Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War

Israel and Syria Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of P...

Author: Anthony H. Cordesman | Aram Nerguizian | Inout C. Popescu

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Israel and Syria

Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Israel and Syria The Military Balance and Prospects of War

Anthony H. Cordesman With the Assistance of Aram Nerguizian and Ionut C. Popescu

Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL

Westport, Connecticut

•

London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cordesman, Anthony H. Israel and Syria : the military balance and prospects of war / Anthony H. Cordesman with the Assistance of Aram Nerguizian and Ionut C. Popescu. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN-13: 978–0–313–35520–2 (alk. paper) 1. Israel—History, Military. 2. Israel—Military policy. 3. Syria—History, Military. 4. Syria—Military policy. 5. Lebanon War, 2006. 6. Arab-Israeli conflict—1993—Peace. I. Nerguizian, Aram. II. Popescu, Ionut C. III. Title. UA853.I8C672 2008 355’.03305694–dc22 2008008889 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright  2008 by Center for Strategic and International Studies All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008008889 ISBN-13: 978–0–313–35520–2 First published in 2008 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

FIGURES

xi

SOURCES AND METHODS

xv

CHAPTER 1: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE OR WAR MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH WAR Shifts on the Golan A Growing Missile Threat? ISRAELI AND SYRIAN ALARMS AND EXCURSIONS IN 2007 Conventional Military Tensions Israeli Raid on Syrian ‘‘Nuclear’’ Facilities THE PROSPECTS FOR WAR

1 2 3 5 6 6 7 9

CHAPTER 2: MAJOR TRENDS IN FORCE STRENGTH ISRAELI FORCE QUALITY VERSUS SYRIAN FORCE QUANTITY LOOKING AT A SNAPSHOT OF TOTAL FORCES COMPARATIVE MANPOWER QUANTITY AND QUALITY

11 11 12 18

CHAPTER 3: COMPARATIVE LAND FORCE STRENGTH: ACTIVE VERSUS MOBILIZED STRENGTH COMPARATIVE LAND FORCE MANPOWER ARMOR AND ANTITANK WEAPONS ARTILLERY WEAPONS ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS

24 24 27 34 39

vi

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 4: COMPARATIVE AIR STRENGTH: QUALITY OVER QUANTITY COMPARATIVE AIR FORCE STRENGTH AIR FORCE MANPOWER AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT, WEAPONS, AND TECHNOLOGY COMPARATIVE LAND-BASED AIR-DEFENSE FORCES

40

CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE NAVAL STRENGTH: PERIPHERAL MISSIONS SHIFTS IN THE ROLE OF SEAPOWER NAVAL MANPOWER NAVAL SHIPS, WEAPONS, AND TECHNOLOGY

50

CHAPTER 6: TOTAL RESOURCES: RECAPITALIZATION, FORCE MODERNIZATION, AND IMPACT ON EFFECTIVENESS COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN ARMS IMPORTS RECENT DEALS: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, AND IRAN Israeli Arms Buys Syrian Arms Buys

57

CHAPTER 7: THE MILITARY FORCES OF ISRAEL ISRAEL’S STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN ITS CONVENTIONAL ‘‘EDGE’’ ADAPTING TO ASYMMETRIC WARS The Impact of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict The Threat from Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction SEEKING TO ADD AN ASYMMETRIC EDGE TO A CONVENTIONAL ONE ADAPTING TO NEW THREATS WHILE RETAINING CONVENTIONAL MILITARY STRENGTHS The Impact of the Israeli-Hezbollah War Restructuring Forces to Meet New Mission Needs TRENDS IN MANPOWER AND TOTAL FORCE STRENGTH BEFORE THE 2006 LEBANON WAR: ACTIVE VERSUS RESERVE FORCES The ‘‘Kela 2008 Plan’’ Kushet (Rainbow) Plan ISRAELI DEFENSE PLANNING AFTER THE 2006 LEBANON WAR The Winograd Commission Post-Hezbollah War Reforms The Teffen 2012 Five-Year Plan: Implementing Lessons Learned? ISRAELI LAND FORCES Land Force Transformation Changes in Command and Control and Netcentric Warfare Main Battle Tanks Other Armor Antitank Weapons

73 73 76 76 77 78 80

40 41 41 47

50 52 53

58 61 69 69 71

80 81 81 84 85 86 87 88 90 91 96 97 99 101 102

CONTENTS

Upgrading Lighter Vehicles and Support Forces Artillery Forces Asymmetric Warfare Capabilities Other Aspects of Land Force Development ISRAELI AIR FORCES IAF Fixed-Wing Combat Forces IAF Rotary-Wing Combat Forces IAF ‘‘Enablers’’ Modern Air Operations ‘‘Are’’ Joint Operations Air Defense and Air-to-Air Combat Capability Air Offense and Air-to-Ground Combat Capability Air Operations for Asymmetric Warfare IAF Readiness and Training Standards Current Superiority and Future Challenges ISRAELI LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSES Surface-to-Air Missile Forces Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Forces C4I/BM and Sensor Systems Short-Range Air-Defense Systems Readiness and Effectiveness ISRAELI NAVAL FORCES Surface Fleet Developments Smaller Surface Ships Submarine Forces Amphibious Forces Naval Aviation The Navy’s Role in Asymmetric Warfare Naval Readiness and Mission Capability ISRAEL’S COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES Israeli Capabilities Israeli Terrorist Groups Internal Security versus Human Rights and Political Impacts ISRAELI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILE DEFENSES Probable Israeli Capabilities Shifts in Israeli Missile Defenses CHAPTER 8: THE MILITARY FORCES OF SYRIA SYRIA’S LONG PROXY WAR WITH ISRAEL INTERNAL STABILITY, ALAWITE RULE, AND THE SHI’ITE CRESCENT SYRIA’S BROADER REGIONAL ISSUES THE TRENDS IN SYRIAN FORCES The Syrian Modernization and Recapitalization Crisis The Russian Connection

vii 102 103 105 106 107 107 107 112 113 114 115 117 117 118 118 118 120 121 122 122 123 123 127 127 128 128 129 130 130 133 133 134 139 140 150 152 154 155 156 156 159 160

viii

CONTENTS

Future Arms Deliveries Continuing to Go ‘‘Hollow’’ SYRIAN LAND FORCES Syrian Force Strengths and Deployments Syrian Main Battle Tanks Syrian Other Armored Vehicles Syrian Antitank Weapons Syrian Artillery Syrian Rocket Forces Syrian Army Air Defenses Syrian Army Training, Readiness, and Warfighting Capability SYRIAN AIR AND AIR-DEFENSE FORCES Syrian Combat Air Strength Syrian Rotary-Wing Combat Strength Syrian Air Force Training, Readiness, and Warfighting Capabilities SYRIAN LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSES Syrian Air-Defense Weapons Shorter Range Syrian Air Defenses Syrian Air-Defense Training, Readiness, and Warfighting Capabilities Syria’s Need for Air-Defense Modernization SYRIAN NAVAL FORCES Syrian Surface Forces Syrian Amphibious Capability Syrian Naval Aviation Syrian Coastal-Defense Forces Syrian Naval Readiness, Training, and Warfighting Capability SYRIAN PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES SYRIAN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Syrian Chemical Weapons Syrian Biological Weapons Syrian Nuclear Weapons Syrian Delivery Systems Possible Syrian Strategy, Tactics, and Employment CHAPTER 9: WAR ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS THE STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF THE STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE GOLAN THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON THE GOLAN ISRAELI POSITIONS ON THE GOLAN SYRIAN POSITIONS NEAR THE GOLAN A SYRIAN SURPRISE ATTACK OR ‘‘GRAB FOR THE GOLAN’’ Syrian Options and Motives The Operational Challenges Syria Would Face The Risk of Air and Missile Escalation

164 164 165 165 166 171 172 173 174 175 177 178 178 182 182 183 183 185 186 186 188 189 191 191 192 192 192 201 201 213 213 218 219 221 222 223 227 230 231 232 233 234 235

CONTENTS

ISRAELI OPTIONS AGAINST SYRIA The Costs of an IDF Advance into Syria Israel’s Ability to Use the AirLand Battle in Offensive Operations Israel’s Deep Strike and Strategic Air Option Assessing the Balance of Risks

ix 237 237 238 239 239

CHAPTER 10: CONTINUING EXTERNAL ASYMMETRIC WARS ISRAEL’S ‘‘HAVES’’ VERSUS SYRIA’S ‘‘HAVE NOTS’’ Syria’s Real-World Strategic Priorities versus Asymmetric Adventures The Cost-Benefits of the ‘‘Spoiler’’ Game THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT GAMING A FUTURE ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH CONFLICT? The Lebanese ‘‘Wild Card’’ The Lebanese Armed Forces Hezbollah’s Domestic and International Posture THE IRANIAN WILD CARD Iranian Proliferation The Israeli View and the Uncertain Iranian Strategic Calculus Iran and the Prospects for a Future Military Strike Possible Iranian Response Shifts in Israeli Strategic Nuclear Forces

241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 251 252 253 256 257 260 261

NOTES

263

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Figures

FIGURE 2.1: THE ARAB-ISRAELI BALANCE: FORCES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI ‘‘RING’’ STATES IN 2008 FIGURE 2.2: ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND LEBANON AS OF 2008 FIGURE 2.3: ISRAELI VERSUS SYRIAN OPERATIONAL FORCE STRENGTH AS OF 2008 FIGURE 2.4: SYRIAN-ISRAELI ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES: 1999–2006 FIGURE 2.5: ARAB-ISRAELI BORDERS FIGURE 2.6: TOTAL ARAB-ISRAELI ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER: 1973–2008 FIGURE 2.7: ARAB ACTIVE VERSUS ISRAELI MOBILIZED ARMY MANPOWER: 1973–2008 FIGURE 3.1: ARAB ACTIVE VERSUS ISRAELI MOBILIZED ARMY MANPOWER: 1973–2008 FIGURE 3.2: ARAB-ISRAELI LAND FORCE MANPOWER IN 2008 FIGURE 3.3: ARAB-ISRAELI ARMORED FORCES IN 2008 FIGURE 3.4: ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND LEBANON: OPERATIONAL TANKS BY TYPE 2008 FIGURE 3.5: ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND LEBANON: HIGH-QUALITY TANKS BY TYPE 2008 FIGURE 3.6: ARAB-ISRAELI OTHER ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES (LIGHT TANKS, OAFVS, APCS, SCOUTS, AND RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES): 1973–2008 FIGURE 3.7: ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND LEBANON: ‘‘TRUE AFVS’’ 2008 FIGURE 3.8: OPERATIONAL ARAB-ISRAELI ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS IN 2008 FIGURE 3.9: ARAB-ISRAELI ARTILLERY FORCES BY CATEGORY OF WEAPON IN 2008

13 16 17 18 19 20 21 25 26 28 29 30 31 32 33 35

xii

FIGURES

FIGURE 3.10: ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND LEBANON: HIGH PERFORMANCE ARTILLERY IN 2008 FIGURE 3.11: ARAB-ISRAELI SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY BY CALIBER IN 2008 FIGURE 3.12: ARAB-ISRAELI MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS BY CALIBER IN 2008 FIGURE 4.1: ARAB-ISRAELI AIR FORCE AND AIR-DEFENSE MANPOWER IN 2008 FIGURE 4.2: TRENDS IN TOTAL ARAB-ISRAELI COMBAT AIRCRAFT: 1973–2007 FIGURE 4.3: TOTAL OPERATIONAL ARAB-ISRAELI COMBAT FIGHTER, ATTACK, BOMBER BY TYPE IN 2008 FIGURE 4.4: HIGH-QUALITY OPERATIONAL ARAB-ISRAELI COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN 2008 FIGURE 4.5: UNARMED FIXED- AND ROTARY-WING RECCE, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND INTELLIGENCE AIRCRAFT IN 2008 FIGURE 4.6: OPERATIONAL ARAB-ISRAELI ATTACK AND ARMED HELICOPTERS IN 2008 FIGURE 4.7: ARAB-ISRAELI LAND-BASED AIR-DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN 2008 FIGURE 5.1: ARAB-ISRAELI NAVAL MANPOWER IN 2008 FIGURE 5.2: ARAB-ISRAELI MAJOR COMBAT SHIPS BY CATEGORY IN 2008 FIGURE 5.3: OTHER ARAB-ISRAELI NAVAL CAPABILITIES IN 2008 FIGURE 6.1: COMPARATIVE MILITARY EFFORT: 1985–2006 (IN 2008 $U.S. DOLLARS) FIGURE 6.2: NATIONAL TRENDS IN ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY SPENDING IN CONSTANT DOLLARS: THE DECLINE IN ARAB FORCES AS A SHARE OF TOTAL SPENDING: 1985–1999 FIGURE 6.3: ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY COUNTRY: 1997–2007 (IN 2008 $U.S. MILLIONS) FIGURE 6.4: TREND IN PERCENT OF GNP SPENT ON MILITARY FORCES: 1983–2007: HALF THE BURDEN OF THE EARLY 1980S FIGURE 6.5: NATIONAL TRENDS IN ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS DELIVERIES IN CONSTANT DOLLARS FIGURE 6.6: ARAB-ISRAELI NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES BY COUNTRY: 1995–2006 FIGURE 6.7: ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS ORDERS BY SUPPLIER COUNTRY: 1995–2006 FIGURE 6.8: THE COMPARATIVE SIZE OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COMMERCIAL ARMS SALES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI RING STATES: 1986–1997 (IN $U.S. MILLIONS) FIGURE 6.9: THE COMPARATIVE SIZE OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COMMERCIAL ARMS SALES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI RING STATES: 1997–2007 (IN 2007 $U.S. MILLIONS) MAP 7.1: ISRAEL FIGURE 7.1: PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS: TOTAL POPULATION IN ISRAEL, THE GAZA STRIP, THE WEST BANK, AND GREATER JERUSALEM: 1950–2050 FIGURE 7.2: ISRAELI MILITARY: MANPOWER AND FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS: 1990–2008 FIGURE 7.3: RECENT ISRAELI ARMS SALES

36 37 38 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 53 54 55 58 59

60 61 62 63 64 65

67

74 75 82 83

FIGURES

FIGURE 7.4: ISRAELI ARMY FORCES: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 7.5: ISRAELI AIR FORCE: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 7.6: ISRAELI AIR-DEFENSE FORCE: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 7.7: ISRAELI NAVY: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 7.8: ISRAEL’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION MAP 8.1: SYRIA FIGURE 8.1: SYRIAN FORCES: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 8.2: THE SYRIAN RECAPITALIZATION CRISIS: PART ONE FIGURE 8.3: THE SYRIAN RECAPITALIZATION CRISIS: PART TWO FIGURE 8.4: SYRIAN ARMY: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 8.5: SYRIAN AIR FORCE: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 8.6: SYRIAN AIR-DEFENSE COMMAND: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 8.7: SYRIAN NAVY: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 8.8: SYRIAN PARAMILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 8.9: SYRIA’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION MAP 9.1: THE GOLAN MAP 9.2: UNDOF LOCATIONS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS: DECEMBER 2007

xiii 92 108 119 124 141 153 157 160 161 167 179 184 190 193 202 224 228


Sources and Methods

The reader should be aware that much of the analysis in this book is based on discussions with U.S., Israeli, and Arab officers and officials. None of the interviews are attributed or discussed by mutual agreement. The names of individuals, places, and weapons are only partially standardized because a database is used that links given spellings and phrases to given sources. Since there is no agreed-upon spelling in such cases, the differences are sometimes retained in the final manuscript.


1

Prospects for Peace or War

It is far from certain that there will be another major conventional Arab-Israeli conflict. Peace remains a possibility, as do years of continuing low-level tension and clashes. If yet another war does take place, it is more likely to be an asymmetric struggle than a conventional one and may well involve nonstate actors or proxies. The fact remains, however, that all of the states involved continue to maintain and modernize major conventional forces, and tension and low-level clashes can escalate without warning. The Arab-Israeli military balance now consists of two largely separate and localized balances: The first such balance is the balance between Israel and the Palestinians. Since 2000, this has been an asymmetric war that seems to have no end. Israel has won every tactical clash, created massive new security barriers, expanded its settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and rid itself of much of the strategic burden of the Gaza Strip. Israel’s ‘‘victories’’ are, however, purely tactical and do not create a lasting framework for stability or security. The Israeli-Palestinian War is also as much a political struggle as a military one. It has led to a civil conflict among the Palestinians that has given Hamas at least temporary control of Gaza and strengthened Palestinian radicals. Its politics continue to poison the region, stimulate Arab and Islamic popular anger against Israel, aid extremism throughout the region, and block a full Arab-Israeli peace at a time when most Arab states seem willing to accept one. The second military balance is far more conventional, but seems more likely to end in mutual deterrence than large-scale war. It is shaped by Israel and Syria, although Iran and Lebanon play a major role in shaping the dynamics of the competition between Israel and Syria competition. If such a conventional war does occur, Syria has become so weak and isolated relative to Israel that a conventional war could still be bloody and costly to both sides, but would almost certainly be quickly and decisively won by Israel.

2

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Israel’s peace with Egypt and Jordan has left Syria isolated from Israel’s main Arab neighbors in both military and political terms. Syria has made things worse by weakening its ties to other Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia, and by its adventures in Lebanon, ties to Iran, mismanagement of its economic development, and poor force planning and military development. Syria can use terrorist and extremist movements as proxies, but only as a ‘‘spoiler’’ effort that irritates Israel more than pressuring or threatening it. It can join with Iran in backing a movement such as Hezbollah, but —as the Israeli-Hezbollah War showed in 2006—such conflicts do not give Syria military leverage or clear strategic benefits. Israel, in turn, has shown that it is far more vulnerable to asymmetric threats and conflicts than to conventional attack, although it has learned much from its inconclusive military performance in Lebanon during the summer of 2006. It also would find it difficult to transform any kind of tactical victory into lasting strategic or grand strategic benefits. It has little to gain from occupying more Syrian territory, taking unnecessary casualties, or destabilizing Syria in ways that may produce a far more risk-prone Sunni Islamist government. Such a war would not be a zero sum game. It would rather be one in which both sides would lose relative to peace almost regardless of the outcome of the fighting and the respective suffering. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH WAR Israel and Syria have made new peace initiatives since the Israeli-Hezbollah War during the summer of 2006. However, they have also strengthened their warfighting capabilities, particularly in the Golan Heights. At one level, this increased preparedness may act as a deterrent. At another, it has raised tensions and increased the risk of miscalculation and conflict. In August 2006, in the immediate aftermath of the Israeli-Hezbollah War, Israeli officials expressed concern that Hezbollah’s success in operating Syrian-supplied weapons could accelerate additional procurement of such systems and might encourage Syria to experiment with a military confrontation. They stated that Syrians had made efforts for several years to overcome the Israeli Defense Force’s armor and air superiority by investing in advanced antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) instead of tanks, in surface-to-surface missiles that could threaten the Israeli rear, and in surface-to-air missiles that could challenge the Israeli Air Force (IAF).1 Former Israeli Chief of Staff Gen. Dan Halutz declared that he did not believe ‘‘Syria wishes or even considers initiating a war against Israel,’’ but the Military Intelligence agency AMAN, nevertheless, raised the threat of war with Syria from ‘‘low probability’’ to ‘‘probable’’ in October 2006.2 Syria, in turn, issued threats to begin military action in the Golan Heights. Syrian President Bashar Asad praised Hezbollah for ‘‘defeating the Israeli Army’’ and declared that ‘‘the Golan will be liberated by Syrian hands.’’3 At approximately the same time, a series of reports appeared in the Syrian media hinting at new Syrian military developments in the Golan.4

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE OR WAR

3

Shifts on the Golan Both sides adjusted their military postures in the Golan during the latter half of 2006 as a result of the lessons and uncertainties growing out of the IsraelHezbollah War. Syrian forces along the Syrian-Israeli border were reinforced with commando brigades and artillery units. Correspondingly, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) reinforced its presence along the border to the highest level in ten years by doubling the number of troops on Mount Hermon, the Golan’s most elevated peak and a strategic observation point into Syria. In addition, IDF engineers began strengthening the ‘‘wide obstacle’’ built along the border to prevent a potential invasion, while infantry and armor units have been assigned to large-scale military exercises in the Golan.5 At the end of 2006, the Israeli defense intelligence community was reported to be divided in its interpretation of Syria’s moves to bolster its forces on the Golan Heights.6 It reported in January 2007 that Brig. Gen. Yossi Baidatz told the cabinet on December 10 that ‘‘Syrian President Bashar Asad is preparing his army for a confrontation with Israel . . . Asad ordered more anti-tank weapons to advance to the border, as well as to accelerate production of long-range surface-to-surface missiles.’’7 Shortly after General Baidatz’s statement, however, an IDF spokesman issued a clarification stating that ‘‘the IDF has no information that Syria intends to initiate a war [next] summer . . . Gen. Baidatz was talking about trends, not about a deterministic process.’’8 According to a story in the same periodical the IDF’s intelligence agency, AMAN, believed Syrian calls for resuming negotiations with Israel reflected a genuine will, while Meir Dagan, head of Israel’s foreign intelligence service, Mossad, claimed that Bashar Asad had no real intention of negotiating with Israel.9 The head of AMAN, Gen. Amos Yadlin, stated that ‘‘there is a low probability that Syria would start a war against Israel,’’ but also stated that ‘‘there is a possibility that Syria will initiate military operations in the Golan Heights in order to place the issue of the Golan on the global agenda.’’10 One of the scenarios that concerned Israeli defense planners was that a guerrilla campaign could be launched from the dozens of inhabited villages built by Syria along the border in the last decade. Syrian officials began using the term Moqawama (resistance) when referring to any potential conflict with Israel, a term usually used to describe Hezbollah guerrilla tactics against Israel.11 A senior IDF source pointed out, however, that while the Syrians could borrow some of the tactics used by Hezbollah, Syria presented far more retaliatory targets for IAF attack than Hezbollah did. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was more explicit, stating that Israel’s strategic capabilities ‘‘would be put in action when we remove the limitations we placed on ourselves in Lebanon.’’12 During the spring of 2007, a series of newspaper reports appeared in the Israeli media describing the details of what was said to be a Syrian military buildup near the Golan Heights. On February 22, the daily Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) stated, ‘‘The Syrian armed forces are being strengthened in a way unprecedented in recent memory with the help of generous funding from Iran.’’13 Ha’aretz said the main thrust of Syria’s

4

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

armaments drive was composed of missiles and long-range rockets, with its navy being bolstered by Iranian antiship guided missiles (C-802 ‘‘Noor’’) similar to the one Hezbollah used to hit the INS (Israeli Navy Ship) Hanit and kill four Israeli sailors in the summer of 2006. The paper also said that Syria was about to conclude a deal with Russia to procure thousands of advanced antitank missiles of the sort that Hezbollah successfully used in the recent war against Israeli armor. Finally, the report also mentioned that Syria has test-fired ballistic missiles, such as a Scud-D surface-tosurface missile, which would put most of Israel within range.14 The following month, in March 2007, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that Israeli military and government sources declared that ‘‘Syria has positioned on its border with Israel thousands of medium and long-range rockets capable of striking major towns across Northern Israel.’’15 This deployment, coupled with other recent reports of Syrian troop mobilization, was seen in Israel as an indication that Damascus may be preparing for future ‘‘low intensity warfare,’’ the officials said. According to AFP, Most of the rockets deployed are 220 millimeter, with a range of 70 kilometers (43 miles), and 302 millimeter rockets capable of striking elements at a distance of more than 100 kilometers (56 miles). The latter would be well within the range of the main population centers in northern Israel such as Tiberias and Kiryat Shmona. These longrange rockets could also reach Israel’s third largest city of Haifa and its industrial zone, which is home to several essential industries, including oil refineries and a deepwater port. It is also believed that Syria has deployed several FROG rocket launchers, with a 550kilogram (1,200-pound) warhead and 70-kilometre range, in areas between the border and the capital Damascus, 40 kilometers (25 miles) away. According to the sources, such a massive deployment of well-entrenched rockets poses ‘‘a real strategic threat to Israel.’’ While Syria concentrates most of its long-range surface-to-surface missile arsenal in the north of the country, its decision to deploy missiles so close to the border may indicate Syria is mulling an attack on Israel, experts say. ‘‘Syrian President Bashar Asad realized after the Lebanon war that Israel was not as strong as it seems and that it could be threatened by simple means rather than an advanced army’’, the director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Ephraim Inbar, told AFP. Inbar, as well as the military sources, believe ‘‘Asad could be preparing for low intensity war, a type of war of attrition with Israel, where Syria fires several rockets against Israel without provoking full-fledged war.’’16

Israel’s military intelligence chief, Gen. Amod Yadlin, told the government’s annual intelligence assessment that, while Syria was beefing up its military, war between the two neighboring countries was unlikely in 2007.17 Nevertheless, a report in the Jerusalem Post in April 2007 quoted senior Israeli defense officials as warning of ‘‘an unprecedented military build-up’’ in Syria and said that prevailing in a war with Israel’s northeastern neighbor would not be as simple as some might have been led to believe. 18 Following Hezbollah’s success in using asymmetric, irregular tactics against the IDF, the Syrian military reportedly had attempted to


5

increase its own capabilities in this type of warfare. One of the 12 divisions of the Syrian military was said to be made up of 10,000 elite commando units, a formidable force that would serve as Syria’s first line in an offensive against the IDF. The Post reported that since the Second Lebanon War, Syria has established new commando units and is said to have increased urban and guerilla warfare training. ‘‘Syria saw the difficulty the IDF had during the fighting inside the southern Lebanese villages and now the military there wants to draw us—in the event of a war—into battles in built-up areas where they think they will have the upper hand’’, explained a source in the IDF Northern Command.19

Israel increased its military activities in the Golan region during the same period. Following strong criticism of its performance in the summer war against Hezbollah, Israeli forces began a process of incorporating the ‘‘lessons learned’’ from that conflict into their training. This was part of a broad effort to rebuild the conventional and unconventional warfighting skills of Israeli forces and to reduce a perceived overreliance on airpower and failures in both developing effective command structures and conducting realistic large-scale warfighting exercises. Jane’s reported on February 23, 2007, that the IDF concluded a full brigade-level exercise in the Golan Heights. Following earlier company- and battalion-level exercises spanning some two months, the IDF’s 35 Paratroop Brigade—together with elements of IDF armor, artillery, engineering units, and the Israeli Air Force — conducted extensive maneuvers from February 18 to 23 based on a scenario of a conventional war with Syria.20 That was the first full brigade exercise in the Golan for the past six years. Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz attempted to play down rumors of war with Syria by declaring to Jane’s, ‘‘This scenario is in no way a reflection of any intention on our behalf. It merely reflects our need to be prepared for any potential threat.’’21 A Growing Missile Threat? The Post report also claimed that Syria was placing a new emphasis on missile warfare and deployment. Some 300 Scud missiles had reportedly been deployed just north of the demilitarized zone in the Syrian part of the Golan Heights. A division of some 10,000 troops was said to be responsible for operating the missiles, which include a number of Scud Ds with a range of 700 kilometers said to be capable of carrying unconventional warheads. Syria was reported to have 30 launchers for its Scud missiles, according to foreign sources. They were said to keep missiles in bunkers at several locations: most in a valley near al-Hamma, where it has built a missile electronics and assembly facility.22 At the site in al-Hamma, referred to as the ‘‘heart’’ of Syria’s missile program, a weapons factory was said to be surrounded by more than 30 hardened concrete bunkers that house multiple launchers and missiles. The report states that ‘‘experts’’ claimed these launchers could deliver more than a ton of nonconventional warheads anywhere in

6

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Israel. Another missile site near Homs was said to contain a previously undisclosed chemical warhead facility where a drive-through building leads to a facility for installing warheads on ballistic missiles.23 Like so many reports, however, such reports seem to have been more ‘‘scare’’ than real. Any such Syrian attack would risk massive reprisals. Ballistic missiles with conventional warheads have limited lethality and are area weapons that cannot be aimed accurately enough to do predictable damage to strategic targets. Even the most lethal chemical weapons fall far short of the lethality of nuclear weapons, but could provoke an Israel nuclear response. The existence of any given type of threat must always be considered in terms of the impact of any actual military exchange and the realworld cost benefits to each side. ISRAELI AND SYRIAN ALARMS AND EXCURSIONS IN 2007 Relations between Israel and Syria remained tense and confused in 2007. A number of media reports suggested that secret peace feelers between Jerusalem and Damascus were about to bear fruit, but others speculated that the Syrians were actually preparing for war in the summer.24 Israeli officials were concerned that Syria might see the IDF’s inability to secure a decisive victory over Hezbollah in 2006 as a reason to become more confident about the prospect of engaging Israel in a direct military confrontation and applying techniques on the ground inspired by the Lebanon war in 2006, especially the use of advanced antitank weapons to defeat Israeli armor. Conventional Military Tensions Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was reported to have appointed a ministerial committee on June 6, 2007, to review the IDF operational plans against Syria. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi issued repeated calls for Israeli troops to be ready for war in the summer of 2007. According to some reports, this led IDF personnel to believe that there was information pointing to an imminent attack.25 Both the Syrian and the Israeli military intensified their training exercises in the Golan region in May and June 2007. In late May, the Syrians carried out a large military exercise, involving all branches of their fighting forces. Primarily, they focused on blocking Israeli armor with sophisticated Russian ground-to-air missile systems.26 A report in Jane’s Defence Weekly detailed the concern among Israeli intelligence officials with regard to Syria’s military preparedness: ‘‘Syria is demonstrating its preparedness for war as never before,’’ Major General Amos Yadlin, head of military intelligence (AMAN), reported to the Knesset on June 5. A day earlier, his Head of Research, Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, said: ‘‘While the Syrian alignment is defensive by nature, it could be switched to an offensive posture within hours. ‘‘Syria is making concrete preparations to strengthen its fire alignments, is [preparing] its border posts and conducting battalion exercises,’’ said Gen. Yadlin. ‘‘Syria is also


7

accelerating military acquisition,’’ Brig Baidatz added, in reference to the recent procurement of Pantsyr-S1E and Tor-M1 air-defense systems and anti-tank guided weapon systems from Russia. A senior defence source told Jane’s: ‘‘The Syrians have carefully learned the lessons from Israel’s 2006 fighting in Lebanon, primarily the effectiveness of advanced antitank weapons against Israeli armor and the limitations of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in suppressing rocket fire on the country’s vulnerable civilian rear.27

According to some reports the Israeli defense establishment was most concerned about a scenario in which Syria might try to take over the northern part of the Golan Heights, in an attempt to improve its position for future negotiations concerning the territory. Jane’s quoted a senior defense official as saying, With their current deployment the Syrians can air-drop their commandos and take over several hills in the Golan within hours . . . Then they could immediately call for a ceasefire and drag Israel to the negotiation table with them having the upper hand. The IDF is determined to prevent any forceful achievement from Syria.28

Israeli forces continued large-scale military exercises in the Golan region. In midJune, the IDF conducted a major combined-forces exercise involving a simulated offensive in which Israeli F-15s actually bombed mock Syrian positions close to the border.29 The Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv (Tel Aviv) noted that the IDF will continue its series of extensive training exercises in the Golan Heights throughout July.30 The paper also noted that Jerusalem sent a message to Damascus, clarifying that Israel has no intention of attacking Syria and that the exercises were purely defensive. Then Israeli Defense Minister Peretz declared that ‘‘the IDF should be prepared for every scenario. We are exercising and I hope the Syrians won’t misinterpret it.’’31 Eyal Zisser, a strategic analyst at Tel Aviv University, also remarked that the potential for a military misunderstanding could rapidly escalate to a serious confrontation, saying, ‘‘There has never been such a state of readiness since the 1980s and there is a great danger of a chain reaction if one side makes a mistake in reading the other’s intention.’’32 Israeli Raid on Syrian ‘‘Nuclear’’ Facilities Other kinds of tension rose between Israel and Syria during the course of 2007. On September 8, 2007, the Syrian Arab News Agency claimed that Israeli jets had broken the sound barrier over northern Syria in the previous 48 hours in what seemed to be an approach from the Mediterranean Sea. Syria went on to add that ‘‘munitions’’ were dropped in a deserted area as the jets evaded Syrian antiaircraft fire.33 Syria claimed at the time that IAF aircraft entered Syrian airspace on September 6, 2007, allegedly dropping munitions without any reports of damage or casualties. Israel did not confirm any such operation, and both countries increased their level of battle readiness.34

8

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

As is discussed later in more depth, in reality the incident was an Israeli air raid that struck deep into northeast Syria on September 6, 2007, at a target that may have been a covert Syrian effort to build a nuclear reactor similar to North Korean designs and that could be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. The details of the strike and target remain unclear, although unclassified satellite photos do indicate that Syria was building a reactor. There are no indications of the exact design of any such a reactor, if this was the real nature of the Syrian effort, or of how it would have been fueled, what capacity it would have had for producing fissile material, when it may have produced enough material for a weapon, and how Syria planned to deploy any nuclear capability it developed. Major questions remained in 2008 about the level of North Korean support Syria did or did not receive for what seemed to be a copy of a North Korean reactor design, about where Syria hoped to get the fuel rods for a reactor and the ability to process spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium, about how much technical data and nuclear weapons design information Syria had received from such sources as the A. Q. Khan network, and about the level of Syrian-Iranian or SyrianIranian-North Korean cooperation, if any. There were, however, a number of factors that indicated why Syria seemed to have pursued a covert nuclear weapons development effort: • Syria had fallen far behind Israel in conventional capability and had no practical chance of catching up. • Syrian capabilities for asymmetric warfare, and its ability to use such allies as Hezbollah, could irritate or provoke Israel, but not defeat it or deter it from using its massive supremacy in long-range precision strike capability. • Syrian chemical and possible biological capabilities did not give it a meaningful deterrent against Israel, did not rival Israel’s status as a nuclear power, and could have done more to justify an Israeli use of nuclear weapons in retaliation than achieve strategic benefits. • The Syrian Air Force was approaching obsolescence as a force. Although Syria had some ‘‘modern aircraft,’’ it lacked the mix of airborne and ground-based sensor and battle-management assets, the mix of munitions, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, and sortie sustainability it needed to compete with Israel. It faced de facto air supremacy from the Israeli Air Force. • Missiles were a way of striking at Israel with some confidence of success, though Syria still faced steadily more effective Israeli ballistic missile defenses and the Israeli ability to target and destroy Syria’s larger missile systems with precision strike assets.

Seen from this perspective, Syria might have seen an effort to achieve a ‘‘breakout’’ by covertly developing nuclear weapons as a means to the status Syria then lacked, and a potential level of ultimate deterrence that its existing weapons of mass destruction could not provide. Even one or two ‘‘bombs in the basement’’ might have been seen as giving the Syrian regime more status and at least have symbolically compensated for Syria’s growing inferiority in conventional warfighting capability. Syria


9

might also have seen nuclear status as a major negotiating lever making Israel more willing to give up the Golan Heights. At the same time, serious questions do exist as to whether Syria could have believed such an effort could succeed without Israeli intervention, and if Syria would benefit from the end result if Syria did achieve a breakout without detection by Israel. A surface-built reactor could not have been kept secret over time. Israel would certainly have acquired knowledge of the Syrian program long before a reactor was completed and could start producing fissile material. This raised serious questions as to why Syria would have taken the risk of building a light-water reactor above ground and especially in a structure that seemed to have been similar to North Korean designs. Such actions were almost an invitation to Israel to strike. Political symbolism is one thing. War fighting is another. Like Iran, Syria is much bigger than Israel. Like Iran, its population is hyperurbanized and at least as vulnerable as Israel’s. Syria’s leadership and economy are heavily concentrated in a small number of targets. Syria would probably have only fission weapons versus Israel’s ‘‘boosted’’ and probable thermonuclear weapons, and Israel could have probably inflicted at least an order of magnitude more damage on Syria with each nuclear strike. It seems almost certain that it would have taken Syria half a decade or more of effort to build up a survivable nuclear-armed missile force. It would be highly vulnerable in the process and would still be much more vulnerable than Israel in any countervalue exchange in spite of the different size of the two countries. Israel would also retain a major conventional counterforce strike capability, even if it did not preempt Syria. THE PROSPECTS FOR WAR There is no question that both states take the threat of war seriously enough to prepare and train for such a conflict—one that could involve ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional forces. The two countries have been preparing for a flare-up in the Golan Heights for more than three decades. In addition to the most recent reforms and 2007’s military buildup, the two armies already had in place careful operational war plans. At the same time, both sides stated they would not start hostilities in the aftermath of the Israeli-Hezbollah War.35 Israel and Syria also explored options for renewing peace negotiations. Syrian President Bashar Asad gave public speeches indicating an interest in such negotiations.36 Prime Minister Olmert was reported to have sent secret messages to Asad in May 2007 that Israel was willing to give up the Golan Heights in return for a peace deal. Olmert formally announced his acceptance of the 2002 League of Arab States peace plan as a basis for land-for-peace negotiations with the Arab world as a whole in a cabinet meeting in early June 2007. The Syrian response was cool. A Syrian government spokesman stated, ‘‘The Golan is Syrian and there is no need for secret offers.’’37 Syria did, however, send a senior diplomat to the Annapolis peace conference in November 2007. There are

10

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

also good reasons for mutual deterrence. As the following chapters show, Syria has little or no prospect of winning a conventional war or making any near-term use of its chemical and possible biological weapons against a nuclear-armed Israel without risking a far more devastating Israeli counterattack. Conversations with Israeli and Syrian senior officials and military officers make it clear that both governments and sets of commanders understand these realities. There is far more immediate concern on both sides with the prospects of unconventional or asymmetric conflicts, and Israel is particularly concerned about the prospects of another proxy war in which it must deal with Hezbollah (supported by Iran and Syria) in Lebanon. Nevertheless, there are continuing rumors in each country of the other’s plans to attack. There is also the possibility that one side will make a serious miscalculation or respond to asymmetric or proxy attacks with conventional attacks. Some analysts in both countries raised the prospects of a possible war over the Golan in both 2007 and 2008, and some Israeli analysts felt Syria was building up for such an attack and/ or increasing its missile forces with Iranian support. From April 6 to April 10, 2008, Israel held its largest ever emergency exercise, code named Turning Point, to test the government responsiveness and the level of readiness of civil defense forces. The exercise simulated a large-scale offensive on the Israeli home front that concluded with simulated chemical missile attacks on major Israeli cities. While the exercise did not call up reserve combat forces, Lebanon’s Hezbollah put its forces on high alert pledging to defend Lebanon, while Syria, by week’s end, conducted its own large-scale emergency combat drill.38 These exercises, however, continued to be accompanied by talk of peace, most recently with signals that Israel and Syria continue to keep active back channels and that Israel would be willing to return the Golan Heights to Syria as part of a lasting peace deal.39 The degree of mutual deterrence remains uncertain, and Israeli and Syrian relations seem likely to be volatile indefinitely into the future. The resulting risks are almost certain to continue to be made worse by the tensions caused from Syria’s involvement in Lebanon and with Hezbollah, by Syrian ties to Iran, and by Israel’s ongoing struggle with Hamas and the Palestinians. This a region of ‘‘rational bargainers’’; this is the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli strike on a possible Syrian nuclear facility illustrates the longer-term risks of a continuing arms race between the two sides and the potential for a three-cornered crisis involving Israel, Syria, and Iran.

2

Major Trends in Force Strength

Any assessment of the Israel-Syrian military balance, like assessments of the other aspects of the Arab-Israeli balance, must address the fact that strength measured in force numbers can be very different from strength measured in terms of force quality. Manpower numbers have little meaning as a measure of military capability or merit. Leadership, the ability to conduct joint and combined operations, and the ability to sustain complex cycles of rapid maneuver warfare are all functions of manpower quality that can overcome superiority in manpower quantity. Equipment modernization and the integration of weapons systems, command and control, and targeting and intelligence capabilities are generally far more important than the number of tanks, combat aircraft, or ships. Modern military equipment is far more sophisticated and capable than equipment made a decade or more ago. This is especially true when such equipment is supported by the most modern precisionguided weapons, area ordinance, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. In other cases, the ability to modernize and modify older equipment is equally important, as is adequate maintenance. The same type of equipment can be far more effective in one country or combat unit than in another. ISRAELI FORCE QUALITY VERSUS SYRIAN FORCE QUANTITY Syria’s conventional forces have become the impoverished stepchild of the region. Egypt and Israel have benefited from high levels of military aid from the United States and the transfer of modern American weaponry. Israel has further benefited from the fact that it is the only country in the Arab-Israeli ring states to create a world-class defense industry. While all three powers retain significant amounts of low- and medium-quality systems, Israel has far fewer numbers of such systems and has done a better job of modification and modernization. Egypt retains large amounts of obsolete Soviet-bloc

12

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

systems that have been poorly modernized and modified—when updated at all. It also retains aging European systems that compound its standardization and interoperability problems. Syria is clearly the odd man out. It lost its past access to massive transfers of cheap or free Soviet-bloc weapons in the late 1980s. Although it has had some major weapons transfers since 1990, the weapons types involved have not modernized many critical aspects of the Syrian warfighting capability, and the volume of arms transfers has been so limited that Syria has become something of a military museum—a problem compounded by poorly organized technical and maintenance support and the failure to modify and update much of its equipment. Syria also has not fought a significant war since 1982. Large elements of Syrian forces have become garrison units with limited recent practice in moving and operating outside of their bases and casernes in anything approaching demanding or realistic ways. In contrast, Israel has fought a continuing asymmetric war against the Palestinians since 2000 and fought a war in Lebanon in 2006 that taught it much about the nature of modern warfare and what it needs to do to make its forces more effective. LOOKING AT A SNAPSHOT OF TOTAL FORCES Israeli and Syrian forces differ as much in force size as in force quality, and there are significant uncertainties in the force counts available from unclassified sources. Figure 2.1 does, however, provide a broadly accurate ‘‘snapshot’’ of the forces of each state in 2008. Egypt and Israel clearly have the largest total forces, with Syria ranking third. Jordan has much smaller forces, and Lebanon has only token military strength. Palestinian forces are all paramilitary or irregular and cannot be compared on the same basis. Figure 2.1 reveals several other important aspects of the balance. First, even a cursory examination shows that each country has adopted a difference approach to mixing active and reserve forces, and to choosing its equipment mix in each service. Israel has strikingly low ratios of active manpower to equipment, although this is largely a function of the fact that it is highly dependent on its reserves and is the only country to have an effective reserve system. Second, such an examination also shows that each country has a very different mix of arms within each service, partly because of their respective histories of combat and partly because of the different emphasis each country places on force quality versus force quantity. Israel cannot totally ignore the risk from Egypt and Jordan in a conflict with Syria, and there are many different ways these numbers can be assembled to show different kinds of Arab-Israeli military balances. Figure 2.2 takes a ‘‘traditional’’ approach to measuring the balance and compares Israel’s operational military strength to that of all of the Arab countries around it. As might be expected, the Arab countries have a major lead. This comparison, however, ignores the fact that Egypt and Jordan have peace agreements with Israel and that the Lebanese armed forces have token defensive

MAJOR TRENDS IN FORCE STRENGTH

13

Figure 2.1 The Arab-Israeli Balance: Forces in the Arab-Israeli ‘‘Ring’’ States in 2008 (Total Manpower Includes Total Active, Conscripts, and Reserves) (dollar values in current millions) Category/Weapon

Israel

Syria

Jordan

Egypt

Lebanon

Defense Budget in 2008 (current $billions)

9.45

1.36

1.59

3.42

0.63

6,700 4,300

500 400

700 400

7,600 5,100

0 200

4,200 5,400

1,200 500

1,500 600

5,700 5,800

0 0

27 64 10

37 58 4

35 62 4

33 62 5

27 66 7

Manpower Total Active (Conscript) Total Reserve Total Paramilitary

176,500 109,500 565,000 741,500 8,050

292,600 – 314,000 741,500 108,000

100,500 – 65,000 165,500 10,000

468,500 290,000 479,000 947,500 397,000

56,000 – – 56,000 20,000

Land Forces Active Manpower (Conscripts) Reserve Manpower Total Active & Reserve Manpower

133,000 107,000 500,000 633,000

215,000 – 280,000 495,000

88,000 – 60,000 148,500

340,000 220,000 375,000 715,000

53,900 – – 53,900

Main Battle Tanks

3,501

310

400(?)

1,100 (168) 235/0/45

3,505

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Light (Lt.) Tanks APCs/Recce/Scouts

4,950 (1200) 2,450

610

–

10,419 +/408( (3000– 3,500)

1,500/ 1000 0

1,345 0

0

0

1,225+

2,600

670

2,362

70

620

500+

390

489

0

Arms Imports: 1999–2002 (current $millions) New Orders Deliveries Arms Imports: 2002–2006 (current $millions) New Orders Deliveries Mobilization Base (% of total population) People aged 0–14 People aged 15–64 People aged 65+

WWII Half-Tracks

ATGM Launchers SP Artillery

4,160/412 1257/60

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Towed Artillery MRLs Mortars

456 224 4,132

2,030 500 410+

94 0 740

946 498 2,480

157 25 369

SSM Launchers AA Guns Lt. SAM Launchers

100(7) 0 1,250

94+ 1,225+ 4,184+

0 395 992+

42+ 705+ 2,096+

0 10+ 20

34,000 3,000 55,000 15,000

40,000 60,000 10,000 20,000

12,000 0 – 0

30,000 80,000 20,000 70,000

1,000 0 – 0

373 193 174 6 3 32+ 32+ ? 3

515 178 289 48 0 10(?) 0 10 0

100 100 – – 0 0 0 0 0

420 165 235 20 4 7 3 4 4

(6) 0 (6) 0 0 0 – – 0

86 9 45

74 0 22

26 0 14

169 0 53+

8 0 0

94+ 7 178 279

71 13 120 204

20+ – 75 95+

115 15 124 254

8(5) – 45 53

66 91? 0? 1,270 920

44 707 84 4,000 1,225+

80+ 80+ 0 992+ 395

38+ 290 486 2,000+ 1,566+

0 0 0 20 10+

7,000 10,000 17,000 300 3 3 3

7,600 4,000 11,600 0 0 2 2

500 – 500 0 0 0 0

18,500 14,000 32,500 0 4 11 10

1,100 0 1,100 0 0 0 0

Air & Air-Defense Forces Active Air Force Manpower Active Air-Defense Command Air Force Reserve Manpower Air-Defense Command Reserve Manpower Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce Fighter FGA Recce Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Electronic Warfare (EW) Fixed Wing Helicopter Maritime Reconnaissance (MR/ MPA) Combat Capable Trainer ? Tanker Transport Helicopters Attack/Armed SAR/ASW Transport & Other Total SAM Forces Batteries ? Heavy Launchers ? Medium Launchers ? Short Range Missiles/Manpads ? AA Guns ? Naval Forces Active Manpower Reserve Manpower Total Manpower Naval Commandos/Marines Submarines Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes Missile


Other Missile Patrol Coastal/Inshore Patrol Mine Amphibious Ships Landing Craft/Light Support Fixed-Wing Combat Aircraft MR/MPA ASW/Combat Helicopter Other Helicopters

0 10 34 0 2 1 0 3 7 17

0 10 8 5 3 3 0 0 13 –

0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 –

1 23 18 12 12 12/9 0 0 20 –

15

0 0 21 0 2 – 0 0 0 –

Notes: Figures in parenthesis show additional equipment known to be in long-term storage. Some Syrian tanks shown in parentheses are used as fire points in fixed positions. Batteries refer to the total number of batteries. Heavy launchers include MIM-23 HAWK, MIM-104 Patriot, PAC2, Arrow II, SA-2/3/5/6, S-300, and S-400 systems. Short-range missiles/manpads include M-54 ChFIM-92 Stinger, FIM-43 Redeye, and SA-7/8/9 systems. For Jordan, 1 squadron of 15 Mirage F-1EJ and 3 squadrons of 54 F-5E/F are classified as FGA/Recce assets. Lebanese Hawker Hunter MK9, MK6, and T66 are grounded but could be refurbished. Only 20 of 45 Lebanese transport and other helicopters are serviceable. Term definitions: AIFV = armored infantry fighting vehicle, APC = armored personnel carrier, Recce = reconnaissance, ATGM = antitank guided missile, SP = self-propelled, MRL = multiple rocket launcher, SSM = surface-to-surface missile, FGA = fighter ground attack, MR/MPA = maritime reconnaissance/patrol aircraft (note this is listed generally as MP [military patrol] in the International Institute for International Studies [IISS]), and ASW = antisubmarine warfare. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by various editions of The Military Balance by the International Institute for International Studies (IISS) and by Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999–2006, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., September 2007.

and virtually no offensive capabilities. It also ignores mass qualitative differences that generally favor Israel and the fact that no country shown can now mass and sustain all of its forces in a war with another country. Nevertheless, while it is a highly improbable model of the military balance, it is not impossible. Some kind of Israeli-Palestinian crisis or series of political upheavals in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria may create a warfighting balance somewhat similar to the one shown in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.3 seems to be the most ‘‘realistic’’ picture of the major quantitative aspects of the balance. It compares operational Israeli and Syrian forces, and the ratios are reversed in Israel’s favor. Moreover, Israel’s quantitative lead is matched by an even greater qualitative lead. This comparison may do more, however, to explain why Syria is deterred from military adventures than portray what might happen in a war. The rate and size of arms transfers provide a key measure of each country’s ability to modernize its forces. As Figure 2.4 shows, Israel’s lead is almost certain to grow in the near-term—although Syria is importing some advanced modern weapons such as anti-tank-guided weapons and short-range air-defense systems (SHORADs), and there have been reports and rumors for years that it may have ambitious modernization plans to buy such aircraft as the MiG-31 and advanced surface-to-air missiles such as the S-300 or S-400.

16

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 2.2 Israel versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon as of 2008

Figure 2.4 shows that Israel can take advantage of the massive lead in arms imports and military technology that it has now sustained for nearly two decades, and these figures understate Israel’s advantage as Israel has a vastly superior defense industry. Moreover, Israel not only leads in actual deliveries, but in new orders—which normally take between three years and a decade to deliver. This more than 10:1 lead in new agreements is particularly important because so many advances have taken place in precision-guided munitions, munitions lethality, sensor systems, and the ‘‘netcentric’’ integration of battle management, intelligence, targeting, tracking, and communications systems during the years involved. Syria has fallen far behind in force quality. One important caveat that must be kept in mind, however, is that Israel is a comparatively small country surrounded on three sides by Arab nations. These Arab nations have never fought tightly coordinated wars, but Egypt and Syria did achieve a major degree of surprise in their attack on Israel in 1973 and attacked before Israel


17

Figure 2.3 Israeli versus Syrian Operational Force Strength as of 2008

mobilized. As Figure 2.5 shows, Israel’s potential need to defend several borders at once is an issue, as is its lack of strategic depth and airspace. Israel is a country with only 20,330 square kilometers of land territory versus 990,450 square kilometers for Egypt, 91,971 for Jordan, 10,230 for Lebanon, and 184,050 for Syria. The strategic center is an area where flight times are measured in minutes, long-range artillery can reach deep into enemy territory, rapid armored maneuvers can be critical, and warning and reaction times can present existential threats.

18

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 2.4 Syrian-Israeli Arms Agreements and Deliveries: 1999–2006

COMPARATIVE MANPOWER QUANTITY AND QUALITY Total manpower is an uncertain measure of force strength at the best of times, and it is a particularly poor measure when countries have such different force structures and set such different standards for manpower quality and training as Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 do, however, provide a rough measure of total force strength and show the trends in the forces concerned. • Israel’s active manpower has not changed radically over time, but has fluctuated according to fiscal and security pressures. A comparison of Figures 2.6 and 2.7 shows just how dependent Israel is on reserve versus active manpower. Israel has a small active force, but it has now halted a recent trend toward force cuts and is rebuilding the


19

Figure 2.5 Arab-Israeli Borders

training and readiness of both its active manpower and reserves. If its high-quality reserves are added to its total actives, its force strength is far more competitive with its Arab neighbors. • Syria maintained extremely high manpower levels after its 1982 war with Israel, but then cut them back in the late 1990s, partly because of their cost and partly because it could not properly equip, train, and support such forces.

Once again, however, numbers tell only part of the story. Human factors are at least as important as manpower numbers. Training, experience, and personnel

20

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 2.6 Total Arab-Israeli Active Military Manpower: 1973–2008

management and development are critical ‘‘intangibles’’ that are hard to compare, virtually impossible to quantify, and which again can differ radically among countries and units. Countries differ strikingly in the demands they put on personnel for promotion, and the trust and initiative given to junior officers. In some countries, given forces have highly effective cadres of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and technicians. In others, a major gap exists between officers and other ranks, degrading every aspect of operations. Israel has set much higher training standards than Syria, although it did reduce many aspects of its training activity between 2003 and 2005. The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006 made the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) aware of the need to rebuild its manpower quality as soon as possible, to carry out large-scale exercises of its conscripts and reserves, and to expand and improve the training of its experienced, combat-ready cadres.


21

Figure 2.7 Arab Active versus Israeli Mobilized Army Manpower: 1973–2008

Jordan is the only Arab state that has created a modern corps of NCOs and that gives its junior officers significant initiative, promotes largely on the basis of merit, and limits the impact of nepotism and favoritism. Jordan faces serious financial constraints on both its force size and rates of modernization, however, and has concentrated on building up elite Special Forces, modernizing its air forces, and maintaining a deliberately defensive land posture for armored warfare. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and a number of other Arab states are making progress in improving manpower quality, but most Arab forces not only lack recent combat experience, but also face political and cultural problems that are compounded by

22

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

swollen and inflexible military bureaucracies and a garrison mentality. Syria has compounded these problems with corruption, nepotism, and an occupation of Lebanon that further politicized and corrupted its forces. Syrian forces still have very real pockets of excellence, but they exist in spite of—not because of—Syria’s overall approach to manpower quality. Syria’s potential allies or proxies also lack the kind of effective conventional warfighting capability necessary to challenge the IDF. Hezbollah demonstrated the limits of its warfighting capabilities in 2006, as well as some of its strengths. It can play a limited, largely defensive role in conventional warfare and wage spoiler attacks and wars of defensive attrition, but is not a serious threat to Israel’s ability to maneuver, defend its territory, or exercise air and missile supremacy. Lebanon shows little indication of any willingness to fight on Syria’s behalf, and its regular military forces have not posed a real-world threat to Israel since the 1940s. The Lebanese Air Force does not exist as a combat force, although it is acquiring some armed training aircraft from the United States. The Lebanese Army has some excellent officers, but has not been able to achieve a high level of effectiveness in any aspect of its forces, lacks modern heavy weapons, and is still affected by the nation’s confessional sectarian divisions and rivalries. The Palestinians have learned asymmetric warfare by fighting it, but Palestinian government forces are hopelessly divided, corrupt, and have been crippled by Israeli attacks. The training of extremist forces, militias, and similar informal forces is poor and is often more a showpiece than anything meaningful. Hamas may become a more serious threat over time, but its present capability consists largely of the ability to harass Israel in relatively minor ways, and it would suffer far more from any effort to escalate its attacks on Israel than it would gain. The net result is a serious gap in manpower quality between Israel and its surrounding Arab neighbors that is compounded by similar differences in the quality of realistic training for war. Israel has resumed demanding unit and exercise training at the field (FTX) and command post (CPX) levels. Syrian FTX and CPX exercises are limited and unrealistic. Lebanon and the Palestinians have little experience, although Lebanon has made a few attempts at such efforts. As the following chapters show, similar disparities exist in the key elements of military organization, systems, and training that underpin what some experts have called the ‘‘revolution in military affairs.’’ Israel is the only country that has made major progress in developing a modern mix of ‘‘jointness’’ among its military services; integration or netting of its command, sensor, communications, information and intelligence systems; and integrated or ‘‘combined operations’’ within its individual services. These differences in the quality of each country’s full-time active manpower are compounded by even more serious quality gaps in the case of most reserve forces. Israel does have modern and relatively well-trained reserves, many of which have had extensive practical experience in asymmetric warfare since 2000. Jordan has some good reserve elements. In general, however, Arab reserve military forces are


23

little more than ‘‘paper’’ forces with no real refresher or modern training, little or no exercise experience, poor equipment and readiness support, and little or no experience in mobility and sustainability. These forces are often given low-grade or failed officers and NCOs. They do little more than pointlessly consume military resources that would be better spent on active forces.

3

Comparative Land Force Strength: Active versus Mobilized Strength

There is no easy way to analyze the comparative strength of Israeli and Syrian land forces. Various war games and equipment weighting systems can help provide insights into some aspects of military capability, but they also disguise many of the qualitative differences involved. ‘‘Intangibles’’ such as leadership, experience, motivation, and sheer luck are often as important in war as anything that can be measured or modeled. War games can test only certain aspects of force capability in given scenarios, and equipment weighting systems present major problems because there are so many types of equipment that come in so many different force mixes, levels of modernization, and levels of readiness. There are, however, some trends that can provide useful insights. Manpower data are a good measure of force size and can reveal some aspects of force quality. Comparing equipment holdings by type and quality provides at least some insights into the qualitative differences between land forces. COMPARATIVE LAND FORCE MANPOWER Figure 3.1 shows that the trends in army manpower largely mirror the trends in total manpower in all four services. Figure 3.1 compares mobilized Israel manpower with active Arab country manpower because Israel organizes its forces to rely on its reserves as a substitute for active manpower. This reliance on reserves sharply reduces the cost of maintaining Israeli forces and gives Israel far greater real-world warfighting strength than its active manning levels would indicate. However, it also requires that the Israeli Defense Fund (IDF) have the necessary time to mobilize and deploy its reserves. Figure 3.1 also shows that there have been no major buildups in land force manpower since the late 1980s, aside from the rebuilding of Lebanese manpower

COMPARATIVE LAND FORCE STRENGTH: ACTIVE VERSUS MOBILIZED STRENGTH

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Figure 3.1 Arab Active versus Israeli Mobilized Army Manpower: 1973–2008

following the end of the Lebanese civil war. Syria has, in fact, cut back its active manpower, in part because it no longer perceives the same risk of war, but also for cost reasons and to make trade-offs in spending on other aspects of military capability. Figure 3.2 displays the full diversity of current Israeli and Syrian land force manpower, including paramilitary forces. Data are lacking on the number of conscripts in several countries, but high levels of dependence on conscripts are a critical factor affecting manpower quality in Israel, Egypt, and Syria. It also gives critical importance to leadership, noncommissioned officer (NCO) quality, and conscript training. As has been noted earlier, the large numbers of reserves in the Arab countries are largely meaningless. The same is true of the large numbers of paramilitary forces.

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Figure 3.2 Arab-Israeli Land Force Manpower in 2008

The vast majority lack the training, experience, leadership, equipment quality, and sustainability to give them real warfighting capability, and most lack more than minimal capability even in their main mission. As was touched upon earlier, such figures disguise major differences in manpower quality among countries. They also, however, disguise major differences in the manpower quality and strength in individual units. Israel does maintain a rough consistency in the quality of the manpower in major combat units, but some units still get significantly higher priority in terms of officer and NCO quality, realistic


27

training, and cadres of professional full-time soldiers. The quality of combat support units is often higher than that of service support and logistic units. Syria has seen a steady drop in army manpower quality since the early 1990s, has very different levels of manning and manpower quality in given combat units, and has become more and more of a bureaucratic garrison force. Some Special Forces and armored units are exceptions, but promotion is highly dependent on favoritism and nepotism. The NCO corps and technical specialists in Syria’s other ranks lag badly in both quality and status. The occupation of Lebanon has also encouraged a pattern of corruption, compounded by relatively poor salaries and a slow loss of social status. One key lesson that emerges out of these differences, and the many other differences that follow, is that fully adequate force comparisons would have to look far beyond the totals and examine the differences between each major combat unit in each army’s order of battle and in the relevant combat support, service support, logistic, and other units. There is no way to validly generalize about entire force structures; assessments and simulations based on the thesis that the major combat units in given countries are similar—or in country-to-country comparisons—are simply wrong. The qualitative and quantitative differences between units are often so great that a fully valid analysis of warfighting effectiveness can be done only on a unitby-unit level. ARMOR AND ANTITANK WEAPONS The importance of qualitative differences is striking in every aspect of the IsraeliSyrian balance, but it is particularly important in heavy armor, combat aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and suppression of enemy air-defense (SEAD) capabilities. Figures 3.3–3.8 show the trend in Israeli and Syrian armor. They show both forces are ‘‘tank heavy’’ and place a major emphasis on heavy armor—partly because the outcome of past wars has been so heavily shaped by armored maneuver warfare. These figures also show, however, that the mix of combined arms within each army is strikingly different. Figure 3.3 compares the armored forces of each nation. It shows that Israel has emphasized main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs)—many of which it has armed with light weapons. Syria has supported its tanks with large numbers of other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs) from the Soviet bloc, but has much less overall armored mobility and far fewer armored personnel carriers. Syria’s forces seem to be deliberately tank heavy in an effort to provide enough tank numbers to try to compensate for the IDF’s superior tactics, training, leadership, and equipment. It is important to note that Egypt and Jordan have built up large tank forces, and Egypt has very large numbers of OAFVs. This reinforces the importance of the peace process in limiting the scale (and probability) of future major Arab-Israeli conflicts. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the relative type and quality of main battle tanks in each country. Figure 3.5 shows that Israel and Egypt have a distinct lead, Israel with

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Figure 3.3 Arab-Israeli Armored Forces in 2008

Merkavas and Egypt with M-1s. The M-60 series is still a good tank by regional standards, as is the T-72, but even the best upgraded M-60s are technically inferior to the Merkava and the M-1. The export versions of the T-72s in Syria have competent armor and drive trains, but poor ergonomics and inferior fire-control, targeting, and night-vision systems. The armor, night-fighting, and long-range engagement capabilities of export versions of the T-72 proved to be significantly more limited than many unclassified estimates had predicted. The Challengers in Jordanian hands have had drive train problems in


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Figure 3.4 Israel versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon: Operational Tanks by Type 2008

the past. The level of modernization of night warfare and long-range engagement sighting and fire control is unclear. Even upgraded T-62s shown in Figure 3.4 are now obsolescent. The older T-54s, T-55s, M-47s, M-48s, Ramses, and Chieftains shown in Figure 3.4 can still play an effective role in armored infantry combat, and sheer numbers can be important. However, they are all obsolete against truly modern main battle tanks. Figures 3.6–Figures 3.8 show the relative strength and quality of Israeli and Syrian other armored vehicles, including armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) and

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Figure 3.5 Israel versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon: High-Quality Tanks by Type 2008

APCs. Figure 3.6 shows that Israel has a major lead in sheer numbers of all types of other armored vehicles, but the totals shown include 180 obsolete M-2 half-tracks and some 3,386 M-3 half-tracks, and a large portion of these vehicles are inoperable and in storage. These are open, World War II vintage armored vehicles that are extremely vulnerable and make up more than a third of the more than 10,000 Israeli OAFVs shown for 2007 in Figure 3.6. Figure 3.7 shows the relative strength of each country in combat-capable armored fighting vehicles, and it is clear that Syria has a major quantitative lead. Many of


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Figure 3.6 Arab-Israeli Other Armored Fighting Vehicles (Light Tanks, OAFVs, APCs, Scouts, and Reconnaissance Vehicles): 1973–2008

these Syrian and other Arab systems, however, are worn and obsolete or obsolescent. Israel’s Ramtas, BMPs, and YPR-765s are exceptions, but are lightly armored by modern standards. They are less able to engage in armored maneuver warfare except in the support role or in defensive positions where those equipped with modern antitank-guided weapons can be far more effective. Almost all, however, can play an important role in bringing infantry and weapons squads into the forward area and provide fire support. This ‘‘battlefield taxi’’ role can be critical in ensuring that tanks have suitable combined arms support in combat. Figure 3.8 shows holdings of more conventional APCs. It shows Israel has excellent combat mobility even without counting its half-tracks. Syria has good mobility, but many systems are worn, wheeled vehicles and are hard to sustain in maneuver warfare.

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Figure 3.7 Israel versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon: ‘‘True AFVs’’ 2008

One key point about these figures is that they show total numbers before combat. Armor, artillery, and aircraft numbers in combat depend heavily on support, maintenance, and repair capabilities. Israel retains a major lead in battlefield recovery and repair, and overall maintenance, readiness, and armored support vehicle capability. It takes only days of maneuver, or minutes of intensive combat, for the ability to recover major weapons and make rapid repairs to be at least as critical as the initial force ratios of weapons committed to combat. Both sides have built up major stocks of antiarmor weapons, although anything like an accurate inventory of current holdings or historical trend line analysis is


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Figure 3.8 Operational Arab-Israeli Armored Personnel Carriers in 2008

impossible without access to classified information. Israel has significant numbers of anti-tank-guided missiles (ATGMs) and other antitank weapons, and it is steadily improving its ATGM and antiarmor submunition technology. Syria has exceptionally large numbers of ATGMs and has focused on importing the latest weapons from Russia in recent years. Syria has done so because Israel has forced it to react defensively against Israeli tank attacks. Many of the ATGMs held by all of the countries that make up the frontline states in the Arab-Israeli balance are now mounted on APCs and AIFVs, but each country has a different force mix. Israel and Jordan have also developed significant uparmoring programs for their OAFVs. It is important to note that Israel, like the United States in Iraq, has learned

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the hard way that irregular forces such as Hezbollah and the Palestinians have learned how to carry out sophisticated ambushes with such light antiarmored weapons as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and that such attacks can be effective in urban warfare against exposed patrols. The depth and nature of armored warfare is changing, and Israel has increasingly found that only main battle tanks and heavily armored tank-to-AFV conversions can safely engage in close combat in urban and built-up areas. However, Israel has not as yet encountered the kind of systematic ambushes and IED attacks on soft support and logistic vehicles that have forced the United States to up-armor many of its support and logistic vehicles in Iraq. ARTILLERY WEAPONS As might be expected from armies that have fought several major wars of maneuver, Israel and Syria all have large numbers of self-propelled artillery weapons— although the ratios differ and there are major differences in equipment quality. All of the armies also retain large numbers of towed weapons, although Syria has a very large pool of such weapons compared to its neighbors. This reflects a long-standing Syrian emphasis on artillery, growing out of its past dependence on French doctrine from the 1950s and the 1960s, and Soviet doctrine thereafter. However, it also reflects Syria’s heavy dependence on mass fires and the use of towed artillery in defensive positions. Figure 3.9 shows the overall mix of artillery weapons in each country. Figure 3.10 highlights relative strength in self-propelled weapons and reflects the Israeli emphasis on self-propelled weapons over towed weapons. These systems are broken down by caliber in Figure 3.11. In theory, the weapons in Syrian hands should have a range advantage over those in Israeli forces. In practice, Syria has badly lagged behind Israel in long-range targeting capability, the ability to shift and rapidly retarget fires, other artillery battlement systems, the use of counterbattery and other radars, use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as targeting and reconnaissance systems, and mobile ammunition support. Jordan has good artillery numbers for a force its size, but faces financial limitations in providing adequate numbers of targeting and battle-management systems. Figure 3.12 shows that Israel and Syria also have significant numbers of multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). The numbers of MRLs is misleading, however, since Israel has developed a family of highly sophisticated rockets for its MRLs, and Syria and Egypt are more dependent on conventional Soviet-bloc rounds with limited accuracy and lethality. Syria is, however, acquiring steadily larger numbers of long-range artillery rockets with improved accuracy and some with what seem to be guided warheads. Both Israel and Syria have rockets with advanced submunitions, including antiarmor systems. These systems could significantly change and increase the role of artillery in a future war, but no empirical combat data yet exist on each side’s maneuver, targeting, and supply/sustainability capability to use such weapons effectively or what their future tactical impact would be.


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Figure 3.9 Arab-Israeli Artillery Forces by Category of Weapon in 2008

These figures are also somewhat misleading because they do not include the growing holdings of nonstate actors. Irregular forces such as Hezbollah have large numbers of rockets that can be fired from single round launchers or improvised vehicle launchers, and various Palestinian groups have started manufacturing crude single round rockets. All of the countries involved have significant numbers of mortars, many mounted in armored vehicles, for close combat. The figures for surface-to-surface missile launchers almost certainly sharply understate Israeli and Syrian holdings. These weapons generally have operational conventional warheads, but lack the accuracy and lethality to be useful as much more than

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Figure 3.10 Israel versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon: High Performance Artillery in 2008

terror weapons. Israel has had conventional cluster warheads, but it is unclear that these are still in service. It is widely assumed to have tactical nuclear warheads with variable yields. Syria is believed to have mustard and nerve gas warheads, probably including persistent nerve agents, and chemical cluster munitions. It may have experimental biological devices. Two additional points need to be made about interpreting the data in Figures 3.7–3.12. Israel is the only country to have developed, deployed, and realistically exercised ‘‘precision artillery’’ capabilities in terms of training and doctrine for rapid


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Figure 3.11 Arab-Israeli Self-Propelled Artillery by Caliber in 2008

maneuver, the ability to target and register the effect of individual fires in near-real or real time, and the ability to shift fires to strike at a mix of individual targets. Syria has an obsolete artillery arm that is still heavily oriented toward mass fires, lacks the equipment needed to support its massive artillery holdings effectively, and does a poor job of conducting meaningful training for an artillery doctrine that is weak on precision fire, rapid maneuver, and rapid changes in well-targeted fire. Lebanon is still in the process of developing effective artillery forces. Syria also lags in computerized fire management, communications practices, and artillery radars.

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Figure 3.12 Arab-Israeli Multiple Rocket Launchers by Caliber in 2008

Israel’s advantages in precision artillery extend to include the ability to acquire targets and observe fire in real time using unmanned aerial vehicles and long-range ground-based and other aerial sensors. Israel also has a major advantage in processing such data, joint air-land targeting and operations, and battle damage analysis. Syria has a number of long-range weapons, but poor long-range targeting and battle damage assessment capability—unless it can take advantage of covert observers using cell phones or similar communications devices.


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As is the case with tanks, Israel retains a lead in battlefield recovery and repair capability, and overall maintenance, readiness, and armored support vehicle capability. This is a critical capability in combat. After only days of maneuver, or minutes of intensive combat, the ability to recover major weapons and make rapid repairs becomes at least as critical as the initial force ratios of weapons available in combat. ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS Both armies have extensive numbers of land-based air-defense weapons. Syria has large numbers of antiaircraft guns (AA), some radar guided and mounted on armored vehicles. Israel and Syria both have large numbers of man-portable and vehicle-mounted light surface-to-air missiles with a variety of infrared (IR) and radar-guided missiles. Recent estimates do not permit accurate counts of the weapons on both sides. Israel emphasizes the use of combat aircraft as its primary form of air defense in depth, backed by man-portable surface-to-air missile defense systems (MANPADs). The IDF has at least 1,250 MANPAD fire units, but these include large numbers of aging FIM-43 Redeyes, many of which are of limited value or are in storage. No reliable unclassified count exists of current systems. Syria has far less capability to use fighters to protect its ground forces, and many of its larger surface-to-air missile systems are relatively easy to target and are not suitable for covering ground forces. Syria does, however, have some 1,225–1,800 AA guns and some 4,200 short-range air-defense systems (SHORADs). No accurate count of the number and types of such weapons exist. Many are obsolete variants of the SA-7 MANPAD, but Syria is procuring much more modern systems such as SA14, SA-16, and SA-18 MANPADs. Syria is reported to have received its first batches of 9M39 Igla (SA-18 ‘‘Grouse’’) missiles and Kolomna KBM Strelets (Archers) multiple launch units in 2007. Syria also took delivery of 36 Russian-made Pantsyr-SE1 self-propelled short-range gun and missile air-defense systems during 2007, out of what seems to be an order of 50. Some reports also indicate that Syria has taken delivery of some Tor-M1 (SA-15 ‘‘Gauntlet’’) road-mobile shelter-mounted, low-to-medium altitude, surface-to-air missile systems, or has them on order. These purchases of short-range air-defense systems are no substitute for the overall modernization of Syrian longrange surface-to-air missiles, sensors, electronic warfare, and battle-management capabilities, but they do provide Syria with increased capability in some aspects of point defense against IAF attacks. These air-defense weapons differ sharply in quality and range. In general, most airdefense systems of such short range are more a way of pushing attack helicopters and strike fighters back to longer attack ranges than a means of killing large numbers of aircraft in combat. These capabilities are discussed later, in more depth, in the broader analysis of air-defense systems in the country chapters on Israel and Syria.

4

Comparative Air Strength: Quality over Quantity

As has been discussed earlier, air force quality is generally more important than air force quantity. Nevertheless, numerical comparisons do provide important insights into the Syrian-Israeli balance. This is particularly true when basic comparisons of force numbers are supplemented by comparisons of the quality of the equipment involved. As is the case throughout this analysis, such numerical comparisons once again highlight the importance of a lasting peace among Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. The Egyptian Air Force is far more capable and better trained, although its training, readiness, and sortie generation capability are limited relative to that of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). The Jordanian Air Force is small, but effective. The Lebanese Air Force is not a meaningful military force, but plans on acquiring more modern armed trainers with some counterinsurgency capability.

