International Encyclopedia of Civil Society

International Encyclopedia of Civil Society Helmut K. Anheier, Stefan Toepler, Regina List (Eds). International Ency...

Author: Helmut K. Anheier | Stefan Toepler

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International Encyclopedia of Civil Society

Helmut K. Anheier, Stefan Toepler, Regina List (Eds).

International Encyclopedia of Civil Society

With 40 Figures and 44 Tables

HELMUT K. ANHEIER University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany Hertie School of Governance Berlin Germany STEFAN TOEPLER George Mason University Arlington, VA USA

Library of Congress Control Number: 2009937022

ISBN: 978-0-387-93994-0 This publication is available also as: Electronic publication under ISBN: 978-0-387-93996-4 and Print and electronic bundle under ISBN: 978-0-387-93997-1 ß Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010 (USA) All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC., 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks, and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights. springer.com Printed on acid free paper

SPIN: 12609567 2109SPi– 5 4 3 2 1 0

Preface The purpose of the International Encyclopedia of Civil Society is twofold. First, it is to take intellectual stock and offer an authoritative assessment of knowledge of and for a field of study that has expanded greatly in recent decades. This field, however, does not present itself as a settled or unified body of theories and facts; nor is it easily accessible to experts, students and practitioners. Instead, the field consists of several overlapping substantive areas such as civil society, social capital, philanthropy, voluntarism, civic engagement, etc., and cuts across a range of social science disciplines that include economics, sociology, political science, history, the law, and psychology. The second purpose of the Encyclopedia is to introduce greater conceptual clarity to an increasingly perplexing terminology that has been developing in the field of civil society, philanthropy, nonprofit or nongovernmental organizations, voluntarism, etc. over time. Confusion about the meaning of volunteering, association, civil society, nonprofit organizations, foundations, and charity has handicapped communication and understanding, particularly in inter-disciplinary and international contexts. In the past, the terminological tangles so characteristic of this field may well have mattered less, yet as this set of institutions has achieved greater social, economic and policy relevance, greater clarity now seems more urgent. Indeed, the lack of a multi-disciplinary and international Encyclopedia dedicated to civil society and related topics has long been a major complaint among teachers, students, and researchers in the field, as well as among practitioners and policymakers around the world. The present Encyclopedia was developed with these multiple audiences and uses in mind. Though an unsettled, evolving body of knowledge with a complex, even confusing terminology could be seen as a chronic weakness of a research agenda, curriculum or policy field, we believe that in the case of civil society it is rather a sign of intellectual fertility. In the context of this evolving intellectual field, we have sought to offer an inventory of the conceptual landscape rather than set some standards —however defined— or privilege one definition over another. Nonetheless this meant that we had to come to terms with the diversity and richness of institutions, organizations and behaviors located between the ‘market’ and the ‘state’ — a task complicated by the great profusion of terms. Selecting the entries for this Encyclopedia was a complex process that involved many difficult choices. A basic premise was that given the relative newness of the field, the Encyclopedia should not only cover terms and concepts but also include entries on internationally relevant organizations and personalities in the field of civil society. Another premise was that the Encyclopedia should genuinely be internationally-oriented and provide coverage of concepts, traditions, and institutions from different parts of the world, thereby acknowledging the diversity of the field from a cross-national perspective. The field of civil society studies is a conglomerate of separate intellectual approaches and traditions that are reflected in this Encyclopedia and include: ● the resurgent interest in civil society across the social science and policy fields, particularly since the 1990s; ● the older traditions of civil society from Antiquity through the early 20th century, with several distinct intellectual, national and regional traditions; ● a tradition of philanthropic studies, largely US-based and focused on the role of foundations and philanthropy in American society; ● an emphasis on nonprofit organizations in economics since the 1980s; ● the rich intellectual approaches to voluntary associations, voluntarism and civic engagement in sociology; ● the anthropology and ethnology of voluntary associations and voluntarism; ● the different approaches to social capital in sociology and political science; ● work on altruism and helping behavior in psychology and economics; ● the study of advocacy, new social movements, interest associations and political associations in political science; ● the welfare state literature in political science, sociology and economics; ● the bourgeoning literature on nongovernmental organizations in developmental studies and international relations; ● the study of the social economy and its institutions in Europe and other parts of the world; and, of course, ● the impact of different legal systems (common law and civil law) and traditions.

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Preface

Table 1 Encyclopedia concept with entry samples NONPROFIT AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

SOCIAL CAPITAL

CIVIL SOCIETY

PHILANTHROPY

Substantive entries

Associations, definitions and history Civil society history Civil society theory Civility Civic culture

Foundations, definitions and history Charity Gift, Giving Wakfs Venture Philanthropy

Theories of nonprofit organizations Partnerships Third party government Social investment Social entrepreneurship

Civic participation Reciprocity Social capital, definition Social cohesion Social trust

Organizational profiles

Charta 77 Civicus Transparency International

European Foundation Centre Ford Foundation Tata Trusts

Ashoka BRAC Caritas

Free Masons Boy/Girl Scouts Rochdale Society

Bibliographic entries

De Toqueville, Alexis Ferguson, Adam Dahrendorf, Ralf

Carnegie, Andrew Rowntree, Joseph Soros, George

Dunant, Jean-Henri Yunus, Muhammad

Bourdieu, Pierre Coleman, James Putnam, Robert

In trying to address these different approaches and traditions, we used an approach whereby we developed an initial list of concepts, organizations and personalities to be covered. We did so by specifying four major ‘streams’ that roughly correspond to the intellectual and policy divisions in the field, although much overlap exists among them: civil society, philanthropy, nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations, and social capital. In each of these four ‘streams’, policy fields, traditions, and literatures, we identified key concepts, institutions/organizations and personalities. Table 1 offers an illustration of our approach. We submitted an initial list to the International Advisory Committee for comments and, in particular, encouraged each member to suggest additions and modifications. After incorporating further suggestions from entry authors and the field at large and several iterations, we arrived at a list that forms the basis of the Encyclopedia. This Encyclopedia includes 628 entries: 267 conceptual terms, 222 organizations and institutions; and 139 biographies – available both in hard print copy and in electronic format accessible via the Internet. Entries of similar type, e.g., regionally focused entries, civil society history essays, biographical or organizational entries, follow a standardized structure. All entries are arranged in alphabetical order from A to Z, are cross-referenced, and provide suggestions for further readings. They represent original contributions by the corresponding authors; editorial input was for the most part reserved for structural aspects. Of course, in a first edition, any encyclopedia will suffer from omissions and unevenness in the treatment and the quality of entries. We hope that future editions will remedy such shortcomings and build on knowledge we have managed to assemble in the course of this initial intellectual stock-taking. Helmut K. Anheier Stefan Toepler Regina List

Acknowledgements Many people have been involved in the development of the Encyclopedia. Cooperation is in the very nature of the encyclopedia ‘genre’, and it requires the cooperation and goodwill of many. First, we owe deep gratitude to our collaborators at Springer, especially Teresa Krauss, who in the best of editorial traditions approached us to take on this task in the first place. We are also grateful to Michaela Bilic and Jennifer Carlson, as well as their assistants Katherine Chabalko, Susan Bednarczyk and Saskia Ellis, who all kept us going throughout this process and were always there to give a helping hand. Their patience in guiding us through numerous international conference calls made the difference between feelings of progress rather than frustration. We are also grateful to the members of the International Advisory Committee, listed on a separate page, who lent their expertise and not only advised us on the content of the Encyclopedia, but also recommended suitable authors and, in many cases, contributed entries. In particular, Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Ju¨rgen Kocka, Craig Calhoun, Marlies Glasius, Dave Brown, Susan Pharr, Alnoor Ebrahim, Hagai Katz, and Eva Kuti stand out, and their contributions are well beyond what we could have reasonably expected. They are outstanding exemplars of the kind of scholars one hopes to have involved in projects like this one. Special thanks are also due to Ebenezer Obadare (University of Kansas) and Samiul Hasan (United Arab Emirates University), who offered advice regarding their areas of regional expertise, and to David Horton Smith for his wise advice. At the University of Heidelberg and George Mason University, we thank our research assistants, Anael Labigne, Martin Ho¨lz, Francisco Martinez, Filip Zielinski, and Jan Sacharko, who conducted background research, especially for many of the biographical and organizational entries. Of course, we could not have done this without the contributions of nearly 400 authors, among them scholars and practitioners – both renowned and up-and-coming – from every major world region, who prepared their entries – in many cases more than one – on a voluntary basis. We are especially grateful to those who came in at the last minute to fill in on those occasions where the originally assigned authors had to drop out.

About the Editors-in-Chief

Helmut K. Anheier (Ph.D. Yale University, 1986) is Professor of Sociology, Heidelberg University, and Academic Director of the Center for Social Investment and Professor of Sociology. From 2001 to 2009 he was Professor of Public Policy and Social Welfare at UCLA, and Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics. He founded and directed the Centre for Civil Society at LSE (1998–2002), the Center for Civil Society at UCLA (2001–2009), and the Center for Globalization and Policy Research (2004–2009), also at UCLA. Prior to this he was a Senior Research Associate and Project Co-director at the Johns Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies, and Associate Professor of Sociology at Rutgers University. Before embarking on an academic career, Dr. Anheier served as Social Affairs Officer to the United Nations. Dr. Anheier’s work has focused on civil society, the nonprofit sector, philanthropy, organizational studies, policy analysis and comparative methodology. He is author of over 300 publications, including over thirty authored and edited books. He has won several national and international awards, including the 2006 PNP Best Book Award of the American Academy of Management. He is currently researching the role of philanthropy internationally, and interested in methodological questions at the intersection of globalization, civil society, and culture. Dr. Anheier serves on the board of several scholarly and philanthropic organizations.

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Stefan Toepler (Dr. rer.pol., Free University of Berlin, 1995) is Associate Professor of Nonprofit Studies in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University in Virginia, USA. Prior to joining George Mason in 2002, he was on the faculty of the Institute of Policy Studies at Johns Hopkins University, where he coordinated, inter alia, the legal, Central European and Middle Eastern components of the Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. Dr. Toepler was a doctoral fellow of Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at the Free University of Berlin from 1992 to 1995, a Philanthropy Fellow at Johns Hopkins in 1993/94; and a Fellow in Museum Practice at the Smithsonian Institution in 2004. Dr. Toepler’s research interests range from the study of philanthropic foundations and nonprofit management and policy more generally to arts policy and cultural economics. With over 70 publications in both English and German, his work has appeared in such journals as Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Nonprofit Management & Leadership, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Administration & Society, the International Journal of Public Sector Management, the International Journal of Public Administration, the Journal of Cultural Economics, and VoluntasInternational Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations. He is the contributing co-editor of Private Funds, Public Purpose: Philanthropic Foundations in International Perspective (New York: Kluwer/Plenum, 1999); Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999)—winner of Independent Sector’s 2001 Virginia Hodgkinson Research Prize; and The Legitimacy of Philanthropic Foundations: US and European Perspectives (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006).


About the Managing Editor

Regina A. List is an independent editor, researcher and writer living in Hamburg, Germany. She is also Managing Editor of the Journal of Civil Society. Previously, she served as Research Projects Manager at the Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies and Co-Ordinator for Developing Countries for the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, as well as overall Project Manager. She is co-editor with Helmut K. Anheier of A Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy and the Non-Profit Sector, and co-author of Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector, Volume One, and Cross-border Philanthropy, among other works. After completing an M.A. in International Development at the American University (Washington, DC), she served as Program Co-ordinator and Executive Director of the Esquel Group Foundation.

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International Advisory Committee Martin Albrow London School of Economics and Political Science London UK

Joseph Chan University of Hong Kong Hong Kong China

Daniele Archibugi Italian National Research Council Rome Italy University of London Birkbeck UK

Neera Chandhoke University of Delhi Delhi India

Avner Ben-Ner University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN USA Gabriel Berger Universidad de San Andres Buenos Aires Argentina Patrick Bond University of KwaZulu-Natal Durban South Africa Elizabeth Boris Urban Institute Washington, D.C. USA L. David Brown Harvard University Cambridge, MA USA Craig Calhoun New York University New York, NY USA

Ramesh C. Datta Tata Institute of Social Sciences Mumbai India Paul Dekker Tilburg University Tilburg The Netherlands Alnoor Ebrahim Harvard Business School Boston, MA USA Heba Raouf Ezzat Cairo University Cairo Egypt Mamadou Gaye Groupe Institut Africain de Management Senegal Africa Giuliana Gemelli Universita di Bologna Bologna Italy

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International Advisory Committee

Marlies Glasius University of Amsterdam Amsterdam The Netherlands Xavier Greffe University of Paris Paris France Steven Heydemann United States Institute of Peace Washington, DC USA Mary Kaldor London School of Economics and Political Science London UK Hagai Katz Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Be’er Sheva Israel Ju¨rgen Kocka Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Berlin Germany Eva Kuti Budapest College of Management Budapest Hungary

Francis Nyamnjoh Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) Dakar Senegal Tae-Kyu Park Yonsei University Seoul South Korea Vıćtor Pe´rez-Dıáz Analistas Socio-Politicos (ASP) Madrid Spain Susan Pharr Harvard University Cambridge, MA USA Jan Aart Scholte University of Warwick Coventry UK London School of Economics London UK Hakan Seckinelgin London School of Economics and Political Science London UK

Myles McGregor-Lowndes Queensland University of Technology Brisbane, QLD Australia

Steven Rathgeb Smith University of Washington Seattle, WA USA

Henrietta Moore London School of Economics and Political Science London UK

Volker Then University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany

Alejandro Natal El Colegio Mexiquense Toluca Mexico

Michel Wieviorka Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Paris France

International Advisory Committee

Filip Wijkstro¨m Stockholm School of Economics Stockholm Sweden

Dennis R. Young Georgia State University Atlanta, GA USA

Naoto Yamauchi Osaka University Osaka Japan

Annette Zimmer University of Mu¨nster Mu¨nster Germany

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List of Contributors FRANK ADLOFF Free University of Berlin Berlin Germany

MORRIS ALTMAN Victoria University of Wellington Wellington New Zealand

DIETER AHLERT Westphalian Wilhelms-University Mu¨nster Germany

GABRIEL AMITSIS Institute of Social Innovation Athens Greece

MAHTAB AHMAD Asian Institute of Technology Pathumthani Thailand MOKBUL MORSHED AHMAD Asian Institute of Technology Pathumthani Thailand SALVATORE ALAIMO School of Public and Environmental Affairs Decatur, GA USA MICHAEL ALBERG-SEBERICH Forum for Active Philanthropy Berlin Germany OLGA ALEXEEVA Charities Aid Foundation London UK

CHARLOTTE ANHEIER Pitzer College Sherman Oaks, CA USA HELMUT K. ANHEIER University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany Hertie School of Governance Berlin Germany EDITH ARCHAMBAULT University of Paris Paris France ZEYNEP ATALAY University of Maryland College Park, MD USA

SAIF ABD AL-FATTAH Cairo University Giza Egypt

JAMES E. AUSTIN Harvard Business School Boston, MA USA

ANNE ALSTOTT Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA USA

GERALD AUTEN US Department of the Treasury Washington, DC USA

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List of Contributors

HOLGER BACKHAUS-MAUL The Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg Halle (Saale) Germany

MICHAEL BISESI Seattle University Seattle, WA USA

HARRY BAUER International Relations London UK

FLORIAN BLAESS Centre for Social Investment Heidelberg Germany

ARND BAUERKA¨MPER Free University of Berlin Berlin Germany

HANS BLOMKVIST Uppsala University Uppsala Sweden

LEHN M. BENJAMIN George Mason University Fairfax, VA USA

INGO BODE Universitaet Wuppertal Wuppertal Germany

GABRIEL BERGER Universidad de San Andres Buenos Aires Argentina

CLAUDIA BODE-HARLASS Woergl Austria

P. ISHWARA BHAT University of Mysore Mysore India SHAHJAHAN BHUIYAN Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research (KIMEP) Almaty Kazakhstan ERIC BIDET University of Maine LeMans France

THOMAS P. BOJE Roskilde University Roskilde Denmark JESSE O. BOLLINGER Regis University Independence, MO USA PATRICK BOND Kwa-Zulu Natal School of Development Studies Durban South Africa

CHRISTOPHER S. BIGGERS Asheboro, NC USA

ELIZABETH T. BORIS The Urban Institute Washington, DC USA

ANAEL BIGNE University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany

THOMASINA BORKMAN George Mason University Fairfax, VA USA


A. JOSEPH BORRELL Shippensburg University Shippensburg, PA USA

JENNIFER M. BRINKERHOFF George Washington University Washington, DC USA

ODILE BOUR Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales Berlin Berlin Germany

ASPEN BRINTON Northwestern University Evanston, IL USA

MATT BOWDEN Dublin Institute of Technology Dublin Ireland

EVELYN BRODY Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago, IL USA

WOODS BOWMAN DePaul University Chicago, IL USA

L. DAVID BROWN Harvard University Cambridge, MA USA

LORI A. BRAINARD George Washington University Washington, DC USA TACO BRANDSEN Radboud University Nijmegen Nijmegen The Netherlands KAI BRAUER Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Berlin Germany BETH BREEZE University of Kent at Canterbury Kent UK

JEFFREY L. BRUDNEY Cleveland State University Cleveland, OH USA FREYA BRUNE University of Mu¨nster Mu¨nster Germany JANA BRUNKE University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany RONELLE BURGER Stellenbosch University Stellenbosch South Africa

ELEANOR BRILLIANT Rutgers University Scarsdale, NY USA

JAN R. BUSSE Eschede Germany

DERICK BRINKERHOFF George Washington University Washington, DC USA

JORGE CADENA-ROA Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico Mexico City Mexico

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SABINE CAMPE Free University of Berlin Berlin Germany

CARLOS CORDOURIER REAL Centro Mexicano para la Filantropia Mexico City Mexico

RAQUEL CAMPOS FRANCO Universidade Catolica Portuguesa Porto Portugal

SUE CRAWFORD Creighton University Omaha, NE USA

ELAINE CHAN The University of Hong Kong Hong Kong China

MARIANO CROCE Sapienza - Universita di Roma Rome Italy

JOSEPH CHAN The University of Hong Kong Hong Kong China

RUTH CROCKER Auburn University Auburn, AL USA

KIN-MAN CHAN The Chinese University of Hong Kong Hong Kong China

HANS-CHRISTIAN CRUEGER Universitaet Bonn Bonn Germany

OLIVIER CHAVAREN George Mason University Paris France

LAWRENCE S. CUMMING International Development and Civil Society Ottawa, ON Canada

MARTHA CHEN Harvard University Cambridge, MA USA

KLA´RA CZIKE National Volunteer Centre of Hungary Budapest Hungary

JOHN D. CLARK World Bank (retired) Washington, DC USA

ROD DACOMBE King’s College London London UK

RAM CNAAN University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA USA

TIMOTHY R. DAHLSTROM Arizona State University Litchfield Park, AZ USA

STEPHEN COMMINS UCLA Los Angeles, CA USA

ROBERT DALZIEL University of Birmingham Birmingham UK


ASHOK DAS San Francisco State University San Francisco, CA USA

MA OLIVA Z. DOMINGO University of the Philippines Quezon City Philippines

THOMAS DAVIES City University London London UK

YASHAVANTHA DONGRE University of Mysore Mysore India

ANDREA DE JONGE Van Andel Institute Grand Rapids, MI USA

FREDA DONOGHUE Trinity College Dublin Ireland

CAROL J. DE VITA The Urban Institute Washington, DC USA

HEATHER DOUGLAS Kenmore, QLD Australia

PAUL DEKKER The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) The Hague The Netherlands GLORIA S. H. DENOON New York University Manhattan, NY USA

GEORGETTE DUMONT Northern Illinois University South Bend, IN USA HAI VAN DUONG DINH Westphalian Wilhelms-University Mu¨nster Germany

REBECCA DIBB Centre for Development Services Cairo Egypt

ALEXIA DUTEN University of Mu¨nster Mu¨nster Germany

EVA DIDION Universitaet Bamberg Bamberg Germany

BERNHARD EBBINGHAUS Fakultat fur Sozialwissenschaften Mannheim Germany

DIANA DIGOL Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) Hamburg Germany

ALNOOR EBRAHIM Harvard University Cambridge, MA USA

ROUMEN DIMITROV University of Western Sydney Penrith South DC, NSW Australia

STEVE VAN ECK Meyer Memorial Trust Portland, OR USA

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MARC EDELMAN City University of New York New York, NY USA

ANTHONY J. FILIPOVITCH Minnesota State University Mankato, MN USA

ANGELA M. EIKENBERRY University of Nebraska at Omaha Omaha, NE USA

ALAN FOWLER University of KwaZulu Natal Herbetsdale South Africa

JENNY ELMACO University of Mu¨nster Mu¨nster Germany

JONATHAN FOX University of California Santa Cruz, CA USA

JED EMERSON Uhuru Capital Management New York, NY USA

MARIA RAQUEL FREIRE University of Coimbra Coimbra Portugal

ANJA ERBEL London UK

MATTHEW FREISE University of Mu¨nster Mu¨nster Germany

AMITAI ETZIONI George Washington University Washington, DC USA

BRYAN T. FROEHLE School of Theology and Ministry Miami Gardens, FL USA

MARTIN FARRELL get2thepoint Kingston UK

BRENDA GAINER York University Toronto, ON Canada

LEWIS FAULK Georgia State University Atlanta, GA USA

ANJULA GARG European Commission ISPRA (VA) Italy

CARINNE FAVEERE Boston College Bradenton, FL USA

GIULIANA GEMELLI Universita di Bologna Bologna Italy

SUSAN K. FEIGENBAUM University of Missouri-St. Louis St. Louis, MO USA

BENJAMIN GIDRON Ben Gurion University Beer Sheva Israel


LEAH GILBERT Georgetown University Washington, DC USA

SUZANNE GRANT University of Waikato Hamilton New Zealand

GUNNAR GLAENZEL University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany

CHRISTOPHER L. GRIFFIN Yale Law School New Haven, CT USA

MARLIES GLASIUS London School of Economics & Political Science London UK University of Amsterdam Amsterdam The Netherlands TED G. GOERTZEL Rutgers University Camden, NJ USA CHRISTOPH GOLBECK University of Mu¨nster Mu¨nster Germany SHANTHI GOPALAN University of Mysore Mysore India DIETER GOSEWINKEL Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Germany

ANTJE GRONEBERG University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany DIRK GROWE LandsAid e.V. Kaufering Germany NORBERT GO¨TZ University of Helsinki Helsinki Finland MARY KAY GUGERTY University of Washington Seattle, WA USA MARK A. HAGER Arizona State University Phoenix, AZ USA SHARILYN HALE YWCA Toronto Toronto, ON Canada

MICHAEL GOUSMETT University of Canterbury Christchurch New Zealand

MICHAEL HALL Imagine Canada Toronto, ON Canada

CHRIS GOVEKAR First Cause Beaverton, OR USA

PETER DOBKIN HALL Harvard University Cambridge, MA USA

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LOEK HALMAN Tilburg University LE Tilburg The Netherlands

BERND HELMIG University of Mannheim Mannheim Germany

MARK HAMILTON Ellicot City, MD USA

LEIGH HERSEY Arizona State University Scottsdale, AZ USA

TULLIA HAMILTON Washington University Missouri St. Louis, MO USA DAVID C. HAMMACK Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH USA SARAH HARDS York UK JENNY HARROW City University London London UK SAMIUL HASAN United Arab Emirates University Al Ain United Arab Emirates

LISA HILL University of Adelaide Adelaide, SA Australia RICHARD HOLLOWAY Aga Khan Foundation Geneva Switzerland MARTIN HO¨LZ University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany MARTIN HOLZBERG Westphalian Wilhelms-University Mu¨nster Germany

THORSTEN HASCHE Goettingen Graduate School of Social Sciences Goettingen Germany

DAVID B. HOWARD UCLA Center for Civil Society Los Angeles, CA USA University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany

MUHAMMAD EEQBAL FAROUQUE HASSIM University of Melbourne Melbourne, VIC Australia

MARC MORJE HOWARD Georgetown University Washington, DC USA

VOLKHART F. HEINRICH Transparency International Melville South Africa

JANE HUDSON University of the West of England Bristol UK


CHANG-SOON HWANG Soonchunhyang University Asan Korea

DAVID JOULFAIAN US Department of the Treasury Washington, DC USA

BARBARA LETHEM IBRAHIM American University in Cairo Cairo Egypt

MARK JUERGENSMEYER University of California, Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, CA USA

LEON E. IRISH International Center for Civil Society Law Crownsville, MD USA

RU¨DIGER H. JUNG University of Applied Sciences Remagen Germany

RENEÉ A. IRVIN University of Oregon Eugene, OR USA

CHRISTOPHER KAAN Free University of Berlin Berlin Germany

YUDHISHTHIR RAJ ISAR The American University of Paris Paris France

PAULA KABALO Ben Gurion University Sede Boker Israel

ARMINE ISHKANIAN London School of Economics London UK

PANU KALMI Helsinki School of Economics Helsinki Finland

SARAH JASTRAM University of Hamburg Hamburg Germany

CHRISTOPHER KANN Free University of Berlin Berlin Germany

JANE JENSON Universite´ de Montreal Montreal, QB Canada

KARUTI KANYINGA University of Nairobi Nairobi Kenya

DEREK C. JONES Hamilton College Clinton, NY USA

HAGAI KATZ Ben Gurion University Beer Sheva Israel

NICOLA JONES Overseas Development Institute London UK

JOHN KEANE The University of Westminster London UK

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KONSTANTIN KEHL University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany

SEBASTIAN KOOS Fakultat fur Sozialwissenschaften Mannheim Germany

ANDRAS KELEN Budapest College of Management Budapest Hungary

DENISA KOSTOVICOVA London School of Economics and Political Science London UK

JANELLE A. KERLIN Georgia State University Atlanta, GA USA

PATSY KRAEGER Arizona State University Phoenix, AZ USA

ANSGAR KLEIN Bundesnetzwerk Buergerschaftliches Engagement Berlin Germany

KRISTIAN KRIEGER King’s College London London UK

THOMAS KLIE Zentrum fuer zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung Freiburg Germany

BENEDIKT KROLLPFEIFER Braunschweig Neustadtring Germany

DAVID KNOKE University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN USA

JAN KUENZL Caucasian Review of International Affairs Berlin Germany

JU¨RGEN KOCKA Social Science Research Center Berlin Germany

BERTHOLD KUHN Free University of Berlin Bonn Germany

BEATE KOHLER-KOCH Mannheimer Zentrum fur Europaische Sozialforschung Mannheim Germany

STEIN KUHNLE Hertie School of Governance Berlin Germany

ANDREAS KOLLER Social Science Research Council New York, NY USA

PRADEEP KUMAR Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi India

AAFKE KOMTER University College Utrecht Utrecht The Netherlands

SARABAJAYA KUMAR University of Oxford Oxford UK


SUNIL KUMAR London School of Economics and Political Science London UK

JEFFREY LEITER North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC USA

SHYAMA KURUVILLA Boston University School of Public Health Boston, MA USA

ELIZABETH LEVI The New School Montclair, NJ USA

E´VA KUTI Budapest School of Management Budapest Hungary

DAVID L LEWIS London School of Economics and Political Science London UK

ANAEL LABIGNE University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany

ANTONIUS LIEDHEGENER University of Lucerne Lucerne Switzerland

DIRK LANGE University of Oldenburg Oldenburg Germany

GABRIELE LINGELBACH Albert-Ludwigs-Universitaet Freiburg Freiburg Germany

KEVIN LASKOWSKI National Center for Family Philanthropy Washington, DC USA

REGINA LIST University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany

JEAN-LOUIS LAVILLE Cnam University Paris France

ANDREA LIVERANI London School of Economics London UK

MICHAEL D. LAYTON Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico Mexico City Mexico

ROGER A. LOHMANN West Virginia University Morgantown, WV USA

DIANA LEAT The City University London UK

PAULA DUARTE LOPES University of Coimbra Coimbra Portugal

SANG-EUN LEE Arizona University Phoenix, AZ USA

SUSAN LORD University of New Hampshire Durham, NH USA

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JIM LOTZ Halifax, NS Canada MARK LYONS University of Technology Sydney, NSW Australia CHARLES MACLEAN PhilanthropyNow Portland, OR USA IAN MACPHERSON University of Victoria Victoria, BC Canada KYM MADDEN Queensland University of Technology Brisbane, QLD Australia CARMEN MALENA CIVICUS Participatory Governance Program Stoneham, QC Canada

KERSTIN MARTENS University of Bremen Bremen Germany FRANCISCO MARTINEZ University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany JOHANNES MARX Universitaet Mainz Mainz Germany THORNTON MATHESON US Department of the Treasury Chevy Chase, MD USA MYLES MCGREGOR-LOWNDES Queensland University of Technology Brisbane, QLD Australia PAUL-BRIAN MCINERNEY University of Illinois at Chicago Chicago, IL USA

SINISˇA MALESˇEVIC´ National University of Ireland Galway Ireland

MICHAEL MCQUARRIE University of California-Davis Davis, CA USA

VESNA MALESˇEVIC´ National University of Ireland Galway Ireland

HERIBERT MEFFERT Westphalian Wilhelms-University Mu¨nster Germany

MIKLOS MARSCHALL Transparency International Berlin Germany

LUCAS MEIJS Erasmus University Rotterdam The Netherlands

HANNAH MARSDEN Overseas Development Institute London UK

ROSE MELVILLE University of Queensland Brisbane, QLD Australia


BARBARA A. METELSKY Cary, NC USA MEGAN MEYER University of Maryland Baltimore, MD USA MICHAEL MEYER Vienna University of Economics and Business Vienna Austria TIMO MEYNHARDT University of St. Gallen St. Gallen Switzerland SILKE MICHALSKI University of Mannheim Mannheim Germany MARCO ANTONIO FIGUEIREDO MILANI FILHO Mackenzie Presbyterian University Sao Paulo Brazil CARL MILOFSKY Bucknell University Lewisburg, PA USA RANJITA MOHANTY Society for Participatory Research in Asia New Delhi India GA´BOR MOLNA´R University of Kaposvar Kaposvar Hungary COR VAN MONTFORT The Netherlands and Court of Audit Public-Private Sector The Hague The Netherlands

LAURIE MOOK OISE/University of Toronto Toronto, ON Canada JESSICA MOORE North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC USA EVA MORE-HOLLERWEGER Vienna University of Economics and Business Vienna Austria GARETH G. MORGAN Sheffield Hallam University Sheffield UK GIOVANNI MORO FONDACA Rome Italy BHEKINKOSI MOYO TrustAfrica Dakar-Fann Senegal CAMILLO VON MUELLER University of St. Gallen Hamburg Germany MAITRAYEE MUKERJI Institute of Rural Management Gujarat India DHRUBODHI MUKHERJEE Southern Illinois University Carbondale Carbondale, IL USA ALEX MURDOCK London South Bank University London UK

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MARTTI MUUKKONEN University of Eastern Finland Joensuu Finland

TAMAKI ONISHI Indiana University Indianapolis, IN USA

STEFAN NA¨HRLICH Aktive Burgerschaft Berlin Germany

CLAUDIA OPITZ-BELAKHAL University of Basel Basel Switzerland

ALEJANDRO NATAL El Colegio Mexiquense Toluca Mexico CAMERON NEWTON Queensland University of Technology Brisbane, QLD Australia DOROTHY NORRIS-TIRRELL University of Memphis Memphis, TN USA GARTH NOWLAND-FOREMAN Unitec New Zealand Auckland New Zealand MICHAŁ NOWOSIELSKI Institute for Western Affairs Poznan Poland EBENEZER OBADARE University of Kansas Lawrence, KS USA

WIM VAN OPSTAL HIVA – Catholic University of Leuven Leuven Belgium PAURIC O’ROURKE Limerick Institute of Technology Limerick Ireland ANDREAS ORTMANN University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW Australia CERGE-EI Prague Czech Republic SUSAN A. OSTRANDER Tufts University Medford, MA USA MIRJAN OUDE VRIELINK Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration Tilburg The Netherlands

KERRY O’HALLORAN Queensland University of Technology Brisbane, QLD Australia

TRUDY OWENS School of Economics Nottingham UK

JULIUS OMONA Makerere University Kampala Uganda

RAUL PACHECO-VEGA University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC Canada


SANG PEEL PARK Sungkonghoe University Seoul Korea

JENNIFER PREECE University of Maryland College Park, MD USA

TAE-KYU PARK Yonsei University College of Business and Economics Seoul Korea

CRISTINA PUGA National Autonomous University of Mexico Mexico City Mexico

ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI University of Helsinki Helsinki Finland

JACK QUARTER OISE/University of Toronto Toronto, ON Canada

BRHLIKOVA PETRA University of Edinburgh Edinburgh Scotland

ARVIND RAJAGOPAL New York University New York, NY USA

STEVE PFAFF University of Washington Seattle, WA USA

SUSHMA RAMAN Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights Los Angeles, CA USA

CATHERINA PHAROAH Cass Business School London UK

SARA GORDON RAPPOPORT Circuito Mario de la Cueva s/n Ciudad Universitaria Mexico City Mexico

EMMA PLAYFAIR Ford Foundation London UK

ALLYSON REAVES ArC International Consultants Hilton Head Island, SC USA

TYMEN VAN DER PLOEG VU-University Amsterdam The Netherlands

RAQUEL REGO SOCIUS-ISEG Lisbon Portugal

MIROSLAV POSPI´SˇIL Center for Nonprofit Research Brno Czech Republic

FLORIAN REHLI University of St. Gallen Holzweid Switzerland

FRED POWELL National University of Ireland-Cork Cork Ireland

CHRISTOPH REICHARD Universitaet Potsdam Potsdam Germany

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DAVID O. RENZ University of Missouri-Kansas City Kansas City, MO USA TRAVIS REYNOLDS University of Washington Seattle, WA USA ANDREW RICH City College of New York New York, NY USA JONATHAN ROBERTS London School of Economics and Political Science London UK ROBBIE WATERS ROBICHAU Arizona State University Phoenix, AZ USA JEANETTE ROHR University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany MARIO ROITTER Center for the Study of State and Society Buenos Aires Argentina LISIUNIA ROMANIENKO Wroclaw University Wroclaw Poland

SAM ROYSTON York UK DIETER RUCHT Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Berlin Germany KATE RUFF Gloucester, MA USA ALAA SABER Near East Foundation Cairo Egypt JOHN SACCO George Mason University Fairfax, VA USA JAN SACHARKO George Mason University Arlington, VA USA ELEANOR W. SACKS Indiana University Cambridge UK REBECCA SAGER Bellarmine College of Liberal Arts Los Angeles, CA USA

DAMIEN ROUSSELIERE Universite Pierre Mendes France Grenoble II Grenoble France

LESTER M. SALAMON The John Hopkins University Baltimore, MD USA

SAMIRA ROUSSELIERE ENITIAA Nantes France

ANNE SANDER Hertie School of Governance Berlin Germany


ANNA VAN SANTEN Hertie School of Governance Berlin Germany

ANDREAS SCHROËR Portland State University Portland, OR USA

CURTIS SARLES New York University New York, NY USA

ANDREA SCHUESSLER Berlin Germany

WENDY SCAIFE Queensland University of Technology Brisbane, QLD Australia

CHRISTINA SCHWABENLAND London Metropolitan University London UK

JANINE SCHALL-EMDEN Beyond Development Consulting and Research Bolonga Italy

HAKAN SECKINELGIN London School of Economics London UK

EVELYNE SCHMID Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Geneva Switzerland

KLODJAN SEFERAJ Albarian Socio Economic Think-Tank (ASET) Tirana Albania

JU¨RGEN SCHMIDT Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Berlin Germany SABINA SCHNELL The George Washington University Washington, DC USA GEORG VON SCHNURBEIN Universitaet Basel Basel Switzerland

SABINE SELCHOW London School of Economics London UK PER SELLE University of Bergen Bergen Norway ANIL SETHI European Commission ISPRA (VA) Italy

DOMINIK SCHOLZ Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Berlin Germany

GORDON SHOCKLEY Arizona State University Phoenix, AZ USA

ALICIA SCHORTGEN University of Texas at Dallas Richardson, TX USA

FEDERICO SILVA CIVICUS Johannesburg South Africa

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KARLA SIMON Catholic University of America Washington, DC USA

NORMAN SPENGLER University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany

DEBORAH SIMPSON University of New Brunswick Saint John, NB Canada

KATHARINA SPRAUL University of Mannheim Mannheim Germany

KARUN K. SINGH City University of New York New York, NY USA

HARI SRINIVAS Global Development Research Center Kobe Japan

KARL HENRIK SIVESIND Institute for Social Research Oslo Norway

SIMON STACEY University of Maryland Baltimore, MD USA

SIMONA SˇKARABELOVA´ Masaryk University Brno Czech Republic MARGARET F. SLOAN University of Kentucky Olive Hill, KY USA DAVID HORTON SMITH Boston College Bradenton, FL USA STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH The University of Washington Seattle, WA USA

DARWIN STAPLETON Rockefeller Archive Center Ossining, NY USA MAX STEPHENSON School of Public and International Affairs Blacksburg, VA USA RUPERT GRAF STRACHWITZ Humboldt University Berlin Germany MARTY SULEK Indiana University Center on Philanthropy Farmland, IN USA

ROGER SPEAR The Open University Walton Hall UK

BALAZS SZABO Budapest Hungary

BASTIAN SPECHT University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany

RAJESH TANDON ORI New Delhi India


MARILYN TAYLOR University of the West of England Bristol UK

MATTHEW TURNOUR Neumann & Turnour Lawyers Brisbane, QLD Australia

NUNO S. THEMUDO University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh, PA USA

KATRIN UBA Uppsala University Sweden

VOLKER THEN University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany EKKEHARD THUEMLER University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany HELEN STONE TICE Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD USA STEFAN TOEPLER George Mason University Arlington, VA USA

SARAH VALDEZ University of Washington Seattle, WA USA MARTA VARANDA SOCIUS-ISEG Lisbon Portugal SUSAN VERDUCCI San Jose State University San Jose, CA USA ALFRED VERNIS Ramon Llull University Barcelona Spain

ANA TOLEDO CHAVARRI Madrid Spain

BRAM VERSCHUERE University College Ghent and Ghent University Ghent Belgium

KIMAIRIS TOOGOOD-LUEHRS George Mason University Arlington, VA USA

MARCIA SERRA RIBEIRO VIANA Mackenzie Presbyterian University Cotia, Sao Paolo Brazil

YUTAKA TSUJINAKA University of Tsukuba Ibaraki Japan

PETER WALKENHORST Bertelsmann Stiftung Guterslon Germany

HOWARD P. TUCKMAN Fordham University New York, NY USA

LILI WANG School of Community Resources and Development Phoenix, AZ USA

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MARGARETHA WARNICKE Arizona State University Phoenix, AZ USA

TAKAYUKI YOSHIOKA Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University Indianpolis, IN USA

RICHARD D. WATERS North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC USA

DENNIS R. YOUNG Georgia State University Atlanta, GA USA

MEREDITH WEISS University at Albany Albany, NY USA LEVI A. WHITE George Mason University Fairfax, VA USA SHANNON ADAIR WILLIAMS University of California-Santa Cruz Santa Cruz, CA USA SEIBEL WOLFGANG University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany SCHIRIN YACHKASCHI Cape Town South Africa NAOTO YAMAUCHI Osaka University Osaka Japan YAEL YISHAI University of Haifa Haifa Israel

FEISAL A. YUNIS Cairo University Giza Egypt DALIA YUSUF Media International Giza Egypt XI ZHU University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN USA FILIP ZIELINSKI University of Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany ANNETTE ZIMMER Westphalian Wilhelms-University Mu¨nster Germany MELANI E. ZIMMER Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Germany

A AARP ANDREA DEJONGE

Address of Organization 601 E Street NW Washington, DC 20049 USA www.aarp.org

Introduction Originally known as the American Association of Retired Persons, AARP is an enormous association dedicated to enhancing the quality of life of the aging population. The motto of its constituents is ‘‘To Serve, and Not Be Served.’’ Membership is restricted to persons over fifty, and at the time of this writing AARP claims to have over 40 million US members. AARP and its related organizations provide services, advocacy, and education for its members. It actively lobbies for health-related issues such as Medicare and prescription drug coverage, as well as Social Security.

Brief History In 1947, Dr. Ethel Percy Andrus, a retired high school principle, founded the National Retired Teachers Association (NRTA) when she discovered that private health insurance was not available to retired educators. Ten years later, after success in finding health resources and programs for the NRTA, Dr. Andrus expanded her mission to all aging Americans and founded the American Association of Retired Persons (in 1999 this name was shortened to only ‘‘AARP’’), subsuming NRTA within the structure of the AARP. With public policy changes over the years such as Medicare for the elderly (1965), AARP has expanded its programs to actively promote the wellbeing of older Americans through a variety of measures, including advocacy, education, and service.

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas Although the original focus of AARP was providing to health care to older Americans, with a lesser focus on

other aspects of aging, successes in elderly access to health care have expanded AARP’s mission to include other issues, including enhancing the quality of life by increasing independence and encouraging community service by older Americans, and advocacy/lobbying efforts on local, state, and federal levels regarding public policy. Currently, AARP ‘‘is dedicated to enhancing quality of life for all as we age. We lead positive social change and deliver value to members through information, advocacy and service.’’

Activities AARP runs the gamut for services and membership benefits. Members (who no longer must be retired) are entitled to various benefits including travel discounts and home insurance discounts. AARP’s for-profit subsidiary, AARP Financial, Inc., provides services such as life insurance, and AARP’s web site, AARP.org, provides a wealth of information in every field, including leisure, money, and health. Besides AARP’s various member benefits and services (too numerous to list in this article), AARP also leads a powerful lobbying group in Washington, D.C., actively lobbying on issues relating to public policy as it affects the aging population of the US.

Structure and Governance AARP is a nonprofit 501(c) (4) membership organization with for-profit subsidiaries, including AARP Services, Inc., (offers benefits and services to AARP’s members) and AARP Financial Inc., (manages AARP-endorsed financial products). The AARP Foundation is AARP’s affiliated charity. AARP has a national office in Washington, D.C., as well as offices in all 50 states. There are also offices in the US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. AARP is governed by a Board of Directors (23 members) to oversee all policies and programs, and an Executive Team, which has members dedicated to specific leadership roles within AARP.

Funding Major funding sources for AARP (as reported in its 2007 financial report) include (from highest revenue to lowest), royalties (AARP makes insurance programs available to its

H. Anheier, S. Toepler (eds.), International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, DOI 10.1007/978-0-387-93996-4, # Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

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members through various insurance agencies and retains a portion of those premiums collected, which are reported as royalties on its intellectual property), membership dues, publications and advertising, investment income, grants (both federal agencies and private organizations), contributions, program income, and other income.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions With revenues of over $1 billion per year, AARP is one of the most powerful nonprofit lobbying organizations in the United States. Its lobbying efforts have most impacted the health care public policy debates, and it was instrumental in lobbying Congress to pass the law creating Medicare Part D in 2003, which is a federal insurance program to subsidize prescription drug costs for Medicare recipients. AARP also conducts a wide variety of research, including polling and surveys, on various topics of elderly care issues relating to the over-50 population.

Cross-References

▶ Advocacy ▶ Civil Society and the Elderly ▶ Lobbying ▶ Membership and Membership Associations

References/Further Readings Morris, C. R. (1996). The AARP: America’s most powerful lobby and the clash of generations. New York, Time Books. Litwak, E., & Butler, R. N. (1985). Helping the elderly: The complementary roles of informal networks and formal systems. New York: Guilford. Peterson, P. G. (1996). Will America grow up before it grows old? How the coming social security crisis threatens you, your family, and your country. New York: Random House.

Abbe, Ernst CHRISTOPH GOLBECK

Basic Biographical Information Born in 1840 in Eisenach, Thuringia (Germany) to a rather poor working-class family, Ernst Abbe went on to become an award-winning physicist, professor at the University of Jena, successful businessman, and a generous philanthropist to his employees and his adopted home town of Jena. Abbe owed his superb educational biography to his

outstanding intellect but also to a couple of benefactors who repeatedly helped him financing his studies. After he received his habilitation from Jena University, he joined the company of Carl Zeiss, an optician, and became an associate of the Carl Zeiss stock corporation in 1875, which by then was one of Germany’s most important companies. The same year Abbe started the company’s health insurance scheme, what would over the upcoming decades become one of the most generous corporate benefit schemes of its time. In 1889 he established the Carl Zeiss Foundation in order to ensure the sustainability of his social inventions. He died in 1905 in Jena.

Major Contributions Already a professor at the University of Jena, Abbe was engaged by Carl Zeiss to improve the manufacturing process of optical instruments. He designed the first refractometer, invented the today so-called ‘‘Abbe condenser’’ and described important details of the mathematical foundation of microscope design. But even if he was a great scientist, Abbe is probably best known for his innovations in the field of social and labor rights. He not only introduced exceptional social rights such as the 8-hour work day, an employer-based health insurance as well as a pension scheme, but also pioneered with a system of profit sharing for the employees of the Carl Zeiss AG particularly with regard to preventing their participation in potential losses. After the death of his associate Carl Zeiss, Abbe founded on May 19, 1889 the so-called ‘‘CarlZeiss-Stiftung’’ (Carl Zeiss Foundation). Its statute, issued by Abbe after long case studies of English and Australian labor law in 1896, has to be acknowledged as one of the early and pioneering documents of the German welfare state. Up until today the foundation encourages the promotion of science, for example with the Carl Zeiss Research Award. But Abbe also was a great philanthropist who dedicated much of his money to local people as well as to the University of Jena, including financing a children’s hospital and a civic auditorium for the purpose of political gatherings.

Cross-References

▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Foundations, Independent

References/Further Readings Gerth, K., & Wimmer, W. (2005). Ernst Abbe – Wissenschaftler, Unternehmer, Sozialreformer. Jena: Bussert & Stadeler. Linck, G. (1930). Ernst Abbe – Rede zum Geda¨chtnis seines 25. Todestages. Jena: Fischer.

Accountability

Abed, Fazle SHAHJAHAN BHUIYAN

Basic Biographical Information Born in 1936 in Sylhet in erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to a wealthy landowner family, Fazle Hasan Abed went to the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, and the University of Glasgow, Scotland, to study accountancy. After graduation, then in his thirties, Abed joined Shell Oil and was holding a senior executive position in its outlet in Chittagong. The Bangladesh liberation war, which took place in 1971, played a significant role on the direction of his life and career. In the wake of the severity and brutality of the war, Abed felt moral responsibility to support his countrymen who were engaged in war for what he considered a just cause. As a result, he quit his job in 1971, and traveled to London to raise awareness in the international community about the genocide and generated funds for the independence war through a campaign called Help Bangladesh. After the liberation war was ended, he returned home to the newly independent Bangladesh in 1972 with the hope of contributing to the reconstruction of his war-ravaged motherland.

Major Contributions Millions of displaced people, who took refuge in India during the war, started returning home, which warranted immediate efforts for their relief and rehabilitation. Abed decided to contribute to this venture and set up BRAC (formerly, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) in 1972, of which he is now the Chairperson. The relief work was soon finished, but poverty and vulnerability still existed. He then expanded that organization to provide services to people affected by abject poverty, discrimination, and exploitation. BRAC, now one of the largest non-government organizations in the globe, is recognized internationally for programs such as micro-credit, health care, education, social development, capacity building, human rights and legal services. With a view to empower poor, BRAC has so far reached 110 million people covering all 64 districts of the country and thus has contributed to the reduction of human suffering. Abed has also established many development organizations in the fields of higher education (BRAC University), information and communication technology (bracNet), banking (BRAC Bank), and house building financing (Delta BRAC Housing Finance).

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On the social responsibility front, Abed is actively working to improve the human condition of poor of developing countries. To meet the vision, BRAC has expanded its programs in Asian and African countries (Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) and is successfully working to alleviating poverty and empowerment of the poor in these regions. In recognition of his services to society, Abed has received awards and recognition both at home and abroad. Some of them include: The Ramon Magsaysay Award for Community Leadership (1980), the UNESCO Noma Prize for Literacy (1985), the UNICEF’s Maurice Pate Award (1992), the Gates Award for Global Health (2004), the UNDP Mahbub ul Haq Award for Outstanding Contribution in Human Development (2004), the Henry K. Kravis Prize in Leadership (2007), the PKSP Lifetime Achievement in Social Development and Poverty Alleviation (2007), an Honorary Doctor of Law by Columbia University (2008), and an Asiatic Society Fellowship (2008).

Cross-References ▶ BRAC ▶ Grameen Bank

References/Further Readings Alliance Magazine (2005). Interview- Fazle Hasan Abed, from http://www. alliancemagazine.org/node/1344, accessed February 4, 2009. BRAC Homepage (2008). Founder and Chairperson: Fazle Hasan Abed, from http://www.brac.net/index.php?nid = 104, accessed February 5, 2009. Lovell, C. H. (1992). Breaking the cycle of poverty: The BRAC strategy. Dhaka: University Press.

Accountability ALNOOR EBRAHIM Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Introduction Calls for greater accountability in all sectors of society – public, private, and nonprofit – have become increasingly common over the last two decades. For the first time in 2007, a public relations survey known as the Edelman Trust Barometer recorded a decline in trust in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), after six years of consistent increases (Edelman, 2007). NGOs are no doubt still widely trusted, but not in all places. The divide between the wealthy nations of the North and the poorer countries of the South is especially stark: While NGOs are most

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trusted in many Northern countries such as the United States, France, and Germany, businesses are more trusted in many rapidly growing economies such as Brazil, India, and Russia. While these findings are limited, they capture a wedge of public unease and uncertainty about NGOs, and about civil society organizations (CSOs) more broadly. Over the past decade, regulators, funders, and civil society actors themselves have moved to increase accountability in CSOs, particularly in terms of financial disclosure, transparency in governance, and measurement of performance. Accountability even emerged as the key theme of the 2007 World Assembly organized by CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

Definition The term ‘‘accountability’’ is not easily translated across languages or cultures, sometimes being interchanged with terms that are not quite synonymous such as ‘‘responsibility’’ or ‘‘answerability’’ (e.g., the Spanish and Portuguese Responsabilidad(e), the Hindi Jawaabdaari, or the German Verantwortlichkeit). Mel Dubnick attributes Anglican roots to the concept, tracing it back to a census ordered by King William 1 of England, published as the Domesday Books in 1086. That census, for the first time, not only required property holders ‘‘to ‘render a count’ of what they possessed’’ but they were ‘‘to do so in terms set by the king’s agents,’’ thus effectively establishing the notion of accountability as a foundation for governance (Dubnick, 1998: 71). In contemporary English usage, various definitions of accountability have been offered by scholars and practitioners including, for example, ‘‘the process of holding actors responsible for actions’’ (Fox & Brown, 1998: 12), or ‘‘the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions’’ (Edwards & Hulme, 1996: 967), or ‘‘the capacity to demand someone engage in reason-giving to justify his/her behavior, and/or the capacity to impose a penalty for poor performance’’ (Goetz & Jenkins, 2002: 5). What many definitions share is a ‘‘core sense’’ of accountability that Mulgan (2000: 555) identifies as having a set of three key features: the account is given to an external authority; there is social interaction and exchange, with one side seeking answers, while the other responds and accepts sanctions; and, it implies rights of authority, where those calling for an account assert rights of superiority over those who are accountable. This is essentially a principal–agent view of accountability, in which the lead actor or principal sets goals and employs agents to accomplish them.

This view of accountability is also widely shared among scholars of global governance and international politics. Definitions here likewise refer to the authority of some actors over others, for example, ‘‘that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of those standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that those responsibilities have not been met’’ (Grant & Keohane, 2004: 3). The literature further identifies four core components of accountability in global governance (Ebrahim & Weisband, 2007): (1) Transparency, which involves collecting information and making it available and accessible for public scrutiny; (2) Answerability or Justification, which requires providing clear reasoning for actions and decisions, including those not adopted, so that they may reasonably be questioned; (3) Compliance, through the monitoring and evaluation of procedures and outcomes, combined with transparency in reporting those findings; and (4) Enforcement or Sanctions for shortfalls in compliance, justification, or transparency. For numerous observers, this enforceability is what underlies the power of accountability mechanisms. Other scholars, particularly in the nonprofit and social sectors have suggested that this is a limiting view of accountability, and have argued that the concept is not only about being held accountable by others but also about ‘‘taking responsibility’’ for oneself (Cornwall et al., 2000). As such, it is not only a reactive response to overseers, but also a proactive one linked to ensuring that the public trust is served. This internal dimension of accountability is motivated by a ‘‘felt responsibility’’ as expressed through individual action and organizational mission (Fry, 1995). Reflecting a balancing of these external and internal components, the UK-based One World Trust defines accountability as ‘‘the processes through which an organization makes a commitment to respond to and balance the needs of stakeholders in its decision making processes and activities, and delivers against this commitment’’ (Lloyd et al., 2007:11).

Key Issues At the very least, what all of the above definitions share is an understanding that accountability involves relationships among various actors. Most discussions about the concept also pose two further questions: Accountability to whom? And accountability for what? Accountability to Whom?

Accountability relationships are complicated by the fact that CSOs are expected to be accountable to multiple actors: upward to patrons, downward to clients, and

Accountability

internally to themselves and their missions (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Kearns, 1996; Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001; Najam, 1996). CSO-patron accountability or ‘‘upward’’ accountability usually refers to relationships with donors, foundations, and governments and is often focused on the use of funds. CSO accountability to clients refers primarily to ‘‘downward’’ relationships with groups receiving services although it may also include communities or regions indirectly impacted by CSO programs. The third category of accountability concerns CSOs themselves. This internal accountability centers on an organization’s responsibility to its mission and staff, which includes decision makers as well as field-level implementers. Some scholars have even suggested that there are as many types of accountability as there are distinct relationships among people and organizations (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999: 256). Civil society actors engaged in policy advocacy face an additional accountability challenge increasingly leveled by their critics: ‘‘Whom do you represent? Who elected you?’’ The problem of representation is especially thorny when CSOs seek entry to policy arenas (as compared to their involvement in service delivery projects), ostensibly the domain of elected representatives in democratic societies. This challenge is less of a problem for CSOs that are membership based, and who can thus claim to be accountable to their members for their lobbying and advocacy activities. Nonmembership CSOs, on the other hand, tend to claim authorization on the grounds of what, rather than whom, they represent – such as a set of values, a social purpose or mission, expertise and experience in an issue area such as health or humanitarian relief, or a particular set of interests such as those of marginalized or unorganized groups (Peruzzotti, 2006: 52–53). In short, the demands of accountability ‘‘to whom’’ are multifold and can seldom be reduced to simple principal–agent terms. Accountability is a relational concept; its mechanisms do not stand alone as technical fixes to organizational problems, but are embedded in a social and institutional environment. This suggests that asymmetric relationships among stakeholders are likely to result in a skewing toward accountability mechanisms that satisfy the interests of dominant actors. In other words, accountability is also about power, in that asymmetries in resources become important in influencing who is able to hold whom accountable. Accountability for What?

Given that civil society actors face demands for accountability from multiple actors, it follows that they are expected to be accountable for different things by different people. These expectations may be broken down

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into four broad, but far from comprehensive, categories: accountability for finances, governance, performance, and mission (Behn, 2001; Ebrahim, 2009). Questions about finances have received considerable attention in the wake of various accounting scandals and crises not only in civil society but also in the private sector (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, and more recently the mortgage investments industry). Public policy responses to such crises typically call for greater disclosure of financial transactions, transparency in the use and oversight of funds by executives and trustees, as well as protections for whistleblowers who reveal information about mismanagement. Accountability, in this context, is constituted as coercive or punitive, with an emphasis on disclosure, a reliance on legislative or regulatory oversight, and backed up by threats of sanctions for noncompliance, such as fines, imprisonment, or loss of tax-exempt status. The second type of expectation focuses on organizational governance which, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, has often centered on the role of the board of directors. The basic premise is that boards are responsible not only for policy direction, but also for oversight of internal controls, and that failures within an organization are reflective of failures of guidance and oversight at the board level. The board is the nexus of standards of care, loyalty, and obedience: board members are responsible for seeking and considering adequate information on which to base decisions (care), for disclosing conflicts of interest and placing the organization’s interests over personal ones (loyalty), and for acting within the organization’s mission while also adhering to internal organizational protocols for decision making (obedience). The past decade has witnessed the emergence of an array of voluntary codes of conduct and third-party certification standards that detail what constitutes appropriate board composition, responsibility, and conflict of interest. While these self-regulatory codes and certifications are less coercive than governmental regulatory requirements, their powers of coercion lie in their symbolic and legitimating value – the signals of good housekeeping they send to the outside world, regardless of whether they actually lead to better housekeeping. The third stream of accountability demands centers on performance, built on the premise that organizations should be held to account for what they deliver. The purpose of such accountability is to demonstrate ‘‘results.’’ Within an international development context, performance-based accountability often uses logical framework analysis tools, in which a project’s objectives and expected results are identified in a matrix with a list of indicators used in measuring and verifying progress. This kind of accountability

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relies on a range of technical and professional skills related to performance measurement, indicator development, evaluation, and rational assessment, all of which converge toward metrics that link goals to outcomes. This accountability regime is supported by funder-reporting requirements that reward clear outputs and outcomes, and pressures on bilateral and multilateral aid agencies to show that the activities supported by taxpayers are having an impact. Some critical observers have cautioned, however, that ‘‘[d]emanding ‘results’ can mean either pushing for quick fixes, or insisting upon digging up the seedling to examine its roots before it can bear fruit. Domestic poverty work often is abandoned when narrowly measured results are demanded – and not found’’ (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001: 214). They stress a need to examine long-term effectiveness and less easily measurable goals of political and social change. This leads to a fourth and more emergent type of accountability that focuses on the very core of civil society activity: organizational mission. If CSOs exist for purposes of public good, why not ask them to demonstrate progress toward achieving that mission? One might describe this as a mission-centered variant of performance-based accountability. Yet, it is different in two respects. First, it embraces a long-term view of performance measurement by emphasizing iteration and learning – CSO managers are unlikely to know how best to achieve their goals and what to measure along the way, but repeated trials and critical scrutiny can lead to new insights and convergence. This suggests there are no panaceas to social problems, but instead that social problem solving requires an ability to cope with uncertainty and changing circumstances. And second, organizational goals and strategies are themselves subject to adaptation, as managers learn more about the social problems that they are trying to understand and solve. A central managerial challenge becomes putting in place processes that can engender systematic critical reflection and remain focused on solving social problems (Ebrahim, 2005). This type of strategic or adaptive accountability is not as well-established as the others above, but its nascent mechanisms – such as theories of change and organizational learning systems –are attracting attention among civil society actors. This is what some observers have called accountability as strategic choice (Brown et al., 2004; Jordan, 2007) or intelligent accountability (O’Neill, 2002). These four ‘‘whats’’ of accountability are not mutually exclusive. Boards are responsible for serving the mission and for overseeing performance. Donors consider mission in selecting which organizations to fund, and many

provide considerable flexibility with respect to performance assessment. Moreover, performance measurement can be both technocratic and adaptive. Accountability in Different Types of CSOs

The discussion has thus far only briefly touched upon the diversity among civil society organizations. Three basic categories are discussed here – membership organizations, welfare or service-oriented organizations, and advocacy and network organizations – although there are many others such as faith-based organizations, social movements, and labor unions. Membership organizations are largely oriented toward serving the interests of their members, and can include organizations as diverse as agricultural cooperatives, savings groups, and interest-based associations such as academic research societies and associations of retired persons. These organizations are often run by and for their members, and might also be called self-interest or self-help groups. The mechanisms of accountability available to members include franchise (voting for the organization’s leaders), revoking membership and dues (and joining another cooperative, for example), and attempting to reform the organization either by influencing leaders or by running for a leadership position. All of these options involve exit, voice, or loyalty (Hirschman, 1970). Because the members/clients are internal to the organization, membership organizations combine internal accountability (to members of the organizations) with downward accountability (to clients, who are members). In short, there is a structural equality between principals and agents, and thus a significant potential for the use of exit, voice, and loyalty options. The orientation of service organizations is often charitable in the sense that there is no profit motive, and that the clients and beneficiaries are generally external to the organization. These organizations provide a wide range of services, ranging from health and education to housing and rural development. The clients of service organizations are usually not involved in creating the CSO in the way that members are; they are external actors to the organization and therefore have less voice in shaping its activities and direction. As already discussed, they often face multiple competing demands for accountability – from funders, regulators, and clients. For many, the demands of funders or patrons (i.e., upward accountability) tend to be the most formalized, for example, through grant contracts, reporting requirements, and summative evaluations. They have relatively weak options for voice or exit in these relations, unless they are willing to risk losing

Accountability

grants. This imbalance is reproduced in CSO relations with clients, where the clients have only weak forms of voice or exit, unless they are willing to risk losing CSO services (except in highly competitive contexts where clients have multiple service-providers from which to choose). Some scholars have noted that the clients or beneficiaries of a service-delivery organization ‘‘are in a ‘take it or leave it’ relationship, quite similar to that of customers and employees of private firms’’ (Uphoff, 1996: 25) because ‘‘[u]nlike donors, [communities] cannot withdraw their funding; unlike governments, they cannot impose conditionalities’’ (Najam, 1996: 346–347). A third type of CSO includes those that operate through networks which may be regional, national, or transnational in scale. Many such organizations are involved in issue-based policy advocacy work. They display characteristics that are common to membership as well as service organizations, and also characteristics that are unique. For example, organizations like the Sierra Club and Amnesty International both have individual members who pay dues and thus have the option of taking their dues elsewhere should the organization fail to satisfy their interests. But they are not self-help organizations in the way that cooperatives are, and most members do not have direct access to organizational decision making or even to other members (nor do they necessarily desire such access), despite the fact that they elect board members. They are more like clients of service organizations. In other words, while their options for exit (e.g., franchise, and revoking membership dues) are potentially powerful, their actions are likely to be remote and isolated. On the other hand, some network organizations attract members by virtue of their policy advocacy work – thereby seeking to hold policy makers and public officials accountable to the views and values of their members. The mechanisms of accountability available to them are advocacy-oriented (voice), including lobbying, litigation, protest, negotiation, fact-finding, and demanding transparency in the reporting of information and events. These actions may be considered legitimate in a pluralistic society to the extent that they represent the collective voice of a group of people. Networks in which the members are organizations rather than individuals, involve an additional layer of accountability that depends on negotiation and coordination among member organizations. Accountability is collective in the sense that it depends on reliable coordination and pooling of resources among key players. In summary, the diversity among civil society organizations suggests that accountability relationships and mechanisms necessarily vary with CSO type. Mechanisms

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of accountability to clients, for example, are quite different in membership organizations (where clients or members are internal to the organization) than they are in service delivery NGOs (where clients are external). Accountability in membership organizations may be characterized as being largely member-centered, whereas it is multiple and contingent in service organizations. Advocacy networks represent still another type of organization, with accountability being negotiated and collective in nature.

Future Directions Public concern about accountability in civil society continues to grow globally, especially as CSOs become increasingly visible public actors. Many governments, funders, and citizens are responding with calls for increased oversight and regulation. A growth in compliance-driven or regulatory forms of accountability, however, raises an additional set of concerns – that funders and oversight agencies might abuse their powers of oversight, especially where regulators are themselves unregulated, and that efforts to control inappropriate behavior in a relatively small number of organizations might inadvertently stifle experimentation and innovation in civil society more broadly. The first of these concerns is quite real, particularly in cases where donors or regulators have the ability to punish CSOs by threatening to revoke their legal status, cut funds, impose conditions, or tarnish reputations. The past decade has witnessed a host of restrictive regulations enacted in over 30 countries around the world, ranging from limitations on the rights of individuals to form CSOs and raise funds, to excessive government discretion in shutting down or controlling what CSOs do (ICNL, 2006). Even CSOs in prosperous democratic societies, where the threat of abuse may not be as obvious, face the risks of co-optation, goal deflection, and censorship by their funders and regulators. These problems have become more pronounced in a post-9/11 context where CSO policy activities are subject to greater scrutiny by their governments, where funders are being asked to prove that their moneys are not being channeled to violent activities, and where some subsectors, such as Muslim CSOs, suffer ‘‘from a loss of the presumption of innocence’’ (Jordan & Van Tuijl, 2006: 8). A second, and related, apprehension about accountability is that a ‘‘strong unified accountability will be at the expense of diversity and innovation’’ in the social sector (Cnaan, 1996: 223–224). This is of particular relevance when considering external regulatory approaches to accountability. In examining the legal framework of accountability of nonprofit organizations in the

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United States, Chisolm (1995: 149) has cautioned that ‘‘there is a delicate balance between enough regulation to protect legitimate social interests in preventing diversion of charitable assets to private pockets . . . and enough regulation to squelch the qualities our society has most valued in the charitable sector,’’ such as creativity and independence of thought and action. Both of these concerns – about co-optation and abuse of power by donors and regulators, and about the loss of innovation and diversity as a result of more oversight and regulation – emphasize the potential fallouts of a rather narrow culture of accountability built on punitive notions of oversight and compliance. In the end, it is inescapable that CSOs will continue to face accountability demands from numerous actors. New innovations in CSO accountability are unlikely to lie in oversight and punishment alone, but in a more complex balancing of multiple kinds of accountabilities within a broader system of social relations. Arguably, there is a need for greater attention to mechanisms of accountability that can help align organizational missions with performance, and which might enable, rather than constrain, long-term systemic change.

Cross-References

▶ Amnesty International ▶ Civicus ▶ Civil Society and Democracy ▶ Codes of Ethics and Codes of Practice ▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Evaluation and Civil Society ▶ Legitimacy ▶ Performance and Impact ▶ Sierra Club ▶ Social Audits ▶ Social Trust ▶ Transparency

References/Further Readings Behn, R. D. (2001). Rethinking democratic accountability. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Brown, L. D., Moore, M. H., & Honan, J. (2004). Building strategic accountability systems for international NGOs. Accountability Forum, 2 (Summer), 31–43. Chisolm, L. B. (1995). Accountability of nonprofit organizations and those who control them: The legal framework. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 6(2), 141–156. Cnaan, R. (1996). Commentary. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 7(2), 221–225. Cornwall, A., Lucas, H., & Pasteur, K. (2000). Introduction: Accountability through participation: Developing workable partnership models in the health sector. IDS Bulletin, 31(1), 1–13.

Dubnick, M. J. (1998). Clarifying accountability: An ethical theory framework. In N. P. C. Sampford & C. -A. Bois (Eds.) Public sector ethics: Finding and implementing values (pp. 68–81). Leichhardt, NSW, Australia: The Federation Press/Routledge. Ebrahim, A. (2005). Accountability myopia: Losing sight of organizational learning. Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34(1), 56–87. Ebrahim, A. (2009). Placing the normative logics of accountability in ‘thick’ perspective. American Behavioral Scientist, 52(6), 885–904. Ebrahim, A., & Weisband, E. (Eds.) (2007). Global accountabilities: Participation, pluralism, and public ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edelman (2007). Edelman Trust Barometer 2007. Available at: www. edelman.com/trust/2007/trust_final_1_31.pdf Edwards, M., & Hulme, D. (1996). Too close for comfort? The impact of official aid on nongovernmental organizations. World Development, 24(6), 961–73. Fox, J. A., & Brown, L. D. (Eds.) (1998). The struggle for accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and grassroots movements. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston, MA: Pitman. Fry, R. E. (1995). Accountability in organizational life: Problem or opportunity for nonprofits? Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 6(2), 181–195. Goetz, A. M., & Jenkins, R. (2002). Voice, accountability and human development: The emergence of a new agenda. Background paper for the Human Development Report 2002. New York: United Nations Development Programme. Grant, R. W., & Keohane, R. O. (2004). Accountability and abuses of power, in world politics: International Law and Justice Working Paper. Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University School of Law. Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). (2006). Recent laws and legislative proposals to restrict civil society and civil society organizations. International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 8(4), 76–85. Jordan, L. (2007). A rights-based approach to accountability. In A. Ebrahim & E. Weisband (Eds.) Global accountabilities: Participation, pluralism, and public ethics (pp. 151–167). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jordan, L., & Van Tuijl, P. (Eds.) (2006). NGO accountability: Politics, principles and innovations. London/Sterling, VA: Earthscan. Kearns, K. P. (1996). Managing for accountability: Preserving the public trust in nonprofit organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Kovach, H., Neligan, C., & Burall, S. (2003). The Global Accountability Report 1: Power without accountability? London: Global Accountability Project, The One World Trust. Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999) Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological Bulletin, 125(2), 255–275. Lindenberg, M., & Bryant, C. (2001). Going global: Transforming relief and development NGOs. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Lloyd, R., Oatham, J., & Hammer, M. (2007). 2007 Global Accountability Report. London: One World Trust. Mulgan, R. (2000). ‘Accountability’: An ever-expanding concept? Public Administration, 78(3), 555–573. Najam, A. (1996). NGO accountability: A conceptual framework. Development Policy Review, 14, 339–353. O’Neill, O. (2002). A question of trust: The BBC Reith lectures 2002. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

AccountAbility Peruzzotti, E. (2006). Civil society, representation and accountability. In L. Jordan & P. Van Tuijl (Eds.), NGO accountability: Politics, principles and innovations (pp. 43–58). London/Sterling, VA: Earthscan. Uphoff, N. (1996). Why NGOs are not a third sector: A sectoral analysis with some thoughts on accountability, sustainability, and evaluation. In M. Edwards & D. Hulme (Eds.), Beyond the magic bullet: NGO performance and accountability in the post-cold war (pp. 23–39). West Hartford, CT: Kumarian.

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and ethical reporting. AccountAbility provides advisory and training services on the implementation of the standards, responsible competitiveness, stakeholder engagement and collaborative governance. In partnership with CSR network, AccountAbility publishes an annual accountability rating of the world’s 50 largest companies.

Structure and Governance

AccountAbility KATE RUFF

AccountAbility is a global not-for-profit self-managed partnership with locations in Beijing, Geneva, London, Sao Paolo and Washington D. C. AccoutAbility is governed by a multistakeholder network acting in accordance with the AccountAbility Charter. A governing council, with 13 members, stewards effective application of the charter.

Address of Organization

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250-252 Goswell Road Clerkenwell London EC1V 7EB UK www.accountability21.net

AccountAbility’s revenue in the fiscal year ending March 2008, was £2.2 M with 88% from project income, 10% from membership subscriptions, 1% from training fees, and the remaining from sale of publications and other sundry. Of total revenue, 26% is attributable to the UK market, 36% is attributable to the US market and 38% is attributable to the rest of the world.

Introduction AccountAbility works to promote accountability innovations that advance sustainable development. It develops and promotes the AA1000 Series of standards for social and ethical accounting, auditing and reporting.

Brief History AccountAbility, formerly The Institute for Social and Ethical AccountAbility, was launched in 1995 to professionalize the practice of social auditing and reporting and address the trust deficit between corporations and their stakeholders. Founding members included The Body Shop, The European Institute for Business Ethics, KPMG, Oxfam, and Shell. In 1999 AccountAbility launched the AA1000 Framework and subsequently additional standards and tools based on this foundation.

Mission/Objectives AccountAbility’s mission ‘‘is to promote accountability for sustainable development.’’ AccountAbility enables people to hold to account those individuals and institutions whose decisions and actions affect their lives.

Activities AccountAbility develops and promotes the AA1000 Series of standards, including principles for effective social and ethical reporting, and standards for the assurance of social

Major Accomplishments The AA1000 Series is a leading standard for sustainability auditing and assurance. It has been used by hundreds of organizations in over 30 countries. AccountAbility has contributed to the ongoing development of global standards through collaboration with the Global Reporting Initiative, Transparency International and the ISO Social Responsibility Working Group.

Cross-References

▶ Accountability ▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Global Reporting Initiative ▶ International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ▶ Oxfam International ▶ Social Audits ▶ Transparency International

References/Further Readings Burgis, T., & Zadek, S. (2006). A21: Reinventing accountability for the 21st century. London: AccountAbility. Zadek, S.(2005). Responsible competitiveness: Reshaping markets through responsible business practices. London: Fundaça˘o Dom Cabral (FDC) & UN Global Compact. Zadek, S., Raynard, P., & Forstater, M. (2006). What assures? London: AccountAbility with PricewaterhouseCoopers. www.accountability21.net www.accountabilityrating.org

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ActionAid

ActionAid CLAUDIA BODE-HARLASS

Address of Organization PostNet Suite #248 Private Bag Y31 Saxonwold 2132 Johannesburg South Africa www.actionaid.org

Introduction ActionAid describes itself as an ‘‘international antipoverty agency’’ working with the ‘‘world’s poorest and most disadvantaged people’’ through cooperation with local partners all around the world.

Brief History ActionAid was founded in 1972 by the British businessman Cecil Jackson Cole as a British Charity called ‘‘Action in Distress’’ when Cole and 87 other concerned British citizens came together to sponsor 88 poor children in India and Kenya to enable them access to education. In the following years the organization expanded not only the geographical but also the thematic areas it was working in. This resulted in a mission shift from solely giving charity to empowering poor people, which led to the renaming of the organization to ActionAid in 1985. In 2003 ActionAid International was founded as a foundation registered in the Netherlands with its headquarters based in Johannesburg, South Africa.

Mission The original mission of providing poor children with education was extended to include five more priority areas, namely HIV/Aids, food rights, emergencies, women and girls, and governance. In its work, the organization uses a rights-based approach, which means that it makes poor people aware of their own rights and conducts capacity building so that these people themselves can influence decisions that are affecting their lives. Besides, ActionAid has committed itself to an ‘‘Open Information Policy’’ meaning that it is following the principle of transparency and of providing information to all its stakeholders including donors as well as poor and marginalized people.

Activities In order to achieve its aims, ActionAid is working very closely with its local partners who have an equal say on the

ongoing operations. These can include the provisions of food and medicine in emergency situations, working with southern African governments to help them in establishing national AIDS commissions or the strengthening of women’s organizations and women’s leadership. ActionAid is also still offering the possibility to sponsor a child in a poor country. The organization is publishing a number of thematic reports and high quality research as well as an annual report on its activities, successes, and challenges. Furthermore, it is conducting analysis on international, national, and local systems and rules that disadvantage the poor and marginalized and prepare policy recommendations based on its findings. These are then used to lobby actors such as the World Bank, the European Union or the World Trade Organization for a policy sensitive to the needs of the poorest.

Structure and Governance Besides the International Secretariat in Johannesburg, the organization is also running four regional offices and a number of national level branches in each country a program is being conducted in. The regional office for Africa is based in Kenya, the one for Asia in Thailand, the European one in Belgium, and the office for the Americas in Brazil. ActionAid is headed by a Board of Trustees consisting of 11 members drawn from all over the world who are meeting three to four times a year. Furthermore, a Chief Executive is functioning as the organization’s official Secretary. All in all, ActionAid is employing more than 1,780 people and has around 484,000 supporters.

Funding The bulk of the organization’s budget, namely 70%, is provided by individual supporters, while 25% comes through partnerships with government agencies. The most important of these agencies is the British Department for International Development (DFID) which agreed in a Partnership Programme Arrangement for the years 2008 until 2011 to fund ActionAid with £13 million. The remaining 5% of ActionAid’s budget is provided by private trusts and foundations or companies. The total income of the organization for the year 2007 was €185.9 million.

Accomplishments In 2007 alone, ActionAid was reaching more than 13 million people in 42 countries all around the world. In the same year the organization was rewarded with the annual UN Sasakawa Award for Disaster Reduction

ADDES

recognizing not only the research being conducted by the organization but also its innovative ideas and inclusion of the grassroots. Besides, ActionAid is a cofounder of the Global Campaign for Education and was awarded with the United Nations International Literacy Prize in 2003 and 2005 for its approach to adult learning.

Cross-References

▶ INGOs ▶ Nonprofit Organizations, Comparative Perspectives ▶ Transparency

Addams, Jane KARUN K. SINGH

Basic Biographical Information Jane Addams was born in 1860 in Cedarville, Illinois (USA). Although her parents were attentive and wealthy, her early childhood was marked by family tragedy with the deaths of three of her siblings and the death of her mother when she was only two. Additionally, she had a congenital spinal defect, which compromised her health for the rest of her life. Addams was educated in the United States and Europe. She graduated in 1881 from the Rockford Female Seminary. During a tour of England, she visited Toynbee Hall, a settlement house for underprivileged and neglected boys in London’s East End. Taking inspiration from this model, she and her close friend Ellen Starr cofounded Hull House in 1889 in Chicago, Illinois. After the establishment of the first settlement house in the United States, she continued to achieve numerous socially beneficial outcomes until her death by cancer in 1935.

Major Contributions Today, Addams would rightly be considered a social worker, a community organizer, a social scientist, a peace advocate, a feminist, and a philanthropist. The agency she cofounded, Hull House, was a residence for women, a school for lifelong education, and a safe meeting space for neighborhood immigrants. Also, it functioned as a social laboratory and a training site for educating young people in social service theory and practice. Moreover, Addams strongly influenced the research practices of the Chicago School of Sociology, including its thematic emphases on ethnic group interaction, community conflict, stakeholder succession in community institutions, and social reform.

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Over time, Addams assumed many leadership positions. For example, in 1908 she assisted with the founding of the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy, in 1909 she was selected as the first woman president of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, and in 1911 she joined the board of the National American Woman Suffrage Association. In 1915 Addams was instrumental in creating the Women’s Peace Party and became its first president. As an ardent advocate for resolving world conflicts peacefully, she even publicly opposed the American intervention in World War I, which led to her being publicly chastised as unpatriotic and naı¨ve. True to form, Addams defended her pacifist ideals, and worked collaboratively with President Herbert Hoover to provide relief and food to women and children in war-torn enemy countries. Her humanitarian contributions to fostering peace on a global scale were eventually recognized when she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931.

Cross-References

▶ Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations ▶ Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

References/Further Readings Farrell, J. C. (1967). Beloved lady: A history of Jane Addams’ ideas on reform and peace. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Knight, L. W. (2005). Citizen: Jane Addams and the struggle for democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Linn, J. W. (1935). Jane Addams: A biography. New York: AppletonCentury. Polacheck, H. S. (1991). I came a stranger: The story of a Hull-House girl. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Stiehm, J. H. (2006). Champions for peace: Women winners of the Nobel Peace Prize. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

ADDES EDITH ARCHAMBAULT

Address of Organization 33 rue des Trois-Fontanot 92002 Nanterre Cedex France www.addes.asso.fr

Introduction ADDES was created with a double objective: to improve and disseminate the knowledge of social economy

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organizations, especially by giving them a greater visibility in the official statistics and to promote this set of organizations in the public sphere and the public at large.

Adenauer, Konrad ▶ Konrad Adenauer Stifung

Brief History ADDES was founded in 1982 by an informal group of statisticians and academics, rapidly joined by employees of cooperatives, mutual societies and associations eager to give more acknowledgement to the economic and social role of these organizations. In 1983 a first conference was organized, followed by more than 20. Since 1986 two young researchers are annually awarded prizes by ADDES.

Mission, Objectives, Activities The first mission of ADDES was to draw the main lines of a satellite account of social economy and to lobby the government and the French statistical office to implement it. Facing political difficulties in this lobbying, ADDES turned toward a larger objective, the accumulation and dissemination of multidisciplinary research done in isolation. One of the vehicles for achieving this objective is the Revue des Etudes Cooperatives, mutualistes et associatives (RECMA), the only French journal on the social economy and related topics.

Structure, Governance and Funding ADDES is a declared association, with few members whose general assembly is the governing body. A larger scientific council composed of statisticians, academics, and representatives of social economy organizations prepares the annual conference and awards. ADDES’s annual budget is €30,000 and funding comes since the very beginning from Credit Cooperatif, a cooperative bank, and later from its corporate foundation.

Advocacy JOHN D. CLARK World Bank, Washington, DC, USA (retired)

Introduction Civil society advocacy embraces influential decision makers, media promotion, citizen education, and various forms of civic engagement, and has emerged strongly in recent decades. This is because of the increasingly multifaceted nature of politics in today’s cosmopolitan world, which makes it difficult for a small number of political parties to adequately represent the diverse concerns of citizens. There is a clear shift from representative to participatory democracy – with a profusion of pressure groups and the relative decline of political parties in most democracies. The CSOs and networks that result have a variety of forms, largely reflecting the degree of formality of their alliances. Given that the policy issues of popular concern may be global in nature, the rise of transnational civil society – uniting people who share common concerns everywhere – is one of the most important developments. This, however, presents CSOs considerable challenges concerning their organizational and governance arrangements. There is also a considerable establishment backlash challenging the legitimacy of such advocacy and which civil society must address robustly. In doing so, CSOs must recognize that their advocacy is a complement to, not substitute for, traditional party-based democracy.

Major Contributions By its awards and the publication of the papers delivered in its annual conference on line and through the RECMA journal, ADDES is now the main French reference on this topic. An academic community was created step by step.

Cross-References ▶ Associations ▶ Cooperatives ▶ Mutual Societies ▶ Social Economy

Definition The word ‘‘advocacy’’ derives from the Latin ad vocare – ‘‘to speak to,’’ in other words to argue for a particular position. Initially coined for legal professionals (advocates) who argue for one side or the other in a legal dispute, in recent decades the term has become increasingly associated with groups of citizens who argue for a particular position, or set of positions, on a given issue. While individuals and lawyers can conduct advocacy to advance their points of view, it is generally the nongovernmental organizations who seek to influence the policies

Advocacy

and programs of governments, corporations, and other institutions. These organizations may primarily exist for other purposes, with their advocacy being ancillary to these purposes. For example, professional associations and consumer associations primarily exist to provide services, support, and advice to their members but may also advocate policies and actions that would benefit those members. And many operational charities (e.g., in the service of development, humanitarian relief, disability, or conservation) undertake advocacy to seek policy shifts that would advance the causes they serve. Some organizations exist primarily or solely to conduct advocacy. Again, these can be divided into those which primarily serve the mutual interests of their members (these are typically political lobbying organizations, such as those that exist in profusion around Capitol Hill in Washington DC) and those that focus on public interest issues (such as pro- or anti-abortion, environmental activists, and women’s rights campaigners). The former are often referred to as lobbies or lobbyists, while the latter are often referred to as pressure groups.

Historical Background The growth of civil society advocacy relates closely to the evolution of democracy. In its earliest manifestation, in ancient Greece, citizens were directly involved in decision making. All free men could go to the forum and vote on issues they cared about. From this derives the term ‘‘democracy, from demos kratein or ‘‘people’s rule.’’ Such direct democracy is impractical, of course, in larger societies, and hence indirect or representative democracy evolved and took root – first in seventeenth-century Britain, through the civil wars and the ‘‘Glorious Revolution’’ that established supremacy of the parliament over the monarch. The system’s most evident deficiency was that there was no ready quality control over those early Members of Parliament; they could be ‘‘bought’’ by vested interests, or could be delinquent in their duties. Political parties emerged as the response. A party was defined by Edmund Burke in 1770 as ‘‘an organized assembly of men, united for working together for the national interest, according to the particular principle they agreed upon.’’ Hence, through its collectivity of members, parties provided something of a guarantee that its elected representatives would stay true to that ‘‘particular principle.’’ They therefore offered a wholesaling of representative democracy. This institution has been the cornerstone of politics for centuries. There have long been traditions of seeking to influence individual legislators outside the context of their party, however. In the eighteenth and nineteenth

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centuries, those seeking to influence a debate in either chamber of the Houses of Parliament in the United Kingdom would congregate in the Central Lobby (an area to which the public have access in the Palace of Westminster), waiting for the chance to beard the MP in question and press them to support their point of view. This custom has given the world the term ‘‘lobbyist.’’ Civil society advocacy is not a new phenomenon. The Anti-Corn Law League was an early example of successful campaigning, ironically in support of free trade. It was founded in 1839 to protest the extortionate price of staple foods, due to high import duties and market restrictions designed to protect British landowners. After 6 years of struggle and bread riots the government gave way and repealed the Corn Law. Most party-based democratic systems evolved with just two or a few political parties. This is to be expected in societies where there are just one or two defining political concerns, each of which can be addressed in just two or three ways. This was broadly the case in Western Europe during most of the nineteenth century, where the defining issue was between industrialization, trade, and the urban sector on the one hand and landed interests and the rural sector on the other. In the United States the defining issue at the same time was more a geographic one, between North and South. By the late nineteenth century, reflecting the progress toward universal enfranchisement, the fault line in politics became the issue of equity and class, particularly the massive inequalities of wealth, income, and working hours. This was the case on both sides of the Atlantic, but particularly in Europe. The various manifestations of socialism that evolved, all gave central importance to the issue of the ownership of the means of production. Since World War II, progressive taxation, universal education, national health systems, unemployment benefits, public housing, and other policies have gradually reduced the class divide. At the same time, and partly because sheer survival can be increasingly taken for granted for most in the wealthier countries, citizens have increasingly become concerned about a host of political issues beyond class and equity. Citizens have become increasingly disenchanted with party politics. While political apathy is a major factor, this also reflects a variety of newer ways in which citizens exercise their political voice: joining advocacy CSOs, taking part in demonstrations, confronting local officials or employers, writing to newspapers, mounting petitions, etc. The growth of civil society advocacy can be seen as a response to the deficiencies of electoral democracy. Indeed, election of delegates is only a small part of

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today’s democracy. A transformation is underway, particularly in rich countries, from Representative to Participatory Democracy. Held argues (2002) that this new dynamic of ‘‘cosmopolitan democracy’’ is because people now live in a world of overlapping communities of interests and fate, and hence a political system in which one is represented just according to physical locality is anachronistic. Modern communications and the growth of civil society make possible more direct engagement between citizens and decision makers.

Key Issues Advocacy and the Evolution of Cause-Based CSOs

The plethora of political fault lines today does not fit well with a party-based democracy. The latter generally aggregates people according to ‘‘the particular principle they agree upon’’ and to their physical community. But when there are myriad principles at stake, citizens agree with one set of people on one issue, and a different set on a second topic. It is unlikely that a single political party will have a platform that matches one’s particular palette of interests. A ‘‘pick-and-mix’’ political system fits better with cosmopolitan societies than the limited choice offered by political parties. Advocacy groups permit this customizing of politics to one’s individual persuasions. CSOs permit people to associate outside their families or communities in pursuit of their particular interests or wishes. Scholte (2001) points out that in modern times such identification can be an affinity group (such as an ethnic Diaspora, sexuality, occupation, class, or even gender) as well as a group of people within a nation. In today’s more mobile and interconnected world, citizens increasingly identify with those who share their concerns wherever they live, not just with their immediate neighbors. So as constituents of democracies, people increasingly prefer to be represented according to the issues they care about rather than the place where they live. Moreover, these issues do not necessarily reflect ‘‘national interests’’ but global interests (Matherws, 1997). As a consequence, most countries (especially Western democracies) have seen the ascendancy of a host of advocacy groups that define positions on the most popular political issues of the times (Carothers, 1999). While some represent classic divides (such as those for and against abortion, immigration, gun-control, and free trade) others seek to elevate concerns that have no polar opposite constituency, but which languish because of political neglect (such as gender equity, conservation, and opportunities for disabled people).

The Rise of Advocacy Groups and the Decline of Political Parties

While pressure groups have a much longer history (e.g., the Anti-Slavery Society dates back to the eighteenth century), it was not until the 1960s and the 1970s that they mushroomed, with the profusion of issues of citizen concern that political parties largely eschewed – such as civil rights, feminism, the environment, nuclear power, nuclear disarmament, the Vietnam war, and racism. Pressure groups on such issues grew rapidly, and formed a new political culture of the ‘‘baby-boomers’’ that differed radically from the previous generation’s prewar political contours. And from this period the decline of party membership can be traced. For example, in the United Kingdom in 1971 Greenpeace was formed – then, an obscure organization concerned primarily with the protection of the marine environment. At that time the British Labour Party had 700,000 members – close to its peak. By 1990, Greenpeace had grown to about 320,000 members and had overtaken Labour. Today, Labour has declined further to just 180,000 members and hundreds of other environmental concerns compete with Greenpeace for public support (Clark, 2003). The decline of the UK Conservative Party’s membership has been even more dramatic – from over two million in the mid-1960s to less than 350,000 in 2000. Similarly elsewhere; about 25% of the New Zealand electorate were party members in the 1950s, as were 15% of Italians and 10% of the French; by the 1990s this had declined to below 5% for all of them (The Economist, July 24, 1999). There is other evidence for dwindling public confidence in the party-based democratic processes. Opinion polls in a range of countries reveal that public respect for politicians has declined rapidly. One survey of 14 OECD countries by Robert Putnam (2000) showed that public confidence in legislatures has declined from the 1970s to the 1990s in 11 of them. Public trust and confidence in politicians declined in 13 countries (all except the Netherlands). A 40-country survey, commissioned by the World Economic Forum in 2002, showed that of 17 leading institutions of influence in these countries, those least trusted were parliaments, large corporations, and the IMF; and those most trusted were NGOs and the military. Politicians are widely seen as making false promises, dishonest, just interested in getting votes, out of touch, and not caring. There are many reasons for such trends – scandals, broken promises, apparent impotence on issues of public concern, etc. – but a major factor is the proliferation of causes with which societies are concerned. The dominant

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political concern has shifted from a contest over the ownership of the means of production to more diverse debates about what is produced, how, and for what sort of society. Advocacy groups have a growing role, said the former Director of Friends of the Earth, UK, only because the public is ‘‘dissatisfied with traditional political institutions and processes that drive public debate and decision-making’’ (Secrett, 1996). If the parliamentary process, the media, industry, etc. ‘‘adequately represented the particular interests of citizens, ensured their direct participation in community affairs, and dealt with their concerns, there would be no pressure groups.’’

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Advocacy Tactics

Advocacy groups use a wide range of tactics including high-level lobbying, media work, public education campaigns, protests and other forms of direct action, boycotts, presenting testimony to parliaments, defending court actions, mounting court actions, shaming campaigns, street theatre, etc. This array embraces three broad goals:

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● Seeking to win the argument: showing that something being done at present is wrong, or that there is a better approach that could be taken ● Seeking to demonstrate that there are large numbers of people who demand and expect change (and that at least some of them are well-informed). ● Insinuating or inflicting costs: this can mean generating a ‘‘nuisance factor’’ in terms of the costs incurred by a target institution of not giving way to the campaign (the time its officers spend defending the institution’s position; reputational damage due to negative publicity, etc.) and it can mean incurring real costs such as through consumer boycotts and even inflicting physical damage to property (as with animal rights groups campaigns targeting laboratories that use live animal testing). ● Organizational Forms of Civil Society Advocacy

Civil society advocacy mechanisms, whether national or global, generally fall into one of six organizational forms representing a trade-off between campaign coherence and breadth of support (see Clark, 2003b; Lindenberg & Dobel, 1999). They comprise: ● Centralized organizations: Unitary organizations with a clear HQs and branches at local or national levels, albeit these may enjoy some degree of autonomy. Examples would include Greenpeace, Social Watch, and Jubilee 2000. Some are in effect national organizations in terms of their governance (i.e., their

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secretariats and boards) but have members and supporters elsewhere (such as the US-based Human Rights Watch or the US-based International Forum on Globalization). Federations: Networks comprising member CSOs with a common name and charter, single governing body, but also local self-determination. Examples would include Amnesty International and the Global Union Federations (such as Public Service International or Education International). Confederations: Looser structures in which the members are autonomous but agree on a set of common ground rules and work together on specific activities where there is mutual advantage. For example, Friends of the Earth International has 68 national chapters which decide by majority vote what campaigns to adopt globally, but allow each chapter to choose which of these it will actually promote. Informal networks: Fluid networks on a self-selecting basis; any group having broadly similar aims can join, but membership bestows few advantages (other than information and ‘‘belonging’’) and demands few responsibilities. While they bring together CSOs in different countries for the specific cause, these CSOs may have widely differing objectives and concerns otherwise. Arguably the first single issue transnational advocacy network was the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) – formed in 1979 by the NGOs attending the first ever multi-stakeholder meeting, organized by the World Health Organization and Unicef, on the threats posed by the marketing excesses of artificial baby milk manufacturers. Within months, hundreds of NGOs from North and South had joined IBFAN, which became pivotal in persuading governments to adopt, at the 1981 World Health Assembly, an international code to regulate the marketing of breast-milk substitutes. Social movements: These are not true organizations, but loose networks or affinities of people, lacking formal decision-making processes and leadership. Though not CSOs as such, they are an increasingly powerful form of civil society on the global stage. Examples include the feminist movement and the anti-globalization protest movement; Dot-causes: These are the Internet-based campaigns that have little or no presence outside the World Wide Web, but which can have considerable impact due to their ability to respond swiftly to changing situations (not having an elaborate governance structure) and to reach large numbers of like-minded people. Examples include the Nobel prize-winning

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International Campaign to Ban Landmines, ATTAC (the campaign to stem inequality through introduction of a Tobin Tax) and a smorgasbord of protest groups. Some, such as IndyMedia and Globalize Resistance, are multipurpose cause promoters, offering a ‘‘one-stop shop’’ for like-minded radical activists (Clark & Themudo, 2006).

