority of Scripture surpasses the authority of all the doctors, and even that of the whole Catholic Church. But there is still no disjunction between Scripture and the Church, inasmuch as the Catholic Church is contemporaneous with Holy Scripture, stemming as it does from the side of Christ, joined as bride to groom, body to head.79 And since the faith of the Catholic Church assents to the faith of Scripture one must never doubt it, for the testimony of the Catholic Church is itself the object of the Christian faith.80 “This is the true Christian and Catholic faith, handed down through the Holy Scriptures from ancient times, which Cyprian received from our Fathers, and which is preserved by us, and so must be transmitted to our faithful descendents. What does Wyclif hope to accomplish by disrupting the testimony and customs of the Holy Fathers?”81 Wyclif is charged with undermining the authority of the Church even while he hopes to protect his errors by seeking refuge in the literal 77

Doctrinale antiquitatum fidei catholicae I, ii, xxi, 348: “Quod authoritas universalis Ecclesiae subdita est authoritati Scripturarum tam novi quam veteris testamenti.” 78 Ibid., 348-49: “… ita quod adhuc sine ejus authoriate, Scriptura aliqua nec legi poterit, nec haberi pro certa. Et hoc sapuit, cum diceret contra Epistolam fundamenti cito post principium, id est, cap. v. Augustinus. ‘Evangelio non crederem, nisi me Catholicae Ecclesiae commoveret authoritas.’ Nec tamen hic laudo supercillium, quod quidam attollunt, volentes occasione hujus dicti, decretum Patrum in Ecclesia, majoris esse authoritatis, culminis, et ponderis, quam sit authoritas Scripturarum. Quod quidem non tam videtur ineptum, quam fatuum, nisi talis quis dicat Philippum fuisse majorem Christo, quando induxit Nathanaelem ad credendum Christum esse illum quem scripsit Moyses in lege et Prophetis, Joan I, sine cujus authoritate non tunc adverteret.” 79 Ibid., 348: “Scripturae authoritas, authoritati cunctorum Doctorum, ac etiam totius Ecclesiae Catholicae supereminet.” Ibid., 351: “… tum quia universalis Ecclesia Catholica non est Scriptura sacra posterior, sed coaeva ipsi, et ejus latori Christo, sicut sponsa sponso, corpus capiti …” 80 Ibid., 351: “Fides autem ut est Ecclesiae Catholicae, in hoc accedit fidei Scripturarum, quod non licet de ipsa dubitare, eo quod testimonium Ecclesiae Catholicae est objectum fidei Christinae, sicut ad testimonium et legislatio Scripturae Canonicae.” 81 Ibid., xxii, 360: “Haec est vera fides Christiana atque Catholica, per Scripturas Sanctas antiquitus tradita, quam a Patribus nostris Cyprianus accepit, et quae a nobis retenta est, sic et fidelibus posteris transmittenda. Quid ergo intendit Wicleffus, interrumpendo testimonia et consuetudines Sanctorum Patrum …”


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sense of the canonical Scriptures. It is not for the individual to determine the correct reading of Scripture, however. “The very faith of the Church most truly interprets the sense of Scripture, and so should also point out the falsity of heretical interpretation. One is not a faithful doctor just because one promotes the faith of Scripture. He must follow the faith and authority, not of one particular [church], but of the Universal Church, in which alone the true sense of the Scriptures is preserved.”82 From his faithless foundation Wyclif destroys the very article of faith by which we believe in the Catholic and Apostolic Church, retaining nothing of the authority of her testimony, apart from which we would not believe the gospel. Truth is found in Scripture to be sure, but may it may well be implicit, and thus in need of the Church’s subtle and authoritative interpretation. Yes, Scripture states that God is three persons and not three essences, but this is not defined there explicitly. The Church must make explicit what Scripture leaves implicit.83 Modern scholarship’s consideration of Wyclif’s commitment to the greater Tradition of the Church arrives at a various answers. On the one hand, de Vooght argues that while Wyclif championed the authority of Scripture, he never isolated the biblical text from the sacred Tradition, and thus never advocated a sola scriptura position (Vooght, 169-83). Hurley, in keeping with his portrayal of Wyclif as an individualistic enthusiast, takes issue with de Vooght, arguing that while Wyclif may not have been a supporter of sola scriptura in principle, this was exactly his position in practice. Hence, says Hurley, while Wyclif did appeal to the Fathers, councils and popes, he never actually granted them any genuine authority, only invoking them to 82

Ibid., xxi, 360: “Sed et dolo malo, parvipensa authoritate universalis, id est, catholicae et apostolicae Ecclesiae, currit omnis haereticus ad literam Scipturae canonicae, ut hinc error suus protectus appareat: et ne apparentia illa dissolvatur authoritate Ecclesiae et traditione Patrum fidelium: quia (ut dixi) fides ipsa Ecclesiae verissime interpretatur sensum Scripturae, et aeque declaret falsitatem interpretationis haereticae. Non ergo inde est fidelis Doctor, quia fidem Scripturae producit, nisi etiam fidem et authoriatem sequatur, non unius particularis, sed universalis Ecclesiae, in qua sola sensus Scriptuarum verus habetur.” 83 Ibid., xxiii, 362: “Ex hoc fundamento maxime infideli videtis, quomodo destruit articulum fidei, quo credimus Ecclesiam Catholicam et Apostolicam, nihil reservans authoritatis ejus testimonio, vel decretis: sine qua nec Evangelio crederemus. Et ubi, rogo, credendum invenis Deum esse tres personas, non tres essentias? In Scripturis (inquis) verum est, sed non definitum expresse.”

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the extent they agreed with his own reading (Hurley, 340-42). Smalley rightly notes, however, that Hurley bypasses Wyclif’s genuine reliance upon Augustine as an authoritative biblical commentator (Smalley 1963). Tavard thinks that Wyclif so exalts the Bible that he loses sight of the ancient mutual adherence between Scripture and Tradition (Tavard, 36-43). Yet Oberman supports de Vooght’s thesis that Wyclif conceives of Scripture and Tradition as forming a necessary union, affirming the sufficiency of Scripture, as it is understood by the Fathers and Church doctors. Wyclif’s battle, says Oberman, was against curialism and was really not a question of the Bible versus Tradition at all (Oberman 1983, 364-72). Likewise, Tierney argues that Wyclif was reacting to the excessive claims of some canonists who may have asserted in practice what they would never have supported in principle. Thus in demanding that papal decrees always be in conformity with Scripture, Wyclif would have found no opposition (Tierney 1967).

7 Conclusion It would seem that de Vooght and Oberman have it right in saying that Wyclif belongs to the school which maintains the sufficiency of Scripture as it is interpreted by the Fathers and doctors of the Church, such that Tradition itself is conceived of as an extended commentary on Scripture. Wyclif’s works are replete with citations of Jerome, Gregory, and of course Augustine. Moreover, he not only cites later doctors like Anselm, Grosseteste, Aquinas and Lyra, but commends their faithful exegesis, often appealing to their exegetical principles as well as their conclusions. Ensuring that he should not err in his interpretation of the text Wyclif is confident in appealing to the “testimony of Sacred Scripture, the witness of the holy doctors and the laws of the Church.”84 Does all this amount to the lip-service that Hurley charges him with? Actually, the next two chapters on the development of medieval eucharistic doctrine generally, and then 84

De veritate III, xxvii, 78: “unde ne errem in deteccione istius fallacie, utor testimonio scripture sacre, testimonio sanctorum doctorum et legum ecclesie …”


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Wyclif’s reading of the tradition specifically, should go some way in answering that. As we shall see, there are times when Wyclif will read some conciliar decrees and papal decretals in a manner contrary to their general intention. But there will be other times when he astutely points out the inherent ambiguity of earlier orthodox texts, and objects to the labored interpretations offered by his opponents. What is to be made of Wyclif’s reaction to the whole enterprise of canon law with respect to the authority of Scripture? First of all, in his antagonism towards the decretalists he was hardly alone; strife between theologians and lawyers was commonplace. And as a doctor of theology at late medieval Oxford Wyclif may have good reason to feel a bit defensive. Throughout the fourteenth century the numbers of students studying the law, whether civil or canonical, consistently outpaced the theologians (Southern 1987, 143-44). But canon law in itself was not what Wyclif objected to, for as Wilks rightly notes, he approved the Decretum as legitimate Church law, soundly based upon Scripture, the creeds, and the holy doctors. The Decretales were what upset him the most (Wilks, 12). It must be noted that Wyclif concedes to the pope the right to pass laws for the good of the Church, providing such statutes are in keeping with Holy Scripture. He only reckons as blasphemous the notion that such statutes can achieve full authority with the gospel by virtue of their papal sanction.85 It is not papal legislation as such that Wyclif rejects, only the prospect that popes can pass into law anything other than a clear expression of the eternal law of Scripture. This position too hinges on the question of authorship and its attendant authority. Any part of Holy Scripture must be of infinitely greater authority than a decretal, insofar as every decretal is just the creation of some pope and his subordinates. Every part of Holy Scripture, however, is immediately and proximately authorized by God. The decretals are only human traditions invented after the Ibid., I, vi, 137: “unde sanctos doctores non legi sic variare in logica , sed acceptare logicam ac veritatem scripture concorditer iuxta illud apostoli prima Cor. primo: obsecro vos fratres …” 85 Ibid., I, xv, 403: “non negatur tamen, sed conceditur, quod licet episcopis, Petri vicariis, condere statuta ad edificacionem ecclesie, qualia debent supponi esse, quecunque statuerint, nisi statuorum et scripture sacre contrarietas clamet oppositum; sed quod statuta huiusmodi, in quantum a papa edita, sint paris autoritas cum ewangelio, videtur michi sapere expressam blasfemium …”

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Donation of Constantine for the sake of correcting errors which might arise in the Church. On the other hand, Scripture is the Word of God, who hands down all knowledge immediately to his scribes, none of whom would ever have added their own inventions.86 The notion that papal statutes manifested in decretals could be put on a par with Scripture is what he finds unacceptable; in other words, the suggestion of an equally valid extra-scriptural expression of the Catholic faith. Nevertheless, whether one accepted extra-scriptural tradition or not, Wyclif’s contention that popes are subject to Scripture, and thereby prohibited from creating laws which violate it, was axiomatic for theologians and canonists alike. He is in the right when turning to those canons in the Decretum which, while establishing the rights of popes to make law, also demand that the popes always defer to apostolic and patristic doctrine.87 Indeed, one could scarcely deny that the faithful are under no obligation to believe the pope unless he speaks in accordance with the faith of Scripture, most especially in a time of schism when Urban and Clement are issuing mutual recriminations.88 What is more, canon law itself makes provisions for the possibility, however remote, of a pope lapsing into heresy, and thereby facing correction.89 The conditions for deposing 86

Ibid., 395: “quelibet pars scripture sacre est infinitum maioris autoritatis quam aliqua epistola decretalis, patet sic: quelibet epistola decretalis est condita per aliquem papam, Cristi vicarium cum suis subditis; quelibet pars scripture sacre immediate et proxime autorizatur per deum, igitur conclusio. suppono maiorem ex deffinicione quid nominis, cum omnes epistole decretales sunt tradiciones humane, adinvente post dotacionem ecclesie super correccione errorum in ecclesia contingencium. sed secus est de quacunque parte scripture sacre, cum verbum dei adinvenit omnem eius scienciam et immediate tradidit scribis suis, qui nichil addiderunt de adinvencionibus propriis, sicut oportet ex fide scripture supponere.” 87 Ibid., II, xxi, 176: “unde eadem questione dicit Urbanus papa, quod ‘romanus pontifex non potest contra scripturam sacram legem condere, sed debet eam usque ad animam et sangwinem confirmare.’ … et infra dicit papa Pelagius, quod ‘leges professionis sue precipiunt, ut sint subditi scripture sacre.’” Cf. Dec. II, c. 35, q. 1, c. 6-10; Friedberg 1:1008-09. 88 De potestate papae X, 248: “… quod nec est credendum nec obediendum pape, episcopo, abbati vel cuicumque spirituali preposito, nisi de quanto dixerit vel mandaverit legem Christi, et per consequens nec Urbano nec Roberto tenetur fidelis credere, nisi de quanto fidem scripture dixerit.” 89 Dec. I, d. 40, c. 6; Friedberg 1:146: “Si papa suae et fraternae salutis negligens reprehenditur inutilis et remissus in operibus suis … quia cunctos ipse iudicaturus a nemine est iudicandus, nisi deprehendatur a fide deuius …”


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a delinquent pope were in fact discussed at length by the high medieval decretists (Tierney 1988, 116-126). Having said all this, it must be admitted that even among those who did agree that the Bible should form the sole basis of theology and law, to the exclusion of extra-scriptural doctrines, a consistent witness to the truth of Scripture was reckoned to abide within the Church herself. There is no doubt that Wyclif accepted this principle, and it is precisely for this reason that he could argue that some members of the Church, even its most powerful, were themselves in opposition to the Church’s own faithful reading of the Sacred Page. By definition the truth of Scripture cannot be contrary to the Holy Church; and so adherence to Scripture is the test of orthodoxy. Because Scripture is the sacred charter of Holy Mother Church, those who conspire against Scripture should be censured as heretics, since it is in that way that they oppose the Church.90 Defending the position that Scripture is the sole source of Christian truth was quite common and perfectly respectable. Nor did such a position automatically denote anti-papal, or anti-hierarchical sentiment. One could in fact be an ardent papalist and still be committed to the principle that all the articles of Christian faith were located in Scripture alone. What the issue turns on is the level of confidence one places in the hierarchy to interpret Scripture rightly. The fourteenth-century proponent of papal infallibility, Guido Terreni, regarded the Church as the inerrant interpreter of Scripture. He viewed the Bible as the sole source of all Christian doctrines, whether implicitly or explicitly located therein (Tierney 1972, 251-59). Whereas the general trend in the thirteenth century had been to equate heresy with the rejection of the articles of faith, Terreni (like Wyclif) equated heresy with the contradiction of Scripture, itself the source of all such articles. Of course, with Terreni’s exalted view of the papacy it is the pope, as the embodiment of Church authority, who holds the place of infallible interpreter of Scripture, guided as he is by the Holy Spirit (Shogimen 1998, 521-22). Thus while Wyclif shared Terreni’s confidence in Scripture as the standard 90

De veritate, xiv, 370: “… quia veritas scripture sacre non potest esse ecclesie sancte contraria … qui contra scripturam sacram, que est carta sancte matris ecclesie, conspirant et senciunt, sunt censendi heretici, eo quod solum illi sunt contra ecclesiam.”

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by which heresy and orthodoxy are determined, he did not share any such confidence in the pope to offer a consistently correct interpretation. One must still remember that neither Barton nor Netter, nor even the friendlier Kynyngham, said that Wyclif’s failing was his refusal to submit to papal authority, or his rejection of extra-scriptural tradition. Rather, it was an apparent refusal to interpret Holy Scripture within the commonly accepted parameters of the wider Church. For Netter, this greater tradition is embodied in the magisterium which renders authoritative judgments regarding the ancient and immutable tradition on behalf of the Universal Church. This is not a question of theologians against lawyers, schoolmen versus prelates, but rather whether one man stands against sacred received tradition. Yet as we shall see when looking at Wyclif’s eucharistic theology, and the history of medieval eucharistic theology generally, the decisive issue is not respect for tradition, but the assignation of authority in determining the nature of that tradition. Is the correct reading of biblical and patristic texts to be synonymous with a given set of scholastic and ecclesiastical formulations which are themselves only one piece within a much larger, and still-evolving, tradition? This much is clear: Wyclif considered himself loyal to the Catholic Church, and an integral aspect of that loyalty was an unwillingness to yield all doctrinal authority to even a majority of his fellow churchmen if that meant deviating from Christ. Because it is Christ who stands at the heart of Scripture for Wyclif, and is indeed its very essence, so there is an undeniable sense of personal loyalty to the Savior in faith. Ultimately then, it is true for Wyclif that to know Christ is the only sure way to know Scripture. But he never doubts that the same Christ is present to the Church, his mystical body, and inseparable from her.

5~Medieval Eucharistic Theology

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5 Medieval Eucharistic Theology

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his chapter examines the development of eucharistic theology in the West from the ninth through the fourteenth century, specifically with regard to the question of real presence. One of the central issues is actually one of the most basic: what did Christ mean when he said, ‘Hoc est corpus meum’? Such a seemingly simple question finds no single answer of course. The last two chapters were concerned with the reading of Scripture and its inherent concerns about literal and metaphorical speech, and thus authorial intention. Those are also the concerns of this chapter, though sometimes indirectly, as one takes up the increasingly complex metaphysical questions pertaining to Christ’s eucharistic presence. Nevertheless, in the last analysis it is still a matter of biblical interpretation. But what marks this is out as an especially contentious issue is that the texts in question often relate directly to the words of Christ himself, thus greatly reducing the level of abstraction. For the larger matter of divine authorship is now being worked out on that far more intimate plane where the believer listens directly to the words spoken by his Savior on the night before his crucifixion. By examining some of the most important discussions, debates, confessions and scholastic definitions the proper context will be provided for Wyclif’s own views of the Eucharist and the controversy which they engendered. One must really consider the breadth of medieval eucharistic doctrine as it developed over the centuries, precisely because Wyclif was in dialogue with so much of the tradition, whether explicitly or implicitly. What should become clear in the reading of these texts is that however far apart various factions may have considered themselves to be, many of their positions often differed more in the formulation of what they believed than in the content. The reality of Christ’s presence was not

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in doubt for any involved; the question which remained was only how this could be possible. We begin in the ninth century because it stands as a watershed in the history of eucharistic theology, for this is really the first time the Western Church began to investigate just how it is that the bread and wine becomes the body and blood of Christ. This is not to say that in the patristic age there was no talk of the conversion of the elements, but the definitive aspect of the Eucharist in that era was essentially one of a communal, corporate nature, primarily concerned with an event by which the Church participates in the life of the head of that mystical body, Jesus Christ. The chief focus was not the act of the celebrant so much as that of the group, as the faithful were united with each other and distinguished from the world. Within this larger conception, however, there did exist two basic approaches to the mystery of the Eucharist, that of the ‘metabolic,’ generally associated with Ambrose of Milan, which spoke more of the conversion of the elements; and that of the ‘symbolic,’ associated with Augustine, stressing the role of the sacrament as an outward sign of grace and the consequent union of the faithful. Nevertheless, no dogma was pronounced during this period and both understandings existed side by side (Kelly, 440-49; Macy 1984, 18-21). Precise definitions of what exactly occurred after the consecration of the elements were not to be found in the patristic sources to the degree that medieval scholasticism would demand, though each side of the later debates continued to appeal to the authority of both Ambrose and Augustine, sure that these saints, among others, were on their side. We must forego a discussion of patristic sources, but a very brief look at some of the chief eucharistic texts of Ambrose and Augustine will be instructive. In his De sacramentis, Ambrose argues that while the bread is indeed bread before the words of consecration, afterwards it becomes the flesh of Christ. What was not Christ’s body before the consecration is now his body.1 The emphasis is placed on divine power exhibited in the words of the Lord; the one who created heaven and earth can surely effect this miraculous conversion. Indeed, 1

De Sacramentis IV, 14, 82: “Tu forte dicis: Meus panis est usitatus. Sed panis iste panis est ante uerba sacramentorum; ubi accesserit consecratio de pane fit caro Christi.” Ibid., IV, 22, 85: “Antequam consecratur panis est; ubi autem uerba accesserint, corpus est Christi.”


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this is the work of God the creator, but as Ambrose pursues this point it becomes clear that he is not thinking along the lines of a material conversion. For just as the Christian has been consecrated and thus begins to be a ‘new creation,’ so also the consecrated bread.2 That one does not see the outward appearance of blood after consecration is to spare people the horror, though the value of that spilled blood is still effective for one’s redemption.3 For all of this, however, Ambrose does not explain just how this conversion takes place, or how the species of one substance can remain while that of the other do not appear. In fact, he does not talk about substance at all, nor accidents, for he is concerned only to affirm real presence (if undefined) as the miraculous result of divine power. One ought to bear in mind the pastoral quality of these statements. The Bishop of Milan was addressing a very natural question on the part of the catechumens, those who were looking for something more spectacular than ordinary bread, and were perhaps skeptical about this being presented to them as Christ’s body. Rather than seeking recourse to metaphysics, Ambrose, as well as some of his counterparts in the East, called upon communicants to see beyond the limitations of their corporeal eyes, and instead rely upon their ‘spiritual eyes’(Frank, 619-21). Augustine for his part was much less concerned with the process of conversion. Emphasizing the symbolic value of the sacrament, he distinguished the sacrament from the power of the sacrament, the visible food from the invisible grace at work among the faithful. Spiritual eating of visible food achieves spiritual satiety.4 He placed 2

Ibid., IV, 14-15, 82: “Ergo sermo Christi hoc conficit sacramentum. Quis sermo Christi? Nempe is quo facta sunt omnia. Iussit dominus factum est caelum, iussut dominus facta est terra … Si ergo tanta uis est in sermone domini Iesu ut inciperent esse quae non erant …” Ibid., IV, 16, 83: “Ergo, tibi ut respondem, non erat corpus Christi ante consecrationem, sed post consecrationem dico tibi quia iam corpus est Christi. Ipse dixit et factum est, ipse mandauit et creatum est. Tu ipse eras, sed eras uetus creatura; postquam consecratus es, noua creatura esse coepisti. Uis scire noua creatura? Omnis, inquit, in Christo noua creatura.” 3 Ibid., IV, 20, 84: “Sed forte dicis: Speciem sanguinis non uideo. Sed habet similitudinem. Sicut enim mortis similitudinem sumpsisti, ita etaim similitudinem pretiosi sanguinis bibis, ut nullus horror cruoris sit et pretium tamen operetur redemptionis.” 4 Tractatus in Iohannis Evangelium XXVI, 11; CCSL 36; 265: “Quia uisibilem cibum spiritualiter intellexerunt, spiritualiter esurierunt, spiritualiter gustauerunt, ut spiritualiter satiarentur. Nam et nos hodie accipimus uisibilem cibum; sed aliud est sacramentum, aliud uirtus sacramenti.

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this sacramental efficacy within a communal context, for he also emphasized that the reality (res) conveyed in the sacrament of the Eucharist is the unity of the Christ’s mystical body, the holy society of the predestined.5 The faithful receive more than a bare sacrament of course, for to eat Christ’s flesh is to be incorporated into the Lord’s body, to abide in Christ and to possess Christ dwelling within oneself.6 Despite the difference of emphasis, Augustine and Ambrose were not at odds with one another, nor would they be considered such in the Middle Ages. The two saints were seen to belong to a single holy continuum which admits no contradiction. Yet to say that they did not stand in opposition is not to erase the diverse ways of discussing the meaning of the Eucharist for the faithful. The extent to which such diversity could be tolerated throughout the medieval period would prove the greatest challenge to the Church. For when uniformity in matters of doctrine and law becomes increasingly important, diversity is often equated with heterodoxy, which can then lead to the forced convergence of authoritative texts. When orthodoxy becomes synonymous with homogeneity the viable means of expressing a sacred mystery will have to be limited.

1 The Ninth Century: Radbertus and Ratramnus As the Church pressed into Northern Europe and began its missionary activities among the Germanic peoples the emphasis began to shift away from the original notion of communal participation and towards the actions of the priest himself as celebrant. Given the higher 5

Ibid., XXVI, 15; 267: “Hunc itaque cibum et potum societatem uult intellegi corporis et membrorum suorum, quod est sancta in praedestinatis et uocatis, et iustificatis, et glorificatis sanctis, et fidelibus eius. … Huius rei sacramentum, id est, unitatis corporis et sanguinis Christi alicubi quotidie, alicubi certis interuallis dierum in dominica mensa praeparatur, et de mensa dominica sumitur.” 6 Ibid., XXVI, 18; 268: “Hoc est ergo manducare illam escam, et illum bibere potum, in Christo manere, et illum manentem in se habere.” Ibid., XXVII, 11; 276: “… ut carnem Christi et sanguinem Christi non edamus tantum in sacramento, quod et multi mali; sed usque ad spiritus participationem manducemus et bibamus, ut in Domini corpore tamquam membra maneamus, ut eius spiritu uegetemur …”


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value placed on the element of magic in the Germanic religious consciousness, sacerdotal activity became the primary focus. The priesthood, in its mediatorial role, became a special class set apart from the laity. Stressed now was the stupendous feat performed by God through the exclusive actions of his priests, well in keeping with the prevalent notion in the native religion that working wonders in the created order is a divine prerogative (Gibson, 71-74; Seeberg, 2:3437). Such circumstances would inevitably demand the production of a doctrine of the Eucharist suitable to meet these exigencies. Moreover, by the end of the eighth century the Carolingian reform movement was underway, seeking liturgical uniformity in order to counter pagan practices and address Christian misinterpretations. Thus it was clear that the diverse patristic conceptions of the Eucharist would demand an attempt at reconciliation (McKitterick, 116-54). This process of seeking greater precision would continue well into the fourteenth century. In light of this brief background we will examine the matter of Christ’s eucharistic presence in the seminal medieval discussion presented by two monks belonging to the monastery at Corbie: Paschasius Radbertus and Ratramnus. Originally, Radbertus had written his De corpore et sanguine domini c. 831-33 for the instruction of the Saxon monks at Corbie, and this same work was then presented to Charles the Bald in 844 upon his coronation. The reaction of the emperor’s court was mixed, however, and just about this time Charles turned to Ratramnus for guidance concerning Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. The tracts of these two monks would mark not only two different conceptions of eucharistic presence, but also a divergence in the very way such a question could be approached by later generations.

a~Paschasius Radbertus For Radbertus, “although this figure of bread and wine is present, one must believe that following the consecration there exists nothing other than the flesh and blood of Christ. For the Truth himself said to his disciples, ‘This is my flesh given for the life of the world.’” Indeed, this is the very same body born of Mary which suffered on the

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cross and was raised from the tomb. This flesh which had been offered by Christ for the life of the world is now daily offered so that eternal life may be restored in the faithful.7 This appeal to the Truth himself proves pivotal for all sides of the debate throughout the centuries. Christ the God/man does not lie: “Christ is the Truth, and yet the Truth is God. And if God is Truth then whatever Christ promised in this mystery must surely be true. Therefore, the one who worthily eats and drinks Christ’s flesh and blood has eternal life abiding within him.”8 Radbertus contends that the substance of the bread and wine undergoes an effective interior change into the flesh and blood of Christ, such that immediately following consecration there is nothing present other than the true flesh and blood of Christ.9 That this body present in the Eucharist is the very body born of the Virgin is essential to Radbertus’s soteriology, for it is by participation in the divinehuman Christ through the reception of the Eucharist that the believer is redeemed. The flesh of the Word becomes the food and drink of the faithful, and it is through this participation in Christ’s flesh that he remains in us and imparts his life-giving power. To feed on the flesh of the Word and drink his blood is the foundation of Christian faith, and this unity is the very means to life.10 7

De corpore et sanguine Domini I, CCCM 16; 14-15: “Et quia voluit licet figura panis et vini haec sic esse, omnino nihil aliud quam caro Christi et sanguis post consecrationem credenda sunt. Vnde ipsa Veritas ad discipulos: Haec, inquid, caro mea est pro mundi uita. Et ut mirabilius loquar, non alia plane, quam quae nata est de Maria et passa in cruce et resurrexit de sepulchro. Haec, inquam, ipsa est et ideo Christi est caro quae pro mundi uita adhuc hodie offertur, et cum digne percipitur, uita utique aeterna in nobis reparatur.” 8 Ibid., 18: “… quod Christus est Veritas, Veritas autem Deus est. Et si Deus Veritas est, quicquid Christus promisit in hoc mysterio, utique uerum est. Et ideo uera Christ caro et sanguis quam qui manducat [+ et bibit] digne, habet uitam aeternam in se manentem.” 9 Ibid., VIII, 42-43: “Cogita igitur si quippiam corporeum potest esse sublimius, cum substantia panis et uini in Christi carnem et sanguinem efficaciter interius commutatur, ita ut deinceps post consecrationem iam uera Christi caro et sanguis ueraciter credatur et non aliud quam Christus panis de caelo a credentibus aestimetur.” 10 Ibid., I, 19: “Quae nimirium caro Verbi fit esca in hoc mysterio cybusque fidelium, dum uere creditur esse caro pro mundi vita, neque aliud aliquid quam caro corporis Christi ex qua Christus manet in nobis, ut et nos per eam transformemur in illo qui nihil aliud factus est Deus caro dignitatione sua, ut habitaret in nobis. Si ergo habitat in nobis et nos membra corporis eius maneamus in illo, iustum est,


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The question remains just how the flesh and blood of Christ exist in relation to the elements; and this concerns the pivotal matter of the nature of truth and figure. Christ must be present unconditionally for Radbertus if the Eucharist is to retain its salvific function. He points out that nobody who believes the divine words could doubt that following the consecration both the body and blood existed in truth (in veritate), for the Truth himself said that he was truly (vere) offering his flesh and blood (Jn 6:55). The text says exactly what it means: flesh is flesh. Moreover, the words are to be believed for the sake of the one who spoke them. It is Christ, the Truth, who ensures the veracity of the text.11 Of course, Christ cannot be devoured by human teeth, and it is for this reason that he intended for the bread and wine to be his flesh and blood, having been created by the consecration of the Holy Spirit, and offered daily as a mystical sacrifice ‘for the life of the world.’ Just as the true flesh was created from the Virgin Mary through the power of the Holy Spirit without sexual union, so then from the substance of bread and wine the very same body and blood of Christ is mystically consecrated.12 Through participation in the transformed human nature of Christ the communicant will likewise share in this glorious nature. Yet this body, while being the true body, is not present in a tactile sense, but in a spiritual sense, though still no less the body born of Mary, crucified and resurrected. It is precisely because it is the resurrected glorified body that it is the life-giving body. This is very important, for as long as one bears in mind that Radbertus is speaking of the resurrected body, his insistence on the body’s presence in veritate, as opposed to in figura, need never take on quia in illo sumus, ut ex eo uiuamus. Et ideo carne Verbi pascimur et potamur sanguine. Haec, inquam, firmitas fidei nostrae, haec unitas et uitae communicatio.” 11 Ibid., IV, 27: “Quod in ueritate corpus et sanguis fiat consecratione mysterii, nemo qui uerbis diuinis credit dubitat. Vnde Veritas ait: Caro enim mea uere est cybus et sanguis meus uere est potus. … Ergo si uere est cybus et uera caro, et si uere est potus utique et uerus sanguis.” 12 Ibid., 27-28: “Sed quia Christum uorari fas dentibus non est, uoluit in misterio hunc panem et uinum uere carnem suam et sanguinem consecratione Spiritus Sancti potentialiter creari, creando uero cotidie pro mundi uita mystice immolari, ut sicut de uirgine per Spiritum uera caro sine coitu creatur, ita per eundum ex substantia panis ac uini mystice idem Christi corpus et sanguis consecretur. … Vbi profecto non aliam quam ueram carnem dicit et uerum sanguinem licet mystice.”

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the materialistic overtones which he specifically rejects (Macy 1992, 70-71). Because, says Radbertus, a sacrament is a mystery one may not negate the presence of the figure. But if it is a figure (figura), it must be asked in what manner it is able to be the truth (veritas). Every figure must be the figure of something and is always referred to it. In the case of the Eucharist the figure pertains to the sensible elements, and the truth to the presence of Christ. The figure seems to exist when it is broken, while something other than what the bodily senses discern is understood. The truth here is Christ’s body and blood which is made present by the power of the Holy Spirit. Thus it is the bread and wine which have but a figurative presence, while Christ is truly present in the Eucharist.13 The figure of truth is discerned outwardly, while the truth itself is understood interiorly.14 In the Eucharist the whole truth, free from any veil, is perceived interiorly; and this is the truth of the crucified and resurrected body. After all, Christ himself proclaims, ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’15 There is no question of falsehood involved in this figure, however. Consider the fact that Paul had spoken of the Son of God as ‘the splendor of the glory and the figure of his substance (Heb 1:3).’ The splendor of glory pertains to the consubstantiality of divinity, just as the figure or character of his substance designates the nature of his humanity where ‘the plenitude of his divinity corporeally dwells (Col 2:9).’ Still, one true Christ is affirmed in both. In this vein, Radbertus notes that the relationship between figure and truth is like 13

Ibid., 28: “Vnde quia mysticum est sacramentum, nec figuram illud negare possumus. Sed si figura est, quaerendum quomodo veritas esse possit. Omnis enim figura alicuius rei figura est et semper ad eum refertur, ut si res uera cuius figura est. … Sed figura esse uidetur dum frangitur, dum in specie visibili aliud intelligitur quam quod uisu carnis et gustu sentitur … Veritas ergo dum corpus Christi et sanguis uirtute Spiritus in uerbo ipsius ex panis uinique substantia efficitur …” 14 Ibid., 29: “Sed si ueraciter inspicimus, iure simul ueritas et figura dicitur, ut sit figura uel caracter ueritatis quod exterius sentitur, ueritas uero quidquid de hoc mysterio interius recte intellegitur aut creditur.” 15 Ibid., 30: “Est autem figura vel caracter hoc quod exterius sentitur, sed totum veritas et nulla adumbratio quod intrinsecus percipitur ac per hoc nihil aliud hinc inde quam veritas et sacramentum ipsius carnis aperitur. Vera utique caro Christi quae crucifixa est et sepulta, uere illius carnis sacramentum quod per sacerdotem super altare in uerbo Christi per Spiritum Sanctum diuinitas consecratur. Vnde ipse Dominus clamat: Hoc est corpus meum.”


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that of characters and words. Just as through the characters, which are the figures of words, one ascends to comprehension of the words themselves, and from there to an understanding of the spiritual senses of the Scripture, so from the humanity of Christ one is led to the divinity of the Father. The Word was made flesh so that through that flesh we might be nourished in the knowledge of his divinity.16 To move from the human Christ to the divine is not to move from a mere shadow of reality to reality itself. Nor then in the Eucharist does one move from a shadow of reality to the true and real Christ. This would require two steps, but there is only one step for Radbertus: Christ is present in truth.

b~Ratramnus The relationship between truth and figure stands at the heart of Ratramnus’s conception of the Eucharist, but just how these concepts are defined marks the difference between him and his fellow monk. Ratramnus set himself to answer two specific questions posed by Charles the Bald: whether the body and the blood consumed in the mouths of faithful were present in a mystery (in misterio) or in truth (in veritate); and whether this was the very same body that was born of Mary, died, and was resurrected. The answer, says Ratramnus, requires the definition of truth and figure.17 For Ratramnus, the figure 16

Ibid., 29: “Non enim omnis figura umbra uel falsitas. Vnde Paulus de unico Dei Filio ad Hebraeos loquens ait: Qui cum sit splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius portansque omnia uerbo uirtutis suae purgationem peccatorum faciens. Quibus profecto uerbis duas in Christo substantias declarat et utrasque ueras. Nam cum dicit: Qui cum sit splendor gloriae, diuinitatis consubstantialem praedicat. Cum uero figura et caracter substantiae eius, humanitatis designat naturam, ubi corporaliter plenitudo inhabitat diuinitatis et tamen in utroque unus et uerus Christus Deus catholice commendatur. Vnde unam rem sumit ad demonstrationem duarum substantiarum quam figuram substantiae et caracterem nominauit. Quia sicut per caracteres uel figuras litterarum infantia nostra prius pertingit gradatim ad lectionem, deinde ad spiritales scripturarum sensus intelligentiam, sic ex humanitate Christi ad diuinitatem Patris peruenitur et ideo iure figura uel caracter substantiae illius uocatur. Quod enim aliud sunt figurae litterarum quam caracteres earundum, ut per eas uis et potestas ac spiritus prolatione oculis demonstretur? Sic itaque formatur Verbum caro, ut per carnem nostra infantia ad diuinitatis intelligentiam nutriatur.” 17 Ratramnus, De corpore et sanguine Domini V-VI, 34: “Quod in ecclesia ore fidelium sumiter, corpus et sanguis Christi, quaerit vestrae magnitudinis excellentia

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is a veil (obumbratio), something under which the intended thing is manifested. And this definition is linked to figurative or metaphorical language. When Christ calls himself the bread from heaven, or the true vine and the apostles the branches, he is employing figures, speaking under a veil, by which one thing is said and another thing is meant (aliud dicunt et aliud inuunt). Truth, however, is the direct manifestation of the thing itself, not hidden under any veil, but pure and open, spoken of more plainly. Unlike a figure, it is in no need of explication. When it is said that Christ was born of the Virgin, suffered death and was buried, there is nothing in this statement that is said in a figure or under a veil. The truth of the thing (rei veritas) is clearly displayed by verbal signs and nothing other than this is understood. If this is the case then it must also be true that Christ is not substantially bread, any more than he is a vine and the apostles branches. For while in the previous statements about Christ the truth was openly demonstrated, this one provides a figure.18 Returning then to the question of whether Christ is present in mystery or in truth, Ratramnus notes that if a mystery is not something set under a figure, then it is not rightly called a mystery. Nothing can be called a mystery when nothing is hidden, or removed from the bodily senses, and so concealed under some sort of veil. In the case of the bread which becomes the body of Christ, one thing presents itself to the human senses exteriorly, while another speaks to in misterio fiat et in veritate … et utrum ipsum corpus sit quod de Maria natum est et passum mortuum et sepultum … Harum duarum questionum primam inspiciamus; et ne dubitatis ambage detineamur, definiamus quid sit figura, quid veritas ut certum aliquid contuentes nouerimus quo rationis iter contendere debeamus.” 18 Ibid., VII-VIII, 34-35: “Figura est obumbratio quaedam quibusdam uelaminibus quod intendit ostendens. … uel cum Christus in euangelio loquitur dicens: ego sum panis uiuus qui de caelo descendi; uel cum se ipsum uitem discipulos autem palmites appellat: ego sum, dicens, uitis uera uos autem palmites. haec enim omnia aliud dicunt et aliud inuunt. Veritas uero est rei manifestae demonstratio nullis umbrarum imaginibus obuelatae sed puris et apertis utque planius eloquamur naturalibus significationibus insinuatae. utpote cum dicitur Christus natus de virgine, passus crucifixus mortuus et sepultus. nihil enim hic figuris obuelantibus adumbratur, uerum rei ueritas naturalium significationibus uerborum ostenditur neque aliud hic licet intellegi quam dicitur. at in superioribus non ita. nam substantialiter nec panis Christus nec vitis nec palamites apostoli. quapropter hic figura, superius uero ueritas in narratione monstratur, id est nuda et aperta significatio.”


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the minds of the faithful interiorly. Ratramnus clearly distinguishes the exterior and interior, that which is known to the senses and that which is understood in faith. While the bread remains what it was prior to consecration from the exterior point of view, having to do with color and taste, it is something else interiorly, something much more precious. The body of Christ itself may not be manifested to the corporeal senses, but it may be known, accepted and eaten in the souls of the faithful.19 For Ratramnus, the emphasis is clearly on the apprehension of the true body through faith. The body cannot be present in veritate, but the believer can press through the veil by faith into what lies beyond it. Spiritual presence is genuine, though made manifest only on the level of faith. Ratramnus considers Christ’s resurrected body to be thoroughly tangible and visible, even if incorruptible. This is the historical body which will be sensibly perceptible to the faithful on the final day. Such a body cannot be present in the Eucharist, therefore, meaning that the eucharistic body must be a spiritual one (Chazelle, 33-34). A definite change is wrought, though, for if this is confessed to be the body and blood of Christ it could not be so unless it were changed into something better. Such a transformation does not occur on the material level, but the spiritual. It is spoken of as having taken place figuratively, because the spiritual body and blood exists under the veil of the material bread and wine.20 Ratramnus will even speak of Christ’s substantial presence, though it is clear that he does not equate this with the presence of the material body. The body and blood perceived by the faithful are figures in keeping with their visible 19

Ibid., IX, 35: “Nunc redeamus ad illa quorum causa dicta sunt ista, uidelicet corpus et sanguinem Christi. si enim nulla sub figura misterium illud peragitur, iam misterium non rite uocitatur quoniam misterium dici non potest in quo nihil est abditum, nihil a corporalibus sensibus remotum, nihil aliquo uelamine contectum. at ille panis qui per sacerdotis ministerium Christi corpus conficitur, aliud exterius humanis sensibus ostendit et aliud interius fidelium mentibus clamat. exterius quidem panis quod ante fuerat forma praetenditur, color ostenditur, sapor acciptur. est interius longius aliud multoque praeciosius multoque excellentius intimatur quia caeleste, quia diuinum, id est Christi corpus ostenditur quod non sensibus carnis sed animi fidelis contuitu uel aspicitur uel accipitur uel comeditur.” 20 Ibid., XVI, 37: “At quia confitentur et corpus et sanguinem esse Christi nec hoc esse potuisse nisi facta melius commutatione neque ista commutatio corporaliter sed spiritaliter facta sit, necesse est iam ut figurate facta esse dicatur quoniam sub

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appearance, though they are true in keeping with their invisible substance. By the power of the Divine Word Christ’s body and blood are truly present. True presence, substantial presence, is equated with the power of the Word, since through material representations the souls of the faithful are fed and sanctified by the force of the stronger substance.21 While one thing is exteriorly intended in the figure of the bread and wine, another power is interiorly operating. This is why they are called sacraments, he says, because the divine force is secretly at work, hidden as it is under the veil of material things, dispensing salvation to those who faithfully receive them.22 One ought never doubt that Ratramnus believes the words of Christ when he said, ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’ What the Church grasps in the sacrament is not a mere token or remembrance; it is Christ, but Christ in a figure. The words are true when rightly interpreted. When one thing is said and another meant, the question becomes one of discerning just what the speaker, the author of those words, intended. It becomes then a matter of authorial intention, discerning the truth intended beneath the figure. This body nailed to a cross is surely not present in truth. Nevertheless, Ratramnus insists that this is the body of Christ: his spiritual body, though, not the material. Christ’s body in the Eucharist is there to be sensed spiritually.23 Distinguishing figure and truth entails a distinction between veiled and manifest existence, between direct and indirect apprehension. When Christ spoke figuratively of himself as the bread from heaven he was uelamento corporei panis corporeique uini spiritale corpus Christi spiritalisque sanguis existit.” 21 Ibid., XLIX, 46: “Ex his omnibus, quae sunt hactenus dicta, monstratum est quod corpus et sanguis Christi quae fidelium ore in ecclesia percipiuntur figurae sint secundum speciem uisibilem at uero secundum inuisibilem substantiam, id est diuini potentiam uerbi, corpus et sanguis uere Christi existunt. Unde secundum uisibilem creaturam corpus pascunt iuxta uero potentioris uirtutem substantiae mentes fidelium et pascunt et sanctificat.” 22 Ibid., XLVII-XLVIII, 46: “id est, aliud sint quod exterius innuant et aliud quod interius inuisibiliter operentur. Hinc etiam et sacramenta uocitantur quia tegumento coporalium rerum uirtus diuina secretius salutem accipientium fideliter dispensat.” 23 Ibid., LX, 49: “non igitur sensum carnis adhibeas, nihil enim secundum eum hic decernitur. est quidem corpus Christi sed non corporale sed spiritale. est sanguis Christi sed non corporalis sed spiritalis. nihil igitur hic coporaliter sed spiritaliter sentiendum.”


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conveying the truth, though in a veiled fashion. As Fahey rightly notes, for Ratramnus the Eucharist is in the real order what metaphorical speech is in the logical order (Fahey, 77). Ratramnus’s equation of the true body with the historical body also touches upon the impassibility of the resurrected body. The very body which died and was raised is impassible and incorruptible, and as such, cannot be identical with the one that the Church celebrates in the temporal realm, which is clearly neither incorruptible nor eternal. But if this is the body of Christ in truth it would have to be eternal and incorruptible, and thus could not be separated it into parts, nor could it be subject to the grinding of human teeth.24 Again, this means that, “one thing is exteriorly displayed, while another is believed through faith. What pertains to the sense of the body is corruptible, while that which faith believes is incorruptible. Hence, what appears exteriorly is not the thing itself but the image of the thing, while what the mind perceives and understands is the truth.”25 Make no mistake, Ratramnus warns his readers, do not think that the faithful fail to consume the Lord’s body and blood. Faith sees not with the eyes, but believes what it accepts, inasmuch as it is spiritual food and drink, spiritually refreshing the soul that it might never thirst again.26 24

Ibid., LXXVI-LXXVII, 53: “Item quae a se differunt idem non sunt. corpus Christi quod mortuum est et resurrexit et immortale factum iam non moritur et mors illi ultra non dominabitur, aeternum est nec iam passibile. hoc autem quod in ecclesia celebratur temporale est non aeternum est non incorruptum in uia est non in patria. differunt igitur a se quapropter non sunt idem. Quodsi non sunt idem quomodo uerum corpus Christi dicitur et uerus sanguis? si enim corpus Christi est et hoc dicitur uere quia corpus Christi est, in ueritate corpus Christi est. et si in ueritate corpus Christi est et corpus Christi incorruptibile et impassibile est ac per hoc aeternum. hoc igitur corpus Christi quod agitur in ecclesia necesse est ut et incorruptibile sit et aeternum. sed negari non potest corrumpi quod per partes comminutum disparitur sumendum et dentibus commolitum in corpus traicitur.” 25 Ibid., LXXVII, 53-54: “sed aliud est quod exterius geritur aliud uero quod per fidem creditur. ad sensum quod pertinet corporis corruptibile est, quod fides uero credit incorruptibile. exterius igitur quod apparet non est ipsa res sed imago rei mente uero quod sentitur et intellegitur ueritas est.” 26 Ibid., CI, 60: “Nec ideo quoniam ista … dicimus putetur in misterio sacramenti corpus domini uel sanguinem ipsius non a fidelibus sumi quando fides non quod oculis uidet sed quod credit accipit quoniam spiritalis est esca et spiritalis potus spiritaliter animam pascens et aeternae sacietatis uitam tribuens, sicut ipse saluator misterium hoc commendans loquitur: spiritus est qui uiuificat nam caro nihil prodest.”

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c~Confluence Amid Divergence With respect to the most fundamental premises upon which both monks based their arguments, Stock makes the point that for Radbertus the starting point is the concrete, while for Ratramnus the Eucharist stands as an intellectual problem, something to be resolved with the aid of the trivium. The fundamental meaning of the Eucharist was for Radbertus something which needs no interpretation; the interpretive materials exist only in the sense of evidential documents which attest to an act that stands by its own power. Ratramnus, on the other hand, reckons the meaning of the Eucharist unattainable apart from the texts by which it is conveyed. There is a need to get beneath the surface and interpret this mystery, applying grammar and logic, and considering the mystery within the terms of allegory (Stock, 262-70). One might conclude, though, that for both sides the question of authorial intention always comes to the fore as one seeks out what is meant under the veil of figurative language. Bear in mind that Radbertus also admitted that figures were being employed, though he claimed they pertained to the figurative presence of bread and wine, while Ratramnus applied them to the body and blood. Either way, one must discern just what the Divine Author meant beneath the shadow of metaphorical speech he created. This distinction between these approaches is evident two centuries later in the dispute between Lanfranc and Berengar, though with added dimensions owing to the advances and changes which had taken place in the study of the liberal arts. Despite these differences there was really much agreement. Paschasius Radbertus certainly did not propose the overt tangibility which his words might imply any more than Ratramnus disavowed Christ’s presence when speaking of spiritual food. Macy is right when observing that even as Radbertus insists upon actual contact between the communicant’s body and the risen body of Christ, and Ratramnus argues that Christ’s presence to faith is salvific, there is really not the stark opposition which might first appear. That being said, however, later orthodoxy would follow and refine the position offered by Paschasius Radbertus throughout a time when changing perceptions of just what it means for something to be ‘real’ were also receiving more consideration (Macy 1992, 73-79). And as McCue notes, there


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was a mutual distrust between the followers of the Paschasian model and the Ratramnian, as the former thought their opponents were emptying the Eucharist of its content, and the latter believed the other side was lapsing into a crude materialism (McCue, 89-90). From this point forward increasingly technical distinctions, largely dependent upon Aristotelianism, were brought to bear in an effort to explain just how Christ’s body and blood could be really present while the communicant seemingly touches and tastes bread and wine.

2 The Eleventh Century: Berengar of Tours and Lanfranc of Bec The conflict between Berengar and Lanfranc might be considered the first great ‘scholastic dispute’ over the Eucharist, as both sides brought to the contest the full arsenal of medieval learning to date. And what is more, this dispute, unlike that of the ninth century, was not permitted to conclude with an agreement to disagree. With the increasing effort in the eleventh and twelfth centuries to clarify and systematize Church doctrine and law, such that doctrine did in fact become law, there was less and less room for dissent from the approved theories. Just how these approved theories were arrived at, and what they were, is the subject matter of this chapter. Lanfranc was one of the foremost masters of the eleventh century. An expert in the trivium, by 1055 he was applying these artes to the study of Scripture. The trivium always retained an ancillary role in the study of the Bible for Lanfranc, however, as various philosophical conclusions were never forced onto the biblical text. For his part, Berengar was perhaps the most noted scholastic of his generation, something of a popular star. He too had studied under Fulbert at Chartres, but where Fulbert was conscious of the limits of reason in matters of Church doctrine, and thus would defer to faith at the appropriate time, Berengar placed far more stock in reason and dialectic, considering it only fitting that human beings make use of the rational faculties God had bestowed upon them (Gibson, 60-65; MacDonald, 1-10). Discussing Berengar’s theories is especially im-

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portant when understanding Wyclif, for despite the fact that Wyclif does not appeal to Berengar directly, his own eucharistic theology is quite similar in places - something not lost on his opponents. Berengar began to publish his eucharistic doctrine by 1047, and as early as the summer of 1049 he was being criticized for his position that the substance of the bread and wine remained after consecration. In 1050 at the synod of Vercelli his teaching was condemned, as it was again at Paris in 1051. In 1054 at Tours the papal legate Hildebrand (later Gregory VII) accepted a compromise solution drawn up by Berengar himself which affirmed the ultimately ambiguous statement that “the bread and wine on the altar after consecration are the true body and blood of Christ.” Throughout most of the 1050s Berengar actually found considerable support from many quarters, including his bishop, Eusebius Bruno of Angers, as well as the Count of Anjou, Geoffrey Martel (Gibson, 65-70). Yet his fortunes would change in 1059 at the Easter council of Rome presided over by Pope Nicholas II. For it was there that Berengar looked on as his writings were burnt, and there also where he signed the Ego Berengarius statement drafted by Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida. It is especially worthwhile for us to look at this text, not only because of its consequences for later medieval eucharistic theology as whole, but specifically because Wyclif managed to interpret this document in a way that he considered a validation of his own understanding of real presence.

a~The Confession of 1059 Claiming that he had been forced to sign under duress, Berengar recanted his confession soon after he returned home and then published his eucharistic theories anew. It is to his latest work that Lanfranc responds in his own De corpore et sanguine Domini written c. 1063. In fact, the Ego Berengarius confession composed by Cardinal Humbert would prove very difficult for future generations of churchmen to defend due to its excessively crude language, ambiguous phrasing, and imprecise terminology. This confession which Berengar was forced to sign anathematized the position that “the bread and wine which are placed upon the altar are only a sacrament following consecration and not the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus


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Christ.” He was thereby compelled to affirm instead that, “the bread and wine which are placed on the altar are, after consecration, not only a sacrament, but are the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ. And [they are] sensibly, not only in a sacrament, but in truth, handled and broken in the hands of the priest, and crushed by the teeth of the faithful.”27 The wording of the confession engendered two genuine theological problems. As Macy observes, Humbert’s formulation not only seems to deny that sacramental presence could itself be real, but the excessively sensual language cast doubts upon the impassibility of Christ’s risen body (Macy 1999b, 22-23). There was also the problem that Humbert’s imprecise wording, in one place especially, opened the door to a reading of the confession that was thoroughly contrary to the cardinal’s intentions. Berengar made the case, as Wyclif would do some three centuries later, that while denying that the Eucharist was only a sacrament, Humbert’s document also denied that it was only the reality (res), that is, only the true body and blood. As it turns out Berengar claimed that the confession’s use of solummodo does not in fact undermine the reality of the bread and wine. While Humbert may have intended to negate the substantial presence of the elements, he ended up affirming them. Consequently, Berengar’s own point is proven: the elements remain or they could not logically be called the body and blood: “The one who says the bread and wine of the altar are only sacraments, or that the bread and wine of the altar are only the true body and blood of Christ,

27

Dec. III, De cons. d. 2, c. 42; Friedberg 1:1328-29: “Ego Berengarius, indignus ecclesiae S. Mauritii Andegauensis diaconus, cognoscens veram et apostolicam fidem, anathematizo omnem haeresim, praecipue eam, de qua hactenus infamatus sum, que adstruere conatur, panem et uinum, que in altari ponuntur, post consecrationem solummodo sacramentum, et non uerum corpus et sanguinem Domini nostri Iesu Christi esse, nec posse sensualiter, nisi in solo sacramento, manibus sacerdotum tractari uel frangi, aut fidelium dentibus atteri. Consentio autem sanctae Romanae ecclesiae et apostolicae sedi, et ore et corde profiteor … scilicet panem et uinum, que in altari ponuntur, post consecrationem non solum sacramentum, sed etiam uerum corpus et sanguinem Domini nostri Iesu Christi esse, et sensualiter, non solum sacramento, sed in ueritate, manibus sacerdotum tractari, frangi, et fidelium dentibus atteri; iurans per sanctam, et homousion Trinitatem, et per hec sacrosancta Christi euangelia.”

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has thoroughly established that the bread and wine remain.”28 Lanfranc admits no contradiction, however, arguing that it is Berengar who denies the truth of the body and blood of Christ, while the Church reads this correctly and thus believes the bread is converted into the body even as it is a sacrament of the flesh and blood assumed from the Virgin. Berengar, not the Church, is the one who teaches that the bread and wine remain in their original essences without material change.29

b~Metaphorical Language Berengar draws the vital connection between language and reality as he restates his position by appealing to the dynamics of metaphorical speech. “When someone says that Christ is the chief cornerstone he does not do away with Christ, but instead establishes that Christ absolutely exists. And thus when one says that the bread of the altar is only a sacrament, or that the bread of the altar is only the true body of Christ, one is not denying that the bread exists on the altar, but is instead confirming that the bread and wine are present on the Lord’s table.”30 Berengar’s greater point is that something may be true to its own nature while at the same time signifying something else, and in that sense becoming something else. After all, Christ does not cease to be Christ just because he is simultaneously the cornerstone any more than the bread ceases to be bread while signifying something else, something greater, namely the body of Christ. 28

PL 150; 414d: “Qui enim dicit: Panis et vinum altaris solummodo sacramenta sunt; vel panis et vinum altaris solummodo sunt verum Christi corpus et sanguis, modis omnibus panem et vinum superesse constituit.” Ibid., 418d-419a: “Susceperat autem Burgundus negare panem et vinum in mensa Dominica superesse. Hoc minime negat, imo omnino panem et vinum esse confirmat.” Cf. Chadwick 1989, 422-23. 29 Ibid., 415a-b: “Nam et tu veritatem carnis ac sanguinis negas, et Ecclesia Christi, sic panem in carnem, vinum credit converti in sanguinem, ut tamen salubriter credat et veraciter recognoscat sacramentum esse Dominicae passionis, divinae propitationis, concordiae et unitatis, postremo assumpte de Virgine carnis ac sanguinis …” 30 Ibid., 415d-416a: “Sicut enim qui dicit: Christus est summus angularis lapis, Christum non aufert, Christum esse omnino constituit; ita qui dicit: Panis altaris solummodo est sacramentum, vel: Panis altaris solummodo est verum corpus Christi, panem in altari esse non negat, panem et vinum esse confirmat in mensa Dominica.”


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This appeal to metaphorical speech invokes a response in kind. If Berengar’s point is that the bread is bread, but at the same time something greater, Lanfranc’s position is that one may call it bread when it is no longer bread at all. We are accustomed, says Lanfranc, to call things by the name of those materials from which they were produced, even though they have since been translated into another nature. Ice and snow have distinct natures, but because ice is formed from snow that has hardened over many years, one may still call ice ‘snow,’ though only in a manner of speaking (locutionis modo). Likewise, the first human being was made from the earth, and is thus called the earth from which he was made, and to which he will return.31 In this same vein, Lanfranc claims to have located a flaw in Berengar’s argument; for when he calls Christ a cornerstone he does not so constitute him as such in truth, but only in likeness. Similarly, when the Sacred Page calls the body of Christ ‘bread’ it is speaking in a sacred and mystical fashion, or because it was from the bread that the body was confected even as the bread still retains some of its qualities.32 Most notable in this exchange is the similarity it bears to the contrasting positions of Radbertus and Ratramnus. For Berengar, it is Christ whose presence is spoken of figuratively or metaphorically while the elements remain. And it is Lanfranc who contends that Scripture is speaking mystically or metaphorically when referring to the bread and wine. The bread and wine have been substantially converted and thus can be said to exist in name alone. 31

Ibid., 416a-b: “Solemus enim aliquas res illarum rerum, ex quibus efficiuntur, nominibus appellare, quamvis, in aliam naturam translate … Sicut beatus Augustinus (in psal. CXLVII) in extremo psalmorum explanationis opere, ‘cristallum’ vocat ‘nivem multorum annorum duratam tempore, et serie saeculorum,’ cum nix sit liquida et humida, cristalli vero natura existat dura et sicca. Ac per hoc cum tam diversae naturae sint in utrisque non recte quis cristallum nivem vocaverit, nisi eo locutionis modo quo res effecta materiali solet nomine appellari. Et Creator ex terra creato primo homini in Genesi dicit: Terra es, et in terram ibis (Gen. 3:19). Quasi diceret: Quia factus es ex terra quandoque fies terra, et reverteris in terram.” Cf. Augustine, In Psalmum CXLVII; CCSL 40; 2138-65. 32 Ibid., 416c: “Sicut enim qui dicit: ‘Christus est lapis angularis,’ non revera Christum lapidem esse constituit, sed propter aliquam similitudinem, quam ad se invicem gerunt ei nomen imponunt; eodem modo cum divina pagina corpus Domini panem vocat, sacrata ac mystica locutione id agit, seu quoniam ex pane conficitur ejusque nonnullas retinet qualitates.”

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As we have noted, both men were expert practitioners of the trivium, and it is in an appeal to ‘sprachlogik’ that Berengar addresses the interpretation of the proposition ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’ It is a principle of grammar, says Berengar, that a word must supposit for the same thing at the beginning of a proposition as it does at the end, or else the proposition will be invalidated. A proposition is invalidated if the predicate denies, contradicts or destroys the subject. If no affirmation can be maintained as a whole when destroyed in part, then if ‘hoc’ supposits for bread at the beginning, it must do so at the end or the proposition would contradict itself. Hence, the remnance of the bread is established.33 By the demonstrative pronoun ‘hoc’ Christ means that this thing (haec res), namely this bread, is his body. The proposition of the Truth himself reads: ‘This bread is my body.’34

c~Eucharistic Conversion Lanfranc articulated a position that may be accurately deemed a forerunner to transubstantiation, whereby the bread and wine placed upon the altar undergo an essential transformation into the body and blood while their outward aspects remain the same. And acceptance of this formulation itself is becoming a test of orthodoxy, as Berengar’s dissent is counted as a prideful deviation from the faith of the Universal Church. “A member of the Church should not disagree with the Church. For the whole Church spread across the face of the earth confesses that the bread and wine, which are placed upon the altar in order to be consecrated, are then incomprehensibly and ineffably changed into the substance of the flesh and blood during their consecration. … And while the presence of the visible species attests to things which were once present, they are truly changed according to their interior essence into the nature of those things 33

Rescriptum contra Lanfrannum I; CCCM 84; 92: “… omnis affirmatio non constabit parte subruta, qui dedit totum, necessario partem dedit, ‘totum’ propositionem, predicatum vel subiectum propositionis terminum ‘partem’ accipi oportere.” Cf. Southern, 1948, 45-46; Gibson, 87. 34 Ibid., III, 204: “… hoc, id est haec res, id est [hic] panis, est meum corpus, quae ipsius Veritatis enuntiatio, id est ‘hic panis est meum corpus,’ nulla poterit veritate constare si subiectum panis sacrificio Christi abstuleris.”


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which were not previously present.”35 Berengar will also affirm that following the consecration the bread and wine do undergo a conversion, though without substantially ceasing to be what they had been. For he is insistent to the end that, in keeping with the testimony of Holy Scripture, the bread and wine do become the true body and blood of Christ; but this is always a question for faith and the intellect, not the senses. Without ceasing to be what they were, the elements are changed into something else, while an actual “corruption” of the subjects of the bread and wine is reckoned an affront to the truth of Christ’s teaching. Rather, the bread and wine undergo an “intelligible conversion” into the body and blood of Christ. It is a matter not of destruction, but assumption, as the bread takes on an additional dignity.36 Intelligible conversion is not the opposite of real; it only means that it is not perceptible to the senses. Berengar fears what he considers to be the materialistic connotations of Lanfranc’s position and counters with an understanding of presence perceptible to faith. Intelligible conversion is a genuine one, but one which leaves the original subject intact, as is the case with the regeneration of the sinner. Appealing to Ambrose’s words concerning the change that takes place in the faithful soul, Berengar applies this to the bread and wine. The person who was an old creature is made anew, even though 35

PL 150; 419a: “Membrum Ecclesiae ab Ecclesia discrepare non debuit. Confitetur enim Ecclesia, toto terrarum orbe difusa, panem et vinum ad sacrandum proponi in altari, sed, inter sacrandum, incomprehensibiliter et ineffabiliter in substantiam carnis et sanguinis commutari.” Ibid., 420d: “Esse quidem secundum visibilem speciem testatur quae erant, commutari vero secundum interiorem essentiam in naturam illarum rerum quae antea non erant.” 36 Epistola contra Almannum; text transcribed in Montclos (appendix ii), 531-32: “Concedo autem panem et vinum altaris post consecrationem, secundum scripturas, Christi fieri corpus et sanguinem. Ac per hoc non concedere nullus possum post consecrationem ipsum panem et vinum facta esse fidei et intellectu verum Christi corpus et sanguinem.” Rescriptum II, 142: “… secundum quam de eo quod est instituitur esse quod non erat per corruptionem ipsius quod erat; haec autem conversio panis in corpus Christi intelligibilis est …” Montclos, 534: “Panem et vinum mensae dominicae non sensualiter, sed intellectualiter, non per absumptionem, sed per assumptionem, non in portiunculam carnis contra scripturas, sed secundum scripturas, in totum converti Christi corpus et sanguinem.” PL 150; 419c: “Per consecrationem altaris fiunt panis et vinum sacramentum religionis non ut desinant esse quae erant, sed ut sint quae, et in aliud commutentur quod dicit beatus Ambrosius in libro De sacramentis.”

