Japanese Education Reform: Nakasone's Legacy (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge Series)

Japanese Education Reform The Japanese education system has attracted increasing attention over the past twenty years, ...

Author: Christopher P. Hood

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Japanese Education Reform The Japanese education system has attracted increasing attention over the past twenty years, largely due to the belief that it has been central to Japan’s economic growth. However, many have felt that the system is stunted by an inability, or perhaps even an incapacity, to change. This study challenges these contentions. It examines the reform policies initiated by Prime Minister Nakasone during the 1980s and argues that, not only has the system changed considerably as a result of Nakasone’s work, but it continues to do so. Christopher P.Hood analyses the key areas of the education reform debate, in particular internationalism, government control of education, increased liberalisation and various social problems, and considers the degree to which responses to them have been successful. Basing his research on a wide range of sources including interviews with Nakasone himself, he finds that reforms are being implemented according to Nakasone’s agenda, although they have taken time to come about. He argues that this may in time lead to their proving more successful than previous attempts at reform. Japanese Education Reform considers the major changes that have occurred and provides a fuller understanding of Nakasone, his ideologies and the ‘new Japanese’ who will be produced by the reformed system. It is essential reading for all students and scholars interested in the history of educational reform and its implications for Japanese society. Christopher P.Hood is Director of the Cardiff Japanese Studies Centre, Cardiff University, and Associate Fellow at the Royal Institute for International Affairs.

Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series Edited by Glenn D.Hook Professor of Japanese Studies, University of Sheffield

This series, published by Routledge in association with the Centre for Japanese Studies at the University of Sheffield, both makes available original research on a wide range of subjects dealing with Japan and provides introductory overviews of key topics in Japanese studies. The Internationalization of Japan Edited by Glenn D.Hook and Michael Weiner Race and Migration in Imperial Japan Michael Weiner Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area Pekka Korhonen Greater China and Japan Prospects for an Economic Partnership? Robert Taylor The Steel Industry in Japan A Comparison with the UK Hasegawa Harukiyo Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan Richard Siddle Japan’s Minorities The Illusion of Homogeneity Edited by Michael Weiner Japanese Business Management Restructuring for Low Growth and Globalization Edited by Hasegawa Harukyio and Glenn D.Hook Japan and Asia Pacific Integration

Pacific Romances 1968–996 Pekka Korhonen Japan’s Economic Power and Security Japan and North Korea Christopher W.Hughes Japan’s International Relations Politics, Economics and Security Glenn D.Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes and Hugo Dobson The Japanese Constitution Documents and Analysis Edited by Glenn D.Hook and Gavan McCormack Japanese Education Reform Nakasone’s Legacy Christopher P.Hood

Japanese Education Reform Nakasone’s Legacy

Christopher P.Hood

London and New York

First published 2001 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledges’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2001 Christopher P.Hood All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Hood, Christopher P. (Christopher Philip), 1971– Japanese education reform: Nakasone’s legacy/ Christopher P.Hood. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Education—Japan—History—20th century. 2. Educational change—Japan—History—20thcentury. 3. Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 1918–1. Title. LA1311.82.H565 2001 370′.952–dc21 ISBN 0-203-39852-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-39958-7 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-23283-X (Print Edition)

To Man Yee, my parents, and friends teachers at Concord College (especially 1987–89)

Contents

List of illustrations Acknowledgements Notes on style

ix xi xiii

Introduction Background Nakasone as number one ‘Healthy internationalism’ Traditionalism and control ‘Liberalisation’ and ‘privatisation’ The individual The social problems United and successful: final conclusions

1 12 26 45 71 93 113 136 154

Appendix 1: Major events in Nakasone’s life, education and Japan Appendix 2: History and meaning of Hinomaru and Kimigayo Appendix 3: Map of Japan Glossary Notes Bibliography Index

159 166 167 168 170 185 204

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Illustrations Tables

3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 5.1 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3

Membership of Rinkyōshin Composition and work of the sub-committees Definitions of internationalism Use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at graduation ceremonies Number of part-time outside teachers employed Installation of computers at public schools Reported cases of school violence and assaults on teachers Number of schools reporting incidents of school violence Trend in universities using NCUEE examinations

40 43 46 66 82 127 138 139 150

Figures

1.1 2.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 5.1 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 8.1

Research strategy Factors that influence an individual Support for the Nakasone cabinet by age group The popularity of the Nakasone cabinet and LDP Participants on the JET Programme Number of foreign students in Japan Foreign students by region and country of origin Japanese students studying abroad by region and country Usage of Hinomaru Usage of Kimigayo Teachers’ union membership in 1992 The importance of private education Profiting from university education Understanding of classes Enrolment for master’s and doctorate courses Number and percentage of upper secondary school students who ‘drop out’ 8.2 Number of students at elementary and lower secondary school refusing to attend school for more than thirty days

7 13 28 31 55 62 63 64 67 68 84 102 107 119 131 141 141

8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 9.1 Appendix 3

Students refusing to attend school for more than fifty days—by grade Reasons given for ‘dropping out’ Cases of ijime and number of schools reporting cases of ijime Bullying cases by grade at public schools Number of suicides for each month Evaluation of Rinkyōshin Map of Japan

142 142 144 146 147 157 167

Acknowledgements There are many people who I would like to thank for their help during the course of my research. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor lan Gow, and the other members of staff at the University of Sheffield, especially Dr Hasegawa Harukiyo and Professor Glenn Hook, who have provided me with the opportunity to conduct this research and have given advice at various times. Secondly, I would like to thank all those who gave up time to be interviewed (a full list appears at the end of the Bibliography) and helped arrange other interviews, in particular, former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō,Tanaka Shigeru, the late Professor Satō Seizaburō,Professor Amano Ikuo,Professor Ichikawa Shōgo,Professor Horio Teruhisa, Professor Ogawa Masahito, Oki Kiyotake, Koizumi Masashi, Okamoto Kaoru and Taniguchi Tomohiko. Thirdly, I would like to thank all the other people who have given me advice and helped me to find information, in particular Dr Lesley Connors (SOAS, London), Professor Arthur Stockwin (Nissan Institute, Oxford University), Dr David Williams, Dr Roger Goodman, Gill Goddard and Ann Jackson (East Asian Studies Library, University of Sheffield), Dr Robert Aspinall, Dr Okada Akito, Peter Matanle, Huw Oliphant, Dr Komatsu Keiichiro and Professor Geoffrey Bownas. Also thanks to all at Routledge for their help and advice in preparing this book. I would also like to thank all my friends and family who have supported me and tried to keep me sane throughout the past six years, in particular Man Yee and family, my parents, the rest of my family, my friends ‘Up North’ (especially Mitsuyo and Steve, Carol, Mariko and Yoshimi), friends at Chatham House and in London (especially Tomoe and Lance, Antony and Aya, Teresa, Sacha, Mariyam and Laura) and around the world (especially Junko (‘Judy’), Dabrowka (‘Gunia’), Paunlina, Masashi, Daisuke, Kentarō, Toshihiko (‘Docchan’), Shinsuke, and Shuji)—I’m sorry I cannot name you all! I would also like to give a special mention to other friends and host families in Japan, many of whom provided me with useful information and insights into Japanese education and society—as well as providing a roof over my head on one of my many trips— especially Funatsu Suguru, the Gotoh/Matsuoka family, the Tanaka family, the Tanabe family, the Wada/Miyabe/Miyata family, Okada Harumi and family, the Mizuno family, Yamada Masaaki and family, Yukie and Natsue. Again I’m sorry that I cannot name you all. Finally, my thanks go to those people and institutions who also provided financial backing during the course of my research, especially my parents, the University of Sheffield, Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation, Chūbu Electric Company and the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee.

Permissions acknowledgements The author and publishers would like to thank the following for granting permission to reproduce material in this work: Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai (ed.) (1987a) Rinkyōshin Sōran , Volume 1, Tokyo: Dai Ichi Hōki Shuppan. Nakasone Y. (1978) Atarashii Hoshu no Ronri , Tokyo: Kōdansha. Yamazaki M. (1986) Jimintō to Kyōiku Seisaku , Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Yoshimura K. (1988) Sengo Sōri no Hōgen, Shitsugen , Tokyo: Bunshun Bunko.

Notes on style Japanese names are given in their proper order, with the surname first and personal name second. With names of Westerners of Japanese descent, Western order is preserved. Macrons are used over vowels which are lengthened in Japanese pronunciation, in order to distinguish them from short vowels, for example at the end of Monbushō. For the names of Tokyo, Osaka and some other major cities and place names, however, they are omitted. It should be noted that a long vowel is given in pronunciation approximately twice the length of a short vowel. Throughout this book I will use the term Rinkyōshin, the Japanese abbreviation of Rinji Kyōiku Shingikai, rather than one of the many English translations, including Ad Hoc Council on Education and National Council for Educational Reform, which has caused some other writers confusion. 1 Accordingly, Chōkyōshin will be used rather than its English translation, often given as the Central Council on Education. The Japanese name Monbushō, which was known as the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture (MOE), but was later renamed as the Ministry of Education, Sports, Science and Culture (MESSC), will be used so as to avoid confusion. Naturally, in quoting some texts, the full English title or the terms Ministry of Education or MOE will be used. In 2001, as part of the administrative reforms, Monbushō merged with the Science and Technology Agency to become Monbukagakushō (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, abbreviated to MEXT). Also, to try and avoid further confusion and inconsistency, I will use the terms elementary school as the translation for shogakkō, lower secondary school for chūgakkō, upper secondary school for kōtōgakkō, junior college for tanki daigaku, and university for daigaku. The only exceptions to this are when quoting another academic’s work and when quoting the name of the establishment (junior high school for chūgakkō, and either senior high school or high school for kōtōgakkō.) The term ‘public’ when referring to schools will be used to mean schools which are funded by the government (whether they be national, prefectural or municipal), rather than the sense of ‘public school’ in the United Kingdom which refers to a select number of private schools. It is becoming increasingly the case that ministries and other bodies produce official English translations to some of the most important documents, although they may not be published until at least a year later. In order to avoid inconsistency between different studies, throughout this book the official English translation will be used where it has been possible to obtain it, although the original Japanese was also read. I have sought to conform to the rules of English usage set out in The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1990) and Collins English Dictionary (1991). Both dictionaries endorse the view that the pronoun ‘he’ may refer to ‘a person of unspecified sex, esp. referring to one already named or identified (if anyone comes he will have to wait)’. Words such as ‘mankind’ are used in their normal English sense, that is ‘the human species’ regardless

of gender. As of mid 2000, the exchange rate was about £1=¥160 and $1=¥110.

1 Introduction Any politician that has accomplished great things must also endure the criticism that comes with such high office. A true politician carries out the affairs of state whilst burdened with the destiny of his times. Without pandering to the whims of public opinion he resolutely implements his ideas through his own self-sacrifice and finally he fades from the political scene, leaving it up to the historians of the future to pass judgement on his actions. (Nakasone Yasuhiro, quoted in Yoshimura 1988:51–2) 1

Nakasone Yasuhiro was one of the most significant prime ministers in postwar Japan, perhaps the most significant. He was prime minister of Japan for almost five years, the third longest time in the post-war period, and considerably above the average of about two years. 2 During those five years he had ‘considerable impact’ (Giffard 1997) as he initiated many reforms, including education reform, advanced administrative reform and helped change the perception of the Japanese in the international community. Despite this, there has been little work done on the success of these changes, and what work has been done has tended to concentrate on Nakasone’s leadership style rather than on providing an understanding of his policies and ideologies. This study is a reflection on Nakasone’s intellectual perspective and how he made a difference to the education system through the creation of an ad hoc council. It also shows how this council was largely an extension of Nakasone and so put forward proposals that were consistent with his own ideologies. This study will show that this is significant as education plays an important role in the development of people’s own attitudes and ideologies. Indeed, as much as being about education and education reform this study is concerned with social reform. Japanese education has been an area of great interest for Western academics for a number of years. The reform of this system has been of less interest. This appears to be partly due to a belief that the education system is not changing, or even cannot change. This belief was given further strength by Schoppa’s work (1991a) on the Nakasone education reforms. The results of that study were comfortable for much of the academic community, particularly in the West, as the conclusions and reasoning did not conflict in any way with what many believed to be true. That is, they preserved the idea that Japan’s education system was not significantly changing since genuine reform in Japan was not possible owing to the conflicts between the government and the bureaucracy. Although heavily influenced by Schoppa’s study, my own research and observations led me to a very different conclusion. This may in part be due to timing, an issue which

Japanese education reform

2

will be dealt with in greater detail below. However, the difference in emphasis also undoubtedly played a part. Schoppa was primarily interested in the policy making progress and used the issue of education reform as a means to study this. This study, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the contents of the reform programme.

Methodology My doctoral thesis (Hood 1998b), which provides the foundation for this study, concentrated upon the ideologies and work of Nakasone, and then demonstrated his influence over education reform. However, this work includes more of my personal observations on the reforms. I do this as I have had the opportunity to research and experience things that many cannot, and so wish to present my results as fully as possible. Indeed, this is a normal feature of any academic work. For although opinions may not always be explicitly expressed, the inclusion or exclusion of certain ‘facts’ or ‘truths’ will occur in all works based upon the author’s own perceptions and beliefs about what is ‘appropriate’, ‘true’ and ‘correct’. I am sure that this happened in my thesis, intentionally or not. It is, therefore, important for me to explain briefly my methodology so that the reader can have a greater understanding of why information is presented in the way that it is. Having done this, I follow on by explaining the structure of the book. Although I have been fortunate to meet many important people, both Japanese and those related to Japan in some way, I know that many of my ideas about Japan have been formed with conversations not with these people, but with friends that I have made over the years, casual conversations with Japan specialists, and through trying to gain an understanding of my own observations from my various trips to Japan. Naturally all of this information is further filtered and used based upon ideologies and suchlike that date back to my childhood, as well as the formal training in Japanese studies that I experienced at the University of Sheffield. As a result of this process and the experiences that I have had during the twelve or so years that I have been studying Japan, I undoubtedly have a unique view on Japan. Although there is much that is consistent with others who study Japan or are concerned with Japan, whether they be Japanese or non-Japanese, my own background, experiences, the information that I have been able to gather and the way that I then interpret that information comes together to form this unique viewpoint. This is not to say that this viewpoint is in any way superior than others’, simply that it is different. Being a Japan specialist, rather than having a disciplinary background in politics, economics or anthropology, for example, means that the way in which I see relationships between certain fields, issues and actions is perhaps also different to many who read this work. Although it was disagreement and displeasure with some works on Japanese education that I read while participating on the JET Programme that provided the final stimulus for choosing education as the subject of my doctoral research, it is perhaps the role of social engineering in education that attracted me to the subject of education reform in Japan. I was also interested with the issue of regional and national identity, in part due to it being an issue that continues to vex many in this country, regarding the differences in being ‘English’, ‘British’ or even ‘European’. On top of this, I realised that as a Japan

Introduction

3

specialist, what happens in Japan, and in particular changes to what shape its future, often has greater bearing on my life than events in my own country, and so I wanted to gain a greater understanding of this process. As a result of my experiences and development, I feel as though I am typical of an increasing number of people at the start of the new millennium. Although I would not go so far as to say that the old divisions of left and right wing have gone, the borders have certainly blurred. I do not wish to be labelled as being on one or the other, but would rather ‘pick and mix’ policies and ideas from both. It is perhaps because of this that I can look at each part of the education reform on its own merits or demerits. It is upon this background that this study is based. It is a combination of academic analysis of the important works on the subject, the use of interviews with various people involved in the debate, but also the use of experiences, observations and conversations with ‘normal, everyday Japanese’ that I have had over the years. My experiences on the JET Programme in Seto (Aichi prefecture) were particularly instructive. Observations of what occurred at the eight lower secondary schools I regularly visited helped me to learn a lot about the way the education system really works, as opposed to what is sometimes portrayed in certain books that claim to be on the Japanese education system. The great advantage of being on the JET Programme was that, after the first few weeks, I was treated like any other teacher by the students and staff alike, and so was not subject to the same kind of displays that seem apparent from the results of some people’s specially arranged visits. Speaking Japanese was probably another major bonus. Although I am aware of the dangers of drawing too many conclusions from such a small sample, I know from conversations with teachers, academics and other contacts in the rest of Japan that much of what I observed was typical. What my experience on the JET Programme allowed was for me to have a starting point with which to compare other observations. During other visits to Japan, I have returned to Seto to see what changes have occurred there. On top of this I have travelled throughout Japan in an attempt to ascertain what changes are happening there. Comments or observations that have departed greatly from those in Seto have been the ones that have required further research and analysis to discover the reasons for them. In the text not much mention is given to Seto or its schools, but I still believe it is useful to introduce it briefly. Seto is a small city by Japanese standards—its population is approximately 130,000. It is only 15 miles (24 km) from the centre of Nagoya, the fourthlargest city in Japan. Although historically Seto has been quite a rich city, making its money from pottery (the Japanese word for pottery, setomono, literally means ‘product of Seto’), these days many work either in Nagoya or in neighbouring Toyota. While I was there (1993–4) Seto was beginning the preparations for Expo 2005. At the time of writing there are still various wranglings about this event due to environmental concerns. These various changes are affecting Seto, and as a consequence the education within the city. Gradually the city is expanding southwards (towards Toyota), leading to the growth in the size of schools in the area. Expo is likely to exaggerate this growth further. The schools in this area have begun to experience discipline problems, the like of which are being seen and reported throughout Japan. Indeed Seto’s school problems also found their way into the national press. However, although my observations at the schools and


4

conversations with students and teachers have been invaluable, I will not name any of the schools in my observations—and the only teacher that gets named is one whom I formally interviewed and agreed to have comments printed. As well as personal observations, I have read extensively on the subject, and although I have not cited from all works that appear in the Bibliography, they are all worthy of mention, as they have all played a part in the development of my own ideas and, as a consequence, this work. The only exception to this is government and Monbushō reports, which are so numerous that I have only listed those that are cited. Within the text I have attempted, where applicable and space allows, to offer alternative sources for material, as I am more than aware that in this modern age where accessing online information is improving at the cost of more traditional forms of information gathering, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain even significant works on education in Japan. Furthermore, I have assumed that the readership is broadly made up of two groups. The first are non-Japanese who have either no knowledge of Japanese or a level that means the reading of Japanese language books is not feasible, but have an interest in Japan, Japanese education, Japanese society or Nakasone, or some combination of them. The second are Japanese who are experts in one of these fields, but are interested in reading the information and views of a non-Japanese who has been able to access information that would not normally be available to them. This group, consequently, has a great understanding of the Japanese language material on the subject and so is more interested in non-Japanese works. It is because of this assumption that I have not cited so readily from Japanese sources, and I apologise to those who do not fall into the two groups I have described. The Bibliography also includes a comprehensive list of those who I interviewed for this study. In the same way that the Bibliography contains most books that I have read and have helped form this study, I would dearly wish to include the names of all those who I have spoken to over the years and have helped me to form my ideas on Japan, education, Nakasone and so on. However, space does not permit this, and so I have merely mentioned some of the more significant examples. I hope that all those who have met me will be aware of their role in my development and that of this work, and will forgive me for not listing their names also. On top of this, either some that were interviewed did not wish to be named, or I felt that when citing them it would be best if their names did not appear in the text. Interviews have been instrumental in helping me to develop ideas and gain a greater understanding of the subject—whether by confirming my own ideas, providing additional information, or challenging my own ideas. However, interviews present other particular problems. Although I have the advantage of speaking Japanese, which enabled me to conduct interviews with a wide range of people, there can still be a tendency for the interviewees to come from a rather select group. In particular, interviewees are often acquaintances of other interviewees, and thereby tend to be like-minded (and often likeminded to the interviewer as well), only certain people are prepared to be interviewed, and there is also a limit to the people that one researcher can make contact with. I have attempted throughout this study to try to get as broad a range of interviewees as possible by making use of contacts that I know have very different perspectives to my own. The other problem with interviews, though this also occurs in published material, is a

Introduction

5

risk that the information presented will not be wholly accurate. The interviewee, for example, may attempt to rationalise an action, which at the time may have been the result of completely different processes. There is also the tendency for some respondents to give, in some ways, the answer which they believe the interviewer wishes to hear. These are problems that any researcher encounters. I hope that by balancing the information gathered from printed sources, interviews and my own experiences and observations I will have done all that can be expected to take account of them. Accessing information about the Japanese education system is not particularly difficult, and helps to explain the number of works on the subject compared with some other Japan-related subjects that are equally worthy of study. As the focus of this study is different and aims to add to many of these works rather than to replace them, there is no need to reinvent the wheel as it were, and so many are cited throughout this study. Although there are no problems in studying Japanese education, studying Nakasone was in some respects a risk. Owing to his outspoken nature, and the fact that so few have studied him, there has inevitably been a tendency for people naturally to assume that I am sympathetic to Nakasone’s ways. 3 This is certainly something that appears to discourage many Japanese academics from studying him. Despite Nakasone being responsible for so much change and being so influential, and at times being very popular, many people still have a negative attitude towards him. This has meant that literature about him and those prepared to discuss him are limited. When his name is mentioned, it is often met with a somewhat cautious reaction, which naturally makes research harder. ‘Nakasone’ and ‘education’ in the same sentence can make this reaction even more severe. This problem is perhaps further confused by the amount of work that is published and written by Nakasone himself. A situation appears to have been created whereby those who are critical of Nakasone see little need to publish work, as such views are already widely held, and those who support Nakasone have little to add to what Nakasone has already written himself. The underlying strategy of the study, which is reflected in the structure of this book, was to gain an understanding of what Nakasone wanted and then ascertain whether this has been achieved or not. To borrow a phrase popular in police dramas on TV and in films, I tried to ‘get inside his head’. The question I asked whenever I studied a particular part of the education reform debate or its results was ‘is this what Nakasone would have wanted?’ This in turn relates to the important issue of defining what is meant by ‘success’ when answering the question ‘were the education reforms successful?’ which is the central issue in this study.

Definition of success Education remains a subjective area; there is no agreed way in which education should be pursued. It does not have the positivist laws that are found in economics, for example, and so this makes it difficult to define ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in terms of its position relative to an agreed educational theory. Despite the recognition that the desirability of education reform is a ‘normative issue’ (Schoppa 1991a:7), the emphasis of Schoppa’s study was very much that the


6

reform process was a ‘failure’. His apparent definition of ‘success’ would be ‘the complete implementation of those policies desired by the government’. However, as the ‘government’ contains many different groups, with differing views and ideologies, such a definition is hard to use accurately. It would also appear that Schoppa was expecting the reforms to be implemented in a short time, as his conclusions were made within three years of the end of the work by Nakasone’s ad hoc council. This study overcomes the first of these problems by defining the key actor as Nakasone. Therefore, the degree to which the reforms were a ‘success’ or ‘failure’ is measured in terms of the implementation or non-implementation of policies that Nakasone espoused. Although, on the surface, this has the clear advantage that the likelihood of conflict over what is being sought is greatly reduced, some conflict still exists as Nakasone appeared to alter his opinions and goals throughout his political career. However, by the time he had become prime minister his goals and ideologies had largely stabilised, and it is these ideologies that are of importance to this study, rather than the various stages of evolution of his ideologies up to that point. The means by which Nakasone’s ‘true’ ideologies can be established and analysed are set out in Chapter 3. The second problem that has to be dealt with is the time scale. This is a lot harder. Different people may have different perceptions of the time scale during which the reforms should occur. For example, Nakasone almost certainly would have wanted the reforms to be implemented during his time as prime minister, however unlikely this was, so that he could take full credit for the reforms, and hopefully profit from the success at the polls. Yet, history teaches us that such a short time scale can be both unrealistic and in some respects undesirable. The Nakasone-initiated education reform programme is the third great education reform in Japan. The first major reform was the Meiji reforms, and the second was the Occupation reforms after the Pacific War. As will be examined in Chapter 2, both of these are essentially seen as having been successful, yet the reforms took many years to be fully completed. Although both cases saw a sudden change in the education system, this was followed by a period of readjustment to eliminate the ‘excesses’ of the initial reform (Beauchamp 1991b:27). If one were to measure the success simply in terms of the results of the initial reform, then the need for readjustment would suggest that even the Meiji and Occupation reforms were not successful. However, such a view is not widely held. Thus, one can only conclude that the period during which the education system evolved as a result of the initial reform has also to be considered when analysing the degree to which the reforms were successful. In the case of the Nakasone reforms, therefore, it is necessary to consider the state of the education reform system some years after the initial reform programme was initiated and also take into consideration the changes that are likely to occur in the future as a result of the original initiative. The contrast between the two types of reform can be illustrated by using two retrospective—in the sense that they become clear after time rather than being particular models that the actors involved attempted to pursue—models of reform. I would describe the Meiji and Occupation reforms as a ‘Leap of Faith’, whereby ideas for a new education system were developed and the plans were implemented rapidly. Such a

Introduction

7

method can be successful when the opposition is not in a position to combat the reforms during or soon after implementation. It is this model that most think of when using the term ‘reform’. However, the weakness of this method is that if the opposition grows at any level, then it can lead to a readjustment and undoing of some of the reforms which were considered to have gone too far; this can be costly (in terms of both time and resources). The case of the education reforms initiated by Nakasone shows a different model. I think of it as being like a tsunami. After an initial shock and change to the system, there is a period when the reforms continue to be

Figure 1.1 Research strategy.

implemented—but many may overlook or forget the fact that the reforms are going on— until it reaches a point where the pressure for change builds up and the reforms gain speed and there is more rapid change to the system. 4 However, unlike the ‘Leap of Faith’ model, there has been time for these changes to develop and for attitudes to change, so reducing the probability of there being a period of re-reform in the future. Considering Figure 1.1, this work establishes which position the education system is in. As time passes along from left to right, if there had been no changes, and the ‘conservative’ forces had won, then the education system would be in position ‘A’. However, all studies agree that there was some initial change in the direction that Nakasone wanted, and so the system moved to position ‘B’ (in about 1990). Therefore, the main question is whether there has been any more reform since then, and what it was. If there had been no more reform then the position would be ‘C’. However, this study maintains that there has been more reform, and the position is now ‘D’, on course for an eventual position, ‘E’, which Nakasone hoped for. It should be remembered that this work is not concerned with analysing the policy making process itself, though it may raise questions about the validity of the assumptions and arguments that are used about


8

the policy making process in other studies. In my thesis, the focus was very much on the degree of ‘success’ in the implementation of the Nakasone reforms. However, this study also includes information and opinions on whether these reforms have had or will have their intended results. Owing to the problems of time scale, some of this is particularly hard to judge, and I am well aware that further appraisal will be needed in the years to come.

Focus of the study It should go without saying that the study of the Japanese education system and the reform of it is very important. The Japanese education system has been of much interest in recent years both to those who study Japan wishing to understand the people and culture better, and to those who want to reform the education system in their own country and wish to see whether Japan has any possible answers. As will be shown in the first part of Chapter 2, the education system plays a crucial role in the development of Japanese people’s behaviour and culture. Therefore, to understand the education system of today is to begin to understand the Japan of tomorrow. Many Japanese have tended to remain critical of their education system as a result of the conflicts over the direction which education should be taking or, due to the high, almost unobtainable, standards that are expected (Rohlen 1983:5). The debate over education has been intense during the post-war period, with strikes, sit-ins, legal battles, and fist fights in the Diet (Rohlen 1983:210). It is an issue that everyone has an opinion on, but it ‘hits so close to home that almost everyone tends to discuss it in terms of their own narrow experience’ (Katsukata 1996:5). The reform of such a highly emotive issue, therefore, can be controversial. 5 Okamoto (1992:76) believes that this is one of the reasons why many foreign experts have found it hard to study education in Japan, as the debates have often been ‘ideological and political rather than pedagogical/educational’. To understand what has happened to the education system and what changes are still occurring, issues are analysed individually in this work. As a result of the strategy of this study, in attempting to establish whether policies that Nakasone would favour have been implemented and what these policies are, it is important to gain an understanding of the policy. However, this should not be mistaken for an attempt to justify the policy or a suggestion that the policy being pursued is in any way ‘right’—although, admittedly, there are many instances when I do agree with Nakasone’s approach. It is important to understand what is meant by ‘reform. Whereas an education system is forever changing, reform represents a more significant change. However, even after reform there will be continuity and areas which are the same or similar to what existed before. A simple analogy is the difference between fine tuning a car engine (gradual change), and actually taking the engine out and replacing it with a different kind of engine (reform). However, even when a car engine is replaced, it still has elements, such as the need for some kind of fuel or energy to run on, which are the same as or similar to the make-up and needs of the previous engine. When attempting to measure the changes, in some areas there are tangible differences; however, even in other areas there are ways to measure the changes. Although

Introduction

9

Monbushō, being a government ministry, ‘does not actually take formal “positions” on political questions, nevertheless, it reveals how it stands through its actions (or inactions), through the reports of its advisory councils and through the comments of its officials’ (Schoppa 1991a: 98). Therefore, one can use the change in wording and emphasis in these reports and comments by officials as a measure of changes in attitude within Monhushō, which will give an indication of the probable course of education policy in the future. One of the problems in covering such a large topic as education reform is that it is impossible in limited space to cover all areas of the system adequately. Choices have to be made about what to include and what to leave out. This inevitably means that there will also be a degree of generalisation. However, as much as this is something that all academics aim to avoid, it is necessary, since to do otherwise risks overemphasising the extraordinary. To give an analogy, if one was to study the flight from London Heathrow to Narita or Kansai International, the study of the departure from Heathrow on a typical day would lead to the conclusion that the aeroplane flies westward (over North America) to its destination. However, a more general study would recognise that the flight path is essentially eastwards (over Russia). This study of the Japanese education system is concerned with the overall picture. However, just as it would not be important to consider an aeroplane’s eastward progression over every single forest, river and village in Siberia, so this study cannot consider all parts of the education reform and changes to the system. Likewise, just as the aeroplane turns to a largely south-eastward or southward approach after it starts to cross the Sea of Japan, this study will also look at areas of the education reform debate that do not appear to completely fit with the general picture. Although this study analyses the reforms to the whole education system, the greatest attention will be paid to the changes to what I term the ‘mandatory education system’, that is the compulsory nine years of elementary and lower secondary education, and also the three years of upper secondary education which over 90 per cent of Japanese attend (making it effectively compulsory for those who do not want to be at a disadvantage when seeking employment after leaving education). Even though It appears that both the economy and higher education have greater influence on the rest of the education system than in many other developed countries, much of the debate on education reform is related to changes needed in the ‘mandatory education system’. It is important that education is not seen in total isolation from the rest of Japanese society. It interacts with other parts of society in many different ways, both influencing the rest of society and being influenced by the changes and demands of society. One of the greatest influences is the economy. Indeed, education in Japan is sometimes viewed as being ‘a slave to the economy’ (McVeigh, interview, 4 May 1996). However, I believe that the education system has to respond to the demands of the economy and the rest of society, and so changes in the perception of what skills, abilities and ideologies will be needed in employees and members of society in the future will form a core part of any education reform debate. Consequently other changes in Japanese society, such as the belief in the need for greater internationalisation, more creativity, better understanding of information technology, and ways to respond to the ageing society, will also be pointed to so that the education reform debate can be put into context. One final point that should be made is that this study is not concerned with


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international comparisons, merely with how Japan is changing, although in a few places reference will be made to the situation in other countries so that comments or information can be seen in context. The focus of many studies on Japanese education has been international comparison, and although they are useful in many ways, the scale of a subject like education reform means that to attempt to gain a full understanding of all the issues in culturally diverse countries can be very difficult. I do hope, however, that this study will be useful to those who are concerned with such international comparisons.

Structure The structure of this study reflects the strategy that is being used to analyse the education reforms. Chapter 2 looks at what the role of education is and how its reform can be used as a means to bring about wider social reform. To provide further evidence of this, a historical background to the Japanese education system is also given, including an analysis of the previous reforms of the education system and how education reform became an issue once more. Finally, the chapter briefly looks at the actors involved in the policy making process in education and how education policy is normally made. Chapter 3 analyses Nakasone’s background so that a better understanding of the key figure in the education reform debate can be gained. This chapter shows how he became more involved in the education reform debate and how he managed to ensure that his influence would continue throughout the debate and implementation stages through the creation of an ad hoc council that was largely made up of those sympathetic to his agenda. Chapters 4–8 deal with the contents of the education reforms themselves. Chapter 4 is concerned with the issue of internationalisation, what is meant by the term, in particular taking account of Nakasone’s desire for a form of nationalism, what reforms were included to help ‘internationalise’ the education system, and what has happened in recent years. Chapter 5 then analyses the areas that were designed to increase the control over the education system and ensure that certain standards and cultural elements were taught and maintained. Many of the issues that are raised in these two chapters are those which were implemented in the early stages of the education reform process. Chapters 6 and 7 are different, for many of the proposals contained in these chapters have taken time to gain support and some are only recently reaching a stage where they might be implemented. However, without the education reform debate being initiated in the 1980s by Nakasone, it is questionable whether such a position would have been reached yet. These issues relate to a perceived need for greater ‘liberalisation’ and greater emphasis on the individual, which was thought to be lacking in the education system and was responsible for many of the problems that the education system was already facing and was expected to face in the future. Chapter 8 looks at those issues that first helped bring education reform to the top of the political agenda, namely ‘examination hell’ (juken jigoku), juvenile delinquency and ijime (bullying). Chapter 9 concludes by showing how previous studies have overemphasised the differences and divisions between the various actors involved in the education reform debate, how these actors are broadly united now with a similar agenda, and that the

Introduction

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education reforms, using the definition given above, have generally been successful and are likely to become more so in the future.

2 Background Tis Education forms the common mind, Just as the twig is bent, the tree’s inclin’d. Alexander Pope (1688–1744)

To understand the Nakasone education reforms fully it is necessary to understand the reforms in their historical context and also to understand what the role of education is. This chapter shows that one of the principal roles of education is character development, and it is this role that made education reform of such great concern in the past, as well as in the case of the Nakasone reforms. Then the historical background of the Japanese education system and previous attempts at education reform are analysed before looking at the buildup to the recent reforms. Finally, this chapter looks at the way in which education policy has usually been made in Japan, so that the pivotal role that Nakasone played can be seen in context.

Education as social engineering It is important to understand what the purpose of education is. At the simplest level, it is to teach the facts and skills that are necessary for future life. However, on top of this education also plays a pivotal role in character formation, shaping the way in which future generations will think and behave. 1 The education reforms initiated by Nakasone were concerned with both of these factors. There is nothing particularly out of the ordinary for a government or a politician to use education as a means by which to achieve other goals. The reason for this is that for almost the first twenty years of a person’s life they receive education which is largely accepted without question. The degree to which what is taught is accepted without question by individuals may vary from nation to nation, and even vary within a nation for various reasons. However, the core part of the education is not opposed in any way. Indeed, education probably plays an even more important role than that of relations, such as parents, and other groups. This may be particularly the case in Japan where children tend to spend so much time in school, and also due to their relationship with the teachers and education system as a whole. Although an individual may receive contradictory information from the various influences around them, there may be a tendency to believe—or at least not contradict—what is taught at school due to peer and teacher pressure and the need to digest the information for examinations. It may be the case that Japan has used education more than many other countries to

Background

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help form ‘suitable’ characteristics in its people. However, I feel that it is also the case that Japan has been more open about admitting education’s role in this area, and the process goes on in other countries more subtly. The importance of education in character forming is one more reason as to why the Japanese appear to have so much interest in education issues and why proposed changes to the system can cause so much heated debate (Schoppa 1991a:22–3). The reason why education is such a good tool in character formation, and why proposed changes can cause so much controversy, becomes clear when one considers how much control the government can have over the content of education, and the importance of affecting people’s character at an early age. Figure 2.1 shows some of the major factors that influence an individual, and the amount of control a government has over them. Although the government can influence adults, it can be hard to do so because of their preconceived ideas. Just as these adults, that make up families and communities which further influence children, can help speed up the installation of traditional norms, so they can slow down the introduction of new ideas as they resist ideologies that are different to their own well-established ones. As children may not yet have these preconceived ideas, and although adults around them may try to teach them otherwise, what is taught to them through the education system has the potential to be the greatest and most effective influence. It is also in this area that the government can have the greatest control, at least in theory, through the formulation of the curriculum, school rules and so on.

Figure 2.1 Factors that influence an individual.


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School has the advantage of being a relatively stable part of a person’s life. It is an unmistakable fact that ‘character is acquired through habit’. 2 It is also important to note that the government’s control, and that of Monbushō, over education will be strongest in compulsory education, that is the elementary and lower secondary schools in the case of Japan. At each higher level, the amount of control is gradually reduced, and is least in the areas of higher education and lifelong learning, though it can remain significant even at these levels. This gives further incentive to make sure that the ‘correct’ characteristics have already been taught and established by this time. It may be true that ‘a considerable amount of culturally patterned behavior has already come into being by three to four months of age’ (Caudill and Schooler 1973:323–38) and that no one ever stops developing and experiencing a certain degree of ideological evolution. However, it is generally agreed that children develop most of their ideas and values once they have entered the Notes: Mentor/Zoku=Those people that the individual chooses to be influenced by (it may include friends, people at work (school), and those in a club). E=The environment and any other areas that people have no control over. For a description of the ‘E' factors that influence the Japanese, such as the weather and earthquakes, see Duke (1986:130–1) and Mouer and Sugimoto (1986:384). The government can try to control international events, and more particularly the way in which they are reported and dealt with in the media. However, particularly in present society with the extra access to many forms of information, this is becoming more and more difficult.

education system (Cummings 1980:178; Brown 1965; Mussen et al. 1974). Rohlen (1983:2, 319) sees that society, religion and schools are most important in controlling the quality of a society and that in modern society education is ‘analogous to religion’. This may be particularly so in Japan where the role of religion is not as pronounced as in many other countries. Indeed, Okamoto (interview, 22 March 2000) says that in Japan, ‘education is a religion’. What is important is that school children are, by and large, in a position where they have to react to the norms being taught them, and are not in a position where they can have much influence in changing these norms (Rohlen 1983:207). However, once the norms are amended in any way, and these new norms are taught to the students, then these students have the potential to reinforce the change as they go on to interact with the rest of society more after they end their school education. Cummings (1980:236) suggests three possible outcomes after children leave school: that they will convert to the norms set by adults, that they will conform to adult norms while holding on to their own values, or that society will be reformed by the new values of the younger generation. There is no certainty about what the result will be, and it may be that different areas will see different responses. Although Azumi (1969) and Lifton (1972) believe that most will experience tenkō (i.e. allow their minds to be changed by adult society), I believe that it is likely that a position that combines the second two of the suggestions will develop. The youths will continue to try to hold on to the norms that they have developed during their years of schooling, but may have to conform to the norms around them. However, as they reach more

Background

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influential positions, and assuming the new youths are coming through with similar ideologies to themselves, so these adults will begin to exert greater influence on society. It is certainly most unlikely that the youth of Japan will be in a position to have an immediate influence on Japanese society, although it is increased by the fact that the government has also tried to persuade adult society to transform many of its ideas and ways. There can be no doubt that education can play a role in social reform. This is not a new approach by any means, and it has been the focus of attention of Aristotle, Rousseau and Dewey (Cummings 1980:5). However, an important point to be aware of is that although its effects can potentially be longer lasting than other attempts at social reform owing to its ability to alter the foundations of people’s ideologies, the full effects may not be seen for many years owing to the resistance to change from the rest of society. For example, the main decisions in Japan are still being made by people who were educated during the first two decades after the Pacific War and even earlier in some cases. One cannot truly know whether changes to the education system have had their desired effect until the children who were educated under the new system have reached an age where they play a more active role in society and have children of their own (thus ending the potential ideological conflict between parent and child that might have existed when the new ideologies were introduced). In other words, if a new ideology were introduced during the 1980s, one might not see any major results from this policy for at least five to ten years after its introduction, and the full effects might not be known for as long as twenty or thirty years, by which time the children who first received the new education would be becoming influential in company and government policy making and enactment. Nakasone was also aware of this, as he demonstrated in 1997 when he said it would ‘take 30 years to achieve educational reform—like planting a forest’ (Nakasone 1997a:40). Education has a role to play in the evolution of society (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996), but it is not a one-way relationship as education does not exist in total isolation from society. Education must also respond to the changes going on around it (Beauchamp 1986:19; Nagai 1985:17). The comments of Kōyama Ken’ichi, a central figure in the Nakasone education reform debate, make this point very well: No human activity is more closely tied to the future than education. As the most basic formative force of tomorrow’s society, education reaches into the future through its role in molding the next generation. Moreover, without insight into the possibilities and pitfalls that await people in the years to come, education cannot perform that role properly…Yet education is also more closely tied to the past—to history and tradition, and to the propagation of humankind’s cultural heritage—than any other human activity. (Kōyama 1985:43) Speaking after he left office, Nakasone (1987:3) said that ‘I have had the privilege of serving as prime minister of Japan for close to five years and have therefore been able to obtain a first-hand feel for what you might call Japan’s destiny’. There can be no doubt that Nakasone was interested in the future path of Japan, and that education was just one means for him to affect which route would be taken. Therefore, it is essential to


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understand what Nakasone was wanting to achieve, what has been achieved, and the probable direction of future education policy.

Meiji education reforms Having established that education reform can be used as a tool in pursuing social reform, it should be noted that Nakasone’s aim to achieve this was not the first experience Japan has had of such a policy. Indeed, both of the previous major reforms of the education system were designed to complement the reforms being carried out in other areas. The first of these reforms was the Meiji reforms. Japan’s first formal education system was established in 1872 with the promulgation of the Fundamental Code of Education (Gakusei). Before this there had been essentially two systems; hankō (fief schools) for the shizoku (ruling samurai class), which made up about 2 per cent of the population, and terakoya (small private schools run by one teacher, traditionally at Buddhist temples) for the masses. Although initial plans were to maintain a dual structure, the decision was eventually made to unite them (Roesgaard 1998:31; Linicome 1991:13; Rubinger 1986:202–3; Aso and Amano 1978:7–32). The reason for the unification was based on the belief that education could be used to unite the people of Japan, teaching them obedience and moral behaviour (Roesgaard 1998:31–2). Education was to be used specifically as a tool to help modernise Japan and unify the country. This was most clearly demonstrated by the views of Mori Arinori, Minister of Education (1885–9), when he stated that Our country must move from its third class position to second class, and from second class to first; and ultimately to the leading position among all countries of the world. The best way to do this is [by laying] the foundations of elementary education. (Quoted in Passin 1965:68) and ‘What is to be done [with education] is not for the sake of the pupils, but for the sake of the country’ (quoted in Passin 1965:150). At the beginning of the reform process, the policy makers essentially borrowed ideas and the best features (i.e. those that best suited the Japanese) of Western education systems. The result was a hybrid of many education systems: the centralised education structure of the French system; a few elite universities based on the German model; the moral discipline of the English system; and an elementary school system from the United States (Beauchamp 1991b:28). In fact, the process of borrowing did not stop there, for not only were Japanese being sent abroad to study, there were also many foreigners employed in Japanese schools until there were enough native teachers available. 3 In the early years of the Meiji period the reforms continued unabated. However, gradually the belief that things had gone too far—specifically had become too Western— began to grow. It reached a stage where steps were taken to undo some of the excesses of the reforms and reintroduce more traditional values (Beauchamp 1991b:28; Najita and Scheiner 1978:98–9). In 1880, the Revised Education Law (Kaisei Kyōikurei) was promulgated, an event which many historians see as a

Background

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watershed separating an initial period of unabashed enthusiasm for Western political and educational theories emphasizing individualism, natural rights, positivism, and utilitarianism from a subsequent period of conservative reaction to these ‘Western excesses.’ (Linicome 1991:17) This was followed ten years later by the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku Chokugo) which was seen to be one of the contributing factors in the rise of Japanese excesses, with the rise of militarism and ultranationalism, through its overemphasis on Confucian values, and promoting ‘blind obedience’ to the state (Beauchamp 1991b:29). However, the general consensus is that the Meiji reforms were successful. It is certainly true that they had achieved the goal in aiding Japan’s modernisation. The definition of the ‘Meiji reforms’ and the time scale under examination are important though. The fact that the Revised Education Law and the Imperial Rescript were deemed necessary would suggest that the original reforms were not successful. Yet if one includes these revisions within the ‘Meiji reforms’ as they were part of the evolution of the education system, then the ‘Meiji reforms’ can be seen to have been a qualified success. For although some of the eventual results were perhaps not beneficial to the country as a whole, the reforms did achieve many of the aims of the government. If this method of including the ‘evolutionary’ revisions is used when analysing reforms, as I believe is appropriate, then when analysing the reforms initiated by Nakasone one should also consider the changes to the education system that occur some years later as a result of the initial reforms. This is particularly so if they are reinforcing the original reforms rather than undoing them, as was the case in the Meiji period.

Occupation education reforms The second major reform of the Japanese education system occurred following Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War. Once again education was used along with other policies as a means to bring about social reform. However, this time, rather than the Japanese policy makers looking to borrow ideas from foreign countries, the foreign countries—in the form of the Occupation and primarily the United States—by and large decided what would be appropriate in achieving their goals of democratisation, demilitarisation and decentralisation. For the Occupation realised that the education system could play a major role in achieving these goals (Beauchamp 1991b:30). Those who had to develop a new education system were agreed on the idea that the pre-war education system had played a very important role in creating ‘an aggressive military dictatorship’ (Beauchamp 1991b:29). 4 Because of the war, the Japanese education system was in ruins, with around 4,000 schools destroyed and thousands of homeless teachers, and the ideological content of many of the textbooks was not considered to be appropriate (Beauchamp 1991b:29–30; Hall 1949:2; Nishi 1982:176– 80). Just as the early Meiji years saw dramatic changes, so the early years after the Pacific War saw rapid alterations to the education system. These alterations were further helped


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by the fact that many of the Japanese themselves were all too happy to get rid of the things that were associated with Japan’s defeat in the war and the hardship they were causing (Beauchamp 1991b:30). The steps taken by the Occupation included the censoring of inappropriate books, magazines and films; changing the multitrack system to a new 6–3–3–4 system; measures to emphasise more individuality in children; coeducation; greater flexibility in the curriculum; and the purging of teachers who were seen to have been supportive of the pre-war system (Beauchamp 1982:175–92; Beauchamp 1991b:30–1; Anderson 1975:63; Baerwald 1959). The result was that ‘one of the great ironies of this period was that, in encouraging the democratization of Japanese education, the actions of the all-powerful Occupation forces were often not democratic’ (Beauchamp 1991b:30). Another of the major reforms was the introduction of the Fundamental Law of Education (FLE, Kyōiku Kihon Hō), promulgated in March 1947, which represented a 180-degree change from the 1890 Imperial Rescript, declaring that ‘education shall aim at the full development of personality, striving for the rearing of the people sound in mind and body, who shall love truth and justice, esteem individual value, respect labor and have a deep sense of responsibility, and be imbued with the independent spirit, as builders of a peaceful state and society’. (Beauchamp 1991b:31) If one is to measure the success of the Occupation’s education reforms simply on what had been achieved in the time before the end of the Occupation in Spring 1952, then one probably could conclude that they had been successful in achieving many of their goals (Beauchamp 1991b:31). However, as with the Meiji reforms, to judge the success of a reform programme on such a short period would be too simple and would not measure the all-important long-term effects of the reforms. It is essential, therefore, to discover what happened to the Japanese education system in the years following the Occupation’s withdrawal. As with the Meiji reforms, the initial phase of dramatic reforms was followed by a period of re-examination, and the system was ‘re-Japanised’. For the problem was that the new system was based on many ideas that were ‘deeply rooted in the American democratic model but were dysfunctional when transported to the Japanese context’ (Beauchamp 1991b:31). Although the Japanese had been in no position to deal with the incompatible parts of the education reforms prior to 1952, the following years saw them reasserting themselves. There are numerous examples of reforms that the Japanese authorities replaced or amended to take account of Japanese culture and traditions. Perhaps the most noteworthy for this study, since it was also one of the issues central to the education reforms initiated by Nakasone, was the reintroduction of a moral education course. The course itself (shūshin) had been abolished by the Occupation for its perceived role in brainwashing the Japanese people, though moral education partly remained within the ‘social studies’ classes as well as more general moral behaviour being taught through everyday school activities (Schoppa 1991a:33). Even before the Occupation left, however, there were calls from people such as Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru for some sort of moral education

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course (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994:11; Beauchamp 1991b:32). A moral education course (dōtoku) was eventually introduced in 1958 despite resistance from the left. Another issue that arose in the 1950s that returned in the Nakasone reforms was the control over the teachers and the confrontations with the teachers, most notably Nikkyōso (Japan Teachers’ Union, JTU). In 1954, following statements made by Monbushō and laws already passed the previous year, Chūkyōshin (an advisory body within Monbushō) produced a report concerning the political neutrality of teachers, which was passed later that year (Chūkyōshin 1954; Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994:11–15, 136–9). Such action may appear somewhat heavy-handed nowadays, but it came at a time when many countries were going to extraordinary lengths in attempts to stop the spread of leftist and communist ideologies. Although there was much resistance from the left to these re-reforms, there was support from the business community that had been unhappy with the education system left by the Occupation. 5 The 1950s became a period when the government and Monbushō tried to ensure a better fit between the new system and traditional Japanese values, and many of the reforms, such as recentralising the system, gained support from the people. 6 Therefore, to give a true analysis of the success of the Occupation reforms becomes very difficult, as there were so many changes made after 1952 that this period cannot be used as the focus of the analysis. It is necessary, then, to look at what the results of the new education system that was in place at the end of the 1950s were. However, the ideological divide between the right and the left, the supporters of the re-reforms and the supporters of the original Occupation reforms, makes a definition of ‘success’ almost impossible. Instead, it is time to look at what occurred in this period running up to the start of the latest education reform debate, as it will provide an understanding of why certain actors behaved in the way that they did.

1960–83: the buildup to the Nakasone reforms The 1960s saw dramatic changes in Japan economically. Likewise, the education system, which is often seen as a key ingredient in this success, experienced a remarkable change in the number of people continuing in it. 7 Probably the most famous policy of the 1960s was Prime Minister Ikeda’s income doubling policy. However, education was also a concern of his as was demonstrated by a campaign speech in 1962, during which he spoke for the need for the further promotion of education, improved science education, and an improvement in the quality of teachers (Monbushō 1983a:62–3). Other groups also had their concerns with the education system despite the apparently healthy position that it was now in. Nikkyōso was concerned about the increased control of the government and lack of democracy in education, which replaced its chief concerns in the previous decade of a lack of space and the problems of large class sizes (Nikkyōso 1994:122–31; Nikkyōso 1966:1; Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994:164). Meanwhile, business was concerned about the lack of graduates in sciences and engineering (National Institute for Educational Research 1984:4; Nikkeiren 1994a:142–6; Nikkeiren 1994b:152– 4; Monbushō 1983a:117–18; Economic Investigation Council (Keizai Shingikai)


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1994:159–63; Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994:136, 156–8; Beauchamp 1991b:37). Monbushō's 1964 White Paper highlighted certain problems concerning students, and was the first indication that the emphasis was moving away from science education and more towards wider issues. In the second half of the 1960s Monbushō produced two reports related to the social behaviour of students and adults. In 1966, it published ‘the image of the ideal Japanese’, and three years later it introduced the moral education course of study for lower secondary schools. This shift reflected the worries that older generations had concerning the behaviour of children and young adults around the world at this time. By the end of the 1960s, the emphasis had moved even further towards concerns over the quality of education in general. The perceived problems in the education system had reached such a stage that in 1967 Kennoki Toshihiro, the Minister of Education, made a ‘little-noticed “request for advice” from Chūkyōshin’ (Schoppa 1991a:3), which could be used to develop a new education system that was appropriate for present Japan. However, the work of Chūkyōshin took on new significance in 1969 with several high-publicity disturbances at some universities. The successes of the past ten years were now being forgotten and people began to concentrate on the problems in the education system. Calls grew for concrete education reform to deal with these problems, and since Chūkyōshin was already examining the issue, its report, published in 1971, 8 became the key document in the debate on education reform for the next decade. Following an OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) report in 1970, and the Chūkyōshin report in 1971, it is possible to see a coming together of interests of the actors involved in the education debate. However, although they were all beginning to take an interest in similar topics, they did not necessarily all have the same ideas about how to solve the problems. The key terms and topics for reform were ‘information society’, ‘lifelong development’, ‘co-operation’, ‘creativity’, ‘diversification of higher education’, as well as more ‘traditional’ topics of reform such as the improvement in teacher quality. However, despite the then Minister of Education, Sakata Michita, referring to the Chūkyōshin proposals as ‘the third major educational reform in Japan’s history’ (Beauchamp 1991b:42), there were few significant changes to the education system itself (Schoppa 1991a:4–5). Despite this, the report may have had some effect on the way of thinking of some people, including Nakasone, as many of the ideas were similar to those put forward in later years. There are many possible reasons for the apparent lack of success of the Chūkyōshin reforms. Not least of them is that the timing was not good. The oil shocks hit Japan hard and the economic fallout caused by them meant there were limited government resources for responding to the report, which included many proposals that would have been expensive to implement (Beauchamp 1991b:42–3). Another reason that has been suggested is that ‘society was not yet ready for the report’ (Kōyama 1985:47). In the early 1980s, Monbushō became more concerned about social problems relating to students. In 1980, only two and a half years after the ‘directive concerning prevention of problem behavior of pupils’ was published, which was brought about by an increase in the amount of juvenile delinquency as reported by the National Police Agency, Monbushō published a ‘directive concerning the prevention of delinquency of pupils’ which was sent to all chiefs of education, boards of education, governors of

Background

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municipalities and prefectures, and presidents of national universities with affiliated elementary and secondary schools (Monbushō 1983b:393–4; Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994:259). This was followed by a changing of the content of moral education and a survey of conditions of moral education in public elementary and lower secondary schools, which highlighted the fact that some schools were not teaching moral education adequately (Monbushō 1994:261–2). However, following the shelving of the Chūkyōshin report, education reform was no longer a major political issue at the time of these reports, and this limited their effect. Furthermore, despite the fact that one-half of those surveyed in a poll for Mainichi Shimbun on 4 January 1983 expressed some dissatisfaction with schools, education and education reform were not major concerns with the general public. Even the attention periodically given to the issue of ‘examination hell’ (to be analysed in Chapter 8) did not cause enough concern by itself to raise calls for education reform. The main trigger to start the moves towards education reform were two incidents in the Kantō region: the murder of some vagrants living in parks in Yokohama by some school children, and the beating of a teacher by eight lower secondary school students in Machida. After this Nakasone became central in the education debate. Nakasone had become prime minister at a critical time as Japan was ‘facing crisis both in its foreign relations and in its internal affairs’ (Horsley and Buckley 1990:171). The former prime minister, Suzuki Zenkō, whose resignation eventually led to Nakasone’s appointment, said that ‘in order to tackle national issues effectively, the party must sweep away the mistrust and resentment generated by past [party] presidential elections, and that to do so required a fresh, vigorous leadership team’ (Seki 1983:8). However, the method by which the prime minister was chosen, through the selection of a new president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, Jiyū Minshutō or Jimintō), is probably best remembered for doing exactly the opposite. As a result of this and the general mistrust felt towards Nakasone, when he became prime minister he created one of the most unpopular post-war cabinets ever according to opinion polls in Asahi Shimbun (see Chapter 3). In the months leading up to his appointment as president of the LDP, and thus prime minister, Nakasone had noted that education was one of the important issues that had to be addressed, though he tended to leave out specific details of actual policies that would be needed (Nakasone 1983:16). During the first few weeks of 1983, about a month after Nakasone became prime minister, the number of incidents of student violence and general delinquency reported in the media rose, with the Machida and Yokohama incidents being the most notable. Some believed that these problems were being caused because the Occupation reforms ‘never really “took root’”, while others felt that the problems were caused precisely because the ‘American-style education did put down roots’ (Goodman 1989:12). However, after some time, Prime Minister Nakasone responded to these problems, making a ‘declaration of war’ against the problem children (Japan Times 28 February 1983). Thus, the first step was taken towards education reform becoming one of the key domestic policy issues of the Nakasone administration. Nakasone’s interest in education reform, however, was not limited to attempting to resolve some of the problems in the system; indeed, this would appear to be almost a secondary issue. What he appears to have been seeking was a reform of the sort of


22

Japanese person ‘produced’ by the education system, and this would be a stepping stone to a reform of society as a whole. In effect, education reform was to become a tool by which to achieve his goals of social reform.

