Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 21-2 (Winter 1993-94)

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Interpretation A A JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Winter 1993-1994

Volume 21

Thomas Lewis

Identifying

Number 2

Rhetoric in the Apology: Does

Socrates Use the Appeal for Pity? in Plato's Cave

Joel Warren Lidz

Reflections

Bernard Jacob

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes

Mary

L. Bellhouse

on and

Rousseau Under Surveillance: Thoughts New Edition

and

Translation

of

on a

Rousseau,

Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues Socialism

Peter Augustine Lawler

Tocqueville

Maurice Auerbach

Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political:

on

and

Theology, Decisionism, of the

History

and

the Concept

Enemy

Discussion

Victor Gourevich

The End

of

History?

Book Reviews

Will

Morrisey

Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus,

by

Charles L. Griswold, Jr. Leslie G. Rubin

Citizens

and

Statesmen: A

Aristotle's Politics, John S. Waggoner

Study of by Mary P. Nichols

The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical Introduction, by Daniel J.

Mahoney

Interpretation Editor-in-Chief

Executive Editor General Editors

Consulting

Editors

European Editors Editors

Hilail Gildin, Dept.

Leonard

of

Philosophy, Queens College

Grey

Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974)

Christopher Bruell Joseph Cropsey Ernest L. Fortin John Hallowell (d. 1992) Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W. Thompson Terence E. Marshall

Heinrich Meier

Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Fred Baumann Michael Blaustein Patrick Coby Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Joseph E. Goldberg Stephen Harvey Pamela K. Jensen Ken Masugi Grant B. Mindle James W. Morris Will Morrisey Aryeh L. Motzkin Charles T. Rubin Leslie G. Rubin Bradford P. Wilson Hossein Ziai Michael Zuckert Catherine Zuckert -

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Interpretation Winter 1993-1994

Thomas Lewis

A Volume 21 A

Identifying

Number 2

Rhetoric in the Apology: Does

Socrates Use the Appeal for Pity? Joel Warren Lidz

Reflections

Bernard Jacob


Mary

L. Bellhouse

on and

105

in Plato's Cave

115 135

Rousseau Under Surveillance: Thoughts New Edition

and

Translation

of

on a

Rousseau,

Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues

169

Peter Augustine Lawler

Tocqueville

Maurice Auerbach

Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political:

on

Socialism

and

Theology, Decisionism, of

the

181

History

and

the Concept

201

Enemy

Discussion Victor Gourevich

The End

of

215

History?

Book Reviews

Will

Morrisey

Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus,

by

Charles L. Griswold, Jr. Leslie G. Rubin

Citizens

and

Statesmen: A

Aristotle's Politics,

John S. Waggoner

233

Study of by Mary P. Nichols

245

The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical Introduction, by Daniel

J.

Mahoney

Copyright 1994

interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

253

Rhetoric in the Apology:

Identifying

Does Socrates Use the Appeal For Pity? Thomas Lewis McMaster

Many and

University

compared

Gorgias'

with

similar ]

Palamedes. Two

The first treats the

Socrates'

devices in

rhetorical

defense

main

lines

of

rhetoric of

hidden in the defense Socrates'

rhetoric

not appear

fit

to

interpretation

claim

and

attack on

as

the

eschews

house

and

example,

they

as a rhetorical

Although Allen

parody.

of

to gain

the defense speech,

an acquittal and

sufficiently transparent to

They also Apology and

rejects.

in the

be

an

emphasize Socrates'

that

and

they

his

use

ironic parody

the similarities

denunciation

of

3

defense

as a sincere and truthful account of

role of rhetoric as

claim either

sincere and

quality

use of rhetoric

devices is

discount the

Smith

as a parody of disreputable rhetoric rhetoric in Plato has in mind

rhetorical

who understand

rates'

in the defense

rhetoric

Gorgias'

attack on rhetoric

largely

Socrates'

Apology

Socrates'

his life

embedded

to truth-telling.

claims that

highly

the

in the Gorgias.

Those

deeply

this

still well

the pandering rhetoric that permeated the courts and

the disreputable pleading that he

rhetoric

is

the interpretation of rhetoric as parody or the

Seeskin interpret

Seeskin

of standard rhetorical

between this

strategy that

offer as an example of

the specific target for an ironic

emphasize

Socrates

paper explores

truth-telling do

and of sincere

foundation for the parody interpretation. Re Kenneth Seeskin have extended and refined Burnet's

and

whereas

the Palamedes

parody

his life. This

Socrates'

appeal

Allen interprets the

assembly.

of the

work provides a

Plato's

in general, Seeskin

the

of rhetoric as subordinate

Both Allen

speech as

ironic parody

for pity and his very successful attempt to in the peroration of his defense speech. This rhetoric does

cently R. E. Allen analysis.2

of

embedded rhetorical

I

speech.

within either

John Burnet's

the

deeply

a

use of

conceal this appeal

of

interpretations

that the

possibility take into account

an

and

work.

the day. The second rejects the parody inter

attempt to provide a sincere and truthful account of

not

for

Antidosis from this

emerge

the rhetorical elements as a subordinate part of

pretation and portrays

the

Isocrates'

interpretation

rhetorical elements as a vehicle

disreputable forensic

have been identified

speech

devices in

rhetorical

parody

straightforward

parody

or as persuasion. Brick-

or persuasion would

presentation of

be

his way

at odds with

of

life.4

Soc

Thus, for

the possibility that Socrates is using the story of the Oracle device. "Were he then to be intentionally misleading about such

reject

interpretation,

Winter 1993-94, Vol. 21, No. 2

Interpretation

106

point, he

a substantive

he

which

ironical

would

the

condemns

parodying tone

and

be guilty

C.D.C. Reeve

in the Apology. Reeve

of some rhetorical elements means that

persuade, but Reeve insists that the truth-telling.6

to

Thus,

the very sort of dishonest

of

prosecution."5

Socrates does

gives

Smith, he

elements than Brickhouse and

is

to

to the rhetorical

discounts the

also

presence

much subordinate

weight

more

no overall

that the

make some attempt

persuasive element

Reeve

although

is

agrees there

recognizes

for

rhetoric

of

significance

rhetoric.

Both the nate to

ironic parody

view of rhetoric as

set aside

truth-telling

identified in the Apology may be reluctance

Rossetti ception, spade a

claims a

of a much more

there

is

If Rossetti is correct, we may that prevents us from treating may

if

rhetoric.

despite

we realize

Skillful

progress

rhetoric

in

embedded

that

it is due

Socrates'

Perhaps

to "a

has

ask what

With the

difficulty

of

some of

what we are

singles out one

for

rhetoric

claims

utable methods of

concealed

the rhetorical

may from its audience. Thus, elements in the Apology,

be

concealed

in

mind

I turn to

in the Apology. I focus and

that he

appeal

will

from

so well

view.

hidden

that he

identifying

on

and

the peroration

not, stoop to the

in the

rhetoric so common

particularly disreputable

an answer

not appear as

at.8

looking

that he has not,

forensic

I believe

because it has been

rhetoric

recognizing

Socrates'

explicating where Socrates

a

created and sustained an attitude

rhetoric as rhetoric.

may be skillfully

some of

of precon

from calling

us

masterful use of rhetoric

this spade a spade

that we do not recognize

kind

rhetoric."7

rhetorical structure still could

we cannot call

a

rhetoric as

that the

identifying

much of a powerful

Is there

devices may be only rhetorical structure? Livio

Socrates'

emerge

far

rhetoric

attitude, [that prevents]

ungrounded

from treating

and

deeply

such a reluctance and

traditional but

spade,

view of rhetoric subordi rhetorical elements so

part of an overall rhetorical strategy.

to open up the possibility that these

indicators

surface

the

and

the possibility that the

disrep

courts of

Athens. He

will not use

the appeal

pity.

THE PLEA FOR PITY IN THE PERORATION

Most at

face

scholars

value.

have

They

Socrates'

accepted

agree

that

by

refusal not

hauling

his

to appeal for pity pretty

family

tes eschews the appeal for pity, even though

he

he

says:

even

or

from

"To

quote

of

Homer,

I

(34d). Socrates does

sion, and

that his

he

failure to

offers a

just

employed

much

Socra

it, for

as

sprung from an oak the appeal for pity. He

omit

for pity is the result of an reasons for his decision. He

appeal

number of

not

have

court

am not

rock"

a

emphasizes

explicit

deci

claims

he is

tarnishing his reputation with such disgraceful behavior. Even important, he insists it would be impious for him to plead in a way which

concerned with more

the very words

could

before the

Rhetoric in

Identifying induce the jurors to

would

over, he

adds

render other

than

that such impious pleading

stantiating the very charge of Some scholars argue that

impiety

than just eschew

for

appeal

and

lawful

sense of

They

propriety leads him to

suggest that

More

verdict.

be self-incriminating that has brought him to court.

pity.

107

Apology

would

Socrates'

an

just

a

the

by

sub

further

go

emphasizing his

by

Socrates is urging the jurors to overcome any temptation they may have to be moved by pity. Feaver and Hare (p. 212) claim that Socrates emphasizes his rejection of the appeal for pity to attempt to make the jurors discount any emotional factor that would improperly influence their decision. I offer a very different view of disavowal of the appeal for pity a view consistent with choice of words from Homer. By the reminding jurors that he is "not sprung from an oak or a (Odyssey, XIX, 163), refusal to appeal

Socrates'

Socrates'

rock"

Socrates is reminding them that, like Odysseus, he too has relatives. But this is more than a general association with the powerful and wily Odys

reminder

"Not sprung from an oak or a Odysseus, still disguised as a beggar, to

rock"

seus.

deception rate

that

lies to

he is,

identify

day,

next

words as she presses

himself. Odysseus,

Penelope's interrogation

responds to

up his disguise. The

keep

Penelope's

are

master of

with ever more elabo

by

still not recognized

the

suitors, Odysseus takes them by surprise and kills them all. Part of this phrase is also spoken in the Iliad by Hector just before he is

killed

Achilles. It is unlikely that Socrates is alluding to Hector (Iliad, XXII, 126), however. Hector, speaking to himself, is lamenting that Achilles is deaf to any appeal Hector might make to him. Hector concludes that neither

by

promises,

nor

Achilles if he

jurors

would

though

even

Odysseus is

nor

respect,

listen,

they apt.9

more

dissuade Achilles. Hector Socrates

whereas

listen. The

would

The

connected to their

mately

can

pity

prowess of

mastery

he

claims

comparison

both Socrates

of speech.

would appeal

to

to the

will not appeal

between Socrates

and

Odysseus is inti

and

Accordingly, I

the possi

explore

for pity Socrates is engaging in bility by Odysseus-like deception. That is, he is disguising his appeal for pity so well that he can use the appeal and he can also claim credit for not using the appeal. emphatically eschewing the appeal

that

Socrates'

To

elucidate

peroration of of

the

day,

and

appreciation

of

Palamedes the

futation

force

peroration of a

and often

Defendants

considers

rhetorical

more subtle rhetorical

The

for pity I examine Palamedes. The Palamedes is force

beg

nism towards

the

defense

an appeal

the

words

appeal

of

the

the rhetoric

for

helps to

pity.

An

reveal

the

words.

buttressed the

refutation

with

distraught friends

compassion.

for the

rejects

Palamedes'

speech summarized

jurors'

that failure to

but then

of

in light

an example of

Socrates'

of

often paraded their

to appeal to the

find

peroration

the appeal

Gorgias'

jurors'

"Direct

the

main points of

for

pity.

before the

court

an explicit appeal and relatives

requests

for pity

the re

were so common

compassion was regarded as a sign of antago

popular courts and

their

methods."10

Thus

for pity in the Palamedes. Indeed, Palamedes

we

may

expect

to

acknowledges that

108

Interpretation

he is

expected to conclude with an appeal

in the

peroration of

the

for

There is

pity.

Palamedes, however; instead,

for pity

no appeal

Palamedes has

a good

deal to say about his refusal to appeal for pity. Palamedes begins his peroration by summing up many aspects of his good character, and then, concerned not to appear boastful, he remarks: "It is not for me to praise myself, however, having been accused of these things, the present (32)." Although he occasion forces me to mount a defense in every way I can"

he

claims

for

defense in any way he can, Pal it is not necessary to appeal necessary

be justified in mounting

would

amedes explains some things are not

a

pity:

Appeals to pity, entreaties, the supplications of friends are helpful when the trial takes place before a crowd; but when it is before you, first among the Greeks and men of good repute, nor

it is

nor pity.

entreaties,

not proper

Rather, it is

appealing to the clearest principles entangling in deception. (33)

Palamedes

by

to persuade you proper

of

for

using the

help

of

me to escape this charge

justice, putting forth

the truth, and

friends,

by not

for pity may be proper when appealing to ordi do not understand the clear principles of justice,

claims an appeal

nary people (a crowd), who Under the but it has no place when addressing the "first among the guise of explaining his departure from the standard plea for pity, Palamedes takes the opportunity to flatter his audience. He also continues to praise him Greeks."

self, by indirectly alluding to himself as the kind of person who, even in these and desperate circumstances, is prepared to let the outcome rest on "the "the principles of He attempts to counter the possibility of appearing truth"

justice."

too boastful

him to

by

suggesting that it is the

adhere to

the

principled

Socrates begins his

way

peroration

by

and

virtue of

his fellow Greeks that

forego the

appeal

for

allows

pity.

acknowledging that the jurors may

expect

him to

appeal for pity with a flood of tears and a tearful parade of relatives and friends. Like Palamedes, he says he refuses. Also like Palamedes Socrates does not simply omit the appeal for pity. He too emphasizes that he refuses to appeal for pity, and then he uses his refusal as a talking point to explain the impropri

ety

of such appeals and entreaties

higher

(34bc).12

He

points out

defendant tells

that the jurors and he

jury the facts and jurors determine where justice lies and "return a just and lawful (35c). For after all, he claims that like them, he too is an Athenian, and anything less is beneath Athenians. By eschewing an appeal for pity, he presents himself as exist on a

moral

plane,

where a

the

verdict"

someone who would never presses

his

stoop to such discreditable pleading, and he ex in Athenian jurors to abide by their oaths and dispense justice. Like Palamedes, Socrates presents himself as a man of

confidence

evenhanded

he flatters the jurors that they too are Athenians On these points the perorations of the and

principle and principles. are

very

similar.

Apology

of

the

the

highest

Palamedes

Identifying

Rhetoric in

the

109

Apology

There are two rhetorical refinements in peroration, however. The Socrates' first is consideration of the possible impact of his refusal to appeal for pity. He says he understands that some of the jurors may be annoyed and angry Socrates'

at

his refusal, especially if they remember how they begged for pity less serious charge (34bc).

when

faced

with a much

It may be that

one of

on these facts, will be prejudiced against me, his reflections, will give his vote in anger. If one of you is so disposed I do not expect it, but there is the possibility I think that I should be quite justified in saying to him, My dear sir, of course I have some relatives. To and

you, reflecting

being irritated by

very words of Homer, even f am not sprung "from an oak or from but from human parents, and consequently I have relatives yes, and

quote the

a

rock,"

sons

too, gentlemen, three of them, one of them almost grown up and the other two but all the same I am not going to produce them here and beseech only children you to acquit me.

(34d)

What is the cause of this anticipated irritation and anger? If it is beneath Socrates to appeal for their pity, and y^t the jurors know they have appealed for pity, or they know that they would appeal for pity if hauled into court, then Socrates risks implying that they are beneath him. He may seem to be dis

tancing himself from Notice he

lack He

of

his

claims

respect, indeed

will provoke an

by

them

refusal

is

worse

angry

stressing his commitment to the honorable way. not due to lack of respect, but it may sound like still, it may

reaction

if his

like

sound

(34e).

scorn or contempt

to appeal for pity is

refusal

interpreted

as contemptuous arrogance. Socrates'

choice of words an

angry

"one"

of

He

reaction.

is

calculated

exempts most of the

them who may be provoked to

to diffuse

jurors from any

vote against

than to exacerbate

rather

him,

criticism.

and even

It is only

this he does

possibility."

really expect, "but there is the them are like him; they would not stoop to

Socrates implies that

not

implies that

those few among

even

men of enough character

court.

They

who abides

by

not say.

the

honorable

rhetorical

not say:

the

principled way.

else

Moreover, he

among them (the

chooses claim

his

to the

words

that

ambiguous

principled way.

they have

themselves.

also

They

are men

words consider what

that what

whereas you always

they

"one")

he does

tone, he does not he does is foreign to them.

strikes a principled

are much

whom

take the

low"

(even

like him in their devotion to

encourages each of

to dissipate any

He

towards someone

Socrates'

by insisting

allows

and resentful

of

"I take the high road,

if they do). Instead, he

pleading.

behavior.11

Although, like Palamedes, he

distance himself from them

He does

force

disreputable

may have begged for pity, are man should do when brought into

be angry

their principles better than

appreciate

such who

to recognize what a

are not men who would

who recognize and respect

To

them,

most of

they

them to think of someone

feel

superior

to. He

he may

provoke

by

can all

anger or resentment

his

1 10

Interpretation

*

The

Socrates'

use of the appeal for pity after claiming for eschewing the appeal for pity. Socrates makes his appeal by introduc his family in speech rather than in the flesh. He says he mentions his family second refinement

is

credit

ing

only to

emphasize

his

refusal

to

is

them to plead for pity. There

use

another

here, however. Although he does not physically display his family in he does display them in speech. He has three sons; two are only chil court, dren. Rather than literally bring them to court, Socrates invokes the images of element

his

and

for pity

alluding to his

by

family

may

be

indirectly

this appeal.

even

for

may have been swayed by an appeal for pity, (as Socrates explains) be irritated when it is not made. However, audience

the Palamedes as an example of

we accept

appeal

so

make

Palamedes'

of

balance Palamedes

clude that on

to

makes an appeal

subtly that he can also claim credit for not using them to

Some if

He

children.

and

pity.

He

by

rhetoric,

to strengthen his case

the disadvantage

must expect

than offset

more

expects

Gorgias'

of

the propensity to think

we must con

by forgoing

an

for pity him for refusing this what may. Socrates fol

forgoing

an appeal

well of

ploy and appearing to embrace truth and justice come lows this reasoning and improves upon it. He anticipates the possible annoy ance he may cause by not making the appeal for pity. Then he chooses his words

to allow each juror to attribute this irritation to someone else

encourage each of

kind?"

the peroration. He asks:

(34d). To

answer

(34e). He

of

pleading

on

such methods

he

reputation

urges the

the appeal for pity as an

jurors to "make it

clear

city is far more likely to be (35b). Then he sets aside the ques

to attempt

the very charge

of

peroration

quiet"

toward the crux of the would

issue. He

claims

that to

induce them to break their

pleading lawful verdict (35c). Moreover, he claims that to induce them to break their oaths he would be guilty of just

impiety is

that anyone who stages these

ridicule upon our

methods of

solemn oaths to return a

If the

uses

for pity to structure the intend to do anything of

disreputable pleading which he claims to have appeal for pity and other disreputable methods

if he kept perfectly

disgraceful

were

not

brings

of appearances and moves

if he

"Why

do I

finds them personally disgraceful and that discredit the reputation of the whole city. To protect the city's

condemned than

use such

the appeal

the grounds that he

pathetic scenes and so

tion

the

rejects

of

this question he

example of all the methods of eschewed

to

well of a man who

for pity by introducing Socrates uses his apparent disavowal

this

and

encourages

claimed maximum credit

appeal

remainder of

ill-spirited irritation. He

lives up to the best of Athenian standards. for not appealing for pity, he makes the his family in speech rather than in person.

them to think

Then, having

them to rise above an

and

with which

he has been

charged

(35d).

Socrates handles identifying for pity, Socrates seems to be reminding the jurors that he has done what he said he would do. He seems to substantiate the claim he made in the exordium that he would speak the truth in his usual simple and straightforward fashion (17c). words sound very different if his use of rhetorical the

read without

appeal

Socrates'

the subtle way

Rhetoric in

Identifying technique is understood

his

rhetoric

is

his defense

he has just

when

made

Apology

I have suggested, however. From this

as

so much more subtle than the rhetoric of

can conclude

the

by

credit

claiming

for

not

-111

perspective

Palamedes that Socrates for pity

an appeal

making

this very appeal.

THE PRESUMPTION THAT RHETORIC CAN BE RECOGNIZED

I have

identify Most

the rhetorical techniques in the Palamedes to

used some of

but

the similar

have

readers

more refined use of these techniques

partly because identified.

difficulty

position.

are

raises

the question

identifying

of

if they

the presumption that

of

Socrates himself the

of

is the to

be used, it is

the

not

being

identification, but he does

they

In the

have

exordium

to the

In the

words

rather

that, if he had

that rhetoric

that,

it is

not to

astonished at

is readily identified be seen

(he

claims

when

as a speaker

(17b). He

being

a

accusers'

by

by deceptively

skillful speaker

it

of place and

different

must

ful

on

he is

untrue and

obvious

that he does

his lack

of skill will

in the first

so unfamiliar with

the courts) that his might almost seem

words

not

that

the language

it

will

have the

become

that

be

the

the

he is

confuted

slightest skill

obvious when

occur of

destroy

claims

they

to him (17c). In courts

(the

decep

speaking will sound entirely out that he is from another country and speaks a manner of

dialect."

Socrates alien,

claims

follows Aris

that, if the accusers have room in the hearer's mind for

warns

this charge, for it is

straightforward speech

rhetoric of

he did not),

responding to the his skillful speech. This immediate

be deceived

it becomes

very quickly

tive

his

exordium

the suppressed premise of

used rhetoric

Socrates begins his defense

accusation of

claims

for

since rhetoric will not

adversary."'4

deed, he

even

than reading

in both the

impressed the jurors, "One must therefore make the speech one intends to make; and for this purpose you impression made by the Accordingly, Socrates

hear his

not stress

and straightforward

peroration

totle's advice on opening a defense. Aristotle

particularly

have

noticed.

warning to the jurors response

claim

the argument

used.

counterfactual argument would

the

exordium

suppressed premise of

readers

many

subtly used, and would be readily they

appears as a suppressed premise

the peroration. In the

and

so one

technique. Indeed he takes the opposite

rhetorical

He implies that identification is easy jurors who are listening to his

This implication

so

techniques,

are so

were used

those like the words.

these

use of

they really there. Could I believe they could, partly because they

missed them?

to

Socrates'

not remarked on

might well ask whether

help

in the Apology.

rests

the

speech.

his

claim

presumption

Socrates

uses

that his

that the

speech

will

skillful speech can presumption

that

sound simple, perhaps even

be readily identified if

speech sounds

as skill

simple and

112

Interpretation (as his

straightforward sets aside the

may be the

possibility that the

result of

the

it

undetected

forward fashion

he

as

simple and straightforward.

simple and straightforward sound of

a rhetoric so

use of skillful rhetoric

by passing In the peroration Socrates

that

done

will) then it is

speech

said

his

He

speech

skillfully

used

speaker.16

the charge of

confutes

he has

claims that

he

would

in the

being

spoken

in

exordium.

be reputable, moral, he is just not the sort

a skillful

a simple and straight

He

claims

or consistent with

otherwise would not

that to

his

have

religious

duty. In short, he claims of man who engages in decep tive speech (35d). Moreover, he claims that even if he were that sort of man he would not have attempted to prevail upon them to go against their solemn oaths.

For

Above here.

as

he

says:

it

all you must not expect

Surely

it is

obvious

when

1

impiety by

stand charged with

Meletus

that if I tried to persuade you and prevail upon you

by

my entreaties to go against your solemn oath, I should be teaching you contempt for religion, and by my very defense I should be accusing myself of having no religious belief. (35d)

Here

again

Socrates would

that rhetoric

suppressed premise

by

that appeals to pity, and

presumes

be

have two

is the

recognized

the jurors

by

He

consequences.

for

what

extension are.

they

is readily identifiable. other impious appeals,

This

recognition would

be teaching them contempt for religion (pre his impious behavior), and he would be incriminat would

sumably by the example of ing himself by being seen to do

the very things of which he is accused. is readily identifiable need not be introduced by Socrates; it may be imported into a reading of the Apology by the reader. In either event, by trading on the presumption that rhetoric is readily identifiable,

The

presumption

Socrates either of

entrenches

jurors

would see

it for

that

the

presumption

what

immediately bility that Socrates

in the

mind of

that if he

or of readers

apparent.

one of

rhetoric

it is. Because his Thus the

reader

were

rhetoric

is

the audience

is

so

subtle,

not provoked

is both using rhetoric It is not surprising that

and

taking

however, it is

not

to investigate the possi

great care to conceal

Socrates'

use of rhetoric.

an audience

to use rhetoric the audience

appeal

for pity has

his

remained

so well concealed.

CONCLUSION

In the

peroration

disreputable

rhetoric

subtly that he can

Socrates identifies the he

refuses

go on

to

not make such an appeal. who

take his disavowal

jurors that it is beneath

claim credit

He

of

appeal

for pity

as an example of

to employ. He then makes the appeal

for

being

them to

be irritated

by

his

so

the kind of man who would

also anticipates the possible annoyance of

the appeal for pity at

the

for pity

face value, refusal

jurors

by flattering

to appeal

the

for pity

Identifying for

as men of principle

ric

is far

appeal

and relies

of

subtle rhetoric

and

the

difficulty

evidence

of

rheto

the ploy of

potential of

himself

displaying

his misleading

with

exordium

he

attempts

In the

no rhetorical ability.

in the

claims

to

exordium

readily identi his speech will be clear

claims that rhetoric

simple and straightforward sound of

that he has

the

the kind of

as

both making the appeal for pity and disavowing it. in the peroration is difficult to detect. He com

detection

In the

peroration.

fiable that the

on

-113

Socrates'

Palamedes'. Palamedes forgoes the

Socrates'

the

honorable behavior.

too appreciate

solely

the rhetorical force

pounds

Apology

to stoop to such disreputable pleading. Socrates

man who refuses

obtain

than

more subtle

for pity

they

Rhetoric in the

peroration

is

he

so

that

claims

rheto

is so readily identifiable that if he were to use rhetoric his audience would quickly recognize its use and condemn him for impiety. Thus it is very difficult for the reader to overcome the attitude which Rossetti claims prevents us from ric

Socrates'

treating

rhetoric as rhetoric.

his

rhetorical skill

the

peroration

Although

is

and sustain

the

reader's

belief that the

used

rhetoric

in

not rhetoric.

Socrates'

rhetoric

have identified possibility

to create

It is difficult because Socrates has

in the

enough of an

peroration

underlying

is

deeply

rhetorical

of comparable rhetorical structures

in

embedded, I believe I

structure

to

other parts of

open

the

up the If

speech.

is identified elsewhere, it will be difficult to sustain interpreta the Apology as either ironic parody or as sincere and straightforward

similar rhetoric

tions of

Socrates'

We

truth-telling.

will need a more comprehensive

understanding

of

use of rhetoric.

NOTES 1. George Norlin, Isocrates (London: William Heineman, 1929). James A. Coulter, "The Re Defense of Palamedes and Plato's Critique of of the Apology of Socrates to Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 68 (1964): 269-303. Gorgianic Gorgias'

lation

Rhetoric,"

2. John Bumet, ed., Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924). R. E. Allen, "The Trial of Socrates: A Study in the Morality of the Criminal Pro in M.O. Friedland, ed., Courts and Trials (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp.

cess,"

3-21 ; Socrates

and

Legal Obligation (Minneapolis: Parody?"

Seeskin, "Is reprinted

the

Apology

in Dialogue

Douglas Feaver

and

and

of Socrates a Discovery (Albany: State

John Hare, 'The

Apology

University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Philosophy

University

as an

and

of

Kenneth

Literature 6 (1982): 94-105;

New York Press, 1987). See also Arethusa 14 of Rhetoric,"

Inverted

Parody

(1981): 205-17.

3. The Gorgias

serves as a

basis

of a

parody interpretation

of the

Apology only if

Socrates'

The Gorgias is

not a in the Gorgias is taken pretty much at face consid itself Gorgias is in the rhetoric denunciation of the if interpretation firm basis for a parody as an example of rhetoric, however. For explorations of the Gorgias ered as part of of Plato's Socratic rhetoric see Steven Rendall, "Dialogue, Philosophy, and Rhetoric: The Example

denunciation

value.

of rhetoric

Socrates'

Gorgias"

in the

"Enactment as Rhetoric Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (1977): 165-79; Charles Kauffman, "Refutative Rhet Philosophy and Rhetoric 12 (1979): 1 14-29; Thomas J. Lewis,

Gorgias,"

Interpretation 14 (1986): 195-210. True Rhetoric in the 4. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, "Irony, Arrogance, and (New York and London: Apology, in E. Kelly, ed., New Essays on Socrates Gorgias,"

oric as

Sincerity in Plato's University Press of

114*

Interpretation

America, 1984), pp. 29-46. A revised University Press, 1989), pp. 37-47.

History

on

(Princeton: Princeton

Trial

Mission,"

Journal

Socrates'

Nicholas D. Smith, "The Origin of Socrates of Ideas 44 (1983): 658. A revision of this article appears in

5. Thomas C. Brickhouse of the

in Socrates

version appears

and

Trial,

on

pp.

89-100. 6. C.D.C. Reeve, Socrates in the Apology (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 8. 225. 7. Livio Rossetti, "The Rhetoric of Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (1989): that I am using 8. I hope it is clear from the contexts in which I have used the word Socrates,"

"rhetoric"

it in the traditional a

reasoning

narrow

meaning that

sense of rhetoric as

"a

sense,

has

rather

emerged

than as an overall

in the twentieth

science of

century.

discourse

or of practical

Thomas Cole defines the

speaker's or writer's self-conscious manipulation of

his

narrow

medium with a view

(The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient his message as favorable reception as Greece [Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991], p. ix.) 9. In his note on this line John Bumet assumes that Socrates is alluding to Odysseus (Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito, p. 145). Leo Strauss makes the same assumption in possible."

to ensuring

Studies in Political Philosophy, with an introduction Chicago Press, 1983), p. 48. Brickhouse and Smith

by

Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago:

claim that

because both the

University

of

from the

passage

and that from the Odyssey fit the context of the Apology, they cannot tell which passage Socrates is referring to or if he is referring to either (Socrates on Trial, p. 202, n. 63). 10. John O. Lofberg, Sycophancy in Athens (Chicago: Ares, 1976), p. 15. 1 1 Quotations from the Palamedes are from the translation by Kenneth Seeskin in Dialogue

Iliad

.

and

Discovery, Appendix A. Socrates'

explanation of why he will for pity (Socrates on Trial, pp. 202-9). My interpretation of the peroration is reasons for not appealing for pity, whereas I very different, however. They explain explain how Socrates attempts both to make an appeal for pity and also to claim credit for not

12. Brickhouse

and

Smith

offer a

detailed

examination of

not use an appeal

Socrates'

making an appeal for pity. 13. See Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates on Trial, pp. 207-9, particularly n. 71. 14. Rhetoric III, XVII, 15. The exordium is one part of the defense speech where the rhetoric much of

has been

this debate.

from that

offered

227-28. For

dium, phy

by

debated. Brickhouse

and

Smith (Socrates

just how

use of

the

deeply

argumentum ex

arrests attention and arouses

J. Bonner, Lawyers 1927), pp. 228-29.

ert

and

16. I believe this is

Socrates is

pp.

48-57)

"concealing

role of

summarize exordium

Socrates,"

Socrates'

embedded

Thomas J. Lewis, "Parody and the Argument from Literature 14 (1990): 359-66.

facts that

Trial,

Socrates'

see

and

on

a very different interpretation of use of rhetoric in the Brickhouse and Smith, see Livio Rossetti, "The Rhetoric of

For

an exploration of

15. Note the of

much

Apology,'

Probability

contrario, an argument based on the supposed reversal

interest

Socrates is

not

from

Litigants in Ancient Athens (Chicago:

an example of what

his

own

Rossetti

means

by

another country.

University

elaborate

of

See Rob

Chicago Press,

the claim that in the exordium Socrates,"

prose"

rhetorically

pp.

may be in the exor in the Philoso

rhetoric

("The Rhetoric

of

p.

228).

Reflections

in Plato's Cave

on and

Joel Warren Lidz

Bentley

College

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Despite

do

explicit statement

the effect

with

of

majority other

Socrates'

of paideia and

those who have

sistent and/or parallel with placed upon

the Divided

Cave's

the

issues

that the Cave image has to

the lack thereof upon our nature

written about

to two considerations, the first on epistemological

effect

Line.1

relation

being

(514a),

the Cave have focused instead

that of the degree to

issues, particularly

has been

to the

which

1

the Cave is

formally

that the emphasis

suspect

to the Divided Line

be

can

bifurcation

con

which

attributed

focus

the modern philosophical tradition's

and attendant

Had

reason.2

of sense and

a

on

Socrates intended the Cave to deal primarily with knowledge, as most commen however, he would probably have spoken of

tators seem to take for granted,

instead

mathesis or episteme

Moreover,

even

if

understood

from

within

the obvious

fact

lic

as a

Paideia

connotes

the simple acquisition of theoretical

not

culturation,

of paideia.

we make

the plausible

that all three

images

occur within

whole, while the Republic'?,

or practical

that the

assumption

the context of the Sun and

the process

Line,

en-

knowledge.

Cave

we are still

must

left

nature of

(eudaimonia) and moral excellence (arete), (ergon) of a human being (353a).

the relation between well-being

latter

being

the

proper work

When Socrates

they

whether

he

rather

prisoners'

asks about the

would see

"do

also asks:

themselves

or

of

versus

only

with

interpretations

of

not

only

have

with

seen

(515a; my

ignorance

of

anything of In

emphasis).

the true sources of

also with one's self-ignorance.

the distinction between

merely but

the parapet,

shadows?"

The Cave is

perception/appearance/opinion

that between

also with

which

I believe

accounts

the Cave lies in the fact that

Cave, he begins by before"

to what was

carried at

not ask

the

prephilosophical

life.

second reason

explication of the applied

for the

thought/reality/knowledge, but

versus philosophical

The

is

world, but

one's experience of the

the artifacts

he does

you think these people would

concern

words,

concerned not

of

one another except

Socrates'

other

condition,

anything

be

with

the framework of the Repub

fundamental theme is the

most

of

said

for the popularity of formal Socrates offers his own

when

saying, "this image

as a whole must

(517b). But the fact that Socrates tells

interpretation, Winter 1993-94, Vol. 21, No. 2

be

Glau-

116

Interpretation "attach"

"apply"

con to

before"

"what

was said

long

with reference

that

ago

Line

both

relate

them

in

the Cave to

that Socrates intends the Cave to be

to the Sun and Divided Line. A.S. Ferguson

of

Sun

and

then one will

whereas

supplemental

can think of no reason

to the preceding images

it,

of what precedes

then the image becomes

However, I

similes.3

said about

one translates prosapteon as

"attached,"

as

has been

"applied,"

if

led to interpret the image in the light

lates it

what

imply

need not

interpreted solely noted

(prosapteon)

or

if

to the Sun and

why the Cave image

Line,

be

trans

one

while also

cannot

superseding

various respects.

Another

question arises

be "applied to

in this

regard:

When Socrates

before,"

he

says

that the

Cave

everything that Glaucon? seems emi between himself and This discussed had been previously discussion with nently plausible in view of the fact that the bulk of should

might

what was said

not mean

Socrates'

Glaucon both before lies"

and after

the

Cave image deals

with various courses of

citizens, dialectic for others. Following his pre sentation of the Cave image, Socrates draws, in the space of less than one page, a few parallels between the contents of the Cave and the Sun image, and

paideia:

"noble

for

some

then notes that those who manage to escape from the Cave are unwilling to themselves

concern

with

human dealings. Socrates then begins

discussion concerning the

nature and content of a philosophical

sort of paideia which would enable one within a

This

city

lengthy

very

education, the

to best rule the multiplicity of parts

or within oneself.

paper

stood as a

a

tends toward the conclusion that the

protreptic,

"the

soteriological

myth.4

Cave image is best

Socrates in fact

refers

to the

under

philoso

regime"

(502c), but such saviors are only because they have first guarded their own souls (413c) by becoming to the intelligible structure of Being. By viewing this attunement to the

pher-rulers as

saviors of our

possible

attuned

structure of

Being

as

the Cave's

has

leitmotif, in

we can avoid

the sort of

interpretive

secondary literature. As a final introductory remark, I should say that in my attempt to avoid reducing the cave to any single theme, it may appear that I have gone too far in the opposite direction, providing what is largely a series of observations and reductionism which

prevailed

so much of

the

the meaning of the Cave. This approach seemed appropriate, in that Socrates describes the Cave as an image, and his discussion of however, the Divided Line explains that eikasia is the least clear of the four faculties of reflections on

(509d). Yet it is precisely this lack of clarity which provides the first intimations of our goal intimations which can never be other than more or less vague signposts on our way toward the Sun. 1 must also confess to a apprehension

for writing which exhibits spontaneous suggestivewriting is especially well suited to evoking the reader's own reflections. In the present instance, such writing seems faithful to the Cave's hidden meanings. many

longstanding

ness,

as

predilection

such

Reflections

in Plato's Cave

on and

'111

THE MYTHIC SETTING

The Republic

opens

quasi-mythically

with

Socrates

"to

descending

Peiraias"

(327a). Eva Brann has

noted that this is an unusual linguistic formation, in that it atypically omits the definite article. She suggests that Plato intends the reader to recall he Peraia, "the Land and notes that the festival which has captured is in honor of Bendis, a Thracian goddess identi curiosity Beyond,"

Socrates'

fied

with

Hecate,

Socrates'

goddess of the underworld.

alus, is said to be at the threshold shades, in the house of

Pluto,"

writes

host, Ceph

well-to-do

death (328e). "We

of

are

in the city

of

Brann.5

Socrates'

descent, like that of other Hellenic heroes before him (e.g., Hera Theseus, Orpheus) is fraught with danger. His ostensible mission is to

cles,

Glaucon

save

theory

of

that

thus

and

suggests that not

images, but

Adeimantus from the temptations

and

justice,

only

they

deficient way

of a

are

the prisoners

themselves

like

are

of

and

dangers

life. The

dwelling

in

of a

deficient

symbolism of

insubstantial images

shades

Hades

insubstantial

a world of

of what

it is to be human.

IMAGINING THE CAVE beyond,"

From this "land

to"

"sticking

or

describes himself

images (glischros eikadzo; 488a) cities, ranging from a "cavelike

Glaucon does

which

(592a). Socrates

implies that

"greedy

will

construct

dwelling"

(kallipolis; 527c),

on

for"

as

to

of

earth"

"anywhere which

who

city"

"fair

of a

close

diverse images

speech

Socrates

is the

our nature

commences

sort of

thing

his

an

believe to

not

in

image exist

parable with a statement

which can

be influenced

by

education:

Imagine

1

education and want of education.

Since Socrates begins the Cave image

.

our nature ply"

"in its

"attach"

or

Greek

education and

literal translation the to

of

living

renowned

a

human

purposes of

being"

"in

of

connotes our condition of

comparison,

portrays prephilosophical

cave-dwellers are

that it is a likeness

(514a), I infer that to "ap be a mistake. Insofar as the

the Greek parabole) the whole of

Socrates'

for

us

the process whereby one becomes

2. The Cave image ment:

by telling

(514a)6

education"

of

it only to the Divided Line would like the German word Bildung,

i.e., image should instead, for

ment

lack

word paideia,

enculturation

the

in its

our nature

bonds."

We

life

(Apology, 38a). This

human

be "placed

I believe

beside"

(the

our experience.

as a condition of enslave

can relate

pronouncement, "The

fully

this condition of enslave

unexamined

standard

life is

not worth

translation seems to

118*

me

as

Interpretation

to miss the point. Ou biotos can

"not

[worthy]

humans (when desire to

lived."

be

to

be translated

"not

or

living

worth

makes reference

The fact that Socrates here

to

is normally implicitly understood) only emphasizes his the properly human (rational-deliberative) mode of life with

such

contrast

human life

the nonhuman, rather than to contrast a

human life

another

either as

is

which

not.7

I

Thus,

is

which

suggest

that a

worth

living

with

translation

superior

human."

be: "The

would

in

Bearing

unexamined

(enslaved)

human

fully

not

the Hellenic contempt

mind

prephilosophical

less than

life is

worthy for slaves,

lived

being

of

we can understand

condition when contrasted with

life. (In the Sophist [253c], dialectic is described

why the

would symbolize a

the cave-dwellers

condition of

by

a

the

philosophical

the

episteme of

as

way the

of

free

man.)

3. The Cave image

is therefore lack

presented

both

state of education

the image is

whom

by

Such

education"

of

"our

4.

nature

Why

hension

(eikasia)

that: "so

it

nature

they

in its

are

images; it

education and

necessarily reflect the the image and of the one for

purposes will

who creates

lack

of which

is

conditions and

conditioned

education."

of

for

image-making

and

image-appre

the most appropriate method for understanding our nature?

as

fifteen

hard is the

of

"our

of

The image both

education and

pages prior

to relating the Cave

condition suffered

the cities that there

image

the one

that

and

image

to rely on our capacity

are we

Approximately

of

an

for didactic

constructed.

in its

images

will concern

self-referential.

is

by

the

most

no other single condition

image, Socrates

decent

says

men with respect

like it, but I

to

must make an

from many sources, as when painters (488a). Socrates implies that when attempting to describe an unique sort of experience, it is best to rely upon the imagination

by bringing

together elements

goat-stags"

make unfamiliar or

as a means of what

precisely

tween the

merely

bringing the

real

Cave image does: it

need

for

apparent needs

ally conditioned of images plays

the unfamiliar into the ambit of the

a

(desires)

opinions such an

we should reflect on

soul

well which

seeks

to

familiar. This is

illuminate the distinction be

according to disrupt the psyche as

ordered

nature

and

those

a result of cultur

concerning what is true and good. Since the concept important role in Books VI and VII of the Republic,

the nature of

images.

EXCURSUS I: IMAGES AND IMAGINATION a.

Images

contain reference to

originals of which

they

are

pointing beyond themselves the accounts

for their

b. The

relation

something

images; they prisoners

other than

point

fail to

"imprisonment."

between images

presuppose the existence of

themselves, namely, the beyond themselves. It is this

recognize and which,

in

effect

is asymmetrical, in that images originals, but originals do not presuppose the exisand originals

Reflections

in Plato's Cave

on and

-119

images. The One (Unity) is ontologically prior to the Many. As H.G. writes: "As the unity of what is unitary, the idea of the good would to be presupposed by anything ordered, enduring and consistent. That

tence

of

Gadamer seem

means,

however,

that

impels it toward

eros

it is

presupposed as the

an

of

its

of

unity

the

The

many."8

condition of alienation

soul's

from Self

and overcoming thus, toward unity qua self-identity. c. One original can produce many images of itself; there are many Caves, but only one exterior. Moreover, the many images can vary in their degree of resemblance to the original. Since the original is not accessible as such, the

Being,

and

how

question arises as to

holds between image

(i)

that

there

one

is to determine the degree to Consider the

and original.

which a resemblance

following

analogy:

Roman statues, each of which that (ii) the Greek original has

exist a number of

Suppose be

appears to

a

Greek original, and copy long since been lost. Under such circumstances, the look (eidos) of the original is not accessible to us at least not as such. Yet we hypothesize that the many Roman statues of a

are all copies of one

original,

blance between the

copies.

unity, both

of

Assuming

nal.

we are

lovers

the copies in

is the

which

Such

would

further

to one another and in

relation

a

relation

resemblance

that the copies only hint of

beauty,

pearance of the original.

cause or explanation of the resem

we will no

at

the

beauty

we could

do in

the original,

of

doubt be driven to

But the best

constitute

a

to the origi and

wonder about

that

the ap

such a case would

be to

the original on the basis of the

("recollect") imagination, by considering the similarities between the copies. thereby profess to have inferred a single, invisible look from many, the appearance

reconstruct

of

power of our

We

will

similar

looks. But insofar

as

the possibility always

the copies remains to be noticed,

exists

such a quest would seem

that something about to

be interminable in

principle.

d. Images may present

or

may

themselves as what

are not

Unity

originals.

not

they

are

images; i.e., they may (deceptively) as what they

themselves as

reveal

images

or

can appear as multiplicity.

[Form] is itself one, but, by showing actions, bodies, and one another,

with

As Socrates

each

looks like

reality but masquerade as reality. Opinions for truth if one fails to examine them dialectically. are about

e.

Images

to be. An

the

a

"each

community

many"

(476a). Opinions

are

inevitably

mis-taken

in that they both are and are not what they appear both conceals and reveals the original; it

a mask which

away from its source. (As Heraclitus said: "The nature things likes to hide itself [Diels-Kranz, fr. 123].) Plato's identification of

points of

are ambiguous

image is

in

themselves everywhere

states:

both toward

real and

and

the intelligible suggests that

what

it is to be in

sensu strictu

is to be

absolutely (kath hauton). Something which is deficiently F provides a clue as to what the absolute F is like. Whether one could determine what F itself is like simply

by

performing the way in which the

a

feat

of mental abstraction would seem

elements of

the

mixture are combined.

to depend

If

upon

each element

Interpretation

120

retained

its

or nature of

chlorine), then

in

manifest

Judging from

abstraction will not

in

stand

affected as a result of statement at

Analogously,

is

fails

to account who

alus, thus

is

justice

opinions

for the Good love

by

of

the

latter

relatively inarticulate

(elenchos),

related

seems

to be his

accounts

recognize

of

view.

of reality,

their

which

For example,

all

harms,

determinant

obedience), but each

of what

and practical affairs

is

owed.

Ceph

(philochrematia)

and

determining what one owes others. His son, Polemarchus, who defines is ruled by love of as "Doing good to friends and harm to enemies,"

not see that

strength

(ability)

the

his definition requisite

we

have been

points

nature, because

ambiguous and

to

our nature

if

that

by

a

a

in

love

stronger,"

toward the question of

to determine

asked

see

own good

friends. Thrasymachus, who is ruled as "the advantage of the

philosophical character gone

Perhaps our

else.

the appetitive part of the soul, adopts strictly conventional crite

to be able to know one's

sents

character

that justice has to do with that

or

ruling (philarchia), defines justice

does

the

sodium and

to something

not mere refutation.

as the prime

money

being

victory (philoneikia) and love of honor (philotimia), and fails to friend is one who knows one's good, then one must know one's order

to

M

and

alter

unarticulated version of

are

justice in Book I

its

(borrowed property, benefits

ruled

represents

for

ria

owed

476a,

present a

need of examination

three definitions of which

mixed were

do the trick. In the latter case, the

Socrates'

f. Images (qua shadows) originals.

being

M

a mixture of

the elements (as in the case of colors of paint, or

thing is

a

like

mixture

then abstraction would suffice; but if

candies

look

the

pristine character within

what

is truly

but

what possesses

advantageous.

He

the

repre

bad (cf. 491b-496a).

capacity for eikasia in thinking about like that of images is erotic, deceptively

use our

constantly transcending itself,

tion is best suited to encompass this

and of all our

faculties, imagina

myriad of existential modes.

TOPOGRAPHY OF THE CAVE

See human beings

as

(oikeisei spelaiodei)

though

with

whole width of the cave.

they

were

its entrance,

a

living in an underground cavelike dwelling long one, open to the light across the

(514a)

The fact that the humans dwell underground is consistent both with the Socrates' notion that the Republic takes place in Hades, and with "noble of metallic souls, which describes the citizenry's common from the Earth ancestry 1

.

lie"

(414d f.).

2. That the

dwelling

is described

as cavelike

(i.e.,

as an

image

of a cave

rather than se) is probably intended to imply that the Cave is artificial. Dale Hall attributes to A.S. Ferguson the recognition that: "the as a cave per

can

be

understood

only if

we recognize

that the

inmates'

unnatural.'

sense

Unnatural,

that

is,

Cave

condition is 'in some because their confinement deprives them

Reflections of

sunlight, the 'natural

medium

"eyes"

metallic

eye'."9

This, however,

capacity for souls (eyes), but

we all possess

souls,

121

by

assumes that

In terms

of the myth of

some souls are

golden, others

possess the same

all

nature,

for the

in Plato's Cave

on and

sight.

silver, bronze; i.e., some souls function better, are less alienated from reality than others, and so are more valuable than others. 3. Socrates implies that it is natural for us to be born into a cavelike dwell and yet others

ing, it

this

and

be

will

life. The Cave

have been there

They

in the

remain

1. Contra

from

&

it

legs

seeing only in front suggests

in bonds, (514a)

so that

we are

within

born in

Aeschylus'

Prometheus Bound,

they

The

chains.

as well as

para

to be liberated

polis, construed as a source of tyrannical opinion. The story

predecessor, that in

of

of our previous

and necks

of them.

that

to be imprisoned

means

darkness)

say,

be entirely transcended.

can never

Rousseau, Socrates

taking leave

we experience after

should we

since childhood with

same place,

reveals what

with a

in the light (or

understood

subterranean

ble

that everything which

suggests

contrasts

Prometheus

wherein

reminds mortals of their origins:

Hear

what troubles there were

them the use of their

For

men at

first had

among men, how I found them

eyes

but

witless and gave

them master of their minds

wits and made

they had

saw to no purpose;

ears

.

.

.

but did

not

hear.

dreams they dragged through their long lives and handled all things in bewilderment and confusion. They lived like swarming ants in holes Like the

shapes of

.

in the ground, in the sunless caves without intelligent calculation.

the

of

earth.

...

All their doings

were

indeed

.

Prometheus then describes how he dane things us

in short, "Humanity is the the

tioning

Socratic

(useful) for

the

To the humans

letters,

myth

body

beasts

focuses

This

shift

of

burden,

on those

from

Socrates subtly

physically

hurting

shifts

from

debilitating

By

things requisite for the proper

to things good for the

internal condition), is exemplified marchus, who defines justice as "helping mies."

mun

Prometheus

the cave,

within

ships and medicines.

chremata

an

or

useful,

the sort of things of which Protagoras tells

ta chremata

soul."

the

of

with

measure."

provides numbers and

trast,

humankind

provided

soul

by

to

dikaia, from

(and from

Socrates'

one's

Polemarchus'

and

func

things good

outward

behavior to

discussion

friends

con

harming

with

Pole

one's ene

understanding of harming to harming in the sense

one's enemies

corrupting another's character (335a-d). For Socrates, true justice deals (443d).'2 "that which is truly about oneself and is [properly] one's

as of

with

own"

2. Although the

they

prisoners are aware

are affected also

the danger Men was

are

of

missing

deceived

Homer,

by

by a

that

which

lies

lesson taught

their cognizance

wisest of

by

only

of

that

invisibly

which

lies before them,

behind them.

They

thus

run

Heraclitus:

(gnosin)

the Greeks. For he was

of what

deceived

is

manifest

by

boys

(to phaneron) as lice when

killing

122

Interpretation

they

said to

him: "What

we see and

catch, these

we

leave behind;

don't

what we

away."

catch, these

see or

Heraclitus here grasp the

we

of Homer's wisdom, for the latter failed to lice like death. The meaning of the riddle of the is elusive. I interpret the riddle as follows: Having caught of lice, the boys leave them behind; but other lice attach

life

the lice themselves and

killed

a number

themselves to the boys

What

story:

ironically

and

and are

unwittingly

"know"

function

shadows

parable,

i.e.,

are

carried

away

are not aware of

by

can

like Homer's lice: many

much

"carried"

ions) less

don't

we

carry

speaks

riddle of

(Diels-Kranz, fr. 56)

(i.e., held) by

unknowingly

them.

hurt

shadows

the prisoners,

of

In the

(i.e.,

the

cave opin

yet are nonethe

potent.

Their light is from

fire

a

burning

far

above and

behind them. Between the fire

the prisoners there is a road above, along which see a wall, built puppet-handlers

they

(thaumatopoiois)

show their puppets.

and statues of men

every

.

"It's

set

(andriantas) image,"

he

of the

utter sounds

said.

whether or

2.

"they"

the

human beings

and

partitions

and over which artifacts

.

things made of stone, wood and

(phthengomenous),

"They're like

us,"

I

others are

said. (514b

prisoners.

515a)

He does

not

say

us"

"like

who are

like the

humans carrying

wall

living

and other

Some

a strange

in front

See along this

.

Socrates modestly includes himself among the

.

dlers

.

other sort of material.

silent.

1

Moral

us.

refers

to the prisoners, the puppet-han

both. us"

does Socrates say "They're like rather than "We're like them"? After all, the cave and its denizens were constructed as the model against which we were to compare ourselves. Are we images of them or are they images of us?

Why

Who is

more real?

depends

their existence this mythic

fers from

image

the

(537c): it is

upon

prisoners are

image

seen of

by

images

of us

in the

ours; we created them "in our own

we create of ourselves

images

an

Perhaps the

in

order

and

that

But

to understand ourselves dif

the prisoners, in that the cave

both images

sense

image."

image is

synoptic

originals, and we are aware of

it

as an

image.

3. Socrates does

not say the puppet-handlers speak, only that they "utter is presumably meant to suggest their utterances are relatively so in need of dialectical examination. In the Apology, Socrates

sounds,"

which

inarticulate,

and

even goes so

far

thereby raising divine

as

to approach the pronouncements of the

questions as

speech with

piety.

the same modesty

construed as evidence of

4. Note that

to his

his

Oracle in

this way,

But then, the fact that Socrates treats

he treats human speech

might

better be

piety.

fire (an image

is a natural substance it (more than once) and controlled Those persons behind the parapet control the fire. Although the fire is impor tant to the environment of the cave, the prisoners can't see it. The unlike

the sun

while

can

be artificially

of

the sun)

created

prisoners'

Reflections knowledge

long of

of

reality is thus

by

mediated

those

the prisoners fail to recognize the

as

those controlling the shadows

oners'

fortune

(daimon)."