COMPARATIVE AIR FORCE STRENGTH The total number of combat aircraft each country has in inventory has little real meaning. It is the quality of modern combat aircraft, their associated munitions, their targeting and sensor systems, and their battle management that are critical. At the same time, the ability to provide the aircrew numbers and maintenance/repair capabilities to sustain a high rate of sorties is equally critical. In past wars, the IAF has been able to sustain sortie rates at least two to three times as high as Syria. Syria may have the largest numbers, but has one of the least capable air forces. Certainly, it is the worst air force per plane in service. Syria has not fought a meaningful air war since 1973, and there is no way to assess current capabilities. However, it seems likely that Syria has not improved most aspects of the kind of air combat

COMPARATIVE AIR STRENGTH: QUALITY OVER QUANTITY

41

performance that led to its disastrous loss rate during the brief IAF-Syrian Air Force (SAF) clashes in 1982. Its poor track record on sortie rates alone might effectively double or triple the strength of the IAF relative to the SAF if any air conflict did last long enough to make the differences in sortie generation rates relevant. Israel also has a large numbers of ‘‘enablers’’ such as airborne warning and control, intelligence, battle management, and electronic countermeasure capabilities. Israel has a distinct lead in its ability to use these systems and its tankers in long-range strike missions. This allows it to fight as a coherent force, while Syria would probably have to fight at the squadron or formation level with slow-moving and poorly coordinated command, control, and communications and battle management. Israel can probably sustain advanced sensor coverage for targeting and battle damage assessment over most Syrian territory and sustain some unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) coverage. Syria could only sporadically extend limited sensor and UCAV coverage into Israel, and its assets would have trouble surviving even over its own ground forces. AIR FORCE MANPOWER Figure 4.1 compares air force manpower. The amount of active manning in each force is roughly in proportion to the size of the air force involved. Once again, however, Israel is able to make effective use of its reserves, while Syria has little reserve capability other than some technical specialists and other reservists whose proficiency is a product of their civilian jobs. Unless it is seen as purely a holding structure for military manpower, the Syrian Air Force reserve system serves little practical purpose and does little to contribute to real-world warfighting capability. The active and reserve manpower for the land-based air-defense forces in Syria, however, is much larger than is needed—at best reflecting an emphasis on manning unguided, obsolescent antiaircraft guns that make little sense in modern military operations. AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT, WEAPONS, AND TECHNOLOGY Figure 4.2 shows the trend in total numbers of combat aircraft or combat air strength. Oddly enough, it is the downward trend in Israeli numbers that is the best indication of effectiveness. The downward trend is driven by the fact that Israel has done the best job of emphasizing overall force quality over numbers and of funding full mission capability with all of the necessary munitions, force enablers, and sustainability. Syria maintains larger numbers of combat aircraft than it can properly support— in effect, disarming by overarming. This problem also affects Egypt. As is the case with the Egyptian Army, Egypt maintains a substantial pool of low-grade and obsolete weapons platforms that do not serve any apparent military purpose. Figure 4.3 shows the total number of combat aircraft by type, and Figure 4.4 shows the number of high-quality aircraft on each side. In warfighting terms, it is

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Figure 4.1 Arab-Israeli Air Force and Air-Defense Manpower in 2008

the aircraft in Figure 4.4 that really count, and the contrast between the two figures is striking. If one looks only at the total aircraft numbers shown in Figure 4.3, Syrian forces have a lead in aircraft. This is driven in part by the large number of obsolete and obsolescent aircraft in the Syrian forces that serve little warfighting purpose. Furthermore, it is clear that Syria is trying to train for, maintain, arm, and sustain far too many different types of aircraft. This puts a major—and costly—burden on the air force and dilutes manpower quality, and does so to little, if any, actual benefit.


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Figure 4.2 Trends in Total Arab-Israeli Combat Aircraft: 1973–2007

If one looks at the high-quality aircraft shown in Figure 4.4, however, Israel has a vast superiority over Syria, whose MiG-29s and Su-24s now have obsolescent avionics and cannot compete with Israeli types on a one-on-one basis. Given past rates of delivery and modernization, this Israeli lead will also grow in the near term. Israel has much better real-world access to aircraft improvement programs, and nextgeneration aircraft such as the F-22, than Syria has to either aircraft upgrades or any next-generation system with ‘‘stealth,’’ supercruise, or advanced avionics. Figure 4.5 provides a rough picture of the airborne command and control, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and intelligence ‘‘enabling’’ aircraft in each force. It shows that Israel has a major lead in both the quantity and quality of the air battle

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Figure 4.3 Total Operational Arab-Israeli Combat Fighter, Attack, Bomber by Type in 2008

management, intelligence, warning, and targeting systems critical to making use of modern airpower and precision weapons. This advantage is greatly enhanced by superior Israeli tactics, overall training, and use of other technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Israel has its own intelligence satellites for surveillance and targeting purposes, and much more advanced ‘‘netting’’ of its communications, battle management, and intelligence systems, plus world-class electronic intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities. Despite operating four reconnaissance squadrons with 40 MiG-21 H/J Fishbed, Syria has little overall meaningful capability in this area.


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Figure 4.4 High-Quality Operational Arab-Israeli Combat Aircraft in 2008

Figure 4.6 shows the total strength each air force and army has in rotary-wing combat aircraft, less naval assets. Israel has truly advanced attack helicopters such as the AH-64 Apache, and it is also now in the process of taking delivery on 18 AH64Ds, with extremely advanced avionics and ‘‘fire and forget’’ capabilities that do not require the aircraft to wait and track the missile to its target. The AH-1 has moderate capability. Syrian attack helicopter units are elite units, but Syria has not been

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Figure 4.5 Unarmed Fixed- and Rotary-Wing RECCE, Electronic Warfare, and Intelligence Aircraft in 2008

able to modernize its rotary-wing combat forces, and its training and tactics have not been fully updated over the last decade. It is far more difficult to make comparisons of air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, particularly since Israel can modify imports and has a wide range of its own systems, some of which are classified. It is clear, however, that Israel has extensive stocks of state-of-the-art systems and ready access to U.S. weapons and technology. Syria’s stocks are often badly dated, and Syria faces particularly serious limits in terms of comparative precision strike, and long-range air-to-air missiles that have high


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Figure 4.6 Operational Arab-Israeli Attack and Armed Helicopters in 2008

terminal energy of maneuver and effective counter-countermeasures. The IAF also has a significant advantage in the ability to add specialized external fuel tanks, add on pads with special electronic warfare and precision strike capability, modify and develop external jammers, and adapt wing loading to new munitions needs. COMPARATIVE LAND-BASED AIR-DEFENSE FORCES Figure 4.7 shows the strength of each country’s land-based air defenses. As Figure 4.1 has shown, some countries integrate their major air defenses into their air forces,

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Figure 4.7 Arab-Israeli Land-Based Air-Defense Systems in 2008 Country

Major SAMs

Egypt

702+ launchers 282 SA-2s 212 SA-3As 56 SA-6s 78+ MIM-23B IHawks

Israel

5 Bty MIM-104 Patriots 17 Bty MIM-23 IHawks 51 fire units 2 Bty/9 Arrow II/ 18 launchers 3 Bty/16 PAC-2/ 48 launchers

Jordan

Lebanon

Syria

Light SAMs

AA Guns

2000 SA-7 Ayn as Saqr 2,200+ guns 20 SA-9s 300 ZPU-4 14.5 mm 50 MIM-92A Avengers 280 ZU-23-2 23 mm Some FIM-92A Stingers 45+ Sinai SP 23 mm 26 M-54 Chaparral SPs 36+ Sinai SP 23 mm 50+ M-48 Chaparral SPs 230 ZSU-23-4 23mm 24 Crotales 400 M-1939 37 mm 72 Amoun Skyguard/RIM-7Fs 600 S-60 57 mm 36 quad SAM Ayn as Saqrs 40 ZSU-57-2 SP 57 mm 400 M-1939 KS-12 85 mm 300 KS-19 100 mm 250 FIM-92A Stingers 1,000 FIM-43 Redeyes

920 guns, including 20 mm Vulcan, TCM-20 105 M-163 Machbet/ Vulcan M-167 M-167 150 ZU-23 23 mm 60 ZSU-23-4 SP 23 mm M-1939 37 mm 150 L-70 40 mm

2 bde/14 Bty/80 IHawks 3 PAC-2 bty

20 SA-7As 50 SA-7B2s 60 SA-8s 92 SA-13s 300 SA-14s 240 SA-16s SA-18s 250 FIM-43 Redeyes

395 guns 139 M-163 SP 20 mm 40 ZSU-23-4 SP 216 M-42 SP 40 mm

None

20 SA-7/Bs

10+ guns ZU-23 23 mm 10 M-42A1 40 mm

25 Ad Brigades 150 SAM Bty. 320 SA-2s 195 SA-6s 44 SA-5s 148 SA-3s

30 SA-13s 20 SA-9s 4,000 SA-7s 14 SA-8s 20 SA-11s 100 SA-14s

1,225 guns 600 ZU-23s ZSU-23-4 SP M-1938 37 mm 600 S-60 57 mm 25 KS-19 100 mm 10 ZSU-5-2 SPs Some 4,000 air-defense artillery

Note: Figures in italics are systems operated by the air force or air-defense commands. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, The Military Balance. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author.


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and some have a dedicated air-defense force. Most countries also deploy a separate mix of short-range air defenses (SHORADs) in their land forces. Israel and Syria both have large numbers of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but only the Israeli Air Force has truly modern medium- and long-range systems, radars, and command and control facilities. Israel also has access to the latest U.S. weapons and technologies and can develop advanced weapons systems of its own. Moreover, Israel is able to combine surface-to-air missile defenses with antimissile defenses in a layered defense system and is examining options to add defenses against shortrange rockets and UCAVs. Syria’s system has many obsolescent and obsolete weapons and sensors and is vulnerable to Israeli real-time targeting, precision air and missile attack, and electronic countermeasures. It has a weak command and control system, as well as serious training and readiness problems. The effectiveness of many of the Syrian surface-to-air missile systems listed in Figure 4.7 is increasingly uncertain. Advances in air targeting and long-range, airto-ground precision combat capability—coupled with steady advances in the longrange strike capabilities of rockets and missiles—have reduced the effectiveness of many short-range air-defense systems. Some have limited or no effectiveness against low-flying helicopters unless the pilots cannot avoid overflying the defenses, and many others lack the range, lethality, and ease of maneuver to attack fighters that can use long-range air-to-surface missiles. Many of the longer-range systems—particularly the SA-2, the SA-3, the SA-5, and the SA-6—are now so old that electronic and other countermeasures, including antiradiation missiles, can deprive them of much of their effectiveness. If they use their radars persistently, they can be located, characterized, and jammed or killed. If they make sudden use of their radars, or remote radars further to the rear, reaction times are slow and lethality is low. If they attempt to use optical means, they generally fail to hit a target. Israel’s Improved Hawk or IHawk missiles are considerably better and more modern systems than Syria’s aging SA-2s, SA-3s, SA-5s, and SA-6s and have been heavily updated, but do have some of the same vulnerabilities. The Patriots in Israeli forces are the only fully modern long-range air-defense missiles in Arab-Israeli hands, although Syria has long sought Soviet-designed S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles—which have many of the advantages of the Patriot. Israel’s Arrow missiles are the only antiballistic missile defenses in the region with significant area coverage, although the Patriot has meaningful point defense capability and the IHawk has limited value as a point defense system. At present, neither Israel nor Syria has a fully modern, integrated mix of sensors and battle-management systems to tie together its surface-to-air defenses, but Israel does have a significant capability to perform such operations. The Syrian system was never of more than limited capability and has lost capability relative to Israel’s ability to suppress Syrian air defenses over time in spite of some modernization. Though it is increasingly vulnerable, it still has some capability, and Syria is improving its shorter-range air-defense systems. The survivability of both Syrian radars and hardened and dispersed Syrian command facilities is increasingly questionable.

5

Comparative Naval Strength: Peripheral Missions

Syria and Israel still maintain significant naval forces, but only Israel retains significant operational capability, and the naval forces on each side are now more likely to be used for asymmetric warfare missions or amphibious raids than in conventional combat. The Israel-Hezbollah War in 2006, for example, showed that a nonstate actor such as Hezbollah could use antiship missiles to attack one of the Israeli Navy’s most modern ships. At the same time, the Israeli Navy maintained extraordinarily high activity levels seeking to prevent infiltration or asymmetric attacks on Israel’s coast, secure the waters off of the Gaza Strip, and prevent seaborne resupply of Hezbollah. SHIFTS IN THE ROLE OF SEAPOWER The Israeli Navy played a major role in securing the Israeli coast against both Hezbollah and various Palestinian threats during the war, and in enforcing a blockade against naval resupply. It spent some 8,000 ship hours in carrying out these missions during the war and fired its guns some 2,500 times against such targets as rocket launchers and launching sites, weapons stores, Hezbollah infrastructure and radars, fuel depots, and roads. During these missions, Israel’s most modern corvette, INS Hanit, was hit by an antiship missile. Hanit is one of three Israeli Sa’ar 5 class ships. She was completed in 1995 and is one of Israel’s most modern and capable ships. Hezbollah forces attacked Hanit with two antiship missiles on July 14. In addition to the Hanit attack, Hezbollah claimed further successful missile strikes on Israeli Navy ships on August 1 and 12. Israel denied that any ships had been hit. However, shortly after the claim on

COMPARATIVE NAVAL STRENGTH: PERIPHERAL MISSIONS

51

the August 12, Jane’s reported an unexplained plume of smoke on the horizon southwest of Tyre.1 The two missiles seem to have been C-802s, although some experts outside Israel still feel it is possible that they were the smaller C-701s. According to Global Security, the Yingji YJ-2 (C-802) is powered by a turbojet with paraffin-based fuel. It is subsonic (0.9 Mach), weighs 715 kilograms, has a range of 120 kilometers (km), and has a 165-kilogram warhead. It has a small radar cross section and skims about 5 to 7 meters above sea surface as it approaches the target. It has good antijamming capability. In contrast, the C-701 is less than half the size of the C-802 and has a cruising speed of 0.8 Mach and a range of approximately 15 km.2 The first missile, which might have been a decoy, flew a high-attack trajectory and missed the Hanit, striking a cargo ship 60 km offshore. The second missile hit Hanit under her stern, started a fire, and killed four sailors. It is possible that the missiles were mounted on a truck small enough to be easily concealed in a garage or camouflaged and deployed in a parking lot or empty space. IAF forces later destroyed a Lebanese military coastal radar in response to the attack. Some reports suggest that the coastal radar would have been integral to the use of a C-802 or C-701. According to Jane’s, however, the radar would not have been needed for the attack since the C-802 is a fire and forget missile, using its own onboard active radar, and the C-701 uses television guidance.3 The Hanit was not using active countermeasures when the second missile struck. This was critical because the ship’s antimissile capability consists of 64 Barak pointdefense missiles, a 20-mm Phalanx close-in, rapid-fire cannon, 20-mm and 7.62 machine guns, and a sophisticated passive system consisting of chaff, decoy expendables, and jamming devices.4 A later Israeli investigation found that all of these systems were turned off. One reason for the systems being turned off may have been that the radar for the Barak system was functioning at less than 50 percent accuracy during the time of the attack.5 A preliminary report by the committee investigating the incident blamed both Hanit’s commander and the senior leadership of the Israeli Navy. The crew, however, had turned three other antimissile systems off, and the majority was in the ship’s mess hall eating Sabbath dinner. The officer who turned the Barak system off also did not report the malfunctioning radar to the ship’s captain or inform him of the decision to turn off the missile defense system.6 Several other factors may have affected Hanit’s vulnerability. The ship was under admiralty orders to keep close to the Lebanese coast in order to enforce the blockade. The lack of active countermeasures and the proximity to the coast may have also been due in part to navy intelligence’s belief that either Hezbollah did not possess advanced antiship missiles such as the C-802 or lacked the ability to use them. Army intelligence stated after the attack, however, that it had warned navy intelligence that Hezbollah might have possessed such weapons.7 An IDF statement said that ‘‘the investigation shows that despite the fact there was no specific intelligence

52

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

regarding the weapons held by Hezbollah, there was certain information received by the Israeli Navy in the past, which could have led to the operational assumption of a possibility that the enemy could have been in the possession of coastal ammunition. Accordingly, it would have been advisable to operate in a way that would preclude this threat.’’8 A Syrian-Israeli War could involve more conventional combat, but it seems unlikely that a navy as weak as Syria’s would risk direct encounters. Syria is more likely to use its land-based antiship missile brigade and coastal guns to carry out coastal-defense missions, disperse key assets to the extent it can, carry out such asymmetric missions as spreading free-floating mines, and attempt to use Hezbollah or Palestinian forces to carry out proxy attacks. One other major possible change in the role of seapower is that Israel may react to increasing missile threats by sea basing some of its nuclear armed missiles on its new submarines. NAVAL MANPOWER The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) data on naval manpower shown in Figure 5.1 show roughly equal national manning levels for Israel and Syria. Jane’s, however, reports that Israel has an active force of around 6,500 (880 officers and 2,500 conscripts) and some 5,000 reservists. Unlike the army, only a small part of these reservists would be called up under most contingencies. It reports the Syrian Navy as having a total manning of only 3,200 officers and men, including substantial numbers of 18-month conscripts, and 2,500 reservists—who receive little refresher training and have poor-to-negligible value in combat. Regardless of which manpower figures are correct, there are striking differences in experience, training, and readiness. The Israeli Navy has constant mission experience, high levels of training, access to significant tactical and technical assistance from the U.S. Navy, maintains a high level of hours at sea, and often operates at significant distances from Israel’s coast. It also has considerable support in joint warfare from the IAF. The Syrian Navy’s manpower has little experience and spends little meaningful time at sea. It does not carry out significant training with other navies and has had only limited domestic and foreign technical support. Its practical experience is as a coastal, if not a ‘‘harbor,’’ naval force. Its manpower may, however, have better readiness for using antiship missiles in coastal-defense missions. The Egyptian Navy is a more capable force, although some of its ships—including its four improved Romeo-class submarines—have not been modernized since the mid-1980s, and its training and exercise activity is still limited relative to that of the Israeli Navy. Egypt did recommission two U.S.–supplied Knox-class frigates in 1994 and has two others to use for spares. It also received four U.S.–built Oliver Hazard Perry–class missile frigates during 1996–1998. The Jordanian Navy is trained and equipped as a local patrol force. The Lebanese Navy is not a meaningful military force.


53

Figure 5.1 Arab-Israeli Naval Manpower in 2008

NAVAL SHIPS, WEAPONS, AND TECHNOLOGY Figure 5.2 compares the major combat ship strength in Israeli and Syrian forces. Israel has relatively modern and effective submarines and surface forces, backed by effective airpower. Israel has effective antiship missiles, as well as superior systems and targeting/electronic warfare capabilities. Its three Sa’ar 5 corvettes are very modern ships with considerable long-range capability by local mission capability standards. Construction of the first of the eight Sa’ar 4.5-class missile patrol boats

54

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 5.2 Arab-Israeli Major Combat Ships by Category in 2008

began in 1981, but most were commissioned during 1994–2002, and they have been regularly modernized. All of these Sa’ar-class vessels are armed with updated versions of the Harpoon antiship missile and have modern radars and electronic warfare suites. Israel’s three Dolphin-class (Type 800) submarines are also modern vessels commissioned during 1999–2000. Israel updated some of its support vessels in the late 1980s. Syria’s navy is largely obsolete, ineffective, and dependent on aging antiship missiles. It has two Petya-class frigates armed with guns and torpedoes, but they spend


55

Figure 5.3 Other Arab-Israeli Naval Capabilities in 2008

Israel Smaller Combat Vessels Amphibious Lift Naval Aviation Marine and Commando Coast Guard and Paramilitary Egypt Smaller Combat Vessels Amphibious Lift Naval Aviation Marine and Commando

Coast Guard and Paramilitary

Jordan Smaller Combat Vessels Amphibious Lift Naval Aviation Marine and Commando Coast Guard and Paramilitary Lebanon Smaller Combat Vessels Amphibious Lift Naval Aviation Marine and Commando Coast Guard and Paramilitary Syria Smaller Combat Vessels Amphibious Lift Naval Aviation Marine and Commando Coast Guard and Paramilitary

32 Fast Patrol Boat Inshore (PFIs) under 100 tons; 1 support craft; other small craft 1 landing craft tank (LCT); 1 landing craft medium (LCM) ASW helicopters; 3 IAI-1124 maritime reconnaissance in IAF 300-man commando force 50-man coast guard with 4 patrol craft and small craft

12 mine warfare craft 3 landing ship medium (LSMs), and 9 landing craft utility (LCUs) 12 air-to-surface missiles; 15 ASW helicopters; some UAVs. Coastal-defense force manned by army under naval command, with SSC-2b Samlet and 3/3 Ootomat 1 launchers and some 100-mm, 130-mm, and 15 2-mm guns 2,000-man coast guard with 74 small boats, including 12 patrol craft-inshore (PCIs), 6 fast patrol craft-inshore (PFIs) less than 100 tons, 44 patrol craft-coastal (PCCs), and 12 patrol boatsinshore (PBIs) 13 light patrol craft of less than 100 tons. None None None None

25 armed boats None None None Customs force with 7 small patrol craft of less than 100 tons

8 light patrol craft of less than 100 tons; 5 minecraft (1 ocean and 1 coastal). 3 LSMs; some landing craft 15 ASW helicopters, some with antiship missiles Some shore-based antiship missiles and guns operated by the army None

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, The Military Balance, and Jane’s Fighting Ships, various editions.

56

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

little meaningful time at sea. Its three Romeo-class submarines never performed meaningful combat roles and have been withdrawn from service. Figure 5.3 compares the other ships and small vessels, and other elements of each navy. Some mine warfare capability exists in both navies but is limited, and the operational readiness and even the seagoing capability of Syrian mine warfare vessels is uncertain. Israel has ten capable missile patrol boats with modern missiles. It is building ten new Super Dvora Mark III patrol craft, at least four of which are in service, and is deploying a new Shaldag-class fast-attack craft. It has developed advanced land-based sensors to deal with coastal infiltration, has deployed four of eight new Tzira-class coastal response boats, and is experimenting with unmanned surface vessels such as the Rafael Protector.9 The main operational element in the Syrian Navy consists of its 16 aging Osa I/II-class missile patrol boats, although there is evidence Syria is bringing into service a total of three Iranian-built Tir-class in-shore patrol boats armed with two Noor (C-802) antiship missiles each. At least one is evidently in service.10 Israel has significant and improving amphibious lift capability that is more useful for Special Operations than conventional warfare. It also has a small 300-man naval commando force. Syria’s amphibious vessels have limited operational capability. The specialized naval aviation capabilities of both countries are limited and largely focus on rescue and ASW (antisubmarine warfare) capability. The IAF does, however, have three small, aging IAI-1125 Seascan (Shahaf ) maritime patrol aircraft that can be armed with antiship missiles and a number of UAVs and other aircraft with naval mission capabilities.

6

Total Resources: Recapitalization, Force Modernization, and Impact on Effectiveness

The data on Syrian-Israeli military spending and arms transfers have significant limits and uncertainties. These problems are compounded by the fact that the U.S. Department of State has failed to update the reporting on such expenditures that it used to provide in the past, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) data are erratic and somewhat inconsistent. There are enough data with broad accuracy, however, to provide a useful picture of the trends in military resources. One consistent message of these data is that Syria has sought to sustain a much larger force posture than it can properly modernize and support. This is partly a result of the end of the Cold War. Syria ceased to get concessional arms sales and loans from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the Warsaw Pact when they collapsed, and it lost the support it needs to try to rival Israel in military power. FSU and Warsaw Pact arms deliveries halted well over a decade ago, and Syria’s failure to properly modernize and ‘‘recapitalize’’ its forces has reached the crisis level. Much of Syria’s conventional force posture is now obsolescent or obsolete. In contrast, the military spending and arms transfer data provided in this chapter show that Israel has benefited from massive U.S. military assistance. At the same time, Israel’s forces are still limited. Israel is forced to maintain a ‘‘high-low’’ force mix that includes substantial numbers of obsolete systems. It also is forced to remain reliant on conscript and reserve manpower to free resources for arms imports and its heavily subsidized military industries. At least in recent years, the resulting trade-offs and resource constraints seem to have limited the manpower quality and readiness Israel needs to take maximum advantage of its hightechnology systems.

58

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES There is little correlation between the balance of Israeli and Syrian force numbers and the balance of national military spending. Israel’s vast superiority in military expenditures is reflected all too clearly in the comparisons shown in Figure 6.1. Israel has spent far more on its forces over time than any Arab state. In fact, Israel has consistently spent more than all of the Arab states combined. The numbers involved are not directly comparable. The disparity in favor of Israel shown in Figure 6.1 is partly offset by higher Israeli manpower and maintenance costs. Israel must also plan for a larger Arab-Israeli conflict in spite of its peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and has been fighting a prolonged series of asymmetric wars while its Arab neighbors have not. At the same time, Israel spends its resources more efficiently on both manpower and procurement, has the ability to draw upon an advanced mix of military industries, and has virtually free access to advanced U.S. military technology. Unlike Syria, Israel has also benefited from massive amounts of U.S. aid that is not fully reflected in the data in Figure 6.1. Figure 6.2 shows a U.S. Department of State estimate of the past trend in military expenditures in constant 1999 dollars. This estimate is now dated because the Department of State stopped issuing the report from which the data were taken. Figure 6.2 does show, however, that Israel’s lead in military spending over its neighbors is long-standing and does much to explain its consistent qualitative lead over its neighbors. A comparison of Figures 6.1 and 6.2 also shows just how serious resource pressure on Syria has been and remains. There is insufficient data available to provide directly comparable figures, but it is clear that Syrian spending began to fall far short of what was needed to sustain its force structure after the 1982 war. It has since remained far behind that of Israel. While Figure 6.2 shows that Syria outspent Egypt during the late 1980s to late 1990s, Figure 6.1 shows it has since fallen far behind Egypt, in spite of often spending higher percentages of its gross domestic product (GDP) on military forces than

Figure 6.1 Comparative Military Effort: 1985–2006 (in 2008 $U.S. dollars)

Country

Military Spending in $U.S. Millions 1985 2001 2007

Military Spending per Capita ($U.S.) 1985 2001 2007

Military Spending as a % of GDP 1985 2001 2007

Israel Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

8,124 7,967 1,005 569 6,698

2,709 95 261 65 763

19.2 9.5 12.3 9.0 17.2

10,312 3,267 805 600 1,940

9,648 3,491 1,623 644 1,490

Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions.

1,928 70 170 189 524

1,550 46 280 167 80

9.2 3.9 8.9 3.5 5.7

5.7 2.6 10 2.9 3.6

TOTAL RESOURCES: RECAPITALIZATION, FORCE MODERNIZATION, AND IMPACT ON EFFECTIVENESS

59

Figure 6.2 National Trends in Arab-Israeli Military Spending in Constant Dollars: The Decline in Arab Forces as a Share of Total Spending: 1985–1999

Egypt. In broad terms, these resource data help explain why Syria’s overall force management and readiness is so poor. Syria has effectively created hollow forces. It is trying to compete with Israel at levels it simply cannot afford. Figure 6.3 shows more recent trends in military expenditures in current U.S. dollars based on IISS figures. These data are considerably more uncertain than the previous data because they include estimates for some countries for 2004 and 2005 rather than actual data and do not seem to fully account for the impact of U.S. aid to Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. Israel’s edge in military resources remains clear, although its spending efforts dropped significantly after 2001 in spite of the Israeli-Palestinian

60

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 6.3 Arab-Israeli Military Expenditures by Country: 1997–2007 (in 2008 $U.S. millions)

War, while other Israeli security-related spending increased to pay for such civilian programs as roads and settlements. Syria’s military expenditures continued to decline over most of the last decade and have been less than one-third of the level needed to pay for the mix of manpower quality, readiness, and modernization it would need to compete with Israel in overall conventional force quality. Figure 6.4 shows the long-term trend in military effort as a percent of GNP. The burdens placed on the Israeli, Jordanian, and Syrian economies have been cut sharply since the mid-1980s. It is striking, however, that Syria’s military burden is so close to that of Israel. This indicates that Syria’s slow economic development has been a major factor limiting what it can spend. Egypt cut its spending as a percentage of


61

Figure 6.4 Trend in Percent of GNP Spent on Military Forces: 1983–2007: Half the Burden of the Early 1980s

GNP and that spending has been low ever since. Lebanon has never attempted to spend the money to become a serious military power by regional standards. COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN ARMS IMPORTS The trends in arms imports provide another important measure of military effort and one that shows how well given countries are modernizing and recapitalizing their forces. The data are more uncertain than those for military spending, and almost all come from declassified U.S. intelligence estimates provided by the Department of State and the IISS. Once again, however, they are useful in providing a picture of broad trends. Figure 6.5 compares the national trends in deliveries of Arab-Israeli arms imports during 1985–1999, as measured in constant U.S. dollars. These figures show a major drop in such deliveries to Syria and Jordan over time. Syria, however, did not downsize its force posture in proportion to the drop in its arms imports, while Jordan did. As a result, the drop in deliveries to Syria is so precipitous that it has had a crippling effect on Syrian force modernization. Figure 6.5 also indicates that Egypt and Israel both received roughly similar average levels of arms imports during the period shown. These data, however, are not

62

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 6.5 National Trends in Arab-Israeli Arms Deliveries in Constant Dollars

truly comparable. Israel is the only state in the region with a relatively efficient defense industry capable of producing modern military weapons and equipment, and it imports large amounts of U.S. technology and equipment that is included in its weapons systems, but which are not classified as arms imports under the present definition of the term. This estimate shows a precipitous drop in Jordanian and Syrian arms imports that has had a crippling impact on both countries since the early 1990s. Figure 6.6 provides more current data on new arms orders and arms deliveries, using a different source. It shows that Israel has continued to receive far more arms imports than Syria and has placed far more new orders. Syria did increase its new


63

Figure 6.6 Arab-Israeli New Arms Agreements and Deliveries by Country: 1995–2006

orders during 2003–2006 versus 1995–2002, but the total remained less than onethird that of Israel, and again, Israel has the additional advantage of a major military-industrial base while Syria does not. Figure 6.7 shows the source of Arab-Israel arms imports by supplier country. It shows that Israel has had large-scale access to U.S. arms imports, including the most modern equipment—and the data in Figure 6.7 do not include significant imports of technology, components, and subassemblies for Israeli military production that are not counted as arms imports. In contrast, Syria lost Russia as a major supplier without finding any replacement—particularly one capable of selling advanced arms and technology. Syria made a total of $1.4 billion in arms agreements with Russia during 1995–2006, while Israel made a total of $12.5 billion in agreements with the United States.

64

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 6.7 Arab-Israeli Arms Orders by Supplier Country: 1995–2006

Figures 6.8 and 6.9 provide a detailed picture of the flow of U.S. military sales, aid, and financing. They provide an important perspective on the comparative flow of U.S. aid to Egypt and Israel and show that Israel has had far larger amounts of grant military assistance than Egypt and has been able to import far more equipment. The data in Figures 6.8 and 6.9 differ from the previous totals in that they include spending on technology, services, and import goods for military industry, while the other totals counted deliveries classified only as ‘‘arms.’’

Figure 6.8 The Comparative Size of U.S. Military Assistance and Commercial Arms Sales to the Arab-Israeli Ring States: 1986–1997 (in $ U.S. millions)

Israel Foreign Military Financing Program Payment Waived FMS* Agreements Commercial Exports FMS Construction Agreements FMS Deliveries MAP Program MAP Deliveries IMET Program/Deliveries Egypt Foreign Military Financing Program Payment Waived FMS Agreements Commercial Exports FMS Construction Agreements FMS Deliveries MAP Program MAP Deliveries IMET Program/Deliveries

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800 100.5 1,024.8 – 1,229.6 – – 1.9(0)

1,800 130.9 474.8 – 754.1 – – 1.7(0)

1,800 327.7 997.2 – 230.3 – – 1.9(0)

1,800 376.7 387.3 – 146.3 74.0 – 2.1(0)

1,800 361.4 169.1 – 239.0 43.0 114.7 1.1(0.2)

1,800 96.5 27.9 – 718.7 47.0 0.6 0.6(0)

1,800 161.0 41.8 – 773.9 491.0 44.7 0.5(0)

1,800 2,142.9 34.0 – 409.2 165.9 – 0.8(0)

1,800 631.3 34.7 – 327.0 80.0 0.0 0.8(0)

1,800 828.7 13.1 – 385.8 22.0 – –

1,300

1,300

1,300

1,300

1,300

1,300

1,300

1,300

1,300

1,300

1,300 330.9 55.4 112.4 955.1 – – 1.7

1,300 1,306.1 73.1 118.8 473.0 – – 1.5

1,300 587.0 31.0 66.9 1,026.7 – – 1.5

1,300 435.2 18.7 124.0 1,236.0 – – 1.7

1,300 409.5 9.6 139.2 889.0 13.5 1.4 0.8

1,300 1,014.8 10.3 83.0 1,478.7 – 1.6 1.0

1,300 1,269.1 3.5 57.0 1,083.2 – – 1.0

1,300 1,300 1,300 1,631.7 969.5 2,646.3 75.6 206.0 252.5 48.2269.7 269.7 65.1 482.3 368.1 296.8 – – – – – – 1.8 1.5 1.5

Jordan Foreign Military Financing Program Payment Waived DoD Guaranty FMS Agreements Commercial Exports FMS Deliveries MAP Deliveries IMET Program/Deliveries

–

–

10.0

67.8

20.0

20.0

9.0

9.0

7.3

100.3

– 81.3 33.9 73.4 49.7 1.1 1.9

– – 28.7 18.3 55.4 0.8 1.7

10.0 – 9.4 23.5 59.5 – 1.9

67.8 – 26.7 12.1 42.1 – 2.1

20.0 – 0.4 0.9 22.9 0.4 1.1

20.0 – 6.8 27.9 19.5 – 0.6

9.0 – 14.5 41.8 24.9 0.1 0.5

9.0 – 38.7 34.0 31.5 – 0.8

7.3 – 13.0 34.7 47.0 – 1.0

100.3 – 199.5 13.1 15.7 10.7 1.2

Lebanon FMS Agreements Commercial Exports FMS Deliveries IMET Program/Deliveries

4.9 0.1 12.1 –

0.5 0.0 11.9 0.3

– 0.2 3.9 0.3

– 0.1 2.0 0.1

– 0.5 0.3 –

– 0.4 1.3 –

2.4 1.0 4.9 0.6

29.3 0.8 3.6 0.3

64.4 0.5 40.9 0.4

15.8 0.3 31.7 0.5

* FMS = Foreign Military Sales; MAP = Military Assistance Program; IMET = International Military Education and Training; DoD = Department of Defense. Source: Adapted from U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Department of Defense, Washington, various editions. Syria received no U.S. aid or sales during the period shown.

Figure 6.9 The Comparative Size of U.S. Military Assistance and Commercial Arms Sales to the Arab-Israeli Ring States: 1997–2007 (in 2007 $U.S. millions)

Israel Foreign Military Financing Program Payment Waived FMS† Agreements Commercial Exports FMS Construction Agreements FMS Deliveries MAP Program MAP Deliveries IMET Program/Deliveries Egypt Foreign Military Financing Program Payment Waived FMS Agreements Commercial Exports FMS Construction Agreements FMS Deliveries MAP Program MAP Deliveries IMET Program/Deliveries

2007

2008*

3,086.6 2,147.3 2,202.2 2,257.2

2,340

2,380.5

3,086.6 2,147.3 2,202.2 2,257.2 507.5 1,050.8 632.6 454.6 418.9 1,110.2 1,201.4 16.5 63.5 5.6 28.93 79.5

2,340

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

1,800

1,800

1,860

2,820

1,976

2,040

1,800 506.4 12.8 –

1,800 654.6 11.5 –

1,860 2,430.7 4.2 –

2,820 782.6 26.3 0.3

1,976 2,882.1 4.0 9.9

2,040 665.9 1.4 12.7

562 – – –

766 – – –

629.4 – – –

1,300

1,297

1,300

1,291.6 1,291.6 1,289.6

1,287

1,300

1,300 999.9 0.04 33.4

1,291.6 1,291.6 1,289.6 912.3 2,060.0 1,107.8 340.5 166.8 15.9 46.96 54.81 11.3

1,287 358.8 327.1 13.9

1,300

455.9 – – –

1,194.8 1,213.1 – – – – – –

1,300

1,300

1,300 961.0 5.0 45.6

1,300 978.5 2.4 27.3

891.4 – – 1.0

551.3 – – 1.0

1,300

1,297 1,300 1,300 2,058.7 1,612.2 1,720.5 0.9 3.8 0.6 48.9 93.3 61.9 542.6 – – 1.0

1,030.6 – – 1.0

871.7 – – 1.1

1,875.1 – – 1.2

2003

846.0 – – –

860.6 – – 1.2

2004

901.7 – – –

2005

2006

1,701.7 1,396.7 – – – – – –

1.344.5 1,307.5 1,226.8 – – – – – – 1.2 1.2 1.4

1.2

1,289.5

1.2

Jordan Foreign Military Financing Program Payment Waived DoD Guaranty FMS Agreements Commercial Exports FMS Construction Agreements FMS Deliveries MAP Deliveries IMET Program/Deliveries Lebanon Foreign Military Financing Program Payment Waived FMS Agreements Commercial Exports FMS Deliveries IMET Program/Deliveries

30.0

50.0

95.9

124.9

74.8

100.0

604.0

204.8

304.3

207.9

252.9

30.0 – 17.5 12.8 –

50.0 – 17.9 11.5 –

95.9 – 14.7 4.2 –

124.9 – 120.5 26.3 –

74.8 – 122.3 4.0 –

100.0

604.0

204.8

304.3

207.9

252.9

109.3 0.24 –

163.6 0.71 –

491.8 19.8 –

123.5 88.4 –

114.8 72.7 98.8

41.7 16.3 1.7

47.0 50.2 1.6

48.7 7.5 1.7

52.3 8.2 1.7

80.4 11.5 1.7

67.0 8.0 2.0

69.5 0.6 2.4

104.3 – 3.2

140.6 0.5 3.0

106.0 – 3.0

2.9

2.9

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

29.7

224.8

6.9

– 16.7 0.8 33.0 0.5

– 12.3 0.8 8.0 0.6

– 1.6 0.1 7.0 0.6

– 6.9 0.1 4.9 0.6

– 5.5 0.1 6.1 0.5

– 1.3 – 3.1 0.6

– 0.7 0.14 3.1 0.7

– 2.0 0.1 2.0 0.7

– 1.25 0.14 1.25 0.7

29.7 1.68 0.8 1.7 0.7

224.8

0.9

298.4

1.4

* Note: 2008 figures are estimates and do not include supplemental funding estimates. † FMS = Foreign Military Sales; MAP = Military Assistance Program; IMET = International Military Education and Training; DoD = Department of Defense. Source: Adapted from Congressional Research Service Report No. RL32260, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, various editions, U.S. Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Department of Defense, Washington, various editions. Syria received no U.S. aid or sales during the period shown.


69

The data for Jordon and Lebanon also show rising levels of U.S. aid that have helped cement the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty and have given Israel added security in being able to plan for a single front conflict. The data do not, however, cover important recent rises in security aid to Lebanon that occurred after the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, which may help Lebanon achieve added stability. RECENT DEALS: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, AND IRAN Both Israel and Syria continue to make efforts to secure outside military assistance, although Israel has been far more successful than Syria. As was described earlier, Israel relies mainly on its alliance with the United States for external military assistance, and defense cooperation between the Israel Defense Force (IDF) and the Pentagon appears to be on sure footing for the foreseeable future. Syria has attempted to cement its relationship with Iran, while continuing efforts to obtain the levels of advanced arms from Russia that it obtained from the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. Israeli Arms Buys Some of the details for future Israeli aid from the United States have already been made public. The Bush administration has announced that Israel will benefit over the next decade from an augmented U.S. military aid package. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on August 16, 2007, that would provide Israel with U.S.$30 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) over the 2009–2018 period. The modified FMF would foresee annual increases in U.S. military aid worth U.S.$150 million over the next four years to $2.55 billion in the 2008 fiscal year (FY), $2.7 billion in the 2009 FY, and $2.85 billion in the 2010 FY. Aid would then be held at $3.1 billion from 2011 to 2017. This agreement represents a boost of 25 percent in military aid, which stood at $2.4 billion annually at the time. The renegotiated level of FMF would allow Israel to revamp its military capabilities in anticipation of a future conflict, possibly with Iran and Syria, as well as to offset U.S. planned weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, estimated at $20 billion. The new FMF would foresee annual increases in U.S. military aid worth $150 million over the next four years.1 It is intended by both Israel and the United States to assure that Israel maintains a qualitative military ‘‘edge’’ over its potential future enemies. While the United States and Israel had not initially reported on how the money would be spent in any detail, Jane’s Defence Weekly reported some possible details as to how Israel’s military planned to use the funds:2 The Israel Defence Force (IDF), which received advanced notice of the expected FMF increase, has already begun preparing its procurement plan based on the new budget, with all services competing for their share. The current requirements accumulate to more

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than the $U.S.30 billion FMF package guaranteed for the next 10 years and the IDF General Staff will decide on its priorities between those different requirements, which include: • Armored vehicles—the IDF considers modernizing its ground forces as its most urgent requirement. The major procurement will be new armored personnel carriers for its infantry, some 100 Merkava-based Namer infantry fighting vehicles, which will be partially manufactured in the United States, along with 300 General Dynamics Land Systems Strykers; • Fighter aircraft—the IAF [Israeli Air Force] has already decided to acquire 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and is currently seeking to begin the procurement in 2014. While each aircraft costs $U.S.47 million, the total contract may add up to $U.S.8 billion. A U.S. approval to sell the F-22 might postpone the F-35 acquisition; • Transport aircraft—the IAF is set to acquire six C-130J Super Hercules: a contract estimated at $U.S.400 million. Additionally, the IAF is planning to have an overall upgrade of eight of its ageing C-130E/H aircraft; • Refueling aircraft—the IAF requirement to replace its ageing KC-707 tankers is widely supported among the IDF, but currently no suitable replacement has been found. Therefore, the IDF will allocate a special budget for a future decision on tanker procurement; • Attack helicopters—the IAF has asked to upgrade a second squadron of its AH-64A Apaches to the AH-64D Longbow configuration. However, this requirement has little support from the IDF; • Precision munitions—the replenishing and increasing of the IAF arsenal of precise munitions following the 2006 war in Lebanon was already approved. The IAF is planning to acquire hundreds of strike munitions, mostly Boeing’s Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided bomb kits; • Naval modernization—in addition to the two new Dolphin-class submarines currently being built in Germany and financed mostly by Israel, the Israeli Navy is asking to acquire two advanced corvettes equipped with long-range strike capabilities and a phased-array radar, preferably based on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship design. The overall cost of this requirement is estimated at $U.S.1 billion; it is seen as highly controversial among the IDF senior command.

In late 2007 Israel requested $1.33 billion in ammunition from the United States under the FMS program, so as to meet the latest Teffen 2012 five-year work plan’s requirements for restocking emergency supplies, as stores were depleted during the 2006 Lebanon War. Teffen 2012 also calls on Israel to increase and extend its ability to sustain a longer-term conflict by expanding munitions and equipment stocks. The request, submitted to the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) included the following: • 1,500 AGM-114K3/M3 Hellfire II missiles for the IAF’s AH-64A Apache attack helicopters;


71

• 200 AGM-114L3 Hellfire II missiles for the more advanced AH-64D Apache Longbows; • 100 additional MIM-104 Patriot PAC-2 Guided Enhanced Missile Plus rounds; • 100,000 155-mm M107 artillery shells for the IDF’s M109 SP howitzers; • 2,000 BMG-71 TOW2A antitank missiles; • 43,000 81-mm, 8-3mm and 120-mm mortar rounds; • 150,000 M433 40-mm grenade rounds.

The IDF intends to acquire these systems in the United States rather than in Israel, given the U.S. FY2008 commitment of $2.4 billion in FMF.3 The DSCA passed on Israel’s request to the U.S. Congress on October 30, 2007, for future review and confirmation.4 Syrian Arms Buys Syria has no counterpart to U.S. aid, but Russia is supplying Syria and Iran with higher quality weapons systems, an indication of Russia’s interest in increasing its stake in the region. Russia will commit $308.5 billion (RUB7.4 trillion) to national security and defense expenditure over a three-year period starting in 2008. Russia’s proposed three-year defense budget could be viewed as an indicator that the country hopes to reassert itself on the global stage by becoming one of the major forces driving global spending growth on defense outside the United States. Russia also hopes to step up its arms sales to fund far-reaching modernization and personnel reforms. While 2001 is a low base year for Russian defense spending, a spending rise of 518 percent between 2001 and 2010 is by no means negligible. 5 Increasing arms exports to China, India, and clients in the Middle East and abroad made Russia the second largest arms supplier to developing countries, accounting for 22.6 percent and 28.2 percent of arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2005 and 2006 successively, with Russian arms transfers accounting for 16.9 percent of worldwide arms agreements in 2003–2006.6 There is speculation that Russia has agreed to sell 50 RD-33 turbofan engines to Iran for a claimed cost of $150 million. The power plants are used on MIG-29 fighter aircraft and could conceivably outfit domestically designed Iranian aircraft. The Russian export body, Rosoboronexport, neither confirmed nor denied the claim.7 Syria has also improved its military ties to Iran in ways that may ease its modernization problems. Jane’shas reported that Syria and Iran moved to consolidate their collaborative strategic signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities in the region, following the signature and ratification of a joint strategic defense cooperation accord in November 2005.8 It reports that two joint Iranian-Syrian SIGINT stations were established in the Al-Jazeera region in northern Syria and on the Golan Heights as part of this strategic cooperation and that these stations have been operating since June 2006. According to diplomatic sources, ‘‘Equipment, technology, infrastructure

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and personnel are supplied by both a clandestine sub-unit in Syrian intelligence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Al-Qods counterintelligence services, although the funding for the program, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars, has been principally supplied by the IRGC.’’9 Iran has also been rumored to have financed part of a $730 million deal for the Syrian purchase of 50 Russian-made Pantsyr-S1E mobile air-defense systems.10 The Moscow-based newspaper Kommersant has published a controversial report about an alleged Syrian purchase of five MiG-31E fighter aircraft and an undetermined number of MiG-29M/M2s. The article states that Syria did not have the resources to support the $1 billion deal, but that the contract is being financed by Iran.11 Syria also appears to have reached an agreement for the direct acquisition of Iranian defense-related products. Last year, Iranian Defense Minister Mustafa Najjar confirmed that Syria had recently purchased some Iranian military equipment, but he did not elaborate on the purchased items.12 These Russian efforts have provoked some pushback from the U.S. Congress. A bill was presented to the U.S. House of Representatives in November 2007, calling for sanctions to be imposed on Russian defense firms for selling weapons systems to Iran and Syria.

7

The Military Forces of Israel

Israel has the strongest mix of military forces in the Middle East, but it still faces military challenges that are imposed by its geography and demography. It is a small country surrounded on all its land borders by Arab and predominantly Muslim powers. It has a total area of 20,700 square kilometers. It has borders with Egypt (266 kilometers), Gaza (51 kilometers), Jordan (238 kilometers), Lebanon (79 kilometers), Syria (27 kilometers), and the West Bank (307 kilometers). It has a 273-kilometer-long coastline on the Mediterranean and a small coastline on the Gulf of Aqaba. Like its Arab neighbors, Israel also faces serious challenges in terms of water and agriculture. Only 16.4 percent of its land is arable, and only another 4.2 percent can grow permanent crops. Its population was over 6.47 million in 2007, including some 187,000 settlers in the West Bank, fewer than 177,000 in east Jerusalem, and 20,000 in the Israelioccupied Golan Heights. Its population was 76 percent Jewish and 24 percent non-Jewish, largely Arab. About 66 percent of the non-Jewish population was Muslim, and the rest was Christian, Druze, and other.1 The non-Jewish population of Israel continues to have a higher birthrate than Israel, but the main demographic challenge comes from Gaza and the West Bank. As Figure 7.1 shows, the total Palestinian population in Israel, Gaza, the West Bank, and greater Jerusalem will be much larger than the Jewish population well into the 2000s, although declines in the Palestinian birthrate are projected to eventually reduce this disparity. The Israeli fear of being a minority in a ‘‘greater Israel’’ is both a reason for advocating separation and for the argument that Israel should unilaterally withdraw to territory it can ensure is a truly Jewish state. ISRAEL’S STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN ITS CONVENTIONAL ‘‘EDGE’’ The most serious security threats Israel faces, however, are military. Few nations have faced as many ‘‘existential’’ military crises in modern times. Ever since the

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Map 7.1 Israel Source: Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

THE MILITARY FORCES OF ISRAEL

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Figure 7.1 Palestinians and Israelis: Total Population in Israel, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Greater Jerusalem: 1950–2050

mid-1950s, conventional military forces have shaped the Arab-Israeli balance and the outcome of regional conflicts. This has led to a continuing arms race where Israel has struggled to develop and maintain a decisive qualitative edge over its Arab neighbors. As the previous chapters have shown, Israel has won its struggle to create and maintain such an edge in conventional warfighting terms. Syria, its primary current threat, has fallen far behind in force quality. Egypt has made impressive progress in conventional military modernization, but is at peace with Israel and has emphasized the search for a broader peace, taking on difficult missions such as securing Gaza’s southern border in the process. Jordan was a reluctant participant in the 1967 war, stood aside in 1973, and is also at peace with Israel. Its forces are defensive and do

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not pose a major threat. Lebanon has never had significant warfighting capabilities. Israeli conventional superiority has been a major factor in securing peace with Egypt and Jordan and is critical to deterring Syria. Maintaining this superiority, however, is anything but cheap. The burden of Israeli security expenditures is far lower than during the periods when Arab armies collectively posed a major threat, but Israel is forced to spend some 9 percent of its gross domestic product on military and security efforts. Israel’s ability to maintain its conventional edge has also been complicated since 2000 by the costs of the IsraeliPalestinian War and the need to devote much of Israel’s forces to low-intensity combat missions. Israel’s defense expenditure reached an all-time record of ILS52.4 billion (ILS = new Israeli shekel) (U.S.$12.47 billion) in 2007. The direct defense budget was set at ILS35 billion, with $2.34 billion coming from U.S. Foreign Military Funding (FMF), ILS2.5 billion from Ministry of Defense (MoD) sales, and a special one-time budget addition of ILS8.2 billion to cover the costs of the campaign in Lebanon. As discussed earlier, Israel will receive a gradually increasing amount of assistance in meeting its defense needs from the United States under the renegotiated FMF. The Bush administration will increase the level of military aid to Israel over the next decade in response to an Israeli request and in line with U.S. policy to assist allies in the region—Israel and U.S. Arab allied states—to meet current and future security threats in the Middle East.2 Even this level of spending, however, forces Israel to make important trade-offs in its military capabilities. Former Defense Minister Amir Peretz declared in January 2007 that even the ILS35 billion base budget ‘‘does not provide cover for supporting the existing force.’’3 A committee appointed by Israel’s prime minister to examine the country’s defense budget (‘‘The Brodet Committee’’) has also called for an annual increase of 1.3 percent in the budget from 2009, regardless of any increase in U.S. Foreign Military Funding.4 ADAPTING TO ASYMMETRIC WARS Israel also faces asymmetric threats where it has far less of a decisive edge. As is discussed in detail in Chapter 10, Israel faces a wide range of current potential asymmetric threats, some direct and some largely external. The two that directly affect Israel’s security are the new Israeli-Palestinian conflict that began in September 2000 and the risk that Syria might use its missiles and weapons of mass destruction against Israel. The Impact of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict The Israeli-Palestinian conflict currently presents more political risks than military ones. It is a war in which Israel’s vast conventional superiority gives Israel almost total freedom of action in the air, where the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has the ability to project ground forces into Gaza and the West Bank with only limited Israeli casualties, and where Israeli security barriers and ‘‘walls’’ limit Palestinian military options.


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Israel has also found many countermeasures to irregular forces and terrorist attacks, but its enemies have learned to adapt their tactics as well. Israel faces a steadily more sophisticated mix of tactics and weapons from such threats as Hamas and Hezbollah and must also consider the possibility that the Syrian military may decide to employ Hezbollah-style asymmetric warfare tactics in a future war. It must effectively plan for a ‘‘two-front’’ war: one against Syria and one against the Palestinians, with additional ‘‘wild cards’’ in the form of Hezbollah and Iran. It is doubtful that Syria could use or aid the Palestinians in any way that would do more than harass Israel, and any large-scale Syrian support could provoke Israeli retaliation. However, asymmetric conflicts easily become long wars of attrition that are extraordinarily difficult to win. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has now gone on continuously since 2000—in spite of such peace negotiations as the Annapolis summit in 2007—and has cost Israel significant support in Europe and many other parts of the world. The Threat from Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction The second kind of asymmetric threat is potentially far more serious and takes a very different form. As Chapters 8 and 9 describe, Israel faces a threat from Syria’s mix of chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles, coupled to the prospect that Iran may acquire both nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to deliver them. Israel has had a decisive edge over its Arab neighbors ever since it first acquired nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Jordan and Lebanon have never sought to compete in this aspect of the regional arms race. Egypt has sought to improve its missile forces and seems to maintain some form of chemical warfare capability, but has apparently abandoned any serious search for biological and nuclear weapons. It has focused more on efforts to create a nuclear-free zone than on proliferation. Syria does have long-range missiles and chemical weapons and shows a continuing interest in biological and nuclear weapons. Its biological capabilities—if any—are unknown, but are most likely to be limited. Syria does, however, have a long history of interest in nuclear technology, some of which seems to have been driven by the desire to at least lay the groundwork for creating a nuclear weapons option. It also seems to have obtained North Korean aid in building a reactor facility similar to the one that North Korea used to obtain weapons-grade plutonium. Syria did not, however, co-locate facilities that could be tied to either creating reactor fuel or processing the rods from a reactor into weapons-grade material. Israel destroyed this reactor facility during an aid raid in 2007, and this means the Syrian threat now seems to consist only of chemical weapons. Syria can, however, exploit Israeli sensitivity to military and civilian casualties by threatening to use its missiles and by conducting demonstrative strikes with conventional warheads. These may do limited damage, but they have had a major political and psychological impact in past struggles.

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A Syrian threat to use weapons of mass destruction also provides some leverage over Israel, regardless of the fact that any form of chemical attack, and most forms of biological attack, would be several orders of magnitude less lethal than an Israeli nuclear strike on Syria. However, any actual Syrian use of its current inventory of chemical and biological weapons in the face of Israeli nuclear weapons and missile defenses seems more suicidal than practical. Israel cannot, however, be sure of the future balance in weapons of mass destruction. At some point in the next two decades, the ability of Syria, Iran, and some nonstate actors to deliver such weapons may radically improve. As is noted in Chapter 8, Syria does seem to have tried to covertly build a nuclear reactor. It is also virtually certain that it will become far easier for Syria to acquire advanced chemical and biological agents. Most suppose ‘‘controlled’’ equipment is already available in a used form or through second-party sales on uncontrolled markets, including much of the equipment to produce genetically modified weapons and dry, storable micropowders and disseminate them. Ongoing advances in genetic engineering have steadily reduced the barriers both state and nonstate actors face in producing biological weapons and are creating the prospect of producing much more lethal agents more easily at lower cost. Some similar advances are taking place in producing more lethal chemical agents and in acquiring fission weapons, but the cost and technical barriers seem likely to remain much higher. It is already possible that terrorist or hard-line movements could acquire chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear weapons on their own or without any clear tie to a state actor. Today, attacks by nonstate actors might well have limited lethality, but the risk of serious biological and nuclear attacks is likely to grow over time. Even today, a chemical or biological attack by a movement such as Al Qa’ida might prompt Israel to change its strategic posture to focus on a global threat from terrorism and any nation where such movements were based on which might be the source of such weapons. It would probably change Palestinian and Arab perceptions of Israel’s vulnerability and force Israel to adopt drastic new security and counterterrorist measures. Israel has a unique existential vulnerability. It may or may not be a ‘‘one bomb’’ country, but it is clear that any attack that killed or incapacitated a serious percentage of the population of an urban area such as the greater Tel Aviv area could have a devastating effect.

SEEKING TO ADD AN ASYMMETRIC EDGE TO A CONVENTIONAL ONE These shifts in the military balance have already had a major impact on the way Israel uses and structures its military forces and its internal security and intelligence services. The fact that Israel has had to conduct more than half a decade of asymmetric warfare with the Palestinians forced it to shift many of its conventional military resources to low-intensity conflict, raids and reoccupations of Palestinian territory,


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and internal security missions. This shift has been further accelerated by the impact of the Israeli-Hezbollah War in 2006. The end result has been a steady expansion of the training and equipment the IDF units have for asymmetric warfare—as well as for low-intensity conflict and internal security missions—although few of the details are public. For example, Israel signed two separate security agreements, one with Russia and one with Turkey, promising to share information about terrorist groups.5 Israel hoped that the added intelligence would boost the IDF’s effectiveness in low-intensity conflict. Israel has utilized unorthodox strategies both domestically and internationally in an effort to enhance security. These have included aggressive diplomatic efforts heavily targeted toward the United States, taking back Palestinian territory to defeat terrorists, isolating Arafat and the Palestinian leadership, use of forces and physical barriers to separate the Palestinians from Israel, economic warfare, and direct attacks on hostile Palestinian forces. In the process, Israel has implemented a targeted assassination policy to try and destroy terrorist organizations by destroying their leadership. An extreme example of how this policy has been implemented is the assassination of Hamas’ spiritual leader Ahmed Yassin in March 2004, and the assassination of Hamas’ newly named leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi some three weeks later. Although the killings boosted Hamas’ popularity within the Palestinian population, it appears that there has been a serious leadership crisis within the movement since then. Even though it was promised, there was not any direct retaliation for the assassination of Yassin and Rantisi.6 Opinions differ over the effectiveness of such hard-line tactics. Some Israelis feel that any new leader that arises will first and foremost have to concentrate on staying alive and not on killing Israelis.7 This policy has produced critics both abroad and at home. Many Arab nations, and obviously the Palestinians, opposed the policy, seeing it as counterproductive to the peace process while pointing out that strikes frequently incur bystander casualties. Some Israelis have publicly disagreed with Israeli policies in the occupied territories. Some reservists refuse to serve in either Gaza or the West Bank, and 27 Israeli Air Force pilots, including the most decorated pilot in Israel’s history, refused to carry out further strikes. Four former heads of the Shin Bet security service declared that Israel’s activities in the territories actually eroded national security instead of bolstering it.8 A former deputy chief of staff of the IDF stated that Israel lacked a grand strategy and that the West Bank security fence that Israel is constructing at a cost of $450 million a year precludes the creation of a Palestinian state.9 Broadly speaking, however, the Israeli government and many Israelis feel Israel’s asymmetric strategies and tactics are working. The IDF reports that gunfire attacks on Israelis in the West Bank decreased by 1,016 incidents in almost one year. Israelis and the IDF were bombed about 220 times in 2003 compared to 578 times in 2002. In 2004, only six suicide bombings occurred inside of Israel, with the number of attempts declining by 50 percent.10 Israel touted these statistics as proof that the controversial strategies were successful. It should be noted, however, that the number of attempts to kill Israelis, especially

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by suicide bombers, had risen since 2003,11 The increased use of crude missiles— including the many variants of the Qassam rocket—by Palestinian militants has prompted Israeli security officials to question the overall effectiveness of Israel’s security barriers in containing Palestinian and other attacks by nonstate actors. Rocket attacks doubled from 2001 to 2003 before quadrupling from 226 to 861 rocket attack attempts over the 2005 to 2006 period. In the first quarter of 2008, 200 rockets were being fired at Israel on average.12 The increased emphasis placed on the use of rocket attacks by militant groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and Hamas, would prompt more vigorous efforts to develop and utilize active rather than passive systems to protect against attacks from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There is no way to precisely quantify just how much of Israel’s effort has been shifted to such missions, but on a day-to-day basis—when Israel does not need to deploy or exercise to deal with threats on the Golan—they may consume nearly half of Israel’s military resources in terms of self-financed security expenditures and some 25 percent of its active and mobilized reserve manpower. ADAPTING TO NEW THREATS WHILE RETAINING CONVENTIONAL MILITARY STRENGTHS Some analysts feel that Israel has been forced to sacrifice some of its conventional edge to adopt these asymmetric tactics. Such comments have some merit, but they need to be kept in careful perspective. The conventional capabilities of such key threats as Syria have continued to deteriorate far more quickly than those of Israel, and Egypt and Jordan have not made any significant gains. Moreover, transforming Israel’s conventional warfighting capabilities to include asymmetric capabilities provides real-world combat experience and forces Israel to deal with the full range of new military requirements of the twenty-first century. The Impact of the Israeli-Hezbollah War Israel did underemphasize some of its classic conventional military strengths— particularly land force readiness and large-scale exercise training—in the years before the Israeli-Hezbollah War in 2006. It has since placed a new emphasis on all of these potential problem areas, especially exercise training both in the field and at the command level, and reserve readiness. It is also reemphasizing training that develops battlefield initiative, and it allows flexibility in executing orders. Its continuing strengths include selective promotion and advanced training for leadership for both officers and noncommissioned officers, promoting on the basis of competence, maintaining a relatively young and aggressive officer corps, and insisting on forward leadership. In contrast, Arab forces—and particularly Syrian forces—often require highly detailed orders, supported by demanding systems of accountability, to ensure that orders are properly executed in the field. With some notable exceptions, junior


81

officers and mid-level commanders are slow to deviate from orders when presented with new battlefield opportunities or unanticipated problems. Most exercises have predetermined outcomes that sharply limit the initiative of the officers involved and make it impossible to determine the relative effectiveness of the forces involved. Restructuring Forces to Meet New Mission Needs The IDF has adopted a new, more demanding training regimen for its soldiers. In the past, it assumed that soldiers needed to be trained for months prior to deployment. Largely as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian War, Israel has instituted a different three-pronged approach. Training consists of a brief yet difficult month-long training program followed by immediate deployment to either the occupied territories or the border with Lebanon. The training regimen, 40 percent of which has been altered, stresses the challenges soldiers will face during low-intensity conflict in an urban setting. Forgoing the traditional 17-week course enables soldiers to acquire ‘‘on the job training,’’ an experience at least one IDF official states cannot be replicated. The fluidity and rapidly changing tactics of the Israeli-Palestinian War renders many forms of lengthy training anachronistic by the time soldiers complete the various courses. Three field schools supplement the regimented and on-the-job training for IDF soldiers. Every month, all soldiers spend four to five days in a field school being trained in the latest techniques tailored to their specific functions in the context of the most recent developments. After six months of deployment, soldiers train for yet another month and attend the field schools once more. Israel makes good use of advanced military technology and of its access to arms transfers from the United States, and Israel has done more than procure hightechnology equipment. While most Arab states focus on the ‘‘glitter factor’’ inherent in buying the most advanced weapons systems, Israel gives the proper weight to battle management, sustainability, and systems integration. Israel integrates technology into its force structure in ways that emphasize tactics, training, and all aspects of technology rather than relying on force strengths and weapons performance. TRENDS IN MANPOWER AND TOTAL FORCE STRENGTH BEFORE THE 2006 LEBANON WAR: ACTIVE VERSUS RESERVE FORCES The recent trends in Israeli manpower and force structure are shown in Figure 7.2. These trends do not show dramatic changes, but they do reflect both a limited rise in active manpower and a significant downward shift in total reserve manpower after 2000, driven in part by the need for active forces for the Israeli-Palestinian War and the need to pay for the steadily increasing added technological sophistication of Israeli forces. Israel’s reserve manpower pool has been cut in recent years from 504,000 in 1990, to 425,000 in 2000, to 408,000 in 2006. Israel faces major cost constraints in spite of the massive transfers of U.S. arms and technology it receives. Figure 7.3. shows the recent trends in Israeli arms transfers

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Figure 7.2 Israeli Military: Manpower and Force Structure Trends: 1990–2008 1990

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

645,000

697,500

~576,000

576,300

576,000

741,500

141,000

173,500

~168,000

168,300

168,000

176,500

Conscript

110,000

107,500

107,500

107,500

107,500

109,500

Army

104,000

130,000

125,000

125,000

125,000

133,000

Navy

3,000

~6,500

~8,000

8,300

8,000

9,500

Air Force

19,000

20,000

35,000

35,000

35,000

34,000

?

~6,050

~8,050

8,050

8,050

8,050

Reserve

504,000

425,000

408,000

408,000

408,000

565,000

Army

494,000

400,000

~380,000

380,000

380,000

500,000

Navy

1,000

5,000

3,500

3,500

3,500

10,000

Air Force

9,000

20,000

24,500

24,500

24,500

55,000

Manpower Active

Paramilitary

Source: Various editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, and U.S., British, and Israeli experts.

and is in many ways as important a summary indication of force trends as the force data in Figure 7.2 and the service-by-service figures that follow. While deliveries fluctuate over time, Figure 7.3 shows that new arms orders have remained consistently high, and this seems to be true of Israeli domestic military procurement as well. Figure 7.3 shows Israel’s heavy reliance on U.S. arms. Between 2001 and 2004, Israel imported $4.0 billion worth of new arms from the United States. It has been reported that due to Israel’s financial crunch, the United States may allow Israel to defer payment for major arms purchases between 2009 and 2010. It plans to use most of its aid from the United States to buy U.S. weapons, according to the U.S. Defense Cooperation Agency. Israel argued that it will pay all the debt, but that it would need some time to do so. U.S. military grants and loans to Israel are the largest in the world. From 1959 to 1984, U.S. military loans to Israel totaled $11.2 billion; from 1949 to 2005, U.S. military grants to Israel totaled $49.1 billion. In 2004 alone, U.S. military development assistance reached $2.68 billion. In 2006, the U.S. military grant to Israel totaled $2.28 billion. Israel is required to use 75 percent of it to buy U.S. arms, but Israel can also use 25 percent of it for its own military research and procurement programs. In addition, the United States gave Israel $78 million for its Arrow antimissile systems.13 The U.S. aid program gave Israel $120 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid, $240,000 in nonproliferation and antiterrorism aid, and $2,340 million in FMF in fiscal year 2007 (FY2007), for a total of $2.5 billion. President George W. Bush requested military grant aid only after FY2007 and requested $2,381 billion in FY2008 and $2,550 billion in FY2009. 14 Future U.S. aid will continue on a


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Figure 7.3 Recent Israeli Arms Sales

long-term basis. The U.S. FY2009 aid request marks the start of a new, ten-year, $30 billion security arrangement with the Government of Israel. The U.S. aid request describes this as follows: Commitment to Israel’s security and well-being has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East since Israel’s creation in 1948. Aid to Israel supports American ideals by helping the only established democracy in the Middle East defend itself and economically prosper. Continuing U.S. security assistance to Israel reinforces U.S. ties and signals to adversaries in the region that a negotiated settlement is the only option. The broad issues of Arab-Israeli peace continue to be a major focus of the U.S.–Israel relationship. U.S. efforts to reach a Middle East peace settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 have been based on the premise that as Israel takes risks calculated

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to promote peace, the United States will help minimize those risks. Increased assistance will allow for a more robust Israeli defense budget during a critical time for the peace process and in the midst of regional instability. It also will help to safeguard Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge.15

Procurement and research and development costs are only part of the story. While almost all of the United States supplied equipment shown in Figure 7.3 is provided in the form of grant aid, the costs of absorbing high-technology equipment into Israel’s force structure, supporting it throughout its life cycle, and adding major additional capabilities from Israel’s military industries put a major strain on Israel’s national budget. This helps explain why Israel cut its total active manpower from around 174,000 actives in its peacetime force structure in 2000 to 168,000 in 2007 in spite of the Israeli-Palestinian War—a step it now seems determined to reverse as a result of the lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006. The IDF’s total active strength does include some 107,500 conscripts. Unlike the short-service conscripts in many forces, however, Israeli male conscripts serve a total of 36 months (women serve 21 months and officers 48 months), and a significant number are still in training or gathering combat experience at any given time. At the same time, many of the personnel fighting in the Israeli-Palestinian War are reservists. Some of Israel’s best troops consist of its younger reserves, and this gives Israel considerable strategic flexibility in dealing with asymmetric wars. Calling up reservists for limited periods of active service is expensive and disruptive to Israel’s civil economy, but still imposes a much lower burden than maintaining large active forces. Israel’s use of reserves does make it dependent on timely mobilization for its warfighting capability, and Israel requires 36–48 hours of strategic warning and reaction time to fully prepare its defenses in the Golan Heights—its most vulnerable front. However, the risk Israel takes in relying on reserves is now largely limited to war with Syria. The risk of relying on reserves is ameliorated both by Syrian readiness problems and by Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, and the limits on Egyptian forces in the Sinai sharply reduce the chances of any surprise in a war on more than one front. The ‘‘Kela 2008 Plan’’ Israel has examined a number of different approaches to reshaping its forces in recent years. In 2003, Israel began to reshape its military forces in accordance with a military restructuring effort that has been reported in the press as the Kela 2008 plan. With the ‘‘eastern front’’ now gone, the IDF was discussing the possibility of combining the West Bank and Gaza under one command, and whether a separate Southern Command was still needed against Egypt. Other major aspects of the plan included transforming Merkava Mk 1 and Mk 2 main battle tank (MBT) chassis or newly produced Merkava Mk 4 hulls into a new heavily armored personnel carrier (APC) called the Namer. To improve their


85

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), Kela 2008 introduced the Tsayad project, intended to fully integrate all ground platforms with broadband communications capabilities. The plan also called for heavy investments into researching and procuring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).16 In 2003, however, the military announced that it would outsource maintenance and administration functions in an effort to reduce costs, cut wages by up to 20 percent, eliminate welfare programs for officers, and increase the minimum retirement age for officers. Overall, the army announced it would cut 10 percent of its regular forces and minimize the use of unskilled reservists who typically incur large operating expenses.17 In addition, a panel of industrialists, former generals, and security experts recommended further reductions on top of the Kela plan. The panelists want to decrease the number of combat helicopters by 20 percent, the number of tanks by an additional 10 percent, the older fighter planes by 5 percent, and the patrol boats by 15 percent. Reportedly, the resulting force numbers would be sufficient to face Israel’s threats.18 Other reports indicate that Israeli concerns about funding and the threat of budget reduction had led the navy, the army, and the air force to compete far more seriously for their share of U.S. Foreign Military Financing allocations.

Kushet (Rainbow) Plan In February 2006, Israel announced that it had launched its own Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), or Kushet Plan, which would be completed in June or July 2006. The aim of this project was to guide Israel’s defense spending and planning between 2007 and 2011.19 The Kushet Plan sought to restructure the IDF based on threat assessments and the changing nature of warfare. This includes optimizing the IDF for low-intensity, urban, and asymmetric warfare without compromising Israel’s conventional edge.20 Then IDF Deputy Chief of General Staff Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky stated the following in an interview: We [in Israel] need to achieve an appropriate balance between conventional highintensity conflict [HIC]—which is no longer our principal threat, though it regrettably still exists—and all kinds of low intensity conflicts [LIC] . . . We’ve been trying to strike this balance while fighting over the past several years, but now we are emphasizing this as a bottom-up requirement for future plans. Our central direction is toward generic capabilities that can give us the flexibility we need for HIC and LIC, since we can’t afford to put platforms and weapon systems in warehouses and save them for a war that might never come.21

Kushet focused on strengthening Israel’s capabilities against infiltrations and terrorist attacks including remotely monitored, sensor-fused, multilayered C4I systems to control its borders with Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank. The IDF hoped this would improve Israel’s monitoring and detection capabilities on its borders.22

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

The plan focused on developing and deploying ‘‘multirole’’ and linked forces and on limiting the use of IDF troops. According to an IDF officer, the new system reflected the view of Maj. Gen. Dan Halutz, then chief of the General Staff. He was described as focusing on ‘‘replacing people with technology whenever possible, but he’s equally intent on doing it in a methodical, very prudent, low-risk manner.’’23 The planned shift toward a ‘‘techno-centric’’ force called for cutting active IDF manpower by 5,000 (a 10-percent reduction) and substituting in more advanced weapons and technology. The details of the actual plan, however, remained uncertain at the time. These numbers were not final and were subject to change when the actual plan was presented to Israel’s Knesset. Other plans to restructure IDF manpower surfaced in the press at the time, but it was unclear if those plans were part of Kushet. For example, it was reported that the IDF planned to reorganize its IDF command structure by merging commands, cutting back on manpower, and optimizing IDF ground capabilities. This process was reported to have started on December 26, 2005, and was based on three principles:24 • Separating operating units from the staff units, • Building up the IDF forces will be accomplished only from within the units, and • Severing the General Staff from its role as the supreme commander of the IDF ground forces.

To implement these principles, the IDF was reported to plan to reorganize its ground forces in the following ways: • Subordinate eight corps, including the signals, ordnance, and personnel management corps, to the ground forces by the end of 2006. The goal is to improve maneuver, auxiliary, and support capabilities. • Decommission some of the corps. • Combine artillery, intelligence, and field tactical intelligence corps into one, which the IDF hopes will be more effective. • Create a ‘‘Special Forces school,’’ which will offer a joint training and weapons program. • Create new divisions called ‘‘multiple corps tactical divisions.’’