An overview of the policy making process Before analysing the recent education reform programme, it is worth looking at the ‘normal’ policy making process, those who are involved, and the relative degree of influence they have. Although there are various actors involved in the policy making process in education in Japan, the two most important have been the bureaucracy, principally Monbushō, and the government, which for most of the post-war period has been the LDP. The LDP in turn has also tended to take the business world’s concerns into consideration. However, the prime minister and the cabinet have not often been directly involved in the policy making process, although the influence and input has varied depending on the leadership style of the prime minister and the state of the education system. One of the most important features that developed during the latter period of LDP dominance was the rise of the zoku—cliques or groups of politicians with similar interests—to the extent that some believe that they became even more important than the bureaucrats (Hayao 1993:11; Park 1986:55–77). The education zoku (bunkyōzoku) is the group of politicians in the LDP who are concerned with education, and have chosen to specialise in this area. Schoppa theorises that given the lack of political payoffs and the actual risk of defeat associated with the education issue, the fact that these men chose to devote their careers to education marks them out as particularly policy-orientated politicians…[as education] promises neither political funds nor votes. As a result it tends to attract ‘strong’ politicians. (Schoppa 1991a:85) Many have concentrated their studies on Japanese politics on the relative dominance of either the bureaucracy or the LDP and pointed to the importance of the ‘sectoral conflicts based on cleavages which cut across party and bureaucratic lines to create distinct issueorientated divisions’ (Schoppa 1991a:12). These divisions are referred to as ‘subgovernments’ and the policy making process becomes a battle between them and the ‘centre’. There is no single answer to the question as to who formulates education policy in Japan. There are times when Monbushō initiates policy, and there are times when policy is initiated by the LDP, especially the education zoku. There are also other important groups within the LDP, such as the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) and its divisions, research councils and other special committees, which tend to be set up on an issue-specific basis. The PARC divisions usually respond to legislation that is received from the relevant ministry and are particularly concerned with the budget, whereas the research councils look at more long-term issues, and special committees handle matters that are not handled by any of the other groups (Schoppa 1991a:78). There is also the

Background

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Diet Education Committee, which although strongly linked with the education zoku, can have quite different positions on issues—as appears to be the case of the Nakasone education reforms when the Diet Education Committee appeared to have been supportive of Nakasone’s position. 9 Monbushō tends to see itself as being above the concerns of politicians, as being ‘neutral’, which leads it to being particularly dominant in the policy making process (Schoppa 1991a:10; Kubota and Tomita 1977:190–6; Muramatsu and Krauss 1984:126– 46). It is perhaps because of this dominance of the ministries, such as Monbushō, that Johnson (1982:31) was lead to conclude that ‘the LDP has reigned but the bureaucracy has ruled’. The image that is projected is that the minister is almost powerless, and his job is reduced to merely approving policies that have been drawn up by the bureaucrats. The way in which Monbushō can exert its power is most clearly demonstrated through its use of ‘administrative guidance’, or by implementation of a law through a procedural mechanism of revising the Ministry of Education Law. This has been a tactic used when the Diet has not passed a piece of desired education legislation. Only then, ‘when faced with a fait accompli does the Diet pass the legislation. 10 Also Monbushō can block measures that it does not support. 11 On top of this, many other education policies are known as yōkyū, which are Monbushō demands which local boards of education must follow, and which remain an internal matter, not requiring any sort of legislative action. Examples of this sort of policy include the curriculum and the system of textbook authorisation. This gives rise to the possibility of Monbushō being able to ‘effect change on its own by initiating changes in regulations’ (Schoppa 1991a:111). However, it is important to be aware that such action should not be seen as Monbushō working against, or independent of, the LDP. Indeed, such action is most likely when the LDP itself has failed to get a desired piece of legislation passed. For although the LDP has dominated post-war Japanese politics, a majority in the Diet has not guaranteed the same political dominance that is enjoyed by majority parties in many other countries. So the LDP works together with Monbushō to get its wishes. On top of this, Monbushō often seeks LDP support for certain legislation and for attempts to get its budget increased (Schoppa 1991a: 110). Although many studies concentrate on the battles between the bureaucracy and the LDP, it is important to note that the two are often working together, with the zoku being the most significant link strengthening this relationship. The relationship is further strengthened by the fact that the retiring administrative viceminister, the top civil servant, appoints his successor, but apparently bases his decision on advice from the education zoku (Schoppa 1991a:88). Although the bureaucrats often see themselves as being ‘neutral’, one needs to think about what is really meant by ‘neutral’. If it is to stand between the various opposing parties, so that a consensus or compromise can be reached, then it follows that a shift in the parties, such as a swing to the right, will move the ‘neutral’ position also. Saitō Taijun claims that the bureaucracy makes a “‘fair and objective judgement based on social necessity” and builds rational policies on this basis’ (Schoppa 1991a:109). Assuming that Monbushō can behave like this in practice, any shifts in the political equilibrium that are backed by any change in the social equilibrium should speed up the process of change to education policy. This is of particular relevance in the Nakasone education reform debate which is so closely associated with both social reform and the political realignments


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occurring at the same time. However, it is also argued that bureaucrats tend to be conservative. The reason for this conservatism is believed to originate in the fact that those who draw up many policy ideas and are responsible for implementing them are those who are closest to the genba (‘the actual site’ where education is delivered) (Schoppa 1991a:94–5). In the past the possible conflicts with Nikkyōso, amongst other reasons, has led to suggestions that Monbushō was particularly conservative (Schoppa 1991a:96). The degree to which this was actually the case will be dealt with in Chapter 5. The policy making process often begins with the decisions of lower- to middle-ranking administrators being put on the ringisho, although it may be that these administrators are only following directives received from above. This is then passed up through the ministry, with each level of officials having the opportunity to add their own comments. Although in the past this has given the possibility of increased conservatism in the ministry due to the position of the lower-level administrators and their proximity to the genba, it also means that as more reform-minded administrators enter the lower levels, the possibility to bring about change is increased compared with a system where policy is drawn up by the higher levels of bureaucracy. As a result of all the various viewpoints and potential conflicts, Monbushō has tended to avoid action until ‘sufficient pressure has built up’ (Schoppa 1991a:98). However, Monbushō is continually studying the system and possible changes that may need to be made. In 1983, just before Nakasone embarked on education reform, Monbushō was being advised by seventeen councils, ranging from Chūkyōshin to ones specialising on issues such as textbook content, teacher training policy and the Japanese language. 12 These advisory councils are part of the process by which Monbushō tries to demonstrate its ‘neutrality’. Although they are often used to further research issues that are of interest to Monbushō and the zoku, the appointing of ‘outside experts’ gives the councils, and thus Monbushō's policies, ‘a degree of legitimacy’, since in theory these ‘outside experts’ will represent many different views and the final report will demonstrate a consensus. However, through the choice of council members, and careful selection of what information is provided to help the council make decisions, Monbushō can have significant influence over the direction of the final report (Schoppa 1991a:112–14; Saitō 1984:81, 87–95). Although Monbushō may not always be successful in doing so, it is probable that a report that contains ideas that are similar to those of Nakasone’s ad hoc council, which also received much of its information from Monbushō, represents a real shift in attitude within Monbushō. 13 Just as many different attitudes towards education policy exist within the LDP, so there are differences within Monbushō as well. Therefore, it is more useful to look at how each issue is handled rather than attempting to treat Monbushō as a homogeneous unit. Even to attempt to create ‘camps’ can be futile, for if one is to do a complete study, the result would create so many ‘camps’ that the picture would remain relatively chaotic. This situation is further complicated by the fact that some people agree on one issue but disagree on another. Therefore, this study will avoid dealing with such groupings and concentrate instead on the relationship between the main areas of reform and Nakasone’s ideologies, and the degree to which they have been or will be implemented. The next chapter, therefore, will show how Nakasone became the central figure and managed to

Background

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influence the direction of the education reform debate, before analysing his ideologies and the degree to which they have been introduced into the education system in the following chapters.

3 Nakasone as number one The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of Nakasone himself through an analysis of his background and his leadership style. This will then be developed to show how he became the central figure in the education reform debate. Finally, this chapter concludes by showing how Nakasone ensured that his influence would be paramount in the education reform debate through the establishment of an ad hoc council, to which many were appointed that were sympathetic to his ideologies.

Nakasone’s background Nakasone was born in 1918 in Gunma prefecture. After graduating from elementary school in Takasaki, and spending four years at the local middle school, he went to Shizuoka High School. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in 1941, he entered the Ministry of Home Affairs (Naimushō), before enlisting in the Imperial Navy. After the war he joined the Metropolitan Police Board. He then returned to his home city and in 1947 was elected to the Lower House as a member of the Democratic Party (Minshutō). He was then involved in the various stages of the evolution of the party, being known as one of the ‘young Turks’ whilst in the Reform Party (Kaishintō), before the creation of the LDP in 1955 (Nakasone 1992; Nakasone 1997a:1–2; Nakasone 1997b; Nakasone 1999: Narai 1988; Kishimoto 1988:32, 94–5). Nakasone got his first cabinet post, in the Science and Technology Agency, in 1959 as a member of the second Kishi cabinet. By the end of the 1960s he had risen to become Minister of Transport. In 1970 he became Director General of the Defence Agency, a post that he was particularly pleased to receive (Nakasone 1997b:301–2). His influence within the party continued to grow as he became Minister of International Trade and Industry in the first Tanaka cabinet in 1972, and then headed the LDP committee on the 1976 oil crisis. By the time he became the Administrative Management Agency Director in the Suzuki administration in 1980 he had shown his determination to pursue his own ideologies and that he was prepared to take the initiative and show strong leadership. (See Appendix 1 for further outline of Nakasone’s life.) Although Nakasone has been described as being ‘really talented’ (Satō 1997) and a ‘perceptive and astute politician’ (Leestma and Walberg 1992:28), he was not seen as being part of the ‘elite’ (Komatsu, interview, 19 November 1997). Furthermore, he appeared to be sidelined when he took positions at the Defence Agency and the Administrative Management Agency, but through his own persistence and due to the growing importance of administrative reform he managed to remain an important figure within the LDP. However, he was distrusted by many people, partly because of this style of leadership, and partly because he found it hard to ‘disguise his ambitions or to inspire

Nakasone as number one

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the trust and support required to scramble to the top of Japan’s greasy pole’. 1 Yet he also managed to gain great popularity at times during his career, especially while prime minister. Although Nakasone is referred to by some as being a ‘neo-conservative’ (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996; Oki, interview, 19 November 1997; Sasaki, interview, 19 November 1997; also see Chapter 6), the two images of Nakasone that have been used the most are the ‘hawk’ (takaha) and the ‘weathercock’ (kazami). The ‘hawk’ is his ‘nationalistic’ side that advocates constitutional reform, increased defence spending, and support for the emperor, for example. However, Nakasone is also known as being a great political opportunist, the ‘weathercock’ (Watanabe 1993:3–4; Nishimura 1985:21; Buckley 1990:107; Pyle 1987:266; Simmons 1990:126). These terms appeared to annoy Nakasone, for he told an LDP seminar in 1984 that he felt the media concentrated on whether he was a ‘hawk’ or ‘weather-cock’ ‘without realising that I had progressive ideas. [Newspapers] will no doubt all end up in the incinerator, but all the same it is awful that people you have never met can write what they like about you’ (Yoshimura 1988:27). There seems little doubt that much of the time the ‘Japanese media liked Nakasone to be their enemy’ (Koizumi, interview, 26 November 1997). The problem with using terms such as ‘hawk’ and ‘weathercock’ is that the assumption is that these two types of behaviour are ‘in complete opposition to each other’ and reveal inconsistencies in Nakasone’s character and ideologies, and so some try to show how his behaviour changed during various stages in his career (Watanabe 1993:3–5). 2 However, I do not think this necessarily has to be the case. Reacting to public opinion should not be seen so much as ‘opportunist’ but as a necessity in a democratic society. Satō (interview, 17 November 1997) believed that Nakasone is a ‘practical politician’, who is flexible enough to change his priorities, although his basic ideas do not change very much. Nakasone believed it was necessary for him to strike a balance between having policies that are considered to be good for the people—without necessarily being popular—and policies that are demanded by the people. He demonstrated this belief at an LDP national seminar when he said: We lose votes when we tell people they must endure the snows of winter or warn them against catching cold from the brisk winds of autumn. All of us would rather talk about spring or summer. Some politicians talk as though the year consisted of just these two seasons. However, spring only comes after autumn and winter. We must help people understand this basic logic. They have to be able to discern who is telling them the truth. Unless you can get people to support the politicians who are telling them the truth, unpleasant though it may be for them, democracy cannot endure. (Nakasone 1987:56–7) The position of prime minister was one to which Nakasone had ‘long aspired’ and ‘from the outset he intended to use his office as a pulpit and lead rather than follow public opinion’ (Buckley 1990:25). However, perhaps it was only during his time as prime minister that he came to realise how much he needed the support of the people to ensure his own survival, and so his hawkish statements would have to be toned down. The


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thinking of much of the electorate was not the same as Nakasone’s, which was largely a product of pre-war Japan. This is clearly demonstrated in Figure 3.1 which shows the difference between those who supported the Nakasone cabinet and those who did not by various age groups. Nakasone himself admitted that ‘the old thinking of the inter war period will no longer do. We must address the people with something that the post-war generation, which represents the vast majority of the population, can understand and find convincing’ (Masumi 1995:425). Although some would claim that this appears to be a weakening of his stance and ideologies so as to remain in power, I believe it also reveals Nakasone’s awareness of reality and his desire to make Japan more democratic. Although many have tended to brand Nakasone’s style of leadership as being ‘presidential’, Nakasone himself saw his role being more like the ‘British way of primus inter pares [first amongst equals]’ (Nakasone 1988:13), 3 and once said that he had become a ‘presidential type prime minister’

Figure 3.1 Support for the Nakasone cabinet by age group.

Source: Based on opinion poll in Asahi Shimbun 19 February 1983. like Thatcher (Yoshimura 1988:22). However, although Nakasone was not a president, he has supported the idea of having a directly elected prime minister, rather than one selected from within the party (interview, 15 March 2000; Nakasone 1995:69). 4 Nakasone certainly did not have the opportunity to behave like a president during his time as leader, as both his survival and that of the whole administration relied on the support of various factions within his own party, the support of other parties at times, as well as the electorate. Without such support, his leadership would have lost its ‘foundation’ and he would have faced a stronger challenge for the position of LDP president (Muramatsu 1987:342). 5 As mentioned before, much of what is written concerns his leadership and it is worth reviewing some of these briefly. Muramatsu (1987:307) believes that in Japan there are two types of leaders, ‘those who excel in realizing goals (purpose-oriented, or P-type, leaders), and those more inclined to maintaining organization (maintenance-oriented, or M-type)’. The situation of Japan’s political economy during the 1960s and 1970s ‘made political stability the leader’s task’ (Muramatsu 1987:307). This suited M-type


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leadership, which was characterised by compromises with other political parties and greater cooperation with the bureaucracy. Although it is fair to say that Nakasone was more of a P-type leader, in many areas Nakasone either wished to maintain the status quo or had to owing to his weakness within the LDP. Therefore, such classification is not sufficient. Shinoda (1995) classifies prime ministers’ leadership styles into four groups: the ‘Political Insider’ (e.g. Satō, Tanaka and Takeshita), the ‘Grandstander’ (e.g. Nakasone, Hosokawa and Ikeda), the ‘Kamikaze Fighter’ (e.g. Kishi), and the ‘Peace Lover’ (e.g. Suzuki, Kaifu and Miyazawa). 6 He classifies Nakasone as a ‘Grandstander’ because of his need to get support from the people because of a lack of support and strength within his own party. However, such a definition is misleading as any leader may behave differently in various policy areas. Overall, it does appear as though Nakasone was a ‘Grandstander’, though there were times, such as at the beginning of his term in office, when he seemed unconcerned about his lack of popularity, 7 and started pursuing policies that were likely to be controversial and unpopular. This meant his approach was closer to that of a ‘Kamikaze Fighter’, although he tended to bail out before his position as prime minister became untenable, for example over the issue of visits to Yasukuni Shrine (see Chapter 4). On top of this, because his own faction was not particularly strong (Ichikawa, interview, 5 June 1996), Nakasone could not have survived as long as he did without the support of Tanaka Kakuei (Williams 1996b:14). This association with the unpopular and discredited head of the largest faction within the LDP was one more factor that added to the unpopularity of the Nakasone cabinet in its early days, leading to the creation of the term ‘Tanakasone Cabinet’, and to the continued distrust of Nakasone throughout his time as prime minister. It appears that none of Shinoda’s classifications completely apply to Nakasone throughout his time as prime minister. Hayao (1993:15–18) believes that there are three types of leadership: ‘technocratic’, which is typified by problem solving; ‘political’, where the leader tries to initiate change, with the emphasis on agenda setting; and ‘reactive’, when others try to bring about change. Nakasone would certainly fall into the category of being a ‘political’ leader by this definition owing to his agenda setting policies. However, there were also times when he was responding to other people’s demands or having to solve problems. Such terms, therefore, also would appear to be too simplistic. The conclusion has to be that although Nakasone demonstrated certain characteristics more than others, it is neither possible nor necessarily beneficial to attempt to place him in any preconceived models. Instead one must judge him on how he behaves as an individual leader and be aware that different policies and different times during the debate may require different responses and types of behaviour. It is important to note, however, that Nakasone was not inventing a new style of leadership in Japan; he merely showed that in the right hands, the position of prime minister can be powerful (Hayao 1993:28; Emmott 1989:204). Any previous prime minister could have acted in a similar way, but for various reasons, such behaviour had not really been seen before. Rather than solely seeking the support of his own party, Nakasone had a different strategy. He wanted to use ‘deliberative council politics’ (shingikai seiji) or ‘brain-trust politics’ (Muramatsu 1987:311; Ōtsuki 1985:11; Matsuda 1995:756–61). Nakasone was


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not the first to attempt to use such methods, as ōhira Masayoshi had done the same through the establishment of a staff office and various advisory groups. However, they did not have a chance to present their results before his sudden death, and they were not used by his successor, Suzuki Zenkō. 8 The various groups which Nakasone established did present their results and ‘arbitrarily decided policies and encroached on the vested interests of Diet members’ (Ōtsuki 1985:11). Nakasone wanted to create a ‘television democracy’, and the use of advisory bodies and ad hoc councils were a means to do this. His reasons for using this system were that having taken ideas from his own notebooks (see below), he would then discuss the issues with his ministers and staff unofficially, and ask them to do further research. Then he would establish a council made up of experts from various fields to discuss the plans further and to make recommendations. These recommendations would then appear in the press and on television and thus involve the people in the debate from that stage forward (Nakasone 1991:46–7). Muramatsu (1987:312) calls such policies ‘comprehensive policies’, as he used the councils and brain-trusts to attempt to gain public support and thus minimise the effect of any opposition from within his own party and from the other parties. The Diet could not affect the membership of these groups that Nakasone established. Even with the official councils, Nakasone managed to influence the make-up, and get those who had already worked with him before or who were sympathetic to his beliefs to be appointed. So these groups were designed to ‘highlight his pet proposals and to bring forth largely predetermined policy recommendations’ (Pyle 1987:253). This system not only suited Nakasone’s style of leadership but was probably also inevitable owing to Nakasone’s relative weakness: since his faction was only fourth largest in the LDP he could not rely on the kind of support that many previous LDP leaders had enjoyed, despite the support from Tanaka and his faction (Masumi 1995:422). This style of leadership was not popular with many, particularly within the bureaucracy and parts of the LDP. The previous prime minister, Suzuki Zenkō, said that politics is ‘the response to problems as they arise and the slow and deliberate adjustment of interest relationships’ and that this style of leadership of Nakasone’s was un-Japanese and showed ‘the height of arrogance’ (Asahi Shimbun 20 June 1986). 9 For Japan, Nakasone’s style of leadership was undoubtedly unconventional; however, ‘although leftist critics try to identify him with pre-war images for ideological reasons, Nakasone is instead a postwar type of politician’ (Muramatsu 1987:333). According to opinions polls in Asahi Shimbun, Nakasone and his cabinet were unpopular at first (see Figure 3.2). 10 With elections approaching for the House of Councillors and local government he needed an issue that would increase his popularity, although it has been argued that ‘the LDP never gets re-elected based on particular policy (ies)’ (Krauss 1995). Indeed, even when the popularity of the LDP and Nakasone was at its highest and the LDP won the double landslide victory of July 1986, the most popular answer people gave when asked why they supported the Nakasone cabinet was that there was ‘no particular reason’. The next two most popular reasons were because the cabinet was an LDP cabinet, and because the prime minister was Nakasone. The importance of various policy issues was relatively minor. However, it is probably also true that without policies, especially when the public perceives there to be a real problem, a party is


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unlikely to do that well. After the LDP’s landslide victory in 1986, Nakasone said that ‘For the first time in Japanese political history, I was able to bypass the Government and party bureaucrats and take my case directly to the people’ (Pyle 1987:253–4). 11 This reveals his desire to have popular support and his belief that he was re-elected for this reason. According to Masumi (1995:12) ‘he was absolutely correct’ in thinking that he had managed to ‘keep a firm grip of the party’s “regular customers’” and appeal to the “‘grey zone” of television viewers that accounted for 40 per cent of the electorate’. In fact, Nakasone was probably the first Japanese prime minister to realise ‘the full potential of the media for building popular support’ (Flanagan et al. 1991:321). Another factor that dogged Nakasone throughout his time as prime minister was that as well as suffering from the problem that ‘mud sticks’, whereby people distrusted him and so did not like his policies without really attempting to understand him or his policies, he did not help himself with

Figure 3.2 The popularity of the Nakasone cabinet and LDP.

Source: Graph based on opinion polls in Asahi Shimbun. Note that the gaps are not equally spaced. his occasional unfortunate comments. Indeed, there were times when it ‘would have been better if Nakasone had kept his mouth shut’ (Buckley 1990:114). 12 Uchida (1983:21) believes that Nakasone’s attempt to use ‘fine-sounding words’ to cover up his political manoeuvres fuelled the people’s distrust of Nakasone. The most notable examples of his faux pas were his reference to Japan being an unsinkable battleship, his views that part of the reason for the problems in the American education system was due to the poor abilities of the racial minorities, and his comments about not introducing a sales tax. 13


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I believe that, rather than ever being particularly popular, perhaps what was really happening was that he was moving from one ‘honeymoon period’ to another. Through the pursuit of a few popular actions, particularly his foreign policies, people stopped voicing their opposition towards him, and even gave the appearance of supporting him. But, once the newness of an issue had passed and the ‘honeymoon was over’, the support faded and distrust set in again. It appears that the negative attitude towards Nakasone was partly responsible for the cabinet’s low approval rate when he first became prime minister. 14 Education reform appears to be one of the issues that he hoped would allow him to overcome his initial unpopularity. Nakasone was aware that he had a problem with the way he was perceived by the people and so ‘he started to look for domestic issues to soften his hawkish image’ (Hayao 1993:49). Gradually, with pressure from other groups and parties, the issue of juvenile delinquency, which was initially Nakasone’s main focus, became part of an education problem. This led Nakasone to change his emphasis and he began to speak about the need for educational reform (Hayao 1993:51). Given his interest in education and its broader influence, Nakasone was probably happy with this change of emphasis. Nakasone had always been interested in changing some aspects of Japan and its society, including elements of the education system. However, it was also the case that these changes to the education system would help with tackling some of his other goals, including some of the more controversial ones, and these “‘comprehensive policies” express the first stage of Nakasone’s search for an “identity of the state’” (Muramatsu 1987:319). 15 Amano (interview, 5 June 1996) believes that Nakasone’s main interest in education reform stemmed from his desire to use the education system to help him change the ideologies of the Japanese people. Indeed, Nakasone appears to have pursued many policies that would help him achieve other ends that were of concern to him. Satō Seizaburō commented that Nakasone “‘really didn’t understand economic problems all that well,” and that “his aims were on a much higher level’” (Muramatsu 1987:312). Nakasone believed that many areas ‘of Japanese politics had become “taboo” due to the nation’s experience of militarism and defeat’ (Schoppa 1991a:48, 56–7; Matsuda and Sasaki 1995:774). Education reform was going to be a means to help Nakasone attempt to change many aspects of Japanese society, including one of his long-time goals, constitutional revision, a view that he publicly admitted (Schoppa 1991a:57). 16 Nakasone’s motivation was the ‘genuine desire to rid the Japanese system of what he perceived as its American occupation influence. He saw such a move as another step towards Japan’s emergence as an independent country on the world stage’ (Goodman 1989:19) as well as a means to ‘break free from the Yoshida Doctrine’ (Nakasone 1995:63). 17 As a consequence, one would expect his commitment to reform to be strongest in the areas that helped him achieve his goals of ‘the total clearance of the postwar political accounts’ (sengo seiji no sōkessan), which included the education system itself (Schoppa 1991a:48; Horio 1997a:175). This would lead to ‘a system founded on Japanese tradition’ (Nishimura 1985:21). These ideas were to be later echoed in comments made by Okamoto Michio, at the first meeting of the ad hoc council dealing with education reform, when he said that the time had come ‘to review modern Western civilization in its entirety’ (Nishimura 1985:22). Nakasone was very clear about the role he was playing in shaping the future direction


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for Japan, and the role that education had, being ‘the very foundation of our nation’s destiny’ (Nakasone 1984:13). The fact that Nakasone saw himself as an agenda setter was clearly demonstrated when he stated that: I always think of Japan in terms of the co-ordinates of history—the vertical axis of time and the horizontal axis of space. I always think in terms of where we are located, where we stand on these co-ordinates, and in which direction we should go. And I think of this future direction in terms of 10 to 20 years. (Nakasone 1991:41)

Finding his feet in the education debate When Nakasone first became involved in education reform it appeared as though it was as much due to pressure from others as to do with his own interest in the issue. It was as though he had lost his footing, for he had expressed interest in reforming certain aspects of education on a number of occasions in the past. It certainly appeared that education reform ‘was not one of Nakasone’s first priorities when he became prime minister’ (Hayao 1993:48). Indeed he showed more interest in the controversial issue of whether politicians should be able to visit Yasukuni Shrine or not (see Chapter 4). On at least three occasions in his political career Nakasone had expressed great interest in the need for education reform. The first was in his involvement as a leader of a group in the 1950s in a failed attempt to have a council established to look at education reform (Nihon Kyōiku Shimbun 9 April and 4 June 1984). Secondly, in 1978, he specified certain areas of education reform that he believed necessary in his book Atarashii Hoshu no Ronri (‘Theory of New Conservatism’). Then, while Director General of the Administrative Management Agency, he was quoted as saying ‘after the Extraordinary Administrative Reform Council [Rinchō], we’ll have to create a provisional council on educational reform’ (Foreign Press Center 1985:5; Yamazaki 1986:172). The most notable of these were his comments in Atarashii Hoshu no Ronri, which was based on volumes of notes that he made when he had ideas about policies during his time as a politician. He has described the book as ‘my “bible” on politics. When I became prime minister, I utilised the important points in this book’ (Nakasone 1991:41) 18 and that it ‘contains my DNA on education ideologies’ (Nakasone, interview, 1 December 1997). In this book he laid out his five key educational principles: ‘jinkakushug’ (individualism), ‘kokumin-shugi’ (nationalism), ‘kokusai-shugi’ (internationalism), ‘jitsuryoku-shugi’ (merit system), and ‘chihō-shugi’ (regionalism) (Nakasone 1978:89). Other than these five principles, he also expressed the need for ‘reform of the 6–3–3 system, the realisation of infant education and education for gifted children, the eradication of “examination hell”, retraining of teachers, reform of the teachers’ unions, and a realisation of high level, large scale research’, which he wrote that he would give greater detail about at another stage (Nakasone 1978:104). It still remains quite unusual for a Japanese politician to write books and be so explicit on desired policies. However, Nakasone had always been prepared to use such methods


34

to try to explain his ideologies, although some of his ideas on particular issues changed during his political career. As this book was written only a few years before he became prime minister and he used it when deciding policy during his five years as leader, it indicates that the contents reflected many of Nakasone’s ‘true’ ideologies during his period as prime minister. For the purpose of this study, therefore, the contents of this book and comments made at other times that are consistent with the contents of this book can be used as the focus of analysis. Naturally, some of the ideas where not original to Nakasone; indeed Duke (1986:167) believes that although Nakasone was right about many of the assumptions that he made about the need for change. there was nothing new in what he was saying and that it had been said for many years. However, the fact that he expressed his endorsement of them in his ‘bible’ means that they had become part of his core beliefs and so warrant proper analysis. Also Nakasone was one of the first Japanese leaders to act upon his beliefs. It is of course extremely difficult to prove that Nakasone was the most important figure in the education reform debate. As Ichikawa (1991:353) comments about Schoppa’s work, the problem is that much of the information about the political activity in the education reform debate ‘is based on hearsay because most policy decisions were made behind closed doors’. However, the events during this period do reveal that Nakasone had a sizeable influence, and the results of the education reform programme further demonstrate how important his role was. Once Nakasone became involved in the education reform debate in early 1983, he began to find his feet and assert himself. A little over six months after becoming prime minister he established a private commission, the Group for Discussing Culture and Education (GDCE, Bunka to Kyōiku ni Kansuru Kondankai (Bunkyōkon)). This was designed to be a ‘forum of free discussion and not an advisory organ in the strict sense of the term’ (Foreign Press Centre 1985:5; Kōyama 1995:673). Although this can be seen as the start of the moves towards education reform, there was certainly no firm indication of it becoming government policy at this stage. According to Kitamura (1986:153) it was not until the 1983 general election campaign that Nakasone discovered that education problems were a ‘major concern to the voters’ and that it was this concern that ‘led Nakasone to conclude that educational reform should be an important policy issue’. On 10 December Nakasone finally showed his commitment to education reform with the announcement of the ‘seven-point proposal’ at a press conference in Kagoshima. The seven points were: 1 to consider changing the 6–3–3 school education system, 2 to revise the upper secondary school entrance examination system and discontinue reliance on test results as the main yardstick of students’ academic success, 3 to revise the university entrance examination system, 4 to promote extracurricular activities, such as community service activities, 5 to reinforce moral education, 6 to encourage a more cosmopolitan outlook, and 7 to improve the quality of teaching staff by revising training and hiring programmes. (Foreign Press Centre 1985:13) 19 He also said that education was his next major item for reform following


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administrative reform and that ‘he was firmly committed to implementing his brand of educational reform if he could win popular support for it’ (Foreign Press Centre l985:5, 13). 20 However, the election did not go well for the LDP and Nakasone was ‘humiliated’ (Kerns 1983:10). Although the election has been referred to as the ‘education election’ (Yamazaki 1986:173), if Nakasone’s announcement that he intended to pursue education reform had been an attempt to win extra votes, it was not particularly successful. The LDP only held on to power because of the support of nine independents (Masumi 1995:418). Nakasone was clear about what the problem had been, and on 24 December he read a statement ‘that broke through the anti-mainstream’s resistance’, for he said that ‘The biggest reason for the defeat was…that there was no clear resolution of the “Tanaka problem” and we caused unease among the citizenry regarding our handling of political ethics’ (Masumi 1995:418). However, Nakasone still believed that the people wanted education reform, even if it had not yet become a vote winner. 21 What followed would suggest that Nakasone was now beginning to take a genuine interest in education reform. In an address to the Diet he spoke out again for what he believed was needed, the contents of which are consistent with what was contained in his ‘bible’ and the ‘seven-point proposal’: I believe the priorities for educational reform lie in questing for overall education for the total individual by making educational institutions and curricula more diverse and more flexible, emphasizing home and social education, promoting respect for the individual, encouraging practical hands on training outside of the classroom, and expanding the freedom of choice for people seeking education, as well as in seeking to internationalize Japanese education as befits the people of a truly international state. (Nakasone 1984:13) Also, rather than allowing the issue to fade from the political stage, he asked the members of the GDCE to make a report before the end of fiscal year 1983. At the same time, Nakasone began to think about how education reform would be handled. Compared with the Meiji and Occupation reforms, this would be a completely new situation, as there appeared to be no model for Japan to base its new education system on, although the experiences of other countries would still be useful. Indeed, what some believed was needed now was for Japan to create a new education system that fitted its own new goals, social balances and international roles (Beauchamp 1991b:46; Cummings 1991:204; Prime Minister’s Office 1984:2). It would be more of a matter of whether the Japanese could ‘create a new model which will not only meet their needs in the twentyfirst century, but will also serve as a model from which the rest of the world might learn’ (Beauchamp 1991b:46–7). Education was now taking a more central role in the workings of the Nakasone administration and he ‘was thinking of making educational reform a centerpiece of his second cabinet’ (Hayao 1993:52). There existed two main options for how to deal with education reform. Firstly, there was Chūkyōshin that had dealt with previous requests for education reform. Secondly, there was the possibility of creating an ad hoc council to


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look at education reform, in much the same way as administration reform, that had been overseen by Nakasone in his time prior to becoming prime minister, had been handled by Rinchō. According to Hayao (1993:52), Nakasone would probably have opted for establishing a new ad hoc council had the LDP done well in the December election. However, the poor result left Nakasone in a weak position as he did not command great support from the people. Nor could he rely on support from his party, in particular from the education zoku, which was hostile to such a proposal. I feel that Nakasone would probably not have been out of place being a member of the education zoku given his strong ideologies and interest in changing Japanese society. However, as he was not a member it meant that he was viewed as an outsider in the eyes of the education zoku. Indeed, based on what was in Nakasone’s ‘bible’ there should have been little reason for the education zoku to oppose Nakasone’s ideologies about education reform, for it contained many ideas that had also been put forward by the education zoku itself at various times. Their opposition to Nakasone’s plans seems to be more a fear of their influence being reduced and a fear of Nakasone’s budget cutting past. 22 However, although the education zoku remained strong, they had been weakened, as some of their top politicians (Setoyama Mitsuo, Nishioka Takeo and Tanikawa Kazuo) had failed to get re-elected in the December election (Yamazaki 1986:174). At this time Nakasone could also not rely upon public support. In fact, public opinion was something that Nakasone could never rely on, although it has sometimes been described as being ‘high and stable’ at around 40 per cent (Masumi 1995:423). Looking at the opinion polls in Asahi Shimbun (see Figure 3.2), one can see that it was only at this time that the Nakasone cabinet was beginning to gain support. This was largely due to his new international image and the creation of the popular ‘Ron-Yasu’ relationship. 23 Therefore, in order to pursue his policies, he had to ensure that he had the support from within the party, and this meant gaining the support of the education zoku.

Prime Minister Yasu While Nakasone was beginning to bolster his public image by his handling of international affairs, ‘the purely domestic nature of education meant that reformers could not bring outside pressures [gaiatsu] to bear on the issues and force changes through’ (Ichikawa 1991:351). He wanted to retain control over education reform as he said, ‘in the age of mass democracy, the leader bears all the responsibilities. The leader must write the script himself, be lead actor, do the choreography, and plan the PR’ (Yamamoto 1986). During the New Year holidays in 1984, Nakasone said at a press conference in Ise that Chūkyōshin would handle education reform (Yamazaki 1986:174). 24 This was not his preferred option, despite the fact that it had already been dealing with some of the problems that were becoming central to the education reform debate. 25 There were also others, such as the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP, Minshatō) that wanted an ad hoc reform council to be established. However, Nakasone had to find a way to deal with the education zoku. They felt that


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having dedicated their careers to the issue, they were the most suitable people in the party to discuss the problems, and with their close working relationship with Monbushō, the use of Chūkyōshin was preferable. However, Nakasone argued that the issue was so great that it required expertise and experiences of people from wider areas, and should not be left to Monbushō alone. He believed Monbushō could not effectively do the job, as was demonstrated by the fact that the 1971 reforms had not been fully implemented because Monbushō had been unable to get the support to make more than ‘minor improvements’ (Schoppa 1991a:4–5, 75–6; Saitō 1985:113; Takeuchi 1985:41; Japan Times 22 February 1983). One of the key factors that helped Nakasone proceed towards his goal of creating an ad hoc council was his appointment of Mori Yoshirō as Education Minister. Mori was a young member of the education zoku, who was also a member of the Nakasone supporting Fukuda faction, and this was his first cabinet post. Although he had wanted Chūkyōshin to handle education reform (Yamazaki 1986:174; Maki 1988b:241), he agreed to help Nakasone in setting up an ad hoc council, as he saw the potential for furthering his own career by being associated with such a large high-profile policy (Hayao 1993:151). Therefore, despite giving the impression that education reform was going to be handled by Chūkyōshin , behind the scenes Nakasone continued to work towards creating an ad hoc council. Following the appointment of Mori, he had gained more support from education zoku members, and after meeting with the leaders of the opposition parties he gained the support of the Kōmeitō (The Clean Government Party) and DSP (Hayao 1993:52, 62). By the middle of January, he decided that he had got enough support to allow him to create an ad hoc council. The important point, for Nakasone, in creating an ad hoc council would be that his influence could be much greater than if education reform was handled by Chūkyōshin alone, as he would have a greater opportunity to appoint people sympathetic to his views. As a result there were some, in particular members of his own party, that criticised him and questioned his motives, saying that he was ‘turning education into a political tool for improving his chances of re-election to the LDP presidency’ in November 1984 (Foreign Press Centre 1985:6). However, at this stage of the education reform debate Nakasone was winning the battle, if not the war, by silencing much of the education zoku through his appointment of Mori, and using Mori’s position to gain support. Although not happy with Nakasone’s approach, even the members of the education zoku opposed to his ideologies and methods probably believed that their influence would be more effective in the consultation and implementation stages, and so were prepared to support Nakasone at this time. Following a meeting with Nakasone on 30 January, Sakata Michita (head of the education zoku) announced his support for the proposal, which was followed by other members the next day (Harada 1990:52). Monbushō was in a similar position to the zoku, also apparently being against the establishment of an ad hoc council, and wary of Nakasone’s motives which might include cost cutting policies that would reduce the size and influence of the ministry over the education system (Harada 1990:52). According to Hayasaka (1994:7), there are only two administrative reforms which bureaucrats will agree to: one that will increase their


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authority of giving rights and permits, and one that will expand their opportunities of working in the private sector after retiring from the government. A change from a large government to a small government is as difficult as making an elephant go through [the eye of] a needle. However, there was no way that Monbushō could prevent the establishment of an ad hoc council, and the belief that it could use its position to greater effect in the implementation stage, in particular, meant that the resistance at this stage was limited. Nakasone appeared to distrust the bureaucracy, which he believes ‘is very strong’ (Nakasone 1991:47), and ‘represents nothing more than a simple sectional interest that might compromise his comprehensive policies which are in everyone’s overall interest’ (Muramatsu 1987:321). This lead him to take firm action against the bureaucracy at various times during his career, and showed that it was possible ‘to manipulate the bureaucracy’ (Satō 1997). For example, while he was handling administrative reform, he tried to limit the amount of bureaucratic opposition through suriawase, whereby probable opposition was eliminated before the writing of the final report. Once the final report had been published, he said at a cabinet meeting, ‘I would like your co-operation with the knowledge that, as Director of the Administrative Agency, I will make note of any activities that temporarily obstruct administrative reform, and report to the Prime Minister and appropriate ministers requesting suitable [disciplinary] measures’ (Muramatsu 1987:321). He also demonstrated that he would not allow anyone to block the progress of one of his policies whilst trying to reform Japanese National Railways (JNR). According to Nakasone, ‘the head of the National Railways indicated his reluctance to co-operate. So I accepted his letter of resignation forth-with, assessing that the circumstances no longer justified his holding the office. This reform succeeded at precisely that moment’ (Nakasone 1991:42). 26 Monbushō was obviously aware of Nakasone’s attitude and tactics, and so was careful in its dealings with Nakasone directly. On 1 February 1984, Nakasone met the education minister and finalised his decision to create an ad hoc council under the prime minister’s authority This further demonstrates his personal interest in the issue and also ensured ‘that he could become intimately involved in reform’ and have affect on the direction that the reports took (Kitamura 1986:154; Roesgaard 1998:89). On 13 March another group, the Kyoto Group for the Study of Global Issues (Sekai o Kangaeru Kyoto Zaikai), published a report entitled ‘Seven Recommendations to Revitalize School Education’. The Kyoto Group was founded and chaired by Matsushita Kōnosuke, and also included many other leading businessmen as well as academics and government figures. The recommendations were particularly noteworthy for their support of ‘liberalising’ the education system by introducing greater flexibility, though they also called for more ‘traditional’ changes, such as improved teacher quality and more moral education, 27 and so were very close to Nakasone’s position. Nakasone and Monbushō sorted out the specifics in drafting a bill for the creation of the new ad hoc council after the House of Representatives passed the Fiscal 1984 Budget Bill on 14 March. On 21 March, the Bill was approved by the LDP’s Education Division (Bunkyō bukai) as well as by the Education System Research Council (Bunkyō seido chōsakai) (Harada 1990:55–6; Schoppa 1991a:217–18).


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The following day GDCE submitted its report to Nakasone. GDCE had six main points in it’s final report relating to: (1) permanent versus transitory values, (2) human virtues and social rules, (3) the end of rote learning, (4) physical education, (5) cultural stimulation, and (6) lifelong learning (Foreign Press Centre 1985:6–7). Interestingly, the group did not believe that it was ‘desirable’ to change the education system in one sweep, owing to the need to heed the ‘wishes and consensus of the people’, though the need for reorganisation was noted, with a call for greater flexibility (Foreign Press Centre 1985:21–4). Given that Nakasone appointed all the members of this group, one might have expected a greater endorsement of his ideas to change the 6–3–3–4 system (which was recommended by the Kyoto Group). However, the call for greater flexibility and awareness of people’s opinions showed that the spirit of Nakasone’s ideas were still central. The Bill for the establishment of Rinji Kyōiku Shingikai (Rinkyōshin), as the ad hoc council was to be known, was submitted to the Diet five days later and became law on 7 August 1984. The passage of the Bill was not simple as both Nihon Shakaitō (Japan Socialist Party, JSP) and Nihon Kyōsantō (Japan Communist Party, JCP) voted against it, as they ‘contended that Nakasone was trying to politicize what should remain a neutral issue and expressed strong suspicions that he was proposing educational reform as an exercise in preparation for amending the Constitution’ (Nishimura 1985:19; Harada 1990:57–76). That Nakasone had managed to get this Bill enacted despite some concessions— chiefly the need for Diet approval for appointments to Rinkyōshin and that the FLE (see Chapter 5) would not be reformed 28 —was a great personal victory for him, and ‘is a clear indication of his great strength as a leader’ (Roesgaard 1998:89). 29 Not only did it mean that there was to be an ad hoc council dealing with education reform, over which he would have great influence through the appointments of many of the members, and due to the fact that it would report to him directly, but also it helped him score ‘a political point to assure his reelection as LDP president in November 1984’ (Nishimura 1985:21). The establishment of Rinkyōshin on 21 August 1984 was ‘a logical culmination to a lengthy period of concern in Japan over a set of widely perceived educational problems and the future prospects for Japanese education’ (Beauchamp 1991b:27). With the establishment of Rinkyōshin, Chūkyōshin was suspended for three years (Simmons 1990:120).

The workings of Rinkyōshin Only in the final run-up to the creation of Rinkyōshin had the ‘sub-government’ and other opposition groups started to assert themselves fully for perhaps the first time. Having compromised over the method by which education reform was handled, the opposition wanted to make sure that its voice was heard loud and clear by the ‘centre’ when it came to the appointing of members to the Rinkyōshin, in particular, in the selection of the chairman. Monbushō in particular wanted to ‘minimize the intervention of “amateurs”' (Nishimura 1985:22). Table 3.1 shows the make-up of Rinkyōshin and its experiences. With a few


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exceptions, one would have to say that there does appear to be two main camps: those people who had worked with Nakasone and those who had worked with Monbushō, though there were two who had worked with both Nakasone and Monbushō before. It was one of these two, Okamoto Michio, who became the Chairman of Rinkyōshin after Monbushō and education zoku insisted that the Prime Minister should choose an established figure from the “education world'” (Schoppa 1991a:219; Nishimura 1985:22) rather than Nakasone’s preferred choice of Nakayama Sohei, 30 a businessman they feared might support budget cutting proposals. Although it would appear on the surface that Nakasone had to make a compromise over the membership of Rinkyōshin, there were certainly many that had been directly chosen by Nakasone and his aides. In fact, virtually every member of Rinkyōshin, with the possible exceptions of Kanasugi, Tobari and Uchida, had been previously connected with Nakasone, the LDP

Table 3.1 Membership of Rinkyōshin.

Name

Experience

Amaya Naohiro

Former MITI senior official. Member of the Kyoto Group. Served on LDP think-tank closely associated with Rinchō’s privatising ideas.

Arita Kazuhisa

Former education zoku member. Former member of Chūkyōshin. Once chair of Nikkeiren’s Education Committee.

Dōgakinai Naohiro

Former governor of Hokkaidō. Given place after failing to win LDP House of Councillors seat.

Hosomi Takashi

Former Ministry of Finance senior official. Member of LDP think-tank and Nakasone ‘brain’.

Iijima Sōichi

President of Nagoya University. Worked with Chūkyōshin and other Monbushō advisory councils.

Ishii Takemochi

Tokyo University professor. Member of the Kyoto Group. Advisor to Prime Minister Ōhira and then Nakasone. Chaired one of Nakasone’s private advisory councils.

Ishikawa Tadao

President of Keiō University. Member of three Monbushō advisory councils. Member of GDCE.

Kanasugi Hidenobu Advisor of Dōmei Labour Confederation. Close links to DSP Member of Rinchō. Kimura Harumi

Chiba Institute of Technology professor. An essayist known for her view that Japanese have gone soft. Member of the Kyoto Group.

Kobayashi Noboru

General director of Children’s Medical Research Centre, National Children’s Hospital. Member of Ministry of Health and Welfare advisory councils. A former Ōhira ‘brain’.

Kōyama Ken’ichi

Gakushōin University professor. A former advisor to Prime Minister Ōhira and one of Nakasone’s chief ‘brains’.


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Minakami Tadashi

Tokyo education superintendent. Long-time local education administrator in Tokyo.

Miyata Yoshiji

Senior advisor of a Sōhyō-affiliated labour union. Member of Nakasone’s private advisory council on the ‘peace problem’.

Nakauchi Isao

President of Daiei. Member of zaikai group supporting Nakasone.

Nakayama Sohei

Former president of the Industrial Bank of Japan. Served on Nakasone’s private advisory council on the ‘peace problem’.

Okamoto Michio

Former president of Kyoto University. Had worked with both Nakasone and Monbushō before.

Okano Shunichirō

Former association football player. Head of Japan Olympic Committee. Member of Chūkyōshin.

Saitō Sei

Former Monbushō administrative vice-minister. President of National Theatre. Member of Monbushō advisory councils, including Chūkyōshin.

Saitō Toshitsugu

Executive director, Daishōwa Paper Manufacturing. A relative of Nakasone (Nakasone’s niece married Saitō's brother).

Sejima Ryūzō

Member of Rinchō. Close advisor to Nakasone and member of his private advisory council on the ‘peace problem’. Member of Chūkyōshin to provide link to Rinchō.

Miura Chizuko Author. One of ōhira’s brain-trust who went on to advise Nakasone. (a.k.a. Sono Ayako) Member of two of Nakasone’s private advisory councils, including GDCE. Sunobe Ryōzō

Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs administrative vice-minister. Kyōrin University professor.

Tamaru Akiyo

Elementary school teacher. Participated in Monbushō moral education project.

Tobari Atsuo

Lower secondary school principal. Head of Tokyo Association of Lower Secondary School Principals.

Uchida Kenzō

Was long-time journalist for Kyōdō Press. Retired to become Hōsei University professor.

Sources: Based on Schoppa (1991a: 220–2), Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyōkai (1987a:14–15), Asahi Shimbun 21 August 1984, Roesgaard (1998:93–5).

or industrial interests (Roesgaard 1998:95). On top of this, as members of the Kyoto Group and GDCE, which had already recommended reforms that Nakasone also espoused, were appointed to Rinkyōshin, it further increased the likelihood that Rinkyōshin would take a line similar to his own (Roesgaard 1998:92, 95, 96). Even those who were more closely affiliated to Monbushō, such as lijima Sōichi, could not be described as a Monbushō ‘tool'. 31 This led to some referring to Rinkyōshin members as being ‘Nakasone people’ (Roesgaard 1998:95) and many Japanese, across the whole political spectrum, suspected that the membership had been shaped to recommend those policies that


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Nakasone had ‘already decided are needed’ (Beauchamp 1986:11; Nishimura 1985:18). Further, those appointed by Nakasone, such as Nakayama Sohei and Kōyama Ken’ichi, remained determined to overcome Monbushō obstacles and bring about education reform (Nishimura 1985:22). One of the problems lay in the difference of goals between Nakasone and the education zoku and Monbushō. Nakasone hoped that Rinkyōshin would put forward proposals that would lead to a complete reform of the system, whereas Monbushō and many within in the LDP wanted the basic system to be maintained, with changes being made in a few areas only. Hayao (1993:55) believes that ‘This difference was reflected both in struggles over the appointments to the council and its deliberations’. However, it was natural that Rinkyōshin worked on both new and old ideas, many borrowed from the 1971 Chūkyōshin, but ‘primarily basing itself on signals from Prime Minister Nakasone and the Liberal Democratic Party’ (Roesgaard 1998:12). At the inaugural meeting of Rinkyōshin, Nakasone said that its task was to address the problems of growing school violence and juvenile delinquency as well as the more basic problems of ‘a social climate that places too much value on the academic background of individuals, a uniform and inflexible structure of formal education and a need for internationalizing Japan’s educational institutions’. Nakasone wanted Rinkyōshin to develop ‘basic strategies for necessary reforms with regard to governmental policies and measures in various aspects, so as to secure such education as will be compatible with the social changes and cultural developments of our country’ (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:361–2). After Rinkyōshin began its work, it split into four sub-committees (see Table 3.2). Too much should not be read into this situation. The fact that the sub-committees reflect—to a certain extent—the affiliations mentioned above is only significant in that it would have a bearing on the sort of recommendations made by the individual sub-committees. However, it is the final recommendations of Rinkyōshin as a whole which are most important in discovering whether Nakasone was successful or not, as it was these recommendations that Monbushō had to deal with. Therefore, while the make-up of the sub-committees should not be ignored as it would have some bearing on the direction that the sub-committee took, and, therefore, the direction that Rinkyōshin took, it is not necessary to study the work of each sub-committee in detail. On top of the four sub-committees, various other hearings were arranged to deal with specific issues, such as sports in education, the start of the academic year and internationalisation. In all, 483 people participated in Rinkyōshin sub-committees and hearings. There were also seven trips to study the education system in foreign countries (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a: 46). These steps helped to compensate for the fact that most of the committee members were graduates of national universities (nearly half from Tokyo University), were not that young, that most were male, and few were experts in primary and secondary education (Beauchamp 1986:11). Also under-represented, as with the 1971 Chūkyōshin, were the teachers, though their representation had been discussed. Although Rinkyōshin did include a teacher, who happened to be a member of Nikkyōso, she was not chosen for this reason, but rather because of her previous cooperation with Monbushō over a moral education project, and throughout the three years, Nikkyōso did not contact her once regarding her role on the council. 32 Teachers were


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invited to various hearings held by Rinkyōshin, and their views were listened

Table 3.2 Composition and work of the sub-committees.

Sub-cttee First

Second

Members

Theme

Amaya Naohiro Uchida Kenzō Kanasugi Noboru Kōyama Ken’ichi Nakauchi Isao Minakami Tadashi

Education for the twenty-first century

Ishii Takemochi Kimura Harumi Saitō Toshitsugu Dōgakinai Naohiro Miura Chizuko Miyata Yoshiji

Revitalisation of educational functions of society

Issues • Fundamentals of character formation • Internationalisation, ageing society, liberalisation, information society, highlevel science research, etc.

• The role of national and regional organisations

• ‘Diploma disease’ • Promotion of culture and international relations

• Relationship between schools and the home and society

• Lifelong learning

Third

Arita Reform of primary and • Reform of the curriculum (including the Kazuhisa secondary education textbooks) Okano Shunichirō Kobayashi Noboru Saitō Sei • Changing the school system Tamaru Akiyo Tobari Atsuo

Fourth

lijima Sōichi Reform of higher Sunobe education Ryōzō Sejima Ryūzō

• Financing of higher education • Types of institutions • Higher education system


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Hosomi Takashi Third and fourth together

• The school system (types of schools and start of school year) • Entrance requirements • Improvement of teaching quality • Special education

Note: Okamoto Michio (Chairman of Rinkyōshin), Ishikawa Tadao and Nakayama Sohei (both vice-chairmen) were not members of any of the sub-committees. Source: Table based on information from Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai (1987a:21–2).

to, although the degree to which they were truly considered is debatable (Roesgaard 1998:119–20). During its three years, the full council met a total of ninety times, and the total time spent in meetings of the full council, sub-committees and various hearings was 2,086 hours (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:46). During the three years, a total of four reports were published, and it was these reports that were used as a basis for the education reform process. In conclusion, one should be careful not to overemphasise the apparent divisions due to the different affiliations of the members of Rinkyōshin, and the creation of the subcommittees. lijima Sōichi said that he did not have the impression that the subcommittees were ‘independent’, for the reports were written with the consent of all the members of Rinkyōshin, rather than sections being written by the various sub-committees (Ichikawa 1995a:136). Therefore, the next five chapters will look at some of the most important issues to discover how the recommendations of Rinkyōshin compared with Nakasone’s own ideologies, and what has happened to these recommendations.

4 ‘Healthy internationalism’ Our country cannot exist in isolation from the international community in any field of activity, including resources, energy, industry, education, and culture. (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:316)

Internationalism was the most successful areas of the Nakasone education reforms in the early years of reform. Even at the time when Schoppa completed his study, many of the proposals had been ‘largely implemented or [were] likely to be implemented’ as they enjoyed ‘fairly broad support (if not a consensus)’ (Schoppa 1991a:247, 248). However, in order to determine the true extent of the success of these internationalism proposals, it is necessary to understand what is meant by the terms ‘internationalism’ and ‘internationalisation’, and more particularly what Nakasone meant by these terms.