Thus,

will

the

be

on and

in Plato's Cave

who control

So

shadows.

their situation, the motives

nature of

all-important

prisoners will

the

123

be

in

determining

the pris

unable to choose a

way

of

life for themselves. The theme is

of a choice

the

anticipated near

between

a

life

intellectual bondage

of

Socrates'

beginning

of

discussion

with

versus

freedom

Glaucon in Book

lives"

between justice and injustice II, where Glaucon speaks of a "choice of and that phrase recalls the choice of lives made (360e), by the mythic Heracles, who was

be

forced to

alternatives of

choose

between Pleasure

and

understood as a continuation of this theme of

in

the noetic

a

highly

realm

picturesque manner.

(the

familiarity

dergo

a

transition from

life

of

a

contrasts an

By describing

within.

familiar

appearances

can

life, presenting

image

of

the

what

toward

the

Beauty

Cave

the philosopher's eros) outside the

object of

the life of comfortable a

It

Virtue. The Cave image

choosing

with

it is like to

Being

un

in itself, it

why the life of Virtue is unpleasurable in the short term only. 5. Dale Hall argues that: "the upper level of the cave must represent the state

also suggests

of

those

who

have been

training directed

by

made as good as possible

the

against this conclusion:

philosopher-ruler."14

First,

the

fact that

by

the musical and gymnastic

But two

workers"

implies that those

the cave

chained within

considerations militate

thaumatopoiois connotes are

in

"wonder

by

effect mesmerized

in trade is deception. Secondly, those on the upper level of the cave carry images of objects, not the originals. Those images will pre sumably resemble their originals to a greater or lesser degree, though insofar as

persons whose stock

those carrying the artifacts have not taken leave of the cave, any such resem

blance

will

be strictly

The best the

accidental.

wonder-workers can achieve

is

right opinion.

6. It is

being

a serious question as

so chained

be in

of natural versus conventional meet

for the

cave.

whether

best

by

virtue of

the

question

those chained might not

suited

slavery is

escapee who returns

the sake of the entire not

to

a position

for their

raised

i.e.,

nature

and whether

it is therefore

to the cave to take control of the

not

parapet

for

"vision"

In this way, those born with defective of the few proves salvific for all.

will

be in danger. Liberation

Do

you suppose such men would

another other

have

than the shadows cast

anything of themselves fire? (515a)

seen

by

the

or of one

prisoners'

Not only is the understanding of the world determined by others, but even their understanding of their own nature is. Strictly speaking, therefore, there is

no

true self-understanding for the prisoners, any

understanding others whose

of

more

their environs, since their understanding of self

understanding

of

the self's nature

is deficient.

than there

is

mediated

is

by

Interpretation

124

If they

things going

at

they

see

(515b).

would

its familiarity) has the distinct 516d Socrates notes that the prisoners the

maintaining the

are

naming the

images

Hegel noted,

advantage of pride

of

images)

quo),

not

as

remains unexamined

being

themselves

predictable,

being

on

possible

and

able

to

because those in

arbitrarily created order (presumably because that order is inherent in nature.

aimed at

prisoners with an

status

be

would consider the truth to

the images passing by. But this ability is only

control present

they

(515c)

as

virtue of

predict

think

the familiar (in this case,

identify

The familiar (which

reality.

they

They

shadows of artificial things.

prisoners would

the one true

by

them that

by

nothing but the

The

to discuss with each other,

were able

LIBERATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT

Consider

healing (iasin) from bonds and folly would be like by nature to happen to them. Take a man who is

what their release and

if something

of this sort were

and to walk and look up toward the light. up because he is dazzled, he would be unable to make out the he had seen before. (515c)

released and compelled to stand

It

be painful,

would

things whose shadows

1. Socrates The

.

merely of a release, but of a healing, imprisonment are not erased simply by virtue

healing

by

undergone

of

healing,

as a

implies

being from

liber

partial

making whole,

the soul capable of apprehending reality in its plenitude.

2. Socrates does

fair to

assume that

scribes.

One

nature.

not explain

how this liberation takes place, though it

recognizing that it exists and by understanding Our liberation paradoxically consists in an understanding of our fini

3. While

by

Self."

under natural conditions

light

function, it here temporarily produces the the principle mia dunamis ton enantion). What do

you suppose

nonsense

(phluarias),

more

turned toward

1. The

seems

the parable seeks to produce the very phenomenon it de

escapes the cave

tude: "Know Your

escapee

nonsense and guide.

which

the soul parallels the movement

toward a fuller grasp:

apprehension of one's object renders

its

.

speaks not

that the effects of ated.

.

and

is

makes

the power of sight able to

opposite result

he'd say if

someone were to tell

while

because he is

now,

beings, he at

first

reality, but

must

have

Despite the fact that the beings

accordance with

him that before he

somewhat nearer to what

sees more correctly?

so confused

(in

saw

is

and

(515d)

that he cannot

distinguish between

the

difference

pointed out to

are

inherently

clearer than their shadows,

the shadows seem clearer to the escapee.

among things that become (gignomena).

The

him

by

his

prisoners'

thought comes to

rest

Reflections 2. The issue here is

firelight

capable of

judging

which

by

or that guided

being

before

his

by

guided

Like J.S. Mill's

artificial

man who

experienced a wide

125

is

most

variety

of

to choose between life within or without

by, he was compelled with thing is? Wouldn't he believe that what he saw (alethesterap. and if compelled to look toward the light itself,

distinguish

was truer

would not

a position

in Plato's Cave

life is best: that

only because he has

pleasures

shown each of

questions to

of

natural sunlight.

them, only the escapee is in the cave (cf. 582b). And

way

on and

hurt

eyes

the things which pass

what each

and would

he

not

flee back to the

he

objects

can make out

hold them to be really clearer than what is being shown? And if someone Wouldn't he find it painful? When he came to the dragged him away by force and

.

light

he

...

would

He'd have to make out

be

.

.

to

unable

in

get accustomed

see even one of order

the things now said to be true.

is

to see what

the shadows and then the images

in water, and, later, the things themselves.

(eidola) (515d

At first he'd easily

above.

of the

humans

1. Once again, the familiar is the comfortable, and the attractive that it leads the escapee to deny the evidence of his is the

power of one's

2. The

movement

and

origins,

from less

hence the importance

clear

to more

clear

is

Finally its in

he

appearances a position

the

be

would

able to make out the sun

(phantasmata)

and see what

to conclude that this is the

itself in its

own

of

so

Such life.

examined

not a

process,

habituation

on

domain (chora)not

it's like (516b). Finally, he

source of

is

own senses.

a gradual

truth, and demands an arduous process No pain, no gain: chalepa ta kala.

escapee's part.

things

comfortable

the

of

sudden revelation of

the

and other

516a)

would

be

the seasons and the years, and is

(or governor) of all things in the visible place, and is in a certain way of (i.e. that which explains: aitios) all those things he and his

steward

the cause

,

had been

companions

(516b-c)

seeing.

1. Not surprisingly, only the interior of the cave is described in any detail. Like the heavenly lights of Genesis (1:16 f.), the sun outside the cave seems to exist

for the

sake of earthbound

2. Plato presumably does

not mean that

to see the sun. In the Phaedo

directly

at

the

led him to

search

"second-best When he

sun or of

Having

they

the

speaks of

to make out things

for the "truth

beings"

of

"find the

ultimate point of

(99d-e), Socrates

trying

might

directly

way."

the

journey is looking

the danger of with

his

eyes

which

in logoi. He describes this

as a

way.""

recalled

his first home

fellow prisoners, he pity the

mortals, that

others.

and what was

would consider

held

as wisdom

there,

and

himself fortunate (eudaimonidzein)

his

and would

(516c)

adjusted

to the

new

environment, the escapee's understanding of

own situation undergoes a reversal.

His initial

experience was one of

his

pain, but

126 he

Interpretation himself

now regards

him; thus,

stand

Ironically,

in that it

while the escape at

only pity those who cannot understanding of his own experience and can

this good

has

fortune

to the

will not extend

made possible a truer

the

to be

will prove

a

very

under under mixed

For

well-being.

physical

escapee's

life in the cave, it has to the point where he is

perception of

the same time alienated the escapee from the

others

Amidst unenlightenment, the

perceived as a threat.

mind's

freedom jeopardizes

body's life. He

hold in disdain their honors

would

(katharonti) The

practice

as a skill

kind

shadows

Good,

went

he

but knacks

as rhetoric

back to his

and so

thereby been

is

old place

would provoke

corrupted.

If it

This implies that the

conventional

2. The

beliefs

a mere

again

of

the

were possible to get

anything

other

in the cave, but is

of

the one who attempted

ridiculousness is

the escapee

can

be the

cave.

Like the

no more correct

product of

realities

than their

to which he has been

is inaccessible, because alien, to them. Before the others, but other than himself; now he is one

than the others. The escapee

no

made much

graduate student and

"The

hold

(cf. 457a).

in the

one with

himself, but is

Goldstein has

mere appear

true nature

escapee's

(at)

else

the

dialectic.

(516e-517a)

appearance of

and values

of

in the cave, his eyes would be full of darkness laughter. It would be said that his vision had

perception of

escaping, he is with

in the language

service of

knack/image

prisoners'

perception of

privy, the

into the

are put

to lead them upward, he would be killed.

.

would,

a mere (tribe) unlike true paideia, which Socrates refers to (techne; 518d). A knack is an image of a skill, in that a knack is also

ance of the

1

making out by next. (5 1 6d)

quickest at

"knack"

"know-how,"

again,

those

out"

"making

of

of

If he

and

the shadows and predicting what would pass

Gorgias, be a

fortunate,

the escapee's

even

goes a reversal.

blessing,

as

longer

of

his philosophy

unexamined

life is

the

cave.

the same point

in

In

a

(i.e., his

a wonderful

soul) is

once

novel, Rebecca

discussion between

an under

professor:

living,"

not worth

Eva

said quietly.

"You really believe that, don't you? I think it's the examined life that's worth living, at least what these guys call the examined life. Sub quadam

not

specie."

aeternitatis

"So

you prefer the existence of

those pathetically chained prisoners in Plato's

cave?"

of

the

allegory "At least they're

The

his way out of back inside, with all stumbling those pretensions about enlightening the others, he doesn't even know how to live in their world anymore. He can't even see in there. For him it's all darkness and chained together.

the cave makes his way alone. And

shadows."

when

philosopher who makes

he

comes

Reflections

on and

in Plato's Cave

"That's because it really is all darkness and shadows in "Not for the others. Not for the ones who are chained together.

127

there."

"But chained, Michael! Think! So unfree that theydon't So foolish they have no idea they are

even

see."

They

can

know they're

fools."

unfree.

"I'm "So

not so sure who the

you

they

transforms their

a

"Yeah. I think I "But

story.

are attached to one another

blessing."

bondage into

viewed

between

fool is in this

think the fact that do."

from outside, from the for

objective point of view,

these attachments

nothing."

people count

"I don't believe that. And I don't believe

you

do

either.

I don't believe any

does."16

woman

SOCRATES'

This image revealed

COMMENTARY ON THE CAVE

as a whole must

by

and the ascent

be

to what was said before. Liken the domain

applied

home,

to the prison

sight

the light of the fire in it to the sun's power,

to what's above to the soul's

journey

to the intelligible. A god

knows if it happens to be true. (517a-b)

The Cave image is former

having

arisen

preceded

in the

by

the

images

context of a

of

the Sun and Divided

discussion

of

knowledge

Line,

the

versus opinion

"divine"

sun is an erotic image: not only is it said to concerning the Good. The be responsible for our seeing things "as beautifully as (508a), but also for those birth, growth and nurture (509b). The Line image, by con possible"

objects'

trast, is

thing

eros

things

logical form, which is some lacks. The Line illustrates that the ontological dependence of visible

meant to

upon

the

illustrate

Sun is

certain

paralleled

by

things about

the relation between

intelligible beings; beings. The Cave effects a

objects; (b) (hupotheses) and noetic other two images, for while it

visible

visible objects and

ages

(a)

visible

and

images

and

(c) dianoetic im

sort of

Aufhebung

of

subsumes the points made in the preceding images it introduces something which they had omitted: human beings. More over, the Cave integrates an element of negativity absent in the other images,

the

inasmuch

light)

an

as

it

makes

important

lack

of paideia

element of

the

(symbolized

by darkness,

the absence of

myth.

EXCURSUS II: LIGHT

a.

Perhaps Plato

uses a

light

because light, being purely homoge does not create the heterogeneity mani

metaphor

neous, has the quality of oneness, and fest in the world, but merely allows that heterogeneity to manifest itself. Light has the character of a power (dunamis) specifically, a power of showing forth

Interpretation

128

(apophainesthai). It

itself

being

not

is

permits that which

other than

light itself to be

seen while

an object of perception.

b. In the Parmenides (130e-131e), the young Socrates light in an unsuccessful attempt to respond to

Forms to

compares

Parmenides'

Forms. It

notion of unlike

Fink

the objects it renders visible, light is that: "Light is

writes

the

symbol of

fest in nor

that the young Socrates

seems

main

arbitrary difference between

illuminated things, dispersed throughout that scattering, it is

and

persing

yet

ubiquitous and nonphysical.

Being

and

thereof; it is neither divided is divided and dispersed in it. As the dis

is

no mere part

which

nonetheless one and

concordant.'"7

In the knowable, the idea of the good is seen last and Once seen, it must be concluded that it is the

Just

the sun

as

does

one

is to

who

act with sound

with

(or barely:

difficulty

cause of all

judgment in

that is right and

public or

in

private

it. (517c)

the intelligible

but

One

everything.

must see

Eugen

Platonic ontology, it is the beings. Light becomes mani

mogis).

fair in

to point out that

wishes

metaphor of

no

all

the

criticism of

last in the

was seen

realm.

One does

to see

need

it in

visible

order

realm,

so

the

to see the Form

not need

Good is of

the

seen

last in

Good to act,

to act prudently. The Good makes prudence

possible.

Those

this point aren't willing to attend to human affairs, but their souls

who reach

are eager to spend

Plato's nature

(or

waste:

concern with

Socrates had

types of men. He mentions

itself as

and see

being

it

"rare"

by

time above.

intellectualism is here

the philosopher,

of

diatribein)

itself."

(spanioi; 476b). Second,

the

distinguished between three to approach the Beautiful

are able

described

men are

Discussing

made quite clear.

earlier

first those "who Such

(517c)

with

ironic

understatement

there are those who hold that there are

beautiful things, but who deny that there is Beauty itself; such persons are in that they mistake likenesses for that of which the likenesses are likenesses (476c).18 Finally, there are those who believe there is Beauty itself "dreaming,"

"to

and who are able who

do

both

of

it

identified

deemed

not with

that

"awake"

first

and possess class of men

the third sort of men,

rather with

pates and

the

which

is

participated

(who

who

in

in

and of what participates

not confuse that which participates with

such persons are

but

catch sight

which

is

philosopher

that-which-is alone

not confuse

the sort of

and

participated

knowledge. The

see

do

that

it,"

in; is

by itself),

that which partici

men who

distinguish be

tween noeta and aistheta.

Whereas the

second class of

men, the

eidetic realm, the members of the

becoming.

They

dispensing

with

have

escaped the

first

"dreamers,"

remain unaware of the

class are oblivious

to the

domain

cave, but choose not to return to

of

it. Such

world"

the

"body

of

the

(Timaeus, 32c) by

those persons who

Reflections prefer

the purity

tes and

the noetic realm

of

is

on and

satirized

in

in

Plato'

s

an exchange

Cave

129

between Socra

Protarchus in the Philebus (62a ff.):

Socrates: Now let

imagine

us

give an account of

it

a man who understands what

conformable with

his knowledge,

Justice itself is, and can has a

and who moreover

like understanding of all that is. Protarchus: Very well. Socrates: Will account of of

be adequately possessed of knowledge if he can give his and the divine spheres themselves, but knows nothing

such a man

the divine circle

these human spheres and circles of ours,

so

the ruler that he uses, no less than the circles,

Protarchus: I

am moved

This interchange

form,

than pure

knowledge

of

One

in

the "divine

who returns

a

building

a

house,

the other sort?

this description we are giving of

knowledge."

emphasizes that

never

man circle against

Socrates, by

to mirth,

divine

ourselves confined to

that when he is are of

human

existence occurs

in

a

physical, less

cosmos"

(Philebus, 64b). Humans seek for its own sake, but to measure the hu

"bodiless

circle"

not

it. from divine

and ridiculous when

he is

contemplation to

human things

compelled to contend about

will seem graceless

the shadows of justice. There

when they kinds of disturbances of the eye, stemming from two sources have been transferred from light to darkness and when they have been transferred

are two

from darkness to light. (517d-518a)

The

for disorientation

reason

when one returns

familiarity, but is

no

to it. Upon

the situation, but

newness of

when one

Cave, disorientation is due to the returning to it, the problem is not lack of

leaving

upon

the

has occurred, such that the cave life pursued by the denizens of the Cave

that a transformation of

longer intelligible. The way

has left the Cave is different from

of

vision

nugatory.20

now seems

Education is the

eyes.

.

not what certain men profess

knowledge that isn't in it,

soul .

.

But this

power

is in the

it to be.

as though soul of

they

They were

assert that

putting

they

sight

each, and the instrument

put

into

into blind

with which

each leams must be turned around, together with the whole soul, from that which

is coming into being, until it is able to brightest part of that which is. And we

This

endure

affirm

looking

at that which

that this is

is

and the

the good. (518b d)

bears closely upon the way in which Plato divergent interpretations which his writings have widely centuries. If his the writing aims at such a turning around of the

conception of education

writes and explains the elicited over whole

soul, then clearly he

this. The primary

by

e-ducing

must

(drawing

find

a manner of

be to convey his the reader's thought, out)

goal will not

writing best

own

and

suited

to effect

thoughts, but to educate thought is educed by the

130

Interpretation in

apparent presence of opposites

to be

expect

(532a-c). Hence the

an object

reader should

presented with real or apparent conflicts which stand

in

need of

resolution.

Another way of looking at this is to note that when the Platonic Socrates engages others in discussion, he does not primarily aim at persuading others to a certain point of view. As he says to Theodoras: "You are truly a lover of argument,

Theodoras,

the way

you

take me so

facilely

for

ments"

(Theaetetus, 161a). Rather, he

to learn something examine

himself,

and

provides an occasion

in

doing,

so

full

for his interlocutor

become better

to

of argu

prepared

subject"

(505c). The

the "greatest

only to those There

about

a sack

order of

the cosmos reveals

to

itself

with a well-ordered soul.

be

would

an art of this

turning

around, concerned with how the power can

easily and efficiently turned around. This art takes it as given that sight is there, but neither rightly oriented nor looking at what it ought. The other virtues of the soul thus seem close to those of the body; they aren't there beforehand, but are be

most

later

by

produced

habits

and

exercises,

while sound

judgment is

more

divine. It

loses its power, but according to the way it is turned, becomes useful and helpful or useless and harmful. The vision of those with a small soul (psucharion), who are said to be wicked but wise (or clever: sophos), sharply distinguishes the never

things toward

they

ties with

If this

becoming

Cleverness is

a

souls would seem

so that the more

form

it

here

correspond

is relatively

"turn the

which

to

reference

soteriological

is that

food

of

knowledge

ness

she

hadn't

but because

of

its

being

effect on

the

of

and

been

the

(i.e.,

petty)

the fire and artifacts:

attached

to "food and similar

(519b).

is

soul

Eve's

Evil leads her to

created at

such, it is strictly

"small"

to that of those in chains. The

soul's eye

and

Good

even

having

control of

downward"

myth, that of Adam and Eve.

tree of

tion

in

to those

pleasures"

The

considered as

to as

referred

clear when compared

the soul

original condition of

true things. (518d 519c)

would see

intelligence, but

of

persons

to

sharply they see, the more evil trimmed in childhood, and its

part of such a nature were

severed, then

The

means-oriented.

their vision

it is turned,

which

accomplish.

reminiscent of another

attraction

eat

the

fruit

to the

fruit

of

the

not out of willful

the time God gave Adam the proscrip

fruit's aesthetic,

nutritive and

intellectual

value

(Gen

esis, 3:6). The Primal Pair is then evicted from the Garden, not because of their disobedience, but because of God's concern that his status qua immortal might be usurped by them (3:22), and the price they pay is loss of moral innocence, as well as alienation

But the Eden gloss on

from God, Nature

myth portrays no mere

the pains

myth

is

escapee

Janus-faced, his

loss

of

Paradise, but

rather presents a

moving from Nature (symbolized by unabashed of the Cave also presents a transformation which

and gains of

nudity) to Culture. The quence of

and each other.

for the

escape.

both

gains and

Whereas Eve's failure to

loses something as her soul turned

keep

a conse

upwards

Reflections toward the was no

word of

longer

the

Creator

God, but

in Plato's Cave

in her

produced a rapture

only to

subordinate

on and

inferior Adam,

so

looking

toward true beings renders them subject to

upward

the failure

of

being

now subordinate

those with small souls to an

such

-131

that she

to the relatively

keep

their souls

inferior

mode of

being. Neither the

uneducated nor those who spend all their

could govern well.

We

must compel

The former lack

a single aim and

the best natures to go to the study

greatest, to see the good and to go up that ascent remain there. (519c-d)

That

the former lack

is,

tion. A mean

must

emphasis on not

only the "best

In

are to can

people grow

[but]

saying is the

not permit

case of education.

oneself.

students.

which we are .

them

to

...

the latter lack the proper motiva

while

in the

educating solely

natures"

only they

Such

direction,

struck even

in choosing

discriminating cause

be

.

life educating themselves the latter refuse to act (519c).

On the

keeping by way

other

be

one must

the myth of metallic souls,

with

be liberated

Socrates here lays

hand,

of

the "greatest

study"

be

be liberated. against the will of the regime and

up spontaneously

don't

owe

their rearing to anyone and so are right in not paying off the price of rearing to anyone.

The

(520b)

"soil"

of

the Cave produces

an

inferior

Superior

crop.

plants grow

de

because of, the Cave. This passage makes an interesting counterpoint to the Crito (50d-51b), where the Laws argue that the citizens must obey not

spite,

because they So

owe their

you must go

rearing to the Laws.

down into the

common

dwelling

of

the others and get habituated

Then you'll know far along with them to seeing obscure things (skoteina). better than they what each of the images is because you have seen the truth about .

fair, just and good things. Thus the city will be ruled by us and by you in a waking state, not in a dream as the many cities are nowadays. If you discover a life better than ruling for those who are going to rule, it is possible that your wellthe

city will in gold, but in the

governed

come

into being. For there

riches needed to

be happy,

alone will a

life

the

truly

rich

rule, rich not

of goodness and wisdom.

(520c)21

NOTES

1.

See,

e.g., the following: J.

Ferguson, "Sun, Line

and

Cave

Again,"

Philosophical

Quarterly

Cave,"

Phronesis 7 (1962): 38-45; J. Malcolm, (1963): 188-93; J. Malcolm, 'The Line and the Classical Quarterly 31 (1981): 60-68; J.E. Raven, "Sun, Divided Line and 'The Cave Classical Quarterly n.s. 3 (1953): 22-32; R.G. Tanner, "Dianoia and Plato's Clas Revisited,"

Cave,"

Cave,"

sical

Quarterly

n.s.

20 (1970): 81-91.

1 32

Interpretation

2. At 507b, Socrates

it

makes

seem

related, but at 508d he states that the objects, suggesting that

Ferguson

applied

relation obtains

regions are

toward sensible or

either

between the two kinds

of

externally intelligible

beings.

Part I, Classical Quarterly 15 (f921): 152. On the same page, interpretations of the Cave exclusively with reference to the Line: "if

of

complained about

Cave is

be turned

Light,"

3. "Plato's Simile the

internal

an

intelligible

that the sensible and

soul can

to the

focus

sion of articles which

purpose?"

Line,

assimilating their content and these formal issues, see J. Malcolm, 'The Cave

For discus

can one avoid

on

Revisited"

and

A.D. Woozley, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary (London: Mac millan, 1964), pp. 206-28. 4. Myths are said in the Republic to deal with the genesis of something whose true origins lie beyond our ability to know (382d) and to influence the development of moral character (377b).

R.C. Cross

Although

and

a myth

phors can

be

not

may

a mode of

do explicitly

and

be entirely true, it

can nonetheless of

understanding, and so

systematically

be useful, like

and often with art what

a

drug

(382c). "Meta

Philosophers merely does by instinct. Plato,

our condition.

acting upon,

the ordinary person

this situation better than most of the metaphysical philosophers, referred to many theories as and tells us that the Republic is to be thought of as an allegory of the

who understood

'myths,'

his

of

[592]."

soul

Iris Murdoch, The the

of

descent. Brann

ascent and

[katabas] into Hades

that in the

pointed out

also notes

to look

of Good (New York: Ark, 1985), p. 94. Agon 1 (1967): 3. The Republic is replete with

Sovereignty

Republic,"

5. "The Music

(p.

that Pythagoras

88)

is

the way of life of those who "Odysseus tells Penelope of the

on

Odyssey,

down to Hades to inquire about the return Highlands: Humanities, 1975), p. 316.

of

to

below."

day

when, in his words, 'I went

friends.'"

of myself and

imagery

have "told how he descended have gone John Sallis has

said

my

Being

and

Logos (Atlantic

6. Quotations from the Republic are based primarily upon The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968). I have used Shorey's Greek text and have made numerous modifications in the translation. Some passages have been paraphrased. Stephanus pagination refers Republic unless otherwise indicated. 7. In the Gorgias, for example, Socrates attacks Callicles, not by arguing that one who lives a disciplined life will be of good fortune (eudaimon), but by attempting to shame Callicles by liken to the

ing

life

the

of greed

(pleonexia)

he

which

advocates to the

life

of a catamite

(494e)

or cormorant

(charadrios; 494b). 8. H.G.

Gadamer, The Idea

University Press, 1986), p. 9. "Interpreting Plato's

of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian

Cave

as an

Allegory

10.

Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 1942), pp. 440-55, passim. 11

Although Socrates

.

knowledge, in ucts of

the Gorgias

Philosophy

(New Haven: Yale

31.

speaks

highly

(518e),

the crafts, he speaks

of

trans. D.

of the crafts when

wherein

disdainfully

the Human

of

he

Condition,"

Grene (Chicago: he

Apeiron 14 (1980): 78.

University

wishes

of

Chicago Press,

to use them as a paradigm of

criticizes excessive concern with the material prod

them.

12. From the opening of the Republic, Socrates seems to describe the dwelling of the body in the Cave exclusively from the standpoint of the soul, which would explain the appropriateness of the of

Republic

in Hades. For

a discussion of related themes, see Stanley Rosen, "The Role Review of Metaphysics 18 (1965): 452-75. 13. Heraclitus anticipated this pillar of Platonism: "One's way of life (or "character") is one's (Diels-Kranz, fr. 119).

being

Eros in Plato's

set

Republic,"

fortune"

14.

"Interpreting

Plato's

Cave,"

p.

15. We know from Menander (fr.

taking

to oars

in the

83.

241)

that this phrase

absence of sufficient wind.

It

was used

by

sailors to refer to the

can also connote a safer attempt at something.

16. Rebecca

Straus 17.

and

Goldstein, The Late-Summer Passion of a Woman of Mind (New York: Farrar, Giroux, 1989), p. 117.

My

translation

33. The German

reads:

from Metaphysik der Erziehung (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), "Das Licht ist keine willkurliche Metapher der platonischen Ontologie,

ist das Symbol der

und

an und

zerteilt und zerstreut

zentralen Differenz von Sein ist doch kein Stuck daran; es wird nicht

p.

es

Seiendem. Das Licht west in allem Belichteten durch das was in ihm zerteilt

Reflections und zerstreut

ist. Es

als

das

Zerstreuende

gleichsam

und

in Plato's Cave

on and

Auseinandersetzende ist

133

gleichwohl eins

einig."

und

18. At the opposite extreme to the lovers of sights and sounds is what R.W. Hall refers to as an "intellectual One with such "an omnivorous appetite for learning cannot be left forever to its own devices, or fed whatever it desires in the way of intellectual fodder. [A]t a certain stage glutton."

.

the proper

ordering

.

.

becomes crucial, along with the resulting synoptic vision of these "Plato on Philosophical Journal of the History of Phi

of studies

Character,"

systematically."

matters arrayed

25 (1987): 333. 19. Plato's Philebus, trans. R. Hackforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). 20. "For Plato, the task of theorizing was to make men better; to arouse in men a Desire to

losophy

assess

their place in the order,

better fitted to

and

in that

re

through the action of such a re-assessment to become beings

For the moderns [t)heorizing became re-defined as Alan Blum, Theorizing (London: Heinemann, 1974), p. 168. 21. I wish to thank my friend Kenneth Quandt (formerly of the Classics Departments of Uni versity of California at Berkeley and Boston University) and the anonymous reader for their many helpful comments.

a method

participate

for producing

order.

.

agreement."

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93-

102. Republic."

Classical Notopoulos, J. A. "The Symbolism of Sun and Light in Plato's Philology 39 (1944): 163-72; 223-40. Classical Quarterly n.s. 3 (1953): 22-32. Raven J.E. "Sun, Divided Line and Cave."

Smith, N.D. "The Objects 129-37.

of

Dianoia in Plato's Divided

Line."

Apeiron 15 (1981):

134

Interpretation

Stocks, J.L. "The Divided Line

of

Plato, Republic

VI."

Quarterly 15 (1921):

Classical

73-88.

Sze, C.S. "EIKASIA

and

PISTIS in Plato's Cave

Allegory."

Classical

Quarterly 27

(1977): 127-38.

Tanner, R.G. "DIANOIA

and

Plato's

Cave."

Classical

Quarterly

n.s.

20 (1970):

81-

91.

Wilson, J.R.S. "The Contents New Essays

on

Plato

of the

and the

Cave."

In F.J. Pelletier

and

J.

King-Farlow,

eds.,

Pre-Socratics. Guelph: Canadian Association for Pub

lications in Philosophy, 1983. Pp. 117-27. Review of Metaphysics 44 (1991): 525-47. Wood, R.E. "Plato's Line J.H. "The Origins of Plato's Harvard Studies in Classical Philology Wright, Revisited."

Cave,"

17(1906): 130-42.

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes Bernard E. Jacob Hofstra

University

PART I. DIALECTIC AND THE ORGANON

This

is devoted to

article

identifying

tended dialectic. Aristotle treats treatment

of

the Topics the high

dred

a single whole.

it

as

Alexander

the keystone

Aristotle's different (Alexander

inquiry

It is

position assigned

Aphrodisias

firmly

more

than to philosophy since

1-2).

pp.

ages a major role

in

Eighteen hun

hymning

philosophy itself

of

a certain syllogistic

it

presents

the

form in

of

with

way of Aris

which

elementary pedagogical Professor Brun-

as what

(Brunschwig,

exercise.

education

subsidiary

the eight books of

devalued dialectic from

Moreover,

longer,"

in different

with

connected to

Aristotle

Aristotle in

contrasting Plato's

dialectic is only

that

which

and adds a

not a new claim.

was

schwig calls the "game none play any disputation formally organized as a scholastic played

form

that Aristotle

Plato. This is

Aphrodisias,

totle presents dialectic seems exercises

to

(thrigkos, Rep. VII 534E)

conclusion of

often said

by

of

for

the purposes

dialectic in the Topics

fallacies, Sophistical Refutations,

years ago

dialectic

of

p.

ix)

that

is,

the

The disputation format has

down the

centuries since and

has

but its pres temporarily, from the educational only recently faded, in Aris continued so did not prevent a failure of philosophic interest ence, long, totle's texts on dialectic. And when Pierre Aubenque concludes that dialectic re scene;'

perhaps

mains at which

the heart of Aristotle's thought,

has

crept

back into philosophy

it is

a

and which

disguised

Aristotle

and

devalued dialectic

seeks to

differentiate

and

from philosophy (Aubenque, pp. 255, 282-302, 374). Nevertheless, scholarship has come to emphasize the importance of Aristotle's dia

exclude

much recent

Aristotle.2 I would rather conclude that Aristotle understanding of distinguishes dialectic from philosophy, but conceives of dialectic as playing a most honorable role in the life of the philosopher.

lectic to

The

an

Priority

The Topics has been the

of the Topics

and

the Sophistical Refutations

collective

name applied

form

part of the

to Aristotle's

Organon,

"logical"

works

which

for two

This article is adapted from a part of my doctoral dissertation, "Finding the Place for Rhetoric: New School for Social Research. Aristotle's Rhetorical Art in its Philosophic Context,"

interpretation, Winter

1993-94, Vol. 21, No. 2

136

Interpretation

thousand

The term

years.

"logical"

in this

requires quotation marks

context

because the term has a meaning for Aristotle that is different from its meaning logos.3 Aristotle can refer to today. Aristotle's logical works are the arts of these arts collectively as analytics (Met. Gamma 3 1005b3-5; Rhet. A4 1359M0; Met. Kl 1059M5-19) and decisively orients them toward their em in human thought.

ployment

The human capacity for logos is Socrates'

tradition.

Whatever devaluation some

degree logos

tance

for him.

It is

th[e] Socratic

"things"

ambiguous

Socratic

character and

impor

being

"nature,"

offer

It is in speech, in searching for and things, the logos of nature (phusis)

program.

logos

of

understood.

(Klein,

the way to

may for treatment in isolation from its human

agree, for Aristotle

175-79).

pp.

however, that become capable of being under knowledge, it is not for Aristotle itself

or

analytics

a subject

no part of analytics

is

use.

As

most commentators

(Ross,

a science

20-21; Owens

pp.

128-35; Owens [1981], p. 26 notes 7-9; Weil; Evans, pp. 5-6, 73-77; Aubenque, pp. 285-86). Aristotle eschews the temptation of a pp.

speculative

interest in the formal

vant.

Father Joseph Owens

itself

with

sive

deeply

audible and capable of

It is the

[1978], 49-50,

its

adequate words, that the

becomes

If

of

retains

execution of

finding

stood.

in the Socratic

to say, I think, that in one respect at least Aristotelian philosophy consists

safe

in the

charged with a special value

sailing in the Phaedo is a turn to the logos (99D). dialectic Aristotle effected, it is still the case that in

second

the

science of

logic,

and

why he does

so

is

rele

that Aristotle viewed analytics as concerning

activity of humans and with the aspect of at least discur something humans did. Such thought was, thus, contingent

variable

thought as

(Owens

says

128-35; Owens [1981], p. 26). Owens also cites the con sixteenth-century Aristotelian, Zabarella, that there is, properly

[1978],

clusion of

the

speaking,

no

pp.

science of our

thought because

thought is "our

such

product"

(Zabarella, 1.3). The science

that Aristotle did

view

is the dominant

that opinion

is

Aristotle's "logical Analytics. Most

Organon

where

the climactic

opinion

paradoxical

the syllogism, that

of

is,

thought."

For

them do not

The

among

and not

such authors

bother to plays an

Topics is

the Organon as a

Aristotle today; but authors persist in treating

the

Topics,

the Topics

explain

is the

the import

introductory

reversal of the order of

understood as a precursor to the

of

commentators on

Analytics,

Analytics

philological conclusion that the

be

treat any discipline

to the extent that the same

the Prior

the Prior

work.

not

role,

as

the

apex of

precursor of

the

or order of the

and

the Topics

the Organon is assisted

by

is a

"early"

an

work and

therefore only to

Analytics.

There is evidence, however, that the conclusion that these disciplines were is far reaching in its implications and that there was controversy over the character of Aristotle's analytical disciplines from a very early period. not sciences


137

This controversy has affected the treatment of the corpus Aristotelicum, for it is responsible for the creation and organization of the Organon. Paul Moraux tells us:

When he .

.

speaks of

different kinds

From before the time

.

logic

(meros)

as a part

(organon). Alexander itself: it

of

sciences, Aristotle does not

Alexander

Aphrodisias,

of

of the philosophical

it

considers

has its

always

of

as an

sciences, and others,

organon;

(reference)

anaphora

.

.

The

be the Stoics

level

(P.

Socrates

Hadot,

for

.

a part of philosophy.

for the study

154). It is

p.

Platonists differ. It

by

and

to the creation of a regional science of

logic, very

much

in the

that Plato's

not as a regional science

dialectic.

speaks of

The Stoic

Stoics

by

who were attracted

with physics and ethics

modern sense

.

instrument

as an

not practiced

174)

treatments proposed

scientific

seems to on a

p.

.

logic.

to consider

different from it; it is indicate that it is the

to a science

certainly thus an instrument. [A]ll the commentators Stoics and certain Platonists who considered logic as (Moraux [1951],

logic is

.

mention

some wanted

has enduring attraction, and at its heart lies a turn to logic.4 ward the formalization of The energy behind the turn toward formaliza tion is strong, and few have chosen to resist it. Although Alexander affirmed approach

the instrumental nature

he is

credited with

"concerned

Aristotle

the logos works, he did

first using the

"logic"

word

the principles of valid

with

23). Even if logic is what

of

inference"

science, but the formalization

not called a

called syllogism

formalization, for in its modern sense, that is, (Kneale and Kneale, pp. 1, not oppose

continues, both logic

and

explicitly formalized are already potentially the object of Thus, when Pierre Aubenque speaks of the "formal

of

logic

and of

the syllogism thus

a science.

character"

Aristotle's dialectic, that our

ordinary

the nature of

conception of

proach cautions

may

characterization

that

too-ready

important

cover over

may

"logic."

an agreement as

aspects of

others not

(e.g.,

see

Stump [1978],

pp.

But Aristotle's

to

285)

of

in light

of

differing

dialectic's formal

Aristotle's thought

though formalization is precisely the fate that

(p.

seem unproblematic

awaits

dialectic.5

about

the Topics at the

205-14, 219, Stump [1989]),

ap

character

Al

hands

of

the Topics is

essentially formal. Instead the dialectic to which the Topics is oriented is a the human activity of thought for human uses tran

convenient organization of scendent to speech

logos

works

thought in a

itself. Similarly,

Although it is important to Prior Analytics mark

the

a case can

be

made

that none of

Aristotle's

is essentially formal, but each is instead a tentative organization of form that is apt to assist in the process of seeking and learning. or

the

degree to

dialectic in

check

disciplines

of

in

logos,

see

that a

other parts of

which

formal

the

character

Organon,

Aristotle keeps the formal

relation

to the ends

are useful

for

which

(Weil). There

is implicit in, say, the

one must at

the

same

time

side of syllogistic

he believes the

are several ways

and

Organon,

the

in

the

which

138

Interpretation

understanding

hampered

The

works of

the

the Organon will

be

too-formal character.

attributing to them a of the Organon culminates in the

by

order

first

self-evident

essential character of

the

of

principles

(Posterior

analysis of

demonstration from

and a consideration of

Analytics)

dialec

tic arising or apparently arising from accepted or endoxic premises (Topics, Sophistical Refutations). Demonstration and dialectic each concerns itself with

its

The formal

own syllogisms.

Analytics. That book

structure of

the syllogism

appears at an earlier point

than does any of the above noted works.

ordering demotes the formal syllogism in demonstration and dialectic.

The fact that the demonstrative

and

It is

in the

at

least

and subordinates

the

dialectical

is treated in the Prior the

order of

Organon

arguable that such an

it to its

pragmatic uses

syllogisms

have

a similar

is, similarly join the extremes by means of an appropriate mid "validity", noted (An.Pr. Al 24a26-28; A29-30 45b29-46a31; An.Post. A2 is dle term, 71b24-25), but the basis for the distinction between the demonstrative syllog that

ism

and

the dialectical syllogism does not turn on formal considerations. In

stead, the syllogisms apportioned to

dialectic,

are characterized

syllogisms

kind

question. with

those apportioned to

ten

by

hulen).6

which

its

Alexander

of

The definition

of

what

of syllogism turns on the underlying character of the premises in Thus the Posterior Analytics and the Topics consider the material

their

which

which

distinction (he kata

calls a material

as

the nature of the subject matter of

treat. Each such syllogism is distinguished

Aphrodisias each

by

demonstration, just

syllogisms

deal,

that

is, they

consider

precisely that from

the Prior Analytics abstracted.

Demonstration involves

syllogistic

first principles; but dialectical

(endoxa),

that

is,

reasoning proceeding from self-evident from creditworthy opinions

syllogisms proceed

the propositions contained

in the

syllogisms are matters ac

true, but only have the status of belief or opinion for all that (Top. Al 100a25-100b23; An. Post. A2 71M7-25). It follows, then, that demonstrative

cepted as

that, likewise, the dialectical syllogism proceeds from more than arbitrary premises since it pro ceeds from principles which the participants accept. From this fundamental syllogisms are not

material

merely

distinction

follows. Dialectical

of

parts of an axiomatic system and

the dialectical syllogism a secondary formal distinction

syllogisms

actually

used

in

a

disputation

are

in

principle

questions, since the inquirer stands ready to proceed on the basis

presented as

contrary seems true to the respondent (An. Pr. Al 24a23-24bl6). Moreover, even in the Prior Analytics Aristotle seems to cite as the chief

of whichever

motive

for working

production of

out

the syllogism that the syllogism is

arguments, that

is,

that

it is chiefly to be

"fecund"

in the

valued as a means

(An.Pr. A30-31). A too-formal

Organon

conception of

analytics, then,

be misleading

and

turns the

is the capstone of the Organon. Aristotle's analytics, his logos works, have come down to us in a traditional on

its head. It is the Topics

can

which

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes not as

arrangement,

sciences, but

under

the

name of

139

organon, the Instrument or

Organon. Such

an Organon is not valued solely in itself, but also or even because it leads to another end. In its canonical form, the Organon primarily consists of six works. The first three are works concerned with the term (Cate

gories), the sentence (de

These in turn cal

Interpretatione)

the

and

syllogism

(Prior Analytics).

in the Posterior Analytics, the Topics

culminate

Refutations. The first

and

the Sophisti

these considers the requirements of science (epis

of

teme); the second and third, the resources and procedures of dialectic and those fallacies and corruptions of dialectic which make eristic and sophistic reasoning possible.

If the Organon must

as a principle of organization

determine the

ticular,

identity

of

one must understand

understanding terms,

dialectic,

the ends to

is

which

be taken seriously, it is instrumental. In

to

if the first three books

that

sentences and syllogisms as used

then the entire structure will turn on the

dialectic. It is to these that

inquiry

for the

are

one par

sake of

in demonstration

and

demonstration

and

uses of

must turn.

Aristotle's Philosophic Sciences The Posterior Analytics has to do

(episteme)

possible.

The book begins

with

the

with an

conditions which make science

insistence that

science, that

all

is,

syllogistically derived, necessary knowledge, presupposes pre-existing knowledge (An. Post. Al, B19). This pre-existing knowledge is understood as all

the principles

(archai)

way other than by Analytics Aristotle

knowledge;

science.

to

points

through the

we come

of

In

to these we

must

a celebrated passage at

our access

to

the end

what we call

repeated experience of

have

access of

in

some

the Posterior

the universal, to

which

the same thing. We call that access

induction (epagoge), and our human capacity to achieve induction is under stood as intelligence (nous) (An. Post. B19, 100b-5-17; N.E. Z6). Aristotle affirms that induction also provides us with unmediated access to or noetic The Posterior Analytics lies within the grasp of the first principles of things.7

presupposed

framework

tion, but the book is entirely pp.

which

is

constituted

this

through

noetic grasp.

induc

Instead it is

with

13-14, 163).

The hallmark sality

of

the demonstrative

is its

The necessity hypothetical because it is not derived

hypothetically. It is

must not

proof

of

and unchangeableness.

omatic or or

grasp

concerned with

primarily the knowledge that grasp makes possible and so is the conditions for demonstrative proof by syllogism (Aquinas,

concerned

concerned with

of a noetic

not

immediate;

that

is, they

inherently

must

be

necessary

self-evident.

necessity, proof

is

univer not axi

as part of an axiomatic system

a requirement of science

only be true, but

absolute

demonstrative

(episteme)

and

that

its

principles

eternal, indemonstrable

From the

requirement

and

that the

140

Interpretation be self-evident, necessary distinguishing science from opinion and

principles of science

sity

of

there is no science of the contingent. Even ered

from the

The first

the

contingent

Aristotle, in

"To

which are unique

argue

to

can

"for the

or

point of view of what occurs

a sense science and

in

a

be

consid part"

most

sense, not

least in part, also unique in the case of from first principles is to argue from first principles

is,

principle of a science

each science.

when

neces

It follows, too, that

"naturally"

(epi to polu) the result is, for (An. Post. A8 75b33-36).

follows the

and eternal sensation.

each genus

at

oikeidn)."

(to

(An. Post. A2

ex archon

72a7;

A9 75b37-76a31.) Aristotle not only believes that there are several sciences resting, in each case, on different and uniquely appropriate principles, but he denies the existence of a single all-embracing genus of things for, as see also

Aristotle that

elsewhere

far-reaching

constitution of

is

being

proves,

not a genus

the

cosmos

as a

and,

(Met. B3 998b22-23). With

the acceptance of

and problematic claim goes

corollary, that the

equivocity in the is (at best) a

world

unity (An. Post. A 10 76a37-39). For Aristotle's

universe and not a

arts of

analytics, these conclusions portend the acknowledgement that the common principles of thought are not the common principles of

the principles of thought and the principles of

which

common, is itself

The that the to

are

Aristotle's

wanted

respectively,

are

(An. Post. A6, A9; S.E. 11). the knowledge whose character is set forth in the Posterior

rigorous.

canons of

being,

in

sense

equivocal

standards of

Analytics

being. The

They

the Prior

works.

are so

rigorous that it has become

Analytics

"What Euclid later

done for every branch

of

a commonplace

are more appropriate to mathematics than

did, haltingly, for

human

knowledge"

geometry, Aristotle

(Barnes [1975b],

pp.

x-xi). system"

The fact is that "Aristotle simply does not mean to present such a (Wieland, p. 128). The Aristotelian corpus has, in comparison to the standards

forth here, a distinctly aporetic character (Edel, pp. 204-7; Wieland; Barnes [1975a]). The Posterior Analytics do not present a method of investigation,

set

instead it is how

we collect

into

an

intelligible

whole the scientist's various

how

discoveries

facts that their interrelations, and in particular their may best be revealed and grasped. (Barnes [1975b], pp. x-xi; explanations, may also Barnes [1975a], p. 82) so arrange the

we

It may be possible to in the rigorous manner science which reality.

argue of

that

(episteme) ultimately only brings into

Thus,

articulates

living

taneous grasping

is

actual

of

Analytics has

exists

knowledge8

as

a

secondary character, for

a part of

the attributes

even science conceived

of

true the

wisdom

highest

(sophia)

genera of

living knowledge of a being when and only when it knowing. But as living knowledge it is also the simul the principle from which the whole of the science derives;

science

itself in

Aristotle taught that

the Prior

see

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes it is Aristotle's

(sophia),

wisdom

being

genus of

141

the most accurate science in the case of each

and, unqualifiedly, of the most honorable beings (N.E.

Z7; Met.

Al-2 981b26-982bll). (to gnonai)

"Knowing 76a26). Short

whether one

there is necessarily

of sophia

(epistemai). These

the sciences

to the self-evident

access

can

was

deep

(An. Post. A9

the status of controversy in any case than the problematic any science demonstrates only the over

no surer

being of which by love of wisdom (philosophia)

gional sciences as sciences must

is

be

difficult"

For those driven

attributes.

ness

knows (oiden) is

be tentative. The

precise

the status of re

degree

of tentative-

extremely important and controversial subject, and that controversy waged not least within Socratic philosophy. Aristotle's characteristic divi an

the

sion of

whole

to accept such Socrates'

into

separate sciences contrasts

divisions. In proceeding

strongly he does Aristotle

as

with

Plato's

attempts

to

refusal

preserve

first sailing, the sciences of pre-Socratic philosophy, in a revised form.9 These are best thought of as leading in the direction of

Aristotelian As

science.

any

a

result,

actual

Aristotelian

science, despite its the way to its

such

again

principles.10

tentative

cannot

achievement,

Professor Benardete

a

long

it

remain scientific unless

as

for

re-examines

.

to

investigation.""

in

soul

dealing

up the (Davis [1985], cover

by

the way not

itself

desire to

This is less

ascent

pp.

.

pp.

by

which

stand at

evident

accessible

the inversion

the end, not

the

the

actual

beginning

than it should be because the human to exhibit an

irrepressible tendency

p.

61). The Posterior Analytics

science was

originally obtained,

to demonstration. This abandonment

clarity

at

of

the principles of the art or science were reached

75-97; Ferrari, to

2,4)

expresses

with art and science seems

route

which access

obtain

.

(Benardete [1978],

In this sense, the Posterior Analytics task of coming to know. "The principles the

continuously the

becoming dogmatic. Decay

whom

problematical premises.

of

unavoidably

Aristotle, as political scientist, any ascent. morality is an absolute and not open to question; but Aristotle himself founds political science, he cannot be unaware of its concomitant of

necessary

addresses men

insofar

must retrace again and

speaks of this

to science. Science cannot be institutionalized without

is

philosophy because

that affects Aristotle's works:

character

Science

science approaches

claim of

of expression

for the demonstration

and

abandons

this access is

is justified of

that

by

the

knowledge

which was obtained.

In

comparison

European offers

with

the "sweet Analytics

[which] ravished generations of (Barnes [1975b], p. ix), Aristotle's dialectic

scientists"

scholars and

only the lowered horizons of wrangling dispute. The the Posterior Analytics is admiration of all that is

aim of

precise

for the

clearest and most

in human knowledge.

Precisely readers

admiration

will

as a result of the powerful pull of the

have

a

tendency

Posterior Analytics many as explicated in the

to downgrade dialectics

Interpretation

142

Topics. Thus, the

downgrading

of

Topics,

the

during

which occurred

the nine

widespread conclusion early twentieth centuries, accompanied the Prior Analytics. As the version of surpassed and was an Topics that the early of Topics out made his have (Ross, p. Ross says, "his own Analytics

teenth and

date"

.

59;

Kneale

see

and

desire

satisfied a

Kneale,

rooted

form (Evans, conclusion furthers

scientific cal

Aristotle did

what

for this

in

33, 43). That

pp.

2; Forster,

p.

Wolfgang

pp.

Wieland has

this attitude

said

few

(Wieland,

syllogistic

intuitively

p.

on

in human

affairs and stands at

is,

that

of

if his

point of

belief

works consis

by

means of

the

newer scholarship from inexpugnable role to play

the

an

coordination with science.

this assessment and then seeks to understand the order of the

one accepts

one obtains a

surprising

the Topics. The

dialectic (and the autobiographical

an unjustified

as

obvious principles

128). The

least in

in

often results

is demonstration,

has been that dialectical thought has

Eric Weil

and

logos,

scientific aspect of

philologi

The tendency to downgrade the Topics fascination with demonstrative knowledge

method"

lytics

59). The

p.

is only increased by in the Posterior Analytics.

ted of "deductions from a

If

time also

same

for logic in its later

a science.

that the only Aristotelian methodology

Organon,

the

conclusion at

syllogism and

265-71; Ross,

interest in the

an

reason

as presented

for the

admiration

treat as

not

.

.

confirmation of the relative roles of the

relation of science

Topics) is description

to the

analogous of

Ana

(and the Posterior Analytics) to relation suggested

his turn from

physical

science

Socrates'

by

to the logos

(Phaedo 95E-100A). This has the tion

of

following

meaning for

Organon authentically

the

First,

our study.

reflects

so

far

Aristotelian thought,

the admission that for Aristotle dialectical method, the

safed

gation

through the

logos,

must always

as

follow

as

well

as

the organiza

we are vouch

method of

investi

precede apodictic

knowledge. At

level this is the

one

an affirmation of

rience is denial

deeply

of

(one

imitates,

the importance

of such spontaneity.

such

as a

here

who) stands in

that the mimema "is not

way to

its

tendency

to

to

p.

counterpart

but reveals,

36). This is important if

hide its beginnings. Yet the

goes

of

the

so

the

of science

to

order of

conceded the

Organon

dialectic. As Socrates

first sailing, tions

derived from its

of science

individual (tode ti),

to the essential it reflects and

(Zuckerkandl,

resist the

the ancient organizers

dinate

a relation

of expe

meaning of the immanent in and

one

are

the

of

counterpart"

beyond this. The Posterior Analytics, although

point

forms. Such forms

the

But more, it is

The spontaneity

fabric; it is

themselves through the development

almost says

more experience of

than of science.

interwoven into the Aristotelian

or almost produces

only

have

we

everyday life

the separate existence of the

must express which

that

affirmation

artless and spontaneous realm of

as previous

reports

Organon

was

physical

from the discussion

stands

to

treated

by

to and to that extent as subor

he turned from

moves

dialectic. Science

higher status,

dialectic

as

science, the of

the condi

the unachieved,

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes perhaps

humanly

unachievable, goal

is the way

science, but

an

something depends finally

than itself.

and

its

on

The

is

method of such proof

evaluation of either

It is to that

use.

Aristotle

ultimate purposes

Paideia

sciences, but the

of

not

(e.g., S.E. 11 171a40-172bl); demonstration

art

other

philosophy to philosophy and thus as a dialectic. Moreover apodic-

the problematic status of

contrast which underlines

tic proof

of

143

reserves

demonstration

itself

refers

to

dialectic

or

use one must turn to understand the

for dialectic.