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he retains his proper nature.37 In this vein, it is significant that Berengar will also draw a comparison between the Eucharist and the sacrament of Baptism. Such a comparison is especially compelling because it seeks to apply the understanding of one sacrament to the other on the assumption that there exists a uniformity among the sacraments concerning the relationship between signum and res. As through consecration the water does not cease to be water, even as it is converted into the spiritual laver which it had not been before, so it is with the bread and wine. The water has indeed undergone a conversion, but in dignity not substance, taking on a sacred quality it did not previously possess.38 As Berengar sees it, his position stands on the most basic presupposition, namely the veracity of Christ himself. “If Christ extends to human observers the bread of the altar as if bread were there, when after the consecration it is not bread on the altar in a completely sensible manner; if Christ merely pretends that bread is contained in his sacrifice, even though it is not completely bread in this instance after the consecration, then Christ deceives human beings. If Christ deceives human beings, Christ is not the Truth. Yet Christ is the Truth and thus does not extend bread before human eyes upon the altar if it is not entirely bread upon the altar.”39 If the bread is not essentially present Christ has lied. Yet Christ, the Truth, is the 37

Rescriptum I, 83: “Unde beatus Ambrosius in libro De sacramentis de mutatione fidelis animae, quae fit in regeneratione, exemplum ducens ad eam mutationem panis et vini, quae fit in refectione mensae dominice: denique, inquit, tu ipse eras, sed eras vetus creatura: postquam consecratus es, nova creatura esse cepisti: vetus creatura facta est nova creatura, sed abiecta vetustate, se manente tam animae quam corporis proprietate naturae.” Cf. Ambrose, De sacramentis IV, 83. 38 Ibid., II, 103: “… per omnia comparabili quia revera quod concesseris in altero, in altero concessisti: si in regenerandis fidelibus in spirituale per consecrationem quod non erat aqua convertitur lavacrum, non ut desinat esse aqua sed ut supersit aqua et in aliud convertatur, in spirituale lavacrum quod non erat.” On Berengar’s appeal to Ambrose’s understanding of Baptism and its implications for his own Eucharistic theology cf. Haring, 1948. 39 Rescriptum III, 210-11: “Si pretendit Christus aspectibus humanis panem in altari quasi ibi sit panis, cum post consecrationem non sit panis omnino sensualiter in altari, si simulat Christus haberi in sacrificio suo panem, cum non sit in eo panis post consecrationem omnino, fallit homines Christus, si fallit homines Christus, non est veritas Christus. Est autem veritas Christus, non igitur pretendit panem oculis humanis in altari, cum non sit omnino panis in altari, non simulat Christus


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guarantor of the veracity of the text; the words are true in light of the one who spoke them.

d~Sacramentum et Res Here a central question comes to the fore concerning just what constitutes the nature of the Eucharist as a sacrament. Berengar argues that the Eucharist has two facets, that which is visible, the sacramentum, and that which is invisible, the res sacramenti. The sign must be distinct from that which it signifies. The res is Christ’s body which has been drawn into heaven and sits at the right hand of the Father; it is something which has been removed from sight. Berengar splits the sacramentum and res sacramenti, and regards any attempt to merge their existence as tantamount to a confusion. One receives the body of Christ, which is the res sacramenti, when accepting the body of Christ in sacramento, which is the temporal gift of the sanctified bread.40 Invoking Augustine’s definition of a sign in De doctrina christiana, as something which exhibits itself to the senses, and in so doing brings something else to mind, Berengar connects this to his definition of a sacrament in De civitate Dei as a sacred sign of an invisible sacrifice.41 Actually, Berengar formulated a lasting scholastic definition of a sacrament, though crediting it to Augustine: “a sacrament is the visible form of invisible grace.”42 By the twelfth panem habere sacrificium suum, quod non habeat panem omnino post consecrationem.” Berengar will liken this sort of deception to Manicheism. 40 PL 150; 421b: “Sacrificiumque Ecclesiae duobus constat, duobus conficitur, visibili et invisibili, sacramento et re sacramenti; quae tamen res, id est corpus Christi, si esset prae oculis, visibilis esset; sed, elevata in coelum sedensque as dextram Patris …” Rescriptum III, 202-03: “Salus enim aeterna provenit nobis si corpus Christi, id est rem sacramenti, puro corde accipimus dum corpus Christi in sacramento, id est pane sancto altaris, quod est munus temporale, accipimus.” 41 PL 150; 422b: “Unde beatus Augustinus, in libro De civitate Dei: ‘Sacramentum est sacrum signum.’ Signum definit in libro De doctrina Christiana: Signum est res praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cognitionem venire.” Cf. Augustine, De doc. chr. II, 1; CCSL 32; 32; De civ. Dei X, 5; CCSL 47; 277: “Sacrificium ergo uisibile inuisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum est.” 42 Epistola contra Almannum, 536: “Secundum superiorem interpretationem, definit beatus Augustinus sacramentum in quadam epistola: Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma.” This division is evident concerning the eating of the impious. Cf. ibid., 533: “… et utrumque a piis visibiliter sacramentum, rem sacramenti invisibiliter, accipi, ab impiis autem tantum sacramenta commendant

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century this definition had found its way into both the Decretum and Lombard’s Sententiae. As Haring as shown, while the ingredients of such a phrase lay in the writings of Augustine, the way in which Berengar defined it, so as to strictly distinguish the visible and invisible, the material and the spiritual, was hitherto unknown. Sacraments, for Berengar, like visible words, are fleeting and subject to corruption. They are always signs, received visibly, and though sacred in their ability to designate the eternal truth received invisibly, they are yet distinct from that truth (Haring 1948). As in the case of Radbertus and Ratramnus, of great concern here two centuries later, is the role of the historical body of Christ, that body which exists now in heaven. In what sense is it present to the communicant? Berengar appeals to Augustine’s observation that things can accept the names of other things to which they are similar, and that this similitude is an essential aspect of the nature of a sacrament. Thus it can be conceded that the sacrament of Christ’s body is the body of Christ “in a certain manner.”43 Figurative speech is employed to denote the presence of Christ’s body as a presence in faith. The sacrament retains its complete distinction from that which it signifies, since the sacrament in this case is only called the body on account of its likeness to the body, not the body’s actual presence. To speak of body and blood is to mean the sacrament of the body and blood; presence is not denied, but it is only affirmed following interpretation. Berengar simply reckons the contrast between the earthly and the heavenly as too great to allow for such an identification between the earthly sign and its celestial reality. As such, it is contrary to reason to speak of such a fracture of Christ’s incorruptible body.44 …” Cf. Augustine, Epistola CV; CSEL 34; 604: “… qui si bonus est, adhaeret deo, et operatur cum deo, si autem malus est, operatur per illum deus visibilem sacramenti formam, ipse autem donat invisibilem gratiam?” This defintion (Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma) is also found in Dec. III, De cons. d. 2, c. 32; Friedberg 1:1324; and Lombard’s Sententiae IV, d. 8, c. 6; 284. 43 PL 150; 423d: “Unde beatus Augustinus in epistola ad Bonifacium: ‘Sicut, inquit, sacramentum corporis Christi secundum quemdam modum corpus Christi est, sacramentum sanguinis Christi secundum quemdam modum sanguis Christi est: ita sacramentum fidei, fides est.’” Cf. Augustine, Epsitola XCVIII; CSEL 34; 531. 44 PL 150 426d: “Quis enim aut ratione concipiat, aut per miraculum fieri posse concedat, panem frangi in Christi corpore, quod post resurrectionem tota viget incorruptibilitate …”


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For Lanfranc, like Paschasius Radbertus, the sacrament of the body of Christ is the very Lord who suffered on the cross. We accept his same flesh hidden under the form of bread. But this invisible, spiritual flesh accepted in communion is itself a sign of the visible, palpable body of Christ in heaven.45 Because Lanfranc did not accept Berengar’s absolute division of sign and reality, he contends that Christ may become a figure of himself, existing as both sacramentum and res sacramenti. When Christ appeared to the two disciples on the road to Emmaus he acted as a “type” or “figure,” signifying through himself that he was going to ascend to heaven (Lk 24:13-28). As a sacrament is a sign, so “Christ is a sacrament of Christ … true God and true man, both the one who represents and the one who ascends. Notwithstanding that, it is one thing to be the representation of the earthly journey, and another to be the truth of the one ascending into heaven.”46 Lanfranc concludes that one can at once say that this is the same body assumed from the Virgin and still not the same. “We believe that those earthly substances on the Lord’s table are divinely sanctified through the sacerdotal mystery, such that by the working of heavenly power they are ineffably, incomprehensibly and miraculously converted into the essence of the Lord’s body. Yet the outward appearances of these things, along with certain other qualities, are preserved. For this will spare people the horror of gazing upon the blood and wounded flesh, while also allowing believers to perceive the more noble rewards of faith. And all the while the very same body of the Lord still exists in 45

Ibid., 423d-424a: “Sacramentum corporis Christi, quantum ad id spectat quod in cruce immolatus est ipse Dominus Christus, caro ejus est, quam forma panis opertam, in sacramento accipimus, et sanguis ejus, quem sub vini specie ac sapore potamus. Caro, videlicet, carnis, et sanguis sacramentum est sanguinis. Carne et sanguine, utroque invisibili, intelligibili, spirituali, significatur Redemptoris corpus visibile, palpabile, manifeste plenum gratia omnium virtutem et divina majestate.” 46 Ibid., 424b-c: “… cum ipse Dominus Jesus, post resurrectionem suam, sui ipsius diversa temporum ratione typum gesserit et figuram. Apparens enim duobus discipulis, locutusque eis, quantum satis esse judicat, dum finxit se longius ire (Luc. xxiv, 13-28), sicut beatus Augustinus dicit, significavit se post paucos dies in coelum ascensurum esse. Quod iter longe remotum est a communi hominum vita, quae ipsis duobus discipulis evidentissime figurata. Christus ergo Christi est sacramentum. … Verus namque Deus, et verus homo, et fingens, et ascendens. Verumtamen aliud est figmentum terreni itineris, aliud in coelum veritas ascenditis.”

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heaven at the right hand of the Father, immortal, inviolable, intact, undefiled, and uninjured. Thus one can truly say that this is the same body which he assumed from the Virgin, and yet it is not the same. It is surely the same with regard to its essence and the property and power of its true nature; and still not the same if one is thinking of the outward appearances of the bread and wine, along with the rest of the [qualities] mentioned above.”47 The body is received, though not seen, to make room for the merit of faith. But it is still the true flesh eaten, at once corporeally, spiritually and incomprehensibly.48 The bread and wine have been converted into the flesh and blood, so that while we see the species of the elements, we honor the res invisibilis, which is nothing other than Christ’s body and blood. Through it all, however, one should remember that this remains a “mystery of faith” which one is better off not investigating.49 No matter how great the metaphysical advances in the following centuries the Eucharist was still largely determined by the same exegetical concerns faced in the ninth century. And as we have seen here in the eleventh century the two opponents adamantly affirmed 47

Ibid., 430c-d: “Credimus igitur terrenas substantias, quae in mensa Dominica, per sacredotale mysterium, divinitus sanctificantur, ineffabiliter, incomprehensibiliter, mirabiliter, operante superna potentia, converti in essentiam Dominici corporis, reservatis ipsarum rerum speciebus, et quibusdam aliis qualitatibus, ne percipientes cruda et cruenta, horrent, et ut credentes fidei praemia ampliora perciperent, ipso tamen Dominico corpore existente in coelestibus ad dexteram Patris, immortali, inviolato, integro, incontaminato, illaeso: ut vere dici possit, et ipsum corpus quod de Virgine sumptum sumere, et tamen non ipsum. Ipsum quidem, quantum ad essentiam veraquae naturae proprietam atque virtutem; non ipsum autem, si species panis et vinique species, caeteraque superius comprehensa.” 48 Ibid., 434a: “… videlicet ipsum esse corpus, et non ipsum. Neque enim eo quo ipsi putabant modo credimus quod visibile Christi corpus comedamus, aut sanguinem quem fisuri et oculis suis conspecturi erant persequentes bibamus. Sed potius id credimus quod non videmus, ut valeat esse fides, quae non potest esse, si res quae creduntur corporalibus sensibus constiterit subjacere.” Ibid., 435c: “… ut arbitror, innotescit quod vera Christi caro, verusque ejus sanguis in mensa Dominica immoletur, comedatur, bibatur, corporaliter, spiritualiter, incomprehensibiliter.” 49 Ibid., 421c-d: “Si quaeris modum quo id fieri possi, breviter ad praesens respondeo: Mysterium fidei credi salubriter potest, vestigari utiliter non potest.” Ibid., 423c: “Nos etenim in specie panis et vini, quam videmus, res invisibilis, id est Christi carnem et sanguinem, honoramus. … cum fideliter fateamur, ante consecrationem, esse panem vinumque, id est, eas res quas natura formavit. Inter sacramentum caro converti in Christi carnem ac sanguinem …”


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that Christ’s words, ‘Hoc est corpus meum,’ are the promise of communication with his body in the Mass. Moreover, both recognize the sacrament by definition requires a process of signification. Berengar neither denies the presence of Christ, nor that some type of conversion takes place. But he cannot abide the destruction of the elements and therefore speaks of a conversio intelligibilis. For Lanfranc, real presence is only maintained if presence exists in some manner within the elements, thus affirming a substantial conversion. The truth of the words of institution lay in just this sort of presence; anything else renders the words untrue. As Stock has noted, Lanfranc, like Radbertus, is concerned with the spoken, performative aspect of the Eucharist, while Berengar and Ratramnus focused on the written and allegorical. Berengar stresses the primacy of reason and takes both Lanfranc and Radbertus to task for drawing too simple an equation between the text and the real world, uncritically bypassing the necessary interpretative function of logic (Stock, 259-81). Berengar is less bound to the interior quality of the elements as the standard by which presence is measured, as he thinks more along the lines of a symbolic, though real, presence based upon the intimate, though distinct, relationship between signum and signatum. Actually, both Lanfranc and Berengar are in their own way reading these words properly or literally, at least at the first level, so that the question focuses on where the reader places the emphasis; is it on the ‘hoc’ or on the ‘corpus,’ the bread in Christ’s hands or the body which is offered? Only when that is established can one offer a further explanation. In both cases the primary objective is to understand the intention of the one who spoke these words. What is the authorial intent behind ‘Hoc est corpus meum’? The answers to that specific question are in fact quite similar in their content if not in their formulation. Christ is true; he gives to the Church his body and blood. How he does this is another question; one which will require an increasingly technical apparatus to answer.

d~Linguistic and Conceptual Refinements Something quite significant had occurred in the time that separated Radbertus and Ratramnus from Lanfranc and Berengar. The logica vetus, including Aristotle’s Categories, had come to the forefront in

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Northern European scholasticism by the late tenth century. This debate was no longer characterized by the straightforward antithesis of figura and res which had formed the crux of the ninth-century discussion. As Aristotelian thinking began to predominate, so interest increased in the particular thing as the instantiation of truth, just as biblical studies began to place greater emphasis on the letter of Scripture. The traditional Platonic contrast between the material and the spiritual, the transient and the eternal, was giving way to an approach to reality which was concerned with the thing itself, how it could be transformed. The thing is no longer simply signifying something beyond itself, but is actually being converted into something different, something greater. As Southern observes, the Categories provided an excellent means for Lanfranc to offer a logically coherent account of the eucharistic conversion. Given that the Aristotelian universe consists of a substratum of invisible primary substances made manifest by the accidents which adhere to them, it was only natural for Lanfranc to apply these categories to the Eucharist, thereby positing the replacement of one substance with another while the accidents remained. He could thus explain what Berengar could not. And, while lacking the later precision, it was Lanfranc who first began to apply to the Eucharist the concept of substance within the context of Aristotelian metaphysics. Still hesitant about the application of dialectic to such sacred matters, though, Lanfranc uses less common terminology which, while equivalent in meaning, would not associate him too closely with Aristotle. Hence, he tends to avoid substantia and accidens, preferring the equally acceptable essentia and species (Southern 1990, 43-50; Chadwick 1989, 417-27). Lanfranc was thus pointing the way to the future of medieval eucharistic theology, with its increasing demand for precision which Aristotelianism, as opposed to Platonism, could provide. The means to express the truth will require precise terminology. While Latin Christian writers of the patristic period often used the terms substantia and essentia for the Greek ousia, throughout much of the medieval period both substantia and essentia could be employed when speaking of tangible objects, as well as the abstract principles of reality which lay beneath them (Ghellinck 1942). For Aristotle, that which ‘is’ primarily, without further qualification, is substance.


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Substance is the ‘what’ of a thing, as when one calls some thing a human being (Metaphysics 7; 1028a). Yet as Jorissen notes, the use of Aristotelian terminology did not necessarily denote the full comprehension of the concepts supporting it; such comprehension would be a gradual process. It was in the twelfth century that substance began to separate itself from material or sensible considerations, as the reception of the new Aristotle increased in the West, and acquaintance with terminology paved the way for the subsequent ontology (Jorissen, 113-14). In this vein, Colish points out that one of the Porretans distinguished between the terms substance and essence, and so denied a substantial change of the elements in favor of an essential change. Such a distinction was based upon his equation of substantia with sensible, physical aspects of the bread. Yet in so arguing he provides no explanation as to how one might distinguish between the essence and that substance which provides a subject for the accidents (Colish 1994, 2:556-57). Given the subsequent acrimony surrounding the Eucharist for centuries to come it must be admitted that the material connotations of substance were always lurking in any discussion of real presence to the extent that just what constituted real presence could never find any sustained consensus.

e~The Status of ‘Ego Berengarius’ It was not very long before the 1059 Ego Berengarius confession was considered an inadequate, and even troublesome, document. Some two decades later a new confession was drawn by Alberic, a monk of Monte Cassino, and signed by Berengar on February 11, 1079 at the pre-Lenten synod called by Gregory VII. The new confession marks most significantly the beginning of the triumph of Aristotelianism in medieval eucharistic thought. This confession affirms the real presence of the crucified and risen Christ, but in precise language which would put to rest much of the ambiguity that so marred Humbert’s version. Now it said that “the bread and wine placed on the altar are, through the mystery of the sacred prayer and the words of our Redeemer, substantially converted into the true and proper and lifegiving flesh and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ. And after the consecration they are the true body of Christ which was born of the

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Virgin and hung on the cross, offered for the salvation of the world, and that sits at the right hand of the Father. And the true blood which poured from his side is present not merely through a sign and the power of the sacrament, but in the propriety of nature and in the truth of substance.”50 In point of fact, the term “substantialiter” was employed by Durandus of Troarn as early as 1053, though more significantly by Guitmund of Aversa, a student of Lanfranc, writing on the Eucharist between 1073 and 1078. Guitmund, who attended the 1079 council, and may well have helped draft the confession, writes of the elements being “substantially transmuted into something else,” and confesses the flesh and blood to be “substantially” present. “We consume the substance of the Lord’s body and blood in the Lord’s food, and not a mere shadow and figure.”51 Of note here also is the emergence of a new text from the 1075 legantine synod of Poitiers, which Berengar himself attended, and where it was affirmed that the bread and wine are “substantially transmuted into the true body and true blood of Christ.”52 It is one of the great ironies of ecclesiastical history that Humbert’s confession of 1059 passed into so many canon law collections, while 50

Denzinger, 700: “Ego Berengarius corde credo et ore confiteor, panem et vinum, quae ponuntur in altari, per mysterium sacrae orationis et verba nostri Redemptoris substantialiter converti in veram et propriam ac vivificatricem carnem et sanguinem Iesu Christi Domini nostri et post consecrationem esse verum Christi corpus, quod natum est de Virgine et quod pro salute mundi oblatum in cruce pependit, et quod sedet ad dextram Patris, et verum sanguinem Christi, qui de latere eius effusus est, non tantum per signum et virtutem sacramenti, sed in proprietate naturae et veritate substantiae.” On the circumstances surrounding this council and the confession’s forumulation cf. Sommerville 1972; Montclos, 213-45; Gibson, 94-96; Chadwick 1989, 432-33; Macy 1984, 36-37. 51 Durandus of Troarn, De corpore et sanguine Domini; PL 149; 1386d: “… nihil tamen aliud omnino substantialiter esse quam vera Christi caro et verus sanguis comprobatur.” Guitmund of Aversa, De corporis et sanguinis Domini veritate in eucharistia; PL 149; 1440b: “Nam cum aliquid substantialiter transmutatur in aliud, in id utique transire solet, quod non existebat prius, verbi gratia, Virga Moysi mutata est in serpentem (Exod. VII), quae ante non erat serpens, sed tunc coepit esse serpens.” Ibid., 1487c: “… substantiam corporis et sanguinis Domini nos in cibo Dominico sumere, non umbram et figuram tantum …” Ibid., 1472b: “… id quod de altari sumimus, Christi carnem et sanguinem substantialiter confitemur.” Cf. Sommerville 70-71; Chadwick 1989, 432-34. 52 Poitiers text transcribed in Sommerville, 68-69: “… post consecrationem que ibi fit virtute Spiritus sancti per manum sacerdotis, substantialiter transmutatum in verum corpus et verum sanguinem Christi …”


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the 1079 confession of Alberic found only sparse circulation.53 With regard to the place of the 1059 Ego Berengarius, it is apparent that as eucharistic theology was advancing in depth of understanding and precision of definition it carried what amounted to a millstone around its neck in the confession of Humbert, such that it had to be continually glossed by later interpreters. We will presently examine these interpretations which serve to highlight the advances made throughout the twelfth century. Though the ‘Paschasian’ conception of the Eucharist affirmed by Lanfranc had certainly won the day, by the twelfth century very few people were willing to defend Humbert’s confession. Guitmund takes up the interpretation of the 1059 confession, defending a literal reading of the text, though with definite nuance. He tells us that Berengar and his followers deny the body and blood of the Lord are present substantialiter, asserting instead that it is only a symbolic figure of the body, and thus called the body in name only (sola voce).54 It is evident that Berengar was understood by many to have reduced the conversion of the elements to a mere linguistic phenomenon. But precisely because substance is equated with reality any denial of substantial presence is reckoned a denial of real presence, even while the term substantia clearly meant different things to different people. Taking up the language of Cardinal Humbert, specifically referring to the body of Christ being “crushed,” Guitmund argues that this can mean to touch or press “more forcefully,” since it is not so hard to believe that after the resurrection Thomas had touched the risen Christ, just as the holy women grasped his feet. Moreover, it is hardly unfitting that one should press Christ against the teeth, inasmuch as Christ had allowed himself to be beaten and crucified by unbelievers for the sake of the faithful.55 That being said, 53

Dec. III, De cons., d. 2, c. 42; Friedberg 1:1328-29. The confession is also found in the earlier collection of Ivo of Chartres, PL 160d-161c. Cf. Macy 1999b, to which I am indebted for leading me to many important eucharistic texts of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. 54 De corporis; PL 149; 1430a: “Berengarius et qui cum sequuntur, asseverant Eucharistiam Domini non esse vere substantialiterque corpus et sanguinem Domini, sed sola voce appellari, pro eo quod tamquam umbra et figura significativa sit corporis et sanguinis Domini.” 55 Ibid., 1432a-c: “Si enim intelligunt atteri, velut pressius tangi aut fortius premi quaero quare non sit fas Christum dentibus atteri? … Nulla quippe rerum impossibilitas potest impedire voluntatem Dei. Deinde quare non possit dentibus

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however, Guitmund acknowledges that no violence can be done to Christ, and thus he cannot be broken into parts or suffer any corruption. The impassibility of Christ’s resurrected body must always be maintained. The Eucharist is a great mystery dependent upon the will and power of God. There is only one body, and while it may appear to be broken, it is miraculously separated into parts and distributed without any harm done; for with God all things are possible.56

3 Developments in the Late Eleventh and the Twelfth Century For Alger of Liège, “the body of the Lord is consumed no less by the mouth of the body than that of the heart.” Not only does he insist upon Christ’s substantial presence, he will not permit the substantial remnance of the bread and wine, since they cease to exist following their conversion. He thereby rules out consubstantiation as he states: “In these species of bread and wine either nothing exists except the substance of Christ’s body, or else our faith is in vain. The substance of the bread and the wine is converted into the body and blood of Christ while it becomes what it was not and ceases to be what it had been.”57 For Alger, as for Lanfranc, Christ can be a sacrament of premi, qui manibus Thomae et post resurrectionem potuit attrectari? Et sanctae muleries, quibus occurrit post resurrectionem, scriptum est quia tenuerunt pedes ejus. … An quia nimium Christum humiliari videatur? Sed qui dedignatus non est ob salutem fidelium, virgis infidelium, corona spinea, cruce …” 56 Ibid., 1433c-1434b: “Hoc equidem et nos confitemur: scilicet, quia non est fas Christum ulla quidem violentia, sive dentibus, sive alio modi per partes dissipari. Si vero illi cui omnia possibilia sunt (Matth. XIX), altissima et inscrutabili consilii sui ratione placet, ut corpus suum per partes ipse dividere possit, ita dumtaxit, ita jam ultra non moriatur, neque laedatur, neque ullam corruptionem patiatur … Nec tamen tres particulae separatae, sunt tria corpora, sed unum corpus. … Similiter et si dentibus, vel aliquo alio modo haec frangi videntur, intelligimus non haec frangi.” 57 De sacramentis de corporis et sanguinis Dominici; PL 180; 807b: “Diximus superius non minus ore corporis quam ore cordis corpus Domini esse sumendum.” Ibid., 808c: “In illis enim speciebus panis et vini, vel nulla est nisi corporis Christi


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himself, both signifying and being signified, as the invisible body of the resurrected Christ functions as a sacrament of the visible body which endured the passion.58 And because it was well known that Aristotle did not allow for the existence of accidents apart from subjects, Alger anticipates the query of the dialecticians as they ask how the qualities of the bread, its color and taste, can exist when their foundation i.e., the substance of the bread no longer exists. As one might expect, the answer is an appeal to divine omnipotence. The language is becoming more precise as Alger says that, “in his sacrament [God] makes accidental qualities exist by their own power (per se), which in other cases is impossible. Yet if this is the one who brought fertility to the Virgin without a seed, what marvel is it if he allows qualities to exist without the foundation of substance?”59 Alger makes it clear that it is the invisible, spiritual body which is received in the visible sacrament. Yet even as the resurrected body received in the Eucharist is invisible and spiritual, it is no less substantial for being so.60 It is essential for Alger that preservation of Christ’s impassibility never compromises his substantial bodily presence in the host. Rupert of Deutz, anxious to establish real presence in the wake of the Berengarian controversy, proposed a doctrine that cast him into a controversy of his own (c.1113-15). If the Truth said, ‘Hoc est corpus substantia vel fides nostra est irrata. Panis enim et vini substantia in corpus et sanguinem Christi conversa, dum facta est quod non erat, desistit esse quod fuerat.” 58 Ibid., 792c-d: “ … ut corporis Christi in sacramento sacramentum significans et significatum, in panis et vini forma, itemque in hominis forma substantialiter et vere unum eumdemque Christum credant esse. ... Quod vero verum corpus Christi invisibile post resurrectionem sit sacramentum visibilis corporis Christi, in passione scilicet sui ipsius …” Cf. Haring 1958; Macy 1984, 49-51. 59 Ibid., 809d-810a: “Sed quaerunt dialectici, cum substantia panis in corpus Christi conversa, jam non sit panis, in quo fundamento remanent qualitates ut idem qui fuerat panis color et sapor habeant fundari et existere, cum substantia ipsius sacramenti, id est, corpus Christi, nec colore panis et coloratum, nec sapore sapidum. Ad quod respondendum est, quod sicut Deus in omnibus et mirabilis, sic et in istis. Facit in suo sacramento accidentales qualitates existere per se, quod in caeteris est impossibile. Sed qui virgini dedit fecunditatem sine semine, qui mirum si sine substantiae fundamento facit qualitates existere?” 60 Ibid., 771: “Quod autem corpus Christi spirituale sit, et incorruptibile, et invisibile, nec tamen non minus substantiale in sacramento …” Ibid., 775: “Quia ergo spirituale et invisibile corpus Christi astruiximus, et per ipsum tamen non solum spiritualiter, sed et corporaliter humanitatis et divinitatis ejus participamur.”

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meum, quod pro uobis tradetur,’ then this must be the very same body, the bread which descended from heaven.61 This reading would seem to be perfectly orthodox except that Rupert’s literal reading led to an interpretation which his adversaries, principally Alger of Liège, charged was the doctrine of impanation, identifying Christ with the bread itself. For in fact Rupert did say, “the Word, that is the bread of angels, was made flesh, not having been changed into flesh, but by assuming flesh; so that same Word previously made flesh becomes the visible bread, not having been changed into bread, but by assuming and transferring the bread into the unity of his person.”62 Hence, a proper or literal reading of the text which had led Berengar to assert the remnance of the bread left Rupert to identify the bread with Christ. As we shall see, this very same issue crops up at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and will also be dealt with by Wyclif. As accident and substance were being clearly delineated, the scandal of breaking the body of the Lord may be answered more readily, contrasting the two levels of existence, that of the purely phenomenal and that of the intelligible. Gilbert de la Porrée contends that in the case of the Eucharist the sign undergoes a complete transformation such that what were once bread and wine are changed into the flesh and blood.63 The species remain, and that leads to the question of what exactly is being broken in the hands of the priest. Gilbert reports some as saying that this occurs only on the accidental level, and if pressed on this point they say the accidents exist without a subject. Gilbert draws upon Augustine’s distinction between intentional acts of deception and simpler matters of mistaken judgment. For Gilbert, the 61

Commentaria in Evangelium Sancti Iohannis VI; CCCM 9; 333. “Hoc est corpus meum, quod pro uobis tradetur, audes dicere aliud esse quam Christi corpus? Veritas dicit: Hoc est corpus meum, et addit: quod pro uobis tradetur, et tu dicis: Non est idem corpus?” For an analysis of Rupert’s eucharistic theology and the controversy with Alger of Liège cf. Van Engen 1983, 136-80. 62 Ibid., VI, 357: “Et sic Verbum, quod est panis angelorum, caro factum est, non mutatum in carnem sed assumendo carnem; sic idipsum Verbum iamdudum caro factum panis uisibilis fit, non mutatum in panem, sed assumendo et in unitatem personae suae transferendo panem.” 63 Sententie Magistri Gisleberti, ed. Haring 1979, 62: “(3) Et notandum quod duo sunt genera sacramentorum: aliud cuius significans penitus immutatur ut fit in sacramento corporis et sanguinis domini, quia illud quod erat panis mutatur in carnem et quod erat uinum in sanguinem.”


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eucharistic fracture should be likened to a branch which only appears to be broken when submerged in the water. And so while Christ’s body only appears to be broken, Gilbert cautions that there is no question of people being deceived here by some act of trickery, since it is all done to serve useful ends.64 One is reminded of Lanfranc’s argument that this manipulation of sense experience both spares the faithful a bloody horror and provides an opportunity for meritorious faith. Thus the crude results that Humbert’s language would seem to demand are being tactfully smoothed out. The confession itself is in the process of being glossed as scholars look for suitable interpretations without resorting to outright repudiations. The explanation cited by Gilbert is also quite significant in its attempt to meet Berengar’s charge that such a process makes Christ a prevaricator. That was clearly one charge that could not go unanswered, though it would be consistently raised by Wyclif. As we examine the increasingly refined explanations of the relation between Christ’s corporeal presence and the remaining elements, we ought to bear in mind that more was at stake than the quenching of intellectual thirst. Macy points out the pastoral dimension of the early scholastic question, “What if a mouse eats the host?” In other words, what exactly would the mouse be consuming were he to start eating the consecrated bread; the true body or bread alone? Berengar had raised this very point in the eleventh century, arguing that were actual bits of body and blood present they would be subject not only to putrefaction, but could be eaten by bird and beast alike.65 This was no mere scholastic conundrum, and many theologians continued to 64

Ibid., 64: “(23) Et sciendum quod species panis et uini remanet. Item quaeritur si sit ibi uera fractio et uera rotunditas et huismodi.” “(24) Quidam tenent quod uera fractio est ibi uera rotunditas. Et si opponantur eis quod fractio et rotunditas sunt accidentia, et si accidentia, ergo in aliquo subiecto, ipsi respondent quod sunt accidentia et sine subiecto.” “(25) Sed Augustinus uidetur uelle quod nulla fractio est ibi dicens: Sicut baculus uidetur frangi in aqua et non frangitur, ita corpus Christi uidetur frangi et non frangitur. Et quamuis aliter sit quam uidetur, tamen non est prestigium quia non ad deceptionem hominum sed ad utilitatem fit.” Cf. Augustine, De vera religione XXXIII, 61-62; CCSL 32; 227-28. 65 Rescriptum III, 204: “… ut non per subiectum superesset altaris oblatio sed adesset recens facta per generationem subiecti porciuncula carnis, porciuncula sanguinis, non solum hominibus, sed etiam pecudibus, avibus, putredini atque ignibus corpus fieret Christi et sanguis oblatio altaris.”

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weigh in on it in an attempt to preserve real presence in the face of apparent sacrilege. Stephen Langton said that the host miraculously returned to mere bread when the mouse began to gnaw, while some of the Laon school said the mouse consumed only the outward appearances of the bread, not the substance of Christ’s body. And for Alger, the mouse ate the appearance of bread, itself only an illusion anyway. Yet the urgency this question assumed by the thirteenth century may well have moved beyond safeguarding the host from trespassing rodents, and involved the Church’s response to the heretical Cathar movement. This question seemed tailor-made to support their denigration of the material world and consequent docetic christology (Macy 1991). That the Cathars were no small threat in the eyes of the Catholic Church is evinced by the especially brutal crusade launched against them after the murder of a papal legate in 1208, as well as by the legislation passed by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 which, among many other things, affirmed real eucharistic presence with the term ‘transubstantiation.’ Keeping the visible and invisible, terrestrial and eternal, distinct from one another so as to preserve the Savior’s impassibility, while at the same time not reducing the bread and wine to merely reflective symbols, was one of the chief tasks of twelfth-century eucharistic theology. This, in turn, led to greater deliberation regarding the components of the sacraments themselves. We have noted how Lanfranc was unwilling to posit the radical split between sacramentum and res sacramenti put forward by Berengar, insisting instead that something could be both sacramentum and res at the same time. This theme was to be developed in the twelfth century in a decisive manner such that it would ensure the real presence of Christ’s crucified and risen body on the altar. In an effort to affirm real presence the sacramental quality could never be lost sight of, however, and this required further precision in the definition of the Eucharist’s symbolic power. Hugh of St. Victor, in his De sacramentis c. 1130, defines a sacrament this way: “A sacrament is a corporeal or material element that is set before the senses outwardly, representing through its likeness, signifying on account of its institution, and containing some


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invisible and spiritual grace by way of sanctification.”66 Hugh rejects the Berengarian notion that something may not be simultaneously truth (veritas) and a figure (figura). After all, the death of Christ was both truth and figure, a genuine historical event which still signifies death to sin, just as the truth of the resurrection signifies living unto righteousness. Such events were no less true for having been sacraments, sacred signs, as well. So too then, the sacrament of the altar can be a likeness in one aspect and truth in another.67 Colish reckons Hugh to have made a great contribution to sacramental theology through this systematic development of the Augustinian definition of a sacrament as the visible sign of invisible grace. For not only does the sacrament signify the sacred reality, but it contains the very grace conferred to the recipient for the purpose of his sanctification. Sacraments not only signify, therefore, but they effect what they signify (Colish 1994, 2:523-34). Adopting the now dominant Paschasian understanding, Hugh asserts that the body present under the species is none other than the very one suspended upon the cross. While the outward appearance is the visible sacrament of the true body and blood, the body and blood themselves are, in turn, the sacrament of spiritual grace.68 In fact, Hugh is specifically proposing a threefold understanding of the sacrament, consisting of the visible species, the truth of the body and blood invisibly believed to subsist underneath those visible species, 66

De sacramentis; PL 176; 317d: “Sacramentum est corporale vel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter propositum ex similitudine repraesentans, et ex institutione significans, et ex sanctifactione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritalem gratiam.” On twelfth-century developments cf. Eynde 1949; Ghellinck 1930. 67 PL 176; 466a-b: “Nunquid ideo sacramentum altaris veritas non est quia figura est. Ergo nec mors Christi veritas est, quia figura est, et resurrectio Christi veritas non est, quia figura est. Nam et mortem Christi et resurrectionem figuram esse et imaginem, et similitudinem, et sacramentum, et exemplum … Ergo mors Christi exemplum fuit, ut peccato moriamur, et resurrectio ejus exemplum fuit, ut justitiae vivamus. Nunquid ideo veritas non fuit? Quare ergo altaris sacramentum similitudo esse non potest, et veritas? In alio quidem similitudo, in alio veritas.” 68 Ibid., 466c-d: “… quod autem sub specie illa credimus, verum corpus Christi est, et verus sanguis Jesu Christi quod pependit in cruce, et qui fluxit de latere. … sed sub specie panis et vini verum corpus et verum sanguinem consecrari, et speciem quidem visibilem sacramentum esse veri corporis et veri sanguinis; corpus autem et sanguinem sacramentum esse gratiae spiritualis.”

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and the power of spiritual grace which is invisibly and spiritually received together with the body and blood.69 The species of the bread and wine are perceived even as their res or substantia is not believed to be present. Yet the res of the body and blood is present, both veraciter and substantialiter, for the substantia, while imperceptible to the senses, is nonetheless believed to be present.70 Substance is equated with res, just as being present substantialiter is equated with being present veraciter. The terms substantia and substantialiter assert the actuality of a thing, being present according to the truth of its being, that is, the manner by which something is what it is. Substance is thus equated with truth, and so establishes a bulwark against memorialism, thereby allowing for the grace of spiritual union. Putting forward a position which is basically that of transubstantiation, though not yet called such, Hugh rejects the competing doctrines of both consubstantiation and annihilation, neither of which were considered heretical at that time. “Through the words of sanctification the true substance of the bread and wine is converted into the true body and blood of Christ, while only the outward appearance of the bread and wine remain, for substance passes into substance. One must believe that this conversion does not occur through a union, but through transition. … Nor is the substance of the bread and wine reduced to nothing just because it ceases to be what it once was. Rather, it is changed since it begins to be something else which it had not been.”71 Christ is thus consumed “visibly with respect 69

Ibid., 466c: “Nam cum unum sit sacramentum, tria ibi discreta proponuntur: species videlicet visibilis, et veritas corporis, virtus gratiae spiritualis. Aliud est enim visibilis species quae visibiliter cernitur; aliud est veritas corporis et sanguinis quae sub visibili specie invisibiliter creditur, atque aliud gratia spiritualis quae cum corpore et sanguine invisibiliter et spiritualiter percipitur.” 70 Ibid., 466d: “Et quemadmodum species illic cernitur, cujus res vel substantia ibi esse non creditur; sic res ibi veraciter et substantialiter praesens creditur, cujus species non cernitur; videtur enim species panis et vini, et substantia panis et vini creditur; creditur autem substantia corporis et sangunis Christi et tamen species non cernitur.” 71 Ibid., 468a-b: “Per verba sanctificationis vera panis et vera vini substantia, in verum corpus et sanguinem Christi convertitur, sola specie panis et vini remanente, substantia in et substantiam transeunte. Conversio autem ipsa non secundum unionem, sed transitionem credenda est. … Nec ipsam substantiam panis et vini in nihilum redactam quia desiit esse quod fuit; sed mutatem potius, quia coepit esse aliud quod non fuit …”


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to the sacrament’s outward appearance, and corporeally with respect to the truth of Christ’s flesh and blood.” The truth of the body and blood is itself a sacrament, however, functioning as “an image of the invisible and spiritual participation of Jesus, which is perfected inwardly in the heart through faith and love.”72 Christ, though consumed in his body remains whole, undivided in his inviolable and immortal nature. Miraculously free from any harm in this process, Christ comes to the communicant in the reception of the tangible host so that one may be stirred to seek his spiritual presence.73 The Summa Sententiarum, written at about the same time and once erroneously attributed to Hugh, brings greater definition to Hugh’s threefold conception of the Eucharist. Here it is proposed that the same body which was crucified and raised is present on the altar “invisibly hidden under another form.” The substance of the bread and wine is “converted” into the body and blood of Christ while only their species remain.74 Now the terms sacramentum and res sacramenti are applied directly to each aspect of the tripartite Eucharist. There is the sacramentum tantum, the sacramentum et res sacramenti, and the res tantum.75 The sacrament is assigned its traditional role as sacrae rei signum. The sacramentum tantum is the visible species, the outward 72

Ibid., 467a-b: “Et rursum quod nunc visibiliter secundum sacramenti speciem et corporaliter secundum carnis et sanguinis veritatem Christum in altari sumimus … Ergo divinissima Eucharistia quae in altari et secundum panis et vini speciem et secundum corporis et sanguinis Christi veritatem visibiliter et corporaliter tractatur, sacramentum est et signum; et imago invisibilis et spiritualis participationis Jesu, quae intus in corde per fidem et dilectionem perficitur.” 73 Ibid., 469b: “Ipse integer manet in se, nec dividitur, nec partitur.” Ibid., 470a: “Servat corpori suo veritatem naturae inviolabilis et immortalis, ne in suo corrumpatur.” Ibid., 470d: “Sic ergo in sacramento suo modo temporaliter venit ad te, et est eo corporaliter tecum, ut tu per corporalem praesentiam ad spiritualem quaerendam exciteris, et inveniendam adjuveris.” 74 Summa Sententiarum; PL 176; 139d: “Cum enim idem corpus quod in cruce pependit, in sepulcro jacuit, indubitanter fateamur esse in altari; et tantum hic quantum et ibi fuit, et modo est ad dextram patris, non est dubium corpus Christi in altari sua non carere forma, sed invisibiliter; in altari invisibiliter latens sub forma aliena.” Ibid., 141a-b: “Quamvis autem substantia panis in corpus Christi convertatur, non tamen corpus Christi augmentatur inde. Et, quamvis non sit post consecrationem panis, neque vinum quod prius erat panis et vinum; species tamen remanet, sapor etiam remanet.” 75 Ibid., 140a: “Tria hic considerare opportet: unum quod est sacramentum tantum, alterum quod est sacramentum et res sacramenti, tertium quod est res tantum.”

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appearance. And significantly, in direct contradiction to Humbert’s formula, only the species of the bread and wine are broken, that is to say, the sacramentum tantum.76 Claims of real presence are not diminished, however, for Lanfranc’s position that something may be both sacramentum and res is explicitly affirmed. In the same vein as Hugh, the sacramentum and res together are the true body and blood of Christ under the species of bread and wine. It is res, insofar as it is signified by the species, though simultaneously the sacramentum of something else, namely the res tantum. This pure res is the unity of Christ the Head with the members of his mystical body, which is itself rendered through the faith of Christ’s body and blood.77 The Sententiae of Roland, completed by 1150, also speaks of the Eucharist in the threefold fashion. The true body and blood are on the altar in whole form at all times. He is careful to note, though, that the body is not consumed by the faithful in the same form in which it was crucified, nor the blood as it poured from Christ’s side. Rather, the communicant receives a sacrament, and it is under the sacramental species of the bread and wine that the true body and blood are present.78 As to whether one may speak of an illusion when the true body of Christ seems to be broken under the species of the elements while actually remaining whole, Roland provides an answer similar to 76

Ibid., 140a-b: “Sacramentum et non res, sunt species visibiles, id est panis et vini; et ea quae ibi visibiliter celebrantur, ut fractio, depositio, elevatio. Sacramentum enim est sacrae rei signum. Signum autem est quod praeter speciem quam ingerit facit aliquid in mentem venire. … In hoc etiam species panis et vini dicuntur sacramenta corporis et sanguinis Dominici.” 77 Ibid., 140b-c: “Sacramentum et res, ipsum corpus Christi et sanguis: res quantum ad illas species quibus significantur. Haec res iterum sacramentum est alterius, scilicet unitatis capitis et memborum quam efficit fides corporis et sanguinis Domini; et ista res sacramenti virtus appellatur. Dicitur etiam spiritualis caro Christi.” 78 Die Sentenzen Rolands, ed. Gietl 222: “Ad hec dicimus, quod verum corpus et sanguis Christi totum et non particulariter est in altari, et totum in hoc altari et totum in illo et totum in manu sacerdotis et in ore cuiusque, et totum hic Rome et in Jerosolimis, uno et eodem tempore. Quod vero Christus dixit: ‘non dixi de corpore, quod Judei sunt crucifixuri’ etc., ‘sed sacramentum’ etc., id est, non dixi, quod debeatis corpus comedere aut sanguinem bibere in ea forma, in qua Judei illud sunt crucifixuri et sanguinem fusuri, sed sacramentum tradidi vobis, id est, sub sacramentali specie hoc facturi estis, videlicet sub specie panis et vini.” The long-held identification with Roland Bandinelli, later Pope Alexander III, may not be correct. Cf. Noonan 1977.


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Gilbert de la Porrée. Though one thing is seen, another is understood; like a branch in the water it may seem to be broken and yet is whole. And this may not rightfully be called a deception inasmuch as it is done for the confirmation of our salvation. Here too the traditional justification is offered: if the body of Christ were to appear on the altar in the appearance of his human form anyone consuming it would surely be horrified.79 Peter Lombard’s Sententiae, written c. 1155, soon became the standard text-book of the medieval schools, as he gathered and systematized not only the writings of the Fathers, but the best scholarship to date on a variety of subjects. Here he states that with the pronouncement of the sacramental words the bread and wine are converted into the substance of Christ’s body and blood. It is expressly considered a heresy to assert that Christ is present in a sacrament alone (tantum in sacramento), meaning only in a sign. Moreover, applying the rules of figurative speech to Christ’s presence in the Eucharist, such that one equates the words ‘Hoc est corpus meum’ with St. Paul’s expression, ‘Petra erat Christus (1 Cor. 10:4),’ is specifically rejected.80 Drawing upon the Summa Sententiarum, Lombard also establishes the tripartite definition of the Eucharist as sacramentum tantum consisting of the visible species; the sacramentum et res i.e., the proper flesh and blood of Christ; and res et non sacramentum, which is his mystical flesh.81 Grounded in this definition, Lombard neatly glosses 79

Ibid., 229: “Videtur enim species panis et vini, et est ibi veritas corporis et sanguinis Christi. Ad quod dicimus, quod nulla est ibi delusio, licet aliud videtur: ut de baculo in aqua posito potest perpendi; aliud enim est et aliud videtur. Est enim integer, cum fractus intueatur, nec tamen aliqua est ibi illusio. Ita licet ibi aliud videatur, nulla autem est ibi illusio, nec debet dici quod sit illusio, quod est nostre salutis confirmacio. Si enim in humane nature specie Christi corpus ibi appareret, eius susceptionem quisque profecto abhorreret.” 80 Sententiae IV, d. 8, c. 4, 282: “Cum enim haec verba proferuntur, conversio panis et vini in substantiam corporis et sanguinis Christi; reliqua ad Dei laudem dicuntur.” Ibid., IV, d. 10, c. 1, 290: “De haeresi aliorum qui dicunt corpus Christi non esse in altari nisi in signo. … asserentes in altari non esse corpus Christi vel sanguinem, nec substantiam panis vel vini in substantiam carnis et sanguinis converti; sed ita Christum dixisse: Hoc est corpus meum, sicut Apostolus dixit: Petra erat Christus. Dicunt enim ibi esse corpus Christi tantum in sacramento, id est in signo; et tantum in signo manducari a nobis.” 81 Ibid., IV, d. 8, c. 7, 285: “Sunt igitur hic tria distinguenda: unum quod tantum est sacramentum, alterum quod est sacramentum et res, et tertium quod est res

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Humbert’s language, thereby providing a suitable reading of the 1059 Ego Berengarius. While some say that the body is broken and divided essentialiter, though remaining intact, Lombard will offer what he considers the more probable scenario: “Because the body of Christ is incorruptible, one can rightly say that the fracture and division does not occur in the substance of the body, but in the sacramental form of the bread. Nevertheless, a true fracture and division does take place there, though not in substance, but instead in the sacrament, that is to say, in the species.”82 When interpreting the words of Berengar’s confession therefore one must recognize that the body of Christ is received in truth, and thus ‘non modo sacramento,’ but the fracture that truly occurs applies ‘in sacramento tantum.’ Hence, even as there is a partition when the priest breaks apart the consecrated host, the whole Christ still exists in all the different parts.83 Many of these scholastic formulations were themselves born of increasingly sophisticated exegetical methods applied to biblical texts, and thus could be found in the commentaries from which they originated, or into which they were later poured back. The Glossa Ordinaria, largely a product of the early twelfth-century Laon school, also renders an implicit repudiation of Humbert’s language in its comment on 1 Cor. 11:24, where St. Paul’s choice of the word ‘fregit’ is explained in the marginal gloss as pertaining to the sacramentum alone: “He broke: In the sacrament, that is to say, according to what was seen, while yet believed by the faithful to remain intact.”84 As to et non sacramentum. Sacramentum et non res est species visibilis panis vel vini; sacramentum et res, caro Christi propria et sanguis; res et non sacramentum, mystica eius caro.” 82 Ibid., IV, d. 12, c. 3, 305: “Aliorum opinio. Confessio Berengarii. Alii tradunt corpus Christi essentialiter frangi et dividi, et tamen integrum et incorruptibile existere. … Sententia probabilior. Sed quia corpus Christi incorruptibile est, sane dici potest fractio illa et partitio non in substantia corporis, sed in ipsa forma panis sacramentali fieri: ut vera fractio et partitio sit ibi, quae fit non in substantia, sed in sacramento, id est in specie.” 83 Ibid., 306-07: “Ideoque illa Berengarii verba ita distinguenda sunt: ut ‘sensualiter, non modo sacramento, sed in veritate’ dicatur corpus Christi ‘tractari manibus sacerdotum; frangi vero et atteri dentibus’ vere quidem, sed in sacramento tantum. Vera igitur est ibi attritio et partitio, sed in singulis partibus totus Christus est.” 84 Biblia Latina cum Glossa Ordinaria vol. 4, 325: “Fregit. In sacramento scilicet, secundum quod videbatur et integrum a fidelibus credibatur. Unum omnibus


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why Christ gave his body to the disciples under the appearance of bread, the marginal gloss says this was for the sake of faithful reception, inasmuch as there is no merit in accepting what is clearly perceived by human reason. Moreover, the species express a likeness to the things they signify. The flesh of Christ assumed from the Virgin Mary is both contained and signified. The res which is not contained, but only signified, is the unity of the Church comprising the predestined called to righteousness and glorification.85 Lombard’s interpretation, and that of the Gloss, may well have reflected the thought of most by the middle of the twelfth century. Indeed, the wide acceptance of the Sententiae and the Glossa Ordinaria helped to establish this as the standard reading for following generations. A number of early commentaries on Lombard’s Sententiae also denied that Christ could be broken essentialiter, thereby stating that only the form of the bread is broken, while the subject remains intact (Hödl 1962). But as is so often the case throughout the Middle Ages, general consensus should never be taken for unwavering uniformity on all fronts, much less an incontrovertible and universally recognized standard of orthodoxy. Zachary of Besançon is a case in point, as he held firm to a literal reading of the 1059 confession and excoriated those who did not. Through the lens of christology he affirms the paradox that while Christ is locally in heaven, the same body which was crucified is now upon the altar. It is impassible and inviolable; yet this true body which is broken in the hands of the priest sensualiter is incorruptible even as it is crushed in the teeth of the of the faithful. While God is of incorporeal nature he still became man; though eternal he was born of the Virgin. This immortal God died on the dedit, ut in unitate permaneant: sed cum fregit, spontaneam passionem suam ostendit.” Note that in transcribing the text I have provided the complete forms of the abbreviated Latin. 85 Biblia Latina cum Glossa Ordinaria vol. 4, 325: “Sub alia specie tradidit et deinceps a fidelibus sumendum instituit, quia fides non habet meritum cui humana ratio prebet experimentum. Sub specie panis et vini quia res huius speciei expressam habent similitudinem cum utraque re huius sacramenti contenta scilicet et significata, et significata et non contenta. Contenta et significata est caro christi quam de virgine traxit, et sanguis quem nobis fudit. Significata vero et non contenta, unitas ecclesiae in predestinatis vocatis iustificatis et glorificatis.” For other commentaries of this period which differ from the Glossa Ordinaria and the school of Laon cf. Macy 1985.

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cross, and though of limitless dimensions, was still laid in a tomb.86 Zachary laments the fact that there are those who condemn Berengar and yet are scandalized by the starkness of the confession’s wording. Some were apparently arguing that the confession is not in keeping with scriptural discourse, which very often calls signs by the name of what they signify, especially with respect to the sacraments, since they express the powers of the things they signify.87

4 The Formulation of Transubstantiation By the middle of the twelfth century, substantial conversion would be described by the term ‘transubstantiation,’ which would itself become a fixture in discussions of the Eucharist for centuries to come. As Goering points out, while Roland’s Sententiae (c. 1150) marks a very early appearance of the term, here in the form transubstantiatio,88 he is already employing the term as if it were part of the common language of the schools. Actually the term transubstantio seems to have been the earliest version, and may well have been introduced in Paris c. 1140 by the English scholar Robert Pullen (Goering 1991). The 86

De concordia Evangelistarum; PL 186; 508a-b: “Tenet igitur Ecclesia corpus Domini localiter esse in coelo; tenet corpus Domini quod pependit in ligno, super altaria esse, Corpus Christi impassibile est, inviolabile est, mors ei ultra non dominabitur, verum corpus Christi manibus sacredotum sensualiter tractatur, frangitur, in singulis portionibus totum suscipitur et integre. Corpus Christi incorruptibile est; iterum, corpus Christi dentibus atteritur et tranglutitur. … Deus et simplex et incorporea natura, Deus et homo, Deus ipsa aeternitas est, Deus de virgine natus est, Deus est immortalis, Deus in cruce mortuus est, Deus est immensus, Deus in sepulcro jacuit …” Cf. Macy 1999b, 26-28. 87 Ibid., 508b-c: “… qui cum damnato Berengario idem sentiunt, et tamen eumdem cum Ecclesia damnant. In hoc videlicet damnant eum, quia formam verborum Ecclesiae abjiciens, nuditate sermonis scandalum movebat. Non sequebatur, ut dicunt, usum Scripturarum, quae passim res significantes tanquam significatas appellant, praesertim in sacramentis, ut eorum virtutes exprimant.” 88 Speaking of the proper preparation of the elements for the Mass, Roland writes in Sentenzen, 231: “Verum tamen si necessitate imminente sub altaris panis specie consecratur, profecto fieret transubstantiatio, sanguinis autem nunquam fit nisi de vino transubstantiatio.”


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author of an anonymous work, who might well be Pullen, distinguishes between a transformatio, which pertains to a change of qualities or outward forms, and what he calls a transubstantio, namely a change of one substance into another. Hence, it cannot be said that one looks at the bread and wine upon the altar, for it is now Christ’s body and blood under the appearance of bread and wine. “By the power of the sacrament the bread and the wine pass into the body of Christ and his blood, one substance being wholly changed into another, while its form alone is retained.”89 Alan of Lille, writing at the end of the twelfth century, describes transubstantiation as the process whereby neither the matter nor the substantial form of the bread remain, but only the accidents, as the bread is “transubstantiated” into Christ’s body.90 Concerning the relationship between subject and accidents, Alan appeals to metaphorical speech to preserve the integrity of Christ’s body. Christ is present in the form he assumed from the Virgin Mary, though he is not present under that form, but rather under the form of the bread and wine. “It is only improperly said that the body of Christ is seen upon the altar, since it is not seen by means of its own form; and improperly is it said to be broken or crushed by the teeth, since this does not pertain to Christ’s body, but to the form [of the bread].”91 At the close of the twelfth century, Lothario of Segni, prior to ascending to the papal throne in 1198 as Innocent III, addressed a 89

Cf. portions of Oxford, Corpus Christi College MS 32, transcribed in Goering, 165: “In hac autem consecratione nullius qualitatis fit transformatio, set huius substancie in illam, ut ita dicam, transubstantio uel transmutatio. Cum itaque corpus Christi et sanguis sub specie panis et uini in altari conspiciuntur, dici non potest quod sit panis qui conspicitur, quia corpus Christi est. Sic nec uinum est set Christi sanguis sub specie uini. Manifestum itaque est, ut predictum est, quod ex uirtute sacramenti panis ille et uinum in corpus Christi et sanguinem eius transit, substantia penitus in alteram mutata, forma vero eius tantum modo retenta.” 90 Regulae Alani de sacra theologia; PL 210; 678b-c: “Transsubstantiatio est, quando nec materia, nec substantialis forma remanet, ut in mutatione, secundum quam panis transsubstantiatur in corpus Christi; ubi nec materia panis remanet, nec substantialia, sed accidentialia tantum.” 91 Ibid., 679a: “In illa enim forma, quam assumpsit de Virgine est in altari, sed non sub illa, imo sub forma panis et vini. Unde improprie dicitur videri corpus Christi in altari, cum non videatur mediante sua forma, improprie dicitur frangi, vel dentibus atteri, quia hoc non corpori Christi, sed formae convenit.”

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series of questions pertaining the celebration of the Mass. In need of clarification is just what is being demonstrated when Christ spoke the words, ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’ Specifically, what does the demonstrative pronoun refer to? It is not referring to the bread, for bread cannot be Christ’s body. Nor can it refer to the body at that moment, since Christ had not yet completed the pronouncement which effects the conversion. Lothario solves the problem by concluding that Christ actually consecrated the host when he blessed it. Though Christ accomplished this by his own divine power through the blessing, he then expressed the form under which later priests could bless the host, and thus consecrate. When the priest pronounces these words during the Mass, therefore, he actually demonstrates nothing, since he is employing them in a recitative manner. The priest simply recites the words which confer the power of Christ’s blessing.92 This explanation will gain currency, though it will later be rejected by Wyclif (as we shall see) for undermining the signifying power of Christ’s words. Lothario then takes up the manner in which ‘transubstantiation’ occurs, seeing if it entails the bread’s annihilation or its conversion. Here the question is whether one can concede prior to the consecration that the bread ‘will be’ the body of Christ; or whether after consecration what was once bread ‘is’ the body of Christ. For if the bread ‘will not be’ the body of Christ, or anything else, then it will be nothing there. This means it must be annihilated, and thus does not become the body of Christ. Some have sought to avoid the various difficulties which annihilation might entail, and say instead that the bread is changed, or converted, or transubstantiated, or that it passes into the body of Christ, which itself begins to exist in the place of the 92

De sacro altaris mysterio; PL 217; 868c-d: “Sed queritur, quid demonstratur Christus cum dixit: Hoc est corpus meum? Non panem, quia de pane non erat verum, quod corpus ejus existeret, nec corpus, qui nondum illa verba protulerat, ad quorum prolationem panem mutavit in corpus. … Ab hujus ergo quaestionis laqueo facile se absolvit, qui dicit, quod Christus tunc confecit, cum benedixit. Nam si opponatur de sacerdote qui tunc consecrat, cum illa verba pronuntiat, respondetur, quod sacerdos nihil demonstrat, cum illis verbis non utatur enuntiative, sed recitative. Quemadmodum et Christus ait: Ego sum vitis vera; ego sum lux mundi, et innumera talia.” Ibid., 859b: “Sane dici potest, quod Christus virtute divina confecit, et postea formam expressit, sub qua posteri benedicerent. Ipse namque per se virtute propria benedixit. Nos autem ex illa virtute quam indidit verbis.”


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bread under the same accidents. With recourse to basic grammatical rules, these people claim the process is similar to the letter ‘a’ being changed into an ‘e’ when the past tense ‘egi’ is formed from the present ‘ago.’93 The essence of the bread is truly changed into the substance of the body of Christ; yet it is not reduced to nothing simply because it ceases to be what it was. Rather, it is changed into something else. And here, like Hugh of St Victor, he notes that this is conversion by way of transition, not union, since it is not a matter of one essence being added to another.94 Conversion by way of transition rather than union would seem to reject consubstantiation, therefore, as well as annihilation. He goes on to clarify this position, distinguishing it from the hypostatic union of the Incarnation. The difference here, says Lothario, is that when the Word became flesh he remained what he was, for he assumed flesh; he did not pass into it. In the case of the Eucharist the situation is just the opposite, since the bread becomes flesh as it ceases to be what it was and passes into flesh.95 And with respect to the accidents, he states that following consecration the accidents of the bread and wine are present without a subject, existing per se, their proper subject having passed away. Employing the term ‘forma’ for outward appearance, he says: “Just as the substance of the body is present where the form of the body is not seen, so then the form of the bread is seen where the substance of the bread is not present. … We say therefore that the form of the bread is broken and 93

Ibid., 870a-c: “Queritur autem, utrum ante consecrationem ait concedendum, panis erit corpus Christi, vel post conscerationem, id quod panis fuit, est corpus Christi. … Nam etsi panis nec erit corpus Christi, nec aliud, panis ibi nihil erit, et ita panis annihilatur, ergo nec fit corpus Christi, nec aliud. … non desunt qui dicunt, quod ea ratione dicitur panis mutari, vel converteri seu transsubstantiari, sive transire in corpus Christi, quod corpus Christi sub eisdem accidentibus loco panis incipit esse, sicut dicitur a grammaticis, quod a mutatur in e, cum a praesenti formatur praeterium ago egi, quia in loco hujus litterae a ponitur haec littera e.” 94 Ibid., 870d: “Quidam autem expresse dixerunt, quod ipsa panis essentia vere mutatur in corporis Christi substantiam nec redigitur panis in nihilum, quia desinit esse quod fuit, sed mutatur in aliud, quod iam incipit esse quod non fuit. Fit autem ipsa conversio non secundum unionem sed secundum transitionem, quia nequaquam essentia essentiae accedit in augmentium.” 95 Ibid., 871c-d: “Nam verbum manens quod ita erat factum est caro, quod carnem assumpsit non transivit in carnem, sed panis desinens esse quod erat ita fit caro, quod transit in carnem, non assumptum carnem.”

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crushed, while Christ’s body is received and eaten.”96 And in opposition to those who reduce this miracle to a matter of metaphorical speech, he replies: “The Truth said this, and therefore what he said is altogether true. What had been bread when he accepted it, was his body when he gave it. The bread had been changed into his own body and similarly the wine into blood. It is not as the heretic imagines, though he does so foolishly, that one should think that when the Lord said: ‘Hoc est corpus meum,’ he meant ‘this signifies my body,’ just as when the Apostle says ‘Petra autem erat Christus,’ this means ‘the rock signified Christ.’ … For just as the body of Christ is truthfully given so it was truly being demonstrated, not in the figure which had at this point ceased, but in truth which had now arrived.”97 Once more, Christ, the Truth, is invoked as the authority whereby the words find their absolute validity. In the Cum Marthae decretal of 1202, Pope Innocent III writes to the Archbishop of Lyons in response to a question regarding “the form of the words which Christ himself spoke when he transubstantiated the bread and wine into his body and blood,” for the canon of the Mass uses words not found in the Gospels.98 Innocent’s response is notable on a number of counts. First of all, he points out that the Church rightly accepts many things regarding the words and deeds of Christ that are not to be found in the Four Gospels, and yet have been supplied by the apostles, whether in the Pauline epistles or the Acts of 96

Ibid., 862b-c: “Sed post consecrationem accidens est sine subjecto, quoniam existit per se, transit enim substantia, sed remanent accidentia. … Sicut enim ibi substantia corporis est ubi forma corporis non videtur, sic ibi forma panis videtur, ubi substantia panis non est. … Dicimus ergo quod forma panis frangitur et atteritur, sed [corpus] Christi sumiter et comeditur.” 97 Ibid., 860a-b: “Veritas hoc dixit, et ideo verum est omnino quod dixit. Quod ergo panis fuerat cum accepit, corpus suum erat cum dedit. Panis itaque mutatus erat in corpus ipsius, et similiter vinum in sanguinem. Non enim ut haereticos sapit, sed desipit, ita debet intellegi, quod Dominus ait: Hoc est corpus meum, id est signat corpus meum, sicut quod dicit Apostolus: Petra autem erat Christus id est petra significabat Christum (I Cor. X). … Sicut ergo corpus Christi veraciter tradetur, ita vere demonstrabatur, non in figura quae jam cessaverat, sed in veritate quae jam advenerat.” 98 Decr. Greg. IX, L. III, t. 41, c. 6; Friedberg 2:637: “Quesivisiti siquidem, quis formae verborum, quam ipse Christus expressit, quum in corpus et sanguinem suum panem transsubstantiavit et vinum, illud in canone missae, quo ecclesia utitur generalis, adiecerit, quod nullus Evangelistarum legitur expressisse.”


