International Human Rights in the 21st Century: Protecting the Rights of Groups

International HumanRights in the21stCentury

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International HumanRights in the21stCentury ProtectingtheRightsof Groups Editedby GeneM. Lyonsand

JamesMayall

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, I N C .

Lanham Boulder New York Oxford

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS,INC. Published in theUnitedStatesof America by Rowman& LittlefieldPublishers, Inc. Group A Memberof theRowman& LittlefieldPublishing 4720BostonWay, Lanham,Maryland20706 www.rowmanlittlefield.com

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retrievalsystem,or transmitted in anyformor by anymeans,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, withoutthepriorpermission of the publisher. BritishLibraryCataloguing in Publication InformationAvailable Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data International humanrightsin the21stcentury:protecting therights of groups/ editedby GeneM. LyonsandJamesMayall. p. cm. Includesbibliographical references (p. ) andindex. ISBN 0-7425-2352-7(cloth)- ISBN 0-7425-2353-5(paper) 1. Humanrights. I. Lyons,GeneMartin, 1924- 11. Mayall,James. JC571.I5918 2003 323.14~21 2002011579 Printedin theUnitedStatesof America

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Contents

Preface

vii

List of Acronyms

ix

Part I. From Individualto GroupRights I. StatingtheProblemof GroupRights

GeneM. LyonsandJamesMayall

2. In Defenseof theUniversalDeclaration Model JackDonnelly

3 20

Part 11. The Casefor GroupRights 3. HumanRightsandCulturalPluralism

Jennifer Jackson-Preece

4. Indigenous Rights

49

72

Hurst Hannum

5. Protecting theHumanRightsof Women

Eva Brems

100

Part 111. The Roleof InternationalSociety 6. HumanRightsin Weak,Divided,andThreatened States Marc Weller

141

7. EnforcingHumanRights Nicholas J. Wheeler

169 V

vi

Contents

8. HumanRightsandInternational Politics

JamesMayall and GeneM. Lyons

200

Index

219

AbouttheContributors

225

Preface

This bookhadits originsin a meetingat DartmouthCollegein the fall of 1998to assess thefiftiethanniversary of theUniversalDeclaration of Human Rights.At thetime,we recognized thewidespread significance of thedeclarationandthe subsequent covenants that,together,makeup an international asan intebill of rightsand,mostimportant,havebecomewidelyaccepted gralpartof normativebehaviorin international relations. But we alsorecognizedthatthedeclaration andthe covenants largelyfocuson theprotection of individualrightsandgiveonlyindirectattentionto the rightsof groups, viotheir culture,language, and identity,whichhavebecomeincreasingly lated,especially sincetheendof the ColdWar. In the monthsthatfollowed,we becameconvinced thatthe problemsof grouprightsdeservespecialattention,particularly(but not exclusively) in casesof weakanddividedstateswherehumanrightshavebeenbrutallyviolatedbecause of ethnicor religiousdifferences andwherethepositionof womenhasbeenconsistently degraded. Thelastdecadeof thetwentiethcentury alsoprovideda seriesof casesof failedand dividedstateswherethe international communityhadintervened, in thefirstinstance,to provide humanitarian assistance, but in a numberof cases,to attendto thewider processes of nationbuilding,includingthe protectionof humanrightsfor is mixedbut neverindividuals andfor groups.The recordof intervention background toanticipate theproblems of interthelessservesasa significant nationalhumanrightsin the twenty-firstcentury,mostparticularlythe rightsof groups. We thereforetooktheinitiativeto assemble the scholars whohavecontributedto thisbookandto convene two workingsessions, thefirstat theCentre of International Studiesat the Universityof Cambridgeandthe second at theJohnSloanDickey Centerfor International Understanding at DartmouthCollege.We aregratefulto thetwo centersfor financialsupportthat vii

...

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Preface

enabledus to bringtheprojecttogether.We arealsogratefulto theparticifor pantsfor theirwillingness to join us.Eachof usis, of course,responsible hisor her own contribution, but we all profitedgreatlyfromthe sharpand challenginginteractions at the meetingsin Cambridgeand Hanover.In essence, ourpurposehasnot beento be definitivebut ratherto introduce perplexing issues thatshouldoccupytheattentionof scholars andstatesmen for muchof the centurythat hasnow started.We hopethat we havesucceeded.

List of Acronyms

ASEAN AU CEDAW CIM CIS CmEDAW COE

csw

DAW ECHR ECtHR ECOSOC ECOWAS EU FGM GATT HCNM ICC ICCPR ICESCR ICJ 1cm ILO IMF

Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Union Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Commission Interamericana de Mujeres (Inter- American Commission of Women) Commonwealth of Independent States Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Council of Europe Commission on the Status of Women Division for the Advancement of Women European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Economic and Social Council Economic Community of West African States European Union Female genital mutilation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade High Commissioner for National Minorities International Criminal Court International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights International Court of Justice International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Labor Organization International Monetary Fund

X

INSTRAW

Listof Acronyms

International Research andTrainingInstitutefor the Advancement of Women International RefugeeOrganization IRO KosovoLiberationArmy KLA NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization NATO Nongovernmental organization NGO of AmericanStates Organization OAS Organization of AfricanUnity OAU UnitedNationsOperationin theCongo ONUC ONUMOZ UnitedNationsOperationin Mozambique Organization for SecurityandCooperation in Europe OSCE Presidential DecisionDirective PDD NationalResistance RENAMO Mozambiquan RPF Rwandese PatrioticFront SouthWestAfricaPeople’sOrganization SWAP0 UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights UDHR UnitedNationsAssistance Missionfor Rwanda UNAMIR UnitedNationsAouzouStripObserverGroup UNASOG UnitedNationsAngolaVerificationMission UNAVEM UnitedNationsCommission on HumanRights UNCHR UnitedNationsEducational, Scientific,andCultural UNESCO Organization andPakistan UNGOMAP UnitedNationsGoodOfficesin Afghanistan UN Officeof theHigh Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR UnitedNationsDevelopment Fundfor Women UNIFEM UNIIMOG UnitedNationsIran-Iraq Military ObserverGroup NationalUnionfor theFull Independence of Angola UNITA UnifiedTaskForce UNITAF UnitedNationsMissionin Ethiopia/Eritrea UNMEE in Prevlaka UnitedNationsMissionof Observers UNMOP UnitedNationsMissionof Observers in Tajikistan UNMOT UnitedNationsObserverMissionin Georgia UNOMIG UNOMUR UnitedNationsObserverMissionUganda-Rwanda UNOSOM UnitedNationsOperationin Somalia UnitedNationalSecurityForcein WesternNew Guinea UNSF UnitedNationsTransitional Authorityin Cambodia UNTAC WorldTradeOrganization WTO

FROM INDIVIDUAL TO GROUP RIGHTS

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1 StatingtheProblemof GroupRights GeneM. LyonsandJamesMayall

The UnitedNationsapproved the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights spawned two international covenants, oneon civil in 1948.The declaration andpoliticalrightsandthe otheron economic, social,and culturalrights. Together,the declaration andthe two covenants comprisean international bill of rights,a setof normsandprocedures, whichthe greatmajorityof stateshaveratified.More specifictreatieshavealsobeendeveloped-for example,to protectthe rightsof womenandchildrenandrid the worldof racialdiscrimination. Together,thesecommitments makehumanrightsa matterof international concernandgovernments liableto the international accomplishcommunity for theirimplementation. All of thisis a formidable mentoverthepastfifty-plusyears.What,then,is theproblem? Theproblemis twofold.First,governments continuetoviolatetheirtreaty obligations, theinternational communityis dividedonhowto compelstates to meettheir commitments, thereare tensionsbetweendifferentsetsof rights,andthe treatiesrun up againstthe claimof sovereignty by governmentsto dealwith domestic problems withoutoutsideinterference. Second, increasing controversies overtherightsof groupshavecomplicated theorigiandthe relationship betweenthestate nal focuson the rightsof individuals andtheindividual.Thisis especially truein thecaseof therightsof minorities,indigenous peoples, andwomenthatwereoriginallyneglected in creatinga baselinefor theinternational humanrightsregimewhentheUniversal Declarationwaswritten.The liberalapproachthat drovethe first seriesof humanrightsagreements hasbeenovertakenasindividualrightsbecome increasingly entangled in grouprightswheneverthe rights of individuals are violatedbecause they are membersof ethnicor religiousminoritiesor of indigenous peopleor because theyarewomen. 3

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This double-edged problemwasvividly exposedwith theendof theCold thatheightened theinternaWar, whichwasfollowedby twodevelopments tionalvisibilityand politicalsalienceof humanrights.First, the fall of the SovietUnionraisedthepoliticalstockof multipartydemocracy, leadingto thewidespread hopethatthemajorityof stateswouldnow optfor a democraticconstitutional orderwith full protectionof humanrights.The second was the resurgence of a seriesof fierceethnicand/orreligiousconflictsin whichtherewassystematic andwidespread abuseof fundamental rights.The scaleof thesehumanitarian catastrophes inevitablyfacedthe international community with the questionof how it shouldrespondand-since mostof theseconflictswerewithinthebordersof sovereign states-what basisthere wasfor interventioninto whatwere essentiallymattersof “domesticjurisdiction.’’ It was the desireto tracethe implicationsof thesedevelopments for the futureof the international humanrightsregimethatprovidedthe focusfor ourbook.Democracy and humanrightsarenotidenticalconcepts (asseveral of ourcontributors remindedus),buttheyoverlap.Mostimportant,if democraticpoliticsare to replaceauthoritarian systems, it is crucialthat fundamentalhumanrightsareentrenched in theworkingsof societyin realityand not merelyin theory.If they are not, therewill be no incentivefor those wholosean election,for example,to accepttheresults.It is possible,asJack Donnellyarguesin his chapterin thisbook,thatthe originalliberalregime can be adaptedto covernew concernsaboutthe rightsof groupswithout invokingnewsetsof obligations. But it is notobvious,particularlyin deeply dividedsocieties wheredemocratization, while oftenperceivedasa solution to civil conflict,canaseasilybecomea majorpartof theproblemif theinterestsof minoritiesare ignoredand they continueto fear beingtreatedlike second-class citizenswith theobliteration of theirculturalpracticesandlanguage. on therightsof groups This is the underlyingrationalefor concentrating in thechaptersthatfollow;theprotectionof grouprightsis a necessary part of any attemptto democratize troubledsocieties,especiallythosethat are deeplydivided.The reasonis that,in suchsocieties,constitutional guaranteesof individualcitizenrightsandthe rule of law may not be sufficientto overcomecommunaland/orsectarianidentitiesand rivalries.This is the essentialargumentin the chapteron minorityrightsby JenniferJacksonPreece,no lessthan in the chaptersthat follow on indigenouspeoplesby HurstHannumandthe rightsof womenby Eva Brems.If it canbe shown, for example,thattheexistingliberalframeworkcannotlenditselfto accommodatingissuesof greatimportanceto womenaswomen,thiswill provide powerfulsupportfor takinggrouprightsmoreseriouslythantheyhavebeen in the past.Also, as “native”to the countryin whichthey live, indigenous peoplesinsistthattheyarenotminorities,a distinctionthatmakesmorepsy-

StatingtheProblemof GroupRights

5

chological andhistoricalthanlogicalsense.Fromthepointof view of human rights,however,the campaignof indigenouspeoplesfor autonomyrather thansecession is nota directthreatto thesovereignty of statesand,paradoxically, may give themmoreroomfor maneuverin domesticpoliticsthan otherminoritiesenjoy. Ideally,theinternational communityshouldattemptto widenthebasisof humanrightsbothto serveasa prerequisite of credibledemocraticgovernment and to reassuremarginalizedgroupsof the legitimacyof democratic freedomsandpoliticsby guaranteeing therightsof theiridentity.Whathappens,however,whenall effortsto persuadegovernments to protecthuman rightsthroughdiplomaticchannels fail?O r whena government is tooweakenedor corrupted to fulfill itsobligations underinternational treaties? These arethequestions thatledusto considerthehumanrightsdimensionof internationalintervention, thesecondfocusof thebook.The strictproscriptions placedon theuseof forceundertheUnitedNationsCharterwouldseemto rule out interventionto respondto violationsof humanrights(asmuchas for any otherreason)exceptundervery limited circumstances: a threatto international peaceandsecurityasagreedto by theSecurityCouncil.Should thisproscriptionbe lifted, and if so,when?Underwhatconditionsshould the violationsof humanrightsbe interpretedas a threatto international peace?Havetheinterventions authorizedby theSecurityCouncil,especially after the Cold War, createda new setof commoninterestsin the internationalcommunity? Thesequestions are the centerof the chapterby NicholasJ. Wheeler. Whetherjustifiedor not, the international communityhasintervenedin a numberof conflictssincethe endof the ColdWar in whichtheviolationof humanrightshasnot beenthe only reasonbut hascertainlybeena major justification. Similarly,reconstruction effortsin countries wheretheSecurity Councilhas authorizedUN operations haveprovidedthat the civil and rightsand politicalorderberebuiltonthebasisof protectionof fundamental democratic institutions. How successful havetheseeffortsbeen,andto what extentdo they providesupportfor the view that international societyis evolvingtowardgreatersolidaritywith regardto the meaningand significanceof humanrights?Theevidencereviewedin thechapterby MarcWeller on thisissue. allowsus to reachtentativeconclusions Thecontributors in thisbookall agreedthattheworldhasmovedbeyond the narrowconfinesof the paradigmthat acceptsa naturallaw basisfor humanrightsand almostexclusivelyemphasizes the rightsof individuals, especiallyin relationto states.Thisis not to denytheimportance of liberalismasan argumentfor humanrights.AsJackDonnellyexplainsin hischapter, the originalliberalapproachhastakenus a longway, providingus with an ambitiousregimethatcontainsa far-reaching codeof humanrightsanda seriesof procedures, bothformalandinformal,to monitortheirimplemen-

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tation.The questionis whetherthe existingregimecanbe expandedto needbeadded.Libincludegrouprightsorwhethera newsetof obligations setof textsand eralismhasneverbeena staticphilosophy with a canonical prescribeddogmas,however.JustasJohnStuartMill waspersuaded by reflectionandexperience repeatedly to extendthe list of publicgoodsthat couldnot be providedby the unfettered market,’we areconvinced thatthe next fiftyyearsneedsan expanded frameworkof analysis, withinor beyond the presentregime,if the aim of extending humanrightsto thosewho are deniedthemis to succeed.

HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH HISTORY In manyrespects, humanrightshaveonlybeena majorissuein international politicssinceWorldWar 11. Fromthe emergence of modernstatesin the seventeenth century,humanrightshaveessentially beena matterbetween the stateandits people,with the behaviorof statesprotectedfrom outside interference by thedoctrineof sovereignty. Sovereignty, moreover,hasbeen a bedrockof theinternational system. Peaceandstabilityamongstateswere basedon thepremisethatstatesrecognized eachother’ssovereignty and intoeachother’sdomestic affairs.Nevertheless, sovagreednotto intervene ereignty,beyondits legaldimensions, hasneverbeenuniformor absolute. Somestates-to mimicGeorgeOrwell’sAnimalFarm-are moresovereign thanothers,and stateshavefrequentlybeencommittedby treatyto treat theirpeoplemorebenignlythantheymighthaveotherwise wished.2 From the beginning,for example,the internationalcommunityhas attempted throughtreatiesto protectminoritiesfrombeingrepressed by states. Thetreatiesthatmadeup thepeaceof Westphalia, comingastheydid at theendof thereligiouswars,prevailedon statesto ensuretherightof all groupsto followthereligionto whichtheybelong.Theimposition on state intothe nineteenth centurywhen policytoprotectminorityrightsextended themajorEuropean powersputpressure ontheOttomanEmpireto protect Duringthe Christianminorities(throughmilitarythreatsaswell astreaties). nineteenthcentury,the internationalcommunity-via the Concertof in abolishing the Europe-also madeinroadsontheprincipleof sovereignty of thewoundedandsickin war slavetradeandprovidingfor theprotection in thefirstGenevaconventions of 1864. Protectionof minoritieswas alsowrittendownin a seriesof treaties in theseveralcountries signedatthe endof WorldWar I to protectminorities beingformedout of the broken-upAustro-Hungarian Empire.Nevertheless,the ambitiousattemptby Japanto inserta provisionoutlawingracial wassummarilyrejectedby the other discrimination in the 1919 conference powersasa breachof theprinciples of sovereignty andnoninterference. All

StatingtheProblemof GroupRights

7

of theeffortsto protectminorities, moreover, weresubject to thewill of state authorities,and the widespread violationof minorityrightsin the years of thesysbetweenthetwoworldwarswasuglytestimonyto theweakness tem.Thishistoryprovidesmuchof thebackground to thechapterby Jennifer Jackson-Preece on the revivalof interestin, anddebateabout,minority rights. By 1945, thebehaviorof Nazi Germanysohorrifiedthe worldthatthere waslittleresistance to addinga provisionin theU N Charterthat,amongits majoraims,the UnitedNationswouldpromote“universalrespectfor, and observance of, humanrightsandfundamental freedoms for all withoutdistinctionasto race,sex,language, or religion.”CertainlytheHolocaust,the systematic attemptto eradicate theJewsof Europe,wasthe mostappalling of Nazi crimes.The Nazis’arrogantclaimof beinga superiorraceandthe throughout the countries thattheyoccupied deepfearsthattheyengendered createdwidespread supportfor raisinghumanrightsto a newlevelof internationalconcern. Theidealsof humanrightshadalreadybeengivenpositive directionby the “FourFreedoms” speechof FranklinDelanoRoosevelt in 1941, in whichthe Americanpresident calledfor a worldwith freedomof speech andworshipandequallyfreedomfromwantandfear. The humanrightsprovisions in the U N Charterare still limitedby the 2.7 recognitionof sovereignty and especially the admonitionin paragraph that “nothingcontainedin the presentChartershallauthorizethe United Nationsto intervenein matterswhichare essentially within the domestic to thislimijurisdiction of anystate.”Aswe notedearlier,theoneexception tationis whentheSecurityCouncilunderChapterVII authorizes enforcementmeasures. When,in effect,the SecurityCouncilfindsthat a threatto international peaceandsecurityexists,statesarenot protectedby the doctrine of sovereignty andcanbe held directlyaccountable for violationsof humanrights.In the yearssince1945, the expansion of the humanrights regimehasnot only threatened to erodethe conceptof sovereignty but, led the especiallysincethe end of the Cold War, has on severaloccasions SecurityCouncilto adopta widenedinterpretation of “international peace andsecurity”as the basisfor actionunderChapterVII of the Charter.In theprocess, thenarrowmeaningof securityas protectionof attackfrom anotherstateis slowlyshifting.Increasingly, threatsto worldpeaceemerge frominternalconflictsthatdirectlyaffectneighboring statesand,asthey becomemoreviolentand especiallyas they involvegrossviolationsof humanrights,alsodrawin theinterests andresources of majorstates, individuallyor in supportof internationally sanctioned coalitions.