International Perspectives International campaigns to shape international policy are not entirely new (notably the Anti-Slavery Society – which started in the United Kingdom in the eighteenth century – drew support from various countries and made a pivotal contribution to its cause). However, it has only been in recent decades that transnational advocacy has become prominent and a new cast of civil society actors have emerged as a result. Transnational action on environmental issues has been the longest and strongest – dating back to 1972 and the first parallel NGO forum to a UN event (the Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm). The membership of World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) grew from 572,000 in 1985 to five million in 2001. It now employs 3,300 staff and has an annual budget of $350 million. Greenpeace grew similarly to reach over four million members globally in 1994 with an annual budget peak of $179 million. By 1986 it had linked its network of 30 national offices via an international computer network – well before most TNCs did so. By 2000, Friends of the Earth comprised 68 autonomous national groups with, collectively, over one million members, 5,000 local groups, and a budget of over $200 million. Similar growth has been seen on other sectors. In human rights, Amnesty International has over one million members in 160 countries, and employs 400 staff. Jubilee 2000, the NGO promoting Third World debt relief, orchestrated the world’s largest petition (with 24 million signatures). And many NGOs that were previously considered to be humanitarian or service-delivery charities, such as Oxfam and World Wide Fund for Nature, have given increasing attention and resources to advocacy on issues that affect their programs or their partners. Other civil society actors, such as trade unions, professional associations, and consumer groups, have also evolved strong advocacy programs. For example, Education International – a federation of teachers’ unions representing over 35 million teachers worldwide – has come to exert significant impact on education policy internationally (Clark, 2003b). NGO lobbying is widely credited for securing debt relief for poor countries, the Rio Earth Summit agreement on controlling greenhouse gases, the creation of the

International Criminal Court, Antarctica being declared a world park – protected from mining, major reforms at the World Bank, and the international landmine treaty (Florini, 2000). The transnational advocacy phenomenon reflects an important paradox in traditional democracy: while much of the substance of politics has been globalized (climate change, trade, economics, HIV/AIDS, the SARS pandemic, terrorism, etc.), the process of politics has not. Its main institutions – elections, political parties, and parliaments – remain rooted at the national level. An increasing number of people argue that meaningful democracy today requires processes that enable citizens to help shape a framework of global values, policies, instruments, and governance; they argue that it cannot be achieved by powerful democratic nations imposing their will on the rest of the world. One indicator of the growth of transnational advocacy is the number of NGOs seeking consultative status at the UN’s Economic and Social Council. In the 1970s and 1980s there were 20–30 new applications per year; in 1998–1999 there were 200; in 2000–2001 400 and in 2002 there were over 800 applications. NGO participation in global conferences grew similarly. For example, with the women’s conferences: 114 NGOs attended the Mexico event in 1975, 163 went to Nairobi in 1985, but 2600 went to Beijing in 1995. Even more attended the parallel NGO forums at these UN conferences. Hence 6000 took part in the parallel NGO event at Mexico City, 13,500 went to the equivalent event in Nairobi and 300,000 to the NGO forum in Beijing (Cardoso Panel, 2004). Transnational advocacy has helped change the geography of democracy. It allows individuals to aggregate differently – with others who share burning concerns wherever they live. In other words community of neighborhood is being supplemented by community of interest – and, thanks to information technology, such communities can be global as easily as local.

Future Perspectives Backlash Against Civil Society Advocacy

As pressure groups have become increasingly influential, so too have the efforts of their targets to discredit them and the consequences of mistakes. While the media relish sensation, and therefore willingly publish the extravagant claims of advocates whatever their accuracy, errors diminish their credibility in the eyes of policy makers. Hence, when Greenpeace pressed Shell not to dump the Brent Spar oilrig at sea, but to dispose of it on-shore to avoid polluting the North Sea (a much more expensive option),

Advocacy

the media gave full coverage and Shell finally gave way. Later, Greenpeace admitted it had got its calculations wildly wrong, and this seriously damaged its reputation (Clark, 2003a). Such mistakes, though perhaps rare, provide ammunition to their political adversaries. That pressure groups erode democracy is a charge increasingly leveled by those most comfortable with the status quo. After the street protests at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle, 1999, there was a chorus of such attack. The Economist (September 23, 1999), for example, said: ‘‘The increasing clout of NGOs, respectable and not so respectable, raises an important question: who elected Oxfam, or, for that matter, the League for a Revolutionary Communist International? Bodies such as these are, to varying degrees, extorting admissions of fault from law-abiding companies and changes in policy from democratically elected governments. They may claim to be acting in the interests of the people – but then so do the objects of their criticisms, governments and the despised international institutions. In the West, governments and their agencies are, in the end, accountable to voters. Who holds the activists accountable?’’ Such reprisals harp on three issues: that pressure groups are not elected; that they are not accountable; and that they have no right to influence changes in their target institutions. The defense is easy at one level. Universal freedoms of speech and association would be rendered meaningless if citizens did not have the right to form associations to promote causes they believe in. Associations need not be of a minimum size and need only be accountable to their members, not to the broader society. If they damage property, intimidate or defame people, or cause a public nuisance, there are laws that can be used against them. However, the charges of irresponsibility are not so easy to shrug off at a broader level. Responsible CSO leaders are increasingly concerned that unscrupulous or over-zealous campaigns are discrediting their trade and could undermine democracy, not least because newer entries into the field may display a more lax attitude to accuracy and a greedier thirst for publicity. They care increasingly about the opinion of the media, parliamentarians, and the public at large – not just their supporters – and hence increasingly urge their peers to join with them in defining codes of conduct for their advocacy. For example, a group of leading international campaigning organizations concerned variously with the environment, human rights and development have formed the International Advocacy NGO Network to agree common high standards of advocacy. Civil society advocacy – though a powerful force in policy making – is a complement to, not a substitute for, traditional politics. It allows governance by representation

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to be complemented by more direct participatory governance. Misgivings about advocacy stem from an assumption – sometimes grounded – that pressure groups do not just seek to influence decisions through argument, but to replace legislatures and political parties. An excessive influence of advocacy can lead to the atomizing of politics as government strategy loses coherence and logic to a scatter of ad hoc responses to myriad interest groups. This can result in a drift toward elitism, since pressure groups are often middle class and capital-citybased. It is also likely to leave important gaps. There are no pressure groups for things one takes for granted – until those things, like sewerage and postal services, disappear. Hence, civil society advocacy is most effective where democracy is working well. It achieves influence by persuading people to use the democracy at their fingertips – not just through their voting choices, but as consumers, shareholders, lobbyists, demonstrators, educators of their children, workers, employers, and investors. ‘‘Pressure groups demonstrate that individuals do matter and can meaningfully help shape society’’ (Secrett, 1996).

Cross-References

▶ Amnesty International ▶ Anti-Slavery Movement ▶ Attac ▶ Charity Law ▶ Citizenship ▶ Civil Society and Democracy ▶ Dotcauses ▶ Friends of the Earth ▶ Governance, Organizational ▶ Greenpeace ▶ Human Rights Watch ▶ Interest and Pressure Groups ▶ International Advocacy NGOs and Networks (IANGO) ▶ International Baby Food Action Network ▶ International Campaign to Ban Landmines ▶ Jubilee 2000 ▶ Lobbying ▶ NGOs and international relations, UN ▶ Oxfam International ▶ Social Watch ▶ Theories of the Nonprofit Sector, Political ▶ World-wide Fund for Nature

References/Further Readings Cardoso Panel (2004). Report of the panel of eminent persons on UN–civil society relations, and ‘‘UN System and Civil Society: an Inventory and Analysis of Practice’’, Background Paper for the Panel, prepared by its secretariat. United Nations, from www.un.org/reform/panel.htm

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Carothers, T. (1999). Civil society: Think again. Foreign Policy. Winter. Castells, M. (2004). The crisis of democracy, global governance, and the rise of the global civil society (Mimeo), Paper Prepared for the Inaugural Seminar of the Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Sao Paulo. Clark, J. (2003a). Worlds apart: Civil society and the battle for ethical globalization. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press; London: Earthscan. Clark, J. (Ed.) (2003b). Globalizing civic engagement: Civil society and trans-national action. London: Earthscan. Clark, J., & Themudo, N. (2006). Linking the web and the street: Internetbased ‘‘dot-causes’’ and the ‘‘anti-globalization’’ movement. World Development, 34(1). Edwards, M., & Gaventa, J. (Eds.) (2001). Global citizen action. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Florini, A. (Ed.) (2000). The third Force: The rise of transnational civil society. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Held, D. (2002). Cosmopolitanism and globalization. Logos, 1(3), 1–17. Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Lindenberg, M., & Dobel, P. (1999). ‘‘Globalization and Northern NGOs: The Challenge of Relief and Development in a Changing Context’’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Supplement, 29–4. Matherws, J. (1997). Power shift. Foreign Affairs, 76(1), January/February, 50–66. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Scholte, J. (2001). New citizens action and global finance. Notes for seminar ‘‘Translator-national civil society: Issues of governance and organisation’’, London: School of Economics, 1–2 June. Secrett, C. (1996). Why do pressure groups matter? Paper for the Social Market Foundation (June). Friends of the Earth, London.

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outreach in 16 countries. The organization with more than 3,000 staff is now busy doing profitable and nonprofit activities from North to South.

Brief History The AKF was founded in 1967 in Geneva by the Prince Karim ‘‘Aga Khan’’ to work for the development of marginalized areas in the developing world. As part of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), AKF is a ‘‘private, not-for-profit, non-denominational, development agency’’ (AKF, 2008), and due to the visionary chairpersonship, the Foundation is now widely accepted as a development and philanthropic organization.

Mission/Objectives AKF was established to turn various international development agencies to the poorest parts of the world (Ebrahim, 2002). With the objectives of global poverty reduction, gender equality and advancement of pluralistic values, the Foundation is committed to uplift rural communities of coastal and mountainous areas regardless of any specific faith or origin (AKF, 2008). AKF firmly believes in civil society’s role in development, and recognizes civil society organizations (CSOs) as the best facilitators. The policy of AKF encourages rapid growth of CSOs in various sectors. The Foundation is keen to promote tolerance, pluralism, and equity, and seeks the implementation of the ‘‘corporate social responsibility’’ idea through partnerships between CSOs, the business sector and governments.

▶ Association Française contre les Myopathies

Focus Areas

Aga Khan Foundation MAHTAB AHMAD, MOKBUL MORSHED AHMAD

Address of Organization 1-3 avenue de la Paix 1202 Geneva Case Postale 2369 1211 Geneva 2 Switzerland www.akdn.org

Introduction The Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) is one of the largest international nongovernmental organizations with

AKF focuses on five major areas: rural development, health, education, civil society, and environment, with cross-cutting issues of participation, gender development, and binding state-society relations (see Kaiser, 1995 for its relevance in Tanzania).

Activities The activities include operating more than 300 schools (Machiwala, 2008) and two universities executing transcultural quality education programs in Asia, Africa, MiddleEast, and the United Kingdom (AKF, 2008; Smith, 1997); providing primary and curative health care in over 200 health outlets; assisting local communities with village planning, sanitation, and water supply systems; and giving humanitarian assistance to victims. The service delivery of the Foundation is undoubtedly exemplary, however, the access to its costly higher education programs specifically by the poor communities is deemed debatable.

Aga Khan, Prince Karim

Structure and Governance The AKF is a branch of social development, one of three facets under AKDN. AKDN administratively controls the economic development, social development, and culture facets, serves under the Chairmanship (the Imamat) at Geneva, and strictly adheres to the International Nongovernmental Organizations’ Accountability Charter. AKF both mobilizes funding and implements the relevant projects (social development).

Funding Sources Income from the endowment and capital investments in the business sector, donations from individuals Ismailis, and grants from partners, e.g., host governments and joint-ventures are the AKF’s major funding sources. The Aga Khan, founder and chairman of the AKF, contributes funds himself toward administrative costs, new program initiatives, and the endowment. The Foundation is estimated to control assets of more than $1.5 billion (AKDN, 2002).

Major Accomplishments/Contributions UNESCO’s Asia-Pacific Heritage Award of Excellence for Work in Herat, Afghanistan; World Habitat Award; Global Development Award for Innovative Development Project; Green Oscar for Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP); and the CGAP Financial Transparency Award signify AKF’s diverse contributions in development.

Cross-References

▶ Aga Khan, Prince Karim ▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Faith-Based Organizations ▶ INGOs ▶ NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance ▶ NGOs and Socioeconomic Development

References/Further Readings Aga Khan Development Network (2002). Geneva Briefing Book. Geneva, Switzerland: AKF. Aga Khan Foundation (2008). Annual report. Geneva, Switzerland: AKF. Ebrahim, A. (2002). Information struggles: The role of information in the reproduction of NGO-funder relationships. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31(1), 84–114. Kaiser, P. (1995). State-society relations in an international context: The case of Aga Khan health-care initiatives in Tanzania. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 36(3–4), 184–197. Machiwala, I. (2008). Aga Khan Education Services (akes), from http://www.articlesbase.com/education-articles/aga-khan-educationservices-akes-366652.html Shamatov, D. A. et al. (2005). Reconceptualization of teacher education: Experiences from the context of a multicultural developing country. Journal of Transformative Education, 3(3), 271–288. Smith, S. E. (1997). Increasing transcultural awareness: The McMasterAga Khan-CIDA Project workshop model. Journal of Transcultural Nursing, 8(2), 23–31.

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Aga Khan, Prince Karim SHAHJAHAN BHUIYAN

Basic Biographical Information Born in Geneva on December 13, 1936, Prince Karim Aga Khan, the Aga Khan IV, is the eldest son of Prince Aly Salman (Salomone) Khan. During WWII, his father joined the Allies and Karim, along with his other family members, moved to Nairobi in 1941. By the age of seven, Karim became well-versed in his religion (‘‘Sevener Shi’a Islam’’) under the private tutorship of a Muslim missionary, and showed the agility for his future religious leadership. Right at the end of the War, Karim entered the Institute le Rosey in Switzerland followed by the Harvard University (earning a bachelor degree in Islamic history in 1959). Karim, at the age of 20 in 1957, being appointed by his grandfather the Aga Khan III as the ‘‘Imam’’ (49th) and ‘‘Pir’’ (spiritual leader) of Shi’a Ismaili followers, became the Aga Khan IV. In 2007, the Ismaili community embarked on a one-year celebration of the golden jubilee of his Imamate (religious leadership).

Major Contributions Upon becoming the Imam, His Highness Prince Karim Aga Khan, determined to materialize his grandfather’s (the Aga Khan III) vision of improved quality of life of the global community, and the Ismailis in particular, founded the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), one of the largest international NGOs, in 1967. In addition, Karim Aga Khan has been instrumental in the establishment of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) with agencies like the Aga Khan Agency for Microfinance, Aga Khan Health Services, Aga Khan Planning and Building Services, Aga Khan Education Services, Aga Khan Trust for Culture, and Aga Khan University. The combined involvement of community services by these organizations extends as much as 300 schools, two universities (offering transcultural quality education in Asia, Africa, Middle East and the United Kingdom), 200 health care outlets, and the offering of humanitarian services to victims of war and famine. Under his patronage, since 1977, the Aga Khan Award of Architecture, deemed to be the largest in the field, has become a prestigious award and a source of data on thousands of innovations on ‘‘green architecture.’’ Karim Aga Khan chairs the Institute of Ismaili Studies, which he established in 1977 in the United Kingdom to promote scholarship and learning of Muslim cultures and societies, and understanding and harmony among religions.

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The Aga Khan IV has received many prestigious awards like the Hadrian Award (World Monuments Fund, 1996) for his contribution to preserve and revitalize historic cities in the Muslim world, the Knight Commander in the Order of the British Empire (2003) for his services to international development, and the Andrew Carnegie Medal for Philanthropy (2005). He has received honorary degrees from universities in Pakistan, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Cross-References

▶ Aga Khan Foundation ▶ Sadaqa ▶ Wakfs ▶ Zakat

References/Further Readings Moosa, M. (2007). Prince Karim Aga Khan – A true leader of Islam, from http://ezinarticles.com/?Prince-kARIM-Aga-Khan—A-True-Leaderof-Islam&id = 1401609. Tajddin, M. A. (2007). Prince Karim Aga Khan IV, from http://www. ismaili.net/heritage/node/10524.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Rafael Alegrıá was one of the promoters of the Belgium conference in which a group of farm leaders formally constituted Via Campesina in 1993. This social movement took the form of an organization that coordinates small and medium peasants and indigenous communities from America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Rafael Alegrıá was then elected to hold the operational secretariat of the organization, a post he retained until 2004. With his work he has contributed to criticizing the liberalization of agriculture and food, showing the consequences of deregulation policies on rural livelihoods in the context of the World Trade Organization international market rules. He also played a role in finding progressive alternatives to this neoliberal alimentary model. He worked to promote people’s food sovereignty and land reforms to recover natural resources on behalf of the communities. At present, he is still a peasant leader and an active member of the International Coordinating Committee of Via Campesina.

Cross-References

▶ Cooperatives and Employee-owned Enterprises ▶ Peasant and Farmers’ Organizations ▶ Social Movements

AKF ▶ Aga Khan Foundation

Alegrıá, Rafael

References/Further Readings Bello, W. F. (2004). Deglobalization: Ideas for a new world economy. London: Zed Books. Bove´, J., Dufour, F., Luneau, G., & De Casparis, A. (2000). The world is not for sale: Farmers against junk food. London: Verso. Cummings, C. H. (2008). Uncertain peril: Genetic engineering and the future of seeds. Boston, MA: Beacon.

ANA TOLEDO CHAVARRI

Alliance for Justice Basic Biographical Information Born in the village of San Marquitos Morolica in Honduras in a peasant family, Rafael Alegrıá has become an agrarian leader and one of the founders of the international organization Via Campesina. He was raised and educated in Potrerillos, in the Honduran department of Olancho. In this village, he started working with agricultural cooperatives and organizing producers that demanded land rights. After some episodes of repression he was exiled from his native region. He kept working with cooperative enterprises and also got involved in ‘‘Glass of Milk’’ programs, not just in rural areas but also in popular neighborhoods of Honduran cities.

PATSY KRAEGER

Address of Organization 11 Dupont Circle NW 2nd Floor Washington, DC 20036 USA www.afj.org

Introduction Alliance for Justice (AFJ) describes itself as ‘‘a national association of environmental, civil rights, mental health,

Altruism

women’s, children’s, and consumer advocacy organizations. Since its inception in 1979, AFJ has worked to advance the cause of justice for all Americans, strengthen the public interest community’s ability to influence public policy, and foster the next generation of advocates.’’ AFJ has a diverse group of approximately 80 member organizations who join in on policy debates regarding access to justice. AFJ has two offices, in Washington D.C. and a West Coast office in California.

Brief History Alliance for Justice was founded in 1979 by Nan Aron, a former Equal Employment Opportunity Commission lawyer who litigated cases against companies accused of racial and sexual discrimination. She brought 20 advocacy organizations together to form AFJ, which became prominent though its judicial selection project during the confirmation hearings for Judge Robert Bork’s seat on the Unites States Supreme Court: Aron and AFJ helped to defeat that nomination. AFJ was a significant voice when the Supreme Court nominations of Clarence Thomas, John Roberts, Harriet Myers and Samuel Alito were before the Congress.

Mission AFJ’s original mission was to address issues that affected the survival of public interest law. Today, the mission has been broadened to lead ‘‘progressive advocacy and strengthening the progressive movement to ensure robust and equal access to levers of government power.’’ AFJ leadership has been committed to the broader goal of policy advocacy and the formation of advocacy coalition networks for nonprofits in areas separate from judicial selection. To support its mission expansion, AFJ opened a West Coast Office in 2004.

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Structure and Governance AFJ is an incorporated entity which also has been designated by the I.R.S. as a 501(c)(3) public charity. AFJ is led by its founder and President and a 16-member Board of Directors.

Funding Alliance for Justice’s work is financed primarily through donations from foundations and individuals. AFJ does not receive government contributions for its work. In 2005, AFJ reported revenues of slightly more than $5 million.

Major Accomplishments AFJ claims its major accomplishment was the defeat of the Bork nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987, which propelled the organization as a policy leader in judicial selection and advocacy.

Cross-References ▶ Advocacy ▶ Human Rights ▶ Networks ▶ Social Justice

References/Further Readings Aron, N. (1989). Liberty and justice for all: Public interest law in the 1980s and beyond. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Payne, E. (2008). The practical progressive: How to build a twenty-first century political movement. New York: Public Affairs. Pickering, C. W. (2005). Supreme chaos: The politics of judicial confirmation & the culture war. Macon, GA: Stroud and Hall.

Altruism Activities To pursue it mission, AFJ combines advocacy campaigns at the grassroots level with research and publications relating to advocacy and judicial nominations to train others to advocate. AFJ has expanded its capacity through technology and is able to reach more than 53,000 total activists and supporters, including 1,640 law professors and 2,654 students. The organization’s Nonprofit Action Network grew to more than 8,100 members, and in 2005 they launched an Access to Justice update with more than 6,000 subscribers. Its main programs are the judicial selection project; access to justice project; the nonprofit advocacy project/foundation advocacy initiative; and the student action campaign.

ANNE BIRGITTA PESSI University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

Introduction Altruism as a form of helping behavior forms the cornerstone of societal cohesion, the everyday well-being of individuals and the central manifestation of human values. Still, much research views humans and humanity in a way best described in David Hume’s words as ‘‘homo homini lupus.’’ Altruism is thus often neglected as a secondary ad hoc explanation, as its explanatory power compared to selfishness is considered to be less. This,

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however, need not nor should it be the case with altruism. Appreciation of various forms of altruism can bring considerable benefit for the understanding of the interaction between people both in theoretical considerations and empirical studies. Altruism, an essential and pivotal part of humanity, can be regarded as a universal phenomenon, since it is found in all known societies. However, the forms of altruism vary greatly between and within societies and probably between different eras in the same societies. Today’s societal context creates an especially interesting framework for altruism: While individuals are less dependent on traditional social ties and traditions, they are increasingly tied to other types of networks, including global ones. Individuals live in the midst of multiple novel networks in several senses of the word; people may, for instance, not be interested in helping their neighbors but have godchildren on the other side of the world. As the networks of individuals are changing, so too is altruism. The changes in the forms of altruism and helping behavior might even be playing a role in the transformation of social networks.

Definition Altruism, in general, refers to actions that take other human beings into consideration: action concerned with the well-being of others. The concept was brought into the social sciences by Auguste Comte (1798–1857) in the mid-nineteenth century as the antonym of selfishness. The term derives from the Latin words ‘‘alter’’ and ‘‘other.’’ In Comte’s often restated view, individuals have two distinct motives: egoism and altruism; the latter for him is ‘‘the most important sociological question.’’ Similar views were later put by E´mile Durkheim (1858–1917) in his early work ‘‘The Division of Labour in Society.’’ Durkheim argues that wherever there are communities, there is altruism since communities exhibit solidarity. Durkheim linked egoism and altruism to the deepening of the societal division of labor, the transformation from mechanical to organic solidarity. Likewise, he linked egoism and altruism to the maintenance of moral communality demanded by and included in the transformed solidarity. According to Durkheim, both egoism and altruism have been a part of each human consciousness from the very beginning: consciousness that does not reflect these elements cannot exist. For Durkheim, unselfishness is expected to come from the deepest foundation of our social life; people cannot live together without mutual understanding, and thus without mutual sacrifice, and without being bonded together in a strong, durable manner.

During the twentieth century, an increasing part of the literature on altruism-related themes has been encompassed specifically by the concept of altruism. Research can indeed be found on various fields: philosophy, religious studies, developmental psychology studies, social psychology, organisational studies, political science, economics, evolutionary studies both in psychology and biology, etc. However, today, there is a remarkable lack of agreement over what is meant by the term. Macaulay and Berkowitz’s classic definition of altruism is ‘‘behaviour carried out to benefit another without anticipation of rewards from external sources’’ (1970: 3). This definition includes internal rewards, such as alleviation of guilt, increase in self-esteem, and feeling good about oneself. Such a definition offers the advantage of avoiding both the philosophical dilemma of true unselfishness and unobservable variables. Another classic study by Monroe (1996) has defined altruism as ‘‘behaviour intended to benefit another, even when this risks possible sacrifice to the welfare of the actor.’’ Monroe has further outlined six critical points in the definition: 1. Altruism entails action. 2. The action must be goal-directed, either consciously or reflexively. 3. The goal must concern the welfare of another. 4. Intentions count more than consequences. 5. The act must carry some possibility of decrease in the actor’s own welfare. 6. There must be no conditions or anticipation of reward. Some of these points, however, divide scholarly views. The sixth criterion, ‘‘no conditions or anticipation of reward,’’ is particularly tricky. In other words, the question of whether the actor is allowed to gain joy from altruism or expected to gain it prior to the action is a divisive issue between scholars. For instance, one can look at the definition by Montada and Bierhof (1991: 18) that differs from the one by Monroe: altruism is voluntary ‘‘behaviour that aims at a termination or reduction of an emergency, a neediness, or disadvantage of others and that primarily does not aim at the fulfilment of one’s own interests.’’ A further age-old debated issue concerns whether altruism really exists; what is the relation between selfishness and non-selfishness in helping-behavior. It is actually logically rather difficult to demonstrate altruism to those thinking that helping is always inherently selfish; for instance, those who do personally value altruism most likely do derive positive feelings from altruistic behavior. Thus, a cynic can always claim that there is always a selfish gain. She/he could respond that it may be true that

Altruism

helping others brings one pleasure, yet this is by no means the same as showing that one has helped in order to primarily please oneself. Similarly, as noted by Felscher and Worthen (2007), pleasure, as such, is never an end motive in itself but something causes one pleasure; the fact that altruism brings joy particularly indicates true altruistic motives that have been provided by biological and cultural evolution (both nature and nurture). Additionally, a continuum perspective from pure egoism to pure altruism can be utilized as a key to this dilemma: the problem with theories of motivation based on self-interest is not that they are false but that they are only partly true. In other words, neither egoism nor altruism is adequate explanation on its own. Considering the pure form of thinking and acting (either egoism or altruism) as extremely rare, and taking most human thinking and behavior as including elements of both these poles, leads to an understanding that helping others and gaining joy from it (or the increased social respect and status) are two sides of the same coin. There are overall considerable fundamental differences in the criteria for altruism in the literature; in other words, what is considered ‘‘pure altruism’’ or even just ‘‘altruism’’ and ‘‘helping behaviour,’’ looking at these phenomena in the continuum perspective. Some scholars consider that altruism resembles self-sacrifice and heroism, while others link it more loosely to pro-social behavior, taking it as a synonym for helping-behavior. How then does one resolve this puzzle of the criteria for altruism? One solution is to return to the original concept in Latin — altruism is ‘‘other-ism,’’ behavior that primarily takes the other into account, as a starting point. The essence of altruism then is in putting someone else’s welfare and well-being above one’s own benefit. Seeing altruism as ‘‘other-ism’’ does not prevent one from being able to separate something that could be labelled as ‘‘more extreme altruism’’ from ‘‘milder altruism’’; different forms of altruism indeed can be seen as a continuum not only forming a continuum from egoism, but a continuum of their own. Many researchers have indeed rejected the dichotomy between egoism and altruism in various frames of reference, e.g., in educational studies and psychology (Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1992).

Key Issues The mainstream of the altruism discussion in various disciplines can be seen as roughly constituting three eras. At the first stage, up to the 1970s, the discussions concerning altruism in different disciplines went on in their own spheres and contexts, and there was little interaction between disciplines. Furthermore, much social

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science research focused on more negative aspects of human action, such as crime. All in all, the altruism research of the time – at least in hindsight – was not all that productive, considering the amount of further research and the number of significant publications. In the second era of altruism research, from the middle of the 1970s to the early 1990s, work in various disciplines and applications was marked by disputing and questioning unselfish altruism. Researchers aimed to show that phenomena appearing to be altruistic ultimately serve the altruist’s own interest and own good. Even actions that in the short term can be interpreted as altruistic were discovered to work to the advantage of the altruist in the long term. This view was reflected most clearly in sociobiology and economics research in which altruism was interpreted mainly as nepotism or efficient solutions to recurring problems. During the third era of altruism research, the last 15 years, the questions have changed again and common themes for research have increased. More importantly, in social psychology, sociology, economics and political science, a clear paradigm shift away from the position that behavior must reveal egoistic motivation has taken place, recent theory and data being more compatible with the view that ‘‘true altruism’’ does exist. The starting point of research is to a greater extent ‘‘pro-social’’ behavior, the human being considered capable of unselfish altruism which cannot be reduced to favoring of relatives. The various disciplines focus on different elements in their explanations of altruism. Sociocultural explanations focus on the demographic correlations of altruism (religion, age, gender, wealth, education, political views, etc.). Economic explanations, on the other hand, consider altruism a good, and stress the role of the rewards of altruism (material or psychological). Evolutionary biology and psychology base their explanations on very similar grounds to economic explanations. Biologists stress kin and/or group selection and emphasise elements such as birth order and community size. Psychologists prefer to emphasise developmental matters (socialisation, level of cognitive development, etc.) in their altruism explanations, as well as more contextual elements such as norms and culture (e.g., habits of reciprocity, moral judgements). One of the most heated debates on altruism has recently taken place in evolutionary studies in biology and psychology. The early version of kin-selection theory has been traced to the father of the evolution theory, Charles Darwin (1809–1882), who explained the altruistic behavior of ants by natural selection, the survival of the fittest, which applies at the level of the family. A central source of tension in evolutionary studies has then

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been the question of the extent to which social and cultural behavior ultimately supports biological and genetic objectives. The core debate concerns the question of whether altruism is developed and to what extent by individual-selection, kin-selection, or group-selection, or is it rather a question of co-evolution in which the evolution of genes and cultures is quite closely linked. The game theories of evolution biology, as well as those in economics, have identified the altruistic and cooperative inclinations of humans. Altruism has been tested using these classic games (e.g., Prisoner’s Dilemma, Ultimatum) in which short- and long-term advantages of an individual’s are set in contrast to each other, and the solutions of the second players determine the usefulness of one’s own strategy. Game theory experiments have repeatedly shown that individuals cooperate more than the rational choice theory predicts. Furthermore, in repeated games patterns of reciprocity between the players soon appear. Also findings in neurobiology indicate that in situations in which one player would have cooperated but the co-player would not, there is a negative response in the dopamine system in the more cooperative player’s brain. In more empirically oriented studies of altruism there are two strong currents of research. First, several researchers have analysed heroes and their choices. Subjects of such hero research have included people who saved Jews during the Second World War, and people who have led an exceptionally altruistic life such as Gandhi or Mother Teresa. In these cases individuals have made choices that underscore the common good and require sacrifices, choices that have deviated from the dominant cultural models. Organ and blood donation research forms the second study area, most of which has sought the donors’ motivation. Much of altruism research in various fields has concerned the question of what separates an altruist from a non-altruist, or a more altruistic individual from a less altruistic one. One example is Monroe’s theory of altruism (1996); she concludes based on empirical exploration that altruism is constituted most fundamentally by perspective, a different way of seeing oneself and one’s world. This perspective might easily be activated by different factors, such as religious teachings. The basic explanation of altruism, however, consists of the individuals’ perceived identity (not identity as such) and their perspective of themselves in relation to others. Five concepts are crucial: ● Cognition; cognitive framework and processing, including intentionality, agency as well as both biological and cultural self; in other words, the processes by which people come to make sense of the world

● World view; group membership and connection with others playing a crucial role ● Canonical expectations concerning what is normal, or what is ordinary; expectations ● Empathy and/or sympathy including both cognitive and affective elements; resulting from socialisation and developmental processes ● Views of self; identity and perception of who one is, including in relation to others Similarly, in their classic study on individuals who had rescued Jews during the Nazi era, the Oliners (1988) indicated that the rescuers where marked by ‘‘extensivity,’’ being more attached and committed to people in their social relationships and having empathy as well as an inclusive sense of obligation towards various groups. In other words, both the propensity to attach oneself to others and the propensity towards inclusiveness in respect of individuals and groups are critical to altruism. Various scholars have provided evidence supporting the theory that altruism is learned and can be further developed by teaching and learning. Hunt (1990) has summed up three elements that are characteristic of altruists, particularly altruistic children: being (1) happy, welladjusted and socially popular, (2) being sensitive and emotionally expressive and (3) having high self-esteem. Thus, teaching by parents, schools, civil society agents, among others that support these elements will also support the development of altruism.

Future Directions In the forthcoming studies, the best basis for altruism research is not to strictly separate the core phenomenon from closely related pro-social acts such as giving, sharing and co-operating. Rather, innovative research exploring individual-level experiences and views concerning networks of altruism is needed: for instance, what constitutes altruism, and particularly networks of altruism, for latemodern individuals? Such research would both benefit the interdisciplinary links and the links between theory and praxis. Thus some re-direction of research must be accounted for. Five such ways will be outlined next. First, in order to understand altruism in the context of the novel forms of social ties and networks, peoples’ attitudes, trust and expectations – not only deeds – should be accounted for. Researchers should not divide people beforehand into altruists and non-altruists or offer presumptions about where to find the altruists, but explore the present-day experiences and views of altruism with more open eyes. What is the nature and substance of altruism networks now?

Altruism

Second, previous research has largely restricted itself one-sidedly to the acts of altruism by individuals as givers, not receivers. However, in order to understand altruism as a societal and social phenomenon, both directions should be explored. The present-day support and altruism is highly likely to include sporadic and hybrid stories of altruism, as well as series of such stories, and should be studied as such. Third, our understanding of altruism will remain limited if focus is placed simply on individuals, neglecting the role of social groups and institutions in the construction, well-being and maintenance of altruistic values. Even though public institutions such as welfare agencies, schools, associations and churches do not assist or teach altruistic norms primarily because they experience altruistic wishes (but have, for example, statutory responsibilities and regulations), individuals’ expectations and trust in institutional support should be explored. It would also be valuable to explore the way the individuals view the role institutions have in promoting societal values and common faith in compassion and altruism. Fourth, in order to understand experiences and views of altruism more thoroughly, one should include not only the life-cycle viewpoint (past–present–future), but also a wide range of cognitive, rational, emotional and societal elements. Traditionally, explanations of altruism (sociocultural, economic, biological and psychological) have all focused primarily on the explanations found in their own niches. Furthermore, most studies have primarily emphasised cognitive factors. Additionally, both values and, for instance, religion-related elements affect views, acts and attitudes of altruism, as well as individual faith and trust in the networks of altruism supporting them. Fifth, altruism is methodologically most often studied through extreme cases (e.g., people rescuing Jews during the Second World War) and instances quite distinct from individual everyday lives (e.g., blood and organ donation). One next step in altruism research should involve exploration of everyday experiences and views of altruism through combining survey and qualitative data. Research taking these notions into consideration will enable better understanding of the nature of altruism in the intricate present-day interconnections between individualism and collectivism. The relationship between altruism and civil society is a dual process; different forms of altruism promote civil society and participating in civil society activities promotes altruism and altruistic values. In other words, civil society socializes us into further altruism. Altruism is usually thought to decrease when the group-size increases. Moreover, the further the group is from an individual, the less

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altruism. Civil society may transform perspective, even to global spheres. Involvement in civil society may ‘‘mess up’’ the circles; a group not so close to an individual might start to feel closer; it may come to represent one of the meaningful others to an individual, also in altruistic sense.

Cross-References

▶ Community Philanthropy ▶ Compassion ▶ Comte, Auguste ▶ Donor, Donor Intent ▶ Durkheim, E´mile ▶ Gift, Giving ▶ Philanthropy ▶ Reciprocity ▶ Social Cohesion ▶ Solidarity

References/Further Readings Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature, 425, 785–791. Felscher, A. E., & Worthen, D. L. (2007). The altruistic species: Scientific, philosophical, and religious perspectives of human benevolence. New York: Templeton Foundation Press. Field, A. J. (2004). Altruistically inclined? The behavioral sciences, evolutionary theory and the origins of reciprocity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Gintis, H. (2003). Solving the puzzle of prosociality. Rationality and Society, 15(2), 155–187. Hardin, G. (1993). Discriminating altruism. In G. Hardin, (Ed.), Living within the limits (pp. 225–237). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hunt, M. (1990). The compassionate beast. What science is discovering about the humane side of humankind. New York: William Morrow. Kohn, A. (1990). The brighter side of human nature. Altruism & empathy in everyday life. New York: Basic Books. Krebs, D. L., & Van Hesteren, F. (1992). The development of altruistic personality. In P. M. Oliner, et al., (Eds), Embracing the other. Philosophical, psychological, and historical perspectives on altruism (pp. 142–169). New York: New York University Press. Macaulay, J. R., & Berkowitz, L., (Eds.) (1970). Altruism and helping behavior: Social psychological studies of some antecedents and consequences. New York: Academic Press. Monroe, K. R. (1996). The heart of altruism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Montada, L., & Bierhof, H. W. (1991). Studying prosocial behavior in social systems. In L. Montada, & H. Bierhof, (Eds.), Altruism and social systems (pp. 1–26). New York: Hogrefe & Huber. Oliner, S. P., & Oliner, P. M. (1988). The altruistic personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. New York: Free Press. Piliavin, J. A., & Charng, H. W. (1990). Altruism: A review of recent theory and research. Annual Review of Sociology, 16, 27–65. Rushton, J. P., & Sorrentino, R. M. (Eds.), Altruism and helping behavior: Social, personality and developmental perspectives. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. Seidler, V. J. (1992). Rescue, righteousness, and morality. In P. M. Oliner, et al. (Eds.), Embracing the other. Philosophical, psychological, and

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historical perspectives on altruism (pp. 48–65). New York: New York University Press. Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto others. The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

AEI in 1954, Baroody led the organization for over 26 years coining its prominent slogan: ‘‘Competition of ideas is fundamental to a free society.’’ Many of AEI’s scholars and fellows were recruited by the Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush administrations.

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas

American Association of Retired Persons ▶ AARP

American Enterprise Institute ROBBIE WATERS ROBICHAU

AEI’s founding mission statement was to promote ‘‘greater public knowledge and understanding of the social and economic advantages accruing to the American people through the maintenance of the system of free, competitive enterprise.’’ The institute later changed its purpose statement to ‘‘defend the principles and improve the institutes of American freedom and democratic capitalism – limited government, private enterprise, individual liberty and responsibility, vigilant and effective defense and foreign policies, political accountability, and open debate.’’

Activities Address of Organization 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20036 USA www.aei.org

Introduction The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) describes itself as one of America’s ‘‘oldest and most respected think tanks.’’ AEI is primarily dedicated to education and research on governmental issues such as politics, social welfare, and economics. It promotes fact-finding, empirical research on public policy topics that are distributed to various government officials, business executives, academics, and journalist across the United States.

Brief History Founded in 1943 during World War II, the American Enterprise Association (AEA) started out as a partnership between prominent policy experts (e.g., Roscoe Pound, Henry Hazlitt, Raymond Moley) and executives from the business and financial communities (e.g., Bristol-Myers, General Mills, Chemical Bank). From the beginning, the Washington, DC-based association was libertarian and conservative, but had a commitment to being nonpartisan, apolitical, and objective in their research. AEA wanted to ensure that Congress understood the economic consequences of their actions. Later changed to the American Enterprise Institute, the organization was highly influenced by William J. Baroody’s leadership. Joining

In its research and publication endeavors, AEI maintains an unbiased and nonpartisan approach. Through its employees, fellows, and scholars, the Institute publishes several books, monographs, e-newsletters, and periodicals as well as sponsors conferences, seminars, and lectures. One of their major publications, The American magazine, is distributed six times a year. A few of AEI’s projects include the National Research Initiative, Future of American Education Project, Global Governance Watch, and Reg-Market Center.

Structure and Governance AEI is designated as an education, nonprofit institute under the Internal Revenue Code 501(c)(3). It employs approximately 190 individuals at their Washington, DC office and around 100 additional fellows and scholars located around the United States. Research is performed by three main research branches: Economic Policy Studies, Social and Political Studies, and Defense and Foreign Policy Studies. Additionally, AEI works with several other specialized programs such as the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies or the Brady Program on Culture and Freedom to perform its mission. A Board of Trustees governs AEI and selects the institution’s president. The Board and president are advised by the Council of Academic Advisers.

Funding In addition to receiving funding from their internal endowment, AEI primarily obtains funding from individuals, foundations, corporations, and its conferences, book sales, and other revenues. The organization rarely receives

Amnesty International

governmental grants and avoids engaging in contract research. AEI’s revenues were $31.3 million and its expenses were around $27.4 million in 2007. According to their website, over 80% of AEI’s resources go to supporting its research, publications, and conferences.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions AEI has contributed to government, business, and society’s awareness of public policy issues facing the United States through its many publications and conferences. Many of its scholars and fellows have received positions in presidential cabinets, testified before Congress, appeared on televised public affairs programs, and lectured on various topics. According to their website, AEI scholars have published more op-ed pieces in the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and the Washington Post than all other DC-based think tanks combined.

Cross-References ▶ Think Tanks

References/Further Readings Abelson, D. E. (2002). Do think tanks matter?: Assessing the impact of public policy institutes. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Rich, A. (2005). Think tanks, public policy, and the politics of expertise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weaver, R. K. (1989). The changing world of think tanks. Political Science and Politics, 22(3), 563–578.

Amnesty International REGINA LIST

Address of Organization International Secretariat 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW UK www.amnesty.org

Introduction Amnesty International (AI) describes itself as a ‘‘worldwide movement of people who campaign for internationally recognized human rights.’’ AI has grown into one of the largest international NGOs with more than 2.2 million members, supporters, and subscribers in over 150 countries and territories.

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Brief History Amnesty International’s work began in 1961 when British lawyer, Peter Benenson, launched the ‘‘Appeal for Amnesty’’ with the publication of a widely reprinted article that brought attention to those imprisoned, tortured or executed because their opinions were unacceptable to government. Several months after the article’s publication, delegates from six European countries and the United States agreed to establish a permanent international movement to defend freedom of opinion and religion, and in 1962, delegates from 14 national groups decided to set up the organization known as Amnesty International.

Mission From its original mission to draw attention to prisoners of conscience, AI’s mandate has expanded in response to new needs and its own capacities. AI’s Statute states that its mission is ‘‘to undertake research and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of the rights to physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and expression, and freedom from discrimination, within the context of its work to promote all human rights.’’ At its 2007 International Council Meeting, AI’s leadership committed to the broader goal of ‘‘tackling poverty and disparity as the gravest global threats to universal human rights.’’

Activities To pursue its mission, AI combines research and publications, including reports, news releases, and urgent action alerts, with campaigns at the grassroots, national, international and inter-governmental levels. Recent global campaigns focus on torture and the ‘‘war on terror,’’ arms control, abolition of the death penalty, support for human rights defenders, refugees and migrants, among others. Members of AI’s Urgent Action network in some 70 countries respond to its alerts by sending correspondence to responsible parties to hinder specific cases of human rights abuse. AI’s annual reports on ‘‘The State of the World’s Human Rights’’ highlight its work and current concerns.

Structure and Governance AI is an unincorporated global movement, which includes formally organized ‘‘sections’’ in more than 50 countries, ‘‘structures,’’ i.e., aspiring sections, and international members. Its International Secretariat, led by a Secretary General appointed by AI’s International Council, is incorporated in the UK. In 2005–6, AI participated in the drafting of and adheres to the International Nongovernmental Organizations’ Accountability Charter.

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Funding Amnesty International’s work is financed primarily through individual contributions, special events, and donations from foundations and corporations. Although AI receives no governmental contributions for its campaigning, it does accept restricted funds for human rights education projects. The International Secretariat alone reported total expenditures of more than £28.8 million for the year ending March 31, 2006.

Accomplishments Among its other achievements, AI was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977 for its contributions to ‘‘securing the ground for freedom, for justice, and thereby also for peace in the world’’. In addition, for its innovative use of email, AI won ‘‘The Revolution Awards’’ for its ‘‘Stop Torture’’ website.

Cross-References ▶ Human Rights ▶ INGOs

References/Further Readings Clark, A. M. (2001). Diplomacy of conscience: Amnesty International and changing human rights norms. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hopgood, S. (2006). Keepers of the flame: Understanding Amnesty International. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Power, J. (2001). Like water on stone: The story of Amnesty International. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

Annenberg, Walter Hubert DAVID B. HOWARD

television. President Richard Nixon appointed Annenberg as Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s, Great Britain, for which he served from 1969 to 1974. Annenberg sold Triangle Publications to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation for $3 billion in 1988, enabling him to become one of the country’s most active philanthropists. He died in Wynnewood, Pennsylvania in 2002 at the age of 94.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Even in Annenberg’s early publishing and media career, he showed a desire to improve educational opportunities by way of television. One of the first to air educational programming on television, he was awarded the Alfred I. Dupont award in 1951 and the Marshall Field Award in 1958. He extended his interest in education by founding two separate Annenberg Schools of Communication – one at the University of Pennsylvania in 1958 and one at the University of Southern California in 1971. In 1981, Annenberg pledged $90 million to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to put college courses on the air – the largest pledge in the history of public broadcasting. In 1991, Annenberg and wife Leonore donated their $1 billion Impressionist and Post- Impressionist art collection to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. The Annenberg Foundation was established in 1989 to advance the public well-being through improved communication. In 1993, the foundation created the Annenberg Challenge, a $500 million, 5-year reform effort and the largest single gift ever made to American public education. This historic gift generated more than $600 million in matching funds. In 2006, the Annenberg Foundation was the 19th largest in the US with assets nearing $2.7 billion. Annenberg supported a variety of institutions over time, including presidential libraries, universities, hospitals, orchestras, children’s museums, and science centers. Throughout his lifetime, it is estimated that Annenberg donated over $2 billion.

Basic Biographical Information Born in 1908 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (USA) to a Jewish family, Walter H. Annenberg would become a pioneer in media and publishing, diplomat, and philanthropist. After taking over the family publishing business – Triangle Publications – in the early 1940s, Annenberg sought ways to expand the company just as television was becoming the next major communication medium. He created Seventeen Magazine for teenage girls in 1944 before establishing TV Guide, a weekly magazine about television programming, which became the most read and circulated magazine in the country by the 1960s. Over the years, Annenberg’s company delved into radio and television broadcasting, and he became an early pioneer in and supporter of public

Cross-References

▶ Grantmaking Foundations ▶ Philanthropy and the media

References/Further Readings Cervone, B. T. (1996). Walter H. Annenberg’s challenge to the nation: A progress report. Providence, RI: Annenberg Institute for School Reform. Cooney, J. (1982). The Annenbergs. New York: Simon & Schuster. Fonzi, G. (1970). Annenberg: A biography of power. New York: Weybright and Talley. The Annenberg Foundation (2005). Creating opportunities: Fifteen years of advancing the public good, from http://www.annenbergfoundation. org/usr_doc/Retrospective.pdf; 1/6/2009.

Anti-Slavery International

Anti-Slavery International PATSY KRAEGER

Address of Organization Thomas Clarkson House The Stableyard Broomgrove Road London SW9 9TL UK www.antislavery.org

Introduction Anti-Slavery International (ASI) describes itself as ‘‘the world’s oldest international human rights organization’’ claiming roots back to 1787 with the establishment of the first abolitionist society in England.

Brief History Anti-Slavery International is origins date back to 1787 with the establishment of the first abolitionist society in England. The organization’s early leaders included Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, Thomas Clarkson, and other notable British Quakers, Baptists, and Methodists. In 1839, the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society was formed and in 1990 the society changed its name to AntiSlavery International.

Mission The original mission of the organization was a commitment to abolish slavery throughout the world. In the 1890s, the mission was expanded to abolish the ill treatment of indigenous peoples, merging with the Aborigines’ Protection Society in 1909. Today, the organization seeks to work against slavery and its related abuses throughout the world.

Activities Anti-Slavery International has two teams, a program and a communications team. The Program Team works with partner organizations around the world to collect information on: debt bondage, forced labor, forced marriage, the worst forms of child labor, human trafficking, and traditional slavery. Anti-Slavery International publishes information and works through international bodies in order to promote laws to protect those exploited by these practices. The Communications Team is comprised of campaign, education, and press officers who produce action briefings, educational materials, and a quarterly magazine

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called the Reporter, to inform both the public and policy makers about slavery issues around the world. AntiSlavery International also lobbies national governments, the United Nations and the European Union to adopt policies which will help to bring about the end of all forms of slavery.

Structure and Governance Anti-Slavery International is a British charitable and advocacy organization. It works with partner agencies throughout the world to abolish slavery and related abuses. The organization has a director, a staff of less than 25 and a Board of Trustees as well as affiliated worldwide partners.

Funding Anti-Slavery International’s work is financed primarily through public and private charitable trusts, foundations, individuals, governments, the European Union and other institutions. The organization reported £1,700,725 in funds received in 2006 and expenditures of £1,541,318 for that same year. Eighty percent of received funding goes directly into projects and campaigns.

Major Accomplishments In 2003, following ASI’s first national survey of slavery in Niger, the Niger Government introduced a new law against slavery with sentences of 30 years in prison for offenders. Within 6 months of this measure over 200 slaves were freed. In 2002, after years of pressure from Anti-Slavery International, the Nepalese Government passed a law declaring bonded labor illegal. In 2000, Anti-Slavery International initiated a new program with local partners in six West African countries to end the cross-border trafficking of children, leading to the first anti-trafficking network of its kind in the region.

Cross-References ▶ Advocacy ▶ Human Rights ▶ INGOs

References/Further Readings Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders. Ithaca, NY/ London, England: Cornell University Press. McDonagh, P. (2002). Communicative campaigns to effect anti-slavery and fair trade: The cases of Rugmark and Cafedirect. European Journal of Marketing, 36(5/6), 642–666. Sharman, A.-M. (Ed.) (1993). Anti-Slavery Reporter (Vol. 13, No. 8). London: Anti-Slavery International.

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ANZTSR ▶ Australia New Zealand Third Sector Research (ANZTSR) Inc.

APPC ▶ Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium (APPC)

Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO) EVA DIDION

Address of Organization Heinrich-Albertz-Haus Blu¨cherstraße 62/63 10961 Berlin Germany www.awo.org

AWO was reconstituted in 1946 in the western sectors, this time independent from the Social Democratic Party, but nonetheless committed to the social democratic movement. AWO joined the ‘‘Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Freien Wohlfahrtspflege,’’ an umbrella organization created in 1956, lobbying for the six large welfare organizations in Germany: Deutscher Caritasverband, Diakonisches Werk der EKD, AWO, German Red Cross, Parita¨tischer Wohlfahrtsverband – Parity and Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland. After the German reunification, AWO reestablished the organization in former East Germany.

Mission AWO is driven by the values solidarity, tolerance, freedom, equality, and justice, based on its history as part of the workers’ movement. AWO substantially differs from other voluntary welfare associations by proclaiming priority to public over private welfare organizations.

Activities

Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO) is one of six central voluntary welfare associations in Germany. It describes itself as a ‘‘member association fighting for a socially just society and taking political influence.’’ This is achieved by voluntary action and professional services. 430,000 members, 100,000 volunteers and 146,000 professionals support the association and perform services in more than 14,000 facilities including about 2,100 residential homes with approximately 330,000 beds.

The activities of AWO comprise the whole sector of social work including stimulation of self-help, encouragement of voluntary work, offering and maintaining institutions and services in fields of healthcare, prevention and aid as well as support for women, children and adolescents. AWO is also engaged in education and foreign aid. Another important field is to comment on questions of public and private welfare and assist the planning of social services and institutions. AWO also addresses delegates of the democratic parties and thereby tries to participate in legislation on a local, federal, national, and European level. Finally, AWO collaborates with other associations and self-help groups. AWO’s bimonthly journal ‘‘Theorie und Praxis’’ informs about various aspects of social work.

Brief History


In 1919, the German Social Democratic Party founded the ‘‘Hauptausschuss fu¨r Arbeiterwohlfahrt’’ (Main Committee for Workers’ Welfare) as a social support organization aiming at more independence for workers from bourgeois poor relief and strengthening their self-help. The organization grew rapidly: in the mid-1920s the organization comprised more than 1,000 residential homes. The main initiator of the organization was Marie Juchacz (1897– 1956) who also became the first chairwoman. In 1933, the National Socialists banned the AWO. As a consequence, all institutions were either dissolved or taken over by the national socialist welfare organization. Marie Juchacz and other leaders left the country.

Members of the Federal Association are the 29 state or regional associations. Those are composed of 480 district and 3,800 local associations. The federal conference, consisting of 440 elected delegates, is the main decision-making body of the organization. The delegates meet every 4 years, elect the 19 board members, decide about membership fees, proposals and focus areas.

Introduction

Funding The federal association’s main sources of income are private grants and governmental subsidies. In 2006, those two sources together constituted €27.9 million. Other

ARNOVA

important financial sources are revenues from the association’s activities which added up to €9.7 million in 2006.

Cross-References

▶ Diakonisches Werk der EKD ▶ Umbrella Organizations

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ARNOVA in 1990; (e) the establishment of an awards program in 1993; (f) the hiring of the first paid executive director in 1994, and (g) the establishment of ARNOVA’s first sections in 1999. Today, ARNOVA has almost 1,300 members from 24 countries and is widely recognized for its leadership in the advancement of nonprofit and voluntary action scholarship.

References/Further Readings

Mission

Boessenecker, K.-H. (1995). Spitzenverba¨nde der freien Wohlfahrtspflege in der BRD: eine Einfu¨hrung in Organisationsstrukturen und Handlungsfelder. Mu¨nster, Germany: Votum-Verlag. Eifert, C. (1993). Frauenpolitik und Wohlfahrtspflege: zur Geschichte der sozialdemokratischen ‘‘Arbeiterwohlfahrt’’. Frankfurt/Main, Germany: Campus Verlag.

ARNOVA is a leading interdisciplinary community of people dedicated to fostering through research and education, the creation, application, and dissemination of knowledge on nonprofit organizations, philanthropy, civil society and voluntary action.

Activities

ARNOVA BARBARA A. METELSKY

Address of Organization 340 W. Michigan St., Canal Level, Suite A Indianapolis, IN 46202 USA www.arnova.org

Introduction The Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA) is a nonprofit professional membership organization dedicated to advancing scholarship on nonprofit organizations and voluntary action. ARNOVA members include scholars and practitioners from the United States and abroad who conduct research on issues affecting the nonprofit sector. This research often informs nonprofit policy and practice.

Brief History In 1971, ARNOVA was founded as the Association for Voluntary Action Scholars (AVAS) by David Horton Smith. Funding for AVAS was provided by the Center for a Voluntary Society. Major historical milestones include: (a) the publication of the first issue of the Journal of Voluntary Action Research in 1972; (b) the convening of the first annual conference in 1974; (c) the journal’s name change to Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly (NVSQ) in 1989; (d) the organization’s name change to

ARNOVA’s mission is advanced by three primary means: publications, an annual research conference, and dialog groups. ARNOVA publishes NVSQ and ARNOVA News. ARNOVA’s conference provides scholars with opportunities for dissemination and feedback on their research, and includes an awards program that honors and highlights outstanding achievement in nonprofit scholarship. Members are afforded ongoing opportunities for dialog through participation in ARNOVA-L (a listserve) and ARNOVA’s sections (subgroups focused on: Teaching; Community and Grassroots; Pracademics; Social Entrepreneurship/Enterprise; Theories, Issues, and Boundaries; and Values, Religion, and Deviance).

Structure and Governance ARNOVA is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, which is governed by a 15-member board of directors. The organization’s executive director and the coeditors of NVSQ serve as ex-officio directors. ARNOVA offers two membership types; individual and institutional. An annual membership meeting is held in conjunction with its conference.

Funding ARNOVA’s largest revenue sources are conference revenue and membership dues. Philanthropic support has come from individuals and foundations that include the Ford Foundation, the Lilly Endowment, and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation.

Accomplishments ARNOVA has undertaken several strategic initiatives that have focused on strengthening the community of nonprofit and voluntary action scholars by increasing membership growth, disciplinary diversity, and practitioner participation. As a result membership has grown from

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Article 19

an estimated 150 in 1976, to 464 in 1994, to 1,049 in 2000 to 1,287 in 2008. ARNOVA’s Occasional Paper Series has made a significant contribution by inviting leading scholars to examine pertinent issues in the field. Most recently, in partnership with the Council on Foundations and the Foundation Center, ARNOVA has established a ‘‘Research & Practice Think Tank.’’

Cross-References

▶ Council on Foundations ▶ Ford Foundation ▶ Foundation Center ▶ Lilly Endowment ▶ Mott Foundation, Charles Stewart ▶ Smith, David Horton

References/Further Readings Association for Research on Nonprofits and Voluntary Action. 2007 annual report: A year of change and progress, from http://www. arnova.org/pdf/07AnnualReport.pdf; 12/10/2008 Johnson, T. E. (2004). Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA). In D. Burlingame (Ed.), Philanthropy in America: A comprehensive historical encyclopedia (Vol. 1, pp. 35–37). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Smith, D. H. (2003). A history of ARNOVA. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32(3), 458–472. Van Til, J. (1993). ARNOVA and its journal: Some reflections. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 22(3), 201–205.

expression’’ which includes the rights to ‘‘receive and impart information and ideas through any media.’’

Brief History The founding of the organization is based on the idea of the Chicago businessman Roderick MacArthur who worked towards the establishment of an organization focusing solely on the human right to freedom of expression and information on an international scope. After his early death, it was his son Greg who fulfilled his father’s vision and founded Article 19 in 1987.

Mission The basic idea of being an organization that supports defenders of freedom of expression and provides expertise for them was soon expanded to include advocacy and campaigning for freedom of expression and information worldwide. Article 19 is emphasizing the anchorage of freedom of expression and information in the human rights framework and regards these freedoms as central for the protection of other rights, be it basic ones like the right to food, medical care and housing or an accountable and transparent government. Article 19 is working with 80 partner organizations all around the world and is following a rights-based approach which means that it is focusing on the improvement of citizen participation in its decision-making processes at all levels.

Activities

Article 19 CLAUDIA BODE-HARLASS

Address of Organization 6-8 Amwell Street London EC1R 1UQ UK www.article19.org

Introduction According to the organization itself, Article 19 is a ‘‘global campaign for free expression’’ that ‘‘defends and promotes freedom of expression and freedom of information all over the world.’’ Its name is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states in its 19th Article that ‘‘everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and

Article 19 conducts a variety of different activities in order to fulfil its aim. Their monitoring and research on the situation of freedom of expression and information all around the world is accompanied by legal standard setting, the drafting of model laws to protect these freedoms and the promotion, campaigning and lobbying for legal change. Besides, the organization is conducting legal and professional trainings for relevant actors including NGOs, journalists, lawyers, and so on. Furthermore, the organization is supporting individuals whose rights have been violated, which can even include their litigation in national as well as international courts. A recent campaign is, for example, focusing on the freedom of the Burmese Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. The organization’s work and findings are presented not only in their annual report but also in special reports, handbooks, and research papers on special issues as well as on certain countries.

Structure and Governance Besides its headquarters in London, Article 19 is also running field offices in Kenya, Senegal, Lebanon, Mexico,

Ashoka

and Brazil. The organization is headed by an international board consisting of lawyers, human rights activists and journalists from all over the world.

Funding The organization is funded by donations which it receives from individuals, foundations and governments. Regular supporters are, for example, the Norwegian Fritt Ord Foundation and the Open Society Institute. More recently, also the Ford Foundation became one of Article 19’s donors. Total revenues in 2007 amounted to just over ₤2 million.

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Environment, Health, Human Rights, and Learning/ Education. Globally, Ashoka has been electing Fellows for almost 30 years, and the Ashoka-US program is in its eighth year. A network of social entrepreneurs, Ashoka rewards fellows for their leading work in innovative social change.

Brief History

In 1989 Article 19 set up and coordinated the International Rushdie Defence Committee following the issuing of a fatwa against the author. Besides, the organization was one of the founding members of International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) established in 1992. Furthermore, it is the coordinator of the Global Transparency Initiative working against corruption.

Founded by Bill Drayton in 1980, Ashoka elected its first fellows in India one year later. During its first decade in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Central Europe, Ashoka focused exclusively on launching leading social entrepreneurs and helping them succeed. As the citizen sector evolved and grew in the 1990s, Ashoka responded with a wider range of programs and initiatives to deal with the sector’s growing needs. Ashoka grew as well, tripling in size from 1988 to 1990, and again from 1999 to 2002. Today Ashoka is in its third period of rapid growth, electing record numbers of Fellows recently and expanding its programs in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East.

Cross-References

Mission/Objective/Focus Area

Accomplishments

▶ Human Rights ▶ INGOs ▶ Transparency

References/Further Readings Boyle, K. (Ed.) (1988). Article 19 information, freedom and censorship. Cambridge: Keesing’s Reference Publications. MacDonogh, S. (Ed.) (1993). The Rushdie letters: Freedom to speak, freedom to write. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Ashoka ALLYSON REAVES

Address of Organization Ashoka Global Headquarters 1700 North Moore Street, Suite 2000 (20th Floor) Arlington, VA 22209 USA www.ashoka.org

Introduction Registered as a not-for-profit organization in the United States, Ashoka has established programs in over 60 countries and supports the work of over 2,200 Fellows in Civic Engagement, Economic Development,

Ashoka supports fellows that are leading social entrepreneurs whose work presents innovative solutions to social problems and the potential to change patterns across society.

Activities Ashoka’s supportive programming for elected fellows is represented through three areas of activities: Supporting Social Entrepreneurs, Promoting Group Entrepreneurs, and Building Social Infrastructure. In its work to support entrepreneurs, Ashoka awards fellows with a living stipend for an average of 3 years, allowing them to focus full-time on building their institutions and spreading their ideas. Through the initiative to promote group entrepreneurship, Ashoka facilitates collaboration among the fellows globally. Ashoka also assists the work of the fellows by building a social infrastructure, which includes seed financing and capital, bridges to the business and academic sectors, and strategic partnerships that deliver social and financial value. Other activities include Youth Venture, Ashoka’s organization on youth programming. Youth Venture invests in teams of young people to start and lead their own social ventures, and it is currently operating in the United States, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, India, South Africa, Thailand, France, Germany, and Spain. Ashoka’s Changemakers is another well known program that ‘‘open sources’’ innovative solutions to social problems worldwide. Changemakers has sourced over 500 high-impact action blueprints for solving social problems.

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Established as a separate organization in 1999, Changemakers granted over $2 million to community-based social change philanthropies. Due to economic and fundraising challenges, Changemakers discontinued its programming in October 2008.

Elkington, J. (2008). The power of unreasonable people: How social entrepreneurs create markets that change the world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Yunus, M. (2008). Creating a world without poverty: Social business and the future of capitalism. New York: PublicAffairs.

Structure and Governance Ashoka’s 8-member Board of Directors serves the specific needs of both Ashoka and the social entrepreneurship movement. Bill Drayton serves as the Chair and CEO of Ashoka. As one of three members of the Leadership Team, his special responsibilities are leadership of the new group entrepreneurship and social financial services programs as well as staff search and marketing functions. Diana Wells serves as the organization’s President.

Funding At first funded with an annual budget of $50,000 from founder Bill Drayton’s own resources, the organization is now financed by individuals, foundations, and business entrepreneurs from around the world. Ashoka does not accept funding from government entities. Individual and institutional endowment funds provide for Ashoka’s long-term stability. As of the end of its 2007 fiscal year (8/31/2007), Ashoka reported total assets of $74,681,835 and total giving of $10,270,07.

Accomplishments Bill Drayton, the founder of Ashoka, has won numerous awards and honors throughout his career. In 2005, he was selected one of America’s Best Leaders by US News & World Report and Harvard’s Center for Public Leadership. Other awards include the Yale Law School’s highest alumni honor, the National Wildlife Federation’s Conservation Achievement Award International, and the National Academy of Public Administration National Public Service Award. Notable fellows include Muhammad Yunus (Founder, Grameen Bank). Yunus was elected as a founding member of Ashoka’s Global Academy in 2001, and 2006, Yunus was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Cross-References

▶ Social Entrepreneurship ▶ Venture Philanthropy ▶ Yunus, Muhammad

References/Further Readings Bornstein, D. (2007). How to change the world: Social entrepreneurs and the power of new ideas. New York: Oxford University Press.

Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium (APPC) CHRISTOPHER S. BIGGERS

Address of Organization 2nd Floor, Lexington Condominium 65 Xavierville Avenue Loyola Heights, 1108 Quezon City Philippines www.asiapacificphilanthropy.org

Introduction The APPC is an independent nonprofit association of organizations and philanthropic institutions, encouraging the growth and further development of philanthropy in the Asia-Pacific region. Through its extensive multinational network, the APPC contributes to the creation of international standards in the nonprofit sector by developing critical studies and making recommendations with partner organizations.

Brief History The APPC is the final culmination of three high level research conferences that took place in Bangkok (1989), Seoul (1993), and Osaka (1994). By the end of 1994, the APPC officially emerged as a nonmembership based informal network of grantmaking philanthropy institutions with its home established out of Manila in the Philippines. Since then, the APPC has worked diligently with governments, corporations, and individuals to further public awareness and fund-raising capacity establishing internationally recognized priorities and mechanisms to improve cooperation among regional players.

Mission The mission and objective of the APPC focus on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of philanthropy by helping build the ‘‘institutional infrastructures’’ as well as the proper ‘‘operating environment’’ for organizations in the region. In order to fulfill its mission, the Consortium acts as a vehicle to bring like minded individuals and

Asociacioń Espanõla de Fundaciones

organizations together by addressing issues that affect the nonprofit sector and through disseminating operational knowledge at conferences and in policy papers.

Activities The APPC carries out projects focused on four major areas: policy advocacy, raising awareness, resource mobilization, and capacity building. In support of these areas, the Consortium maintains an active exchange program for grantmakers, legal experts, and NGO leaders in order to create a responsible and capable nonprofit community. In addition, the APPC hosts biannual conferences where leaders in the nonprofit sector gather to present ‘‘background’’ briefs and policy papers advocating new practices while raising awareness. Like most philanthropic organizations, the Consortium host fundraising events spearheading programs for corporate giving often coupled with corporate social responsibility campaigns.

Structure and Governance The structure and governance of the APPC is led by a 17 member Board of Directors made up of senior members from various philanthropic organizations, NGOs, and academic institutions. The Board includes a Chair, Deputy Chair, and Treasury positions as well as various honorary posts and subcommittees. Additionally, there is a Secretariat which functions as the primary administrative apparatus for the organization’s finances and research programs operating throughout the region.

Funding Since the APPC is not a membership-based organization, funding comes entirely from generous contributions of private and corporate foundations. Due to the success of the APPC and its sponsored events, funding has grown to include resources not only from the public and private sectors of the Asia-Pacific region but also from Europe and the Americas.

Accomplishments Among the Consortium’s most notable accomplishments include various corporate social responsibility campaigns launched throughout the Asia-Pacific area. Much of this effort grew out of the annual Asian Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility which the APPC has co-organized with the Asian Institute of Management’s RVR Center since 2002. Above all, the Consortium’s continued growth attests to the vitality of the organization despite the financial crisis and recent natural disasters that have plagued the region.

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Cross-References

▶ Corporate Giving ▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Fundraising ▶ Philanthropy in Southeast Asia ▶ Social Capital

References/Further Readings Silk, T. (1999). Philanthropy and law in Asia: A comparative study of the nonprofit legal system in ten Asia Pacific societies. New York: Jossey-Bass.

Asociacioń Espanõla de Fundaciones MARTIN HO¨LZ, REGINA LIST


C/ General Castanõs, 4 – 4a Planta 28004 Madrid Spain www.fundaciones.org

Introduction The Asociacioń Espanõla de Fundaciones (AEF – Spanish Association of Foundations) is an umbrella organization, headquartered in Madrid, Spain, providing support to Spanish foundations and promoting the strength of the foundation sector.

Brief History AEF was created in January 2003 through the merger of the Centro de Fundaciones (Foundation Centre) and the Confederacioń Espanõla de Fundaciones (Spanish Confederation of Foundations).

Mission/Objectives AEF’s obectives are threefold: to promote the foundation sector in Spain and to serve as its representative to the public at large; to provide information and services to its members and serve as a platform for exchange; and to strengthen the foundation sector by providing opportunities for networking and collaboration.

Activities AEF pursues these objectives through a variety of activities. As a representative of the foundation sector, AEF

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works with policy makers and participates in the formulation of reform measures. It also provides its more than 1,000 members advice in legal matters and offers courses and seminars on management and other topics. Through its publications, including Cuadernos de la Asociacioń Espanõla de Fundaciones (Magazine of the Spanish Association of Foundations) and a weekly newsletter, AEF presents information about its members’ activities and analysis of pressing issues affecting the Spanish foundation sector. It also publishes a directory of Spanish foundations, the latest edition covering more than 8,600 foundations. Like many other umbrella organizations, AEF hosts affinity groups organized by topics, such as culture, employment, and environment, and by region (Consejos Autonomicos – Autonomous Advisory Groups). As part of its networking function, AEF cooperates with the European Foundation Centre and WINGS.

Structure and Governance As a membership organization, the highest governing body is its General Assembly of all members. A Board of Directors with a maximum of 33 members provides general direction. In 2009, the Board’s President was Carlos A´lvarez Jimenez and its honorary President was His Royal Highness Carlos de Borboń. An Executive Committee oversees the day-to-day operations. Rounding out the governance structure are an Advisory Board and a Patrons Board.

Funding Membership dues constituted the majority of AEF’s annual revenue of some €1.2 million.

Major Accomplishments Through a survey of its membership in 2007, AEF found that the majority of its members were satisfied in particular with its information-provision activities, including its publications and website, and its training and consulting services.

Cross-References

▶ European Foundation Centre ▶ WINGS

References/Further Readings Asociacioń Espanõla de Fundaciones. (2007). Directorio de Fundaciones Espanõlas. Madrid: Asociacioń Espanõla de Fundaciones.

Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA) ▶ ARNOVA

Association Française contre les Myopathies ANAEL LABIGNE, REGINA LIST

Address of Organization 1, rue de l’Internationale BP 59 91 002 Evry Cedex France www.afm-france.org

Introduction The Association Française contre les Myopathies (AFM) was established in 1958 and is one of the most active of many organizations focused on supporting medical research to cure genetic diseases and on bettering the living conditions of people afflicted by diseases. AFM is a nonprofit association regulated by the French law of 1901.

Brief History After having been founded in 1958 by a group of patients and their families, AFM was recognized as being of public utility by decree of March 26, 1976. In December 1987, AFM launched the first French telethon fundraising campaign. The idea of the telethon was ‘‘imported’’ from the United States in 1986 by Pierre Birambeau, a French entrepreneur whose child was affected by myopathy. He was looking for sponsoring and resources and went therefore to New York to learn about the telethon mechanism. He and AFM adopted a French version and introduced it successfully. AFM chose a major French television channel to host their first telethon show and the French Lions Club, whose members are volunteers, to answer the pledge calls. This campaign has since had growing success and involves temporary volunteers throughout France.

Association of Charitable Foundations

Mission The organization’s declared objective is to defeat neuromuscular diseases which are devastating muscle-wasting diseases.

Activities AFM has three major fields of activities. It promotes research that leads to a direct or indirect understanding of neuromuscular diseases. The research focuses on genetics, the treatment of diseases and the prevention of disabilities. Second, the organization is involved in the opinion-making process on a national and international level and provides financial and technical as well as moral assistance to patients. Third, AFM advocates for the social integration of patients.

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its privately-raised funds thereby breaking the quasimonopoly held by public agencies in France over the direction of basic research.

Cross-References

▶ Fund-raising ▶ Membership and Membership Associations

References/Further Readings Leat, D. (1989). Fund-raising and grant making: A case study of ITV Telethon’88. Kent: Charities Aid Foundation.

Association of Charitable Foundations Structure and Governance AFM is governed by a Board of Directors made up of patients and their families and elected by the General Assembly of members. This Board defines AFM’s policy and actions and makes decisions relating to its financial commitments. Within the Board, the Executive Committee makes decisions passed on to it by the Board, prepares the Board’s deliberations, implements them, and assists the general management in the day-to-day running of the Association. Every year, the Board appoints a new President. It also makes sure AFM’s general management implements the policy and actions that have been defined.

Funding AFM finances itself mainly through proceeds from its annual telethon, which have amounted to more than €100 million in 2006 and 2007. More than 80% of the proceeds are devoted to AFM’s research and advocacy activities, with less than 20% used for publicity, planning, and administration.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions One of AFM’s major contributions was the introduction to France of the telethon fundraising concept. The telethon is a unique fund-raising event combining a 20- to 30-hour televised show along with tens of thousands of local events, organized by volunteers. It has become almost the only means of collecting funds used by AFM. The second important contribution to civil society, besides of the exemplary telethon fundraising campaign was the establishment of the research center, Geńe´thon. It supports government-employed research teams with

DIANA LEAT

Address of Organization Central House 14 Upper Woburn Place London WC1H 0AE UK www.acf.org.uk

Introduction The Association of Charitable Foundations is the leading membership organization for foundations and grantmaking charities in the UK. It is based in London but holds various meetings and conferences in other parts of the UK.

Brief History ACF held its inaugural meeting in 1989 attracting representatives of 80 foundations. The creation of ACF was led by a group of eight foundations, despite opposition and apathy by some others. Those opposed to ACF’s creation were concerned that an association would detract from the autonomy and individuality of foundations, that it would encourage bureaucracy – and that it was unnecessary. After a feasibility study the eight supporting foundations decided to create an experimental organization (with a review after three or four years) designed to bring together trustees and administrators ‘‘which could where necessary carry the weight of the foundations themselves into discussions with government; which would bring a professional staff to develop notions of good practice in grantmaking (much aired orally) into practical guidance

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for those running trusts; and which would improve public understanding of foundations and of philanthropy, assist prospective settlers, and develop international links’’ (ACF, 1992: 3).

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas On the back cover of its news magazine, Trust and Foundation News, ACF today describes its role today as providing ‘‘help and support for the distinctive role of foundations, while respecting –and protecting – their independence. Through its services ACF provides a framework in which members can learn from each other’s experience, explore matters of common concern and achieve good practice in grantmaking.’’ ACF also has a strong track record on representing the common interests of foundations to government, regulators, and the media.

Activities ACF engages in a wide range of activities including a Professional Development Programme of ‘‘training’’ and development for grant-makers, as well as a series of special seminars on topics of current interest and concern to foundations; it runs conferences and special events and publishes studies and reports as well as a quarterly magazine – Trust and Foundation News – and a regular briefing paper on recent developments in the foundation world and in government. In addition ACF provides individual support to members and runs a series of Issue Based Networks (IBNs) on a variety of topics determined by members; the Woburn Place Collaborative – a group of funders committed to issues of social justice and environmental sustainability – is also administered by ACF. Philanthropy UK is a project of ACF to promote giving and is a leading resource for free and impartial advice to aspiring philanthropists. Philanthropy UK also publishes a quarterly free online newsletter. In recent years ACF has been increasingly involved in representing foundations in discussions with government and has been influential in gaining recognition of the special needs and interests of grantmaking foundations (previously treated as no different from operating charities). ACF maintains close links with other associations of foundations in Europe and throughout the world.

Structure and Governance ACF currently has over 300 members. ACF is governed by 15 trustees elected by the membership at the Annual General Meeting, and 8.4 FTE staff including 2 working for Philanthropy UK.

Funding ACF’s annual revenues of approximately £600,000 are secured predominantly from membership subscriptions and supporting grants from members, approximately £70,000 from sponsorships, and earned income.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions In 20 years ACF has moved from being a ‘‘minority’’ organization to an established part of the UK philanthropic landscape. It has been instrumental in changing the way in which foundations are perceived and perceive themselves, raised the profile and level of understanding of foundations within government and legislation, and contributed to the transparency and development of foundation thinking and practices. In these ways ACF has contributed to public benefit, to grant seekers and to grantmakers.

Cross-References

▶ Foundations, Grantmaking ▶ Umbrella Organizations

References/Further Readings ACF. (1992). The first three years 1989–1992. London: Association of Charitable Foundations.

Association of Fundraising Professionals LEIGH HERSEY

Address of Organization 4300 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 300 Arlington, VA 22203 USA www.afpnet.com

Introduction The Association of Fundraising Professionals (AFP) is a membership-based organization that advances philanthropy. With more than 30,000 members, it is the largest organization in the world that represents the charitable fundraiser. The organization sets high standards for fundraising and emphasizes continuous growth of the fundraising professional.

Association of Fundraising Professionals

Brief History The Association of Fundraising Professionals (AFP) was founded as the National Society of Fund Raisers (NSFR) in 1960, as the first association that represented the needs of the professional charitable fundraiser. The organization was formed by three fundraisers – William R. Simms of the National Urban League, Benjamin Sklar of Brandeis University and Harry Rosen of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies. Dr. Abel Hanson served as the first president. The organization served as the first to meet the needs of the charitable fundraiser by aiding in professional performance, promoting high standards for fundraisers, interpreting the objectives of fundraising to those in the profession and to the public, and encouraging research and grantmaking. In 2001, the name was changed to the Association of Fundraising Professionals to better reflect a broader scope of fundraising-related professions, including marketing, communications, advocacy, and public relations.

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fundraising issues and by hosting an annual international conference.

Structure and Governance AFP has 200 chapters worldwide, each with its own local level board of directors. While, most chapters are located in the United States, the areas of recent growth have been with the international and collegiate chapters. At the international level, the board consists of nine officers, 12 district representatives, and 11 at-large members. There is also an AFP – Canada which has its own governance structure.

Funding AFP is funded predominantly through its membership base. Approximately three-quarters of the $12.4 million received in FY 2007, came from membership dues, the annual conference, and registration fees. Another $1 million was received through contributions and grants. The organization spent approximately $13.3 million in the same FY.

Mission According to AFP documents, its mission is to ‘‘advance philanthropy by enabling people and organizations to practice ethical and effective fundraising. The core activities through which AFP fulfills this mission include education, training, mentoring, research, credentialing and advocacy’’. This mission evolved from the 2004–2006 Strategic Plan and was updated to reflect the changing role of the professional fundraiser.

Activities The Association participates in a variety of programming to support its mission statement. AFP was part of a group of four organizations that created the Donor Bill of Rights to help maintain donors’ confidence in philanthropic causes. The cocreators are the Association for Healthcare Philanthropy (AHP), the Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE), and the Giving Institute: Leading Consultants to Non-Profits. In the mid-1980s, AFP established the Certified Fund Raising Executive (CFRE) program for fundraising professionals committed to high standards. In 1997, the certification program merged with a similar program offered by the Association for Healthcare Philanthropy to establish an independent certification program known as CFRE International. An advanced certification program (ACFRE) is also available. The Association continues to educate fundraisers by conducting and disseminating research on current

Major Accomplishments/Contributions AFP has played an important role in enhancing the fundraising profession. In the 1990s, the organization testified before the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board to discuss impacts of proposed legislation on fundraising and the philanthropic community. The organization has also served as a forerunner in emphasizing ethical standards in fundraising, adding credibility to the profession. In 2008, AFP president and CEO Paulette Maehara was named to The Nonprofit Times’ annual ‘‘Power and Influence Top 50’’ list for the tenth consecutive year. The list recognizes leaders that impact and shape the nonprofit sector.

Cross-References

▶ Fundraising ▶ Professional Associations

References/Further Readings Association of Fundraising Professionals, from www.afpnet.org CFRE International, from www.cfre.org Chobot, R. B. (2004). Fundraising credentialing. New Directions for Philanthropic Fundraising, 43, 31–49. The Non-profit Times. (2000). NSFRE to officially become AFP. The Non-profit Times, 14(21), 5. The Non-profit Times. (2008). The 2008 NPT Power & Influence Top 50. The Non-profit Times, 22(15), 17–22.

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Association pour le De´veloppement de la Documentation sur l’Economie Sociale

Association pour le De´veloppement de la Documentation sur l’Economie Sociale ▶ ADDES

Associations, Definitions and History ANNETTE ZIMMER Westfa¨lische Wilhelms-Universita¨t Mu¨nster, Mu¨nster, Germany

Introduction According to Talcott Parsons modern societal communities foster the proliferation of three distinct forms of social organization: markets, bureaucracies, and associations. As such associations constitute a central feature of modernity. Today’s universe of associations in democratic societies differs widely form premodern associational life. There is a clear distinction between traditional involuntary associations such as kin groups, castes, or communities and modern voluntary associations. Historically, the shift from involuntary groupings to the modern association has been made possible by the evolution of the concept of freedom of association. The coming into being of the concept was closely linked to modernity in terms of both the development of modern statehood and societal differentiation. Today, the concept constitutes an integral part of the majority of the constitutions of modern democracies, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulating that (1) everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; (2) no one may be compelled to belong to an association (Art. 20). But associational life is by no means restricted to the world of politics. Looking back upon a long history that goes back to ancient times, in modern societies associations are ubiquitous: Associations are to be found all over the world, taking up very different tasks and duties. Besides associations being active in politics, there are those working on behalf of the business interest of their members, and others facilitating the private life of their membership by providing an institutional setting for a wide range of leisure activities. Against this background, associations constitute an interesting topic of research for various disciplines of the social sciences, amongst those at least history, sociology, political science, and third sector research. But, each discipline highlights different features and functions of associations. While historians, political

scientists and sociologists stress the importance of associations for processes of modernization and societal stratification as well as for interest politics and the formation of social capital, third sector research draws the attention to the economic dimension of associations, and thus to their service providing functions. Therefore, what makes associations such a fascinating topic for the social sciences is closely connected with their multitasking and indeed multifunctional character (Fig 1). As lobbyists and interest organizations associations are supporting as well as criticizing government; as service providers they are working on par with for-profit business enterprises; and as membership organizations they are embedded in social milieus, providing avenues for civic engagement and societal integration. In sum, associations are not an easy topic to address. What makes it even more complicated is the fact that associations do not restrict their scope of activities to just one level of operation. Instead, many of them are complex organizations with local, regional, federal, and even international chapters and departments. Moreover, there are many associations based on individual membership; however, there are also many umbrella organizations or consortia which do not allow for individual membership but are exclusively based on organizations and thus on corporate actors. In order to understand the complex universe of associations it is necessary to both differentiate between the various levels of analysis of associational research and take the respective environment of the associations in terms of their political, legal, and social, and thus historical and regional embeddedness into account. Due to the legacy of history there are culturally and thus regionally bound differences. Associational life in the USA differs from the situation with which associations are faced in the

Associations, Definitions and History. Fig. 1 Multifunctional character of associations

Associations, Definitions and History

developing world or in West Europe or in the countries of the former so-called Eastern bloc. According to the level of analysis, research questions and topics that are addressed with respect to associations as well as the theoretical perspectives and methodologies applied in associational research differ significantly: At the micro- or individual/personal level which traditionally has been linked to the investigation of political culture, associations are looked upon as vehicles for civic engagement and participating. Hence, at the micro-level of analysis associations are currently investigated by applying the social capital approach. The meso- or organizational level constitutes the prime arena of third sector research. This level of analysis has traditionally been addressed by organizational theory. Currently with respect to associations, the central topics of research focusing on the meso-level are issues of associational leadership, management, and governance. Finally, research topics addressed at the macro level have always aimed at investigating impact and importance of associations for the society at large as well as for the political system. Democratic theory and civil society research are the most important approaches of associational research at this level of analysis. Since there is no chance of covering all the topics and research questions linked to the study of associations, in the following selected issues will be highlighted, particularly the topics of how to define and how to develop a typology of associations, as well as the historical background of the differentiation of associational research.

Definition According to David Sill’s classical definition an association is an organized group of persons (1) that is formed in order to further some common interest of its members; (2) in which membership is voluntary in the sense that is neither mandatory nor acquired through birth; and (3) that exists independent from the state (Sills, 1968: 363). Hence associations are membership-based organizations that – guided by interests – are independent from the state apparatus, although they might cooperate intensively with government, and of which membership is not compulsory. Definitions based in an Anglo-Saxon context typically focus on the voluntary dimension of associations. Providing prime avenues for social participation, volunteering, and discourse, associations constitute an important part of the infrastructure of civil society that in the words of Habermas, Walzer, Dahrendorf, and other civil society scholars is characterized as an intermediary organizational field functioning as a public sphere between state, economy, and private life. In contrast to stressing the embeddedness of associations in civil society,

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Max Weber took a different approach by defining association as a domain of sovereign rule. This definition focuses on the steering and ruling capacities of associations. It is particularly referred to in Continental Europe, where the term association is primarily used for large, encompassing organizations that often are integrated into corporatist governance arrangements, and as such are working on par or at least in close cooperation with government. Associations that are small and membershipbased organizations operating first and foremost at the local level are generally referred to as voluntary organizations and more specifically as clubs in Europe, and in many countries that once belonged to one of the European Empires such as the British Commonwealth. Clubs are supposed to generate high degrees of reciprocity among their members, and they are generally associated with notions of sociability that is facilitated by an active club life. Despite these differentiations in Europe and elsewhere the term association is used in the sense that excludes primary groups and commercial companies but admits an exceptionally wide area of institutions and organizations that – pervading every functional sector of society – ranges from business related activities, trade, and labor unions, clubs, churches, and congregations, civic service associations, third sector organizations, social welfare councils, self-help groups, secret societies, professional societies, and other ‘‘collectivist organizations’’ (Knoke, 1985: 212). Against this background, a variety of typologies has been developed, each of those, depending on the respective discipline, focuses on certain features and functions of associations. Typologies developed in political science structure the universe of associations according to policy fields or area of pressure politics; those referred to in sociology highlight the societal dimension of associations; and finally typologies and models based in organizational theory take a look at associations from a public choice perspective. Many typologies categorize associations with respect to their area of activity. These classifications are outward-bound highlighting the functions of associations for their members and the society or polity at large. They broadly distinguish between associations that foster the self-interest of their members and those working either on behalf of a third party (i.e., children, the elderly) or for the advancement of a public purpose and/or common good (i.e., human rights or clear water). This specific type of typology, which is closely linked to policy fields, is commonly referred to in political science (Table 1). Gordon and Babchuk (1959) added a further dimension to those typologies differentiating between associations either working on behalf of their members

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(expressive association) or fostering the common interest (instrumental association). By introducing the variables ‘‘accessibility-’’ and ‘‘status-conferring capacity of the association,’’ Gordon and Babchuk drew the attention to the prestige factor of associational membership. Their typology highlights that associations significantly Associations, Definitions and History. Table 1 Typology of associations according to fields of activity 1. Business and labor relations Business, employers and professional associations Labor unions Consumer organizations 2. Social services and health Service organizations, e.g., the German Welfare Associations Interest associations, e.g., Association for the Blind Self-help groups, e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous 3. Leisure and sports Leisure clubs, e.g., Sports clubs, gardening societies Hobby associations, e.g., Carnival societies Service clubs, e.g., Zonta, Rotary 4. Religion, science, the arts and humanities Churches, sects, and religious congregations Scientific associations, e.g., International Political Science Association (IPSA) Arts societies, e.g., Friends of the Boston Symphony Orchestra 5. Promotion of public goods Ecological associations, e.g., Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth Human rights, e.g., Amnesty International, Society for Threatened People Source: von Alemann (1989: 71)

contribute to the stratification of modern societies. This specific type of typology is helpful for studies that aim at providing a sociological portrait of a community or society (Table 2). Finally, there are typologies that take a closer look at the structural dimension of associations. They are helpful for analyzing governance problems of organizational structure and control. In a very broad sense these typologies distinguish between centralized and federalized organizations. The ‘‘centralized type’’ of association is modeled in accordance with a ‘‘corporate or hierarchical governance structure’’ (Anheier and Themudo, 2002: 316ff.). A characteristic feature of this model is a topdown approach of decision making that leaves little room to maneuver for departments or chapters and for associated membership organizations. The Catholic Church or Greenpeace are organized according to the ‘‘corporate model.’’ Associations modeled according to the ‘‘federation type’’ constitute loosely coupled systems, which give way to a larger degree of membership participation (individual or corporate) and hence democratic decision making within the organization. The Red Cross, the Diakonie and the Protestant Church are federalized associations. Charles Handy (1988) developed a typology categorizing associations in accordance with their organizational culture. He differentiated between a club, a role, a task and a person culture of associations as voluntary organizations. Associations with a club culture are ruled by a very strong leader, in the words of Handy by ‘‘Zeus, the king of gods in Ancient Greece. . . a very personal ruler with the habit of direct interventions’’ (Handy, 1988: 86). Associations based on a role culture are highly structured and formalized organizations, where everybody knows what he or she has to do. Associations developing a task culture are governed in accordance with the managerial approach of ‘‘management by objectives.’’ The ‘‘person culture’’ is a highly individualistic approach of running an association.

Associations, Definitions and History. Table 2 A typology of voluntary associations High accessibility High status

Low status

Low accessibility High status

Low status

Instrumental

Young Republican Club

Klu Klux Klan

League of Women

Instrumental–expressive

Kiwanis

American Legion

American Sociological Society

Alcoholics Anonymous

Expressive

Boy Scouts of America

YMCA

Daughters of the American Revolution

Omega

Source: Gordon and Babchuk (1959: 28)


According to Handy ‘‘stars, loosely grouped in a cluster or constellation, are the image of a person culture’’ (Handy, 1988: 92). Referring to Handy’s typology, the reader might like to identify the culture of the association of which he or she is a member.