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the Apostles. And what is more, the Gospel narratives themselves vary, as one may supply what is omitted in the others.99 Innocent then goes on to note that there are those who claim that “the truth of the body and blood of Christ is not present in the sacrament of the altar, but only an imago.” These people, however, have fallen into such an error because they neither understand the authorities of Scripture, nor reverently acknowledge the sacraments of God. Yet just because the sacrament of the altar is a figura does not negate its truth. For by that line of thinking, he notes in a vein reminiscent of Hugh, neither the death nor the resurrection of Christ should be believed as truth, since they too are figures, presenting examples of how one must die to sin and live in righteousness.100 This sacrament is reckoned a “mysterium fidei” precisely because the species of the bread and wine are outwardly perceived, while “the truth of Christ’s flesh and blood is believed, and so too the power of unity and charity.” Innocent then explains the threefold nature of the Eucharist in keeping with the commonly accepted division: there is the visible form consisting of the bread and wine; the truth of the flesh and blood; and the power of unity and charity. Thus the first is the sacramentum et non res; the second is the sacramentum et res; and the third is the res et non sacramentum.101 Also of note is his discussion of the question whether the water with the wine is converted into the blood, noting that on this point the 99

Ibid., 637: “Sane multa tam de verbis quam de factis dominicis invenimus ab Evangelistis omissa, quae Apostoli vel supplevissse verbo, vel facto expressisse leguntur. … Ipsi etiam Evangelistae mutuo inter se supplevisse leguntur quae ab eorum aliquo vel aliquibus sunt omissa.” 100 Ibid., 638: “… dicentes, in sacramento altaris non esse corporis Christi et sanguinis veritatem, sed imaginem tantum … Sed tales ex eo laqueum erroris incurrunt, quod nec auctoritates scripturae convenienter intelligunt, nec sacramenta Dei suscipiunt reverenter, scripturas et virtutem Dei pariter nescientes. Si enim ideo, quia figura est sacramentum altaris, veritas esse negatur, ergo nec mors, nec resurrectio Christi, quum figura sit, veritas est credenda, siquidem mortem et resurrectionem Christi similitudinem et imaginem esse Apostolus manifestat … Si ergo tam mors Christi quam eius resurrectio est exemplum, ut et nos, peccato mortui, iustitiae iam vivamus.” 101 Ibid., 638: “Dicitur tamen mysterium fidei, quoniam et aliud ibi creditur quam cernatur, et aliud cernitur, quam credatur. Cernitur enim species panis et vini, et creditur veritas carnis et sanguinis Christi, ac virtus unitatis et caritatis. … Forma est panis et vini, veritas carnis et sanguinis, virtus unitatis et caritatis. Primum est sacramentum et non res. Secundum est sacramentum et res. Tertium est res et non sacramentum.”

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“scholastics” are divided. Of the various “opinions” canvassed, Innocent reckons as “more probable” the one which asserts that “the water together with the wine is transmuted into the blood, since this more clearly manifests the properties of the sacrament.”102 Here then we have the pope, himself quite a capable theologian, instructing his subordinate on some of the fine points of eucharistic theology according to the most recent formulations produced by the schools. To be sure, the real presence must be protected against any heretical assertions which would reduce it to no more than an image, and thus a memorial of sorts. But the precise nature of the eucharistic transformation is not posited here as a matter of faith, as Innocent simply offers what he considers to be some of the better explanations currently circulating among the schoolmen. Notwithstanding that, just three decades later this theology lesson will be codified, thus becoming a legal matter to be studied by future decretalists and used to establish and enforce law. In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council, convened by Innocent III, established the first official use of the term ‘transubstantiation,’ here used as a perfect passive participle. This, the greatest of all the medieval councils, passed a series of measures designed both to promote pastoral care and lay piety, and to solidify matters of doctrine in the face the Cathar and Waldensian threats. It is a matter of supreme significance in the history of medieval eucharistic theology that the Council’s declaration of the true faith of the Catholic Church was so quickly incorporated into canon law, and indeed became the opening document of Gregory IX’s Liber extra, compiled by Raymond of Penafort and published in 1234. The opening chapter, Firmiter, confesses the Church’s belief in the one triune God: Three Persons, but one substance.103 It then proceeds to say: “There is truly one universal Church of the faithful, outside of which nobody at all is 102

Ibid., 638-39: “Quaesivisti etiam, utrum aqua cum vino in sanguinem convertatur. Super hoc autem opiniones apud scholasticos variantur. … Verum inter opiniones praedictas illa probabilior iudicatur, quae asserit, aquam cum vino in sanguinem transmutari, ut expressius eluceat proprietas sacramenti.” 103 Decr. Greg. IX, L. I, t. 1, c. 1; Friedberg 2:5: “Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus, aeternus, immensus, et incommutabilis, incomprehensibilis, omnipotens et ineffabilis, Pater, et Filius et Spiritus sanctus: tres quidem personae, sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino.”


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saved, in which Jesus Christ himself is both priest and sacrifice, whose body and blood in the sacrament of the altar, under the species of the bread and wine are truly contained, having been transubstantiated, the bread into the body and the wine into the blood by divine power, so that in order to perfect the mystery of unity we receive from him what he accepted from us. And nobody can confect this sacrament unless he is a priest who has been duly ordained in accordance with the keys of the Church which Jesus Christ himself granted to the Apostles and to their successors.”104 Transubstantiation, a term which had only been in existence for some seventy years, and still open to multiple interpretations, is employed by the Council for the sole purpose of defending the real presence of Christ, the Savior and Head of the Church. In fact, the Eucharist itself, let alone the manner of conversion, is but one part of a general affirmation of fundamental Catholic trinitarianism, christology and ecclesiology. The decree goes on to confirm the efficacy of Baptism properly performed according to the sanctioned formula of the Church, as well as the efficacy of penance for those who subsequently sin. And it closes with the proclamation of salvation for all those who persevere in true faith and good works. That this chapter, Firmiter, would later be viewed as sanctioning one particular scholastic explanation of real presence to the exclusion of all others is surely one of the most remarkable turns in the history of dogma. One might note here that the Council’s use of the terms ‘essentia, substantia, and natura’ when speaking of the Trinity would seem to preclude any materialism being attached to the notion of substance. And yet, as Jorissen has demonstrated, not only was there no consensus regarding the category of substance at the time of the Fourth Lateran Council, there was not even any agreement regarding the precise meaning of transubstantiation. In fact, three theories of real 104

Ibid., 5: “Una vero est fidelium universalis ecclesia, extra quam nullus omnino salvatur, in qua idem ipse sacerdos est sacrificium Iesus Christus, cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continentur, transsubstantiatis pane in corpus, et vino in sanguinem potestate divina, ut ad perficiendum mysterium unitatis accipiamus ipsi de suo quod accepit ipse de nostro. Et hoc utique sacramentum nemo potest conficere, nisi sacerdos, qui rite fuerit ordinatus, secundum claves ecclesiae, quas ipse concessit Apostolis eorumque successoribus Iesus Christus.”

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presence existed: consubstantiation, namely that the substance of the bread remains together with the substance of Christ’s body; the annihilation/succession theory whereby the substance of the bread is annihilated and succeeded by the substance of Christ’s body; and transubstantiation taken to mean a conversion whereby the bread’s substance changes into the substance of Christ’s body. One will note that last category of ‘transubstantiation’ entails an inner nexus for the true change, rather than the exterior relationship of the annihilation/ succession theory, inasmuch as the substance of the bread is not reduced to nothing only to be replaced, but instead passes into something else (Jorissen, 24-25). That all three explanations could exist side by side without raising the specter of heterodoxy is evinced by the Parisian Master, Peter of Capua, who in 1201-02, was free to reckon all three orthodox, while preferring the last. In fact, he makes the point that it is not an article of faith (articulus fidei) to believe in one particular theory of conversion, but only to believe that the body of Christ is present on the altar following the consecration. He writes: “There are three opinions regarding the conversion. Some say that there is no change there, for while the substance of the bread and the substance of the wine remain, at the pronouncement of the those words the flesh and blood of Christ begin to exist under the same species, though there had been nothing there earlier except for the substance of the bread and wine. And wherever one reads something regarding conversion it should be so understood that where there was once only bread and wine, the flesh and blood of Christ also begins to exist. Other people say that the substance of the bread and wine are completely annihilated, and while their species do remain, only the flesh and blood of Christ begin to exist there. And they explain that conversion in a similar manner. Yet we say, and the expositors thus assert, that the very substance of the bread is converted into the true flesh of Christ which he assumed from the Virgin, and the substance of the wine into the true blood. For although the prior species do remain, the flesh and blood of Christ begin to exist there. It is not an article of faith to believe that the conversion takes place in one way or another. One must only believe that at the pronouncement of those


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words the body of Christ is present upon the altar.”105 And in 1240 William of Auvergne said it is enough to believe that the bread of life is placed before us under the form of material and visible bread.106 Thus, as McCue points out, while thinkers such as Alan of Lille and Balduin of Ford did consider transubstantiation to be an article of faith, this was only conceived broadly in opposition to a complete lack of real presence. Balduin is content to affirm a substantial conversion, while leaving the technical aspects unexplained. He does not address the question as to whether real presence and transubstantiation are necessarily connected, that is, whether real presence could be achieved apart from substantial conversion of the bread. He is quite content to admit the incomprehensibility of this miraculous substantial change.107

5 Canon Law and the Decretum As a point of order it must be remembered that respected as the Decretum Gratiani was in the Middle Ages, and however much it served the process of papal legislation, this remained a private collec105

Text quoted in Jorissen, 24: “De conversione triplex est opinio. Quidam dicunt quod non est ibi aliqua mutatio, sed remanente substantia panis et substantia vini ad prolationem illorum verborum incipit sub eisdem speciebus esse caro et sanguis Christi, cum prius non esset ibi nisi substantia panis et vini, et ubicumque legitur aliquid de conversione, sic intellegitur: ubi prius erat tantum panis et vinum, incipit esse etiam caro Christi et sanguis. Alii dicunt quod substantia panis et vini penitus adnihilatur et manentibus speciebus eisdem incipit ibi esse sola caro et sanguis Christi, et simili modo exponunt conversionem illam. Nos dicimus et expositores hoc asserunt, quod ipsa substantia panis convertitur in carnem Christi veram traxat de Virgine, et substatntia vini in verum sanguinem, et manentibus prioribus speciebus incipit ibi esse caro et sanguis Christi. Nec est articulus fidei credere quod sic vel sic fiat illa conversio, sed tantummodo credere quod corpus Christi ad prolationem illorum verborum sit in altari.” 106 Text quoted in Macy 1999a, 107: “Sufficit enim ad pietatem fidei, quam hic intendimus stabilire, credere, et tenere, quod sub forma panis materialis atque visibilis, in altari post benedictionem sacerdotalem rite factam apponitur panis vitae, et sub forma vini visibilis, potus vitae.” Cf. Macy ibid., 82-84. 107 Liber de sacramento altaris, PL 204; 679: “Simpliciter ergo et confidenter, firmiter et constanter, teneamus, credamus, et confiteamur, quod substantia panis, in substantiam carnis Christi mutatur, manente tamen species panis, mirabiliter, et ineffabaliter, et incomprehensibiliter.” Cf. McCue, 91-92.

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tion with no universal force of law. Thus while the Decretum was complete by c. 1142, one must wait until 1234 for the first official publication of canon law when Gregory IX issued the Decretales Gregorii IX, or Liber extra (Van de Wiel, 100-108). Consisting mainly of papal decretals issued since the time of Innocent III, but also containing short excerpts from the Church Fathers, all of these entries now bore the force of law. Fundamental to this collection was the notion that the papacy was the authoritative source in all matters pertaining to the welfare of the Christian society. Like Justinian’s Code, the first decretal of the Liber extra presents a statement of faith as a matter of law (Ullmann, 142-43). This is especially noteworthy when considering Wyclif, for he was quite conversant with the Decretum and fond of appealing to it in support of his own positions. It was the Decretales that he often found so objectionable, with its exalted view of the papacy as the source and arbiter of Christian law. Indeed, at the outset the Liber extra codifies the pronouncements of the very pope Wyclif took to be the epitome of the prelatical quest for temporal dominion, the very pope he blamed for introducing the blasphemy of transubstantiation into the Church. By 1234, Firmiter and Cum Marthae were a matter of law; the question remains as to which aspects of these decretals were ever meant to be counted as authoritative and binding. While the Liber extra possessed the force of law that the Decretum did not, the Decretum was widely respected and consulted for the purposes of forming legislation and settling cases. Winroth has recently argued that the Decretum in its current form is actually a second, larger recension which incorporated Gratian’s earlier work. The upshot of this is that many parts, including the De consecratione section, did not belong to the original version, and are not the work of Gratian at all (Winroth, 1-8). Notwithstanding the dispute as to whether Gratian is personally responsible for De consecratione, Van Engen points out that until the publication of Lombard’s Sententiae c. 1155, it was the De consecratione which served as a complete and traditional explanation of the sacraments. Thus, in the wake of the Berengarian controversy, it could supply theologians with many pertinent texts on the Eucharist. In this third main section the dialectical method previously employed is set aside, with no dicta


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which might attempt to reconcile the discordant canons (Van Engen 1985, 311-12; Winroth, 12). Prescinding from the matter of authorship, this latter point is noteworthy precisely because it highlights the fact that as a question of law, the Eucharist receives none of the fine definition offered in the first two parts of the Decretum. Van Engen believes that Gratian did indeed author De consecratione; but whether he did or did not, his further point is well taken, namely that there is a reluctance in this section to offer strong opinions on matters of sacramental theology. The focus is instead on the truth of the sacraments and their proper administration within the institutional Church (Van Engen 1985, 319-20). Southern, who also regards De consecratione as the work of Gratian, notes Lombard’s indebtedness to this section. But in keeping with their distinctive tasks, Lombard is more interested in doctrine, while Gratian is concerned primarily with proper behavior (Southern 1995, 289-90). Indeed, it does seem that for the editor of De consecratione (whether Gratian or not) as long as the fundamental sanctity and efficacy of the Eucharist is maintained that is sufficient. One finds here a series of texts lined up to affirm one central fact: what the communicant receives may look like bread and wine, but it is in truth the body and blood of Christ. Just how this is possible, and the permissible explanations of this phenomenon, are questions that were not seen to merit detailed analysis in what was designed to be of a book of Church law, not scholastic theology. Distinction II of De consecratione offers a collection of texts concerning eucharistic theology excerpted from papal letters, conciliar decisions, and theological tracts. One must bear in mind throughout, however, that some very significant texts attributed to the Church Fathers are actually the writings of much later theologians such as Paschasius Radbertus, Lanfranc of Bec and Alger of Liège. Distinction II begins with matters of proper administration and reception before taking up the question of eucharistic presence. Though we will not attempt to offer an exhaustive analysis, it is still worth while to touch on some of the canons, with special attention paid to their rubrics. For the rubrics often function as short glosses on the canons they introduce, though it must also be noted that rubrics can vary from edition to edition. Canon 32, in addition to a quote from Augustine, actually provides Berengar’s definition of a sacrament as a “visible form of

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invisible grace,” even as it too is attributed to Augustine.108 And Canon 33 provides the definition of a sign taken from Augustine’s De doctrina christiana, namely that which impresses itself upon the senses for the sake of bringing something else to mind.109 From there, one reads the rubric for Canon 34: “After consecration it is not the substance, but the species which remain.” The thrust of the canon is that the species of the bread and wine which were once there may be seen, though it is the body of Christ which is grasped by faith under such appearances.110 Yet the text of this canon, while attributed to Gregory, is really the work of Lanfranc. And this is illustrative of the manner in which rather recent theological positions could be imbued with the inherent grandeur of antiquity, which the medievals instinctively viewed as authoritative. The rubric for Canon 35 reads: “The visible things of creation are invisibly converted into the body and blood of Christ,” while the canon states that the unique and perfect sacrificial body of Christ is grasped interiorly by faith and not according to outward appearances.111 The canons which follow likewise affirm the real presence of Christ’s body and blood under the appearance of bread and wine, with little if any clarification of just how this takes place. The point is simply that faith grasps the truth which is not otherwise apparent to the senses. Canon 42 is none other than the 1059 confession, Ego Berengarius, with its overwhelmingly sensual language. The following fifty-five canons address the questions of appearance and reality, but with nothing like the precision one encounters by the middle of the thirteenth century. Canon 43 answers the question, “Why the species of the elements are preserved, since this is truly the body and blood of 108

Dec. III, De Cons., d. 2, c. 32; Friedberg 1:1324: “Sacrificium est uisibile sacramentum, id est sacrum signum. Item alibi: Sacramentum est inuisibilis gratiae uisiblis forma.” Cf. Augustine, De civ. Dei X, 5; CCSL 47; 277. 109 Ibid., c. 33; 1:1324. “Signum est res preter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cognitionem uenire.” Cf. Augustine, De Doc. Chr. II, 1; CCSL 32; 32. 110 Ibid., c. 34; 1:1325: “Postulat quippe sacerdos, ut corpus Christi, quod sub specie panis et uini nunc geritur, manifesta visione, sicuti reuera est, quandoque capiatur.” Cf. Lanfranc, PL 150; 436b; and Alger, PL 180; 753a. 111 Ibid., c. 35; 1:1325: “Visibilies creaturae in Christi corpus et sanguinem inuisibiliter conuertuntur. … et semper praesens esset in gratia uere unica et perfecta hostia, fide estimanda, non specie, nec exteriori censenda uisu, sed interiori affectu.” Cf. Eusebius Gallicanus, Homilia XVII, 2; CCSL 101; 196; and Alger, PL 180; 754a.


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Christ.” The answer given is classic: lest people would recoil from the awesome prospect of eating Christ’s body, or be horrified at the sight of his blood, the sacrament is accepted in similitudine, while the glory of his nature is truly received.112 The rubric for Canon 44 states that, “We should not receive the body and blood of Christ carnally, but spiritually.” In fact, the text of the canon stands in stark contrast to Canon 42, Ego Berengarius, and there is no dictum to reconcile them. Relying primarily on Augustine, in addition to Alger, the canon explains Christ’s ‘hard saying’ of eating his body and drinking his blood (Jn 6:54) by pointing out that he is speaking spiritually. For the disciples will not eat the body they see, that is, the one that will be crucified. Instead, Christ offers to them a sacrament which, spiritually understood, will bring them life. When he tells them that ‘the flesh profiteth nothing’ he is correcting their understanding of the flesh as the sort one would find in the market. Thus while the Lord ascends into heaven it is still true that he is among the faithful. The body in which he was resurrected is only in one place, but its truth is everywhere.113 Canon 45 considers just “how the body of Christ which hung upon the cross is received and how it is not.” Again, the disciples are not going to eat the body which they see, nor drink the blood that will pour out from Christ on the cross. It is the body and yet not the body; in other words, the body invisibly, not visibly, just as the sacrament is celebrated visibly but understood invisibly.114 112

Ibid., c. 43; 1:1329: “Quare elementum species reseruentur, cum uere sit Christi corpus et sanguis. … Ne igitur plures hoc dicerent, et ne ueluti quidam esset horror cruoris, sed maneret gratia redemptionis, ideo in similitudine quidem accipis sacramentum , sed uere naturae gloriam uirtutemque consequeris.” Cf. Lanfranc, PL 150; 432c. 113 Ibid., c. 44; 1:1330: “Non carnaliter, sed spiritualiter Christi corpus et sanguinem debemus accipere. … Spiritus est, inquit, qui uiuificat; caro nichil prodest. Verba, que locutus sum ad uos, spiritus et uita sunt. … Spiritualiter intelligite que locutus sum. Non hoc corpus, quod uidetis, manducaturi estis, et bibituri illum sanguinem, quem fusuri sunt qui me crucifigent. Sacramentum, aliquod uobis commendaui: spiritualiter intellectum uiuificabit uos: caro autem non prodest quicquam. Sed quomodo illi intellexerunt? Carnem quippe sic intellexerunt, quomodo in cadauere uenditur, aut in macello dilaniatur. … Donec seculum finiatur, sursum est Dominus; sed tamen etiam hic nobiscum est ueritas Dominus. Corpus enim, in quo resurrexit, uno loco esse oportet; ueritas autem eius ubique diffusa est.” Cf. Augustine, Tract. in Ioh. XXVII, 5; CCSL 36; 272; and Alger, PL 180; 773a. 114 Ibid., c. 45; 1:1330-31: “Quomodo Christi corpus, quod in cruce pependit, accipitur, et quomodo non. Non hoc corpus, quod uidetis, manducaturi estis, et bibituri

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Canon 47, with the rubric: “To believe in Christ is to eat him,” offers Augustine’s classic remark: “Why do you prepare your teeth and stomach? Believe, and you have eaten.”115 Here then is a canon that, if cited by itself, could easily be read as an affirmation of Berengarian theology. And yet the canon which immediately follows, while attributed to Augustine actually belongs to Lanfranc: the flesh and blood are received in a sacrament under sensible species. And yet the flesh is a sacrament of flesh, and blood of blood, inasmuch as the invisible, spiritual body and blood signify Christ’s visible, palpable body that was suspended upon the cross.116 The lengthy canon 72, with the rubric: “The sacrament is celebrated not only under a figure, but also in the truth of the Lord’s body and blood,” while attributed to Augustine, is compiled from Paschasius Radbertus and Alger of Liège. The body of Christ is both truth and figure; truth inasmuch as the body of Christ is rendered through the power of the Spirit, and figure with reference to what is exteriorly perceived.117 The rubric for canon 74 states that, “Although after the consecration the figure of the bread and wine remain, there is nevertheless nothing there except the body and blood of Christ.” The text which follows contains material from Ambrose as well as Paschasius Radbertus. As we have seen, Ambrose did argue that the appearance of the bread will remain even illum sanguinem, quem effusuri sunt illi, qui me crucifigent; ipsum quidem, et non ipsum, ipsum inuisibiliter, non ipsum uisibiliter. Unde et subditur: Si necesse est, illud celebrari uisibiliter, necesse tamen est, inuisibiliter intelligi.” Cf. Augustine, Enarr. in Psalmos XCVIII, 9; CCSL 39; 1386. Cf. also Lanfranc, PL 150; 433c; Alger, PL 180; 769c; Ivo of Chartres, PL 161; 156b. 115 Ibid., c. 47; 1:1331: “Credere in Christum est manducare ipsum. Ut quid paras dentem et ventrem? Crede, et manducasti.” Cf. Augustine, Tract. in Ioh. XXV, 12; CCSL 36; 254. 116 Ibid., c. 48; 1:1331-32: “Caro eius est, quam forma panis opertam in sacramento accipimus, et sanguis eius, quem sub uini specie ac sapore potamus. Caro uidelicet carnis, et sanguis sacramentum sanguinis; carne et sanguine, utroque inuisibili, spirituali, intelligibili, significatur corpus uisibile Christi Domini nostri Iesu Christi, et palpabile, plenum gratia omnium uirtutum, diuina maiestate.” Cf. Lanfranc, PL 150; 421b-c, 425a. 117 Ibid., c. 72; 1:1342: “Non solum sub figura, sed etiam in ueritate dominici corporis et sanguinis sacramentum celebratur. … Corpus Christi et ueritas et figura est: ueritas dum corpus Christi et sanguis uirtute Spiritus in uirtute ipsius ex panis uinique substantia efficitur; figura uero est id, quod exterius sentitur.” Cf. Radbertus, CCCM 16; 28-30; and Alger, PL 180; 751c.


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though the body of Christ is present. He did not, as this canon does not, explain the process. The second part of the canon goes on to affirm that as Christ is the one ‘living bread’ given ‘for the life of the world,’ so this is the one body born of the Virgin, crucified and resurrected, and sitting at the right hand of the Father.118 Taken as they stand, these canons are not so much contradictory as they are obscure. The first question one might ask is what is exactly meant by verus and veritas; or corporalis and spiritualis. They likely meant different things to the different authors from whom these quotations are taken. But what do they mean to whomever compiled De consecratione? What do they mean as a point of law? Of course, the theoretical definition brought to bear on juridical matters is lacking here, as we have noted. There are no dicta to provide clues as to how these canons might be reconciled, nor even an acknowledgement that they might need to be reconciled. But then, as we have also noted, theological exposition was really not the point of De consecratione. That would soon arrive in Lombard’s Sententiae. And yet, when doctrine and law do intersect as they must in the later medieval Church, reference to the Decretum in matters of eucharistic theology will prove tricky business. By 1166, commentaries on the De consecratione section of the Decretum were appearing. In the thirteenth-century glossa ordinaria three “opinions” regarding real presence are discussed. The first simply states that what was bread before consecration is Christ’s body afterwards. The second is the annihilation/succession theory, and the third consubstantiation. And though the glossator prefers the second because he thinks it is in keeping with the decree of Lateran IV, none are condemned as heretical since they all maintain real presence.119 118

Ibid., c. 74; 1:1344-45: “Post consecrationem licet figura panis et uini remaneant, tamen nichil est ibi, nisi corpus et sanguis Christi. … unde ipse ait: ‘Ego sum panis uiuus, qui de celo descendi,’ et idem: ‘Panis, quem ego dabo, caro mea est, pro mundi uita.’ … sed unus panis est una caro, proculdubio unum corpus efficitur; illud uere, illud sane, quod sumptum est de Virgine, … et sedet ad dexteram Dei patris …” Cf. Radbertus, CCCM 16; 15; and Ambrose, De Sacr. IV, 22-23, 85. 119 Text quoted in Macy 1999a, 112: “De eo tamen quod dicitur quod panis convertitur in corpus Christi variae sunt opiniones. Una asserit quod illa substantia quae fuit panis primo postea est caro at sanguis Christi; argumentum infra eadem. panis est in altari [de consecratione, II, c. 55] etc. quia corpus [c. 35]. Secundum opinio tenet quod substantia panis et vini ibi desinit esse et remanent

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6 Thomas Aquinas Taking up the differentiation between truth and figure, Aquinas notes that while the sacrifices of the Old Law contained the true sacrifice of Christ’s passion only in figure, the sacrifice of the New Law instituted by Christ, “contains the suffering Christ, not only by way of signification or figure, but in the truth of the thing itself. And therefore this sacrament really contains Christ himself.”120 As he says in his commentary on 1 Corinthians: “In the sacrament of Baptism, by which Christ regenerates unto salvation, Christ himself is not present according to his substance, but only according to his power (virtus). But in the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is spiritual nourishment, Christ is present according to his substance.”121 The heretics imagine that Christ is only present in this sacrament as in a sign, though this contradicts Christ’s own words. Aquinas reckons that Berengar was the first to invent this error, though notes that he later recanted and confessed the true faith.122 Christ’s presence is not perceptible to the senses, says Aquinas, but to faith alone trusting in divine authority. One must not doubt the words of the Savior who offered up his body, accidentia tantum, scilicet sapor, color, pondus, et similia, et sub illis accidentibus incipit ibi esse corpus Christi. Tertia tenet quod remanet ibi substantia panis et vini et in eodem loco et sub specie est corpus Christi. argumentum infra eadem ego [c. 42] Quelibet tamen opinio fatetur ibi esse corpus Christi. Secunda opinio verior est, ut extra de summa, trinitate, firmiter …” Cf. Macy ibid., 92-94. 120 ST III, q. 75, a. 1; 496: “Sacrificia enim veteris legis illud verum sacrificium passionis Christi continebant solum in figura: secundum illud Heb. 10, (1): Umbram habens lex futurorum bonorum, non ipsum rerum imaginem. Et ideo oportuit ut aliquid plus haberet sacrificium novae legis a Christo institutum, ut scilicet contineret ipsum Christum passum, non solum in significatione vel figura, sed etiam in rei veritate. Et ideo hoc sacramentum, quod ipsum Christum realiter continet …” 121 In Epist. ad Cor. I, XI, 729: “Unde in sacramento baptismi, quo Christus regenerat ad salutem, non est ipse Christus secundum suam substantiam, sed solum suam virtutem. Sed in sacramento eucharistiae, quod est spirituale alimentum, Christus est secundum suam substantiam.” 122 ST III, q. 75, a. 1; 496: “Quae quidem non attendentes, posuerunt corpus et sanguinem Christi non esse in hoc sacramento nisi sicut in signo. Quod est tanquam haereticum abiiciendum, utpote verbis Christi contrarium. Unde et Berengarius, qui primus inventor huius error fuerat, postea coactus est suum errorem revocare, et veritatem fidei confiteri.”


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for he is the Truth who does not lie.123 So again, there is the appeal to the authority of Christ, the unimpeachable Author. But while affirming that Christ’s body is present in the Eucharist, he says it is not present as a body would be in a place, such that its dimensions are commensurate with that place. Rather, it is present in a special manner which is unique to this sacrament. Thus while the body is truly present upon different altars it is not present as it would be in different places, but rather “as in a sacrament.”124 For Aquinas, only transubstantiation, defined as the conversion of one substance into another, can properly account for Christ’s presence. The substantial remnance of the bread along with Christ’s body, namely consubstantiation, is reckoned incompatible with the possibility of real presence, for he thinks this would undermine the very truth of this sacrament, which depends upon the unique existence of Christ’s true body.125 Moreover, Aquinas considers it axiomatic that, “something cannot begin to exist somewhere, where it was not earlier, except through a change of place or through the conversion of something else into it.” Local motion is reckoned unacceptable because this implies that Christ’s body would cease to be in heaven, since nothing may arrive at a new place without vacating its earlier location. What is more, this would mean traversing various intermediary places, as well as requiring the local motion of the same body to different places simultaneously. Thus only through the conversion of

123

Ibid., 496: “Respondeo dicendum quod verum corpus Christi et sanguinem esse in hoc sacramento, sensu deprehendi non potest, sed sola fide, quae auctoritati divinae innititur. Unde super Luc 22 [19], Hoc est corpus meum quod pro vobis tradetur, dicit Cyrillius: Non dubites an hoc verum sit, sed potius suscipe verba Salvatoris in fide: cum enim sit veritas, non mentitur.” 124 Ibid., 497: “Ad tertium, dicendum quod corpus Christi non est eo modo in hoc sacramento sicut corpus in loco, quod suis dimensionibus loco commensuratur: sed quodam speciali modo qui est proprius huic sacramento. Unde dicimus quod corpus Christi est in diversis altaribus, non sicut in diversis locis, sed sicut in sacramento.” 125 ST III, q. 75, a. 2; 497: “Respondeo dicendum quod quidam poserunt post consecrationem substantiam panis et vini in hoc sacramento remanere. Sed haec positio stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia per hanc positionem tollitur veritas huius sacramenti, ad quam pertinet ut verum corpus Christi in hoc sacramento existat.”

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the bread’s substance into the body does Christ begin to be present in the Eucharist.126 As his first objection to consubstantiation makes clear, there is more at stake here for Aquinas than its supposed logistical incongruities. There is the dignity and uniqueness of the Eucharist to consider. One remembers that Berengar defended his position that the eucharistic bread does not undergo a substantial change by appealing to the sacrament of Baptism. He did so based upon the assumption that there exists a uniformity among the sacraments concerning the relationship between signum and res. Just as the water experiences a conversion in dignity, but not in substance, so it is that following consecration the bread assumes a new sacred power of signification apart from any substantial alteration. Well aware of this line of reasoning, Aquinas notes that some people, seeking conformity among the various sacraments, have posited the substantial remnance of the bread just as water remains in Baptism and the oil in confirmation. His response is similar to the remarks in his Corinthians commentary: “In the other sacraments Christ himself is not really present (realiter) as he is in this sacrament. And it is for this reason that the substance of the material element remains in the other sacraments, though not in [the Eucharist].”127 And to those who argue that the bread’s substance must remain in order to symbolize the unity of the Church through that bread made up of many grains, he replies that the remaining accidents will suffice.128 There are even more troubling 126

Ibid., 497: “Quod quidem ibi non est ante consecrationem. Non autem aliquid potest esse alicubi ubi prius non erat, nisi per loci mutationem, vel per alterius conversionem in ipsum. … Manifestum est autem quod corpus Christi non incipit esse in hoc sacramento per motum localem. Primo quidem quia sequeretur quod desineret esse in caelo: non enim quod localiter movetur, pervenit de novo ad aliquem locum, nisi deseret priorem. Secundo, quia omne corpus localiter motum pertransit omnia media; quod hic dici non potest. Tertio, quia impossibile est quod unus motus eiusdem corporis localiter moti terminetur simul ad diversa loca: cum tamen in pluribus locis corpus Christi sub hoc sacramento simul esse incipiat. Et ideo relinquitur quod non possit aliter corpus Christi incipere esse de novo in hoc sacramento nisi per conversionem substantiae panis in ipsum.” 127 Ibid., 498: “Ad secundum dicendum quod in aliis sacramentis non est ipse Christus realiter, sicut in hoc sacramento. Et ideo in sacramentis aliis manet substantia materiae, non autem in isto.” 128 Ibid., 498: “Ad tertium dicendum quod species quae remnant in hoc sacramento, ut infra dicetur, sufficiunt ad significationem huius sacramenti: nam per accidentia cognoscitur ratio substantiae.”


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aspects of consubstantiation, however, which would in fact strike at the very heart of the Eucharist. It would be contrary to the form of this sacrament where it is said, ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’ If the substance of the bread remained the statement itself would not be true, since the substance of the bread cannot be the body of Christ. Indeed, it would more fittingly be said, ‘Hic est corpus meum,’ meaning ‘here is my body.’ Furthermore, this would contradict the proper veneration due this sacrament, since some substance would remain there that cannot receive the full adoration of latria. And if this is not enough, the bread’s substantial remnance would entail breaking the eucharistic fast. All of which leads Aquinas to conclude that consubstantiation is not just erroneous, but is heretical.129 In fact, when commenting on the first two articles of the Liber extra, Aquinas argues that consubstantiation was ruled out by the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council.130 But that this is simply his own belief is evinced by the fact that Henry of Susa, writing in the 1270s, does not even refer to Aquinas’s position as he list the three classic opinions, concluding that it is only heretical to deny the real presence of Christ. Henry personally preferred the annihilation/succession theory, though he refers to it under the general heading of transubstantiation. But he does not condemn those opinions positing either transmutation or consubstantiation.131

129

Ibid., 498: “Secundo, quia haec positio contrariatur formae huius sacramenti, in qua dicitur, Hoc est corpus meum. Quod non esset verum si substantia ibi remaneret: nunquam enim substantia panis est corpus Christi. Sed potius esset dicendum, Hic est corpus meum.” Ibid., 498: “Tertio, quia contrariaretur venerationi huius sacramenti, si aliqua substantia esset ibi quae non posset adorari adoratione latriae.” Ibid., 498: “Quarto, quia contrariaretur ritui Ecclesiae, secundum quem post corporalem cibum non licet sumere corpus Christi: cum tamen post unam hostiam consecratam liceat sumere aliam. Unde haec positio vitanda est tanquam haeretica.” 130 Text quoted in Macy 1999a, 115: “Dicit autem sub speciebus panis et vini ad excludendum errorem quorundam qui dixerunt quod in sacramento altaris simul continetur substantia panis et substantia corporis Christi …” Cf. Macy ibid., 95-96. 131 Macy ibid., 115: “Et quilibet istorum asserunt corpus verum esse in altari. Quarti asserunt in sacramento altaris non esse corporis et sanguinis veritatem. Hoc reprobatur de cel[ebratione] mis[se], cum Marthe [c. 6], quesivisti. Opinio vero secundarum ibi approbatur et hic ut sequitur.” Cf. ibid., 115: “Transubstantiatur Et haec est vera et ita desinit ibi species panis et vini.”

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Having rejected consubstantiation. Aquinas must still contend with the annihilation/succession theory. The bread is not annihilated, nor is it reduced to pre-existent material. The effect of a sacrament is signified by its form, and neither of these theories satisfy that criterion, says Aquinas. For the end term of annihilation is nothingness, while that of conversion is something positive, namely Christ’s body. Annihilation is simply counted as false and not heretical, however, inasmuch as it preserves the unique substantial presence of Christ following consecration.132 Aquinas opts for the ‘conversion’ theory: while it is true that the substance of the bread and wine no longer remain under the species of the bread and wine, nor anywhere else for that matter, this does not mean that they have been annihilated. And while conversion is the only plausible solution as he sees it, he also emphasizes that such a conversion is unlike natural conversions, for it is entirely supernatural, effected by divine power alone.133 Aquinas concludes that, “the whole substance of the bread is converted into the whole substance of Christ’s body. Hence, this conversion is not formal, but substantial. Nor is it included among sorts of natural motion, but it can be called by the proper title of transubstantiation.”134 Aquinas must still tackle the thorny question of just how a body of normal human proportions can be substantially present in many small wafers at one time. On this point he contends that the dimensions of 132

ST III, q. 75, a. 3; 499: “Similiter etiam non est dare unde talis resolutio vel annihilatio in hoc sacramento causetur: cum effectus sacramenti significetur per formam; neutrum autem horum significatur per haec verba formae, Hoc est corpus meum. Unde patet praedictam positionem esse falsam.” 133 Ibid., 499: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia panis et vini, facta consecratione, neque sub speciebus sacramenti manet, neque alibi. Non tamen sequitur annihiletur; convertitur enim in corpus Christi.” ST III, q. 75, a. 4; 500: “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum in hoc sacramento sit verum corpus Christi, nec incipiat ibi esse de novo per motum localem, cum etiam nec corpus Christi sit ibi sicut loco, ut dictis patet: necesse est dicere quod incipiat ibi esse per conversionem substantiae panis in ipsum. Haec tamen conversio non est similis conversionibus naturalibus, sed est omnino supernaturalis, sola Dei virtute effecta.” 134 ST III, q. 75, a. 4; 500: “Et hoc agitur divina virtute in hoc sacramento. Nam tota substantia panis convertitur in totam substantiam corporis Christi. Unde haec conversio non est formalis, sed substantialis. Nec continetur inter species motus naturalis, sed proprio nomine potest dici transubstantiatio.”


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the bread and wine are not converted into the dimensions of Christ’s body. It is instead a conversion of substance into substance. The power of the sacrament makes Christ’s body substantially present, but that power does not make the body’s dimensions present. “Thus it is clear that the body of Christ is present through the mode of substance and not through the mode of quantity. After all, the totality of substance is contained equally in both small and large quantity, as the whole nature of air exists in large or small amounts of air, and the entire human nature exists in a large or small man. So too then is the whole substance of Christ’s body and blood contained in this sacrament following consecration, just as the entire substance of the bread and wine were contained there prior to consecration.”135 Sacramental power does not make the dimensive quantity of the body of Christ present in this sacrament. But this is not say that the substance of Christ’s body is stripped of its quantity or any other accidents. “For by the power of real concomitance the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is present in this sacrament along with all the rest of its accidents.”136 The quantity of Christ’s body will accompany it in this substantial conversion, but will be present in a different way than it naturally exists. Thus Aquinas says, “the substance of Christ’s body is present on the altar, while its dimensive quantity is there concomitantly, and thus accidentally as it were.” The dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is still present, but not according to its proper mode of existence, which would require circumscriptive 135

ST III, q. 76, a. 1; 507: “Ex quo patet quod dimensiones panis vel vini non convertuntur in dimensiones corporis Christi, sed substantia in substantiam. Et sic substantia corporis Christi vel sanguinis est in hoc sacramento ex vi sacramenti, non autem dimensiones corporis vel sanguinis Christi. Unde patet quod corpus Christi est in hoc sacramento per modum substantiae, et non per modum quantitatis. Propria autem totalitas substantiae continetur indifferenter in parva vel magna quantitate: sicut tota natura aeris in magno vel parvo aere, et tota natura hominis in magno vel parvo homine. Unde et tota substantia corporis et sanguinis Christi continetur in hoc sacramento post consecrationem, sicut ante consecrationem continebatur ibi tota substantia panis et vini.” 136 ST III, q. 76, a. 4; 509: “Ex vi quidem sacramenti quantitas dimensiva corporis Christi non est in hoc sacramento. … Quia tamen substantia corporis Christi realiter non denudatur a sua quantitate dimensiva et ab aliis accidentibus, inde est quod ex vi realis concomitantiae est in hoc sacramento tota quantitas dimensiva corporis Christi, et omnia accidentia eius.”

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presence. Instead, it is present in the manner of a substance, whose proper manner of presence is definitive, whole to whole, and whole to every part. Yet while the body’s dimensive quantity is only present concomitantly, the dimsensive quantity of the bread is present according to its proper mode, and thus according to commensuration, which is itself proper to quantity.137 One recalls that among the propositions condemned in 1277 were those which claimed that not even God could cause accidents to exist apart from their subjects. Aquinas is well aware of Aristotle’s restriction, and thus turns to divine power as the means to accomplish this feat in the Eucharist. Because the effect depends more upon the first cause than the second, it stands to reason that God, who is the first cause of substance and accidents, can by his infinite power preserve the accidents while subtracting the substance. Indeed, he has rendered many other effects apart from their natural causes, such as with the Virgin Birth.138 That being established, Aquinas must provide a reasonable explanation as to how this would actually take place. He proposes that the dimensive quantity of the bread functions as the subject for the bread’s remaining accidents. While quantity is itself an accident, it is the second of the categories and the accident nearest to substance. Quantity differs from other accidents insofar as it serves a greater function, making possible the extension of qualities. Because the other accidents were previously individuated by dimensive quan137

Ibid., 509: “Quia igitur ex vi huius sacramenti est in altari substantia corporis Christi, quantitas autem dimensiva eius est ibi comcomitanter et quasi per accidens; ideo quantitas dimensiva corporis Christi est in hoc sacramento, non secundum proprium modum, ut scilicet sit totum in toto et singulae partes in singulis partibus; sed per modum substantiae, cuius natura est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte.” Ibid., 509: “In hoc autem sacramento quantitas dimensiva panis est secundum proprium modum, scilicet secundum commensurationem quandam; non autem quantitas dimensiva corporis Christi, sed ibi per modum substantiae, ut dictum est.” 138 ST III, q. 77, a. 1; 515: “Et ideo relinquitur quod accidentia in hoc sacramento manent sine subiecto. Quod quidem virtute divina fieri potest. Cum enim effectus magis dependeat a causa prima quam a causa secunda, potest Deus, qui est prima causa substantiae et accidentis, per suam infintam virtutem conservare potest in esse accidens, subtracta substantia per quam conservabatur in esse sicut per propriam causam: sicut etiam alios effectus naturalium causarum potest producere sine naturalibus causis, sicut humanum corpus formavit in utero Virginis sine virili semine.”


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tity when they inhered in the bread’s substance, it is fitting that dimensive quantity would now serve as the subject of the other remaining accidents.139 And so, when addressing the 1059 Ego Berengarius, he contends that only the sacramental species are divided, since the body of Christ is incorruptible and the substance of the bread no longer remains. Because all the accidents remain, supported by quantity, his gloss on Ego Berengarius runs along now traditional lines: “The body of Christ is not broken, except according to the sacramental species. And it is in this manner that Berengar’s confession should be understood, since the breaking and the crushing of the teeth refers to the sacramental species, under which the body of Christ truly exists.”140 And with respect to the relationship between substance and accident in the phrase, ‘Hoc est corpus meum,’ Aquinas claims that the ‘hoc’ demonstrates the substance contained under the accidents, which was first bread and later Christ’s body.141 Commenting on Matthew 26, he contends that the ‘hoc’ stands for the body which is contained underneath the accidents. Christ used a pronoun at the beginning of the proposition to signify an indeterminate substance, while he used a noun at the end in order to signify what is then determined by form.142 And commenting on 1 Corinthians 11, he notes that the 139

ST III, q. 77, a. 2; 516: “Ergo quantitas dimensiva est subiectum accidentium quae remanent in hoc sacramento.” Ibid., 517: “Ad secundum ergo dicendum quod alia accidentia, etiam secundum quod erant in substantia panis, individuabantur mediante quantitate dimensiva, sicut dictum est. Et ideo potius quantitas dimensiva est subiectum aliorum accidentium remanentium in hoc sacramento quam e converso.” 140 ST III, q. 77, a. 7; 521: “Sed nullum quantum ibi dividitur nisi species sacramentales, quia neque corpus Christi, quod est incorruptibile; neque substantia panis, quae non manet. Ergo species sacramentales franguntur.” Ibid., 522: “Et ideo ipsum corpus Christi non frangitur, nisi secundum speciem sacramentalem. - Et hoc modo intelligenda est confessio Berengarii: ut fractio et attritio dentium referatur ad speciem sacramentalem, sub qua vere est corpus Christi.” 141 ST III, q. 78, a. 5; 531: “Ad secundum dicendum hoc pronomen hoc non demonstrat ipsa accidentia, sed substantiam sub accidentibus contentam, quae primo fuit panis, et postea est corpus Christi: quod licet non informetur his accidentibus, tamen sub eis continetur.” 142 Evang. Matthaei XXVI, 620: “Quid ergo demonstrat ly hoc? Dicendum, quod sensus est: Hoc est corpus meum; id est, contentum sub accidente, est corpus meum; vel hoc fit quod contentum sub accidentibus sit corpus meum. Unde in

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forms of the sacraments are not only signative, but creative, signifying as they truly effect. As such, the ‘hoc’ is referring to the body contained beneath the accidents, which is made present through the words of consecration.143 Finally, concerning the matter of illusion which proved so vexing for Berengar (and later Wyclif), Aquinas offers the traditional reasons as to why, when the substance of the elements has been converted, the accidents remain to be perceived by the senses: God in his providence preserves the recipient from the horror of the bare flesh and blood; guards against the scorn of infidels; and allows for the merit of faith.144 Moreover, there is no deception involved given the fact that accidents are the object of sense perception, and are indeed truly present to the senses, while the intellect remains focused on its proper object, which is substance. As the perception of Christ’s substantial presence is itself a matter of faith, the believing intellect is not deceived.145

fine posuit nomen, sed in principio pronomen, quod substantiam indeterminatam significat; sed per nomen forma determinata: unde in principio non est forma, sed in fine.” Note that interpolated chapters cover 5:11-6:8 and 6:14-6:19. This lectura on Matthew dates to 1269-70, and its text may also be counted as a reportatio. Cf. Torrell, 339. 143 In Epist. ad Cor., XI, 732: “Et ideo aliter dicendum est: quod formae sacramentorum non solum sunt significativae, sed etiam factivae: significando enim efficiunt. … Et ergo sensus: Hoc, id est contentum sub his accidentibus, est corpus meum, et hoc est quod fit per verba consecrationis.” The reportatio made by Reginald of Piperno extends from 1 Cor 11 through Hebrews. Cf. Torrell, 340. 144 ST III, q. 75, a. 5; 501: “Respondeo dicendum quod sensu apparet, facta consecratione, omnia accidentia panis et vini remanere. Quod quidem rationabiliter per divinam providentiam fit. Primo quidem, quia non est consuetum hominibus, sed horribile, carnem hominis comdere et sanguinem bibere. … Secundo, ne hoc sacramentum ab infidelibus irredeatur … Tertio, ut dum invisibiliter corpus et sanguinem Domini nostri suminus, hoc proficiat ad meritum fidei.” 145 Ibid., 501: “Ad secundum dicendum quod in hoc sacramento nulla est deceptio: sunt enim ibi secundum rei veritatem accidentia, quae sensibus diiudicantur. Intellectus autem, cuius est proprium obiectum substantia, ut dicitur in III de Anima, per fidem a deceptione praeservatur.”


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7 Duns Scotus Before looking at Scotus’s various critiques of Aquinas, as well as his own explanation of real presence, something must be said about the way his final eucharistic position was formed by his evaluation of the authority of the Church relative to the determination of dogma. For the way in which Scotus comes to accept one particular formulation of transubstantiation marks an important turn in the relationship between academic speculation and the limits of orthodoxy in the sacrament of the Eucharist. Because Scotus holds that in matters of belief one should not posit things which are not necessary, nor more miracles than needed, he is quite sure the truth of the Eucharist could be preserved without transubstantiation. Indeed, he says that the body of Christ could be truly present along with the remaining substance of the bread, just as it could be with the accidents alone after the bread’s substance has been annihilated. In point of fact, the simplest way for Christ to be present would not entail substantial conversion at all. Scotus finds that consubstantiation, which Aquinas explicitly rejected as heretical, would prove an easier and more scriptural definition. But while God could have taken the simpler route, the fact that he exercised his prerogative and chose not to in this instance only serves to demonstrate divine omnipotence. God is always free to order the universe as he sees fit, irrespective of human expectations. Who is to say that God did in fact choose this more complicated procedure? The One Holy Catholic Church. Scotus concludes that the Church has explicitly declared transubstantiation, defined as conversion, to be the true faith as issued in the creed of the Fourth Lateran Council and codified in Firmiter. So it is that whatever is stated there must be believed as the substance of the faith, solemnly declared by the Church.146 In this vein, when addressing Lateran IV’s affirmation of 146

Sent. IV, d. 11, q. 3; 375-76: “Ad argumenta pro prima opinione et secunda. Ad primum, concedo quod etiam in creditis non sunt plura ponenda sine necessitate, nec plura miracula quam oportet. Sed cum dicitur in minori, veritas Eucharistae posset salvari manente pane vel sine transubtantatione, dico quod bene fuisset Deo possibile instituisse, quod corpus Christi vere esset praesens, substantia panis manente, vel cum acccidentibus, pane annihilato, et tunc ibi ritas Eucharistae, quia et signum verum signatum verum; … Ad secundum, dico quod non est

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the double procession of the Holy Spirit, Scotus states flatly that whatever the Catholic Church has declared must be held as the substance of faith. Because Firmiter makes it clear that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and from the Son, so it must be held.147 Scotus’s understanding of the relationship between Scripture and Tradition comes to the fore here, as he admits that one might well wonder why the Church adopted the more difficult understanding when the words of Scripture seem to support one that is less difficult and apparently even more true. As it turns out there is no conflict between Church and Scripture for Scotus. “The Scriptures are explicated by the same Spirit who fashioned them. And thus one must suppose that the Catholic Church explicated them by the same Spirit who handed down the faith to us.” It is not in the Church’s power to make what she has received either true or untrue. The role of the Church is to explicate the teachings she has received from God, directed in this task by the Spirit of Truth.148 Scotus sees the Holy Spirit as the guarantor of Church teaching, as she preserves what is entrusted to her under the guidance of the Spirit, aliquis articulus arctandus ad intellectum difficilem, nisi ille intellectus sit verus; sed si verus est et probatur evidenter esse verum oportet secundum illum intellectum tenere articulum … Et tunc ad tertium, ubi stat vis, dicendum quod Ecclesia declaravit istum intellectum esse de veritate fidei in illo Symbolo edito Innocentio III in Concilio Lateranensi, Firmiter credimus, etc. sicut allegatum est superius, ubi explicite ponitur veritas aliquroum credendorum, magis explicite quam habebatur in Symbolo Apostolorum, vel Athanasii, vel Niceni. Et breviter, quidquid ibi dicitur esse credendum, tenendum est esse de substantia fidei, et hoc post istam declarationem solemnem factam ab Ecclesia.” Cf. McCue, 103-105; Macy 1992, 112-114. 147 Ordinatio I, d. 11, q. 1; 4: “Quidquid sit de eis, ex quo Ecclesia catholica declaravit hoc esse tenendum sicut de substantia fidei (sicut patet Extra, ‘De summa Trinitate et fide catholica’: ‘Firmiter credimus’), firmiter tenendum est quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit ‘ab utroque.’” 148 Sent. IV, d. 11, q. 3; 376: “Et si queras quare voluit ecclesia eligere istum intellectum ita difficilem hujus articuli, cum verba Scripturae possent salvari seccundum intellectum facilem, et veriorem secundum apparentiam de hoc articulo; dico, quod eo Spiritu expositae sunt Scripturae quo conditae. Et ita supponendum est, quod Ecclesia Catholica eo Spiritu exposuit, quo tradita est nobis fides. Spiritu scilicet veritatis edocta, et ideo hunc intellectum eligit, qui verus est. Non enim in potestate Ecclesiae fuit facere istud verum vel non verum, sed Dei instituentis, sed intellectum a Deo traditum Ecclesia explicavit directa in hoc, ut creditur, Spiritu veritatis.”


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whether it be handed down within the confines of Scripture or outside of it. This is not to say that there are two independent traditions, one scriptural and the other extra-scriptural. For whether these revelations are found inside or outside Scripture they still belong to one whole tradition whose source is uniquely divine (Buytaert, 362). Scotus will readily admit therefore that Christ’s descent into hell is not to be found in the Gospels, and yet must be believed as an article of faith because it is posited in the Apostles’ Creed. In fact, there are many other mysteries which are not found in the Gospels, and yet the Church believes to have been handed down unfailingly by the Apostles. As such, it is dangerous to err not only in matters which the Apostles handed down in Scripture, but also in those extra-scriptural doctrines of the Universal Church which must also be upheld by the faithful.149 Christ did not teach his disciples everything pertinent to the dispensation of his holy mysteries, but he specifically told them that the Spirit would come and later teach them all the truths they could not yet bear. Thus that same Holy Spirit who creates and interprets Scripture also taught them many things which are not written in the Gospels. Some have been handed down in written form and others through custom, which is to say, through unwritten teachings.150 Determinative as sacred tradition is for Scotus, he is aware of factors that seem to undermine the need for transubstantiation, read as a conversion of substance into substance. Consubstantiation is itself perfectly plausible, for there is no good reason why God could not allow the substance of the bread to coexist with Christ’s body, as that 149

Ordinatio I, d. 11, q. 1; 7: “Ad rationem illam de Evangelio dico quod ‘Christum descendisse ad inferna’ non docitur in Evangelio, et tamen tenendum est sicut articulus fidei, quia ponitur in Symbolo apostolorum. Ita multa alia de sacramentis ecclesiae non sunt expressa in Evangelio et tamen ecclesia tenet illa tradita certitudinaliter ab apostolis, et periculosum esset errare circa illa quae non tantum ab apostolis descenderunt per scripta sed etiam quae consuetudinem universalis Ecclesiae tenenda sunt.” 150 Ibid., 8: “Nec Christus in Evangelio docuit omnia pertinentia ad dispensationem sacramentorum; dixit enim discipulis suis (in Ioan.): Adhuc habeo multa vobis dicere, sed vos non potestis portare modo; cum autem venerit ille Spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem. Multa ergo docuit eos Spiritus Sanctus, quae non sunt in scripta in Evangelio: et illa multa, quaedam per scripturam, quaedam per consuetudinem Ecclesia, tradiderunt.” Cf. Buytaert, 354-57.

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is no more difficult than Christ’s body existing with the bread’s quantity.151 Moreover, substantial bread would serve as an even better sign than the mere accidents of bread. And with respect to Aquinas’s argument that substantial remnance would result in idolatry if the consecrated host were venerated, Scotus points out that there is no more reason to assume this of substantial remnance than mere accidental remnance, inasmuch as accidents are also created things. Anyway, people could just as easily adore Christ contained under the substantial bread as they do now under the accidents. And, if the bread does remain there is no reason why there could not be a true “double signification” whereby the accidents naturally signify the bread’s substance, and the sensible sacrament signifies Christ’s body by virtue of divine institution.152 What Scotus does reject as plainly heretical is the notion that Christ’s reference to his body can be read figuratively as when he referred to himself as the ‘true vine (Jn 15:1),’ or when Paul called him ‘the rock (1 Cor 10:4).’ Such a reading would be “completely contrary to the Savior’s intention.”153 There can be no doubt here as to the genuine authorial intention. Consubstantiation might be reasonable in theory at least, even if apparently ruled out by the Church, but any sort of ‘Berengarian’ symbolism must be rejected outright. 151

Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 3; 223: “Item, non est major repugnantia, corpus Christi esse simul cum substantia panis, quam quantitate ejus, quia non magis substantia repugnat substantiae, quam quantitati quoad talem simultatem; sed corpore Christi existente in coelo potest Deus facere idem corpus simul cum quantitate panis secundum omnes; ergo potest facere idem simul cum substantia panis quanta, et per consequens sine conversione; hoc quantum ad primum duorum quae tacta sunt.” 152 Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 3; 357: “Prima non valet, quia modo non est idolatra, qui adorat Christum in Eucharistia, et tamen non potest negari quin sit ibi creatura aliqua, scilicet species illae; sed non est adorandum sensibile continens, sed Christus contentus; et eodem modo tunc dicetur Christum contineri sub pane quanto et quali, et ita panem non adorari, sed Christum contentum in pane, ut in signo.” Ibid., 357: “Ad secundum dico, quod est ad oppositum, quia si esset hic substantia panis, illa duplex significatio esset vera, scilicet naturalis, qua accidentia significant substantiam panis, et illa quae est ex institutione divina, qua sensibile significat corpus Christi.” 153 Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 1; 153: “… ubi in Coena ait Christus: Hoc est corpus meum; Hic est sanguis meus. Et si haeretici vellent ista exponere, dicendo quod sint figurativa dicta, sicut illud quod ait Joan. 15, Ego sum vitis vera, et illud 1 Corinth. 10. Petra autem erat Christus; istud omnino est contra intentionem Salvatoris …”


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Of special note here is that Scotus points out some of the incongruities surrounding the substantial removal of the bread which would so vex Wyclif eighty years later. Of course, where Wyclif will dissent, Scotus, given his absolute adherence to the what he regards as dogma, is willing to live with all the apparent incongruities. Indeed, Scotus finds that this particular theory not only raises a series of philosophical problems, but in doing so opens the faith up to attacks on the basis of natural reason. And while nothing forms the substance of the faith except that which is found in Scripture, or is expressly declared by the Church, there is no rational basis for denying the remnance of the bread’s substance. Despite the fact that sacraments should not contain any falsity the Eucharist must be the exception, since the accidents do not properly signify their substance as they are meant to do. Yet if one must relinquish consubstantiation, Scotus reckons annihilation preferable to substantial conversion inasmuch as it requires fewer miracles and incovenientia, while still remaining true to Scripture and tradition (Burr 1972, 348-49). Even as he attempts to defend the ‘conversion’ theory of transubstantiation, Scotus finds problems in the Thomist explanation. One rather large problem is that Aquinas’s doctrine of transubstantiation only addresses the substances themselves and not their presence in a particular place. Yet since the existence of a substance as substance is prior to its existence in a place, merely to posit the conversion of one substance into another does not explain how that substance actually exists in any particular place. Remember that Aquinas holds that only transubstantiation, understood as conversion, can sufficiently explain Christ’s presence, since other theories require local motion. Here Scotus will meet the shortcoming of the conversion theory, without resorting to local motion, as he appeals to the Aristotelian category of ‘relation’ to explain how the body of Christ can be present in many places at once. The relations of a subject can change without the subject itself undergoing any substantial change, and moreover, a subject can have more than one relation of the same type. In the instance of place relations, therefore, Christ may have the relation of being in heaven while also having the relation of being on many altars. As Christ’s body becomes present on the altar it does not undergo a change in its form, but only a change insofar as it acquires a new

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extrinsic relation (Burr 1972, 341-42; Cross, 141).154 Despite what Aquinas says, God can make the same body simultaneously present in different locations, not just sacramentally, but locally and dimensively. After all, wherever God can make a natural substance exist in a way that is not in keeping with its natural mode of existence, he can surely make it exist according to its natural mode, since the latter would require one less miracle. Hence, if God can make Christ’s body simultaneously present to many different locations sacramentally, which is not in keeping with its natural mode of existence, it stands to reason that he can make it present according to its natural mode, thus locally and dimensively. The same body is simultaneously in different places inasmuch this body, which is a quantified thing, acquires a new extrinsic relation to the quantified thing which circumscribes it.155 For Scotus, a body’s internal ordering is logically independent of its categorical position, that is, the ordering of its parts to the parts of a place. Presence in a place refers to an extrinsic relation, and such relations can be multiplied without the body itself being changed internally. The dimensions of the body are naturally prior to the accidental, extrinsic relation to any place where the body might exist. And whatever is essentially prior to the body’s location in a place will remain constant despite its multiple extrinsic relations (Adams 1991, 225-27). Aquinas had argued that the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body can only be present concomitantly. This actually met with objections not only from Scotus, but from the Franciscan Peter John 154

Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 1; 179: “… et corpus Christi habebit novum respectum ejus, quia si species sunt de novo praesentes corpori Christi, et corpus est de novo praesens eis … non erit tunc inconveniens dare in corpore Christi talem mutationem ad respectum extrinsecus advenientem.” 155 Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 2; 196: “Ubicumque potest Deus facere substantiam naturalem, non sub modo suo naturali, vel sub modo sibi opposito, potest eam facere sub modo suo naturali seu convenienti suae naturae. Probatio, quia in faciendo primum est duplex miraculum, unum vero tantum est in faciendo secundum. Sed Deus potest facere corpus Christi sacramentum secundum omnes, et facit de facto sacramentaliter, id est, non sub modo suo naturali simul in diversis locis; ergo potest idem facere in eisdem sub modo naturali, scilicet localiter et dimensive.” Ibid., 197: “Dico ergo quod simpliciter est possibile idem corpus simul facere in diversis locis localiter; hoc patet ex intellectu terminorum. Cum enim dico, idem corpus simul esse localiter in diversis locis, nihil dico super hoc corpus, nisi quemdam respectum extrinsicus advenientem fundatum in uno quanto ad aliud quantum circumscribens.” Cf. Aquinas, ST III, q. 75, a. 1; 497.


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Olivi before him. For Olivi, Christ’s body must retain its quantity, for to remain an organic being it has to possess the situatio of its organs. If Christ is to maintain a genuine living body in the host his vital organs and members must be properly ordered (Burr 1974, 19-21). Nor can Scotus accept the merely concomitant presence of quantity in the Eucharist. He proposes that Christ’s body preserves its natural extension, but while his whole body is spatially related to the whole place where it is contained, there are no spatial relations between Christ’s body parts and the parts of the host which contain it. Christ’s body is not related to the host part to part, but the whole to every part (Cross, 143-44). Scotus can retain the body’s quantity, because he finds two ways of understanding positio; the first refers to parts as they are ordered to the whole, while the second refers to the parts as they are ordered to a place. Scotus maintains that every quantified thing (quantum), in this case Christ’s body, must have positio of the first sort, but not necessarily of the second. A quantum can retain its own internal order of parts without those same parts being commensurate with the parts of that place. In the case of the Eucharist, Christ’s body retains the first sense of positio, as each part is properly ordered within his own body, but that same body does not have positio in the second sense, inasmuch as its parts are not commensurate with any given host (Burr 1972, 342-45).156 We noted that if Scotus could not have consubstantiation, he took annihilation as second best. But since he feels compelled to accept the conversion theory, he actually ends up defending conversion while simultaneously rejecting the Thomist explanation. By the time Scotus was writing transubstantiation did entail a conversion of substance and not just a succession. For Scotus, however, transubstantiation is an adductive, rather than a productive process, since the pre-existent substance of Christ’s body assumes a being-here (esse hic). He argues that the conversion is one by which the bread’s presence on the altar is succeeded by Christ’s presence, such that the bread does not lose its esse simpliciter, but rather its esse hic. Yet it is still true that the bread 156

Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 1; 185: “… ergo absolute corpus quantum habens primam positionem posset esse sine omni positione extrinseca, et intelligi quantum coexistentiam habere ad aliud quantum sine ista positione. … Et hoc potest breviter declarari sic, quia positio secunda supponit ubi proprie dictum; ergo si Deus potest quantum conservare sine ubi proprio dicto, potest et sine positione.”