Definition of internationalism There are no agreed definitions of the ideology of ‘internationalism’ (kokusaishugi) or the term ‘internationalisation’ (kokusaika). However, internationalism is generally seen as being a ‘desirable process of change’, with people attaching to it their own ideas and goals (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986:380). What became clear during the 1980s was that the ideology was gaining greater importance, and that it is ‘essential that kokusaika is not simply regarded as a “buzz word”’ (Hook and Weiner 1992:1). Table 4.1 summarises the concepts of internationalism based on research done by Mouer and Befu. The interesting points to notice from this table are the importance of English, indicated by Mouer’s research, and also the importance of better understanding of Japan’s own culture and the teaching of Japanese language to foreigners, according to Befu’s research. These factors have continued to play an important role in the internationalisation debate in Japan and were central to the debate over internationalising the education system. Within the debate over what constitutes internationalisation and how it should be introduced, there essentially exists two main groups. One, which Goodman (1990:224) refers to as ‘idealists’ (such as some academics), ‘look


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Table 4.1 Definitions of internationalism.

Definitions based on Mouer’s research

Definitions listed in Befu’s paper

To learn English

The introduction of Western ideas and practices

To speak foreign languages

Foreigners in Japan

To travel overseas

Foreign investment in Japan

To learn about foreign countries

The liberalisation of trade policy

To be more friendly to foreigners visiting Japan

Japanese investment abroad

To teach more about the world in Japanese schools

Foreign language competency

To learn about the customs of other peoples

Association with foreigners

To stop behaving like economic animals

Understanding foreign cultures

To promote world peace

Allowing foreigners to teach at Japanese universities

To foster international understanding

Easing Japanese laws for naturalisation Teaching the Japanese language to foreigners An improved cultural understanding of Japan Contributions to the world order

Source: Based on Table 15.1 in Mouer and Sugimoto (1986:381).

towards a genuine global community where people’s similarities are more important than their differences’ and believe that Japan should not be aiming to influence the outside world in any way, but that Japan should change to fit with the increasingly interdependent international community (see also Ogata 1992:63; Sugiyama 1986:2–15; Sugiyama 1992:72; Katō 1992:310). At the extreme some ‘idealists’ would like to see the creation of a one-world government (Mikami et al. 1988:28; Hatsuse 1985:iii; Mouer and Sugimoto 1986:382–3). The other group, Goodman calls ‘realists’ (such as businessmen). ‘Realists’ believe that within internationalism, a certain degree of nationalism is also necessary for cultural understanding and for Japan’s future economic growth, although it should be introduced in a way that does not cause conflict with people’s own identity (Yano 1986:60). Although I am not totally comfortable with using these terms, as they seem to suggest a bias, it is probably also the case that no single word could describe either of the positions neutrally. Further, these terms do seem appropriate in the context of Nakasone’s approach. Nakasone is firmly in the ‘realist’ camp, believing in the need for an ‘international nationhood’ (Nakasone 1987:58). What had concerned Nakasone was that in some countries, such as the United Kingdom and United States, a certain amount of

'Healthy internationalism

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nationalism is not only expected, but is also desirable, and yet in Japan, any person who attempts to introduce such behaviour is seen as a threat. Owing to the experiences of the 1930s and 1940s, words such as ‘nationalism’ and ‘nationalist’ have taken on a negative connotation. In Japan, this problem is even greater, given that it was one of the countries that brought about this negative image, through its pursuit of kokka-shugi. However, Germany has by and large been able to develop a nationalist programme without the sort of problems that Japan has faced, domestically and internationally. Williams (1994:112) points out that words are at the root of the problem. Any analysis of Japan as a nationalist polity in a language other than Japanese will almost inevitably get the nuances wrong for the good reason that Japanese maps social reality in different ways from English. As Ishihara Shintarō (interview, 21 March 2000) says, ‘Aikoku-shugi [nationalism] includes a feeling of racism in English. Americans in particular make a strange face when the term “nationalist” is used’. Perhaps the easiest way for Westerners to understand Japanese ‘nationalism’ is to think of it as ‘patriotism’. For whereas ‘nationalists’ in the West will tend to support their own country and see any criticism of their own country (particularly by people of their own country) as being unacceptable, and is largely viewed as a negative attribute, ‘patriotism’, generally speaking, appears to be an ideology whereby one is supportive of one’s own country, but is also prepared to criticise (and allow others also to criticise) aspects of the country at times, and is viewed more positively. Japanese nationalism is definitely different. For many British people, for example, the important aspects of being British are cultural aspects such as drinking tea, going to the pub, eating fish and chips, watching cricket, and an appreciation of the British character and sense of humour as demonstrated in films such as The Full Monty, The Italian Job, Zulu, and the James Bond films. Much of this has been confirmed by Yoshino’s (1995:109) study, which compared nationalism in the United Kingdom and Japan. However, Yoshino (1995:115–29) found that for Japanese people the central issue is that of blood (although it is not a clear-cut issue due to the problem of kikokushijo (see below) and Nikkeijin (primarily Latin Americans of Japanese descent)). Indeed, I have spoken to Japanese that find it hard to appreciate that Linford Christie, the black Olympic 100 m gold medallist, can be regarded as British, for example. Likewise, sumo’s Yokozuna Akebono and Yokozuna Musashimaru and former Ōzeki Konishiki, despite their knowledge of Japan, Japanese and contributions to Japanese sports and culture, will always be regarded as foreigners due to their Hawaiian background even though they are naturalised Japanese. 1 In order to differentiate from the kokka-shugi type of nationalism, another terminology is needed. Nakasone described his breed of nationalism as being ‘healthy’ (kenzen) or ‘justifiable’ (tadashii) nationalism, which he believes is ‘necessary’, so as to ‘reconcile nationalism and internationalism’ (Nakasone 1987:14). 2 Nakasone defines ‘healthy nationalism’ as follows: Each country has a long history, traditions and culture…its heritage. That is the foundation…It is to love the long history, traditions and culture. On top of this, it is then to use them to contribute to the rest of the world. Without knowing the


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foundation, you cannot exchange with other countries…It is to plant a flower of Japan in the global garden.’ (Nakasone, interview, 15 March 2000) He also said that It is important that we unite in peace and culture around the Emperor, that we contribute culturally, politically, and economically to the rest of the world, that we join together with other nations in seriously considering these issues, and that we share our prosperity with the rest of the global community. Yet we cannot do any of this unless we are also confident of our own identity. A nationalism that endeavours to foster self-identity in this sense is a completely justifiable nationalism. And we must teach this through education. (Nakasone 1987:13–14)

Nakasone’s ‘healthy nationalism’

As the idea of nationalism, particularly Japanese nationalism, is of such concern to many in the West, it is worth providing some more background toNakasone’s ideology in this area. This is particularly so, since it was one ofthe key areas of the education reform debate. Ichikawa (1995a:7) believes that ‘the image that Nakasone was a nationalist was very often strong’. Although Satō (interview, 17 November 1997) said that Nakasone was ‘wrongly but widely believed to be a “rightist”’, this image meant that he had to ‘tread carefully’ (Muramatsu 1987:339). Part of this image of Nakasone was based on him being a hawk and his desire for Japan to have a greater role in defence issues. However, he made it clear on many occasions that he wanted peace, and that he was aware that Japan had to be careful not to worry its Asian neighbours, which were wary of the possible rise of militarism and another attempt at imperialism. 3 However, Nakasone was very concerned with building up Japan’s defence capabilities. A pamphlet handed out to journalists on the day he became prime minister stated that ‘Japan must rely upon its own military forces for the defence of the motherland [sokoku] rather than on the US military’ (Yoshimura 1988:16). During Nakasone’s time as prime minister, the percentage of the budget spent on defence reached 1.004 per cent, breaking the self-imposed 1 per cent limit that Nakasone had promised to stick to. Curtis (1988:36–7) suggests that such a move ‘hardly amounted to a quantum jump in Japanese military expenditure or a fundamental change in Japanese defence policy’, but it was highly significant to the Japanese. 4 Another area that led to him being labelled as a ‘nationalist’ was regarding the position of the emperor. Although most believe that Nakasone wanted a return to the pre-war situation, he made it clear that it was closer to a pre-Meiji situation that he sought, separating the emperor from politics and the running of the country. This way, the emperor could become the ‘shining sun in the sky’ and be an international symbol of national unity and peace (Nakasone 1987:12). 5


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Perhaps the most notorious moment of Nakasone’s time as prime minister was his visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which contains some of Japan’s war dead (including those considered to be war criminals according to the Allies’ Tokyo Trials) on 15 August 1985. He did this after receiving a report saying that such visits were not unconstitutional. 6 Nakasone (1995:60) believes that even if only once, a prime minister of Japan was obliged to pay reverence at Yasukuni shrine and say to the war dead, Thank you for all your hardships and pains. Rest assured, we shall build a new Japan as a peaceful state.’ He was also probably moved by the fact that soldiers going off to war were often heard to say ‘Let’s meet again at Yasukuni Shrine’, and although those ‘words were spoken in jest, there was an underlying seriousness to them’, a fact that Nakasone was all too aware of since one of his brothers was killed during the war, and he narrowly escaped death himself on at least one occasion (Nakasone 1995:53, 60; Nakasone 1997b; Takahama 1995:171). Although not unconstitutional, it proved to be very unpopular with people both in Japan and abroad. However, Nakasone claimed that In every country there is somewhere like the National Cemetery at Arlington in the United States, where the public can offer their gratitude to those who died for their country. This is an entirely normal state of affairs. (Yoshimura 1988:23) The following year he did not attend because of the criticism he received in 1985, despite his claims that ‘It is wrong to think my own visit…meant some kind of homage to militarism and ultranationalism’ (Nakasone 1991:17). This was a view Nakasone reiterated when he spoke of his worries regarding ‘narrow-minded nationalism’ (Nakasone, interview, 1 December 1997) when he stressed the importance of not letting ‘any “loose springs” pop up on the right and also control the radicals on the left. We have walked a safe middle course so far, veering off neither to the left nor the right’ (Nakasone 1987:31). I think that Nakasone’s arguments are sound. The fact that Japan started the Pacific War obviously adds an element of controversy to his visit to Yasukuni—especially due to the inclusion of ‘war criminals’ there. However, history does not teach us about the actions of the victors, many of which were equally as appalling. On top of this, and perhaps most importantly, for most killed in war, they had little choice about whether to fight for their country or not. For them to give up their lives in the pursuit of what they were told to be right deserves respect, no matter which side they were on. It seems wholly appropriate that a prime minister should be involved in this process, especially as such a visit may help increase the public awareness of the ills of war and prevent future conflicts. To view Nakasone’s visit in any other way, I believe, is simply an attempt to put Nakasone, the LDP and Japan on the back foot either in domestic politics or in diplomatic relations with other nations. However, it is also true to say that there is an additional problem for a Japanese prime minister in cases such as these, with the need to separate politics from religion, as required by the constitution, but I feel a degree of understanding and flexibility is needed for such visits. Naturally, some of Nakasone’s comments could have been tatemae in an attempt to


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dispel the fears of those who did not trust his beliefs. Indeed some would argue that actions, such as his increase in the defence budget, would indicate his true nationalistic tendencies. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Nakasone would ever advocate a situation where Japan used its military capability for anything other than the defence of its islands and sealanes, as he has demonstrated with his proposals to strengthen the peaceful nature of the constitution, 7 and his support for an international ban on land mines. 8 The fact of the matter is that in the modern world Japan would have much more to lose from a military conflict than it could ever possibly gain. What Nakasone sought was a form of internationalism that allowed Japan to ‘assert itself to the same extent as other nations assert themselves. We must look out for our own interests so long as they are compatible with international peace and prosperity. For unless we do this, our culture will not progress’ (Nakasone 1987:15). Although such words may still cause unease for some, Sir Sydney Giffard, who was British Ambassador to Japan while Nakasone was prime minister, believes that nationalism is unlikely to become a problem in Japan owing to the country’s relationship with the United States (Giffard 1997). There can be no doubt that Nakasone, despite the need for occasional apologies to other nations for comments or actions by either himself or other members of his government, managed to demonstrate and further strengthen Japan’s improved international status through various events, such as the receiving of national leaders, foreign visits (including the first post-war visit to South Korea by a Japanese prime minister), and the ‘Ron-Yasu’ relationship (Buckley 1990:78). The image that symbolises Nakasone for many Japanese, and is my first memory of seeing him on television, was when he stood in the middle—rather than on the edges as was normal for Japanese prime ministers—of a meeting of world leaders in Williamsburg.

‘Healthy internationalism’ in education In this work, I refer to Nakasone’s ideology that combines internationalism and ‘healthy nationalism’ as ‘healthy internationalism’. It is what Rinkyōshin called ‘Atarashii Kokusaika’ or ‘new internationalisation’ (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:179). In short, ‘healthy internationalism’ is not just concerned with Japan’s relations with other countries, it is also concerned with Japanese identity. This was one of Nakasone’s main concerns with the education reforms (Tanaka, interview, 10 May 1996), as he wanted to create a country where people have a respect for ‘freedom, creativity and a joy of life’ as part of its culture and to have ‘love for the country’ (kuni o aisuru kokoro) (Nakasone 1984:2–3; Schoppa 1991a:241). 9 Nakasone’s brand of ‘healthy internationalism’ probably came at the right time for Japan. There were increasing numbers of people in Japan who were becoming nationalistic, aware that Japan was in a position that they could be proud of, what Tsukushi (1984) calls ‘Nihon wa Saikō Syndrome’ (Japan is Best Syndrome). In fact some believe that Nakasone further strengthened this move with the help of the mass media (Katō 1992:314). Part of the problem is that there is no agreed ‘Prime Directive’ concerning international relations, and countries’ involvement in the cultural, economic and political development


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of other countries. 10 It has been assumed that the system established in the West, in particular, is the correct, and perhaps only, way, and so other countries are expected to conform to these norms. This view was summarised by Yamazawa’s (1992:119) observation about the different perceptions of the term ‘internationalisation’ between certain Western countries and Japan: The former perceive internationalization as doing to others, while the latter perceive it as adjusting to others’. One of the oldest English proverbs relating to internationalisation is ‘When in Rome do as the Romans do’. However, The full implications, however, are difficult to discern. If the guest travels to Rome and tries to accommodate himself to local customs, he is said to be cosmopolitan; on the other hand, if the host demands the visitors adhere strictly to all the house rules, he is said to be ethnocentric or at best ungracious. (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986:382) Therefore, it became a responsibility of Rinkyōshin to attempt to introduce ‘healthy internationalism’ into the education system, though it was noted that the actual contents tend to vary as the global situation varies, and that appropriate changes are sometimes needed (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:279, 316). The idea that ‘internationalism’ meant further ‘Westernisation’ had long prevailed, dating back to the Meiji period, when internationalism in the education system was seen as important to the modernisation process (Ehara 1992:269–70), so Nakasone’s ‘realist’ approach would be different. A ‘realist’ approach to international education argues that it should aim to bring about an understanding of foreign countries, greater understanding of one’s own culture and values, and a ‘positive attitude towards international co-operation’ (Sugiyama 1992:92). Indeed, what was important about Nakasone’s stance was that he argued that the Japanese education system had failed in this area of teaching the people to understand and respect their own culture and traditions, and he believed that it was necessary for children to be taught the basic rules, obligations and responsibilities that go with peace, democracy, human rights and freedom (Asahi Shimbun 22 August 1984). 11 What Nakasone and others also wanted was a Japanese education system that had no part that was forced on it by foreign authorities, as many perceived to be the case with the education system established under the Occupation (Schoppa 1991a:38). It should be of no surprise that Nakasone’s views in this area found support, for most of the members of the education zoku were also members of the Dietmen’s League for the Realisation of an Independent Constitution (Jishu Kempō Kisei Giin Dōmei) (Schoppa 1991a:57). Monbushō was also generally supportive of reforms that included ‘healthy nationalism’ elements (Schoppa 1991a:98–9). There can be no doubt that Rinkyōshin adopted Nakasone’s view of ‘healthy internationalism’, as is clear from the following statement: From now on the Japanese must have a deep understanding, respect and affection for Japanese culture as well as be tolerant toward other cultures… It must be understood that a good world citizen [yoki kokusaijin] is also a good Japanese [yoki nihonjin], and our education must teach people love for the country [kuni o aisuru kokoro] and a firm sense of the individuality of the Japanese culture as well as deepen the knowledge of the culture and traditions


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of all foreign countries. (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyōkai 1987a:72) Roesgaard (1998:207) points out that the wording of some areas of Rinkyōshin’s reports was ‘quite emotional’, with the use of such terms as keiai (love and respect) (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:72) regarding Japanese culture, which was a term that had previously been used in the prewar period when referring to the emperor. ‘ldealists’ that did not like Nakasone and Rinkyōshin’s ‘healthy nationalism’ argued that it was ‘not kokusaika but kokusuika [ultranationalism]’ (Kawai Naoki, Zenkyō member, quoted in Roesgaard 1998:202). However, that Japan was already seen to be misunderstood by many other nations, and that further nationalism could enhance this misunderstanding, probably led to Rinkyōshin’s desire for Japan to be ‘trusted and respected by other people (shinrai to sonkei o kachitoru koto ga dekiru yō)’ (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a: 188). That Nakasone has been successful in getting his brand of ‘healthy internationalism’ officially adopted can be clearly seen by the following statement of the Monbushō 1994 White Paper: We need to focus not only on the improvement of foreign language education but also on an approach that gives priority to the development of understanding and respect for the diversity of other cultures and lifestyles from the perspective of a thorough understanding of Japanese culture and traditions. It is vital that we strive to achieve further improvement on school education from this standpoint. (Monbushō 1995:16) That Monbushō is now able to deal with this area should be seen as a major success for Nakasone and Rinkyōshin, as the ‘healthy nationalism’ side of internationalism was an area that had been ‘too controversial’ (Schoppa 1991a:100). A few of these measures have baffled some foreigners, such as the inclusion of texts about Ainu in lower secondary school English textbooks (Mizuno, interview, 28 November 1997). However, I believe that the inclusion of such material is extremely beneficial. For it not only helps the Japanese children improve their understanding of their own country, but also improves the knowledge of foreigners about Japan, as some will come into contact with the textbooks directly and others may ask Japanese about such subjects (without necessarily being able to have the conversation in Japanese). Monbushō has introduced changes into the Course of Study to reflect the need for ‘healthy internationalism’ (Monbushō 2000a:174). These include the introduction of a new subject, ‘life environmental studies’, for children in the lower grades of elementary school; the improvement of history education; restructuring of upper secondary school ‘social studies’ into ‘geography’, ‘history’ and ‘civics’; the improvement of foreign language education; enhancement of oral and aural skills in Japanese language; enhancement of moral education, including prioritising teacher content according to children’s stage of development; and enhancement of education concerning the national flag (Hinomaru) and the national anthem (Kimigayo) (Monbushō 1995:18, 42; Monbushō 2000a:174). Students now are also having to study world history, something which Nakasone wanted to be introduced into the curriculum (Nakasone, interview, 1 December


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1997; also see Chapter 5). One interesting comment in the Monbushō 1994 White Paper is the belief in the need to develop the qualities that will help ‘Japan to fulfill its international responsibilities’ (Monbushō 1995:69). This appears may be an indication of moves to support and further help develop support for Japan’s overseas peace keeping operations, amongst other things, something that would almost certainly have been unthinkable without the reassessment of Japan’s international role brought about by politicians such as Nakasone. Rinkyōshin was well aware that it would take time for ‘healthy internationalism’ to be realised, and stated that ‘no immediate solution should be expected’ (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:279). Therefore, to discover to what degree ‘healthy internationalism’ has been introduced into the system, an analysis will be made of the progress of the reforms in some of the areas which Rinkyōshin described as the ‘barometers of internationalisation’ (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:180): the studying of foreign languages and Japanese, kikokushijo and foreign students.

Foreign language teaching and culture Rather than simply becoming more ‘Westernised’ by adopting ideas and methods from the West, Rinkyōshin wanted to create an education system where people would be able to understand the situation in Japan relative to the values and traditions of other countries (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:179). Although Nakasone had concentrated on the need for improved English language programmes, Rinkyōshin made a point about the fact that the education system had not done enough to date in teaching children other foreign languages and about the neighbouring Asian countries (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:179, 185, 188). Morita (1988:75) questions Rinkyōshin’s sincerity in its apparent interest in the teaching of Asian languages, as little guidance for teacher training was given, calling only for a knowledge of foreign history, society and the classics, and not language expertise. However, Rinkyōshin did recommend that foreign language teaching should be improved, and not only English (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:185, 188). By 1992 there were around seventy languages being taught at Japanese universities and junior colleges revealing the diverse nature of foreign language study in Japan (Monbushō 1995, 193–4). Chūkyōshin has also continued to emphasise the importance of improving international understanding with other Asian countries rather than merely looking towards the Western countries (Chūkyōshin 1996:51). This has not stopped some people from claiming that the new international programmes that have been established since Rinkyōshin are ‘designed to train an elite but compartmentalized corps of workers able to work in the English language and in Western culture’ (Schoppa 1991b:70). I believe it is too easy for those from the English speaking world to criticise countries such as Japan for their emphasis on English without appreciating the advantages for people to speak the language no matter which country they travel to or study. Many people from countries where English is not the mother tongue often have to be effectively trilingual in order to study a foreign country and culture effectively, as much of the material is written in English, which has become the


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‘bridge’ or common language that helps unite and bring people together. Although there has been a recent, and in my opinion ridiculous, debate and suggestion that English should become an official language of Japan, it is still the case that ‘most Japanese people do not need English’ (Okamoto, interview, 22 March 2000). The problem is that one does not know who will or will not need this knowledge in the future, in the same way that no one knows which children will need to use scientific knowledge in the future. Therefore, the teaching of English, as an international language, and as a means to open up the Japanese to being aware of the international community, as well as the other skills that the learning of any foreign language can develop, is very important. It is this that helps account for the fact that many elementary school students have been studying English at juku though it had not been a required subject at school. The types of sentences and expressions learnt at these juku are not usually related to what is learnt at lower secondary school (other than some of the basics), and so it would be wrong to assume that the purpose of such classes is simply to get a head start. As part of the latest Course of Study revision, English can now be taught at elementary school. My greatest worry is that by making it a formal subject of study, some of the eagerness and enjoyment of studying English may be lost. In my experience there were many elementary school students who could speak—and perhaps more importantly were prepared to try to speak—English than their seniors in lower secondary school. The Japanese are often criticised for their relatively poor ability in English. Rinkyōshin itself was highly critical of foreign language education in Japan for its overemphasis on grammatical knowledge and reading comprehension, believing that there should be greater emphasis on the mastery of the language as ‘a tool for international communication’ (Roesgaard 1998:217). However, as Duke (1986:155–60) points out, their ability tends to be far superior to the foreign language ability of many other nations, in particular the United States, where the learning of a foreign language has not been seen as important. Likewise, as many who visit Japan like to joke about the English errors on signs and fashion garments, so there has been a recent trend for East Asian characters— whether they be Japanese, Chinese or Korean—to be used in the United Kingdom on clothes and the like, but many are badly written, form meaningless combinations, or simply do not exist! It appears that misuse of other’s languages is a global habit. In an attempt to improve the standard of foreign language teaching, the new Course of Study places more emphasis on communication skills. Textbooks also have more emphasis on communication and conversation, rather than the development of grammatical skills (Koizumi, interview, 26 November 1997). I certainly found the textbooks that I taught with far more practical and enjoyable for learning a foreign language than what I studied with to learn French and German in England. English is also being used as a means to develop the students’ debating skills (Koizumi, interview, 26 November 1997), something that many have felt was underdeveloped, even in Japanese (Satō, interview, 17 November 1997; Taniguchi, interview, 10 November 1997). Perhaps the most well-known attempt by the Japanese government to improve foreign language teaching in Japan was the introduction of the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme in 1987, which Nakasone was strongly in favour of (Tanaka, interview, 10 May 1996). This programme is administered by Monbushō in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs—which actually ‘holds the


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reins but keeps a low profile’ (Matanle, interview, 22 September 1997)—and local governments. It now employs several thousand young people from foreign countries every year. Indeed Japan is now the biggest employer of British university graduates each year, taking on around 700 in 2000. Most are employed as Assistant Language Teachers (ALTs), with others employed as Co-ordinators of International Relations (CIRs), with a new type created in 1992 for advising with sports (Sports Exchange Advisor, SEA). Monbushō believes that the programme has been very successful to date, and is continuing to expand it (see Figure 4.1). The JET Programme was seen as ‘the black ship’ of the education reforms as it was instrumental in helping reform many areas other than just foreign language teaching (Koizumi, interview, 26 November 1997). 12 The success of the JET Programme has been on various levels. Many tend to restrict their analysis of the merits of the JET Programme to the performance of the ALTs, who make up the majority of JET participants, and the degree to which their help improves the students’ foreign language ability (usually English, but also other languages). However, to do this is to overlook the

Figure 4.1 Participants on the JET Programme.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000b). Notes: Figures are for the number of all participants (including ALTs, CIRs and SEAs) from each country. The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand started in 1987. Canada and Ireland joined the programme in 1988; France and Germany joined in 1989; China in 1990; South Korea in 1993; Russia in 1994; Brazil, Peru, Spain and Portugal in 1995; Mexico, Israel and Italy in 1996; South Africa, Belgium, Finland, the Czech Republic, Mongolia, Ukraine, Argentina, Laos and Austria in 1997; the Netherlands, Poland, India, the Philippines, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Turkey and others have joined since 1998.


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improved understanding of foreign countries that the participants throughout the whole programme have helped achieve. Furthermore, it also overlooks the improved understanding of Japanese culture and Japan that is gained by so many young foreign teachers during their time living in the country. Indeed, this part of the programme is one of the most important aspects of the whole programme, if not the most important, as it was one of the principal reasons why the programme was established. 13 Although the JET Programme is no longer referred to as a ‘black ship’, there can be no doubt that its influence has spread outside the sphere of even internationalisation, for example helping to promote the idea of team-teaching. 14 This is something that I experienced when I was on JET, having teachers of many other subjects sitting in on some classes so that they could learn more about how team-teaching works. On top of this, prefectures are now being encouraged to develop their own programmes and styles within the JET Programme (Oliphant, interview, 21 November 1997), and this is likely to help further the regional diversification of the education system. Monbushō has also been attempting to improve the quality of the Japanese teachers of English. Teachers are sent to English speaking countries to help improve their communicative skills and confidence in using the language, on a combination of twomonth, six-month and one-year courses. Other steps that are being taken to improve foreign language teaching in schools include the provision of subsidies for the improvement of language laboratories and other educational equipment. All of these are extremely positive steps. Compared with the situation in many countries, where it is often left to teachers to fund their own trips to countries that would help their skills, the Japanese programmes are a very positive move. However, one major difference that I have found is that there appear to be many teachers who are teaching English despite having little or no interest in the language or in foreign countries, let alone English speaking foreign countries. Although I am sure that such teachers exist for all subjects in all countries—where the thought is that it is their job to teach a particular subject rather than a passion—it is regrettable. Trying to generate enthusiasm and confidence among students in learning a subject -particularly for a foreign language— must be harder when the teachers do not have these attributes themselves. One cannot instruct teachers to be interested in a particular subject or country, but I have come across too many examples of teachers who either were teaching the wrong subject, or perhaps would have been better in another profession. By the same token, there are many other teachers who undoubtedly would like to pursue their interests more, which would improve their skills, but are unable to because of the immense amount of school responsibilities—even during the so-called holidays—such as club activities and administrative work. More needs to be done to help release these teachers, and not just language teachers, to develop their skills. One factor that appears to be missing compared with the foreign language activities in many other countries is the apparent lack of international exchanges. This appears to be a situation which is changing, and is another area in which participants on the JET Programme have been particularly influential. In 1997 only 1,352 upper secondary schools had ‘sister’ schools in foreign countries. Although the number of students going on overseas study tours has increased four times from 32,388 in 1992 to 130,669 in 1996 (Monbushō 1995:205; Shimizu et al. 1999:288), the emphasis is still on individuals, and


57

their families, to fund their own trips to foreign countries. This is, however, an area where the internet can be particularly influential. By eliminating the need to travel, Japanese students now have the opportunity to communicate more easily with foreign children of their own age. This is further increasing the expressiveness of Japanese children while also improving their language skills. Although the internet is a writingbased system, it tends to be very casual with most exchanges on noticeboards, in chatrooms and by e-mail, tending to resemble conversations rather than letters or standard written language. 15 However, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, the internet is not the answer to everything, and real experiences with real people and seeing the real world for themselves is still an important need. Monbushō's position has moved away from the idea of ‘absorbing foreign culture’ to that of ‘cross-cultural communication’ so that people at various levels of society can improve their understanding of foreign cultures, while maintaining a distinctive culture of their own (Monbushō 1995:177). This shift reflects the ‘realist’ element that has become prominent since Nakasone and Rinkyōshin, with the belief that difference is good and that assimilation and standardisation is not necessarily desirable. 16 Culture is one of the areas for which Monbushō is responsible, with most of the work being carried out by the Agency for Cultural Affairs. It has been trying to promote Japanese culture more in several ways after organisational changes were made in 1994 (Monbushō 1995:177–8). The importance of this area is demonstrated by the increase in its budget from almost ¥60 billion in 1994 to ¥81.9 billion in 1998 (an increase of over 36 per cent), which now accounts for 1.4 per cent of Monbushō's total budget (Monbushō 1995:178; Shimizu et al. 1999:318). 17 This budget is still relatively low compared with some other countries, but Monbushō hopes to continue to increase it. Together with the work carried out by the Advisory Group on International Cultural Exchange, an advisory body within the Prime Minister’s Office, the ‘entire government is now working to promote international cultural exchange’ (Monbushō 1995:193). If Monbushō's position had been similar to that of the LDP doves, as Schoppa (1991a: 100) suggests, with a desire for more nationalism without agreeing with the hawks on the means to introduce it, there would now appear to be greater agreement on the issue. However, one issue that ‘healthy internationalism’ has yet to address appropriately is the traditions and elements that ‘have developed in the past closely related to the mono-racial composition of the Japanese’ (Kobayashi 1976:173). There are a number of racial minorities in Japan, and their status and the status of the schools that provide their education (when the children do not attend normal Japanese schools) have never been adequately resolved. The greatest problem with the Korean schools in Japan, for example, is their legal position and how to provide an appropriate education for Korean children in relation to what is learnt by the Japanese children, while preserving their own culture, traditions and so on (Kobayashi 1981:92). Umakoshi (1991:281) points out that while Rinkyōshin’s ‘several reports mention international schools in Japan, they fail to acknowledge the problems associated with the nation’s more than 150 minzoku gakkō (ethnic schools) and the problems of resident Koreans’. There are also an increasing number of foreign children—16,835 in 1997 (Monbushō 2000b: 29)—at Japanese schools whose mother tongue is not Japanese, and who will need to be given proper attention.


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Umakoshi (1991:289) points out that ‘Issues of ethnicity and ethnic education cannot be taken lightly in the education of children; schools play a vital role both in maintaining culture and values and in transmitting them to new generations’. Indeed, Rinkyōshin and Nakasone seemed very concerned with these issues as they related to ‘pure’ Japanese; however, they seemed less enthusiastic when attempting to deal with the minorities in Japan, though this may have partly been due to the fact that during this period the existence of any minority groups was still not officially recognised. That such issues are now being discussed in Japan will hopefully mean that Monbushō will attempt to deal with the problem adequately in the future. Hokkaidō, for example, being ‘mindful’ of the Ainu minority, is now attempting to behave in a more informed and healthier manner (Williams 1994:93). Kikokushijo and foreign students One of the most discussed issues of the ‘healthy internationalism’ debate was that of kikokushijo (children returning from living and studying abroad), for they represented the new vision of an internationalised Japanese youth. 18 Indeed, Hasebe (1986:98–100) points out that they represented some of the other key areas of education reform, in particular individuality and creativity, and so it was only natural that they were given so much attention. This is despite the fact that, as Kobayashi (1990:190–1) points out, ‘it would be erroneous to assume that all children residing abroad automatically become internationally minded’. However, they are perceived to be ‘internationalised’ and the problems surrounding them also reflected the balancing act that had to be done in order to satisfy those who wanted more ‘healthy nationalism’ to be introduced into the system. It is easy to overemphasise the importance of the kikokushijo, and on the surface, it does appear that Rinkyōshin concentrated a ‘disproportionately large part of the internationalisation chapters’ in its reports on kikokushijo, as they only represent a very small part of the whole education system’s population. Roesgaard (1998:213) points out that in 1985—the second year of Rinkyōshin—there were only around 40,000 Japanese children studying abroad, compared with the 15 million children in Japan (see also Statistics Bureau, Japan Statistics Yearbook 1992:671; Monbushō 1989, 23). Each year about a quarter of the children abroad return to Japan (Horie, interview, 21 November 1997), and in 1997 there were 12, 569, of whom 62.0 per cent returned to elementary school, 22.6% to lower secondary school, and 15.4% to upper secondary school (Shimizu et al. 1999:294). 19 It is also worth noting that there has been huge regional variations in the numbers of kikokushijo, with Kantō accounting for 63.0 per cent and Kinki 13.4 per cent of the total number, for example (Shimizu et al. 1999:295). Roesgaard (1998:213) argues that one of the reasons for the amount of attention that the kikokushijo issue enjoyed was due to the relative importance of their parents and the influence that they enjoyed. However, this seems unlikely as many parents of kikokushijo do not have access to high-level bureaucrats in Monbushō, nor did they have access to Rinkyōshin members, and so are unlikely to be the key to why the issue was of so much attention. However, just as it is easy to overestimate the importance of kikokushijo, so It is also easy to underestimate their importance as a means to help change attitudes, both towards those who have international experience and also towards the issue of Japan’s relative


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insularity. It would be wrong to conclude that the special treatment that is given to kikokushijo does ‘nothing to internationalize the school system as a whole’ (Schoppa 1991b:70). What happens to kikokushijo sends out signals to the other parts of the education system and so can help set a tone for how ‘healthy internationalism’ will proceed. Kobayashi (1990:192) believes that ‘The success or failure of educational experiments for returning children will thus have much broader implications for the education for all children in Japan’. There can be no doubt that in recent decades there has been increasing demand for people who have the knowledge and skills necessary for an internationally competitive economic climate (Ehara 1992:270). A report by Chūkyōshin in the 1970s pointed to the future importance that internationally minded people would have and that kikokushijo would play an important part in the development of such people (Kobayashi 1990:190). Following this report, Monbushō created a committee to deal specifically with this issue (Kobayashi 1990:190). The kikokushijo represent the essence of what is desired by many, though lacking certain ‘Japanese qualities’, with ‘the implication of being somewhat different from “real Japanese’” (Duke 1986:41). For, although it is possible for the kikokushijo to catch up with knowledge and facts that they have not learnt abroad, it is not so easy for them to learn the ‘intricacies’ of group behaviour and other aspects of living which distinguish them from the norm, even if they have attended special classes or special Japanese schools abroad (Duke 1986:41; Kobayashi 1990:187). An example of the sort of problems that kikokushijo experience upon their return to Japanese education is that ‘they often irritate teachers and classmates by their inquisitive attitudes which may be interpreted as disturbance rather than constructive participation in the orderly processes of teacher-directed instruction commonly seen in Japanese classrooms’ (Kobayashi 1990:188). Indeed, the problems that the kikokushijo cause can be so great that some have to let go of what they have learnt abroad and fit in like other students in Japan. The child rather than the school or society has sometimes been expected to make all the adjustments (Kobayashi 1990:189). However, the goal of the reforms was to establish a means by which the kikokushijo could have a better understanding of Japanese identity, 20 whilst the other Japanese could gain some of the insight and skills that the kikokushijo had gained. The actual issue of what the individual kikokushijo experience is ‘largely peripheral to the debates about them…they are symbols of “westernism” and “internationalism” to which either negative or positive values are ascribed by different groups in Japanese society, regardless of their individual experiences or backgrounds’ (Goodman 1990:8). However, Mouer and Sugimoto (1986:382–3) claim that the kikokushijo have ‘become symbols of a more idealistic concept of internationalism’. The fact that how to deal with them became such an issue further reveals the conflict between ‘idealism’ and Rinkyōshin-endorsed ‘realism’. According to Goodman, Those who perceive the kikokushijo as in need of ‘rejapanization’ also support the general status quo in Japan and so-called ‘traditional’ concepts of groupism, consensus, and homogeneity. Those who support the idea of kikokushijo as agents of change see them as valuable assets in emphasizing concepts of individualism, creativity, and heterogeneity in Japanese society.


60 (Goodman 1990:223)

However, Nakasone was one who was aware of the balance that was needed as he supported both the ‘traditional’ concepts and the changes. It was inevitable that Rinkyōshin, which also described them as valuable assets (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:181), would also have to attempt this difficult balancing act that typified so much of the education reform debate. Kobayashi (1990:188) points out that kikokushijo do not necessarily have an advantage in English classes (assuming that they have been living in an English speaking nation), as their Japanese is often not of a standard needed to cope with the translations. However, these students tend to be given extra Japanese tuition and be treated favourably by the English teacher, as long as they do not correct the teacher in front of the class when mistakes are made. For example, I have seen one kikokushijo being given preferential status in English classes and although his English was not necessarily the best in the school, the fact of having lived in California helped him to be selected to represent his school, and eventually win the city speech contest. Also one friend who was a kikokushijo commented on the fact that his English teacher asked him not to correct the teacher’s mistakes in front of the other students. One of the problems is that as Duke (1986:154) points out, not only do many Japanese children have problems understanding basic English after studying it for six years, ‘Many Japanese teachers of English are not much above this level in oral English’. A student returning from a constant English speaking environment can present a real problem for the teacher in that instance. The number of schools that accept kikokushijo has ‘mushroomed in recent years’ (Goodman 1990:229). However, although Monbushō may have invested heavily in helping kikokushijo both before and after their return, and companies have benefited from employing both kikokushijo and those who have been influenced by them, the majority of students in Japan have no such contact or experience, and so have had to rely on other means to become internationalised (Goodman 1990:231). One school that has received the most attention regarding this is the Metropolitan International High School in Meguro, Tokyo. It was the first of several high schools around the country to offer internationally oriented studies in response to proposals’ by Rinkyōshin (Katsukata 1996:7). Not only does it weigh the scores of the entrance examination according to its own emphasis on internationalism, but also it has been given permission to have its own English language questions. It also has places especially for kikokushijo and foreign students, on top of the entrance of normal students, with all the classes being made up of the three types of student. The entrance examinations have been a particular problem in the past, leading to cases where the child would have to return to Japan at a different time to at least one of the parents to take them (Horie, interview, 21 November 1997). However, universities have started accepting more kikokushijo, which has been facilitated by the more flexible entrance systems that are being introduced (see Chapter 8). Some universities, such as International Christian University and Sophia University, have been doing this for many years; however, Monbushō has also attempted to encourage other universities to become more favourable towards them and develop schemes that make their entrance less problematical (Kobayashi 1990:186; Monbushō 1995:210). Again, kikokushijo have been


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used as a means to demonstrate and improve the international nature of the education system or institution, and have also helped bring about other changes, such as greater flexibility, in the system. This can also be seen clearly in a report by the Study Group on Overseas Japanese Children’s Education in June 1993, which pointed to the need for: (1) respect for learning and life in other cultural environments, (2) improvement of individually targeted teaching to accord with the diverse circumstances of children returning from overseas, and (3) development of classes and schools that are receptive to diversity (Monbushō 1995:210). There is no doubt that the attitude towards kikokushijo has become more favourable since Rinkyōshin and that they are now seen in a new positive light, rather than just in need of ‘re-Japanisation’ or ‘de-internationalising’ (Linicome 1993:136; Roesgaard 1998:213). In 1998 there were nearly 50,000 Japanese children aged between 6 and 15 living abroad on a long-term basis (Shimizu et al. 1999:290). Although Monbushō ‘is not required to provide education for children abroad’ (Horie, interview, 21 November 1997), it has helped local residents’ associations, for example, establish nearly 100 full-time schools and over 175 supplementary education schools for these children in an attempt to help make sure their readjustment to Japanese society is improved. 21 These schools are then sent teachers from schools in Japan to help ‘improve the standard of education’ (Monbushō 1995:209). On top of this they are also provided with free textbooks, teaching materials are being improved, and a computerised information network has been developed. The aim of these schools is not only to help the children learn and develop the behaviour and knowledge necessary upon their return to Japan, but also to ensure that they receive appropriate understanding of the country where they are located through both classes and exchanges with people in their community. Some pilot schools have been established to help study the ways in which education in this area can be improved (Monbushō 1995:209–10). This policy is in direct accordance with Rinkyōshin’s wishes for the children to gain ‘as much experience of the host country as possible’ and that these schools should attempt to accept more local children so as to avoid the problems associated with simply being Japanese-style exam-oriented schools abroad (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:180–1). Rinkyōshin was not exclusively concerned with the foreign studies by Japanese; it also hoped that more resources would be put into improving the study of Japanese (language and culture) in foreign countries (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:185–6). Rinkyōshin’s belief in the importance of studying the language and culture was that it was an important step towards the ending of ‘cultural frictions’ (Roesgaard 1994:232). One means to help demonstrate the improved level of Japanese language skills was the introduction of the Japanese Language Proficiency Test. Monbushō has been promoting this and other schemes, and the number of people studying Japanese abroad had risen to over 1.6 million in 1993, over three times the figure in 1984 (Shimizu et al. 1999:282). One of the most well-known schemes has been aimed at the increasing number of foreign students studying at Japanese universities, through Monbushō's continuing support for the ‘100,000 Foreign Students Plan’, established by Rinkyōshin which hoped to see an increase in the number of foreign students to 100,000 by the start of the twentyfirst century (Roesgaard 1998:216). Although this target was not met—largely as a result of the economic problems in Asia in the late 1990s—there has been a significant increase


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from the levels before Nakasone became prime minister. Monbushō continues to offer funds to more students each year and in 1998, 8,323 foreign students were receiving Japanese government scholarships, and the figure has increased every year for the past twenty years. There are more students studying in Japan now (see Figure 4.2), though many are on short-term exchanges rather than being registered at Japanese universities for their whole degree. Furthermore, Monbushō is also building more facilities, as

Figure 4.2 The number of foreign students in Japan (as of 1 May each year).

Source: Shimizu et al (1999:270). Notes: ‘Foreign government expense’ refers to students sent by the governments of Brazil, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore.

well as providing incentives to other organisations to build more, to help provide accommodation for foreign students. This is an issue that Nakasone (1997a:43) believes is a major reason why the 100,000 target was not met. Monbushō has also taken steps to make it easier for universities to accept foreign students, including the provision of subsidies to private universities to cover some costs (Monbushō 1995:203–4). These steps are of particular importance as in the past foreign students have often found courses at Japanese universities badly structured, and that the environment was not conducive to study and hard to live in (Kitamura 1991:312). According to Ehara (1992:275), for an education system to become internationalised, there has to be a universal system so that exchange of people and information can be carried out most efficiently. This includes all aspects of the education system, including the academic year, the contents of the curriculum and the standard of equipment and facilities. Monbushō appears to be taking many of the steps towards meeting these conditions. The flow of university students is not one way, for an increasing number of Japanese university students are studying abroad. In 1998, the number had risen to 180,979.


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However, whereas almost 90 per cent of foreign students in Japan are from Asia, threequarters of Japanese go to Europe or North America to study or train (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Monbushō has also being active in establishing schemes that help these students study abroad and although Monbushō does provide scholarships for some, most are privately financed, though attempts are made to provide them with information and advice (Monbushō 1995:205). The increasing flow of students into and out of Japan, together with the increasing number of foreign teachers at Japanese universities, should help to develop the international awareness of Japanese students in the future. There is still a long way to go before Japanese universities become as cosmopolitan as those in the United Kingdom, for example, but they have already come a long way. I hope that this will continue as it can only be good for international understanding and co-operation.

Figure 4.3 Foreign students by region and country of origin (1998).

Source: Shimizu et al. (1999:272).


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Figure 4.4 Japanese students studying abroad by region and country (1998).

Source: Ministry of Justice (1999). Note: The number of individuals studying abroad for educational or training purposes or to learn technical skills.

Hinomaru and Kimigayo If the debate surrounding the kikokushijo came to typify the debate over internationalism as attempts were made to balance different ideas, then the debate that highlighted the divisions over ‘healthy nationalism’ was over the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo (see Appendix 2 for explanation of the flag’s and anthem’s history and meaning). Although I have been arguing that the Nakasone reforms have been successful for a number of years, I could never have expected the events that happened in the year after finishing my thesis. These events not only put the icing on the cake for Nakasone’s ‘healthy internationalism’ but are likely to have a significant affect upon the course of other areas of the education reform debate (to be covered in Chapter 5) and issues related to it, specifically revision of the constitution. Hinomaru has always tended to be translated as the national flag, and Kimigayo as the national anthem. However, until 1999 there was no legal basis for them being ‘national’. Although I do not believe that it is necessarily have any legal status for something to be treated in such a manner, as the United Kingdom demonstrates in many areas, it had been one of the sticking points in the education debate. The problem with them particularly surrounds Kimigayo, sometimes translated as the


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‘Emperor Song’, the words of which, according to Nishimura (1988:154), ‘undeniably extol an absolute emperor and hence have an ominous ring to those concerned by the conservative party’s moves to revise the Constitution and strengthen the authority of the state’. Both are reminders of Japan’s past and the results of ‘unhealthy nationalism’ that led to war and defeat (Nishimura 1988:156), and have been symbols of the right wing’s desire for greater nationalism (Nishimura 1988:152–6; Mogi 1989:6; Schoppa 1991b:75 (footnote 45)). 22 Ironically, although some also point to Hinomaru’s association with the war, for those who fought against the Japanese, it is the Asahi flag—with sixteen rays radiating out from the sun—that most associate with the imperial Japanese forces. After the war, SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers) had stopped the use of Hinomaru, though it did not restrict the use of Kimigayo. However, in 1948, it was decided that Hinomaru could be used on national holidays, and all other restrictions were lifted the following year. This change of position was due to General MacArthur’s hope that the flag could become a ‘symbol of peace’ (Cripps 1996:81) and be used to help prevent the rise of communism. Moves then began in the 1960s, following the Tokyo Olympics where they were given great exposure, to have them used more. By the late 1970s it was being recommended that they were used in school ceremonies (Nishimura 1988:153). Nakasone strongly supported the use of the flag and anthem at schools, as he demonstrated when he said The Japanese flag and national anthem exist as symbols around which the people can go forth in full awareness that we are one nation and one community sharing a common fate. In every country, the people cherish their flag and national anthem and unite around them. That is why flags are raised and national anthems played during the Olympic Games. These are expressions of respect for the country. (Nakasone 1987:14) Rinkyōshin, supporting Nakasone’s brand of ‘healthy nationalism’, also believed that it was right for them to be used more and recommended that students be trained to respect and understand them (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:320). Monbushō was also supportive of this area of ‘healthy internationalism’ at a very early stage, having already designated Kimigayo as the national anthem in 1977 (Mainichi Daily News 10 April 1990), and regulations requiring the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at all official school ceremonies were introduced (Cripps 1996:83; Schoppa 1991b:75 (footnote 45)). The Course of Study guidelines for elementary schools now include, in the fourth grade of the social sciences course, the expectation that children should learn that all countries have a national anthem and that it should be revered. In the sixth grade, children are expected to learn to understand the role of the emperor, and learn to love and respect the emperor (Roesgaard 1998:220). Unfortunately this message has not reached all levels of society. For example, I am still shocked by commentators in Japan talking through the national anthems of other countries during sporting events. Table 4.2 shows the percentage of schools across the country that used Hinomaru and Kimigayo in ceremonies in 1984, 1990, 1994, 1999 and 2000. What is clear from this


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data is that there is less opposition to the use of Hinomaru, opposition is greatest at upper secondary schools, and that on average schools are using them both more. Given the events just before the 1999 ceremonies (to be discussed below), and the extra attention given to the debate, the higher figures are probably as expected. However, one will never know whether the figures would have maintained this level without the legalisation in August 1999. Although the percentage of schools using Hinomaru and Kimigayo appears to be quite high, there are regional differences between the prefectures (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6). For example, in the past Okinawa used them on only a very small scale, which is interesting as up until reversion to Japan in 1972, Hinomaru had been a symbol of the people’s hopes to be freed from occupation. However, the flag has now become the symbol of Tokyo’s

Table 4.2 Use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at graduation ceremonies (national average for public schools).

Year Elementary schools

Lower secondary schools

Upper secondary schools

Using Hinomaru

Using Kimigayo

1984

92.5

72.8

1990

94.7

76.7

1994

98.4

87.3

1999

99.0

90.5

2000

99.7

95.4

1984

91.2

68.0

1990

93.9

71.3

1994

96.1

83.6

1999

98.6

87.1

2000

99.3

93.6

1984

81.6

53.3

1990

83.8

55.3

1994

96.4

74.9

1999

98.8

83.5

2000

99.7

96.2

Sources: Cripps (1996:91), Okamoto (1998), Monbushō (1999b) and Monbushō (2000c).

influence over the prefecture and the problems that led to Okinawa’s eventual occupation (Nishimura 1988:155). The most significant, however, is Hiroshima prefecture. Opposition in this prefecture remained high until 1999. In 1999 the prefectural board of education was particularly


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keen to increase the usage of Kimigayo and the message was sent to all school principals. The principal of one upper secondary school found that opposition from the teachers remained high, and, following numerous failed attempts to gain their support, committed suicide. The story caused a public outcry. There were two results to this outcry. Firstly, the level of usage for Hinomaru and Kimigayo increased again in 1999, most particularly in Hiroshima where the usage of Kimigayo at elementary school rose from 23.4 per cent to 81.1 per cent, at lower secondary school from 22.6 per cent to 67.5 per cent, and at upper secondary school from 11.7 per cent to 87.1 per cent (Monbushō 1999b). The second result was, combined with the increased strength that the right wing was enjoying at the time (Hood 1999b), that a Bill to legalise the flag and anthem was rushed through the Diet. The battle over Hinomaru and Kimigayo appears to be largely ending now. Prefectures are all becoming more supportive—and even those prefectures where the level of usage of Kimigayo was low in 1999 saw remarkable increases in 2000 (e.g. Tokyo rose from 7.2 per cent to 88.5 per cent, Kanagawa from 16.0 per cent to 97.0 per cent, and Mie from 6.5 per cent to 98.3 per cent), and Hiroshima registered 100 per cent. Events such as those at Tokorozawa High School, where unofficial ceremonies which do not use

Figure 4.5 Usage of Hinomaru (public schools).

Sources: Based on data from Monbushō surveys in Mikami et al. (1988), Okamoto (1998) and Monbushō (2000c).


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Figure 4.6 Usage of Kimigayo (public schools).

Sources: Based on data from Monbushō surveys in Mikami et al. (1988), Okamoto (1998) and Monbushō (2000c). Hinomaru and Kimigayo have taken place together with official ones (Aspinall 1999; Aspinall and Cave (forthcoming)), are likely to become even more unusual. Of course, one has to be careful when using statistics. Although the figures do take account of the difference in Kimigayo’s words not been sung, and both words not being sung and music not played, 23 even in those prefectures where schools statistically appear to be using Hinomaru and Kimigayo, it may be that owing to local opposition Kimigayo is only briefly or softly played. One cannot even be sure that schools are correctly reporting information in all cases. This, and trying to help ensure the guidelines were adhered to, probably helps account for why 155 officials from Osaka Prefecture Board of Education were sent to schools for entrance ceremonies in 2000 (Mainichi Daily News 10 May 2000). In the case of Hinomaru, the flag pole may be hidden out of sight. 24 However, it is worth noting certain lessons that can be learnt from this debate. Firstly, local habits and beliefs can and do ‘prevail over transcendental politics’ (Rohlen 1984:139). However uniform the Japanese education system appears to be on the surface, there are ‘considerable differences’ among prefectures, school districts and schools (Ichikawa 1986:245). Many of the differences and problems in this debate have been caused by the actions of teachers’ groups and unions that have been opposed to their use, criticising the


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government’s attempt to glorify militarism and war. In 1991, 125 school principals (90 per cent of whom were in Kōchi prefecture) were disciplined for not following the new rules (Cripps 1996:90). Nikkyōso believed that the government’s eagerness to use them was proof of the lack of commitment to ‘real’ internationalism. 25 However, Nikkyōso removed its opposition to them from its charter in 1993 (McGregor 1996:262). In some cases, teachers have not sung Kimigayo, for example, because of union pressure or membership. I interviewed one new teacher in Mie prefecture who in 1997 said that she did this although she was not particularly opposed to its use herself. Interestingly, in Spring 2000 the same teacher was vehemently opposed to Kimigayo’s usage, citing reasons and words that sounded more like union language than everyday language. This would suggest that union activities in some areas are perhaps stronger than the overall picture may suggest (see Chapter 5). I have also learnt of the case of opposition to their usage at one school ending in 2000 because their most vocal opponent was too busy preparing work for students in their final year (Shank 2000)! Whether or not the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo can be justified is an issue that is central to Nakasone’s beliefs on ‘healthy nationalism’ and was supported by Rinkyōshin and implemented by Monbushō. It is an issue that I find difficult to reach a satisfactory conclusion on. I do not associate either Hinomaru or Kimigayo with the war. This is partly because I never experienced the war myself, and partly because I also tend to associate the Asahi flag rather than Hinomaru with Japan’s aggressive past. I, therefore, have no opposition to Japan keeping them and using them as their national flag and anthem. However, I can understand why some groups are opposed to Kimigayo. Indeed most, if not all, opposition to the issue of the national anthem could be swept away if Kimigayo was replaced. This is something that some think should happen as Kimigayo is too hard to sing (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996) and it sounds like a funeral march (Ishihara, interview, 21 March 2000). However, to do this would not only raise the possibility of strong opposition from right wing groups, but open up a very heated debate over the wording of the anthem with respect to the position of the emperor. It seems logical to me that while a country has an emperor, who is effectively the symbol of the nation and head of state in practice if not in law, the national anthem should relate to this. On the other hand, I would welcome a change to the United Kingdom’s national anthem (‘God Save the Queen’), for although I am happy to have reference to the monarchy, I no longer feel it is appropriate for the religious reference to be maintained given the large number of non-Christians living in the country. Even if one can ignore the problems regarding which particular flag or anthem is used, the other issue that needs to be addressed is whether they should be used at school ceremonies. Coming from a country where we essentially do not have school graduation ceremonies, I do find it hard to make a judgement on whether they should be used at school or not. To use them before sporting events—at least where it is an international event—seems natural, yet their usage at school seems somehow more questionable. Perhaps this is an area that should be handled by ‘social education’ rather than formal education. In the same way that it is not appropriate to force children to follow a particular religion at school, unless they are of that denomination, perhaps children should not be forced to use the flag and anthem. However, religion is much more


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personal—there is no choice in what nationality a person is, and so learning to respect the symbols of a country may be a role that a school should be playing. This is less of a problem in a country where there are few from other countries. In the United Kingdom, it would be hard to imagine this happening at many schools in certain areas where the schools are mainly made up of children from Asian backgrounds, for example. Indeed, many politicians have argued that those who are resident in England long term should view themselves as English, and support England at international sports events, for example. There is no simple conclusion. In Japan, the likelihood is that as the present generation of school children pass through the education system with relatively smaller opposition compared with previous generations, so the opposition to Kimigayo as a whole will continue to weaken, though regional differences are likely to continue. The effect of the extra exposure that Hinomaru and Kimigayo will receive in the 2002 World Cup (which Japan will co-host with South Korea) will also be of critical significance. Already, support for them has grown thanks to the actions of people such as Miura Kazu, the then captain of the Japan football team, whose hand-on-heart singing of Kimigayo has been mirrored by the fans. I noticed during a visit to Japan in 1997 that there were even calls for the national team’s shirt to be changed before the 1998 World Cup so that the Japan Football Association logo on the shirt above the heart could be replaced by Hinomaru, which was only on the sleeve of the previous shirt. This probably reflects the fact that although they would not consider themselves to be particularly nationalistic, according to Satō (interview, 17 November 1997), ‘Most Japanese are unconscious nationalists’. This display of patriotism is almost certainly what Nakasone would have wanted when he called for ‘healthy nationalism’ and what has been termed ‘Japan’s Nice New Nationalism’ by others (The Economist 14 January 1995). Nakasone (interview, 15 March 2000) was ‘very happy’ with the legalisation of Hinomaru and Kimigayo, which he feels means that ‘Japan has become a normal country’. Without Nakasone and his education reforms it is doubtful whether the legislation would have been passed so easily. For Nakasone, Rinkyōshin and Monbushō, this is all part of making Japan more internationalised.