Dialectic

Aristotle distinguishes dialectic, which evaluates opinions and beliefs, from knowledge or science, which demonstrates the truth. Aristotle also distin guishes

dialectic from philosophy

totle taught first philosophy philosophic

Aristotelian

He

project.

from

and

philosophy

men

young

and

philosophy through with insight

of puzzles.

urged

Aris

rhetoric.

as

as

gained

fourth

view a

to acquire paideia, to come to be

to understanding the relations of dialec tic, philosophy and science by returning to Pierre Aubenque and his insistence on the formal nature of dialectic and on the identity of that formal dialectic with well educated.

paideia or

We

political

is obviously shot That he taught brings in

and each

science,

from the dialectical treatment

from sophistry

and

and

being

Aubenque

can gain some clue

well educated.

makes

logue

ing

as

being

both these

concerned with

a wise man

points

in the

context of a

reading

dialogue, The Rival Lovers. Aubenque

or pseudo-Platonic

the question of wisdom, that

should most seek.

For Aubenque

the Platonic

of

understands

is,

solution

of

the dialogue raises lies along the way to the

sation with

involving

culture,

conceptions of

Socrates

and

and

dialectic,

carried on

two young rivals.

One

in the form

of

of

thesis of his

main

book that the reality of Aristotle's ontology is dialectic. For Aubenque the dialogue presents a contest between Plato's totle's contrasting

learn

the "node

problems"

which

the dia

with what

and

Aris

of a conver

the rivals is

much

taken

the other is not. Aubenque remarks that the term dialectic

have been already common coin in Plato's time, "where the idea of total is obscurely associated with that of dialogue."12 Aubenque goes on to claim that Plato tries to transform dialectic into a knowledge that is universal because must

ity

it is

supreme.

that

is,

as

knowledge edge

its

the

Such knowledge is aggregate of all

of which permits

place.

It is this

versal science

in this

ically by virtue

call

wants

to

not universal

knowledge;

the rare

in the

rather

philosopher

revised combination of

under

his

its universality that Plato Good dialectic (pp. 281, 277). of

But the Rival Lovers is

it is the Idea

sense,

which

Aubenque

"audaciously"

concerned also with

of

the

to assign to all other

new scheme. can

is, Good,

that polymathy

knowl

the universal and science, uni

new and nonencyclopedic

dialectic

sense

call

Plato says

paradox

it is solely

the science of the

the argument, attributed to Aris-

Interpretation

144

totle, that Plato's Science-of-the-Good a more traditional version of

ing

with

rivals

the young

is

grants that paideia

that he the

it

attacks

competitor

the

that

ranging

pentathlon who can

is especially

best in

wrath

Gorgias. Gorgias skill

in

attack on

because

what

persuasion of

Gorgias

It is

teaching

of

Isocrates.

him

upon

and

.

traits

.

.

that,

p.

Aristotle is

in favor akin

of

corollary

is the reality

They help

in the Gorgias; and the the kinship between Aristotle and

signals

philosophy does

Aristotle's

Aristotelian themes: the

rehabilitation of opinion

Aristotle

returns the old name of

Gorgias

and

Isocrates,

with

the

and

.

.

takes

dialectic.

in

apparent contrast

simultaneous assignment

Aubenque's

dialectic is the

duo tropoi tes

judging

part

substance of

paideia?

teach a nonscientific

Aristotle

paideia,15

now can

way13

be

of

the

seen as

the

an art

that

is

to

by

the

specialist.

dialectic, but Aubenque dis

dialectic

the possibility of philosophy or a more ultimate on

best

dialectic to

skilled man, with

rehabilitates paideia and

this

at

.

the realm of opinion, so that the dialectician

with

hand

differ from the

in Gorgias [that are] perpetuated in the before us the antiplatonic

deny

apt

not

above all to set

rehabilitating paideia, returning the name

It is true that Aristotle

rian

It is this teach

of wisdom.

second

What is this

is

264)

universal, but only is contrasted with the savant,

totle's

proffered

the art that to a greater degree than rhetoric

matched with

failure

bring by

paideia

wisdom

attack

of rhetoric

moves within

regards

knowledge

the

Socrates'

Plato's

of

conceded

is likened to

a wise man should seek

Socrates, (1) in rehabilitating paideia, the Rival Lovers (Aubenque, pp. 282-85), and (2) in what with

by

Aristotle's

to the

knowledge

understands as

opinion as object and to which

(Aubenque,

having

the paideia of Aristotle.

origins of a certain number of parallel with

But

possessor of paideia

only hope to be second best to anyone in any one of the athletic contests in

is

of

persuasion

Isocrates

good to recall these

and, in

kind

Aristotle in the Rival Lovers

Gorgias. And

absent and

gifted

paideia

that the

Gorgias that brings

ing by

The

arguments

because

argued

persuasion

by

each particular sport.

Aubenque believes that the

down Platonic

replaced

Socrates, deal unnamed Aristotle,

Overall victory is tainted

pentathlete competes.

others are

in for the

and even universal.

as shallow and useless.

in the

dialectic must, in turn, be

now conceived as paideia.

who stand

wide

who concentrates on or which

dialectic

as

of a role

wisdom.

questioning his

I

that does not come

assumption

to

issue

that Aris

paideia.14

was said

by

ancient commentators

a second mode of

knowledge (peri

to claim to

pasan

theo-

hexeos)

pursuant to which "there is the ability to show an (krinai eustochos) whether a researcher has got hold of a (Part. An. Al 639al-5). The evidence about Aristotle's

not"

good

theory

or

understanding of paideia is sparse; it consists of the cited reference to Parts of Animals supplemented only by scattered passages where Aristotle refers to a paideia or its lack (Part.An. Al 639a 1-10; Rhet. A2 1356a29; Met. Gamma 3 1005M-5; N.E. A3 1094bl3-28).

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes In

ber

dialectic

identifying

(Ross,

of other commentators

Evans,

17-20). At least

pp.

identifies

that Aristotle

Fortin's

me.

its

pp.

author,

the mode

is that

20-23; Moraux [1951], pp. 174-76; however, Father Ernest Fortin, denies

dialectic. His

paideia with

object

stands with a substantial num

proper

is

what

pepaideumenon) is

common

to each science

is that

remarkable

decisive to

only includes dialectic, that is, to all the sciences; but it also

paideia not

the mode

arguments seem

(Fortin,

256).

p.

to the one passage in which Aristotle reflects

we return

matically,

one

observation

as

knowing

embraces

If

key

has

the art that

Aubenque

and paideia

145

is completely

one who

judgment

on paideia the-

(holds

educated

in making is proceeding rightly or not in the case of practically all sciences (hos peri panton) (Part. An., 639a5-10). Thus the major role of paideia is to capable of

a

as to whether one engaged

a science eipein

to

prepare one

address wouldbe researchers with standards

treatment

ganization and

of a given subject.

Knowing

for

appropriate or

that precision is

inap

(N.E. A3 1094M3-28), that rhetoric is (Rhet. A2 1356a29), and that it is foolish to

propriate to ethical and political matters not

itself

kind

a

of political science

question the principle of noncontradiction prime examples

It is hard to latter is

that Aristotle gives of

identify

insights

Dialectic is

(koinoi)

identifying

while

is to

are

the

dialectic, for

the

universal and

disclosing

deals

with

contradiction within

the universal dialectical

the examples Aristotle gives of paideia

involve,

science."

"the

mode proper

dialectic. It is better to

Nothing

1005M-5)

as a product of

a method of argument which aims at

given premises.

terms

of these

any

(Met. Gamma 3

paideia.

prevent

Paideia is

to each

conclude

tentatively

with

not

primarily,

identical

with

Father Fortin that

[the young] from acquiring the

rudiments of

Iphilosophy]

or,

to use Aristotle's own term, its paideia, even if he cannot hope to gain a complete

mastery

of

it

until much

the student who has not

youth]

will

be hard

later. What is more, there is every reason to suspect that received the proper formation at this privileged moment [of

pressed to attain wisdom at a more advanced age.

(Fortin,

p.

259) Dialectic is

Aristotle's [T]he

not

identical

with

paideia, but nothing prevents it

view productive of paideia.

student who wishes

to

As Fortin

acquire paideia must

principle as opposed to a conclusion or, to put

between

what

is known

and what

is

unknown.

first leam to

being

in

recognize a

it very simply, be (P.

from

says:

able to

distinguish

252)

It is this step that Aristotle's dialectic does attempt and claims to accom although it does so only in so far as dialectic has become what Aristotle

plish,

"peirastic."

calls

peirastic use of

Moreover there is

dialectic is

least

one occasion on which

called productive of paideia.

Stranger, adopting

a suggestion

tic. Aristotle

his tendency to

with

at

by Theaetetus,

calls

it

this very

In Plato's Sophist the

paideia or noble sophis

separate out parts and stages of

the

whole

Interpretation

146

cannot

be

collapsed

understood

if

is

paideia

if philosophy is the entire Aristotelian

into dialectic

collapsed

into dialectic. Instead, the interrelations of be brought into play, for if Aristotle can be

corpus must

or

said

to

have

a candi

in the Rival Lovers it is neither paideia nor dialec date for the tic, but rather philosophy and philosophic science (he kata philosophian epis teme) (see Top. A2 101 a35). And paideia is the early stage, or the beginnings wisdom sought

of

philosophy, while peirastic

dialectic, I hope

to show, provides access to

paideia and philosophy.

In the Gorgias Socrates

calls

true species of politike, namely,

sune) in the polis, that

is,

the coupled pairs stand to each other in the relation of

Something

original and copy.

original, but is inferior to it

thing is

also a

is

it

copy in the bad sense if it pretends to be the less authentic; a copy is a counterfeit. Some

a

and

copy, but in the

original and makes

sophistry and rhetoric copies (eidola) of the foundation (nomothetike) and justice (dikaio-

to that extent present where

The Gorgias is primarily seen whether

it

re-produces

the

otherwise would not

be.

in the bad sense, that is, with in Polus and in Callicles. It remains to

concerned with copies

the poisonous consequences of rhetoric

be

(somehow)16

sense, if it

good

dialectic

and paideia are

in different

ways useful copies of

philosophy which contribute in their way to the wise man's happiness. We will be better able to opine on that when we have identified the purposes or uses for which

Aristotle intends his dialectic.

PART II. ARISTOTLE'S DIALECTIC

Having

considered

the structure of Aristotle's

logos

works and

their organi

into the Organon, I have argued that the structure of the Organon repli in a certain way the "Socratic described in the Phaedo and that this

zation

turn"

cates

is the meaning of how Aristotle's thematic treatment of dialectic is placed the Organon. I have also argued that dialectic differs for Aristotle both

within

from

educated, possessing paideia, and from philosophy, but is closely both. In this part we will take a closer look at what Aristotle has to

being

related to

say about the purposes that dialectic can serve. For that purpose, we turn to the Topics and its

companion

Sophistical Re

futations. The latter, although treated as a separate title in the manuscript tradi tion, is shown by both internal and external clues to be the culminating book (the ninth) of the Topics.'1 Accepting this, Aristotle's treatment of the art of dialectic in the Topics falls into three parts, to which we add the Sophistical Refutations as a fourth. Within the Topics proper, Book Alpha constitutes an

introduction through Eta

and of

overview

the

produce and test

Topics,

of

the proposed

the

bulk

arguments.19

all structure and conduct of

of

the

Book Theta

the

of

art

book,

of

dialectic.18

work

the Topics is

Books Beta

through the

ways

devoted to the

to

over

disputation. It is left to Sophistical Refutations

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes to provide an analysis of

fallacies

147

and sophistic and eristic argument and their

solutions.

Aristotle

no precise

comes closest to a

he defines dialectic

where

Indeed he

aseos).

19-24),

that

definition

dialectic in the Topics. Aristotle brief definition of dialectic in the Prior Analytics (Al 24a24)

gives

suggests

is to be

what

of

"inquiry into that being precise

contradiction"

(erotesis

as

sought

is

way to defend

a

antiph-

is inappropriate (Top. Al 101a and attack

any

problem

consistently.

Aristotle believes that every

tic, trying

172a30-172bl)

has

and uses an

to

elementary form

(Rhet. Al 1354al-6; dialectic is

that the practice of

and

(S.E. 34 183a37-184b9). But

sophists and eristics

he

one

to test and maintain arguments

one

dialec

S.E. 1 1

see also

in

engaged

already

protodialectic

have been the first to transform into

of

is

by

a practice

(This striking priority in reducing dialectic to an art is made in his culminating chapter, chapter 34, of the Sophistical Refutations.) Dialectic as an art, he says in the opening lines of the Topics, is the way which

claims

an art.

claim of

of

reasoning, based on the best opinions, about any

asking, in

our own

case,

ourselves uphold an argument.

Although Aristotle begins and a

way

dialectic such as

in

all

of

can

(Top. Al

21)

by

art

is

arts"

marked

by

not guarantee a result

"a capacity

100al8

"undertake the testing of all things, and is an art of a sort, but not (S.E. 11 171a40-172bl). As Aristotle requires

arts, this

but does

whatsoever and of

calling dialectic an undertaking (pragmateia) investigation (methodos), Aristotle's precise description is that

demonstrative

the

difficulty

no questions which contradict each other when we

of

making

an effective operation

(Top. A3

101b5 10).

syllogisms about a

difficulty

(ergon)

The

from

which aims

ergon of

at,

dialectic is

relevant propositions

possible"

generally believed as is Dialectic also has a perspective dictated

(S.E. 34 133a37-133bl).

which are as

The latter fulfills the

need

for

some

dialectic its definition. For dialectic is terminate because it lacks case of

dialectic,

those opinions with other

by

that

or skill

accepted opinions

use of

commonly

it is

(Evans,

is

inde

73-77). In the

pp.

investigate

through comparison

(Top., A4, 10-1 1; Rhet. A2

accepted

created.

otherwise

practitioners to seek to

which need and will receive clarification

by

be the

most or

Dialectic itself definite

capacity

its

which

opinions, endoxa, is

1356b35-

central

to

dia

endoxa are

what seems to all or

a

the uses for

set of purposes which will give

a proper subject matter

the perspective leads

commonly

36). Thus, the lectic. The

by

finite

case to all or to most or to the wise, and of the

by

the most famed and reverenced. (Top. Al

grows out of the

subject matter and so

is

capacity to

capable of

develop

considering

latter

either

100b22-25)

arguments; it has

what

is

common

no

to all

148

Interpretation

subjects

whatever,

in

and

a peculiar

of

way

developing

both

sides of

1355a33-

100al8-21, A2 101a35-37; Rhet. A2 1356a32-33, 36; S.E. 11 172al2-21; An.Pr. Al 24a24). This itself is a result that

tion (Top. Al

ence can

achieve, for

is

each science

ques

any

no sci

a science of something, and even

first

in being philosophy is universal only insofar as it deals with that which is prior (Met. El 1026a23-32; S.E. 11 172al2-21). Dialectic is an art which, like every

perspectival

art, is directed to a

subject matter supplied

by

human

uses

and purposes.

Aristotle we will

tic,

on

goes on

follow. In

the one

to

discuss these

doing

hand,

and

sophistry

or

the

discourse

ther

discussion

greater

(Rhet. Al

detail,

that the line

a

who

1355bl7

is using

18;

discussion that

between dialec

eristic, on the other, will

the character and moral choice of the one

on

in

purposes

so we should remember

finally

dialectic,

depend

and not on

Met. Gamma

4, 1004M8-27; Sophist 253E; Gorgias 487E-488B). Following Aristotle's fur

hood,

as

as

such

a proper subject

of

Aphrodisias

matter, is

also

to get a better notion of the place or neighbor

should allow us

Alexander

see

still at

calls

it, in

which

dialectic,

although

it lacks

home.

The Uses of Dialectic in Topics A2 There is the

locus

early on in the Topics (A2 101a25-101b4) that provides for Aristotle's evaluation of the uses of dialectical art. We

a passage

classicus

turn to that passage, but

the

uses of

and

finally

with the warning that the explication and evaluation of dialectic that is introduced in this passage are qualified, deepened

transformed in the course of Aristotle's subsequent

emerges and

is developed in the

we will soon

turn.

which

Aristotle

The first exercise

Nevertheless,

there we are

given

cultivation the exercise

Practicing

in the

dialectic that Aristotle

(gumnasia). Aristotle

will

repeats

passage

mentions

further

some clue as

is

that

in A2

requires

is that dialectic

emphasize the gumnasia

is

What

argument.

peirastike20

the three distinct functions

each of

characterizes as useful

use of

nasia; in Book Theta he twice and

course of this argument

to

of

which

dialectic

discussion.

will provide

importance

a purpose of

of

gum-

dialectic,

to the nature of the ability to

whose

is devoted.

is for the

sake of an ability [with logos] and foremost with theories and (protaseis kai enstaseis). For the dialectician in the unqualified sense, so to speak, is someone who can come up with theories and objections. Making up a theory is turning the many into one (for one needs to grasp as a whole that in relation to which the argument is being made). And making objections is turning the one into many, for objections either divide up or dissolve the argument, that is both to concede and to deny that which has been put forward as a

objections

theory.21

is

This ability or capacity can only develop through strenuous use. Gumnasia (Top. A2 101a27-30; Theta 5 159a25-26; Theta 14 163a29). The

exercise

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes exhortations and the

training

strenuous the exercise

become

find

if

the

one

arguments

undoing

has

be

heart

at

one's

Dialectic the

is,

palestra.

instinct

that the case stands thus

with

frequent occurrence,

hand definitions be

as

the word

gumnasia

Dialectic is, however,

point

not a

with

especially

have learned through

about the

and through

already suggests, instinct with the sweat palestral in another sense, for it is also

perfects

without

showing

a

this, the structured disputation does not emerge as a com is to see the implications of the argument, and not to win; used

competition,

for the

sake of

testing

and

inquiry. Moreover,

students are warned against the careless use of

those not prepared for it (Top. Theta

14,

164b8

15). But

practice

the ability. The ends of this ability must lie in the other uses to be

it.

Aristotle

enjoins care as

disputation. But he in

and

the modified and channelled competition of athletes.

The

because it is

made of

seek

first things

of the endoxa and of

prompt about principles and to

the structured disputation is

only

straightway

premisses.22

Notwithstanding

dialectic

and

definitions

Those practicing dialectic cannot uphold an argument competitive edge. (Top. Theta 14 164b 14- 15)

petition.

thus,

and not

to argue with, argue with oneself

arguments of most

well provided with

one ought to

of

just how

questions

have ready

by

show

of each

no one else

leam thoroughly primary

in Book Theta

is to be:

accustomed to convert arguments

investigate to

activities suggested

149

also

to the persons

finds that the

with whom

second

may

important

engage

use of

in dialectical

dialectic

occurs

(enteuxeis) everyday ordinary peo ple, for it is dialectical ability that permits us to work out in detail the convic tions ordinary people have just as much as those of scholars and philosophers. connection with

guarded encounters

with

The resulting understanding is useful in deciding how to talk to ordinary people (Top. A2 101a31 35). In this way dialectic helps one to prepare for the every day social intercourse. The wise man proceeds in such intercourse on the basis of the

beliefs

than from allotrion).

and convictions of the others

what must appear

to those others

(ek ton

oikeion

dogmaton)

as an alien point of view

rather

(ek ton

Interpretation

150

Dialectic is the basis

kinds

of statements

be

to

in

discriminating

of

made to

any

guarded encounters

particular

between the

has to

since one

person,

that judgment based on an understanding of the beliefs of the

other.

make

Aristotle

then explicitly goes on to say that dialectic in this way permits one to make an judgment about how far one can correct the errors of one's audi

appropriate

is,

ence, that

freedom

an

understanding

of

with which one can speak

Aristotle here

agrees with what

dialectic helps

for the beliefs

is erected, for it is dialectic that

tween exoteric and esoteric speech. encounter and others.

ek

is inserted into The third

point at which

or grafted on

use of

is that dialectic is

losophian

ton allotrion

This

249-52),

pp.

order of

that

speech

is

abilities and

grounded

in

disposition

of

the scion or offshoot of

description, in

the

service of

dialectic,

this often cited passage

(tas kata

philosophical sciences

phi-

dialectic is usually identified with 20-23; Moraux [1951], pp. 174-76;

philosophic use of

(Ross, pp. is, assistance in

propaideutic task

Aubenque,

that

the progress

of science.

It is in

that Aristotle's remarks here are often quoted. This theme is brought

this

sense

out

in the translation

[Dialectic] is

useful

by in

impossible to discuss science

in

the basis on which rhetorical

beliefs, as

ek ton oikeion

the basis for the distinction be

The former is

rhetoric,

and

with a re

the mainstem of dialectic.

dialectic, in

useful

epistemai).

dialectic's

provides

takes into consideration the

This is the

be formed all'

(ouk

of others as such

in the Phaedrus 266B-D

says

permit speech to

dogmaton) (Top. A2 101a33). Thus, dialectic is art

to gauge the amount of

(Top. A2 101a33-34). Socrates

273D-274A. What dialectic does is to gard

one

in question,

E.S Forster in the Loeb Edition:

connection with the ultimate

them at all on the

basis

since the principles are

basis

of each

science; for it is

of the principles peculiar

primary in

to the

relation to

everything else, it is necessary to deal with them through the generally accepted opinions on each point. This process belongs peculiarly, or most appropriately to dialectic; for, and

being

of the nature of an

it lies along the inquiry. (Top. A2 101a37-101b4)

m\zs\\ga.\\on(exetastike),ly

principles of all methods of

Professor John Evans, for

dialectic in this Evans

connects this

sciences of

as

that of

this reading

example

simply

as a

(see e.g.,

kind

of skill

theory-making function

in An.Pr. A30. At

dialectic

with

regard

being

what

a

later

23),

in the

to the

understands the role of elaboration of theories.

to the discussion

of progress

in the

in his book, Evans describes the role preparative for induction; and he links

point

the unique

Aristotle

p.

path

says elsewhere about

the

tled experience and, through experience, progress to the

development

inductive

of set

act and the

resulting firmer establishment of the science (Evans, pp. 33-41). But theory-making in the sense of a modern philosophy of science cannot be the whole story in dialectic, for when Aristotle speaks of dialectical skills he adds to theory-making the different function of critique, division and dissolu tion.24

Moreover,

although

Aristotle does believe that the

value of

dialectic is to

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes a

large degree based

its

on

sciences, one must carefully assess what

To

attempt

sense

modern

would

fail to

to treat dialectic would give

adequate

is the highest

peirastic

Metaphysics

ing

with

the

where

Aristotle

totality

of

Aristotle were a

importance

the

of

by

means

philosophy of science in the of dialectic to Aristotle: it

dialectic. Let up

begin

me

and contrasts the exclusive ways of

the cosmos. There he

names

is that it is

(1004b26-28). Aristotle's description

is

not complete without an

Peirastic Dialectic

The the

relation of

and

understanding

Theta that together

philosopher

Topics A2

make

is

least

There

suggests.

that point. Dialectic

important to

as

understand

phistic and eristic context of

the

dialectic

pretensions of

and

its

are

peirastic, the

sophistry

and

relation

eristic, that

than

two passages in Book

163b9

even closer.

18,

Top.

cf.

intimately

also

Aristotle

eristic.25

asso

even speaks

(geitniasis)

one considers

is

intimate

not

neighborhood

(S.E. 34 183b3). When as

and

differ from philosophy (Theta 1, 155b3 17). Dialec

does

that dialectic is

inseparable from, sophistic dialectic living side by side in the same

ciated with, and of

dialectic

closer and more

in the way it works up its theories and objections is immediately propaideutic to philosophy (Theta 14, A2 101a35-37; S.E. 16 175a5-17). at

of

and

dialectic

of peirastic.

tic

It is

mentions

Sophistry

dialectic to the

cool appreciation of

he

word or aspect under which

that

deal

dialectic, sophistry

But the

uses

of this article

the passage in the

with

philosophic science. peirastic

this claim.

omission, for it is the thesis

sums

the philosophical

to what Aristotle calls peirastic

consideration

no small use of

if it

as

understate

(peirastike). This last is

the handmaiden

operation as

151

with so

the relation in the

The

main weapon of

which makes possible

their false

knowledge, arises at the same moment as does peirastic argument (S.E. 8 169b20-25; 34 183b 1-9). The intimate relations of dialectic, philosophy and sophistry are summed up in the passage in the Metaphysics where Aristotle says that dialectic, sophistic claims of

philosophy alone deal cisively different ways. and

In coming to

undertaking

understand

the task

of

with

the wholly universal, although each

Aristotle's

peirastic

doctrine

the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's

We

the

Consideration

of

sophist.

the doctrine

of

must

simultaneously that

is,

we are

study the point at which peirastic and

seeking identify sophistry come together in order to distinguish, so far from peirastic and from dialectical uses in general. to

we are

Sophist,

in de

peirastic,

finally,

as

needs

possible, sophistry to

be

prefaced

by

noting the way in which the term appears in Aristotle's text. First, the word itself appears to be an Aristotelian invention. A search of the Theasauras strange

Linguae Graecae

shows

that the term originates

with

Aristotle, is

used

by

him

Interpretation

152

in the Sophistical Refutations Metaphysics. Thereafter it

and

appears

in the

passage,-

already quoted, from the

only in Aristotle's later Greek

commenta

tors.

is,

As already noted, the term does not appear early in the text of the Topics. It as I have pointed out, carefully avoided in the discussion of the usefulness

of

dialectic in Topics A2. In Theta 5 Aristotle does twice

disputation

first

of

testing (peira),

as

the

from

noun

these references, Aristotle couples

which peirastic

refer

dialectic

to

is formed. In the

peira with yet another

for inves

term

tigation (skepsis).

When Aristotle of

the Sophistical

in retrospect,

introduces the term

finally

peirastike

in the

Refutations, however, he paradoxically

we should

be

able

to see that the peirastic

second chapter

seems

to assert

has been

skill

that,

at

the

along as the subject of discussion throughout the Aristotle defines four kinds of discourse (didactic, dia

center of our attention all

Topics. In this

lectic,

passage

logoi). Once he has laid down the

peirastic and eristic

definitions, how

ever, he remarks that only eristic speeches have not yet been thematically treated. Didactic speeches, he tells us, were treated in the Analytics (wis alutikois) and both peirastic and dialectical speeches were treated "in the other an-

places"

other

(en wis allois) (S.E. 2 165b9-ll). We are left to conclude that these places in which dialectic in general and peirastic in particular have been

concurrently treated are, in both cases, the totality Topics. Peirastic is always at issue in dialectic.

of

the preceding pages of the

Peirastike is the art, skill or capacity that corresponds to the Greek adjective peirastikos. This means: to be tentative or experimental, but also to be capable of

testing

or

assaying,

undertake or

attempt,

of

tempting

and

peira,

or attempting. a

It is

related

to peiro, I try,

trial or experience and thus both to the

ordinary word for experienced (empeiros) and to that for inexperienced (apeiros). Thence, there are available as puns a group of words related to peiras or

Thus

peras,

limit, bound,

peirastike

unclear and

having

implies

end.

a skill

in

or

capacity for both being uncertain or For this reason it has seemed better

exposed or made clear.

me simply to transliterate the Greek word as peirastic rather than to alternate between and or to use a clumsy and paradoxical phrase that contains both of the contrasting pair. Indeed, if a translation were to be

to

"testing"

attempted

English a

it

"tentative"

would seem

directly

that

referring to

"elenctic"

"maieutic"

or

ways,

"Socratic,"

or

Socrates'

would

be best

words

in

and most correct as

translation of the term.

Peirastic is Stranger there tes. The

tive

calls

Stranger's

maieutics,27

like the "noble

most

and we

paideia26

and which

claims are

have

of paideia rather

than

Sophistical Refutations

in Plato's Sophist

the Stranger

implicitly

different from those Socrates

shown

that Aristotle teaches that

identical

echo

sophistic"

with

it. The

Plato's Sophist is

makes about

really

the

to Socra

dialectic is

extent to which the

nevertheless

which

assigns

Topics

quite

his

produc and

remark-

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes The Topics

able.

the

Stranger's

the

Plato

Aristotle, the differentiated;

lated

and

both there is

sophist, the eristic the philosopher

in light

in his treatment

division. In both

the dialectician

and

emerge as re

explicitly found in either;

not

of

of

are

the

guises of

and

in

the sophist which are only to

the problem of nonbeing. As

Stanley

the Sophist the multiple guises of the sophist

Rosen

lead

the dialogue through the need for grasping the ways

second part of web of speech

is dissociated from reality

and fraud are simultaneously made Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations.

of

is

method of

a concern with paideia.

understood

Even

the

repeated applications of

The four types in the Sophist be

mention of

types adumbrated in the early part of the Sophist as the

results of

and

Sophist, for instance, by its

the

as a work evokes

same character

153

in

into the

which

the

the result that human creativity

with

The

possible.

suggests

us

same

issues

are at work

in

Aristotle has explicitly introduced peirastic dialectic, it is only by asides to the treatment of fallacies in general and of sophisti

after

illustrative

way cal fallacies

and refutations

in

that Aristotle gives

particular28

us

its thematic

first we know only that peirastic is the kind of discourse (logos) double source; insofar as it is a speech made to a respondent, it is in opinion and insofar as that respondent is someone who has claimed

treatment. At

has

which

grounded

to have

a

knowledge, it is

is in

who

possession

poioumenoi echein

ises to

in

grounded

is necessarily implied to

what

knowledge (ek

of

anankaion

someone

toi

eidenai

pros-

(S.E. 2 165b4-7). Aristotle vaguely prom claims involved or peirastike

ten epistemen)

expand on either the

ton

implicit knowledge

itself. It is only

Aristotle

when

gives

an explication of

characteristic arguments of eristics and dialectic"

of matic way.

(koinoi) (S.E. 170a35-37)

Aristotle

says

the

ways

sophistry involve "the

finally

that peirastic

that the characteristic

in

which

in

emerges

the

topics

universal

a

the

arguments of peirastic also are

those using the koinoi.

Aristotle identifies

one

kind

of

ment of peirastic as well as of

three

(sophistry,

fallacy

eristic and

fallacy

fallacies

advantage of the respondent's appropriate

(oikeion)

This latter form

which

fallacy

is the

within

treatment

by

his

using

argu of all

analysis of a particular

begins in

in fact employ

ignorance

to the subject

of

presenting the characteristic that Aristotle's treatment

so

peirastic) is found

in Sophistical Refutations. This

consideration of those

as

sophistry,

valid

chapter

7

with a

syllogisms, but take

arguments

which

are not

matter under consideration.

sophistical

fallacy

par excellence and

is, in

is typically employed in peirastic (S.E. 7 169b23-25). The primary difference between the sophistical and the peirastic uses of the same syllogism is that in peirastic the point is to make it clear where

turn, the

same argumentation

that

wrong (deiknuntes agnountas), while neither sophist for any such clarification (ou poiousi delon ei agnoei) looking (S.E. 8 169b24-29). Aristotle then drives his point home with comparisons of

it

was

the

nor eristic

respondent went

is

Interpretation

154

Socratic

asking him

by

with a respondent not

fallacious assumption, but the

makes

by having

In any

lines

case all such are

they

in form

of

versal dialectical terms (dia ton

like

1005al6

and

the

and

part and

species,

as

and

or

is

whole,

part of

common

koinon)

is their

to

without regard

170al2

13). What

all

the uni

employment of

being, unity, same, 1003b36, 1004al8-21,

terms such as

Gamma 2

(Met.

to this list contrariety,

prior and

dialectical

inclusive

the dialectical art is and

adds

hominem, (S.E 8

posterior,

motion and

[Owens, 1978,

rest, genus

275-79].)

pp.

if in apology for the sudden introduction of a consideration of peirastic in the midst of a discussion of fallacy, Aristotle reminds

that it

reader

lectical

his

Socratic

misrepresentations (pseu-

involve

are ad

reasoning

unequal

unlike,

18; Father Owens

Almost

sophistry

will

arguments or refutations

these lines of reasoning also have in

other,

the

169b31-35).

deis) (S.E. whether

it;

implicit. Some

one relies on explicit concession, the other on

these arguments, in either case,

all of

implicitly

assume

explicit, elicits agreement and then shows the conse

assumption

The

quences.

to the point of

questions which go

him

The latter deal

procedure.

the eristic or sophistic

procedure as against

art

to deal

and must give an account of the

the peirastic, in

addition

starts again and

introduces his dialectical

to

because

with such an analysis

an account of

dialectic

apparently dia proper (S.E. 9

170a8-ll). Aristotle sophistical

with a consideration

argument

of

account of peirastic and

the distinction that people are

reaching for when they attempt to draw a line between verbal and conceptual arguments. Aristotle attempts to show that that distinction ultimately has its roots

in the distinction between the kind

of

teaching

by

effected

the

methods of

didactic teaching on the other hand (S.E 10 171a28-171b3). The didactic method or lecture is appropriate for teaching sub

dialectic, jects

there is

of which

certain

first

noetic

grasp

supposing

a

of

and

demonstration,

principles which

from the

elicit them

hand,

the one

on

auditor.

It

such as mathematics.

proceeds

from

it is up to the auditor to reach for; it does not first If the student does not already have a pre-existent

the principles, didactic

trustful acceptance

of

teaching

proceeds on

the teacher on the part

of

the basis

of pre

the student (S.E.

2

165b2-3) who obtains thus a first knowledge of science as a kind of dogma. Dialectic, on the other hand, and its highest form, peirastic, can only pro

by way of eliciting responses from the auditor; dialectic is necessarily ad hominem. The fact that fallacies are similarly ad hominem is relevant. Both in fallacies and in dialectic the respondent has to find his own way out of the ceed

difficulties is

and cannot

appropriate

to peirastic,

proceeding from

Fallacy,

rely

on

and

occurs when a

lecturing

certain principles as

again, is both like

dialectical terms

the questioner. That

can

be

in

is

not.

The

is why reverse

dialectician does

so

is the

actual mathematical

and unlike a mistake

used within

question-and-answer

in

case

if

we are

demonstration.

mathematics.

Universal

their proper sphere, and actual dialectic

(ho kata

to pragma theoron ta

koina). The

Aristotle'

Dialectical Purposes

s

sophist

tries to give the appearance of

dialectician who, if he people who have some hold

is

a

doing

truth, but know but think they know. So in a

not

draws

anyone who

ing

in

talking

we are

eristics,

In the

however,

on

the

instead

with

peirastikos

the work of

do

those who

sense when we speak of sophists or

misapply dialectic in just the way that diagram is attempting, but fail

about people who

misleading

and

blunting

not on

dealing

of

thing;

same

mathematical

to do mathematics while in some sense making use of mathema

an effort

tics (S.E. 11

a

the

fallacy, is bent

uses

155

171M-8, 35-38).

case of

not with a

is only, in the best case,

in

and eristic and

sophistry

dealing

we are

a use of

case of the abuse of

blunder in

a settled

logos. Speech in the

dialectical terms lacks the discipline

science, but realm of

reality, for there is

of

a

dialectic, with what

the universal

gap between

speech and reality:

Now dialectical terms do

not

deal

they ho katholou), for

explicate nothing, nor are

toioutbs oios

(en heni tini genet) make

everything

if

and

involving

universal

The

do

not stand

subject

truly

in

one

level

involving

procedures

communicating in opposed

us

back

and

to the

in dialectic, that is, to to the apodictive demonstration. Aris

no art which can explicate some particular

indifferently

would not proceed

by

proceed with

questioning,

its first

thing (tina

be demonstrative. Dialectic is interrogative. If it

about

principles

once more

to

as

science and

denied

only

universal class

self-evident

cannot

explication, it

they

(oude

universality is possible, it is not such of principles. (S.E. 1 1 172al2 14)

interrogative. It and still

matter,

universal

saying:

is that

result

determinate

dialectical terms brings

the dialectical conversation as

by

all things

stand under one set

characteristic methods of

totle continues

with some

the same nature as the

some sort of

The difference between those

of

or at

phusiri) is

principles affirmed or

least

was a

kind

of

would raise questions

the less important items. Without concessions to begin with, dialectic

can make no

headway

its

with

objections.

It is the

same with peirastic.

(S.E. 1 1

172al4-21) Socratic

conversation

he insists he does who

not

test anyone who

consequences of

that way the

Socrates'

not presuppose

know. Instead it involves the

lacks knowledge to

necessary

does

respondent

the

supposed

auditor

may

does

claim

knowing

to know in terms of the

knowledge (S.E. 11

not come

something, for

undeniable power of one

172a21 28).

In

to knowledge of the subject

discussion, but he may come, first, to wonder and then to knowledge of himself, the knowledge that he, like Socrates, can know that he does not know. This, in turn, is just the Socratic refinement of ordinary, everyday conversa under

tion. What

is

refined

is the

consciousness of one's own use of

dialectical terms (which ordinary

conversation

hardly

reaches).29

the universal

Interpretation

156

Thus

is

peirastic

may be

in

applicable

subjects, but

of

a

self; it is a

and

sense

kind

a new

the

it

that

of

(apophaneis) (S.E. 11 172a39). This is

Socratic argument, (S.E. 11 172b 1-2).

work of

Sophists, Eristics

knowledge in the

of universal

any subject; but it is a knowledge, not knowledge, not of eide, but like a knowledge

discussion

exclusions and negations

others

kind

capable of a

of of

root and

science, very different from all

of art or

Socratics

Sophistry makes use of dialectic, but goes beyond it in a sense. In the open ing passages of the Topics (101al8 21) Aristotle says that investigation and maintaining

arguments are

art

and

exploits;

he

the characteristic human activities that the dialectical

says close

to the same

thing

beginning

the

at

of

Rhetorical

Art. Aristotle distinguishes the activity of investigating arguments from that of sustaining them, however, when he comes, at the end of Sophistical Refuta tions, to

make a

final summing

peirastic effective operation

(dunamin

cations said

sullogistiken).

see

(kath

proper

(ergon) is simply

identity

hauten) dialectical

ability to seek

an

The sustaining

to arise from dialectic's near

183b7;

The

up.

of arguments

is

and see

set apart and 183a37-

sophistry (S.E. 34

with

and

impli

Rhet. A4 1359b8-12).

Dialectic

as a way of upholding argument, Aristotle says, can most clearly in the fact that the sophist asserts not only the ability to seek and see implications as a dialectician should (ou monon dialektikos), but asserts also the

be

seen

power of

doing

eidos) (S.E. 34

as

were all there were to

contrasts

modesty

Socratic basis

Aristotle

if this

Socrates'

Aristotle specific

this

of

the sophist's

of

knowledge (alia kai hos

183b2-4).30

with

this sophistic claim;

that modesty that gives the clue to the

taking

opinion as no

but it is the

implications for

different from the truth. Aristotle

says:

This is the conceded

reason that

he did

not

What Aristotle

asked

characterizes as

pejorative

enduring demonstration

Socrates

questions, but did

not answer them.

For he

know. (S.E. 34 187b7-8)

meaning)

sophistry (and

exploits

with

Plato

gives

that possibility of speech

that term its

which mimics

itself empty (S.E. 1 165a22-24; 11 171b28-30). It is this negative characterization of dialectic that lends credence to Pierre Aubenque's conclusion that the ultimate formulation of Aristotle's dia lectic is as a purely formal and negative activity, for Aristotle clearly says that while

being

Socrates'

Socratic

peirastic

is the

remarks of similar

Universality,

finally

are

speech of one who

import in

critical

other places

activity,

formality

does

in his

not

have knowledge

work.

in character,

Aubenque

and makes

concludes that

openness to the totality: such

the traits which Aristotle recognizes in a [dialectic].

.

.

One

sees well

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes in

enough

sophistry

what sense that conception of

and of rhetoric as against

[dialectic]

157

constitutes a rehabilitation of

the Platonic attacks on them.

(Aubenque,

pp.

252, 285) As I have already suggested, my opinion is that if the emphasis in this reading is on the formal in the sense of the empty character of dialectic, it misstates the role of dialectical negativity and turns it into a quasi-Kantian emptiness of

thought.31

Instead in

order

for Aubenque's

to show an alternative

reading, I return to Aristotle's claim that sophists act as if speech and opinion

that opinion is all there is to

Saying meaning.

can

knowledge.

there were to

were all

To

accuse sophists of

knowledge has if opinion

improperly

mean, of course, that a sophist

forth the truth

as

acting

double

a

and opposed

knowledge

and

are

identical

offers an argument as

setting

things. It can suggest dogmatism. But such an accusation

of

equally well may mean skepticism of a specifically sophistical the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition sophistic skepticism with its

from argument, that is,

At least in

sort.

consequence of

hatred for discussion (misology), (Phaedo 89C-90D; cf. Sophist 234C-E), is the more dangerous form of skepticism because it amounts to the denial, at least with respect to the whole, of any revulsion

knowledge human

is distinct from

which

Sophistic

Such

opinion.

is the denial

skepticism

opinion.

of

skepticism

that there

is knowledge

as opposed

to

teaches that to attempt to distinguish between

knowledge is simply illusory. In its most radical and elegant form, it is the assertion of the Protagorean argument as set forth in Plato's Theaetetus

opinion and

(152D-168D). There is

into two and

is

there

and

private,

no ultimate

truth available to men;

there are only individual perceptions,

classes

speech.

Knowledge is

illusion,

an

understanding this. Aristotle is identifying sophistry in its two forms of dogmatism and skepticism.

what

with

falls

there is

which are

incorrigible

and wisdom

the illusion

of

is

knowl

edge

In the Theaetetus Socrates

Protagoras,

refutes

faction, by insisting finding agreement there between Socrates on

1.183). At the now

be

same

an art of

For Aristotle are all uses of

to

use an art

There is The

sophist

is

time it is a

overcoming

a

out

is to

for the

an

satis

and

ignorance

and

Theaetetus (Benardete [1984], p. wisdom, for wisdom will not

art, sophistry

a sophist or

end.

Such

eristic,

and eristic and peirastic

as well as

a use always also

sophist's adoption of

to be a peirastic, is

involves

fallacious

moral choice.

claims of

knowledge.

to gain a reputation, and the paradigmatic motive for gaining make

money (S.E. 1 165a23; 11

tes also attacked the sophist's

Aristotle

error

Theaetetus'

redefinition of

dialectic is

human

and

least to

all other men.

dialectic. To be

a motive

a reputation

the possibility of mistake,

although

for

at

and

the

171b27 28).

rhetor's unlimited

agrees with that characterization.

For many for the

Plato's Socra

seeking for fees,

modern

and

commentators, of indepen-

sophists'

this is to be dismissed

as a class-based scorn

lack

Interpretation

158 dent

(Stone,

means

42; Kerferd,

p.

be taxed

totle ought not simply

that

The

heavy

a

happiness,

must

his friends

was proverbial.

means;

Aristotle has

poverty further point and

a

that sophistry is essentially

insisting

be

to

sophistical motivation which needs

Aristotle's

de

and

and

argu

explicated.

a

moneymaking the fact that lies elsewhere, although was a socially distasteful way of making a living. For this reason, it important to put aside the question of the position of the historical it may begin

enterprise

fee-taking is

how

goods and

reasonable

goods,

this claim of

point of

perhaps

in

sophists

He is very clear burden is placed on

Socrates'

presuppose external

ment about

35-40). But Aris

pp.

the fact that philosophy, the highest human

by

pendence on

25-26; Guthrie,

with a partisan political act.

philosophers need external

philosophy

pp.

order

to understand the moral

with or exploit

defects that Aristotle

the term to

uses

impute. There is

double-sidedness to sophistry

a

in Aristotle. On the

and eristic

one

few if any vices, hand, sophistry wouldbe philosophers do not show traces. On the other hand, the term is a loose way of referring to an identifiable group of individual thinkers. In this latter sense sophists emerge and re-emerge in history in various guises, for are the philosophic

and eristics

whom

They

is the insistence that

the principle are

insights,

Gorgias

Protagoras,

and

Nietzsche

and perhaps

or

of which

knowledge

opinion and

splendid

fellows

Heidegger

John

or

are

identical.

with splendid and serious

Dewey

Richard Rorty,

or

fellows, but denying in the name of knowledge the possibility equally of knowledge. One wants both to embrace the fellow philosophers in such splendid

persons

or, alternatively, to

which

they

vices.

If Aristotle

present

permanent pejorative

party the

Socratics, deeply the

any

sign of ever

the

If

stand

the

and

claim

fee-taking

In any

we

gratefully

of

intellectual importance

of

than to

have been Plato

nor

the

Gorgian

them

and

of

the

party Aristotle shows

indistinguishable,

read

read

gave a

to have been the party

likely

case neither

Moreover they

they

when

activity

with

philosophic

themselves sophists, then the

the moral and

knowing,

favorite

or

and the

nearly so, Protagorean

the texts of

Nietzsche,

that Aristotle's partisanship is

a

partisanship

of

ideas,

of

in the Gorgias, then we will be able to under that the sophist develops and uses dialectic for self-aggrandize

as

ment and gain

more

our

Dewey.

and

life,

partisan

that sophists are the

philosopher.

we can accept

ways of

of not

conservatives.

forgetting

in

who called

acting is

persuaded of

texts very carefully, just as

Heidegger

engaged

were

knowledge

philosophy dominant Athenian congeners of

Plato

them the struggle against that

invitation to indulge in

flavor to those

behalf they

on whose

as

i.e.,

us, and

project onto

an

Socrates

in the is

says

narrowest possible sense

for

want of

any

other

motive,

emblematic of that narrow sense of self-aggrandizement.

There is something feckless about such a use of the most important and highest There is even something deeply comic about the sophist of the analytic arts.32

who claims

to

have the

key

to empire and power

(Gorgias 452D), but

offers to

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes it to

teach

others at

[all things] quickly 234A).

On the of

any art'

a small

only

fee. He turns for

and offers them

for

sale

be

to

out

159

"makes

someone who

sum"

a

very

(Sophist

small

hand, the sophist claims his art is more important than that of others, because, as Stanley Rosen says, "[t]he purpose of the 'focal

other

the

sophistry is to

satisfy our desires [while is the law, written and un written, of the (Rosen, pp. 165-66, 160-61). Comic sophistry is too close to philosophy for comfort. Rosen elsewhere says: of

enable us to persuade others to

overtly] the primary theme

of sophistical speeches

city"

is

Sophistry

rival to philosophy because it claims to deal with the welfare of is based upon the sophist's putting opinion in the place

a

.

the whole city. This claim

knowledge. In

of

other words, the crucial

thesis

of

sophistry is that

higher than knowledge. The Sophist does

not

knowledge,

or geometry.

is

whether of some

shoemaking

technical knowledge of opinions about the good;

no

knowledge

of

how to

opinion

is

that there is technical

deny

His

point

instead,

is

rather

that there

there is technical

persuade others to accept our opinion of the good.

(Rosen,

p.

160) This drive to

bring

to one's side fits in easily and

others over

the sophist's moneymaking time both persuasion and

teaching

the art

of

At the

wisdom.

which claims

directly

with

to be at the same

time the sophistic desire to

same

money from teaching is, in the Socratic tradition, only a derivative from different kind of gain-seeking. This second understanding of the meaning of

make a

gain-seeking shows a fiercer side of the fictive drive to persuade than before. The motives and skills of the sophists would not be fully

sophistic we

have

seen

elucidated as

they

by

are

in

Knowledge

Protagoras horizon

of

considering the sophists as teachers. They must also be elucidated a passage in Seth Benardete's Commentary on the Theaetetus: and wisdom are not

.

this ground alone. of a

food?

.

.

own

The

...

.

.

.

.

The

soul.

Wisdom is

.

the Heraclitean

The

The

soul

is

He is

image. (Benardete [1984],

its

have

by

flux;

means of

drugs

are

Knowledge,

drugs the

patient's opinion

speeches; what, then, is the

feed

healthy

it

on

every

a

1. 121-1.

a

city is a The

other city.

assimilates other souls

wise who can make someone or

pp.

the

only if they leave

own assimilation to another

when

which

wisdom works within

are effective

...

condition can

becomes

that though sophists

wise

changes

sophist's

can resist

power.

sophist so elucidated

Republic

.

The doctor

.

A city that

holds for the

same

itself.

of

city, and the city in the best

healthy

his

.

food's bitterness.

soul's

the same [for Protagoras].

only once, is ineradicable illusion. mentions

to

something into

122)

type of the

tyrant.33

handbook for

Socrates

handling

public

says

in the

opinion, it

really coopt the young into the ways of public thinking (Rep. VI 492A-493C). It is the statesmen who have power, then, who are the true sophists. If we are talking of assimilation that is overwhelming, the

is those in

power

in the city

who

Interpretation

160

(nomos)

sophists'

distant copy of the tyrant's use of social pressures 303B-C; see Benardete [1984], pp. III.138-UI.139). is

art

(Statesman

a

sophistry presuppose a neediness and a capacity. But the sophist has a different character from the neediness that

Both philosophy the

neediness of

characterizes

and

Socratic eros,

does the

and so

The

sophistic capacity.

nizes

from Socratic neediness, and the neediness that the in himself and in others drives him to seek unlimited

kinds

of neediness

turned away

recog The two

gain.34

stand

in the Phaedrus.

speeches

nibalistic, "just as the

The

to

wolf

love,

to his neediness

sophist responds

endless assimilation of others through

the world,

views of

Sophistic

wisdom

incorrigibly

has its

(Phaedrus 24 ID).

by

an endless pursuit of

wealth, an

the creation and imposition of persuasive

roots

he thinks

are

in

reaches out to others

illusion. The belief that illusion is

ultimate

assimilative and can

equally true, false or indifferent. in the skepticism that believes that each of us, as

all of which

private,

Socratic

the second

and

Socrates, is

says

lamb"

loves the

first

the

other as

each

Lysias'

has

sophist

sophist

speech

ultimate

is

the

on

only

basis

of an

the

denial

coupled with

the distinction between opinion and knowledge. The two provide the under

of

motivation

pinning

case, to a

here

person's

search

[S]ophists draw .

.

...

becoming

of

those

on

for knowledge into the

but is

Aristotle

from

too often

satisfied with appearance.

1355bl7

18:

for sophistry does philosophy, but differs from it Sophistic does not seek reality,

themselves the appearance of the philosopher

the sophist's choice of a way of life.

"Sophistry lies

Dialectic, Philosophy

and

not

the worst

whom

pursuit of wealth and power.

grapples with the same class of objects as

by

lead, in

that

moral choices

that corrupt and burntout case to

the name of sophist. The sophistic character results

gives

perverting the

.

for the making

.

.

...

.

(Met. Gamma 4, 1004bl8-27; see in a skill, but in a moral choice.")

also

Rhet. Al

Philosophic Sciences

The philosopher, however, makes a different choice, that is, the choice to knowledge believing that is right.35 It is a choice that is made possible

pursue

by

the

knowledge

knowledge use of

of

dialectic;

display

friends, right, in the

deeper

reason

(Fortin,

p.

whether

short

for

259),

537D-539D) by a

lover

such a person also must

a moral character.

one's

is

ignorance (peirastic), but it is ignorance. One who engages in peirastic is of one's

motive

a

is something like that

the respondent or the audience or

study from

which

also

then

Socrates'

practice

young

(which is the

men.

a

human

of

both.36

doing

words

some

in the Republic (Rep. and record

him

one more aspect of the motive

motive of the teacher).

A

for

If Father Fortin

the relatively young

throughout the dialogues

There is

will

good

I have already quoted, that there is

we must correct

Socrates'

making

the

with

motive, and that motive

education through peirastic to start with

of philosophic

peirastic

The

have

identical

not

friendly

motive

is

as

for

charac-


by

terized

selfless

is, for

action, that

1 163b2-5). But Aristotle

also

such

within

self-interest, grown

action

for the

insists there is the

sake of

the

other

-161

(N.E. 18

in any friendship, and persons into the love of the

self-interest

soul of good

noble, is good (N.E. 18 1169b2-3). Aristotle separates philosophy from both peirastic and dialectic, although he seems to admit the intimate association of all three. In the culminating passage of

Metaphysics

the

where

Aristotle both

distinguishes dialectic, dialectic is peirastic, philosophy

compares and

philosophy, he says that where sophistry is openness to achieving knowledge (gnoristike) (Met. Gamma 2 1004b26-27). Earlier in the same passage in the Metaphysics Aristotle has said that what and

dialectic from philosophy is because dialectic has nothing to say separates

not

the subject matter of

about the

priority

dialectic, but (ousia)

of substance

(Met. Gamma 2 1004b5-10). We

now

have the

resources

to understand these claims. The sophist ulti

mately denies the possibility of knowledge of the whole, but that is, in effect, to deny ignorance of the whole. To admit one's ignorance, however, is to admit that

the

distinction between

appearance and

reality is

applicable to under

standing the whole; it is a turn to seeking the essence of things (ousia) and a denial that all knowledge is basically and radically contingent (Met. E2 1026b3-22). On the contrary, to speak of knowledge of the radically contin in the Posterior Analytics, to claim that knowledge is knowledge of accidents, (An. Post. A2 71b9 10) and that claim is, as he ar gues in the Metaphysics, an attempt to do without the principle of noncontra gent

is,

as

Aristotle

says

diction (Met. Gamma 4 1007a21-1007bl8). Thus, philosophy is the attempt to turn from the investigation of opinions considered as such (which is what dia lectic undertakes) (Top. Al 100a30-100bl; Met. BI 99521-26) toward knowl beings, that is, an attempt to move beyond wonder. Moreover, it is

edge of the an attempt

(to

to

make such a move with an awareness of

logon asthenes) (Seventh Epistle 343al). Even Aristotle proposes philosophic sciences

the weakness of speech

ton

he

in this

only,

and

the

adjective

knowl primarily edge, not knowing. In Met. Zl 1028b3-7 Aristotle says, "What is being, that is, what is ousial This is what was, is and will be sought and always be hedged gnoristike which

uses

means openness

passage

to

puzzles."

with

Thus dialectic in its highest does

seem that peirastic

limits

serve

to

limit

cycle of which

the

cave.

without

peirastic and

the

underline

philosophic paideia

peirastic,37

but it

would

beyond dialectic, that is, it stays within the speech (S.E. 11 171b7 8). In doing so it pushes

speech and opinions to their

The break between

is inseparable from

not go

of the proper use of

the cave,

use

demands

that

limit.38

philosophy may, like the Socratic image of from normal civic life that

radical conversion

and

the

role of

For it is necessary to

is the knowledge that

breaking

the conversion in the completed

make the

we are governed

by

first

turn to self-knowledge

opinions, endoxa

and

conven-

Interpretation

162

tions only, and the trace of the truth and that these are the ineradicable ground of our shared understanding. But the conversion is not only this turn, but it is also wonder and not

the fires

bitter

the wall

on

sensing that the light is primary

cynicism

which must

result, for that

and not

leads away to the light

alone

way that leads away towards philosophy which, however, turn back to dialectic to test itself. The cave is first and last, and it

of the true sun, the must always

is lit only

with remembered

light.