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does cease to be, though this fact is only concomitant with the conversion and is not its term. In other words, it is not the substantial conversion itself which brings about the annihilation of the bread’s substance; and in that sense Scotus thinks he has avoided an outright repudiation of the Thomist explanation (Burr 1972, 355-57). Burr observes here that while Scotus does finally confirm that the bread is not annihilated, he provides so many qualifications that one wonders whether he has really rejected annihilation at all. More important for the history of doctrine, however, is Burr’s observation that once transubstantiation is shown to be an inadequate way of explaining real presence it becomes a genuine stumbling block for theology, one that must be gotten round, rather than relied upon to explicate a mystery. For having demonstrated that real presence need not entail substantial conversion, one is increasingly pushed in the direction of accepting this one particular scholastic formulation on the basis of authority alone (Burr 1984, 106-07). Scotus winds up defending transubstantiation, not because it more satisfying philosophically, but because the Church declared it to be true. One must again agree with Burr that while Scotus’s emphasis on the divine will and the contingency of the created order does exalt revelation over natural reason, this must be considered in light of the fact that he examined explanations such as Aquinas’s and found they lacked philosophical cogency. Thus it is not a matter of jettisoning natural reason and escaping into fideism. Quite the opposite; when an orthodox doctrine like transubstantiation is put under the microscope one soon concludes that it must be believed on the basis of revelation, precisely because it fails the test of reason (Burr 1972, 352-53).

8 John Quidort While Scotus may have come to the conclusion that the Church had reached a definitive position on the manner in which Christ’s body is really present in the host, many others did not regard the matter as settled. As we have seen, some were content to fix the standard of orthodoxy at the simple affirmation of Christ’s substantial presence,


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whether attained via conversion, annihilation or consubstantiation. Yet it is recorded that in 1305/06 the Dominican John Quidort, a regent in theology at the University of Paris, offered a “novel position” not customarily heard or posited: apparently that of impanation. After his position was examined by the Bishop of Paris and the masters of the Theology faculty he was henceforth prohibited from reading or disputing this position in Paris.157 John protested, however, that the Church had not yet rendered a determination on this matter. Thus if no single formula has been designated an article of faith, there are no grounds for reckoning his position contrary to the faith.158 Earlier on he had grappled with various explanations of real presence, and was mindful to point out at the beginning of his Determinatio that he was planning to defend the true and real presence of Christ over and against a merely symbolic presence. And while he affirms substantial conversion and the remnance of the accidents without a subject here, he says that he cannot count such an explanation as a matter of faith, seeing as there are other plausible explanations. That being said, if someone can prove to him that the aforementioned explanation has been defined by the Church, General Council, or Pope he remains prepared to retract his own opinion and assent immediately.159 One cannot be certain that John did offer the “novel position” of impanation he is accused of holding. He does discuss the theory, however. Based upon the model of the Incarnation, he states that the 157

CUP II, i, 120: “… ponens de corpore Christi in sacramento altaris positionem novam et Parisius non consuetam audiri vel poni … prohibitus est amplius legere et disputare Parisius.” 158 Ibid., 120: “Dicit tamen quod nullus est determinatus per ecclesiam, et ideo nullus cadit sub fide, et si aliter dixisset, minus bene dixisset, et qui aliter dicunt, minus bene dicunt. Et qui determinate assereret alterum per se cadere sub fide, incurreret sententiam canonis vel anathematis.” 159 Text quoted in Martin, 214-15: “Intendo defendere veram existatiam et realem corporis Christi in sacramento altaris, et quod non est ibi solum sicut in signo: et licet teneam et approbem illam solemnem opinionem, quod corpus Christi est in sacramento altaris per conversionem substantiae panis in ipsum, et quod ibi maneant accidentia sine subjecto; non tamen audeo dicere quod hoc cadat sub fide mea; sed potest aliter salvari vera et realis existentia corporis Christi in sacramento altaris; protestor tamen, quod si ostendatur dictus modus determinatus esse per sacrum canonem, aut per Eccclesiam, aut per Generale Concilium, aut per Papam qui virtute continet totam Ecclesiam, quidquid dicam, volo haberi pro non dicto, et statim paratus sum revocare. Quod si non sit determinatus, contigat tamen ipsum determinari; statim paratus sum assentiri.”

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totality of the bread (substance and accidents) is assumed into Christ. The substance of the bread does remain underneath the accidents, but no longer in its own supposit. Instead, it is drawn into the supposit of the one Person of Christ with the result that there is now one supposit with two natures. The Word accomplishes this indirectly as the bread is assumed through the mediation of the body.160 As one might expect, the issue of the communicatio idiomatum comes into play here. For while it is true that the bread does not become divine any more than Christ’s human nature did when assumed by the Divine Word, the one supposit is still the subject of all predication. The two natures, bread and body, remain unconfused while sharing a common supposit. If the bread were to retain its own supposit the whole process would be ruined, of course, as one could not then say, ‘the bread is the body of Christ.’161 While Scotus did not speak for everyone at the dawn of the fourteenth century, it is likely that he had some company in reading the Fourth Lateran Council’s decree as an authoritative explanation of real presence. For John responds to this very point, arguing that there must be a certain degree of latitude, since no council intends for every aspect of its chapters to be taken as a matter of faith. Transubstantiation is a case in point, he says, given the possibility of alternative explanations. But if one still insists it was intended as a matter of faith, John reckons it sufficient to believe that the bread is transubstantiated, inasmuch as its supposit passes into the supposit of Christ.162 What 160

Ibid., 215: “Alio modo, ut substantia panis maneat sub accidentibus suis, non in proprio supposito, sed tracta ad esse et suppositum Christi, ut sic sit unum suppositum in duabus naturis. … dico igitur quod panis in sacramento altaris trahitur ad esse, vel suppositum Verbi non immediate, sed mediante corporeitate, et non mediante corporeitate quae est totum.” Cf. Martin, 204-05. 161 Ibid., 215: “… uno modo sic, quod substantia panis in sacramento altaris sub suis accidentibus maneat in proprio supposito, et illud esset falsum, quia non est communicatio idiomatum, inter panem et corpus Christi, nec esset verum dicere panis est corpus Christi, nec ‘Caro mea vere est cibus.’ … quia post consecrationem est panis increatus, ante consecrationem vero, est panis creatus, licet autem sit alius panis, ante et post, tamen est eadem paneitas.” Cf. Martin, 204. 162 Ibid., 221: “ … non tamen Concilium intendit ponere sub fide omnia contenta in capitulis determinatis per ipsum, de quibus forte est panem transsubstantiari in corpus Christi in Sacramento Altaris, ut dicit Hostiensis et Innocentius. Vel dicendum quod si concilium hoc intendat sub fide ponere, quod sicut prius dictum est, panis transsubstantiatur in corpus Christi, inquantum suppositum panis transit in suppositum Christi, quod suppositum maxime proprie dicitur de


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makes John Quidort’s case all the more troubling, however, is that he was censured for what may only have been a ‘recited’ opinion proffered for scholastic disputation, and not a view ‘asserted’ as his own. Indeed, in his Sentences commentary he specifically regards the substantial remnance of the bread to be an erroneous opinion.163 It may well be that he was already suspect in some people’s eyes, wrongly accused of supporting Philip the Fair’s personal attacks on Boniface VIII. In fact, anonymous accusations leveled against his eucharistic theology in 1284 might account for the fact that, despite taking his bachelor’s degree in theology in 1286, he did not take his master’s until 1304 (Macy 1999a, 101-02; Martin, 196-97). This case highlights the larger question of academic censure discussed in an earlier section of this book. Positions could be condemned without being patently heretical, and moreover, without necessarily condemning the person who has put them foreword in the public domain. After all, John did not even claim to defend this position himself; but it was enough that he was accused of teaching something that sounded wrong, and possibly blasphemous, in the presence of his colleagues.

9 William of Ockham William of Ockham, like his Franciscan predecessor Duns Scotus, was committed to defending what he reckoned to be the Church’s authoritative explanation of transubstantiation. Unlike Scotus, however, Ockham found himself formally charged before a papal commission for his efforts on this front and others. When commenting on the Sentences at Oxford c. 1317-19, Ockham describes transubstantiation as the succession of substance, whereby the first substance ceases to exist and the new substance begins to exist underneath the accidents of the one it succeeds. This seems quite possible, as there is no reason substantia per Aristotelem, 5 Metaphysicae, ut dictum est, et in Praedicamentis dicit quod prima substantia proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur substantia, quae prima substantia est suppositum.” 163 Text quoted in Macy 1999a, 118: “Ad hec dicendum quod magister in littera recitat opinionem illorum qui ponunt quod substantia remanet cum corpore Christi. Sed opinio illorum non stat. Immo error erit dicere.”

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why the divine power cannot destroy a substance while conserving the accidents.164 Ockham then takes up the question as to whether transubstantiation is in fact a viable doctrine. Having affirmed that Christ’s body is truly present upon the altar, he sets out four explanations of this process, none of which is impossible. The first he mentions is consubstantiation, that is, the simple coexistence of the bread’s substance along with the substance of Christ’s body. The other three involve either the removal of the bread’s substance to another place, its reduction to matter, or its annihilation. He concludes that consubstantiation can be maintained since it is not in opposition to reason or biblical authority. Indeed, it is more reasonable and easier to grasp than any of the other three modes he has outlined, since there are fewer incovenientia following from it. Of all the various incovenientia the greatest is that of accidents existing without a subject, and consubstantiation is immune from that very problem. That being said, he acknowledges that the Church has determined in the Liber extra (citing Firmiter and Cum Marthae) that the substance of the bread does not remain, which is also the common opinion of the doctors. Yet Ockham still reckons transubstantiation so defined by the Church as broad enough to include annihilation/succession, since he says this only requires the real remnance of the bread’s accidents, the absence of its substance, and Christ’s real presence there in a nonquantitative manner.165 164

Reportatio IV, 8, 136-37: “Quantum ad primum potest dici quod transubstantio est—in propositio—successio substantiae ad substantiam desinentem esse simpliciter in se sub aliquibus accidentibus propriis substantiae praecedenti. Possibilitas istius apparet, quia non repugnat potentiae divinae destruere substantiam in se et conservare accidentia et quod alia substantia eisdem accidentibus non eam informantibus immediate coexsistat.” 165 Ibid., 137-140: “Quantum ad secundum dico quod in altari est praesentia corporis Christi. Sed hoc potest multis modis poni. Uno modo ponendo quod remaneat ibi substantia panis et cum hoc quod corpus Christi coexistat substantiae illi, ita quod prima substantia sit deserens accidens secunda non, sed tantum coexistens. … Primus modus potest teneri quia non repugnat rationi nec alicui auctoritati Bibliae, et est rationabililior et facilior ad tenendum inter omnes modos, quia pauciora inconvenientia sequuntur ex eo quam ex aliquo alio modo. Quod patet, quia inter omnia inconvenientia quae ponuntur sequi ex isto sacramento maius est quod accidens sit sine subiecto. Sed ponendo primum modum non oportet illud ponere, igitur etc. … Quia tamen determinatio Ecclesie in contrarium, sicut patet Extra, De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica


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Ockham is intent in his Reportatio on keeping the word ‘transubstantiation,’ precisely because he equates it with the orthodox teaching of the Church. And so he goes to great lengths to explain how his annihilation/succession theory can be classified under this title. Here he distinguishes between two sorts of annihilation. If one means that the bread is annihilated such that it is reduced to nothing and cannot be converted into something else, then this must be rejected. The second theory of annihilation, which he accepts, reduces the bread to the sort of being it had in the divine power before the creation of the world; it was truly nothing then and yet possessed being in God’s creative power. Considered in this way, one can say that the bread is annihilated.166 Ockham will speak of annihilation and conversion in one breath: “I say that the substance of the bread is truly annihilated and there is then a conversion here of the bread into the body of Christ, because Christ’s body comes into existence here after the bread. It is just as when day comes into existence from night, and afternoon from morning, for day comes into existence after the night, and afternoon after the morning.”167 What is more, Ockham feels free to call his annihilation/succession theory ‘transubstantiation’ in the et De Celebratione Missae, et communiter doctores tenent oppositum, ideo teneo quod non remanet ibi substantia panis sed illa species et quod illi coexistat corpus Christi. Et quod hoc sit possibile patet, quia in ista transubstantiatione non includitur nisi quod species ibi realiter maneant, et quod substantia non maneat in se realiter, et quod ibi sit realiter corpus Christi non quantitative. Sed quodlibet istorum est possible, igitur etc.” Cf. Friedberg 2:5-6; and 2:636-39. 166 Ibid., 148: “Ad septimum dico quod accipiendo adnihilationem sic quod illud quod adnihilatur redigitur in nihil et non covertitur in aliquid aliud, sic panis non adnihilatur. Accipiendo tamen sic quod illud dicatur adnihilari quod reducitur in ita purum nihil sicut fuit ante mundi creationem, sic vere adnihilatur panis. Quod probatur, quia non verius esse nec actualis habet substantia panis in corpore Christi quam in potentia Dei creativa. Sed non obstante esse quod habet in essentia divina, sive potentia Dei sive secundum contientiam virtualem sive perfectionalem sive quocumque alio modo, vere potest panis adnihilari licet habet esse in potentia divina, quia ante mundi creationem vere fuit nihil, et tamen tunc habuit esse in potentia divina. Similiter vere potest panem adnihilare, tamen tunc haberet esse in potentia Dei, igitur eodem modo, non obstante omni esse quod habet in corpore Christi, vere potest dici adnihilare.” 167 Ibid., 149: “Ideo dico quod vere substantia panis adnihilatur et est tunc hic conversio panis in corpus Christi, quia post panem fit hic corpus Christi, sicut ex nocte fit dies et [ex] mane merides, quia post noctem fit dies et post manes merides.”

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proper sense of the term (ex virtute vocabuli), defining the process whereby one substance is destroyed and is succeeded by another substance.168 Not surprisingly, Ockham’s nominalism plays an important role in the formulation of his eucharistic doctrine, for among the ten Aristotelian categories, he accepts the actual existence of only substance and quality. Only substance and quality are absolute terms, while quantity is a connotative term. Absolute terms stand for real things, while quantity directly signifies substance or quality and connotes the way in which their parts are arranged (Adams 1987, 1:176). This is important for his eucharistic theology. Because quantity is only a term which can be predicated accidentally of substance when it has extended parts, it does not apply where there is no extension. Substance need not have extended parts, but where it does, as in the case with Christ’s body in heaven, then it has quantity (Leff 1975, 604). The substance of Christ’s body can exist in the host without extension, even while it is extended in heaven. There is nothing to prevent it from possessing a quantified mode of existence in one place while not having such in another.169 Nor is the shape of Christ’s body present. For whenever a substance exists without quantity and extension, as Christ’s body does in the Eucharist, its parts cannot maintain their distance and arrangement.170 In his 1323/24 De corpore Christi, Ockham argues that Christ’s body is really and truly contained under the species of the bread and yet is not circumscribed in the Eucharist with regard to place. Because Christ is not present as a quantum his body does not exist part after part in the host. His presence in the host is definitive, and not 168

Ibid., 151: “Aliter potest dici quod sicut non est transubstantiatio nisi quod primo est una substantia et post destruitur illa et succedit alia substantia, et ideo ex virtute vocabuli dicitur transubstantiatio …” 169 Ibid., 88: “Ad aliud de corpore Christi dico quod secundum istam viam, substantia corporis Christi potest esse non extensa in hostia, et eadem tamen potest esse extensa in caelo. Nec est hoc inconveniens, quia in uno loco habet modum quantitativum, puta in caelo, in hostia non.” 170 Ibid., 89: “Ad aliud de figura dico sicut de quantitate, quia significat substantiam vel qualitatem connotando talem et talem distantiam partium, quia ordinem partium in toto et in loco. Nunc autem quando substantia fit sine quantitate et extensione, sicut est in Eucharistia, non possunt partes sic distare nec ordinari in toto vel in loco. Et ideo sicut Deus facit corpus suum sine quantitate et extensione, ita sine figura.”


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circumscriptive: the whole Christ is present to the whole host, and the whole to every part of the host. Thus it is neither commensurate with that place, nor circumscribed by it.171 He appeals to the examples of angels, who exist definitively, and human souls which do the same. And while it is true that these are spiritual substances, whose very nature entails such presence, there is no reason why God could not grant this sort of presence to material substances, such that the whole would exist to each part. Ockham always has the infinite divine power in mind; we must not restrict divine power according to the dictates of natural causality. If God can so arrange for the Virgin to conceive there is no reason why, by his absolute power (potentia absoluta), he cannot make a material substance exist whole to whole and whole to part in the same way the soul is present to every part of the body. There is nothing logically impossible about this.172 Thus the whole substance of Christ’s body is present to whole host and every part of the host.173 And while the body is not quantified in the host, this is not to say that the parts of the body are no longer distinct. The hand can be in the same place as the eye and yet remain a hand. Bodily organs may remain distinct from one another, retaining their respective functions, even as they exist in the same place. And this too cannot be denied when one appeals to divine power.174 Ockham must have thought some of 171

De corpore Christi VII, 102: “Quamvis autem corpus Christi realiter et veraciter sub specie panis contineatur, non tamen in sacramento Altaris loco circumscribitur, sed totum corpus Christi sub tota hostia et sub qualibet hostiae realiter continetur. … Ex quibus manifeste colligitur quod totus Christus est in tota hostia et totus in parte. Ex quo sequitur quod loco non comensuratur nec circumscribitur.” Cf. Buescher, 73-75. For the dating of De quantitate and De corpore Christi cf. Grassi’s introduction ibid., 27. 172 Ibid., 103: “Non enim iuxta modum causarum naturalium divinam potentiam artare debemus, cum divina potestas virtutem omnium creatorum excedat in infinitum … Quis enim experiabatur umquam virginem naturaliter sine viro concipere … non ergo debet christianus negare quin Deus per potentiam suam absolutam possit facere aliquam substantiam coexistere alicui corporeo ita quod tota coexistat toti illi corporeo et cuilibet parti eius. Ita enim tenemus quod anima intellectiva est tota in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius. Nec oppositum potest per rationem demonstrativam probari.” Cf. Buescher, 84-86. 173 Ibid., 104: “… sicut patet de anima et angelo, sequitur manifeste quod non impossibile Deo facere quod tota substantia corporis Christi coexistat toti hostiae et cuilibet parti eius; quod est propositum principale.” 174 Ibid., 104-05: “Nam quamvis manus retentis eisdem dispositionibus poneretur cum oculo, ita quod simul in eodem loco essent manus et oculus, adhuc tamen

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this was controversial, however, for he concludes the chapter affirming that while he has ‘asserted’ nothing that is not in keeping with the teaching of the saints, if it turns out something here is not consonant with their statements he defers, since it was all said as part of an academic exercise, offered for the sake of training studious minds.175 In fact, Ockham declares at the outset of this work that, “I am going to assert nothing except that which the Roman Church holds and teaches.” The use of precise academic language is noteworthy here. While he will not ‘assert’ such things as if they were his own positions, he will for the sake of scholarly inquiry ‘recite’ ideas as he explains these topics in all humility and modesty. Indeed, he makes it quite clear that this work is in no way meant to offend pious ears with profane or novel propositions.176 This caveat is especially instructive if the De corpore Christi and De quantitate were written in 1323/24, and thus shortly before Ockham was called to Avignon. Ockham describes the position held by the Roman Church and the Catholic doctors as one in which “the substance of the bread is transubstantiated, converted or changed, such that the substance of the bread does not remain; for only the accidents remain, subsisting per se, without a subject.” When the bread has been transubstantiated the whole Christ then exists underneath the species of the bread. Ockham proceeds to affirm the doctrine of transubstantiation as an article of Catholic faith, and thus his own faith. “For whatever the Roman Church explicitly believes, this alone and nothing else do I believe, manus esset manus et non oculus, et homo per manum non videret sed per oculum. Et ita tunc possent organa remanere distincta et nata habere distinctas operationes quantumcumque localiter non distarent. Et ideo hoc a divina potentia non est negandum.” 175 Ibid., 105: “De omnibus tamen praedictis nihil assero nisi quod consonum est doctrinae Sanctorum. Si quid autem non fuerit consonum dictis eorum, tantum ad exercitandum mentes studiosas sit dictum.” 176 Ibid., I, 90: “… protestor me nihil asserturum nisi quod Romana tenet et docet Ecclesia. Quaedam autem philosophica inserenda et universaliter quaecumque dicenda, quae non sunt per Romanam Ecclesiam authenticata, non temerarie approbando sed tantum recitando causa exercitii et veritatis inquirendae cum omni humilitate et modestia explicabo … Noverint autem universi quod praesens opsculum non aggredior ut fidelium auribus aliquas profanas vocum ingeram novitates, sed ut quam innocenter et sobrie de hoc altissimo sacramento, quando Sententias legi, fuerim locutus ostendam.”


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either explicitly or implicitly.” In fact, Innocent has done the Church a great service by explicating the faith as he did in Firmiter.177 Ockham insists that as natural reason cannot demonstrate that the body of Christ is really present under the species of the bread one must turn to faith, for we may not doubt this in light of Christ’s revelation to the apostles recorded in Scripture (Matt 26; Mk 14; Lk 22; Jn 6; 1 Cor 11). He finds consensus among the great doctors of the Church and the Holy Fathers, themselves illustrious expositors of Scripture. They all offer testimony to the truth which has been authenticated by the Roman Church. He then presents a series of short quotations from the Decretum, none of which can offer anything approaching the technical sophistication and clarity of the early fourteenth century. They simply affirm that the faithful receive the body of Christ in the sacrament.178 In the prologue to his De quantitate, Ockham begins by quoting the gloss on De consecratione which we have already discussed. He notes here the “three opinions” regarding the conversion of the bread, and reads the gloss as supporting substantial conversion, whereby only the accidents of the bread remain, noting the glossator’s appeal to Firmiter, which Ockham then quotes. Accepting this explanation as authoritative, he says that one must still inquire into the existence and distinction of the accidents, and their separation from their subject.179 177

Ibid., II, 91-92: “Doctores catholici a Romana Ecclesia approbati … in quod substantia panis transubstantiatur, covertitur seu mutatur, ita quod substantia panis non manet, sed remanent accidentia sola per se subsistentia sine subiecto. Et non tantum corpus Christi … sed etiam totus Christi integer, perfectus Deus et verus homo … Haec est et mea fides quoniam est catholica fides. Quidquid enim explicite Romana credit Ecclesia hoc solum et non aliud vel explicite vel implicite credo. Quantae autem utilitatis et efficaciae sit fides implicita, explicat Innocentius, Extra, De summa Trinitate et fide catholica, Firmiter …” 178 Ibid., III, 92-94: “Quod corpus Christi sub specie panis realiter continetur [in sacramanto Altaris] per rationem naturalem ostendi non potest. Et ideo ad istius veritatis notitiam oportet per fidem accedere, de qua dubitare non debemus cum constet ipsam per unigenitum Dei Filium fuisee revelatam Apostolis, teste sanctissimo Evangelista Matthaeo 26 … Praedictis etiam scriptoribus Scripturae canonicae consentiunt Doctores egregii, sancti Patres Scripturae Divinae expositores clarissimi ac a Romana Ecclesia authenticati. Quorum nonnullae auctoritates insertae Iuri Canonico sunt in medium proponendae.” Cf. Friedberg 1:385; 1:1315; 1:1328; 1:1350. 179 Tractatus de Quantitate, prologus, 3-4: “Sicut dicit quaedam glossa De consecratione, d. 2, In sacramentorum, circa conversionem panis in corpus Christi tres erant

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Ockham concludes this treatise by arguing that the true quantity which does remain there on the altar after consecration is quality, inasmuch as quantity is not really distnct from the whiteness or taste of the host. The very doctors approved by the Church herself say that color, taste, weight and other such qualities remain, all of which exist without a subject through divine power alone.180 As quantity only signifies substance and quality, so when the bread’s substance is annihilated quantity cannot remain to support the other accidents; hence the recourse to divine power (Buescher, 123-24). Ockham thus rejects the most popular theory, espoused by Aquinas among others, that quantity remains as the subject for the other accidents. The Avignon commission listed among its censured articles the annihilation theory, arguing that the Church had determined the bread is “transubstantiated.”181 Yet, as Burr correctly notes, while Ockham may have said the bread is annihilated, he never opposes this to transubstantiation. Like Scotus, he employs what Burr calls the “weak” version of transubstantiation, one that allows for the succession of substance to substance (Burr 1968, 151-52). Also of note is Ockham’s use of the term ‘inconvenientia,’ one with which the commission took umbrage. Though Ockham may have employed this term to mean nothing more than difficulties which God can opiniones: ‘Una asserit quod illa substantia quae fuit panis primo, postea est caro et sanguis Christi. Secunda opinio tenet quod substantia panis et vini ibi desinit esse manet accidentia tantum … Tertia tenet quod remanet ibi substantia panis et vini et eodem loco et sub eadem specie est corpus Christi. Argumentum est ad hoc eadem distinctione, Ego. Quaelibet tamen opinio fatetur ibi esse corpus Christi. Secunda opinio verior est, Extra, De Summa Trinitate, Firmiter, Una.’ Haec sunt verba glossae. Ex qua apparet quod substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi, ita quod substantia panis non manet, sed taman accidentia quae prius erant in substantia panis manent. … Ad istius veritatis declarationem circa duo specialiter aliqua sunt quaerenda, videlicet circa istorum accidentium entitatem et distinctionem et circa ipsorum a subiecto separationem.” 180 Ibid., III, 84-85: “… sed remanet ibi vera quantitas quae est qualitas, quia remanet quantitas quae non est alia res ab albedine. Similiter remanet ibi quantitas quae non est alia res a sapore, et sic de aliis quantitbus. Et ideo dico cum Doctoribus approbatis ab Ecclesia quod remanent ibi color, sapor, pondus, hoc est gravitas, et huismodi qualitates quarum nulla est alia res a quantitate extra omne subiectum, per se subsistentia divina potentia …” 181 Article 20, Pelzer, 261: “Dicimus quod in sacramento altaris substantia panis non adnihilatur, sed transsubstantiatur in corpus Christi secundum determinationem ecclesie.”


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certainly overcome, the commission equated the term with logical impossibilities that even God himself could not surmount. Thus while the commission admitted there may be difficulties involved, it countered that to claim these are ‘inconvenientia’ amounts to nothing less than a dangerous attack on the Church.182 Ockham’s nemesis John Lutterell had also attacked Ockham for saying that Christ’s body in the host could be seen by the human eye. This is especially noteworthy because Wyclif too is disturbed by this prospect. The fact is that Ockham only said that there was nothing about either circumscriptive or definitive presence which prevented this, for neither reason nor experience militates against it. But just because something is possible does mean it actually takes place; and in the case of the Eucharist God does not choose to co-assist the human action in this way. Thus Christ’s body is not in fact seen by our bodily eyes, but is apprehended by faith.183 Finally, a word should be said about Ockham’s treatment of the eucharistic proposition, ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’ He addresses the question whether it is true in its proper sense (de virtute sermonis) when spoken by the priest in the Mass. As one recalls, the problem is that if the ‘hoc’ demonstrates Christ’s body then the proposition is false, since the body is not yet present when the ‘hoc’ is uttered. But if it demonstrates anything else it is also false because nothing else can be the body of Christ. On the other side of this, of course, is the principle that there can be no falsehood in this sacrament, and so the proposition must not be false.184 Ockham responds by first affirming the 182

Article 19, Pelzer, 261: “Dicimus quod assertio est temeraria et periculosa et contra reverentiam et doctrinam Ecclesiae, quia licet ad viam, quam approbat Ecclesia, sequuntur multa difficilia, non sunt tamen inconvenientia, quia minimum incoveniens est Deo impossible secundum Anselm.” Cf. Burr 1968, 154-55. 183 Quodlibet IV, 13, 362: “Ideo dico quod Christus in altari posset videre oculo corporali illa quae fiunt in altari, et videri ab aliis visione corporali, nisi esset speciale impedimentum.” Reportatio IV, 7, 135: “Ad aliud dico quod non repugnat intellectui viatoris ex natura rei videre corpus Christi in hostia si permitteretur, puta si Deus secum coageret, tamen de facto non facit, quia non permittitur.” Cf. Buescher, 95-96. 184 Quodlibet II, 19, 193. “Utrum haec propositio ‘Hoc est corpus meum’ prolata a sacerdote in missa sit vera de virtute sermonis. Quod non: Quia quaero quid demonstratur per hoc pronomen ‘hoc’: aut corpus Christi, et tunc est falsa, quia quando profertur hoc pronomen, non est corpus Christi in Eucharistia; igitur si tunc demonstratur corpus Christi, illa propositio erit falsa. Aut demonstratur

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principle that a demonstrative pronoun is only significative on account of the intention of the one who utters it. He then argues that as there is some mental proposition corresponding to every vocal proposition, so the priest’s proposition is true because the priest duly utters these words with the intention of demonstrating Christ’s body through the pronoun ‘hoc.’ The truth of the proposition is secured insofar as the proper intention is already present on the mental level.185 A mental proposition can be wholly formed in an instant, remaining permanent from beginning to end, but the vocal proposition is formed successively and so is only true at the end. After all, the one listening to the proposition is not yet certain at the beginning what this proposition will be; he must wait until it is vocally completed.186 Ockham concludes that the priest uttering this proposition demonstrates Christ’s body as much at the beginning as at the end. The vocal proposition, however, is neither true nor false at the beginning, achieving truth only at the end. But the mental proposition is as true at the beginning as it is at the end, though in different respects, since the beginning relates to the future and the end to the present.187

aliud a corpore Christi, et tunc adhuc est falsa, quia nihil aliud quam corpus Christi est corpus Christi. Contra: Nulla falsitas est quocumque sacramento; igitur haec non est falsa ‘hoc est corpus meum.’” 185 Ibid., 193-94: “Ad istam quaestionem dico primo quod pronomen demonstrativum non est significativum nisi ex intentione proferentis. … Secundo dico quod omni propositioni vocali correspondet aliqua propositio mentalis. His suppositis dico tunc ad quaestionem quod ista propositio prolata a sacerdote vera est, quia sacerdos debito modo proferens debet intendere demonstrare corpus Christi per hoc pronomen ‘hoc’ prolatum.” 186 Ibid., 196: “Ad tertium dico quod propositio mentalis est vera in principio et in fine, sed non eadem sed diversa. Et causa est quia propositio mentalis est tota simul, et potest tota formari in instanti sive in parvo tempore. Et quia est permanens in principio et in fine, ideo est vera in principio et in fine. Sed propositio vocalis non est tota simul sed succesive. Ideo est illa vera in fine et non in principio, quia homines sic utuntur propositione vocali. … Si quaeris quare non est vera in principio sicut in fine, respondeo, quia in principio non est certum alicui audienti quod erit talis propositio.” 187 Ibid., 197: “Ad arguentum principale dico quod sacerdos proferens talem propositionem, semper tam in principio quam in fine demonstrat corpus Christi. Sed in principio propositio vocalis nec est vera nec falsa propter causam dictam. Tamen propositio mentalis vera est tam in principio quam in fine; sed alia et alia est in principio et in fine, quia una est de futuro et alia de praesenti.”


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10 Popular Piety While this chapter has focused on the scholastic and legal aspects of eucharistic doctrine, that is to say, the increasingly refined definitions offered by medieval scholars and ecclesiastical officials, a few words should be said about the place of the Eucharist in the religious life of the larger public. This cannot be lost sight of when assessing Wyclif’s objections to transubstantiation. By the late Middle Ages the host itself was receiving greater attention as an object of devotion, within and without the setting of the Mass. The elevation of the host was standard practice by the thirteenth century. Writing in 1287, Bishop Quivil of Exeter gives us a glimpse into the thinking behind this practice when he states that following consecration the host should be lifted up that it might be seen by the laity, thus exciting devotion and increasing faith. What is more, they are to kneel at this moment and adore their creator (Rubin, 57). Yet while all lay people were expected to attend the Sunday Mass they rarely communicated, especially as the host was considered such a precious object unto itself, and thereby in danger of defilement. None of this is to say the Mass had thereby become a hollow event for the laity; quite the opposite is true. It was a vibrant sensory experience charged with a symbolism that was rooted not only in the church building itself, with its stained glass and paintings depicting the lives of Christ and the saints, but in the clerical vestments as well, and of course in the liturgy. By the fourteenth century there was an effort to increase the beauty of the Mass, and in so doing evoke yet more devotion on the part of the people. While the host might not be touched by the laity it was meant to be seen and adored by them in the full solemnity of this reenactment of Christ’s passion (Manning 1919, 4-16; Rubin, 57-64; Swanson, 100-02). There is no doubt but that the emphasis on substantial conversion, transubstantiation, led to an increasing devotion to the host and made it an object to be gazed upon, much as one would gaze upon a relic and pray before it in hopes of receiving the blessings of its inherent power and holiness. Despite the fact that theologians insisted that the host not be treated as a relic, it received similar veneration as it was placed in a monstrance and carried in procession through the streets under

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a canopy accompanied by candles and bells. The most notable procession was the Feast of Corpus Christi, the celebration of which reached England by 1318 (Rubin 199-204, 246-49, 290-91; Swanson, 136-42). In this vein, and quite troubling to Wyclif (as we shall see), was the proliferation of miracle stories in the late Middle Ages involving the host, whether having to do with its adoration or desecration. Such stories were part of the stock and trade of Wyclif’s later nemeses, the friars, who had various exempla prepared as would befit the purpose of their sermons. Some involved sensory perception of the real substances as a reward for faith or as a cure for doubt. Some concerned an unusual reaction elicited from man or beast in close proximity to the host, and yet others involved the appearance of the flesh and blood as punishment meted out to someone who abused or profaned the host (Rubin, 108-29). Swanson points out that such devotion to the Eucharist naturally prompted greater expectations of clerical sanctity. As the confecting of Christ’s body was the unique province of the clergy, so their status was exalted, since they were the only ones capable of making God present on the altar with all the attendant effects (Swanson, 236-41). In fact, this was one of the results of the Gregorian reform effort with its emphasis on a priestly power that went hand in hand with cultic purity (Morris, 98-101). Consider the praises sung of the priesthood in the thirteenth-century Stella clericorum, where it said that the Son of God is incarnated in the hands of the priest much as he was within the Virgin’s womb. “O what a divine mystery it is that through you [the priest] the Father, Son and Holy Spirit operate so miraculously. For the very God who presides in heaven is at that same moment a sacrifice in your hands.”188 If transubstantiation can grant power, so then will the denial of this doctrine, strike a blow against it. The awesome nature of the eucharistic mystery itself must continually be promoted as well, for once the sacramental bread is deemed as ordinary as any other the special role of the priest is in jeopardy (Rubin, 328). Holding the clergy to high 188

Stella clericorum XVI, 40-41: “Bernardus: O veneranda sacerdotum [Bernardus] dignitas, si digne et sacerdotaliter vixeritis, intra quorum manus uelut in utero Virginis Dei Filius incarnatur. O celeste mysterium, quod per uos Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus tam mirabiliter operatur, quod vno eodemque momento idem Deus qui presidet in celo in manibus vestris est sacrificium.”


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standards was not simply a matter of morality, though; they would have to maintain some basic level of theological competence. That errors could and did result from poor instruction was not lost on conscientious churchmen. Parish priests will have to be better informed if they are to provide worthy counsel to their charges (Rubin, 83-90). Witness the proliferation of instructional manuals in the fourteenth century (Pantin 189-219). Indeed, it was none other than Archbishop John Thoresby, in whose diocese Wyclif served soon after his ordination in 1351, who issued the Latin instructional manual designed to be explained in English to the laity, and which came to be known as the Lay-folks Catechism (Pantin, 211-12).

11 Conclusion We began this chapter by remarking that no simple answer was going to be found throughout the Middle Ages to that seemingly simple question: what did Christ mean when he said, ‘Hoc est corpus meum’? The Church Fathers were not nearly so vexed as their medieval counterparts by the apparent incongruities faced by the faithful in receiving the one true body of their Savior promised to them in the host. By and large it was enough to trust in faith that Christ’s word is true, and that he is daily accomplishing this miraculous feeding of his flock with the life-giving body into which they are all incorporated. Yet it was inevitable that more precise answers would be demanded, not just in the face of heresy or skepticism, but in response to a genuine desire to explain by reason what faith already accepted as truth. Christ cannot lie; so what did this Author of authors mean here when he took bread and called it his body? Because the Eucharist is a sacrament, one must consider the relationship between signs and things. And that discussion, in turn, means analyzing the language used to express such a relationship. If everyone agrees that the Lord’s discourse communicates a sacred mystery, the Church must then decipher the words which communicate this mystery. One finds that such a task will call for increasing attention focused upon metaphysical explanations to balance the dialectic of appearance and reality, sign and thing.

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This project began in earnest when the Church was in the process of solidifying and systematizing doctrine with the aid of logic and metaphysics; and that doctrine would then become a matter of law which could brook increasingly little dissent. The materials had begun to be gathered in the ninth-century monastery of Corbie, but the enduring character of the medieval eucharistic debate was forged in the eleventh-century schools and papal synods. As great doctrinal advances were being made in the twelfth century, the law did not yet reflect them, evinced in the difference between Lombard’s Sententiae and the De consecratione section of the Decretum. The former offers a detailed explanation of substantial conversion and accidental remnance, while the latter merely assembles disparate statements all designed to affirm the central truth of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist as a principle of Church law. That being said, as De consecratione was glossed over the next century there was still remarkable flexibility permitted within the general parameters of affirming real presence. No doubt that substantial presence was by then considered the only orthodox means to affirm true or real presence, but the means of explaining the process by which the presence comes about in relation to the elements remained open to various ‘opinions.’ From the point of view of the later Middle Ages, though, the promulgation of the Liber Extra was clearly a watershed event, however inadvertently. Scholasticism managed to co-opt law even as it thought it was simply obeying it. The fact that consubstantiation, and then annihilation, could be ruled out as heretical by leading theologians who, in turn, formed the mind the institutional Church, is remarkable. No less brilliant men than Duns Scotus and William of Ockham felt compelled to put aside all of their principled objections to transubstantiation, understood as conversion, and struggle to conform their own explanations to fit what they considered the only legitimate formulation, decreed by Lateran IV and codified in Firmiter. For his part, John Quidort had objected to treating this one decree as if it provided an absolute and irrevocable exposition of real presence. But merely by speculating with regard to other possibilities, he met with censure. And among the various charges Ockham had to face at Avignon was the positing of annihilation. Indeed, by the time Wyclif arrived at Oxford in the middle of the fourteenth century the


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parameters of eucharistic orthodoxy had been narrowed to a degree unknown even a century before. But that is really not surprising, for it was the inevitable outcome of a process which had begun at the Easter council of 1059.

6 The Eucharistic Theology of John Wyclif

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he last chapters have dealt with medieval biblical exegesis and its intersection with the development of eucharistic theology. In keeping with his predecessors, Wyclif’s eucharistic theology largely hinges upon the interpretation of Scripture, which itself raises a series of metaphysical questions. Yet at the heart of any consideration of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist there is always the matter of intuiting the intention of the Divine Author, whether speaking directly in Holy Scripture, or through the decrees of the Church and the testimony of her saints. More specifically, and most importantly, the discussion concerns the intention of the one who spoke the words, ‘Hoc est corpus meum,’ the very person whose body it is. From the late medieval perspective Christ’s substantial presence equals his real presence; anything else denigrates the salvific power of the Eucharist. By the late fourteenth century the remnance of the elements came to be viewed as a threat to that real, substantial presence. The earlier flexibility, which allowed for three definitions of real presence, as long they all affirmed substantial presence, was eroding. While some form of the annihilation/succession theory was permitted under the general heading of ‘transubstantiation,’ an orthodox description of real presence now demanded the exclusive substantial presence of Christ’s body and blood, meaning that consubstantiation would have to be ruled out. As we shall see, Wyclif will be censured in 1380 by a university council not only for denying Christ’s substantial presence in the Eucharist, but also for denying the substantial conversion of the elements. The two may go hand in hand, but the subsequent lists of censured propositions will always treat these points separately. As we have seen, when the Church increas-

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ingly sought standardization in matters of doctrine and law, so then did certain scholastic formulations become fixed as a matter of law from which deviation was illicit and punishable. Inasmuch as Wyclif’s rejection of transubstantiation spelled the end of his academic career and the beginning of his designation as a heresiarch, it is only to be expected that so many modern scholars have weighed in on his eucharistic theories. For earlier Protestant scholars like Vaughn, transubstantiation was an abominable abuse, the clearest sign of Church corruption. As for Wyclif’s own position on the Eucharist, he reckons it almost Zwinglian (Vaughn, 55-58). For Lechler, Wyclif’s objection to transubstantiation stemmed first of all from its contradiction of Scripture. Lechler sees Wyclif’s theory of presence as actually being closer to Luther than Zwingli, or even Calvin. He argues that while Wyclif rejects the corporeal presence that Luther had insisted upon, he does believe in the immediate presence of the body, albeit in a spiritual manner, as opposed to the Calvinistic theory whereby communion with the body is only effected through the power of the Holy Spirit (Lechler, 381-89). For Trevelyan, Wyclif did not attack transubstantiation for metaphysical reasons, but instead because he saw it as a source of idolatry and clerical abuse (Trevelyan, 170-76). Workman concludes that Wyclif’s opposition to transubstantiation sprung from his metaphysics, and contends that Wyclif actually wound up supporting the doctrine of consubstantiation (Workman 2:30-40). Thomson believes that it was Wyclif’s denial of the possibility of annihilation which would not allow him to accept the doctrine of transubstantiation (Thomson 1931, 110-14). And Manning says that while Wyclif was increasingly concerned with combating the superstition he perceived to be inherent in the doctrine of transubstantiation, he was driven by a process of elimination to deny the possibility of accidents existing without their proper subjects (Manning 1949, 501-02). For Robson, Wyclif’s rejection of this doctrine was a consequence of his denial of the possibility of annihilation. In fact, says Robson, he was in a position to reject it years before it did so publicly (Robson, 187-90). Leff finds that Wyclif’s eucharistic thought was the direct result of his metaphysics (Leff 1987, 230), though he also concludes that while Wyclif did not reject real

6~The Eucharistic Theology of John Wyclif

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presence, just how he did believe Christ to be present in the host is all but impossible to determine (Leff 1976, 8). Recently, two leading medieval scholars have objected to the emphasis placed upon the metaphysical components of Wyclif’s dissent. J. I. Catto contends that much of modern Wyclif scholarship has examined his philosophy and ecclesiology in purely intellectual terms, thereby missing the more passionate strains of the eucharistic debate. It is Catto’s position that Wyclif wished to remove the Eucharist from what he took to be the abuses of popular religion, including cults and the veneration of relics. Wyclif believed that transubstantiation undercut the dignity of the Eucharist, positing a deception and leading the people into idolatry. He hoped to bridge the gap between the Eucharist and its recipient, which is created when the natural order is suspended in transubstantiation, thereby fostering a sense of community of believers through a more direct experience of Christ (Catto 1985). Also turning away from metaphysical origins, Maurice Keen argues that while Wyclif’s realist metaphysics are the key to much of his theology, the heart of the Mass for him was the spiritual union of the faithful, with the long-term implications of a socialistic union of believers. What is more, he thinks Wyclif’s final repudiation of transubstantiation stemmed from his years spent lecturing on the Bible, as he finally concluded that a non-scriptural understanding of the Eucharist had led to idolatry in the Mass (Keen 1985). What should become clear in the following pages is that throughout his career Wyclif will consistently claim that Christ is really present in the Eucharist, though he offers various explanations as the years progress. By the end of his career he rejected transubstantiation, which is to say that he rejected a particular scholastic definition of Christ’s presence without ever rejecting real presence itself. At no point did he consider himself to be outside the sacred tradition of the Church which proclaimed the presence of Christ’s body in the consecrated host. Wyclif also stands within the greater orthodox medieval tradition of biblical exegesis that is principally concerned with discerning the sense of the one true Author of Scripture. And so it is that he returns again and again to Christ the auctor, the one who speaks the language of the saints, employing a sacred eloquence and reasoning in

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keeping with a sacred logic. The logic of Scripture is only understood in light of the logic of Christ, the Word conveyed by the words of the sacred text, the content and goal of Holy Scripture. It is Christ therefore who stands at the heart of Wyclif’s understanding of the Eucharist, for it is Christ who is true, and whose veracity forms the point upon which Wyclif’s entire eucharistic doctrine turns. The explication of the Sacred Page has always to do with the quest for certainty, the hope of comprehending the sacred logic of Christ, and at no time more so than in the Mass. We have seen that for all sides over the centuries nothing less than the veracity of Christ was at stake in the Eucharist. If he cannot deceive his faithful then his words at the Last Supper must be true for all time; but what interpretation constitutes a deception? We have looked at the ways in which that seemingly simple proposition, ‘Hoc est corpus meum,’ was read and defended across the centuries. Moreover, we have examined the later medieval refinements in the greater field of biblical exegesis and the specific question of authorship. But we have also seen the way in which academic speculation was increasingly viewed with suspicion from at least 1277 onwards. Wyclif can rightly be counted among the suspicious, and so sought refuge in an older, more Augustinian metaphysical realism, which exercised considerable influence over his biblical exegesis. Wyclif had various reasons for rejecting transubstantiation, all of which intersected one another. Yet he primarily rejects this doctrine because he believes that it renders Christ a deceiver in its negation of the substantial presence of the bread. Christ’s substantial presence in the host is deeply troubling for him, but it is his insistence on the remnance of the bread which forms the mainstay his objection to transubstantiation. Surely Christ could be present in the Eucharist in some true and real manner without the removal of the bread’s substance, a process Wyclif reckons the undoing of the trustworthy and sacred order of God’s creation, making God a deceiver in the process. Here it might be best to proceed by first charting the development of Wyclif’s eucharistic theology during the 1360s and 1370s leading up to his 1380 De eucharistia tractatus maior, the content of which prompted his censure. We will examine the university censure itself (1380) and the later ecclesiastical condemnation (1382) to see exactly


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what it was that many of his fellow theologians and churchmen considered so unacceptable. Next, we will have a brief look at his reaction to the university commission set forth in the opening pages of his Confessio (1381). From there we can turn to his mature eucharistic theology in a thematic, rather than a chronological manner, thus encompassing the De eucharistia as well as later tracts and sermons.

1 The Earlier Stages of Wyclif’s Eucharistic Theology In 1380 Wyclif admits that at one time in his life he had struggled to reconcile the present definitions of transubstantiation with what he regards as the position of the early Church, but has finally come to the conclusion that the modern Church has strayed from the truth.1 Here we can trace the road that led to such a conclusion. Wyclif’s positions on such matters as the relationship of substannce and accidents in the Eucharist, as well as a definition of transubstantiation itself, were subject to change not only in the years prior to receiving his doctorate, but all the way up until his monumental treatise De eucharistia. The Franciscan William Woodford, a contemporary of Wyclif with whom he exchanged notebooks as they lectured on the Sentences, commented on some of these changes in his own De sacramento altaris, written soon after Wyclif had left Oxford. We will look at significant portions of Wyclif’s own writings, but for the moment we can consider Woodford’s personal recollection. When Wyclif first read the Sentences, according to Woodford, he had asserted that the subject of the accidents following transubstantiation was a corpus mathematicum, though in the course of arguments responded that it was a corpus mixtum. He had even said that when the bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ it then ceased to exist. Later, as a bachelor of theology, Wyclif said that the accidents did have a subject but what that subject was he did not know. Finally, having become a 1

De eucharistia II, 52: “Unde licet quondam laboraverim ad describendum transsubtanciacionem concorditer ad sensum prioris ecclesie, tamen modo videtur michi quod contrariantur, posteriori ecclesia oberrante.”

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doctor, Woodford records him as asserting that the substance of the bread remains after consecration.2 We can now turn to Wyclif’s own earlier writings and examine what he has to say first hand. Taking up specific logical questions c. 136062, Wyclif addressed the imprecise use of language in theological discussion. Here the issue is the power to create and its application in one instance to the Eucharist. God is the first productive principle and he cannot communicate such creative power to any mere creature. Thus wherever the holy doctors attribute creation to the creature, they do not intend this to be taken in the proper sense of the term.3 Wyclif insists upon careful language when speaking about the consecration of the host and the process he readily designates ‘transubstantiation.’ He flatly states here that, “in the mystery the priest transubstantiates and converts the bread into the body of Christ,” though he still does not create Christ’s body there in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless, Wyclif speaks quite easily in this passage of “the substantial conversion of the bread into Christ’s body, as the bread totally and completely ceases to exist,” while the body of Christ really comes to exist underneath the visible species according to its own substance. To say then that the priest creates the body of Christ is correct if taken as a figure of speech to be understood equivocally and improperly.4 In 1363 Wyclif distinguishes between being somewhere in power (potencialiter) as a king in his kingdom; by way of presence (presencialiter) as a king in a hall; and being present essentially (essencialiter) 2

For excerpts from De sacramento altaris and a discussion of Wyclif’s progression of thought cf. Robson, 190-95. For more on Woodford and his anti-Wycliffite polemics cf. Doyle 1983. 3 Quaestiones logicae et philosophicae I, in De ente praedicamentali and Quaestiones XIII logicae et philosophicae, 231: “Deus non potest alicui pure creature commuunicare esse simpliciter primum principium productivum … quia solus Deus potest esse primum principium productivum creare et simpliciter finis ultimus iuxta illud. Apoc. primo … Deus non potest creanciam communicare alicui pure creature. … Ubicumque doctores sancti creature attribuunt creacionem, ibi creacionem capiunt improprie; patet ex conclusione.” 4 Ibid., 232: “Sacerdos in misterio transsubstancians et convertens panem in corpus Cristi, non creat ibi corpus Cristi; patet ex conclusione et plus ex fidei veritate. Verumptamen, quia sacerdos misterialiter per conversionem substancialem panis in corpus Cristi, pane totaliter et plene cessante existere facit ibi sub specie visibili esse corpus Christi secundum suam substanciam realiter, veraciter et presencialiter ex nulla substancia, vel de aliquo subiecto quodam genere locucionis, licet equivoce et improprie, dicitur creare corpus Christi …”


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which requires filling up a space entirely. The first two require the third, for one could not be present in these ways if one had no essential presence somewhere. God is everywhere in all three cases, because God is essentially everywhere as the cause of all things. But if the notion of being in a place is limited to the filling up of a space, as opposed to presence through causation, then we should deny that Christ’s humanity is everywhere, even though the Divine Word, which is the same Person as the humanity, is indeed everywhere. Likewise, we should deny that the corporeal quantity of Christ’s body is present in every place that his body is present. This is not to say that the body of Christ which is there in the host is not quantified, but only that it is not quantified there.5 Christ’s body is really present in the host, though this same body which is quantified in heaven, having part after part, is not present in the host as a quantified thing filling up space in that way. All the parts of Christ’s body are indeed present in the Eucharist, but without position, shape or quantity. Wyclif sees no reason to affirm that the body’s quantity must always be present any more than Christ’s humanity need accompany everywhere the existence of the Divine Word, despite being the same Person.6 For just as the hypostatic union is not compromised by denying ubiquity to Christ’s human nature, so the body of Christ does not relinquish its quantity even if it is not quantified in every place it exists. That being said, he does appear to accept the ‘Thomist’ explanation of transubstantiation as conversion, stating here that the bread is not annihilated through the conversion, inasmuch as a “mathematical body” remains to support the accidents of the bread. This would have to be the bread’s quantity, since his definition of a mathematical body, 5

De logica III, x, 136: “... conceditur quod habens alium modum essendi quam per causacionem in aliquo loco, solum est ubi illo alio modo est; ut replecione loci, actuacione in loco, vel alio tali affino. Unde negatur quod humanitas Cristi sit ubique, quamvis verbum, quod est illa humanitas, sit ubique; negatur eciam quod quantitas vel qualitas corporea correspondens Cristi sit in Eukaristia. Nec sequitur ex hoc quod illud corpus sit ibi non quantum nec quale, sed bene sequitur quod est illud quod non est quantum ibi.” On Wyclif’s later revisions of this work and others cf. Hudson 1999. 6 Ibid., 137: “Probabile vero videtur quod omnes partes correspondentes Cristi sunt in Eukaristia sine posicione, figura, vel quantitate harum continua, sicud humanitas Cristi non concomitatur ubique existenciam Verbi quamvis sit eadem persona.”

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as one that is intrinsically composed by surfaces, points and lines, coincides with his definition of the accident quantity. He will in fact explicitly define quantity as a mathematical body.7 Wyclif goes on to say that, because the bread is not reduced to utter nothingness, so the same being (esse) which was formerly bread does remain, though it is not purely Christ’s body, nor purely bread at this stage. The bread is converted into the body of Christ and remains Christ’s body sacramentally, now existing as a corpus mathematicum underneath those accidents where the bread was once formally present. The bread is subordinated as a sacramental sign to the body which now exists more principally in that place. Consequently, the bread does not remain after conversion, in the sense that it no longer remains in actuality, but only in potency.8 While Wyclif did revise the De logica tractatus tertia in the 1380s, the discussion of the Eucharist here is still in keeping with Woodford’s description of Wyclif’s position at the time of its original composition. The rejection of the body’s quantification will recur in later years, but he does not propose the bread’s substantial remnance here, nor does he reject the substantial presence of Christ’s body. At all events, Wyclif’s opposition to annihilation in the Eucharist does not stem from the Thomist concern that it would entail local motion on the part of Christ’s body, but rather because he believes annihilation would lead to the wholesale destruction of creation. Thus when treating the question of annihilation and the Eucharist in 7

Ibid., 137: “... et quo ad permanenciam correspondentis transsubstanciati soleo dicere quod non anichilatur vel corrumpitur ex vi conversionis, sed manet unum corpus subiectans accidencia panis, quod voco corpus mathematicum in abstractum.” Ibid., ix, 62: “… sicut eciam corpus mathematicum componitur intrinsece ex superficiebus, punctis, et lineis …” De logica I, iii, 11: “Quantitas est forma denominans substanciam esse formaliter quantam; ut: linea, superficies.” See also his comments on 1 Corinthians 10 in Benrath, 369: “ … quod quantitas, que est corpus mathematicum …” 8 Ibid., x, 137: “Et sic idem esse, quod prius est panis, manet corpus sub illo gradu quidditatis generalis; sed non manet pure corpus Cristi nec panis pure, sed panis convertitur in corpus Cristi; quia panis manet corpus Cristi sacramentaliter, existens sub illis accidentibus sub quibus formaliter panis fuit. Unde, quia panis non est corpus Christi primarie existens per illum situm, sed subordinatur ut sit sacramentale signum corpori inibi principalius existenti; ideo non manet post conversionem panis; sicud quidam dicunt propter talem causam elementa non manere in mixtis in actu, sed tantum in potencia.”


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1371/72, he argues that as God cannot annihilate any substance without annihilating the entire created universe, so it is that nothing can be totally annihilated. For the annihilation of a substance requires the annihilation of all of its parts. Yet as the quidditive part of any singular is the genus of the substance, then the annihilation of the singular leads to the annihilation of the genus itself. This argument holds true for the Eucharist as Wyclif rejects the substantial annihilation of the bread. That the substance of the bread is not annihilated is proven by the remnance of the accidents, since annihilation would entail the destruction of the accidents as well as the substance. This is not to say the substance of the bread cannot take on new form as the body of Christ, only that it is not utterly annihilated, since that would entail the annihilation of ‘breadness’ itself.9 In fact, such a process would lead to the destruction of God, for the annihilation of a thing entails the corruption of the eternal idea, its causal principle, which is essentially God himself.10 In this vein, Wyclif argues in his De universalibus that as all creatures have being primarily in their first created analogue they are not actually annihilated as long as the analogue is preserved. The only way to annihilate a creature is to annihilate the analogue, and that would mean the destruction of the universe.11 Discussing the Eucharist here, he goes on to make the point that the bread and wine are not annihilated since they are 9

De potencia productiva dei ad extra XII, in De ente librorum duorum, 289: “Item, deus non potest adnichilare substanciam aliquam, nisi adnichilet totam universitatem creatam; set illam non potest adnichilare: igitur nichil penitus potest adnichilare. Maior probatur ex hoc quod ad cuiuscunque substancie nichilacionem requiritur cuiuslibet partis adnichilacio de vi vocis; et cuiuslibet singularis substancie pars quiditativa est genus substancie, sicut et alia genera ac species; igitur, adnichilata substancia qualibet singulari, adnichilaretur genus substancie, et per consequens non maneret post adnichilacionem existens in alico singulari; totum igitur genus substancie destruetur ad cuiuscunque substancie adnichilacionem. Confirmatur per locum a maiori. Substancia panis in eukarista non adnichilatur propter remanenciam accidencium, licet ipsa corrumpatur secundum totam formam.” 10 Ibid., 290: “Ymmo ulterius ordinando videtur quod ad simpliciter adnichilacionem requiritur ydee corrupcio, que est idem essencialiter cum causa existente; cum talis ydea sit essencialiter deus …” 11 De universalibus XIII, 307-08: “Igitur, nullius creaturae omne esse creatum potest desinere, servato esse analogo. Cum ergo nulla creatura potest annihilari, servato aliquo eius esse creato, sequitur quod nulla creatura potest annihilari nisi esse analogum, et, per consequens, nisi universitas annihiletur.”

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converted into accidents. If the remnance of the accidents, after the destruction of each of its quantitative parts, preserves it from annihilation, all the more so will the remnance of the bread’s essence in its per se cause.12 In his 1372 De benedicta incarnacione, it is evident that Wyclif is becoming increasingly ill at ease with the doctrine of transubstantiation. When discussing Scotus’s theory of the Incarnation, Wyclif notes the Subtle Doctor’s position that just as God is able to make accidents exist per se, as happens in the Eucharist, so he could make the inferior human substance inhere in the superior Word. Wyclif procceds to argue that no inherent accident can have a completely independent existence, for it is really only a mode of substance. Yet since every created thing is an accident and adheres to God, as an accident to a subject, it would be possible for God to grant an accident independent existence in the sense that it only adheres to God. Thus while noting that Saint Thomas admits quality can only exist via quantity, Wyclif still insists that in the Eucharist there must be a subject for all the accidents we see. In fact, were there no subject for these accidents the Eucharist would prove to be an exceptional act of sensory illusion.13 Not even the miracle of transubstantiation will permit quantity and 12

Ibid., 308: “Ergo cum magis cognatum sit unicuique creaturae genus proprium quam subiectum accidentis, quod est generis alieni, multo magis inferius non annihilatur servato genere proprio. Sic enim dicitur quod panis et vinum non annihilantur eo quod convertuntur in accidentia. Si ergo remanentia accidentium rei, post desitionem cuiuslibet suae partis quantitativae, tollit eius annihilationem, multo magis remanentia essentiae rei in sua per se causa quae est idem cum individuo desinente.” 13 De benedicta incarnacione XI, 189-90: “4to confirmatur ex hoc quod accidens potest Deus facere per se esse, ut patet de eucaristia; ergo per idem potest facere substanciam inherere. … cum omne tale sit modus substancie, sed cum omnis creatura sit accidens Deo adhereatque sibi tam essencialiter sicut accidens ad subiectum; patet quod accidens potest Deus facere per se esse, non sic quin alicui, scilicet Deo, adheraet, sed quod nulli formaliter inhereat. ... De qualitate consentit sanctus Thomas, quod ipsa non potest esse nisi insit quantitati. Et de quantitate est michi evidencius, cum sit substanciam esse quantam, et non potest exspectare rarefaccionem et condensacionem et ceteras mutaciones, quas in benedicta eucaristia oculariter experimur. Ideo, ut alias dixi, esset nimis magna sensu illusio, nisi esset in eucaristia unum quantum diversimode qualificatum et accidentatum ac mobile. Et illud subicitur quantitati, qualitati et ceteris accidentibus que videmus.”


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quality to exist per se without a subject.14 Just what the precise nature of that subject would be, however, he cannot determine with any certainty. Some of the “saints” appear to say it is the bread and wine. But in 1372 Wyclif cannot leave it there, as that would imply they propose substantial remnance; so he must look for some way to explain what they mean. One possible scenario is that while the substance of the bread ceases to exist by virtue of the transubstantiation, the bread’s essence remains, and thus acts as the subject for the accidents. That essence does not become the body of Christ, however, but rather becomes a sign which signifies to us that Christ’s body is sacramentally present to all of its points. Even so, it is not necessary for the wayfarer to know as an article of faith just what that remaining essence is.15 We have seen Wyclif argue against annihilation, claiming that the essence of a thing will always be preserved even as the individual may pass out of existence. Perhaps Wyclif means here that the eternal essence of bread now upholds the accidents even as the substance of the individual host ceases to exist. And, insofar as God sustains the essence of bread itself, so these accidents adhere to God. At any rate, Wyclif then switches gears, and draws upon a principle of optics to explain Christ’s sacramental presence: a body multiplied intentionally is truly present wherever its species is brought about, and has a power of operating there. Hence, it stands to reason that, “God can make his body present to every point of the host sacramentally, and make its spiritual effects operate there effectively.”16 As the same 14

Ibid., 186: “Nec sequitur ex miraculosa transsubstanciacione in eucaristia quod vel qualitas vel inherens quantitas possit per se existere sine informacione et essenciali dependencia ad subjectum.” 15 Ibid., 190-91: “Et illud subicitur quantitati, qualitati et ceteris accidentibus que videmus. Sed quoad questionem - quid est de tali essencia? - non sollicitor; licet sint quodlibet dicta sanctorum que sonant quod sit panis vel vinum; que forte intelligenda sunt, quod essencia subiecta illis accidentibus post transsubstanciacionem est panis ante transsubstanciacionem, et virtute transsubstanciacionis desinit esse quod vel substancia, et manet eadem essencia conformiter accidentata. Illa autem non fit corpus Christi sed signum signans nobis ineffabiliter quod ad omnem punctum sui sacramentaliter corpus Christi et concomitanter anima et omnia alia Christi accidencia absoluta. Nec est de substancia fidei viatorum scire est illa essencia …” 16 Ibid., 191: “Si enim secundum perspectivos corpus multiplicatur intencionaliter vere praesens, ubicunque species agitur, et habet ibi efficaciam operandi; quod magistrum Deo facere corpus suum esse ad omnem punctum hostie sacramentaliter et effectus spirituales effecaciter operari!”

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body can have an intentional existence in many places, and thus be experienced in those places, so too can Christ’s body permeate many hosts simultaneously and convey its salvific power to all faithful communicants. Just about this time, in the course of his debate with Kynyngham (1372-74) on matters unrelated to the Eucharist, the Carmelite argued that apart from proof drawn from linguistic signs the Church has no evidence Christ had said of the consecrated bread, ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’ And he records Wyclif as responding that he does not believe Christ said the bread is his body. Kynyngham leaves it at that, only promising to pray for Wyclif if he really does not believe the gospel.17 Just what Wyclif meant by this remark was apparently not discussed, nor clarified, but Kynyngham expresses no doubts here as to Wyclif’s eucharistic orthodoxy. By the mid-1370s, commenting on 1 Corinthians 10 in his Postilla, Wyclif once more voices his concerns about the mere remnance of accidents following the eucharistic conversion. “Some people call those sensible things accidents, which the Apostle Paul calls bread and wine, but this much is certain: those accidents are not identical with the quantity and quality of the philosophers.” In fact, the modern theologians have stumbled into error as they claim accidents can function as subjects in the Eucharist.18 It is at this point that Wyclif offers a solution which foreshadows his final position. He does not deny Christ’s substantial presence in the host, but he does affirm, albeit it in more subtle tones, the substantial remnance of the elements. What he outlines looks much like consubstantiation except for the fact that he speaks of Christ’s ‘virtual and real’ presence, and not his substantial presence. In fact, a number of the points Wyclif makes here echo his later position. Setting out his own theory he 17

FZ, 53-54: “… quod nisi ex probatione signorum non haberet ecclesia evidentiam quod Christus dixisset de pane consecrato, Hoc est corpus meum, respondet Magister, et dicit se non credere quod Christus dixit panem esse corpus suum …” 18 Latin text transcribed in Benrath, 369: “Unde illa sensibilia vocant quidam accidencia, que apostolus vocat panem et vinum, sed certum est, quod non sunt univoce accidencia cum quantitate et qualititate philosophorum. Unde hic est lapsus modernorum, quorum aliqui dicunt, quod quantitas, que est corpus mathematicum, subiectat quantitates et alia accidencia. Quidam autem dicunt, quod qualitates rarefactibiles subiectant qualitatem.”