ISRAELI DEFENSE PLANNING AFTER THE 2006 LEBANON WAR As has been touched upon earlier, the problems Israel experienced while fighting the 2006 Lebanon War and the war’s disappointing outcome had a strong impact on these defense policy debates. Both the political leadership and military commanders became the object of strong public criticism by a wide range of serving and retired Israeli officials, as well as by Israeli defense experts. There was reason for such criticism. The IDF had become too committed to the technological possibilities of ‘‘Revolution in Military Affairs’’ and had failed to focus


87

on military fundamentals. The Kushet Plan, for example, gave priority to improvements in precision air strike capabilities and of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems at the expense of reductions in manpower and large-scale exercise and command post training. Reserve readiness also suffered in terms of training and equipment readiness, preparation for rapid deployment, and the funding of supply and sustainability. The IDF’s decidedly mixed performance in Lebanon showed that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) could not substitute for ground troops and that high levels of reserve readiness remained important and large-scale exercise training remained critical. It also led to a flood of new criticism from military experts who had been skeptical of the ‘‘transformational’’ reforms before the war. For example, Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, general officer commanding the Northern Command, and head of IDF Operations Directorate until shortly after the war, described these reforms as ‘‘a virus that had infiltrated IDF’s basic doctrine.’’25 Other senior officers also deplored the ‘‘aerial arrogance’’ of the IDF. Jane’s summarized this dissatisfaction with the new doctrine as follows: The recently adopted doctrine recognized the weakness of the ground forces, which for the past six years have hardly trained and have been occupied fighting Palestinian insurgents, who represent no real challenge to IDF capabilities. ‘‘The continuous occupation in the territories has not only damaged training, procedures, combat techniques, but has also damaged the IDF mentality,’’ said Levin. The IDF’s undisputed success in suppressing Palestinian terrorism increased commanders’ self-confidence and drove them to underestimate their Lebanese opponent. Moreover, the doctrine’s new jargon, which became widespread as a growing number of officers were educated on it, ‘‘created confusion in terminology and misunderstanding of basic military principles,’’ as several inquiry teams pointed out. The assessment of several senior IDF sources is that they have no alternative but to completely rewrite the doctrine and perhaps reverse some of the structural changes conducted in recent years. The General Staff is expected to decide on considerably increased investments in ground forces, both in training and equipment.26

The Winograd Commission This criticism was reinforced by the work of the Winograd Commission, which was chaired by retired judge Eliyahu Winograd. The Israeli government established the Winograd Commission shortly after the 2006 war with Lebanon. Its mission was to investigate the shortcomings and failures of the Israeli government and the armed forces in the execution of the war and to draw lessons for future operations. In its interim report, the Commission made serious criticisms of many aspects of the conduct of the war, as well as Israeli civilian and military leaders, and it offered the following recommendations for improving Israeli strategy-making governmental structures and institutions:

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

a. The improvement of the quality of discussions and decision-making within the government through strengthening and deepening staff work; strict enforcement of the prohibition of leaks; improving the knowledge base of all members of the government on core issues of Israel’s challenges, and orderly procedures for presentation of issues for discussion and resolution. b. Full incorporation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in security decisions with political and diplomatic aspects. c. Substantial improvement in the functioning of the National Security Council, the establishment of a national assessment team, and creating a center for crises management in the Prime Minister’s Office.27

The Commission’s findings also concluded the following: The IDF was not ready for this war. Among the many reasons for this we can mention a few: Some of the political and military elites in Israel have reached the conclusion that Israel is beyond the era of wars. It had enough military might and superiority to deter others from declaring war against her; these would also be sufficient to send a painful reminder to anyone who seemed to be undeterred; since Israel did not intend to initiate a war, the conclusion was that the main challenge facing the land forces would be low intensity asymmetrical conflicts. Given these assumptions, the IDF did not need to be prepared for ‘‘real’’ war. There was also no urgent need to update in a systematic and sophisticated way Israel’s overall security strategy and to consider how to mobilize and combine all its resources and sources of strength—political, economic, social, military, spiritual, cultural and scientific—to address the totality of the challenges it faces.28

Post-Hezbollah War Reforms The ‘‘lessons learned’’ led to the postponement and/or reversal of many of the previous decisions regarding the long-term future of country’s defense force structure and doctrine. Jane’s quoted a senior source as saying, ‘‘As there is no point in drafting a work plan before we conclude the lessons from the war, we decided that 2007 will be an independent year, in which a new work plan will be outlined.’’29 It also led to some immediate reforms. One of the first such reforms was the creation of a Special Forces Command, dubbed Deep Command, which will be responsible for commanding and coordinating all operations beyond the territorial command theaters.30 The need to improve the level of training of ground forces, especially in the reserve component, is another issue that was singled out by the strategic reviews following the Lebanon war. Another reform was improved training activity. Jane’s has reported that during the six years preceding the Israel-Hezbollah 2006 war, hardly any of the IDF brigades and battalions, whether regular or reserve, conducted a full exercise. Continuous budget cuts combined with six years of low-intensity conflict with the Palestinians have gradually eroded the level of training of all IDF ground units.31 In 2007, the IDF increased the number of annual weeks of training for all infantry brigades from


89

8 to 18. The IDF also put on hold a 2003 decision of the Kela 2008 plan to scale down its ground forces by 25 percent. The quality of training was changed as well after the war. New emphasis was placed on fighting the kind of urban asymmetric warfare the IDF confronted in southern Lebanon. The National Urban Training Center in the Negev region shifted its emphasis from creating conditions resembling the Gaza Strip to transform the area into what IDF officials call ‘‘Hezbollahland.’’32 This training area was designed to reflect the lessons from the recent Lebanon War: side streets and main passageways would be armed with improvised explosive devices, while snipers would man the rooftops of multistory apartment buildings positioned throughout the town. IDF forces would have to contend with underground bunkers and the so-called ‘‘nature reserves,’’ those foliage-camouflaged, often remotely activated Katyusha launching sites that confounded Israeli airpower and ground forces until the last day of the war.33 The role of airpower was also given a different priority. As more details emerged about the conduct of the war, the IAF received an increasing amount of criticism for failing to counter Hezbollah’s rocket-launching campaign. Uzi Rubin, an expert on missile defense, challenged postwar conventional wisdom that ground forces, rather than airpower, were the only solution to the Hezbollah short-range rocket threat. In his 50-page study, he concluded that the IAF was ‘‘perfectly capable’’ of eradicating the short-range rockets, but did not prepare properly for the mission.34 According to Rubin, the IAF should have availed itself of ‘‘various methods to determine the location of any launcher.’’ Had it done so and acquired the necessary target coordinates, the IAF could have destroyed these threats with various types of precision munitions in its arsenal. He stated, ‘‘Would such preparations have been made in time, the eradication of the stationary launchers would have been a walkover . . . The war would have ended with a clear Israeli victory and without recourse to a costly ground invasion.’’35 Moreover, Rubin challenged the widespread claims that the IAF destroyed most of Hezbollah’s long- and medium-range missile arsenal at the start of the war. ‘‘Judging by the intensity of the fire . . . the IAF failed to eradicate the longer-range rocket threat.’’ He was referring specifically to Hezbollah’s 122-, 220-, and 320-mm rockets, with ranges varying from 50 kilometers to about 100 kilometers.36 In addition to criticism of Israeli performance of the tactical and operational levels, the war triggered a flood of criticism of Israel’s strategic and political leadership during the conflict. The debates between high-ranking military and civilian officials led to an examination of the larger question of the role of the military in this type of asymmetric war. In his farewell address in February 2007, Dan Halutz, the former chief of the General Staff, warned political leaders that the complexity of asymmetric threats would force them to rethink what exactly they expect to achieve through military force: Today’s reality is not painted in black and white, [but] rather [in] many shades of gray. It’s much more complex. The threats to Israel are not from the tank or the plane or the

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

revolver that are in the hands of the enemy, but rather can be found in cultural, social and other threats . . . I personally believe the words decisiveness and defeat against guerillas and terror are not relevant words.37

These opinions led others to accuse Halutz of attempting to shift blame away from the military. Jacob Amidror, a retired major general and former commandant of the IDF war colleges, commented the following to Defense News: The IDF cannot hide behind the fabricated rationale that we’re in a new era of asymmetric warfare which limits our way to be decisive in battle . . . Every time the military fails to achieve planned results or finds itself in a situation of surprise, you’ll find those who will pin the failures on the so-called new type of asymmetrical warfare . . . This is a cop-out. It doesn’t matter if the threat is from conventional armies or heavily-armed terror forces operating from urban areas, the military must be capable of denying the other side’s ability to kill us.38

Just how much the war will change Israel’s longer-term force plans and tactics is unclear, but these developments did conclude that Israel, like the United States, needed to find better ways to fight asymmetric wars and confront Hezbollah-style insurgent enemies in the future without losing the capability to fight urban and more conventional maneuver conflicts.

The Teffen 2012 Five-Year Plan: Implementing Lessons Learned? The IDF officially launched its first post-Israeli-Hezbollah War five-year plan, Teffen 2012, in September 2007. This plan called for a major shift away from a military doctrine that favored airpower; the plan focused on modernizing Israel’s land forces and associated services to increase force mobility and maneuverability. Teffen 2012 was based on several logical assumptions about future contingencies. It assumed the likelihood of continuing conflict with the Palestinians, the potential for war with Syria or Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and the emergence of a nuclear weapons capability in Iran by the end of the decade. It considered the risk of a potentially ‘‘dramatic change’’ in regimes of moderate neighboring Arab states, including Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. The IDF identified symmetric challenges of advanced regular armies, asymmetric challenges by paramilitary and terror groups, a nuclear challenge from Iran, and a challenge of regional instability as Israel’s four major future challenges. Teffen 2012 would drastically alter how the IDF would manage and allocate future appropriations from different branches of the armed forces, and many of the traditional firsttier receivers of the Israeli military budget will have to cut back their requests. Teffen 2012 called for a significant improvement in Israeli ground forces that would include the procurement of ‘‘hundreds’’ of Merkava-based Namer heavy infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) with active protection systems, ‘‘hundreds’’ of General Dynamics Land Systems Stryker 8 × 8 medium IFVs, increasing the number of


91

Merkava Mk 4 MBTs by several dozen per year, upgrading Merkava Mk 2s and Mk 3s, and dozens of tactical mini-UAVs for battalion-level use. Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s request for two more armored divisions was not adopted. Rather the decision was taken to establish another divisional headquarters (HQ) in southern Israel and to reorganize existing forces. The plan also called for the IAF, traditionally the top recipient of military budget allocations, to limit its procurement in the five-year plan to enable ground forces to modernize. The IAF’s requirement for 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) was slashed to 25, with an additional 25 aircraft deferred. The IAF would modernize its F-15 fleet, in part because the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor air-superiority fighter was not available for export to U.S. allies. These decisions were driven in part by the IDF’s inability to neutralize Hezbollah with an emphasis on high-precision airpower. The Israel Navy’s (IN’s) request for new naval assets was approved, and $240 million was allocated for the appropriation of a new multimission surface combatant. Reports indicated that this might involve procurement of Lockheed Martin’s design for the U.S. Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Teffen 2012 also emphasized the development of a comprehensive multitier Israeli antirocket and antiballistic missile defense umbrella. Rafael Armament Development Authority’s Iron Cap, which is designed to protect against rockets up to a range of 40 kilometers (km), received full funding for development. So did Rafael’s David’s Sling 40–400-km rocket and missile defense system. The IAF confirmed it would upgrade Israel’s MIM-104 Patriot batteries to the PAC-3 specifications, while Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. (IAI) is tapped to develop a new upper-tier defense interceptor, the Arrow 3, designed to defeat incoming higher-altitude and longer-ranged missile systems. The end result was an Israeli effort to recapitalize and reorient its force posture and effectiveness to counter asymmetric threats, classic symmetrical warfare, and possible use of asymmetric tactics in a future war with Syria. Teffen 2012 was based on a budget of U.S.$12.3 billion in 2008 with the expectation that the Israeli defense budget would grow by 1.5 percent annually. It was a significant departure from Kela 2008 and the Kushet Plan, and the Teffen work plan could not have been funded without the increased U.S. FMF package.39 ISRAELI LAND FORCES The trends in Israeli land forces are shown in Figure 7.4 and reflect the same trends in total manpower discussed earlier. As of the end of 2007, Israel had an active army strength of 125,000 and an active reserve force of 380,000.40 The IDF’s land forces were organized into three territorial commands and one home-front command and had a combat structure of four corps. Its active forces had a nominal strength of two armored divisions, four infantry divisions, and three air-mobile brigades. Its reserves had a nominal strength of eight armored divisions, with a total of 15 armored brigades, four infantry brigades, and six artillery

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 7.4 Israeli Army Forces: Force Structure 1990

Manpower

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

645,000

697,500 ~576,000* 576,300

575,000

741,500

Active

104,000

130,000

~125,000

125,000

125,000

176,500

Reserve

494,000

400,000

~380,000

380,000

380,000

565,000

17+

~15

~18

~14

~14

3

3

2

2

2

Mechanized Infantry Brigade

5

4

4

4

4

Infantry Division HQ

?

3

4

4

4

Reserve Armored Divisions

9

8

8

8

8

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Warheads

100

100

200

200

200

200

Lance

7

(7 in store)

(7 in store)

(7 in store)

0

0

Jericho I

?

?

?

Jericho II

?

?

?

–

–

–

Aircraft

0

0

0

Some

Some

Some

Combat Units Armored Divisions

Nuclear Capabilities

Main Battle Tanks

100+ of I 100+ of I & II & II

100+ of I & II

3,794

3,800

3,090

3,657

3,657

3,501

1,080

800

N/A

206

206

206

561

300

N/A

561

561

561

1,300

900

900

711

711

711

M-60A1

?

300

300

–

–

–

M-60A3

?

600

600

–

–

–

T-54

138

200

114

126

T-55

–

–

–

(261)

–

–

T-62

115

100

100

–

–

–

Merkava

600

1,100

1,790

1,681

1,681

1,525

Merkava I

?

?

?

407 (+441)

407 (+441)

441

Merkava II

?

?

?

375

375

455

Centurion M-48A5 M-60

126 (incl. 126 (incl. T-55/ T-55/ T-62) T-62)


Merkava III

0

?

?

378

378

454

Merkava IV

0

0

?

80

80

175

0

400

186

111

111

111

~400

~400

~400

408

408

408

Some

~400

~400

~400

Magach 7 Reconnaissance –RAMTA RBY

BRDM-2 BRDM-2

–Fuchs

0

~8

~8

APCs

~10,380

~10,000

5,900 ~80

BTR-50P

93

~8 Tpz-1 ~8 Tpz-1

~8 Tpz-1

~12,940

10,419+

10,419+

10,419+

5,500

7,700

6,131

6,131

6,131

~200

~400

?

~400

~ 400

?

Inc. w/ Achzarit

?

?

?

?

M-2 half-track

?

?

?

180

(180)

(180)

M-3 half-track

(3,386)

(2,000)

(2,000 in store)

(2,000)

(Some in store)

(Some in store)

Achzarit, Puma

0

~200

270

6

6

6

BTR 40/BTR-152

0

0

0

40

40

40

Nakpadon

0

0

?

Some

Some

Some

579

420

370

456

456

456

70

70

70

70

70

70

M-113A1/A2 Nagmashot

Towed Artillery 105 mm M-101

70

70

70

70

70

70

122 mm

100

100

5

5

5

5

D-30

100

100

5

5

5

5

130 mm

109

100

15

100

100

100

M-46

109

100

15

100

100

100

155 mm

300

150

280

281

281

281

300

50

50

50

50

50

M-839P/-845P

?

50

80

81

81

81

M-114A1

0

50

50

50

50 in reserve

50 in reserve

Soltam M-46

0

?

100

100

100

100

781

1,010

960

620

620

620

0

34

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

34

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

~605

700

852

548

548

548

Soltam M-68/-71

Self-Propelled Artillery 105 mm M-7 155 mm

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

L-33

?

150

148

148

148

148

M-50

75

120

0

50

50

50

M-109A1/A2

530

530

704

350

350

350

175 mm

140

140

72

36

36

36

M-107

140

140

72

36

36

36

203 mm

36

36

36

36

36

36

M-110

36

36

36

36

36

36

MRLs

?

200+

212

224

224

224

122 mm

?

50

58

58

58

58

BM-21

?

50

58

58

58

58

160 mm

?

50

50

50

50

50

?

50

50

50

50

50

227 mm

0

48

48

60

60

60

MLRS

0

48

48

60

60

60

240 mm

?

30

36

36

36

36

BM-24

?

30

36

36

36

36

290 mm

?

20+

20

20

20

20

?

20+

20

20

20

20

Mortars

~230

~7,740

1,890

4,132

4,132

4,132

52 mm

0

0

0

2,000

2,000

2,000

60 mm

0

~5,000

0

?

?

?

81 mm

?

1,600

1,360

1,358

1,358

1,358

120 mm

~230

900

400

652

652

652

160 mm

?

240

130

122

122

122

M-43 (in reserve)

0

0

?

104

104

104

M-66 Soltam

0

0

?

18

18

18

Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSSMs)

12+

~20+

~107

107

107

107

LAR-160

MAR-290

Lance

12

20

7

7

7

7

Jericho 1 (SRBM)/ 2 (IRBM)

?

Some

~100

~100

~100

~100

Antitank Guided Weapon

?

~1,325

~1,225+

1,225+

1,225+

1,225+

TOW (inc. Ramta [M-113] SP)

?

300

300

300

300

300


Dragon

?

1,000

900

900

900

900

AT-3 Sagger

?

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

Mapats

?

25

25

25

25

25

Gill/ Spike

0

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

?

?

?

Some

Some

Some

82 mm

?

?

?

Some

Some

Some

B-300

?

?

?

Some

Some

Some

250+

250

250

?

?

?

?

0

0

?

?

?

?

0

0

?

?

?

250

250

250

250

250

250

0 250

250

250

250

250

250

~900

~1,010

?

815

815

920

850

850

?

455

455

105

TCM-20

?

?

?

?

?

?

M-48 Chaparral

?

?

?

?

?

?

M-163 Vulcan

30

35

?

?

?

105

M-167 Vulcan

?

?

?

?

?

?

M-1939

?

?

?

?

?

?

Stinger

?

?

?

0

0

0

?

160

?

210

210

210

Rocket Launcher

Recoilless Rifle 84 mm Carl Gustav 106 mm M-40A1 Air-Defense Guns 20 mm

23 mm ZU-23

?

100

?

150

150

150

50

60

?

60

60

60

37 mm

?

?

?

?

?

?

M-39

?

?

?

?

?

?

40 mm

?

?

?

150

150

150

L-70

?

?

?

150

150

150

?

1,298

1,250

1,250

1,250

1,270

Redeye

?

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

Stinger

0

250

250

250

250

250

Chaparral

0

48

0

0

0

0

Surveillance

0

?

?

?

?

?

0

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

ZSU-23-4 SP

Surface-to-Air Missiles

EL/M-2140 (veh)

95

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder (arty) AN/PPS-15 (arty)

0

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

0

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

* ~ = Estimated amount; + = more than the number given but not specified how much more; Some = unspecified amount; N/A = not available; ? = unspecified amount, if any; MRLs = multiple rocket launchers. The figures in parentheses show the number in storage or largely in storage. Source: Various editions of the IISS, Military Balance, Jane’s Sentinel series, and U.S., British, and Israeli experts.

regiments. There were four infantry divisions with a total of 15 infantry brigades, four artillery regiments, and three mobile brigades. Each of these units had reserve elements. Another 6 of Israel’s 11 armored ‘‘divisions’’ were reserve forces, as was one airmobile mechanized division. Its reserve units had a total of 15 armored brigades, four infantry brigades, and at least four artillery regiments. This gave the IDF a 14-division force, with some 8 divisions manned by reserves. However, the IDF may be moving toward a more flexible task force structure in which the independently controlled infantry brigades could be placed under the overall control of the armored divisions in order to enhance armored combat under fire-saturated battlefield scenarios. The resulting units could operate independently in a number of scenarios. The IDF’s major combat equipment included 3,657 main battle tanks. It had an inventory of some 10,000 APCs, 670 armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), 3,386 obsolete half-tracks, 620 self-propelled artillery weapons, 456 towed weapons, 224 multiple rocket launchers, some 4,100 mortars, over 1,200 modern antitank guided-weapons launchers, some 250 recoilless rifles, and under 1,300 light surface-to-air missiles (many obsolete). Land forces are reported to operate Israel’s nuclear-armed Jericho missiles.

Land Force Transformation Israeli ground forces may have restored their focus on fundamentals, but they also continue to adopt new military tactics and technology and to adapt many elements of what the United States calls ‘‘the revolution in military affairs’’ and ‘‘netcentric’’ warfare to their needs. In addition to the force shifts described earlier, Israel has begun a service-wide transformation into a fully integrated combat-ready multimission force under the Land Forces Command dubbed the Tzayad or ‘‘Hunter’’ Army Modernization Program. The Hunter program is the IDF’s attempt at integrating different services under one command to gain better control of situations and be more focused in operations. This concept assumes Land Forces Command will have more ability to rapidly draw on its full range of expertise to find solutions in-house and be able to shorten the time between planning and execution because all key elements will be


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subordinated to one command center. The proposed transformation includes placing the Signals Corps, the Ordnance Corps, and the Technology and Logistics Branch under the direct control of the Land Forces Command. The test brigade for this new combat unit is planned to include battalions of armor, infantry, engineering, artillery, and support forces all fighting together. In addition the brigade would be able to operate manned and unmanned air force aircraft and other intelligence assets. Land Forces Command is also reported to be planning to establish a Special Operations Force that would combine military commando units with antiterror units currently managed by the General Staff. It was estimated within the military that the price tag for the Hunter Program would be around $900 million in procurement and development from 2005 to 2015. It was hoped that this program would lead the IDF into a fully digitized, integrated network structure.41 Changes in Command and Control and Netcentric Warfare The full nature of such changes is far from clear, and the IDF has adopted a lowercost, evolutionary, and more affordable ‘‘proven state of the art’’ approach to netcentric warfare than the ambitious and more revolutionary Future Combat Systems (FCS) approach of the U.S. Army. The IDF relies heavily on digital upgrades and modifications of existing communications, information systems, and sensors. At the same time, Israel is developing more advanced technologies. For example, Elbit—the IDF’s prime contractor for the national C4ISR effort—is reported to be developing an integrated strategic system for consumers and providers of national security. This system, dubbed ‘‘Big Brother’’ since the code name is secret, is planned to link imaging sensors, electronic signals, and communications systems, from ground, sea, air, and space, all on one secure command and control network. The system is to be designed to search for information and then, through the use of artificial intelligence, decipher what is relevant and pass it on to the appropriate individuals. In theory, it would be designed to process fragments, shards, and unstructured data in a relatively short time into a coherent, processed, structured, and packaged format that can be used easily and effectively.42 Israel is also reported to be moving closer to creating the highly digitized, multioperational forces by adopting other C4I systems in addition to the Hunter Program. A test of another new C4I system, dubbed Tirat Ha’agam (Castle on the Lake), was conducted during the disengagement from Gaza in August 2005. Tirat Ha’agam was developed beginning in 2003 under the supervision of the IDF’s C4I Directorate and the Digital Army Program (DAP) at an estimated cost of $22 million. It was intended to provide the senior command and decision makers with real-time high-resolution knowledge about the situations on the ground. Tirat Ha’agam is intended to reduce the time it takes forces on the ground to relay information to senior decision makers and the time it then takes for the decision to be handed down to the forces on the ground. It can provide maps, aerial images, units’ weaponry, and ammunition supply and presents a ‘‘target bank’’ that the decision

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makers and the ground forces could both see and refer to without the need for physical briefings by lower-level commanders. Tirat Ha’agam also incorporates another technology called Modern Mirror that collects and distributes real-time pictures from up to 24 different sources of the different IDF intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance sensors.43 The current version of the C4I system, Beta 2, has been distributed to senior military officials and also to the senior directors of the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, and the Shin Bet, the agency responsible for internal security. The next version of the system was to be developed and manufactured in 2006 by Ness Technologies, to be supplied to all IDF commanders down to the division commander level. Access to the system’s different usages would be given according to the user’s level. The IDF’s communications systems are also improving. On September 19, 2005, Tadiran Communications Ltd. (TadCom) was selected to provide broadband communications capabilities in a contract estimated at $15 million for 30 months. TadCom will ‘‘develop and provide a system that delivers long-range, high-capacity broadband data, video and voice telecommunications. The system would be based on wireless broadband technology, supplied by British Airspan Networks.’’ Elbit Systems Ltd., which owns TadCom, is the primary contractor for the DAP and was assisting the IDF in connecting all three fighting platforms into one network with a unified communication infrastructure based on broadband communications for ground, air, and naval units.44 As part of its modernization programs, the IDF adopted a doctrine of ‘‘low-signature or no-signature’’ warfare. The IDF is also reported to be seeking to use the netting of communications and information technology to reduce the exposure of ground troops to combat. The IDF’s use of UAVs is one example, but Israel is pursuing a number of other options, including various kinds of robots. Another example of this shift is the development of a remote-controlled weapons station that could be mounted on many different vehicles such as jeeps, light-armored vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, and even on Merkava tanks. Another option may be the use of remotely fired weapons. These include shortrange as well as longer-range systems. Before the pullout from Gaza, Israeli forces within the territories began using a new weapon that put the soldiers in less danger, providing similar capability. The new Israeli weapon was a rifle and video camera mounted on a segmented pole about 6 meters high attached to an armored vehicle. With this new weapon, IDF forces could inspect an area beyond their vision from the ground, while remaining inside the vehicle and without being subject to retaliatory fire.45 The three main Israeli military contractors, Rafael, Elbit Systems, and Israel Military Industries (IMI), competed for the contract that would produce the weapon system first for Israeli use and then for international export. So far, however, only a few dozen of the Katlanit (Lethal) by Rafael have been procured by the IDF and international customers, while the other two contractors are still developing various models.


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Main Battle Tanks As has been noted earlier, Israel also faces significant resource constraints in modernizing the IDF. The Israeli Army does not face recapitalization problems that approach those of Jordan or Syria, but it does have problems. It so far has been unable to pay for fully converting its armor to a coherent force of first-line systems and to procure the mix of the most advanced tanks and the most advanced infantry fighting vehicles it desires. The recent increase in U.S. FMF to Israel may help, but still will not allow the IDF to make all the improvements it desires. At the same time, peace with Egypt and Jordan and reductions in the Syrian threat have helped Israel maintain its edge by focusing its resources on force quality. Figure 7.4 shows a steady downward trend in main battle tank numbers, but it also shows a steady rise in tank quality. Israel’s 1,525 Merkavas are designed for the specific tactical conditions Israel faces. The Merkavas are more advanced than any tank in Arab hands, except for Egypt’s 750 M1A1s, and can defeat most antitank weapons in Arab forces. The Merkava Mk 4, Mk 3, and Mk 3 Baz provide excellent protection and have some of the best fire-control and sighting systems available. The Mk 4 has become operational and is much more powerful that the previous versions without an increase in weight. It also has much better day- and night-vision systems, better internal control of firepower, and a new and improved version of ballistic protection enhanced for urban warfare. The Ministry of Defense recently decided to forgo the development of the Merkava Mk 5, citing the success and cost-effectiveness of the Mk 4.46 Merkava program manager Brig. Gen. Amir Nir has said that the Mk 4 is being transformed into a true multipurpose combat vehicle for low-intensity conflict. A remote-controlled turret, underbelly protection, added armor, and new rubberized tracks are just part of the new modifications being added to the Mk 4. In addition, the Merkava will be able to fire 0.50 caliber machine guns and 40-mm grenade launchers safely from inside the hull. Elbit’s remote-controlled system has been tested and certified for Merkava use and will be available to the IDF not just for the Merkava but for other platforms as well. It is a lightweight system that has the capabilities of firing 7.62-mm rounds from platforms such as armored personnel carriers, tactical vehicles, and unmanned ground vehicles and a larger caliber model for 25- to 30mm rounds.47 Asymmetric warfare has scarcely made the main battle tank obsolete. During the 2006 Lebanon War, the new Israeli armor, including explosive reactive armor suits, did not succeed in reducing the penetration rates in its MBTs compared to the previous conflict in 1982. Twenty-one out of the 50 Merkava tanks (45 percent) hit by Hezbollah antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) (including AT-14 Kornets and Metis-M9 9M131 equipped with high-explosive antitank warheads) were penetrated.48 However, one IDF source maintained that the improved Merkava armor succeeded in preventing higher casualty rates.

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Following the mixed performance of Merkava’s armor, the Israeli Minister of Defense ordered the Rafael Armament Development Authority to complete the development of its Trophy armor protection system (APS) and prepare for mass production. In addition, the Israeli military industry was asked to accelerate testing of its Iron Fist APS.49 An ‘‘Iron Fist’’ system would use a search and track radar to detect an incoming round or missile and fire an interception round or missile to deflect it, rather than relying on active or passive armor. Nevertheless, money remains an issue, and the cost of the Merkava has raised questions about the viability of continuing the 34-year-old program. In October 2006, Jane’s reported that the Israeli Ministry of Defense’s Merkava Project Administration (Mantak) informed the companies manufacturing the Merkava that the IDF intended to reduce by 20 percent the total number of Merkava 4 produced. While a decision to fully abandon the Merkava program has yet to be made, the requirement for heavier, better protected APCs led the IDF to consider converting the MBT production line to manufacture the Namer (Tiger) Merkava-based heavy APC. Some Merkava supporters stress its protective capabilities and its costeffectiveness, and the enhancement to ground forces envisioned in Teffen 2012 include increasing the number of Merkava Mk 4 MBTs by several dozen per year and upgrading Merkava Mk 2s and Mk 3s.50 However, the Merkava’s vulnerability in the 2006 fighting in Lebanon (for which some blame the tactics used by the IDF) could hurt the program’s prospects.51 It has been reported that some elements within the Israeli Ministry of Defense feel that the Merkava line should be abandoned in favor of the U.S. M1A2 main battle tank. Viewed as widely successful, the M1A2 would also be paid for by U.S. Foreign Military Financing aid, making it an even more attractive option. Israel’s 600 M-60A3s are not up to the standard of the Merkava, but have an edge in fire control and sights, and a marginal advantage in protection over Syria’s 1,500 export versions of the T-72 and the T-72M—the only relatively modern tank in Syrian forces. Israel’s 300 M-60/M-60A1s have been upgraded to the point where they may well have a similar advantage. They may not have such an advantage over Egypt’s nearly 1,000 M-60A3s and 300 M-60A-1s or Jordan’s 268 M-60A1/A3s and 288 Al Husseins (Challenger 1s)—which also have improved armor and other upgrades. Egypt also had some 1,400 M-60s, which have significant capabilities relative to Israel’s first-line tanks. Israel has upgraded at least 180–190 of its M-48s and M-60s to the Magach 6 and 7 modifications, with improved passive and reactive armor, power, guns, and fire control, and it may upgrade the rest to a further improved version in the Magach (Merkevet Giborey Chayil [Chariot of War Heroes]) series. Israel also developed a Sabra upgrade of the M-60, with improvements in fire control, protection, and mobility. Israel’s other tanks are much less advanced than its Merkavas and M-60s. They include T-67s (somewhat improved T-54/T-55s) and 100 T-62s. This means that some 114 of Israel’s tanks are of low to medium quality, although many of these


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tanks have been upgraded to the point where they are considerably better than the original version. Some have suggested that Israel should modernize its armor by becoming part of the U.S. Army Future Combat Systems program, which aims to develop a future armored force that is far lighter, easier to transport, and that integrates manned and unmanned vehicles while maintaining survivability and lethality. Critics argue, however, that, while they would be willing to participate in some aspects of the program, the FCS program is proving to be highly unstable and subject to increasing delays and uncertainty over exactly what vehicles it will create. They also argue that the U.S. Army’s stress on weight and transportability does little to solve Israel’s needs. Others maintain that the Merkava line best meets Israel’s long-term needs and call for an increase in the program’s budget.52 A recent proposal to sell the Merkava tank production line, either to a private Israeli defense firm or to another owned by the government had further clouded the tank’s future. Proponents believe that the sale would increase efficiency and drastically cut the line’s costs.53

Other Armor Figure 7.4 shows that Israel is not only continuing to rely on heavy tanks, but on modified tanks and heavily armored APCs. This reflects the changing dynamic of war in several ways. They give Israel added maneuverability and survivability against forces with main battle tanks and other antitank guided weapons. Israel—like the United States in Iraq—has found that heavily armored infantry vehicles can do a good job of protecting against ambushes by irregular forces with antitank weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and provide better protection against roadside bombs—discouraging such attacks and reducing their numbers in the process. This mission requirement also explains why Israel is developing UAV and unmanned vehicle weapons capabilities that are supposed to see ‘‘over the hill’’ and reduce the need to expose men in any type of vehicles. Israel has, however, had to make trade-offs between funding improved tanks and funding improvements of other armored fighting vehicles. As a result, it has a relatively limited number of modern AIFVs to supplement its tanks. The exact numbers of such weapons are uncertain, but in 2008 they included some 400 light-wheeled Ramtas and RBYs, BRDM-2 amphibious scout cars, and eight Fuchs. Israel’s APCs include some 400 converted Centurions called Nagmaschons, 276 heavy Achzarit APC conversions of the T-54 (designed to accompany the Merkava), Puma combat engineer APCs, and Nakpadons. Israel has also upgraded large numbers of its fleet of some 5,000–6,000 M-113s to something approaching AIFVs. Israel is also examining ways to make significant improvements in its armor, perhaps using new ‘‘4th generation’’ light hybrid armor. Urban fighting in the Gaza area in 2004 showed that the M-113 was too vulnerable for some missions, and the IDF was examining an up-armoring package called L-VAS.

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The IDF is considering more intensive programs to create heavy armored engineering and support equipment and an AIFV or APC with many of the features of the Merkava Mk 4. It recently began to modernize its light armor and took delivery of 100 Ze’ev or ’’Wolf ’’ armored wheeled vehicles in July 2005. The IDF is evaluating heavier wheeled armored vehicles such as the General Dynamics Land Systems Stryker 8 × 8 and IMI’s Wildcat 4 × 4 IFVs. Teffen 2012 evaluated the possible procurement of ‘‘hundreds’’ of Strykers.54 Another weakness in other armored weapons systems is that the IDF has to phase out a stockpile of several thousand (some reports go as high as 4,300) half-tracks for support vehicles and reserves—although most are in storage or will be placed in storage. Israel is also paying close attention to the U.S. experience in Iraq and was considering armoring some of its Humvees and logistic vehicles. The IDF is seeking to supplement its pool of other armored fighting vehicles, and possibly eventually replacing its M113s, through development and procurement of the Namer APC, as well as through the purchase of 100 Kraus-Maffei Wegmann Dingo wheeled APCs.55 Antitank Weapons Israel no longer relies on armor to the partial exclusion of other weapons, a mistake it made before the October 1973 war. Its forces now have a wide range of advanced antitank guided weapons, including 300 TOW 2A/Bs (many mounted on armored vehicles), 900 Dragon man-portable weapons, somewhat modified AT3 Saggers, and an unknown number of Israeli-developed weapons, including 25 Mapats, Gills, Spikes, and Dandys. The Dandy can be fired from either a helicopter or a ground-based vehicle.56 The Spike, available in medium range, long range, and extended range (ER), has received a significant upgrade. This upgrade is named Spike C4I and included a global positioning system (GPS) receiver, computer, and datalink, as well as a hand-held laser rangefinder, and a laptop command unit and radio system. The C4I decreases the chance of friendly fire incidents while providing a network capability to Spike units in the field.57 The IDF has large numbers of rocket launchers and some 250 106-mm recoilless rifles. Upgrading Lighter Vehicles and Support Forces Israel faces a growing threat to all its armor from the steadily more advanced antitank guided weapons in Syrian and Hezbollah forces and to its lighter vehicles from Palestinian forces with RPGs and potentially from Palestinian acquisition of antitank guided weapons. The IDF is reacting to this threat in a number of ways. It is seeking to create better active and passive defense for all of its first line armor. At the same time, the IDF needs a broader upgrading of its other vehicles for internal security and counterinsurgency/counterterrorism missions and to restructure its


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support and logistic elements to allow more rapid support of maneuver operations at the brigade or task-force level, instead of supporting combat arms in ‘‘force-to-force’’ combat. As part of this effort, Israel is seeking to equip more of its forces with a mix of specialized armored and tracked support vehicles such as the Achzarit, the Puma, and the Nakpadon to provide better mobility and some degree of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection. It is up-armoring some of its support and light vehicles as well, although not on the level that the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps have been forced to do in Iraq. Some reports also indicate that Small Arms Detection Systems (SADSs) were integrated into 20–25 armor-protected Humvees to meet Israel’s new operational requirements after the 2005 disengagement from Gaza. The SADS provides each vehicle with real-time detection and location identification of small arms fire. The system is also said to provide audio and visual alarms to the crew and to be able to traverse the direction with an accuracy of 2° to 3°. The SADS can be used when the vehicle is stationary or mobile, with only a slight decrease in accuracy in the latter case. The SADS has three main elements: an acoustic antenna with four microphones, a miniaturized processing unit, and the user interface on which the information is posted. The interface can define information from 360°, and information from events can be stored to be reviewed at a later date. The Humvees were also to be equipped with a battle-management system, a navigational system, and an overhead weapon station, armed with a 7.62- or 12.7-mm machine gun or a 40-mm grenade launcher.58 Artillery Forces Israel has a modern artillery force of some 620 self-propelled weapons and more than 220 multiple rocket launchers, including 60 U.S. multiple launch rocket systems (MLRSs). Its self-propelled weapons include 148 L-33 and 350 M-109A1/A2 weapons, 36 M-107 175-mm weapons, and 36 M-110 203-mm weapons. It upgraded its 175-mm M-107 weapons into a version called the Romach and had upgraded many of its 155-mm M-109 weapons into a version called the Doher, improving mobility, NBC protection, and fire control and accuracy. The L-33 Soltam is an aging Israeli system placed on a Sherman M4A3e8 tank chassis. Its operational status is unclear. Some sources indicate that 200 were built and the system was in reserve. Israel also has 456 towed weapons, including 70 105-mm, 5 122mm, 100 130-mm, and 280 155-mm weapons. Israel’s multiple rocket launcher strength included 58 BM-21 122-mm, 50 light armored reconnaissance (LAR) 160-mm, 48 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) 227-mm, 36 BM-24 240-mm, and 20 LAR-90 290–350-mm weapons. These weapons often had substantial modifications and upgrades, and the LAR had three 160-mm and one 290–350-mm versions. The 160-mm version had a range of 12–45 kilometers, and the 350-mm version from 30 to 100 kilometers, varying in range from 12 to 30 kilometers. Israel also had some 1,358 81-mm, 652 120-mm,

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and 122 160-mm mortars, many mounted on armored vehicles with the M-46 mostly in reserve. Additionally, the IDF has absorbed 33 AFB-142F-1 and seven AGM-142 Have Nap Popeye Standoff Attack Missiles.59 Israeli weapons manufacturers developed a deep-strike, precision-guided missile dubbed LORA, or long-range artillery. The LORA, with a range of approximately 200 km, is similar to the SS-26s employed by the Russians or the ATACMS utilized by the Americans. The operational status of the missile remains uncertain, however, as the developers accidentally broadcast a failed LORA missile test in 2003.60 LORA did succeed in four out of the past five live-fire weapons tests since that time. One of the tests was ground based, while the rest were sea launched. In April 2007, LORA flew more than 200 km with a precision radius of less than 5 meters (m). LORA is expected to reach distances of up to 300 km. Like the U.S. Army and a number of other Western forces, Israel is seeking to create a precision artillery force with smart and much more lethal munitions, particularly for attacking armor and suppressing enemy sensors, artillery, and air defenses. It also is developing more lethal area munitions and real-time targeting and firecontrol systems in order to locate high-value mobile targets in both urban and field areas. Like other armies, the IDF has found that major improvements are possible using existing weapons and munitions but upgrading fire management and communications systems and tying them to sensors such as UAVs. The IDF has, however, gone further in developing precise and smart munitions. In 2004, Israel incorporated the Ramam Trajectory Corrected System into the army’s battle of strength increasing long-range accuracy. The Ramam is similar to the U.S. Army-Lockheed Martin MLRS. In addition to the Ramam, Israel is developing another missile that will resemble the MLRS, the Extended Range Artillery (Extra) for land- or sea-based launches. Extra is designed to carry a 125-kilogram warhead and is guided by an inertial navigation system and GPS satellite signals.61 Israel has over 100 active variants of the Jericho intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), plus seven Lance surface-to-surface missile fire units in storage. IMI claimed that the IDF had used the company’s Trajectory Correction System (TCS) in combat operations during the 2006 Lebanon War. It claimed that the TCS could give Israeli MLRS systems in-flight trajectory correction via command signal from the launch vehicle, allowing them to obtain an accuracy of 40–50 m—accuracy on par with standard tube artillery.62 There is no way to fully assess how far the IDF has already gone or how far nearterm advances will take it. Most of the data available are anecdotal or are provided by sources advocating a given weapon or technology and cannot be tied to any meaningful estimate of their real-world effectiveness. It is clear, however, that Israel wants to acquire much larger stocks of advanced and specialized ammunitions, upgrade to such weapons as an upgunned version of the M-109 and Soltam Slammer selfpropelled 155-mm howitzers, and increase its number of MLRS and other advanced multiple rocket launchers. It may, however, have to concentrate its resources on


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upgrading its targeting sensors such as radars, UAVs, and battlefield-management systems. The Ministry of Defense ordered additional special surveillance coverage to be provided by Searcher UAVs that have been in service since 1992.63 It is not clear, however, that the Searcher will satisfy the IDF’s needs. The Israeli Army would like to acquire a number of Skylark mini-UAVs for Special Operations purposes, but had yet to place a specific order as of 2004.64 The IDF is also improving its communications and battle management in ways that improve its artillery capabilities. In 2004, it acquired the PNR-500 personal radio network system that allows units to communicate in a manner similar to a conference call, enhancing coordination and information transfer.65 It has examined plans to develop a fleet of aircraft that would mimic the abilities of U.S. aircraft equipped with the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, or JSTARS. This would greatly enhance both long-range targeting and battle management.66 The Israel Air Force is acquiring three signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection aircraft that can be used for land as well as air targeting.67 Asymmetric Warfare Capabilities The IDF has acquired vast experience in counterterrorism and special operations since the beginning of the Israel-Palestinian War in 2000, and it has supplemented what it has learned from the latest round of fighting with the Palestinians as a result of the fighting with Hezbollah in 2006. There are no reliable reports on how individual elements of the IDF have reshaped their combat capabilities in such missions. A wide range of units have, however, been named in public sources. These include the following:68 • Sayeret Matkal (General Staff Deep Reconnaissance Unit), a rapid reaction commando force for ‘‘unconventional’’ action; • Sayeret Duvdenvan, a deep cover unit whose members normally pose as Palestinians; • Sayeret Haruv, IDF Central Command reconnaissance unit; • Shaldeg or Unit 5101, long-range patrol and targeting in hostile territory; • 1 Egoz, a special unit dealing with the threat from Hezbollah; • Unit 5707, a unit operating behind the lines for targeting and damage assessment; • Mista’arvin, undercover operatives speaking and acting as Arabs; • Sayeret Golani (Special Forces Reconnaissance Platoon), commando unit in the Golani brigade, specializing in airborne operations and demolition; • Givati Brigade, an amphibious infantry; • Sayeret Shimson, a similar unit in the Givati brigade; • Sayert Nahal, a reconnaissance unit in the Naval Infantry Brigade; • Sayeret Tzanhanim (Paratroop Brigade Sayeret), a mechanized paratroop force that can mobilize to full division.

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It is clear that IDF training and other aspects of its force development are increasingly tailored to asymmetric warfare. This has included integrating Israel’s security barrier into its concept of operations. The barrier has factored into the design of security roads and access routes in the West Bank and the greater Jerusalem area, as well as sensor design. For example, the IDF is reported to have deployed a ‘‘Solid Mirror’’ integrated system along the expanding security barrier system and on the border of the Gaza Strip. Solid Mirror detects and identifies threats, tracks their progress, and has the ability to warn or set off an alarm. The system utilizes a variety of sensors and automated constructs to perform its mission. It has been deployed along the 120-kilometer border with Lebanon since 1999.69 Virtually all of the intelligence elements it developed for conventional warfighting capabilities now have considerable capability for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. The Directorate of Military Intelligence and the Field Intelligence Corps are trained and organized for such missions. Even specialized IDF electronic intelligence and surveillance units such as those in the Hei Modi’in HaSadeh (Intelligence Corps) and Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence Service) have steadily broadened their functions. Other Aspects of Land Force Development Like most Western forces, the IDF is increasingly emphasizing joint operations in its training and doctrine and may develop fully mobile and air-mobile infantry units that match or exceed the maneuver capability of its armored forces. It is pursuing netcentric approaches to warfare to reduce the ‘‘borders’’ between the services through a common intelligence, targeting, and force allocation system.70 Israel also has one of the few armies in the Middle East with anything approaching the advanced training facilities that the U.S. Army has at Fort Irwin (California) or that the U.S. Marine Corps has at Twentynine Palms (California). Egypt and Jordan are the only two Arab powers acquiring somewhat similar capabilities. The Israeli Army has a computer corps called Mamram. It has a training center at Mabat in the Negev Desert, which uses a modern computerized training range, an advanced command and control simulator, an area-weapons effect system, and over 1,000 MILES II instrumented player outfits for infantry, antitank weapons, and armored vehicles. There are other MILES systems for infantry and Special Forces training, and some form of equipment was used to simulate helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft in joint training. The facility is scarcely as advanced as its U.S. counterparts, but has well over $50 million worth of equipment. Some reports indicate that another of Israel’s projects, called ANOG, was seeking to apply existing technologies to create an integrated battle-suite system in an effort to boost each individual soldier’s effectiveness.71 The program has been renamed the Dominator and is planned to include a rugged personal digital unit computer utilizing Elbit Systems’ Tactical Intranet Geographic Dissemination in Real Time system. Dominator will also incorporate a display, eyepiece, weapon-mounted fire-


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control system, military wireless lan (MWLAN), and a specialized GPS navigation suite for built-up areas and will weigh 4.5 kg. It is planned to constitute the first tranch of a new Integrated Infantry Combat System (IICS) and be part of the IDF’s DAP. Elbit Systems reported that it would be given $U.S.300 million from the U.S. FMF for the ongoing project; Israeli ground forces were scheduled to receive the first systems in March 2008.72 ISRAELI AIR FORCES As has been discussed in earlier chapters, the IAF has a large force of advanced combat aircraft by regional standards. The trends in the size and structure of the IAF manning are shown in Figure 7.5. As of the end of 2008, the IAF had maintained a nominal active strength of 34,000. This manpower included 20,000 conscripts, largely assigned to land-based air-defense forces. It had some 400 active combat aircraft, plus 250 in storage, and some 95 armed helicopters.73 IAF Fixed-Wing Combat Forces It had 15 fighter and fighter attack squadrons with a total of 375 aircraft authorized. These included 36 F-15A/Bs, 28 F-15 C/Ds, 25 F-15Is, 106 F-16A/Bs, 101 F-16C/Ds, and 34 F-16Is that are now in the process of delivery and conversion at the rate of 2 per month, totaling 102 (which are expected to be delivered in 2008). It also had one attack squadron of 39 A-4Ns. The IAF had recently absorbed 20–24 F-15Is, 50 surplus U.S. Air Force (USAF) F-16s, additional AH-64s, 10 Black Hawk helicopters, new advanced UAVs, and ongoing Israeli upgrades to such existing aircraft as the F-15, the F-16, and the Phantom 2000. The IAF is buying 102 F-16I fighters. Its older F-15Is are fitted with Mk84 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs).74 The F-16I was developed from the proposed F-16ES (Enhanced Strategic) single and two-seat interdictor and is an upgraded version of the F-16D Block 50, which Israel feels has many of the capabilities of the USAF F-15E. This F-16 variant has Israeli-developed advanced electronic warfare equipment, a special mission computer, added sensors, special secure communications gear, and two conformal wing tanks that free wing racks to carry added weapons, minimize drag, and can offer an unrefueled strike range in excess of 1,000 nautical miles. IAF Rotary-Wing Combat Forces The IAF’s rotary-wing combat forces included 94 attack helicopters (16 AH-1Es, 39 AH-1Ss, 30 AH-64As, and 9 Sarat/AH-64Ds) and 7 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters. In April 2005, the first three Apache AH-64D Longbows arrived in Israel after nearly a decade of considerations regarding the necessity of an advanced attack helicopter squadron.75 The IAF originally planned to buy 24 AH64Ds and name them the Sarat. In 2003 the Israelis announced they would leave

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 7.5 Israeli Air Force: Force Structure 1990

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

Manpower

65,000 93,000

?

59,500 59,500 89,000

Air Force

28,000 37,000

35,000

35,000 35,000 34,000

Conscript

19,000 20,000

?

?

?

?

Mobilized

37,000 57,000

?

?

?

?

Reserve

?

?

?

651

592

494

402

402

393

Armed helicopters

77

133

95

?

?

101

Combat aircraft

574

459

399

?

?

393

Total Combat Aircraft

FGA/Fighter (squadrons/total number of aircraft)* F-4E (+13 in storage)

24,500 24,500 55,000

16/405 12/385 13/365 15/376 15/376 16/376 112

20

Large #’s Some

Some

Some

F-4E-2000

0

50

Large #’s

?

?

?

F-15

53

73

89

89

89

89

F-15A

35

38

29

29

29

29

F-15B

2

8

7

7

7

7

F-15C

11

16

17

17

17

17

F-15D

5

11

11

11

11

11

F-15I

0

25

25

25

25

25

145

237

238

248

248

241

F-16A

62

92

90

90

90

90

F-16B

8

17

20

20

20

16

F-16C

51

79

52

52

52

52

F-16D

24

49

75

74

74

49

0

0

1

12

12

34

Some

Some

F-16

F-16I Sufa (102 being delivered at the rate of 2/month) Kfir C2/C7 (+95 in storage)

95

A-4N Skyhawk

0

0

Large #’s

39

39

39

4/135

1/25

?

?

?

?

121

25

?

?

?

?

Reconnaissance

14

10

?

5

5

6

RF-4E (combat capable) (+10 in storage)

14

10

?

0

0

0

Other FGA A-4H/N (+14 in storage)

Stored Large #’s Some

109


RC-12D

0

0

?

5

5

6

4

6

2

2

2

3

E-2C

4

0

0

0

0

0

Boeing 707 with Phalcon system

0

6

2

2

2

3

Electronic Warfare

23

37

32

23

23

38

Boeing 707 (ELINT/ECM) (being replaced by G-550 Shavit

6

3

3

3

3

3

EC-130H

0

?

2

2

2

2

EV-1E (ECM)

2

?

0

0

0

0

IAI-201 (ELINT)

4

0

0

0

0

0

IAI-200

0

3

0

0

0

0

IAI-202 Arava

0

0

6

6

6

8

RC-12D (ELINT)

6

6

5

5

5

5

RU-21A

3

?

0

0

0

0

Do-28

0

15

8

0

8+

15

King Air

9

0

4

0

0

0

King Air 2000

0

10

0

0

0

0

Beech 200CT Super King Air

0

0

0

4

4

4

Gulfstream G-550

0

0

1 of 4

3

3

3

5

3

3

3

3

3

5

3

3

3

3

3

7

3

5

10

10

9

Boeing 707

5

0

0

5

5

4

KC-130H

2

3

5

5

5

5

60

39

21

63+

48

45

C-130H

24

22

5

7

5

5

Boeing 707

3

5

5

2

5

4

IAI-201

10

0

0

0

0

0

Airborne Early Warning

Maritime Reconnaissance IAI-1124 Seascan Tanker Aircraft

Transport Aircraft

IAI-1124

3

0

0

0

0

0

C-47

20

12

11

11

11

1

Liaison

77

32

32

32

32

32

Islander

4

2

2

2

2

2

Cessna U-206

41

20

22

22

22

22

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Cessna U-172

2

0

0

0

0

0

Cessna U-180

2

0

0

0

0

0

Do-27

6

0

0

0

0

0

Do-28

10

0

0

8+

8+

0

Queen Air 80

12

10

8

12

12

8

225

295

281

~278

~278

~279

77

129

95

95+

95+

94

Helicopters Attack AH-1G/S

42

0

?

?

?

?

AH-1E

0

0

16

16

16

16

AH-1F

0

36

39

39

39

39

Hughes 500MD

35

30

0

0

0

0

AU-1G

0

21

0

0

0

0

AH-64A

0

42

40

40

40

30

AH-64D

0

0

0

Some

Some

Some

0

0

0

1

1

9

2

0

0

17

?

?

2

0

0

16

?

?

Transport

159

160

186

186

186

186

Heavy

35

38

41

41

41

41

Apache (18 to be delivered in all) SAR HH-65A

CH-53

35

38

41

41

41

41

CH-53A

2

0

0

0

0

0

CH-53D

33

38

41

41

41

41

Medium

26

25

48

48

48

48

SA-321

9

0

0

0

0

0

UH-1D

17

0

0

0

0

0

UH-60

0

10

0

0

0

0

UH-60A

0

0

10

10

10

10

UH-60L Black Hawk

0

0

14

14

14

14

S-70A Black Hawk

0

15

24

24

24

24

98

97

97

77

77

77

Bell 212

58

54

54

34

34

34

Bell 206A

40

43

43

43

43

43

Light

111


Training Aircraft

169

128

90

110

90

86

Cessna 152

6

0

0

0

0

0

CM-170 Tzukit

80

77

43

0

0

0

?

0

0

43

43

43

16

0

0

0

0

0

CM-170 Magister (being replaced by A-4N) F-4E Kfir TC 2/7

5

0

0

0

0

0

Super Cub

35

28

0

20

?

?

TA-4H (combat capable trainer, some in storage)

20

9

10

10

10

10

TA-4J (combat capable trainer, some in storage)

7

10

16

16

16

16

Queen Air 80

0

4

4

4

4

0

Grob 120

0

0

17

17

17

17

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

AGM-45 Shrike

?

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

AGM-62A Walleye

?

?

0

Some

Some

Some

AGM-62B Walleye

0

0

Some

?

Some

Some

AGM-65 Maverick

?

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

AGM-78D Standard

?

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

AGM-114 Hellfire

0

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

TOW

0

?

?

?

?

?

Popeye I+II

0

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

Luz

?

0

0

0

0

0

Gabriel III

?

0

0

0

0

0

0

Yes

Some

Some

Some

Some

?

?

?

?

?

?

AIM-7 Sparrow

?

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

AIM-9 Sidewinder

?

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

AIM-120B AMRAAM

0

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

R-530

?

?

0

0

0

0

Shafrir

?

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

Missile Air-to-Surface

GBU-31 JDAM undergoing IAF op/integration test Air-to-Air

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Python III

?

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

Python IV

0

?

Some

Some

Some

Some

UAV

0

?

?

22+

22+

44+

Scout, Pioneer, Searcher, Firebee, Samson, Delilah, Hunter Silver Arrow

0

?

?

22+

22+

44+

* FGA = Fighter Ground Attack; ? = unspecified amount, if any; ~ = estimated amount; + = more than the number given but not specified how much more; Some = unspecified amount. Source: Various editions of the IISS, The Military Balance, Jane’s Sentinel series, and U.S., British, and Israeli experts.

their purchase of AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters at 18 and not utilize their option of purchasing 6 additional Apaches. There now seem to be at least 10 in service.76 IAF ‘‘Enablers’’ The IAF has a strong force of ‘‘enabling’’ aircraft such as tankers, electronic warfare, intelligence, and command and control aircraft. At the end of 2007, these included three Phalcon airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft and 52 EW and electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft. It had five KC130H tankers, around 45 major transport aircraft, some scout helicopters, and 89 medium- and heavy-transport helicopters. It also had a wide range of more than 22 UAVs and a large inventory of advanced air-to-air and precision-guided air-to-surface weapons, including both Israeli and U.S.–made weapons. Israel purchased four Gulfstream G550s in August 2003, with an option for two more, to provide improved airborne early-warning capability.77 Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation was awarded a contract with a potential value of up to $473 million to supply and provide support for four Gulfstream G550 business jet aircraft, with an option for two additional G550 aircraft, to the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The aircraft were to used as Compact Airborne Early Warning (CAEW) platforms. The contract seems to have included a firm, fixed-price, ten-year contractor logistics support (CLS) program valued at up to $18 million, with the follow-on ten-year option valued at up to $26 million. The mission equipment installation and systems integration were to be done in Israel.78 The IDF began testing this new CAEW system no later than January 2007.79 The first CAEW airframe was delivered to Israel in September 2006 and made its first flights with the radar installed in December 2006. The main goals of the new radar and airborne warning and control system were to achieve 360° coverage, including banked turns, in a small, high-performance airframe—which means minimizing weight, drag, and power. CAEW was also claimed to be one of the highest-flying AEW systems available, improving its ability to track low-flying targets in mountainous terrain.80 Israeli sources also indicate that it could have the first operational radar


113

to implement a technology known as ‘‘track before detect’’ (TBD). TBD was mentioned as a potential counterstealth technology because it improves the ability of radar to detect small targets and targets with a small radar cross section.81 The IAF intended to build and deploy an indigenous variant of the U.S.–built CH-53 heavy-lift helicopter. The Yasour 2025 program hoped to extend the CH53’s service life with a sizable upgrade suite, which included new avionics architecture, rewiring of electrical power systems, and an automatic hovering system to enable the craft to maintain a stable position when hovering over water in extreme dust or other conditions that impair visual reference points.82 At the same time, the IAF continues to face the same resource constraints as Israel’s other services. Although the air force still gets substantial funding, increasing amounts are going to the navy and ground forces as a result of the impact of the 2006 Lebanon War. As was discussed earlier, Israeli planners concluded after the war that greater investment was needed in ground forces, force protection, and naval capabilities even at the expense of air force modernization.

Modern Air Operations ‘‘Are’’ Joint Operations The IAF is the only Middle Eastern air force that combines all of the elements of modern airpower into an efficient and integrated whole—although Egypt continues to make significant progress. Israel has long stressed joint warfare and combines its skills in land maneuver warfare with one of the most effective air forces in the world. The ongoing effort to integrate all three branches into a functioning commandand-control network is a driving factor in IAF modernization, investment, tactics, and plans. The IAF is taking advantage of the capabilities provided by its advanced combat, electronic warfare, intelligence and targeting, and battle-management aircraft. These are supported by a host of advanced and special purpose weapons systems, combat electronics, unmanned airborne vehicles, night and all weather combat systems, and command and control facilities. Israel plans on spending almost $5 billion on C4ISR over the next three years. Some Israeli sources claim that C4ISR capabilities will also decrease operation and maintenance costs because systems will be more automated and less manpower will be needed. For example, between 2002 and 2004 operational costs went down by 60 percent because money was invested in both land and aircraft technologies.83 Israel’s superior technology was fully supported by superior tactics and training, and this gave it all of the qualitative advantages over Syria that were discussed earlier. Israel is one of the few countries capable of creating advanced avionics, radars and other sensors, electronic warfare and electronic support measures equipment, guided air weapons, and advanced/smart munitions and submunitions. Israel’s defense industrial base has the technical resources to steadily modernize and improve the capability of its electronic warfare and reconnaissance aircraft. It also has the C4I/ BM (battle management), training, night warfare, electronic warfare, support,

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

sustainability, and other specialized qualitative capabilities necessary to exploit the revolution in military affairs. The CAEW program described earlier is only one example of many in virtually every area of air force capability. According to some reports, the IAF is also pursuing the development of multispectral sensor systems to be fitted on UAVs, planes, and helicopters. Replacing forward-looking infrared systems with synthetic aperture radar or millimeter wave radio systems would drastically reduce the effects of poor weather conditions on reconnaissance and targeting. However, development and deployment may be 10 to 20 years away.84 The IAF also benefits from Israel’s intelligence satellites and their reconnaissance and targeting capability. These capabilities may improve significantly in the future. Two of Israel’s biggest defense firms joined together in 2005 to create a new entity, tentatively named MicroSat Ltd., which would develop and produce multimission satellites weighing between 10 and 120 kg. Although MicroSat is a commercial space program, national security and defense capabilities would also gain from the development of these satellites. These small satellites would be capable of operating as a unit for various intelligence gathering, targeting, and command and control missions, as well as housing a variety of ‘‘plug-and-play’’ payloads. Although the project may take 10 to 20 years to be realized, producers are hopeful that microsatellites will be as useful and needed as laptops and handheld computers.85 Air Defense and Air-to-Air Combat Capability The Israeli air-defense system is scarcely foolproof. This was demonstrated some years ago when a defecting Iraqi pilot flew deep into Israeli airspace, although there are strong indications that the pilot had coordinated his preentry with Israel. However, a fully alert, Israeli air defense is capable of coordinating its sensors, fighters, and land-based defenses with a level of effectiveness that no other Middle Eastern air force can approach.86 Israel has a better overall mix of systems, better-trained personnel, and a far better ability to integrate all its assets with its own technology and software than any other Middle Eastern air force. The Israeli Air Force has an unequalled record in air-to-air combat. It destroyed many of its opponent’s aircraft on the ground in the 1967 war and then scored 72 air-to-air kills over the rest. It destroyed 113 Egyptian and Syrian aircraft in air-toair combat during the war of attrition and killed 452 Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian aircraft during the October War in 1973. It destroyed at least 23 Syrian aircraft between 1973 and 1982 and 71 fixed-wing aircraft during the fighting in 1982. It shot down three Syrian fighters between 1982 and 1992. While it has lost 247 aircraft in combat since the beginning of the 1948 war, only 18 have been lost in air-to-air combat. In contrast, Arab forces have lost at least 1,428 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in combat, and 817 have been lost in air-to-air combat. Israeli officials have shown an interest in the potential acquisition of the nextgeneration U.S. air superiority fighter, Lockheed Martin’s F-22 Raptor, which has


115

sophisticated stealth features and can carry advanced precision-attack munitions. According to Jane’s, U.S. officials have indicated that Israel could be granted access to the F-22, if the aircraft is cleared for export by the Senate.87 At present, however, the IAF lacks the resources to pay for the F-22 and is focusing on modernizing its F-15 fleet. Air Offense and Air-to-Ground Combat Capability Israel has equal advantages in strategic and long-range offensive operations. The IAF is the only air force in the Middle East that was seriously organized for strategic attacks on its neighbors. Other Middle Eastern air forces have long-range strike aircraft, effective munitions, and even a limited refueling capacity, but they remain unable to take advantage of their assets to inflict strategic damage on an enemy nation or conduct effective long-range strategic strikes. Israel has shown the ability to strike deep into the Arab world and has greatly improved its long-range strike capability since its attacks on Osirak in 1981 and on Tunisia in 1985. It has the F-15I and greatly improved refueling capability, targeting capability, standoff precision munitions, and electronic warfare capability. Israel could probably surgically strike a limited number of key targets in virtually any Arab country within 1,500 nautical miles of Israel and could sustain operations against western Iraq. The IAF has long benefited from access to the most advanced U.S. air-to-ground and air-to-air munitions and has developed or modified many munitions on its own. According to some reports, Israel engaged in talks with the United States in 2004 to obtain $319 million worth of air-launched bombs, including 500 ‘‘bunker busters,’’ possibly to use on Iran’s alleged underground nuclear facilities.88 Among the bombs Israel might get from the deal are 500 one-ton bunker busters, 2,500 regular one-ton bombs, 1,000 half-ton bombs, and 500 quarter-ton bombs.89 In addition, Israel will probably acquire the F-35 JSF. The JSF seems to be slated to replace the F-16 that has been Israel’s primary assault aircraft for the past 25 years. Israel initially sought to make the F-35 a joint development project with Lockheed Martin and the numerous other countries that are developing the plane. However, the United States suspended Israel’s involvement following an Israel-China arms deal, on which Israel eventually reneged, and which led Defense Ministry Director Gen. Amos Yaron to resign.90 Security relations became strained when the United States discovered that Israel had been selling U.S. Patriot antimissile technology to China throughout the 1990s. The strain intensified when the United States learned that Israel provided China with Harpies, unmanned aerial vehicles with bombs that home in on radars, in 2001, and conducted maintenance on the drones in 2003 and 2004. After learning that China possessed the drones and that Israel planned to provide maintenance and upgrades for them, the United States drastically reduced weapons and technology transfers to Israel. The United States felt that its agreement with Israel was damaged, and only when Israel reneged on the deal did the Pentagon agree to

116

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

resume security and technological relations with Israel. This happened in August 2005.91 Following the disagreements between Israel and the United States regarding Israel’s military sales to China, the United States also asked Israel to halt a military deal with Venezuela. (Hugo Chavez has been a vocal critic of the Bush administration and has been a partner with Cuban leader Fidel Castro in opposing U.S. policies.) The deal with Venezuela included upgrading F-16 fighter jets for the Venezuelan Air Force. Since the jets are constructed from an American-made platform, Israel Aircraft Industries asked the Pentagon for permission to conduct the work. The deal seems to have been deferred indefinitely or canceled completely.92 In any case, the fact Israel has halted such sales now allows the IAF to procure the F-35. In April 2007, senior Israeli Air Force sources stated that the IAF modernization program for the next decade will include the acquisition of 100 Lockheed Martin F-35A (conventional take-off and landing) JSFs and at least six Lockheed Martin C-130J transport aircraft.93 The F-35A deal was estimated at $5 billion and the IAF was said to be seeking U.S. Department of Defense approval to install Israeli-made systems on the aircraft and gain access to its software source code. In the wake of the Teffen 2012 plan, however, the IAF’s requirement for 100 F-35 JSFs was slashed to 25 with an additional 25 aircraft in a future work plan. The IAF did express interest in the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) version of the F-35, the F-35B, in early 2008. The IAF had not used STOVL-capable aircraft thus far and was previously considered to be more inclined to pursue traditional runway-based air capabilities. However the IAF cited the vulnerability of runways to expanding missile threats as an important factor. A decision on the matter was still pending at the time of writing.94 Some IAF experts also called for Israel to shift its focus to developing unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) following the suspension of Israel’s involvement in the JSF program. They feel the costs of training pilots, the operational limitations of manned versus unmanned aircraft, and the price a nation pays when a pilot is downed or taken hostage make unmanned aircraft the superior option. A sign of the IAF’s commitment to expanding its UAV capabilities is its plan to deploy a longer-endurance variant of the Israeli-built Hermes 450 UAV and to upgrade older variants over the next decade. The upgrade would afford the Hermes 30 hours of endurance rather than 20 hours, and its maximum mission range would exceed 200 km. The Hermes 450 was used extensively during the Israel-Hezbollah war, flying over 80 percent of the 16,000 unmanned hours logged during the 34 day-long conflict.95 There has been research on manned versus unmanned aircraft capabilities for the IAF by the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Studies. There is not, however, any current move toward building a UCAV fleet in the near future. Eitan Ben-Eliahu, former Israeli Air Force commander and a key participant of the Fisher study about the JSF program and UCAVs, has stated, ‘‘We need to solve all the problems with the Americans and make that next-generation fighter our new center of gravity.’’96


117

Air Operations for Asymmetric Warfare Like its other services, the Israeli Air Force is steadily improving its capabilities for asymmetric warfare and counterterrorism. It has developed special intelligence and targeting techniques for killing targets it designates as terrorists and attacking their facilities. It improved its IS&R systems to cover urban areas and suspect terrorist facilities and developed specialized units such as the Sayeret Shaldag (Kingfisher), a unit tied to the army command that is also known as Unit 5101.97 It has a variety of helicopters, aircraft, and UAVs for counterterrorism and air assault missions. Other elements include such specialist branches as the Israel Air Force’s heliborne medevac unit known as Unit 669. The IAF has also adapted its offensive tactics to strike selectively at enemy leaders and cadres within urban areas. These tactics have included precision strikes against hostile leaders. The IAF coordinates with the Shin Bet security service, military intelligence, and regional command authorities to develop such targets and track them in real or near real time, as well as to estimate civilian casualties and collateral damage to civilian facilities. This precision-strike capability is possible with both its AH-64s and fixed-wing attack aircraft and allows the IAF to assume a large part of the counterterror operations that would otherwise be performed by forces on the ground at a much higher risk. The IAF uses UAVs for situations that require loitering and observing a possible target. The goal, according to one senior Israeli official, is to have the capability to strike an emerging target within 50 seconds or less, although the times when targets do emerge are fleeting, action is achieved by shortening the sensor-to-shooter loop.98 IAF Readiness and Training Standards Israeli pilot and aircrew selection and training standards are the highest in the Middle East and some of the highest in the world. In addition, Israel has developed a reserve system that requires exceptional performance from its air force reservists. There are no reserve squadrons in the IAF, and all squadrons could operate without mobilization. However, about one-third of the aircrews in each squadron are reservists. Reserve aircrews train 55–60 days a year and fly operational missions with the squadron to which they are assigned. In the event of a call-up, the reserve aircrews and operations support personnel report first, and then support personnel for sustained operations. About 60 percent of the IAF reserves are in air- and grounddefense units. In contrast, other Middle Eastern forces are weakened by their failure to enforce rigorous selection procedures for assignments other than combat pilot and by their failure to create a highly professional class of noncommissioned officers that are paid, trained, and given the status necessary to maintain fully effective combat operations. In most cases, these problems were compounded by poor overall manpower policies and promotion for political and personal loyalty. Other Middle Eastern air forces

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also tend to be weakened by a failure to see command and control, intelligence and targeting, high-intensity combat operations, and sustainability as being equal in importance to weapons numbers and quality. While Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia have moved toward the idea of force-wide excellence in supporting an overall concept of operations, they still have a long way to go before approaching Israel’s level of capability. Current Superiority and Future Challenges Several Arab forces now have combat elements with moderate to high capabilities. Two Arab air forces—Egypt and Saudi Arabia—have relatively good training standards, modern combat aircraft, and advanced battle-management systems such as the E-3A and the E-2C. The IAF does, however, face growing problems over the cost of advanced new aircraft, munitions, sensors, and battle-management systems. Modernization will continue to present financial challenges. As has been discussed earlier, the IAF would also like to buy up to 42 more AH-64 Apache or AH-64D Longbow attack helicopters, including at least one more squadron equipped with Longbow Hellfire long-range, all-weather, fire-and-forget, antiarmor missiles. The IAF also faces two evolving challenges that could erode its present almostdecisive superiority. The first is the risk that such a nation as Syria will acquire large numbers of truly modern surface-to-air missiles such as the S-300 or S-400, along with the necessary command and control system and sensors. The second is proliferation. Long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, and weapons of mass destruction, pose a risk to all of Israel’s conventional forces, but they pose a particular challenge to Israel’s air forces because they (a) provide the ability to strike directly at Israel’s densely packed main operating bases and (b) bypass its air combat capabilities. Israel’s very strengths drive its opponents toward asymmetric warfare and to use proliferation as a way to exploit its remaining areas of vulnerability. ISRAELI LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSES The IAF operates Israel’s land-based air-defense units, and the trends in these forces are shown in Figure 7.6.99 At the end of 2007, they were organized into six brigades covering five geographic regions (central, northwestern, southeastern, southwestern, and northeastern), plus a training unit. Its air-defense weapons were deployed into battalions organized by weapons type. Surface-to-Air Missile Forces Israeli forces included Israel’s Patriot/IHawk battalions (136th, 138th, and 139th Battalions) that had one Patriot battery and three IHawk batteries each. Israel had 17 batteries of MIM-23 Improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles, and 3 batteries of

119


Figure 7.6 Israeli Air-Defense Force: Force Structure

Manpower Active Reserve

1990

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

?

?

18,000

18,000

18,000

18,000

?

?

3,000

3,000

3,000

3,000

?

?

15,000

15,000

15,000

15,000

SAM Batteries

15

17

17

66+

66+

66+

MIM-23 Hawk/Improved Hawk

15

17

17

Some

17 bty

17 bty

0

0

3 bty

3 bty

3 bty

5 bty

0

0

3 bty

3 bty

4 bty

4 bty

0

0

2

?

3?

3?

Arrow II (launchers)

0

0

9

18

18

18

M-163 Chaparral (each with 4 FIM-92A Stinger MANPAD SAM)

0

8

0

35

35

35

M-163 Vulcan SP 20 mm (each with 4 FIM-92A Stinger MANPAD SAM)

0

0

0

35

35

35

M-163 Machbet Vulcan SP 20 mm (each with 4 FIM-92A Stinger MANPAD SAM)

0

0

0

35

35

35

Launchers

0

0

9

?

?

?

Forces Abroad

0

?

Occasional Up to 1 detach.

Up to 1 detach.

Up to 1 detach.

Turkey (detachment of AF F-16 located at Akinci

0

?

Occasional Up to 1 detach.

Up to 1 detach.

Up to 1 detach.

Foreign Forces

?

141

153

?

?

?

UN, UN Truce Supervision Organization (observers)

?

141

153

?

?

?

MIM-104 Patriot MIM-104 Patriot PAC-2/ PAC-3 Arrow battalions

Note: No PAC-3s to be acquired yet. Previous Patriot Systems to be upgraded to PAC-3 standard. Israel is still hoping to develop Arrow 3, hopes to not purchase new PAC-3 and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defense) systems from the United States. On September 5, 2007, Israel decided, in principle, to upgrade all Patriot systems to PAC-3. While IISS, The Military Balance, 2004–2005 states that Israel maintains 3 batteries of PAC-2s with 16 missiles each, Jane’s Defense Weekly (August 28, 2007) claims Israel currently operates 4 PAC-2 batteries. Source: Various editions of the IISS, The Military Balance, Jane’s Sentinel series, and U.S., British, and Israeli experts.

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upgraded Patriot missiles with improved antitactical ballistic missile capabilities. The Patriot batteries had three multiple launcher fire units each. The Patriots in Israeli forces have improved strikingly since the Gulf War and now have a nominal footprint with some five times the previous area coverage. The MIM104 or PAC-2 has a speed of Mach 5, rather than Mach 3. Its maximum altitude is 24 km, its minimum range is 3 km, and its maximum range is 160 km. Israel may seek to upgrade its PAC-2 system to the PAC-3 version to augment the country’s missile defense posture. The PAC-2 is considered to have limited missile interception capability, and the PAC-3 upgrade is expected to provide improvements in lower-tier missile defense, which is of immediate concern given recent Syrian acquisitions of hundreds of long-range rocket systems.100 The PAC-3 is a further improvement over the PAC-2/GEM system in area coverage, lethality, and missile intercept capability. The PAC-3 has a new interceptor missile using a hit-to-kill warhead instead of an exploding warhead. The missile is also smaller. The launcher canister is approximately the same size as a PAC-2 canister, but contains four missiles and tubes instead of a single round.101 It uses inertial/active millimeter-wave radar terminal homing. Cost is a real issue, however, and Israel may decide to stay with the PAC-2 and fund improved versions of its own missile defense systems such as the Arrow. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Forces By 2007, Israel had deployed two Arrow ballistic missile defense batteries at Palmachim and Ein Shemer.102 The first Arrow Weapon System battery was deployed in the center of the country and became operational on March 12, 2000, at the Palmachim base (some reports suggest that the first battery was in the southern Negev Desert at the Dimona nuclear facility). The second battery was placed at Ein Shemer east of Hadera and was operational ‘‘for training purposes’’ as of mid-2002. The main warning and battle-management sensors are tied to the Green Pine radar system.103 The original Arrow missile, its Green Pine radar, and its battle-management system have been steadily upgraded. At the end of 2007, Israel’s existing missile defense umbrella consisted of two layers, one provided by the Arrow that operates in the exosphere at an altitude of dozens of kilometers, while the second is provided by the Patriot PAC-2s that functioned as a lower-tier defense system. The Arrow is being upgraded to the Arrow 3 at an expected cost of $250 million.104 Israel conducted two successful tests of the improved Arrow system in the first months of 2007. On February 11, a prototype Arrow 4 interceptor with Block 3 software successfully intercepted a target simulating an Iranian Shahab 3 medium-range ballistic missile. The target used was a Rafael Black Sparrow missile, launched from an Israeli F-15 fighter, that ascended above the atmosphere and reentered in a profile similar to the Shahab.105 A couple of months later, Israel also successfully tested a new variant, the Arrow 2 M5. Early next year, the Arrow system will attempt to intercept a maneuverable ballistic missile capable of releasing


121

decoys.106 By 2012, Israel is set to acquire a third Arrow battery, foreseeing a growing threat from surface-to-surface missiles from Iran and Syria.107 Israel is also seeking to deploy defense systems to deal with shorter-range rockets. Following the fighting in July and August 2006 in Lebanon, during which the Israeli rear sustained more than 4,000 rocket hits, most of which were from short-range weapons, and with increased Qassam rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, the Israeli MoD established a special team to seek solutions against the growing threat.108 In February 2007, the MoD selected Rafael Armament Development Authority’s proposal for an antirocket system that will counter threats coming from ranges between 2 and 40 km. The system, dubbed Iron Dome, will consist of an inexpensive kinetic interceptor based on Rafael’s missile technology, combined with IAI Elta Industries’ detect and fire-control radar. The cost of each interceptor should not exceed $40,000, and Rafael said it will present initial operations capability in 30 months.109 Recently, Rafael was also awarded a contract to develop a defense system to counter medium-range rockets (40–200 km) jointly with U.S. firm Raytheon Company under the MoD’s Short-Range Ballistic Missile Defense program. The interceptor, dubbed Magic Wand or Stunner, will be based on next-generation Rafael Python dual-wave imaging infrared missile technology and advanced low-cost Raytheon tactical missile designs.110 According to Israel’s Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh, In a few years Israel will have a three-layered missile and rocket defense system, with the Arrow dealing with ballistic missile threats coming from a range of 200 km or more, the Magic Wand dealing with rockets from 40 km to 200 km as well as incoming maneuvering missiles and the Iron Dome dealing with short-range threats.111

The Israeli Ministry of Defense suggested in February 2008 that a lower-tier 4– 70-km-range interception-capable variant of Rafael’s Iron Dome system should be fast-tracked into active service before its expected service entry date of 2010. Iron Dome’s accelerated fielding was viewed as increasingly necessary as a means of protecting residents in Sderot and other communities from Qassam rocket fire from the Gaza Strip.112 C4I/BM and Sensor Systems Israel had a mix of different radars, including at least two AN/TPS-43 threedimensional radars with three AN/MPQ-53 radar sets and three AN/MSQ-104 engagement control stations bought in 1998. This system was tailored to Israel’s local threats and had sufficient technology to meet these threats in combat. Israel also had the ability to coordinate its air defenses from the air, possessed superior electronic warfare and systems integration capability, and had a clear strategy for suppressing enemy land-based air defenses and the ability to execute it. The Israeli C4I/BM and sensor system is believed to make use of the Hughes technology developed for the USAF, including many elements of the USAF 407L tactical

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

command and control system and Hughes 4118 digital computers. The system had main control centers in the Negev and near Tel Aviv. Israel is also steadily improving its missile warning and ballistic missile defense radars. These developments are discussed in the later section on Israeli weapons of mass destruction. Short-Range Air-Defense Systems As was mentioned earlier, the IDF has short-range air-defense assets of its own. In 2007, the Israeli Army was reported to have eight short-range Chaparral missile fire units and units with large numbers of Stinger, Grail, and Redeye man-portable missiles and Vulcan antiaircraft guns. It had over 250 Stingers, 1,000 obsolescent Redeye man-portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and 45 Chaparral crew-served missile launchers. It also had some 455 20-mm antiaircraft (AA) guns, including TCM20s and M-167 Vulcans. It had M-163 Vulcan/M-48 Chaparral gun-missile systems, 150 ZU-23-2 and 60 ZSU-23-4 23-mm AA guns, some M-39 37-mm and 150 L-70 40-mm AA guns. These assets give Israel fewer land-based air-defense forces and mobility than some of its neighbors, but Israel relies primarily upon its air force for such defense. Two Israeli defense firms jointly produced a new surface-to-air missile platform dubbed the ‘‘SPYDER.’’ The all-weather day/night system is truck mounted along with a surveillance radar and a command and control unit. The SPYDER was designed to target precision-guided munitions, helicopters, UAVs, and aircraft up to 15 km away and up to 9,000 m in the air. 113 The IDF had not, however, announced any plans to acquire SPYDER units. Additionally, the IDF had developed a Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser, in conjunction with the U.S. Army, to target UAVs, some types of cruise missiles, artillery shells, and short-range rockets. A similar system, albeit much larger and in prototype form only, had already been produced in the United States.114 The U.S. Army seems to have opted out of this program, however, and it is not clear how Israel will proceed. Readiness and Effectiveness Israel remains the only Middle Eastern state with the resources, technology, organizational skills, war-planning capability, and leadership to provide a fully integrated approach to combining land-based air defense and air warfare. Jordan has the technical understanding, but lacks the equipment and resources. Egypt combines some modern capabilities, but still has significant numbers of obsolete forces and a lack of overall systems integration and military coherence. Syria relies on aging Soviet systems, the most modern of which date back to the early 1980s. Its air-defense deployments and battle-management systems are poorly executed in detail and lack effective systems integration, electronic warfare capability, and modern C4I/BM capabilities.