5 Traditionalism and control There were various problems with the education system and people’s attitudes. This was brought about by a change in society. The home was different to the home in the past…and there was a breakdown in the relationship between home, principal and teachers’ room…the losers being the children. Nakasone (interview, 1 December 1997)

If some were angered by the inclusion of ‘nationalistic’ elements in the debate over internationalism, then some of the other issues raised by Nakasone and Rinkyōshin were of just as much concern. These issues are closely related to the debate over ‘healthy nationalism’ and support actions that would strengthen Japanese traditions, and appear to give greater control to the government. This latter factor is in direct contrast to the issues to be analysed in the following two chapters, for although many issues in different areas of the education reform debate are inter-related, forming a spider’s web of mutually supportive measures, these traditional and control issues play a pivotal role in the education debate, as they form the link between two apparently opposing concepts. This chapter analyses why these issues were promoted by Nakasone, Rinkyōshin and what has happened to them since then.

Maintaining traditions and Japaneseness One issue that arose during the Rinkyōshin’s look at internationalism in particular had been whether the academic year should be shifted from its start in April to starting in September. The idea had been supported by the Keizai Dōyūkai (1985:40) which saw it as beneficial for international exchange, since the September-August academic year is common in many countries with which greater international exchange was desired. Rinkyōshin also debated the issue, but concluded that such a change would have wide reaching influence and should be studied more (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a: 292– 9). While other countries maintain their own systems, there is still no overwhelming international pressure for standardisation. As well as the argument that the proposal may have ‘lacked pertinence’ (Ichikawa 1991:354), within Japan there appears to be no great desire for change with the symbols associated with the Spring start to an academic year typifying the traditionalist point of view that used ‘practical reasons’ as a hindrance to its implementation (Roesgaard 1998:17). In fact the April-March academic year that is presently used is preferable and logical in


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many respects. In particular, it means that it coincides with the fiscal year, which helps in terms of administrative aspects. By having a September start, the advantage for the United Kingdom, for example, is that more time is created for the examination process— in particular the marking of examinations—which means that more essay- and practicalbased exams can be used rather than easy-to-mark multiple choice ones (also see Chapter 8) and also there is extra time to prepare the school or university for the new intake of students. Given the greater flexibility that is being introduced into the examination system and the entrance procedures to universities, I do not believe there is any reason to proceed with the massive upheaval that would entail changing the academic year in Japan. If tradition was a reason for not changing this area of the education system, then it has also been used as a reason for changing and strengthening other parts of the education system. There is an undeniable link between traditionalism and Nakasone’s view of the need for ‘healthy nationalism’, highlighted by the issue of improved moral education. Moral education, one of the seven-point proposals, also has its link to other areas of education reform, such as the need for more extra-curricular activities (voluntary services), which was another one of the seven-point proposals, as part of the drive towards the development of character. It is for this reason that amongst some of the more specific proposals that Rinkyōshin made were the recommended introduction of supplementary readers in moral education and the expansion of overnight camps (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:117–21). These recommendations enjoyed widespread support in Monbushō, though some did not believe that they went far enough. For example, some had hoped that Rinkyōshin would have proposed the introduction of a moral education textbook rather than the use of supplementary readers (Schoppa 1991a:242). Moral education has a long history in Japan. During the Meiji period, Motoda Eifu, the emperor’s private tutor, argued for the need of moral education based on Confucianism (Horio 1988b:46). However, the Occupation, which equated moral education with the indoctrination of the Japanese people that led to the Pacific War, did away with it. Yet there were still many traditionalists, though aware that many aspects of the Imperial Rescript could not be maintained, who hoped to keep its moral content, which they believe gave the Japanese ‘a unique “ethic” (not unlike the “Protestant ethic”)' (Schoppa 1991a:30). According to Amano (interview, 5 June 1996), the need for moral education stems partly from the fact that Shintō is not a ‘militant religion like Islam and Christianity’ and does not have the same sort of moral content. In 1958 moral education was reintroduced into the curriculum, although for only one hour per week and the details of what would be taught were left to the discretion of schools and teachers (Nakano 1989:45). In 1965, Chūkyōshin called for its use ‘to create citizens who would love and revere their homeland and the Emperor’ [sokoku keiai tennō keiai] (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986:258). Moral education was subsequently formally reintroduced into the curriculum. However, the traditionalists believed that rising juvenile delinquency and social problems in the 1980s were indications that not enough had been done to combat the problem caused by Japan’s post-war changes, and that the role of the family and community had to be given more emphasis. This point was made by Nakasone in early 1983 in an address to the Diet:

Traditionalism and control

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I cannot believe that the problems of drugs, crime, violence, and other phenomena that corrode our youth are unrelated to the decline of the home as the basic unit of society and the lack of education for our young people in such basic and essential social patterns as courtesy, responsibility, honesty, brotherly love, neighbourly kindness, and the spirit of service. (Japan Times 25 January 1983) These steps would also help the children better understand their culture, an essential part of ‘healthy internationalism’. In fact, culture is very much a part of the social engineering process, as much a tool as a result of the process itself, and much of the time its influence goes unnoticed (Shimahara 1991:272). With the rise in cases of juvenile delinquency, the traditionalists pointed to the inordinate amount of freedom and independence that Japanese children enjoyed and argued that they were neglecting their social responsibilities (Cummings 1980:59). This is a concept that may be alien to a Western politician such as Margaret Thatcher, who believed that ‘There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families’, but for the Japanese, school is a time to develop a child’s ‘wholeperson’, so that when they enter employment and become a shakaijin (literally ‘a member of society’), they will know how to behave ‘appropriately’. That Rinkyōshin also came out in support of a ‘substantialisation’ (jūjitsuka) of moral education, the teaching of basic manners (shitsuke) and self-restraint (jikoyokuseiryoku), and that it also recommended that teacher training in this area should be improved, was of no surprise (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:135–6; Schoppa 1991b:66). Likewise, Monbushō believes that the development of morality has become particularly important in recent years because of social changes, including the trends toward nuclear families and fewer children per family and because of the need to foster healthy human relations and prevent problem behavior, such as bullying and delinquency. (Monbushō 1995:87) To understand the reason why moral education was supported by so many, one has to remember that in Japan there is a belief that education plays a larger role than teaching knowledge and skills—education is also to develop kokoro (‘spirit’). In an approach known as ‘whole-person education’ (zenjin kyōiku), the aim is to get a balance between mental, intellectual, moral and physical development (Okamoto 1992:42; Duke 1986:128; Cummings 1980:13, 104, 145; Monbushō 1995:87; Rohlen 1983:246–7). In this respect, Japan ‘is probably without peer in the community of nations’ (Leestma and Walberg 1992:7), and it is because of this that Monbushō's emphasis on further development of kokoro in the curriculum reforms following Rinkyōshin caused a certain degree of surprise amongst educationalists in other countries, while it was seen as a natural move by ‘virtually all Japanese’ (Okamoto 1992:35). One commentator on education I interviewed believes that ‘education in Japan is good at attitude development’ but ‘there is too much emphasis on the education of kokoro. For the more work that is done, the less time is available to develop kokoro!’ However, that this is a continuing aspect of education in Japan points to the importance of the


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‘socialising’ role of education. Monbushō sees its role as the pursuit of values that remain constant across the generations. The basic approaches to this task are character formation, including the development of knowledge, morals, and physical health (education), the pursuit of truth (science), and the realization of basic human spiritual and physical aspirations (culture and sports). (Monbushō 1995:69) Okamoto (interview, 5 December 1997) says that ‘Japanese believe that people should only have good ideas’ and ‘if there is good kokoro, then all problems will be solved’. Discussing the nuclear accident at Tōkaimura in 1999, he said that incidents like this can occur in Japan because the assumption is that the workers will do no wrong, whereas in the West safeguards and checks are put in place on the assumption that people make mistakes and do not always do what they are told (Okamoto, interview, 22 March 2000). It is easy for outsiders to become suspicious of moral education, but those who have looked at the content of the course have tended to be favourable in their judgement. Cummings (1980:115–16) shows how teachers use programmes and discussions to teach moral education, and that he never came across programmes with political themes, ‘Rather they emphasized fundamental matters such as the value of life, the foolishness of fighting, the importance of friendship, the problems of old people’. Indeed, moral education has become another area that has gained support amongst the large number of foreigners who look to Japan to provide answers to the problems that plague their own societies and education systems. Cummings (1980:116) goes on to add that the moral education classes ‘by themselves probably achieve very little. However, the lessons they presented were reinforced by other school activities, providing a dimension of education that is not found in the American primary school’. The OERI Japan Study Team (1987:31–2) believed that the ‘Japanese concept of moral education is far from vague or formless’ and includes various themes. These include the importance of order, regularity, co-operation, thoughtfulness, participation, manners; endurance, hard work and high aspirations; freedom, justice, rights, duties, trust; the individual’s place in groups such as the family, school, nation and the world; harmony with and appreciation of nature; and the need for rational and scientific attitudes towards human life. On top of this, schools also identify a few ‘central goals in moral education to be emphasized during the year’. However, there are also many who believe that moral education and the teaching of children how to behave has reached a situation of ‘over-management’. In particular, Horio (1988b:15) points to the regulations that set out the appropriate hairstyle, clothing, as well as other aspects of children’s lives that ‘are being managed through the highly detailed rules enacted by and enforced in the nation’s schools’. Teachers wait at the school gates every morning, as well as selected points on the way to school, not only to check that students arrive at school safely, but also to check their appearance. Many schools even require students to wear their school uniforms when they are not at school. However, Monbushō sees these rules as important for the ‘better growth and development’ of students, and states that they are the responsibility, and made at the


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discretion, of the school and it is the school’s responsibility to ensure that the students understand what the purpose of the rules are and to discuss them (Monbushō 1995:91). The school is viewed in Japan as a ‘moral community’, being expected to maintain a high moral standard, which is subject to public scrutiny and is supported by the parents in various activities (Shimahara 1990:260; Ichikawa 1986:249). Indeed, the parents’ influence is so great that it can lead to teachers having to take early retirement or change schools if they do not perform ‘appropriately’ (Matanle, interview, 22 September 1997). The teaching of morals and ‘appropriate’ behaviour comes in the form of moral education, but also through class management, cleaning the school, serving and clearing lunches, and student guidance. Some believe that this helps contribute to the creation of students that ‘are cooperative and well disciplined, and studious’ and so reduces the need for teachers to waste energy on ‘maintaining order’ (Ichikawa 1986:248). Although this view tends to overemphasise the supposed passive nature of the typical Japanese student, it does indicate the advantages of the skills and behaviour that are developed through all aspects of moral education. Monbushō was quick to develop the supplementary readers that had been recommended by Rinkyōshin and distribute them free to teachers. However, although teachers ‘readily accept their responsibilities in this curriculum area’ (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:32), since many teachers were opposed to increased moral education, there were those who questioned to what degree they would be used. 1 However, according to a Monbushō survey in 1993, ‘almost all elementary and lower secondary schools have now drawn up teaching plans for moral education and are using supplementary readers’ (Monbushō 1995:87). Although the survey showed that much had been done to improve moral education, there were still problems. In particular, the number of hours available for moral education and the way in which it was taught was believed to be in need of further development. Using the survey results, Monbushō has developed several measures to improve further the teaching of moral education. These measures include the use of pilot schools, prefectural conferences on moral education promotion, seminars for teachers, and the development of better teaching materials (Monbushō 1995:87–8). Public opinion also appears to support this action as in an opinion poll in January 1997, 49 per cent of those questioned said that moral education should be improved (Daily Mainichi 14 January 1997). One of the most intriguing parts of the ‘traditionalist’ elements of the reforms (though Monbushō also points to the diversification involved) was the introduction of rice-based meals, so that children could learn the ‘correct eating habits with regard to rice, which is Japan’s traditional staple food’. By fiscal 1993, the average number of these meals being served per week had risen to 2.6 (Monbushō 1995:96). This is further evidence of the desire to ensure that future generations continue to maintain certain habits and lifestyles that used to be the ‘norm’. This desire is further demonstrated through the reforms of the part of the curriculum known as the ‘Special Activities’. These extra-curricular activities are part of the formal curriculum, and are considered to be ‘an integral part of whole-person education of children, and are carried out in a very systematic and well-organised way’ (Okamoto 1992:43). These areas have become increasingly important as Japan attempts to develop a response to the problems caused by the ageing society, urbanisation, and trends towards


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more nuclear and smaller families, which have taken away experiences that would have been ‘normal’ in the past. The sort of experiences that have been encouraged include volunteer services, outdoor nature classes, clean-up campaigns, and gardening (Monbushō 1995:88, 89). According to Amano (interview, 5 June 1996), these areas are the most important as ‘Morality cannot really be taught at school, it is something that has to be learnt through experience and life’. Monbushō is promoting voluntary services through the curriculum and also by the use of pilot schools that research into ‘hands-on learning’, organising special conferences, and the preparation of materials for teachers (Monbushō 1995:88). The emphasis on the need for more contact with and experience of nature has also seen a greater emphasis on the teaching of the environment, through the distribution of new materials, seminars for teachers on the environment, and the introduction of Environmental Education Fairs (Monbushō 1995:92). (Further analysis of voluntary activities is given in Chapters 6 and 7.) The use of a moral education course does not strike me as being a particular problem. The only question that I have is over who decides what is included and how it is taught. In the United Kingdom, a moral education course would almost certainly be linked to the country’s traditional Christian ethics, although many are neither Christians nor practising Christians. As Amano said, Japan’s religions do not have this kind of moral content, and so do not have the same foundation upon which to base a course. This is not to say that there are not ‘traditional Japanese views’ on particular moral issues, for there certainly are. However, it is also the case that many areas—such as how to treat other people— probably are unlikely to cause dispute. In other areas, perhaps what is important is that the children have the chance to debate the topic, with a teacher ensuring that different views are presented, so that they can come to their own conclusion. Given the nature of modern life, it is probably also desirable that there is time given for these discussions to occur at school, as there will be many topics which children either will prefer not to discuss with their family or do not have time to.

Control over teachers If there was one thing that typified the education debate during the post-war period, it was the continuing friction between the government and the teachers, in particular Nikkyōso, the largest teachers’ union (Duke 1973:xiii; also see Chapter 2: An overview of the policy making process). Apparently one of Nakasone’s main wishes in the education reform process was ‘to deal with Nikkyōso’ (Tanaka, interview, 10 May 1996). This view appears to have been shared by Monbushō, as Hayao (1993:60–1) claims that success in this area would make ‘the whole effort at education reform worthwhile’ for it. Many union leaders also believed that the education reforms were being used as a further attack on the teachers and unions (Thurston 1989:186; Aspinall 1997:66). One of the means to deal with Nikkyōso was through the demands for improved teacher quality. Calls for improved teacher quality and moves to encourage better teachers into the system had also been recommended by the 1971 Chūkyōshin (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994:218–19). It was then one of the recommendations of the Kyoto Group


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(The Kyoto Group for Study of Global Issues 1985:33), together with its recommendation for the use of outside experienced people capable of teaching. Such ideas were also included as part of Nakasone’s seven-point proposal. So it was inevitable that Rinkyōshin would make recommendations along these lines. Rinkyōshin’s main proposal regarding the teachers was the introduction of shoninsha kenshū, a year-long on-the-job training under the supervision of other teachers. At the same time, the conditional period of employment was to be extended from six months, as for other public employees, to one year (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:144, 145). Although the final recommendation was not as strong as some, such as the education zoku, had wanted (Schoppa 1991a:242), the shoninsha kenshū proposal was, unsurprisingly, opposed by Nikkyōso on the grounds that it was educationally unsound, since the contents of the programme were not to be developed by teachers, that it would further standardise teaching rather than take account of local conditions, and that it would weaken the union (Thurston 1989:197). Attempts to control the teachers have a long history in Japan and have been a feature of post-war education debates. For example, in 1957 Monbushō introduced the Teacher Evaluation System, in an attempt to evaluate teachers’ ‘loyalty and love of education’. According to Horio (1988b:215), the secretive nature of this system allowed Monbushō to promote only those that were sympathetic to its views. However, Cummings (1980:143–4) says that in his experience, school principals, supposedly sympathetic to the Monbushō, do not force their teachers to change or do certain things. The LDP’s ideal teacher, according to Yamazaki (1986:120), would ‘never do anything like strike, never say a word about politics and never get involved in union activities. Instead, he would subscribe to the idea that teaching is a holy profession and simply concentrate on educating children’. However, the way to achieve this is described as the need ‘to improve the quality of teachers’ (kyōin shishitsu kōjō) (Jiyū Minshutō 1986:81; Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:144). As early as 1979, Nikkyōso had found that new teachers were tending not to join the union, suggesting that Monbushō may have begun to discourage union membership even when a simple in-service training programme was in place (Ota 1990:256; Nikkyōso 1979:51–63). Although when the new system was first introduced many feared it would increase Monbushō's control, ‘not so many people are against it now’ (Kiuchi, interview, 21 November 1997). A system of teacher training is justified by Monbushō, with the support of much of the public, as a part of the means to achieve ‘equality’ in the education system. Indeed, Nakasone (interview, 1 December 1997) claims that Monbushō was so ‘pleased’ to have the system introduced, that Monbushō agreed to introduce the ‘World History’ course and reduce the number of hours devoted to mathematics. By ensuring that all teachers receive equal training, Monbushō can claim that no prefecture can employ significantly better teachers and so claim to have better schools. This system is reinforced by rotating teacher’s assignments, whereby they change schools, usually within the boundaries of one board of education, every few years. The importance of this aspect of the measures for ‘equality’ has particular relevance in the debate about relaxing the school district system (see Chapter 6). On top of this, the system helps ensure that teachers will follow the guidelines in the new curriculum rather than continuing to follow more conventional


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practices. 2 It is not surprising that once Rinkyōshin had recommended the shoninsha kenshō system in its second report, Monbushō immediately took steps to implement it, with the establishment of the Education Personnel Training Council. It also began piloting the system in various prefectures on around 6 per cent of the newly recruited teachers. The system was introduced across the country in 1989 after it became law in 1988 (Hayao 1993:63). Teachers are often the scapegoats for problems in an education system, and the situation is no different in Japan. However, this idea, as Horio (1988b:17) notes, is ‘overly simplistic’ and can be ‘extremely counterproductive and harmful’. Indeed, Horio (1988b:13) claims that teachers are sometimes not being given the opportunity to respond to the increasing problems that they have to face. Many traditionalists did blame the teachers for the rise in school violence, and so measures to improve the quality of teachers were seen as vital to solving the education system’s problems (Schoppa 1991b:60; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:17; Ichikawa 1983:41). However, the one thing that was overlooked was that teachers were also suffering. It was problems with students’ behaviour and inability to handle the pressures of the education system that kick-started the education reform programme in the early 1980s, and not the fact that around 100 teachers were committing suicide every year. 3 With these problems and the fact that teachers’ self-esteem had become bound up with educational achievements (Lynn 1988:29), which were now under fire, and with the pressure being placed on Nikkyōso by Nakasone’s education reforms, the whole teaching profession was reeling. However, once the education reform debate began, the problems facing teachers did fuel the argument that teachers needed better training in how to deal with the problems that they faced. Shimahara (1991:272) believes that ‘Teachers’ roles are shaped by the society’s cultural expectations of teachers’. Therefore, in Japan, the importance of the quality of teachers is made greater owing to the emphasis on ‘whole-person education’, which has tended to lead to a situation where the teachers in Japan command greater respect than their counterparts in other countries (Okamoto 1992:24; Ichikawa 1986:248; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:15; Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:117–21). However, owing to the role of the teachers in Japan, steps have to be taken to make sure that the ‘appropriate’ things are being taught to the students. The best way to achieve this, according to those like Nakasone, is to ensure that the teachers are trained properly and that they use the curriculum prescribed by the Monbushō, which gains its legitimacy from working with the democratically elected government (Shimahara 1991:259). Rinkyōshin made a stinging attack on those teachers which it believed lacked ‘a sense of mission’ and the ‘ability to guide’ students, and were ‘insensitive to parental and community needs’ (Shimahara 1991:276; Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:144–7, 149– 50). This view was supported by an NHK survey (Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK) 1984:10; Ichikawa 1986:249) in 1983 which revealed that 54 per cent of adults believed that ‘only a few teachers were reliable’, and only 14 per cent said that ‘many teachers were reliable’. Disturbingly, according to another survey, relatively low numbers of students respected their teachers when compared with many other countries. 4 It was perhaps as a result of this that the attacks on teachers occurred, events which appalled the Japanese


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public as they violated ‘the most fundamental code of Confucian-influenced traditional educational values—namely, respecting and obeying teachers’ (Nishimura 1985:19). However, during the course of my research, I have been shocked by some of the expectations made of teachers. For example, I came across the case of a teacher who had to go to the home of one student almost every day to take him to school—sometimes even having to dress him first—as his family did nothing about it themselves (Lau, interview). Other teachers had to patrol a school in Seto during the night before a graduation ceremony because of fears of vandalism following some high-profile cases of delinquency that year (Mizuno, interview, 6 March 2000). It seems that society— particularly the police and social services—are not doing enough to support the teachers. This support would enable teachers to concentrate on what happens in the classroom, while also helping with the other aspects of ‘whole-person education’. The belief that many Japanese have is that all children are equal and differences result from a lack of effort, and that this is a responsibility of the teacher (Cummings 1980:129). This belief further strengthened the view that teachers needed to be better trained, since there appeared to be evidence, as demonstrated by the acts of delinquency, at the start of the education reform debate that children were not displaying the qualities that were expected of them. Cummings (1980:128, 136) argues that teachers ‘often depart from the framework of conventional teaching, but restraints of class size, the demands of the curriculum, and the time and money they have available for preparation keep them from straying very far’. Many teachers have long wanted greater freedom so that they can develop more creative teaching methods. These demands were no better demonstrated than when some challenged Morito Tatsuo, Chairman of the 1971 Chūkyōshin, and Education Minister Takami, demanding ‘More than increased pay, what we want is greater freedom!’ 5 However, while the teachers are responsible for teaching the curriculum that is prescribed by Monbushō, such freedoms are unlikely to be granted. When teachers have directed their attacks on the curriculum itself, they have been slated as ‘educational thieves’. 6 If diversity is to be introduced into the education system, it will be introduced by Monbushō on its terms (see Chapters 6 and 7). In 1978, a special report called for university retraining for teachers on top of the training of new teachers (Schoppa 1991a:99; Chūkyōshin 1978), despite teachers’ claims that university professors tend to be unfamiliar with the reality of teaching in schools. 7 In 1983, the Teacher Education Council tried to improve teacher certification standards, but it was defeated when presented to the Diet in 1984 (Shimahara 1991:267). Undoubtedly one factor that had led to this call for improved standards was that around one-third of all graduates from colleges and universities had some sort of teaching credential, due to the teaching profession’s prestige and financial rewards, 8 with more than five applicants applying for every teaching position (Monbushō, Kyōiku linkai Geppō 1985:68; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:16, 17). Despite opposition from groups such as the Japan Pedagogical Association and the Association of National Universities, which feared that the establishment of special education universities may advance Monbushō's control over the teachers, Rinkyōshin also made recommendations relating to the improvement of what teachers learnt (Shimahara 1991:268; Tsuchiya 1984:96–7). Although Monbushō has supposedly less


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control over the content and methods of teaching in higher education, this has not prevented higher education being called upon to play an important role in the training of teachers, which has been developed in recent years in particular. One reason for Monbushō's apparent keenness to use more university training programmes is that the shoninsha kenshū is not used at all private schools (Okada, interview, 30 November 1997), thus reducing Monbushō's effect on this large and increasingly influential area of the education system. Another reason that Monbushō has begun to focus its attention onto improving university training programmes is due to the fact that universities have tended to concentrate on more conventional training methods and ideas which are not necessarily consistent with the education reforms and the present education system. 9 Since 1990 universities have been offering various new courses designed to improve the teachers’ practical instruction skills, including training in information technology, student guidance and counselling. Monbushō is encouraging universities to develop such courses further, a move opposed by Nikkyōso fearing that it would restrict the range of graduates that would become teachers (Monbushō 1995:103; Schoppa 1991a:151–2). With the number taking the appointment examinations declining in recent years, Monbushō has also been introducing various policies to ensure that those most suitable for the profession are employed, through the use of more diversified selection methods, information briefings, and easing the age restrictions on candidates (Monbushō 1995:104). Improvement in teacher training has not been restricted to what is taught at university or during the first year of employment; Monbushō has also placed strong emphasis on the need for retraining throughout teachers’ careers, and the hope is that teachers will be keen to educate themselves in this respect (Monbushō 1995:104)—though I fear that they have little time to do so as things stand. Although critics may suggest that this is further evidence of Monbushō's desire to control all teachers, it must be noted that Monbushō has made similar statements about all careers regarding the need for more lifelong learning (see Chapter 7). Training programmes are now provided for many different people in the education system—experienced teachers, deputy-principals and principals—as well as the new teachers. Newly appointed teachers receive training, both in and outside the school. The in-school training, of about two days a week for at least sixty days a year, includes individual guidance on how to instruct and guide children, improve class management, and carry out extra-curricular activities. The out-of-school training, of about one day a week for at least thirty days a year, takes the form of lectures and seminars on various aspects of teaching (Monbushō 1995:104, 105). Training for experienced teachers, originally for those with about five years’ experience, has been expanded to include those with ten and twenty years’ experience, and is being subsidised by the national treasury although the training is usually provided by municipal and prefectural boards of education, and universities, private companies and other organisations are also starting to be used (Monbushō 1995:105). The impression given so far may appear to support the conventional idea that teachers must be opposed to the training programme, with some teachers saying that it, especially the training outside the school, ‘is a waste of time’ as they feel that they ‘are not taught or


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trained about how to teach the new subjects properly’ and that ‘the time could be better spent with children’ (interview with teacher from Mie prefecture, 1997). However, there is also evidence to suggest that the opposition is not that great, and it appears that the opposition has largely been coming from the more vocal union leaders and ‘liberal’ academics rather than the ‘normal, everyday’ teachers. In 1978, more than two-thirds of teachers said that their ‘professional preparation was inadequate’, pointing to a desire for improved training. 10 Likewise, two-thirds of participants in the original training programme considered it to be ‘useful’ (Shimahara 1991:272). Even those teachers who are not fully convinced of its usefulness now, believe that ‘it may be useful later in the career’ (interview with teacher from Mie prefecture, 1997). One possible reason for this support is that many teachers had lost their confidence in their ability to teach because of the amount of criticism they were receiving, and it was this that they wished to regain rather than being allowed greater educational freedom. 11 The OERI Japan Study Team (1987:17) also supported the system of in-service training, describing the way it is initiated and co-ordinated as ‘one of the commendable characteristics of the teaching profession in Japan’. The importance of teacher training is likely to be increased as a result of other changes to the education system. In particular, as mentioned, Rinkyōshin was critical of many of the teachers’ inability to ‘guide’ students. With the reform of the examination system, whereby the use of test results is being decreased and more emphasis put on the individual and what they want their career path to be, guidance will need to be improved from its relatively unimportant role in the past (see Chapters 7 and 8). However, the teacher will continue to be important in areas such as helping the student prepare for examinations, as well as being available to give advice outside classroom hours. With greater emphasis on education for the individual, so changes to the way groups are to be handled will need to be taught to teachers through training and retraining, as teaching methods play an important role in the way the group, and individuals within it, develop (Duke 1986:28). With Rinkyōshin’s interest in ‘liberalising’ the education system and intro-ducing greater flexibility (Chapters 6 and 7), it was inevitable that even in an area where greater control was apparently being sought, there would also be more radical recommendations. Before Rinkyōshin, there had been criteria that prevented well-qualified people from becoming teachers. For example, many prefectures had strict age limits on those who could take the application exam to become a teacher, and only two prefectures had no age limit. 12 Rinkyōshin wanted to relax the certification requirements so that competent people from other fields and occupations could pass on their invaluable experience and knowledge (Shimahara 1991:277). In response to this and other Rinkyōshin proposals, Monbushō has introduced and enhanced various areas in recent years through an amendment to the Educational Personnel Certification Law. This amendment created the ‘Special Certificate System’ and the ‘Special Arrangement for Part-time Teachers without Teaching Certificates’ that aimed at improving and expanding the teacher certification system, raising certification criteria, and established a system to utilise people outside of school as teachers. Most of the part-time outside teachers are employed at upper secondary schools in areas such as nursing, foreign languages and physical education. The number of people employed


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under this system has risen dramatically, as can be seen in Table 5.1. The need for these kinds of teachers is ‘natural’ according to Amano (interview, 5 June 1996), as ‘teacher experiences are quite narrow’, and these teachers can ‘come in for short periods to teach about real experiences’. There are now more younger teachers in the education system than in the past, and this is being reflected in the appointment of younger principals and head teachers. The percentage of teachers under 44 promoted to head teacher rose to 21.4 per cent by 1997 from 8.4 per cent in 1987, and those under 49 promoted to principal rose to 13.2 per cent from 1.7 per cent between the same years. Monbushō is continuing to guide boards of education in the promotion of younger teachers as well as women in administrative posts, with the percentage of women principals rising from 2.1 per cent in 1988 to 9.4 per cent in 1997, and women head teachers rising from 6.4 per cent to 15.4 per cent (Monbushō 1995:106; Shimizu et al. 1999:170, 171).

Table 5.1 Number of part-time outside teachers employed.

1989 1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Elementary school

0

0

0

0

1

2

2

6

515

Lower secondary

6

21

34

58

95

206

348

442

913

Upper secondary

167

495

1,127

1,459

1,668

2,068

2,530

3,049

3,563

0

1

1

9

18

26

35

40

23

173

517

1,162

1,526

1,782

2,328

2,915

3,537

5,401

Special schools Total

Source: Shimizu et al. (1997:136) and (1999:139).

Already it has been pointed out that one of the primary goals of the reforms may have been to break Nikkyōso, which had ‘Marxism as its main principle’ (Nakasone, interview, 1 December 1997). The reason for this was that many were dissatisfied with the situation whereby the government and Monbushō controlled the education system at the national level, but the union tended to have greater influence at the lower levels and was able to affect the way in which policies were carried out at these levels; in other words, the schools themselves (Rohlen 1984:138, 140; Thurston 1989:187; Aspinall 1997:1, 4; Marshall 1994:171; Schoppa 1991a:162). However, this view of education in Japan, which has for long been prevalent, appears to exaggerate what often occurred. There was for a long time a gap between the national-level members of Nikkyōso and the average teacher, who experiences a very different side of the education system (Rohlen 1984:140; Duke 1973; Thurston 1973; Aspinall 1997:3–4, 42), and there were also significant differences from prefecture to prefecture (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996). These differences are reinforced by the fact that each of the prefectural unions are separate legal entities (Aspinall 1997:84). Rohlen (1984:169) points out that The majority of Japanese schools are more independent and less political than anyone would predict from events at the national level’, and teachers tend to be ‘relatively liberal in their social


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opinions but rather conservative in their preference for orderly, smoothly run schools’ (Rohlen 1983:222). This helped lead to a situation where many supported and were critical of both Nikkyōso and the government (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:19). Accordingly, Nikkyōso became referred to as a tanchōzuru (‘red-crested white crane'), reflecting the belief that leadership was left wing, while most members remained more moderate or apolitical (Smethurst 1967:119). Therefore, the strength of the union could be taken away if the key weakness, namely the difference between the national level and the majority of members in the schools, was in any way exposed and developed. Combined with the remarkable fall in membership, the breakup of the Nikkyōso became more and more likely (Ota 1990:254; Thurston 1989:187; Roesgaard 1998:112). The education reforms, addressing some of the issues that caused the greatest rifts between the various divisions within the union, were bound to weaken the union further and make the breakup inevitable. Even before Rinkyōshin, Nikkyōso had been suffering from declining membership, demonstrated by the fact that in 1986, in twenty-seven of the forty-seven prefectures, Nikkyōso’s membership was below 50 per cent of all teachers for the first time, and the percentage of new teachers across Japan joining the union had fallen from 78 per cent in 1960 to only 28 per cent, with eighteen prefectures having figures of under 10 per cent, and only ten prefectures attracting more than 50 per cent of new teachers (Thurston 1989:199; Monbushō 1986c). One of the factors that appeared to discourage teachers from joining the union was its ‘open confrontation’ with the authorities (Aspinall 1997:67). This view was supported by Thurston (1989:200–1), who cited it as one of the three reasons for the falling membership, the other two being the high level of teachers’ salaries and the high cost of union dues. 13 According to Aspinall (1997:72), ‘the union’s enemies not only benefited from its chronic, long term, decline in membership, but also benefited from its attempts to find solutions to this crisis’. As the union debated ways to overcome the problems in falling membership, it opened up the divisions on how the union should be run and revealed the ideological divisions throughout the union. 14 The point of no return for Nikkyōso came in November 1989, when the issue of whether to associate with the central organisation Rengō (Zen Nippon Minkan Rōdōkumiai Rengōkai) arose. Until then Nikkyōso had been affiliated to Sōhyō, where it had been influential, but because of its internal problems this influence had diminished within an organisation itself being weakened by reduced membership. The decision to join Rengō was made in November 1987 and was finally put in place in 1989. Rengō, however, was far more ‘establishment friendly’ than Sōhyō, being largely led by private sector unions, and also supportive of Rinkyōshin’s proposals (Thurston 1989:191, 192; Roesgaard 1998:115). How to respond to Rinkyōshin and the association with Rengō was ‘the final ingredient in a deadly cocktail’ that brought about the final and inevitable split within Nikkyōso (Aspinall 1997:80). The left, aware of Rengō's natural stance, argued that Nikkyōso would lose its influence and would not be heard, and feared that further reforms would be supported by the organisation and forced upon it (Thurston 1989:192; Roesgaard 1998:115). The result was the creation of a new teachers’ union, Zen Nippon Kyōshokuin Kumiai Keimeikai (Zenkyō), which was ‘to continue the original Nikkyōso line’, fighting for the rights of children, democracy and peace (Roesgaard 1998:114–15; Mikami


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1990:49–51). Naturally Zenkyō did not support Rinkyōshins proposals. Rengō's VicePresident Kanasugi, on the other hand, supported ‘healthy internationalism’, saying that ‘if you are not able to explain about Japanese things like the Meiji Restoration and Admiral Tōgō you will not be valued as an international being by the other countries’. 15 Aspinall (1997:92–3) summarises that after the schism, there were five categories of outcome. Firstly, there are prefectures where Nikkyōso is unchallenged (fifteen prefectures); secondly, prefectures where Nikkyōso is dominant—that is, it has at least twice as many members as Zenkyō (twelve prefectures); thirdly, those prefectures where membership is evenly divided (eight prefectures); fourthly, prefectures where Zenkyō is dominant (eight prefectures); fifthly, prefectures where both unions have been decimated—that is, where the combined membership is below 5 per cent (four prefectures). (See Figure 5.1.) However, in five of those prefectures where Zenkyō is ‘dominant’, Zenkyō membership in that prefecture is below half the national average for combined membership, so it is clear that although Zenkyō has continued with Nikkyōso’s conventional ideologies (Aspinall 1997:110–11,

Figure 5.1 Teachers’ union membership in 1992.

Source: Table 3.2 in Aspinall (1997) (data from Monbushō, Kyōiku linkai Geppō, June 1992). Notes: ‘Nikkyōso unchallenged’=where Zenkyō failed to form an prefectural organisation. ‘Nikkyōso dominant’=where Nikkyōso membership is at least double Zenkyō membership. ‘Evenly divided’=neither union is clearly stronger. ‘Zenkyō dominant’=Zenkyō membership is at least double Nikkyōso membership. ‘Both decimated’=where combined membership of both unions is below 5 per cent.

168, 169), ‘it is not as strong as Nikkyōso was’ (Kioka, interview, 19 November 1997). The hope is that now that Nikkyōso is generally supportive of Monbushō policies, and Zenkyō is not strong enough to resist them, the situation where the two sides blamed each other for the ‘ills of the education system’ will no longer occur (Aspinall 1997:12,164), and more time will be spent on co-operation and dealing with the problems and ‘ills’.


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Indeed, Nikkyōso has been promoting the idea of compromise by both sides or ayumiyori (‘walking together’) (Aspinall 1997:113). However, so far, although the LDP has been more positive in its relations with ‘new Nikkyōso’, Monbushō has shown little need or enthusiasm for concessions. 16 Having reformed its ‘campaign policy’, Nikkyōso’s position has come much closer to Monbushō. In four key areas, Nikkyōso now appears to support Monbushō's position; the Course of Study, teachers’ meetings, the shunin system which provides bonuses to middle-management teachers, and the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo. However, Nikkyōso still remains opposed to the training system (Aspinall 1997:159–62, 164–8). Nikkyōso has been affected by ‘Prime Minister Nakasone’s success in taking the initiative in championing educational reform’, and has been ‘shunted to the sidelines’ where it can no longer be a potent force in criticising reforms that it opposes or gain popular support for its own initiatives (Curtis 1988:217). 17 Nikkyōso is no longer the force it used to be and the ‘problems with Nikkyōso have gone’ (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996). However, differences between national- and local-level activities in the unions still continue. In the previous chapter I referred to a teacher who had appeared to have been influenced by her union during the past few years. Indeed, when she first joined she did so although she could not ‘understand what they are on about’ (interview with teacher from Mie prefecture, 1997). Interestingly, when I asked her in 2000 which organisation, Nikkyōso or Zenkyō, her union (Sankyōso—Mie Prefectural Teachers’ Union) belonged to, she neither knew the answer to the question, nor had even heard of Zenkyō (interview with teacher from Mie prefecture, 2000). Mie is a ‘Nikkyōso unchallenged’ prefecture, yet it is clear that Sankyōso’s agenda is very different to that of the national level Nikkyōso. To most the battles between the government and teachers’ unions appear to be over, and they are no longer an issue, but it is clear that the debate has moved to a much more localised level where teachers are, or at least claim to be, more in tune with local concerns. Since Nikkyōso’s schism much has changed, but Monbushō, rather than ensuring and reinforcing its advantage over the teachers, has simply continued to take various steps to improve teacher quality based on the reports published by Rinkyōshin, developing recommendations further, as well as using ideas that Monbushō had already developed itself (Aspinall 1997:143–4). 18 However, it is very difficult to develop a fool-proof system by which to measure the quality of teachers. Asahi Shimbun in the past has pointed to the increase in nationwide test scores as a sign of an improvement. However, as there are many factors that can affect the average scores of students, such as improved teaching methods rather than the teachers themselves, it is impossible to conclude that the use of such statistics is reliable. It is probable that Monbushō will continue to justify the use of a system of training to ensure that all teachers have the necessary skills to be able to teach and guide children, being particularly aware of ‘problem children’, and so that the teachers can learn the new diverse teaching methods. This has particular significance since Monbushō is wishing to introduce ‘improved’ methods of teaching and learning, including team-teaching, reducing class sizes and providing teachers to teach more diverse subjects at upper secondary schools (see Chapters 6 and 7) as a means to overcome the relatively high


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levels of dissatisfaction amongst students and teachers (Monbushō 1995:5–6, 73, 102–3). If the reforms were meant to be a means to break up Nikkyōso, then they were successful, and Nakasone and Monbushō should be satisfied. The idea of increasing teacher training seems to be important when there are so many things expected of teachers, particularly in Japan. However, as I have pointed out in Chapter 4, time is the greatest problem. Teachers seem inordinately busy in Japan—and often busy on things which probably should not be their responsibility. As a consequence, they do not have enough time to spend on things they definitely should be pursuing, or would like to be pursuing. Indeed, they do not even seem to have opportunities to rest. I hope that as the reforms continue in the future and try to give children more freedom (see Chapters 6 and 7), the same provisions will be made for teachers, otherwise both teachers and children could ultimately end up suffering.

Textbook authorisation If the debate of the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo had emphasised the problems over ‘healthy nationalism’, then the debate over the authorisation of textbooks highlighted further problems in this area as well as the need for a balance between maintaining standards, traditionalism and control while also trying to introduce greater ‘liberalisation’. Much is made of the authorisation and the possibilities of government abuse and many argue that the system is unjustifiable (Horio 1988b:173). Opponents of the system believe that it is censorship and ‘improper control’, which is prohibited under Articles 21 and 23 of the constitution and Article 10 of the FLE (see Horio 1988b:176). Indeed, Herzog (1993:200) concludes: ‘lf this is not censorship, I do not know what censorship is’. However, it should be noted that the system is not peculiar to Japan, although it tends to be less subtle. 19 Howarth points out that such practice also occurs in the United Kingdom, where it is rare to find accounts for classroom consumption, of Britain’s nineteenth-century opium trade and the misery it inflicted upon China. Our [British] invention of the concentration camp during the Boer War, African races dispossessed of their lands and some near genocidal attacks on indigenous populations in various parts of the world are equally hard to find in our [British] school books. (Howarth l991:123–4) Members of Rinkyōshin’s first sub-committee apparently wanted the system to be completely liberalised with no intervention by Monbushō. However, there was opposition to this view, including from members of the third sub-committee, as well as Monbushō and the education zoku, which wanted the system to be strengthened (Hayao 1993:59). The final recommendation made by Rinkyōshin, which was implemented by Monbushō, called for a simplification of the authorisation system, reducing the review process from three steps to one. It also called for further liberalisation in the future and the possibility of some upper secondary school texts not being subject to screening (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:233). The new system was introduced for elementary and lower


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secondary school books submitted to Monbushō in 1988, and for upper secondary school books in 1989, the new elementary school books began being used in 1990 (Hayao 1993:59, 63–4; Monbushō 1995:100). The new system also allows for the results of the examination to be made available for public inspection, and the amount of information explaining the system and the number of locations where the results can be inspected have been increased (Monbushō 1995:100). This appears to be a step towards greater ‘liberalisation’, and textbook specialists do believe that the new system is ‘more relaxed now’ and the ‘rules are more simplified that they used to be’ (Koizumi, interview, 26 November 1997). However, it also appears to give Monbushō greater control as the number of steps where the authors or publishers can present their version of the text is reduced, and the education minister retains the right to call for further revisions, as well as to approve or reject a book. Senior textbook specialist Koizumi Masashi (interview, 26 November 1997) maintains that ‘We are not interested in controlling the content, just screening it. We are trying to get rid of any extraordinary bias.’ The problem, as far as Koizumi and others are concerned, is that ‘the academic sector in Japan is rather weak and can be controlled by politics’. The worry for those who deal with the screening of English textbooks, for example, is that ‘left to themselves, publishers would concentrate more on grammar, which goes against the present reforms. So we need the screening system’ (Koizumi, interview, 26 November 1997). Another problem is that ‘publishers try to cover all things in the guidelines, although this is not required’ (Koizumi, interview, 26 November 1997). It appears that publishers, perhaps still unsure of their new-found relaxed rules and remembering the problems in the past, are being overly cautious. However, this also allows for occurrences that border on what many would consider overly intrusive. In 1988, for example, Monbushō requested that content of textbooks follow government policy regarding nuclear power, demonstrating Karr’s view that the more that things change, the more they are the same, 20 though now ‘not only is the ministry seeking deletions of offensive passages, as it has done in the past, but it is now apparently also directing the publishers to add certain items’ (Hayao 1993:59, 63–4; Shields 1990:218; Harada 1990:148–60). A court ruling by the Tokyo District Court in 1989 on a case brought by lenaga Saburō, though upholding the constitutionality of the system, defined certain instances when it would be illegal (Hayao 1993:277 (footnote 41)). lenaga’s battles with Monbushō through the courts had been continuing for many years and continued until August 1997, when he was awarded ¥400,000 (he had been seeking ¥2 million) in damages against the government by the Supreme Court, a result which he hoped would help work as a deterrent against further abuses by the government. However, at the same time the Supreme Court ruled that the authorisation system was constitutional, so the result was also considered to be a victory by Monbushō, though it would have to study how to avoid problems over references to certain incidents that occurred during the Pacific War (Japan Times 30 August 1997). It is worth noting that lenaga is not regarded as a ‘liberal’ by all commentators. Indeed, one Japan specialist (private e-mail, 1997) has suggested that it is an oversimplification to suggest that he is a ‘liberal’ fighting against the ‘reactionary’ Monbushō, and believes that lenaga appears to be ‘a neo-Stalinist’ who attempts to ‘glorify the Red Army’ in


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Manchuria in his book Taiheiyō Sensō. Furthermore, he believes that lenaga has been more concerned with avoiding the issue of war responsibility than with addressing it and that ‘lenaga’s quest for “responsibility” is superficial at best and diversionary at worst’. It does appear that lenaga had his own agenda, and that trying to demonstrate the possible unconstitutionality of the authorisation system and ensuring that all facts surrounding the events during the Pacific War appeared in textbooks were not necessarily his priority, despite being the figurehead for these movements. Debates over changes to the system were not limited to the work of Rinkyōshin. In fact, much of the most important work and events occurred before Rinkyōshin was established, as well as during its existence. In 1982 new guidelines on the system were announced by the education minister after previous plans had been rejected. However, it was two incidents which caused so much controversy that they led to diplomatic incidents with China, South Korea and other Asian countries that focused attention on the need to revise some aspects of the authorisation system. On 26 June 1982, the headline of Asahi Shimbun read ‘Textbooks return further to Prewar Style’. The story was about the expression ‘invasion’ being watered down, and that emperors from ancient times were referred to using honorifics. The sentence that had led to the story was in reference to the Manchuria Incident of 1931, and had read ‘the Japanese forces invaded [shinryaku] North China’. According to the article this was changed, after revision, to ‘the Japanese forces advanced [shinshutsu] into North China’. In another example, the 1937 ‘Rape of Nanjing’ was changed to the ‘Nanjing Incident’ (Asahi Shimbun 26 June 1982). Almost a month later the Chinese and South Korean press covered the story (Rose 1998; Livesey 1994:45). This led to many more articles condemning the Japanese government, and sparked off a wave of anti-Japanese sentiment on the popular level. Eventually, the Japanese government, responding to official protests from the two countries, sent an envoy from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Monbushō to explain the Japanese government’s policy on textbook authorisation. However, they were not successful and so on 28 August it was announced that the offending passages would be amended. Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa issued a statement in which he said that there would be a revision to the textbook authorisation criteria (Fuji 1987:4; Rose 1998; Livesey 1994:45). The new criteria stated that the Treatment of modern and contemporary historical events involving the countries of nearby Asia must show due consideration for international understanding and international harmony’ (Livesey 1994:46). In fact the Japanese press had been mistaken when they reported that the government demanded the word ‘advance’ replace ‘invasion’, and would be in school texts by the next year (Livesey 1994:46; Rose 1998). This was not the first time that the press had made such a mistake (Taniguchi, interview, 10 November 1997), and although Monbushō had not made such demands, it had in the past suggested that authors put less emphasis on Japanese wartime aggression, and so it seems the government had no choice but to apologise to these nations once it became an international dispute (Livesey 1994:46). In 1986 more controversy arose, this time regarding the ‘Shimpen Nihon-Shi’ (‘Newly Edited History of Japan’), which was written by the National Confederation to Defend Japan, a nationalistic organisation headed by a former Japanese ambassador to the UN,


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Kase Toshikazu. Their aim was to compile an “impartial” history to counteract the “left bias” of previous texts’ (Livesey 1994:46). It was submitted for review in August 1985, and sent to the textbook council in January 1986 by Monbushō, noting 241 mandatory revisions and 478 recommended revisions. The text covered several myths about the ‘birth’ of Japan, and said that there was controversy in Japan as to whether or not the atrocities committed by the Japanese Army in Nanjing actually happened (Hata 1986:23; Japan Times 26 June 1986). The council met and was strongly critical of the text, but owing to the publicity of the lenaga textbook case and the fact that Monbushō was also worried about the pressure some right wing LDP Diet members might exert if the book was banned, it did not want to reject it at once (Hata 1986:23; Livesey 1994:47). Therefore, the council decided to approve the text, so long as the revisions were implemented, after one more review. Just three days before the second review, Asahi Shimbun wrote about the text and quoted many examples of the nationalistic flavour of the textbook, for example ‘Emperor Jimmu as the Founder of Japan and Asian Independence Thanks to World War II’ (Hata 1986:23; Asahi Shimbun 24 May 1986; Livesey 1994:47). However, the text was approved on the condition that certain passages be altered further. The South Korean press discovered the story, and once again criticism rose up from East Asian nations. As a result of these criticisms, the council conducted three more reviews of the textbook, before giving it their final approval in July, and so allowing it to be used in schools from the following April. Controversy continued as in 1987 it was revealed that the publishers of one textbook were obliged to delete a reference about the 700,000 Korean residents in Japan who did no have their social status guaranteed, despite the fact that they were born and educated in the country. A Monbushō spokesman later explained the matter, saying that, legally speaking, Koreans were foreigners living in Japan (Japan Times 1 July 1989). The debate over the content of certain books looks set to continue, with the ‘liberals’ wishing to see the end of the authorisation system altogether and at the very least the inclusion of ‘correct’ information. Others, such as the Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho-wo Tsukuru Kai (Group to Make New History Textbooks), aim to eliminate the ‘masochistic’ and ‘too many negative accounts’ in the textbooks, and instead provide books that help children foster a ‘sound nationalism’ (Asahi Evening News 16 September 1997). The importance of the system is further emphasised by the fact that the textbook market is so large in Japan. Satō (interview, 17 November 1997) believed that ‘publishing textbooks is one of the safest and most profitable things to do’. In fiscal 1994, 177.96 million copies of nearly 1,500 different titles were published and distributed in Japan. The budget for the free distribution of textbooks to elementary and lower secondary schools was ¥43.4 billion in the same year, which accounted for 136.15 million textbooks. 21 Some feel that there are now ‘too many books’ and that many of the different books that can be chosen from ‘look very similar’ (Koizumi, interview, 26 November 1997; Ogushi, interview, 26 November 1997). However, with textbooks at the compulsory level being provided free, I believe that it is understandable why the government would want to ensure that the quality of the product is satisfactory. One can only speculate what the effect might be if the system were abolished or ‘liberalised’ further. Okamoto (interview, 5 December 1997) believes that


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people want to be controlled in this country [Japan], and because it is a democracy, the government should follow. If we abolished the textbook standards, there would be difference between the prefectures, this would lead to calls of discrimination, and then there would be standardisation again. (Okamoto, interview, 5 December 1997) Indeed, there are even pressure groups which support the government control of textbooks (Satō, interview, 17 November 1997). Given that the teachers have all received similar training, it is possible that many would still choose books which contained a traditional view of events and that were recommended to them by Monbushō or local government. Other teachers would undoubtedly take the opportunity to teach a less traditional line, spurred on by ‘liberal’ academics and local union activists. It is also likely that teachers would come under pressure from parents, if they felt that their children were not being taught ‘appropriate facts’. Indeed, in early 1997, a group of 200 parents brought a suit against Monbushō for allowing mention of ‘comfort women’ in textbooks, which they considered was not appropriate for fostering sound, right thinking Japanese children. The threat of pressure and action from right wing groups could also act as a deterrent against publishers wishing to print more ‘liberal’ texts (Kinmonth 1997). The irony of the debate is that many children, based upon conversations that I have had with students, appear to remain unaware and unsure of what the ‘correct’ way to phrase certain events is. The situation is further confused by the fact that this area of history (regarding the events in the Pacific War) are barely covered in lessons, if covered at all, as they appear so late in the course that they usually come after the entrance examinations. 22 In fact, rather than the textbooks, it is events and debates in the media, coupled with discussions that many JET Programme participants initiate in English classes on the subject, 23 which appear to be educating the children about some areas of the Pacific War and other controversial issues. However unpopular the system may be with some quarters, it is supported by traditionalists, and apathy and tacit approval amongst the Japanese public means that there is little effective opposition to the system and that it is likely to remain pretty well intact, certainly at the compulsory level of education, for many years yet. 24

Reform of the fundamentals One element of the Occupation reforms that caused particular concern to many traditionalists was the FLE. This ‘is closely related to the Constitution’ (Satō, interview, 17 November 1997), which they also hoped to have revised. Shortly after becoming education minister in 1960, Araki Masuo criticised the FLE for failing to allow the ‘full cultivation of the excellence of the Japanese race’ (Schoppa 1991a:55; Habara 1982:66). It appears that the FLE is held in the same regard by many in Japan as the ‘Bill of Rights’ in the United States. It is of no wonder then that attempts to revise it would be controversial. However, it is important to understand what traditionalists, such as Nakasone, are hoping to achieve. Nakasone had wanted the discussion of a possible


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reform of the FLE to be discussed by Rinkyōshin, but had to compromise on the issue (Nishimura 1985:21). Nakasone (interview, 1 December 1997) claims that the compromise was also partly due to the fact that Rinkyōshin would be ‘too busy discussing other areas’; however, the compromise did not prevent some of the members discussing some of the issues relating to the law. 25 The problem for those such as Nakasone is that the present FLE emphasises qualities which appeal to the leftist, Marxist, groups with its promotion of “the noncognitive and nonutilitarian goals of education: independence, individualism, self-actualization, friendship, peace’ (Cummings 1980:59). In fact, the problem is ‘with what is not written rather than with what is written’ (Satō, interview, 17 November 1997). 26 Nakasone believes that the FLE ‘is a very good thing and contains many excellent points’ (interview, 15 March 2000), but was appropriate when it was created, but it is not appropriate now. It contains no mention of history, community, home, and nation. Other countries, such as South Korea and Brazil, have these included. It was because of this that we had problems with Nikkyōso and with society—the valuable spirit was lost. (Nakasone, interview, 1 December 1997) According to Nakasone, it is ‘a law about general principles based on musty classical modernism and is not a law tailored to suit the ethos of Japan’ (Nakasone 1997a:71–2). Although Horio (1997d) believes that The reality of education has indeed greatly deviated from the spirit of the Fundamental Law of Education’, Monbushō still appears to support the FLE, when it points to the need to improve the teaching of human rights ‘in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution of Japan and the Fundamental Law of Education’ (Monbushō 1995:99). In 1997, Ogawa (interview, 4 December 1997), a member of Chūkyōshin, said that the FLE ‘is not an issue for Chūkyōshin at the moment’. However, Satō (interview, 17 November 1997) said that he ‘would not be surprised if Monbushō becomes willing to reform it’. Although this may be the case, the FLE is not something that can be reformed by bureaucrats; action would need to be taken by the Diet. This would almost certainly mean the creation of a special ad hoc body, and would also lead to many long and heated debates in the Diet. Okamoto (interview, 5 December 1997) believes that the reform of the FLE would require ‘a big discussion’ and that it is ‘worrying about words and not about what is happening in the schools…if we have time, let’s have that discussion’. However, I expect that many also thought the legalisation of Hinomaru and Kimigayo would require ‘a big discussion’. Nakasone (interview, 1 December 1997) does believe that the fact that the FLE has not been changed is ‘a failure’ and considers that it is one of Japan’s education problems now (interview, 15 March 2000). The probability of the FLE being revised has increased greatly following the legalisation of Hinomaru and Kimigayo and the selection of Mori Yoshirō, who is greatly in favour of its revision, as prime minister. I believe that it is highly probable that the FLE will be reformed within the next few years. This is a situation that would probably be unimaginable without the attitudinal shift that has occurred following Nakasone.