Historical Background The work of historians clearly shows: Associations have constituted the most important societal force since the beginning of modernity. There have been forerunners of the modern associations in earlier times. A case in point were burial funds in Ancient Greece and Rome as well as traditional guilds and brotherhoods in the Middle Ages. However, membership in these social entities was obtained by birth or marriage, and therefore not based on the premises of the ‘‘freedom of association.’’ The diversification of the associational universe constitutes in itself a historical development. At the beginning of modernity, in terms of terminology there was no differentiation between various groups, organizations, and institutions. Association was used as a catchall term for describing any groupbased activity, either business or public purpose oriented. "

‘‘In truth’’ wrote William Ellery Channing as early as 1829, ‘‘one of the remarkable circumstances or features of our age is the energy with which the principle of combination, or of action by joint forces, by associated numbers, is manifesting itself. . . Those who have one great object find one another out through a vast extent of county, join forces, settle their mode of operation, and act together with the uniformity of a disciplined army.’’ (Schlesinger, 1944: 9)

Today, there is a remarkable variety of terms and expressions related to the realm of associational life, ranging from formal and sometimes highly institutionalized organizations (NGOs and NPOs) to loosely coupled groups and networks which came into being and still are operating in the context of social movements. The diversification of associational life including the development of specific legal forms constitutes the outcome of societal differentiation that – having started in the late Middle Ages – came to full swing in the course of the nineteenth century. One of these differentiations is related to the purpose of the association and distinguishes between (1) associations whose goal is linked to business activities or making a living for its members, and (2) those that are serving the common weal. Among those organizational forms and legal stipulations that serve the business interests of the association’s membership, cooperatives, and mutual associations/societies count most prominently. Although in many countries in the second half of the

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nineteenth century, legal stipulations for business related activities of associations were developed, this was rarely the case with respect to activities of associations advancing the common weal. Instead of enjoying a special legal form, in many countries associations serving a public purpose are still exclusively acknowledged by the tax laws. The German legal stipulation Verein represents a case in point. A Verein is a legal entity that thoroughly fulfills the criteria of David Sill’s definition. However, in order to be filed as an instrumental association serving the common weal, the organization has to be checked by the respective fiscal authority that is entitled to both granting tax privileges and withdrawing the legal status of a public benefit association. The Verein, codified as a legal entity under the rule of the German Empire, served at that time as a textbook example and blueprint for the development of legal stipulations in many other European countries, particularly in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. A differentiation of the associational universe that was closely linked to the development of the modern state is related to the scope of associational activity. All over the world, in Europe and in the US associations started as small locally based organizations. In the course of the nineteenth century, alongside with a significant growth in membership, many of these organizations extended their scope of operation significantly by setting up regional, federal, and even international chapters. The associational universe developed from a local club culture into a multilevel setting of highly structured, federalized organizations which, like trade unions, parties, and other traditional associations, always were and still are based on individual membership, but nevertheless express a high degree of bureaucracy. The various layers of the organizational setting of the multilevel associations were set up in accordance with the administrative layers of government. Today with respect to organization-building history repeats itself. With globalization and Europeanization, associations are becoming more and more active at the European and at the global level of governance, while the national level as a prime area for lobbying activities of associations is increasingly losing importance, particularly in the European setting. Modernity in the sense of economic proliferation via the breakthrough of the capitalistic market economy and the softening of the three estates of the Middle Ages were the driving forces of the ‘‘associational revolution’’ in the nineteenth century. Avenues for new societal alignments and hence for a blossoming of associational life were opened up in Europe, the USA, and in any region and country where the trends of modernity took roots. Comparing different regions and cultures, there are many

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similarities with respect to the distinctive periods of associational life, which were identified by associational research. However, depending particularly on the political environment of associations, there are also striking differences between regions and countries. If a distinction is made in accordance with the work of Ulrich Beck between ‘‘early modernity,’’ ‘‘classical modernity,’’ and ‘‘postmodernity,’’ there are specific types of associations that were embedded in social movements and put forward by representatives of a particular social class and are typical for each period. However, in addition to these commonalities, there are also, depending on the political and economic environment of the respective association, distinctive differences that set the associational movement in the USA apart from the development in other countries, and particularly in Europe at that time (Table 3). Typical for the eighteenth and early nineteenth century were associations that were founded by members of the growing bourgeoisie and took up issues of political life and self-governing. These associations constituted the building units of a public sphere and self-governed communities. ‘‘Salons,’’ ‘‘reading and secret societies,’’ ‘‘fraternities and brotherhoods’’ as well as ‘‘patriotic societies,’’ which were associations taking up local welfare related issues, were founded all over Europe, and in the USA. Associations facilitating various kinds of leisure activities ranging from sports to singing or gardening became popular all over the western hemisphere from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. Indeed, the industrial revolution along with urbanization significantly furthered the growth of associations. The world of business, labor relations and party politics was increasingly organized via associations. In close alliance with trade unions, associations were also founded in order to buffer the risks of industrial life. Besides friendly societies, which were the forerunners of health and accident insurance, housing and consumer cooperatives facilitated the daily life of workers in the industrial centers and of farmers in the

deprived rural areas. The second half of the nineteenth century also stands out for the proliferation of business and labor associations in the sense of large and federalized organizations whose daily operations were and still are managed by professional bureaucrats. Doubtlessly, the emergence of the federalized countrywide operating association, organized in regional chapters and local departments, was in accordance with the organizational culture of the time. The world of country and even worldwide operating associations resembled the business world that at that time was dominated by huge agglomerates of corporations that combined under one ownership many companies operating in numerous locations. Moreover, this era also witnessed the foundation of many associations lobbying for humanitarian purposes such as the International Red Cross or the American Conference of Social Work (Schlesinger, 1944: 17). In order to round up the picture of the associational universe of ‘‘classic modernity’’ the foundation boom of those associations has to be mentioned which still today operate for the promotion of professional and particularly research interest such as the Association for Social Policy in Germany or the American Political Science Association. The period of ‘‘classical modernity’’ doubtlessly constituted the heyday of associational growth and proliferation. Nevertheless, ‘‘postmodernity’’ again paved the way for new forms of associations and societal groups. The international area became a prime field of associational operation. Alongside the internationalization of ecological, social, and political problems began the development of nongovernmental organizations that are associations, which primarily operate internationally. Associations of the postmodernity period again have much in common with the modern business enterprise. They are loosely coupled ‘‘network organizations,’’ managed by a highly professionalized central unit. In contrast to the federalized associations of the former period, the modern association is no longer primarily financed by membership dues.

Associations, Definitions and History. Table 3 Associational life over time Era

Early modernity

Classical modernity

Postmodernity

State

Liberal state

National welfare state

Postmodern state

Economy

Farming

Heavy industry

Service industry

Society

Development of the bourgeoisie

Societal differentiation, development of societal milieus

Individualization, privatization of milieus

Associations

Salons, reading societies, charity associations

Trade unions, professional ass., business, and employers ass., service clubs, leisure clubs, parties, cooperatives, mutual societies

Self-help groups, NGOs, clubs

Source: Zimmer (2007: 48)


Instead it relies on income of fundraising drives and sponsoring as well as on the income of merchandizing. A further significant feature of associational life in the postmodern period translates into the division of labor between the professional center and the supporting periphery of the modern associations. The professionals of the associations are responsible for both campaigning and effective lobbying, primarily conducted in the capitals of the world. Although the periphery of the supporting membership and affiliated organizations have no say in associational politics, they are nevertheless supposed to guarantee the regional and local embeddedness of the respective association. This particular division of labor where the members no longer enjoy the right of democratic participation within the organization gave way to a sharp critique of well-known scholars such as Theda Skocpol (1999) and Robert Putnam (1995).

International Perspectives Despite common features and similarities, associational life has always been country-bound and thus reflecting the political, social, and economic embeddedness of the respective organization. In the USA, from the very beginning, associational life has been influenced by ‘‘American Exceptionalism’’ (Lipset, 1996), which ever since has set it apart from the development in European countries. Two cultural features were distinctive for the early associational movement in the USA: First, unlike in Europe, in the post-feudal society of the US associations were not necessary for bridging class distinctions between the nobility and the new classes of entrepreneurs and professionals. In Europe, associations provided an important tool for the democratization of both state and society. Secondly, ‘‘the United States is the first country in which religious groups became voluntary organizations’’ (Lipset, 1996: 61). Indeed, it was religion as one central domain of societal life where associational life firstly took roots the USA. In European societies, churches have traditionally been linked to the state. Although secularization constituted one important step of modernization, in many European countries, there has never been a clear-cut division between the two powers of the state and the churches. The reason associational life in America proliferated to such an extent in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century that it attracted the admiration of Alexis de Tocqueville and many others, Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci included, has to be judged against the very different societal and political backgrounds of Europe and the USA at that time. While Europeans slowly embarqued on their way to democratize state and society with the

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help of associations, Americans – with the exception of blacks and women – already lived in a modern democratic society, in which associations were legitimate tools for selforganization and democratic governance. Against this background, associations in the USA developed into an expression of ‘‘liberal democracy’’ in the sense that associations safeguard the rights of the citizenry vis a vis the state. Compared to the USA, in many European countries, government – association relationships took a very different road. That is why from a comparative perspective civil society differs significantly in the various regions of the world. Particularly in Continental Europe, in Germany and partially also in Austria, the authoritarian state – by recognizing the power of associations at a very early stage of modernity – incorporated these organizations into its modernizing strategies. A textbook example is provided by Germany, where in the course of the nineteenth century traditional guilds as well as modern associations active in the area of social services and health were acknowledged as private legal entities operating in close cooperation with the local, regional, and federal authorities. The ‘‘German Free Welfare Associations’’ (Caritas, Diakonie) were integrated into a particular public-private partnership that backed by the principle of subsidiarity developed into a very specific arrangement of corporatism after the Second World War (Zimmer, 1999). Again, in Eastern Europe associational life took a very different path. In the nineteenth century, these countries by and large did not enjoy sovereign rule but were governed either by Austria, Prussia, or Russia. In all these countries, associations active in the area of the arts and culture blossomed and enjoyed widespread public support because these associations worked on behalf of and for the advancement of a national identity. Consisting of numerous singing clubs, salons, and theater associations and societies this was a civil society against the state that developed in Eastern Europe, particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century. Interestingly enough, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the associational revolution that took place in the majority of the Eastern European countries took up the tradition of antietatism: Civil society was conceptualized as an institutional alternative against the state. Compared to Central and also Eastern Europe the Scandinavian countries look back upon a very different story with respect to government – associational relationships. Since the period of ‘‘classic modernity’’ associations are acknowledged by the state enjoying a high degree of legitimacy, particularly in Sweden. But, in contrast to Germany, associations are not incorporated into the social service production of the welfare state.

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They are primarily perceived as either pressure groups acting on behalf of the interests of their members or as self-governing entities, and thus clubs primarily organizing leisure activities for their membership. This is the case because according to the political scientists Scandinavia stands out for a developmental or social democratic model of democracy, in which the state guarantees and facilitates civic participation via associations without incorporating the organizations into policy implementation strategies. In sum, while in the US associational life has always been an expression of self-governing that is distinct from the state, associational life, particularly in Continental Europe has developed either in the shadow of or even against the state, whereas in Scandinavia associational life has been organized in accordance with the so-called arms-length principle: The state facilitates associational activities including lobbying and hence distances itself from putting the organizations under its control.

Key Issues/Future Directions Depending on the level of analysis as well as on the discipline very different topics are addressed as key issues of both the further development of associational life and research. For political scientists addressing a macro level topic, a key concern definitely constitutes the question of the relationship between democracy and associations. The questions are whether, to what extent and how associations as the infrastructure of civil society contribute to the functioning, strength, and advancement of democracy both in countries which look back upon a long and enduring tradition of democratic rule and also in countries that have just recently moved into the direction of democratization. Indeed, since the work of de Tocqueville the topic of the associational underpinning of democracy has been a key issue of associational research that in the post-socialist countries and in many other regions of the world is enjoying a high priority. Key issues addressed at the meso-level and thus focusing on the organizational dimension of associational life are also connected to the topic of democracy. However, with respect to the organizational setting, particularly researchers of organizational theory have since the seminal work of Max Weber and Robert Michels always asked for innovative ways to overcome problems of bureaucratization and oligarchization in the sense of the establishment of an informal leadership of the very few that are increasingly deprived of democratic legitimacy but nevertheless continue to act on behalf of the membership. A new issue of the meso-level of associational research is the topic of competition among associations and between

associations and business entities. Along with the shift from the welfare state to a welfare society all over the world, associations are increasingly referred to as service providers. Documented by the results of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, service provision of associations constitutes a growing segment of modern economies. However, since service provision of associations is no longer generously subsidized by the state, the organizations have to turn to the market in order to safeguard their organizational survival. This puts them in direct competition with service providers of the business sector. But, competition and increasing engagement in business activities has a significant impact on the culture and governance of associations. Due to the growth of the association in size and particularly employed workforce, the organizations become more and more businesslike. Accordingly, commercialization and professionalization are key buzzwords of the current debate related to associations, particularly in Europe. Moreover, these trends are not restricted to large supraregional associations. Many locally active clubs, specifically in sports, are increasingly faced with competition from for-profit providers, and hence tending to shift their governance structure and organizational culture towards the business sector. For these associations what will the future look like? Will they be able to safeguard the uniqueness of associational life that still relies on reciprocity among the members of the association; or will they end up as professionally run small business entities? In recent decades the micro-level and thus the capacity of associations to provide avenues for civic participation and engagement have been key concerns of research. Bewildered by the results of quantitative surveys, social researchers all over the world were afraid of facing a significant downturn in civic engagement that might translate into a loss of overall trust and social capital. Particularly Robert Putnam (1995) but also others feared that due to the widespread tendency of ‘‘bowling alone’’ among citizens, also the ‘‘old democracies’’ have to face a transformation and deterioration of their political culture. Although the results of recent surveys did not confirm the hypothesis of a citizenry that increasingly turns its back to civic engagement and volunteering, citizens, nevertheless, do not trust the democratic institutions such as the parliament, the political parties or the politicians leading the country. In other words: This topic continues to be on the agenda. The same holds true for another key issue of associational research investigated at the micro-level. Does associational membership foster bridging or bonding capital? The topic whether associations facilitate the integration of their members into the

Associative Democracy

community and the society at large or, to the contrary, whether they have an impact just in the opposite direction by preventing particularly members of ethnic minorities and migrants from getting access to the old-established members of local communities still constitutes an open question that is of high relevance particularly against the background of the increased multiethnicity of local communities worldwide.

Cross-References

▶ Caritas Internationalis ▶ Churches and Denominations ▶ Civil Society Theory: Dahrendorf ▶ Civil Society Theory: de Tocqueville ▶ Civil Society Theory: Gramsci, Antonio ▶ Civil Society Theory: Habermas ▶ Civil Society Theory: Walzer ▶ Clubs and Clans ▶ Cooperatives and Employee Ownership ▶ Corporatism ▶ Diakonisches Werk der EKD ▶ Freedom of Association ▶ International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement ▶ Membership and Membership Associations ▶ Mutual Organizations, Mutual Societies ▶ Nonprofit Organizations, Definition and History of ▶ Professional Associations ▶ Public Sphere ▶ Putnam, Robert ▶ Secret Societies ▶ Self-help Groups ▶ Skocpol, Theda ▶ Sociability ▶ Social Capital ▶ Social Movements ▶ Subsidiarity ▶ Weber, Max

References/Further Readings von Alemann, U. (1989). Organisierte Interessen in der Bundesrepublik. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Anheier, H., & Themudo, N. (2002). Fu¨hrung und management in internationalen Mitgliederorganisationen. In C. Frantz & A. Zimmer (Eds.), Zivilgesellschaft international: Alte und neue NGOs (pp. 304– 325). Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Gordon, W. C., & Babchuk, N. (1959). A typologo of voluntary associations. American Sociological Review, 24, 22–29. Handy, C. (1988). Understanding voluntary organizations. London: Penguin Books. Knoke, D. (1985). The political economies of associations. Research in Political Sociology, 1, 211–242. Lipset, S. M. (1996). American exceptionalism. A double-edged sword. New York/London: Norton.

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Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal of Democracy, 6(1), 65–77. Schlesinger, A. (1944). Biography of a nation of joiners. The American Historical Review, L(1), 1–25. Sills, D. L. (1968). Voluntary Associations II: Sociological aspects. In D. L. Sills (Ed.), International encyclopedia of the social sciences (pp. 362–379). New York: Macmillan. Skocpol, T. (1999). Advocates without members: The recent transformation of American civic life. In T. Skocpol & M. Fiorina (Eds.), Civic engagement in American democracy (pp. 461–509). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Zimmer, A. (1999). Corporatism revisited – The legacy of history and the German nonprofit-sector. Voluntas, 10(1), 37–49. Zimmer, A. (2007). Vereine – Zivilgesellschaft konkret. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.

Associative Democracy NICOLA JONES, HANNAH MARSDEN Overseas Development Institute, London, UK

Introduction Given growing concern about the state of democracy and governance more broadly in the developed as well as developing worlds, revisiting different schools of thought on democratic models is of critical contemporary importance. Associative democracy – referring to a model of democracy where power is highly decentralized and responsibility for civic well-being resides with like-minded civic associations – is one such model. On the one hand, the model has specific sociocultural roots in early twentieth century Britain (Cole, 1930, in Hirst, 1989), and again in efforts under the New Labour Government (1997–) to recraft the relationship between citizens and the state in the management of new welfare architecture (Lister, 2005). On the other hand, however, associative democracy, with its focus on combating growing individualism and fears about the unbridled power of the state, clearly has wider relevance for thinking about the role of civil society in an international context. It raises important questions about state-civil society relations, as well as about the characteristics, composition, and role of civil society itself, at the subnational, national, and international levels.

Definition/Historical Background The concept of associative democracy emerged in the context of fears of growing centralized state power and authority in the 1920s and 1930s. Political pluralists such

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as Cole, Figgis, and Laski promoted an associative democracy model, in which groups sharing a ‘‘common purpose,’’ such as churches and trade unions, contribute to social wellbeing. To allow ordinary citizens regular participation in the structures of society, the approach called for power to be decentralized and dispersed among associations (Hirst, 1989: 188). "

A well-organised society is one in which not merely is the administration good, but the wills of the members of the community active, and find expression through the various associations and institutions of which society is made up. (Cole, 1930, in Hirst, 1989: 89)

Since the 1980s, Hirst (2001, in Hirst and Bader, 2001) has pointed to the increased hierarchal control of governments, arguing that associative democracy represents the ‘‘real third way’’ between free-market individualism and centralized state control. Associative democracy offers a means to establish organization amongst increased societal plurality and complexity. ‘‘Associationalism is defined by its combining of pluralism with a cooperative mutualism.’’ It is the ‘‘collection of the diverse’’ (Martell, 1992: 168, 170). Within this model, voluntary organizations, based on cooperation and self governance, would play a greater role in providing public services. Although resourced and protected by the state, such organizations should also act as a counterbalance to state power. ‘‘Associative democracy aims at a manageable and accountable state’’ writes Hirst (1994: 20). In a globalized context, Edwards suggests the role of civil society to be in negotiating the ‘‘social contracts between governments and citizens that development requires’’ (2004: 13). Group cooperation in political life is a critical component of Cohen and Rogers’ model of associative democracy (1995: 34). There is however the risk of emerging factions within associations. Thus, the state’s role is seen to be in ‘‘curbing’’ such instances and encouraging associations to be more ‘‘other-regarding’’ (Perczynski, 1999: 8). "

The way to do this is to stand by the idea of autonomous and diverse individuals and interests in society but to integrate them into systems of association and pluralist social negotiation within which they must pursue their own identities and interests in negotiation with others and with regard for others’ priorities. Associational democracy describes a political structure and system of relations intended to facilitate the pluralist social negotiation of social priorities. (Martell, 1992: 169)

More recent discussions are heavily influenced by the work of Tocqueville (1840, in Goldhammer and Zinz,

2004) and his concern with the decline in associations based on reciprocal and common activity in the context of industrialization and commercialism. Associative democracy proponents call for a ‘‘lively public sphere,’’ in which citizens discuss and criticize public issues, as an antidote to the rise in individualism and a more powerful state in America (McLaverty, 1998). This call for renewed associational life has gone hand in hand with a revival of communitarian approaches, including Etzioni’s (1993) work which held that community institutions should rebuild America’s ‘‘social base.’’ Associative democracy approaches are primarily concerned with citizens’ involvement in formalized groups. Associations are to function within institutionalized politics, through managing resources and channeling voices in an organized fashion in order to achieve ‘‘a radical, but nonauthoritarian redistribution of economic and political power’’ (Hirst, 2001 in Hirst and Bader, 2001: 15). This emphasis is distinct from the concept of participatory democracy which is based on dialog and deliberation at the grassroots level, but does not necessarily involve associations given that not all citizens can or wish to be mobilized into formal organizations (see Brock and McGee, 2002). A distinction is also apparent between associative thought and that of social movement theory which places more emphasis on contentious collective action (Tarrow, 1998), defiance (Eckstein et al., 2001), and the expression of grievances against powers.

Key Issues Channeling Voice and Agency

Fundamental to associative democracy are the principles of cooperation and voluntarism, and that organizations function as a mechanism for citizens’ agency and voice (Moyser and Parry, 1997). In the context of authoritarian rule in Latin America and East Asia, for instance, when political parties were largely banned or driven underground, urban poor, labor, religious (informed by liberation theology) and women’s associations played a critical role in channeling citizens’ voice against military rule (see Waylen, 1993; Smith, 1991; Weyland, 1995; Kim, 2000). Collectively they succeeded in overcoming repressive state practices and demanding citizenship rights for all in the private and public spheres, irrespective of class, ethnicity, or gender. Other examples in the literature include more microlevel grassroots efforts to foster democratic community participation through cooperative organization. For instance, the antiviolent Basista movement in Argentina, based on solidarity and community, focuses on poverty reduction in the shanty towns of Buenos Aires (Schapira,


1999), while the Indigenas de la Sierra de Motozintla (ISMAM), a successful worldwide producer of organic coffee in Mexico, builds on a traditional cooperative model to support the democratic participation of its members (Nigh, 1997: 431, 428). However, because such associations are often resourced by the state (Hirst, 1994: 10), the practice of associative democracy may tend to be closer to corporative democracy where an explicit agreement to share power is reached between state and non-state groups. Baccaro (2002) highlights that many real-world experiments with associative democracy are built on a corporatist core, such as the experience of Ireland. In the 1990s strong corporatiststyle social partnerships developed, involving religious organizations, farmers’ associations, youth councils and community workers cooperatives. These were seen as playing a pivotal role in democratic life and in ensuring continued economic and social progress. Autonomy Versus Cooptation

Associative democratic thought places importance on the self-governance of associations. In both Hirst’s (1994) and Cohen and Rogers’ (1995) models, associations are both connected to yet autonomous from the state. Critics, however, have questioned whether the state’s role in monitoring associations damages their spontaneity (Perczynski, 1999: 8). To Tripp (2001), for example, the influence of the Ugandan women’s movement on policy making is directly tied to it having remained a degree of associational autonomy from the dominant political party. It is however increasingly questioned whether NGOs are facilitating participation and empowerment. Fisher (1997: 445) cautions that NGOs risk losing their autonomy, to become ‘‘technical solutions’’ to ‘‘development problems.’’ It has similarly been debated whether popular associations are able to serve as an adequate counterweight in postauthoritarian states as associations often become carefully regulated by the state and/or marginalized from mainstream politics following democratic transitions (Molyneux, 1998; Jones and Tembo, 2008). However, to Bader (2001 in Hirst and Bader, 2001: 59) what is needed is the ‘‘skilful combination of the state approach and the societal approach towards associations’’ (Perczynski, 1999: 14). Practicing Citizenship and Social Responsibility

A major concern within the associative democracy school is that associations must be democratic themselves. To Percynski (1999: 13–14), associative democracy offers a model of participatory democracy in which individuals participate through membership in associations which in turn serve as ‘‘schools of democracy and citizenship.’’

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Through active involvement in decision-making and implementation, members develop personal and social responsibility, and have opportunities to ‘‘learn and practice their civic skills.’’ This is in keeping with Putnam’s thinking on the links between associational life, active citizenship and democratic performance. Putnam’s (1993) seminal work on ‘‘making democracy work’’ in Italy focuses on the social capital derived from participation in associations, of which he identifies two main types: bonding (horizontal ties which create shared identities) and bridging (ties which transcend social divides) social capital. The latter is particularly needed in pluralist societies for ‘‘healthy social life’’ (Putnam and Feldstein, 2003: 72). Blind Spots and Challenges Anomie/Fragmentation

The concept of associative democracy emerged in response to increased individualism and commercialism. More recent advocates have similarly stressed the important role of associations in light of the challenges of globalization and the failure of political systems to provide adequate social welfare. It is arguable, however, that the level of anomie and complexity in current societies may be too difficult to overcome. Streek (1995 in Cohen and Rogers, 1995), for instance, is pessimistic about the prospect of moving towards an associative democracy, given the level of fragmentation, differentiation of identities, and the refusal of some groups to participate in organized democratic politics. Associative democracy models arguably struggle to deal with diversity in contexts of, for example, increased migration and unstable borders. Power

Associative democracy is premised on the redistribution of power to citizens through associations. However, the extent to which this can be achieved through a associative democracy is an open question. In particular, Gramsci (1971) maintained a more contested notion of civil society, pointing to embedded power relations, while Lewis emphasizes that civil society organizations span the spectrum of those that uphold the existing social order to those engaged in conflict with the same order (2004: 303). It is also difficult to assume that citizens’ involvement in associations equates with power sharing. For example, while new global social movements, such as the environmental and women’s movements, involve large numbers of organizations, these face a huge task in pursuing ‘‘all available paths to power and influence,’’ suggests Tinker (1999: 33; 2004). As well as highlighting the boundaries to political

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participation and decision-making in global governance structures, this exposes the limitations of the associative democratic model which works only within institutional politics. Arguably, what is needed is a change in existing power relations between activists and power holders. The associative democracy model also appears to overlook various hidden costs of participation, for example, unpaid labor and its constraints on membership and participation. Molyneux (2002) argues in particular that social capital approaches, and programs which attempt to ‘‘create’’ it, frequently maintain a conservative bias and neglect social and gendered inequalities. Similar criticisms have been leveled at the burgeoning women’s ‘‘self-help’’ micro-credit groups heavily promoted by donor agencies in South Asia, which have had a limited impact on transforming broader power imbalances within households and broader economic markets (see Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Kabeer, 2001). In addition, participation in associations can be costly and time consuming, as Delap (2001) concluded in an analysis of citizen juries’ in Scotland, which have been integral to New Labour thinking on decentralization. Evaluation findings with participants suggested that the 2½ days commitment to participate was too lengthy, especially given that the issues under deliberation were not deemed to be sufficiently concrete in nature in order to be able to influence local policy making. The focus of associative democracy on individuals also tends to be at the expense of an understanding of the interplay of structural power relations. Morgan (1996: 6), for instance, criticizes Hirst for casting citizens as ‘‘institutional consumers.’’ The model neglects material constraints on participation, including class, gender, occupation, and geographical location, and the fact that a certain level of material and time resources are required in order to afford to volunteer or be involved in associations. Agrawal and Gupta (2005), for instance, explore efforts in Nepal to decentralize common pool resources, and find that the socially and economically better-off held an advantage in community participation. Similarly, Waylen (1993) discusses how middle-class women’s groups in Chile remained active throughout the democratic consolidation years inside and outside institutional politics, but in contrast, working-class and poor women’s groups experienced more fracturing and marginalization. In these circumstances, women often face a ‘‘triple burden’’ of productive, reproductive, and community labor (Moser, 1993). In the same vein, the rationale for states and markets in Hirst’s model is uncertain (Morgan, 1996). Potential difficulties in decentralizing power to voluntary associations are largely overlooked. Not only do existing voluntary agencies lack the financial and organizational capacity to deliver welfare services on a large scale, but it is

also unclear how the state would retain power over fiscal policy and taxation to overcome this. Representation and Efficiency Concerns

There are a number of concerns regarding the quality of representation and efficiency offered by associative democracy models. Immergut (1995) emphasizes the dilemma of whose interests to include and exclude in decision making processes, and argues that ‘‘arrival at consensus on the public good means that some interests may not be accommodated’’ (205). Successful corporatist democratic systems owe part of their success to the exclusion of some interests. Sweden is an example. In the post-World War II period, various small businesses, craft unions and professionals were underrepresented, while the three main producer organizations (LO, TCO, and SAF) were represented and influential in policy-making. Immergut also points out that reaching a consensus on issues of social inequality can be challenging. Baccaro (2002: 11) highlights that associative democracy models can only accommodate associations which are membership based. Yet in practice this is not always possible. In contexts such as Bangladesh, for example, where hundreds of NGOs claim to speak for the same groups of people, this principle becomes more problematic. Accounts of decentralization and participatory user-committees recall problems with leadership, where national or local elites have failed to hand over power fully (see Pradnja Resosudarmo, 2004; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). It seems that associations should not be overromanticized. There is a tendency to equate state with inefficiency and civil society with efficiency (Baccaro, 2002: 6). White (1999) highlights that organizations themselves can be hierarchal, and argues that a more critical and local-specific analytical framework is needed.

International Perspectives Relevance in Context of Globalization

Discussions of democracy now go beyond the nation state (Pieterse, 2001), and within this there is a recognition that the role of civil society is certain to grow as global governance becomes more pluralistic and less confined to statebased systems. As Edwards et al. (1999) argue, new forms of solidarity and cooperation are emerging in response to this complexity between citizens and authorities at different levels internationally. In this, NGOs are expected to act as a countervailing force to the expanding influence of markets and declining authority of states. ‘‘Transnational advocacy networks’’ and ‘‘multiple channels of access to the international system’’ are opening up and uncovering information which sustain multiple abuses of power (Keck and


Sikkink, 1998: 1). Such networks are arguably reframing international and domestic debates, changing their terms, their sites and the configuration of participants (ibid). Indeed, many ostensibly consolidated democracies now find themselves being challenged by movements rallying against the failure of states to universalize democratic practices and secure political autonomy. Social movements championing the rights of ethnic minorities, in contexts such as Guatemala, Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador, for instance, have come increasingly to contest the foundations and contours of contemporary democratic and liberal institutions. These emergent movements have sparked political debates about territorial autonomy, legal pluralism, citizenship, representation, and multiculturalism. However, some analysts such as Cooley and Ron (2002: 6) caution that there is a high degree of competition between organizations for funding and public profile, and as such this makes it difficult to equate the proliferation of INGOs with a ‘‘robust global civil society.’’ Fowler (2000) goes so far as to argue that: "

It would appear that NGDOs are about to succumb to the homogenising forces of economic globalisation in favour of a market-inspired model of NGO identity and behaviour (644).

In other words, there is growing concern with the qualitative dimensions of INGOs rather than their numbers alone. In this regard there is a call for greater decentralization of INGOs to the South, the creation of more genuine North-South partnerships (Malhotra, 2000), and greater efforts to promote more truly mass movements based on a broad change of values and a commitment to: ‘‘A new social order requires those who gain power to make room for those with less’’ (Edwards and Sen, 2000: 608). Another critical variable concerns the historical evolution of civil society in different regional contexts. While associational life typically enjoys positive connotations in a North American, European, or Latin American context, in former Soviet Bloc countries and other socialist states (e.g., Vietnam, Ethiopia), membership in associations (e.g., youth associations, women’s associations) is often linked with top-down state mobilization of citizens and ‘‘compulsory’’ participation in civic life. As such following the democratic transition in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, analysts for instance, in the early 1990s, analysts observed a marked retreat away from associational life because of its historic roots. For instance, due to a lack of independently organized women’s organizations in the region, there were no established women’s movements to advocate for gender equality in the new democracies and instead there was a greater tendency to reject the affirmative action measures and gender quotas of the Communist era.

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In other contexts, with historically weak civil societies, such as many parts of Africa, more pressing questions have focused around how to create an associational life. The democratic transitions of the 1990s in the region have sparked considerable interest in the potential role of civil society in promoting good governance and better development outcomes. However, civil society organizations are still fledgling in many countries and face significant resource and capacity challenges (e.g., Longwe, 2002; Fatton, 1999). As a result, some analysts see a positive potential role for international organizations to play in fostering more active civil society associations. Gawaya (2008) for example argues that INGOs could play a valuable role in supporting the mobilization of the rural poor so that they can more effectively participate in policy processes which too often seem remote from their lived experiences. However, others such as Manor (2004) and Jones et al. (2007) are more circumspect, and in the context of the now widespread user committees in South Asia, call attention to concerns about the artificiality of created volunteer associations to monitor basic service delivery, which may practice limited transparency in decision-making, fail to overcome structural barriers (especially caste and genderbased) to exercising voice and agency, and risk being little more than a cheap source of labor for understaffed social and agricultural policy programs. Indeed, more cynical interpretations of this trend are that such associations serve as a useful way for governments to secure international funds but that such initiatives are then rolled out in such a way as to manipulate, control, and contain committees and civil society (Manor, 2004).

Future Directions Associative democracy’s focus on the role of organized civil society as a counterbalance to individualism on the one hand, and the power of the state on the other, is an important one. In order to enhance the resonance of the associative democracy model in debates about global civil society, however, there are a number of possible research questions and themes that could fruitfully be explored. First, associative democracy as conceptualized by Hirst underemphasizes the importance of difference and the contestation of different identities which can be played out in associational life. However, the emergence of new civil society networks and social movements focusing on identity politics suggests that it is important to incorporate a wider understanding of ‘‘sociopolitical citizenship’’ that is achieved through ‘‘struggles for social recognition of their existence and for political spaces of expression’’ (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992: 4). Second, associative democracy has largely paid attention to group membership, but in the context of an

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increasingly complex globalized world, focusing on a diversity of approaches to associational life could be fruitful. In order to promote greater representativity, Font (2002), for instance, highlights the need to consider models of civic participation that involve individuals rather than groups in policy deliberations, such as consultative councils, citizens’ juries, participatory budget processes, children’s/youth councils, and so forth. Finally, given a growing recognition of the important intersection between knowledge and power, it is important that proponents of associative democracy inform their analysis with an understanding of the role that associations play in generating and reinforcing hierarchies of knowledge that may exclude the poorest and most marginalized. More attention could be paid to the ways that civil society organizations and networks could help to address power imbalances and promote the generation and uptake of new forms of (citizen-led) knowledge.

Cross-References

▶ Associations, Definitions and History ▶ Citizenship ▶ Civic Participation ▶ Civil Society Theory: de Tocqueville ▶ Civil Society Theory: Gramsci, Antonio ▶ Communitarianism ▶ Corporatism ▶ Etzioni, Amitai ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Government Nonprofit Sector Relationships ▶ INGOs ▶ Putnam, Robert ▶ Third Way

References/Further Readings Agrawal, A., & Gupta, K. (2005). Decentralization and participation: The governance of common pool resources in Nepal’s Terai. World Development, 33(7), 1101–1114. Baccaro, L. (2002). Civil society meets the state: A model of associational democracy. ILO Discussion Paper, 138, 1–23. Bader, V. (2001). Problems and prospects of associative democracy: Cohen and Rogers revisited. In P. Hirst & V. Bader (Eds.), Associative democracy: The real third way (pp. 31–70). London: Frank Cass. Brock, K., & McGee, R. (2002). Knowing poverty: Critical reflections on participatory research and policy. London: Earthscan. Cohen, J., & Rogers, J. (1995). Secondary associations and democratic governance. In J. Cohen & J. Rogers (Eds.), Associations and democracy (pp. 7–98). London/New York: Verso. Cole, G. D. H. (1930). The Social Theory by G. D. H. Cole In P. Hirst (Ed.) (1989). The Phralist Theory of the state: Selected writings of G. D. H. Cole, J. N. Figgis and H. J. Laski. (pp. 51–108). London: Routledge. Cole, G. D. H., Figgis, J. N., Laski, H. J., & Hirst, P. (Eds.) (1989). The pluralist theory of the State. Selected writings of Cole, Figgis and Laski. London/New York: Routledge.

Cooley, A., & Ron, J. (2002). The NGO scramble: Organizational insecurity and the political economy of transnational action. International Insecurity, 27(1), 5–39. Delap, C. (2001). Citizens’ juries: Reflections on the UK experience. In Deliberative democracy and citizen empowerment (pp. 39–42), from http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/G01929.pdf Eckstein, S. et al. (2001). Power and popular protest. Latin American social movements. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Edwards, M. (2004). Civil society. Oxford: Blackwell. Edwards, M., & Sen, G. (2000). NGOs, social change and the transformation of human relationships: A 21st century civic agenda. Third World Quarterly, 21(4), 605–616. Edwards, M., Hulme, D., & Wallace, T. (1999). NGOs in a global future: Marrying local diversity to worldwide leverage. Public Administration and Development, 19(2), 117–136. Escobar, A., & Alvarez, S. (1992). The making of social movements in Latin America. Identity, strategy and democracy. Oxford: Westview. Etzioni, A. (1993). The spirit of community. Rights, responsibilities, and the communitarian agenda. New York: Crown Publishers. Fatton, R. J. (1999). Civil society revisited: Africa in the new millennium. West Africa Review, 1(1), from http://westafricareview.org Fisher, W. (1997). Doing good? The politics and antipolitics of NGO practices. Annual Review of Anthropology, 26(1), 439–464. Font, J. (2002). Local Participation in Spain: Beyond Associative Democracy. WP 210, Institute de Ciencies Politiques I Socials, Barcelona, 1–27. Fowler, A. (2000). NGDOs as a moment in history: Beyond aid to social entrepreneurship or civic innovation? Third World Quarterly, 21(4), 637–654. Gawaya, R. (2008). Investing in women farmers to eliminate food insecurity in Southern Africa: Policy-related research from Mozambique. Gender and Development, 16(1), 147–159. Goetz, A. M., & Gupta, R. S. (1996). Who takes the credit? Gender, power and control over loan use in rural credit programmes in Bangladesh. World Development, 24(1), 45–64. Gramsci, A. (1971). Americanism and Fordism. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Hirst, P. (1989) (ed): The Pluralist Theory of the State. Selected Writings of G. D. H. Cole, J. N. Figgis and H. J. Laski. London: Routledge. Hirst, P. (1994). Associative democracy. New forms of economic and social governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hirst, P. (2001). Can Associationalism Come Back? In P. Hirst & V. M. Bader (eds.), Associative Democracy: The Real Third Way (pp. 15–30) London: Frank Cass. Immergut, E. (1995). An institutional critique of associative democracy. In J. Cohen & J. Rogers (Eds.), Associations and democracy (pp. 201–206). London/New York: Verso. Jones, N., & Tembo, F. (2008). Deepening democracy through civil society-legislator linkages: Opportunities and challenges for policy engagement in developing country contexts. Global Civil Society and Democratic Cultures ISTR Conference, Barcelona, July 2008. Jones, N., Lyytikainen, M., & Reddy, G. (2007). Decentralization and participatory service delivery: Implications for tackling childhood poverty in Andhra Pradesh, India. Journal of Children and Poverty, 13(2), 1–23. Kabeer, N. (2001). Conflicts over credit: Re-evaluating the empowerment potential of loans to women in rural Bangladesh. World Development, 29(1), 63–84. Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders. Advocacy networks in international politics. New York: Cornell University Press.

ATD Quart-Monde Kim, S. (2000). The politics of democratization in Korea: The role of civil society. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Lewis, D. (2004). On the difficulty of studying ‘‘civil society’’: Reflections on NGOs, state and democracy in Bangladesh. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 38(3), 299–322. Lister, R. (2005). Investing in the citizen-workers of the future: Transformations in citizenship and the State under new labour. In H. Hendrick (Eds.), Child welfare and social policy: An essential reader (pp. 449–469). London: Policy Press. Longwe, S. H. (2002). How can civil society influence the work of international organizations in developing countries? The World Civil Society Forum official report: The role of civil society organizations in Africa, from http://www.worldcivilsocietyorg/documents/ 16.17_longwe_sara.doc Malhotra, K. (2000). NGOs without aid: Beyond the global soup kitchen. Third World Quarterly, 21(4), 655–668. Manor, J. (2004). User committees: A potentially damaging second wave of decentralisation. The European Journal of Development Research, 16(1), 192–213. Martell, L. (1992). New ideas of socialism. Economy and Society, 21(2), 152–172. McLaverty, P. (1998). The public sphere and local democracy. Democratization, 5(3), 224–239. Molyneux, M. (1998). Analysing women’s movements. Development and Change, 29(2), 219–245. Molyneux, M. (2002). Gender and the silences of social capital: Lessons from Latin America. Development and Change, 33(2), 167–188. Morgan, D. (1996). Associative democracy: Decentralisation of societal and industrial governance? A critical discussion. Journal of Sociology, 32(1), 1–19. Moser, C. (1993). Adjustment from below: Low-income women, time and the triple burden in Guayaquil, Ecuador. In S. Radcliffe & S. Westwood (Eds.), ‘‘Viva’’: Women and popular protest in Latin America (pp. 173–196). London : Routledge. Moyser, G., & Parry, G. (1997). Voluntary associations and democratic participation in Britain. In D. Jan & V. Deth (Eds.), Private groups and public life: Voluntary associations and political involvement in representative democracies (pp. 24–44). London: Routledge. Nigh, R. (1997). Organic agriculture and globalization: A Maya Associative Corporation in Chiapas, Mexico. Human Organization, 56(4), 427–436. Perczynski, P. (1999). Citizenship and associative democracy. European consortium of political research (pp. 1–22), from http://www.essex.ac.uk/ ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/mannheim/w20/perczynski.pdf Pieterse, J. N. (2001). Participatory democracy reconceived. Futures, 33(5), 407–422. Pradnja Resosudarmo, I. A. (2004). Closer to the people and trees: Will decentralisation work for the people and forests of Indonesia? The European Journal of Development Research, 16(2), 110–132. Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R., & Feldstein, L. (2003). Better together. Restoring the American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Schapira, M. F. (1999). From Utopia to pragmatism: The heritage of Basismo in local government in the greater Buenos Aires region. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 18(2), 227–239. Smith, C. (1991). The emergence of liberation theology: Radical religion and social movement theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Streek, W. (1995). Inclusion and secession: Questions and the boundaries of associative democracy. In J. Cohen & J. Rogers (Eds.), Associations and democracy (pp. 184–192). London/New York: Verso.

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Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movement. Social movements and contentious places. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tinker, I. (1999). NGOs: An alternative power base for women? In M. Meyer & E. Prugl (Eds.), Gender politics in global governance (pp. 1–39). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, from http://www. onlinewomeninpolitics.org/beijing12/ProleadNGOE.pdf Tinker, I. (2004). Quotas for women in elected legislatures: Do they really empower women? Women’s Studies International Forum, 27(5–6), 531–546. Tocqueville. (1840). On the use that Americans make of association in civil life. In Goldhammer, A (trans) & Zunz, O (eds) (2004) Democracy in America (pp. 595–599). New York: Penguin Putnam Inc. Tripp, A. (2001). The politics of autonomy and cooptation in Africa: The case of the Ugandan Women’s Movement. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39(1), 101–128. Waylen, G. (1993). Women’s movements and democratization in Latin America. Third World Quarterly, 14(3), 573–587. Weyland, K. (1995). Latin America’s four political models. Journal of Democracy, 6(4), 125–135. White, S. (1999). NGOs, civil society, and the State in Bangladesh. Development and Change, 30(2), 307–326.

ATD Quart-Monde ANAEL LABIGNE, REGINA LIST

Address of Organization 114 avenue du Geńe´ral Leclerc 95480 Pierrelaye France www.atd-fourthworld.org

Introduction The international NGO Aide a` Toute De´tresse QuartMonde (ATD Quart-Monde or ATD Fourth World, in English) mobilizes poor families and communities in housing estates, slums, and isolated towns, researches issues of poverty with the participation of those affected, and informs public opinion. It does this with help from the members of its international Volunteer Corps.

Brief History In 1956, Father Joseph Wresinski (1917–1988), the son of a poor immigrant family, was assigned by his bishop to be a chaplain to 250 families placed in an emergency housing camp in Noisy-le-Grand, near Paris, France. In 1957, Wresinski and the families of the camp founded an association, which was later to become ATD Quart-Monde. Wresinski chose the term ‘‘Quart-Monde,’’ or ‘‘Fourth

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Attac (Association for Transaction Taxes to Aid Citizens)

World,’’ to represent all people needing help, not only those in the so-called Third World, but also in places such as France. From its modest roots, ATD QuartMonde has grown into an international movement with associations in more than 30 countries (in Europe, Africa, North & Central America, and Asia) and with consultative status to the UN’s ECOSOC and other UN agencies.

Funding ATD Quart-Monde France receives most of its income from receipts from private donations. Worldwide organizational members of the International Movement depend mostly on donations and other private funding, with some income from governments and other public sector funding sources.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas The mission of ATD Quart-Monde is to fight poverty and to obtain official representation for the poorest people in society. The International Movement ATD Fourth World that grew out of the French group describes itself as a nongovernmental organization with no religious or political affiliation that engages with individuals and institutions to find solutions to extreme poverty. Working in partnership with people in poverty, ATD Fourth World’s human rights-based approach focuses on supporting families and individuals through its grassroots presence.

Activities On the ground in France and other countries where there are members, ATD Quart-Monde provides direct assistance to needy communities, helping families find housing, providing clothing and health services, and obtaining entrance to the local social security system. ATD Quart-Monde also undertakes research and other knowledge-building efforts relating to all areas affecting the lives of the poorest. These activities are conducted predominantly through the Research and Training Institute, also based in Paris, which was created in 1960 at the request of Joseph Wresinski. ATD Quart-Monde in France was commissioned by the Economic and Social Council of France to prepare a report, ‘‘Chronic Poverty and Lack of Basic Security,’’ published in 1987 and better known as the Wresinski Report. One of the report’s key concepts is partnership, stressing that the best informed experts on poverty are the poor, and that they must be involved in the planning and management of any effort undertaken on their behalf.

Structure and Governance ATD Quart-Monde in France is, like other French associations, governed by a board. The International Movement ATD Fourth World is governed by a board of international members and led by an International Leadership Team selected every 4 years by a Discernment Group, consisting of Volunteer Corps members and other members of the organization. The International Movement’s membership consists of activists, Volunteer Corps members (more than 350 worldwide), and approximately 100,000 friends and allies.

Within France, ATD Quart-Monde gained notoriety because of its charismatic founder and leader Joseph Wresinski, as well as its focus on creating public awareness of and eradicating extreme poverty within its own borders. Internationally, the International Movement ATD Fourth World has contributed to the understanding of extreme poverty in both wealthy and poor countries by bringing the voices of the poor and the people who work with them into its research.

Cross-References

▶ Civil Society and Social Inequality ▶ INGOs ▶ Nonprofit Organizations, Comparative Perspectives

References/Further Readings Fourth World University Research Group (2007). The merging of knowledge. People in poverty and academics thinking together. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Godinot, X., & Wodon, Q. (2006). Participatory approaches to attacking extreme poverty: case studies led by the International Movement ATD Fourth World. Washington, DC: World Bank. Wresinski, J. (1994). Chronic poverty and lack of basic security. A report of the economic and social council of France. 1. ed. Landover, MD: Fourth World Publications.

Attac (Association for Transaction Taxes to Aid Citizens) ANAEL LABIGNE, REGINA LIST

Address of Organization 66-72 rue Marceau 93 100 Montreuil-sous-bois France www.attac.org

Introduction The Association for Transaction Taxes to Aid Citizens, better known as Attac, is a French-based international NGO that has become emblematic of the

Attac (Association for Transaction Taxes to Aid Citizens)

antiestablishment organizations that mushroomed with the deepening of the economic recession of the late 1990s. Attac claims to act as advocates for the rights of those ‘‘without rights’’ and has many links to the wider antiglobalization movement.

Brief History In 1972, James Tobin (1918–2002), an American economist and Nobel Prize winner, proposed a worldwide standardized tax on currency speculations, the so-called Tobin tax. His idea was to make short-term currency speculation less attractive, since he considered it detrimental to the economy. In December 1997, Ignacio Ramonet, editor of the French journal Le Monde diplomatique wrote an article titled ‘‘De´sarmer les marche´s’’ (‘‘Disarm the Markets’’), in which he advocated the establishment of the Tobin tax and the creation of an organization to promote the introduction of the tax around the world, with the proceeds devoted to fighting poverty and injustice. Together with Bernard Cassen, General Director of the journal, and others including Pierre Bourdieu, Ramonet followed up on his call and helped organize the first constitutive assembly of Attac in June 1998. As time went on, national groups in other European countries were also established and became active on a wide range of issues, including international financial institutions, debt, tax havens, public services, water, and free trade zones. Attac’s renown grew following the July 2001 meeting of the G7/G8 nations in Genoa, Italy. On this occasion, Attac and other groups organized one of the largest demonstrations of its history (some 100,000 demonstrators) against what they called ‘‘neoliberal globalization.’’ Segments of the demonstrators and the Italian government’s military police clashed, leading to riots and violence, with one dead, hundreds wounded, and significant destruction of shops and autos.

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas Attac’s first concrete proposal was to introduce the Tobin tax on international financial transactions in order to create a general fund (thus, Attac’s name: the Association for the Transaction Taxes to Aid Citizens), but the range of target issues has expanded over time. Joint actions of Attac have the following goals: to hamper international speculation; to tax income on capital; to penalize tax havens; to prevent the generalization of pension funds; to promote transparency in investments in developing countries; to establish a legal framework for banking and financial operations in order not to penalize consumers and citizens; and to support the general annulment of the public debt of developing countries, and

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the use of the freed-up resources on behalf of populations and for sustainable development, which many call paying off the ‘‘social and ecological debt.’’

Activities Attac seeks to enable political processes of learning and experiencing, to build a platform that enables political communication, and to consolidate various political views in discussions and common actions, which, in turn, lead to the possibility of acting jointly in commonly defined political fields. Attac offers seminars and open discussion rounds, publishes through its local groups in small newspapers, and distributes flyers highlighting its goals. Attac has also frequently supported specific political parties during elections. Its informal organization leads to various activities like free concerts for the people, demonstrations, declarations, discussion rounds, often in a small and unprofessional context and often depending on the local people involved. Attac France does not support violence, but even it admits that some among its members take to violence.

Structure and Governance Attac functions on a principle of decentralisation: local associations organise meetings and conferences, and compose documents (another reason why there are different voices speaking for Attac). Currently, there are about 90,000 members in 50 national subgroups, which each control themselves and are not ruled by a higher council. The topics which have international importance are coordinated internationally among the groups. For example when there is a meeting of the World Economic Forum, the Attac national groups decide jointly what to do. But generally, most of the decisions rely on the national groups. However, there are coordinating bodies including the General Assembly, an Administrative Council, ‘‘le Bureau’’ (headquarters), Founders’ College and Scientific Council.

Funding The resources of Attac comprise mainly fees and other contributions by the members. The exact amount of those fees is fixed by the General Assembly on recommendation of the Administrative Council. Attac’s organizational documents indicate that it is open to accepting every allocation it is able to get legally, even regularly or exceptionally with the agreement of the responsible authority. This allows for flexibility in receiving other funds, but corporate and governmental grants and contracts are – not surprisingly – rare, if any.

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Australia New Zealand Third Sector Research (ANZTSR) Inc.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Originally founded in France, Attac now exists in some 50 countries around the world. It has attracted the involvement of many well-known political figures and intellectuals, including, for example, many left-oriented politicians in France. Through Attac’s efforts, the Tobin tax and similar ideas to develop solidarity-based alternatives to neoliberal orthodoxy became known to a broader spectrum of activists. Despite negative press as a result of violence occurring at some Attac-organized or led demonstrations, Attac has still managed to bring concrete proposals to the table.

community, or voluntary organizations and the activities of volunteering, philanthropy and social enterprise.

Brief History The third sector is an important, but frequently undervalued, misunderstood, and under researched sector of society. ANZTSR was launched in 1993 as a response to the growing awareness of the importance of third sector activities in Australia and New Zealand societies, and the paucity of reliable information about the sector and its activities which existed at that time. In doing so, the isolation and difficulties many third sector researchers experienced began to be addressed.

Cross-References

▶ Bourdieu, Pierre ▶ Dotcauses ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ INGOs ▶ World Economic Forum

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas "

‘‘ANZTSR aims to develop a better understanding and recognition of the Third Sector and its role in the development of a strong civil society by:

● encouraging interest and support for research in the Third Sector;

References/Further Readings Attac. (2007). Manifeste altermondialiste. Construire un monde solidaire, ećologique et de´mocratique. Paris: E´dition Mille et Une Nuits. Fro¨hlich, R., & Wimmer, J. (2007). The determination of the success of organizational relationship management through network structure: The Attac case. In S. Duhe´ (Ed.), New media and public relations. New York: Lang.

● promoting research and scholarship in matters relating to the Third Sector;

● building networks of individuals and organisations interested in better understanding the Third Sector;

● serving as a centre for information on all aspects of the Third Sector;

● developing and maintaining relations with other organisations concerned with the Third Sector;

● convening seminars and conferences for participants

Australia New Zealand Third Sector Research (ANZTSR) Inc. SUZANNE GRANT

Address of Organization ANZTSR Secretariat c/- Social Justice & Social Change Research Centre University of Western Sydney Locked Bag 1797 Penrith South DC NSW 179 Australia www.anztsr.org.au

Introduction The Australia New Zealand Third Sector Research (ANZTSR) Inc is a network of people interested in pursuing and encouraging research into not-for-profit,

in, researchers of, and all those interested in the issues and activities of the Third Sector.’’ (www.anztsr.org.au)

Activities ANZTSR produces a quarterly newsletter to keep members informed of news, published research and conferences from around the region as well as international third sector developments. An annual membership directory is compiled to facilitate contact between researchers and practitioners in New Zealand and Australia. Academic papers, relevant research findings and theoretical developments are published in ANZTSR’s refereed journal – Third Sector Review (TSR). Two issues of TSR are published each year. ANZTSR conferences are biennial, bringing together third sector researchers and practitioners from both sides of the Tasman Sea, as well as the wider Pacific region. The 9th Biennial ANZTSR conference was held in Auckland, New Zealand, November 2008. Formal links are maintained with similar organizations/networks around the world, including ISTR

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(International Society for Third Sector Research), and the ISTR Asia Pacific Regional network.

sector researchers and practitioners around Australia and New Zealand. Research dissemination, awareness of and advocacy for the third sector is thus facilitated.

Structure and Governance ANZTSR is an incorporated association, with membership open to any individual and/or organization who shares the organization’s objectives. Governance is undertaken by an elected executive committee comprising a Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Treasurer, and six non-office bearing committee members. Office Bearers are elected annually at the Annual General Meeting.

Funding

Cross-References

▶ Civil Society and Social Capital in Australia and New Zealand ▶ ISTR ▶ Philanthropy in Australia ▶ Third Sector

References/Further Readings Third Sector Review (ISSN 1323 9163) (ISBN 1 86365 805 X).

Membership fees and TSR journal subscriptions are the main sources of ANZTSR income. Revenue from TSR copyright royalties is becoming increasingly significant.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Through newsletters, conferences, and the TSR journal ANZTSR provides a network of support, linking third

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AWO ▶ Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO)

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B Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee ▶ BRAC

Barnett, Samuel Augustus JENNY HARROW

Basic Biographical Information Born in Bristol, England, in 1844, Samuel Barnett’s invention of and advocacy for the university settlement underpins his achievements as a social entrepreneur and change advocate. As an institutional structure and social relations concept, the settlement became and remains significant in the development of subsequent Anglo-American community-based social action. A member of a prosperous merchant family (although its first to go to university), Barnett was ordained in the Church of England in 1867, after education at Wadham College, Oxford. In his first fashionable London parish he learnt from Octavia Hill, the social housing reformer. Marriage to Henrietta Rowland, one of Hill’s young workers, matched Barnett with an intending and subsequently successful social reformer in her own right. In 1873, their move to St Jude’s parish, Whitechapel (‘‘the worst’’ in the Diocese of London), began a period of immense combined parochial and social action led by Barnett, in areas including housing, education, arts and children’s needs. In 1884, after Barnett’s advocacy for ‘‘university settlements,’’ Toynbee Hall, the first university settlement with Barnett as its first Warden, was founded. Its Whitechapel location and Oxford-collegial style accommodation for volunteer settlers made it an institutional innovation for community activities and a practical base for social projects. The founding of a string of university settlements in London and elsewhere in the United Kingdom followed, gaining strength from other reformers’ support and visits. (These visits included Jane Addams

in 1887 and 1889, prior to her founding of Hull House; visited in turn by the Barnetts in 1891.) Barnett’s ‘‘practicable socialism,’’ voice and action for reform, gained a critical platform in his Wardenship; as did his focus on the Christian imperatives for neighborly and friendly social interaction; though Toynbee Hall was not denominationally or church-linked. Latterly appointed Canon of Bristol Cathedral in 1893, and of Westminster Abbey in 1906, Barnett’s thoughtful, pragmatic, generous churchmanship was integral to his social action.

Major Contributions Barnett was not the first advocate of the responsibilities of the university-educated to live with and work for and among the poor. However his skills of social entrepreneurship ensured that the first university settlement was emulated, firstly in London, then in the United Kingdom and notably in the United States. It proved capable of replication without damage, but rather with improvement, interpretation and growth. Moreover, his wardenship model looked for and gained leadership from others. Toynbee Hall and its fellow settlements became – and continue to be – incubators for new and flourishing organizations, offering organizational independence and further innovation. Elements in Barnett’s creation remained uncertain, with social interactions leaving patterns of political leadership intact, the resulting interclass harmony fragile and prime beneficiaries (neighbors or settlers themselves) often unclear. The model never lacked critics. Critically, in England, an integrating closeness (educational or financial) between universities and ‘‘their’’ settlements remained absent. Yet Barnett’s gifts for social organization, institution-building and social convenorship created and inspired a vital community movement and an enduring social action model.

Cross-References

▶ Addams, Jane ▶ Hill, Octavia ▶ Social Entrepreneurship

References/Further Readings Barnett, H. O. (1919). Canon Barnett his life, work and friends by his wife. (2nd ed., 2 Vols.). London: John Murray.


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Barnett, S. A. (1895). Practicable socialism. London: Longman, Green and Co. Briggs, A., & Macartney, A. (1984). Toynbee Hall. The first hundred years. London: Routledge. Carson, M. (1990). Prologue; the English background. In M. Carson (Eds.), Settlement folk and the American Settlement Movement 1885–1930 (pp. 2–9). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. O’Day, R. (2004). Caring or controlling? The east end of London in the 1880s and 1890s. In C. Emsley, E. Johnson & P. Spierenburg (Eds.), Social control in Europe, 1800–2000 (Vol. 2, pp. 149–166). Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.

Berger, Peter Ludwig SUSAN LORD

Basic Biographical Information Sociologist Peter L. Berger was born in 1929 in Vienna, Austria. He immigrated to the United States in 1946 at the age of 17, and became a US citizen in 1952. He received a BA from Wagner College in New York City in 1949 and an MA (1950) and Ph.D. (1954) from the New School for Social Research in New York City. He has been on the faculty of University of Georgia, Evangelical Academy (Bad Boll, West Germany), University of North Carolina, Hartford Seminary Foundation, New School for Social Research, Rutgers University, and Boston College. Currently Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Theology at Boston University where he has been on the faculty since 1981, he is also, since 1985, the Director of Boston University’s Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs, a center for research, publication, and education on how culture affects economic and political developments worldwide. He holds honorary doctorates from Loyola University, Wagner College, and the University of Notre Dame, and in 1992 he was awarded the Manes Sperber Prize, presented by the Austrian government for significant contributions to culture.

Major Contributions Berger is known for his writings on sociological theory, the sociology of religion, and the interface between issues of global economic development and sociocultural change. His scholarly work is noted for its accessibility, and for the breadth and depth of his analyses, as he grapples with issues of modernity as they pertain to human beings and to sociocultural institutions. He purports that

institutions that affect everyday life, such as schools and churches, make up the foundation of democracy, and claims that capitalism is the economic system that cultivates the highest levels of civic virtue and liberty. Essentially, he says that a market economy is necessary to democracy, and that capitalism introduces institutional forces that have a certain independence and balance out governmental controls. He is interested in the human yearning for transcendental experience and how this yearning affects everyday life. Over his long career, he has changed his claim that modernization leads to increasing secularization, and now claims that most of the world is not secular; it is very religious. His phenomenological approach offers a certain balance to the positivism of other sociological endeavors, as he attempts to apply a scientific approach to such studies as the role of religion in the public realm. His mixing of a scientific approach with religious beliefs has met with both positive and negative critiques; while many applaud his application of the scientific method to religion, some view it as a betrayal of the method. A selfproclaimed orthodox Weberian, he believes in value-free science, and that social scientists should base their theories on the weight of empirical evidence. In her 11/22/92 New York Times Book Review of Berger’s A Far Glory: The Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity (1992), Eleanor Munro characterized Berger’s The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (with Thomas Luckmann, 1966), The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (1967), and The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation (1979), as ‘‘milestones in the study of the life of ideas in contemporary society.’’ Among his more recent books are: Questions of Faith: A Skeptical Affirmation of Christianity (2003), and Redeeming Laughter: The Comic Dimension of Human Experience (1997).

Cross-References

▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Religious Organizations

References/Further Readings Hunter, J. D., & Ainley, S. C. (Eds.) (1986). Making sense of modern times. In L. Peter (Ed.), Berger and the vision of interpretive sociology. New York: Routledge. Woodhead, L., Heelas, P., & Martin, D. (Eds.) (2001). Peter Berger and the study of religion. New York: Routledge. Wuthnow, R., Hunter, J. D., Bergesen, A., & Kurzweil, E. (1984). Cultural analysis: The work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, and Jurgen Habermas. New York: Routledge.

Bernard van Leer Foundation

Bernard van Leer Foundation JAN SACHARKO

Address of Organization P.O. Box 82334 2508 EH, The Hague The Netherlands www.bernardvanleer.org

Introduction The Bernard van Leer Foundation operates globally, funding organizations and sharing gained knowledge about childhood development. Its vision is a world where all children can reach their full potential despite any social or economic disadvantages. From its origin in Switzerland with the equivalent of a few €100,000, today it operates over 150 major programs in more than 40 countries with an annual budget over €25 million.

Brief History Bernard van Leer (1883–1958) of the Netherlands began the original foundation in 1949 in Switzerland. He had made his fortune running his own container production company, Royal Packaging Industries, which specialized in barrels and barrel closures. Though his companies were sold under duress to German operators during WWII, he returned to business after the war and would soon set up his foundation with broad humanitarian interests that operated often anonymously. After his death, his son Oscar van Leer (1914–1996) would be inspired by the developmental psychologist, Martin Deutsch, and narrow the focus of the foundation to child development issues. He legally established the foundation in 1971 in The Hague.

Mission Its mission since the 1960s has been ‘‘to develop and support programs that create significant positive change for children up to the age of eight who are growing up in circumstances of social and economic disadvantage.’’

Activities To accomplish its mission, it operates a grant-making program that funds innovative programs in over 40 countries (most of which are countries where van Leer’s company operated) and work to disseminate information about early childhood development to better inform public policy decisions. One of its main publications, Early

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Childhood Matters, is published at least once a year and details new theories on childhood development and reports on its work in the field. Its three main areas of interest within this arena are strengthening vulnerable families and communities; improving childcare and preschool programs as well the way children transition from home to these programs; and promoting diverse and inclusive environments in which children may develop.

Structure and Governance At the same time that the foundation was legally established in The Hague, the Van Leer Group Foundation was also established with the same nine members of the board of trustees. The Governors of the Van Leer Group Foundation continue to be the trustees of the Bernard van Leer Foundation and decide questions of governance, board composition, tenure, etc.

Funding The Bernard van Leer Foundation derives all of its income from the Van Leer Group Foundation. Originally the Group Foundation received its income from its shares of Royal Packaging Industries, which it fully owned. However, the Group sold the company in the 1990s and now receives all income from its investment portfolio and a venture capital company.

Major Accomplishments FM Weekly, a professional journal on philanthropic organizations in The Netherlands, named Bernard van Leer the ‘‘greatest philanthropist in Dutch history’’ in 2004. The foundation has moved in the direction of being a convener and facilitator for other organizations in the past few years. One of its successes in that matter has been to publish ‘‘A Guide to General Comment 7 ‘Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood’’’ with the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2006. Prior to this, most rights programs under the United Nations Conventions for children under 18 focused on older children, leaving the earliest years unprotected.

Cross-References

▶ Foundations, Functions of

References/Further Readings An English language prećis, from http://www.bernardvanleer.org/about/ bernard_van_leer_biography. Micheels, P. (2002). De vatenman Bernard van Leer (1883–1958). Amsterdam.

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Bertelsmann Foundation

Bertelsmann Foundation ALLYSON REAVES

Address of Organization Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256 33311 Gu¨tersloh Germany www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Introduction The foundation Bertelsmann Stiftung functions as a private operating foundation and supports its own research, projects, and initiatives. Headquartered in Gu¨tersloh, Germany, the foundation has offices in Barcelona, Brussels, and Washington, DC. Employing about 330 staff members, it is one of the largest foundations in Germany and has provided approximately €728 million in support since its inception.

Brief History After the international growth and success of Bertelsmann AG, initially a regional, small publishing company founded by Carl Bertelsmann in 1835, the eponymous foundation was created in 1977 by Reinhard Mohn, who was also the major stakeholder in Bertelsmann AG. Ensuring the permanence of the foundation, Mohn, then chairman of the company board and majority shareholder, transferred his shares in Bertelsmann AG to the foundation. The shares are without voting rights.

Mission/Objective/Focus Area The foundation is committed to developing programmatic initiatives, research, and think-tank forums on international social concerns. With 18 focus areas in education, integration of immigrant and minority students, globalization and its impact (especially on Germany as a business location), and healthcare, the foundation launches programming and research practices around the most current pressing issues.

Activities The activities of the Bertelsmann Stiftung fall into four categories: programming, convening, research, and competitions. The foundation is engaged in more than 60 specific projects that are all designed, launched, and implemented by the foundation and frequently involve other foundations, government entities, businesses, and nonprofit partners. By hosting events such as the Democratic Change Forum, the Kronberger Middle East Talks, the International

Bertelsmann Forum and the Brussels Forum, the foundation is active in network- and coalition-building. With more than 50 publications released each year, the foundation promotes research and information dissemination. The foundation also hosts two major international competitions each year. While the ‘‘Neue Stimmen’’ International Singing Competition focuses on young opera talents (awarded biannually), the Carl Bertelsmann Prize, at €150,000, is awarded annually to organizations, companies, individuals, teams, and civic bodies (countries, towns, and regions) that have demonstrated exceptional progress in a thematic area. Previous awards have been given in the areas of Civic Engagement, Higher Education, Integration, and Employment Policy.

Structure and Governance As of January 1, 2005, the 14-member Board of Trustees, appointed by founder Reinhard Mohn, serves as a supervisory board for consultation and controlling activities, while the 5-member Executive Board functions as a management board. Reflecting a corporate governance practice, the roles of the Executive Board and the Board of Trustees are separated, and their functions and powers are clearly defined.

Funding The foundation is the majority shareholder (76.9%) in Bertelsmann AG, and it is funded predominantly by income earned from its shares in the company, which in 2007 yielded €72 million. Additional funding comes from the foundation’s project partners and financial management of assets. In fiscal year 2007, the foundation’s total resources were €84 million, of which €48 million was dedicated to project work. The largest programming expenditures were made in international relations.

Major Accomplishments Among organizational achievements, the foundation’s leadership has also been recognized for the foundation’s progress. Liz Mohn, vice-chair of the Bertelsmann Foundation Executive Board, has received the Atlantik Bru¨cke organization’s Vernon A. Walters Award, Spain’s Grand Cross of the Order for Civil Merit (La Gran Cruz de la Orden del Me´rito Civil), and an honorary doctoral degree from the University of Tel Aviv. Founder Reinhard Mohn has been awarded the 2007 German Founders Prize, an honorary doctoral degree from the University of Mu¨nster, and the Spanish royal family’s Prince of Asturias Award. This internationally recognized honor is Spain’s most prestigious award.

Bhatt, Ela R.

Cross-References

▶ Foundations, Operating ▶ Philanthropy in Europe

References/Further Readings Mohn, R. (1997). A sense of community – bridging the gap between the individual and society. Gu¨tersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers. Mohn, R. (2000). Humanity wins a strategy for progress and leadership in times of change. New York: Crown Publications. Mohn, R. (2005). An age of new possibilities: How humane values and an entrepreneurial spirit will lead us into the future. New York: Three Rivers Press.

Beveridge, Lord William Henry ANNE SANDER

Basic Biographical Information William Henry Beveridge – economist and one of Britain’s most famous social reformers – was born in March 1879 in Rangpur (British India) as the eldest son of Henry Beveridge, an Indian civil service officer. Originally trained as a lawyer, his early interest in social services and social justice brought him to the Morning Post as a leading writer in 1905 where he wrote about social problems until he entered the Board of Trade and became a civil servant in 1908. During his years as the Director of labor exchanges (1909–1916) he already proved to be one of the leading experts on unemployment in Britain. His ideas influenced and led to the passing of the National Insurance Act which for the first time introduced an unemployment insurance for heavy industry workers. In 1919 he joined academia as the Director of the renowned London School of Economics where he stayed until 1937. During World War II he set up the Academic Assistance Council to shelter refugee scholars and help them escape the Nazi oppression. Beveridge today is most well-known however for his 1942 Beveridge Report which eventually led to the foundation of the modern welfare state in Britain, as described below. He died in March 1963 still working on his ‘‘History of Prices.’’ His last words were: ‘‘I have a thousand things to do.’’

Major Contributions Even though Lord Beveridge worked as an analyst of social injustice and welfare for most of his life and published numerous works on this, his name is still most

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famous for his 1942 ‘‘Social Insurance and Allied Services Report’’ to the British government. More well-known as the ‘‘Beveridge Report’’ his recommendations eventually led to the set up of the modern welfare state in Britain, including the National Health Service and have since then served also to categorize a specific type of welfare state. Beveridge, who had been highly influenced by the Fabian Society British intellectual socialist movement, had joined the government in 1940. In his report which then served as the basis for the postwar Labour government’s legislation program for social reform, Beveridge stressed that full employment should be the main pivot and target of any social welfare program, including Keynesian-style fiscal regulation, state control of the means of production and more direct control of manpower. The report reflected his strong belief in social justice and in the creation of an ideal postwar society and urged the government to fight the five ‘‘Giant Evils: Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness.’’ For Beveridge the discovery of objective socioeconomic laws would lead to solving injustice and the problems of society. It is also remarkable that Beveridge managed to also convince the Conservatives that his proposed welfare institutions would be both socially and economically profitable.

Cross-References

▶ Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations ▶ Welfare State

References/Further Readings Jose, H. (1997). William Beveridge: A biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bhatt, Ela R. MARTHA CHEN

Basic Biographical Information Ela R. Bhatt, the founder of the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) of India, is recognized around the world for her visionary ideals, her pioneering work, and her quiet centered humility. Known as the ‘‘gentle revolutionary,’’ she has dedicated her life to improving the lives of working poor women in India and beyond. Born in 1933 in Ahmedabad, India into a prominent family.

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Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

Her father was a lawyer, and her maternal grandfather was a freedom fighter who took part in the Salt March led by Mahatma Gandhi. Ela Bhatt trained as a lawyer. After completing her legal studies, she joined the legal department of the Textile Labour Association which was founded in 1920 by Mahatma Gandhi and Anasuyaben Sarabhai (the daughter of a prosperous industrial family). Some years later, Ela Bhatt had the opportunity to work in a desert kibbutz in Israel where she learned about the joint action of labor unions and cooperatives. When she returned to India, she was determined to form a union of working poor women who did not have formal jobs but who, she felt, should enjoy the same benefits that organized labor received. Established in 1972, SEWA is today the largest union in India and the largest union of informal workers in the world. Ela Bhatt and her late husband Ramesh, who shared her commitment to the working poor, had two children: a daughter Ami who lives in the USA with her husband and their two children; and a son Mihir who, with his wife and their two sons, lives next door to his mother in India.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Founded and led for two decades by Ela Bhatt, the SelfEmployed Women’s Association (SEWA) is world-renowned for its unique and effective blend of trade union activism and development interventions with, as its core function, the building of membership-based organizations of working poor women, including a union with over one million women members from multiple trades, a cooperative bank, an insurance cooperative, and over 100 producer and service cooperatives. Ela Bhatt was a member of the Indian Parliament and subsequently the Indian Planning Commission. She cofounded and served as chair of Women’s World Banking and of the global network Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). She also served as a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation for a decade. She continues to serve as a pioneering leader and abiding inspiration to three international movements: the labor movement, the women’s movement, and the micro-finance movement. She has received many awards, including the Ramon Magsaysay Award and the Right Livelihoods Award, as well as honorary degrees from Harvard University, the University of KwaZulu Natal, Yale University, and other academic institutions.

Cross-References

▶ Cooperatives and Employee Ownership ▶ Gandhi, Mahatma ▶ Informal Sector

▶ Labor Movements/Labor Unions ▶ Self Employed Women’s Organization

References/Further Readings Bhatt, E. R. (2006). We are poor but so many. London/New York: Oxford University Press. Chen, M. A. (2006). Self-employed women: A profile of SEWA’s membership. Ahmedabad: SEWA Academy. Rose, K. (1992). Where women are leaders: The SEWA movement in India. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications. Sreenivasan, J. (2000). Ela Bhatt: Uniting women in India. New York: The Feminist Press.

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation MICHAEL BISESI

Address of Organization P.O. Box 23350 Seattle, WA 98102 USA www.gatesfoundation.org

Introduction The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is currently the largest philanthropic foundation in the world. In addition to its grant-making impact, the Foundation plays an important leadership role by identifying emerging issues and focusing its funding in a relatively small number of program areas where significant change is possible.

Brief History Bill Gates, the cofounder of Microsoft, and his wife, Microsoft executive Melinda French Gates, decided in 1994 to focus their charitable giving on global health and on community issues in the Pacific Northwest. Bill Gates Sr. took on the key leadership role with the creation of the William H. Gates Foundation. In 1997, Bill and Melinda Gates started the Gates Library Initiative to provide computer and Internet access for US and Canadian low-income communities. The William H. Gates Foundation continued operating as a separate foundation. In 1999, the Gates Library Initiative was renamed the Gates Learning Foundation, and the William H. Gates Foundation became The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Bismarck, Otto von

By the year 2000, the Gates Learning Foundation and The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation merged. As a result, grant-making was targeted at four key program areas: Global Health, Education, Libraries, and the Pacific Northwest. These program areas were further consolidated in 2006 into three grant-making divisions: Global Development, Global Health, and United States programs. Warren Buffett’s 2006 gift to the existing endowment made the Foundation the world’s largest philanthropy, with assets projected eventually to be worth some $60 billion. At the end of 2008, the Foundation employed nearly 700 people and had an asset trust endowment of some $35 billion.

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas The mission of The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is to increase opportunity and equity for those most in need. Among the Foundation’s 15 Guiding Principles, the family has made it clear that the Foundation may fund and shape philanthropic initiatives but that action and implementation will be the responsibility of others. Grant-making is limited to three areas of interest: Global Development, Global Health, and United States programs, including the Pacific Northwest region that is the home base for the Gates family.

Activities, Major Accomplishments, and Contributions Since its inception, the Foundation has made grant commitments totaling over $17 billion, including some $2 billion in 2007. Grants have been made to an array of organizations for a variety of purposes, ranging from the PATH Malaria Vaccine Initiative ($287 million) and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa ($264 million) to the Opportunity Online Program ($8.3 million) and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor ($24 million).

Cross-References

▶ Buffett, Warren ▶ Foundations, Family ▶ Foundations, Grant-making ▶ Gates, William H.

References/Further Readings The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation website: www.gatesfoundation.org Collinson, S. (June 26, 2006). Buffett-Gates merger creates 60 billion dollar charity giant. Agence France-Presse, from http://www.aegis. com/NEWS/AFP/2006/AF060645.html

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Bismarck, Otto von JAN R. BUSSE

Basic Biographical Information Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck was born in 1815 in Scho¨nhausen (Prussia) as a son of a Prussian Junker. Between 1862 and 1890 he was Prime Minister of Prussia. He was chiefly responsible for the formation of the German Empire which resulted from the war of German particular states – led by Prussia – against France in 1870/1871. In this sense, Germany was not unified by a revolution from below, but from above by ‘‘blood and iron.’’ As the first Chancellor of the German Empire (1871–1890) he had important influence on European ‘‘great power’’ relations. In order not to engender the mistrust of the other European powers Bismarck declared that the German Empire does not pursue any territorially expansive ambitions. In 1888, the Year of the Three Emperors, Wilhelm I – under whom Bismarck had served since being Prussian Prime Minister – died. He was succeeded by his son Frederick William who died already after 99 days of rule. Only 2 years after, in 1890, Bismarck resigned from office as Imperial Chancellor due to continuous conflicts about German domestic and foreign politics with Wilhelm II who had been Emperor since 1888. Bismarck died in 1898 in Friedrichsruh near Hamburg.

Major Contributions Bismarck’s social legislation represents a seminal achievement for social justice and can be considered as the foundation of the welfare state as such. In detail, the following bills were part of Bismarck’s social legislation: Health Insurance (1883), Accident Insurance (1884), Old Age and Disability Insurance (1889). These social policy measures need to be seen in context with the consequences of industrialization to German society. As Bismarck feared revolutionary aspirations within the working class he tried to contain and combat Social Democrats by Anti-Socialist Laws in 1878. In this sense, Bismarck’s social insurance program can be seen as Realpolitik by which he tried to increase workers’ identification with the state. Despite these obvious tactical considerations, Bismarck’s reforms were also motivated by a belief in ‘‘applied Christianity.’’

Cross-References ▶ Welfare State

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References/Further Readings Gall, L. (1986). Bismarck: The white revolutionary. Vol. 2, 1871–1898. London: Allen & Unwin. Pflanze, O. (1990). Bismarck and the development of Germany. Vol. 3, The period of fortification, 1880–1898 (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Blended Value JED EMERSON Uhuru Capital Management, New York, NY, USA

Definition First introduced in 2000 (Harvard Social Enterprise Series, 2000), Blended Value is a theory of both capital and organizational value creation which posits that value itself is whole and nondivisible. Within a Blended Value framework, all value is understood as being generated (by organizations and the application of capital) through the interaction over time of three primary value components: social, economic, and environmental, which together comprise organizational value creation and capital returns.

Historical Background Traditionally, philanthropy and NGO/nonprofit corporations have been understood as the domain responsible for the creation of social value and impacts, with for-profit corporations and investors charged with the creation of economic value. While it was understood that (primarily through job creation and tax payments) there was an inherent element of social value to mainstream business, the fundamental value proposition of business was viewed as one of economics and returns to shareholders, whereas the value proposition of nonprofits was viewed as social and creating broader public good. By the late 1990s, social entrepreneurship, corporate social responsibility, social investing, mission-related investing, sustainable and/or development finance, microfinance, venture philanthropy, strategic philanthropy, and a host of related activities had evolved. While each of these has its individual adherents and specific concepts/ terms, when viewed as part of a larger movement it becomes clear that what these activities share is an understanding of value creation as the product of more than the traditional ‘‘nonprofit versus for-profit’’ dynamic. Actors in each of these related silos of activity all understand value as not ‘‘either/or’’ (for-profit versus nonprofit; economic versus

social/environmental), but rather ‘‘both/and’’ – a blend of economic, social, and environmental performance. In terms of organizations, these initiatives demonstrated that for-profit corporations could manage for social and environmental impacts/value creation, while nonprofit organizations could seek to maximize various aspects of economic value and returns. In terms of capital, it is increasingly understood that investment funds could be structured to create not only economic value and return, but also social and environmental value – and that mainstream financial investors should take social and environmental factors into account as they seek to maximize the performance/returns of their investment portfolio. When viewed in total, what these various initiatives demonstrate is that rather than focusing first upon whether a corporation is nonprofit or for-profit, or whether an investment is generating social or financial returns, asset owners and entrepreneurs should seek to maximize the total Blended Value of both organizations and capital. Furthermore, by operating within a Blended Value conceptual and practice framework, one may more effectively understand the various types of value and multiple returns one seeks to create. With this framework in mind, one may then structure the most appropriate type of legal entity or investment strategy to best maximize the elements of the total Blended Value one seeks to generate through the application of capital and management of organizations.

Key Issues Core implications of a Blended Value framework: Unified Investment Strategies and Integrated Wealth Management

Asset owners have traditionally viewed the creation of economic value and financial returns as being completely separate from the allocation of charitable dollars and creation of social value. While this has been true of traditional asset management strategies used by pension funds, educational endowments, and other owners of significant assets, one clear example is that of private, endowed foundations. Private foundations most often manage financial assets to maximize economic returns with no reference to whether those assets are being managed in alignment with the institutional, philanthropic mission. These financial assets usually amount to 95% of the total capital of a private, endowed foundation, while 5% of the annual payout is used for both grantmaking and to cover the administrative costs of operating the foundation. Within a Blended Value framework, foundation trustees and fund managers design a unified investment strategy (UIS) which seeks to align various types of grant

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investments (program, general operating, research and development, etc.) with how the balance of the investment portfolio is managed (cash/cash equivalents, equities (private and public), and alternative investments). Such an investment approach might draw upon tools from program-related investing, mission-related investing, social investing, sustainable investing, and so forth to complement mainstream investment products. However, the key point is that just as in traditional investing, the correct mix of both strategy and investment instruments will differ from investor to investor based upon the risk profile and investment goals of the investing institution. There is no single, correct way to invest – rather, there is simply the commitment to seek to maximize the total Blended Value of the portfolio in a manner most consistent with the institutional mission of the foundation, pension fund, or other investor. These same principles hold true for individual investors seeking to maximize Blended Value. Accordingly, individuals seek to engage in an integrated wealth management strategy which integrates the life goals of the individual with the investment strategy of capital assets under management. The intent is not to maximize financial returns of the investment portfolio first and then secondarily seek to ‘‘do good’’ with some remaining portion allocated to personal philanthropy. Rather, the intent is to understand the total value trajectory of an individual’s life – all the components of value which are joined together as one – and create an investment approach which reflects the values and value creation elements of each individual investor’s life. New Metrics and Blended/Multiple Returns

Over recent years, CSR reporting, Social Return on Investment analysis, and Triple Bottom Line accounting have each advanced a family of new metrics by which investors and managers have sought to assess extra-financial performance of capital and organizations. A Blended Value framework does not replace these various approaches to metrics and performance measurement, but rather, builds upon and seeks to integrate a set of indices in order to better reflect the full Blended Value generated by organizations through their allocation of capital investments. For example, Triple Bottom Line accounting tracks a variety of individual metrics assessing economic, social, and environmental performance of organizations – yet if that analysis remains at the level of the Triple Bottom Line the value created remains bifurcated and disaggregated. Accordingly, many CSR and Triple Bottom Line reports include separate sections addressing economic, social, and environmental performance. While extremely

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helpful in assessing the three individual components of value, such approaches foster an understanding of value creation as a set of trade-offs among limited value components and resources as opposed to a set of strategic decisions made with the intent of maximizing total performance at each level in the form of multiple returns and Blended Value. With individual metrics in place, what remains is to reintegrate these metrics and multiple returns into a holistic framework of performance assessment – a blended metric or return. In the same way banking institutions often ‘‘tier’’ interest rates (combining a federal funds rate with a risk rate and an institutional capital costs rate to create a single blended interest rate which is then charged to the borrower), the multiple returns of capital investment and three aspects of organizational performance must ultimately be viewed as a single blended return in order for analysts to truly assess the total value creation of any given investment or organization. Leadership and Organizational Development

In previous decades nonprofit managers were trained as social work administrators, and business managers received their MBAs. Today, corporate CEOs are being held accountable for social and environmental impacts and performance, and executives of NGOs need to be versed in capital structure finance. In response to these evolving shifts in required skills, business schools are offering courses in social entrepreneurship and national conferences bringing together civic sector leaders include sessions on finance and capital markets. The reality is that increasingly managers in all types of organizations must develop a blend of skills which apply equally to the nonprofit and for-profit corporate environment. By building an integrated skill set and vision of leadership, these ‘‘mutant managers’’ are leading organizations that seek to capture their full Blended Value through acting as disruptive agents in global, regional, and local markets.

International Perspectives Blended Value is a conceptual framework applicable in a variety of nations and international contexts. Whether one considers Bovespa’s Social Stock Exchange, Kiva’s lending platform, or any number of for-profit corporations, social enterprises and microfinance institutions operating around the world, each of these and other initiatives reflect a movement away from an understanding of the world as being divided along the lines of traditional, bifurcated value propositions and organizations.

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This movement across a host of for-profit and NGO entities, being supported with a range of capital investments seeking blended returns, reflects the reality that the value pursued by today’s managers and investors is increasingly blended and moving across global markets. Blended Value is a linking framework that allows one to place each of these enterprise and capital investment practices across a continuum of market activity which together maximizes the performance of actors seeking to create more than simply social or economic impact. Since there is no single, culturally determined manner in which Blended Value is created, the framework translates equally well to both developed and developing market contexts.

Cross-References

▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Social Accounting ▶ Social Entrepreneurship ▶ Strategic Philanthropy ▶ Venture Philanthropy

References/Further Readings A Capital Idea: Total Foundation Asset Management and The Unified Investment Strategy, Stanford Business School, Research Paper Number 1786, January 2002. Blended Value: Papers may be found at www.blendedvalue.org Emerson, J. (2003). The blended value proposition: Integrating social and financial returns. California Management Review, Summer, 45(4). Emerson, J. (2003). Unified investment strategy. Where money meets mission: Breaking down the firewall between foundation investments and programming. Stanford Social Innovation Review, Summer. Emerson, J., & Bonini, S. (2003). The blended value map: Tracking the intersects and opportunities of economic, environmental and social value creation. Hewlett Foundation, October. Emerson, J., Spitzer, J., & Mulhair, G. (2006). Blended value investing: Capital investment opportunities for social and environmental impact. World Economic Forum, Ref. Paper No. 270306, March. Social Enterprise Series No. 17 (2000). The nature of returns: A social capital markets inquiry into the elements of investment and the blended value proposition. Harvard Business School Working Paper. Spitzer, J., Emerson, J., & Harold, J. (2007). Blended value investing: Innovations in real estate. Oxford University, Said Business School, ISBN: 978–1–905551–56–9, Fall.

Bloch-Laine´, François ANAEL LABIGNE, REGINA LIST

Basic Biographical Information Born in 1912 in Paris into a middle-class Catholic family, François Bloch-Laine´ was a French civil servant who

played a decisive role in the evolution of French nonprofit organizations during the 1970s. In his youth he was active in social movements inspired by the social Catholic French movement and, at the age of 17, participated in the creation of a group called Come´diens routiers, a scouting group that traveled throughout the country. The problems he observed as he came into contact with young working class adolescents through Catholic associative structures became the topic of his Ph.D. thesis: Le proble`me de l’e´ducation populaire (translated: The problem of working class education). After studying law and politics, he began his civil service career as a finance inspector in 1936 and held numerous important positions in various government departments. At one time, he was responsible for the national budget and later became the director of the Caisse des De´poˆts, the state investment bank. Bloch-Laine´ died in Paris in 2002.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions His enduring fight for a place for associations in the French relation between the state and the nonprofit sector made Bloch-Laine´ one of the most important civil society actors in France. While in office, he implemented public sector financial incentives and favorable regulations towards nonprofit organizations. Especially toward the end of his career, he brought his extensive knowledge and experience as a state official to bear in the development of the French third sector. In 1975, he led the creation of the Association pour le de´veloppement des associations de progre`s (DAP), which translates to the Association for the Development of Associations for Progress. The DAP organized three colloquiums in 1977, 1979, and 1981 and published Pour le progre`s des associations (‘‘For the Progress of Associations’’). In 1988 Bloch-Laine´ became the president of the Comite´ de la Charte, a French certification committee for ethical fundraising and today a branch of ICFO (International Committee on Fundraising Organizations). Furthermore, when he retired he chaired the Union of Health and Welfare Non-Profit Organizations (UNIOPSS), which became an example of partnership between the state and social-service organizations. In his 1999 book on French civil society organizations, he poses questions on modernizing the legal framework for the French associative sector, measuring the third sector’s impact, and building donor trust. To this effect he brought together economists, sociologists, and jurists. In recognition of his accomplishments, Bloch-Laine´ received several awards including the Me´daille de la Re´sistance and the Grand-Croix de la Le´gion d’honneur.

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Cross-References

▶ International Committee on Fundraising Organizations ▶ UNIOPSS

References/Further Readings Bloch-Laine´, F. (1999). Faire socie´te´. Les associations au coeur du social. Paris: Syros (Alternatives sociales). Margairaz, M. (2005). François Bloch-Laine´, fonctionnaire, financier, citoyen. Paris: Comite´ pour l’histoire ećonomique et financie`re de la France.

Boards GABRIEL BERGER Universidad de San Andres, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Introduction Governance design, leadership, and management represent some of the critical organizational issues faced by civil society organizations. Several authors suggest that governance boards play a crucial role in successful civil society organizations, for they provide strategic direction, a counterbalance to the power of executive and management staff, and a vision that inspires and guides individuals directly involved in and supporters of these organizations (Knauft et al., 1991). However, boards come in several forms and shapes, and empirical studies have shown a more complex view of their role and function in civil society organizations (Middleton, 1987; SEKN, 2006).

Definitions Good governance is widely viewed as a crucial factor for organizational performance. Therefore the notion of governance calls for some clarification, since it is often unclear and undifferentiated from other aspects of strategic leadership, especially in civil society organizations where governance is frequently confused with administration or management in regulatory frameworks of several countries. An organization’s governance is expressed in the formal authority and actual influence distribution among its members as regards its core decisions (Knoke, 1990). Thus, the term ‘‘governance’’ is associated with two different meanings: one that relates to the definition of who has final responsibility and is legally authorized to make core decisions and to clarify rights

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and duties, and another that focuses on the distribution of actual power to make the organization’s fundamental decisions. Boards are the bodies which have final legal authority over civil society organizations and are legally authorized to make decisions that affect directions, activities, and resource allocation. Authority over some decisions is delegated to other actors, even though final responsibility remains within these boards. These governance structures or bodies, which are called differently depending on organizations’ legal status and home countries – Board of Directors, Administrative Council, Governance Committees, are usually made up by individuals who participate in these organizations on a volunteer basis. In civil society organizations, the role of governance bodies involves making fundamental decisions that determine organizations’ purposes, strategies, and goals, enabling the allocation of their collective resources to those ends (Knoke, 1990). Governance bodies are supposed to focus on general, broad and core policies, rather than on operating decisions of lesser significance to the entire organization. The design of organizations’ governance structures is intertwined with the definition of implementation and operating structures and processes, which reflects in the differentiation between governance and management spheres. Management structures refer to the distribution of authority and responsibility in the execution of tasks and activities intended to implement the policies, strategies, and decisions made by governance structures, as well as to the organization of core and support functions and activities derived from civil society organizations’ mission. Although the set of issues related to organizational governance mainly depends on the context, mission, and development phase of the organization, primary governance responsibilities include the organization’s mission, strategy, performance monitoring and control, and accountability. Thus, governance functions engulf the decisions and actions involving the authority to determine or revise organizational vision, mission, values, and core strategies, assess organizational results in the pursuit of its mission and in achieving its main objectives, establish fundamental institutional policies, allocate major organizational resources, and finally set mechanisms used to delegate authority within organizational structure and among its actors. Altogether, these functions can be summarized by two key concepts that capture the focus of governance and boards as the bodies in which governance is performed in civil society organizations: fiduciary responsibility and trusteeship.