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begins by arguing that it is possible for the bread and wine to remain, while each particle of Christ’s body is sacramentally multiplied to every one of their points. This would not be unfitting for God, appealing again to principles of optics, inasmuch as a sensible body is multiplied across every distance where it is perceived. As such, it stands to reason that the body of Christ has a certain kind of existence underneath the sacrament, though it would not be a dimensional existence. And here again we encounter the important proviso that while the body is still a quantified thing, it is not a quantified thing there in the host.19 In other words, while Christ’s body there is the very same body which has a quantified existence somewhere i.e., in heaven, this body is not present in the host as a quantified thing having part after part. Moreover, since it is a reasonable principle that the soul is present anywhere that it is influenced, and sensible anywhere that it is seen by way of its species or action, so by the same rationale one can say that Christ’s body is present wherever it operates sacramentally. This is to say that Christ’s body need not be moved to a place to make its presence felt there, and in that sense, be present there. Thus “transubstantiation and conversion” may be understood as a process whereby the substance of the bread and wine become the body by assuming a subordinate status, now functioning as a sign designed to signify the body of Christ which is present there“really and virtually.”20 Just as one would not pay attention to the green circle outside a tavern except to the extent that it induces knowledge of the wine therein, so it is with the remaining bread and wine which function as signs of a latent 19

Ibid., 370: “Possit ergo dici, si placeret satrapis, quod panis et vinum manent, et quelibet particula corporis Christi multiplicata sacramentaliter ad quemlibet punctum eorum. Nec est hoc inconveniens deo, quia secundum aliquos perspectivos corpus sensibile multiplicatur per omnem distanciam, ubi sentitur, ergo corpus Christi habet quoddam esse sub sacramento, sed non dimensionale, nec est ibi quantum vel quale sensibiliter, nec est ibi non quantum, sed est ibi non quantum ibi.” 20 Ibid., 370: “Nec est racio quod anima sit, ubi afficitur, et sensibile, ubi videtur propter eius speciem vel actum, quin per idem corpus Christi est, ubi taliter sacramentaliter operatur, et ita per transsubstanciacionem et conversionem potest intelligi faccio, qua substancia panis et vini fit corpus secundario ibi tanquam signum accidens corporis Christi, significando quod est ibi virtualiter et realiter.”

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reality.21 They do remain, but they are no longer the principal concern of the communicant, whose attention is now fixed on the reality they signify, namely the virtual presence of Christ’s body and blood hidden within. Virtual presence, however, is not meant to imply the merely close approximation of reality conveyed in the modern phrase ‘virtual reality.’ For the divine/human Person of Christ to be present virtually means he is present in the fullness of his power, achieving a level of truth which surpasses all creaturely manifestations. In a sermon written for Easter Sunday 1378, Wyclif warns against identifying this white and round host with Christ, since it is not Christ’s body in nature, for that would mean that Christ could then too be divided. “Thus it is clear that the Christian perceives the Lord’s body in this venerable sacrament through mental perception and not through the bodily senses. By faith one perceives that the complete body of Christ, blood and soul, is wholly present to every point of this sacrament. And among all the mysteries of faith this one seems to be the most difficult for the Christian to comprehend.”22 That Wyclif is moving away from transubstantiation is evident as he declares it sufficient for one to believe that, “Christ’s body is present in some spiritual, sacramental way to every part of the consecrated host,” and that the consecrated host is worthy of the same veneration due a crucifix, which no one believes to be the actual body of the Lord.23 Thus it is worthy of dulia alone and not latria. Wyclif appeals here to an optical theory to explain how Christ can be present sacramentally 21

Ibid., 370: “... hoc igitur signum differt ab aliis in hoc, quod semper est prius suo significato, quod insensibiliter, sed virtualiter latet in illo. Sicut ergo non attenditur ad circulum viridem ut est signum vini, nisi de quanto inducit in noticiam vini quod intus est, sic sciendum est de pane et vino remanentibus.” 22 Sermones IV, xlii, 350: “… quod illa res alba, rotunda, dura, gravis et sapida non est in natura corpus dominicum vel pars eius, quia tunc corpus Christi macularetur, divideretur … Ex quo patet quod sensu mentis non sensu corporis percipit christianus corpus dominicum in hoc venerabile sacramento. Percipit autem ex fide quod plenum corpus Christi sanguis et anima sit ex integro ad omnem punctum huius sacramenti, quod inter omnia misteria fidei videtur difficillimum christiano concipere.” 23 Ibid., 351: “Videtur ergo satis christiano credere quod corpus Christi sit quodammodo spirituali sacramentali ad omnem punctum hostie consecrate et quod illi corpori sit post Deum honor principaliter tribuendus et tercio loco illi sacramento sensibili tamquam ymagini vel sepluchro corporis Christi. Sic enim adoramus crucem Domini non credentes quod illa crux sit corpus Christi vel eius pars eius.”


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and not dimensionally, noting that a face is present to every point of the mirror depending upon the angle one looks at it. If created nature can multiply itself to every point of a mirror, it must be easy enough for uncreated nature to make the body sacramentally present to every point of the sensible sacrament. And here we have an explanation of the classic tripartite definition: “The body of Christ is itself a sacrament insofar as it is a sign of insensible grace, and is yet the res sacramenti because it is signified by the consecrated host, which is the sacramentum tantum, just as grace is the tantum res sacramenti.”24 Wyclif will often make use of optical theories to explain how Christ can be present to all points of the host. Phillips has documented the influence of medieval theories of optics on Wyclif’s thought in general, and with regard to the Eucharist specifically, noting that he would very likely have known the texts of Alhazen and Witelo, and may also have been influenced by Roger Bacon (Phillips 1987). By the end of the 1370s Wyclif’s unease with transubstantiation was increasingly integrated with a general dissatisfaction with his fellow schoolmen. Eucharistic theology is a case in point where Wyclif was clearly losing confidence in the universities to perform their duly allotted role as defenders of orthodoxy. This is evinced in his Dialogus, a short tract written in late 1379, and thus very close to his De eucharistia. Here he describes the universities as places where the rules of charity have been deserted in favor of envy-driven disputes born of the devil, the father of lies. Rather than being places where heresy is destroyed, they are now the very nests of heretical teachings. Indeed, one can hardly count universities as the secure refuges of orthodoxy 24

Ibid., 352: “Unde concipiendum quomodo corpus Christi sit sacramentaliter, non dimensionaliter in hoc venerabili sacramento, videtur conferre sentencia perspectivorum dicencium quod speculo mundo proporcionaliter faciei obiecto est ad omnem punctum talem speculi plena similitudo faciei, licet unus videat in uno loco et alius in alio secundum diversitatem radii incidencie et reflexi. Si ergo natura creata potest facere similitudinem suam vel verius se ipsam esse multiplicatam ad omnem punctum dati medii vel speculi secundum esse intencionabile, facile est nature increate facere corpus sui suppositi esse sacramentaliter secundum totum ad omnem punctum sensibilis sacramenti. Et sic corpus Christi est et sacramentum quia signum gracie insensibilis, et res sacramenti quia signatum hostie consecrate, que tantum est sacramentum, sicut gracia tantum est res sacramenti.”

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when “the new sects” are busy defending the notion that the consecrated host is nothing more than an accident without a subject.25

2 Censure and Condemnation In late 1380, soon after Wyclif had published his De eucharistia tractatus maior in which he expressed his outright aversion to transubstantiation, two principal elements of his eucharistic theology were censured by a council composed of twelve theologians and doctors of canon law convened by the chancellor of Oxford University, William Barton.26 It is noteworthy that Barton was a longtime opponent of Wyclif and the ‘certain doctor’ Wyclif referred to just two years earlier as having accused him of heresy. In fact, Barton is recorded as having determined against Wyclif.27 Efforts to silence Wyclif on matters of dominion and clerical disendowment had been foiled on account of the lay protection he enjoyed, evinced in the Queen Mother’s intervention at Lambeth in 1378. His clerical enemies were surely bitter and resentful, but now in 1380 they had their best chance. Indeed, his lectures on the Eucharist must have seemed a blessing, a self-inflicted mortal wound from which even John of Gaunt could not help him recover. And after Sudbury was killed in the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381, the formidable new Archbishop of Canterbury, William Courtenay, would be just the man to deliver the coup de grâce, as he 25

Dialogus XXVI, 54: “… in universitatibus querunt que sua sunt, caritatis regulas deserentes; ex quo pullulant invidie, comparaciones personarum et patrie, et multa alia seminaria patris mendacii … Et quantum ad destrucciones heresum, videtur multis quod talia studia sint nidus heresis et fomentum … Ut que securitas est in istis defendo quod hostia consecrata non sit corpus domini sed accidens incognitum sine subjecto, ut reserant nove secte?” 26 Concerning this series of events and the composition of the council cf. FZ, 10514. On evidence for the dating of the condemnation of Wyclif’s eucharistic doctrine see Matthew, 328-30. For more information regarding the circumstances of the Oxford censure cf. Gwynn, 258-61; Workman, 2:140-48; Dahmus, 129-35. 27 FZ, 241: “Item magister Willelmus Berton, postea cancellarius Oxoniensis, secularis, strenue egit ac determinavit contra magistrum Johannem Wycclyff; qui


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undoubtedly harbored a deep resentment towards Wyclif since his days as Bishop of London. While Wyclif was not actually mentioned by name in the censure issued by Barton, the council did condemn two specific tenets which could be drawn from De eucharistia. In the preamble, Barton speaks of those who would attempt to break asunder the unity of Holy Mother Church by reviving heresies she had previously condemned, as they publicly assert the following pestiferous doctrines.28 It is important to note that while both propositions are censured the second is considered especially grave. This is understandable since the first proposition only asserts the substantial remnance of the bread: “In the sacrament of the altar the substance of the material bread and wine, which were present previously before the consecration, really remain after consecration.” The second is deemed even worse (execrabilius), however, since it is a rejection of Christ’s substantial presence: “In that venerable sacrament the body and blood of Christ does not exist essentially, nor substantially, nor even corporeally, but rather figuratively or metaphorically, such that Christ is not truly there is his own proper corporeal person.”29 While the council declared these assertions to be in opposition to the determinations of the Church and contrary to Catholic truths, they are still referred to as ‘erroneous’ at this stage, and not specifically heretical. Anyone who, after the third warning, persists in teaching or defending “the two aforementioned erroneous assertions,” whether inside or outside the university, is subject to incarceration, suspension from all scholastic activity, and excommunication.30 The true posiquidem magister Willelmus, dum exstitit cancellarius, dedit sententiam contra Wycclyff residentem in cathedra, in schola Augustinensum.” 28 Ibid., 110: “ … scilicet sanctae matris ecclesiae scindere unitatem, quasdem haereses olim ab ecclesia solemniter condemnatas, his diebus, pro dolor, innovant; et tam in ista universitate, quam extra, publice dogmatizant; duo inter alia sua documenta pestifera asserenetes.” 29 Ibid., 110: “Primo, in sacramento altaris substantiam panis materialis et vini, quae prius fuerunt ante consecrationem, post consecrationem realiter remanere. Secundo, quod execrabilius est auditu, in illo venerabili sacramento non esse corpus Christi et sanguinem, essentialiter nec substantialiter, nec etiam corporaliter, sed figurative seu tropice; sic quod Christus non sit ibi veraciter in sua propria persona corporali.” 30 Ibid., 112: “… ne quis de cetero, cujuscunque gradus, status, aut conditionis existat, praemissas duas assertiones erroneas, aut earum alteram in scholis vel

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tion of the Church is defined as follows: “Through the sacramental words duly spoken by the priest, the bread and the wine on the altar are transubstantiated into the true body and blood of Christ, or substantially converted, such that after the consecration the material bread and wine do not remain in that venerable sacrament, which were present previously according to their substances or natures, but only the species of the same, under which species the true body and blood of Christ are really contained, not only figuratively or metaphorically, but essentially, substantially, and corporeally. Thus Christ is there truly in his proper corporeal presence. This must be believed, must be taught, and against all adversaries must be resolutely defended.”31 According to Wyclif, the censure was passed by the narrow margin of seven to five, but as Dahmus rightly notes, Barton could never have publicly stated this to have been a unanimous decision were it not the case. Perhaps Wyclif is referring to the debates that went on behind the scenes before all agreed to sign the censure (Dahmus, 132).32 Along these lines, one might add that it is quite possible the condemnation of substantial remnance evoked more resistance within the commission on the part of those who could surely have argued that,

31

32

extra scholas, in hac universitate, publice teneat, doceat, defendat; sub poena incarcerationis, et suspensionis ab omni actu scholastico; ac sub poena excommunicationis majoris … ac districtius inhibemus ne quis de cetero aliquem publice docentem, tenentem, seu defendentem praemissas duas assertiones erroneas, aut earum alteram, in scholis vel extra scholas, in hac universitate, quovismodo audiat vel ascultet.” Ibid., 111: “… et eorum judico declaratum, ipsas esse erroneas, atque determinationibus ecclesiae repugnantes; contradictioriasque earundem esse veritates catholicas, ex dictis sanctorum et determinationibus ecclesiae manifeste sequentes, videlicet quod per verba sacramentalia a sacerdote rite prolata, panis et vinum in altari in verum corpus Christi et sanguinem transubstantiantur, seu substantialiter convertuntur, sic quod post consecrationem non remanent in illo venerabili sacramento panis materialis et vinum, quae prius, secundum suas substantias seu naturas, sed solum species eorundem, sub quibus speciebus verum corpus Christi et sanguis realiter continentur, non solum figurative seu tropice, sed essentialiter, substantialiter, ac corporaliter; sic quod Christus est ibi veraciter in sua propria praesentia corporali: hoc credendum, hoc docendum, hoc contra omnes contradictentes viriliter defendum.” De blasphemia VI, 89: “… ut VII doctores dicuntur Oxonie non introisse pretorium ut non contaminarentur, sed ut dampnarent corpus Cristi non esse substancialiter in sacramento pascali.”


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taken alone, this had long been considered orthodox. It is the denial of Christ’s substantial presence which would have been almost impossible to defend, and it is that second article which is reckoned exceptionally odious. At any rate, one of those committee members who originally dissented may well have been the future university chancellor, Robert Rigg, who would prove very sympathetic to Oxford Wycliffites over the next year. It is also of some interest that among the twelve doctors on the commission, Rigg is one of only two secular theologians, thus listed as sacrae paginae professor et secularis, while the rest were monks, friars and lawyers (FZ, 112-13). And while Wyclif had until this time enjoyed relatively good relations with the mendicants, he had not so with the monks. As it stood, the censure issued by the commission was an academic matter to be handled within the schools. In May of 1382, however, Archbishop Courtenay convened a council at Blackfriars in London which raised the stakes to the more serious level of official ecclesiastical condemnation. The Blackfriars Council condemned ten propositions as heretical and fourteen as erroneous, though never attaching Wyclif’s name to the propositions. Of the ten heretical propositions the first three speak directly to Wyclif’s denial of transubstantiation. Numbers one and three mirror Barton’s Oxford council, as the first condemns substantial remnance of the material bread, and the third that Christ is not present identically and really in his own proper corporeal person. The second proposition condemned states that accidents do not remain without a subject after consecration. The fourth is a broader sacramental proposition not directly linked to transubstantiation, namely that a bishop or priest in a state of mortal sin neither ordains, consecrates nor baptizes. The remaining propositions concern matters largely having to do with dominion and clerical prerogatives.33 While the council surely had Wyclif in mind, along with his sympathizers, it is noteworthy that when Wyclif did respond to the 33

FZ, 277-78: “Quod substantia panis materialis et vini maneat post consecrationem in sacramento altaris (1);” “Item quod accidentia non maneant sine subjecto post consecrationem in eodem sacramento (2);” “Item quod Christus non sit in sacramento altaris identice, vere, et realiter in propria praesentia corporali (3);” “Item quod si episcopus vel sacerdos existat in peccato mortali: non ordinat, conficit, nec baptizat (4).” For a thorough analysis of the Blackfriars council cf. Dahmus, 89-128.

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Blackfriars list, he claims that some of the propositions condemned at the ‘Earthquake Council,’ as it was known, were orthodox and others patently heretical. While Wyclif stood by the first three it is unclear whether he would have approved the fourth (and this will be treated later).34 These twenty-four propositions were subsequently included in the list of forty-five Wycliffite errors condemned at Constance in 1415 (Denzinger, 1151-95). Wyclif’s popularity at Oxford seems not to have dimmed much since his retirement, and it was this that prompted Courtenay to act decisively, demanding the publication of the twenty-four condemned propositions at the university, though that too met with opposition. On May 28, 1382 the Blackfriars condemnation was sent to Robert Rigg, now chancellor of the university. Rigg as it turns out had chosen the Wycliffite Philip Repingdon to preach the Corpus Christi Day sermon scheduled for June 5 of that year. Earlier that spring Repingdon had publicly defended Wyclif’s eucharistic theology, and now the chancellor chose him to preach on the very feast day dedicated to the Blessed Sacrament. Rigg had in fact also chosen another Wycliffite, Nicholas Hereford, to preach the Ascension Day sermon.35 Courtenay instructed the Carmelite Peter Stokes to read the Blackfriars condemnation on Corpus Christi prior to Repingdon’s sermon, and in a letter to Rigg he told the chancellor both to assist Stokes and to have the condemnations read publicly in the theological schools. A strong subplot in this whole episode is that of academic freedom and the rights of the university to sort out its own affairs. Some at Oxford may have regarded Courtenay’s action to be an infringement upon their liberty. For Chancellor Rigg is reported to have claimed that the Archbishop had no power over the university, even in a case of heresy.36 As it turned out Stokes did present the condemnations to Rigg, but the 34

Sermones III, liv, 468: “Quantum ad dampnacionem atque catholicacionem factas in illo concilio Terremotus, patet ex dictis quomodo alique sunt catholice, et alique plene heretice. … Talia enim fingunt de viris catholicis, ut suam famam denigrent …” Cf. Sermones III, l, 436; ibid., III, li, 441-42; and Trialogus IV, xxvii, 338-41. 35 I follow Workman’s narration of the events. Cf. Workman vol. 2:273-82. For the relevant documents cf. FZ, 296-317. 36 FZ, 299: “ … et dicebat quod nec episcopus nec archiepiscopus haberet super universitatem potestatem aliquam, etiam in causa haeresis.”


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chancellor delayed publishing them, saying that he would first have to consult the university on proper procedure. Repingdon then preached his sermon, and while saying little about transubstantiation, declared Wyclif “a most catholic doctor” who never taught anything that the whole Church did not maintain regarding the sacrament of the altar, and moreover, that his opinion on the Eucharist is “absolutely true.”37 The event concluded with Repingdon preaching to great acclaim, leaving the Church joyfully with Rigg, while Stokes feared for his own life amidst the crowd. Courtenay was hardly content to leave matters there, and soon brought Rigg and the other recalcitrant academics to heel, summoning them to appear before him, after which the condemnations were soon published at Oxford in Latin and English. Thus would begin the effective stamping out of Wycliffism at Oxford, initiated decisively by Courtenay and ended by his successor Arundel. These events belong to the year 1382, after Wyclif had left the university for his parish in Lutterworth where he spent the remainder of his life actively writing until his death on December 31, 1384. Wyclif did present a specific rejoinder to the university censure soon before his departure in the latter part of 1381. His Confessio may be pegged to May 10, 1381 (note the date is not entirely certain; and also that the tract was later incorporated into his De apostasia). This concise work elicited responses from fellow schoolmen, among them the Franciscan John Tissington, who had been a member of Barton’s commission, as well as the Austin friar Thomas Winterton. The latter’s response will be considered further on. Before analyzing Wyclif’s position at length, that which led to his censure and followed it, the opening pages of this response will help us get our bearings before launching upon the thematic treatment. The Confessio begins: “I have often confessed, and still do confess, that the same body of Christ in number that was assumed from the Virgin Mary, suffered on the cross, that lay dead in the tomb over the course of the blessed triduum, that on the third day was resurrected, that after forty days ascended into heaven and is seated forever at the 37

Ibid., 307: “ … et quod suus magister Johannes Wycclyff est doctor maxime catholicus; et quod nunquam Wycclyff aliter determinavit vel docuit, in materia de sacramento altaris, quam tota ecclesia Dei tenet; et quod opinio sua de sacramento altaris est verissma.”

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right hand of the Father; that very one, I say, that same body and same substance is truly and really the sacramental bread or consecrated host, which the faithful perceive in the hands of the priest. It is so proven, because Christ, who cannot lie, so asserts it.”38 The language is ‘Paschasian’ with its emphasis on the presence of the body of the historical Christ. Wyclif does not say that this body is present under the species of the sacramental bread, however, but instead that it is truly and really the sacramental bread. Having so identified the body and the bread, he must then clarify his position: “Nevertheless, I dare not say that the body of Christ is essentially, substantially, corporeally, or identically that bread. Indeed, the extended body of Christ is that bread, but the body itself is not extensively or dimensionally that bread.”39 How then is Christ’s body present? The answer involves an explanation of various modes of existence. “We believe that the mode of existence of Christ’s body in the consecrated host is threefold, namely virtual, spiritual and sacramental. It is virtual as in the mode by which he [Christ] duly operates throughout his entire dominion according to the properties of his nature or grace. The mode of existence is spiritual, however, as in the manner by which the body of Christ is in the Eucharist and in his saints through grace. And the third mode of existence is sacramental, the manner by which the body of Christ is uniquely in the consecrated host. And just as the second mode presupposes the first, so the third mode presupposes the second.”40 38

Ibid., 115: “Saepe confessus sum, et adhuc confiteor, quod idem corpus Christi in numero quod fuit assumptum de Virgine, quod passum est in cruce, quod pro sancto triduo jacuit mortuum in sepulcro, quod tertia die resurrexit, quod post quadraginta dies ascendit in coelum, et quod sedet perpetuo ad dextram Dei Patris; ipsum, inquam, idem corpus, et eadem substantia est vere et realiter panis sacramentalis vel hostia consecrata, quam fideles sentiunt in manibus sacerdotis. Probatio est, quia Christus, qui mentiri non potest, sic asserit.” 39 Ibid., 115: “Non tamen audeo dicere quod corpus Christi sit essentialiter, substantialiter, corporaliter, vel identice ille panis. Sicut corpus Christi extensum est ille panis; sed ipsum corpus non est extense vel dimensionaliter ille panis.” 40 Ibid., 115-16: “Credimus enim quod triplex est modus essendi corporis Christi in hostia consecrata, scilicet virtualis, spiritualis, et sacramentalis. Virtualis est quo bene facit per totum suum dominium, secundum bona naturae vel gratiae. Modus autem essendi spiritualis est, quo corpus Christi est in eucharistia et sanctis per gratiam. Et tertius modus essendi sacramentalis, quo corpus Christi est singulariter in hostia consecrata. Et sicut secundus modus praeexigit primum, ita tertius modus secundum praeexigit, quia impossibile est praescitum carentem


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3 Wyclif ’s Reaction to Popular Piety When, by mid to late 1380, Wyclif had completed the lectures on the Eucharist that formed his De eucharistia tractatus maior, he ignited the controversy that forced his departure from Oxford. He begins this treatise by affirming the traditional tripartite definition of the Eucharist consisting of the nudum sacramentum, namely the elements alone; the sacramentum and res sacramenti, which is the true body and blood; and the res sacramenti apart from the sacramentum, which is that union of Christ with his mystical body the Church.41 He likewise accepts the standard scholastic explanation that the body of Christ itself is not broken during the Mass, but only the sacramentum, such that the body of Christ is not bruised by the teeth of the faithful who spiritually receive it intact.42 And also in keeping with tradition, he notes that were a beast to eat the consecrated host it would receive only the nudum sacramentum. But as he explains this phenomenon one begins to see where it might lead, when he notes that while a lion eating a human being does not eat the person’s soul, even as the soul is present to every part of the body, so it is that Christ is present in the host. That is to say, “the whole body is present sacramentally, spiritually and virtually to every point of the consecrated host, just as the soul is to the body.”43 There is no talk of substantial presence; as we shall see, that is ruled out. fide secundum justitiam praesentem conficere. Qui ergo credit, sive conficiat, sive non conficiat, manducat, ut dicit B. Augustinus super Johannem, Homilia 25.” Cf. Augustine, Tract. in Ioh. XXV, 12; CCSL 36; 254: “Credere in Christum est manducare ipsum. Ut quid paras dentem et ventrem? Crede, et manducasti.” Cf. also Friedberg 1:1331. Wyclif’s last statement here regarding consecration on the part of the foreknown priest will be discussed further on in this study. 41 De eucharistia tractatus maior I, 11: “In qua materia dixi sepe populo quod in sacramento altaris est tria considerare, scilicet nudum sacramentum sic quod non rem sacramenti ut hostiam consecratam; secundo sacramentum et rem sacramenti ut verum corpus Christi et sanguinem; et tercio rem sacramentum ut unionem Christi cum corpore suo mistico quod est ecclesia.” 42 Ibid., 12: “ … et corpus Christi non frangitur, manifestum est quod illud sacramentum quod frangitur, non est corpus Christi …” Ibid., 13: “Nec conterimus corpus Christi dentibus sed spiritualiter integrum ipsum accipimus.” 43 Ibid., 11-12: “ … cum tales bestie possunt comedere hostiam consecratam que est nudum sacramentum et non corpus Christi vel sanguis. Ymmo sicut leo comedens corpus hominis non comedit eius animam, licet sit ad omnem punctum illius

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That Wyclif begins his De eucharistia with an attempt to quash any thought of Christ’s tangible presence in the host, however orthodox and traditional his arguments, is actually indicative if his preoccupation with what he sees as the materialistic, and thus potentially idolatrous, dangers attached to the doctrine of transubstantiation. We noted Catto’s argument that Wyclif was deeply troubled by the superstition which transubstantiation could induce among the laity; this is surely right. And yet despite the fact that Wyclif believes transubstantiation, especially as it is manifested in popular preaching, leads to idolatry, he is not opposed to all things visual in matters of devotion. As Aston observes, Wyclif was no extremist on this point, seeing as he allows for the proper use of images not only for teaching the laity, but for arousing in them love for God. Excessive ornamentation is condemned as one might expect. The adoration of images, as well as that of the host, is deemed a violation of the First Commandment; but the laity’s access to visual representations of the truth is not rejected outright. (Aston 1984, 137-43). In his 1375-76 De mandatis divinis, he says that images may serve to the good or the ill, either exciting faithful hearts to an even more devout worship of God, or conversely, leading people away from the truth of the faith.44 That being said, he warns against the tendency of many to think that the divine is actually contained within the image, thus adoring one image more than another on the grounds that it will have even greater effect; for that does amount to idolatry.45 Here, though, Wyclif’s abiding concern comes to the fore: misunderstanding the role of images is an occasion for diabolical deception. No human work is to be adored as if it could perform a miracle. This is the devil’s way of blinding an

corporis, sic intelligendum est de corpore Christi in sacramento altaris. Ipsum enim est totum sacramentaliter, spiritualiter vel virtualiter ad omnem punctum hostie consecrate, sicut anima est in corpore.” 44 De mandatis divinis XV, 156: “Et patet quod ymagines tam bene quam male possunt fieri: bene ad excitandum, facilitandum, et accendendum mentes fidelium, ut colant devocius Deum suum; et male ut occasione ymaginum a veritate fidei aberretur …” 45 Ibid., 156-57: “In secundo errant plurimi putantes aliquid numinis esse subiective in ymagine, et sic uni ymagini plus affecti quam alteri adorant ymagines, quod indubie est ydolatria; ut ostenditur Baruch VI per decem deducciones.”


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adulterous generation seeking after signs.46 All too often pilgrims are cheated out of their money, unaware as they are that the image remains an ineffective sign, except to the extent that it rouses a person’s mind and stirs his affections to the contemplation of heavenly things.47 People deceived into mistaking signs for things, the classic error Augustine commented upon almost a thousand years earlier, is for Wyclif an all too real state of affairs. “We must show the greatest diligence and be on our guard, lest we partake of that poison offered beneath honey, idolatrously worshipping the sign in place what it signifies.”48 By 1380 he reckons the Eucharist to be the most egregious example of this very sort of thing. The excesses of popular piety were disturbing enough to Wyclif, but what really angered him were those churchmen who encouraged such excesses. He writes of one account in which the host descended from the altar, crept into the ventricle of a man with a sick heart, and immediately cured him.49 Perhaps what Wyclif goes on to say is more to the point, for it is not the story itself which so rattles him, but the fact that the narrator later admitted it was a “pulchrum mendacium.” There are no ‘lovely lies’ from Wyclif’s standpoint, inasmuch as this all smacks of the idolatry born of Antichrist’s cult of signs. Indeed, the very signs or fables his opponents use in their hope of increasing eucharistic devotion might just as well seduce the people into wor46

Ibid., 157: “Ysaie XLIV patet idem: Truncus enim, figura vel aliud opus humanum non est adorandum, cum ipsum non facit miracula, sed dyabolus occasione infidelitatis illudit plures putantes quandoque esse miraculum, ubi est pure decepcio. Et de ista decepcione generacionis adultere signum querentis populus Christi continue plus cecatur.” 47 Ibid., 157: “Ideo predicandum est contra preciositatem, speciositatem et alias sophisticaciones quibus illudimus peregrinos pocius propter pecunias hauriendas quam propter religionem Christi in popula augendam. Quelibet enim ymago est ad hoc inefficax, nisi de quanto expergefacit intellectum et affectum hominis ad intendendum celestibus …” 48 Ibid., 157: “… patet quod summa diligencia cavere debemus venenum sub melle adorando ydolatrice signum loco signati.” 49 De eucharistia I, 19-20: “… ut audivi quendam fingere quomodo hostia de altari paulatim descendit ad ventrem ecclesie et ingressum est cor cuiusdam infirmi qui devote et publice professus est sic inquiens: Tu Deus nosti … Hostia vero fisso pectore cum corde infirmi surrepsit in cordis ventriculum, et sic infirmus constitutus est subito totus sane.”

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shipping moles and bats rather than God.50 Lay people, in Wyclif’s eyes, were for the most part pious simpletons seeking direction, and thus easily duped by fast-talking mendici armed with sweet-sounding mendacia. In this vein, Keen’s point is well taken: there is in Wyclif a “passionate anger” as he comes to see the friars living by a rule which is a human addition to Scripture, hawking humanly devised indulgences, and now promoting a eucharistic doctrine with no scriptural foundation (Keen 1985, 14). Anger soon leads to a call to action, for if it is fitting that a tenant fight for his temporal Lord when honor is offended and lies are spread around, then surely one must defend Christ’s honor against the defamation of these false friars.51 Solemn processions, people straining to get a look at the host in its monstrance like some sacred relic, friars preaching their eucharistic miracle stories; it is all the result of this unscriptural, metaphysical impossibility. Idolatry will surely result when people fail to realize that it is Christ’s spiritual presence which is hidden within the sacrament. Only when this is grasped can God be rightly worshipped.52 Again and again Wyclif stresses that while Christ is present, only the intellect perceives his body through faith. The saints, he says, maintain that not even glorified human eyes can carnally see Christ’s body and blood in the host.53 That substantial presence bears materialistic overtones for Wyclif is evident when he laments that nothing could be more horrible to imagine than, following the celebration of the Mass, the 50

Ibid., 20: “Et postquam narrator iste ex narracione et populi devocione fuit ad partem a quodam familiari socio commendatus, confessus est mandacium hoc turpe: Os finxit, inquit, hoc pulchrum mandacium. … fuit ex cultu Antichristi ydolatra manifestus. Revera sic posset ex signis seduci populus quod coleret talpas et verspertiliones et creaturas magis abhominabiles tanquam Deum.” 51 Trialogus IV, 27, 340: “Si ergo fidelis tenens temporalis domini offenditur et offert se ad pugnam propter hoc quod alius mentitur in diffamationem super suum dominum temporalem, quanto magis fidelis quilibet, qui debet Christum summe diligere, offenderetur et impugnaret spiritualiter contra talem quemlibet pseudofratrem.” 52 De eucharistia I, 15: “Et patet quod destructo errore ydolatrie plus et purius coleretur Deus quam modo colitur, quia credendum est quod Christus in sacramentis illis praesens absconditur.” 53 Ibid., 19: “Sed modo nullus sensus hominis sed pure intellectus per fidem percipit corpus Christi …” Ibid., 20: “ … ideo secundum vere perspectivorum principia non sic videtur oculo corporali, in tantum quod sancti tenent nec oculum corporis glorificati nec eciam oculum Christi posse carnaliter videre corpus Christi vel sanguinem in hostia consecrata.”


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priest would be carrying around God corporeally on the tips of his fingers, such that whatever he touched with his fingers would thereby come into contact with the Lord’s body.54 By the middle of 1381 Wyclif is arguing that heresy and idolatry hide under the cloak of sanctity. If idolaters are those who worship the creature as though it were God, then the clergy and many of the people must be idolaters, since they adore the host, which is itself bread in nature and Christ in a figure. Yet were the host identical with the body of Christ it would have to be God, since Christ is the incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity. So it is then that these idolaters claim the host is naturally the very body of Christ which is glorified in heaven.55 For all of this, Wyclif even now grants that relics, images and sacraments can be venerated if done so prudently. This requires that the person put aside any consideration of the sensible sign itself and focus his attention and affection on the divine creator of this image, just as a cleric turns his attention away from the inscribed texts themselves and looks to their meaning. And in this way one worships God with due latria through the visible sign. The problem is that many among the laity are worshipping the host itself, lapsing into idolatry, such that they are reckoned no better than mere brutes bearing their yokes of servitude.56 Wyclif blames the preachers of 54

Ibid., 22-23: “Quid enim horribilius quam quod sacerdos post celebracionem portat corporaliter Deum in extremitatibis digitorum et quidquid tetigerit cum illis digitis facit corpus dominicum illud tangere?” 55 De blasphemia II, 20: “… ut in sacramento sub pallio sanctitatis sunt hereses et ydolatrie simulate, ut patet de sacramento altaris. In qua materia si ydolatre sunt quicunque qui adorant creaturam non deum tamquam deum, patet quod tam de clero quam populo multi sunt idolatre: cum multi credunt et adorant hostiam (que de facto est panis in natura et corpus Cristi in figura) ac si esset naturaliter et idemptice corpus Cristi et sic deus, cum notum sit quod corpus Cristi est Cristus et per consequens deus noster, ut patet in materia de incarnacione. Et tamen ad tantum ydolatre nostri insaniunt, quod dicunt non esse aliud naturaliter corpus Cristi in celo glorificatum …” 56 De eucharistia IX, 318: “Conceditur ergo quod reliquie, ymagines, et sacramenta sunt cum prudencia adoranda. Ille ergo qui sciret suspendere consideracionem signi sensibilis et appendere totam intencionem et affecionem in creatore ymaginis, modo quo clericus suspendit scripturas concipiendo sentenciam; ille inquam adoraret latria Deum in illo signo. Sed nimis multi sunt layci et bestiales sensibilibus nimium intendentes et multi, ut loquitur Apostolus I Cor. XII, 2, cum adorando hostiam tanquam gentes ad simulacra muta prout ducebantur captivi euntes ad ydolatrandum sicut brutum ad iugum servilis operis.”

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transubstantiation, primarily the friars, not only for leading the people into idolatry and heresy, but for what is worse: de-humanizing them, stripping them of their rational capacities and reducing them to merely sentient beasts. The mendicant orders are especially culpable, precisely because they are so well educated. They have plenty of books offering testimony to the truth, and yet rather than preaching the true faith contained therein they preach their own blasphemy to the people. This is what makes the friars all the more treacherous from his standpoint. For even while they know the visible sacrament handled by the priest is not identical with Christ’s body, they refuse to tell this to the people for fear that devotion to the host would be lost. They prefer instead to allow these poor folk to wallow in the filth of idolatry.57 Continually inveighing against the religious orders, who claim the consecrated host is a collection of accidents without a subject, he thinks that, given their druthers, these disciples of Innocent III would have the laity believe the sacrament is the head of a donkey, or any other substance one could name—anything but bread. Because Wyclif reads the equation of the bread and body figuratively (as we shall see just below), so the sacrament must only be adored vicariously, accorded a status a little higher than that of humanly created images.58 All the while the laity think that the bread is identical with Christ’s body, however, and the friars are loathe to rid them of this error, on the one hand because they themselves do not really know what the sensible sacrament is, and on the other, because doing so 57

De blasphemia II, 21: “Et omnino culpandi sunt fratres qui habent codices suos plenos hoc testimonio, tam novos quos appreciantur ut ewangelium, quam antiquos; et tamen suam blasfeme reticent et depravant, ut codices ipsorum sunt pleni: quod non videtur corpus Cristi in sacramento oculo corporali; quod sacramentum illud visum corporaliter ab eis in manibus sacerdotis nec est nec esse potest corpus domini ydemptice, nec pars eius. Et tamen dicunt: Talia non sunt predicanda populo, ne eius devocio extinguatur; sed permitti debet in eius ydolatria sordescere.” 58 Sermones I, xiii, 92: “Quantum ad hostiam consecratam, patet ex spe dictis quomodo blasphemi et ydolatre in ista materia sunt divisi. Nam religiosi nostri qui abhorrent quod panem consecrent sed accidencia, defendunt pertinaciter quod ipsum sacramentum (sic tractatum ab ipsis sensibiliter) sit accidens ab eis incognitum in nullo simpliciter subiectatum. Et revera Innocencius et eius discipuli possent cicius facere multos fideles credere quod ipsum sacramentum sit caput asini vel quecunque alia substancia nominanda. Est igitur ipsum sacramentum verus panis, factus virtute verborum Domini corpus Christi; et sic cum hec


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would impinge upon their own wealth and status. Instead, they are content to let an idolatrous generation sink into this violation of the first commandment. One can only yearn for the day when God will cleanse the Church of this deceitful infidelity and restore the pristine state that awaits her in the world to come.59 English bishops must also share in the blame as they allow the heresy of transubstantiation to spread throughout the realm, either because they do not understand it, or because they care more for the wealth its cult engenders.60

4 Reading Christ’s Words: ‘Hoc est Corpus meum’ Throughout Wyclif’s later writings, whether having to do with dominion, the papacy, or the Eucharist, the one persistent charge leveled against all who would attempt to block his efforts is that they do not know how to interpret Scripture correctly. All evil stems from the Church having turned her back on biblical logic. Thus it is so important that the Church rightly interpret that small, but central proposition, ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’ Wyclif enters into the centuriesold debate, arguing by 1380 that the demonstrative pronoun ‘hoc’ must refer to the bread, for if it designates bread and wine at the beginning, and they are subsequently converted at the end, then the proposition would either be false in its succession or just irrelevant to locucio secundum Augustinum Hoc est corpus meum sit figurativa, patet quod ipsum sacramentum sit adorandum vicarie paulo supra imagines ab homine fabricatas.” 59 Ibid., 92: “Communitas autem laicorum putat quod panis ille sit idemptice corpus Christi, nec audent fratres errorem istum abstergere, tum quia ignorant quid secundum naturam sit illud sensibile sacramentum, tum eciam quia timent sibi quod perderent lucrum temporalium atque famam, et sic ut infideles heretici incidunt in prevaricacionem primi mandati, et sic idem foret purgare ecclesiam ab hac infideli prevaricancia et facere eam pentius sine ruga quod solius Dei est reservatum ad statum in patria.” 60 Sermones I, lx, 395: “Iam enim et fere ab Innocenio III pullulavit heresis de sacramento altaris, quod est qualitas, quantitas sive nichil, et quod ibi non est sacramentum preter illud quod est naturaliter corpus Christi; et ita consequenter negant infideles quod panem Christus cepit in manibus fecit esse sacramentaliter corpus suum. Et non obstante quod ista heresis sit in Anglia hodie adeo dilatata,

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the conversion. If the pronoun demonstrates what is already Christ’s body then nothing new is constituted; and if the pronoun connotes the body of Christ as that which is the under the accidents without functioning as their subject, then this is just contrary to Scripture.61 The bread which Christ took in his hands is demonstrated by the first pronoun (hoc), and the very same thing is demonstrated by the following pronoun (meum). The same bread must be demonstrated by the subject of the sacramental proposition, for no faithful person can be expected to believe that Christ accepted the bread and gave it to the disciples, unless he was thinking of the bread when he uttered that first pronoun (hoc). Were this not the case, Christ would be guilty of nothing less than having deceived his Church.62 The ‘hoc’ must supposit for the bread which remains after the consecration, even though it is true that the bread is the body of Christ. After all, Christ blessed this bread before giving it to the disciples; had he destroyed its substance in this process it would have been a curse more severe than the one which withered the fig tree, for then at least the substance of the tree remained.63 But Christ is the greatest auctor of all: “Christ, who cannot have lied, said the bread which he took in hands is really my body. And he did not err in that regard, nor did he assert a tamen episcopi nostri ad istud subditorum periculum non attendunt, vel quia ipsi ut infideles ignorant materiam vel quia terrenum lucrum et singularia negocia magis curant.” 61 De eucharistia V, 123: “Si autem demonstratur pronomine panis aut vinum in principio et in fine fit conversio, tunc proposicio in sua successione foret falsa vel conversioni impertinens, nisi sompnietur quod Deus instituit proposicionem talem ad habendum efficaciam taliter convertendi; quod non fundabitur. Si demonstretur pronomine corpus Christi, tunc nihil novi constituitur, ut sic Christi carnis effectivum. Si autem pronomen connotat quod hoc sub istis accidentibus non subiectatis est corpus Christi, petitur infundabiliter contra scripture ordinem sompniatum.” 62 Trialogus IV, 3, 251-52: “Nam priori pronomine demonstratur panis quem sumpsit in manibus; sed sequenti pronomine demonstratur idem quod fuit antea demonstratum; ergo per subjectum propositionis sacramentalis demonstratur etiam idem panis. Quomodo, rogo, caperet fidelis ingenium, quod Christus accepit panem in manibus, benedixit et fregit, et mandavit ex illo apostolos manducare, nisi intellexerit priori pronomine illum panem? … tum etiam quia Christus aliter nimis illuderet suae ecclesiae; et ista ratio de demonstratione pronominis daret fidelibus plenam fidem.” 63 De eucharistia IX, 293: “Admisso ergo quod panis demonstratur in proposicione illa conversiva: Hoc est corpus meum, manifestum est quod supposita eius veritate


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falsehood. Thus it was truly such.”64 When it is recorded that the Apostles knew Christ in the breaking of the bread, Wyclif’s opponents think this denotes the fracture of an accident apart from its subject. Yet they have surely fallen under the sway of Antichrist as he destroys all grammar, logic, natural knowledge, and most distressingly, obliterates the meaning of the gospel.65 Once more, it is the veracity, the authority, of Christ which is at stake: “What greater blasphemy could there be than to say that Christ, who is God and the Lord of Truth, authorizes such errors specifically for his own people? Without a doubt, such a deviation from evangelical law is the reason why those false disciples of Antichrist render themselves more ignorant than either beasts or pagans.”66 Wyclif will so often appeal to the “Truth, who cannot lie,” reminding the faithful that they are never permitted to falsify the word of Christ, and so must concede that the bread is truly and really the body while retaining its own nature after the sacramental conversion.67 Christ is the auctor whose words bear the utmost auctoritas, and must not be tampered with for any reason. sequitur panem remanere post consecracionem; nam post consecracionem est verum quod ille panis est corpus Christi, ideo post consecracionem remanet quod ille panis est panis. … Nam si ille panis benedictus secundum se totum destruatur, illa benediccio foret crudelior sive severior quam malediccio qua Christus maledixit ficui, Matt. XXI, quia post malediccionem ficus, substantia eius remansit arida, hic dicitur nichil de panis substancia remanere et conversio nichil facit ad bonitatem panis sive sue essencie.” 64 Trialogus IV, 2, 250: “Et eadem sententia patet plane Marci xiv. Lucae xxii. et I Cor. xi.; ex quibus fides ecclesiae observat in consecratione hujus hostiae hunc ordinem: ‘Qui pridie quam pateretur accepit Jesus panem …’ Christus, qui mentiri non potuit, dixit panem, quem accepit in manibus, esse realiter corpus meum, et non erravit in isto nec falsum asseruit, ergo veraciter fuit ita.” 65 Ibid., IV, 5, 261: “Nam ipsi nec construendo nec praedicando intelligunt voces suas, quando dicunt, quod apostoli noverunt Christum in fractione panis, hoc est in fractione accidentis sine subjecto. Et sic antichristus in ista haeresi destruit grammaticam, logicam, et scientiam naturalem; sed quod magis dolendum est, tollit sensum evangelii.” 66 Ibid., 262: “Quae ergo major blasphema quam dicere, quod Christus, qui est Deus et Dominus veritatis, tales errores specialiter in suo populo auctorisat? Indubie declinatio a lege evangelica est in causa, quare isti pseudodiscipuli antichristi reddunt se plus ignaros quam sunt bestiae vel pagani.” 67 Sermones II, lxi, 453: “Dicit enim Veritas que mentiri non potest de illo pane: Hoc est corpus meum, et de illo vino vel calice: Hic est sanguis meus. Cum ergo non licet fideli falsificare verbum Christi in minimo, patet quod oportet fidelem concedere panem illum esse vere et realiter corpus Christi et ex vi conversionis illud quod in natura sua est corpus Christi esse vere et realiter panem illum.”

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Wyclif also expresses his displeasure with how the decretists have glossed De consecratione, such that the pronoun ‘hoc’ demonstrates absolutely nothing, since the whole prayer must be taken materially, as though recited by Christ. The theory is that the transformative power is in the divine blessing which is conferred through the priest’s pronouncement of the words. Thus it is an instance of material supposition, whereby the words simply stand in for words and not for actual things. But as Wyclif sees it, this would mean that Christ’s own words are bereft of any genuine signifying power, and thus ineffective in bringing about this miraculous conversion.68 Others, who say that the pronoun simply demonstrates the body, make a mockery of the faith, as one must then conclude Christ only meant that ‘his body is his body.’ Here Wyclif has recourse to Jerome, “that saint who was better acquainted with the sense of Scripture than all those deceitful postillators unleashed since the time of Innocent III.” The bread Christ gave to the disciples is his body, meaning that the pronoun demonstrates the substance of the bread which he had just previously taken in his hands.69 Jerome could not be more clear, says Wyclif: the bread taken in the hands of the priest is the Lord’s body, for Christ, “who cannot lie,” was clearly demonstrating the bread when he said, ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’70 68

Sermones III, xxxiv, 278: “Decretiste quidam ut glossator ordinarius De Consecratione dist. II tenent quod omnino nichil demonstratur pronomine, cum ipsum et tota oracio sumitur materialiter tamquam recitatum a Christo; quod si sit verum, omnino tota oracio sicut et eius subiectum bonum demonstracione significans nichil penitus indicaret. Quomodo ergo forent hec verba Christi in nobis effectiva sacramenti altaris vel panis tam mirabiliter conversiva.” 69 Ibid., 278: “Ideo dicunt alii quod per illud pronomen demonstratur absolute et simpliciter corpus, sed ipsi stulcius maculant fidem nostram, cum iuxta illos Christus non magis intenderet, nisi quod corpus suum sit corpus suum quod a nativitatis sue exordio continue fuit verum, ideo tenenda est sentencia beati Jeronymi in epistola sua ad Helvidiam dicentis, Nos, inquit, audiamus panem quem fregit Dominus deditque discipulis suis as mandicandum corpus esse domini Salvatoris, ipso dicente: Hoc est corpus meum; ubi patet quod iste sanctus (qui plus novit de sensu scripture quam omnes mendaces postilantes a tempore Innocencii III usque hodie) confitetur ut certitudinem fidei quod in ista proposicione sacramentali panis substancia quam Christus ut eius vicarius in manus prius acceperat demonstratur …” Cf. Jerome, Ad Hedibiam II; PL 22; 986. 70 Ibid., 279: “Iste autem sanctus manifeste dicit quod panis ille quem sacerdos capit in manibus consecrando est corpus Domini; quod probat per hoc quod ille qui mentiri non potest dicit: hoc est corpus meum, quem panem ille indubie demonstrando.”


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Wyclif’s reading is obviously at variance with the contemporary interpretations which have to account for the bread’s substantial conversion and subsequent accidental existence. We have looked at a few such readings of ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’ Much of this debate turns on the question of proper and improper speech, with Wyclif arguing that the ‘hoc’ be taken properly as referring to bread, even as the whole proposition is read figuratively. Thus what is really bread undergoes a sacramental, semiotic transformation. We are told that his opponents argue that to read the proposition metaphorically, as if it were a trope, is heretical inasmuch as it renders it false de virtute sermonis, that is, according to the rules of proper speech. To this Wyclif responds that “figurative speech is in fact supremely true, most catholic, and most miraculous form of discourse.”71 As Scripture employs both literal and metaphorical speech, the identification of the bread with the body of Christ has to be figurative in ‘Hoc est corpus meum,’ just as we read John 6:53 figuratively when Christ says one must eat his flesh. Of course, the reader will be selective, seeing as many other passages, such as those referring to the Incarnation, are to be taken “plane sine figura.”72 Defenders of transubstantiation also have to engage in improper, metaphorical discourse. This ‘bread’ cannot really be bread if it is transubstantiated. Wyclif argues that because every saying of Christ is true, so when he called that bread his body he spoke the truth. He records his opponents’ claim, however, that the Author of Scripture actually means this self-subsisting accident without a subject sacramentally signifies the body of Christ.73 For Wyclif, this amounts to a 71

De eucharistia V, 153: “Sed replicatur per hoc quod responsio ista implicat locucionem istam esse tropicam: Hoc est corpus meum, quod est hereticum, cum tunc foret false de virtute sermonis. … Locucio autem tropica est verissima, summe katholica et miraculosissime conversiva.” 72 Trialogus IV, 7, 268: “Ideo absque omni ambiguitate haec est figurativa: ‘hoc est corpus meum,’ ut sunt locutiones de evangelio Johannis; ‘nisi manducaveritis carnem filii hominis, non habebitis vitam in nobis,’ cum multis similibus quae ad sensum alium dixit Christus. Verumtamen aliquae sunt locutiones fidei scripturae quas oportet plane sine figura acccipere, ut in materia de incarnatione concedi debet, quod Jesus noster sit Deus et homo, ut patet ex scripturis collatis ad invicem, ut Johannis i. et Ephes, i. et Hebrae. ii.” 73 Ibid., IV, 3, 253: “Cum autem omne dictum Christi sit verum et summe catholicum, Christus autem dixit, quod iste panis sit corpus suum, manifeste sequitur quod hoc sit verum. … Tertia autem via videns, quod nihil illius panis

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willful distortion of the sacred text. Rather than accept the plain sense of Scripture, these people feel free to impose an extraneous sense upon the Sacred Page which the Holy Spirit never authorized. They have taken it upon themselves to correct Scripture in an effort to bolster their contention that this accident without a subject is not Christ’s body, but only signifies it.74 Yet if, apart from the authority of Scripture, one is permitted to gloss the biblical text so as to claim that what it calls bread really means some accident like quantity, then the ancient faith itself is imperiled. The entire history of Christ’s life could then be denied ad literam, and glossed to prove the opposite. There will no limit to the power of such glossators.75 Not only must one distinguish which passages are to be read literally and which figuratively, the reader must also note that not all figurative speech carries the same weight. Christ the Truth calls something his body and the believer must recognize that such signification possesses an efficacy unmatched by human language; the very Truth who speaks is the Word ‘through whom all things were made (Jn 1:3).’ One must also recognize that Scripture itself varies in its use of signification, such that while it is true that Christ is a lion or a worm, this is true on a different level of predication.76 The words of consecration, spoken by in Christi corpore remanebit, negat quemlibet sensum priorem, sed dicit, quod auctor scripturae intelligit, quod hoc accidens per se sine subjecto signat sacramentaliter corpus Christi.” 74 Ibid., 254: “Similiter cum juxta sanctos, quincunque imposuerit fidei scripturae aliquem sensum extraneum, quem Spiritus Sanctus non flagitat, sit ut sic haereticus, et iste sensus nec ex fidei scripturae, nec ex revelatione vel ratione ostendi poterit. … Oportet enim istos scripturam corrigere, non quod hoc accidens sine subjecto eis incognitum est corpus Christi, sed quod ipsum significat corpus Christi.” 75 De apsotasia III, 49: “Item, si sine auctoritate scripture licet variare vocando sacramentum, quod ipsa vocat panem, non panem sed quantitatem vel aliam vanitatem (et non est finis potencie sic glosantis), videtur quod totam scripturam sacram pari auctoritate poterit sic glosare et sic totam fidem scripture antiquam pervertere et novam inducere, ut totam historiam gestorum Christi negare ad literam et glosare ad suum oppositum; et sic de aliis que in biblia inseruntur.” 76 Sermones III, xxxiv, 283: “Ad hoc enim quod valeat talis argucia oporteret prius fundare quod Veritas que mentiri non potest dixerit talem rem esse corpus suum, sicut dixit de pane sacramentali, quod si Christus concesserit, tunc concedam. Absit enim quod imposicio vel imaginacio nostra de signis habeat tantam efficaciam quantam habet verbum Veritas, que dixit et facta sunt omnia; concedo tamen quod Christus est leo, vermis, vitulus cum predicatis figurativis similibus;


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the Word, creative principle of the universe, uniquely effect what they signify. The bread’s nature is not substantially changed by the blessing, however; it is improved, because a sacramental existence has been bestowed upon its earlier pure natural state. As a result it becomes an effective sign, symbolizing, and thereby making, the true body of Christ become present to every one of its points. And in this way, the bread does indeed receive the true, though metaphorical, predication of the body.77 There is nothing incongruous about the bread retaining its substance while truly being the body of Christ. The man who becomes a lord or prelate retains his proper substance no matter how highly he is presently exalted. “One should believe that by the power of the sacramental words that bread truly becomes the body of Christ through the consecration of the Chief Priest.” Its nature is not destroyed, even as it begins to be the body of Christ sacramentally. When John the Baptist was made Elijah on the strength of Christ’s words he did not cease to be John and so lose his prior substance.78 Hence, while John denied being Elijah, one takes this to mean that he is Elijah figuratively, not personally. There is no contradiction if one speaks equivocally in saying that this sacrament is not the body of Christ, that is, naturally, and yet is the body figuratively.79 et quod in predicatis huiusmodi sunt multi gradus quorum omnium quietans evidencia est ista: fides scripture sic asserit.” 77 De eucharistia V, 153: “Sic, inquam, natura panis melioratur per benediccionem, quia post nudum esse habet superadditum esse sacramentale, ut efficaciter figuret et faciat verum corpus Christi ad quemlibet eius punctum, et sic vere accipit sed tropice predicacionem corporis.” 78 Trialogus IV, 4, 255-56: “… non enim repugnat veritati quod homo, dum fit dominus vel praelatus ecclesiae, desinat esse eadem persona, sed maneat omnino eadem substantia quodammodo exaltata; sic oportet credere quod iste panis virtute verborum sacramentalium fit consecratione sacerdotis primi veraciter corpus Christi, et non potius desinit panis, quam humanitas ex hoc, quod fit Deus, desinit esse homo … Numquid credimus quod Baptista ex hoc quod fuit factus Helias virtute verborum Christi Matth. xi., desiit esse Johannes vel aliquid quod substantialiter ante fuerit? Conformiter non oportet, quod licet panis incipiat esse corpus Christi virtute verborum suorum, desinat esse panis, cum panis fuit substantialiter, ex hoc quod incipit esse sacramentaliter corpus Christi.” 79 Ibid., 256: “… dum asserit: ‘non sum Helias;’ unus enim intelligit quod est Helias figuraliter, et alius quod non est Helias personaliter; et conformiter non contradicunt; sed aequivocant qui concedunt, quod hoc sacramentum non est (supple ‘naturaliter’) corpus Christi, et idem sacramentum est figuraliter corpus Christi.”

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All of this depends upon Wyclif’s theory of predication. He distinguished between formal, essential and habitudinal predication. Formal predication refers to the form inhering in the subject: animality is the form by which every animal is an animal.80 Essential predication holds that the same essence is the subject and the predicate, although the notion of the predicate differs from that of the subject. Wyclif gives such examples as ‘fire is water’ to describe this, but Kenny’s explanation of what he means offers a more comprehensible example: ‘steam is ice.’ The same thing that is at one time steam can be ice at another time.81 Habitudinal predication concerns relations, when something can be predicated of a subject without the subject experiencing a change, as when a thing is loved or acquires a new location.82 Thus when the Apostle Paul identifies Christ with the bread that is broken (1 Cor 10:16) he is clearly employing habitudinal predication, rather than identical predication. If partaking of the Lord’s body is understood formally, then the bread is not such, whether identically or essentially, even though this partaking of Christ’s body is still materially caused by the bread. “Many sacramentally eat the bread which is so broken, and thus they partake of the Lord’s body, since the bread is that body in accordance with a figure or relation.”83

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De universalibus I, 28-29: “Est autem praedicatio formalis praedicatio qua praedicatur formaliter inexistens subiecto. … Et animalitas est forma, qua omne animal est animal.” 81 Ibid., 30: “Praedicatio vero secundum essentiam est praedicatio in qua eadem essentia est subiectum et praedicatum, licet alia sit ratio praedicati quam sit ratio subiecti, ut hic: ‘Deus est homo’, ‘Ignis est aqua’, ‘Universale est singulare’. For a helpful explanation of all three sorts of predication cf. Kenny, 1985, 25-26. 82 Ibid., 34: “Tertia est praedicatio secundum habitudinem ex qua secundum genus adveniente subiecto non oportet ipsum ut sic esse proprie mobile, ut contingit rem intelligi, amari, varie causare et acquirere sibi ubicationem …” 83 De fide catholica VI, in Opera Minora, 118: “… quod iste panis est corpus suum non in predicacione ydemptica sed in predicacione secundum habitudinem … Si autem communicacio corporis Domini intelligatur formaliter, tum certum est quod ille panis non est ydemptice vel essentialiter illa communicacio sed illa communicacio causatur materialiter ab illo pane, ac si Apostolus intenderet quasi multos sacramentaliter comedere panem sic fractum, sic ipsos communicare corpus Domini, cum ille panis secundum figuram vel habitudinem sit corpus illud.”


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It is also by way of habitudinal predication therefore that Christ calls John the Baptist Elijah, or Paul calls Christ the rock. Similarly, Scripture says that the seven stalks and seven fat cows are seven years of plenty, though Scripture does not say that they ‘signify’ (signant), but that they ‘are’ (sunt) seven years. All this sort of predication is clearly habitudinal, and not formal or essential, because it designates a change in relation without altering the nature of the Baptist, Christ, or the seven stalks and cows. Following this line, one can say that the sacramental bread is the Lord’s body in a specific sort of way, since Christ himself spoke in this manner and thereby authenticated it.84 Just as the Baptist began to be Elijah at the moment when God granted him that relationship (habitudinem) to Elijah, so the bread becomes Christ’s body when the sacramental words are pronounced and not before.85 The Word’s speech has a uniquely effective and transformative power which determines the reality it addresses. John’s designation as Elijah is not simply a play on words. Christ ‘made’ him Elijah in the sense that he fulfills Elijah’s unique purpose in foretelling the coming of the Messiah. If it belongs to the definition of the prophet Elijah, as so determined by God alone, to precede the Messiah in this way, then John ‘is’ Elijah, for he has fulfilled that definition, according to Christ, the God/man. Likewise, the bread fulfills its divinely determined defintion as life-giving body of Christ. This is possible precisely, and only, because Christ the Word, principle of all creation, is the very power which determines the meaning of that creation, of all that is an expression of his own being. 84

Trialogus IV, 7, 266-67: “Et novisti quod triplex est praedicatio, scilicet formalis essentialis et habitudinalis. Relictis in ista materia duabus praedicationibus ad tertiam oportet attendere. Nam secundum tertiam dixi tibi, quomodo Christus dixit de Baptista, quod sit Helias, Matth. xi., apostolus dicit de Christo 1 Cor. x., moralisando gesta legis veteris, ‘petra, inquit, erat Christus.’ Et Genes, xli. fides scripturae asserit, quod septem spicae et septem boves crassae sunt septem anni fertilitatis; et ut Augustinus notat, scriptura non dicit quod signant illos annos, sed quod sunt ipsi anni. … Sic autem dici potest quod pane ille sacramentalis est ad illum modum specialiter corpus Domini, cum Christus tam autenticus illud dixit. … Cum ergo major sit habitudo panis ad corpus Christi, ut docet Augustinus, quam hujusmodi accidentis …” 85 Ibid., IV, 9, 275: “Et si quaeres, quando Baptista incepit esse Helias, videtur mihi quod tunc quando habuit ex ordinatione Dei illam habitudinem ad Heliam … De sacramento tamen altaris videtur probabile, quod prolatis his verbis sacramentalibus ille panis est corpus Domini, et non ante.”

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Wyclif outlines three faithful ways of speaking of the bread in relation to Christ’s body. Some people affirm that all of Christ’s propositions are supremely true and yet will not say that the bread he blessed is, or was, his body. Scripture uses words like ‘is’ figuratively to signify that the bread sacramentally becomes Christ’s body. Human beings, however, should not employ this sort of metaphorical language when speaking of the Eucharist, leaving that to the Divine Author.86 The second approach grants that the consecrated bread is sacramentally the body of Christ, because it sacramentally symbolizes it, and in this sense will be, was, or can be, Christ’s body. But this approach will not concede that one actually sees or tears apart the body.87 The third way speaks rather broadly, saying that the consecrated host not only is, or will be, the body of Christ, but that Christ’s body receives all the same predications that the host does, such that one can say the body is even moved corporeally. This is quite correct, according to Wyclif, provided that one recognize it is said of the Lord’s body present as a sign, that is, present in a spiritual, immaterial way.88 All three explanations are acceptable, since they all affirm the substantial remnance of the bread supporting its own accidents, even as one 86

De eucharistia VII, 230: “Notandum quod multiplex est variacio loyce fidelium in ista materia, ut aliqui fideliter concedunt proposiciones Christi et tocius scripture esse verissimas et tamen negant quod panis quem Christus cepit et sacravit est vel fuit corpus suum, et a pari nullus panis sacerdotum sequencium; nec proposicio scripture sacre illud significat sed significat quod panis sacramentaliter fiat corpus Christi. Proposicionibus autem nostris non debemus dare talem sensum tropicum, cum Christus concessit hoc: Baptista est Helias, et Baptista negavit ipsum esse Heliam, reservando tropum magistro.” 87 Ibid., 230: “Secunda via concedit generaliter quod panis sacramentaliter consecratus est corpus Christi, quia sacramentaliter ipsum figurat et erit ac fuit et per consequens potest esse corpus Christi; sed non concedit plus cum aliis verbis adiectivis, ut quod homo videt, terit vel sentit corpus Christi oculo corporali.” 88 Ibid., 230-31: “Tercia via laxius loquitur, ut quod panis sacratus nedum est, fit, vel erit, corpus Christi ad sensum expositum, sed corpus Christi movetur corporaliter, conficitur, sanctificatur, et sic de aliis predicacionibus quas panis sacratus suscipit. Nec repugnat corpori Domini ut sit signum; unde decretum Jeronimi positum in De Consecratione, distinccione II, distinguit de duplici corpore Christi. Et sic intelligitur caro Christi et sanguis, vel spiritualis illa de qua ait: Caro mea vera est cibus, vel caro ille que crucifixa est; et sic de sanguine.” Cf. Dec. III, De Cons., d. 2, c. 49; Friedberg 1:1332.