NOTES

was eclipsed by the rhetorical exercise, the declamatio, in the Roman world, 201-5, 286-89; Kennedy, pp. 316-22), but it was reborn in the medieval univer sities. See Green-Pedersen, p. 338; Murphy, pp. 200-211, 198-230; Ong (1983), pp. 36-37, 152-56; Ong (1981), p. 139.

1. The disputation

(Marrou,

pp.

2. "LeBlond to dialectic

.

.

[which

E. Weil

.

is] firmly

3. Aristotle does p.

154).

does

Moreover,

and

in the

not use when

G.E.L. Owen

the expression

Aristotle does "dialectical"

4. For the

unproblematic

12-19; Kneale

and

Kneale,

seizing

pp.

.

have

on

stressed

Aristotie's

logike, logic,

use

the meaning of

so with

.

centre of the mature

of

the importance thought"

which

(Evans,

any discipline

pp.

Aristotle

assigns

2-3, 5).

(P. Hadot, logikos, he probably

whatsoever

the related words logikos and

(Evans,

pp.

29-30).

the formal aspect of the syllogism, see

1, 33, 178. "Aristotle, it

would

seem,

was

Lukasiewicz,

the first to

write a

pp.

logic

fact"

He was, it must be conceded, unaware of the (McMullin, p. v). 5. The concept of formality is a difficult one in any case, and many different meanings have of been assigned to it. Aubenque seems to be thinking of testing through the "formal series.

validity"

lead

arguments which

a

thesis into self-contradiction. It

questioner provides while

is the test

of

formal validity

the theses, the matter of the argument, are provided

by

alone

the

that the

respondent

Aubenque may be overstating the formal character of dialectic since, it will be argued, it is difficult to say the effect of dialectic for Aristotle is empty, formal and negative although each of these adjectives is, in a sense, true of the questioner's role in dialogue. Aubenque and not the proponent.

has

reason

to emphasize the

highlights his

301;

conclusion

compare

Owens [1978],

6. Alexander relates

nature of

dialectic to the highest degree, for such emphasis such a dialectic (pp. 300-

first philosophy is nothing but

pp. xvi-xxvi).

Aphrodisias, pp. 2-5. Reference to (hule) of the two syllogism types

the distinction in question as

"matter"

to the

grasping

of

formal

that the reality of

of a specific

emergence of

content suggests problems that

intellectual content, for that content form in relation to the

the contrast between the

that the Commentator's

use of

one which

very strange way to refer to the would itself be a form. The sudden

seems a

matter and

the term already has

the

form in

implicitly

run

relation

into

to the

some of

the

follow from formalization.

7. An. Post. B19 100al5-100b4; de An. Gamma 8 431b20-432al4; N.E. Z3 1139b30-31 and Z7. Aristotle, it is important to bear in mind, does not purport to give a full account of the process. The description of induction remains, as H.G. Gadamer has said in a slightly different context vague."

"conspicuously experience

See Gadamer, p. 314. The questions at stake, the movement from raw forms, do not permit treating this process as if it were a manner of

to access to the

mechanical summing.

8. Living knowledge is that known in its first causes, for other knowledge is accidental (An. Post. A2 71b9-10). It is knowledge "which has a (N.E. Z7 1 141al9). Aristotle several times head"

mentions

the

sophistic

byplay

that equates

knowledge

with some unactivated

"possession

of

knowl

edge"

(An. Post. A6

74b22-24),

knowledge just as a man clothing lying in a closet when he is, in fact, standing naked. See Theaetetus 197 A-E; Euthydemus 277B-278E. It is not possible, for Aristotle, to conceive of knowledge in this way; such knowledge is possessed only in an accidental sense. "possesses"

and pretends that one can possess

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes 9. "This

.

him have

the

serves

.

.

world as a whole.

.

great and

Aristotle

.

goal of giving a nearly complete account of the satisfy that demand once and for all. Only a few after 187).

awe-inspiring

undertook to

attempt"

(Klein,

made such an

10. It is dialectic that

163

p.

in the seeking of those sciences which philosophy seeks (tas kata philosophian epistemas) (Top. A2 101a28). Dialectic is peirastike, tentative, but philosophy is gnoristike, aiming at knowledge (Met. Gamma 2, 1004b26-28). The latter adjective, however, is expressive of

the

argument about

potential

aids

for

the degree to

rather

which

than the actuality of knowledge; Aristotle does not forestall the knowledge is in us merely tentative. See Benardete [1978], pp.

2,4. 11. Wieland,

135. Cf. the

movement from the indeterminate (hoti) to the determinate grasp in Owens [1978], pp. 287-98, 159-63. 12. According to Aubenque, Plato found the proto-dialectic was being thought of as a way to make knowledge useful for men. For example, Kleinais says in the Euthydemus that hunters and

(dihoti)

fishers fruits have

p.

of a subject as explained

turn their

must

of

catch over

hunt, dialectic is

the

(opsopoiike). It is

a skill

calls a scandalous sham-art

13. The

to the cooks if it is

Socrates'

"second

the Rival Lovers (Rival Lovers

p.

252

n.

4

and p.

is

see

14. Aubenque, pp. not an isolated affirmation, but

is

15. I. Hadot,

Peripatos

not absent p.

an essential

18-24. I. Hadot

pp.

by

written

253

sailing"

concludes

is to the

(opsopoioi), (Euthydemus 290B),

from

Gorgias Socrates

1).

n.

Socrates'

criticism of paideia

in

93).

132D; Bruell, 249-52. For Aubenque, moreover,

tic

cooks

skill, Aubenque lets us remember, which in the

a

(Aubenque,

echo of

to be useful; and as cookery

ever

The

to the regional sciences.

identification

the

building block

of paideia and

dialec

his understanding of Aristotle. (p. 24) that the Rival Lovers is an attack on the of

a cynic.

16. The copy is not just inferior to it.

another case of

17. Green-Pedersen,

13-14. Proponents

the original, but

like the original, it

being

still

is in

some sense

to

be treated

pp.

separate, believe the tradition in

as

late to the unitary

by]

accepting that of his

vision which would

of

the other view, under which the work continues

question reflects

be described [in

chapter

the

34

fact that "Aristotle

of

came

only

Sophistical Refutations

and

impossible that Aristotle has noticeably changed the original sense (Brunschwig, pp. xix-xx). I am strongly inclined to join the Sophistical Refuta

vision

it is

not

undertaking"

tions to the surprise

originary

scope of

18. Book Alpha

of

through definitions and vides a

description

induction,

the

teaching

of

dialectic, but if

we

do so,

we need express no

easily with more straightforward aspects of dialectical reasoning. the Topics contains introductory matter orienting the activity of dialectic a preliminary discussion of the function of dialectic. The book also pro

that sophistry does

not sit

of the constitutive elements of

dialectical method, including syllogism for disputation (pro or con)

a statement of the principles on which the subjects

and are

"instruments"

(organa) of dialectic (A13 105a21-26). The instruments of dialectic are (i) the provision of propositions, (ii) being able to review how many senses a term has, (iii) finding distinctions and (iv) seeking similarities. formulated

and a

19. The

te terms:

description

actual

accident

of

the

four

topics, or beginning points of argument, are organized around the four predica (Books Beta, Gamma), genus (Book Delta), proper attribute (Book Epsilon) and

definition (Books Zeta, Eta). 20. The peirastic character

emerges in Book Theta, and Sophistical Refuta for separating dialectic from sophistry. The most impor tant loci are S.E. 1 165a38-165bl0; 7-9; 11 171b3-172b4; 16 175a5-31; 34 183a37-184b9. 21. Top. Theta 14 164bl-8; Phaedrus 266B-C; Sophist 253D-253E. This passage expands on Aristotle's earlier remark that through the use of dialectic "we are the more easily able to deal with

tions

(Book

Iota) becomes

of

dialectic first

the touchstone

(Top. A2 101a30 31). 22. Top. Theta 14 163a29-163b29. See also Top. A13-18 and S.E. 16. Book Theta closely connects dialectic as a kind of strenuous practice in argument to the developed and regulated disputation, which thus is a kind of culmination for dialectic. See Top. Theta 1 1 161al7-161bl8.

any

subject set

before

For descriptions

of

us"

the Aristotelian disputation and discussions of its nature, see the

in Owen (1968), e.g., Moraux (1968), Solmsen, Ryle; and see 23. The fact that Aristotle fails to use the work peirastike

at

various studies

Owen (1986), 221-35, 238. this point will take on a deeper

also

164

Interpretation how important

uncover

meaning as we dialectic.

peirastic

is to become in the

course of

Aristotle's treatment

of

24.

there have been discussions

Recently

These discussions

nings of science.

in Aristotelian terms. I have in

sciences

Wisconsin Rhetoric

Rhetoric

the

Human Sciences

of

Inquiry (POROI)

of

about a

are closer

different kind to the

spirit

(e.g., McCloskey)

University

of

of

dialectic

Iowa. These

the

underpin

in the

and

the

University

of

N.E.H. -funded Project

on

describe themselves

as

the books

and the

about

between dialectic

connection

mind exercises such as

series

the

at

in

projects

rhetorical.

25. Aristotle's

usage gives

the eristic and the

sophist

differing

motives,

but in

each case

the

victory for its own sake; the mere appearance of prevailing is what he needs. The sophist intends to use that appearance, the appearance of wisdom, in order to get a reputation and gain wealth and fame. From time to time Aristotle motive

is

an evil or vicious one.

includes the

the

26. In these teachings

and

in the Sophist

Aristotelian

deforming

is

so on

contrasted paideia

a

and

42)

n.

aspect

but he does

notes

peirastic.

The

I try to suggest some differences between the Stranger's is a difficult one. The noble sophistic is introduced

learning

suggestion of

taken

it

the

word.

has

as a

missed

kind

the

point of

of mathematics.

in Theaetetus, 145A, This is "a far reaching

usage

division (like from

Benardete ([1984], pp. that introduction. The first

worse).

aspects of

(demiourgike). Since the

with craft arts

and

deforming

accepts paideia as

Theaetetus'

of

nonevaluative

better from the

the

here. The Stranger

way, Theaetetus

Socrates'

echoes with

between the Stranger's

points out three crucial

the heels

only

those of the sophist) with the

self-interested as

subject

(separating

cathartics

relevant

totally frustrating purifying

narrowly

the basis of a distinction

on

like) II. 97-99, 11.97

motives are as

following

and the

eristic aims at

the latter.

name of

his diacritical

and

in

(whose

eristic

sophist under

The

the

name of

the noble sophistic,

Theaetetus (Sophist

contrast

229D2) has

is jarring, it is

likely

that,

the noble sophistic as a refutational

As Benardete

out, the contrast

points

where paideia means education

in the

"sciences"

mistake"

as opposed

despite

to craft arts.

Socrates'

in Theaetetus (Benardete) and shows that, a day to his very first definition of

maieutics, Theaetetus has "reverted in less than Theaetetus'

knowledge (Ibid.). Nevertheless, however askew understanding is, the Stranger goes on to describe another and more Socratic kind of paideia (Sophist 230A-D). 27. Theaetetus, 149A-151D. The chief difference seems to be that account is fo Socrates'

cused on

the subject

matter of

the coparticipant, that tic

movement

in the

28. There is

is,

29. The

discussion does

is the Stranger's,

and not, as

not attempt to

dissociate the

on

the reflexive effect on

from the

philosophical

peiras

activity.

no reason

to believe either that eristics

or sophistic arguments at all

off

the

maieutics

times

or

that

only eristics be translated

and sophists are

limited to

use of

the eristic

and sophists use such arguments.

as "even though they seem to speak very far arguably could (S.E. 11 172a33-34; see generally S.E. 11 172a29-172b4). 30. Alia kai hos eidos can also be understood as "pretending that they also have same passage

point"

the

knowledge."

31. Aristotle inquiry. This merely

'empty'

formal,

describe the dialectical or Platonic method of is to speak in a more recent fashion Aristotle does not contrast and in this

"regularly uses the term imply that the Platonic

seems to

and emptied of real content.

to

method

'formal'

'real'

manner"

(Owens [1978], p. 199). 32. The eristic is an even more feckless type. Such

modern

argument,

desire

and

nothing

more

(S.E. 11 171b24-25).

a one wants

Sophistry

the sense of

and eristic relate

to

having

won

the

one another as

and spiritedness.

33. Perhaps there is a notion of the sophist attempting to metamorphose into the tyrant. If there is such a notion, it helps to explain the progression of persons in the Gorgias from the rhetor

Gorgias through the lover/hater of tyranny, Polus, to the one who would himself become tyrant (Callicles), but may lack the courage (or brutality) to do so. 34. The term moneymaker implies that money-making has become an end in itself, precisely because it is unlimited in scope. See the treatment of the chrematistike in Pol. A9-10. 35. "Philosophers the

tyrant"

(Strauss,

philosophic views of

could not possibly identify the life according to nature with the life of 115). See the discussion of sophists, philosophers and the vulgar and convention at pp. 1 14-18. .

p.


165

36. Socrates expressly claims to be acting from goodwill (eunoia) (Theaetetus, 15 ID). 37. The Stranger in the Sophist seems to agree that separation of dialectic and peirastic is ultimately impossible (Benardete

38. Aristotle insists

on

[1984],

the distinction

p.

11.93).

between dialectic

which

deals

with opinions as

such, and

knowledge. That insistence may account for his refusal to use the term dialectic for the philosophic effort. There is a passage in Metaphysics (M4 1078bl7 30) in which Aristotle seems to be saying that Socrates did not understand that it was possible to make such a sharp differentiation between dialectic and philosophy. On the other hand, insistence on the barrenness of the maieutic function suggests something like the same the

purified student's effort

to move toward

Socrates'

distinction.

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of

Aphrodisias. In Aristoteles Topicorum Libros

octo commentaria.

Ed. Max

imilian Wallies. Berlin: George Reimer, 1891. Aquinas, St. Thomas. Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. Trans. F. R. Larcher. Albany: Magi Books, 1960.

Aubenque, Pierre. Le aristotelicienne

.

probleme

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de I'letre

chez

Aristote: Essai

sur

la

problematique

Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977. First

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Barnes, Jonathan. "Aristotle's Theory of Schofield and Richard Sorabji, eds., Articles worth, 1975

on

In Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm

Aristotle, 1. London: Gerald Duck

(a) Pp. 65-87.

"Introduction."

In Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Trans. Jonathan Barnes.

Clarendon Aristotle Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 (b). Benardete, Seth. The Being of the Beautiful: Plato's Theaetetus, Sophist Chicago Press, 1984. University The City and "Review of Leo

Chicago:

and

Statesman.

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Strauss'

Man."

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In Thomas L. Bruell, Christopher. "On the Original Meaning of Political Dialogues. Socratic Forgotten Philosophy: Ten Political Pangle, ed. The Roots of Pp. 90-110. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. In Aristotle, Les Topiques. Ed. Bude. Paris: Presses Brunschwig. J. Universitaires de France, 1967. Vol. 1. Cropsey, Joseph, ed. Ancients and Moderns: Essays in Honor of Leo Strauss. New York: Basic Books, 1964. Davis, Michael. "Philosophy and the Perfect Tense: On the Beginning of Plato's "Introduction."

Lovers."

Graduate

Faculty Philosophy

Journal 10(1985):75-97.

Edel, Abraham. Aristotle and His Philosophy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Evans, John D. G. Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Ferrari, G. R. F. Listening to the Cicadas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Topica."

Forster, E. S.

"Introduction to the

ica. Trans. Hugh Tredenneck

Harvard

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University Press, 1960.

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and Top-

E. S. Forster. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge:

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Interpretation

Fortin, Ernest. "The Paradoxes Controversies."

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and

Education in the Light

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Philosophique 13(1959):248-60.

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Crossroad Publishing, 1982. First published 1960. Green-Pedersen, Niels. The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages: The Commen taries on Aristotle's and Boethius's Topics. Analytica Series. Munich: Philosophia

Verlag, 1984. Guthrie, W. K. The Sophists. Vol. 2, Part 1 of A History of Greek Philosophy. Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. First published 1969. Hadot, Ilsetraut. Arts liberaux et philosophie dans la pensee antique. Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1984. Hadot, Pierre. "Philosophie, Dialectique, Rhetorique dans

l'antiquite."

Studia

Philo-

de la philosophie) 39(1980): 139-66. George. The Art Rhetoric in the Roman World: 300 B.C. -A.D. 300. Kennedy, of Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. sophica

(annuaire de la

societe Suisse

Kerford, G. B. The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. In The Lectures and Essays of Jacob Klein. Klein, Jacob. "Aristotle, an Introduction."

Ed. Robert B. Williamson

and

Elliott Zuckerman. Annapolis: St. John's College

Press, 1985. Kneale, William, and Martha Kneale. The Development of Logic. Corr. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. First published 1962. Lukasiewicz, Jan. Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic. 2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957. First published 1951. Marrou, Henri I. A History of Education in Antiquity. Trans. George Lamb. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982. McCloskey, Donald N. The Rhetoric of Economics. University of Wisconsin Rhetoric of Human Sciences Series. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. In Otto Bird, Syllogistic and Its Extensions. Funda McMullin, Ernan. "Editor's mentals of Logic Series. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964. In G. E. L. Moraux, Paul. "La joute dialectique apres le huitieme livre des Owen, ed. Aristotle on Dialectics: The Topics, Papers of the Third Symp. Aristotelicum. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. 227-311. Note."

Topiques."

Les listes

anciennes

de Louvain, 1951. Murphy, James J. "Rhetoric

Murphy,

des

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ouvrages

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Dialectic in The Owl

ed., Medieval Eloquence: Studies in the

Rhetoric. Berkeley:

University

Nelson, John S., Allen Megill

of

and the

Theory

Nightingale."

and

In James J.

Practice of Medieval

California Press, 1978.

Donald N. McCluskey, eds. The Rhetoric of Human Sciences. University of Wisconsin Rhetoric of Human Sciences Series. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. Ong, Walter J. Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality and Consciousness. Ithaca: Cornell

University Press,

1981.

Ramus: Method

Press, 1958;

and

and the

paperback

1983.

Decay

of Dialogue. Cambridge: Harvard

University

Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes Owen, G. E. L.,

ed.

Aristotle

on

Aristotelicum. Oxford: Oxford

"Dialectic

and

167

Dialectics: The Topics, Papers of the Third Symp. 1968.

University Press,

Eristic in the Treatment

of the

Forms."

In G. E. L. Owen,

Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. Ed. Martha Craven Nussbaum. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. Pp. 221-38.

Logic, Science,

and

Owens, Joseph. "The Aristotelian Conception

Sciences."

In Aristotle: The Col lected Papers of Joseph Owens. Ed. John R. Catan. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981. Pp. 23-34. of

the

The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. 3d rev. ed. Toronto: of Mediaeval Studies, 1978. First published 1951. Rosen, Stanley. Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. Pontifical Institute

Ross, W. David. Aristotle. 5th ed. London: Methuen, 1949. First published 1923. In G. E. L. Owen, ed., Aristotle on Dialec Ryle, Gilbert. "Dialectic in the tics: The Topics, Papers of the Third Symp. Aristotelicum. Oxford: Oxford Univer sity Press, 1968. Pp. 69-79. In G. E. L. Owen, ed., Aristotle on Solmsen, Friedrich. "Dialectic without Dialectics: The Topics, Papers of the Third Symp. Aristotelicum. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. 49-68. Stone, I. F. The Trial of Socrates. Boston: Little Brown, 1988. Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. Academy."

Forms."

First

published

1950.

Stump, Eleonore. De topiciis differentiis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978. Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic. Ithaca: Cornell

University Press,

1989. Thought."

Weil, E. "The Place of Logic in Aristotle's Barnes. In Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield

Trans. Jonathan

and

Jennifer

Richard Sorabji, eds., Articles on Aristotle, I. London: Gerald Duckworth, 1975. Pp. 88-112. Trans. Wieland, W. "Aristotle's Physics and the Problem of Inquiry into and

Principles."

Malcolm Schofield. In Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield eds., Articles

on

and

Richard Sorabji,

Aristotle, I. London: Gerald Duckworth, 1975. Pp. 127-40.

Zabarella, Joseph, de natura logicae 1.3 in opera logica (1549). Quoted in Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. 3d ed. Toronto: Pon tifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978. P. 129 n. 95. The St. John's Review 35(1984):32 47. Zuckerkandl, Victor. "On Mimesis."

Rousseau Under Surveillance: Thoughts

New Edition

on a

and

Translation

of

Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues Mary L. Bellhouse Providence College

Remember that piercing

Dialogues,

p.

What does it essence of

translation

and

of

and

highly

published.1

There

readable.

the part called the "First

based

on

by

the text

in Volume 1

The Pleiade

three (or perhaps

are

new

Dialogues able

Masters

will no

of

in French

serve

in English. It includes

edition of

for

Rousseau's life, chronology are not intended to be as detailed yet

they

are ample

Rousseau's

authoritative

I

would

consider the

highly

accurate, lit

complete manuscripts

and an additional manuscript of and

Masters translation is

(1958),

completes

the standard

for the

the first

French

original

and

one given

Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques:

time as the standard

introduction notes,

by Kelly

and a useful

those found in the

reference avail and

Masters,

index. The

a

notes

the

in number, extremely helpful, especially

on

other

English

is

needed, this

critical apparatus of

as

writings,

and often

edition appears as

planned series of translations of the

ises to be

long

excellent

connections with

tive. This

a

Long

latest manuscript, the Paul Moultou in 1778.

a superior

of

Pleiade edition,

and now

the third

minister

Kelly

and

doubt

four)

The Bush, Kelly, the Pleiade Oeuvres

edition relies on

Rousseau to the Genevan The

second major auto

translation

Dialogue."

complete edition to appear text.2

252)

p.

Rousseau's

Masters, has recently been to appear in English; it is a superb

Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues

of

(Rousseau,

Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues, edited by Roger Christopher Kelly, and translated by Judith R. Bush, Christopher

Roger D.

and

and

in their looks? (Rousseau, Dialogues,

new edition

the first translation

eral,

you.

entitled

D. Masters

Kelly,

watching

to me if men want to see me other than as I am? Is the

matter

being

my

An important

biography,

incessantly

eyes are

72)

philosophically

the first

of seven

sugges

volumes,

Collected Writings of Rousseau that

a

prom

influential.

like to thank my students Anne M. Lee and Alexander S. Brough III for helping me to meaning of Rousseau's Dialogues. The Providence College Committee to Aid Faculty

Research has

provided

financial


assistance.

1993-94, Vol. 21, No. 2

170

Interpretation

is usually called) has been undeservedly ne wrote it. As glected and widely misunderstood virtually since the Genevan read of Rous Kelly and Masters point out, "this book has surely been the least The Dialogues (as the

works"

important

seau's

(p.

English-speaking The Dialogues

is,

after

and

politically Masters and Kelly's important

The

xiii).

new

readers should prompt an

situated

of

work

provocative

all, a remarkably

lively

commentaries.

and our age

book,

is

well

philosophically to interpret it. edition of the

Dialogues invites

Rousseau's philosophy,

aspects of

In considering the Dialogues

autobiography.

of

outpouring

the Dialogues to

of

accessibility

us

to

rethink a number

including his

complex use of

Rousseau's last work, The

and

Reveries of the Solitary Walker, the question arises, Why did Rousseau write not one, but three major autobiographies? These three works were composed over a

twelve-year period: the Confessions

the Dialogues between 1772 and years of

Rousseau's

as autobiographies and each

is in

1776,

life, between 1776

is

and

Each is

problematic:

some ways

was written

deliberately

between 1766

the Reveries

and

1778. The

much more

fictive. As

during

status of

than

Kelly

an

and

and

the

1770,

last two

these writings

autobiography,

Masters suggest,

the distinction that is often drawn between Rousseau's autobiographical writ

his obviously theoretical writings is in some ways did Rousseau persist beyond the Confessions in his project ings

and

questionable.3

of

Why

a self?

creating Are the Dialogues, as Michel Foucault claims, "anti-Confessions"? (Foucault is exceptional in that he treats the Dialogues as a serious work of philosophy; some

thirty

years ago

a substantial

essay

he

prepared a

French

edition of

the Dialogues

and wrote

it.)4

Surely, Rousseau's three autobiographies are not On the contrary, as I will try to show, there is a transfor

on

simply

restatements.

mation

in Rousseau's thought, not only from the Confessions to the Dialogues, from the Dialogues to the Reveries.

but

also

Let

the central theme of my argument at the outset: In the Dia

me state

logues Rousseau himself into an object

adopts

the extraordinary

several characters or voices

"under

device

in

order

of

disassociating

or

dividing

to resist disempowerment as

surveillance,"

and at

such objectification.

While wary

of an anachronistic

throughout this essay that there is and some aspects of the

late

the same time to teach his readers

an

interpretation, I

about

will claim

affinity between Rousseau's Dialogues

writings of

Foucault.5

My

thoughts on a

possible

between some of the ideas of Rousseau and Fou final conclusions, but offered instead as a set of questions for future readers of the Dialogues. The Dialogues can be usefully read, first of

connection or resemblance cault are not

comply with what Foucault later names disciplinary power. Rousseau reconstitutes his selfhood and presents himself as both subject and object in the Dialogues in order to confront and resist being transformed all,

into

as a grand refusal

versions of

to

himself

produced

useless ravings of a madman

pretation of the

Dialogues (see

a

by

his

enemies.

Secondly,

rather than the

paranoiac, according to the standard inter

Kelly

and

Masters,

p.

xiii), this

little-known

Rousseau Under Surveillance book

contains some of

Rousseau's

In sum, the Dialogues focuses

derstanding, and

object,

and on

the

the

the twin issues

on

teachings for late

most valuable

modernity.

of self-explanation and misun

relationship between the technologies

workings of modern

-171

self as subject, the self as

of power.

Rousseau form a theoretical triptych, be understood more may clearly if viewed in relation to the Rousseau claims that the Confessions is addressed to everyone: he ex

The three

major autobiographies of

and each part whole.

plicitly defines his self-proclaimed closure.

audience as

numberless

in the Confessions is

method

He defines

"the

legion

words.

His

men."6

total dis

complete openness,

the self through

and reveals

my fellow

of

This discursive

subject

in the Confessions is carefully and deliberately presented before the gaze of the other. The Confessions and the Dialogues resemble each

established external

other

in

fundamental

a

way:

in

each case

division is the primary explains in

in constituting himself. As Huck Gutman Rousseau's Confessions, seau, uses

The first,

division,

and essential, move above

in the

constitution of

the

Rous

move an

on

essay

is division. And it is

self

all, that we discover in Rousseau. Division is the primary move in

the countless analyses he provides as the explanation of the course of his existence.

In

...

dividing

himself from the world, he creates a self, he constitutes himself as and examination. He will explore, in the Confessions, the

knowledge

a subject of

particular experiences

development secular sins

and

he has had and, out of those experiences, he will trace the of his own, particular, consciousness. The modem

boundaries

confessional, as invented

but the

who one

by Rousseau,

enumeration of each and

every

involves

merely the recital of has made one what and

not

experience that

is.7

Thus, division is essential to the project of self-presentation transparency of the soul which characterize the Confessions. In the Dialogues Rousseau

including by his

addresses

control over

agency

appropriated

the

adversaries.8

This

of

the Confessions. Rousseau gives the Royal Prince

Dorat's, in front of ing to Foucault, Rousseau hopes

of

his

appropriation

circulation of earlier texts and accelerated

ings

problem of

the meaning of

by

his

is

set

in

the goal of

his

having

character and

subjective

his texts

motion

by

the

construction and private read

several readings

Sweden,

and

at

and at the

M. du Pezay's,

at

Egmonts'. Accord

that:

for the spoken word, light, faithful, indefinitely transmissible, where belief and truth communicate without obstacle, the space of the immediate voice, probably, where the Savoyard vicar, listening, had in the past a space will then open

placed

But the

his

profession of

readings

do

faith. (P. vii)

not produce

amid silence, and silence then

the effects that Rousseau wants:

becomes

a major theme of

his

voice

the Dialogues.

falls

172

Interpretation

Rousseau

A failure in

ure.

intended

as a

judges this

point.

fession

training

further that, well as his

as

It is

manual

"By

a claim

readers of

Rousseau's

fully

writings.

two centuries

articulated

is

They

interpretation.9

keys to

prompted countless others contributed

"truth."

by

"truth"

of confessions

Rousseau's first

auto

to produce their own secular confes

to widespread acceptance of the

Ironically,

produces

later

subject and empowers privi

to be able to extract the

the

possession of

sions; moreover, it has confession

fail

that work, the Dialogues

disempowers the

confessional mode

has

a

because

Confessions. Con simply a matter of misunderstanding the has increased Rousseau's vulnerability. Embedded in the Dia

who claim

biography

for future

note that

confessors"

"listeners,"

through their

and

misunderstood

is

the Confessions

Masters correctly

Rousseau made them his confessing to his readers, place more emphasis on to want (p. xvii). I

logues, in inchoate form, is leged

recognition that

not

as such

Foucault: The

Kelly

what sense?

the Confessions

some readers of

comment

Dialogues in

writes the

since

belief that

Rousseau's Confessions has

in which Rousseau recog enormously influential and the Dialogues how confession effects a loss of power for the one who confesses has

proved nizes

been

the sum effect of these two autobiographies has been to advance

ignored,

disciplinary

power.

As the discursive

self of

modern

sophical

opponents,

they

the spoken Confessions threatens Rousseau's philo

produce

hostile interpretations

of

him,

tempt to silence him. Their efforts are so effective that Rousseau

Dialogues

on the

and

they

begins

at

work

very different usage of voice than that of the Confes choked and locked in "a terrifying and terrible

with a

silenc

sions, a voice

(Dialogues, mies'

p.

now

4). The

strategic

focus

of

the Dialogues is to discredit his ene

his discursive self, while addressing the larger problem appropriation. After this task is accomplished, Rousseau will turn

appropriation of of

any

such

to a different which

forms

Solitary

project:

a postscript

to the

Walker, Rousseau

considers the positive

fringes

Near the

of

Writing,"

"History

end of the

Dialogues,

the

Preceding

throughout The Reveries of the

meaning to his existence, as he it were, of his solitary life on the

assigns a peaceful

side, the privileges,

society (see,

and

of

e.g.,

Dialogues,

In the Dialogues Rousseau

as

p.

re-presents

253).

himself in

multiple

forms, including

his subjectivity by his enemies. JeanJacques Rousseau in his unity is present only in the preliminary section a work as on the a called "On the Subject whole, and of this Form commentary his

own versions of

and

those produced

Writing"

most

and the concluding materials, not in the dialogues themselves. The important division in the Dialogues is between the two personae named "Jean-Jacques."

"Rousseau"

and

by

This extraordinary disassociation, conveyed is at the center of the work's structure

the splitting of Rousseau's own name,

Dialogues'

With this move, the strangeness, and its uniqueness Rousseau's writings, is immediately established. The reader is startled among and in some cases driven away. Rousseau claims explicitly in the Dialogues narrative.10

and

173

Rousseau Under Surveillance

his Confessions simply for pleasure. In "On the Rousseau explains that he deliberately made

that too many readers enjoyed

Subject

Form

and

autobiography difficult in

this second

lack "good

to

order

repel

superficial readers who

minds":

After all, I have

disorder

Writing,"

of this

just

said

everything I had to

about

say.

It is drowned in

a chaos of

repetitions, but it is there. Good minds will be able to find it. As for

and

who want only some agreeable rapid reading, who sought and found only that in my Confessions, and who cannot tolerate a little fatigue or maintain their attention in the interest of justice and truth, they will do well to spare themselves

those

the boredom of reading this. It is not to them I wished to speak.

(Dialogues,

6-7)

pp.

Thus, in

part

because he

seeks a more

the style and structure of

changes

his

thoughtful audience, Rousseau radically

He

writing:

replaces

the linear

form

and

ordering of the Confessions with the more challenging dialogue form centering on contestation over subjectivity and the objectified of the Dialogues is Rousseau as he would be if he had read but

chronological

self."

"Rousseau"

his books

not written

ful

and

and unprejudiced

reputation

and who

has

"Rousseau"-as-reader effect on

than I

Rousseau's

read all of

that he has

avers

seau's

the other

on

writings.

"Jean-Jacques"-as-Author has

from the discussion Form

and made an object

Writing,"

of

hand, is defined

this

party, using my Christian

named

simply the

virtue"

for

the Author

of

direct voice; he is

no

Rousseau remarks, "I

Rous absent

refer

to myself as a third me"

of

the

(p. 5).

to which the public chose to reduce

name

crimes"

"the Author

just, better

more

profit

in the Dialogues. In "On the Subject

This "Jean-Jacques"-as-Author is further and

as

"the total

reading:

my soul has always been to make me more humane, before. I have never turned to these books without

"Jean-Jacques,"

times. This

several

writings

benefitted from the

was

(p. 29).

and

had only recently arrived in France. He is a thought a foreigner who is unfamiliar with Rousseau's

reader,

books."

between the "Author

split

Finally,

"Frenchman,"

a man who

there

is

an

important

knows Rousseau's

of

monstrous pub

lic reputation, and who, as a result, has never read Rousseau's writings. The two interlocuters, the rather philosophic "Rousseau"-as-reader and "Frenchman,"

first completely dependent on public opinion, three dialogues about the Author, the Author's writings, who

in

a series of

is

dressed; logue

the

second

investigates the

the

the

concerns

"Rousseau"

contents of

and

the

"Rousseau"

Nouvelle Heloise. The

by

one:

writings

attempt

public reputation of claims

which

Is this Author

charges

states

character of

"Frenchman"

between the low the Author

The first dialogue

to

the

resolve

is implied

and

by

and the

the questions to be ad

Author;

and

and correct ways

the Author

the

engage

at

readers of those writings.

the

character

the third dia

to

read

them.

the enormous

discrepancy

favorable

character of

the

the Emile and

Julie,

ou

La

circulating in public opinion are articulated one hypocritical? duplicitous? evil? an enemy

a plagiarizer?

174

Interpretation

the human

of

dissolute?

race?

decadent? debauched? depraved?

vile?

with

As

"Rousseau"

and

the

the relationship between the

"Frenchman"

consider

Author's reputation, his character, the conspiracy stance of his writings, they attempt to judge

him,

against

"the Dialogues

first dialogue, and

the

"Rousseau"

tion

of

the

books

author of

resolve

"Frenchman"

will read

's ignorance

of

consequently de

p. xiii).

At the

will

that

"Jean-Jacques'"s

the Author's

The

writings.

is

reputation

end of

visit "Jean-

"Rousseau"

interlocutors

the

and

("Introduction,"

author of numerous

Jacques,"

acter

finding

are aimed at

crimes"

stroying the

the sub

and

As Foucault notes,

"Jean-Jacques."

the

rotted

syphilis?'2

a

char

condi

necessary his understanding of the texts. For the majority of readers, including the hostile views of the Author need to be corrected before the

"Frenchman,"

"Rousseau"

meaning of the texts can be understood. and, in effect, the reader of the Dialogues: "Don't read, any bias ence the impressions it will you

and without

either

in favor

or

counsels the

even think of the

against, let

receive"

reader of

the Dialogues

are

(p. 31).

to be transformed

How is their interpretation to be the Author's personality, but

ing

problematic the

theoretical

by

Thus, into

grounded?

"Frenchman"

the

Author

your soul experi

"Frenchman"

and

Ultimately,

relationship between text and author, known as "the death of the

the

readers.'3

reliable

the texts themselves. The

as

by

not

reference

Dialogues, in

to

mak

speaks to the recent

author."

Foucault in his

phenomenon

Author?"

essay "What Is who is

(1969) has

an

asked, "What difference does it

make

Critics like Foucault, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Derrida textual interpretations which understand the individualized au

speaking?"14

have

challenged

thor as a creator whose subjectivity offers a set of principles

underlying unity

the particular

ence

late

modern

text.15

of a great

by

other

suggests

for

that the

discovering

the

authorial pres

will disappear in the the writing subject words, the writing subject's individual characteris

individuality

period; in

tics will be effaced

Foucault

what she or

of

he

writes.

On the

other

hand,

the

extraordin

ary biographical context supplied by Rousseau's Confessions (and the Dia logues, too, especially to the extent that it has been read as evidence of the Author's mental illness) has encouraged valorization of the individualized au thor as "the meaning

"true

self

that

can

of

be

text,

relatively transparently in

language"

562). Moreover, once Rousseau's writings were adopted as part he became a privileged writer guaranteed "authorship." The roots p.

lem

has

a personal autobiographical personage who

embodied

a

(Walker,

of

the

of

the

canon prob

"authenticity,"

desirable

favored term for what it between the Author's character construed our culture's

of match

gender, race, ethnicity,

and class

and

the substance of

presumes to

be

a

recently to include his or her writings,

may be traced back to Rousseau. What is typically forgotten in the modern authenticity is the way in which Rousseau understands his

valorization of

self

to be a

discursive

"true"

self.

pretation and reputation

Indeed, his

bear

some

suggestions about the problems of inter to what Foucault calls "the author

kinship

Rousseau Under Surveillance function."

Foucault

name with

"a

that the author's

states

is

name

author's name manifests

indicates the

Foucault

within a

society

characteristic of the mode of

discourses

of certain

on

Author, his

of

p.

own

distribution

modes of

117,

Walker,

and

texts

p.

leads him to

.

.

The

.

author

Author,"

an

106-7)

pp.

established

is,

by

552). Rousseau's

call attention

to the reception of texts

power relations concern about

("What Is the

an

reception

to these same themes. In the Dia

personality because it has become an extraordinary obsta to communication; the effacement of the Author's character would be wel

logues he focuses cle

it is

come, but

on

can

be

to

not

"Frenchman"

of

discourse.

existence, circulation, and

that

and appropriation of

the

and a culture.

("What Is

within a society.

discourses,"

based

of

to draw attention to "the modes of circulation, valorization,

wants

attribution,

being

the appearance of a certain discursive set and

this discourse

status of

function is therefore

functioning

type of proper

a particular

paradoxical singularity":

the author's name serves to characterize a certain mode of

The

175

be

open

to the meaning of the

the character of the Author

has been

Rousseau demonstrates the dangers

how he has been

siders

"Rousseau"

how

to public

I

deals

in the foreseeable future. The

expected or relied on

writings

resolved

in the

of objectification

placed under surveillance.

is instituted

surveillance

only

and

after

second

The

by

the

question

dialogue.

others as

he

con

"Frenchman"

explains

judgment is

the

withheld as

with "Jean- Jacques":

basis

see that the

of

the system

they follow

with regard to

him is the

duty they

him thoroughly, to make him well known to all and yet never make any explanation to him, to deprive him of any knowledge of his accusers, and of any clear enlightenment about the things of which he is accused. This assumed

to

unmask

double necessity is based would be too scandalous,

being him

punished.

on

the nature of the crimes, whose public declaration

and which

All that

...

does

can therefore

under such good surveillance that

knowing it,

not allow

he

that he be convicted

be done for

can undertake

public

without

safety is first to

nothing

keep

their

without

that he carry out nothing of importance unless they wish it, and for the danger of listening to and frequenting such a scoundrel.

rest to alert everyone to the

(P.

50)

Rousseau

'surveillance'

uses

the term

that surveillance

maintains prejudice

not what one sees.

.

true that the biased

.

.

One

man sees what

passionate man sees what never

tends

impartial more

he

because "one

in the Dialogues. He sees what one

to find hateful what one

believes

hates,

and

and

if it is

he believes, it is even more true that the (p. 64). The gaze of the surveillant is of

the surveillant ex

reader.

analysis of surveillance

power."16

argues

desires"

disinterested. Moreover, this partiality

or less to the

Rousseau's

"panoptic

or

strives

several times

Rousseau becomes

is

charged with an

paradigmatic of

incipient

the prisoner

notion of

in the

Pan-

176

Interpretation

opticon, when, according to his

account, his

own

and

stant, unending,

the new

and

becomes "con

surveillance

him is "continuous, disci

total,"

power over

"Frenchman"

Rabinow, p. 189). The surveillance in Paris,

anonymous"

how Rousseau is

reports on

I don't who

him, him

and

his letters

are opened.

.

.

No

him

one approaches

the tone he already learned his lesson about what he must say and in talking to him. A record is kept of all those who ask to see him.

not

.

enters a public place,

him

everyone surrounds

him.

under

need to tell you that all

has

must use

If he

(Dreyfus

and

plinary,

In the

...

public

and

booksellers.

by

his

keeping

a

like

point

By

in this immense city

multiplying under

him

out to

pointed

small

the eyes of

.

.

the plague:

talking

and not

to

those around

side a guard or a sergeant who speaks

He has been

loudly

about

described, recommended Chimney-sweeps, at all the out,

all the ...

someone with

distance

is taken to

care

deliverymen, Clerks, guards, spies, cafes, to the barbers, the merchants,

everywhere to

Theaters, in

stares, but

anything.

saying

viewed and treated

garden, great

and always to place without

he is

the peddlers, the

they have successfully kept him the rabble, who view him with horror. (Pp. attentions,

41-42) Foucault is particularly interested in this part of Rousseau's text, quoting his commentary, too, at some length: A

whole world

is established, the

everywhere, J. -J. is

him. But this language. he

goes

being

silent world of

watched.

by; he

one surrounds

signs, but none enters

him

of

the theatre,

it is

worth

Sign. From

and

The walls, the floors have eyes that follow is never directly transformed into accusing

.

.

speechless surveillance

Only

Surveillance

and

.

these are words: he is walking, one spits when

one

with outstretched

keeps away from him or,

fists, threatening

on

canes; one

the contrary,

speaks of

him,

him but obliquely from one to the other around his worried ears, so that he feels himself brought into question, but not questioned. One throws stones at him in Motiers, and in Paris, under his but in

a

silent,

icy language,

windows, one bums a

not

directed

at

straw mannequin that

looks like him: double

sign

that one

like to bum him, but one will only bum him derisively, because he would have the right to speak if one decided to condemn him. But he is condemned to would

this world of signs that do not let him speak.

Silence is the fundamental

experience of

("Introduction,"

pp.

xviii-xix)

the Dialogues: it makes the writing of

the Dialogues necessary; it serves as proof of the plot against underlies the organization and

inner dialectic

of

the book

Rousseau; and it (Foucault, "Introduc

tion,"

p. xv).

Rousseau demonstrates resistance to this concerted web of power in the Dia logues and Reveries. First, he recognizes that confession encourages surveil lance as it places one at any moment under the disciplinary gaze of the other.

Next, Rousseau begins phatically:

If the

to suggest another point that

person under surveillance

is

not

Foucault later

makes em

vigilantly self-conscious, he

Rousseau Under Surveillance or she

is

likely

internalize the

to

177

disciplinary power of the external gaze. Rous part by the activity of writing the Dialogues

internalization in

seau avoids such

the Reveries. The

latter work recalls his ultimate and perhaps unique for resisting panopticism, namely, his rare capacity to withdraw into himself and experience reverie. (He partially transforms an older discourse by and

method

naming his

exceptional characteristics

xxiv-xxv.)

Rousseau, then, does

"natural."

Cf. Masters

and

succumb to the

not

Kelly,

pp.

controlling

compliantly his discourses, they spy on him, new versions of create but his psyche and intellect remain intact, him, they resistant to their disciplinary regime. He never becomes his own panoptic

tactics of his adversaries.

They

appropriate

"guard."

In his essay

on

sure on surveillance

because the

ends

Dialogues, Foucault

the

by forcing judgment

"Frenchmen"

observes

p. xix).

"Rousseau"

and

"Jean-Jacques."

stitute another version of

are

Rousseau, in his

the objectified

that Rousseau forces

("Introduction,"

led to judge

concrete

clo

Surveillance

and exonerate

unity, may

now con

the self in the third panel of his autobiographical

triptych, The Reveries of the Solitary Walker. In the final autobiography Rous seau presents a discursive self who can enjoy solitude precisely because the twin problems of surveillance and objectification have been resolved in the Dialogues. In the Reveries Rousseau inverts the meaning of his solitariness: Isolation becomes wholeness, separation is redefined as completeness. Of course, Rousseau does ary

gaze as

politically

useful

entirely reject surveillance and the disciplin methods. Power in itself is neutral. In a move

not

liberals, Rousseau radically devalues privacy in the virtuous politi community; instead, what matters is public and communal. Even in the

alarming to cal

Dialogues Rosseau

tive,

returns

in his

writings

Thus, for

eye.

Clarens spy with

remarks

true self

and our

that "our sweetest existence

not

entirely

to the theme of

example, in

the secret gazes

of

relative and collec

Julie,

(p. 118). Rousseau continually

within

ou

seeing and the controlling La Nouvelle Heloise the servants at

unmediated

hearts

their masters not with open

on

is

us"

is

surveillants.'7

and

In the innovative

transparent souls, but and

influential Confes

sions, Rousseau volunteers the most intimate details about himself. Liberalism

has traditionally failed to voluntary

cessful operation of

lance

and

recognize

self-exposure, that

the

how

is, how

disciplinary

private

power.

Within

ubiquitous confessional mode

destabilize the

powerful

myth

of

life may be threatened

confession often contributes to

the

modern

liberal society

function together to

political

sanctity,

by

such

the suc surveil

undermine or

the cherished invi

Rousseau's understanding of the meaning of the public and private is profoundly different from the liberal view: He recognizes that modernity brings not only new constructions of the meaning of private life, but

olability,

of privacy.

also new threats

a

reveal oneself

before the

public gaze produces sur

for Rousseau among his enemies,

policing of the self, desirable turn of events within the Rousseauean

veillance and

but

to it. To

unfortunate

virtuous

community

of

178

Interpretation

"true"

citizens,

seeing

knowing

and

Rousseau

non

intelligor

does he

Why

is

seau's self of

a

of

is based

citizens

on

"the

this

the same

with

sweet

habit

of

from Ovid that he

epigraph

his First Discourse: "Barbarus hie

(Here I

repeat

his Confessions'? As sions

Dialogues

beginning illis"

fellow

of

another."18

one

opens the

the

placed at

love

where

the barbarian because

am

to begin the

epigraph

above, it

suggested

failure (in the hands

immediately

work written

the

signals

ego sum,

quia

no one understands me).

sense

in

of unphilosophic or untrained

the

which

readers)

after

Confes

and

Rous

in the Dialogues. Since the discursive

interest in addressing this problem the Confessions has been appropriated the Dialogues

choked voice of

creates

his

in the his enemies, Rousseau internal audience in the form

by

own

"Frenchman,"

of

exemplary audience that he converts from prejudiced to sympathetic reader. While Foucault's characterization of the Dia

the

an

nonreader

logues

"anti-confessions"

as

is in

a sense

accurate, it does

to which the two works are complementary and eries

of the

Solitary Walker, they

form

how,

not

convey the extent with The Rev

together

a whole.

NOTES

1.

Jean-

Jacques Rousseau, Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues, ed. Roger D. Mas trans. Judith R. Bush, Christopher Kelly, and Roger D. Masters (Han

Christopher Kelly, over, NH: University Press ters and

Dialogues;

to as the

of

New England, 1990). All editions of this book identified are from this edition.

are

hereafter

referred

quotations not otherwise

2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres Completes (Paris: Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1958-) 1: 657-992. 3. I strongly

agree

Kelly

with

See

and

Masters that Rousseau's

autobiographical

writings

have

"Introduction,"

in Dialogues, p. xiii. 4. Michel Foucault, in Rousseau, Juge de Jean Jaques: Dialogues, ed. Michel Foucault (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962), pp. vii-xxiv. This spelling of Jaques without the letter c is by Rousseau. All translations from this essay given here are by Jacqueline Grenez Brovender. Kelly philosophical significance.

"Introduction,"

and

Masters 5.

Kelly

cite the and

Foucault

Masters do

edition of

the Dialogues in their

not make this claim

in their

introductory

edition of

essay, p. xvii and n. 6.

the Dialogues.

6. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. J. M. Cohen (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1953), p. 17. The Confessions was first published in 1781. Self,"

7. Huck Gutman, "Rousseau's Confessions: A Technology of the in Technologies of the with Michel Foucault, ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton

Self: A Seminar (Amherst: MA:

8.

Early

University

in the

Massachusetts Press, 1988), p. 107. dialogue, Rousseau considers how his

of

physical or embodied self has been visually appropriated and misrepresented in several famous portraits, including paintings by Maurice Quentin de la Tour and Allan Ramsay. See my forthcoming book Visions of Power, on power and visual art in eighteenth-century France, for commentary on Rousseau's understanding of second

visual representation and unmediated seeing.

9. See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: vol. 1 An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980) and Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), ,

especially

chap.

8,

pp.

173-78.

10. Rousseau wrote

the

went

by

Dialogues, he

the pseudonym

resumed use of

Jean-Joseph Renou from 1767

his

own name.

Foucault,

to

1770.

By

the time he

"Introduction,"

p. xii.

Rousseau Under Surveillance 11

Foucault

.

calls the

of

writing

the Dialogues

"Introduction,"

Confessions. See

Foucault, 12. Dialogues, pp. 22-23. Rousseau's

the Dialogues

is in

Condemnation separate

by

treatment

like that

dangerous

prejudices against

the problem of the

the majority

of

their

the small number of "true

as opposed

Socrates in

fellow

to the linear

form

of

the

ff.

pp. xi

some ways

of

"vertical"

179

of

the problem of audience and

the Apology.

Both

reputation

philosophers

directly

in

face

them accepted

citizens

by many of their contemporaries. leads Rousseau and Socrates, respectively, to

judges"

contemporaries

among

(in

Socrates'

case, those

at

his

for his acquittal), from those who are unremittingly prejudiced, and to reserve certain teachings for the former group, the true judges. Kelly and Masters state that "the Dialogues is trial who vote

of a philosophic teaching and its dependence on See, too, their remarks on Rousseau's Dialogues in relation to Platonic dialogues Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, pp. xix, xiv.

concerned with

the effective communication

the

reputation."

author's name or

trilogy

of

13. The

Although he

"Frenchman''

grasps

the

later

basic

"Jean-Jacques"

reads

's books

principles of the writings,

reading is a practical impossibility. See 14. Michel Foucault, "What Is an

Kelly

and

Author?,"

numerous times with special care.

the third dialogue

Masters,

the

suggests

that a perfect

p. xxiii.

trans. Josue V.

Harari, in The Foucault Reader,

ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 120. For a summary of this debate and recent feminist criticism of it, see, e.g., Cheryl Walker, "Feminist Literary Criticism and the Author,"

Critical

Inquiry 16,

No. 3

(Spring

1990): 551-71. Author,"

15. See Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), pp. 142-48; Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri ,

Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1976); Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play trans. Alan Bass, in Critical Theory Since 1965, ed. in the Discourse of the Human

Chakravorty

Sciences,"

Hazard Adams and

and

theorists, is

Searle (Tallahassee: Florida State

associated with

sively theorized em

Leroy

University Press, 1986),

technologies

about

Foucault's

panopticism, and

of power of

17. See Marshall Berman's

and

inaugurated in the

eighteenth century.

unsympathetic

and

espe

on

commentary in The Politics of Authenticity (New the Origin

and

Foundations

of

Inequality

Second Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 79. Italics added. in The First

See

Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New

York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 248. 18. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse Men,"

political

Bentham's Panopticon. Foucault, who exten his followers have made explicit the implications for mod analysis of

this punitive system

cially Michel Foucault, Discipline York: Vintage, 1979).

83-94;

pp.

Jacques Derrida, Limited, Inc (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 16. Panoptic power, a concept gaining currency among some postmodern and feminist

and

among Judith R.