123

ISRAELI NAVAL FORCES As was described in Chapter 5, Israel maintains a small but effective navy whose missions have steadily expanded along with the threat of coastal infiltration and arms smuggling. Barring a major breakthrough in Israel’s peace negotiations with the Palestinians and in peace with Syria and Lebanon, the Israeli Navy seems likely to continue to expand its steaming hours to deal with these threats and expand its range to secure the maritime approaches to Israel. At the end of 2007, Israel’s naval forces had a total manpower strength of 6,000 actives and 3,500 reserves. Like the other services, it had a substantial number of three-year conscripts. Its forces included 3 submarines, 3 Sa’ar 5-class corvettes, 10 missile patrol craft, 34 inshore patrol craft, and 2 amphibious ships. The navy also had a small commando force of around 300 men and had 5 AS 565SA Sea Panther antisubmarine warfare helicopters. Its forces were based at Haifa, Ashdod, and Eilat. The trends in these forces are shown in Figure 7.7.115

Surface Fleet Developments Israeli major surface ships included three Sa’ar 5 (Eilat or Sa’ar V)-class missile corvettes. A fourth has been delayed. The Sa’ar 5s are modern 1,227-ton ships, each of which had two quad launchers for Harpoon missiles with a range of up to 130 km (block 1D Harpoons have a range in excess of 315 km), one 76-mm gun, a Dauphin SA-366G helicopter, a Phalanx close-in defense system, and six torpedo launchers. These ships have the mission of protecting Israel’s shipping lanes. The Sa’ar 5s have modern electronic support and countermeasure systems and advanced software for target tracking and identification. These facilities included a sophisticated command information center sheltered deep within the ship that can act as task group command centers, as well as fight individually. The sea and air tracking and battle-management system are also advanced for a ship of this class.116 The ships also have extensive countermeasures and some stealth features and may be upgraded to use the Barak missile if suitable funds become available. The ships give Israel additional ‘‘blue water capability’’ and are superior to any similar missile ships in service with Israel’s Arab neighbors. There have, however, been cost constraints in arming them. Some reports indicate that Israel planned to equip them with eight IAI MBT Gabriel 5 antiship missiles with radar and optical homing and ranges of up to 36 km, but there have been top weight problems. Other plans called for giving each ship two 32-cell launchers for Barak air-defense missiles. There have been cost problems in procuring this system, and some reports indicate that cost problems have limited the complement of Harpoon missiles. Israel has sought funds for up to five more ships through U.S. aid, but it is unclear whether it will have sufficient funds to do so. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense

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Figure 7.7 Israeli Navy: Force Structure 1990

Manpower Navy

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

19,000 ~18,000 ~19,500 11,500– 11,500– 9,500– 23,000 23,000 19,500 9,000

~6,500 ~8,000

6,000

5,500

7,000

Conscripts

3,000

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,500

Reservists

?

?

?

3,500

3,500

10,000

10,000 11,500 11,500 11,500 11,500

10,000

Mobilized forces Patrol and Coastal Combatants

61

53

54

51

52

52

300

~300

~300

~300

~300

~300

Number of Bases

3

3

4

4

4

4

Submarines

0

2

3

3

3

3

Gal (UK Vickers) SSK* with Mk 37 HWT Harpoon USGW

3

3

0

0

0

0

SSK Dolphin (Sub-Harpoon USGW, 4 × 650 mm ASTT, 6 × 533 mm ASTT

0

1

3

3

3

3

Corvettes

0

3

3

3

3

3

Eilat (Sa’ar 5) FSG (8 Harpoon SSMs, 8 Gabriel II SSMs, 2 Barak VLS SAMs (2 × 32 mls), 1 × 76-mm gun, 6 × 324-mm ASTT, 1 SA-366G hel)

0

3

3

0

0

Eilat (Sa’ar 5) (either 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel or 1 AS366G Dauphin II SAR hel)

0

0

0

3

3

3

Missile Craft

26

14

12

12

10

10

2

2

2

2

0

0

(4 Harpoons, 4 Gabriel SSMs, 1 AB-206 Kiowa hel)

2

0

0

0

0

0

(4 Harpoon SSMs, 4 Gabriel SSMs, SA-366G Dauphin hel)

0

2

2

2

0

0

0

6

8

8

8

8

0

6

8

8

8

8

2

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

8

4

2

2

2

2

8

0

0

0

0

0

Commando

Aliya

Hetz (Sa’ar 4.5) (8 Harpoon SSMs, 6 Gabriel SSMs, 6 Barak VLS SAMs, 1 × 76-mm gun) Romach (8 Harpoons, 8 Gabriels) Reshef (2–4 Harpoons, 4–6 Gabriels)

125


(8 Harpoon SSMs, 6 Gabriel SSMs, 1 × 76-mm gun)

0

4

2

2

2

2

10

2

0

0

0

0

10

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

3

0

0

0

0

0

3

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

35

36

39

32

34

34

Super-Dvora PFI

4

13

13

13

19

19

Dabur PFI (under 100 tons)

31

17

18

18

15

15

Nashal PCI

0

3

3

3

3

0

Shaldag PFI

?

?

?

?

2

0

Alligator

0

0

1

1

1

0

Katler (SpecOps support craft)

0

0

0

1

1

0

9

2

2

2

2

2

LCT Ashdod

6

1

1

1

1

1

LCM U.S. type

3

1

1

1

1

1

2

0

0

0

0

0

Patrol Craft Depot Ship

1

0

0

0

0

0

Transport

1

0

0

0

0

0

Patrol Craft

0

0

0

0

0

0

?

?

?

?

7

7

Naval Aviation

0

0

5

5

28

28

Helicopters (ASW, AS-565SA Panther)

0

0

5

5

7

7

Helicopters (ASW, 2 SA-366 G Dauphin)

?

?

?

?

2

2

?

?

?

?

2

2

?

?

?

?

17

17

Mivtach/Sa’ar (2 Harpoons, 3–5 Gabriels) (2–4 Harpoon SSMs, 3–5 Gabriel SSMs) Shimrit (U.S. Flagstaff 2) PHM (4 Harpoons, 2 Gabriels) Dvora (under 100 tons) Patrol, inshore

Amphibious

Support and miscellaneous

Tzir’a and Stingray PFBs

C-130 (Transport) Helicopters (SAR/UTL, Bell 212) *

SSK = hunter-killer submarine; USGW = undersea guided weapon; ASTT = antisubmarine torpedo tube; FSG = guided missile frigate; SSM = ship-to-ship missile; ASW = antisubmarine warfare; PHM = missile hydrofoil craft; PFI = fast patrol boat-inshore; PCI = patrol craft-inshore; LCT = landing craft tank; LCM = landing craft medium; PFB = fast patrol boat; SAR = search and rescue; UTL = utility. Source: Various editions of the IISS, The Military Balance, Jane’s, and U.S., British, and Israeli experts.

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

continues to pursue funds for and development of sea-based vessels capable of interdicting air-, surface-, and submarine-fired missiles.117 Israel had ten additional missile craft, including eight operational Sa’ar 4.5 (Hetz)class ships with eight Harpoons and six Gabriels each. Some reports indicate that two Sa’ar 4 (Reshef )-class missile patrol boats were still being upgraded. All Sa’ar 2s and 3s have been retired.118 The Sa’ar 4.5s have been extensively modernized under the Nirit (4.5)-class upgrade program that incorporated a ‘‘modernization by cannibalization’’ approach, scrapping much of the material from the Sa’ar 4s while outfitting the vessels with new hulls, low-radar-signature masts, new fire-control detectors, and updated sensors. At least one ship has four eight-cell launchers for Barak point-defense missiles. The ships are also specially equipped to support Special Operations forces. The Israeli Navy (IN) is seeking to purchase two or three multimission combat ships, dubbed the Sa’ar 5 Plus program.119 The vessels would extend the navy’s sensor capability and possibly could serve as the platform for a sea-based missile defense system.120 The future shape of the Israeli surface fleet is uncertain, and some senior commanders in the IDF have opposed the navy’s requirement for two new surface combatant vessels.121 Hezbollah’s success in hitting the IN’s flagship—the Sa’ar 5-class INS Hanit—with a C-802 antiship missile off the coast of Lebanon in July 2006 damaged the image of the navy among the other services. In June 2007, Jane’s reported that some senior IDF officials believed that the navy should function more as a coast guard, reinforced with submarines, rather than as a navy with long-strike capabilities. Nevertheless, the Israeli Navy’s 2007 budget request for new naval assets was approved. A total of $240 million was appropriated for a new multimission surface combatant, possibly Lockheed Martin’s design for the U.S. Navy’s new LCS.122 The Israeli Navy commissioned a second feasibility study of the LCS-I, wherein the system’s deployment was to be considered as an integral component of Israel’s strategic missile defense umbrella. Specifically the study will consider which of two radars—the Elta EL/M-2248 Multi-Function Surveillance, Tracking, and Missile Guidance active radar array or the Lockheed Martin SPY-1F—would be integrated into the LCS’s COMBATSS-21 combat management system. The COMBATSS21 system is tied in with the Typhoon stabilized gun platform, IAI’s Barak pointdefense missile system, the MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), and the VLSbased SM-2 theatre defense and antiballistic missile platform. Some plans have called for production of the LCS-I to begin in 2009.123 However, the funds required for Israel to purchase the LCS based on Lockheed Martin’s semiplaning monohull design—now dubbed the LCS-I—would have to be made available under the augmented U.S. FMF package. This would present serious cost problems if the cost of each ship remains as high as some estimates indicate. It is also unclear that any other variant of the LCS-I would be affordable without a major increase in the navy’s budget.


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Smaller Surface Ships Israel is changing its current force of smaller surface ships to improve its capability to defend against terrorism. Israel now has 19 Mark I/II Super Dvora-class fast attack craft (36 to 46 knots) with 20-mm guns as standard armament, and which sometimes come outfitted with Hellfire missiles. These ships were built in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. They can be equipped with depth charges or multiple rocket launchers. Two are based at Eilat on the Red Sea. The rest are in Haifa. By early 2006, the Israeli Navy had also deployed two of eight new Wasp versions of the Defender-class boat (four 25-foot and four 31-foot). This is a $2.5 million program to provide seaborne counterterrorism protection for Israel’s ports at Haifa, Ashdod, and Eilat. It has also signed a $45 million contract to buy four Super Dvoras and three Shaldag Mark IIIs to supplement the initial order it placed for six Super Dvoras and two Shaldags in January 2002.124 Six Super Dvora Mark IIIs were operational by the summer of 2007. The next four have a waterjet drive system to allow much more rapid maneuver in shallow water. They are 27.4 meters long and displace 58 to 72 tons, depending on the mission load. They have maximum speeds close to 50 knots. The Super Dvoras and the Shaldags would have stabilized 25-mm bow guns and two machine guns on each side. Phase 2 of the contract, for four additional Super Dvora Mk IIIs and three more Shaldag vessels, was awarded in 2005 to IAI and Israel shipyards, respectively.125 Israel once had 15 Dabur-class light patrol ships of 32 tons displacement. These are land transportable, but are too slow for their original purpose of antiterrorist operations (13 knots). They are being sold off and retired, but two are based at Eilat on the Red Sea. There were three small Bobcat (coast guard)-class patrol boats. At this point in time, Israel has only light patrol capability in the Red Sea— reflecting its peace with Egypt and Jordan.

Submarine Forces Israel has replaced its three aging Gal-class submarines with three modern Type 800 Dolphin-class submarines, designed and built by the German firm ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. The three vessels were commissioned in 1999 and 2000 with an additional two Dolphins on order at the request of the IN.126 The Dolphins are the most advanced submarines in the Middle East. They weigh 1,700 tons and are twice the size of the Gal-class subs. In addition, Israel is to receive the German Seahake active wire-guided heavyweight torpedoes with a range of 13 km. These may now be in service. Israel also has NT 37E torpedoes. The IN will purchase two more Dolphins rather than acquire two additional missile corvettes due to the concern that the corvettes would be vulnerable to terrorist attacks while in such narrow waters as the Suez Canal. Israel will fund two-thirds of the $1.17 billion project, while the German government will fund the remaining third.127

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The Dolphins give Israel considerably greater strategic depth in operating in Mediterranean waters. They can be operated at ranges of up to 8,000 miles and have an endurance of up to 30 days. They have modern sonars, torpedoes, and facilities for the launch of Harpoon antiship missiles. The Israeli-held version of Harpoon has GPS guidance for the land-attack role. There are ‘‘wet and dry’’ compartments for underwater swimmers and personnel craft for special operations. Some within the navy have stressed the importance of submarines over corvettes in order to preserve a nuclear second-strike capability in the event of an attack.128 There are reports that Israel can use its submarines to provide a secure and relatively invulnerable launch platform for nuclear-armed missiles. These initially would be a nuclear-armed version of a system like the Harpoon, with a nominal range of 70 miles or 130 kilometers. They could be followed by a new long-range cruise missile. Israel is also believed to be working to develop a variety of conventionally armed longer-range missiles for both its submarines and surface forces. These include a loitering missile with a nominal range of 200 km and a 220-kg warhead, with an endurance of up to one hour and an integrated radar and imaging seeker. Other systems include a large missile with a 570-kg warhead, terminal guidance, and a range exceeding 200 km. Such systems could be openly or covertly equipped with nuclear warheads as well.129

Amphibious Forces Israel has roughly a 300-man Naval Infantry Brigade and a variety of Special Forces and intelligence units that can be inserted by sea. The Israeli Navy had one Ashdod-class landing craft tank (LCT) (400 tons, 730 tons fully loaded) and one U.S.–type landing craft mechanized (LCM) in 2006. The Israeli Navy has considered the purchase of either a 13,000-ton amphibious ship that could carry troops, tanks, aerial vehicles, and helicopters as far as 2,000 miles away (the multimission combined arms platform) or a 3,000-ton Sa’ar 5 II advanced surface warship.130 However, due to budgetary concerns, the navy has shelved such procurement plans at least until 2008.131

Naval Aviation The IAF’s six Phalcons can provide maritime surveillance, as well as airborne early warning. In addition, the IAF had 17 Bell 212 helicopters for coastal surveillance tasks. The IAF also operates two C-130 transport aircraft for naval missions. The IAF also has small, aging IAI-1125 Seascan (Shahaf ) maritime patrol aircraft that can be armed with antiship missiles. Israel had seven Sea Panther and two Dauphin SA 366G helicopters for its Sa’ar 5s, and Sea Scan UAVs for maritime surveillance and targeting. Israeli forces had a number of other UAVs, aircraft, surface platforms, and land-based sensors with naval mission capabilities.


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The Navy’s Role in Asymmetric Warfare The navy’s counterterrorist forces include Shayetet Shlosh-Esrai. This is a 300man commando unit based at Atlit. It is trained for at-sea search and rescue and counterterrorism operations. There is also LOTAR Eilat, a reserve counterterrorism unit based in Eilat, that works with Shayetet 13 commando forces. All of Israel’s submarines are combat swimmer capable, and a number of its fast attack ships and boats are fitted for insertions and extractions and can rapidly deploy and recover Special Forces assault craft.132 The navy has long shown its value in asymmetric warfare. In 2002, the Israeli Navy seized control of the Karine A, a ship headed for the shores of Gaza. When the cargo was uncovered, the navy discovered 50 tons of weapons including 122and 107-mm Katyusha rockets, mortar shells, rifles, mines, and a variety of antitank missiles and mines. The range of the 122-mm Katyushas, about 20 km, would have enabled the Palestinians in Gaza to threaten such towns as Ashkelon or other coastal cities, and the Palestinians in the West Bank to threaten Ben Gurion National Airport and several major cities.133 As Chapter 5 has discussed, the navy played a major role during the fighting in 2006. This role is likely to remain important in the future. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza has opened up the prospect of significant new efforts at infiltration by sea, and the security barrier has created another incentive for infiltration from Lebanon or the Mediterranean. Israel has not only reacted to this threat by increasing its naval patrol activity. It has created the Snapir Diving and Sea Warfare Unit to intercept swimmers and frogmen, provide port entry defense, and board and inspect suspect vessels. The navy has built the first stage of a two-stage anti-infiltration barrier off of the southern end of Gaza that will extend from 150 m to nearly a kilometer into the Mediterranean and be some 3–10 m deep. The second stage will be a floating security barrier system 10 m deep anchored to the bottom. These nets are supposed to be able to halt a boat traveling at speeds up to 50 knots. There already is a somewhat similar, but less developed barrier off Israel’s coast near its border with Lebanon.134 These barriers include a variety of fixed optical, night vision, and radar sensors mounted on highpoints on land such as smokestacks and are netted together by a common C4I/BM system. Israeli patrol boats have proven to be effective in land as well as coastal surveillance missions, particularly in Gaza. Patrol boats can use precision 25-mm guns that are slaved to these sensors against land targets. Israeli vessels are also sometimes able to use their radars and sensors to target various aspects of Palestinian operations on land near the shore as well as use Doppler radars to detect infiltrators in small boats even in serious sea states. The navy is considering using UAVs as well to replace its aging Westwind Seascan manned aircraft, which date back to 1978.135 Israel has greatly improved port security, both in ports and in nearby waters— where ships sometimes drop explosives and arms for later recovery. Containers have been used to smuggle in suicide bombers, and scuba divers have been dropped off to act as infiltrators.136

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Naval Readiness and Mission Capability Sea power is not likely to be a major factor in any near-term Israeli-Syrian conflict. Israel has massive naval superiority over Syria and Lebanon. It can also probably use joint naval-air operations to win superiority over Egypt except in Egyptian waters.137 It should be noted, however, that Israel has sharply limited its naval presence in the Red Sea and has had to make trade-offs that have reduced its naval capabilities. Nevertheless, Israel is the only navy in the Middle East supported by an industrial base that had advanced electronic warfare design and modification capabilities, and with the ability to manufacture and design its own sensors and antiship missiles. These developments should allow Israel to maintain a decisive edge over Syria in the Mediterranean and a more limited advantage in tactics, training, and technology over the Egyptian Navy—although the Egyptian Navy was significantly modernizing. Resources will remain a problem, in spite of the renegotiated level of U.S. FMF aid and the new priority given to the navy in Teffen 2012. The navy had to cut its procurement of new Sa’ar corvettes from eight to three and may have problems in funding all three Dolphin-class submarines. It also had to cut back substantially on its Barak ship defense missile—although these were armed with Harpoon and Gabriel ship-to-ship missiles. The practical issue is whether this matters given the strategic partnership between the United States and Israel and U.S. dominance of the sea. It simply is not clear that any of Israel’s naval trade-offs erode its edge in any probable contingency.

ISRAEL’S COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES The open literature on Israel’s military forces, like that on most Middle Eastern states, does not provide a clear or accurate picture of Israel’s intelligence or security capabilities to support either conventional or asymmetric warfare. The role of police, intelligence, covert action, and security forces has always been important, but it is just beginning to be seen as a critical part of the real-world military balance. Furthermore, only limited data are available on the expansion of such forces, and major changes in their role and structure, that has occurred in virtually every Middle East country over the last half-decade.138 It is clear, however, that Israel has a wide mix of forces with exceptional experience and skill in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. These include such civilian elements as the Hamosad Hamerkazi Le’Modiin U’Latafkidim Meyochadim (Central Institute for Intelligence and Special Missions), which is responsible for intelligence collection and operations and counterterrorism outside Israel. The Israel Security Agency (also called the General Security Service or Shin Bet) is Israel’s main internal security and counterespionage service.139 There are mixed civil-military units such as the MALMAB (an acronym for Security Authority of the Israeli Ministry of Defense), which is responsible for the security


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of Israeli defense industries and a variety of intelligence activities, including industrial espionage. There are also a number of special units that have not been made public, as well as special branch elements of the police. The Israeli National Police (INP) have an intelligence and internal security mission. Once again, reliable data are not available, but unclassified sources have named such elements as the Latam (works with Israel Security Agency), MATILAN (Intelligence Observation Interception and Mobile Warfare Unit) with a special mission to protect Jerusalem, and the Y’’MM (Police Counterterrorist and Hostage Rescue Unit), which is a hostage rescue unit with over 100 men and units working in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Y’’MM is a self-sufficient unit within the INP with its own dog units, snipers, bomb disposal and demolition teams, and specialist communications and intelligence personnel. There are teams within the Y’’MM that are trained in scaling and entering buildings undetected in counterterrorist operations.140 In addition, the INP includes some 8,000 personnel in the Mishmar HavgulMAGAV (Border Police or Green Police).141 The MAGAV is trained in flexibility and rapid response to border incidents, public disorder, and regular police missions. The Border Police have at their disposal 1,600 BTR-152 APCs as well as other armored vehicles, including Sufa jeeps that have been converted to operational armor-plated vehicles. Specialized equipment includes night-vision equipment and grenade launchers. Weapons include Galils, Mini-Galils, M-16 assault rifles, Uzis, mini-Uzi submachine guns, and 9-mm IMI ‘‘Jericho’’ 941F DA semiautomatic pistols.142 YAMAS (Mista’aravim) is a specialist unit within the MAGAV that conducts covert operations against terrorists and hard-line armed elements mainly in the West Bank and in Judea and Samaria. About 12 percent of the total MAGAV force is from ethnic minorities—Druze, Bedouin, Christian, Muslim, and Circassian—a fact that facilitates undercover operations in Arab-speaking areas.143 Other units subordinate to INP include the following:144 • Unit 33 (Gideonim)—elite intelligence-oriented undercover unit, • YAGAL—a paramilitary countersmuggling unit for the Lebanese border, and • YAMAG—tactical countercrime and counterterror rapid deployment unit.

These capabilities can be used to support conventional warfare, asymmetric warfare, and internal security operations. They are also supported by groups of academic and technical experts, media sources, and by Israel’s military intelligence and satellite programs. ‘‘Jointness’’ goes far beyond interservice coordination; it involves civilmilitary cooperation as well. While Israel is no more immune to jurisdictional issues and interagency rivalries than any other country, its civilian services are used to working jointly with the IDF. There is far more jointness in Israel’s intelligence services than in virtually all other Middle Eastern states. They are also linked by one of the most advanced computer and communications systems in the world, and one that uses data mining,

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advanced algorithms, and other data integration techniques to tie together opensource material, human intelligence (HUMINT), and technical collection from platforms such as UAVs to support both covert intelligence and military operations. This ‘‘fusion’’ capability ranges from agents in place in threat countries to intelligence personnel in the military. When it functions well, it can provide real-time targeting to both police and military operations, and its graphics and data readouts have been steadily improved to support direct operational use. So has the automation of data routing to ensure the proper use gets immediate warning. This has been a major factor in allowing such forces as the Shin Bet to intercept suicide bombers. While the details remain classified, it is scarcely coincidental that the same firm, Elbit Systems, is responsible for both Israel’s new Intelligence Knowledge Management and the DAP.145 One thing is clear. Israel has very extensive counterterrorism and internal security forces that have been actively engaged in asymmetric warfare since Israel’s founding. Since the late 1960s, Israel has faced an ongoing threat from such violent Palestinian organizations as the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, from such foreign groups as Hezbollah, and potentially from such Islamist extremist groups as Al Qa’ida. The nature and capabilities of these forces are described in the following chapters on Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian forces. Most are individually weak, but they cumulatively confront Israel with a serious threat. Hamas also has emerged as the strongest single force in Palestinian politics in Gaza and the West Bank as a result of the January 25, 2006, parliamentary elections. As has been noted earlier, this threat is changing as a result of Israel’s unilateral withdrawals from Gaza and the West Bank and its creation of security barriers to separate Israelis and Palestinians. Quite aside from their political and diplomatic impacts, these policies require Israel to increasingly shift its security focus to defense of the barriers and lines of separation and to maintain security within Israel and the territory Israel occupies on the Israeli-governed side of the barrier. The IDF is free of the need to occupy parts of Gaza and to protect its settlers, but must now work with Egypt to secure the Egyptian-Gaza border. Israel’s new security approach demands that it must find ways to strike at hostile forces and points of attack in Gaza, with reoccupation as a desperate last resort. By shifting to a predominately unilateral course of action, this means Israel must also redefine its security position around Jerusalem and throughout the West Bank, effectively creating a perimeter defense around the settlements Israel intends to retain, creating a de facto ‘‘border’’ with security barriers rather than relying on broad freedom of action, security roads, and scattered settlements. At the same time, it must preserve its deterrent and warfighting capabilities to deal with any infiltration or threat across the Lebanese, Syrian, and Jordanian borders—a threat increasingly posed by nonstate actors working in concert with the Palestinians. It is simply too soon to predict how serious the resulting pressure will be on the IDF. Much of the burden may fall on Israeli intelligence, counterterrorist, and security forces. This burden may also prove to be little more than a variation of threats


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that Israel has long had to deal with. There is no guarantee that any combination of the Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, and outside movements and states will pose a highly effective threat or develop ways to attack Israel that the IDF and the Israeli security services cannot counter. What does seem almost certain, however, is that they will try. Israeli Capabilities Israel has long maintained an extensive mix of security and intelligence services to deal with such threats. Some are civilian and some are elements within the military. Many have extensive experience in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, including covert operations and targeted assassinations. The structure of Israeli intelligence and covert operations capabilities is a separate study in itself, and one where there is often more speculation than fact. What is clear is that Israel is still often able to target hostile leaders and attackers within Gaza and the West Bank. Israel retains a network of Palestinian informers and agents who can act as Palestinians. There are some indicators that some Palestinians aid Israel by giving Israel data that targets rival movements and leaders. Israel has developed a wide range of intelligence and surveillance systems such as specialized UAVs, SIGINT, and communications intelligence to supplement its extensive HUMINT systems. Israel has done much more than creating physical barriers of separation between Israeli and Palestinian areas. Its security barriers and procedures make extensive use of sensors and have in-depth defense with coverage of Palestinian areas in the barrier area, and security coverage on the Israeli side. The nature and control of such systems is classified, and journalistic reporting is uncertain. It also seems almost certain that Israeli defenses will change strikingly once the security barriers and systems are fully in place. Nevertheless, until a real peace settlement is achieved, the barrier areas, like Israel’s borders, will remain the scene of an ongoing and constantly evolving asymmetric duel between Israeli forces and security services and the Palestinians and outside forces hostile to Israel. Israeli Terrorist Groups Israel has its own terrorists as well as Palestinian threats. While most of the extreme settler groups have as yet used only very limited amounts of violence, some in the West Bank have become increasingly threatening. The U.S. Department of State has also designated one Israeli group, Kahane Chai or Kach, as a terrorist organization and describes it as follows: ‘‘Kahane Lives’’), founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyamin following his father’s 1990 assassination in the United States, were declared to be terrorist organizations in 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet under its 1948 Terrorism Law. This followed the group’s statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein’s attack in February 1994 on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque (Goldstein was affiliated with Kach) and their verbal attacks on the Israeli

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Government. Palestinian gunmen killed Binyamin Kahane and his wife in a drive-by shooting in December 2000 in the West Bank. . . . Kach’s stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kach, founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane, and its offshoot Kahane Chai . . . . . . The group has organized protests against the Israeli Government. Kach has harassed and threatened Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli Government officials, and has vowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife. Kach is suspected of involvement in a number of low-level attacks since the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. Known Kach sympathizers are becoming more vocal and active against the planned Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in mid-2005. . . . Receives support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.146

There have also been settler groups and other Israelis that have threatened and intimidated Palestinians, destroyed their businesses and olive groves, and committed acts of violence and sometimes killings that cannot be confirmed as large-scale terrorism but seem to be a growing problem. For example, the U.S. Department of State human rights report stated in 2005 that in December (2004), Israel convicted and sentenced an Israeli man for membership in the ‘‘New Jewish Underground,’’ a terrorist organization that aimed to carry out attacks on Arab civilians. On September 29, 2004, a group of five Israeli settlers attacked and seriously wounded two U.S. citizens, members of an nongovernmental organization (NGO), who were escorting Palestinian children to school near Hebron. Internal Security versus Human Rights and Political Impacts The political dimension and impact of internal security have become critical parts of the military balance throughout the region. Asymmetric wars inevitably challenge human rights and make them an extension of war by other means. The ability to use and manipulate human rights organizations is a weapon, as is the effort to conceal abuses or practices that stretch legitimate security measures to the limit. Every nation in the Middle East faces such a struggle, regardless of the type of regime and the massive differences in the nature of the internal and the external threat. Israel is no exception. No matter how well Israel organizes and uses such forces, they are a source of major friction with the Palestinians and present major problems in terms of human rights and foreign perceptions of Israel. Few issues are the subject of so much controversy, but the human rights country report issued by the U.S. Department of State provides a relatively neutral view of both Israeli actions and those of the other countries shaping the Arab-Israeli balance. The U.S. Department of State reports on human rights and terrorism issued in 2007 noted that Israeli paramilitary and security forces have extensive powers that they often abuse in dealing with both Palestinian extremists and peaceful dissidents: Internal security is the responsibility of the Israel Security Agency (ISA or Shin Bet), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister. The National Police, which includes


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the Border Police and the Immigration Police, are under the Minister of Internal Security and the Minister of Interior respectively. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are under the authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. The IDF includes a significant portion of the adult population on active duty or reserve status. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset oversees the IDF and the ISA. Security forces were under effective government control. Some members of the security forces committed serious abuses. The country’s population is approximately 6.8 million, including 5.2 million Jews, 1.3 million Arabs, and some 290,000 other minorities. It has an advanced industrial, market economy with a relatively high standard of living. Twenty one percent of the population lived below the poverty line in 2003. Unemployment was approximately 11 percent, and was higher among the Arab population. Foreign workers, both legal and illegal, constituted about 7 percent of the labor force. The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Some members of the security forces abused Palestinian detainees. Conditions in some detention and interrogation facilities remained poor. During the year, the Government detained on security grounds but without charge thousands of persons in Israel. (Most were from the occupied territories and their situation is covered in the annex.) The Government did little to reduce institutional, legal, and societal discrimination against the country’s Arab citizens. The Government did not recognize marriages performed by non-Orthodox rabbis, compelling many citizens to travel abroad to marry. The Government interfered with individual privacy in some instances. . . . The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally observed these prohibitions. (Palestinian security detainees fell under the jurisdiction of military law even if they were detained in Israel (see annex). When arrested, the accused is considered innocent until proven guilty, has the right to habeas corpus, to remain silent, to be represented by an attorney, to contact his family without delay, and to a fair trial. A bail system exists and decisions denying bail are subject to appeal. A citizen may be held without charge for 24 hours before he must be brought before a judge (48 hours for administrative detainees). If the detainee is suspected of committing a ‘‘security offense,’’ the police and the courts can delay notification of counsel for up to 31 days. The Government may withhold evidence from defense lawyers on security grounds. In March, the Public Defender’s Office charged that the police sometimes failed to apprise detainees of their rights under law and did not always provide detainees with legal counsel when required. The Public Defender’s Office estimated that, as a result, approximately 500 persons were deprived of their rights to due process. . . . Foreign nationals detained for suspected violations of immigration law are afforded an immigration hearing within 4 days of detention, but do not have the right to legal representation. According to the local advocacy organization Hotline for Migrant Workers, appropriate interpreters were not always present at the hearings. Hotline received complaints from Israeli attorneys of being denied access to their foreign clients. According to Hotline, foreign detainees were rarely released pending judicial determination of their status. If the country of origin of the detainee had no representation in the country, detention could last for months, pending receipt of travel documents. During the year, there were credible allegations that the police knowingly detained and deported legal foreign workers to meet deportation quotas. . . . Pursuant to the 1979 Emergency Powers Law, the Ministry of Defense may order persons detained without charge or trial for up to 6 months in administrative detention,

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renewable indefinitely subject to district court review. Such detainees have the right to legal representation, but the court may rely on confidential information to which the defendant and his or her lawyer are not privy. Administrative detainees have the right to appeal their cases to the Supreme Court. . . . The Judicial Branch is organized into three levels: Magistrate Courts; six District Courts; and the Supreme or High Court. District Courts prosecute felonies, and Magistrate Courts prosecute misdemeanors. There are military, religious, labor relations, and administrative courts, with the High Court of Justice as the ultimate judicial authority. The High Court is both a court of first instance and an appellate court (when it sits as the Supreme Court). All courts in the judicial system, including the High Court of Justice, thus have appellate courts of jurisdiction. Religious courts, representing the main recognized religious groups, have jurisdiction over matters of personal status for their adherents (see Section 2.c.). The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. The country’s criminal justice system is adversarial, and professional judges rather than juries decide cases. . . . Nonsecurity trials are public except in cases in which the interests of the parties are determined to be best served by privacy. Security or military trials are open to independent observers upon request and at the discretion of the court, but they are not open to the general public. The law provides for the right to a hearing with legal representation, and authorities generally observed this right in practice. In cases of serious felonies—subject to penalties of 10 years or more—indigent defendants receive mandatory legal representation. Indigent defendants facing lesser sentences are provided with representation on a discretionary basis. Counsel represented approximately 70 percent of defendants. . . . The 1970 regulations governing military trials are the same as evidentiary rules in criminal cases. Convictions may not be based solely on confessions; however, according to PCATI [Public Committee against Torture in Israel], in practice, some security prisoners have been sentenced on the basis of the coerced confessions made by both themselves and others. Counsel may assist the accused, and a judge may assign counsel to those defendants when the judge deems it necessary. Indigent detainees are not provided with free legal representation for military trials. Charges are made available to the defendant and the public in Hebrew, and the court can order that they be translated into Arabic if necessary. Sentencing procedures in military courts were consistent with those in criminal courts. Defendants in military trials have the right to appeal through the Military High Court. Defendants in military trials also can petition the civilian High Court of Justice (sitting as a court of first instance) in cases in which they believe there are procedural or evidentiary irregularities. Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem during the 1967 War. Pursuant to the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the September 1995 Interim Agreement, Israel transferred most responsibilities for civil government in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank to the newly created Palestinian Authority (PA). The 1995 Interim Agreement divided the territories into three types of areas denoting different levels of Palestinian Authority and Israeli occupation control. Since Palestinian extremist groups resumed the use of violence in 2000, Israeli forces have resumed control of a number of the PA areas, citing the PA’s failure to abide by its security responsibilities.


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Israel exercised occupation authority through the Israeli Ministry of Defense’s Office of Coordination and Liaison (MATAK). . . . Violence associated with the Intifada has claimed the lives of 3,517 Palestinians, according to the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), 1,051 Israelis, according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, and 52 foreign nationals, according to B’tselem, an Israeli human rights organization that monitors the occupied territories. During the year, over 800 Palestinians were killed during Israeli military operations in the occupied territories, a total of 76 Israeli civilians and 4 foreigners were killed in terrorist attacks in both Israel and the occupied territories, and 41 members of the Israeli Defense Forces were killed in clashes with Palestinian militants. Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consisted of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the Israeli National Police (INP), and the Border Police, an operational arm of the Israel National Police that is under IDF command when operating in the occupied territories. Israeli military courts tried Palestinians accused of security offenses. Israeli security forces were under effective government control. Members of the Israeli security forces committed numerous, serious abuses. . . . There were reports that Israeli security forces used excessive force, abused and tortured detainees. Conditions in permanent prisons met international standards, but temporary facilities were austere and overcrowded. Many Israeli security personnel were prosecuted for committing abuses, but international and Israeli human rights groups complained of lack of disciplinary action in a large number of cases. The Israeli Government continued construction of a security barrier along parts of the Green Line (the 1949 Armistice line) and in the West Bank. The PA alleged that the routing of the barrier resulted in the taking of land, isolating residents from hospitals, schools, social services, and agricultural property. Israel asserts that it has sought to build the barrier on public lands where possible, and where private land was used, provided opportunities for compensation. Palestinians filed a number of cases with the Israeli Supreme Court challenging the routing of the barrier. In June, the Court ruled that a section of the barrier must be rerouted; determining that the injury caused by the routing of the barrier did not stand in proper proportion to the security benefits; various portions of the barrier route were rerouted. On July 9, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion, concluding that ‘‘The construction of the wall built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem . . . and its associated regime, are contrary to international law.’’ . . . Israeli law, as interpreted by a 1999 High Court of Justice decision, prohibited torture and several interrogation techniques, such as violent shaking, holding and tying of prisoner in painful positions, shackling, sleep deprivation, covering the prisoner’s head with a sack, playing loud music, and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures, but allowed ‘‘moderate physical pressure’’ against detainees considered to possess information about an imminent attack. However, CATI and the Physicians for Human Rights in Israel (PHR) reported that techniques prohibited by the law were used against Palestinian detainees during interrogation and that security forces often beat Palestinians during arrest and transport. Israeli law prohibits the admission of forced confessions, but most convictions in security cases were based on confessions made before legal representation was available to defendants.

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. . . Under applicable occupation orders, Israeli security personnel may arrest without warrant or hold for questioning a person suspected of having committed or to be likely to commit a security related offense. Israeli Military Order 1507 permits the Israeli army to detain persons for 10 days, during which detainees are barred from seeing a lawyer or appearing before court. Administrative detention orders could be issued for up to 6-month periods and could be renewed indefinitely by judges. No detainee has ever successfully appealed a detention order. Israeli military Order 1369 provides for a 7 year prison term for anyone who does not respond to a special summons in security cases. Suspects are entitled to an attorney, but this can be deferred during the interrogation phase, which sometimes lasts up to 90 days. Israeli authorities stated that they attempted to post notification of arrests within 48 hours, but senior officers may delay notification for up to 12 days. Additionally, a military commander may appeal to a judge to extend this period in security cases for an unlimited period, and many families reported serious problems in learning of the status and whereabouts of prisoners. Evidence used at hearings for administrative detentions in security cases was often unavailable to the detainee or his attorneys due to security classification. While Israeli citizen prisoners 17 years and younger were separated from adult prisoners, Palestinian prisoners 16 years and older were treated and housed as adults. The ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] reported that, as of October 31, the government held 522 Palestinians of age 17 or younger; the youngest was 12 years old. The ICRC reported that most Palestinian minors were held in Hasharon and Ofek prisons; all had access to organized education provided by the Ministry of Education. Not all minors were separated from adults, but according to the ICRC, this situation was designed to keep families together or for minors to be close to home. The ICRC examined such cases on an individual basis. . . . The Israeli Government maintained that it held no political prisoners, but Palestinians claimed that administrative detainees were political prisoners . . . Palestinians claimed that security detainees held under Israeli security detention military orders were in fact political prisoners. At year’s end the Mandela Institute estimated Israel held 10,633 Palestinian security prisoners. B’Tselem’s end of year report said there were 9,075 Palestinians in custody as of November, 738 of whom were in administrative detention. One illustrative case reportedly was Ziyad Hmeidan, an employee of AlHaq, a Palestinian NGO, arrested in May 2005 and subsequently detained without charge. His petition for release in September was rejected by the High Court; at year’s end Al-Haqplanned further petitions in Hmeidan’s behalf. Also, Hassan Zaga, field worker for PCATI, was released on November 15 after his January 11 arrest and detention without charge. . . . Israeli law provides for an independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this in practice. Palestinians accused of security offenses usually were tried in military courts. Security offenses are comprehensively defined and may include charges as varied as rock throwing or membership in outlawed terrorist organizations, such as Hamas or the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine]. Military prosecutors brought charges. Serious charges were tried before three-judge panels; lesser offenses were tried before one judge. The Israeli military courts rarely acquitted Palestinians of security offenses, but sentences in some cases were reduced on appeal. Israeli military trials followed evidentiary rules that were the same as those in regular criminal cases. Convictions may not be based solely on confessions, although, in


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practice, some security prisoners were convicted on the basis of alleged coerced confessions of themselves and others. The prosecution must justify closing the proceedings to the public in security cases. The accused is entitled to counsel, and a judge may assign counsel. Charges are made available to the defendant and the public in Hebrew, and the court may order that the charges be translated into Arabic, if necessary. Defendants had the right to appeal through the Military High Court or to the Civilian High Court of Justice in certain instances. The court may hear secret evidence in security cases that is not available to the defendant or his attorney. However, a conviction may not be based solely on such evidence. Trials sometimes were delayed for very extended periods, because Israeli security force witnesses did not appear, the defendant was not brought to court, files were lost, or attorneys were delayed by travel restrictions (see Section 2.d.). Palestinian legal advocates alleged that these delays were designed to pressure defendants to settle their cases. . . . Palestinians transferred to prisons in Israel had difficulty obtaining legal representation because only Israeli citizens or Palestinian lawyers with Jerusalem identification cards were permitted to visit them. Lawyers said they had better access to clients than in previous years. Israeli authorities in some instances scheduled appointments but then moved the prisoners to other prisons to delay lawyer-client meetings for as long as 90 days. . . . According to the PA Ministry of Health, the Palestine Red Crescent Society, and B’tselem, at least 800 Palestinians were killed during the course of Israeli military and police operations during (2004). The PA Ministry of Health estimated that approximately half of those killed were noncombatants. B’tselem reported a figure of 452 innocent Palestinians killed this year. The IDF stated that the majority of Palestinians killed were armed fighters or persons engaged in planning or carrying out violence against Israeli civilian and military targets. According to the PRCS, IDF operations resulted in injuries to approximately 4,000 Palestinians. . . . The IDF (has) conducted numerous military incursions into Palestinian population centers, in response to Palestinian mortar and antitank fire. These actions often resulted in civilian casualties. Israeli forces fired tank shells, heavy machine-gun rounds, and rockets from aircraft at targets in residential and business neighborhoods where Palestinian gunfire was believed to have originated. Palestinians often used civilian homes to fire upon Israeli forces and booby-trapped civilian homes and apartment buildings. In response to these actions, the IDF usually raided, and often leveled, these buildings.147

ISRAELI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILE DEFENSES Israel’s nuclear capabilities and other efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction are some of its most secret and most controversial force developments. Although there have been many unclassified reports on such developments, only a few have been credible and these have consisted largely of reports on its missile forces or nuclear activities that took place several decades ago. Many of the estimates of Israel’s nuclear weapons trace back to rough estimates made a decade ago. No official Israeli data or credible outside report data have emerged on the details of Israel’s strategic doctrine, targeting plans, or systems for planning and executing nuclear strikes, or

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how these have changed in recent years. However, a great deal of speculation has emerged over how Israel might act in a war or crisis. Figure 7.8 provides an estimate of Israel’s capabilities. It should be stressed again that all of the estimates of this kind provided are highly uncertain and heavily dependent upon unclassified sources and the views of outside experts, Probable Israeli Capabilities Israel’s biological weapons programs seem to be largely defensive, but advanced defensive programs provide the technology base for weapons production and Israel has advanced civil biotechnology and pharmaceutical programs with extensive dual capability to produce such weapons. There is no public evidence that the IDF has organized and trained for more than defensive chemical warfare. However, Israel has been detected importing significant amounts of precursors for chemical weapons. It does seem highly likely that Israel can target virtually any Arab state and Iran with long-range missiles and deliver nuclear strikes using such missiles, as well as by air using air-to-surface missiles. Israel almost certainly has ‘‘boosted’’ nuclear weapons with yields of 100 kilotons or more and may have thermonuclear weapons. Israel probably has enough nuclear weapons, and a stock of weapons with low enough yields, so that it can use its nuclear strike capabilities against both cities and populations and military area targets and critical civilian facilities. There is no way to determine Israeli plans and targeting, but the fact that Israel’s population is so small and concentrated may well mean that any retaliatory attack in response to the use of highly lethal weapons of mass destruction against Israel’s population would take the form of massive retaliation against the enemy’s continuity of government, economy recovery capability, and population. It seems highly likely that Israel has long had tactical nuclear weapons. Israel is well aware of U.S., NATO, French, and former Soviet Union (FSU) doctrine and planning for the use and employment of such weapons and probably has low-yield weapons it can use in close proximity to its own territory and forces. In any case, airbursts of high-yield nuclear weapons largely eliminate fallout and allow the use of nuclear weapons under the same conditions. Israel has acquired and developed intelligence satellites that could provide highly advanced targeting data for missile and air strikes, with some near-real-time capability. As was seen earlier, it has also acquired ballistic missile defense capabilities, although the real-world operational capability of such defenses is uncertain. Israel’s testing programs have been minimal, and it has had to place an extraordinary reliance on engineering forecasts of effectiveness in moving to production and deployment. The current missile and air forces Israel would probably use to deliver nuclear strikes are somewhat vulnerable to air and missile attack. The survivability and effectiveness of such strikes is uncertain, and such threats would currently come from Iran or Arab states, which can use only chemical or conventional bombs and warheads. There are also indications that Israel relies on dispersal in a major crisis, and it


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Figure 7.8 Israel’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction

Delivery Systems • Israel has done technical work on a terrain contour matching-type smart warhead. It has examined cruise missile guidance developments using GPS navigation systems. This system may be linked to a submarine launch option. • As part of its first long-range missile force, Israel deployed up to 50 ‘‘Jericho I’’ (YA-1) missiles in shelters on mobile launchers with up to a 400-mile range with a 2,200pound payload and with possible nuclear warhead storage nearby. These missiles were near copies of the two-stage, solid-fueled, French MD-620 missile. Some reports claim the first 14 were built in France. (Some reports give the range as 500 km.) • NTI reports, ‘‘It appears that some time in the early 1970s, Israel took over production and testing of the missile and by 1978 had domestically constructed around 50 Jericho-I missiles. Previously France had delivered 14 complete missiles to Israel. There are conflicting reports as to when the Jericho-I entered service. Some sources indicated that the Jericho-I was deployed with nuclear warheads during the 1973 war with Egypt and Syria. Other sources, however, indicate that at the time, the Jericho-I still suffered from problems with guidance and control and was not yet operational. Those problems, however, may have had more to do with insufficient accuracy to deliver a nuclear warhead and the missile may have been deployed during the 1973 war even with the knowledge that its accuracy was unreliable.. . . . There seems to be no dispute though that the Jericho-I was designed to deliver nuclear warheads, despite Israel’s policy of opacity with regards to its status as a nuclear weapon state.’’148 • Israel is thought to have conventional, chemical, and nuclear warheads for the Jericho I. • The current deployment of the ‘‘Jericho I’’ force is unclear. Some sources say it has been phased out for the Jericho II missile.149 • Israel has since gone far beyond the Jericho I in developing long-range missile systems. It has developed and deployed the ‘‘Jericho II’’ (YA-2). • The Jericho II began development in the mid-1970s and had its first tests in 1986.150 Israel carried out a launch in mid-1986 over the Mediterranean that reached a range of 288 miles (460 km). It seems to have been tested in May 1987. A flight across the Mediterranean reached a range of some 510 miles (820 km), landing south of Crete.151 Another test occurred on September 14, 1989. • The Nuclear Threat Initiative reports, ‘‘Some reports indicate that Israel began production of the two-stage Jericho-II ballistic missile as early as 1977. Other sources place the date several years later. In either case, Israel conducted several test-flights of the Jericho-II in the 1980s and 1990s. The Jericho-II was reported by a source to have entered service in 1989. However, during the first Persian Gulf War, Israel apparently balked at U.S. suggestions to limit any response to Iraqi Scud attacks to ballistic missile strikes in part because the Jericho was not yet fully operational. The Jericho-II is reported to have a range of between 1,500 and 3,500 km, depending on payload weight. It is said to be deployed in underground caves and silos primarily at the Zachariah facility . . . . Much of the information about the Jericho-II has been

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gleaned from observation of launches of the Shavit space launch vehicle (SLV). The Shavit is a three-stage, solid-propellant launcher designed to carry payloads up to 250 kg into low earth orbit. It was speculated for some time that the first two stages of the Shavit were the Jericho-II. This was confirmed in 2001 when a spokesman for the Israeli Defense Forces admitted that the ‘‘Shavit is Jericho.’’ Shavit launches are conducted from the Palmachim airbase near Tel Aviv. The first launch was in September 1988 and placed a satellite, the Ofeq-1, into orbit. The most recent launch was in June 2001 and placed the Ofeq-5 spy satellite in orbit.’’152 • Israel launched a missile across the Mediterranean that landed about 250 miles north of Benghazi, Libya. The missile flew over 800 miles, and U.S. experts felt it had a maximum range of up to 900–940 miles (1,450 km)—which would allow the Jericho II to cover virtually all of the Arab world and even the southern former Soviet Union.153 • The most recent version of the missile seems to be a two-stage, solid-fueled missile with a range of up to 900 miles (1,500 km) with a 2,200-pound payload. • Commercial satellite imaging indicates the Jericho II missile may be 14 m long and 1.5 m wide. Its deployment configuration hints that it may have radar area guidance similar to the terminal guidance in the Pershing II and probably has deployed these systems. • Some Jericho IIs may have been brought to readiness for firing during the Gulf War. • Israel began work on an updated version of the Jericho II no later than 1995 in an effort to stretch its range to 2,000 km. At least part of this work may have begun earlier in cooperation with South Africa. There have been unconfirmed reports of a Jericho III missile. • Israel is also seeking technology to improve its accuracy, particularly with gyroscopes for the inertial guidance system and associated systems software. • Israel is actively examining ways to lower the vulnerability of its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. These include improved hardening, dispersal, and the use of airlaunched and sea-based delivery systems. • There are reports that Israel is developing a Jericho III missile, based on a booster it developed with South Africa in the 1980s. • The tests of a longer-range missile seem to have begun in the mid-1980s.154 A major test of such a booster seems to have taken place on September 14, 1989, and resulted in extensive reporting on such cooperation in the press during October 25 and 26, 1989. • It is possible that both the booster and any Israeli-South African cooperation may have focused on satellite launches.155 Since 1994, however, there have been numerous reports that Israel was seeking a missile with a range of at least 4,800 km, and which could fully cover Iran and any other probable threat. • Jane’s estimated that the missile has a range of up to 5,000 km and a 1,000-kg warhead. This estimate is based largely on a declassified Defense Intelligence Agency estimate of the launch capability of the Shavit booster that Israel tested on September 19, 1988.156


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• Reports of how Israel deploys its missiles differ. Initial reports indicated that 30–50 Jericho I missiles were deployed on mobile launchers in shelters in the caves southwest of Tel Aviv. A source claimed in 1985 that Israel had 50 missiles deployed on mobile erector launchers in the Golan Heights on launchers on flat cars that could be wheeled out of sheltered cases in the Negev. (This latter report may confuse mobile missile launchers with the rail transporter used to move missiles from a production facility near Be’er Yaakov to a base at Kefar Zeharya, about 15 km south of Be’er Yaakov. • More recent reports indicate that Jericho II missiles are located in 50 underground bunkers carved into the limestone hills near a base near Kefar Zeharya. The number that are on alert, command and control and targeting arrangements, and the method of giving them nuclear warheads have never been convincingly reported.157 • Jane’s Intelligence Review published satellite photos of what it said was a Jericho II missile base at Zachariah (God remembers with a vengeance) several miles southeast of Tel Aviv in September 1997.158 According to this report, the transport-erector-launcher (TEL) for the Jericho II measures about 16 m long by 4 m wide and 3 m high. The actual missile is about 14 m long and 1.5 m wide. The TEL is supported by three support vehicles, including a guidance and power vehicle. The other two vehicles include a communications vehicle and a firing-control vehicle. This configuration is somewhat similar to that used in the U.S. Pershing II IRBM system, although there are few physical similarities. • The photos in the article show numerous bunkers near the TEL and launch pad, and the article estimates a force of 50 missiles on the site. It also concludes that the lightly armored TEL would be vulnerable to a first strike, but that the missiles are held in limestone caves behind heavy blast-resistant doors. It estimates that a nuclear-armed M9 or Scud C could destroy the launch capability of the site.159 • The same article refers to nuclear weapons bunkers at the Tel Nof airbase, a few kilometers to the northwest. The author concludes that the large number of bunkers indicates that Israel may have substantially more nuclear bombers than is normally estimated—perhaps up to 400 weapons with a total yield of 50 megatons.160 • 76 F-15s, 232 F-16s, 20 F-4Es, and 50 Phantom 2000 fighter-bombers capable of long-range refueling and of carrying nuclear and chemical bombs. • Israel bought some Lance missile launchers and 160 Lance missiles from the United States in the 1970s. The United States removed them from active duty during 1991– 1994. The status of the Israeli missiles is unknown. • The IISS reports that Israel currently has some 20 Lance launchers in storage. • The Lance has a range of 130 km with a 450-kg payload. • Reports indicate that Israel has developed conventional cluster munitions for use with the Lance rocket. • Reports of a May 2000 test launch seem to indicate that Israel has a cruise missile with a range of 1,500 km capable of being launched from its new Dolphin-class, Germanbuilt submarines.161 • It is believed that such a cruise missile, an extended-range, turbofan powered variant of the Popeye cruise missile, called the Popeye Turbo, can carry a nuclear warhead.

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• There are reports of the development of a long-range, nuclear-armed version of Popeye with GPS guidance and of studies of possible cruise missile designs that could be both surface ship and submarine based. • A variant of the Popeye air-to-surface missile is believed to be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon payload. • The MAR-290 rocket with a 30-km range is believed to be deployed. • MAR-350 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 56 miles and a 735-pound payload capacity are believed to have completed development or to be in early deployment. • Israel was seeking supercomputers for Technion (Israel Institute of Technology) (designing ballistic missile RVs), Hebrew University (may be engaged in hydrogen bomb research), and Israeli Military Industries (maker of Jericho II and the Shavit booster). • Israel’s current review of its military doctrine seems to include a review of its missile basing options and the study of possible hardening and dispersal systems. There are also reports that Israel will solve its survivability problems by deploying some form of nuclear-armed missile on its new submarines. Chemical Weapons • Israel is reported to have begun chemical weapons research in 1948. Some reports that its chemical and biological weapons efforts were merged in 1952 as part of the creation of the Israel Institute for Biological Research at Nes Tona. • Some reports say a ‘‘crash’’ chemical weapons production effort began in 1955. • Reports of a mustard and nerve gas production facility established in 1982 in the restricted area in the Sinai near Dimona seem incorrect. May have additional facilities. May have capacity to produce other gases. Probable stocks of bombs, rockets, and artillery. • Extensive laboratory research into gas warfare and defense. • An El Al 747-200 cargo plane crashed in southern Amsterdam on October 4, 1992, killing 43 people in the apartment complex it hit. This led to extensive examination of the crash, and the plane was found to be carrying 50 gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate, a chemical used to make sarin nerve gas. The chemical had been purchased from Solkatronic Chemicals in the United States and was being shipped to the Israel Institute for Biological Research. It was part of an order of 480 pounds of the chemical. Two of the three other chemicals used in making sarin were shipped on the same flight. Israel at first denied this and then claimed it was being imported only to test gas masks.162 • Israel did sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993, but has never ratified it. • In 1998, Israel chose not to expand the facilities at the Israel Institute for Biological Research at Nes Tona because of concerns for the risk to the local population. It may later have constructed a new, remote site.


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• Israel may have the contingency capability to produce at least two types of chemical weapons and has certainly studied biological weapons as well as chemical ones. According to one interview with an Israeli source of unknown reliability, Israel has mustard gas, persistent and nonpersistent nerve gas, and may have at least one additional agent. • Development of defensive systems includes Shalon Chemical Industries protection gear, Elbit Computer gas detectors, and Bezal R&D aircrew protection system. • Extensive field exercises conducted in chemical defense. • Gas masks were stockpiled and then distributed to the population with other civil defense instructions during the first and second Gulf wars. • Warhead delivery capability for bombs, rockets, and missiles, but none now believed to be equipped with chemical agents. • An unconfirmed October 4, 1998, report in the Sunday Times (London) quotes military sources as stating that Israeli F-16s had been modified to carry out attacks using chemical and biological weapons produced at the Nes Ziona facility.163 • No firm evidence Israel has stockpiled chemical weapons or has gone beyond improving its defense and decontamination capabilities. Biological Weapons • Extensive research into weapons and defense. Ben Gurion initiates a search for experts as early as April 1948. A center called HEMED BEIT is reported to be established, but any biological weapons activity is never confirmed. • Ready to quickly produce biological weapons, but no reports of active production effort. • According to some reports, Israel revitalized its chemical warfare facilities south of Dimona in the mid-1980s, after Syria deployed chemical weapons and Iraq began to use these weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. • Israel has at least one major research facility with sufficient security and capacity to produce both chemical and biological weapons.164 There are reports that HEMED BEIT was replaced in 1952 by a biological weapons research facility at the Israel Institute for Biological Research at Nes Tona, about 12 miles south of Tel Aviv, and that this same facility also has worked on the development and testing of nerve gas. This facility has created enough public concern in Israel so that the mayor of Nes Tona has asked that it be moved away from populated areas. The facility is reported to have stockpiled anthrax and to have provided toxins to Israeli intelligence for use in covert operations and assassinations such as the attempt on a Hamas leader in Jordan in 1997.165 • The Israel Institute for Biological Research is located in a 14-acre compound. It has high walls and exceptional security and is believed to have a staff of around 300, including 120 scientists. A former deputy head, Marcus Klingberg, served 16 years in prison for spying for the former Soviet Union. • U.S. experts privately state that Israel is one of the nations included in U.S. lists of nations with biological and chemical weapons. They believe that Israel has at least some

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stocks of weaponized nerve gas, although they may be stored in forms that require binary agents to be loaded into binary weapons. • They believe that Israel has fully developed bombs and warheads capable of effectively disseminating dry, storable biological agents in micropowder form and has agents considerably more advanced than anthrax. Opinion differs over whether such weapons are actively loaded and deployed. Unconfirmed reports by the Sunday Times (London) claimed that IAF F-16s are equipped for strikes using both these weapons and chemical weapons.166 • No firm evidence Israel has stockpiled biological weapons or has gone beyond improving its defense and decontamination capabilities. Nuclear Weapons • Uranium exploration began in the Negev as early as 1949; Israeli Atomic Energy Commission began to discuss nuclear option in 1952. Cooperation with France in nuclear reactor design and technology began in the 1950s. French-Israeli construction of a reactor in Dimona—whose actual capacity was much larger than its announced capacity, began in 1957. The United States detected the project in 1958 and visited the reactor during the 1960s, but Israel concealed its true output and performance characteristics. • Britain sells 20 tons of heavy water to Israel in 1959–1960. It also sells beryllium and lithium-6. These sales are critical to bringing the kind of reactor Israel needs on-line and are potentially useful in easing its problems in producing ‘‘boosted’’ fission and fusion weapons. • Possible nuclear test (implosion proof of principle or ‘‘zero yield’’) in the Negev on November 2, 1966. • By 1968, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) publicly estimated that Israel had nuclear weapons. It estimated that Israel had 10–20 nuclear weapons. • By 1986, leaks by Mordecai Vanunu, and from other sources, led to estimates that Israel had some 100–200 fission weapons. The possibility existed that it had ‘‘boosted’’ fission weapons with yields in the 60–100 kiloton (KT) range. • October 1973: reports that Prime Minister Golda Meir orders the IDF to assemble nuclear weapons for delivery in response to Egyptian and Syrian attacks and that Jericho missiles at Hirbat Zachariah and nuclear strike F-4s at Tel Nof are armed. • Reports of joint nuclear test with South Africa in 1979, but never confirmed. Israel does seem to have cooperated with South Africa in missile design and booster testing. • The director of the CIA indicated in May 1989 that Israel may be seeking to construct a thermonuclear weapon. • June 2000: reports begin to surface that Israel will arm submarines with nuclear-armed cruise or ballistic missiles. Such reports have continued ever since. Reports that Israel had modified the Harpoon cruise missile to have nuclear warheads have been regularly repeated since 2003. Germany sells Israel advanced Dolphin-class submarines in 2005. • Israel has two significant reactor projects: the 5 megawatt highly enriched uranium light-water IRR I reactor at Nahal Soreq and the 75–200 megawatt heavy-water IRR-2


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natural uranium reactor used for the production of fissile plutonium material at Dimona. Only the IRR-1 is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. • Dimona has conducted experiments in pilot scale laser and centrifuge enrichment, purifies uranium dioxide (UO2), converts uranium hexafluoride (UF6), and fabricates fuel for weapons purpose. • Uranium phosphate mining in the Negev, near Beersheba, and yellowcake is produced at two plants in the Haifa area and one in southern Israel. • Pilot-scale heavy water plant operating at Rehovot. • Estimates of numbers and types of weapons differ sharply. • No agreement exists over the plutonium output from the reactor at Dimona, which is reported at power outputs of 75–200 megawatts. Satellite photos indicate that output is more likely to be below 140 megawatts. • Stockpile of at least 60–80 plutonium weapons. • May have well over 100 nuclear weapons assemblies, with some weapons with yields over 100 kilotons. • U.S. experts believe Israel has highly advanced implosion weapons. Known to have produced lithium-6, allowing production of both tritium and lithium deuteride at Dimona. Facility no longer believed to be operating. • Some weapons may be extended-range variants or have variable yields. • Stockpile of up to 300–400 weapons is possible. Lower limit could be 70–100. • There exists a possibility that Israel may have developed thermonuclear warheads. • Major weapons facilities include production of weapons-grade plutonium at Dimona, nuclear weapons design facility at Nahal Soreq (south of Tel Aviv), missile test facility at Palmachim, nuclear armed missile storage facility at Kefar Zekharya, nuclear weapons assembly facility at Yodefat, and tactical nuclear weapons storage facility at Eilabun in eastern Galilee. Missile Defenses • Patriot missiles with future PAC-3 upgrade to reflect lessons of the Gulf War. • Arrow 2 two-stage antiballistic missile system with slant intercept ranges at altitudes of 8–10 and 50 km, speeds of up to Mach 9, plus possible development of the Rafal AB-10 close-in defense missile with ranges of 10–20 km and speeds of up to Mach 4.5. Taas rocket motor, Rafael warhead, and Tadiran BM/C4I system and ‘‘Music’’ phased array radar. • Israel plans to deploy three batteries of the Arrow to cover Israel, each with four launchers, to protect up to 85 percent of its population. The first battery was deployed in early 2000, with an official announcement declaring the system operational on March 12, 2000. • The Arrow program has three phases: • Phase I: Validate Defense Concept and Demonstrate Pre-prototype Missile. • Fixed price contract: $158 million.

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• The United States pays 80 percent, Israel pays 20 percent. • Completed in December 1982. • Phase II: Demonstrate lethality; develop and demonstrate tactical interceptor and launcher. • Fixed price contract: $330 million. • The United States pays 72 percent, Israel pays 28 percent. • Began in July 1991. • Successfully completed. • Phase III: Develop and integrate tactical system, conduct weapon system tests, and develop and implement interoperability. • Program cost estimated at $616 million. • The United States pays 48 percent, Israel pays 52 percent. • Began in March 1996. • System integration in progress. • The Arrow will be deployed in batteries as a wide area defense system with intercepts normally at reentry or exoatmospheric altitudes. Capable of multitarget tracking and multiple intercepts. • Israel has designed the Nautilus laser system for rocket defense in a joint project with the United States. It has developed into the Theater High Energy Laser. The project has recently been expanded to include interception of not only short-range rockets and artillery, but also medium-range Scuds and longer-range missiles such as Iran’s Shahab series. • Israel is examining the possibility of boost-phase defenses. The Rafael Moab UAV forms part of the Israeli Boost-Phase Intercept System. This is intended to engage ballistic missiles soon after launch, using weapons fired from a UAV. Moab would launch an improved Rafael Python 4 air-to-air missile. Range is stated as 80–100 km depending on the altitude of release. Advanced Intelligence Systems • Israeli space program to date: Satellite Ofeq 1 Ofeq 2

Launch Date 9/19/1988 4/3/1990

Ofeq 3

4/5/1995

Ofeq 4 (Eros A)

1/22/1998

Eros A1

12/5/2000

Ofeq 5

5/28/2002

Status Decayed 1/14/1989 Decayed 7/9/1990

Function Experimental Communications experiments Decayed 10/24/2000 Reconnaissance/ experimental? Launch failed during Reconnaissance/ second-stage burn commercial imaging? In orbit Reconnaissance/ commercial imaging? In orbit Reconnaissance


Ofeq-7 TecSAR

6/11/2007 1/21/2008

In orbit In orbit/Awaiting final certification

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Reconnaissance Reconnaissance/radar imaging

Note: This chart does not include Israel’s commercial communications satellite ventures.

• The Shavit launched Israel’s satellite payload on September 19, 1989. It used a threestage booster system capable of launching a 4,000-pound payload over 1,200 miles or a 2,000-pound payload over 1,800 miles. It is doubtful that it had a payload capable of intelligence missions and seems to have been launched, in part, to offset the psychological impact of Iraq’s missile launches. • It is believed that the vehicle was launched for experimentation in generation of solar power and transmission reception from space, for verification of the system’s ability to withstand vacuum and weightless conditions, and for data collection on space environment conditions and Earth’s magnetic field. • Ofeq 2 launched on April 3, 1990—one day after Saddam Hussein threatened to destroy Israel with chemical weapons if it should attack Baghdad. • This vehicle used the Ofeq 1 test-bed. Little open-source information exists on this vehicle although it is believed to be a test-bed for communications experiments. • Israel launched its first intelligence satellite on April 5, 1995, covering Syria, Iran, and Iraq in orbit every 90 minutes. The Ofeq 3 satellite is a 495-pound system launched using the Shavit 1 launch rocket and is believed to carry an imagery system. Its orbit passes over or near Damascus, Tehran, and Baghdad. • The Shavit 1 differs from the Shavit only in the use of a somewhat different first stage. This change has not significantly affected vehicle performance. The Ofeq 3 and all subsequent launches have used the Shavit 1. • Reports conflict regarding whether this was an experimental platform or Israel’s first surveillance satellite. Although it is thought to carry visible and ultraviolet wavelength imaging technology, the resolution is thought to be on the order of feet. The relatively low resolution, combined with its orbit, suggest to some observers that the satellite was capable of producing imagery of limited military usefulness. • On January 22, 1998, the Ofeq 4/Eros A satellite was launched. Due to a failure in the second stage the satellite never made orbit. Reports conflict about whether this was a launch of a military reconnaissance satellite or was intended for producing commercial satellite imagery. • The Eros A1 satellite was launched on December 5, 2000, on a Russian Start-1 rocket from the Svobodny launch site. This satellite produces commercially available satellite images. At a basic level, multispectral images with resolutions of 1.8 m can be obtained. Currently, image processing techniques can yield resolutions of 1 m. This is expected to improve to 0.6–0.7-m resolutions in the next year or two. Some reports indicate that the Israeli government is a primary consumer of Eros imagery. • A successor craft, the Eros B, is reported to have a baseline ability to produce images with a panchromatic resolution of 0.87 m and 3.5 m for multispectral images. Launch on board a Russian vehicle was expected in early 2004, but this has not been confirmed. • On May 28, 2002, the Ofeq 5 reconnaissance satellite was launched successfully.

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• Agreement signed with the United States in April 1996 to provide Israel with missile early warning, launch point, vector, and point of impact data. • Israeli Aircraft Industries, the manufacturer of the Shavit series SLV, is developing additional launchers to place satellites in polar orbits: • LK-A—For 350-kg-class satellites in 240 × 600-km elliptical polar orbits. • LK-1—For 350-kg-class satellites in 700-km circular polar orbits. • LK-2—For 800-kg-class satellites in 700-km circular polar orbits. • It is likely that these SLVs designed to place satellites in polar orbits could not be launched from Israel and would require an overseas launching site, such as the American site at Wallops Island. • On June 11, 2007, the Ofleq 7 reconnaissance satellite was launched successfully.167 • Ofeq 7, which began transmitting on June 14, 2007, would complement the 2002launched Ofleq 5, which had surpassed its four-year service life span. • The Ofeq 7’s camera is believed to be superior to the older Eros-B1 system, which, it was declared, has a resolution of 0.7 m. • The upcoming Ofeq 8 should present a major leap in image resolution and capability. • On January 21, 2008, the TecSAR reconnaissance satellite was launched successfully. TecSAR was Israel’s first radar imaging satellite and was designed by Israel Aerospace Industries. At the time of writing, TecSAR was undergoing testing under various operational modes before being declared fully operational. While no immediate data were available on image resolution, Israeli space official estimated TecSAR’s footprint to cover more than 500 square kilometers in ‘‘mosaic mode.’’ TecSAR is expected to play an integral role, along with Ofeq 5, Ofeq 7, and Eros A and B in countering potential strategic threats posed by Iran and Syria.168

certainly has capable enough sensors and battle-management systems to maintain launch on warning and/or launch under attack capabilities. There are unconfirmed reports that Israel plans to sea base some of its nuclear weapons on ballistic or cruise missiles deployed on its Dolphin-class submarines as part of a possible second-strike capability. Shifts in Israeli Missile Defenses As for missile defenses, Israel did declare that the improved Block 3 version of its Arrow ballistic missile defense system became active in April 2006, and further improvements in software are expected. It has improved its Green Pine and other radar warning and sensor systems and created a new battle-management system, nicknamed the ‘‘Cube.’’ It is working on Block 4 versions of both the Arrow and Green Pine to be deployed by 2009 capable of handling significantly greater numbers of missile tracks at the same time and intercepting incoming missiles with a


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higher closing velocity and at ranges of more than 700 km. It is believed to be developing more advanced counter-countermeasures and the ability to detect decoy warheads.169 It should be noted, however, that the Israeli missile defense test program has been limited in terms of operational data and that Israel must rely to a high degree on engineering models and estimates. While Iran has conducted some ten tests of the Shahab series since 1997 and conducted a 2,000-km test in May 23, 2006, it too might be using missiles whose accuracy and reliability would not be fully established with nuclear warheads that were largely untested. There is at least some possibility of an exchange in which the blind tried to use unproven systems to kill the blind.