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no longer focuses upon the bread, but rather upon the presence of the more noble body of Christ.89

5 Interpreting Tradition and Law In his response to Wyclif’s Confessio, the Franciscan John Tissington (one of Barton’s twelve) attributes Wyclif’s “heretical position” to an infatuation with Berengar. Moreover, he claims that Wyclif refuses to accept the authority of Catholic witnesses living after the millennial loosing of Satan, thus negating three hundred and eighty years of tradition comprising such luminaries as Anselm, Hugh of St. Victor, and even Grosseteste, whom Tissington promptly compares to all the modern doctors as the sun to an eclipsed moon.90 This charge does not really hold up though, for even were one to argue that Wyclif did not accurately interpret these later doctors, the fact is that he did consider the ones Tissington mentions as almost unimpeachable authorities in matters ranging from biblical exegesis to metaphysics. That he might not have accorded them equal status with Jerome or Augustine is hardly unusual. Actually, it is quite in keeping with the medieval esteem for the patristic era, and for all things ancient. Nevertheless, Tissington was not alone in his appraisal. Thomas Netter said much the same thing some forty years later, as we have seen and will again.

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Ibid., 231:”Nec contendo circa istam variacionem loyce cum hoc quod sane intelligitur quod panis non sit essencialiter sed tropice corpus Christi, sed quod natura panis remanet post consecracionem subiectans talia accidencia, licet consideracio eius ex presencia nobilioris corporis sit sopita.” FZ, 134-35: “Haeretica vero sententia quae his a somniis Berengarii excitatur, catholicos nullos habet testes, immo sibi ipsi suspecta ad sui defensionem invalidam, omnes doctores et ecclesie patres secundi millenarii (nunc modo loquendi eorum exemplis utamur), i.e. qui fuerunt infra trecentos et octaginta annos, aperte affirmat fuisse post solutionem Sathanae … Infra CCCLXXX annos, ut dicunt chronicae, fuerunt B. Anselmus, B. Bernardus, Ricardus de Sancto Victore, Hugo de Sancto Victore, Magister historiarum, Magister sententiarum, et multi alii, qui sicut erant clari in vita, ita fuerant in doctrina. Infra hoc tempus floruit Lincolniensis, cujus comparatio ad omnes doctores modernos est velut comparatio solis ad lunam quando eclipsatur.”

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We have noted how the De consecratione section of the Decretum incorporated many sayings of the Fathers, as well as many later quotations mistakenly attributed to the Fathers, all to the end of affirming real presence over mere memorialism. Wyclif could feel confident in appealing to the Decretum precisely because many of the patristic sayings were broad enough, vague enough, to support his own position of substantial remnance. This is not to say that he believes they meant otherwise; far from it. He is convinced that the Fathers of the Church enshrined in the good old law, prior to the codifying of the decretals in the Liber extra, represent the true tradition which has only recently been corrupted. He is perfectly right when asserting that Fathers such as Ambrose and Augustine had not outlined a clear program of the bread’s substantial annihilation and merely accidental existence. While it is true that Ambrose placed a greater emphasis on the conversion of the bread and wine, this was in an effort to affirm Christ’s true presence despite the apparent lack of evidence presented to sense experience. Ambrose’s language speaks of appearance and reality, and not of the relationship between the various Aristotelian categories. Whether Ambrose would have endorsed the Thomist or Ockhamist position had he lived to see it is obviously unanswerable and beside the point. What is true, however, and proves Wyclif’s greatest obstacle, is that the Church of his own day had come to read the patristic sayings recorded in the Decretum within the light of present standards and explanations of real presence. The Church’s own sense of received tradition in the late fourteenth century demanded a reading of these Fathers that affirmed transubstantiation. The onus is on Wyclif therefore to prove why he is entitled to dissent from the present ‘tradition’ and affirm the opposite. All of these texts must be ‘glossed;’ the question is under what authority the gloss is undertaken. Wyclif feels free to call upon the Decretum’s citation of Ambrose as confirmation of substantial remnance: “What was bread before the consecration is now the body of Christ after the consecration.”91 By Wyclif’s reading, or gloss, what was one thing remains in order that 91

Ibid., 127: “Tertius testis est B. Ambrose in libro suo de Sacramentis, et ponitur in canone , de Consecratione, Dist. 2, panis est in altari. ‘Quod erat panis,’ inquit, ‘ante consecrationem, jam est corpus Christi post consecrationem.’” Cf. Ambrose, De sacramentis IV, c. 4; 82; Dec. III, De cons., d. 2, c. 55; Friedberg 1:1334-35.


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it might be something else, undergoing an intelligible rather than a material conversion. Likewise, Wyclif can also appeal to the quotation taken from Augustine: “Not all bread, but the bread which receives the benediction of Christ, becomes the body of Christ.”92 One could list many more quotations of the Fathers throughout Wyclif’s works, all read to this end, namely an intelligible conversion which leaves the substance of the elements intact, while making present Christ’s body. Clearly, Wyclif’s opponents (such as Tissington, Winterton and Netter) charged him with misreading these passages and distorting their authors’ intended meaning. Looming over Wyclif’s head is the consistent claim that, whether reading Scripture or the Fathers, discerning authorial intention is the work of the Church. Holy Mother Church is a sacred spiritual body whose will is manifested in the decisions of the present ecclesiastical authorities who, under the guidance of the Spirit, render authoritative conclusions on ‘what is believed everywhere, always, and by all.’ The medieval gloss was reflective commenting. And whether it is commenting on Scripture with the help of the Fathers, or glossing the Fathers themselves, such commenting was absolutely necessary if sense was going to be made of the tradition. Wyclif is well aware of the need to gloss pertinent passages of Scripture, as well as the patristic sources, in order to render the true sense of the text. What he objects to are glosses which impose ideas upon the texts which only distort the sacred logic embodied in the tradition. There is no good reason to doubt his sincerity when, in his 1381 Confessio, he protests that he has no desire to scandalize the Roman Church: “I understand my sayings on this matter to be in accordance with the logic of Scripture, and also in keeping with the logic of the holy doctors and the decrees of the Roman Church, which I suppose to have spoken prudently.” Despite the errors of recent glossators who have distorted the sacred testimonies, he remains confident that true doctrine is maintained continuously in the Church and even yet among the laity.93 92

Ibid., 128: “Quartus testis est B. Augustinus in quodam sermone exponens illud Lucae XXIV. 35. Cognoverunt eum in fractione panis. ‘Non omnis panis,’ inquit, ‘sed panis accipiens benedictionem Christi fit corpus Christi.’ Et ponitur in canone ubi supra.” Cf. Augustine, Sermo CCXXXIV; PL 38; 1116; Dec. III, De cons., d.2, c. 6; Friedberg 1:1337. 93 Ibid., 119: “Intelligo autem dicta mea in ista materia secundum logicam Scripturae, nec non secundum logicam sanctorum doctorum et decreti Romani ecclesiae,

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Perhaps the most utilized weapon in Wyclif’s legal arsenal is the 1059 Ego Berengarius, which he is fully convinced supports his own position of substantial remnance. Tissington and Netter might charge Wyclif with following after his master Berengar, yet he read the confession not as a vindication of Berengar, but rather of his own orthodox view upheld by the papacy itself. Wyclif had probably never read Berengar’s own work, for there is no evidence to suggest that he had access to Berengar’s writings first hand. What he knew of Berengar was derived from secondhand sources such as the Decretum, Higden’s Polychronicon, and Lanfranc’s De corpore et sanguine domini. (Hudson 1971, 464-65). He does quote directly from Higden’s account, where it is said that Berengar asserted, “the Eucharist is not the true body of Christ, but a figure.” This is a distortion of Berengar’s view, but Wyclif did not know that, and so applauded the Council of 1059, even while he will go on to skew its pronouncement. Interestingly, though, Wyclif is comforted by records of this still sober age when the Church cared more for the faith than secular dominion, and clerics like Berengar were willing to recant their errors and live out the rest of the lives in holiness.94 With regard to Lanfranc’s refutation of Berengar, Wyclif claims that he is in no way defending what Berengar said prior to his recantation. Nor, in light of Berengar’s contention that he signed the oath under duress, is Wyclif interested in whether his confession was born more of fear than of faith. It is the confession itself that Wyclif holds up as the standard of orthodoxy, one which he insists does not call for the destruction of bread’s nature.95

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quos suppono prudenter fuisse locutos. Non enim valet scandalizare totam Romanam ecclesiam, quando dicit panem et vinum esse post consecrationem corpus et sanguinem Jesu Christi; et non obstante errore glossantium, ista fides mansit continue in ecclesia, etiam apud laicos.” Ibid., 128-29: “Ista autem septem testimonia sic inficiunt glossatores, quod dicunt tacite omnia talia dicta sanctorum debere intelligi per suum contrarium, et sic negari finaliter cum Scriptura. Penset itaque fidelis si sanum fuerit haereticare, vel in hoc scandalizare, hos testes et multos similes.” De eucharistia IV, 107: “Ex istis videtur quod ecclesia quando plus habuit sollicitudinem de fide quam de seculari dominio, ponderavit errorem et fidelem revocacionem Beringarii que ex vite sue sanctitate sequente et dacione prophecie de suo obitu declaratur.” Ibid., IX, 284: “Nec plus dicit adversarius; unde creditur Lanfrancum arguere contra eum pro dictis suis hereticis ante suam correccionem. Sed quid hoc ad nos? vel quod metu et non fide Berengarius ista dixit in sinodo? et sic sacramentum


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The 1059 Ego Berengarius was a thorn in the side of the Church from the moment the ink dried on the parchment. Berengar had a heyday exploiting Humbert’s solecisms, but for Wyclif it read just fine. Here he had a solemn confession that had become a fixture in canon law collections for three centuries. He read the confession as Berengar himself had argued that it could be read, focusing on the elements which are now said to be the body and blood, thus proving their remnance. Yet while Berengar realized that a reading which maintained the substantial remnance of the bread as a sacrament surely contradicted the spirit of its formulation, Wyclif defended the confession as an orthodox eucharistic statement confirmed by a duly constituted council and a pope in good standing. To Wyclif’s mind this confession makes it quite clear that, “the same bread placed upon the altar before the Mass remains after consecration as much a sacrament as the Lord’s body.”96 The confession rightly understands Scripture to mean, “the bread which remains is not really the body of Christ, but an efficacious sign of it.”97 Nicholas II and his bishops had wisely declared the truth in keeping with the sort of correct logic that the whole Church should emulate: “The bread and wine which are placed upon the altar are, following consecration, not only a sacrament, but the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ.”98 Wyclif decided to read this portion of the confession in a strictly literal fashion, and properly speaking it says that the bread is the body; thus the bread must remain even as it now functions as a sacrament. eukaristie non solum dicit veritatem corporis Christi de preterito sed facit quod verum corpus Christi sit vere et realiter ibi presens; quod non fecerunt sacramenta legis veteris. Nec ad hoc pertinet desicio nature panis vel eius destruccio.” 96 Ibid., II, 30-31: “Constat quidem ex publica et sollempni confessione Beringarii posita in De Consecratione, distinccione 2 … Ubi patet quod ille sensit quod idem panis et vinum quod ponebatur ante missam super altare remanet post consecracionem tam sacramentum quam corpus dominicum. Quod autem ista fuit tunc sentencia Romanae ecclesie …” 97 Ibid., II, 34: “Et constat quod illo manente pane non est realiter corpus Christi sed signum efficax eius. Ex istis colligitur quod confessio Beringarii et antiquum decretum ecclesie sunt undique plus consona veritati.” 98 FZ, 128: “Sextus testis est decretum Romanae ecclesiae, quae sub Nicolao Secundo, cum 114 episcopis dictavit prudenter secundum rectam logicam quae debet capi a tota ecclesia, quod panis et vinum quae in altari ponuntur sunt post consecrationem non solum sacramentum, sed verum corpus et sanguis Domini nostri Jesu Christi: ut patet in canone ubi supra.”

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His opponents will take issue with just such a ‘literal’ reading that is clearly not in accord with the accepted gloss of the confession. We noted how the 1059 Ego Berengarius was glossed almost immediately after its publication to deal with Humbert’s excessively materialistic language, and the fracture “in sacramento tantum,” gained a lasting legitimacy in Lombard’s Sentences. The gloss which follows from this premise - the very one which Wyclif cannot abide - holds that the terms ‘bread and wine’ in the confession are really to be taken as only the species of bread and wine, under which the body of Christ is contained. Of course, the confession itself says nothing of the kind; it merely affirms the real presence of Christ in language however clumsy. But that is precisely what led these glossators to justify their reading. The confession is impossible and heretical if taken literally, de virtute sermonis, since that would mean the bread and wine remain following consecration. The bread and wine are only accidents now, however, and cannot be equated with the body of Christ which is underneath them. Here then is an instance where Wyclif’s opponents must appeal to metaphorical, improper speech, thereby reading the text de usu loquendi.99 As much weight as Ego Berengarius may have carried even among those who read it as it was intended, it did not have the force of law that Firmiter did. And while the Fourth Lateran’s decree enshrined therein may not have been intended as a systematic explanation of real presence, many people, including Scotus and Ockham, did take it just that way. Wyclif will often let go unchallenged the prevalent notion that the previous decrees and canonical chapters are meant to be read as explanations of real presence, rather than just affirmations. On those occasions he is forced to consider the relative merits of ecclesiastical pronouncements, thereby championing some as correct and authoritative, while rejecting others. As one might expect, he argues 99

De eucharistia VII, 225: “Super quo textu dat glossa pro regula ut omnia referas ad species ipsas, ita quod iste sit sensus: profiteor non panem et vinum sed species panis et vini per se positas non solum esse sacramentum nec corpus Christi, sed sub illis contineri corpus Christi. Et sic confessio Beringarii est impossibilis et heretica de virtute sermonis, sed debet glossari per suum contradictorium, cum hereticum sit quod panis et vinum remaneant post consecracionem sacramentum, sed sunt res aliene nature, non panis et vinum sed accidencia que non possunt esse corpus Christi, sed in illis est corpus Christi.”


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that the Roman Church can err when determining articles of faith, and has done so. And in light of this reality, he contends that one is under no compulsion to believe that Rome is right when deeming some doctrine heretical. In fact, the chances are always good that the earlier Church got it right and the later has gone astray. With that mindset Wyclif will take a stand against the later decretals by grounding himself in the eleventh-century council convened by Nicholas, in view of the authority, holiness and wisdom which shone forth in that illustrious pope. His Ego Berengarius cannot be abrogated by later decrees therefore, since it is more consonant with sense, reason, the holy doctors and Holy Scripture.100 Prior to the unloosing of Satan, the papacy stood in accord with the ancient teaching as the Decretum itself makes clear. Indeed, all the holy doctors agreed upon this matter. But now the faith of Scripture has been set aside as the friars obstinately defend their heresies, thus not only blaspheming Christ and the law of his Scripture, but defaming the Roman curia itself.101 They are the real heretics! If there is one man in Christendom who must face the full brunt of blame for the Church’s dismal lapse into the abyss of heresy, her abandonment of her true abbot, Jesus Christ, that man is Pope Innocent III. It was Innocent who fell prey to the dementia which the friars inflicted upon him. No heresy is so scandalous as turning this venerable sacrament into an accident without a subject, when the faith of the gospel makes it clear that this is naturally true bread, and 100

Ibid., II, 32: “Ex quo patet primo quod Romana ecclesia potest errare in articulis fidei, cum sic fecit; patet secundo quod non oportet credere quod si Romana ecclesia quidquam katholicat vel hereticat, ergo vere; et tercio videtur probabile quod prior ecclesia sane sensit in isto et posterior oberravit; tanta namque auctoritas, tanta sanctitas et tanta sapiencia vel maior lucebat in isto papa Nicholao II … Et iterum prior sentencia plus consonat sensui, racioni, sanctis doctoribus et scripturis, igitur cum illa non sit posterius abrogata vel inprobata videtur quod ecclesia adhuc debet illam credere sicut primo.” 101 Trialoogus IV, 2, 249-50: “Ipsa tamen curia ante solutionem diaboli cum antiqua sententia praedicta planius concordavit, ut patet ‘De consecratione,’ distinct. ii., capitulo, ‘Ego Berengarius,’ et sic est de omnibus sanctis doctoribus … A tempore autem solutionis Sathanae, dimissa fide scripturae multae hereses in ista materia … Fratres enim specialiter istas haereses sustinent pertinaciter et defendunt, non solum blasphemando in Christum et legem scripturae suae, sed diffamando papam et curiam Romanam …”

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sacramentally Christ’s body.102 For the pope to claim that the consecrated sacrament is but a collection of accidents is tantamount to destroying the sense of Scripture, opening the door to series of glosses that could erase all Christ’s deeds narrated in the Gospels.103 Just how much Firmiter, in addition to Cum Marthae, dominated the landscape, defining the parameters of eucharistic orthodoxy in the late fourteenth century is evinced both in Wyclif’s attacks on these canons from the Liber extra, as well as his attempts to accommodate them so as to fit his theory of substantial remnance.104 Wyclif is unmoved by the argument that simply because Innocent asserts something in one of his decretals it must be true. Far better to follow good old Nicholas who stood in line with Scripture and the holy doctors. That being said, Wyclif claims the first chapter of the Liber extra deserves respect; transubstantiation as it is set forth in Firmiter might well be glossed to yield the Catholic sense. Perhaps this sort of mutation can be compared with Thomas Becket, for example, who was “suddenly changed into another man” when consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury, even as his nature is not destroyed in the process.105 And with respect to Innocent’s Cum Marthae, Wyclif 102

Trialogus IV, 6, 262-63: “Et inter omnes infidelitates, quae unquam creverunt in ecclesia Dei sancta, ista subtilius et profundius demergit homines in voragines errorum de fide, et plus facit apostatare ab abbate Domino nostro Jesu Christo. Et esto quod Innocentius tertius deviavit in ista dementia, ut fratres sibi imponunt … non debet acceptari a fidelibus, nisi de quanto in lege evangelica est fundatum … non fuit nefandior, quam haeresis ponens accidens sine subjecto esse hoc venerabile sacramentum. … hoc sacramentum ex fide evangelii est naturaliter verus panis, et sacramentaliter ac veraciter corpus Christi.” Sermones III, l, 438: “ Ad hoc autem tendit insania quod Innocencius III. Romanus episcopus et per idem alius habet potestatem hereticandi legem Christi …” 103 De apostasia III, 49-50: “Si enim papa potest licite tollere sensum scripture, dicendo quod regulariter intelligit per panem quem ponit sacramentum non panem sed accidens, quare non potest conduci aliquis ad glossandum quod Christus non fecit opera que de ipso narrat ewangelium, sed assumpta humanitas? et multa magis de quolibet sensu scripture.” 104 Ibid., X, 122: “… primo ex hoc, quod decratalis Innocencii 3ii dicit quod accidens est sine subiecto; ut de celebracione missarum, Cum Marthe, ubi multa recitantur de dicto Innocencio opinata. Secundo, quia primo decretalium, titulo primo, capitulo Firmiter, in fine dicitur panem et vinum transsubstanciari in corpus Christi et sangwinem.” 105 De blasphemia II, 23-24: “Quis ergo color, ut dixi alias, Si Innocencius tercius sic asserit, ergo verum? … Quia ergo ecclesia papae Nicholai secundi ante circiter centum annis declaravit expresse catholice conformiter sanctis doctoribus et


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argues that the pope proceeds in a hesitant manner, more by way of offering an opinion than by pronouncing a decree. Where Innocent spoke broadly of conversion, says Wyclif, the friars have glossed it to read as a declaration of their own version of transubstantiation, namely the destruction of substance and the remnance of selfsubsisting accidents. If such a theory were so vital to the faith of the Church, though, how does one account for its absence? Hence, it would seem, says Wyclif, that the Holy Spirit specifically kept it out of Pope Gregory’s collection.106 His opponents are charged with having read one explanation of eucharistic conversion back into the decretal, which they then absolutized as a point of law. Wyclif’s larger point is actually quite solid. In the decretal Cum Marthae, though pope at the time, Innocent was speaking as a theologian responding to a question put to him by a fellow churchman; he was not legislating, nor offering an officially sanctioned definition of eucharistic conversion. And if Innocent had a principal aim in this letter, it was to defend real presence despite appearances to contrary, not to offer an incontrovertibly precise explanation as to how this occurs. Wyclif is clearly unmoved by the argument that Innocent was in possession of the spirit, and so had the power to expound upon the faith of Scripture, when he supposedly determined in Cum Marthae that accidents exist without their proper substance. Wyclif responds to this with his constant refrain that not even God can make an scripture istam materiam, ideo sibi debet credi pocius posteriori priori postposito. Glosa tamen sibi debet dari ob reverenciam, quantum permittit mensura fidei: ut transsubstanciacio panis, quam ponit primo decretalium capitulo Firmiter, debet concedi ad sensum catholicum. Sic enim fuit Thomas Cantuariensis subito mutatus in virum alium; et sic mutantur pape, sopito priori nomine, sine destruccione.” 106 Ibid., 24: “Et quantum ad dictum suum de celebracione missarum, capitulo, Cum Marthe, patet quod ambigue procedit et non decretive in ista materia. Unde fratres sequentes subtiliaverunt infundabiliter et irracionabiliter ad gravamen et perturbacionem ecclesie, ponentes per ‘transubstanciacionem’, ‘destrucccionem substancie;’ propter existenciam accidencium per se ponunt sacramentum altaris esse nude quantitatem.” De apostasia XV, 199-200: “… Cum Marthe, que videtur dicere, quod accidens sit sine subiecto … Sed constat quod multa dicta in tercio Decretalium in ista materia sunt tanquam probabiliter opinata. Et illud de permanencia accidencium sine subiecto ex instinctu spiritus sancti est omissum in decretali Gregorii noni; quod si foret tam necessarium ad fundandum fidem ecclesie, deberet primi inseri, aliis preternecessariis pretermissis.”

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accident without a subject (contra Paris 1277!). But there may still be a way to salvage this canon. Perhaps Innocent meant that the natural subject of these accidents is no longer principally perceived by the faithful who now focus their attention upon Christ’s body, just as when one looks at a burning coal and does not stop to consider whether it is stone or wood. Wyclif must admit, however, that even were this Innocent’s intended meaning, the decretal is not assigned that sense now. And so the fact remains that no pope should be believed unless he is truly speaking under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and is thoroughly in keeping with Scripture.107 Yet Wyclif holds out hope that there may still be a way to gloss Innocent’s statements such that they are found to be in accordance with Nicholas II. Without clear evidence that Innocent did contradict his predecessor, it is better to take the pious road and think the best of him, though once more the ignorant glossators are to blame for creating all this division in the Church.108 For all Wyclif’s bluster directed at Innocent on some occasions, we see him trying to salvage the pope’s words and reputation. We should not be surprised therefore when, in the midst of the schism, with England supporting the Roman claimant, Wyclif still holds out hope that the true faith will be preserved there in the Eternal City. In fact, he claims that “our Urban” maintains the ancient faith of the Roman 107

De apostasia V, 65: “Secundo obicitur per hoc, quod papa Innocencius III, qui habet spiritum et potestatem exponendi fidem scripture, determinat quod est accidens sine substancia; ut patet III decretalium de celebrandis missis, capitulo Cum Marthe. … Hec sepe dixi, quod nec deus nec homo potest facere accidens sine subiecto. Et quantum ad dictum pape potest dici, quod ipse intelligit accidens esse in sacramento sine subiecto naturali, actualiter et principaliter a fidelibus apprehenso; cum tota consideracio fidelium debet esse suspensa in corpore Christi, quod est figuarative sacramentum sensibile; sicut, videndo carbonem ingnitum, homo non considerat utrum sit lapis vel lignum. … Sed ulterius cum non docetur istum fuisse sensum predicti, scilicet Innocencii III: notandum quod nulli pape est credendum, nisi de quanto docuerit se loqui ex spiritu sancto, vel se fundaverit in scriptura.” 108 Ibid., XIV, 192: “Posset glozari Innocencius tercius ut supra et concordari cum declaracione subtili Romane ecclesie sub Nicolao II … Utrum autem papa Innocencius tercius sic intellexerit, vel solum contrarium erroneum, non contendo; sed licet utrumque sit satis possibile, pium tamen est, nisi patens evidencia doceat contrarium, supponere primam partem. Glosatores autem inscii nimis perturbarunt ecclesiam in hac fide.”


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Church expressed in Ego Berengarius, while Clement VII and his Avignon cardinals support this “fiction regarding transubstantiation.”109 One should not call Wyclif’s sincerity into question here, nor when he allies himself with the recent scholastics. We have noted Wyclif’s esteem for Aquinas as a biblical commentator, how he consistently refers to him as ‘Saint Thomas.’ Wyclif is quite fond of the Angelic Doctor, certainly in questions of biblical exegesis. His affection is such that even when confronted with Aquinas’s own eucharistic writings, he readily believes that many of them were corrupted after his death by “false friars.” Feeble positions have been ascribed to the saint and heretical meanings imposed upon his writings.110 Wyclif also knows of the Dominican Order’s efforts to salvage Thomas’s reputation in the wake of the 1277 condemnations, thereby leading to his canonization in 1323. What he is especially wary of, however, is the effort to equate one schoolman’s theories with orthodoxy. For just as it is contrary to the very faith of Christ to accuse someone of heresy without due cause, so these friars never should have so deceitfully beseeched the Roman curia to proclaim all of the saint’s writings Catholic doctrine.111 He marvels that these same Dominicans who have corrupted his writings then have the audacity to claim that whatever Thomas asserts must be true, especially when Duns Scotus is more trustworthy in speculative matters and has often proven the Angelic Doctor wrong. Hence, it hardly follows that everything ascribed to Thomas must be preached to the people.112 109

De eucharistia V, 125: “Ex istis credo deffinicionem [Ego Berengarius] Urbani nostri cum suis episcopis tenere antiquam fidem Romane ecclesie, licet Robertus cum suis teneat ficticiam Avinone de transsubstanciacione.” 110 Ibid., 139: “Et quantum ad illud allegatum de sancto Thoma, dicitur a multis quod pseudofratres post mortem eius corruperant ut plurimum eius scripta et hoc ideo, quia procurarunt esse inquisitores pravitatis heretice propter lucrum.” Ibid., 156: “Sentencia autem ista que sancto Thome ascribitur est tam infirma et debilis quod nemo scit illam defendere vel probare.” Ibid., 157: “… Quantum ad secundum patet quod multe sentencie heretice sunt scriptis sancti Thome imposite …” 111 De eucharistia V, 156-57: “Non consonat fidei Christi, quod vel sine causa aut ordine accusetur persona de heresi, vel quod eatur ad curiam mendaciter procurando katholicacionem omnium que scripsit sanctus Thomas.” 112 Ibid., 158: “ … qua fronte vendicarent fratres viacentes sic scripta Thome si ipse sic asserit, ergo verum? Nam Doctor Subtilis cui plus credendum est in speculacionibus quam sibi in pluribus plane detegit errores quos seminat. … Non ergo sequitur: si Thomas hoc asserit, ergo hoc est populo predicandum.”

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The Subtle Doctor can also miss the mark, though, as he did when claiming that ‘Hoc est corpus meum’ could not be a figurative expression, on the grounds that it would be entirely opposed to the Savior’s intention. Here is an instance when he did not speak subtly enough!113 And when his opponents cite Scotus’s submission to the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council on the grounds of authority, Wyclif prefers to give him the benefit of the doubt and assume he did no such thing. But even if it is true that Scotus really did say only the decretals compelled him to accept Innocent’s position, this is hardly reason for Wyclif himself to comply. He wonders, though, why modern theologians rely so heavily upon this one decretal, while dismissing Holy Scripture and the four great doctors. This is especially puzzling given the fact that Innocent was the pope chiefly responsible for camouflaging the Scriptures so as to usurp secular dominion for the clergy, thereby abandoning the religion of the pristine Church.114 What Wyclif grants Innocent with one hand he often takes away with the other. But whether it be Innocent or Thomas, Wyclif is slow to pass judgment on the state of their souls. It is one thing to be in error and another to be a heretic. In fact, Wyclif must meet the charge that were his own position the truly Catholic one, then many previous popes and schoolmen would have to be categorized as heretics. He does not rise to the bait, and instead offers a careful analysis of just what constitutes a heretic. Many people may be heretics whether presently recognized as such or not. Those whose damnation is foreknown are heretics, though some in act, and others in habit, even if they are in a present state of righteousness. Among the predestined, some may be heretics at present when in a state of mortal sin, though 113

Ibid., 115: “Ponit enim Scotus super quartum in principio distinccione X quod hec non est figurrative locucio: Hoc est corpus meum. … Ex quibus concludit quod omnino est contra intencionem Salvatoris loqui hic figurative. Sed non satis subtiliter, ymmo nimis superficialiter videtur doctor in isto fuisse locutus …” Cf. Scotus, Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 1; 153. 114 Ibid., IX, 274: “De ista materia dixi alibi; ideo si verum est quod dicit Doctor Subtilis quod nichil cogit sic dicere nisi decretales epistole supradicte, nimis vacuus est baculus arundineus cui adversarii innituntur. Unde doctor quidam dubitat quare tantum innituntur moderni isti decretali dimissa scriptura sacra cum quatuor sanctis doctoribus. … iste inter omnes papas maxime palliavit scripturas ad subtrahendum honorem et domina secularium dominorum et accumulando sibi et clero suo contra religionem Christi primatus seculi …”


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this will not prove their ultimate condition. More to the point, many people may hold a heretical opinion without being heretics themselves, since they hold their positions simply as opinions, or on a conditional basis, and are prepared to revoke them. None of these people is a heretic, for that would render Aquinas himself a heretic something Wyclif is consistently unwilling to allow.115 Holding up his own reading of the 1059 Ego Berengarius as the standard of orthodox eucharistic doctrine, Wyclif does contend, however, that anyone who has obstinately believed that the bread and wine do not remain, and that the host is no more than a ball of accidents, is clearly a heretic and worthy of expulsion from the society of the faithful.116 That being said, he is prudent enough to admit that even if the pope and his cardinals have frequently fallen away from the faith and deceived the Church, he would not to dare to speculate as to whether they later abjured this heresy or remained heretics after death.117 Wyclif was never going to convince more than a small minority of his fellow schoolmen that his gloss of Ego Berengarius, or even Cum Marthae, is the correct interpretation of the received tradition. Prelates like Archbishop Courtenay would never countenance such readings for even a moment. That battle was lost before it had even begun. Wyclif is on his best footing when he makes the simple, but cogent, argument that until quite recently the Church allowed for a 115

Ibid., V, 155: “Hic igitur quod multi sunt heretici, aliqui cogniti et aliqui ignoti, omnes enim presciti sunt heretici, sed aliqui sunt heretici in actu et alii in habitu, licet sint in gracia secundum presentem iusticiam. Aliqui eciam sunt heretici ad tempus solum secundum presentem iusticiam ut predestinati in mortali, et sic de multis divisionibus cum suis declaracionibus quas hic suppono, sed notum est quod stat multos homines tenere sentenciam hereticam sine hoc quod ipsi sint tunc heretici, quia multi opinative vel condtionaliter tenet multas sentencias parati ad revocandum docto opposito; et certum est quod nulli tales sunt ut sic heretici, quia tunc Doctor Communis fuisset nimis crebro hereticus.” 116 Ibid., 156: “Sed conformiter ad antiquum decretum Romane eccclesie permittit panis substanciam remanere; unum tamen credo quod quicunque pertinaciter crediderit quod non remanent panis et vinum in hostia consecrata, sed quod ipsa est globis accidencium sine subiecto, est manifeste hereticus a qualibet universitate fidelium expellendus.” 117 Trialogus IV, 6, 264-65: “Quod si replicas, ex hoc sequi, quod papa et cardinales sui frequenter in fide deficiunt ac se et ecclesias suas saepe decipiunt, vera est conclusio, sed dolenda. Verumtamen utrum decesserunt contriti de tali haseresi, vel remanserunt post mortem haeretici, non est nostrum temere diffinire.”

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good bit of variety, thus pointing out that prior to the time of Lanfranc and Guitmund of Aversa (i.e., 1059) the Church had never issued any decrees to refute substantial remnance.118 And, as previous glossators of the Decretum came to no consensus regarding this admittedly difficult question, one is hard-pressed to make a case based upon their testimony.119 Of course, he is well aware that the gloss on De consecratione offers three possible opinions, the third of which posited the substantial remnance of the bread. This is reckoned as still more support for his own reading of Ego Berengarius.120 There is a major problem with appealing to that third opinion, however. For this gloss, which affirmed the orthodoxy of consubstantiation, thereby affirmed Christ’s substantial presence together with that of the bread. Yes, the bread is substantially present, but so is Christ’s body. Wyclif is unwilling to grant Christ’s substantial presence, however, while that is the very thing the gloss insists upon above all else. At any rate, even had Wyclif accepted full-fledged consubstantiation, that too had been ruled out of the orthodox ledger by the late fourteenth century. His only hope rests in those blissfully misty days before his dear Pope Nicholas convened that fateful Easter council.

6 Christ as Sign and Truth Two things must be affirmed for Christ’s own veracity to be maintained, namely the substantial remnance of the elements, and the real presence of Christ’s body. “The mode of existence by which the body of Christ is in the consecrated host is a true and real mode, since the one Author who cannot lie, said ‘Hoc est corpus meum,’ and has 118

De eucharistia IX, 285: “Et quantum ad tercium credo ante Lanfrancum et Wimundum non erant aliqua decreta ecclesie contraria huic sentencie.” 119 Ibid., 283: “Unde propter perplexitatem illius materie datam a nostris novellis doctoribus glossatores decretorum titubant et discordant; ideo dictum eorum in ista materia non est argumentum nisi ad hominem.” 120 Ibid., IV, 107-08: “… et idem recitat glosa ordinaria super primo capitulo De Consecracione, distinccione II, quarum tercia opinio dicit quod post consecracionem remanent panis et vinum hostia consecrata et allegat utraque glosa ad hoc illud capitulum: Ego Beringarius …”


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bequeathed to his priests the power of performing the same action. This entire matter is gathered from the faith of Scripture. Therefore, Christ is present in this sacrament in a more special manner than in the others, since he is simultaneously truth and figure in this one.”121 Wyclif affirms what Berengar could not: something can be signum and res simultaneously. Christ’s body must considered in a twofold sense, namely as it exists in a figure and in its nature. Christ has many bodies in figure, but none of these is the body of Christ which is naturally and personally actuated through his soul in heaven.122 We noted that Wyclif concedes the virtual, spiritual, and sacramental presence of Christ’s body in the host. Having established that, he goes on to say: “Beyond those three modes of existence which belong to the body of Christ [in the host] there are three other modes which are more real and more true possessed by Christ’s body in heaven, namely the mode of existing substantially, corporeally, and dimensionally.” These three are interdependent and none is possible for Christ’s body in the host; only in heaven does the body have definite corporeal size (septipedalitas).123 There is only one body, but that same body can exist in different ways. The three lesser modes of existence enjoyed by Christ’s body in the host actually serve as signs for the three higher modes which the body possesses in heaven. The virtual, spiritual, and sacramental way the body exists in the host is true and real, and is thus veritas; but it also functions as figura, inasmuch as it signifies the truer, more real way in which the body exists in heaven. Christ’s body can have a real existence in the host by virtue of the words of consecration, while also existing there as a sign of the body 121

FZ, 116: “Modus essendi quo corpus Christi est in hostia consecrata est modus verus et realis, cum auctor qui mentiri non potest dixit, Hoc est corpus meum, et reliquit suis sacerdotibus, virtutem similiter faciendi. Hoc autem totum ex fide Scripturae colligitur. Ideo Christus est specialori modo in isto sacramento quam in aliis, cum sit simul veritas et figura in isto: non est autem sic aliis sacramentis.” 122 De blasphemia II, 30: “Tercia responsio dicit quod duplex est corpus Cristi, scilicet in figura et in natura; et sic Cristus habet multa corpora in figura (ut loquitur beatus Jeronimus), sed nullum eorum est corpus Cristi quoad naturaliter et personaliter actuatur per animam suam in celo, sed unum aliud corpus quod satis equivoce dicitur corpus Cristi.” 123 FZ, 117: “Sed praeter istos tres modos essendi corporis Christi, est dare tres alios modos realiores et veriores, quos corpus Christi appropriate habet in coelo; scilicet modus essendi substantialiter, corporaliter, et dimensionaliter. … Nullo

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as it exists in heaven. In the Eucharist these two modes of existence are inseparable, thus forming an infinite sign whereby Christ’s body is more present in the host than in the Old Testament, or in New Testament images, since it functions here as both truth and figure.124 Though the communicant does not receive the body in its truest manner of existence, he does receive the true body nonetheless, even as it is designed to lead him to contemplate the yet higher mode. Here one is tempted to think of Lanfranc, for instance, who insisted that the invisible Christ in the host was still a sign of the visible Christ in heaven. But the central difference here is that Lanfranc never said that one version of the body was any ‘more real’ than the other. Because, for Lanfranc, substantial does not imply visible or tangible, so Christ’s body can enjoy substantial presence in two places without being visible in both. Wyclif, on the other hand, seems unable to shake off the material connotations of substantial presence which, in turn, is equated with the truest form of a body. If Wyclif is to insist upon the use of figurative language, he still must preserve the special efficacy which distinguishes Christ’s words of consecration from other instances of figurative language in Scripture. The transformative power of Christ’s words effect the sacramental, as opposed to the dimensional, presence of his body within the outward signs. Thus while it is correct that Christ spoke the sacramental words in a figurative manner, by way of a trope, “[this manner of speaking] possesses the effectiveness of making Christ’s body and blood actually present under the sacramental species, in a way the other figures of both the Old and the New Law were unable to accomplish.”125 autem istorum modorum trium est corpus Christi in sacramento sed in coelo, quia tunc foret corpus Christi septipedale in hostia.” 124 Ibid., 119: “Et secunda pars conclusionis patet ex hoc quod alius est modus essendi signum corporis Christi, et alius modus essendi vere et realiter virtute verborum Domini corpus Christi. Conceditur tamen quod isti duo modi inseparabiliter comitantur. Hoc tamen signum infintum est praestantius quam signa corporis Christi in lege veteri, vel imagines in lege nova, cum sit simul veritas et figura.” 125 De eucharistia IV, 83-84: “Sed restat videndum ulterius quam efficaciam habent verba sacramentalia et quomodo corpus Christi habet non esse dimensionale sed sacramentale in signis illis absconditum. Quantum ad verba sacramentalia, videtur quod Christus in illis loquitur figurative vel tropice … Sicut igitur Veritas loquitur in istis parabolice ut dicit evangelium, sic videtur loqui figurative in


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Christ’s sacramental mode of existence varies depending upon the different sacraments, but he is especially present in the host. The Gospel and Epistles not only record how Christ called the bread his body, but they also mark the exceptional solemnity attached to his words and the nature of the event itself, thereby surpassing all the other signs of either the Old or New Testament. After the purely figurative eating of the paschal lamb, Christ solemnly introduced this sacrament to his disciples. And, as it is only fitting that Christ should improve things as he proceeds, so this newly instituted sacrament is all the more efficacious, and that much closer to the res sacramenti, than the ancient sacraments.126 The other sacraments are far removed from the res sacramenti in time and space, but the Eucharist possesses its concomitant res here and now. The paschal lamb was far from Christ’s body, while the Eucharist possesses the entire humanity of Christ.127 Christ is called ‘our Passover;’ and while the paschal lamb in its nature was superior to the sacrament that Christians now receive in memorial of the True Lamb, this mystical sacrament of the Eucharist surpasses those of the Old Testament according to the mystical sense. It is only fitting that the figure given to the unsophisticated people of the Old Law, for the purpose of believing in the coming Messiah, would be more sensible and naturally closer to what it symbolized than that sacrament which commemorates the same body under the Law of quatuor evangeliis ... habet enim efficaciam faciendi corpus Christi et sanguinem esse de facto sub sacramentalibus speciebus, a quo defecerunt alie figure tam nove lege quam veteris.” 126 Ibid., 85-86: “Modus autem essendi sacramentalis licet varietur in Christo secundum distinccionem sacramentorum, tamen specialiter est in hostia consecrata, quia omnes quatuor evangeliste Matthaeus, Marcus, Lucas, et Paulus commemorant quomodo Christus dixit panem et vinum esse corpus suum et sanguinem; que loccucio ex solempnitate loquentis et circumstancie captate ac testimonio sanctorum oportet quod habeat aliquam insolitam efficaciam ultra alia signa novi et veteris testamenti. … post esum pure figuralem agni paschalis introduxit sollempniter hoc sacramentum; ex quo patet, cum oportet Christum meliorando procedere, quod hoc sacramentum sit efficacius et rei sacramenti propinquius quam sacramenta antiqua.” 127 Ibid., 87: “Primo quod, ubi alia sacramenta multum distant a re sacramenti tam loco quam tempore, hoc sacramentum habet rem suam tam loco quam tempore concomitantem. Nam agnus paschalis legis veteris (de quo Exodi XII) multum distit loco et tempore a corpore Christi; hoc autem sacramentum habet totam humanitatem Christi necessario comitantem.”

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Grace. Such talk of commemoration can be easily misconstrued, however, and so Wyclif is careful to stipulate that this memorial which sacramentally commemorates Christ’s body is still truly and really the very same body of Christ. Here the faithful must pay keen attention to the precise manner in which it is that body, for this is a sacramental union between bread and body, less powerful only than the hypostatic union.128 Hence, this is clearly not a case of impanation. Addressing John of Damascus’s statement that this is the true body of the deified Lord, and not a type or figure, Wyclif considers himself to be in complete agreement. “It is customary for human beings to be washed by the water and anointed with the oil to which the grace of the Holy Spirit is joined that it may become a laver of regeneration. Likewise, since it is a human custom to eat bread, and drink water and wine, God united his own divinity to these things, and so made them his own body and blood.”129 The bread and wine have not undergone a substantial transformation, but have instead been joined to Christ’s divine presence and power, thereby enabling them to confer the very truth of what they now bear. In this vein, Wyclif agrees that the bread is no mere ‘type’ in the sense of the sacrificial lamb which temporally preceded Christ’s own sacrifice. Some figures do indeed function typologically, preceding what they signify, but here in order for the 128

Sermones III, xxv, 195: “Ipse ergo dicitur autonomatice pascha nostrum, et licet agnus paschalis in natura sua precellebat sacramentum nostrum quod accipimus in memoriam veri agni, tamen figuraliter et ad sensum misticum hoc sacramentum misticum excedit sacramenta veteris testamenti. Oportet enim figuram datam rudi populi ad credendum Messiam venturum esse magis sensibilem et naturaliter plus propinquam suo figurato quam oportet memoriale in lege gracie quod sit sacramentum memorans idem corpus. Non enim est tale memoriale sacramentaliter memorans corpus Christi quin sit vere et realiter idem corpus Christi, sed modum quo est corpus Christi oportet fidelem attendere. Nam unio illa sacramentalis est maxima citra ypostaticam unionem.” 129 De apostasia III, 51-52: “Et per ista potest intelligi dictum Damasceni 4to sentenciarum suarum, capitulo 85to, quando dicit: ‘Non enim typus panis et vinum corporis et sanguinis Christi; absit! sed ipsum domini deificatum …’ Hic dicitur, quod inter omnes doctores iste Grecus asseruit expressius nostram sentenciam, cum sic precedit ibidem, quia conswetudo est hominibus aqua lavari et oleo ungi, quibus iuncta gracia spiritus sancti fit lavacrum regeneracionis; sic, quia conswetudo est hominibus panem comedere, vinum et aqua bibere, coniugavit deus ipsis sui ipsius deitatem et fecit ipsa corpus et sanguinem sui ipsius.” Cf. De Fide Orthodoxa IV, PG 94; 1147.


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bread and wine to assume their sacramental role Christ must be truly present.130 Not only must the faithful affirm that the bread is the body, but they must recognize that following the consecration the nature of the remaining bread receives a new identity, as it is primarily designated the body of Christ into which it is converted. The faithful communicant no longer thinks of the bread now, but thinks only of Christ. Wyclif will then quote a passage drawn from John of Damascus which has a definite christological ring: “Just as the burning coal is not simple wood, but is united to fire, so then the communion bread is not simple bread, but is united to divinity.”131 Luther would use this very sort of imagery one hundred and fifty years later in support of his doctrine of consubstantiation, as the substance of the bread and the substance of Christ’s body are joined in the host much like fire and iron in the glowing-hot iron, while each retains its distinct nature.132 Yet Wyclif is not asserting Christ’s substantial presence based precisely upon a model of the Incarnation; this is a union of the bread’s natural substance with Christ’s sacramental existence. Similarly, in a sermon for Easter Day, Wyclif observes how all those coming to church to receive communion on this day are like the disciples seeking Christ in the empty tomb. Some worthily accept the Eucharist in memory of Christ, while others eat to their own condemnation. Yet all who sacramentally receive Christ’s body on this day come to him as if coming to the grave, for Christ is in the Eucharist 130

Ibid., 52: “Unde notandum quod alia est figura precedens temporaliter figuratum, sicut agnus typicus precesserat corpus Christi, et illud; quia non asseritur in scriptura esse corpus Christi, sicut panis et vinum, qui ad esse suum sacramentale requirunt corpus Christi precedere et Christus dicit ipsa vere esse carnem suam et sanguinem.” 131 Ibid., 52: “Unde horrendum foret fidelem negare panem esse corpus Christi, vel post consecracionem naturam panis secundum denominacionem corporis principalissimam remanere, cum convertitur in corpus Christi; ad quod fidelis, suspendendo consideracionem aliam, quantum sufficit debet attendere. Et patet ista sentencia ex textu doctoris. Unde statim post scribitur: ‘Carbo autem simplex lignum non est, sed unitum igni, ita et panis communionis non panis simplex est sed unitus deitati.’” Cf. De Fide Orthodoxa IV, PG 94; 1150. 132 De Captivitate Bablyonica Ecclesiae, WA 6; 510: “Cur autem non possit Christus corpus suum intra substantiam panis continere sicut in accidentibus? Ecce ignis et ferrum duae substantiae sic miscentur in ferro ignito, ut quaelibet pars sit ferrum et ignis: cur non multo magis corpus gloriosum Christi sic in omni parte substantiae panis esse possit?”

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as he was when hidden in the tomb: unseen to the naked eye. And just as Jesus is risen, so the communicants must be instructed in the Catholic faith, and know that Christ is above in heaven according to his substance, while present here sacramentally, in a sign.133 And in his response to the Cistercian William Rymyngton, Wyclif argues that just as one enters a church and concentrates upon the crucified Christ rather than the wood of the crucifix, so it should be with the host, which would then receive the proper sacramental veneration it deserves. “The consecrated host is the true body of Christ which is perceived through some other inferior nature, but the divine nature and the nature of the body are insensibly reserved for faith.”134 All of this talk of signification, and the different levels of presence is very much in keeping with Wyclif’s Neoplatonic realism, as he posits a scale of being with its concurrent continuum of signification not unlike the five levels of Scripture. He had chastised his scriptural opponents for their obsession with the lowest level, the mere codex, when they should have focused their attention on the greater reality of the Word that it ultimately signifies. In the matter of the Eucharist too, Wyclif believes his opponents are lost in their obsession with the transformation of earthly elements, thereby rendering themselves incapable of recognizing the greater spiritual reality which awaits them should they turn their gaze upwards. The Word permeates all levels of Scripture in a descending fashion, and so too does the Word’s body permeate the consecrated host. But one must still ascend to the

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Sermones I, xxiv, 164: “Omnes enim qui isto die sacramentaliter recipiunt corpus Christi veniunt ad ipsum ut monumentum, quia corpus Christi in ipso ut monumento absconditur, sed oculariter non videtur. … Surrexit; non est hic. Necesse quidem est sic accipientibus eukaristiam quod in fide katholica instruantur et per consequens cognoscant quod Christus est sursum in patria quod secundum suam substanciam, et non est hic taliter sed sacramentaliter vel in signo.” 134 Responsiones ad XLV Conclusiones in Opera Minora, 212: “Sicut intrans ecclesiam et intuens ymaginem crucifixi non considerat si in natura sua sit de una arbore sive alia sed intencionem suam et devocionem suam transfigit in corpore Domini, ita est quodammodo de veneracione sacramentali quoad istud venerabile sacramentum. … quod ipsa hostia consecrata est verum corpus Domini que in alia inferiori natura est sentita, sed natura divina et natura corporis sunt insensibiliter fidei reservate, studeat doctor, si nescit predicacionem secundum habitudinem. Et tunc potest per Dei graciam ab errore fidei expurgari.”


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highest realm of existence if one is to see the glorified body in all the celestial splendor of the beatific vision.

7 Metaphysical Objections to Transubstantiation That Wyclif cherished the first thousand years of Christian history, and most especially the patristic era, is clear, though not especially remarkable. Yearning for an idealized past, and lamenting the paucity of sanctity and learning in one’s own age, was a common medieval refrain. At any rate, he does break down the history of eucharistic doctrine into three stages. When truth reigned during the first millennium the Church knew that “the host is the substance of bread in nature, but sacramentally Christ’s body, as the saints say; and it is that faith which always abides among Catholics.” Then, with the unloosing of Satan, many different theories abounded including Guitmund’s, which Wyclif characterizes as simply asserting that the substance of the sacrament is only Christ’s body. Finally, Wyclif reports that in his own day the Thomists say it is self-subsistent quantity upholding sensible qualities, while the followers of Scotus claim the sacrament is a self-subsistent sensible quality. And still others imagine the sacrament is nothing more than a collection of accidents, many of which are invisible.135 Slowly, but surely, eucharistic doctrine has been on the decline. There had been an age of uniform purity, but even the next age, while admitting suspect teachings, at 135

De apostasia X, 130: “Tres itaque variaciones notari possunt in materia de quidditate eukaristie; prima regnante veritate pro millenario Christi dicit quod ipsa hostia est substancia panis in natura, sed sacramentaliter corpus Christi, ut dicunt sancti; et ista fides manet semper aput catholicos. Secunda fuit pro millenario solucionis sathane multiplex variacio in materia quidditate hostie, ut tempore Berengarii et Wymundi; ipse enim videtur dicere quod sacramentum sit in natura vel substancia solummodo corpus; et tercio magi pharaonis magis defecerant, ut hii capiunt a doctore communi quod ipsum sit quantitas, cum ipsum per se existet et sit multiplicter sensibile, sed sola quantitas, ut inquiunt, subiectat sensibiles qualitates. Hii autem capiunt a doctore subtili cum secta sua quod sacramentum sit qualitas sensibilis per se existens. Et hii tercio pessime sompniant, quod ipsum sacramentum nichil est nec potest videri oculo corporali, cum sit aggregacio accidencium, quorum multa non poterunt sic videri.”

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least knew great variation. Only recently has full-fledged transubstantiation reigned supreme. Wyclif specifically records three prevalent explanations of the host circulating in the British Isles in his own day. In the province of Canterbury the sacrament is said to be weight, and Wyclif surmises much of the rest of England will follow its lead. In his own diocese of Lincoln they tend to say the host is quantity. Finally there are those who say it is quality, and specifically whiteness, since it is the color which is most visible. And it is this theory which Wyclif claims is most popular in the mountains of Wales, as well as in Ireland, where they see the dead!136 Wyclif’s metaphysical reasons for rejecting transubstantiation are focused upon the impossibility of annihilation for reasons we have noted, and the impossibility of accidents subsisting apart from substance. One remembers that the Paris condemnations of 1277 were largely directed against limitations placed upon divine actions, one being God’s inability to sustain accidents apart from their natural subjects. Wyclif insists, however, that accidents such as quantity and quality cannot be separated from material substance, and thus cannot be self-subsistent. More to the point, he rejects the argument that while this might be impossible in the natural order, it is still possible for God supernaturally. For Wyclif, such an event is simply contrary to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as God does nothing superfluously. In fact, this principle is borne out as the philosophers prove that even the spherical design of the world is the most fitting, since it is the most capacious of all isometric figures.137 136

De eucharistia VI, 183-85: “Primo dicitur secundum illos episcopos qui innituntur legi cesaree quod sacramentum altaris est ponderositas. … Et sic maior pars Anglicane ecclesie ad ponderositatem hostie declinabit, cum quasi per totam Cantuariensem provinciam servabitur iste usus. … Secundus usus sparsus in multis ecclesiis est quod hostia altaris sit quantitas; sed iste usus est non minus a katholicis abrogandus … unde quamvis diocesis Lincolniensis cui dicitur iste usus competere sit ampla et rara, tamen oportet ipsam initi magis stabili fundamento, nam superficies vel linea non potest sic qualificari in hostia … Ideo tercius usus est credere quod sacramentum altaris sit qualitas. Unde illi qui vident acucius eligiunt quod hoc sacramentum de omnibus qualitatibus sit albedo; ipsa enim plus inter alios colores suscitat visionem; et hic usus in Vallia montuosa et Hibernia ubi vident mortuos est famosus.” 137 De apostasia XI, 138-39: “Ex istis patet quod genus quantitatis et qualitatis non possunt a materiali substancia separari; et evidencius non potuerunt per se esse.


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Recall that Scotus and Ockham had also taken notice of the extra miracles required for transubstantiation. Nevertheless, they accepted it as a matter of faith based upon the authority of the Church. God in his freedom can employ more steps than needed if God so chooses. Nevertheless, they both regarded the conversion theory as perfectly possible, if awkward, and even preferred annihilation if they could not have consubstantiation. Yet Wyclif refuses to speculate on God’s absolute power, precisely because such speculation takes one outside the bounds of scriptural revelation. What is more, because he considers all these theories to be patently impossible, then all such attachment to transubstantiation is no more than a blind and doctrinaire fideism which demands people accept positions on faith apart from investigation. There is no dogma that cannot withstand rational scrutiny. In fact, it is absolutely necessary that everything credible, and especially the Catholic faith, can be investigated. Saint Augustine had even investigated the Trinity which is infinitely superior to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Only when the doctors examine articles of faith, as the saints had done, can they then uncover such novel heresies. To prohibit investigation, he says, is to follow the dictates of Mohammed.138 Wyclif finds no solace in dogma. Quite the opposite; he finds only the very sort of uncertainty that so detracts from the majesty of divine order. It is in this vein that he admits he had once erred when considering the nature of the Eucharist, and praises God for liberating him from those errors which only feed pagan mockery. Unde sinister videtur michi glosa ponens Augustinum intelligere, quod necesse est naturaliter ita esse, quamvis supernaturaliter ut in sacramento altaris possit oppositum evenire. … Maior patet ex hoc quod deus, dispendiose agens sine innovacione finis et comodi, ageret de tanto superflue: et per hoc principium probant philosophi quod oportet mundum esse sphericum, cum inter omnes figuras ysopometras illa sit capacissima.” 138 De eucharistia IX, 285-86: “Hoc (inquiunt) salubriter credi potest, investigari non potest, nam (ut sepe dixi) una pars nimis heretici contradicit alteri, quia absolute necessario omne credibile et specialiter fides katholica potest investigari salubriter, cum beatus Augustinus sub obtentu sue beatitudunis investigavit sollicite materiam de Trinitate que est infinitum superior sacramento eukaristie; ideo nullum velamen hereticum posset magis cecare ecclesiam; quia, inducta quacunque novitate heretica sine fundacione scripture si doctores incipiant idem examinare sicut sancti examinarunt alios articulos fidei, statim proponitur hoc principium Machometi: Hoc investigari non potest.” Cf. Lanfranc in PL 150; 421c-d.

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Where everything should be ordered and clear the faithful are instead lost in ambiguity now, caught up in their own vain imaginings.139 For Wyclif, to posit the existence of accidents without their subjects is to misunderstand the nature of their relationship. An accident formally inhering in a given substance is only the truth that the substance is of such a sort in an accidental way. But that accidental truth cannot exist apart from that substance any more than a creature could exist apart from God’s preserving power.140 Quantity is nothing but the quantification of a given substance, just as quality is the qualification of a substance; and this applies to the relative accidents as well. Thus for God to preserve an accident without a subject would be tantamount to preserving something which does not actually exist, since such accidents are only real insofar as they inhere in a specific substance.141 Here we should note Wyclif’s definitions of concrete and abstract terms, since this question plays an integral role in his argument against self-subsistent accidents. In his De logica he notes that a concrete term can stand for the individual thing in personal supposition, or the essence of a thing in simple supposition. Abstract terms, on the other hand, only signify the essence of a thing without connoting the individual supposit in which the essence exists.142 The whole error 139

Ibid., VII, 199: “Ideo quantum ad istud laudo Deum qui liberavit ab isto scandaloso et derisibili errore de quidditate huius sacramenti. In qua materia philosophi et pagani derident nimirum nostram ficticiam de incertitudine et variacione circa quidditatem hostie consecrate.” 140 Ibid., III, 63: “Secundo principaliter arguitur de racione accidentis: nam omne accidens formaliter inherens substancie non est nisi veritas que est substanciam esse accidentaliter alicuius modi, ut hic supponitur, sed nulla talis veritas potest esse sine substancia, sicut nulla creatura potest esse sine Deo, ergo non est cumulus talium accidencium sine subiecto que sit hostia consecrata.” 141 Sermones III, lviii, 508: “Quantitas enim non est nisi quantificacio substancie vel ipsam quantificari, qualitas autem non est nisi substanciam qualificari, et sic de aliis accidentibus respectivis. Idem ergo foret Deum servare accidens sine subiecto et servare quod alicui substancie accidit taliter se habere, et tamen illam substanciam omnino non esse quod est contradiccio manifesta.” 142 De logica I, i, 5: “Terminus concretus est terminus significans rem que indifferenter potest contrahi ad supposicionem simplicem vel personalem; sicut iste terminus, homo, significat in proposicione tam personaliter pro persona, quam eciam simpliciter pro natura. Sed terminus abstractus significat pure essenciam rei sine connotacione aliqua ad suppositum cui inest, sicut iste terminus deitas, humanitas, albedo, canitas etc.”


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regarding the nature of the Eucharist stems from the fact that prelates, in their ignorance of both logic and the meaning of Scripture, have failed to consider this difference between abstract and concrete terms. Abstractions do not possess independent existence; the quality of whiteness, as an accident, presupposes a subject in which it will inhere. And yet the supporters of transubstantiation have annihilated the very subject of this whiteness as they convert the bread into nothingness.143 Wyclif occasionally has a bit of fun at his opponents’ expense, joking here that faithful townsmen refuse to let friars into their wine cellars, lest when blessing the cup they convert the contents of their casks into mere accidents!144 It is not only that Wyclif cannot accept the separation of accidents in principle, he also warns against the gravest consequences of such a possibility: the lack of all genuine certainty. One is reminded here of those questions regarding the limits of knowledge based upon sense experience. Wyclif must surely have in mind the argument that, in principle, the sensible experience of accidents is no guarantee of the presence of a corresponding substance. And is not the Eucharist a prime case in point? Wyclif offers what Kenny aptly calls an “antiCartesian” argument, directed against those who would claim that the senses are unable to provide any certainty of the natural world (Kenny 1985, 86). If the connection between accidents and substances has broken down, then the intellect would have no proof of the existence of a given substance. For no matter what sense experience tells one, there is no reason to believe that the universe is not just one great ball of accidents. The only recourse one would have at that point is the faith of Scripture. Yet it is not by the faith of Scripture that one is convinced of one’s own existence, thereby leaving everyone to doubt 143

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Sermones III, xxv, 193: “Et patet consideranti differencia inter abstractum terminum et concretum et ad quem sensum verificari potest grammaticorum sentencia et consideracio logicalis. Et in ista contencione ac dissencione stant verbales logici, eciam prelati superiores, quia ignorant logicam et sentencias scripturarum. Et hec ignorancia est radix tocius erroris in materia de quiditate eukaristie, ut dicunt quod ipsa est accidens vel accidencia sine subiecto et sic vere virtute sue benediccionis panis quem consecrant in nichil convertitur.” Ibid., 194: “Hec eciam ratio quare fideles burgenses non permittunt fratres penetrantes domos intrare celaria sua vinaria ad vinum, ne forte benedicendo vino in calice convertant totam dolorium congeriem in pura accidencia.”

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if he exists, and just what he is. Perhaps one is only a spirit joined to mere accidents.145 In fact, the Dominican Robert Holcot had drawn similar conclusions some forty years earlier, though in defense of God’s prerogative to adopt transubstantiation, despite the problems it causes for acquiring certain knowledge from sense experience. In his Sentences commentary Holcot would have to meet the objection that if such a conversion of one thing into another is possible, then God could convert the whole structure of the world into the substance of a fly. What is more, if it is possible for one substance to exist under the appearance of another, then a donkey could exist under the species of a human being, even a thousand donkeys, or vice versa. The result of all this is that the certitude of sense experience would altogether perish, and so too all knowledge based upon such experience.146 Holcot’s response encapsulates the very line of thinking which Wyclif so abhorres, and the ineluctable conclusion to be drawn from transubstantiation. In point of fact, says Holcot, God is able to do far more than the human intellect can comprehend. As such, there is nothing unfitting about conceding that God can indeed make the world exist under the species of a single fly. And here then is the result Wyclif fears most of all, as Holcot concludes that sense experience offers no certitude regarding things as they presently exist. For something could

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De eucharistia III, 78-79: “Nam iuxta dicta nullus sensus vel intellectus convincit esse quamcunque materialem substanciam, cum stante omni noticia sensitiva vel experiencia apparet compossibile et consonum quod tota universitas creata sit globus accidencium; ideo ponens talia necesse habet recurrere ad fidem scripture et supponere eius sensum. … Item, de quocunque nostrum non convincitur ex fide scripture ipsum esse, nec sensus nec racio hoc convincit, ergo de quolibet tali est pie dubitandum si est et quid est. … ponit enim esse quod spiritus esset nudis accidentibus copulatus.” 146 In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Quaestiones IV, q. 3: “Preterea, sit talis conversio unius rei in aliam foret possibilis. … sequeretur quod deus posset conuertere totam machinam mundi in substantiam muscae: vel etiam quod posset ponere quamlibet substantiam sub specie alterius. Et sic posset ponere asinum sub specie hominis: immo pari ratione mille asinos in specie unius hominis vel econtrario: et sic periret omnino certitudo experientie: et sic generatio scientie per experimentum secundum Aristotelem …” Note that in transcribing this text I have provided the complete forms of the abbrievated Latin. This passage is discussed in Macy 1992, 113.