Tocqueville

Socialism

on

History

and

Peter Augustine Lawler College

Berry

My

here is to

purpose

be the

may

well

than

it is today,

since

Tocqueville's understanding

consider

that the authority of Tocqueville has

case

the authority of socialism

while

is

weaker now

also

liberty

in the

would suffer

Tocqueville, liberals

From

a

his

ought

to

absence of

In the

challenge.

socialism more

problematic and

diffi

fundamental debt to Rousseau. Tocqueville's indebtedness to

often

been

religion

been recognized,

overstated.

although

the West

mostly in terms of the similarity democracy.' This practical debt

Tocqueville, for

to civil religion. Nor

individuality

modern

that

the case for

reflect upon

their political solutions to the problems of often

social

theoretical perspective, Tocqueville's understanding of socialism re most

Rousseau has

duce

it has been

than

theorist, but with an appreciation of its great of its challenge. He suggested, in fact, that the

seriously than they characteristically do. It reveals how cult the defense of human liberty is in our time. veals

It

stronger

so as a political

human

cause of name of

did

the theoretical strength

ness and

has

been

the time of Tocqueville. As a political actor, Tocqueville opposed

ism. He

of

of socialism.

never

example, emphatically did not re did he attempt to reduce the particularity of

to the general

But Tocqueville did

will.2

understand

the

history humanity in essentially the same way as Rousseau described it in his Discourse on Inequality. It is in light of that history's ac of

the movement away from natural order and goodness, toward human

count of

disorder

or of

misery that Tocqueville accounted for socialist revolution. Tocqueville's understanding of socialism, and especially the relationship be tween socialism and bourgeois liberalism, is found mostly in his Souvenirs. and

There he

writes

that socialism was the

feature,"

essential of

the

of

plan of

these

the

Revolution

"philosophy,"

theory

or

1848. He

of

Souvenirs to inquire into

or also says

that "[i]t

But then he

have

surprised the world as much as

It turns

the revolution

essential to

seeing

a

revolution

did,"

and goes on

"this

"should

to explain

not

why.3

explaining why the revolution occurred, to the surprise of but Tocqueville, and why it was, necessarily, a socialist one,

the Souvenirs. Tocqueville's

to give himself a judging"

it

that socialist

most

no part

out that

almost everyone

is

asserts

is

gave"

what

character."

socialist

"the

"solitary

one

human, particularly "true

purpose

pleasure,"

political,

picture,"


and

that

affairs.

partly from

This

knowing

1993-94, Vol. 21, No. 2

in writing them, he says, is from "understanding and

comes

pleasure comes

partly from

that one's understanding and

Interpretation

182

is truly superior (S, p. 4). Tocqueville recollections is to show himself the superiority

judging

says that one purpose of

his

science, of

his

his

of

political

p. 4).

affairs"

"understanding

judging

and

human, particularly

of

(S,

political,

TOCQUEVILLE'S PREDICTION

Tocqueville

interest in the

tuous

its

of

pieces of evidence

in the first

tranquility. He was able to

geois enervation and

no

two

provides

alone, predicted the coming of revolution

he,

that

venirs

life to

to reduce public

efforts

an

do so, in part, because he had "ingenious

contemp

mecha

and

to drown revolutionary passion in the love of material

"gently

bour

midst of

that middle-class regime. He was

perpetuation of

Sou

the

chapter of

in the

pleasure"

(S,

11-12).

pp.

The bourgeois

by

ruled

was

The

more.

"Haves,"

"a

result was

those

rapid growth

for its

exploited government people,"

"the

or

those

devoted to

mained

with

economic

little

with

or no

virtue and political

openly and selfishly Their purpose

property.

exclusive.

It

have

to

was

wealth"

in

became indistinguishable from

that

ment

or middle-class regime was

the

public

created

by

a govern

company."

a

The ruling

"trading

the interest

interest, ignoring property,

and

life for their

the aristocrats,

own sake.

class

both

of

who re

Political life

and

passion"

"political

virtually disappeared, because they had

no outlet

(S,

pp.5,

that regime came from

his

parti

12-14, 73). Tocqueville's contempt,

hatred, for

even

sanship on behalf of greatness, a political or aristocratic perspective. He knew he needed political life to live well. So strong was this need that his contempt did not cause him to withdraw from the bourgeois political stage. But he could take

not

its

"petty"

became doubtful His

self.

or

indecisive,

interests seriously

enough

lacking

and anxious and

in

to act

well.

He

self-confidence.

extremely disordered in the bourgeois world, and he says it him to remember it. His condition became miserable or hateful to him

mind

pained

distinctions

and

was

What

moderated

no political

issue

was

his doubtful anxiety, he says,

interesting

was political

"great"

or

enough

to arouse

passion, and

his

passion

(S,

pp.77-85).

Bourgeois life able.

"greatness"

makes aristocrats or partisans of political

Their desires

cannot

be

machine."

Tocqueville's

that the contempt the "people,"

by

the

miserable aristocratic

aristocrats

the industrial

that, despite the trated far into men's perceive

miser

to "the peaceful, regular movements of a

reduced

detachment

felt for bourgeois

workers.

absence of

His

personal

"visible

allowed

him to

see

selfishness was also shared

disorder

disorder,"

allowed

"disorder had

him to pene

minds"

To

from

some

(S,

pp.

11-13).

extent, the cause of this

property.

Had they, like the

disorder

rural

was

the exclusion of the people

peasants, been included among the

Tocqueville

on

Socialism

183

History

and

"fraternity"

could

of property owners, perhaps their minds or opinions and passions have been much more readily regulated (S, pp.87, 95). The extremity of

bourgeois

the

rulers'

selfish

Tocqueville does

them,

not see

ing

not root

Marx did,

as

was

exclusivity

the

as revolutionaries once

people's poverty.

they

But

self-destructive.

stupid and

simply in the

revolution

were reduced

He did

to noth

economically.

HUMAN PROGRESS AND REVOLUTION

Tocqueville "that for

says

long

a

the revolution was surprising

because

no one

had

noticed

been continually gaining ground and im that their importance, education, desires and power

time the people had

proving their condition,

and

"growing"

growing."

They were constantly human. Tocqueville also distinctively

were all

are

says

in

those

all

quickly as their desires expanded (S, p. 75). As the people become more distinctively human, their

but

qualities which

increased,

that their prosperity

not as

"restless."

This

mental restlessness mixes with and

desires."

in their

(S,

pendent

This

Restlessness

p.76).

restlessness.

mixture makes

The desires

of

expands

minds

inevitably

become

desire

and mental restlessness

desire,

and

human beings

the

new

expand more

desire

more

"ferment

causes

interde

arouses more

rapidly than their

abil

to satisfy them. The people become better off, objectively or quantitatively, but they experience themselves as more discontented or miserable. This paradox that improvement in conditions produces discontent accounts

ity

for Tocqueville's

rising

revolution of

improve

illogical

expectation.

discontent"

that "popular tions

most celebrated contribution

but

revolution

history

He

increases is

most

is full

says

to political science, the

in the Old Regime

likely. He

and the

improve,

when conditions

acknowledges

so-called

Revolution

and when condi

that "[fjhis may seem

paradoxes"

(OR,

of such

p.

176).

DISORDER AND HISTORY

History human

is

"illogical"

movement

sistency

or

away from the

regularity becomes

as the mind

because it is

the record of human

natural standards of

and contentment. more

disordered

"feverish"

comes more extreme or

in

It becomes, and

response

logic

over

restless,

distinctiveness, or

of

impersonal

the

con

time, more illogical, human action be

and as

to growing discontent (cf.

because it is the

DA,

S, p. 11). History is full of paradoxes Tocqueville calls, in Democracy in America, the brute with the angel in him (DA, p. 546). The human condition is the incoherent mixture of brutish and angelic qualities. History is the record of human beings becoming progressively more aware of and dissatisfied with this disordered or diseased condition. The p. 536 with

what

record of

Interpretation

184

itself,

condition

as a result of

this growth in self-consciousness, becomes

Revolution, Tocqueville

disordered.

says, is caused

minds"

become too

having

This understanding disorder is an

human distinctiveness

of

It is

verish"

first

the

account of

of

Discourse

Inequality,

on

ressively

human.5

ness, restlessness, count of the

The

movement of

weakness

what

history

of

history

the

it

as

they have

made

beings,

time,

over

by

through the support

beings,

of

less

what

of

move

away from

its discontents is

most

the

West, for Tocqueville, is from instinct

realistic

selfishness,

material

liberty,

human beings have been

is

and

and content

by

nature to

from aristocracy to doubtful destruction of the prideful

movement

mind's skeptical or

given

poverty

also

human distinctiveness. over

natural

time, become

service of

more

or subordinated

Passion leads the imagination to

in the

disorder

in Rousseau's

making themselves prog

restless mind and

for themselves. This

beliefs that

scious and

toward the

moves

also present

to prosperity and power, political oppression to

democracy

ness

the

illusion to

sublime

to misery. It is from

Human

essentially "fe perhaps the

indebted to Rousseau.

to calculation,

ment

and

as an

History, for Rousseau, is the growth of self-conscious i).6 Tocqueville's ac misery (Discourse, especially n.

paradoxical

fundamentally

human

It is

toward their self-created disorder

natural order and

more

tyranny.4

finally

where

history

or

a movement that produces the

democracy,

relativism, then apathy, and

"malady

in Plato's Republic,

present

growing disorder

mind or soul's

individualism

chaotic

old one.

by

more

of men's

p. 35).

(S,

extreme

this

the

natural

human

or

historical

or self-con

to instinct or merely brutish desire.

produce prideful

belief to limit

desire for happiness

frees itself from

self-conscious

But, over (DA, pp. 482-

or contentment.

that

time, the mind's restlessness 87). Human existence, eventually, becomes unendurable, and human beings self-destruct. History is the emergence, growth, and self-destruction of human ity. Tocqueville structive mon

time,

one

in

revolutionary

or

spectacularly

self-de

pp.535, 538

DA,

with

OR,

p.

157).

History

Tocqueville

human

a

which extreme restlessness and madness were more com

than ever before (cf.

Popular

of

he lived in

thought

even most of

gives

progress

his

most

detailed

in his "Memoir

and most

clearly Rousseauean account In feudal times, he begins,

Pauperism."

on

relatively content because no one, by contemporary standards, The people, in their slavish condition, were particularly content:

everyone was

had

comfort.

Their

powers,

they

assured; the interest of the master Limited in their desires as well as their present or future that was not theirs to choose,

means of subsistence was almost always

their own on this point.

coincided with

anxiety about a kind of vegetative happiness. It is

without

enjoyed a

understand

its

charms as

it is to

deny

its

as

existence.6

difficult for

civilized man to

Tocqueville The

Socialism

on

History

and

185

-

lacked anxiety about their fu desires were easily satisfied, because they were not mixed restlessness or anxiety. They were weak and oppressed, but they

people's minds were not restless.

They

tures. Their simple with mental

had

no reason

with

human

tables.7

out

to mind.

liberty

They

lacked the

Their happiness

have been

would not

feudal times been

exposed

It

thought"

on, "extends the

goes

p. 7).

and powers of

As

history

or

knowledge

more powerful and

and more miserable.

able, more anxious and restless,

and

range of

("Memoir," man"

progresses, human beings become

civilization

goes with

aroused.

Tocqueville

"increases the desires

vege

to socialist doctrine

century,"

"Each

associated

literally

almost

or contentment was natural or subhuman.

saying that had the people in

they

that Tocqueville

qualities

were, in his mind,

They

or greatness.

from

They become,

a

human perspective, more free. But their existence also becomes, because it is more free from natural order, more contingent or subject to chance. "[C]ivilized

Tocqueville observes, is far from

man,"

is readily available,

"brute"

being

by

what

Hence he is

satisfactions alone.

or

by

satisfied

"natural"

man."

"infinitely

"[h]e has

cause

Tocqueville

of

more civilization

progresses, the

beings become

further

powerful or conquer

("Memoir,"

to chance

pp.7-

or

poverty

and observes

nature, the

more

the people created

by

becomes especially the rich

poor and

ments,"

which

be

met

the

.

become

"cultivation

by

for the

factory

.

.

.

.

.

"needs."

subject to chance

they become

subject

and

movement of

to impoverishment.

new"

conceive of

At

the

a certain

or unprecedented

point, these human

"enjoy

needs cannot

alone. To meet them, a growing portion of be diverted to industry. Those men who "left the

hammer"

shuttle and

and

"moved from the thatched

immutable laws

obeying the

were

perception of

soil"

of

agrarian population must

plow

the

that the more hu

this "irresistible

civilization,"

Both "the

to

10).

class,"

The "industrial

open

the Marxian observation that the

makes

goes

Be

he "leaves himself

more common

deprivation becomes. He

extreme

destiny

than savage

needs,"

his

the range of

expanded fortune."

the hazards

man

to the vicissitudes of

more exposed

which govern

cottage

the

to the

growth of

society."

organized

They, properly

speaking, "speculate

ings,"

not on subsistence

but

the secondary needs

on

comfort and

luxury. The

of

human be

satisfaction and even

needs"

existence of

tune, but

depend

"secondary

economic reversals

cumstances can

lead the

do

upon society's

prosperity

to

The coming of such "unfortunate cir deny itself certain pleasures to which it

attracted."

ordinarily be industrial worker's control

Such circumstances,

but toward

"misery

or

and

which are

comprehension, throw him

death."

not

Displaced from the land, he ("Memoir,"

his primary or subsistence needs existence is particularly The industrial

upon

it to

meet

workers'

and so restless and anxious.

for

occur.

population

would

or good

Tocqueville

attempts

far beyond the

only

out of work

cannot pp.7-

fall back

10).

contingent or unsupported

to

ennoble their plight

by

Interpretation

186

comparing it, implicitly, to the restless daring of the American describes in Democracy in America: "I consider the industrial

from God the

received

well-being

of

preneur,

through the

in the

chances

his risks

service of

class as

he

having

securing the material

mission of

("Memoir,"

and

But the

p. 9).

entre

to distinguish himself

his risks, and he aims bring. The industrial

chooses

course, wealth

dangers"

its risks

by

of others

dangerous

special and

entrepreneur

take his

worker must

might

he

the enrichment of others, and

hardly

finds them

choiceworthy.

NATURAL GOODNESS VERSUS SOCIALIST GREATNESS

Tocqueville

also

suggests,

however,

is

that there

greatness

in the

worker's

misery because it is distinctively human. It has made his mind extremely rest less, opening it to socialist arousal. It has caused him to perceive, with growing clarity, the

brute

with

truth about the

unadorned

the

in him. His

angel

arbitrary

or accidental existence of

circumstances

have

caused

the

him to feel his

contingency or isolated dependence on nothing but chance. His earthly misery, as well as his earthly hopes, increase as he ceases to view the world as gov

by

erned

The is

God's providence,

"lottery"

their condition

improved.

They

their behalf.

from their

to believe the socialist indictment

seem

They

social transformation promised

their

reduced

or such a great

good about

of

want, above all, to be liberated from their

radical perception of

they have been

ing

(S,

pp.63, 75).

the

injustice

the present more than the socialist promise to control the

arbitrariness of

man

the providence of aristocrats

revolution, Tocqueville says in the Souvenirs, (S, p. 136). The people, in their restlessness, see no reason why might be radically altered, and, who knows, maybe radically

as a

on

by

or

popular view of socialist

their individuality.

by

revolution not

They

because,

embrace as

to a subhuman condition, but because

distance from

nature

They

affirm

their existence.

that

they

restless

the

or

future

misery, radical

Marx contends, they are so hu

experience almost noth

the socialist

lottery

in the hope that

will be something other than that which is determined by the out lotteries. Socialist revolution is "a powerful effort of the workers to

lives

come of

from the

escape

Tocqueville acter of

the

condition"

necessities of

shows

the

(S,

their

unnatural or

mental restlessness

p.

137).

extremely human

or

late-historical

that produces socialist arousal

by

char

comparing his

drunken porter, a particularly repulsive socialist braggart who threatened his life, with his exemplary servant Eugene, "assuredly no socialist either by the temperament."

Eugene seems at first, the finer human being ory or by far. But his goodness, it becomes clear, comes from the fact that he is barely human at all.

It

is, in

The passion

Rousseau's sense,

blindly

natural goodness

and otherwise

greedy inflamed by mental

(S,

p.

157).

mentally disordered porter is full of the His discontent causes him, but not

restlessness.

Tocqueville

Eugene,

to imagine replacing Tocqueville

is because his

his desires

mind and

Eugene, Tocqueville

Socialism

on

If he is the

as master.

are more

and

187

History

being, it

worse

human.

other human beings of his in his revolutionary time by his contentment. He is satisfied as a servant. He "generally desired nothing beyond his and he "was always pleased

says, is distinguished from

class

reach,"

himself."

He was free from anxiety about his future. His desires are sim because they are unmixed with much self-consciousness. His freedom, Toc queville says, is "from that most usual sickness of our time, the restless with

ple

mind.

freedom, "a

This

repose,"

Tocqueville

peaceful

goes

on, Eugene "enjoyed as a

nature."

gift of

Eugene's freedom from discontentment is

what people enjoyed

in feudal

mind, had passed History, humanity him by. Eugene was, in many senses, remarkably unaffected by time. Even in a much earlier time, Tocqueville remarks, his lack of restlessness would have times.

been

the progress of

or

considered extreme

Tocqueville

reports

face. But it

was

being. It did

not cure

worthy

of

manifestations

that

p.

157).

he felt "a

repose"

sense of

momentary experience, one

Eugene. He did

with

and

a

(S,

and the restless

his

mental

and

restlessness,

when

he

did

not

which

he did

saw

Eugene's

his

transform

not spend much

time

find Eugene, as he found socialist arousal, interesting serious study. What Tocqueville recognizes is human liberty, or of the restless mind (S, pp.157, 76, 82). not

Tocqueville's description theoretical statement about

of

Eugene's

human

natural gift

He

condition.

is

part of an

uncommonly Eugene "uncon

says that

sciously followed the precepts inculcated by philosophers, but seldom observed by them, and enjoyed as a gift of nature the happy balance between powers and wants that alone brings the happiness promised (S, by the

philoso

p.

157). The

moderation. ness.

say that human beings should consciously cultivate That moderation, the life according to nature, brings human happi philosophers

It is the human

But it

seems

the happiness

antidote to the

they

They

promise.

not

of

the restless

mind.

inculcations

in

"happy

balance."

Philosophy

or philo

are not effective antidotes to the restless mind, and

lead to human happiness. What the

through conscious

not

enjoy rarely moderate, because they do not

are

experience their powers and wants sophic

feverish misery

to Tocqueville that the philosophers themselves do

cultivation can

only be

philosophers achieved

hold

be

can

they do

achieved

unconsciously, through nat

ural gift.

In human some

beings,

reason, fails to

to the give

extent

her

progressively greater amount, increases. To be human is to and

ence that

it is the human

of

The

are

result

distinctively human, is that

and restlessness, experience

primarily

the discontent

mental

of this

but

not

condition

to

wish

to have them. He

"for

saw

a

for

nature,

wants exceed powers

hence to be immoderate. Tocqueville knew from

disorder,

desires,"

gift.

they

by

a

restlessness,

imbalance

or

personal experi

peace of mind and moderation

kinship

between his

own

and

188

Interpretation dissatisfaction in the bourgeois regime, and he saw them both as a truthful reflection of the human condition than the doctrine of the philoso

popular more

phers.8

The

more

balance that

human

historical

enjoy.

Revolution is

distance from Eugene's

great a

human

a

being becomes,

opposite of

Eugene's

caused

by

contentment.

about

his.

They

be radically transformed. The theoretical intention of socialism,

the more the natural

is disturbed,

produces the response of contentment

human beings is the

or

human beings

Their

too

lives

their

conclusion about

hold that their

less

the

and

who exist at

present condition

should

tremely

restless

tion, to

create

purpose of

history

or

described

minds, is to

return

history

through

to

as a product of and attractive

humanity

to

Eugene's he

or revolution what

human

barely by

enjoys

nature.

the historical act of socialist revolution, in other words,

humanity to an end, to return human by Rousseau. One reason Eugene is

beings to the no socialist

ex

condi

is to

The

bring

natural goodness

is that he already

possesses what socialism promises.

THE ATTACK ON PROPERTY

Tocqueville defines lege

socialism

by

its

radical opposition

to the

right

or privi

property which has heretofore seemed to have been the foundation of It is an attack by the restless mind on the one inegalitarian distinc

of

social order.

tion that

has,

so

far, been leveling,

from characteristically the restless destruction of order. exempted

modern or late-

historical

acts of

leveling

the egalitarian perfection of the form of government

the

made

had

people more miserable and restless

expanded more

tence,

as

Marx

what

Marx

pp.

13-15, 75). Their desires

rapidly than their conditions had improved. Their exis in "On the Jewish seemed more whim Question,"

miserably isolated than "heaven"

calls political

had

before. The coming of or universal and homoge

ever

the egalitarian

made social existence more

individualistic

or

hellish.9

misery had become more intense or distinctively human. Such extreme experiences of one's unsupported individuality the

revolution

political

had, in fact,

also explains

sical and atomistic and

neous state

(S,

Merely

is incomplete. The

trary

experience

aims

to make the

of

foundation

social

individual distinctiveness

revolution not

liberation to

must

political or

merely prehensively human (S, p. 75). Socialism is based on the awareness that the people's

of

come

this miserable

be

eradicated.

limited but

Human

because

and arbi

Socialism

social or com

political change cannot produce the

expanding desires point. Liberation discontent requires, it seems, the transformation of what Tocqueville itself." calls "the unalterable laws that constitute society It requires, Toc queville often says, what is obviously impossible. But at one point he muses radical

from

this

which

Tocqueville his

Socialism

on

1 89

History

and

that these laws are unalterable is merely a prejudice in favor of existing order, one that cannot sustain itself against popular restlessness. His that

view

imagination is

constrained

Tocqueville's

fact that his

the

is

mind

not

simply

law"

"sacred

or

flourishing

of

property,

which, along

not

inevitable, he

have "the

(S,

restless

"enjoyment."

reason,

the

with

as

"ancient

family, is indispensable for the Property, for him,

the

right"

keep

open

aristocratic

to

people would come

possi

ask whether

property in the interest of bourgeois regime, have been given no to

abolish

The people, in a incentive, for preserving anything

or

argument

aristocratic.

greatness or excellence.

says, that the

power and

their own no

human

to be perpetuated to

an aristocratic remnant

they do

not

right,"

of civilization or

bilities. But it is

he acknowledges, is for bourgeois reasons, but

prejudice against socialism,

He defends the right

is

by

75-76, 98, 136-37).

pp.66,

(S,

aristocratic

pp.75, 105).

Socialist tences to

last

accidental or arbitrary.

equally so. In the bourgeois regime, "the right to property is the destroyed aristocratic It appears as "an isolated privi

seem

society

only because the people feel their own exis The distinctions that constitute bourgeois

arousal occurs not

be

world."

remnant of a

lege in

leveled

a

society"

(S,

12-13). The right

pp.

or privilege makes no sense

alone, but only as part of a world that had been destroyed or leveled. The right to property was easy to defend "[w]hen it was merely the basis rights"

many

other

those based

on

queville

tarian

in

liberty

order

of all

believes to have

revolution.

challengers. "Haves,"

or

12). These rights, Tocqueville

says

of

were

elsewhere,

the aristocratic claim that a particular class needs freedom from

material concerns

preserve the

(S,

p.

Both those

to

be

(CN, much

cultivated

p. 206).

that

aristocratic

claim,

which

merit, seems to have been discredited

The bourgeois agree

to rule for the common good and

But this

rulers

bourgeois

believe it

rule aims

no more than

by

Toc

egali

their socialist

simply to be for the benefit

of

with property.

The right to property, appearing in the bourgeois world unveiled as the only foundation of social order, is unprecedently indefensible as a right. The distinc tion between the Haves

and

Have-nots, appearing

the

merely economic or This historical revelation as

never seemed more arbitrary or unjust. its arbitrariness, Tocqueville partly agrees with Marx, is partly in the service of the truth. Aristocrats have always, with some self-consciousness, veiled their

quantitative, of

selfishness with arguments and

in the

arguments and some

acknowledges that of

the

restless

Tocqueville "that the

real

quotes

largely

made them no

effective it"

to

of political

ineffective. Revolution, longer generally

himself saying in the assembly

cause, the

become unworthy

integrity

they

Tocqueville himself

exercise

life,

sees some

human benefit to the illusions. Nevertheless, he

are now

mind, has

illusions.'0

one, that

(S,

p.

agrees with

the people,

the

also

progress

persuasive or credible.

on

makes men

14). He, the

or

truth

the eve of

lose

power

revolution

is that they

aristocratic partisan of

and even socialist

the

theorists,

Interpretation

190

that the bourgeois rulers are unworthy to rule. He says that

for the

cared

through

fact any ruling

by

and

of virtue.

Tocqueville

see virtue's

really

the

affirms

beauty,

good, to rule

common

skepticism of

the

inevitable

Tocqueville adds, revolution, oppression.

candid about

perpetuate

its

they

the

could

(S,

it

least

by

rulers

that one

inherently

somewhat

ingenious institu

reliance on

It

unstable.

makes

the so

legitimate (S, pp.7, 14, 41). is the result of demo

rulers'

is

candid selfishness

illusion

to

restless mind's reduction of order

their reduction

human to

of

would seem

their self-defense

or arbi

a product of

intellectual liberation from illusion.

pp.11, 62). It

situation made

Tocqueville's

viewed

central aristocratic opinion

that bourgeois skepticism

The bourgeois their

be

not even

the

power

hence really be devoted to political liberty most effectively. The open moral and political

and at

however,

regarded

a point of pride

historical

of

of

enlightenment, restlessly,

that it

bourgeois rule, despite the resulting

cialist challenge

trary

to

and

tional or mechanical solutions, makes

cratic

and

own

The bourgeois rulers, he notes, not only They were also blind to its utility (S, p. 6).

effectiveness of virtue requires useful.

merely

their

He is particularly

class must cultivate mores and opinions

beauty

But the must

religion and country.

greed

popular

popular restlessness.

curbing

not see the

as

moderated

good, and

common

devotion to

have

to

ought

they

their

Incoherently

or

mechanical motivation as

that their postrevolutionary

impossible.

in his Souvenirs

was that, despite the life's project, he could not foresee political life returning in his time, except momentarily. One of his memories was yet another failed attempt to institutionalize or constitutionalize

partnership that

it. The

own candid conclusion

was

the foundation

his

of

whole

had simply become too restless to sustain ordered or political liberty. The history of his time, he acknowledged, is the history of revolution. mind

THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIALIST THEORY

The

is inevitable

socialist challenge

tion of the revolution, the

disease

theoretical

The

acknowledgement of

Socialism work.

has

to be the culmina

misery.

partly theoretical. It

afflicted man since

to eradicate mental restlessness

and

duces

practical and

called work which

also seeks

speculation with a

connects the

It

means

that science's truth would

disorder

aims to cure

beginning

to

bring

the

of

life, religion, (S, pp.71, 74).

mind

of mental restlessness with

same material and

property

"that

exist

political

science"

It holds that they have the

cure would

the

by

replacing true "social simply

transformable cause. The eradication of

This

means

human

not yet

tion to property is partly

It

It

and radical.

the growth of

been shown, that history's movement away from nature toward democratic equality is genuinely good for human beings. Its opposi

show what and

has

reversal of

hence

would mean

extend, somehow, to mental restlessness.

that

to

rest.

which pro

historically

the end of

work.

Socialist theorists

Tocqueville may, characteristically, be

and

191

History

unclear on whether work causes mental restlessness

But their interdependence in

or mental restlessness causes work.

queville

Socialism

on

himself, following Rousseau,

Toc

history

sees.

History is opposed to nature, that which is governed to impersonal neces History is the work of human beings to overcome the contingency of their existence, which they, inexplicably, come to experience through their self-con sciousness. By working, they increase their distance from nature and hence their dependence on chance. They become, and experience themselves as, sity.

progressively more contingent or accidental or disordered. The resulting rest lessness causes them to work all the harder. They do so to meet the needs they have created through the mixture of brutish desire with anxious self-conscious ness, but

beings,

they

end

up

the historical

response

It

to

in

both

bring

imagination to discover ence

goes,

new

make

needs, harder to

themselves

more

Human

satisfy.

miserably

restless

in

misery.

to eliminate the

aims

works

producing

paradox

to their restless

Socialism paradox.

also

incoherence

or

disorder

restlessness and work

socialism's

possibility

which produces

this

to an end. The mind uses

against

all

human

experi

to the perception that that experience has been no good.

response

Socialism

aims to replace anxiousness and misery with truth and contentment. Because everything human is to some extent disordered, its "social can only become wholly true if human distinctiveness or liberty disappears.

science"

The individual

Tocqueville opposes, the

most

brute

with

identified

radically, the

individual to

Science

lose his

must

always

separate

or

her

self-consciousness

socialism with extreme

in the

social

"decentralizing"

passion or willfulness

himself from the

social

whole.

centralization, because it that causes

whole."

knowledge is only possible in a world without the in him. But that seemingly logical conclusion is really a

or comprehensive

the angel

particularly incoherent or restless or human one. Brutes, of course, cannot pos sess such knowledge. God, Tocqueville says, sees human beings in their partic

He, in his wisdom, can comprehend each brute with the angel in him. Tocqueville, in affirming the superiority of and in pursuing divine wisdom, ularity.

shows

the

inadequacy

man or systematic

and

hence the disordered

pretentiousness of

merely hu

rationalism.12

SYSTEMATIC THEORY

Tocqueville

understands socialism as a systematic

give a comprehensive,

deterministic

account of

human

theory,

as an attempt

and social change.

to

It is, bour

radically different from but merely a radicalization of also attempts to understand human existence systematically which geois theory, or mechanically. Both theories share a moral and political skepticism, a denial or goodness of human liberty, which made them both hateful of the

in that respect,

not

possibility

Interpretation

192

to Tocqueville (cf.

S,

62,

pp.6-7,

they

certainly Systematic theories give

that achieve "mathematical ence of mental restlessness

divinize themselves

than

existence, ones

by "banish[ing]

or

the

Such theorists vainly claim, in effect, to (DA, p. 543). They deny or attempt to

p. 62).

by brutalizing

incoher

men"

exactness,"

(S,

in fact, that

said,

untrue.13

coherent or consistent accounts of

the existence of the brute

destroy

DA, 542-43). He

with

"pernicious"

were more

others

with

the

angel

in him.

They

the uncertainty and incoherence that characterizes merely

claim

to eradicate

human existence, in

cluding human thought, through thought.

theorists, in truth, banish themselves. They do so because they find their extreme mental restlessness, their intense aware ness of the contingency of the human condition, hateful. They experience noth

By banishing

ing

good

in

being

misanthropy, or

men,

systematic

human. Systematic theory is, at bottom, willful self-denial or human misery rather than devotion either to wisdom

a product of

human liberty. It is hateful from the which opposed systematic

ship,

perspective of

consistency

on

behalf

Tocqueville's

of

partisan

human liberty.

SOCIALIST THEORISTS: INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

The misery of extreme historical origin, motivates

by

aroused

bourgeois

socialist challenge

the

of

and

or middle

in their

socialism,

people's material

desires

of a similar although

restlessness,

socialist

theorists

as much as

their theory. These intellectuals ally

aristocrats and

doctrine

mental

attachment to

a product of

desires

hence their

their

restlessness

They hope that the people, systematic theory true (S, p. 137). connects

existing

so

They further by aroused,

use

distinct

people who are

the people against the

together

order.

minds and

hopes.

and

hopes.

Tocqueville

class,

with

who come

the

in

response

The theorists

to the

use

the

imaginations, to appeal to it, in fact, to expand their

radicalizing and be the "brute

focusing force"

will

the extreme restlessness of theorists

with

to

their make

the origina

theory clearly in his uncompleted second volume on the revolution. There, he notes that the literary-political theorists of the eighteenth century had an "unnatural contempt for the time in which they lived and the tion of

most

systematic

belonged."

society to

love, own

they

which

or almost

involuntary

institutions,

fathers."

ments

were

their traditional customs, or the wisdom and virtues of their

Because they

ordinarily should "take the

strangely deficient "in instinctual felt usually by men in all countries for their

They

respect

were so uprooted

established

by

instinct

from

and

things."

authority in all far from nature, that they they historical beings (CN, pp.153, 157). that

These was not

the natural and particular attach

passion,

place of

existed

partisans of reason were

reasonable, but arbitrary

extremely

they

asserted that

Their detachment is

were

extremely human

"reason"

evidence or late-

aware that their present existence

and contingent.

They hated

the

incoherence

Tocqueville that characterizes the mixture of

imagined

their restless misery,

brute

Socialism

on

and angel which change"

and

193

History

is human life. They, in 153-54).

(CN, Reason, they held, should rule without restraint or exception. In their pride, they did not see clearly that the simple rule of reason would be the end of humanity. But, with Rousseau, they could not but ask "whether the simplicity radical

than

of savages was not worth more are

stincts

doubting

better than

our virtues

.

p.

all our

riches

(CN,

.

p.

and

whether

arts,

156).

They

the goodness of their pride in their intellectual

even

freed them from the blindness

instinct. Their misery,

of

for consistency, made them doubt the tinctively human.

goodness or

liberty,

mixed with

of

reality

their in

could not

help

which

desire

their

everything dis

for the

restless misery of the eighteenth-century French in The Old Regime, as the product of their detach particularly from the pleasures and responsibility of political life. In that century, he

Tocqueville theorists ment

accounts

more

observes, French

letters

men of

in

were not

life,

political

they

as

in En

were

politics"

world"

Nor did they "turn their backs on and enter a "separate "pure as they did in Germany. The French writers were

gland.

philosophy,"

of

politics, but

they

interested in

were

political reform

The English writers, like Tocqueville, found ical

responsibility.

"statesmen"

on made them

ory,

as

from

a

too

They

behalf

of

were

still,

(OR,

satisfaction or pleasure

decisively,

They

aristocrats.

human liberty. If anything, their

unappreciative of

not

in

158).

p.

in

polit

like

wrote

involvement

political

the partial truth of general or systematic the

Tocqueville believed Burke theoretical perspective, not

(OR,

was

detached

pp.2, 153).

'4

Their

minds

were,

or restless enough to perceive

the

The German writers, in effect, attempted to divert themselves from their knowledge of the limitations of the political world by trying to live somewhere truth.

The French

else.

writers neither affirmed

divert themselves from the

through

political world.

They

involvement

wrote

nor were able

to

to criticize and perfect it

imaginatively. These and

politics"

proponents of an

distance from

better,

practical

the unnaturalness

they

perspective,

"abstract, literary affairs

of political

to

thought

they had

about the

reflect

radically life. From their cosmopolitan

(CN,

criticized all patriotism and particularism

the time

nature, or, or universal p.

165). But

truth, was a reflection of the unnaturalness of their detach For Tocqueville, any view from a distance is bound to be a distortion. These writers, and the aristocratic audience they formed according to their tastes and opinions, had privileges but not political power. They had all that their criticism, in ment.

was required

to

exercise

intellectual

liberty, but not bored, and

tachment made them miserably anxious, what

Tocqueville did

which

denied him

criminate passion understood

They

it

or

a

as an uprooted aristocrat

weighty

for

not,

concluded

role.

in the

Their theorizing,

rationalistic or systematic

political

liberty. Their de

They

restless.

political

experienced

bourgeois

regime

which produced an

innovation,

was,

indis

whether

they

a reflection of their restless misery.

that

political or

human life, because it is

somewhat incoher-

Interpretation

194 ent, is

absurd.

immaterial

aristocrats,

for merely material advantages, were the bourgeois rulers of 1848 about the indefensibility of their contempt

principle and

less blind than their

but

responsibility is inde

which

liberty.15

cal

that their situation, as disempowered

concludes

was absurd. Privilege without is why Tocqueville holds that human liberty depends on politi The eighteenth-century theorists, with their aristocratic taste for

still privileged

fensible,

Tocqueville

privileges.

were

But both they and the bourgeois rulers justification for their situation.

agreed

that there was no

moral or political

theorists'

From Tocqueville's perspective, the exclusion from political life. Reflection

that, because

conclusion

ought man

to be

political

Political

abolished.

on

life is

involvement,

Tocqueville, despite his propensity for

disordered, it

somewhat restless or although

or makes endurable

moderates

restlessness,

misery was caused by their its basis should not produce the itself

a product of

hu

that restlessness. It caused

detachment

theoretical

doubtful

and

anxiety, to avoid misanthropy.

But the political

theorists'

rationalistic

life. Tocqueville reason, the

partisans of

some

detail how the

perhaps

tors

eventually

of socialist

says

imagination

"Physiocrats"

"Economists,"

or

to be reformed.

world was

all

They hated, Tocqueville

whatsoever."

mity to "fanatical

carried

They

nents of restlessness or

disorder.

trol

of

of

activities

all

they

said,

and

the true origina

were

"any

many

kind

diversity

of

on

aimed at

"absolute equality, State

despotic

individuals,

individuality

of each citizen's

submerging 59).

were

They

anticipated

behalf of consistency or unifor extremely restless or disordered oppo

their partisanship

lengths."

to the abolition of

eighteenth-century actually considered in

They

the results of revolution, and

theory.

They

always pointed

that the most practical of the

legislation,

into the group

the

and

con

total

mind"

(OR,

pp.158

All human particularity or individuality is to be subjected to the rule of reason. All individual activity that would offend the mind is to be eliminated. conquer merely human reality, to eradicate everything it It opposes, as Tocqueville says, the "human the mixture of brute and angel. Socialism is the "confiscation of human

The intellect is to

condition,"

regards as unjust. paradoxical freedom"

"schoolmaster"

by

or theoretical or social scientific

leadership.16

THE PROBLEM OF THE SOCIALIST CHALLENGE

The of

effectiveness of socialism

the theorists and

from the

tingency

rity

restless

and

nothing

more.

The

depends

Both

mind, from the

and contentment.

and can

workers.

intensely

human

Theorists

experience and want

interests

liberation

condition experienced as radical con

Workers want secu if human beings are content

seek rational control.

convergence

live according to reason,

upon the convergence of the

only

or with

comes

the unconscious moderation of Eu-

Tocqueville Contentment is

gene.

or

it

historical, Human beings, and

humanity is

tence rooted

jected and

in the

the theorists conclude,

195

History

distinctively

human

it

and

accident,

of this

and a partisan of

bring

the

human

exis

behavior. Socialism, to its pro

egalitarian revolution

understanding the theoretical force

Tocqueville,

conclusion, became the

Distinctively

absurd

produces

their

or surrender

overcome

must

service of reason and contentment.

or rational conclusion.

ment,

Discontent is

natural and subhuman.

this conclusion, means to

misanthropy

and

grows over time.

a miserable

in

Socialism

on

an opponent of reason and content

willful affirmation of

human

in

liberty

spite of

its

misery, to the extent necessary to perpetuate human liberty.

Tocqueville

that he did

acknowledges

know

not

whether socialism would

That uncertainty gave nobility to his political writing and action. He did not consider himself a reactionary, defending a cause that history had defi nitely made futile or obsolete, although he was well aware that it might have triumph.

done

so.

His

ring

to socialism also did not make

opposition

to

what succeeds

imaginary

Utopias

bourgeois

the strength of the socialist challenge. The

icate

restless

but,

misery,

the

intensity

has

made political

in

him

a

that certainly

Machiavellian,

regime

had

fact, had intensified it. If history

and commonness of

the experience of extreme

life impossible, then

He

cannot.17

prefer

could see

aimed

to erad

the growth of

or

mental restlessness

eventually suc bourgeois distinctions. indefensibility merely In the last several years, the socialist challenge has come to seem, perhaps

ceed on

the basis of

for the first time

perhaps socialism will

of

1848,

since

longer

no

credible.

The demise

of

socialism,

its triumph, now seems to some to be the end of history.'8 But history, arguably, has not come to an end. The restless mind is still particularly restless, and religion, philosophic speculation, and even political life have not rather

than

been completely

replaced

an

it

end,

perhaps

to existence goodness of geois

life

a

simply true

property

or

has

great

it

would

If

is to have

history

be socialism,

or

the return

to something close to the

nature.19

of

The

Tocqueville

natural

socialist criticism of

perhaps socialism still

weight, and

of socialism

understood

social science.

individuality,

the Rousseauean state

still

to say

still makes sense

without

The disappearance

blessing. He

by

has

a

bour

future.

would not regard as an unmixed

selfwhy so many, who have been and are particularly in bourgeois regimes, have lost themselves in the

conscious and passionate socialist

imagination.

socialism

is the only

the only way

of

They believe,

escaping from the

Tocqueville held they

integrity

mistakenly, that devotion to the coming of

of political

left in the world, and hence anxiety of bourgeois life. But

credible or egalitarian passion apolitical

were mistaken

life,

which seems

did in his, only in extraordinary socialists

to

return

moments.

problematic to our restless minds as

Some contemporary

only because he to the

remained world

in

devoted to the our

Tocqueville's devotion

it did to

time,

as

it

remains as

his.20

have turned to Tocqueville's

antibourgeois

Interpretation

196

for inspiration

analysis

Tocqueville's

least

or at

William Sullivan, for one,

vindication.

informed

anti-individualism as

by

"Rousseau's

sees

pessimistic con virtue."

that

clusion

is best

queville

civil

modern

understood as

giving "a

ship,

"positive

or

despotism"

freedom,"

is the

that

incompatible

new version of

the

Toc

civic

with

republican argument

citizenship."

the intrinsic good of active

for

was

society

Only

cultivation of such citizen

can provide effective resistance to

"atomized

the

"negative"

or antipolitical

product of a

understanding

of

liberty.21 liberty"

But, despite his anti-individualism and his affirmation of "positive against bourgeois liberalism, Sullivan recognizes that Tocqueville was no so cialist. Unlike Marx, "he did not seek, and does seem to have imagined under modern

circumstances, a social

(Sullivan, rooted

in

p. 7).

He did

egalitarian

limited

was

by

not share

"moral

substantially

the socialist

(Sullivan,

vision of

would

see socialism as

market"

fellowship"

"citizenly

pp. 220- 25).

be the perfection,

the

Because his

not

vision

not see

that

the eradication, of

producing the

a world where

saw

passionate concern

for their

desire to

themselves or others. It would be a

rule over

politiciza-

comprehensive

it as, necessarily, producing the end of politi human beings would be without political passion or

tion of society. Tocqueville

particular

existences,

Eugene's dignity, because there

without

upon an ethic

replace

life.

Sullivan tends to

but

based

antisocialist, liberal prejudice, Tocqueville did

an

moral and political

life,

would

culture"

socialism, properly understood,

cal

organization of production

responsibility that

of participation and

where

would

they

would no

full

world

be

of

no masters

longer

Eugenes, like Toc

queville.

Tocqueville's than Sullivan's. says

civic

essary

the

of

virtue, but

a world

It

human

Tocqueville

and

be

to

closer

to the

of communism or

of citizens.

He

writes of

Marx's

spirit of

the end

of

history,

the spontaneous,

whims, a weightless, amoral

existence.22

the dream of socialism is not the overcoming of selfishness

or obsolete.

distinctively

fellowship

satisfaction of personal

The fulfillment

by

Marx, in his description

about

nothing

passionless

view of socialism seems

in

would

which virtue or self-restraint

be

possible

experience or

Marx

oppose

only

with

the

has become

disappearance

liberty.

Sullivan, finally, by viewing

socialism not as

the overcoming but the radicalization of bourgeois materialism. It the egalitarian revolution against human order, which is revealed as, cally, disorder. Socialism

restores

unnec

of most

society to

order

by

purging the

completes most radi angel

from

the brute. share a hatred of the bourgeois world. Marx identified human self-consciousness, which Tocqueville did not. Toc queville held that its miserable anxiety can be genuinely moderated by the pleasures and responsibility of political life, of ruling oneself and others. Sul seems to agree with Tocqueville about polivan, in his "civic

Marx

and

Tocqueville

the bourgeois

with

republicanism,"

Tocqueville

Socialism

on

litical life

as an antidote to

individualism, but he

mation of

it is inegalitarian

and

be toward

hence

Tocqueville

dence

Political

reactionary.

movement can

Sullivan's

paradoxical

affir

only

restless

anxiety,

devotion to

political

recognize that this paradoxical

devotion

was evi

only misanthropy but the greatness of socialism. It was the of distinctively human passion, a human response to extremely restless of

not

product

but

could not

197

History

holds that Tocqueville's

a more comprehensive egalitarianism.

from Tocqueville's perspective, produces a movements to bring political life to an end.

and

the

party"

It was, he says, the foundation of a "great (S, p. 12). Socialism, he agrees with Sullivan, is a political movement, even if it is one that aims to anxiety.

bring

life to

political

It

an end.

was

the

cause of

a

bringing

aristocrats

back to the

political stage and even

Socialism,

more

It

stage.

It

his

gave

him

the

a

against

his

political

weighty

by

passion, and

gave

anxiety (S,

causing the bourgeois the center of the po

near

hence

his doubtful

suppressed

or The resulting self-confidence him distinctly human pleasure and mod

political role.

greatness

existence

apolitical

ism,

his

personal

brought into

particularly, brought Tocqueville

aroused

consciousness of

erated

life, if

liberty.

rulers to experience a nobler conception of

anxiety.

return of political

moment, in 1848. The challenge inspirited the bourgeois regime,

only for

litical

the

pp.

3-5, 231-32). The fact

that the

political

life

the revolution turned out to be an effective antidote to

anxiety of doubtful isolation is a the intentions of revolutionaries

crucial argument against social who

fight to

make subsequent

life impossible. But, in this respect, bourgeois inten different. When in power, bourgeois rulers also aim to create

revolution and political

tions are

no

systematic or apolitical order. of

made

socialism,

Tocqueville

ing

Their

his

spent most of

that he

would

have been

ism,

that

It

was not

rescued

Tocqueville

his

agrees with

cizing bourgeois life

an

or

in the

human

its inclinations, fends The response

and

based

that human beings

demo

challenge of social

socialism,

by

politi

history,

the

to that challenge certainly

order"

on

disordered

will continue

makes

pp. 84-85).

decades. The "new

recent

full

the

would

indistinguishable liberal

with

nature's standards of reason and contentment.

have feared, in the crucial or But we can hope that

socialism.24

enough

to live

of

world

complete replacement of political

indistinguishable from

mind will remain

(S,

of

ennobling

off the end of

may be, Tocqueville

respects almost

the human

ble,

life

or

challenge of

absence of socialism

bourgeois democracies

with economic

failure

and misery-produc

The Souvenirs

efforts, but the

miserable condition

coming of gentle, peaceful is the noblest product of the West in emerge

futile

idealization

Nietzsche that the

against

a

world.

despotism.23

that may

than the

in the America he described in Democ

own political

him from his

in

the bourgeois

miserable

racy, although it was, in many respects, cratic reality.

as much as or more

political career

attempt to elevate or politicize

clear

failure,

Tocqueville happy.

to make

world order

their restless misery

impossi

and resist

Interpretation

198

NOTES Komost comprehensive attempt to view Tocqueville in light of Rousseau is John Carolina NC: Academic and the New Politics Alexis de Tocqueville Science (Durham, ritansky, of Press, 1987). Another very sweeping and instructive attempt is Wilhelm Hennis, 'Tocqueville's

1. The

Perspective,"

see Allan Bloom, Giants and Dwarfs (New 202-3, 231-32, 312-13. Roger Boesche makes some

Interpretation 16 (1988): 61-86. Also

York: Simon

and

Schuster, 1990),

suggestive comments about

pp.

distinctively

the

antibourgeois character of

The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville (Ithaca: Cornell

Tocqueville's liberalism in

University Press, 1987).

2. Koritansky's analysis, which reduces Tocqueville's political and religious teaching to that of Contract, does not even attempt to do justice to Tocqueville's analysis of religion as a

the Social support

to individual greatness

in America, trans. G.

(Democracy

York: Doubleday, 1969], pp. 542-45). Lamberti distinguishes well between Rousseau individual to the

citizen.

how to

Better than

anyone

the individual

and

Lawrence,

Tocqueville: "Rousseau

else, Tocqueville

posed

J. P. Mayer [New

ed.

.

sacrificed the

.

the central problem of modem

citizen"

(Tocqueville and the Two preserving the Democracies, trans. A. Goldhammer [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989], p. 188). philosophy:

respect

while

3. Alexis de Tocqueville, Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848,

ed.

J. P. Mayer,

trans.

G. Lawrence (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), p. 75. This source (Tocqueville's Souvenirs) is hereafter referred to as S. Tocqueville's other books are referred to as follows: De mocracy in America is DA. The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. S. Gilbert (New York: Anchor Books, 1955) is OR. "Chapters and Notes for His Unfinished Book on the French Revolution,''

The Two Tocquevilles,

ed. and trans.

R.R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton

University

Press, 1987), is CN. 4. See Hennis,

Rousseau soul

in the

a moral

p.

83: "Tocqueville is

historian,

a political scientist

or, if you will,

an analyst of

in the tradition

of

Plato

and

the order and disorder of the human

democracy."

age of

5. Rousseau's theoretical intentions are, of course, revealed in the quotation from Aristotle on page (Jean- Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality

his title

Among Men,

The First

and

Second Discourses,

R. Masters, trans. R.

ed.

and

J. Masters [New

York: St. Martin's Press, 1964]), p. 77. The quotation, given in Latin, is translated by Masters as follows: "Not in corrupt things, but in those well ordered in accordance with nature, should one consider what

is

history. Nature nature's

natural."

gives

For Rousseau, contrary to Aristotle, what is beings make themselves human

order; human

perspective, to be human

is to be disordered

Tocqueville's debt to Rousseau is

or

natural

and

is

what exists prior

to

hence disordered. From

diseased.

Pascal, because Rousseau's history depends on Pas cal's psychology. For Tocqueville's debt to Pascal, see my The Restless Mind: Alexis de Toc queville on the Origin and Perpetration of Human Liberty (Lanhan, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993). This

also

to

article contains much of chapter

1

of

that book.

Pauperism,"

6. Alexis de Tocqueville, "Memoir on Tocqueville and Beaumont on Social Re form, ed. S. Drescher (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 6. 7. Alexis de Tocqueville, Letter to Louis de Kergorlay (21 September 1834), Selected Letters Politics and Society, ed. R. Boesche, trans. J. Toupin and R. Boesche (Berkeley: University California Press, 1987), p. 93. 8. Tocqueville, Letter to Edouard de Tocqueville (2 November 1840), in Selected Letters, 143. on

9. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish pp. 24-25.

Question,"

The Marx-Engels Reader,

ed.

of

p.

R. Tucker (New York:

Norton, 1972),

10. Compare S,

p.

75,

with

Tocqueville, DA,

p.

525,

the time "[w]hen the world was under the control of a

on "the official doctrine few rich and powerful

Work,"

morali

of

at

men."

11. See Tocqueville, "Speech on the Right to Tocqueville and Beaumont on Social Reform, pp. 199-200. See also Tocqueville, Letter to Nassau William Senior (10 April 1848), Selected Letters, p. 206.

Tocqueville 12. On divine wisdom, ideas" "general

weakness of

13. See DA,

p.

543,

p.

DA,

437,

p.

where

it is described to

and

show

History

199

the merely human

letter to Arthur de Gobineau (20 December 1843) in John Lukacs, and Correspondence with Gobineau (Westport, CT: Greenwood

Revolution 227.

14. On Tocqueville's

criticism of Burke as James Ceaser, Liberal Democracy Press, 1990), pp. 153-54.

science, see

University

Socialism

thinking.

or systematic

and

ed., The European

Press, 1959),

see

on

the theoretical foundation

part of and

of

his

political

Political Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

15. See Delba Winthrop, "Tocqueville's Old Regime: Political (1981): 88-111.

History,"

Review of Politics 43

Work,"

pp. 183, 199-200. For an analysis of Toc 16. Tocqueville, "Speech on the Right to queville's defense of liberty that centers on this speech, see Daniel Mahoney, 'Tocqueville and s Defense of Human Liberty. Socialism,"

Tocqueville'

17. For Tocqueville's

criticism of

the

superficiality

and

nism, see my 'Tocqueville on Metaphysics and Human

human

Liberty,"

unworthiness of

Teaching

Machiavellia

Political Science 14

(1987): 92. End

18. Consider the controversy fueled by the instantly famous essay by Francis Fukuyama, 'The The National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18. Fukuyama says that of History?"

bourgeois liberalism is the

end of

history. All

preliberal alternatives

history. Socialism, understood as a failed. That Fukuyama's essay has a Nietzschean ending been discredited

by

political and religious

radicalization of

suggests that

liberalism,

he is

neither a

was

have

tried and

Hegelian

sage

brute. This essay, in any case, made him a great bourgeois success story. His book-length version, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), has already made him a millionaire. nor a

19. That is

what is really suggested by Fukuyama's mentor, Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to of Hegel, trans. J. Nichols, ed. A. Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 159-62, "Note to the Second 20. L. E. Shiner goes so far as to suggest that Tocqueville's defense of the greatness of politi

Reading

Edition."

life in the Souvenirs is

cal

and

a

failure. Despite his intentions, he shows that it is nothing but inanity overwhelms his devotion to human liberty or greatness (The

insanity. His devotion to the truth

Secret Mirror:

Literary Form and History

sity Press, 1988]). 21. William Sullivan,

Press, 1982),

pp.

Reconstructing

203-6. Sullivan is

in

Tocqueville'

Public

one of

"Recollections''

s

Philosophy

the authors

of

(Berkeley:

Robert Bellah

[Ithaca: Cornell Univer

University of California best-selling Habits

et al.'s

of the Heart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). His book shows better than Habits how Bellah's project for reform is rooted in and is a criticism of Tocqueville.

22. See Marx, The German Ideology in The Marx-Engels Reader p. 124. 23. See Roger Boesche, "Hedonism and Nihilism: the Predictions of Tocqueville and The Tocqueville Review 8 (1986/7): 178. Boesche quotes The Will to Power: "Social ism will be able to be something useful and therapeutic: it delays "peace on and total mol Nietzsche."

earth'

lification

of

the democratic herd animal; it forces the European to

24. Fukuyama

claims

to describe

definitively

spirit"

(p. 125).

retain

the emergence of this

order

in his book.

Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political: Theology, Decisionism,

the Concept

and

of

Enemy

the

Maurice Auerbach St. Francis College

Carl Schmitt War I

and

for

the most influential German

was

a

time

(1933-36)

leading

a

political

theorist

jurist in the Nazi

after

World

regime.

Until

recently Schmitt's work has been largely ignored outside of Germany because of his association with Nazism. His work, particularly The Concept of the Po and among leftists again in vogue, however his death in 1985 (see Telos 72 [Summer 1987]).

litical, is since

Perhaps the and

end of

Eastern Europe have

given

Schmitt's teachings

that the

America math of

especially

problems

lease

a new

on

life.

his penetrating insights into the transforma as a result of World War I. Have not recent

on

tion of the European state system

nuclear stalemate and

less

the Cold War and the recent transformation of Central

Schmitt's influence depended

events shown

no

that emerged in 1918

the bipolar

were never resolved?

superpower system of

the United

The

States

of

Soviet Union, the unique situation resulting from the after World War II, merely concealed the perennial political conflicts which and

the

remained the concern of

Schmitt

until

his death. Consider the failure

Soviet

communism, the collapse of the

empire and

of world

the disintegration of the

Soviet Union itself, the resulting revival of nationalism, the re-emergence of ethnic strife in the Balkans, and the reunification of Germany. Perhaps the unique

issues

broader

of

be, Does Schmitt's "concept spective?