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Similarly, the possibility of constitutional revision is also increasing. Committees have now been established in the Diet to discuss the issue, something which Nakasone (interview, 15 March 2000) is ‘very happy’ about. According to Satō (interview, 17 November 1997), ‘Support for constitutional revision is gaining momentum, especially amongst younger Japanese. It’s not taboo.’ Again, Nakasone has helped set the agenda, and he believes that it should be changed in about ten years (Odawara 2000:18). In conclusion, although Nakasone may not have achieved everything in the area of ‘traditionalism that he would have wanted, much has been achieved and the others appear to be close to being achieved. It was probably unrealistic for these areas to have all been dealt with according to Nakasone’s wishes at an earlier stage—it needed the attitudinal reform to come first. I do not believe that there is anything to fear about revision to the FLE or the constitution. Indeed, I believe that it is a desirable process. If a country is to have written documents as important as the FLE and constitution, it is desirable that they take account of that country’s distinctive character, culture and traditions, and that the country itself takes responsibility for formulating the documents. Although there are those that are concerned about a return to militarism due to constitutional revision and about further control and censorship due to the FLE, I have not come across anything to justify these fears. So long as safeguards are in place to ensure that the system cannot be abused by ‘loose springs’, then I think the time is right for the debate on the revision of the FLE and constitution to take place.

6 ‘Liberalisation’ and ‘privatisation’ The previous two chapters have concentrated on issues that generally gained support at an early stage during the education reform debate. Since the issues raised in these chapters are ones which most would expect to be supported, the assumption may be that the education reform process initiated by Nakasone was not at all radical. However, this would be a fallacy. Both this and the next chapter will analyse the issue of ‘liberalisation’, which although one of the issues most espoused by Nakasone (Hayao 1993:57), did not gain widespread support at first, being opposed by many quarters, but has now become a central part of the ongoing education reforms. This chapter will analyse the terms used to describe this area of reform, and show that it was at least partly concerned with the ‘privatisation’ of the education system. Chapter 7 will go on to show that these reforms are also concerned with the individual, and the attempt to teach and improve the skills thought necessary for the future, and allow students greater opportunity to study what they want.

Understanding the terms As shown in the previous two chapters, Nakasone was closely associated with the support of ‘nationalist’ issues and traditionalism, and so is usually classed as a ‘conservative’. However, he was also included as a member of the ‘new right’, a phrase coined by the Japanese mass media that was designed to indicate ‘the new liberal trend of the LDP' (Watanabe 1993:14). Nakasone was both a ‘conservative’ and a ‘liberalisation person’, as he described himself (Hayao 1993:58)—in other words, a ‘neoconservative’ (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996; Oki, interview, 19 November 1997). 1 When seen in the context of the events that occurred during the 1980s, it becomes possible to understand how these two ideologies could be joined together. For this decade, according to Francis Fukuyama, saw the ‘end of history’ with capitalism’s victory over communism. 2 Although there are many that would not agree with Fukuyama’s point of view, many countries, including Japan and the United Kingdom, have seen a shift whereby many traditional socialist values have been rejected even by the parties that were supposed to stand for them. Nakasone’s philosophy was very much akin to the school of thinking that was put forward by Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan. 3 The effect on the social, economic and political systems of these countries by each of those leaders has been long lasting. However, it would be too simplistic and wrong to assume that Nakasone was wanting a carbon copy of their policies for Japan. Nakasone defined his ideas on ‘conservatism’ as follows:


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First, to conserve Japan’s beautiful nature and country. Second, to conserve the Japanese people’s way of life and desire for that way of life. Third, to keep the liberal and market economy. Then fourth, it is to conserve the positive national vitality and progress which the Japanese people showed in the major reformations and the Meiji restoration. (Nakasone 1978:206) Some of these points have already been raised in the previous two chapters, but the third is an indication of what Nakasone’s major concern was when he also espoused ‘liberalisation’. One of the problems in dealing with ‘liberalisation’ is the terminology. In Japanese, two terms were originally used, jiyūka (‘liberalisation’) and jūnanka (‘deregulation’). The word ‘jiyiū' is also the word used for ‘liberal’ in the sense of democracy. 4 However, in comments made by Nakasone and others, the two were combined as jiyūka, in much the same way that in English the two are often combined as ‘liberalisation’ (Hiratsuka, interview, 15 May 1996; Schoppa 1991a:70–1). Yet the two terms mean quite different things, and one can exist without the other. In the context of education, jiyūka without jūnanka would mean that all schools competed on a standard scale, whereas jūnanka without jiyūka would mean that the contents of education would be made less uniform, but school choice would remain regulated (Schoppa 1991a:70–1). The problems with these terms are compounded by the fact that ‘liberalization and deregulation are viewed in Japan, as elsewhere in post-confucian Asia, not as a return to normalcy or a preordained harmony, but as an unleashing of some of the worst human passions and dispositions’ (Williams 1994:69) and that to many Japanese ‘liberty seems to connote something uncontrolled, undisciplined, licentious, and even uncivilized’ (Yanaga 1956:35). Indeed, Williams goes on to argue that In the Japanese context, terms such as ‘deregulation’, ‘liberalization’ and ‘internationalization’ refer not to the freeing of entrepreneurial energies from misguided government controls, but to the erosion, even destruction of a way of life. It should surprise no one that the Japanese ministries most concerned have fought so sustained a rearguard action against these changes, and had so much help from Japanese businessmen and politicians in doing so. (Williams 1994:71) Nakasone (interview, 1 December 1997) supported increasing freedom of choice, deregulation and flexibility, and introducing more competition (between the institutions rather than the students) into the system, particularly if it reduced government costs. This was demonstrated when he said that ‘not everything has to be done by the government. Things which can be handed over to the private sector should be handed over’ (Nihon Kyōiku Shimbun 3 September 1984). At the Eleventh LDP National Seminar in September 1987, Nakasone also stated that we should implement various reforms that will further promote liberalisation, openness, and participation. This applies equally to economic affairs, education, and international relations. For instance we set up Rinkyōshin, which has made

'Liberalisation' and 'privatisation'

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its recommendations. These are now ready to be implemented. The key point in implementation is deregulation, which is something that applies to all areas of government activities. This means doing away with restrictions and letting people act freely. (Nakasone 1987:106) An important point to note is that Nakasone’s ‘liberalisation’ was not concerned in any way with introducing a ‘liberal education’ system. In the recent reform debate ‘liberalisation’ was first put forward by the Kyoto Group, although Chūkyōshin and the OECD had referred to its need in the late 1960s and early 1970s—and many other ideas had been around before then (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:63; Katsukata 1996:8; Schoppa 1991a:3–4). The main precedent that the Kyoto Group members wished to establish was that flexibility should be introduced after children had mastered the basics (The Kyoto Group for Study of Global Issues 1985:31, 32), in other words, forming a strong base before being allowed to make choices about their future paths. Essentially, their idea was ‘rather than a new liberalistic system, a liberalisation of the old one’ (Roesgaard 1998:141). Rinkyōshin was to support this, recommending the abolition of standardisation and protecting the individual, but the framework established by the local boards of education would have to be adhered to. Greater freedom and the expression of personal ideologies by teachers would only be acceptable at the university level (Roesgaard 1998:183–4). 5 As well as the appointment of members of the Kyoto Group to Rinkyōshin, Nakasone also appointed others who favoured ‘liberalisation’, particularly Kōyama Ken’ichi, who Nakasone (interview, 1 December 1997) described as having ideas very close to his own, Tawara Kōtarō and Yayama Tarō (Hayao 1993:57–8; Pyle 1987:258). However, this group favouring ‘liberalisation’ appeared to be in a minority, with little support from others in the LDP, Monbushō, or even big business. Although some had supported the idea in the 1970s and 1980s, 6 many in the LDP were opposed to ‘liberalisation’ and wanted greater controls rather than less, and saw the whole issue as diverting away from the initial problem of juvenile delinquency (Hayao 1993:57, 58). Thus, Nakasone’s men became labelled as ‘outsiders’ (Hayao 1993:66). 7 The issue of ‘liberalisation’ has always been closely related to what skills, characteristics and abilities are thought to be needed to be developed by the education system, so that the economy could respond to the demands and changes that were already occurring and were expected in the future. However, the problem was that it was difficult for people to agree upon what was going to be needed (Schoppa 1991a:64–5). Many, such as those in the education zoku, argued that ‘the system was working all right, so why change it?’ (Schoppa 1991a:72). But Rinkyōshin, with its ‘pro-liberalisation’ members appointed by Nakasone, took ‘aim at a school structure characterized by standardization, centralization, and insulation from international influences’, wanting to liberalize and deregulate the educational system so as to permit greater diversity, flexibility, and even competition among schools’ (Pyle 1987:258). Although ‘liberalisation’ so far has been discussed under the banners of jiyūka and jūnanka, the unpopularity of the terms and a certain degree of uncertainty surrounding their meanings meant that more acceptable terms that still contained the original


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ideologies were sought. This process began during Rinkyōshin’s debates when ‘liberalisation’ was strongly linked with ‘individualism’, to the extent that some felt that the terms were being ‘confused’ by Rinkyōshin, though in fact it was the terminology that was causing the confusion, as Rinkyōshins proposals remained consistent. 8 The view that the various terms actually represented identical ideologies appears to be supported by the fact that Rinkyōshins main emphasis was on the individualisation of institutions rather than concentrating on the people. However, one should be careful not to exaggerate this point, as the individualisation and diversification of the system was deemed to be a necessary step, so that individuals can make the choices, for example, that they wish. However, even ‘individualism is not a term without its problems and Rinkyōshin spent a considerable amount of time attempting to agree upon a phrase. The three that were debated in particular were kosei shugi (the promotion of individuality), kosei no sonchō (respect for individuality) and kosei jūshi (an emphasis on individuality), with the second two eventually being chosen as the first was criticised for being too inflexible and difficult to understand (Schoppa 1991b:67; Shields 1990:222; Roesgaard 1998:161). However, the overriding view was that ‘individualism’ was based on a broad idea of ‘liberalisation’ of the education system (and society), including the children, families and communities, which reinforce each other’s ‘individualism’ (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:69). 9 This is clear from the remarks made by Minakami Tadashi, who said that the ‘schools have to change, to create a more varied curriculum, this is also what kosei jūshi is about’ and that students had to be given more choice through the schools becoming more differentiated, so that ‘rather than choosing between different flavours of ice cream, be given the choice between ice cream and fruit’ (Roesgaard 1998:162). Such moves to find an acceptable terminology had occurred before with Chūkyōshin’s use of the terms koseika (individualisation) and tayōka (diversification), but its content remained as part of Rinkyōshin’s work in this area. Individuality was to become the means to solve the problems of standardisation and supposed lack of creativity in the education system (Roesgaard 1998:164). In the next stage of the evolution of the terms the key words expressing these ideologies became yutori (‘room to grow’) and ikiruchikara (‘zest for living’) in Chūkyōshins report in 1996 (Chūkyōshin 1997). However, behind the words, the central ideology in this area of reform is the idea of kisei kanwa (‘regulatory relief’ or ‘deregulation’) (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996; Hiratsuka, interview, 15 May 1996; Ogawa, interview, 13 May 1996). According to Amano (interview, 5 June 1996), these reforms were designed to ‘get rid of the controls or weaken Monbushō'. Unsurprisingly, Monbushō initially opposed ‘liberalisation’ (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996), giving six reasons for its opposition: it would make it harder for Monbushō to guarantee equal opportunities, maintain and improve education standards, emphasize ‘whole-person education’, maintain the public nature of education, guarantee neutrality, and to respect the role of local governments. 10 Schoppa (1991a:101, 102) believes that some Monbushō officials, however, appeared to sympathise with some of the points being made, but ‘they were often too timid to act in accordance with this sympathy’ and did not want to act until ‘sufficient pressure had built up’ to bring about change. Saitō Taijun, a Monbushō official, believes that Monbushō had been becoming more favourable towards these ideologies, that were limited to jūnanka, for some time, starting


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in the 1970s (Saitō 1984:113–16; Schoppa 1991a:103). Although this may have been the case it had not yet reached a sufficient level for the implementation of policies in this area (Schoppa 1991a:103). The change to allow the implementation of such policies to begin, and for Monbushō to express its support for such ideologies, has occurred during the latter years of Rinkyōshin and after Rinkyōshin. Without Rinkyōshin, there is no reason to assume that the pressure would have reached a level to bring about the changes in Monbushō that are evident now. It appears to be largely due to Rinkyōshin that standardisation in education has become ‘out of vogue in Japan’ (Schoppa 1991a:154) and that Monbushō has ‘come to agree on diversity as a goal’ (Katsukata 1996:7). Indeed, according to Okamoto (interview, 5 December 1997), ‘Many in Monbushō want to abolish standards as they are tired of being accused of everything’. Many still see Monbushō as being a strict uncompromising monolith, as though it was an educational Godzilla stamping its standardised view over the whole country, knocking down towers of liberalist educational thinking in its path. This view now appears to be out-dated, and it has now ‘become more “liberal”’ (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996). Opponents of ‘liberalisation’ refer to it as being ‘a nebulous term’ and an ‘empty slogan’ that cannot be expected to achieve the reforms ‘necessary’ (Kida 1985:58). Others oppose the idea because of the emphasis on such ‘economics-inspired concepts as supply-side competition, deregulation, and consumers’ “freedom to choose’” (Takeuchi 1985:42). Nikkyōso was opposed to Rinkyōshin’s moves in this area, for although wishing to see the reduction in governmental control, its priority was for the maintenance of equal and public education, where most of its members were employed, which it saw as being at risk (see below) (Schoppa 1991a:156). Whatever the opposition to ‘liberalisation’, the fact that will be shown is that further ‘liberalisation’ is ‘inescapable’, and that it is seen as ‘definitely an important and unavoidable goal in solving the many problems—economic and social as well as educational—that Japan now faces’ (Amano 1992:7). It is essential to realise that what was being advocated was what I refer to as a ‘pick and mix’ style of education; that is, a system whereby people could choose from a limited number of choices, as opposed to being given freedom to choose whatever they want. Conventional views, even when new terms such as ‘neo-conservative’ have been used, have tended to concentrate on whether there should be more of such things as moral education and improved teacher training or more ‘liberalisation’. However, what Nakasone and Rinkyōshin put forward was a mixture of the two, and this chapter and the following chapter will analyse the extent to which ‘liberalisation’ was advocated, how the proposals have gained support, through a certain degree of ‘evolution’, to become the spearheads of the ongoing reform process.

Reform of the 6–3–3 system One issue that has been central to the ‘liberalisation’ debate has been the reform of the 6– 3-3 system. Calls for reforming the system had long been made by those who wished to see a reintroduction of multiple tracks that would allow the provision of elite education for those who wished it, as had been provided by the pre-war education system (Schoppa


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1991a:27). In the buildup to the education reform debate, reform of the 6–3-3 system was supported by the Keizai Dōyūkai and the Kyoto Group (Keizai Dōyūkai 1985:35–42; The Kyoto Group for Study of Global Issues 1985:31–4). The Kyoto Group (1985:33) had recommended that there should be a review of the 6–3–3 system, with more emphasis on allowing schools to choose how to operate, and even allowing individuals, once they had achieved certain minimum standards, to have the freedom not to attend school. Although not all were convinced that the system needed to be changed, for example the GDCE had not supported its reform (see Chapter 3), the system has effectively being changing through the introduction of new types of schools that were recommended by Rinkyōshin, for example the six-year secondary schools. One of the potential problems in introducing six-year secondary schools has been that compulsory education ends during this period. However, with the advancement rate to upper secondary education in 1998 standing at 95.9 per cent, this is not a major problem (Shimizu et al. 1999:9). Rinkyōshin saw the advantage of six-year secondary schools as being consistency and continuity, as the courses could be structured to take account of the fact that students would be studying a course for six years and would not be interrupted by an entrance examination (Roesgaard 1998:182). However, one worry raised by the introduction of such a system would be that ‘examination hell’ (to be analysed in Chapter 8) would be shifted to those trying to enter the six-year secondary school. Rinkyōshin hoped that this could be avoided through the use of interviews, reports from elementary schools, and practical tests rather than standard written tests (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:87–8). Initially, this was one area that Monbushō did not favour, owing to its preference of maintaining a single-track system, and was apparently able to resist change. 11 However, in recent years that position has changed, after the proposal had appeared to have ‘died’ owing to Monbushō's lack of interest (Schoppa 1991b:101–2). In 1999, the unified lower and upper secondary school system was finally introduced, and prefectures are now looking to establish at least one in each upper secondary school zone (in other words, about 500 nationwide) (Monbushō 2000a:122). There are three types of unified secondary schools. ‘Secondary education schools’ (Chūtō Kyōiku Gakkō) which are a single school with no entrance examinations, but selection made on the basis of interviews, recommendations and lotteries; ‘Joint-type lower and upper secondary schools’ (Heisetsu-kei no Chūgakkō, Kōtōgakkō) where the lower secondary school students automatically move up to the jointly administered upper secondary school; and ‘Cooperative-type lower and upper secondary schools’ (Renkei-kei no Chūgakkō, Kōtōgakkō) where existing municipal lower secondary schools and prefectural upper secondary schools co-operate more closely together on the curriculum, exchanges and so on (Monbushō 1999a:128; Monbushō 2000a:122). Opposition to the creation of six-year secondary schools has not completely gone. One commentator on Japanese education told me that he remains opposed to their creation as he believes that lower secondary education will become ‘contaminated’ by upper secondary education and that the creation of a 9–3 system would be preferable, as this would avoid the problems caused by the ‘differentiation at the stage of entrance to upper secondary education’. Getting rid of the examinations between the two levels of


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schooling is like ‘assuming you can get rid of prostitution by getting rid of hotels’, he added. Although I can understand his concerns, the creation of combined secondary schools does seem a logical conclusion to the development of upper secondary education in Japan. What is important is to ensure that entrance to these schools does not become another form of ‘examination hell’ (see Chapter 8). The creation of the combined secondary schools will finally hammer home the realisation that so many do continue their education and so not everything has to be crammed into the first twelve years of education. This, combined with the greater flexibility in subjects and promotion of lifelong learning (see Chapter 7), is a welcome development. The combination of recommending more flexible subject choices and new types of schools was the recommendation to create yet another type of school, the credit-system upper secondary school (tarn’ isei kōtōgakkō). The main aims of credit-system schools are to allow students to choose what they study according to their own interests and intended career path, and to allow students to mix more with students of different ages with a wide range of experiences. As a result, it is hoped that this will reduce the likelihood of students ‘dropping out’ by having students study what they are interested in. Monbushō appeared less hostile to this recommendation and began studying the possibility of establishing the new types of secondary schools at an early stage, and was backed up by the 1991 report by Chūkyōshin (Monbushō 1995:40). At credit-system upper secondary schools, students can graduate once they have accumulated the required number of credits rather than being awarded certificates at the end of each school year, and graduating after three years. This system, therefore, makes it easier for those wishing to return to education to study The system was initially introduced for some types of courses in 1988, and introduced for full-time study in 1993. The number of these schools has risen dramatically in recent years, from 43 in 1993 to 175 in 1998 (Shimizu et al. 1999:20). Not only is this necessary for the promotion of lifelong learning, but also the demand for a system that can accommodate such students was evident from the fact that even before the system had been fully introduced, the number of students transferring schools had already risen from 8,600 in 1989 to 11,800 in 1991. Accordingly, a new system, the Upper Secondary School Transfer Student Admission Information System, was introduced in 1992 to make transfers even easier (Monbushō 1995:45, 57, 83). The other type of school that continues to be a source of great debate is the vocational school. It has long been a problem to get able children to attend these schools, partly as a result of the belief that ‘gentlemen do not involve themselves in trade’. However, the greatest problem has been that these schools have not been a successful route to higher education, especially to the ‘better’ universities. Furthermore, employers have also tended to opt for students with all-round ability rather than specialist skills, despite Monbushō's encouragement of vocational education (Dore and Sako 1989:13–14; Amano 1986a:29; Benjamin and James 1990:155). As a result of these and other factors, vocational schools have gained the image of accepting, and only having, poorer students. 12

Vocational schools’ courses have tended to be quite specialised, and have expanded into areas such as information technology. However, just as at normal upper secondary schools, the options available to students have been limited (Dore and Sako 1989:34, 36).


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Rinkyōshin placed much importance on the need to improve both the quality of vocational education and its status, and made calls for the graduates of such schools to be given the same status and be treated in the same way as graduates from other forms of secondary schools (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:86, 124, 239). However, it will take time for attitudes towards vocational schools to change, although the graduates from such schools should also benefit from the effects of other recommendations, such as the reduction on reliance of school name as a yardstick by which to measure an applicant (see Chapter 8). Perhaps the best example of another of the new style of schools is Ina Comprehensive High School. It is a huge school with over 3,000 students, and with its philosophy of treating students as adults, allows students to choose from a wide range of courses. It is because of the wide range of courses available that so many students are needed, as students are needed to keep courses financially feasible. In 1994, there were seven comprehensive schools (kōtōgakkō sōgōgakka), which rose to 106 in 1998 (Shimizu et al. 1999:20). Comprehensive schools are neither ‘ordinary’ nor ‘vocational’ as students are able to choose which courses they study, though they are encouraged to think clearly about their relevance to their future life rather than simply choosing the easiest subjects to pass. Such schools are likely to play a larger role in the future, with people such as Okamoto (interview, 5 December 1997) believing that all schools should be like Ina, being allowed to organise their own curriculum. Gokase Junior and Senior High School in Miyazaki prefecture is another new type of secondary school and is the only full boarding secondary school in Japan. 13 These new types of schools that are now emerging will further influence the structure of the 6–3–3 system, and is something that is unlikely to have occurred without Rinkyōshin. The 6–3–3 system is not dead, but continues to exist in parallel to a new 6–6 system, and potentially other systems as students are given the opportunity to enter university early (Monbushō 2000a:14, 152). It is also worth giving special mention to the ‘integrated course’, which was established in 1994. This course has been developed in an attempt to bridge the gap between regular schools and vocational schools, and the problems that studying general courses or specialised courses at the two types of institutions has caused. The ‘integrated course’ takes content from both courses and is designed to give students a breadth of experience and knowledge by choosing subjects that are of interest to them. By 1999 there were 124 schools offering such courses (Monbushō 2000a: 124). Even at ordinary schools there will be periods of integrated study, where the content of the lesson is essentially decided by the school itself. There can be no doubt that the 6–3–3 system and strict centrally controlled picture of Japanese education is breaking down.

Privatisation of the education system Crucial to the debate on ‘liberalisation’ was the idea of reducing the amount of public money spent on education and increasing the role of the private sector (Takeuchi 1985:42). These sorts of proposals had been made by Kumon Shumpei, one of Nakasone's advisors (Schoppa 1991a:68–9). Some of the ideas that were discussed had


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also been raised originally by Rinchō, where Nakasone had been a central figure, and included the abolishment of free textbook provision in compulsory education, not expanding the number of staff, and reducing subsidies to private universities (Foreign Press Center 1984:14, 15). Up to this point education had been a ‘sanctuary’, safe from budget cuts, but this situation changed at a time when many felt that more money was needed to combat the problems facing the education system (Kitamura 1986:155; Schoppa 1991a:77). Even before Rinkyōshin, the role of the private sector, particularly outside the compulsory levels, was highly significant. However, even in the public sector more money was being raised, for example with the increase in fees at public kindergarten (Japan Times 13 January 1983). The Kyoto Group and big business, like Nakasone (see above), also proposed that there should be a shift away from a reliance on public schools to an education system based on choice and market competition, with schools created in the same way that schools were created by individuals after the Meiji Restoration (The Kyoto Group for Study of Global Issues 1985:32). 14 Private education is very important in Japan, accounting for 79.5 per cent of kindergarten students, 30.5 per cent of full-time upper secondary school students and 73 per cent of university students (see Figure 6.1), though there are regional differences, with Tokyo having the highest concentration of private schools. 15 However, unlike the norm in many Western countries, most of the private secondary schools have not enjoyed the reputation for being centres of academic excellence. The situation has been improving and according to Satō (interview, 17 November 1997), ‘Japan is becoming like the US and UK, where the best education is seen to be private education’. Although only between 50 and 100 of the approximately 1,300 private schools have achieved this status, the top 20 schools measured by their success in getting students into Tokyo University are all private schools in large cities (Amano 1986a: 28; Rohlen 1983:127). It is also worth noting that many of these schools are effectively six-year secondary schools, combining lower and upper secondary school, and completing the courses in five years, leaving the extra year for exam preparation (Amano 1986a: 28). As Rinkyōshin was seeking to have variations to the 6–3-3 system introduced, these types of successful schools provided further impetus for increasing the role of the private sector. Whereas private education had always been encouraged after compulsory education, partly through an insufficient supply of public education (Benjamin and James 1990:152, 156), Rinkyōshin was keen to see the creation of more private schools at the compulsory level of education to help further diversify the education system, as well as reduce the financial burden on public finances (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:65). Also Nakasone (interview, 1 December 1997) believed that the ‘spirit’, such as that of Keiō University’s founder, Fukuzawa Yukichi, had been lost. As already mentioned, in recent years a small number of private schools


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Figure 6.1 The importance of private education.

Source: Japan Almanac (2000:247). Note: Number of students at each level of education on 1 May 1998.

have gained a reputation for being of a high standard, but the rankings of schools show that there are public and private schools at all levels (Lynn 1988:30, 31). If more private education is to be introduced, a change of public attitude, which perceives many of the private schools to have problems with poor academic standards and juvenile delinquency, will be needed (Simmons 1990:71). The relatively low prestige of the majority of private schools also helps explain the low numbers of students that switch to private lower secondary schools after graduation from elementary school. In Japan the figure is only 3 per cent, as compared with 6 per cent in the United Kingdom, and 13 per cent in the United States (Lynn 1988:22). However, in 1998, whilst only 0.9 per cent of elementary school students were attending private schools, the percentage of lower secondary school students at private schools had risen to a figure more comparable with the United Kingdom’s at 5.4 per cent (Shimizu et al. 1999:4, 6). Another reason that relatively small numbers of students attend private compulsory schools is that parents would rather that they attended juku which supplement what is learnt at the public schools (see below). It is interesting to note that all the private elementary schools in Japan were established before the war, unlike the situation for private upper secondary schools (Satō, interview, 17 November 1997). Therefore, the support of Monbushō appears to be necessary. It is attempting to promote the establishment and use of more private schools and is implementing policies under the Private School Promotion Law to help, including the provision of subsidies to cover running costs, tax relief, and providing resources to prefectural governments that have also provided subsidies (Monbushō 1995:129, 131–2). Such steps are made even more important as private schools are facing the problem of reduced income due to falling student numbers as the school-age population declines. Monbushō hopes that these schools will be able to attract more students by improving


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their quality, by becoming more individualised and offering more diverse courses and teaching methods (Monbushō 1995:129)—clearly following the Nakasone/Rinkyōshin line. Costs are kept to a minimum at public schools in Japan, with the most expensive item being the land. Not much money is spent on ‘cosmetic’ expenses, such as decorations and the up-keep (including heating or cooling) of the buildings, as this, in the opinion of many Japanese, would not significantly improve education results (Duke 1986:184–5). Although Monbushō is now spending more on such ‘cosmetic’ things as air-conditioning (Monbushō 1995:109), and some schools are aesthetically pleasing to look at, it is still true to say that most schools remain relatively spartan compared with schools in many other developed countries. It should be remembered that many schools were built to cope with the ‘baby boom’ at a time when there was still limited funds available, and this led to the creation of the apparently homogeneous architecture of school buildings across Japan. Although the costs are supposed to be met by the board of education, Monbushō has been providing money for the improvement of buildings and facilities, especially those which can be used for lifelong learning, and are necessary for the changes in the education system that reflect more internationalisation and information technology. 16 Spare classrooms, the number of which has increased as a result of the falling student population, are also being altered so that they can be used for specific subjects, such as life environmental studies, foreign languages and information technology. However, despite the problems facing private institutions, the private sector has continued to grow around the compulsory education system. In particular, one area of education that has seen a huge expansion in private education has been the pre-school sector. In Japan this is made up of kindergarten, which are administered by Monbushō, and nursery schools, which are administered by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The kindergarten are not purely ‘play schools’ but also provide a foundation in reading and arithmetic, and try to develop the child’s thinking and learning abilities (Lynn 1988:18). Some private kindergarten have become notorious abroad for their emphasis on academic tuition, appealing to those parents who wish their child to go to a good private school, which should then take them on the ‘educational escalator’ to one of the top universities. However, the number of these kindergarten, like the number of private elementary schools, is small and limited to only the largest metropolitan areas. Many, including those who send their children to these pre-schools, 17 criticise them for interfering with the natural development of the children, and creating differences in abilities in the children, making it harder for elementary schools to keep equality in the classes (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:23). Although ability streaming (to be analysed in Chapter 7) would overcome this problem, without a curb on academic teaching at preschools, the pressure for ability streaming at elementary schools, where emphasis on equality tends to be greatest, may grow from frustrated parents. Another reason why the content of pre-school education has been changing has been the need for these schools, most of which are private, to boost enrolment, at a time when the pre-school-age population is shrinking. Private kindergarten receive about two-thirds of their revenue from fees, another 5 per cent from subsidies from Monbushō, and the remainder through private sources. The public kindergarten charge modest fees which


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account for less that 10 per cent of their costs, the rest being received from the local authority (Lynn 1988:18). However, what the expansion in the number of private kindergarten points to is the willingness of Japanese parents, particularly in metropolitan areas, to do anything, including spend money, to help their child’s education. In 1998, there were 14,603 kindergarten with over 1,750,000 students. In 1996, the attendance levels ranged from 28.8 per cent of 3 year olds, to 57.0 per cent of 4 year olds, up to 62.5 per cent of 5 year olds (Shimizu et al. 1999:2). However, there are considerable regional differences, and 940 municipalities (about 30 per cent) have no kindergarten at all. Although Monbushō is hoping to correct this by providing subsidies to the municipalities, the private sector is also being encouraged to establish new kindergarten and improve older ones (Monbushō 1995:96, 97). Perhaps the most infamous areas of Japan’s private education sector are the juku and yobikō. Most students at these two types of institution are thought to be concerned with just passing the entrance exam to the next level of education. Indeed, yobikō are full-time schools dedicated to helping students take university entrance examinations. However, there are different types of juku, providing different types of service. Most are ‘supplementary’ juku (hoshū-juku), established by individuals, which ‘shadow’ the school curriculum by repeating past lessons and preparing students for future lessons. The type of juku that most people think of when they hear the word are the shingaku-juku that specialise in helping students advance to the next level of education by not only ‘shadowing’ the regular curriculum but also expanding on it. Comprehensive juku (sōgōjuku) combine the aims of these two types of juku, but tend to concentrate on preparatory studies. Relief juku (kyūsai-juku), which tend to suffer more financial problems than the others, offer help to students who struggle at regular schools because of social problems. However, not all juku are dedicated to exam- and curriculum-related pursuits; some also provide classes in music, calligraphy, foreign languages, and other subjects for those interested. Indeed, only through the changes recommended by Rinkyōshin, calling for students to be judged on more than just exam results, will these studies become more than just a means towards self-development (Dore and Sako 1989:5). Some of the increase in juku attendance may also be due to the fact that there are more families where both parents work, and so need something to provide supervision in the early evening (Yūki 1987:21–31). Juku and yobikō, by providing for the students falling behind in some subjects, supplement the work done in school, relieving some of the pressure and responsibilities of the regular teachers, and ensuring that the school classes can proceed without the teacher having to spend too much time on these students (Duke 1986:96; Kitamura 1986:161; Simmons 1990:63). However, the problem with juku is that they have become ‘like tactical weapons in an escalating educational arms race’ as students attend in an attempt to gain an advantage over other students (Rohlen 1988:28). Indeed, some have come to question whether the high results achieved by Japanese students in international comparisons are really due to the formal schooling, or whether it is the juku that caused it (Ichikawa 1986:247–8). Some juku have gained great prestige through their academic record (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:11). On top of this some are praised for the attention that they put on the individual students, something which many felt regular schools did not offer enough


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of in the past. The free market had made juku think carefully about providing the sort of education that was demanded, often with more innovative teaching methods than have been found in regular schools (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:13). It is because of this that Rinkyōshin wanted juku to become a recognised part of the education system and be encouraged as alternatives to regular schools, while remaining largely unregulated by Monbushō (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:254–7). 18 As with kindergarten, the willingness of parents to pay juku costs reveals their willingness to spend money on their child’s education (Simmons 1990:63). Rohlen (1983:128) believes that as there is a ‘solid correlation between poverty and poor school performance’, it is the poorer families, who can least afford it, in particular, which are faced with the burden of private tuition fees. However, most juku are considered ‘affordable’ for most families, though some elite juku are ‘expensive’ (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:13). In 1996, the average cost of juku fees for public elementary schools students, public lower secondary school students and public full-time upper secondary school students were ¥52,000, ¥127,000 and ¥184,000 respectively, although 7.5 per cent of public lower secondary school students were paying over ¥400,000, for example (Shimizu et al. 1999:110) Juku have grown in number: a survey in 1986 estimated there to be around 35,000, nearly half of which had been established in the previous five years (Monbushō 1986a). However, another estimate, in 1992, suggested that the number was between 50,000 and 60,000, with around 4.4 million students in total, spending twice as much money on juku costs as seven years before (Weisman 1992:1). For this reason some criticise the juku for being concerned with making money rather than in education. Others point to the fact that to make money the juku have to offer a high-quality service, and so educational quality is important to them. Interestingly, studies into juku which help prepare students for areas to be covered in future classes at school have proven inconclusive about the degree to which they help students, though they were not considered to be ‘disruptive’ to the teaching in the schools. 19 However, although one gains the impression that virtually all Japanese children attend juku, in fact many do not, with attendance levels varying depending on the year of study and the region where the student lives. Some estimates suggest that over 40 per cent of all students never attend a juku. 20 In 1993, the attendance ratios for juku were 23.6 per cent at elementary school and 59.5 per cent at lower secondary school (Monbushō 1995:6). However, juku have become an integral part of the education system in some areas, and some even have entrance examinations, though rather than for student selection they tend to be used more for class formation as they do have ability-based streaming, and tests are regularly held to check on progress (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:11,13). Interestingly, the main reason cited by parents for sending their child to juku was that the child wanted to attend. The other reasons given by parents were that no one at home can help with the studies, the child does not study independently, and school study alone is not enough for success in exams. 21 Rinkyōshin was concerned with the last three reasons and possible solutions. However, the most popular response is something which many would not predict, and points to why Rinkyōshin hoped to have schools adopt similar philosophies to juku. Juku teachers are often part-time undergraduate students with no teaching


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qualifications, people who have teaching certificates but have little or no teaching experience, or former teachers. In the past some juku and yobikō teachers were regular teachers moonlighting to get extra money and also because the work was often more rewarding as students were highly motivated; however, this practice has now been stopped. Critics have questioned the quality of education being provided by such juku, as well as often also seeing juku as interfering with the regular education, club activities and life of the children (Simmons 1990:93). However, others believe that juku help students in their social development as they give them an opportunity to mix with friends outside school, and that it is this that accounts for the popularity of juku amongst the students (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:11, 14; Simmons 1990:91; Mochizuki 1990:142). Juku offer a degree of choice to parents who do not normally have it unless their child is in a private regular school. As many Japanese have used the power to choose and to choose private education in certain areas such as kindergarten, juku, upper secondary schools and universities, it is likely that many would opt for private education at the compulsory level if they had a reason to do so. New private schools have been founded, particularly by private universities, which use the school as a ‘feeder’ for ensuring the supply of future students. The money needed to found such schools comes from the university’s ‘profits’ and from bank loans, which in the past have been easily secured given the strong demand for education, particularly from the ‘best’ universities (Benjamin and James 1990:154). The schools also receive tax relief so long as they are non-profit making, as do those making contributions to the schools (Monbushō 1995:133). In other words, private education is being positively promoted. However, the financial burden of a child’s education is already huge for parents who have to plan already for the costs of higher education. The average cost of public education up to and including upper secondary school is over ¥1,500,000, whereas for private education for all levels except elementary school it is over ¥2,950,000 (Shimizu et al. 1999:113). The question is at what point will the financial burden become too much, and what will Monbushō do to help the private schools that have not got sufficient numbers of students? Private education could further emphasise inequalities in the education system. Even in public education there are inequalities, as many cities have spent more on students than rural areas (Benjamin and James 1990:156). One area of the cost of education that I find particularly interesting in Japan is that of higher education. According to the average figures (see Figure 6.2), Japanese university students actually make a profit during their four years of study. This is something which remains unimaginable for most British students. Naturally part of this profit is thanks to contributions from their parents (and it is worth remembering that a relatively large proportion of Japanese students continue to live at home while they are at university), but it is still a remarkable situation and points to both what the motivations are of university students and why the higher education system is as it is in Japan (see Chapter 7).


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Figure 6.2 Profiting from university education.

Source: Shimizu et al. (1999:50). Note: Income and expenses in ¥. Data for 1996.

Private education is likely to play an ever increasing role, particularly as the efforts to reduce the government’s budget and administrative costs continue. However, while private education relies on subsidies from Monbushō, the worry continues as to what the effect would be if these subsidies were reduced. The escalating costs of education also continue to be a problem, and the support of Monbushō and other organisations is necessary to prevent them from becoming too much of a burden. Ironically, the continued ‘privatisation’ of the system could increase Monbushō's burden, as it has to respond to these problems.

The community The community has always been an integral part of Japanese society. Given Nakasone’s and Rinkyōshins interests in promoting traditionalism, one would expect to find such recommendations relating to the community. Indeed, Rinkyōshin included the community as part of its debate on ‘individualism’, emphasising the importance of the community (chīki) to the point that ‘Expectations to its effect were extremely high and it would at times seem to be invoked for its anticipated beneficial effect almost like a mantra’ (Roesgaard 1994:198). However, if there had been some paradoxes in other areas


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of the proposals made by Rinkyōshin, the recommendation to end school districts offered perhaps one of the greatest paradoxes of all. This section will analyse the proposals relating to the community and what has happened in recent years as Monbushō has had to deal with this situation. Under the school district system a child, in public education, attends a specific elementary school (usually the closest), and upon graduation goes to the lower secondary school which all graduates from that elementary school attend. This system meant that the number of places and students at each school could be easily predicted and calculated, doing away with the need for any kind of entrance examination. There was almost no opportunity for choice. Changing to another school outside the normal school district could only be done as a result of problems such as bullying. If the family moved, the child had to change schools unless during the final year of study, though some families did find ways around this. 22 Some families, however, also took the step of moving into particular areas that would mean that their children would attend a school which was seen to be of high quality, despite the fact that there was meant to have been no difference between schools, or to ensure they were in the right zone for a good upper secondary school (Cummings 1980:212; Lynn 1988:24). The proposal to relax this system was made by some of the members of Rinkyōshin while in the Kyoto Group (The Kyoto Group for Study of Global Issues 1985:33), believing that it would improve choice and force the schools to improve their quality, otherwise they would close through lack of students. Therefore, it was inevitable that the issue would continue to be debated. However, it was one of the other Rinkyōshin members, Kōyama Ken’ichi, who spoke out most on the need to change the system, arguing that ‘When the school a child attends is determined in a manner that eliminates competition among schools, schoolroom education becomes stagnant and decadent’ (Kōyama 1985:45). Although there were those who did not favour such a proposal, Rinkyōshin recommended that the number of districts where students (or more likely, their parents) have the choice of two or more schools should be increased (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyōkai 1987a:252–3). However, the boards of education, as well as Monbushō, were concerned about the administrative problems and inequalities that may be caused by such changes (Gendai Kyōiku Kagaku 341, April 1985, 105). 23 Essentially, the final proposal was phrased in such a way that boards of education were encouraged to develop the system, though the original system was maintained (Schoppa 1991b:69; Hayao 1993:59). The proposal is consistent with some of the ideals of ‘liberalisation’, in particular its emphasis on the ‘supply side’ and the extra provision of choice. However, in other respects, it goes against some of the other themes pursued by Rinkyōshin and ideologies important to Nakasone, especially the development of stronger school-community links, and maintaining and developing traditional local-community-based relationships (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:171–5). Some have even questioned why the ‘liberalisation’ debate has concentrated on the difficult issue of the school district system, when they believe that it is higher education that is in need of the greatest attention (Kida 1985:60). Even before the education reform programme began, the link between school and community was strong, as many parents, especially mothers, played an active role in supporting the work of the school through such things as the PTA (Parent-Teachers


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Association). The proximity to the school made it easier for these parents to keep involved (Vogel 1979:165). Therefore, one has to wonder what the effect would be if the child was attending a school further away. Any extra distance would surely mean that the accessibility to the school would be reduced and this could weaken the link between the school and the family. Not only that, as the student would not be a member of the local community, the relationship between the school and community would probably be weakened as a smaller percentage of students would be from it. This would appear to be contrary to other goals of Rinkyōshin and Nakasone. As mentioned above, some feared that the relaxation of the system could also have a detrimental effect on the equality and quality of education. Although Rinkyōshin did not appear to be overly concerned with equality so long as basic standards were maintained, the issue of quality was of great importance. Under the school district system, equality is maintained by the rotation of teachers between schools in the area, thus making it unlikely that one school excelled in all areas. If the school district system were relaxed, and parents were expected to make a choice based on the quality of education, then teachers would be unlikely to be changed, as ‘good’ schools would be reluctant to allow their ‘assets’ to be taken away. 24 If teachers did continue to change, then one has to wonder upon what basis the quality of the school could be measured, as facilities at all public schools are supposed to be equal. However, it should also be pointed out that even with the rotation of teachers, certain schools within each city still tend to gain a reputation for being better than others. 25 One commentator, who I spoke to in 2000 after school zoning blocks’ were introduced in Shinagawa Ward (Tokyo), has pointed out that the biggest problem is that without adequate information, parents are likely to base their decisions about which school is best or bad upon rumours and gossip. This is certainly not a desirable situation. There is also a logistical problem with the relaxation of the school district system which Rinkyōshin did not appear to address. In a city such as Tokyo where the railways and bus routes cross over each like a bowl of rāmen (noodles), it may be possible for the system to cope with the extra burden of taking more students further if the school district system was relaxed. However, most cities, even large ones such as Kyoto and Nagoya, and certainly the smaller cities, would find it extremely difficult to handle the situation satisfactorily. When these cities already have problems coping with the normal rush-hour, any increase in the number of users would only compound these problems. Under the present school district system, most children have to walk to school, though in some areas the use of bicycles is permitted, with the use of public transport tending to be restricted to upper secondary school students. Since the relaxation of a system which, by definition, has children going to the closest school would mean that the distance to the school would be increased, there would be demands for the use of public transport or to be taken to school by car. The problems of transportation already facing upper secondary students, with many commuting for more than an hour every day, and living far away from school friends (Cummings 1980:216), could also become a factor for students at elementary and lower secondary schools. Furthermore, if students at public compulsory-level schools had to use public transport, there would almost certainly be demands for these costs to be covered by the municipal or prefectural government, which goes against the cost cutting agenda of the ‘liberalisation’ proposals.


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It is unlikely that the system will be ‘deregulated to the point where they can choose any school. The system will be more like that for upper secondary schools, where there is a choice of a few schools, or they will be judged case by case’ (Kiuchi, interview, 21 November 1997). Indeed, the ‘Flexible Application of the School Zoning System’ was introduced in 1997 and although it does allow more flexibility (Monbushō 2000a:126), it certainly does not give total freedom of choice. The school district system has begun to change. For students going on to public upper secondary schools, there is a certain amount of choice, though this is also limited to only a handful of schools. With the emphasis on greater ‘individualisation’ of upper secondary schools, so that they develop their own unique characteristics, Monbushō is having to look at ways in which to improve the means by which students can choose schools and schools select which students they accept (Monbushō 1995:56). Since there are not strong community-school links at this level, and Rinkyōshin envisaged much of the moral and social development common to all students to occur during compulsory education, the problems relating to the relaxation of these upper secondary school zones are less pronounced. However, there are still problems, such as the methods of selection and the distance between home and school, that Monbushō is trying to address before the system is changed further. All these problems, which could be brought about by a relaxation in the school district system, are a far cry from the Rinkyōshin and Monbushō proposals to develop the educational functions of the community further, seen as important for moral and social development of the children, and to improve its links with the schools, which had sometimes been overlooked in the past (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:171–5; Roesgaard 1998:190–2; Monbushō 1995:13, 15, 25). According to a 1993 survey, many people blamed families for relying too much on the school to provide education and discipline and not doing enough themselves, or for being overprotective (Monbushō 1995:14–15). A survey in the following year, however, found that parents believed it to be important for communities to be involved in children’s development (Monbushō 1995:15). The greater role of the family and community was one of the reasons why the five-day week was established (see Chapter 7), as the extra time should provide children with the opportunity to gain more out of school experiences which would help them develop, instead of being reliant on school education as in the past. Monbushō has introduced the ‘Regional Boys and Girls Circle Activity Promotion Programme’ to encourage more community activities on the free Saturdays, as well as conducting research into ways to improve further the use of the community on these days (Monbushō 1995:19, 24, 158). One way in which the community-school relationship and the community spirit has developed has been the greater accessibility to school facilities for members of the community, which was proposed by Rinkyōshin, and supported by Monbushō (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:247–8; Monbushō 1995:35). As mentioned above, Monbushō has already taken steps to improve school facilities and this is being co-ordinated with respect to the use of the facilities in community learning activities (Monbushō 1995:84). Higher education institutions were also encouraged by Rinkyōshin to open their facilities more to the community and develop learning activities for them, as was already beginning to happen (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:266–7).


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Combined with the extra time being spent in the community, especially on the free Saturdays, Rinkyōshin also hoped that Japanese children would once again have more time to experience nature at first hand, in the way that traditional rural Japanese had done. It was also hoped that the revitalised community spirit would help the expansion of voluntary activities, which would help overcome the problems of alienation and noninvolvement which occur in many urban areas, as people have tended not to mix with other people in the same community (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:247–50). Rinkyōshin also hoped that the community could become more involved in school education, through the use of community members as part-time instructors, particularly in sports, science and in community and regional history (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:173–4). On top of this, the use of museums and youth education facilities is also being encouraged (Monbushō 1995:93). More outside teachers are being used (see Chapter 5), and the community is becoming the place where children can learn things that cannot be adequately taught by the school (Katsukata 1996:7). The community-based learning and experiences with nature are being used to help teach children about the global problem of the environment, which had already been taught in various school subjects, 26 on top of which Monbushō is attempting to ensure that schools are built and maintained in a way that is more environmentally-friendly. 27 While the benefits of developing community spirit and community-school links are obvious, one also has to be aware of the possible dangers of opening schools to the public, and possible strangers, given the lack of security measures within most Japanese schools. While a strong community may be able to repel such people, the risk is a very real one, and will need to be addressed, although the potential for such incidents has always existed apparently without major problems. 28 The potential for such problems is further increased by the creation of new types of schools which share facilities with public halls, or at ‘schools without fences’ where local people can walk through and watch the students studying (Monbushō 2000a:128, 129). The greater emphasis on the community is closely related to ‘regional revitalisation’. This was something that Nakasone was in favour of (Nakasone 1978:102–4), and Rinkyōshin hoped that local boards of education could be given more opportunity for local innovation through a reduction in centralised control, while maintaining certain national standards (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:65; Simmons 1990:128). Although sceptical at first, it is something that Monbushō has also become more supportive of, together with the University Council which proposed that higher education should also be used to help ‘regional revitalisation’. 29 The aim is to allow the regions to specialise more and further develop their own identities and special characteristics. This study has already shown that there are differences between the various regions and it is too simplistic to assume that the Japanese education system, and the way things are carried out, are exactly the same from one prefecture or region to another. ‘Regional revitalisation’ will make these differences even more apparent, as boards of education are encouraged to react according to the demands of their own area rather than simply implementing directives from the central administration, which left them with little ability to innovate in the past (Schoppa 1991a:138; Monbushō 1995:74). The regional identity is even being enhanced through the use of more local dishes in school lunches (Monbushō 1995:95–6). However, if regional education is to be developed in the future then some of the largest


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regional differences in educational achievement will have to be addressed. For example, in 1998, 57.5 per cent of students in Tokyo went to university or junior college, but the rate was only 30.5 per cent in Aomori (Shimizu et al. 1999:38). Indeed, Tokyo accounts for approximately 30 per cent of students in higher education, but only 15 per cent of Japan’s population. This means that in other regions, particularly rural ones, a relatively large percentage of students are not continuing with their studies, which creates an educational divide between the regions. This could lead to a situation where these rural regions will have either to employ people who have been educated outside the region, or to employ those who are from outside the region originally and so do not possess the same regional identity as their employers. Neither of these situations will help develop regional identity, and both could be expensive for companies that try to compete with the salaries of Tokyo people or expected salaries of those educated in Tokyo. 30 Throughout the education reform debate there were obvious conflicts between the maintenance and strengthening of traditional elements, while also ‘liberalising’ other elements. Whereas in many areas the balance was kept by only having ‘liberalisation’ at the higher levels of the education system, the issue of the school district system highlighted the problems of trying to ‘liberalise’ the lower levels of the education system. However, with the system being relaxed in some metropolitan areas, the effect is likely to be even greater differences in the education system between various regions and cities. Although the picture of a uniform education system was never entirely accurate, it seems certain that in the future there will be even greater flexibility and the regional differences will be increased and become more apparent. 31 However, the greater flexibility, although it may appear to weaken Monbushō's position, will probably increase Monbushō's responsibilities as attempts are made to ensure that standards are maintained (Kiuchi, interview, 21 November 1997).

7 The individual As was shown in the previous chapter, Rinkyōshin considered the changes to the education system to make it have more emphasis on the individual as one of the most important parts of the education reform process. This clearly followed Nakasone’s belief that ‘individuality and creativity’ were missing, and more emphasis on the individual was necessary (interview, 1 December 1997). Rinkyōshin saw these reforms as ‘the rejection of standardisation, inflexibility, closedness and ethnocentrism and a new emphasis on respect for the individual and his freedom, autonomy and responsibility, in other words an emphasis on individuality (kosei jūshi) (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a: 68). However, this ‘individuality’ not only meant the individual but included the individuality of the family, the school, the community, the country, all of which are linked. Minakami Tadashi, a former Rinkyōshin member, said that he believed that the goal was the development of the individual’s personality, not as an isolated individual but as an individual in a group… [Rinkyōshin] did not think of the individual in particular. It was part of it, but we also emphasised that the families, the schools, the Japanese culture, society and the country had to have their own peculiar characteristics. A very broad definition. (Roesgaard 1998:161,2) The new education system is aiming to foster children who will demand more according to their individuals interests, having gained a foundation in the necessary knowledge and skills that all Japanese are believed to need (Monbushō 1995:20). The focus on the individual will mean a change away from the conventional ideas of studying and learning, which have tended to emphasise ‘the passive reproduction of knowledge or techniques already established by others’. These methods do not allow students to work out problems for themselves and have discussions, which tend to be ‘inherently inefficient if information loading is the central goal’, especially when hampered by the size of Japanese classes and the students’ reluctance to participate (Horio 1988b: 3,13, 176; Rohlen 1983:244). However, even before the education reforms, Cummings (1980:125) suggests that in fact ‘most Japanese teachers do make significant departures from the traditional approach’ and make efforts to maximise student participation. The problem I believe is not that the Japanese cannot be expressive, it is just that they tend to prefer to know who they are expressing their ideas to, and whether it is appropriate for them to do so without causing an uncomfortable situation for anyone involved. This can lead to the appearance of shyness. My experience has certainly been that the Japanese classroom tends to be a very noisy place—whatever the subject. The worry that is created for many who are uneasy about the greater emphasis on the


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individual is its effect upon Japan’s much-praised group orientation, which has been valued more than individualism, uniqueness and independence, except in the rhetoric of some official documents (Iwama 1990:73; Shimahara 1990:276). Therefore, Rinkyōshin had to deal with ‘perhaps the most complex tension between two forces in the Japanese cultural system: the tension between the group and the individual’ (Shimahara 1990:276). Traditionally, children have learnt from a young age how to cooperate and help each other, and how to react and act within a group (Okamoto 1992:37; Dore and Sako 1989:11). Indeed, so great has the emphasis been on the group that some wonder whether Japanese children would be able to socialise and be comfortable if left on their own (Woronoff 1980:36; Duke 1986:27). As it is the school that plays a major role in developing this group behaviour (Duke 1986:25), changes to the way the group and the individual are treated at school will effect the overall development of the group consciousness. It must be noted that the way in which group behaviour develops is not the same at all schools, or even the same within a school, as activities, such as clubs, operate in different ways. Some clubs, most notoriously the baseball club at lower secondary school, can be severe and do not demonstrate the group-harmony characteristics that many praise the group orientation with. 1 Although many teachers try to develop groups and sub-groups that are made up of students with varying abilities (though students may not be aware of this) so that they experience things that help them develop skills in co-operation (Cummings 1980:13, 126–7, 130), the group behaviour develops from within and independently of teacher control. However, student guidance from the teacher remains an important element in developing correct behaviour (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:3, 27; Monbushō 1995:88). Indeed, as a result of the changes in Japan’s society, such as urbanisation, and the increase in nuclear families with fewer children, Monbushō believes that student guidance will need to be improved in the future. However, as Rinkyōshin emphasised (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyōkai 1987a:80–3), this guidance cannot be provided by the teachers and schools alone, but needs to be a combined effort with the family, community and society as a whole. For this reason centres have been established providing counselling and advice (Monbushō 1995:88, 89). The Japanese have learnt to ‘sway with the breeze’, so that group harmony can be maintained, as the improvement of the group in turn improves the individual (Duke 1986:33, 193–4). This concept runs contrary to the conventional idea of developing ‘individuality’, but in other respects the individual in Japan ‘retains a very strong selfidentity’ (Reischauer and Jansen 1995:159). Previous attempts at introducing different relationships in the classroom and individuality have failed in Japan, for The intrinsic value and dignity of the individual has deep roots in Japanese social customs. Individuality per se does not’ (Duke 1986:162). However, Monbushō has made it clear that it now wishes to see ‘further improvement of primary and secondary education through a return to the fundamental goal, which is to provide education that places a high value on the individual’ (Monbushō 1995:3). To say that the Japanese do not value the individual would be a mistake; they are ‘not a nation of lemmings’ (Duke 1986:193). The Japanese do care about the individual and the individual’s viewpoint, even though it can be obstructive. Duke (1986:163) gives a clear example of this, citing the delay that can be caused to the building of expressways in

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order to accommodate the views of those who are protesting about its route, concluding that the process can ‘result in inaction in its overconcern for minority viewpoints’. The delays to the construction of Narita Airport, and subsequently a second runway, caused by individuals not wishing to move or sell land are perhaps the most well-known examples. The emphasis on individuality is also closely linked with the increased emphasis on moral education, and the solutions to the juvenile delinquency problem. In the past, such things as individual rights and social justice have not been a central part of the education system (Rohlen 1983:265; Shimahara 1990:277). Rinkyōshin’s emphasis on both may appear to be ‘paradoxical’, but it reveals not only the conflict between the traditional and the new, but also the need for a balance (Shimahara 1990:278). However, these areas are now being developed so that (Japanese) ‘individualism’ (kosei) does not lead to selfishness, immaturity and a reduction in social responsibility, which have often been associated with (Western) ‘individualism’ (kojin shugi) in Japan (Reischauer and Jansen 1995:160, 166; Hendry 1992:56; Moeran 1989:70; Roesgaard 1998:161). It is the qualities of ‘independence, self-control, endurance, a sense of responsibility, a feeling of togetherness, consideration for others, and a sense of gratitude’ that most parents wish to have instilled in their children (Monbushō 1995:10). Ironically, it has been the education system itself that has emphasised the group at the expense of the individual and that has led to some of the problems of juvenile delinquency and bullying (see Chapter 8), which the new education system hopes to remedy through ‘individualism’. Japanese children have never had the ‘encouragement of choice and display of individuality’ that is found in American high schools (Rohlen 1983:309). However, the key word here I believe is ‘display’, as for Western people, ‘individuality’ has almost to be proven through ‘displays of individuality’ rather than the thoughts and actions of the individual. McVeigh (interview, 4 May 1996) believes that the Japanese ‘play act’ to conform to the group, and although they perhaps do this more than people in other countries, it happens there too. The reality is that Japan and the West ‘are much less different than the American Lone Ranger myth, for example, or the traditional Japanese ideal of selfless merging with the group would lead one to believe’ (Reischauer and Jansen 1995:128–9). Part of the problem has been the tendency for any differences between cultures to be emphasised so that a point could be proven. These judgements have been based as much on emotion than on fact, as the goal was to prove that the Japanese were ‘opposite’ to Westerners (Rosenberger 1992:2; Roesgaard 1998:156). The Japanese displays of group loyalty and the ‘herd instinct’ revealed through their susceptibility to fads has continued to disguise the levels of individuality (Reischauer and Jansen 1995:135). Although group harmony has been of obvious benefit to Japan’s economic development, to treat the Japanese as a ‘uniform race of pliant, obedient robots, meekly conforming to rigid social rules and endlessly repeating the established patterns of their society’ would be a mistake (Reischauer and Jansen 1995:139, 159). However, Okamoto (interview, 5 December 1997) argues that there is no ‘need to emphasise individuality as they are already individuals’ and ‘are different from the beginning’. He also argues that the problem is that it is believed that by adding something to the education system, the children’s individuality can be developed, whereas in fact they should be ‘taking off the factors that are suppressing diversity’.