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Key Issues Key issues in the analysis of civil society organizations’ boards are their role and responsibilities, their structure and organization, their composition and contribution of their members, and the relationship with the staff leadership of civil society organizations. In the field of civil society organizations, normative literature suggests that, although governance structures and processes may vary according to the organization’s type, size, and evolution stage, governance responsibilities are not dependent on specific organizational features. A vast bibliography refers to a civil society organization’s board responsibilities, which may be summarized as follows: 1. Setting and revising organization’s mission, objectives, and major strategies, and analyzing its accomplishments and results 2. Establishing key institutional policies 3. Ensuring the formulation of a suitable strategic plan 4. Approving and monitoring major programs and services provided by the organization 5. Allocating adequate resources and ensuring economic sustainability 6. Monitoring financial performance and protecting organization’s net worth 7. Assuring compliance with legal requirements 8. Recruiting, supporting and evaluating the individual that will have overall managerial responsibilities 9. Promoting organization’s public image, acting as a link between society and the organization, and being accountable for the actions of the organization 10. Strengthening and assessing governance body performance This list of responsibilities details and specifies the governance definition advanced earlier, and according to normative approaches, effective performance of civil society organizations is affected to a large extent by the degree in which boards ensure themselves that they are adequately covered. Meeting these responsibilities prompts board members to go beyond traditional governance duties to perform several roles in addition to that of trustees, such as organizational ambassadors, fund-raisers, and donors. How these responsibilities are met and assigned is one of the key challenges in designing board structures and processes. Beyond the definition of responsibilities and how delegation is done, normative literature on civil society organizations show consensus that effective governance is based on a collective effort geared to establishing adequate processes to enable actions that ensure advancement towards shared goals consistent with the organization’s mission. This means that, according to this literature,

governance should be exercised by a collective body that has been assigned authority and not by individual members acting independently (Andringa & Engstrom, 1997; Carver et al., 1997). However, there are several alternatives to design and operate these governance structures, such as the creation of executive, standing, and ad hoc committee bodies, the involvement of advisory boards, etc. Different proposals and recommendations have surfaced to reformulate governance structure operations. In the corporate arena, some authors state that responsibilities are often inadequately fulfilled due to several reasons, such as limited dedication or insufficient information available to board members. Governance body members are demanded greater accountability for their performance, and companies are now challenged to design suitable mechanisms and processes to enhance their work. Topics such as board independence from management, board member appointments, term limitations or internal stakeholder group engagement are widely accepted as subjects requiring greater research in order to determine their contributions to corporate performance. In order to address these problems, different solutions have been proposed, such as changes in governance meeting processes, the incorporation of outside members with no interest in the company, a limited number of company executives serving at boards, the separation of the roles of company CEO and board chair, greater regulation on board auditing committees, more involvement of stockholders and investors in boards, governance member selection and appointment process redesign, or greater authority of stockholders over boards (Carter & Lorsch, 2004). Along these critical lines, civil society governance performance analysts point out that these bodies often restrict their responsibilities to a passive or traditional role, focusing on report analysis and approval, management supervision, and pursuing specific activities of interest to each member (Chait et al., 2005; Taylor et al., 1996). However, for these analysts, the increasingly important role played by these entities in society demands that, in order to deliver effective governance, board members should focus their work on strategic tasks, which require new commitment rules to ensure responsibility fulfillment. These strategic tasks refer to crucial issues for the organization’s future. Actions can be planned with specific deadlines and clearly-defined success measures, and their implementation requires the engagement of internal and external actors. Adopting this strategic approach implies the recognition of governance bodies as one of the major leadership sources in civil society organizations, working jointly with management teams. Unlike the focus of corporate discussions, that are keyed on strengthening governance bodies’ overseeing functions

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to ensure their performance as a counterbalance for executive management, the nonprofit world has stressed the role of governance body members as managers’ partners in organizational leadership and as a source of leadership for organizations (Drucker, 1990; Chait et al., 2005). The topic of boards and governance in civil society organizations has received greater attention in countries with Anglo-Saxon origins, and the vast majority of writing and empirical research on this topic has been conducted in these countries with few exceptions. Recent research conducted in Latin America and Spain suggests some significant aspects in civil society governance models that are to be considered and that open up questions about normative perspectives (SEKN, 2006). First, in spite of the fact that most analysts would recommend term limits and renewal in board membership, there seems to be a significant continuity in board composition – members hold their positions for many years, and membership turnover in governance structures is low. What seems to be critical is that governance body members tend to add value to their social ventures by contributing or enabling access to the legitimacy, credibility, capabilities, and economic resources required for their development. Finally, research findings showed that governance body members may be involved in executive tasks, while organization executives may be involved as well in governance tasks, indicating a certain degree of role overlapping between governance members and management teams. Given the complexity and creativity involved in the issues addressed by civil society organizations, continued governance members’ permanence may become an asset, since it allows for experience and knowledge acquisition on issues addressed, taking advantage of learning. Governance body composition continuity may take various forms, but, whatever the format chosen, it helps to endow civil society organizations with a long-term perspective. For example, in civil society organizations, it is usual for the founding group or initial social entrepreneurs that launched the initiative to remain in the governance body for a long time, thus providing a stable framework for major policies and strategies in some cases. When there is turnover in governance body composition, other institutional mechanisms are found to be in place to ensure continuity in organizations’ core decisions: when there is a higher controlling body or hierarchy that launched a specific initiative or that oversees a social venture’s governance body, immediate, or direct governance body members may be subject to turnover. Setting time constraints for governance body members is an institutionally designed mechanism that has been

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viewed as protecting organizations from self-perpetuating leadership roles. However, observations from successful civil society organizations in some regions of the world seem to contradict Anglo-Saxon normative bibliography on nonprofit governance (Andringa & Engstrom, 1997; Axelrod, 1994; Grummon, 1995). In this literature, setting standards for governance body members’ permanence – either limiting the number of periods to be served at the board, the number of terms to serve at the same position, the specific duration of terms, or any such rule – are viewed as essential to promote internal democracy, encourage community involvement, facilitate organizations’ adjustments to environmental changes through outlook renewal, and avoid the risk of organizational ‘‘appropriation’’ by governance body members. However, a governance body member’s prolonged stay may contribute to a deeper and specific knowledge of the organization’s focal issues. Second, member continuity provides a sense of stability and long-term outlook for social ventures. Third, stable governance body composition may effectively enhance economic resource mobilization towards social ventures by boosting donors’ trust. Governance body members enhance their performance by providing legitimacy, credibility, critical yet scarce capabilities, and network access to raise required economic resources or political support for venture success. Social venture governance body composition and member profiles significantly shape initiatives’ performance by providing them with any of the following elements that are crucial to their sustainability. In some cases, the primary resource for a social venture is an intangible attribute, such as legitimacy among critical stakeholder groups, ‘‘permission’’ or validation of decisions made regarding mission, strategies, and actions that render them acceptable. This leads to a discussion on how legitimacy is built. A starting point for this analysis involves an understanding of the relationship between governance bodies and organizations’ members and stakeholders. In civil society organizations, the relationship between governance bodies and organization members is usually characterized as ‘‘fiduciary’’ or as trusteeship. Basically, in a fiduciary relationship, some individuals are considered trustworthy and are designated to look after the resources or net worth transferred to or produced by an entity. Thus, governance body members agree to act on behalf of others, to whom they are legally and morally bound. Fiduciary obligations entail loyalty, honesty, and a bona fide effort to act in the organization’s best interest. These relationships are based on the recognition that governance bodies represent a larger group of people, who legally and morally ‘‘own’’ organizations and to

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whom these bodies are to be held accountable (Carver, 1997). Since civil society organizations lack shareholders governance bodies of civil society organizations must explore and answer the following questions: How does the organization legitimize its decisions for its critical stakeholders? Who grants its authority to an organization’s governance body? Who should governance bodies and their members be accountable to? The stakeholder involvement achieved through governance body engagement effectively validates the policies and strategies adopted by organizations. In this way, legitimacy can be understood as key third-party recognition of organizations’ decisions, positions, and beliefs as valid. Considering stakeholders’ concerns and needs and reaching consensus through governance body involvement for all sectors involved provide legitimacy to the policies and strategies adopted by organizations. In turn, this legitimacy ensures the support of those who must collaborate in implementation. When the public interest pursued by an organization needs to be especially safeguarded and there are circumstances that may jeopardize the organization’s trustworthiness or the belief that the organization seeks to protect a collective interest (stated in its mission) to the expense of its employees’ or governance body members’ interests, incorporating renowned business, social, political, and academic leaders to governance bodies may enhance organizational credibility. Another alternative to enhance organizational credibility involves incorporating people who ‘‘reflect’’ or share the characteristics of specific stakeholder groups. Governance bodies may include members with fundamental characteristics for organizations’ effective performance, because they contribute specific technical and professional expertise and cannot be ‘‘acquired’’ or afforded by these organizations. Engaging people with these capabilities in governance bodies effectively enhances institutional decisions and actions. In some cases incorporating business-oriented people to civil society organizations’ governance bodies is often viewed as a success factor, for their experience may be helpful to bring to these organizations an orientation towards efficient management. In the same line of reasoning, board membership profiles can be critical to provide access to or networks of economic resources and political support rather than direct economic contributions through personal, professional, and business connections. Often, more than direct resource contributions, social ventures seem to primarily need their governance bodies to provide them with access to other individuals or organizations that may contribute the resources required. Through their personal, professional, or business connections, governance body members help organizations to raise the

necessary resources and materials. It seems, therefore, that the Anglo-Saxon motto that describes civil society organizations’ expectations for their governance body members – Give, Get, or Get Off – should be adjusted slightly to read, instead, ‘‘Get, Help to Get, or Get Lost.’’ Civil society organizations often turn to Advisory Councils or Consultation Committees to attain key capabilities for their organizations or to expand their access to resource providing networks, expanding with these bodies their governance structures. Advisory or Consultation Committees enable governance structures to engage – with no decision-making responsibilities – people who supply their experience, connections, and networks, professional and academic credentials, sound image or credibility to organizations, thus broadening their resource portfolio to enhance their governance quality. An Advisory Council may also improve the bond between organizations and communities by incorporating other stakeholders’ perspectives, as well as reaching other organizations that operate in the same communities or that may collaborate through networks and alliances (Axelrod, 1991; Saidel & D’Aquanni, 1999). From a traditional standpoint, governance and execution roles should be clearly differentiated, since this separation contributes to the establishment of control systems and balanced management models for effective organizational performance. In this light, governance body members must remain detached from organizational management (Carver & Carver, 1997). However, contrary to these views, often civil society organizations show a wide range of board member involvement in several implementation aspects, with three major schemes for high governance involvement in social venture operative management: presidents (board chairpersons) who lead organizations and are involved in management, chairpersons who also serve as executive directors or general managers, and governance body members who are responsible for several operating areas or functions. In civil society organizations in which leadership is exercised by their chairpersons, their involvement in organizational performance is perceived as natural, especially when they have been the founders of the organizations and/or they are simultaneously in charge of management. In other civil society organizations, leaders-founders have differentiated the chairpersons and executive director positions, but they have left their mark on management as well. Finally, at the very extreme of board member involvement in organizational management, board members also headed several operating areas and devoted many weekdays to their organizational duties. In this case, there is a functional overlapping between board members and the

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organization’s management structure. Other civil society organizations prefer a low involvement model for governance body members. Some organizations view rare board involvement in daily operations as a practice contributing to good organizational performance, since it allows board members to focus on strategic courses, global performance monitoring and support network construction. Thus, they have given ample leeway to their executive directors for strategic management. In these cases, governance body members are rarely or never involved in implementation or operational issues. Regardless of board member involvement in organizational management or operations, in general terms, civil society organizations’ executive employees are involved in some way in governance tasks, engaging in the formulation of strategic priorities, primary policies and core decisions and contributing to enhance institutional decision-making quality, with the top executive as a member of the organization’s Executive Committee, or with the management team attending board meetings, actively participating in strategy formulation and planning. When civil society organization governance bodies meet on rare occasions and have an oversight function, or when they are almost exclusively devoted to contributing in a specific and critical area such as fund-raising, organizations’ management teams tend to be actively involved in governance tasks and formulate strategies, policies, and core decisions, which are then submitted for governance body approval, as it is mandatory according to their bylaws. This scheme is often used when civil society organization founders choose to hold executive positions but not to formally join governance bodies, although they significantly influence organizational governance. At the same time, some of them lay the groundwork and encourage other governance body members to actively engage in strategic tasks, such as institutional relations, partnership building or project oversight. A good working relationship between an organization’s executive, in charge of management structures, and the board chair seems to be a key factor for the development and enhancement of executive contributions to organizational governance. This good working relationship may be based on complementary functions, capabilities, and personal traits. This specific relationship between an organization’s top executive who is an employee in charge of management and its volunteer leader formally in charge of governance has been identified as one of the most salient features of civil society organizations’ leadership (O’Connell, 1985; Drucker, 1992). All in all, the engagement of at least some governance body members in executive and management tasks helps

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to articulate polices, strategies, operating plans and activities, granting greater internal consistency and more effective institutional performance. In addition, the involvement of individuals holding executive positions in governance body meetings usually enriches decisionmaking processes relating to social venture policies and strategies (SEKN, 2006). This approach often implies that these bodies become ‘‘working’’ governance bodies or assume an active role in organizational leadership, along with top management, developing a ‘‘generative governance’’ model (Chait et al., 2005).

Future Directions Understanding how civil society organizations’ governance schemes, processes, and structures must be designed to respond to sustainability requirements remains a key issue for further development. While boards need stability, persistence, and continuity there are risks associated with these features, such as the potential lack of new ideas, limited options considered in strategic decision making, or public perception that organizations are controlled by a self-perpetuating group. At the same time, often governance body member continuity is unfeasible or politically unacceptable, thus the challenge seems to be how to devise more complex governance structures that preserve a medium or long-term perspective on some critical issues while ensuring periodic changes in board membership. A second issue for further attention relates to how to integrate the need to have boards with the appropriate profiles to contribute value to civil society organizations while at the same time considering some form of stakeholder representation. Recruiting for governance bodies must on the one hand consider mechanisms and processes to screen for suitable profiles, and clarify candidates’ expected contributions. At the same time, appropriate stakeholder representation becomes a growing demand for civil society organizations, in the quest for greater legitimacy and public expectations of democratic participation within them. How to balance these two aspects of recruiting and board composition, or how to design models that respond to these challenges is an area that calls for greater theoretical analysis and empirical research. Board accountability and evaluation in the context of civil society organizations constitute a third issue that future research must address (Herman et al., 1997; Holland & Jackson, 1998; Jackson & Holland, 1998). Greater calls for accountability in civil society organizations have become commonplace. Fulfilling this expectation is one of the central challenges for boards, not only with regards to overall performance and impact of their organizations, but also on the boards’ own contribution. In the same

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vein, evaluation of board performance remains an area in which best practices have to be developed and studied. To the extent that individual and group performance evaluation be introduced as a tool for board management, the process for greater board accountability will probably be paved. Finally, governance body members’ involvement in activities or tasks that exceed the traditional oversight, control, and policy or priority setting functions and lead them to participate in strategic or operational issue management seems to lead to improved performance as it enhances commitment and motivation, encouraging them to continue their engagement and to reinforce their personal contributions to civil society organizations. However, this approach entails risking interference in management tasks. How to build board member involvement in strategic and operational issues, how to manage this engagement and how to adjust it periodically as needed constitute an area in which much needs to be learnt.

Cross-References

▶ Accountability ▶ Governance, Organizational ▶ Legitimacy ▶ Nonprofit Management ▶ Social Enterprise ▶ Social Enterprise Knowledge Network ▶ Stakeholders ▶ Trusteeship

Holland, T., & Jackson, D. (1998). Strengthening board performance: Findings and lessons from demonstration projects. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 9(2). Jackson, D., & Holland, T. (1998). Measuring the effectiveness of nonprofit boards. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quaterly, 27(2), 159–182. Knauft, E. B., Berger, R. A., & Gray, S. (1991). Profiles of excellence: Achieving success in the nonprofit sector. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Knoke, D. (1990). Organizing for collective action. New York: Aldyne de Gruyter. Middleton, M. (1987). Nonprofit boards of directors: Beyond the governance function. In W. W. Powell (Ed.), The nonprofit sector: A research handbook (pp. 141–153). New Haven, CA: Yale University Press. Nelson, J. G. (1995). Six keys to recruiting, orienting, and involving nonprofit Board members. Washington, DC: National Center for Nonprofit Boards. O’Connell, B. (1985). The board member’s book. New York: The Foundation Center. Saidel, Judith & D’Aquanni, Alissandra. (1999). Expanding the Governance Construct: Functions and Contributions of Nonprofit Advisory Groups. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute. SEKN. (2006). Effective management of social enterprises: Lessons form businesses and civil society organizations in Iberoame´rica. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Taylor, B., Chait, R., & Holland, T. (1996). The new work of the nonprofit board. Harvard Business Review, September–October, 36–46.

Bodelschwingh, Friedrich von ALEXIA DUTEN


Basic Bibliographical Information

Andringa, R., & Engstrom, T. (1997). Nonprofit board answer book: Practical guidelines for board members and chief executives. Washington, DC: National Center for Nonprofit Boards. Axelrod, N. (1991). Creating and renewing advisory boards: Strategies for success. Washington, DC: National Center for Nonprofit Boards. Axelrod, N. (1994). Board Leadership and Board Development. In R. D. Herman & Associates (Eds.), The Jossey-Bass handbook of nonprofit leadership and management (pp. 119–136). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Carter, C. B., & Lorsch, J. W. (2004). Back to the drawing board: Designing corporate boards for a complex world. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publising. Carver, J., & Carver, M. (1997). Reinventing your board. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Chait, R., Ryan, W. P., & Taylor, B. (2005). Governance as leadership: Reframing the work of nonprofit boards. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Drucker, P. F. (1990). Managing the non-profit organization. New York: Harper Collins. Grummon N. J. (1995) Six keys to Recruiting, Orienting, and Involving Nonprofit Board Members. Washington, DC: National Center for Nonprofit Boards. Herman, R., Renz, D., & Heimovics, R. (1997). Board practices and board effectiveness in local nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 7(4), 373–385.

Born in 1831 in Tecklenburg, Germany, Friedrich von Bodelschwingh is known to contemporaries as Friedrich von Bodelschwingh Senior, in contrast to his son, born in 1877, named after him. Bodelschwingh was a pastor and theologian from a politically ultraconservative background. His family was one of the oldest in Westphalia; he personally was very close to the emperor-to-be, Friedrich III. Although reportedly authoritarian and a maverick, he was said to be a charismatic and warmhearted individual. After a botany course at Berlin University, Bodelschwingh encountered poverty in the field. Young Bodelschwingh felt he had to help and started studying theology. His first post was located at the Protestant Mission for Germans in Paris where he worked from 1858 to 1864 with immigrant workers. Back in Germany, Bodelschwingh became pastor in the rural town Dellwig where he stayed with his family from 1864 to 1871. After having lost all of his four children to diphtheria, he moved to Bielefeld in 1872 to manage an institution for epileptic

Bosch, Robert

and mentally disabled children, which he named Bethel, literally ‘‘the House of God.’’ Although most of the credit for the ‘‘v. Bodelschwinghschen Anstalten Bethel’’ (v. Bodelschwingh’s Bethel Foundation) goes to Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, the premises had existed since 1867 thanks to an initiative of the Inner Mission and donations of local merchants. Bethel soon received support for its activities from the mother house ‘‘Sarepta’’ and its friar equivalent, the ‘‘Nazareth.’’ In order to finance the rapid growth of the Bethel institutions, Bodelschwingh practiced highly successful fundraising. The pastor received funds from the Emperor as well as from workers, the latter he particularly focused on in his letters of thanks for which he employed several people. He also instituted ‘‘penny clubs.’’ His fundraising activities led him to the nickname ‘‘the most brilliant beggar that Germany has ever seen’’ (Heuss, 1951). The Bethel Foundation started with 27 deaconesses working in eight stations. Within a decade, 263 deaconesses were operative at Bethel. No other mother house knew such an expansion. Even though Bodelschwingh did not really believe in the necessity of a welfare state, he initiated two welfare services before his death. First, the ‘‘Lex Bodelschwingh’’ was meant to protect wayfarers and migrant workers who were often arrested by the police. Bodelschwingh created colonies where migrants could work and rest temporarily in line with his motto ‘‘Work, not charity.’’ Second, the pastor sent Bethel-trained sisters to the Protestant Mission for German-East Africa. In 1903, he created a hospital including a station for the mentally ill in East Africa as well as facilities for the education of liberated slave children.

Major Contributions The Bethel Foundations that von Bodelschwing founded soon became a reference for treatment of the mentally deficient, an example for nonprofit management and a historical milestone for social and health welfare. Their administration has also been a mirror of structural change within the German foundation landscape: from its origins as a private institution belonging to the Inner Mission in the 1870s, it became a Christian establishment under public regulation in 1895 before turning into a deaconal corporation affiliated to the Diakonisches Werk (since the mid-1980s).

Cross-References

▶ Diakonisches Werk der EKD ▶ Fundraising ▶ Missionary Societies

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References/Further Readings Bradfield, M. (Ed.) (1961). The good samaritan: The life and work of Friedrich von Bodelschwingh. London: Marshall Morgan & Scott. Heuss, T. (1951). Friedrich von Bodelschwingh. Verl.-Handl. d. Anstalt Bethel: Verlag. Schmuhl, H.-W. (2005). Friedrich von Bodelschwingh. Reinbeck bei Hamburg Rowohlt Taschenbuch: Verlag.

Bo¨ll, Heinrich ▶ Heinrich Bo¨ll Stiftung

Bosch, Robert ODILE BOUR

Basic Biographical Information Born in Albeck (South Germany) in 1861 as last son of a wealthy Swabian farmer of democratic liberal convictions, Robert Bosch went on to found one of Germany’s most important automobile equipment manufacturing firms, introducing in his plant a progressive social and welfare policy and displaying a consistent philanthropic activity. Following school graduation he went in precisioninstrument maker apprenticeship in Ulm, and after his military service studied electrical engineering for one semester in Stuttgart before he left for New York where he worked with Thomas Edison. In 1886 he opened his own craft workshop in Stuttgart which grew into a huge firm, developing the spark plug and the magneto, assisting thus the birth of Germany’s auto industry. He died in 1942 in Stuttgart.

Major Contributions The strong influence socialist thinking had had on Robert Bosch during his journeyman year in America was evident in his concern about political and economic aspects of the workers movement. His plant soon stood for pioneer social policy and social welfare: all employees enjoyed high wages, an 8-hour day (1906), retirement security, Saturday afternoons off, and graduated vacation time (1910). Bosch used to say: ‘‘I don’t pay good wages because I am rich; I am rich because I pay good wages.’’ Robert Bosch considered himself a successful entrepreneur whose responsibility it was to care for public welfare

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inside and outside his firm by bettering the social condition of his own employees and establishing foundations for the common good: he supported among others education on the job, popular education, research and teaching, homeopathy, French-German and American-German understanding, and the Paneuropean movement. Simultaneously he regarded philanthropy as a mean of pursuing his objectives of society improvement and progress and thus counterbalancing the state where he thought it was necessary. This strong social commitment turned into an undeniably political one, as he became the walk-in center for political resistance against Hitler’s regime from the end of the 1930s with the so-called ‘‘Bosch circle of resistance.’’ Settling his inheritance and his former donations, the Robert Bosch Foundation was created 1964 following his last will and testament. By 2008, it was one of the largest foundations in Germany.

Cross-References

▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH

References/Further Readings Heuss, T., Gillepsie, S., & Kapczynski, J. (1994). Robert Bosch – His life and achievements. New York: Henry Holt (German ed. 1946). Lessing, H.-E. (2007). Robert Bosch. Hamburg: Rohwolt. Scholtyseck, J. (1999). Robert Bosch und der liberale Widerstand gegen Hitler (1933–1945). Munich: Beck.

Boulding, Kenneth Ewart DAVID HORTON SMITH

Basic Biographical Information Kenneth Boulding was born January 18, 1910, in Liverpool, England. He graduated in 1931 from Oxford University with first class honors in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (B. Litt.). Although he did some post-graduate work elsewhere, he never earned a higher degree. In 1936, Boulding emigrated permanently to the United States, becoming a US citizen in 1948. Boulding spent most of his career as a Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan (1949–1967) and then at the University of Colorado at Boulder (1967– 1980; subsequently a Distinguished Professor Emeritus).

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Although principally an economist (J. B. Clark Medal, 1949; President of the American Economics Association,

1968), Boulding’s greatest contributions to civil society/ nonprofit sector studies came from his broad, interdisciplinary interests and work. He attempted to broaden the narrow, highly mathematical, and profit/‘‘utility’’-oriented approach of economics. He argued forcefully for economists to include less precise and more interdisciplinary approaches to understanding human behavior and groups. Boulding was convinced, unlike most economists, that human behavior can only be understood by studying people in their totality. Boulding was the first major economist to give careful attention to the nonprofit sector. He concluded that in studying only the ‘‘exchange’’ economy, economists were missing a great deal of important economic activity. In a 1966 article, he wrote that economists needed to grapple with the ‘‘grants economy,’’ which was his term for what non-economists see as the financial part of the nonprofit sector. Elaborating on this theme with others, Boulding co-founded (1968) the Association for the Study of the Grants Economy/ASGE, which still exists. He was President of ASGE from 1970 to 1989. The exchange economy usually studied by economists involves two parties each giving something to the other (usually money for goods or services) so that the net worth of each party is unchanged. But in the grants economy, transfers between two parties/entities result in the reduction of the net worth of one party (the grantor) and increase in the net worth of the other party (the grantee). Both charitable giving by individuals and by organizations (e.g., foundations, corporations) meet this criterion, because Boulding interprets the term ‘‘grants’’ quite broadly. In nonprofit studies, the focus is usually on (voluntary) grants made out of altruism or ‘‘love’’ in Boulding’s terms. But there is also the ‘‘threat’’ (coercive) grants economy, as when a robber steals from us or when some government taxes us. Boulding’s classic discussion of the grants economy was published first in his book The Economy of Love and Fear (1973). Boulding also hinted at the (historically recent) revolutionary growth of associations in his book The Organizational Revolution (1953). In a later journal article, D. H. Smith (1972) first expanded on this idea for the nonprofit sector and volunteer/grassroots associations specifically.

Cross-References

▶ Altruism ▶ Gift, Giving ▶ Smith, David Horton

Boy Scouts

References/Further Readings Boulding, K. E. (1953). The organizational revolution. New York: Harper. Boulding, K. E. (1973). The economy of love and fear: A preface to grants economics. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Smith, D. H. (1972). Modernization and the emergence of volunteer organizations. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 13, 113–134.

Bourdieu, Pierre ANAEL LABIGNE, REGINA LIST

Basic Biographical Information Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, was born in 1930 in Denguin, France. After receiving his agre´gation from the Ećole Normale Supe´rieure, he worked as a teacher in France until taking a post as a lecturer in Algiers. His first book, The Algerians (1962), resulted from ethnographic research on selected groups during the Algerian War. Upon his return to France, Bourdieu taught and held research positions at the University of Paris (1960–1964), the Ećole Pratique des Hautes E´tudes (1964–1981), and the Colle`ge de France (from 1981). From 1968 until his death, he also directed the Centre de Sociologie Europeénne. In 1996, together with other social scientists seeking to focus on social issues, Bourdieu founded the publishing company Raisons d’agir (Reason to Act). The company publishes critical books and papers concerning social problems linked to state responsibility, the media, intellectuals in France and global economy developments. Bourdieu died of cancer in 2002 in Paris.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Bourdieu’s contributions to the field of study of civil society and social capital are numerous. In his piece, ‘‘Forms of Capital’’ (1986), he introduced and expanded upon terms relating to different types of capital which act as a social relation within a system of exchange. The forms of capital include economic, cultural, symbolic, and also social capital. In Bourdieu’s terminology, social capital refers to the resources provided by personal networks such as families, communities, and other associations within a society. In his 1984 work, Distinction: A social critique of the judgment of taste, Bourdieu focuses on the reproduction of social patterns of power and on the structural analysis of society and systems of distinction. Here he developed the concepts of habitus and different fields with different rules

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of power. Habitus describes a set of ‘‘durable dispositions’’ that condense traditions, knowledge, and practices, and which guide choices. A field is a setting, which has its own logic and in which agents and their social positions – depending on their capital and their habitus – are located. For Bourdieu, social science and political action were strongly linked. In the 1990s he became more and more present in public debates on globalization and in international intellectual networks. He wrote several articles encouraging the creation of a European social movement to promote a European Union that is more than just a strong market held together by the economic interests of nation states. He called on European citizens, especially intellectuals, to create the European Union the way they want it. In addition to his academic work, Bourdieu himself was an important actor of civil society as a cofounder and strong supporter of the Attac movement.

Cross-References

▶ Attac ▶ Gift, Giving ▶ Social Capital, Definition of

References/Further Readings Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction. A social critique of the judgment of taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education (pp. 241–258). New York: Greenwood Press. Bourdieu, P. (2001). Contre-feux 2. Pour un mouvement social europeén. Paris: Raisons d’agir. Bourdieu, P. (2008). Political interventions: Social science and political action. London: Verso Books. Poupeau, F., & Discepolo, T. (2005). Scholarship with commitment: On the political engagements of Pierre Bourdieu. In L. Wacquant (Ed.), Pierre Bourdieu and democratic politics. The mystery of ministry (pp. 55–63). Cambridge: Polity.

Boy Scouts A. JOSEPH BORRELL

Address of Organization Rue du Pre´-Jeroˆme 5 PO Box 91 CH-1211 Geneva 4 Plainpalais Switzerland www.scout.org

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Introduction The Boys Scouts are organized as a worldwide federation of non-governmental organizations whose purpose is to offer leadership and character-development skills to boys as they make the transition to adulthood. Religious involvement and a programmatic emphasis on physical activities are hallmarks of the Boy Scout approach to youth development.

Brief History The Boy Scout movement was started by Sir (later Lord) Robert Baden-Powell (1857–1941), a former British soldier who had served in India and South Africa. Disheartened by seeing youth inactivity and unemployment when returning to the United Kingdom, Baden-Powell drew upon his military experience to design the early Scouting program. Baden-Powell held the first camp for Scouts in 1907 where he and other volunteer adults supervised a group of boys as they camped, cooked, and played games. BadenPowell used this experience to refine his conception of Scouting as a youth activity and the next year published Scouting for Boys, which became the first handbook of the movement.

that includes ‘‘duty to God.’’ Scouting is open to members of all recognized religions, but a belief in God is held as a central tenet and atheists have been denied membership and leadership roles in the organization. Modern Scouting has its critics. A common criticism of Scouting worldwide is that too much attention is paid to preparation for military service and development of patriotic fervor. In addition, the ban on gay leaders has provoked much controversy, particularly in the United States, where other civic and nonprofit organizations, including grant makers, have been unable to work with the Boy Scouts of America due to its policy on gay men.

Achievements The Scout motto of ‘‘be prepared’’ has become known worldwide. Over the last century, the scouting movement has spread to over 150 countries and is known for its effective, informal educational methods. Prominent alumni of the Boy Scout movement include musician Paul McCartney and former US President Gerald Ford.

Cross-References

▶ Federations, Nonprofit ▶ Girl Scouts

Mission and Activities Scouting has three primary development objectives for its members: character, citizenship, and fitness. Across the world, the organization appeals to adolescents since it provides friendship and outside the home activities that are often physically challenging. The acquisition of skills, as measured by earning merit badges, and the completion of community service projects are required to advance to the higher levels of scouting. While the uniform of the Boy Scout is easily recognized, this vestment is also a symbol of the Scouting’s egalitarian premise. Shared activities, such as overnight camping, also help to deemphasize the class, culture, and racial differences among its members.

BRAC MARTIN HO¨LZ, REGINA LIST

Address of Organization BRAC Centre 75 Mohakhali Dhaka Bangladesh www.brac.net

Introduction Structure Scouting is organized at the local level into small groups of Scouts, sometimes called a patrol or den. The Scoutmaster, a volunteer adult, provides leadership and mentoring to the group and is responsible for the safety of the youth involved. In addition to regular group meetings, Scouts have the opportunity to participate in a camp experience, known as a jamboree, with other Scouts outside their group. Churches are often sponsors of scouting groups, and religion is viewed by the organization as an important element of Scouting. Scouts take an oath or promise

The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, now known by its acronym BRAC, is one of the largest development NGOs in the world, headquartered in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Founded in 1972, it employs more than 100,000 workers, most of them women, and reaches more than 100 million people in Asia and Africa.

Brief History BRAC has its roots in the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. After the country won its independence from Pakistan, the economy and its people were devastated.

BRAC

In 1972, Fazle Hasan Abed, who had left his position as an executive with Shell Oil, founded BRAC to provide relief to refugees returning from India. During its first year, BRAC focused on emergency rebuilding, constructing homes, boats, and medical centers, but then turned to longer term strategies to fight poverty, predominantly by concentrating on women. BRAC’s first lending program was launched in 1974 and its support for woman handicraft workers in 1975. As its successful approach gained renown, BRAC established programs in other parts of Asia, including Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, and in several African countries. In addition, BRAC now has affiliated organizations in the United Kingdom and the United States, which mobilize support for its efforts.

Mission/Objectives BRAC’s primary goals are to alleviate poverty, with all its ramifications and causes, and to strengthen the poor to participate fully in society. According to its materials, BRAC is led by a vision of ‘‘a just, enlightened, healthy and democratic world free from hunger, poverty, environmental degradation and all forms of exploitation.’’

Activities Reflecting its holistic approach to poverty alleviation and empowerment of the poor, BRAC is active in economic development, health, education, social development, and human rights/legal services. Village organizations (VOs), each with 30–40 women members, are the hubs for service delivery to both members and nonmembers, but also for awareness-raising and participation. BRAC’s economic development programs include group-based micro-lending and skills training and technical assistance to engage in small-scale income-generating activities such as livestock, fisheries, and social forestry. Basic health care services, in particular maternal and child health services, are provided by trained volunteers as well as through clinics. BRAC has also entered into partnerships to undertake diagnosis and treatment of and raise awareness of diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS. With education considered a key element of empowerment and higher living standards for the poor, BRAC runs primary schools, preschools, schools for children with special needs, teacher training programs, community libraries, and, since 2001, BRAC University, based in Dhaka. In 2008, BRAC inaugurated the BRAC Development Institute based at BRAC University. In addition to its development and disaster relief programs, BRAC also operates a number of incomegenerating social enterprises. In addition to enterprises generating seeds and chicks to support its agricultural

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and livestock projects, BRAC also controls a dairy, which markets the produce of milk producers. Another prominent example is Aarong, which began as a small fair-trade organization marketing the wares of rural craftswomen and now has expanded to become a chain of shops selling fashion and home dećor – still made by rural artisans. BRAC Bank, established in 2001, was a natural extension of BRAC’s economic development-related activities.

Structure and Governance BRAC’s Governing Body consists of 16 members, with Fazle Hasan Abed serving as Chair. An Executive Director manages the various development programs, while a separate Managing Director oversees BRAC’s enterprises. Additionally there is an Executive Director for BRAC’s International Programmes. An ombudsman was also installed.

Funding In 2007, BRAC’s revenues amounted to more than US $300 million. BRAC reports that it has brought the proportion of donor coverage of its expenditures from 100% in 1980 to some 20% in 2007. The bulk of its income derives primarily from service charges on loans to VO members, income-generating projects, and revenue generated by support enterprises.

Major Contributions/Accomplishments In the early 1970s following the Liberation War, BRAC helped rebuild war-ravaged Bangladesh. Since then, it has grown to become one of the largest povertyoriented NGOs in the world, affecting millions of people, and a pioneer in poverty reduction and development approaches. BRAC has also blazed trails in South-South cooperation by transferring its approach to other Asian and African countries. In 2008, BRAC received the Conrad N. Hilton Humanitarian Prize for its work to alleviate human suffering and has consistently (twice) won the CGAP Financial Transparency Award for its annual reports and financial statements.

Cross-References

▶ Abed, Fazle Hasan ▶ NGOs and Socioeconomic Development ▶ Nonproft Sector and Poverty Reduction ▶ Transparency

References/Further Readings Ahmed, M. (1977). BRAC. Building human infrastructure to serve the rural poor. Essex, CT: International Council for Educational Development. Economics and Governance of Nongovernmental Organizations in Bangladesh. Bangladesh Development Series Paper No 11. Edited

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2006 by the World Bank Office Dhaka, from http://siteresources. worldbank.org/BANGLADESHEXTN/Resources/NGOreport_Dev_ Series.pdf Rhode, J. E. (Ed.) (2005). Learning to reach health for all. Thirty years of instructive experience at BRAC. Dhaka, Bangladesh: The University Press Limited. Smillie, I. (2009). Freedom from want: The remarkable success story of BRAC, the global grassroots organization that’s winning the fight against poverty. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.

been concerned with the maintenance of a consistent style and tone of voice and ensuring that a consistent personality is projected (Tapp, 1996). Furthermore, Grounds (2005) argues that such practices are the very essence of brand management, irrespective of whether an organization’s management chooses to call them as such.

Definition

Brands and Branding JANE HUDSON University of the West of England, Bristol, UK

Introduction The twenty-first century has seen companies recognize the power of a strong brand. At the time when the global economy is subject to changing market dynamics and heightened competition, the role of brands in the commercial domain has never been greater. Furthermore, with the war in the Middle East causing political and economic unease, investors, customers, and employees are questioning whom they can trust; the ability of a familiar brand to deliver proven value is undeniable (Khermouch, 2002). Brands and brand management have been key focal areas for academics and practitioners alike. The ability of a strong brand to differentiate itself from similar competitors is not in question. Nonprofit branding appears to have come of age. The Habitat for Humanity brand, for example, was recently valued at $1.8 billion (Quelch et al., 2004) reinforcing the significance of the practice of branding to nonprofit organizations. It is argued that such recognition is well overdue. Historically, nonprofits have been relatively slow to adopt branding practices because of difficulties in committing internal stakeholders to the process (Grounds & Harkness, 1996) and a perception on the part of some nonprofit managers that branding is too ‘‘commercial’’ or even immoral (Ritchie et al., 1998). Furthermore, there has been concern that formally recognizing a charity as a brand may have a negative impact on donations as potential donors may believe those to be unjustifiable expenses and inappropriate use of donors’ money involved in branding (Grounds, 2005). Despite this underlying reticence to use ‘‘commercial’’ terminology, nonprofit organizations have increasingly

There are various definitions presented in the branding literature largely because as brands have evolved in the last century, they have become a complex means of, sometimes unspoken, communication between the brand owner and the consumer. Each definition tends to emphasize rather different dimensions of brands or the way that they may enhance or detract from consumer relationships. Historically, these definitions have been largely based around the physical product and explain how any combination of the name, term, sign, or design can be used to differentiate the brand from its competition. The notion of brands as differentiating devices has perhaps received the most attention in the literature. Brands can be differentiated on the basis of their tangible performance attributes and symbolic representational functions (Bhat & Reddy, 1998). The latter says something about the buyer – a statement of who they are and who they aspire to be. It is, therefore, perceived that brands reassure and enhance consumer self-perception and enable consumers to differentiate on that basis (de Chernatony & Dall’Olmo Riley, 1997, 1998). In addition, they can also satisfy experiential needs, in that they can provide sensory pleasure, variety, and stimulation (Whan Park et al., 1986). These too can provide the basis for differentiation. However, it has been argued that such productbased definitions are dated as they are too preoccupied with the physical product, too mechanical, and too input-orientated (Crainer, 1995). Furthermore, in the context of nonprofit brands, it fails to take into account the intangible, service orientated nature of nonprofit organizations. Gardener and Levy’s (1955: 7) definition focuses on a brand as a more complex symbol, which is representative of a variety of ideas, attributes, and bodies of association that are communicated to consumers over a period of time. In this vein, authors such as de Chernatony and Dall’Olmo Riley (1998) have posited brands in a more holistic manner and have considered various themes such as brands as a legal instrument, as a differentiating devise, as a company, as an identity system, as an image in consumers’ minds, as a personality, as a relationship, as adding value, and as an evolving entity. In the nonprofit

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context, these definitions are particularly helpful as they identify the need to consider not only all that is associated with the brand name but also all the brand activities. More contemporary is the holistic definition offered by the United Kingdom’s National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children brand, which encompasses who they are, what they say, and what they do and the set of relationships built on that.

Historical Background It is thought that the roots of brands lie in Greek and Roman times, where signs or route descriptions to shops were carved in stone and there were markings (thought to be brands) applied to pieces of silver (Riezebos, 2003). Given the widespread illiteracy in this era, the signs used by traders were pictures or maps of where the products were sold and were the only way to effectively communicate with the consumer. In Europe, the English word ‘‘brand’’ was probably conceived in the Middle Ages as a degenerate of the old Norse word brandr, which refers to the branding of cattle to denote ownership. At this time, three types of signs were used on products: craftsman, guild, and city signs. The craftsman signs were a method of identification and normally applied to the bottom of a product, as such they had little effect on stimulating purchase unlike today’s brands (Riezebos, 2003). The guild marks were used to guarantee the quality of a product and may be comparable to the contemporary quality certificates such as those used in the precious metal and gem industries. A city sign was used to state where the product was made as is like the contemporary ‘‘made in’’ assurance. After the Middle Ages, the use of branding developed as trade increased and tradesmen wished to be recognized for their products. This development is particularly noticeable in the alcoholic drinks sector (e.g., Drambuie, 1745), probably due to the nonperishable nature of the product. Such brands could survive long journeys and, as such, were marketed over a wider geographical area. The demand for branded goods notably increased with the advent of the Industrial Revolution (1830–1870), and many brands that are still available today, such as Levi’s (1850) and Heinz (1869), were developed. Riezebos (2003) argues that three factors contributed to the development of branded goods: 1. The migration of the population into industrial areas leading to urbanization and inability to produce their own goods led to an increase in demand for prepackaged goods.

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2. Mass production and improved infrastructure improved the transport of goods, making them more widely available. 3. An increase in the number of shops and grocers increased the availability of goods. Despite these improved market conditions, branding at this time is not comparable to branding in the twenty-first century. There was little or no brand advertising conducted throughout the Industrial Revolution and the distribution power lay with the wholesale trader (de Chernatony & McDonald, 1992). The wholesaler controlled the producer and the availability of goods in the grocers. This changed toward the end of the nineteenth century, when the manufacturer-owned brand became more prevalent (Riezebos, 2003). The manufacturer-owned label became more dominant in the twentieth century when the power in the distribution chain shifted toward the manufacturer. The demand for prepackaged goods grew as consumers demanded a constant price and quality product. As products developed, the manufacturer’s trademark became more important to the consumer, and manufacturers starting using advertising in the early twentieth century to stimulate greater demand (de Chernatony & McDonald, 1992). As the market became more competitive, manufacturers realized that they needed to expand their product range to gain competitive advantage. This led to the introduction of brand and category managers that considered the company’s portfolio of brands. With the advent of more effective transport and communication links, international trade increased and the global brand developed. Within the nonprofit sector, Roberts Wray (1994) was one of the first to acknowledge and debate the relevance of branding. He argued that charities could brand in the same way as commercial organizations. Managing a nonprofit as a brand should enhance it by emphasizing its strengths and projecting its distinct beliefs and values to its stakeholders (Saxton, 1995). Clearly, these views are controversial, and there are heated debates surrounding such commercial practices in the nonprofit arena.

Key Issues The Importance of Branding in Nonprofits

Branding is of critical importance to nonprofits because it can impact dramatically on income generation (Dixon, 1996; Grounds & Harkness, 1998) and has consistently been shown to assist fund-raising. Furthermore, a strong brand can convey the values and beliefs of a nonprofit to potential donors and suggest very persuasive

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reasons as to why it might be worthy of support (Dixon, 1996). This is significant as it has been argued that, where donors lack knowledge of the charities’ image, they may either ignore or distort a communications message to excuse themselves from making a donation (Bendapudi & Singh, 1996). There are, however, four key ways in which branding is of benefit to nonprofit organizations. First, brands are considered an aid to learning and can be used as a tool to educate members of the public. A nonprofit is not working from a ‘‘zero base’’ if members of the public are already familiar with a charity’s brand, their name, and the values associated with that name. Through branding, there will already be a fundamental understanding of the work the organization undertakes and its values in the minds of potential supporters. Second, it is argued that branding reduces risk for a donor. Using ‘‘Agency theory’’ donors are effectively using nonprofits to act as their agents in disbursing funds. Donors may see evidence of an individual charity’s performance in their brand image. Where fund-raising relies on impersonal communications such as direct mail, press, or radio advertising, the brand’s image will be particularly important as the donor may be completely reliant on their perception of the organization in deciding whether to offer a donation. Third, brands can serve to enhance trust between a nonprofit and its donors/potential donors (Tapp, 1996). Brands provide assurance that an organization is worthy of trust and that funds donated will be used in a manner consistent with standards that have been established over time (Ritchie et al., 1998). Finally, branding can also offer a form of reputation insurance to a nonprofit. Having built up a consistent image over time that becomes trusted and increasingly well-understood, short-term crises can be survived. The Aramony scandal, for example, rocked the United Way in the United States. The chief executive was accused of wasting donated funds on unnecessary flights on the Concord. In the short term, this had a dramatic impact on donations. However, the reputation of the organization is very strong, and it quickly regained donations and its relative position in the market (Sargeant & Jay, 2004). Brand Constituents

There are many elements of brands that can be actively managed over time. Broadly speaking, such elements are largely categorized by whether they are rational or emotional (de Chernatony & Dall’Olmo, 1998). The rational elements of brands include the physical benefits and functional attributes. The emotional elements include brand image, brand personality, brand essence, and the added value that it offers.

The rational elements of the brand are perhaps easier to understand and within the nonprofit context would refer to the functional physical benefits provided by an organization. For example, Cancer Research UK may use their brand to convey information about the research undertaken and the practical benefits (such as improving survival rates) of the work undertaken. The emotional elements are less tangible and are concerned with how the brand makes the donor feel and what the brand says about that donor. The brand can be seen as representative of the donor. Arguably, the most critical of these emotional elements is that of brand personality which has been accepted by practitioners and academics alike in the commercial sector. Furthermore, the notion of brand personality is being explored in the nonprofit sector (Hudson, 2008). Research suggests that brand personality helps to differentiate brands, develops the emotional aspects of the brand, and augments the personal meaning of a brand to the consumer (Aaker, 1997; Crask & Laskey, 1990). In its most simplistic form, brand personality can be described as the human characteristics associated with a brand (Aaker, 1997). Expanding on this definition, brand personality is operationalized by literally personifying a brand. The brand performs ‘‘intentional behaviours’’ and consumers make attributions about the brand’s personality such as its character and values (Aaker, 1995: 392). The management of brand personality is rather complex as it considers how a brand can be imbued with particular human and emotional characteristics (Hudson, 2008). Furthermore, it has been argued that the emotional elements of branding have dominated consumer brand management. McEnally and de Chernatony (1999) posit that individuals form a self-concept based on their perception of the response of others to their brand choice. As such, they choose symbolic brands with common values and ascribe attributes or status to others by their ability to purchase these specific brands. Brands, thus, become a means of self-representation and communicating values to others. Additionally, when consumers make brand choices, they assess the projected personality of the brand and how it might represent them, thus choosing brands with the personality that they wish to project. Brand personality is built and communicated to consumers through the use of advertising and other elements of the marketing mix (Aaker, 1997). Where consumers accept a brand personality they know what the brand stands for, develop opinions of the brand, and have an ‘‘‘active awareness.’’ The brand transcends being just another product, and it is argued that the consumer can develop a relationship with the brand (Fournier, 1991).

Brands and Branding

Within the nonprofit context there has been little empirical work conducted into brand personality, despite the acceptance that branding, and brand personality as a key element of brand, is critical especially to fund-raising. In choosing to purchase brands with particular personalities, consumers can seek to convey representation of themselves and reinforce their self-image (Fournier, 1991). This may be equally important in the nonprofit sector, as research has shown that the act of offering a donation can bestow an identity on the donor (Schwartz, 1967). This identity is likely to vary; however, Yavas et al., (1980) suggest that a generous, loving self-image has more importance for donors than non-donors. Sargeant et al. (forthcoming) explored how charity personalities may be structured and whether there are some personality traits that may be considered generic to the sector. Their research highlighted that donors appear to ‘‘imbue’’ an organization with specific characteristics by virtue of its charitable status. The analysis also suggests that these common/shared characteristics reflect the voluntary, benevolent nature of nonprofits and the role that they play in instigating change. Consequently, they recommend that charity marketers consider the nature of the emotional stimulant used and the voice projected by the charity, the character of their service provision, and the extent to which the organization can be perceived as traditional when seeking to differentiate their brand. This work suggests that charity brands may not be as distinct as previously thought. However, further research is warranted to explore this interesting notion.

Future Directions Branding literature within the nonprofit domain is still growing as research attempts to explore this complex notion outside of the commercial sector from which it originated. It is important to recognize that despite branding’s obvious advantages some parties, including donors and internal stakeholders, may be hostile toward the organization spending money on building and maintaining a brand. Spruill (2001) has argued that branding creates barriers to collaborative partnerships with each other for service delivery or fund-raising. Brand managers are unwilling to confuse or dilute their brand by being involved in partnerships. Furthermore, Spruill argues that branding increases competition between charities for greater visibility which will not directly benefit the intended beneficiaries of the charity. However, the reality is that nonprofits have brands whether they wish to call them so or not. The critical issue is finding the most appropriate means to manage these nonprofit brands and as such brand management is necessary and warrants serious management attention.

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Greater clarity is required with regard to the lessons that may be legitimately applied from the commercial sector in respect of nonprofit brand management. Nonprofit branding should be a subject of study in its own right. The issue of brand personality is crucial and the management of this component of nonprofit brands is particularly complex. As discussed by Sargeant, Hudson et al. (forthcoming) some aspects of personality are outside of direct control of any specific organization. Brand personality in the nonprofit context most certainly warrants further investigation. Furthermore, the donor and brand relationship has not been explored in the nonprofit sector.

Cross-References

▶ Donor, Donor Intent ▶ Fundraising ▶ Habitat for Humanity ▶ National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children ▶ Nonprofit Management ▶ Social Marketing ▶ Stakeholders ▶ United Way International

References/Further Readings Aaker, D. A. (1995). Building strong brands, New York: Free Press. Aaker, J. (1997). Dimensions of brand personality. Journal of Marketing Research, 34 August, 347–356. Bendapudi, N., & Singh, S. N. (1996). Enhancing helping behavior: An integrative framework for promotion planning. Journal of Marketing, 60(3), 33–54. Bhat, S., & Reddy, S. (1998). Symbolic and functional positioning of brands. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 15(1), 32–43. Crainer, S. (1995). The real power of brands. Making brands work for competitive advantage. London: Pitman. Crask, M. R., & Laskey, H. A. (1990). A positioning-based decision model for selecting advertising messages. Journal of Advertising Research, 30(S), 32–38. de Chernatony, L., & McDonald, M. (1992). Creating powerful brands: The strategic route to success in consumer, industrial and service markets. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. de Chernatony, L., & Dall’Olmo Riley, F. (1997). The chasm between managers’ and consumers’ views of brands. Journal of Strategic Marketing, 5, 89–104. de Chernatony, L., & Dall’Olmo Riley, F. (1998). Defining a ‘‘brand’’: Beyond the literature with experts’ interpretations. Journal of Marketing Management, 14, 417–443. Dixon, M. (1996). Small and medium sized charities need a strong brand too: Crisis’ experience. Journal of Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Marketing, 2(1), 52–57. Fournier, S. (1991). A meaning-based framework for the study of the consumer-object relations. In R. Holman & M. Soloman (Eds.), Advances in consumer research (Vol. 18, pp. 736–742). Duluth, MN: Association for Consumer Research. Gardener, B., & Levy, S. (1955). The product and the brand. Harvard Business Review, 33 (March–April), 33–39.

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Grounds, J. (2005). Editorial special issue on charity branding. International Journal of Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Marketing, 10, 65–67. Grounds, J., & Harkness, J. (1996). Developing a brand from within: Involving employees and volunteers when developing a new brand position. Journal of Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Marketing, 3(2), 179–184. Hankinson, P. (2001). Brand orientation in the charity sector: A framework for discussion and research. Journal of Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Marketing, 6(3), 1465–4520. Hudson, J. (2008). The branding of charities. In A. Sargeant & W. Wymer (Eds.), The Routledge companion to nonprofit marketing (pp. 65–74). Oxon: Routledge. Khermouch, G. (2002). The best global brands. Business Week (3794), 92–95. McEnally, D. C., & de Chernatony, L. (1999). The evolving nature of branding: consumer and managerial considerations. Journal of Consumer and Market Research, 99(2). Murphy, J. M. (1990). Brand strategy. Cambridge: Director Books. Quelch, J. A., Austin, J. E., & Laidler-Kylander, N. (2004). Mining gold in the not-for-profit brands. Harvard Business Review, 82(4), 24. Riezebos, R. (2003). Brand management: A theoretical and practical approach. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited. Ritchie, R. J. B., Swami, S., & Weinberg, C. (1998). A brand new world. International Journal of Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Marketing, 4, 26–42. Roberts Wray, B. (1994) Branding, product development and positioning the charity. Journal of Brand Management, 1(6), 350–370. Sargeant, A., & Jay, E. (2004). Fundraising management. London: Routledge. Sargeant, A., Hudson, J., & West, D. (forthcoming). Conceptualising brand values in the charity sector: The relationship between sector, cause and organisation. Service Industry Journal. Saxton, J. A. (1995). Strong charity brand comes from strong beliefs and values. Journal of Brand Management, 2(4), 211–220. Schwartz, B. (1967). The social psychology of the gift. American Journal of Sociology, 73, 1–11. Spruill, V. (2001). Build brand identity for causes, not groups. Chronicle of Philanthropy, 13 (June), 45. Tapp, A. (1996). Charity brands: A qualitative study of current practice. Journal of Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Marketing, 1, 327–336. Whan Park, C., Jaworski, B., & MacInnis, D. (1986). Strategic brand concept-image management. Journal of Marketing, 50 (October), 135–145. Yavas, U., Riecken, G., & Parameswaran, R. (1980). Using psychographics to profile potential donors. Business Atlanta, 30(5), 41–45.

Bread for the World TIMOTHY R. DAHLSTROM

Introduction Bread for the World is an ecumenical Christian advocacy group dedicated to ending hunger. Its members advocate with United States policy makers to change policies, programs, and conditions that allow hunger and poverty to persist. It is a 501(c)(4) organization. The associated Bread for the World Institute provides policy analysis on hunger and strategies to end it. The Institute educates its advocacy network, opinion leaders, policy makers and the public about hunger in the United States and abroad. It is a 501(c)(3) organization.

Brief History In October 1972, a small group of Catholics and Protestants met to consider how people of faith could be mobilized to influence United States government policies on hunger. In the spring of 1974, the group began to implement its ideas under the leadership of the Reverend Arthur Simon. By year’s end, more than 500 people had joined as citizen advocates for hungry people. Since then, Bread for the World has grown into a nationwide advocacy network.

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas Bread for the World is a collective Christian voice urging decision makers in the United States to end hunger at home and abroad. Its stated focus and motivation is: ‘‘God’s grace in Jesus Christ moves our members to help our neighbors, whether they live in the next house, the next state, or the next continent. Food is a basic need and it is unjust that so many people go without enough to eat.’’ Bread for the World describes itself as, ‘‘A Christian Voice for ending hunger.’’

Activities Working through churches, campuses, and other organizations, Bread for the World engages people in advocacy to end hunger. Members write personal letters and emails to, and meet with their representatives in the United States Congress. In its advocacy activities, Bread for the World works in a bipartisan manner. It also collaborates with other organizations to build the political commitment needed to overcome hunger and poverty.



50 F Street, NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20001 USA www.bread.org

Bread for the World is governed by a Board of Directors under the leadership of a President. Members are individuals, and coalition partners include religious and nonreligious organizations dedicated to the eradication of

Bremner, Robert Hamlett

hunger. The Bread for the World Institute is a member of the Alliance to End Hunger.

Funding The major funding for Bread for the World comes from public contributions and membership, with a smaller portion coming from church and denominational support. For 2007, Bread for the World reported $5,256,750, in revenue, with net assets of $2,507,763.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Bread for the World led the US legislative coalition of the Jubilee movement to reduce the debts of low-income countries. Since 2000, the organization has helped to double US funding for poverty-focused development assistance. Since the late 1990s, Bread for the World has also helped to win increases in nutrition assistance for foodinsecure people in the United States – to a total that now exceeds $50 billion a year.

Cross-References

▶ Charity and Religion ▶ Faith-Based Organizations ▶ Jubilee 2000

References/Further Readings Beckmann, D., & Simon, A. (1999). Grace at the table: Ending hunger in God’s world. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press. Simon, A. (1985). Bread for the world. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing.

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continued to write and mentor students. He was the recipient of a number of honors throughout his lifetime including the Distinguished Teaching Award from The Ohio State University and the Lifetime Achievement Award from ARNOVA.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Bremner is recognized as a pioneer in the development of three areas of historical inquiry: poverty, philanthropy, and childhood. Bremner’s 1956 book From the Depths: The Discovery of Poverty in the United States examines shifts in thinking about poverty in the United States from the late nineteenth century through the New Deal. According to Alice O’Connor, this work took a subject absent from the public agenda and ‘‘made it part of the historical canon.’’ In 1960, he published American Philanthropy, an historical overview of benevolent activity in America. Historians such as David Hammack have pointed out the importance of the book as defining a new topic for historical study. In many respects the book is dated by today’s standards. It has little to say about the role of women or racial and ethnic groups. Writing prior to the Filer Commission and the conception of the ‘‘Third Sector,’’ Bremner’s characterization of philanthropy lacks definition. In addition, he has little to say about the sometimes complex motives behind American benevolence. Despite these limitations, the book remains an important starting point for many interested in the evolution of American philanthropy. Along with Philippe Aries and Erik Erikson, Bremner is recognized for his role in stimulating historical research on childhood. In 1966, Bremner was named lead editor for Children and Youth in America, a three-volume documentary history of children in the United States spanning the years 1600–1970. Like most of Bremner’s work, Children and Youth is useful to both scholars and practitioners.

Cross-References Basic Biographical Information Robert Bremner was an American social historian whose work focuses on benevolence and social welfare. Born in Brunswick, Ohio, Bremner received his B.A. from BaldwinWallace College (1935) and the MA (1939) and Ph.D. (1943) from The Ohio State University. During WWII he worked in Washington, D.C. as a civilian employee of the War Department and the Red Cross. From 1946 to 1980 he was a member of the history department of The Ohio State University during which time he advised over 40 Ph.D. students. After his retirement in 1980, Bremner

▶ ARNOVA ▶ Philanthropy in North America

References/Further Readings Bremner, R. H. (1956). From the depths: The discovery of poverty in America. New York: New York University Press. Bremner, R. H. (1960, 1988). American philanthropy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bremner, R. H. (1970). Children and youth in America (Vols. I–III). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hammack, D. (2003). Robert Bremner and the study of philanthropy in the US: Four appraisals. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32, 439.

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Brookings Institution

Brookings Institution ALLYSON REAVES

Address of Organization 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW Washington, DC 20036 USA www.brookings.edu

Introduction The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization conducting high-quality, independent research to strengthen democracy and secure a cooperative international social system. Through its conferences, publications, and other activities, Brookings operates as an analyst and a critic that is committed to providing research, policy recommendations, and analysis on a full range of public policy issues. Brookings scholars regularly provide reporters with commentary, analysis, and background information; appear on television and radio programs; testify before US Congress; and brief policymakers and their staff on important current issues.

Brief History The Brookings Institution traces its beginnings to 1916, just before the US entry into WWI, when Robert S. Brookings joined a group of government reformers in creating the Institute for Government Research (IGR), the first private organization devoted to analyzing public policy issues at the national level. Brookings also created two sister organizations: the Institute of Economics in 1922 and a graduate school in 1924. In 1927, the institutes and the school merged to form the present-day Brookings Institution, with the mission to promote, conduct, and foster research ‘‘in the broad fields of economics, government administration, and the political and social sciences.’’ During the war, the institution fell under the management of the National Defense Council. Once the council ended, the Brookings Institution analyzed issues of national concern such as the budgetary consolidation of the country. During World War II, the research organization worked on investigating prices control and war economy. Later, in 1946, it focused on rebuilding Europe and assisted with the development of the Marshall Plan.

Mission/Objective/Focus Area The Brookings’ mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to

provide innovative, practical recommendations that advance three broad goals: strengthen American democracy; foster the economic and social welfare, security and opportunity of all Americans; and secure a more open, safe, prosperous, and cooperative international system.

Activities The core work of the Brookings Institution addresses existing and emerging policy issues while offering practical approaches to solving them to policy-makers as well as the general public. It is devoted to improving the performance of American institutions and the quality of the policies they make. Brookings’s work is conducted in five program research areas (Economic Studies, Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development, Governance Studies, and Metropolitan Policy), and under these program areas falls the management of ten specialized policy centers (which focus on specific subjects ranging from Asian Policy Studies to Social and Economic Dynamics), and the research is classified into 24 major projects.

Structure and Governance The 50 Trustees and 58 Honorary Trustees serve 3-year terms and meet three times a year. The Board’s role is to provide governance of the business and affairs of the Institution, approve the fields of scholarly research, and preserve the independence of the Institution’s work.

Funding The Brookings Institution is supported largely by an endowment and through contributions from philanthropic foundations, corporations, and private individuals. Though it is not directly supported by the government, Brookings undertakes government contract studies. By reserving the right to publish its findings from them, it maintains its independence from governmental control.

Accomplishments In the 1990s, the federal government devolved many of its social programs back to cities and states, and Brookings shaped a new generation of urban policies to help build strong neighborhoods, cities, and metropolitan regions. As President Bill Clinton prepared to sign historic welfare reform legislation, experts at Brookings teamed up to study the nation’s policies on children and families. In 2001, a Brookings proposal for a child tax credit became part of major tax legislation.

Buffett, Warren Edward

Cross-References ▶ Lobbying ▶ Think Tanks

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▶ Civil Society Theory: Smith, Adam ▶ Public Choice



Brainerd, W., & Perry, G. (Eds.) (2003). Brookings papers on economic activity. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1985). The reason of rules: Constitutional political economy (Vol. 10). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buchanan, J. M. (1975). The limits of liberty: Between anarchy and leviathan. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Collected Works of James M. Buchanan by Liberty Fund, Inc. Reisman, D. (1990). The political economy of James Buchanan. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.

Buchanan, James McGill GORDON SHOCKLEY

Basic Biographical Information Born in Murfreesboro, Tennessee (USA) in 1919, James McGill Buchanan, Jr. is an American economist. He received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 ‘‘for his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decisionmaking,’’ which is known as public choice theory. Professor Buchanan earned a B.A. from Middle Tennessee State College in 1940, a M.S. from the University of Tennessee in 1941, and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1948. Before joining the economics faculty at George Mason University (GMU) in the 1980s, he taught and conducted research at the University of Virginia, UCLA, and the Virginia Polytechnic Institute. At GMU he presently serves as the advisory general director of the James Buchanan Center for Political Economy.

Major Contributions Public choice theory is James Buchanan’s major contribution. In its essence the application of microeconomic principles to politics, public choice theory is premised on the insight that individuals act in their own self-interest not only in market settings such as commerce but also in nonmarket settings such as politics and civil society. (In the term public choice, ‘‘public’’ refers to people and ‘‘choice’’ to selecting among alternatives.) Buchanan’s public choice ideas have been applied widely in constitutional political economy. Buchanan once wrote, ‘‘The American constitutional structure is in disarray.’’ According to Reisman (1990), Buchanan is influenced by Adam Smith’s ideas of the minimal state and liberal economics and Knut Wicksell’s insight that ‘‘a rule of unanimity for reaching collective decisions provides the institutional analogue to two-person trade in strictly private or partitionable goods’’ (p. 4).

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Buffett, Warren Edward DAVID B. HOWARD

Basic Biographical Information Warren E. Buffett was born in 1930 – less than a year after the stock market crash – in Omaha, Nebraska, and would become one of the world’s most successful investors, the world’s richest person, and one of the most prominent philanthropists in history. Filing his first tax return at the age of 13, Buffett showed early signs of business acumen and would eventually earn the nickname ‘‘The Oracle of Omaha.’’ After studying business at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and economics at the University of Nebraska and Columbia University, Buffett began an immensely successful career as a businessman. When he was 26 years old, Buffett created Buffett Partnership, Ltd., an investment partnership. Over the next few years, Buffett would create several more partnerships, finding myriad lucrative investment opportunities. In 1965, he took over the textile firm Berkshire Hathaway, which became a holding company for his highly profitable investments over the years. In 2008, Forbes Magazine named Buffett the richest man in the world, surpassing Bill Gates, with a net worth of approximately $62 billion. Buffett still resides in the same Omaha home that he purchased in 1958 for $31,500.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions In 2006, Buffett made the largest charitable donation in history when he pledged to gradually give 85% of his Berkshire stock to five foundations (valued at $37 billion in 2006). The largest portion – 10 million shares of

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Berkshire Hathaway stock – was pledged to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (valued at approximately $30.7 billion at the time the gift was made). According to Gates, Buffett’s contribution – amounting to about $1.7 billion a year – will be used to seek cures for the world’s worst diseases and improve the US education system. Along with the historic gift to Gates, Buffett made the request that all the money be distributed in the year it is donated and not added to the foundation’s assets for future giving. Buffett’s gift to the Gates Foundation represented a significant piece of his plan to give away the bulk of his fortune to charity. The other foundation gifts that Buffett is making will go to foundations headed by Buffett’s three children, Susan, Howard, and Peter, and to the Susan Thompson Buffett Foundation. The latter was for 40 years known simply as the Buffett Foundation and was recently renamed in honor of Buffett’s late wife, Susie, who died in 2004. The foundation has mainly focused on reproductive health, family planning, and pro-choice causes, and on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Buffets’ gifts made the Foundation one of the largest in 2007, with assets nearing $4 billion.

Cross-References

▶ Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation ▶ Foundations, Family ▶ Grantmaking Foundations

References/Further Readings Buffet, W., & Cunningham, L. (2008). The essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for corporate America (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: The Cunningham Group. Kilpatrick, A. (1998). Of permanent value: The story of Warren Buffett. New York: McGraw-Hill. Lowenstein, R. (1995). Buffett: The making of an American capitalist. New York: Random House. Schroeder, A. (2008). Snowball: Warren Buffett and the business of life. New York: Bantam Books.

Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen FREYA BRUNE

Address of Organization Haus Deutscher Stiftungen Mauerstr. 93 10117 Berlin Germany www.stiftungen.org

Introduction The Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen (BVDS) represents the consortium of foundations in Germany. Its constitution describes its purpose as supporting ‘‘the charitable foundation sector in Germany.’’ As an umbrella organization, the BVDS represents an overall number of approx. 6,000 foundations.

Brief History In 1948, the representatives of the larger foundations in Germany joined into the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Wohlta¨tigkeits-, Erziehungs- und Kultus-Stiftungen (Working Group of German Charitable, Educational, and Cultural Foundations), which later developed into the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Stiftungen (Working Group of German Foundations). It became the agency of the German foundations, and its work added to the strengthening and acknowledgment of the German foundation system. Since 1986 it carries its current name: Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen to underline its national importance. In 1990, the members determined the official statute and thus defined it as a registered association (Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen e.V.). In 2008, the BVDS was awarded ‘‘Association of the Year’’ by the 11th German Association Congress.

Mission The formal mission of the BVDS is the support of the public welfare oriented foundation landscape. The association is attending to the interests of foundations that follow charitable, church related or benevolent goals. Furthermore, the BVDS seeks to foster foundation cooperation and networks. Through the creation and improvement of a foundation-friendly climate and the enhancement of the foundations’ effectiveness, as well as the advancement of the legal and fiscal framework for foundations requirements, the BVDS aims at creating a more stable, active, and free democratic civil society.

Activities In order to fulfill its mission, the BVDS is carrying out different activities, such as the support of research projects, the arrangement of events and publications, public relations, data collection and documentation, education, and further training, international exchange, awards to institutions and individuals who have rendered outstanding services to the foundation landscape, as well as consultancy for foundations and sponsors.

Business and Employers’ Associations

Furthermore, the BVDS organizes the German Foundation Day, bestows the KOMPASS Award for good public relations work of foundations, and edits a variety of publications, such as the magazine ‘‘Stiftungswelt,’’ the foundation yearbook, and the annual ‘‘Stiftungs Report.’’ On the European level, the BVDS works closely together with the European Foundation Center (EFC).

Structure and Governance The BVDS is a nonprofit organization, divided into five departments, with one head each. All heads build together the association board, led by a secretary general. In 2008 the secretary general was Dr. Hans Fleisch, who also holds the position of the federal commissioner for civic engagement, which leads to a rare close attachment between the BVDS and the German government. Outside the organizational structure, but connected, stands the Deutsche Stiftungs Akademie (DSA – German Foundation Academy), which is a joint project of the BVDS and the Stifterverband der Deutschen Wissenschaft. Overall, the BVDS has 30 employees. In 2008, the BVDS had 3,200 listed members, the largest part being foundations (approx. 2,500), the other being foundations’ administrators (individuals and legal entities). Due to the latter, the BVDS itself claims to represent approx. 6,000 members in total, which are 40% of approx. 15,000 foundations in (2008) all over Germany.

Funding The revenues of the association come from member fees and donations. In its statute the BVDS bounds itself to the exclusive disposition of funds for charitable and statutory purposes.

Accomplishments The BVDS supports third sector research via informing about the activities of the sector, the awarding of good practices, and producing a variety of publications about the foundation system in Germany.

Cross-References

▶ European Foundation Centre ▶ Stifterverband der Deutschen Wissenschaft ▶ Umbrella Organizations

References/Further Readings BVDS. (2001). Zahlen, Daten, Fakten zum deutschen Stiftungswesen. Darmstadt, Germany: Darmstadt Hoppenstedt. BVDS. (2007). Stiftungsjahr 2006. Berlin, Germany: Trigger.Medien. GmbH.

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Business and Employers’ Associations BERNHARD EBBINGHAUS, SEBASTIAN KOOS Universita¨t Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

Introduction According to Friedrich Engels, business is always organized and therefore does not need a formal association. Nevertheless traditional guilds and craftsmen associations existed before the first trade unions were founded. With the industrial and democratic revolutions the organization of business interests changed substantially, first challenging and later becoming an important partner for organized labor. Research on business and employers’ associations is less advanced and more recent than research on labor unions. Comparatively, business interest organizations are often more powerful and more specialized than labor interest organizations.

Definition A business association (BA) is a voluntary organization of enterprises (or entrepreneurs) that represents the interests of (for-profit) business in the political arena and provides services to its members. As trade associations, these organizations promote the economic interests of a particular sector, be it in relation to international trade (fostering export, limiting import), favorable economic conditions (tax concessions and subsidies), or sector-specific issues (industrial norms, joint research and development, advertisement). Peak associations unify these BAs under one umbrella and represent their interests on a national or even international level. Some of these organizations include besides the economic interests of companies also the function of employer associations. In some cases, instead of formal associations of companies, ‘‘clubs’’ of entrepreneurs or networks of managers (CEOs) play an influential role in coordinating business interests. In addition, chambers organize business interests, particularly of small and medium sized companies and artisanal trades. These chambers promote the interests of local business and provide common services, e.g., coordinating vocational training. In some countries, membership in the respective local or national chamber is mandatory, while some international chambers are set up to promote multilateral trade and business relations. An employer association (EA) represents the interests of employers (entrepreneurs or companies) in the industrial relations and political arena. These voluntary organizations engage in collective bargaining with labor unions

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on wage and working conditions, they also engage in lobbying of political decision-makers on matters of labor law and social policy. In contrast to trade unions that organize workers, EAs organize companies from small shop owners with few employees to large multinational companies with a separation between managers and owners (shareholders). In several countries and many sectors, companies may engage in bargaining with local unions by themselves and larger companies can afford to lobby political decision-makers separately thereby circumventing EAs. Some EAs organize only private companies, while others are constituted by or include public administration, state owned companies and not-for-profit organizations, including churches and NGOs.

Historical Background Historically three factors have been crucial for the development of business (and employers’) associations, all of which foster specific interests: labor relations, competition, and public policy. At the end of the nineteenth century, employers ‘‘colluded’’ in reaction to the collective organization of their workers in strike action and increasingly in trade unions (Crouch, 1993), first by opposing, later by recognizing them. While larger companies were capable to react single handedly, small-, and medium-sized firms were often the first to form a ‘‘cartel’’ on the labor market and coordinate lock outs-against strike action. With the increased recognition of collective bargaining, particularly after its breakthrough during and after World War I, the formation of EAs boomed and peak associations were formed in many industrializing countries. Following the integration of national labor markets and the rise of national welfare states, EAs engaged not only in multiemployer collective bargaining, but they also sought to lobby lawmakers in respect to the increased regulation of employment and expansion of social rights. Antiunion activities such as yellow unions or black lists against unionized workers were outlawed in some countries after 1918 and internationally after 1948. Another reason to form BAs was to ensure political voice in emerging democratic systems. With the introduction of universal suffrage, the majority of voters were dependent employees, thus entrepreneurs faced the risk of state intervention into business and employer prerogatives. BAs promote the idea of a liberal market economy, with private ownership, free trade and a non-interventionist state. Hence in countries with state-owned sectors they push for privatization. In many instances, BAs seek to fight redistributive policies, direct state intervention, and codetermination since these policies are seen as a threat to business autonomy and private property. To meet their

objectives organized business relies on the one hand on public communication geared towards a wider public audience and on the other hand on informal channels of lobbying public bureaucracies and political actors. By means of public relations, BAs try to promote and gain public support for their policy recommendations; they often operate special bureaus, close to lawmakers’ offices, for instance, the US policy-makers in Washington or EU Commission in Brussels, thereby getting easier access. A third reason for business to form ‘‘cartels’’ was to prevent foreign competition and to limit the dependence on providers of raw materials. For keeping foreign business at bay and controlling suppliers, tariff unions were established. While generally pushing for free trade, cutthroat competition or a monopoly can threaten the functioning of the whole economic system. Therefore in some countries BAs came to agree on coordination. Especially in neo-corporatist systems a tripartite mode of concerted action between employers’ associations, labor unions and the state came into existence to prevent wage competition. On the international level, the International Organization of Employers (IOE) was founded in 1920 in response to the formation of the ‘‘tripartite’’ International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1918 with representatives of national governments, employers, and trade unions. Initially an organization of industrialized countries, the IOE today organizes over 140 national peak employers’ associations in the member-states of ILO, a special division of the United Nations since 1945. With increased European economic and political integration after World War II, UNICE coordinated business and employers’ interests at a European level following the Common Market in 1957. Today, BUSINESSEUROPE (renamed in 2007) organizes 40 national peak associations from 34 countries, including all member states of the European Union plus several other countries.

Key Issues Power Asymmetry Between Organized Capital and Labor

Pluralist theory postulates that in liberal democracies interest groups compete equally for influence, while neo-Marxist and corporatist approaches assume that capital has more structural power than labor in influencing public policy and determining employment relations. Offe and Wiesenthal (1980), building upon Marxist class theory, postulated ‘‘two logics of collective action’’ to the advantage of organized capital and to the detriment of labor. Capitalists are a smaller group with more narrow


instrumental interests and plentiful (financial) resources; they can also use their structural power by going separately, while workers are a much larger and heterogeneous group with diffuse political and economic interests that have to rely on collective action for lack of individual bargaining power. Comparative studies on business and employers’ associations in OECD countries (Traxler, 1995) have challenged this thesis. Although employer associations are more concentrated and better organized than trade unions, ‘‘producer coalitions’’ are more fragmented and narrower, given the competitive pressures within each sector and the anti-cartel policies in market economies. Corporatist analyses studied the self-regulative function of business interests, in particular in respect to standard setting, vocational training, and labor relations (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985), indicating substantial crossnational variations in the degree of corporatist interest intermediation. The increased global competition and the political turn toward neo-liberal policies has been seen as a factor limiting the potential for corporatism, although in some European countries a renaissance of ‘‘social pacts’’ between government, employers, and organized labor occurred following the European Monetary Union. Internationalization of Business Interests

The promotion of international trade, free market institutions and foreign direct investments need not much coordination at global level as multinational companies often can do this on their own and international competition has been hampering supranational cooperation. The organization of employers’ interests has been particularly problematic, even though EAs are represented on the international governmental organizations (e.g., ILO, OECD). Within the European Union (EU), EAs were reluctant to give up competencies, in particular to allow negotiations at supranational level, thereby limiting the possibilities to reregulate at EU-level what was deregulated with the ‘‘Internal Market’’ since 1992. After longer efforts to foster European ‘‘social dialogue’’ between capital and labor since the 1970s, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introduced the possibility to negotiate EU-level agreements between employers and trade unions on social issues that would otherwise be legislated by the European Union; this led to a reallocation of resources and competencies at the EU-level and some joint agreements (Sadowski and Jacobi, 1991). Role of Business in Policy Making

In one perspective business associations are perceived as ‘‘cartels in disguise,’’ that are more or less undermining antitrust laws and democratic institutions. In a different

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view, they are said to enhance democracy in at least three distinct ways by checking power, by representing interests, and by direct governance (Fung, 2003). Firstly, business associations contribute to democratic governance by checking power and resisting illegitimate authority. There is empirical evidence that especially in young democracies business associations help overcoming corruption, by monitoring public officials and signaling resistance to law violations (Duvanova, 2007). BAs thereby become agents of development, assisting in establishing core economic and democratic institutions. Secondly, their core feature is the representation of business interests, channelling and transmitting the needs and preferences of the business community to governments. As an intermediary between state and companies, BAs assume the role of pressure groups, seeking to influence legislative decision-makers and governmental agencies through legal actions, law expertise, party support and lobbyism. This raises also the issue of asymmetric power, if not illegitimate influence. Business associations are accused of using ‘‘money for politics’’ and thereby threatening the functioning of democracies. A third way of enhancing democracy is by direct self-governance. In some – mostly neo-corporatist – countries business (and employers’) associations assume the role of ‘‘private interest governments’’ (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) by self-regulating and implementing policies for the common good. Through collaboration in advisory councils and boards (especially regarding social security, vocational training, and labor administration) they perform a self-regulatory function. This can often be found in compulsory chambers that have the power to control, tax, and even sanction their members in order to produce public goods.

International Perspectives Business (and employer) interests are better organized in OECD economies than elsewhere, though research has largely focused on few (western) European and North American countries, less on Japan and other non-European OECD countries. Given the different historical development during industrialization, there are considerable differences in the organization of business and employer interests across OECD countries. Corporatist theories (Crouch, 1993) as well as the ‘‘Varieties of Capitalism’’ approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001) point at major differences between liberal (or uncoordinated) and corporatist (or coordinated) market economies: the capacity of business and employer interests to overcome collective action problems and coordinate joint activities for the common good is lower in liberal market economies and higher in corporatist countries.

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In liberal market economies (Britain and the USA, but also other Anglophone OECD countries) business and employers’ associations are more fragmented (lacking often a peak association), direct lobbying and collective bargaining by large (multinational) companies coexists, and corporatist social dialogue is rare (an exception is Ireland since the late 1980s). Not only labor unions tend to be less organized with low union density and high fragmentation, but also employer associations have less encompassing membership (in both number of firms and employees employed) and bargaining coverage is considerably lower than in the other countries. Thus a large majority of employees are not covered by collective bargaining and have to negotiate employment conditions individually. Responding to the criticism of a narrow shareholder value orientation, ‘‘corporate social responsibility’’ has been advanced by some business communities in liberal countries as a strategic goal, reaching out to civil society organizations and the local communities. In coordinated market economies a ‘‘stakeholder’’ orientation and corporatist coordination have a long tradition, dating back to the premodern guilds (Crouch, 1993). Business associations, chambers of commerce and artisans, and employer associations tend to be more centralized, better organized in terms of firm membership (and size of workforce covered), and more functionally differentiated (Traxler et al., 2001). These organizations coordinate and join resources to produce common goods for the business community, ranging from lobbying for subsidies to engaging in self-regulation and negotiating nation- or sector-wide collective wage agreements. Enforcing compliance by all members, employers associations have played an important role in taking wages out of competition and providing minimum standards of employment. Interbusiness coordination through chambers facilitates also the organization of dual vocational training (most prominently in Germany) as smaller companies train young people to acquire skills for later employment in larger companies. Outside the OECD countries there is only scattered research on business and employers’ associations, reflecting the more varied organizational landscape. In the postcommunist countries of Eastern and Central Europe and Asia employers are generally perceived to be rather weak or even disorganized. Nevertheless, for instance, in Russia or Slovenia somewhat powerful BAs emerged after communist collapse. In Hungary a compulsory membership in chambers of commerce was introduced, and like in the Czech Republic, tripartite institutions emerged, while in Poland only weak BAs came into existence. BAs in postcommunist countries often assume the role of promoters

for small businesses. Contrary to fears of BAs’ power to exploit governments for business short term interests, they often play a role in establishing economic institutions and helping to overcome problems of bribery and lacking state support for businesses. Many African countries have adopted corporatist elements for example in Senegal, Nigeria, or Madagascar, albeit with less success than in Europe. In some countries BAs have been founded already by the 1960s in line with independence (for instance the Uganda Manufacturing Association). After an era of decline and stagnation due to political and social turmoil many associations have been (re-)established or revitalized by the 1990s. With processes of political democratization BAs increase their access to state bureaucracy and political decision-makers. Today, African BAs seem to fill a gap of governmental services to businesses, like the information on policy environment and granting of access to policy makers. African BAs are perceived as foundations for future progress in democratizing governance (Lucas, 1997). Therefore foreign aid sponsors promote these as agencies not only of business interests, but also of ‘‘social capital,’’ fostering trusted social relations in the wider civil society. In Latin America BAs have been largely shaped by the state following the independence in the nineteenth century (Schneider, 2004). Either the state helped in founding BAs to gain support for its policies or to channel business preferences, or BAs were founded to oppose specific state policies, but even then they gradually shifted and became dependent on the state for resources and access. Countries like Mexico, Colombia, and Chile have strong encompassing business associations, unlike for instance, Brazil and Argentina. Interest representations in the former advance economic performance, and evidence leans toward a positive influence on democracy, even if there are some negative examples. In China BAs have been seen as instruments of the state to retain control during economic decentralization. Nevertheless these associations seem to have gained some autonomy to voice the interests of its members and open up some space for societal initiative.

Future Directions Research in the field of business and employers’ associations is still underdeveloped in many areas; hence many issues still need to be further investigated to get a more systematic understanding of the many facets of business interest organization. The differences in the functioning and organization of BAs in developing and developed countries seem to be a crucial starting point for comparative research. In regard to civil society there seem


to be quite different roles that BAs play in both groups. In developing countries, BAs might be important agencies in building market institutions, but also fostering democratic development, while in the OECD world BAs seem to challenge democratic institutions and developed welfare states, pushing towards liberal market reforms. The question of negative or positive impacts on democratic governance is still a matter of debate in need of more empirical research. Processes of internationalization have especially been studied for the European Union; given its unique institutional set up, these efforts cannot be projected on other international activities. The global economic players such as the USA, the EU and Japan, but also nonOECD economies all face the processes of fast economic globalization and slow political internationalization. Whether this will strengthen or weaken business interests at home and worldwide remains an open question.

Cross-References

▶ Associative Democracy ▶ Collective Action ▶ Corporatism ▶ Interest and Pressure Groups ▶ Interest Politics ▶ Labor Movements/ Labor Unions ▶ Lobbying ▶ Membership and Membership Associations ▶ OECD

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References/Further Readings Crouch, C. (1993). Industrial Relations and European State Traditions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Duvanova, D. (2007). Bureaucratic corruption and collective action Business associations in the postcommunist transition. Comparative Politics, 39(4), 441–461. Fung, A. (2003). Associations and democracy: Between theories, hopes, and realities. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 515–539. Greenwood, J. (Eds.). (2002). The effectiveness of EU business associations. Houndsmills: Palgrave. Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. New York: Oxford University Press. Lucas, J. (1997). The politics of business associations in the developing world. Journal of the Developing Areas, 32(1), 71–96. Maxfield, S., & Schneider, B. R. (Eds.). (1997). Business and the state in developing countries. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Offe, C., & Wiesenthal, H. (1980). Two logics of collective action: Theoretical notes on social class and organisational form. Political Power and Social Theory, 1, 67–115. Sadowski, D., & Jacobi, O. (Eds.). (1991). Employers’ associations in Europe: Policy and organisation. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Schneider, B. R. (2004). Business politics and the state in twentieth-century latin America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Streeck, W., et al. (Eds.). (2006). Governing interests. Business associations facing internationalization. London: Routledge. Streeck, W., & Schmitter, P. C. (Eds.). (1985). Private interest government. Beyond market and state. London: Sage. Traxler, F. (1995). Two logics of collective action in industrial relations? In C. Crouch & F. Traxler (Eds.), Organized industrial relations in Europe: What future? (pp. 23–44). Aldershot: Avebury. Traxler, F., Blaschke, S., & Kittel, B. (2001). National labour relations in internationalized markets: A comparative study of institutions, change, and performance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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C CAF ▶ Charities Aid Foundation (CAF)

Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation RAQUEL CAMPOS FRANCO

inaugurated in 1969 in a park of 7 ha which include the Museum that houses Calouste Gulbenkian’s art collection, a large auditorium with 1,200 places, spaces for temporary exhibitions, a congress area, an Art Library, and a Modern Art Center (opened in 1983). The Instituto Gulbenkian de Cieˆncia, a scientific research institute currently focused on biomedicine, is situated in Oeiras. The Foundation has a delegation in the United Kingdom (UK branch), a cultural centre in Paris (the Calouste Gulbenkian Cultural Centre) and activities in more that 60 countries.

Mission Address of Organization Av. de Berna, 45A 1067-001 Lisboa Portugal www.gulbenkian.pt

Introduction The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation is a Portuguese private institution of public benefit whose statutory aims are in the fields of charity, arts, education, and science. It is one of the largest European foundations, with assets of approximately €3 billion.

Brief History The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation was created as a perpetual institution by a clause in the will of Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian, and its statutes were approved in 1956. Born in 1869 in Istanbul, Calouste would prove to be a visionary investor, having played a crucial role in the shaping of the early oil industry in the Middle East. Having followed a family practice of patronage of the arts and welfare work, he also managed to create a vast collection of pieces of art comprising 5,000 years of art history. During the Second World War he decided to emigrate to the United States, but the journey included a stop in Lisbon, a city he fell in love with and where he would live the 13 final years of his life. By his will Calouste Gulbenkian created an international foundation that would bear his name. The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation started operations immediately in 1956 and its headquarters were

According to its statutes the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation must accomplish four aims – ‘‘charitable, artistic, educational and scientific.’’ With no mission defined, to these purposes is also added that ‘‘the action will be developed, not only in Portugal, but also in any other country that its managers will judge as convenient.’’ Currently, the Foundation operates in Portugal, Europe, Portuguesespeaking countries, worldwide Armenian communities, and internationally.

Activities The Foundation pursues its statutory aims in Portugal and abroad through direct activities and grants supporting projects and programs. It has an orchestra and a choir with performances throughout the year; organizes solo and collective exhibitions of Portuguese and foreign artists; organizes conferences, meetings, and courses; and is actively involved in publishing. The Foundation awards subsidies and scholarships for special studies in Portugal and abroad, and gives support to programs and projects in the fields established in the statutes. It also promotes the Portuguese culture abroad and supports the Armenian Diaspora worldwide in order to preserve its culture and language. The Foundation attempts to be a centre of rationality and excellence for the dissemination of knowledge with new areas of intervention emerging, from the environment to social inclusion.

Structure and Governance The Foundation is managed by a Board of Trustees that can include between three to nine directors. The


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members’ mandates are for renewable 5-year periods and vacancies are filled by appointments approved by vote of all members. There is no limit in the number of mandates, but the age limit for appointment is currently 70. Any direct descendant of the founder holds a lifelong position as member of the Board. The Foundation published in 2007 its Code of Conduct, with the purpose of establishing the general rules and principles of professional ethics and conduct of its workers, and a specific set of principles for the members of the Board of Trustees.

Funding The funding derives mostly from the investment portfolio, from the stocks held in oil and gas interests and, in the late years, also in renewable energy projects. In 2007 the Foundation’s total assets reached €3,142 million and the total net costs €106 million (annual report, 2007). In the last years, the distribution of costs by the statutory purposes privileged the arts, followed by education, science, and charitable purposes. Considering the activity in Portugal and abroad, the division of costs was, in 2006 and 2007, 82% and 18% respectively.

Major Accomplishments The accomplishments of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation throughout its 50 years history are such as to deserve the following statement: ‘‘It is not even possible to imagine the country without Gulbenkian’’ (Barreto, 2007). From the research and projects that would not otherwise have been developed, to the scholarships given in a time where no other institution in Portugal could have given them, to the books that were and are too expensive for others to produce, the itinerant and fixed libraries that served 50 million readers when such services did not exist, to the debate generated in the conferences with the most knowledgeable persons in the world, to the financing of equipment in hospitals, to projects as the recognition of the qualifications of immigrant doctors, to the programs recently created to face pressing issues in the world in the present, as the Gulbenkian Program for the Environment, and so on, the contribution of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation to the Portuguese society and the world is undeniable. The Foundation is also investing growingly in its participation in international networks, being present in shared projects in several domains (global health, migrations, intercultural dialogue).

Cross-References

▶ European Foundation Centre ▶ Foundations, Grantmaking ▶ Foundations, Operating

▶ Gulbenkian, Calouste Sarkis ▶ Philanthropy in Europe

References/Further Readings Barreto, A. (cood.) (2007). Fundaçaõ Calouste Gulbenkian – cinquenta anos, 1956.2006 (Vols. I e II). Lisbon: Fundaçaõ Calouste Gulbenkian. Fundaçaõ Calouste Gulbenkian. (2008). Fundaçaõ Calouste Gulbenkian 1956–2006 Factos e Nu´meros. Lisbon: Fundaçaõ Calouste Gulbenkian. MacDonald, N., & Tayart de Borms, L. (Eds.) (2008). Philanthropy in Europe – A rich past, a promising future. London: Alliance Publishing Trust. Tosto˜es, A. (2008). Gulbenkian, arquitecture and landscape. Portugal: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. Vilar, E. R. (2006). Speech given by the president of the board of trustees. The solemn commemorative session of the fifty years of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. Lisbon: Fundaçaõ Calouste Gulbenkian.

CARE LILI WANG

Address of Organization International Secretariat Chemin de Balexert 7-9 1219 Chatelaine Geneva Switzerland www.care-international.org/ CARE USA 151 Ellis Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30303 USA www.care.org/

Introduction CARE is one of the world’s largest international humanitarian organizations fighting global poverty. It not only feeds the hungry, but also tackles underlying causes of poverty to help people become self-sufficient. Recognizing that women and children suffer disproportionately from poverty, CARE places special emphasis on working with poor women and empowering them to create permanent social change. CARE also provides emergency aid to survivors of natural disasters and war, and helps people rebuild their lives.

CARE

Brief History CARE was founded in 1945, when 22 American organizations came together to distribute lifesaving food packages to survivors of World War II in Europe. In May 1946, the first 20,000 ‘‘CARE packages’’ reached the port of Le Havre, France. Over the following 2 decades, some 100 million more packages reached people in need, first in Europe and later in Asian and other parts of the developing world. In the 1950s, CARE expanded into emerging nations and used US surplus food to feed the hungry. In the 1960s, CARE started primary heath care programs. In the 1970s, CARE responded to massive famines in Africa with both emergency relief and longterm agroforestry projects. The first CARE package distributed were US Army surplus ‘‘10-in-1’’ food parcels intended to supply ten soldiers with one meal. Later CARE Packages included food for different culture diet and nonfood items, such as tools, blankets, and medicines. Although the CARE Package program had been phased out decades ago, it remained a powerful symbol for the organization. The organization has always been known by the acronym ‘‘CARE,’’ but the meaning behind the letters has evolved with the organization. Originally, CARE stood for ‘‘Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe.’’ Today, CARE stands for ‘‘Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.’’

Mission CARE has expanded the scope of its mission considerably since it was founded in 1945. Today, CARE’s mission is ‘‘to serve individuals and families in the poorest communities in the world.’’ Drawing strength from its ‘‘global diversity, resources and experience,’’ CARE promotes ‘‘innovative solutions’’ and advocates for global responsibilities. It facilitates lasting social change by ‘‘strengthening capacity for self-help, providing economic opportunity, delivering relief in emergencies, influencing policy decisions at all levels, and addressing discrimination in all its forms.’’

Activities CARE tackles underlying causes of poverty so that people can become self-sufficient. Its programmatic strategy for the 5 years beginning fiscal year 2002 was to focus on three key factors affecting poor communities: education, HIV/AIDS, and emergency relief and preparedness. By helping children gain the knowledge and skills to succeed, CARE lays foundations for healthier, more productive families, communities, and society. By providing information and tools of protection to people in poverty, CARE helps promote grassroots efforts to mitigate the effects of HIV/AIDS in poor

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communities. Women are at the center of CARE’s community-based effort to improve basic education, prevent the spread of HIV, increase access to clean water and sanitation, expand economic opportunity and protect natural resources.

Structure and Governance CARE International (CI) is a global confederation of 12 national member organizations in Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Each member is registered as a nonprofit charitable organization according to the laws of its own country and is an autonomous organization in its own right that carries out a range of project-related, advocacy, fundraising, and communications activities in support of CARE’s relief and development programs worldwide. The CARE Country Director leads the projects and programs in the country it operates. The CI Secretariat is an international foundation, registered under Swiss law. CI’s governance rests with the General Assembly (GS) and its executive board. The GS consists of two representatives from each of the 12 national members. It meets once a year and appoints the Chairperson, the two viceChairpersons and the Treasure. The CI Board of Directors consists of one representative of each national member and the Chairperson of CI. The different parts of CARE coordinate regularly through a series of staff working groups, whose primary role is to inform the Secretary General on the progress of the CARE Strategic Plan.

Funding CARE obtains funding and commodities from the United States governmental agencies, the European Union and the United Nations. In addition, CARE receives donations and grants from hundreds of thousands of individuals and dozens of US corporations, foundations, and other organizations. More than 90% of its expenditure goes to poverty-fighting projects worldwide and less than 10% goes towards administrative and fundraising costs. Among the national member organizations, CARE USA’s income and expenditure represents the largest share of CI. In fiscal year 2007, CARE USA received more than $591 million contributions, 57% of which comes from government contribution, and its program expenses exceeded $545 million.

Accomplishments CARE implemented more than 1,000 projects in over 70 countries and improved the lives of more than 65 million people in 2007. In 2001, CARE operated agriculture and natural resources projects in 42 countries and worked

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with more than 2.6 million farmers to increase their crop and livestock yields through activities such as planting new seed varieties, animal husbandry, home gardening and irrigation. In the same year, CARE’s emergency projects directly assisted more than 7 million people in 26 countries. Currently, CARE has 131 small economic activity development projects in 39 countries assisting about 800,000 people, 90% of them women.

Cross-References

▶ Civil Society History VI: Early and Mid 20th Century ▶ INGOs ▶ NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance ▶ NGOs and International Relations, UN

References/Further Readings Lindenberg, M., & Bryant, C. (2001). Going global: Transforming relief and development NGOs. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Quelch, J. A., & Laidler-Kylander, N. (2006). Communicating brand meaning: CARE USA. In J. A. Quelch & N. Laidler-Kylander, The new global brands: Managing non-government organizations in the 21st century. Mason, WI: South-West.