Does

require

in the

dogmas

of

best

the recent past and the present are

perspective than that of

not end

the full

the

understood

1945. The

world after

from

some

chief question would

political"

of

supply the basis for

the

comprehension of

the conceptual framework

the of

such a per

concrete political situation

philosophy

rather

than the

ideology?

Schmitt found wanting the formalistic, legalistic study of politics common in the German academy at the time. Hans Kelsen reduced politics to legal norms what was

As

a

termed "the pure

law."

theory

result, Schmitt came

the studies

of

the monopoly

Max Weber, of

the

use of

of

under

who

or extreme situation.

mines

the

>

influence

Such

a

decides

1993-94, Vol. 21, No. 2

sociology,

such as

the institution possessing

person who represents

the

the state of emergency, the excep

decision

sovereignty.'

essence of


of political

state as

force. For Schmitt the

sovereign power of the state alone

tional

the

defined the

unfettered

by

legal

niceties

deter

202

Interpretation

affairs strong influence on the study of international possible (for example, the work of Hans Morgenthau). But one may ask if it is to combine Schmitt's realism in foreign policy with Kelsen's liberal legalism in domestic policy. Such was the position of those who considered themselves

Schmitt's

had

realism

a

liberals. What if society is on the verge of civil war or revolution, however? Under these circumstances legal norms do not suffice to preserve the pragmatic

Schmitt's

state.

conception of

sovereignty

to both domestic and

applies

foreign

policy.

A

combination of a pragmatic

realism

principle

the right

liberalism

Schmitt did

the

basis

as an adequate

founder

of

But the

ferent from Hobbes's. Schmitt of

his

not consider

opposition

to liberalism

may term

adaptation of

in terms

of

theory

of

the

Al

the state solely

Theology

a sociological conception of

theistic

theology,

Catholic

modern state are

the omnipotent sovereign

Likewise, the exception, limits of the law, is analogous to the ordinary first cause,

not view

theological concepts.

secularized

the Enlightenment

Catholic

adaptation of

nation-state system.

Church. In his Political

the omnipotent God.

the

the

Schmitt did

perspective of the teachings of the what one

in his

of

theology. He maintained that the concepts of the

By

the conception

Schmitt's theory was quite dif as the implacable foe of liber

was rooted

to the analysis of the development

Schmitt developed in fact

state, however. He

shared

himself

though of traditional Catholic upbringing,

from the

he

with whom

motivation of

presented

the principle of classical

conception of the

individualism.

Schmitt's

theology

of

liberalism, Hobbes,

of absolute sovereignty.

alism

politics and a moderate

affairs

sanction of political power.

praised

liberalism in domestic

may be the reasonable policy. But what is the political which may direct this dual policy? According to classical liberalism, to self-preservation is both the source of individual freedom and the

in foreign

were

deists

basically

regularities

generally God's

as

political

miracle.

who rationalized

was understood

fundamental

the

But the

theology

ruling the

so

is

analogous

decision that

philosophers of

God,

as

cosmic order at a

or scientific

principles.

intervention.

By

to

outside the

They

merely distance

ruled out

politicalanalogy in the social sphere, the monarch had to govern according to natural law and the principles of the constitution, which seemed to eliminate the decision as to the exception. But in politics the need for the concrete decision independent of

miracles and

the generality ered

Hobbes

ogy, p.

of as

the law arises from time to time.

"the

representative"

classical

33) because he

nist character of

Schmitt thus

personal

Accordingly, Schmitt consid decisionism (Political Theol

argued, despite his modern rationalism, that the decisio-

sovereignty is

suggested

insight into

of

intrinsically

connected to personal authority.

that theistic, rather than

deistic, theology

offered the

Like God according to monotheism, so the sover eign according to decisionism creates out of nothing. Schmitt claimed that his methodology offers the basis for a sociology of concepts that will explain the greater

politics.

Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political the

character of

state

in

The

a certain epoch.

structure of

203

theological and meta

to the structure of political concepts (p. 45).

physical concepts corresponds

Schmitt found inspiration in the reactionary Catholic thinkers who mounted attack on modern rationalism and in particular the doctrines and conse

an

quences of

In the

tes)

the French

Revolution (p. 53).

century these thinkers (e.g., de Maistre and Donoso Cor basis for restoring sovereignty, a decisionist mon

nineteenth

theism as the

revived

archy.

By

deistic

God

contrast

the conceptual

liberalism,

total rejection of transcended civil

legal

anarchism,

abstract

laid the foundation for the

and socialism

In

to supply the

order

(at least in the

West)

divided

theological counterpart to

longer

no

or pluralistic

The counterrevolutionary Catholic thinkers totelian elements of Thomistic

theology

and

for the decisionist

condition

government, it would be necessary to resort to

system

the

of even

any legitimate form of sovereign rule because no authority meta society. All governing principles were now immanent

physical and political. ment of

had become bereft

world

ele

dictatorship because

the

recognized

the exception. The

authority is

polytheism.

the rationalistic, Aris

rejected

the doctrine

of natural

law. The

society depends on the personal authority of the monarch, as the order of the family depends on the personal authority of the father. The form of personalism is grounded on the supreme will of God. The infallibility of the order of

pope

has its

counterpart

in the sovereignty infallible decision

State there is the final, formulated it near the end

[is]

the exacting moral

of

the king. In

the

both Church

and

decision. As Schmitt

moral

Political Theology, "the core of the political idea (p. 65). The decision as to the exception is

of

decision"

simply a matter of power but of morality, of determining the just and the unjust. The moral responsibility of each member of society depends on the thus

not

principle of sovereignty.

For Schmitt every the nature

of man

corrupted

by

the grace

of

gard man's

political

idea is derived from

a

basic

(p. 56). The theological tradition

original

presupposition as to

capable of redemption through

sin, although

faith

thority. The sovereign decision that distinguished the just from the

by

original sin.

human wickedness,

The

not

to

trines, e.g., liberalism, democracy, thus oppose

as

to human

in

juridical

as such a

principles are

rooted

by

and

God. Political theology must focus on man's depravity and disre capacity for moral choice. Human evil necessitates sovereign au

thus conditioned to contain

is

that man

maintained

linked to

nature.

politics

Schmitt

man's evilness.

establish

and

socialism,

way

suggested

The doctrine

Schmitt's

Catholic thought, he

that

is

man

good and

presupposition

that the very idea of politics as such

of man's

agreement

accepted

is

Theological-metaphysical

anthropology, or the

of

unpolitical and therefore antithetical to the

Notwithstanding

claim

sovereign authority.

by

unjust

authority has only the capacity goodness. Modern political doc

sovereign

inherent

justification

with

certain

only the formal

goodness

is

is essentially

of the state.

features

structure

of

of

reactionary

theology

as

the

204

Interpretation

framework for

a

the

of

sociology

In part, he

state.

emptied theological concepts

For example, while Schmitt apparently retained divine providence, it is not clear how divine right as political right is a central factor in his

of religious and moral content.

indefinite

an

concept of

theory.7

the ultimate directive of

Schmitt's formalistic and, to an extent, positivistic conception clearly emerges in his most influential work, The Concept of the Rather than

being

transmuted

into the

the exacting antithesis

moral

decision the

between friend

and enemy.

sarily arises, Is Schmitt's decisionism sufficient to

Did he

of politics?

he

normativism that

Because clude

ist,

warranted

the

complexity the legal

of

narrowness

the Nazi regime, it is

association with

that form the basis for Nazi ideology.

Schmitt's

theorist of

a

to

usual

liberal

Because

of

leftist

and

failure

the

School, however, political

While

some

of

leftist

I think it is

stature

the polemical and theoretical strands

error of most

In

question neces

con

it is

perhaps

to consider the possible ideological consequences of Schmitt's teach

ing, in discussing

ogy.

The

was

that The Concept of the Political exhibits theoretical support for extrem

rightist views

guish

idea

rejected?

Schmitt's

of

Political.3

political

encompass

the real alternative to the

offer

the

core of

of politics

of

the

essential

argument.

is precisely to confuse and the insufficiencies

critics

Marxism

theorists are

to distin

As expected, the theory and ideol of

increasingly turning

the Frankfort

to

Schmitt for

insight (see Telos 72 [Summer 1987]).

a sense

The Concept of the Political

offers a

substantive conception of political

decisionism

broader

view of politics

latter developed

the earlier work, Political Theology. While the

and

than

a narrow

sovereignty, the

but

former de

encompassing conception of politics but somewhat devoid As Schmitt moved from his preoccupation with the theological basis

veloped a more content.

the state to a general concept of politics,

the sovereignty

of

ingly

influence

the

under

the

sociology

human life

stood

in terms

that

consists

rather

includes the

each sphere of

from

than the reverse. The political state

The

human thought

distinction. The

criterion of

poli

be

under

morality is the

antith

and experience must

beautiful

the

antithesis of

the profitable and unprofitable. In poli

distinction is that between friend

in the

reduction of politics

connotations of or

sphere

the antithesis of the

essentially determines the of the sovereign decision.

to,

is the

be

of aesthetics

political

position

state must

that most expresses the nature of

affinity

and enemy.

and

Schmitt's

ugly,

extrem

to the condition of conflict, to the state

emergency, thus to the possibility of

the ground

The

evil, that

of economics

tics the specific

ism

politics,

of a specific

esis of good and

and

of

which

tics. For Schmitt

the

of

increas

and as a result abstracted

that the state presupposes the political.

concluded

defined in terms

of

came

moral content of politics.

Schmitt

of

of political

he

of

war

if

not war

itself. The

criterion of

it is

exceptional or extreme situation

the concept, enemy, may suggest an

for, Nazism. Schmitt

ideological

characterized the

enemy

predis

as

the

205

Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political other, the stranger,

who

threatening situation,

in

definition possibly brings to

as any hated or supposedly threat exterminated. And, of course, in be justifiably may Nazism the Jewish people became such an enemy. Thus, for some

the enemy

mind

race or nation which

ening the

intense way is alien, and thus in an extreme or is possible (Concept, pp. 27 f.). This

an

conflict or war

view of

or

anti-Semitism,

critics,

racism

generally,

is the logical

consequence

of

Schmitt's theory. Schmitt's

But

more

of political

extremist politics.

law"

replaced

power"

theory

may contribute to "the pure theory of

reductionist conceptualization

to the point, Schmitt

is

which

constructed upon a

"the

with

pure

formal definition

and

thus empty of content.

Schmitt's theory of politics is the result of a misplaced abstraction. Schmitt lucidly distinguishes the political enemy from any other kind of adversary, e.g., religious or economic (Concept, sees. 3 and 4). The political enemy need not

be morally

evil or

"An enemy

ugly.

aesthetically

exists

at

only when,

least

collec

potentially, one

fighting collectivity fighting collectivities

of people confronts a similar

(sec. 3). Normally, the

Any conflict

to qualify as a

are sovereign states.

become strong enough in a situation of entity political entity, however (Concept, pp. 37 f.). At this can

nonpolitical social

antithesis pushes aside any other antithesis by which a determined. For any grouping which is constituted by the "most is entity extreme of battle or war is "the decisive human "the point

friend/enemy

the

social

possibility,"

grouping,"

Thus Schmitt's formulation

entity."

political states

but

powerful enough

which

friend/enemy

For example,

have become

and not

simply

political

struggle

in the Marxist

between

political entities.

sense

not

antithesis covers a

and the

simply

a private adversary.

expressions of

one

hand,

infidels. Likewise the

for decisionism. The But

what

(Concept,

sec.

but

in taking

a

class

battle

over

the

is the

3).

real

It is

issue is, What is the that the enemy is

clear

substance of concrete political

major component? concrete and existential mean

They

are not symbols or psycho

finally, they do not refer to For Schmitt, liberalism is the political

individualistic feelings and,

moralistic or spiritualistic antitheses.

ideology that has been

the distinction of the

proletarian class succeeds

reality of which the friend/enemy antithesis is a Schmitt prided himself on his attention to the logical

by

an economic conflict

substantive purpose or goal of political conflict?

of political concepts

religious com

source of sovereignty. In conclusion, the friend/ broader scope of politics than the concept of deci

sionism and supplies the ground

ing

between

social groups

according to the criterion of

determined

believers

is

If the

state, then it becomes the

public, not

conflict

involve

religious wars entities

groupings

chosen and the unchosen or the

enemy

only

the results of

to challenge and oppose sovereign states and consequently to

create political situations. munities

covers not

also civil wars and revolutions which are

responsible

liberalism has

reduced

for the

confusion

in

political

the enemy to the competitor

thought.

in the

On the

economic

206

Interpretation

domain,

the other hand to the

and on

intellect. Insofar

morals or

theoretically

as

as

well

adversary in the domain

debating

as political concepts contain a polemical

politically, liberalism

the

as

of politics

negation

of

character,

is

Schmitt's enemy (sec. 8). Schmitt considered liberalism as a consistent system thought which has resulted in the project to depoliticize society by neutraliz ing the political character of the most controversial issues. There is the impera

of

tive to at

the expense

honest

of an

From this

perspective

success), even

often without

Notwithstand

acknowledgement of political reality.

the impact of liberalism on

ing

(although

avoid conflict and war at all costs

modern

liberalism

politics

society,

reveals

itself

as

remains, if

concealed.

form

the most deceptive

of

politics.

After World War I Schmitt parliamentary democracy from the ruins of monarchy Schmitt

pacifism and

and empire

opposition

to

sovereign

internationalism. Liberal

ideological formulas

exhibited

the crisis of

of

which emerged

the major disorders that

the faith in rationalism, the denial of man's inherent

associated with

wickedness, the

a probing analysis The liberal democracies

undertook

Europe.4

in

which masked

authority,

and

the Utopian appeal of to

parliaments sought

the real conflicts that

in terms

govern

finally

surfaced,

of

and

in many cases brutal dictatorships replaced parliamentary governments. The Bolshevik and Fascist revolutions seemed to confirm Schmitt's basic thesis. Although Schmitt originally opposed first three years of Hitler's rule.

Nazism, he

made

his

it

peace with

during

the

Schmitt as

presented

parliamentary

democracy. The

and

opinions

delayed

in the

indefinitely

The parliament, the

popular will

tempting

is the

which

basically

essence of

the

debate

liberalism

and exchange of

liberalism. The final decision is

the different proposals are considered

as

but the

coalition of parties.

publicists and

view of politics as

parliament

ideal but

government not as a worthwhile

the unfortunate coming together of two contradictory principles

ostensibly is

elected

by

the people,

and

does

discussed.

not represent

interests that form the majority party or parliament is ruled by an elite supported by

constellation of

In the

end

intellectuals. Government is

to manipulate the

opinion of

the

a

debating

public

in the

society that

rules

by

name of rationality.

at

The

"rational"

publicity of parliamentary discussion in search of the policy is only a facade for the cabals of the party leaders. Democracy is grounded on a different principle. Schmitt viewed democracy in its radical form as the result of the formation of a popular will or general will.

Unlike

ernment

in

liberalism, democracy is

order

social and moral

to

satisfy the needs

bonds,

and

shaped and

by definitive decisions

desires

of

to advance the conditions of equality.

legal

of

the gov

the people, to reinforce the

Hence, in

with de fail, dictatorship may be determined by acclamation rather than by votes. On this basis Schmitt compared Bolshevism and Fascism with the Jacob inism of the French Revolution. The crisis of modern has been the

extreme

situations,

mocracy, for the

when

norms

is identified

popular will

democracy

Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political between liberalism

tension

democracy,

and

failure

the

and

207

this system

of

has

led to totalitarian dictatorship. Schmitt ture, the the

among the very first to point to the unique phenomenon of sec. 1). Inasmuch as politics is rooted in human na

was

(Concept,

totalitarianism

to the

reaction

liberal

negation of politics unleashes with a vengeance

affirmation of politics.

Schmitt

that in the eighteenth century and in some instances into the twentieth, the right relationship was established and the nonpolitical, between the state and the other areas

considered

through the nineteenth

between the of

human

sumed

political

activity.

Society

to the state, and the state as

was not antithetical

the status above society as the source

Hegel.

of order

relationship developed

a

Culture, by independently of the state, but the state could still intervene to preserve the political order. Any area of life could acquire political significance under specific, concrete situations. But beginning in the nineteenth century lib eralism became increasingly the enemy of the political, of the state, as the

philosophically

religion and

the economy developed as dis

tinctive spheres

instrument

of repression.

As

a result

the distinction

the economy,

the state and society led

of

to the depoliticization and neutralization of significant

life, particularly

areas of

the enlargement of the rights of the individual. Liberalism

and

thus has moved between the two poles of ethics and economics

71 f.). From the

pole of

supreme principle

ethics, the freedom

the state must supply the conditions

infringements on, freedom. The liberal enemy is From the worker,

pole of

economics, the

fice

of

the

individual in defense

state as the

in

a

discussion.

the

is depreciated in favor

individualism,

the assertion of rights in opposition to the state. For struggle with

the state.

self-sacri

of a radical

Schmitt,

In the twentieth century, the democratic element in liberal society has itself and demanded a greater role for the state. But the state is

racy

authority that

stands above society.

identity essentially Social matters have become the

of state and

governed. social.

State

and

development

of

society interpenetrate

the

the

the enemy determines the very essence of politics.

serted

as

the

principle of society.

Morally,

life-and-death

regarded as the

pp.

of employer or

or subject of

ordering

economic power.

of the state

and eliminate

consumer,

than that of citizen

The economy apparently replaces the The enemy is thus the competitor for

for,

the opponent

role of producer or

attains greater significance

(Concept,

the individual becomes the

of

tendency

Schmitt

society,

of

understood

to politicize the

have become

Consequently,

formerly

democ

the government and the

political as affairs of state one another.

as not

neutral

the radical

domains

of soci

ety has resulted in the total state. Society constitutes the state which embraces all facets of life. Any and every opponent or adversary may become the enemy.

Thus, for Schmitt, totalitarianism arises out of the instability and inadequacy the depoliticization of society is followed by the total of liberal democracy life. Of course, the defeat Bolshevism have removed the

politicization of collapse of

of

Nazism in

worst

war and

totalitarian

the

systems.

internal The

di-

208

Interpretation

lemmas

and

issues indicated

however. In the the

foster

addition, many in the

moral

for

middle and

As

friend/enemy

the

into limited

anticipated

the

antithesis and

lack

a

and appeal

to the

issues

judicial

are presented

outcome of the

thus of the political

the appeal to

conceives

course, is

of

of

(Concept,

regard

he

the proclamation of the

the establishment of the uni

liberal

ideology

ethics and eco

the individual

as essentially part of humanity, for liberalism the individual is devoid of any

law)

and

the

any

of

existence of a

the

obligations.

The

concept of

the criterion for man's highest

thus the basis

for the formation

view acknowledged

53-57). In this

pp.

i.e.,

politics,

identity and thereby basically supplied

as natural

and civilization and

most

Alexandre Kojeve

end of

true. But

in former times

fulfillment (such

the

state.5

specific social or political

humanity

thus

to a universal society without politics. From the ethical

point

side, liberalism which,

and

insidious

to Schmitt the two poles of

both

of

beliefs

in the United States bypass the

that opposes the legitimate division of peoples and

teaching

is the

which

homogeneous

According nomics

In

have become disenchanted

virtues and

elites

perhaps

political entities

political

history,

versal and

individualism in

bureaucratic insti

name of equality.

controversial political

is

revealed what

some nebulous universalism nations

of

constitutionality that are immune to the judgment of the majority.

Schmitt further of

liberal democracy,

plague

support radical

classes

working

result, liberal

a

laws

traditional

support of their policies

as matters of

end of

the

to

process, and thus the general electorate,

political

denial

a

continue

in many areas a vast array form of collectivism in the

policies that challenge

consensus.

system

while

sphere,

tutions and programs

liberal

Schmitt

modern welfare state

moral-social

with

by

for the judgment

character of

diversity

of polities

the individual. Such a

of societies and cultures as a

the need for specific at reality given the limits of human nature man tachments. In short, must be satisfied with the possibility that the universal permanent

goals of

times.

human

By

aspiration are

contrast

liberalism

entity the development moded

in the full

fulfilled in

of which

is

particular societies at particular

humanity as potentially a concrete by irrational attachments to out of good faith fostered by political

obstructed

To many liberals the United Nations is the first step humanity.

and conflicts.

realization of universal

From the

economic

been brought

closer

side, liberals point to the fact that

together as a result of

for exchanging industrial

modern nations

involvement in international

have

markets

in order to satisfy the in the benefits of technological develop people, sharing which transcend national boundaries and overcome political differences.

needs of ments

part

conceives of

traditions and beliefs and the lack

dissensions

One

in

and of

products and natural resources

the

say that even nuclear power, which created the fear of worldwide annihilation, has further contributed to the unification of mankind as a social could

entity, especially economics

Schmitt

are

after

the

Cold War. Humanitarianism

joined in the destruction

speculated

in 1932 that if

and

trade

ethics and

of politics.

such a world came

into being, the reality

Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political the enemy

of

disappear

would

worldwide

technological-economic

to control

power

as mankind would

The bureaucratic

producers and consumers.

system

association of

an

structures required to operate this would

direct it, however. Such

and

become

209

bring

forth

a power would

in the ordinary sense of the word. any Schmitt pointed to the totalitarian implications

awesome

an

be

than

greater

state

humanity. The

versal

activity and thus the designation of the enemy. In the interim liberal foreign policy utilizes

boycotts, war

sanctions,

and war

itself. For Schmitt this

78-79).

Strictly,

must

enemy

be

no

the

of

could

be

an

economics

kind

harm

of moral

as

to

appeal

involves the

uni

political

weapon

civilians more

than

hypocrisy (Concept,

pp.

enemy of humanity. Consequently, the The war to end all wars, the war to

nonhuman or subhuman.

subhuman.

annihilated

tions

the liberal

which could

reparations,

represents a

human

establish a world without

of

of

struggle to achieve the universal order

It is

in the

name of

to

defeat

humanity. In

universalism, totalitarian

the concrete enemy to the level

must reduce

enemies,

not sufficient

or weaken

order

to actualize the radical

ideologies have

be

the enemy, he must

politicized

implica

the liberal idea of

humanity. For example, if humanity is identified with the proletariat, then the bourgeoisie is not only the enemy but is either demonized or dehumanized. This

explains

the

extreme

For Schmitt the

cruelty

concept of

the

of

Communist

political

enemy is

self-limiting.

politi

fight

not require

the extreme policy of general annihilation or destruction. The ideo

logical

wars of

the present, like religious

political

of

understanding While Schmitt did not

the enemy

the enemy, he

theory

perhaps

of politics

losophy.

Notwithstanding

and

wars of

context

does

the past, have obscured the

its human dimensions.

fully develop the definitely

political concept of

and perceptive

specific reasons.

War in this

Finite

cal entities

concrete enemies

for

dictatorship.6

philosophical

was

implications

striving for

of

the

a comprehensive

unintentionally for the restoration of political phi his devastating critique of liberalism and his original

insights into

concrete political

reality, Schmitt's

work

is

con

by his methodology and formalism. He did not define politics in terms distinctive goal. Any human activity may become the substance of poli

stricted of a

is an empty formula. Schmitt's truly philosophic critic, Leo Strauss. Strauss, in his famous commentary on The Concept of the Political (pp. 81-105), offered a penetrating insight into the major limitations tics

the

To

of

subject of

substantiate

the

this

friend/enemy

antithesis,

criticism one must

Schmitt's thought. Years later he

which

turn to

maintained

that this

critique corresponded

thinking.7

Whereas he originally thought that a to a change of orientation return to premodern philosophy is impossible, he came to the conclusion that

in his

the

self-destruction of reason was

the

consequence of modern

rationalism, and

that it was both necessary and possible to return to the premodern rationalism Jewish-medieval rationalism and its foundation in the classical philosophy

Plato

and

of

Aristotle.

Already Strauss,

as

a

young Jew,

saw

the

need

to face "the

theolog-

210

Interpretation

ico-political

predicament"

in the

democracy

unstable

of

post-

World War I

Germany. In

the political situation has always been

general

most acute

for Jews

to tradition the

and

Penta

especially for Judaism in Christian Europe. According teuch is the Law of God revealed to the Jews through Moses. The covenant established not only a community of believers but a civil order. Hence the Jews distinct community in Christian nations. A particular Christian society is composed of believers in the universal faith of human salvation as revealed by God through Jesus, God's son who announced the fulfillment of

have formed

a

the Old Law. The faithful are governed

community, the church,

spiritual

than, the

state.

the

with

But the

from, but morally higher for

conditions

religion.

basically

for Jews

alike.

distinctiveness, their estrangement even in a liberalized Christian Likewise, traditional Christians have not accepted fully the political Christians

modern society.

distinct in their

remain

Jews from

in

Christianity

neutralization of

Even liberal Jews

liberalism

view of

failures

of

an ethnic standpoint.

liberal

democracy

jected the teaching

or civil

not of

liberal

Jews

are

abol

completely Nazism out of the

this truth. For this reason, Strauss re

confirmed

Spinoza,

of

society.

and

nonreligious

Liberal society has Jew ished the differences between and non-Jew. The rise

still

Only liberal

full citizenship, which presented dilemmas Religious Jews have remained aware of their

acquire

Christians

separate

the secularization of the state (a

objective) did the Jews and

is

which

a particular state and comprise a

had to supply the

state

advancement of

by

the philosophic source of

the liberal

in

liberal Judaism and,

Hobbes, along ideology While he was committed to Zionism, Strauss concluded that the state of Israel cannot resolve the dilemma for the modern Jew. Zionism is a secular of

with

idea, but because Strauss

the Jewish tradition Israel cannot be like other nations.

maintained

of politics

known

of

itself

that the theologico-political problem exhibits the essence

politics

as religion.

general.

has its

Strauss's

in the sacred, in

roots

reconsideration of classical

what

is commonly

philosophy,

as essen

tial to the revival of rationalism in a troubled age, led to the realization that classical political

life

with

piety.

grew out of

philosophy

the confrontation of the

the life of political virtue sanctioned

According

wisdom, the love

to the classics, the of

wisdom,

by

highest life is that devoted to the

or philosophy.

Knowledge is

unassisted exercise of reason.

For the

that devoted to the exercise

the moral virtues in

conventional

order, the realm

cal order offers needful

gods

by

of

of

appealing to the order

by

pursuit of

attained through the

nonphilosophic citizens, the good

fulfillment

of the

laws

life is of the

the sacred supervised

the context for the philosophical

the nature of the good

philosophic

the gods of the polity, or

life

and

by the gods. The politi inquiry into what is most

thus the questioning

of

the traditional

Such questioning created the tension led to the execution of Socrates and to

of nature.

between philosophy and politics which the development of political philosophy

by

his successors, Plato

and

Aristotle.

Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political The

had to be based

standard of political right

trary

based

conventions

human soul, discerned the

model of

of natural right was

but

Revelation

challenged

reality that

the

thought into Judaism raised

of classical

the world; the

known

fully

by

is

order of nature

reason alone.

inscrutable

to the

quires submission

sponse

followers

the Jewish

method of

will of

of

offered

the

fully

they

of

Law,

the

be

what must

and speculative are

the greatest challenge to

that

wisdom re

who reveals the truth

In

reason.

followed

re

an esoteric

could give philosophic support

the freedom of philosophical speculation.

preserve

justified in terms

so

high

the

arrive at

Thus the highest

Creator,

the classical philosophers

interpreting Scriptures,

to the Law and was

it. Revelation

by

similar

not a self-subsistent

according to his discretion. The Law of God prescribes known in order to gain salvation. All truths both practical encompassed

measure of

established.8

the view that unassisted reason could

created

be

can

inquiry

an

Pentateuch,

by

God

being. Such

fundamental difference. The Jewish community was or Torah, the law revealed by the Creator-God.

with a

constituted

est wisdom.

on arbi

simply

the best regime, the rule of wisdom, as the

For Strauss the introduction

difficulties

not

to the fulfillment of the

a rational and political

And thus the doctrine

politics.

reason,

on nature or what conforms

both

of man as

on

21 1

Philosophy

philosophy became

so that political

associ

ated with prophecy.

Strauss demonstrated that the theologico-political ination

of

the distinction between classical and

tension between philosophy

and politics

problem required an exam

modern

rationalism

the

and

ultimately between philosophy

and

religion.

The

real core of

the fundamental

the problem

sources of

Ironically, in his

is the tension between

Western thought

Strauss

offered an alternative conception of

Schmitt, his

concept of

political problem

from the

which could alone make sense of

side of

acterized political truth as what situation

with

the theologico-political

the

is

an

reason, however.

is disclosed

instance

admixture

of

the

by

the

of revelation. political

By

the

extreme situation.

He

presented

of

the real theoretical issue

f.). For friends

the

and

friend/enemy

presented

antithesis

by

presupposes

intense

as

if

political and

the of

as

to their

put

in bold pp.

94

association

of

liberalism (Concept, the

char

beginnings

Strauss's commentary thought of later years. In contrasting Schmitt with Hobbes (his favorite philosopher) opposing views of the relation of the individual to society, Strauss modern

It is

his

Hobbes

suggests the

methodology of his own distinctive

theologico-

contrast, Schmitt

philosophy

sociology.9

relief

to

problem

Christian theology as a model for the develop decisionism. Strauss specifically endeavored to restore

philosophy,

theology

aspiration.

who adopted

classical political

the extreme

political

to classical philosophy and natural law, Strauss is Catholic tradition, that of Aquinas, than is Schmitt.

that

ment of

reason and revelation as

thus of

appeal

closer to a part of the

of

and

the intense dissociation of enemies. The possibility of self-sacrifice

212 is

Interpretation defense

essential to the

preservation

is the

ground of civil

demand the

can

the right of

self-

state of nature

no

Hobbes, however,

the state. For

of

society

it is

as

of

the

is

that right. Peace

desir

most

collectivity able for the security of the right to self-preservation which is the ultimate goal. Whereas Schmitt's affirmation of the political and thus of conflict justifies the sacrifice of the individual for the defense of society, the Hobbesian and liberal negation of

Schmitt's

relinquishment of

the political in

favor

the true character

unmasking

by

the comforts and security

For

of

else

life

tive is

human

condition

spell of

the foundation of

entertainment.

that Hobbes

he

humanitarianism. Schmitt's than "liberalism preceded

It

to

wished

of

is

obscured

to demonstrate the

wished

For

without politics

that Schmitt's

the

overcome.

According

conceived of no other

to

dangerous

Strauss, how

still remained under

morality but that

the political

every impera

moral

the

of

political

from morality because he

affirmation of

which

quo.

morality.

would appear

affirmation

abstracted politics

liberalism

Unlike his

not so much a glorification of war as

the human condition,

the political Schmitt

inseparable from the

ever, Schmitt the

and

becomes

of

the peaceful status

of

Strauss, by affirming

seriousness of

thing

liberalism is

polemical attack on

an

individualism.

of peace supports a radical

of

liberal

was

really nothing 102).

other

minus-sign"

by

(Concept,

a

p.

in his

depravity

acceptance of the theological concept of moral

writings, in The Concept of the Political Schmitt specifically adopted the morally neutral concept of man's dangerous nature as developed in the thought earlier

Hobbes. Further, Schmitt suggested that the pessimistic presupposition of nature in political thought is a methodological determination (Concept,

of

human pp.

64 f). Thus the

question

arises whether

Schmitt did

not undermine

his

original substantive anthropology.

In the end, Schmitt did ism. Schmitt's

Hobbes,

who

tradition

by

ral

critique of

not

transcend the conceptual limits of liberal

totally

liberalism

was

determined

by

the presuppositions of

founded liberalism. Strauss transcended the limits

appealing to classical political philosophy, to the

right. His interpretation

presented a criticism of

of

Aristotle's

as well as

the liberal

teaching

conception of natural

Schmitt's decisionism

of

right

of natu

implicitly

liberal humanitarian

ism (Natural Right

According sions rather

to

and History, pp. 159-61). Strauss, Aristotelian natural right

consists of concrete

than general propositions, in contradistinction to

law. "In every human conflict there based on full consideration of all

exists the

Thomistic

deci

natural

possibility of a just decision While in normal situations

circumstances."

society demands compliance with the general rules of in extreme situations "the public safety is the highest justice, which per mits deviations from ordinary principles of justice. Thus natural right must be the common good of

law"

mutable

in

order

to cope with the wicked

The discrimination between ultimately depend

on

inventiveness

of

dangerous

enemies.

a normal situation and an extreme situation must

the prudential

judgment

of

the statesman, not on general

Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political for

prescriptions

action

decided in

of

"realism"

of

of

the realization

view politics as

In light

Natural right

foregoing, I

the

Schmitt

This doc

valid rules of and

"idealism"

the

those who

of

of moral virtue.

think it is appropriate to discuss

Schmitt regarding the

with

"a universally

rests on

action."

"universally

not on

trine satisfies both the

differences

advance.

ends,"

hierarchy

valid

-213

Strauss's

briefly

liberal de

positive aspects of modern

mocracy.

Strauss

the moral relativism

of

(Natural Right

and

can regime were

right, the

to the doctrine of the Declaration of

referred

denunciation

of

by

a modification of

inalienable rights

the Declaration

of

preservation condition

the

but the

duty

form

to

for the fulfillment

radical

individuality

right

Biblical

is

highest

the Ameri

harkened back

revelation.

The

only the right to preserves freedom

Contrary

aims.

liberalism does

of modern

of

not

a government which

of man's

Founders

the Creator

by

and

to sacred honor. There

refers

the

liberalism

the modern principle of natural

endowed

to the double tradition of classical natural

Independence in his

nihilism of modern

History, "Introduction"). While

inspired

teaching

hence

and

end

self-

the

to this

tradition, discriminate between

not

true freedom and license.

Because

of

the classical element in

democracy, Strauss

Churchill

the great democratic statesmen such as Lincoln and to the

Thus,

freedom

preservation of

democracy

modern

pose natural

may

and

justice in the face

engender

praised the virtues of who contributed

of extreme situations.

those concrete decisions

which com

right.

To be fair to Schmitt, it is necessary to consider his own qualified defense the American constitutional order (The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 45). The tive

conception of

the separation of powers,

by

power as characterized

the source of unity

of

decision,

rational

discussion

the influence of deism. For Schmitt the preferable to the of

decisive

and

p.

designates the legisla

which

the executive power as

liberalism

embodies a moderate

of

which reflects

democracy

presidential system of

is

parliamentary system, for it gives the executive the authority in times of emergency. In light of this conception of democ

action

racy, Schmitt

to

reforms

suggested

strengthen

the

office

presidential

in the

Weimar Republic. In conclusion, Strauss's the philosophy natural

right

of

the

Hobbes, claim of

right began

reconsideration of natural who

was the

founder

of

the

the individual to the right of

as a

modern

study doctrine

self-preservation.

of of

This

doctrine takes its bearings from the extreme situation of a prepolitical state of nature which engenders the fear of violent death as the root of the creation of society. of natural

While Schmitt

right

or of natural

extreme situation,

right. Strauss classical

he did

sought

teaching

as

Hobbes in rejecting the and in deriving the truth of

agreed with law,10

not subscribe

to the Hobbesian

to overcome the deficiencies of

the

alternative

from the

conception of natural

Schmitt

to that of Hobbes.

premodern view politics

by

recovering the

Interpretation

214

NOTES 1. Schmitt, Political Theology, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), p. 5. 2. The fact that the Christian concept of Providence is not specifically political may explain Schmitt's ambiguity. Schmitt did not show how sovereignty is limited by any transcendent princi ple. Perhaps as a believing Catholic he subscribed to the general teachings of the Catholic Church the limits of the

as to

Political,

p.

67).

is

such an occurrence

Schmitt, Leo Strauss handlung, 1988).

But he did

state.

Possibly

he

Der

law (see The Concept of the

God's direct intervention imposes limits

the state, and

on

but only by faith. See Heinrich Meier, Carl des Politischen (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuch-

by

not comprehensible und

the doctrine of natural

reject

thought that

Begriff

reason

3. The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick: Rutgers

University

Press, 1976). 4. The Crisis of

Parliamentary Democracy,

Ellen

trans.

MA: MIT

Kennedy (Cambridge,

Press, 1985). Wisdom,"

5. Alexandre Kojeve, "Tyranny and Press, 1963), pp. 43-88. Kojeve drew a the fulfillment of man's

In his

for

in Leo Strauss, On

between the

Tyranny innate

the

mutual recognition of

(New York: Free

the universal state as

realization of

dignity

of all and

the

the end of politics and the end of philosophy.

wisdom

Kojeve, Strauss follows Schmitt in affirming politics, but specifically for the and what is intrinsically human, which is ultimately the philosophical

critique of

freedom

defending

life. The

struggle

the philosophical pursuit of

completion of

sake of

historical

parallel

end of politics would

be the

end of

philosophy ("Restatement

on

Xenophon's

Hiero,"

pp.

189-226). 6.

Harry Neumann,

mann

claims

Liberalism

politics.

development

Liberalism (Durham: Carolina Academic

that liberalism

denies any

is filled

creates nihilism, an emptiness, that "politicized"

totalitarianism. The

of

Press, 1991),

pp.

138-48. Neu

foundation

thus undermines the very

moral truth and

liberal is

fanatical

by

susceptible

of

hence the

politics

to the ideologies of Hitler

Stalin.

and

7.

"Preface,"

Books, 1965),

pp.

Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E.M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken 1-31. This study on Spinoza is an early work (1930) to which Strauss attached

his intellectual autobiography, "theologico-political

which outlines

the

development

his thought

of

and

its

roots

in the

predicament."

8. Natural Right

and

History

He

also reassessed

(Chicago:

University

his of

views of

Spinoza.

Chicago Press, 1953),

chaps.

3

4.

and

9. Ibid., chap. 2, especially pp. 74 f. Weber's doctrine of the distinction between facts and values is compared to the tension between reason and revelation. Weber claims that reason can determine the true relationships of facts or phenomena, which comprise science, but there cannot be

a science of values.

will.

The

good

is

The

For Strauss, Weber's value of science

This is for

of

comparable

revelation.

It

revelation

choice of one value over another

not an object of

the

view of

the

of

is

not

dependent

on reason

values took on

the

into

that perhaps philosophy

rests on

than that of man

on

question even the

aura of religious

to the fact that philosophy as unassisted reason cannot refute the

some greater mind

but

belief.

noncognitive status of values called

knowledge. All

pursuit of

would appear

from

knowledge but only

faith,

which would confirm

from God. Schmitt's

beliefs.

claims of

the

need

use of social science

in explicating his political theology may thus not be so strange after all. 10. The Concept of the Political, p. 67. Here Schmitt appealed to Hobbes in outlining the usual positivistic argument against natural law, or higher law: law implies some authority to enforce it. There is

a

Christian tradition that

communicated

dependent

on

by

would

claim

that the

higher law is the law

the teachings of the Church and ultimately

human

by

acts of

of

God, partly

Providence

law

not

reason or prudence.

For Neumann (Liberalism, p. 93), Schmitt's Christian faith ultimately shares with liberalism a against politics, because he cannot affirm politics as a positive good but as a necessity for

bias

controlling evil, which may explain the dangerous condition of human life. Also specific regime of a political society.

rejection of

Christianity

traditional natural law. appeals

to the universal

Politics discloses order of

faith,

not

the the

Discussion

The End

History?

of

Victor Gourevitch Wesleyan

University

Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man1 is bold: modern liberal democracy, democracy as it has developed in

The thesis simple and

of

West, especially in

the

sense of

being

"democracy,"

he

as

feature

satisfying

its final

The

cause.

term, is popular sovereignty is the formal guarantee and

(p. 42). With liberal

rights

and

that

stage and

liberalism"

the goals of its

attained

reduce

uses

"political

of

individual

history in the defining feature of (p. 43). The defining

the past two centuries, marks the end of

both its final

stable;

democracy

for the

millennial struggle

and

so

because it is, it tends to

the conflicts caused

by

geographical,

protection of

understood,

humanity that is

political order

unite

us"

feel

is,

to

compelled

it faces

munism

at

has

just,

mankind, or at least to

national and religious

differences.

There is therefore every reason to expect that it will be adopted the over within the foreseeable future. Its superiority to the "historical available to

basic

wide world

alternatives

least in principle, universally acknowledged: even tyrants their rule With the collapse of Soviet Com "democratic."

call

no serious external

threat. The most urgent

question now

is

whether

it is equally safe from internal threats. What are its problems and its prospects? Fukuyama's argument is as bold as his thesis: Nature, and in particular hu man nature, is the standard of political action and judgment. Modern liberal

democracy

conforms

to human nature as closely as

form to it; it is therefore just, satisfying completion and the fulfillment of history. The two guiding the just city

and of

tially

true (p.

337);

actualization

premises of which

and

that the whole

and modification

corresponding just

history

the gradual

as

perhaps

I

wish

sions of

remained

best described

stable;

argument are:

Plato has Socrates

and of the

Kant, but it

this

and

of

of

a political order can con

that the account

present

human

and therefore

of

it is the the soul

in the Republic is

history

is the

history

essen of

the

this Platonic understanding of the soul

(p. 138). In his view, the Idea of man's humanity was first sketched by

political order

actualization of

for Hegel to as an effort

work

to

it

out

reconcile

fully. His

project

is therefore

Plato's understanding

of

the

to thank Professors Mark Lilla and Donald Moon for helpful comments on earlier ver

this paper.

interpretation, Winter 1993-94, Vol. 21, No. 2

216

Interpretation

soul and of

the just city

democracy."

What is

eral

"Platonism"

his

teachings

Plato

Fukuyama

of

understanding measure

mediated

about

"Hegelianism,"

acknowledges, in his text

Plato

by

as

the actualiza

Fukuyama's "lib

his

but his

enterprise

is, then,

not

to

reconcile

the

attempt

Hegel.

and of

fully

distinctive

most

his

or of

history

state"

humanity,

tion of man's

either

Hegel's understanding of culminating in "the modern

with

and of

the

the

history

teaching

of

in his notes, that his philosophy is in very large

as well as

of political

Leo Strauss (and

more

particularly

of

students'

his students and students), and that his understanding of Hegel is in very large measure mediated by the teaching of Alexandre Kojeve. He could not have chosen better guides. Strauss and Kojeve are the most out some of

influential contemporary thinkers to have modeled their thinking the thinking of Plato and of Hegel respectively. Their classical debate, os

standing on

tensibly

and

about

tyranny but in fact

about

the

irreconcilable differences between

the teachings of Plato and of Hegel regarding the relationship between philoso

phy

and

politics,

the title of

serves as

his book

echoes

history,"

end of

vision and

spiritedness

itself primarily

other

(thymos),

cruelty. end and

Its first

and reason

Spiritedness

pride and

movement

evocation of

distinguishes three

as appetite and acquisitiveness.

self-assertion,

(logistikon) Its first

said

shame, but also

to be the care and concern

for

no

the "last

Desire

movement

Even

as

difference man."

desire

manifests

is to affirm,

itself primarily

manifests

is to deny, to recoil, to

is

parts of the soul:

as

anger,

vanity, vindictiveness,

Reason is both the

reject.

the means of rule over the other two parts. The

desire may be

reflections.2

that there

charge

harrowing

initially

to approach, to appropriate.

indignation,

Strauss's

Nietzsche's

In the Republic, Socrates

(epithymia),

for his

that debate: on the one hand Kojeve's vision of "the

the

and on

between that

the immediate background

bodily

primary

object of

goods, security

and

the primary object of spiritedness, the care and concern

for independence. When desire and spiritedness so understood are compared, desire appears calculative, petty, slavish; and spir itedness passionate, grand, noble. Dominance of one or another part of the soul will make for a corresponding human type or political regime: Achilles and Oedipus are embodiments of spiritedness, as are the Thracians, Scythians and possessions;

and

nonbodily goods, honor

northern peoples

generally.4

each part of one's soul

just city is of

On this

doing

its job

account of the

soul,

well with a view

being

just is to have

to their common good; a

city that provides suitable scope for the exercise of all three parts in which their corresponding human types do their jobs well

a

the soul,

and

and

to their common good.

Such a soul and such a city would be just because they conformed to what interlocutors in a dialogue devoted to justice agreed is the nature of the soul. A moment's reflection suggests that this must be a provisional account of the soul, dictated with a view

"according to

by

nature"

specifically

and

narrowly

Socrates'

political

considerations.5

The End of History? It is in terms

his

organizes

is

History he

which

of a simplified version of

argument and

of

passim):6

to use the term

and

the spirited

it is precisely if

his

look

we

soul are

to take the whole of

claims

most of

the

parts of

just

of

and

204f.); in

other

the moving principles

for his province,

history

to modern times. For

attention

not

desire,"

the "mechanism

(pp. 144, 174-80, 189, 198,

history. Although he

...

"mechanisms,"

two

recognition"

desiring

Fukuyama devotes

et

by

this simple schema that Fukuyama

history.

account of

motion

from Kant (p. 71

the "mechanism of words, the

kept in

set and

adapts

his

-217

at the past

fifteen years, but

the whole

at

that liberal

democracy begins to occupy a special kind of place. While there have been cycles in the worldwide fortunes of democracy, there has of history,

scope

also

been

been the

The

liberal democracy, together

past

four

hundred

or so

desire"

has

come

dominance in large natural science. comparable

It

last four hundred

years

measure

Modern

is

also

during

the period

the "mecha

which

to assume unprecedented dominance. It owes that to the

its disposal

power placed at

science marks a

turning

point

in the

history

by of

modern

the race

only to the transition from the life of nomadic hunter-gatherers to

sedentary farmers.

of

Indeed, the liberalism, has .

economic

47f.)

nism of

the life

its companion,

with

most remarkable macropolitical phenomenon of the

(Pp.

years.

in the democratic direction.

a pronounced secular trend

growth of

is,

of

course,

method

by

men

Modernity

not so much modern

is irreversible (pp. 72f.).

science, "the

discovery

of the scientific

like Descartes, Bacon, and Spinoza in the sixteenth and seven (pp. 72, 56f.), that has transformed every aspect of human

centuries"

teenth

life,

it is the decision to

as

estate, in short,

between reason

in the

enlist science

relief of man's station and

technology (p. 131). Fukuyama virtually ignores the difference technology throughout most of his argument. Perhaps one

science and

why he

chooses

to

ignore it is

he

that

wants

to

keep

his discussion

political. Indeed, regardless of what may be the status of science in itself, it plays a role in modern political society primarily in the form of technology (pp. 80f.). In particular, modern society decisively depends on technology for military security (pp. 73-76, 127) and for the economic benefits

resolutely and of

that on so

accrue

to

it from the

tion"

which, in turn, forces them to to the dominant view,

According

them also to "rational"

national,

adopt at

least

well-being.

"economic

adopt

economic

a measure of

Nations

of modern advanced

liberalism

"political

religious

rejects this

familiar

desire"

and

and cultural

divisions,

liberalism becomes account of

the "economic

and

therefore, industrializa

are

liberalism"

or capitalism. sooner or

liberalism"; by

structures and practices of economic and political

nomic and political

of

(pp. 76-80). In short, it depends

conquest of nature

technology for survival and for material to speak, forced to submit to "the logic

later forces and

liberalism

gradually but

by

inexorably

a worldwide phenomenon.

the

weaken

eco

Fukuyama

the rise of liberal democracy. The "mechanism

choice" rationality"

or

"rational

models of

politi-

218

Interpretation that are based

cal conduct

on

it fail to

for

account even

capitalism

223-

(pp.

34), they fail utterly to account for conduct and choices that are not strictly speaking economic, but political in nature (p. 135). He goes to considerable and

lengths to political

structures,

that therefore

and

the

nomic ones must guide

properly speaking Fukuyama holds Hobbes

(pp. 185f, 153,

the fear

on

equality

founders

the

the interpretation of their natural

adopts

play

are

rights the basis

made equal natural

of violent

responsible

eco

strictly or

any

death to

of

liberalism"

of modern

for the tendency to desire"

to the "mechanism

Locke

and

illiberal

democracy,

establish

Locke, "the founders

and

and conduct

Hobbes

rationality.

than

decisions.

154, 157, 159), directly

political choices

compatible with

considerations other

decision to

political

political

other

they

liberalism is perfectly

that economic

show

of

or

of modern

the political

reduce

to economic

liberalism in that

association.

Fukuyama

rights teaching according to which they into settling for mere

scare spiritedness

rights. On this interpretation, their teaching is based appeal to "man's lowest common denominator of

on

little

more

self-preservation"

than

an

(p.

denigrates the nobility of the modern lib eral project: to secure every human being's inherent dignity, and to provide a political bulwark against man's inhumanity to man (consider p. 261). It deni 157). This interpretation

it

grates

his he

by

systematically conflating the

to persuade

effort

deliberately

even

the right reason for

regards as

to

motives

which

Hobbes

appeals

in

the meanest capacity to do the right

doing

the

right

thing.7

thing, with what The device is transpar

not surprising to find critics of liberal democracy resort to it. It is surprising to find Fukuyama adopt it. For he proclaims himself a champion of liberal democracy "the best possible solution to the human (p.

ent.

It is

problem"

338)

and

have

could

he

arisen

ing. Be that ism"

it

as

decisively

independently

may.

He

tilted the

the soul in favor of the soul

its

and

hints

nowhere so much as

master

economic man or

how he thinks liberal

Hobbes's

concludes

that the

Locke's

and

founders

of

democracy

natural-rights

teach

"Anglo-Saxon liberal

balance between the

desiring

passions,

the

of

at

part

(p.

desiring and the spirited parts of 185). They deliberately denatured the

and constructed an

entirely

new

human type,

bourgeois.8

Fukuyama has nothing but contempt for the bourgeois. The bourgeois is his spiritedness eviscerated, and rendered incapable of the passions,

man with

the needs, the aspirations and the deeds that reach

The

man of

desire, Economic Man,

"cost-benefit

the true

beyond

bourgeois,

material goods.

will perform an

internal

analysis"

which will always give

him

reason

to

work

"within the

system."

It is only thymotic

own

dignity

worth

up his

is

and of

the

constituted

by

[spirited]

dignity

of

man, the man of anger who is

his fellow citizens, the

man who

jealous

of

his

feels that his

something more than the complex set of desires that make it is this man alone who is willing to walk in front of a

physical existence

tank or confront a line of soldiers. (P.

180;

cp. pp.

145, 160f.)

The End of History? But there is

be

no

turning back. Primitive forms

humanly

more

satisfying"

(p.

technology have

and

in

wrought

if only because they have

ible,

77),9

but the

lives

our

life

"may

in

certain respects

changes which modern science

in

and

placed at our

of

219

our expectations are

irrevers

disposal riches beyond the dreams

of avarice.

.

.

few

.

idea

developed democracies

of those comfortable residents of

historical

in the

who scoff at

the

be willing to make their lives in backward, Third World country that represents, in effect, an earlier age of 85)' mankind. (P. 130; cp. p.

The

of

few

happy

progress

be willing to

who might

mankind would not affect

abstract would

the course

that spares any part of mankind, must

winter

memory And

of modern science and of

long

as

reconstitute within

is

as a stake

itself

not

the

their lives in

make

Even

of events.

inevitably

driven through that

vampire's

its social, economic, few generations. (P 127; cp.

the space of a

an earlier age of

a nuclear war or a nuclear also spare at

promises of modern

with all of

a

least the

technology.

heart, it

will

and political concomitants pp.

71f., 82-88, 336)

The outburst, with its comparison of modern science and technology to a vam pire, is uncharacteristic of Fukuyama. As a rule he models his attitude toward

liberal

democracy

that matter,

of

on

that

of

Hegel who,

Tocqueville after

judgment"

world court of

which

and of

Kojeve (pp. 310,

all, borrowed the line "world

he

made so

famous, from

311)

or, for

is the

history

a poem entitled

Resignation (p. 137).

By

contrast, Nietzsche

effects of

liberalism

"rages"

and of

(p. 31

1)

at what

he

saw as

dehumanizing

the

the swelling tide of democracy. If early Anglo-

Saxon liberalism may be said to favor desire to the virtual neglect of spirited ness and of all but a strictly instrumental reason, Nietzsche may be said to go to the

other

extreme,

of reason.

He

and

to favor spiritedness to the

sweeps aside

the

the

claims of

body,

virtual neglect of of

equality,

Although Fukuyama's thinking is Nietzsche's criticism of modernity, he rejects, "for the

common

good.

of

desire

rights

influenced

deeply

and

and of

by

now,"

of

liberal

democracy"

(p. 314).

He turns instead to Hegel's

between the

Anglo-Saxons'

ing, but especially

that

influential interpretation tion the

ing

(Anerkennung),"

Nietzsche's "hatred

political

bourgeois

teaching

teaching.

and

viewed

It

Nietzsche's

in the light

provides

the sober

Hegel's teach

over-man. of

Kojeve's brilliant

"Master-Slave"

of

can

the

be

struggle

renowned

seen as an attempt

to

restore

teaching12

"nobler"

for

and

recogni

the balance between

the soul by returning spiritedness to its rightful place thus provides a desire its full due. Hegel-Kojeve's parts of

mean

without

deny

"deeper"

and a

than the moral-political

(pp. 145, 199f.) psychology Fukuyama's view, Hegel-Kojeve's liberalism. In Anglo-Saxon of psychology moral-political

220

Interpretation recognition"

"struggle for that he

frequently

In the

sim).

their

so

149-52). The

interchangeably

recognition men assert and

and

in every

respect

"radically

desire to

165f.,

et pas

freedom,

objectify their

self-legislation, but also, in the

choice"

moral

(pp.