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Five-day week and the curriculum Perhaps one of the greatest changes to the structure of the education system in recent years has been the introduction of the five-day week. It is this issue that has come to be the flagship of the ‘liberalisation’ of the education system, as it encompasses all aspects of the new education system that ‘gives priority to fostering children’s willingness to learn independently and their ability to think, judge, and express themselves by means of hands-on learning and a problem-solving approach to learning’ (Monbushō 1995:23–4, 28). A system whereby one Saturday in every month was designated a school holiday was first introduced in September 1992, a second free Saturday was then introduced in April 1995, with the system being fully introduced in 2002. One of the main arguments used against the introduction of the five-day week was that the extra time may be spent by students studying at home, or more probably at juku. This was the view that was taken not only by parents and teachers, but also originally by government officials (Duke 1986:212; Simmons 1990:93). In 1994, around 17 per cent of respondents cited this problem as their reason for opposing the increase in free Saturdays. However, only 0.3 per cent of children were found to attend juku in the morning during a survey on the second Saturday in June 1994, and only 1.0 per cent in the afternoon (Monbushō 1995:36). However, a 1997 survey found that although most (over 60 per cent) spend the free time at home, 35 per cent of the elementary school students and 17.1 per cent of the lower secondary school students spent the time at juku or studying (Shimizu et al. 1999:105) Many surveys have shown that opposition to the five-day week has fallen. In 1992, two surveys were carried out, one before the implementation of the first stage of the introduction of a five-day week, and one shortly after. The level of opposition fell from 44.1 per cent to 24.3 per cent, while support rose from 48.5 per cent to 64.1 per cent (Monbushō 1995:25). Surveys were also carried out before and after the introduction of the semi-monthly five-day week in 1994. The results, as in 1992, showed that after implementation the level of opposition fell (from 39.8 per cent to 27.7 per cent) and the level of support rose (from 50.8 per cent to 66.0 per cent) (Monbushō 1995:31). Despite this, private schools, which can set their own school holidays, have shown some resistance to introducing the five-day week, apparently ignoring the encouragement from the Monbushō. 2 The level of support for the five-day week appears to be rising, and Monbushō is particularly pleased that the reasons stated by those supportive of the system reflect its own aims for the system. 3 However, for those opposed to the five-day week, the main reasons were ‘some families cannot take care of children on Saturdays’ (58.4 per cent), ‘disruption of children’s life rhythm’ (51.4 per cent), ‘slower progress in school studies’ (40.3 per cent), and ‘children will simply spend more time playing’ (35.2 per cent) (Monbushō 1995:33). Further analysis of the opposition and support of the five-day week shows some interesting differences. For example, more fathers support the five-day week for their children than oppose it (43.5 per cent and 38.6 per cent respectively), whereas for mothers, the results are reversed (28.1 per cent supportive, 49.2 per cent opposed)

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(Monbushō 1995:29). This difference may have been caused by factors such as those fathers who do not have to work on Saturdays, and see little of their children during the week, hoping that they might have more time to spend with their children, whereas mothers, in particular the infamous kyōiku-mama, on the other hand, being typically more involved with the education of their children, may have been more wary of the increase in their children’s workload or the possibility of them learning less. Perhaps most interesting is what parents want to see done in respect to the implementation of the five-day week. The most popular answer (54.2 per cent) was that there should be improved access to school facilities. This is notable since this is what Rinkyōshin proposed to help the educational functions of the community and promote lifelong learning (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:247). The next two most popular answers (53.8 per cent and 37.6 per cent) called for provisions to be made for families that are busy on Saturdays, and for steps to be taken to introduce a five-day working week to complement the five-day school week (Monbushō 1995:34). These are closely related to the continuing social changes that Rinkyōshin foresaw (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:127), and changes that are to be further strengthened as a result of the five-day school week. Another fear of those opposed to the five-day week was that, without a reduction in the amount of work to be covered in the curriculum, the system would increase the burden on students. This is something that appeared to concern many mothers, teachers (Okada, interview, 30 November 1997), and was also a problem that Monbushō was aware of (Monbushō 1995:25). It is because of the curriculum that the final stage of implementation was seven years after the second. The curriculum is central to an education system. Changes to it not only reflect ideological changes about the education system, but also can reinforce these changes. The greater emphasis on the individual, and the quest to allow children to study what is of interest to them, is another consideration that has to be taken into account at the same time as the amount that has to be learnt is increased. According to one academic I interviewed in 1997, one of the problems in education is that ‘children are too busy and do not have time to think’. The Curriculum Council (Kyōiku Katei Shingikai) was inaugurated in September 1985, and made a final report in December 1987 about the national standards of the curriculum at all levels of the education system, and many of the revisions were consistent with ideas recommended by Rinkyōshin. 4 Monbushō, having agreed to these revisions, then issued a revised Course of Study in September 1988 for elementary and lower secondary education, and in February 1989 for upper secondary education. The new Course of Study was then introduced in 1992 for elementary, 1993 for lower secondary and 1994 for upper secondary education (Monbushō 1995:17). The latest stage of the curriculum reform follows the Curriculum Council’s 1998 report, with introduction at the various levels of schooling taking place between 2000 and 2003 (Monbushō 2000a:94). However, despite these revisions and the creation of the Curriculum Council, one commentator I interviewed in 1997 believes that ‘there is no democratic system to decide what should be taught’ and the problem is that it is ‘experts that make the decision’, even Monbushō ‘cannot touch the curriculum’, and ‘experts try to teach things that are not necessary’ but are of interest to themselves. This leads to a situation similar to where a


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country could be led into war or create unnecessary weapons if decisions are made by the military. Some of the changes that have been made to the curriculum include more emphasis on interaction with nature at the kindergarten level, more ‘hands-on ‘activities, improving the teaching of history and culture, improving foreign language teaching with more emphasis on communication, more elective subjects at secondary schools (Monbushō 1995:17, 72; Monbushō 2000a: 93). However, the new curriculum also contains the elements discussed in the previous chapters, such as more emphasis on moral education and ‘healthy internationalism’. The problems regarding the content of the curriculum are likely to continue as further social and economic changes bring new information which some believe has to be included in the curriculum, while there are few areas which they believe can easily be trimmed (Okamoto 1992:86; Kobayashi 1986:71). One of the concerns that is starting to arise now is the ‘dumbing down’ of the curriculum. For example, students will no longer be told to make certain calculations using π equalling 3.14, but rather equalling 3. This may not appear to be a major problem, but even present elementary school students when they have tried sample questions using the new curriculum have claimed that it is too easy. The danger is that by making things too easy, children’s ability to think will also be reduced—in much the same way that the overuse of calculators in the United Kingdom has been seen to have had a negative outcome. However, Okamoto (interview, 5 December 1997) believes that it is necessary ‘to lower the standard of all subjects’ as ‘some things will never be used’, demonstrated by the fact that even adults can answer some lower secondary school questions. More than anything else, Okamoto believes that a new philosophy is needed, whereby it is acceptable to say that ‘we do not know the answer, it’s a mystery’, as this will encourage students to research these areas one day, rather than believing that all the answers they receive are definite and cannot be questioned. Therefore, Okamoto believes that ‘compulsory education should only cover basic education’, and if they want more, they ‘must go to university and discover it…this is lifelong learning’. Recognition is also given to study done outside the school, such as at other upper secondary schools, training colleges, correspondence courses and the passing of proficiency tests. For example, in the case of proficiency tests, eighteen subjects, such as English, are approved by Monbushō and are also being used to help give students recognition for pursuing their own interests. In 1993, 4,123,417 took proficiency tests, of which 1,977,384 were successful, with Grade 2 of the Practical English Proficiency Test, for example, being granted 3 credits (Monbushō 1995:46–7, 86). However, there is a danger that, although students can choose which tests and subject to take, these tests are becoming another form of mandatory study. Rinkyōshin also recommended that schools and universities be given more choices when formulating curricula, and ‘allowing some of them to adopt exceptional practices’ (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:156–60), pointing to the apparent need for change in teaching methods away from the notorious rote learning method (anki kyōiku), which has been favoured in Japan for so long. Westerners tend to discourage rote learning because of the custom of it being used as a method of punishment and because the material was often seen as trivial, and only rewarding those who were good at taking

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tests (Kobayashi 1986:72; Beauchamp 1991b:39). However, Japan has long seen the benefits of such methods and has not been so quick to criticise. This change in attitude is reflected in Monbushō's view that more attention now needs to be placed on the acquisition of skills that can be used throughout students’ lives rather than on knowledge ‘that is forgotten the day after examinations’ (Monbushō 1995:19).

Elite education Central to the debate on ‘liberalisation’ of the education system is the battle over the balance between equality and quality. The Japanese have become sensitive to the issue of ‘equality’, partly as a result of the increasing view that they belong to the ‘middle class’. 5 It has been a long-held view that the Japanese education system is both high in quality as well as being equal. Indeed equality of opportunity has been achieved, ‘and is no longer an issue’ even though some students find it difficult to enter preferred institutions owing to financial limitations (Amano 1986b:2). However, some (Okamoto, interview, 22 March 2000; Fujita 1990:136) refer to the system as ‘Shichi-Go-San’ (7–5–3), meaning that the percentage of students understanding the lessons at elementary schools, lower secondary schools and upper secondary schools is 70 per cent, 50 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. 6 The degree to which this is actually the case is clearly demonstrated in Figure 7.1. With such results one has to question the idea of the system being equal. Partly as a result of the disparities in levels of understanding, the debate over ‘grade skipping’ (tobikyū) for brighter students, and ‘holding back’ (ryūnen) for those not keeping up, was intensified. The idea had been espoused by the 1971 Chūkyōshin report and was also suggested by a special School System Problem Sub-committee in 1981 in a plan known as the ‘Kondō Plan’, named after its Chairman, Kondō Tetsuo, and again by

Figure 7.1 Understanding of classes.

Source: Monbushō (2000a:98).


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the Kyoto Group as part of its recommendations on greater flexibility on the contents and methods of education (Chūkyōshin 1972:14–5; Schoppa 1991a: 66, 101; The Kyoto Group for Study of Global Issues 1985:33). It is an issue that causes great debate. Vogel and others believe that to the Japanese, the ‘threat of failure or of being held back is considered neither desirable nor necessary to encourage students to maintain minimal performance standards’ (Vogel 1979:175; Blinco 1991:136–7). In the past those students who have been struggling with the curriculum were believed to have gained through the extra effort given to them by the teachers, and the help provided by the brighter students who provided coaching in classes once they had finished their own work. The system was successful, especially when complemented by juku tuition. However, it has tended to ignore the aspirations of those who have proceeded with greater ease, and it also compounds the problems for those falling behind (ochikobore) as the amount they have to catch up with continues to increase (Dore and Sako 1989:10; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:26, 37; Kobayashi 1986:92). Many feel that ‘tracking’ threatens the ‘sense of togetherness’ and egalitarianism that exists in the Japanese education system. For Japanese students are not normally in direct competition with each other, but tend to be working together to enter the next level of education (Rohlen 1983:308, 309; Dore and Sako 1989:6; Reischauer and Jansen 1995:193; Vogel 1979:166). The new curriculum does allow ‘tracking’ at lower secondary schools, but since there was so much opposition from the teachers, the degree to which it would actually be implemented remains questionable (Schoppa 1991b:75 (footnote 54)). Zenkyō was opposed to any changes which could be seen as introducing greater stratification and making the education system less egalitarian, which could mean children feeling like failures at an even younger age (Zenkyō 1990a:14; Roesgaard 1998:149). One commentator in 1997 also told me that he thought ‘tobikyū at the compulsory level is not necessary, and is bad’ and that if students want to study extra this should be for them to do in their own time. However, Fujita (interview, 21 November 1997) believes that it will happen, although ‘it will be difficult’. The Japanese custom has allowed all students to graduate at the end of their period of study, particularly for compulsory education, regardless of whether they have mastered the curriculum or not (Amano 1986a:31; Reischauer and Jansen 1995:193). There has been no need for ‘tracking’ as the supposed egalitarianism and uniformity has meant that all students should be the same, with no students falling behind, or striving to be significantly ahead (Kitamura 1986:161). However, the view of Rinkyōshin, and people such as Ichikawa (1986:251), is that ‘Egalitarianism in the classroom can lead to uniformity of school performance’. Amano (interview, 5 June 1996) also argues that ‘equality stops individuality and creativity, and this needs to be changed’. According to Tanaka (interview, 10 May 1996), Nakasone also felt that there was ‘too much equality and not enough personality and individuality’. This is a view that now appears to be shared by Monbushō since it emphasises more education according to individual character and ability, even at lower secondary school. Monbushō, in an attempt to curb further increases in ‘dropouts’ at upper secondary schools, for example, has also introduced provisions to allow students still to progress even if they have failed some courses, so long as they complete the necessary requirements for graduation (Monbushō 1995:43).

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One of the problems is that it is not easy to measure the degree to which Japanese are ‘individuals’ or ‘creative’. The conclusion has always been that both are bound to be lacking owing to the emphasis on egalitarianism and uniformity (Duke 1986:33; Ichikawa 1986:252). The degree to which this was ever true, and is true today, is highly questionable as Japan could probably never have developed economically to the extent it has ‘if individual originality had been overly restricted by the group’ (Duke 1986:194). Rinkyōshin had concluded that as there was no lack of individuality in the people, the apparent lack of creativity and abilities to judge and analyse had to be a result of the education system, and so the methods and contents of teaching had to be improved. Rinkyōshin also felt that people’s ‘mental attitudes have been individualised and diversified, and their demand for freedom of choice has been increasing’ and so believed that it was dealing with an issue that had already been developing rather than starting a new policy in response to economic demands (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:321). Before Rinkyōshin, Japanese students did not have many choices. Indeed, the one choice that they could make, not to study hard, had severe repercussions. With the greater emphasis on individuality and choice, there will be a battle between learning the appropriate amount of knowledge and learning the skills and abilities necessary to use the knowledge. What constitutes ‘appropriate’ and ‘necessary’ will highlight the crux of the problem. The battle is summed up in two proverbs, ‘He who learns but does not think is lost’, and Confucius’s response to this, ‘He who thinks but does not learn is in great danger’ (Rohlen 1983:267, 316; Waley 1938:91). The Japanese school has been the place where children have been taught the ‘fundamental knowledge and values and to achieve physical development’, not the place to develop their own interests (Kobayashi 1986:78; Rohlen 1983:267), but this is now changing. Monbushō now considers that the abilities to think, judge and act for one-self are ‘necessities’, that it is a mistake to ‘teach excessively broad curricula within a limited number of years’, and that ‘priority must be placed on the promotion of education based on a new concept of scholastic ability’ (Monbushō 1995:12, 12–13, 17, 23, 24). The new curriculum takes account of these changes. However, this cannot be achieved by the education system alone, but needs the co-operation of society. This stance is closely related to that taken by Rinkyōshin which identified that two of the greatest problems in Japanese education were the ‘lack of respect for children’s personalities and lack of adjustment to society’s evolution’ (Roesgaard 1998:164). The new education system aims to develop the student’s expressive and critical skills (Koizumi, interview, 26 November 1997), which have tended to be seen as something that develop during adulthood, and so have never been tested in examinations, the passing of which has been one of the priorities to date (Rohlen 1983:245, 267–8; Buckley 1990:89). However, with greater emphasis being put on these areas and the recommendation that they be tested and taken into account during the admission or employment process, they are bound to be developed more in the future. The result of the changes may well have a profound effect on the degree of equality in the education system. Many parents have long wished for greater emphasis on the individual, while also maintaining an egalitarian education system. However, many take the first as a general policy idea and the second view for their own children, for ‘when the chips are down, most parents want success for their own children more than anything


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else’ (Okamoto 1992:65). This inevitably causes problems for those seeking to reform the education system, as the apparent support of parents for their policies is lost. The debate is intensified by the fact that Article 26 of the constitution states that ‘All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability.’ What is meant by ‘ability’ is a crucial point. The assumption has been that ‘all children have equal potential’ and the differences in achievement are a result of the differences in ‘effort, perseverance, and self-discipline, not from differences in individual ability’ (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:26). Therefore, an individual’s performance at school is a sign of their moral character as well as their knowledge and abilities (White and LeVine 1986:56; Simmons 1990:102). However, the fact that differences do exist, and that these differences should be developed rather than hampered, is evident from the continued demands from some quarters for elite education. The calls for elite education have been made for many decades with even Monbushō calling for ‘education appropriate for the ability and aptitudes of students’ (seito no nōryoku tekisei ni ōjita kyōiku), and the 1971 Chūkyōshin report had also called for attention to be given to the student’s aspirations (kibō) (Schoppa 1991a:44, 101, 278 (footnote 19)). Although Rinkyōshin never actually proposed the creation of ‘an elite’, its proposals for greater ‘individualism’ may well have provide a major step towards it. It is important to understand what brought about the change in attitude. According to Katsukata (1996:6, 7), there appear to be three main reasons: firstly, the recognition that rote learning ‘has reached its limits’; secondly, ‘the negative aspects of too much egalitarianism, homogeneity, and “me-too” thinking have become readily apparent’; thirdly, there is a need for more workers who can be flexible, rather than the companies training the easily moulded graduates of the past. Regarding the third point, Rinkyōshin had recommended the introduction of greater career guidance (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:139–40). The main problem was that its recommendation applied to secondary school level, where children are probably not yet sure what they want to do in the future, a problem which Monbushō has noted (Monbushō 1995:59). Indeed, I believe part of the problem in this regard is that the Japanese do not become adults until they are 20, which probably postpones the need to development and need to think about the future in the way that is found in England, for example. Conventionally, the Japanese individual has not been concerned with their own interests and has merely sought to enter the highest-ranking university possible, and ‘career guidance’ has been little more than ‘school and university selection guidance’ based on commercially produced tests (which have now been stopped) and ‘standard scores’. 7 As part of the need for greater emphasis on the individual, Rinkyōshin, as the Kyoto Group (The Kyoto Group for Study of Global Issues 1985:32) had done beforehand, also proposed that employers should pay more attention to applicants’ skills and abilities rather than which school or university they had attended. However, Rinkyōshin did not make it clear that the public sector, which tends to follow this practice the most, should also behave in this way (Schoppa 1991b:68). Yet changes have happened. The best example is the application forms for Sony and Hitachi, where the former does not include details about the applicant’s university and the latter does. Unsurprisingly, Hitachi has proven to be more popular with graduates from Tokyo University (Matanle, interview). The education system and the economy have a major effect on the career choices of

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people. The students have tended to aim for the educational record that will best help them achieve entry to the desired company. To change the way in which people study will require a change in the employment methods of companies and in attitudes towards the importance of the academic hierarchy, and the attitude that identifies some schools or companies as ‘good’ (Amano 1986a:24–5; Amaya and Nishio 1985:56). This hierarchy is created as the student population is ‘cut into slices’, creating a homogeneous student body at each school, for whereas the lower secondary schools were homogeneous and undifferentiated, the upper secondary schools are heterogeneous and differentiated. This has meant that at the lower levels there is ‘an excessive concentration of uninterested attendants’ who, with a ‘cooling-out’ of their ambitions and aspirations, become disillusioned with their educational, and future, life, and is one of the causes of ‘dropouts’ (Amano 1986a:30, 31; Simmons 1990:72, 80–1; Monbushō 1995:60; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:41) (also see Chapter 8). The continuing problems caused by school hierarchies, whereby the ‘opportunity for admission to top universities is now virtually monopolized by graduates from the top high schools’ (Amano 1986a:24), was identified by Chūkyōshin as a ‘serious problem’ in its report of April 1991. Central to the problem was the emphasis on the use of the ‘standard score’, which benefited students that could do well in all subjects, rather than judgements being made on the basis of individual characteristics of both institutions and students. This issue was addressed by Rinkyōshin (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a: 84–5), and is now a major concern in Monbushō (Monbushō 1995:7–8, 18, 21, 39–40). The solution to the problem is something that rests not only with the institutions, but also with society as a whole and the way it judges people. The greater individualism of the students is combined with the diversification of the schools and universities, as students are encouraged to select those institutions that satisfy their own interests and goals. Monbushō believes they should be given guidance, and consult with their parents, about which institutions are most appropriate and what needs to be done to gain admission, taking into account fees and commuting times (Monbushō 1995:63, 64). The problem in the future may be that as differences are emphasised, particularly in public education, the perception may be that ‘essential fairness’ will have been lost, which will be unpopular with many Japanese (Simmons 1990:127). This is a view supported by Okamoto (interview, 5 December 1997), who believes that Japanese people ‘hate differentiation’.

Skills for the future Rinkyōshin did not concern itself with the actual contents of each subject, but made recommendations as to what skills and abilities the students needed to develop. Central to Rinkyōshin’s proposals was the belief that there was a need for ‘developing creativity (sōzōryoku), the ability to think clearly (shikōryoku), judgement (handanryoku) and the power of expression (hyōgenryoku)’and for children to be able to cope with the age of information technology (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:138). Rinkyōshin made it clear that ‘creativity is closely related to individuality (sōzōsei wa kosei to missetsu na kankei o motsu)’ However, whereas individuality was being emphasised mostly at the


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higher levels of education, creativity was to be emphasised at all levels. Calls for greater emphasis of these skills began in the 1970s with people such as Amaya Naohiro, who later became a member of Rinkyōshin (Schoppa 1991a:64). Gradually the business world also came to believe that people with these skills, rather than the standard graduates that had been ‘produced’ in the past, were what was going to be needed in the future (Goodman 1989:25). 8 Therefore, it is not surprising that Rinkyōshin’s pro posals are seen as little more than a political response to economic demands (Shimahara 1990:272). However, there was a genuine feeling that as Japan was now one of the world leaders in knowledge and technical skills, it would have to become ‘more intellectually and scientifically creative than it has been in the past’ in response to the changes in its own society and the world (Reischauer and Jansen 1995:201). Although the Japanese are often cited as not being creative (Duke 1986:200–1, 215; Roesgaard 1998:164), it is important to discover to what degree this is actually the case. As mentioned above, creativity is not something that can easily be measured. Many Japanese, including Rinkyōshin and Monbushō, have tended to use the number of Nobel Prize winners as a very crude measurement. However, there is no evidence that any education system actually helps develop such winners, but the belief is that the Japanese education system hampers the development of the creative abilities in children (Okamoto 1992:34; Ichikawa 1986:251). One has to question whether the number of winners of Nobel Prizes is an appropriate measure of a nation’s creative and thinking abilities, since it has its own inherent problems, such as the fact that it awards exceptional individuals rather than ‘normal people’, and it is a fact that the Japanese do not invest much in pure science which tends to be favoured by the Nobel Prizes (Lynn 1988:126–7). This problem is also highlighted by the fact that society rewards creative thinkers such as Sir Richard Branson and Bill Gates, who dropped out of education relatively early, but forgets that for every success story such as theirs’, there are many more hundreds who remain either unemployed or in poorly paid jobs. Another measure that has been used by some people trying to show that the Japanese are less creative is the size of the technological trade deficit. However, this is something that all countries tend to suffer from during the early stages of their modernisation, and it cannot be put down to a lack of creativity. Indeed, the size of Japan’s deficit has been shrinking (Ichikawa 1986:251). Furthermore, Japanese children perform just as well in the creative sections of mathematical tests (algebra, geometry and verbal problems) as in the factual sections (arithmetical calculations). However, even this measure has its problems, since problem solving tests may not be the best way to measure creativity (Lynn 1988:126; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:51). In fact, there is no proof or evidence to suggest that the Japanese are less creative or have lower thinking ability than people in other countries (Okamoto 1992:30). I have come across examples of Japanese students demonstrating creativity, and other times when I was surprised by the degree of uniformity. To give one example for each case, when I asked one student in an English class where he lived, he replied that he lived in a ‘cardboard box at the local station’. To be able to reply so quickly in this way in a foreign language shows a degree of imagination and creativity. However, on another occasion I asked students in a class to draw a picture of a school. Thirty-five of the class of thirty-six drew a stereotypical three-storey Japanese school. This would not have bothered me, if it

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was not for the fact that their school (Mizuno Junior High School, Seto) did not conform to this style, and is itself very distinctive, being only two storeys high with a clock in the middle of two parts of the building that is about the same height as the school. This was drawn by only one student. However, on balance I do believe that the idea that the Japanese are not creative is something that has gone past its sell-by date, but like Okamoto (interview, 5 December 1997), who is ‘not sure if the Japanese are creative or not under any definition’, I question some of the measures that are being taken to develop creativity, in particular the idea that by adding something to the curriculum, children will become more creative. Even if evidence does not exist to show that the Japanese are not creative, the perception held even by many Japanese was that it was true. Nakasone said that if Japan were to ‘build up a society that is full of vitality and creativity as well as relevant to the 21 st century, it is a matter of great urgency to design necessary reforms’ (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:62). His answer to the problem was the need to reform the 6– 3–3 system as he believed that it was over-egalitarian and impeded the development of creative and thinking abilities which would become more and more necessary in the future (Schoppa 1991a:48). Changes are being made, and some already argue that Japan’s science education in elementary schools is better at developing thinking skills than that in American schools, 9 and Japan is also now a world leader in many areas of science research (Monbushō 1995:135). Emphasis has been taken off rote learning, which may have had a ‘dampening effect on creativity’ due to the huge quantity of facts that had to be absorbed rather than giving students time to think about the possible solution to problems (Schoppa 1991b:56; Duke 1986:200–1). However, there is no proof that rote learning does impede creativity, as the provision of such knowledge may in fact help lead to greater creativity later on (Ichikawa 1986:251; Schoppa 1991b:56, 57; Lynn 1988:126; Bono 1977). On top of this, the Japanese curriculum has always helped creativity in subjects such as art and music (White 1987:78–81), and the ‘the basic academic standards of the Japanese class are ideally suited for developing creative, original thinking’ (Duke 1986:203). Perhaps one of the problems is that people are trying to make judgements about the whole system, when there are perhaps differences throughout the system. Duke argues that the creative teachers are rarely to be found at the higher levels of education (Duke 1986:126). Indeed, the issue of creativity, and the supposed weakness of the Japanese in this area, was closely linked to another major concern, the weakness of Japanese universities (Schoppa 1991b:57–8). The suggestion, therefore, would be that the Japanese are creative and perhaps lose some of this ability during their education, though it has not been proven that they end up any less creative than people in other countries. One problem is that many of the judgements on Japanese thinking and creativity may be prejudiced by culture, with different attitudes towards how views should be expressed (Okamoto 1992:31). Language is probably also a barrier, which helps explain the lack of recognition for Japanese philosophy, for example, while their artistic creativeness is better known (Reischauer and Jansen 1995:200). Creativity and what constitutes good work tends to be judged against Western ideas and values, and so those which do not conform are rejected, without the necessary analysis of the Western ideas and values themselves as to whether they are appropriate or not. There has also been the tendency


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for the West to downplay the creative skills necessary to make innovative changes as opposed to inventions (Reischauer and Jansen 1995:202). Creativity, as a skill which is highly valued in the modern age, is closely related to responses to the information age. Japan’s responses have been quite perplexing. In 1986, Duke (1986:152) characterised this by pointing out that ‘In a nation that has achieved international notoriety for its highly developed computer industry, the low levels of diffusion of computer-assisted teaching, and computers themselves, in Japanese schools seems incongruous’. Rinkyōshin was quite detailed in its recommendations for the introduction of information technology, giving details on the type of equipment and design of computer rooms (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:288–91). However, Rinkyōshin also pointed out that care had to be taken with ‘the dark side of the information technology’ (jōhōka no kage) whereby people can become detached from nature and real experiences by spending too much time in front of computer screens, and have the ‘illusion’ (sakkaku) that machines can help with everything (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyōkai 1987a:192). Rinkyōshin believed that this would also impede the development of creative skills (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:192). Rinkyōshin recommended that information media be used to ‘invigorate and stimulate’ schools and universities, that research be done into the impact on education of new technology, and into how to combat and make up for the effects of the ‘dark side’ (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:194–6). Rinkyōshin also pointed to the need for information morality to be developed in the same way that traffic morality is needed for safe driving (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:287). Rinkyōshin wanted to get harmony between the information technology and nature and traditional culture (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:192). Despite this, both Zenkyō and Nikkyōso claimed that Rinkyōshin’s proposals for extra computers were driven by the desire to boost the Japanese computer industry (Roesgaard 1998:233–4). There is no doubt that the Japanese have been slow to introduce computers and technology at schools, and even in some offices. One of the problems with computers is that, unlike other machinery, they become obsolete very quickly as newer models with new features keep being introduced (Dore and Sako 1989:44). Monbushō has been providing subsidies to help the introduction of computers into schools. The target set in 1994 was to have twenty-two computers per elementary school (one between two students in an average class), forty-two (one per student) at lower and upper secondary school, and eight (one per student) at special schools. The target was to be reached within six years, with local allocation tax being used to fund the programme (Monbushō 1995:213–14, 223). Table 7.1 shows the degree to which computers had been introduced at public schools by the end of March 1999. It is questionable whether the target will be met for elementary and lower secondary schools, although it has been for upper secondary and special schools. The fact that computers were taking so long to be introduced into Japanese schools was no better demonstrated than by the fact that a charity record was released in 1997 to bring greater awareness for the need to improve computer technology at schools and for the idea of having all schools connected to the internet. 10 But just as the provision of computers at schools has improved, so access to the internet has also been improving rapidly. The number of schools with home pages has risen from just 9 in early 1995 to

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Table 7.1 Installation of computers at public schools (1999).

Number of schools (A)

Number of schools installing computers (B)

Installation ratio (%) (B/A)

Number of computers installed (C)

Average number of computers installed (C/B)

Elementary schools

23,686

23,140

97.7

297,845

12.9

Lower secondary schools

10,432

10,426

99.9

334,213

32.1


4,161

4,161

100.0

317,886

76.4

920

910

98.9

12,163

13.4

39,199

38,637

98.6

962,107

24.9

Special schools Total


2,630 by the end of 1997. However, the percentage of schools with internet access in 1998 was 13.6 per cent, 22.7 per cent and 37.4 per cent respectively for the three levels of schooling, though this was almost double the previous year (Shimizu et al. 1999:90, 91). Perhaps what is most surprising is that not all universities had internet connections, which probably reflects the continuing problems that face some aspects of higher education and that will be dealt with in greater depth below. Whatever the problems have been in introducing the technology, there is little evidence to suggest that the Japanese are any less capable of using the technology when they meet it in the workplace. Although Duke (1986:153) believed that it would be a mistake if the Japanese did not modernise the school, and that it could be their Waterloo, he also argued that ‘the Japanese have demonstrated over and over again that a traditional classroom can produce a worker who adapts readily to the requirement of modern technology’. The debate over information technology epitomises one of the issues brought about by the changes in Japanese society. For it had been the case in Japan that companies expected to receive a ‘standard product’ which they then trained to suit their own needs. However, companies now expect to recruit more creative and ‘individualised’ workers. On top of this, it has been the case that the companies provided the latest technology and trained their workers in its use (Duke 1986:168). However, with the reduction in training, companies now expect to recruit students who are computer and IT literate (Kitamura 1991:313; Feigenbaum and McCorduck 1988:244–5). Monbushō is aware of these problems, and the subsequent need to improve vocational and technical education, as well promote further scientific research (Monbushō 1995:16, 69). This places an extra burden


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on the school education system, though, historically, it has always managed to train students who have proven to be ‘surprisingly, and innovatively, adaptable to the needs of the times’ (Duke 1986:169–70). However, with the pace of change in technology it has become harder to provide complete training in all areas during education (Dore and Sako 1989:150), which strengthens the need for improved lifelong learning. Following Rinkyōshin’s reports, Monbushō has been implementing several policies relating to information technology. These include policies that are aimed at improving the information literacy of students, so that they will know how to access and use the information sought, training highly skilled people to help the development of the information society, and providing the necessary equipment and facilities. Monbushō has also established special groups to discuss the further steps that need to be taken in introducing more information technology and multimedia. The expansion of the use of information technology has also meant that Monbushō has pointed to the need to improve teacher training in the use of such technology, and has been establishing special courses for this purpose (Monbushō 1995:211, 212, 214). The new curriculum also includes areas that should help develop students that can respond to the information age. These include the introduction of basic use of computers in maths and science and a new area of study, ‘basic information’, within the industrial arts and home economics courses at lower secondary school; new subjects dedicated to information technology at upper secondary schools; as well as encouragement of information technology in all courses at all levels of education, where appropriate (Monbushō 1995:212–13). The great thing about information technology, and learning the skills required to use it, is that children tend to learn much of what is required by themselves if they have a computer at home. Natural inquisitiveness combined with ‘practice makes perfect’ means that the pressure on the school system to teach is reduced, although schools have to help those who do not have access to computers at home.

‘Liberalisation’ of higher education Special attention should be given to the recommendations related to higher education, which has been seen by many as the weakest part of the Japanese education system. Beauchamp (1991b:41) has described it as being ‘Somewhat like the aerodynamics of the gooney bird, the marvel of Japanese higher education is not that it fails to perform as well as critics would like, but that it works at all’. The fact that students have not tended to fail at university, with about 82 per cent of students graduating after four years and another 10 per cent graduating later (Shimizu et al. 1999:64), has not been seen as a result of high-quality education, but rather the lax attitude taken by the university towards poor students (Duke 1986:217). However, despite these criticisms, higher education also exerts great influence on the rest of the education system, as it has done since the early days of a formal education system in Japan (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:vii, 67; Linicome 1991:14), though Reischauer and Jansen (1995:195) suggest it may play a smaller role in society than the pressures of entrance to universities suggests. Traditionally higher education has also played another role, as universities became

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places where students could relax after the supposed great pressures of the entrance exams and before entering full-time employment, pursue their own interests, and develop their individuality (Hendry 1987:99; Kitamura 1991:317; Kitamura 1986:164, 165, 166; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:51; Buckley 1990:90; Okamoto 1992:48–9). Indeed, some students apparently have chosen universities and courses on the basis of which are likely to offer the most kyūkō (cancelled classes) (Okamoto, interview, 22 March 2000). As a consequence, and owing to the fact that the companies were seeking generalists, the courses that were offered at the universities were not particularly demanding, being made up of some general courses in the first two years, and specialist courses in the final two years, though some faculties did take the general courses more seriously than others. 11 However, many students were disappointed by the curriculum and became unmotivated (Kitamura 1991:314), which further weakened the status of higher education. Furthermore, society in general and the business community began to question the quality of higher education, especially in relation to the amount of money that was being spent on it (Schoppa 1991b:58). Before Rinkyōshin, the minimum requirements for graduation were 124 credits, of which 36 were in general studies, 8 in foreign languages, 76 in the major, and 4 in health and physical education. This balancing act led many university professors to complain that the students’ education was not ‘complete’ (Amano 1986a:35). Rinkyōshin, therefore, as part of its recommendations for greater emphasis on the individual, proposed that there should be greater specialisation (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:156–8). Rinkyōshin’s proposals were followed up by the University Council, which Rinkyōshin had recommended be established (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:170–1), when it made a report in February 1991. Following this, Monbushō, in June of that year, abolished the traditional make-up of university education, including the need for the study of a certain amount of credits in general education, foreign languages and specialised education, and made it clear that a new understanding was needed about the balance between general and specialised education (Monbushō 1995:111, 121, 124). Consequently, universities have had to change the way these departments work, the coordination between general and specialised education, and their relationship to studies at school and graduate schools (Monbushō 1995:112–13). These steps being taken by universities are seen as further diversifying higher education with more emphasis on specialised study (Katsukata 1996:8). The lack of specialisation was also cited as a reason for the poor state of postgraduate education in Japan (Amano 1986a:36). These problems were something that Rinkyōshin was also aware of, and stated that improvement in this area was an ‘urgent task’, as the demands on it were likely to increase in the future as more creative and original research would be demanded (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:160–1). Rinkyōshin proposed that teaching at the master’s level should be done in greater co-ordination with specialised undergraduate teaching, though it also proposed that special research-only schools should be established (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:161–2). Rinkyōshin also proposed that master’s courses should be changed to one year in length to encourage more students, including mature students, to enrol (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:161). Similar recommendations were made for doctoral courses, with the length being reduced to three years in most fields (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:161).


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Furthermore, Rinkyōshin proposed that the work done by graduate schools should be made more accessible to non-university bodies, and that there should be improved cooperation between private companies, outside organisations and the government with the universities (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:166–8). Among the recommendations that were subsequently made by the University Council and that have been introduced are the establishment of independent graduate schools, more flexible course lengths in line with Rinkyōshin’s proposals, allowing graduate students to work as teaching assistants, and making it easier for students to enter postgraduate studies, including a provision for students to begin their postgraduate studies after completing the third year of their undergraduate course, and for studies to be done on a part-time basis during day or evening courses. The University Council has also pointed out the need for the quality to be improved (Monbushō 1995:71, 73–4, 111–13, 119, 122). Although about 60 per cent of universities had graduate schools, over half of all the masters’ students and two-thirds of those studying for doctorates were concentrated at only twenty-four universities (5 per cent of the total) (Amano 1986a:35). However, this statistic may be deceptive, for many Japanese receive a doctorate as a result of research done during employment (Amano 1986a:36), and much research is conducted by companies in Japan, which viewed universities as being incapable of providing highquality research (Ogose 1988:161; Roesgaard 1998:85). National universities have tended to have better research facilities compared with private universities, which have concentrated on providing low-cost courses to as many students as possible, leading to a situation where their staff-student ratio is almost three times higher than public universities (Ogose 1988:158–9; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:54). This can reduce student motivation as teachers have less time to spend on each individual student (Reischauer and Jansen 1995:197). However, the problem, particularly at national universities, has been that recruitment and promotion have been based on research work rather than on teaching skills and so courses have been developed that interest members of staff rather than the students (Kitamura 1986:167). However, to be successful, Rinkyōshin’s proposals would have to be matched by a change in employers’ attitudes. For many Japanese employers have preferred to employ graduates at 23, or even a master’s graduate, and spend a couple of years training them than employ them at 28 with a doctorate (Feigenbaum and McCorduck 1988:244; Amano 1986a:36; Reischauer and Jansen 1995:195; Kitamura 1991:309). For those with a master’s degree or doctorate in humanities or social sciences, employment has tended to be restricted to education (Amano 1986a:36). However, gradually attitudes have been changing owing to the expectations about what skills will be needed in the future. This has been reflected in, and reinforced by, the increase in numbers enrolling at graduate schools (see Figure 7.2). Furthermore, the reforms have made it easier for the graduate schools to secure funding from outside the university (Monbushō 1995:122–3).

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Figure 7.2 Enrolment for masters’ and doctorate courses.

Source: Shimizu et al. (1999:37). To alleviate the problem of falling student numbers, Kitamura (1991:315) believes that universities, as well as receiving extra funding through research, will have to provide more courses that are of interest to students, such as computer science, international relations and business management. In fact, some universities have already been successful in pursuing such marketing techniques. Kitamura (1986:168) also thinks that this movement to ‘student consumerism’ is ‘not temporary but an inevitable and historical trend’, so ‘the most important challenge for universities is deciding how to adapt to the changes the trend is causing while maintaining their identity as traditional centers of learning’. As a result of these changes, and the poor economic climate which has either put people off or made it impossible for them to find employment, the advancement rate to university in recent years has seen a dramatic rise. Although it has always been thought that the rate was high in Japan, it has tended to be between 30 and 35 per cent, having fallen from a peak of 40.9 per cent during the 1970s. However, the rate has increased every year since 1990 and reached a record 49.1 per cent in 1999 (Shimizu et al. 1999:38; Monbushō 1999a:288). But the falling population is a major concern and there are likely to be more and more places available and less competition for them. This is demonstrated by the pass rate for entrance examinations (i.e. the percentage of students who enter university or junior colleges compared with applicants for these institutions) rising to a record 81.4 per cent in 1999 (Monbushō 1999a: 288). The result is that university closures due to lack of students is becoming a very real possibility. However, there is no precedent for this. Since the war, only two small private universities and one national university have closed. Similarly only forty-two junior colleges had been closed by 1987, out of nearly 650 established since 1951 (Kitamura 1991:311; Monbushō, Zenkoku Daigaku Ichiran, 1988, and Zenkoku Tankidaigaku Ichiran, 1988). In other words, higher education has survived demographic fluctuations before. Indeed, the number of universities since


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Rinkyōshin was established has risen from 460 to 622 (Monbushō 2000a:13). However, with the other problems facing higher education, such as the pressure to reduce the subsidies to private universities (which accounts for about one-third of their expenditure) (Kitamura 1991:313), the change in the student population may play a decisive role in the survival of many institutions. 12 I believe that it is inevitable that there will be university mergers, at the very least, perhaps with the creation of campuses specialising in particular fields, in the next decade. The process will not be an easy one, but it could be invigorating and be what higher education in Japan needs. Further invigoration should also come about through the plans to change the national universities into independent administrative legal entities. This is an example of yet more ‘liberalisation’ of higher education. Although there are many at universities that I have spoken to who feel that there is a long way to go, they also admit that the situation is better now than it was twenty years ago.

Lifelong learning One of the key phrases developed by Rinkyōshin was ‘lifelong learning’, something that Nakasone spoke about soon after becoming prime minister (Japan Times 25 January 1983). Lifelong learning was central to solving many of the problems that Rinkyōshin had identified within the education system and society, such as the overemphasis on an individual’s academic background, the lack of career- and interest-oriented study, and the ageing society (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:71). Rinkyōshin helped make people realise that learning does not start and finish with school and university education, but that it occurs throughout one’s lifetime, and that it also includes such things as sports, cultural activities, volunteer activities and hobbies. Japan has been described as having gakureki shugi or gakureki shakai. These phrases have been translated variously as the ‘diploma disease’ (Dore 1976:ix), a ‘qualification society’ (Dore 1976:42), or ‘educational credentialism’ (Amano 1990b:113). This overreliance on academic background was seen as the root cause of problems such as ‘examination hell’ (see Chapter 8), and was preventing students from studying courses that interested them, as they concentrated solely on trying to get to the institution that would give them the opportunity to get into a ‘good’ company. However, the difference in earnings between those that have and do not have university degrees is not as great as in many other countries, and initial salaries are not dependent on the place of study as is the case in France (Ichikawa 1986:246, 250). Rinkyōshin proposed that this belief that where one studied was most important should be ended (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:81). However, despite support for this proposal, which some considered to be too vague (Schoppa 1991a:6), the early indications were that little had changed, with the government being particularly guilty of continuing to employ graduates from institutions such as the Tokyo University (Schoppa 1991a:6). Amano (interview, 5 June 1996) believes that companies still tend to look at the name of the university that an applicant attended, and this fuels the demand for ‘meigara daigaku’ (‘brand-name universities’), which make up about 10 per cent of all universities. Consequently Monbushō is still conducting research into how to change

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attitudes further (Monbushō 1995:86). However, as a result of the reforms, Fujita (interview, 21 November 1997) believes that there will soon be an end to the gakureki shakai. Under lifelong learning, it should become easier for adults to study at university, which have tended to be ‘youth-centred’ (Amano 1986a:36), and Rinkyōshin hoped that it would give people a ‘second chance’ at receiving higher education (Roesgaard 1998:14). Monbushō considers it the universities’ ‘social responsibility’ to improve such opportunities (Monbushō 1995:112). However, the process is slow and the majority of adult education was at first provided by profit making institutions rather than by schools and universities (Amano 1986a:37; Amano 1990c:36), though Rinkyōshin pointed out that although schools and universities would be central to lifelong learning, private organisations should be encouraged to provide lifelong learning and receive assistance from the government to do so (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:126–9). Rinkyōshin’s recommendations were furthered developed by the University Council, which indicated that lifelong learning was one of the greatest changes facing higher education (Monbushō 1995:119). Universities have begun to accept more adults and have created quotas for the numbers of such students, as was recommended by Rinkyōshin (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:125). In 1993 a total of 3,665 adults were enrolled, which had risen to 5,070 by 1999 (Monbushō 2000a:15). Many universities have also begun to provide evening classes to take account of the limited time that some have. Further flexibility has been introduced through the establishment of a system for ‘special register students’, who can register as part-time students for particular subjects and courses at universities and special training colleges and receive credits in them (Monbushō 1995:73–4, 82, 113–14). An important figurehead of lifelong learning is the University of the Air (broadly equivalent to the Open University in the United Kingdom). It first took students in April 1985, with its radio and television broadcasts limited to the Kantō region. The University has continued to grow from its original 17,038 students to 73,446 students by 1999, and the broadcasts became nationwide in 1998. There are no entrance examinations for the University of the Air, and students can start either in April or October (Monbushō 2000a: 8, 67). In the past the assumption has been that all knowledge had to be taught during school education. However, with the shift to lifelong learning, the schools are being expected to provide the foundations in knowledge, skills and behaviour, so that the individuals can choose more freely what they want to study and learn in the future and are capable of doing so. This shift is particularly important as the amount and type of knowledge and skills is continuing to increase and change, and so cannot be exclusively taught in schools. This realisation has helped to reinforce the changes, including the greater emphasis on the individual, in school education. In 1987 Monbushō began to develop a system so that information about lifelong learning activities was more readily available. Since 1989 exhibitions and festivals have been sponsored by Monbushō to promote lifelong learning, and Monbushō created the Lifelong Learning Bureau to help co-ordinate and promote all aspects of lifelong learning. Lifelong learning organisations now exist in all prefectures and, by October 1993, twenty-six prefectures had established lifelong learning councils, with a further ten


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being created by April 1999. Lifelong learning has also been promoted at the municipal level, with the creation of ‘lifelong learning communities’, of which there were fifty-four by October 1993, and 134 by April 1999 (Monbushō 1995:72, 77, 78, 79, 80; Shimizu et al. 1999:209, 211). In 1990, the Lifelong Learning Promotion Law was enacted, which allowed central and local government to develop a framework for improving lifelong learning. The law was ‘so much in accord’ with the Rinkyōshin proposals ‘that it offers further proof’ that the Rinkyōshin ‘reports are central documents in national educational policy since Nakasone’ (Roesgaard 1998:202). 13 The Lifelong Learning Council produced a report in 1992 that identified four priorities in the shift to lifelong learning. Firstly, there was the need to promote recurrent education; secondly, to encourage volunteer activities; thirdly, to improve out-of-school activities and facilities; fourthly, to increase opportunities to study contemporary issues (Monbushō 1995:71). The link between lifelong learning and community development is very important. To develop this link further, schools have been encouraged to make their facilities available to the community. In 1994, 93.5 per cent of elementary schools, 88.7 per cent of lower secondary schools and 59.7 per cent of upper secondary schools made their facilities available, usually for sports, but increasingly for other activities. On top of this, 382 universities made their sports facilities available to the public in 1991 (Monbushō 1995:84). Such action will undoubtedly help to strengthen the community and develop life-long learning. In 1991, The National Institution for Academic Degrees was established which aims to provide recognition of studying carried out in higher education by giving degrees to those who have reached the same standard as those who are studying full time (Monbushō 1995:126). This body should help the development of a lifelong system as people will be encouraged to take up further studies since they can receive a significant academic reward at the end. Effectively there now appears to be three types of university developing in Japan: those which are research or graduate oriented, those which emphasise undergraduate education, and those which also offer courses that are relevant to those in work and offer lifelong education to those who wish to pursue their own interests (Katsukata 1996:8). Lifelong learning could also become a means to help the schools and universities that were struggling to cope with the fall in the student population. By offering diverse courses that are of particular interest to individuals, they may be able to boost their enrolments, limit their financial problems, and thus reduce the demands for subsidies and support from the government. Lifelong learning is not limited to the use of school and university facilities. There has also been a need to improve and develop other facilities such as citizens’ halls, libraries and museums. The number of citizens’ halls has increased from 17,650 in 1983 to 20,744 by 1995; libraries from 1,642 in 1984 to 2,396 by 1996; and museums from 676 in 1984 to 985 by 1996 (Shimizu et al. 1999:237, 244, 246). The number of people using these facilities has also continued to grow. Monbushō is also encouraging the production of material that can be used for lifelong learning, and material which is of particular quality is given the status of ‘Monbushō sentei’ (recommended by the Monbushō) or ‘Monbushō tokubetsu sentei (special

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recommendation by Monbushō) (Monbushō 1995:166–7). Although this is by no means a form of authorisation that is used for textbooks, the fact that people may tend to use materials that have such markings means that Monbushō will be able to maintain a certain degree of control over what is used in lifelong learning. There can be little doubt that the education system is changing. The introduction of sixyear secondary schools and the introduction of the five-day week signify ‘real change’ (Fujita, interview, 21 November 1997). On top of this, there is now greater emphasis on the individual, which is no longer an empty phrase as some had claimed in the past. However, the next chapter will analyse to what degree the reforms covered in this chapter, as well as the previous three chapters, on top of other reforms to be analysed, have actually altered the situation for those suffering the worst effects of the education system.

8 The social problems The education reform debate began in 1983 as a result of the perceived problems in the education system demonstrated by the incidents of juvenile delinquency, school violence and ijimei. Therefore, having already analysed some of the central issues in the education reform debate, it is worth analysing what has happened to these problems and whether they were really as great as was projected in the media.

Juvenile delinquency Juvenile delinquency is not a new phenomenon in Japan. The rise that was seen in the late 1970s and early 1980s was referred to as the ‘third postwar peak’. The first peak was around 1951 and was linked to the social and economic problems following Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War; the second peak, in about 1964, was seen to be due to the large numbers who had migrated to the large cities in search of employment. However, the third time the blame was laid upon social changes and the education system (Parker 1987:154). Nakasone (1984:13) had blamed the juvenile delinquency problem, as well as other problems, on the neglect given to the role of the family and community in education. Rinkyōshin, unsurprisingly, also took this line, and stated that schools should not be attempting to handle such problems by themselves (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:100–2), a view that Monbushō also has now adopted (Monbushō 1995:91). There is a Japanese saying that there are four things to be feared in life: earthquakes, thunder, fire and fathers (jishin, kaminari, kaji, oyaji). However, while mothers may continue to tell their children that the father will discipline them if they misbehave, in recent decades the father has not been a figure to be feared, and it has been left to the mother to provide the discipline (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:21). The mother also, however, has tended not to fulfil this role (Hoshi 1978; Parker 1987:149). Many juvenile delinquents are found to have been ‘indulged by their parents’ and be ‘immature for their age’ (Parker 1987:144, 148). Indeed, Horio (1988b:16) believes that part of the problem has been the ‘irresponsible attitude of parents who expect teachers to provide the discipline which they themselves fail to impart to their children’. This problem is compounded by the fact that many see ‘youth problems’ in Japan as ‘school problems’, since they are supposed to carry out the roles that are carried out by families, communities and even churches in many other countries (Okamoto 1992:22–3) (see Chapter 5). However, if before Rinkyōshin the school was seen as the place to teach discipline, by 1994 things appear to have changed. According to a Monbushō survey, 63.3 per cent believed that it was the ‘primary role of the family’, and another 24.6 per cent said that

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‘all things considered, [it was] the role of the family’. Less than 0.5 per cent said that it was the role of the school, and only 11.1 per cent said that they were about the same (Monbushō 1995:15). The problem is that although people may answer a survey rationally in this way, the degree to which they behave and truly think this way appears to be very different. Factors that are thought to lead to juvenile delinquency in many countries are not that common in Japan, for example Japan has relatively low levels of divorce, poverty and reported adult crime. Indeed, education is regarded to be one of the reasons why Japan does not have many kinds of social problems (Rohlen 1983:3). However, the worry must be that if these social problems increase, which they are, the juvenile delinquency problem in Japan will also increase. Indeed, many feel that unless the juvenile delinquency problem is solved then this will actually lead to higher adult crime, and so begin a vicious circle (Ames 1981:77). To improve the students’ behaviour, Rinkyōshin sought to have the environment the students study in reformed, as well as dealing with the problem students directly Rinkyōshin hoped there would be a move towards having smaller schools (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:150–2), a move that would be helped by the reducing number of children of school age in Japan. This would mean that all children should receive more attention and have better access to facilities. Rinkyōshin also hoped that the size of classes could be reduced (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:150–2), a move that had already been started by the government, again helped by the fact that since 1989 the student population has been shrinking (Monbushō 1995:39). Rinkyōshin also recommended that international comparisons should be made, so that an appropriate staff-student ratio could be found, and that the facilities at schools should be improved, providing students with a more fulfilling education (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:151). Reducing staff-student ratios is a popular issue, as the logic is so easy to comprehend: the lower the ratio, the better the education due to the increased attention given to each student and the ease in controlling the class. However, the performance of Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese children in international tests would appear to question the validity of the argument. Despite this, it remains a goal of many advanced countries. Juvenile delinquency and violence at schools became a major news story and remained a focus of media attention for much of the early 1980s, and education was perceived as being in a state of ‘crisis’. One of the fears that these stories raised was that they were only the tip of the iceberg, as schools and parents were often reluctant to expose problems that would harm their reputations (Parker 1987:142; Wolferen 1989:91; Schoppa 1991b: 71–2 (footnote 6)). Some estimates suggest that the actual number of cases of juvenile delinquency may be between five and ten times higher than the reported levels (Ichikawa 1986:249). The dilemma was that no accurate data existed to assess the real size of the juvenile delinquency problem. Although 49,638 youths were arrested in 1982 and despite claims that a half of all crimes were committed by juveniles, the Metropolitan Police Department said that the number of cases of juvenile delinquency and crime had fallen in Tokyo that year (Japan Times 22 October 1982, 24 December 1982, 20 January 1983, 6 February 1983). This may have been due to a settling down after the huge rise of around 44 per cent in school violence in 1980 (Asahi Nenkan 1982:474). However, the national picture appeared to


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show a continuing problem, for according to the National Police Agency, the number of assaults on teachers in 1982 was double that for 1981, and over four times higher than the figure in 1978 (Hayao 1993:48; Schoppa 1991b:53; Schoppa 1991a:49). Furthermore, whereas between 1973 and 1982 the number of 19 year olds arrested remained fairly constant, the number for 14 year olds increased 2.5 times (Tsukuda 1986:107), and in 1983 more than 2,000 secondary schools had police onlookers at the graduation ceremony in an attempt to curb problems (Fujita 1990:124). Part of the problem with the statistics was that the media reporting of juvenile delinquency may have caused increased interest, and made more people inclined to report cases. However, as media interest subsided, so the people may have become less inclined to report cases. Therefore, the increase and the decrease in the size of the problem may have been exaggerated. The same argument can also be used for the reporting of incidents of ijime, as will be discussed below. It is also interesting to note that as attention on these problems has increased again in recent years, so the levels in reported cases and schools reporting cases have also increased again (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). In fact, although Rinkyōshin wanted to have international comparisons made, such data would be largely meaningless. In 1983, the year before Rinkyōshin was established, the 2,580 cases of school violence and 1,270 assaults on teachers were ‘statistically insignificant’ compared with the situation in the United States, where, in 1983, 282,000 students were physically attacked and 1,000 teachers assaulted to the extent that they needed medical attention every month (Schoppa 1991b:54; Duke 1986:188). Indeed, the Japanese still do not tend to make international comparisons in this area, but concentrate on whether they consider the figures acceptable by their own domestic standards, though many are aware of the enormity of the problems in countries such as the United States— to the extent that they tend to overlook or forget about problems on their own doorstep. 1 Teachers have often become the scapegoats when problems of juvenile delinquency have arisen, because of the view that such problems are ‘school

Table 8.1 Reported cases of school violence and assaults on teachers (at public lower secondary and upper secondary schools).