THE EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Oneof thefirstactionstakenby theUnitedNationswhenit wasorganized a workingcommission to preparewhatcameto be in 1945 wasto establish

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the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights.From the time the Universal Declarationwasadoptedin 1948,it hasbeenwidely acceptedby statesand hasbecomepartof customary international law.3The declaration, by itself, is a statement of highlyendorsed intentionsbut is not operational in the senseof providingprocesses and institutionsfor the executionof its aims. The taskof writinga covenantto implementthe provisionsof the declaration becamemired in the conflictbetweencivil and politicalrights,on the onehand,andeconomic,social,and culturalrightson the other.TheWesternstatesstronglysupported civil andpoliticalrightsontwo grounds.First, on governments, whichare seen,in the tradithey emphasized constraints threatto personalliberty. tion of Westernpoliticalphilosophy, asa constant Second,becausegovernments weresoconstrained, politicaland civil rights couldbe expressed negativelyand in a form that, in principle,couldbe upheldin thecourts. TheWestwasmoredividedoneconomic, social,andculturalrights,which impliedan activerole for government. Suchrightswerestronglysupported by the WesternEuropeanstateswith importantsocialistconstituencies, as well asthe Sovietblocand,astheygainedindependence, by the developing countriesof AsiaandAfrica.TheUnitedStates,however,led theopposition to raisingtheserightsto a levelof obligationthatgovernments owedto their citizens.As a result,it wasagreedin the early 1950sto proceedby drafting two covenants, in effectseparating the two setsof rights.It was not until 1966thatthedocuments werereadyfor signature, andwhile theyhavebeen widelyratified,the UnitedStatesdid not ratify the civil andpoliticalrights covenantuntil 1992andhasneverratifiedthecovenanton economic,social, andculturalrights. Meanwhile,a seriesof anti-Semiticattacksin variouspartsof theworldin the early 1960sagainraisedthe spectrumof the Holocaustand renewed interestin writing,first,a declaration andthena “conventionontheelimination of all formsof racialdi~crimination.”~ Themomentum wasinitiallycarriedforwardby thecivilrightsmovementin theUnitedStatesandby newly independent African statesthat used the negotiations as a mechanism throughwhich to mobilizepoliticalsupportagainstthe apartheidgovernmentin SouthAfrica.Hereagain,Americanenthusiasm recededasconservative groupsin the United Statesfearedthat internationalhumanrights treaties,in general,would not only give the federalgovernmentincreased powerovertheindividualstatesbutwouldalsogivegovernment theauthority to limit the right of freedomof expression,guaranteedin the First Amendmentof theU.S. Constitution. DespiteAmericanreservations, the conventionon eliminatingracialdiscriminationwas alsoopenedfor signaturein 1966 andwaswidelyratified. Thecampaign againstapartheid, moreover,tookona life of itsownandcontinuedcondemnation was intensifiedin resolutions of the UN General

StatingtheProblemof GroupRights

9

Assembly,the Commonwealth, and,afterthe Sharpevillemassacre in 1960, periodicallyeventheSecurityCouncil.Cumulatively,thesepressures forced SouthAfrica into diplomaticisolation.The Westernpowers,however,continuedto vetoattemptsby the SecurityCouncilto imposeeconomicsanctionsunderChapterVII of the Charterin an attemptto disruptSouth Africantraderelationsanddeprivethe countryof essential imports. In 1977,afterthe murderof theblackconsciousness leaderSteveBiko by theSouthAfricanSecurityservice,Westernopposition faded,andtheCouncil imposeda mandatoryarmsembargo.From the mid-1980s,partly in response to pressurefrom the Commonwealth and the prosanctions lobby in theU.S. Congress, butprimarilyfromprivatefinancialinterestsactingfor prudentialreasons,thenet wastightened.To whatextentinternational condemnationand economicsanctions ultimatelycontributed to the fall of apartheidis very muchan openquestion.Nonetheless, the casewasonein whichthe shieldof sovereignty waspurposefully breachedby the internationalcommunityand servedas a precedentfor the moresubstantial challengeto theprincipleof sovereignty thathasresultedfromSecurityCouncil activitiesin the 1990s. The UnitedNationshasalsobecomean instrumentfor humanrightsinitiativesbeyondracialdiscrimination. A convention againstgenocide had alreadybeensignedin 1948andwasjoinedby “a convention againsttorture and othercruel,inhumanor degradingtreatmentor punishment” in 1984. Nevertheless, the difficultyof implementing theseeffortsto criminalize grossviolationsof rightsbecamemostevidentin the 1990s:For one,the international community failedto interveneto preventthe genocidalmassacreof Tutsiin Rwandain 1994;for another,theUN SecurityCouncilestablisheda weak“securityzone”thatprovedineffectivein deterringthekillings in Srebenica in 1995;and,yet again,it intervenedtoolatein Kosovoin 1998 to preventwhatamountedto a wide campaignof “ethniccleansing”of the KosovarAlbaniansby the Serbs(whichwas followedby the Serbsfleeing from theirhomeswhenthe Albaniansreturnedin the wakeof the NATOled intervention intotheKosovoconflict).At thesametime,therelevance of thetorturetreatywassharpened in 1998whenit becamethebasisfor a Spanish judgeexercisingthe right of universaljurisdictionto bringthe former Chileandictator,GeneralAugust0Pinochet,to trial for crimesagainst humanitywhile he washeadof state. Held in housearrestin Britain,the generalwas judgedto be medically unfit to standtrial and subsequently sentbackto Chile ratherthan extraditedto Spain.Nevertheless, buildingon the earlierNurembergtrials and the morerecentSecurityCouncildecisions to createad hoccriminalcourts for BosniaandRwanda,aswell asthe agreement in 1998to setup a permanentinternational criminalcourt,it will no doubtbe claimedin the future thatthePinochetcaseconfirmedthattheprincipleof “sovereign immunity”

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canno longerbe invokedto protectpoliticalleadersfrom takingpersonal responsibility for violatingthehumanrightsof theirpeople.Indeed,the apparentprecedentwas immediatelynoted:the Pinochetcasewas rapidly followedby thetrialof HisstneHabrCin Senegalese courts,forhumanrights violationscommitted while hewaspresident of Chad.Moreover,theindictof theYugoslavleader,Slobodan MiloSeviC, mentandultimatelythe transfer to theinternational tribunalin TheHaguein 2001, reinforced the concept of personal responsibility, notwithstanding questions raisedby theambiguities of “universal jurisdiction.” surrounding theapplication

EXTENDING HUMAN RIGHTS For all theexpansion, thereis stillconsiderable controversy overthe universalityof humanrights.At theU N humanrightsreviewconference in Vienna in 1993,representatives fromAsianstates,especially, insistedthattheinternationalbill of humanrightswas essentially a “Western”creation,andits provisionhadto be adaptedby othersin accordance with their own belief systems and culturalbackgrounds. Admittedly,manyAsianhumanrights groupslobbiedagainsttheirowngovernments atViennain favorof a universalstandard. Nonetheless, it is clearthatsomecultures holda narrowerrange of viewsontherelationsbetweentheindividualandthecommunitythanin the West andthat othersseedifferenttraditionalrolesfor womenin their society.The strongpressureto abandonthe idea of the universalityof humanrightsin favorof somekind of “culturalrelativism”mayhavebeen counlargelyopportunistic, butnotwhollyso.At thesametime,developing tries,led,in manyrespects, by China,insistthatmodernization anddemocthatmay requirecurtailment of political ratizationarelong-termprocesses rightsin ensuring thesocialstabilityessential for economic growth. Thetruthis thatthe “internationalization” of humanrightshasmorerapidly expanded in prosperous Europewherea EuropeanCourtof Human thatservesas an appealscourtwhenlitigants Rightshasbeenestablished haveexhausted nationalsystems of justice?Not onlyhasitsjurisdiction been dramatically broadened, butdecisions of the European Courtarebindingon participating memberstates.In Europe,the causeof humanrightswasalso advancedby the HelsinkiAccords,a seriesof agreements signedin 1975 betweenthe SovietUnionandits alliesandthe Westernmembersof the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (NATO) andthe European Union.The Helsinkidiscussions beganas an attemptby the SovietUnion to get some of its hegemony in EasternEurope.Duringthe course kind of recognition of longnegotiations, the Westinsistedon a setof humanrightsprovisions essentially involvingtheunitingof dividedfamilies,whichtheUSSRfinally accepted. The humanrights“basket,”asit cameto be called,wasexploited

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by privatehumanrightsgroupsin theWestto makecontactwith dissidents in the Easterncountries. The dissidents, in turn,mobilizedby leaderslike VaclavHave1in Czechoslovakia andAndreiSakharov in the SovietUnion, took the accordsas a basisfor pressingfor freedomof association and to expression and,with materialsupportfromwesterncontacts, contributed thefall of thecommunist regimes. Morebroadly,however,humanrightshavebeenfurtherextended in three of international activityin proways.First,therehasbeena vastexpansion tectingrefugeesandprovidinghumanitarian assistance in countriesdevastatedby civil conflict.6 Theseareareas,whiledistinctuntothemselves, that clearlyoverlapwith humanrights.EvenwhileWorldWar I1 continued, programshadbeendeveloped to dealwith the hundredsof thousands of refugees,largelyfrom EasternEurope,who hadbeendrivenfrom theirhomes and,in manycases, takenintoGermanyasforcedlaborers. In theyearsafter thewar,theInternational RefugeeOrganization (IRO) at firstbeganto repatriatethesedisplaced persons, butasthegovernments of EasternEuropefell intocommunist hands,the agencyadoptedprogramsof resettlement for thosewhowereopposed to returning to theirhomeland forpoliticalreasons. agencyto handleWorldWar I1 refugees, theIRO Intendedasa temporary increasein refugeepopulations, wasslowlydissolved. But thecontinuing initiallydrivenby thefirstArab-Israeliwar andby the Koreanconflict,led to the creationof the U N Officeof the High Commissioner for Refugees thatalsoestablished criteriafor deter(UNHCR) undera 1951convention miningrefugeestatus.Over the years,UNHCR hasdealtwith millionsof broughtonwith the refugees in Asia,especially asa resultof thedisruptions Vietnamstruggleand in Africa as countrieswereshakenby internalconflicts,largelyethnicin character. Indeed,by the 1990s,the problemwas expanded, principallyin Africa,by the addition of millionsof internallydisplacedpersons whowerenotqualifiedasrefugees sincetheywerenotforced out of theirhomestates,but whoserightshadbeenseriously violatedand wereno lessdestitute,havinglost all of theirpossessions in the horrorof civil war. Accordingto U N figures,by 1996,thereweremorethantwentyfive millioninternallydisplaced persons-up from aroundthreemillionin theearly198Os-in fifty-threecountries.’ Second,the problemsof refugeeprotectionandhumanitarian assistance havealso become entwinedwith theevolutionof U N peacekeeping. During the Cold War, the U N had developed peacekeeping procedures to deploy lightlyarmedtroopsbetweentheforcesof conflicting states,but onlywith theprioragreement of theantagonists andtheircommitment to seekapeaceful settlement of theirdispute. WhentheColdWar ended,consensus became morepossible in the Security Council,andin a seriesof casesinvolvingweak and dividedstates,the CouncilauthorizedU N intervention withoutprior A approvalof thewarringsides,to go far beyondtraditionalpeacekeeping.

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major objectivein the operations in a rupturedstatesuchas Bosnia,for example,was,first, to providehumanitarian assistance and,oncedrawnin, Peacekeepto go on to protectethnicminoritiesfromfurtherbrutalization. ing cameto includea rangeof functionsfrominterveningbetweenconflicting factionsto caringfor theweakandhomeless, protectingthedistribution of relief supplies, policingwar-strickencities,andsupervising electionsonce hostilitieshavebeenpacified.Marc Weller andNicholasWheelerdevelopa deeperanalysisof thesecasesin theirchapters. Third, the internationalhumanrightsregime-the treaties,international organizations, and networksof nongovernmental agencies-is an essential part of a normativeframeworkfor statebehaviorthat hasbeendeveloping sincethe UniversalDeclarationwaswrittenand expandingsincethe Soviet systemcollapsed.Statesthat havedefiedhumanrightsstandards, whether they signedthe humanrightstreatiesor not, areunderpressureto comply. Democraticpracticesandthestateof humanrights,for example,arecriteria for the admissionof former communiststatesof Easternand Central Europe,into the EuropeanUnion, as they were earlierfor the Councilof Europe.Democracies havealsoreplacedmilitaryregimesthroughout most of Latin Americaand are holdingtheirformerrulersto accountfor violationsof humanrights.O n his returnto Chile, for example,Pinochetwas strippedof his immunityandonly escaped judicialinquiryon violationsto humanrightsby reasonof medicalunfitness.In Africa,theendingof apartheidin SouthAfrica remainsa significanttriumphin thestrugglefor equality despitetheway humanrightsare trampledelsewherein the violenceof internalwars.In Asia,freedomof expression andassociation arespurredon by thespreadof freemarketsdespiteserioussetbacks, suchastheeconomic retrenchment andmilitaryresistance thatunsteadied thedemocratic election in Indonesiathat followedthe forcedresignationof the longtimedictator, Suharto. By the end of the twentiethcentury,humanrightshad becomea major issuein international politics.It hadalsobecomean extremelycomplicating issuesincehumanrightshasto be understood within a broadcontext;that is, they get linkedup with a full spectrumof othereconomicand social issues.For onething,theseveralsetsof humanrightshaveto be seenin relation to oneanother.This is mostobviousin the relationsbetweencivil and politicalrights,on the onehand,and economic,social,and culturalrights, on the other.Perhapsthe pointis oversimplified,but the right to express one’sviewsand the rightsof association may havelittle meaningto many peoplewho sufferseverepovertysuchasonefindsin manypartsof Africa andAsia.Thisneednot compromise theuniversality of humanrights.But it doesreinforcethe imperativeto provideeconomicrightsandensurethat thereis “freedomfromwant”aswell asfreedomof speechandassembly. Thereis more:Humanrightsare alsoinvolvedin the choicesthat states

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makein decidingoneconomicpolicies.Today,globalization is drivingstates to adoptopenmarketsandremoverestrictions onthefreemovementof capital. Suchderegulation increases the difficultiesin pursuingincomeredistributionpolicies.Therearepressures on developingcountriesto privatize theirindustries, reducegovernment expenditures, andconstructa society thatfacilitatessocialmobility.The UnitedStates,of course,is theprime exampleof a countryin whichsocialmobilityis a centralfeatureof economicdevelopment. Nonetheless, whatevertheothermeritsof freemarkets, the United Statescan only providea long-termmodelfor the rest of the world.Besidessufferingfromlargedisparities in incomein its ownpopulation,it is a continental statewith abundantnaturalresources that,overtime, providedunusualopportunities for a largeimmigrantand generallymobile in manypartsof theworld,thereis deep anddesperpopulation.In contrast, atepovertyandlayersof customandculturethatcannotbesoreadilyshedsnakelike-in theinterests of wealthcreation.Underwhatis effectivelya new internationaleconomicorthodoxythat eschewswelfareand prizes mobility,thosewhohavethemostdifficultyin climbingtheladderof social andeconomicsuccess withoutgovernment supportareveryoftenthosewho suffer the harshestdiscrimination: minorities,indigenouspeople, and women.Moreover,if they chooseto packup and migrate,they risk being classified aseconomicrefugees,not eligiblefor international protection,and turnedbackat thebordersof moreprosperous countries. H U M A N RIGHTS IN T H E NEXT FIFTY YEARS

A majorpurposein thisbookis thusto inquireintotwosetsof humanrights attentionduring problemsthatarecertainto beat thecenterof international the nextfifty years:the increasing evidenceof groupidentityas a principal sourceof humanrightsviolations,andthe intervention of theinternational community in emergency casesin whichtherearegrossviolationsof rights. JenniferJackson-Preece, HurstHannum,and Eva Bremsdevelopthe probThe chaptersby Marc Waller lem of grouprightsin depthin theirchapters. and NicholasWheelerexaminethe problemsthat internationalsociety encounters in responding to violationsof rightsin a worldthatis stillhighly “ pluralist”wherestatescontinueto pursuenarrowlyconceivedinterests. JackDonnellytreatsbothsetsof problemsin themoretheoreticalintroductory chapter. Donnelly,in the first place,identifiesthefocuson individualrightsin humanrights whathecallsthe“Universalmodel,”in effect,theinternational regimethat emergedwith the UniversalDeclarationandsubsequent Covenants.This is particularlyevidentin article27 of the covenanton civil and politicalrights,whichguarantees therightto pursueone’sownculture,reli-

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gion,andlanguage but onlyin termsof the rightsof individuals andnot of socialgroups.All of thisdespitetherealitythatpeopledo not live as“isolated,atomistic individuals” butassocialbeingswhocannoteffectively exerciserightsof culture,religion,or language alonebut only as members of a thecollective nature largergroup.ArguingthattheUniversalmodelassumes of individualrights,Donnellyinsiststhatthereis no need,as othersadvocate,for an additionalsystemof grouprights. Second,Donnellymaintainsthat,asa matterof practice,theUniversal modelleavesimplementation to the memberstates.In thissense,human eventhoughthey rightsareultimatelysubject to thepoliciesof governments, increasingly havecome“to express manyof thehighestpoliticalaspirations” in international society.Certainlyit is fair to saythat,in formulatingpolihumanrightsregime cies,mostgovernments haveto takethe international into accountsincetheiractionsareboundto be measured againstthe standardsof the regimeby othergovernments, by nongovernmental organizations(NGOs),andby the international media,aswell assectors of theirown public.Nonetheless, thisstill doesnot ensurethatconsiderations of human rightswill outweighotherfactorsandbe decisive in thepoliciesthatgovernstrongconsensus of what mentsadoptor that thereis as yet a sufficiently humanrightsmeanto makeinternational societyeffectivein influencing nationalpriorities.A majortaskfor the future,Donnellyconcludes, is to developmoreeffectivemethodsfor implementing theexistinghumanrights regimeratherthanaddingto it. In herchapter, Jackson-Preece alsoarguesthatthehumanrightsregimeis dominated by a concernfor individualrights.Thisemphasis hascomeabout notonlybecause of thestronginfluence of Westernpoliticalphilosophy but of theweightgivento the interestsof statesin international alsobecause is society.Attachmentto the state,particularlyin the form of citizenship, givenpreference overaffiliationwith othercommunities, whetherclansor ethnicgroups.For that matter,the onegrouprightthat is specifiedin the U N Charterandthehumanrightstreatiesis therightof self-determination. It is as if the choicefor any ethnicgroupis eitherto becomecompletely assimilated into the dominantcultureof the statein whichthey live or to achieveseparate statehood. CertainlytheU N Chartergavelessattentionto the right of self-determination than had the Covenantof the Leagueof Nations, but for understandable political reasons.In the caseof the covenant, a majorobjective wasto eliminatethepresence of minoritiesas a sourceof Europeanconflictby grantingthemstatehood, particularlywith the breakupof the Austro-Hungarian Empire.As for the Charter,selfdetermination wasby nowextended beyondEuropeto therestof theworld, whereit was deliberatelydownplayedsincethe major Europeanstates wishedto postpone thebreakupof theirempiresanddelaytherushtoward decolonization. However,decolonization did occur,morerapidlythanany-