"spiritedness"

by

HH-determined

final

nature"

(pp.

freedom, and have others freely recognize it, is constitutive of being human (p. 152), and be denied recognition, to be an Invisible Man (p. 176), is to be denied one's

146, to

for

being

analysis, their

to

for

struggle

"capacity

the two expressions

uses

to Socrates's

corresponds

closely

humanity. We also need and

need and

desire

need and

desire to

and confirmed

by

not

assert and

only security

assert our sense of our

to objectify our

and material

worth, and to

(pp. 164-66, 167). That

others

They

our greatest efforts and achievements.

gratification,

have it desire

need and

we

recognized spur us

to

override economic and all other

considerations of narrow self-interest.

Fukuyama vividly conveys Hegel-Kojeve's insistence that one is not prop erly human unless one risks one's life or is at least prepared to risk it, and that to

to save life and property at all costs is slavish. He repeatedly singles out

try

for

Kojeve's

particular emphasis

for

idea or, 155). To risk 148, 152,

struggle

an

seek recognition as clusive concern

as

he

one's

something

with

one's

remark

life for more

body,

that the struggle for recognition is

it, "for

puts

prestige"

(pp. xvi,

pure

pure prestige

is to

a

143, 147,

assert oneself and to

least as something other than ex avoiding death and gratifying one's

or at with

appetites.

Kojeve's

account of

the fact that he

moved

the struggle for recognition owes

it squarely to the

much of

center of political

its

power

to

life. He holds that

the struggle for recognition is the principle of all properly political choices and actions.

It is

re-enacted with

does

not

name of

every

serious attempt to negate

or

to preserve

be regarded as serious if it affairs, involve at least the readiness to risk bloody battle and death in the an idea (or ideology), Kojeve's "pure Fukuyama adopts

a given state of

and no such attempt can

prestige."

Kojeve's thesis: "the

recognition"

mechanism of is the mainspring of history. In particular, "the mechanism of accounts for the choice of equal rights, that is to say of political as distinguished from economic liberalism, in other words of liberal democracy properly so called. recognition"

Kojeve's in

a more

account of

immediate

the struggle for recognition was

sense as well.

He left

no

transparently

doubt in his

political

audience's mind that

"now,"

in the mid-thirties when he was delivering his famous lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology, the man who most fully embodied humanity by risk ing his life for an idea was the revolutionary fighting for what he, Kojeve, called

the

how he

"universal

and

conceived of this

homogeneous "universal

and

state."

Regardless, homogeneous

now,

state,'"3

of

precisely he thought its

imminent. And with its actualization history would end. The uni versal and homogeneous state would mark the end of history precisely because it would be everyone recognizing everyone, and hence everyone actualization

"universal,"

The End of History? "homogeneous,"

being, and being recognized as free; and less, and hence everyone being, and being

221

that is to say class

For

recognized as also equal.

all

is purposes, "everyone's recognizing everyone as free and rights." equivalent to the recognition of men's "natural Fukuyama is therefore surely right to maintain that, at least on this decisive point, "Anglo-Saxon liber equal"

practical

alism"

and

Hegel-Kojeve's

to agree

said

For Hegel, term,

refers

political

and

teaching

may, for

all practical

purposes, be

'4

(pp. 199-204).

"history,"

for Kojeve,

in the strong

sense

to the millennial struggle to achieve political

free

secure everyone's recognition as

Once

and equal.

they

attach

to the

modes and orders

that

such modes and orders

have been instituted, history proper ends. There would be no political obstacles left to negate. And hence no more ideas (or ideologies) worth dying or liv for. Everyone

"satisfied."

be

In

famous Note to the second, 1960, edition of his Introduction, Kojeve described post-historical life as the global victory of consumerism in other words of Fukuyama's "economic

ing

would

"bourgeois"

"ennobled"

man"

or

ritual

for

suicides."

For Kojeve

history threats

want of significant external

by

such

strictly formal

"snobbishness"

prestige"

"pure

nials of

and

conceivably he now calls it

a

as

ends as or of

Hegel had

internal

tea-ceremonies

said societies

short

Anglo-Saxon liberalism

German Idealism had recent revival of even

Fichte

and

"struggle for readiness to siders

claimed

interest in the

Schelling. He had for

strive, to risk

and

appears

expected of

it.

as

least

as

embourgeoisement at

Fukuyama does some

himself

not reach

may Hegel-Kojeve's

Hobbes's fails to

by

and

particularly turned to Hegel-Kojeve's in restoring a passionate, public-spirited help to sacrifice, as a counterpoise to what he con pusillanimous self-seeking.

not ask

whether

According

dreary

for

his

as

account

falls far

in Fukuyama's

to Kojeve and,

recognition ends

that in Hobbes's

as

Yet

the Hegel-Kojeve reform

well, the struggle

himself

or

that outcome

Locke's

whether

not at

short

judg

with an

civil state.

least in

part may Hegel/spiritedness. He does Hobbes/desire, the affinities between Hobbes's teaching and Hegel's

flaw in his

much

of

schema:

deeper than their differences. Although he

struggle unto

death for

recognition

is

notes

that

a generalized version of

state of nature as a state of war of all against all

(pp. 146f., 154), he "recognition"

note

all, is

all, the

And

Kant, Hegel

most

that the outcome

ment, according to Hegel

not ask

teachings of

moral-political

recognition"

he had

be due to

understood as

German Idealism. That is, of course, what for itself, and it is what accounts for much of the

by

ennobled

Anglo-Saxon liberalism's

unfolds, it of what

perish,

to be over

contradictions

from complacency and boredom.'6 Fukuyama had argued that modern liberal democracy is best

come, in

ceremo

that the

a generalized version

social contract:

even

Hegel-Kojeve's struggle, of the resolution of Hobbes's

both

seek

the

grounds

assuming that Kojeve's "pure

"vanity"

"vainglory,"

or

of all

resolution of

and

that

war of all against

for intersubjective

prestige"

Hegel's,

really is

nobler

and perhaps even

consensus.17

than Hobbes's

Kojeve's

liberal-

222

Interpretation

ism really does it.18

poses

his

ennoble

Anglo-Saxon

Fukuyama's sharp

is

entire synoptic effort

Effect:

one throws open

contrast

threatened

the gates to to find

insights, only

contained

liberalism,

the fact

between Hobbes

by

by

surrounded

oneself

called

few sparkling

some

that

Hegel,

and

be

what might

remains

it presup it

and with

the Trojan Horse

and

self-

apparently

one's enemy's

fully

host.

armed

Kojeve's bleak 0f

ment

history, led Strauss

Nietzsche's chilling blinked.'"9

title of

in the

the end

view of

to

him to

challenge

evocation of

Kojeve declined the

up.

He

explain

man"

the "last

who

to

proposes

cause and

fulfill

how it differs from

"invented happiness

Fukuyama

challenge.

his book that he takes it

the final

sense of

and

in the very both that Kojeve is

announces

show

right in asserting that we are at the end of history, and that he may be wrong in his bleak vision of it, that liberal democracy is the last stage of history, and that does not entail it can be its fulfillment. It can be its fulfillment only if "the it. For vir entail to have does not the neglect and atrophy of spiritedness. It end"

the

tually be

only

tyrant (p.

ambition

320),

liberal

and while

Hegelian liberalism

democracy

does

can energize

is the

tolerate

not

Anglo-Saxon liberalism

enervates

it. Fukuyama believes that

ambition

to

spiritedness,

while on

the An

"natural,"

for

dignity

glo-Saxons'

account,

Hegel-Kojeve

on the said

to be

rights and respect account of

(e.g.,

earned

earned recognition might

pp.

It

teaching.

be

might

to

said

are

simply given, for dignity

and respect

205).20

174, 294,

therefore

and unequal recognition of Saxons'

them, rights

The Hegel-Kojeve

allow

for

universal equal

the spirited few more readily than thus

be

to

said

remain more

might

does

be

account of

rights

the Anglo-

faithful to the distinc

tion between different human types and the different kinds of

illustrated that difference

recognition which

glossing the old not a hero, saying that no man is a hero to his valet, "not because the hero is judgment in Fukuyama's seem that would It valet is a the but because is that it perhaps the greatest merit attaching to Hegel-Kojeve's

they

seek and

deserve. Hegel

once

by

valet."

"recognition"

do justice to the morality recognition in proportion to desert. can also

In

order

adopts

tion

of

"heroes,"

of

the

to their quest for

earned

to distinguish between the two kinds of recognition, Fukuyama

the Greek terms isothymia for the equality,

and megalothymia

quest and

for the

inequalities. When he

ognition of earned

the claim to equal recogni

quest and

criticizes

the

claim

to unequal rec

Anglo-Saxon liberalism, he

is criticizing what he regards as an excessive emphasis on "isothymia"; and what he calls for a restoration of spiritedness to public life, he is calling for greater scope and rewards

both

noble and useful

Since the be

claims of

satisfied

How

well

stability

fully, liberal

"megalothymia,"

to strive to be a

the two forms

is

and

to

is

recognition

be

of spiritedness cannot

always and

that

it is

recognized as one.

and ought not

necessarily

both

unstable.

ultimately determine the strength and (pp. 292f.). Fukuyama's book is dedicated to the

maintained will

democracy

for fuller

"hero,"

the balance between them

that balance

of

for

The End of History?

if that

that balance. For

last

only the tzsche's

is

that nothing

proposition

history

stage of

The

gravest present

succeeds, liberal

but

to be

Strauss's

or

and

not

Nie

met.

satisfactory balance between the lack of a shared concep denial that such a shared conception is

"relativism,"

is

and

tion of human nature, or the outright possible or

will prove

threat to maintaining a

"megalothymia"

"isothymia"

democracy

its fulfillment,

also

have been

challenge will

than the effort to preserve or to restore

more urgent

effort

223

desirable. Relativism is

commonly justified

most

by

appeals

to his

to the changes in our ways and our conceptions of ourselves from time to

tory,

time and place to

place.

Fukuyama

argues

that such appeals owe

what per

they may possess to the failure to understand that history is human actualizing itself, that its full actualization is modern liberal democracy,

suasiveness nature

that, in

other

words, liberal

end of

clearly

the sole,

better than any tudes and and

puts an end to

other

beliefs,

that its

so

it

relativism,

is

virtue

nature as

of

atti

its very essence,

to this view, the appeal to

limits to tolerance, and would there human fore be undemocratic. Fukuyama easily shows the incoherence of this view. Regardless of how tolerant a liberal democracy may be, it necessarily rests on nature threatens at

some

form

least in

leaving

the endless variety of ways,

According

tolerance.

that "the

After all, according liberal democracy is that it,

that this variety, and hence relativism, is

defining

and

would seem.

excellence of

accommodates

regime,

history,"

end of

(historical)

(p. 338). Or

universal standard

prevailing view, the distinctive

to the

is "the

democracy

history"

"recognition,"

of

Still,

a partner means

in

on some shared conception of

recognition.

to be a human

a political society's shared conception of

nature

The

appeal

standard

for

doubt the

Beyond

being

a certain

point,

threatens even the

most

democracies (p. 332).

human

stand

hence

and

of mutual

who properly qualifies as disagreement about what it

liberal

principle

may be something

to

(human)

political

most

feature

attempt takes

judgment

claim

is

one

thing;

else entirely.

and conduct

the most

Fukuyama's

is the

nature

(human) nature as the (pp. 137-39, 288f.), is without a

nature, the attempt to restore

distinctive,

of

human

ambitious and

argument.

The

most

that modern liberal

the most

difficult to

startling form

democracy

under

which

actualizes

that

in deed

in deed, Socrates's 337, 338) fully because it best to nature is just that pattern "in of the city according conforms to the nature of the human soul (p. 337). The claim is most imme diately startling because one would not expect Socrates or Plato to rank modern "in

reality"

(pp.

as

as

it

can

be

actualized

speech"

liberal

democracy high,

let

alone

highest in the

hierarchy of regimes.

Nor is it

a

has ever deduced from Most generally, in Socrates's just city the citizens are wise or virtuous; in instiwisdom and virtue is replaced by modern liberal democracy the

regime which anyone

their premises and principles.

citizens'

224

Interpretation

tutions designed to

Fukuyama

fully

of

for

wise and

honor

least

and at

or set

by

to

a civic

reason

(pp.

Socrates

puts it, 164, 337). Fukuyama's as

reason; or,

effort to reanimate spiritedness might therefore appear also to restore reason to a more authoritative

ruling does he have

to a ruling position. Nor

discovered

or set

by

reason.

On the

position.

be

an effort

But he does

162f.).21

cp. pp.

In

other

spiritedness conform to standards

He holds that it is spiritedness, (p.

contrary.

words, he goes far beyond

simply

the need for noble lies. He regards spiritedness as the cause not "values,"

sionate attachment

to

but

the

of

to

not restore

reason, that sets the standards. Spiritedness "invests objects with

165;

317).

p.

efforts

by

to be subordinated to

spiritedness ought

not

his

Socrates's just city (pp. 304-7). How far do they to it? Earned recognition is recognition in proportion to merit.

virtue, are guided

really conform Merit implies standards discovered

reason

(e.g.

virtuous outcomes

this shift, and he might argue that

to strive for earned recognition,

rouse spiritedness

form

for

make

recognizes

"values"

themselves.

value"

insisting

on

of pas

only

Spiritedness,

reason, determines the rank of beings, goods and goals. If that really is his settled view, then his efforts on behalf of spiritedness can only serve to and not

promote

the relativism and nihilism

Indeed,

reason

proper,

noetic

which

reason,

it is his

stated aim to combat.

plays no role

in Fukuyama's

account

the soul or of the city. He considers only two of the three parts of the

of

Socratic soul, and he nowhere discusses their order or hierarchy. In what sense, then, does account of the soul and of the just city serve as Fukuyama's standard? Very near the end of the book, after briefly Socrates'

what

summarizing

Socrates

the just soul and the

says about

just city, he

ob

serves:

By

this standard,

would seem that soul].

(P.

when compared

liberal

would not

to

fullest

scope to all

three parts [of the

us"

by

be

a silent reference

liberal

show that

or constitutional

democracy

comes

the classics demanded than any alternative that is viable in our

entire

short

appears to

Strauss:

be difficult to

what

Fukuyama's Two

gives

alternatives available to

to the position adopted

It

democracy

337)

The "historical

closer

to the historical alternatives available to us, it

book is designed to

paragraphs

later he

age.22

refute that position.

states

his own, definitive

view

without

qualifications:

.

.

.

liberal

problem."

democracy

(P.

in reality

constitutes the

best

possible solution to the

human

338)

The blunt "in reality

constitutes"

alternatives available to us,

it

has

replaced the open-ended

"the historical

seem."

would

When

the two statements are set

The End of History? side

by

225

side, it is striking how categorically Fukuyama rejects the possibility

that there might ever have existed in the past, or that there might ever exist

the future

in

closely to the Socratic-Platonic stan his own, than does modern liberal or constitutional democracy. He gives no reasons for this sweeping judgment. One is therefore left to speculate about what they might be. The form in which he casts his dard

that corresponds more

a regime

he

which

claims as

that he

entire argument would suggest

in the

Socratic-Platonic

to the

approximation

the possibility that

rules out

have

model might

a closer

existed at some

time

because, before the introduction of technology, desire or appetition be fully satisfied; and that he rules out any closer approximation to

past

could not

the Socratic-Platonic model in the

introduced,

forever

will

remain

future because technology, once it has been uneliminable given (pp. 226f.). In other

an

is ineffective. But then, technology if it does not altogether eliminate it.

words, virtue

the

minimizes

for

need

vir

tue, even The categorical .

.

.

liberal

problem.

is

democracy

(P.

in reality

striking for its single "best also

solution,

It is hard to

cal solution.

that

unqualified assertion

possible"

a

best

constitutes the

and

that that best possible

how that

conceive

"the human

in the

reason

As Fukuyama

ing

that the

lothymia, what

rights

notes, modern

or

recognition,

somehow corresponds

does the liberal democratic

to the

inherent

themselves")

dignity

of

correspond

be

is

reconciled with

Hegel's

with

a politi

for

quest

the

for outstanding

quest

admits of solution

present."

cross of

frequently

with universal equal

problem"

assertion could

the Republic's analogy of the cave, or, for that matter, the "rose of

human

possible solution to the

338)

liberal he

what

democracy

isothymia. Even

calls and

achievement

recognition, his

to what Socrates calls recognition of equal

human beings

qua

stands or

human beings

due

respect

or qua

to in Socrates's account of the soul and

grant mega

(thymos),

spiritedness

rights (or the

falls

"ends in

of

just

the

city? The very fact that Fukuyama felt compelled to introduce such a cumber some un-Platonic term as isothymia indicates the problem clearly enough. And as he himself points out, neither the Anglo-Saxon liberals nor Hegel thought

had

that Socrates-Plato freedom.23

Hegelian serts that

Now, Fukuyama,

to call

"history"

that

it

by

(pp.

that Rousseau

it

of

(human)

its

they In

position.

fully

to

for Rousseau

correct

called

rights

wants to

and

name,

or, in

they

some of

agreement with

fully

to

Hegel, he

as

"spirited

understand

it,

manifestations,

understand

"history,"

nature

its

both the

Socrates-Plato, he

its manifestations, (p. 207). In other words, he claims to some of

(subjective)

called

German Idealism to

the German Idealists failed

or, in

and

maintain

agreement with

understand what

"freedom"

337, 149f., 152). In and

"freedom"

called

remained

what

characteristically,

Socrates-Plato failed

and

for

the Socratic-Platonic

and

ness,"

and

allowed

that

is really

asserts

what

they

an aspect

understand Socrates-

226

Interpretation

Plato

Hegel-Kojeve better than they

and

poses

to do

"Hegel-Kojeve."

"Socrates-Plato"

or

and

How he

and

pro

"history,"

"freedom"

to reconcile

clear enough:

What he

understood themselves. "nature"

is

proposes

is

to do so

rather

less

clear.

He

comes closest

to stating his argument in the

following

brief

and obscure

passage.

The

mere

"in the

fact that human

course of

nature time"

historical

is

"once

not created

does

all"

for

and

but

creates

itself

human

not spare us the need to speak of

nature, either as a structure within which man's self-creation occurs, or as an point or telos toward which

(P. 138,

The two view of

about

unidentified quotations

tacit appeal to

standard.

human

He speaks, rather,

claimed

The

he had

struggle

historical

rejects

by

no trans-historical standard

for

recognition

march of ten

fully

recognition

satisfies that

mutual recognition

universal and

homogeneous

universalization.

which

in fact

to measure the

constituted such a

a permanent part of

or

[spiritedness] may

more, it was no less a

207) recognition of all

criterion of noncontradiction.

by

Universal

"trans-historical"

internal

not

is necessarily

therefore speaks of his end-state as

"hu least

escape an at

out of thymos

arising

thousand years

the soul for Hegel than for Plato. (P.

is the strictly formal

re

speak, there or anywhere else,

that argument. The only criterion which

to satisfy

rion. Universal

ian

drawn from Kojeve's

human institutions, the desire for Thymos [spiritedness] was in the end for Kojeve

nature.

Kojeve

moving.

about a somewhat amorphous

of

required an

all needs

not

recognition

constitutive part of

"the

passage are

Still, Fukuyama charges, he simply cannot a determinate, enduring human nature.

While Kojeve

adequacy

to be

nature."

reality."24

mutual

in this

Strauss's On Tyranny. Kojeve does

man

appears

207)

cp. p.

"human

have

human historical development

end-

crite

also equal recognition.

Kojeve

homogeneous. His formula, understood as a variant of Kant

universal and

state,"

can

be

Unequal recognition, Fukuyama's megalothymia, cannot and hence cannot be reduced to a strictly formal

be similarly universalized, criterion; any

Republic, of

or

more

any

than

other

and

form

of

for the

distributive justice

course, why Kojeve's end-state is

peopled

by

considers dictions."

Nietzschean "last

Kojeve's

argument

Be that

for

a

to transhistorical

be

can

so vulnerable

men."

Instead, he consistently

entails an appeal

same reason that

as

it

may.

strictly formal argues that

human

the justice of Plato's universalized.

That

to the charge that

Fukuyama

resolution of

never

"internal

is,

it is

directly contra

"the-end-of-history"

nature:

necessarily A

given political order

may plausibly be said to mark the end of history if (1) we cannot think of an essen tially different and better political order; (2) the given political order is free of

The End of History?

227

internal contradictions, that is to say of contradictions which it cannot on its own terms; (3) it conforms to human nature and satisfies all parts

essential

resolve

it (pp. 46, 70; 136f., 290ff.). He

of

we cannot at

best;25

he believes that the

internal contradictions,

political

criterion, the absence

second

only be

can

his first criterion, that alternative, is inconclusive

recognizes that

better

fundamentally

think of a

and

fully

by

satisfied

is

the question whether a given state of affairs

is

or

say, the

by

not rent

equality and of freedom or of can only be answered by reference to "non-historicist" "human (pp. 136-39, 290).

between,

fundamental

of

reference to the third criterion:

claims of

"megalothymia,"

a contradiction

"isothymia"

and of "trans-historical"

nature"

How,

precisely, does

holds that

understand

without

it is (pp. 72, "... nature is HIV

he

"nature,"

352f.)

fully

these

he

although

capable of

also

biting

contrast

that as it

"nature"

to

without

it is (pp. 296-98, et discusses his equivocal use of

"human

cide what

does

"nature"

and what

it is

adds,

standard, then it is just political order marks

By

for the

and

men

and the problems

eschew

to

all references to

by

is the

by definition;

"variable"

and

standard.26

a as

standard

"history"

inconclusive

history

which we

"nature"

for

deciding

that a

is the fact that we, here

alternative.

de

view of

only by definition. For, as he But if is a variable

a criterion as

by

(p. 138). On this

Indeed, both

given

and

criteria are

now,

incon

same reason. tacitly

paragraphs

he

but

none

abandons

appeal

concedes as much.

to transhistorical human

strictly cishistorical, about human He

equation of

the

a

nature.27

consensus

Socrates-Plato's

nition"

(consider

the less clearly

his

"provisional"

of

able"

by

"nature"

not count as

the end of

Fukuyama

In his very last nature in favor

his

does

think of an essentially better

clusive

mod

instead, a strictly formal solution to the problem He does, however, on one occasion offer a characterization of

"trans-historical"

is

immediately

cannot

"nature"

led Kojeve to

by

nature,

to seek,

and

that eludes these difficulties:

nature

"Human"

nature"

of recognition.

it,

problems which

of nuclear weapons or

may.

emphatically is not what passim). Fukuyama never

qualifications,

he

that

claim

most

ern natural science says

tions, let alone which it gives rise,

the extraordinary

back in the form

317, 324f, 298). Be

(pp.

most part

what modern natural science says

makes

viruses"

For the

expressions?

qualifications, is

note

is,

as

"spiritedness"

with

17 below). Yet

by

earlier

it were, forced to

abandoning

Hegel-Kojeve's

it, his

"vari

abandon

version of

it

"recog the

end-

of-history argument and hence his refutation of historicism simply col lapses. He had sought to overcome historicism by, as it were, capping history with

transhistorical

(human)

nature.

But

a

"trans-historical

nature"

(human)

that

proves to be no more than a provisional consensus cannot be invoked to resolve disagreements between competing provisionally plausible accounts, for exam conception ple between his own conception of human nature and the of it (pp. 137f.) or, for that matter, between Anglo-Saxon liberalism's feminists'

concep-

Interpretation

228 tion

it

of

and

Hegel-Kojeve's. It

historical relativism; "the

marks

can therefore also not

be invoked to dispose

which, if any, state

or to settle the question of

of

of affairs

history."

end of

critical points of really be surprising to find strains at various traced to his effort to can be of them Most Fukuyama's theoretical construction. and reconcile positions which, once again, prove to be irreconcilable,

It

should not

"nature"

"history,"

"Hegel."

"Plato"

and

it necessary to

thought

It is

place.

not evident "desire,"

point, that

from

"spiritedness"

What is surprising is that he such an

elaborate

he

that

needs

it in

should

order

to

make

his

have

in the first

ambitious construction main

theoretical

especially in the form of acquisitiveness, differs in nature the quest for honor and for recognition. Nor is it evident

or

that he

needs

it in

order

to

explore

his primary

political concerns:

how best to

balance the competing claims of equality and liberty; and how to shift the emphasis from the dominant, Anglo-Saxon understanding of liberal democracy to his own, qualified Hegelian-Kojevian understanding of it, in order to ener gize the public spiritedness which

can, in his view,

Saxon ever,

model

most

lectual

not make a

(pp.

and moral

servants

he

215; 148,

impressively called

"the

democracy

requires

but for

which

it

Anglo-

sufficiently rousing case on the dominant 222, 316, 329, 332-34). His effort does, how

illustrate

discipline

liberal

and

embody the public-spiritedness, the intel breadth which Hegel attributed to the public and

class"

because

universal

of their

devotion to the

com

mon good.

NOTES

1. New York: The Free Press, 1992. All present

are

otherwise unidentified page references throughout

the

to this edition.

essay 2. Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: Including the Strauss-Kojeve Correspondence, Revised and Ex panded, ed. Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 88-94 (and see especially p. 125, n.59), pp. 158-63, 189-92, 196-99. 3. Plato, Republic IV, 439D-441C; see also Timaeus, 69D-73A, Laws IX, 863B-869E, XI, 935A-936B; contrast Phaedrus, 246A-B. 4. Plato, Republic, IV, 435E; cf. Aristotle, Politics, VII.7, 1327b 23-1328a 7.

and

5. For Fukuyama's reading of Plato's political psychology, and most particularly of spirited Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964), pp. 1 10-12; and,

ness, see

among the growing number "On Plato's Timaeus and

of subsequent studies of

Timaeus'

spiritedness, see especially

Seth Benardete,

Fiction,"

Interpretation, 2(1971):21-63, pp. 55f., "Leo The City and The Political Science Reviewer, 8(1978): 1-20, pp. 9-11, and Socra Second Sailing (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 55-58, 94, 98-102; Thomas Pangle in his edition of Plato's Laws (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 452-57; see also Steward Umphrey, "Eros and Interpretation, 10(1982): 353-422; and Laurence Interpretation, Berns, "Spiritedness in Ethics and Politics: a Study in Aristotelian 12(1984): 335-48. Fukuyama most frequently refers to essays in Catherine H. Zuckert, ed., Un Strauss'

Science

Man,"

tes'

Thymos,"

Psychology,"

derstanding the Political Spirit: Philosophical Investigations from Socrates ven: Yale University Press, 1988).

to

Nietzsche (New Ha

The End of History?

229

6. "The means [das Mittet] nature uses to achieve the development of all of its potentialities men's asocial sociability [ungesellige Geselligkeit] (Idea For A Universal [Anlagen] is History From A Cosmopolitan Point Of View, Proposition Four; see also Proposition Seven). In this .

.

.

connection, also consider the

Hegel

role

7. To take but

Hobbes's

one

social contract

on the

example, quite

at

is

that in

an agreement

pride"

(pp. 156f).

his 'human

According to Hobbes, Covenants;

the performance of their

it. And those

strengthen

Pride in appearing presumed

p.

"That

again:

Gallantness

or

pursuers of

the

limitations, is in

which gives

of courage

to

Words

be

virtue, the

noble character

being

.

too

folly

the

persuaded of

nature, but two imaginable helps to

mans

breaking their word; or a Glory, or Generosity too rarely found to be

reckoned

upon, is

or sensual Fear"

to humane Actions the

(rarely found,) by

Pleasure;

which are

relish of

Jutice, is

to be

which a man scorns

nowhere concludes

justice

"folly,''

and should

be

that,

a certain

beholding

righteous glory or pride, generosity, nobleness or but rarely, they represent "unjust pride and

since

the

end, Penguin

(Leviathan, 14,

for the is

which

Vice"

Hobbes

his

consequence of

his life, to fraud, or breach of promise. This Justice of the Manners, is that Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a (chap. 15, Penguin ed.,

of courage and

of

to hold men to

weak

contentment of

meant, where

to

side of man that seeks to show

superior

Wealth, Command,

Mankind. The Passion to be

200). Or

Nobleness

the basis of

of

Fukuyama, "Fundamental

to

preservation of their physical exis

The

vanity. on

"[t]he force of

for the

return

there are

Feare

e.g.

vol.

to need to breake it. This latter is a

on, especially in the

greatest part of

ed.,

not

are either a

(Verwirklichung);

According

random:

human'

too

all

develop

"realization"

called

1; Georg Lasson ed. (Miinchen: Felix Philosophy of History, Sibree trans. [New York: Dover

tences, men will give up their unjust pride and himself superior to other men, to dominate them who struggles against

in historical

assigns to self-interest and passion

in particular, and, more generally, in what he Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte,

ment

Meiner, 1930), pp. 59-66 (Lectures Publications, 1956], pp. 20-26).

.

p.

207).

gallantness vanity"

are encountered

overridden when and where

they

or

are encountered.

8. "The bourgeois

was an entirely deliberate creation of early modern thought, an effort at engineering that sought to create social peace by changing human nature itself (p. 185; cp. 153-61, 184-86,222).

social

pp.

9. "Locke's laborer in

observation

England'

that a

king

in America 'feeds, lodges,

and

neglects thymos and thus misses the point entirely.

is

than a day-

clad worse

The

king

in America has

a

missing entirely from the English day-laborer, a dignity that is born of his free dom, self-sufficiency, and the respect and recognition he receives from the community around (p. 174; Locke, Second Treatise of sec. 41). sense of

dignity

him"

Government"

,

10. See, for example, Leo Strauss to Karl Lowith, August 20, 1945, in "Correspondence transcribed and translated by Susanne Klein and George Elliott Tucker, Concerning Modernity,"

Independent Journal of Philosophy, 41 (1983): 113. 1 1 Introduction a la lecture de Hegel (Paris: Gallimard, 1947); Introduction to Hegel, A. Bloom ed., J. H. Nichols, Jr., trans. (New York: Basic Books, 1969). .

12. ".

for the

purposes of

Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojeve,

the present argument we are

interested

not

the

in Hegel

Reading

per se

of

but in

Hegel-Kojeve"

or perhaps a new, synthetic philosopher named

(p.

144). 13. See On Tyranny, 14. E. g.: "A human

Editors'

being

Introduction,

counts as such

pp. xvif.

because he is

a

human being,

not

because he is

a

etc."

(Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, Allan W. Wood, ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991], sec. 209; see also sec. 66. However, "[Ijiberalism [of the variety which Fukuyama calls "Anglo-Saxon liberalism"], not con tent with rational rights, with various civil

institutions

[die Verstdndigen] name of

freedom

of person and of property, with a political structure and

each of which performs a

exercise

influence

over

the principle of atomism, of

the

distinct function,

people and

particular wills:

people's express power, and with their express consent.

Freiheit],

the

actions are

people prevent

immediately

any

stable structures

opposed on

it

having

the

its

competent

enjoy their trust, opposes all this in the have everything be done by the

would

With this formal freedom [Formellen der

from getting

the grounds that

and with

they

established.

Specific

are acts of particular

government

wills, and

hence

230

Interpretation The

arbitrary.

will of

the

Many

topples the government, and

had been the Opposition

what

now

Government, it is again opposed by the Many. As a result, agitation and unrest are perpetuated. This collision, this knot, this problem is the juncture at which (Hegel, history currently finds itself, and which it will have to resolve in the times to Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, vol. 4, pp. 932f; for Sibree's translation; see Lectures on the Philosophy of History (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), p. 452. 15. Introduction a la lecture de Hegel, 2d ed. (Paris: Gallimard, I960), pp. 436f.; Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, pp. 1 50f ; see also Kojeve's lecture "Marx est Dieu; Henry Ford est son Commentaire (Printemps 1980), pp. 131-35. 16. Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Einleitung: Die Vernunft in der Ges chichte, pp. 45f; Sibree trans, pp. 74f. 17. Yet he appears fully to accept Kojeve's utterly anthropologized Hegel, his understanding of recognition as intersubjectivity, and of intersubjectivity as for all intents and purposes replacing reason and (human) nature: in quoting a passage in which Hegel speaks of [Geist], power; but

assumes

that it is the

now

come''

.

Prophete,"

"Spirit"

Fukuyama

glosses:

"i.e.

acknowledgment and apparent itedness"

Hegel-Kojeve's

and

human

collective

dismissal

consciousness"

of

"recognition"

(p. 60). In this context,

the decisive

his difference between Socrates-Plato's "spir

(pp. 165f.),

and the related

De Cive II. 1, Annotation. 18. "Hegel undoubtedly takes Hobbes as his point of departure to the Ancients that is to say by way of

364; regarding Hobbes,

discussion in

endnote

7,

p.

consider

('dialectically,'

'return'

to

consider also

November 2, 1936, On Tyranny, p. 231). Or, anticipate many of Hegel's assumptions .

.

as .

Fukuyama

.

Hegel consciously wants (Kojeve to Strauss,

.

'Hobbes')"

would

have it, Hobbes

and

Locke

(p. 153).

19. Thus Spake Zarathustra, Zarathustra's Prologue, sec. 5; see Strauss's letters to Kojeve and September 11, 1957, On Tyranny, pp. 239, 291; p. "Restatement,"

dated August 22, 1948, 208. 20.

"

individuals have duties towards the

.

state

in

proportion as

Elements of the Philosophy of Right, sec. 261, cp. sec. 155). 21. Cp. "Thymos or the desire for recognition is thus the seat for 'values'"

(p. 213). Elsewhere he

(p. 183). It is

such; is it

what

rights"

(Hegel,

the social scientists call

according to Socrates thymos is "an innately political that means: is thymos a virtue; where does Socrates speak of it

says that

virtue"

not clear what

innate virtue; again, where does Socrates there in the teaching of Socrates or of Plato for "innate as

they have

an

speak of

it

as

and what

such;

basis is

virtue"

might

"innately

political"

mean?

On

thymos was the basis of the virtues

another occasion "

.

.

any kind? Alternatively, what Fukuyama asserts that Plato argued that of

"

.

(p. 337). Where does Plato

that; of what virtues: of intelligible without those two? argue

of moderation; and how is Platonic justice or even courage Even granting that the virtue Aristotle calls megalopsychia greatness of soul or "proper is he simply does not rank it as "the central human (p. 370 n.3); it is one of the two complete moral not virtues, and for all of his praise of it, Aristotle does not go beyond saying that it seems to be a kind of crown of the virtues (Nichomachean Ethics 1 124a If;

wisdom,

pride"

"thymotic,"

virtue"

"human"

and consider

pp.

Posterior Analytics II, 13, 97b 15-25). p. 194; cf. What Is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1989),

22. On Tyranny, 306f.

23. E.g. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Preface, p. 20, and sees. 124, 185, 260 Additions to them, as well as sec. 279, Addition /'./. "Whether any text that has come down to us from the Greco-Roman world (or any Biblical text) ever mentions what can together with the

rights,'

natural or 'the rights of properly be translated as 'human is (Thomas Pangle, "The Classical Challenge to the American Chicago-Kent Law Re view, 66[1990]: 145-76, p. 153; id. Thomas Pangle, The Ennobling of Democracy [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992], p. 97). rights,'

doubtful"

man,'

Constitution,"

24. The immediate

context

is Kojeve's sharp criticism of Strauss's distinction between philoso life, while dangerous on any hypothesis, is strictly unacceptable

'cloistered'

phy and politics. "The for the philosopher who,

with

Hegel,

acknowledges that

for all, but creates itself in the course time). For if that is the case, then the members of the given once and

reality (at least human reality), is not (at least in the course of historical

of time

'cloister,'

isolated from the

rest of

the

world

The End of History? in

part

really taking

and not

life in its historical evolution, will, sooner or later, be 'over time was can later become change into a will fail to notice what has ("Tyranny and

public

events.'

taken

Indeed,

by

'prejudice,'

and

'true,'

even what at one 'cloister'

only the

'false,'

happened"

Wisdom,"

in Strauss, On Tyranny, p. 155). Kojeve states his objection to human of October 29, 1953, pp. 161f. Instead, he suggests, I'homme comme une erreur qui se maintient dans I'existence, qui dure dans la tion a la lecture de Hegel, p. 461; cp. p. 432).

"nature"

"

ful

Europe

.

and

most

"

his letter to Strauss

25.

on

-231

the eve of the

French Revolution looked to many

satisfying social order, as did that in Iran in the 1970s, (pp. 137, 287-96).

or

the

succinctly in definir

on pourrait

realite"

(Introduc

observers

like

a success

Eastern Europe in

countries of

1980s"

the

26. "In the end, it

permanent, trans-historical standard,

which we separate

138f.; a

without reference

without reference

to nature. For

history

is

not a

given,

to

a

not

everything that happened in the past, but a deliberate effort of abstraction in important from unimportant events. The standards on which this abstraction are But

are variable.

unimportant, and

for

i.e.

'history'

about

a catalogue of

merely based

impossible to talk

would appear

cp. pp.

hence

[no] historian

reference

130, 189);

can evade the choice

to a standard that exists somewhere

see also

Kant's

regulative

"Idea

between important

'outside'

of

history

" .

man"

in the Second Thesis

of

of

and

(pp.

the Idea

Universal History.

27. ". similar

if,

.

long

over

time,

term patterns of

institutions governing a result of economic

more and more societies with

development; if

most advanced

development,

then the idea

now"

(p. 338). And,

after

societies; and

comparing

history

is

cultures and

histories

a

of relativism

to a

diverse

exhibit

continuing convergence in the types if the homogenization of mankind continues

there

long

may

he

"

concludes:

as

than it does

seem much stranger

wagon-train,

of

.

despite the

wagons'

liberal revolution, the evidence concerning the direction of the provisionally inconclusive. Nor can we, in the final analysis know

recent world-wide

ing

must remain

the occupants, and set

having

their eyes on a

looked

around a

new and more

bit

at

distant

their new surroundings, will not journey"

(p. 339).

find

them

wander whether

inadequate

Book Reviews

Charles L.

Griswold, Jr., Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus (New Haven: University Press, 1986), xii + 315 pp., $29.50.

Yale

Will Morrisey

"The Phaedrus unravelled

into

a

the appearance of a

presents

tangled skein of themes and

this appearance Professor Griswold weaving, to glimpse the intention

In

form

keeping

with

partially (p. 1). In working through to see Plato's statesmanlike

helps the

reader

and

written

that

"the

content"

intrinsic to its meaning

as

Plato selects, the

genre

come

judgment governing the artistry. this attentiveness to Plato's art, Griswold argues

dialogue is

the

of

that has

tapestry

images"

as

(p. 2). The

the

Socrates'

dialogue,

contrasts

noticeably

with

writing contained therein. This establishes a certain distance between Plato and his characters, including his protagonist. The distance leaves strictures against

for irony, as may be "Know is a written thyself,"

command at

the

"morally

understand

life"

right

the soul

for the divine; chology that

and

tent, the

quest

for

be

understood

the

form,

or

written

self-knowledge

order

to establish the nature of

relation

to the soul's striving

methodologically, entailing a teachable

dialogue,

(and

psy

divisions.

soul's natural

the

in

is, in

metaphysically, that

technically

analyzes

How does the

(p. 3). There

which must

the morally right life:

favorite maxim,

the temple of Delphi (p. 7). In con

is self-knowledge, associated with the issue are at least two ways to attempt to

tent the dialogue's unifying theme of

Socrates'

in the fact that

seen

room

contribute

to the dialogue's

"The Phaedrus

vice versa)?

con

presents us

extremely odd, but very rich, description of how eros and logos are connected to each other in the desire to give a discursive description of oneself, with an

desire

to how

self-knowledge"

that

is,

ourselves.

through

(p. 5). What

to

We talk

opinions.

separate

never

ourselves

about

Our

opinions point

from the

we

not

always

relates

of

out

to the truth about

we

talk about

self-knowledge

ourselves.

truth. Plato's account of this

Opinions

but are

incident in Socra

entirely for self-knowledge follows his mentor to a place outside the Athens. The Phaedrus is the only Platonic dialogue set 'in tes'

quest

walls of

nature,'

"rife

divinized

gods,"

with reminders of the

wold's

introduction is his

Socrates'

a

Socrates'

observation of

walking away from the city, from

solitary; it is

accompanied


nature

by

a companion,

1993-94, Vol. 21, No. 2

"return to

convention.

by

a nature

(p. 9). Central to Gris

dialogue:

nature"

(p. 8),

But the walking is

not

234

Interpretation

Is

in

self-knowledge

self-knowledge with

his

commitment to

Socrates, then,

Socrates'

some sense suprapolitical?

divine

subsequent

erotic madness points to an affirmative

dialogue

inevitably

involves him

himself

sometimes presents

joining

answer, whereas

the political. (P.

with

as a political

of

9)

philosopher, some

times not. How are these apparently contradictory aspects of Socrates related?

Why

should a philosopher

be

political at

all, in any

sense?

chapter takes up these questions, first by considering Socra Socrates' relationship to his interlocutor, Phaedrus. Why should a man of intelligence pay any more than the most cursory attention to such a mediocrity? Phaedrus is an unusually tedious specimen of the all-too-familiar type, the liter

Griswold's first

tes'

disciple"

ary intellectual. No rhetorician himself, only an "eternal student and (p. 21), Phaedrus enjoys speeches more for their form than for any truth they might convey. He is neither political, nor businesslike, nor especially erotic; he 'appreciates,'

loves

others

'connoisseur.'

he is

a

only "out

materialism and anti traditional ism.

rialistic physics, Spiro T. Agnew

He has

no

(p.

He is "a

or serious passions.

strong

utility"

of a sense of

23)

and

cultured

inclines to

a

He

fashionable

dabbler in rhetoric,

mate

medicine"

(p. 25). Former United States Vice President

and would

have

him among the

classed

effete snobs of

Greek

antiquity.

Socrates bothers an

ideal

logue"

character

(p.

18),

with

him because

"Phaedrus'

for the development No

self-knowledge.

shortcomings make

very of

.

.

.

lacks it

one

the central theme of the

him

dia

more conspicuously.

By showing what it means to lack self-knowledge, Plato is able to show us both why the philosophic life is superior to the Phaedran and what would be required to achieve it. Plato chose to say something about self-knowledge by constructing .

.

.

dialogue between someone who

Moreover, with

of even

his

own

knowledge

nature's silence

(p. 24).

eros, his lack

Phaedrus'

"is

lack

of

his

own

ignorance

and

ignorance. (P. 18)

setting for

nature serves as an appropriate

Phaedrus because

thoughtlessness"

lack

someone who possesses a

is ignorant

discussion

a

dangerously

of

conducive to

writing Phaedran

of self-knowledge corresponds

to his

business interest, and his tendency to drift into surroundings. He does not know himself in part because he does not understand others, his need for others. Socrates, no frivolous tionalist "understands that he needs the polis and what it can teach him about himself (p. 25). Phaedrus wants to get Socrates into the coun of

of

any

political or

'country'

antitradi-

'intellectual,'

.

try

as

a captive

audience

for

.

.

speech-reading.

Socrates

wants

to learn about

himself

by conversing with his inferior. Not incidentally, Socrates will also use the cal purpose. Properly educated, Phaedrus can

'utilitarian'

tween

Socrates

and

tween Socrates and

faces

a

difficult

the 'opinion Phaedrus'

problem

in

a

makers'

of

serve

"as

Phaedrus for an

a politi

intermediary

be

city"

the

(p.

27),

specifically, be

rhetorician friend Lysias. Philosophic rhetoric democracy. Such rhetoric "is effective only when

Book Reviews the

know the

speaker can

soul of

his

interlocutors),

impossibility

an

235

when a

large group is being addressed (at least if the truth is to be (p. 27). To defend philosophy before the bar of democratic opinion, therefore, the phi losopher must persuade the persuaders. Phaedrus may be able to put in a good word for Socrates with the persuader, Lysias. To do so Phaedrus must be edu cated, brought to some sort of self-knowledge, however partial. For this pur conveyed)"

pose

Socrates "enters into

him,

a complex sequence of

matically the intellectual arable in the context of

a

not

(p.

29)

with

Socra

and

(in the broadest sense) philosophers. This is

or

nonphilosophers and

for

"[T]he

philosophers.

Phaedrus'

both

32)

'social'

irremediably

32) for

utility for

a matter of

(p.

role-playing and role reversals that imitates dra dialectic. Dialectic and rhetoric "are insep

self-knowledge"

(p.

soul cannot

know itself

soul"

the

(p. 32).

mirrorlike presence of another

degraded image

Socrates

of eros

(p.

Phaedrus

get

33)

him,

himself,

and

at a

again

to his own self-protection

as well as contribute

to know

"[B]y looking

himself to think through

can challenge

eros"

the nature of

letting

deception"

and

character"

merely

without

imitation

process of

tes'. Self-knowledge has "an 'political'

of

comedy

a

by

little better.

country is just that only a day trip. Transcendence of the city is possible but temporary. The conspicuously urbane Socrates evidently has been here before and "is remarkably sensitive to the beauty of the (p. The

to the

excursion

spot"

34). Phaedrus is

He "walks

not.

outside the

city, but his

is

soul

it,"

by

owned

polis"

Socrates is "in, not of, the (p. 35). Neither nature in its silence its chatter alone suffices for self-knowledge. Dialogue requires

whereas

nor

the city in

both "the

soul's recollection of a natural order and other

self-knowledge requires sured

by

nature,

not

dialogue in

just

other

order

to unify

books,

speeches,

theory or

beings"

human

ion,

"the

truth"

cludes mated

try he

does "contain something

feeling

prescientific or

incorporeal

we are

beings"

live in

who

a world

(and to) the gods, refusing terms but instead translating

In

Typhon,

telligence"; Socrates,"

so

he finds in his

"represents the

the

divine"

so

with

"self-knowledge is

his

not

Socrates desires to know himself "in so

he

moderation, discourse

Phaedrus has

some sense ani

goes

must continue

of

least two beings: the

tyranny

coun

myths and nature

of eros

to

into

mythic

deprived

these alternatives alone

erotic

madness

and

wild monster and

terminable

of

in

as

long

describes

law-abiding

rea

the mild animal are lives"

as one

(p. 43). best"

he may lead the life that is to deepen his understanding of eros

order

and nondiscursive

a written speech

to the

or nature

animal, a moderate creature that can "live in

The tensions between the

(p. 43). To do

soul at

absolute

(p. 41). "Neither

the philosopher,

sonableness.

manifold,

doing who

and a zoion or natural

with

in

(p. 38). When Socrates

or souls

or materialist

psychic terms.

in

version of self-knowledge

"beings

to reduce myths

speaks of

the

of

"everyday"

that

'naturalistic'

harmony

opin

are,"

the

monster

because

experience of nature will not suffice

prescientific sense of what we

(p. 38). This

by

35);

the applause of one's ad

mirers"

(p. 36). The direct

(p.

eros, "love mea

and

on

that

and

vision, rhetoric and truth.

love

by

the

rhetorician

Lysias. In the

236

Interpretation young boy.

speech

Lysias

The

because "the nonlover argues that the boy "singularly (p. 45). The him because he does not love the gratify sexually "no features rhetoric of "reads like a very sober legal brief (p. 45) and

poses as a nonlover who nonetheless would seduce a

is

speech

odd"

boy"

should speech love"

(p. 46); it is impersonal, not individualized. Emotionally absurd and mor its appeal nonetheless should not be underestimated, "As the debased, ally

be

point might

today, liberation from

put

moral constraints

is justified in the

preferences"

(p.

name of controlled satisfaction of subjective

46)

an

ideology

(so to speak) of hedonism, utilitarianism, and technicism governed by the prin ciples (so to speak) of calculation, frankness, privacy, selfishness, and freedom 'lifestyle.'

of choice or rality'

of

"enlightened

The

speech's

(p.

only in the different

47), i.e.,

he

wants

acquired

them"

means

desire"

lover'

Lysias is really The Lysian

a

lover"

"concealed

'nonlover'

"assumes that his

does

not

self-knowledge

(p. 47).

Imagining

does, but

that

he has

is only "an instrument reason is a techne, only. The 'non (p. 48), a none-too-convincing liar. as

his

reason

know himself, but believes he does. He not require the discursive mediation of

does

person"

(p. 50). Self-satisfied

another

'mo

needs,

Lysias "negates

the identical goals the lover

for attaining mastered eros, in fact he remains its slave, for the satisfaction of (p. 47). His

has

a

satisfaction of physical

preservation of reputation.

pain,

specific sense:

eros

toward

pushes

self-interest"

minimalization of

pleasure,

dialectic"

"debasing

rather

than self-knowing, he assumes

has nothing to learn from the boy, whom he would reduce to physical pleasure. Despite his baseness and folly the

an

'nonlover'

he

instrument

of

is better than

he knows. "However base his intentions, the nonlover must conceal himself as a lover and so transcend in his own rhetoric the level of his (pp. 5051). Eros edified in spite of, even by means of, the hypocrisy of the speaker. A intentions"

"glimmer "[T]alk and

of

about what

in its

concealed

fore

anamnesis,"

of

not

it

apparent

means

truly

nonforgetting the beautiful, remains (p. 51). be is "implicit in the language of human"

love"

opposite, the studied language

lover (p. 51).

about truth.

to

Lysias'

self-interested.

'self-interest'

is

But it does tell the

skeptical

desire collide": "reason and is to be satisfied"; a philosopher does need to be detached from desire, if not from eros as such (p. 48). son

cal

response

competence, criticizing

delivers his pulls

his

by

a

"simply

which reason and

Socrates begins his

by

there

listener something false": "there is a level at desire must collaborate if a per

Lysias'

assumptions are not

of nonlove spoken

not self-knowledge and

appealing to

sexual

Phaedrus'

admiration of techni

Lysias'

speech as a work of rhetoric.

own speech as a replacement of

his head in

Lysias'

speech.

Socrates then

Before

doing

so

he

ironic gesture of shame. This is appropriate, Griswold argues, because "shame is a kind of self-consciousness, mediated by one's consciousness of how someone else would evaluate one's a cloak over

an

deeds"

"paradigm"

of

speech

"the

Socrates

complex reflexive nature of

shows that

Lysias

should

be

self-knowledge"

ashamed of

(p. 56). In this

himself,

that Lysias is

Book Reviews a

lover

lying

itself

nonlover.

This

present

58-59). Yet

a good

"between intelligent Socrates'

In

is if

speech

with

find,

own

(pp.

with convention.

How to distin

(p. 60)?

its

by

object

(p.

62), "the

working it to death in the service of itself, destroying its own be

eros contradicts

devices if

power"

cancels

itself

out"

(p. 63). Reason is here

self-gratification, for technical "efficiency (p. 63). We are left with a circle. Lysias the 'non

self-preservation

pursuit of

lover'

is

a concealed

detaches himself "formulate

not

a

lover; Socrates

somewhat

better

from

conception of

fall into Lysianism. Still, just

the

eros

in

human

shameful shamelessness also points

in turn

expands our

desire

we

have

satisfaction

(p.

is

64)

if he is

than this

in

to a truth. Erotic

leads to the

understand others.

attraction and

are not so

reason,

Socrates

spite of

not

to

itself, Socra

dialectic has

acquisition of

must

a "self-

theory,

which

vocabulary and conception of eros"; "in order to understand do more than think about ourselves as particular individ

What is more,

logic,

eros.

satisfy

to

(p. 66). We have to

as eros and

a concealed nonlover who

nature"

uals"

political matters.

is

order to

speech edified

motion."

"[T]he desire for

'lover'

Lysias'

as

tes'

eros

(in

actions"

our

pleasure"

in the

our

"we

as

ourselves and

too easy to confuse (as

all

"eros is the tyrannical desire for

loved. "Nature left to its

for

it is

is

argument"

(p. 63). Such

required

as

opinion, truth

master/lover"

the

the argument,

in understanding to find constancy in

and unfounded

to annihilate

narcissistic effort

speech

or abstract character of

needed to advance

to

237

Socrates'

proceed

we are

theory is hard

do) knowledge

rhetoricians

guish

how to

of what eros

case)

is

shamelessness

theoretical account of

need a

However,

shameless, mimicking the impersonal

somewhat speech.

the

frank,

not a

Lysias'

'enlightened'

easily (p. 67).

we

begin to

We have to

see

social,

even

that such apparent dichotomies

detachment, desire

separable.

consider

and

moderation, desire

"[A]t the highest level

reason

and

is erotic,

or

rational"

cannot just let our desires run away with us; they need to be made reflective in way that allows them to be measured by an answer about what it means to be human. The measures cannot themselves be further desires or other discourses

We a

about

desires. (P.

68)

Socrates'

Lysias'

shameful"

speech is "superior but in reply to because, lover and nonlover alike as "intelligent wolves, speech, it portrays (p. 69). Neither speech "gives us an whose appetite is speech

like

Lysias'

enlightened"

animals

account of eros that explains the willingness of

deliver those very his own speech and

to and rupts

of urbane

detachment

and

Socrates to listen

(pp. 68-69). Socrates (unlike Lysias) inter threatens to leave, inducing Phaedrus to drop his pose

and act as a

Phaedrus'

Phaedrus

speeches"

lover, imploring Socrates

claiming (as

to stay. Socrates

his inner daimon

desire, is, a set of moral considerations the prophetic dai mon, his respect for divine Eros, the opinion of an imagined gentleman who overheard the speeches, the feeling of shame after blaspheming, and so on accedes to urges

him to

stay.