Caritas Internationalis PAURIC O’ROURKE

Address of Organization Palazzo San Calisto 00120 Vatican City Rome Italy www.caritas.org

Introduction Within the spectrum of civil society organizations Caritas stands out as being unique and distinctive in its origin and history as well as in the breadth of its goals and activities. The name stems from the Latin word for charity or virtue, it represents 162 Catholic organizations in the field of international relief aid and social and human development and remains a pioneer in the promotion of humanitarian and equalitarian causes.

History Caritas was founded by a German priest Lorenz Werthmann in Freiburg, in 1897 and quickly spread to other countries

with establishment in Switzerland in 1901 and the United States in 1910. Central to its global spread was Giovanni Battista Montini, the future Pope Paul VI. Elevating it to international status in 1954, Montini enabled Caritas to form an international platform and it became officially known as Caritas Internationalis in 1957. Today it has national member organizations from 137 countries divided into seven regions: Europe, Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Asia, North America, Latin America and Oceania and so has achieved a highly visible global presence.

Mission Its prime mission is to tackle all sources of world poverty, social inequality and exclusion and to make the world a better place. Since its foundation, Caritas has provided developmental support, relief and social services for the poor in over 200 countries worldwide. Caritas interprets its mission broadly and has always sought to remain current and relevant and is now vocal on the issue of climate change, especially its impact on the developing world. Since 1987, it has also worked tirelessly to impede the spread of HIV through its efforts in some 107 countries. It has become a truly global movement, working towards international solidarity, equality and social and economic justice. It highlights the plight of the world’s neediest people and uniquely acts within the ethos of the Christian faith and Catholic social teaching.

Activities Caritas addresses a wide diversity of activities by acting as an umbrella agency for over 160 Catholic groups who share similar humanitarian goals. It effectively co-coordinates their resources and optimizes their efforts for maximum effect on the ground. As an international and well recognized nonprofit organization, Caritas plays numerous roles within the voluntary sector focusing on three main areas: emergencies, sustainable development and peace and reconciliation building. This includes campaigning for global human and economic rights, promotion of universal access to education, care for the elderly and more recently, protection of the environment and HIV prevention. It is also among the first to respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises throughout the world and has become synonymous with such timely and first on the scene response. Caritas volunteers work at the grassroots level in order to promote peace and reconciliation and address local social and cultural issues such as sexual inequality and discrimination.

Carnegie, Andrew

Structure and Governance The organizational structure and governance of Caritas has strong ecclesiastical overtones and Vatican connections, being granted canonical legal status by the Pope in 2004. Headed by a Secretary General, currently, Lesley-Anne Knight, it is supported by an Executive Committee, Bureau and Secretariat. Every 4 years its holds a General Assembly in the Vatican City attended by representatives from each of its 162 members and its seven geographical regions at which its elects the Executive Committee, the President, the Secretary General, the Treasurer and seven Regional Presidents. All of the latter plus observers forms the Bureau which serves as an oversight committee on governance while the Executive Committee manage the agency’s operational activities. It agreed a new 5-year strategic plain in 2005 and has a global operational plan covering 2007–2011.

Funding The finances of Caritas are managed by a Finance Director and overseen by a Finance Commission which is chaired by the elected Treasurer. According to Caritas’s 2003–2007 Activities Report, annual statutory fees from the 162 members account for 65% of Caritas’s budget with the remaining 35% coming from external funding such a voluntary contributions from existing members and others. Administrative costs account for 28% of the annual budget. In 2007, Caritas organizations had a combined turnover of over US$5.5 billion and a workforce of 40,000 paid staff and 125,000 volunteers.

Major Accomplishments In 2007, Caritas responded to 40 humanitarian crises across the globe. Twenty-four million people a year in 200 different countries and territories benefit from the work of Caritas. Caritas is a major contributor and supporter of the Millennium Development Goals in bringing an end to Third World poverty.

Cross-References

▶ INGOs ▶ NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance ▶ Social Justice

References/Further Readings Caritas Annual Report and other Caritas Publications, from http://www. caritas.org/resources/publications/index.html. Jedin, H., Adriańyi, G., Dolan, J., & Repgen, K. (1981). History of the church (Vol. 10, Chap. 14). London: Continuum International Publishing Group. Murphy, C. M. (2007, June). Charity, not justice, as constitutive of the church’s mission. Theological Studies, 68(2), 274–286. Schmidhalt, M. (2005). The history of Caritas Internationalis. Rome: Caritas.

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Carnegie, Andrew BETH BREEZE

C Basic Biographical Information Born in 1835 in Dunfermline, Scotland, Andrew Carnegie rose from inauspicious origins, as the son of a poor weaver, to become an industrial tycoon, the richest man in the world, and arguably the most famous philanthropist of all time. At the age of 13, Carnegie’s destitute family immigrated to the United States to join relatives settled in Allegheny, Pennsylvania. Although he began work as a humble bobbin boy, Carnegie educated himself at Colonel Anderson’s free library, and soon impressed his employers and gained patrons. He rose quickly within the telegraph industry, then on the railroads before making his fortune in iron and steel production and through associated investments. He realized his fortune in 1901 by selling his businesses for $480 million to his main rival John Pierpoint Morgan. Although his philanthropy began in 1873 with a gift of $25,000 to build public baths in his native home town, Carnegie became a full-time philanthropist after retirement, aiming (albeit unsuccessfully) to give away all his wealth before his death, which occurred at Lenox, Massachusetts in 1919, an aim consistent with his oft-quoted philosophy that ‘‘he who dies rich, dies disgraced.’’

Major Contributions Carnegie is known as a founding father of modern philanthropy whose writing and actions continue to influence contemporary philanthropists, including Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, and Sir Tom Hunter. Whilst still immersed in wealth creation, he argued that the rich have a duty to give away their surplus through properly administered philanthropy. These views were set out in two articles published in the North American Review in 1889: ‘‘The Best Fields for Philanthropy’’ and ‘‘Wealth,’’ later republished as ‘‘The Gospel of Wealth.’’ Carnegie proposed seven causes, ranked in order of merit, as suitable recipients of philanthropic funding: universities, free libraries, health care and research, public parks, music halls, public baths, and churches. In keeping with these published opinions, Carnegie gave away almost all his wealth, largely to those seven causes. In line with another expressed view, that naming rights are an appropriate tribute to donors, his ubiquitous presence lives on in libraries, museums, music halls, universities, and other facilities across the United States, the United Kingdom

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and many other countries. The most widely recognized aspect of his legacy, the 2,509 Carnegie libraries built across the English-speaking world, derive from the recognition of his own lack of formal education and appreciation of free access to books during his formative years. Carnegie’s institutional legacy lives on in a variety of organizations that he founded, including The Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.

Cross-References

▶ Buffett, Warren Edward ▶ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ▶ Foundations, Definition and History ▶ Foundations, Family ▶ Foundations, Grant-making ▶ Gates, William H.

References/Further Readings Carnegie, A. (1920). Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Krass, P. (2002). Carnegie. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Nasaw, D. (2007). Andrew Carnegie. New York: Penguin.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Brief History On November 25, 1910, Andrew Carnegie, an US industrialist and philanthropist of Scottish origin, founded the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace. The internationalist Carnegie was convinced, that peace could be reached through the strengthening of international law and organizations. Influenced by the philosopher and later Nobel Prize laureate Nicholas Murray Butler, he wanted to make a contribution to international peace by funding the endowment. During its almost 100 years of existence, the Endowment was an inherent part of the US foreign policy establishment.

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas CEIP’s focus is the broader area of international relations, with an emphasis on conflict research and prevention. Since the launch of the Moscow center in 1993, ‘‘Carnegie aims to transform itself from a think tank on international issues to the first truly multinational – ultimately global – think tank.’’

Activities The Endowment currently runs programs focusing on the following topics and geographic areas: China, Russia, and Eurasia; Democracy and Rule of Law; South Asia; Energy and Climate; Trade, Equity, and Development; Middle East; Non Proliferation; as well as the US Role in the World. These programs include research, various publications and conferences. The Endowment also publishes the bimonthly ‘‘Foreign Policy,’’ one of the leading publications concerned with International Relations issues.

JAN KU¨NZL

Structure and Governance Address of Organization 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington, DC 20036-2103 USA www.carnegieendowment.org

Introduction The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), one of the oldest foreign policy think tanks of the USA, describes itself as: ‘‘a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States.’’ Besides its headquarters in Washington DC, the Endowment has offices in Moscow, Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels.

The Endowment is subdivided in four regional offices, which are relatively independent from the headquarters in Washington DC. The Staff of the regional offices is mainly recruited in the region. The current president of CEIP is Jessica T. Mathews.

Funding CEIP draws financial support of various public and private donors, like Shell International, The Open Society Institute and various Ministries.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions CEIP was a pioneer among foreign policy think tanks and has served as a role model for other such organizations. In the late 1990s, the Endowment established itself as one of

Catholic Charities USA

the world’s leading research institutions on globalization through the creation of the interdisciplinary Global Policy Program. With the expansion of its activities on an international level CEIP is again at the cutting edge of the evolution of foreign policy think tanks.

Cross-References ▶ Carnegie, Andrew ▶ Think Tanks

References/Further Readings Abelson, D. E. (2006). A capitol idea: think tanks and US foreign policy. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press. Parmar, I. (2000). Engineering consent: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the mobilization of American public opinion 1939–1945. Review of International Studies, 26, 35–48.

Catholic Charities USA CHRIS GOVEKAR

Address of Organization 66 Canal Center Place Suite 600 Alexandria, VA 22314 USA www.catholiccharitiesusa.org

Introduction Catholic Charities USA is a network of local and national relief groups united around a common mission.

Brief History Catholic Charities was founded in 1910 on the campus of Catholic University in Washington DC as the National Conference of Catholic Charities. It was designed to promote and encourage the creation of individual diocesan Catholic Charities offices to encourage professional social work practice. Today, it serves as the national voice for the Catholic Charities network and the people it helps.

Mission Catholic Charities exists as a network of affiliated charitable organizations in order to accomplish the US Conference of Catholic Bishops’ mission of relieving suffering and encouraging advocacy on behalf of the nation’s

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poorest people. In addition, the national organization exists to assist member organizations in their mission of service and advocacy at the local level.

Activities As a national organization, Catholic Charities USA assists its member and affiliate organizations with fundraising, program organization and volunteer training in order to increase their efficacy in carrying out their individual missions. In addition, it pursues programs designed to educate individuals on key social justice issues as well as lobbying legislators on issues of importance to its membership and the mission of the Catholic Church as a whole. The national organization also acts as the primary coordinating agency for the Roman Catholic Church’s response to natural or man made disasters and assists in directing the efforts of local Catholic charitable organizations in response to those disasters. Training programs are offered for its member and affiliate organizations so that they are better able to use their limited resources to relieve suffering.

Structure and Governance While the individual member organizations are responsible to their local parish and diocesan councils, they do not report to the national organization in any formal manner. The national organization reports to the US Conference of Catholic Bishops through a board of directors appointed by the USCCB.

Funding Catholic Charities’ work is financed both by the church as a whole and by individual donations to either member organizations or through mass appeals to congregants. In addition, the individual organizations also accept corporate donations from groups in accord with their mission and objectives. The organization reports that approximately 89% of all donations goes directly to charitable work, with the remaining 11% is reserved for administration costs and legislative activities.

Major Accomplishments In 2007, Catholic Charities: 1. Provided assistance to more than 7.5 million individuals 2. Provided food service to more than 6.5 million people 3. Provided family assistance to more than 1.1 million people 4. Worked with nearly 3.5 million individuals in programs to build communities

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Cross-References

▶ Charity and Religion ▶ Faith-Based Organizations ▶ Social Justice ▶ Umbrella Organizations

Catholic Relief Services CHRIS GOVEKAR

Address of Organization 228 West Lexington Street Baltimore, MD 21201-3413 USA www.crs.org

Introduction Catholic Relief Services is the official international humanitarian agency of the US Catholic community. It exists to alleviate suffering and provide assistance to people in need without regard to race, religion, or nationality.

Brief History In 1943, during World War II, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) first began its work focused on the resettlement of war refugees in Europe. The Roman Catholic Bishops of the United States established CRS to help war-torn Europe and its refugees recover from this great conflict. Even today, more than 60 years later, its mission continues to focus on the poor overseas, using the gospel of Jesus Christ as its mandate. CRS seeks to help those most in need, providing assistance on the basis of need, without regard to race, creed, or nationality. In the 1950s, CRS reacted to the increasing stability in Europe by looking to other parts of the world for people who could benefit from the support of US Catholics. This led to the opening of CRS offices in Africa, Asia and Latin America. During this time, the organization also began to work on finding ways for people in the developing world to break the cycle of poverty through ‘‘community-based, sustainable development initiatives.’’ Their work continues throughout more than 100 countries today with more than 5,000 full-time employees and relief workers.

Mission Catholic Relief Services assists the Bishops of the United States in fulfilling their commitment to assist the poor and vulnerable overseas through programs that:

1. Promote human development by responding to major emergencies, fighting disease and poverty, and nurturing peaceful and just societies and 2. Serve Catholics in the United States as they live their faith in solidarity with their brothers and sisters around the world

Activities All programming for the agency is evaluated using an established set of criteria called the ‘‘Justice Lens’’ to ensure it is compatible with Catholic Social Justice Teaching. This focus on social justice came about as a result of the organization’s reflection following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and remains the standard today. Overseas work is done in partnership with local church agencies, other faith-based partners, nongovernmental organizations and local governments. CRS emphasizes the empowerment of partners and beneficiaries in programming decisions. The agency has also made engaging the US Catholic population a priority. CRS is seeking to help Catholics more actively live their faith and build global solidarity. One example of this commitment is ‘‘Operation Rice Bowl,’’ in which more than 12 million individual Catholics participate during the season of lent. The program emphasizes prayer, fasting, learning, and giving, with activities designed to encourage prayer for and learning about the developing world. The rice bowl itself is used to collect funds for those in need. Of those funds, 75% goes to projects in the developing world, while the remaining 25% supports local programs aimed at ending poverty and hunger.

Structure and Governance CRS reports directly to the board of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). The board, made up of 22 individuals (13 bishops, 1 monsignor, and 8 lay persons), is appointed by the USCCB and monitors the activities of the executive leadership team.

Funding CRS’ work is funded both by donations from Catholic churches throughout the United States as well as from individual and corporate donations. Ninety-four cents of every dollar donated goes directly to programs and services, according to the organization.

Major Accomplishments In 2007, CRS earned a Gold Award from the Independent Film and Video Competition for the ‘‘Water for Life’’

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documentary video, which explores why more than one billion people do not have adequate access to clean water. Other awards include the Pakistan Star of Sacrifice, awarded by the government of Pakistan for efforts following the 2005 earthquake and the 2005 Caritas ‘‘Flame of Hope’’ award, given in recognition of CRS’ work to bring ‘‘the very core of Christianity’’ to those suffering around the world.

Cross-References

▶ Faith-Based Organizations ▶ INGOs ▶ NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance ▶ NGOs and Socioeconomic Development ▶ Social Justice

References/Further Readings Egan, E. (1988). Catholic Relief Services: The beginning years. New York: Catholic Relief Services. Egan, E. (1995). For whom there is no room: Scenes from the refugee world. New York: Paulist Press. USAID. (1994). Initial environmental examination for the Catholic Relief Service Food Transition Strategy Project in the Philippines. Washington, DC: USAID.

CDRA ▶ Community Development Resource Association (CDRA)

CEDAG ANAEL LABIGNE

Address of Organization Square Ambiorix 32, bte 47 B-1000 Bruxelles Belgium www.cedag-eu.org

Introduction CEDAG is a Brussels-based network-structuring organization that speaks for national and regional umbrella bodies. In doing so, CEDAG provides the voice for

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the nonprofit sector at European level, especially when it comes to issues that all nonprofit organizations and associations have in common.

Brief History Formally incorporated in 1996, the network was formed in 1989 in order to provide a voice for the nonprofit sector at European level. CEDAG is one of the founding members of Social Economy Europe (SEE), the European standing conference for cooperatives, mutual societies, associations, and foundations (www.socialeconomy.eu. org), and a member of the Social Platform (www.socialplatform.org).

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas According to its charter, CEDAG should strengthen the representation and defend the interests of associations that manage economic activities without profit and for the social welfare, and provide services to its members and users in order to create a better social and cultural environment. CEDAG’s aims are to create a strong European platform to represent the association’s views before the European Union; to bring together the most important national platforms working for the general interest in the countries of the European Union; to use the intersectoral competences of those platforms to elaborate joint statements; to build a pool of resources for the representative national platforms; to underline the good practice in relation to the civil dialogue; and to promote a European Charter as a framework for the relations between nongovernmental organizations and European institutions.

Activities CEDAG pursues these aims by sponsoring research, workshops and conferences on topics of interest to its membership, including, among others, fostering civil dialogue in Europe and valuing the economic value of nonprofit activities. It lobbies for the adoption of a European legal framework for nonprofit organizations that will facilitate transnational cooperation between associations. Furthermore, CEDAG has contributed to the enlargement process by developing links between associations from candidate countries to the European Union, and by encouraging the exchange of information and good practice. Through its newsletters, website, and publications, CEDAG keeps members informed about issues of interest at EU level and the current EU policy developments.

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Structure and Governance CEDAG’s members are regional and national umbrella bodies for the nonprofit sector. In 2009 its membership included 33 national umbrellas in 20 countries of the EU, which together represent over 50,000 nonprofit organizations with over nine million individual members. Members include the French UNIOPSS (Union Nationale Interfe´de´rale des Organismes Prive´s Sanitaires et Sociaux) and the British NCVO (National Council for Voluntary Organizations). CEDAG has an office in Brussels and is governed by an international board consisting of a President, two Vice Presidents, a treasurer and several board members from all over Europe.

Funding CEDAG’s income consists of annual dues paid by members, income from CEDAG’s own activities, grants and contracts, including from the EU and government agencies, and income from invested capital.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions

Center for American Progress CHRISTOPHER S. BIGGERS

Address of Organization 1333 H Street NW 10th Floor Washington, DC 20005 USA www.americanprogress.org

Introduction The CAP is a think tank which seeks to promote the US progressive movement in the national discourse by challenging conservative political philosophy. With members whose subject matter expertise spans across disciplines, the CAP has published books and policy papers on diverse subjects such as biofuels and poverty to trade policy and war.

Brief History

By respecting the specific aptitudes of the different European networks in the social context, CEDAG works for more coordination and compliance between those. As the challenges are so big, all associations need to speak with one voice and that is where CEDAG is coming in. As a network of associations active at European level, CEDAG has consistently called for a dialogue with civil society organizations within the EU decision-making process – at the earliest possible stage of the process – and tried to influence the European legislation by doing so.

CAP is a recent addition to the Washington scene whose arrival in 2003 has been viewed as a counterweight to more conservative think tanks like the CATO institute and the Heritage Foundation. The political climate of 2002 created the impetus for the Center’s development as the Republican Party had a President at the helm and total control of both houses in the US congress. This was the first time since 1953 that the Republicans had monopolized both houses which led John Podesta, former Whitehouse Chief of Staff to Bill Clinton and Georgetown Law Professor, to found the CAP.

Cross-References

Mission

▶ Civil Society and the European Union ▶ National Council of Voluntary Organisations ▶ Umbrella Organizations ▶ UNIOPSS

References/Further Readings Weisbein, J. (2002). Le lobbying associatif a` Bruxelles: entre mobilisations unitaires et sectorielles. Revue Internationale de Politique Compareé, 9(1), 79–98.

CEMEFI ▶ Centro Mexicano para la Filantropia, AC (CEMEFI)

CAP’s mission and objectives revolves around developing a vision for a progressive America by providing a forum to generate new ideas and policy proposals in order to respond effectively to conservative policy with clear alternatives. As a result, CAP has united with other think tanks to advocate for the progressive agenda inviting larger groups of Americans to participate in order to address issues requiring collective action. For the 44th presidency of the United States, CAP advocates five policy priorities: inclusive economic growth, universal healthcare, restructuring the US educational system, improving US leadership, and the development of a sustainable environment.

Activities CAP maintains several active projects promoting the progressive agenda in which citizens are invited to participate

Center for Women’s Global Leadership

in developing new ideas in further support of the progressive movement. Some of these projects include the thinkprogress.org blog, highlighting the pitfalls of conservative philosophy in the media, Campus Progress, seeking to open opportunities for young people to advocate issues of importance, as well as Reel Progress, a yearly film series connecting the arts with campaigns for social change. Additionally, CAP sustains a large group of research fellows who periodically publish policy ideas and analysis in order to influence the public debate.

Structure and Governance The governing structure of CAP includes a seven member executive committee headed by John Podesta as President and Chief Executive Officer. There are 15 subsidiary departments that deal with inner workings of the organization including four that only deal with policy specific areas of research. When questioned on the decision making process and the overall governance of the organization, CAP declined to answer.

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Center for Women’s Global Leadership PATSY KRAEGER

C Address of Organization Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 160 Ryders Lane New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8555 USA www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter

Introduction The Center for Women’s Global Leadership (CWGL) describes itself as an organization which develops women leaders who advocates for women’s rights and social justice. CWGL engages in policy making and social justice activism throughout the globe. CWGL is not an NGO rather it is a program of Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.

Funding The CAP is supported through financial contributions from the private sector and through the resources of its members. With an initial budget of $10 million in 2003, the CAP has more than doubled its contributions to $24 million in 5 short years. The more notable philanthropic contributors include, but are not limited to, those such as Herb and Marion Sandler, George Soros, Peter B. Lewis, and Hillary R. Clinton. The CAP receives no direct government funding.

Accomplishments

Brief History The Center for Women’s Global Leadership was founded as a project of Douglass College in 1989 and is a unit of the Institute for Women’s Leadership (IWL) – a consortium of seven women’s programs at Rutgers University created to study and promote how and why women lead, and to develop programs that prepare women of all ages to lead effectively.

Within less than one year of opening, the experts from CAP had already made more than 300 television appearances making them a formidable opponent in the think tank arena. CAP has been successful in campaigning for the Obama presidency by providing talking points as well as strong critiques of his opponents.

Mission

Cross-References

CWGL’s programs promote the leadership of women and advance feminist perspectives in policy-making processes in local, national, and international arenas. Since 1990, CWGL has fostered women’s leadership in the area of human rights through women’s global leadership institutes, strategic planning activities, international mobilization campaigns, UN monitoring, global education endeavors, publications, and a resource center. CWGL works from a human rights perspective with an emphasis on violence against women, sexual, and reproductive health and socioeconomic well-being. CWGL’s programs are in two broad areas of policy & advocacy and leadership development & women’s

▶ Advocacy ▶ Civil Society and Social Capital in the US ▶ Heritage Foundation ▶ Political Organizations ▶ Soros, George ▶ Think Tanks

References/Further Readings Gizzi, J. (2007). Center for American progress: Think-tank on steroids. Organizational Ttrends. Washington DC: Capital Research Center. http://www.capitalresearch.org/pubs/pdf/v1185996377.pdf

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The Center for Women’s Global Leadership mission is to ‘‘develop and facilitate women’s leadership for women’s human rights and social justice worldwide.’’

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human rights education. CWGL’s signature program is ‘‘The 16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence’’ is an international campaign originating from the first Women’s Global Leadership Institute sponsored by the Center for Women’s Global Leadership in 1991.

Structure and Governance CWGL’s Founder and Executive Director, Charlotte Bunch is a Rutgers University tenured faculty member in the Department of Women and Gender studies. CWGL has a full-time staff of six members, three consultants, and three student staff members. The administrative/reporting relationship within Rutgers is to the Area Dean for International Programs and ultimately to the Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences.

Funding CWGL’s work is financed primarily through donations from Rutgers University, foundations such as the Asia Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Johnson & Johnson Foundation, the Rockefeller Family Fund, the MS Foundation and others as well as individuals. CWGL does receive government contributions for its work including The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Netherlands and CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency).

Major Accomplishments In 2008, CWGL sponsored events on violence against women, UN gender architecture, and women human rights defenders and participated in sessions on sexual rights, multigenerational leadership, violence, and conflict, among others in Cape Town, South Africa. Also in 2008, CWGL sponsored an International AIDS conference in Mexico City attended by 25,000 people.

Cross-References

▶ Civil Society and Gender ▶ Human Rights ▶ Social Justice

References/Further Readings Clark, A. M., Friedman, E. J., & Hochstetler, K. (1998). The sovereign limits of global civil society: A comparison of NGO participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women. World Politics, 51(1), 1–35. Dekoven, M. (2001). Feminist locations: Global and local, theory and practice. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Prygl, M., & Meyer, E. (Eds.) (1999). Gender politics in global governance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Centre Français des Fondations ODILE BOUR

Address of Organization 40 avenue Hoche F-75008 Paris France www.centre-francais-fondations.org

Introduction The Centre Français des Fondations (CFF – French Center for Foundations) is the umbrella organization of French foundations and acts as a platform for the exchange of experience and knowledge about foundations, advice on the creation and development of foundations, and representation to public bodies.

Brief History CFF was founded in 2002 under the legal form of an association (Law of 1901) on the initiative of seven French foundations: Fondation de France, Fondation Caisse d0 Epargne pour la Solidarite´, Fondation Hippocre`ne, Fondation Institut Pasteur, Fondation des Orphelins d0 Auteuil, Fondation Macif and Fondation pour la Recherche Me´dicale.

Mission With the primary goal to promote foundations and their development in France, the CFF represents French foundations’ interests vis-a`-vis public authorities and national, European, and international institutions and to enhance their international representation by improving the knowledge of their status and action, and by supporting their developing projects. It also provides information and services on foundations, advises individuals and corporations intending to create a foundation and engages in advocacy on matters relating to taxation and financial concerns.

Activities To pursue its mission, the CFF organizes workshops, seminars, and conferences on current issues relevant to foundations, facilitating connections among foundations, sharing, and exchange of ideas; assisting foundations in becoming more effective and innovative in their activities; cooperates with other European foundations and other associations of foundations. It also serves as an information pool in providing database, research results, studies, and directories on foundations.

Centro Mexicano para la Filantropia, AC (CEMEFI)

Structure and Governance As of February 2009, CCF is composed of 151 foundation members. Its board of directors counts 12 members, all trustees of French foundations active in different fields. It is a member of the European Foundation Center.

Funding CFF’s work is financed primarily through the membership fees of its members which contribute proportionally according to their annual operating expenditures.

Cross-References

▶ European Foundation Center ▶ Fondation de France ▶ Lobbying ▶ Umbrella Organizations

References/Further Readings Broca, B. (2009). La Fondation de France 1994–2008. Une aventure tre`s humaine. Paris: Perrin.

Centro Mexicano para la Filantropia, AC (CEMEFI) MARTIN HO¨LZ, REGINA LIST

Address of Organization Cda. de Salvador Alvarado 7 Col. Escandoń Del. Miguel Hidalgo 11800, Mexico City Mexico www.cemefi.org

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said to be ‘‘a visionary philanthropist’’ (Winder, 2007: 39). It emerged following the disastrous earthquake in Mexico City in 1985 and in the midst of a number of private initiatives that emerged to rebuild where the government failed to. Since then, CEMEFI has played a decisive role in highlighting the importance of civil society activities within Mexico.

Mission/Objectives Based on its 2007 strategic planning process, CEMEFI’s mission is to promote the philanthropic, committed, and socially responsible participation of citizens and their organizations in order to achieve a more equitable, solidaristic, and prosperous society. These aims are to be realized by way of a flourishing philanthropic sector and sustained corporate social responsibility.

Activities CEMEFI’s diverse activities go beyond that of a typical member-serving association. One of its focal points is promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR). In addition to organizing workshops and publishing guides relating to CSR, CEMEFI together with AliaRSE awards the Distintivo ESR (Socially Responsible Enterprise Distinction) every year to companies that meet the majority of 120 indicators relating to ethics, working conditions, community relations, and environmental impact. Through its ‘‘Hacesfalta’’ (‘‘you are missed’’) program, CEMEFI provides information and guides on volunteer management and an Internet-based platform for recruiting volunteers. CEMEFI also offers support for a number of affinity groups, including an expanding group of community foundations. In its support for the civil society sector more broadly, CEMEFI organizes an annual congress on third sector research in Mexico.

Structure/Governance

The Centro Mexicano para la Filantropıá (CEMEFI) is a private, nonprofit membership association based in Mexico City that seeks to promote a culture of philanthropy and social responsibility in Mexico.

CEMEFI is governed by several bodies, including the general assembly of members, the board of directors, led by Jacqueline Butcher de Rivas, and the executive committee, led by Jorge Villalobos Grzybowicz as executive president. As of December 2008, CEMEFI’s membership included 210 active members (associations, foundations, companies, and individuals) and 480 affiliated institutions and individuals.

Brief History

Funding

CEMEFI was founded in December 1988 by Manuel Arango, previously part owner of a large general retailing business and now chair of a real estate company, who is

In 2007, CEMEFI’s expenditures amounted to approximately 30 million pesos. The majority of its expenditures are covered by donations as well as member dues. In fact,

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CEMEFI claims to be the only organization in Latin America with its financial sustainability ensured mainly by member contributions, which represent more than 50% of its income.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions Over its 20 years of existence, CEMEFI has developed and adapted approaches that have been critical to promoting philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, and volunteerism in Mexico. As a key actor, it has helped to clarify and deepen understanding of these areas of civil society development. In addition, CEMEFI has played a ‘‘critical role in convening dialogues around an enabling legal and tax environment for nonprofit organizations including foundations’’ (Winder, 2007: 39).

Cross-References

▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Philanthropy in Latin America

References/Further Readings Arango, M. (2002). Philanthropy in Mexico. ReVista Harvard review of Latin America, Spring 2002 (Ed. Giving and volunteering in the Americas: From charity to solidarity), from http://www.drclas. harvard.edu/revista/articles/view/12. CEMEFI. (2008). Informe Anual 2007. Mexico City: CEMEFI. Winder, D. (2007). Mexico. In H. K. Anheier, A. Simmons, & D. Winder (Eds.), Innovation in strategic philanthropy. Local and global perspectives (pp. 37–55). New York: Springer.

NCVO) to encourage effective giving to the charitable sector in the United Kingdom. CAF’s key role is to support the sustainability of the nonprofit and voluntary sector by encouraging social investment and philanthropic donations. CAF provides financial services to the charitable sector such as low-cost banking and investment management, as well as it assists corporate and individual donors in tax-effective giving. Likewise, CAF runs a company advisory service that helps businesses in designing and implementing programs of strategic grantmaking.

Brief History CAF origins trace back to a Charities Department set up by the NCVO aimed at increasing donations and stimulating new donors in the United Kingdom. Due to its success, indicated by the fact that it started to administer Deeds of Covenant (the first way available to charities to receive untaxed donations), the Charities Department became independent from the NCVO. CAF, as an autonomous organization, was formally constituted by a Declaration of Trust dated on October 2, 1974. The Charities Aid Foundation has specialized in creating financial and fundraising strategies suitable for the not-for profit sector and lobbying for a legal and fiscal regulation that may encourage philanthropic giving. Currently, CAF operates through an international network of offices in the following countries to strengthen social investment worldwide: Australia, Brazil (in partnership with the Institute for the Development of Social Investment, IDIS), Bulgaria, India, Russia, Southern Africa and the United States.

Mission

Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) CARLOS CORDOURIER REAL

Address of Organization 25 Kings Hill Avenue Kings Hill West Malling Kent ME19 4TA UK www.cafonline.org

Introduction The Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) is a British registered charity founded by the National Council of Social Service (afterwards National Council for Voluntary Organizations,

CAF’s mission is to be ‘‘[a]n integrated customer-focused organisation for donors and charities that stimulates giving, social investment and the effective use of funds.’’ In order to carry out its stated mission, CAF works with individuals, companies, and nonprofit organizations, through the provision of financial services and counseling to increase the impact of charitable giving and social investment.

Activities For individual donors, CAF provides information about the charitable sector and offers schemes of tax-effective donations; for corporate donors, CAF advises to implement successful community investment programs; and for charities, CAF offers low-costing banking as well as investment and fundraising strategies. CAF also develops research and up-to-date analysis on the characteristics of charitable giving. The survey UK Giving carried out

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annually jointly with the NCVO is an important source of information about the trends of donations amongst the British public. Moreover, CAF has fostered international surveys to identify the features of charitable donations in the fast growing developing economies of BRIC (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, and China).

KERRY O’HALLORAN Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia


Introduction

CAF is governed by the Declaration of Trust that constituted it as a registered charity in 1974. Its Board of Trustees, which directs the Executive Management Group, includes the Chairman of the NCVO, two trustees elected by the Executive committee of the NCVO, and at least six other members appointed by the existing trustees. The structure of governance also comprises the following bodies: Advisory Council; Audit, Risk, and Compliance Committee, Investment Advisory Committee; and the Nominations and Remuneration Committee.

Funding CAF finances its activities through the provision of a wide range of services. According to its Annual Report for the fiscal year ended 30 April 2008, the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) administered a total of £2.5 billion of funds of charities and donors. CAF’s income for that year amounted £409 million, whilst expenditure was £316 (mainly donations to charities).

Major Contributions The Charities Aid Foundation has contributed to the sustainability of the charitable sector through the development of specialized services and relevant know-how on effective financial strategies for the social sector. CAF has also played an important role in promoting a legal environment that promotes philanthropic giving of both individual and corporate donors.

Cross-References

▶ Corporate Giving ▶ Foundations, Grantmaking ▶ Fundraising ▶ National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) ▶ Planned Giving


Religion and charity have been inextricably entangled throughout their long history. The foundations of the three main religions – Christianity, Islam, and Judaism – are each bedded down on doctrines that require their members to do good for others mainly by caring for the ill or destitute and giving to those otherwise in need. The earliest manifestations of civil society grew from that context in the form of associations or guilds (confraternities in the Catholic Church) dedicated to the pursuit of religious aims through various forms of community activity. Perhaps the earliest threats to civil society, as manifested in the Crusades, were similarly generated. Arguably, religion and charity continue to simultaneously sustain and erode the basis for civil society. ‘‘Charity,’’ as it is known to those nations belonging to the common-law tradition, is defined by law rather than religion. In that respect, it is quite different from its counterpart zakat and sadaqa in Islamic culture and from tzedakah in Judaism. It differs also from its equivalent in other Christian but civil law jurisdictions, where the law has accreted in codified form rather than been shaped by principles formulated in the Court of Equity as has occurred in the common-law nations. Charity, in a common-law context, has its origin in the ‘‘pious use’’ employed to facilitate gifts made by landowners to religious bodies in return for masses being said for the salvation of their souls. In the developing nations, charity and religion, particularly in an Islamic context, continue to be very much bound together and in theocratic Muslim states that symbiotic relationship has a prominent political salience. Indeed, the growing difference in perception between Islam and Christianity, regarding the role to be played by religion/charity on a domestic and international basis, is not without global political implications. Consideration of such matters, however, lies outside the scope of this entry.

References/Further Readings Clegg, S. (2008). UK giving 2008: An overview of charitable giving in the UK in 2007/08. London: Charities Aid Foundation/NCVO. Russell, L., & Scott, D. (2007). Social enterprise in practice: Developmental stories from the voluntary and community sectors. London: Charities Aid Foundation.

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Definition ‘‘Charity,’’ as a legal concept, is confined to and defined by the common law. It is usually considered to date from the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 in England & Wales,

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which laid the legislative foundations for the development of modern charity law. The preamble to that statute defined charity in terms of the following charitable purposes: "

Releife of aged impotent and poore people, some for Maintenance of sicke and maymed Souldiers and Marriners, Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and Schollers in Universities, some for Repaire of Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies Churches Seabankes and Highwaies, some for Educacion and prefermente of Orphans, some for or towardes Reliefe Stocke or Maintenance of Howses of Correccion, some for Mariages of poore Maides, some for Supportacion Ayde and Helpe of younge tradesmen Handicraftesmen and persons decayed, and others for reliefe or redemption of Prisoners or Captives, and for aide or ease of any poore Inhabitantes concerninge paymente of Fifteenes, setting out of Souldiers and other Taxes.

Therefore, neither government nor court would regard a purpose as charitable unless it appeared on that list or could be defined as coming within ‘‘the spirit and intendment’’ of the preamble which required proof that the new purpose approximated an established charitable purpose and could be viewed as an extension of it or as analogous to it; a rule that has underpinned the development of charity law, giving the judiciary some discretion to adjust the law to fit contemporary social circumstances. Religion was defined in Keren Kayemeth Le Jisroel v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1931) 48 TLR 459 as ‘‘the promotion of spiritual teaching in a wide sense, and the maintenance of the doctrines on which it rests, and the observances that serve to promote and manifest it.’’ It was not mentioned as a charitable purpose in the 1601 Act, probably for reasons to do with the equivocal role of the Church in English society in the years following the Reformation, but there was never any doubt as to the legal inseparableness of charity and religion. This was confirmed in the landmark decision The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel [1879] AC 531 when Macnaghten LJ ruled that ‘‘the advancement of religion’’ was a charitable purpose. Subsequently, the judiciary added that for it to do so two conditions must be met: the gift must contribute to the advancement of ‘‘religion,’’ as interpreted by the courts and it must promote the religious instruction or education of the public. A body of case law precedents and related principles largely shared among the 60 or so nations that subscribe to the common-law tradition, now determines when religion, religious organizations and their activities meet the legal definition of ‘‘charity.’’ In some nations, such as

Ireland, they attract preferential treatment through statutory endorsement of the rule that gifts to and the activities of religious organizations are for the public benefit and are therefore de facto charitable. In others, such as Canada and the United States, this rule applies despite not being embodied in statutory form. Only in England & Wales has this rule been statutorily repealed, by Sect. 3 of the Charities Act 2006, to require religious organizations to be as subject to the public benefit test as any other organization. For the purposes of charity law in all the common-law nations, ‘‘religion’’ has for the most part been tied to a belief in god which, until relatively recently, was most usually interpreted to mean a Christian deity; although, in the United States, the IRS took an early and clear view that charitable trusts could not be restricted to those that declared their belief in one ‘‘Supreme Being.’’ Any suggestion that the legal definition of religion could be satisfied by a system of belief not involving faith in a god was explicitly rejected by Dillon J in Re South Place Ethical Society, Barralet v. Attorney General [1980] 1 WLR 1565 where it was stressed that the ‘‘two essential attributes of religion are faith and worship: faith in a god and worship of that god.’’ Further, the law holds that all religions are to be treated equally. As explained in Thornton v. Howe (1862) 31 Beav 14, the law will not inquire into the inherent validity of any particular religion nor will it examine the relative merits of different religions. Although judicial interpretation of ‘‘religion’’ has not differed greatly, there has been considerable jurisdictional variation in relation to the range of activities held to merit charitable status. For example, the lead taken in England & Wales with the decision in Gilmour v. Coats [1949] AC 426 which denied charitable status to closed contemplative religious orders, as opposed to those actively engaged in good works in the community, has been followed in Canada and Northern Ireland but not in Ireland where the opposite view of the Court of Appeal in O’Hanlon v. Logue [1906] IR 247 has since prevailed. It is now no longer followed in Australia, where section 5 of the Extension of Charitable Purposes Act 2004 declares such activities to be charitable. Another exception has been in regard to the charitable status of activities dedicated to the dead. In Ireland, gifts for the saying of masses for the dead and for the upkeep of graves have always been regarded as charitable but this is not necessarily the case elsewhere (masses for the dead being viewed for centuries as ‘‘superstitious uses’’ in England & Wales and are currently so regarded in Singapore). Controversy over what constitutes a religion is illustrated by the varying judicial approaches to the Church of Scientology, which was refused charitable


status in England & Wales because its core practices of training and auditing (counseling) did not constitute worship of a ‘‘Supreme Being,’’ even though it had been deemed charitable in Australia and the United States. In the latter jurisdiction, where the principle of preventing opportunities for Church/State entanglement is well established, the IRS exercises extreme caution with regard to the definition of ‘‘church’’ as is evident in the 14-part test for determining whether or not an organization qualifies as such (‘‘Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations’’). This approach has been sharpened since the introduction of the USA Patriot Act 2001 (as reauthorized in 2005) with its focus on tracking funds including those of religious and other charitable entities.

Historical Background ‘‘Charity,’’ as a social construct, predates its legal definition and has its origins in the doctrine common to all religions that only by doing good works in this life can eternal salvation be assured in the next. Indeed, to subscribe to the Christian faith entails obeying the duty to love one’s neighbor, an inescapable requirement for salvation of the soul. Christianity is not, of course, unique in this respect: Buddhism teaches the love of mankind as the highest form of righteousness; Islam requires a tithe of one-tenth of income to be given to those in need; and the Jewish religion urges its followers to assist the poor and practice charity. In its initial religious context, charity was thus ‘‘more a means to the salvation of the soul of the benefactor than an endeavor to diagnose and alleviate the needs of the beneficiary’’ as succinctly explained in the Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts (Charitable Trusts Committee, 1952, at para 36). Collective organizations, in the form of guilds or confraternities dedicated to such purposes, were in existence centuries before the 1601 statute. In The Parish Gilds of Mediaeval England (Westlake, 1919), for example, mention is made of ‘‘the gild of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the parish church of St. Botolph at Boston, founded in 1260, which gave a yearly distribution of bread and herrings to the poor in alms for the souls of its benefactors.’’ Confraternities, as Flack explains, ‘‘were established for a variety of purposes but fundamentally they were about laymen and women joining a voluntary association to receive mutual encouragement to live pious lives’’ (Flack, 2008). He adds that they may have existed in both the Eastern and Holy Roman Empires even before the sack of Rome in AD 410. Some had charitable purposes such as one with a special devotion to the sick and deceased, which flourished in Constantinople in 336 and others in the West which looked after abandoned children as early as AD 400. The

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earliest Catholic lay confraternities were probably formed in Italy as early as the third century, but were certainly well established by the mid-twentieth century. In medieval England, many schools and hospitals were founded by religious organizations and they in turn received powerful support from the State. King Edward’s code promulgated at Andover in 963, for example, proclaimed that ‘‘God’s churches are entitled to their rights,’’ required taxes to be paid to the Church and imposed severe penalties for nonpayment. The instilling of Christian beliefs, accompanied by charitable provision for the disadvantaged, was of common interest to Church and State and provided an early conceptual test bed for establishing civil society. Historically and currently, the contribution of religious organizations to total charitable activity, to the work of the wider voluntary sector and to statutory services provision in all common-law jurisdictions is inestimable. They have been most obviously prominent in activities which serve to advance religion, sometimes with contentious outcomes, but have also often been engaged in putting in place social infrastructure both in common-law countries and in developing nations. Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, are much indebted to the religious organizations which laid the foundations for their present health and education systems and often provided the staff and resources for their functioning and maintenance. Faith-based educational facilities and hospitals continue to play a role in these countries, though are now largely redirected towards developmental projects in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific region. However, the contribution of religious organizations has been at a price. In the developed nations at the dawn of the twenty-first century, resonances of social upheaval, generated by earlier failings of religion and charity, are now triggering an acute political awareness of their strategic role in civil society. The post-9/11 era and the ongoing turmoil in Iraq and the Middle East brings a salutary reminder, a lesson that stretches back to the Crusades, of the dangers of cultural polarization and of religion’s capacity for accentuating divisiveness. In societies characterized by religious division, as in India, Malaysia, and Singapore, the tendency for religious charities to be both very active and very partisan has served to emphasize differences, increase social polarization, and raise tensions. In such societies, it is seldom acceptable for a charity of one religious denomination to use its resources for the benefit of members of another, or to do so for the purpose of building conciliatory bridges of communication between rival religious groups. Throughout the centuries, religion has demonstrated its latent capacity to cause social divisions and provoke violent confrontations. Most recently, this

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occurred in Northern Ireland resulting in several thousand deaths from clashes between Protestant and Catholic communities and damage to civil society that may take generations to repair. Poverty, and the mass migration of economic refugees into the northern hemisphere, has awakened folk memories of the social dislocation that followed industrialization within the nations of that hemisphere. The impact of so many disparate ethnic groups on the social infrastructure and cultural cohesion of the receiving nations is considerable. The challenge of accommodating their needs and responding sensitively to their cultural affiliations is depleting resources and imposing real pressures on the multicultural policies of those nations. The root causes of poverty and disease, currently affecting countries in Africa and parts of Asia, are connected to the inequitable aid and trade policies pursued by the developed nations and are reminiscent of domestic exploitive practices during the industrialization era. In both eras, charity has proved equally ineffectual in addressing the causes of poverty. As the developed nations move closer to economic recession, the threat of a more general social destabilization, as a consequence of failure to adequately meet this particular challenge, is a pressing cause for concern. Again, in the recent spread of faith-based schools in the United States and the United Kingdom, there are uncomfortable echoes of an earlier role of Churchcontrolled residential educational facilities in Canada, Australia, and Ireland. Religious organizations were then guilty of colonizing the educational system for purposes of proselytism, being used as agents of the State to advance policies that separated out and accentuated the marginalization of minority groups and of setting standards of care that allowed the victimization of some children. Now, governments are again facilitating the rise of faith-based organizations as providers of publicly funded services. In the United States, for example, through the Charitable Choice clause in the Welfare Reform Act 1996 (known as the PWRORA), the federal government has reached out to such organizations so that they may assist in the welfare reform effort. If these bodies are to avoid similar charges in the future then an appropriate regulatory system will need to be put in place.

Key Issues The role of religion and charity in modern society has given rise to considerable controversy, usually centered on their capacity, separately and jointly, to promote pluralism rather than simply defend sectional interests.

Religious or faith-based organizations tend to be politically conservative. On the one hand, because of their institutional nature and longevity, such charitable entities can reinforce and sustain established social norms and may exercise a reactionary influence when faced with the prospect of political change, as occurred in some South American countries in the last half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, their pastoral concerns, established over generations of close engagement with vulnerable communities can, as in Poland, prompt them to be at the forefront of such change when religion itself is being politically suppressed. Religion, charity, and charitable religious organizations share an approach of acceptance toward the challenge of circumstances which can be problematic in some social contexts, such as the use of contraceptives to combat the spread of AIDS in Africa and to lift communities out of poverty by controlling population growth. The political value of religion and the charitable activities of religious organizations lie in their undoubted capacity to generate social capital (Putnam, 2000). However, there are those who take the view that this is essentially of a member-benefit nature which, while cementing relationships between those of the same religion, preferences and sharply differentiates that religion from all others: the ‘‘bonding’’ form of social capital provided by religion is at the price of the ‘‘bridging’’ form; as illustrated by the experience of jurisdictions such as Northern Ireland. The latter, with its population divided on religious grounds, is a society where most charitable activity has always been associated with religious bodies but where the net charitable impact has arguably been divisive: polarizing communities and hindering the consolidation of a pluralist civil society. The ‘‘gift relationship’’ (Titmus, R., 1970) held to underpin charity, is for some a questionable means of addressing social need. It is suggested that charity’s contribution to the alleviation of the effects of poverty is achieved at the cost of ignoring its causes, conceding compliant deference to the benefactor and instilling in individuals, institutions, and society, an acceptance of things as they are. Instead, it is argued, a more effective strategy would be to equip the individual, community, or nation with the means to achieve self-sufficiency by investing in the aid/trade/skill development programs necessary to ensure their independence and ability to compete in the ‘‘open market.’’ There is also the fact that increased secularization of the social infrastructure in contemporary developed nations has allowed, if not stimulated, mounting skepticism as to the benefits inherent in the role of religion,


while an ever-expanding raft of national and international legislation underpinning entitlements to human rights, equity, equality, and nondiscrimination has cast doubt on the relative usefulness of charity. The belief or acceptance that religion and charity were destined to complement each other in perpetuity, saving lives in this world in order to save souls in the next, is for most, in the more developed nations, succumbing to a contemporary attitude of quiet disinterest in both.

International Perspectives The common-law jurisdictions largely share the same pool of judicial precedents, adhere to much the same body of domestic legislation dealing with equity, equality, and nondiscriminatory practice and subscribe to the same international Conventions, treaties, and instruments (or their domestic equivalents) governing matters such as human rights. Some have also recently completed, or are in the process of completing, charity law reform processes. While this facilitates a congruity of approach toward charity and religion, it also permits identification of some areas of jurisdictional difference. The right of an individual to choose and practice a religion is firmly established by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 and has been endorsed in the domestic legislation of common-law countries. The Convention requires that any interpretation of ‘‘religion’’ be applied objectively, have reasonable justification and be nondiscriminatory; any differential treatment must comply with strict standards. This legal benchmark for nondiscrimination in matters of religion is underpinned by Article 14 and supported by Article 9 (the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion). It has the effect of requiring governments and other public bodies to give parity of recognition to Christian and non-Christian religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism. Two important decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have recently raised the profile of Article 9: Kokkinakis v. Greece (A/260-A) (1994) 17 EHRR 397 and Manoussakis v. Greece (18748/91) (1996) 21 EHRR CD3. In the Kokkinakis case, the court recognized the right to proselytize when it is exercised with respect for freedom of the religion of others, and held the right to be protected by Article 9. Moreover, as Justice Pettiti then stated: ‘‘[R]eligion is one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention and the pluralism that cannot be disassociated from a democratic society depends on religious freedom.’’ In the Manoussakis case, the court found that ‘‘the right to freedom of religion . . . excludes any discretion on the part of the State to

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determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate.’’ These cases affirm the significance of freedom of religion for modern democratic states. In the United States, the Constitution, its Bill of Rights, together with the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, may be considered to provide a body of provisions equivalent to the European Convention on Human Rights with nationwide application. The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause draws a line between Church and State by prohibiting undue government involvement with religion; reflecting, perhaps, the deep distrust of the ‘‘founding fathers’’ with the collusive nature of that relationship and its propensity in ‘‘old’’ Europe to trigger social disruption. Case law in that jurisdiction (e.g., Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 US 664 [1970]) illustrates the vigilance with which the IRS and the courts carefully police any possible entanglement of Church and State interests. In Australia, the recent decision in Commissioner of Taxation v. Word Investments Limited [2007] FCAFC 171 is likely to have implications for religious organizations elsewhere in the common-law world. The charitable status of Word Investments Ltd. was challenged because it raised its funds through various activities such as investing money borrowed at noncommercial rates from supporters, offering financial planning for a fee, and a funeral business. The court noted that with the decline of the welfare state, charitable organizations are expected to do more with the same resources and reliance on donations in many cases will be insufficient. They further noted that many charitable organizations have established business ventures to generate the income necessary to support their activities. The purpose of the organization was deemed to be charitable. The charity law reviews in England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Ireland have concluded (or are concluding) with – and in New Zealand, Australia, and Singapore have concluded without – a change to the legal definition of ‘‘charity.’’ Other nations, including the United States and Canada, are still engaged in that process. The definitional changes expand the meaning of ‘‘charity’’ into the areas of health and social care service provision, civil society consolidation, and the promotion of human rights, which will undoubtedly generate case law with international implications.

Future Directions For the common-law nations, the future role of charitable religious organizations is likely to be shaped by domestic opportunities resulting from the contraction of

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government services and, on an international basis, by the growth in entrepreneurial philanthropy and the constraints imposed by the war against terrorism. In both domestic and international contexts, the essentially Christian ethos of religion and charity in those nations will have to adjust to meet the challenges presented by a sustained influx of migrants, the necessity to engage with and accommodate the needs of those from other cultures, and the mounting pressure to address the grievances of a resurgent Islam. The contraction of government service provision, resulting from inexorable demographic trends that include falling fertility rates and an age imbalance, is now well advanced in all modern, developed nations and is likely to gather momentum in future decades. As government retreats, it is negotiating the terms on which charities will assume increased responsibility for service provision. In England & Wales, the Charity Commission decision in Applications for registration of (i) Trafford Community Leisure Trust and (ii) Wigan Leisure and Culture Trust [2004] granted charitable status to entities established by government to provide what until then had been local authority public services, with almost total government funding. This was a significant indicator of government intent to increase the transfer of responsibility to its partner. In Australia, the same was true of the decision in Central Bayside Division of General Practice Ltd v. Commissioner of State Revenue [2005] VSCA 168/. Then, an independent association of general medical practitioners, almost wholly funded by a federal government department, established to deliver a government health care scheme within a small geographic area in accordance with the government’s national plan, was found to be charitable. The Charities Act 2006, and similar legislation in other UK jurisdictions and in Ireland, has laid the foundations for further charity encroachment into the heartland of government public service provision. By identifying as charitable purposes a range of what would otherwise be assumed to be government responsibilities, the new legislation, emerging from a range of national charity law review processes, has opened wide the doors for future and more extensive government/ charity partnership arrangements. The growth prospects for charity have to be set against the constraints emanating from the new international security imperative. The current ‘‘global war against terrorism’’ and the accompanying raft of antiterrorism laws, in conjunction with the minefield of international trade, will undoubtedly combine to restrict the overseas activity of many charities. Government pursuit of terrorists, and maintenance of subsidies for domestic produce, can result

in charities being regarded with some suspicion. This is particularly the case in relation to those charities associated with countries and religions that fall within the scrutiny of government foreign policy. As governments increase their regulatory powers of surveillance, and improve the capacity to track international flows of finance, charities now run the risk of being viewed as the weak link in the war against terrorism. Philanthropy, anchored to a new and decidedly more secular entrepreneurial spirit – dedicated to vanquishing AIDS, malaria, and to ‘‘making poverty history’’ – is, arguably, gradually moving into the space traditionally occupied by religion and charity to address issues of poverty, disease, and social inclusion. New and independent hybrid legal structures, combined with the financial resources and business expertise of entities such as the Bill Gates Foundation, are positioning themselves to make a greater impact upon these perennial problems than ever before achieved by government, charity, or religion.

Cross-References

▶ Charity, Defined ▶ Charity Law ▶ Charity, History of ▶ Civil Society and Religion ▶ Common Law and Civil Society ▶ Faith-Based Organizations ▶ Gift Relationship ▶ Law, Foundations ▶ Philanthropy and Religion, Christianity ▶ Religious Organization ▶ Social Capital, definition of ▶ Welfare State

References/Further Readings Bothwell, J. (1997). Indicators of a healthy civil society. In Burbridge (Ed.), Beyond prince and merchant: Citizen participation and the rise of civil society. Brussels: Institute of Cultural Affairs International. Brady, J. (1975). Religion and the law of charities in Ireland. Belfast: Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly. Bromley, K. (2001). The definition of religion in charity law in the age of fundamental human rights. London: Charity Law & Practice Review, 7(1), 39–91. Charitable Trusts Committee, ‘Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts’ (the ‘‘Nathan Report’’), Cmd 8710 (1952-53), HMSO, London. Flack, T. (2008). Insights into the origins of organised charity from the Catholic tradition of confraternities. Brisbane: Occasional paper for Australian Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, Queensland University of Technology. Luxton, P. (2001). The law of charities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Charity Bank Mitchell, C., & Moody, S. (2000). Foundations of charity. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Picarda, H. (1999). The law and practice relating to charities (3rd ed.). London: Butterworths. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone. New York: Simon & Schuster. Titmus, R. (1970). The gift relationship: From human blood to social policy. London: Allen & Unwin. Westlake, H. F. (1919). The parish gilds of mediaeval England. London: Macmillan.

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ever Charity ISA, the only tax free savings account where 100% of the proceeds go for charitable purposes.

Mission Charity Bank’s mission is ‘‘to tackle marginalisation, social injustice and exclusion, and facilitate social change through investment.’’ Charity Bank seeks to change the perceptions of how personal and corporate wealth can provide finance for the benefit of society.’’

Activities

Charity Bank PATSY KRAEGER

Address of Organization 194 High Street Tonbridge Kent TN9 1BE UK www.charitybank.org

Introduction Charity Bank describes itself as similar to a development bank financing projects and organizations that the bank believes are viable even when the project may not be typically commercial bankable. Charity Bank suggests that at least 3 million people in the United Kingdom have been affected by the organizations that they support. Charity Bank, based outside of London has opened a second regional office in North England to foster its programs in sustaining the charitable sector.

Brief History In 1992, Charities Aid Foundation (CAF), a registered British charity, commissioned research into a bank for charity and in 1993 a loans services unit was established. In 1995, Investors in Society set up a pilot loan with in CAF and a guaranteed fund of £500,000. In 1996, the first loan was made and in 1997 regulatory discussions developed to lead toward the establishment of a charity bank. In 2002, Charity Bank registered as charity became authorized as a bank from the Financial Services Authority and received approval from Inland Revenue with an opening balance of £6.4 million. In 2003, the bank became a member of the Community Development Finance Association and was the fist bank to deliver the community investment tax credit. In 2006, loan inquiries exceeded £100 million. In 2008, the bank issued the first

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Charity Bank is the only regulated bank in the United Kingdom that is also a charity. The bank uses depositor’s savings to support charities and social profit organizations that address societal needs. Depositors who bank with Charity Bank receive a modest interest to protect their capitol. Significantly, depositors earn a social return by depositing in the bank by allowing their savings to be used as a pool of funds which are in turn lent to organizations serving social needs. Charity Bank provided financial guidance as well as loan assistance and each organization are assessed to see if they are a match for Charity Bank’s loans. Funds are solely dispersed within the United Kingdom. Charity Bank has supported many organizations and the following are reflective of the types of organizations that this social venture bank supports. In social care, Charity Bank supported Salterhill, a nonprofit who provided homes to adults with learning disabilities. The City of Oxford charities, support for almshouses in Oxford to help with immediate needs. In their faith based initiatives, Charity Bank loaned money to the Tom Roberts Adventure Center to provide a faith based program activity center initially for youth from Christian churches. The Kadampa Buddhist Meditation Center which provides mediation sessions, retreats, study, and classes also was funded. In community services, Charity Bank supported the Colchester and Tendering Women’s refuge to provide services to women who are victims of domestic violence. Internationally, Charity Bank loaned money to Valid Nutrition in Malawi who makes and markets highly-fortified nutritional pastes, called ‘‘ready-to-use foods’’ or RUF, to treat and prevent malnutrition.

Structure and Governance Charity Bank is unique in that it is registered as a charitable organization and subject to banking regulations. ‘‘As a bank, we are regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and are, like other financial service providers, required to undertake regular training, reporting, and selfor external assessment processes. We are also a registered

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charity, which means that we are required to comply with the Charity Commission’s guidance.’’ Daily bank management is invested in an executive management team led by a chair, who was previously the Director of Community Finance at Charities Aid Foundation. The bank also has a Board of Trustees.

Funding Charity Bank is able to issue share capitol and the shares are held by Charities Aid Foundation, the National Council for Voluntary Organizations, 15 charitable trusts and foundations, and Barclays Bank, but in trust for charity. There are three classes of shareholders, ordinary, and two preferred shareholder categories. Charity bank as a registered charity also accepts donations from government, foundations, and individuals.

Major Accomplishments Charity Bank has committed £72,748,831 to charities and other socially driven organizations since its launch in 2002.

Cross-References

▶ Charities Aid Foundation ▶ National Council of Voluntary Organisations ▶ Social Investment

References/Further Readings Kingston, J., & Bolton, M. (2004). Opinion piece: New approaches to funding not-for-profit organizations. International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 9(2), 112–121. Mulgan, G., & Landry, C. (1995). The other invisible hand: Remaking charity for the 21st century. London: Demos.

Charity, History of GABRIELE LINGELBACH Albert-Ludwigs Universita¨t Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany

Introduction Today’s research on charity is heavily focused on the present: sociologists, political scientists, economists, and researchers representing other disciplines are occupied with the causes, forms, and consequences of charitable giving in the present. In contrast, the history of charity is less discussed in research and is mostly rather concerned with selected individual aspects. The history of charity or philanthropy does not yet constitute its own research area

with its own networks, historical peer-reviewed journal, academic society with its own conferences, or established reference works. Though there are some monographs presenting surveys (Bremner, 1994), of which the majority remain within national frameworks (Friedman, 2003; Marais, 1999; Owen, 1964), historical analysis is still in its beginning stages for many areas. Furthermore, the concepts with which historians of charity analyze their object are still in flux, and, in international comparison, the problem exists that many of the key categories of analysis are difficult to translate: The terms philanthropy, foundation, donation, alms, gift, third sector, etc. have very different meanings in the various languages. In addition, the very different developments of philanthropic traditions and landscapes in cross-national comparison hinders historians specializing in charity from coming to an international agreement since historical research too often takes as its point of departure the researcher’s own contemporary, national experience.

Definition In the following, charity should be understood as an act on the part of a giver, a ‘‘benefactor’’: It is not the recipient of charitable gifts, but the one who gives the gift that is the focus of analysis. A rather broadly applied definition of charity encompasses thus a broad spectrum of activity, which can be differentiated at various levels. For one, such activities can be differentiated according to the purpose of the gift: Benefactors can be active in religious matters through the financing of church building or of Masses, an area that has had a fundamental significance for centuries. Other purposes include support for the arts, culture, education, or research, for example, the establishment of a chair at a university, the donation of a work of art from one’s private collection to a museum, or membership in a supporting organization for an orchestra. This form of private, civic engagement for public purposes has grown in importance primarily since the nineteenth century. A third area is the support of social purposes, that is, support for socially disadvantaged individuals or groups of people – be they the poor, the sick, the invalid, the disabled, widows, or orphans – with which the donor has no personal relationship. This type of purpose was also of great importance inasmuch as donations ‘‘for the poor’’ in Europe played a significant role already in the Middle Ages, later then in the private financing of urban poor relief in early modern history, or in civic foundations in support of hospitals or orphanages during the ‘‘long’’ nineteenth century. More recently, by contrast, the protection of nature, animals, and the environment has become a major target. A narrower

Charity, History of

concept of charity, like that used in this article, refers primarily to the third type, the social purpose, whereas the term philanthropy is also often applied to a broader definition of charity that includes the other targets mentioned. Regarding the purpose of gifts, a distinction must also be made between those that were given directly to the needy, e.g., alms to beggars in the European Middle Age cities, and those given to some type of intermediary institution, which then allocated the resources. Notably, since the early modern age, donations to intermediaries have increasingly displaced direct donations in the form of alms. These intermediaries have evolved and diversified over time: In ancient Egypt, for example, temples were the primary intermediaries, whereas in the Middle Ages religious institutions, such as cloisters and church parishes as well as religious orders such as the mendicant, hospital, and knightly orders dominated. Later, the distribution of charitable donations became increasingly secular: Since the ‘‘high’’ Middle Ages, charitable gifts were also given to city poor funds; in the late eighteenth civic associations emerged to take on this task; in the twentieth century welfare federations were established; and over the last few decades internationally active organizations such as UNICEF or Oxfam have arisen to distribute charitable donations to groups in need of assistance. A second level at which one can differentiate types of charity is the nature of the gift given: A particularly frequent form was the giving of money, but goods such as food or clothing also were made available for charitable purposes. Furthermore, and third, people also gave of their time, often providing their expertise, i.e., volunteering. Historical research has primarily focused on monetary charity and has distinguished four forms: endowments or trusts, donations, membership fees paid to a philanthropic association, and, more seldom, purchases of stocks of charitable enterprises. Endowments generally were composed of large sums of money or real estate, which income (interest or earned income) would finance the charitable purpose. For example, if a patron in the nineteenth century created a scholarship fund to benefit a university, it meant that the money would be invested, and the scholarships would be financed out of the interest income. Since in many cases large sums were made available in the creation of an endowment, the gift was usually well thought through and legally safeguarded. Donors generally came from the wealthier classes of the population. In contrast to endowment gifts, donations were not invested, but rather were applied directly to the donation’s purpose, for example, when one gave money as part of a collection for the victims of an earthquake

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catastrophe. For the most part, such donations were rather modest sums; often they ranged below a certain threshold such that a donation could also be part of the everyday activities of the less wealthy social strata and frequently occurred without a long period of consideration. An example would be collections during religious services that had taken place since the second and third centuries AD. A third form of giving was the payment of membership fees to a charitable association: In this case, regular contributions would be made available so that the association could finance charitable purposes as set out in its bylaws. This involved a collective act, in contrast to the creation of an endowment, which was carried out mostly on an individual basis. Finally, one can distinguish between those forms of charity for which one receives no explicit material or immaterial service in return and a gift that implies some sort of quid pro quo or service in return. Thus, for example, already in the fifteenth century there existed charitable lotteries, through which one received a chance of winning in exchange for a donation, or later also charity galas, during which one expected to be entertained in return for the money given. However, with such types of activity, the money donated had to be of significantly higher value than that of the service received in return so that the gift could still be considered charitable. In light of this definition, it also becomes clear which topics are not dealt with in the history of charity: For example, it does not involve help in the context of friendship networks, nor the lending of an interest-free loan to a business colleague, nor the giving of a sum of money to a family member in case of an emergency. Furthermore, this concept of charity excludes sponsoring, since there exists the hope that the donation will ‘‘pay off ’’ through the accompanying advertising effect. In consequence, the investigation of the history of charity covers all those activities in the past, which from the benefactor’s perspective should serve to help those individuals or social groups who find themselves in a significantly worse situation and to remedy or alleviate this distress – be it physical, spiritual, psychological, or economic.

Key Issues A key question for historical research is certainly how the motivations for social engagement have changed over time (Cavallo, 1991). Somewhat oversimplified, two traditions regarding the motivations for charitable activities can be differentiated, presented here as ideal types: euergetism and alms giving. They differ in the aims pursued and the motives behind the giving. The

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phenomenon of euergetism is connected to the GrecoRoman cultural sphere and was intensively studied by the French historian Paul Veyne (Veyne, 1976), who analyzed how wealthy citizens of the Greek and Roman cities donated large sums of money for a variety of public purposes, for example, alleviation of a famine or improvement of the city infrastructure in the form of roads and public baths, as well as for the amusement of the citizens by financing circuses or theaters or to nurture patriotic sentiment by creating monuments, and so forth. The motives that drove euergetists to contribute intensively to the public good did not include help for others per se; the aim was rather to promote the donor’s political career, to build his reputation, public esteem, and admiration, to build up social capital and networks in form of clientele, or, in the case of a donation in the form of a bequest, a legacy the donor hoped would be remembered by the citizens. The second tradition of giving money or goods for the public good goes back to the Oriental and Jewish traditions and was adopted in the Christian cultural sphere (Bolkestein, 1939). In this connection, alms played a crucial role. The motives for alms giving differed very much from those for euergetism: since they were rooted in religious beliefs, it was a much more internalized, value-driven behavioral pattern. Giving alms to the poor and starving was thought to be pleasing in the eyes of God. The donor hoped to be rewarded by God with a happy life before death, and that her or his soul would be saved in the afterlife (Geremek, 1994; Schubert, 1992). This was assured by the fact that the receiver had to pray for the soul of the donor. Through secularization, the spectrum of previously internalized motives for charitable activities expanded to the humanitarian and ideological (e.g., in the form of international socialist assistance or in the form of ‘‘patriotic’’ donations for the families of soldiers killed in action, etc.). For most charitable activities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both types of motivation can be detected, but generally in varying proportions. The charitable activities of those of higher class status tended most often to take on euergetic characteristics: frequently the creation of an endowment for hospitals or orphanages had as much to do with seeking recognition within one’s own class, social advancement, or social boundary setting (inclusion within or exclusion from the local elite) as with helping the needy and serving society (Schulz, 1998). Charitable acts could serve the purpose of accumulating social and symbolic capital, which in turn would be converted also into economic capital or could legitimate demands for political participation or dominance. For

example, Thomas Adam examined selected American, Canadian, and European cities to determine to what extent newer groups within the bourgeoisie (i.e., families that became wealthy through industrialization) sought – with the help of social and cultural foundations – to build social capital and enter the circles of the already established elite during the second half of the nineteenth century (Adam, 2009). At the same time, social networks could also be sealed off against newcomers through philanthropic organizations such as charitable associations, in order to protect the social exclusivity of the elite. Philanthropy could also be used to underpin a political claim to leadership alongside a social or cultural claim (Adam & Retallack, 2001). Here the question also arises whether social discipline objectives were also being pursued through charitable engagement, for example, to bring middle and upper-class models of behavior closer to the lower classes during times of rising social conflicts accompanying the industrial age (Schulz, 1998). Charitable engagement can be interpreted as an attempt to accommodate relatively deprived social groups in order to relieve social tensions and stave off threatening social-revolutionary developments. Thus the in early modern times frequently made distinction between the worthy poor (which should be supported) and the unworthy poor can be interpreted as a call to control the behavior of the deprived popular classes. At the same time, the social agency of the poor can also be pointed to: The recipients of help often used the gifts received in thoroughly stubborn ways and not always according to the directives of the givers. When one examines charity via the categories of social and political power, the question generally arises to what extent it also implies a hierarchical relationship between giver and recipient and thereby leads to the confirmation and perpetuation of social structures and/or political inequality. In other acts of charitable activities, euergetic motivations and those related to social relationships either within one’s own social class or toward those of other classes were not as important; instead, convictions – religious or secular – came to the fore. Unfortunately the analysis of these motives for charitable activities in earlier times will often have its limits: While founders and large donors have in many cases left documents behind in which they discuss the reasons they made money available for social purposes, the everyday giving of smaller sums on the part of the average person produced fewer written sources. Historians exploring the motivations for charitable activities are regularly confronted with the generally lacking empirical basis. Another question pursued by historians is the influence of state activities on the charitable engagement of

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citizens. Two opposing hypotheses exist: Some historians assume that the expansion of the state’s sphere of activity has led to a retreat of private engagement (crowding out), while others argue to the contrary that crowding out has not occurred at all (McCarthy, 2003: 3). For example, the development of university financing in the United States, in comparison with France or Germany, speaks for the thesis of crowding out. In the United States during the nineteenth century, public agencies contributed to the financing of higher education only to a limited extent and left room for private support in the areas of, for example, scholarships, professorial chairs, buildings, and even athletics. In Europe, by contrast, the state took on the financing of higher education to a much greater extent; private grants or endowments for universities were much less frequent. This difference gives evidence for a crowding out effect. Against the assumption that state activities always crowd out private engagement another example can be put forward: citizen engagement for social concerns in Germany reached its first peak at the same time as the Bismarckian social welfare state was introduced and then extended (Sachße & Tennstedt, 1980; Hein, 1997). Furthermore, it must be considered that many projects and institutions in the social assistance area were established in the form of a public/private partnership in which private and public funds flowed together. From the perspective of historians, some doubts can be raised against the general assumption that the expansion of the social welfare state always and everywhere led to a crowding out of private engagement for social purposes. State intervention also plays a role for historians of charity in another sense, for example, whether tax policy favored charitable giving to a greater or lesser extent. Public entities also affect the field of private charity through lawmaking as well, insofar as, especially in the twentieth century, they enacted the legal framework for social engagement, for example, laws related to foundations, associations, and fundraising, which had clear impact on charitable activities (Liermann, 1963). This is clearly seen in the example of West Germany after World War II: In the FRG a ban on public fundraising by private individuals and most organizations stemming from a 1934 law was in effect until the early 1960s. With only few exceptions, charitable initiatives did not receive governmental approval to approach citizens to seek donations. Since only a handful of organizations received this permission, public agencies regulated charitable contributions according to their own agenda. As soon as that law was replaced in the early 1960s with a broadly liberal one, the donations ‘‘market’’ in Germany ‘‘exploded’’, and

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a multitude of organizations were established that competed for citizens’ donations and offered a significantly broader spectrum of purposes to be supported than previously. The change took place once the state reduced its regulatory measures (Lingelbach, 2007). The role of the state regarding charitable activities leads to the question of how the framework for charity took shape under dictatorships. Historians have analyzed how the National Socialist regime exploited the charitable activities of the population for its own purposes and introduced collection activities for propaganda purposes (Vorla¨nder, 1986). For East Germany (the former GDR), a case study on donation collections for third world countries determined that the population continued to make significant donations, but at the same time, the government intensively monitored and influenced the campaigns. The regime also exploited the fundraising campaigns, on the one hand, domestically insofar as it sought to strengthen the population’s identification with the socialist system, and, on the other hand, for its foreign policy goals since the fundraising campaigns were used to achieve diplomatic recognition of the second German state on the part of newly established states in the process of decolonization (Witkowski, 2009). Another substantial research area for the history of charity relates to the development of intermediaries. As already mentioned, donations in particular were most often not given directly to the needy in the form of alms, but rather to institutions that redistributed these gifts. So, for example, the donations of the American population for the suffering people in Europe after World War II were given to intermediaries such as the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE), which then handed out food packages to the beneficiaries. The growing significance and differentiation of the intermediary institutions over time resulted in a clear influence of their interests and motivations over the charitable process. This can be retraced using the example of the medieval church-related institutions as well as by way of the communal poor funds in early modernity or the big welfare federations of the twentieth century. The intermediaries followed their own ideals (one thinks of the missionary institutions that were financed through donations) or also tangible (social-) political goals at the same time as they had an interest in their own institutional survival. They were in the position to direct the currents of giving in specific directions, to allow the money to flow to the purposes or target groups of their choosing, thereby taking on a society-shaping function. Historians of charity also investigate which social groups were most intensively engaged. As an example,

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the charitable activities of women are more closely examined. In the age of foundations and charitable associations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it can be asked, to what extent women became involved in charitable activities to achieve social influence and to play a more decisive role in public life, or to build ‘‘parallel power structures’’ (McCarthy, 1990; Quataert, 2001). Since charitable engagement remained within the framework of gender-defined stereotypes of women as caring and sacrificing, middle- and upper-class women were able to seize and define a sphere of influence outside of the home long before the introduction of female suffrage, without in the process endangering the gender roles assigned to them. Since women as a marginalized group sought to achieve social impact through charity, the engagement of ethnic minorities can also be considered from this vantage point. The above average engagement of Jewish citizens in the German Empire can be interpreted in this direction; charity offered the possibility to free oneself from one’s marginal status at least partially; at the same time, Jewish philanthropic activity could also serve to create Jewish identity or to prevent and defend against anti-Semitic prejudices or treatment (Liedtke, 1999; Penslar, 1993). Similarly, African-Americans became involved in charitable organizations in order to improve the social situation of blacks in the United States, for example, during the civil rights era (Clegg III, 2003).

Future Directions From this brief presentation of research conducted to date, it becomes clear which topics and questions could be of interest for future research. Included here surely is international comparison: with few exceptions, most studies on the history of charity are of local, regional, or national nature, whereas a comparative approach could help to draw out the specifics of the developments and the causes for the differences between the paths charitable giving took. Various traditions of charitable activities have developed in a path-dependent way so that, in the different regions of the world, charity is practiced differently even today and has taken on a variety of meanings. Differing practices of social distinction have similarly led to diverse forms of philanthropic expression; different religious orientations and different legal frameworks have led up to now to variations in the ways people become engaged with the help of foundations or donations for others, etc. In this case, comparative analyses offer an as yet unexploited potential for enhanced knowledge. Historical research related to charity can also achieve greater significance in the framework of transnational

history. In the age of globalization, assistance provided to people in need beyond one’s own local, regional, or national frame of reference gains ever more importance. In a media-dominated world in which pictures of starving people or victims of natural catastrophes reach every affluent household, giving on behalf of distant ‘‘others’’ gains more weight. Even if well into the twentieth century charity focused on the local needy (Hein, 1997), and later also one the needy of one’s own nation, still there were also earlier signs of an international solidarity that are worth examining. In doing so, the development of media must be incorporated into the discussion and, in particular, one must consider that charity often conformed to the functional logic of the media: International aid organizations increasingly needed the attention of the media in order to bring their concerns to the potential donors, which also meant that they had to adapt their range of actions and their approaches to the interests of newspapers, magazines, and television in order to be heard (Benthall, 1993). Furthermore, charity research offers a prominent field for interdisciplinary research, for example, in the area of motivation research. Anthropologists, psychologists, social scientists, and specialists in religious studies could work together with historians to examine the changing motivations for charitable activities over time. However, the closing of these and other research gaps calls for an historically based determination of the key analytical categories and concepts to lead international and interdisciplinary research activities to fruitful results.

Cross-References

▶ CARE ▶ Charity and religion ▶ Charity Law ▶ Donor/Donor Intent ▶ Foundations, Definition and History ▶ Gift/Giving ▶ Gift Relationship ▶ Nonprofit Organizations, Definition and History of ▶ Philanthropy, Definitions ▶ Philanthropy and Religion, Christianity ▶ Philanthropy and Religion, Judaism

References/Further Readings Adam, T. (2009, forthcoming). Buying respectability: Philanthropy and urban society in transnational perspective, 1840s to 1930s. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Adam, T., & Retallack. J. (2001). Philanthropy und politische Macht in deutschen Kommunen. In T. Adam & J. Retallack (Eds.), Zwischen Markt und Staat: Stifter und Stiftungen im internationalen Vergleich (pp. 106–138). Leipzig: Leipziger Universita¨ts-Verlag. Benthall, J. (1993). Disasters, relief and the media. London: Tauris.

Charity Law Bolkestein, H. (1939). Wohlta¨tigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum. Ein Beitrag zum Problem, Moral und Gesellschaft. Utrecht: Oosthoek. Bremner, R. H. (1996). Giving: Charity and philanthropy in history. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Cavallo, S. (1991). The motivation of benefactors. An overview of approaches to the study of charity. In J. Barry (Ed.), Medicine and charity before the welfare state (pp. 46–62). London: Routledge. Clegg, C. A. (2003). Philanthropy, the civil rights movement, and the politics of racial reform. In L. J. Friedman & M. D. McGarvie (Eds.), Charity, philanthropy, and civility in American history (pp. 341–361). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davis, S. (1996). Philanthropy as a virtue in late antiquity and the middle ages. In J. B. Schneewind (Ed.), Giving: Western ideas of philanthropy (pp. 1–23). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Friedman, L. J., & McGarvie, M. D. (Eds.) (2003). Charity, philanthropy, and civility in American history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Geremek, B. (1994). Poverty: A history. Oxford: Blackwell. Hands, A. R. (1968). Charities and social aid in Greece and Rome. London: Thames & Hudson. Hein, D. (1997). Das Stiftungswesen als Instrument bu¨rgerlichen Handelns im 19. Jahrhundert. In B. Kirchga¨ssner & H.-P. Becht (Eds.), Stadt und Ma¨zenatentum (pp. 75–92). Sigmaringen: Thorbecke. Liedtke, R. (1999). Integration and separation: Jewish welfare in Hamburg and Manchester in the nineteenth century. In M. Brenner, R. Liedtke, & D. Rechter (Eds.), Two nations. British and German Jews in comparative perspective (pp. 247–271). Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck. Liermann, H. (1963). Handbuch des Stiftungsrechts, Band 1: Geschichte des Stiftungsrechts. Tu¨bingen: Mohr. Lingelbach, G. (2007). Die Entwicklung des Spendenmarktes in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von der staatlichen Regulierung zur medialen Lenkung. Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 33, 127–157. Marais, J. -L. (1999). Histoire du don en France de 1800 a` 1939. Dons et legs charitables, pieux et philanthropiques. Rennes: Presse Universitaire de Rennes. McCarthy, K. (2003). American creed. Philanthropy and the rise of civil society 1700–1865. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. McCarthy, K. D. (1990). Parallel power structures: Women and the voluntary sphere. In K. D. McCarthy (Ed.), Lady bountiful revisited: Women, philanthropy, and power (pp. 1–31). New York: Rutgers University Press. Owen, D. (1964). English philanthropy, 1660–1960. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Penslar, D. J. (1993). Philanthropy, the ‘‘Social Question’’ and Jewish identity in imperial Germany. Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook, 38, 51–73. Quataert, J. H. (2001). Staging philanthropy: Patriotic women and the national imagination in dynastic Germany 1813–1916. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Roberts, S. (1996). Contexts of charity in the middle ages. In J. B. Schneewind (Ed.), Giving: Western ideas of philanthropy (pp. 24–53). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Sachße, C., & Tennstedt, F. (1980). Geschichte der Armenfu¨rsorge in Deutschland. Bd.1: Vom Spa¨tmittelalter bis zum 1. Weltkrieg. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Schubert, E. (1992). Gestalt und Gestaltwandel des Almosens im Mittelalter. Jahrbuch fu¨r fra¨nkische Landesforschung, 52, 241–262. Schulz, A. (1998). Ma¨zenatentum und Wohlta¨tigkeit – Ausdrucksformen bu¨rgerlichen Gemeinsinns in der Neuzeit. In J. Kocka & M. Frey

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(Eds.), Bu¨rgerkultur und Ma¨zenatentum im 19. Jahrhundert (pp. 240–262). Berlin: Bostelmann & Siebenhaar Edition Fannei & Walz. Veyne, P. (1976). Le pain et le cirque. Sociologie historique d’un pluralisme politique. Paris: Editions du Seuil. Vorla¨nder, H. (1986). NS-Volkswohlfahrt und Winterhilfswerk des Deutschen Volkes. Vierteljahrshefte fu¨r Zeitgeschichte, 34, 341–380. Witkowski, G. R. (2009, forthcoming). ‘‘Unser Tisch ist besser gedeckt’’: Ostdeutsche Philanthropie und Wohlta¨tigkeit von 1959 bis 1989. In T. Adam, S. La¨ssig, & G. Lingelbach (Eds.), Stifter, Spender und Ma¨zene: USA und Deutschland im historischen Vergleich. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Charity Law MYLES MCGREGOR-LOWNDES, KERRY O’HALLORAN Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia

Introduction Charity law is traditionally regarded as having emerged from the English law of equity. Equitable principles permitted a charitable trust to be established which departed from the usual trust principles of requiring identifiable beneficiaries and having a duration falling within a set period of time. Charitable trusts are able to exist in perpetuity and be for purposes, rather than for specific persons. However, the legal definition of charity restricts such trusts to certain purposes and requires them to be for the public benefit. Charity law’s modern roots lie in seventeenth century England. Thereafter it was imposed by default in most of the British colonies including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, India, and Hong Kong. The law has developed through judicial precedent with most of the 60 or so common law jurisdictions having varying degrees of reference back to developing English precedents. Only since the turn of this century has there been significant proposed and actual statutory intervention in the United Kingdom and some former colonies apart from the United States (USA). On independence the United States quickly broke from traditional ties to English charity law developing a preference for corporations rather than trusts and a statutory definition of charity for taxation purposes. Since the quincentennial in 2001 of the modern English origins of the definition of charitable purposes there have been significant legal reform proposals to largely transfer the determination of core common law concepts from a judicial

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to a statutory basis by legislating for a new definition of what constitutes charitable purposes and public benefit in the United Kingdom and some of its former colonies. This has been accompanied by reforms to the regulatory framework governing those organizations (now wider than the equitable trust form) which have adopted charitable purposes (refer charitable organizations).

Definition The word charity in a legal context differs from popular usage in its widest sense which can range from ‘‘the good affections between persons’’ to its restricted sense of ‘‘relief of the poor’’ – often the deserving poor. It is also distinguished legally from ‘‘benevolent’’ and ‘‘philanthropic’’ purposes which are regarded as having meanings which are narrower or broader than that permitted in law by charitable purposes. At the root of the legal definition of charity is the Preamble to the English Charitable Uses Act 1601 (also referred to as the Statute of Elizabeth I) which listed activities which permitted charitable activities and judicial interpretations of such items as classified in Pemsel’s case (Income Tax Special Purposes Commrs. v Pemsel [1981] AC 531). The Pemsel classification includes trusts for the relief of poverty; the advancement of religion; the advancement of education; and for any other purposes beneficial to the community falling under any of the preceding heads. Any purpose must also be for the ‘‘public benefit’’ and be available to sufficient members of the public. Subsequent judicial decisions, administrative rulings, and statutory instruments have modified the Pemsel classification across jurisdictions with an English legal heritage. Such modifications have included requirements that for an organization to be charitable its purposes must be confined exclusively to charitable purposes, without profit or gain accruing to its members, and such purposes must not be primarily devoted to advocating or opposing changes in law or public policy. For the United States, the tax code definition of ‘‘charitable organization’’ is found in Section 501(c)(3) of The Internal Revenue Code of 1968, being organizations ‘‘organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes’’ and is broader than the English legal conception.

Historical Background As stated above, the usual starting point for the history of English charity law is the seventeenth century Charitable Uses Act 1601 known commonly as ‘‘the Statute of Elizabeth I’’ (the Preamble). Others have traced the origin

of the laws of charity back to Judaeo-Christian traditions molded by the arrangements of the Catholic Church and its fraternities and reconfigured by Protestant theology as exemplified by a fourteenth century poem The Vision of Piers Plowman which closely resembles the Statute of Elizabeth I. There are intriguing similarities to the Hindu math and instances of returning crusaders establishing institutions which were later regarded as charitable that incorporated notions from the Islamic waqf, but in the common law jurisdictions it is the Preamble that is the lawyer’s compass. The Preamble contained a list of charitable purposes: "

Releife of aged impotent and poore people, some for Maintenance of sicke and maymed Souldiers and Marriners, Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and Schollers in Universities, some for Repaire of Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies Churches Seabankes and Highwaies, some for Educacion and prefermente of Orphans, some for or towardes Reliefe Stocke or Maintenance of Howses of Correccion, some for Mariages of poore Maides, some for Supportacion Ayde and Helpe of younge tradesmen Handicraftesmen and persons decayed, and others for reliefe or redemption of Prisoners or Captives, and for aide or ease of any poore Inhabitantes concerninge paymente of Fifteenes, setting out of Souldiers and other Taxes.

An English court would not regard a purpose as charitable unless it appeared on that list or could be defined as coming within ‘‘the spirit and intendment’’ of the Preamble and disclosed an element of ‘‘public benefit.’’ In 1891 Lord MacNaghten classified charitable purposes for legal purposes into four principal heads being: the relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of religion, and other purposes beneficial to the community falling under any of the preceding heads. All such purposes must also be directed to the public benefit with the exception of purposes to relieve poverty among a limited class of beneficiaries (often referred to as the ‘‘poor relatives’’ exception). Within this framework the English courts have created case precedents refining and sometimes confusing the charity definition. Over the last century, as the traditional roles of judiciary and Attorney General have faded, the Charity Commission for England and Wales has been given increasing administrative and quasi-judicial powers over charitable bodies which has also influenced the definition of charity. After years of various inquiries rejecting a statutory definitional reform of the definition of charity, in 2002 a UK Cabinet Office Strategy Unit Report known as Private Action, Public Benefit. A Review of charities and the

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wider not-for-profit sector recommended wide ranging definitional and regulatory reform for the law of charities. These recommendations included a modernization and restatement of charitable purposes, reform of the Charity Commission and the establishment of a Charity Tribunal. The Charities Act 2006 was passed by Parliament in November 2006, came into force partially on 7 November 2007 but mostly took effect in early 2008. Under Section 2 of the Charities Act 2006, the four common law heads of charitable purposes are increased to thirteen statutory heads. Thus a ‘‘charitable purpose’’ is one that is for either "

‘‘(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

(i) (j)

(k) (l)

(m)

the prevention or relief of poverty; the advancement of education; the advancement of religion; the advancement of health or the saving of lives; the advancement of citizenship or community development; the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science; the advancement of amateur sport; the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the promotion of religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity; the advancement of environmental protection or improvement; the relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or other disadvantage; the advancement of animal welfare; the promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown, or of the efficiency of the police, fire and rescue services or ambulance services; and other purposes that are currently recognized as charitable or are in the spirit of any purposes currently recognized as charitable.’’

The law had previously presumed that charities with the purposes of relief of poverty, or the advancement of education or of religion, were for the public benefit. The Charities Act 2006 removed this presumption, so for the first time the law requires every charity to explicitly demonstrate that their purposes are for the public benefit. The Act declares that ‘‘charity means an institution established for charitable purposes only’’ but it does not contain any new definition of public benefit or suggest how charities should meet that requirement. It does give the Charity Commission the new objective of promoting awareness and understanding of the operation of the public benefit requirement, and requires the Commission to consult on any guidance on public benefit it produces,

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to which charity trustees are required to have regard when running their charity.

Key Issues The boundaries of what is regarded as charitable in law and its fit with the social environment is the fundamental issue which is wrestled with by lawyers, regulators, policy makers and civil society participants. The expansion and contraction of the boundaries is a contested space and the means by which the movement takes place and the rate of change is always productive of controversy. England and her colonies until recently have relied upon judicial precedent to set these boundaries in the main, although the Charity Commission of England and Wales has, over the last 2 decades, played a more activist role in attempting to move the definitional boundaries by administrative fiat and quasi-judicial mechanisms. The lack of judicial opportunity through contested cases combined with increasing reluctance of courts to be adventurous where there are significant taxation concessions at stake have slowed the progress of judicial advancement in Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The growing pressure for statutory intervention since 2001 in all closely aligned English jurisdictions is working its way through each of the jurisdictions at different rates of progress. The final practical outcomes of the new legislative interventions will only be discerned in the coming years. However, replacing common law concepts with statutory definitions does inevitably signify a break with tradition. In future the legal definition of what constitutes ‘‘charity’’ will be much less amenable to judicial influence and more vulnerable to direct political control through government use of statutory amendment. Moreover, as each jurisdiction in turn legislates for a slightly different definition of charitable purpose, charity law is being nationalised and prised away from the pool of common law precedents that has allowed a shared jurisprudence to shape the development of philanthropy across many of the world’s most developed countries. As judicial involvement in the setting and maintaining of the charity law boundaries wanes and administrative and quasi-judicial measures are used more frequently, it is probable that charity law will become subject to a greater and more frequent level of political intervention as legislation is used by government to effect and manage change in the third sector. Finally, whether the legal boundary of charity will remain legally significant in the future is under threat from the adoption by lawyers, regulators, policy makers, politicians, and the public, of broader ideas of a third sector and civil society organizations, and the growth of

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hybrid organizations which span business and government sectors.

whereas in England and Wales, the issue is whether a particular charitable purpose is for the public benefit.