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oneexpected, largelywithinboundaries thathadbeensetdownby the colonial powers. Self-determination was effectivelydefined as European a formulathatwas obviouslyin the interestof thosewho decolonization, hadwon controlof the stateandwho hadno interestin cedingterritoryto theiropponents. Mostof thenewstates createdin thiswayincludeddifferent ethnicgroupswho,aftertheunifyingexcitement of independence, beganto competefor poweranddomination. It is nonetheless importantto takenote,as Hurst Hannumdoesin his chapter,that unlikeotherminorities,therehasbeenlittle inclinationby a rightof secession. Livingon themarginsof indigenous peopleto exercise society,theyhaveusuallyaskedfor theprotectionof theirrightswithinthe stateandhaveespeciallybeenconcerned with their rightsto the land on whichthey live. Indigenous peoplecanbe clearlyidentifiedin North and SouthAmerica,in the Arcticregions,andin AustraliaandNew Zealand wherenativepeoplewereforcedoff theirlandandsegregated by invading Europeans whoproceeded to establish permanent settlements anddominate the politicallife of the developing state.The problemis morecomplexin Asia andAfricawherethereare nativepeopleforcedon to the marginsof society,but not so stronglydifferentiatedfrom the dominantgroups. of therightsof indigenous people Indeed,asHannumreports,a declaration is beingdraftedat theUnitedNationswithoutclearlydefiningto whomit applies. BothJackson-Preece and Hannumconcludethat a majorchallengeto humanrightsis to create“pluralist”societies thatenfolddifferentgroupsof people,livingtogetherwith tolerance-andevenrespect-for thevery differences thatsetthemapart.In thisregard,theirconclusions intersect with Donnelly’sdiscussion of the difficultiesof movingstatestowardpoliciesof tolerance and evenfurtherto nondiscrimination andeventuallyto multicultopluralistsocieties. Theproblemis noless turalismastheultimateresponse complicated whenwe addtheissueof gender.While therewereno distincwere tionsin theway thatthe UniversalDeclarationandthe two covenants written,it couldnot be takenfor grantedthatin implementing theirprovisions,stateswoulddealwith menandwomenon an equalbasis.For that onthepoliticalrightsof womenwasopenedfor ratifimatter,a convention cationas earlyas 1953and a separate convention on the eliminationof all formsof discrimination againstwomenin 1979.As Eva Bremsemphasizes in herchapter,the drivefor women’srightshasadvanced in twodirections: to ensurethatthetwo covenants applyto womenastheydo to menandto protectthespecialrightsof womenthatderivefromtheirownexperiencefor example,protectionfrom sexualharassment andspecialprovisions in casesof maternity. Morerecently,asBremsdiscusses, thequestfor women’srightsis leading of the humanrightsregimethat involvesan overall to a transformation

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rethinkingof the kind of societyin whichpeoplelive, a transformation, for example,from a largelymale-dominated, highlyassimilationist societyto a societyin which women-and minorities,whetherethnic,religious,or indigenous-playa fuller andmoreproductivepartin the normalpractices of daily life. This kind of transformation-spurredon by feministcritiques and movingin the directionof the kind of multiculturalism that Donnelly identifiesasa long-rangegoal-is onlybeginningbut,Bremscontends, will becomeincreasingly influentialin theyearsto come.More immediately,the storyof women’srightshasalreadydramaticallyillustratedhow the growing influenceof nonstateactorshasinfluenced ,theoveralldevelopment of humanrightsand,by practice,thecharacterof international society.Beyond theconventions thathavebeenpromulgated, improvement in women’sstatus hasbeenthefocusof a seriesof globalconferences, beginningin MexicoCity havebeenespeciallyusefulin creatinga vibrant in 1975.Theseconferences networkof women’sgroupsthroughout theworld,a primeexampleof how privateeconomicand socialmovements havecontributedto the expansion of humanrightsandbeena primemeansof encouraging, evengoading,governmentstowardcooperation. In herchapter,Brems’sdiscussion of therole of N G O s echoestheanalysisin the chaptersby Jackson-Preece andHannum.As all threechapters pointout,N G O sperforma seriesof functionsin international society:they serveas “lobbies”at the internationallevel and at the nationallevel,they conductindependent investigations of humanrightsviolations,theypublicizethehumanrightspoliciesandpracticesof governments, andtheymobilize publicopinionto supporthumanrightsactivitiesat homeand abroad. Transnational movements operatewheregovernments cannoteitherbecause of thefearof destabilizing politicalor economicrelationswith othergovernmentsor becausetheythemselves areviolatingthe rightsof theirown citizens. Governmentsare, more often than not, the targets of N G O investigations. At the sametime, it is justasimportantto rememberthat N G O s areprivateorganizations, and,asvaluableas they are, theremay be questions aboutwhomthey represent,how they are accountable for their activities,andhowtheyarefunded.8 society,they In the end, as muchas N G O s haveenrichedinternational havenot changedits fundamental structureor the centralrole within it playedby states.It is well to rememberthat,whatevertheincreasing roleof privatesocialandeconomicmovements in givingit centralpurpose,international societyis a societyof statesthat havedifferentand oftenopposing interests. Thereis thusreal questionwhether,asWheelerpointsout, the societyof statesis capableof developinga collectivecapacityfor human rightsenforcement. BothWheelerandMarc Wellergivespecialattentionto thecourseof international relationssincetheendof theColdWar, especially international operations to intervenein internalconflictsin dividedstatesin

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whichtherehavebeenwidespread violationsof humanrights.Theirverdict is mixed:ontheonehand,theseoperations provideconsiderable evidenceof the willingnessof international societyto overridethe limits of sovereignty and hold politicalleadersdirectlyresponsible when humanrightsare violated;on the otherhand,the decisionto intervenehasoftenbeenweakened (or abandoned, as in the caseof Rwanda)by an unwillingness to support operations with the humanand materialresources necessary to accomplish their objective^.^ Wheelertacklesthe problemin the broadersense,settingup his chapter asa dialogueamongthreeviewsof international society:realism,pluralism, andsolidarism.Realists,in thefirst instance,assumethat statespursuenarrowly conceivedinterestsin an otherwiseanarchicworld in whichpower, principallymeasured by materialresources, determines relationswith other states.Pluralistsseestatesno lessasseparateself-servingactors,but,in this case,theyareconstrained in theirrelationswith othersby commoninterests in maintainingstabilitylargelythroughdiplomaticexchangeand a willingnessto complywith international agreements. Finally,solidarists arguethat thebondsof international societyhavebeenstrengthened beyondtheclaims of pluralistsby thethreatthatweaponsof massdestruction posefor people everywhere,by the worldwideconnections createdby modernscienceand technology andtheexpanding globaleconomy,andby thecommoninterests that emergefrom the needto protectthe world environment from further degradation andfromthe commitmentto humanrightsin theinternational treatiesthathavebeenratifiedsincetheUniversalDeclaration.’O In manyrespects, Wheelerarguesthecasefor solidarism. Nevertheless, he is constrained in identifyingan evolutionfrom pluralismby the indecisive response of internationalsocietyto violationsof humanrightsin recent and herehe is internalconflicts.Therehasbeenas muchfailureas success, joinedby Marc Weller,wholooksat theseconflicts-in Africa,theBalkans, Asia, and CentralAmerica-from theperspective of the internalpoliticsof the countriesinvolvedas muchas the politicsamongthe statesin internationalsociety.Weller demonstrates in considerable detailhow traditional “ first-generation’’ peacekeeping hasdevelopedintomorecomplexoperationswith the end of the Cold War. He illustratesthe varietyof functions that so-calledinternational peacekeeping forceshavecometo perform.In EastTimorandKosovo,for example,theyhavebeenchargedwith thedirect administration of government affairs;in othercases,theyhavereconstituted publicagencies, providedpoliceprotectionfor localgovernment to operate, monitoredthe transitionfromviolenceto stability,encouraged reconciliation amongopposingfactions,and servedto preventfurtheroutbreaksof violence.Welleragreeswith Wheelerthat a majorweakness in international “ peacekeeping” comesfromtheunwillingness of themajorstatesin internaresources andto realizethatinternal tionalsocietyto providethenecessary

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conflictsin oftenpoorandunderdeveloped countriescanonly be resolved overa longperiodof time;majordonorswantcheapandquickresults.In Weller’scase,he alsocontends that it cantakeconsiderable time to bring strongconsensus amongthe conflicting partiesto reconabouta sufficiently stitutetheirsocietyalongmoredemocratic linesandto agreeontheconcrete shapeof a newpoliticalstructure.” All together,the chapters in thisbookdo whatmostscholarlycontributionsdo:theyraisemorequestions than answers. For thatmatter,theremay not be answersin the narrow,directsense.What the chaptersgive us is a senseof directionthat it wouldbe sensibleto takeif we areto extendthe effectiveness of the international humanrightsregimeoverthenextfifty years:for onething,to movetoward“pluralist”societies in whichdifferent ethnicor religiousgroupscanlivetogetherin peaceandtranquilitywith genuinerespectfor the differences amongthem;and,on the otherhand,to strengthen the movetoward“solidarism” in international societyby reinforcingincentives for statesto absorbtheinternational humanrightsregime In thisregard,the booktakesa posiinto theirinternalrulesandpractices. tion whetheror not all of us seeit in quitethe sameway. We think that humanrightsenhance thedignityof peopleandthatviolations reduceusto thecrudestandcruelest of humanrelations. We will wantto returnto these issuesin the concluding chapter,not to bringthemto a closebut ratherto on questions that areboundto providea basisfor a continuingdiscussion occupyscholars andstatesmen for sometimeto come.

NOTES 1. J. S. Mill, Principlesof PoliticalEconomy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1999),chap.13. 2. For a recentstudyof sovereignty, seeStephenD. Krasner,Sovereignty: OrganizedHypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,1999).Krasner’sreview is valuable,howeverdoubtfulhis argumentthat,because the notionof sovereignty hasneverbeenabsolute,nothinghassubstantially changedsincethe settlement of Westphalia. 3. SeeJohannes Morsink,The UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights:Origins, Draftingand Intent(Philadelphia: Universityof Pennsylvania Press,1999).For a generalreviewof humanrightsin international relations,seeR. J. Vincent,Human Cambridge UniversityPress,1986); RightsandInternational Relations(Cambridge: JackDonnelly,International HumanRights(Boulder,Colo.:Westview,1998);and David Forsythe,HumanRightsin International Relations(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,2000). 4. SeeGeneM. Lyons,“In Searchof RacialEquality:The Eliminationof Racial Discrimination,” in GlobalIssuesin theUnitedNationsFramework, ed.PaulTaylor andA. J. R. Groom(London:Macmillan,1989).

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5. For a reviewof theEuropeanexperience, seePhilipAlston,ed., TheEuropean Unionand HumanRights(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999). 6. The refugeequestionis coveredin Gil Loescher,BeyondCharity:Znternational Cooperationand the GlobalRefugeeProblem(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1993). 7. For ananalysis of theinternallydispossessed, seeFrancisM. Deng,Protecting theDispossessed (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,1993). 8. For a broadreviewof the role of NGOs in severalissuesareas,seeMargaret E. KeckandKathrynSikkink,ActivistsbeyondBorders(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,1998). 9. Severalearlycasesarediscussed in JamesMayall,ed., TheNew Znterventionism,1991-1994 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).The moregeneral relationship betweensovereignty andinternational intervention is analyzedin Gene StateSovereignty and M. LyonsandMichaelMastanduno, eds.,BeyondWestphalia? InternationalIntervention(Baltimore: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1995). 11, 2001, whenterroristsdestroyedtheWorld 10. Sincethe eventsof September TradeCenterin New York andrammedan aircraftintothePentagon in Washington, D.C., thecampaign againstterrorismhasbeencalleda “commoncause”of theinternationalcommunity,at leastby the U.S. government. Thereis, nonetheless, some uncertainty whetherall states,eventhosecooperating with theUnitedStateswould agreeon a definitionof whoareterrorists. 11. Bothsetsof problemsmaybecriticallyaffectedby theexperience of theinternationalcommunity in rebuildingthestateof Afghanistan, butat thisstageof writing (late2OO2),it is stilltooearlyto cometo anyjudgment.

In Defenseof theUniversal Declaration Model JackDonnelly

The globalhumanrightsregimeis rootedin the 1948UniversalDeclaration of HumanRightsandits laterelaborations, especiallythe 1966International HumanRightsCovenants. Thesedocuments reflectwhat I will call “the UniversalDeclarationmodel”of international humanrights.In thischapter, thefirstfoursectionsoutlinethemodelandarguethattodayit standsonan on a politicalconception of justicebasedon the overlapping consensus notionof equalconcernand respect.The followingfive sectionsdevelopa liberal defenseof this vision,focusingon issuesof grouprights(which appearcentrallyin the chaptersby Eva Brems,HurstHannum,and especiallyJenniferJackson-Preece) andon the centralrole of the statein implementingtheserights(a shortcoming emphasized in the chaptersby Marc WellerandNicholasWheeler).

THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION MODEL Four elementsof the UniversalDeclarationmodeldeserveemphasis: its focuson rights;therestrictionto individualrights;thebalancebetweencivil and politicalrightsand economic,social,and culturalrights;and national for implementing internationally recognizedhumanrights. responsibility

Human Rights Internationally recognized humanrightsare rights,a particularsortof socialpractice.’To havea rightto x is to be entitledto x and authorizedto 20

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makespecialclaimsto enjoyx shouldit be threatenedor denied.Although all rightshavecorrelative duties,theyarenotreducibleto thoseduties.Social andpoliticalduties,andthevaluestheyseekto realize,arevitally important. But they neednot be-and throughout mostof historyhavenot beenrootedin the entitlements of rightholders.Not all importantobjectives are bestrealizedthroughthepracticeof (human)rights. Humanrightsarethoserightsheld simplybecauseoneis a humanbeing, goods,services, andopportunities to whicheveryoneis entitled.Because one eitheris or is not a humanbeing,humanrightsare held equallyby all. Because onecannotstopbeinghuman,nomatterhowinhumanone’s behavior or the treatmentone is forcedto endure,they are inalienablerights. Humanrightsarealsocommonlyspokenof asuniversalrights.Thisuniversalityis moreprescriptive thandescriptive.2 The claimof ‘‘universal’’human rightsis that all humanbeingsoughtto be treatedin theseways,not that theyareor havebeen,or thatthesenormsare(let alonehavebeen)accepted everywhere.

IndividualRights All the rightsthat appearin the UniversalDeclarationandthe covenants are,with theexceptionof self-determination of peoples,rightsof individuals,notcorporateentities.Enumeration of rightsthustypicallybegin“Every humanbeing. . . ,”“Everyonehasthe right. . . ,”“No oneshallbe . . . ,” or “Everyoneis entitled.. . .” Evenwhereonemightexpectgroupsto appearas right holders,they do CovenantonCivil andPolitnot.For example,article27 of theInternational icalRights(ICCPR) reads,“In thoseStatesin whichethnic,religiousor linguisticminoritiesexist,personsbelongingto suchminoritiesshallnot be deniedthe right, in communitywith the othermembersof their group,to enjoytheirownculture,to professandpractisetheirownreligion,or to use theirownlanguage.”Individualsbelongingto minorities,not minorities (collectiveentities),havetheserights.The chapterby Jackson-Preece challengesthe adequacyof this approach,whichI defendlater. Individualrights,however,are a socialpractice.Individualand group rightsdifferin whoholdstheright-individuals or corporateactors-not in social.A’s right theirsociality.All (individualhuman)rightsareinescapably and operatesthroughsocialrelationships. to x with respectto B establishes Rights-bearing individualsalonecannoteffectivelyimplementtheir rights, a life worthyof humanbeings. let alonemakefor themselves The UniversalDeclarationmodelenvisionsindividualsdeeplyenmeshed in “natural”andvoluntarygroupsrangingfromfamiliesthroughthe state. on the state, Internationally recognized humanrightsimposeobligations regulaterelationsbetweencitizensandstates,andrequirethestateandsoci-

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etyfor theirrealization. Many (most?) humanrights,althoughheldby individuals,canonly be enjoyedcollectively.Consider,for example,workers’ rights,familyrights,andminorityrights,whicharedefinedby socialgroups freedomof assoor roles,aswell asrightsasdiverseaspoliticalparticipation, ciation,socialinsurance, andfreeandcompulsory primaryeducation. Civil and Politicaland Economic,Social,andCultural Rights

Anotherstrikingfeatureof theUniversalDeclaration modelis thebalance betweencivilandpoliticalandeconomic, social,andculturalrights.Nothing in eithercovenant suggests priorityfor onesetof rights.TheUniversalDeclarationdoesnot evenmakea categorical distinction. Althoughthe relationship betweencivilandpoliticalandeconomic, social, controversy duringthe andculturalrightswasa matterof intenseideological Cold War, todaythereis little disagreement that,as article5 of the 1993 ViennaDeclarationputsit, “All humanrightsareuniversal, indivisibleand interdependent andinterrelated.”For example,asof November16,2000 only8 stateswerepartyto justoneof thecovenants, while137wereparties to both.3Debatefocusesinsteadon short-andmedium-runprioritiesand themosteffectivemeansto realizeeconomic andsocial(andcivil andpolitical) rights.Suchdebates, however,arenot a centralconcernof thisvolume. theinterdependence andindivisibilityof all Therefore,I will simplyassume internationally recognized humanrights. NationalImplementationof InternationalHuman Rights

A furtherdistinctivefeatureof the UniversalDeclarationmodelis the nationalimplementation of internationallyrecognizedhuman rights. “Everyonehasa rightto x” in practicemeans“Eachstatehastheauthority andresponsibility to implementandprotectthe rightto x withinits territory.” The UniversalDeclarationwasformulatedas “a standardof achievement,”a setof aspirational normsthatleft stateswith full sovereign authority to implementhumanrightswithin their territory.The “enforcement” procedures of the covenants-periodic reportsto committees of experts+didnotsignificantly alterthisallocation of responsibility. Normcreationhas beeninternationalized, but implementation remainslargelywith sovereign territorialstates. The normativeadequacy of this statistapproachto implementation is a centralmatterof controversy within thisvolume,especially in the chapters by Marc Weller and NicholasWheeler.I returnto it myselflaterin this chapter.