8

The Military Forces of Syria

In the past half century, Syria has declined from being a major intellectual, cultural, and power center in the Arab world to a status approaching a regional irritant. Over the last two decades, Syria has also entered in a strange strategic limbo. It maintains far larger conventional forces than it can hope to make effective or modernize. At the same time, its consistent failures to modernize and reform its economy have made it fall further and further behind the pace of global economic modernization and have steadily reduced its ability to fund effective and modern forces. The Syrian forces that achieved surprise against Israel and major initial advances in the Golan Heights in 1973, and that resisted the Israeli advance in 1982, have steadily decayed in capability. It is difficult to know just how much. Syrian forces never engaged in meaningful combat in the Gulf War in 1991 and never met meaningful resistance in Lebanon. It is clear that their equipment is now often obsolete, that many of the units deployed to Lebanon became corrupt and exploited their position, and that much of the Syrian force structure is now a garrison force with little realistic experience and training. At the same time, some elements carry out realistic training, and there are armored/mechanized, Special Forces, and attack helicopter units that still maintain significant proficiency. Syria is, however, a relatively large country by regional standards, with a population of 19.3 million, and its strategic geography makes it a major factor in the regional balance.1 It has an area of 185,180 square kilometers (including 1,295 square kilometers of Israeli-occupied territory). It has borders with Israel (76 kilometers), Iraq (605 kilometers), Jordan (375 kilometers), Lebanon (375 kilometers), and Turkey (822 kilometers). It has a 193-kilometer-long coastline on the Mediterranean.2 In any case, Syria continues to size its forces as if it has the resources and access to the cheap and free Soviet bloc arms as it did during the 1970s and the early 1980s even though it has steadily less real-world offensive and defensive capability against

THE MILITARY FORCES OF SYRIA

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Israel. Syria also seems to remain ambiguous about peace negotiations. Its leaders have repeatedly called for negotiations or engaged in them, but former President Hafez al-Assad rejected a unique opportunity to regain the Golan Heights in negotiating with former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, even though its forces had already decayed to a purely defensive posture of uncertain effectiveness. This scarcely means that Syria is defenseless, cannot conduct asymmetric operations, or cannot play a spoiler role in spite of its military weakness. It retains enough influence in Lebanon to use Hezbollah as a proxy in its struggle with Israel and acts as a conduit for Iranian shipments of arms to both Hezbollah and Palestinian groups opposed to Israel. It continues to play a destabilizing role in Lebanese politics, and it has played a significant role in the insurgency in Iraq—allowing Iraqi insurgent

Map 8.1 Syria Source: Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

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groups to operate in Syria and acting as a transit point for infiltrating volunteers and arms into Iraq. SYRIA’S LONG PROXY WAR WITH ISRAEL Any discussion of Syrian military capabilities should be prefaced by the fact that Syria’s struggle with Israel has long involved asymmetric and proxy warfare. Although Syria has had relatively quiet borders with Israel for the past 32 years, it has used Lebanon as an arena for a low-level proxy war against Israel and hosted various Palestinian antipeace and terrorist movements. Syria and Iran conducted a major buildup of Hezbollah’s arms over a period of more than half a decade. Iranian 747s routinely off-loaded arms in Syrian airports, and Syria made major arms transfers of its own and provided trucks for shipping in arms and armed vehicles through the north and across the Bekaa Valley. The war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 showed that Syria could use these efforts to put significant military pressure on Israel. The Israeli-Hezbollah War also highlighted the growing impact of asymmetric warfare and the interaction between nonstate actors and the role of state actors on the Israeli-Syrian military balance. Hezbollah would never have emerged as a major force in Lebanon without Iranian and Syrian arms transfers, training, and financial support. Iran and Syria also continued to provide intelligence support during the war and some arms transfers.3 However, there is little evidence that Hezbollah has acted, or will act, as a Syrian or Iranian proxy unless its leaders feel this is to their direct advantage. The exact nature of meetings between commanders and officials from all three sides during the fighting in 2006 is uncertain, as is the exact role of the HezbollahIranian-Syrian intelligence center that began to operate in Damascus during the war. In practice, however, there is no evidence Hezbollah sought the major war that followed its raid into Israel or was pushed to fight by either Iran or Syria. If anything, Iran and Syria lost much of the medium- and long-range missile force they had given Hezbollah to no military benefit. In practice, Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria all seem to have used each other for their own goals and interests. Nevertheless, Syria and Iran projected power in ways that Israel could not directly counter and that did not create conditions where Israel could use decisive force against Hezbollah’s sponsors. Moreover, this form of power projection allowed Syria and Iran to push Israel into a low-level war of attrition without involving Syria, while it gradually transformed Hezbollah into a serious threat. Syria continues to provide logistical and financial assistance to Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other groups, and Hezbollah has heavily rearmed since the end of the fighting in 2006. Although the Syrian government denies the assistance and safeguarding of terrorists, the denial stems more from the unwillingness to recognize the organizations as terrorist organizations and not from any Syrian denial of such ties or that it provides a sanctuary for Palestinian militants and other sources of instability in the region such as some of the men who killed Rafik Hariri in Beirut.4


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INTERNAL STABILITY, ALAWITE RULE, AND THE SHI’ITE CRESCENT Syria does face problems in conducting such operations and in dealing with its neighbors. Syria is currently dominated by Alawite leaders, who represent a small sect in Islam and a distinct minority in Syria. Alawites have a strong element of Gnosticism and devotion to the Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib as part of a line of voices spread out over seven ages that act as near incarnations of God. Other sources claim that the inner core of Alawite beliefs is heavily syncretic, although the public face of Alawite practices is based on the five pillars of Islam.5 Alawites normally do not accept converts, and many of their writings and practices are secret. They are sometimes regarded as Twelver Shi’ites, but various sources describe them as ‘‘extremists’’ whose level of devotion to Ali, martyred son-in-law of Mohammed, approaches deification. Some feel Alawites see God, Mohammed, and Ali as having some of the aspects of a trinity. Syria’s demographics do not favor Alawite dominance. Syria’s population was 19.3 million in mid-2007. Some 74 percent of the population was Sunni Arab, and 16 percent was Alawite, Druze, and other Muslim sects. Another 10 percent was various sects of Christian, and there were small Jewish communities in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and Aleppo. Ethnically, the population was 90.3 percent Arab and 9.7 percent Kurdish, Armenian, and other. Foreign adventures can be manipulated as a reason for regime control, and in an attempt to create popular loyalty, but it is unclear how much support the regime would have for any major military clash, for another losing war, or even if it attempted to increase the burden military spending places on a Syrian economy. The Syrian economy is slowly beginning to develop, but still has major problems in terms of youth unemployment and underemployment. It is not clear that the present regime can survive indefinitely by juggling local alliances and maintaining the equivalent of a police state. President Bashar al-Asad has shown more economic pragmatism to date than his father, but has so far failed to make major progress in the decline in Syria’s economic position relative to Israel and make major increases in its per capita income and government services. Income distribution remains poor, Syria’s Ba’ath Party has little popular political credibility, and Syria seems to have increasing problems with Islamist internal resistance in spite of the repressive nature of its regime. Moreover, the growing sectarian polarization of the Islamic world presents additional problems for Syria’s Alawite leaders. Such leaders as President Kosni Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdullah II of Jordan, and Prince Saud al Faisal of Saudi Arabia have warned of a potential ‘‘Shi’ite’’ crescent involving Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. At the same time, Syrian Sunnis show little support for any of Iran’s religious ambitions, and it is unclear that a significant number of Syrian Alawites see themselves as having any ties to Iran and its concept of the Supreme Leader or that Syrian Alawites are seen as fully legitimate Shi’ites by Iran’s clerics.

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SYRIA’S BROADER REGIONAL ISSUES Syria has had limited success in dealing with other aspects of its regional power struggles. At one point, it attempted to exploit Turkey’s problems with its Kurds by giving aid and sanctuary to Turkish Kurdish separatists. The end result was that Turkey threatened military action and moved troops toward the Syrian border, and Syria was forced to accede to virtually every Turkish demand. Syria’s alleged involvement in the death of Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, led to international protects and a UN investigation that threatened to marginalize and distance Syria from its regional neighbors. Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia saw the attack against Hariri as a serious problem in their relationship with Syria. Despite sharp disagreements among Arabs in the past, there has been an informal understanding that assassinating rival leaders was unacceptable. Egyptian and Saudi leaders urged President Bashar al-Assad to withdraw Syrian troops from Lebanon and pressured him to cooperate with the UN investigation. This enhanced external pressure against Syria remains a major problem for the Syrian leadership, and Syrian leaders show deep concern about the risk that Lebanon might come under the control of a ‘‘hostile’’ regime. These concerns have led to continued Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs, taking sides with Shi’ites and Hezbollah, as well as both antigovernment pro-Syrian actors in the Maronite community. Syria took an active role in trying to select Lebanon’s new president in 2007, and some accused it of supporting the assassination of hostile members of parliament in an effort to shape the outcome of the election. Syria has supported a range of Sunni insurgent factions in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein in May 2003, but it again has had little success in achieving any strategic gains.6 Syrian actions have so far helped to create a Sunni fundamentalist insurgency in Iraq that is ideologically hostile to the Alawites. Syria has also had to absorb large numbers of refugees. By mid-2007, this seemed to lead Syria to place growing limits on the infiltration of Sunni fighters across its borders. It is unclear how Syria will behave in the future. If Syria reverts to supporting the Sunni insurgency, its actions may weaken the Iraqi central government and the United States, but seem more likely to provoke Iraq and the United States than to produce any benefits for Syria.7 It is more likely to divide Iraq and polarize Iraqi Arab Sunnis and Shi’ites in ways that could come back to haunt Syria’s ruling Alawite minority. THE TRENDS IN SYRIAN FORCES The overall trends in Syrian forces are shown in Figure 8.1, and the trends by service are shown in Figures 8.3–8.6. It is clear from the level and structure of Syrian forces that Syria still focuses on Israel as an enemy power, but that the resources and modernization pressures on Syrian force development have weakened Syria’s capability to fight a future conventional military clash with Israel and force it to

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Figure 8.1 Syrian Forces: Force Structure 1990

Total Manpower Active

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

704,000 ~820,000 758,800

769,600

769,600

714,600

404,000 ~316,000 296,800

307,600

307,600

292,600

Conscript

130,000

Army

300,000 ~215,000 200,000

?

?

?

?

?

200,000

200,000

215,000

Navy

4,000

~6,000

7,600

7,600

7,600

7,600

Air Force

40,000

40,000

35,000

40,000

40,000

40,000

Air-Defense Command

~60,000

~55,000

~54,200

~60,000

~60,000

40,000

Paramilitary

24,300

~108,000 ~108,000 ~108,000 ~108,000 ~108,000

Reserve

400,000

396,000

354,000

354,000

354,000

314,000

Army

392,000

300,000

280,000

280,000

280,000

280,000

Navy

8,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

Air Force

N/A

92,000

70,000

70,000

70,000

10,000

~ Estimated amount; ? unspecified amount, if any; N/A = not available. Total manpower includes paramilitary. Source: Various editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, and U.S., British, and other experts.

make shifts in its strategy and procurement effort that would include a new focus on ‘‘asymmetric warfare.’’ If the trends in Figures 8.1–8.6 are considered in the broader context of Syrian force development, they reflect the following gradual force changes:8 • Emphasize the procurement of long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction as a relatively low-cost offset to Israel’s conventional superiority while giving Syria a limited counterweight to Israel’s nuclear strike capability. There are allegations that Syria is working with Iran to achieve chemical warfare capabilities, although there has been no mention of nuclear capability acquisitions.9 • Procure substantial numbers of conventional missiles and rockets, some with considerable range, as a way of trying to compensate for the weakness of Syrian air forces. • Steadily strengthen Syrian Army capability to provide defense in depth in the area around the Golan Heights and the approaches to Damascus. • Give priority to elite commando and Special Forces units that can be used to defend key approaches to Syria and spearhead infiltrations and attacks. Many of these forces are equipped with modern antitank guided weapons and other modern crew and manportable weapons that allow them to disperse without relying on armored weapons and other systems Israel can target more easily. They are supported by attack helicopters. There has been no real change in the number of attack helicopters since 2000.10 Airdefense and antitank missile capabilities have increased continuously since 2000.11

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• Maintain a large tank force both as a deterrent to any Israeli attempt to penetrate Syria and to maintain a constant threat to the Golan Heights, even if Syria had no hope of achieving overall parity. • Use Hezbollah and Amal as proxies to attack Israel (there is no South Lebanon Army [SLA] anymore; it was disbanded after the Israeli pullout when the SLA leadership and others fled to Israel), the Golan Heights, and the Shebaa Farms area. Following the October 5, 2003, bombing of a suspected Islamic Jihad training camp near Damascus by Israel, it was speculated that the Golan Heights, in particular, could become a new battleground. However, critics of such a view argue that it would be very difficult for Syria to establish a credible resistance movement among the Syrians in the Golan Heights, mostly the Druze, since they have faced little repression. Some Druze serve in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). They contend that attacks on the Shebaa area by Hezbollah are much more likely.

The successes Hezbollah achieved during its 2006 fight against the Israeli Defense Forces have shown the Syrian military that adopting asymmetric, unconventional warfare techniques may at least partially compensate for Syria’s deficit in conventional military power relative to the Israelis. There is, however, considerable uncertainty as to just how much the IDF’s vulnerability in ‘‘irregular warfare’’ has reduced its reputation for having a clear military edge over Syria and whether Syria’s military believes it can exploit such vulnerability with any hope of success. Some sources reflect growing Syrian confidence, although such statements may be more a matter of propaganda. The Jerusalem Post quoted a top Syrian official declaring, ‘‘For years we thought that the IDF had a clear upper hand over Syria’s military . . . After the war in Lebanon we now know that this assumption was not accurate.’’12 The same idea was conveyed as well by a senior Israeli official, quoted in Jane’s Defence Weekly, who stated, ‘‘The Syrians have carefully learned the lessons from Israel’s 2006 fighting in Lebanon, primarily the effectiveness of advanced anti-tank weapons against Israeli armor and the limitations of the Israeli Air Force in suppressing rocket fire on the country’s vulnerable civilian rear . . . It is clear that, while until a year ago the thought of confronting Israel militarily was unthinkable for Syria, today there are Syrians who toy with this possibility.’’13 Some recent decisions taken by the Syrian military leaders indicate Syria is seeking to make more use of ‘‘irregular,’’ Hezbollah-like tactics in any future confrontation with Israel. Syria has recently established new commando units and is said to have increased urban and guerrilla warfare training.14 In addition to improving its capabilities in small-unit combat, Syria has also increasingly shifted its procurement priorities toward the kind of military equipment that proved valuable against the IDF in last summer’s conflict. An Israeli analyst, Ephraim Inbar, commented, Israel has absolute superiority in several fields in warfare . . . so Syria is investing in fields where it can have an edge. It has invested in recent years in anti-aircraft weapons, rockets, missiles and bunkers. The war in Lebanon proved to the Syrians that they were right to do so.15


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In March 2007, the Agence France-Presse quoted Israeli military and government sources as saying that Syria has recently deployed ‘‘hundreds, possibly thousands’’ of medium- and long-range rockets along the border with Israel, thus threatening major towns across northern Israel.16 These massive deployments have led defense experts such as Inbar to suspect that ‘‘Asad could be preparing for low intensity war, a type of war of attrition with Israel, where Syria fires several rockets against Israel without provoking full-fledged war.’’17 The Syrian Modernization and Recapitalization Crisis Syria has had limited success in its overall force modernization efforts. The manpower trends in Figure 8.1 reflect significant uncertainties and inconsistencies in unclassified sources, but do seem to reflect relatively constant manning levels after major reductions during 1990–2000. The number of conscripts is not shown, but Syrian forces seem to have a very high percentage of conscripted junior officers and other ranks. The downsizing of Syrian reserves has not been accompanied by an improvement in the level of training activity and realism for most reserves, which remain a largely paper force unless Syria has substantial time to retrain them. The educational level and technical background of Syrian conscripts has improved over time, but Syria has still not developed a modern noncommissioned officer (NCO) component in most of its forces and has only recently begun to make more effective use of its technical personnel. The IISS’s The Military Balance for 2007 reports that there are 150 Russian advisors present in Syria; if so, this total is a fraction of the number of advisors once present from the former Soviet Union.18 Figures 8.2 and 8.3 highlight some of the previous data on Syrian arms transfers and show that Syria has long faced massive problems in recapitalizing its forces and modernization. The United States no longer publishes unclassified annual estimates of Syrian arms imports, but the data in Chapter 6 have shown that Syria has increased its imports over the last four years—although scarcely at levels that allow it to overcome the impact of past underfunding or to begin to compete with the IDF in resources. Comparisons of Syrian holdings by weapons type also show that overall inventory of Syrian weapons systems and military equipment continues to age, although Syria has had limited success in modernizing selected equipment like short-range airdefense systems (SHORADSs) and antitank guided missiles (ATGMs).19 Syria’s only major conventional force improvements during the mid- and late1990s were some Ukrainian modifications for part of the T-55 tank fleet and AT14 Kornet antitank guided missiles. Some reports do indicate, however, that the Syrian Armed Forces did acquire an additional 1,500 Kornets as well as upgrade packages for up to a brigade of T-72 tanks. A successful upgrade could significantly improve the T-72’s armor while adding an attachment that would enable the tank to fire ATGMs.20 It is important to note, however, that Syria has tried to make major upgrades of its T-72s in the past with little success, and some reports indicate Syria had difficulties with the reported upgrade package.

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Figure 8.2 The Syrian Recapitalization Crisis: Part One

The Russian Connection As has been discussed in Chapter 6, Syria has not yet succeeded in negotiating major new arms agreements with Russia and other suppliers. Western companies want firm cash guarantees and are reluctant to sell to Syria. China and North Korea cannot supply the quality of conventional arms Syria needs, and any purchase of equipment that does not come from Russia will create interoperability problems that will compound Syrian weaknesses in sustainability and combined arms. Russia is Syria’s most logical source of new advanced conventional arms, particularly now that so many former Soviet bloc countries have joined NATO (North


161

Figure 8.3 The Syrian Recapitalization Crisis: Part Two

Atlantic Treaty Organization). Bulgaria, for example, could supply Syria with much of the Soviet-era replacement parts that it needs. However, an illegal sale by a Bulgarian firm of 50 sets of gearboxes and engines for T-55s in 2001 illustrates the problems Syria now faces. Bulgaria had expressed its desire to join NATO, and the country launched an investigation into the sale of Soviet armored personnel carrier (APC) parts to Syria in 2003, culminating in at least six arrests. Bulgaria hopes to rid itself of the perception that it will sell arms to almost any group interested to

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support its flagging defense industry and thus is unlikely to continue or strengthen ties with Syria.21 There were reports during the early 1990s that indicated that Syria would be able to spend some $1.4 billion on Russian arms sales between 1992 and 1994. Syria found, however, that post-Communist Russia did not make concessionary arms sales that approached the level of gifts or show the past tolerance for unpaid loans. This was a major stumbling block throughout the 1990s. Syria had piled up a massive debt over the years. It owed Russia roughly $7 billion–$11 billion for past arms purchases and a total of $20 billion for both its military and civil debt. Russia was well aware that there was little prospect that it would ever be paid, and this had a chilling impact on Syria’s ability to obtain arms.22 Russia and Syria have claimed on several occasions to have resolved the debt issue and the problems in making major Russian arms sales to Syria. However, real-world transfers have so far remained limited. Syria signed a new cooperation agreement with Russia in April 1994 for ‘‘defensive weapons and spare parts.’’ Syria held extensive new arms purchasing talks with Russia in 1997 and 1998. In February 1999, Syria announced plans to spend as much as $2 billion on a range of Russian armaments, including more antitank systems—which seem to have included deliveries of more AT-14 Kornets.23 Syria and Russia held talks in May 1999 to discuss expanding military cooperation and, in particular, to arrange the sale of Russian advanced weapons systems to Syria.24 According to some reports, Russia now seemed willing to put repayments of its debt on hold.25 A five-year, $2-billion contract was under discussion.26 According to one report, Syria requested Su-27 fighters and the S-300 air-defense system, but was offered the cheaper MiG-29 fighters and Tor-M1 air-defense systems.27 Syria and Russia held new high-level talks on military cooperation in September 1999. These talks seem to have again involved a $2-billion–$2.5-billion deal over five years, and the possible purchase of the S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) defense system, the Sukhoi Su-27 multirole fighter, MiG-29SMT fighters, T-80 tanks, and more antitank weapons. Once again, however, the contractual status of such agreements, the weapons involved, and delivery schedules remained unclear.28 New progress in resolving the military debt issue was reported again in 2005. It was reported that Russia agreed to write off 73 percent of Syria’s $13.4-billion debt in a meeting between al-Asad and Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin. This was reported to have significantly reduced the Syrian foreign debt to less than 10 percent of its gross domestic product and allowed Syria to fund more weapon acquisitions. 29 The two countries were reported to have reached six cooperation agreements, one of them focusing on military issues.30 In April 2005, it was reported that Russia agreed to a $100-million contract to sell Strelets SA-18 surface-to-air missiles to Syria.31 U.S. intelligence sources estimate that Syria signed $200 million worth of new arms orders from Russia during 1999–2002, out of total orders of $500 million (40 percent). They estimate that it signed $700 million worth of new orders during


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2003–2006, out of a total of 1,200 million (58 percent).32 Syria took delivery on $200 million worth of new arms orders from Russia during 1999–2002, out of total orders of $400 million (50 percent). It took delivery on $300 million worth of new orders during 2003–2006, out of a total of $600 million (60 percent).33 Syria seems to have gotten a Russian agreement to accelerate other military acquisition programs. According to the testimony of Gen. Yossi Baidatz to the Knesset on June 5, 2007, Syria procured Pantsir-S1E, Tor-M1 air-defense systems and Kornet and Metis antitank guided weapons systems from Russia.34 Syria also sought to improve its antitank missile arsenal by purchasing the state-of-the-art 9M123 Khrizantema, which is a more sophisticated missile than Kornet and Metis antitank weapons successfully used by Hezbollah.35 In 2007, Syria signed a deal with Russia for the purchase of six aircraft simulators: three A-level integrated helicopter simulators and three Sukhoi Su-22/24 fighter-bomber simulators.36 Russia has claimed that its arms transfers will remain limited. On June 28, 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was dispatched to Jerusalem to clarify Russia’s position on arms sales to Syria. Lavrov stated that Russian arms sales to Syria were ‘‘absolutely in line with [Russia’s] international obligations’’ and that any and all systems sold are ‘‘not destabilizing the balance [of power] in the region.’’37 Lavrov’s defense of Russian arms sales came, however, at a time when there were conflicting statements concerning the sale of MiG-31Es and MiG-29M/M2 fighters to unspecified Middle Eastern countries. The Russian export agent Rosoboronexport (ROE) denied any such sales took place, but strikingly Russian Federal Industry Agency Chairman Boris Alyoshin confirmed that there was a contract to supply upgraded MiG-31Es to a foreign customer. Meanwhile sources in New Delhi claimed that ROE was preparing to sell as many as 250 Sukhoi Su-30MKs to Iran, using Syria as a possible pass-through nation so as to provide Moscow with deniability; however, experts remain highly skeptical on this matter.38 There are also indications that Russia is seeking to bolster its strategic presence in the region. Admiral Vladimir Masorin, then commander of the Russian Navy, commented that Russia intended to send a frigate to join NATO maritime forces in the eastern Mediterranean in September 2007. Russia was interested in both protecting existing energy supply routes and increasing its own influence as a regional energy supplier. This could signal a new and more destabilizing Russian role.39 A few reports go so far as to claim that upgrades to the infrastructure and defenses of the Syrian port of Tartus are geared toward facilitating a Russian Black Sea Fleet deployment to the Mediterranean. The Russian newspaper Kommersant cited unnamed Russian Ministry of Defense sources that claimed that Tartus would come under the protection of Russian long-range S-300PMU-2 Favorit SAM systems manned by Russian personnel. Tartus’s proximity to the Turkish port of Ceyhan—the terminus for the Caspian Pipeline Consortium oil pipeline, which was opposed by Russia—is also sometimes reported to be a factor in Russian actions. Jane’s reported in August 2007, for example, some 2,000 Russian military personnel as being in Syria, training Syrian officers, along with the writing off of the majority of Syria’s debt to Moscow, and that given

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renewed Russian interest in the Mediterranean, Russia’s importance in the IsraeliSyrian military balance may need to be reevaluated.40 Future Arms Deliveries There have also been reports that Russia might seek to develop a closer relationship with Israel, but this prospect seems to have become less probable as Russia’s attitudes toward the West and Israel hardened. It was reported in 2005 that Syria was interested in acquiring Iskander-E shortrange ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The Iskander-E is the export version of the Kolomna-designed 9M72 short-range ballistic missile currently in use in the Russian military.41 It has a range of 280 kilometers (km) and carries a 480-kilogram (kg) payload, comprising either a high-explosive fragmentation warhead or 54 submunitions using inertial guidance. The missile is claimed to have a circular error probable (CEP) of 30–50 meters (m) at maximum range. If electro-optical terminal guidance is used, the CEP is expected to be a superior 5–7 m.42 Moreover, Russia and Iran signed a contract in late November 2005 for Russia to supply Iran with the TorM1 (SA-15 ‘‘Gauntlet’’) SAM systems to be delivered over the next two years.43 This sale was completed in January 2007, despite U.S. and Israeli objections. In August 2006, Jane’s reported that Syria received the first batches of the Kolomna KBM Strelets (Archer) multiple launch units for use with the 9M39 Igla (SA-18 ‘‘Grouse’’) fire-and-forget SAM system. Strelets can be integrated on a variety of land, sea, and air platforms, with the latter being helicopters for use in the air-toair role. It can be used to update fully tracked systems such as the SA-13 ‘‘Gopher’’ and can also be fitted to towed antiaircraft guns such as the ZSU-23-2 currently deployed by the Syrian Air-Defense Command.44 Some reports indicate that the Igla sale was part of discussions to sell not only these missiles, but also dozens of AT-14 Kornet-Es, AT-13 Metis, and possibly the Almaz S-300PMU medium-range lowto high-altitude SAM system.45 As for future sales, there have again been reports in Kommersant regarding the sale of MiG-31s and MiG-29M/M2s to Syria that have raised concern within the Israeli Air Force (IAF). There have also been reports of possible Russian intentions to sell Syria new Iskander missiles, which would give Syria the ability to hit anywhere inside Israel save the southernmost areas, as well as the Igla man-portable air-defense systems.46 Continuing to Go ‘‘Hollow’’ Barring massive Russian arms transfers, Syrian forces are almost certain to continue to go hollow for the foreseeable future, although moderate deliveries of advanced modern aircraft, tanks, and surface-to-air missile systems such as the S-300 could still help correct key Syrian weaknesses. It is interesting to note that Syria has not yet invested in or explored acquisitions for an integrated airdefense system.47


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Syria’s limitations will be further compounded by its problems in absorbing new equipment. These include endemic corruption, a politicized and compartmented command structure, inadequate military pay, poor manpower management, poor technical training, and poor overall training—particularly in realistic combat exercises and aggressor training. Syrian forces have inadequate combat and service support, equipment for night and poor weather warfare, long-range sensors and targeting systems, and mobile rapidly maneuverable logistics, recording, and combat repair capability. While individual Syrian officers have shown an understanding of many of these problems, Syria has never taken effective action to deal with them. SYRIAN LAND FORCES Syria’s military forces have never lacked courage, and they performed with considerable skill in the October 1973 War with Israel. Elements of the Syrian Army fought equally well during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, particularly some Special Forces, commando, and attack helicopter units. The Syrian Army has, however, suffered badly from a lack of proper modernization, poor overall command direction, corruption, and from the debilitating impact of occupying Lebanon and acting as a static defensive force in the Golan Heights.48 The primary mission of the Syrian Army remains defensive, namely, to counter Israeli attacks. In 2006, Syria organized its ground forces into two corps that reported to the Land Forces General Staff and the Commander of the Land Force. The chain of command then passes up to the Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Defense Minister, Minister of Defense, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This chain of command has become increasingly unstable in recent years. Veteran security chiefs are being systematically removed from office. In April 2004 a presidential decree changed the retirement age for generals to 62, for lieutenant generals to 60, for major generals to 58, and so on. Since 2004, the following events have taken place:49 • October—Army Deputy Commander in Chief Lt. Gen. Farouq l’ssa was dismissed; • January—Army Deputy Commander in Chief Lt. Tawfiq Jaloul was dismissed; • January—Deputies in the Defense Ministry Lt. Gen. Ahmad Abd al-Bani and Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Al-Safi were dismissed; • January 2002 to January 2005—Command of the First Corps was replaced three times; • June 2002 to January 2005—Second Corps commander was replaced three times; • June 2002 to January 2004—Third Corps commander was replaced twice.

Syrian Force Strengths and Deployments Syrian deployments have changed since the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006, but have remained postured to defend the approaches to Damascus and were close

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

enough to the Golan Heights to have considerable capability for a surprise attack. The Syrian 1st Corps was headquartered near Damascus in 2006 and commanded forces in southeastern Syria opposing Israel. The 2nd Corps was headquartered near Zabadani, near the Lebanese border, and covered units in Lebanon, but this is changing now that Syria officially removed its forces from Lebanon. The 1st Corps had two armored and three mechanized divisions. The 2nd Corps had three armored and two mechanized divisions. The command relationships Syrian Army forces would have in contingencies involving Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq are unclear. The trends in the manning, force structure, and equipment of the Syrian Army are shown in Figure 8.4. In early 2008, it had a total of 215,000 active men and was organized into seven armored divisions, including the 1st, the 3rd, the 9th, the 11th, and the 569th. Syrian armored divisions vary in size. Most have three armored brigades, two mechanized brigades, and one artillery regiment. A typical division had around 8,000 men. A typical armored brigade had 93 main battle tanks (MBTs) and 30 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), such as BMPs. The Syrian Army had three mechanized divisions that normally have about 11,000 men, but vary in structure. These divisions have one to two armored brigades, two to three mechanized brigades, and one artillery regiment. A typical mechanized brigade had 40 main battle tanks and 90 other armored fighting vehicles, such as the BMP. Syria also had one Republican Guard division with three armored brigades, one mechanized brigade, and one artillery regiment that reports directly to the Commander of the Land Forces, plus a Special Forces division with three Special Forces regiments and ten independent Special Forces regiments. Syria’s other independent formations included four independent infantry brigades, two independent artillery brigades, and two independent air tanker brigades. Its active smaller formations include one border guard brigade, three infantry brigades, one antitank brigade, one independent tank regiment, eight Special Forces regiments, three surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigades with an additional coastal-defense brigade, and two artillery brigades.50 On paper, Syria had one low-grade reserve armored unit with about half the effective strength of its active divisions, plus 31 infantry regiments, three artillery reserve regiments, and four armored brigades. Most of these Syrian reserve units are poorly equipped and trained. Those Syrian reserves that do train usually do not receive meaningful training above the company or battalion level, and many train using obsolete equipment that is different from the equipment in the active units to which they are assigned. The Syrian call-up system is relatively effective, but the Syrian Army is not organized to make use of it. Virtually all of the Syrian reserves called up in the 1982 war had to be sent home because the Syrian Army lacked the capability to absorb and support them. Syrian Main Battle Tanks Syria had a total of some 4,950 main battle tanks at the beginning of 2008, but at least 1,200 of these tanks were in static positions or in storage. Roughly half were

167


Figure 8.4 Syrian Army: Force Structure 1990

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

Manpower Active

300,000 ~215,000* 200,000 200,000

200,000

215,000

Reserves

392,000

300,000

280,000

280,000

19

22

26

26

28

28

Corps HQ

2

3

3

3

3

3

Armored Division

5

7

7

7

7

7

Mechanized Division

3

3

3

3

3

3

Infantry Brigade

2

4

4

4

4

4

Special Forces Division

1

1

1

1

1

1

Combat Units—Army

Artillery Brigade

280,000 280,000

2

N/A

2

2

2

2

N/A

1

2

2

2

2

4

4

5

5

4

4

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

9

30

38

38

39

39

Division HQ

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

Armored Brigade

N/A

N/A

4

4

4

4

Infantry Regiment

9

30

31

31

31

31

Artillery Regiment

N/A

Some

3

3

3

3

MBTs

4,050

4,650

4,600

4,600

4,950

4,950

T-55

2,100

2,150

2,000

2,000

2,250

2,250

2,100

2,150

2,000

Some stored

Some stored

Some stored

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

Some stored

Some stored

Some stored

950

1,500

1,600

1,600

1,500– 1,700

1,500– 1,700

950

1,200

1,600

1,600

1,500– 1,700

1,500– 1,700

1,100

Some

N/A

Some

Some

Some

Air Tanker Brigade SSM Brigade Border Guard Brigade Republican Guard Division Reserves

T-55MBT/T-55MV T-62 T-62K/T-62M T-72 T-72MBT/T-72M Stored

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

RECCE

500

935

800

800

1000

590

500

850

800

800

1000

590

0

85

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

AIFVs

2,350

~2,350+

2,200

2,200

2,450

2,450

BMP

2,350

~2,350+

2,200

2,200

2,200

2,200

BMP-1

2,350

2,250

2,100

2,100

2,100

2,100

BMP-2

0

100

100

100

100

100

BRDM-2 BRDM-2 Rkh

BMP-3

0

Some

?

?

?

?

APCs

1,450

1,500

~1,600

1,600+

1,500

1,500

APC (W)

1,450+

1,500

~1,600

1,600+

1,500

1,500

BTR-50

?

?

?

?

?

?

BTR-60

?

?

?

?

?

?

BTR-70

?

?

?

?

?

?

BTR-152

?

?

?

?

500

500

OT-64

Some

0

0

0

0

0

Artillery

~2,150

1,930

2,060

1,960

3,440+

3,440+

~2,000

~1,480

1,630

1,530

2,030

2,030

122 mm

600

700

850

850

D-30

500

450

600

600

500

500

100 (stored)

100 (stored)

100 (stored)

100 (stored)

100 (stored)

100 (stored)

M-1938

Some

150

150

150

150

150

ISU-122

Some

0

0

0

0

0

130 mm

650

700

600

600

800

800

M-46

650

700

600

600

800

800

152 mm

Some

70

70

70

70

70

TOWED

M-1931/37

D-20 M-1937 155 mm M-1943 180 mm S23 SP

1,150 (500 1,150 (500 stored) stored)

0

20

20

20

20

20

Some

50

50

50

50

50

Some

0

0

0

0

0

Some

0

0

0

0

0

Some

10

10

?

10

10

Some

10

10

?

10

10

150

450

430

430

500+

500+

169


122 mm

108

400

380

380

450+

450+

2S1 Carnation

72

400

380

380

400

400

T-34/D-30

36

?

?

?

50+

50+

42

50

50

50

50

50

?

0

0

0

0

0

42

50

50

50

50

50

~250+

480

480

480

500

500

107 mm

0

200

200

200

200

200

Type-63

0

200

200

200

200

200

122 mm

250

280

280

280

300

300

BM-21

250

280

280

280

300

300

220 mm

Some

0

0

0

0

0

BM-27

Some

0

0

0

0

0

240 mm

Some

0

0

0

0

0

BM-24

Some

0

0

0

0

0

Some

~908

710

710

410+

410+

82 mm

Some

200

200

200

Some

Some

120 mm

Some

600

400

400

400

400

Some

600

400

400

400

400

160 mm

Some

100

100

100

Some

Some

M-160

Some

100

100

100

240 mm

Some

~8

10

10

10

10

M-240

Some

~8

10

10

10

10

Antitank (AT)

1,300+

3,390

~4,190

~4,190+

~5,190+

2,600

Missiles (MSL)

1,300+

3,390

4,190

4,190+

5,190+

2,600

AT-3 Sagger

1,300

3,000

3,000

3,000

3,000

?

AT-4 Spigot

Some

150

150

150

150

150

AT-5 Spandrel

N/A

40

40

40

40

40

AT-7 Saxhorn

N/A

N/A

Some

Some

Some

Some

AT-10

N/A

Some

800

800

800

800

AT-14 Kornet

N/A

Some

Some

Some

1000

1000

Milan

Some

200

200

200

200

200

0

N/A

Some

Some

Some

Some

152 mm ISU-152 2S3 MRLs

Mortars (MOR)

M-1943

Rocket Launcher (RL)

Some Some (hundreds) (hundreds)

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

73 mm

0

N/A

Some

Some

Some

Some

0

N/A

Some

Some

Some

Some

0

N/A

Some

Some

Some

Some

0

N/A

Some

Some

Some

Some

1,700+

6,115

6,285

6,385

?

?

SAM

Some

~4,055

4,235+

4,335+

4,184+

4,184+

SP

N/A

55

235

235

84

84

SA-8 Gecko

N/A

N/A

160

160

14

14

SA-9 Gaskin

Some

20

20

20

20

20

SA-11 Gadfly

N/A

N/A

20

20

20

20

SA-13 Gopher

Some

35

35

35

30

30

Man-Portable Air Defense (MANPAD)

Some

4,000

~4,000+

4,100+

4,100+

4,100+

SA-7 Grail

Some

4,000

4,000

4,000

Some

Some

SA-14 Gremlin

N/A

N/A

N/A

100

100

100

SA-18 Grouse

N/A

N/A

Some

Some

4,000+

4,000+

GUNS

1,700

2,060

2,050

2,050

1,225+

1,225+

23 mm

Some

1,050

1,050

1,050

600+

600+

TOWED

Some

650

650

650

600

600

ZU-23

Some

650

650

650

600

600

SP

Some

400

400

400

Some

Some

ZSU-23-4

Some

400

400

400

Some

Some

37 mm

Some

300

300

300

Some

Some

TOWED

Some

300

300

300

Some

Some

M-1939

Some

300

300

300

Some

Some

Some

675

675

675

600

600

Some

675

675

675

600

600

S-60

Some

675

675

675

600

600

100 mm

RPG-7 Knout 105 mm RPG-29 Air Defense (AD)

57 mm TOWED

Some

25

25

25

25

25

TOWED

Some

25

25

25

25

25

KS-19

Some

25

25

25

25

25

~54

72+

72+

72+

94+

94+

36+

72+

72+

72+

94+

94+

18

18

18

18

18

18

MSL, Tactical SSM Frog-7

171


SS-21 Scarab (Tochka)

18+

18+

18+

18+

18+

18+

SS-C-1B Sepal

Some

4

4

4

4

4

SS-C-3 Styx

Some

6

6

6

6

6

18

26

26

26

48

48

SCUD B

18

?

?

?

?

?

SCUD C

N/A

?

?

?

?

?

SCUD D

N/A

?

?

?

?

?

SCUD

* HQ = headquarters; N/A = not available; Some = unspecified amount; RECCE = reconnaissance; ~ = estimated amount; + = more than the number given but not specified how much more; ? = unspecified amount, if any; SSM = surface-to-surface missile; MRLs = multiple rocket launchers. Source: Various editions of the IISS, The Military Balance, and U.S., British, and other experts.

relatively low-grade T-54s and T-55s, and only 1,500–1,700 were relatively modern T-72s and T-72Ms. The number of Syrian tanks with upgraded or add-on armor and upgrades to the drivetrain, sights, and figure control systems is unclear. Even the upgraded part of the Syrian T-72 force, however, seems to lack the advanced thermal sights, fire-control systems, and armor to engage the Israeli Merkavas and M-60s on anything like a 1:1 basis. The T-72 also performed surprisingly poorly in Iraqi hands during the Gulf War and in the Iraq War of 2003. Its armor did not prove to be as effective against modern Western antitank rounds as many expected, and its sensors and fire-control systems proved inadequate for night and poor visibility combat and could not keep up with Western thermal sights in range and target acquisition capability.

Syrian Other Armored Vehicles Syria had some 4,600 armored vehicles, of which approximately 2,450 were BMPs. Many of these armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) could supplement and support Syria’s tanks in combined arms combat and increase its potential ability to overwhelm immobilized Israeli forces with sheer mass. Only about 100 of Syria’s BMPs were the more modern BMP-2s, and experts differ on whether Syria has a limited number of BMP-3s. The BMP series is a competent design, but only the upgraded version of the BMP3 is really a modern AFV in terms of firepower, sights, and night vision devices.51 The BMP-1 is a 1960s design that proved to be very vulnerable in combat and whose weapons have proven awkward to operate. The BMP-2 is a good AFV by regional standards and can be equipped with modern ATGMs, but does have limitations. It has relatively light armor and retains many of the ergonomic problems in fighting from the vehicle and using its guns and antitank guided missile launchers as with the BMP-1. All types of BMPs have only a moderate ability to escort tanks in a combat environment where the opponent has modern sensors, advanced antitank guided weapons, and ‘‘smart’’ artillery rockets with antiarmor bomblets.

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Nearly half of Syria’s other armor included 500 low-grade BTR-152 wheeled armored patrol vehicles, a total of 1,000 BTR-50, BTR-60, and BTR-70 wheeled APCs that have good cross-country capability but limited fighting value and are hard to enter and exit, and 590 BRDM-2 reconnaissance (RECCE) vehicles and APCs. These are 1950s designs that have all been withdrawn from Russian service. These vehicles are useful as battlefield taxis, but many are severely worn and all have become highly vulnerable to the mix of antiarmor mechanisms in the IDF and the IAF. Syrian Antitank Weapons Syria has a growing inventory of relatively modern antitank guided weapons. Its more modern third-generation antitank guided missile launchers consist of 200 Milans, 40 AT-5s, some AT-7s, 800 AT-10 laser-beam riding antitank missiles, and 1,000 AT-14 Kornet Es. This is about 20–25 percent of its total holdings of some 4,190 antitank guided missile launchers. Much of Syria’s inventory, however, consists of older antitank guided weapons—the bulk of which consists of 3,000 obsolescent AT-3s. These systems require constant training for their crews to be effective, and such live-fire training exercises are generally lacking. The AT-14 Kornet E is particularly important because it is a third-generation system that can challenge the protection on much of the IDF’s armor. It was developed to replace the Fagot and Konkurs missile systems in the Russian Army and was designed to destroy modern tanks, including those fitted with explosive reactive armor (ERA). It can also be used against fortifications and entrenched troops, as well as small-scale targets. It can be fitted to a variety of tracked and wheeled vehicles and used as a stand-alone crew-portable system.52 The missiles have a five-kilometer range. Some have tandem shaped charge highexplosive antitank (HEAT) warheads to defeat tanks fitted with ERA, and others are armed with high-explosive/incendiary (thermobaric effect) warheads for use against bunkers, fortifications, and fire emplacements. Armor penetration capability for the HEAT warhead is claimed to be 1,200 mm. The AT-14 uses semiautomatic command-to-line-of-sight laser beam-riding guidance. According to Army Technology.com, the missile flies along the line of sight to engage the target head on. The tripod launcher includes an optical sight, a thermal sight, laying drives, missile launch mechanism, and missiles. The operator uses either optical or thermal sights to detect and track the target.53 There are also reports that Syria has a significant stock of AT-13 Metis-M antitank guided weapons with a range of 0.85–1.5 km. The AT-13 is a modern system that entered service in the early 1990s. It is light and small enough to be carried by its crew in compact packs over rough terrain. The system normally has a three-man crew. One carries a loaded missile launcher, and the others carry two missiles each. It can be fired from prone positions, foxholes, buildings, and from various combat vehicles, and its warhead is lethal enough to be effective against many modern tanks and forms of reactive armor, as well as bunkers and fortified positions; some have an


173

incendiary effect. It has a semiautomatic guidance system that transmits commands linked to the operator’s thermal or optical sight.54 Syria also has large numbers of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and other antitank rockets, some recoilless rifles, and some obsolete antitank guns. Most of these antiarmor weapons can defeat the armor on most of Israel’s OAFVs, and the more recent weapons systems may have some effectiveness even against Israel’s more modern Merkavas. Syrian forces would, however, have serious problems in using such weapons in the face of combined operations of Merkava tanks, suppressive artillery force, and attack helicopters and other air operations.

Syrian Artillery Syria can mass large numbers of towed artillery weapons and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). It also has a growing number of long-range artillery rockets and missiles. Syria maintains a large inventory of towed tube artillery weapons. In early 2008, these included some 2,030 weapons.55 There were some 500 undesignated weapons in storage, plus 150 122-mm M-1938s, 500 122-mm D-30s, 100 122-mm M-1931s (mostly in storage), 700–800 130-mm M-46s, 70 152-mm D-20/ML-20 M-1937s, and 10 180-mm S23 towed weapons. Many of these towed weapons are worn, and some are very heavy systems or present ammunition supply problems. All towed weapons are difficult to maneuver at anything like the rate required for modern armored warfare or to meet Israel’s ability to combine air and armored operations. Towed artillery can, however, deliver large amounts of long-range firepower from static positions and present a more difficult target once they are dug in and revetted. Syria deployed some 200 107-mm Type-63 and 300 122-mm BM-21 rocket launchers. These weapons are best suited for mass fires from relatively static positions against area targets. Such weapons could have a major impact in an area such as the Golan Heights where ranges are relatively short and where Syria normally deploys much of its artillery. At the same time, massed artillery fire has only limited lethality against welldug-in defenses and armor, and Syria lacks the sensors and battle-management systems to concentrate its artillery fire with great precision and to rapidly switch fires. Syria would also have problems in maneuvering its artillery. Only about 30 percent of Syria’s artillery consists of self-propelled weapons. At the start of 2008, these weapons included 400–475 122-mm 2S1s and 50–70 152-mm 2S3s. So far, Syria has shown only limited ability to use such weapons in rapid maneuver, to target them effectively, and to manage rapid shifts of fire with some degree of precision. Counterbattery radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other targeting systems, and battle-management vehicles and advanced fire-control systems seem to be in limited supply even for Syria’s self-propelled artillery. Syria also has over 400 mortars, many of which are very heavy, obsolete, Soviet bloc–supplied weapons.

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Syrian Rocket Forces There are no reliable estimates of Syrian holdings of long-range artillery rockets or detailed reports on their accuracy, range, and the sophistication of their warheads. Syria did, however, supply substantial numbers of such systems to Hezbollah before the fighting in 2006 and has long had 17 Soviet-supplied FROG launchers. Syria also has some 48 Scud launcher vehicles, although these may be reserved for use in long-range strike missions and ones involving chemical warheads. Syrian artillery rockets include Ra’ad rockets with a maximum range of 45 km, similar to the Iranian Fajr-3 and the Fajr-5. 56 The Ra’ad has a range of 45 km, a 45—50-kg warhead, a 220–240-mm diameter, a length of 5.2 m, and weighs 408 kg.57 Syria has also deployed longer-range 220-mm rockets. Unclassified sources do not agree on their performance. Some say that the Syrian-supplied rockets have a range of 20–29 km, while others cite an Israeli estimate of 72 km. The only imported weapons of this type known to be in the Syrian arsenal with this performance are Soviet-manufactured BM-27 220-mm rockets with a range of about 40 km.58 Syria is also reported to have deployed the 302-mm Khaibar-I (M302) artillery rocket with a range of up to 100 km and a 100-kg warhead. Israeli experts state that the size of Syrian deliveries of medium-range 220-mm and 302-mm rocket deliveries to Hezbollah came as a major surprise to Israeli intelligence in 2006, but most were destroyed before they could be used in large enough numbers to determine their effectiveness. It is not clear whether Syria has rockets with advanced antiarmor and antipersonnel submunitions, but a number of experts believe it does. A few experts speculate that Syria has systems with self-homing or ‘‘smart’’ submunitions. Syria does seem to have some unmanned aerial vehicles for targeting purposes, but its holdings are unclear, as is Syrian capability to acquire and strike targets effectively within the time windows dictated by IDF force maneuvers, concentration, and dispersal. There are some unconfirmed reports that Iran has supplied Syria with the Zelzal series of artillery rockets, and Fatah 110. These have ranges up to 220 km. Sources differ sharply as to their designation and capability. The Zelzal 1 and Zelzal 2 are generally described as artillery rockets. The Zelzal 2 is a derivative of the Russian FROG 7 and has a range in excess of 115 km and what some sources put as high as 220 km, allowing the system to reach targets south of Ashkelon from southern Lebanon. It has a 610-mm diameter, a length of 8.46 m, and a weight of 3,545 kg.59 It requires a large transporter-erector-launch (TEL) vehicle with a large target signature. The Zelzal 3 is a ballistic missile or guided rocket with considerable accuracy. The Zelzal 3 has an estimated range of up to 1,500 km and would be able to reach any target in Israel. In May 2008, Jane’s reported that Syria had undertaken large-scale production and deployment of long-range rockets. The report noted that the domestic production of Iranian 600-mm Fateh-110 missiles, as well as indigenous 220 mm and 302 mm, were among the systems in high-volume production. The Fatah-110 is guidance


175

equiped and can deliver a 500-kg warhead to an effective range of 250 km. Syria was also seen as expanding its inventory of Scud-B, Scud-C, and Scud-D SRBMs. The accuracy of these systems was continually upgraded, especially the 700-km Scud-D variant.60 Syria is well aware that Hezbollah had several tactics to help increase the survivability of its rocket forces in the face of IAF airpower. First, to limit the effect of interdiction efforts Hezbollah maintained the majority of its rocket arsenal in theater. Second, for protection, some rocket launchers were mounted on pneumatic platforms that could be lowered into holes in the ground after firing. To further lower the heat signature, crews would then cover the launcher with a fire-retardant blanket. After the Israeli response, typically in a minute or two, the battery could be raised to fire again. Crews also used timers to ensure their own safety before the missiles were launched.61 Syrian Army Air Defenses In 2008, the Syrian Army had roughly 4,000 man-portable light surface-to-air missiles, including SA-7s. It had a number of vehicle-mounted, infrared systems that included 20 SA-9s, 30 SA-13s, and 20 SA-11s. Syria’s 14 radar-guided SA-8 fire units are assigned to its air force as part of its Air Defense Command. These systems have low individual lethality, but help keep attacking aircraft at standoff distances, can degrade the attack profile of aircraft they are fired at, and have some cumulative kill probability. As previously mentioned, Russia seems to have sold Syria the 9M39 Igla and Pantsyr-SE1 (Pantsir S1-E) air-defense systems, and possibly other new air-defense systems, in spite of Israeli objections. The sale and first deliveries of the SA-18s seem to have taken place in 2005.62 Israel’s concerns go beyond the impact such systems can have on Syrian capabilities. Israel is concerned about the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah or Palestinian insurgent groups.63 The Russian sale of the 9M39 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) fire-and-forget SAM system is reported to have included APC-mounted Kolomna KBM Strelets (Archer) multiple launch units for use with the Igla. The SA-18 has a range of 5,200 m and can operate against targets at comparatively low altitudes of 10–2,500 m. The SA-18 missile has some similarities to the SA-14, but has superior range, speed, and energy of maneuver. It is reported to have a new seeker, aerodynamic improvements, and an infrared (IR) guidance system using proportional convergence logic. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the new seeker offers better protection against electro-optical jammers.64 Jane’s also reported that the Igla uses homing proportional navigation guidance, with a final course correction to deflect the missile from the target’s engine exhaust plume toward the fuselage.65 The Igla1 has a single wavelength cooled IR, and the system offers two detectors on two separate wavelengths for better counter-countermeasure performance. The Igla’s launch tubes are reported to be reusable up to five times, and the system may be used in conjunction with a lightweight electronic plotting board and radio, enabling the

176

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

operators to prioritize the targets within a 12.5-km radius.66 The Federation of American Scientists reports the probability of a kill against an unprotected fighter to be 30–48 percent, and the use of infrared countermeasures (IRCM) to degrade this only to 24–30 percent.67 A number of variants of the system have been produced, with a shorter, reduced performance version, the Igla-D, available where portability is required. Jane’s reported the purchase of the Pantsyr-SE1 (Pantsir S1-E) self-propelled airdefense gun in May 2007.68 Syria is reported to have taken delivery of 36 Russianmade Pantsyr-SE1 self-propelled short-range gun and missile air-defense systems during 2007.69 They are reported to be equipped with the latest Roman I-Band fire-control radar. Syria is reported to have at least 50 of the Pantsyr-SE1 systems on order.70 Russia has sold the TOR-1M to Iran, but reports that it has been sold to Syria remain unclear and reports of deliveries are very uncertain. If the sale does take place, Syria will possess a low- to medium-altitude air-defense weapon that can engage aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, and cruise missiles. It can operate either as an entirely independent system or be linked into an integrated air-defense network. The Russian combat formation is a battery with four transporter-launchers that carry eight ready missiles stored in two containers holding four missiles each, plus a Rangir battery command post.71 The TOR-1M is mounted on tracked armored vehicles. Each transporterlauncher system has the capability to automatically track and attack two targets simultaneously. Its effective range limits are from 1,500 to 12,000 m, and its altitude limits are between 10 and 6,000 m. The maximum maneuvering load factor limit in attacking an aircraft is an exceptional 30 ‘‘G.’’ The system also has an advanced sensor and command system. The Federation of American Scientists reports that the TOR-1M has a 3D pulse Doppler electronically beam-steered E/F-band surveillance radar that can track and attack 48 targets. Automatic track initiation can be performed on the ten most dangerous targets and reprioritized by the operator. Maximum radar range is stated as 25 km, but may be greater. Target radar surveillance is carried out on the move, but the vehicle would normally come to a halt for missile launch.72 It is not clear how these new systems will be allocated between the Syrian Army and the Syrian Air-Defense Force, but all are primarily designed for short-range defense of ground forces, and any such purchases are no substitute for the overall modernization of Syrian long-range air-defense missiles, sensors, electronic warfare, and battle-management capabilities. They can, however, provide Syria with an increased capability to force Israeli fighters and attack helicopters to attack from longer distances and avoid defense areas and to score kills against UAVs, cruise missiles, and unwarned aircraft. The Syrian Army also had well over 2,000 antiaircraft guns in early 2008, including some 650 radar-guided 23-mm ZSU-23-4s. It had 600 23-mm ZU-23s, 300 37mm M-1939s, 600 57-mm S-60s, and 25 100-mm KS-19 unguided towed guns. These antiaircraft guns have limited lethality even at low altitudes, except for the


177

ZSU-23-4. They can, however, be used effectively in ‘‘curtain fire’’ to force attacking aircraft and helicopters to attack at high altitudes or at standoff ranges. Syrian Army Training, Readiness, and Warfighting Capability The Syrian Army retains some elite elements with reasonable training and proficiency. The bulk of the army, however, is now a garrison force best suited to static defense in depth and has limited real-world maneuver, combined arms, and joint warfare training. It is largely defensive in character, lacks leadership, and has suffered from serious corruption as a result of nepotism, political favoritism, and the impact of deployment in Lebanon. The Syrian Army lacks modern tactics, still restricts the initiative of its junior officers, and has not developed an effective NCO corps or adequate numbers of technical specialists. It gives force size and weapons numbers priority over maintenance, sustainability, and recovery and repair capability. Its overall logistic and service support capabilities are suited largely for static defensive warfare, although some combat engineer and other combat support elements seem adequate. This does not mean that the Syrian Army is ineffective. Syria has also spent decades improving its terrain barriers, creating antitank barriers and ditches in order to confront any IDF advance with a war of attrition. The sheer mass of Syrian forces and prepared defensive positions would limit the depth of Israeli advance and increase Israeli casualties. Syria does have good physical defenses of its positions on the Golan Heights. Many Syrian Army units in the area between Damascus and the Golan Heights have considerable readiness and effectiveness, and Syria’s problems in battle management, large-scale maneuver, and combined arms would have far less impact in defending Syrian territory than in a war of maneuver. Similarly, a relatively static Syrian Army, operating largely from prepared positions, would be less vulnerable to Israeli air attack and to the use of smart artillery munitions. The Syrian Army, however, lacks the cohesion, flexible and responsive command structure, real-world large-scale maneuver training, integrated combined arms capability, maneuver sustainability, and rapid recovery and repair capabilities to match the IDF in open maneuver combat. It could rapidly initiate an offensive from an exercise, ‘‘defensive maneuver,’’ or other form of cover or deception, but it is not structured or ready to fight such operations effectively over time. The Syrian Army also has not demonstrated the necessary level of command, control, communications, and computer (C4), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R), and battle-management capabilities to match the IDF’s decisionmaking cycle and reaction time, much less surpass it. It has only a limited number of the technical tools and equipment the IDF has integrated into its C4/IS&R system, and it has only begun to adopt some form of ‘‘netcentric’’ warfare tailored to its capabilities and needs. Syria has not come close to Israel in developing the kind of capabilities for combined operations and rapid maneuver. Finally, as the following discussion of Syria’s air and air-defense capabilities makes clear, Syria is not prepared to fight modern joint operations and the kind of AirLand

178

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

battles the IDF showed it could fight even while experiencing its most serious operational difficulties in Lebanon in 2006. The IDF and the IAF are far better prepared for counterattack helicopter operations than in 1982. The IAF has the UAVs and other assets to maintain real-time air and artillery targeting and surveillance capabilities over the Syrian Army forces near the Golan Heights and defending Damascus, and substantial precision standoff strike capability to avoid and suppress Syrian Army air defenses. Israel also has more modern and effective attack helicopters and tactical air mobility. Modern conventional warfare, and many aspects of modern asymmetric warfare, is joint warfare. Syria has limited capabilities for such combat relative to Israel. SYRIAN AIR AND AIR-DEFENSE FORCES The Syrian Air Force (SAF) and Air-Defense Command have more severe qualitative problems than Syrian land forces. Again, courage is not an issue. Syrian Air Force pilots continued to fly what were little more than suicide missions after President Hafez al-Assad demanded that they be committed to combat in 1982 even after it was obvious they could not survive against a far superior IAF. Syria lacks significant numbers of modern aircraft, as well as the modern airborne and other command and control and sensor systems needed for today’s forms of warfare. Much of the Syrian Air Force and Air-Defense Command have aged to the point where they are more a military museum dedicated to obsolete Soviet bloc forms of air combat than a modern air force. Syrian Combat Air Strength The trends in Syria’s Air Force are shown in Figure 8.5. Although Syria possessed 583 combat aircraft and a force of 40,000 men, its 20 Su-24s were its only relatively modern attack fighter; these are export versions of the aircraft, largely limited to the technology available in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. While these Su-24s do seem to have had limited upgrades and acquired better air munitions such as the AS-7 Kerry and more modern types of air-to-surface missiles, they lack any equivalent of the avionics and precision all-weather strike capabilities of first-line Israeli attack aircraft. The rest of the SAF’s attack forces include 60 1970s-era MiG-23BN Flogger H. The Flogger H is an improved attack version of the Soviet fighter design that was the first such fighter to have a look-down, shoot-down radar and beyond-visualrange missiles. Its on-board computer, displays, sensors, electronic warfare, and fire-control systems are badly dated.73 The SAF also has a mix of 50 Su 22s (Su-17M-2 Fitters) and seven squadrons of 159 now-obsolete Mig-21 Fishbeds—a substantial number of which are probably not operational. None of these aircraft have advanced avionics or precision-strike capability, and all are vulnerable to Israeli electronic warfare. The Fitters do, however, seem to have a display to control air-to-surface missiles with a TV guidance system

179


Figure 8.5 Syrian Air Force: Force Structure 1990

Manpower Air Force Reserve Total Aircraft Fighter

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

40,000 132,00 105,000 110,000 100,000 100,000 40,000 40,000 35,000 40,000 40,000 N/A 609

92,000 70,000 70,000 60,000 661

591

632

17/311 17/310 16/289 18/390

40,000 10,000

584

583

178

178

MiG-23MLD Flogger

80

90

107

N/A*

80

80

MiG-25

30

30

30

110

30

30

MiG-25 Foxbat

?

?

?

30

30

30

MiG-25U

5

0

0

0

0

0

MiG-29

24

20

42

80

68

68

?

20

42

80

68

68

0

N/A

8

N/A

14 ?

14?

9/148

9/154

9/130

8/136

290

289

Su-7

15

0

0

0

0

0

Su-17

0

90

50

56

?

?

0

90

50

56

?

?

Su-22 (Su-17M-2) Fitter D

0

90

50

50

50

50

Combat capable

0

?

?

6

?

?

Su-20

35

0

0

0

0

0

Su-24

0

20

20

20

20

20

0

20

20

20

20

20

172

170

102

200

160

159

MiG-21H Fishbed

?

?

?

160

160

159

Combat capable

?

?

?

40

?

?

60

44

60

60

60

60

27

29

21

22

22

22

An-12

6

0

0

0

0

0

An-24 Coke

4

4

N/A

1

1

1

An-26 Curl

4

5

4

6

6

6

Falcon 20

2

2

2

2

2

2

Falcon 900

0

1

1

1

1

1

Il-76 Candid

4

4

4

4

4

4

MiG-29A Fulcrum A SU-27 Fighter Ground Attack (FGA)

Su-17M

Su-24 Fencer MiG-21

MiG-23BN Flogger H Transport

180

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

PA-31 Navajo

0

N/A

N/A

2

2

2

Yu-134

0

6

4

N/A

N/A

N/A

Yak-40 Codling

7

7

6

6

6

6

220

177

81

139

139

139

L-29

70

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

L-39 Albatros*

90

80

23

70

70

70

MBB-223 Flamingo (basic)

20

20

35

35

35

35

Training

MFI-17 Mushshak

N/A

6

6

6

6

6

MiG-17

10

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

MiG-21U Mongol A*

20

20

20

20

20

20

MiG-23UM*

N/A

6

6

6

6

6

MiG-25U Foxbat 2*

N/A

5

2

?

2

2

MiG-29UB*

N/A

N/A

6

N/A

N/A

N/A

10

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Su-7U Du-22*

N/A

N/A

6

N/A

N/A

N/A

Some

N/A

0

0

0

0

245

182

174

191

191

191

110

72

36

71

71

71

Mi-24

25

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Mi-25

35

49

36

36

36

36

?

49

36

36

36

36

50

23

Some

35

35

35

?

23

?

35

35

35

Transport

20

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Mi-4

10

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Mi-6

10

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Support

115

110

138

120

120

120

Mi-8

60

100

138

100

100

100

45

100

138

100

100

100

10

10

N/A

20

20

20

0

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

0

0

0

0

Yak-11 Helicopter Attack

Mi-25 Hind D SA-342 SA-342L Gazelle

Mi-17 (Mi-8MT) Hip H/Mi-8 Hip PZL Mi-2 Hoplite MSL Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASM) AS-2 Swatter


181

AS-7 Kerry

0

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

AS-10 Karen

0

0

Some

N/A

N/A

N/A

AS-11 Kilter

0

0

Some

N/A

N/A

N/A

Some

Some

Some

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

Some

N/A

N/A

N/A

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

AA-2 Atoll

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

AA-6 Acrid

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

AA-7 Apex

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

AA-8 Aphid

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

0

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

AS-12 AS-14 Kedge HOT Air-to-Air Missiles (AAM)

AA-10 Alamo

* N/A = not available; ? = unspecified amount, if any; * = combat capable; Some = unspecified amount. Source: Various editions of the IISS, The Military Balance, and U.S., British, and other experts

and can deliver a range of air-to-surface radio-guided or laser-guided missiles. These include the AS-7s known to be in Syrian hands and more advanced systems such as the AS-10 Karen, the AS-12 Kegler, and the AS-11 Kilter antiradar missiles.74 Syria’s 68 MiG-29s are its only modern fighters with reasonably advanced beyondvisual-range and look-down shoot-down capabilities.75 These are export versions of the aircraft with largely late 1970s/early 1980s-vintage avionics. Syria has so far shown little ability to use such aircraft effectively in training and simulated combat or to generate high sortie rates. The SAF’s other fighter-air-defense aircraft include around 80 MiG-23MLD Floggers, 30 MiG-25s, and the aforementioned MiG-23BNs and MiG-21s. The exact number of Mig-25s in service at the end of 2007 is unclear. The MiG-23 MLD is the most advanced form of the ‘‘third-generation’’ MiG-23 fighter and does have some look-down, shoot-down capabilities and beyond-visualrange combat capability. It is a good mid-1980s design, but increasingly dated. The MiG-25s are fast, high-altitude fliers with a maximum speed of Mach 3.0 and a ceiling of 90,000 feet (27,000 meters), but are mid-1970s designs that do not have modern air-to-air computers, radars, and electronic warfare capabilities. Syria does have some UAVs and reconnaissance aircraft. These include a mix of 40 MiG-21H and MIG-21J aircraft and 8 MiG-25R Foxbats. The MiG-21s have limited mission capability and are very vulnerable. The MiG-25 Foxbats have moderately capable avionics of a 1980s vintage, but their sensors are limited and the systems are vulnerable to countermeasures. They are not believed to have the side-looking airborne radar, electronic warfare, electronic intelligence, or antiradiation missile capabilities of the more advanced Russian Air Force versions of the MiG-25.

182

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Some aspects of SAF electronic warfare, electronic support measures, and communications have been modernized in recent years, but the SAF lags far behind Israel and significantly behind Egypt. Syria has no airborne early warning and electronic intelligence and warfare aircraft that approach Israel’s capabilities.

Syrian Rotary-Wing Combat Strength Syria had some 36 Mi-25s and 35 SA-342ls in service in early 2008, with up to another 35 in storage. These forces have declined in readiness and sustainability since 1982. They are still largely mission capable, but Syria has been slow to modernize its attack helicopter tactics. While Syria’s attack helicopter tactics were successful in the 1982 war, they were successful largely because the IDF did not expect them and was often trying to rush its advances without adequate coordination. The IDF has now greatly improved its counterattack helicopter training and tactics, arms its helicopters to attack other helicopters, and its antiaircraft systems and light air-defense weaponry.

Syrian Air Force Training, Readiness, and Warfighting Capabilities The Syrian Air Force is not able to compete with the IAF in any major mission area. As has been described earlier, it has very limited AirLand battle capabilities and little hope of either flying fixed-wing close air support sorties or providing active air cover over Syrian land forces—a problem compounded by the lack of any clear training and exercises to practice the deconfliction of Syrian fighters and land-based air defenses in such roles. Syrian strategic bombing efforts would probably consist of largely one-way lowaltitude missions that would have limited success against the IAF unless they were part of a surprise attack or part of some single mass wave of attacks. Some sorties might get through under such conditions, but it is unclear whether attacks with conventionally armed precision weapons could penetrate in large enough numbers to have a major impact on Israeli warfighting capabilities. The exceptions might be chemical attacks on Israeli reserve and other forces during the assembly and mobilization phases or on Israeli population centers, particularly if the Syrian Air Force was equipped with line dispensing systems. Such attacks, however, would probably still do more to provoke (and justify) massive IAF retaliation in kind than affect Israeli military capabilities. The air-to-air combat capabilities of the Syrian Air Force remain limited, and there is little evidence of realistic training for dog fighting, long-range and beyond visual range engagement, or large-scale air-to-air engagement on the scale needed to be effective. The force-on-force capabilities of the Syrian Air Force would also be severely limited by its lack of airborne warning and air control capabilities, the superior training and engagement range of Israeli fighters, inferiority in electronic warfare, and inferiority in both aircraft and avionics/air-to-air munitions.


183

The Syrian Air Force also seems to remain organized on a squadron-by-squadron level, rather than as a cohesive force, and relies heavily on centralized and somewhat slow battle management. Like many Arab air forces, Syria also seems to be placing far too little emphasis on generating and sustaining high sortie rates and rapid in-thefield repair. In past wars, the IAF has had sortie rates far higher than any of its Arab neighbors, which effectively acted as a major force multiplier. It is the number of sorties flown that count in war, not the number of aircraft on each side. SYRIAN LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSES Syria has a large separate Air-Defense Command with nearly 60,000 personnel. In early 2008, its forces were organized into 25 regional brigades and a countrywide total of 150 air-defense batteries. There were two major air-defense commands: a North Zone and a South Zone. The defenses were concentrated to protect the south, but Syria had recently redeployed some forces to strengthen the North Zone and defenses against Turkey and Iraq. Some forces were deployed to cover Lebanon.76 Syrian Air-Defense Weapons The trends in Syrian Air-Defense Command forces are shown in Figure 8.6. Syrian forces included large numbers of worn, obsolete, Soviet bloc systems that have had only limited upgrades. These 2008 assets included 11 SA-2 and SA-3 brigades with 60 batteries and some 468 launchers. They also included 11 brigades with 27 batteries that were armed with 195 SA-6 launchers and some air-defense guns. In addition, there were two regiments that had two battalions with two batteries each and which were armed with 44 SA-5s and an unspecified number of SA-8 surfaceto-air missile launchers. The SA-5s seemed to be deployed near Dumayr, about 40 km east of Damascus, and at Shansur near Homs. The SA-2 and SA-3 units have had some upgrading over time, but were effectively obsolete. They were hard to move, large enough to be easy to target, and were vulnerable to Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian countermeasures. The SA-2 is a long-range system with a range of 35–50 km, depending on the missile variant, and can strike targets at altitudes up to 27,000–40,000 feet. However, it cannot effectively strike targets at low attitudes or within 7 to 9 km of the SA-2 launcher. The SA-2 has the advantage that it is simple to operate and requires only limited specialized training. Its launchers can also be dispersed, kept semimobile, dug into pits, and left at ground level or hardened in concrete revetments. It is, however, a 1950s-era system with limited energy of maneuver, vulnerability to a variety of countermeasures, and its command links, Fan Song missile control radar, and P-12 Spoon Rest early warning radar are relatively easy to target and are subject to electronic countermeasures. The system has a high profile from a targeting standpoint.77 The SA-3 is designed to operate with the SA-2 as a low- to medium-altitude defense system capable of attacking aircraft, cruise missiles, assault helicopters, and UAVs. It too has had limited upgrading, and its missile has considerably more energy of

184

ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 8.6 Syrian Air-Defense Command: Force Structure 1990

Active Manpower

2000

2005

2006

2007

~60,000 ~55,000 ~54,200 ~60,000 60,000

2008

60,000

Surface-to-Air Missile Strength SELF-PROPELLED SA-3 Goa

392

480

560

148

148

148

SA-6 Gainful

200

200

220

195

195

195

392

480

560

320

320

320

48

48

48

44

44

44

N/A

?

?

4,000

4,000

4,000

TOWED, SEMI-STATIC SA-2 Guideline STATIC SA-5 Gammon MANPAD (Man-portable) SA-7A Grail/SA-7B Grail

Note: The unclassified reporting on Syria strength is extremely uncertain, and various sources are highly contradictory. Sources also are not consistent from year to year. The IISS estimates that Syria’s forces are organized into 2 divisions of 25 air-defense brigades with 150 batteries. The SA-5 units are reported to be organized into 2 regiments of 2 battalions each, each of which has two batteries. The figure for MANPADs is more uncertain than the others. Most are probably with the army, which includes a wide range of more modern types, including SA-14 Gremlins and SA-18 Grouse. N/A = not available. Source: Various editions of the IISS, The Military Balance, and U.S., British, and other experts.

maneuver than the SA-2. It has a 6–25-kilometer range and is effective at altitudes from 100–25,000 m.78 It is a late-1950s design, however, and the missile, its search radars, radar altimeter, and Low Blow guidance radar are vulnerable to countermeasures. The SA-3 has a TV guidance capability as a backup to its radars, but this is a line of sight system with limited resolution and seems to be vulnerable to electronic countermeasures. It is more mobile than the SA-2, but has a more limited range. It is unclear how many Syrian systems have been upgraded, but the system has been improved to maintain detection, tracking, and kill capability in spite of electronic countermeasures. It has an improved optical tracking system to avoid emitting and can be linked to radars outside the unit. Reliability has been improved, and the electronics are now solid state, digital systems. The SA-6 is Syria’s most modern and mobile major surface-to-air missile. It was an effective system in the October War in 1973, but like Syria’s other systems, has lost much of its effectiveness against the IAF since that time. Like the SA-2 and the SA-3, Israel was able to target and destroy a significant amount of the total Syrian major surface-to-air missile force during the fighting in 1982 and had great success in using countermeasures against the portion that survived.