International Perspectives

Ireland

Scotland

Revenue law is applied uniformly across the United Kingdom so for taxation purposes Scotland shared the legal definition of ‘‘charity.’’ However, in the general law of Scotland the term ‘‘charity’’ and ‘‘charitable’’ did not acquire a technical meaning and so in this respect diverged from the situation in England and Wales. Recent reforms have largely brought this divergence to an end. In May 2001 the Scottish Charity Law Review Commission published its report (the McFadden Report) making 114 recommendations for the reform of charity law and regulation in Scotland. As a result the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 (the CTI(S) Act 2005) was introduced. The new legislation transfers responsibility for charitable status in Scotland from HM Revenue and Customs to the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR). OSCR has further regulatory responsibilities which include maintaining the Scottish Charity Register. Section 7(2) of the CTI(S) Act 2005 sets out 15 different charitable purposes and a sixteenth category, being any other purpose that may reasonably be regarded as analogous to any of those 15 purposes. These are: the advancement of health (including the prevention or relief of sickness, disease, or human suffering); the saving of lives; the advancement of citizenship or community development (including rural or urban regeneration and the promotion of civic responsibility, volunteering, the voluntary sector or the effectiveness or efficiency of charities); the advancement of the arts, heritage, culture, or science; the advancement of public participation in sport (‘‘sport’’ means sport which involves physical skill and exertion) and the provision of certain types of recreational facilities, or the organization of recreational activities, with the object of improving the conditions of life for the persons for whom the facilities or activities are primarily intended; the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation; the promotion of religious or racial harmony; the promotion of equality and diversity; the advancement of environmental protection or improvement; the relief of those in need by reason of age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or other disadvantage (including relief given by the provision of accommodation or care); and the advancement of animal welfare. The listed charitable purposes are similar to the English reforms but are not identical. In Scotland, public benefit is assessed on the basis of how a body exercises its functions;

Charity law in Ireland is rooted in the common law and based on the Statute of Pious Uses 1634 which is not dissimilar to the English Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 noted above. The English classification of charitable purposes was accepted in Ireland and their judicial interpretation has developed along much the same lines. The legislative framework consisting of the Charities Acts of 1961 and 1973 as amended by the Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2002 are closely modeled on the provisions of the English Charities Act 1960. The lead regulatory agency was the Revenue Commissioners and was most influential in charity registration approval, with the Commissioners of Charitable Donations and Bequests (an antiquated forerunner to the present English Charity Commission) in a monitoring and support role. Although the Irish reform process was first mooted in 1996, it was not launched until 2002. By 2007, the Irish Charities Bill 2007 had been introduced to modernise the law and definition of charities and the Charities Act (NI) 2008 is expected shortly. The Charities Regulatory Authority, replacing the Commissioners for Charitable Donations and Bequests, will be responsible for the establishment and maintenance of a register of charities and will oversee the reporting regimes applicable to registered charities. A Charity Appeals Tribunal is to be established to provide an alternative to the courts system for the review of regulatory decisions. ‘‘Charitable purposes,’’ under the new legislation, will retain but extend the common law definition interpreted by the judiciary over many years. In addition to enlarging the first head to allow for the ‘‘prevention’’ as well as the relief of poverty, the statute will restate the fourth head ‘‘other purposes beneficial to the community,’’ but add that this is to ‘‘include’’ a further eleven specific new charitable purposes. This will expressly recognize the charitable nature of: advancing the community welfare of young, old, and disabled people; supporting community development; protecting the natural environment; promoting health; advancing art, science, culture, and heritage; and integrating disadvantaged individuals more fully into society. It will also recognize as ‘‘charitable’’ a body lending assistance to other charities in fulfilling their charitable purpose in an efficient or effective manner. The legislation will omit any reference to amateur sport or to human rights in its definition of ‘‘charitable purpose.’’ Irish legislation will require proof of public benefit before a purpose can be declared charitable. The new

Charity Law

statutory test for public benefit, applicable to all nonreligious purposes, will require proof of three facts: (a) that the purpose in question is intended to benefit the public or a section thereof; (b) that any private benefit flowing from the purpose is ancillary and necessary for the achievement of the primary charitable purpose; and (c) that any donor-imposed limitations on the class entitled to benefit or any charges imposed in the provision of the charitable purpose are justified and reasonable and will not limit unduly the number of persons or classes of person who will benefit. Canada

Despite the English-speaking parts of Canada not adopting English statutory law at the time of colonization, much of the charity law in Canada reflects the English common law of charitable trusts. Various provinces, including Quebec, have their own definitions of what constitutes a charitable purpose. Whilst under the federated constitution the responsibility for the supervision of charities rests with the provinces, under the Income Tax Act 1985 the Canadian Revenue Authority (CRA) has effectively become the gatekeeper to charitable status. Charity law reform has been underway in Canada for over a decade with the Ontario Law Reform Commission issuing a report in 1996 and from 2002 a series of roundtables and joint government/sector working groups. However, little substantive reform has resulted from the various recommendations. Expansive interpretations by the Canadian courts have occurred from time to time. In Re Vancouver Regional Free Net Association and Minister of National Revenue [1996] 137 DLR (4th) 206 (Federal Court of Appeal, 8 July 1996), an organization established to provide free community access to the Internet was regarded as charitable as the service could be viewed as a contemporary equivalent to the ‘‘highways’’ declared charitable in the English Preamble. In Everywoman’s Health Centre Society (1988) v. Minister of National Revenue [1992] 2 FC 52 (Federal Court of Appeal, 26 November 1991), the court also awarded charitable status to a society established to provide ‘‘necessary medical services for women for the benefit of the community as a whole’’ and carrying on ‘‘educational activities incidental to the above.’’ The society ran a free-standing abortion clinic. In 2007, the ultimate Canadian appeal court in A.Y.S.A. Amateur Youth Soccer Association v. Canada (Revenue Agency) 2007 SCC 42; [2008] 287 DLR (4th) 4 (Supreme Court of Canada, 5 October 2007), decided that the court should only vary the definition of charity at the margins, leaving any other developments to the legislature.

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Singapore

Charity law in this jurisdiction is derived primarily from English law, but since attaining independence in 1965, Singapore has begun actively to develop its own body of law. Section 2(1) of the Charities Act 1994 defines ‘‘charity’’ as any institution, corporate or not, that is established for charitable purposes and is under the jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to charities while ‘‘charitable purposes’’ is defined as purposes that are exclusively charitable according to the law of Singapore. To interpret the meaning of these terms the courts rely on the common law, as established largely through English precedents. One of the departures from English law in Singapore was the establishment a subset of charities known as Institutions of a Public Character (IPCs) which have authorization to receive tax-deductible donations from the public. IPCs bear a similarity to Australia’s Public Benevolent Institutions. In October 2005, following the considerable media exposure given to scandals involving the National Kidney Foundation and other organizations which highlighted problems of governance in the sector, the Inter-Ministry Committee on the Regulation of Charities and Institutions of Public Character was established with a remit to examine the regulation of charitable organizations and IPCs. The result was a series of administrative and procedural reforms, but no alteration to the definition of charity. The separation of the office of Charity Commissioner from the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore may result in the Commissioner having a greater degree of autonomy in determining charitable status. Australia

Australia was stamped at its colonial birth with the imprimatur of English laws and followed the English common law of charities. In the 1920s case of Chesterman v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation the Australian High Court decided that the meaning of ‘‘charity’’ in a federal taxing statute was the popular narrow meaning of the word, rather than the wider English legal meaning. The decision was overturned on appeal to the English Privy Council which replaced it with the orthodox English formula. The federal government responded with the new legislative concept of ‘‘public benevolent institution’’ (PBI), a restricted subset of charity which is still the main gateway to donation deductibility, rather than charity status. As in other common law nations, such as Canada, the primary regulatory authority in Australia is by default at federal level in the government revenue agency, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) which applies the provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 to regulate the

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fiscal environment including charities. It follows established English precedents on definitional matters, deploys a generally conservative and defensive interpretation of Pemsel and the ‘‘spirit and intendment’’ rule. Unlike the English Charity Commission, the ATO has neither the remit nor the resources to undertake a strategic program for the development of charitable purposes. States have the responsibility for the definition and regulation of charities outside the federal taxing statutes, but generally follow federal definitions, and state Attorneys–General who have regulatory oversight of charities are largely inactive. The Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations was launched by the Federal Government and in 2001 provided recommendations for new heads of charity and other reforms including a charity commission type body, all of which were remarkably similar to later charity reforms in England and Wales. However, the translation of such recommendations to a draft bill was regarded by many as flawed and subsequent legislative reform was contained to three relatively minor matters. The Tax Laws Amendment (2005 Measures No. 3) Act 2005, provided that ‘‘the provision of child care services on a nonprofit basis’’ is a charitable purpose; provision was made for self-help groups to acquire charitable status provided that they are ‘‘open and non-discriminatory’’; and closed or contemplative religious orders were also determined to be charitable. New Zealand

New Zealand also took the hallmarks of English charity law until the introduction of the Charities Act 2005. Prior to that legislation a definition of ‘‘charity’’ and ‘‘charitable purpose’’ required a referral to s 2 of the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 which provided that charitable purpose meant ‘‘every purpose which in accordance with the law of New Zealand is charitable.’’ Subject to some minor adjustments, the common law will continue under the 2005 Act. There has been an obvious and longstanding fundamental difficulty in fitting the charity law framework to Maori needs due to the fact that Maori communities are organised around blood relationships. Section 5 (2)(a) of the Charities Act 2005 says that the purpose of an organization may still be charitable and may satisfy the public benefit requirement, even if the beneficiaries or members are related by blood. The Inland Revenue Department has transferred to the newly established Charities Commission the power to grant an organization ‘‘charitable status’’ for income tax purposes only if that organization satisfies four requirements:

● It must be carried on exclusively for charitable purposes. ● It must not be carried on for the private pecuniary profit of any individual. ● It must have a provision in its rules requiring the assets of the organization to be transferred to another entity with charitable purposes if the organization ceases to exist. ● It must not have the power to amend its rules in such a way as to alter the exclusively charitable nature of the organization. United States of America

The American constitution leaves the definition and regulation of charity to the states, but it is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that is the dominant influence in what is regarded as ‘‘charitable.’’ The repeal of English legislation at the time of the Revolution was thought to extend to the Statute of Charitable Uses, thereby rendering all charities established in the newly founded states null and void. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in Section 501 lists two major sets of nonprofit organizations that are tax preferenced. There are what are commonly called ‘‘charitable’’ organizations being organizations ‘‘organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes’’ (Section 501(c)(3)) and a residuary group of ‘‘non-charities’’ such as social clubs, veterans’ organizations, unions, chambers of commerce and other private member organizations. While all Section 501(c) organizations are exempt from income tax, Section 501(c)(3) organization donors may be eligible for income tax deductions as a result of the gift. Within 501(c)(3) the law divides organizations into private foundations and public charities. The intent of the law is to separate donor-controlled or closely held organizations from operating charities with broad based donor or beneficiary constituencies so that stricter controls could be placed upon private foundations. State courts tend to look at broader definitions of ‘‘notfor-profit purposes’’ for determination of whether a corporation is an organization that deserves to be recognized as a charity or other beneficial non-business organization. State courts also must decide whether provisions of charitable trusts will be enforced. In recent years the Senate Finance Committee has been holding hearings about reforms of the tax rules for the nonprofit sector generally. In the June 2004 hearings the Committee requested the Independent Sector (IS) to convene what became known as the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector. The focus of the Senate Committee was on

Charles Stewart Mott Foundation

issues related to accountability and transparency and ultimately governance rather than on definitional issues.

Future Directions The impending raft of reforms to the law and regulation of charity led by England and Wales and spreading through former British colonies is too recent to confidently predict the further development of charity law. The expansion of the heads of charitable purpose by legislation coupled with revamped, quasi-judicial mechanisms for the interpretation of charitable purposes through tribunals or administrative fiat will relieve some of the worst artificial confinement of the legal definition of charity. The stripping away of the public benefit presumptions from the law of charity and its replacement with various assessments and metrics will cause ongoing confrontation between organisations and regulators and governments as a new balance is struck. It is yet to be seen in our fast changing social context whether the additions to Pemsel will continue to adapt at a satisfactory pace with societal needs and beliefs, or whether government, emboldened by its legislative engineering of the definition of charitable purposes will further politicise charitable purposes to its own ends. If charitable purpose is to serve as the threshold to legal dispensations and fiscal concessions to the exclusion of other civil society organisations, then this contest will increasingly be prosecuted. However, those countries which are part of Europe will be under pressure to integrate into the European notions of nonprofit and foundation law in cross border taxation exemptions and gift deductions as well as common corporate forms, fundraising regulation and accountability measures. The European civil law traditions are quite different from the underlying jurisprudence of English charity law. The United States largely has left behind the Pemsel list and developed its own jurisprudential understanding of charitable purposes through its revenue laws. All jurisdictions with charity law will be challenged by hybrid organisations which span the traditional sector boundaries either with business or government. The principles of public benefit do not fit with personal gain so critical to business motivations. Independence of control inherent in trust law is an issue when the government boundary is overlapped, with governments demanding some element of control for public accountability assurance. These issues point to the need for the development of a jurisprudence that can serve as a touchstone of legal principles for civil society organisations, not merely charities.

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Cross-References

▶ Charity and Religion ▶ Common Law and Civil Society ▶ Charity, History of ▶ Law, Foundations ▶ Law, Nonprofit Associations ▶ Public Benefit and Public Good

References/Further Readings Hopkins, Bruce, R. (2007). The law of tax-exempt organizations, 9th ed. New York: Wiley and Sons. Charles, M., & Susan, M. (Eds.) (2000). Foundations of charity, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 111. Dal Pont, G. (2000). Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Great Britain, Home Office. (2003). Charities and not-for-profits: A modern legal framework – The government’s response to ‘‘private action, public benefit’’ London: Home Office. Jim, P., Bruce, C., & David, S. (Eds.) (2001). Between state and market: Essays on charity law and policy in Canada. Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, p. 457. Jones, G. (1969). History of the Law of Charity, 1532–1827, Holmes Beach, Fla: WW Gaunt. Luxton, P. (2001). The Law of Charities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ontario Law Reform Commission (1996). Report on the law of charities, Government of Ontario. O’Halloran, K., McGregor-Lowndes, M., & Simon, K. (2008). Charity law and social policy. Enschede, The Netherlands: Springer. Picarda, H. (1999). The law and practice relating to charities (3rd ed.). London: Butterworths. Warburton, J., Morris, D., & Riddle, N. F. (2003). Tudor on Charities. London: Sweet & Maxwell.

Charles Stewart Mott Foundation ALLYSON REAVES

Address of Organization Mott Foundation Building 503 S. Saginaw Street, Suite 1200 Flint, MI 48502-1851 USA www.mott.org

Introduction Located in southeastern Michigan, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation is a private foundation providing grant support for programs throughout the United States and internationally. With approximately 85 staff members in its offices in Flint and Detroit (Michigan, USA),

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Charles Stewart Mott Foundation

Johannesburg (South Africa), and London (United Kingdom), the Foundation awarded 558 grants totaling more than $110.4 million is 2008.

Brief History Former mayor of Flint, Michigan and pioneer of General Motors, Charles Stewart Mott established the C.S. Mott Foundation in 1926 by endowing it with 2,000 shares of General Motors stock valued at $320,000. Partnering with the Flint Community Schools in its early years, the Foundation became a major benefactor in the life of the city through school-based educational and recreational activities. This partnership ultimately developed into a nationwide community education movement.

Mission/Objective/Focus Area Through its programs of Civil Society, Environment, Flint Area, and Pathways Out of Poverty, and the more specific focus areas of these programs, the Foundation seeks to fulfill its mission of supporting efforts that promote a just, equitable and sustainable society.

Activities Through the foundation’s Civil Society program, nongovernmental organizations are funded in three major geographic areas: The United States, Central/Eastern Europe and Russia, and South Africa. In addition to its four program areas, the foundation also funds Exploratory and Special Projects (XSP). XSP grants support unusual or unique opportunities to address significant national and international problems. Under this program, the foundation makes a limited number of small grants for projects falling outside its regular grantmaking programs, including a longtime emphasis on supporting Historically Black Colleges and Universities. Proposals for XSP grants are by invitation only; unsolicited proposals are discouraged. The Mott Foundation maintains an extensive Web site, www.mott.org, which is designed to share insights into the Foundation’s grantmaking and the work of its grantees. The Web site includes general information and addresses topics related to any of the Foundation’s 14 issue areas, which include: Afterschool, Citizen Participation, Community Foundations, Community Organizing, Flint Area, Freshwater Ecosystems, Income Security, Michigan, Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector, Race and Reconciliation, Sustainable Development, Transitional Justice, Vulnerable Youth, and Workforce Development. The Foundation also

produces a limited number of publications that are available free of charge by request.

Structure and Governance The 13 members of the Board of Trustees comprise its Audit, Executive, and Investment Committees. Of the 13 trustees, five are Mott family members. The Mott Foundation is unusual when compared with other large, international foundations that have been in existence for more than 75 years because of its continuity of leadership through the years. Also, its top leadership position is still held by a family member. The current president, William S. White, is only the third person to serve in that role. He follows in the footsteps of Harding Mott, who was the founder’s son and also Mr. White’s father-in-law. Adhering to principles of transparency and accountability are two of several standards listed in the Foundation’s Code of Ethics. In 1970, Mott was one of the nation’s first large foundations to print an annual report that detailed the type and amount of each grant made that year. The Foundation has continued to do so every year since then. Mott’s grantmaking is also guided by a stated set of values. Among others, they include: ‘‘Building strong communities through collaboration to provide a basis for positive change; Promoting the social, economic and political empowerment of all individuals and communities to preserve fundamental democratic principles and rights; and Respecting the diversity of life to maintain a sustainable human and physical environment.’’

Funding The Foundation, with year-end assets of approximately $1.96 billion, made 558 grants totaling almost $110.4 million in 2008. As a private foundation, Mott does not receive government funds. The Foundation’s grantmaking is supported by investment returns generated on the endowment left by Mott’s founder.

Accomplishments Mott’s afterschool grantmaking, funded through the Pathways Out of Poverty (POP) Program has been the model for afterschool programs throughout the United States and around the world. Additionally, the Foundation has been recognized as a leader in its support of microenterprise programs and workforce investment through the POP program.

Charta 77 Foundation

Through its Civil Society program, Mott has been a longtime supporter and promoter of the community foundation concept in the United States and globally. Additionally, Mott’s Environment grantmaking has been nationally recognized for its support of efforts to preserve and restore the Great Lakes water resources as the world’s largest freshwater ecosystem. The Foundation also supports nonprofit groups working nationally and internationally to change policies and practices of international trade and financial institutions so the environment is protected and people’s standard of living is not adversely affected by projects supported by these institutions.

Cross-References

▶ Foundations, Community ▶ Foundations, Grantmaking ▶ Mott, C.S. ▶ Philanthropy in North America

References/Further Readings Gordon, T., & Morgan-Witts, M. (1979). The day the bubble burst: A social history of the Wall Street crash of 1929. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Young, C., & Quinn, W. (1963). Foundation for living: The story of Charles Stewart Mott & Flint. New York: McGraw-Hill.

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Brief History Charta 77 Foundation was established in 1978 in Stockholm by a group of young activists around the Folket i Bild magazine (represented by Peter Larsson a Peter Gavelin) and by Charta 77 signatory Jirˇı´ Pallas. Its mission was to support the aims of Charta 77 and to provide help for people persecuted by the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. It was established with the money from the Monismanien Prize for freedom of speech, which Charta 77 was awarded for its brave defense of human rights. With the approval of the spokespersons of Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia, the foundation then went on to receive the other prizes that Charta 77 was awarded in the following years as well as numerous gifts from individuals and organizations around the world. In 1981 the foundation won generous support from George Soros that enabled it not only to intensify its help for Czechoslovak dissidents but also to support unofficial culture and science in Czechoslovakia. By the end of the 1980s it worked from four offices in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and New York. As soon as the Czechoslovak communist regime collapsed in November 1989, the foundation moved to Prague and opened regional offices in Brno and Bratislava. After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the foundation split into the Czech Nadace Charty 77 and the Slovak Nadaćia Charty 77. Both continue their work to this day, but independently of each other and with differing missions.

Mission

Charta 77 Foundation MIROSLAV POSPI´SˇIL

Address of Organization Nadace Charty 77 Melantrichova 5 110 00 Praha 1 Czech Republic www.bariery.cz/nadace/

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From its original mission to draw attention to the fate of the opponents of the communist regime, to support the persecuted and imprisoned activists and their families and to support the development of free culture and thought, the mission of the post-1989 foundation had to be adapted to the new situation of transition to democracy and market economy. While continuing to work in the area of support for culture and science to this day, the Czech Ch77 Foundation has gradually expanded its mandate into the area of human services, the rights of minorities and the integration of minorities. The Slovak Ch77 Foundation, on the other hand, has narrowed its mission down to legal advisory services in the field of human rights.

Introduction

Activities

Charta 77 Foundation in the Czech Republic is one of two successor organizations to the original Charta 77 Foundation founded in Sweden in 1978. Since 1990, it has grown into one of the most important Czech supporters and funders of human rights causes.

To pursue its mission in the area of support for culture and science Charta 77 Foundation Czech Republic awards three annual prizes for outstanding achievement in humanities/social sciences, literature, and ecology and has a program of support for cultural projects. It also awards a

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prize for outstanding achievement if the fight for human rights and freedom. The best known and the largest program today, however, is the so-called Barriers Account, which supports projects that aim ‘‘to bring down barriers’’ between the majority and disadvantaged minorities of all descriptions. The ‘‘Barriers’’ program provides both direct support for disadvantaged individuals and groups as well as funding for nonprofit organizations that work for the integration of minorities.



CHRISTOPHER L. GRIFFIN, JR.

Charta 77 Foundation Czech Republic is a foundation in Czech law, registered with the regional court in Prague. It is governed by a Board of Trustees (eight members in 2006) and its activities and finances are monitored by a separate Supervisory Board (three members). The foundation is a member of the Czech Association of Foundations and adheres to its charter.

Funding Charta 77 Foundation has always been a grant-seeking foundation, both when it worked in Sweden and in the Czech Republic since 1989. It is financed primarily through individual contributions, special events and donations from corporations. It has also gradually built a small endowment of its own (CZK 76.6 million/$3.8 million in 2006), mainly with funding provided by the Czech state from the proceeds from the privatization of state-owned enterprises in the 1990s. In 2006 it reported total expenditures of CZK 47.2 million/$2.1 million, out of which CZK 34 million/$1.7 million were distributed as grants.

Hosˇt’a´lek, A., Jechova´, K., & Kantu˚rkova´, E. (1998). Nadace Charty 77: Dvacet let. [Charta 77 Foundation: Twenty Years]. Brno: Atlantis.

Child Trust Fund

Address of Organization Waterview Park Mandarin Way Washington NE38 8QG UK www.childtrustfund.gov.uk/

Introduction The Child Trust Fund (CTF) is an entitlement as well as a savings and investment account made available to all qualified children born in the United Kingdom on or after 2002. In practice, CTFs may take the form of: (1) traditional savings accounts; (2) stock market investments; or (3) ‘‘stakeholder accounts’’ with diversified portfolios regulated by the government to diminish risks from market fluctuations. Accounts may be opened either by the child’s parent(s) or the government if a parent fails to complete the stated requirements.

Brief History Accomplishments In November 1989, Charta 77 Foundation was one of only two foundations that were ready to start work in liberated Czechoslovakia without interruption and delay (the other being the Jan Hus Educational Foundation). It therefore holds a number of ‘‘firsts’’ that contributed significantly to the rapid renewal of the Czech foundation sector in the 1990s: it was the first foundation to launch a large-scale national appeal, the first to organize a charity concert or a charity auction, or the first to introduce regular payroll deduction as a way of donating to charity.

Cross-References

▶ Foundations, Grant-seeking ▶ Human Rights ▶ Soros, George

Gavin Kelly and Rachel Lissauer of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) published ‘‘Ownership for All’’ in 2000, the document which first recommended establishing CTFs. Kelly and Lissauer suggested creating a universal ‘‘Opportunity Fund’’ that would provide an endowment of £1,000 to each UK citizen, payable at birth or at age eighteen. After the report’s release, the IPPR coordinated a seminar in September 2000 at the Prime Minister’s office bringing together government officials and experts on asset-based welfare schemes. This meeting launched the political campaign to introduce CTFs. After soliciting consultation through two April 2001 reports, ‘‘Saving and Assets for All’’ and ‘‘Delivering Saving and Assets,’’ Parliament enacted legislation in May 2004 establishing the CTF as a birthright for all children born on or after September 1, 2002 and residing in the

Child Trust Fund

United Kingdom. Even though the first accounts were activated in April 2005, children born between 2002 and 2005 still had access to CTFs. Then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown amended the scheme in March 2006 so that all children who qualify for the CTF would receive an additional payment of £250 at age seven, whereas that children from households with incomes less than a fixed threshold (£15,575 in 2008) would receive £500 at the same time.

Mission As stated in the Explanatory Notes accompanying the Child Trust Funds Act, the policy objectives of the CTF are ‘‘[to] help people understand the benefits of saving and investing; [to] encourage parents and children to develop the saving habit and engage with financial institutions; [to] ensure that in [the] future all children have a financial asset at the start of adult life; [to] and build on financial education to help people make better financial choices throughout their lives.’’

Activities Between September 2002 and April 2007, almost 3.2 million CTF accounts were opened. In the 2006–2007 fiscal year, the average contribution to parent-opened accounts was about £260; the average level rose to £280 for the 2007– 2008 fiscal year. About one third of these parent-opened accounts received an additional nongovernment contribution. Regional government offices have made almost identical average donations to CTFs, although the average share of accounts with such investments was about 25%. The government remains involved in refining CTF design and coverage. For example, a consultation period initiated in 2007 sought to determine whether dropping the requirement that parents physically transfer payment vouchers to account providers (e.g., commercial banks, building societies, and investment managers) would increase efficiency and coverage. When parents fail to remit the initial voucher after twelve months, the government still establishes a Revenue Allocated Account (RAA) on the child’s behalf. Empirical evidence suggests that RAAs receive lower average parental contributions; thus, waiving the remittal requirement might increase parental participation and overall saving. Suggestions that the government make additional payments upon enrollment in secondary school have been raised but not enacted.

Structure and Governance Unlike many other forms of social security in the industrialized world, the CTF involves minimal government

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oversight and participation. The UK government sends the initial £250 voucher to a child’s ‘‘benefit claimant,’’ most often a parent. The claimant then activates a CTF account on the child’s behalf through a chosen financial services provider. Anyone may make payments to the child’s account as long as total contributions do not exceed £1,200 per year. The CTF account holder may not manage his or her funds until age 16, and only upon turning 18 may the child withdraw assets (although exceptions exist for terminally ill or deceased persons). CTF balances, for which all income and gains are taxexempt, may be used at the discretion of the account holder upon withdrawal.

Funding As noted in the history and structure of the CTF, initial funding for the fund comes from the government, and subsequent investments may come from the government or the child’s family and friends. The Exchequer projects that government costs associated with maintaining staff, information technology infrastructure, and legal expenses will reach £360 million in 2010 and £510 million by 2012.

Major Accomplishments In addition to the rising parental contribution statistics cited above, the CTF’s marketing campaign has achieved significant strides in educating the British public. As of April 2008, 97% of eligible parents surveyed were aware of the CTF, and 88% knew that interest earned on the accounts would be tax-free. The government also has strengthened efforts to ensure that ‘‘looked after children’’ (those in the custody of local authorities and foster families) have accounts opened and managed while separated from their parents.

Cross-References ▶ Stakeholder Society

References/Further Readings Ackerman, B., & Alstott, A. (1999). The stakeholder society. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Finlayson, A. (2007). Characterizing new labour: The case of the Child Trust Fund. Public Administration, 86(1), 95–110. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2007). Encouraging savings through tax-preferred accounts. Paris: OECD Publishing. Sherraden, M. (2003). Individual accounts in social security: Can they be progressive? International Journal of Social Welfare, 12(2), 97–107.

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Child Welfare League of America

Child Welfare League of America ROBBIE WATERS ROBICHAU

Address of Organization 2345 Crystal Drive, Suite 250 Arlington, VA 22202 USA www.cwla.org/

Introduction The Child Welfare League of America’s (CWLA) primary objective is ‘‘making children a national priority.’’ In order to achieve this goal, the organization desires to have all Americans and their communities involved in promoting and protecting children’s welfare. The League has championed for children for over 80 years, making it one of America’s ‘‘oldest and largest membership-based child welfare organizations’’ with over 800 public and private child-serving agencies that reach approximately nine million children every year.

Brief History In 1915, a voluntary union of 37 agencies came together as the Bureau for Exchange of Information. As the number of organizations grew within the Bureau, CWLA became officially incorporated in 1920 with a total of 65 charter members. The purpose of the voluntary federation of agencies was to set the nation’s first standard of practice for child welfare services. The League’s first executive, C.C. Carstens, believed that CWLA had an important role to serve by helping agencies engage in their work more effectively and determining proper standards for higher quality child services. This began one of the League’s primary objectives: to develop, review, and improve standards in service provision to children.

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas The CWLA’s vision is that all children can ‘‘grow up in a safe, loving, and stable family’’; therefore, the organization focuses on children and youth who may not live in this type of environment as well as the individuals that provide for and support these youth. CWLA states that its mission is to ‘‘lead the nation in building public will to ensure safety, permanence, and well-being of children, youth, and their families by advancing public policy, defining and promoting practice excellence and delivering superior membership services.’’

Activities Believing that collaboration and partnership is paramount, the CWLA provides direct support to its member agencies who are involved in service provisions to children and families. The League also engages in various advocacy, research, publications, training programs, consultations, and conferences; moreover, CWLA works in many child welfare practice areas such as adoption, child care and development, domestic violence, parenting, youth services and positive youth development. CWLA produces a National Data Analysis System, Children’s Voice Magazine, Child Welfare Journal, and reports on its numerous practice areas. Some of the League’s most recent initiatives have been Creating Parenting-Rich Communities, Children’s Memorial Flag project, Child Welfare Standards of Excellence, and Youth Ambassador Program.

Structure and Governance The League contains a diverse group of public and private agencies that provide social services to children in some form. With over 800 different organizations in the League, these affiliates have a common interest in supporting and protecting children. The CWLA unites these agencies through its various programs, educational resources, and advocacy on child policy issues. CWLA’s influence is nationwide with offices across the country in Washington, DC (headquarters), Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Denver, and Los Angeles.

Funding The CWLA receives funding from state and federal grants and contracts, membership and consulting fees, publication sales, corporation and foundation grants, and individual donations. The League has earned an A + from the Best in America Seal of Excellence from Independent Charities of America for demonstrating and documenting public accountability and program and cost effectiveness. Their annual report in 2006 stated that the League received over $12 million in total support and revenue. According to their 990 form in 2007, CWLA’s total assets were worth over $7 million.

Major Accomplishments/Contributions The CWLA has made tremendous contributions to child welfare services across the nation. One of the primary ways they have impacted society has been through setting, evaluating, and revising CWLA Standards for child welfare services in both public and private organizations. CWLA has united, supported,

Churches and Denominations

and advocated on the behalf of children, their families, and memberships agencies. Their advocacy has also influenced the adoption of national legislation and programs such as the Fostering Connections and Increasing Adoptions Act, Family Preservation and Support Act, and Independent Living, Postlegal Adoption, and Section 8 Family Unification Programs. According to the CWLA, they are the ‘‘world’s largest publisher of child welfare materials.’’

Cross-References

▶ Advocacy ▶ Federations, Nonprofit

References/Further Readings CWLA. (2006). 2006 Annual report. Arlington, VA: CWLA. Accessed from http://www.cwla.org/whowhat/2006annual.pdf; 1/12/2008 CWLA. (2000). Making children a national priority: CWLA strategic plan for 2000–2010. Washington, DC: CWLA. Morgan, L. J., & Martin, T. K. (2004). Making children a national priority: A framework for community action: Community implementation guide. Washington, DC: CWLA.

Churches and Denominations ANTONIUS LIEDHEGENER Friedrich-Schiller-Universita¨t Jena, Jena, Germany

Introduction The universe of organized religion in modern society is abound. This article is related to the Christian tradition of organized religion and its role within civil society as indicated by the two key words ‘‘churches’’ and ‘‘denominations.’’ Sociologically, churches and denominations, the multitude of their more or less integrated Christian congregations, and related Christian organizations form an integral and important part of civil society in many countries. As larger organizational bodies, churches, and denominations are also apt to act as collective actors in emerging transnational contexts of civic engagement. Churches and denominations spur religious as well as civic engagement by virtue of their values and their teaching and by providing various structures of opportunity to get involved with a congregation, other religious organizations, and the larger community. Being an active member of a church or congregation is frequently related with a wide array of attitudes and behaviors commonly attributed to a healthy civil society.

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Definitions and Historical Background Historically, the church (Latin: ‘‘ecclesia’’) became the essential self descriptive term of the followers of Jesus Christ in the ancient world. Early Christianity depicted itself theologically as a unified body of believers united by a common creed and the succession of local bishops including the bishop of Rome, the pope. During the course of history and especially during the Reformation period, the unity of the church dissolved, creating a complex situation of various Christian traditions and numerous churches in Europe, then in the Americas, and later with considerable variations in other parts of the world. Today, the Roman Catholic Church, (national) Protestant churches of Lutheran or Calvinist tradition, and various orthodox churches dominate the religious landscape in most European countries from an institutional point of view. However, industrialization, urbanization, migration, and to a lesser extent missionary activities led to the dominant modern pluralistic situation of civil societies in Western societies, including some nonreligious parts among its populations. Although secularization is a controversial concept in social science today, the emergence of the modern civil society as an independent sphere between state and market corresponds with a (nonlinear) process of secularization on an institutional level at the least. The human right of religious freedom and the idea of separating state and religion are at the center of this process of fundamental institutional change. In the course of modern history, churches had to, and did adjust to this process of modernization. Thus, Christianity and religion in general have ‘‘shown a surprising capacity (from the perspective of the Enlightenment critique of religion and secularization theory) to adapt to changing social conditions.’’ (Herbert, 2003: 291) In fact, churches have become an important segment of civil society. Compared with the notion ‘‘church,’’ ‘‘denomination’’ is a much younger term. Denomination is mainly used and in everyday language understood only in the English speaking world. Especially in the United States, denomination is a term pregnant with meaning. It is related to the self-understanding of America as a pluralistic civil society and to the positioning of religious entities within the larger societal context: Religion is free but separated from the sphere of democratic government. Religious truth is thus not a matter of political decisions of majorities. And religion exists legitimately in a variety of religious bodies related to the general Judeo-Christian tradition. As distinct organizations these bodies are called denomination. They constitute the dominant translocal aspect of organized religion (Ammerman, 2005: 362).

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However, as Tocqueville emphasized in his famous book Democracy in America, this does not mean that religion is not part of the larger political community as such. On the contrary, Tocqueville named denominational religious institutions – explicitly including the Roman Catholic Church in the United States – as one of the most basic democratic institutions in the United States. During the nineteenth century the US situation contrasted sharply with the role of churches in European polities. Confronted with the many disastrous events and outcomes of the French Revolution, churches in Europe opposed democratic ideas for about another 100 years for political and theological reasons. Yet, at the same time they became involved in the various trends of modernization themselves. Especially after World War II, European churches became more and more supportive of the democratic rule of government. This is true for the Protestant as well the as the Catholic tradition. For several reasons, the various orthodox churches in eastern Europe started this process of accommodating to democracy only recently, but while they reflected their role in ending Communist rule they started to develop new versions of Christian social teaching, too. Although churches and denominations see themselves as having a religious mission extending far beyond the sphere of inner worldly civil society (Bane et al., 2005), from a social science perspective ‘‘denominationalism’’ can be taken and observed as the dominant mode of organized religion in contemporary (Western) societies. Thus, from a social science point of view a clear terminological line between church and denomination can hardly be drawn today. How do churches and denominations then contribute to civil society?

Christiantiy and Civic Engagement: General Trends and National Variations In the US religion is a key aspect of the latest debates on civil society and social capital as well as their decline or resurgence in contemporary America (Putnam, 2000; Wuthnow, 1999). In his widely absorbed writings, Robert Putnam highlighted the importance of religion within the sphere of associational life in America. ‘‘Religious affiliation is by far the most common associational membership among Americans’’ (Putnam, 1995: 68–69). Putnam’s work helped to raise new interest in the role of religion in social science. Much of the recent research on religion in the United States shows that the local congregation is at the heart of American religion today (Ammerman, 2005: 357). This bears important consequences for volunteering and civic engagement. According to recent polls, about 38% of all Americans claim to volunteer within the framework of a religious organization. This is by far the largest

proportion among the various forms of volunteering. Especially local congregations provide ample opportunities to get involved in the religious community and larger society. Americans invest significant portions of their time, talent, and money in religious contexts. Members of religious communities serve in their congregation as ushers, choir singers and musicians, volunteers in religious education and religious youth meetings and members of church boards. They also direct their energies at the wider community by working with soup kitchens, home shelters, programs for children, civil rights and social justice activities, housing and repair, day care, elderly housing, political training, and other activities sponsored by their congregation. Many surveys do not show much variation in the level of engagement among different Christian traditions on the individual level. Some surveys see mainline Protestants as more civically engaged than their Evangelical counterparts with Catholics falling somewhere in between. But the most significant differences are usually observed between those who are involved in their congregation’s life and those who are nonattenders or nonreligious. In addition, it is important to look not only at individual behavior. Recent research has shown that the institutional or organizational level adds important information in illustrating the role of churches and denominations in American civil society. Social services are a vital segment of congregations’ civic activities. According to the National Congregations Study, 57% of American congregations report at least one kind of activity in this area. The most typical forms are food programs (32%), shelters (18%), children and youth programs (16%), and clothing (11%). Forty-two percent of congregations report political activities like informing its members about public policy, delivering voter guides, or organizing grass root activities. Taken by the numbers, it is worth noting that social services are less prominent on the list of civic activities than music and arts. There are also significant differences in the extent, scope, and sort of civic activities between congregations of the various Christian traditions. Although Catholics, for example, are no more civically involved than members of other denominations, Catholic parishes as institutions show a very strong commitment particularly to social and political activities and programs. Compared to other denominations they are clearly overrepresented in these segments. This higher level of institutional activity corresponds with the on average larger size of Catholic parishes and indicates some effects of economy of scale on the institutional level (Davis & Liedhegener, 2007: 146–154).


Compared to the wealth of American research on denominations and civic engagement, research on religion and civic engagement in European countries is still scarce. However, from existing studies on civic engagement it is clear that Christianity is far from being insignificant for civil society in Europe today (Anheier & Toepler, 2000; Ruiter & de Graaf, 2006). In Germany, the Freiwilligensurvey 2004 allows for some instructive observations. It reports that 36% of the German population are involved in some form of nonpaid voluntary work involving some sort of responsible activities beyond an active membership in an organization. In contrast to the United States, sports and not religion is the most prominent field of civic engagement (Gensicke et al., 2006: 60). Among all questioned 11% do some type of voluntary work in the context of sporting activities. In the field of religion 6% are involved as volunteers. Interestingly, among general active membership religion ranks sixth, but among volunteer work it ranks third. Since most Germans either belong to a Protestant church or the Roman Catholic Church, this means that these churches bring about volunteers in higher rates than other segments of civil society in Germany. Currently, it is not clear whether there is a significant difference between Catholics, Protestants, and other believers and nonbelievers with respect to civic engagement. In Switzerland the Freiwilligen-Monitor Schweiz 2007 reports a total of about 26% in civic engagement. Here Protestants (30%) are more active than Catholics and persons without a religious belonging (25% each) (Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2007: 72). In Australia the National Church Life Survey reports a different pattern. ‘‘Attenders most influenced by Anglo-Catholic or liberal Protestant traditions are more likely to be involved’’ (Kaldor et al., 1999: 71).

Beyond the Religious Context: Churches and Denominations as a Resource of Civil Society The activities of church members within and through their congregations, the forms and structures of these activities, and the (quantitative) significance of this kind of engagement have been reported so far. The following section concentrates on major topics and debates that examine civic engagement by religious people and institutions in societal context. The interest is thus in correlations and explanations between churches and denominations and civil society. Civic Engagement

Civic engagement of religious people is not confined to their own flocks. It clearly extends into the larger civil

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society. Data from the World Value Survey (WVS) for 80 countries around the world show that religiously involved persons are more likely to be civically engaged in general. Controlling for other variables the WVS data confirm ‘‘that the social networks and personal communications derived from regular churchgoing play an important role, not just in promoting activism within religious-related organizations, but also in strengthening community associations more generally’’ (Norris & Inglehart, 2004: 1991). This general pattern of a positive correlation seems true for individual countries as well (Ruiter & de Graaf, 2006). Civic Skills

Churches and denominations generate civic skills like organizing events, directing group meetings, and making one’s own views vocal. Evidence from the US context shows that congregations as promoters of civic skills are especially important for those who are not well integrated in the working force (Verba et al., 1995). This is of high political relevance: ‘‘[C]ivic skills learned in one place do leak out into the political process, especially to activities beyond voting. And because people of all economic and educational levels belong nearly equally to congregations (whereas other voluntary organizations are disproportionately middle and upper class), congregations are the single most widespread and egalitarian providers of civic opportunity’’ (Ammerman, 2005: 360). Again, we do not have this kind of dense evidence for most other countries. ‘‘Social Capital’’

The notion of social capital became very prominent among scholars of social science recently, although no consensus has been reached on its definition. One reason for its salience is the implied promise to move from correlations to explanations. Social capital, understood as the norms and networks of voluntary cooperation and social trust and their distribution in society, is seen as making civil society and democracy work (Putnam, 2002). A high level of social capital prevents modern societies from apathy, social misbehavior and deteriorating political conditions. Apparently, what has been reported on churches and denominations so far is relevant for social capital as well (Smidt, 1999). Denominations and local religious communities promote norms of civic behavior, provide many opportunities for voluntary engagement and allow for experiences to develop mutual trust in face to face relations which in turn can lead to generalized social trust. One of the valuable distinctions arising from this concept is the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. The former describes

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networks of cooperation among group members such as church members which exclude nongroup members. The latter bridges differences between various groups horizontally (identity bridging) or vertically (status bridging) and is seen as especially important for generating generalized trust (Wuthnow, 2002). In the United States much of religion’s social capital seems to be bonding social capital. Congregations and their activists tend to experience problems with overcoming social differences (Lichterman, 2006). On the other hand, active church members are more likely to get into contact with persons in key positions such as entrepreneurs or elected officials (Wuthnow, 2002). Yet, beyond a metaphoric use, the implied causal model of social capital producing a healthy society and stable political institutions is still to be elaborated and tested. Welfare Provisions and Education

Charity has been an integral part of Christianity since its early days. Across Europe charitable institutions were first developed in connection with churches and monasteries. The same is true for education. Although the emerging territorial nation states took over some of these activities and gradually developed into a form of modern welfare state, the role of churches remained strong in many European states (Fix & Fix, 2005). Many forms of social services and educational institutions remained organized along religious lines, especially in countries with a religiously diverse population and/or a dominant cleavage between a secular labor movement and Catholic subculture such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, or Switzerland. This frequently led to a system of state–church separation which is characterized by religious freedom combined with a high level of institutionalized cooperation between religious service providers and state authorities. Interestingly enough, the recent trend of deregulating the welfare state led to the growing importance of religious providers, most notably seen in the new United States policy to support faith-based initiatives with federal money. Empirical research across various nations indicates that churches and denominations do not provide social services independently. They run their programs mostly in collaboration with para church organizations, secular social service providers, and governmental authorities. One of the major resources churches provide to the larger public is the channeling of large numbers of volunteers to the social service sector. Democracy and Democratization

Contrary to the traditional secularization thesis, religion in general and Christianity in particular have proved to be

a major force in public debates and politics (Casanova, 1994). Churches and denominations are vocal politically and thus play a prominent role in providing democratic political systems with means of political articulation and support. In general, comparative international research indicates that the measurable correlation between the civicness of individuals and the performance and stability of democracy is low (Gabriel et al., 2002). But with respect to religion there seems to be a correlation between church attendance and important institutional features like trust in democratic institutions (Gabriel, 1999). Finally, the fact that churches and denominations are resources of politics can clearly be seen in the case of the transition from a dictatorial regime to democracy. Many of the countries which became democracies in the so called third and fourth wave of democratization saw church activists working for (re-)establishing a civil society to overcome communist regimes or conservative dictatorships. The post-Vatican II Catholic church took the lead in many of these countries with large portions of Catholics (Huntington, 1991: 75). This is most evident in the case of Poland where the Polish born Pope John Paul II. contributed to the success of the free worker movement Solidarnosc. The new civic engagement in the context of churches and denominations in Eastern Europe laid the foundation to end communist rule and to overcome the block confrontation. This history is generally seen as one of the major roots of the new interest in civil society in general. Although churches contributed to liberalization and democratization, for many churches and denominations the period of consolidation proved to be a peculiar one. Many had difficulties in adjusting to their new role as public religions in a democratic system and a pluralistic society (Spieker, 2003). A growing new field of research follows these kind of questions with respect to non-European countries (Lienemann-Perrin & Lienemann, 2006). In a globalizing world the possibilities and chances of churches and denominations as actors in emerging transnational networks of civic engagement certainly deserve closer attention. From a civil society perspective Christian organizations are means for channeling ideas, personnel, skills, and material resources across the globe. The international web of religious cooperation and development aid is a pillar of the twenty-first century civil society.

Perspectives Current research shows churches and denominations mainly in a positive light with respect to their role in and contribution to civil society. This is mainly due to the fact that most Christian denominations have taken a


constructive view on modern society and its democratic institutions. Looking back especially to the dark sides of Christian history in Europe and taking the continuous temptation of a fundamentalist retreat from democratic politics seriously, finally we have to point to the importance of the question of what makes Christianity civil (Wuthnow, 1996: 41 ff.). Of course, there are important traditions within the Christian tradition that give support and credibility to constitutional democracies. The dignity of each human person as an image of God, the Golden Rule as a means to impartial judgment on the interests of all concerned, the norm of compassion to friends and foes, the idea of the inner worldly time as an unrepeatable test to improve one’s faith as well as the conditions of this world – all of this was a cultural precondition for developing an ethos of human rights and democratic institutions. Yet to make Christianity a supportive force of civil society, churches, and denominations themselves had to undergo considerable change. Churches and denominations – as well as other religions – had (and continuously have) to ‘‘integrate ideas of human freedom, representative government, human rights, and human flourishing’’ into their message (Farina, 2007: 24). This leads to a task still to be undertaken by humanities and social science. The connection between civic engagement by churches and denominations and regime change in favor of democracy is far from being understood. It seems to be helpful to ask under which circumstances and under which internal religious and intellectual conditions churches and denominations are capable of developing and nurturing role models of citizenship and political participation. Finally, taking the fact into account that churches and denominations are important resources of today’s civil society, more comparative empirical research is needed to better understand their crucial role in contemporary societies. This will pose multilevel and multiarena problems of analyses, and it involves serious measurement problems in order to correctly chart the cultural variations within the reality of civil society (Andolina & Jenkins, 2005: 76–78; Liedhegener, 2007). Comparative empirical research also implies a move from simple correlations between organized Christian religion and civic engagement to explicit explanations and model building. A better understanding of the complexity of mutual interactions, inherent connections, and more or less causal relationships is crucial for the success and societal relevance of this research. Studying churches and denominations will thus contribute much to the ongoing and growing public interest in better understanding the social and cultural foundations of modern democracies and civil society.

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Cross-References

▶ Charity and Religion ▶ Christianity ▶ Civil Society and Religion ▶ Civil Society Theory: de Tocqueville ▶ Faith-Based Organizations ▶ Philanthropy and Religion, Christianity ▶ Religious Orders ▶ Religious Organization ▶ Social Capital, Definition ▶ Volunteers

References/Further Readings Ammerman, N. T. (2005). Denominationalism/congregationalism. In H. R. Ebaugh, (Ed.), Handbook of religion and social institutions (pp. 353–371). New York: Springer. Andolina, M. W., & Jenkins, C. (2005). Citizen engagement measurement. In S. J. Best, & B. Radcliff, (Ed.), Polling America. An encyclopedia of public opinion (Vol. 1, pp. 74–81). Westport, CT/London: Greenwood Press. Anheier, H. K., & Toepler, S. (2002). Bu¨rgerschaftliches Engagement in ¨ berblick und gesellschaftspolitische Einordnung. Aus Europa. U Poliltik und Zeitgeschichte, B(9), 31–38. Bane, M. J., Coffin, B., & Higgins, R. (2005). Introduction: Taking faith seriously. In M. J. Bane, B. Coffin, & R. Higgins (Eds.), Taking faith seriously (pp. 1–17). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Casanova, J. (1994). Public religions in the modern world. Chicago, IL/London: University of Chicago Press. Chaves, M. (2004). Congregations in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Davis, M., & Liedhegener, A. (2007). Catholic civic engagement at the local level. The parish and beyond. In A. Liedhegener & W. Kremp (Eds.), Civil society, civic engagement and catholicism in the US (pp. 241–255). Trier: WVT. Fix, B., & Fix, E. (2005). Kirche und Wohlfahrtsstaat. Soziale Arbeit kirchlicher Wohlfahrtsorganisationen im westeuropaïschen Vergleich. Freiburg i.Br.: Lambertus. Gabriel, O. W. (1999). Sozialkapital und Institutionenvertrauen in ¨ sterreich und Deutschland. In F. Plasser (Hgg.), Wahlen und politische O ¨ sterreich (pp. 147–189). Frankfurt Einstellungen in Deutschland und O a.M.: Lang. Gabriel, O. W. et al. (2002). Sozialkapital und Demokratie. Zivilgesellschaftliche Ressourcen im Vergleich. Wien: WUV. Gensicke, T., Picot, S., & Geiss, S. (2006). Freiwilliges Engagement in Deutschland 1999–2004. Ergebnisse der repra¨sentativen Trenderhebung zu Ehrenamt, Freiwilligenarbeit und bu¨rgerschaftlichem Engagement, in Auftrag gegeben und ed. vom Bundesministerium fu¨r Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, vorgelegt von TNS Infratest Sozialforschung, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Herbert, D. (2003). Religion and civil society. Rethinking public religion in the contemporary world. Aldershot: Ashgate. Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman/London: University of Oklahoma Press. Kaldor, P., Dixon, R., & Powell, R. (1999). Taking stock. A profile of Australian church attenders. Adelaide: Openbook Publishers. Lichterman, P. (2006). Elusive togetherness: Church groups trying to bridge America’s divisions. Princeton, NJ/Oxford: Princeton University Press.

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Liedhegener, A. (2007). Civic engagement by religion. American civil society and the catholic case in prespective. An introduction. In A. Liedhegener & W. Kremp (Eds.), Civil society, civic engagement and catholicism in the US (pp. 3–15), Trier: WVT. ¨ ffenLienemann-Perrin, C., & Lienemann, W. (Eds.) (2006). Kirche und O tlichkeit in Transformationsgesellschaften. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). Sacred and secular. Religion and politics worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal of Democracy, 6, 64–78. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Putnam, R. D. (Ed.) (2002). Democracies in flux. The evolution of social capital in contemporary society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ruiter, S., & de Graaf, N. D. (2006). National context, religiotiy, and volunteering: Results from 53 countries. American Sociological Review, 71, 191–210. Smidt, C. (Ed.) (2003). Religion as social capital. Producing the common good. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. Stadelmann-Steffen, I., Freitag, M., & Bu¨hlmann, M. (2007). FreiwilligenMonitor Schweiz 2007. Zu¨rich: Seismo Verlag. Spieker, M. (Ed.) (2003). Katholische Kirche und Zivilgesellschaft in Osteuropa. Postkommunistische Transformationsprozesse in Polen, Tschechien, der Slowakei und Litauen. Paderborn: Scho¨ningh. Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Henry, E. B. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wuthnow, R. (1999). Mobilizing civic engagement: The changing impact of religious involvement. In T. Skocpol & M. P. Fiorina (Eds.), Civic engagement in American democracy (pp. 331–363). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Wuthnow, R. (2002). Religious involvement and status-bridging social capital. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41, 669–684.

CIRIEC FRANCISCO MARTINEZ

Address of Organization Baˆtiment B33 – boıˆte 6 BE-4000 Lie`ge Belgium www.ciriec.ulg.ac.be

Introduction The Centre International de Recherches et d’Information sur l’Economie Publique, Sociale et Coope´rative (CIRIEC – International Center of Research and Information on the Public, Social, and Cooperative Economy) is an international, nongovernmental scientific organization focused on the social economy and the public sector. CIRIEC develops its own research and publications and organizes

several events to strengthen the international community of researchers, managers, and interested people.

Brief History In 1908 Edgard Milhaud, a french economics Professor at the University of Geneva, founded the journal Annals of Collective Economy. In order to ensure the continuity of the journal, the ‘‘International Centre of Research and Information on the Collective Economy’’ was founded by Milhaud in 1947. After 10 years of activity, financially endorsed by Swiss benefactors, the headquarters of the association was transferred to the University of Lıège in Belgium, where it has operated until present time. During the last decades the international presence of CIRIEC was strengthened through the foundation of national sections in 12 countries (Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey). A membership system was designed for organizations and institutions from countries where no official section exists.

Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas The main objective of the organization is to collect and publish information and scientific research on the topics of ‘‘economic sectors and activities oriented towards the service of the general and collective interest.’’ Although not exclusively, mainly three sectors fall into the scope of investigation: the State and the regional public authorities in regards to their economic policy and regulations capacity; the public and mixed enterprises across the national, regional, and municipal levels; and the social economy sector. Through its activities, CIRIEC seeks to provide useful information and opportunities not only for researchers, but for managers as well.

Activities CIRIEC still edits the Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, which is published since 1995 by Blackwell Publishing at Oxford, United Kingdom. The journal is published on a quarterly basis and features ‘‘high quality theoretical and empirical articles providing information of interest to both academics and practitioners, in the following fields: enterprises with public participation, new economy of regulation, networks economics, public utilities worker participation, nonprofit organizations, cooperatives, social economy, and related topics.’’ The complete journal in a printed format can be accessed at CIRIEC main offices and an online version is available from 1925 onwards at the Blackwell Publishing website. In addition, a large amount of working papers and reports

Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice

are available for public access on the institution website and a new series of publications called the ‘‘Social Economy & Public Economy Series’’ was announced in 2008. CIRIEC also organizes events periodically to gather the research and managerial community. An international research conference is held every 2 years (odd years) and a biennial international congress (even years) is organized to gather a broader audience which includes both researchers, managers, and participants related to the social economy sector.

Structure and Governance The general administration body is structured in several instances: an executive committee called the Praesidium; the Board of Directors, composed by delegates of the national sections of the organization; the biennial General Assembly which meets on occasion of the international Congresses; and the International Secretariat who provides the daily management. The research activities are coordinated by the International Scientific Council.

Cross-References

▶ Cooperatives and Employee Ownership ▶ Social Economy

References/Further Readings Fecher, F., & Le´vesque, B. (2008). The public sector and the social economsy in reply to: The annals (1975, 2007): Towards a new paradigm. Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics, 79(3/4), 679–727. Geerkens, E. (2008). From the annales de la re´gie directe. Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics, 79(3/4), 417–460.

Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice SANG PEEL PARK

Address of Organization 50-2 Dongsoong-dong, Jongro-gu 110-809 Seoul South Korea www.ccej.or.kr

Introduction/Brief History Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) was founded in 1989 by 500 persons representing various walks of life, such as economics professors, lawyers, housewives, students, business people, etc., in response

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to the extremely unjust structure of Korean economic life. The main founder of CCEJ was Kyungsuk Suh, who was a conservative minister. In Korea, rapid economic development over the last 30 years has brought wealth to the giant ‘‘chaebol’’ business groups singled out by the government, and has raised the per capita GNP to more than $10,000. In this process, however, equitable distribution has been forgotten, environment gravely damaged, and democratic development postponed. The priority on industrialization and urbanization has alienated large groups and areas and created wide structural gaps, even risking collapse of the economic system. Before CCEJ came into being, there were few organizations to point out the structural problems of Korean economy and to engage citizens in the economic reform movement. Therefore, the appearance of CCEJ significantly drew the attention of the Korean people to economic justice.

Mission/Objectives CCEJ’s mission is to achieve economic justice through citizens’ power with the belief that the deep-rooted economic injustice cannot be cured by government alone, but ultimately must be solved by the organized power of citizens; the fruits of economic development should be shared by all the common people, not just the small group of ‘‘haves.’’

Activities Its major activities are in the areas of economic policy research, economic justice campaign, urban reform, anticorruption vigilance, local self-government, and reunification of Korea, international solidarity, etc. It publishes the monthly magazine Civil Society, written in English.

Structure and Governance CCEJ is structured in the general assembly as the highest legislative organ, co-representative, steering committee, executive committee, and secretary general. Under the secretary general, there are six departments, which are composed of executive committee members. CCEJ has also around 30 branches across the nation. It pursues civil action led by ordinary citizens, using legal and nonviolent methods, seeking workable alternatives, speaking for the interests of all people, regardless of economic standing, and overcoming greed and egoism in order to build a sharing society.

Funding As of 2008, CCEJ has approximately 20,000 members and 60 full-time paid staff members. Membership dues cover around 50% of the total budget. Other funds are

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filled up by donations, various projects, bazaar, and so forth. The annual budget of the year 2008 is US$1.2 million.

Major Accomplishments From the beginning of 1989, CCEJ has campaigned for solving the housing problem of the urban poor. By initiating campaigns to prohibit speculative real estate business, to expand the quantity of leased houses, and to secure the right of renters, CCEJ urged the government to make practicable plans and stable housing policies. As a result, a housing lessee protection law was revised. With this, it accomplished many economic reforms, such as independence of the Korean Bank, introduction of a real-name system for all financial transactions, fair taxation, and activation of local self-government.

Cross-References ▶ Social Justice

References/Further Readings Park, S. (2005). The introduction to NGO studies. Seoul: Arche (Korean).

Citizenship DIETER GOSEWINKEL Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin, Germany

Introduction Citizenship has become one of the most influential concepts of social science as well as political debate after World War II. It is used by sociologists and anthropologists, legal experts, as well as historians. The topic of citizenship is linked to a broad variety of issues. Citizenship and citizenship rights are a major theme in debates over the development of the welfare state. They also serve as political concepts for the mobilization and participation of citizens. Citizenship is a central legal institution to ascribe voting rights and the duty of conscription. In political as well as scientific debates on migration, national identity, and its limits all over the world, the idea of citizenship has come to play an increasingly important role. In attempts for transnational and supranational community building the institution of citizenship, in particular European citizenship, is an increasingly important issue both in politics and scientific literature. In general, the fundamental theoretical categories for the analysis of

any society or community, inclusion and exclusion are perfectly well exemplified by the institutional structure and practical working of citizenship. The political and practical relevance of citizenship thus goes far beyond the scientific context. It is deeply rooted in the history of the concept. Like many political concepts citizenship has developed from a political claim to a concept of legitimation. From its very beginning it has been closely linked to individual claims for autonomy, for the recognition of individual rights, as well as for equality against status differences. The use of the concept of citizenship ranges from the particular national level to a universal global meaning. As a principle of political order, citizenship always refers both to the state as well as to society. It thus represents a fundamental precondition for the existence of civil society and shapes its practice.

Definition In political theory, one can broadly differentiate between three conceptualizations of citizenship. According to Giesen and Eder (2001) an individualist, a political, and a collective identity paradigm can be distinguished. While the individualist paradigm based on individual liberties and welfare entitlements is realized in petitions of rights, the political paradigm interprets citizenship as a pattern of civic duties and obligations which are mainly practiced in a strong public sphere. Finally, the collective identity paradigm leaves the individual level and starts from the assumption of a predominantly cultural set of common values and traditions converging in a common sense of belonging. These conceptualizations, based on a wide range of historical variations of citizenship, can be reduced to two core meanings which apply to all of the historical phases that the formation of citizenship as subject and concept has undergone. Citizenship means membership in a political community as well as a form of active behavior toward the community which constitutes the good and responsible citizen. These two meanings constitute the general definition of citizenship. Like membership, citizenship can – but does not need to – be based on a common set and belief of belonging which gives a common ground and internal stability to the community. It always confers, however, the status of equality among all citizens with respect to the rights and duties that the status implies. The form of membership varies between merely cultural and political types of belonging, especially in ancient societies, and legal forms of membership which have increasingly developed in the modern state. Citizenship as modern legal membership

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in a state or community has to be differentiated according to two meanings. First, as a mere formal, legal status of membership, citizenship is equivalent to nationality as a legal institution. It designates the status of being the national of a state or member of a local community. Citizenship in a material sense means a set of individual rights which in general are attached to the formal status of membership in a political community. This type of material legal citizenship has found its classical formulation in the work of Thomas H. Marshall, who analyzed citizenship as a set of rights according to three main categories: civil, political, and social rights (Marshall, 1950/1992: 8). Marshall’s evolutionary interpretation of citizenship as a sequential development of these three types of rights became the point of departure for the theory and definition of citizenship after World War II. The second meaning of citizenship as good civic behavior completes the membership status. It derives from the model of the ancient Greek city-state citizenship that was ideally and practically linked to democracy by the civic virtues of an active ‘‘citizen,’’ which permitted him to ‘‘share in the polis,’’ a politically active and autonomous community. Citizenship in the meaning of good civic behavior is linked to both the political and the collective identity paradigm of citizenship. The obligation of active engagement in the polity and the more passive commitment to commonly shared values and convictions are interpreted as an essential prerequisite both of citizenship and of civil society (Giesen & Eder, 2001: 6).

History The historical origin of citizenship is European. While every human group has developed institutions by which to define its members and procedures for making new members, the Greeks were the first society to combine the legal provisions of membership with a political theory of membership virtues and institutions in order to perpetuate their idea of citizenship. The legal status of citizenship established equality among Athenian citizens in terms of their rights and obligations. The status of equal membership marked privilege vis-a`-vis nonmembers. Apart from the legal framework, the concept of Athenian citizenship included a set of citizen values, behaviors, and communal attitudes. Roman citizenship – more complex, expansive, and legalistic than its Greek counterpart – revealed the development of citizenship from an instrument for defining the city-state community to one for the legal integration of an extensive world empire. With the loss of a central, universal legal structure at the end of the Roman Empire, citizenship became obsolete as a political concept.

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Christianity rejected the model of political order to which ancient philosophy, especially Aristotle and Cicero, had contributed. It developed a complete and alternative system of social and moral values that helped establish a new institutional political order. A system of multifaceted loyalty replaced the citizen’s concentrated loyalty to the state. The lack of a centralizing and nationalizing state power in parts of medieval Europe left room for the growth of a strong, urban citizenship, particularly in the city-states of northern and central Italy (Heater, 1990: 23). The theory and political order of state sovereignty in European absolutism, with its concentration of central state power and its unambiguous claim to loyalty, prepared the ground for a national rather than local concept of modern citizenship. The personal and territorial delimitation of sovereign states and the ordering of their international relations increased the necessity to define membership in and allegiance to the state. The call for individual rights of religious freedom and selfgovernment, strengthened by religious opponents of the state, and revolutionary efforts to found governments upon popular sovereignty, for example in England, were the predecessors to active citizenship. The eighteenth century brought a breakthrough in the defining of citizenship, with political theory and institutions at its core. In the American and French Revolutions the word ‘‘citizen’’ – and its French equivalent, citoyen – became a key concept in the legitimation of the political struggle against the feudal ancien re´gime, as well as in the struggle for equality before the law, freedom from religious discrimination and arbitrary arrest, the extension of political rights, and popular democracy. From this point onward, citizen, citizenship, and citoyennete´ became core terms of a state order based on democracy and constitutionalism. The key concept of citizenship (citoyennete´) in the French Revolution combined four traits that were to become essential for the development of citizenship throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: an egalitarian, anti-feudal impetus; confirmation as a key concept of the legal constitution; an association with extensive individual rights; and finally, nationalization. The modern concept of citizenship arose together with the concept of the nation-state and became one of its central legal institutions. The age of revolution and constitutionalism in the Western world was also an age of an increasing delimitation of national citizenries. Extended citizenship law came to define membership in the nation-state as well as the rules of naturalization policies. Citizenship and citizenship law (in the sense of nationality

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law to define formal membership in a nation-state) became key instruments for defining national identity (Gosewinkel, 2003) and controlling migration in a modern world characterized by increasing transnational mobility (Brubaker, 1992). The central function of citizenship in defining membership in the sense of nationality was supplemented by a second main function, i.e., conferring upon the citizen individual rights vis-a`-vis the state. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Western constitutional states extended the range of civil, political, and, increasingly, social rights that were reserved mainly for their own citizens. The nationalization of citizenship as a membership status corresponded to a nationalization of citizens’ rights. Citizenship became an institution for distributing ‘‘life opportunities’’ in a world of nation-states. As the importance of citizenship as a legal entitlement increased, its extension to new members became more and more contested within the national citizenry. The struggle for inclusion, in European as well as in American constitutional law, dominates the history of citizenship to this day. The gradual extension of equal civil rights to groups resident on the nation-state’s soil who had been denied citizenship rights and were subjected to discrimination on the basis of ethnic or national origin, religious beliefs, social status, or gender, determined the direction that citizenship was to take. The claims of discriminated groups to equality became the motor for full inclusion in the community defined by citizenship. With the decline of liberal democracy, the rise of radical nationalism, racism, and totalitarian dictatorship in the constitutional states of Europe and Asia, the period between the two world wars represented an interruption in the development of modern citizenship. The dominance of ascriptive national, ethnic, or racial criteria in admission to citizenship, the splintering of the citizenry through hierarchical classes of rights, the withdrawal of civil rights and massive expatriation of millions destroyed the core of equality within the concept of citizenship. The rise of an army of stateless people deprived of rights and protection revealed how dependent citizenship was on the liberal legal structures of the nation-state. To summarize, the historical development of citizenship from its beginning in the Greek city-states has been characterized by a multiple process of expansion. Citizenship as a historical concept developed in Europe. It expanded from a membership status in a local community to a central membership in the territorial nation-state. Citizenship as entitlement to individual rights was transferred from the level of the nation-state to that of supranational communities. From its inception in the

Greek city-communities, the concept and ideal of citizenship has spread beyond Europe all over the world to states based on the principle of constitutional democracy. The substantive program of citizenship as a set of individual rights has expanded from political and civil to encompass social and economic rights, and ultimately, cultural and environmental rights as well.

Key Issues While the relevance of citizenship as an institution of modern society as well as an instrument of social analysis is commonly recognized, its conceptualization is under debate. This is mainly due to the increasing practical importance of citizenship as a membership status, as a set of rights and obligations as well as a standard of legitimizing – particular – feelings of identity and modes of civic action. To the degree that citizenship became an institution of inclusion into the (welfare) state or national citizenry and an instrument of struggles for recognition (Fraser & Honneth, 2003), the academic debate over its function, reach, and limits assumed an increasingly political impact. Conceptualization Under Debate

Thomas Marshall’s concept of citizenship, which had been developed in the immediate post-World War II period and in the heyday of the Western welfare state, was thus subject to criticism from various perspectives. The most important lines of criticism particularly focus on historical, social, and territorial ‘‘frontiers’’ (Vogel & Moran, 1991: xii). Marshall’s analysis of the development of citizenship as a sequence of civil, political, and social rights is deeply rooted in the social and economic history of England as the starting point and pattern of worldwide industrialization. Its Anglocentric orientation differs sharply from the generalized, sometimes even universalistic language of the analysis not only in Marshall’s account but even more in its wide reception by social science. Marshall’s abstract language of ‘‘the universal status of citizenship’’ in its connection with ‘‘basic human inequality’’ (Marshall, 1950/1992: 6, 44) invites generalization despite the temporal and geographical contingency of its context. There is a wide range of critique. First, predominantly agricultural or culturally different societies – in Europe or beyond – which were not marked by centralized industrial modernization like England did not offer the same structural opportunities for the development of the idea and practice of individualism, equality, and rights. Second, Marshall’s analysis, with its inherent idea of expanding rights, is linked to the Western welfare state in the heyday

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of its development after World War II. It loses explanatory force in times of decline of public welfare institutions and state power in general due to processes of liberalization and deregulation in Western industrial societies since the 1970s. Third, the Marshallian model of a sequential development of civil, political, and social rights does not fit into every Western, or even Western European state. In Germany, for example, the development of a system of social insurance rights at the end of the nineteenth century became a widely accepted model in the industrial world. It preceded, however, the implementation of equal political rights which could not be established durably before the end of World War II. In France, moreover, civil and social rights for women were recognized far earlier in the course of the first half of the twentieth century than political rights which were implemented only after World War II. Fourth, the focus on social, particularly on class struggles, to explain the inherent force of citizenship development faces objections of two kinds. On the one hand, the concept of ‘‘social’’ in Marshall’s analysis is criticized as being far too narrow. Gender, for example, as a social category and an argument for hierarchical discrimination and withholding rights, was not only a contingent aspect but a fundamental structure of modern citizenship from its very beginning (Vogel, 1991a: 58–85; Siim, 2000: 13). On the other hand, the particular focus on social struggles to explain the upsurge and persisting relevance of citizenship is criticized and enlarged by a broader conception of struggles for recognition which end up with the codification of rights. The recognition of cultural difference (Fraser & Honneth, 2003) as an argument for the implementation of rights paves the way for a new category of cultural rights which are based on claims for cultural identity. These claims may be oriented toward the recognition of individual rights, e.g., sexual rights, as well as collective rights, e.g. ethnic group rights (Isin & Wood, 1999). What these lines of critique have in common is that they do not want to give up the Marshallian model, but they want to modify and adapt it to new contexts in order to enlarge it and to include even more types of rights. Nationalization – Internationalization

Citizenship as a membership status refers to a personal relationship between an individual (or a group) and an institution. From its origin, however, this relationship always included a territorial aspect. Citizenship as a status of full membership could only be realized within the territorial frame of a state, nation-state, city, etc. In the age of the nation-state the interrelation between the territorial reach of (nation-)state power and the status of

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membership became particularly close. The nationalization of citizenship meant that the right to hold and exercise most of the rights of a citizen was derived from birth or stay in the territory of a nation-state. Increasingly, systematic controls of the territorial boundaries of nationstates regulated the right to residence as a precondition for naturalization and citizenship. Citizenship as a status of nationality became the precondition for most of the elementary rights conferred or protected by the state. The line between inclusion and exclusion was sharply drawn by the status of citizenship within a territory. This model of inclusion and exclusion underlies the Marshallian model of citizenship without being mentioned explicitly. This is criticized by recent literature which demonstrates another – territorial – ‘‘frontier of citizenship’’ (Vogel & Moran, 1991: xiii). Its point of departure is the change and partial decline of the territorial bindings of citizenship. One basic reason is the eminent upsurge of cross-national migration after World War II due to fundamental political and economic changes: the postwar economic boom, decolonization, the opening of the communist systems in Europe and Asia, as well as an unprecedented phase of globalization in world economy. This new quality of mobilizing citizens all over the world to move and work abroad has changed the basic assumptions of national citizenship regimes (Castles & Davidson, 2000). The discrepancy between the place of birth and the place of permanent residence, increasing intermarriage and a growing need for the social integration of longterm residents with foreign citizenship led to changes in the legal regulation of membership. The national regulation of citizenship and nationality, encouraged by new developments in international law, is now gradually admitting multiple nationalities. Citizenship regulations are negotiated between nation-states in bilateral or multilateral agreements. Territorial residence and personhood – instead of ethnic descent – more and more legitimize the exercise of individual rights which had hitherto been reserved to members of the nation-state (Soysal, 1994). The denationalization of citizenship can also lead to alternative forms of territorialization. This becomes evident in supranational institutions like the European Union (EU). EU law is developing a particular kind of supranational membership status, European citizenship, which is designed to confer specific ‘‘European’’ rights upon citizens from EU countries. Apart from this still rudimentary form of supranational citizenship there is a wide range of specific rights and entitlements particularly in the social and economic domain recognized by EU jurisdiction. These rights are detached from national

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citizenship and the territory of the nation-state (Weiler, 1999). They are, however, connected to a new territoriality: the European Union. Citizenship and Civil Society

Citizenship and civil society can be interpreted as interdependent. The degree of interrelatedness depends on the concept of civil society: Civil society can either be conceptualized as a specific quality of ‘‘civil’’ interaction (Gosewinkel & Rucht, 2003: 49) or as an intermediary sphere of action between the state, the economy, and the private sphere where associations organize and act publicly and in self-determination. If one follows an ‘‘associational’’ concept of civil society (Walzer, 1995: 153), a common ground of civil society and citizenship consists in a specific legal framework. Both the exercise of citizenship rights and the activities of civil society actors are based on the codification and judicial enforcement of individual rights, particularly civil and political rights, e.g., the freedom of speech and association and the right to vote. Historically, this junction goes back to the Age of Enlightenment. The renaissance of civil society theory during the second half of the eighteenth century was closely linked to the idea of natural law and often resulted in the claim for individual, constitutional rights. Theoretically, the link between citizenship and civil society can be conceptualized in the following ways: First, citizenship as a political institution serves as an ‘‘interface’’ between the organization and the individual relating state and civil society, government, and the people (Giesen & Eder, 2001: 4; Janoski, 1999: 12). Second, citizenship rights are an instrument of participation in the public sphere as the genuine sphere of civil society (Cohen & Arato, 1992). Thus, changes in the concept and practice of citizenship rights, e.g., the shift from national to transnational rights, contribute to the redefinition of the sphere of civil society (Soysal, 2001: 160, 172). Third, according to a communitarian perspective, civil society as an associational network serves as a school for the values and virtues of a good (democratic) citizen. While this perspective is disputed by liberal theory (Kymlicka & Norman, 1995: 294, 296) there is consensus about the interrelation of the two concepts: Civil society has come to need citizenship as the codification and practice of rights and values; in turn, citizenship presupposes civil society as a space for organizing and practicing individual and diverse concepts of freedom.

Future Directions Developments after World War II, in Europe and beyond, were characterized by a dual tendency. On the one

hand, the restoration of liberal democracy, particularly in Western Europe, saw a reconstruction of citizenship. This was reinforced and extended to the global arena after 1989 with the end of ideological-block confrontations and the adoption of democratic and constitutional patterns by most of the formerly communist states. On the other hand, there is also evidence of a tendency toward some ‘‘devaluation’’ and weakening of citizenship. (Fahrmeir, 2007) The weakening of nation-state structures, the trend toward transnational political unions, global standards, and guarantees of civil rights as human rights have all diminished the importance of (national) citizenship for the conferral of individual rights. While formal citizenship is still crucial on the level of the right to full participation in the political arena, this no longer applies to economic and social rights. Citizenship as national membership status is of decreasing importance for the exercise of these increasingly relevant rights (Soysal, 1994: 136). This trend for the devaluation of citizenship is joined by the expansion and possibly overstretching of the concept. Historically, citizenship’s efficacy as a claim for rights was always based on political sovereignty – be it monarchical or popular. This was a prerequisite both for addressing individual claims and enforcing the corresponding civil duties. With the pluralist expansion of citizenship rights to new kinds of conflict-ridden, often controversial claims for identity in a situation of declining nation-state sovereignty the answer to the question ‘‘Who guarantees and enforces claims for citizenship?’’ becomes less clear.

Cross-References

▶ Civil Society and Democracy ▶ Civil Society, Definitions of and Approaches ▶ Civil Society Theory: Cohen and Arato ▶ Civil Society Theory: Habermas ▶ Civil Society Theory: Walzer ▶ Civility ▶ Communitarianism ▶ Human Rights ▶ Identity ▶ Marshall, Thomas H. ▶ Welfare State

References/Further Readings Brubaker, R. (1992). Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press. Castles, S., & Davidson, A. (2000). Citizenship and migration. Globalization and the politics of belonging. London: Macmillan Press. Cohen, J., & Arato, A. (1992). Civil society and political theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Civic Action Fahrmeir, A. (2007). Citizenship. The rise and fall of a modern concept. New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press. Fraser, N., & Honneth, A. (2003). Redistribution or recognition: A politicalphilosophical exchange. London: Verso. Giesen, B., & Eder, K. (2001). European citizenship: An avenue for the social integration of Europe. In K. Eder & B. Giesen (Eds.), European citizenship between national legacies and postnational projects. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gosewinkel, D. (2003). Einbu¨rgern und ausschließen. Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangeho¨rigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2nd ed.). Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Gosewinkel, D., & Rucht, D. (2003). History meets sociology. Zivilgesellschaft als Prozess. In D. Gosewinkel (Eds.), Zivilgesellschaft – national und transnational (pp. 29–60). Berlin: Edition Sigma. Heater, D. (1990). Citizenship. The civic ideal in world history. Politics and education. London: Longman. Isin, E., & Wood, P. (1999). Citizenship and identity. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage. Janoski, T. (1999). Citizenship and civil society. A framework of rights and obligations in liberal, traditional, and social democratic regimes. Cambridge: University Press. Kymlicka, W., & Norman, W. (1995). Return of the citizen: A survey of recent work on citizenship theory. In R. Beiner (Ed.), Theorizing citizenship. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Marshall, T. (1950/1992). Citizenship and social class. London: Pluto (Reprint 1992). Siim, B. (2000). Gender and citizenship. Politics and agency in France, Britain and Denmark. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Soysal, Y. (1994). Limits of citizenship. migrants and postnational membership in Europe. Chicago, IL: Chicago Press. Soysal, Y. (2001). Changing boundaries of participation in European public spheres: Reflections on citizenship and civil society. In K. Eder & B. Giesen (Eds.), European citizenship between national legacies and postnational projects (pp. 159–179). Oxford: University Press. Vogel, U., & Moran, M. (Eds.) (1991). The frontiers of citizenship. London: Macmillan. Vogel, U. (1991a). Is citizenship gender-specific? In U. Vogel & M. Moran (Eds.), The frontiers of citizenship (pp. 58–85). London: Macmillan. Walzer, M. (Ed.) (1995). Toward a global civil society. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books. Weiler, J. (1999). The constitution of Europe. Do the new clothes have an emperor? And other essays on European integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Civic Action GIOVANNI MORO FONDACA, Active Citizenship Foundation, Rome, Italy

Introduction Though widely diffused the concept of civic action is not clearly defined, nor has it a well-established meaning. For example, civic action is referred to enabling people to

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make sure legislators hear their voices; to building knowledge on important issues and take action through campaigns to change the behavior of public and private institutions; to citizens becoming more active members in their community; up to a military force operating in favor of civilians including dental, engineering, medical, veterinarian activities. Civic action neither has a precise placing in scientific community. References to this concept can indeed be found in the literature on collective action and social movements, on participatory democracy, on advocacy, on political participation, on community organizing, on social networks, on social capital, on direct democracy, on volunteerism, on stakeholder theory, etc. (cf. Andriof, 2002; Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Rubin & Rubin, 1992). In this situation, therefore, what has to be done is not to choose the most updated, comprehensive, and precise definition of the concept, but rather to identify the kind of reality the concept would refer to. Starting from this concern, it can be noticed that, in the civil society discourse, what distinguishes this concept from close others is the focus on the practices that the citizenry carry out in order to fulfill general or common interest goals, rather than on forms, motivations, kind of actors, etc. Starting from this essential element a definition and a more precise content of the concept can be fixed.

Definition Civic action can be defined as a form of citizenship practice consisting in mainly collective initiatives aimed at implementing rights, taking care of common goods or empowering citizens. It can be addressed both to governmental or private interlocutors as well as to the general public. It implies the exercise of powers and the use of specific tools on the citizens’ side. The general distinguishing elements of this definition of civic action can be summarized as follows: ● It is related to the participatory component of citizenship, but going beyond the exercise of the right to vote. ● Also in case it addresses the political establishment, it is an autonomous practice of the citizenry, well distinguished by the traditional political participation through parties. ● It is about the fact that citizens engage themselves in common or general interest activities, rather than about issues like the fields of engagement, the organizational structures or the operational patterns (e.g., advocacy or service delivery); in other words, it is about the way citizens act rather than the way they get together.

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● It requires some degree of organization to be really effective and is therefore based on the ability of citizens engaged in common problems to gather and collectively act. ● It implies the exercise of citizens’ powers in the public realm, such as the powers to produce information and knowledge, to change the common awareness, to give the ‘‘social license to operate’’, to constrain public institutions to effectively work, to change material conditions, etc. ● Despite civic action being a widespread phenomenon, which does not depend on the political regimes, it is related to a constitutional role that citizens’ activities acquire in the evolution of democracies, often defined in terms of horizontal subsidiarity.

Historical Background It can be stated that civic action came into the fore together with a double process affecting contemporary societies, and especially democracies, starting from the 1960s. On one side, a weakening of the effectiveness of State structures and operations, due to a number of factors (localism, increased power of private companies, financial crisis of welfare systems, etc.), while on the other side a growing autonomous political subjectivity and an enriched and more concrete meaning of citizenship emerged in civil societies. In relation to this process, citizens’ initiatives from the local to the global levels expanded and increased their impact in the public realm, influencing a number of relevant policies and the public policy making styles and habits themselves. In particular, the public significance of non-state actors’ practices devoted to the general interest definitely spread. The growing diffusion and importance of civic action can be accounted as a part of this broad phenomenon (cf. Pierre & Guy Peters, 2000).

Key Issues Enabling Factors

A number of factors can favor the implementation of civic action. Four of them can be distinguished. There are, first of all, material conditions, in this case of the utmost importance since civic action requires an amount of energy definitely bigger than voting. Verba et al. (1993) identify three of them. A first category of material conditions is the availability of resources such as time; money and other goods to be mobilized; and civic skills, i.e., organizational and communicational abilities like the one of speaking in public or organizing a meeting.

Another kind of condition regards motivations, that is, a good cause to be involved in. A last kind of condition is the existence of recruiting structures, that meaning that the presence of a preexistent organization can make easier to take civic action. Secondly, social capital can be considered as an enabling condition for civic action. Social capital can be defined as the links of reciprocity, cooperation, and trust that connect individuals in society (Putnam, 1993). More the social capital, more civic action is likely to take place. A third enabling condition for civic action is the civic culture, intended as the set of norms and habits, visions, symbols, behavioral models characterizing individuals as members of a democratic society (Donolo, 1992). For example, if among the patterns of the civic culture there is the responsibility of citizens to take care of their neighborhood, civic action is favored. A last condition enabling civic action can be defined as civic dimension, meaning the attitude of a society as a whole to consider the engagement of citizens in public affairs as a worthy resource or as an ordinary habit. If a strong civic dimension exists, the taking place of civic action is facilitated (Moro, 2005). Summarizing, it can be stated that, when a texture of social capital, a strong civic dimension, a rich individual civic culture and some material conditions (time, resources, and civic skills; strong motivations and recruiting structures) do exist, civic action is more likely to take place. Repertoires of Civic Action ‘‘Technologies’’

What are the main tools of civic action? Taking what worked out by Charles Tilly on social movements (cf. Traugott, 1995), there can be identified repertoires of civic action tools, intended as sets of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out according to specific situations, needs, and goals. These tools can be considered as technologies, meaning with this term systems of operational rules based on a specific knowledge. Starting from these assumptions, there can be identified four repertoires of civic action technologies, that can be illustrated using some examples coming mainly from European experience (Table 1). Technologies of Direct Action

In this category tools that citizens can activate by themselves, without the consent or the involvement of other actors, are included. The Charters of rights are documents that specify how rights established in laws and regulations in a general way and therefore often not implemented, should be

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Civic Action. Table 1 Repertoires of civic action technologies Repertoires

Examples of technologies ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Charters of rights Advice and counseling structures Monitoring and production of data and information Symbolic actions Information and awakening actions Proximity information Conflict management Establishment of services

Mobilization of resources

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Recruiting Fund raising Mobilization of technical resources Gathering of signatures and support Boycott Gathering and diffusion of good practices Education and training Use of information technologies Use of media

Interlocution

● ● ● ●

Roundtables Agreements Participatory planning, budgeting, etc. Partnerships

Public institutions’ activation

● ● ● ●

Claims and complaints Implementation of bodies and procedures provided by laws Lobbying Legal (civil) actions

Direct action

Source: Adapted from Moro (2005)

protected (with regard, for example, to patients, children, immigrants, etc.). They are used also at the end of favoring the recognition and promotion of new rights. Advice and counseling structures are services enabling citizens to get information, expert knowledge and support in case their rights or common goods are at risk. The technology of monitoring and production of data and information refers to the, usually but not necessarily recurring, gathering of data and information regarding a concerning situation or functioning of a service. Its outputs are often reports. Symbolic actions are initiatives with a high degree of visibility aimed at stimulating a reaction of interlocutors and involving the public in an unsolved or unrecognized question, creating a strong pressure and catalyzing public attention. Information and awakening actions are devoted to increase the citizens’ awareness of a problem or an opportunity related to a public interest through meetings, advertisements, publications, etc. Proximity information consists in the activation of people trusted by the citizens affected by a problem and able to give them direct and reliable

information and answers on relevant questions. Conflict management includes those activities aimed at prevent or minimize damages coming from tensions and clashing interests between individuals or groups in a number of issues, from service delivery to interethnic relations. Establishment of services refers to the creation and delivery of services that answer to needs or rights not proteted adequately or not protected at all by public institutions. Technologies of Mobilization of Resources

This category includes those technologies of civic action that are aimed at raising people, means, and money needed for the achievement of the planned goals. Recruiting consists in the involvement of people in a project, a campaign or a long-term or permanent initiative, on the base of their link with a problem, commitment with the mission of the organization, abilities related to the goal of the action, and so on. Fund raising is the collection of financial resources for the fulfillment of the goal of the action. Mobilization of technical resources regards the gathering of those means that are needed for

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the civic action, usually through donations or on loan. Gathering of signatures and support can go from complex initiatives as a referendum proposals to more simple ones such as petitions. Boycott is a tool aimed at damaging the reputation of public or private bodies, whose behavior is against citizens’ rights or common goods, making the continuing of this behavior counterproductive. Gathering and diffusion of good practices refers to the share – through catalogs or databases, for example – of good practices in the management of public issues, e.g., practices aimed at improving the efficiency or the quality of utilities or the attitude to listen to the citizenry. The aim of this tool is to trigger an emulation chain. Education and training refers to all the actions aimed at facilitating the increase of knowledge and abilities of citizens in protecting rights and taking care of common goods, thus empowering them. The use of information technologies refers to the internet tools available for campaigning, informing, protesting, promoting petitions, etc. The use of the media refers to those activities – press releases, press conferences, dossiers, and reports, letters to the editor, newsletters – able to activate the media in support of a citizens’ cause. Technologies of Interlocution

In this cluster are grouped tools of civic action that favor and make as much effective as possible citizens’ relation with public institutions and with private actors – whatever of dialogue, confrontation, or conflict. Roundtables consist in convening representatives of bodies engaged in a relevant issue in order to discuss the situation and how to address it, often in the presence of the whole concerned citizenry. With the agreements, that can have various forms, actors engaged in a issue of citizens’ concern publicly undertake to develop programs, activities, and behaviors to face the problem and put them in a common agenda. Participatory planning, budgeting, etc. is the involvement of the affected citizens in planning and taking binding decisions on relevant issues such as urban planning or welfare spending. Though usually coming from public administrations, in case it is promoted and lead by the citizenry it can be considered a tool of civic action. Partnership refers to projects and programs promoted and implemented by a group of citizens together with one or more public or private actor, sharing objectives, resources, and risks, and in which the results have an added value. Technologies of Public Institutions’ Activation

This category refers to those civic actions that are aimed at pushing or forcing public institutions to implement laws

and regulations that contain principles, bodies, and procedures related to the protection of citizens’ rights or the care for common goods. The common starting point of these tools is that citizens’ engagement is necessary to make those institutions and procedures effectively work. Claims and complaints are reports, requests, or call for intervention that citizens (also as individuals) can address to public institutions in relation to a problem or a need, that activate a check, an answer and consequent actions on the institutions’ side. Implementation of bodies and procedures provided by laws refers to law instruments that can be effectively implemented thanks to citizens’ intervention. Varying on the base of national (or EU) legislation, they can regard for example the access to information, the quality standards of services, the ombudsman, etc. Lobbying is a well known tool consisting in pressing political and administrative authorities to change laws, regulations, and public budgets in favor of a right or a common cause, with reference to a specific decision-making process. Legal action is the use of jurisdictional resources by citizens as individuals and/or as organizations. According to the various national judicial systems, opportunities to use criminal, civil, or administrative action to protect a citizens’ right, to constrain the judicial system to fill gaps and clarify ambiguities in laws and regulations, to shed light to concerning but not known situations, to force powerful actors to change their behaviors are available. Challenges

Due to its growing relevance in contemporary societies, civic action is challenged by some questions of the utmost importance. Three of them can be mentioned and summarized as follows. Civic Competence

People engaged in civic actions require a growing amount of knowledge and expertise in order to effectively face the problems they are dealing with. But this competence is not taken for granted. On one side, in general there are several information asymmetries that affect all the actors of the public realm, including citizens. On the other side, the ability of citizens to have an adequate expertise is often questioned. This lack of ability is supposed concerning three different elements (Dahl, 1998): the moral competence (the knowledge of what is good and what is bad for public interest); the virtue (the agency needed to pursue the common good); the technical competence (the knowhow needed to make effective that virtue). On the contrary, it can be argued that citizens engaged in public problems that directly affect them are able both to develop a specific knowledge of situations on their

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own, and to use the advice of experts to get into the ‘‘black box.’’ Moreover, the task of protecting rights and caring for common goods is related to a moral competence, i.e., a perception of the general interest related to specific situations, and a commitment, or an agency, to the general interest as well (Caddy, 2004; Moro, 2004). In addition, according to Aaron Wildavsky (1993), when citizens’ participation is intended not as a general, holistic (and therefore unworkable) attitude, but as a policy-centered one, it is possible to satisfy the basic conditions for citizens’ participation: understanding what is at stake, distinguishing between big and small changes (so that perceiving the utility of participation), and being continually involved, thus learning from experience. In public policies, citizens – acting as ‘‘analysts’’ – are indeed able to choose an issue, to collect and accumulate information and to use it acting together with other citizens, influencing the course of them. Representation and Representativeness

In spite of the idea that direct citizens’ action is the opposite of representation, it is a matter of fact that citizens engaged in civic actions, especially as organized entities, do exercise representative functions. These functions involve both the meanings of the concept of representation: ‘‘to speak for’’ and ‘‘to act for’’ someone or something else. Among the ‘‘speak for’’ phenomena, there can be mentioned several civic actions that are carried on with the aim to give voice to weak or marginal people (e.g., illegal immigrants or prisoners), or even to the whole society (for instance, in consumer issues) when not to subjects not yet living (the future generations in environmental actions). Among the ‘‘act for’’ phenomena there can be mentioned agreements and memoranda of understanding signed by citizens’ groups with public or private actors, implying that measures are effective for the whole concerned people. A number of problems, though, raise: overrepresentation of the stronger and wealthier parts of population, living room to the ‘‘extreme voices’’ rather than to the average citizen, lack of accountability of those that take action, priority given to the leaders to the detriment of the targets, and so on (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). These problems would be addressed clarifying the standards and requirements that make a civic action representative of the affected people. On the other side, focusing on the actions rather than on the subjects carrying them out, it could be noticed that what is really important is not the representativeness, but rather the relevance of the action undertaken to face a specific problem or situation.

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Definition of Civic Action Standards

In the last years civic action has become more and more diffused, recurrent, and influential in public life at local, national, regional, and global levels. As a consequence, it has affected governments’ core operations much more directly and continuously than in the past. This circumstance has given place to negative or suspicious attitudes towards civic action, often considered as a threat or an obstacle for the functioning of public institutions and the activity of the representative democracy actors. On this regard, the need for the definition of a set of standards of civic action especially when it interacts or interferes with public institutions, has emerged. For example, the European Charter of Active Citizenship, promoted in 2006 by Active Citizenship Network (ACN, FONDACA, 2006), establishes a set of rights to civic action vis-a`-vis public institutions. The most relevant is the right to intervention: ‘‘Whenever citizens’ rights and general interests are at stake, autonomous citizens’ organizations (ACOs) have the right to intervene with opinions and actions, as well as publicly disclosing the actions and/or omissions which may have an effect on such rights and general interests.’’ Other relevant rights included in the Charter are: the right to carry out prevention activities, to consultation, to access, to evaluate, to a qualified interlocution, to respect of time, to trust and equal dignity, to facilitation and support measures. These rights, or others set up in similar documents, can be considered as starting points for defining standards for civic action in the public realm.

International Perspectives The major difference in civic action, as it results from the international debate and consolidated knowledge, is the one between American and European perspectives (cf. Tocqueville, 1969; Putnam, 1993, 2000). It can be summarized as follows: while civic action is a constitutive element of American democracy as relevant part of the attitude of citizens to get together and set up associations, in Europe it is a more recent phenomenon, coming from the weakening of traditional political and social forces, such as political parties and trade unions. The main differential factor is the role of the State in facing public problems and in legitimizing non-state actors, which is much more relevant in Europe rather in the United States. As a consequence, in Europe civic action still tends to be considered at the same time as a resource and a threat for the sake of public institutions (Active Citizenship Network, 2004).

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Future Directions Future directions in research on civic action involve mainly a reinforcement of the concept and a more in-depth analysis of the phenomenon. This development can be expected, because of the growing attention towards the role of autonomous citizens’ initiatives in the public sphere, with emphasis given to practices rather than to forms. In this framework, various topics could be dealt with. One is the meaning of civic action, going from the constitutional (horizontal subsidiarity) to the operational one (participatory governance). Another concerns the relationships with interlocutors of civic action, focusing on the conflict-cooperation continuum. A last one regards impacts and knock-on effects of civic action.