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HEGEMONY AND SETTLED NORMS The nextseveralsections providea seriesof increasingly deepandsubstantive,andthusincreasingly controversial, justifications of theUniversalDeclarationmodel.I beginwith a descriptive, empiricalclaim:Humanrights politicaldiscourse, or whatMervynFrostcalls havebecomea hegemonic “settlednorms”of contemporary international society,5 principles thatare widelyaccepted asauthoritative withinthesocietyof states. Bothnationally and internationally,politicallegitimacyis increasinglyjudgedby and expressed in termsof internationally recognized humanrights. The six leadinginternational humanrightstreaties(on civil andpolitical rights;economic, social,andculturalrights;racialdiscrimination; discriminationagainstwomen;torture;andtherightsof thechild)hadanaverageof 154 partiesat the end of 2000.6 Evenmorenotableis the penetration of humanrightsintobilateral,multilateral, andtransnational diplomacy. In the 1970s, considerable controversy stillragedoverwhetherhumanrightswere evenanappropriate concern of foreignpolicy.As lateas1980, onlya handful of stateshadexplicitinternational humanrightspolicies,andmostof those usuallyweresupported onlywith verbalandsymbolicpolicyinstruments. Today,however,humanrightsarea standardsubjectof bilateralandmultilateraldiplomacy. Humanrightsnormsandvaluesare alsopenetrating moredeeplyinto a growingnumberof nationalsocieties. Bothgovernments andtheiropponentsappealto humanrightsnotonlymuchmorefrequentlybutmorecentrallythanjusta fewdecades ago.Compare,for example,the terms of debate andtherangeof politicaloptionsconsidered nationallyandregionally today in LatinAmerica,Africa,andAsiawith thosein the 1960s and1970s. Thisdoesnotmeanthathumanrightshavebeenenthusiastically embraced onlybecause everywhere. For many,theyarea “defaultoption,”’accepted theleadingcompetitors havebeendelegitimized. Evencynicalusespaytribto humanrights.And as the ute to the moralimperative of a commitment HelsinkiFinalAct illustrates, suchnormscantakeon anindependent life of theirown,with consequences verydifferentfromthoseintendedby cynical endorsers. Theprominence of humanrightsin contemporary international societyis notunrelated to theirendorsement by theworld’sleadingpower,theUnited States,and its principalallies.The UniversalDeclarationmodel,however, alsoresponds to someof themostimportantsocialandpoliticalaspirations of individuals, families,andgroupsin mostcountries of theworld.Human rightsdominatepolitical debate not onlybecause of thesupportof materially dominantpowersbut alsobecause a wide rangeof states,groups,and at leastquasi-voluntarily acceptsthem.They haveauthority,as individuals

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well asthebackingof force,andthushavebecomeinternationally hegemonic in a Gramscian senseof theterm. A N OVERLAPPING CONSENSUSON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS JohnRawlsdistinguishes “comprehensive religious,philosophical, or moral doctrines”from “political conceptions of justice.”8Becausethe latter address onlythepoliticalstructure of society,defined(asfar aspossible) independent of anyparticularcomprehensive doctrine,adherents of different comprehensive doctrinesmayreachan “overlapping consensus” on a politicalconception of justice.9I will arguethat thereis an international overlapping consensus on theUniversalDeclarationmodel.’o Theideaof overlapping (ratherthancomplete)political(ratherthanmoral or religious)consensus offersa plausibleanswerto the question“How is it possiblethattherecanbe a stableandjustsocietywhosefreeandequalcitizensaredeeplydividedby conflictingandevenincommensurable religious, philosophical, and moraldoctrines?”ll This answerseemsespeciallyattracworld skepticalof foundations. It alsohas special tive in a “postmodern” attractions for a culturallyand politicallydiversepluralistinternational society. Moral theoriesand othercomprehensive doctrineshave rarely (until recently)beenfoundedonhumanrights.For example,humanrights,despite theirpoliticalprominence, haveplayeda tinypartin thehistoryof (Western) moraltheory.IZNonetheless, humanrightscan be relativelyeasilyderived frommanymoraltheories;for example,they canbe seenas encodedin or derivedfromthenaturallaw, aspoliticalmeansto furtherhumangood(utility), or as politicalinstitutionsdesignedto producevirtuouscitizens.The increasing politicalprominenceof humanrightsoverthe pastfew decades hasled moreandmoreadherents of a growingrangeof comprehensive doctrinesto endorsehumanrights-but (only) as a politicalconception of justice.For example,Muslimsof variouspoliticalpersuasions in manypartsof the Islamicworld havein recentdecadesdevelopedIslamicdoctrinesof humanrightsthatarestrikinglysimilarin substance to theUniversalDeclaration.” Althoughinternationally recognized humanrights“donotdependonany particularcomprehensive religiousdoctrineof humannature,”I4theyarenot compatiblewith all comprehensive doctrines.Claimssuchas thosein the covenantsthat “theserightsderivefrom the inherentdignityof the human person”or in theViennaDeclarationthat“all humanrightsderivefromthe dignityandworthinherentin the humanperson”setthe rangeof possible comprehensive doctrines withinan overlapping consensus. Thelink between

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humanrightsand comprehensive doctrines,althoughloose,is a matterof substance, not justproceduralagreement. Certaincomprehensive doctrines arein principleexcludedfromtheconsensus. Mostimportant,humanrights, because theyareheldequallyby all humanbeings,areincompatible with all fundamentally inegalitarian comprehensive doctrines.

EQUAL CONCERN A N D RESPECT Elsewhere,l5 drawingheavilyon RonaldDworkin,I6I haveshownthat the full list of rightsin the UniversalDeclarationand the covenants is easily derivedfrom the requirement that statestreat eachcitizenwith equalconcernandrespect.Here I will arguethatthepracticeof equalandinalienable rightsheld by all humanbeingscanbe seenasa politicalconception of justicebasedonequalconcernandrespectthathasbeenaccepted in significant measurefor intrinsicor moralreasons, notjustasa modusvivendi.” Humanrightsare bothconstitutive andregulativenorms.We are most immediately familiarwith theirregulativeaspects: “No oneshallbe subjectedto tortureo r t o cruel,inhumano r degrading treatmento r punishment”;“Everyonehasthe right to work, to free choiceof employment, to just andfavorableconditions of work andto protectionagainstunemployment.”Evenmoreimportant, though,humanrightsconstitute individuals as a particularkind of politicalsubject,ascitizensentitledto a government that will recognize,implement,andprotecttheir humanrights.By definingthe requirements and limits of legitimategovernment, they constitute statesfit to governrights-holding citizens. The equalityof all humanbeingsleads“naturally”to a politicalemphasis onautonomy. To justifydenyingor severelyrestricting individualautonomy almostnecessarily involvesan appealto inequality.Equaland autonomous rights-bearing individualsare entitledto makefundamentalchoicesabout what constitutes the goodlife (for them),with whomthey associate, and how.The statemusttreatsuchindividuals with equalconcernandrespect. A list of (humanandlegal)rightsreflectsa particularunderstanding of the meaningof equalconcernandrespect,basedon a substantive conception of humandignity,of the conditionsrequiredfor humanflourishing.Human rightspromiseto (re)shape politicaland socialrelationsso that this moral visionwill be realized.Equal,inalienablerightsheldby all againststateand societyprovidea mechanism to realizea world of equaland autonomous humanbeings.The effectiveimplementation of the specifiedrightswill producethe envisioned person/life(assuming a certaincoherence andpracticality in thatvision). Theunderlyingvisionof humanpossibilities in theUniversalDeclaration modelcannotbe separated from the politicalprinciplesand institutions by

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whichthosepossibilities areto berealized.Humanrightsthusaresimultaneouslya “utopian”visionanda setof institutions-equalandinalienable rights-for realizingatleastanapproximation of thatvision.Thesubstantive of this particular“realisticutopia’”*go a long way toward attractions explaining thehegemonic powerof theUniversalDeclaration model.

DEFINING LIBERALISM Equalconcernandrespect,understood as a politicalconception of justice, canbeendorsed by a varietyof comprehensive doctrines. I turnnowto one, to an increasliberalism.In so doing,the chaptermovesfrom description ingly prescriptiveargument.Startingfrom the commonassociation of humanrightswith “Westernliberalism,”bothin theirhistoricaldevelopmentandin contemporary politicalpractice,I arguethat(a particulartype of) liberalismprovidesa strongnormativefoundation for the substance of the Universal Declaration modelandfor itscontinuing refinement andelaborationin thecomingdecades. setof orientations and Although“liberalism”is a complexandcontested to saythatit is rootedin a commitment values,it is relativelyuncontroversial to liberty,freedom,or, in theformulation I prefer,autonomy. Moreparticularly,liberalsgivecentralpoliticalplaceto individualautonomy, ratherthan thelibertyof society,thestate,or othercorporateactors.Liberalsseeindifor vidualsasentitledto “govern”theirlives,to makeimportantlife choices themselves, within limitsconnected primarilywith the mutualrecognition of equalopportunities for others. Liberalismalsois speciallycommitted to equality-althoughmostliberal ultimately (andnonliberal)theoriesandall liberal(andnonliberal)societies permitsubstantial economic, social,or politicalinequality.Libertyis seen not asa special privilegeof anelitebutas(in principle)available to all. Equal libertyfor all is at theheartof anyliberalpoliticalvision.19 liberaltheoriesalongtwo dimensions: theextentto Figure2.1 categorizes whichtheyemphasize rightsor thegood(or virtueor someothervalue)and thesubstantive “thickness” of theirconceptions of thosecorevalues. JohnLockeis the seminalfigurein the strandof liberalismthat grounds the commitment to equallibertyon natural,or whatwe todaycallhuman, rights.Its rootsgobackat leastto LevelerandDiggerarguments duringthe EnglishCivil War. ImmanuelKant,ThomasPaine,andJean-Jacques Rousseauwereleadingeighteenth-century proponents. JohnRawlsandDworkin areprominentrecentAmericanrepresentatives. Liberalism, however,alsohasa stronghistoricalassociation with utilitarianism,a good-based theory.The rootsof thistraditionrun backat leastto

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Good Based

Thick

Figure 2.1

A Typologyof Liberal Theories

ThomasHobbes,buttheseminalfigureisJeremy Bentham. It wasthedominantvisionof liberalismin Britainin the nineteenthcentury.A microeconomic version underliescontemporary“neoliberal” market-oriented economicreforms. liberaldefenseof theUniverMy purpose hereis to advancea rights-based sal Declarationmodel.Good-basedconceptions, however,makehuman rightsat besta second-order or derivativepoliticalprinciple.Therefore, althoughmanygood-based liberalsparticipatein theoverlapping consensus on international humanrights,theirviewswill not be considered here. In fact, microeconomic, utilitarianneoliberalismis fundamentally opposedto the liberalhumanrightsperspectiveI defend.Its logic of efficiencyis aggregate,and thuscollectivist,in sharpcontrastto the logic of individualhumanrights20Neoliberalequalityinvolvespoliticalindifference to competingpreferences-unbiased treatmentin the marketplace-rather thanguaranteed access to essentialgoods,services, andopportunities. Neoliberal structuraladjustment is very differentfrom the welfarestatesof EuropeandNorthAmericawithwhichtheUniversalDeclarationmodelhas (rightly)beenspeciallyassociated. Turningto theseconddimension of ourtypology,therangeof recognized rights,threeimportantcontemporary variantsof rights-based liberalismcan be identified.At the end pointsof the continuumare what I label “European”(or socialdemocratic) or “minimalist”(or libertarian)liberalism,with the “American”variantlying somewhere in themiddle.

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A liberalismcompatible with theUniversalDeclarationmodelmustbe stronglyegalitarian,mustactivelyembracean extensive systemof economic andsocialrights,andmustreflecta robust(procedural andsubstantive) conceptionof democracy.21 The Europeanwelfarestateis the leadingpractical exemplarof sucha position,especiallyin itssocialdemocratic conception. It is distinguished by a dual emphasison the equalenjoymentof all human rightsby all membersof the politicalcommunityand an extensivelist of economicandsocialrights.All internationally recognizedhumanrightsare seenas entitlements of individuals-socialandpoliticalclaimsthat impose dutieson thestateandsociety-rather thanmereliberties.Evenwith recent welfarestateretrenchments, all the statesof WesternEuropelie towardthe topleft of figure2.1. At thebottomleft of thefigureliesa minimalistliberalism that emphasizes individualpersonallibertiesand includesonly a short list of economicand socialrights.Somecirclesrefer to this as “classical” liberalism.In the UnitedStates,it is perhapsmostneutrallydescribed as “libertarian.” Minimalistliberalism’struncatedlist of humanrightsis substantively incompatible with the UniversalDeclarationmodel.Whateverits historical or philosophical merits,it is bestseenas a critiqueof the substance of the UniversalDeclarationmodel,despitethe considerable overlapon civil and politicalrights.For the pasthalf century,no liberaldemocraticregimein WesternEuropeandNorthAmerica,noteventheUnitedStates,haspursued libertarianminimalistpolicies. An important“intermediate” rights-based perspective emphasizes personaland civil liberties,a modestlist of economicand socialrightsto be This providedby a welfare state,and primarilyproceduraldemocracy. “American”visionis muchmorewillingthanthelibertarianto restrictpersonallibertiesin orderto remedyinvidiousinequalities. It alsois somewhat more sympathetic to the idea of stateactionto assureminimumaccessto socialandeconomicgoods,services,andopportunities. The Americanwelfarestateis muchlessrobustthanthoseof Europe.In theUnitedStatesthis perspective is usuallyreferredto as“liberal,”pejorativelyby theright.I will treatit asthe thinnestplausibleliberalconception of theUniversalDeclarationmodel. “American”and“European”liberalismsarebothcommittedto a democracythatoperatesonlywithin thesubstantive requirements of equalhuman rightsfor all andto a welfarestatethatsupplements a marketsystemof productionwith substantial “welfarestate”redistribution, againin orderto assureequalhumanrightsfor all.22I will useliberalwithoutqualification to referto thissharedpoliticalidealof theliberaldemocratic welfarestateand theunderlyingvisionof equalconcernandrespect.

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LIBERAL APPROACHES TO GROUP DIFFERENCE A standard,and theoreticallyimportant,complaintagainstliberalismis its excessive individualism. Most liberals,andtheUniversalDeclarationmodel, will dogenerallydenyhumunrightsto groups.Theyassumethatindividuals exercisetheir rightscollectively,as membersof both“natural”andvoluntary groups,not asatomisticor deracinated individuals. All liberalregimesin practicerecognizelegal rightsof groupsranging from businesses and tradeunions,to churches and civic associations, to bowlingleaguesandhuntclubs.A greatrangeof internationally recognized humanrightsare of specialinterestand valueto marginalizedor despised groups.For example,freedomsof thought,conscience, religion,opinion, andexpression protectgroup,aswell asindividual,difference.Familyrights, includingtherightof parentsto choosethe kind of educationgivento their children,protectthetransmission of groupbeliefsandpractices. Nonetheless, issuesthat somesee as mattersof “group rights” are addressed by liberalsand by the UniversalDeclarationmodelprimarily I arguethat throughindividual rights. In thisandthefollowingtwo sections, a liberalindividualrightsstrategyto remedyingthe sufferingsof members of despised, oppressed, or disadvantaged groupsremainsviablein the contemporaryworld.

Nondiscrimination Liberalapproaches to differencespana continuum lyingbetweentwovery differentkindsof communitarianism. At oneend are communitarians that allowor requirethe stateto imposecivil andlegaldisabilitiesagainstmembersof certaingroups.At theotherendarevisionsof a societyof “separate but equal”groups.Wherecommunitarians seeindividualsandthe social definedin significantmeasureby optionsavailableto them,asappropriately their groupmembership, liberalsarguethat groupaffiliationsoughtto be largelyirrelevantto the rightsand opportunities availableto individual^.^^ Eachindividual,irrespective of race,gender,religion,or anyothergroup affiliation,shouldbe treatedequally. Nondiscrimination is thusthe liberalstartingpointfor addressing issues of groupdifference.The UniversalDeclarationmodel’sgeneralprohibition of discrimination is powerfullysupplemented by a setof civil liberties(e.g., rightsto freedomof expression, belief,and assembly) that specifyparticularly importantactivitieswherethe statemustrespectindividualliberty, whetherthatlibertyis expressed in privateor in public,aloneor in association with others.

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We candistinguishthreeidealtypeinterpretations of the requirement of nondiscrimination, whichI will calltoleration,equalprotection,andmulticulturalism.Tolerationrequiresnot imposingdisabilitieson individuals basedon (voluntary,ascriptive,or imposed)groupmembershipor disapprovedbehaviorassociated with a group.24 It involvesa principledpolitical decisionnot to imposespecialburdenson (membersof) despisedgroups. But theymaystill be marginalized andsociallyexcluded. Equalprotectionrequiresactiveeffortsto ensurethat membersof disadvantagedor despised groupsenjoythe(equal)rightsthattheyformallyhold. At minimumit involvesan active effort to assurethat peopleare not excludedfrom goods,services,andopportunities thatwouldbe availableto themweretheynot membersof despisedor disadvantaged groups.In its strongerforms-affirmativeactionandevencertainkindsof reversediscrimination-equal protectionseeksto assurethat membersof targetedgroups achievefull legalandpoliticalincorporation intosociety. Equalprotection,however,allowsa neutral,evennegative,evaluationof diversity.Multiculturalism positivelyvaluesdiversity,implyingpoliciesthat recognize,celebrate,preserve,or fostergroupdifferences.Ratherthan attemptto abstractfrom groupdifferences, asin tolerationand equaltreatment,thosedifferencesarehighlightedandpositivelyvalued,within a generalcontextof equalconcernandrespect.

Liberal Neutrality and the Protectionof Difference Its respectfor andendeavors to assuretherealizationof thehumanrights of the of its citizensdefinethe legitimacyof the liberalstate.The purposes statethusordinarilyaresubordinated to therightsof itscitizens.Thissubordinationis oftenexpressed in theclaimthattheliberalstatemustbe neutral with respectto thevalues,purposes,andlife plansof its citizens,insofaras theyarerootedin protectedautonomous exercises of humanrights.This formulationof therequirement of nondiscrimination placestheemphasis on respectfor individualautonomy. Liberalneutrality,however,is not a signof indifferenceto the decisions of citizens.It reflectsan activecommitment,embeddedin the principleof equalconcernand respect,to fosteringcitizens’enjoymentof their rights. Neutralityoperates onlywithin the boundaries of humanrights. To requireidenticaltreatmentof all individualor groupdifferences would be morallyperverse.Consider,for example,the consequences of tolerating pedophiles, violentracists,thosewho derivepleasurefromkidnappingand torturingstrangers, andreligiousmissionaries committedto killing all those they cannotconvert.Suchdifferencesfall outsidethe rangeof the overlapping consensus and thusshouldnot be treatedneutrallyby a liberalstate.