185

The SA-6 is a low-altitude defense system with radio command guidance and semiactive radar terminal homing first deployed in the 1960s.79 Its missiles and systems were upgraded in the late 1970s, and it has a maximum effective range of 24,000 m and has a minimum effective range of 3,000 m. It has exceptional lowaltitude coverage: its minimum engagement height is 100 m when using its Straight Flush fire-control radar and 80 m when using its optical tracking mode. Its maximum effective altitude is about 11,000 m. Its fire-control radar has a maximum range of 55 to 75 km and a 10,000-m maximum altitude capability. Some units use a TV camera with a 30-km range to enable the battery to remain in action even if the vehicle’s radar is jammed or forced to shut down due to threats from antiradiation missiles. The system is, however, vulnerable to electronic countermeasures, particularly its Long Track target acquisition radar. The SA-5 is an obsolescent Russian long-range system that was originally developed in the late 1960s as a means of attacking the SR-71 Blackbird—a mission it never succeeded in accomplishing. Syria first deployed it in an attempt to expand the depth of its air-defense coverage and to force large, fixed-wing aircraft such as Israel’s E-2Cs to stand off outside the range of the SA-5. It has not been an effective system against IAF aircraft with modern countermeasures and acts only as a limited deterrent to IAF coverage of Syrian airspace and Israeli territory near the Syrian border. The SA-5’s radars are sensitive to countermeasures, but do have exceptional longrange medium- to high-altitude coverage.80 An SA-5 battalion has one 320-km range Barlock-B E/F-band target search and acquisition radar with an integral identification friend or foe (IFF) system and one 270-km range Square Pair H-band missile guidance radar. The missile is very large—which makes it easier to target—and has a minimum range of 60 km. In practice, its capabilities are limited to relatively large and unmaneuverable targets at ranges up to 250 km, and its command guidance and communications links are vulnerable to countermeasures. Shorter Range Syrian Air Defenses Syria’s 14 radar-guided SA-8 fire units are assigned to the air force as part of its Air-Defense Command. The SA-8 is a mobile medium-range system that is more modern and effective than most of Syria’s systems.81 The SA-8b is a 1980s vintage system with a maximum speed of Mach 2.4, a minimum operational altitude of 25 m, and a maximum effective altitude of 5,000–6,000 m. Its Land Roll radar has a range of about 35 km, and it has additional optical tracking and a ‘‘two missiles on target’’ capability to limit the impact of countermeasures. The system is effective enough to lead the IAF to make it a targeting priority and use active countermeasures whenever it might be present. The SA-8s have low individual lethality, but help keep attacking aircraft at standoff distances, can degrade the attack profile of aircraft they are fired at, and have some cumulative kill probability. Syria is keenly aware that Iraqi short-range air defenses proved relatively ineffective in the Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. It is aware that the IAF suffered few losses to

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SHORADS during the 2006 fighting with Hezbollah and that Israel is now equipped with standoff air-to-ground missiles, high-speed antiradiation missiles, UAVs that can target mobile and concealed systems, and extensive countermeasures. Syrian Air-Defense Training, Readiness, and Warfighting Capabilities It is not clear how much Syria has been able to ‘‘net’’ the various components of this layered, if largely obsolescent air-defense system into an integrated mix of sensors and fire units or modernize the netting, sensor coverage, and electronic countercountermeasure capability of the overall mix of its fire units, radars, optical systems, and command and control systems. It is also unclear how secure any aspect of Syria’s IFF system now is. Syria has practiced some of the remote radar, decoy and trap, and pop-up tactics Iraq attempted to use against Coalition aircraft between 1991 and 2003. However, Iraq never scored a successful kill against French, U.K., or U.S. aircraft using such tactics, and Israel has overflown Syria since 1982 on a number of occasions without losses—and most notably in the recent strike on a Syrian nuclear reactor site in northeast Syria in 2007. Some Syrian surface-to-air missile crews and subsystems are well manned and have a high degree of readiness. However, readiness is uncertain. Syria has not modernized its C4I/BM system to anything approaching a high-capability automated system, its electronic order of battle is aging, and its mix of electronic countermeasures and counter-countermeasures has gaps and vulnerabilities. Most of its major surface-toair missile systems require active radar to operate with any lethality. This makes its forces vulnerable to Israeli antiradiation missiles, target location and identification systems, and electronic warfare capabilities. Syria’s Need for Air-Defense Modernization Syria’s many land-based air defenses can scarcely be disregarded. They can force Israel to conduct a massive air-defense suppression campaign and to fly attack mission profiles that avoid or minimize exposure to surviving defenses. Syrian air defenses do not, however, have the quality necessary to match their quantity. Syria has long needed more modern and advanced surface-to-air missile systems and modernized sensor and command and control systems to support it for more than a decade. This is the only way it can develop the range of air-defense capabilities it requires. If Syria is to create the land-based elements of an air-defense system capable of dealing with the retaliatory capabilities of the Israeli Air Force, it must create a modern, heavy surface-to-air missile system that is part of an advanced integrated air-defense system. For all the reasons described earlier, such a system will not be easy for Syria to obtain. No European or Asian power can currently sell Syria an advanced mix of ground-based air-defense sensors, command and control, and electronic


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warfare components, an advanced heavy surface-to-air missile, or help Syria integrate them into an effective system. The United States and Russia are the only current suppliers of such systems, and the only surface-to-air missiles that can meet Syria’s needs are the U.S. Patriot and the Russian S-300 and S-400 series. In practice, Russia has long been Syria’s only potential source of the required landbased air-defense technology. This explains why Syria has sought to buy the S-300 or S-400 heavy surface-to-air missile/antitactical ballistic missile systems and a nextgeneration warning, command and control system from Russia for more than ten years.82 The S-300 (also named SA-10, Fakel 5300PMU, or Grumble) has a range of 90 km or 50 nautical miles. It has highly sophisticated warning radar, tracking radar, terminal guidance system, and warhead and has good electronic warfare capabilities. It is a far more advanced and capable system than the SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, or SA-6.83 Sources differ over the system’s capabilities. The Federation of American Scientists indicates that the system is highly mobile and has fast step and reaction times. It states that missile guidance is a track-via-missile type with a Flap Lid guidance radar that can engage up to six targets simultaneously and assign two missiles per target to increase kill probability. Depending on whether a radar tower is used, the system’s low-level engagement range can be extended from 32,000 to 43,200 m. There are a number of variants. The S-300PMU1 is an extended-range version of the S-300PMU with a limited antiballistic missile capability, including capabilities against aerodynamic targets with speeds up to 3 km per second. The S-300PMU2 Favorit variant is a new missile with a larger warhead and better guidance with a range of 200 km versus the 150 km of previous versions. In the mid-1990s, Russia also deployed a new 96L6E autonomous mobile radar. The Federation of American Scientists reports that the S-300PMU2 Favorit can engage aircraft and cruise missile targets flying from 10 m to 27 km above the surface at a speed of up to 10,000 km per hour.84 The S-400 Triumf is an even more-advanced air-defense and antimissile weapon. Once again, unclassified sources do not agree on many details. The Federation of American Scientists reports that it can detect and destroy airborne targets at a distance of up to 400 km (2–2.5 times greater than the previous S-300PMU system).85 The system is said to have radars capable of detecting very low-signature targets. The antimissile capability of the system has been increased to the limits established by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty demarcation agreements—it can intercept targets with velocities of up to 4.8 km per second, corresponding to a ballistic missile with a range of 3,500 km. The Federation of American Scientists also reports that the system can fire two types of missiles.86 The larger missile has a range of up to 400 km and can engage ‘‘over-the-horizon’’ targets using a new seeker head operating in both a semiactive and an active mode, with the seeker switched to a search mode on ground command and homing on targets independently. Targets for this missile also include airborne early warning and control aircraft as well as jammers. The smaller missile is designed to destroy aircraft and air-delivered weapons at ranges in excess of 120 km. It is fitted

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with an active homing head and can maneuver at altitudes of up to 35 km at forces of over 20 Gs, which permits engagement of nonstrategic ballistic missiles. These new missiles can be fired by the launchers of the S-300PMU family. As is the case of other aspects of Syrian modernization, success depends on Russian willingness to make such sales in the face of Syria’s debt and credit problems. There have been many reports since 1982 that Syria reached an accommodation with Russia. These reports may now be more credible, given Russia’s recent underwriting of Syria’s debt. Even a Russian sale of its most advanced surface-to-air missile systems would still have important limits unless it was part of a far broader effort to create a new architecture for Syria’s air-defense system to support it with a greatly improved early warning sensor system and an advanced command and control system for both its fighters and land-based air defenses. Russia itself, however, has not fully completed the integration of the S-300 or S-400 into a state-of-the-art air-defense system. Russia has limitations in its deployed air-defense computer technology and relies on redundant sensors and different overlapping surface-to-air missiles to compensate for a lack of overall system efficiency. A combination of advanced Russian missiles and an advanced sensor and battlemanagement system would still be vulnerable to active and passive attack. It would take Syria at least three to five years to fully deploy and integrate any such system into its force structure, even if Russia agreed to the sale. Its effectiveness would also depend on Russia’s ability to both provide suitable technical training and to adapt a Russian system to the specific topographical and operating conditions of Syria. A Russian system cannot simply be transferred to Syria as an equipment package. It would take a major effort in terms of software, radar deployment, personnel training, and technology—and considerable adaptation of Russian tactics and sighting concepts—to make such a system fully combat effective. As a result, fullscale modernization of the Syrian land-based air-defense system has not occurred thus far and will probably lag well beyond 2012.87 SYRIAN NAVAL FORCES As was described in Chapter 5, the Syrian Navy is the least capable of Syria’s military services. Its mission capabilities are largely limited to peacetime coastal security and counterinfiltration. It does not have the ability to engage the Israeli Navy at sea or conduct significant wartime missions. It is based in Latakia, Tartus, Baniyas, and Minet el-Baida (Al-Mina-Al Bayda). The Syrian Navy is manned largely by conscripts with 18 months of service. The IISS reports its manpower strength as 7,600 actives and 4,000 reserves, but Jane’s reports it as only 3,200 actives and 2,500 reserves. Part of the difference may be explained if Jane’s did not report the manning in Syria’s coastal-defense force. This force includes a missile brigade with SS-C-I Sepal and SS-C-3 Styx antiship missiles located at Latakia, Tartus, and Baniyas. It also has two coastal artillery battalions and two naval infantry brigades assigned to coastal-defense missions.88


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Junior naval officers receive training at the Jableh Naval Academy. Senior officers receive training as part of the normal program of the General Staff ’s center at Quabon. Petty officer and enlisted training is conducted at Minet el-Baida, Latakia, and on ship. Syria has some 4,000 naval reserves, but they have little training and warfighting capability.89 The trends in Syrian naval forces are shown in Figure 8.7. The navy had 31 surface ships in 2008. It also had three nonoperational Romeo-class submarines transferred by the Soviet Navy in 1985 and moored at Tartus.90 These submarines had long been out of commission, had no combat capability, and were little more than potential deathtraps.

Syrian Surface Forces Syria’s only significant surface ships include two obsolete Petya III-class frigates.91 These 50-ton ships were transferred to Syria by Russia in the mid-1970s. They are equipped with sonars, depth charges, torpedo tubes, and rocket launchers, but have no modern air-defense capability or antiship missiles. They remain in commission, but they have never been modernized or refitted. Their radars and electronic suites are obsolete and have low capability. Their seagoing status is unclear as they are very poorly maintained, and one may no longer be functional. They are based at Tartus. The Syrian Navy has ten obsolescent Osa I and ten Osa II 245-ton missile patrol boats dating back to the 1970s. Each Osa I is equipped with SS-N-2A/B Styx antiship missiles. The Osa IIs are equipped with four SS-N-2C missiles. The SS-N-2C is a sea-skimming antiship missile with a range of 43 nautical miles and either active radar or infrared homing. All Osa-class variants have two twin 30-mm guns, chaff launchers, and surface search and fire-control radars. The Osa IIs were transferred to Syria in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.92 They are based at Latakia. Some of the Osa Is and Osa IIs have only limited operational capability, and some are reported by local sources to be on the edge of being laid up or to already lack operational capability. These boats have never been modernized or refitted. Syria did, however, partially modernize two of its Osas in the mid-1980s.93 Syria has eight light Soviet Zhuk-class patrol boats that the former Soviet Union (FSU) transferred to Syria in the 1980s. These 39-ton coastal patrol boats have little firepower (twin 14.5-mm guns) and limited combat capability. They are capable of 30-knot speeds, however, and do have I-band surface search radars. All are based at Tartus. They are suitable for their undemanding patrol missions, but roughly half are no longer operational.94 Syria has five operational FSU-supplied mine warfare craft, including one Natyaclass, one T-43, and three Yevgenya-class ships. Only some of these mine craft are operational in the mine warfare mission (although all the operational vessels could release mines). The three 50-ton Yevgenya-class ships are coastal minesweepers transferred by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the mid-1980s. Syria has

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Figure 8.7 Syrian Navy: Force Structure 1990

2006

2007

2008

12,000 ~10,000* 11,600

11,600

11,600

11,600

Navy

4,000

~6,000

7,600

7,600

7,600

7,600

Manpower

2000

2005

Reserve

8,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

Facilities

3

3

3

3

3

3

Latakia

1

1

1

1

1

1

Tartus

1

1

1

1

1

1

Minet el-Baida

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

3

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3

3

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

FSU Petya III

0

0

2

2

2

2

Sov Petya II

2

2

0

0

0

0

18

20

20

20

18

18

6

8

8

8

8

8

Zhuk (less than 100 tons)

6

8

8

8

8

8

Hamelin (less than 100 tons)

0

2

0

0

0

0

12

10

12

12

10

10

12

10

12

12

10

10

9

5

5

5

5

5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

4

3

3

3

3

3

4

3

3

3

3

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

3

3

3

3

3

Submarines SSK Romeo (nonoperative) Frigates FF2

Patrol and Coastal Combatants Fast Patrol Craft Inshore (PFI)

Fast Patrol Craft with SSM (PFM) Osa I/II Mine Warfare Mine Sweeper Coastal (MSC) Sonya Mine Sweeper Inshore (MSI) Yevgenya MineSweeper Ocean (MSO) T-43 (FSU) Amphibious Polnochny B

3

3

3

3

3

3

Logistics and Support

N/A

4

4

4

4

3

Oceanographic Research Vessel (AGOR)

N/A

1

1

1

1

2

191


Support

N/A

1

1

1

1

0

Division

N/A

1

1

1

1

0

Training

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

17

48

41

50

30

13

5

24

16

25

15

13

5

24

16

25

15

13

0

24

25

25

15

13

0

4

5

5

2

0

0

4

5

5

2

2

Mi-14

12

20

20

20

13

11

Haze

12

20

20

20

13

11

Naval Aviation Helicopters Attack Antisubmarine Warfare KA-27 Ka-28 (Ka-27PL) Helix A

* ~ = Estimated amount; N/A = not available; FSU = former Soviet Union. Source: Various editions of the IISS, The Military Balance, and U.S., British, and other experts.

had trouble in operating these ships, however, and has sometimes had to cut its operational force of this class from five to three ships.95 The 804-ton Natya-class vessel had its guns and minesweeping gear removed. It retains its 2 × 4 SA-N-5 antiaircraft missiles. It is painted white and is now a training and patrol ship. The 450-ton Sonya is a relatively capable wooden hulled ship transferred in the mid-1980s, with adequate equipment and electronics, but may not be operational. The T-43 is a 1950s vintage, iron-hulled ship that has negligible mine warfare capability and does not seem to be operational. Syrian Amphibious Capability Syria has three Polnochny-class landing ships with a lift capacity of 100–180 troops, 350 tons of cargo, or five tanks. These ships were transferred by the USSR in 1984–1985. All the ships are based at Tartus, are active, and are armed with antiaircraft guns and two 18 barrel 140-mm rocket launchers each. However, Syria does not hold any meaningful exercises of amphibious operations. The navy also has a 3,500-ton training ship that could be used to ferry 140–180 men in an emergency.96 Syrian Naval Aviation The navy has a small naval aviation branch with 13 armed helicopters. These include 11 operational Mi-14P Hazes and 2 Kamov Ka-28 Helixes, all manned with air force operators. The Mi-14s have dipping sonar, radar, magnetic anomaly detectors (MAD), and could use sonobuoys, as well as launch torpedoes, depth charges, or mines. The Ka-28s are relatively modern and also have dipping sonar, radar, and MAD. They can also deploy sonobuoys, launch torpedoes, depth charges, or mines.

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Syrian Coastal-Defense Forces The coastal-defense force was placed under naval command in 1984. In 2008, it had two infantry brigades for coastal surveillance and defense, two artillery brigades with 18-36 active 130-mm M-46 coastal guns, 12 100-mm guns, and KS-19 antiaircraft guns. It also had a coastal antiship missile brigade whose main armament consists of 8–12 batteries of aging SSC-1B Sepal and SS-N-2 Styx antiship missiles.97 Syrian Naval Readiness, Training, and Warfighting Capability As has already been mentioned, the Syrian Navy has negligible ocean-going or ‘‘blue-water’’ warfighting capability. Its primary mission is the defense of Syria’s ports at Latakia and Tartus, coastal surveillance and defense, and peacetime patrol missions. In wartime, it would probably have to disperse to other countries or attempt to shelter in its major bases at Banias, Minet el-Baida, Lattakia, and Tartus. It does, however, have small naval infantry or marine detachments at Banias, Lattakia, and Tartus. In 2007, there were scuba and underwater demolition units at Minet elBaida. Most surface forces were based at Lattakia and Tartus, and the submarines at Tartus.98 Overall readiness, training, and funding levels are low. The Syrian Navy rarely practices meaningful exercises, has almost no joint warfare training, and has little warfighting capability against either Israel or Turkey.99 It does, however, have the limited ability to defend against an Israeli Navy coastal operation. However, the Syrian Navy does seem to be adapting its force structure to act on its perceptions of ‘‘lessons learned’’ from the asymmetric warfare tactics employed by Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon War.100 Jane’s has reported that the Syrian Navy is outfitting its Tir (IPS 18)-class fast inshore attack craft with Noor medium-range radar-guided antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The Noor ASCM is an Iranianbuilt clone of the Chinese C-802 ASCM, with a range of 120 km and is powered by a Toloo 4 turbojet engine. This missile was first successfully used in the field by the Lebanese Islamic Resistance (the armed wing of Hezbollah) during the 2006 Lebanon War. Fired from the shore, the Noor hit the Israeli Navy flagship INS Hanit, a Sa’ar 5-class missile corvette. The strike killed four crew members and inflicted severe damage to the ship’s flight deck and steering system, although this success occurred largely because none of Hanit’s defense systems were functioning at the time and its crew had not adopted a wartime watch posture.101 SYRIAN PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES Syria has a large mix of paramilitary forces, which are described in Figure 8.8. These forces have little or no military value in conventional combat, but do serve as effective instruments of state control. They helped Syria secure its occupation of

193


Figure 8.8 Syrian Paramilitary and Security Forces: Force Structure 1990

Manpower Gendarmerie

19,800

2000

2005

~108,000* ~108,000

2006

~108,000

2007

2008

~108,000 ~108,000

8,000

8,000

8,000

8,000

N/A

~100,000

~100,000

~100,000

Desert Guard

1,800

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Republican Guard

10,000

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

30,000

23,179

17,179

N/A

N/A

N/A

30,000

22,000

16,000

0

0

0

1

1

1

N/A

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

N/A

N/A

N/A

Mechanized Infantry Brigade

2

4

4

N/A

N/A

N/A

Element of Special Forces

8

10

10

N/A

N/A

N/A

Artillery Regiment

0

2

2

N/A

N/A

N/A

Workers’ Militia (People’s Army)

Forces Abroad Lebanon Mechanized Division HQ Element Armored

8,000

8,000

~100,000 ~100,000

* ~ = Estimated amount; N/A = not available; HQ = headquarters. Source: Various editions of the IISS, The Military Balance, and U.S., British, and other experts.

Lebanon before the Syrian force had to withdraw in 2005, and some can conduct unconventional or asymmetric attacks or work with proxy and allied forces. The level of direct Syrian support of Hezbollah forces in 2006, if any, was limited. Israel never announced that it estimated Syrian forces were present or that it took any Syrian prisoners of war.102 Syrian security and intelligence forces have been willing to take major risks in the past and have supported terrorist and militia forces in covert attacks against Israel, and against the United States and its allies in Lebanon after they deployed to that country in 1982. They have covertly supported a number of the Sunni insurgent elements in Iraq since 2003 and have joined Iran in supporting Hezbollah. They played a major role in the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. Syrian security forces are notorious for their repressiveness, although their operations are generally focused on actual opponents of the regime. Ordinary Syrians are well aware of the security forces, but rarely see them in operation. The services do, however, often conduct operations against citizens with Kurdish ethnicity or suspected ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic organizations. The U.S. Department of State report on terrorism issued in 2005 summarized their conduct as follows:

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ISRAEL AND SYRIA

The Syrian Government in 2004 continued to provide political and material support to both Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), among others, continue to operate from Syria, although they have lowered their public profiles since May 2003, when Damascus announced that the groups had voluntarily closed their offices. Many of these Palestinian groups, in statements originating from both inside and outside of Syria, claimed responsibility for anti-Israeli terrorist attacks in 2004. The Syrian Government insists that these Damascus based offices undertake only political and informational activities. Syria also continued to permit Iran to use Damascus as a transshipment point for resupplying Lebanese Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syrian officials have publicly condemned international terrorism, but make a distinction between terrorism and what they consider to be the legitimate armed resistance of Palestinians in the occupied territories and of Lebanese Hezbollah. The Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986, although Israeli officials accused Syria of being indirectly involved in the August 31, 2004, Beersheva bus bombings that left 16 dead. Damascus has cooperated with the United States and other foreign governments against al-Qa’ida and other terrorist organizations and individuals; it also has discouraged signs of public support for al-Qa’ida, including in the media and at mosques. In September 2004, Syria hosted border security discussions with the Iraqis and took a number of measures to improve the physical security of the border and establish security cooperation mechanisms. Although these and other efforts by the Syrian Government have been partly successful, more must be done in order to prevent the use of Syrian territory by those individuals and groups supporting the insurgency in Iraq.103

An updated U.S. Department of State report issued in April 2006 was little different, highlighting Syria’s spoiler role in the region and growing problems with its own internal security: The Syrian Government insists that the Damascus-based groups undertake only political and informational activities. However, in statements originating from outside Syria, many Palestinian groups claimed responsibility for anti-Israeli terrorist acts. Syria’s public support for the groups varied, depending on its national interests and international pressure. In 2003, these groups lowered their public profile after Damascus announced that they had voluntarily closed their offices in Syria. In September, however, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad held a highly publicized meeting with rejectionist leaders, and a month later the rejectionist leaders participated in a meeting in Damascus with the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad Adel. Syria continued to permit Iran to use Damascus as a transshipment point to resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon. . . . preliminary findings of a UN investigation into the February assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri have indicated a strong likelihood of official Syrian involvement. In the past, Damascus cooperated with the United States and other foreign governments against al-Qa’ida and other terrorist organizations and individuals. In May,


195

however, the Syrian Government ended intelligence cooperation, citing continued U.S. public complaints about the inadequate level of Syria’s assistance to end the flow of fighters and money to Iraq. Syria made efforts to limit the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq. It upgraded physical security conditions on the border and announced that it has begun to give closer scrutiny to military-age Arab males entering Syria (visas are still not required for citizens of Arab countries). The government claimed that since 2003 it has repatriated more than 1,200 foreign extremists and arrested more than 4,000 Syrians trying to go to Iraq to fight. In the last six months of 2005, Damascus highlighted clashes on Syrian territory with terrorist groups, particularly with the Jund a-Sham group associated with Abu Musab alZarqawi, in its government-controlled press information.104

The most recent U.S. Department of State report on Syria’s support for terrorism was issued in April 2007. It again accuses Syria of providing support to Hezbollah and to Palestinian terrorist organizations: The Syrian government continued to provide political and material support to Hezbollah and political support to Palestinian terrorist groups. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), HAMAS, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), among others, base their external leadership in Damascus. The Syrian government insisted that the Damascus-based groups undertake only political and informational activities, but Palestinian groups with leaders in Syria have claimed responsibility for anti-Israeli terrorist acts. Syria’s public support for the Palestinian groups varied, depending on its national interests and international pressure. In April, visiting PA Foreign Minister Zahar (HAMAS) met with Damascus-based Palestinian leaders and attended a rally at the Palestinian Yarmouk refugee camp alongside HAMAS Political Bureau Chief Khalid Mish’al and representatives of other terrorist groups and Hezbollah. In July, Mish’al held a highly publicized press conference under tight security at a Damascus hotel, expressing gratitude for Syria’s unconditional support to the Palestinian cause. The Government of Syria has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986, although preliminary findings of a UN investigation into the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri indicated a strong likelihood of official Syrian involvement. That investigation remains in process. On September 12, four Syrian nationals with alleged Islamist ties used grenades, guns, and a small truck bomb to launch an attack against the U.S. embassy in Damascus. All four of the assailants were killed as was a Syrian security officer who responded to the attack. In the incident’s aftermath, the Syrian government enhanced security for the embassy and American personnel in Syria, although it declined to provide the embassy with the findings of its internal investigation into the attack. Damascus repeatedly assured the United States that it will take every possible measure to protect U.S. citizens and facilities in Syria, but at the same time has not taken the measures considered necessary by the United States. In November, Syria’s foreign minister announced the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq after a 25-year rupture, and, a month later, the Syrian and Iraqi Ministers

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of Interior signed a five-year memorandum of understanding to boost, among other things, joint efforts to control the borders and combat terrorism. As in recent years, Damascus highlighted in Syrian government-controlled press, information about clashes on Syrian territory with terrorist groups, particularly with the Jund a-Sham group. Separately, in November, security agents on the Syrian side of the border with Lebanon engaged in a gun battle with a Syrian Islamic militant from the Tawhid and Jihad group. The militant, who was trying to use fake documents to cross into Lebanon, subsequently blew himself up with a hand grenade.105

The human rights country report issued by the U.S. Department of State in February 2005 provided additional data on how repressive Syria’s forces can be: The powerful role of the security services, which extends beyond strictly security matters, is due to the state of emergency, which has been in place since 1963. The Government justifies ongoing martial law because of its state of war with Israel and past threats from terrorist groups. Syrian Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence are military agencies; the Ministry of Interior controls general security, state security, and political security. The branches of the security services operated independently of each other and outside the legal system. The Government maintained effective control of the security forces, and members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses. . . . There are four major branches of security: Political Security Directorate (PSD); Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI); General Intelligence Directorate (GID); and Air Force Security (AFS), all of which devote some of their overlapping resources to monitoring internal dissent and individual citizens. Only PSD, supervised by the Ministry of Interior, is under civilian control. The four branches operate independently and generally outside of the control of the legal system. . . . The Government prevented any organized political opposition, and there have been few antigovernment manifestations. Continuing serious abuses included the use of torture in detention, which at times resulted in death; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged detention without trial; fundamentally unfair trials in the security courts; and infringement on privacy rights. The Government significantly restricted freedom of speech and of the press. The Government also severely restricted freedom of assembly and association. The Government did not officially allow independent domestic human rights groups to exist. The Government placed some limits on freedom of religion and freedom of movement. Violence and societal discrimination against women were problems. The Government’s discrimination against the stateless Kurdish minority resulted in a series of riots in March centered in the Hassakeh province which spread to other parts of the country during which more than 30 persons were reportedly killed by security forces and more than 1000 arrested. The Government also restricted worker rights. . . . The Ministry of Interior controlled the police forces, which consist of four separate divisions: emergency police; local neighborhood police; riot police; and traffic police. The emergency division responds to 911 calls and operates through roving patrols. The local neighborhood police are responsible for general security in the neighborhood they patrol and respond to non-emergency situations. The Government uses the riot police to break up demonstrations and marches.


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During the year, the security forces again conducted mass arrests of suspected Islamists: 25 in Hama; 18 in Hayaleen; 19 in Qatana; and an unknown number in Damascus and Aleppo. In March, the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC) sentenced 33 persons to 2 years in prison who had been arrested in Aleppo in August 2003 and accused of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. The suspects remained in detention at year’s end. In April, military security arrested the human rights activist Aktham Naiissa, head of the Committee for the Defense of Democracy, Freedom, and Human Rights (CDF), for his involvement in a protest in front of the Parliament in March and for communique´s issued by the CDF critical of the Government’s treatment of the Kurdish minority (see Section 2.b.). Naiissa was held at Saidnaya prison without access to his lawyer and was tried by the SSSC; he was released on bail in August. His trial has been postponed twice, and it is now scheduled for April 4, 2005. Throughout the year, the security services also conducted mass arrests of Kurds in Hassakeh province, Aleppo, Damascus, and other areas. Human rights organizations and Kurdish groups reported that 1,000–2,000 Kurds were detained in the aftermath of the March riots. Most were freed after a few months detention; however, 200-300 Kurds remain in custody and are awaiting trial at the SSSC and military courts. . . . Media sources reported that in April, security forces increasingly staged nighttime raids on Kurdish homes in Hassakeh province and arbitrarily arrested male members of households. Press reports also stated that on April 8, following a dispute between Kurdish children and Arab students at a school in Qamishli, security forces took four school children, ages 12 and 13, from the school during the day and transferred them to a prison in Hassakeh. At year’s end, the children were reportedly still detained. . . . The Government, through its security services, also threatened families or friends of detainees to ensure their silence, to force them to disavow publicly their relatives, or to force detainees into compliance. For example, the family of a human rights activist received numerous calls from security service personnel alleging misconduct and inappropriate social behavior by the activist. These calls continued during the year and became increasingly threatening. The number of remaining political detainees was unknown. AI’s [Amnesty International] 2003 report stated that 800 political detainees were held in Saidnaya prison and that hundreds of others were held in other prisons. There also were Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian political detainees. Estimates of detainees were difficult to confirm because the branches of the security services, which maintain their own prison facilities, hold a large number of prisoners. These prisoners are frequently held for extended periods of time without trial and without information given to their families. Estimates were also difficult to confirm because the Government did not verify publicly the number of detentions without charge, the release of detainees or amnestied prisoners, or whether detainees subsequently were sentenced to prison . . . . . . The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC), in dealing with cases of alleged national security violations, was not independent of executive branch control. Political connections and bribery sometimes influenced verdicts in regular courts. . . . The SSSC tried political and national security cases and operated under the provisions of the Emergency Law. The SSSC did not observe the constitutional provisions safeguarding defendants’ rights. The Emergency Law and the Penal Code are so broad and vague, and the Government’s powers so sweeping, that many persons have been

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convicted and many remain in prison for the mere expression of political opposition to the Government. In April 2001, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights stated that the procedures of the SSSC are incompatible with the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the country is a party. Charges against defendants before the SSSC were vague. Defendants appeared to be tried for exercising normal political rights, such as free speech. For example, the Emergency Law authorizes the prosecution of anyone ‘‘opposing the goals of the revolution,’’ ‘‘shaking the confidence of the masses in the aims of the revolution,’’ or attempting to ‘‘change the economic or social structure of the State.’’ The Government stated that the SSSC tries only persons who have sought to use violence against the State, but the majority of defendants who appeared before the SSSC this year were prosecuted for exercising their political rights. Under SSSC procedures, defendants were not present during the preliminary or investigative phase of the trial, during which the prosecutor presents evidence. Trials usually were closed to the public. Lawyers were not ensured access to their clients before the trial and were excluded from the court during their client’s initial interrogation by the prosecutor. Lawyers submitted written defense pleas rather than making oral presentations. During the year, there was one case in which a lawyer representing defendants in a national security case had his license to practice law suspended. The Government’s case was based on confessions, and the defendants were not allowed to argue that their confessions were coerced. On July 11, the SSSC acquitted for lack of evidence a Syrian-Canadian citizen arrested in 2002 when he returned home to Syria to visit his family. The individual was charged with belonging to a religious group and was reportedly tortured while in detention (see Section 1.c.). Defendants did not have the right to appeal verdicts, but the Minister of Interior, who may ratify, nullify, or alter them, reviews sentences. The President also may intervene in the review process. Accurate information regarding the number of cases heard by the SSSC was difficult to obtain, although hundreds of cases were believed to pass through the court annually. Many cases reportedly involved charges relating to membership in various banned political groups, including religious parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Liberation Party, the Party of Communist Action, Syrian Kurdish Parties and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba’ath Party. Sentences as long as 15 years have been imposed in the past. Human rights NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] were not permitted to visit the SSSC; however, local lawyers affiliated with local NGOs acted as defense counsel in some cases (see Section 4). . . . Military courts have the authority to try civilians as well as military personnel. A military prosecutor decides the venue for a civilian defendant. There have been reports that the Government operated military field courts in locations outside established courtrooms. Such courts reportedly observed fewer of the formal procedures of regular military courts. . . . Corruption continued to be a serious problem throughout the police forces and security services. International and regional human rights groups continue to consider the police forces corrupt.106


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The report issued in 2006 was similar, but highlighted Syria’s role in assassinating Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, its use of torture, and provided a long chronology of Syrian actions to suppress all political dissent. On October 19 and December 12, Chief Investigator for the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) Detlev Mehlis presented two interim reports on the February 14 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Hariri and 22 other individuals [were] killed in a blast in central Beirut. The October report concluded that evidence pointed toward the involvement of Syrian authorities in the assassination of al-Hariri. The report also made it clear that Syrian officials, while purporting to cooperate, deliberately misled investigators. In response to the UN report, citizens rallied in front of the Central Bank in Damascus on October 24, protesting its findings (see section 2.b), and in smaller demonstrations throughout November and early December. The December report stated that the ongoing investigation reinforced the conclusions of the October report and requested a six-month extension, noting Syrian authorities’ ‘‘reluctance and procrastination’’ and citing its attempt to ‘‘hinder the investigation internally and procedurally.’’ The UN Security Council passed Security Resolution 1644 on December 15, extending the UNIIIC’s mandate. . . . Former prisoners, detainees, and reputable local human rights groups, reported that torture methods included electrical shocks; pulling out fingernails; burning genitalia; forcing objects into the rectum; beating, sometimes while the victim was suspended from the ceiling; alternately dousing victims with freezing water and beating them in extremely cold rooms; hyperextending the spine; bending the detainees into the frame of a wheel and whipping exposed body parts; and using a backward-bending chair to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the victim’s spine. Torture was most likely to occur while detainees were held at one of the many detention centers operated by the various security services throughout the country, particularly while authorities attempted to extract a confession or information.107

The 2007 report detailed more instances of abuse by the Syrian security forces: During the year there were reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life. According to local human rights groups, one person died in detention following torture or mistreatment by security services during the year. On April 24, a local human rights organization reported on the death of Muhammed Shaher Haysa as a result of a heart attack while detained. His body, which was handed over to his family in April, bore evidence of earlier torture during the months of his imprisonment for allegedly belonging to the banned ‘‘Jund al-Sham’’ Islamist organization. Press reports indicated that a Syrian Kurd, Muhammed Oso Ali, reportedly died in March as a result of an untreated case of asthma. Ali was completing his mandatory service in the armed forces in the village of Khirbit Shahab at his time of death. On March 30, his family received his body, which displayed evidence of torture prior to his death. Authorities failed to conduct independent investigations into these deaths by year’s end. There were reports of politically motivated disappearances during the year.

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Since his 2004 arrest, Kamal al-Bittar, a Palestinian, has vanished, according to a February report of a local human rights organization. On April 19, security forces in Aleppo arrested the following citizens: Jihan Muhammed Ali, Adnan Khalil Racheed, Waheed Jihad Moustafa, and Fawzi Ali Kahwa. Their whereabouts and reasons for arrest were unknown at year’s end, according to human rights organizations. On May 11, security officials arrested eight Ahwazi Iranians (see section 1.d.), five of whom were deported and believed to be held in Iran at year’s end, according to international human rights organizations. On August 10, writer and English teacher Ali Sayed al-Shihabi initially disappeared after responding to a summons for a meeting in Damascus with state security agents. According to international human rights groups, although he has not been charged with any offence, al-Shihabi’s disappearance may be linked to his publication on political and social issues. Al-Shihabi was reportedly also detained between 1982 and 1991 for his membership in the banned Party for Communist Action, which he has since left. On December 30, despite his disappearance, Al-Shihabi was pardoned as part of the yearend amnesty; however, he remained detained at an unknown location at year’s end. On November 6, a local human rights organization reported the September 4 disappearance on his return to the country of Osama Muhammed Ali al-Ello, a citizen who resided with his family in the United Arab Emirates. At year’s end his whereabouts remained unknown. The government did not punish any members of the security forces for their roles in abductions and disappearances. The government continued to withhold new information on the welfare and whereabouts of persons who have disappeared; little is known other than the approximate date of their disappearance. A local human rights organization recorded at least 3,000 disappearance cases in the country of Syrians and Palestinians since the late 1970s, and estimated that the actual number may be several thousands more.108

The details of Syria’s intelligence forces are not shown in Figure 8.8, but Syrian intelligence is notorious for its operations in Lebanon and its support of such operations as assassinations and insurgent infiltration into Iraq (and previously Jordan). This is particularly true of Syrian Air Force intelligence. The Department of Defense report on Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, issued on December 14, 2007, noted the following: Terrorists, foreign fighters, and former Iraqi regime elements continue to find sanctuary, border transit opportunities and logistical support in Syria. Syria is estimated to be the entry point for 90% of all foreign terrorists known in Iraq. Recent efforts by the Syrian Government to stem the flow of foreign terrorists and suicide bombers inside of Syria may have had some effect in decreasing the flow of extremists into Iraq. The Syrian Government participates in the Neighbors Process framework, having hosted both the inaugural Border Security Working group in August 2007 and the follow-up Border Security Working group in November 2007. While these are positive diplomatic steps, it is not clear that Syria has made a strategic decision to persistently and comprehensively deal with foreign terrorists. The Syrian Government must take additional measures to further reduce the flow of foreign terrorists transiting Syria into Iraq. Foreign terrorists


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and suicide bombers still enter Iraq through Syria, albeit at a significantly reduced rate likely owing in part to increasing internal security efforts by the Syrians.109

Syrian military and civil intelligence continues to cooperate with Iran in supporting Hezbollah. It has also long supported those Palestinian movements, including Hamas, that Syria believes it can use as leverage against Israel. SYRIAN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Syria has long sought missiles and weapons of mass destruction to match Israel’s capabilities. In practice, however, it has never had the resources or technology base to compete with Israel or to develop a meaningful nuclear weapons effort. Figure 8.9 summarizes current reporting on Syrian weapons of mass destruction. Like the previous figures dealing with Israeli and Egyptian weapons of mass destruction, the data are often speculative. It is clear, however, that Syria has pursued the updating of its surface-to-surface missiles in spite of all of its resource constraints and has given such forces high priority. Syrian Chemical Weapons Syria has chemical weapons, and most experts believe it has mustard agents and at least ordinary nerve gas. It may have persistent nerve gas as well. It is believed to have cluster warheads for delivering chemical weapons, and it probably has chemical bombs and rocket warheads as well. It may have chemical artillery shells. There are other reports that Syria has benefited from sales and technology transfers from Iran. Some reports indicate that Syria is undertaking ‘‘an innovative chemical warfare (CW) program in cooperation with Iran.’’145 Syria’s CW program began in the mid-1970s, and its facilities are known to have successfully produced VX and sarin nerve agents as well as mustard blister agents, but not independently. The Scientific Studies and Research Center (CERS) runs the facilities in Dumayr, Khan Abou, Shamat, and Furklus.146 There are other reports that Syria imported hundreds of tons of hydrochloric acid and ethylene glycol (MEG) from Iran. These chemical agents are precursors for the production of mustard blister agents and sarin nerve gas. The precursors would be used and mounted on Scud-B/C warheads and/or on aerial bombs. Construction of the chemical facilities was said to be due to start in late 2005, with what was then estimated to take one year to complete construction. These reports have not been confirmed, but Syria has long sought to end its dependence on other countries for the precursors and other components of chemical agents.147 The same reports did not indicate that a contract had been signed, but that the draft agreements would lead Iranian scientists from the Iranian Defense Industries Organization to assist Syria in establishing the infrastructure and location of the new chemical facilities. It will also supply Syria with reactors, pipes, condensers, heat exchangers, and storage and feed tanks as well as chemical detection equipment for

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Figure 8.9 Syria’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction

Delivery Systems • Four SSM brigades: 1 with FROG, 1 with Scud Bs, 1 with Scud Cs, and 1 with SS-21s. • 18 SS-21 launchers and at least 36 SS-21 missiles with 80–100-km range. May be developing chemical warheads. • According to the May 1998 estimate of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Syria possessed 200 SS-21 Scarab missiles.110 • Some experts believe that some Syrian surface-to-surface missiles armed with chemical weapons began to be stored in concrete shelters in the mountains near Damascus and in the Palmyra region no later than 1986 and that plans have long existed to deploy them forward in an emergency since that date. • Up to 12 Scud-B launchers and 200 Scud-B missiles with 310-km range. Believed to have chemical warheads. Scud-B warhead weighs 985 kg. The inventory of Scud-B missiles is believed to be approximately 200. • The Monterey Institute of International Studies’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies reports that the Chinese provided technical assistance to upgrade Scud-B missiles in 1993.111 • New long-range North Korean Scud Cs deployed: • Jane’s cites an American Department of Defense document published in 1992 alleging that Syria had purchased 150 Scud-C missiles. • Two brigades of 18 launchers each are said to be deployed in a horseshoe-shaped valley. This estimate of 36 launchers is based on the fact that there are 36 tunnels into the hillside. The launchers must be for the Scud C since the older Scud Bs would not be within range of most of Israel. Up to 50 missiles are stored in bunkers to the north as possible reloads. There is a maintenance building and barracks. • Underground bunkers are thought to have sufficient storage for some 1,000 Scud-C missiles according to a fall 2002 article in the Middle East Quarterly.112 • Estimates indicate that Syria has 24–36 Scud launchers for a total of 260–300 missiles of all types. The normal ratio of launchers to missiles is 10:1, but Syria is focusing on both survivability and the capability to launch a large preemptive strike. • The Scud Cs have ranges of up to 550–600 km. They have a CEP of 1,000–2,600 m. Nerve gas warheads using VX with cluster bomblets seem to have begun production in early 1997. Syria is believed to have 50–80 Scud-C missiles. • A training site exists about 6 km south of Hama, with an underground facility where TELs and missiles are stored. • Jane’s reports, ‘‘It was reported in early 1998 that Israeli intelligence experts had estimated that there were between 24 and 36 ‘Scud’ launchers at most Syrian missile sites—far more launchers than previously estimated.’’ Traditionally, armies deploying Scuds stock about ten missiles per launcher. The higher number of Syrian launchers


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suggests a ratio closer to two missiles per launcher—this would enable Syria to launch a large first-wave strike before launchers were destroyed. • Syria can now build both the entire Scud B and the Scud C. It has sheltered and/or underground missile production/assembly facilities at Aleppo, Hama, and near Damascus, which have been built with aid from Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean technicians. Possibly some Russian technical aid. • Israeli defense officials have been reported as stating that Syria has been producing about 30 Scud-C missiles per year at an underground facility.113 • A missile test site exists 15 km south of Homs where Syria has tested missile modifications and new chemical warheads. It has heavy perimeter defenses, a storage area and bunkers, heavily sheltered bunkers, and a missile storage area just west of the site. According to some reports, Syria has built two missile plants near Hama, about 110 miles north of Damascus; one is for solid fueled rockets and the other is for liquid fueled systems. North Korea may have provided the equipment for the liquid fuel plant, and Syria may now be able to produce the missile. • There are reports of Chinese deliveries of missiles, but little hard evidence: • There are reports of People’s Republic of China (PRC) deliveries of missile components by China Precision Machinery Company, maker of the M-11, in July 1996. The M-11 has a 186-mile (280-km) range with a warhead of 1,100 pounds. Missile components may have ‘‘contained sensitive guidance equipment.’’114 • All reports of Syrian purchases and production of the Chinese M-9 missile are unconfirmed and of uncertain value: • Some sources believe M-9 missile components, or M-9-like components, were delivered to Syria. The missile is reported to have a CEP as low as 300 m. • Some intelligence reports indicate that 24 M-9 launchers were sighted in late 1991.115 Other reports suggest that the 1991 missile deliveries were subsequently canceled due to U.S. pressure. • Since 1989 there have been persistent rumors that Syria was trying to import the M9 from China. Up to the mid-1990s, Israeli sources believed that these attempts ended in failure—Beijing reportedly backed out of the deal due to U.S. pressure. The reports surfaced again in the late 1990s, with suggestions that the M-9 had been delivered from China—possibly in kit form, or partly assembled. • Jane’s reported in March 1999 that Syria had created a production facility to build both the M-11 (CSS-7/DF-11) and M-9 missiles with ranges of 280 km and 600– 800 km, respectively. It reports that production of the booster stage of the M-11 began in 1996 and that missile production is expected to start ‘‘soon.’’ • An April 1993 report in Jane’s Intelligence Review indicated that North Korea and Iran (with Chinese assistance) helped in the construction of underground production facilities for the Scud-C and M-9 missiles. At the time of the article (April 1993), production of the Scud C was believed to be 12–18 months off, while M-9 production was believed to be two to three years away.116 • Senior administration officials were quoted as stating that China had sold missile technology to Syria; 30–90 tons of chemicals for solid propellant were sold to Syria by mid-1992.117

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• Syria has also developed, with considerable North Korean assistance, a Syrian version of the Korean No Dong missile (sometimes referred to as the Scud D). • A number of sources reported the September 23, 2000, test flight of the Syrian No Dong. • Four tunnels for shelters for No Dong launchers have been excavated, as of late 2002.118 • Syria is expected to produce or have already started production at the rate of about 30 missiles per year.119 • Israeli officials claimed that Syria was developing ‘‘multiple warhead clusters’’ in a bid to defeat Israel’s Arrow missile defense system.120 • The Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies has compiled a chronology of North Korean assistance to Syria through 2000:121 Date Item(s) 1991 March 24 Scud Cs and 20 TELs 1991 April 60 Scud Cs and 12 TELs 1991 May 36 Scud Cs 1991 Unknown number of summer Scud Cs 1992 24 Scud-C missiles; missile production and assembly equipment

1992

1993

1994

1994

1996 1999

Remarks Syria pays approximately $250 million, and Libya reportedly helps finance the transaction. First delivery after agreement for Syria to acquire 150 Scud Cs for an estimated $500 million. Missiles transported by Yugoslavian freighter. Missiles delivered by North Korean ship Mupo and transferred to Syria via Cyprus. Delivered by North Korean freighter Tae Hung Ho in March. Part of the shipment was airlifted to Syria via the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, and the remaining cargo was transported directly to the Tartus. The manufacturing equipment reportedly was destined for suspected missile factories in Hama and Aleppo. Approximately 50 A North Korean ship carrying 100 Scud Cs departs for Scud Cs the Iranian port Bandar Abbas in October. Half of the delivery is transported over land to Syria. Seven MAZ 543 In August, two Russian Condor aircraft transport the missiles and chassis from Sunan International Airport chassis and an unknown number of to Damascus. According to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, North Korea offered to stop the delivery Scud Cs if Israel paid $500 million. Unknown number of Scud-C missiles and TELs Unknown number of Scud-C cluster warheads Missile expertise Syrian missile technicians spend two weeks training in North Korea. Ten tons of powdered aluminum


2000

Scud-D missile

2000

No Dong missiles and TELs

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Originally from China, shipment delivered to the Centre des Etudes de Recherche Scientifique (CERS), the institute in charge of Syria’s missile program. Unconfirmed; Syria conducted a Scud-D flight test on September 23, 2000. Unconfirmed; North Korean firm Ch’ongchon’gang reportedly delivers 50 No Dong missiles and seven TELs to Syria. Missiles possibly procured on behalf of Iraq, Egypt, and Libya for $600 million.

• Sheltered or underground missile production/assembly facilities at Aleppo and Hamas have been built with aid from Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean technicians. Possibly some Russian technical aid. • A missile test site exists 15 km south of Homs where Syria has tested missile modifications and new chemical warheads. It has heavy perimeter defenses, a storage area and bunkers, heavily sheltered bunkers, and a missile storage area just west of the site. • The Nuclear Threat Initiative states, • ‘‘Evidence that Syria continues to advance its missile technology and capabilities was revealed in May 2006 in a de-classified report to the United States Congress. The report indicates that for the period January 1 to December 31, 2004, ‘‘Syria continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability.’’ The report also states that Syria’s liquid-propellant missile program continues to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance and that ‘‘Syria was developing longer range missile programs, such as the Scud D and possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea and Iran.’’122 • The Nuclear Threat Initiative reports that Syria may have test-fired a Scud-D shortrange ballistic missile capable of striking any target in Israel in January 2007. Israel’s Arrow Missile Defense System detected the launch and tracked the test. Such a test would confirm that Syria received Scud-D missiles from North Korea.123 • Syria has shorter-range systems: • Short-range M-1B missiles (up to 60-mile range) seem to be in delivery from the PRC. • SS-N-3 and SSC-1b cruise missiles. • May be converting some long-range surface-to-air and naval cruise missiles to use chemical warheads. • 20 Su-24 long-range strike fighters. • 44 operational MiG-23BN Flogger F fighter ground attack aircraft. • 20 Su-20 fighter ground attack aircraft. • 90 Su-22 fighter ground attack aircraft.124 • 18 FROG-7 launchers and rockets. • Negotiations for PRC-made M-9 missile (185–375-mile range).

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• Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery. • Syria thought to be interested in purchasing Russia’s Iskander-E (SS-X-26) ballistic missile when once it has finished development.125 • Syria has improved its targeting capability in recent years by making extensive direct and indirect use of commercial satellite imagery, much of which now offers 3-meter levels of resolution and comes with coordinate data with near GPS-like levels of accuracy. One-meter levels of resolution will become commercially available. • The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated in January 1999 that Syria continued work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Foreign equipment and assistance have been and will continue to be essential for this effort. Chemical Weapons • Unconfirmed reports that first acquired small amounts of chemical weapons (mustard and sarin) from Egypt in 1973. • Acquired design for Soviet Scud warhead using VX in 1970s. • May have acquired chemical bombs and warheads for Scud missiles in 1979–1982. Reports that Syria had VX agents as early as 1982 seem premature. • Syria imports specialized glass ware, suitable for chemical weapons production, from Germany in 1983. • The NTI reports that a U.S. Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) issued on September 15, 1983, states that Syria is ‘‘a major recipient of Soviet CW assistance, [and] probably has the most advanced chemical warfare capability in the Arab world, with the possible exception of Egypt. Both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union provided the chemical agents, delivery systems, and training that flowed to Syria. As long as this support is forthcoming, there is no need for Syria to develop an indigenous capability to produce CW agents or materiel, and none has been identified.’’126 • Reports that production of nonpersistent nerve gas began to surface in 1984. May have had chemical warheads for missiles as early as 1985. U.S. intelligence sources confirm on a background basis that Syria has sarin gas in 1986. • The Nuclear Threat Initiative reports the following: • The Syrian CW program was established under the aegis of the Centre D’Etude et Recherche´ Scientifique (CERS), an ostensibly civilian research institute that appears to be responsible for all research, development, and production activities and facilities. Once the decision to proceed with a CW program had been made, it appears that the initial focus was the establishment of a facility for research and development, and possibly pilot production, in the Damascus area. This facility has continued to be used for CW-related research. Simultaneously, work commenced on the construction of larger dedicated CW production facilities. These plants in AlSafira, Hama, and Homs all came online in the mid- to late 1980s. The first priority of the Syrian CW program was the production of sarin; initial, small-scale production appears to have started in 1984. Originally, this agent was to be carried by Syrian Air Force bombers, but this was an unreliable means of delivery given Israeli


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air superiority. Intense efforts were undertaken to provide a more dependable delivery system. • By 1987, Syria was able to fit sarin-filled warheads, probably unitary rather than cluster, on some of its Scud missiles creating a limited long-range CW strike capability. Since that time, the focus of Syrian efforts has been on increasing the range and effectiveness of their strike capability by obtaining longer-range missiles from foreign suppliers such as North Korea and by improving the sophistication of the warheads. The fitting of bomblet-filled cluster warheads to Scud-C missiles after 1997 was a significant development that greatly increased the potential effectiveness of Syrian chemical weapons. Additionally, Syria has sought to increase the lethality of its force by developing V-agents. Syria has been researching this type of agent since the late 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, reports pointed to continuing work on V-agents but also suggested a lack of success . . . Following the successful weaponization of sarin in the 1980s, Syria turned to developing additional agents, most notably vesicants. Syria appears to have built up a stockpile of mustard and sarin for tactical uses in the 1990s. By the mid-1990s, the Syrian CW program seems to have reached a plateau in terms of capability and production. There is no current information conclusively suggesting that Syria is engaged in ongoing large-scale production and stockpiling of CW agents.. . . Syria is currently believed to deploy between 100 and 200 Scud missiles fitted with sarin warheads. Some of these missiles may be fitted with V-agent warheads although this information is less reliable. In addition, Syria is believed to have stockpiled several hundred tons of sarin and mustard agents for tactical uses in the form of artillery shells and air-dropped munitions. Syria retains its production infrastructure of at least three and possibly four facilities; however, it is not known whether these are currently being used to produce new agent. Syria conducted one missile test in July 2001, which probably involved the use of a simulated chemical warhead.[5] Since that time, the CW program has maintained a very low profile.127 • Reports in 1986 that Syria is helping Iran acquire chemical weapons technology as part of its support of Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. • In December 1986, then Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin tells the Israel Knesset, ‘‘We are aware that Syria is armed with chemical weapons—artillery shells, bombs, and ground-to-ground missile warheads . . . including nerve gas.’’128 • U.S. intelligence officials testify to Congress in 1989 that Syria is stockpiling a variety of chemical weapons. • Reports in 1990 that a classified DIA report states Syria has chemical munitions depots at Khan Abu Shamat and Furqlus and that the primary chemical weapons development facility is the Centre D’Etude et Recherche Scientifique, near Damascus. • In May 1992, Syria’s Sema Ltd. Corporation obtains a 45-ton shipment of trimethyl phosphite, a nerve gas precursor. Large German shipments of the same precursor are intercepted in July. Shipments of other precursors from Russia are detected in 1993. In October 1995, Russia announces the investigation of Lt.-Gen. Anatoliy Kuntsevich for allowing illegal exports. • Reports in June 1996 that a new major chemical weapons plant is under construction near Aleppo. Other facilities are reported in the general area of Damascus and Homs. • Believed to have begun deploying VX in late 1996, early 1997.

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• The CIA reported in June 1997 that Syria had acquired new chemical weapons technology from Russia and Eastern Europe in 1996. • Unconfirmed reports in 1997 of sheltered Scud missiles with unitary sarin or tabun nerve gas warheads, now being replaced by cluster warheads with VX bomblets, deployed in caves and shelters near Damascus. • Tested Scuds in manner indicating possible chemical warheads in 1996 and 1998, and possible cluster warhead in 2004. • Seems to have cluster warheads and bombs. • May have VX and sarin in modified Soviet ZAB-incendiary bombs and PTAB-500 cluster bombs. Reports stated that a U.S. intelligence source had obtained information indicating a late October 1999 test of a live chemical bomb dropped by a Syrian MiG-23.129 • CIA estimates in January 1999 that Syria continued to seek CW-related precursors from various sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and may be trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. • The CIA stated that Chinese entities sought to supply Iran and Syria with CW-related chemicals during this reporting period. • Convincing reports of covert imports of precursors in 2000 and 2003. • In 2002–2006, a series of unclassified CIA reports confirm Syrian chemical weapons efforts in unclassified reports in 2003. A U.S. official says on background that Syria may now have the largest inventory of chemical weapons in the world, but provides no details or comparisons with U.S., Russian, and Chinese programs.130 • On January 17, 2005, U.S. officials deny there is valid intelligence that Iraqi chemical weapons were smuggled to Syria. The Iraq Survey Group report issued on April 27, 2005, is more ambiguous. It finds no evidence that such smuggling took place, but cannot exclude the possibility.131 • Reports in 2005 that Iran will assist Syria in producing its own precursors for chemical weapons. Syria and Iran sign a new defense cooperation agreement on June 15, 2006. • Syria conducts two long-range (600–700 km) Scud missile tests in May 2005. Some reports indicate that they had cluster warheads. • On January 5, 2007, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designates three Syrian organizations—the Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology (HIAST), the Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory (NSCL)—as involved in proliferation. • Major nerve gas and possible other chemical agent production facilities north of Damascus. Two to three plants. • One facility is located near Homs and is located next to a major petrochemical plant. It reportedly produces several hundred tons of nerve gas a year. • Reports on the building of a new major plant at Safira, near Aleppo. • Reports that a facility co-located with the CERS is developing a warhead with chemical bomblets for the Scud C.


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• Many parts of the program are dispersed and compartmented. Missiles, rockets, bombs, and artillery shells are produced/modified and loaded in other facilities. Many may be modified to use VX bomblets. • Wide range of delivery systems: • Extensive testing of chemical warheads for Scud Bs. May have tested chemical warheads for Scud Cs. Recent tests include a July 2001 test of a Scud B near Aleppo and a May 1998 test of a Scud C with a VX warhead near Damascus. • May have started production of extended range Scuds in 2002. • Shells, bombs, and nerve gas warheads for multiple rocket launchers. • FROG warheads may be under development. • Reports of SS-21 capability to deliver chemical weapons are not believed by U.S. or Israeli experts. • Israeli sources believe Syria has binary weapons and cluster bomb technology suitable for delivering chemical weapons. • Experts believe Syria has stockpiled 500 to 1,000 metric tons of chemical agents. Holdings thought to include persistent (VX) and nonpersistent nerve agents (sarin) as well as blister agents. Biological Weapons • Syria signed, but did not ratify the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Extensive research effort. • U.S. intelligence officials testify to Congress in 1991 and 1992 that Syria is believed to have an offensive biological weapons effort.132 • U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control report in August 1996 indicated that ‘‘it is highly probably that Syria is developing an offensive biological capability.’’ • In 1997 and 1998, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1996 compliance reports state that ‘‘it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive biological warfare capability.’’133 • In 2001–2004, the CIA unclassified biannual reports on WMD proliferation state that it is considered ‘‘highly probable that Syria also is developing an offensive BW capability.’’134 • On January 17, 2005, U.S. officials deny there is valid intelligence that Iraqi chemical weapons were smuggled to Syria. The Iraq Survey Group report issued on April 27, 2005, is more ambiguous. It finds no evidence that such smuggling took place, but cannot exclude the possibility.135 • In February 2006, the Director of DIA states, ‘‘We also believe the Syrian government maintains an offensive biological weapons research and development program.’’136 • Current capabilities may be summarized as follows: • Extensive research effort. Reports of one underground facility and one near the coast. • Possible production capability for anthrax and botulism, and possibly other agents.

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• Israeli sources claim Syria weaponized botulinum and ricin toxins in the early 1990s, and probably anthrax. • Limited indications may be developing or testing biological variations on ZABincendiary bombs and PTAB-500 cluster bombs and Scud warheads. • Major questions exist regarding Syria’s strike capabilities. Older types of biological weapons using wet agents, and placed in older bomb and warhead designs with limited dissemination capability, can achieve only a small fraction of the potential effectiveness of biological weapons. Dry micropowders using advanced agents—such as the most lethal forms of anthrax—can have the effectiveness of small theater nuclear weapons. It is difficult to design adequate missile warheads to disseminate such agents, but this is not beyond Syrian capabilities—particularly since much of the technology needed to make effective cluster munitions and bomblets for VX gas can be adapted to the delivery of biological weapons.137 • The design of biological bombs and missile warheads with the lethality of small nuclear weapons may now be within Syrian capabilities, as is the design of UAV, helicopter, cruise missile, or aircraft-borne systems to deliver the agent slowly over a long line of flight and taking maximum advanced of wind and weather conditions. U.S. and Soviet texts proved that this kind of ‘‘line source’’ delivery could achieve lethalities as high as 50–100 kiloton weapons by the late 1950s, and the technology is well within Syria’s grasp. So is the use of proxy or covert delivery. • The Nuclear Threat Initiative has a more conservative estimate: • It is probable, though undemonstrated, that limited research into biological weapons is undertaken by Syrian military scientists. As in many countries, it may only be to identify defensive needs and possible offensive military applications. Claims that Syria has weaponized botulinum toxin and ricin are dubious given the profound difficulties associated with transforming these agents into useful weapons . . . Research on anthrax may be undertaken in support of efforts to improve the productivity and limit the vulnerability of Syrian agriculture to this disease, which is endemic to the region. Such research could be used to conceal a military program and may be the source of cautious claims that Syria is attempting to weaponize anthrax. If anthrax has in actuality been developed and deployed as a weapon, it is possible that Syria would seek to employ bomblet technology such as that allegedly developed for the dispersal of CW agents . . . However, on the basis of present knowledge, any conclusions about weaponization or deployment modes must be speculative. • Public statements by Western intelligence agencies concur in describing Syria as possessing a limited biotechnical capability that would require significant outside technical assistance before it could undertake large-scale production and weaponization of BW agents. At the same time these reports generally maintain that Syria is engaged in an ongoing BW R&D effort that has not yet resulted in weaponization. Occasional assertions that Syria has weaponized and deployed biological agents or toxins are unsupported by facts and probably reflect political goals more than technical analyses. In the absence of new revelations, it is impossible to support or refute allegations that Syria has an active BW program. It is equally difficult to make any claims regarding military or strategic aspects of this alleged program in the absence of more information.138


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Nuclear Weapons • Ongoing research effort whose overt aspects are directed by the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission (AECS). • Syria became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June 1963 and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in September 1969. • Syria launched an ongoing research effort no later than the 1970s. Its overt aspects are directed by the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission (AECS), which was created in 1979. • The ACES began studies of nuclear power options in 1979–1980 that could be used to conceal efforts to obtain weapons-grade fissile materials. • Beginning in 1982, the IAEA began to assist Syria in creating a nuclear research laboratory for peaceful nuclear power purposes and research, and in obtaining training for Syrian scientists overseas. This effort was expanded in 1983 to include a nuclear laboratory for the AECS and the Arab Center for the Study of Arab Zones and Dry Lands in Damascus. In 1986, the NTI reports that the IAEA helped Syria create a microplant facility for the recovery of yellowcake uranium on an experimental basis from the phosphoric acid being sold by the Syrian General Fertilizer Company Plant at Homs. Syria mines phosphatic rock from deposits at Charkia and Knifes—which have 60–100 parts per million of uranium.139 • Strong evidence that Syria sought to develop the capability to acquire fissile plutonium for a weapon. • Russia and Syria sign a nuclear cooperation agreement in February 1983. They began a joint study of a nuclear power option for Syria in the spring of 1983. • At some point in the 1980s, Syria started a program to extract uranium from phosphoric acid. Syria has extensive phosphate mining and refining capability and is an exporter of phosphoric acid-based fertilizers. The NTI reports that the AECS conducted studies in 1992, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to examine this option, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) funded a project in 1996 to assist the AECS with a pilot plant to extract from a facility in Homs, run by the General Company for Phosphate and Mines. No overt effort to make the plant operational has been reported, but Syria has the capability to extract uranium from phosphoric acid on a pilot scale.140 • In 1996, the IAEA helps the AECS to acquire a cyclotron similar to one operated in Iran in Karaj and that can be used to experiment with uranium enrichment. NTI reports that Belgium’s Ion Beam Applications has sold Syria a Cyclon-30 cyclotron and the plan is for facility design in 1996–1997; construction and hot cell equipment order and installation in 1997–1999, and cyclotron installation in 1998–1999.141 In 1997, the IAEA helps Syria obtain an ion beam accelerator for materials research. • Syria tried to obtain six power reactors (for a total of 6,000 megawatts of generating capacity) in the 1980s from a number of countries, including the Soviet Union, Belgium, and Switzerland, but plans were never implemented. • Syria becomes a founding member of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency in February 1989.

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• Syria announced nuclear reactor purchase plans in the late 1980s. In 1990, it sought to buy a 10 megawatt research reactor from Argentina’s National Institute of Applied Research (INVAP) and Argentine National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEA). The reactor was supposed to be used for research into isotope production and would have had uranium fuel enriched to 20 percent U-235. Negotiation continued through 1995, but the sale was eventually blocked by U.S. negotiating efforts with Argentina. • In December 1991 Syria purchased a 30-kilowatt neutron-source research reactor from China, with technical assistance from the IAEA. The reactor is not suitable for weapons production. The AECS received 980 grams of 90.2 percent enriched uranium 235 as part of the deal. The reactor goes critical in 1996. It is located at the Der Al-Hadjar Nuclear Research Center (also known as Dayr al Hajar or Der Al-Hadjar) and is a Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR). The Center seems to be roughly 140 km north of Damascus, and its overt mission is nuclear and chemical research with a focus on obtaining nuclear fuel, medical research, and nuclear safety. (Syria was also negotiating with India for a 5-megawatt reactor, but the sale seems to have been halted by U.S. diplomatic efforts.) • Syria seems to have signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran in 1992. • The Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies quotes a Jane’s Intelligence Review article from 1993 claiming Syria attempted to purchase ‘‘large (thousand ton) quantities’’ of yellowcake from Namibia.142 • Syria became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June 1963. • Russia and Syria approved a draft of a plan for cooperation on civil nuclear power in February 1998, which is signed later that summer.143 There are reports that Russia will sell Syria a 25MW light water pool-type research reactor. There are other reports of possible reactor sales in 1998 and 2003. Reports surfaced in January 2003 indicating that Syria and Russia had reached an agreement on the construction of a $2-billion facility that would include a nuclear reactor. Although within several days, Russian Foreign Ministry officials had indicated that no reactor would be sold.144 • Unconfirmed reports begin that Iraq has transferred its nuclear and other programs to develop weapons of mass destruction as early as 1992. Unconfirmed reports that Iraq’s nuclear weapons scientists and teams have fled to Syria began to surface shortly after the U.S.–led invasion in March 2003. Officials in the Bush administration announce on January 25, 2005, that U.S. intelligence and analysis efforts found these reports to be untrue. The report of the Iraq Survey Group reaches the same general conclusion on April 25, 2005, but notes that it cannot exclude the possibility. • Reports in April 1994 confirm that Syria has ‘‘hot cells’’ larger than normally required for peaceful research. Such cells provide robotic ability to handle radioactive material and can be used to handle spent fuel rods. • Reports in mid-2004 indicate that Syria was involved in negotiations and possible technology sales with the A. Q Khan Network that has sold nuclear weapons materials and technology to such countries as Iran and Libya. Declassified U.S. intelligence reports, issued in May 2006, strongly indicate that Syria did make use of the A. Q Khan Network.


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• Syria built a heavy water reactor suited to produce plutonium between 2001 and 2007, with North Korean support. The Israeli Air Force destroyed the reactor in September 2007, just as construction was near completion. Missile Defenses • Seeking Russian S-300 or S-400 surface-to-air missile system with limited antitactical ballistic missile capability.

airborne agents. Then Iran will assist in producing and piloting the first four or five CW facilities throughout Syria, producing precursors for VX and sarin nerve agents and mustard blister agents.

Syrian Biological Weapons Syria may be working on biological weapons. The nature of its progress, if any, is unclear. Syria does, however, have the technology base to develop such weapons. Its Scientific Studies and Research Center (CERS) may work on biological and nuclear, as well as chemical weapons. Its experience with UAVs and drones could be used to develop line-source delivery methods for disseminating biological agents, and its experience with cluster munitions and chemical warheads could be adapted to deliver biological weapons.

Syrian Nuclear Weapons Syria has long had an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.148 Its primary partner seems to have been North Korea, although it may have acquired some of the technology and weapons designs sold by the A. Q. Khan network, possibly though Iran, and may have acquired technology and design data from other sources. As was noted in Chapter 1, however, new evidence surfaced in 2007 that Syria had a far more active nuclear weapons effort than had previously been reported. On September 8, 2007, the Syrian Arab News Agency reported Israeli air strikes and dropped ‘‘munitions’’ in Syria without any reports of damage or casualties. 149 Unclassified satellite photographs later made it clear that an Israeli air raid had struck deep into northeast Syria on September 6, 2007, at a target that the imagery strongly indicated might have been a covert Syrian effort to build a nuclear reactor. The images were similar to those of facilities that could contain North Korean designs and that could be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.150 A report by David Albright and Paul Brannan of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) described the site as follows:

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ISIS recently obtained commercial satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe taken on August 10, 2007 of a large portion of Eastern Syria along the Euphrates River. After an extensive search and analysis of the imagery, ISIS found a site that could be the target of the Israeli raid inside Syria on September 6, 2007. The tall building in the image may house a reactor under construction and the pump station along the river may have been intended to supply cooling water to the reactor. The tall building, located approximately 780 meters from the river, is square with approximately 47 meter length sides. There is what appears to be a pump station located on the banks of the river directly west of the tall building. A reactor requires a large volume of water for cooling and this pump station could serve that purpose. The purpose of the secondary building in the image . . . is unknown, but it does not appear to be a temporary structure. Trucks can be seen approximately 100 meters to the east of the tall building. This, along with evidence of heavy machinery tracks around this site, indicates recent construction activity. . . . (The) site is approximately 145 kilometers from the Iraqi border and situated 11 kilometers north of At Tibnah in the Dayr az Zawr region of Syria . . . There is an airstrip located 3.5 kilometers north of the site . . . Such an airstrip would serve as quick transportation of personnel and officials. ABC News reported on Friday, October 19th, 2007 that Israel had recruited a spy to take ground photographs of the reactor construction from inside the complex. Recruiting a spy to take ground photographs of an exposed reactor vessel is unnecessary—as high resolution non-commercial satellite imagery would negate this need. If, however, the reactor vessel and associated shielding were surrounded by a building and covered with a roof, a spy may have been necessary to take photographs from inside the reactor building. The Washington Post reported on Friday, October 19th, 2007 that an official described a facility as similar in structure to a North Korean reactor. North Korean reactor construction is based on an old Russian model—in which the reactor vessel is built gradually and is not brought to the site already constructed or in large pieces, requiring a large crane to move heavy equipment inside. This North Korean/Russian approach would mean that a roof would be placed on a building earlier than in some other reactor designs, and it would hide what was inside the building earlier in the construction timeline. In comparing the five megawatt-electric (or 20–25 megawatt-thermal) reactor building at North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility to this suspected Syrian reactor building, the length of the outer walls of the structures are approximately the same . . . The taller roof of North Korea’s reactor measures approximately 32 meters by 24 meters on its sides. There also appears to be a faint square on top of the Syrian building’s roof. It is unclear whether something would be built there, but its dimensions, 24 meters by 22 meters, are consistent with the subsequent construction of an upper roof. From the image, the Syrian building is similar in shape to the North Korean reactor building, but the Syrian building is not far enough along in its construction to make a definitive comparison. If the design of the reactor is similar to a North Korean reactor, it is likely a small gasgraphite reactor of the type North Korea built at the Yongbyon nuclear site north of Pyongyang. The Syrian building size suggests that the reactor would be in the range of


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about 20–25 megawatts-thermal, large enough to make about one nuclear weapon’s worth of plutonium each year. If Syria wanted to build nuclear weapons, it would need a specialized facility to chemically separate the plutonium from the irradiated fuel discharged from the reactor. It is unknown whether Syria has such a facility under construction or planned. On October 23, 2007, Google Earth posted imagery that covers a wide swath of eastern Syria and includes this site. The suspected reactor building can be seen, but the secondary structure and the pump station are both missing in this image. The exact date on which the image was taken is not provided by Google Earth, but it must be significantly earlier than August 10, the date of the DigitalGlobe imagery obtained by ISIS. The absence of the pump station would make interpretation of the purpose of the site very difficult. The images raise as many questions as they answer. How far along was the reactor construction project when it was bombed? What was the extent of nuclear assistance from North Korea? Which reactor components did Syria obtain from North Korea or elsewhere, and where are they now? Is Syria able to produce any of the key reactor components itself? Could Syria have finished the reactor without on-going North Korean assistance? Did Syria plan to build a plutonium separation plant?151

Images taken much later after the air strike revealed a rushed Syrian effort to cover up all visual indicators that the sight even existed. On April 24, 2008, the White House released photographic images to support the position that the target of the Israeli air raid was a nuclear reactor constructed with the assistance of North Korea. The photographs were taken inside the reactor prior to the September 6, 2007, attack and showed details like heat control rods. Some of the photographs may have gone as far back as 2002, suggesting a possible multiyear North Korean commitment. Senior U.S. intelligence officials provided photos, movies, and the following additional details at the briefing, all of which provided a unique set of insights into the intelligence effort to analyze Syria’s programs: The reactor was built in a remote area of eastern Syria near the Euphrates River. The nearest town is called al Kibar. Our information supports the following key points: Syria was building a gas-cooled graphite-moderated reactor that was nearing operational capability in August 2007. The reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. It was not configured to produce electricity and was illsuited for research. The reactor was destroyed in early September 2007 before it was loaded with nuclear fuel or operated. We are convinced, based on a variety of information, that North Korea assisted the Syrians covert nuclear activities both before and after the reactor was destroyed. Only North Korea has built this type of reactor in the past 35 years. Features of the facility and its location indicate Syria attempted to maintain its secrecy. Syria moved quickly to cover up its covert nuclear activities by demolishing and burying the reactor building and by removing incriminating equipment. These actions probably were intended to forestall identification of reactor debris by international inspectors and are inconsistent with peaceful nuclear intentions.

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We have detailed information showing that the al Kibar facility was a nuclear reactor. Three dimensional computer model of the facility has been created using features and dimensions through photographs of the facility. This diagram shows key features of a gas-cooled graphite moderated reactor, the type built at al Kibar. We have photographs showing some of these important reactor components under construction including vertical tubes in the top of the reactor for control rods and for refueling, a reinforcedconcrete steel-lined reactor vessel, and the water supply systems use heat exchangers to remove heat from the carbon-dioxide coolant. The main feature of the reactor hall, shown here in the center of the building, was the top of the reactor vessel. The pattern of holes on the floor were the ends of vertical tubes used for control rods and refueling of the corps, a key feature of gas-cooled reactors. We judge other features of the building, such as heavily sealed reinforced-concrete rooms for heat exchangers and a spent fuel holding pool also are consistent with typical gas-cooled reactors. This photograph shows the top of the reactor vessel in the reactor hall before concrete was poured around the vertical control rod and refueling tubes. Note the similar arrangement of vertical tube openings in the top of the Syrian reactor on the left and North Korea’s Yongbyon plutonium production reactor on the right. We assess the Syrian reactor was similar in size and capacity to this North Korean reactor. Only North Korea has built such gas-cool graphite moderated reactors in the past 35 years. This photograph shows the steel liner for the reinforced-concrete reactor vessel before it was installed. The network of small pipes on the outside of the liner is for cooling water to protect the concrete against the reactor is intense heat and radiation. The animated model shows how this component was positioned in the reactor vessel. This photograph and view of the computer model shows the concrete reactor vessel under construction. The photograph shows the steel liner in place within the vessel. Satellite imagery, together with ground photographs of the facility under construction, showed features of the cooling water-supply system. A key feature was pipes running up a canyon to supply water from the Euphrates River to an underground storage tank at the reactor site. The site lacked key features of alternative facilities such as fuel storage and turbines for an oil-fired power plant or pipes from the site for irrigation or water treatment. The water would have been pumped from the tank through heat exchangers in the reactor building and the hot water would return to the river by a separate pipeline. When the pipeline and pump house were externally completed in early August 2007, no further observable construction was necessary before the reactor could begin operations. We assess that the reactor could have been complete and that start of operations could have begun at any time although additional weeks to months of testing were likely. We have information spanning more than a decade that indicates sustained nuclear cooperation between Syria and North Korea. We obtained this photograph, for example, showing the head of North Korea’s nuclear reactor fuel manufacturing plant in Yongbyon. Seen also at the Six-Party talks in the photograph on the right, together is Syria with the head of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission. Other examples of cooperation include senior North Koreans from the Yongbyon nuclear complex made multiple visits to Syria before construction of the al Kibar reactor began in 2001. In 2002, North Korean officials were procuring equipment for an undisclosed site in Syria. North Korea, that same year, sought a gas-cooled reactor component


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we believe was intended for the Syrian site. A North Korean nuclear organization and Syrian officials involved in the covert nuclear program reportedly were involved in a cargo transfer from North Korea to probably al Kibar in 2006. North Korean nuclear officials were located in the region of the reactor both early and late in 2007. Our information shows that North Korean advisors also probably assisted with damage assessment after the reactor was destroyed. A high-level North Korean delegation traveled to Syria shortly after the reactor was destroyed and met with officials associated with Syria’s covert nuclear program. The reactor building was irreparably damaged early in the morning of September 6th, 2007, before it became operational, causing a collapse of the central reactor hall and surrounding light walls and roof structures. Damascus, including Syrian President Assad has specifically and forcefully denied that a nuclear facility was destroyed or that it has any undeclared nuclear facilities. Syria has gone to extraordinary lengths to conceal the existence and nature of the al Kibar reactor both during its construction and after it was destroyed. These photographs show how a light roof and thin curtain walls were added after the main reactor hall was completed. They alter the building’s outline, which otherwise resembles the profile of North Korea’s plutonium-production reactor at Yongbyon seen in the photograph on the left. This photograph shows how much the building’s appearance changed after the curtain walls and roof were added. The reactor building was located in a remote area of the Syrian Desert and was built in a canyon which concealed it from view. Further measures including earthen wall or mound that has been in place to block the view of the reactor from the bottom of the canyon. The concealment afforded by the reactor site’s terrain and by the building modifications suggest Syrian attempts to maintain the secrecy of the facility. Immediately after the building was destroyed, the Syrians began taking additional measures to limit potential observation of the reactor and their activities including covering the exposed reactor vessel with tarpaulins; erecting structures to prevent satellite observation of their activities; and opening holes in the building, probably to remove heavy reactor-related equipment. Syria destroyed the remainder of the reactor building with a massive controlled demolition on October 10th, 2007, as part of an ongoing effort to remove all evidence of the reactor’s existence. Demolition of the building, however, revealed key nuclear-related interior structures that remain because they were made of heavily reinforced concrete. These corresponded in configuration and location to key gas-cooled reactor features of our photography-based computer model, including the concrete reactor vessel, the shielded heat-exchanger rooms, and the probably spent fuel storage pool area. Syria continued to demolish the building and remove equipment and by late October covered the excavation for the reactor building and remaining debris with earth. Syria subsequently erected a light metal-framework building over the site of the destroyed reactor and began preparing a pipeline to connect the site’s water-pumping system to a water-treatment plant a few kilometers away, most likely an attempt to further cover up the nuclear nature of the al Kibar site. We do not know the function of the new building, but we assess it is not nuclear related and primarily is intended to discourage excavation of any remaining reactor debris. In conclusion, our information shows that Syria was building a gas-cooled, graphitemoderated reactor that was nearing operational capability in August 2007. The reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. It was not

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configured to produce electricity and was ill-suited for research. The reactor was destroyed in early September 2007 before it was loaded with nuclear fuel or operated. We are convinced based on a variety of information that North Korea assisted Syria’s covert nuclear activities both before and after the reactor was destroyed. Only North Korea has built this type of reactor in the past 35 years.152

A number of questions still remained about the nature of the project and Syria’s nuclear weapons efforts. There were no indications that Syria had the ability to provide fuel for the reactor, and there were no reports it had begun construction of a facility to use the irradiated rods from the reactors to separate out weapons-grade plutonium.153 This was a critical issue because later reports indicated that the reactor at the Al Kibar facility was nearly complete when it was attacked, and it had far more infrastructure support than was initially made public. Syria was able to draw upon an extensive North Korean covert purchasing network run by Ho Jin Yin, and which used a commercial cover and office in Beijing—the Namchongan Trading Co. or NCG—to buy precisely machined equipment such as specialized steel pipes, aluminum tubes, transformers, and vacuum pumps for what were claimed to be commercial purposes. This North Korean effort had attracted the attention of Western intelligence agencies no later than 2003 and had previously led to concerns that its imports were designed to help North Korea build a facility to develop fissile uranium.154 Work by the Institute for Science and International Security also indicated that the building had a false roof and wall to partly conceal its shape, and that the relatively low profile of the building concealed the fact that the facility had extensive underground facilities that could conceal a reserve water tank and space for spent fuel rods. It also had hidden power lines, hidden underground water cooling systems that discharged into the Euphrates River rather than the normal cooling towers, and ventilation systems built into the walls rather than the usual smokestack-like vents.155 Neither the United States nor Israel provided further background on how Syria might have planned to build, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. Major questions remain unanswered about the level of North Korean support Syria did or did not receive, how much technical data and nuclear weapons design information Syria had gotten from such sources as the A. Q. Khan network, and about the level of Syrian-Iranian cooperation, if any.