Pierre, J., & Guy Peters, B. (2000). Governance, politics and the state. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Rubin, H. J., & Rubin, I. S. (1992). Community organizing and development. New York: Macmillan. Skocpol, T., & Fiorina, M. P. (Eds.) (1999). Civic engagement in American democracy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Traugott, M. (Ed.) (1995). Repertoires and cycles of collective action. Durham/London: Duke University Press. Tocqueville, A. (1969). Democracy in America. New York: Anchor Books. Verba, S., Lehman Schlozmann, K., & Brady, H. E. (1993). Voice and equality. Civic voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wildavsky, A. (1993). Speaking truth to power. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Cross-References

▶ Advocacy ▶ Citizenship ▶ Civic Culture ▶ Civic Participation ▶ Collective Action ▶ Lobbying ▶ Participation ▶ Social Audits ▶ Social Capital, Definition of ▶ Subsidiarity

References/Further Readings Active Citizenship Network (ACN). (2004). Public institutions interacting with citizens’ organizations. A survey on public policies on civic activism in Europe, from http://www.fondaca.org/misc/Download/ Rapporti%20di%20ricerca/%20organisations%20-%20A%20survey %20on%20public%20policies%20regarding%20civic%20activism %20in%20Europe.pdf; 11/25/2008. ACN, FONDACA. (2006). European charter of active citizenship, from http://www.fondaca.org/misc/Download/Documenti/EuropeanCharter ofActiveCitizenship%20FINAL.pdf; 11/25/2008 Andriof, J. et al. (Eds.)(2002). Unfolding stakeholder thinking: Theory, responsibility and engagement. Sheffield: Greenleaf. Caddy, J. (Ed.) (2004). Evaluating public participation in policy making. Paris: OECD. Dahl, R. (1988). Democracy and its critics. Yale: Yale University Press. Della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2006). Social movements. An introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Donolo, C. (1992). Il sogno del buon governo. Apologia del regime democratico. Milano: Anabasi [The Dream of Good Governance. Apology of Democratic Regime]. Moro, G. (2004). Citizens’ evaluation of public participation. In J. Caddy (Ed.), Evaluating public participation in policy making (pp. 109–126). Paris: OCED Moro, G. (2005). Azione civica. Conoscere e gestire le organizzazioni di cittadinanza attiva. Roma: Carocci [Civic Action. Knowing and Managing Active Citizenship Organizations].

Civic Agency ALAN FOWLER University of KwaZulu Natal, Western Cape, South Africa

Introduction The term ‘‘civic agency’’ enjoins two concepts with lineages stemming, respectively, from ancient Mediterranean politics of governing an (urbanizing) community and from modern sociology. Their coupled history is associated with the emergence in the seventeenth century of nationstates and their subsequent conflicted (internal) consolidation and colonial imposition as sovereign geopolitical units on the world stage. This process set in play an association of ‘‘civic’’ with an uneven, and as yet incomplete, evolution in identity of the world’s polity as citizens. However, the advent and content of citizenship as a distinctive feature of a polity is itself problematic. Difficulties in definition and interpretation stem largely from modernization of societies driven by the private accumulation of capital and (collectivized) reactions to it at different times and places. These processes emerge as systemic ‘‘political projects’’ that contend for recognition and supremacy in terms of beliefs about what society should be and what is at stake for whom in attaining this future condition (Dagnino, 2008: 27). In so doing, political projects ‘‘frame’’ identities of actors – such as citizens – and label problems to be solved in ways that are codetermined by power divisions and relations within and between societies. Against this backdrop, contemporary understandings of citizenship place civic agency as a value-based mode of

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sociopolitical expression which is increasingly allied to rights-based perspectives on the relationship between polity and state. In other words, today, civic agency is located within normative debates about a desired form and quality of governance, with democratization as a pivotal feature of discussion. One consequence is that civic agency cannot be properly understood outside of contested meanings. Nor can it ignore different scales of the historical geographies in which meanings play out. In other words, ascription of civic agency is mediated by power over signification or labeling (Moncrieffe & Eyben, 2007). This phenomenon occurs within ever-changing contextual conditions that connect from individual to global order. These observations signal that definition and comprehension of civic agency are not straightforward. The approach to doing so is therefore iterative. It begins with a working definition. Thereafter, a sequential discussion of ‘‘agency’’ and ‘‘civic’’ provides the grounding for examining interpretations about their linkage.

Definition Civic agency connects political theory with purposeful sociopolitical action by persons who enjoy a minimal condition of meaningful citizenship, i.e., there is at least respect for the ‘‘right to have rights’’ (Dagnino, 2005: 5). Environments with a minimum respect for the right of all to have their say and be socially engaged are a precondition for civic agency. Where this precondition is not fulfilled, notions of a public realm and civic agency remain a theoretical potential but cannot operate in a practical sense. Civic agency is a predisposition toward, and a capability for, leading life together with others in a society and being concerned for the whole. Agency which is considered civic incorporates a basic principle of an equitable, democratic society. Agency

In a comprehensive treatment of the topic, Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 963) argue that agency has not been adequately addressed as an analytic category in its own right. This shortcoming is attributed to theorists’ preoccupation to demonstrate and explain the interpenetration of structure and agency. Their analysis to redress this lacuna posits an iterative, temporal process of reflection through which people gain and apply a responsive capacity to (problematic) situations as they arise (ibid: 970). In this view, agency is an interplay between (1) past routine, experience, and learning, energized by (2) images of a desired future situation, which is then (3)

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situationally judged for achievability and risk, from which action may or may not be taken. In this reflexive sense, inaction is also an action. Results of (in)action feed into capabilities and future decision processes leading to a constantly self-developing and updated condition of capability, appraisal, and decision choice. At a given moment, any one of the three elements determining agency dominate, but all are present in agentic processes. For these authors, therefore, agency is defined as "

the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments – the temporal-relational contexts of action – which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment both reproduces and transforms these structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations. (Ibid: 970)

Thus, agency is one category in a total repertoire of human behavior. It is co-defined by orientation of personal or group action toward the stabilizing, enabling, and constraining forces of social norms and values embedded in institutions (Walker & Ostrom, 2007). Agency can thus be interpreted as an investment in a future that people care about. It is precisely the nature, breadth, and depth of caring that ‘‘civicness’’ is concerned about. Agency is a pathway for a continual updating of self as a conscious identity. This condition is part-attained through relationships with others from which reputation and social capital are built and maintained. The reflexive experience of agency is an important factor codetermining what is perceived (not) to be in one’s interest. More critically, agency is a mechanism through which meanings are communicated, preferences are expressed, and correspondence or divergence with others is found. The latter are typically labeled in a normative way, for example, as antagonistic or irrelevant or indeterminant. Agentic action can therefore be understood as a ‘‘project’’ to be undertaken alone or in collaboration or in conflict with others. Human agency is ‘‘projected’’ toward a preferred future whose image is to be realized through practical action. One critique of this analytic lens is that there is inadequate attention to layering of scales of agency and evolution in terms of human processes of becoming, learning, and associating. Agency of early childhood is, initially, more conditioned by affinities of family, community, and physical proximity. Wider sources of influence are filtered and transmitted through these intermediaries until selfawareness and self-reflection gain an upper hand. The range or circle of a persons’ agency expands over time toward identification of self in a structural context. This evolution produces values and attitudes toward others as well as identification of affinities, such as citizenship, and of

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life experience, for example a shared livelihood, role, or profession. In this sense, formative worldviews generated by early socialization are insufficiently delineated as axiomatic self-referents influencing agency in later life. For purposes here, it is sufficient to note that temporal trajectories are intergenerational. Limits to a distance in the past or imaginings of future along which agency plays out are indeterminate. Moreover, human values are malleable. Consequently, identities associated with intergenerational processes and the forces that give meaning to life experiences are critical for addressing a normative approach to agency. The authors do not attempt this task. Values – such as good or bad agency – cannot be derived from their definition. The concepts of civic, civicness, civility, and citizenship introduce such a normative directionality. Civic

In Heater’s account (2004) the earliest references to ‘‘civic’’ are allied to the concept of citizenship associated with a sociopolitical status accorded within Spartan communities and the governance of Athens as a citystate. The corresponding tasks, authority, and accountability of citizenship were accorded to selected individuals – propertied elites exhibiting valor, virtue, and commanding influence. Women, slaves, laborers, and craftsmen were excluded from this rank. Exclusion was the norm. Citizens were recognized as political beings with rights to wield the power required to protect and ‘‘justly’’ oversee and govern the affairs of rural communities and of urban city-states. There was stringent attention to citizens properly discharging their mutual duties which called for particular ‘‘civil’’ behavior in terms of constrained self-interest for the overall good. That which emerged as ‘‘civic’’ – a normative property of citizenship – included responsibility for the proper servicing and management of public areas and of investments and resources derived from the functioning of the whole populace. Historical analysis shows citizenship transforming from exclusive power with normative prescriptions of virtue and probity toward a legal status for those ruled under the Roman Empire. The granting of citizenship to those within the Roman realm was seen as a prudent measure – a sort of compelled quid pro quo – to ameliorate resistance to taxation. In return for state protection a citizen’s required behavior was loyalty, allegiance, and obedience toward Rome and its edicts. Citizenship thus evolved into a judicial status allocated by the state as a single political authority. These ancient principles underpinning citizenship – as a morally virtuous, public caring, or as a deferential and

compliant behavior – continue to resonate in contemporary perspectives on civic agency within the context of statehood. Sovereign statehood as the unit of geopolitical organization established a precondition from which arose a formalized link between citizenship and rights (codified by the United Nations in 1948). "

And so we come to citizenship. This defines the relationship between an individual not to another individual (as is the case with feudal, monarchical and tyrannical systems) or a group (as with nationhood), but essentially to the idea of the state. The civic identity is enshrined in the rights conveyed by the state and the duties performed by individual citizens, who are all autonomous persons, equal in status. Good citizens are those who feel allegiance to the state and have a sense of responsibility in discharging their duties. As a consequence they need the skills appropriate for this civic participation. (Heater, 2004: 1)

The works of T. H. Marshall (1950, 1964) are oft-cited landmarks in defining three key elements of citizenship in the modern era. Drawing on a somewhat narrow history of Britain, he argues for a historical sequence in the content of citizenship, beginning with attaining rights associated with individual liberties of speech, thought, faith, and equality before the law. Thereafter arose a political element expressed in the franchise to both define (as an elected member) and take part (as a voter) in the political system. Though not mutually exclusive, Marshall’s third, social, element has been variously interpreted. One approach relies on attaining social or socioeconomic rights in terms of access to public welfare. Another perspective gives primacy to the psychosocial dimensions of rights. This perspective hinges on a self-realization of a civic identity within complex mosaics or layers of identity, meaning, attitudes, and driving energies toward social issues and choices of preferred futures. The latter interpretation is more attuned to the concept of agency as previously described. Civic Agency

Agency is the decision process and capability to pursue individual or collective action – that is, practical investments to bring about a desired future society. Associated with the rights of citizenship, civicness introduces normative behaviors for applying agency as a right and a duty. A first condition is that agentic action is directed at change which consciously takes into account concerns of the whole rather than of a narrow self. Second, an imperative for moral virtues would rely on the selfwilled responsibility of people to act in ways that are

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civil. Volunteering would be viewed as such behavior. A loyalty imperative would treat civility as compliance and conformity – behaving as a state requires and expects. In either case, what would civility entail? One line of argument links civility to political culture: that is, citizens’ perceptions of political engagement, legitimacy, and traditions. Here, a positive interplay is conceived between a ‘‘natural’’ emergence and dominance of civic values leading to democratic forms of governance, a form of politics which is more cost-effective for society than (authoritarian) coercion (Almond & Verba, 1963). More recent arguments concentrate on the content of civicness itself, through the lens of civility. There are "

three elements that together constitute civility. The first element is respect for others, ‘‘Civility is basically respect for the dignity and the desire for dignity of other persons.’’ The second element is civility in public behaviour towards strangers, ‘‘[C]ivility equips us for everyday life with strangers . . . we need neither to love them nor to hate them in order to be civil towards them’’. . . . The third element is self-regulation in the sense that civility requires empathy, putting one’s own immediate self-interest in the context of the larger common good and acting accordingly. (Anheier, 2007: 46)

The first element, dignity, is implicit to equality in human interaction and a basic principle of human rights informing citizenship in theory if not in consistent national practices. Stemming from recognition of common humanity, the second element calls for a worldview and relational stance that is inclusive and tolerant of difference. Such a principle is manifest, for example, in the African concept of ubuntu, a moral philosophy of identity as a collective self (Louw, 1999) and in the premodern roots of philanthropy. The third element embodies a ‘‘social duty of assistance’’ that is argued to be intrinsic to human nature (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991: 23). It also defines a prescriptive rule for agency as ‘‘projection into the future.’’ Akin to the second element, in psychological terms it equates to adequate ‘‘projection of self ’’ into the life world of others, leading to willing self-restraint. The associated principle is found in the enjoinder ‘‘only do unto others as you would have done to yourself.’’ Incivility would exhibit the opposite characteristics: behaviors are disrespectful, exclude, and denigrate ‘‘the other,’’ and pursue selfish exploitation. Marshall’s three elements of citizenship and the above normative specificity give theoretical and practical substance to the definition of civic agency. But they obscure issues stemming from theoretical biases and contemporary political contentions about language and social futures that are themselves embedded in a global

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hegemonic discourse. A concluding critical framing of civic agency is therefore still required.

Key Issues and International Perspectives Contemporary debates impacting on civic agency revolve around two issues. Both have international dimensions. These are the problem of theoretical disjuncture and mislocation of civic agency, a process allied to the elision of language and meaning in ways that systemically distort citizenship discourse. Second is to critically review the link between civic agency and the politics of democracy and (re)democratization. Mislocating Civic Agency

Much enquiry into civic agency exhibits a logical inconsistency. It does so by ‘‘locating’’ civic agency primarily within, and as a distinctive attribute of civil society. This location is often understood as a Habermasian public space for communication, information, debate, and exchange bounded by state, market, and family. However, as sociopolitical categories, citizenship and civic agency are not amenable to reframing in terms of location within a particular institutional ‘‘sector’’ or ‘‘space.’’ Such analytic simplification can be useful for some purposes, but not in this case. Sectoral differentiation within a society distorts the essence of what citizenship and civicness are about. It does so in ways that recast their ontology toward a particular political project associated with liberal capitalism. Disembodied from the enduring rights and duties of citizenship and fixated on civil society organizations, placing civic agency in institutional category introduces a potentially narrowed and apolitical separation from roots of politics and rights. Aside from a Western bias and common lack of attention to asymmetries in power, one reason for questioning a sectoral analysis is the potential to understate or ignore the degree of market and state penetration into the Third Sector – as civil society is also (mis)labeled. An increasing infiltration of market principles and state oversight of civil society is influencing ‘‘civic’’ in terms of its selfunderstanding and its projects. Though highly variable across the world, the resource base and functions of civil society – as a (nonprofit) sector – are heavily influenced by commodification and reliant on surpluses derived from market transactions directly or via redistribution through taxation. And, increasingly, access to taxation is premised on the provision of services where citizens as claimants become needy beneficiaries and the victims of poverty requiring charity. Citizenship is recast from a legitimate claiming of rights toward integration in society as compliant consumer or producer of public goods.

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In the process, poverty, inequality, and exclusion are transformed from issues of justice and equality attendant to rights-based citizenship to technical problems of public management, charity, and philanthropy to ensure minimum survival. As Dagnino demonstrates, unless such processes are properly labeled and markets are ‘‘civilized,’’ the substance and meaning of citizenship, and hence civic agency, will be subordinated to logic of unbounded personal wealth. A further argument against sectoralization of civic agency stems from the deeper ‘‘securitization’’ of territory as a signal feature of statehood. Reflecting Foucault, modern governing has an imperative toward controlling a future filled with unknown events. State responses to recent events of terrorism highlight uncivil potentials and practices as well as ambivalence toward civil society as a location for (un)civil agency. As identified by Sidel (2004), states regard civil society both as a source of uncertainty and insecurity as well as a remedy for instability through promotion of inclusion and outreach to the marginalized. Civil society is coming under scrutiny and state influence to a pressing degree. An alternative consistent with the definition and arguments provided so far is to recognize and name the necessity for agency that is civic in all walks of life. Put another way, citizens functioning within states, markets, families, and civil society can all act in civil or uncivil ways as they define and act to create an imagined future. It is precisely the fact that agency is within ‘‘everyone, everywhere,’’ so to speak, that applying ‘‘civic’’ norms to business can lead to the notion of ethical markets and corporate citizenship (Zadek, 2001). It can produce unlikely champions of ‘‘civilized’’ capitalism such as George Soros. Similarly, civic norms often underpin reforms of public management such that agency of government employees is really ‘‘civil’’ by volition and commitment, as opposed to deploying a ‘‘govern-mentality’’ toward citizens and change. And, as feminist analysis strongly shows, family and patriarchy are also systems and sources of (un)civil behavior that can affect the whole today as well as carry into the future by shaping the experiential worldviews, imaginations, civility, and agency of subsequent generations. The challenge, therefore, is not to permit a discourse on civic agency which allows responsibility for the whole to be passed off, sectoralized, or located into a civic arena such that the rest of a society’s institutions at any sociopolitical level are able to go about uncivic business as usual. What then of civic agency and civil society? Does an allocational error mean that civil society is simply on a par with other locations within society in terms of civic agency? One view is that (transnational) civil society actors have a greater potential and necessary obligation to deploy their

‘‘pre-emptive’’ civility in service of conflict prevention and resolution (Ezzat & Kaldor, cited in Anheier, 2007: 48). The mechanism involved is one of fostering mutual respect and providing pathways for communication and dialogue. This aptitude was ‘‘naturally selected’’ because it helped reduce transaction costs and attenuate instabilities arising from conflicts of interest as capitalism evolved. A different, contemporary analysis spans a wider geography. In this view, civil society continues to generate and harbor factional identities and their public actions. Contestation between faiths is but one example. With enhanced communication and network effects, civil society actors are more ready and capable for disruptive assertion as much around fine-grained local issues and disputes as around incidents commanding international attention. Positive cases of civil society promoting civicness are notable, but over-cited because they are relatively rare and gain media hype. They cannot gather the power to successfully tackle deep structural dysfunctions of international governance and markets. Moreover, reflecting Anheier’s contemporary concern and as a historical trait or not, civility within civil society is being undermined by identity politics, insidious marketing, branded memberships, alienation, and unbounded inequality. These processes are allied to political manipulations that stress differences over commonalities, feeding anxieties that reinforce a state’s right to shrink civic space and citizen’s freedoms. In sum, there are contradictory interpretations that do not allow an uncontested conclusion about the ‘‘civilizing’’ potential for civil society on society as a whole. Civic Agency and Democratization as a Political Project

Accompanying the issue of understanding or defining civic agency from a sector perspective is a critical area of politics with local to global dimensions. This terrain can be understood in terms of a polity defining a state project toward an imagined better society. Civic agency presumes and requires the right of all citizens to influence the commanding image and ways of getting there. However, it need not and does not necessarily follow that this can only to be achieved via a party-based, electoral-process mandating representative. Indeed, there is accumulating evidence – such as decline in voting – to suggest that relying on this method may have reached its historical limits (Marquand, 2004). An analysis stemming from, but not limited to, the United States identifies factors that conspire to work against civic agency as a force in politics. "

We live in a hyper-regulated world that constrains agency on every side, a world of hidden manipulations, standardized programs, mass mobilizations, and bureaucratic

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interventions. In a memorable turn of phrase, the South African writer Xolela Mangcu has termed the invisible virus spreading through modern societies that erodes agency ‘‘technocratic creep.’’ (Boyte, 2008)

It is argued that solutions are not to be found by improving mass mobilization through political parties (Michels et al., 1999). These processes are oft-proven to be sites of manipulation and control by elites over future image and shared identity. Nor is it likely to be found by enhancing ‘‘participation.’’ Too seldom are the associated rules of the game and the nature of participants subject to unconditioned co-definition and symmetry in power over outcomes. An alternative future perspective is called for.

Future Directions A remedy to mislocation of civic agency and apolitical labeling can be sought in enhancing capacity for civic agency as a self-reflective source of energy. Such a capability entails insightful readings of power and discerning of ‘‘truth.’’ The latter involves understanding the contending uses of language, recognizing ways in which reality is (re)constructed by mass media and by other sources of information that co-define the discourses in play. Such a capability is necessary for pursuing the politics of small things (Goldfarb, 2006). This means attention to the politics of everyday life by applying the values and principles of civic agency to situations and problems as and when they arise wherever one may be – in family, in business, in civic association, in government. The application of civic agency to a multiplicity of micro-settings, relations, and transactions gives generative power for directing how societies change. It is beyond the scope of this entry to elaborate on practical methods. The forwardlooking point is to employ the notion of civic agency to reinvigorate political engagement in a deep sense of active citizenship.

Cross-References

▶ Citizenship ▶ Civic Culture ▶ Civil Society and Democracy ▶ Civil Society, Definitions and Approaches ▶ Civility ▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ Identity ▶ Interest Politics ▶ Political Society ▶ Uncivil Society

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References/Further Readings Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture. Boston, MA: Little Brown. Anheier, H. (2007). Bringing civility back in – Reflections on global civil society. Development Dialogue, October. Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. (Eds.) (1991). The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf. Dagnino, E. (2005). Meanings of citizenship in Latin America. Working Paper 258, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton: University of Sussex. Dagnino, E. (2008). Civic driven change and political projects. In A. Fowler & K. Biekart (Eds.), Civic driven change: Citizen’s imagination in action (pp. 27–49). The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. Emirbayer, M., & Mische, A. (1998). What is agency?. The American Journal of Sociology, 103(4): 962–1023, from http://www.jstor.org/ stable/2782934 Goldfarb, J. (2006). The politics of small things: The power of the powerless in dark times, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Heater, D. (2004). A brief history of citizenship. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Klein, N. (2000). No logo. London: Flamingo. Louw, D. (1999). Ubuntu: An African assessment of the religious other, from http:/www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Afri/AfriLouw.htm Marshall, T. (1950). Citizenship, social class and other essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marshall, T. (1964). Class, citizenship and social development. New York: Doubleday. Michels, R., Lipset, S., & Paul, E. (1999). Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press. Moncrieffe, J., & Eyben, R. (2007). The power of labelling: How people are categorized and why it matters. London: Earthscan. Sidel, M. (2004). More secure, less free. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Walker, J., & Ostrom, E. (2007). Trust and reciprocity as foundations for cooperation: Individuals, institutions, and context. Paper presented at the Capstone Meeting of the RSF Trust Initiative at the Russell Sage Foundation, May.

Civic Culture LOEK HALMAN Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

Introduction The issue of civic culture has become popular again recently. Robert Putnam’s (1993) study on why democracy works, the idea that culture is an important determinant in contemporary society, the rise of political apathy among voters in advanced industrial democracies, the widespread decline of political trust among mass publics,

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the difficulties of (re)establishing civic society in Eastern European countries, the assumed growing levels of intolerance, the assumed weakening of norms of civility, and the supposed decline of good citizenship have all fueled the debates about the good society, good governance, and the future of democracy. It is generally accepted that the latter cannot exist if citizens are indifferent, uncommitted, not engaged, and not involved, and are lacking the attitudes and behaviors that are supportive to democracy and democratic processes. The civic culture was a hot and much discussed topic in the 1960s, not in the last place because of Almond and Verba’s (1965) groundbreaking study on political involvement in democratic states. Their study originated in the postwar period when democracy was challenged severely. The authors were ‘‘concerned with the question of why some democracies survive while others collapse’’ (Verba, 1980: 407), not only because social and political scientists at that time were still looking for explanations of why democratic regimes were replaced by totalitarian ones, but also because of the insecurity of the recently established democracies in Germany and Italy, and because it was doubted whether the French Fifth Republic would be democratic at all. Further, the developments in Asia and Africa demonstrated that the requirements for stable democracies were apparently not fulfilled. One of the requirements is that all ‘‘citizens be involved and active in politics, and that their participation be informed, analytic, and rational’’ (Almond, 1980: 16). The current renewed interest in civic culture arises from strong concerns about the survival of democracy and democratic institutions. Although it seems that the principle of democracy as an ideal form of government is overwhelmingly supported all over the world, citizens, particularly in the more advanced industrialized societies, appear to have become much more critical toward their governments and political institutions. There seems to be a ‘‘growing tension between ideals and reality’’ which ‘‘may have produced the emergence of more ‘‘critical citizens’’ or perhaps ‘disenchanted democrats’’’ (Norris, 1999: 27). The current interest also stems from the idea that publics appear to become less and less engaged and involved in society. Leading scholars like Putnam, Fukuyama, and Etzioni warn of the disastrous consequences of these declining levels of civic engagement for society, the social order, and the democratic process. Their worries have been labeled as, for example, the ‘‘shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft’’ or the ‘‘waning of social capital,’’ and have been concisely denoted as the ‘‘decline-of-community thesis’’ (Paxton, 1999: 88). There is a strong belief that engagement and active participation are indispensable in

a democratic polity and essential for the well-functioning of any decent society (Bellah et al., 1992: 6). Etzioni (2001) argues that we need to be not merely a civil but also a good society, one that nurtures the good virtues. Civic engagement, political support, and involvement in politics are regarded to have ‘‘direct policy relevance in areas such as health, crime, welfare, economic growth, the performance of political institutions, and the development of effective and democratic governance’’ (Maloney et al., 2000: 213). Influenced by such scholarly works, in their turn, many politicians and society watchers claim that a growing number of citizens are indifferent and skeptical about politics, and too narrowly focused on pure self-interest. This is considered a severe threat to the respect for human rights and human dignity, liberty, equality, and solidarity. In their view, the ‘‘good’’ civic values have declined or have even vanished, while the wrong, ‘‘bad’’ non-civic values triumph in today’s highly individualized society. No wonder that sociology and political science focus on the extent of people’s involvement in society, their engagement with communities, their interests and activities in politics, and other kinds of pro-social behaviors and attitudes.

Definition The term civic culture was coined by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba in their seminal study on political cultures. In that study they argued that a stable and effective democratic government depends upon people’s orientations that must be favorable to the political democratic process. They concluded that a mixture of participant (active) orientations and the others (passive orientations) would be the ideal combination for a stable democracy. What seems crucial to sustain the political democratic processes in a society is a vibrant civic culture which was defined as ‘‘a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values’’ (Almond & Verba, 1965: 30). Thus, democratic systems require political cultures that encourage citizens’ societal engagement, involvement, and participation. Civic culture refers to a number of virtues of citizens such as responsibility, cooperation, commitment, loyalty, tolerance, solidarity, law abiding, involvement, activism, and engagement. Their ideas were based on the character qualities of the democrat that Harold Laswell had identified, and they were inspired by Charles Merriam’s innovative work ‘‘The making of citizens’’ (see Almond, 1996). The main feature of civic culture is that citizens are active and engaged in society, and as such that idea is far from new. They were, though in different wordings, already stressed

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by Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Tocqueville, and virtually all political thinkers (see Almond, 1980), and although there seem to be ‘‘as many definitions of civic culture as there are scholars writing about the subject,’’ all seem to ‘‘stress attitudes such as public spiritedness, participation and tolerance’’ (Janmaat, 2006: 366).

Historical Background ‘‘The civic culture’’ was one of the first empirical studies using the then recently developed research technology ‘‘of sample surveys, which led to a much sharper specification and elaboration of the subjective dimensions of stable democratic politics’’ (Almond, 1980: 22). The study was not innovative theoretically, as ‘‘the theories and hypotheses which it tested were well discussed in the historical and social science literature’’ (Almond, 1996: 3), but their study was groundbreaking because for the first time in history it was possible to ‘‘establish whether there were indeed distinctive nation ‘marks’ and national characters; whether and in what respects and degrees nations were divided into distinctive subcultures; whether social class, functional groups, and specific elites had distinctive orientations toward politics and public policy, and what role was played by what socialization agents in the development of these orientations’’ (Almond, 1980: 15). Almond and Verba’s study took place in a period of a more general ascension of the idea that culture is a prominent explanatory power in the social sciences and history. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, interest in culture as determining factor declined, for one part because culture appeared difficult to measure empirically, and for another part because rational choice theories became dominant. Following the logics of economics, social phenomena were explained as the result of the rational calculations made by self-interested individuals who aim at maximizing their own individual utility. In more recent years, interest in the cultural factor and civic culture rose again, not in the last place because rational choice models appeared to have limited explanatory power, for example, to understand collective action or to understand the survival of social norms such as altruism, reciprocity, and trust. In particular, Putnam’s Italian study (1993) in which he demonstrated that government performance was linked with citizens public engagement and involvement, and Fukuyama’s (1996) claim that a society’s socioeconomic development could be attributed to levels of trust among its citizens fueled the interest in the civic culture. Such studies demonstrated that mutual trust, informal social connectedness, and formal civic engagement are at least as vital as physical, financial, and human capital for the well-being of

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individuals and broader for the society at large because they are conducive to collective actions and feelings of happiness, but also to the better performance of not only democracies but also economies (see, e.g., Beugelsdijk & van Schaik, 2003; Knack & Keefer, 1997).

Key Issues The growing interest in the civic culture was encouraged by a growing preoccupation with the decline of values, in particular those values that make us good citizens and make society and human life good. ‘‘Widespread feelings of social mistrust, citizens turning away from prime institutions and political authorities, and engaging less in informal interactions are seen as indicators of the decline of the traditional civic ethic’’ (Ester et al., 2006: 17; Bellah et al., 1992; Dekker & van den Broek, 1996; Etzioni, 1996, 2001; Fukuyama, 2000; Putnam, 2000, 2002). In the current, sometimes heated, debate, the discussion is not so much on the decline of values as such, but more on the decline of decent, (pro-)social behavior and moral decline. Many politicians and society watchers claim that a growing number of citizens are too narrowly focused on pure self-interest and not anymore committed to others and the community. It is argued that in contemporary, highly individualized, secular, and globalized order, the significance of traditional structures and ties, such as religion, family, class, has receded, enlarging the individual’s freedom and autonomy in shaping personal life. People have gradually become self-decisive and self-reliant, no longer forced to accept the traditional authorities as taken for granted. The absoluteness of any kind of external authority, be it religious or secular, has eroded. Authority becomes internalized and deference to authority pervasively declines (Inglehart, 1999). The unrestrained striving to realize personal desires and aspirations, giving priority to individual freedom, personal autonomy, and private need fulfillment are assumed to have made people mainly interested in their own lucrative careers and devoting their lives to conspicuous consumption, immediate gratification, personal happiness, success, and achievement. The growing emphasis on the individual has eroded interest and participation in public life. As Sennett (1977) wrote, we are witnessing the Fall of Public Man. Evidence of such a development is found in increasing crime rates, marital breakdown, drug abuse, suicide, tax evasion, and other deviant behaviors and practices, and the increasing disconnection from family, friends, neighbors, and social structures, such as the church, recreation clubs, political parties, and even bowling leagues (Putnam, 2000). Because civic virtues, such as trust, social engagement, and

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solidarity are on the decline, and since these virtues are considered basic requirement for democracy to survive or to work properly (Putnam, 1993), contemporary society suffers a democratic deficit. Democracy is endangered because people are less and less inclined to engage in civic actions and are no longer willing to be committed to and engaged in society.

International Perspectives In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba predicted an increasing support for democratic values, but as followup studies revealed, ‘‘such a tendency toward more widely held ‘civic’ attitudes has not been borne out’’ (Verba, 1980: 399). It appeared that people’s attitudes are strongly affected by the particular political issues which nations face and that each nation has to cope with specific crises and problems. Hence, nations follow their own trajectories and thus a much more differentiated pattern of development will be found. The authors of The Civic Culture did not, for instance, anticipate the declining resources many governments nowadays are confronted with and the rising demands from citizens; nor did they anticipate the development of modern welfare states, the modernization and individualization processes, the fast technological advancements, the integration of European states, and the recent influx of foreigners in many countries. All such developments are assumed to have severe consequences for the virtues of the civic culture and in the end for democracy. The erosion of confidence in the government is linked with the idea that contemporary democracies have become ‘‘overloaded by more and more insistent demands from an ever-expanding array of participants’’ (Putnam et al., 2000: 3; Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999). Many contemporary democracies face a performance deficit because the state does not respond adequately to citizens’ demands (Thomassen, 1995). Contemporary citizens are more critical and demanding than before and the expansion of the welfare state created demands and expectations that governments could not meet ‘‘given the globalization of the economy, problems of government overload, and hence the ‘crisis of the state’’’ (Norris, 1999: 22). Political trust relies on the concrete policy measures taken by a government to solve these discrepancies but also by the images of politicians. The recent declines in political support in some countries, has been attributed to the personal scandals and abuses of power by political elites. It is obvious that the tendency of the mass media to report such scandals and abuses of power is conducive to increasing cynicism about politicians and politics (see also Dalton, 2004).

The current debate on the future of citizenship and civil society is directed strongly toward the negative effects of modernization and individualization processes and the severe consequences for society in general and democracy in particular. Individualization is regarded not to be very beneficial to civil society and to social solidarity because of the decline of social responsibilities and because individual citizens are less embedded in associative relations. A process of deinstitutionalization has occurred appearing as weaker societal bonds and (feelings of) detachment in society and a calculative orientation among citizens seems to prevail in the modern welfare state. It is argued that ongoing individualization will result ultimately in a society in which values, beliefs, and ideas are no longer commonly shared. Such a society is threatened by disintegration and the individual is threatened by anomie, radical individualism, and ethical relativism. Therefore communitarians argue that in order to solve the problem of individualistic, modern society a firm moral order in society should be established by (re)creating a strong ‘‘we’’ feeling and the (re) establishment of a ‘‘spirit of community’’ (Etzioni, 1996, 2001). The question is if it is realistic to assume that that can be achieved, for if one thing is clear in contemporary individualized society, such a spirit of community cannot be imposed from any authority because one of the key characteristics of individualism is that people are not inclined to accept any interference with their personal life (Inglehart 1997). The opening of Central and Eastern Europe and the democratization process that started there in the 1990s were not accompanied by economic growth and expanding welfare. As a result many Eastern Europeans became more cynical about politics in general and the fortunes of democracy in particular. The European project recently seems to have awakened nationalistic sentiments and movements from their slumber and massive migration waves into Europe seem to have triggered exclusionist reactions toward new cultural and ethnic minorities and increased intercultural and interethnic conflict (Touraine, 1994; Blokker, 2005). European unification along economic and political lines has been successful; it has brought peace and economic prosperity to its members over the past decades, but the European project is likely to fail if it remains defined along economic and political lines. The European project can only be successful if the people begin to feel and act as Europeans, and particularly become engaged Europeans. A European civic society has to develop, otherwise mutual trust, honesty, and morality will weaken and mistrust in

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European institutions and political authorities will rise (e.g., Dekker et al., 2003; Putnam, 2000, 2002). However, Europe is a complex continent; dynamic and diverse, full of histories and subtle nuances. Being a European is therefore not a simple or an obvious matter as it is to being a Frenchman or an Italian. Despite that ‘‘political institutions’’ were established and a monetary union built, a truly European society in the sense of a European community and European group identity (see also Glasius et al., 2006: 26–27) has not developed. Civil societies that exist at national and regional levels are suffocated in the process of economic and administrative harmonization and equalization. Increasingly, people perceive Europe as a threat instead of the cradle of their traditions and culture (Van de Donk quoted in Halman et al., 2005: 23). Both are rooted in civil society, and a flourishing civil society is regarded a medicine toward this ‘‘threat.’’ The creation of a European civil society will not be easy, but it is essential; the alternative is cynicism and a victory of the calculating citizen. There are other factors that erode people’s societal engagement, and their interest and participation in public life. According to Putnam, our civic engagement is endangered first of all by an increased pressure of time and money. People are simply so occupied with their work that they are unable to get civilly engaged, e.g., in voluntary activities. Secondly, people are increasingly mobile in the sense that they move so often that it is difficult for them to get acquainted with their neighbors and to engage in voluntary activities. Finally, people are increasingly watching TV, reducing the need for direct personal contact. The TV programs people watch are increasingly associated with civic disengagement: entertainment as distinct from news (Putnam, 2000: 246). Thus, increased mobility, time pressure, and the impact of technology (TV, in particular) decrease the likelihood of people being active in voluntary activities and thus have negative impact on our civic culture. However, at least the consequences of modern technology can be debated. For example, television can also be seen as an agent of socialization and creator of positive images of politics and the political system and thus be conducive to group attachment and social and political commitment (see also McBride, 1998). As Norris noted, the evidence that television is to be blamed for our political ills is not very convincing and the sources of the cynical and disenchanted publics need to be found elsewhere (Norris, 2000: 249–250). The same can be said about the use of other modern communication means such as the Internet. It has been demonstrated that the Internet

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‘‘meets citizen demand for political information’’ (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003: 184), and as such produces more politically informed, socially engaged, and interested people who are more likely to vote in elections (Gibson et al., 2000; Kavanaugh & Patterson, 2001; Karakaya Porat, 2005). Finally, the recent influx of migrant minorities and the multicultural society that is developing have provoked in many European countries an open debate on the consequences of value diversity and what exactly comprises the cultural entity and identity of nation-states. According to Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 5), multiculturalism has put a considerable strain on the norms of civility and good citizenship. An increase of minority groups and thus the rise of minority rights are issues that are considered to have severe consequences for the feelings of citizenship, cooperation, tolerance, solidarity, public involvement, and social engagement. Minorities may not be willing or able to identify with and participate in the society, while the majority may not be willing or able to recognize cultural minorities and to allow them to become full members of the society. This may very well result in, or be a consequence of, feelings of competition, mutual mistrust, and antagonism between the minorities and majority and as such feelings of citizenship, willingness to participate, and civic involvement and engagement are endangered.

Future Directions It seems likely that important issues to be addressed in future studies on the civic culture will have to focus first of all on the declining levels of political trust and increasing cynicism among mass publics and the consequences for political support. Second, attention has to be paid to the question as to how civil society and democracy will survive in a further individualizing and modernizing society. A third topic to deal with is the creation of a civil society across borders. This will be essential not only for the further advancement and proper working of the European Union, but will also be important for North America and its recently established trade agreement between Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Can such projects be successful if civil society does not develop? Further, the consequences of modern communication means, television, and the Internet have to be further explored for the results thus far are ambiguous, confusing, and not consistent. Finally, the consequences of migration for feelings of citizenship, societal participation, and civic engagement have to be studied carefully.

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Cross-References

▶ Citizenship ▶ Civic Participation ▶ Civil Society and Culture ▶ Civil Society and Democracy ▶ Coalitions and Networks ▶ Communitarianism ▶ Etzioni, A. ▶ Identity ▶ Participation ▶ Public Sphere ▶ Putnam, Robert ▶ Social Capital, Definition of ▶ Social Cohesion ▶ Social Trust ▶ Solidarity ▶ Uncivil Society ▶ Values ▶ Volunteers ▶ Welfare State

References/Further Readings Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1965). The civic culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (Eds.) (1980). The civic culture revisited. Boston/Toronto: Little, Brown & Company. Almond, G. A. (1996). The civic culture: Prehistory, retrospect, and prospect. Paper presented at the Center for the Study of Democracy and the Department of Politics and Society, University of California, Irvine, November 1995, from http://repositories.cdlib. org/csd/96–01 Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1992). The good society. New York: Vintage Books. Beugelsdijk, S., & Van Schaik, T. (2003). Participation in civil society and European regional economic growth. In W. Arts, J. Hagenaars, & L. Halman (Eds.), The cultural diversity of European unity (pp. 119–146). Leiden/Boston: Brill. Blokker, P. (2005). Populist nationalism, anti-Europeanism, postnationalism, and the East-West distinction. German Law Journal, 6, 371–389. Castiglione, D., Van Deth, J. W., & Wolleb, G. (Eds.) (2008). The handbook of social capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, R. (2004). Democratic challenges. Democratic choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dekker, P., Ester, P., & Vinken, H. (2003). Civil society, social trust and democratic involvement. In W. Arts, J. Hagenaars, & L. Halman (Eds.), The cultural diversity of European unity (pp. 217–254). Leiden/Boston: Brill. Dekker, P., & Uslaner, E. (Eds.) (2001). Social capital and participation in everyday life. London: Routledge. Dekker, P., & van den Broek, A. (1996). Volunteering and politics: Involvement in voluntary associations from a ‘‘civic culture’’ perspective. In L. Halman & N. Nevitte (Eds.), Political value change in Western democracies (pp. 125–152). Tilburg: Tilburg University Press. Ester, P., Mohler, P., & Vinken, H. (2006). Values and the social sciences: A global world of global values? In P. Ester, M. Braun, & P. Mohler

(Eds.), Globalization, value change, and generations (pp. 3–29). Leiden, Boston: Brill. Etzioni, A. (1996). The new golden rule. Community and morality in a democratic society. New York: Basic Books. Etzioni, A. (2001). The monochrome society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fukuyama, F. (1996). Trust. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Fukuyama, F. (2000). The great disruption. New York: Touchstone. Gibson, R. K., Howard, P. E. N., & Ward, S. (2000). Social capital, Internet connectedness & political participation: A four country study. Paper prepared for the 2000 International Political Science Association, Quebec, Canada. Glasius, M., Kaldor, M., & Anheier, H. (2006). Introduction. In M. Glasius, M. Kaldor, & H. Anheier (Eds.), Global civil society 2005/6 (pp. 1–34). London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage. Halman, L., Luijkx, R., & Van Zundert, M. (2005). The atlas of European values. Leiden: Brill. Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. (1999). Postmodernization erodes respect for authority, but increases support for democracy. In P. Norris (Ed.), Critical citizens (pp. 236–256). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Janmaat, J. G. (2006). Civic culture in Western and Eastern Europe. European Journal of Sociology, 47: 363–393. Kavanaugh, A. L., & Patterson, S. J. (2001). The impact of community computer networks on social capital and community involvement. American Behavioral Scientist, 45: 496–509. Karakaya Polat, R. (2005). The Internet and political participation. European Journal of Communication, 20: 435–459. Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 62: 1251–1288. Kymlicka, W., & Norman, W. (Eds.) (2000). Citizenship in diverse societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maloney, W. A., Smith, G., & Stoker, G. (2000). Social capital and associational life. In S. Baron, J. Field, & T. Schuller (Eds.), Social capital. Critical perspectives (pp. 212–225). Oxford: Oxford University Press. McBride, A. (1998). Television, individualism, and social capital. Political Science & Politics, 31: 542–552. Norris, P. (Eds.) (1999). Critical citizens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Norris, P. (2000). The impact of television on civic malaise. In S. J. Pharr & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), Disaffected democracies (pp. 231–251). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Norris, P. (2003). Democratic phoenix. Reinventing political activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paxton, P. (1999). Is social capital declining in the United States? A multiple indicator assessment. American Journal of Sociology, 105: 88–127. Pharr, S. J., & Putnam, R. D. (Eds.) (2000). Disaffected democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone. New York: Simon & Schuster Putnam, R. (Ed.) (2002). Democracies in flux. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Putnam, D., Pharr, S. J., & Dalton, R. J. (2000). Introduction: What’s troubling the trilateral democracies. In S. J. Pharr & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), Disaffected democracies (pp. 3–27). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sennett, R. (1977). The fall of public man. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Civic Participation Skocpol, T. (2004). Diminished democracy: From membership to management in American civic life. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Thomassen, J. (1995). Support for democratic values. In H. D. Klingemann & D. Fuchs (Eds.), Citizens and the state (pp. 383–416). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tolbert, C. J., & McNeal, R. S. (2003). Unraveling the effects of the Internet on political participation. Political Research Quarterly, 56: 175–185. Touraine, A. (1994). European countries In a post-national era. In C. Rootes & H. Davis (Eds.), Social change and political transformation (pp. 13–26). London: UCL Press. Van Deth, J. W., Maraffi, M., Newton, K., & Whiteley, P. (Eds.) (1999). Social capital and European democracy. London: Routledge. Van Deth, J. W., Ramoń Montero, J., & Westholm, A. (Eds.) (2006). Citizenship and involvement in European democracies. London: Routledge. Verba, S. (1980). On revisiting the civic culture: A personal postscript. In G. A. Almond & S. Verba (Eds.), The civic culture revisited (pp. 394– 410). Boston/Toronto: Little, Brown & Company.

Civic Participation ROD DACOMBE King’s College, London, London, UK

Introduction Participation in civic life has long been considered a core element of democracy and a fundamental expression of civil society. In recent years, a range of different forms of civic participation have taken on a growing prominence in public policy debates, with governments and scholars variously promoting these activities as vehicles for citizen choice, as counters to the decline of ‘‘community,’’ and more recently, as core expressions of modern citizenship. Indeed, the involvement of people in the business of civic life is often seen as a central element of political, as well as social, life in many countries. In this context, there has been an increasing concern over the perceived decline of civic participation, with social, economic, and cultural shifts damaging the ‘‘civicness’’ of communities. Although this is by no means a matter of complete consensus, many writers have traced the decline of individual and collective participation in a diverse range of activities which they believe are partly responsible for a range of intractable social problems including persistent forms of exclusion and poverty, rising crime, and declining social trust. Questions around the level and efficacy of civic participation have therefore become highly visible in public and academic discourse.

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Definition Defining civic participation can be a complex and demanding task, and different commentators have developed myriad definitions and understandings. Indeed, most definitions are drawn from a distinct social and cultural context and are usually country-specific, making broader application problematic. As a starting point, however, one can draw on the bulk of the literature and understand participation as some form of engagement, either individually or collectively, of people in the decisions that shape their lives. From this, within much of the literature, it is possible to distinguish between forms of participation that are overtly ‘‘political,’’ which have an obvious effect on public decisions, and other, more ‘‘private’’ forms of civic participation, such as volunteering, whose effects are perhaps less tangible. At its most general, ‘‘political’’ activity might include something along the lines of the approach taken by Parry et al. (1992), who suggest that it is ‘‘taking part in the processes of formulation, passage and implementation of public policies’’ (p. 16); in other words, activity directly connected to public decisions. Conversely, Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) is perhaps the most prominent theorist discussing the ‘‘private’’ forms of civic activity. He suggests that participation in associations and social life has, in and of itself, a beneficial effect on the functioning of democratic institutions. The divide between these two forms of activity is unclear, and has traditionally been made almost arbitrarily. Within the literature it is possible to trace a great number of divisions made between, for example, political and nonpolitical activity, formal and informal participation, and secular and religious activity. Although civic participation can (and increasingly does) occur at national and supranational levels, it is commonly a local concern. Beyond the focus of the activity, Putnam (2000) distinguishes between ‘‘collaborative’’ activities, where organized group action results in civic value, and expressive action, which focuses on the individual and might include any number of activities, such as writing a letter to a public official, contacting the media, or attending a public meeting, that people can undertake of their own accord. In fact, in many countries, participation of any weight or consequence tends to be collective – indeed, for many people engagement in organized collective activity is the sole method of political participation outside of formal elections. There are, however, problems with taking too rigid an approach to defining civic participation. First, it is important to understand that indicators of civic activity (such as those sketched above) do not necessarily translate into effective participation. Second, each of these forms of participation are well-established aspects of social life in

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many countries – any definition that emphasizes these forms of participation does so at the expense of other, less mainstream action, and new and emerging forms, such as those based on the Internet. For this reason, it is necessary to include a broad range of activities within conceptions of civic participation which do not sit on a linear scale that begins with ‘‘political’’ activities and ends with ‘‘volunteering.’’

Historical Background The idea of civic participation as playing a central part in political life is nothing new. Some of the classic treatises of democratic thought have placed an emphasis on the idea of the engagement of citizens as being essential to a healthy social and political life. As such, social theorists have long drawn parallels between modern democratic practice and the participatory aspects of, say, the Greek city-state, and the New England town meeting. However, modern thinking on civic participation owes a great debt to John Dewey (1927) who was one of the first scholars to link participation in civic life with the resolution of social problems. Like many subsequent commentators, however, Dewey was despondent at the inability (as he saw it) of the state to encourage, and respond to, the information provided by civic engagement on specific social issues. Dewey echoes the concern of J. S. Mill (1861), when identifying the ‘‘problem’’ of the public’s involvement in civic affairs – that the public, to participate effectively in civic life, has to have the knowledge and capacity to engage in a meaningful way.

Key Issues Why is it that People Participate in Civic Action?

A number of approaches to explaining the participation in civic activity have been put forward. Some commentators have directly applied rational choice models to civic behavior (e.g., Downs, 1957). Effectively, this focuses on the trade-off between the costs of participation (usually time) and the benefits (such as political power and influence). These discussions are generally based around the idea of economically rational civic actors maximizing the benefits of participation while minimizing costs, and therefore suggest that engagement is likely to occur where the costs of engagement are low and the potential benefits of action are high. Elsewhere, in his classic study of group behavior, Mancur Olson (1971) differentiates between collective and selective benefits associated with participation, where collective benefits are available universally, but selective benefits are restricted to participants. More recent literature suggests that incentives to encourage collective civic activity might arise from the indirect

benefits to interaction, such as personal satisfaction and strong group attachment. Conversely, Almond and Verba (1963) focused on the context of participation, identifying a range of indicators of ‘‘civicness’’ in their study of civic life in five different countries, based on the prevailing attitudes held by citizens of their relation to government. These indicators were used to categorize civic culture into the (1) parochial, where citizens are largely disconnected from government; (2) subject, where citizens are largely passive, despite higher levels of political awareness and interest; and (3) participant, where strong relationships between citizen and government decision making are exhibited. In reality, a mixture of these characteristics is likely to be exhibited in a country. Ronald Inglehart (1990) agrees that cultural factors are also significant in setting the scene for civic participation, suggesting that particular sets of attitudes and norms of behavior are important in fostering a participatory society. Away from these arguments, it is possible to trace a strong role for the state in promoting participation. J. S. Mill (1861) thought that local government played an essential role in providing ‘‘education for citizenship,’’ stimulating the ‘‘energy’’ of local people to engage in civic life. More recently, many commentators have developed this basic idea, suggesting that civic participation has a role to play in enhancing the political ‘‘literacy’’ of society. Different governments have taken the theme of civic participation as important in the success of their social programs, adopting a range of policies that promote participation. Neoliberal administrations, such as the Conservative governments of the late 1980s in the United Kingdom, tended to frame participation largely in terms of its ability to illustrate citizen preferences and encourage competition in public services through expressions of choice. This had a knock-on effect in the kinds of participatory structures encouraged by the state, and underpinned a rise in consumer-oriented methods of participation, such as complaints and suggestion schemes and customer satisfaction questionnaires. These approaches remain influential in many countries, although successive Third Way governments across the Western world have tended to develop policies that are based on a far broader role for participation and recognize the social benefits of association. More recently, the idea of civic participation underpinning the duties expected of citizens has gained currency, with the virtues of ‘‘active’’ citizenship espoused. Who Participates?

It is possible to identify a range of theoretical approaches to understanding the likelihood of civic participation in an individual. These include ideas based on

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socioeconomic status, the level of social capital, and the prevailing institutional setting. An abundance of literature exists that identifies clear distinctions between the likelihood of different social groups participating in civic activity. Most obviously, the socioeconomic status of citizens has long been held to show a strong correlation with the level of civic participation displayed. This has generally been conceived of in terms of the resources held by people: meaning that the higher levels of education, leisure time, and ‘‘civic skill’’ have an effect on the ability of people to participate in civic life (Brady et al., 1995). Recent evidence in a number of countries has brought these ideas into sharp focus, with general trends highlighting a correlation between low household annual incomes and civic disengagement. Longitudinal data suggests that these problems are becoming more acute, with interest in politics, particularly for the lowest socioeconomic groups, declining significantly, and the gap between the highest and lowest social classes, in particular, dramatically widening in the last decades. Further work suggests that the likelihood of participation in civic activity is strongly associated with social connections and association. In recent years, the networks of trust and reciprocal activity in local areas – social capital – have been increasingly linked to civic participation across the literature. Broadly, arguments around the importance of social capital to civic participation hinge on the correlation of a number of indicators of social connectedness and civic activity. Putnam (1993) found that where civic participation was strongest, dense networks of social connections and association existed in local communities. This has demonstrable beneficial effects: statistical analysis has shown an association between participation in voluntary action and economic regeneration (Casey, 2004). Equally, Richardson and Mumford (2002) show that voluntary group involvement can change social attitudes and behavior in a local area to reduce social exclusion. Arguments around the importance of social capital to civic participation tend to focus their analysis on the importance of association to various forms of social, political, and economic activity. However important, this focus tends to neglect the significance of the institutions of the state in shaping the context in which social interaction takes place. An emerging literature is developing away from the more established material dealing with socioeconomic status and the importance of social connections and capital that suggests the relatively underresearched area of institutional design is emerging as an important conceptual tool in understanding civic participation.

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In essence, these arguments suggest that the formal institutional structures, informal practices, and prevailing ‘‘tone’’ of participation in a particular setting, all have roles to play in deciding the likelihood of participation. Variables such as language, dress, the roles assigned to participants (whether formally and informally), and who controls the topics for discussion, are emerging in research in the area as increasingly important (Lowndes et al., 2006). How ‘‘Useful’’ is Civic Participation?

The issues traced above form the basis of a number of objections raised by commentators to approaches to civic participation that emphasize its usefulness in dealing with the disengagement of citizens from public institutions, and in tackling social problems. Some of these are rooted in concerns that participation might be an inadequate mechanism for engaging citizens in public life. In particular, a number of commentators base their concerns on the assumption that the shape of modern governance and its accompanying social problems have rendered civic action impotent. In other words, that the size and complexity of modern public institutions, together with the persistence of intractable, ‘‘wicked’’ social problems, are beyond the grasp of most citizens, who lack the wherewithal and the expertise to engage effectively. Further problems have been identified around the setting and efficacy of civic participation. As outlined above, the difficulties of engaging the voices of minority groups, the less educated, and less well-connected are well-established. This immediately raises concerns over the likelihood of the marginalization of these groups in favor of the privileged and confident. At the same time, the lack of social capital traced in deprived areas by many commentators suggests acute problems with the ‘‘civicness’’ of those living in such conditions. Each of these issues and the resulting parochialism and imbalances of power, are major concerns of those who espouse civic action as a salve to some of the problems of modern governance. However, a number of commentators disagree with these critiques. Archon Fung (2003, 2004) suggests that civic action can be promoted successfully through radical participatory structures, highlighting a range of institutional reforms that have promoted effective civic engagement in a range of different countries. Sherry Arnstein is the most well-known of many commentators who have attempted to typologize the conditions where participation is most successful. She closely identified participation with the redistribution of power, with those normally excluded allowed a voice in decision making. She imagined a Ladder of Participation (1963) ranging

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from ‘‘non-participation,’’ where those enjoying power imposed themselves on participants, through ‘‘tokenism,’’ where participants are allowed a voice, but there is no guarantee of resulting action, to ‘‘citizen power,’’ where participants are empowered in decision-making processes. This concept became highly influential, particularly within urban planning, and has been extended and developed in a number of areas, including the developing world and specific fields such as resource management.

Future Directions There is a clear research agenda emerging, prompted largely by the ways in which civic participation has been embraced by the state in recent years. Core to this is establishing a greater understanding of the kinds of social groups likely to participate in different forms of civic activity, the terms of their engagement, the consequences for public policy and the legitimacy of current approaches to encouraging civic participation. In particular, questions around how far people have a responsibility to participate, and the consequences of exit, or nonparticipation, would seem to be particularly pressing, given the inclusion of civic activity in many modern conceptions of citizenship. Beyond this, the impact on participation of new technology and the Internet is not yet fully understood (Castells, 1999). Websites are now run by a great number of public agencies that directly encourage the views and input of citizens in the planning and delivery of public services. More significantly, the Internet has established a range of possibilities for new forms of connection, association, and participation that were previously not possible. These can serve as forums for sharing information and ideas, opinions and empowerment (and control) that do not sit within national boundaries, and hold the capability to generate new movements that impinge on the political and public arenas, but do not move through established institutional channels.

Cross-References

▶ Civic Culture ▶ Civic Action ▶ Civil Society and Democracy ▶ Civil Society Theory: Dewey ▶ Citizenship ▶ Information Technology/Internet ▶ Olson, Mancur ▶ Participation ▶ Putnam, Robert ▶ Social Capital, Definition of

References/Further Readings Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Arnstein, S. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. American Institute of Planning Journal, July, 216–224. Brady, H. (1995). Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. American Political Science Review, 89(2), 271–294. Casey, J. (2004). Third sector participation in the policy process: a framework for comparative analysis. Politics & Policy, 32(2), 241–257 Castells, M. (1999). The rise of the network society. Oxford: Blackwell. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Cambsridge: Addison-Wesley. Fung, A. (2003). Deepening democracy: Institutional innovations in empowered governance. Oxford: Princeton University Press. Fung, A. (2004). Empowered participation: Reinventing urban democracy. Oxford: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lowndes, V. (2006). Local political participation: The impact of rules-inuse. Public Administration, 84(3), 539–561 Mill, J. S. (1861). Considerations on representative government. London: Dent. Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Parry, G. (1992). Political participation and democracy in Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Chichester: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Richardson, E., & Mumford, K. (2002). Community, neighbourhood and social infrastructure. Understanding social exclusion. In J. Hills et al. (Eds.), Understanding social exclusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CIVICUS ELIZABETH LEVI

Address of Organization CIVICUS House 24 Gwigwi Mrwebi Street (former Pim) corner Quinn Street Newtown Johannesburg 2001 South Africa www.civicus.org

Introduction CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is a membership organization made up of 450 institutional and individual members in over 110 countries, who

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join as advocates to give voice to people and creative energies in the civil society sector. CIVICUS convenes annual World Assemblies that bring together leaders and activists engaged in global civil society and scholarship. CIVICUS describes itself as ‘‘an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional, and international levels, and span the spectrum of civil society including: civil society networks and organisations; trade unions; faith-based networks; professional associations; NGO capacity development organisations; philanthropic foundations and other funding bodies; businesses; and social responsibility programs.’’

Brief History In 1991, an international group of 20 civil society leaders convened to explore how to support citizen participation with the aim of promoting civil society around the world. This process culminated in mid-1993, in Washington, DC, when a founding board comprised of 18 distinguished civil society leaders from six continents established CIVICUS, from the Latin term meaning ‘‘of the community’’. CIVICUS global headquarters is now located to Johannesburg, South Africa from which it has expanded its activities and network of organizations and individuals to strengthen citizen action and civil society. CIVICUS focuses on regions where participatory democracy and freedom of association are at risk. CIVICUS continues to be guided by its core beliefs that the health of societies are directly proportional to the degree of balance between state, the private sector, and civil society rendering CIVICUS as a focal point for knowledge-sharing, common interest representation, global institution-building and engagement among these disparate sectors.

Mission On its website, CIVICUS describes itself as ‘‘an international alliance dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world,’’ driven by a vision of a ‘‘worldwide community of informed, inspired, committed citizens engaged in confronting the challenges facing humanity.’’ The activities of CIVICUS are dedicated to amplifying the voices of all citizens and to promoting their full participation through freedom of association, enabling them to engage in all sectors of society. CIVICUS counts among its central values: Justice and Equality, where all people are free to exercise their rights as citizens as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Reciprocity and Respect; Knowledge; Vision; and Principled Courage, through which CIVICUS strives to promote civil justice and conducts its activities in a manner that honors the values of democratic civil society.

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Activities CIVICUS is engaged in the following spheres of activity in the service of its mission: the annual World Assembly is a major international conference; in 2008 over 900 participants convened in Glasgow from around the globe to share information and focus on emerging issues. The Civil Society Index is a regularly updated participatory needs assessment and action planning resource in the form of an accessible database for scholars and activists in the field. The Civil Society Networks Program convenes international advocacy and nongovernmental organizations to work collaboratively, with an emphasis on policy and accountability. Civil Society Watch strives to respond to emergent threats to the fundamental rights of citizens. The Participatory Governance Program emphasizes civil society organizations in the South, promoting participatory leadership and governance. The Legitimacy, Transparency, and Accountability Program aims to strengthen the individual and collective governance of Civil Society Organizations. Among the Special Projects conducted by CIVICUS are initiatives focused on civic participation and volunteerism.

Structure and Governance CIVICUS is led by Ingrid Srinath, who became Secretary General in May, 2008. The work of CIVICUS is conducted by 42 officers and professionals at the hub in South Africa; in the Washington, DC office; and staff posted to Geneva, New York and the United Nations, Europe and Canada. The governing body of CIVICUS is an International Board of 12 distinguished leaders from nine countries.

Funding Revenue to support the operations of CIVICUS is derived from multiple sources, including institutional funders, individual contributions, membership fees, publications sales, and registration fees for the CIVICUS World Assembly. The annual budget for the year ending 2007 was $2.9 million, with the majority funding support from over 30 institutional funders, including the Ford Foundation, Oxfam, UN Development Program and Millennium Development Campaign, World Bank and World Vision International.

Major Accomplishments Since it formal establishment in 1993, CIVICUS has built successively on its formative activities. The Civil Society Index (CSI) is a widely recognized research-action tool to which civil society organizations can turn to build knowledge and capacity. The CSI has engaged over 7,000

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stakeholders, providing a basis for learning and information exchange across the 50 countries that are involved. Through CIVICUS’ commitment to knowledge development and dissemination, expanded electronic news and regularly updated informational resources enhance CIVICUS’ extensive roster of print publications that are noted in the field for increasing understanding and contributing to building the resource base of the civil society sector. In 2005, CIVICUS established the Nelson Mandela Graca Machel Innovation Awards to recognize leading achievements of grassroots civil society organizations (CSOs). In 2009, four CSOs from Africa and one from Venezuela were each recognized with a cash award of $5,000 for innovative local projects addressing HIV/AIDS.

Cross-References

▶ Accountability ▶ Citizenship ▶ Civil Society Indicators and Indexes ▶ Coalitions and Networks ▶ Freedom of Association ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Legitimacy ▶ Participation ▶ Transparency

References/Further Readings Anheier, Helmut K. (2004). Civil society: Measurement, evaluation, policy. London: Earthscan. The Commonwealth Fund. (1999). Citizens and governance: Civil society in the new millenium. London: The Commonwealth Foundation. Heinrich, V. F. (2005). Studying civil society across the world: Exploring the thorny issues of conceptualization and measurement. Journal of Civil Society, 1(3), 211–228.

Civil Law and Civil Society LEON E. IRISH International Center for Civil Society Law, Crownsville, MD, USA

Introduction The relationship between civil law and civil society is not perspicuous. It exists, however, and the discussion of the two together yields interesting points.

Definition Civil law is the dominant legal tradition in most of Europe, all of Central and South America, parts of Asia and Africa, and even some discrete areas of the commonlaw world (e.g., Louisiana, Quebec, and Puerto Rico). Public international law and the law of the European Community are in large part the product of persons trained in the civil-law tradition. Civil law is older, more widely distributed, and in many ways more influential than the common law, the other principal legal tradition and the one that prevails in England, the United States, most of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries of the British Commonwealth. Civil law has its roots in Roman law, Canon law (i.e., Catholic law) and the Enlightenment, alongside influences from other religious laws such as Islamic law. The legal systems in many civil-law countries are based around one or several codes of law, which set out principal provisions of the law. The most famous example is perhaps the French Civil Code, promulgated by Napoleon in 1804, although the German Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch (or BGB) of 1900 and the Swiss Civil Code are also landmark events in the history of civil law. The civil-law systems of Scotland, the Scandinavian countries, and South Africa are uncodified. So-called Socialist law is often considered to be a particular case of the Romano-Germanic civil law, though in the past it was sometimes classified as a separate legal system. As generalizations, it is often said that the common law follows an ‘‘adversarial’’ model while civil law is more ‘‘inquisitorial’’ Civil law is ‘‘code-based’’: civil-law judges do not interpret the law but instead follow predetermined legal rules, whereas common law judges derive legal rules from prior precedential court decisions. In fact, much of the common law has been codified and many civil-law judges are guided by prior judicial decisions. Civil Society. There are myriad definitions of civil society in the postmodern sense. The London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society’s working definition is illustrative: ‘‘Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family, and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family, and market are often complex, blurred, and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors, and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy, and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development nongovernmental organizations, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-based organizations,


professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions, and advocacy groups.’’

Historical Background Roman Law

The history of civil law, which is often called ‘‘‘continental’ law,’’ is a history of two periods, that of Roman law and that of modern civil law, beginning with the rediscovery of roman law in the eleventh century AD. The beginnings of civil law are often identified as the promulgation in 450 BC of the Twelve Tablets, which set out elementary principles for resolving disputes. When a dispute arose, a nobleman or patrician was assigned to act as iudex (judge) and hear the case. Corruption became endemic and one of the two annually elected praetors, also drawn from the patricians, was authorized to appoint a iudex and instruct him on how to handle the case. Upon election, the praetor would issue an edict stating the remedies he was prepared to supervise the adjudication of. The Edict became particularly important for the development of the equity law of Rome, the jus gentium, which applied to those persons who could not be classified as indigenous Romans. In any given case, the iudex had to investigate to determine what the relevant facts were, and appeals were created to correct errors by the iudex. To assist the praetor the College of Pontiffs (priests) was authorized to interpret the law, and these interpretations were written down and bound into volume (codex) form. The priests who interpreted the law – and developed it into an increasingly detailed and elaborate codex – were subsequently known as ‘‘jurisconsults.’’ The short-term, nonprofessional character of the Roman judiciary and its method of case disposal produced another result, important for the later development of civil-law systems: the lack of regard for the value of decisions in individual cases. Since the praetor was appointed for only 1 year and played a limited role in the resolution of cases, his decisions and rulings in particular cases were not accorded any particular weight or significance. Likewise, there was little respect accorded the decisions of the iudex. The iudex was appointed to decide only a particular case. There was no continuity in litigation, and no chance for the development of legal principles among the various cases presented for resolution. A judicial decision – involving actions by two separate judicial officials – resolved an individual case, and that was the end of the matter. Thus judicial decisions were never accorded any importance in the Roman legal

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system. The resulting derogation of the value of individual decisions in the judicial process elevated the importance of the jurists and their written opinions. The practice of the praetor in issuing the annual Edict at the beginning of his 1-year term evolved into merely a reissuance of the one issued by the previous office holder, with such changes and additions as were desired by the newly elected praetor. The result was an ever-lengthening document of uneven texture and content. This practice ended during the reign of the Emperor Hadrian (117–138 AD), causing the jurists to turn to a new form of legal writing: the treatise, which covered specific aspects of Roman law. Another practice that helped elevate the role of jurists was Caesar Augustus’s practice of ‘‘patenting’’ jurists, by which certain jurists were singled out for recognition. By such recognition the opinions of the patented jurists were accorded special significance and weight. Patented jurists eventually acquired the power of rule making, and their opinions were binding even on the emperor because they had the ‘‘force of law.’’ In the sixth century, the Emperor Justinian ordered the preparation of an even more comprehensive manuscript covering all aspects of Roman law. The Corpus Juris Civilis included not only a refinement of Gaius’s Institutes, but the Digest (writings of classical jurists), the Code (early imperial legislation), and the Novels (Justinian’s legislation). The Corpus Juris Civilis provided a rich store of legal ideas for contemporary and later students and scholars of the law. It brought together legal treatises and principles of law reflecting diverse viewpoints and arguments. As will be seen later in this discussion, the Corpus Juris Civilis, particularly the refined Institutes, became the essential building block for the system of law known popularly as the civil-law system, supplying many of its substantive provisions. Modern Developments

In the ‘‘first renaissance’’ – the tumultuous eleventh to thirteenth centuries – the separation between church and state was established and universities were established, focused on law and theology. Two developments occurred in the medieval period that greatly affected the content of the substantive law of the civil-law systems: (1) the creation of a comprehensive canon or ecclesiastical law by the Roman Catholic Church, and (2) the maturing of a law merchant, or law covering commercial transactions, as the result of the growth of commercial classes and expansion of commercial activities in European cities and regions. The practice of relying on various written forms of law, including scholarly commentaries, doctrinal treatises, and glosses on compilations of legal principles, for the

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creation of a legal system was well established throughout Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The formal, comprehensive codification of an entire body of law of the type characteristic of modern civil-law systems began primarily in France and Germany. Before discussing the codification process, however, it is necessary to examine briefly the influence of three intellectual movements of the period: ‘‘humanism,’’ which grew out of the Renaissance; the ‘‘natural law’’ school, which followed humanism; and finally, the Enlightenment. Humanism was an intellectual movement that had its origins in sixteenth century France, a time and place of great upheaval. There was a ferment of ideas, politics, culture, religion, and commerce. In politics and religion the decline in the secular influence of the Roman Catholic Church and the waning of the power and authority of the Holy Roman Empire were accompanied by the birth of the concept of the nation-state and an emphasis on strong, central governments. These developments culminated in the creation of the modern European system of states by the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War and, with it, the Holy Roman Empire. With its emphasis on rational thought and the potential for individual achievement, humanism was inspired by the culture of antiquity – primarily Greece, and to a lesser extent Rome. It encouraged scholarly examination of law, particularly the nature and function of law, and in the process the science of jurisprudence was founded. The school of natural law was an outgrowth of humanism. The origins of natural law are several, but the writings of Hugo de Groot (better known as Grotius) stand out as the real starting point in the development of natural law thinking. The similarity of approach of the natural law scholars led to the conclusion in one history of law that ‘‘codification in the sense of a rationally organized statement of the whole field of law (or of all private law) was only possible after the work of the natural lawyers.’’ Of course these scholars had much legal tradition with which to work, including Justinian’s Institutes, the glosses of the thirteenth century Italian glossators, the commentaries of the post-glossator period, the collections of ecclesiastical principles that became canon law, and the compilation of commercial customs, rules, and regulations into various manifestations of the law merchant. The intellectual and social turmoil of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries culminated in the eighteenth century in what has come to be known as the Enlightenment. This intellectual movement included the French Revolution and contained the near origins of the modern European codes as well as the key concepts that underlie civil society. The Enlightenment was based

on a belief in the fundamental importance of reason as a liberating force in intellectual life and in how society was organized, a belief that grew out of the precepts of the natural law school. In Europe the effects and influence of the Enlightenment provided the final stimulation for the creation of the modern comprehensive codes of the different European states. Emergence of Civil Society

The modern conception of natural law was seen as implying natural rights, including the rights to life, liberty, and property. John Locke, arguably the most important natural law theorist of modern times, and the works of the eighteenth century Philosophes, including Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, argued that certain rights self-evidently pertain to individuals as human beings. As these rights were elaborated over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century, they came to include the right to freedom of belief, the right to freedom of expression, the right to religious freedom, the right of peaceful assembly, the right to freedom of association, the right to information, and the right to participate in government. Collectively these rights became the rights of citizens, and civil society became the fullest expression of them. After World War II they became enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. It is these rights of citizens that permit the full range of activities of civil society organizations in modern liberal democracies.

Key Issues With the growth and increasing complexity of the state, the law has grown commensurately. Indigenous legal traditions have largely been eliminated. Religion and religious morality have their place, but not in public life. There are now not only civil codes, there are penal codes, commercial codes, urban codes, codes of administration, of forestry, of taxation, and even of sport. Each has its implementing regulations. As secular civil law has expanded, its language has changed. This has something to do with humanism and humanist rationality. There are still many different forms of expression of civil law, however. The French civil code is relatively untechnical. Its language is not far from everyday life; its structure not complex. It was drafted largely by practitioners with a sense of the literary. With its combination of simplicity and beauty of language with conceptual reach, it has been widely emulated in the world. The German civil code came a century later and is probably the most technical and abstract of the civil codes. It has been viciously parodied within Germany, but


it, too, has its attractions and virtues and has been emulated, notably outside the civil-law world and in the United States. The Centrality of the Person and the Growth of Rights. Prior to the late eighteenth century, Europe was a place of gross social inequality. Some people did most of the work and for the advantage of a few. Law perpetuated this situation. It was relational and obligational. People were stuck in their existing relations to one another, often hierarchical, and that is where the law said they had to stay. Judges were corrupt. Roman law, modernized in the civil law, allowed individuals to move from status to rights. Rights, of course, are not absolute, and the law controls the conditions and manner of their exercise. They are, however, a powerful instrument for bringing about basic conditions of human dignity. Once rights exist, and everyone has them without regard to birth or race or wealth, then there is also a notion of social equality. And, since people have the power, in rights, to resist oppression, there is also a guarantee of human liberty. At the base is the centrality of the person. The religious rationalists, such as Descartes, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke, developed the foundations for human law which were lacking in traditional indigenous law. So law comes to be recognized as having a human goal, a human instrumentality. There had to be rights and there had to be codes to ensure their respect. What did it mean to be rational in law? The lawyers of the enlightenment harked back to the Greek and Roman traditions of natural law. Deductive thought, the hallmark of the civillaw tradition, followed from this form of logic. Given a point of departure, you can reach further conclusions which are derivable from or entailed by it. Using law as the instrument of reason, you can also construct a modern state, which is essentially created out of formal, written law, though resting on a transnational legal tradition supporting its existence in multiple, national forms. Law is inextricably linked with the modern state; it created the state; it depends on it for its enforcement; it guarantees, as best it can, its continuing efficacy and integrity. As states develop, and develop into democratic institutions, functions of legislation and execution develop, and separate themselves from the more rudimentary form of government, which is dispute settlement. So we now have the separation of the state from the church, the separation of distinct powers within the state, and the recognition and protection of the rights of citizens, which enable civil society. If everyone has predefined rights, then their violation may exist prior to judgment, and the judicial function is largely one of verification of

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claims to violation of preexisting rights and remedying the violations.

International Perspectives In 1800 Napoleon appointed four senior practitioners of law to develop a comprehensive legal code. These four practitioners were experienced jurists who had studied Grotius, Pufendorf, and the other great writers of the natural law school. The basic structure of the code reflects the influence of Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, while the overall design also conforms to the Declaration of the Rights of Man produced during the French Revolution. The language is simple and clear, since it was designed to be understood by every citizen. It does not deal with procedure, commercial law, or criminal law; those three areas were covered by codes developed later and separately. The civil codes, based as they are on the Corpus Juris Civilis, emphasize form, structure, and the enumeration of both abstract and concrete principles of law within a unified whole. The reasoning process from code provisions is deductive – one arrives at conclusions about specific situations from general principles. The function of the jurists within and for the civil-law system is to analyze the basic codes and legislation for the formulation of general theories and extract, enumerate, and expound on the principles of law contained in and to be derived from them. As the legal systems of Europe developed, the evolution of the role of jurists in the different countries diverged. In particular, the German model became distinctly different from the French one. In Germany the status of jurists and juridical doctrine, in the manner of Rome, was enhanced, while in France it was diminished. One of the reasons for the elevation of the role of jurists in Germany was the condition of the sixteenth and seventeenth-century German courts, staffed by lay judges untrained and unsophisticated in the law. The untrained lay judges required impartial advice, and this situation, in the manner of the judices in Rome, led to the practice of the German judges, seeking advice from the law faculties of the universities. In France the role and influence of jurists was lessened. The monarchy encouraged legally trained men into the judiciary. The result was that the formally trained judges were not compelled to seek outside legal advice in the manner of their German counterparts. Consequently, French legal scholars and law professors were never able to achieve the standing and power accorded their colleagues in Germany.

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Future Directions The civil-law tradition is associated with dominance. The Romans dominated, then the national civilians dominated, then the world became a zone of influence of civil laws, primarily through colonization, but also through admiration and emulation. The European law that is developing so fast today is principally civilian in nature. Many common law jurisdictions have taken on civilian structures and approaches, so perhaps a world law is developing that is fundamentally civilian in nature. And, the universalization of human rights gives global commonality to the concept of civil society.

Cross-References

▶ Associations, Definitions and History ▶ Business and Employers’ Associations ▶ Charity Law ▶ Civic Action ▶ Civic Agency ▶ Civic Culture ▶ Civic Participation ▶ Civil Society, Definitions and Approaches ▶ Common Law and Civil Society ▶ Freedom of Association ▶ Human Rights ▶ Law, Foundations ▶ Law, Nonprofit Associations

References/Further Readings Bellomo, M. (1995). The common legal past of Europe 1000–1800. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press. Bergel, J. L. (1988). Principal features and methods of codification. Louisiana Law Review, 48, 1073. Berman, H. (1983). Law and revolution: The formation of the Western legal tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dawson, J. P. (1968). Oracles of the law. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Edwards, M. (2004). Civil society. Cambridge/England: Polity Press. Glendon, M. A., Gordon, M. W., & Osakwe, C. (1994). Comparative legal traditions. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, Pt. II (‘‘The Civil Law Tradition’’). Glenn, H. P. (2007). Legal traditions of the world (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Honore, A. M. (1974). The background to Justinian’s codification. Tulane Law Review, 48, 859. Jolowicz, H. F. (1972). Historical introduction to the study of Roman law (3rd ed., rev. by P. Stein). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Langbein, J. (1985). The German advantage in civil procedure. University of Chicago Law Review, 52, 825. Lawson, F. H. (1953). A common lawyer looks at the civil law. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Lewis, A., & Ibbetson, D. (1994). The Roman law tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lupoi, M. (2000). The origins of the European legal order (A. Belton, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Merryman, J. H. (1985). The civil law tradition (2nd ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Merryman, J. H., Clark, D., & Haley, J. (1994). The civil law tradition: Europe, Latin America, and East Asia. Charlottesville, VA: The Michie Co. O’Connell, B. (1999). Civil society: The underpinnings of American democracy. Medford, MA: Tufts University Press. Perlas, N. Shaping globalization – civil society, cultural power and threefolding. ISBN 0-95838858X. Pollock, G. (March 2001). Civil society theory and Euro-nationalism. Studies in Social & Political Thought (4), 31–56. Stein, P. (1999). Roman law in European history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Steiner, J. J., Alston, P., & Goodman, R. (2008). International human rights in context (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tuck, R. (1979). Natural rights theories: Their origin and development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vinogradoff, P. (1968). Roman law in medieval Europe. New York: Barnes & Noble. von Mehren, A. T., & Gordley, J. R. (1977). The civil law system (2nd ed.). Boston: Little, Brown. Watson, A. (1981). The making of the civil law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Zimmermann, R. (2001). Roman law, European law: The civilian tradition today. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Civil Society and Civic Education DIRK LANGE University of Oldenburg, Oldenburg, Germany

Introduction In classical civic education, ‘‘citizens’’ were conceived of in a narrower sense as citizens of the state. The consequence of this was that content was focused on the institutions and processes of the state. In modern society, the political realm can no longer be considered as interchangeable with the state. The discourse and regulation of public concerns has become a function of civil society. The historical transformation of the conception of the state means that civic education can no longer educate citizens exclusively in their relation to the state. It has to educate learners as actors in civil society, who then must also have the necessary skills to orient themselves and participate in non-state arenas. The basic concepts and interpretive skills of learners constitute the beginning and end point of civic education. They are transformed during the learning process. This situation renders it necessary to reflect on the academic modeling of citizenship awareness in civic education.


For this article, the question to be focused on is what interpretive skills are necessary for citizens for them to have the ability to effectively exercise judgment and take action in civil society. In seeking to answer this question, I will make the case that civic education – by educating responsible citizens – first creates the preconditions for a functioning civil society (see Milner, 2002). First, the challenges facing a civil society will be depicted, in which an expanded and modified political understanding is discussed. Following that, it will be shown what interpretive skills must be developed within citizenship awareness in order for the citizen to act effectively in civil society.

Definition Civic education organizes learning processes with the aim of improving the ability of citizens to politically orient themselves and take action. The function of this type of education is to legitimize, anchor, and reproduce democratic rule. Civic education emphasizes the importance of the competence and skills necessary for political selfdetermination, while it conceives of the autonomy and responsibility of democratic authority as the beginning point and basis of the education process. Civic education does not simply aim at maintaining the democratic status quo. Rather, it seeks to develop citizens’ skills to judge and act, enabling them to thus create, change, and maintain a political system in such a way that a space continually remains open for self-determination to occur. The pedagogical focus of civic education is ‘‘citizenship awareness.’’ ‘‘Citizenship awareness’’ is that aspect of (civic) consciousness where an individual forms the cognitive skills that allow him or her to interpret and actively influence political and social realities. Within citizenship awareness, the contents and structures of subjective meaning constructs of politics and society are expanded upon and altered. In civic education, of interest are the meaning constructs and formation of meaning that learners use to explain political–social reality. This subjective meaning allows one to see, judge, and act in a political way (see Lange, 2008).

Historical Background The understanding of politics and civic education has changed over the course of time. The frame of reference for civic education has changed depending on what the conception of the state or political system has been. In the following, the historical changes in political understanding will be depicted. These changes that have consequences for the conception of civic education are closely connected to the development of the conceptions of

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civil society, whereby the concept Zivilgesellschaft (civil society) is often used synonymously for Bu¨rgergesellschaft (bourgeois society) (see Arenho¨vel, 2000). The understanding of politics from which traditional civic education took its lead is based on a narrow understanding of the state. It figures in the philosophical tradition of Hegel, who understood bourgeois society (Bu¨rgergesellschaft) as the ‘‘difference entering into the space between the family and state’’ (Schulze, 1991: 127, see Hegel, 1974: 472ff). In the older understanding of civil society, this difference did not yet exist. Those men or even those groups could feel they belonged to civil society if they participated in one way or another in the formation of rule. An independent economic realm separate from the family was not recognized. With the separation of the state and society, the citizen is represented in a twofold way. He simultaneously dwells in a politically relevant sphere and in an apolitical sphere. As a ‘‘citoyen,’’ he moves in the arena of the political-administrative system and participates in this realm in the institutions of representative democracy. The state and its institutions are for him the field of the political. The other part of the citizen, the ‘‘bourgeois,’’ on the other hand, lives in the economic, social system, where he is only subjected to the practical restraints that require no political legitimation. By understanding the state as the ‘‘reality of the ethical idea’’ and society as the ‘‘system of needs,’’ G. Hegel justifies the primacy of the state over society, which forms the basis of the German theory of constitutional law. Liberal theories of the state stand in contrast to the latter, as they emphasize the primacy of society over the state by viewing the social contract as subordinate to the state of nature. He moves in the area of the nonpolitical. Traditional civic education was thus based on an understanding of politics that located the center of the political in the state.

Key Issues The concepts of civil society have, in the meantime, overcome the strict division between state and society. Accordingly, the civil state not only refers to the state in the narrow sense, but also includes a plurality of social practices. A broader understanding of the state thus can be expressed in the formula ‘‘state = political society + civil society’’ (Gramsci, 1992: 783). At the basis of this model is a decentralized concept of the state that comprises the interrelations between the political and civil society. The society as a ‘‘system of private needs’’ was identified with the economic spheres in the tradition of Hegel. But since the societal aspects of communication, the

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public or solidarity are not mediated by the state or the economy, Habermas (1961) considers it necessary to conceive of the civil society as constituting a third sphere. Accordingly, in civil society, communicative public spheres form a sensory system that does not have any primary political function, but which nevertheless influences the general regulation requirements of a society through the perception and rationalization of societal moods and problematic areas. This deliberative form of democratic participation can no longer be conceptually accounted for by the state in the narrower sense. In a broader sense, it must also comprise the politically relevant aspects of civil society (see Habermas, 1992: 364; Schmalz-Bruns, 1995: 257ff.). The modern state thus does not have a monopoly on the potential to shape political reality. Regulatory changes are increasingly called for by the social arena, so that the state loses in its power to decide and steer. In a broader understanding of the state, it must be assumed that the development described cannot be equated with a loss in the autonomy of political action. An ‘‘end to politics’’ would then only be established if the concept of politics were to remain limited by the institutionalized political system. According to Beck, the actual potential for generating and implementing general commitments is not fundamentally lost, but is rather moved into a ‘‘sub-political system’’ (1986: 305). Thus, it is not politics in itself, but rather the place of politics that becomes blurred. Instead of parliamentary debates and decisions by politicians, the contours of another society become visible in the developments of the technical-economic system. Through this development, ‘‘the political’’ tends to become ‘‘unpolitical’’ and ‘‘the unpolitical, political’’ (Beck, 1986: 305). For a broadened concept of the state, see also Esser (1995: 738 ff.). From a democratic perspective, this development gives rise to the problem that the ‘‘sub-political’’ arising in the social system reduces the claims of parliamentary authority and legitimation. The generation of generally binding rules can no longer be guaranteed by the traditional institutions of the state. The new forms of politics are subjected to a pressure to justify themselves against the nonparliamentary initiatives and social movements. Through this process, the state tends to become disempowered relative to a growing politicization of society, which takes on state functions (see Beck, 1986: 300–374). Using the model of the delimitation of the state, some of the aporia are resolved concerning the concept of the political that is centered on the state. In the end however, the ‘‘battle for the limits between the political and the

non-political arena’’ (Hennies, 1973: 61) does not render obsolete the conceptual separation of the citizen concept into ‘‘citoyen’’ and ‘‘bourgeois.’’ To some extent, another figure is added. A kind of ‘‘bouryen’’ arises as a hybrid figure who moves in the social sphere but maintains the potential for political change. Implicitly, this leads to the reproduction of a state-related concept of the political, since the connection of the political with state action is not eliminated, but rather the understanding of the state is expanded. The citizen in this conception initially remains acted upon by politics. He or she is the object of the shaping power of the political will of an expanded state. Nevertheless, arising in the form of media publics, citizen initiatives and protest movements are ‘‘intermediary forms of reciprocal controls that avoid parliamentary centralism and create comparable justification restraints’’ (Beck, 1986: 368). In yet another civil society concept, Greven proposes abolishing the dichotomy between state and society, which is the basis of the state-centered concept of the political, in favor of the concept of the ‘‘political society’’ (Greven, 1990). In doing so, he tries to grasp the new political problem areas that come into view. The concept is justified by two types of development tendencies. Alongside a ‘‘politicization ‘from below’ through social praxis,’’ modern societies are characterized by a ‘‘politicization by state action ‘from above’’’ (ibid 1994a: 290). Here, he understands the theoretical possibility that all areas can become political through the dissemination of state regulation technologies in modern societies. In the political society ‘‘no societal relation, no social spheres, no institution and none of the social processes of societal reproduction are protected from potential access by state regulation’’ (ibid). In Greven’s political society ‘‘we are all politicians’’ (Greven, 1994b: 243) and participate in the creation of political reality through our action and forbearance: ‘‘It is not structural developments that determine our future, but rather the complicated, to some extent composite results of the social and political praxis of the diverse political forces and groups that now determine our everyday life’’ (Greven, 1994b: 252). Dahrendorf (1999) has developed a concept of civil society in which ‘‘freedom rests on three pillars’’ (ibid, 91). These consist of political democracy, the free market as well as civil society. The latter is the decisive bonding factor of the three pillars. Civil society in turn is based on the diversity of different non-state organizations and institutions, the freedom of association for citizens and their willingness to do


so outside of state intervention as well as an active participation in civil society. The peaceful, tolerant, and solidaritybased interaction necessary for civil society is called civicmindedness. Concerning the newer concepts of civil society and their conception of the separation of state and society, see Himmelmann (Himmelmann, 2001a: 171ff.; ibid 2001b.) The concepts of civil society assume that the forms and processes with which generally binding rules are constructed are potentially found in all areas of society. In this understanding of politics, areas of social reality and of everyday life that have been excluded until now have become completely relevant categories for civic education. Civic education has the task of enabling and activating the actors of civil society to participate. The sovereignty of the modern state takes shape in its competence to judge, criticize, and act in all areas of society. Citizens act in civil society. In the following, I will sketch what necessary skills for this should be imparted by civic education. Citizenship Awareness and Civic Education

Citizenship awareness (see Lange, 2008) refers to the entirety of the mental ideas about political-social reality. It serves to orient individuals in politics, economy, and society and produces the meaning that enables people to judge and actively influence preexisting phenomenon. The meaning constructions in citizenship awareness are didactically so relevant because they influence learning processes and change in learning processes. The transformation of citizenship awareness is not only an educationally induced process, but rather a component of the political everyday life of the learner. Didactically relevant here are not only issues concerning the transfer of scientific knowledge into lifeworld knowledge, but rather the lifeworld construction of meaning in citizenship awareness. On the one hand, citizenship awareness provides schema that organize and refract reality. On the other hand, it provides a structure allowing for an intended engagement with reality. A person needs and uses these models to explain and change the world. Citizenship awareness is the mental area that civic education must activate in order to educate responsible citizens. Citizens require specific skills in order to be able to act adequately in civil society. Didactically, these skills can be structured through the meaning constructs in citizenship awareness. Concerning the categorical permeation of citizenship awareness, it can be assumed that each person has five basic meaning constructs: ‘‘socialization,’’ ‘‘value justification,’’ ‘‘satisfaction of needs,’’ ‘‘social change,’’ and ‘‘legitimation of rule.’’ The meaning constructs here refer to

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mental figures by means of which a person constructs expertise. This expertise can be reconstructed in the lifeworld and science and is thus independent of the degree of scientification. The characterizations needed for depicting the meaning constructs vary from individual to individual and can contradict the scientific conceptual understanding. For each meaning construct, the five heuristics are given, which have a search function for the empirical study of the meaning construct. They serve in the discovery of subjective concepts in citizenship awareness. In the meaning construct ‘‘socialization,’’ the citizenship awareness structures ideas about how individuals integrate in society. Learners have an idea about the relation between the individual and society. They experience the social heterogeneity, which they organize and group subjectively. In citizenship awareness, they develop statements and justifications about the meaning of social differences in light of gender, ethnicity, origins, social inequality, lifestyle, or other categorizations. Concepts of plurality must be developed in order to explain how social cohabitation functions despite social diversity. The process of socialization is rendered explainable through concepts of the individual and the mechanisms of his or her inclusion or exclusion. To answer the question as to how society holds together despite diversity, ideas in citizenship awareness are also present concerning the forms of interaction and communication between members of society. With the representation ‘‘how do individuals integrate in society,’’ recourse is taken to the concepts of ‘‘individual,’’ ‘‘heterogeneity,’’ ‘‘society,’’ ‘‘integration,’’ and ‘‘the public.’’ In the meaning construct ‘‘value justification,’’ citizenship awareness structures ideas about what generally valid principles guide social cohabitation. Each learner has ideas about values and norms that are expressed in political conflicts, social debates or economic undertakings. The meaning constructs in citizenship awareness allow for a political-moral formation of judgment on the basis of generally valid principles. In doing so, each person has schema he or she uses to judge questions concerning social justice, the political equality of different people, the peaceableness in cohabitation, the recognition of difference or individual freedom. For the meaning construct ‘‘which principles guide social cohabitation?,’’ the following concepts are used: ‘‘justice,’’ ‘‘equality,’’ ‘‘peace,’’ ‘‘recognition,’’ and ‘‘freedom.’’ In the meaning construct ‘‘satisfaction of needs,’’ citizenship awareness structures ideas about how needs are satisfied by goods. Learners have their own ideas about the important structures and processes of economic life and they can designate these functions of the economic system

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subjectively. In doing so, they use models about the emergence of needs, they describe processes of the production of goods and the possibilities of their distribution (market concepts, for instance). In the representation ‘‘satisfaction of needs,’’ concepts such as work and consumption as well as distribution of labor and business are used. In order to explain ‘‘how needs are satisfied by goods,’’ citizenship awareness takes preliminary recourse to the following concepts: ‘‘need,’’ ‘‘production,’’ ‘‘value,’’ ‘‘distribution,’’ and ‘‘consumption.’’ In the meaning construct ‘‘social transformation,’’ citizenship awareness structures ideas about how social transformation takes place. Learners discover that the political-social reality is not stable, but rather changes over time. They have constructed their own concepts to render these transformations explainable. Crucial to this is the memory of the past, the expectation for the future and an idea of temporality that connects the past, today, and tomorrow. For the characterization of social transformation tendencies – whether it be globalization, individualization, democratization, progress, or history in general – citizenship awareness takes recourse to continuity and development. Thus for the mental construction of the representation, ‘‘how does social transformation occur?,’’ five concepts are assumed: ‘‘continuity,’’ ‘‘development,’’ ‘‘temporality,’’ ‘‘the past,’’ and ‘‘future’’. In the meaning construct ‘‘the legitimation of rule,’’ citizenship awareness structures ideas about how partial interests are transformed into generally binding rules. Learners can describe and justify how power is exercised in society in order to assert interests. They know processes of conflict resolution and can say in what ways the individual can participate in the political process. In citizenship awareness, ideas about state structures and institutions as well as concepts of power and rule are formed. Depending on the size of the group, problem, and context, learners have different models of democracy and autocracy at their disposal. Additionally, they are in a position to justify and criticize power relations. For the representation ‘‘how do partial interests become generally binding?,’’ the following five concepts can be seen as essential: ‘‘interests,’’ ‘‘conflict,’’ ‘‘participation,’’ ‘‘statehood,’’ and ‘‘rule.’’ These five meaning constructs play a central role for the individual understanding and subjective explanation of civil society. Crucial are the mental models that are also fundamental for the didactics of civic education. They arise and change in processes of social, political-moral, economic, historical-political, and political learning. Far too little is still known didactically about which concepts, terminology, and symbols learners use to characterize the meaning constructs of citizenship awareness. The least

likely case is the language of science. The concepts characterized as essential for meaning constructs can thus only serve as preliminary heuristics. See here also the fundamental concepts in civic educations (see Sander, 2007; Weißeno, 2008: 152–258). These also continue to follow the logic of related disciplines, but could also serve in the analysis of civic consciousness as a search instrument. One of the challenges in didactics is to subjectively reconstruct the meaning constructs and concepts of citizenship awareness. This is due to the fact that the knowledge of the citizenship awareness of learners is a prerequisite enabling the normative aim of civic education – responsible citizens and their entitlement to fair social participation – to be reached not only in relation to the state but also to civil society. To that extent, not only the actual, but the desired citizenship awareness is of interest for the didactics of civic education. The didactics of civic education poses the question: What social science ideas can motivate individuals to conceive of responsibility and autonomy as valuable and in this sense to think about them critically in terms of politics, society, and economy in everyday life? Civic Education as Civil Society Skill

Which didactic methods can be used to address the necessary skills for civil society participation within the meaning constructs of citizenship awareness? Alongside the orientation on democratic principles, the principles of everyday, action, and problem orientation are included among the basic orientations of civic education. In the framework of the everyday orientation, civic education looks closely at both the micropolitics of everyday life as well as the everyday relations of ‘‘larger politics.’’ Through action orientation, learner activating and self-guided learning processes find entrance into civic education. This gives the learners the opportunity to act politically. In the research and simulation as well as in the intervention in political-social reality, innovative, and creative methods are now being used (see Lange, 2007). The principle of problem orientation guarantees that civic education is not reduced to drilling content into the learner, but rather stimulates independent political formation of meaning and thinking. Here, civic education processes use a controversy or question that is dealt with by the learners.