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As CharlesTaylornotes,“liberalismcan’tandshouldn’tclaimcomplete. . .

neutral it^."^^

Politicalliberalism’soverlappingconsensus doesnot (and shouldnot) includeall possibleviews.“Liberalismis not a possiblemeetinggroundfor all cultures,butis thepoliticalexpression of onerangeof cultures,andquite incompatible with otherranges.”26 Neutrality,in otherwords,shouldbe seenasan expression of thecorevalueof equalconcernandrespect. Theliberalstateis requiredto beneutralwith respectto (i.e.,notdiscriminateagainst)exercises of humanrights.It neednotbe neutralto thoseactivitiesnot protectedby humanrights.It is requirednot to be neutraltowards activitiesthatinfringeor violatehumanrights. For example,a (liberal)statemustnot discriminateagainstany religion butneednotbeneutraltoward(showequalconcernandrespectfor) all conceptionsof thepurposeof sport(whicharenot ordinarilyunderstood to be protectedby internationally recognizedhumanrights).Equalconcernand respectfor all politicalbeliefsis required,but not for all beliefsaboutthe originof life. Creationism basedon a literalreadingof Genesis,for example, mustbe protectedinsofarasit reflectsan exerciseof humanrightsto freedomsof religionandspeech.It neednot-probably shouldnot-be treated equallyin scienceclasses or naturalhistorymuseums. Eachstate/society hasconsiderable latitudein how it treats,for example, particularminorityreligions.It wouldbe completelyconsistent with internationalhumanrightsstandards to (merely)tolerateminorityreligionu, while activelysupporting themajorityreligionandminorityreligionb. Such decisions fall withinthemarginof appreciation left to statesby thebroadly statednormsof theUniversalDeclaration.Statesmaychooseto treatall religionsidentically-for example,no statesupportfor any, as in the United States-but thatis requiredneitherby theUniversalDeclarationmodelnor by liberalism,asI am usingthattermhere. As MichaelWalzernicelyputsit, liberalismthusunderstood is “permisIt allowsfor a statecommittedto the survivaland sive,not determinative.” flourishingof a particularnation,culture,or religion,or of a (limited)setof nations,cultures,and religions-so long as the basicrightsof citizenswho havedifferentcommitments or no suchcommitments at all arep r o t e ~ t e d . ~ ~ withinliberalism.Theprotection Thereis notmerelya placefor difference of (manyformsof) differenceis one of its mostimportantpoliticalobjectives. Freedomof Association and GuaranteedParticipation

Nondiscrimination, however,is only onepart of the liberalapproachto difference.Remedyingsystematic discrimination usuallyrequirescollective action,whichin theUniversalDeclarationmodelis enabledby rightsto free-

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domof association and democratic politicalparticipation.Furthermore, activeparticipation in society-includinga right to work, understood as a right to economicparticipation-is an intrinsicallyimportantvalue,an essential aspectof (personal or group)autonomy. Nondiscrimination protectsa sphereof personal/group libertyandoffers protectionagainstsufferingimposedfor groupmembership. Freedomof association andrightsof participation makeindividualmembers of thepublic entitledto act individuallyand collectively,with othersof their own choosing, to realizetheirvisionsof thegoodlife. Takentogether,nondiscrimination andfreedomof association, broadly for understood, providea wide-rangingand coherentset of protections groupsandindividuals rootedin the core(liberalandhumanrights)values of equalityandautonomy. Thisliberalapproach is notwithoutdifficulties. modelsgroup Freedomof association, because it is a rightof individuals, membership as a “voluntary”exerciseof the protectedautonomyof its members. Descriptively, thisis obviously inaccurate for groupswhoseidentity is in significant measure externallyimposed. It mayalsobe problematic groupsmarkedby biologicalsignssuchas skincoloror sex-although,it mustbe emphasized, raceandgenderaresocialconstructs, not naturalcategories. Nonetheless, the liberalapproachhasconsiderable leverageevenin such cases.Whenindividualsaresubjected to sufferingwithoutanyvoluntary association with thegroupin question, nondiscrimination oftenwill provide the appropriate remedy.When,for example,womenor racialminorities to realizetheirinterests or protecttheirrights,freebeginto actcollectively domof association usuallymovesto theforefrontof thestruggle for equality andsocialjustice.

GROUP HUMAN RIGHTS: A SKEPTICAL VIEW Withoutdenyingthe achievements andattractions of thisliberalapproach, the chapters by Eva BremsandJenniferJackson-Preece arguefor supplementingit with grouphumanrights.In thissection,I posesevenquestions thatI thinkshouldleadusto be extremely waryof sucha move28 1. How dowe identifythegroupsthat(oughtto) holdhumanrights? Not all groupshavehumanrights.Consider,for example,states,multinational corporations, gangs,andbarbershop quartets. New substantive (individualor group)rightstypicallyemergeasresponses to the appearance or recognition of new “standardthreats”to humandig11ity.2~ Consider,for example, theriseof thepracticeof disappearances in the 1970sandthe ensuing international response. Thisstandard threatprovides a self-limiting character to suchexpansions of thelist of internationally rec-

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ognizedhumanrights.But grouphumanrightsare distinguished by right holder,not the substance of the threadright. Thereis thusa seriousdanger of excessive proliferationof humanrights. Suppose thatwe wereto agreethatgrouphumanrightsfor, say,minorities wouldbe desirable.By whatcriteriacanwe restrictgrouphumanrightsonly to minorities? This is not necessarily an intractable problem,but it is an importantone to which advocatesof grouprightsseemto havelargely ignored. The mostobviouscriterion-namely, a longhistoryof ongoing,systematic suffering-would yield grouphumanrightsfor women;racial,ethnic, religious,andlinguisticminorities;indigenous peoples;homosexuals; people with disabilities;the aged;children;and the poor,to mentionjust someof themoreprominentgroups.Prettymucheveryoneexceptprosperous white males-and manyof themaswell-would havegrouphumanrights.Sucha radicalexpansionof right holdersand associated claimsof rightsseemsto me extremelyproblematic. 2. Havingidentifiedgroupx as a potentialholderof humanrights,what x have?Certainlyit is not enough particularsubstantive rightsdoedshould thatx wantsr in orderto establisha (human)right of x to r.30 O n what groundcanwe saythatothersower to x as a matterof (human) rights? Themostlimitedmovewouldbeto recognizethoserightsneededto enjoy already-recognized humanrights.These,however,wouldbe onlytempoto rary, remedialmeasures andthusprobablybestseenaspracticalmeasures A moreinteresting(becausemoregenuine)class achievenondiscrimination. of grouprightswouldappealinsteadto theparticularcharacterof thegroup or to valuesor attributes notalreadyrecognized. Claimsof threatened values thatmeritgrouphumanrightsprotectionneedto be evaluatedon a case-bycasebasis.My pointfor now simplyis that in orderto avoiddebasingthe currencyof humanrightswith a flood of new, unregulatedcoinage,advocatesof suchrightsoughtto facea considerable burdenof proof. 3. Who exercises grouprights?Rightswork not simplyby beingvoluntarily respectedby duty bearersbut, mostimportant,by beingclaimedor otherwiseexercisedby rightholders.Governments exercisethe rightsof states;the rightsof businesscorporations, by shareholders, directors,and managers.Who ought-and is able-to exercise,for example,minority rights,understood asrightsof a group? The problemsof groupagencymay be modestfor small,concentrated, andhomogenous groupswith a strongtraditionof collectiveaction.(Indigenouspeoplescomereadilyto mind.) Whenthe groupis largelyvoluntary (e.g.,somereligiousminorities),theofficersof theassociation (e.g.,a clerical hierarchy)may be a plausibleagent.But wherethe groupis “natural,” ascribed,or coercivelydefinedandmaintained,agencyis likely to be highly problematic,especiallywhenthe groupis largeo r heterogene~us.~’ The

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“solution”of havinggrouprightsexercised by individuals or associations of groupmembers,beyondits irony,raisesseriousquestions ast o whether of individualrights. suchrightsreallyaregrouprights,ratherthanexercises 4. How dowe handleconflicts of rights? Althoughall rightsconflictwith at leastsomeotherrightsor importantsocialinterests, introducinggroup rightswill notonlyincrease thenumberof conflicts butwill createcompetitionbetweenqualitatively differentkindsof rightsthatis likelyto beunusually intense.How shouldwe respondto nativeNorthAmericantribesthat discriminate againstwomenwho claimequaltreatment? Relatedissuesmay beraisedby definingwhois (andis not)in the group. Especially problematic froma humanrightsperspective areeffortsto blockor punishexitfromthe group. 5. Are the purportedgrouprightsnecessary? Is the problema lackof grouprightsor ratherinadequate effortsto implementindividualhuman rights? Mostoftenit seemsto me thelatter.Oncemore,theburdenof proof oughtto lie with advocates of the rights. 6. Why shouldwe expectgrouprightsto succeed whereindividualrights havefailed?If a government refusesto respectthe individualrightsof a despised minority,often-althoughnot always(discussed later)-it will be hardto imagineit beingconvinced to treatthosepeoplebetteras members of a group.In fact,if grouprightsemphasize the differencebetween“us” and“them,”mightthisnotleadto worsetreatment? 7. Are grouprightsthebestwayto protector realizetheinterests, values, of collectiverights. . . oftenseemto or desiresof a group?“Proponents movein a rathercursoryway from the claimthat communities are good thingsto the claimthat communities haverights.”32 We mustdemandan argumentfor protectingthevaluein questionthroughthemechanism of rights.In particular,we mustaskwhetherthe globalrecognition of a new grouphumanrightis eithernecessary or desirable. At thispoint,we begin to circlebackto thequestions of whichgroupsoughtto beaddedto a list of internationally recognized holdersof whichhumanrights. Noneof theseproblemsis fatal.Many arelargelymattersof “negative externalities,” undesirable unintended consequences, wherethe required calculusof costsandbenefitsmayvarydramatically with circumstances. Some grouphumanrightsmay overcome all of theseproblems.(LaterI suggest that thisis truefor at leastsomeindigenous peoples.)Nonetheless, I think thatthepreceding discussion doescautionprimafacieskepticism toward all) group (althoughnot automaticrejectionof) most(but not necessarily humanrightsclaims.33At theveryleast,we shouldinsistonclarityin specifyingthe “gap”in the UniversalDeclarationmodelthatis beingaddressed andcarefulattentionto unintended consequences of the proposed remedy.

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WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES In thissectionI brieflyexaminehumanrightsclaimsfor threegroupsthat receiveextended discussion in laterchapters: women,minorities, andindigenouspeoples. Women systematic suffering Althoughwomenhavea sadhistoryof near-universal, in virtuallyeveryareaof the globe,the idea of grouphumanrightsfor womenis fatallyundermined by problemsof collective agencyfor a diverse It is alsounclearwhatrightswomen groupthatincludes half of humanity.34 asa groupmightbe heldto possess. Unlesswe acceptgenderrolesthatpostulatequalitative differences betweenmenandwomen,all the obvious candidatesfor specialwomen’srightsseembestformulatedin gender-neutral terms.35 For example,family rights,reproductive rights,or protectionagainst domestic violencearenot specialrightsof women.Althoughthe majority of adultvictimsof violencein thehomearewomen,thisnomoremakesprotection againstdomesticviolencea (group)right of womenthanthe factthat themajorityof thoseexercising (orsuffering violations of) tradeunionrights a (group)rightof men.The aremenmakestherightto bargaincollectively principlein eachcaseis independent of sexor gender:nooneshouldbesubpartner;everyoneis ject to violentassaultby anyone,includinga domestic entitledto bargaincollectively. In practice, womenin all countries continueto suffer(moreor lesssevere) us women.But thissimplydoesnot entailthe deprivations andindignities appropriateness, let alonethe necessity, of grouphumanrights.Compare workerswho sufferasworkersandpoliticaldissidents who sufferas dissidents.In eachcasethe sufferingarisesfrom coercively imposednormsthat statusgroup. createa subordinate Let us grantwomenspecialcollectivehumanrights.Why shouldwe expecttheserightsto bebetterimplemented thanalready-established rights? of collective agency,such Especially in lightof theinsurmountable problems rightswouldmostlikely turnoutto be, at best,irrelevantabstractionswhen they were not usedby patriarchalforcesto divert attentionand resources fromeffortsto establish truenondiscrimination andequalparticiof society. pationfor womenin all aspects Minorities

To evadecontroversy overthetermminorities:6I will followarticle27 of theICCPR andrestrictdiscussion to ethnic,religious,andlinguistic minori-

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ties.”Theestablished international approach to minorityprotectionrestson the dualpillarsof nondiscrimination and“measures to protectandpromote the separateidentityof the minoritygroups.”3*Protectingand promoting minorityidentity,and its politicalexpressions in the form of minority autonomy, is theprincipallocusof potentialgrouprightsclaims. Religiousminorities,however,presenta relativelyeasycasefor a liberal, individualrightsapproach. Freedomsof religion,expression, andassociation ordinarilywill providea contextfor perpetuating religiousidentity,particularly in conjunction with established international humanrightsnormsthat providefamilycontroloverthetypeof education childrenre~eive.~’ Furthermore,“church”structures, whicharereadilyconceptualized in termsof freedomof association, are an obviousmechanismfor collectiveaction, withouttheneedfor additionalgrouprights. Ethnicand linguisticminoritiesmay posemore seriousproblems.Languagerightsfor linguisticminoritiesmay be especiallyproblematicbecause almostall aspects of publiclife aretouchedby language.4o If serioussocialor with useof a minoritylanguage,mere economicdisabilitiesare associated tolerationis unlikelyto be enoughto preservegroupidentity. Even in thesecases,though,nondiscrimination, freedomof association, andfamilyeducation rightsprovideconsiderable leverage.For example,one couldreadilyarguethatit is discriminatory to provideaccess to publicservices-including schooling-only in a dominantlanguage.Single-language publicmediamightalsobe seenasinvolvinginvidiouslinguisticdiscrimination.Whethersuchmeasures are adequateis an empirical,not a theoretical, issue. of grouprightsfor minoritiesare My sense,however,is thatadvocates likelyto seeth.epreceding paragraphs as“missingthepoint.”Theyareinterestedin protections for groupidentitythat go well beyondthoseprovided by strongandeffectivemeasures of nondiscrimination andfreedomof association. Consider JacobLevy’stypologyof culturalrights:exemptions, assistance, self-government, externalrulesrestrictingnonmembers, internalrulescontrollingmembers,recognitionor enforcement of traditionalrules,minority representation in government bodies,and symbolicacknowledgment of worthor Nondiscrimination andfreedomof association principally encompass measures involvingexemptions, assistance, symbolicacknowledgment,and someformsof externalrules on outsiders.Grouprights claims,by contrast,aremostlikely to lie in theothercategories. Are all minorities,as a matterof humanrights,entitledto, for example, self-government or guaranteed grouprepresentation in governmental bodies?A just societycertainlymay legitimatelychooseto grantsomeform of self-government to particularminorities.But is it a humanrightsviolationif

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thesocietydoesnot?I canseenoreasonwhy minorities,or anyothergroup, shouldbe universallyentitledto self-government, or evenguaranteed group representation. And I amawareof nomorallyattractiveprinciplethatwould grantsuchrightsto minoritiesthatdoesnot alsograntthemto an impractical largenumberof othergroupsaswell. Shouldminoritycommunities haveguaranteed legalrightsto discipline members? Again,thepreciseformof thequestionis important.We areinterestedherein legalrights.(Membersof the communityare alreadyfree to shunthosewhoviolategroupnorms.)Because we aredealingwith a putative humanright,theissueis notwhetherit is permissible or desirable in particular casesto recognizesuchlegalrights,but whetherall minoritieseverywhereareentitledto suchpowersovertheirmembers. Givenspaceconstraints, let me simplysuggestthatsuchrightsarelikely to beleastproblematic whentheminoritycanbeunderstood asa freeassociationof individuals.The groupreadilyconceives voluntarymembership as implyingacceptance of discipline.By allowingeffectiveexit options,conflictsbetweenthehumanrightsof individualsandthegrouprightsof minoritiescanbe moderated to perhapsacceptable levels. Underany otherinterpretation, individualrightswouldbe subordinated to the grouprightsof the minority.I can seeno reasonwhy minorities shouldhavesuchsuperiorrights,whichare,I thinkrightly,deniedto other groups.In anycase,if thisis wherethe argumenttakesus,we areno longer talkingaboutmodestsupplements to the UniversalDeclarationmodel. Thesearemajorchanges thatrequirethesortof argumentthatfew advocates of grouphumanrightsfor minoritiesevenattemptto make. I am not, let me repeat,challenging theideaof minorityrightsas theyare alreadyestablished in themajorinternational humanrightsinstruments (i.e., asindividualrightsthatprovidespecialprotections to membersof minority groups).I am not evenchallenginggrouprightsof minorities.For example, the Singaporean practiceof reservinglegislativeseatsfor representatives of Hindu and Malay communities clearlyis (and oughtto remain)defensible onhumanrightsgrounds. Rather,I am questioning theideaof grouphumun rightsfor minorities. Singapore’ssystemof reservedlegislativeseats,or India’s muchmore extensivesystemof reservations for (membersof) scheduled castesand tribes,fallswithintherealmof discretionallowedstatesin discharging their humanrightsobligationsand coordinating themwith the pursuitof other importantsocialpurposes. Althoughsuchpracticeshavebeencontroversial, bothnationallyand internationally,they are not clearlyprohibitedby the UniversalDeclarationmodel.But neitheraretheyrequired.And it wouldbe a seriouserrorto view theabsence of suchreservations-oranyothergroup rightsof minorities-as a violationof humanrights.

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Protecting Group Identity Thisliberalapproach to differencemay,it mustbeacknowledged, leadto the weakening, or evendemise,of someminority(andothergroup)identities.Groupidentities, however,arenotnow,andI thinkoughtnot become, subjects of international humanrightsprotection. Only individualautonthatmustberespected by omygivesrise,andvalue,to thesortsof identities others.Any particularidentityis entitledto protection onlybecause it is an expression of therightsandvaluesof thosewhocarryit. Othersmay chooseto valuedifference for its own sakeor for the social benefitsthatdiversityprovides.They arerequired,asa matterof human rights,onlyto respectthe decisions thatpeoplechooseto acton for themselves,withinthelimitsof theirrights.Neitherindividuallynor collectively indido othershavea rightto imposeanyparticularidentityon a resistant vidualor groupbecause, for example,their ancestors borethat identityor because particularsocialrolesarewidelyendorsed. In almostall societies almostall adultshavemultipleidentities.It is for suchreal,andrealisticallycomplex,humanbeings42to balancethevaried rolesandhistoriesthat shapetheirlife. Suchchoicesare,of course,conditionedand thusin some(relativelyuninteresting) sensenot “free.” But if equaltreatmentandfreedomof association arefully realized,thosechoices canappropriately be seenasautonomous exercises of internationally recognizedhumanrights. In a socialandpoliticalenvironment markedby equaltreatmentandfreeto compete domof association, groupsof all sortshavea “fair” opportunity in shapingthe identitiesof “its” members.If a particularidentityis valued sufficiently, it will survive,perhapseventhrive.If not,thenit will not.That is the way it should The only alternative is to saythat identitiesare thingsthat canrightlybe imposedon thosewho reject,deny,or seekto modifythem.This is not an extension of the UniversalDeclarationmodel but a rejectionof its foundations. Peopleshouldbe-and throughtherightsof nondiscrimination, freedom recognizedhuman of association, and a varietyof otherinternationally rightsare-entitled to develop,express, andmodifytheir identities,acting bothindividuallyand~ollectively.4~ No particularidentityoughtto be entitled to specialprotectionas a matterof humanrightsbeyondthat which derivesfromthe(individualandcollective) choicesof its members. Nonetheless, whereequaltreatmentandeffectivefreedomof association are systematically violated,theremay be no viablealternative to minority self-government. Whereit canbe plausiblyarguedthat equaltreatmentis decidedlylesslikely withoutminorityself-government, then that may indeedbe the besthumanrightsstrategy.But thisdoesnot makeminority self-government a humanright.Rather,it is a localpolitical decision about

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meansof implementing internationally recognized humanrights,withinthe marginof discretionallowedby international humanrightsnorms.Such instances of minorityself-government arebestunderstood as extensions of the right to nondiscrimination, rathera new classof humanrights.When suchrightscometo be implementedterritorially,turningan oppressed minorityinto a potentiallyoppressing majority(e.g., Kosovo),vigilanceis requiredto minimizeunintended negativehumanrightsconsequences. IndigenousPeoples