Year

Cases of violence between students

Assaults on teachers

1982

3,042 (23.1%)

1,563 (10.2%)

1983

2,580 (23.3%)

1,270 (10.3%)

1984

2,037 (24.3%)

859 (14.2%)

1985

1,955 (24.5%)

798 (14.7%)

1986

1,778 (29.0%)

731 (14.6%)

1987

2,074 (29.7%)

665 (16.2%)

1988

2,557 (34.3%)

844 (14.6%)

1989

2,873 (33.7%)

880 (15.5%)

1990

2,957 (37.1%)

938 (24.0%)

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1991

3,418 (38.9%)

858 (26.3%)

1992

3,568 (35.3%)

963 (24.8%)

1993

3,806 (37.2%)

917 (21.6%)

1994

4,498 (33.8%)

992 (19.7%)

1995

5,251 (32.8%)

1,115 (20.4%)

1996

6,653 (29.6%)

1,150 (15.1%)

1997

14,650 (24.5%)

3,560 (12.5%)

Source: Based on data from Shimizu et al. (1999:72). Note: Figures in brackets show the percentage of cases occurring at upper secondary school.

Table 8.2 Number of schools reporting incidents of school violence (public schools only).

Year Lower secondary schools


Total (percentage increase/decrease on previous year)

1982

1,388

415

1,803

1983

1,373

349

1,722 (−4.5%)

1984

1,203

281

1,484 (−13.8%)

1985

1,173

283

1,456 (−1.9%)

1986

979

314

1,293 (–11.2%)

1987

988

309

1,277 (−1.2%)

1988

1,010

392

1,402 (9.8%)

1989

1,136

452

1,588 (13.3%)

1990

1,187

498

1,685 (6.1%)

1991

1,237

572

1,809 (7.4%)

1992

1,293

590

1,883 (4.1%)

1993

1,285

597

1,882 (−0.1%)

1994

1,477

693

2,170 (15.3%)

1995

1,460

775

2,235 (3.0%)

1996

1,860

918

2,778 (24.3%)

1997

3,147

1,519

4,666 (68.0%)

Source: Based on data in Shimizu et al. (1999:72).


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problems’ and that discipline should be enforced by the teachers. During the course of this study, many teachers were found to ignore students that were misbehaving, aware that the problem would go away, at least no longer be their problem, upon the student’s graduation. However, with more serious incidents, the teachers will often visit the child’s home and discuss the problem with the parents and the importance of not having any black marks on their record when it comes to applying to schools, universities and companies. Japanese juvenile delinquency takes many forms, as is reflected by the different classifications of delinquency in law. 2 At first, many students tend to disobey school rules concerning uniform and hairstyles. However, some go on to commit crimes, such as smoking and drinking alcohol (which are not permitted until 20) and glue sniffing. Students caught committing such crimes outside school are dealt with by the police, but the school is usually also informed, and repeated offences can lead to expulsion. Students found breaking other school rules, including uniform rules, outside school are also dealt with by the school if they are notified by members of the public or worried parents (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:46). Although suspensions do occur, they are avoided whenever possible, and are particularly rare at compulsory schools. The means that many schools take to solve discipline will be discussed further below. Under the new curriculum students are taught more about the implications of smoking, drinking alcohol, the use of narcotics and so on (Monbushō 1995:94–5). Other than the various kinds of juvenile delinquency, another problem that has continued to worry educationalists is the increasing number of those refusing to attend school and ‘dropouts’. As already discussed, one of the primary causes of this problem has been the increase in students attending upper secondary school who do not want to be there, but attend in the belief that upper secondary education is a necessity. After a while these students become disillusioned and decide to ‘drop out’, after possibly also causing some discipline problems. Up to the 1970s, upper secondary schools tended only to have students who were attending the school with the sole aim of entering university, which gave them a motivation to study (Okamoto, interview, 22 March 2000; Duke 1986:70; Ichikawa 1986:251). However, as upper secondary education became seen as being effectively part of the compulsory education system, with almost all children attending, it meant that the number of children who were not fully motivated to study increased. In 1997, 111,491 students (2.6 per cent) ‘dropped out’ of upper secondary school before graduation (see Figure 8.1). However, the problem is not limited to upper secondary school. In 1998, 26,014 elementary school students and 101,680 lower secondary school students refused to attend school for more than thirty days, the highest figures ever, though this still represented less than 0.30 per cent and 1.90 per cent of students at the two levels (see Figure 8.2). However, the worrying trend that is shown is Figure 8.3 is that the levels of truancy rise grade by grade, just as the level of understanding falls level by level (see Chapter 7), and the level of enjoyment also falls level by level (see below). This may well indicate a link to the pressures of examinations. Monbushō is now seeking ways to deal with this problem, and try to understand what is causing it. Whereas previous research has been concerned with the individuals involved, Monbushō now believes that it is necessary to understand whether the education system, the community and schools are

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doing enough to help the individuals. Organisations and programmes have also been established in an attempt to provide better counselling and give the children chances to re-enter education. This has also meant improved teacher training and materials to help teachers deal with children having problems (Monbushō 1995:90, 91).

Figure 8.1 Number and percentage of upper secondary school students who ‘drop out’.


Figure 8.2 Number of students at elementary and lower secondary school refusing to attend school for more than thirty days.



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Figure 8.3 Students refusing to attend school for more than fifty days—by grade (1997).


Figure 8.4 Reasons given for ‘dropping out’ (1997).

Source: Shimizu et al. (1999:88). There are many reasons why students ‘drop out’. The most common reason is a ‘career-path change’, by which most mean a change to seek employment rather than continue with their studies, which may help explain the rise around the time of the ‘Bubble Economy’. The second most common answer is that the child has problems adjusting to school and school work (see Figure 8.4). The first answer seems to be rather nebulous and may disguise the real reason why the students wants to ‘drop out’ rather that what they are going to do having ‘dropped out’. The second answer is of greater concern, particularly as the percentage of students giving this answer has risen from 26.1 per cent in 1993 (Shimizu et al. 1999:88). Based on conversations that I have had with students and former students, it appears that one problem that may be occurring is that some students appear to believe that it is acceptable to ‘drop out’ as there are others who ‘drop

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out’, rather than considering what is best in their own circumstances. Monbushō sees that further ‘liberalisation’ and diversification of the upper secondary school system, with more concentration on the individual, as the best means to solve the problem of ‘drop outs’. By giving students more opportunities to study what they want, when they want, the desire to ‘drop out’ should be reduced, it is argued (Monbushō 1995:90). Such attitudes clearly reflect the ideas that were espoused by Nakasone and Rinkyōshin. Ijime One of the other major problems related to the education system that was given media attention was ijime (‘bullying’, particularly by groups). Rinkyōshin believed that it had become a serious problem, and, like the problem of juvenile delinquency, that it was the responsibility of the schools and education authorities to deal with it, together with the home and community (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:152–4). Among its proposals, Rinkyōshin recommended the improvement of counselling facilities, improved use of the Health Room and the information given to members of staff by the nurse, and improved teacher training so that teachers could recognise the symptoms at an early stage. The use of police and child welfare groups should only be considered as a last resort, Rinkyōshin recommended, as should the use of suspensions (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:152–4). The importance of the Health Room was highlighted because it was believed that students suffering from ijime would often complain of some medical disorder so that they could miss classes, and this would later lead to refusal to attend school. However, Rinkyōshin also noted that it had a lack of expertise in this area and that further study into the problem would be needed to determine the size of the problem, and to come up with ways to deal with it (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:152–5). Although Rinkyōshin did not make many recommendations in this area, it did ensure that the issue remained on the agenda and was not totally ignored. To what degree was ijime a real problem, what was causing it, and what has happened in recent years? The year of 1985 was when ijime first became a major issue with many reports in the media, although it was by no means a new problem (Ichikawa, interview, 5 June 1996; Murakami 1990:145). This was followed by investigations by the National Policy Agency, and the Ministry of Justice, as well as Monbushō, which began to investigate the problem fully for the first time (Wolferen 1989:91). The police established a special telephone hotline and unit to deal with the problem. In 1985, there were 1,000 incidents which needed police intervention, and the Tokyo hotline received over 1,300 calls in six months, mostly from lower secondary school students (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:37; Daily Yomiuri 15 December 1985).


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Figure 8.5 Cases of ijime and number of schools reporting cases of ijime.

Sources: Shimizu et al. (1995:70), Shimizu et al. (1999:74), Monbushō (1999a:255). Note: Method of calculation was altered in 1994 so direct comparisons with the previous years are not possible.

However, as with school violence, the amount of attention devoted to ijime by the media and the authorities may have contributed to the large numbers of reports of incidents at first, and then when the attention subsided, so the number of reports fell, while the actual number of incidents may not have. The fact that the number of incidents has risen in recent years (see Figure 8.5)—though this may be partly due to changes in the calculation method—and coincides with renewed media interest is worth noting. It is also possible that some reports were about relatively minor incidents made by overworried and protective parents, or attention seeking children (Beauchamp 1991b:46; Murakami 1985:407–11). One of the reasons that has been cited as being a possible cause for ijime, or at least for not discouraging it, has been the behaviour of some teachers (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996). Although corporal punishment is not permitted in Japan some teachers resort to highly embarrassing verbal attacks on students in front of the class, and physical punishment does also sometimes occur. About half of Nikkyōso members at a conference in the 1980s stated that they believed that corporal punishment was sometimes necessary. Furthermore, a survey conducted by a group of lawyers found that at a majority of the 985 schools surveyed, students were physically attacked in some way almost every day (Wolferen 1989:91). Some studies have suggested that nearly all ‘problem’ children had at some stage been beaten by a teacher (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986:262). Such actions not only impair the student’s individuality (Horio 1988b:15), but can also encourage, or at least not discourage, the other children from acting in similar ways. Indeed, it has been found that teachers, and other adults, often encourage the group to

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ostracise an individual that does not behave properly (Murakami 1990:149; Shields 1990:100, 101; Wolferen 1989:91–2; Monbushō 1995:91; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:22; Lewis 1984:69–84; Fujita 1990:124). Ostracism can be ‘as devastating a weapon as force’ (Woronoff 1980:42). The problem is not, in the view of many, the pressures of the group and the society, but rather the individual’s decision not to conform (Parker 1987:147). According to Satō (interview, 17 November 1997), ‘In Japan, to be unique is not necessarily a good thing, it is a dangerous thing’. The fact that the ‘victim’ is often seen as the problem is demonstrated by the fact that studies on ijime have tended to concentrate on the victims’ personalities and understanding why they did not ‘fit in’ rather than why and how the ‘attackers’ behaved as they did (Simmons 1990:74). The behaviour of teachers also helps explain why those conducting the bullying are often not severely punished. However, the teachers are often in a relatively weak position when trying to enforce discipline, since they do not have the usual weapons (such as detention) that teachers in many other countries have (Fujita 1990:125; Amano, interview, 5 June 1996). The need for improved teacher training so that teachers could recognise the problems and know how to react, which was recommended by Rinkyōshin and is being implemented by Monbushō (Monbushō 1995:91), was demonstrated when some teachers claimed to know nothing about the problems one student was facing, despite the fact that the child had sought their help on several occasions before he was murdered (Murakami 1990:147). One of the reasons that has been cited as the main cause of ijime, and other forms of school violence, has been the changes in society and the differences in attitudes and values between the generations (Amano 1990b:122; Amano 1986b:9). As well as the problems regarding the overindulgence and protection of children by parents, which was discussed above, it is believed that the children have become more materialistic and selfish (Shields 1990:101; Ichikawa 1986:250). This change in behaviour may be more to do with the ‘natural development’ of the country, rather than the education system (Ichikawa 1986:251), yet, in many people’s views, it is the education system that is expected to reverse this trend, or at least provide a means to stop it from being a problem. Some have tried to link the problems of school indiscipline and ijime with the ‘pervasive influence’ of the entrance examinations (Duke 1986:69; Simmons 1990:73). However, there is little data to support this. Figure 8.6 shows how the number of victims of bullying at secondary schools falls grade by grade, and that the level at upper secondary schools is even lower than that at most grades of elementary school. Although it may be that the bullies are in higher years and bullying the students in lower years, the lack of interaction at most schools between the years would suggest that this was not the case. 3 On top of this, a lot of disciplinary problems are found at vocational schools, where students tend not to be facing the supposed pressure of ‘examination hell’, though many become frustrated by the fact that they have to cover the same material as students at regular schools (Rohlen 1983:247). Furthermore, at ‘good’ schools the levels of problems tend to be lower (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:46). It is at these schools where one would expect ‘examination hell’ to be most ‘pervasive’, since these students are supposedly under the greatest pressure to do well and enter the ‘good’ universities. Despite the fact that these reasons may have contributed to the growth of the ijime problem, it is also the case that such behaviour has always occurred and will probably


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continue to occur. Ijime is not something that is peculiar to Japan, ‘all countries have ijime problems’ (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996). This kind of behaviour is another regrettable feature of human life, particularly since children tend to be more vulnerable than adults, yet at the same time can often be more cruel. Such behaviour has to be discouraged, otherwise it can escalate and lead to other social problems (Murakami 1990:146; Shields 1990:101; Beauchamp 1991b:46; Murakami 1985:407–11). However, given that a certain amount of ijime is always going to occur, it becomes very difficult to assess whether policies have been successful (Monbushō 1995:91). The unanswerable question becomes ‘what is the acceptable level of ijime?’ Ijime has also been linked to juvenile suicide in Japan. Contrary to popular belief, Japan does not have a particularly high juvenile suicide rate by international standards. The number of cases of suicides by students at public elementary and secondary schools has fallen from 380 in 1979 to 133 in 1997 (Shimizu et al. 1999:94, 95). If one looks at the breakdown of the status of the suicides in 1997, for example, only one case was attributed to ijime. Furthermore, only four cases were attributed to problems related to problems with examinations or academic progress. Figure 8.7 shows how the number of suicides is not significantly higher around examination time (January-March) compared with the rest of the year. Although the various school problems analysed in this chapter might suggest otherwise, many studies have shown that Japanese children tend to enjoy school, even more than children in other countries. For example, in 1995, 92.7 per cent of elementary school children, 90.9 per cent of lower secondary school children and 86.3 per cent of upper secondary school children said they found school either enjoyable or very enjoyable (Shimizu et al. 1999:126).

Figure 8.6 Bullying cases by grade at public schools (fiscal 1997).


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Figure 8.7 Number of suicides for each month (1992 and 1993).


‘Examination hell’ Perhaps one of the most notorious parts of the Japanese education system has been ‘examination hell’ (juken jigoku), which came to represent the struggles of the teenagers attempting to enter the ‘best’ schools and universities on their way to entering the ‘best’ companies. So bad was the perception of ‘examination hell’ that the solving of this problem was one of the top priorities of the education reform programme. This section will analyse to what degree the phenomenon existed, what proposals were made to solve it, and what has happened since Rinkyōshin. ‘Examination hell’ tends to refer to the period of exams when students attempt to enter university. However, as the pressure to enter university begins with the ‘need’ to enter the ‘right’ upper secondary school, the period of exams to enter these schools should also be included. 4 Indeed some have argued that it is the competition to enter the secondary schools, particularly the private six-year ‘prep’ schools or ‘top’ public upper secondary schools, that is ‘most severe’ (Nishimura 1985:20; Amano 1990b:121–2; Simmons 1990:77). The result is like the Japanese card game of daifugō whereby the successful continue getting more successful, until skill and or luck changes the trend—so certain schools and universities became stronger and more popular. 5 ‘Examination hell’ could be summarised as the pressure of the examination system, or more often than not the pressure of parents, exerted on children to enter particular institutions—a process that robs the children of their childhood as they have to spend so much time preparing for the exams, particularly during their final year when even club activities are suspended (Horio 1988b:15; Vogel 1979:162; Cummings 1980:167). These


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exams, which tend to be multiple choice, are also seen as repressing originality, creativity and preventing students from expressing their ideas in class as they attempt to absorb facts only (Wolferen 1989:117; Frost 1991:291; Vogel 1979:162; Rohlen 1983:108, 316; Horio 1988b:13). With teacher recommendations and other achievements, and even test results in school, counting for little in the past, the entrance examinations became the most important selection criteria (Heidenheimer 1993:202). The perceived need to succeed in the entrance exams to ‘good’ universities has therefore contributed to the growth of the ‘exam industry’, including juku, despite attempts by some teachers to ‘downplay’ the importance of the exams (Rohlen 1983:107; Schoppa 1991b:57; White 1987:177–8). The central problem has been that certain schools have been seen as being ‘good’, because of their success at getting students into the ‘right’ universities, that is the prestigious universities whose graduates have tended to get jobs at ‘good’ companies, which have made selection choices based on where students studied rather than what students studied. This has led to a hierarchy of universities and a hierarchy of schools within each prefecture (Amano 1986a:29; Amano, interview, 5 June 1996). On top of this, the influence of the universities, through the entrance exams, extends downwards to the other levels of education, rather than the compulsory levels of education influencing upper secondary and higher education (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:42–3). However, most students have little trouble entering the upper secondary school of their choice, partly because they take the entrance exam for a school which they are advised by their teachers that they should be able to enter, and the others have a chance soon after the results of the first exam are announced to enter another school, with some prefectures offering even more chances to take exams (Amano 1986a:29; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:38). Furthermore, following recommendations made by the Kyoto Group, Rinkyōshin, the Committee to Improve Systems of Selecting Entrants to Upper Secondary Schools in 1984, and by Chūkyōshin in 1991, public upper secondary schools have begun to use more diverse methods of selection, as well as have more influence on the content of exams which have been made by the municipal or prefectural board of education. For example, the percentage of courses taken through admission by recommendation has risen from 25.9 per cent in 1984 to 75.1 per cent in 1998; all forty-seven prefectures now allow for interviews to be held, thirty-seven prefectures allow for the use of short essays and the like, and forty-four have a performance test (Monbushō 2000a:11). As far as entry to higher education is concerned, at the top of the hierarchy of universities is the University of Tokyo. Every year over 12,000 apply for the 3,000 or so places available: 55 per cent of the successful applicants enter at their first attempt; however, 35 per cent enter at the second attempt; and 10 per cent take the entrance examinations at least three times, with some trying six or seven times, before being successful (Rohlen 1988:27). Although this was excessive, the problem was compounded as students could only apply for one national university, as the exam is held on the same day, though they tended to apply to around three private universities or faculties (Amano 1986a:39). Although Tokyo sits at the top of the list of prestigious universities in name, it is other universities that actually have the highest applicant-to-opening ratios. For example, keiō and Waseda, the two most prestigious private universities, have ratios of over 8 to 1.

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Ratios of around 7 to 1 are seen at other ‘top’ private universities and national universities. Competition tends to be toughest for the upper middle ranking universities, though it is the ‘top’ universities that tend to get the most media attention. However, the quality of the competition cannot be judged by these ratios alone, as some students apply for universities which they have little or no chance of entering. This is particularly the case for medical schools, which often have had ratios as high as 40 to 1 (Rohlen 1983:84–5). With scores to enter the ‘best’ universities increasing, the competition became harder and so students had to study harder and had greater pressure to be more successful (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:45). A further complication is that usually each faculty has had its own entrance exam, and so this has meant that changing faculties after entering the university has often meant retaking the entrance exam rather than being able to transfer (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:50). This has meant that some students have ended up at faculties in ‘good’ universities, as they perceived the entrance exam to that faculty to be relatively easy or the competition weaker, although they had no interest in that subject area, being concerned only with the name of the university. 6 The entrance exam system also meant that those wishing to re-enter education faced competition from the younger students, who often received special training from their teachers or at juku in how to pass the entrance exams (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:53). Both of these factors obviously impeded the development of lifelong learning and allowing individuals to pursue their own interests, which were major concerns for Nakasone and Rinkyōshin (see Chapter 7). This hierarchy has been created largely by the employment practices of companies; it is therefore as much a need to reform this as the education system, if the hierarchical system and problems associated with it are going to be resolved (Okamoto, interview, 5 December 1997). However, such attitudinal changes take time, and some fear that change could lead to a relaxation in students’ motivation, and ultimately the development of their skills and knowledge could also be affected (Rohlen 1988:29). The system did have its advantages, and ‘may well be a good deal more useful socially than most Japanese appear ready to admit’ publicly (Frost 1991:293; Rohlen 1983:81), and could even be described as logical (Vogel 1979:164). For the system was objective and meritocratic, made sure that students were aware of particular facts, ensured that they worked hard, and it developed discipline through the rigorous study for the exams. Furthermore, as the exams were external to the school, it did not disrupt the group harmony, balance of classes, and the teacher-student relationship (Ichikawa 1986:251–2; Frost 1991:292; Vogel 1979:163–4, 166; Rohlen 1983:316; Lynn 1988:45; Cummings 1980:167; Dore 1976; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:3,38,51). The problems are not easy to solve. For example, a change to certification or graduation examinations, such as those in many Western countries, supported by people such as Amano (interview, 5 June 1996), though solving some of the problems associated with the entrance examination system, could cause further problems as graduation examinations tend to motivate only borderline students, be harder and more time consuming to examine objectively, and the discipline-driven education system created by the entrance examination system may be lost. The use of study aids in many countries reveals how rote learning of analytical skills is as feasible as the rote learning of facts, and so changes would not necessarily even halt the development of the juku industry, if


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that it deemed to be a goal. Students and profit-oriented companies in the ‘education business’ will always find a means to master the challenges put in front of them (Rohlen 1983:95). Nakasone wanted to abolish the first-stage entrance examinations for national and public universities and proposed a ‘new test’ for all universities. Although his ideas were not completely implemented, resulting in ‘a curious compromise’ (Schoppa 1991b:67), it is still another example of how Nakasone came to shape the present education system (Hayao 1993:59, 64–5). Rinkyōshin recommended that all universities should reform their examinations, including replacing the ‘Joint First-Stage University Entrance Examination’ (that all those applying to national and local universities had to take) with a ‘Common Test’ that could be used, on a voluntary basis, by any university (national, public or private). In July 1985, Monbushō established the University Entrance Examination Reform Council, which was chaired by Uchida Kenzō, a Rinkyōshin member. It outlined the ‘new test’ the following year, and in 1988 reforms to the National School Establishment Law were made so that the functions of the NCUEE (National Center for University Entrance Examinations—Daigaku Nyūshi Sentā Shiken) could be altered. Although Nakasone wanted the test to be introduced in 1989, it was eventually delayed until 1990, so that universities and schools could have more time to prepare for it (Hayao 1993:64; Monbushō 1995:73–4).

Table 8.3 Trend in universities using NCUEE examinations.

National

Public

Private

Fiscal 1990

All (95)

All (37)

16

Fiscal 1991

All (95)

All (39)

21

Fiscal 1992

All (95)

All (39)

32

Fiscal 1993

All (95)

All (41)

56

Fiscal 1994

All (95)

All (46)

73

Fiscal 1995

All (95)

All (48)

104

Fiscal 1996

All (95)

All (52)

122

Fiscal 1997

All (95)

All (53)

152

Fiscal 1998

All (95)

All (57)

180

Fiscal 1999

All (95)

All (61)

217

Fiscal 2000

All (95)

All (66)

242 (53%)

Source: Based on Monbushō (2000a:156). Note: Private universities use the exam for only part of the admission quota.

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One of the purposes of the NCUEE was to eliminate the ‘excessively difficult and idiosyncratic questions’ that had come to typify the entrance exams to many universities. The exams are designed to be used together with the second-stage exams conducted by the individual universities, including private universities, with universities choosing the number of subjects they use. The system has gained support, as is demonstrated by the increasing number of private universities using the system (see Table 8.3). Rinkyōshin also recommended that admission services at universities should be improved, that better guidance be given to students, and that students should be given the chance to apply to more than one national university in a particular year, as well as making special arrangements for graduates of vocational courses (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:83–6). This is something that Nakasone (interview, 1 December 1997) wanted, and was one of the reasons why he wanted the ‘new test’ established. Students do now have the opportunity to take entrance exams to two or more national universities. This reform, introduced in 1989, is designed to give students more opportunity to take exams for universities they particularly want to enter. Universities are continuing to develop means to determine the numbers of students to be accepted after each of the two rounds of exams (Monbushō 1995:117–18). On top of this, some departments have set special aptitude tests to check whether students are really interested and capable of doing courses they are applying for, particularly medical courses, and the jobs that they lead to (Katsukata 1996:5–6). One of the reasons for these reforms was to deal with another of the problems closely linked to the examination system that Rinkyōshin wanted to deal with. That was the phenomenon of rōnin, the students who would rather resit entrance exams to their choice of university a year later than enter a ‘lesser’, usually private, university or not go to university at all. In 1985 they made up nearly 50 per cent of all applicants, though this figure was higher for the more prestigious universities. 7 Although these students have been praised for their perseverance (Vogel 1979:164), many saw it as a waste and further proof of the negative effects of the examination system, and the number of rōnin has led to the criticism of the secondary education system being 3–3-1 or 3–3–X, reflecting the extra year or years of study by many (OERI Japan StudyTeam 1987:45). To deal with this problem Rinkyōshin recommended reforms to the procedure of selecting universities and to increase the educational routes (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:83–6). As far as the increase in educational routes was concerned, Rinkyōshin recommended three things. Firstly, it was suggested that ‘the government should consider, as soon as possible, concrete measures for granting university entrance…to students who have completed an upper secondary course lasting three years or more at special training schools, as well as to other competent people’ (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:86). This proposal, however, does not appear to address the whole problem, which was not that some students were having difficulty getting into higher education, but that they were having difficulty entering the institution of their choice. The second recommendation was that six-year secondary schools should be established (see Chapter 6). However, this still does not solve the problems related to entrance to specific universities. The third recommendation was the creation of ‘credit-system upper secondary schools, which, although they would reduce the problem of examinations, again would not solve the over-application to certain universities.


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A further proposal that Rinkyōshin made to help reduce the negative effects of the entrance examination system was that more students should be accepted on the basis of recommendations from their schools (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987a:84–6). In fact this system already existed. Indeed, before Rinkyōshin was even established over 60 per cent of all students entering junior colleges were accepted on the basis of recommendation alone (Amano 1986a:37). This may reveal the worry that some have with this system being extended to universities (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996), as junior colleges are not seen as centres of academic excellence, and the extension of the recommendation system, if not administered properly, may allow more students to enter higher education without having a full understanding of the curriculum or having developed the skills that are produced by the entrance examination system. For example, there is the worry that students who advance through the use of the recommendation system may not be able to cope with any pressure and problems that they might face at work, as they may not have developed the strength-of-mind characteristics associated with the examination system. Even universities have used the recommendation system in the past, though to a more refined degree. For example, Dōshisha University has been accepting students from its affiliated (fuzoku) upper secondary school since the 1950s. However, by taking students from this school, where students were failed if they did not reach an appropriate standard, the university could usually ensure that standards were maintained (Cummings 1980:210–1; Reischauer and Jansen 1995:196). In 1984, almost 20 per cent of students entering private universities were accepted on the basis of recommendation alone (Amano 1986a:35; Kuroha 1984:137). There is a definite trend for factors other than just examination results to be used as the criteria for selection, and exams are being used merely to confirm the advice given by schools. However, this will not necessarily change the type of students that are produced by the education system, as students may still continue to participate in activities that are likely to help their chances of selection success rather than pursuing what is of interest to themselves, as was intended by some of the reforms. Another problem with the recommendation system being addressed by Monbushō is that some universities are using the system to secure numbers at an early stage, which will reduce the motivation of students at upper secondary school who have already gained places (Monbushō 1995:118). In 1993, the University Council made proposals, supported by Monbushō, regarding the use of recommendations, including the establishment of a time limit, such as November, before which recommendations could not begin, and a limit to the number of places, about 30 per cent for universities and 50 per cent for junior colleges, available on the basis of recommendations (Monbushō 1995:118). However, if the recommendation system does become more prevalent then ‘examination hell would, by definition, be removed or apply to an even smaller number of students than it ever did. It is very difficult to analyse the examination system and make comparisons with other countries as issues such as ‘exam pressure’ are subjective and cannot be accurately measured. The general opinion is that the distortions created by the exams in Japan are greater than those in other countries, but the validity of such conclusions is questionable. There are places for all students who apply to upper secondary schools, and for most

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applicants in higher education (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996). With the decreasing school/university-age population, the percentage of students affected by ‘examination hell’ must continue to fall. Simmons’ (1990:111) view that ‘nearly all’ Japanese children go through ‘examination hell’ was probably never correct, and certainly does not apply now. The worry that is currently being raised by many Japanese is that students are becoming less motivated towards ‘upward mobility’ now than they were in the past (Amano 1990b:121). Although this reduces the problems of ‘examination hell’, it has the possible negative outcome that graduates will be less motivated and less skilled than their predecessors. Therefore, it becomes of prime importance that students are encouraged to pursue paths that interest them and that these activities and studies are fully appreciated by schools, universities and companies in the selection process, which has not happened in the past (Amano 1990b:122–3; Fujita 1990:135). It is this path that Monbushō now supports through the diversification of upper secondary and higher education with more emphasis on the individual, and selection based more on interviews, proficiency tests and theses, rather than on standard scores. Monbushō is also conducting research into ways for schools and universities to evaluate volunteer activities, which are being encouraged as a means to assess candidates’ characteristics better (Monbushō 1995:20, 56, 85, 117). However, this appears to have begun to lead to a situation whereby voluntary activities (‘social services’ is perhaps a better term) are becoming mandatory if a student wants to get a good record, regardless of whether the student has a genuine interest in the activity or not. Monbushō (1995:53–4) knows that as ‘the entrant-selection process produces failures as well as passes, it is extremely difficult to devise a method that is beneficial to everyone. The difficulty of the task cannot be accepted as justification for abandoning efforts to improve systems, however’. The conclusion has to be that gradually universities and junior colleges do appear to be changing their methods of selection to take into account the individual’s interests (Katsukata 1996:6). This change can be seen at any bookshop in Japan, where university guide books are now placed according to fields of study, giving information about what one will learn, and which universities have courses in that field, with some given stars to show their quality, whereas in the past these books were displayed according to the standard score ranking of the faculty or university alone. However, whereas the problem of ‘examination hell’ itself appears to be lessening, those problems that have been—probably incorrectly—associated with it, such as juvenile delinquency and ijime, continue to be a major concern. It is hard to discern the degree to which these problems have altered over the past two decades, as what data is available is not reliable. However, the challenge will be whether the reforms that have already been implemented and those that are being implemented can prevent the problems from reaching the unacceptable levels seen in many other developed nations.

9 United and successful Final conclusions The opposition that initially met the PCER [Rinkyōshin] proposals has gradually dissipated, and they have become the bible of education reform, providing the basis for almost all the specific measures that have been taken to improve the education system since the beginning of the 1990s, when the reform program got into full swing. (Foreign Press Center 1995:52)

Having analysed the major issues in the education reform debate, it is now possible to draw some conclusions about the degree to which the reforms were successful. However, before doing this, it is first necessary to remember what the definition of ‘success’ in this study is—that is, the degree to which the reforms are consistent with the policies and ideologies that Nakasone espoused. In concentrating on the issues and final proposals, rather than the policy making process itself, Rinkyōshin has been treated as a single entity in this study. This does not mean that it is based on an assumption that it was completely united, for this was not the case. In the same way, it is also true of the business community, LDP and Monbushō, which are also made up of groups of people with differing, sometimes opposing, opinions. There were divisions within Rinkyōshin, with some pushing for more ‘radical’ reforms, and others seeking to keep the reforms more ‘conservative’ (Hayao 1993:62). However, it is the reports produced by the whole body that the subsequent councils, committees and Monbushō have had to respond to. Furthermore, to concentrate on divisions within Rinkyōshin and Monbushō detracts from the fact that one of the reasons for these divisions is that there may be no simple solution to the problems, and so there will be differences of opinion in the debate (Ichikawa 1991:353–4). It is, therefore, more important to look at what was actually proposed and what has happened to these proposals. It has also been suggested that Nakasone may not have been satisfied with the reports that Rinkyōshin made as they may not have been as ‘radical’ as he might have hoped (Hayao 1993:61). However, this study has demonstrated that the substance of what he was seeking remained. Furthermore, the evolution and gradual acceptance of these ideas has made it possible for the more ‘radical’ ideas to become seen as less ‘radical’ and more necessary and natural. One can only speculate about whether or not, without some of the divisions within Rinkyōshin, the reports would have been more ‘radical’. I believe that more ‘radical’ reports would not necessarily have been as ‘successful’, as more

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‘radical’ proposals may have been rejected outright and may not have been allowed to develop and evolve in the way that actually has happened in the years since Rinkyōshin. Alternatively they may have been implemented only to face ‘re-reform’ in later years, as happened with the Meiji and Occupation reforms. In terms of achieving long-term goals for the education reform and social reform, I do not think that things could have worked out any better for Nakasone. It is important to re-emphasise these points. For central to the Nakasone reforms was the attitudinal changes that were brought about. Such attitudinal changes did not occur immediately after the Meiji and Occupation reforms, which led to periods of re-reform. The education reform programme initiated by Nakasone was successful in attitudinal reform (Ichikawa, interview, 5 June 1996). One view is that even without Rinkyōshin, Chūkyōshin or Monbushō would have drawn up similar proposals, and that Rinkyōshin became a forum for debating and promoting them (Hayao 1993:61, 67; Ishiyama 1986:210), merely taking the emphasis off Monbushō. As a result of this, Monbushō was able to implement some reforms almost immediately, whereas others were sent to other committees, groups and councils for further discussion and study (Hayao 1993:63). Proposals which Monbushō did not support were ‘sat on‘(Hayao 1993:62). This approach was supposedly supported by the education zoku which insisted it would not allow the implementation of proposals that it was opposed to (Hayao 1993:67). However, given the arguments put forward by those who believe that Monbushō at first did not support the issues that Rinkyōshin forwarded, it seems unlikely that Monbushō, or one of its advisory councils, would have come up with similar proposals, particularly in the area of ‘liberalisation’. Therefore, for Nakasone’s plans to be a success an ad hoc body such as Rinkyōshin had to be established. According to Amano (interview, 5 June 1996), ‘Monbushō had an old ideology at the time of Nakasone’, but it has changed. Although there are still those in Monbushō who would like to maintain the status quo, it is nonsense to suggest Monbushō as a whole is conservative. 1 Ogawa (interview, 4 December 1997), a professor at Tokyo University and member of Chūkyōshin, also believes that the ideologies of Monbushō and Chūkyōshin now are similar to those put forward by Rinkyōshin. This view is supported by Horio (interviews, 10 October 1997 and 19 November 1997) and Fujita (interview, 21 November 1997), who believe that ‘the people and Monbushō had different opinions to Rinkyōshin, but that has changed…and the attitudes are now similar’. Kioka (interview, 19 November 1997) also believes that ‘Monbushō's attitude has changed’ and that ‘younger people are more supportive of Nakasone’s ideologies’. 2 The fourteenth Chūkyōshin, which followed Rinkyōshin, produced a report which had a content that was similar in many areas to the Rinkyōshin reports, thus showing the continuity and influence that Rinkyōshin would have on education. Further, Monbushō White Papers are also most revealing about just how much of an effect Rinkyōshin did have, for phrases such as ‘sweeping education reforms were studied’ by Rinkyōshin and that it ‘has played an extremely important role in setting the basic tone of contemporary educational administration’ (Monbushō 1995:70), and Monbushō ‘has moved forward with educational reform in accordance with the four reports’ of Rinkyōshin (Monbushō 2000a:8), have been used. Although there is a risk of tatemae being used by some of


156

those calling for education reform, those involved in the education reform debate believe that ‘the system will really change’ (Ogawa, interview, 4 December 1997; Horie, interview, 21 November 1997) and ‘it is not tatemae (Horie, interview, 21 November 1997). Whereas after the 1971 reform attempt, the LDP tried to put great distance between itself and the proposals (Schoppa 1991a:74), the Nakasone education reforms have now become a central policy of the LDP, though reference to Nakasone and Rinkyōshin is rarely made. For although Takeshita ‘politely ignored’ Nakasone’s agenda (Buckley 1990:106), and successive prime ministers did not actively pursue education reform (Hayao 1993:62; Simmons 1990:121; Cantor 1989:11), Monbushō was continuing the process in the background, until it was again brought into the spotlight by Prime Minister Hashimoto, who has ‘a close relationship’ to Nakasone (Horio 1997d), in 1997. Since then it was actively pursued by the Obuchi administration (which appointed Nakasone’s son, Hirofumi, as education minister), and is now being pursued by Prime Minister Mori, who had been one of Nakasone’s education ministers during the 1980s, and who is particularly keen to see the FLE reformed (Takahashi 2000:7). Nakasone was vital to the education reform process, for he not only initiated this process, but also presented ideas and selected many of the members of Rinkyōshin who would represent and support those ideas. Although Nakasone has reportedly said that he feels that the reform process failed, 3 it is his attempts at tax reform that he considers his greatest mistake (Nakasone 1991:48). However, Nakasone’s interpretation and definition of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are probably different to what has been used in this study, as there are many different levels one can measure as ‘success’ and ‘failure’ (Ichikawa, interview, 5 June 1996). As a politician, he may have hoped for more ‘radical’ reforms and for their quick implementation. However, this did not happen, and so perhaps he considers the reforms a ‘failure’, although he does believe that ‘Rinkyōshin made good reports’ (Nakasone, interview, 1 December 1997). Yet, if, as has been suggested, one of the priorities of the education reform programme for Nakasone was to eliminate the opposition of Nikkyōso from the education policy making process, then the process would again appear to have been successful. Although the education reform process alone was not responsible for Nikkyōso’s schism and its subsequent realignment to a more establishment-friendly position, the crucial role that it played, and that other reforms and changes pursued by Nakasone played, cannot be overlooked. Nikkyōso’s Marxist position in the education debate may have been replaced by Zenkyō, but it does not have anything like the same strength as ‘old’ Nikkyōso, and is unlikely to be able to obstruct the education policy making process in the same way that ‘old’ Nikkyōso was believed to. Likewise, although there are still local unions which maintain the ‘old’ Nikkyōso line, the divisions and battles which were a feature of much of the post-war education debate appear to have gone. Many of the proposals relating to ‘healthy internationalism’ and traditionalism enjoyed support at an early stage, and so were quickly implemented. One should not overlook the importance of Nakasone and Rinkyōshin in these areas, however, as they were central in establishing definitions and the means by which these policies could be pursued. In these areas, rather than changing attitudes, the focus of attention was to highlight and bring together established beliefs.

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It is in the ‘liberalisation’ debate that attitudes have changed the most, and this has allowed the further development of ideas and proposals that were espoused by Nakasone and put forward by Rinkyōshin. According to Amano (interview, 5 June 1996), at the time of Nakasone, Monbushō was against it, and although Monbushō slowly changed its position, teachers and parents remained opposed to it; however, most of the ‘opposition has gradually gone and the “egalitarian climate” has changed’. Fujita (interview, 21 November 1997) also believes that the attitudes have changed and ‘people feel jiyūka is all right’. Therefore, the belief is that now the ‘system will change quite a lot’ (Ogawa, interview, 4 December 1997). However, rather than a complete change to the structure of the 6–3–3 system, the change is occurring from within as the upper secondary schools, in particular, change their methods and new types of schools are developed (Amano, interview, 5 June 1996). One of the reasons for the changes, and why Nakasone pursued education reform, is the belief that society is changing and the skills that the next generation of Japanese will need for living and working are changing. Roesgaard (1998:92) points out that if Nakasone’s ideologies on issues such as defence had made him be regarded as a ‘hawk’, ‘his educational policies placed him in the space between business and the most traditionalist of conservatives’ and this was reflected in the Rinkyōshin reports which had an ‘emphasis on traditional moral values and manpower needs’. The Japanese in the future will no longer be‘“worker bees” content to quietly carry out the tasks assigned them’, but ‘will be individuals who seek to use their own strengths and talents in the achievement of self-realization’ (Katsukata 1996:8). Although some have argued that the education reforms were only concerned with the economy and manpower needs, this ‘would clearly be wrong’ (Roesgaard 1998:243).

Figure 9.1 Evaluation of Rinkyōshin.

Source: Ichikawa (1995a:116).


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Different people will have different perceptions of what is meant by ‘success’ and ‘failure’; there are many that feel that ‘on the whole it was a success’ (Komatsu, interview, 19 November 1997). Horie (interview, 21 November 1997) believes that the Nakasone education reforms ‘should be called the third education reform’. Figure 9.1 shows how various types of people evaluate Rinkyōshin’s work, and clearly shows how most feel that it was a ‘success’. However, there are also those, such as Fujita (interview, 21 November 1997), who say that ‘the system is changing’ but feel ‘that is not a good thing’. This study has shown how Nakasone has set the trajectory and policy agenda for the future. Referring back to Figure 1.1, it is clear to see that the education system is changing and moving towards position ‘E’. For Nakasone did manage to influence the education reform debate, the reforms were not a failure, and those involved in the education reform debate are not totally divided on the direction for future changes. Although Nakasone may have been an unusual prime minister, further study into the power and influence of the Japanese prime minister, who has never been regarded as being particularly powerful or influential, is probably necessary. Furthermore, new studies into the policy making process in Japanese education are also necessary as the conventional models based on the conflicts between Nikkyōso and Monbushō, and the divisions between Monbushō and education zoku ‘sub-government’ and others involved in the process, no longer appear appropriate. Hayasaka (1994:8) believes that Nakasone’s involvement in the education reform debate shows that ‘Pouring red water from upstream doesn’t guarantee that it will stay red downstream’. However, if red water is continuously poured into a river in various places, it will lead to a red river at some point further down. Monbushō and Chūkyōshin have been doing so, and the LDP is also doing so now. Nakasone will get his red river, though later than he may have wanted, but it will ensure that his legacy is felt for many years to come. This study has shown that Nakasone was indeed very significant. Nakasone was a survivor (Ōtsuki 1985:12), but his agenda is an even greater survivor.

Appendix 1 Major events in Nakasone’s life, education and Japan Nakasone 1918 27 May: born in Gunma

Education

Japan

University ordinance promulgated and Japan sends troops to Siberia high school ordinance revised (sevenyear high schools)

1919 1920 1921 1922 1923

Naval Armament Treaty is signed at the Washington Conference Ordinance on schools for the blind and Great Kantō earthquake schools for the deaf and dumb promulgated

1924 1925

1926

Public Peace Preservation Act and Universal Male Suffrage Act are promulgated Kindergarten ordinance and youth Start of the Shōwa period training school ordinance promulgated

1927

Bank crisis

1928 1929 1930 1931 Graduates from primary school in Takasaki

The Makden incident is followed by Japan’s occupation of Manchuria

1932

Coup d’état attempt by a group of naval officers; Premier Inukai is killed

1933

Japan’s secession from the League of Nations

Appendix 1

160

1934 1935 Leaves Takasaki Middle School after four years

Youth school ordinance promulgated (for parttime students)

1936

Kodo-ha (Imperial Way faction) attempt coup d’état

1937

Education Council established

1938 Graduates from Shizuoka High School

Japan invades China following the incident at Marco-Polo Bridge National Mobilisation Act is issued

1939

Education made compulsory for boys aged 12–19

1940

State has to bear half the Japan, Germany and Italy cost of education conclude the Tripartite Pact

1941 Graduates from Tokyo Primary schools renamed Imperial University and enters as people’s schools Naimushō. Then joins the Navy

Nakasone

The Russo-Japanese clash at Nomonhan

Neutrality pact signed with Soviet Union. Japan attacks Pearl Harbor. Start of Pacific War

Education

Japan

1942 Navy Paymaster Captain 1943

Study at middle school fixed at 4 years. Normal school brought under state control

Pacific War

1944

Japan Scholarship Society Law promulgated

1945 Gets married. Re-enters Naimushō

Education Principles of New Japan published

Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan surrenders

1946 Joins the Metropolitan Police Board

Education Reform Committee inaugurated

The new constitution is promulgated. First post-war election

1947 Elected as a member of the FLE and School Education First election for the Upper House Minshutō in Gunma 3. Law promulgated—start of Writes book Shōnen no new 6–3–3 system Risō 1948 Becomes the Minshutō's finance secretary. Starts

New system for universities established

Dodge Reforms

Appendix 1

161

‘Hinomaru Patriotic Movement’ 1949 Elected for second time. Demonstration about Hinomaru

New Monbushō established, passing of many new laws relating to education

Yukawa Hideki wins Nobel Prize for physics. $1=¥360 rate set

1950 Visits Europe and America Junior colleges inaugurated Creation of National Police (participates in conference Reserve which becomes Self on reviving morals) Defence force in 1954. War in Korea kick-starts Japanese economy 1951 Presents paper on constitutional Course of Study published. San Francisco Peace Treaty revision to MacArthur Report on reintroduction of and Japan-US Security Pact moral education published are signed 1952 Advocates establishment of Self Chūkyōshin established. Defence Forces. Elected for Law for state subsidisation third time of compulsory education costs promulgated

Japan joins IMF and World Bank. Occupation ends

1953 Elected for fourth time. Joins in Establishment of conference at Harvard on postgraduate courses international problems

NHK begins TV broadcasts

1954 Becomes Organisational Director of the Japan Liberal Party

School Lunch Law promulgated

The film Seven Samurai and the first Godzilla film are made. Transistor radios go on sale

1955 Elected for fifth time. Joins conference in Switzerland on nuclear power. Becomes ViceChief Secretary of the LDP

Course of Study published for upper secondary school

LDP is formed. Japan joins GATT. Kōrakuen Amusement Park opens

1956

Education board members appointed rather than elected

Diplomatic relations with Soviet Union restored. Japan is admitted to the United Nations

1957 Meets Egyptian president. Member of cabinet committee on constitution

Chūkyōshin report published on improving science education

¥5,000 note and ¥100 coin go into circulation

1958 Elected for sixth time

One moral education class per week introduced

Japan makes trade agreement with India. Announcement of the prince’s engagement

Appendix 1 Nakasone

162

Education

Japan

1959 Gets first cabinet post (second Kishi cabinet) in the Science and Technology Agency.

First white paper published by Monbushō

Japan converts to metric system. ‘My car’ period starts

1960 Elected for seventh time

Textbook authorisation system reintroduced

Start of the income-doubling period

1961 Attends inauguration ceremony of JFK

Report published on how to deal with the rapidly increasing number of upper secondary students

Drinking alcohol in public places made illegal. First USJapan economic cooperation meeting

1962 Visits the South Pole

Free distribution of textbooks for compulsory education

Various Japanese companies stop making medicines that caused problems in W. Germany

1963 Elected for eighth time

Chūkyōshin report on improving higher education

New ¥1,000 note. Rapid urbanisation begins

1964

Emphasis put on patriotism and Start of the shinkansen. morals. Teacher licensing Olympic Games held in system strengthened Tokyo

1965

Chūkyōshin report on qualities Signing of Treaty on Basic that people should have. lenaga Relations with South Korea starts legal case over textbook

1966

Strengthening of the textbook authorisation system. Calls for diversification of secondary education

The ‘3Cs Period’ (Car, Cooler and Colour TV)

1967 Elected for ninth time. Becomes

Continued battles between lenaga

Yoshida dies—first post-war state funeral

Minister of Transport in Satō Eisaku’s second cabinet

and Monbushō. More emphasis put on moral education

First beer in a can goes on sale. Nuclear families more common

1968

Strike at Tokyo University— problems spread

Yakuza films become popular

1969 Father dies aged 80

White Paper published on problems with universities

Cash cards are introduced. Boom in manga sales

1970 Elected for tenth time. Becomes National Defence Agency Cabinet Secretary in Sato’s third cabinet

Chūkyōshin report on improving higher education

EXPO held in Osaka

Appendix 1

163

1971 Becomes Secretary-General of Chūkyōshin report on the LDP education reform

USA agrees to return Okinawa to Japan

1972 Becomes Minister of International Trade and Industry (first Tanaka Kakuei cabinet). Elected for eleventh time

Kikokushijo and lifelong learning first become issues

Sapporo Olympics. Normalisation of relations with China by Prime Minister Tanaka

1973 Still Minister for Trade and Industry

Strengthening of the teacher licensing system

Increase in oil prices due to fourth Middle East War (1st Oil Shock)

1974 Becomes Chief Secretary of the LDP in Miki Takeo’s cabinet

Nikkyōso report on education reform. Internationalisation report by Chūkyōshin

6,000,000 strike over wage negotiations

1975

lenaga has more legal battles with Monbushō

Video recorders go on sale

1976 Elected for twelfth time. Heads LDP committee on oil crisis

Further studies done into kikokushijo

Lockheed scandal—former prime minister Tanaka is arrested

Nakasone 1977

Education

Japan

Report by NPA on youth Hijacking of a JAL plane by suicides members of the Red Army. Japanese now living longest

1978 Third (behind Ōhira and Fukuda) Chūkyōshin report on New Tokyo International in LDP presidential election improving teacher quality Airport (Narita) is opened. The Peace and Friendship Treaty is signed with China 1979 Elected for thirteenth time

First joint university entrance exam for national and public universities

Sony Walkman goes on sale

1980 Elected for fourteenth time. Becomes Administrative Management Agency director in Suzuki Zenkō's cabinet

Revision of the Course of The debut of Matsuda Seiko Study. Calls to cut numbers of students in classes to forty by 1991

1981

Textbook issue flares up Start of administrative again. Promulgation of reform University of the Air Law

1982 Becomes eleventh president of the LDP and Japanese prime minister

Textbook problem gets worse. Report on rise in school violence

Fire at hotel New Japan. DC8 crashes at Haneda. Tohoku and Jōetsu shinkansen starts

Appendix 1

164

1983 Becomes first Japanese prime minister to visit South Korea since the war. Start of ‘Ron-Yasu relationship’. Elected for fifteenth time

Machida and Yokohama incidents focus attention on juvenile delinquency and violence

1984 Visits China, India and UK

Rinkyōshin established in New ¥1000, ¥5000 and August ¥10,000 notes

1985 Visits USA, USSR and W. Germany

Rinkyōshin publishes first report

Final report of Administrative Reform Council. Tokyo Disneyland opens

NTT established. JAL jumbo jet crashes

1986 Visits Canada, USA, Korea and Rinkyōshin publishes second Doi Takako becomes first China. Tokyo summit. Elected report. Textbook problem woman to be a party leader for sixteenth time arises again (Socialist Party) 1987 Visits USA (twice), Spain and Thailand. Steps down as prime minister after a total of 1,806 days

Rinkyōshin publishes its final two reports. JET Programme established

Breakup of Japanese National Railways. Rengō established. Defence spending goes over 1%

1988

Reforms begin in some areas of the education system, especially re: teacher training and quality

Recruit scandal. Tokyo Dome opens

1989 Leaves the LDP

More courtroom battles between lenaga and Monbushō. Chūkyōshin discusses reforms

Start of Heisei Period LDP loses its majority in the Upper House

1990 Elected to the House of Representatives as an independent.

Chūkyōshin report on lifelong learning. Use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo increased

Bubble economy. Cordless phones become popular

1991 Rejoins the LDP

Changes made to the Course Mount Unzen erupts. The of Study bubble bursts

1992

Five-day school week introduced on a once per month basis

Sagawa Express scandal. Passing of PKO Bill. Group of SDF forces sent to Cambodia

1993

School dropouts become a concern

LDP loses power— Hosokawa becomes prime minister

Appendix 1 Nakasone

165

Education

Japan

1994

Employment of higher education graduates falls to lowest level since 1951

Murayama becomes first socialist prime minister

1995

Five-day week expanded to twice per month

Great Hanshin earthquake, Aum sarin gas attack on Tokyo Underground

1996

Chūkyōshin produces report on education reform and need for liberalisation

Trial of Aum leader begins. Okinawan problem flares up. First election under new system

1997

Prime Minister Hashimoto calls for education reform, including more liberalisation

Economic problems increase (Yamaichi Shōken goes bust). Itami Jūzō commits suicide

1998

Start of unified lower and upper secondary schools

Nagano Winter Olympics, Japan takes part in its first World Cup finals

1999 Son, Hirofumi, becomes Education Minister

Increased usage of Hinomaru and Kimigayo after suicide of principal in Hiroshima prefecture

Hinomaru and Kimigayo officially become Japan's national flag and anthem

2000 Elected for the twentieth time to the House of Representatives

Greater flexibility of the school district system implemented in Tokyo

Prime Minister Obuchi suffers stroke. Mori becomes prime minister. Obuchi dies one month later

Sources: Nakasone (1992), Nakasone (1997b), Nakasone (1999), Narai (1988), Aso and Amano (1978), Egawa et al. (1995), Japan Almanac, Cortazzi (1993:215-16), Monbushō (1999a:20-8), Monbushō (2000a:24-36). Note: The information given is by no means exclusive and is only a guide to some of the significant events in that year.