Syrian Delivery Systems Syria had some 18–20 SS-21 launchers at the end of 2007, plus 18 Scud Bs and 30 North Korean–made ‘‘Scud C’’ launchers. Syria’s four SS-C-1B Sepal and six SS-C-3 Styx cruise missile fire units might also be adapted to fire missiles for use against area targets. Syria could use virtually any of its combat aircraft for one-way missions or adapt them to remote single sortie use. There are unconfirmed reports that other countries in the region, including Iraq, examined the use of remotely piloted fighters for the line source delivery of chemical weapons.


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Syria is reported to have fired three Scud missiles in 2005. All seem to have been tested in an ‘‘airburst’’ mode where the warheads might be using cluster munitions that could carry chemical or biological weapons. One was an older Scud B, with a range of about 300 km, but two were the improved No Dong missiles sometimes called the Scud D, with a range of up to 700 km. There are some analysts who still feel Syria might have acquired Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction when Saddam Hussein had them smuggled out of Iraq before the U.S.–led invasion. Such reporting is anecdotal and so far has not produced any evidence to give it credibility. As previously noted, some sources have reported that Syria has tried to upgrade its missile forces by buying the Russian SS-X-26 or Iskander E missile from Russia. The missile has a maximum range of 280–300 km and could hit such Israeli cites as Haifa, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. Unlike Syria’s present missiles, the SS-X-26 is solid fueled and could improve Syria’s ability to rapidly disperse its missiles and fire without delays for fueling or preparation. So far, however, Russia seems to have rejected such sales, as well as the sale of new surface-to-air missiles that might be converted for such use.156 The SS-X-26 is believed to be a replacement for both the Scud and the SS-23, which had to be abandoned as a result of the intermediate-range ballistic missile treaty. It is a mobile system mounted on a tracked TEL that can carry two missiles. Work by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) indicates that it is a hightechnology system that could be armed with a cluster munition warhead, a fuel-air explosive enhanced-blast warhead, a tactical earth penetrator for bunker busting, and an electromagnetic pulse device for antiradar missions. The FAS indicates that its small (480-kilogram) conventional warhead would need advanced terminal precision guidance to ensure its efficacy. It speculates that this could be provided by using ‘‘active terminal sensors such as a millimeter wave radar, satellite terminal guidance using GLOSNASS, an improved inertial platform, or some combination of these approaches.’’157 Possible Syrian Strategy, Tactics, and Employment Various experts have postulated that Syria could use its chemical and possibly biological weapons against Israel or any other neighbor in range as terror weapons and see them as at least a partial deterrent to Israeli strikes with weapons of mass destruction in anything other than an existential conflict. Other experts have suggested that Syria might use chemical weapons against Israeli Army forces as they mobilized, to support a surprise attack on the Golan Heights, on Israel’s weapons of mass destruction, or in attacks on some other critical Israeli target or facility. There have also been suggestions that Syria might attempt covert attacks or use a terrorist or other proxy. It is impossible to dismiss such possibilities, and there are no reliable unclassified sources on Syrian doctrine, plans, or intentions for using weapons of mass destruction. Syria does, however, face the fact that any such attack might be seen as the prelude to a Syrian attack on Israeli population centers and that a mass attack producing

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high lethality against Israel’s mobilization centers would probably be viewed as unacceptable for Israel to ignore. Israeli plans and doctrine are as obscure as their Syrian equivalents. However, given Israel’s past actions, the response might well be Israeli massive retaliation with a mix of air and missile strikes designed to destroy much of Syria’s continuity of government, military facilities and capabilities, and economy and infrastructure. A major Syrian attack on Israeli civilian targets might well lead to Israeli retaliation against Syrian cities with nuclear weapons. If Israel sought to send a decisive signal to Syria as to the cost of strikes on Israel, it might come in the form of nuclear ground bursts designed to both cripple Syria and prevent its recovery. It also seems likely that if Israel ever came to believe Syria was acquiring highly lethal biological weapons, or nuclear weapons, it would massively preempt and possibly without warning.

9

War on the Golan Heights

The Golan Heights is the critical area of contention between Israel and Syria, and the only major reason for war between the two states. From Syria’s viewpoint, it represents some 1,250 square kilometers of Syrian territory lost in the fighting June 9–10, 1967, and again in October 1973. The Golan has become a symbol of Syrian prestige and status. Regaining the Golan would also provide strategic depth against an Israeli attack on Damascus and potential leverage against a more vulnerable Israel. While Syria’s Golan refugees are only a small part of its total population of 19.3 million, they, too, are an important Syrian political issue. While estimates vary from extremes of 53,000 to some 200,000 such refugees, the number who fled in the fighting in 1967 is probably between 80,000 and 109,000, mainly Druze Arabs and Circassians.1 From Israel’s viewpoint, the area under Israeli control includes two geologically distinct areas: the Golan Heights proper (413 square miles; 1,070 km 2) and the slopes of the Mount Hermon range (39 square miles; 100 km2).2 The Golan serves as an important barrier to any Syrian advance on Israel, provides a base for improved sensor and electronic intelligence coverage of southern Syria, and allows Israel to pose a constant threat to Syria’s capital of Damascus. The Golan is also an important source of water. The northern Golan has double the average rainfall of the southern Golan and often receives snow in the winter, as does the Mount Hermon area. The Golan lies within the Lake Kinneret catchment basin, which supplies 30 percent of Israel’s water needs. Two of the Jordan River’s main sources, the Dan and the Banias rivers, rise on the slopes of Mount Hermon —in addition to many seasonal streams that rise on the Heights and flow into the lake, either directly or via the Jordan. In 1964, Syria sought to divert the sources of the Jordan and prevent their waters from reaching Israel, provoking a series of border incidents.3 Israel’s construction of desalination plants is, however, reducing its dependence on such supplies.

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The Golan has some 32 Israeli settlements and around 14,000-20,000 Israeli settlers, plus some 17,000-20,000 Druze and Alawite Arabs.4 It is a significant agricultural and tourist area for Israel. Settlers cultivate some 8,100 hectares of land with a wide variety of crops, including wine grapes. There are also 46,575 hectares dedicated to natural pasturage, supporting some 15,000 head of cattle and 5,000 sheep, for both meat and dairy production. The Golan’s dairy cattle produce approximately 60 million liters of milk per year. There are approximately 30 industrial enterprises on the Golan, mostly based in the Katzrin Industrial Zone.5 Built in the 1970s, Katzrin is the Israeli administrative center in the Golan and the largest Israeli town on the Heights. There are a total of 33 Israeli communities (27 kibbutzim [Israeli collective communities] and moshavim [Israeli cooperative agricultural communities], five communal settlements, and the town of Katzrin) on the Golan Heights and the slopes of Mount Hermon. (Katzrin has its own mayor and local council; the other 32 communities form the Golan Heights Regional Council.) The Druze that remain—many of whom have ties to Israel and serve in the Israeli Army—live in four villages in the northern part of the Golan Heights including Majdal Shams. There is an Alawite village called Ghajar that stretches on both sides of the Lebanese-Israeli border.6 Mount Hermon is the site of Israel’s only ski resort, as well as archaeological sites, hotels, restaurants, and guest room facilities. Those who operate the Mount Hermon ski area live in the nearby Israeli moshav of Neve Ativ and the Druze town of Majdal Shams. The Israeli sector of the mountain is heavily patrolled by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israel Police, while Israeli security forces maintain a strategic observation post for monitoring Syrian and Lebanese military activity near Mitzpe Shlagim (‘‘Snow Lookout’’)—which is at an elevation of about 2,224 meters. Its adjacent peak, at 2,236 meters, is the highest elevation in Israel. Israel and Syria also contest an area closely linked to the Golan. Syria defines the greater Golan area in terms of the June 4, 1967, wartime boundary between Israel and Syria. This included a narrow a strip of land on the east shore of Lake Kinneret (the Sea of Galilee) that Syria captured during the 1948–1949 Arab-Israeli War and held from 1949–1967. Israel claims the pre-1948 boundary between French-held Syria and British-held Palestine. This boundary was established in 1923 and was called the Paulet-Newcombe line. Syria never recognized this boundary, however, and claims France and Britain drew it illegally as colonial powers. Israel, in turn, claims that the June 4, 1967, line was the result of Syrian aggression during 1948– 1967. The difference between the Syrian and Israeli lines is normally less than 100 meters, but a return to the June 4, 1967, line would give Syria access to the Sea of Galilee, which is Israel’s only freshwater lake and a key source of water. THE STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS Much of the Golan’s strategic importance is determined by its geography. There is no precise definition of the Golan’s boundaries. In broad terms, however, its western boundary is the Jordan Valley, the southern boundary is the Yarmuk (Yarmouk)

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River, and the northern boundary is the Sa’ar River. The Sa’ar River separates the Golan’s volcanic plateau from the largely limestone formations of Mount Hermon. The eastern boundary on the Hauran plain is not clearly defined, although the Allan River and the Ruqad River are sometimes said to be the boundary.7 The Golan’s main geographic feature is a volcanic plateau of about 1,150 square kilometers located between the Galilee in Israel and the plain of Damascus. It is roughly 67 kilometers (km) long from north to south and a maximum of 25 km wide from the buffer zone between Syrian- and Israeli-occupied territory on the Golan to Israel and the Galilee. Prior to the 1967 war, the Syrian-Israeli border along the Golan was 76 km long.8 The Golan Heights is between 120 and 520 m high. Its topography can be divided into three regions: northern (between the Sa’ar and Jilabun valleys), central (between the Jilabun and Daliyot valleys), and southern (between the Daliyot and Yarmouk valleys).9 The Golan has a rock escarpment to the west that drops 500 m to the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan River. The terrain to the north, near the international border with Lebanon, is shaped by Mount Hermon, and to the east by a largely flat plain, called the Hauran. The side of the Golan facing Syria is part of a Holocene volcanic field that extends northeast almost to Damascus and that is scattered with cinder cones, such as at Majdal Shams. Mount Hermon is in the northern Golan Heights, but is geologically separate from the volcanic field. There is a crater lake near Mount Hermon called Birkat Ram (‘‘Ram Pool’’), which is fed by underground springs. The Israeli-held part of Mount Hermon is technically a different geographic region than the Golan Heights. Movement throughout the Golan can occur through five main east-west routes, but each presents problems. The terrain on the Golan is relatively smooth at the top, but it is broken up with small volcanic cones that make natural sites for defensive positions and strongpoints. Israel occupies the key line of volcanic peaks to the west of Quneitra, and Israeli forces are deployed on the high ground on the Golan to the east of the line of volcanic mounds that defines the Golan watershed. This is the most favorable line of defense on the Golan, and Israel has created a formidable series of fire points, antitank obstacles, and minefields. Syria has also created a formidable series of fortified positions, fire points, minefields, and antitank ditches and barriers on its side of the Golan. THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF THE STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE GOLAN These terrain features create a relatively unique fighting ground for land warfare and proved to be a major factor in the fighting from 1948 to 1967, and again in 1973. It is important to note, however, that the strategic geography of the Golan is far more three dimensional today than it was in 1973 and previous wars. One key new dimension of the battlefield—the electronic or sensor dimension— has been created by advances in sensors and smart long-range kill capability. Allweather and day-night sensor and targeting capabilities have changed fundamentally,

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Map 9.1 The Golan Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace.


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at least for the IDF. Israel can now maintain real-time coverage of the Golan area and Syrian positions with a high level of detail and very sophisticated targeting assets. Syria is far more limited by a lack of access to high ground, sophisticated technical assets, dedicated satellite platforms, and survivable manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This imbalance not only gives the IDF a major advantage in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) dimension in wartime, it greatly improves its warning capability and ability to monitor any Syrian exercise activity that might be used in a surprise attack. Israel’s advantage in this new dimension of warfare is reinforced by its overall capabilities for netcentric warfare, greatly improved real-time targeting, and the ability to use ‘‘smart’’ long-range artillery with submunitions and precision, standoff air-strike capabilities. Syria may have some long-range artillery rockets with smart or highly lethal area-covering submunitions, but these have severe limitations if they are not integrated with survivable IS&R assets, long-range targeting, and near-real-time netcentric integration of the AirLand battle. Moreover, the IDF is far better equipped than Syria for both night warfare and to sustain a 24-hour pace of battle. Its advantages in sensor and smart long-range kill capability extend to intensity, sustainability, and continuity of combat. The air dimension—the ability to conduct the AirLand battle and joint air force and army operations—is the second dimension of any Israeli-Syrian conflict on the Golan that has undergone a fundamental change. Again, the change favors Israel. Syria can still deploy an intensive mix of layered surface-to-air missile systems. However, as the previous chapters have indicated, its air force cannot hope to match the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in air-to-air combat, and most of its surface-to-air missile systems have aged to the point where Israel should very effectively carry out the suppression of enemy air-defense (SEAD) missions. At the same time, Israel’s mix of UAVs and targeting/intelligence aircraft, plus its air attack capabilities with precision airto-ground munitions and area weapons, should make the IAF far more effective in defending against or attacking Syrian ground forces than in the past. The third dimension, ground combat, may not have changed as dramatically, but the changes have still been important. A new round of ground warfare on the Golan would almost certainly be continuous 24-hour war, fought with far better targeting and situational awareness than in the past. It would involve better secure and survivable communications, digital situation displays and GPS, and thermal night-vision devices that can be used for both operations and targeting. Engagement rates, distances, and lethality would be strikingly higher, at least on the Israeli side. Both sides now have weapons that can kill at ranges far longer than the traditional line-of-sight limit to direct fire, which would extend the forward edge of battle by some 2–10 km, depending on the weapons systems and sensors employed. IDF artillery would have capabilities approaching a weapons systems and sensors capable of ‘‘deep-strike’’ targeting and kills at ranges of up to or exceeding 20 km. There is, however, no way to estimate just how much the nature of any future war would change from past fighting until this complex mix of systems and tactical

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capabilities is seen in action. Preparation, readiness, and realistic training are critical to the exploitation of the new tactics and technologies involved, and Israel’s ground forces did not perform well in any of these areas in the fighting against Hezbollah in 2006. Israel’s political leaders and top commanders were even more indecisive and slow to react in the Israeli-Hezbollah War than in reacting to Egyptian and Syrian preparations and initial attack in 1973, and a good deal will depend on how much the IDF and Israel’s political leadership have improved since 2006. However, as Chapter 7 has noted, the IDF attempted to make major improvements in training and readiness in 2007 and has altered the allocation of its military budget to improve the capability of its land forces to fight a major conventional battle. It has upgraded its satellite and other surveillance coverage of the Golan area and Syria.10 It has improved its armor defenses against Syrian holdings of advanced antitank guided weapons such as the AT-13 and the AT-14 and has restructured its reserve call-up planning and training and some aspects of its active army plans and deployments. Israel also began a series of exercises to improve its readiness and capabilities on the Golan in February 2007. The February exercise involved a regiment of paratroopers, together with infantry, sappers, and the air force. It simulated defense against surprise attack on the Golan Heights by Syrian commandos, as well as other scenarios. Amir Peretz, then Israel’s Minister of Defense, stated, ‘‘Conducting these exercises in this area does not at all mean that they are connected to a possible conflict.’’ Peretz also said, however, ‘‘These exercises are the army’s most important for five years and mainly intend to absorb lessons learnt from the war.’’11 Several other exercises were held during the course of 2007, including a major exercise in May—and one that drew close attention from Syrian, Iranian, and Hezbollah military analysts.12 Another exercise was held in that spring that was reported to have involved the Golani (infantry) regiment artillery and engineering forces as well as the air force, and which was stated to focus on applying lessons drawn from the 2006 war in Lebanon.13 One Israeli source reported in December that the IDF had held a series of highlevel exercises code named ‘‘Firestone 10’’ that examined various scenarios for a two- to three-front conflict involving Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The exercise included the full-scale deployment of new information systems that integrate the strategic and territorial commands. The four-day exercise was the largest peacetime conceptual test of its kind held for quite some time by the top military establishment—a distinctive outcome of the Winograd Commission recommendations.14 While Firestone 10 was the largest military exercise to date, in April 2008 Israel carried out its largest-ever drill designed to gauge the readiness of the Israeli government, local authorities, and the civil-defense forces. Dubbed ‘‘Turning Point,’’ the drill was carried out April 6–10, 2008, and simulated a multiple front military confrontation with more than 200 Israeli simulated ‘‘deaths,’’ 3,000 ‘‘wounded,’’ terror attacks, highjacking operations, over 2,500 rocket and missile attacks from Israel’s northern and southern border regions and a simulated chemical missile attack. Unlike the other exercises described above, Turning Point did not include offensive military operations


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or a reserve call-up. While Israeli officials stressed that such exercises take place on an annual basis, Turning Point prompted condemnation from the governments of Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah placed its forces on high alert, while Syria conducted its own large-scale war games as a show of strength and a response to Israel.15 Syria has improved its force strength and readiness. It has continued to upgrade the antitank guided missile and short-range air-defense systems in its forces near the Golan. A wide range of Israeli press reports in 2007 also talked about Syrian exercises as if they were offensive in character and quoted various Israeli intelligence officers and commanders as talking about Syrian plans for war.16 Discussions with Israelis and Syrians indicate, however, that Syrian exercises have at least formally had a defensive character. Israeli concerns have not focused on overt Syrian offensive exercises or plans. They focused on the fact that any ‘‘defensive’’ exercise includes counteroffensive training, maneuver, and deployment practice that improves ‘‘offensive’’ skills and readiness as well. Similarly, any defensive exercise can be used as an excuse or deception operation to move forces into a forward area or increase readiness for a surprise attack. It is also important to reiterate that both President Bashar al-Assad and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert have been reported to have made new peace overtures in 2007 and 2008, that Syria sent a representative to the Arab-Israeli peace conference in Annapolis in the winter of 2007, and that press reports surfaced that both countries would hold further peace talks at a follow-up conference in Moscow in 2008. On April 23, 2008, a Syrian cabinet minister claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had conveyed messages to Basher Al-Assad stating Israel’s willingness to withdraw from all the Golan Heights in return for peace with Syria. The statement said to be conveyed by Turkey was neither confirmed not denied by Israeli officials. It was unclear what may have been meant by ‘‘complete withdrawal,’’ as differences existed over what constituted the international border: the 1923 border between Palestine and Syria, the 1949 armistice line, or the June 4, 1967, border between Israel and Syria on the eve of the 1967 war. Syria maintained that it would sue for peace if Israel withdrew up to the June 4, 1967, border.17 Continued contact between Israel and Syria and intermittent moves toward a final peace between the two countries remain important, especially considering that exercises, improved readiness, and improved equipment and training can be deterrents as well as a prelude to war. THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON THE GOLAN Any discussion of Israeli and Syrian forces in the area must be prefaced by noting the presence of a UN peacekeeping force that acts as a buffer between the two sets of forces. The Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement signed on May 31, 1974, limits the forces Israel and Syria can deploy in the Golan area and established the UN disengagement observer force (UNDOF).18 Israeli and Syrian forces are separated by a 10-km-wide force limitation zone where each side can deploy a maximum of 6,000 soldiers, 75 tanks, and 36

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Map 9.2 UNDOF Locations on the Golan Heights: December 2007 Source: UNDOF, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/undof.pdf.

short-range howitzers (122-mm equivalent). There is a third 10-km-wide force limitation zone where both sides are limited to 450 tanks and 162 artillery weapons with a range not exceeding 20 km. Finally, each side is forbidden from deploying surfaceto-air missiles closer than 25 km from the disengagement zone.


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There is a 3–6-km-wide disengagement zone where no forces are permitted, except for a UN disengagement observer force of 1,043 troops, assisted by some 57 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization’s (UNTSO’s) Observer Group Golan, supported by 39 international civilian personnel and 104 local civilian staff. This force has been in place since May 31, 1974; has manning from Austria, Canada, India, Japan, Poland, and Slovakia; and has a budget of roughly $42 million a year.19 UNDOF describes its mission as follows: The Agreement provided for an area of separation and for two equal zones of limited forces and armaments on both sides of the area, and called for the establishment of a United Nations observer force to supervise its implementation. The Agreement was signed on 31 May 1974 and, on the same day, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) by which it set up the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). The Force has since performed its functions effectively, with the cooperation of the parties. The situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet. Both parties cooperate fully with the mission and for a number of years there have been no serious incidents. In order to carry out its mandate, UNDOF maintains an area of separation, which is some 80 kilometers long and varies in width between approximately 10 kilometers in the centre to less than one kilometer in the extreme south. The terrain is hilly and is dominated in the north by Mount Hermon. The highest United Nations position is at an altitude of 2,800 meters. The area of separation is inhabited and is policed by the Syrian authorities. No military forces other than UNDOF are permitted within it. UNDOF is entirely deployed within and close to the area of separation, with two base camps, 44 permanently manned positions and 11 observation posts. The headquarters of UNDOF is located at Camp Faouar and an office is maintained at Damascus. In addition, the Force operates patrols by day and night. The Austrian battalion, which includes a Slovak company, is deployed in the northern part of the area of separation, while the Polish battalion is deployed in the southern part. Its base camp is Camp Ziouani. Mine clearance is conducted by both battalions under the operational control of UNDOF headquarters. The Force is assisted by the military observers of UNTSO’s Observer Group Golan. The Canadian and Japanese logistic units, which are based in Camp Ziouani, with a detachment in Camp Faouar, perform the second-line general transport tasks, rotation transport, control and management of goods received by the Force and maintenance of heavy equipment. First-line logistic support is internal to the contingents and includes transport of supplies to the positions. From its various positions and through its patrols, the Force supervises the area of separation and intervenes whenever any military personnel enter or try to operate therein. This is effected by means of permanently manned positions and observation posts, by foot and mobile patrols operating at irregular intervals by day and night on predetermined routes. On each side of the area of separation there is one area of limitation with three zones, one 0 to 10 kilometers, one 10 to 20 kilometers and one 20 to 25 kilometers wide. UNDOF inspects these areas every two weeks in order to ascertain that the agreed limitations in armaments and forces are being observed.

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UNDOF continues to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with facilities for mail and the passage of persons through the area of separation. Within the means available, medical treatment is provided to the local population on request. In UNDOF’s area of operation, especially in the area of separation, minefields continue to pose a threat to UNDOF personnel and local inhabitants. In consultation with the Syrian authorities, UNDOF instituted a minefield security and maintenance programme in the area of separation to identify and mark all minefields. The Force also supported the activities of the United Nations Children’s Fund to promote mine awareness among the civilian population. Another priority for the mission is to address the environmental consequences of the Force’s activities and presence in the area of operations. The Force is taking steps to ensure that its presence does not contribute to further environmental pollution of the area.20

In practice, UNDOF monitors the Syrian and Israeli military presence in the area (from permanent observation posts and by patrols day and night, on foot and motorized), intervenes in cases of entry to the separation area by military personnel from either side, or attempted operations, and carries out bi-weekly inspections of some 500 Israeli and Syrian military locations in the areas of limitation on each side to ensure agreed limits of equipment and forces are being followed.21 The buffer zone is currently inhabited and is policed by Syrian authorities. There are several towns and villages within and bordering the zone, the largest of which is Al Qunaytirah. A small UN peacekeeping force cannot stop a nation determined to go to war, but it can disarm some suspicions and its political impact should not be ignored. ISRAELI POSITIONS ON THE GOLAN If war should come, much will depend on the land forces in position at the time and on each side’s ability to draw upon combat-ready reinforcements and the relative rate of deployment. It is all too possible that one or both sides will by then be ignoring at least some of the force limitations they agreed to in 1974 in preparing an attack. Even if Israel sticks to such force limitations, however, it will have the Golani Brigade in the area, and the Golan will still provide the IDF with a distinct geographic advantage. Although the May 31, 1974, separation of forces agreement between Israel and Syria led Israel to withdraw from about 600 square kilometers of territory on the Golan, particularly control over the dominant Bahta ridge line in the south and the Rafid junction, Israel no longer is forced to split its forces to defend against both Egypt and Syria.22 Israel also retains excellent staging points and radars and observation posts to cover Syria. The IDF observation points are on Mount Hermon (1,121 m) in the northwest, on the volcanic mound at Tel Avital (1,024 m) in the central Golan, and on Tel Faris (929 m) in the southern Golan. These posts not only provide a relatively clear picture of Syrian military activity near Israel, but the post on Mount Hermon provides surveillance of part of Lebanon.23 The Golan is only 50 km from Damascus, and Israeli


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sensors have a direct line of sight to downtown Damascus, as well as direct line of sight and line of sensor observation of threatening movements from Lebanon and Syria.24 The Israeli signals and electronic intelligence sensors in the Golan are an integral part of Israel’s early warning system and provide good intelligence coverage of much of Syria. Israeli control of the Golan confronts Syria with the fact that Israel has a springboard to launch an attack into Syria, a platform for UAV/unmanned combat aerial vehicle operations and artillery and rocket attacks, and the ability to target movement and military positions from the Golan to Damascus. The Golan also provides Israel with a platform for artillery and missile fire and for launching UAVs and other sensor systems that can be used in attacking Syria’s land-based air defenses and air force. Israel’s main challenge in defending the Golan would be to deploy sufficient mobility and killing capability over the entire battlefield to halt any sudden Syrian advance. The main tactical problem Israel faces in such a defense is early warning and executing a decisive reaction. Israel must be able to commit the IDF and the IAF in ways that react to initial warning indicators on a near ‘‘hair-trigger’’ basis to prevent significant initial Syrian gains. Much of the Syrian Army is forward deployed and could rapidly mobilize and attack across the Golan with roughly five or six armored division equivalents. This attack could potentially be supported by a thrust through Jordan and/or Lebanon, although such a thrust is now politically far less likely. The IDF needs at least 24 hours of strategic warning that Syria is massing and readying for an attack to mobilize and man its forward defenses. Ideally, it needs 36 to 48 hours of reaction time to fully complete its plans. As has been noted earlier, however, Israel has greatly improved its sensor and warning capability and the capability to fight an AirLand battle since the October War in 1973 and has greatly improved its defenses and fortifications on the Golan. Syria cannot prevent Israel from retaliating with powerful air strike capabilities. Even so, the IDF can halt an all-out Syrian surprise attack with minimal casualties only if it has time to redeploy its active forces and mobilize its reserves. SYRIAN POSITIONS NEAR THE GOLAN Syria’s strategic position is far less advantageous, and it would face serious problems in making offensive use of its forces near the Golan. Even if Syrian land forces achieve some degree of tactical success, the end result could be to lead Israel to exert strategic pressure on Syria and use its missiles and aircraft against Syrian strategic targets. Any major defeat or tactical failure could expose Syria to IDF advances into Syria and potentially to an IDF advance toward Damascus. It is possible, however, that Syria might calculate that Israel may be reluctant to escalate too much in the face of a limited assault on the Golan because this might drive Syria to use its long-range ballistic missiles against Israel in spite of the fact that Syria would receive far more damage in kind. It might also feel that Israel would not

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take the risk of advancing deeply into Syria because it would have to fight a serious battle, and one where the IDF would take serious casualties by Israeli standards, only to occupy more Arab territory with few strategic gains and at considerable political cost in terms of the broader reaction from the Arab and Islamic worlds. As has been noted earlier, the Syrian Army has large forces near the Golan area, with an active strength of nearly 40,000 men. Unclassified sources do not provide a detailed picture of the current Syrian Army order of battle in the Golan area and near Damascus. Older sources reported that the Syrian I Corps, which is headquartered in Damascus, had the 5th and 7th Mechanized Divisions in the Golan area, the 9th Armored Division in support, the 1st Armored Division northeast of Qatana, and the 569th Armored Division and a Republican Guards Division near Damascus. Three more armored divisions—the 11th, the 17th, and the 18th—are located in the general area between Homs and Hama.25 What is clear is that Syria has substantial commando forces and helicopter lift capability, at least two heavy divisions with higher levels of equipment and readiness, and three Special Forces regiments that performed well in 1982. It could bring in at least two other heavy divisions if these were not already in the area. Syria could deploy such a force relatively quickly. Although Syria would normally need sustained training and exercise activity to properly prepare its forces for a massive all-out attack—and some 48 to 72 hours of intensive mobilization and redeployment activity to properly support and sustain such an attack—such preparations might be partially concealed under the guise of being a defensive exercise. Syria might still take the risk of attacking with the forces on hand and supporting them with follow-on echelons. Under these conditions, Syria could use its existing forces to attack with minimal warning and mass large amounts of artillery to support its armored advance. Syria would face serious mobilization, deployment, and sustainability problems. Virtually all heavy units in the Syrian Army now suffer from a sustained lack of spare parts and outside support, a result of Syria’s lack of funds, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Syrian forces cannot prevent Israel from launching devastating conventional air or missile attacks on any Syrian target, or using nuclear weapons. Syria also has lost an option as a result of the withdrawal of its military forces from Lebanon in 2005. Before that withdrawal, some IDF experts felt Syria could put increased pressure on Israel by attacking across the Lebanese border with the 30,000 men it had stationed in the Bekaa Valley, possibly in cooperation with Hezbollah.26 This no longer is a viable option. Large-scale Syrian conventional forces now cannot redeploy to Lebanon and use the Bekaa without such an aggressive move being immediately detected by Israeli monitoring systems, some stationed in the Golan. A SYRIAN SURPRISE ATTACK OR ‘‘GRAB FOR THE GOLAN’’ A Syrian surprise attack or grab for the Golan is the scenario that is of most concern to IDF planners in spite of Israel’s advantages, and which many analysts feel


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offer Syria the greatest hope of success. Syria has already fought major wars over the Golan in 1967 and 1973. The October War, in 1973, showed that the balance of forces that each side could bring to bear in the critical 24-hour period before the attack began—and then after the attack commenced—is a crucial factor in assessing the Israeli-Syrian balance. Syrian Options and Motives Even though Syria cannot hope to penetrate deeply into the Golan, it might still launch such an attack in an effort to create new facts on the ground and try to hold back the IDF by creating static defenses and emergency fortifications. If Syria should carry out such an attack, any success would be highly dependent upon whether Syria could attack with enough surprise or speed to prevent Israel from mobilizing before Syria created new facts on the ground by seizing back the Golan or even penetrating into the Galilee and then using diplomatic pressure to reach a cease-fire. If Syria could use commandos or air assaults to capture key positions and follow up with an all-out armored attack before Israel fully mobilized and deployed, such an attack might still make serious initial gains in spite of the decline in Syria’s capabilities. As has been discussed earlier, much of the Syrian Army is forward deployed and could rapidly mobilize and attack across the Golan with roughly six armored division equivalents. If all of these forces could be used effectively, and Israel miscalculated or faltered, Syria might then be able to hold the territory it seized, dig in, try to obtain a political settlement or to hold a significant amount of the Golan long enough for world opinion to bring a halt to fighting, and use such ‘‘shock therapy’’ to achieve its goals in the peace process. As is discussed in the next chapter, Syria might also be able to use Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to put indirect pressure on Israel. This asymmetric threat would force Israel into a kind of low-level ‘‘second-front’’ war. While any such threat seems more likely to be an irritant to Israel than of serious tactical or strategic value to Syria, it could include intensified mortar attacks from southern Lebanon against IDF and Israeli towns in northern Israel. As a worst case, it might involve spectacular suicide attacks against military and civilian targets in Israel proper. Another worst case is if Syria were to equip such groups with chemical or radiological weapons capabilities to use asymmetrically against Israel. While any Syrian transfers of chemical or radiological weapons seem unlikely in today’s environment, a future crisis or war could sharply increase Syria’s willingness to risk such actions. As for the ‘‘end game’’ of such a Syrian attack, Syria might feel even limited success could alter the outcome of future negotiations with Israel being forced upon it by a full-scale Israeli annexation of the Golan, or to try to exploit a disrupted or weakened IDF if it should be attacked successfully in the future by a nuclear armed Iran. Syria also would be more willing to take risks if Egypt or Jordan came under different political leadership or ceased to support a continued peace. Syrian risk taking might be particularly likely to increase if Israel again faced a multifront war with Egypt.

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Some experts have also suggested that Syria would be more likely to take such a risk if it had a superpower patron to support it diplomatically. Others have suggested that Syria might try to use the threat of escalation to chemical and possibly biological warfare as a substitute for outside diplomatic and military support.

The Operational Challenges Syria Would Face Syria would, however, still face critical operational problems in all currently foreseeable contingencies. The October 1973 War is not a valid model of each side’s current capabilities. Israel miscalculated the compromises it could make in reducing the size and readiness of its reserve forces between 1970 and 1973. As a result, Syria successfully launched a surprise attack with 1,400 tanks and 28,000 other weapons and vehicles against unprepared Israel forces on the Golan and thrust 15 km into Israeli territory. Today, Syria has lost much of its past offensive capability relative to Israel, and Israel now has far better sensor coverage of Syria. The IDF has deployed a wide range of all-weather sensors and can detect virtually any major Syrian movement in time to mobilize and react—although such indicators can never assure that the IDF makes the right assessment of Syrian moves or whether its political leaders choose to react. Israeli coverage of Syria includes advanced airborne radar reconnaissance that extends north of Damascus from positions in Israeli airspace, coverage from advanced UAVs that include electronic intelligence (ELINT) as well as imagery systems, airborne ELINT coverage capable of characterizing and precisely locating any Syrian electronic emitter including radars, and land-based sensors in the Golan and on Mount Hermon. The IDF has built up major strongpoints in the Golan and has created specially tailored heavy armored brigades designed to blunt any initial attack. It has improved its mining and artillery capabilities in the Golan, its ability to rapidly reinforce its forward-deployed forces, and its ability to provide artillery and rocket support. It has developed much stronger attack helicopter forces and fixed-wing air attack capabilities that can attack Syrian armor with considerable precision and lethality even at night or in relatively poor weather. Israel has also improved its real- and near-realtime long-range surveillance and battle-management capabilities. The IDF continues to make further improvements to warning and the sensors and battle-management capabilities necessary to fight intense ‘‘24-hour a day’’ battles in all-weather conditions.27 Many of the sensors and other assets that improve Israel’s early warning and its ability to characterize Syrian movements also provide allweather targeting capabilities that make it much more difficult for Syria to take advantage of weather and terrain masking. Israel is steadily improving its missile and artillery rocket assets in ways that allow Israel to strike far deeper into the Golan battlefield, and even near Damascus. In contrast, Syria lacks matching intelligence, warning, battle management, and strike capabilities. It is half-blind compared to Israel.


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There is no way to predict the nature of the various kinds of combat that would unfold in a Syrian attack on the Golan. Much would depend on the relative readiness of each side at the moment of the Syrian advance and the decisiveness of Israel’s reaction at the political and military levels. It is also almost impossible to predict how a complex new mix of asymmetric tactics and technology on each side would interact and what the resulting exchange ratios of casualties and equipment losses would be. Any major Syrian advance, however, would have to rely heavily on exposed armor, and any major supporting infantry infiltration would have to mass along relatively predictable lines. Both could be targeted in real time and struck with far more lethal munitions than in 1973 and 1982. Given Syria’s current equipment and warfighting capabilities, the end result seems likely to be a ‘‘killing ground’’ in which the IDF inflicts decisive casualties on Syria, with the major uncertainty being the density and reaction time of IDF forces at the moment of the Syrian advance. The more ready and decisive the IDF force, the more the battle would turn into an IDF killing ground against Syrian forces. The Risk of Air and Missile Escalation The air dimension of the battle could also be critical even if Syrian land forces did somehow achieve a considerable degree of initial surprise. The approaches to the Golan force Syria to channel its armor in any major offensive, and it has little ability to provide effective air defense or even prevent the IAF from making intensive air-toground strikes deep into the battlefield without waiting to win an air battle for air supremacy. Israel not only has advanced antitank weapons and attack helicopters, it can now use rockets and submunitions to kill advancing armor in quantity at ranges of well over 60–80 km. Night and poor weather would no longer be Syria’s friend. Israel has superior night warfare capability and warning and intelligence assets that can function in virtually any weather. The confusion factor Syria would face in operating under such conditions would also slow Syrian movement and allow Israel to inflict more attrition during an advance. The IAF has steadily improved its coordination with land forces in combined operations. It can do a much better job of coordinating the AirLand battle in both tactical operations and at the strategic level. Its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and battle-management systems may lack the sophisticated technology and techniques used by U.S. forces, but they are still very advanced and are tailored to a unique area and set of missions in ways that allow Israeli assets to be used with great effectiveness. As a result the use of UAVs, other sensors, smart/precision munitions, and more lethal area munitions increasingly allows the IDF and the IAF to simultaneously engage a Syrian advance at virtually every point from the forward edge of the battle to the limits of its rear areas. Long before such attacks defeat Syria through attrition, they would seriously degrade or break up the coherence of its military advance. In a number of simulations, they would create movement problems that would freeze

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substantial Syrian forces of armor and vehicles in place in the open, allowing Israeli forces to destroy them in detail without directly engaging Syrian forces in a war of maneuver. Syria does have options. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, Syria has carefully considered the lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict and is making efforts to adapt its military strategy accordingly. This includes trying to find some response to Israeli air supremacy. One Syrian defense official told Defense News in July 2007 that Syria would avoid a direct, classic war with Israel, seeking instead a guerrilla conflict on the front lines while firing rockets and ballistic missiles at strategic and civilian installations: ‘‘The next possible Syrian-Israeli war will be more like a war of cities rather than battles on fronts or in the fields . . . It will be a war of attrition that Israelis are not good at.’’28 However, any Syrian use of its long-range missile forces might do more to hand Israel a major strategic advantage than to threaten or weaken it. Syrian conventional warheads could do only limited damage to Israel, would have to penetrate Israel’s steadily improving defenses, and would give Israel a virtual license to attack any target anywhere in Syria and to conduct strategic strikes in response to any Syrian targeting of Israeli cities or population centers. Any Syrian use of a weapon of mass destruction against an Israeli target would, at a minimum, eliminate most outside political pressure on Israel to show restraint in using its strike forces. A successful Syrian strike that used chemical or biological weapons, and that produced serious Israeli casualties, might serve as a justification for Israeli use of nuclear weapons. Crawling part way up the escalation ladder is a very dangerous risk if one’s opponent on the other side can suddenly leap to its top. The IAF would, however, face certain basic operational constraints. The IAF alone cannot destroy all of the land forces of a major enemy such as Syria within a short period, although it would probably be decisive in cooperation with the IDF in an AirLand offensive. Syria’s forces near the Golan are too close to the border, and too large, for any combination of interdiction bombing and close air support to act as a substitute for effective defensive action by the IDF’s land forces. If the IAF is to minimize IAF losses and inflict maximum damage on Syria, the IAF and the IDF must also achieve a high and rapid degree of success in airdefense suppression—either through preemption or in the early phases of a conflict. It seems likely that Israel has such capabilities, but there is no way to know its war plans or to assess its detailed capabilities in the SEAD mission. As Israel learned in 1982, it does not make sense to reveal its air-defense suppression capabilities in limited attacks with limited objectives and give an enemy time to improve its own defense and develop countermeasures. In short, a ‘‘race for the Golan’’ would be an extremely high-risk strategy for the Syrian Army even if it could achieve a substantial degree of surprise. Syria cannot ignore the fact that the IAF can intervene with excellent precision strike capabilities and little fear of Syrian surface-to-air missiles and that Israel has a monopoly of nuclear weapons. Syria also cannot ignore the threat that Israel would escalate by using its air and missile superiority to strike at key military and economic targets.


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Even if Syria could score temporary gains on the ground, the strategic cost could be far higher than they would be worth. Syria is simply too vulnerable to other forms of Israeli escalation and attack. ISRAELI OPTIONS AGAINST SYRIA As for any Israeli land attack or counterattack down from the Golan against Syria, an IDF armored thrust or counterattack that penetrates deep into Syria is still an option. It would, however, almost certainly produce far more IDF casualties than an Israeli defense in depth and confront Israel with the problem of occupying Syrian territory, which it would then have to give up in a cease-fire or occupy for prolonged periods in the face of an almost certain asymmetric war of attrition. The Costs of an IDF Advance into Syria Like a Syrian attack on the Golan, there is no way to predict the nature of the combat that would unfold if the IDF attempted a major advance into Syria. Unlike Syria, however, Israel has nothing to gain from a surprise attack. It could not gain a major territorial or warfighting advantage and would confront immediate political pressure even from such close allies as the United States. It would also take far higher casualties in an offensive than if it were conducting defense in depth. As a result, any Israeli attack seems likely to come as an IDF counterattack after a Syrian advance on the Golan or some extreme Syrian provocation. If the attack came as a counterattack, much of Syria’s warfighting capability might already be severely weakened or crippled. Syrian maneuver forces would probably already have suffered serious disruption and casualties, and Syrian command and control and IS&R capabilities would have taken serious damage. Syria also no longer has any ally that can quickly come to its aid. Iraq is neither a willing or capable ally, and even if Iran sought to reinforce Syria, it is not organized to project land or air power and would have no secure transit route. Moreover, it seems extremely unlikely that Israel would tolerate any Iranian movement by air or sea in peacetime, nor would Israel fail to use its ‘‘deep-strike’’ capabilities to prevent Iranian land or air forces from deploying into Syria. Much would still depend on the relative readiness of each side at the moment of the Syrian advance, however, and the decisiveness of Israel’s reaction at the political and military levels. It again is also almost impossible to predict how a complex new mix of asymmetric tactics and technology on each side would interact and what the resulting exchange ratios of casualties and equipment losses would be. Much would depend on the ability of Syria to fight a battle of attrition in depth and use its most advanced antitank guided weapons and dug-in artillery and armor. It is possible that Syria could maintain a defense in depth with some of its infantry forces and less mobile armor and artillery while its first-line maneuver forces attacked the Golan. It would almost certainly have very strong defense in depth that had considerable capability against the IDF if Syrian forces had not been crippled during

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their initial attack on the Golan. Yet, much depends on Israeli targeting and use of precision weapons and smart/lethal area weapons. The United States demonstrated during its attacks on Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003 that modern sensors, precision weapons, and long-range, standoff land and air weapons can achieve very high lethality against static land-defense forces, no matter how well dug in, and then rapidly maneuver through the gaps of such forces in ways that disrupt an opponent’s ability to maneuver and respond. It simply is not clear what would happen on the ground, how well Syria could sustain its defense, or how the IDF views its ability to shatter a massive static Syrian Army defense in depth and absorb the casualties the IDF would have to take. At some point in any IDF advance, the battle would also cease to be a battle for control of the Golan and become a battle for control of Damascus. This would confront Israel with the problem that every additional advance would mean dealing with more civilians and the regional and international backlash from a direct Israeli threat to an Arab nation’s capital. It would become harder to sustain a war of maneuver as the IDF approached more heavily built-up areas, and any negotiations based largely on the IDF threat to Damascus would be seen as forced on Syria as a matter of duress and become a source of anger and revenge. This does not mean that the IDF could not help Israel improve its strategic and negotiating positions by limited advances into Syria. A major thrust, however, would serve little clear strategic purpose and might well become a killing ground for both armies. Like the IDF advance on Beirut in 1982, what initially appeared to be a dramatic tactical victory would probably be more costly to Israel than it was worth. Israel’s Ability to Use the AirLand Battle in Offensive Operations A successful combination of an IDF defense and selective Israeli air and missile strategic attacks might be a different story. The IDF has long organized its targeting, battle-management, and strike plans for both conventional and nuclear strategic strikes on key potential enemies. Israel has also given high priority to destroying and suppressing enemy air- and land-based air-defense capability during the initial stages of the battle. The potential scale of Israel’s future success in suppressing Syrian air defenses on a nationwide basis is indicated by the fact that during the 1982 war, Israel essentially broke the back of much of the existing Syrian surface-to-air missile network in the Bekaa Valley in one day, on June 9. Israel shot down over 80 Syrian fighters and lost only one A-4 in flying a total of over 1,000 combat sorties—including the sorties delivered against Syrian ground-based air defenses in the Bekaa. Israel also was able to devote an extraordinary percentage of its total sorties to the attack mission, although it should be noted that even in the 1973 war, some 75 percent of all IAF sorties were attack sorties.29 Today, the IDF is organized and equipped to use a far more advanced combination of electronic intelligence aircraft, jammers, standoff munitions, land-based strike systems, UAVs, and other countermeasures to suppress Syrian air defenses. It


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has steadily improved its technology base to reflect the lessons of recent conflicts, while Syria has made only limited progress in its air defenses in the past decade. As a result, the IAF could probably win immediate freedom of action over the Golan and air superiority over critical areas of Syria in 24–48 hours and then rapidly achieve and maintain air supremacy over much of Syria.

Israel’s Deep Strike and Strategic Air Option Once Syria’s air defenses were suppressed, Israel could carry out large-scale strategic attacks on targets throughout the country. It is far from clear that Israel would chose this option, but some Israeli planners have argued since 1973—reinforced by Israel’s experience in 1982 and 2006—that Israel must either fight very limited military actions or strategically decisive ones. Strategic attacks on Syria’s economy, leadership sites, and key military facilities throughout Syria seem more likely to be decisive than victory on the Golan or approaches to Damascus. As has already been noted, Israel can escalate to strike virtually any mix of Syrian targets outside the Golan. Israel currently has so large a qualitative ‘‘edge’’ in air, precision attack, and electronic warfare capabilities that it could probably win air superiority in a matter of hours and break through part of Syria’s land-based air defenses in a day. Israel could then strike high-value targets in Syria with relative impunity in a conventional war—and Syria would be able to launch only limited numbers of air and missile attacks in retaliation. Israel has sufficient long-range precision munitions, land-based missile and rocket systems, and UAVs to then use conventional weapons to cripple the power, water, refining, key communications and command centers, and critical industrial facilities before the United States or other outside powers could intervene. If Israel were to launch such attacks on a surprise or preemptive basis, or do so before the Syrian Air Force was fully alert and dispersed, it would achieve nearly certain success. It would have a very high probability of success even against fully alert Syrian forces. Any major Syrian success in an attack on the Golan would, therefore, involve a significant risk of Israeli strategic retaliation using conventional forces.

Assessing the Balance of Risks Once again, however, this kind of escalation does involve significant dangers if pushed too far. Any such Israeli strategic attacks would create some risk of Syrian escalation to missile strikes on Israel’s cities and population centers, and large-scale attacks might create a risk of Syrian use of biological and chemical weapons in spite of all the factors discussed earlier. In balance, Israel’s vastly superior ability to counterescalate and the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons seem more likely to deter Syrian use of biological and chemical weapons in response to Israeli conventional strategic air attacks unless the Syrian regime felt its control of the state was at stake. Even then, it is unclear that Syria

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could achieve anything approaching massive damage, much less decisive strategic results. But, no IDF commander or political leader can dismiss worst-case scenarios. This has led some analysts to postulate that Syria might use chemical weapons against the Golan and chemically armed missile strikes against Israeli mobilization centers even in the first phase of an attack. It is also one thing to assess the theoretical limits of Syrian capabilities and another to take risks based on such an assessment in practice. Israel has no way of being certain it could predict how many Syrian systems could penetrate into Israel, or what casualties, damage to civilian facilities, and panic and political impacts such strikes may have. If Israel escalated to conventionally armed air and missile strikes on strategic military and economic targets throughout Syria, Israel could never be sure that Syria would not respond with long-range missile strikes or escalate to the use of chemical and possibly biological weapons.

10

Continuing External Asymmetric Wars

The Golan Heights is not the only option for a new war between Israel and Syria. Both nations have been fighting external asymmetric wars for decades, using political and diplomatic means to intimidate or pressure the other, and manipulating peace negotiations in an effort to gain strategic advantage. Diplomacy has been an extension of war by other means. Syria has long used the Palestinians as a proxy against Israel by sponsoring hard-line Palestinian groups on its own territory and providing at least some covert aid to anti-Israel groups in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel has quietly supported Jordan in dealing with Syria and used its peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan as the equivalent of an asymmetric struggle. Lebanon has been a key theater of engagement. It became the scene of a proxy war in the late 1970s, with Israel backing the Maronites, and Syria backing Palestinian factions. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 originally focused on pushing the Palestinian Liberation Organization out of positions on the Israeli-Lebanese border, but escalated to a full-scale Israeli invasion designed to bring a pro-Israeli Maronite government to power that became a major Israeli-Syrian conflict fought largely on Lebanese soil. The end result was Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, the creation of a new powerful set of Shi’ite factions, and the rise of Hezbollah. Syria then took over much of Lebanon as a result of the Taif Accords, which attempted to put an end to the Lebanese Civil War. Israel was forced to withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000, after years of fruitless combat with Hezbollah. Syria was forced to withdraw from Lebanon in April– September 2005 as a result of the local and international backlash to the perceived role Syria played in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005.1 Neither withdrawal, however, put an end to Israeli-Syrian competition for power and influence in Lebanon. The summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah marked yet another round of Israeli-Syrian competition. Israel escalated its attacks in an effort

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to force Lebanon to weaken or disarm Hezbollah, whose strength was largely the result of years of Syrian and Iranian arms shipments. The Israeli-Syrian struggle has extended far beyond their borders. Both nations have long competed for outside support, with mixed success. Israel, largely as a result of U.S. support and aid to Egypt and Jordan, has so far been able to secure its peace treaties. Syria allied itself with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War in 1982, largely as a result of long-standing tensions between Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein. This laid the groundwork for a strategic relationship with Iran that has extended into Lebanon and created fears of a ‘‘Shi’ite crescent’’ in Sunni Arab states, as well as giving Syria support in its struggle with Israel. The situation has been further complicated since 2000 by the breakdown of the Israel-Palestinian peace process and a de facto low-level asymmetric war between the two peoples and by the rise of powerful Islamist factions. Hamas now dominates Gaza and challenges Fatah for control of the West Bank, offering a new opportunity for Syrian and Iranian efforts to use the Palestinians against Israel. The rise of radical Sunni neo-Salafi extremist groups has given nonstate actors such as Al Qa’ida the power to use violence and terrorism in much of the Arab and Islamic world, and neo-Salafi extremist groups have come to play a role in both Palestinian camps in Lebanon and among Sunni Lebanese. None of these asymmetric and proxy struggles currently threaten to escalate into major conflicts, but all seem likely to continue in some form for years to come and could lead to miscalculations with serious consequences. Four involve pressures that could radically change the Israeli-Syrian balance over time: • The risk that the Israel-Palestinian conflict could escalate to levels that forced other Arab states to take a far more actively hostile stand toward Israel and/or put the entire Palestinian movement in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank under the control of Hamas. • A political crisis in Egypt or Jordan—such as a post-Mubarak power struggle—that led either or both nations to reject their peace treaties with Israel. • A round of fighting, new civil conflict, or crisis in Lebanon that led to far more direct Israeli-Syrian confrontation or conflict over Lebanon. • A rise in Iranian power and influence that could be coupled in a variety of different ways to Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, far more direct security ties and military aid to Syria, interacting with growing sectarian struggles between Sunni- and Shi’ite-dominated powers.

None of these pressures currently seem likely to make such changes in the balance, but several do merit further analysis because they involve risks and opportunities that Israel and Syria must consider in all of their strategic planning. ISRAEL’S ‘‘HAVES’’ VERSUS SYRIA’S ‘‘HAVE NOTS’’ Israel is far more powerful than Syria, holds the Golan, and has strong support from the United States. While it must consider the mid- and long-term risks of

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alienating the Arab and Islamic world, today it is clearly the ‘‘haves’’ power. Syria, in contrast, has become a third-rate regional military power, does not hold the Golan, and has limited support from the Arab world, Palestinian movements, and the population of Lebanon. It is equally clearly the ‘‘have nots.’’ History is a constant warning that nations do not act as rational bargainers, and wars often represent their least rational acts. Nevertheless, Syria’s decision makers are clearly aware of these asymmetries and how much Syria needs internal stability and development.2 While Syria’s economy is now improving, the past failure of Syria’s leadership to carry out economic modernization and reform has crippled Syria’s ability to fund modern military forces and keep up with modern technology, as well as severely cutting Syria’s overall economic growth and development. Syria’s decision makers also cannot ignore the dangers of accelerating the IsraelSyrian arms race. Without a major outside patron, Syria cannot obtain the arms it needs to modernize its forces, and it is far from clear that its armed force has the leadership, professionalism, and technical base to use such arms if they did become available unless a nation such as Russia chose to provide a massive degree of both arms and advisory services for its own strategic purposes. Syria’s Real-World Strategic Priorities versus Asymmetric Adventures As a result, Syria’s strategic priorities are not war with Israel or efforts to recover the Golan; rather, they are considerably more modest. Syria needs to do the following: • Maintain the best defensive posture it can to deter Israel without provoking major Israeli retaliation. • Find some way to better modernize its forces, particularly its major surface-to-air missile systems and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence/battle management (C4I/BM) net and sensor systems. • Try to find the delicate balance between making some modernization of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems to deter Israel and provoking Israel into preemption or massive escalation in the event of war. • Seek to balance its domestic economy and social needs with its defense modernization expenditures. • Decide what type of armed forces structure it wants to have. Syrian military forces continue to be largely equipped and organized to fight long wars with other Arab armies against Israel. They lack mobility and the capabilities to win decisive victories early in any war. • Create a new relationship with Lebanon that is not based on occupation or continuing efforts at intervention. • Reach some strategic decision about its role in seeking a meaningful peace process with Israel.

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• Decide whether to try to exploit Hamas’ victory or to reach some different and more stable relationship with the Palestinians. • Deter any form of Syrian action in Jordan from military threats and incursions to hostile actions by Syrian intelligence agencies and proxies. • Secure the Iraqi border, and decide whether continuing support to Iraqi insurgents serves Syria’s strategic interest, particularly given the prospect the United States will withdraw most or all of its forces once Iraq seems secure and politically stable. • Maintain internal security in the face of serious internal threats from Islamist extremists, elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, and external threats from such movements as Al Qa’ida. • Improve its fiscal and monetary situation. Its economy is still largely controlled by the central government, and its key sectors lack necessary foreign and domestic investment. • Find a balance among its strategic relationship with Iran, the prospect of a peace settlement with Israel, and its relationship with other states. Syria is being isolated not only from the West, but also from key Arab states following its alleged involvement in the Hariri assassination. • Balance the funding of its internal security needs with its needs for a strategic and defense posture against Israel.

The Cost-Benefits of the ‘‘Spoiler’’ Game These priorities raise serious questions about Syria’s ability to gain strategic benefits from continuing to play a spoiler role in the region. Its support of Hezbollah and Palestinian factions has not given it any clear strategic traction in dealing with Israel or in negotiating leverage in recovering the Golan. Neither has Syrian inflexibility. Hafez al-Assad effectively lost the Golan Heights for the second time when he refused Ehud Barak’s offer to trade it for peace. It seems unlikely that continuing to play the game in Lebanon can restore Syria’s political and economic position in that country, and it may alienate more and more Lebanese over time.3 Playing the Hezbollah card also has serious dangers, including allowing Iran to provoke Israel in ways that can create a powerful backlash against Syria.4 Israel may well hold Syria accountable for permitting the Iranian transfer of thousands of long-range artillery rockets to Hezbollah.5 If a massive rocket attack is made on northern Israel, Israel may use its air and missile power to conduct strikes on Syria’s forces and economy. The same could be true at a lesser scale if Syria were too supportive of Palestinian groups. The game Syria plays in Iraq may to some extent deter the United States from putting political and military pressure on Syria because of the U.S. focus on the war in Iraq. It also, however, may provoke the United States to strike at Syria or use force to seal off the Syrian border with Iraq. Playing a spoiler role in Iraq is not going to bring back the Ba’ath Party or put a secular power on Syria’s border. Instead, it is strengthening Shi’ite religious parties that have little affinity to Syria’s leadership, and neo-Salafi Sunni extremist movements that ultimately are a threat to Syria’s


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Alawite-controlled regime and secular status. Syria has alienated at least some Iraqi Shi’ite leaders in the process, and closer ties to Iran’s Shi’ite extremists do little to improve Syria’s strategic position or deter Israel and the United States. If anything, they are provocative. The ability to string out a losing hand while others gather in the chips is not strategic success. More broadly, Syria cannot rely on a mixture of foreign ‘‘threats’’ and repression to provide internal security and stability. So far, however, Bashar al-Asad has shown limited serious interest in reform. The new hard-line cabinet he installed on February 11, 2006, changed 15 of 34 senior positions and promoted such figures as Faruq al-Shar’a—a key player in shaping Syrian control of Lebanon—to Vice President. Syria’s conservative (if incompetent) Minister of Defense, Gen. Hasan Turkmani, kept his job, but another hard-liner—Gen. Abd al-Majid —was made Minister of the Interior. He has two important distinctions: He is a member of the Circassian minority, and his whole ‘‘military career’’ has been based on roles in intelligence and internal security operations.6 The burden of military competition also puts pressure on Syria’s internal security. As was previously discussed, Syria maintains far larger forces than it can hope to modernize or render effective, and this inevitably affects its economic growth and ability to maintain its internal stability. Syria must create a better balance between its security efforts and the need to deal with major demographic problems, an expanding workforce, the need for economic development and job creation, and the need for political liberalization. The UN estimates that Syria’s population has already grown from 3.5 million in 1950, 4.6 million in 1960, 6.4 million in 1970, 9.0 million in 1980, 12.7 million in 1990, 16.5 million in 2000, to 19.9 million in 2007. The UN estimates that the population will grow to 21.2 to 21.7 million in 2010, 24.5 to 27.5 million in 2020, 27.1 to 34.1 million in 2030, 28.7 to 41.9 million in 2040, and 29.4 to 51.1 million in 2050. Roughly 37 percent of Syria’s population is now 14 years of age or younger, and it has a sharply rising population over 65 years of age.7 The resulting need for changes in Syria’s strategy seems obvious, but it has been equally obvious for roughly a quarter of a century. So far, the regime’s external ambitions and actions have continued to exacerbate the internal tensions and security problems that should be the primary focus of its decision makers. Syria’s real strategic challenge is social modernization and economic growth. This is something that the military adventures of a have-not power cannot accomplish. THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT Israel faces serious challenges as well. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a key Israeli vulnerability. As was discussed in Chapter 7, it is a war the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) can win tactically but that is extraordinarily difficult to win strategically and on any lasting basis. It has already cost Israel support in Europe and many other parts of the world. It is also a war of attrition that began in 2000 and has no end in sight.

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Israel has found many countermeasures to Palestinian irregular forces and terrorist attacks, but the Palestinians have learned to adapt their tactics as well. As a result, the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians has become a ‘‘battle of separation’’ in which Israel seeks to create security and physical barriers between the two peoples, focusing the Palestinian struggle on defeating or penetrating Israel’s security barriers. So far, Israel has had considerable success in establishing and maintaining such barriers, but the Palestinians have already begun to acquire rockets and mortars capable of firing across such barriers. Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has seriously undermined and divided the secular Palestinian Authority and strengthened hard-line Islamist opponents of conciliation such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These groups now control the Gaza. They rival, if not surpass, Fatah and the Palestinian Authority in power and threaten its control of the West Bank. Syria has long been a source of arms and money to such movements, and while these groups are scarcely Syrian proxies, Syria can use them to put pressure on Israel. The end result can scarcely give Syria any kind of ‘‘victory,’’ but it is a lever that Syria can attempt to use in pressuring Israel. GAMING A FUTURE ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH CONFLICT? Syria can also continue to exploit the fact that Israel faces a range of continuing low-level asymmetric threats from Hezbollah and other actors that Syria has already exploited in cooperation with Iran. Hezbollah showed that it could survive a major Israeli offensive in 2006, and Syria showed that it could conduct a significant proxy struggle without provoking active Israeli retaliation. Hezbollah has since steadily rearmed with Syrian and Iranian support. The chances of another major Israeli war with Hezbollah are uncertain, since neither side has a clear incentive to begin such a conflict. The Israeli military does, however, face a continuing threat from a rearmed Hezbollah. While any ‘‘victory’’ for Hezbollah in 2006 was largely a matter of Hezbollah showing it could survive rather than win any victories in a political or strategic sense, Israel realizes it must try to find better ways to fight asymmetric conflicts and that the political and information realms are where such wars are often won or lost. It is also clear that Israel will face a steadily more sophisticated mix of tactics for asymmetric warfare and more weapons. Reports show that Hezbollah is not only rearming, but also is actively incorporating the lessons it has drawn from the fighting in the summer of 2006 into its training exercises. It is also clearly preparing for possible future flare-ups with Israel. A senior Hezbollah official stated to Defense News, ‘‘We have subjected our guerillas to new training and acquired needed weapons systems and developed new tactics to face a more determined Israeli enemy . . . We also have as good tactical missiles as we did last time, with some additional surprises.’’8 The efforts of an expanded and up-armored United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to create a stronger buffer south of the Litani River—following the 2006 ceasefire—have not stopped Hezbollah from posing a threat to Israel’s northern border in 2008. Israeli government sources felt that Hezbollah had also rearmed to pre-2006


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Lebanon War levels with the help of Syria and Iran. Some sources said it had received weapons systems that included ‘‘hundreds’’ of Zilzal and Fajr rockets with a range of 250 kilometers (km) and had more than tripled its inventory of C-802 antiship cruise missiles.9 Jane’s reported in July 2007 that Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah maintained a postwar inventory of some 20,000 mostly Iranian- and Syrian-supplied rockets and missiles. 10 Hezbollah’s missile and rocket arsenal included ‘‘Syrian-supplied improved 122 mm Grad (50 km), 220 mm Raad (70 km), 302 mm Khaibar 1 (90–100 km) rockets; Iranian-supplied 240 mm Fajr 3 (43 km), 320 mm Fajr-5 (75 km), and 600 mm Zelzal-2 (250 km) rockets.’’11 A July 2007 report to the UN Security Council noted that Syria and Iran continue to supply Hezbollah with ‘‘sophisticated weaponry,’’ including long-range rockets, enabling it to ‘‘re-arm to the same levels as before last year’s war or beyond.’’12 Since that time, some Israeli sources have said on background that Hezbollah had an inventory closer to 40,000 rockets and missiles. Hezbollah has also continued to improve its capabilities for targeting and intelligence gathering. According to Jane’s, Hezbollah could call upon such systems as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Mirsad-1 UAV, a derivative of the Iranian Mohajer-4 UAV that incorporates an infrared camera and a global positioning system (GPS) navigation system.13 These developments help explain why tensions between Israel and Hezbollah increased in the latter half of 2007. Both the IDF and Hezbollah carried out major military exercises on either side of the Blue Line. Hezbollah and much of the Lebanese press described the Hezbollah exercises as the group’s ‘‘largest ever exercises’’ and claimed it fielded ‘‘thousands’’ of guerrillas in a mock mobilization to confront Israel.14 The Hezbollah maneuvers took place south of the Litani River near the IsraeliLebanese border—a no-go zone under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, reached at the end of the 2006 Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah also publicized the maneuvers in a departure from the group’s traditionally more secretive stance on its training operations. This publicity came during the domestic deadlock in the forthcoming Lebanese presidential elections and at the time of an Israeli-Syrian standoff in the wake of a September strike on a purported Syrian nuclear site in northeast Syria.15 The Lebanese ‘‘Wild Card’’ Lebanon’s internal weaknesses and divisions compound the problem and increase Syria’s potential opportunities. Lebanon’s weak national institutions and porous domestic security have long made the country a source of regional instability. The country has suffered from a state of near political paralysis, however, since the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, with loose rival camps aligned either around the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora or against it. Lebanon’s political crisis both feeds into and is exacerbated by

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Lebanon’s confessional political system, which allocates power and distributes seats of office according to sectarian representation. The pro-Siniora government groups were often described as either pro-Western or aligned with U.S., French, and to some extent Saudi regional geostrategic interests in the region. Antigovernment forces were similarly portrayed as pro-Iranian and/or pro-Syrian. However, both descriptions are tenuous and do not accurately depict the complexity of the Lebanese political arena. Intraparty political alignments were unstable, and Lebanon’s list-based electoral system and the propensity for weaker political parties to seek the strength of other parties have encouraged crossconfessional alliances. These have varied across Lebanon’s electoral districts, and rival parties often make temporary alliances to the end of securing seats in parliament.16 This alliance-based approach to electoral politics is both unstable and based on partnerships of convenience, which are by no means rigid or sustainable. As of April 2008, attempts to elect a new president, a seat reserved for a Maronite Christian in accordance with Lebanon’s confessional political system, had failed, with neither the pro- nor the antigovernment forces able to rally the necessary two-thirds majority in Parliament necessary to elect a president. The inability to elect a Lebanese president had motivated parties to the impasse—and their international patrons—to reconsider what they could frame as favorable outcomes. The proposal of electing the head of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Gen. Michel Suleiman, to the office of the presidency was originally passed over by most parties on either side of the impasse, only to become the most plausible outcome from December 2007 onward.17 Suleiman was viewed as a neutral candidate who enjoyed both strong domestic and international support. He enjoyed broad cross-confessional support, due in no small part to the military’s overall positive image among the majority of the Lebanese and the military’s performance and ‘‘martyrdom for Lebanon’’ in fighting Fatah AlIslam. Suleiman enjoyed strong support from the vast majority of Lebanese Christians, who viewed him as one of only a few presidential hopefuls who enjoyed strong Christian support—the other being the former head of the military, retired Gen. Michel Aoun. Nevertheless, the various factions still could not agree on the appropriate parliamentary procedure to elect him, and they continued to struggle over cabinet appointments and other offices that would follow the election of the president. Even a ‘‘successful’’ political compromise reveals Lebanon’s fragility and continued vulnerability to Syrian and Iranian influence as well as U.S., French, and Saudi regional objectives—let alone other outside pressure. Like the Bourbon dynasty in France, Lebanon’s factions seem to forget nothing and learn nothing with grim consistency. The Lebanese Armed Forces The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) provide another potential barrier to civil conflict and Syrian pressure, but they remained relatively weak and much depends on their future political unity. They do have nominal support from the progovernment ‘‘March 14 Forces,’’ the antigovernment ‘‘March 8’’ Alliance, and the international


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community. The LAF also has had the support of successive U.S. administrations. Nevertheless, the confrontation between the LAF and the Fatah Al-Islam radical group in the Nahr Al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in the summer of 2007 was just one more illustration of the LAF’s present weakness—and need for increased capability to deal with internal domestic disturbances, control Hezbollah, and resist outside military pressure. The Bush administration has tried to build up the LAF since the cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah. The administration sought $41.2 million in aid to Lebanon in FY2007, of which $4.8 million was to be in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and $935,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET). 18 The administration’s FY2007 emergency supplemental request included $220 million in FMF for the LAF—a substantial increase over previous years—and funded improvements in equipment, personnel training, spare parts, and ammunition. The U.S. Department of State reported that the goal behind this increase was to ‘‘promote Lebanese control over southern Lebanon and Palestinian refugee camps to prevent them from being used as bases to attack Israel.’’19 The administration sought a further increase in FMF to the Lebanese forces of $9.6 million in FY2008.20 The Department of State Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations requested level of support for Lebanon in FY2009 included $62.2 million in FMF and $2.1 million in IMET, 21 although actual funding is subject to Congressional approval. There might also be increases if the White House chooses to request additional emergency supplemental funds.22 The Department of Defense (DoD) sought to enhance the LAF’s Special Forces capabilities in early 2008, appropriating $7.2 million under its Section 1206 program—an authority that lets the DoD boost the military forces of allies without going through the Department of State—to equip small specialized and highly trained LAF units. Of the total amount, $5 million would go to providing these units with 150 M24 sniper rifles, 150 M500 shotguns, and an as yet unspecified number of M4 carbine replacement parts. The DoD also planned to provide the LAF with nine sports utility vehicles (SUVs), two 5-ton trucks, five tactical ambulances, 150 night-vision weapon sights, and 200 GPS handheld receivers. The DoD expected these items to be ordered from stock by September 30, 2008; with May 1, 2009, as the expected first day of delivery, it could take 18 months for the LAF’s elite units to receive the equipment.23 The LAF took steps in 2008 to update its force command structure and organizational jointness by establishing a Lebanese Special Operations Command to coordinate the operations of the Commandos Regiment, the Sea Commandos Regiment, military intelligence’s Counter-Sabotage Regiment, and an airborne brigade. A senior Lebanese military official stated that the LAF hoped the initial size of the force would be around 5,000 strong, with the ultimate expectation of scaling to two to three brigades within a few years. The Special Operations Command is expected to play an important role in addressing the LAF’s primary operational imperatives: countering asymmetric threats from armed militias and extremist groups—many of which had chosen Palestinian refugee camps as their base of operations.24

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An emphasis on augmenting LAF Special Forces capability continued during the spring of 2008. The fighting with Fatah Al-Islam highlighted the LAF’s weaknesses in gathering actionable intelligence, as well as shortcomings in terms of equipment and training. Lebanese assault regiments and commando units required extensive use of combat engineers and demolitions teams to clear heavily fortified enemy positions protected by improvised explosive devices. The LAF showed ingenuity in the field, adapting aging UH-1s to drop 250-kilogram (kg) and 400-kg free-fall bombs. Regardless of U.S. and other foreign aid, and ongoing organizational reforms, it will be at least several years before the LAF can become an effective military fighting force, one capable of deterring intervention by Israel and Syria. The Lebanese Army —a 53,900-strong force—is undermanned and underequipped. It also has basic supply and logistic deficiencies. The average LAF soldier was allotted 10 to 15 bullets per year for marksmanship training.25 The LAF had to rely on using U.S. FMF to replenish its depleted stock of munitions even after a clash as small as the Naher Al-Bared confrontation. The Lebanese Army expects to take possession of 40 Belgian Leopard-1A5 tanks and 32 YPR advanced infantry fighting vehicles, having already received 100 twoand-a-half-ton trucks from the United States for a total of 200 by the end of January 2008. The LAF also requested that Jordan donate 66 surplus M60A1 tanks. Delivery of tanks from Belgium and Jordan would allow the LAF to scrap half of its obsolescent Soviet-built T-54/55 tanks. As of May 2008, the Leopard-1A5s and YPRs were yet to be authorized for delivery to the LAF and the request for the M60s was pending review by the United States. However, Poland had promised to deliver $12 million in military assistance to Lebanon in the form of ammunition for the LAF’s T-54/55 main battle tanks and its inventory of 130-mm field guns, 120-mm mortars, and its multiple-rocket launcher systems. The Lebanese Army continues to increase its capabilities at a slow rate in spite of its problems. If Lebanon’s politics permit, it could grow capable enough to meet Lebanese national defense needs and to confront asymmetric threats at home over the next half-decade. It does, however, face an uncertain future. Lebanon lacks a meaningful air force. The LAF currently has five Hawker Hunter jets and 11 Mirage-3s—all of which are grounded and lack components that are increasingly difficult to acquire. The LAF did engage in talks with the United States about acquiring TA-3 Skywarrior or TA-4J Skyhawk trainers in 2007, but these aircraft cannot successfully engage either Israel or Syrian fighters. The TA-3 and the TA-4 are old trainers and not combat aircraft. Even so, an LAF official commented, ‘‘So long as the trainer we will get can carry bombs and attack ground targets, we will be very happy with it.’’26 The LAF has not ruled out trying to acquire surplus F-5E/F Tiger II light tactical fighters from Jordan or Saudi Arabia.27 Given the relative obsolescence of TA-3s, TA-4Js, or F-5E/Fs, they would not augment Lebanon’s capability to confront external air threats. They would, however, augment the LAF’s ability to address asymmetric threats within Lebanon. The United States has not supported Lebanese efforts to acquire air combat systems primarily intended for offensive combat operations. The LAF did, however,


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hope to augment its helicopter-based capability. As previously mentioned, Lebanese forces modified UH-1H helicopters to carry bombs and conduct bombing operations during the Nahr Al-Bared confrontation. The LAF was in negotiations with the United States to acquire AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters and the OH-58 Kiowa reconnaissance helicopter, but U.S. policy made it easier for the LAF to acquire OH-58s than the AH-1 system.28 In 2008 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) donated 100 Milan antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and nine SA-341/342 Gazelle attack helicopters, with France contributing 40 HOT ATGMs for the Gazelles.29 Aside from its shortcomings in military capability and capacity, the LAF faces serious political challenges. It is forced to react to Lebanon’s political ebbs and flows, although it has attempted to keep the armed forces neutral as the country continued to experience instability and heightened sectarian tension. Though the LAF seemed to have stayed clear of divisive politics as of May 2008, it remained to be seen how effectively the LAF could maintain its cohesion and order within the ranks if national politics continue to degenerate. Hezbollah’s Domestic and International Posture Given this background, Hezbollah seems likely to remain a largely independent armed faction that can operate in a sectarian political structure and play the role of an armed militant group with both domestic and international considerations in decision making. It will not be the kind of proxy that will follow Iranian or Syrian instruction or support their policies if they do not support the interest of Hezbollah. It will, however, be the most powerful faction in Lebanon and one that will continue to be subject to Syrian and Iranian influence. Hezbollah does, however, face challenges. One key challenge is its sectarian identity and future political role in Lebanon. While Hezbollah is a Shi’a movement, it has made an effort to define itself as a cross-confessional and Lebanese national resistance movement against Israel. This effort came as a result of the group’s second general conference in May 1991, where the policy of Infitah—opening up to other communities and groups in the country—was framed. It also succeeded in legitimizing much of the group’s actions in the 1990s and the early 2000s, protecting the group’s armed status by not connecting the issue with a domestic Lebanese agenda.30 The summer 2006 Lebanon War and the on-going confrontation between proand antigovernment forces have, however, already undermined Hezbollah’s efforts to give ‘‘the resistance’’ a Lebanese facade, as did a failed sit-in against the Siniora government.31 A Crisis Group report in October 2007 characterized Hezbollah as adopting an increasing deterrence-based military strategy, rather than one based on resistance, and Hezbollah remains a sectarian faction in a country where new confessional struggles are all too possible.32 One of the most important events in 2008 was the assassination of one of Hezbollah’s top commanders, Imad Mugniyah, in Damascus on February 12, 2008. Mughniyah was one of Hezbollah’s leading operatives and had been accused by the United States, Israel, and a host of other governments of masterminding numerous suicide

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vehicle operations, hijackings, and kidnapping operations over the past 25 years. Mughniyah was reported by Jane’s as the organizational architect responsible for the Islamic Resistance’s reconfiguration after the departure of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000.33 There are few conclusive details about the assassination, and at the time of this writing, Syria had not publicized any findings on the killing. There was speculation that the killing was an inside job, or the result of Israeli or Saudi involvement, but Israel was seen as the most likely suspect. Internal tensions in Lebanon remained high. In early May 2008, fighting broke out in Beirut between pro- and antigovernment supporters, prompting the closure of Lebanon’s sole international airport. The fighting was sparked by the Siniora government’s decision to shut down the militant group’s private telecommunications network, which led in turn to antigovernment protests led by Hezbollah.34 At least through the spring of 2008, these events put growing pressure on both the Lebanese political and state superstructure, and on Hezbollah as an extragovernmental armed group. While talk of civil war in Lebanon similar to the 1975–1990 conflict seemed unlikely, civil strife was not unavoidable. A new confessional civil war pitting Shi’ites against Sunnis was a prospect that was becoming harder to mitigate over time. Hezbollah may be less likely to pose a significant threat to Israel if it faces the prospect or reality of another confessional civil war. It may be the most powerful faction in Lebanon, but it is still a minority faction and faces the possibility that the Lebanese Armed Forces will strengthen to the point where they will not allow any major independent military force or militia to challenge the nation’s government. THE IRANIAN WILD CARD Iran may eventually prove to be the most important source of aid to Syria in future confrontations or conflicts with Israel. The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006 showed that Syria and Iran could work together in proxy warfare. It also showed that Syrian and Iranian transfers of such advanced weapons as modern antitank guided weapons, light surface-to-air missiles, and a range of short- to long-range rockets and missiles could inflict casualties on the IDF and limit its military freedom of action. Other events have shown that Syria has an ‘‘ally’’ that is steadily improving its long-range ballistic missile capabilities, and there are strong indicators that Iran is acquiring the capability to acquire nuclear weapons at some point between 2010 and 2015. It is still far from clear that military ties exist between the two countries that would lead Iran to provide military forces or ‘‘volunteers’’ to aid Syria or ever lead Iran to take the risk of threatening or actually using its missile capabilities against Israel on Syria’s behalf. Syria’s ties to Iran do, however, provide Syria with at least one potential ally and significantly complicate Israel’s threat analysis and contingency planning—both in dealing with Syria and in dealing with Iran. Moreover, a formal strategic accord between Damascus and Tehran has been in place since early 2006.35 Jane’s reported that the pact included ‘‘a sensitive chapter dealing with cooperation and mutual aid during time of international sanctions, or


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scenarios of military confrontation with the West.’’36 The signing of this strategic agreement was followed in June 2006 by the signing of a military cooperation agreement aimed at consolidating Iran and Syria’s defense efforts against the ‘‘common threats’’ presented by Israel and the United States.37 One possible scenario that might lead to a joint military conflict between Israel and Syria and Iran would be an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. While this seems unlikely, some sources feel it could trigger a Syrian military response against Israel. A Syrian defense analyst discussed this scenario in an interview with Defense News in July 2007: ‘‘That’s what Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad meant when he said in July that if Iran was attacked by the U.S., Syria would be the first line of defense.’’38 There have also been reports—of uncertain credibility—that Syria agreed to the deployment of sophisticated Iranian weaponry on its territory.39 In June 2007, the London newspaper, Daily Telegraph, published a report stating that Iran was preparing to transfer dozens of medium-range Shahab-3 and Russian-made Scud-C missiles, together with Scud-B missiles. 40 The Telegraph stated that a senior UN official in Lebanon had said, ‘‘Iran is preparing itself for the possibility of military action over its nuclear program . . . If Iran is attacked, then this will give it a number of retaliation options.’’41 UN officials estimated that the work on the new missile storage facility will begin in the summer of 2008, and it will take about a year to complete.