International Perspectives In some schools in Germany, students with a migration background comprise the majority of the student body. This topic is therefore of particular importance and relevance within this social, political, and national


context. What is the relevance of citizenship and citizenship education for native born Germans, and those originally from other countries? What differences and similarities can be identified, and how can they be perceived and applied for the greater good, both domestically and internationally? The international research tasks to be carried out as part of citizenship education can be divided into four areas. The purpose of citizenship education as a field of science is to analyze the level of political awareness of learners by adopting empirical, normative, reflective, and application-oriented methods. Empirical Assignment

The empirical assignment to be completed in citizenship education comprises an analysis of current levels of political awareness. Efforts in this field will focus on the conceptions which male and female pupils have of political subject matters. To make sure that not only data on attitudes and knowledge of learners are gathered but sense-building capabilities are also taken into account, the quantitative and qualitative methods applied in social research are also used in a didactical analysis of citizenship education. Traditionally, citizenship education was focused on legitimizing teaching contents and on the teaching methods applied in delivering this knowledge. To achieve this goal, the individual qualifications of learners and the learning process itself were negligible. In the future, the ability to analyze capabilities of pupils will be more important in citizenship education. As part of this analytical process the conceptions which pupils bring into the learning process may not be interpreted as mental dysfunctions. These conceptions are rather subjective theories which help pupils to cope with everyday situations. Political learning processes must proceed from existing conceptions, and they should be learning occasions for pupils which can be modified and further differentiated. Hence, the empirical task to be performed as part of citizenship education is to record and analyze the ‘‘current status’’ of civic educational processes: ● Analyses of learners’ conceptions of subject-specific matters (political awareness from an empirical perspective) ● Studies on the efficiency of learning ● Observations of classroom instruction Normative Assignment

The normative research assignment to be completed in citizenship education is legitimizing a desired level of

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political awareness. The efforts undertaken by the government to influence the political conceptions of citizens through deliberate learning processes provided in class requires justification. What is at issue here is the substantiality of political learning objectives. Didactics of civic education explores which political conceptions a given society ought to acquire on a mandatory basis. It is one of the consensus goals of citizenship education that political learning processes are designed to promote democratic sense-building capabilities. The values delivered as part of citizenship education are consistent with the notion of a democracy. However, how a democracy ought to work and how concrete social problems are to be resolved in a democratic manner are still controversial issues, not only in society, but also among the scientific community. The normative research task of citizenship education is to develop learning objectives and purposes for citizenship education. This task field closely links the didactics of civic education with the normative theory of democracy. On the basis of the guiding principle of responsibility, the qualities and capabilities citizens living in a democracy should have are explored in the didactics of citizenship education. Normative research carried out as part of the didactics of citizenship education serves as the justification of learning objectives, educational standards and conceptional designs of citizenship education: ● A democracy-centered justification for the delivery of skills which ‘‘responsible citizens’’ need ● Criticism of educational objectives in political subjects ● Developing curricula for schools Reflective Assignment

Reflective research carried out as part of citizenship education is about exploring the potential level of political awareness. In the process, learning materials are analyzed for their educational potential. Not only the learners’ experienced world but also subject-related disciplines are explored for the educational potential they hold. The assumption underlying this study is that teaching and learning material for citizenship education cannot be derived linearly from existing structures. Rather, subject matters for teaching require didactical reconstruction. On the one hand, the experienced world of male and female pupils must be analyzed with respect to their potential for promoting the development of political conceptions. On the other hand, subject-specific science is increasingly becoming a subject matter of didactics in civic

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education. This discipline draws on the specialized knowledge gained in the social sciences and explores which learning materials advance the political conceptions of pupils and in which manner this occurs. Hence the reflective task to be carried out as part of research in citizenship education is to identify potential political opportunities for learning in the experienced world of the learners and in research. Reflective research carried out as part of citizenship education is about identifying the potential for civic education in the learner’s experienced world, in research and in educational media. ● Didactical reflection of subject-specific scientific material ● Subject-specific analysis of everyday objects ● Analysis of educational media; out-of-school learning locations Application-Oriented Assignment

Application-oriented research to be carried out as part of citizenship education comprises structuring of civic educational processes. To achieve this, the findings obtained from empirical, normative, and reflective studies will be used and related to each other in a meaningful manner. The goal to be achieved is to develop guidelines for planning, implementing, and reflecting teaching units in citizenship education on the basis of a didactical analysis. Application-oriented research to be carried out as part of citizenship education is to structure civic educational processes. The findings obtained will be condensed into opportunities for learning. The teaching principles applied and the educational material used for teaching will themselves be the objects of acceptance and efficiency studies. Application-oriented research carried out as part of citizenship education helps to structure civic educational processes and serves three functions: ● Developing teaching guidelines. ● Designing teaching and learning opportunities. ● Developing educational media.

Future Directions The normative research on citizenship awareness relies on general theories of democracy and society. Guided by the idea of responsibility, the didactics of civic education reflects the qualities and skills citizens should have in a civil society. Future research will have to continue to provide continually refined definitions of these attributes in order to achieve an ever clearer view of the topic, both

from a scientific point of view, as well as from a sociopolitical perspective. The movement of political power into non-state institutionalized arenas of society has created new challenges for civic education. For a civil society to support and stabilize a democratic system, civic education must not only educate citizens to be responsible citizens of the state but also capable participants in civil society. This is because a functioning civil society is based on a strong citizenship, which is able to act in the different political-social skill fields. These skill fields can be didactically addressed through the meaning constructs in civil consciousness. As a consequence, civic education focuses increasingly on empirical investigations of the meaning constructs in citizenship awareness in order to refine in a step by step way the methodological access to democratic-participative oriented development of meaning constructs. We look forward to future research in this area, and eagerly anticipate the outcomes and progress that result from it.

Cross-References

▶ Citizenship ▶ Civil Society and Democracy ▶ Civil Society Theory: Dahrendorf ▶ Civil Society Theory: Habermas ▶ Civil Society Theory: Hegel ▶ Civil Society Theory: Gramsci ▶ Political Society

References/Further Readings Arenho¨vel, M. (2000). Zivilgesellschaft/Bu¨rgergesellschaft. Wochenschau fu¨r politische Erziehung, Sozial- und Gemeinschaftskunde, 2, 55–94. Beck, U. (1986). Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, Frankfurt am Main. Dahrendorf, R. (1999). Die Bu¨rgergesellschaft. In A. Pongs (Hrsg.): In welcher Gesellschaft leben wir eigentlich? Bd. 1, Mu¨nchen. Esser, J. (1995). Staatstheorie. In D. Nohlen (Hrsg.): Wo¨rterbuch Staat und Politik, Bonn, S. 733–743. Gramsci, A. (1992) Gefa¨ngnishefte. Bd. 2, Hefte 6–7, Hamburg ff. Greven, M. Th. (1990). Die politische Gesellschaft als Gegenstand der Politikwissenschaft. In: Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften 2, S. 223–228 u. 255–261. Greven, M. Th. (1994a). Die Allgegenwart des Politischen und die Randsta¨ndigkeit der Politikwissenschaft. In C. Leggewie (Hrsg.): ¨ ber das Neue in der Politik, Darmstadt. Wozu Politikwissenschaft. U S. 285–296. Greven, M. Th. (1994b). Kritische Theorie und historische Politik: theoriegeschichtliche Beitra¨ge zur gegenwa¨rtigen Gesellschaft, Opladen. Habermas, J. (1961). Reflexionen u¨ber den Begriff der politischen Beteiligung. In Ders. u. a. (Hrsg.): Student und Politik: eine soziologische Untersuchung zum politischen Bewusstsein Frankfurter Studenten, Neuwied am Rhein.

Civil Society and Cultural Organizations Habermas, J. (1992). Faktizita¨t und Geltung: Beitra¨ge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt am Main. Hegel G. W. F. (1974). Vorlesungen u¨ber Rechtsphilosophie 1818–1831, Bd. 4, Philosophie des Rechts, n. d. Vorlesungsschrift v. K.G. v. Griesheim 1824/25, Edition und Kommentar v. Karl-Heinz Ilting, Stuttgart. Hennies, W. (1973). Demokratisierung. Zur Problematik eines Begriffs. In M. Greiffenhagen (Hrsg.): Demokratisierung in Staat und Gesellschaft, Mu¨nchen/Zu¨rich. 47–70. Himmelmann, G. (2001a). Demokratie Lernen als Lebens-, Gesellschaftsund Herrschaftsform. Ein Lehr- und Studienbuch, Schwalbach/Ts. Himmelmann, G. (2001b). Was bedeutet der Staat fu¨r den Bu¨rger und der Bu¨rger fu¨r den Staat?, in: PolBil, Jg. 34, H. 3, 57–71. Lange, D. (2007). Methoden Politischer Bildung, Basiswissen Politische Bildung Bd.2 (hrsg. v. D. Lange u. V. Reinhardt), Baltmannsweiler. Lange, D. (2008). Kernkonzepte des Bu¨rgerbewusstseins. Grundzu¨ge einer Lerntheorie der Politischen Bildung. In G. Weißeno (Hrsg.): Politikkompetenz. Was Unterricht zu leisten hat, Bonn. Milner, H. (2002). Civic Literacy: How Informed Citizens Make Democracy Work, Hanover N.H. Sander, W. (Hrsg.) (2007). Handbuch politischer Bildung, Bonn. Schmalz-Bruns, R. (1995). Reflexive Demokratie: die demokratische Transformation moderner Politik, Baden-Baden. Schulze, W. (1991). Einfu¨hrung in die neuere Geschichte. 2. verbesserte Auflage, Stuttgart. Weißeno, G. (Hrsg.) (2008). Politikkompetenz. Was Unterricht zu leisten hat, Bonn.

Civil Society and Cultural Organizations YUDHISHTHIR RAJ ISAR The American University of Paris, Paris, France

Introduction and Definition The binomial ‘‘civil society and cultural organizations’’ could be read in several ways (just like the relationships between civil society and ‘‘culture,’’ cf. Civil Society and Culture). The term is understood here as the interface between the ways cultural organizations of a governmental nature envisage the contribution of civil society to cultural policy objectives and conversely, the ways in which entities that identify themselves as belonging to civil society envision their role with regard to cultural policy. Some might want to focus their attention on civil society organizations that have a specifically cultural remit, but there would be limited analytical purchase in such a reading. ‘‘Cultural policy’’ here means both the common sense usage, i.e., what any authority (but principally governmental ones) envisions and enacts in terms of support to and regulation of cultural affairs, and the more

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academy-driven notion of ‘‘the politics of culture in the most general sense. . . the clash of ideas, institutional struggles and power relations in the production and circulation of symbolic meanings.’’ (McGuigan, 1996: 1). Several key aspects of the interface between civil society and official organizations can be usefully examined. Some confusion may arise because of the fact that many civil society entities are ‘‘cultural organizations’’ as well; therefore, the defining trait for our purposes cannot be their organizational nature but their civil society characteristics. As regards culture, the ‘‘arts and heritage’’ meaning is emphasized (Williams, 1988: 90), except that the broader rubric of ‘‘cultural expression’’ makes it possible to encompass many collective forms of artistic work that may not be defined as ‘‘art.’’ It should be noted, however, that today the arts and heritage understanding of culture is increasingly elided with the broader ways of life meanings: defense of or support to cultural expression is increasingly justified not for the intrinsic value of the latter, as sheer human creativity and/or ground for delectation, but as a means of shoring up distinct ways of life against the perceived forces and trends of cultural homogenization. It should also be mentioned that the interface between cultural organizations and civil society has been subjected only to limited scholarly inquiry. The analyst has little literature upon which to draw, instead she can observe and dissect a set of discursive formations regarding cultural organizations and civil society. This set of discourses has evolved both through the activism and institutional position-taking of civil society entities themselves and through deliberate outreach to this sector on the part of governmental bodies and the world of business. One can extrapolate from these discourses and the practices that result from them. Hence this entry will first discuss two emblematic cases and then explore the socioeconomic and cultural causes of these emergent interactions between cultural policy-making and civil society.

International Perspectives A good illustration of the interface at the international level is provided by the manner in which the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) sees the role of civil society in the ‘‘protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions.’’ This role has actually been articulated by state actors, in other words governmental delegates working together on an Intergovernmental Committee established to oversee the implementation of the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Article 11 of that international treaty states that ‘‘Parties acknowledge the fundamental

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role of civil society in protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions. Parties shall encourage the active participation of civil society in their efforts to achieve the objectives of this Convention.’’ The Intergovernmental Committee’s task is to flesh out such provisions and make them operational. In a document proposing a set of ‘‘operational guidelines on the role and participation of civil society’’ in the implementation of the Convention, the Committee (Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2008) takes the position that as regards the diversity of cultural expressions, civil society entities can fulfill the sorts of generic roles set out by Anheier (2007), namely bringing citizens’ concerns to governments, monitoring policy and program implementation, serving as a warning mechanism, value-guardian, and innovator as well as contributing to the achievement of greater transparency and accountability in governance. In that light, pursues the document, governments should encourage civil society to perform such functions by creating an ‘‘enabling environment’’ consisting, inter alia, of a legal and regulatory framework; the provision of spaces and mechanisms that make it possible to involve civil society in consultations on cultural policy-making, and in systems for accessing public information relating to the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions. By the same token it recommends to governments that ‘‘civil society should be encouraged and advised to act as an awareness-raiser and cultural service provider, in particular by offering specific expertise, contributing to capacity building and carrying out data collection in the field of the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions.’’ The document goes on to underline civil society’s potential to act as an innovator and cultural change agent in this field, hence advises governments to encourage civil society to bring new ideas and approaches to the formulation of cultural policies, as well as to the development of innovative cultural processes, practices, or programs that could help achieve the objectives of the Convention. It recognizes the role civil society plays in defending specific cultural values by giving voice to social groups such as minorities, indigenous peoples, women, etc., and states that ‘‘civil society organizations should endeavor to assist Parties in ensuring that all stakeholders’ interests are taken into account when formulating cultural policies.’’ On the international level, civil society organizations should be proactive in the area of cooperation for development, by initiating, creating, and participating in innovative partnerships with the public and private sectors. A specific North–South dimension is built in here, as

the document urges that ‘‘it is essential that, in addition to being encouraged by Parties, civil society in developing countries receive support and assistance from its counterparts in developed countries, in terms of expertise and organizational, technical and financial support.’’ The general openness demonstrated by governmental organizations towards civil society today is a mix of pragmatism and rhetoric, some of it linked to a genuine recognition of the sector’s role, both demonstrated and potential, some of it stemming from the recognized inadequacy of state institutions to solve all societal problems (Anheier, 2007). In the case of UNESCO and cultural diversity, this posture perhaps also reflects the important role bodies such as the International Network for Cultural Diversity (INCD) played in the elaboration of the Convention and in the initial stages of its implementation. The INCD was established originally at the instigation and with the financial support of the Canadian government, desirous of having a civil society partner in its efforts to advance the ‘‘cultural exception’’ agenda internationally, but was also funded by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. This development was significant in itself, as a demonstration of how one polity, the Canadian, can deliberately choose to highlight and stimulate civil society participation and input to serve its own ends (in contrast, for example, to the statist paradigm under which the French government operates, allowing non-state actors to play but a minor role). The INCD describes itself as ‘‘a worldwide network working to counter the adverse affects of globalization on world cultures.’’ It has members in all regions of the world: cultural organizations, artists, and cultural producers from every media, academics, heritage institutions and others. In point of fact, it was called upon at every turn by Canadian cultural diplomacy to support, refine, or relay its international strategic positions (and even correct them in some instances), reflecting Zemans’ notion (2004: 6) that ‘‘civil society provides legitimacy for governments seeking new international understandings of the role of nations in controlling their own cultural policies.’’ While the INCD has never gone beyond the stance of being advisory to governments, its role in the elaboration of the Convention has embodied a new kind of dialectic of between state and civil society representatives. Substantively, it appears to have pushed the envelope beyond questions of national cultural sovereignty alone, also grounding a ‘‘discourse of rights and responsibilities as being crucial’’ (Zemans, 2004: 6). It has contributed to broadening understanding of the need for a new global trade regime as regards cultural goods and services; it has, with the help of the new technologies deployed a judicious mix of information, symbolic, and


leverage politics (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2002) in order to build awareness of this particular reading of cultural diversity in the public realm of many countries that otherwise would not have such awareness emerge. The institutions of the European Union, notably the European Parliament and the European Commission, are also increasingly mindful of the role of civil society in the still fledgling cultural arena of EU policy-making. This stance provides another instructive case. In 1992, the European institutions encouraged and supported the creation of the European Forum for the Arts and Heritage (EFAH), a body set up by and for cultural sector activists who were eager to give a voice to and for European ‘‘cultural civil society’’ at the precise moment when for the first time, in the Treaty of Maastricht, cultural activities were given legal status at the EU level. As a result, the European Commission acquired a cultural mandate, albeit a limited and constrained one, because of the primacy of the ‘‘subsidiarity’’ principle. Thus the Commission became de facto a cultural organization in addition to its existing economic and political nature. EFAH was the platform of cultural networks and organizations active at the pan-European level which could serve as a leading interlocutor for the European institutions. Rebranded ‘‘Culture Action Europe’’ in 2008, the platform today has some 90 member organizations that in turn represent over 6,000 organizations across the 27 EU Member States and beyond, active in all cultural domains, ranging from orchestras to writers’ associations, national theatres to international cultural networks, conservatoires to choirs and festivals to foundations. It has had recognized success in developing policy positions for the cultural sector and presenting them to European Union institutions, through one-to-one contacts with Members of the European Parliament and the European Commission, expressing its views and influencing the work of policy-setting committees at the European Parliament, as well as with other nongovernmental groups campaigning for a democratic, participatory Europe. It serves also a source of information for its members, monitoring European Union legislation and policy in cultural affairs, giving members the information they need to take advantage of funding opportunities and to anticipate emerging trends in funding priorities. The degree to which it’s views have been heeded is illustrated by the content of a key recent policy document issued by the European Commission ‘‘on a European agenda for a globalizing world,’’ which refers frequently to the role of civil society in achieving innovative purposes in this field (Commission of the European Communities, 2007).

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The Emergence of the Civil Society Turn

The cooperation between cultural organizations and civil society illustrated by these two cases is emblematic of the way in which civil society involvement is increasingly taken for granted by states or organizations exercising state agency in the cultural realm. The examples are international and regional respectively; yet national examples could readily be cited as well. Involving civil society is the reigning common sense, its emergence is relatively recent however; it has unfolded over the past half century, interconnected with a series of significant economic, political, social, and cultural changes. It is advocated and practiced by cultural organizations at many different levels, not only on pragmatic, dollars, and cents, grounds but for reasons of a less instrumental kind, based on ethics, symbols, and values. This reasoning has been driven by various contemporary trends of concept and of context in the cultural field. A first key trend of concept has been the shift from strictly aesthetic criteria to broader humanistic or cultural ones, from a paradigm of aesthetics to a paradigm of representation. Aesthetic or historical criteria for cultural valuation now take a back seat to issues of group identity, self-awareness, and power. In other words, cultural value is closely associated with the politics of difference and identity. In urban and regional planning frameworks, for example, the question of culture is no longer limited to embellishment and beautification. Today it extends to more operational definitions of how people use, relate to, celebrate, or desecrate their living environments. A second conceptual factor is the growing awareness that whilst expenditure on culture and cultural conservation can and should be justified on economic grounds, culture ought not to be reduced to a purely instrumental role. To be sure, cultural methods are often very effective in achieving noncultural objectives, ranging from health promotion or education to employment. As culture has come to be recognized more fully as part of the broader ecology of human settlements, investment in heritage preservation, for example, has increased commercial activity and raised property values, leading to a virtuous circle of economic growth, as has been shown in hundreds of heritage districts, ranging from the ‘‘Main Street’’ programs of North America, to the Marais in Paris or the abandoned docklands of Bilbao. Conservation works tend to stimulate quality employment and training, they also develop premises for the community, which can have a significant social value. In increasingly impoverished and insecure inner cities, cultural activities are helping keep disadvantaged youths off the city streets, reduce poverty, combat social exclusion and foster equity and citizenship, as we can observe in the

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urban slums of Brazil (Ramos, 2007), the Medina of Fez or the Ilha do Mocambique. Climbing onto this particular bandwagon has its risks, however. Doing so means playing by a new set of rules, rules that are set by considerations other than those of the integrity of the cultural heritage. Playing by these rules means accepting to lose when another sector with a higher economic or social impact can make more robust claims. Hence Amartya Sen would ask whether economic growth is to be valued for its own sake, or whether it is only an instrument with less claim to a foundational role than other aspects of human life, including the cultural. Thus the World Commission on Culture and Development, in its report entitled Our Creative Diversity (1996) refused to limit culture to a subsidiary position as a mere promoter of economic growth. It must also be seen as an end in itself, said the Commission, as the social basis of the ends themselves. Once we shift our attention from the purely instrumental view of culture to awarding it a constructive, constitutive, and creative role, we have to see development in terms that in terms that include cultural growth. The two conceptual shifts have together resulted in the major trend of content, which is the exponential growth – in sheer quantity as well as in sheer diversity – of cultural awareness in all world societies. This has had several qualitative implications. A huge range of different kinds of cultural action, from the preservation or ancient archaeological remains to the promotion of front-edge digital art, is now expected to be undertaken on behalf of a wide array of different communities. The criteria of selection, access, custodianship, and control regarding all such activities have had to change, with important implications for funding, service delivery and overall policy purview. It is not merely a question of giving more to particular groups but of recognizing, promoting, and preserving the resources which count as cultural to these groups. This demand far outstrips the resources available, particularly in these times of shrinking public sector budgets and the inexorable trend towards privatization. Finally, three trends of context. First, the devolution of public sector expenditure – not just the decrease – as central governments seek to offload responsibilities to lower tiers of administration as well as to other sectors. The result is that cultural budgets are under ever increasing stress, despite the now vigorous cultural industry arguments that sees cultural expression and its creativity as valuable resources for investment (Anheier & Isar, 2008). This reasoning is valid as far as it goes, which is to say not as far as the kinds of cultural activity that require subsidy because they cannot be adequately generated and/or distributed under the aegis of market forces alone. Faced with declining budgets, central governments

everywhere are looking for ways to lighten their burdens as curators, impresarios, and suppliers of cultural infrastructure. The responsibility for cultural stewardship has to be spread more evenly over a broader set of shoulders. This trend has intersected with a second one, the cultural affirmation of the local. As people become increasingly aware of and swept up in the powerful forces of globalization, culture has been taken up in an extraordinary world wide dialectic of cultural self-awareness – of their own inherited way of life as a value and a political right. The world cultural system has generated a strong reaction in local cultural orders, thus the potential for an increasing diversity of cultures. This cultural assertion of the local has in turn contributed to reinforcing the third trend, which is the affirmation of local citizenship through the steadily advancing ethic of participation: the recognition that cultural, economic, and social policy-making priorities should emerge from the grassroots. This shift from ‘‘top-down’’ to ‘‘bottom-up’’ models of governance is also bound up with the commitment to cultural diversity, for only such a commitment will enable the voices and choices of a wide variety of cultural, ethnic, and other collectivities to be heard. Taken together, both participation and the celebration of diversity contribute to reducing the gap between ends and means, in generating energies and resources for cultural expression. Governments cannot or will no longer seek to meet that gap and market forces cannot be expected to do so (the realities of business sponsorship and corporate citizenship warrant no more than relatively limited add-on funding at the best of times. . .). Hence not-for-profit sector and voluntary work and service emerging from civil society are also being solicited and encouraged, and are themselves becoming increasingly proactive stakeholders.

Future Directions Yet because cultural identity and national sovereignty are so closely interlinked, will such stakeholdership be even more fully recognized by organizations charged with delivering cultural regulation and services on behalf of governments? The question is an open one. Is the ‘‘civil society turn’’ destined to be durable? It should be noted that this question does not apply to the two North American societies, the United States and Canada, whose cultural systems have been shaped chiefly by cooperation between market forces and civil society inputs and which for that reason would merit a differently worded entry as regards this topic. Elsewhere, however, while it is likely that we shall see a diversification of alliances between cultural organizations and civil society, the key question is whether their scale will transcend present

Civil Society and Culture

levels. What will current and emerging economic, political, and social conditions do to transcend rhetoric on all sides and enable true intersectoral partnership to be developed? On the governmental side, how much voice and power do the authorities really wish to offer to civil society in questions of cultural governance and to what degree will civil society wish to retain its freedom to maneuver independently of governmental purposes?

Cross-References

▶ Advocacy ▶ Civil Society and Culture ▶ Civil Society and the European Union ▶ Civil Society, Definitions and Approaches ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations ▶ Interest Politics ▶ Nonprofit Organizations, Functions of ▶ Public Value ▶ Subsidiarity

References/Further Readings Anheier, H. K. (2007) Civil society and the convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions (2005). Paper prepared for the UNESCO Secretariat. Anheier, H. K., & Isar, Y. R. (Eds.) (2008). Introduction. The Cultural Economy. The Cultures and Globalization Series 2. London: Sage. Commission of the European Communities. (2007). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world (document COM (2007) 242 final. Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. (2008). Operational guidelines on the role and participation of civil society (Art. 11 and related articles). UNESCO document CE/08/1.EXT.IGS/5. Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.) (1998). Activists beyond borders. Ithaca/ London: Cornell University Press. Khagram, S., Riker, J. V., Sikkink, K. (Eds.) (2002). Restructuring world politics. Transnational social movements, networks and norms. Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press. McGuigan, J. (1996). Culture and the public sphere. London/New York: Routledge. Ramos, S. (2007). The pedagogy of drums: Culture mediating conflict in the slums of Brazil. In H. K. Anheier & Y. R. Isar (Eds.), Conflicts and Tensions. The Cultures and Globalization Series, 1. London: Sage. Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNESCO. (2005). Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, from http://portal.unesco.org/cul ture/en/ev.php-URL_ID = 11281&URL_DO = DO_TOPIC&URL_ SECTION = 201.html Williams, R. (1988). Keywords. London: Fontana Press. World Commission on Culture and Development (1996). Our Creative Diversity. Paris: UNESCO Publishing. Zemans, J. (2004). Advancing Cultural Diversity Globally: The Role of Civil Society Movements. Unpublished discussion paper.

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Civil Society and Culture YUDHISHTHIR RAJ ISAR The American University of Paris, Paris, France

Introduction and Definitional Issues ‘‘Civil society’’ and ‘‘Culture’’ are both broad concepts, dauntingly polysemous, the former more than the latter. This makes their coupling problematic. When the two abstract categories are yoked together, as we do here, the difficulty is compounded. Several questions arise. First, what understandings of both of these abstractions should we use? Second, what is to be made of the conjunction ‘‘and’’? What sorts of relationships does it imply? The uses of civil society in the cause of culture, or the uses of culture by civil society? Recent developments suggest that it should be both. As regards the first definitional question, the notion of ‘‘civil society’’ is easier to circumscribe. We can take it to be ‘‘a sphere located between state and market – a buffer zone strong enough to keep both state and market in check, thereby preventing each from becoming too powerful and dominating’’ while noting that ‘‘civil society is not a singular, monolithic, separate entity, but a sphere constituted in relation to both state and market’’ (Anheier, 2007). Given its plurality and plasticity, however, to what degree can it be claimed that this particular societal sphere exercises a form of agency that is different or independent from agency in and of other sectors of society? Isn’t the relationship between culture and civil society the same thing as the relationship between culture and society tout court? In the case of the word culture, definition is an even more complicated matter. Do we have in mind, in terms of the classic Raymond Williams typology (1988), the original idea of a general process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development? Or are we concerned with particular ways of life or systems and structures of meaning? Or do we mean the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity, both past and present (including therefore ‘‘heritage’’)? The first sense, still dear to humanists, may not have a great deal of purchase as far as our notion of civil society is concerned. The second is highly salient in the contemporary zeitgeist, yet it flirts with over-extensivity. It takes breadth to the point of meaninglessness, for surely civil society is a part and manifestation of culture so envisioned, just as both state and market are ‘‘cultural’’ forms in this reading. The third meaning, arts and heritage, for which we choose to use the more encompassing term ‘‘cultural expression,’’ is more

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straightforward. Yet while it may well be more amenable to analytical precision, this understanding also poses a problem of tautology. Cultural expression and its consumption and enjoyment permeate entire societies, so what significance resides in the distinction between civil society production and/or consumption of cultural expression as opposed to market production – particularly at a time at which commodities have been so thoroughly aestheticized and the aesthetic so largely commodified? And the same question is relevant as regards government-sponsored forms (which remains culture despite the sources of patronage). A semiotic reading may help. We could take culture to be the social construction, articulation, and reception of meaning – encompassing both art and symbolic production in general, the commodified output of the cultural industries as well as the spontaneous or enacted, organized or unorganized expressions of everyday life, including social relations (Anheier and Isar, 2007: 9). Such a reading would be germane to what Stuart Hall (1997) sees as the constitutive position of culture in all aspects of social life. More precisely, its substantive centrality in economic and political terms, as the means of producing, circulating, and exchanging culture have been dramatically expanded through the new media technologies and the information revolution. Also its epistemological weight, i.e., culture’s position in relation to knowledge and concepts: how it is involved in understanding, explaining, and envisioning the world. Both in turn explain the force and intensity the concept has acquired at the service of the intensive practice of identity in our time. It is now central to the repertoires of discourses and strategies deployed by ‘‘imagined communities’’ at different levels and many of which have crystallized in the sphere of civil society, both within and across national boundaries. To this extent, ‘‘culture’’ has become an area of concern for civil society organizations that represent themselves as cultural, of a range of entities that describe themselves as belonging to and representing the realm of ‘‘cultural civil society’’; more broadly, civil society resistances to neoliberalism, particularly in Latin America, have opened up discourses and practices of struggle in which culture is a crucial dimension (Yu´dice, 2003). But this set of discourses has been little analyzed academically. As is the case with interactions between civil society and cultural organizations (see entry ‘‘Civil Society and Cultural Organizations’’), apart from a limited quantity of work emerging from Latin America, there is next to no research that focuses on the interface between civil society and cultural phenomena. Both have been studied separately, not together. Joining them up under a dedicated research

agenda has to the best of our knowledge not been attempted, no doubt because the two categories are so broad, diffuse, and protean in content. Yet there are a number of issues around which, clearly, there is scope for a specific focus and it is these that will be briefly discussed below.

Key Issues Culture, Power, Culturalism, and Citizenship

A first key issue is the interaction between culture and power, a topic broadly discussed in both anthropology and cultural studies. Appadurai, for example, famously characterized contemporary culturalism as ‘‘the conscious mobilization of cultural differences in the service of a larger national or transnational politics’’ (1996: 15). Such a politics is indeed increasingly becoming one of the causes adhered to by CSOs. It should be noted in passing that the ways this ambient culturalism has cleaved to readings of culture as a principally national phenomenon, readings that are in direct descent from the Herderian notion of culture as the national Volksgeist, are often at variance with the visions of current cultural theory. Paul Gilroy (2004: 6) holds, for example, that the idea of culture ‘‘has been abused by being simplified, instrumentalized, or trivialized, and particularly though being coupled with notions of identity and belonging that are overly fixed or too easily naturalized as exclusively national phenomena.’’ In other words, it is freighted with ‘‘methodological nationalism,’’ the assumption that the nation-state is the only proper container for culture. Today, however, the nexus of culture and nation no longer holds sway. Culture is now appropriated by collectivities at narrower as well as broader levels, as well as by individuals who articulate claims to culture as members of civil society. Writing on agenda-setting for political and social policies in Latin America, George Yu´dice (2003; see also Alvarez et al., 1998) evokes the innovative role of civil society actors who ‘‘put a premium on culture, defined in myriad ways, a resource already targeted for exploitation by capital (e.g., in the media, consumerism, and tourism), and a foundation for resistance against the ravages of that very same economic system.’’ In all such self-conscious articulations of cultural ‘‘identity,’’ there is a growing awareness of the porosity of boundaries and the fluidity and multiplicity of identities that matches the unease of the social science disciplines with the fixity and stasis of the traditional view of cultures as bounded wholes and over the essentialization and reification that so often results from this view. Yet despite the problems with these readings of the culture


concept itself, social scientists stay with it, if only, as Hannerz (1996: 43) puts it, ‘‘to retain the common ground it has created . . . and profit from the fact that the general public increasingly understands what we mean when we employ it.’’ Such pragmatism is of course inspired by the way in which civil society actors propagate ‘‘complex whole’’ readings of culture on behalf of the groups to which they belong and, concomitantly, a fixed vision of the corresponding ‘‘culture.’’ Civil society actors themselves perform the rituals that project complex wholes by way of specific dramaturgies that use ‘‘the intersubjective abilities – of culture – to build monolithic and truth-generating symbolic worlds’’ (Wicker, 1997: 42). Putting this predicament somewhat differently, Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson (2001: 3), the editors of the volume Culture and Rights, observe how ‘‘at the very moment in which anthropologists were engaged in an intense and wide-ranging critique especially of the more essentialist interpretations of the concept, to the point of querying its usefulness at all, they found themselves witnessing, often during fieldwork, the increasing prevalence of ‘culture’ as a rhetorical object – often in a highly essentialized form – in contemporary political talk.’’ Yet it would be wrong to conclude that as civil society engages in the shifting and contested process of constructing collective identities, its ideologues and leaders are unaware of such pitfalls. For civil society actors are also among the principal agents of the interconnected phenomena of transculturality, deterritorialization, hybridity, and creolization that are produced by ‘‘flows and crossovers between cultures, and the patterns of their intermingling that are produced by the movement of peoples and the restless cultural mixing that now characterizes developed cultural markets’’ (Bennett, 2001: 19). The phenomenon is often referred to as deterritorialization, as Garcıá Canclini (1995: 261) puts it, the end of the ‘‘natural’’ relation of culture to geographical and social territories. In exploring various forms of cultural mobility and border-crossing between tradition and modernity, and between countryside and city in contemporary Latin America, he observes that ‘‘all cultures are border cultures.’’ CSOs are among the most active explorers of these emergent zones of culture in which old traditions survive and meld with contemporary novelty, just as many of them negotiate the processes known as creolization, ‘‘the recent confluence of separate and different traditions not themselves pure, bounded wholes, but identifiable as of different derivation at the moment, or period, of creolization’’ (Hannerz, 1996: 67). Another key feature is the way in which ideas of citizenship, with which the very notion of civil society is entangled, are now being modulated by the growing

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significance social movements attach to the cultural dimension. These movements are now articulating this awareness ever more forcefully and linking it to other domains of social and political life. The claims being articulated here relate centrally to the idea of ‘‘cultural’’ citizenship, which can be defined as recognition of the ways of life of different groups in ways that create an entitlement to equal opportunity for each individual to participate in all the practices that constitute the field of culture and at the same time to function effectively as a citizen without being required to change her/his cultural allegiances and affiliations (Bennett, 2001). Across the world today, many new social and cultural movements are focusing on the rights to recognition, preservation, and protection of the ways of life of all kinds of groups. These rights go beyond rights for welfare protection, political representation or civil justice, and focus on the recognition of a cultural identity or lifestyle as well as the right to preserve or reproduce it. Already in the 1960s, Williams suggested an alternative democratic framework for his own (British) society, where a radically decentralized communications system would be open to the ‘‘challenge and view’’ of a republic of voice. The idea was to represent the voices of ordinary people, artists, and radical critics so that they might engage with a wider public on issues of common concern. A society of actively engaged citizens requires both the protection offered by rights and opportunities to participate. This implies a diverse civic and popular culture. Cultural Expression

Phenomena such as those briefly evoked above play out increasingly as peoples – in other words civil societies – and not just nation-states, articulate multiple rhetorics and practices of cultural preservation and reaffirmation, in the attempt to find a place in the planetary culture whilst preserving their own distinctive specificities. In the global South, the challenge is to introduce modernization, i.e., the tools and methods of the global North, in their own terms, at their own pace, under their own control. While they do not want their identity to be absorbed into a single world culture, many of these societies are in fact building a new, hybrid synthesis: traditions on the one hand, and today’s cosmopolitan cultural repertoire on the other. At their best, these are not mere transfers, but real transformations. And we observe that the transformations contributing to the world repertoire can emerge from Bahia or Bombay just easily as from London or Paris. But there are many ‘‘combat zones’’ as well. There are the producers of culture (artists, ideologues, media producers, and entrepreneurs) educated and trained in the North, and, often in opposition to them, more

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introverted groups who see themselves as the rightful guardians of a cultural essence. There are the people who constitute the audiences of cultural production who are divided on more or less the same lines. There are political leaders who instrumentalize culture as a workable rhetoric to help shape the processes of nation-building and development, indulging thereby in what Beck terms ‘‘introverted nationalism’’ (2006). Amongst themselves these groups debate, often passionately, the question of which of the various forms and expressions of culture – new or old, local, or global – shall gain dominance and have the greatest influence. At issue, of course, is the question of which groups, and which values, will emerge possessing the authority and power to represent more general cultural consciousness and identity. A somewhat less contested terrain has emerged in the cities, towns, and villages of the global South, where different forms of cultural expression and heritage are being mobilized by a range of activist groups concerned with social change and development. These kinds of CSOs can muster up a dynamism and engagement that is more organically related to the needs articulated by local populations than either the performative rhetoric of official bodies or the logic of the marketplace. An increasing number of civil society networks now play a crucial role in facilitating both production and dissemination of a variety of cultural forms. It is in recognition of this that the Dutch NGO HIVOS (Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries) and the Open Society Institute (OSI), in cooperation with the Budapest-based Center for the Study of Culture and Society (CSCS) organized in December 2008 on the Bangalore campus of the information society giant INFOSYS, a conference on ‘‘Culture and Civil Society Development in Asia.’’ The conference announcement stated that ‘‘networks in the arts and culture sector have created platforms for the interaction of practitioners and mediated between the producer, market and the state.’’ (http://www.cscsarchive.org/cscs/ announcements_folder/announcements.2008–11–01.076 2716893/announcement.2008–11–01.1130677957). The organizers of the conference hoped to identify obstacles to the further development of such interplays as well as develop solutions for them. It is worth noting the way they recognized the very different starting points and trajectories of the respective national civil societies concerned: ‘‘Cultural practitioners from Central Asia struggle with the Soviet cultural inheritance and the contingencies of the post-Soviet independent states, with weak institutions, competing ideological projects, mass impoverishment and cultural isolation despite the penetration of global cultural products. The Indian

counterparts work in a parliamentary democracy with huge regional differences and deeply ingrained inequalities despite the postindustrial boom, the growing participation in a global economy and the emergence of a middle class. Cultural production in Sri Lanka is marked by a protracted civil war. In Indonesia, a fragile democratic order is being tested by enormous cultural differences, socioeconomic stratification and radical politics inspired by religion.’’ Civil Society Against Cultural ‘‘Bads’’

There is no doubt a special place for cultural civil society in situations of crisis and political repression. This goes beyond the image of the individual artist ‘‘speaking truth to power’’ and catalyzing popular energies that was made familiar during the fall of European Communist regimes, e.g., Vaclav Havel and Kurt Masur, and reincarnated more recently by the writer Arundhati Roy in her public positions against ecological destruction and the related ethnocide in contemporary India. Local associations and networks in the cultural field, whether local, national, or transnational, step in at a less exalted level at critical moments of social transformation, as observed recently by the Commonwealth Foundation in its reflections on culture and development: ‘‘with multiple paths available as possible outcomes, cultural practitioners can play an important role at critical junctures in shaping how citizens and political actors think about their reality and about which paths are viable’’ (2008: 47). The South African case is emblematic of such roles being filled both in resistance to oppression and the processes of healing and reconciliation. Civil society entities and networks deploy the powers and resources of cultural expression to pursue a series of goals in such contexts. These purposes are diverse and can include: strengthening group identity, social organization and community; generating social energy; overcoming feelings of inferiority and alienation; teaching and consciousness raising; promoting creativity and innovation as well as democratic discourse and social mediation; promoting pluralist visions in culturally diverse (and hence possibly conflict-prone) societies. Increasingly, as the reach of the marketplace broadens, such cultural CSOs are also facilitating the production and distribution of cultural goods and services (Kleymeyer, 1994). This kaleidoscope of activities is still somewhat under-researched however; the principal focus of cultural research has shifted to the workings of the cultural economy, under the rubrics ‘‘cultural industries’’ and/or ‘‘creative industries,’’ indeed also ‘‘creative economy.’’ The remainder retains its focus on governmental policymaking. How CSOs can or could interact with


government and the marketplace is beginning to occupy a more prominent place on the research agenda, but the pickings are limited so far, for the scope of such inquiry is simply not yet holistic and transversal enough, as Pratt has observed (2005). No Global Epistemic Community

It is somewhat paradoxical to observe, therefore, that these local and national activities have spread only thinly to the transnational level. There is no real global epistemic community for either of the senses of culture we have used here, only a limited number of international cultural NGOs (most of which gravitate around UNESCO, such as the International Council of Museums or, the International Council on Monuments and Sites), a handful of transnational advocacy networks (see ‘‘Civil Society and Cultural Organizations’’) and no significant transnational cultural movements or coalitions (as defined by Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2002). To be sure, globally shared anxieties with regard to cultural homogenization and the erosion of local cultures are regularly voiced in global social and economic forums, notably in the context of antiglobalization movements, but these evocations are almost invariably secondary, residual, even ritualistic; they do not contest nation-state positions and on the contrary may well echo them, as is the case for example with the ‘‘cultural exception’’ arguments now subsumed under the rubric of ‘‘cultural diversity’’ and that inspired the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (cf. ‘‘Civil Society and Cultural Organizations’’). There is no worldwide cultural movement comparable, mutatis mutandis, to Greenpeace or to Amnesty International. This lacuna has been noted and regretted by some scholars such as Kleberg (1998) since the 1980s, the concern surfaces in the public pronouncements of platform organizations such as Culture Action Europe and has been the motivation behind a number of short-lived start ups using the notion of ‘‘World Culture Forum.’’ A militant cultural wing has yet to emerge in global civil society. The question is, can large-scale mobilization around cultural causes ever emerge? The fact that it has not yet done so despite overabundant rhetorical reiteration of the central importance of culture does not encourage a positive response.

Future Directions More specific inquiry needs to be directed at a number of questions. First, at the question of whether there are forms of culture (in diverse understandings of the term) that are emerging from civil society understood as a self-defined sector of society which is performing certain social roles.

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Second, the question of whether civil society discourses and practice regarding culture are different from the positions taken by governmental authorities and of the divergence or complementarity between the two positions. Third, the question of why there is not yet a ‘‘cultural civil society’’ at the global level and whether there are certain factors or processes are promoting the emergence of such a global formation.

Cross-References

▶ Citizenship ▶ Civil Society and Cultural Organizations ▶ Civil Society and Ethnicity ▶ Civil Society, Definitions and Approaches ▶ Cosmopolitanism ▶ Havel, Vaclav ▶ Hybridity ▶ Identity ▶ Public Value ▶ Values

References/Further Readings Alvarez, S., Dagnino, E., & Escobar, A. (Eds.) (1998). Cultures of politics, politics of cultures: Re-visioning Latin American social movements. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Anheier, H. K. (2007). Civil society and the convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions (2005). Paper prepared for the UNESCO Secretariat, Paris. Anheier, H. K., & Isar, Y. R. (Eds.) (2007). Conflicts and Tensions. Cultures and Globalization Series, 1. London: SAGE. Appadurai, A. (1996). Modernity at large. Cultural dimensions of globalization. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Beck, U. (2006). The cosmopolitan vision. Cambridge: Polity. Bennett, T. (2001). Differing diversities. Cultural policy and cultural diversity. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe Publishing. Commonwealth Foundation (2008). Putting culture first. Commonwealth perspectives on culture and development. London: Commonwealth Foundation. Cowan, J. K., Dembour, M. B. Wilson, R. A. (Eds.) (2001). Cultural rights: Anthropological perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Garcıá Canclini, N. (1995). Hybrid cultures: Strategies for entering and leaving modernity. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Gilroy, P. (2004). After empire. Abingdon: Routledge. Hall, S. (1997). The centrality of culture: Notes on the cultural revolutions of our time. In K. Thompson (Ed.), Media and cultural regulation. Milton Keynes: The Open University. Hannerz, U. (1996). Transnational connections. Culture, people, places. London/New York: Routledge. Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.) (1998). Activists beyond borders. Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press. Khagram, S., Riker, J. V., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.) (2002). Restructuring world politics. Transnational social movements, networks and norms. Minneapolis, MN/London: University of Minnesota Press. Kleberg, C. J. (Ed.) (1998). Promoting cultural research for human development, report from three seminars. Stockholm: The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation & Gidlunds Fo¨rlag.

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Kleymeyer, C. (Ed.) (1994). Cultural expression and grassroots development. Cases from Latin America and the Caribbean. Boulder, CO/ London: Lynne Riener. Pratt, A. (2005 March). Cultural industries and public policy. An oxymoron? The International Journal of Cultural Policy, 11(1), 15–29. Wicker, H. R. (1997). From complex culture to cultural complexity. In P. Werbner & T. Modood (Eds.). Debating cultural hybridity. Multi-cultural identities and the politics of anti-racism. London: Zed Books. Williams, R. (1988). Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society. London: Fontana. Yu´dice, G. (2003). The expediency of culture. Uses of culture in the global era. Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press.


of democratic consolidation, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) have provided a starting point for this broad perspective by distinguishing between five interacting and mutually reinforcing ‘‘arenas’’ of democratic consolidation: (1) civil society, (2) political society, (3) economic society, (4) the rule of law, and (5) state bureaucracy. The role of civil society is best understood when distinguished from the other arenas. Figure 1 presents an illustrated summary of these different arenas, and the interaction between them (drawn from Howard, 2003). In order to understand Fig. 1, several key points need to be made explicit. The first is the broad distinction between the public and private spheres, indicated by the solid line separating family and friendship networks, on the one hand, from civil society and the other four arenas, on the other. This distinction refers to the important difference between social activities that are within close

MARC MORJE´ HOWARD Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

Introduction Several decades ago, ‘‘civil society’’ was an arcane concept in political theory. Today, it is a term that floods academic, journalistic, and everyday discourse. The concept of civil society was revitalized in the 1980s by the Polish opposition movement and the subsequent wave of democratization around the world. Civil society as an object of study has experienced a veritable explosion, and today, it is commonly applied to very different contexts and continents throughout the world. In the post-Cold War era, in which many countries have embarked on various forms of democratization, civil society has come to be seen as one of the main indicators of that process, as well as an appealing way to frame such research. A vibrant civil society is often seen as a key ingredient for the success of advanced Western countries, as well as a panacea for developing countries elsewhere in the world. Within the social sciences – even though trust, political participation, and democratization have been standard themes in comparative politics for decades – civil society has become an appealing way of framing such research, with applications throughout the Western and non-Western world.

Definition In order to understand the role of civil society, it is useful to start with a wider view of social relations in any given democratic or democratizing system. Within the context

Civil Society and Democracy. Fig. 1 The arenas of democratization


and trusted circles, and those that go beyond them to involve interaction with other forms of social organization in society at large. The next distinction is between the two arenas that are above, and the three that are below, the dotted line in Fig. 1. The state bureaucracy and the rule of law are based first and foremost on legal-rational institutions and organizing principles, which provide the essential core of any modern democratic system. Political society, economic society, and civil society, in contrast, consist of concrete organizations and groups of people that shape and define the particular character of that democratic system. As indicated by the thick arrow connecting these two categories of arenas, they interact in a mutually reinforcing way. The relationship among the three arenas below the dotted line in Fig. 1, consisting of concrete organizations and groups of people, is more complex. Simply put, political society refers to elite politics, namely political leadership and the competition for political power and office. Economic society refers to the myriad business organizations in pursuit of economic profit in a capitalist system. Civil society refers to the realm of organizations, groups, and associations that are formally established, legally protected, autonomously run, and voluntarily joined by ordinary citizens. More explicitly, the conceptual and empirical feature that differentiates civil society from political society and economic society is the important distinction between the elite and the mass level. In civil society, individual members can effect or prevent change through or by virtue of their organization. In economic society and political society, however, individual elites still have the power to control economic or political policies even when they are not acting within, and on behalf of, an organization. In other words, political society and economic society are primarily composed of elite actors and institutions that are involved with the pursuit of power or profit, whereas civil society is the realm of ordinary citizens, who join and participate in groups and associations on the basis of their everyday interests, needs, and desires. Unlike the organizations of political and economic society, civil society organizations – although they often seek political influence, and they constantly need financial support – have neither power nor profit as their objective or rationale. The fact that there are crucial differences between these three concepts in abstract terms does not mean that there are always clear-cut conceptual or practical lines that separate them. On the contrary, there is small but significant overlap among all three of the arenas. As shown in Fig. 2, the three arenas constitute overlapping

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circles. The central elements of political society consist of the leadership groups of political parties, interparty alliances, and professional politicians and elites. Economic society – which, along with civil society, maintains a close connection with the private sphere, since its origins stem from the very concept of private property and personal and family entrepreneurship – includes most importantly businesses, financial institutions, and entrepreneurs and economic elites. Finally, civil society encompasses a wide array of groups, associations, and organizations, including community and local organizations; human rights, peace, and environmental groups; educational or cultural activities; churches or religious organizations; sports or recreational clubs; women’s, veterans’, youth, elderly, disabled, animal rights, health, and self-help groups; and many others. But this is not the end of the story. According to the above definitions of each of these three arenas, there must be groups and organizations that belong to more than one type of arena at the same time. For example, political interest groups and large-scale nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) usually have the explicit goal of influencing and changing political power structures, yet they also rely on participation and support from ordinary citizens for legitimation of their cause. The overlapping section between civil society and economic society includes labor unions, professional, employers, and producers associations, and economic interest groups and NGOs. All of these belong to economic society since they are concerned with influencing economic outcomes; yet their membership basis is voluntary, and they consist of large or small numbers of people who come together to discuss and act on their common interests. The overlap between political and economic society consists of an array of elite-based political-economic interest groups and NGOs, which are not at all based on citizen participation or support. This would also include the corporatist or quasi-corporatist arrangements between firms and unions, which in certain sectors operate separately from the input of their members. Finally, cutting across all three arenas, one could place the media, which plays an influential agenda-setting role within political and economic society, while also serving as the fundamental means of communication to, and among, ordinary citizens. Overall, this conception and delineation of civil society remains true to the theoretical origins of the concept and to contemporary discussions of democracy and democratization. It also shows how different types of groups and organizations from the real world actually fit into an otherwise theoretical conceptualization of civil society.

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Civil Society and Democracy. Fig. 2 The groups of political society, economic society, and civil society

Key Issues The Democratic Benefits of Civil Society

A common understanding of most scholars who write about civil society – however they define or operationalize it – is the assumption that it has a positive and beneficial influence. Indeed, for most people, the term immediately brings to mind a peaceful, moral, and idealistic image. But what exactly are the benefits of civil society? Larry Diamond (1996: xxiii, 227–240) presents a general account of the role of civil society, listing many ways

in which it can exert a positive influence on the process of democratic consolidation. According to Diamond, in addition to ‘‘checking and limiting the power of the state,’’ civil society ‘‘stimulates political participation, develops a democratic culture of tolerance and bargaining, creates additional channels for articulating and representing interests, generates cross-cutting cleavages, recruits and trains new political leaders, improves the functioning of democratic institutions, widens and enriches the flow of information to citizens, and produces supporting coalitions on behalf of economic reform,’’ all of which help to


strengthen and legitimate a democratic state. While Diamond adds that a strong civil society in itself is no substitute for solid political and legal institutions, which are a sine qua non for a democratic system, he concludes that once these basic institutions are set in place, civil society can and indeed must develop in order to establish a more deeply rooted, legitimate, and effective democracy. Diamond’s account provides a useful summary of the potential virtues of civil society in a democratic system, but how does civil society actually cause or influence them? Skeptics remain unconvinced by wide-reaching generalizations about the beneficial effects of civil society – even those that seem logical or obvious – in the absence of concrete evidence about how the causal mechanism works empirically. In other words, could other factors, such as economic well-being, the effectiveness of democratic political institutions, or long-standing cultural factors, be more important for explaining the outcomes that Diamond attributes to civil society? The question is impossible to answer systematically and definitively, but there is certainly no shortage of skepticism (e.g., Berman, 1997; Edwards & Foley, 1998). While perhaps not as clear-cut as Diamond’s description of the benefits of civil society, most of the empirical research – whether qualitative or quantitative, contemporary or historical – on this topic has pointed to a strong positive relationship between civil society and democracy. That said, the skeptics correctly object to the hyperbole that some scholars express when treating civil society as if it were the only or the most important factor, rather than simply one important factor among others. But in the end, while they might dispute over the relative emphasis placed on civil society when compared to other factors, few would actually deny its importance in establishing and sustaining a vibrant and healthy democratic system. And fewer still, if any, would suggest that a weaker civil society would actually be more beneficial for a democracy. The scholarship on the beneficial effects of civil society can be broken down into two general approaches. The first, most closely associated with the work of Robert Putnam (1993, 2000), emphasizes on the positive effects that participation in civil society has on individual people, which in turn contributes to a more peaceful, harmonious, and democratic society. Putnam has outlined a series of different ways in which civil society – or more generally the broader rubric of ‘‘social capital’’ – can have beneficial consequences. He writes (2000: 287): ‘‘Does social capital have salutary effects on individuals, communities, or even entire nations? Yes, an impressive and growing body of research suggests that civic connections help make us healthy, wealthy, and wise.’’ His study includes chapters

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on ‘‘Education and Children’s Welfare,’’ ‘‘Safe and Productive Neighborhoods,’’ ‘‘Economic Prosperity,’’ ‘‘Health and Happiness,’’ and ‘‘Democracy,’’ and for each, he synthesizes much of the scholarship on social capital from the past decade, highlighting its positive effects. More specifically, the basic logic of arguments made by Putnam and other ‘‘social capitalists’’ is that civil society organizations serve as what Putnam, paraphrasing Tocqueville, calls ‘‘schools for democracy.’’ In other words, the existence and flourishing of autonomous organizations allow ordinary citizens to interact with one another outside of their networks of family and close friends, thereby developing greater trust, tolerance, and bargaining skills, all of which are beneficial for democracy. Furthermore, their experience with the organizations of civil society allows people to gain a greater sense of their own roles and capacities in a participatory democratic system, thus creating a more proficient and engaged citizenry. The more people participate in the voluntary organizations of civil society – even in those that are not explicitly political – the more they internalize the norms and behavior of a participatory democratic citizenry, which can only strengthen the institutions and performance of a country’s democratic government. The second approach is generally associated with the work of historical institutionalists such as Theda Skocpol (2004), who argue that the organizations of civil society provide a direct source of popular influence on political or economic developments, thus benefiting individuals and society. Unlike Putnam, who emphasizes the socialpsychological benefits of consensus and cooperation that group participation will provide to its members and to society overall, this approach emphasizes the role of group conflict and struggle in shaping the historical development of modern democracy. As Skocpol and Fiorina (1999: 15) put it: ‘‘From an institutionalist perspective, voluntary associations matter as sources of popular leverage, not just as facilitators of individual participation and generalized social trust.’’ In the contemporary context, the institutional approach emphasizes the ability of the organizations of civil society to serve as a shield or a self-defense mechanism that protects citizens against a potentially intrusive state. In other words, in a democratic system, the groups and organizations of civil society have the capacity to prevent the state from passing new laws that oppose the organized interests of groups of citizens, as well as to positively influence those laws and regulations that do get passed. Moreover, voluntary organizations provide legislators with a greater breadth of information, viewpoints, and pressure, all of which can contribute to more effective and equitable policy making.

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The institutionalist emphasis on the direct political leverage of civil society can also be applied to individuals. As explained by Amy Gutmann (1998: 1): ‘‘Without access to an association that is willing and able to speak up for our views and values, we have a very limited ability to be heard by many other people or to influence the political process, unless we happen to be rich or famous.’’ Moreover, in the words of Alexis de Tocqueville (1969 [1835]: 190): ‘‘An association unites the energies of divergent minds and vigorously directs them toward a clearly indicated goal.’’ In short, membership in organizations provides direct and tangible benefits to individuals and to society, by allowing people to have an influence on the processes that affect their lives, and by achieving collective goals that could not be reached without the means of an organization. These two types of arguments are not at all mutually exclusive, of course, and proponents of one often recognize the importance of the other, but the difference in emphasis – either on the value of participation or on the power of institutional leverage – is analytically and substantively significant. Measuring Civil Society

Generally speaking, there are two alternative empirical approaches to the measurement of civil society within a wider comparative perspective. One is to focus on the organizations and associations themselves, by presenting extensive data on the distribution of different types of organizations within a country’s civil society, listing the numbers and percentages of voluntary associations that break down into different categories. Yet there are two main problems with this type of report: first, the categories of types of organizations are rarely standardized, and they vary tremendously from study to study, thus ruling out meaningful comparison across countries; second, the data are often collected haphazardly, based on unclear and unsystematic sampling methods, resulting in a dubious claim of representativeness. In addition to focusing on the distribution of voluntary organizations in a given country, some analysts report data on civil society organizations by showing the changes in the number of registered groups over time. This allows for an analysis of trends, a vital topic in most discussions of civil society, which attempts to measure or predict changes in the level of civil society over time. While a consideration of trends in the number of registered organizations is certainly more helpful than a simple typology of different types of organizations, nonetheless, it is problematic. The data should be viewed with a certain skepticism, given inconsistent methods for

counting the number of organizations across countries, especially when based on a subsample of organizations. These discrepancies make comparative analysis particularly difficult and tentative, since the findings have limited utility for researchers seeking to establish a comparative ‘‘baseline’’ on civil society across countries and regions. While there is no perfect measure of civil society across different countries, a second approach views representative surveys as a more valid and reliable starting point for such research. Indeed, the very reason why theorists and scholars have considered civil society an important feature of democracy is not so much because of the quantity and ‘‘form’’ of the groups themselves, but rather, is based on the meaning and ‘‘content’’ provided to them by the participation of ordinary citizens. By measuring the percentage of respondents who are members of voluntary associations, surveys not only give a better approximation of the development of a country’s civil society than a hollow list of total numbers or types of registered organizations, but they also allow for extensive comparisons, both with other countries and between different social strata within a country. Major survey projects such as the World Values Survey, the European Social Survey, and the US Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy survey have including questions about people’s membership and participation in voluntary organizations. Although there are certainly limitations to this approach as well – necessitating more in-depth case studies to contextualize larger patterns and differences – well-designed high quality surveys allow for more meaningful comparisons across countries. Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses, and can be viewed as legitimate within the framework of a particular research project. But given the significant challenges in conducting valid and reliable comparative research on the organizational level, focusing on civil society as participation – measured by representative surveys that replicate the same questions in many different countries – probably provides a better starting point for comparative research on this important attribute of democracy and democratization. Civil Society in Nondemocratic Contexts

An important question in the comparative study of civil society is whether civil society does (or can) exist in nondemocratic and/or non-Western countries. There are a variety of possible answers, spanning from a very narrow to a quite broad conceptualization of civil society. A narrow view will posit that civil society derives from the particular theoretical tradition and practical


historical experience of the West. According to this position, civil society refers specifically to the kinds of voluntary organizations that emerged from the American and West European models, and in some sense, civil society can only exist in societies with that historical background. In other words, even if this gives the concept an ethnocentric bias, civil society is viewed as an inherently Western concept that arose out of a distinct historical experience. In contrast, a broad view of civil society – of the type that is generally stressed by anthropologists – argues that the conceptualization and measurement of civil society should be expanded from its narrow focus on voluntary organizations in democracies, so that it treats all forms of social organization and practices as different manifestations of the same general phenomenon, civil society. According to this perspective, each country has its own civil society, and any cross-national variation is in the form that civil society takes, rather than in its level or strength. A third approach is closer to the middle. According to this view, civil society is not a universal concept that exists everywhere, just under different guises. And it does not support that the original definition and empirical manifestations of civil society should be diluted and stretched in order to fit contexts that are vastly different, since this may result in the mischaracterization of some of the most interesting and unique forms of political and social action in some countries, by forcing them into the ‘‘civil society’’ label. At the same time, however, unlike the narrow view, this approach does not restrict the applicable empirical terrain to countries that are culturally or historically ‘‘Western.’’ For there is an actual substantive and practical basis for the study of civil society – even while still viewing it as a specifically Western concept – in non-Western countries, since many of them have attempted over the past few decades to Westernize and democratize. From this perspective, regime type is the crucial distinction, and what one might call ‘‘classical’’ civil society can only really exist within countries that have democratic institutions (regardless of their ‘‘Western-ness’’). This is not to say, however, that countries must be advanced liberal democracies in order for civil society to exist, but rather that they should meet the basic minimal criteria of procedural democracy. In other words, civil society is a legitimate, appropriate, and important object of exploration and analysis within countries that can be considered electoral democracies. But to extend the concept beyond that to various types of authoritarian regimes may risk lumping in too many different phenomena and forms of organization into one already-beleaguered concept.

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This debate is by no means resolved. As the comparative study of civil society continues to grow and expand (Heinrich & Fioramonti, 2007), and as more scholars develop empirical indices to measure the strength of both civil society and democracy, the concept of civil society will continue to be applied to a wide array of countries and contexts – perhaps with mixed results for those concerned with systematic and meaningful comparisons.

Future Directions The study of civil society and democracy has come a long way since the early 1980s, when few people had heard of the term ‘‘civil society,’’ and democracy was hardly on the political agenda in most areas of the world. Although the flurry of research and advocacy work on civil society in the 1990s may have exaggerated its existence and impact in many places, the current state of the field is somewhat more sober and realistic about the relationship between civil society and democracy, both in advanced democracies and in countries struggling to institutionalize elections within an authoritarian historical tradition. While there will certainly be no shortage of skepticism and debate – whether on the larger conceptual issues or the more technical empirical questions of measurement and operationalization – civil society will continue to serve as an object of study and fascination within the context of democracy and democratization.

Cross-References

▶ Civic Participation ▶ Civil Society and Economy ▶ Civil Society Indexes and Indicators ▶ Civil Society Theory: de Tocqueville ▶ Membership and Membership Associations ▶ Participation ▶ Political Society ▶ Public Sphere ▶ Putnam, Robert ▶ Skocpol, Theda ▶ Social Capital, Definition of ▶ Theories of Nonprofit Sector, Political

References/Further Readings Berman, S. (1997). Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic. World Politics, 49(3), 401–429. Diamond, L. (1996). Rethinking civil society: Toward democratic consolidation. In L. Diamond & M.F. Plattner (Eds.), The global resurgence of democracy (pp. 227–240). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Edwards, B., & Foley, M. W. (1998). Civil society and social capital beyond Putnam. American Behavioral Scientist, 42(1), 124–140.

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Gutmann, A. (1998). Freedom of association: An introductory essay. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Freedom of association (pp. 3–32). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Heinrich, V. F., & Fioramonti, L. (2007). CIVICUS global survey of the state of civil society (Vols. I & II). Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Howard, M. M. (2003). The weakness of civil society in post-Communist Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and postCommunist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Skocpol, T. (2004). Diminished democracy: From membership to management in American civic life. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Skocpol, T., & Fiorina, M. P. (Eds.) (1999). Civic engagement in American democracy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press and the Russell Sage Foundation. Tocqueville, A. (1969 [1835]). Democracy in America (G. Lawrence, Trans.). In J. P. Mayer (Ed.). Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Anchor Books.

provided social scientists with tremendous insight into the economic possibilities and limitations of human, institutional, and other forms of agency influencing redistribution schemes advancing civil society construction. This body of knowledge has not only demonstrated the importance of public and private mediating responses independently, but has also demonstrated their impact when integrated together through subcontracting and other complex systemic arrangements. The political economy of public and private mediation, as well as the structures that these activities have developed, have sometimes eluded more action-oriented theorists advocating change. Nevertheless, the systemic processes of economic intervention that seek to ameliorate or maintain existing inequalities associated with stratified societies should be of profound interest to researchers concerned with civil society building around the world. This branch of knowledge has evolved under the rubric of economy of civil society.

Definition

Civil Society and Economy LISIUNIA A. ROMANIENKO Wrocław University, Wroclaw, Poland

Introduction In exploring the economic evolution of theoretical frameworks to demystify civil society, the discussion begins with Berger and Neuhaus’s (1977: 148) concept of mediating structures, which are defined as ‘‘those institutions standing between the individual in his private life and large impersonal structures of public life.’’ The concept emerged in research attempting to align the role of the individual to powerful institutions including voluntary or nonprofit organizations. In addition to the nonprofit sector, the state figures prominently as another powerful institution of mediation. Both the state and nonprofit sectors as mediating structures are of tremendous importance in unraveling the concept of civil society, because public and private institutions are able to intervene (individually, competitively, or cooperatively) in the often deleterious socioeconomic processes that lead to unequal distribution of societal resources within nation-states and across the globe. The mediating structures of interest are therefore, the welfare apparatus (public intervention) and the nonprofit apparatus (private intervention). By focusing on these dual mechanisms of mediation, civil society epistemology has

According to Patten (2002), civil society refers to the action of community-building in democratic societies that ideally seeks to capture pluralistic voices of discourse, that motivates individuals to accumulate increased forms of human capital, and that tends to occur within a charitable atmosphere full of cooperation spirit. Both public and private sector community-building figure prominently. Economic perspectives of civil society were first described by Weisbrod (1977), who viewed civil society construction in both public and private spheres as a layered response to failures of other sectors. His failure diversification paradigm argued that the demand for public goods is first attempted by the state when left unsatisfied by the market. Then when the demand for public goods is left unsatisfied by the state, the desire to meet demand is attempted through the private sector. In this early view, public or private sector provision of social services (as goods) is an economic model of opportunism driven exclusively by consumer demand. Extending this notion, Esping-Andersen (1990) called this sectoral interdependence the public-private mix. He described three systemic typologies in the industrialized civil society, the liberal welfare regime (characterized by minimizing the state, individualizing risks, and promoting market solutions), the social democratic regime (characterized by universal provision, comprehensive risk coverage, generous benefits, and egalitarianism), and finally, the conservative welfare regime (status segmentation and familialism, where head of households prevail and high pension returns are derived for high status workers).


While the typology provides a global framework suitable for cross-cultural analysis, the delineation between public and private schemes is not clearly delineated. Theorists like Salamon et al. (1999) distinguished public and private partnerships by focusing on civil society construction through the nonprofit supplementary paradigm, which views private mediation as the innovative fulfillment of particular social service objectives which the state has not been historically involved. Others like Handy (1988) prefer the transactional perspective or cooperative view, focusing on subcontracts and other resources flowing between the two that illustrates high degrees of interdependence rendering them virtually inseparable. Wagner (2000) transcends beyond cooperative agreements, and focuses on power inherent in contract relationship types as either complementary (where public and private partnerships together share some elements of primary responsibility) or substitutive (where the state holds primary accountability but substitutes its role through providers in the private sector). Young (2000) adds the adversarial view, suggesting that public and private structures are not always harmonious in pursuing respective interests. Regardless of perspective, the economic construction of civil society through both public and private sector mediation has a rich tradition of scholarship that highlights unique intervening mechanisms used independently or in conjunction to redistribute (often scarce) societal resources. To demystify how mediation operates with greater specificity, scholars have gone to considerable lengths to distinguish public and private approaches to economic construction of civil society through elaborate mapping of emerging structures and activities associated with the rise of the welfare state and the nongovernmental or nonprofit sector.

Key Issues Public Mediation Through the Welfare State

Piven and Cloward’s (1971) groundbreaking work discussed the welfare state as a necessary response to the failures of capitalism. Due largely to demand fluctuations in goods during declining periods of economic depression and recession, coupled with the production changes brought about through modernization; unemployment is demonstrated to be a permanent and irrevocable feature of capitalism. Because workers are unable to adapt as quickly as economic conditions warrant, periods of unemployability are a consistent longitudinal generational phenomenon. When social instability arises as a result of these changes, civil society construction occurs through

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the design and implementation of welfare state programs in an effort to realign social unrest back to a state of equilibrium (pp. 7, 40). "

[T]he legitimacy of the social order itself becomes questioned. The result is usually civil disorder. . .that may even threaten to overturn existing social and economic arrangements. It is then that relief programs are initiated or expanded. To restore order, the society must create the means to reassert its authority. [Welfare is] a surrogate system of social control . . . used to recapture the allegiance of disaffected blocs.

The mechanism of control is not physical or psychological coercion as has been the case under communism in the Soviet Union and China, but is instead a quid pro quo involving transactions of aid in exchange for fostering certain conforming behaviors among the needy. The goals of state welfare systems are highly normative. They involve the quelling of expressions of civil discontent, reengaging electoral participation, coercing individuals to accept undesirable low wage work, compelling employers to sustain exploitative hiring practices by providing endless supplies of historically marginalized laborers, perpetuating the segmentation of labor markets, motivating submission through complex bureaucratic systems of humiliation and degradation, and the absorption of moral, psychological, or other character deficiency (as opposed to economic capitalist systemic deficiency) among an entire strata of citizens. Another groundbreaking work that strengthened interest in this branch of knowledge is Wilensky’s (1975) research that fully discounted state ideology as a determinant of welfare state expenditures which he defined as government-protected minimum standards of income. Instead, his cross-cultural structural analysis found evidence to suggest that demographic factors, especially age, played a significant role in influencing the extent to which a state provides collectivistic versus individualistic protections. Although on the surface the findings provide evidence to bolster Weisbrod’s suggestion that welfare is a consumer-driven demand-based market phenomenon, Wilensky showed that welfare allocations compete and are mitigated by simultaneous demands for other public goods and services. Competition of public goods includes military spending, which are asserted by the state and not exclusively determined by consumer preferences. Welfare expenditures as transfer payments are similarly influenced by levels of taxation, so citizens residing in large industrialized nations tend to benefit exponentially. By exploring these combinations of variables, Wilensky advanced welfare mediation scholarship by moving

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beyond simple demand-oriented consumer models, to offer macrosocioeconomic nonmarket factors that influence welfare state allocations around the world. His analysis attempted to demystify the causes of fluctuating levels of welfare expenditures in both capitalist and communist industrialized societies exhibited at the time of his analysis. But are these fluctuating expenditures any genuine indication of structural mediation per se? In looking back at two decades of welfare analysis, Esping-Andersen (1990) believes that social scientific explorations of international welfare should have yielded more to this understanding. He suggests that Wilensky and others fall into what he called the comparativist framework, which distort realities by focusing on expenditures and related bureaucratic and demographic correlates. Expenditures in his view are no genuine indication of welfare mediation, because resource transfers originating from the elite are often absorbed circuitously by the elite (i.e., civil servants, administrative directors, insurance pension matching schemes, etc.). He suggests that welfare states not only prevent the redistribution of wealth, but paradoxically operate to rigidly solidify and deepen existing class divisions of a given society. Here, the role of welfare structure mediation is not a redistributive one, but rather, one that is self-confirming, self-perpetuating, class legitimating, and ‘‘an active force in the ordering of [existing] social relations’’ (p. 23). Esping-Andersen agrees that the net redistributive effects of welfare are determined largely though taxation, but he suggests greater attention to analytical details. He recommends demographic segmentation to determine what proportion of recipient populations such as the aged are found among a nations’ poor and needy. He also suggests taking into account level-of-living, which transcends beyond dollar exchange rates with regard to budgetary welfare allocations, and attempts to capture sociocultural nuances that can greatly inflate or deflate the quality of living in a given society. Welfare allocation levels compared cross-culturally, as dismal as they sometimes may appear, actually overestimate the strength of redistribution efforts in industrialized societies. In an attempt to move beyond false perceptions in order to embed ideology and demographics more deeply within welfare mediation scholarship, the issue of segmented labor markets under conditions of capitalism is integrated by feminist analysis such as that offered by Scott (1984: 7, 9) to suggest that public welfare services are disproportionately in demand by women. The author argues therefore, that any analysis of welfare state mediation must incorporate gender rigorously.

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Sociological literature offers us packaged explanations to the effect that poverty is influenced by class, race, nation, economic region, ethnic group, and gender. This is an ideologically impeccable conclusion that can never get you into trouble but also does not leave you much the wiser. In fact, considerable academic research has been done on the role of the first five factors in determining who is poor, the sixth is a recent afterthought. Yet gender cuts across all the others. Women are poorer than men in all five categories. Surely this says something about the power of gender as a way of getting at the whole issue of poverty.

Clark, Cochrane, and Smart (1987) also argue that mediating welfare state structures have disproportionate affects upon women. The combination of capitalism and patriarchy led women (and their dependent children) to be more economically vulnerable and in need of special mediations. The intention was to move women on a continuum from paternalism to independence, and from individualism to collectivism. This led to legislation attempting to provide direct public relief to women when needed, rather than through spousal or other household indices (pp. 146, 149). "

Key concepts in the formation of these more coherent analyses of welfare and social policy [involved] a major critique of traditional family life and its values, and a rejection of the institution of marriage [thus weakening the] system of male oppression over women. In contemporary feminist ideology the state is fully implicated in the structure of family life, the labour market and hence in constructing the very poverty of women which in turn causes women to make demands of the state for welfare benefits.

Women of color who are simultaneously vulnerable to institutionalized discrimination by gender as well as race face particularly difficult conditions of double jeopardy (Romanienko, 2001). Societal mediation through public welfare is thus viewed by many race, gender, and class theorists as a potential source of liberation to reverse historic economic and cultural oppression that manifests through reduced accumulation of educational and cultural capital as well as the severe socioeconomic deprivation that these disparate conditions cause. Leonard (1997) suggests that these ideological goals remain largely unfulfilled. The civil society dreams of mediation that are inherent in the welfare state as an ‘‘emancipation project of progress and order . . . upon which human betterment [could be] constructed’’ fell somewhat short of its intended target. The welfare state


merely shifted functions of dependency from the family and labor market toward the state, giving vulnerable citizens choices of dependency types. These arrangements create significant dual-edged threats to the existing elite, thereby worsening the social and economic conditions of both parties (pp. 51, 53). "

[D]ependency on state financial support means the absence of support on the labour market, the latter being a form of dependency essential to the reproduction of capitalist social relations. At the same time, lack of dependency on the labour market results. . .in a reduced ability to consume. In brief, dependency on the market is approved precisely because it is necessary to the dynamic of the capitalist system itself . . . while dependency on the state is criticized or even reviled.

He discusses the lack of human emancipation through the perspective of those invoking structural mediation, the welfare recipients, which he describes as resistant moral agents, whose action serves as an indictment against the existing arrangements that leads to stratified dissimilarity. This perspective significantly broadens the definition of dependency and the role of human agency with regard to mediating structures. Private Mediation Through the Nonprofit or Nongovernmental Sector

Beyond public interventions through the welfare state, the second pillar of mediating structures lies in the activities of the nonprofit sector. Through the act of association, individuals organize freely within this sector to aid in the construction of civil society. It has been suggested by Meister (1984) that this form of mediation has the fewest impediments for social integration, when compared to for-profit and governmental sectors. He cites three forms of association activities that describe non-state, private mediation. They are routine association (typified in professional associations, other existing group representing particular interests), instigated association (usually in response to environmental stimulus such as antiwar organization proliferation), and voluntary association (usually created by members to fulfill a need). Beyond typology, Meister extends Goldthorpe and Lockwood’s (1962) notion of instrumental collectivism and argues that association manifests as a result of strong human need to instrumentalize contacts and interpersonal relationships. Because the social structure is antagonistic, individuals create and withdraw into voluntary groups seeking warmth and camaraderie at levels of action that cannot be provided by traditional family structures. Social distances inherent in complex institutional arrangements are

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thus mediated, and shared commonalties discovered to advance mutual interests and mediation objectives. While Meister’s research illustrates the social circumstances that facilitate the formation of voluntary association groups, it does not describe the social, economic, political, or cultural functions beyond the immediate needs of organizing participants. Later Ware (1989) offers a broader analysis. He describes four functional levels of importance; first, nongovernmental organizations or nonprofits act as a countervailing source of economic power to balance the activities of both market and state. Secondly, they give democratic citizens a level of participation that is unavailable through for-profit or government sectors. Here, the act of nonprofit association is viewed as a form of participatory democracy constructing civil society through social integration. Next, the sector provides public goods (services) that are unavailable through the other sectors, and does so safer and more efficiently than possible through government. Finally, the sector stabilizes democratic principles by providing financial and other opportunities for direct structural mediation by giving voice to oppositional forces and enabling them to mobilize collective efforts. Salamon (1995) elaborates on the mediation functions of the nonprofit sector in even greater detail, stating that the sector is much more powerful than previous research suggests. Nonprofit sector organizations enjoy substantial degrees of autonomy, exercise tremendous discretion over the spending of public money, and have developed an arsenal of sophistical weapons of political resistance he calls the ‘‘proliferation of new techniques of social action.’’ The increased prestige surrounding nonprofit associational activities is rooted in the unique qualities of sectoral activities. The innovation and lack of centralization, or what Salamon refers to as the directness-automatic dimension, enables swift accountable action without regard for strict chain of command, thus enabling these organizations to rapidly and quantifiably mitigate many of the deleterious consequences of poverty. Beyond mere effectiveness, Salamon describes the importance of the creativity-visibility dimension. This enables organizations to reach objectives through a variety of innovative approaches, such as the distribution or solicitation of inkind relief (Poole et al., 2000), and to do so creatively in a haute couture, non-civil service-like fashion. So if the nonprofit sector is such a powerful and effective economic instrument to combat social, cultural, and political inequality internationally; why does inequality persist with such vehemence and why does the world remain so uncivilized? Salamon reminds the reader that

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the sector is plagued with problems preventing it from fulfilling its’ economic mediation role in strengthening civil society. First, he states that sectoral failures are to blame. Just as markets and governments fail, so too do organizations in the nonprofit sector. Secondly, the sector’s inability to generate the necessary resources results in leadership spending an inordinate amount of time cultivating relations and actions advancing fundraising activities, which he calls philanthropic insufficiency. In addition, nonprofits tend to fixate on particular forms of civil society construction, to the detriment of others, which he calls philanthropic particularism. Also, the sector has been undemocratically usurped by dominating powerful funders, whose special elite interests rarely align with those at the bottom, a phenomenon he calls philanthropic paternalism. Salamon also attributes mediation weaknesses with certain occupational specializations resulting in philanthropic amateurism. In his view, the immersion of social workers and psychologists that disproportionately design and conceptualize sectoral activities negatively influences the trajectory of actions toward a therapeutic ‘‘self-help’’ orientation, misdirecting precious resources toward programs addressing the emotional needs of middle-class paraprofessionals, rather then the truly disadvantaged that their programs are allegedly intended to serve.

International Perspectives The challenges facing those involved in public and private mediation efforts, as well as the complex organizational factors that are associated with these mediation failure theories elaborated by researchers, is expected to become even greater for the future. Demands for economic mediation in light of demographic shifts taking place around the world will only intensify pressures for relief. Aging populations, collapsing financial institutions, increasingly inhospitable labor markets for women – youth – people of color, the rise in full-time gainfully-employed working class poor, the eradication of labor unions, deindustrialization, dismantling of small scale agrarian production, continued migration to overcrowded cities, proliferation of low-skilled service sector employment, bilateral trade agreements benefiting large corporations, coercive regulatory government intervention hindering nonprofit activities, and tax legislation that discourages philanthropic support; are some economic factors that are expected to intensify challenges for international mediation around the world. In addition, with the end of the cold war and dismantling of communist regimes no longer competing with capitalism on a global stage, there is no longer a need to publicly legitimate market failure or

democracy through formal ideological mediation (Seibel, 1990; Standing, 1996). Yet Van Til (2000) points out that nonprofits have, and will continue to behave, as a festering source of institutional pedagogy socializing citizens in ways to advocate on the behalf of pluralistic voices in democratic societies. Smith et al. (1972) argues that economic social scientific mediation scholarship must move inquiry beyond enumeration and multiple-level sectoral mapping, to provide interested constituencies with more compelling insight into genuine socioeconomic and political factors influencing global community organizing. Bayat (2005) and Wuthnow (2004) suggests that Islamic, Christian, and other faith-based organizations will be a powerful contestational force for capacitybuilding, while Van Aelst and Walgrave (2002) identify web-based communication as revolutionizing the speed, efficacy, and popularity of economic justice mediation efforts disseminated across borders.

Future Directions In the spirit of the challenge to demystify the economic roots of civil society construction taking place in complex public and private mediation structures evolving around the world, Wagner (2000) has suggested that transactions are an important source of political agency that influences systemic programming, while Handy (1988) goes further to describe calculative transactions (fairly explicit exchanges involving tilted but harmonious controls), cooperative transactions (creative pursuit of mutually beneficial exchanges with balanced controls), and coercive transactions (exchanges occurring through concentration of powers with the method of control involving threat of punishment that can include deprivations). Although transaction-oriented methodologies have enjoyed limited popularity, an exploration of exchanges taking place across core to periphery might enable those concerned with economic paradigms and processes driving the civil society project to abandon the strict sector-centered view by functional differentiation, in order to more accurately portray complex resource exchanges taking place in light of an increasingly globalized, often coercive, one world economy (Frank, 1966; Wallerstein, 2000). Another potentially fortuitous approach for future analysis is to focus on civil society professionalism, which could advance the understanding of organizations significantly. Brown, Kenny, and Turner (2000) embed organizational power in the professionalization of occupations under capitalism. They suggest that the phenomenon results in occupational conflict among elites and others, vying to inform activities within the frameworks of each


respective profession. This results in severe internal competition that may be a detriment to operations. Excessive professionalization is rendered even more problematic through the contemporary absorption of generic managerial types from business to superficially legitimate (but substantively weaken) sectoral progress. Exorbitant remuneration for celebrity spokespeople and executive leadership are deemed shockingly excessive by many charitable observers, while occupational eliticism brought on by nepotistic interlocking directorates is expected to further weaken institutional legitimation. Isomorphism and routinization might present even more deleterious consequences for authentic civil society construction for the future (Gibelman, 2000; Meyer and Rowen, 1991). The recent preponderance of mergers and franchises may also be leading to excessive financial, cultural, and ideological dependencies through large scale multilateral public – private mediation efforts. Critics claim these increasingly counterproductive, non-mediating, dependencybreeding efforts taking place around the globe attempt to cultivate unsustainable development patterns and projects that are highly inconsistent with avant-garde alternative economic justice globalization strategies known as alterglobalization; while inadvertently (or perhaps intentionally) contributing to the chaos and lawlessness that fosters exploitative trade relations prioritizing industrial petroleum, diamond, and arms proliferation over development goals. Observers suggest that the economic construction of civil society among governmental and nongovernmental organizations is leading to such widespread complicity with powerful, multilateral structures such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, and bilateral trade commissions; that they run the risk of rendering the civil society project virtually innocuous. The intended or unintended consequences of existing arrangements is, by even the most casual observation, resulting in unprecedented levels of death and destruction to the planet and its people manifesting through genocides and mass dislocation of refugees, widespread famine and starvation, water wars, dwindling access to genetically unmodified food, generic pharmaceuticals to combat the HIV pandemic, climate change, and many other urgent socioeconomic, political, and ecological conditions on a scale, breadth, and depth that civil society organizations have been unwilling or are yet unable to sufficiently address. By many accounts, neither public nor private mediation efforts constructing the global civil society have developed any authentic or cohesive economic resistance strategies to effectively combat the complex consequences of

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exploitative capital circulating around the globe due to collusive deregulatory government policies that have detrimental affects upon the poor. In response, participants at worldwide alterglobalizing events are working outside and beyond conventional public and private mediation organizations to conceptualize and implement alternative forms of economically-sustainable civil society that attempts to recognize and mitigate these hegemonic socioeconomic and political conditions. Has the potential of traditional mediating structures been permanently and irrevocably usurped as a result of financial dependencies on world capitalist system? Scholarly inquiry will surely have to address these rather plausible indictments posing difficult introspective questions, if research is to continue to strengthen the utopian potential inherent in the global civil society project for the future.

Cross-References

▶ Contracts and Contract Regimes ▶ Esping-Andersen, Gøsta ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ Nonprofit Organizations, Functions of ▶ Social Origins Theory ▶ Theories of Nonprofit Organization, Economic ▶ Theories of Nonprofit Sector, Economic ▶ Weisbrod, Burton A

References/Further Readings Bayat, A. (2005). Islamic and social movement theory. Third World Quarterly, 26(6), 891–908. Berger, P., & Neuhaus, R. (1977 [re-issued in 1996]) To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy [re-named] To Empower People: From State to Civil Society] American Enterprise Institute Press. Berger, P. L., & Neuhaus, R. J. (1996). To empower people: From state to civil society. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. Brown, K. M., Kenny, S., & Turner, B. S. (2000). Rhetorics of welfare: Uncertainty, choice, and voluntary associations. New York: St. Martin. Chomsky, N. (1999). Profit over people. New York: Seven Stories. Clarke, J., Cochrane, A., & Smart, C. (1987). Ideologies of welfare: From dreams to delusion. London: Hutchinson. Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. Frank, A. G. (1966). The development of underdevelopment. Monthly Review, 18(17), 17–31. Handy, C. (1988). Understanding voluntary organizations. London: Penguin. Gibelman, M. (2000). The nonprofit sector and gender discrimination: A preliminary investigation in to the glass ceiling. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 10(3), 251–269. Goldthorpe, J. H., & Lockwood, D. (1962). Affluence and the British class structure. Sociological Review, 11(2), 133–163. Leonard, P. (1997). Postmodern welfare: Reconstructing an emancipatory project. London: Sage.

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Meister, A. (1984). Participation, associations, development, and change. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1991). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. In P. J. DiMaggio & W. W. Powell (Eds.), The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago. McPherson, J. M. (1981). Voluntary affiliation: A structural approach. In P. Blau & R. Merton (Eds.), Continuities in structural inquiry. London: Sage. Patten, M. (2002). Democracy, civil society, and the state. In K. L. Brock (Ed.), Improving connections between governments and nonprofit and voluntary organizations. Montreal, Canada: McGill University. Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. A. (1971). Regulating the poor: The functions of public welfare. New York: Pantheon. Poole, D. L., Ferguson, M., DiNitto, D., & Schwab, A. J. (2002). The capacity of community-based organizations to lead local innovations in welfare reform. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 12(3), 261–276. Romanienko, L. A. (2001). Dual labor market theory and the institutionalization of farmers markets. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 12(4), 359–373. Salamon, L. M. (1995). Partners in public service: Government – nonprofit relations in the modern welfare state. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Salamon, L. M., Anheier, H. K., List, R., Toepler, S. S., & Sokolowski, W. (Eds.) (1999). Global civil society: Dimensions of the non profit sector. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Scott, H. (1984). Working your way to the bottom: The feminization of poverty. Boston, MA: Pandora. Seibel, W. (1990). Organizational behavior and organizational function. In H. Anheier & W. Seibel (Eds.), The nonprofit sector: International and comparative perspectives. Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter. Shiva, V. (1999). Stolen harvest: The hijacking of the global food supply. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Smith, D. H., Reddy, R., & Baldwin, B. (Eds.) (1972). Voluntary action research. Lexington, MA: DC Health. Standing, G. (1996). Social protection in Central and Eastern Europe: A tale of slipping anchors and torn safety nets. In G. Esping-Anderson (Ed.), Welfare states in transition. London: Sage. Van Aelst, P., & Walgrave, S. (2002). New media, new movements ? The role of the internet in shaping the ‘‘Anti-globalization’’ movement. Information, Communication, and Society, 5(4), 464–493. Van Til, J. (2000). Growing civil society: From nonprofit sector to third space. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University. Wagner, A. (2000). Reframing ‘‘Social Origins’’ theory: The structural transformation of the public sphere. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(4), 541–553. Wallerstein, I. (2000). The essential Wallerstein. New York: New Press. Ware, A. (1989). Between profit and state: Intermediate organizations in Britain and the United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Weisbrod, B. A. (1977). The voluntary sector: An economic analysis. Lexington, MA: Lexington. Wilenski, H. L. (1975). The welfare state and inequality: Structural and ideological roots of public expenditures. Berkeley, CA: University of California. Wuthnow, R. (2004). Saving America: Faith-based services and the future of civil society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton. Young, D. R. (2000). Alternative models of government-nonprofit sector relations: Theoretical and international perspectives. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(1), 149–172.

Civil Society and Ethnicity MARY KAY GUGERTY, TRAVIS REYNOLDS University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, USA

Introduction The idea that ethnicity and ethnic heterogeneity may be inimical to civil society has long been debated. Crosscountry empirical research suggests that ethnically diverse societies have slower economic growth and are more prone to corruption and political instability than ethnically homogeneous societies, as a result of political conflict and lack of cooperation across ethnic groups (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997). Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that ethnic diversity has had particularly harmful effects in sub-Saharan Africa, the most ethnically diverse region in the world. While civil society has been increasingly praised for its growing role in public service provision in countries across the globe, agreement on the link between ethnic diversity and lower provision of public goods appears so strong that it has been characterized as among the ‘‘most powerful theses of political economy’’ (Banerjee et al., 2005).

Definition Ethnicity

Ethnic identity can be broadly construed as a communal and individual identity that is both felt and expressed – a notion of ‘‘our people’’ (Fenton, 2003: 114). Family and kinship obligations are not equated with ethnicity, though certainly family and household life constitute important venues for learning and exercising many aspects of an ethnic identity. Early theories of ethnic identity understood ethnicity as ‘‘primordial’’ (Geertz, 1973; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972); even today ethnic identity is still believed to be exceptionally salient for group identification because it is organized around characteristics that are either impossible to change, such as color of skin, or difficult to change, such as language or religion (Posner, 2005). Horowitz (1985) argues that the concept of ethnicity includes all categories based on ascriptive group identities (race, religion, tribe, or caste) that are based on a myth of common ancestry. In some societies ethnic categorizations may overlap with economic class – as in the cases of apartheid South Africa, or the caste system in India for example – such systems can be thought of as ranked ethnic systems. Fearon (2003) proposes that individuals linked by ethnicity have a distinct history as a

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group or share a common culture that is valued by the majority of members. However, though the importance of such more or less immutable attributes remains readily apparent today, ‘‘primordial’’ conceptions of ethnic identities have given way to a notion of ethnicity as a partially constructed category (Chandra, 2004; Horowitz, 1985; Olzak, 1992; Hutchinson, 2000; Posner, 2005) that is flexible, influenced by contextual factors and group leaders’ strategies, and amenable to change over time (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Recent evidence from political science confirms the idea that the salience of an ethnic identity is based in part on the nature of political jurisdictions (Posner, 2004a). Other evidence suggests that the immediacy of important events such as highly contested elections shifts the salience of ethnic identity for individuals (Eifert et al., 2008). Ultimately, as Chandra (2006) argues, ethnicity as a category is in need of additional clarification. Chandra proposes that ethnic identities be understood as a set of identities in which membership eligibility is determined by attributes associated – or believed to be associated with – descent. In this definition, ethnic identities are characterized by two features: constrained change and visibility. Ethnic identities are constrained because, although malleable, these identities are also sticky and resistant to change. Visibility implies that some information about an individual’s ethnic identity can be obtained through ‘‘superficial’’ observation. Civil Society

Just as with ethnicity, there is not u