Appendix 2 History and meaning of Hinomaru and Kimigayo 1 Hinomaru No one is certain about the origins of the Hinomaru (‘sun disk’) flag, also known as Nisshōki (‘sun flag'). It is believed that it dates back to the time of the Mongol invasions of Japan (1274 and 1281) or even earlier when it was used by samurai and the Minamoto and Taira clans. Many flags in a painting of the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600 also use the hinomaru design. However, its widespread usage began when the Tokugawa Shogunate used it on its ships in the seventeenth century. It was then designated as the national flag on ships through a declaration (fukoku) in 1870. It was used at government buildings from 1872 and by many people and homes on national holidays. A Bill to adopt the flag formally as the national flag was defeated in 1931. It officially became the flag of Japan in August 1999.

Kimigayo Kimigayo-wa, Chiyō-ni, Yachiyō-ni, Sazare-ishi-no, Iwao to narite, Koke no musu made (May thy reign Continue for a thousand, Eight thousand generations, Until the pebbles Grow into boulders Lush with moss). The waka (thirty-one-syllable poem) is originally from the poetry anthologies Kokin Wakashū and Wakan Rōeishū written during the Heian period (794–1185). It then became the de facto national anthem in 1869 after the Englishman John William Fenton said that Japan should have one, with the selection supposedly being made by Ōyama Iwao. Though Fenton originally put it to music, one of the Imperial Household Bureau musicians, Hayashi Hiromori, revised it to its present form. As far as the meaning is concerned, in August 1999 the then Prime Minister Obuchi explained; ‘Kimi’ in ‘Kimigayo’, under the current Constitution of Japan, indicates the Emperor, who is the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power; ‘Kimigayo’ as a whole depicts the state of being of our country, which has the Emperor—deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power—as the symbol itself and of the unity of the people; and it is appropriate to interpret the words of the anthem as praying for the lasting prosperity and peace of our country. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000a:2)

Appendix 3 Map of Japan This map is not to scale, but is designed to make referencing to prefectures easier. Prefectures listed in usual Japanese order.

Glossary 6–3–3–4 Six years elementary education, six years lower secondary education, three years upper secondary education, four years higher education Chūkyōshin Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai—an advisory body established within Monbushō Course of Study Gakushū shidō yōryō, the curriculum set out by Monbushō Diet The Japanese parliament or national assembly (Kokkai) Dōtoku Moral education course (name since 1958) DSP Democratic Socialist Party (Minshatō) FLE Fundamental Law of Education (Kyōiku Kihon Hō) Gakureki shugi The idea of putting importance on a person’s educational background (particularly where they studied rather than what they studied) GDCE The Group for Discussing Culture and Education (Bunka to Kyōiku ni Kansuru Kondankai (Bunkyōkon)) Genba ‘The actual site’ where education is delivered Heisei period 1989– House of Councillors Upper House of the Diet (Sangiin) House of Representatives Lower House of the Diet (Shūgiin) Ijime Bullying JCP Japan Communist Party (Nihon Kyōsantō) JET Programme The Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme Jiyūka Liberalisation JSP Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō) Juken jigoku ‘Examination hell’ Juku ‘Cram’ schools Jūnanka Deregulation Kansai or Kinki The region of Japan that includes the prefectures of Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyōgo, Nara and Wakayama Kantō The region of Japan that includes the prefectures of Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gumma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo and Kanagawa Keizai Dōyūkai Japanese Committee for Economic Development, a business organisation Kikokushijo Children returning from living and studying abroad Kokoro ‘Spirit’ or heart Kokusaika Internationalisation Kōmeitō The Clean Government Party Kyōiku-mama Mothers who are concerned (sometimes excessively) with education Kyoto Group The Kyoto Group for the Study of Global Issues (Sekai o Kangaeru Kyoto Zaikai) LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyū Minshutō or Jimintō) Meiji period 1866–1912 Monbushō Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture (MESSC) (name up to

Glossary

169

end of 2000 when it became Monbukagakushō (Ministry of Education and Science) after merging with the Science and Technology Agency) NCUEE National Center for University Entrance Examinations Nikkeiren Japan Federation of Employers’ Association Nikkyōso The Japan Teachers’ Union (JTU) Occupation period 1945–52 OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Rengō Zen Nippon Minkan Rōdōkumiai Rengōkai—a union organisation Rinchō Extraordinary Administrative Reform Council—an ad hoc body established to discuss administrative reform Ringisho A petition used in the decision making process Rinkyōshin Ringi Kyōiku Shingikai—ad hoc council established by Nakasone to discuss education reform Rōnin Literally ‘masterless samurai’—used to refer to students who continue to attempt to enter a particular institution rather than enter a different one Shoninsha kenshū A year-long probationary period of employment and training for teachers Shōwa period 1926–88 Shūshin Moral education course (pre-war title) Sub-government Issue-oriented division that unites politicians and bureaucrats in a particular area Taishō period 1912–26 Tatemae The ‘professed intention’ (as opposed to the ‘real intention’ (honne)) Tsunami A wave created by an earthquake at sea, for example. Often mistakenly referred to as a tidal wave Yobikō Special ‘cram’ schools (usually for university entrance) Zaikai The business world Zenkyō Zen Nippon Kyōshokuin Kumiai Keimeikai—a new teachers’ union created after the splitting up of Nikkyōso Zoku A clique or group of people with similar interests

Notes Notes on style

1 Simmons appears to suggest that the Council was renamed during its three-year lifetime (Simmons 1990:120).

1 Introduction

1 These comments were made by Nakasone at the funeral of former prime minister, Kishi Nobusuke. 2 The longest serving post-war Japanese prime minister was Satō Eisaku (7 years 7 months). The only other prime ministers to serve more than four years were Yoshida Shigeru (two terms—1 year and 5 years 1 month), and Ikeda Hayato (4 years 4 months). Nakasone served a total of 4 years 11 and half months (1,806 days). 3 The mother of one friend questioned why she was mixing with a person such as me who had met with and so, by extension, she felt, must like Nakasone. The comments of some other friends are best not printed. 4 If one considers an earthquake out at sea, after the initial shock a tsunami may be produced. However, the wave at first may only be a few centimetres high. Although it travels very fast, it will often pass under boats without being detected. It is not until the wave reaches land that it builds up in height and finally crashes down onto the shore. 5 Amano (1986a:41) describes education reform as ‘one of the most controversial political issues in Japan’.

2 Background

1 This is a fact that Monbushō has been happy to express (Monbushō 1995:70, 96). See also Horio (1988b:3), Okimoto and Rohlen (1988:2), Rohlen (1983:209, 271, 319), OERI Japan Study Team (1987:2, 70) and Cummings (1980:5, 262).

Notes

171

2 This idea has been noted by Aristotle, for example (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:70). 3 The foreign teachers, known as oyatoi gaikokujin, were seen as being particularly important in introducing many Western ideas and materials. Estimates suggest that there were between 3,000 and 6,000 such teachers in Japan between 1868 and 1912 (Beauchamp 1991b:28; Burks 1985; Dulles 1965; Schwantes 1955; Jones 1980). 4 See also Nishi (1982), Ward and Shulman (1974), Borton (1966), Burkman (1982) and Mayo (1984:3–51). 5 For details about the teacher’s opposition to the re-reforms see Nikkyōso (1967: 347– 8) and Beauchamp and Vardaman (1994:146–7). For details on the business community’s support for the re-reforms see Beauchamp (1991b:33). 6 Many Japanese approve of a centralised system, as it allows for greater equality in the education system (Beauchamp 1991b:33–4). 7 The advancement rate to upper secondary school rose from 57.7 per cent in 1960 to 82.1 per cent in 1970, and to 91.9 per cent in 1975. The advancement rate to university rose from 8.2 per cent in 1960 to 17.1 per cent in 1970, and to 26.7 per cent in 1975 (Japan Almanac 1994:240). 8 The original version was published on 11 June 1971, with the English version being published the following year (Chūkyōshin 1972). 9 See comments by Aichi Kazuo in Schoppa (1991a:71). 10 For example, a 1956 attempt to strengthen the government’s control over the content of textbooks and, in 1973, the legislation regarding the head teacher system, which had already been carried out since a ministerial order in 1957 (Roesgaard 1998:24; Horio 1988b:164). 11 For example, Monbushō did not follow up on ideas to carry out pilot studies into changes to the school system after the 1971 reforms (Schoppa 1991a:110–11). 12 The seventeen councils advising Monbushō in 1983 were the Distinguished Cultural Service Selection Council; Educational Curriculum Council; Private University Council; Special Council on University Problems; Copyright Council; Religious Corporations Council; Teacher Training Council; Science Council; University Establishment Council; Textbook Review Council; Japanese Language Council; Council for the Protection of Cultural Assets; Chūkyōshin; Health and Fitness Council; Science and Industrial Education Council; Social Education Council; and the Geodesy Council (Schoppa 1991a:113, 279 (footnote 42); Gyōsei Kanrichō 1983). 13 Examples of Monbushō not being successful in controlling the councils includes the textbook issue in 1981–3 (see Chapter 5). Also there were problems during the deliberations before the publication of Chūkyōshin’s report in 1971, due to the differences between two groups of people: one that wanted significant change (headed by people such as Nishida and Amagi) and one that wanted to maintain the status quo (see Schoppa 1991a:114–15).

Notes

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3 Nakasone as number one

1 Buckley (1990:106) also believes that this is why Nakasone ‘had to wait impatiently for his turn at the helm and why, once he finally got his chance, he made the most of his belated opportunity’. 2 Uchida (1983:21) splits Nakasone’s political career into two stages. The first from his election in April 1947 until his appointment as Minister of Transport in 1967— ‘Nakasone of this period was an aggressive, straight-forward politician. The second period (from 1967) was a time of political opportunism. 3 Among those who refer to Nakasone’s style of leadership being presidential are Hayao (1993:47). On 2 March 1985, Deputy White House Spokesman Larry Speakes referred to Nakasone as ‘President Nakasone’. Though he quickly corrected himself, the comments caused great amusement to many Japanese (Yoshimura 1988:23). 4 I also noticed a large banner calling for a publicly elected prime minister was hanging on the outside of a building opposite the station in Takasaki, Nakasone’s home city, in early 2000. 5 Nakasone did face challenges to his leadership, but these were largely halted owing to a lack of unity within the opposing factions, or owing to his support in the opinion polls. Masumi (1995:422) also argues that those who wanted to become leaders (Abe, Takeshita and Miyazawa) co-operated to improve their chances of entering a post-Nakasone cabinet. 6 Shinoda (1995) defines the four types of leadership style as follows: The Political Insider is a leader, like Satō, Tanaka and Takeshita, with abundant internal sources of power who enjoys stable support within the ruling party and close ties with the bureaucracy and the opposition parties. The other three leadership styles lack internal sources. The Grandstander, like Nakasone, Hosokawa and Ikeda in his income doubling policy, directly seeks external support from the public and the media for his policy goals to supplement his lack of internal sources of power. The Kamikaze Fighter, like Kishi in the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, tries to achieve an unpopular policy by sacrificing his political leadership role. The Peace Lover, like Suzuki in administrative reform, and Kaifu and Miyazawa in political reform, is an indecisive leader who fails to achieve a controversial policy goal because he tries to please all the actors.’ 7 Both Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun accused Nakasone of ‘turning his back on public opinion and inviting people’s ire’ early on his leadership (Seki 1983:9). 8 Ōhira established nine Policy Study Associations (Seisaku Kenkyūkai) on various issues and made up of both academics and businessmen (Satō et al. 1990:449–51; Hayao 1993:181, 196). Although many of the ‘brains’ that Nakasone used were also used by Ōhira, Nakasone and Ōhira were very different (Satō, interview, 17 November 1997).

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9 Similar comments had been made also about Eda’s preference to seek public support rather than that of his own party, and that popularity should be a result of the actions of the whole party not just one individual (Curtis 1988:142). Another who disliked Nakasone’s ‘grandstanding and sloganeering’ was Miyazawa Kiichi, who was later to become prime minister (Ōtsuki 1985:11–12). 10 Although Asahi Shimbun polls appeared to reveal that the Nakasone cabinet was one of the most unpopular in the post-war period, data from Kyōdō Tsūshinsha revealed much higher levels of support (51 per cent when the cabinet was first created, 45.8 per cent in March 1983) (Sekai Heiwa Kenkyūjo 1995c:663). 11 Satō (1986:3) also believed that ‘at least some credit must be given to expectations of and support for Nakasone’ which led to the LDP’s landslide victory. 12 Construction Minister Amano Kosei remarked ‘Nakasone would be a fine fellow if he just kept his mouth shut, but the minute he starts talking the illusion is shattered’ (Yoshimura 1988:52). Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami Takao was another frustrated by Nakasone’s occasional slips and once said ‘The prime minister did not really mean what he said. The problems rests solely with his choice of words. I tell you, I would really like to get my hands on Takasaki Middle School’s Japanese teachers’ (Yoshimura 1988:29). 13 In January 1983, Nakasone apparently stated ‘What I personally consider to be the objectives for the defence of Japan are firstly to transform the Japanese archipelago into a bulwark, like an unsinkable aircraft carrier’ (Yoshimura 1988:10). Nakasone later denied the comment that had been quoted in the Washington Post. In September 1986, Nakasone said that There can be no other society as awash with information as modern Japan. What is more it is only Japan that has become a highly educated society. Because of the considerable presence of blacks, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans in the United States, the average intelligence level is extremely low’ (Yoshimura 1988:34). These comments soon appeared in the US media, and Nakasone was eventually forced into making an apology to both the people of the United States and Japan for the comments and the trouble that they had caused. In July 1986, Nakasone said ‘I have no intention of bringing in a large-scale indirect tax that is opposed by the electorate and the ruling party’ (Yoshimura 1988:40). However, in September of that year, he began to start the moves towards introducing a sales tax, though he tried to suggest that the proposed tax was not going to be ‘large-scale’. 14 According to the opinion poll in Asahi Shimbun (19 February 1983), of the 43 per cent of those surveyed that said they did not support the Nakasone cabinet, 18.6 per cent gave the fact that Nakasone was the prime minister as being the prime reason for their answer, 27.9 per cent gave the cabinet’s economics policies as the reason, 27.9 per cent said that it was due to its foreign policies, 16.3 per cent said that it was because it was an LDP cabinet, 9.3 per cent gave another answer or no answer. 15 These views were supported by Tanaka (interview, 10 May 1996) and Kioka (interview, 19 November 1997). 16 Nakasone had shown his interest in the issue of the constitution on numerous occasions, including in 1967, when he called for a national referendum to ‘test its “legitimacy’” (Herzog 1993:12). Kioka (interview, 19 November 1997) also

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believes that ‘Nakasone was thinking about the Fundamental Law of Education and constitutional revision’ when he embarked on education reform. 17 The ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ refers to the policies of Prime Minister Yoshida, which tended to leave Japan’s international policies to be determined by and supportive of the US position, while Japan concentrated on its economic revival. 18 Nakasone also said that he took policies from the book in the interview on 1 December 1997. 19 Roesgaard (1998:89) believes that the seven-point proposal was largely based on the ‘Twelve LDP policies on Educational Reform’, which is often referred to as the Nishioka memo, which had been issued a few weeks earlier. Although there is undoubtedly a similarity between the two, the fact that the seven-point proposal is similar to what Nakasone called for in his book Atarashii Hoshu no Ronri is of much greater relevance to this study. This is supported by the fact that the two papers later published by the Nakasone cabinet, the ‘Five Ground Rules for Educational Reform in the 21st Century’ and the ‘Memo on Basic Ideas on Educational Reform’, emphasised the need for issues relating to internationalisation, liberalisation, diversification, the information-oriented society, and respect for the individual (Roesgaard 1998:90), all of which figured prominently in Atarashii Hoshu no Ronri. 20 Having won the election, he then announced on 6 February 1984 that educational reform would be ‘the third major reform, following administrative and financial reform’ (Foreign Press Centre 1985:6). This apparent demotion of the importance of education reform is most likely to be due to the fact that fiscal reform had originally been included as part of administrative reform, rather than due to a real loss of interest in the policy. 21 At the 101st Session of the Diet (6 February 1984), Nakasone said ‘we have long discussed the need for educational reform and renewal, but never before has public opinion been so strong on the need for educational reform as it is now’ (Nakasone 1984:12–13). 22 Nakasone had been known as a budget-cutter while associated with Rinchō, calling for a cut in aid to private universities, a delay in reducing class sizes from forty-five to forty, and a re-examination of the system of providing textbooks free to those students in compulsory education (Schoppa 1991a:76). 23 After a conference with President Reagan, Nakasone said ‘I wanted to build up a deep relationship of trust between myself and President Reagan that also functioned on a personal level and to develop it in such a way that we would be able to have no hold barred discussions at any time…We will no doubt meet again face-to-face and when that time arrives I think that our relationship will have reached a point where we can greet each other with “Hi Ron!” and “Hi Yasu!’” (Yoshimura 1988:11). This was the beginning of the ‘Ron-Yasu Kankei (‘Ron-Yasu relationship’). 24 According to Saitō Tadashi, a former Monbushō official, people were already being selected to be members of Chūkyōshin during January (Saitō 1985:113). 25 Chūkyōshin was already investigating the textbook authorisation system and the possible reform of the 6–3–3 system, as well as receiving advice from Nikkeiren on the school violence problem (Hayao 1993:50).

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26 This view is supported by Ishikawa and Imashiro (1998:13, 22) who state that after the firing of Nisugi, Chairman of JNR, the progress of the reforms became ‘rapid’. 27 The seven recommendations were (1) Diversification of school education through relaxation of rules on establishment of new schools, (2) Relaxation of the school zone system, (3) Employment of dedicated teachers, (4) Greater flexibility in the years, contents and methods of education, (5) Review of the present [6–3–3] school system, (6) Abolition of the ‘deviation value’ (hensachi) system, (7) Enforcement of moral education (The Kyoto Group for Study of Global Issues 1985:31–4). 28 Nakasone also had to promise that recommendations would be reported to the Diet (Nishimura 1985:21). 29 The way that Nakasone showed his strength with getting approval for Rinkyōshin can be demonstrated by the fact that when in a seemingly very strong position following the 1986 general election landslide victory, Nakasone and his cabinet were unable to get Diet approval for a new and unpopular sales tax—which reflected the ‘checks and balances’ that can and do exist in Japanese politics (see Curtis 1988:243). 30 Nakasone (interview, 1 December 1997) said that he did not want Okamoto as chairman, wanting Nakayama instead. 31 lijima was an official of the Japan Scientists Association and the Japan Science Council, neither of which were noted for their support of the Monbushō. However, Monbushō hoped that lijima would provide a brake on any Rinkyōshin proposals on university reform that went too far (Schoppa 1991a:165). 32 Originally both Nakasone and the Nikkyōso leader, Tanaka Ichirō, had been in favour of a union representative being a member of the council. However, owing to opposition from the left wing of the union, which feared that its participation might be used as a means to justify reforms despite outside opposition from Nikkyōso to any Rinkyōshin proposals, the idea was dropped (Schoppa 1991a:157; Nihon Kyōiku Shimbun 2 July 1984).

4 ‘Healthy internationalism’

1 After retiring from sumo, Konishiki (real name: Salevaa Atisanoe) has had to write his name in capitals (KONISHIKI) as part of an agreement with the Sumo Association which allows him to keep his sumo shikona (name) for his entertainment career and charity work. Akebono’s real name is Chad Rowan, and Musashimaru’s is Fiamalu Penitani. Yokozuna is the top rank in sumo; Ōzeki is the second highest rank. 2 Nakasone (1987:14) said There is no reason why Japan should not have a healthy nationalism just like any other nation. But we must never reach the “expel the barbarians” point.’ Nakasone also referred to the ideology as ‘tadashii nashonarizumu’ (‘justifiable nationalism’) and being ‘necessary’ in the interview on

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1 December 1997. 3 Nakasone (1984:2) described the maintenance of peace in Japan and the world as the first of his political objectives. He also said that Japan should ‘pay due attention so as not to become a military power and not pose any military threat to neighbouring countries’ and that ‘Japan must never again become the pariah of Asia’(Nakasone 1987:6, 10). 4 One should be careful when using Japanese defence budget figures for international comparisons, as what is included in the budget is not always the same from country to country, and this tends to mean the Japanese figure is deceptively low. 5 Nakasone (1987:12) went on to explain: ‘In the longing for peace and striving for culture, the Emperor has always been at the centre of popular aspirations and unity. The actual secular politics were carried out by people like Hideyoshi Toyotomi, Nobunaga Oda, leyasu Tokugawa, the Hojos, and the Fujiwaras.’ 6 The report was produced by a cabinet round-table discussion on 7 August 1985 (Yoshimura 1988:19). 7 Based on comments made by Stockwin (1997). 8 Being an avid painter in his spare time, Nakasone even helped design the poster, which I observed on a visit to his office, for a conference on banning land mines. 9 The term ‘kuni o aisuru kokoro’ can also be translated as ‘patriotism’. 10 The ‘Prime Directive’ is a concept central in the science fiction series Star Trek, and its various subsequent series and films. It is based on the principle that one should not interfere with the natural development of others. 11 The Asahi Shimbun article was based on an NHK TV programme, ‘Sōri ni kiku’, shown on 21 August 1984. 12 The term ‘black ship’ refers to the ship on which Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Japan in 1853, which became a catalyst for the reform and modernisation of Japan. 13 Tanaka believed that Nakasone felt this way (interview, 10 May 1996). These views have also been supported by Matanle (interview, 22 September 1997). 14 This view was also supported by Matanle (interview, 22 September 1997) and Oliphant (interview, 21 November 1997). 15 These comments are based on personal observation and a presentation—and response to a question I placed on the subject—by Ōtsuka Masahiro, Deputy Managing Director of Dentsu Europe, at a seminar held in London on 10 May 2000 by Nikkei Business Publications. 16 I also noticed a sign on a notice board in the International Office at Hōsei University (Tama Campus) in 1996 that reflects this change in attitude, proclaiming that ‘We are different, and this is great’. Such views are very different to the traditional idea of the ‘nail that sticks out must be hammered down’ (deru kui-wa utareru). 17 The year of 1994 was the first in twenty-one years that the Agency’s budget had been over 1 per cent of the Monbushō total budget (Monbushō 1995:178). 18 Kobayashi points out that the kikokushijo have enjoyed a change in status from being seen as ‘problem children’ (Kobayashi 1990:189). 19 The peak for kikokushijo in recent years was in 1992 when the figure was 13,219

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(Shimizu et al. 1997:294). 20 Ogiyama Shōji, the head of the Kaigai Shijo Kyōiku Shinkō Zaidan, argues that children should have a firm understanding of Japanese identity before they go abroad (Goodman 1990:225). 21 On top of these facilities, there were another seventeen private ones which had been established by Japanese school corporations (Shimizu et al. 1999:292). 22 Amano (interview, 5 June 1996) also believes that the problems with Hinomaru and Kimigayo are ‘sentimental’ and are a result of their association with the war. 23 For graduation ceremonies in 2000, the percentage of public schools where only the music was played was 0.9 per cent, 1.3 per cent and 0.3 per cent for the three levels of schooling. The percentage of schools where both the music was not played and words not sung was 3.7 per cent, 5.1 per cent and 3.5 per cent (Monbushō 2000c). 24 Comments about Hinomaru being raised out of sight and Kimigayo being played on a tape made by Amano (interview, 5 June 1996). Kioka (interview, 19 November 1997) also said that there have been cases where Hinomaru was only raised in the principal’s office. Also see Cripps (1996:86–90) and Aspinall (1997:167). 25 Roesgaard interview with Sakai Tomiko (Head of Department for Education and Culture in Nikkyōso), May 1991 (Roesgaard 1998:220).

5 Traditionalism and control

1 Many teachers are not opposed to moral education itself, but rather the use of moral education classes, a moral education curriculum, and government-prepared moral education materials (Schoppa 1991a:152; Schoppa 1991b:66). 2 For example, Koizumi (interview, 26 November 1997) believes that teacher training is ‘required’ for English teachers, so that they will not continue to use grammarbased methods. 3 Between 1978 and 1981, 387 teachers committed suicide in Japan (Shimahara 1991:260). 4 Seventy-four pe rcent of fourth and fifth grade of primary school students and 42 per cent of those in the third grade of lower secondary school respected their homeroom teachers (Youth Development Headquarters (YDH) 1981, 109; Ichikawa 1986:249). 5 Neither Morito nor Takami acknowledged the teachers’ demands for greater freedom (Horio 1988b:246). Despite these claims, however, Thurston believed that for most Nikkyōso members economic matters were more important than political ones (Thurston 1973). 6 Comments made by Education Minister Araki Masuo after Nikkyōso criticised the Course of Study (Horio 1988b:247). 7 University professors, on the other hand, do not believe that other teachers and administrators are the best people to train and retrain other teachers (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:18).

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8 Teachers and other personnel in public compulsory schools are paid more generously than ordinary public servants. Although prefectures are responsible for these costs, the central government covers half of the compulsory education expenditures from treasury funds (Monbushō 1995:102). 9 For example, many universities in teaching about English teaching have tended to concentrate on the ‘safe’ ground of grammar, rather than communication which is emphasised now by Monbushō (Ogushi, interview, 26 November 1997). 10 Teachers at this time received a minimum of twenty days’ in-service training during their first year (Shimahara 1991:270; Ichikawa 1983:41; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:17). 11 This view appears to be supported by the view that one of the best features of the training programme is that it gives teachers the opportunity to meet other teachers and discuss each other’s experiences (Okada, interview, 30 November 1997). 12 Over half of the prefectures required that applicants for the examination be under thirty years old (Shimahara 1991:270; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:17). 13 Thurston found that union dues vary from prefecture to prefecture, but can be as high as ¥12,000 per month—partly to cover the costs of supporting those teachers who have received some sort of punishment from the government. Japanese teachers are amongst the best-paid teachers in the world, receiving 2.4 times the national per capita income (compared to 1.7 in the United States) (Stevenson and Stigler 1992:162). 14 Aspinall (1997:78) argues that the flexibility that meant that individual prefectures could follow their own policy became one of the union’s key weaknesses. 15 Kanasugi stated that there were four things that were necessary for an internationally minded Japanese to know about and understand: Admiral Togo, the Meiji Restoration, Kabuki and Zen (Roesgaard 1998:117–18). 16 In February 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto even sent a special message to a Nikkyōso seminar (Aspinall 1997:125–6, 229). Aspinall uses the term ‘new Nikkyōso’ to refer to the post-schism union, drawing a parallel with the changes of the British Labour Party which adopted the word ‘new’ after it began far reaching internal reforms, although it did not formally change its name. 17 An editorial in the Yomiuri Shimbun (5 September 1995) argued that it was indeed Nakasone that was a major influence in changing Nikkyōso’s direction. 18 According to interviews by Schoppa with Nakajima Akio (July 1987) and Suzuki Isao (July 1987), the idea to provide bonuses to shunin (middle-management teachers) originated with Nishida Kikuo rather than with Rinkyōshin (Schoppa 1991a: 99). 19 Mouer and Sugimoto (1986:260) maintain that even Japan’s textbook authorisation system is a ‘subtle form of control from the vantage point of the children’ as, although adults may be aware of the system and its potential, the children are not likely be. 20 Alphonse Karr (1808–90), ‘Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’ (The more things change, the more they are the same). 21 The provision for the free distribution of textbooks was introduced in 1963 (Monbushō 1995:100, 101).

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22 Kinmonth (1997) points out that whatever is said about the 1930s and after in textbooks may be largely irrelevant, because this period has not been stressed in entrance examinations, and it is entrance examinations that largely drive student attention to the textbooks. Furthermore, Kinmonth argues that it is also far from clear that the age cohort aimed at by lenaga and others would be able to grasp the nuances behind wording they would like to use, especially given the skeletal, chronological nature of Japanese textbooks at this level and the types of questions asked on entrance examinations. 23 Based on personal experience and interview with Matanle, 22 September 1997. 24 Kiuchi (interview, 21 November 1997) believes that the textbook authorisation system will continue for at least the next ten to twenty years. 25 Kanasugi had wanted Rinkyōshin to propose a new kyōiku kenshō (education charter) and it was discussed by the First Sub-committee. However, it never gained sufficient backing in this way and an attempt was made to include a ‘reinterpretation’ of the FLE in the philosophical section of the second Rinkyōshin report. Following further opposition the attempt was eventually abandoned before the final report (Schoppa 1991a:296 (footnote 86); Nihon Kyōiku Shimbun 25 November 1985 and 2 December 1985; Schoppa 1991b:66, 74 (footnote 43)). 26 This view is supported by Tanaka (interview, 10 May 1996) who believes that although the FLE has its good points, other areas are not adequately covered because it was written by the Americans.

6 ‘Liberalisation’ and ‘privatisation’

1 Nakasone (1997a:1, 25–6) has also described himself as a ‘neo-conservative liberal’. Schoppa (1991b:63) uses the term ‘neoconservative’ differently—for those who favoured the reduction in Monbushō control as opposed to increased moral education and improved teacher training as a means to solve the education system’s problems. However, Nakasone clearly belongs to a group that favours reduced Monbushō control yet also wants improved moral education and teacher training— which is how Amano and Oki, for example, define ‘neoconservative’. 2 Williams (1994:157) summarises that Fukuyama ‘argued that the end of history has eliminated all but one intellectual option for the future evolution of the planet. The “American way of life” was canonised as the sole coherent system of values and practices; everything else was obscurant barbarism that would inevitably be scattered by the force of this new Enlightenment.’ 3 A view supported by Amano Ikuo (interview, 5 June 1996). 4 The suffix ‘ka’ is often translated as ‘-isation’, and indicates the process of change. For example, kusai means international, and kokusaika mean internationalisation. 5 Amaya commented that at first Rinkyōshin made no indication as to how ‘liberalisation’ was to be introduced, but he supported the idea that it should be

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introduced into higher education first and then allowed to work down gradually (Amaya and Nishio 1985:53). 6 The business community had long campaigned for the reduction of uniformity in the education system (Schoppa 1991a:123), while some LDP politicians had advocated reforms that would increase the emphasis on ability-based streaming, and ‘a radical liberalization of the system’. However, neither of these ideas gained support within the party as a whole (Schoppa 1991a:65). 7 Comment on those appointed by Nakasone supporting ‘liberalisation’ as being ‘outsiders’ was made by Amaya Naohiro (Asahi Shimbun 4 April 1987). 8 Takeuchi (1985:42) points to the change in emphasis from ‘liberalisation’ to ‘respect for the individual’ as being a purely ‘political compromise carried out on the semantic level alone, and signaled no true rapprochement between two positions separated by a vast ideological gulf’. 9 These views are supported by Professor Saitō Taijun who believed that Rinkyōshins proposals for ‘individualism’ sought more ‘liberalisation’ which would lead to more emphasis being placed on the individual (Roesgaard 1998:162). 10 The six points were raised by Monbushō at a meeting with Rinkyōshin’s First Subcommittee on 25 January 1985 (Foreign Press Center 1985:9). 11 Monbushō had considered the idea of changing the 6–3–3 system around the time of the 1971 Chūkyōshin, but it decided that since the idea was not popular with most Japanese, it was not appropriate to experiment and make any changes (Hayao 1993:64; Asahi Shimbun 13 April 1984). 12 Dore and Sako (1989:25) point out that in a prefecture such as Tokyo, the ‘better’ students have a wide choice of schools and so tend not to choose vocational schools, which end up having to take the remaining ‘poorer’ students. There may well then be a ‘trickle-down’ effect to other prefectures because of this perception of vocational schools in Tokyo. 13 Gokase Junior and Senior High School opened in 1993 as part of the Forespia (a ‘Japlish’ word made from the words ‘forest’ and ‘utopia’) Programme to help develop that remote area of Miyazaki (Katsukata 1996:4, 5, 7). 14 Big business was not united on the issue of private education, as Keizai Dōyūkai proposed that scholarships and subsidies should be used to promote private education, whereas Nikkeiren did not see this as necessary (Schoppa 1991a:128). 15 Although about 30 per cent of all upper secondary schools are private, 60 per cent of upper secondary schools in Tokyo are private (Lynn 1988:30; Croucher 1995:32; Inagaki 1986:86). 16 Under laws such as the Law Concerning the National Treasury’s Share of Compulsory School Constitution, money from the national treasury can cover half the costs of the construction or expansion of buildings at elementary or lower secondary schools, and a third of the cost of renovations (Monbushō 1995:107, 108, 219, 223, 224, 225). 17 Based on comments made by the mother and grandmother of a child who was being sent to a special pre-school so that her chances of entering a prestigious private elementary school, and then secondary school, before going on to one of Japan’s top private universities, could be improved.

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18 One juku owner interviewed for this research said that he did not believe that there were any attempts being made by Monbushō to control juku (Date, interview, 2 December 1997). 19 In some areas of maths, students who had attended juku were found to do better than those who did not, but in other areas, no significant difference was found (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:14). 20 Many students will use study guide books either to supplement or instead of juku study, which may account for why some students do not attend juku (Simmons 1990:92–3; OERI Japan Study Team 1987:14). 21 The results of the survey (which allowed multiple answers) were: ‘The child wants to attend’ (46.0 per cent), ‘No one at home can help with studies’ (33.3 per cent), ‘The child does not study independently’ (32.4 per cent), and ‘School study alone is not enough to ensure success in entrance examinations’ (26.0 per cent) (Monbushō 1995:7). 22 During the course of this study, one student in Seto admitted that her family did not tell the board of education that they had moved so that she could remain at the same school. 23 Monbushō shotō chūtō kyōiku kyoku, Wagakuni no shotō chūtō kyōiku, testimony before Rinkyōshin on 23 January 1986. See also Schoppa (1991a:104–5). 24 At present teachers usually stay at one school for no more than ten years unless they have problems, or another school needs a different teacher (Mizuno, interview, 28 November 1997). Recently, however, this teacher himself has been asked to stay on at his school longer than the ten years as the principal does not want lose him (Mizuno, interview, 6 March 2000). This demonstrates not only that schools do want to hold on to their best ‘assets’, but also that schools can and do have some say in the way they are run and do not always have to pander to the board of education. 25 The change can be quite dramatic: for example, within a space of three years, one school within Seto changed from being viewed as the best of the eight lower secondary schools to being seen as the worst (Mizuno, interview, 28 November 1997). 26 Teaching on the environment occurs in many subjects, including social studies, science and English (Monbushō 1995:92). 27 Monbushō is issuing new guidelines on the disposal of rubbish and reducing the amount of energy that the schools consume, for example (Monbushō 1995:222). 28 It is quite common for people, often parents or salesmen, to visit a school unannounced and walk around before they either approach, or are approached by, a member of staff. Such practice may be seen as acceptable and may have not caused any problems in the past, but with the encouragement of more people to enter the school and the rise in crime in Japan, the worry must be that an incident will occur at some stage unless adequate security measures are taken. 29 In October 1993, Monbushō appointed a specialist in community development policies to the Policy Planning and Coordination Division to create an organisation that would help ‘regional revitalisation’ through the collection, analysis and distribution of information (Monbushō 1995:74, 119). 30 It should be noted, however, that large companies will often employ people from

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around the country and will then decide where they will be posted—placing them where they like when they like as though they were shogi (chess) pieces. 31 These views were supported by Amano (interview, 5 June 1996) and by Ogawa (interview, 4 December 1997).

7 The individual

1 I have come across teachers who have ignored the treatment of first-year students by third-year students at lower secondary school baseball clubs that has been bordering on violence and bullying rather than group harmony. See also Rohlen (1983:207) and Cummings (1980:126–7, 137–8). 2 In April 1994, a survey of private schools found that the implementation of the fiveday week was 75.9 per cent at elementary schools, 43.0 per cent at lower secondary schools and 61.2 per cent at upper secondary schools (Monbushō 1995:26). 3 Of parents supportive of the semi-monthly five-day week, 79.6 per cent said the main reason for their support was that it would lead to a ‘more relaxed life and more free time’. The other popular answers were ‘more time for family interaction’ (67.0 per cent), ‘more time to socialize (play) with friends’ (40.5 per cent), and ‘more time for activities involving contact with nature’ (40.0 per cent) (Monbushō 1995:32). 4 Rinkyōshin did not give specific guidelines for the content of the curriculum, but for its proposals to be implemented successfully, the reform of the curriculum in line with its recommendations was of great importance. 5 More than 90 per cent of Japanese consider themselves to be ‘middle class’, and whether these figures are reliable or not, the conclusion that can be made is that the Japanese consider themselves to be, or would like to be, equal (Okamoto 1992:25– 6). 6 Shichi-Go-San (7–5–3) is one of the Japanese festivals celebrated when children reach the age of 3, 5 and 7. ‘7–5–3’ in the education debate is an abbreviation of ‘7 wari, 5 wari, 3 wari’, where a ‘wari’ is Japanese for 10 per cent. 7’Standard score’: When a student receives the score X on a test, his or her standard score is derived according to the formula 50+10(X−M)/S, where M is the mean score and S is the standard deviation. 8 The Keizai Dōyūkai believed that creativity should be classed as the ‘most desirable quality’ (Keizai Dōyūkai 1985:35). 9 Okamoto (1992:33) refers to comments made by some American education experts in an article in Newsweek. However, there is no indication of whether these experts are simply using the Japanese system to criticise the state of American elementary schools or whether they have really studied the Japanese system in any depth. 10 The single ‘You Are The One’ brought together many of the stars whose music is produced by Komuro Tetsuya, Japan’s number one record producer and music writer. The stars included Globe, trf, Amuro Namie, Kahara Tomomi, and Hitomi.

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The project had the backing of both Monbushō and NTT. 11 The faculties which have tended to take the general courses more seriously included engineering, science, agriculture and medicine, where a better integration between the general and specialist courses was often developed, and the general courses were often spread across the four years of the course (OERI Japan Study Team 1987:51; Dore and Sako 1989:7). 12 A view supported by Amano (interview, 5 June 1996) and Ichikawa (interview, 5 June 1996). Also see Kitamura (1991:312) and Kitamura (1986:168). 13 Roesgaard (1998:258) also describes the 1990 law as being almost a ‘letter-by-letter copy’ of Rinkyōshin’s proposals.

8 The social problems

1 While I was on the JET Programme one member of Seto board of education recommended that the other AET in the city did not return to the United States to become a teacher as it was so dangerous. I pointed out that earlier that week a student at one lower secondary school in Seto had been hospitalised after being attacked by another student, which although they knew about did not feel was a major cause for concern. 2 Under Japanese law, there are four types of juvenile delinquent. ‘Juvenile criminals’ (hanzai shōnen) are children aged 14 to 19 who have committed crimes; ‘juvenile offenders’ (sokuhō shōnen) are children under 14 who have committed acts that violate criminal status; ‘crime-prone juveniles’ (guhan shōnen) are those under 20 who, it is feared, will commit crimes in the future, based on their personality and actions; and ‘unwholesome-activity juveniles’ (furyō kōi shōnen) are children who engage in acts ‘injurious to the moral character of themselves and others’, such as smoking, drinking and fighting (Ames 1981:77). 3 Although students from different years do mix during some club activities, there is little interaction between years the rest of the time. If bullying is being carried out by the students in the third year (those most likely to be feeling the effects of ‘examination hell’) against those in lower years, one would expect it to happen, therefore, during club activities. However, this also seems unlikely since third-year students are exempt from club activities for most of their final year as the exams draw closer. 4 Both Simmons (1990:71, 77, 123) and Lynn (1988:22–3) include the whole three years at lower secondary school as well as the three years at upper secondary school as part of ‘examination hell’, but this would appear to be an exaggeration since the entrance exams only take place during a short period, although their influence undoubtedly is far reaching. Cummings (1980:140) also includes the whole of the time spent at upper secondary school as being part of ‘examination hell’, describing the students who enter this period as ‘being similar to students marching off to war’.

Notes

184

5 Daifugō (also known as Daihimin) is a popular card game in Japan. At the beginning of each hand, the loser of the previous hand has to give a certain number of his best cards to the winner of the previous hand, and the winner gives the loser an equal number of cards he does not want. 6 This view was supported by university students and lecturers interviewed during the course of this study. 7 In 1985, 214,217 rōnin applied to universities, which was 48.2 per cent of all applicants. However, this figure rose to 57.3 per cent for applicants to the seven former imperial universities, and 65 per cent for the ‘top’ private universities (Tsukada 1988:286).

9 United and successful: final conclusions

1 View supported by Matanle (interview, 22 September 1997). 2 This view is supported by Horie (interview, 21 November 1997) and another Monbushō official, Kiuchi (interview, 21 November 1997). 3 Comments made by Lesley Connors and Arthur Stockwin in response to presentation made by Hood (1996).

Appendix 2

1 Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000a), Araiso and Moore (1989:197–8, 581– 2), Cripps(1996:77–9).

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Interviews Note that other interviews were also conducted, but for various reasons (see Chapter 1) they are not listed here. Amano Ikuo (Professor, Center for National University Finance; former Professor of Education, Tokyo University), 5 June 1996. Aspinall, Robert (Former JET participant, Oxford University (1993–97), Nagoya University (1998-), various dates 1996–2000. Date Masatoshi (Owner of Date Juku, Gifu Prefecture), 2 December 1997. Fujita Hidenori (Professor, Sociology of Education, School of Education, Tokyo University), 21 November 1997. Fukuda Hiroshi (Unit Chief, Upper Secondary School Division, Elementary and Secondary Education Bureau, Monbushō), 25 February 2000. Hazama Akio (Senior Textbook Specialist, Monbushō), 26 November 1997. Hemmi Kazuha (International Affairs Division, Monbushō), various dates 1996–7. Hiratsuka Maki (Associate Professor, Pedagogic, Hōsei University), 7 May and 15 May 1996. Horie Shin’ichirō (Director, Overseas Japanese Children Education Division, Monbushō), 21 November 1997. Horio Teruhisa (Emeritus Professor of Tokyo University, Professor of Chūō University, Member of Science Council of Japan, President of the Japanese Society for the Study of Education (JSSE)), 10 October, 19 November and 27 November 1997. Ichikawa Kiyoji (Programme Specialist, International Scientific Affairs Division, Science and International Affairs Bureau, Monbushō), various dates 1997–2000. Ichikawa Shōgo (Director of Research Department, Center for National University Finance), 5 June 1996. Ishihara Shintarō (Governor of Tokyo and novelist), 21 March 2000. Ishikawa Masashi (Broadcaster, Yamaguchi Hōsō), 24 March 2000. Kioka Kazuaki (Head of Teaching Profession Division, National Institute for Educational Research of Japan (NIER)), 19 November 1997. Kiuchi Yukio (Senior Specialist, Educational and Cultural Exchange Office, Science and International Affairs Bureau, Monbushō), 21 November 1997. Koizumi Masashi (Senior Textbook Specialist, Monbushō), 26 November 1997, 25 February 2000 and 14 March 2000. Komatsu Ikuo (Head of Educational Management Research Department, National Institute for Educational Research of Japan (NIER)), 19 November 1997. Lau, Man Yee (Former JET participant), various dates. Matanle, Peter (Former JET participant and Programme Co-ordinator in the Planning Section of the JET Programme Division of the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR), University of Sheffield (1996–2000), Niigata University (2000–)), 22 September 1997 and various other dates 1995–2000. McVeigh, Brian (Associate Professor, Anthropology, Tōyō Gakuen University), 4 May 1996.

Bibliography

201

Mizuno Yasuo (Teacher, Hatayama Junior High School, Seto), 28 November 1997 and 6 March 2000. Nakasone Yasuhiro, 1 December 1997 and 15 March 2000. Niisato Masao (Senior Curriculum Specialist, Monbushō), 25 February 2000. Ogawa Masahito (Associate Professor, Department of Educational Policy and Administration, Graduate School of Education, Tokyo University), 13 May 1996 and 4 December 1997. Ogushi Masanori (Senior Textbook Specialist, Monbushō), 26 November 1997. Okada Harumi (Teacher, Ao Elementary School, Naga-gun, Mie Prefecture), 30 November 1997 and 19 March 2000. Okamoto Kaoru (Director, International Copyright Office, Monbushō), 5 December 1997 and (Director, Educational Media and Information Division, Monbushō) 22 March 2000. Oki Kiyotake (Educational Management Research Department, National Institute for Educational Research of Japan (NIER)), 19 November 1997. Oliphant, Huw (ALT and Prefectural Advisor on the JET Programme 1989–92, ALT advisor at the Monbushō), 21 November and 1 December 1997. Sasaki Takeshi (Chief, Division of Comparative Education for the European and American Regions, National Institute for Educational Research of Japan (NIER)), 19 November 1997. Satō Seizaburō (Research Director, Institute for International Policy Studies), 17 November 1997. Tanaka Shigeru (Political Secretary to Nakasone Yasuhiro), 10 May 1996, 21 November 1997 and 13 March 2000. Taniguchi Tomohiko (Bureau Chief, European Editorial Bureau, Nikkei Business), 10 November 1997. Uda Shin’ichirō (London School of Economics), 16 March 2000. Other sources Various informal, but informative, conversations with: staff and students at Minase Junior High School (Seto, Aichi prefecture), Sotō Junior High School (Seto, Aichi prefecture), Minamiyama Junior High School (Seto, Aichi prefecture), Motoyama Junior High School (Seto, Aichi prefecture), Shinano Junior High School (Seto, Aichi prefecture), Hatayama Junior High School (Seto, Aichi prefecture), Kōryō Junior High School (Seto, Aichi prefecture), Mizuno Junior High School (Seto, Aichi prefecture), Sobokai Elementary School (Seto, Aichi prefecture); members of Seto Board of Education; Professor lan Gow, Dr Hasegawa Harukiyo, Professor Glenn Hook, Dr Earl Kinmonth at the University of Sheffield; students from the School of East Asian Studies (University of Sheffield) Distance Learning MA course; staff and students from Meiji High School (Tokyo) in 1997–9; students (especially Sekiya Junko, Matsunaga Eri, Iwashita Yoko, Kinoshita Midori and Tsurumoto Wakako) from Meiji University in 1997 and 2000; students from Nagoya Junior College in 1995–9; students from Hōsei University (1995–8) and Hōsei High Schools (1999); members of various online discussion lists that have helped provide information and views, particularly the JET mailing list ([email protected]), SSJ-Forum (ssj-

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202

[email protected]), and H-Japan ([email protected]); and finally, those mentioned in the Acknowledgements and other people too numerous to mention, but whose ideas and opinions helped me develop this work.

Index

6–3–3 system: reform of 97–100 academic year see traditions Amano Ikuo x, 15, 27, 32, 69, 72, 76, 82,85, 93, 96, 120, 132, 144–5,148, 149, 152–,156, 158, 179, 180, 183–5 Amaya Naohiro 40, 43, 123, 181 American see United States anthem see Kimigayo Britain, British see United Kingdom bullying see ijime bunkyōzoku see education zoku bureaucrats: neutrality of 23–4,96 business community 19, 129, 155, 173, 181 Chūkyōshin 18, 20–1,23, 35, 36–7,39, 42, 53, 58, 72, 76, 79, 90, 94, 96, 99, 119, 121–2,148, 155– 6,159, 170, 173, 175–6,181 community 34, 72, 78, 91, 107–13, 117, 134,141, 143, 183 comprehensive schools 100 Confucianism 72 Connors, Lesley x, 186 consensus 24,39, 45, 59 constitution 27, 32, 39, 49, 64, 86–8,90–1,122, 161, 167, 175 course of study 19, 52, 54, 65, 85, 117, 170, 179 cram schools see juku; yobikō creativity 9, 50, 59, 96, 113, 120,123–5,184 credit system schools 99, 151 curriculum see course of study Date Masatoshi 182 defence see Nakasone Yasuhiro and defence Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) 36, 170 deregulation 94–7,170; see also diversification; flexibility in the education system Diet 8, 23, 30, 35, 39,67, 72, 79, 89, 91, 170, 176– Diet Education Committee 23 diversification 20, 56, 75, 96, 143, 153, 176

Index

205

education budget 23, 56, 88, 101, 178 education as social engineering 12–6 education policy making process 22–4 education zoku (bunkyōzoku) 22–3,35–7, 39–41,51, 76, 86, 95, 155, 158 egalitarianism 77, 102–3,108, 120–1,173 elite education 119–23 England, English nation see United Kingdom English language see foreign language teaching entrance examinations see examination hell equality in education see egalitarianism examination hell 10, 21, 33, 98, 132, 145–8,152–3,170, 185 Extraordinary Administrative Reform Council see Rinchō five-day week 116–9 flag see Hinomaru FLE (Fundamental Law of Education) 17, 39, 86, 90–1,156, 170, 180 flexibility in the education system 17, 38, 49, 60, 71, 81, 94–5,98, 109, 111, 120, 132, 176, 179; see also diversification; deregulation foreign language teaching 45–6,52–7, 60,88, 89, 93, 118, 124, 180, 182 foreign students see Kikokushijo Fujinami Takao 175 Fujita Hidenori 120, 133, 135, 156, 158 Fukuyama, Francis 93, 181 Fukuzawa Yukichi 101 future skills 123 GDCE 34, 39, 41, 98, 170 grade skipping 119–20 Heathrow Airport 9 Hinomaru 52, 64–70,85, 86, 91, 167, 179 Hiratsuka Maki 94, 96 Horie Shin’ichirō 58, 60, 61, 156, 158, 185 Horio Teruhisa x, 156 Howarth, Mike 86 Ichikawa Shōgo x, 28, 142, 155–6,184 lijima Sōichi 40–1,43–4,177 ijime (bullying) 10, 136, 138, 143–5,153, 170 Imperial Rescript on Education 16–7, 71 information technology see future skills internationalism: definition of 45–7; in education 50–3; see also Nakasone Yasuhiro:

Index

206

definition of internationalism Ishihara Shintarō x, 47, 69 Ishikawa Tadao 40, 44 Japan Communist Party (JCP) 38, 170 Japan National Railways (JNR) 38, 165 Japan Scientists Association 176 Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 38, 165–6,170 JET Programme 2, 54–6,90, 165, 185 Jimintō see Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) jiyūka see liberalisation Jiyūtō see Liberal Party juken jigoku see examination hell juku 54, 102, 104–5,116,120, 148–9,170, 182– jūnanka see deregulation juvenile delinquency 136–43 Kaifu Toshiki 29, 174 Kanagawa (Prefecture) 66, 170 Kansai 58, 170; Kansai International Airport 9 Kantō 21, 58, 133, 170 Keizai Dōyūkai 71, 98, 170, 182, 184 Kennoki Toshihiro 20 kikokushijo 47, 53, 58–64, 170, 178 Kimigayo 52, 64–70,85, 86, 91, 167,179 kindergarten 101, 103–5,118 Kinki see Kansai Kioka Kazuaki 84, 156, 175, 179 Kiuchi Yukio 77, 110, 112, 181, 186 Koizumi Masashi x, 27, 54, 87, 89, 121, 179 Kōmeitō 37, 170 kōtōgakkō sōgōgakka see comprehensive schools Komatsu Ikuo 26, 159 Kōyama Ken’ichi 15, 40–1,43, 95, 108 Kumon Shumpei 100 Kyoto Group 38, 41, 77, 95, 98, 101, 108, 120, 122, 148, 170 Lau, Man Yee x, 79 LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) 21–6,28, 30–1,35,37–9,42, 49, 57, 77, 85, 88, 93, 94, 155, 156, 159, 170, 174–5,181 liberalisation: 43, 86, 93, 94–5,176; definition of 93–7; privatisation of education 100–7; of higher education 107;–31 lifelong learning 131–4 London 9

Index

207

MacArthur, Douglas 65, 162 Machida 21, 165 Matanle, Peter x, 54, 75, 123, 178, 181, 186 McVeigh, Brian 9, 115 media 14, 22, 27, 31, 50, 90, 93, 136–7,143,149, 174 Meiji (education reforms) 6, 16–8, 34, 155 Meiji period 16–7, 51, 72, 170 Meiji Restoration 84, 94, 101, 180 Mie (Prefecture) 66, 68, 81, 85 Minshatō see Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) Mizuno Yasuo x, 52, 79, 183 Monbushō see specific subjects for proposals and responses to Rinkyōshin proposals moral education see traditions Mori Arinori 16 Mori Yoshirō 3791, 157, 166 Nakasone Yasuhiro: background: 26–33; definition of internationalism 47–50; and defence 26,48–9,158, 175, 178; interview x, 28, 33, 47, 48, 52, 70, 71, 77, 82, 90–1, 94, 101, 113, 150, 156, 175–6 Nakayama Sohei 40–4,177 Narita airport 9, 115, 164 Nihon Kyōsantō see Japan Communist Party (JCP) Nihon Shakaitō see Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Nikkvōso 18–9,23, 42, 68, 76–8,79, 82–5,90, 97, 126, 143, 156–8,170, 176, 179–80 nursery school see kindergarten Occupation (education reforms) 6, 17–9, 21, 34, 51, 71, 90, 155 OECD 20, 95, 171 Ogawa Masahito x, 91, 96, 156–7,183 Ogushi Masanori 89, 180 Okada Harumi x, 80, 117, 180 Okamoto Kaoru x, 14, 54, 73, 90, 91, 97, 100, 115, 118–9,123–4,129, 149 Okamoto Michio 32, 40,44, 177 Oki Kiyotake 27, 93 Oliphant, Huwx, 56, 178 Pacific War 6, 15, 17, 49, 72, 87–8,89, 136 Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) 23 principals 67, 69, 71, 77, 80, 82, 178, 182 privatisation see liberalisation Reagan, Ronald 93, 176 religious education see traditions Rinchō 33, 36, 40–1,101, 171, 176 Rinkyōshin : establishment and workings of 39–44;

Index

208

see specific subjects for proposals Ron-Yasu relationship 36, 49, 165, 176 rōnin see examination hell Sakata Michita 20, 37 Sasaki Takeshi 27 Satō Eisaku 29, 172, 174 Satō Seizaburō x, 48, 54, 70, 88–91, 101,145, 174 school choice see diversification; flexibility in the education system; community school district system see community school violence 21, 42, 72, 78, 136–8,143–4,176, 182 September school start 71 Sheffield x, 2 Shoninsha kenshū 77,80, 171 six-year secondary schools 97–8,101, 134, 151 Stockwin, Arthur x, 178, 186 streaming 103,105, 182 strikes 8, 77, 163 suicide 67, 78, 146,179 Suzuki Zenkō 21, 26, 29–30,174 Takeshita Noboru 29, 157, 174 Tanaka Kakuei 26, 29, 30, 35, 174 Tanaka Shigeru x, 50, 54, 76, 120, 175, 178, 181 Taniguchi Tomohiko x, 54, 88 tan’isei kōtōgakkō see credit-system schools teachers: neutrality of 19 teacher training see shoninsha kenshū textbook authorisation 86–9 Thatcher, Margaret 28, 73, 93 tobikyū see grade skipping Tokyo Olympics 65 Tokyo University 42, 101, 122, 132, 163 traditions 71–6 United Kingdom (UK) 2, 17, 27, 46, 54, 64, 69, 72, 76, 86, 93, 101,118, 122, 133, 164 United States (US, USA) 16–8, 31–2,46–9,54, 74, 90, 101,114–5,125, 137, 174–5,184 university reform see liberalisation of higher education vocational education 99–100,127, 145,150, 181 World Cup 70,166 Yasukuni Shrine 29, 33, 48–9

Index yobikō 104–6,171 Yokohama 21, 165 Yoshida Shigeru 19, 32, 172, 175 Zenkyō 52, 83–5,120, 126, 157, 171 zoku 22–4,36–7, 40, 42, 51, 77, 86, 95 156, 159, 171

209

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