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change and one would not be able to deterimine whether it is true or false at the moment.147 Just this sort of disruption of the natural order, says Wyclif, is what makes it so difficult for his adversaries to come up with a coherent definition of the sacrament. Brooding over the Blackfriars council, he points out that while his opponents in the mendicant orders proclaimed there publicly that the Eucharist is an accident without a subject, they cannot explain exactly what the consecrated host actually is. They subvert the true faith and have nothing to put in its place.148 These modern apostates have introduced so much division into the Church, for the very fact that they can reach no consensus on the host itself. Wyclif complains that he has repeatedly asked the friars in just what sense the sensible sacrament, which is called bread, should be understood, only to find that they dared not explain.149 But then even the introduction of the terms ‘accident’ and ‘subject’ is an extraneous modern addition to the faith, unwarranted by Scripture.150 Wyclif questions the usefulness of destroying the earthly substance of the bread and so deceiving the senses. For it is in this sacrament that the union of Christ and his Church is symbolized, and yet these diabolical sophists are intent on destroying the substance of this 147

Quaestiones IV, q. 3: “Dicendum est quod deus potest plus facere quam intellectus intelligere. Et ideo non est inconueniens concedere quod deus posset totam machinam mundi conuertere, et facere existere sub speciebus vnius muscae. … Quantum ad certitudinem experientie: credo quod nulla est certitudo creata ita certa de aliqua re presenti: quin posset esse falsa per mutationem: tunc hec lateat me an sit vera an falsa.” 148 Trialogus IV, 27, 339: “Ponunt enim, ut ad partem satis didici, quod ipsa consecrata hostia sit accidens sine substantia subjecta, sive nihil, et hoc publicarunt, sed tacite, Londoniis in generali eorum concilio terraemotus; posuerunt enim ibi publice, quod in sacramento altaris sit accidens sine subjecto, quod accidens non possunt fingere nisi ipsam hostiam consecratam, aliter enim nescirent dicere hujus hostiae quidditatem … Fratres autem qui subvertunt hanc fidem, nesciunt docere fidem aliam de quidditate hujus hostiae …” 149 Sermones III, xxxiv, 279: “Sed a tempore quo divisa est ecclesia per apostatas introductos divisa est hec fides de sacramento eukaristie indicans divisionem ulteriorem in papis et aliis. … Quesivi namque sepe a fratribus ad quem sensum sacramentum illud quod tam crebro vocatur panis debet intelligi, sed ipsi tamquam ydiote ignari fidei postulacionem suam exprimere non audebant.” 150 Ibid., lviii, 507: “… quanto magis moderna ecclesia fugeret a seductivo satrapa capere tam terminos extra fidem scripture quam eciam sentenciam a scripture extraneam. Nam isti termini accidens et subiectum ad sensum loquencium in ista materia sunt satis extranea.”

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venerable sacrament, and so undermining the union itself.151 Not only is the notion of a self-subsisting accident patently impossible, it performs no useful purpose. What good could it possibly do the Church for God to ordain this deceptive miracle which only serves to make him the author of lies, when the remnance of the bread is far more consonant with Scripture, reason and sense experience? Indeed, taking a page right out of Scotus, Wyclif points out that the remnance of the bread avoids the superfluous multiplication of miracles, and would save the Church unnecessary complications. He prefers instead to side with the “Ancient of Days” and affirm that the host is naturally the bread and sacramentally Christ’s body. And lest there be any doubt as to his feelings about his opponents’ teachings, he brands them “merdosa mendacia.”152 Once more, offering an argument reminiscent of Scotus’s and Ockham’s case for the plausibility of consubstantiation, Wyclif notes that a theory of accidents without subjects only creates problems where there need be none. “What would move the Lord Jesus Christ to abrogate the judgment of his worshippers in this way, when it does them absolutely no good, and finds no foundation in either reason or the faith of Scripture? Why is it necessary to deceive people in this manner? For in fact the remnance of the bread and wine would more appropriately symbolize Christ’s body and blood than some accident without a subject. After all, it is equally possible for Christ’s body and blood to be present to every single point of such a body [the bread], as it would for it to be present to any point of such a supremely 151

De cruciata VIII in Polemical works in Latin vol. 2, 621-22: “Sed que utilitas, quod panis usque ad fundamentum in eo destruatur et sensus omnium illud sacramentum percipiencium per se illudantur? Cum autem in hoc sacramento unio Christi cum sua ecclesia figuratur, tales sophiste dyaboli, nitentes destruere substanciam huius venerabilis sacramenti, prenosticant in multis carenciam huius venerabilis unionis.” 152 Responsiones ad XLV Conclusiones in Opera Minora, 213: “Similiter, dicat sic sompnians, si sciverit, causam et utilitatem ecclesie, quare Deus ordinavit miraculum istud absconditum … cum Deus non potest esse auctor mendacii, dogmatis superflui vel illusionis populi. Cum ergo via ponens panem manere sit plus consona scripture, racioni, et sensui quam via fingens accidens sine subiecto … Ergo autem teneo fidem antiqui dierum quod illa hostia sit naturaliter verus panis et sacramentaliter corpus Christi nec multiplico inutilia miracula, difficultando fidem ecclesie sine causa; et merdosa mendacia que suadent hereticis istam sentenciam non sunt digna memoria.”


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monstrous accident. And what is more, the words of the faith of Scripture could then be salvaged, thereby leading to greater reverence for God all the way round.”153 Here is a good argument for consubstantiation, if only Wyclif would allow for Christ’s own substantial presence in addition to that of the bread. God would not institute a sacrament that involved the destruction of his own creation. He does not destroy in the furtherance of a miracle; and yet there must be a conversion of sorts. The bread does indeed become the body, says Wyclif, but that does not entail the destruction of its substantial essence. Just as a sinner undergoes a conversion from the diabolical to the divine, which Wyclif reckons even more miraculous than eucharistic conversion, so in all such miracles God preserves the nature of the bread while changing it for the better.154 Some say that in the consecration they bless the bread into nothingness, since no part of it remains in the body of Christ or in his sacrament. Properly speaking it is annihilated or converted into nothing. Yet when Christ cursed the fig tree, the substance of the tree remained, since he would not utterly destroy his own creation in order to symbolize the sin he had encountered. Thus it stands to reason that in the blessing of the bread he would not destroy his handiwork, but would convert it into something better, namely the sacramental body of Christ.155 153

Ibid., IV, 5, 260-61: “Quid ergo moveret Dominum Jesum Christum tollere sic judicum suorum cultorum, cum in nullo redundat eis in bonum, nec in ratione vel fide scripturae potest fundari, quod est necessarium homines sic decipi? cum panis et vinum remanentia figurarent aptius corpus Christi et sanguinem, quam accidens sine subjecto; et aeque posset corpus Christi et sanguis esse ad quemlibet punctum talis corporis, sicut ad aliquem punctum talis monstruosissimi accidentis; et tunc salvari possent verba fidei scripturae, et sic undique major Dei reverentia resultaret.” 154 De eucharistia III, 53: “Restat superaddere alia argumenta contra doctores novellos pro antique ecclesie sentencia et primo per hoc quod non est Dei destruere suam fabricam in auctorisando ecclesiastica sacramenta.” De eucharistia VII, 189: “Et hec est racio quare sancti dicunt panem converti in corpus Christi vel sacramentum, ymmo panem esse corpus Christi, sicut dicimus peccatorem converti a membro dyaboli in flium Dei; que conversio est magis mirabilis quam conversio sacramenti. Sed nullibi in istis miraculis oportet quod Deus destruat substancialem essenciam, sed mutat ipsam in melius servando naturam.” 155 Trialogus IV, 6, 264: “Dicunt enim, quod in consecratione suae hostiae benedicunt panem et vinum in nihilum, cum nulla pars ejus remanet in Christi corpore nec in suo sacramento, ut inquiunt, sed loquendo proprie de annihilatione annihilatur

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8 The Attempt to Salvage Transubstantiation Wyclif actually proves willing to use the term ‘transubstantiation’ on a number of occasions, as when addressing the long-standing objections to phrases such as, ‘that bread is, was, or will be Christ’s body,’ given the incongruity of identifying the bread with the body. Hence, most people prefer to say that the bread ‘will be transubstantiated, converted, or changed into Christ’s body.’ Arguing for an effective symbolic conversion, Wyclif is content to say: “Prior to consecration that bread was not the body of Christ, but by the power of Christ’s words the bread becomes an efficacious sign. And in this way one can understand that the bread is ‘converted’ into the body of Christ, or ‘transubstantiated’ - or by whatever term of mutation it can be expressed.”156 When defending his reading of Ego Berengarius, such that the bread is preserved while yet becoming Christ’s body, he states: “The laity should believe that [the host] is the body of Christ and that it is bread. For when it is blessed it is converted or transubstantiated, and so becomes the body of Christ.”157 Wyclif will utilize the language of conversion, because he regards it as one positive motion requiring the existence of the subject’s essence, as opposed to the annihilation of an essence to be succeeded by a new body.158 It is the annihilation/ et in nihil convertitur. … quando enim maledixit ficui Marci xi., remansit ficus substantia, cum Christus nesciat propter peccatum vel figuram peccati suam omnimode destruere creaturam … quod panis virtute benedictionis Christi in melius, quia in corpus Domini, est conversus, et remanet panis, quia manet sacramentaliter ipsum corpus.” 156 De eucharistia III, 57-58: “… ut negant quod panis est, fuit vel erit corpus Christi … ideo dicunt quod panis transubstanciabitur in corpus Christi, panis covertetur vel mutabitur in corpus Christi et (ut quibusdam placet) ex pane fiet corpus Christi. … Nam ante consecracionem non fuit panis ille sic corpus Christi, sed virtute verborum Christi fit signum sic efficax; et sic intelligitur quod panis convertitur in corpus Christi, transsubstanciatur vel quocunque termino mutacionis exprimatur.” 157 De apostasia V, 68: “Layci enim debent scire, quod est corpus Christi, et quod est panis, qui dum est sanctificatus convertitur et transsubstanciatur et fit corpus Christi.” 158 De eucharistia III, 59: “Conversio enim cum sit mocio positiva, requirit existenciam essencie subiecti, quia aliter ipsum non plus converteretur quam anichilata essencia, cui succederet corpus novum.”


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succession theory that bothers him the most, not only because he thinks it leads to the destruction of all creation, but because he finds no way to gloss this theory to his own satisfaction. This also helps to explain why he is so sympathetic towards Thomas Aquinas. For while the Angelic Doctor rejected consubstantiation out of hand as heretical, he also rejected annihilation, even if not for Wyclif’s reasons. There is far more in the Thomist position for him to work with, whereas the Scotist and Ockhamist line left him with no subject for accidents and the apparent destruction of the created order. The irony in all of this is that, given their druthers, both Scotus and Ockham would have stood closer to Wyclif than to Aquinas if only they thought it permissible. ‘Transubstantiation’ can also be construed as some sort of “supernatural transmutation,” whereby the bread becomes the body of Christ while remaining naturally the same bread, even though its principal status is no longer that of ordinary bread.159 Something about the bread really has changed; it has undergone a sacramental conversion. The words of consecration have transformed the host in such a way that it is clearly distinct from unconsecrated bread. Attempting to salvage Innocent III’s use of the term ‘transubstantiation’ from the glossators,Wyclif offers a reading which does not require the separation of subjects and accidents. One can allow for Innocent’s decree so long as transubstantiation is taken to imply a conversion which preserves the bread in its entirety. Bread and wine can be converted into Christ’s body and blood while retaining their own natures. Bread means substantial bread here, however, and not just the accidents his opponents like to call ‘bread.’ Wyclif harps on the fact, here as elsewhere, that his adversaries cannot produce a papal decision that speaks specifically of accidents existing without subjects, and so must appeal to distorting glosses to make their case.160 We have 159

Responsiones ad XLV Conclusiones, 214: “Palliare quidem possumus quod sit transsubstanciacio et quod panis sit corpus Christi vel transmutatur supernaturaliter in ipsum corpus Christi, licet remaneat naturaliter idem panis; et sic panis non est principaliter panis usualis.” 160 De apostasia XIII, 169-70: “Unde quia non habent ab Innocencio IIIo vel papa alio quod sacramentum altaris sit accidens sine subiecto, recurrunt ad comenta mendacii et glosas doctorum indiscretorum … Et patet solucio instancie supradicte, cum argumentum concedi debeat ad hunc sensum, quod panis et vinum convertuntur in corpus Christi et sanguinem, cum ipsa aliquomodo, servata

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seen how Wyclif tries to claim Innocent III for his own side where possible, and he may indeed be distorting the spirit of Innocent’s position in the process. But he is right in drawing attention to the relative ambiguity within these earlier broad affirmations of real presence. If one wonders how the bread is transubstantiated, or converted, into Christ’s body while yet remaining, consider how the essence of a staff was “transubstantiated” into a serpent, or the essence of the body of Lot’s wife into a pillar of salt, and water into wine. Even a member of the devil can be “converted” into a member of Christ without his essence being destroyed. He states flatly: “Conversion, or transubstantiation, does not assert the destruction of essence, but rather its remnance.”161 There are two sorts of conversion, he points out. The first is like that of natural motion and involves one substantial form replacing another. The substantial form has changed, but the material essence has not been destroyed in the process, as in the aforementioned biblical examples.162 The point of this is to preserve the bread’s essence against annihilation. Here Wyclif really does make a rather remarkable claim, though, since he must have known that Aquinas explicitly defined transubstantiation as the conversion of whole substance into whole substance, and thus a substantial rather than a formal conversion. In fact, this process is not to be classified as a sort of natural motion, and so assumes the designation ‘transubstantiation’ (ST III, q. 75, a. 4). At any rate, Wyclif’s second sort of conversion, or transubstantiation, is the more miraculous, as when natura eorum, fiunt corpus Christi et sanguis, non sicut adversarii fingunt formam panis, vel accidens quod panem nominant, fieri corpus Christi.” 161 Ibid., 170: “Et si musitant, quomodo panis transsubstanciatur vel convertitur in corpus Christi cum remanet, dicant quomodo hoc competit sacramento, dicant secundo quomodo essencia virge transsubstanciatur in serpentem, essencia corporis uxoris Loth transsubstanciatur in statuam salis, essencia aque fit vinum, quomodo membrum dyaboli covertitur in membrum Christi et tamen utrobique remanet eadem essencia in numero non destructa. Conversio enim, vel transsubstanciacio, non dicit destruccionem essencie, sed eius remanenciam.” 162 Ibid., 170: “Et ita est duplex conversio, prima propinqua motui naturali, quando, educta forma substanciali, alia nova in essenciam naturalem inductur; ut patet in exemplo triplici supradicto, et iuxta philsophiam ac logicam scripture. Substancia unius modi erit substancia alterius modi, ut Joh. II subtiliter dicitur aquam factam vinum. Sicut enim accidens contingit substancie, sic forma substancialis materialis contingit materiali essencie.”


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Christ, the God/man, in some way converts something into himself while the subject remains the same. Hence by entering into the soul of a sinner he may be said the make him Christ, or by sacramentally assisting the earthly substance of the bread he still makes it his body in some manner. Just how this process occurs may not be so easy to explain, despite the best efforts of the faithful. Wyclif recalls once more the all-determinative Word of Christ: He called the sacramental bread his body, and so it is.163 From this perspective Wyclif admits that when compared to the natural changes this latter use of the term ‘transubstantiation’ is only said to be a mutation in an equivocal sense. When God and his priest consecrate the host they do make it into the body of Christ, but symbolically, not identically. The change which has occurred is not essential, but relational.164 For Wyclif, though, this is a genuinely transformative relation which gives the bread a wholly new meaning in the world, a divinely intended meaning, which conveys its full salvific reality. What all of this tells us is that Wyclif is using ‘transubstantiation’ in a manner that is really quite foreign to the way it had been used in its various forms since the middle of the twelfth century, referring to a transition of whole substances, whether through conversion or annihilation. By equating ‘transubstantiation’ with ‘conversion’ in the broadest sense of the latter term, Wyclif can then claim that the authors of Scripture were not thinking of a collection of accidents when recording the Last Supper, “but the true bread which the priest transubstantiates into the Lord’s body by virtue of the sacramental words.” The holy doctors of the first millennium understood this, he says, but then they had a much more profound grasp of the sense of Scripture than all the popes and postillators who have followed in the 163

Ibid., 170: “Secundus modus conversionis vel transubstanciacionis magis miraculosus est, quando dominus Jesus Christus, verus deus et verus homo, facit conversum quodammodo se ipsum: et hec est mutacio dextre excelsi deo propria. Et fit dupliciter: vel illabendo anime peccatoris, faciendo ipsum quodammodo ipsum Christum, vel assistendo sacramentaliter terrene substancie faciendo ipsam quodammodo corpus suum; quomodo autem hoc fit, subiacet communiter scrutinio et fidei cunctorum fidelium. Christus enim dixit panem sacramemtalem esse corpus suum.” 164 Ibid., XIV, 185: “Hic dicitur quod transsubstanciacio dicitur equivoce mutacio, in comparacione ad mutaciones alias naturales. Unde conceditur quod deus et sacerdos suus conficiunt hoc sacramentum et faciunt ipsum esse corpus Christi

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wake of the devil’s loosing.165 If Wyclif will use ‘transubstantiation’ in this broad sense, then he makes the perfectly legitimate point that first-millennial Christianity did not necessarily mean that the bread had relinquished its substantial nature. But then, Christianity did not employ the term ‘transubstantiation’ at all in those first thousand years. He might be better off just jettisoning the term entirely, inasmuch as it was designed to explain the very process he cannot accept. One reason he does retain the terminology of an apparently corrupt age, however, is quite simply that he harbors a deep affection for a number of churchmen who belong to it. For all he says about the sorry state of modern scholarship, he does not allege that there have been no holy doctors and popes since the turning of the millennium, for we know that he praises a number of them, from doctors such as Grosseteste and Aquinas, to a pope like Nicholas II. It must be admitted that such figures are the exception for Wyclif, but then he is hardly alone when lamenting the failings of his own age in comparison with that golden era of the Four Doctors. His assessment is more dire, that is true, but not to the point of an outright dismissal of post-millennial scholarship and sanctity.

9 Explaining Real Presence Though the bread does become Christ’s body through the words of consecration, this union is not identical, numerical or hypostatic, but instead, “something immediately after that.” This is a rather cryptic statement, and it is not really explained. Whatever this next sort of union is, it cannot allow for the corporeal accidents of Christ’s body, such as corporeal quantity and quality, to be multiplied concomitantly with regard to Christ’s body in the host. Nor can the relative

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non ydemptice, sed tropice; sed non faciunt ipsum corpus et faccio terminatur ad hoc esse corpus Christi, quod est respectivum et valde salubre fidelibus.” Sermones III, xxxiv, 278-79: “Nec dubium quin auctores scripture per panem intelligunt non nichil vel ignotum accidens sed verum panem quem sacerdos transsubstanciat virtute verborum sacramentalium in corpus Domini; et revera iste sanctus doctor cum aliis de millenario Christi sanius atque profundius sentit


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accidents which depend upon them be present, since all those accidents presuppose the corporeal existence of their subject wherever they might exist. Wyclif argues that wherever there exists the definite size, color and corporeal glory of Christ’s body, so Christ’s body must exist there in a dimensionally quantified, colored, and corporeally glorified state. These corporeal accidents cannot be present in the host, however, for if they were then Christ would have such a corporeal existence in the host. But as Wyclif denies that Christ is present in this way, so these accidents are not concomitantly multiplied in the host according to their material conditions.166 Instead, the quantitative parts of Christ’s body possess a spiritual existence in the host. In fact, they may be said to have a sacramental existence insofar as the body is present to every quantitative part of the host. Yet Christ’s soul is multiplied all the more throughout the host according to a certain spritual existence, though one that comes after the existence it has in Christ’s body situated in heaven. He then states: “The reason for this multiplication of Christ’s soul is that it is more principally the Person of the Word than the body. The immaterial qualities, however, which find their subject in the soul of Christ, are multiplied along with it throughout the host. These include knowledge, justice and the other virtues of Christ’s soul which do not require Christ’s corporeal pre-existence wherever they might be present.”167 Just what Wyclif de sensu scripture et specialiter de proposicionibus fidei quam omnes pape vel postillatores succedentes a tempore quo diabolus est solutus.” 166 De apostasia XVI, 224: “Verumtamen ista unitas vel unio sive acceptio non attingit ad unitatem identicam, numeralem vel hypostaticam; sed creditur quod sit immediate post illam; et sic accidencia corporalia corporis Christi, ut quantitates et qualitates corporales corporis Christi, videntur non multiplicari concomitanter ad corpus Christi in hostia, et per idem alia accidencia repectiva que fundatur in istis, quia omnia ista accidencia preexigunt esse corporale sui subiecti ubicunque fuerint; ut si hic septipedalitas, color vel gloria corporalis corporis Christi, tunc hic est, quod corpus Christi est septipedale, coloratum, et corporaliter glorificatum; et per consequens corpus Christi habet hic existenciam corporalem; quod cum sit falsum, negandum est talia accidencia secundum conditiones materiales multiplicari concomitanter ad corpus Christi.” Cf. Wyclif’s Confessio in FZ, 120-121. 167 Ibid., 224: “Partes autem quantitative corporis Christi habent esse spirituale in hostia; ymmo habent esse sacramentale ibidem, cum sit quodammodo quelibet pars quantitativa ipsius hostie, et multo magis multiplicatur anima Christi per hostiam, secundum quoddam esse spirituale posterius quam est illud esse quod

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means by asserting that “the [soul] is more principally the Person of the Word than the body,” is unclear. In fact, this remark will not go unnoticed by a later opponent (as we shall see). Perhaps Wyclif is alluding to the theory that the Son of God united flesh to himself by means of the soul (Cf. Aquinas, ST III, q. 6, a. 1). Still, one wonders whether emphasizing the soul’s superiority in this way does not undermine his own efforts to affirm the real presence of Christ’s body against the charges of a vague spiritualism. At all events, Wyclif continues to assert that Christ’s body is present, but that it is not in the host as a quantified thing, nor corporeally qualified there. It has a spiritual existence, not a dimensional one. Wyclif reckons it axiomatic that a body cannot exist anywhere substantially unless it is also there accidentally. As Christ’s body is not present substantially in the host, so it is not present accidentally, inasmuch as his body’s substantial presence is in heaven where it also exists accidentally.168 Because Christ’s body does not possess any formal accidents in the host, there in the place of quantity the body has instead the magnitude of virtue, and in the place of corporeal qualities it has spiritual ones. And rather than a continuation of his members, he has there the grace of continuation which unites the members of the Church with one another, and with Christ, through charity.169 All the while the bread’s accidents remain, supported there by its own substance which naturally upholds all the accidents we habet in corpore Christi in celo. Et causa huius multiplicationis anime Christi est, quod ipsa est principalius ipso corpore persona verbi. Qualitates autem immateriales, quae subiectantur in anima Christi, commultiplicantur cum ipsa per hostiam, ut sciencia, iusticia et alie virtutes anime Christi, que non requirunt, ubicunque fuerint, Christi preexistenciam corporalem.” Cf. FZ, 121. 168 Ibid., XVII, 253: “Conceditur igitur quod corpus Christi est non quantum, non figuratum, non corporaliter qualificatum ibi, quia est spiritualiter et non dimensionaliter ibi. Verumtamen corpus Christi non est non quantum vel corporee qualificatum, quia tunc non esset alicubi illo modo. … Conceditur tamen quod accidentaliter et secundum modum sibi accidentalem est in celo, cum sit ibi substancialiter. Et impossibile est aliquod corpus esse alicubi substancialiter, nisi fuerit ibi accidentaliter, sed econtra.” 169 Ibid., 253: “Corpus itaque Christi non habet in hostia aliquod accidens formale, sed loco quantitatis habet corpus Christi ibi magnitudinem virtutis, et loco qualitatis corporalis habet ibi qualitates spirituales, et loco continuacionis membrorum suorum habet ibi graciam continuandi per caritatem membra ecclesie ad invicem et cum Christo.”


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sensibly perceive. Yet to the extent that the bread is Christ’s body it confers grace upon the faithful.170 Wyclif must be careful that when discussing various modes of existence he does not lose the uniqueness of Christ’s body. The scholastics were well aware of the difficulties involved in explaining how one body could be on so many altars simultaneously, eaten by the faithful while remaining impassible. Wyclif identifies two schools of thought which attempt to explain this phenomenon. In fact,Wyclif often speaks of schools of thought generally, those of the Thomist and the Scotist, rarely identifying specific texts belonging to the masters themselves. As he describes it in his De eucharistia, there is the way of Scotus and his followers, who claim that the body can in fact be multiplied dimensionally to many locations at the same time. And there is the way of the Thomists who argue that Christ’s body is multiplied throughout many places at once, though it remains dimensionally in heaven, while being sacramentally present wherever the consecrated host exists. The body is never there dimensionally, as that would call for extension throughout the location of the host, since every part of the host would be singularly occupied by a part of Christ’s body.171 Wyclif concludes that the Thomist position is right, because it is impossible for the same body to be multiplied situationally or dimensionally to different locations. He defines multiplication as the same created thing existing entirely in many different places at the same time; and while that might be possible for a soul it is not possible for a material body.172 170

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Ibid., 253: “Et dicendum est scolasticis quod sacramentum, secundum quod panis aut vinum, subiectat naturaliter omnia illa accidencia que sentimus; sed secundum quod corpus Christi, confert graciam fidelibus ipsa dignis.” De eucharistia VIII, 232-33: “In ista auten materia sunt due vie: prima que ascribitur Doctori Subtili et suis sequacibus, ponens quod idem corpus in numero mutliplicari dimensionaliter simul tempore per quotlibet loca non communicancia. Et secunda que ascribitur Doctori Communi cum suis sequacibus quod idem corpus potest simul mulitplicari per quotlibet loca … quod dimemsionaliter est in celo et sacramentaliter in quotlibet locis aliis distantibus, quia ubicunque est hostia consecrata; non tamen dimensionaliter in aliqua earum, quia tunc extenderetur per locum hostie coequatum eidem, sic quod quelibet pars loci eiusdem hostie haberet appropriate partem corporis Christi singulariter occupatum …” Cf. Scotus, Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 2; 196; Aquinas, ST III, q. 75, a. 1; 497. Ibid., 268: “Sed redeundo post digressionem ad difficultatem tactam de multiplicacione videtur quod secunda sentencia sit tenenda; cum enim inpossibile

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Yet it should be noted that Wyclif draws conclusions regarding dimensional existence which are not in fact part of the Scotist doctrine. For Scotus says that in the Eucharist the whole of Christ’s body is present to every part of the host, and not each part to each part. Christ’s dimensional existence in the host refers to an internal ordering of the bodily organs, and not an extrinsic ordering to a place. A year later in his De apostasia, Wyclif devotes a fair amount of space to the multiplication of Christ’s body. While not mentioning Scotus by name, he recites the argument of his adversaries that if many bodies can occupy the same place at once then, by the same rationale, one body can be in many places simultaneously. In fact, they say that Wyclif is detracting from God’s absolute power by not allowing this. Appealing to the resources of popular piety, they ask why Christ could not remain in heaven while miraculously presenting himself in the sacrament in the form of a boy.173 And with regard to the Thomists, while it is true that Aquinas said the accident of dimensive quantity is only present concomitantly, he still said that the substance of Christ’s body is present. After affirming the Thomist position, it is clear that Wyclif is thinking along different lines when he writes: “Inasmuch as every material substance is diffused throughout a space, so it is impossible for the same body in number to be extended throughout distant locations simultaneously. It is possible, however, for it to be extended in one place and yet possess a spiritual existence in another, as in a sign or through its power, just as it is said of a king. And so it is clear with respect to the body of Christ that it is dimensionally in heaven and virtually in the host as in a

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sit idem corpus multiplicari situaliter vel dimensionaliter per diversa loca et tam fides de eukaristia quam eciam communis philosophia docet esse multiplicacionem substancie, patet veritas secunde sentencie. Vocatur autem multiplicacio, quando eadem res creata est simul in tempore per multa loca secundum se totam, ut anima, universalia et instancia.” De apostasia VIII, 102: “Item, secundum adversarios, stat diversa corpora esse simul tempore per eundem locum; igitur per locum a sufficienti simulitudine stat idem corpus esse simul tempore diversa. … et videtur omnino derogare potencie divine, quod ipse non posset manendo in celo humanitus ostendere se ipsum in sacramento miraculose in forma pueri. … Et certum est quod altera istarum viarum est omnino heretica, quia sunt summe contrarie in precipua materia fidei de dei omnipotencia.”


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sign.”174 Here again, though, Aquinas had specifically distinguished between Christ’s virtual presence in Baptism and his substantial presence in the host, declaring the latter to be unique and superior. Despite his proposed agreement with the Angelic Doctor, Wyclif rejects the assertion that a thing cannot exist somewhere it had not been previously except through local motion or substantial conversion. Wyclif must reject this thesis, precisely because his own position will not allow for either scenario to explain Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. Christ’s body, says Wyclif, remains in heaven, but acquires a new sacramental existence in the consecrated host. It has to be a sacramental existence, moreover, for if the Eucharist were identically Christ’s body, and not figuratively, then Christ would live there by way of animal life, experiencing the vicissitudes of human existence, and thereby leaving himself open to the various indignities imposed upon the host. Yet this would be in opposition to authority and experience.175 Instead, Christ’s body is multiplied to all the places where the consecrated hosts are, but sacramentally, not substantially. It undergoes no alteration, nor is it in danger of putrefaction, even while the sacrament, which is the body sacramentally, does suffer change.176 Now while it is true that Aquinas argued that Christ’s body is not present as it would be in a place, with dimensions commensurate with that place, its sacramental presence in the host is still a substantial 174

De eucharistia VIII, 271: “… sicut omnis materialis substancia per locum diffunditur, qualiter repugnat idem corpus in numero per distancia loca simul distendi; potest tamen distendi in uno loco et habere aliud esse spirituale in alio tamquam in signo aut in virtute, sicut dictum est de rege. Et sic patet de corpore Christi, quod est dimensionaliter in celo et virtualiter in hostia ut in signo.” 175 De apostasia XIV, 186: “Nec oportet corpus Christi descendere de celo usque ad locum hostie; quia, ut patet ex dictis alibi, hereticum foret pertinaciter concedere, quod inpossibile sit aliquid esse alicubi, ubi prius non fuit, nisi vel moveatur illuc, vel aliud convertatur in ipsum; corpus igitur Christi quiescit in celo, nec movetur localiter nec alteratur, et multo evidencius non generatur propter hoc, quod noviter habet esse sacramentale in hostia consecrata. Item, si sacramentum altaris sit corpus Christi ydemptice vel aliter quam figurative, tunc ipsum vivit vita animali, et posset ex se moveri vel agere sicut homo; consequens contra autorem De divinis officiis et contra experimentum; quia quantumcunque hostia pungitur, comburitur vel inhonorifice tractatur …” 176 Ibid., 190: “Ideo, sicut dixi superius, corpus Christi multiplicatur per situm hostie non substantialiter sed sacramentaliter, nec alteratur; non putrescit, non comburitur, licet sacramentum illud quod est sacramentaliter ipsum taliter alteratur.”

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one. For Wyclif, however, ‘sacramental’ presence specifically precludes substantial presence. Thus when Wyclif affirms that a single subject can be multiplied throughout many different places, that affirmation will depend upon the nature of the subject. For instance, the one soul totally exists in every member of the human body. That Christ’s whole body can be multiplied to many different altars seems to be based upon the fact that his soul is equally present, thus bestowing a spiritual, immaterial existence upon the body.177 While Wyclif agrees with those who say a body can still acquire and lose location without either conversion or local motion, his support for such a position rests on his explanation of sacramental presence. A body may possess intentional existence in a place without being moved there; it may also possess spiritual existence in the soul when considered in that soul. It stands to reason therefore that Christ’s body can possess a sacramental existence through a power granted to the host without being moved locally to the place of that host. While one would think that Wyclif has to be aware of Scotus’s theory of multiple relations, given the fact that he explicitly cites his position here that the same body can acquire many different locations without undergoing local motion or conversion, he never does engage it directly.178 Wyclif specifically addresses the second charge leveled against him by Barton’s Oxford commission, concerning the presence of Christ’s body. One will recall that he is accused of denying that the body of Christ is present corporeally (corporaliter), and that Christ is present in his proper corporeal person (persona corporali). Wyclif will sieze 177

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De eucharistia VIII, 232: “Sed quomodo idem suppositum in numero potest multiplicari per distincta loca et distancia, sicut dicimus animam eandem hominis secundum se totam esse in quotlibet membro suo, oportet eciam fidelem concedere quod tam anima Christi quam totum corpus eius sit simul tempore per diversa loca in multis eclesiis atque altaribus, et illud vocamus multiplicacionem corporis, sicut dicitur totum corpus esse ad omnem punctum hostie consecrate.” Ibid., V, 148: “Videtur enim multis quod subducto omni motu locali vel conversione unius in aliud corpus posset quotlibet loca acquirere et alias perdere. … Et eodem modo diceret pius philosophus pertinenter quod corpus habet esse intencionale per medium, capiens suam speciem, sicut habet esse spirituale per anime consideracionem in ipsa anima sine hoc quod corpus moveatur ad illa loca; quare non posset sic esse de esse sacramentali, quod habet corpus Christi in hostia per virtutem datam hostie sine quod corpus Christi illinc localiter moveatur.” On Scotus cf. ibid., 148-49.


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upon this terminology, arguing that the commission does not understand the distinction. He responds by arguing that presence refers to being present to the senses, whether those of the body or those of the intellect. Inasmuch as the latter form of presence is equally valid, then wherever Christ’s body is sensed by the intellect there it is in its corporeal presence. To say that the body posseses a corporeal presence is perfectly fine, but to say that it is present corporeally is not acceptable. For if a body is somewhere corporeally, says Wyclif, it must acquire an essentially new mode of existence in that place; but the presence of Christ’s body in the host is accidental to his body. “This is called corporeal presence because it is the presence of his body, not because that body is there corporeally, but rather spiritually. It is just as when a creature is called divine, not because it is God, but because it is sanctified by God.” The creature’s sanctification is thus accidental to it and not an essential aspect of its nature. Wyclif insists upon retaining the distinction between the descriptions ‘corporeally’ and ‘in the manner of a body.’ The body can be present in different ways; the former speaks to its essential, substantial presence, while the latter to its accidental, spiritual presence. When the two ways of speaking are not distinguished heresy results.179 As Christ is both God and man, so according to his divinity he is everywhere essentially, potentially and virtually, just as God is in every creature. And since Christ is King of kings according to his humanity, so he is present to his whole kingdom through his regal power. Though he is certainly not present dimensionally or corporeally 179

De blasphemia XVI, 252-53: “Quantum ad secundum dampnacionem quod corpus Cristti non sit corporali presencia in altari, probabile est quod si corpus Cristi vel aliquod sit alicubi, tunc corporali presencia et corporaliter est ibidem ... Manifestum est quod res est presens, ubicunque sentita fuerit intellectu, et per consequens ubicunque corpus fuerit, ibi est presencia corporali. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod ubicunque corpus fuerit, ibi est corporaliter, quia si corpus est alicubi corporaliter, tunc habet ibi unum novum modum essendi qui inest in quantum illud corpus. … Unde presencia corporis Cristi est sibi accidentalis in sacramento panis. Unde dicitur presencia corporalis, quia est presencia corporis, non quia illud corpus est ibi corporaliter, sed spiritualiter; ut creatura dicitur divina, non quia deus, sed quia sanctificata per deum. … ita non sequitur: corpus Cristi est in sacramento presencia corporali; igitur est ibi corporaliter. Et illi qui habent pro eodem corporaliter et modo corporis locuntur inproprie et extense. Unde anticristine procedunt, qui super ista inproprietate fundant dampnacionem heresis.”

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(corporaliter), he is still present to every part of his kingdom in the manner of a body (per modum corporis). Thus the presence of his body is still experienced by the faithful, even as the very body they experience is situated elsewhere.180 Christ’s body cannot be present corporeally or dimensionally, precisely because that manner of being pertains only to his existence in heaven where he is corporeally situated in a place.181 For Wyclif, a body can enjoy a spiritual, non-dimensional presence, as is the case with Christ in the host, while ‘bodily’ presence as such is equated with circumscriptive presence. How the one body of Christ can be multiplied to many places without being in all of them corporeally can also be explained by the power of Christ’s determinative words. Many hosts are figuratively or sacramentally the body of Christ, but that his body is symbolically multiplied does not mean that his body, as this symbolized thing, is thus multiplied in its own nature. Christ said John the Baptist symbolized Elijah, but when the Baptist was decapitated Elijah himself remained intact.182 Wyclif has been arguing that the body of Christ is in the host, but not as a quantified thing or material substance. This does not mean the body is deprived of any and all material substance and quantification, however. Just because an earthly king is not present corporeally or dimensionally in one particular place, does not mean he cannot be 180

De antichristo I, xlv, in Opus Evangelicum vol. 2, 165: “… secundum divinitatem est eternaliter et ubique. Ubique dico essencialiter, potencialiter, et virtualiter, sicut Deus est in qualibet creatura, et secundum humanitatem videtur mihi probabile, cum Christus secundum eam sit rex omnium regum et dominus dominancium, Christus secundum humanitatem et secundum potenciam eius atque virtutem in qualibet parte sui imperii; non audeo dicere quod per omnem partem ecclesie Christus dimensionaliter aut corporaliter, licet sit per modum corporis ad punctum quemlibet sui imperii.” 181 Ibid., 165: “... quidem modus est spiritualis aut virtualis aut potencialis, et cum Christus non est corporaliter vel dimesionaliter nisi in loco celesti in quo resdiet corporaliter situatus vel alio modo quo est proprium corpori residere.” 182 Ibid., 166-67: “.... quia non est inconveniens sed consonum quod multa corpora et singulum eorum sit figuraliter vel sacramentaliter idem corpus, cum figure possunt multiplicari, licet figuratum non multiplicetur in natura sua. Et sic Christus negaret hanc consequenciam: Baptista est Helias et Herodes decapitavit ipsum Baptistam: ergo ipse Herodes decapitavit ipsum Heliam: sic in assimili negaret fidelis racionem huiusmodi sic formatam. Satis quidem est quantumcunque modica particula illius hostie consecrate sit virtute verborum Domini figuraliter ipsum corpus ad sensum expositum.”


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present corporeally and dimensionally somewhere else. To deny dimensional existence to a body in one place is not tantamount to denying such existence to it completely.183 It would seem that for Wyclif if a body is to be present in its essential nature it must be tangible and quantified, perceptible to the bodily senses. This essential existence is unique to Christ’s risen body as it exists in heaven. But this same body can be present elsewhere under different conditions. Wyclif’s appeal to a king’s presence may be an allusion to the broader concept of the king as a ‘twin person.’ The Norman Anonymous c. 1100, whose theories on kingship may have influenced Wyclif, had drawn an analogy between the king’s double persona and Christ’s two natures. In his natural condition the king is an ordinary man subject to all the limitations of other men, while by the grace he receives in his royal office he partakes of divine power (Kantorowicz, 42-61). So for Wyclif, the king as a mortal man has a body which is physically located in only one place at a time, and yet he makes the full regal bearing of that body felt throughout his entire domain. The need for a proper understanding of universals is again underscored by Wyclif when it comes to grasping Christ’s eucharistic presence. For just as the human species is any one of its individual human beings, so the same body of Christ in number is every part of the consecrated host. Yet while the whole universal is identical with its individual supposit, the body of Christ is not identical with every quantitative part of the bread, but is so habitudinally, which is to say, by way of relational predication.184 This is not a matter of formal predication, for though Christ’s body is present to the bread, which is itself quantified and substantially present to us here on earth, 183

Ibid., 167: “Et sic dicit logicus quod corpus Christi sit in ipsa hostia; sed non corpus vel materialis substantia in ipsa hostia. Nec sequitur corpus Christi est non corpus in ipsa hostia, ergo illud corpus Domini est non corpus. … Et cum non est color ex isto concludere quod iste rex terrenus sit non corporaliter vel non dimensionaliter, quia si est non dimensionaliter, tunc est non dimensionaliter alicubi et per consequens nullibi est dimensionaliter.” 184 Trialogus IV, 9, 276-77: “Sicut dixi tibi superius, oportet te cognoscere sententiam de universalibus, et tunc intelliges quod, sicut species humana est quodlibet ejus individuum, sic idem corpus Christi in numero est quaelibet pars sensibilis hostiae consecratae. … et sic totum universale est identice quodlibet ejus suppositum, sed corpus Christi non est identice quaelibet pars quantitativa panis, sed habitudinaliter.”

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Christ’s body is not present in the bread in a quantified manner, since his body is only a quantified thing as it exists in heaven.185 Even though Christ’s body is present in as many hosts as might be consecrated throughout England, the body itself is not multiplied, since it is not identical with the various hosts.186 Wyclif must meet the objection that if the bread substantially remains and yet is Christ’s body at each of its points, then two ‘bodies’ are occupying the same place simultaneously. In response, he argues that the body which is bread in its nature is Christ’s body sacramentally. There are not two bodies co-extended there, for Christ’s body is not present in the host in an extended manner. What is naturally bread, occupying that sacramental place, functions sacramentally as Christ’s body, the very same body which retains its dimensional existence in heaven at the right hand of the Father.187 With recourse to universals again, he notes that, insofar as the nature of the sacramental bread remains, the many hosts are numerically distinct from one another, although they are all the body of Christ (though not identically), just as many supposits belonging to the same species are numerically distinct from one another.188 Modes of presence naturally lead to questions of modes of perception of that presence. We have observed that Wyclif rules out any talk 185

Ibid., 276: “Nota tamen, ut dixi superius, quod omnia ista intelligas in praedicatione habitudinali et essentiali, non autem ut praedicatum tale formaliter praedicatur, ut corpus Christi est quantum et figuratum aequaliter grano frumenti, quia est illud quod taliter quantificatur et figuratur, et tamen corpus Christi non taliter quantificatur aut figuratur, cum corpus Christi non figuratur nisi ut est in coelo, licet sit figuratum quod hic substantialiter est nobiscum, quia est panis qui secundum denominationes hujusmodi est nobiscum.” 186 Ibid., 277: “… concedetur tamen, quod corpus Christi est multi panes a se distantes, ut patet de multis panibus consecratis in Anglia; sed non sequitur propterea, quod corpus Christi multiplicetur, licet sit multi panes tam varie situati; sed si cum istis panibus corpus Christi foret identice illa multa, ratio satis procederet.” 187 De antichristo I, xlv, 164-65: “Sed hic est quod illud corpus quod est panis et vinum in natura sua est sacramentaliter corpus Christi, et sic non sunt duo corpora coextensa, cum istud naturaliter sit panis qui locum sacramentalem occupat et sacramentaliter corpus Christi quod in celo empireo supra angelos residet as dexteram Dei patris.” 188 De apostasia IX, 117: “Natura enim panis sacramentalis remanet, et sic numerabiliter distinguuntur multe hostie consecrate, licet omnes ille sint corpus Christi, sicut multa supposita sunt sua species et tamen numeraliter distinguuntur.”


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of visual apprehension of the body as the stuff of idolatry. The body is present to faith alone. No theologian promoted the notion that one could ever count on actually seeing Christ in the host. This belonged to the realm of mystical experience and the miracle stories of popular preaching. While Ockham had argued there was no reason why, in principle, one could not see Christ’s body, he admitted this is not the case in fact. But for Wyclif it is patently impossible to see Christ in the host for a number of reasons, and optical theory is one. The modern doctors, he says, agree that the eye sees everything according to the form of a triangle, whereby the cone is in the eye and the base in the thing that it seen. But since Christ’s body is multiplied to every point of the host it does not form such a base; the laws of perspective would thus preclude it being seen by the bodily eye. As noted earlier, not even the eye of the glorified body can carnally see Christ in the consecrated host.189 Christ’s body is seen in the host by way of faith and understanding, however. And here two sorts of vision must be differentiated. When Christ promised the pure in heart they would see God (Matt 5:8), he was referring to the intuitive vision of the blessed in heaven. Yet when he said, ‘The one who sees me sees my Father (Jn 14:9),’ he meant that the one who sees the natural Son of God, according to the principle by which he is such, thus sees God the Father abstractly, and not intuitively. And this way of seeing Christ is for the faithful alone, surpassing the merely corporeal vision of the beasts.190 What is more, says Wyclif, were someone to see the essence 189

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De eucharistia I, 20: “Quantum ad quinque sensaciones predictas patet quod moderniores doctores negant hoc de visu, quia (ut inquiunt) nichil videtur ab oculo nisi secundum formam trianguli cuius conus est in oculo et basis in ipso visibili; sed corpus Domini cum sit multiplicatum ad omnem punctum hostie, non terminat talem basem, ideo secundum vera perspectivorum principia non sic videtur oculo corporali, tantum quod sancti tenent nec oculum corporis glorificati nec eciam oculum Christi posse carnaliter videre corpus Christi vel sanguinem in hostia consecrata.” Ibid., VII, 211-12: “Videt, inquam, fide et intellectu corpus Christi in hostia consecrata, et sic per istam distinccionem de visione intelligende sunt alie scripture ut Matth. V, 8, ubi pro finali premio beati mundo corde quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Ibi patet quod loquitur de intuicione in patria. Sed Joh. XIV, 9, dicit: Philippe, qui videt me, videt et patrem meum; ubi videtur loqui de visione abtractiva et visione infusa. Qui enim videt Dei filium naturalem sub racione qua talis, videt abstractive Deum patrem; et illa visio Christi pertinet ad fidelem supra bestiam.”

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of Christ’s body, one would then have to see every sensible quantity and quality which informs the body in its entirety.191 Based upon his conviction that accidents cannot exist apart from substance, Wyclif notes that accidents cannot be perceived unless there is a substance to sustain them. Existing together, the accidents are seen directly and their subject only indirectly. Now given the fact that the accidents of Christ’s body are not seen in the host by the corporeal eye, so then his body is not seen indirectly, via the accidents; only the host is seen in this way.192 Thus if accidents are indicative of substance, and we see the host’s accidents and not Christ’s, then the bread must substantially remain, while Christ’s body is present in some other way, namely sacramentally.

10 An Appeal to Christology Christology, specifically the relationship between the two natures, provides Wyclif with ammunition, both for attacking his opponents, and in support of his own position. With regard to the former, the question of impanation arises. In rejecting impanation as impossible and heretical Wyclif was hardly alone, and so one might wonder why he would spend time denouncing a doctrine that was generally considered illicit. He charges the “false friars” with holding this view based upon their use of identical predication when calling the host the body of Christ. Wyclif knew of John Quidort’s condemnation for supposedly asserting impanation, and bids his opponents to take note

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Ibid., I, 23: “Ex quibus patenter patet quod illa species sensibilis quam sacramentum dicimus non est corpus Christi vel sanguis. … Verumptamen, si viderem sanguinis Christi essenciam, viderem per idem omnem quantitatem vel qualitatem sensibilem, que informat corpus Christi in toto.” 192 Ibid., VII, 213: “Sed ignorant philosophiam quomodo nullum accidens potest sentiri nisi in virtute substancie sustenantis, cum nullum accidens sit nisi substanciam accidentari, hoc est, modus accidentalis substancie. Accidens tamen videtur per se et subiectum per accidens; cum ergo nullum acccidens corporis Christi in hostia videtur oculo corporali, manifestum est quod ipsum non videtur sic per accidens sed ipsa hostia.”


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of it.193 One should not suppose that his opponents were actually positing a doctrine of impanation, of course, but rather that Wyclif is charging them with having lapsed into this heresy as a result of their own inept predication. Impanation is built upon the model of the Incarnation, and thus involves the principle of the communicatio idiomatum, which includes the question of predication. Wyclif correctly points out that when two natures are identified in the same person, as is the case with the Incarnation, then the attributes of one nature may be predicated of the other, since they pertain to the same person, that single supposit. Thus one can say not only that Christ was crucified, but that God was crucified. If applied to the Eucharist then what is predicated of the bread would likewise have to apply to Christ as well. Not only could one say that Christ’s body is made by the baker, as much as by the celebrating priest, but one could also say that a mouse eats the Lord’s body. What is more, idolatry arises as the bread is identified with the body; people will be worshipping the bread as if it were divine. For if the bread becomes the body, and the body is really Christ, then the bread becomes Christ, who is himself God.194 There is a major problem with Wyclif’s rebuttal, however, namely that the Incarnation concerns the existence of two substances, divine and human, while transubstantiation proposes the existence of only one substance, that of Christ’s body. There is no bread anymore, only accidents. That is why, much to Wyclif’s aggravation, the proponents of transubstantiation say that when calling the bread the body they are speaking of the bread in a purely figurative manner. As we have seen, by the middle of twelfth century they had already made it quite clear 193

194

Ibid., VII, 222: “Sed arguendo contra istam sentenciam notandum est primo quod (ut referunt cronicantes) erat quidam frater predicator Parisius qui propter magnificacionem istius sentencie fuit ibi excommunicatus est appellando ad curiam Avinonicam fuit tempore Clementis quinti in ista sentencia condempntaus …” Trialogus IV, 8, 270-71: “Sum certus, quod sententia ista impanationis est impossibilis atque haeretica, et propter hoc quod tenebatur a multis pseudofratribus plus suspecta. … omnes transmutationes vel denominationes quas panis ille reciperet, et sic corpus Christi nedum foret factum a presebytero celebrante sed a pistore … Et consequentia patet, quia quando duae naturae identificantur in eadem persona, ut patet in materia de incarnatione, omnis praedicatio alterius naturae eidem personae convenit. Sic enim vere credimus, nedum quod Christus sed quod Deus fuit crucifixus … Similiter si iste panis sic factus identifice corpus Christi, et illus corpus est realiter ipse Christus, ergo ille panis est factus realiter Christus Deus. Sed quae idolatria foret amplius detestanda?”

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that what the host suffers outwardly has no bearing on Christ’s body; the breaking and chewing apply to the bread’s accidents alone. Impanation must be ruled out. What then is proposed? “Although the bread may have been broken into three, or however many pieces, each one is not really, but rather habitudinally, the same body; just as when gazing upon different mirrors the same face is intentionally in each one of them. … One should not imagine that the body of Christ descends to consecrated host in every church, but rather that it remains stable and immovable in heaven. Therefore, it possesses a spiritual existence in the host, and not the dimensional existence it has with the rest of its accidents in heaven.”195 It is unfortunate that in this instance Wyclif contradicts his usual claim that Christ is ‘really’ (realiter) in the host, but then terms like ‘really’ and ‘truly’ seem to lack a certain degree of precision. The point is clear, though; the predication is not identical, but relational. His own standards of real presence are met as he recounts a favorite refrain: the body of Christ, and thus Christ in his humanity, is spiritually present to every point of the world. For Christ in his humanity is the king of the world, and like a king is spiritually, potentially and virtually present to every point of his kingdom. The body of Christ may called the host in a habitudinal way, therefore, as it enjoys a spiritual and virtual existence in every one of its points.196 One might just note here that Wyclif’s ‘mirror analogy’ enjoys a thoroughly orthodox precedent. Lothario of Segni (Innocent III) and Jacques de Vitry also spoke of the whole Christ being present to each fractured piece of the host, much as an image in every part of a broken mirror. And the latter points out that Christ’s body, while 195

Ibid., 272: “ … quia licet panis fuerit fractus in tres vel in quotlibet partes, quaelibet earum non est realiter sed habitudinaliter idem corpus, ut intuendo diversa specula, eadem facies est intentionaliter in quolibet eorundem. … Ut non est intelligendum corpus Christi descendere ad hostiam in quacunque ecclesia consecratam, sed manet in coelis stabile et immotum, ideo habet esse spirituale in hostia et non esse dimensionatum et cetera accidentia quae in coelo.” 196 Ibid., 272: “Unde videtur mihi, quod corpus Christi et sic Christus humanitus sit spiritualiter ad quemlibet punctum mundi, cum Christus humanitus sit rex mundi, sed secundum Augustinum et doctores ceteros rex spiritualiter potentialiter et virtualiter ad punctum quemlibet regni sui. Corpus ergo Christi est ad punctum quemlibet hujus mundi … Verumtamen credendum est, quod longe aliter est corpus Christi in hostia consecrata, cum sit habitudinaliter ipsa hostia, et secundum rationem spiritualis et virtualis existentiae est aliter ad quemlibet punctum ejus.”


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wholly present under the form of the bread, is not made commensurate with it.197 The Incarnation actually provides Wyclif with a good model to support the bread’s substantial remnance, though of course he does not complete this analogy with any assertion of Christ’s substantial presence. “TheWord did not relinquish its eternal substance through the Incarnation, but instead that nature remained, while newly creating something which had not previously existed. And so it happens that in some manner the body of the bread, while preserving the substance of the bread, is miraculously made together with this, the body of the Lord. I do not dare say it is so identically according to substance or nature, but rather metaphorically by way of a sign or figure. Nevertheless, it is not falsely or improperly called the body of Christ, but truly and properly, just as Christ truly and properly says that bread is his body. Hence, the substance of the sacrament should not be called two bodies, but rather a single one which is the principal and autonomous body of Christ.”198 Aware that his own description sounds close to impanation, he points out that this heresy is averted precisely by the use of figurative, equivocal language.199 One can identify the bread with Christ’s body as long as that remains a sacramental, not a substantial, identification. Yet this sacramental 197

Lothario, De sacro altaris mysterio; PL 217; 861c: “Sicut in speculo dum est integrum una tantum apparet inspicientis imago: sed eo fracto, tot apparent imagines quod sunt in eo fracturae.” Jacques de Vitry, Historia Occidentalis xxxviii, 227: “Facta autem fractione, sub qualibet parte incipit totus esse, sicut in integro speculo una resultat ymago, facta autem fractione apparet ymago in qualibet parte. … Siue autem parua sit forma siue magna, totum Christi corpus sub illa continetur. Nec tamen illi commensuratur, nec est comparatio corporis glorificati ad quantitatem forme …” I am indebted to Gary Macy for bringing these two passages to my attention. 198 De apostasia IX, 106: “Et sicud verbum non amisit per incarnacionem substanciam eternam, sed mansit illa natura noviter faciendo aliquid quod prius non fuerat, sic quodammodo corpus panis, servando panis substanciam, est miraculose factum cum hoc corpus domini, non audeo dicere ydemtice secundum substanciam vel naturam, sed tropice secundum signanciam vel figuram; non tamen false et improprie dicitur corpus Christi, sed vere et proprie, sicut Christus vere et proprie dicit illum panem esse corpus suum. Unde substancia sacramenti non debet dici duo corpora, sed unicum quod est principale et autonomatice corpus Christi.” 199 Ibid., 109: “In omnibus autem istis oportet cavere hereses de idemptificacione et inpanacione in quibus laborant ydolatre … et secure ire per medium istorum errorum notando equivocaciones predicacionum, in quibus non est contradiccio.”

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identification results in the bread receiving a wholly new identity uniquely determined by Christ’s sacred discourse. The single reality following consecration is Christ’s body, because Christ’s own ‘proper’ speech conveys the fullness of his intended meaning. The Incarnation surely seemed an attractive model for Wyclif, and would have been very effective in bolstering an argument for consubstantiation. But even as he refuses to accept Christ’s substantial presence it is clear that he is positing an intimate union between the creator and creation, divine and mundane. “The idiots murmur, asking how the body is that sanctified bread, when it is not such according to substance or nature. But they would do well to study the faith of the Incarnation, and how it is that two very different substances or natures are the same supposit, and yet are not identical with one another, because either one of them is Christ. Only then, reasoning from this observation, will they be able to ascend to an understanding of that miraculous union.”200 Just as Christ is simultaneously God and man, so the sacrament is at once bread and Christ’s body, the former naturally, and the latter sacramentally. And in this vein, just as the divinity of Christ remains constant despite variations in the humanity, so Christ’s body is constant while the bread undergoes alterations. He is careful in using this incarnational analogy, making it clear that he is not asserting a hypostatic union. Rather, it is a matter of the earthly substance conferring what is divine, not being assumed by it.201 200

FZ, 122: “Sed idiotae remurmurant quaerentes quomodo corpus est ille panis sanctus, cum non sit id secundum substantiam vel naturam. Sed ipsos oportet addiscere fidem de incarnatione, quomodo duae substantiae vel naturae valde differentes sunt idem suppositum, et tamen non sunt eadem, quia utraque earum est Christus; et tunc possunt a posteriori ascendere ad cognoscendum istam miraculosam unionem.” 201 Sermones IV, ii, 15: “Veritas quidem est et fides ecclesie quod sicut Christus est simul Deus et homo, sic hoc sacramentum est simul corpus Christi et panis; panis naturaliter et corpus Christi sacramentaliter … Et sicut deitas Christi non maioratur vel minuitur propter variacionem in humanitate, sic corpus Christi non maioratur vel minuratur propter variacionem in pane. … ne credatur esse impanacionem vel invinacionem secundum ypostaticam unionem; est enim vino inferior citra illam. Et hec quare ecclesia Anglicana orat a similitudine quod sicut homo genitus idem refulsit Deus, sic hec terrena substancia nobis conferat quod divinum est.”


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11 The Question of Donatism The focus of this book has been largely confined to the question of Wyclif’s rejection of the substantial conversion of the elements, coupled with his rejection of Christ’s substantial presence in the host. The possibility that he was guilty of Donatism deserves some attention here as well. We noted that the fourth proposition condemned as heretical at Blackfriars in 1382, and again at Constance in 1415, states: “If a bishop or a priest exists in a state of mortal sin, he does not ordain, nor consecrate, nor baptize.”202 We also noted that while Wyclif defended the first three propositions, he makes no mention of the fourth, and furthermore, said that some of the condemned propositions were in fact heretical, though without specifying which ones. One must remember here that while Wyclif was the principal target of the Blackfriars condemnations, he was not mentioned by name. And so it is quite possible that others at Oxford were asserting this, or at least discussing it, even as Wyclif was not. Or then again, Wyclif himself may have indeed raised this question for discussion without ever asserting that it is true. If Wyclif did fall into the Donatist heresy it came rather late in his career. All the while that he was raining blows upon popes and prelates in the late 1370s for their unseemly worldliness, he still concurred with the long-standing prohibition against Donatism spelled out in the Decretum as well as in the Decretales. God confers his grace through the good and the wicked minister alike, preserving the faithful communicant from harm. In his 1379 De ecclesia, he makes it clear that a foreknown priest, even when in a state of mortal sin, does truly administer the sacraments to the faithful. For although he does so to his own damnation, the laity still receives the benefit.203 The celebrant 202

FZ, 278: “Item quod si episcopus vel sacerdos existat in peccato mortali: non ordinat, conficit, nec baptizat.” For Constance cf. Denzinger, 1154. For a fuller treatment of the issue cf. Levy, 2000. 203 De ecclesia xix, 448-49: “Videtur autem mihi quod prescitus eciam in mortali peccato actuali ministrat fidelibus, licet dampnabiliter, tamen subiectis utiliter sacramenta. … Sic ergo sacerdotes mali iniuriantur sed non nocent piis fidelibus non demerentibus ministrando eis ecclesiastica sacramenta, ut patet in decretis I, q. I, Si fuerit, ex testimonio Augustini, et XV questione ultima, cap. ultimo, et III Decretalium, De Cohabitacione clericorum et mulierum, Vestra.” Cf. Friedberg 1:371; 1:760-61; 2:455-56.

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need not be a ‘true priest’ in the sense of being among the predestined, or even free from present mortal sin, in order for Christ’s body to be present, since Christ supplies the very grace that the priest is lacking when consecrating the host.204 Yet a statement in his 1381 Confessio marks a departure from orthodoxy, however briefly, during a discussion of Christ’s different modes of existence. We have already outlined his classification of virtual, spiritual and sacramental existence. Genuine consecration depends upon the way in which these three modes of presence are related to one another. “And just as the second mode presupposes the first, so the third mode presupposes the second, seeing as it is impossible for a foreknown [priest] to consecrate who lacks faith according to present righteousness. Therefore, whether [the priest] consecrates or does not consecrate, the one who believes eats, as Augustine says in Sermon 25 on John. For that mode of spiritual existence is more true in the soul, and it is also more true and real than the first mode of existence, or the second aspect of the second mode of existence which is in the consecrated host, since [the spiritual existence in the soul] is the per se cause of that [spiritual] mode of existence in the consecrated host.”205 The foreknown priest does not possess that spiritual presence by which Christ exists in the souls of the faithful through grace. And because the sacramental presence of Christ in the host presupposes a spiritual presence, itself dependent upon that first spiritual presence in the soul which is missing in the foreknown priest, he cannot confect the sacramental presence. Did 204

De ecclesia xix, 456: “Ulterius videtur quod fides non titubaret in laicis, licet ignorent in particulari disposicionem sui presbiteri, nam nichil quod est supra potestatem eorum faceret in eis fidem deficere, sed certitudo talis circumstancie sacerdotis est supra potestatem eorum.” Ibid., 457: “… sicut credibile est quod Christus sepe supplet defectum presbiteri, ordinando, conficiendo, vel absolvendo, sine ipso rite ministeraliter concurente.” Cf. Friedberg 1:385-88. 205 FZ, 116: “Et sicut secundus modus praeexigit primum, ita tertius modus secundum praeexigit, quia impossibile est praescitum carentem fide secundum justitiam praesentem conficere. Qui ergo credit, sive conficiat, sive non conficiat, manducat, ut dicit B. Augustinus super Johannem, Homilia 25. Et iste modus essendi spiritualis est verior in anima. Est etiam verior et realior quam primus modus essendi, vel secundum membrum secundi modi essendi in hostia consecrata, cum sit per se causa illius modi [essendi in hostia consecrata].” Cf. Augustine, Tract. in Ioh. XXV; CCSL 36, 254: “Ut quid paras dentes et ventrem? Crede, et manducasti.”


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the Blackfriars Council have this very text in mind when they drew up the fourth condemned proposition? Possibly, but remember that the condemned proposition is far wider in scope than Wyclif’s remarks in the Confessio, which were limited to the context of eucharistic presence, and not set forth as a blanket assertion concerning the sacramental powers of sinful clerics. Whether Wyclif’s comments in the Confessio are genuinely representative of his position is hard to determine. While he never takes them back, they do not mark a new course to be charted henceforth. In a 1381 Advent sermon he specifically appeals to Augustine’s debate with the Donatists when arguing that God does accomplish all sacraments, including the Eucharist, irrespective of the minister’s personal worthiness.206 Yet in a sermon from the middle of 1382 he says that those among the foreknown cannot administer the sacraments for the benefit of the people except perhaps “in a relative fashion.”207 And in his 1384 De Antichristo, he says that the faithful have good reason to doubt whether heretics can consecrate or properly administer the sacraments. In fact, Christ need not assist a priest whose own conduct stands in opposition to Christ’s own life. What is more, Wyclif sees no clear reason or evidence in Scripture to support the conclusion that God must assist an unfaithful prelate in consecrating the host.208 Much of this has the ring of provocative speculation, however, and hardly constitutes the construction of a position he was prepared to defend obstinately.