That

a

nonlover) that

238

Interpretation

Socrates to stay and to attempt to go beyond the level of reductionist naturalism. Moral considerations are needed in order "to articulate the ascent of compels

knowledge"

(p. 72). This

the

with some of

turn,

ascent will next take a mythic

striking imagery in Plato's writings. The palinode consists of two sections, the first a discussion of three "tradi forms of madness (p. 74), the second an exposition defending a fourth

most

tional"

form

Once

of madness.

the role of the

Socrates

again

Stesichorus,

poet

a celebrator of

philosop

(p. 74). The three

optimistically in the role of the "potential forms of madness are prophetic,

rather

"traditional"

sicknesses through catharses and

rites),

gods"

(p. 75). Religion is

the

himself, this time by playing noble love, to Phaedrus, cast

conceals

"telistic"

and poetic.

(involving

Each

of

nearly indispensable to

perhaps

the

cure

the all-too-human, techno-materialist conception of nature that grips

Shame, sensitivity

beauty,

to

the experience of eros, and an

premise"

the

(p.

religious

77)

is,

that

'Modern'

arche

conception of nature.

fills the

soul with

into

Phaedrus. of

on

higher

closer

to the

archaic"

more

destroys wonder,

techno-materialism

spoils potentially philosophic souls by making them intellectuals. Religion promotes wonder if not awe,

conceit, call

what we now

humbles the

by

soul of

"understanding

human dependence

of

form the bridge to philosophy, "a

powers

for

cures

these is "sent

before the

soul

cosmos

and

the gods, provides the antidote to

certain presumptions.

The fourth form

Socrates'

individual (as is terpart). Divine

soul

and

thought)

being

composed of mindless particles.

The

sense sense

that the soul

tality for Socrates does and soul

in

a

to the

needed coun

in examining the human soul, self-motion and immortality. Self-motion

buffeted soul

deterministic

by

external

directs itself,

not mean personal

future life.

intelligibility

(p. 85). The In

may be its

conceptions of

forces,

or as

'freely'

not

the

being

in the 'Ger

but or 'creatively') the soul's desires are given has the ability to choose among the desires. Immor

(p. 85). "Intelligence does

a natural

75), internal

to light

soul

is

the not

fit between

keeping

not

Immortality by nature inhabit

a permanent

necessarily

joining

component of

of which

understanding

world; there are

is

of

the

the

of the eternal princi

from

an escape

able to exist without

Ideas"

"a

Truth"

some

an absurd

understanding

soul and

his

immortality,

rather serves as

thesis that every human soul has

ples of

(p.

('autonomously'

man'

body

which

contradicts materialistic and

that portray the soul as

in the

daimon,

cautionary

erotic madness comes

two salient characteristics are

whose

(eros

"unconventional"

is

of madness

finitude"

our

body, but "there is

(p. 87).

strategy here, Socrates describes the soul in scientifically or in terms of epistemic knowledge. The soul is not unchanging; there is no eternal Idea of the soul as there is of, say, Justice. "Human souls are not intelligible as images with

antitechnical

terms of myth. The soul is

of an original principle of

Soul but

by

not

Soul,

to be described

and the world

is populated

not

souls"

(p. 89). There is

no

"immutable

essence of

by

images

man"

(p.

of

89),

Book Reviews but

man

does have

Took,'

a

self-moving nature, limits. Self-knowledge is not

and stable

a

an

epistemic

certain given

articulation,

but

'gnostic,'

be

and must

through myths.

approached

Here Socrates introduces the The

239

myth of

the charioteer

the winged horses.

and

The black horse represents sexual desire, the horse spiritedness, sensitivity to honor and shame. All have wings, repre senting eros. The human soul, then, is a complex entity of interdependent but charioteer represents reason.

white

often as

hierarchical,

teleological"

as well unity is "functional and the charioteer rightfully in control (p. 93). At the same

elements whose

conflicting

with

unnatural, even monstrous, "a seemingly impossible grafting together of the human, the equine, and the (p. 95). It is not in itself good or evil, being good only if rightly ordered. Eros sets the

time the

soul also appears somewhat

avian"

soul on

its

oneself.

This is the

quest

for its "true secret

(p. 98). "To be

self

know

oneself one must

understands"

the

(p. 98). And to know

philosopher

"as

ourselves we must see ourselves

larger Whole,

a part of a

elements of

them"

(p. 98). The naturally attract and fulfill us when we understand Whole helps us fulfill the eros of the well-governed soul. Virtue is no teachable which

method,

Virtue is difficult for human beings. The of

the Ideas

They

with ease.

They

overcome.

do

food, in

taste of divine

a

a

black horse to

but "not unambiguously (p. 101), the result of a

fate"

(p. 100). But the

and

historically

understood

There is little "Man is to be

human

in

a

soul

nature

is "ambigu

relationship between "choice in the sense that it is not "to be

natural

to

be

seen

in the human

(p. 101).

species as a whole.

ends"

category gods

do

primarily in terms of his the same ends, at least immediately of elements within will not see

(also

not rule

men, do at

when

things

the

(p. 101). Not

to obtain

same

of

soul.

light

for the

This

in

a

that "a

different

"Being

because their

gods

do

is but

rather

to

death,"

noth

appears to them

'selves'

neither

be formed

by it";

as

it

impede

the Ideas. "[T]he mind's perfection

or alter what

all

most part.

means

as a soul

for them. Socratic

the divine banquet.

knowledge

and

generally?) is necessary (p. 103).

not care

need no self-knowledge

to master, shape, make,

individual

in the

government

'feasting'

(p. 104); they

nor struggle

(p. 99). The

understood

and rhetoric

but look

good"

development"

category,"

Socratic

human

as a process of social-political

or no

hierarchy

one

is

soul

'progress'

souls pursue

There is

for them

that

of origins of

"murky"

natural"

ously

for

nature"

"state

(p. 99). For Socrates "the

prepolitical"

ing

divine banquet

no

all"

war of all against

are

is"

madness, have

the human souls, this "anarchic mob striving

not assist

for

is "a

(p. 98).

of

to the

gods ascend

need no erotic

self-preservation,"

soul

desire"

techne or skill, but "knowledge of the true ends

no

is

not

"in this

'subjectivity'

the suppression of (p. 104). is the yearning for Human beings are not pure mind. To forget this one would need to be subhu man or superhuman. To be fully human is to be perpetually dissatisfied yet sense eros

somehow our own

"satisfied

ignorance,

with our

(or

in) this state incompleteness,

dissatisfaction,"

of perpetual

to desire to overcome

it,

to know

and yet

to

240

Interpretation (p. 106). Central to his overcoming is of the acknowledgment is Griswold's of the Phaedrus that dialectic disquieting?) impossible"

know that "in this life

such

"disquieting"

the palinode

chapter on

(thus self-moving, literally "cannot in principle arrive despite the dialogue's

Beauty

substitute

teaching

reality,"

at a comprehensive

...

for the

(p. 106). "The Phaedrus seems to n. 47). Whereas "the highest form of

rhetoric"

"edifying Good"

understanding of

(p.

266,

intellectual intuition, not speech, "there is no intellectual intuition for human (pp. 106-7). Nor is there any

Episteme is

noetic,"

a matter of

beings"

pure

"noesis

nous"

or self-consciousness with respect to the

of

'metaintuition'

Kantian

(p. 108). Therefore "the

intuition, a knowing whether of

activity

problem of

critical"

knows something truly is and in the sense of skeptical

both in the

and when one important'

of one's

insights is

108).

By

nourishes

many

The

can move closer

to

look

itself

at

retrospectively (p. to the "objective truth the human individ

happiness"

own eyes

(p. 109),

is the capacity that

or recollection

closer

to the

Being

that

the

divine banquet illustrates that

unification,"

both

an ontological

anamnesis we are

both

reasoning"

(p. 111).

by is "both

anamnesis

"theoretical"

beyond

the soul to go

enables

to "a one gathered together

sense perceptions

myth of

In

soul needs

'extremely acceptance

the soul.

Anamnesis the

it

for his "subjective

needs

its

and also through

eyes of

doing

so

(p. 108). The human

others"

"through the

ual

dangerous"

sense of

"uncritical

or questioning:

"existential"

a rational and

(pp. 112-13).

and

in

recalled to a sense of our primordial status, our place

the cosmos as a whole, and brought

by

means of

lengthy

questioning to

rational

insight into the form

of things. These forms, we're told, nourish the wings and the in remembering the forms we become again what we were. In this sense insight into the Beings is the same as becoming oneself, one's true or whole self. But the insight is always partial, as the myth also makes clear. Recognition of that

soul;

and

fact is knowledge

Anamnesis

the

what we

limits. All

is "a

desire,

where

we

are

in the

these insights together amount to

be

able

to

lead

to

opinions

(p. 115). Anamnesis is

process that takes place through

(p. 115).

Socrates'

erotic art

questioning"

power of cism sees the

to

beloved

speech

lead the

as an

intends "a

not a religious time,"

It

not a

rhetoric that

state, of uses

insight (pp. 1 15-16). Socratic

image, however

partial,

also

unity through conversion. Anam

"an activity,

is "the dialectical

soul to

cosmos.

self-knowledge.

rational

eidos"

soul"

Socratic

of

philosopher must

insight into nesis

ignorance. (P. 1 14)

shows us

shows us our

"The

of

of an

the

eroti

intelligible beauty.

arche"

(p. 121). Socrates is Freud in "Stated very crudely, instead of explaining the desire for philosophy as a modification of sexual desire, Socrates explains sexual desire as a low mani festation of the desire for (p. 121). return to the

reverse:

wisdom"

Self-knowledge is matter of a person's

not

exclusively theoretical

acting in

a certain

manner,

or even verbal. of

living

It is also "a his life in a certain

Book Reviews life"

way,"

the

122). As

"living a

kind

lover,

of

fulfilled"

that is "never quite

out of a philosophical

the philosopher uses eros to move

241

his

(p.

toward

mind

the truth.

The lover loses himself in

to find himself at a deeper level. The lover

order

unconsciously transfers his own character-ideal to the beloved to taken a

here.

crucial

The

fancy,

and

...

and

knowledge"

Beings. This is ture of

(P.

126)

does this consciously,

Christian agape, the unmerited love of a person as God regardless of individual qualities, nor is this the love of a not

individual 'for better other so as

to

Why

for

or

"Socrates'

worse.'

love themselves,

love himself

to

other

should

in

not

qua whole and

widening the

subjects

guard

Still, city

finds

There is

safety.

"double

of

the

does

call

.

(falsely)

has been

per

teaches that that

and

.

make

him

not

so

find

mad and

to be the

in

is,

case"

(p. 132).

to speak, in the talkative

safety in the kill him. Because recol may and therefore "cannot take

greater physical

perception"

sense

body"

14-15), this, too, is a threat to noetic danger in making philosophic madness debasing move indeed for all concerned (p. (pp. 1

also a considerable doctrine,"

as political

133). This is

palinode

not.

production,"

.

'noetic

greater

his fellow-citizens

independently

flawed

other

safety,'

city; many lection "seems inseparable from place

(p. 131). "[T]he

what we

than in the silent country. He of

by including

about oneself and what one

safely distinguish theory

the philosopher

each

the philosopher from self-deception? It does

to be the case and

we see

unique

beloved love

and

way, but in a way that helps the his (p. 129).

'subjectivity'

difficulty"

thinking

a crea

nature"

fulfilling

suaded of remains a grave we cannot

a selfish

lover

scope of

necessarily "[Distinguishing between the truth

"what

he has

divinizing the beloved, mythologizing externalizing himself, thereby "creating for himself a route to self(p. 126). True friendship benefits both friends and recollects the

philosopher

nature,

whom

then sees himself in the beloved. The role of the imagination is

where

a

sophrosyne, moderation,

from the "recollection

of

comes

noetically (p. 134) but

in. True

truth"; "the

presented

sophrosyne results

sources of

true

self-

suprapolitical"

restraint are

ifications. "[T]he desire is the

in

sense

for the

desires"

which virtue

is

within

beings become the

251al,

completely"

Platonic

point

254b 1)

that

the Whole (p.

in the

philosophers.

is

other

knowledge, "an understanding

whole,"

soul as a

"possibly ral';

the

of reason can control

sophic asceticism would result man

not without ethical and political ram

end of

(p. 134). This

of what

is

135). Taken literally,

the human species,

As this is unlikely to be

good

philo

could all

Socrates'

hu

intention,

only pederastic sexual relations (which are 'unnatu indulged in for pleasure alone are to be rejected

and sex

(p. 135).

myths

exemplify philosophic logos. Their interpretation in order to be

"symbolically

expressed

understood"

requires

meaning may be a factual

account or a more

directly

rational

(p. 139). A logos

argument, but it is

not

242

Interpretation conveys a

absolutely distinguishable from a myth, inasmuch as the myth also truth. (Similarly, opinion is not absolutely distinguishable from 'through'

logos,

else one could not reach the truth

immortality

of

opinions).

the soul means "the capacity

a person undergoes

life is simply the quality of that one life (p. 145). Mythic language satisfaction,

a

nonphilosophic

happiness,

love"

love,"

desire

experience of

imagery,

metaphor,

transposed to the inner

"might become "the

and symbols

by telling

what we are

into

in

describing

the

transposed

us what we are

best"

by

"our

(p. 147).

By

the senses is

a personal myth

way that "tells us

by dissolving or reducing

than

rather

in

(p. 148). The

(p. 148). Myth is

soul

ble the The

is

and

'has'

soul

no

its gaining

historically

insight,

generated.

and

The

perhaps unsurpassed

to the

central

life

Idea corresponding to

losing

of

it,

without

unity,

advantages of

of philoso

Platonic

myth can

suggesting

myth resem

advantages of good rhetoric. second

idiom

of

half the

(p. 157). Dialogue theme. After the

in

love

the experience of

that the

"sober

a

of the

Phaedrus

first half

replaces monologue.

enthusiasm of

by

a

Self-knowledge

the palinode "we need

way (p. 163). for rhetoric "to

(p. 159). The

is,

"the

to seduce requires

words"

rhetorician

art of

is both lover free"

language, "value determinate number of

modern

involving a elements by means cedure

remains

beautiful,

rhetoric,"

in

idiom"

and analytic

...

seduce

passion

to some more philosophical, and so more

rhetoric

detached

enthusiastic and

the underlying

to talk about talk

uninspired"

and

uses

"[T]he desire

"[T]he

concerns rhetoric.

seems replaced

Phaedrus'

Socrates

ing

like

or suprahuman

the soul's motion,

ing"

a

true

of

principles"

sub-

express

erotic

lived

well expresses

[our]

at

soul,"

world of

And because the human

phers.

in time to

having

life devoid

world revealed

abstract propositions and arguments cannot match

us

the

regardless of reductionist materialism, and also

and

expresses our recognition of who we means of

for

rational

a

myth of

of a mind that exists

'punishment'

think what is eternal"; "the

The

steps

Phaedrus into listen speeches"

(p. 158).

leading

the

(p.

160)

an

soul

through

The techne

and nonlover.

intellectual

of

pro

that operates on complexes of

of division and collection as a means to some end. A techne is teachable. However, rhetoric is not only a techne. Philosophic dialogue, "the perfection of is "not equivalent to technical (pp. 160-61). This may be seen in the myth of the cicadas who report to the Muses on the discourse"

rhetoric,"

Socrates relates this myth day. For Phaedrus "pure pleasure is

songs and speeches of men.

point of the

listening of

to

"painful

at

high noon, the

mid

freedom,"

beautiful speeches; he has labor"

no sense of

the benefits

the easy,

sleepy

of wakefulness,

(p. 165). The myth warns Phaedrus "about the drugged the cicadas were so enamored of speeches they forgot to eat and died and also "turns our attention from the political goal of Muses" the cultivation of honor among men to that of pleasing the (p. 165). Without the self-consciousness dialogue can bring, the soul degenerates into a whirring cicada; sufficiently disunited, the human soul can become subhuman.

dangers

philosophic

mind"

of a

243

Book Reviews

This vulnerability is exploited by the wrongful use of value-free rhetorical tech nique. "Regardless of what the crowd is persuaded of, someone who rides a (p. 169), as donkey instead of a horse into battle is going to pay a heavy price"

is the

that mistakes evil

soul

if he is himself to

truth

as much as

possible

himself (p.

172)

is the best form a philosopher

avoid

"[T]he

good.

being

deceived"

his

with

questioning.

of rhetoric

for

Better

"depend

to see

(p.

opinion,

must

(p. 176). "Opinion

(p. 176). Analytical technique

even

dividing

and

does talk be "re

philosophizing"

on

unravels

its

them and imposes an order; and

with

questions

(p. 176). Mental

means of

see what

it is

we wish to

say

or

when

the analysis is finished

alone

does

between intuition

distinguishing

Dialogue

a cicada.

"it is dangerous for

as

although a philosopher

of

the capacity to how to analyze it, and to see

of

purposes,

173),

pleted"

lem

disagreement for

only"

intuitions unreflectively; techne grapples dialegesthai forces reflection on them by operations

gadfly than

the technician's collecting

of

into the dialectic

avoid self-deception

a climate of

a

a philosopher's

to talk to himself

know the

artful rhetorician must

(p. 170). To

the philosopher "creates

to himself. The results absorbed

for

of

"resolve the

not

Beings

intuition

and

analyze,

and com

critical prob

governed

by

if the techne is helpful in training the mind to make some steps in (p. 176). Analytical technique cannot "grasp the whole of

problem"

solving the (p. 185); it misses the soul, it misses life (p. 181). The art of rhetoric, including dialectic, "is an episteme nature"

tragedy"

arts of

and

medicine, music,

have their techniques that

the

must

composition of

judgment,"

be

guided

experience"

(p. 187).

by

perfected

only

there are

no rules

dence. A

similar observation

telling

you

by "sound Learning the

understand

nature contains parts that can

how

for

action and

counts

is the

for

being

be

acted upon

supposes

is

acted upon as a

of certain rhetori

that "in matters concerning the good and the just pithanos), not

is

(p. 196). But how

know

the

rhetorician

what

is

true"

(p.

what

196) because

a

that is needed to persuade the many

seductive presentation of the probable will

"can be

thing, but

analyzed with respect

to teleology. Under the influence

(eikos,

probable

one

(pp. 191-92). But to

a complex natural phenomenon acts and

whole one needs recourse

cians, Phaedrus

which

is

rules

arts

sequence of actions and reactions of single

monads,"

to their capacity

to the

how to apply the rules. For that you need pru should be made with respect to the study of na

ture. As "the orderly and intelligible and clustered

comparable

(p. 187). All the

all

what

he

manipulates

if he does

not

"successful'

know the truth cians

of

don't know

the

matter?

what

bother persuading indispensable. Rhetoric

they're

(p. 199). Once again,

or

education, etymologically

does

conceding that many "to what end about

talking

the

human

leading leading of

or

a sort of

self-knowledge

souls with words

drawing

not much

giving the

appearance

is

Writing of a finality it

as

fixed does

as an

not

becomes

leads itself to

out.

conspicuous technique of rhetoric and of education

like it.

ought the rhetori

others?"

cian

One

Or

rhetori

Idea but

really have

is

writing.

not and

nearly

Socrates so

nourishing

true, dog-

244

Interpretation instead

matism

of questioning.

unthoughtful, ignorant the realm of what

his

of

seems

rather

knowledge because "it does book"

a

(p. 208).

soul should

Writing

and

how to

make

it

No

able to

try

logues

can

can a

(p. 223). To ence

their

it;

the

more

good

quest on

everyone

into

soul.

with

The human

the soul to

imagine it

what soul

to

pick

judgment in writing for

an

Socratic

rather

than tell can

to

order

"Recognizing

one searches out oneself

philosophers"

that philosophy

be learned only

by

is

return

for that the

insight

that the unexamined

(p. 241).

to the

life is

search, of

methods"

one must experi

experience.

reader

a

the practice

phronesis rather than rule-governed

provide opportunities

in

desir

More important, Plato's dia into

transform them

the activity of coming to an

as written

or

(p. 221). His dialogues

us"

something like

understand

it "possible

philosopher"

a

(p. 223). "Dialectic

dialogues

self-

live dialogue

"knows

than Socrates does he believe

potential philosophers and

authority (p. 225).

discourse"

who

impede

him!

(p. 222). The dialogues "show questioning a it; it depends

reading dialectician his

a

writing in the

philosophers and nonphilosophers.

"locate

in

engage

They

the written dialogue enables him to refute the

to transform

both to

speak

to

encourages

exercise

of

critique of writing.

How

are sophists,

(p. 206).

of

on a page replaces much

forgetful, "dwelling in

becomes mentally lazy,

truth"

than

dialectical"

audience that will select

Plato's mastery

reader

ignorance. Books

not seem possible

love wisdom; too

now possesses wisdom.

The

own

They

life

"recant

of ensouled

not worth

living,

Mary

P.

Nichols, Citizens

Statesmen: A

Study of & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), ix

age, MD: Rowman

and

Aristotle'

s

Politics (Sav

+ 233 pp., $19.95.

Leslie G. Rubin

Society for

Mary

Greek Political Thought

Nichols has

istotle's Politics such an

sound, and

I believe

tion

book

defining

shows

and

defending

a correct

how this issue

appears

despotic in

Strange

common.

one, is that the Politics is or

politics.

Nichols'

political

thorough interpreta

rule.

various

to define

forms throughout the

ingly

short of

I

even

the so-called ideal or

perfection, though

confess

exposition

Already

statesman, Nichols

concepts of citizen and

that I

and argument

convinced that

class

polity injustice of

against

or

which

Aristotle

both

kingship

for

regime of

in the way it is

not

to this book

came

best

rule of a

came

with a

tyranny

aristocracy to the

away from this encounter with deeper insight into the character

the face

of

of

Ar

convinc

VIII falls

sometimes criticized.

to defend and

political

life

and

the

middle-

the paternalism and political

extent possible

Nichols'

I

and

one or

expecting the clarity and distinctness of Professor Nichols is justly well known.

means

conventional

Books VII

of

thoroughgoing

demonstrate

can

not

work

the injustice

suggest

tyrant, but also in the places where he calls into question the rule of the few virtuous over those inferior in virtue. Through careful development that

Ar

primary premise,

an attempt

only in the more obvious places where Aristotle may the institution of slavery, for instance, or criticize the

istotle's

of

it may

as

Nichols'

interpretation is far from

distinct from tyrannical

rule as

interpretation

written a concise yet comprehensive

as a

keen

in

imperfect world,

an

observations and analysis

and seriousness of

this

defense

even

in

the alternative of the private contemplative life.

Professor Nichols sensitively incorporates the insights of ship while carefully distinguishing her argument from most schools of thought on

Politics, for

Aristotle. She

establishes not an

previous scholar

of

entirely

the prominent

new view of

the

is probably both unnecessary and impossible, but a refreshing book that "everyone as a collection of insightful notes on a that

knows"

angle on a

wide range of political

The

argument of

a novel.

and

of

"characters"

in Politics I through III, develops their through the complexities of Aristotle's advice to existing re

an analysis of

regime of

few take seriously as a coherent text. Statesmen develops very much like the plot

and

in Books IV through VI,

through

i

Citizens

Nichols finds the

various quirks gimes

issues,

Books VII

brings the story to

the place of philosophy and the

and


and

VIII.

1993-94, Vol. 21, No. 2

an

unsettling

conclusion

status of politics

in the

246

Interpretation

By

"characters,"

the

I

the

mean

duced in the early books. The organizing sity versus human deliberation and choice,

body

the

double

beginning

created

tuted

both

in

interestingly, Nichols

and

some sense

without

it

and

the soul, the many versus the

versus

the city. Most

versus

dualities Nichols discovers intro principle of these dualities is neces

crucial

appears

one

sees

this

natural

necessity, but

best man,

cannot

they

According

to Book

II,

actually be insti

city's

beginning

thought not only to the physical necessities, but to the purpose of

some

(Of course, the thoughtful founders totle discusses have been wrong as to the ends proposals would

of

actually have been destructive

the

their

polis

of political

is

given

human

and philosophers whom

community.

in the

cities are

founders have

the best

e.g.,

the village

and

evident also

duality

the deliberate action of a human founder. The

natural and artificial.

guises:

As Book I argues,

the double end of the city.

by

in many

Aris

simplistic

but

community

the Politics is meant to show that a theoretical yet practical approach can rem

edy those flaws.) Therefore, although the city's initial end, perpetuating mere life, is dictated by necessity, it continues to exist for the sake of the choicewor

thy, the good life. It is in the pursuit of the latter end without importance of the former that Aristotle hopes to be helpful. The creates

between the necessary the arena in which politics, the

byplay

when one or

only individual

the

or multitude

philosophic purist

the

other side of

denies the

denies the

and

primary protagonist, dichotomy is denied, when

soul

for the

despotism becomes the only the duality appears in the form of

sake of

sake of

the

the

-soul,

When

that

ishes,

citizens and statesmen.

are not one

possessing

sided, but

a soul and

the

mixed:

statesmen

acknowledging the importance

of

the citizens are the

properly

It is

or when a

political

political

alternative.

ries

works.

a tyrannical

body

stifled and

the

human life

chosen aspects of

story's

for the

body

the

ignoring

life is

life flour

These

catego

ordered

body

the prudently deliberative soul of the city

body. Each takes

cognizance of

the

other's

strengths and contributions.

On the way to a conclusion many may find startling, that Aristotle does not the isolated contemplative life as superior to a thoughtful life that includes

view

in

participation

Book I's

life is view

political

observation

not

a

trail, beginning with life. The best human

long

is necessary to the good The best ruler, we learn in Book III, does not wholly distinct from every other inhabitant of his

that the city

isolated but

himself

controversy, Nichols lays

communal.

as above and

Rather, the city is an amalgamation of the many and the one neither can exist or perfect itself without the other. Hence, the analysis of citizenship and city.

the defense

basileia, political

of

the many, followed

the situation in

friendship

which

the

and political virtues of

With due moderation, Nichols of

by a king

critique of overall

is the only the

argues that

the virtues and political capacities

of

though not without qualification. There is

rest of

or

pam-

citizen and the potential

the kingdom are ignored.

Aristotle's

controversial

the many is to a potential

kingship

defense

be taken seriously, for bestial qualities to be

Book Reviews

247

fostered in the multitude, particularly by those demagogues and extreme demo crats who offer freedom based only on its lowest definition, to do as one likes, rally the multitude by appealing to brute strength. Nichols teases out Aristotle's and who

human

unlimited)

office or acts

juries

limits

if

as

(or

the

nor

political ruler.

are

at

life.

are

will,

immortal. These limits

to exceed these limits

requiring both provide,

healthy

demagogues

Nichols'

to

try

holds

and zealous

(indefinite

life

ruled

with not

acting in Aristotle's definition

in

beings

turn."

Those

are political

which

action,

a

achieve, there

can

beginning

are summarized

fallibility

or

kingship, is

an overall

what political

themselves,

collective

sense of

to the

the many who populate demo

"ruling and being deny that human

for

opportunities

and a

neither

there limits to

of politics as

According

no one who claims perpetual

political actors must set upon

one were

which

wholly

one virtuous citizen who

Not only

delimitation)

not

superiority in numbers and for the higher,

contributions most people can make to political

citizenship discussion (III, 1-4), cratic

their

counterarguments

the

who

try

animals,

does

pambasileia

to restrain them from excess,

democrats discourage.

subtlety of interpretation is well exemplified in laying out the "user for the capacities and judgment of the multitude. On the one hand,

argument"

she

acknowledges,

judges

with

Aristotle,

that those

live in

who

house

a

can

be better

its excellence than any architect, at least as to its practical qualities. If is like architecture, then every political animal may have the wisdom to judge his political rulers and their actions. On the other hand, she distinguishes, of

politics

with

Aristotle,

judge the

of

house, but

into

the household

manager

from

all

the

inhabitants

other

the house's practical qualities: the one whose task

account

to organize life

for the benefit

the needs of the diverse

is the best judge

of all

the rest,

members as well as

the house's excellence. Even

is

if

the

not

as the

and who must good of

has

best

only to live in take

the whole,

capacity to judge and his contribution must be taken into account, each may not be equally contributions. Without overstating capable of coordinating all the of

each

some

members'

Aristotle's

view of

the

potential virtue of

the ordinary citizen,

Nichols'

inter

pretation shows the existence of such potential and the need of the statesman to

foster it. In Books IV through VI, these principles are developed in the course of recommending some form of polity, or political rule strictly speaking, to every only to democracies and oligarchies of which it is a mixture, but to tyrannies as well. The polity favors neither virtue nor material wealth, neither numbers nor strength, but mixes all of these principles into its

imperfect

laws

regime

not

institutions. Insofar

it

type of virtue, according to preserves both sides of the but it type, body/soul duality in treating military virtue as both necessary and noble. Ac cording to the longer discussion of polity in Book IV, this regime emphasizes a and

Book Ill's definition it is

as

emphasizes one

the military

Nichols boils down to moderation, the sort of all sides their due and leads to friendship across

cluster of virtues that

moderation

in

class

action that gives

lines.

248

Interpretation

Though

at

times it seems that Aristotle's highest

for the

praise

middle-class

its stability, Nichols rightly sees that this stability is not mere polity repression, but derives from the regime's justice to the various parts of the city, especially to the rich and the poor, but also to the politically ambitious (pp. refers

to

119-20).

The

statesmen who exercise

dently

moderate and

vastly

know

They

ground.

interdependent, well as

moderately

and relearn

to the citizens

superior

According

should rotate

they

rule.

they

Rather, bodies,

former

to

independent

the

material

From

basileia,

necessities, as

forethought

and

follows the defense

argument

and

ruled

of

in turn, in many

that political

offices

rulers'

citizens, but also that the human

various

of or

citizens and statesmen are

rule, i.e., ruling being Nichols, taking turns implies not only

authority

the necessities of nature and the contingencies of human ac

sometimes nature

power of

From this

need.

back

class

middling

are not

the

political

among

shared with

tion

constantly that

the cooperation the latter need, the latter supplying the

the naturalness of

is

prudent products of a

the former supplying the

public-spiritedness the

forms.

the greatest authority in the polity are the pru

rules,

sometimes

the demands of the populace limit the

the statesman (pp. 121-23).

considerations, Nichols defends her

such

the human

ruler who sees

merely human law, but contemplative

a

law

philosopher,

monly observed, if olent-but-absolute

all

unto

lacking

himself

king

among men,

himself, is, however in

human beings

are

by treating

similar

crucial self-knowledge.

by

unjustly denies his

their political capacities

as a god

that the

argument

nature political

subjects the

pam-

subject to no

to the godlike

As is

more com

animals, the benev

opportunity to

develop

them as perpetual children. Nichols fo-

cusses upon an even more serious charge:

the

pambasileia

does

not even under

worth and capacities. Describing himself as a lion among "where are their claws and teeth?" demonstrates the absolute asking king's failure to see both his own physical vulnerability after all the multitude

stand

his

own

hares

do have claws, in some sense and his of his contributions to defense

need

for

subjects'

and other

public support

in the form

necessary functions

the

of

kingdom.

Having

disposed

of

the pambasileia, Nichols sets to work

on

the

rulers of

the best regime described in Politics VII and VIII. She treats these books as extended examination of

is the best life for

the

questions raised

individual

in the first

chapters of

VII

an

what

for a city? Unlike many interpreters of assuming that Aristotle advocates the apo litical philosophic life as simply the best for an individual, so that when Aris totle shows that isolation is not necessarily the best life for a city, his argument produces no obvious dissonances. The purely contemplative philosopher, the an

these passages, she carefully

pambasileia, and the tyrant choice

and

avoids

all avoid political

life,

the

life

of

deliberation

and

among people who respect each other's freedom and capacity for action. Aristotle grants that the happy life is the life of theoretical activity, but it must

249

Book Reviews include lead

political

theory. The best regime, if it is to

thoughtful

a

and political

Athenian Stranger

of

life. Aristotle, like

Laws,

the

can

identify

parallel

best life,

this

must

thoughtful man, the

another

the physical and

educational re

isolated and attentive to its internal per purely virtuous city fection. He does not, however, adopt all of these characteristics as the require ments of his own best city. Aristotle's city tries to confront rather than avoid political problems, such as the dilemmas of international relations. This attempt

quirements of a

be political is precisely the regime's strength, according to Nichols. The isolated way of life is not a regime or political order, strictly speaking: it does not engage in ruling and being ruled. It does not allow itself the challenges of

to

life,

social

in

that

so

attains a virtue that

tue,

is

not

one must practice

they may be Justice

must

create a

cities,

important

an

fully

sense it takes the easy way to virtue, but human. To demonstrate human individual vir

justice toward

humans, however

other

uncooperative

however difficult it may be to determine the perfectly just act. also be a constituent of a city's virtue, which means the city must

and

just relationship,

treading

always

only with the individuals within it, but with other thin, but perceptible, line between submission and

not

a

despotic hegemony. With thin lines that must

regard

be traced

by

to

issues, Nichols

various

points to analogous

the good statesman.

Despite its practically hopeful signs, this line of argument culminates in critique of the city built in Books VII and VIII. In this part of the

Nichols'

Politics the

necessity/choice

the requirements and

Nichols

for the

duality

in the form

appears

regime's survival

Aristotle's

sees some of

farmers be

enslaved and the

multitude who man the warships

that

the

regime as

'best'

aspirations

ironic"

best

defense

for excellence, If the education that a large

regime require

of

the city

that the

requires

then "Aristotle's

be enslaved,

is surely

the conflict between

choices as unsatisfactory.

and perfection of the virtue of the citizens of the population of

its

and

of

designation

(p. 145). Nichols identifies

of

a reason

merely a practical problem but a fatal flaw in the regime that aims primarily for virtue in its citizens: the need for slaves demon strates the lack of self-knowledge in the only regime Aristotle associates, how that

unnatural

ever

loosely,

slaves shows

make

the

slavery is

with philosophy.

that the

the

slavers also suffer the of slaves

would

terms to have

demonstrably out external

a

the

citizens are

inhabitants. The

decay

is baser than the

Although I

to

whole classes of

circumstances which

If the ruling class's excellence forced into a despotic relationship

their virtue impossible.

leisure,

subordinate

The necessity for employing

citizens themselves are enslaved

perfection of

requires complete with

not

of

their virtue.

rule of

argue,

enslaved

free

contra

men

Nichols,

just slavery relationship

suffer

injustice, but

on

that an

it is

possible on

individual

superior master and a servant who cannot care

direction, I

agree with

such relationships on a wholesale

the en

As Aristotle clearly argues, the (Politics, 1.7, III. 4).

her that

no

level. The

just

level,

Aristotle's between

for himself

I

would

a

with

rely on draw is not

political order can

conclusion

rule

250

Interpretation

that this regime is not the best regime, but that also excludes

strict sense

he is articulating

much as

The term

way

VIII is

and

tyranny of

an

apolitical order.

necessity that condemns the best

political

production of virtuous citizens.

this

way

It is

mixture of motives

the

regime's

heart in

in the founder's

involvement

with

i.e., human,

political,

and choice amid

existence of various

lence. Such involvement is edge, but the that the

do

a novel and

for the

understand either

is the

nurturing

their own

impossibility

by

nature and

is

middle class

that it grants

proving

the

weakness or

much more

by

the

ground of a city's excel

acquisition of self-knowl

this regime on despotic arrangements proves

they do

The sticking justice while

individual

excellence as

strengths.

demands

not

of political

their

the

of

broad

not a

sake of

life through

not achieve a crucial aspect of self-knowledge

virtue on a

intrigu

struggles of careful

subjects'

point

high-minded

philosophic

The

problems.

with

for the

rulers'

essential to

ultimate reliance of

rulers

politeia"

compromise

integrity

so

justice.

choices represents

the complexities created

types of people are the

ironic,

can construct

mixture of

necessary but distasteful compromise of philosophical political order, but an improvement upon the purely

deliberation

its

not

Aristotle

not

political

"the best

and

order,

Nichols defends the

ethics and practical considerations at

ing

order

for

not strive

a political

in the

not a regime

kingship. Aristotle is

and

life that does

(regime) implies

politeia

Books VII

of

a

it is

rather that

satisfying As Nichols shows, the polity based on the suitable to achieving political justice. I would add scale.

freedom to

more people more

achieve

well.

Throughout the

book, Nichols

points

to moments in the Politics at which

Aristotle is clearly exercising deliberation and choice, acting the statesman, insofar as he can do so, by weighing the practicability and desirability, the

justice, of Aristotle, in other

recommending some over he brings his he preaches

advantage and

various alternatives and

others.

words, practices what

bear

philosophic speculations to

upon actual

cess contributes to the good of communities

to his advice) and to

beings

These

veins of

Nichols'

own self-knowledge and

that

of

his

in the

who might

students as

pro

listen

human

necessary

view

that

Aristotle, like Plato, views political life, however tragically flawed, doomed to injustice

to a good human existence, as

permanent of

Aristotle's statesmanship flow into a conclusion at the heart statesman can be a tragedian. Nichols takes on admi

book. No true

rably the tempting

threats

problems and

and citizens.

of

or

his

human

(at least to those

instability. Although

both injustice

she

takes

instability, Nichols

and

due

account

shows

of

the

perennial

that Aristotle sees a real

ground, a habitable area in which statesmen and free citizens work together to maintain justice and stability (pp. 42, 81-84, 110-14, 143-44). middle

That

ground

regime

is

more

likely

to appear and be

mixing the principles

citizens of

middling fortune

of

fertile, if

you

will,

the most common regimes and

and

middling

in

a

calling

polity, a upon

virtue to take the greatest

the

respon-

25 1

Book Reviews sibility for its

cultivation.

If the human

sensible nor useful to overemphasize an

eminently

life is

which political

does

He

sensible man.

not make

those

prone

is

by

nature

potential

enumerates and

but,

pitfalls

being

seem

choices people can make to alleviate

fail,

to

neither

Aristotle is

and

describes in detail the

pitfalls

to

Plato's Socrates, he ubiquitous. Rather, Aristotle stresses the the dangers and strive for improvement by

Nichols shows,

as

political, it is

politics'

unlike

moving toward the practicable and just political regime, the polity. Given hardnosed attitude toward tyranny in any form, I Nichols'

prised

to

be

by a

her

argument

that a tyrant can

be

statesman, pretending to have

by

reformed

the habit

he does

virtues

not

of

have

was sur

pretending and

is

not

interested in acquiring (pp. 108-10). The Nichomachean Ethics does stress the importance of habit to the development of virtue but, though it is plausible that the tyrant becomes less

ing

his power,

He has, would

after

of a

tyrant

by following

all,

received a

merely be going through the motions of life, but simply to hold predominance

good

the good

Leaving Statesmen

this subordinate point aside,

an example of

Aristotle's Politics, consistency and depth

manlike attention to the

be

advice on preserv

deeds

of

however,

book demonstrates

theoretical argument

thorny dilemmas

not

for the

sake of

over a whole people.

we

have in Citizens

the practice of political/theoretical

Nichols'

of

not

Aristotle's

him to become positively a virtuous man. flawed training in virtue during his youth and

we should not expect

a

on

of political

virtue.

and

In imitation

judicious balance between the one

life

on

attained without the author's practice of excellence

hand

the

in

and

other

states

that could

political

thought.

Daniel J. Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), xiv + 187 pp.,

Introduction

$14.95. John S. Waggoner The American

Mahoney'

Daniel J.

It is

The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron has acclaim from diverse reviewers in the United States and Eu s

met with critical rope.

brilliant

a

of Paris

University

analysis of

"one

important thinkers

the most

of

and partici

observers"

in this century and deserves a wide audience. is forthright in acknowledging his deep sympathy for Raymond

pant

Mahoney Aron but

stresses that

it is born

his thought. His first

on

sustained

Aron

contact with

As

and

field

of

study in

which

"critical

and

came as an

a graduate

medi

undergraduate,

and

always remained

works works

Aron is very

the

student, his study of Aron "exciting,"

deepened. But Aron's

to the usual menu of academic

contrast

the

and

study"

"a

strong."

"instant

attraction was

broadened

of

in

found in international relations,

often pigeonholed.

Mahoney generally found the literature of international relations "strangely that en largely disconnected from the "burning issues of the day"

apolitical,"

gage

thoughtful citizens and statesmen (and appeal to university students of

finer instincts

insufficiently

and

better

informed

character of political

by

capacities).

Such literature is

historical knowledge, any

regimes,

or

any

more often than not

deep

appreciation

serious confrontation with

for the

the great

politi

works

largely

cal thinkers.

Aron's

writings

contributed to nated

"suffered

the weakening

the intellectual life

1970's

kept

and

alive

a

sounded the trumpet that

laid the

groundwork

was one of

tury. But

for "a

the

he

most

of

none of of

these

the "Hegelio-Marxist

the European continent

tradition

blew down the

gauchist

trenchant commentators

science"

that can

ing a humane understanding Mahoney insists that Aron

help

embodied


from the 1930's to the

Jericho,

...

it

was

Aron

Mahoney on

writes.

the tragic events

rank who

provide

laid the

"guidance in

of

who

Aron

this cen

groundwork reconstruct

phenomena."

of social and political

was not a narrow or soulless specialist.

distinctions. He

that domi

assault,"

theoretician of the first

genuine political

His

consensus"

humane liberalism. "If Solzhenitsyn

of

for the final triumphant

was also a

deficiencies."

the

His

works transcend academic

ancient perspective of

1993-94, Vol. 21, No. 2

the

political scientist as

the

Interpretation

254

rational architectonic analyst, evaluator, and guide of

simultaneously

historian,

an

international

politics and theoretician of

As

a

Final Note to Mahoney's text

Contemporaneity"

history"

p.

life. He

at the

"Permanent

"dawn

irreducible tensions

the

was

x)

a thinker of

face

choices we

point of view of

political

student of comparative

(Preface,

indicates, Aron is

illuminate the

that can

from the

versal

relations.

human

theorist,

philosopher, political

or

of uni

"antin

that characterize political life.

omies"

Mahoney's Critical Introduction to the

divided into

six chapters.

Chapter 1

the thought of Max Weber. the

towering figure

Weber

and was

But Aron thought

debase

Mahoney

century.

to

Contrary

the

understanding

to

Max

Weber

would

degrade

for the

of

if the fact that

values are

be

built

sciences remain unintelligible without

totalitarianisms, for example, cannot dimension. Moreover, if we begin by denying

man, we end

the limitations of

involves

conflict and painful

negative

consequences.

tradeoffs,

Indeed,

the

by

undermining any incentive for

The future is opaque, choice it can bring forth unanticipated

reason.

and

the limits of reason is a

recognition of

itself. But it does

requirement of reason

that there can

important truths.

most

acknowledges

argued

of modern

appreciated outside of a moral

the possibility of a science

Aron

a student of

historical determinism.

of

Weber, Aron

of social phenomena

judgements. The reality

search

influence

that the unchallenged

into facts is denied. Facts in the human

the

critique of

the whole field

political practice.

gods."

be

himself

Aron as challenging Weber on two fundamental grounds he drew between facts and values and his doctrine of the "inex

piable conflict of

value

cast across

considered

his

relationship to and it is

sociology,

sees

the distinction

no genuine

is

Raymond Aron is

complex

practiced

whose shadow

Aron

attracted

particularly

also sensed

and

Aron's

analyzes

Academically, Aron

Max Weber

of

in this

science

of social

political science of

not entail

the

adoption of nihilism or

irrationalism, in

the manner of Nietzsche or Weber. The

mains scientific

"not

by

a

humanly

impossible

and

social

theoretically

scientist re

undesirable

phenomena.

neutrality but through fair description and evaluation of social a balanced analysis of social phenomena, the responsible social mediate

social

Weberian

conflict

social science

Chapters 2

and

detailed textual

3

the

core

scientist can

moderation

that

the "heart of the

study"

and

together provide a

Aron's 1960 essay "The Dawn of Universal His the Aronian corpus, according to Mahoney. A careful

analysis of

text of

essay introduces the Aron's work. Herein is

examination of this

throughout

bring

to politics the necessary

discounts.

represent

tory,"

Marxist

and

In

all of

reader

and existentialist understandings of

a

to the themes that resonate

"self-conscious

freedom

response

to both

necessity."

and

Following

Aron's essay, Mahoney powerfully reveals in successive chapters the two foci of the Aronian perspective. On the one hand, Aron sees and articulates the

255

Book Reviews undeniably crucial influence of modernity fairs what makes this century essentially the political

The two foci time

in

regime

helping

merge when

they

in his understanding

as

beginning richness. "new

He

also

landscape the ultimately determinative importance

political

and

society on human af discerns in this new

and scientific unique.

of

this century

According

to

of

to shape the events of our time.

turn to the historical interpretation

the

"Thirty

Years'

War"

of our

that dominated the

present a picture of unrivalled

Aron,

to

of political choice

power, clarity

the events of this

and

the century ultimately brought about by the forces of reveal

process"

and

revolutionary

science, technology,

its drama

character of

and

usual,"

industry

and

tragic choices,

the

and

rival ideas

individuals, in

and

"history

persistence of

as

the perennial human

context of conflict and war.

Contrary

to historical

least partially "free

open.

always at

is

determinists,

is did

what

not

have

sarily

reflecting

remain unredeemed

"drama"

and

might

he is

of whom

be

liberty"

by

reason.

changed

in

a self-proclaimed

human freedom the

in

space

be. The future is

But contrary to the existentialists,

construction,"

not a

to

a commitment

modern

which

which neces

relative weight of

times, Aron

day

"values"

"process"

While the

"latter

to

"situation"

our

agrees with

descendant,"

to act. The task is to

Tocqueville,

history

that

use such

leaves to

"margins

of

responsibly and reasonably. Aron articulates a "probabilistic philoso (determinisme aleatoire) that frees modern man from the hold

history"

phy of

of

debilitating Aron's

uation of which

fatalism

as well as

from

mindless

fanaticism.

science, like Tocqueville's before him, is an equitable eval the fundamental choices that man faces politically in the century in political

he finds himself. Clearly, the critical choice which Aron and his genera was the choice between the liberal politics of Western democracies

tion

faced

and

ideocratic

totalitarianism. This

century

witnessed

the

rise

of a new

form

of

despotism, more ambitious in its goals and more violent in its means than the tutelary despotism imagined by Tocqueville. It was Raymond Aron who first coined the phrase

In Chapter 4, poses

this

"secular

entitled

century's

religion"

to describe this wholly new Freedom,"

"The Liberal Definition

historic

strengths and weaknesses of

alternatives

the liberal

of

Aron's

with order.

phenomenon.

Mahoney juxta

reflections on

both the

At the time Aron wrote, the

foregone conclusion, and the totalitarian temptation continued Western intellectuals long after it had been repudiated by those living

choice was not a

to

attract

through the

experience of such regimes.

In the Opium of the Intellectuals, Aron defends prudential political judge or "lit ment, based on empirical sociological investigation, from the perspective. Here Mahoney deserves extended citation (in part, to better "abstract"

erary"

appreciate

The

the

leading

power and

lights

from youth, Sartre

of

lucidity

of

his

prose).

European intelligence,

including

Aron's

philosopher-friends "left,"

and

Merleau-Ponty,

appealed

to

abstractions such as

the

256

Interpretation

the

"revolution"

the

and

which could

only be

European society

"proletariat"

of our

"socialism"

theory

by

political

but judged

socialist practice

by

societies

philosophy of history Marxist-Leninist regimes, this

literary

approach condemned

relatively decent

real alternative to the

constitutional pluralistic

socialist practices.

fessor,

by

political

Among

liberty

in the liberal He further

sides with

fine treatment

a

and others.

and

Tocqueville

by

"due

In the

of

manner of

process"

that anchor

Marx in "On the Jewish

by

Marx in recognizing the

against

to the working class in bourgeois de like Constant than Tocqueville in de-emphasizing

and opportunities available

But he is

mocracies.

importance

the

the times.

the critique

order against

friends, he

the typical university pro

liberties"

the "formal

13)

their approach to politics caused them

Marx, Tocqueville,

to

complex relation

prosperity

in

questions of

Tocqueville, Aron defends Question."

including

analysts,

things, Chapter 4 is distinguished

other

(P

the posture of his youthful

by

to be empirical

truly important

to miss the

Aron's

specifying that the regimes of the West was

was alarmed and appalled

whose attempts

facing the

a semi-mythical

constitutional regimes without

was also exasperated

by

or

with a

If Aron

economy

of the choices

penetrating investigation of its practice. Together which was used to justify heinous practices of

detailed

a

investigation

time. Intellectuals often judged Western

abstract criteria of and not

to judge concrete issues of

addressed through empirical

more

of political participation and

emphasizing

private over public liberties"

liberties. Aron, however, accepts the Marxist claim that "real As distinguished from Friedrich Hayek, and in a spirit entirely free

trinaire, he came to the "pristine

liberalism"

ernment

transform "prey"

of

of a

machinery to

"Promethian"

never

knowledge for Aron in his was one of

In Chapter 5, tional

Aron

relations. criticized

Mahoney

the

ideologies,

that

deny

human

spirit of

the

as a means

to

the Marxist state was a

of

stalking."

Yet Marx

represented a

fund

and

he

claimed

theory

of

interna

modernity,

Aron's writing

on

the

for

largely ignoring

the differences between

not

to mention the role of powerful

the pressure of minority groups on the

and

policy.

He

was

possibilities,"

with

recommended a

denies

the

Power"

authors."

examines

tional politics to standards that

politics that

in

their elaborate gov

part accepts

"empower

to

often characterized as a partisan of power politics,

foreign

that confuses "hopes

He

need to

and

doc

Contrary

welfare state.

Montesquieu

effort to conceptualize

realist school

uals, political parties, public opinion and

tired

"his favorite

Although

political regimes and

espouse.

or a

the

The ideocratic totalitarianism

that Aron said "he

that Marx

Locke

of

hedge in power, Aron in

Marx in recognizing the

society.

form

support a moderate

matter. of the

diversity

and

the Is with the

effectively

morality

our common

equally

critical of

undermine

of prudence

the

individ

formation

idealist

of

school

Ought, holding interna the ultimate goals they

that rejected both the power

humanity as well as the cosmopolitan doctrines inevitably conflictual character of interna

the

tional relations. He thought it necessary to remain

within

the horizon

of

the

257

Book Reviews it from the "geometric

statesman and to protect

(realist)"

and the

"literary

(ide

alist)"

distort international

approaches that

As

a responsible counselor

to

affairs and undermine

individuals in

it

public authority,

its

was

practice.

his

task to

them (in a phrase borrowed from Tocqueville) see "not differently but further than the Chapter 6 of Mahoney's study concludes the preceding with an outline of Aron's liberal political science, and an appendatory chapter fixes the latter in

help

parties."

the political

relation to

Mahoney's to

ability from the

science of

distill

Aristotle.

lie in his

strengths

range and versatility.

the

and comment upon

whole

essentials of

He demonstrates his

Aronian thought,

gathered

Aronian corpus, as well as his capacity as an exegete says he appreciated Aron as a political theorist for

Aronian texts. He

key having of

His commentary on this confronta tion illumines the thought of Aron, of course, but it also sheds valuable light on such figures as Comte, Weber, Constant, Montesquieu, Sartre, Tocqueville, confronted

and

others,

Aron

and

the great thinkers of

who stand

in

Aristotle that

assess the whole

modernity.

comparison. concludes

Aronian

This holds true for the fine discussion

Mahoney's study

enterprise against the

and which allows

backdrop

of

the West's

tradition of political science. Unlike that of many academic studies, prose

is strong

and crisp.

of

him to oldest

Mahoney's

His commentary is often punctuated with an epigram important point while provoking further

matic statement that summarizes an

thought

and rumination.

Mahoney honey's Aron

often speaks of

obvious

Aron's

affinity for the

speaks well of

"affinity"

"thought,"

for

one

thinker

"spirit,"

or another.

"voice"

and

of

Ma

Raymond

the author of The Liberal Political Science of Raymond

Aron. As Aron's texts

does Mahoney's study

always remained

remain

for the

"exciting"

reader.

for Daniel Mahoney,

so

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Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 21-2 (Winter 1993-94)

Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy vol 4-1

Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy vol 3, 2-3

Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 33 1 (Fall Winter 2005)

Winter Journal

Winter Journal

Critical Journal of Philosophy

A Philosophy of Political Myth

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 126, No. 4 (Winter 2007)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 120, No. 4 (Winter 2001)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 124, No. 4 (Winter 2005)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 129, No. 4 (Winter 2010)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 127, No. 4 (Winter 2008)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 121, No. 4 (Winter 2002)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 125, No. 4 (Winter 2006)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 123, No. 4 (Winter 2004)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 128, No. 4 (Winter 2009)

Political Philosophy (Dimensions of Philosophy)

Political Philosophy (Dimensions of Philosophy)

Socratic Rationalism and Political Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato's Phaedo

History of Political Philosophy

Problems of Political Philosophy

History of Political Philosophy

History of Political Philosophy

212: A Novel

Journal of Biblical Literature Winter 2011

2005 (212)

Political Philosophy

Political philosophy

Political Philosophy

Interpretation. A Journal of Bible and Theology. July 2010

Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 21-2 (Winter 1993-94)

Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy vol 4-1

Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy vol 3, 2-3

Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 33 1 (Fall Winter 2005)

Winter Journal

Winter Journal

Critical Journal of Philosophy

A Philosophy of Political Myth

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 126, No. 4 (Winter 2007)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 120, No. 4 (Winter 2001)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 124, No. 4 (Winter 2005)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 129, No. 4 (Winter 2010)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 127, No. 4 (Winter 2008)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 121, No. 4 (Winter 2002)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 125, No. 4 (Winter 2006)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 123, No. 4 (Winter 2004)

Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 128, No. 4 (Winter 2009)

Political Philosophy (Dimensions of Philosophy)

Political Philosophy (Dimensions of Philosophy)

Socratic Rationalism and Political Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato's Phaedo

History of Political Philosophy

Problems of Political Philosophy

History of Political Philosophy

History of Political Philosophy

212: A Novel

Journal of Biblical Literature Winter 2011

2005 (212)

Political Philosophy

Political philosophy

Political Philosophy

Interpretation. A Journal of Bible and Theology. July 2010

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