Iranian Proliferation One key question is whether Syria can benefit from Iran’s growing long-range missile efforts and the possible Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Many of the details of Iranian WMD and missile capabilities had limited importance as long as Israel did not face a direct threat from Iran. Israel now faces the possibility, however, that it may lose its present nuclear monopoly at some point between 2010 and 2015. Most estimates put such an Iranian development at least five years in the future. A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued in early December 2007 provides what is probably the best available assessment of the current trends in the Iranian threat: A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons Program (For the purposes of this Estimate, by ‘‘nuclear weapons program’’ we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversionrelated and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.) . . . we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed

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primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. • We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons. • We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.) • We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons. • We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon. • Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously. B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge with high confidence it has not yet done. C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them. • We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU [highly enriched uranium] for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely. • We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010–2015 time frame. (INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015. D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example, Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high


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confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons. E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program. • Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be. • We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible. F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities —rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007. G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015. H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.42

It is important to note several things about these judgments: No mention is made of exactly what nuclear weapons efforts Iran halted and whether this included all covert and dual-use programs. The NIE does unambiguously say that U.S. intelligence did have high confidence Iran was actively working on nuclear weapons until 2003, and the intelligence community expresses important levels of uncertainty over whether Iran has resumed its nuclear weapons effort. Iran’s current enrichment efforts have and will continue to move it closer to being able to deploy nuclear weapons even if key elements of its weapons design and production activity have been halted or suspended.

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The NIE does not address the major issues and uncertainties still being examined by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The omission of any discussion of the Green Salt, Laptop, and warhead issues is particularly important. So is the statement regarding the uncertainties relating to research and dual-use activity. Iran is known to have worked on technology that could be used to produce the high-explosive lens, uranium machining, neutron initiator, neutron reflector, and other components needed for a fission weapon. Ongoing covert research in each area would be very easy to disperse and conceal. Passive and conventional high-explosive testing of actual warheads and weapons designs using nonfissile material would not provide any indicators other than—at most—those associated with conventional high explosives. Missile testing using warheads with such assemblies and similar bomb testing would probably be detectable only through a major leak of human intelligence. Moreover, no mention is made of Iran’s long-range missile programs, but Iran is clearly continuing to improve its ability to develop advanced nuclear delivery systems. It announced two new missile programs within the month following the announcement of the U.S. NIE. It tested a space booster that had applications for long-range missile use, and early in 2008 it announced that it had 6,000 centrifuges of a new type with at least three times the output of the 3,000 P1 centrifuges that Iran already had. This has a major impact on Iran’s capabilities. Under ideal conditions, the 3,000 P1 centrifuges could produce enough fissile material only for a single weapon every 12–18 months. An equally efficient system using 6,000 IR-2 centrifuges could produce the same amount of fissile material every 4–6 months.

The Israeli View and the Uncertain Iranian Strategic Calculus These developments may explain why Israeli officials almost immediately stated that their estimates were more pessimistic than those in the U.S. NIE and indicated that the IDF was planning for the contingency that Iran might have a nuclear weapon as early as 2010. Even if the Israeli view is right, however, any such Iranian nuclear force would probably be very small and limited in capability for at least half a decade after Iran got its first nuclear device. Israel would also almost certainly retain nuclear superiority for at least a decade and be able to deliver a devastating response. Israel does have a steadily increasing level of missile defense capability and could rapidly improve its long-range nuclear strike capability. By normal standards, Israel should have a decisive deterrent ‘‘edge’’ over Iran for the next decade. It is also unclear why Iran would take existential risks for any cause of interest to Syria or how Iran could or would exert nuclear leverage over Israel to Syria’s benefit. Iran might threaten nuclear retaliation if Israel invaded Syria, but it is far from clear that any such threat would be credible. The fact remains, however, that Israel cannot plan on the basis that Iran’s future behavior will be deterrable or be based on ‘‘rational’’ standards. Iran’s leadership may act out of ideology, make mistakes in threats and escalation, launch under attack


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if struck by the United States or Israel, or use such weapons for reasons that have little to do with the values inherent in Western cost-benefit considerations. It must be stressed that as yet, there are no indications that Syrian ties to Iran would provoke such Iranian reactions or that Iran would ever provide Syria with more than token volunteer forces. Some experts feel that Iranian rhetoric calling for the destruction of Israel is more a smokescreen and an excuse for creating an Iran nuclear monopoly in the Gulf than a sign of any serious willingness or desire to engage Israel. Others have said the opposite. However, even if Iran’s nuclear ambitions are centered on the U.S. presence in the Gulf and other Muslim and Arab states, this may not deter Israel from preventive or preemptive action in dealing with what it sees as an existential threat—a threat former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made all too clear long before the present tensions with Iran. One or two nuclear ground bursts centered on Tel Aviv and Haifa could virtually destroy Israel as a state. There is also the risk that Iran or other nations could give Syria, terrorists, or hardline Palestinian groups weapons of mass destruction or deliver weapons by covert means. Aiding Syria to acquire nuclear weapons and better missiles is a way of creating a far more difficult targeting and related set of military problems for Israel than it would face solely in dealing with Iran, as well as a way of confronting Israel with parallel threats instead of just one. Iran might feel today that aiding Hezbollah or Hamas to get such weapons would involve it in an unacceptable risk of Israeli reprisals. It may be far more willing to take such risks if it came under Israeli and/or U.S. attack. Risk perceptions and escalatory behavior are crisis and history dependent, and the history of rational deterrence is the history of wars that did not occur; the history of modern war is the history of the failure of rational deterrence. Israeli officials such as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert have stated that Israel cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran. Such views are scarcely new. A number of Israeli officers, officials, and experts have said that Israel must not permit the Iranians to acquire nuclear capabilities, regardless of Tehran’s motivations. Ephraim Inbar, President of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, said in 2004, ‘‘For self-defense, we must act in a pre-emptive mode.’’43 Gen. Moshe Ya’alon, the former Israeli Chief of Staff, was quoted as saying in August 2004 that Iran must not be permitted to acquire nuclear weapons. He added that Israel must not rely on the rest of the world to stop Iran from going nuclear because he said a nuclear Iran would change the Middle East in that ‘‘moderate States would become more extreme.’’44 General Ya’alon also indicated that Israel might conduct such attacks without using its aircraft, triggering a wide range of speculation about Israeli and U.S. covert operatives and Special Forces conducting such strikes. Iran and the Prospects for a Future Military Strike It is unclear what type of military strikes Israel might use, if it decided to strike Iran preemptively. Some have argued that Israel might openly declare it had nuclear weapons and seek to establish deterrence based on mutually assured destruction.

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Others have argued that Israel would be forced to strike preventively or preemptively if the United States did not because its very existence would be at stake. When then Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz was asked how far Israel would go to stop Iran’s nuclear program, he said, ‘‘2,000 kilometers.’’45 Some Israeli experts have argued that Israel does not have viable military options. They have argued that Israel does have the required targeting capability, but cannot generate and sustain the necessary number of attack sorties. Some have argued that Israel might do little more than drive Iranian activity further underground, provoke even more Iranian activity, make it impossible for diplomatic and UN pressure to work, and make Israel into a real rather than a proxy or secondary target. Brig. Gen. Shlomo Brom is one of the analysts who has warned that Israel’s capabilities may not be enough to inflict enough damage on Iran’s nuclear program: [A]ny Israeli attack on an Iranian nuclear target would be a very complex operation in which a relatively large number of attack aircraft and support aircraft (interceptors, ECM [electronic countermeasures] aircraft, refuelers, and rescue aircraft) would participate. The conclusion is that Israel could attack only a few Iranian targets and not as part of a sustainable operation over time, but as a one time surprise operation. Even if Israel had the attack capabilities needed for the destruction of all elements of the Iranian nuclear program, it is doubtful whether Israel has the kind of intelligence needed to be certain that all the necessary elements of the program were traced and destroyed fully. Israel has good photographic coverage of Iran with the Ofeq series of reconnaissance satellites, but being so distant from Iran, one can assume that other kinds of intelligence coverage are rather partial and weak. Covert action demands different kinds of operational capabilities and intelligence. There is no indication that Israel has capabilities of covert operations in Iran. The recent information about the development of the Iranian program indicated that it reached a status of being independent of external assistance. Moreover, the assistance Iran got was mostly from Pakistan, another place that is not a traditional area of operations for the Israeli secret services, like Europe or South America. It seems that there is no real potential for covert Israeli operations against the Iranian Nuclear program.46

Israel would face significant operational problems in attacking Iran; Israel does not have conventional ballistic missiles or land-/sea-based cruise missiles with the range or accuracy to carry out such a mission from Israel. The shortest flight routes would be around 1,500–1,700 km through Jordan and Iraq, 1,900–2,100 km through Saudi Arabia, and 2,600–2,800 km in a loop through Turkey.47 Israel has configured its F-15s and F-16s for long-range strikes and has refueling capability. It is doubtful, however, that it has enough refueling capability to do more than send a strike force that would have to defend itself without a significant fighter escort or support from electronic warfare aircraft. Even then, forward area refueling would probably be required, and backup refueling and recovery would be an issue. Israeli air strikes would be detected relatively quickly by the radars in the countries involved, and very low-altitude penetration profiles would lead to even more serious range-payload problems. It is one thing for IAF aircraft to penetrate deep into Syria


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and quite another to take on the range, refueling, and vulnerability problems of attacking deep into Iran. Unless the IAF could somehow stage out of Turkey, the countries overflown would be confronted with the need to either react or have limited credibility in claiming surprise. An overflight of Iraq would be seen in the region as having to have had a U.S. ‘‘green light.’’ Iran would almost certainly see Jordanian, Turkish, and/or Saudi tolerance of such an IAF strike as a hostile act. It might well claim a U.S. green light in any case in an effort to mobilize hostile Arab and Muslim (and possibly world) reactions. Furthermore, Israeli strike aircraft would probably need to fly with close to their maximum payloads to achieve the necessary level of damage against most targets suspected of WMD activity, although any given structure could be destroyed with one to three weapons. (This would include the main Bushehr reactor enclosure, but its real-world potential value to an Iranian nuclear program is limited compared to more dispersed and/or hardened targets.) Iran has at least 20 suspect facilities and over 100 potential aim points. Multiple strikes on the dispersed buildings and entries in a number of facilities would still be necessary to ensure adequate damage without restrikes. Restrikes would require repeated penetration into Arab airspace and do not seem to be feasible planning criteria for Israeli commanders to use. The IAF’s publicly declared mix of standoff precision-guided missiles—such as Harpoons or Popeyes—might not have the required lethality to destroy some Iranian facilities with conventional warheads. (Wildly differing reports exist about the range of the Popeye, which is deployed in the United States as the Have Nap missile. The base system has a range of around 60–70 km. Popeye II has a range of 150 km. Reports have been made about improved ‘‘turbo’’ versions with ranges of 200–350 km.)48 There have been reports of air or submarine launched versions with ranges of 1,500 km. (One report notes that ‘‘Israel is reported to possess a 200kg nuclear warhead, containing 6kg of plutonium that could be mounted on cruise missiles.’’49) Iran also has two to four underground complexes, including a key centrifuge complex at Natanz and a heavy water reactor project at Arak. Israel’s purchase of 500 BLU-109 Have Void ‘‘bunker busters’’ has given it 2,000-pound weapons that can be used against underground or hardened targets, but these weapons are far less effective against deeply buried targets. The standard version of BLU-109 is a ‘‘dumb bomb’’ with a maximum penetration capability of 4 to 6 feet of reinforced concrete. An aircraft must also overfly the target and launch the BLU-109 with great precision to achieve serious penetration capability.50 It is possible to fit the BLU-109 with precision guidance and convert it to a guided glide bomb, and the United States may have sold such a version or Israel may have modified it. The Joint Direct Attack Munition GBU-31 can be fit to the bomb to give it a nominal range of 15 km with a Circular Error Probable of 13 m in the GPS-aided inertial navigation system (INS) modes of operation and 30 m in the INS-only modes of operation.51 Open-source reporting, however, does not provide any data on such capabilities.

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It is possible that Israel has or will purchase the BLU-116 Advanced Unitary Penetrator, GBU-24 C/B (U.S. Air Force) or the GBU-24 D/B (U.S. Navy), which has about three times the penetration capability of the BLU-109.52 Yet, these are problems to be solved, not insuperable barriers. Israel has the capabilities to carry out at least one set of air strikes, and senior U.S. officials have warned about this capability. Vice President Richard Cheney suggested on January 20, 2005, ‘‘Given the fact that Iran has a stated policy that their objective is the destruction of Israel, the Israelis might well decide to act first, and let the rest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterwards.’’53 Possible Iranian Response Iran has considerable capability to retaliate against such an Israeli strike and has threatened retaliation if attacked by Israel. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has been quoted as saying that an attack by Israel or the United States would have a ‘‘severe consequence’’ and threatened that Iran would retaliate ‘‘by all means’’ at its disposal. Mottaki added, ‘‘Iran does not think that the Zionist regime is in a condition to engage in such a dangerous venture and they know how severe the possible Iranian response will be to its possible audacity . . . Suffice to say that the Zionist regime, if they attack, will regret it.’’54 Iran has several options to respond to an Israeli attack: • Multiple launches of Shahab-3 including the possibility of chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) warheads against Tel Aviv, Israeli military and civilian centers, and Israeli suspected nuclear weapons sites. • Escalate the conflict using proxy groups such as Hezbollah to attack Israel proper with suicide bombings, covert CBR attacks, and missile attacks from southern Lebanon and Syria. • Covert attacks against Israeli interests by its intelligence and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps assets. This could include low-level bombings against Israeli embassies, Jewish centers, and other Israeli assets outside and inside Israel.

An Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities might also strengthen the Iranian regime’s stance to move toward nuclear capabilities and push neighboring states into being more tolerant of Iran’s bid for nuclear weapons. The United States is likely to be seen as having given the green light for such Israeli strikes, and this could lead to further escalation of the Iraqi insurgency, increase the threat of asymmetric attacks against American interests and allies in the region, or, even worse, be used as justification for attacks against the U.S. homeland with CBR weapons by proxy groups or covert action. On the other hand, Israeli officials have expressed the concern that if Iran is allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them, this will lead to further proliferation in the region. They feel Iran’s actions would lead to a race to acquire such capabilities around the Middle East and greatly increase the threat


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of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks against Israel and the entire region.55 They feel that waiting also has its penalties and the Israeli attack on a possible Syrian nuclear reactor site in 2007 is an example of such attitudes. Shifts in Israeli Strategic Nuclear Forces If Israel does not preempt, it will almost certainly take steps to both ensure that it has a survivable strike capability, can retaliate immediately with nuclear strikes against all of Iran’s cities, and would retain enough nuclear weapons to devastate Syria and any other hostile Arab nation. Experts have speculated for several years that this will lead Israel to create a submarine-based nuclear missile force and longerrange missiles for air strikes. Israel is also known to have tested much larger boosters than it is presently believed to arm with nuclear warheads, and these might be used to carry several multiple reentry vehicle or even multiple independent reentry vehicle warheads each.56 One key uncertainty is the nature of Israeli efforts to arm its submarines and aircraft with what is sometimes called the turbo version of the Popeye. A report by Global Security notes that Israel may be developing a Popeye Turbo missile similar to the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) carried on the Dolphin-class submarines. Press reports appeared claiming Israel had tested a SLCM with a range of 1,500 km in May 2000. It is possible that Israel could develop a variant of the Popeye Turbo with a range of 1,500 km by lengthening the fuel tank associated with a 300– 350-km variant reported by U.S. intelligence. Israel’s submarines are outfitted with six 533-millimeter (mm) torpedo tubes suitable for the 21-inch torpedoes that are normally used on most submarines, but may have 650-mm tubes. If they have two to four larger 25.5-inch diameter torpedo tubes, these could be used to launch a long-range nuclear-capable SLCM.57 The problem for both Israel and Iran—and potentially for Syria if it should become involved—is that Israel’s vulnerability virtually forces it into a countervalue strike against Iran’s population, and any other state then at war with Israel, the moment even one nuclear armed missile hits Israeli soil. Israel cannot win by riding out an attack and has no reason for delay and restraint. There would also be questions about missile accuracy and lethality against small military targets and the need to send the message that no state could afford to risk trying to exploit Israel’s weakness after an Iranian attack. There is also at least the possibility that Israel would feel compelled to strike Syria as well as Iran if Syria remained hostile or at war. Israel might see itself as too weak to wait out Syrian reactions or resist pressure from a Syria that had not suffered to the same extent as Israel. Such calculations seem almost surrealistic in peacetime, but the problem with existential wars is that they leave little reason for restraint once crippling strategic damage is threatened or inflicted.


Notes

CHAPTER 1 1. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Introspective after Lebanon Offensive,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 18, 2006. 2. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Reflects—New Model Army?’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 11, 2006. 3. Alison Pargeter, ‘‘Standing Alone—Isolated Syria Holds Secret Talks with Israel,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1, 2007. 4. Ibid. 5. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Raising the Stakes,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 20, 2006. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Cancels Ground Forces Cuts,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 17, 2007. 10. Ibid. 11. Ben-David, ‘‘Raising the Stakes.’’ 12. Ibid. 13. Agence France-Presse, ‘‘Israel Gripped by Syria War Fears,’’ February 22, 2007. 14. Ibid. 15. Ron Bousso, ‘‘Syria Deploys Thousands of Rockets on Israel Border: Sources,’’ Agence France-Presse, March 9, 2007. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ya’aqov Katz, ‘‘Israeli Officials Warn of ‘Unprecedented Military Build-up’ by Syria,’’ Jerusalem Post,April 13, 2007. 19. Ibid.

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20. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘IDF Resumes Training in the Golan Heights,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 2, 2007. 21. Ibid. 22. Katz, ‘‘Israeli Officials Warn of ‘Unprecedented Military Build-up’ by Syria.’’ 23. Ibid. 24. Leslie Susser, ‘‘Keeping a Finger on the Syrian Pulse,’’ The Jerusalem Report, July 9, 2007. 25. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel, Syria Prepared for Conflict as Tension Rises,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 8, 2007. 26. Susser, ‘‘Keeping a Finger on the Syrian Pulse.’’ 27. Ben-David, ‘‘Israel, Syria Prepared for Conflict as Tension Rises.’’ 28. Ibid. 29. Susser, ‘‘Keeping a Finger on the Syrian Pulse.’’ 30. Mideast Mirror, ‘‘Frayed Nerves,’’ July 2, 2007. 31. Ben-David, ‘‘Israel, Syria Prepared for Conflict as Tension Rises.’’ 32. Guardian Unlimited, ‘‘Talking of Peace, Preparing for War,’’ June 11, 2007. 33. Wire services, ‘‘Israeli Jets in ‘Iran-Attack Drill’ over Syria,’’ New York Post, September 8, 2007. 34. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Alleged IAF Incident over Syria Heightens Tensions,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 10, 2007. 35. Ben-David, ‘‘Israel, Syria Prepared for Conflict as Tension Rises.’’ 36. Ibid. 37. Susser, ‘‘Keeping a Finger on the Syrian Pulse.’’ 38. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel’s Largest Drill Prompts Regional Jitters,’’ Defense News, April 14, 2008, pp. 1, 8. 39. ‘‘Israel ‘Ready to Return Golan,’ ’’ BBC News Online, April 23, 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7362937.stm (accessed April 24, 2008).

CHAPTER 5 1. ‘‘Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1, 2006. 2. According to Global Security, the Yingji YJ-2 (C-802) is powered by a turbojet with paraffin-based fuel. It is subsonic (0.9 Mach), weighs 715 kilograms, has a range of 120 kilometers, and has a 165-kilogram (363-pound) warhead. It has a small radar cross section and skims about 5 to 7 meters above the sea surface when it attacks the target. It has good antijamming capability. In contrast, the C-701 is less than half the size of the C-802, has a cruising speed of 0.8 Mach, and has a range of approximately 15 kilometers. 3. ‘‘Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.’’ 4. Norman Polmar, ‘‘Hezbollah Attack: Lessons for the LCS?’’ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 9 (September 2006). 5. Amos Harel, ‘‘Probe: IDF Ship Hit by Hezbollah Missile Had Malfunctioning Radar,’’ November 8, 2006, www.haaretz.como. 6. Ibid. 7. Amos Harel, ‘‘Probe Blames Navy Officials for Hezbollah Missile Attack on Ship,’’ October 16, 2006, www.haaretz.como. 8. Harel, ‘‘Probe: IDF Ship Hit by Hezbollah Missile Had Malfunctioning Radar.’’

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9. ‘‘Rafael Protector,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships, on-line updates, posted October 25 2007. 10. ‘‘Patrol Forces, Syria: Tir-Class Inshore Patrol Craft,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships, on-line updates, posted August 29, 2007.

CHAPTER 6 1. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘US and Israel Sign MoU for FMF package,’’ Jane’s Defence Industry, August 17, 2007. 2. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Sees Rise in US Military Aid for 2009–18,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 1, 2007. 3. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Continues to Replenish War Stocks,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, November 21, 2007. 4. United States Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, ‘‘Israel—Missiles and Munitions,’’ News Release, October 30, 2007. 5. Guy Anderson and Matthew Smith, ‘‘Russia Sets Its First-Ever Three-Year Defense Budget,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 26, 2007. 6. Richard F. Grimmett, ‘‘Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999– 2006,’’ CRS Report for Congress, September 26, 2007, pp. 23–24. 7. Gerrard Cowan, ‘‘US Threatens Russia with Sanctions for Exporting Arms to Iran and Syria,’’ Jane’s Defence Industry, November 15, 2007. 8. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Iran and Syria advance SIGINT Cooperation,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 19, 2006. 9. Ibid. 10. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Iran Set to Obtain Pantsyr via Syria,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 23, 2007. 11. Reuben Johnson, ‘‘Riddle of Russia’s Reported Arms Sale to Syrian/Iran,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 18, 2007. 12. Agence France-Presse, ‘‘Iran, Syria Sign Defense Agreement,’’ June 15, 2006.

CHAPTER 7 1. These data are extrapolated from the CIA, World Factbook, 2006, http://www.odci.gov /cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html. 2. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘US Pledges Boost in Military Aid for Israel, Threatens Conditions for Egypt,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 4, 2007. 3. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Set for Record Defense Spending in 2007,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 3, 2007. 4. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Committee Urges Israel to Raise Defense Budget,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 1, 2007. 5. ‘‘Israel, Turkey Sign Security Accord,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 21, 2004, http:// jdw.janes.com (accessed January 27, 2004); and ‘‘Russia Halts Plans to Sell Igla to Syria,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 6, 2002, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 9, 2004). 6. Khaled Abu Toameh, ‘‘Life After Rantisi,’’ Jerusalem Post, April 23, 2004, p. 12. 7. Elliot Chodoff, ‘‘Taking the War on Terror to Syria,’’ National Post, National Edition, September 28, 2004, p. A18. 8. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Tactical Successes, Strategic Failures,’’ Defense News, December 22, 2003, p. 32.

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9. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Security Experts Seek Strategy,’’ Defense News, December 22, 2003, p. 6. 10. Nina Gilbert, ‘‘Israeli Defense Forces: Significant Decline in 2004 Terror,’’ Jerusalem Post, December 21, 2004 (accessed on January 13, 2005). 11. Opall-Rome, ‘‘Tactical Successes, Strategic Failures,’’ p. 34. 12. Margaret Weiss, ‘‘Weapon of Terror: Development and Impact of the Qassam Rocket,’’ PolicyWatch #1352, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 11, 2008, http:// www.thewashingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2728 (accessed April 10, 2008). 13. Barbra Opall-Rome, ‘‘US May Allow Israel to Defer Arms Payments,’’ Defense News, January 16, 2006, p 1. 14. U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, FY2009, p. 512. 15. Ibid. 16. Israel increasingly produces UAVs for countries such as India. Contracts between the two countries call for Israel and India to begin to develop three new UAVs: the Rustam medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV, the Pawan short-range UAV, and the Gagan tactical UAV. Israel is currently India’s sole provider of UAVs. See Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘‘India, Israel Team to Develop 3 UAVs,’’ Defense News, February 28, 2005, p. 14. 17. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Extensive Cuts to Hit Israeli Ground Forces the Most,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 16, 2003, p. 16. 18. Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Security Experts Seek Strategy,’’ p. 6. 19. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israeli QDR Emphasizes Multirole, Linked Force,’’ Defense News, February 13, 2006, p. 38. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Alex Fishman, ‘‘The Changing Face of the IDF; The Security Agenda and the Ballot Box,’’ Strategic Assessment 8, no. 4 (February 2006). 25. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Debriefing Teams Brand IDF Doctrine ‘Completely Wrong,’ ’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 3, 2007. 26. Ibid. 27. Press release posted to the Winograd Commission’s official Web site, April 30, 2007, http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/press.html#null. 28. Ibid. 29. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Reflects—New Model Army?’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 11, 2006. 30. Ibid. 31. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘IDF Resumes Training in Golan Heights,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 7, 2007. 32. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Fake, Flexible City Rises in the Negev,’’ Defense News, June 11, 2007. 33. Ibid. 34. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israeli Experts Debunk Lebanon War Claims,’’ Defense News, June 18, 2007. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid.

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37. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Fights to Reclaim Decisiveness, Victory,’’ Defense News, May 14, 2007. 38. Ibid. 39. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘IDF Unveils Five-Year Plan to Boost Capabilities,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 7, 2007. 40. The data in this section draw heavily from a number of basic source documents on the balance: IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Military Balance in the Middle East, various editions; ‘‘Israel,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, various editions. 41. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israeli Revamp to Strengthen Ground Forces,’’ Defense News, October 3, 2005, p. 46. 42. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Eyes ‘Big Brother’ Approach for Security,’’ Defense News, October 31, 2005, p. 22. 43. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Top Israeli Commanders Get Real-Time C4I System,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 3, 2005, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed October 20, 2005). 44. Ibid. 45. Associated Press, ‘‘Israel Deploys New Weapon,’’ Bell Globemedia Publishing Inc., July 22, 2004, www.globetechnology.com (accessed July 26, 2004). 46. ‘‘Israel Decides Not to Develop Merkava Mk5,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 2, 2003, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 2. 47. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Builds Precision Arsenal for Ground War, Defense News, April 18, 2005, p. 14. 48. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israeli Armour Fails to Protect MBTs from ATGMs,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 25, 2006. 49. Ibid. 50. Ben-David, ‘‘IDF Unveils Five-Year Plan to Boost Capabilities.’’ 51. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Deliberates Future of Merkava,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 1, 2006. 52. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Eyes Merkava MBT Replacement,’’ Defense News, November 10, 2003, p. 34. 53. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘IMI Proposes Buy of Merkava Production Line,’’ Defense News, January 12, 2004, p. 6. 54. Ben-David, ‘‘IDF Unveils Five-Year Plan to Boost Capabilities.’’ 55. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Adjusts Acquisition Plan,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 30, 2004, www4.janes.com (accessed January 14, 2004). 56. ‘‘Eastern Mediterranean, Israel, Procurement,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, November 6, 2002, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 28, 2003). Labeled 4. 57. Clifford Beal, ‘‘Israel’s Spike Weapon Goes Network-Centric,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 1, 2003, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 7. 58. Christopher Foss, ‘‘IDF to Integrate SADS into Humvees,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 28, 2005, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed September 28, 2005). 59. ‘‘Eastern Mediterranean, Israel, Procurement,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, November 6, 2002, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 28, 2003). Labeled 5. 60. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘LORA Missile Called No Threat,’’ Defense News, November 24, 2003, p. 6. Labeled 6. There is some concern that the LORA could be altered in such a way as to be in violation of arms control limits. The Israeli Missile Defense Organization vehemently denies this.

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61. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Seeks to Extend Precise Ground Strike,’’ Defense News, September 12, 2005, p. 42. 62. ‘‘IMI Says Israel Used TCS in Lebanon,’’ Jane’s Missile and Rockets, June 4, 2007. 63. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Israel Orders Surveillance Coverage,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 3, 2003, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 8. 64. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Army Taps Elbit UAV for Over-the-Hill Missions,’’ Defense News, February 4, 2004, http://www.defensenews.com (accessed February 5, 2004). 65. Clifford Beal, ‘‘New Radio Units Primed for Israeli Forces,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 19, 2003, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled Baetjer 9. 66. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Plans $550M JSTARS-Like Flier,’’ Defense News, November 3, 2003, p. 14. Labeled 15. 67. Ibid. 68. ‘‘Special Forces, Israel,’’ Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces, November 6, 2002; ‘‘Internal Affairs—Israel,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, October 3, 2005. 69. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Israel Extols ‘Solid Mirror,’ . . . ’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 3, 2003, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 17. 70. Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Seeks to Extend Precise Ground Strike,’’ p. 42. 71. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘From Foot Soldier to Network Node,’’ Defense News, October 20, 2003, p. 30. 72. Andrew White ‘‘Israeli Army Awaits First Stage of IICS,’’ International Defence Review, October 1, 2007. 73. The data in this section draw heavily from a number of basic source documents on the balance: IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Military Balance in the Middle East, various editions; ‘‘Israel,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, various editions. 74. ‘‘Boeing Wins Israeli JDAM Contract,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 8, 2003, http:// jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 10. 75. Arieh O’Sullivan, ‘‘No Plans to Purchase More Apache Longbows,’’ Jerusalem Post, April 11, 2005. 76. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Air Force to Buy More Apache Longbows,’’ Defense News, October 6, 2003, p. 44. Labeled 11. One retired general insisted that the helicopter had mostly failed its missions in Iraq. 77. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Israel Orders Gulfstream to Fulfill Early-Warning Need,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 10, 2003, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 12. 78. Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/g550.htm. 79. Bill Sweetman, ‘‘Israel’s New AEW Undergoes Trials,’’ Jane’s International Defence Review, January 17, 2007. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Air Force Launches Upgrades for Heavy Helicopters,’’ Defense News, November 19, 2007. 83. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘C4ISR Dominates Israeli Investment Focus,’’ Defense News, September 12, 2005, pp. 26, 28. 84. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel’s Air Force Looks Beyond FLIRS to Multispectral Sensors,’’ Defense News, January 19, 2004, http://www.defensenews.com (accessed February 5, 2004).

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85. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israeli Aerospace Firms Join Forces,’’ Defense News, October 3, 2005, p. 102. 86. The defecting pilot was on maneuver near the Golan and suddenly turned toward Israel and flew very low and fast over the Golan and central Galilee. He landed in a remote civil strip near Megido. This led to a great deal of media comment in Israel, but such incidents are almost unavoidable. Although he flew for seven minutes without being intercepted, he flew at a time when IAF E-2Cs were not in the air and now nearby aircraft were scrambled, when the IAF was in a state of low alert, and flew without using any radar or communications emissions. He also stated later that he did receive warning he was being tracked by Israeli radar. Israel later used the MiG-23ML (G) for training and test and evaluation purposes. Washington Post, October 13, 1989, p. A-35, October 14, 1989, p. A-18; New York Times, October 12, 1989, p. A-10, October 14, 1989, p. A-2; Philadelphia Inquirer, October 12, 1989, p. 18A, October 13, 1989, p. 17A; Washington Times, October 12, 1989, p. A-8; Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 10, 1990, p. 221. 87. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘US Indicates Israeli Raptor Access to Compensate for Saudi JDAM Deal,’’ April 25, 2007. 88. Dan Williams, ‘‘Eyeing Iran Reactors, Israel Seeks U.S. Bunker Bombs,’’ Reuters, September 21, 2004. 89. Aluf Ben, ‘‘US to Sell Israel 5,000 Smart Bombs,’’ Haaretz, September 21, 2004, http://haaretz.com (accessed September 21, 2004). 90. Aluf Ben, ‘‘US Keeps Israel Out of New Fighter-Jet Development Program,’’ Haaretz, October 12, 2005, http://haaretz.com. 91. Bill Gertz, ‘‘US to Restart Arms Technology Transfers to Israel,’’ Washington Times, August 17, 2005, p. 3. 92. Nathan Guttman, ‘‘Israeli-Venezuelan Arms Deal on Hold,’’ Jerusalem Post, October 21, 2005. 93. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Sets Sights on 100 F-35s, Six C-130Js,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 11, 2007. 94. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel May Switch JSF Order to STOVL,’’ Defense News, March 10, 2008, pp. 1, 6. 95. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Air Force Buys Improved Hermes 450s,’’ Defense News, November 12, 2007. 96. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israeli Experts Urge Slow, Steady Move to UCAVs,’’ Defense News, November 7, 2005, p. 21. 97. ‘‘Special Forces, Israel’’; ‘‘Internal Affairs—Israel.’’ 98. Christian Lowe and Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Air Force Seeks Expanded AntiTerror Role,’’ Defense News, March 28, 2005, p. 14. 99. This section draws heavily on a number of basic source documents on the balance: IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Military Balance in the Middle East, various editions; ‘‘Israel,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, various editions. 100. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Decides on PAC-3 to Close Capabilities Gap,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 28, 2007. 101. This analysis draws heavily on reporting by Global Security. See http:// www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/patriot-ac-3.htm and http://www.globalsecurity.org /space/systems/patriot-specs.htm.

270

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102. The Arrow is a joint project between the U.S. and Israel. The Arrow had successfully intercepted target missiles during several tests. Concerns over Israel’s ability to mass-produce Arrow parts have been alleviated by the construction of a parallel plant in the United States. See Barbara Opall-Rome, Defense News, ‘‘Israel Boosts Arrow Arsenal As War Looms,’’ November 25–December 1, 2002, p. 14, for additional information. Labeled 13. 103. This analysis draws heavily on reporting by Global Security. See http:// www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/arrow.htm. 104. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Inclines to Arrow 3 Option for Third-Tier Defense,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 6, 2007. 105. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Arrow Destroys Target Simulating a Shahab 3,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 21, 2007. 106. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Tests New Arrow Variant,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 4, 2007. 107. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Seeks Its Third Arrow Battery by 2012,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 28, 2007. 108. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Rafael Set to Develop Anti-Qassam System,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 10, 2007. 109. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Selects Anti-Rocket System,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 14, 2007. 110. Ben-David, ‘‘Rafael Set to Develop Anti-Qassam System.’’ 111. Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Selects Anti-Rocket System.’’ 112. Doug Richardson, ‘‘Israel Releases More Details on Anti-Rocket Programmes,’’ Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, February 1, 2008. 113. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Rafael, IAI Unveil Surface-to-Air Missile Combo,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 21, 2004, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 27, 2004). 114. ‘‘Israel, US to Pursue Mobile Laser Concept,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 3, 2003, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 14. 115. The data in this section draw heavily from a number of basic source documents on the balance: Jane’s Fighting Ships, various editions; IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Military Balance in the Middle East, various editions; ‘‘Israel,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, various editions. 116. Jane’s International Defense Review, April 1998, p. 29. 117. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Reaches for New Combat Ships,’’ Defense News, December 22, 2003, http://www.defensenews.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 19. 118. Jane’s Fighting Ships, various editions. 119. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israeli Navy Opts for Fewer, but Flexible Vessels,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 17, 2003, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 18. 120. Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Reaches for New Combat Ships,’’ p. 15. 121. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘IDF Ponders Navy or Coastguard Route,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 8, 2007. 122. Ben-David, ‘‘IDF Unveils Five-Year Plan to Boost Capabilities.’’ 123. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘AUSA: Israel Navy Launches Second LCS Study,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 11, 2007. 124. See Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Navy Boosts Layers of Anti-Terror Defenses,’’ Defense News, January 23, 2006, p. 10. 125. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Boosts Fleet of Super Dvora Mk IIIs,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 21, 2006.

NOTES

271

126. Richard Scott, ‘‘Israel Navy Contracts Study into Submarine Communications Facilities,’’ Jane’s Navy International, October 1, 2007. 127. Ben-David, ‘‘IDF Ponders Navy or Coastguard Route.’’ 128. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Seeks More Dolphins,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 21, 2004, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 27, 2004). 129. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Surgical Strike to the Highest Bidder,’’ Defense News, May 15, 2006, 11:22. 130. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel’s Naval Power Play,’’ Defense News, May 24, 2004. 131. Areih O’Sullivan, ‘‘Navy’s Plans to Procure New Vessels Frozen,’’ Jerusalem Post, January 2, 2005. 132. ‘‘Special Forces, Israel.’’ 133. ‘‘Seizing of the Palestinian Weapons Ship Karine A,’’ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 4, 2002, www.mfa.gov.il (accessed November 17, 2005). 134. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Preserves Its Grip on Gaza Coast by Remote Control,’’ Defense News, March 20, 2004. 135. Ibid. 136. ‘‘Israel on Alert over Port Security,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Digest, May 19, 2006. 137. ‘‘Israel,’’ IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; ‘‘Israel,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships, various editions; ‘‘Israel,’’ Jane’s Sentinel, Eastern Mediterranean, various editions. 138. The data in this section draw heavily from a number of basic source documents on the balance: IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Military Balance in the Middle East, various editions; ‘‘Israel,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, various editions. 139. ‘‘Special Forces, Israel’’; ‘‘Internal Affairs—Israel.’’ 140. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Israel,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Eastern Mediterranean, September 19, 2005. 141. ‘‘Special Forces, Israel’’; ‘‘Internal Affairs—Israel.’’ 142. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Israel.’’ 143. Ibid. 144. Ibid. 145. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Shadow Warriors,’’ Defense News, January 9, 2006, p. 22. 146. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 27, 2005, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45394.htm. 147. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ rls/shrd/2005/, and http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78854.htm. 148. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profile on Israel, ‘‘Missile Overview,’’ http:// www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/index.html. 149. Some reports give the range as 500 km; Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 10, 1999, pp. 50–64. 150. Baltimore Sun, November 23, 1988; Washington Post, September 16, 1989. 151. Tass International, 1216 GMT, September 15, 1989; Washington Post, September 16, 1989; Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 19, 1988, September 23, 1989, p. 549; Washington Times, July 22, 1987, p. D-4; International Defense Review, July 1987, p. 857; New York Times, July 22, 1987, p. A-6, July 29, 1987; Mideast Markets, November 23, 1987, p. 11; Harold Hough, ‘‘Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure, Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, November 1994, pp. 505–511. 152. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profile on Israel, ‘‘Missile Overview.’’

272

NOTES

153. BBC and ITV reporting efforts seem to give more credibility to the idea that Israel has some form of relatively short-range nuclear-armed missile. Ranges of anywhere from 750–930 NM have been reported, with accuracies of anywhere from 0.1 km to radar correlator guidance packages capable of CEPs of 10 m. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 46 (January/February 1998): 48; Washington Post, September 16, 1989, p. A-17, November 15, 1989, p. A-14; Economist, August 1, 1987, p. 41; Washington Times, July 22, 1987, p. D-4, July 24, 1987, p. A-9, and April 4, 1988, p. 17; International Defense Review, July 1987, p. 857; New York Times, July 29, 1987, p. A-10. 154. Tass International, 1216 GMT, September 15, 1989; Washington Post, September 16, 1989; Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 19, 1988, September 23, 1989, p. 549; Washington Times, July 22, 1987, p. D-4; International Defense Review, July 1987, p. 857; New York Times, July 22, 1987, p. A-6, July 29, 1987; Mideast Markets, November 23, 1987, p. 11; Harold Hough, ‘‘Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, November 1994, pp. 505–511. 155. Washington Post, October 26, 1989, p. A-36; Boston Globe, October 30, 1989, p. 2; Newsweek, November 6, 1989, p. 52. 156. Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1997, pp. 407–410; Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 10, 1999, pp. 50–64; Jane’s International Defence Review, Extra, February 1997, p. 2. 157. It is also possible that Israel may have deployed nuclear warheads for its MGM-55C Lance missiles. Israel has 12 Lance transporter-erector-launchers, and at least 36 missiles. The Lance is a stored liquid fueled missile with inertial guidance and a range of 5–125 km. It has a warhead weight of 251 kg, and a CEP of 375 m. It was deployed in U.S. forces with the W-70 nuclear warhead. International Defense Review, July 1987, p. 857; Economist, May 4, 1968, pp. 67–68; New York Times, July 22, 1987, p. A-6; Washington Times, July 22, 1987, p. D-4; Defense and Foreign Affairs, June 1985, p. 1; Aerospace Daily, May 1, 1985, p. 5, May 17, 1985, p. 100; Aerospace Daily, May 1, 1985, May 7, 1985; Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, p. 56; CIA, ‘‘Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,’’ DCI NIO 1945/74, September 4, 1974; NBC Nightly News, July 30, 1985; New York Times, April 1, 1986; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington, GPO, 1989, p. 18; Michael A. Ottenberg, ‘‘Israel and the Atom,’’ American Sentinel, August 16, 1992, p. 1. 158. Harold Hough, ‘‘Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a First Strike?’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1997, pp. 407–410. 159. Ibid. 160. Ibid. 161. Uzi Mahnaimi and Matthew Campbell, ‘‘Israel Makes Nuclear Waves with Submarine Missile Test,’’ Sunday Times (London), June 18, 2000; Walter Pincus, ‘‘Israel Has SubBased Atomic Arms Capability,’’ Washington Post, June 15, 2002, p. A1. 162. Associated Press, October 5, 1998, 0316, October 8, 1998, 1350; Philadelphia Inquirer, November 1, 1998, p. A-7. 163. Uzi Mahnaimi, ‘‘Israeli Jets Equipped for Chemical Warfare,’’ Sunday Times (London), October 4, 1998. 164. This information is unconfirmed and is based on only one source. Israel does, however, have excellent research facilities; laboratory production of poison gas is essential to test protection devices as is the production of biological weapons to test countermeasures and antidotes.

NOTES

273

165. Philadelphia Inquirer, November 1, 1998, p. A-7; Associated Press, October 8, 1998, 1350. 166. Sunday Times (London), October 7, 1998, p. A-14. 167. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel Bolsters Reconnaissance Capabilities with Ofeq-7 Launch,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 20, 2007. 168. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Tests 1st Radar-Imagery Satellite,’’ Defense News, February 4, 2008, p. 8. 169. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel Explores Options in Face of Iran’s Nuclear Work,’’ Defense News, May 29, 2006, p. 6.

CHAPTER 8 1. The CIA estimates that the non-Jewish population is 90.3 percent Arab, 9.7 percent Kurds, Armenians, and other; and 74 percent Sunni Muslim, 16 percent other Muslim (includes Alawite, Druze), and 10 percent Christian (various denominations). The Jewish population is estimated at 20,000 (tiny communities in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and Aleppo). CIA, ‘‘Syria,’’ World Factbook, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/sy.html. 2. CIA, ‘‘Syria.’’ 3. Ze’ev Schiff, ‘‘Syria, Iran Intelligence Services Aided Hezbollah during War,’’ www.Haaretz.com, 10:47 October 3, 2006. 4. Lee Kass, ‘‘The Growing Syrian Missile Threat, Middle East Quarterly 7, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 32–33. 5. For a quick overview of beliefs and sources, see ‘‘Alawism,’’ in Wikipedia, http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alawite. 6. Riad Hahwaji, ‘‘Syria Ups Border Security Measures,’’ Defense News, August 1, 2005, p. 14. 7. Lee Kass, ‘‘Syria after Lebanon, The Growing Syrian Missile Threat,’’ Middle East Quarterly 7, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 28–29. 8. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Analysts: Syria May Broaden Proxy Wars into Golan Heights,’’ Defense News, December 1, 2003, p. 14. 9. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Iran Aides Syria’s CW Program,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 26, 2005. 10. Table on Syrian Force Structure by Force, produced from the IISS, ‘‘Syria,’’ Military Balance, 2005/2006 editions. 11. Ibid. 12. Yaaqov Katz, ‘‘Don’t Underestimate Syria’s Military,’’ Jerusalem Post, April 13, 2007. 13. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel, Syria Prepared for Conflict as Tension Rises,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 13, 2007. 14. Katz, ‘‘Don’t Underestimate Syria’s Military.’’ 15. Ron Bousso, ‘‘Syria Deploys Thousands of Rockets on Israel Border,’’Agence FrancePresse, March, 9, 2007. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Table on Syrian Force Structure by Force, produced from the IISS, ‘‘Syria,’’ Military Balance, 2005/2007 editions. 19. Ibid.

274

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20. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Syria Upgrades T-72 Tanks,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 6, 2003, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 39. 21. Elizabeth Konstantinova, ‘‘Bulgarian Arms Exports Investigated,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1, 2003, http://jir.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 40. 22. Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 2, 1999, p. 20. 23. Syria Plans Russian Arms Purchase, United Press International (UPI), February 17, 1999. 24. Ed Blanche, ‘‘Syria Discusses Buying Advanced Russian Systems,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 19, 1999, p. 17. 25. Simon Saradzhyan, ‘‘Bombing Spurs Interest in Russian Craft, Defenses,’’ Defense News, July 19, 1999, p. 11. 26. Sharon LaFraniere, ‘‘Russia, Syria Hint at Weapons Deal,’’ Washington Post, July 7, 1999, p. A6. 27. Damian Kemp, ‘‘Russia Pushes Defense Sales as Exports Hit Highest for Years,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 14, 1999, p. 17. 28. Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 2, 1999, p. 20. 29. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Country Briefing: Syria—Syria’s Dilemma,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 7, 2005, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed September 28, 2005). 30. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Russia, Syria Revive Ties with Debt Reduction, Defense News, January 31, 2005, p. 10. 31. Alex Vatanka and Richard Weitz, ‘‘Russian Roulette—Moscow Seeks Influence through Arms Exports,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1, 2007. 32. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999–2006, Congressional Research Service RL34187, Washington, September 26, 2007, p. 55. 33. Ibid., p. 66. 34. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Israel, Syria Prepared for Conflict as Tension Rises,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 13, 2007. 35. Leslie Susser, ‘‘Keeping a Finger on the Syrian Pulse,’’ Jerusalem Report, July 9, 2007. 36. Nikolai Novichov, ‘‘Syria Buys Russian Aircraft Simulators,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 7, 2007. 37. Reuben F. Johnson, ‘‘Riddle of Russia’s Reported Arms Sale to Syria/Iran,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 18, 2007. 38. Guy Anderson, ‘‘Rosoboronexport Moves to Bypass US Sanctions,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 4, 2007. 39. Tim Fish, ‘‘Russian Naval Chief Seeks Mediterranean Presence,’’ Jane’s Navy International, August 7, 2007. 40. ‘‘Israel’s Security and the Russian Navy,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Digest, August 31, 2007. 41. Hughes, ‘‘Country Briefing: Syria—Syria’s Dilemma.’’ 42. Doug Richardson, ‘‘Iskander to Enter Service in 2005,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, September 17, 2005, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed November 1, 2007). 43. ‘‘Russia Confirms Missile Deal with Iran,’’ UPI, December 6, 2005. 44. Chrisofer Foss, ‘‘Syria Receives First Strelets SAMs,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 23, 2006. 45. Hughes, ‘‘Country Briefing: Syria—Syria’s Dilemma.’’ 46. BBC News, ‘‘Israel Anger and Russian Arms Deal,’’ January 12, 2005, www.bbc.co.uk (accessed January 21, 2005). 47. Hughes, ‘‘Country Briefing: Syria—Syria’s Dilemma.’’

NOTES

275

48. The data in this section draw heavily from a number of basic source documents on the balance: IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Military Balance in the Middle East, various editions; ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, various editions. 49. Hughes, ‘‘Country Briefing: Syria—Syria’s Dilemma.’’ 50. Interviews and IISS, The Military Balance. 51. See http://www.army-technology.com/projects/bmp-3/; http://www.fas.org/man/dod101/sys/land/row/bmp-2.htm; http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/bmp-1.htm. 52. Fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/at-14.htm; http://www.army-technology.com/ projects/kornet/. 53. ArmyTechnology.com. ‘‘Kornet E Anti-Armour Missile, Russia,’’ http://www.armytechnology.com/projects/kornet/ (accessed January 15, 2008). 54. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9К115-2_Metis-M; Deagal.com; http://www.deagel.com/Anti-Armor-Weapons-and-Missiles/Metis_a001011001.aspx; ‘‘9K115 Metis and 9K115-2 Metis-M Antitank Weapon Systems,’’ http://www.wonderland. org.nz/metis.htm. 55. Based largely on the 2007 edition of the IISS, The Military Balance. 56. Various sources report significantly different technical data on these systems. 57. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/mrl-iran-specs.htm. 58. Gary C. Gambill, ‘‘Hezbollah’s Strategic Rocket Arsenal,’’ Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 4, no. 11 (November–February 2002); Yaakov Katz, ‘‘Haifa-Hit Rockets Were Syrian Made,’’ Jerusalem Post, July 15, 2006, 15:19. Updated July 16, 2006, 23:17. 59. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/mrl-iran-specs.htm. 60. ‘‘Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1, 2006. 61. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Iran Set to Obtain Pantsyr via Syria,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 23, 2007. 62. Hughes, ‘‘Country Briefing: Syria—Syria’s Dilemma.’’ 63. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/sa-18.htm. 64. ‘‘Surface-to-Air Missiles, Man-Portable Systems Still Popular,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, November 1, 1997, http://jdw.janes.com (accessed November 1, 2007). 65. Ibid. 66. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/sa-18.htm. 67. Hughes, ‘‘Iran Set to Obtain Pantsyr via Syria.’’ 68. See DEBKA Net Weekly, ‘‘Chavez Sets Up House in Damascus, Wins License to Acquire Syrian and Iranian WMD,’’ http://www.debka-net-weekly.com/read.pl?username= monkeshine&id=1800&issuenumber=321; ‘‘Israel Urges Putin to Block Air Defense System for Syria,’’ World Tribune, October 19, 2007, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/ WTARC/2007/me_israel_10_19.asp. 69. Gerrard Cowan, ‘‘Russia Defends Contracts with Syria,’’ Jane’s Defence Industry, September 24, 2007. 70. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K330_Tor; ‘‘Tor M1 9M330 Air Defense System,’’ Defense Update, http://www.defense-update.com/products/t/tor.htm. 71. Federation of American Scientists, 9K331 Tor SA-15 GAUNTLET SA-N-9 HQ-17, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/sa-15.htm. 72. See wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikoyan-Gurevich; and www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/ mig-23.html.

276

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73. See Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/su-17.htm. 74. The 2007 IISS The Military Balance does not mention any Su-27s. The following number is based on an estimate from www.globalsecurity.org. 75. The data in this section draw heavily from a number of basic source documents on the balance: IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Military Balance in the Middle East, various editions; ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, various editions. 76. See Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/v-75.htm. 77. See Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/s-125specs.htm. 78. See Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/ row/sa-6.htm; and Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ sa-6.htm. 79. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-200 and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/russia/s-200.htm. 80. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/sa-8.htm and http:// www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/sa-8.htm. 81. Defense News, June 30, 1997, p. 4. 82. Flight International, August 24, 1993, p. 12; Federation of American Scientists, http:// www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-300pmu.htm and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/s-400.htm. 83. Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-300 pmu.htm. Also see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-300. 84. See http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-400.htm. Also see http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-400_Triumf and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ russia/s-400.htm. 85. See http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-400.htm. 86. Based on interviews with British, U.S., and Israeli experts. 87. ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships, on-line edition, posted November 7, 2007; IISS, The Military Balance, 2007, p. 244. 88. Hughes, ‘‘Country Briefing: Syria—Syria’s Dilemma.’’ 89. The data in this section draw heavily from a number of basic source documents on the balance: Jane’s Fighting Ships, various editions; IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Military Balance in the Middle East, various editions; ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, various editions. 90. ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships, on-line edition, posted January 17, 2007; IISS, The Military Balance, 2007, p. 244. 91. ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships, on-line edition, posted November 7, 2007; IISS, The Military Balance, 2007, p. 244. 92. Jane’s Fighting Ships, various editions; IISS, The Military Balance, various editions. 93. ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships, on-line edition, posted January 17, 2007; IISS, The Military Balance, 2007, p. 244. 94. ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships, on-line edition, posted January 17, 2007; IISS, The Military Balance, 2007, p. 244. 95. ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships, on-line edition, posted November 7, 2007; IISS, The Military Balance, 2007, p. 244.

NOTES

277

96. Interviews, ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Sentinel; and ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships, on-line edition, posted November 7, 2007. 97. Interviews and various editions of ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Sentinel. 98. Jane’s Fighting Ships, various editions; and IISS, The Military Balance, various editions. 99. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Iran and Syria Equip Tir-Class Attack Craft with ASCMs,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 25, 2007. 100. Ibid. 101. The data in this section draw heavily from a number of basic source documents on the balance IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Military Balance in the Middle East, various editions; ‘‘Syria,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, various editions. 102. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 5B, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2005, http://www.state.gov /s/ct/rls/45392.htm. 103. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64337.htm. 104. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 5B, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., April 30, 2007. 105. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, ‘‘State Sponsors of Terror,’’ Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 6, April 28, 2006, http:// www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm. 106. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Syria,’’ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005, March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ rls/hrrpt/2005/61699.htm. 107. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, December 14, 2007. 108. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights, 2007, released March 11, 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100606.htm. 109. Hughes, ‘‘Iran Aides Syria’s CW Program.’’ 110. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, ‘‘Syria Weapons of Mass Destruction Profile,’’ May 1998, http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/ wmdme/syria.html (accessed March 2003). 111. Michael Eisenstadt, ‘‘Syria’s Strategic Weapons,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1993, pp. 168–173. 112. Dani Shoham, ‘‘Poisoned Missiles: Syria’s Doomsday Deterrent,’’ Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2002). 113. Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 19, 2002, p. 40. 114. Sid Balman, Jr., UPI, July 23, 1996; Executive News Service, July 24, 1996. 115. Far Eastern Economic Review, August 22, 1991, p. 6. 116. Eisenstadt, ‘‘Syria’s Strategic Weapons,’’ pp. 168–173. 117. Elaine Sciolino, with Eric Schmitt, ‘‘China Said to Sell Parts for Missiles,’’ New York Times, January 31, 1992, pp. A1, A2. 118. Shoham, ‘‘Poisoned Missiles: Syria’s Doomsday Deterrent.’’ 119. Steven Rodan and Andrew Koch, ‘‘Syria Preparing to Build Extended-Range ‘Scud,’ ’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 19, 2002, p. 40. 120. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, posted June 28, 2001. 121. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, ‘‘North Korean Missile Exports and Technical Assistance to Syria,’’ http://www.nti.org/db/ profiles/dprk/msl/ie/NKM_EesyriGO.html (accessed March 2003).

278

NOTES

122. Excerpted from ‘‘Syria Profile’’ and related chronologies on the Web site of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Syria/index.html. 123. Ibid. 124. Numbers of aircraft are from various editions of IISS, The Military Balance. 125. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, posted June 28, 2001. 126. Implications of Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxin Weapons for US Security Interests, SNIE 11-17-83, Central Intelligence Agency, September 15, 1983, p. 11, http:// www.foia.cia.gov/. 127. Excerpted from ‘‘Syria Profile’’ and related chronologies on the Web site of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. 128. Ibid. 129. Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, ‘‘Syrian Gas Practice,’’ Washington Times, November 26, 1999, p. A10. 130. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1 through June 30, 2002,’’ Washington, DC, 2003, http:// www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/721report_jan-june2002.pdf; Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,’’ Washington, DC, 2003, p. 6, http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/jan_jun2003.pdf; Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 July through 31 December 2003,’’ Washington, DC, 2004, p. 6, http:// www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/721report_july_dec2003.pdf; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January–31 December 2004,’’ Washington, DC, 2006, p. 5, http://www.dni.gov /reports/2004_unclass_report_to_NIC_DO_16Nov04.pdf. 131. ‘‘Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisors to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Duelfer Report),’’ March 2005, http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_ wmd_2004/addenda.pdf. 132. See statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, on Intelligence Issues, March 7, 1991, pp. 56–59; and Robert Gates, Director of Central Intelligence, Prepared Testimony, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, January 15 and 22, 1992. 133. Threat Control through Arms Control: Annual Report to Congress 1996 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1997); Threat Control Through Arms Control: Annual Report to Congress 1997 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1998). 134. Central Intelligence Agency, ’’Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2001; Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, ‘‘Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2002,’’ Washington, DC, 2003, http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/721report_jan-june2002.pdf; Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional

NOTES

279

Munitions 1 July Through 31 December 2003,’’ Washington, DC, 2004, p. 6, http:// www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/721report_july_dec2003.pdf. 135. ‘‘Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisors to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Duelfer Report).’’ 136. Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 28, 2006, p. 10, http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/statement24.pdf. 137. Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 3, 1997, p. 3. 138. Excerpted from ‘‘Syria Profile’’ and related chronologies on the Web site of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. 139. Based on data excerpted from ‘‘Syria Profile’’ and related chronologies on the Web site of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. 140. Excerpted from ‘‘Syria Profile’’ and related chronologies on the Web site of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. 141. Ibid. 142. Michael Eisenstadt, ‘‘Syria’s Strategic Weapons,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1993, pp. 168–173, in Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, ‘‘Country Overviews: Syria (Nuclear),’’ http://www.nti.org (accessed March 2003). 143. Central Intelligence Agency, ’’Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2001.’’ 144. ‘‘Russian Nuclear Assistance to Syria: Scam or Scandal?,’’ Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 5, no. 1 (January 2003). 145. Hughes, ‘‘Iran Aides Syria’s CW Program.’’ 146. Ibid. 147. Ibid. 148. For a detailed chronology of Syria’s efforts, see the ‘‘Syria Profile’’ and related chronologies on the Web site of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. 149. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Alleged IAF Incident over Syria Heightens Tensions,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 10, 2007. 150. See the work of David Albright in Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), http://www.isis-online.org/publications/SuspectSiteUpdate26October2007.pdf. 151. David Albright and Paul Brannan, ‘‘Suspect Reactor Construction Site in Eastern Syria; The Site of the September 6, 2007 Raid?’’ Institute for Science and International Security, October 23, 2007, http://www.isis-online.org/. 152. Adapted by the author from a working transcript of ‘‘Background Briefing with Senior U.S. Officials on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea’s Involvement,’’ April 24, 2008. 153. David E. Snager, ‘‘Bush Administration Releases Images to Bolster Its Claims About Syrian Reactor,’’ New York Times, April 25, 2008, p. 6. 154. Robin Wright and Joby Warwick, ‘‘Purchases Linked North Korea to Syria,’’ Washington Post, May 10, 2008, p. A18. 155. Joby Warwick, ‘‘Experience with Syria Exemplifies Challenge That Detection Presents,’’ Washington Post, May 12, 2008, p. A16.

280

NOTES

156. See Lee Kass, ‘‘Syria after Lebanon: The Growing Syrian Missile Threat,’’ Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2005), http://www.meforum.org/article/755. 157. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/ss-26.htm.

CHAPTER 9 1. There is a wide range of estimates. These figures are taken from Wikipedia, http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golan_Heights. 2. These numbers are nominal; the details differ from source to source. The probable spread is taken from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_Hermon. 3. These figures and data are taken from the Jewish Virtual Library, http:// www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/golan1.html. 4. The CIA estimates that about 40,000 people live in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights —20,000 Arabs (18,000 Druze and 2,000 Alawites) and about 20,000 Israeli settlers (July 2007 est.) CIA, ‘‘Syria,’’ World Factbook, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html. 5. These figures and data are taken from the Jewish Virtual Library. 6. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golan_Heights. Also see BBC, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/3393813.stm. 7. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golan_Heights. 8. CIA, Atlas of the Middle East (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), pp. 52–53, 62–63. 9. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golan_Heights. 10. David Eshel, ‘‘Is War Between Israel and Syria Inevitable?,’’ Defense Update, file:/// Users/acordesm/Desktop/Golan-Eshel%20on%20War%202007.webarchive (accessed December 19, 2007). 11. ‘‘Israel Launches Golan War Games to Learn Lebanon War Lessons,’’ Ya Libnan, February 22, 2007, 2:32 A.M. 12. For example, see ‘‘ ‘Israel’ Army Stages Golan War Games,’’ Iran Defense, May 5, 2007, http://www.irandefence.net/showthread.php?t=17802. 13. ‘‘Israel Army Stages Golan War Games,’’ Agence France–Presse, July 4, 2007. 14. Eshel, ‘‘Is War Between Israel and Syria Inevitable?’’ 15. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel’s Largest Drill Prompts Regional Jitters,’’ Defense News, April 14, 2008, pp. 1, 8. 16. For example, see Martin van Creveld, ‘‘War Clouds Gather Over Golan,’’ Jewish Daily Forward, March 9, 2007; Smadr Peri, ‘‘Syria Plans War of Attrition in the Golan Heights,’’ Y Net News, August 2, 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3432836,00.html; and Aaron Klein, ‘‘Mideast War This Summer,’’ World Net Daily, July 8, 2007, http:// www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=56567. Also see British newspapers as well. See Harry de Quetteville, ‘‘Syria Threat over Golan puts Israel on War Alert,’’ Daily Telegraph (London), September 30, 2007. 17. Isabel Kershner, ‘‘Israel and Syria Hint at Progress on Golan Heights Deal,’’ New York Times, April 24, 2008 ,p. 12. 18. UNSCR 350, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/289/69/ IMG/NR028969.pdf?OpenElement. 19. ‘‘Current Peacekeeping Operations, Syrian Golan Heights, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,’’ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/ dpko/missions/undof/facts.html (accessed December 22, 2007).

NOTES

281

20. Ibid. 21. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Disengagement_ Observer_Force_Zone; Task Force Golan, http://www.peacekeeper.ca/golan4.html. 22. IDF studies indicate that Israel is considering restoring a southern IDF Headquarters to guard against a possible southern offensive from Egypt if future regime change in Cairo should lead to a more hostile Egyptian regime. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘IDF Unveils Five-Year Plan to Boost Capabilities,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 7, 2007. 23. Washington Institute, Supporting Peace (Washington, DC: Washington Institute, 1994), pp. 9–12, 79–82; Aryeh Shalev, Israel and Syria, Peace and Security on the Golan (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994). 24. Seth Carus and Hirsch Goodman, The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (London, Transaction Press, 1990), p. 83. 25. Washington Institute, Supporting Peace, p. 83; interviews in 2005. 26. UPI, August 3, 1993. 27. ‘‘The IDF’s Security Principles,’’ Office of the IDF Spokesman, April 1995; and Scotty Fisher, ‘‘Country Briefing Israel,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly, February 18, 1995, pp. 29–38. 28. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Syria Preps for Possible War by Year’s End,’’ Defense News, July 23, 2007. 29. Kenneth S. Brower, ‘‘The Middle East Military Balance: Israel versus the Rest,’’ International Defense Review, July 1986, pp. 910–911.

CHAPTER 10 1. Syria has so far been unable to live down its role in the assassination even though the UN is unlikely to take serious action. Four senior Lebanese officers with close ties to Syria have been publicly implicated. Syria’s Minister of Interior, Ghazi Kanaan, committed ‘‘suicide’’ because of his involvement. Bashar al-Asad has been personally implicated, along with his brother Maher al-Asad (commander of the key security brigade stationed near Damascus) and General Asaf Shawkat, head of Syrian military intelligence. For a good summary of events, see ‘‘Syria Under Siege, Bashar’s Greatest Test,’’ International Institute for Strategic Studies, online strategic notes, Vol. 11, no. 9, November 2005. 2. The author held extensive talks with senior Syrian officials and analysts during a visit to Syria in 2007. 3. For an analysis of Syria’s economic profits from its past position in Lebanon, see Gary C. Gambill, ‘‘Syria after Lebanon: Hooked on Lebanon,’’ Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2005), http://www.meforum.org/article/769. 4. Michael Slackman, ‘‘As Syria’s Influence in Lebanon Wanes, Iran Moves In,’’ New York Times, March 13, 2006. 5. See Lee Kass, ‘‘Syria after Lebanon: The Growing Syrian Missile Threat,’’ Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2005), http://www.meforum.org/article/755. 6. ‘‘The Syrian Reshuffle: Consolidating the Hardline,’’ The Estimate (February 27, 2006): 9–10. 7. United Nations Statistics Division, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_years_on_ top.asp?srID=13660&Ct1ID=&crID=760&yrID=1950%2C1960%2C1970%2C1980% 2C1990%2C2000%2C2007%2C2010%2C2020%2C2030%2C2040%2C2050 (accessed December 23, 2007); and CIA, ‘‘Syria,’’ World Factbook, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html.

282

NOTES

Population total (UN Population Division’s annual estimates and projections) [code 13660] Country or Area

Population Projections Variants

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Syrian Estimates 3,536,100 4,620,766 6,371,000 8,971,343 12,720,920 16,510,861 Arab (on the Republic past) Syrian Medium Arab variant Republic projection Syrian High Arab variant Republic projection Syrian Low Arab variant Republic projection Syrian Constant Arab fertility Republic scenario Population ProCountry jections or Area Variants

2007

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Syrian Arab Republic

Estimates (on the past)


Medium 19,928,518 21,428,048 25,573,330 29,294,494 32,403,096 34,886,565 variant projection


High variant projection

19,987,404 21,642,897 26,689,926 31,542,548 36,256,557 40,936,482


Low variant projection

19,869,632 21,213,199 24,456,730 27,063,629 28,737,542 29,444,736


Con20,013,022 21,746,675 27,486,225 34,108,350 41,919,214 51,103,331 stant fertility scenario

NOTES

283

8. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Hizbollah Girds for Round 2 With Israel,’’ Defense News, July 30, 2007. 9. ‘‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006),’’ United National Security Council, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N07/572/70/PDF/N0757270.pdf?OpenElement (accessed November 15, 2007). 10. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Tier Pressure,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 18, 2007. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. ‘‘Hizbullah’s Intelligence Apparatus,’’ Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, August 11, 2006. 14. Alon Ben-David, ‘‘Hizbullah Counters IDF Maneuvers with Major Exercise,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 21, 2007. 15. Staff and AP, ‘‘Hezbollah: Maneuvers Held near Border in ‘Response to Enemy’’ Haaretz (Tel Aviv), November 5, 2007; and Staff, ‘‘Hizbullah Undertakes Massive Exercise,’’ Jerusalem Post, November 5, 2007. 16. See Bassel F. Salloukh, ‘‘The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Post-War Lebanon,’’ The Canadian Journal of Political Science 39, no. 3 (September 2006). 17. Fady Noun, ‘‘A` la loterie de la pre´sidentielle, c’e´tait hier la journeé Michel Sleimane,’’ L’Orient-Le Jour (Beirut), November 29, 2007, http://www.lorientlejour.com/page.aspx?page=article&id=358773. 18. Alfred B. Prados, ‘‘Lebanon,’’ CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 11, 2007, p. 28. 19. Ibid., p. 30 20. Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2008, http:// www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/, revised May 2, 2007, p. 501. 21. Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2009, http:// www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/, revised February 29, 2008, p. 520. 22. Riad Kalwaji, ‘‘Special Operations Command, More Military Aid for Beirut,’’ Defense News, January 21, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3308844&C=mideast (accessed January 22, 2008). 23. ‘‘DOD to Equip Lebanon’s Special Forces with Small Arms, Vehicles,’’ Inside the Pentagon, April 10, 2008, p. 1. 24. Kalwaji, ‘‘Special Operations Command, More Military Aid for Beirut.’’ 25. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Lebanon Continues to Push to Arm Military,’’ Defense News, April 21, 2008, p. 12. 26. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Lebanon May Get Old U.S. Trainers,’’ Defense News, November 12, 2007, p. 26. 27. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Lebanon Seeks Hardware, Will Train Jet Pilots in UAE,’’ Defense News, December 3, 2007, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3217442&C=europe (accessed December 5, 2007). 28. Kahwaji, ‘‘Lebanon May Get Old U.S. Trainers.’’ 29. Kahwaji, ‘‘Lebanon Continues to Push to Arm Military.’’ 30. International Crisis Group, ‘‘Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis,’’ Middle East Report, no. 69, October 10, 2007, p. 7. 31. Ibid., p. 2. 32. Ibid., p. 13.

284

NOTES

33. ‘‘Mughniyah Hit Threatens War,’’ Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, February 16, 2008. 34. ‘‘Five Killed in Beirut Gun Battles,’’ BBC News Online, May 8, 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7390943.stm (accessed May 8, 2008). 35. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Iran and Syria Advance SIGINT Cooperation,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 19, 2006. 36. Ibid. 37. Agence France-Presse, ‘‘Iran, Syria Sign Defense Agreement,’’ June 15, 2006. 38. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Syria Preps for Possible War by Year’s End,’’ Defense News, July 23, 2007. 39. Con Coughlin, ‘‘Iran to Set Up Missile Defence Shield in Syria; Fears Military Action over Nuke Program,’’ Daily Telegraph (London), June 25, 2007. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. ‘‘Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,’’ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, December 3, 2007, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf. 43. T. Orszaq-Land, ‘‘Iran Threatens to Abandon the NPT,’’ Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, October 1, 2004. 44. Abraham Rabinovich, ‘‘Iran Boasts Dimona Now ‘within Range,’ ’’ Washington Times, August 24, 2004. 45. Kenneth R. Timmerman, ‘‘The Crisis Has Begun,’’ Washington Times, January 7, 2006. 46. Shlomo Brom, ‘‘Is the Begin Doctrine Still a Viable Option for Israel?’’ in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., Getting Ready for A Nuclear Iran (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005). 47. For further discussion, see Michael Knights, ‘‘Iran’s Conventional Forces Remain Key to Deterring Potential Threats,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1, 2006; Paul Rogers, ‘‘Iran: Consequences of a War,’’ Oxford Research Group, Briefing Paper, February 2006, www.oxfordresearchgroup.uk. 48. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/popeye-t.htm. 49. Ibid. 50. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/blu-109-specs.htm. 51. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/jdam.htm. 52. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/blu-116.htm. 53. Jim VandeHei, ‘‘Cheney Warns of Iran as a Nuclear Threat,’’ Washington Post, January 21, 2005, p. A02. 54. Ewen MacAskill and Simon Tisdall, ‘‘Iran’s Message to the West: Back Off or We Retaliate,’’ The Guardian, February 2, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/ 0,,1700266,00.html. 55. Tom Carter, ‘‘Tehran Nukes a Global Threat, Israeli Wars,’’ Washington Times, December 7, 2004. 56. Peter Brookes, ‘‘Iran: Our Military Options,’’ New York Post, January 23, 2006. 57. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/popeye-t.htm.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is an analyst and commentator for ABC News. He has written extensively on energy and Middle Eastern politics, economics, demographics, and security. He has served in a number of senior positions in the U.S. government, including the Department of Energy, and several assignments in the Middle East. ARAM NERGUIZIAN is a research assistant at the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, where he conducts research activities on projects concerning the Middle East. His research focuses on security politics in the Levant and specialized themes, such as the Lebanese Armed Forces’ efforts to recapitalize its forces, Lebanese civilmilitary relations in the post-Syria era, and Lebanon’s precarious geostrategic position with regard to Israel and Syria. Nerguizian holds an M.A. in International Affairs from George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. IONUT C. POPESCU is a doctoral student in political science at Duke University, where he studies U.S. defense policy, strategic theory, and American grand strategy. He worked for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) first as an intern with the International Security Program in 2005 and then for the Burke Chair in Strategy in 2007. In 2006, he worked at the United Nation’s Department of Political Affairs with the Policy Planning Unit. His most recent publication is The Changing Challenges of U.S. Defense Spending, co-authored with Anthony H. Cordesman (Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2007). Popescu earned a B.A. in Diplomacy and World Affairs from Occidental College.

Recent Titles by Anthony H. Cordesman

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