206

Sermones I, iv, 25: “Sed difficultes si infideles vel heretici possunt baptizare fideles (ut Augustinus discuit de Donatistis). … Deus non obstante indignitate persone quod suum est perficit, quia aliter in confeccione eucaristie et ministracione cuiuscunque sacramenti alterius foret ecclesia perplexa.” 207 Ibid., xl, 268: “Nam quicunque sunt presciti non ministrant pro populo sacramenta vel faciunt talia opera bonia de genere bona moraliter nisi forte secundum quid, et sic multis operibus laicalibus minus prosunt ecclesie.” 208 De antichristo I, xlviii, 175-76: “… quia non est evidencia quod Christus assistit tali pontifici propter hoc quod tam hianter super istam hostiam sic mentitur, et in sua conversacione dicit contrarium vite Christi. Et sic quod primam partem de confeccione hostie consecrate videtur multis difficile dicere racionem patentem vel evidenciam ex fide scripture quod oportet Deum coassistere omni tali prelato infidele et conficere sacramentum quodlibet quod similat se sacrare …”

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12 Thomas Winterton’s Absolutio We have already noted that Wyclif’s Confessio elicited some prompt responses, such as those of the Franciscan John Tissington, and the Austin Friar Thomas Winterton. While the former’s response is not especially insightful, and is marred by various erroneous citations, the latter’s is a formidable work and well worth some attention. Thomas Winterton’s Absolutio marked the end not only of Wyclif’s support among the mendicant orders, but the end of a what was likely a long friendship between the two men. In his Absolutio, Winterton claims to have found a total of ten “heretical errors” within Wyclif’s Confessio, eight of which pertain to the Eucharist and two to christology. That being said, he refuses to label Wyclif a heretic for the very good reason that he does not know whether Wyclif has the heart to defend his views obstinately, or whether he is prepared to be corrected and duly submit to ecclesiastical authority.209 As to how Wyclif lapsed into such errors, Winterton hangs much of the blame on the fact that Wyclif has supposedly committed himself to follow the dictates of proper speech, abiding by the strictly literal sense.210 The two incidental heretical errors stem from Wyclif’s effort to explain the multiplication of Christ’s soul throughout the host, remarking that, “Christ’s soul is more principally the Person of the Word than the body.” Winterton addresses the apparent schism Wyclif has created in the composite human nature of Christ.211 He proceeds to point out that the Person of the Word assumed the whole 209

FZ, 182: “… non dico haeretici, cum nesciam si habeat animum pertinaciter defendendi, aut paratum corrigi, cognita veritate, vel debite submittendi se ecclesiasticae auctoritati … sed dico multa erronea et haeretica ponentis in dicto tractatu intitulato Confessio.” 210 Ibid., 183-84: “Ista conclusio cum suis explanationibus, supposito proprio modo loquendi, et non solum metaphorico, ut ipsemet dicit in ipsa confessione se velle loqui proprie, continet octo errores haereticos.” 211 Ibid., 186-87: “Hi octo errores tangunt principalem materiam suae confessionis. Alii sunt duo incidentaliter inducti. Unus: quod anima Christi est persona Verbi, et ipse Christus alius quam corpus Christi; quod scilicet est par (pars?) naturae humanae compositae cum anima est etiam ipse Christus, et Verbum Dei. Et quod haec sint de inentione sua patet cum in ipse confessione sic dicat quod ‘anima Christi est principalius ipso corpore persona verbi’ Et post loquens de ipso corpore et anima, ponens quod sint res distinctae; dicit, ‘utraque illarum est Christus.’” Cf. FZ, 121; De apostasia, 224. Note the variant ‘pars’ for ‘par.’


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human nature, which consists of body and soul; and so Christ the Word is not just one or the other of them.212 Futhermore, the distinction between the divine and human natures must always be maintained with respect to both aspects of the human nature.213 With regard to Wyclif’s rejection of transubstantiation, it is clear that much will turn on Wyclif’s interpretation of Christ’s own words. Winterton takes issue with Wyclif’s claim that, “Christ, who cannot lie, thus asserted,” that his body is the consecrated host. Having looked throughout the Gospels he finds no record of Christ saying, “My body is sensible bread.” Yet this would be the inevitable conclusion if read according to what Winterton deems Wyclif’s insistence upon proper speech. And this means, in turn, that Christ’s body was sensible bread even prior to the institution of the sacrament, given such assertions as ‘I am the living bread’ and ‘I am the bread of life.’ Of course, no Christian would accept that.214 In this vein, while Wyclif contends that the ‘hoc’ means bread and thereby affirms the bread’s substantial remnance, Winterton is willing to grant the plausibility of arguing that the pronoun ‘hoc’ did in fact refer to the material bread in Christ’s hands prior to consecration. That is to say, it referred to the bread which had not yet been transubstantiated, seeing as the entire prayer had not yet been pronounced.215 Nevertheless, Winterton offers two responses: the 212

Ibid., 207-08: “Sed constat quod assumens, vel illud quod assumpsit est persona Verbi: assumptum est caro, vel anima, vel natura humana ex eis composita: ergo Christus, vel persona Verbi, non est illorum quodlibet, ut dicit haec opinio.” 213 Ibid., 209-10: “Item tam anima Christi quam corpus incepit esse, et est creatura. Sed Verbum Dei non est creatura, nec incepit esse; ergo nec ipsa anima, nec corpus est persona Verbi. Consequentia patet; quia si creatura est persona Verbi, persona Verbi est creatura, et si creatura incepit esse.” 214 Ibid., 212-13: “Sed revolvendo totum volumen evangelicum non invenitur quod Christus asseruit, nec quod talia verba protulit: Corpus meum est panis sensibilis. … tunc ante institutionem hujus sacramenti fuisset concedendum quod corpus Christi est panis sensibilis, et materialis, quod ut credo negaret opinio; et negare habet quilibet christianus. Et sequela patet cum Christus ante institutionem hujus sacramenti talia verba habuit et asseruit: Ego sum panis vivus …” 215 Ibid., 215: “Sed tamen pro opinione, modo hac parte, videtur posse fieri una ratio colorata. … sed hoc quod Christus tunc tenuit in manibus, fuit pro tempore prolationis illius pronominis hoc panis materialis, qui praefuit ante consecrationem. … quod tunc non fuit transubstantiatio facta; quia non ante completam prolationem illius orationis, Hoc est corpus meum.”

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first being that what Christ held in his hands was not being demonstrated at that time by the pronoun ‘hoc.’ Rather, this referred to Christ’s body alone, inasmuch as Christ was already referring to what the bread was being transubstantiated into, namely the body. The second response seems quite likely, and can be held so long as it is not found to be contrary to the Catholic Church. For then, no matter how great its probability, it would have to be revoked. This states: “Christ transubstantiated the bread into his body through the blessing. He did not do this formally through the pronouncement of the words, ‘Hoc est corpus meum,’ therefore, but formally through the power of his divine blessing applied to render that effect. … Since the blessing at that time preceded the pronouncement of those words, it does not seem unfitting that the transubstantiation also preceded that pronouncement. But now, in the mystery of the priests, transubstantiation occurs by virtue of Christ’s words, the pronouncement of which we believe confers the divine blessing.” Winterton reckons that answer will clear up all difficulties regarding the demonstrative pronoun, so long as it is not adversely ‘glossed.’ Futhermore, the words demonstrate nothing, since they are only pronounced recitatively in the name of Christ. 216 As noted earlier, Wyclif specifically rejected this explanation, because he thought it drained all the signifying power from Christ’s words. 216

Ibid., 215-17: “Hic est duplex responsio: una communis, dicendo quod illud quod Christus tenuit in manibus non demonstrabatur tunc per illud pronomen hoc, sed solum corpus in quod est transubstantiatus, vel de proximo transubstantiandus est panis, est corpus meum. … Alia posse videtur dari responsio, quae apparet satis probabilis, dummodo determinationi ecclesiae catholicae non invenitur contraria: quia tunc quantumcunque probabilitatis habeat, est penitus abdicanda. … hic dicit ista responsio quod Christus transubstantiavit panem in corpus suum benedicendo, et non formaliter per prolationem illorum verborum, Hoc est corpus meum, sed formaliter per potestatem suae divinae benedictionis ad illum effectum applicatae. … Unde cum benedictio tunc praecessit prolationem verborum illorum, videtur non incongrue transubstantiatio illa praecessisse etiam illam prolationem. Sed modo in mysterio sacerdotum, virtute verborum Christi, in quorum prolatione creditur conferri divina benedictione, fit ipsa transubstantiatio ... Et sic ista responsio, sine glossis quae viderentur extortae parti adversae, potest evacuare omnes illas intricationes, quoad demonstrationem illius pronominis hoc ... dicit ista responsio quod nihil demonstratur, vel debet demonstrari, cum solum recitative in nomine Christi proferantur.”


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Wyclif’s reading of the words, ‘Hoc est corpus meum’ prompts his opponents to attack his entire program of biblical exegesis. Some had clearly been troubled with his exegesis for years, as one recalls the debate with Kynyngham, as well as Barton’s criticism that Wyclif lapses into so many errors because he depends upon the ‘sensus verbalis sacrae scripturae.’ Winterton recounts Wyclif’s reputation for calling every manner of speaking in Scripture proper and true according to the exterior or grammatical sense. Such a method will only result in destroying the distinction of meanings found in the propositions of Scripture, however, thereby losing the sense of the author. Much like the Carmelite Kynyngham, the Austin Friar argues that many texts of Scripture would not be true if read according to their strict grammatical sense, that is, when the terms are considered precisely in their exterior meaning alone.217 There is no shortage of biblical propositions which can easily be misconstrued when read according to the rules of proper supposition. The literal sense of Scripture is not always to be identified with the grammatical signification, Winterton explains, for there are countless instances in which the moral or allegorical sense is the literal sense.218 Ironically, Wyclif had been defending some of the very same propositions, now cited by Winterton, when refuting the sophists just a few years earlier in his De veritate 217

Ibid., 195: “Sed, ut reportatum est de isto doctore, ipse omnem modum loquendi sacrae Scripturae vocat proprium, et verum, ad sensum exteriorem vel grammaticalem sonum. … Et si secundum verum esset, periret multorum distinctio de sensu propositionum sacrae Scripturae, in quo fiunt, et ad quem fiunt, scilicet de sensu ad quem positae ab auctore fuerunt, et sensu in quo fiunt; scilicet quo sonant secundum grammaticam, vel ad idioma quo proferuntur. Sed quod periret talis distinctio, modica forte cura videretur doctori recitato. Ideo clare ostendetur de multis, quod in sono exteriori et grammaticali quem prima facie exprimunt cuicunque audienti, vel natae sunt exprimere quantum est ex ipsis terminis praecise, quod non sunt verae.” 218 Ibid., 195-96: “Ut de illa quam asseruit Christus dicendo Pater major me est; cum ex fide teneamur credere, quod in illa benedicta Trinitate nihil sit majus vel minus, prius vel posterius; tum quia ex ipso Christo, Ille et Pater unum sunt; ut etiam de illa quam idem Christus asseruit: Mea doctrina non est mea. Et illa: Caeci vident. Et illa: Ego non ascendam ad diem festum, cum tamen de facto postquam sic dixerat ascendit ad illum diem festum. … Quare videtur quod non semper sensus literalis Scripturae sacrae est significatio grammaticalis, vel sonus exterioris literae. Alia exempla multa possent adduci de moralibus et figurativis dictis sacrae Scripturae; in quibus sensus moralis vel allegoricus est sensus literalis, et non sensus quem exprimit sonus grammaticalis.”

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sacrae scripturae, where he too would identify the mystical senses with the literal in some cases. There really does seem to have been some confusion as to just what Wyclif was saying. Admittedly, he did little to clarify the situation. One must stay in tune with the intention of the sacred authors, Winterton insists. There are times when the word ‘est’ should be taken broadly and improperly so as to mean ‘significat,’ as when the visible species of the bread is called the body of Christ, in the sense that it signifies the body underneath. But when it comes to explaining the truth of what is really present, then one must employ proper discourse and say, “the bread truly and really is the body of Christ.”219 Yes, the doctors do speak metaphorically on occasion, employing the word ‘est’ when they mean ‘significat.’ But one must never divulge such uses of metaphorical language to the laity, lest the saving faith itself be put at risk. They are just too unsophisticated to distinguish between figurative and identical predication. Tell them the bread is the body and leave it at that.220 Winterton also warned that the 1059 Ego Berengarius must not be taken literally (ut verba sonant), for such a reading would end up contradicting many other canons within the Decretum itself. And so the faithful reader should not understand the confession according to the exterior sense of the words.221 The confession must be glossed in 219

Ibid., 194: “Ex quibus expresse patet quod licet aliquando hoc verbum est large, et multum improprie, accipiatur pro significare in dictis doctorum; ut dicatur panis, vel visibilis species panis, est corpus Christi, id est significat corpus Christi, non tamen cum veritas debet explanari, et proprius modus loquendi haberi, debet dici quod talis panis vere et realiter est corpus Christi.” 220 Ibid., 197: “… quod licet doctores aliquando large loquendo, et tropice, dicant quod panis, vel species panis, est caro Christi, accipiendo hoc verbum est, pro hoc verbo significat … Nec laicis, vel minus literatis, aut minus doctis, debent tales tropices locutiones, ut fides necessaria saluti, propalari: cum ipsi inter praedicationem tropologicam, vel figurativam, et praedicationem identicam, sive in aliis verbis, inter actum exercitum, et actum signatum, nesciant distinguere.” 221 Ibid., 223-24: “Sextus testis videtur decretum Romanae ecclesiae, quae sub Nicolao II et centum quatuordecim episcopis … Pro isto dico quod si illa confessio Berengarii accipiatur ut verba sonant, ut vellet haec opinio, non solum contradiceret aliis testibus per eum introductis, scilicet Augustino, et Ambrosio, et sic esset magna exceptio contra testimonium: sed etiam contradiceret multis aliis capitulis ejusdem dist. 2, de Consecratione. Et per consequens, nec iste Doctor cujus opinio tangitur, nec aliquis fidelis habet tenere illam confessionem ad sensum exteriorem verborum.”


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keeping with the canons and doctors, such that the material bread and wine which are placed upon the altar prior to consecration are understood to have been genuinely transubstantiated into the body of Christ. The body of Christ is truly there, and not only signified as being there, as the heretics would claim. Wyclif’s reading might at first seem compatible with the confession, notes Winterton. For although he does say that the sacrament truly is Christ’s body, Wyclif actually takes ‘est’ to be the equivalent of ‘significat,’ and thus affirms a figurative rather than an identical predication. And with respect to the second part of the confession, Winterton invokes Lombard’s gloss to the effect that while it states that the body is broken in truth and not only in sacrament, the doctors understand that only the visible sacrament is broken and not Christ’s body.222 What of Wyclif’s lapse into Donatism? This was not missed by Winterton either, as he includes it among the ten heretical errors. The eighth is that a priest in state of a mortal sin, speaking the sacramental words with the firm intention of consecrating, does not confect the body of Christ.223 He contends that Wyclif misappropriated the canonical statutes regarding priestly sanctity. Drawing upon a number of canons, Winterton appeals to the vital canonical distinction that a good life is necessary for the celebrant only insofar as it pertains to the effect upon himself, and not his ability to consecrate. The sacrifice of the wicked harms the wicked man alone, so that even a 222

Ibid., 225-26: “Ex istis expresse videtur quod repugnat canoni, et aliis doctoribus inductis pro testibus, quod praedicta confessio Berengarii teneatur ut verba sonant; sed oportet quod debite glossetur secundum sententiam dictorum canonis et doctorum, scilicet quod panis materialis et vinum ante consecrationem in altari ponuntur, quae vere transubstantiantur in corpus Christi; ita quod corpus Christi vere sit ibi, et non solum significetur esse ibi: sicut multi haeretici posuerunt, et ipse, ut videtur ex ipsa confessione, de hoc defamatus fuerat. Et haec opinio, ut videtur, in sententia, licet non in verbis, concordat cum eadem haeresi; quia licet dicat verbaliter quod sacramentum altaris sit vere et realiter corpus Christi: illud tamen verbum est penes eum equivalet huic verbo significat, prout ibi ponitur; cum secundum eum sit praedicatio troplogica, et non identica. … Sed solum sacramentum visibile, et non corpus Christi frangitur, dividitur, et dentibus fidelium atteritur. Haec glossa tangitur IV Sententiarum dist. 12.” 223 Ibid., 204: “Contra octavam conclusionem, quae ponit quod sacerdos existens in peccato mortali, quantumcunque firma intentione consecrandi dicat verba sacramentalia super materia competenti, non conficit, corpus Christi, nec corpus Christi ibi conficitur …”

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priest in a state of mortal sin can consecrate the host, provided that he speaks the sacramental words according to the form of the Church.224 Winterton’s arguments are indeed formidable on all counts, but he was not the only theologian capable of leveling some forceful blows.

13 Thomas Netter’s Doctrinale Much of Netter’s Doctrinale Antiquitatum Fidei Catholicae is written directly against the “crafty Wyclif” whom he accuses of hiding his heresy beneath the Church’s own customary manner of speaking.225 Indeed, he likens Wyclif to the Arians, promoting heresy under shaded verbal distinctions, precisely in order to disguise their opposition to the Catholic faith.226 When it comes to the Eucharist, pious readers must be on their guard lest they are deceived when reading Wyclif’s books where he says the sacrament is “truly and really the body of Christ.” For while the faithful equate this with his essence and nature, Wyclif means something very different.227 Netter claims the Eucharist must be venerated precisely because it is the body of Christ naturally, and not just “some figurative body which is bread in nature,” as he accuses Wyclif of positing.228 Because the sacrament is a visible sign of invisible grace, Netter says that the invisible grace of the Eucharist is the body and blood of Christ, present according to 224

Ibid., 204-06. Winterton cites Multi secularium; Friedberg 1:387. The Interogo vos cited is in modern editions Neque potest; Friedberg 1:392. The Si ergo cited is in modern editions Dominus declaravit; Friedberg 1:389. Cited also is Per Ysaiam; Friedberg 1:396-97. 225 Doctrinale II, xx, 140: “Quid sit sacramentum in communi, et quomodo versutus Wicleffus abscondit suam haeresim sub consuetis verbis Ecclesiae.” 226 Ibid., 140: “Quomodo Wicleffus aemuletur Arianos haereticos, qui coloribus verborum suam instaurabant haeresim, ita ut in nullo viderentur a catholicis alieni.” 227 Ibid., lxxxiv, 502: “Existimant quiddam pii lectores, cum ad libros Wicleffi pervenerint, et audiant, eum affere tam constanter, venerabile sacramentum esse vere et realiter corpus Christi, quod jam cum fidelibus de corpore Christi sapiat secundum suam essentiam et naturam.” 228 Ibid., xxi, 144: “Venerandum Eucharistae Sacramentum est corpus Christi naturaliter et sanguis; non corpus tropicum, et panis in natura, secundum Wicleffum.”


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their substance, under the visible form of bread and wine. The outward sign, namely the visible form of the bread and wine, is not the sacrament, except by way of analogy, just as the portrait of a man can be called a man insofar as it signifies, though not according to proper truth.229 As so much of Wyclif’s position hinges upon the use of proper and improper speech, Netter finds that Christ’s words are perfectly clear. The Lord did not say ‘Hoc est corpus meum figuraliter;’ he just said, ‘Hoc est corpus meum.’230 Though the Church believes the Eucharist is the body of Christ naturally, while the bread only figuratively, Wyclif turns this on its head, saying the host is only the body of Christ in a figurative sense, while essentially bread.231 We have seen that Wyclif argues at length that the Eucharist is both truth and figure, but for Netter this means that it is truth according to the substance of Christ’s flesh, and figure with regard to what is perceived exteriorly. Wyclif is thereby charged with “sophistically commuting figura into veritas.”232 229

Ibid., 144: “Descriptio ergo nudi signi sacramentalis est illa praedicta, scilicet invisiblis gratiae visibilis forma. Descriptio vero salutiferi et verissimi Sacramenti est ista: Invisiblis gratia sub visibili forma, loquendo de gratia in sensu Ecclesiae. Sacramentum Eucharistiae est invisiblis gratia, corpus et sanguis Christi, secundum suam substantiam sub visibili forma panis et vini. Et hoc est verissime Sacramentum et hostia consecrata. Signum autem ejus extrinsecum, scilicet, visibilis forma panis et vini, non est sacramentum, nisi per analogiam ad istud: quia scilicet significat istud; sicut urina non est sana, nisi quis significat sanitatem, et qualiter homo pictus dicitur homo secundum signum, cum non sit homo secundum propriam veritatem.” 230 Ibid., xxiii, 154: “Nos non audivimus Christum dicere: Hoc est Corpus meum figuraliter; sed quid? Hoc est corpus meum etc, Hoc facite in meam commemorationem. O horrendissime, et abominande inter omnes haeretice!” 231 Ibid., xxx, 195: “Sacramentum altaris, quod Ecclesia credit esse corpus Christi naturaliter, et panem per figuram, Wicleffus pervertit ad opposita, dicens esse corpus Christi solum figuraliter, et panem per essentiam.” 232 Ibid., 196: “ … quod scilicet dominici corporis sacramentum veritas est, et figura multiplex. Veritas, inquam, secundum substantiam carnis corpus Christi: figura, quod sentiendum exterius exhibet. Unde in sermone de corpore et sanguine Domini, qui incipit, Veritas quae est Christus, et ponitur in Decr. de consecr. Dist. II. cap. Utrum sub figura, Augustinus. ‘Corpus Christi et veritas est, et figura est: veritas est dum corpus Christi et sanguis in virtute Spritus Sancti in verbo ipsius Christi ec panis vinique substantia efficitur: figura vero est id quod exterius sentitur.’ Haec ille. Videtis qualiter Augustinus utitur istis terminis pro distinctis opposito modo, veritas et figura; ita ut nolit dicere figuram esse veritatem secundum id, quod est figura; quamvis ad alium comparata possit veritas appellari, ut infra patebit. Impie ergo confundit terminos istos Wicleffus, sophistice commutans figuram in veritatem, ne seorsum veritas a figura posset discrete cognosci.” Cf. Friedberg 1:1342-43.

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Netter further accuses Wyclif of learning to manipulate the pronouns ‘hoc’ and ‘meum’ from his “master Berengar.”233 Wyclif’s grammar seems to be quite selective according to Netter. For one wonders why the demonstrative pronoun will retain its force when demonstrating the substance of the bread, while the possessive pronoun cannot signify the substance of the body.234 This is a matter of sacred grammar. And yet Wyclif, “contrary to the laws of Holy Scripture ... and without authority,” substitutes figurative for proper discourse whenever he sees fit. 235 He apparently feels free to ignore the distinctions that Scripture itself makes in its own use of proper and improper speech, positing no distinction therefore between the rock being Christ (1 Cor 10:4) and the bread being the body. We have seen Wyclif’s appeal to the seven ears of corn in Pharaoh’s dream as the sort of figurative language applicable to the Eucharist. At the heart of Netter’s response is the role of authority in biblical exegesis, as Wyclif is pointedly asked by what authority he dares to transfer the trope of the seven ears to the unique body of Christ.236 Would it be permissible to claim that Gabriel spoke metaphorically to Mary and not historically, or that ‘the Word was made flesh’ is to be taken as figure? Wyclif is right that the Scriptures express the things themselves (res ipsas), but nothing is truer than the essential reality of the Eucharist. On what grounds does he attenuate that reality into a figure and not the others? Wyclif simply extends these terms without the authority of Church or Holy Scripture. In fact, Wyclif is charged with running roughshod 233

Ibid., xlix, 302: “Habebas hoc argumentum a Magistro tuo Berengario sic ponderante grammaticam hujus pronominis hoc, fortificanteque quod pronomen significat substatiam meram; sicut et tu hanc grammaticam jugiter solemnizas, non hic solum, sed in de ideis, et in eo, quod quodlibet est Deus et alibi.” 234 Ibid., 306: “Aut dicat, quare demonstrativum pronomen habebit vim suam in demonstrando substantiam panis naturaliter, et pronomen possessivum carebit significatione suae substantiae naturaliter sibi subjectae?” 235 Ibid., lxxxiv, 503: “Primus eror ejus in hac parte est, quod contra leges Scripturae sacrae extendit locutionem figuratam, ut propriam: et sine authoritate figuram transfert in locum proprii.” 236 Ibid., 504-05: “Si ergo spicae, quas Pharao somniavit, non fuerunt vere et realiter spicae reales, quamvis Scriptura sic dicat: Vidit Pharao septem spicas, quomodo illae septem spicae erunt vere et realiter septem anni, quamvis eadem Scriptura sic dicat: quia septem spicae, sunt septem anni? Postremo peterem, quo capite, qua item authoritate, transferre audes vel potes tropum septem spicarum ad unicum corpus Christi?” Cf. Wyclif, Trialogus IV, 7, 266-67.


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over Scripture, which possesses a unique prerogative of expression to which every sense of the reader must be bound.237 There has to be some control set upon the reading of the sacred texts; the Church will decide which passages are to be read figuratively, and which literally. As one might expect, Netter considers Wyclif’s heresy to be the result of having deviated from the tradition, the received reading, or glossing of the text. Thus while the ancient fathers may speak of bread after consecration, this belongs to their manner of speaking (modus loquendi), and is not to be taken as proof that the nature of the host remains the same after consecration.238 Well aware that Wyclif made so much of the 1059 Ego Berengarius, Netter must address this distortion of a perfectly orthodox council. Where, he asks, do the pope and curia claim the bread remains in its earlier essence after consecration? “It is true that the bread is said to be the Lord’s body; but where does it say that the bread following the consecration is bread? Nowhere according to the Church. Accept the testimony of the Church, what she says, and not what she does not say. ... The Church believes that it is the body alone without bread.”239 Furthermore, Netter reckons Wyclif’s appeal to tradition highly selective to say the least. Pope Nicholas II’s Church is deemed faithful because Wyclif 237

Ibid., 506-07: “… quis item prohibeat alium dicere ea lege loquendi Gabrielem nuncium de coelis ad Virginem, tropicum fuisse, non historicum: Verbo caro factum est, figura non natura … nihil secundum historiam substantialiter esse verum? Si dicas, Scripturas res ipsas exprimere, verum dicis, et nullam verius, quam hujus sacramenti propriam veritatem. Cur istam sine illis attenuas in figuram? … Quid ergo te cogit dicere esse figuram, quam cuncti fideles dicunt substantiam? … Ergo secundum circumstantiam lectionis pensandus est intellectus vocabuli. Mihi autem videtur, soli Scripturae reservanda haec praerogativa loquendi, cui soli inter omnes scripturas captivandus est omnis sensus legentis.” 238 Ibid., xxxv, 230: “Hunc loquendi modum servaverunt pene cuncti Patres antiqui in loquendo de hosta consecrata, ut non idem dicerent in natura post consecrationem, quod erat ante.” 239 Ibid., xlii, 266: “Non est enim convenientia illa, quam putas, Nicolai scilicet Papae (quem sanctum virum collaudas) ad Berengarium, quem excusas. Ubi est quartum testimonium Papae cum sua Curia, quod panis remanet post conscecrationem in priori sua essentia? Quod dicitur panis et corpus Domini esse, verum est; sed ubi dicitur panis post consecrationem panem esse? Nusquam per Ecclesiam. Accipe ergo testimonium Ecclesiae, quod ipsa dicit, non quod non dicit: panem post consecrationem dicit corpus Domini esse. … Christus dicens: Hoc est corpus meum, non dixit, Et prior panis in natura; nec dixit corpus in figura. Id est solum corpus credit Ecclesia sine pane.”

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thinks it favors his own position, while the modern Church is deemed heretical because he knows it is against him, evinced in Wyclif’s rejection of Innocent III and his decretal Cum Marthae.240 For Netter, the tradition is the seamless garment which cannot be torn asunder when some part of it ceases to please.

14 Conclusion Wyclif’s eucharistic theology evolved over some twenty years, from his days as a young Oxford master of arts until his final days in exile at Lutterworth. In his later years he admits to having once accepted transubstantiation, and his earliest works bear that out. But an unmistakable trend does emerge as one finds him increasingly ill at ease with the ways in which the eucharistic conversion was being explained by the schoolmen. When the final and irreparable break with transubstantiation does arrive, Wyclif never misses an opportunity to harangue the doctrine’s supporters with all of its apparent metaphysical incongruities. By that point, however, such a weapon forms but one part of a mighty arsenal brought to bear against a doctrine which seems to underscore all that is wrong with the present Church. Wyclif reckons this doctrine the inevitable product of an institution which has abandoned her sacred tradition for the sake of worldly glory. This much is certain: Wyclif could not put aside what he considered to be the basic operating principles of the universe for the sake of dogma. The Church is in no position to authorize any sacramental explanations which violate the integrity of the creative and revelatory Word of God. Holy Scripture, itself an embodiment of Christ the Word, could never support a doctrine which turns the Principle of Creation against himself. One is struck by Wyclif’s repeated insistence that transubstantiation is not simply unfitting, but is absolutely 240

Ibid., 267: “Idcirco Ecclesiam illam dicit fidelem, quia ibi favorem putat invenisse perfidiae. Modernam Ecclesiam dicit haereticam, et illi priori contrarium, quia plane sensit sibi adversam; colligit istam a tempore Innocentii Papae III, quia Decretalem illam instituit, cap. Cum Marthae.” Cf. Friedberg 2:636-39.


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impossible. The whole doctrine is based upon a contradiction not even God can resolve, precisely because it involves a contradiction of the Divine Nature. There are certain natural laws that God simply cannot suspend, for the very reason that they are an expression of his nature. What is more, transubstantiation would lead to the destruction of the Divine Nature, since the annihilation of even the smallest entity would result in God’s own destruction. Finally, the natural order can admit no such alteration as transubstantiation would demand, for then all certitude is lost and man is set at odds with his creator. Indeed, for Wyclif, the most troubling aspect of this metaphysical impossibility is the way it reflects upon God: Author of Nature, Author of Salvation, Author of Scripture. If this Author proves untrustworthy then his authority has been forfeited and all is lost. What could be a more horrible prospect than being deceived by the very one the wayfarer depends upon to lead him safely home? The sophists attack the Author of Scripture with their rules of supposition, and the friars attack the Author of Nature with their self-subsistent accidents. They are all are attacking the Author of Salvation.

7 Laying Claim to a Sacred Past

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e have seen Wyclif’s eucharistic theology undergo a series of changes from the early 1360s until his final and decisive rejection of transubstantiation in 1380. In examining this process two central questions arise: why did he reject this doctrine; and what did he propose to put in its place? There is not a single answer for either question, though it is easier to respond to the first (we will take up both just below). Wyclif adamantly insisted that he was not proposing anything novel, but simply calling for a return to the Church’s traditional understanding of the Eucharist. Be that as it may, his censure rests upon the premise that he is in fact deviating from the traditional teaching of the Church. And on that score, the statement issued by Barton’s Oxford council would have us believe that the Holy Catholic Church had abided by the doctrine of transubstantiation (understood as substantial conversion) throughout her entire history. Wyclif and his cohorts are thus accused of resurrecting heresies which had previously met with solemn condemnation. Some forty years later Netter will charge Wyclif with dredging up the heresy of Berengar, which is to say that he is following someone who supposedly chose to reject the sacred tradition for the sake of his own personal opinion. But even if the heresy one promotes has an ancient predecessor, heresy itself is really something novel. This was one thing all sides could agree upon; for by definition heresy represents a deviation from the eternal truth bestowed upon the Church. Wyclif, no less than Netter, casts himself in the role of ‘defender of the sacred tradition.’ It is their doctrine of transubstantiation which is the novelty, he says, the course chosen by the proud and the obstinate. Returning to the two questions raised above, perhaps we can provide some answers. First of all, why did Wyclif reject transubstantiation? We noted Robson’s contention that Wyclif’s objections were

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metaphysical in nature, and so he really could have come out against transubstantiation long before he did, given his belief in the impossibility of annihilation. This only forces one to ask why he did not do so; why wait until 1380 to say what he could have said ten or twenty years earlier? Our study has traced Wyclif’s increasing dissatisfaction with transubstantiation, founded upon his objection to annihilation in principle, as well as the impossibility of accidents existing apart from proper subjects. These objections were certainly a mainstay in his later arguments, but in the years prior to 1380 he went to great lengths to accommodate his metaphysical reservations. Maybe the dam finally broke when he came to the sad realization that he simply could not continue this scholastic high wire act any longer. That is perfectly plausible, but it fails to take into account his other objections, ones which he later reiterates with an unflagging zeal. Transubstantiation posits a deception as he sees it, a pernicious lie on the part of the Savior. And what is more, this prevarication results in the laity’s lapse into the sin of idolatry. To preach transubstantiation is to posit a metaphysical impossibility to be sure, but a dangerous and heretical one at that. It would seem that by 1380 Wyclif came to regard the sacrament of the Eucharist as just the latest casualty in an assault against divine veracity. Scripture is under siege; the Word himself is being maligned. Now the Lord’s own words, uttered on the evening before his death, are being glossed into a lie by those who know nothing of sacred discourse. And when such glosses are passed off on the unsuspecting laity the creature ends up being exalted above the creator. People flock to pay homage to the mundane, thereby forsaking the call to rise above the sign and worship its divine significate. Everything about transubstantiation is wrong: it is metaphysically impossible, thoroughly unscriptural, has no basis in sacred tradition, and is positively dangerous to the souls who believe it. Rejecting a theory is often easier than constructing one to replace it. This brings us to our second question. Here it should be said that all attempts to count Wyclif within the camp of consubstantiation are going to be very difficult for the very simple reason that he repeatedly denies Christ’s substantial presence in the host. As far as Wyclif is concerned, the terms corporaliter, dimensionaliter, and substantialiter are all of a piece, and are all reserved exclusively for Christ’s body in

7~Laying Claim to a Sacred Past

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heaven. Perhaps Wyclif was overly swayed by his own fearful reactions to the excesses of popular piety, for he does seem to have equated substantial presence with tangible, circumscribed presence. Wyclif’s reactions against Christ’s substantial presence are visceral at times, leading one to conclude that he could never disentangle it from the materialistic overtones it had in the earlier Middle Ages. That would be a shame, for we have seen proponents of substantial conversion, such as Alger of Liège, clearly state that the body’s substantial presence is still spiritual and invisible. One remembers Wyclif’s contention that Christ’s presence is ‘true and real’ when he is in the host virtualiter, spiritualiter and sacramentaliter, even though this mode of existence is less true and real than the one he enjoys in heaven. Wyclif allows for Christ to be present ‘in the manner of a body,’ but not in a bodily way, that is, not materially or dimensionally. The mode of existence Wyclif attaches to Christ in heaven is perfectly orthodox. Yet, because he seems to equate the highest level of a body’s presence with its material aspects, any other mode of existence must be of lesser status. The truest form of bodily presence is as a quantified thing; and that is reserved for Christ’s body in heaven. Substantial presence in the host is unacceptable to Wyclif, because he thinks that a body’s substance must always retain its accidents and thus be quantified; but that would lead to an extended dimensional presence in the host. Could he not have sided with Scotus and insisted upon the retention of quantity, while specifically limiting it to the internal ordering of the body’s parts? Wyclif just rejects substantial presence out of hand as a presence which demands each part of Christ’s body be spatially related to each part of the host. It is for this reason that he must turn instead to the ‘true and real’ as manifested in the spiritual, sacramental presence. What is this sacramental presence, which is still less ‘true and real’ than the substantial? It allows for the body’s definitive presence, inasmuch as the whole of Christ’s body is present to every point in the consecrated host, even though it is not the whole of Christ’s substantial body. The way in which Wyclif speaks of Christ’s body as present to all points of the substantial bread, as opposed to the bread’s accidents only, as well as the likening of this to the Incarnation,

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whereby the uncreated divine nature is united to the created human nature, is well suited for consubstantiation. Another significant part of Wyclif’s opposition to transubstantiation was tied to its claim of self-subsisting accidents, a phenomenon some deemed integral to a real eucharistic conversion. But here again, both Scotus and Ockham recognized that the bread’s substantial conversion is not in fact necessary in order for Christ’s body to be substantially present. They adhered to the ‘Thomistic’ line because they thought canon law demanded it, not because it was metaphysically attractive. Quite the opposite; it just caused more problems. Still, it must be noted that they granted its possibility at least, while Wyclif did not. If Wyclif could have accepted Christ’s substantial presence then the second, more grievous, charge leveled against him by Barton’s commission would have been dropped. And, as the recognition of substantial presence was equated with the acceptance of real presence, which is itself always the foremost concern, Wyclif’s orthodox standing would have been harder to assail. For while it is true that consubstantiation was also disallowed by this time, Wyclif would have appeared far less dangerous, and it is doubtful that so much opposition could have been mustered against him. All of this is purely hypothetical, however, inasmuch as he did not accept Christ’s substantial presence in the host. Wyclif’s theory of sacramental presence is often expressed in terms of figurative speech: habitudinal, as opposed to identical, predication. But Wyclif makes it clear that in the case of the Eucharist this is a peculiarly effective form of habitudinal predication, one which makes present the full salvific efficacy of the significate. The bread has clearly undergone a radical transformation, whereby it is infused with the grace and vivifying power of Christ’s body to such an extent that it should then be called that body. The communicant partakes of the real body of Christ there in the host, albeit spiritually and not substantially. What is the difference between Wyclif’s spiritual sacramental presence and the generally accepted theory of substantial sacramental presence? If substantial presence does not imply a visible, circumscribed existence in a particular place; if the substance of the resurrected, incorruptible body is consumed spiritually such that it always remains impassible; how far removed is this from Wyclif’s

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position? Perhaps the greatest problem is that Wyclif himself does not see how close his own position regarding ‘true and real’ presence is to that of his adversaries. As long as spiritual presence is not so taken as to preclude the presence of the body, but only the body in a tangible manner, then there should be a point of agreement. Wyclif is not proposing a Zwinglian memorialism, nor a Calvinistic elevation through the power of the Holy Spirit. For he consistently states that the crucified and risen body of Christ is present to every point of the host, albeit in an immaterial way. Prescinding from the substantial conversion of the bread, which he cannot abide, if agreement could have been reached on the meaning of substantial presence he may very well have become a proponent of consubstantiation. Were he to adopt this theory his metaphysical objections to annihilation and self-subsistent accidents would have been met, and most importantly, the entire question of deception would go by the wayside. It would have been only the slightest jump from saying, ‘this is the true bread and the true body of Christ’ to ‘this is the substantial bread and the substantial body of Christ.’ Having looked at the long and varied tradition of medieval eucharistic theology, also touching upon two of the foremost patristic sources in Ambrose and Augustine, we have seen that even as the range of acceptable positions narrowed, there was still a good deal of latitude at the end of the thirteenth century. Wyclif makes his best case when he points this out, casting himself into the wide sea of history. Where he runs aground is in trying to salvage the more recent formulations by glossing them to his own advantage. He may well have believed in his own reading of Ego Berengarius, but he is far better off appealing to the plurality that really does exist in the tradition, than forcing texts to conform to his own denial of substantial conversion. Better to argue that Innocent III was not laying down an official and legally binding definition of real presence in Firmiter or Cum Marthae, than to say the pope may not have been proposing substantial conversion at all. The tradition afforded more latitude than either he or his opponents would admit. Thus while Wyclif had every right to appeal to that tradition in order to protect his own freedom to dissent, he was every bit as wrong as his adversaries when he accused them of forsaking that same tradition. The field of acceptable doctrines may have been

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constricted, but theirs had always been part of that field. In this period, as the constraints on academic discourse were tightening, Wyclif would have proved himself the greater man had he championed the cause of academic freedom, rather than promoting his own position as the standard of orthodoxy to the exclusion of transubstantiation. Of course, this would hardly have been in keeping with his larger perspective, one that came to regard much of the academy and ecclesiastical hierarchy as the progenitors of apostasy. Wyclif, the magister sacrae paginae, considered himself the heroic defender of Christ the Word, a role in which he could brook no compromise. In all fairness, the doctors who sat on Barton’s commission, or convened at Blackfriars and Constance, were no less dedicated to the Christian faith and the authority of Scripture. They too were fully cognizant that heresy could infect the Church Militant from the lowest to the highest ranks. And in their effort to guard against this very real threat they demanded a level of uniformity which could not permit dissent to go unchecked. When dissent from the prevailing explanation of a specific doctrine is equated with an outright denial of the Catholic faith itself, and therefore reckoned heresy, the theologian may awake to find that he has been forcibly pressed outside the lines of orthodoxy. The late medieval Church ultimately had no place for John Wyclif.

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Index Abelard, Peter, 69 Absolutio, Winterton’s, 308-314 Accidents Alan of Lille, 167 Alger of Liège, 155 Aquinas, 184, 187-189 Gilbert de la Porrée, 156-157 Lanfranc of Bec, 150-151 Lothario of Segni, (Innocent III), 169 Monachus Niger, 35 Ockham, 201-202, 206-208 Paris condemnation, 1277; 25 Quidort, 199-200 Scotus, 190-191, 194-195, Wyclif, 15, 54, 59, 218, 221-228, 232, 235, 244-250, 254, 256, 260264, 267, 275-279, 280-283, 285, 287-290, 292, 300-302, 319, 322325 Adams, Marilyn McCord, 48-49, 196, 204 Aers, David, 114 Alan of Lille, 167, 175 Alberic of Monte Cassino, 151-153 Alcuin of York, 66 Alexander III, pope, 162 n. 78 Alger of Liège, 154-158, 177-180, 323 Alhazen, 231 Allegorical sense, 73, 99-101, 136, 149, 311 Ambrose of Milan, 124-126, 143, 180, 256, 325 Anagogical sense, 73, 99-101 Annihilation Aquinas, 185-186, Hugh of St. Victor, 160 Gloss of Decretum, 181 Lothario of Segni (Innocent III), 168169

Ockham, 202-203, 208 Peter of Capua, 174, Scotus, 191, 195-199 Wyclif, 60-61, 217-218, 223-227, 256, 276-279, 284-287, 319, 322, 325 Anselm of Canterbury, 118, 255 Aquinas, Thomas, 19, 26-27, 38, 40, 55, 68, On Scripture, 74-76, 99-100, 102, 110, 118, On the Eucharist, 182-191, 194-196, 198, 208, 265, 267, 285-286, 288, 290-293 Aristotelianism, 23, 26-27, 33-34, 51, 74, 77, 137, 150-151, 195, 256 Aristotle, 34, 67, 98, 149-151, 155, 188 Arundel, Thomas, archbishop, 18, 237 Aston, Margaret, 240 Aston, Nicholas, 29-30 Augustine of Hippo, 42, 50-51, 55, 6566, 73, 75, 91, 96, 105-106, 110, 118, 124-126, 145-146, 156, 177180, 241, 255-257, 277, 306-307, 325 Augustinianism, 26-28, 41-44, 50, 159, 220 Augustinian Order, 71, 237, 308, 311. See also: Dobelin and Winterton Autrecourt, Nicholas, 32-36 Averroes, 34 Averroism, 23, 27 Avignon, 36, 206, 208, 214, 265 Bacon, Roger, 231 Balduin of Ford, 175 Balliol College, 17 Baptism, 144, 173, 182, 184, 293

346 Barton, William, Oxford Chancellor, 112-115, 122, 232-237, 255, 294, 311, 321, 324, 326 Bede the Venerable, 66 Berengar of Tours, 66, 137-158, 164166, 177, 182-184, 190, 255, 258259, 269, 316, 321 Bianchi, Luca, 34 Blackfriars council, 13, 235-236, 281, 305, 307, 326 Boehner, Philotheus, 20 Bonaventure, Saint, 26, 40, 68, 72-73 Boniface, Saint, 66 Boniface VIII, pope, 201 Bradwardine, Thomas, 19-20, 41-42, 77, 102 Brinkley, Richard, 71 Bruges, 17 Buckingham, Thomas, 30 Buescher, Gabriel, 208 Burley, Walter, 48, 57, 68 Burr, David, 37, 195-198, 208 Buytaert, Eligius 193

Ian Christopher Levy John Wyclif Clement VII, pope, 120, 265 Colish, Marcia, 151, 159 Commensuration, 183, 188, 197, 205, 293, 303 Communicatio idiomatum, 200, 301 Condemnations 1270; 23-24 1277; 18, 23-27, 34, 188, 220, 264265, 276 1284; 18 1315; 18, 28 1340; 69-71, 79 1346; 31-36 1347; 31-36 1382. See: Blackfriars council Confessio, Wyclif’s, 221, 237-238, 255257, 306-308 Constance, Council of, 13, 236, 305, 326 Consubstantiation Aquinas, 182-185 Gloss on Decretum, 181 Hugh of St. Victor, 160 Lothario of Segni (Innocent III), 169 Ockham, 202 Peter of Capua, 174 Scotus, 191-194 Wyclif, 217-218, 228, 268, 273, 277, 282-285, 304, 322-325 Corporeal presence Blackfriars council, 235-236 Earlier medieval views, 154-166 Oxford council (1381), 233-234 Wyclif, 218, 223, 233-235, 238, 243, 254, 269, 288-290, 294-300, 323 Corpus Christi, Feast of, 212, 236. Courtenay, William, archbishop, 18, 232, 235-237, 267 Courtenay, William J., 19-22, 27-28, 36, 42, 68, 71, 93 Cross, Richard, 19, 28-29, 196-197 Cum marthae, 170, 176, 202, 262-263, 267, 318, 325

Calvin, John, 218, 325 Canon law, 119-120, 152, 172, 175176, 232, 259, 324 Carmelite Order, 95, 115, 228, 236, 311. See also: Kynyngham, Netter, and Stokes. Carolingian period 15, 66, 127. See also: Paschasius Radbertus and Ratramnus Cathar heresy, 158, 172 Catto, J. I., 18, 219, 240 Censure. See also: Condemnations Ockham’s, 37-39, 208-209 Paris, 1340; 69-71 Procedure, 21-23 Quidort’s, 199-200 Wyclif’s, 217, 220, 232-235, 237, 321 Chadwick, Henry, 150 Charles the Bald, emperor, 127, 131 Chazelle, Celia, 133 Christology, 87-88, 91, 158, 165, 173, Dahmus, Joseph, 234 De causa Dei Contra Pelagium, Brad200, 300-304, 308 wardine’s, 41-42 Clarke, W. Norris, 55 Clement VI, pope, 31, 33, 36, 77

Index De usu loquendi, 68, 260. See also: supposition (improper) De virtute sermonis, 68, 70-71, 85, 9699, 102-111, 209, 249, 260. See also: supposition (proper) Decretales, 113-114, 119-120, 170-176, 256, 261-266, 305, 318. See also: Cum marthae, Exiit qui seminat, and Firmiter Decretalists, 119, 172 Decretists, 121, 248. Decretum, 119-120, 146, 175-181, 207, 214, 254-259, 261, 267-268, 305, 312, 329 Definitive presence, 188, 204-205, 209, 323 Dialectics, 66-67, 94, 137, 150, 155, 177 Dobelin, Angelus, 71 Doctrinale Antiquitatum Fidei Catholicae Ecclesiae, Netter’s, 115-117, 314-318. Dominican Order, 19, 199, 265, 280. See also: Aquinas, Fishacre, Holcot, Kilwardby, and Quidort. Donatism, 305-307, 313 Donatus, grammarian, 64, 97 Durandus of Troarn, 152 Duns Scotus. See: Scotus, Duns.

347 FitzRalph, Richard, 19-20, 77-79, 8283, 90, 101-102 Formal predication, 252-253, 297, Franciscan Order, 19-20, 37, 76, 113, 196, 201, 221, 237, 255, 308. See also: Brinkley, Lyra, Michael of Cesena, Ockham, Olivi, Pecham, Scotus, Tissington, Wodeham, and Woodford Frank, Georgia, 125 Friars. See: mendicant orders. Fulbert of Chartres, 137

Geoffrey Martel, 138 Ghellinck, Joseph de, 150 Ghosh, Kantik, 82, 102 Gibson, Margaret, 127, 137-138 Gilbert de la Porrée, 156-157, 163 Gilson, Etienne, 21 Glossa Ordinaria, biblical, 164-165; canon law, 181, 248 Glossators, 181, 207, 248, 250, 257, 260, 264, 268, 285 Goering, Joseph, 166-167 Grammatica speculativa, 67 Great Schism, 120, 264 Gregory I, pope, 64, 97, 118 Gregory VII, pope, 138, 151 Gregory IX, pope, 172, 176, 263 Ego Berengarius, Confession, 138-140, Gregory XI, pope, 112. 151-154, 164, 178-179, 189, 258- Grosseteste, Robert, 18, 20, 42, 51-59, 93, 118, 255, 288 261, 265-268, 284, 312, 317, 325 Equivocation, 103-107, 222, 251, 287, Guitmund of Aversa, 152-154, 268, 275 Gwynn, Aubrey, 232 n. 26 303 Essential predication, 252-253, 287 Eucharist. See various theologians; cf. Habitudinal predication, 252-253, 297, 302, 324 also: annihilation, consubstantiation, corporeal presence, sacramental pres- Henry of Susa, 185 Henry, D. P., 67 ence, and transubstantiation Hereford, Nicholas, 236 Eusebius Bruno of Angers, 138 Heresy. See also various censures, conExiit qui seminat, 113-114 demnations and councils; Aquinas’s view of, 184-185 Fahey, John, 135 Bonaventure’s view of, 72 Fasciculi Zizaniorum. See: Winterton’s Cathar, 158 Absolutio and Wyclif’s Confessio Definition, 22-23 Firmiter, 172-176, 191-192, 202, 207Donatist, 305-307 208, 214, 260, 262-263, 325 Pelagian, 36-44 Fishacre, Richard, 19

348 Scotus’s view of, 194 Wyclif implicated, 13, 112-113, 23536, 255, 308, 314-318, 321 Wyclif’s view of, 121, 231, 261, 266267 Hödl, Ludwig, 165 Holcot, Robert, 19-20, 29, 280 Horace, poet, 64 Hudson, Anne, 258 Hugh of St. Victor, 158-162, 169, 171, 255 Humbert of Silva Candida, 138-139, 151-153, 157, 162-164, 259-260 Hurley, Michael, 115-118 Hus, Jan, 13 Identical predication, 235, 238, 243244, 252, 287-288, 293, 297-298, 300-304, 312-313, 324 Impanation, 156, 199-200, 272, 300303 Incarnation, 11, 24, 58, 88, 106, 112, 169, 199, 212, 226, 243, 249, 273, 301, 303-304, 323 Innocent III, pope, 167-172, 176, 207, 248, 261-266, 285-286, 302, 318, 325. See also: Lothario of Segni; Cum marthae and Firmiter. Jacques de Vitry, 302 Jerome, Saint, 64-65, 110-111, 118, 248, 255 Joachim of Fiore, 60 John of Damascus, 272-273 John of Gaunt, 232 John XXI, pope, 24 John XXII, pope, 20, 36 John of Paris. See: Quidort, John. John Wyclif. See: Wyclif, John. Jorissen, Hans, 151, 173-174 Justinian, emperor, 176

Ian Christopher Levy John Wyclif Kilwardby, Robert, archbishop, 18-19, 26-27, 42 Kynyngham, John, 95-96, 122, 228, 311 Lahey, Stephen, 55 Lanfranc of Bec, 66, 137-158, 162, 177180, 258, 268, 270 Langton, Stephen, 93, 158 Laon, school of, 158, 164 Lateran council, fourth, 23, 60, 158, 172-173, 181, 185, 191, 200, 214, 260, 266. See also: Firmiter Lay-Folks Catechism, 213 Lechler, Gotthard, 218 Leff, Gordon, 24, 27, 35, 48, 204, 218219 Lewis of Bavaria, king, 20 Lexington, Henry, bishop, 18 Liber Extra, 172, 176, 185, 202, 214, 256, 262. See also: Decretales. Literal sense, 63-64, 68-78, 81, 92-96, 99-103, 107, 111, 116, 123, 149, 153, 156, 165, 249-250, 259-260, 308-312, 317. See also: supposition. Lollards, 11, 18. See also: Hereford and Repingdon Lombard, Peter, 60, 146, 163-165, 176177, 181, 214, 260, 313 Lothario of Segni (Innocent III), 167172 Luther, Martin, 218, 273 Lutterell, John, 209 Lutterworth, 13, 18, 237, 318 Lyra, Nicholas of, 76-78, 82, 93, 99, 118

MacDonald, A. J., 137 Macy, Gary, 124, 136, 139, 157 Manning, Bernard, 211, 218 Martin, John Hilary, 201 Matthew, F. D., 232 n.26 McCue, James, 136-137, 175 McEvoy, James, 52 McKitterick, Rosamond, 127 Kantorowicz, Ernst, 297 Mendicant Orders, 19-20, 113-114, 212, Kelly, J. N. D., 124 235, 242-244, 261-265, 279, 281, Kennedy, Leonard, 35 300, 308, 319. See also specific orders Kenny, Anthony, 47-48, 60-61, 252, Merit, theories of, 20, 32, 36-44 279 Merton College, 17, 41

Index Metaphor, 65-70, 74-75, 95, 107-108, 123, 132, 136, 140-142, 170, 233, 249, 251, 254, 260, 303, 312, 316. See also: supposition. Metaphysics Wyclif’s 47-61 Wyclif’s eucharistic, 218-219, 275283 Michael of Cesena, 37 Minnis, A. J., 63, 76-78, 82, 90, 101102, 115 Mirecourt, John, 34-36 Monachus Niger, 35 Morris, Colin, 212

349 Paschasius Radbertus, 126-136, 141, 146-149, 177, 180 Peasants’ Revolt, 232 Pecham, John, archbishop, 18, 26 Pelagianism, 36-44 Pelagius, 38-39, 42, 44 Pernoud, Mary Anne, 27 Peter Lombard. See: Lombard, Peter. Peter of Capua, 174 Philip the Fair, king, 201. Phillips, Heather, 231. Pinborg, Jan, 66, 68 Plato, 50 Platonism, 150. See also: Neoplatonism. Poitiers, synod of, 152 Postilla, Lyra’s 76-77; Wyclif’s, 92-93, 100, 106, 228 Potentia Dei absoluta/ordinata, 27-29, 32, 35-39, 43-44, 205, 277, 292 Poverty, 37, 112-115 predication, 49, 57, 92, 107, 142, 200, 204, 250-254, 297, 300-302, 312313, 324. See also various sorts of predication Principium, Wyclif’s, 86, 93

Neoplatonism, 50-54, 274 Netter, Thomas, 115, 122, 255-258, 314-318, 321 Nicholas II, pope, 138, 259, 261-264, 268, 288, 317. See also: Ego Berengarius Nicholas III, pope, 113. See also: Exiit qui seminat Nicholas of Lyra. See: Lyra, Nicholas of Nominalism, 47-49, 56-57, 204 Noonan, John, 162 n.78 Quadrivium, 65, 91 Norman Anonymous, 297 Quality Alger of Liège, 155 Oberman, Heiko, 42, 118 Aquinas, 188 Ockham, William of, 19-20, 23, 28-29, Lanfranc of Bec, 141, 147 113 Ockham, 49, 204, 208 on the Eucharist, 201-210, 214, 256, Pullen, 167 260, 277, 282, 285, 299, 324 Wyclif, 226-228, 275-279, 288, 300 Nominalism, 48-49, 57-58 Quantity Pelagianism, 36-42 Aquinas, 187-189 Oey, Thomas, 87 n. 12; 113 n. 73 Ockham, 204, 208 Olivi, Peter John, 197 Paris condemnation, 1277; 25 Optics, 227-231, 299 Scotus, 194-197 Oxford University, 13, 17-21, 26-29, Wyclif, 223-228, 250, 275-278, 28835, 41-42, 48-54, 70, 77-78, 119, 292, 300, 323 201, 214, 221, 232, 235-239, 294, Quidort, John, 198-201, 214, 300 305, 318, 321 Quivil, bishop of Exeter, 211 Pantin, W. A., 21, 78, 213 Papacy, 121, 176, 245, 258, 261. See Randi, Eugenio, 29 Rashdall, Hastings, 18 also specific popes and decrees. Paris, University of, 19, 22-27, 31, 33- Ratramnus of Corbie, 126-127, 131136, 141, 146, 149 36, 69-71, 79, 199, 264, 276

350 Raymond of Penafort, 172 Real presence, 14, 123, 125, 155-158, 162, 172-175, 178, 181, 214 Aquinas, 182-185, 191 Lanfranc and Berengar, 138-154 Ockham, 201-202 Quidort, 199-200 Scotus, 191, 198 Wyclif, 217-219, 256, 260-263, 268, 286-290, 302, 324-325 Realist metaphysics, 16, 47-61, 82, 9192, 219-220, 274. See also: universals. Reginald of Piperno, 75 n. 21, 190 n. 143. Remnance. See also: consubstantiation Aquinas, 183-185 Berengar of Tours, 138-149 Ockham, 201-202 Scotus, 194-195, 199 Wyclif, 13-14, 217, 220, 224-228, 233-235, 254-259, 262-263, 268, 282, 286, 303, 309 Repingdon, Philip, 236-237. Rigg, Robert, Oxford Chancellor, 235237 Rijk, L. M. de, 33, 66-67 Robert Pullen, 166-167 Robson, J. A., 43, 47-50, 54, 112 n.69, 218, 321 Roland of Bologna, 162, 166 Rubin, Miri, 211-213 Rupert of Deutz, 155-156 Rymyngton, William, 274 Sacraments. See: Baptism and Eucharist Sacramental presence Aquinas, 183 Ego Berengarius, 139 Wyclif, 224, 227, 229-231, 234, 238239, 247, 249, 251, 253-254, 262, 269, 270-274, 282-283, 285, 287, 289, 291, 293-294, 296, 298, 300, 303, 306, 323-324 Schwarz, W., 64 Scotus, Duns, 19, 28-29, 39, 42, 48,

Ian Christopher Levy John Wyclif on the Eucharist, 191-201, 208, 214, 260, 265-266, 275, 277, 282, 285, 291-292, 294, 323-324 Scripture. See various theologians and modes of interpretation. Seeberg, Reinhold, 127 Shogimen, Takashi, 23, 39, 121 Siger of Brabant, 26 Signification, 15, 49, 57, 65, 84-85, 8890, 108, 132, 146, 159, 166, 213, 228-229, 241, 269-271 Simplicius, philosopher, 54 Smalley, Beryl, 67, 82, 93, 118 Sommerville, Robert, 152 n. 50 Sophists, of Arts faculty, 81, 84-85, 88, 94, 97, 102-105, 281, 311, 319 Southern, R. W., 23, 69, 119, 150, 177 Spicq, P. C., 76 Stella clericorum, 212 Stock, Brian, 136, 149 Stokes, Peter, 236-237 Substance. See annihilation, consubstantiation, and transubstantiation Sudbury, Simon, archbishop, 232 Summa Sententiarum, 161-163 Supposition proper/improper, 65-71, 75, 92, 95-96, 102-108, 149, 156, 167, 204, 209, 222, 249, 251, 259-260, 303-304, 308-312, 315-316 Swanson, R. N., 211-212 Tavard, George, 118 Tempier, Stephen, bishop of Paris, 19, 23-26 Terreni, Guido, 121 Thijssen, J. M. M. H., 22-23, 33 Thomson, S. Harrison, 47, 218 Thoresby, John, archbishop, 17, 213 Tierney, Brian, 118, 121 Tissington, John, 237, 255, 257-258, 308 Transubstantiation Aquinas, 182-191 Formulation of, 166-175 Ockham, 201-210 Scotus, 191-198 Wyclif, earlier views, 221-232 Wyclif, later views, 239-288

Index

351

De ente praedicamentali, 222 Trapp, Damasus, 21, 31, 35 De eucharistia, 13, 15, 220-221, 231Trevelyan, George, 218 233, 239-243, 246, 249-251, 254, Trinity, 20, 24, 28, 50, 56, 60, 83, 86258, 260, 265, 268-270, 276-277, 87, 91, 173, 243, 277 280, 283-284, 291-294, 299 Trivium, 65-66, 91, 94, 136-137, 142 De fide catholica, 252 Tropological sense, 73, 99, 100-101 De logica, 52-53, 91-92, 223-224, 278 De mandatis divinis, 240 Ullmann, Walter, 176 Universals, 47-49, 52-57, 59-60, 89-90, De potencia productiva dei ad extra, 225 De potestate papae, 114, 120 297-298 De scientia Dei, 43 Urban VI, pope, 120, 264 De trinitate, 50, 59-60 De universalibus, 53-54, 56-61, 225, 252, Van de Wiel, Constant, 176 297 Van Engen, John, 176-177 De veritate sacrae scripturae, 15, 81-121 Vaughn, Robert, 218 Dialogus sive Speculum Ecclesiae MiliVercelli, synod of, 138 tantis, 231 Vooght, Paul de, 117-118 Opera minora, 252, 274, 282 Opus evangelicum, 296 Waldensians, 172 Polemical Works in Latin, 282 Walsh, Katherine, 77-78 Quaestiones logicae et philosophicae, 222 Weisheipl, James, 20, 48 Responsiones ad XLV Conclusiones, 274, Wilks, Michael, 119 282, 285 William of Auvergne, 175 Sermones, 230, 236, 244-248, 250, 262, William of Moerbeke, 54 272, 274, 278-279, 281, 288, 304, William of Ockham. See: Ockham, Wil307 liam of. Summa de ente, 332 Winroth, Anders, 176-177 Winterton, Thomas, 237, 257, 308-314 Trialogus, 88-89, 236, 242, 246-249, 251-253, 262, 267, 281, 283, 297, Wippel, John, 24, 26 301, 316 Witelo, 231 Wodeham, Adam, 19-20 Zachary of Besançon, 165-166 Woodford, William, 221-224 Zwingli, Ulrich, 218, 325 Workman, H. B., 47, 218, 236 n. 35 Wyclif, John. See various issues and works. Wyclif’s works, De antichristo, 296-298, 307 De apostasia, 237, 262-264, 272, 275276, 284-285, 289, 292-293, 298, 303, 308 De benedicta incarnacione, 87, 107, 226 De blasphemia, 234, 243-244, 262, 269, 295 De civili dominio, 83, 103, 110, 112-113 De cruciata, 282 De dominio divino, 43-44, 49, 55-59 De ecclesia, 114, 305-306 De ente librorum duorum, 43, 55, 57, 225

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Orthodoxy

Silence Love & Death: Saying ''Yes'' to God in the Theology of Karl Rahner (Marquette Studies in Theology)

American Catholic Religious Thought: The Shaping Of A Theological & Social Tradition (Marquette Studies in Theology)

Faith Seeking Understanding: The Functional Specialty 'Systematics' in Bernard Lonergan's 'Method in Theology' (Marquette Studies in Theology, #26.)

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Normativity And Empirical Research In Theology (Empirical Studies in Theology)

The Firstborn of Many Vol. 2, Synoptic Narrative Christology (Marquette Studies in Theology, #20.)

John Wyclif: Scriptural Logic, Real Presence, and the Parameters of Orthodoxy (Marquette Studies in Theology, #36.)

Love (Marquette Studies in Philosophy, #36.)

Vatican II and the Eucumenical Way (Marquette Studies in Theology)

A Theology of the In-Between: The Value of Syncretic Process (Marquette Studies in Theology, #33.)

A Companion to John Wyclif

Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations (Marquette Studies in Theology)

Philosophy and Politics in the Thought of John Wyclif

Abstracts of Karl Rahner's Unserialized Essays (Marquette Studies in Theology)

Martin Luther: Roman Catholic Prophet (Marquette Studies in Theology, #25.)

Lonergan, Hermeneutics, & Theological Method (Marquette Studies in Theology)

The Theology of John Fisher

The Theology of John Zizioulas

Justice Education: From Service To Solidarity (Marquette Studies in Theology)

Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology

Ressentiment (Marquette Studies in Philosophy)

Theology of Ministry (Studies in Reformed Theology)

Space, Time, and Presence in the Icon (Ashgate Studies in Theology, Imagination and the Arts)

Speech and Theology: Language and the Logic of Incarnation (Radical Orthodoxy)

The Firstborn of Many: Doctrinal and Practical Christology (Marquette Studies in Theology, #20.)

Eschatological Presence in Karl Barth's Gottingen Theology

Contributions of Theology to Medical Ethics (Paere Marquette Theology Lecture)

Worship and the Reality of God: An Evangelical Theology of Real Presence

The Firstborn of Many Vol. 1, To Hope in Jesus Christ (Marquette Studies in Theology, #20.)

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Silence Love & Death: Saying ''Yes'' to God in the Theology of Karl Rahner (Marquette Studies in Theology)

American Catholic Religious Thought: The Shaping Of A Theological & Social Tradition (Marquette Studies in Theology)

Faith Seeking Understanding: The Functional Specialty 'Systematics' in Bernard Lonergan's 'Method in Theology' (Marquette Studies in Theology, #26.)

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Normativity And Empirical Research In Theology (Empirical Studies in Theology)

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