Indigenous peoplesmaybeseenasposinganextremeexampleof justsuch a situationwhereeffectiveequaltreatment, perhapsevensurvival,requiresa grouprightto self-government. To simplifythediscussion, let usimaginean indigenous communitywith thefollowingcharacteristics.45 The community is smallif nota face-to-face society,at leastonein whichthelineageof most andculturmembersis knownto mostothermembers.It is geographically ally largelyseparate from the mainstream society.Mainstreaminstitutions thereare thusappearto mostmembersof thecommunityasalien.Because alsoregularcontactswith the “outside”world,we canthinkof thosewho residein the communityas havingchosento stay.Finally,the indigenous communityis fragile,in the sensethatwell-established mainstream institutions(e.g., privatepropertyin land) wouldas an unintendedconsequence radicallyalterthecommunity’s way of life in a fashionthatmostmembers wouldrejectif givena choice. In suchcircumstances, it seemsplausible to arguethattheindigenous communityhaschosena way of life. That choicedemands, on its face,a certain degreeof respectfrom mainstream societyandinstitutions, extendingin at leastsomecasesto accommodation andprotectionof thechosenway of life. In fact,in theconditions I haveoutlinedtherewouldappearto benoeffective alternativeto grouprightsinvolvingbothconsiderable self-governmentwhichwouldbefacilitatedby thegroup’ssmallsize,geographical concentration,andculturalhistory-and restrictions ontheactivities of nonmembers, in lightof thefragilityof theindigenous communityanditswayof life.Furthermore,thenegativeexternalities of theseparticulargrouprightsaremodest, imposingsevereburdenson relativelyfew outsidersin returnfor immensebenefitsto thegroupandits members. The broadersignificance of this “exception”bearsnoting.Evenif most claimsfor grouphumanrightsareprofoundlydefective,no particularclaim canberejectedwithoutexamining itsmeritsin detail.Evenwhereskepticism is theappropriate generalattitude,every claim for recognizing a newhuman rightdeserves carefulscrutiny. Systematic threatsto humandignitychangeovertime. In addition,our understandings of thenatureof thelife worthyof a humanbeing,andof the

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practicalmeaningof equalconcernandrespect,may change.AlthoughI am criticalof mostproposedadditionsto the list of internationally recognized humanrights,I am profoundlysympathetic to the collectiveprojectof this volumeof exploringgapsin andneededadditionsto theUniversalDeclaration model.The UniversalDeclarationand the covenants may be (for us, now) authoritative, evendefinitive.It wouldbe tragic,however,werewe to seethemasthelastwordoninternational humanrights.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE STATE Howeverskepticalof grouphumanrightsonemightbe,we cannotoverlook the deep,althoughusuallyobscured, communitarianism in the Universal Declaration model.As we sawearlier,statesarethenearexclusive instrument for implementing internationally recognized humanrights.The assumed politicalcommunityfor the practiceof humanrights,in the currenthegemonicunderstanding, is the sovereignterritorialstate.In effect,onegroup, thestate,is privilegedoverall others.And evenin thepost-ColdWar world, statesovereignty generallyinsulates governments thatfail to discharge their humanrightsobligations fromcoerciveinternational action. The UniversalDeclarationmodelin effecttransformshumanrightsinto rightsof citizens,a transformation that is explicitin classical contractarian theoristssuchasHobbesandLocke.Therightsthatoneenjoysthusdepend heavilyon accidentsof birth or residence,especiallyin a world with huge legalandpracticalbarriersto migration.Because life opportunities varyboth dramaticallyandsystematically fromcountryto country,the resultinginequalitiesarelargelyindefensible, on moralgrounds, from a humanrights perspe~tive.~~ The priority given t o statesin the UniversalDeclarationmodelthus shouldbe seenaspracticalratherthanmoralor theoretical, a concession to the international political reality of the primacyof sovereignterritorial states.Ratherthana politicalconception of justicein the strongsenseof a view endorsedfor largelyintrinsicreasons,it is insteada politicalmodus vivendiendorsed largelyfor instrumental reasons. If the UniversalDeclarationmodel’sessentialcharacteris cosmopolitan ratherthannationalist, thechallenge we faceis to pushthehegemonic understanding awayfromthisnearexclusive relianceonstatesfor implementation, to movebeyondthismorallydefectivemodusvivendi.The developing postColdWar practiceof humanitarian intervention, discussed in thechapterby Wheeler,represents onesmallbut significantstepin thatdirection. The limitationsof contemporary practiceshouldnot be underestimated. Eventoday,the bestwe cansayis thathumanitarian intervention in theface

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of genocideor extremehumanitarian emergency is legallypermissible (but not required).As Kosovoclearlyindicates,thepermissible modalitiesof suchintervention remaincontentious. Furthermore, thereseemsto be little evidencethatthisexceptionis spillingoverintoother,morecommonkinds of grossandsystematic humanrightsviolations. Nonetheless, the international immunityof the statehasbeenpunctured. And a strongargumentof an emerging(substantive, not merelyinstrumental) overlappingconsensus can be made.For thesekindsof violations,the relevantcommunityfor protectinghumanrightsseemsto be becomingthe societyof states,supplemented, perhaps,by regionalcommunities. We shouldremember,however,that not all formsof cosmopolitanism havethe same,or evennecessarily positive,humanrightsconsequences. For example,the cosmopolitan visionof certainevangelists of globalcapitalism isprofoundly problematic froma humanrightsperspective. Therefore,without minimizingthe threatsto humanrightsthat statespose,it is no less importantto rememberthatthe stateis ourprincipalcontemporary mechanismfor implementing and enforcinghumanrights.Most peoplestill enjoy mostof theirinternationally recognized humanrightsthroughtheagencyor mediationof the statesof whichtheyarea national.We thusshouldbe wary of antistatistarguments, suchas thoseby neoliberalinternational financial institutions, until we havebeenconvincedthat an alternativeto stateprovisionof humanrights-civil and politicalrightsno lessthan economicand socialrights-has beenidentifiedandhasplausibleprospects of beingputin place. In summary,I havetried to suggestthat theprincipalhumanrightstasks facingus todaylie not in developing new rightsbut ratherin betterimplementingthe rightsenumerated in the UniversalDeclarationand the covenants. Even in the area of implementation, without denigratingthe possibilities represented by new surpranational institutions, muchmoreis to be gainedby directingourlimitedresources to protectingandperfecting existingstate-based mechanisms. Ratherthansubstantially altertheUniversalDeclarationmodel,thekey to humanrightsprogress in thecomingdecadesliesin morecreative,andmoreeffectiveeffortsby states,citizens,and othernationalandinternational actorsto implementandenforceit.

NOTES 1. For furtherconceptual analysis,seeJackDonnelly,UniversalHumanRights in Theoryand Practice(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,1989),chap.1, and JamesW. Nickel, MakingSenseof HumanRights:Philosophical Reflections on the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1987).

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2. Donnelly,UniversalHumanRights,1-2, 121-22. Althoughthe UnitedStatesis a party 3. Seewww.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. only to the civil andpoliticalcovenant, ideological attackson economicandsocial rightshavelargelydisappeared fromAmericandiplomacy.Furthermore, the recent Americanemphasis on marketsis regularlydefendedby their greatercapacityto delivereconomic welfareandby arguments of long-runinterdependence between economic andpoliticalfreedom.In practice,theUnitedStateshasan extensive welfarestatethatprotectsa wide (althoughby no meansadequate) rangeof economic andsocialrights.Foranargument thateconomic rightshavebeencentralto theWestern liberalapproach to humanrightssinceLocke,seeDonnelly,UniversalHuman Rights,chap.5. 4. For overviews of the international implementation machinery,seeJackDonnelly,International HumanRights,2d ed.(Boulder,Colo.:Westview,1998),chap.4, andDavid?I Forsythe,HumanRightsin International Relations(Cambridge: Camexamination of internabridgeUniversityPress,2000), chap.3. For an authoritative tionalhumanrightsreporting,seePhilip AlstonandJamesCrawford,eds., The Futureof UN HumanRightsTreatyMonitoring(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2000). 5. Mervyn Frost,Ethicsin International Affairs:A Constitutive Theory(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,1996), 104-1 1. 6. Seewww.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. 7. I takethistermfromClausOffe, whousedit at a conference on globalization andhumanrightsat Yale Universityin thespringof 1999. 8. JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1996),xliii-xlv, 11-15, 174-76; andTheLaw of Peoples(Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard UniversityPress,1999),31-32, 172-73. 133-72, 385-96. 9. Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism, 10. My arguments, however,shouldbe readas drawingon, ratherthansimply elaborating, Rawls;asRawlsian,butin somedetailsdifferentfromRawls. 11. Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism, 133. 12. No majormoralphilosopher priorto World War I1 tookhumanrightsas a moralprimitive.More recently,Alan Gewirthstandsas a moderatelyprominent exception thatprovestherule.SeeHumanRights:Essays on Justifcation andApplications(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,1982). 13. See,for example,the Arab Charterof HumanRights,adoptedby the Arab and the Leaguein 1994 (wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/arabhrcharter.html) CairoDeclarationon HumanRightsin Islam(wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ cairodeclaration.htm1). For recentscholarlydiscussions, see,for example,Shaheen Law:Equalbefore SardarAli, GenderandHumanRightsin IslamandInternational Allah, UnequalbeforeMan?(Boston:KluwerLaw International, 2000); Mahmood Monshipouri, Islamism, Secularism, andHumanRightsin theMiddle-East(Boulder, PluralColo.:Rienner,1998);AhmadMoussalli,TheIslamicQuestfor Democracy, ism,andHumanRights(Gainesville: UniversityPressof Florida,2001);andNorani Othman,“GroundingHumanRightsArgumentsin Non-WesternCulture:Shari’a andtheCitizenshipRightsof Womenin a ModernIslamicState,”in TheEastAsian Challengefor HumanRights,ed.JoanneR. BauerandDanielA. Bell (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1999).

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14. Rawls,Law of Peoples,68. AlthoughRawlsrefershereexplicitlyto a shortlist of rightscomposed principallyof life,liberty,property,andformalequality(65),the argumentholdsfor theUniversalDeclarationmodelmoregenerally. Seealso78-81. 15. Donnelly,UniversalHumanRights,71-73. Mass.:HarvardUni16. SeeRonaldDworkin,A Matterof Principle(Cambridge, versityPress,1985),chap.8. 17. For theimportance of thisdistinction, seeRawls,PoliticalLiberalism,145-50. 18. Rawls,Law of Peoples,11. 19. It is oftenarguedthatliberals(andnonliberalsaswell) facean inescapable trade-offbetweenlibertyandequality.Evenif true,thisunderscores thecommitment of liberalismto bothvalues.What distinguishes liberaltheoriesis theircommitment to equallibertyfor all, ratherthan,for example,equalityfor all or libertyfor some. Differentliberaltheorieshavevery differentaccounts of the meaningof “equalliberty for all.” Evenwhereliberalsacceptsubstantial inequality,it requiresspecial defense-Rawls’s “differenceprinciple”( A Theoryof Justice[Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,1971],65-73)is a much-discussed example-and is subject to liberal(as well asnonliberal)critique.Dworkin,Matterof Principle,chap.9, offers an especially forcefulargumentfor thecentralityof equalityto liberalism. 20. SeeJackDonnelly,“HumanRights,Democracy, andDevelopment,” Human RightsQuarterly21 (August1999):608-32, at 626-30. 21. O n the complexrelationsbetweendemocracyand humanrights,with an emphasis on theirdifferinglogic,seeDonnelly,“HumanRights,”619-21. 22. For a furtherdevelopment of theseclaims,seeDonnelly,“HumanRights,” 619-21,627-31. 23. I certainlydo not want to denythat manypeopleapproachotherssignificantly,evenprimarily,in groupterms.But thissociological fact-to the extentthat it is indeeda fact-has little moralforce.In fact,I wouldsuggest that “othering” groupidentitiesis thehumanrightsproblem,not a potentialsolution. 24. I do not meanto suggest that thisthin conception is the only, let alonethe best,conception of toleration.It simplymarksan endpointon the continuum of approaches to nondiscrimination I consider here.For a characteristically subtlestudy of toleration,seeMichaelWalzer,On Toleration(New Haven,Conn.:YaleUniversity Press,1997). 25. CharlesTaylor,“ThePoliticsof Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining thePoliticsof Recognition, ed.Amy Gutmann(Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press,1994),62. 26. Taylor,“Politicsof Recognition,” 62. 27. MichaelWalzer,“Comment,”in Multiculturalism: Examiningthe Politicsof Recognition, ed.Amy Gutmann(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,1994), 99-100. 28. To beasclearaspossible at theoutset,I wantto emphasize thatI donotargue thatwe shouldtreatany of the issuesraisedin thisor the followingsection“on a purelyindividualbasis”(KristinHenrard,Devisingan AdequateSystemof Minority

Protection:IndividualHumanRights,MinorityRightsand theRightto Self-Deterthe mination[The Hague:MartinusNijhoff, 20001,241). I havealreadyemphasized groupsasholdersof essentially socialcharacter of humanrights.I argueonlyagainst

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humanrights.I am not arguingcategorically againstrecognizinglegal(ratherthan human)rightsfor groups. In addition,I am concerned hereonly with grouprightsthat are not reducible to individualrights.(CompareMarliesGalenkamp, IndividualismversusCollective Filosopische StudRights:TheConceptof Collective Rightspotterdam:Rotterdams ies,19931.)Suchirreduciblygrouprightsposea realandsignificant challenge to the UniversalDeclaration modelthatoughtto betakenseriously howeverwe evaluateit. 29. Henry Shue,BasicRights:Subsistence, Affluence,and US. ForeignPolicy (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,1980),29-34. 30. CompareMarlies Galenkamp,“The Rationaleof MinorityRights:Wishes RatherThanNeeds?”in Do WeNeedMinorityRights?Conceptual Issues,ed.Juha Raikka(The Hague:MartinusNijhoff, 1996). 31. For a thoughtfuland balancedphilosophical discussion of the problemof groupagencyin the contextof rights,seeJamesW. Nickel, “GroupAgencyand GroupRights,”in Ethnicityand GroupRights,ed. Ian ShapiroandWill Kymlicka (NewYork: New York UniversityPress,1997). 32. MichaelHartney,“SomeConfusions ConcerningCollectiveRights,”in The Rightsof MinorityCultures,ed. Will Kymlicka(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1995),203. 33. For a sympathetic approach to at leastsomegrouprightsissues, froma liberal perspective thatdrawsheavilyonWill Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship: A Liberal Theoryof MinorityRights(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995),seeMaleiha Malik, “CommunalGoodsasHumanRights,”in Understanding HumanRights,ed. Conor Gearty and Adam Tomkins(London:Mansell, 1996). Malik also gives thoughtful consideration to thelimitations of individualrightsstrategies for realizing communalgoods. 34. Groupsof womenin particularlocalitiesor concerned with particularissues may havethe necessary collectivepersonality.Nondiscrimination andfreedomof association usuallywill allowsuchgroupsto acteffectively. 35. Theobviousexception is childbearing. Not all womenchoose to or arecapable of bearingchildren.Therelevantgroupthenwouldbe(potentially) pregnant women. Any group(or individual)rightsthat theymighthavewould involveonly minor additionsto theUniversalDeclaration. 36. Seechapter3 by Jackson-Preece in thisvolumeand,moreextensively, Henrard,MinorityProtection,16-55. 37. Racial minoritieshave been treatedin internationalhuman rights law separately(andwith a greatersenseof importance andurgency).Otherminority groupshave beenlargelyexcluded.O n homosexuals, seeJackDonnelly,“Nondiscrimination and SexualOrientation: Makinga Placefor SexualMinoritiesin the GlobalHumanRightsRegime,”in Innovationand Inspiration:F i f y Yearsof the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights,ed. PeterR. Baehr,CeesFlinterman,and MignonSenders (Amsterdam: RoyalAcademyof ArtsandSciences, 1999).In internationalhumanrightslaw, it is decidedlynot the casethat all “minorities,”in the broadsenseof thatterm,aretreatedequally. 38. Henrard,MinorityProtection, 8. 39. Thisrightis explicitlyrecognized in all threeof themajorinternational instruments:UniversalDeclaration, article26; ICESCR,article13.3;ICCPR,article18.4.

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40. For an overviewof linguistichumanrightsissues,seeToveSkutnabb-Kangas andRobertPhillipson,“LinguisticHumanRights,PastandPresent,”in Linguistic HumanRights:Overcoming LinguisticDiscrimination (Berlin:Moutonde Gruyter, 1995). 41. JacobT. Levy, “ClassifyingCulturalRights,”in Ethnicityand GroupRights, ed. Ian ShapiroandWill Kymlicka(New York New York UniversityPress,1997), 25. 42. As JeremyWaldronnotes,manyadvocates of grouprightsandminorityculturesinsteadassumethatindividualsare(if notexclusively, at leastprimarily)membersof a single,coherent,evenhomogenous “culture.”“MinorityCulturesandthe Cosmopolitan Alternative,”in TheRightsof MinorityCultures,ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995),105-8. 43. Thisdoesnotprecludeactivestatesupportfor thegroupin question. But such supportshouldbe seenasan expression of thevaluesandchoicesof thesocietyasa whole,operating throughestablished politicalpractices, ratherthana matterof group humanrights. 44. I find particularlyattractiveWaldron’ssuggestion (“Minority Cultures,”112) thatwe thinkof personalidentity“notin termsof hierarchical management, but in termsof democratic self-government of a pluralisticpopulation.” 45. I claimonlythatsomeindigenous peoplesapproximate sucha model. 46. For a brief argumentto thisconclusion, focusingon the issueof openimmigration,seeJosephH. Carens,“AliensandCitizens:The Casefor OpenBorders,” in TheRightsof MinorityCultures,ed.Will Kymlicka(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1995).

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THE CASE FOR GROUP RIGHTS

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3 HumanRightsandCulturalPluralism The “Problem”of Minorities JenniferJackson-Preece

The generaltendencyof thepost-warmovements for thepromotionof humanrightshasbeento subsume theproblemof. . . minoritiesunder the broaderproblemof ensuringbasicindividualrightsto all human beings,withoutreferenceto membership in ethnicgroups.The leading assumption hasbeenthatmembersof. . . minoritiesd onotneed,arenot entitledto, o r cannotbe grantedrightsof a specialcharacter.The doctrineof humanrightshasbeenput forwardas a substitute for the concept of minorityrights,with the strongimplicationthat minorities whosemembersenjoyindividualequalityof treatmentcannotlegitimatelydemandfacilitiesfor the maintenance of their ethnicparticularism.

-Inis Claude’

HUMAN RIGHTS AND PLURAL SOCIETIES The ideaof humanrightsis predicatedon thenotionthat everyindividual humanbeing,by virtueof hisor her humanity,shouldhavethefreedomto of the goodlife. In other define,pursue,andrealizehis or her conception words,everymanandwoman,regardless of whichsovereign jurisdiction theyhappento inhabit,shouldenjoythecircumstances to be a fully autonomousindividual.Fromthisfundamental convictionarisesa wholeseriesof rightsdesignedto ensurethat suchbasicconditions of libertyexistfor all membersof humankind.That hasimportantimplications for international relations. 49

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Ethnocultural pluralismis a commonfeatureof manystates.(According

to oneestimate,the contemporary statessystemis composed of justunder

two hundredstatesthatcontainoverfivethousand ethnicgroups.2) Arguably becausehumanbeingshavea predisposition to creatediversecommunal attachments, to associate with their own peopleat their own time in their own place,they want to enjoyand exercisethis freedomto form andjoin theirowngroup.Moreover,thefactthatsuchdiverseidentitiesandassociationscontinueto existdespitepoliticaleffortsto alter or eradicatethem wouldseemto suggestthatvery manyindividualsconsidertheseethnoculturalexpressions to be an essentialcomponent of theirconception of the goodlife. Yet, despitethisevidence,bothliberalphilosophy andinternationalpracticedirectedat humanrightshavehistoricallybeenill disposed to the minorityproblemsthat very often arisein situationsof ethnocultural pluralism.Why? Becauseindividualrights-basedpolitical thoughtand actionwas a fundamental component of the politicaltransformation from the divineright of kingsto popularsovereignty andrepresentative government.Thisconnection betweenwhatwe nowreferto as“humanrights”and “democracy”led to a seriesof assumptions thatultimatelyrenderedtheidea of “minorityrights”highlyproblematic within the liberaltradition,aswill be discussed morefully in thenextsection.To putit simply,minorityrights as distinctfrom equalcitizenshipguarantees cameto be associated with politicalinstability,disorder,andconflict;fromthisperspective, recognizing minorityrightswouldputat riskthesocialconsensus onwhichpeace,order, and representative governmentwas built. As a result,problemsassociated with ethnocultural identities,associations, or expressions havetendedto be eitherignoredby liberalsor addressed only throughgeneralguarantees of freedomof expression, association, and equality.For this samereason,the international humanrightssystemcreatedafter1945has,untilveryrecently, largelyignoredthe dilemmasexperienced by membersof minoritygroups asdistinctfromthemajoritypopulationwithinstates. This chapterwill examineboththe initial failuresto addressminority rightsin thepost-1945humanrightsdiscourse andrecentinitiativesto rectify thisshortcoming. In sodoing,it will arguethat culturalpluralismis an essentialfeatureand importantvalueof the humancondition.For thisreason,pluralismoughtto be activelypromotedratherthanmerelytolerated within the liberalhumanrightsdiscourse sinceit is only in situations of socialpluralismthatfreedomcanbefully realized.Achievinggenuineautonomyfor all humankind will thereforerequirenotonlyrespectfor individual libertiesbut alsospecialguarantees for ethnocultural minoritiesin addition to thealready-recognized equalrightsprovisionscurrentlyincludedin multilateralhumanrightsagreements.

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THE “PROBLEM” OF PLURALISM Historically,theideaof rightsemergedin thecontextof Westernsocialand politicalthoughtof the seventeenth andeighteenth centuries. At thistime, theideathateverymanhadhisappointed statusandfunctionin a preestablishedorderwasbreakingdownin the faceof an advancing individualism expressing itselftheologically in Protestantism, economically in mercantile capitalism, andpoliticallyandphilosophically in thetheoryof naturalrights andthe socialcontract.The newtheorywasintendednot as a justification butasa criticismof theexistingorder;itstonewasradical,andin itsultimate employment, it wasrevolutionary.3 In otherwords,asnotedearlier,rights-based politicalthoughtandaction of the politicaltransformation from the were fundamental components divinerightof kingsto popularsovereignty andrepresentative government. of theliberaltradition For thisreason,thefundamental rightsandfreedoms beginning with the AmericanDeclarationof Independence andthe French to be a means Declarationof the Rightsof Man weregenerallyunderstood of protecting“thepeople’’fromtyrannyby thesovereign princeor government. It is at thispointin thehistoryof politicalideasthatethnocultural pluralismbecomes problematic. Who arethepeoplein whomsovereignty, and indeedliberty,ultimatelyresides? The peoplearethe nation,andthe state existsasan expression of thenationalwill. “The principleof all sovereignty restsessentiallyin the nation.No bodyand no individualmay exercise authoritywhichdoesnotemanate fromthenationexpressly” (article3,1789 Declarationof the Rightsof Man and of the Citizen).Moreover,“for a nationthusabusedto ariseunanimously andto resisttheirprince,evento the dethroning of him, is not criminalbut a reasonable way of vindicating theirlibertiesandjust right^."^Thisis thecriticalpointat whichtheideaof politicalcommunityasthe ultimate sourceof bothauthorityandindividual libertyentersthe liberaltradition,andnaturalrightsbecomeconfused with citizenship rightsanddemocracy. Rousseau’s conception of the socialcontractis predicated on the belief that in surrendering his or her will to the generalwill, the individualdoesnot losefreedombut insteadgainsit as a memberof an independent politicalcommunity.Popularsovereignty and representative government put thisconviction into practice;from thisperareperspective, specialminorityrightsbeyondthoseof equalcitizenship ceivedasthreatsto thesurvivalof theoverarching politicalcommunityand thefundamental freedomit givesriseto. We seethattodayin thedeepcontroversyin France,whichpenetrated to theheartof theFrenchgovernment, overthequestion of grantingsomemodestautonomy to Corsica. As the nineteenthcenturyprogressed, thisnewpoliticalthinkingspread

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to areasoutsideWesternEuropeandNorthAmerica.The ideaof thenation as a politicalor civic communityand its concomitant notionof national identitybecameincreasinglyinfusedwith ethnocultural characteristics, therebyrenderingthe positionof ethnocultural minoritiesevenmoredifficult.In Central,Southern,andEasternEurope,thenewrevolutionaries were confrontedby multilingualandmulticulturalempiresthatcontinued to base theirrule on ancientdynasticrightsarisingfrommarriage,succession, purchase,conquest,and so forth,with little regardfor eitherconstitutions or representative institutions. How, then,couldthe “will of the people”be expressed and developedin circumstances whereterritorieswere far flung and scattered,centraladministration was weak, and civic institutions were largelyabsent? The answerwas,of course,to developan alternativebasison whichto mobilizepopularsupportand action:languageand culturerather thanpoliticalor civiccommunity. This emphasis onlanguageandculturegavea newdynamismto theoriginal Anglo-Frenchideaof the nation-state groundedonpopularsovereignty: Whereaspreviouslystatesmadenations,henceforthnationswouldmakeand break-states. The amalgamation of smallerterritories(e.g., Venice, Florence,Milan, etc.)inhabitedby the samelinguisticandculturalgroup intoa singlesovereign, territorialunit(e.g.,Italy)-or, conversely, thepartition of largerterritoriesin whichdifferentlinguisticandculturalgroups intermingled underthe samesovereignauthority(e.g., the Hapsburgand OttomanEmpires)intosmallerpoliticalunitswith morehomogeneous ethnoculturalpopulations (asin thecaseof Greece,Serbia,Montenegro,Macedonia,Romania,andBulgaria)wouldpreoccupy international relationsfrom 1848to 1919.Thepoliticizationof ethnicityandcultureintroduceda whole new dynamicto relationswithin and betweenstates;it gaverise to a new principleof internationallegitimacy-national self-determination-that demandsthat the stateand the ethnonation shouldcoincide.This principle wasonlypreparedto recognizeonekind of state-the nation-state-whose boundaries wereno longerdeterminedby “the coursesof rivers,the direction of mountains,or the chancesof war, but accordingto racesor rather [ethno] nation^."^ Initially, this new ideawasunderstood to be a naturalcorollaryof both individualliberty and popularsovereignty-the fundamentalvaluesin defenseof whichtheAmericanandFrenchRevolutions ostensibly hadbeen fought.As JohnStuartMill wrotein his 1861 treatiseOn Representative Government: Wherethesentiment of nationalityexistsin anyforce,thereis a primafaciecase for unitingall the membersof the nationalityunderthe samegovernment, a government to themselves apart.Thisis merelysayingthatthequestionof governmentoughtto be decidedby the governed.One hardlyknowswhat any

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divisionof thehumanraceshouldbe freeto do,if notto determine withwhich of thevarious collectivebodiesof humanbeingstheychoose to associate themselves.

[However,Mill wenton to addthat] Whena peopleare ripefor freeinstitutions,thereis a stillmorevital consideration Freeinstitutions arenextto impossiblein a countrymadeup of differentnationalities.6 Liberalslike Mill considered ethnocultural pluralisma seriouspolitical problembecauseit appearedto underminethe socialconsensus and shared politicalvalueson whichrepresentative institutions werebased.The despotismcommonlyassociated with the multilingual,multicultural Hapsburg and OttomanEmpireswas construedas furtherevidence-shouldany be needed-that liberalismcouldnot easilybe achievedin ethnoculturally plural societies.Thus,it is only to be expectedthat Mill and Westernliberals like him, viewedliberty and nationalself-determination as naturalalliesin the fight againstdespotism and dynasticrule. The variousnationalmovementsdemandedtheunionof ethnonations dividedby dynasticempireand theindependence of otherethnonations suppressed within dynasticempire: Westernliberalsexpected,o r at leasthoped,that the new nation-states achieved in thiswaywouldpracticerepresentative government andguarantee the rightsof the individual. Unfortunately,historyhasdemonstrated timeandagainthat onceethnoculturalhomogeneity is accepted asthe idealbasisof politicalorganization, the individualliberty of membersof minoritygroupsbecomesprecarious. In suchcircumstances, the state“tendsto act as if it is a singleandunitary nation.”If, in fact,it is not this,it must“endeavour to makethefactscorrespondto theideal,”regardless of therightsandlibertiesof thoseamongits citizenswho do notbelongt o themajorityethnicgroup.’At the sametime, the reverseis alsotrue:Every ethnonation or fractionthereofthatis not an independent nation-statemuststriveto becomeone.In thisway, individual ethnic,cultural,andlinguisticidentitiesbecomeobjectsof politicalmanipulation.The individualno longerdetermines his or her nation;instead,the nation determinesthe individual.National self-determination quickly becomesnationaldeterminism. Justas the statedomesticallycameto view ethnocultural pluralismas potentiallydestructive of its territorialintegrityand politicalcohesion,so, too,did thesocietyof statesincreasingly associate suchdiversitywith internationalinstabilityand conflict.Historically,the problemof pluralismhas evokedtwo international responses designedto eliminateit: (I) themanipulationof eitherbordersto matchpeoplesor peoplesto matchborderswith a view to creatinguniformethnocultural populations within states,or ( 2 ) individualhumanrightsto equalityandnondiscrimination with the tacit acceptance of domesticassimilationist measures designedto createhomogeneityin culture,language,andvalueswithin existingjurisdictions.

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First,international effortsto createuniformitywithin stateshaveled to bothinternationally sanctioned populationtransfers andboundaryrevision a betterfit between juridicalterritoriesandethnonain thehopeof achieving tionalpopulations. Populationtransfers sanctioned by international agreement occurredon severaloccasions duringthe twentiethcentury.8For example,minorityexchanges betweenGreeceandTurkeyandto a lesser extentalsobetweenGreeceandBulgariafollowingWorld War I wereproSimividedfor in the 1919Treatyof Neuilly and1923Treatyof Lausanne. larly,thetransferof ethnicGermansbackto Germanyfromacross Central by the1945Potsdam andEasternEuropeafterWorldWar I1 wasauthorized Protoc01.~ Boundaryrevisionto createethnoculturally homogeneous states was attemptedby the victoriousgreatpowersof 1919. Both of these approaches assume thereis someoptimaldivisionof territorythatwill succeedin givingeveryethnonation its own homogeneous state.Experience, however,hasproventhat any solutionto the problemof pluralism,which groupsandboundattemptsto peacefullysecurea fit betweenethnocultural aries-populationtransfers andborderrevision-is in realityno solutionat all. Thisapproachultimatelyfailsbecause theidealof everyethnonation in its own homogeneous stateis in practiceunobtainable withoutthe useof considerable forceandresultanthumansuffering. Second,the problemof pluralismhasbeenaddressed by redefiningit in termsof individualdiscrimination andequality,therebyprovokinginternationalrequirements for existingstatesto removeanylegalor politicalbarriequalityof civil ersof individualmembership in a minorityby guaranteeing andpoliticalrightsto all itscitizensregardless of theirethnonational identity in accordance with prevailingliberalpractices. Suchinternational stipulations,thoughlaudablein andof themselves, arenevertheless well suitedto a politicalbeliefin thevalueof uniformitysincethey arefullycompatible with domestic programsaimedat assimilating individualmembersof minorities into the dominantlinguisticandculturalgroup.For example,if equalityis definedassameness, thenstipulating that all childrenmustbe taughtin the same(majority)language doesnot violateequalrightsprovisions. Equality coupledwith assimilation wassupported by the UnitedStatesandother majorWestern(liberal)powersafterWorldWar I1 because of boththefailure of the Leagueof Nationsminoritysystemlo to preventethnicconflictin of decolonization in AsiaandAfrica,whereethnoEuropeandthe prospect culturalpluralismwasevengreaterandthuspotentiallyevenmoredestabilizing. Consequently, the new international orderestablished after 1945 includeda systemof universal individualhumanrightsbutnotoneof special in thenextsection. minorityrights,aswill be discussed As a resultof thesevariousapproaches to the problemof pluralism,not all ethnocultural minoritiesarein thesamepositionrelativeto themajority." Someethnocultural minoritieswantto be incorporated withinthemajority

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but are separated from it againsttheirwill-minorities byforce. In these cases,the majoritydeliberatelydifferentiates betweenitselfandmembersof the minorityby, for example,callingattentionto ascriptivedifferencesin termsof race,ethnicity,language, religion,andsoforth,andusesthesecharacteristics as the basisfor oppression designedto perpetuate the separation This sortof oppressive treatmentwasthe experiof the two communities. enceof manyJewishcommunities in Centraland EasternEuropebetween the two world wars;of African Americansin the southernUnitedStates prior to the 1960s;andindeedof blackSouthAfricansduringthe era of apartheid,who were in a nondominant (thus“minority”)positionwith respectto thewhiterulingelite.In suchcircumstances, equalrightsandprotectionfromdiscrimination arenecessary to ensuretheindividualautonomy of minoritymembers.Liberalismin general,andtheinternational human rightsregimein particular,hasmadesubstantial achievements in this area overthepastfifty years. Otherethnocultural minoritieswantto preservetheirdistinctiveness as uniqueethnic,cultural,religious,or linguisticcommunities withinthe territory of the statebut are insteadsubjectto majoritycampaigns of assimilation, expulsion,or, at the mostextreme,genocide’z-minoritiesby will. Unwantedassimilation is a commonexperience of minoritiesduringnationbuildingcampaigns in the nameof the majoritynationalcommunity(e.g., CatalansandBasquesin Spain;Welsh,Irish, andScotsin the United Kingdom;Flemingsin Belgium;Moslemsin Bulgaria;HungariansandRomain RomaniaandSlovakia;Tibetansin China,etc.).Expulsion,too,hasbeen frequentlyusedby statesto overcomethe problemsassociated with troublesomeminority by will communities; post-1945examplesincludethe expulsionof ethnicGermansfrom Centraland EasternEuropebetween 1945and 1948,thepopulationmovementsaccompanying thepartitionof IndiaandPakistanin 1947,thePalestinian expulsions accompanying thecreationof thestateof Israelin 1948,the expulsionof AsiansfromUgandain the early 1970s,the exodusof MoslemsfromBulgariain the 1980s,andthe with the breakupof Yugoslavia variousactsof ethniccleansingassociated in the 1990s.In situations in whichthe minorityin questionis territorially concentrated, assimilationandexpulsionarevery oftenunderscored by a fear of secession or irredentismthat tendsbothto exacerbate minority/ majoritytensionsandto givean addedsenseof urgencyandsometimes also violenceto thesestatemeasures. The ultimateactof violenteliminationof a minorityis, of course,genocideas canbe evidencednot only in the Holocaustbut alsomorerecentlyin Cambodia,Rwanda,andBosnia.In suchcircumstances, equalrightsand protectionfrom discrimination are not by themselves sufficientto ensurethe individualautonomyof minoritymembers.In addition,specialguarantees designedto preserveand promote minorityidentitiesand communities arenecessary to ensureall individuals

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havethefreedomto maketheculturalexpressions andassociations theygenuinely value. Liberalismin general,and the internationalhumanrights regimein particular,hasmadeonlylimitedprogress in thisareaoverthepast fifty years.Consequently, this is one of the areasin whichrecentinterest andfutureactionmustbe concentrated to fulfill thegoalof humanrightsnamely,to ensurethat everyindividualhumanbeinghasthe freedomto define,pursue,andrealizehis or her conception of the goodlife.

HUMAN RIGHTS A N D PLURALISM AFTER 1945 The new internationalsystemcreatedafter 1945-and with it the various UnitedNationsandregionalhumanrightstexts-was formulatedlargely “withoutconsideration of the questions of principle”thatarisefromthe existenceof ethnocultural minoritiesin a “worlddominatedby the concept of thenationalstateasthe. . . unitof politicalorgani~ation.”~~ Thisis hardly surprisinggiventhat the internationalactorsthat createdthis systemwere noneotherthanstatesand thereforedeeplysuspicious of would-berival claimantsto their authority,territory,or population. The ideaof statehood, includingtherelatedconcepts of popularsovereignty andself-determination, is not easilyreconciledto that ethnocultural pluralismthat minorityrights would perpetuate. Accordingly,the onlyminoritygrievances considered legitimatewere thoseinvolvingdiscrimination by the majoritysuchthat individualequalrightsguarantees wereseenasthe appropriate response. Any minorityclaimsto specialtreatmentas a distinctivecommunitywere viewedas tantamount to secessionist demandsand thuscouldand, in the interestsof international peaceand stability,shouldbe ignored.Consequently,minorityclaimsfor specialrightsin cultural,educational, religious, andlinguisticmattersoverandabovethoseof equalcitizenshipwerenoticeably absentfrom thosetreatiesthat createdthe post-1945humanrights system. The UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights(1948)makesno mentionof specialminorityrightsbut insteadendorses the principlesof equalityand nondiscrimination. Amongitsvariousclauses, thosereferringto freedomof thoughtandreligion(articlelS), freedomof expression (article19),freedom of peacefulassembly andassociation (article2O), andtherightto freelyparto ticipatein the culturallife of thecommunity(article27) dohaverelevance the circumstances of minorities.However,theseclausesd o not grantthe rightsto culture,language,andeducation,which(some)minoritiesenjoyed (briefly)undertheearlierLeagueof Nationsminority~ y s t e mWhile . ’ ~ article 27 is directedat thepreservation of culturalcommunities, theclauseis vague asto whethercultural community in thiscontextincludesminoritycultures or simplythe dominantculture.This ambiguityhasenabledstatesto argue

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thatparticipation in thedominantcultureis all thisarticleguarantees; therefore, assimilationist policiesdirectedagainstminoritieshavenot beenpreventedby it. Interestingly,thetravauxprepamtoires indicatethattheinitialdraftof the UniversalDeclarationdid includea guarantee thatin all countriesinhabited numberof personsof a race,language, or religionotherthan by a substantial thoseof themajority,“minoritiesshallhavetherightto establishandmaincultural tain,outof anequitableproportionof publicfunds. . . theirschools, institutions, andto usetheirlanguagebeforecourts,organsof thestateand in thepressandpublicassembly.”’5 Yet, as the draftproposalwent from one committeeto the next, it was editedandfinallyremovedaltogether; onceagain,recognizing diversitywas as invitinginstability. construed Instead,on the samedaythatthe GeneralAssemblypassedtheUniversal Declarationof HumanRights,it alsopassedResolution217 C (111)entitled “The Fateof Minorities.”In thisresolution,theGeneralAssemblyacknowledgedthat it “couldnot remainindifferentto the fate of minorities”but, becauseit wasdifficultto adopta “uniformsolution”to this“complexand delicateissue”that has “specialaspects”in eachstatein whichit arises, decided“not to deal with the question”and insteadto refer it to the U N C H R andSub-commission for thePreventionof Discrimination and Protectionof Minoritiesfor furtherstudy.16Yet eventhis limitedmandate wasconsidered too controversial giventhe hostilityof manymemberstates towardminorityprovisions. As thesubcommission’s ownrapporteur admitted,fromthepassing of thisresolution until 1989,boththeU N C H R andthe subcommission failed to addressthe issueof specialminorityprotection.” Consequently, duringtheyearsfrom 1945to 1989,onlyoneUN convention incorporated a specificminorityrightsclause’?theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), whose article 27-originally proposedby the subcommission in 1950-stipulates that in thosestatesin whichethnic,religious,or linguisticminoritiesexist,persons belongingto suchminoritiesshallnot be deniedthe right, in community with othermembersof their group,to enjoytheir own culture,to profess andpracticetheirownreligion,or to usetheirown1ang~age.I~ This provisiongivesstatesignatories the freedomto determinewhether ethnicgroupsin theirjurisdictions constitute suchminoritiesby will. Needlessto say,very manystatesthatpossessed minoritieseffectivelyavoided their internationalobligations in this regardby redefiningthesegroups undera differentrubric,be it “immigrant,”“aboriginal,”or whatever. This generalantipathytowardthoseguarantees thatwouldhaverecogminoritieswithin existingstatesis also nized and in so doingperpetuated apparentin the activitiesof mostregionalorganizations between1945 and 1989.For example,colonialsuccessor statesin Latin America,Africa, and

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Asiagenerallyassumed thattheabsence of minorityrightswasmoreconducive to statesuccessdefinedin termsof territorialintegrityand internal politicalstabilitythanwouldbe thereverse.Thus,whiletheAmericanConventionon HumanRights(1969)reiteratesalmostall of the rightsincluded in the ICCPR, it doesnot includeany referencewhatsoeverto minority rightsalongthe linesof article27. This absenceof explicitminorityprovisionsis alsoapparentin the AdditionalProtocolto the AmericanConvention on HumanRightsin theArea of Economic,SocialandCulturalRights (“Protocolof SanSalvador”)(1988).Similarly,whiletheAfricanCharteron Humanand People’sRights(1981) incorporates a people’sright to selfdetermination, in practice“people”hasbeenidentifiedwith the alreadyexistingAfrican statesand not the varioustribal groupswithin them. Likewise,althoughthe Association of Commonwealth Statesrepeatedly emphasized its commitmentto individualhumanrightsandracialequality, it saidvirtuallynothingspecificto the circumstances of minoritiesby will and their desirefor protectionagainstunwantedpoliciesof assimilationor oppression. For example,the 1971(Singapore)Declarationof CommonwealthPrinciplesaffirms“equalrightsfor all citizensregardless of race,colour,creedorpoliticalbelief”andrecognizes “racialprejudiceasa dangerous sickness.”However,“self-determination” is mentionedonly in the context of “non-racialism”and oppositionto “all formsof colonialdomination.” Thereis no referenceat all to minorityrightsasdistinctfromequalcitizenon Racism ship.While the 1979LusakaDeclarationof the Commonwealth andRacialPrejudiceacknowledges that“everyoneis freeto retainpluralism in hisor hercultureandlifestyle,”thisstatement is madeonlyin thecontext of suchpluralismbeingnojustification for “theperpetuation of racialprejudiceor raciallydiscriminatory practices.”Again,thereis nomentionof what actions,if any, a stateoughtto taketo promotea pluralismof cultureand lifestyleswithin its jurisdictionor whetherthesemight includeprovisions thatwouldhelpperpetuate minoritiesby will. Evenwithin Europe,whereinternational minorityrightshadbeenrecognizedunderthe Leagueof Nationssystem,therewasno revivalof special minorityguarantees between1945and 1989dueto thewidespread fear that thismightrekindleold ethnicconflicts.For example,theCouncilof Europe (C0E)-which duringthistimecreatedwhatis arguablythemostsuccessful extremelyhesiregionalhumanrightssystemin theworld-was nonetheless tantto pursuea specificminorityrightsprotocolto the EuropeanConvention on HumanRights(ECHR) (1950).20Instead,it maintaineda publicly avowedpositionthatspecialminorityrightswereat best“notveryconvincing” andat worse“aggravated existingtensionsanddifficulties.”21 Moreover, minorityissueswere “not deemedto be of extremeurgency”becauseof a widespread belief thatprotectionagainstdiscrimination adequately protectedall legitimateminorityinterests.22

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Althoughthe HelsinkiFinal Act (whichestablished the Conferencefor SecurityandCooperation in Europe)specificallymentionsminoritiesin threedifferentpartsof thedocument-the DeclarationonPrinciples, Principle VII, and the sectionentitledCooperation in Humanitarianand Other Fields-the contentof theprovisionsis confinedto antidiscrimination measuresand allowedstatesa wide latitudein interpretingthe kindsof actions thatcouldandcouldnot be undertaken with regardto “minorities.”Moreover,thisinitial interestin minorityissueswasnot sustained in thevarious “CSCE Follow-upMeetings”that took place between1975 and 1989. Instead,thesemeetingswere dominatedby a concernfor the violationof individualhumanrights-particularlythosecivil andpoliticallibertiesassociatedwith themovementtowardhumanrightsanddemocracyin communist states.23So onceagain,“legitimate”minorityinterestsdid not include anyrightsin cultural,educational, religious,andlinguisticmattersoverand abovethoseof equalcitizenship. In sum,the circumstances of minoritiesby will weredeliberatelyignored by international actorsduringthe Cold War dueto thewidespread convictionthatthecontinuedexistence of suchgroupsposeda threatto theterritorial integrityandsocialcohesionof existingstatesandthusalsoto orderand stabilitywithin the statessystem.The only legitimateminoritygrievances human werethoseexperienced by minoritiesby force,and sointernational rightstextsfromthisperiodgiveconsiderable emphasisto equalrightsand antidiscrimination provisionsbut are virtually “silent”with regardto the specialrightsoverandaboveequalcitizenshipthatminoritiesby will believe are necessary to preserveandpromotetheirdistinctidentitiesand waysof life. Thisinternational attitudetowardminoritiesby will hada numberof consequences. It ledto theconclusion thatsuchminoritymatterswerenotproperly subjectsof internationalorganizations or multilateralagreements. Instead,and not surprisingly,theseissueswereunderstoodto be the preserveof the sovereignstatein whichthey occurred.Withoutinternational stipulations to the contrary,very many stateschoseto “resolve”their minorityproblemsnot throughminorityrightsconduciveto a climateof constructive pluralismbut insteadthroughpoliciesof assimilationor oppression. Unfortunately, aswe haverecentlydiscovered, thelong-term of suchpoliciesareveryoftenfundamentally destabilizing for consequences thestateaffected.Insteadof producinga sharedidentity,theunintended resultof assimilation is oftentimesa growingminority/majority distrustand antipathy.Similarly,insteadof perpetuating the currentregimeand its underlyingethnocultural powerrelations,oppression canprovokeviolent intercommunal conflictsof the sortrecentlywitnessed,for example,in RwandaandformerYugoslavia.Ironically,theColdWar stances withregard to minoritiesby will notonlyfailedto protecttheinterestsof theseminority

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communities but very oftenalsofailed to preservethe internalstabilityof thestatesin whichthey,howevertenuously, existed.

MINORITY RIGHTS A N D PLURALISM AFTER 1989 Since1989,thepreviousinternational response to pluralismwithinstates (territorialinviolabilitycoupledwith individualequalityguarantees) has comeundergrowingcriticism,notleastowingto theincreasing incidenceof ethnicconflictaroundthe globe.Televisedimagesof the humansuffering causedby ethnicconflicthaveshockedtheconscience of international public opinion,at leastin the West,and precipitatedpublicdemandsfor internationalactiononminorityissues. Thispublicpressure hasresultedin a greater willingnessonthepartof Westernstatesto interferein thedomesticjurisdicfeatured tionsof nondemocracies, and so minorityrightshaveincreasingly in theirattemptsto fosterdemocratic development in nondemocratic states, particularly(thoughnot exclusively)in EasternEurope.Significantly, whereaspreviouslydemocratic assumptions tendedto discreditminority claimsfor specialrightsin additionto thoseof equalcitizenship, recentlythe ideaof democracy hasitselfbeenreevaluated, andindeedredefined,by liberthatis more alswho havecometo recognizetheneedfor a socialconsensus thanjust “majoritarian.”At the sametime, the demonstrated peaceand securityrisksassociated with ethnicconflicthavemadeit easierfor internationalsocietyto acknowledge minoritiessincethe old fear that suchaction mightprecipitateethnicviolencehasnow becomea mootpoint.As a result of thesenewperspectives, international actorsarenowbeginningto cometo the conclusionthat the only way to successfully resolvethe “problem”of pluralismis to createcircumstances in whichminoritiesand majoritiescan flourishsideby side.Suchconstructive pluralismwouldseemto requireat leastminimalminorityrightsin cultural,educational, religious,andlinguistic mattersoverandabovethoseof equalcitizenship. If international minorityrightsguarantees are intendedto ensurethat all individualhumanbeingshavethefreedomto define,pursue,andrealizetheir conceptionof the goodlife, then the contentof theseprovisionsoughtto reflectthecircumstances of bothminoritiesby forceandminoritiesby will. resultin the continuedoppression or disFailureto d o sowill unavoidably advantageof membersof particularminoritycommunities. For example,it as wouldbe inefficacious to grantminoritiesby forceautonomyguarantees suchprovisions wouldsimplyperpetuate theunwantedghettoization by the majority(hencethecreationof black“homelands”by the apartheidregime in SouthAfrica,whichwerenotoriously justifiedas“self-government” provisions).Similarly,it wouldbe inefficacious to grantminoritiesby will only

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equal rightsand antidiscrimination protection(i.e., withoutadditional autonomyprovisions)as thesecan be, and historicallyhavebeen,usedas instruments of unwantedassimilationby the majority.The new human rightsagendais thusseekingto augmenttheearlierprovisionsfor individual equalityand antidiscrimination measures with guarantees designedto preserveandpromoteminoritylanguages, cultures,identities,andwaysof life withinstates.In sodoing,it is onceagaindeveloping in conjunction with the liberaltraditionout of whichit emerged,whichhasin recentyearsalso begunto incorporatea greaterawareness of the socialcircumstances confrontedby membersof disadvantaged groups. A majordevelopment in globalstandards onminorityrightstookplacein 1992 when the UN Declarationon the Rightsof PersonsBelongingto Nationalor Ethnic,Religiousand LinguisticMinoritieswasofficiallyproclaimedby the GeneralAssembly.This declarationwasnoteworthyin the historyof international humanrightssinceit wasthe first suchinstrument devotedexclusivelyto minorityconcerns. Thepreambleandninearticlesin part reiteratedthoserightsalreadyrecognizedin article27 of the ICCPR. Personsbelongingto minoritieswererecognizedashavingrightsto existence,identity,and the enjoymentof culture,religion,language,social affairs,theeconomy,andpubliclife. Specialminorityrightsto participatein relevantnationaland regionaldecisions,to establishand maintainassociations,andto havecontactbothwithinandacrossinternational frontierssupplemented thesebasicprovisions. Moreover,the1992formulationreinforced a certaincollectiveelementby acknowledging that theserightscouldbe exercisedindividuallyas well as in communitywith othermembersof the group.It alsowentonto remedytheearlier1966failureto specifystatemeasuresaimedat thepromotionof minorityrights.Henceforth,stateswere requiredto adoptprovisionsfor minoritylanguageinstructionandthepromotionof knowledgeconcerning minorityculturesandlanguages among wereto be the majoritypopulation. At the sametime, minorityconcerns takenintoconsideration in bothdomesticprogramsandinternational cooperation. At the sametime, the 1992 declarationreiteratedthe traditionalinternationalstance,whichheldthat minorityrightswerenot intendedasvehicles to furtherminoritysecession or irredentism.Article 8 was thereforeconcernednot with the rightsof minoritiesbut with the sovereignrightsof statesincludingtheirsovereignequality,territorialintegrity,andpolitical independence. Indeed,thetext wasrepletewith vagueor equivocalwording suchas“encourage conditions,”“appropriate measures,”“whereappropriate,”“wherepossible,”“whererequired,”and“in a mannernot incompatiblewith nationallegislation.”Thesephrasescontinuedto give state signatories a degreeof maneuversufficientto avoidor at leastto limit those new minorityrightsobligationsthey considered mostdetrimentalto their

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sovereignpowersand prerogatives. In otherwords,sovereignty hasby no meansbeenabandoned; it remainsthe cornerstone of theinternational system,at leastfor theforeseeable future.Similarly,rewritingor redrawingsovereignjurisdictions, exceptby constitutional meansandwith theconsentof all concerned, will not be recognized or encouraged. Whathasbegunto change,and arguablywhatneedsto be furtherdeveloped,is the substantive sovereignty (or goodgovernance) practicedwithin frontiers.Despiteitsvariousshortcomings, theDeclarationon theRightsof Persons Belongingto National,or Ethnic,Religious,andLinguisticMinorities-with its global applicability-constitutesa basisfor international thinkingon minorityquestionsthat is developingin this direction.Other international organizations mightagreeon something betterthanthis basic codeof stateconducttowardminorities,but they cannotgo beneathit and expectto justifytheirpoliciesand actionson the issue.More thanthis,the UN declarationwas a major acknowledgment that minoritymattersincludingthoseof relevanceto minoritiesby will-were oncemorelegitimatesubjectsof international relationsand not solelythe concernof those statesin whichtheyoccurred. FollowingonfromthisUnitedNationsinitiative,Europeanregionalorganizationshavenowalsorecognized theneedfor multilateralminorityrights standard settingandenforcement. TheOrganizationfor SecurityandCooperationin Europe(OSCE) has beenconcernedwith formulatingcodesof stateconducttowardminoritiesbothasa way of minimizingethnicconflicts andasa way of preventingthe oppression of individualmembersof ethnoculturalminoritycommunities. The OSCE thereforeincorporated statementsof minorityrightsin all of thoseofficialdocuments, whichformedthe basisof the organization’s activitiessince1989.Theseincludedthe main OSCE humanrightsstandard-setting text of this period,the Copenhagen Document(1990),aswell asthe Charterof Parisfor a New Europe(1990), the GenevaReporton NationalMinorities(1991),the MoscowDocument (1991),the HelsinkiDocument(1992),andthe BudapestDocument(1994). Moreover,in December1992,theOSCEcreatedtheofficeof High Commissionerfor NationalMinorities(HCNM) to assistin memberstates’implementationof international minoritystandards andt o helpresolveethnic conflicts. At the sametime, the conditionof minoritieswasalsoexaminedby the C O E asa potentialobstacleto thedemocraticdevelopment of formercommuniststatesin the regionandas an economicandsocialproblemin those statesthatwereon the receivingend of minoritymigrations.VariousC O E bodiesincludingtheParliamentary Assembly,theEuropeanCommission of HumanRights,and for DemocracythroughLaw, theSteeringCommittee the Committeeof Ministersexaminedminorityrightsproposals between 1990and1995.Thememberstatesof theC O E decidedat theirViennaSum-

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mit Meetingon October9, 1993,to adoptbotha minoritiesprotocolto the ECHR thatwouldbe opento ECHR signatories anda separateconvention on minoritieswhichwouldbe opento bothmembersand nonmembers of the COE. The decisionto adopta Conventionon NationalMinoritieswas implemented in 1995,but little progresshasbeenmadethusfar with regard to the additionalprotocol.This failureresultsfrom bothideologicaldifferencesamongmemberstatesasregardsthe suitabilityof individualversus collectiveminorityrightsformulations and a widespread fear that transferring minorityresponsibility to the EuropeanCourtof HumanRightsin Strasbourg wouldjudicializean issueoverwhichmanyEuropeanstatesare determined to retaindomesticpoliticalcontrol. While mostOSCE andC O E provisionsfor minorityrightsaugmentthe post-1945 humanrightsregimeand the globalminimumstandardoutlined in the 1992 U N Declarationon Minorities,the 1990sEuropeanregional responseto this problemalsorevealsboth an importantreappraisalof Leagueof Nationslinguisticandculturalguarantees anda possibleextension of the right to self-determination of peoples.The COE’s Charterfor Regionalor Minority Languages (1992),for example,containedfar more extensive provisionsfor theuseof minoritylanguages thandid theUN Declarationon Minorities.Six generalcategories of activitywererecognizededucation,judicial, and administrativeauthorities;the media; cultural activitiesandfacilities;economicandsociallife; andtransfrontier exchanges. Its provisions werethereforean importantcontinuation of earlierLeague initiativesin this area-ideas, whichhad beenlargelyforgottenor ignored duringtheColdWar. Unfortunately,the charter’senforcement mechanisms allowedfor a certainnumberof opt-outsby states i g n a t o r i eAs ~ . ~a ~result, may be morelimitedthan the its actualimpacton minoritycircumstances contentof theprovisionsmightotherwiseindicate. Similarly,the right to freedomfrom assimilationand forcedpopulation transferwasalsoaninnovativeEuropeanresponse to ethnicconflict.Explicit prohibitionsagainstthesesortsof government practiceswerenot incorporatedinto the main bodyof any humanrightsagreementprior to 1990. Therewasa precedent in international agreements for sanctions againstseparationin its mostviolentor extremeform-namely, extermination or genocide.Genocidewasprohibitedin the Conventionon the Preventionand of theCrimeof Genocide(1948).Similarly,theUNESCODecPunishment larationon Raceand RacialPrejudice(1978)statedthat all individualshad the right to be different,to considerthemselvesas different,and to be regardedassuch.Importantly,this1978textaffordsevidenceof a movement towardthe prohibitionof forcedassimilationandpopulationtransferin international thinkingon minoritiesandrelatedmatters.Its preamblenotes that racismis manifestedthroughunjustpracticesamongwhichare the forcedassimilation of membersof disadvantaged groups.However,noprec-

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edentexistedfor the explicitprohibitionof formsof assimilation intended to alteran individual’slanguage,culture,andultimatelyhisor her ethnicor nationalidentityor to forciblytransferan individualfrom onelocaleto anotheron thebasisof ethnicor nationalidentity. The Copenhagen Documentwentbeyondthe international statusquoin this regardwhenit statedin SectionIV (32) that “personsbelongingto nationalminoritieshavethe rightfreelyto express,preserveanddevelop theirethniccultural,linguisticor religiousidentity. . . freeof anyattempts at assimilation againsttheirwill.” Similarly,the Conventionon the Protection of NationalMinoritiesspecifiedthat statesshallrefrainfrom both